

THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT: A BROAD PLAN FOR A SMALL NATION: 'THIRTY!'

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Twenty years ago I completed the most pretentious piece in my lifetime: a long-range plan of action for an entire nation.¹ The nation was Estonia, but it could easily have been Latvia, Slovenia, or any other small nation with its own modernized language. I knew how preposterous it was to spell out such a plan. I was afraid of being laughed out of town by my fellow exile Estonians, but fortunately for me, humor never has been part of their arsenal, and anger is much easier to take than laughter.

The Story

It started in 1970, with a question raised at the Estonian Forest University, a summer institute in Canada: what should be the Estonians' plan of action during the next few years? I argued that any such plan would inevitably be shortsighted, if not embedded in a wider plan encompassing several decades. That evening, Professor Olev Träss called together a brainstorming group, and I was given the task to draft such a plan.

The task was daunting. I settled on 30 years, 1970-2000, as the time span of one generation. For what I knew in 1970, the USSR and the Communist party could survive or vanish during these 30 years; hence a very general terminology had to be used. Estonia could achieve autonomy within a relaxed USSR or even become independent, and the wording had to accommodate this range of possibilities. Whatever the external circumstances, Estonia had to make the most of them, and the starting point was a gradual widening of Estonia's effective autonomy.

But what about the final goal of these 30 years? I kept in mind my wife Mare Taagepera's observation several years earlier: "They talk about independence as an end goal. But what shall we do with it, once we achieve it?" Yes, some end goals transcending independence had to be spelled out. But conversely, if independence was only a means for something else, could parts of this something else be achieved even in the absence of independence? This is when the plan went beyond the Baltic framework and acquired grand features of interest to Slovenes and Basques as well.

The draft plan was presented at the Forest University the following summer, under the title "Thirty!" ending with an exclamation mark. There was discussion, and a dozen comments came later by letter. I thought a team effort would follow, but everyone distanced oneself. Only a short overview could be published in the exile press, and the Estonian central organization in Canada flatly condemned the plan.² A final text, as far as one person could carry the ball, was completed by summer 1972. Five years later, Lembit Kriisa offered to publish it in his periodical in Sweden; I crossed out a few words but made no other changes.³

At all these stages, reception was lukewarm to hostile and notably schizophrenic: the same person could simultaneously view the plan as too demanding in autonomy for Estonia ("Moscow would never agree to it") and too modest ("Only full independence is acceptable"). One preferred to keep one's dreams and reality strictly segregated so that they would not disturb each other. "Thirty!" was an attempt to make a connection between dreams and reality, and it did not satisfy either level. After 1978, the plan seemed forgotten. Reactions from Estonia itself were limited to two mildly sympathetic letters.

However, during Estonia's "Singing Revolution" my plan suddenly emerged into glaring limelight for one single month—October 1988. First a semi-legal youth publication mentioned Taagepera's "famous 30-year plan for Estonia's future."⁴ Then, as if referring to something well known among Estonian intellectuals, an official daily listed what they presented as "RT's famous eight commandments":

1. Increase in territorial administration.
2. Estonianization of Party membership—to 60%, from the present 51% or less.
3. A greater external activity of the Communist Party of Estonia (at meetings within the USSR and abroad).
4. Increase in Party autonomy.
5. More trade and other treaties, with a further goal of becoming a separate member of Comecon, Warsaw Pact and the UN.
6. A more extensive integration of immigrants into Estonian cultural life.
7. Less forcing of alcohol on other people.
8. Removal of nuclear weapons from Estonia.

This program for achieving greater autonomy within the Soviet framework offers many similarities with the Popular Front trends that formed in Estonia some ten years later.⁵

The list presented was compiled from various parts of "30!", suggesting a long chain of recopying and condensing. The full text of "30!" was published in Estonia immediately after these comments reached print, and a full Russian translation followed within a few months. And then the plan was out of sight again. The only ones who seemed to remember it several years thereafter were some leaders of the imperialist Intermovement who at times misquoted my plan to prove the dark Western inspiration behind the Popular Front.⁶

The brief boom can be explained in terms of resonance, a phenomenon well known in physics. The most salient parts of the 30-year plan dealt with gradual emancipation from foreign grip. For 15 years, this looked like a pipedream. Then, within a couple of years (1987-1989), the pipedream of autonomy became reality, and the 30-year plan looked not only prophetic but also promising as a guideline for further action. But then political action proceeded toward the quest of full independence, and my 30-year plan with its deferent attitude toward the "Big Neighbor" looked outdated. It offered some inspiration during the somber years but could be seen as overcautious and thus actually negative by 1989. In sum, as time moved on from 1970, the plan eventually entered a resonance frequency. It was amplified and, in turn, amplified the surrounding vibrations, and then it was out of resonance again.

As such, the plan could be of some minor interest to historians. But it also has this other component besides political autonomy. It sets a national goal far from being reached, namely a visible world role for a nation small in numbers. This part of the plan remains valid and may regain more prominence when the present transitional difficulties no longer monopolize attention.⁷ Even if the plan should lack a practical recipe for achieving national greatness, it at least remains a gadfly, reminding the nation of what it still lacks and should strive at.

Which nation? While worded in the Estonian context, the spirit of "30!" applies to all small nations with a distinct modernized language. Given the geopolitical and historical similarities, it applies particularly to Latvia and Lithuania. The deferent attitude the 30-year plan takes toward the Big Neighbor may be timid for 1992 but might look realistic again ten years from now. One does not escape geography.

Broad Goals to be Achieved

The 30-year plan summarized the broad goals as follows:

1. We exist, and live relatively well.
2. We are a bridge in the downtown of a united Europe.
3. We have our fair share of international science and culture centers.
4. We are active in settling international frictions.
5. We are known as a small nation that helps other small nations.
6. Our heritage is a recognized part of the world's cultural background.⁸

With 20 of the 30 years now gone and largely lost, most of these goals for year 2000 look even more fantastic now than they did in 1970. Unification of Europe is the only aspect that looks more plausible than it did 20 years ago. But the Baltic nations will not live relatively well ten years from now, and much of the rest is tied to it.

