UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

Colonialisms Entangled: Multi-Imperial Relations, Spatial Configuration, and Urban Politics in Treaty-Port China, 1860s-1930s

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in History

by

Taoyu Yang

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Co-Chair
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2022

DEDICATION

To

my family

And

in loving memory of my grandmother

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I was long under the misapprehension that my accomplishments belong solely to myself, but nothing could be further from the truth. Over the course of my postgraduate studies in the United States, I have incurred a tremendous amount of intellectual debt. It is a great pleasure to have this opportunity to acknowledge in writing those who have helped and supported me along the way.

I am deeply grateful to my PhD advisors Professor Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Professor Emily Baum. Their joint mentorship is the best kind that a graduate student can ever get. They have allowed me a great deal of latitude in pursuing whatever topics or methodologies that interest me, but they have always been there to offer guidance and help whenever I need it. Professor Wasserstrom has always encouraged me to look at the broader picture of my project and think creatively about situating my research into a global comparative framework. He has also generously shared with me his wide-ranging professional network, introducing me to various scholars in both China studies and beyond. Professor Baum's dedication to excellence in teaching and research has continuously inspired me. From the first short historiographical essay I wrote for our directed reading course to this nearly 300-page long dissertation, Professor Baum has meticulously read, commented on, and edited nearly all my written works. Words cannot express how grateful I am for their consistent support of and unwavering faith in me, even though at times I did not feel that I deserved it. I hope this dissertation has lived up to their expectations.

I have been fortunate to have worked with and learned from numerous scholars at the University of California, Irvine (UCI). Professor David Fedman, who is also on my dissertation committee, has offered me so much critical feedback on this dissertation. His intellectual rigor and exacting standards for historical study have had a major impact on me. I have also benefited immensely from conversations I have had about my research and professional developments with other faculty of the History Department. My thanks go to Professors Ian Coller, Laura Mitchell, Houri Berberian, and Qitao Guo for their advice and guidance. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to Professor John Smith from the European Languages and Studies Program at UCI, who helped me translate some of the German diplomatic documents used in this dissertation.

The University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) is not only where I obtained by M.A. degree, but also where thoughts and ideas presented in this dissertation began to emerge and develop. Professor Antoinette Burton, whose influence on my scholarship can be seen everywhere throughout the following pages and who played a formative role in shaping my intellectual trajectory, deserves special mention. I still remember the independent study I did with Professor Burton on the history of the British empire with fond memories, and it has continuously amazed me how much the themes we discussed years ago are still influencing my approach as a historian. I have indeed learned "the historian's craft" from many mentors and

teachers, but it was Professor Burton who first inspired me to *think* like a theoretically minded scholar. My PhD studies at UC Irvine would not have been possible, had it not been the help and support provided by my former advisor, Professor Roderick Wilson, at UIUC. I cannot thank him enough for his unfailing faith in my intellectual potential and for having helped me endure one of the bleakest times of my academic career. I would never forget the generous support offered by Professor Mark Micale, who helped me achieve my long-coveted dream of studying in the United States. Who knows where I would be or what I would be doing now, if it had not been the letter of recommendation that Professor Micale wrote in support of my application seven years ago? It might have been a simple kind gesture towards a young student on Professor Micale's part, but it truly meant the world to me. My thanks also go to Professors Harry Liebersohn and Dorothee Schneider, who made me feel at home in Chambana and helped me navigate the interesting world of the American Midwest.

I have presented different parts of this dissertation at various conferences, workshops, and symposiums in different parts of the world and have had conversations about my project with many scholars, from whom I have received invaluable feedback, comments, and critiques. Although I have so many people to thank, I will limit myself to only a handful. I am deeply indebted to Professors Ruth Rogaski and James Carter, both of whom have agreed to read and comment on parts of this dissertation and offered insightful observations. I would also like to express my heartfelt appreciation to Kristin Stapleton, Robert Bickers, Elizabeth LaCouture, Toby Lincoln, Cyrus Schayegh, Pär Cassel, Rana Mitter, Dan Knorr, Anna Ross, Stephen Legg, Hong Zhang, Donna Brunero, John Carroll, Taylor Easum, Evan Dawley, Bill Sewell, Nianshen Song, Li Chen, Alessandra Cappelletti, and Emily Williams. Scholars in mainland China were especially helpful and welcoming when I was conducting archival research in the two cities I focus on. I would like to thank Jiang Jie for inviting me to participate in the biennial conference on the history of the Shanghai French Concession and to contribute to the *Journal of the Study of the Shanghai French Concession*. It has been a pleasure to have cooperated with numerous scholars on various projects and learned so much from them. I would like to thank Wang Min, Zhou Wu, Han Hongquan, Ma Jun, Feng Xiaocai, Xu Tao, Mou Zhenyu, Du Ye, Su Zhiliang, Wei Bingbing, and Zheng Binbin for their comments and questions about my research at various occasions. Tianjin, my native city, felt even more like home when I was surrounded by interesting and hospitable scholars such as Wan Lujian, Ren Yunlan, Liu Haiyan, Zhang Chang, and Yu Xinzhong.

My friends from both academia and beyond have sustained me over the long process of research and writing during the last few years. Professor Gian-Piero Persiani, for whom I TAed at UIUC, has become a dear friend. I am so delighted that what we have in common is not just our keen interest in humanistic knowledge, but also our inexhaustible passion for the great Giallorossi (Daje Roma!). Forrest McSweeney from UIUC has been a true friend and an excellent intellectual interlocutor (and the best English grammar checker?) over the past seven years. The time we spent together in Tianjin remains some of my favorite moments to date. One cannot ask for a better friend than Jin Yanxin, who generously provided me with accommodation during my

research trips in Shanghai. His companionship and sense of humor afforded me some of the most joyous times in the great metropolis where I spent most of my time burying myself in voluminous documents. My faxiao (childhood friends), Xu Guannan and Zhao Weichuan, has been and always will be my closest and most endearing friends. I only wish I could see them more often and spend more time with them.

My family is the most important to me, and yet it is the most difficult to acknowledge my gratitude to them without sounding exceedingly mawkish. Both of my parents have chosen unusual career paths, and they have remained my source of inspiration. This dissertation might be considered as a scholarly milestone of some sort, but it is virtually negligible in comparison with what my mother has accomplished over the past two decades in the United States. I have never ceased to admire her intelligence, perseverance, and resilience. I cannot begin to describe my gratitude to my father, who has taught me so much about life and imparted to me so much of his wisdom. My grandfather, uncle, aunt, and cousin have offered me a solid network of support, and the time I spent with them is a constant reminder that the colonial history of Chinese treaty ports is not the single most important thing in the world! Finally, I consider myself extremely lucky to have met Sherry Wu last year in Shanghai, a city where finding a real connection is as difficult as finding a tranquil spot. I will not try professing my affection here, as doing so would only embarrass both of us. This dissertation is for those who are with me as much as for those who are no longer by my side. To my most profound sadness, my grandmother, who had raised me and first nurtured my interest in history, unexpectedly passed away during my PhD studies. I am sure, however, that she would be proud to see me finish my degree, wherever her spirits might be now. Last, but not the least, there was someone special to me that I let go hastily two years ago. Even though she may never see this, it is important for me to acknowledge that she made me the person I am (and so much more). I dedicate this dissertation to my family and friends, as well as to the loving memories I have had with those who are not with me anymore.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This dissertation examines how multiple imperial powers in Chinese treaty port cities interacted during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It centers on China's two largest treaty port cities: Tianjin and Shanghai, two cities that were divided into several colonial concessions alongside the Chinese districts from the 1860s to 1940s. Historically, while Shanghai was characterized by its tripartite division of governance—the British-dominated International Settlement, the French Concession, and the Chinese municipality, Tianjin was home to up to nine foreign-controlled concessions (British, American, French, German, Japanese, Russian, Belgian, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian). This dissertation inquires into how these multiple imperialisms shaped, and were shaped by, these two cities. Situated at the intersection of modern Chinese history, empire studies, and urban history, this dissertation investigates how the multi-pronged and multifarious interactions between various imperial powers shaped the urban politics of these two cities, as well as their urban development. While much scholarship on colonial history has focused on the bilateral relationship between the

colonizer and the colonized, my research reveals the multiplicity, multilateralism, and multilayered trajectories at the heart of the colonial experiences of both imperial powers and the Chinese. Drawing on a wide range of multi-lingual historical materials located in different parts of the world, this dissertation underscores the density and concentration of crisscrossing imperial trajectories within cities while situating Chinese colonial history within a global comparative framework.