Although the timetable is off, these goals nonetheless remain essential, if a small nation wants to escape provincial mentality. To what extent these goals can be reached by a given time (or ever) is besides the point. The point is to have non-provincial goals, to have vision worthy of a nation:

We want to survive, of course. But not just by crawling into a corner so that we be left alone. ... The attainment of these higher goals presupposes that we continue to exist and live economically at a decent level. But the converse is also true: the goals that focus our aspirations raise our strength and well-being. ... To be an exploited province of the world is expensive. Let us be a nation!⁹

This remains valid. Substitute other longterm semi-impossible goals, if you can find any better ones, but crawling into a corner will not be a solution. Provincial sing-song about our being merely a small nation will not save the Estonians—or Latvians, Lithuanians, Slovenes, Basques. Mental smallness would doom them.

Intermediary Steps

The plan presented the intermediary steps under the headings "The Means—Political" and "The Means—Cultural." The political part was anchored in a notion of historical equilibrium position that has tended to keep Estonia closer to the Big Neighbor, compared to Finland. This equilibrium was seen to have two components:

1. Estonia is a sovereign nation.
2. Its social order is basically the same as that of the Big Neighbor.

The plan saw Estonia as overly closely bound to the Big Neighbor in 1970, but persuasion rather than confrontation was the road toward the reestablishment of equilibrium. Continuation of communism was not taken for granted, but any change in Estonia and Russia was expected to be interdependent.

When history later unfolded itself, Latvia and Lithuania formally abolished the special role of the Communist party only days before Moscow did, and Estonia actually trailed behind Moscow. As for privatization, the Baltic states in 1992 had a hard time keeping ahead of Russia. If Russia objected to privatization, then the task in the Baltic countries would be overwhelming.

Two broad political means were spelled out in the plan:

1. Abandoning the thought of forging a social order different from that of the Big Neighbor.
2. With the acquiescence of the Big Neighbor, turning the Estonian section of the dominant party into a distinct party and implementing the principle of territorial control in economy.

The more detailed steps included a widening of territorial rule, the achievement of sovereign status by "the dominant party's Estonian section," Estonia's membership in Comecon, the Warsaw Pact and the United Nations, and an active participation in the UN work—all this subject to acquiescence by the Big Neighbor.

How timid this looks now that the Communist party, Comecon and Warsaw Pact have landed in the dustbin of history—and how utopian it looked only five years ago! By now, one may even have the impression that the Baltic United Nations membership did not require the Big Neighbor's acquiescence. However, Lithuania did not accede to the UN after its declaration on independence in March 1990, but only after the grudging acceptance of Baltic independence by Gorbachev. The basic restrictions stated in the plan still have an effect.

As for independence within 30 years, the plan neither envisaged nor excluded this possibility. It stressed specific achievements (UN membership, effective self-government, worldwide cultural image) rather than the political format: "The contents are more important than the labeling."

In 1971, a Canadian Estonian newspaper criticized me for not spelling out certain names:

It seems that in presenting his plan Rein Taagepera is very cautious. He does not dare or care to call things by their proper names and consistently talks of the Soviet Union as the "big neighbor" and the Communist party as the "dominant party."¹⁰

The present-oriented tenor of this critique illustrates the difficulties people have in projecting a future different from the present. This staunch anticommunist effectively took me to task for lacking faith in the durability of his favorite devils. Later events have shown that, if anything, I erred on the side of still being too specific, because the dominant party, under any name, is gone.

However, the Big Neighbor of the last thousand years remains, call it Novgorod, Russia, Soviet Union or Petersburgia. My book *Estonia: Return to Independence*¹¹ discusses the chances for Russia possibly falling into smaller pieces. However, even then the piece adjacent to Estonia would most likely still represent a neighbor much larger than Estonia.

In the subsection on "The Means—Cultural" the plan argued for integrating the immigrants, limiting further immigration, moderately raising the birth rate, redefining women's and men's roles, reducing alcohol consumption, increasing productivity, and looking for solutions instead of culprits. The advice on culprits remains highly relevant in the present atmosphere of witch hunt. Numerous witches are still around, but trying to nail them down is futile. Twenty years ago, more hackles were raised by the plan's claim that "Whether the fruits of our labor go to us or to 'them' is irrelevant. By getting used to substandard work we degenerate mentally." Now the independent Baltic countries face a serious problem of work ethic, and my early concern may have become more understandable.

The plan's advice on integration of immigrants (in conjunction with limiting their influx) remains unacceptable to many Estonians:

The large nations have become large through integration. Our aim is not in large numbers, but even for mere survival a readiness to integrate is

unavoidable. The "pure race" doctrine is not only ethically questionable and comical in face of historical data; it represents a danger to the nation's survival. We have to choose whether to be a mixing nation or a vanishing one.¹²

This stand was at odds with the 1992 mood regarding ethnic relations and citizenship in Estonia (and Latvia). However, that mood itself represented a phase of counterproductive hysteria and flew in the face of rational preservation of the Baltic nations. A more efficient example of nation-building after imperial colonization was given by Catalonia.¹³ The Catalonia-style recipe in the 30-year plan is likely to sound better to Baltic audiences ten years from now.

All this is not to say that I was prophetically right 20 years ago—far from that. With 20-20 hindsight I would say many things differently. I expected 30 years of gradual evolution rather than 15 years of total stagnation, followed by five years of revolutionary changes, with ten years of heaven knows what still ahead. Like everyone else, I underestimated the economic decay of the USSR and consequently overestimated the internal resources left to Estonia. They say that "forecasting is difficult, especially regarding the future." In this light, I have no cause to regret I tried.