INTRODUCTION

"China is the colony of every nation that has made treaties with her, and the treaty-making nations are her masters. China is not the colony of one nation, but of all; she is not a semicolony, but a hypocolony."

Sun Yat-sen, 1924[1]

"What a weird city I grew up in. For three or four Chinese coppers, I could ride in a rickshaw from my home, in England, to Italy, Germany, Japan, or Belgium. I walked to France for violin lessons; I had to cross the river to get to Russia, and often did, because the Russians had a beautiful wooded park with a lake in it."

J.R. Hersey , 1982[2]

"The British and American areas became one and the 'International Settlement' was born. At its heart was the upcoming 'golden mile' of Asia—the Bund… the French Concession…developed as a magnificent residential area typified by meandering plane tree-lined avenues, lavish mansions and estates, stylish apartment blocks and theatres."

An English language guide to Shanghai, 1934[3]

The above epigraphs neatly capture the categorical distinction between colonialism in China and in other colonized settings. Despite his characteristic hyperbole and strong nationalistic sentiment, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China in 1912, pinpointed a crucial historical component that differentiated China's colonial experience from those of other colonial contexts. While China was not colonized by one single nation, it was nonetheless subjected to dominance from multiple imperial powers. Colonialism in China was "a piecemeal agglomeration,"[4] it was defined by the diversity and geographical variation, and it thus defied any simplistic categorization. Different empires projected different imperial ambitions onto China, thus generating the nation's distinctive colonial formations between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That China did not lose its sovereignty completely should not

[1] Sun Yat-sun, *Three Principles English Reader*, translated by Baen Lee (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1927).
[2] J.R. Hersey, "A reporter at large: homecoming. I: the house on New China Road," *New Yorker*, 10 May 1982, 54.
[3] *All About Shanghai and Environs: The 1934-35 Standard Guide Book*, Hong Kong: Earnshaw Books, 2008.
[4] Bryna Goodman and David Goodman, eds., *Twentieth-Century Colonialism and China: Localities, the Everyday, and the World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.

obscure the presence of formal colonies in China throughout much of its colonial past. British Hong Kong, Portuguese Macau, and Japanese Taiwan are all well-known cases. There also existed forcibly leased territories by foreign powers, such as British Weihaiwei (Shandong Province), French Guangzhouwan, Russian Port Arthur (Lüshun), and, most notably, German Jiaozhouwan (with its headquarters in Qingdao). The Chinese government did not have any sovereignty over these regions for a finite period, and the distinction between these leased territories and other colonial possessions was difficult to delineate.

In addition to formal colonies, "treaty port cities" constituted the most idiosyncratic colonial arrangements in the Chinese context. As the above epigraphs have shown, Sun's acute observation about China's colonial conditions was embodied through the unique spatial configuration of China's two largest treaty port cities: Tianjin and Shanghai, two cities that were divided into several colonial concessions alongside the Chinese districts from the 1860s to 1940s. From the 1840s to 1940s, the city of Shanghai was characterized by its tripartite division of governance—the British-dominated International Settlement, the French Concession, and the Chinese municipality. Tianjin's colonial history in its treaty-port incarnation was even more complex. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was home to up to nine foreign-controlled concessions (British, American, French, German, Japanese, Russian, Belgian, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian). The concessionary spaces emerged, developed, and declined along the line of global geopolitical events, but the British, French, Japanese, and Italian Concessions all remained until after World War II. These concessions functioned like micro-colonies, with their municipal governing structures and distinctive architectural styles. The only exception was the Shanghai International Settlement, which was not an outpost of one single colonial authority but rather governed by a locally elected body known as the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC).

Tianjin's and Shanghai's urban spaces were defined by the juxtaposition of multiple foreign-controlled concessions and a series of evolving Chinese municipal administrations. This dissertation inquires into how these multilateral imperialisms shaped, and were shaped by, these two cities. While most scholarly discussions on colonial history have revolved around the bilateral relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, my research focuses on how different imperial powers interacted with one another in the context of Chinese treaty port cities. The intersection and juxtaposition of various foreign-foreign and Chinese-foreign dynamics held significant implications for the cities of Tianjin and Shanghai. This dissertation examines how the multi-pronged and multifarious interactions between various imperial powers shaped the urban politics of these two cities, as well as their urban development.

Empires never acted alone. Relationships among these empires were critical to their formation, their politics, and their subjects' colonial experiences. The level of density and concentration of multiple colonialisms in the cities of Tianjin and Shanghai not only draws our attention to the *sui generis* nature of China's coloniality, but it also encourages us to inquire what the peculiar spatial configuration mean for different imperial powers operating alongside one another within confined urban spaces. "Space" is a critical analytical concept that has piqued increasing academic interests in recent years.[5] For the present dissertation, I use the term "spatial configuration" in two senses: 1) to underscore the uneasy coexistence between multiple colonial concessions and a series of evolving Chinese municipal institutions; 2) to show how the proximity of foreign settlements, alongside areas of Chinese jurisdiction, generated interstitial spaces that cut across these overlapping imperial territorial possessions.

[5] For a theoretical reflection on the concept of "space," see Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: SAGE publications, 2005).

This dissertation argues that the mutual constitution between the dynamics of multi-imperial relations and the unique spatial configuration that were generated as a result was a defining factor that shaped the colonial experiences of these two cities. On the one hand, the multiple constellations of colonial powers, as well as their interplays therein, produced ad hoc spatial arrangements characteristic of these port cities, delineated the contours of tangled political landscapes, and exerted significant impact on these cities' physical and discursive landscapes. On the other hand, the side-by-side presence of colonial concessions, along with Chinese municipalities, conditioned the ways in which imperial powers operated within these urban spaces and interacted with one another. Though essentially a localized study, this dissertation is in dialogue with scholars working on imperial history and colonial cities in other parts of Asia and in Africa and is broadly engaged with the academic literature on colonialism in China, empire studies, and urban history.

Colonialism in China: Historiographical Trends and Terminological Debates

Although China was never reduced to the status of a "total colony," as were India and most African countries, imperialism nevertheless shaped a wide range of economic, political, and cultural aspects of modern China and has left significant legacies for contemporary Chinese society. China's partial colonization beginning in the late nineteenth century was an integral part of the broader history of the global imperial expansion powered by capitalism. The development of Chinese nationalism was inextricably connected with Chinese elites' efforts to counter imperial and foreign influences, a perennial struggle that came to define the course of modern China. An assorted array of colonial institutions, technologies, and personnel permeated into the social fabric of cities like Tianjin and Shanghai, with its influences even extending into more

inland areas thanks to the proliferation of communication mechanisms across different colonial outposts in China and beyond.

The study of imperialism in China in Anglophone academia echoes how the historian Frederick Cooper has described the developments of colonialism in French academia— "The Rise, Fall, and Rise of Colonial Studies."[6] In the 1970s, China offered an exemplary case for historians of imperialism to investigate its correlation with the "informal empire," given that "China… is regularly described as falling within Great Britain's informal empire of trade and investment."[7] Starting in the mid-1980s, however, China scholars were less focused on the question of imperialism itself, and the dominant paradigm for China scholars was the "China-centered approach," a methodology proposed and popularized by the renowned China historian Paul Cohen.[8] It is fair to say that during this period the two colossal fields—Chinese history and history of colonialism—were rarely in conversation with one another save some important exceptions such as Rhoads Murphey's study of treaty port cities.[9] Even when questions related to imperialism/colonialism did appear (most of these being about the foreign influence in Shanghai), these studies seem to have emphasized the "subtlety" of colonial operation in the social relations within these Sino-foreign "contact zones" or skewed towards the more positive impact of foreign presence in China.[10]

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[6] Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: California University Press, 2005): 33-58.
[7] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1953), 1–15; Britten Dean, British informal empire: The case of China, *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 14, no. 1, (1976): 64.
[8] Paul Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
[9] Rhoads Murphey, *The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China* (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1977).
[10] Lucien Pye, "How China's Nationalism was Shanghaied," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 29 (January, 1993): 107-33; Rudolf Wagner, "The Role of the Foreign Community in the Chinese Public Sphere," *China Quarterly* 142 (June 1995): 423-443.

Since the 1990s and early 2000s, changing historiographical patterns within China studies and beyond, accompanied by improved archival access in mainland China, have propelled scholars to seriously delve into China's colonial past. It is important to recognize the pioneering role played by scholars such as Robert Bickers and James Hevia, as well as the journal *positions*. While Bickers critiques the overly cautious "China-centered approach" for having written out the "exogenous factor—the foreigner and foreign power" on Chinese soil, Hevia goes as far as to claim that there is simply no need to calibrate the distinctions between China's colonial conditions and those in other colonized settings.[11] *Positions* was mostly known for the notion of "colonial modernity" proposed by its contributors. Although "colonial modernity" has often been criticized for its analytical ambiguity and its universalizing tendencies, it did draw attention to the crucial importance of colonialism in China by reorienting questions related to "colonialism" and "imperialism" back to historical inquiries into China.[12]

Overall, in the past two decades or so, there has been a resurging interest in the nation's colonial history among China historians. Much of the existing scholarship on colonialism in China has explored how China's international status was redefined in the age of high imperialism, revealed the inextricable link between imperial metropolis and the colonial outposts, and investigated the cumulative effects of colonialism on various aspects of Chinese society. One of the central preoccupations of these studies is to identify the qualitative differences between colonialism in China and that of total colonies. China historians have proposed a series of terminologies—semi-colonialism, informal empire, hypercolony and

[11] Robert Bickers, *Britain in China: Community, Culture, and Colonialism, 1900-1949* (Manchester: Manchester Unievrsity Press, 1999), 6; James Hevia, *English Lessons: The pedagogy of imperialism in nineteenth century China* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003).
[12] Tani Barlow, ed. *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); for an oft-cited critique of the concept of "colonial modernity," see Bryna Goodman, "Improvisation on a semicolonial theme, or, how to read a celebration of transnational urban community," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 59(4), 2000: 915-917.

transnational colonialism—to account for this distinction. These various terms merit a close examination and some critical reflections.

It was politicians, rather than scholars, who first made the most concerted efforts to conceptualize China's colonial past. As the first epigraph of this introduction shows, Sun Yat-sen proposed the concept of "hypo-colony" (borrowing a scientific prefix) to suggest that China's global position was no better than those colonized peoples across the world even though China still retained formal sovereignty.[13] Shortly after Sun, Vladimir Lenin formulated the category of "semi-colony" in 1916, under which China was placed. By putting China, Persia, and Turkey into the same category of "semi-colony," Lenin's intent was to include these countries into what he called "Colonial Possessions of the Great Powers," thereby highlighting the potential possibility of the world being partitioned by global imperial powers.[14] If Lenin used the term "semi-colony" to suggest that China, along with Persia and Turkey, was rapidly becoming a full colony, it boiled into a fierce ideological debate between Stalin and Trotsky, which was subsequently carried on by the Nationalists and Communists in China.[15] Mao Zedong's writings also played an indispensable role in formulating the "semi-colonial/semi-feudal" dyad, a theoretical construction that remains popular in today's People's Republic of China and has continued to drive scholarly analysis of China's colonial history.[16]

There is no doubt that the concept of "semi-colony" or "semicolonialism" was used by these political theorists to legitimize their respective political agendas. It did, however, reflect the need to modify the term "colonialism" in the Chinese context. "Semicolonialism," a notion

[13] Sun, *Three Principles*, 1927.
[14] James E. Connor, ed., *Lenin on Politics and Revolution* (Pegasus/New York: Western Publishing Company, 1968), 134–35.
[15] Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History: Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): 81-84.
[16] Mao Zedong, *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), 9–20.

favored by both American and Chinese scholars, has a distinctive genealogy in the English-language scholarship. Scholars have explored its analytical utility from different angles and have generally agreed that this term remains useful for understanding Euro-American and Japanese imperialists' particular colonial formations in China. In her erudite study of China's modernism during the Republican era, Shu-mei Shih has taken the discussion of the concept of "semi-colonialism" the furthest. "Semi-colonialism," according to Shih, is used to "describe the cultural and political condition in modern China to foreground the multiple, layered, intensified, as well as incomplete and fragmentary nature of China's colonial structure." The absence of a formal colonial apparatus, compounded by the very "fragmentary and incomplete nature of such domination," resulted in a bifurcating mentality among Chinese intellectuals that allowed them to distinguish the "metropolitan West" from the "colonial West."[17]

Other scholars have also offered insightful observations on the concept of "semicolonialism," though their interpretations have by and large revolved around demarcating the distinction between China's colonial experience and those of the global colonial world. Eminent world historian Jürgen Osterhammel has explained that semi-colonialism is a useful term "to make sense of a historical process in which 'feudalism' obviously disintegrated, but no significant transition to capitalism took place."[18] Bryna Goodman, whose edited volume—*Twentieth-century Colonialism and China*—has advanced an unequivocal local approach to the study of colonial formations in China,[19] has written elsewhere about the utility of analyzing the effects of colonialism on Chinese society. In her analysis of the 1893 Jubilee celebration in

[17] Shih, Shu-Mei. *The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917-1937*, University of California Press, 2001, 30-40.
[18] Jürgen Osterhammel, "Semicolonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China: Towards a framework of analysis," in *Imperialism and After: Continuities and discontinuities*, edited by Wolfgang Mommsen and Jurgan Osterhammel (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 276.
[19] Goodman and David Goodman, *Twentieth-century Colonialism and China*, 1-22.

Shanghai, she departs from scholars contributing to *positions* by claiming that they have failed to capture "the radical differences that characterized the process of semicolonialism across time, space, and social groups." The preservation of Chinese sovereignty, the dynamism of Chinese society (as manifested in the native place association in her case), and the high degree of interdependence between Chinese social groups and foreign powers were all crucial factors that made China's colonial conditions "qualitatively different" from other colonized contexts.[20] More recent usage of "semi-colonialism" has taken the analysis of this notion a step further by drawing attention to the term's particular and comparative attributes. In a recent monograph, Anne Reinhardt suggests that both sides of the hyphen deserve careful scrutiny. While "semi" focuses on what was particular about colonialism in China, "colonialism" emphasizes China's "comparability with colonial contexts, and its enmeshment within the process of global ascent of European empires in the latter nineteenth century."[21]

Another critical concept that has often been associated with China's colonial conditions is "informal empire," a term that sustained a high level of popularity in the 1970s. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, in their influential article "The Imperialism of Free Trade," argued that "informal empire," underpinned by the principle of free trade, was a more favored imperial policy over formal colonization of overseas territory for the British government. Compared with "formal empire," this line of argument continued, "informal empire"—a system that granted imperial powers extraterritorial privileges, economic domination, and political influence on the less powerful countries in the absence of full-fledged colonial control thereof—seemed to be the

[20] Bryna Goodman, "Improvisations on a Semicolonial Theme, or, How to Read a Celebration of TransnationalUrban Community," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Nov., 2000), 915-921.
[21] Anne Reinhardt, *Navigating Semi-Colonialism: Shipping, sovereignty, and nation-building in China, 1860–1937* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2018), 4. I have written elsewhere about the benefits of defining "semi-colonialism" in this fashion, see Taoyu Yang, "Redefining Semi-Colonialism: A Historiographical Essay on British Colonial Presence in China," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, Volume 20, Number 3, Winter, 2019.

mainstay way of imperial operation. The expansion of global imperialism in the 1880s, exemplified by the "scramble for Africa," was simply a continuation of this policy.[22] That China never completely lost its sovereignty and was subject to the sway of informal imperial influence seemed to make "informal empire" an apt term to analyze Britain's imperial project in China. Even though some scholars have questioned the applicability of the term "informal imperialism" to the case of China from the perspective of economic history,[23] historians like John Darwin and Jürgen Osterhammel maintain that the concept of "informal empire," though "less well suited to dealing with general explanatory problems," still possessed "a higher degree of descriptive power."[24]