How to Forecast and Plan Far Ahead

Forecasting can be done without planning, but planning requires forecasting surrounding conditions. The basic attitude needed for long-range national planning is quite similar to that of scientific inquiry: a dispassionate method driven by a passionate motive. What it means becomes clearer in the course of this section.

After the 30-year plan was found unsatisfactory by the Estonian exile public, some other attempts apparently were made but ended up as short-term plans of immediate action. I cannot blame them; the task is difficult. Long-term plans tend to melt into short-term plans, because we cannot free ourselves from the shackles of the present. Our futures tend to look like carbon copies of the present.

One antidote is to take a deep look at history. The broad trends of the last millennium are likely to reassert themselves, even if the present is at variance with them. A related antidote is to realize that the world 30 years from now will be as different from the present as the present one is from the past, 30 years ago—or even more different, if we know that the previous 30 years were especially stagnant compared to the previous 100 years. We cannot be certain of the direction of change, but a projection of no change is likely to be too timid. Some world trends are pretty much in evidence, if we only wish to accept them. And here is the rub.

Besides intellectual inability to guess the future we also face emotional inabilities. Any rational prediction of political future requires prediction of shifts in our emotions. It's at this point that most of us refuse to accept any future

different from the present. We cannot accept the perspective that our emotions in the future could be any different from today's. Yet, history says it can happen, and here are a few examples.

The French and the English were historical archenemies for 500 years, before this animosity subsided in the face of a new one, a mere 125 years ago: Franco-German hatred. Many of us have witnessed during our own lifetimes the peak and rapid fading, in turn, of that Franco-German hatred. We have also seen how the 700-year animosity of Estonians against Germans collapsed within a single fateful year in 1940/41. But just imagine the reception, had one forecast in the 1920's or even the 1930's a future positive attitude of Estonians toward their archfoe of 700 years!

Could the Estonian feelings toward the Russians change to the same degree, within the next 30 years? History says "They might," but our emotions shout "Never!" Never say never, when forecasting and planning 30 years ahead. For that purpose, we must make our present emotions shut up. But most of us are unable and unwilling to do so, and he who does looks very heartless indeed. This is the main roadblock.

As for going beyond forecasting to making long-range plans, its wisdom can be debated. Wasn't the USSR the most thoroughly planned entity in the world? The 30-year plan admitted the merits of non-planning, yet presented the following justification at its conclusion: "But our generation is at the crossroads of our nation's being and non-being, and self-realization in our case demands a plan." Even for short-term decision-making the geopolitical givens, as expressed in past history, should not be forgotten, and I shall now return to this issue.

One Cannot Escape Geography

A quick comparison of Finland's and Estonia's history and geography is instructive. Look at the map, and what do you see? Then look at a map of 500 years ago, and what do you see?

Throughout history we have almost always been bound more tightly than Finland to the Big Neighbor. Our equilibrium position is closer to the Big Neighbor than is Finland's.¹⁴

This should be put in more precise terms: Finland never has been more tightly connected to the Big Neighbor than Estonia has during the same time period. As Finland's leeway has varied, so has Estonia's. Estonia in year 2000 could be more independent of the Big Neighbor than Finland was in 1970, without contradicting the previous generalization. But there are limits to Estonia's freedom of choice.

In 1992 a widespread feeling among Estonians was that since Estonia was independent it could turn its back to the Big Neighbor and ignore him, as he certainly has deserved it. This feeling prevailed despite the continued presence of Russian forces in Estonia, because continued military occupation was considered an anomaly that could not possibly last. It may be so. But I do not

see any rapid emancipation from the economic dependence on the Eastern market.

The government installed in Russia in late 1991 was better disposed toward the Baltic states than any previous one. (I do not say it was well disposed, only "better than.") What this implied was that the next Russian government was highly likely to be more hostile to the Baltic countries, and the "night frosts" the USSR imposed on Finland in the late 1950's pale in comparison to what Russia could do to Estonia—or any Baltic country, in rotation. A breakup of Russia is possible, but even a reconstituted Lord Novgorod would be more than a match for Estonia.

This is why I am not in a hurry to retract the deferential attitude toward the Big Neighbor as expressed in the plan. The Big Neighbor will still be with Estonia, unfortunately, when the Estonian intoxication with newly-found independence has subsided.

A contradiction may be seen between the bold assertion "Let's be a nation!" and the deference toward the Big Neighbor.¹⁵ However, my argument has been for individual self-confidence and cultural fulfillment, with no pretension of building up military might. The 30-year plan brings examples from Denmark, Switzerland and Finland, not the world's major nations. It is a question of making the most of what one has. There are aspects of greatness achievable in a small nation, because they depend on individuals and not some large number of supporters. But provincialism blocks creative thought by suggesting that, somehow, such supporting masses are indispensable. At the same time, provincialism is quite able to have militaristic delusions. History has seen too many countries, small and large, who thought they could not afford universities but could build up armies in support of border disputes. For me, the only nationalism worth having is cultural nationalism.

Conclusion

My conclusion is translated from a short note I wrote in 1988, in conjunction with the publication of the full text of the 30-year plan in Estonia:¹⁶

Of course, my watch too was poorly set: I expected *perestroika* to begin as early as in 1972. (Or was it that my watch was set all right, but someone else's had stopped ticking?) The intervening years have changed many a thing in the world. But I shall not present a new plan, because my generation has not received any compensatory extra years. If something in this plan is still valid 15 years after its inception, then those parts probably will also be valid a further 15 years from now. As for those parts that have not withstood the test, who is to say that new corrections introduced now would last more than 15 years? In sum, if we no longer have "30!" then at least "15!"