Other conceptual formulations have tended to capture the regional variation of colonialism in modern China. In her sophisticated study of Tianjin during the late Qing and Republican era, Ruth Rogaski proposed the term "hyper-colony," whereby she replaces "hypo" with "hyper," as a way to underscore the multiplicity of colonial formations in the city.[25] This notion of "hyper-colony" is useful for highlighting the historical distinctiveness of colonialism in the city of Tianjin, but its limited definition and scope makes it difficult for the term to be broadly applicable to other colonial contexts. The most recent attempt at conceptualizing China's colonial conditions is Isabella Jackson's notion of "transnational colonialism." As Jackson suggests, neither "semi-colonialism" nor "informal empire" seems to be a satisfactory term to describe the peculiar form that colonialism took in the global city of Shanghai. Her subject

[22] John Gallagher and Robinson, Ronald, "The Imperialism of Free Trade". *The Economic History Review*. 6 (1), 1953: 1–15.
[23] Dean, "British informal empire."
[24] John Darwin, "Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion," *English Historical Review*, Vol. 112, No. 447 (1997), 617; Osterhammel, "Semicolonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China," 309.
[25] Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic modernity: meanings of health and disease in treaty-port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 11.

matter, the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC), certainly shapes her choice of terminology. On the one hand, "informal empire" does not demonstrate the "degree of control that came to be exercised by the SMC," which, as Jackson argues, was not "very informal to the millions of Chinese who lived under its governance." "Semi-colonialism," on the other hand, runs the risk of beguiling some into thinking that "colonialism in Shanghai was a lighter-touch form of imperial control." What defined Shanghai's colonial experience, Jackson contends, was not informal or "half" colonial projects, but rather "transnational colonialism," that is, "colonial authority in the hands of not one nation and its officials but many non-state actors from diverse backgrounds."[26]

Each of the above terms has its distinctive connotations and valences, and they all describe different colonial phenomena in Chinese contexts. However, most of these analytical notions have been primarily preoccupied with the incomplete, partial, heterogeneous, and fragmentary nature of colonialism in China. In other words, such modifiers as "semi" and "informal" do more to perpetuate the assumption that Chinese colonialism was less "real" than colonialism elsewhere than to delineate the distinction between colonial processes in China and other colonized parts of the world. In the meantime, the notions of "hyper-colony" and "transnational colonialism" have a relatively more limited applicability beyond their specific locales and institutions. Therefore, I contend that a key element that characterized China's colonial experience, as well as other empire's imperial operation therein, lies in the very multiplicity, multilateralism, and multilayered as well as interlocking trajectories of various imperial powers operating in China alongside one another. This dissertation thus proposes that "multi-imperial entanglements" would be a productive way to conceptualize China's distinctive colonial history and situate China's colonial past in a broader global comparative framework.

[26] Isabella Jackson, *Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China's Global City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1-21.

Before further elaborating on my coinage of "multi-imperial entanglements," it should be noted that previous scholarship has indeed touched upon the fact that China—its treaty port cities in particular—was subjected to multiple layers of domination. This body of scholarship has revealed the implications of multi-imperial relations for Chinese intellectuals' varied ideological positions, explained how multi-imperial dimensions affected practices and self-representation of imperialists in different settings, and explored various opportunities that a network of overlapping imperialisms afforded to different social groups.[27] However, this strand of historiography has tended to focus on juxtaposition rather than interactions amongst these imperial powers. It has investigated the social, cultural, and psychological effects of multiple colonialisms rather than realpolitik on the ground. What is more, these studies have overwhelmingly focused on an individual imperial power's interactions with the Chinese rather than among imperialists themselves.

I use the term "multi-imperial entanglement" for several reasons. "Multi-" places emphasis on the multilateralism and multi-layeredness that characterized much of the spatial configuration as well as the political dynamics that shaped much of China's colonial experience. It seeks to move beyond more dichotomous formulations such as East-West, colonizer-colonized, and oppression-resistance. Collectively, multilateralism and multi-layeredness contributed to an "imperial assemblage"[28] of crisscrossing and oft-competing municipal, diplomatic, and imperial dominions that operated in close, physical relationship to one another but were nevertheless deflected and fractured by their inherent contradictions and incongruences.

[27] Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot, eds., *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Shih, *The Lure of the Modern*; Bryna Goodman and David Goodman, eds., *Twentieth-Century Colonialism and China*.
[28] I borrow this term from Seema Alavi. See Seema Alavi, "Fugitive Mullahs and Outlawed Fanatics': Indian Muslims in nineteenth century trans-Asiatic Imperial Rivalries," *Modern Asian Studies*, 45, 6 (2011): 1338.

In the meantime, "entanglement," in my view, is a more favorable term vis-à-vis notions such as "encounter," "meeting," and "contact." While conceiving of imperial operations through the lens of "encounter" or "contact zone," as Mary L. Pratt has done, [29] is especially productive in describing cultural or linguistic interactions, these notions have the potential epistemic danger of presenting two stable and discrete, if not essentialized, cultural formations meeting each other, while downplaying the multiple, often-competing skeins of power that developed in complex ways within certain geographical spaces. On the contrary, "entanglement," as scholars across various disciplines have pointed out, indicates a condition of being entwined, which weaves together disparate relationships, and bespeaks a sense of proximity that gestured toward a set of relationships in a complex tangle.[30] My research on overlapping colonialisms in Tianjin and Shanghai shows that different imperial formations defined themselves in relation to, or with reference to, those of other competing, or collaborating, empires. Their agendas, initiatives, ideologies, and practices were inextricable from and mutually constitutive of those of the other colonial powers. I should also distinguish the notion of "multi-imperial entanglements" from Jackson's "transnational colonialism." While *cooperation* between *individuals* from various nations and networks within the SMC features prominently in Jackson's work, my concept of "multi-imperial entanglements" deals with both state (diplomats on different levels) and non-state actors (municipal authorities and business groups) and brings into one single analytical framework cooperation, rivalry, and connectivity amongst various imperial powers in Tianjin and Shanghai. Reorienting imperial state actors—diplomatic officials in particular—to the center of my narrative, I suggest, helps rectify an implicit tendency among scholars to privilege non-

[29] Mary L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge: 1992).
[30] Sarah Nuttall, *Entanglement* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009), 1-16.

state actors and the interlinkages they created at the expense of downplaying real negotiations and contestations on the ground.

Why, then, is the notion of "multi-imperial entanglements" necessary? And what analytical utility does it offer for scholars of colonialism in China? First, despite the proliferation of scholarship on colonialism in China, British colonial projects in China have been and still are the centerpiece of this line of historiography. This is entirely understandable, not least because of the preponderance of British imperial influence on modern China. Recent years have also witnessed a growing number of studies on Japanese imperialism in China, and several important studies have been published recently on Japanese colonial urbanism in Manchuria (Northeastern China).[31] However, with few exceptions, the study of colonialism in China has by and large skewed towards the imperial experiences of the British empire, and perhaps to a lesser extent the Japanese empire. The term "multi-imperial entanglements" does not seek to construct a totalizing umbrella concept encompassing all imperial powers' colonial experiences in China, but rather to situate different empires (or their imperial agents) in an interactive and interlocking framework, one that privileges their mutual constitution and imbrication. From this perspective, this notion also eschews the tendency of reifying national styles of colonialism, though different imperial formations in the context of treaty port cities do permit a certain level of comparison.