NOTES

1. The translation of the document used here is that of the author, based on a previous one by Ain Sonin.
2. *Vaba Eestlane* (Toronto), 28 September 1971.
3. *Välis-Eesti* (Stockholm), September 1977-March 1978.
4. Toomas Kümmel, *Heinakuu* (Tallinn), no. 5, October 1988, 17.
5. Tiit Pruuli, *Edasi* (Tartu), 12 October 1988.
6. Rein Taagepera, "Variant kujutlusele Eesti tulevikust: '30 aasta plaan'" [An alternative scenario for Estonia's future: the 30-year plan], *Vikerkaar* (Tallinn), no. 10, October 1988, 39-45; Rein Taagepera, "Variant budushtshei Estonii: 'Tridtsatiletnii plan razvitiia,'" *Raduga* (Tallinn), no. 2, February 1989, 40-48, and no. 3, March 1989, 53-57. An example of misrepresentation by Intermovement: interview with Evgeni Kogan on 4 January 1990, published in Ene Hion, ed., *Kes on kes Eesti poliitikas* [Who is who in Estonian politics] (Tallinn: Olion, 1990), 147.
7. Precisely this longest-term part of "30!" was favorably recalled by JKr. in *Vaba Eesti Sõna* (New York), 16 April 1992, a publication that otherwise rarely has a good word for me.
8. Text of the document, section on "Goals."
9. Ibid.
10. K.A., "Kummaline plaan tuleviku Eesti kujundaminseks" [An odd plan for shaping Estonia's future], *Vaba Eestlane*, 21 September 1971.
11. Rein Taagepera, *Estonia: Return to Independence* (Boulder: Westview, in press).
12. Text of the document, section on "The Means—Cultural."
13. See *Journal of Baltic Studies*, special issue on Baltic nationalism in comparative perspective, 23 (Summer 1992), and especially Hank Johnson, "The Comparative Study of Nationalism: Six Pivotal Themes from the Baltic States," pp. 95-104; Gershon Shafir, "Relative Overdevelopment and Alternative Paths of Nationalism: A Comparative Study of Catalonia and the Baltic Republics," pp. 105-120; and David Laitin, "Language Normalization in Estonia and Catalonia," pp. 149-166.
14. Text of the document, section on "Conditions."
15. I thank Rasma Kärkliņš for pointing out this issue.
16. *Vikerkaar*, no. 1, January 1989, 65.

TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT:

A BROAD PLAN FOR A SMALL NATION: 'THIRTY!'

Nothing in the world will change,
if we ourselves don't change it.
You must do all you can,
and even if you can't do much.

August Sang

Estonia can become one of the focal points of world culture thirty years from now, if we act purposefully. Or Estonia can be on the verge of demise, if our aims are fuzzy and we have bad luck. We need a plan for long-term direction of our resources. That is the way for the maximum utilization of all our talents. For each of us it is a way out of the drab circle of daily routines. Tomorrow need no longer be a purposeless repetition of today. Tomorrow is one of ten thousand small steps toward a goal shared by a million others.

Why precisely a 30-year plan? This is the time given to a generation. In 30 years our children will be as old as we are today and will make their own plan—a completely different one which may even seem to undo our efforts. They have to do it, and the common aspirations of the generations will become apparent only from the vantage point of century later. But these 30 years are ours. Ours to live, ours to shape, ours to change.

Yet, what can one change at all? Instantaneously, nothing. Little can be changed within the couple of years we usually tend to envisage. Everything can, if there is an infinite amount of time. We've got 30 years.

Shall we set a goal and try to reach it? Or shall we strut around aimlessly—today a step this way, tomorrow perhaps the other way? And on and on for ten thousand days, eleven thousand boring days? Until the next generation comes and asks us why we bothered to exist? The time to set goals is now.

Our goal must be set with sufficient precision, so we can strive toward it. It must be attainably realistic, yet also sufficiently utopian so as to be more than surrender to today's circumstances. The 30-year plan is a way to the goal viewed from the other, distant end. The starting point in the present can be seen by each of us by oneself.

Our goals are and must be utopian. Utopia is something that does not exist nor will be produced by the normal course of events. Today's unreachable goals will never be reached, if they are not defined at the time they are unreachable. Utopia must be born as utopia, before it can develop into reality.

Who must put these goals into words? Those who want to, those who dare to, those who can. Where must it be done? Wherever it is possible. Who has to authorize it? The future does not ask the past for credentials, and in 30 years from now today's present is but a past. The authorization of the 30-year plan lays in its execution.

GOALS

How must these goals be specified? In such a way that they would not be outdated within ten or twenty years. This means we cannot give free rein to our present emotions. We must try extrapolate what our emotions will be ten or twenty years hence.

Our aims should be fairly specific. If "freedom," then freedom for what? If "advancement of our culture," then in which direction? It would be hard to march in a deliberate way toward fuzzy goals.

We want to survive, of course. But not just by crawling into a corner so that we be left alone. Of course we want to live as befits humans and is possible in our century. But not only in the framework of food, shelter, and amusement. Existing for existence's sake, consuming for consumption's sake—this can become so boring that a nation may seek escape in collective suicide, say by drinking themselves to death. We want more than just live; we also want to leave a mark. Create. We want to achieve something within the world's family nations.

We want to be something more than a mere name in a geographical register. Something more than an extra on the world's stage who can be replaced and no one notices. We want to make a contribution and have it accepted and recognized by the world.

The attainment of these higher goals presupposes that we continue to exist and live economically at a decent level. But the converse is also true: the goals that focus our aspirations raise our strength and well-being. While striving for a world role we cannot forget individual welfare. We cannot, however, postpone the striving toward the higher goals until general welfare is reached, because then we would not achieve either. Well-being and self-realization are inextricably linked.

Our opportunities are determined by our location, size and background. We have lived in a windy place, in the border zone between the two branches of European culture. For both branches we have been marginal, unimportant as cultural contributors. It is in our best interest to see a reunion of these two branches of European culture. Instead of a stormy borderland we would then be in the quiet, creative heartland. At the present it is in our interest to be a bridge between the two cultural regions. It is not in our interest to be a glacis for either of them.

The reunion of the two branches of European culture has been going on for centuries, and the Estonian territory has had an important role in this process. This is our historical mission: to be a bridge until the need for a bridge is obviated by the closing of the chasm. Under favorable circumstances the gap can be closed within the next 30 years in all aspects of culture. A successful bridge must extend not only to our nearest neighbors but to as many peoples as possible within both cultural spheres, from Spain to Kyrgystan. We must not be a one-way bridge. We must become accustomed to the cultural values of both regions so that we might transmit them to Europe's other half in a form understandable by the recipient.

We want to be more than a bridge. We want to create new values for the entire world. Being a small people we have to be selective and specialize. Doing a little of everything would result only in high-level mediocrity without remarkable achievements. Switzerland has its watches and cheese. Denmark has Andersen's fairy tales and the Nils Bohr institute of physics. Finland has its architects and applied arts. What have we got? What could we have? It's a matter of which types of development to create on purpose and which ones to support when they spontaneously appear.

What should we try to create? Certainly not reinvent the wheel. Let us turn our attention toward new, growing problems: pollution control, the formation of mass educated class, discovery of general social laws. But in every field, let us focus on the fundamental. This goes for the layout artist just as much as for the chemist and truckdriver. Let us do something new. A bland repetition becomes boring to the doer himself.

What growth should receive support? [Estonian linguist] Johannes Aavik said E.A. Poe would have become a nobody in Estonian surroundings. Let one of our goals be the creation of an atmosphere favorable to the rise of spiritual giants.

One example: oil shale technology. If Estonia wants to remain a world leader in that field, then there must be an oil shale institute to attract the brightest researchers and students in that field from all over the world. This would be an expensive endeavor, but it would be even more expensive to train our own scientists and then fail to make maximal use of their abilities. The work at such an institute would be conducted in the major world languages rather than Estonian—just as it is at those international centers of learning where a creative Estonian will find refuge if the atmosphere at home becomes stifling. If we are too cheap to make such expenditures in any field, if we dare not invite the world, then we are not a nation but a province.

Another example: those of our composers who do not trail behind the world. If we have them, then we also need scores, records, artists, perhaps a symphony orchestra of international repute. It again means expenses and import of foreign talent, to guard against a departure of our best to other lands. Again the question whether to be a nation or a province. To be a province seems less expensive. But is it? The funds not used in the home country will drift abroad. Every time we acquire ready-made technology or art from abroad we pay. Every time brain drain carries off one of our scholars we make a free gift to others. When the others receive no technology or art from us, and when we cannot attract from among their best brains, then the exchange balance is unfavorable. By stepping into the family of creative nations, on the other hand, we will also assure our economic well-being. To be an exploited province of the world is expensive. Let us be a nation!

How many top institutions can we afford, given our size? The simple rule is: relatively no less than others. We have 1/400 of Europe's population. In 30 years, 1/400 of Europe's leading institutions should be in Estonia. At present we have none, and our best are leaving or become stunted.

Our location, background and size also open up a world political role for us. Our Fennoscandian neighbors are making a remarkable contribution to international cooperation by providing diplomats and peacekeeping forces for the United Nations. We are essentially in the same geopolitical situation, with the same opportunities in a 30-year perspective. Our better contacts with Eastern Europe can only be of help in such endeavor.

Our second world political role is based on our unusual smallness. We are the smallest non-island nation that has made it into modern world culture without the traumatic experience of giving up its own language and customs. We have much to share with other developing small nations, from Udmurts to Burundians. Let's not keep such experiences to ourselves.

Finally, a few words about our cultural heritage and its ties with world culture. There are nations, even small ones, whose historical background has become a part of worldwide culture and folklore. What educated person would not know William Tell, Matterhorn or the architecture of an Alpine chalet? Thus every educated person is a Swiss in some small way. He/she is interested in Swiss developments, because he/she can relate to his/her previous experiences and emotions. This is not yet the case with us, and this is among the reasons why things could happen to us that could not have happened to the people of Sibelius without eliciting a much louder outcry. Our goal must be to become a part of world tradition so that every educated person be in some small way also an Estonian.

In sum, we would like to see the following picture after 30 years:

1. We exist, and live relatively well.
2. We are a bridge in the downtown of a united Europe.
3. We have our fair share of international science and culture centers.
4. We are active in settling international frictions.
5. We are known as a small nation that helps other small nations.
6. Our heritage is a recognized part of the world's cultural background.

A vision is appearing on the horizon. An Estonia with sufficient internal fortitude to dare to emerge from its shell, playing its part in the creation of world culture, both at home and abroad. An Estonia making its contribution in international relations as an outstanding small nation about which it is being said: it's here that East and West Europe began to merge; this is the heart of Europe. An Estonia where the achievements of every individual are also those of the entire nation.

THE DOERS

The plan will be executed by our people such as they are—some enthusiastic, the majority indifferent, some even hostile to the development of their people. They all have a part in carrying out the plan. Even the hostile ones, because their resistance helps mobilize the indifferent. The plan accords with the aspirations of most of our people, only enouncing them more clearly than has been done in a while. Thus the majority of our people will act according to the plan even without knowing or recognizing its existence. At first, few will follow the plan consciously. As the stages envisioned in the plan materialize, the number of its conscious supporters also will increase. In the first decade it will take courage to support the plan; in the third it will take courage to oppose it.

We are the doers. We do not expect help from the others. But nor is the plan directed against any other nation. To the extent this is realized, we can expect mild sympathy from other nations toward our internal development. If someone should misunderstand it and attack our plan, then he hereby gives it free publicity, until he realizes his mistake.

CONDITIONS

Next let us specify the initial conditions and general constraints which define our working area for the next 30 years.

The initial conditions can briefly be characterized as follows. Our cultural development has been rapid and almost uninterrupted during the last hundred years, and it is continuing. Our demographic situation has been precarious for the last 60 years, and it still is. Our country's present social structure is based on state and collective enterprise rather than private enterprise, and this has been so for 25 years. At the same time, our country's political autonomy has been more limited than is usual for developed nations.