Second, the term "multi-imperial entanglements" should be considered as a heuristic device, or a means rather than an end. Some historical events or topics, when viewed through the lens of multi-imperial interplay, might reveal aspects that have not been clearly visible. Some seemingly familiar histories might have been retold from a different vantage point if we were to

[31] Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2015); Bill Sewell, *Constructing Empire: The Japanese in Changchun, 1905-45* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019).

re-orient the multifarious interactions amongst various empires to the center of our analysis and narratives. For instance, while we tend to use "scrambling" to describe how imperial powers alternately competed and collaborated and learned from one another while carving out zones within large geographic spaces such as whole countries or even continents, a phenomenon akin to this happened in microcosm in Tianjin in 1900 when the city was ruled by a multinational colonial government. Similarly, scholars of Qing history are familiar with the British and French fighting together against the Qing army during the Second Opium War and four decades later occupying China's capital (along with the other six colonial powers), these two empires' competition and cooperation took a different form in the city of Shanghai. As I will discuss in the first chapter, debates over the Yangjingbang bridge became a contentious issue for the French and British authorities in Shanghai. My approach to multi-imperial entanglements also leads to some surprising ways to interpret some figures or events that might not, at first glance, conjure up the image involving multiple empires directly. Significant continuities and similarities between Liu Kunyi, Li Hongzhang, and Yuan Shikai, as I will demonstrate in chapter two and four, can be discerned in terms of their ways of inserting themselves into multilateral negotiations amongst imperial powers.

Third, the notion "multi-imperial entanglements" problematizes the tendency of China scholars to refer to a monolithic "West." James Hevia has argued that "the West" should not be treated as a "known knowledge" or a unitary entity.[32] Following Hevia's charge, I pay close attention to the internal variations of foreign imperial powers, provincialize international relations throughout different historical stages, and recognize the local specificity of global imperial politics. In some sense, my research restores William Kirby's famous statement that

[32] Hevia, *English Lessons*, 17.

"foreign relations in this era became, quite simply, all penetrating, all permeating, all prevailing… ultimately forcing their way into every part of Chinese society."[33] It also joins larger scholarly efforts to "bring the foreign back" into the historical inquiry of modern China.[34] In other words, if Sino-foreign interactions and enmeshment were of paramount importance to China's modern (trans)formation, the same should be said about foreign-foreign dynamics and their implications for the urban contexts and beyond. Finally, the term "multi-imperial entanglement" can also be transplanted to other settings within China. Cities such as Hankou and Canton, though smaller in size compared with Tianjin and Shanghai, were critical sites where more than one colonial concession existed. Other urban regions such as Harbin and Dairen (Dalian) in Manchuria were also subjected to influences of multiple imperial influences across various historical periods. Even cities that were dominated by one single colonial power, such as Qingdao, came to be shaped by multi-imperial interactions at critical historical junctures. The process of the colonization of Qingdao first by Germany in 1898 and then by Japan in 1914 (acquired from Germany during wartime) involved negotiations and sometimes contestations between Britain, Japan, Germany, Russia, and the United States.[35]

Empire Studies: Beyond "New Imperial History" and "Inter-/Trans-Imperial History"

Ever since the publication of Edward Said's influential *Orientalism* in 1978, imperial or colonial history has gained new vigor and become one of the most productive subfields under European history. A growing number of scholars have challenged conventional approaches to

[33] William Kirby "The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican era," *China Quarterly* 150, (June 1997): 433.
[34] Isabella Jackson, "Chinese Colonial History in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 15, no. 3, 2014; Hans Van de Ven, *Breaking with the Past: The Maritime Customs Service and the Global Origins of Modernity in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
[35] T. G. Otte, "Great Britain, Germany, and the Far-Eastern Crisis of 1897-8," *The English Historical Review*, Nov., 1995, Vol. 110, No. 439 (Nov., 1995), 1157-1179; Bruce A. Elleman, *Wilson and China: a revised history of the Shandong question* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2002).

and knowledge about Europe's relations with its overseas empires. The sheer volume of innovative scholarship has often been subsumed under the umbrella term "new imperial history," or "imperial turn." Despite the internal variation and diversity of how exactly the label "new imperial history" can be employed, scholars mostly associated with this new methodological orientation have generally agreed upon a core set of understandings and ideas. If "old" imperial history focused more on economic exploitation, military conquest, and high politics, "new imperial history," on the contrary, has attached more importance to analysis of cultural discourse and paid greater attention to gender relations as well as racial imaginings. If "old" imperial history held the boundary between "nations" and "empires" as fast and clear, scholars under the influence of "the imperial turn" have brought the metropole and colonies into one single analytical framework.[36]

The turn to "New Imperial History" has taken on different complexions and shaped various subfields in distinctly disparate ways. The field of British history has been fundamentally recast by the "imperial turn," which has, in turn, spawned the most far-reaching and sophisticated research on Britain's historical connection with its empires.[37] The historiographical shift to imperial history in the field of French history, however, has been further complicated by the scholarly debates over social history and more recent cultural or linguistic turns.[38] Interestingly, just as Japan was a later-comer to the "club of the empires" during the late nineteenth century, the study of Japanese history did not integrate "the empire question"—or what Andre Schmid calls "the Korean question"—into their fields of inquiries until the early

[36] See Stephen Howe, ed., *The New Imperial Histories Reader* (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2020).
[37] Durba Ghosh, "Another Set of Imperial Turns?" *The American Historical Review* 117, no. 3 (June 2012): 772-793.
[38] Gary Wilder, "From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effect of Historiographic Turns," *The American Historical Review* 117, no. 3 (June 2012): 723-745.

2000s.[39] Similar points can be raised about other historical subfields that have turned towards a more serious consideration of "empires." As Durba Ghosh has suggested, "there are many more ways in which we might construct genealogies about the nature of imperial turns, the newness of imperial history, and their relationship to what are called 'new imperialisms'."[40]

Despite its dynamism and vibrancy, the "New Imperial History" is not without its critiques or challenges. The very act of pitting the "new" imperial history against the "old" one, according to Stephen Howe, seems to have produced new schism and antagonism and "occasioned a number of negative polemics."[41] In the meantime, the "new imperial history" has been compelled to constantly engage with other emergent historiographical trends—such as the global, the archival, and the postcolonial. These new patterns and topics of inquiry have brought about as much of an opportunity as a challenge to the presumption of closure consolidated by "turn talks." But perhaps a more salient and potentially parochial issue has been insightfully identified and articulated as follows by the eminent historian Antoinette Burton, one of the most influential and insistent proponents of the "imperial turn."

> "What concerns me here is the question of how the "imperial transnational" or the "global imperial" functions in recent British empire work… despite their internal variations… current work in British imperial history circling around these questions treats the transnational and the global much as earlier historians treated the national—that is, as de facto exceptional for being rooted in English/British contexts and… Victorian English histories, as well."[42]

If the closing two decades of the twentieth century have seen imperial history being done in a way that empirically and conceptually integrate a *single* empire's metropole and colonies, a fascinating development in the twenty first century has been a rising interest in interactions and

[39] Andre Schmid, "Colonialism and the `Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 951-976.
[40] Ghosh, "Another Set of Imperial Turns?" 773.
[41] Howe, *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, 3.
[42] Antoinette Burton, *Empire in Question: Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 277.

engagements among empires. In the past two decades or so, theoretical reflections on colonial history, as well as general historical narratives of empires, have all drawn attention to the very multiplicity of "empires" or "imperialisms" in their plurality. As prominent historians of empire Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have argued, "relationships *among* empires were critical to their politics and to their subjects' possibilities… (and) the intersection of empires provoked competition, imitation, and innovation."[43] The interrelationship and interconnection among empires played out across time and space. Imperial ideologies and practices over time certainly embodied conscious imitation by different empires—newly emerging empires in the nineteenth century—the United States, Russia, and Japan—looked to older imperial powers such as Britain and France for inspiration, which followed the precedents set by Spain and Portugal as well. Imperial cooperation and competition in many ways drove the course of modern history in both war and peace. Indeed, though the singular form "empire" still remains a useful descriptive term, we should strive to pluralize "empires" to trace differences and identify structural congruities.