Among these basic features cultural development is favorable and essential for reaching our goals. The demographic situation represents a serious danger. The nature of the social system is basically irrelevant as far as our goals are concerned. A more extensive autonomy would make it easier to attain these goals, and the attainment of the goals would contribute to a wider autonomy.

Regarding political autonomy (and various other matters) our geopolitical location must be taken into account as a general constraint. We live next to a big nation, while other world powers are afar. We are willy-nilly in the sphere of interest and influence of our big neighbor and of no one else. If we try to drift off we will soon be painfully pulled back. But on the other hand, an overly tight tie to the big neighbor will sooner or later see us drift again toward our natural equilibrium position. But what is our state of equilibrium?

For Finland, its equilibrium state is the "Paasikivi line." Finland's attempts to enter Western Europe failed. The big neighbor's attempts to annex Finland were thwarted even earlier. The resulting equilibrium state is an independent Finland, with a government and foreign policy acceptable to the neighbor, who

on his part does not try to define "acceptable" in terms of lord and serf. Finland's extensive cooperation with Western Europe has become possible precisely because the big neighbor believes Finland will not use this cooperation to weaken its ties to the East.

Throughout history we have almost always been bound to the big neighbor more tightly than Finland. Our equilibrium position is closer than Finland's to the big neighbor. But we have not yet reached that position; we are still tied more than needed to the big neighbor. This excessively tight tie makes us dream about its complete severing, and those dreams in turn frighten our neighbor into maintaining an excessive grip. It is clear where we can reduce this vicious circle.

Our equilibrium position is based on two considerations.

1. We are a sovereign people. Nobody has denied that for the last half-century. This means a separate government, separate international relations, separate social and political organizations. This means that all orders and directives binding for an inhabitant of Estonia must come from Tallinn or at least by way of Tallinn. A nation whose members receive orders directly from abroad is not sovereign.
2. Our social order is basically the same as that of the big neighbor. This was true at the time when the Finnish peasants were free. This is true today. Attempts to change this can result in a national catastrophe.

Clearly, our foreign policy and the composition of our government must also be acceptable to the big neighbor. Our relations with Western Europe can develop only as much as we succeed in convincing our big neighbor that we do not intend to use these relations to sneak away from our equilibrium position. At the same time it must be shown that we cannot be held closer than our equilibrium position, without undue efforts.

THE MEANS—POLITICAL

To attain our equilibrium position two interrelated processes must be carried out in the next decades.

1. Abandoning the thought of forging a social order different from that of the big neighbor.
2. With the acquiescence of the big neighbor, turning the Estonian section of the dominant party into a distinct party and implementing the principle of territorial control in economy.

These processes are linked—progress in one aspect will bring progress in the other and vice versa. Yet these steps will often be carried out by different people: those who have dreamed of changes on the one hand and the members of the dominant party on the other. Thus the way stations on the road toward the equilibrium position are the following.

1. A sober analysis of the equilibrium position, for the benefit of us as well as the big neighbor.
2. A gradual getting used to the notion of equilibrium position, again both on our and the big neighbor's part.
3. A widening of territorial rule, acceptance of the equilibrium position as a longterm goal, the achievement of sovereign status by the dominant party's Estonian section, with the big neighbor's agreement.
4. Estonian membership in Comecon, the Warsaw Pact and the United Nations, when the big neighbor and other great powers accept it as a result of our persuasion.
5. An active participation in all aspects of the UN work, with the acquiescence of the big neighbor.

The external forms within which these stages are accomplished are not essential to us. The contents are more important than the labeling.

The determination of the detailed course followed by the dominant party in Estonia is up to the party members. But precisely because it is the dominant party, all the people are entitled to advance demands regarding the party's internal matters as far as they impinge on the interests of the entire people. That party must carry out the following reforms.

1. The party's ethnic composition must reflect that of the permanent population. Equality is the only foundation for a friendship of peoples.
2. The party's leadership must have a home-grown majority. Our own people can lead us better than outsiders.
3. Just as the nation's aim is to participate actively in international affairs through the United Nations, let the dominant party's aim be to take an active and imaginative part in the international activities of similar parties.

The normalization of the ethnic composition of the dominant party also places a demand on non-members of parties: in case of need they should be ready to join the dominant party.

What should be done, if the big neighbor collides with his own big neighbor? It is not in our interest to have our young men die like young Andres of Vargamäe. [This figure in a novel died in the Russo-Japanese war, 1904.] But nor shall we take advantage of the neighbor's difficult situation and attempt to leave his sphere of interest. We shall make it clear that before our equilibrium position has been attained our support will be passive and reluctant.

But should the unthinkable happen and a nuclear conflict erupt between the neighbor and a more distant great power, then northern Estonia will be annihilated. Within the context of developments that might lead to such a conflict it will not be in our interest to take anybody's chestnuts out of the fire—neither those of the potential annihilators, nor those of them whose missile bases in Estonia invite annihilation. This holds particularly regarding our stand on colonial

actions, be they in Southern Asia or Central Europe. Let us not favor imperialism anywhere.

The attainment of neutrality is a precondition for the achievement of our goals. We are located on the fringes of Northern Europe's neutral group—this is our second most important geopolitical coordinate. We need to join that group just as Finland has done, without undoing our ties to the East or changing our social order. Such neutrality is a precondition for our successful role in the United Nations. Our big neighbor's interests agree with ours in that respect, because then he would have in the UN's neutral block a representative of his own social system.

Finland's neutrality does not preclude a defensive alliance with the neighbor, and in our case the neighbor's troops will remain on our territory until the tensions between Europe's two halves have subsided. But there is one thing we cannot accept morally or practically: nuclear weapons on Estonian territory or aimed at it. The big neighbor must publicly affirm that there are no nuclear weapons on Estonian soil; the other big powers must publicly declare they have no missiles aimed at Estonia. Let these be among our first demands.

Neutrality is not only a strategic concept of the leaders but also our personal attitude. Each of us must get used to feeling emotionally neutral in major power contests. We have to realize that victory or defeat of one side will not benefit us greatly, while we are continually frustrated in the tensions between the major powers, not to mention the consequences of war. A reduction of tension is in our interest, not the victory of one side or the other. This means especially that Estonians both at home and abroad would act wisely if they avoid, as far as possible, military service with the great powers, especially if this involves participation in colonial actions on the territory of other small nations. Of course, the possibilities of avoiding military service are limited. But a public "no" from one of our youths in one corner of the world will give courage to do the same in another.

The achievement of neutrality does not solve all our problems, especially not those which confound the whole world. Let us look at just two of them.

The scientific-technological revolution will affect us too. A new educated class is emerging, and a conflict between power and mind is shaping up in various places. We must try alleviate this period of change in Estonia by giving the thinking class as much necessary recognition and autonomy as possible. A clear understanding of the historical process we are undergoing will help us keep the right course toward the "schooling society."

At the same time pollution is becoming critical. In that respect we have an advantage over many nations: we are studying that problem at a time when our water and air are not yet hopelessly polluted. Let us maintain that advantage! Let us limit the pollution produced by every collective farm, let us keep our oil shale under control, let us keep oil refineries off our densely populated territory. Let us spare our natural resources. A forest grows slowly, oil shale not at all. Let us think along these lines as we look at the ever-rising production graphs.

The achievement of our goals presupposes that the norms of human rights as defined by the United Nations be applied in Estonia to a sufficient degree.

Nowhere in the world do they apply to their fullest extent. In some aspects some nations are ahead of us, some are more disadvantaged. Without demanding the absolute or the ideal, let our aim be constant extension of human rights in our country. Within the framework of the UN General Declaration of Human Rights, we have reason to emphasize particularly Articles 13.2 (freedom to leave and return), 19 (freedom of propagation of ideas) and 20.1 (freedom of peaceful assembly). At the same time let us not forget that some articles are already applied in Estonia far better than the world's average, such as Art. 24 (right to vacation) and 26.1 (right to education). Let us read, discuss and propagate the contents of UN international agreements on human rights.

An extension of human rights is of concern to many people among the nations who live in similar conditions, including members of the big neighbor's nation. Let us become familiar with the work these people do, and let us cooperate with them. Let us support neighboring peoples and tiny minorities, especially those who are in dire need or gallantly demand their rights. A contemptuous stand toward them would betray our own future.

THE MEANS—CULTURAL

It is time to define the "nation." The core of our nation consists of those who speak Estonian, have been born and raised in Estonia, and reside more or less permanently in Estonia. But this is only the core. Those who satisfy only part of the above conditions are also part of our nation. This includes people outside Estonia who wish to call themselves Estonians. This also includes those people inside Estonia who have come from elsewhere and who wish to be known as residents of Estonia and want to learn Estonian. What about immigrants who have not yet reached that stage? It is in our interest to adopt them too. The large nations have become large through integration. Our aim is not in large numbers, but even for mere survival a readiness to integrate is unavoidable. The "pure race" doctrine is not only ethically questionable and comical in face of historical data; it represents a danger to the nation's survival. We have to choose whether to be a mixing nation or a vanishing one. Five years' residence is the requirement for citizenship in many countries. We too should tell those who have lived that long in Estonia, "Now you are naturalized Estonians," and leave to them the burden of arguing against that. Let us invite them to Estonian-language events and let them be the ones to carry the burden of impolite refusal. Let us integrate!

On the other hand it is also clear that the country's ability to integrate is limited both economically and culturally. Thus the number and composition of immigrants must be regulated. If the government and the dominant party cannot cope with that, then there are other methods such as the ones used by Georgians and Armenians. But it is essential that one distinguishes between longtimers and the newly arrived surplus immigrants. It is desirable that immigration be ethnically varied, ranging from Finland to Bulgaria and from Poland to Tajikistan. This enriches culture and facilitates integration.

Besides integration the birth rate must also be kept at a sensible level. Even though the world's average birth rate is dangerously high, ours is dangerously lower than Europe's average—dangerous to the survival of our own nation but also to the world equilibrium, since it produces a demographic vacuum.

For a long time we have held a two-child family to be normal. We must begin to accept a three-child norm. This does not mean that everyone should reach that number. But this should be the comparison stick. This means that writers and artists should depict three-child families in their works. (Up to now they have inadvertently advertised the one- and two-child norm.) This also means that roomier apartments and houses must be planned and built, and more nurseries as well. Baby and children's clothes must become more readily available. And what if "they" will not do it? To a large extent it is us who are "they." We can make demands at meetings and in the papers (even if we have no children of our own). In our daily work we can take an understanding attitude toward the needs of families with children and make their life easier.

But all this is still superficial. It is crucial to understand that children are quite essential to maintaining the mental balance of many adults. Otherwise there is a void that will not be filled by the longest sitting in the cafe or the fifth straight double. A worthier excuse for walking on all fours is with a laughing child on one's back. We have to be re-convinced that one of the foremost criteria of real manhood or womanhood is the raising of new men and women. Like every other truly satisfying endeavor, this also is oftentimes trying and exhausting. Yet, in many cases the alternative is a more or less permanent sense of emptiness.

A normalization of the family (be it on the traditional or new basis) requires also a clarification of the husband-wife work relationship. This is a worldwide problem we cannot escape. The strenuous "man's work" is now done by machines, and it is hard to tell which of their buttons should be pushed by whom. There are countries where the woman is forced to sit at home even if she wishes to seek work. There are other countries where economic necessities force the woman to work, even though she desires to stay home with the children. Let our goal be a society where every woman can make a choice between the two alternatives, without any technical or moral pressures. This would mean that the husband share in the housework on a parity basis. Our past customs were different. But the 30-year plan originates in the present and proceeds toward the future.