It has not been until more recently that historians of empires have attempted to theorize the interaction and interplay across various imperial spaces. As scholars have sought to write imperial history beyond the framework of individual or national empires, they have paid greater attention to what they call "inter-imperial" or "trans-imperial" relations. As Bernhard Schär has remarked, historians of empires should not stop at "national-imperial borders" for their specific subject matters.[44] The concepts of "inter-imperial" and "trans-imperial" have a high degree of overlap, though with important differences as well. The historian of Southeast Asia Anne Foster and Asian Americanist Augusto Espiritu have both integrated "inter-imperial cooperation,

[43] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in world history*, 14-15.
[44] Bernhard C. Schär, "From Batticaloa via Basel to Berlin: Transimperial Science in Ceylon and Beyond around 1900", *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 48, no. 2 (2020): 230–62.

conflict, and subaltern agency" into their definition of inter-imperial relations.[45] Europeanists such as Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Heé have proposed the idea of "trans-imperial history" to "methodologically decentralize and dynamize empire studies." Trans-imperial history for them approaches "imperial competition, cooperation, and connectivity as entangled processes."[46] Although imperial competition, cooperation, and connection have featured prominently in both inter-imperial and trans-imperial approaches, those preferring the "trans-" prefix to that of "inter-" have made conscientious efforts to differentiate the two. For instance, as Satoshi Mizutani has explained, "Unlike 'inter-,' which means 'between' or 'among' and has spatial connotations, 'trans-' (as in 'transimperial history') has a temporal dimension."[47] In addition, scholars who have examined imperial history from the vantage points of these new terms have delineated various fields of mutual influences and circuits of exchange, including the construction of racial consciousness, transference of scientific knowledge and practices, military co-operation, economic connection, and negotiations over territorial issues, to name a few.[48]

What these new terms have brought to the surface, I would suggest, is not simply a renewed scholarly interest in the history of three Cs (competition, cooperation, and connection). Those histories have previously been done in different forms or shapes, though they might not invariably have had a theoretical framework in mind. The real stake of denationalizing imperial histories has amounted to a new definition of what constitutes an "empire." The theoretically minded imperial historian Ann Stoler has suggested that "imperial formation" rather than

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[45] Anne L. Foster, *Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919–1941* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 4,7,143; Augusto Espiritu, "Inter-Imperial Relations, the Pacific, and Asian American History," *Pacific Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (May 2014): 239-241.
[46] Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Heé, "Transimperial History - Connectivity, Cooperation and Competition," in *Journal of Modern European History* 16, no. 4 (November 2018): 430.
[47] Satoshi Mizutani, "Introduction to 'Beyond Comparison: Japanese Colonialism in Transimperial Relations," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, no. 32 (2019): 7.
[48] Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski, eds., *Imperial Co-operation and Transfer, 1870–1930: Empires and Encounters* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

"empire" might be a better analytical term. As Stoler and Carole McGranahan (another editor of this volume) have argued, "empire may be things" with a set of fixed characteristics. "Imperial formations," conversely, draws attention to each empire's "historical unfolding" and its constant transformation at each distinct historical moment.[49] Empires, along this line of analysis, should no longer be viewed as closed entities with predetermined characteristics. Though essentially a study on the local level, this dissertation addresses the nature of how we conceive empires in the modern era. Instead of clinging to the conventional image of an empire with a fixed set of enduring features defined by "national characters," I argue that distinct colonial interests, policies, and practices emerged, developed, and transformed through mutual entanglements with those of other empires. The broader theoretical implication of my approach is to rethink imperialism as a series of shared global processes as opposed to political and economic strategies carried out by individual nations.

I should clarify that my concept of "multi-imperial entanglements" is not simply a replacement of "inter-/trans-imperial history," but rather an idea that is not only more applicable to the colonial context in China but also departs from preexisting labels. Just as terms like "semi-colonialism" or "informal empire," as alluded to in the preceding pages, all have their specific points of reference and analytical parameters, so do concepts like "inter-/trans-imperial relations." If "inter-imperial history" is intrinsically and primarily linked with relations in between the states of various empires (just as the subfield "international history" does), "trans-imperial" tends to focus on more spaces in-between or beyond empires while dislocating any imperial centers. In my conceptual formulation, the prefix "multi-" connotes neither a heavy

[49] Stoler, Ann Laura, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue, eds. 2007. *Imperial Formations*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 8.

orientation towards purely state actors nor a seemingly excessive emphasis on border-crossing and deterritorialized activity and subjecthood.

More importantly, the term "multi-imperial entanglements" would encourage historians studying the Chinese colonial past to situate the nation's encounter with colonialism more wittingly into a global comparative framework. To what extent was China's colonial history consistent with, or distinct from, that of the rest of the imperial world remains an open-ended question. While some like Robert Bickers and James Hevia have advocated placing China more firmly into a colonial world and its power-knowledge production system, others such as Bryna Goodman prefer to localize the study of colonialism of China by putting into practice what Jürgen Osterhammel has succinctly described as "[pinpointing] where, when, how and to what effect did which extraneous forces impinge upon Chinese society."[50] A more conciliatory approach exemplified by Anne Reinhardt's monograph has also emerged, one that tries to capture both comparability and particularity. Emphasizing the distinctiveness of colonialism in China is a reasonable option on the ground of the nation's simultaneous preservation of sovereignty and subjugation by multiple colonial empires. However, colonial power, by nature, was incomplete, fragmentary, partial, and highly contested. Even India, "the jewel of the crown" in the British empire, was not quite the total colony as has been conventionally assumed: it was occupied by multiple imperial powers, and some princely states maintained sovereignty as well, albeit nominally sometimes.[51] Bringing China into a global colonial process is not merely a matter of historiographical revision, one most often opposed to the overly cautious "China-centered approach," but also a move towards a fuller recognition of the actual and

[50] Osterhammel, "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China," 295.
[51] Stephen Legg, "An International Anomaly? Sovereignty, the League of Nations, and India's Princely Geographies," *Journal of Historical Geography* no. 43 (2014): 96-110. I would like to thank Prof. Legg for drawing my attention to this point.

epistemological violence of colonial rule in the Chinese context. As Tani Barlow has insightfully observed,

> "The bold occlusion of any categorical status for semicolonialism even in China's treaty ports and Japanese-occupied Manchuria and Taiwan, provided an exceptionalist China to anchor U.S. Cold War area studies. The alleged stability of China's culture reflected the alleged stability of racist society in the U.S. in a realm of a political imagery that continues forty years later to exercise deadly results"[52]

Though written in an intellectual milieu where the Cold War was not yet a distant memory and where China studies were inevitably colored by the aftermath of the Cold War, Barlow's point about the potential epistemic peril of downplaying, if not totally eliding, colonialism in China still holds true today.

This dissertation suggests that the concept "multi-imperial entanglements" as a heuristic device provides a useful analytical category to engage with the scholarship on global colonial processes in other parts of the world. The ways that both Shanghai and Tianjin became sites of multi-imperial dynamics were anomalous, especially in terms of density and concentration, but connecting imperial actors and overlapping imperial trajectories often materially crystalized in specific physical sites—including contact zones, borderlands, port cities, or even oceanic spaces. The "scramble for Africa" around the turn of the twentieth century—the annexation, partitioning, and colonization of nearly all African countries save Liberia and Ethiopia by European powers—was perhaps the best example of imperial entanglements on a continental scale. In other cases, one single African country came to be dominated by multiple imperial influences. The origins of the international regime of extraterritoriality in Egypt, as historian David Todd has shown, were defined by the interactions between Britain and France in the late nineteenth century.[53] As Anne Foster has shown, Southeast Asia was another crucial site where European and American

[52] Tani Barlow, "Colonialism's Career in Postwar China Studies," *positions* 1:1 (1993): 246.
[53] David Todd, "Beneath Sovereignty: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Internationalism in Nineteenth-Century Egypt," *Law and History Review* 36, no. 1, (2018): 105-137.

empires were engaged in a wide range of interactions, including exchange of information, cooperative economic activity, and renegotiations over territorial possessions and colonized subjects.[54] India, as indicated above, was also at one point subject to colonial domination by multiple foreign powers. The Ottoman empire, a polity often compared with the Qing empire, was another place that was never fully colonized by one single imperial power, but rather came to be dominated by multiple European empires. Furthermore, the intersection of Hijaz (today's Western Saudi Arabia), Istanbul, and Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, as well as Burma and Aceh (a province in Indonesia), constituted what Seema Alavi has characterized as "a trans-Asiatic assemblage" where "'modern' Empires (British, Dutch, Ottoman and Russian) coalesced."[55]