Excessive drinking is at the moment one of our serious problems. To a degree it has been caused by lack of national goals and the weakening of individual and family foundations. The emergence of long-range goals is likely to reduce the use of drugs. Everyone has the right to drink as much as he wishes, but also as little as he wishes. There is no need to urge others to abstain, but claims that non-drinking is "impolite" or "unfriendly" must no longer be heard. It is unfriendly and impolite to urge others to drink. Under the present circumstances it is even an offense against the nation. The attainment of our goals requires that we not push alcohol onto others.

Low productivity is another of our problems, known since the serfdom under the Germans, but still perhaps surprising. Indeed, "good old Estonian craftsmanship" surpasses that of some even more primitive nations, but it is below the European average. The problem lies not in justified personal transactions during business hours but in sheer waste of time at the job or elsewhere, be it in the companionship of a bottle or not. Whether the fruits of our labor go to us or to "them" is irrelevant. By getting used to substandard work we degenerate mentally. Here too the next decades must bring changes in our favor.

Our third weakness is that we too often look for the "guilty." The Estonian word for "guilt" means "cause" in Finnish, and that is what we should look for. It is of no use if the "guilt" of a whole group (or possibly a non-existing "guilt") is laid at the door of a single individual. It is enough to remove the cause of the disturbance, preferably in such a manner that nobody will be left with unpleasant impressions (not even he who may have been a little "guilty"). It is futile to sue mentally other nations, officials, neighbors, and family members (including children). When the milk is spilled, let's clean up the mess; when a man is down, let's give him a hand. Compared to that, establishing "guilt" is a third priority issue. When a marriage is on the rocks it does not matter who is "right"; when a nation dies it is of little help that we can blame another nation. It is in the interest of Vargamäe [notoriously litigant farm people in an Estonian novel] to spend more time in the fields and less in the courts.

A search for solutions instead of culprits, the raising of productivity, more moderation in drinking, normalization of family life, integration of immigrants—this is the task of each individual, in his own and the nation's interest. The successes of some will help and inspire others. Success may often seem limited and unimportant. But years and thousands of people later these small steps will prove to have made the difference between an unhappy and declining and a cheerful and developing society. We shall reach our 30-year goals if enough of us will start today toward these personal goals, get tired and discouraged tomorrow, but try again the day thereafter.

The bringing of our culture to the world's stage will depend to a great extent on cooperation between Estonians at home and abroad. Let us join the economic strengths of the ones and the connections and language skills of the others.

We shall reach our aims by cooperating with nations that are in a similar condition. Keep in mind, above all, the Latvians (who are our closest kin in all aspects apart from linguistic) and the Lithuanians. We have to choose whether to be in 30 years an important part of a common Baltic culture or a negligible part of some broader common culture. But let us also think of people further away with whom we shall discover commonalities as soon as we rid ourselves of prejudices imperialists have infused into us.

MODES OF ACTION

This plan is based on considerations of humanity and tolerance. We develop Estonianism within the framework of humanity, not at its expense. We shall not sacrifice live people to the plan. In particular, this plan must not become a club in the hands of some group of narrow-minded fanatics, to be used against all dissidents.

The existence of the plan does not mean that all Estonians would have to follow strictly the proposed course of action. On the contrary, it is necessary that many paths be explored through the thicket of our difficulties, so that if any of them should prove a dead end others are available. The plan represents an average of our opinions. The distribution around this average should be broad, but everyone should know on which side of the average he/she stands. Let our actions be in harmony with the plan or at least neutral. Let us be tolerant toward those whose paths take them along the other side of the average. The Tartu Credit Union [the scene of Red executions in 1919] and Irboska [the scene of White massacre in 1919], the Tartu prison yard [the scene of Red executions in 1941] and exhibition ground [the scene of White executions in 1941] must not be repeated!

The location of the plan within our activities is limited in time in two senses. First, it does not represent a national "final goal" but only goals attainable within the next 30 years. Second, it does not contain any specific blueprints for short-term tactics. Indeed, it cannot possibly do so, for tactics will vary with every individual, depending on his/her position in regard to the mainstream of the plan. But the plan allows us to place our short-term actions in a clearer perspective and enables us to avoid actions that could be harmful in the long run.

THE FIRST TEN YEARS

These are largely the years during which the plan will enter the people's consciousness. In this respect we expect great help from the opponents of the plan, who will not be able to ignore it quietly. Let "30!" be painted on every wall in Estonia ten years from now, so that the plan's opponents are ill at ease every time they see a 30-kopek stamp on an envelope.

These are the years in the course of which the plan's details become known to the majority of our people and the notion of an equilibrium position will be internalized after a long and painful mental process. No less painful and slow will be the demographic and psychological breaking out from the present rut that leads to oblivion.

These are also the years during which the aims of our plan are explained to outsiders, especially the leaders of the big neighbor, but also to other major powers who have their own designs regarding Estonia.

To the degree that individuals or groups join the plan they begin a conscious effort toward specific intermediary goals both in their individual lives and within their communities.

THE MIDDLE TEN YEARS

This is the time when the intermediary goals will essentially be reached.

THE LAST TEN YEARS

In these years attention turns from changing the political and psychological conditions to the attainment of the cultural and international final goals of our generation. We can never say that we have reached these goals, for they must be reached again and again. But 30 years later we can look back with satisfaction on the work done.

THE PLAN'S DISSOLUTION

And then the time will come to pronounce our plan obsolete. It must not remain a millstone around the neck of the next generation. Any attempt to extend the duration of the plan would mean its betrayal. The future generations must be free to prepare their own designs or none at all. Either way, there must be a new critical analysis. But our generation is at the crossroads of our nation's being and non-being, and self-realization in our case demands a plan. We can make it. And we have 30 years. 30!