The analytical scope of "multi-imperial entanglements" also resonates with the colonial reality in East Asia. Although Korea was an indisputable Japanese colony for nearly four decades, it was subject to imperial influences from the Qing, Euro-American empires, and the Japanese empire during the late nineteenth century, a phenomenon conceptualized by historian Kirk Larsen as "overlapping imperialisms."[56] The term "multi-imperial entanglements" would have an even broader applicability, if we were to take into account not only *simultaneous* but also *successive* multi-imperial influences.[57] This is particularly the case if we throw the rise of the Japanese empire into the mix. The emergence and development of the Japanese empire was closely linked with the influences from, interventions by, and competitions of other imperial powers. The mimetic nature of Japanese imperialism in relation to the Western models was an

[54] Foster, *Projections of Power*, 4, 7.
[55] Alavi, "Fugitive Mullahs and Outlawed Fanatics," 1337.
[56] Kirk Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Choson Korea, 1850-1910* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008): 19.
[57] My thanks go to Professor Evan Dawley for inspiring me to conceive of this possibility.

apparent embodiment of imperial influence,[58] and a crucial historical event that gave impetus to Japan's determination to assert itself as a colonial power was the "Triple Intervention" by France, Germany, and Russia into Japan's negotiations with the Qing in the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895.[59] Japan's growing imperial ambition in the first two decades of the twentieth century constituted perhaps the most destabilizing factor in northeast Asia, with Manchuria turned into a geopolitical hotbed where multiple foreign powers vied for supremacy. At the height of WWII, Japan even extended its "New Order" into Micronesia, engulfing the former European colonies in Southeast Asia. The history of Taiwan, Japan's "model colony," offers the most salient example of a place shaped by *successive* multi-imperial controls. As historian Arif Dirlik has articulated,

> "Indeed, Taiwan's historical formation may be viewed as a succession of colonialisms: the initial settlers of the island indigenized over thousands of years were colonized and displaced by settlers from the Mainland during the Ming but especially during the Qing dynasties, by the Dutch colonial unification of the island, by Qing incorporation of the island into its administrative structure, by half a century of Japanese colonialism, followed by the Guomindang after World War II, and presently by the ongoing threat from the Mainland."[60]

The idea of "multi-imperial entanglements" thus draws attention to the myriad ways in which a certain place—be it a city, a state, an archipelago, a multinational region, or even an entire continent—came to be defined and shaped by multiple and overlapping imperial trajectories, simultaneously or successively.

Chinese Urban History: Making Sense of the Multi-Imperial Character of Tianjin and Shanghai

[58] Robert Tierney, *Tropics of Savagery: The Culture of Japanese Empire in Comparative Frame* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 14-18.
[59] William G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 58-59.
[60] Arif Dirlik, "Taiwan: The Land Colonialisms Made," *boundary 2* 45, no. 3, (2018): 8; it should also be noted that Dirlik does not take into consideration Taiwan's being under protection of the US military empire during and after the Cold War, which in itself is another form of imperial influence, see Wendy Cheng and Chih-ming Wang, "Introduction: Against Empire: Taiwan, American Studies, and the Archipelagic," *American Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (June 2021): 335-341.

In his oft-cited edited volume *Remaking the Chinese City*, Joseph Esherick proposes a typology of modern Chinese cities—treaty ports, capital cities, industrial cities, tourist cities, railway cities, inland cities, and frontier cities.[61] As a distinctly urban type in modern China, treaty port cities were inherently linked with foreign imperial activity in China. The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing forced China to open five ports to British trade and residence. In the following decades, a few treaty ports developed into a full-fledged system along the Chinese coastline, with its influences and networks even stretching into inland China. Tianjin and Shanghai, the objects of the present study, were the largest and most well-known treaty port cities in China.[62] The treaty system was not an exclusive Chinese phenomenon. Japan, prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868, also opened several ports to American and European powers, although these treaty ports did not have the same longevity as their Chinese counterparts.[63] Treaty port cities often conjured up diverging representations: it was at the forefront of Chinese modernity and industrial development but was nevertheless fundamentally linked with, and shaped by, Western-Japanese imperialisms.[64]

It is no simple matter to delineate a historiographical genealogy of "treaty port" studies. Works on the political and legal institutions of treaty port cities began to appear even before the "treaty system" itself came to an end.[65] John K. Fairbank's *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast* was the foundational study on the formation of what he identified "the treaty system." The

[61] Joseph Esherick, ed., *Remaking the Chinese city: modernity and national identity, 1900-1950* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1999): 2-7.
[62] Other main ones were Canton and Hankou.
[63] J.E. Hoare, *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests 1858–1899* (Kent: Japan Library, 1994).
[64] See Leo Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999).
[65] See Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson, "Introduction," in Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson, eds., *Law, land and power: treaty ports and concessions in modern China* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016): 12-13.

central point on "Western impact, China response" has been critiqued by China scholars for generations, but *Trade and Diplomacy* nevertheless offered the first comprehensive and empirically driven account of Sino-British diplomatic history in the creation of "the treaty system," the wider foreign presence in China, and some of the most foundational historical actors (missionaries and businessmen) and institutions (the Maritime Customs Service).[66] The scholarship on Chinese treaty port cities in the following decades has undergone a pendulum-like movement. While it had mainly fallen out of favor in the 1970s, the study of treaty ports gained new vigor and momentum in the 1990s for a variety of academic and practical reasons.[67] In general, there have been two sets of bifurcation in scholarly interpretations of the foreign presence in treaty port cities, or China writ large. On the one hand, it has either been credited with bringing about modernizing elements into these treaty ports or been denounced as enabling imperialist exploitation.[68] On the other hand, the foreign presence, or rather the influence thereof, has been considered as either the driving force galvanizing Chinese society into changes or a delusional "grand colonial design" circumscribed only within confined urban spaces.[69] More recently, two edited volumes—*Law, Land and Power* and *Life in Treaty Port China and Japan*—have focused squarely on treaty port cities, albeit with very different emphases. While the former focuses on colonial power, governance, and infrastructure in the context of treaty ports, [70] the latter merges "nostalgia and reality, the everyday and the extraordinary, centre and periphery, local and foreign via case studies from China and Japan."[71]

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[66] John K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).
[67] For a detailed discussion on this, see Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson, "Introduction," 13-14.
[68] For a more elaborate discussion on this, see Osterhammel, "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China," 292-295.
[69] Murphey, *The Outsiders*, 12-35.
[70] Bickers and Jackson, "Introduction," 11.
[71] Donna Brunero and Stephanie Villalta Puig, eds., *Life in Treaty Port China and Japan* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018): 3.

Though undeniably a product of imperialism, treaty port cities were not exactly the same as "colonial cities." Recent studies of colonial cities have moved beyond the traditional paradigm that portrays these cities as laboratories of modernization, where the Western colonial urban ideals and practices were transposed to the indigenous society.[72] Instead, the new generation of scholarship on colonial cities have shown that colonial urbanism was inextricably linked with, and gave rise to, the growth of the capitalist world order, while emphasizing them as sites of encounter, where the interactive dynamics between the colonizer and the colonized shaped the configuration of urban spaces.[73] Such a paradigm, while valuable, is not adequate in explaining the complexity of Tianjin and Shanghai, where urban spaces were shaped by multilateral relations both between the colonizers and the colonized and between the colonizers themselves. Thus, my project highlights the multi-imperial character of these cities as well as the multi-dimensional relations critical to their formation.

The cities of Shanghai and Tianjin have both garnered significant academic interests, though admittedly Shanghai studies are much more bountiful than those of the largest treaty port in northern China. Aside from Shanghai's representational status in the field of Chinese history, other more practical reasons can also explain the city's enduring popularity as an object of analysis: the greater availability of archival documents at the Shanghai Municipal Archive and Library, the general proclivity of Shanghai-based scholars to communicate with their foreign counterparts, and the relative ease with which foreign scholars could live and conduct research in the city, to name a few. Reviewing all major works dealing with these two cities' histories would

[72] For a more elaborate discussion on more traditional understandings of colonial cities, see Brenda S.A. Yeoh, *Contesting Space: Power Relations and The Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4-9.
[73] William Glover, *Making Lahore Modern: Constructing and Imagining a Colonial City*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2008; Metcalf, Thomas. "Colonial Cities," in *The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History*, ed., Peter Clark. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

be an excessively unwieldy task,[74] but shifting historiographical trends and interpretive frameworks pertaining to these two urban centers should rather be noted. The representational status of Shanghai on the national landscape, together with Shanghai studies' overwhelming presence within China studies, is hard to deny. Even in a volume with the unambiguous aim of looking "beyond Shanghai," its chief editor, Joseph Esherick, has nevertheless acknowledged that "there was hardly a city that was not linked in some way to Shanghai."[75] Shanghai studies in Anglophone academia can be roughly divided into three stages. From the 1950s to 1970s, the works produced during this period dealt heavily with the foreign presence in the city's treaty port incarnation. Written mostly by former Shanghailanders, these works were inevitably tinged with a romantic nostalgia and often evinced positive assessment of the foreign influence on the city. From the 1980s through 1990s, however, there was a significant surge of scholarly interest in the history of "Old Shanghai," driven by various historiographical and practical factors. In addition to the quantitative difference, these decades witnessed the interpretive shift from foreign influences on the city to a more China-centered approach to the city's past.[76] The scholarly energy devoted to Shanghai studies did not show any sign of being sapped by the turn of the twenty first century and has certainly continued, which Joshua Fogel has described as "the recent

[74] For the sake of space, this introduction only discusses historiography in English- and Chinese-language academia. I should note, however, that there is a fair amount of scholarship that has been produced in Japan, France, and Germany on Shanghai studies. Many works have been published in languages other than English and Chinese, but some scholars, especially those from Europe, have published important works in English. For the most representative work in Japanese, see Takahashi Kōsuke and Furumaya Tadao, eds., Shanhai shi (Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 1995); In the German academy, there has been what might be called the Heidelberg School of Shanghai studies. Some notable references are: Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872–1912* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004); Rudolf Wagner, ed, *Joining the Global Public: Word, Image, and City in Early Chinese Newspapers, 1870–1910* (New York: University of New York Press, 2007).

[75] Esherick, *Remaking Chinese Cities*, 13.

[76] For a more elaborate overview of the works produced during these two periods, see Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "New Approaches to Old Shanghai," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 32, no. 2 (Autumn, 2001): 263-279.

boom in Shanghai studies."[77] What is more germane to this dissertation is the discernible backlash against the China-centric approach and the reevaluation of the role of foreign presence in the city's history. It is within these historiographical changes that imperialism has been revisited as important forces shaping the "Old Shanghai." Isabella Jackson's *Shaping Modern Shanghai* (noted above) and James Carter's *Champions Day* are some of the most prominent scholarly productions recently.[78]

The study of Tianjin has followed a distinctly disparate historiographical trajectory than that of Shanghai. Unlike Shanghai whose treaty-port-era glory inspired many writings of former Shanghailanders even decades after the dissolution of the treaty system, "Old Tianjin," though singularly interesting, did not generate the same level of fanfare. It was not until the 1980s that China scholars began to pay serious attention to this largest industrial city in the north of China. The secondary literature on Tianjin history has approached its subject matter from two perspectives: 1) state-society relationship; 2) Tianjin as a unique colonial space. After William Rowe's two-volume tour de force on Hankou (Hankow) transplanted the "state-society" polemics into China studies, many China scholars, especially those working on the country's urban pasts, followed suit.[79] By focusing on different social groups, salt merchants and bankers, Kwan Man Bun and Brett Sheehan have both delved into the dynamic state-society interactions within the urban context of Tianjin.[80]

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[77] Joshua Fogel, "The Recent Boom in Shanghai Studies," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 71, no. 2 (April 2010): 313.
[78] James Carter, *Champions Day: The End of Old Shanghai* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020).
[79] William Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984); William Rowe, *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
[80] Man Bun Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Brett Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times: Money, Banks, and State-Society Relations in Republican Tianjin* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

The unique setting of Sino-foreign interactions in Tianjin has attracted even more scholarly attraction. As indicated above, Ruth Rogaski's sophisticated study of "hygienic modernity" is perhaps the most well-known work on the history of Tianjin's colonial past, in which she coins the term "hypercolony" to describe the multiplicity of colonial settlements in the city. Despite its limited definition and narrow applicability, "hypercolony" remains a useful descriptive term to "draw attention to the potential implications of that arise when one urban space is divided among multiple imperialisms."[81] More recently, Elizabeth LaCouture has continued this line of inquiry by investigating what it meant for the urban elites to live in Republican-era Tianjin, a city divided by multiple colonial settlements. *Jiating* (translated as either family or house) within this uniquely cosmopolitan urban environment, LaCouture argues, was a crucial space where Chinese men and women produced and articulated their class and gender identities and fashioned their own conceptions of modernity during the first half of the twentieth century.[82]

Among Chinese (PRC) historians, there has been considerable scholarly interest in the history of foreign imperialism in Chinese treaty port cities. The historical scholarship on the foreign presence in these two cities can be divided into three phases. From the founding of the PRC to the reform era (beginning in 1978), scholars approached the question of foreign imperialism in treaty ports based on the "revolutionary history paradigm (*geming shiguan* 革命史观)," one that is saturated with CCP ideology. Anti-imperialists struggles (such as the Boxer Uprising), mass movements (*qunzhong yundong* 群众运动), and CCP activities of organizing

[81] Rogaski, *Hygienic modernity*, 11.
[82] Elizabeth LaCouture, *Dwelling in the World: Family, House, and Home in Tianjin, China, 1860–1960*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021, 1-14.

workers and students were of central importance to this historiography.[83] In the broader context of China's economic and social reforms in the 1980s, the history of these treaty port cities gained new momentum, which marked the beginning of phase two. The access to Chinese archives improved drastically, which generated renewed interests in local history research, as well as "a nationwide program to revive the Chinese tradition of writing local history."[84] As a result, more nuanced interpretations and empirically based works appeared in large quantity during this period, and the history of foreign presence in these cities was, and has been, generally placed in the subcategory of "zujie shi (租界史 the concession history)." While Western institutions such as the SMC or the Chinese Maritime Customs were still viewed as serving primarily the imperialists' interests, mainland Chinese scholars nevertheless began to note the positive influences brought about by the Westerners on these cities' socio-economic modernization.[85]

This scholarly trend has carried on into the third phase starting in the twenty first century. This phase has witnessed an efflorescence of further historical inquiry into the concession history, with research topics ranging from municipal governance to expatriate population within the foreign concessions and from socio-cultural lives to architectural constellations of these concessionary spaces. It is also worth mentioning that there has been an outpouring of publications on source materials, compilation of archival documents, myriad historical anecdotes, and documentary photographs, as well as popular histories and memoirs. In order to give a sense of the topical scope and variety of scholarly works on "the concession history" in mainland China, it is worthwhile to highlight two areas of inquiry: 1) the study of the Shanghai

[83] Wasserstrom, "New Approaches to Old Shanghai," 270; Zhang Limin (张利民) and Ren Jidong (任吉东), "Jindai Tianjin chengshi shi yanjiu zongshu 近代天津城市史研究综述," *Shilin*, no. 2 (2011): 174.
[84] Hanchao Lu, *Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 1-2.
[85] See, for instance, Yuan Jicheng (袁继成), *Jindai Zhongguo zujie shigao* 近代中国租界史稿 (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1988).

French Concession; and 2) the study of the Japanese Concession in Tianjin. Neither of these topics has received much scholarly attention in the English-language scholarship, but things are different on the other end of the Pacific. The Shanghai Social Science Academy and Shanghai Normal University have jointly held biennial conferences on the Shanghai French Concession since 2014, and there has already been an academic journal—*Shanghai Fa zujie shi yanjiu* (上海法租界史研究 The Journal of the History of the Shanghai French Concession)—devoted specifically to the history of the city's French-governed territory. In the meantime, given the considerable number of Japanese residents in Tianjin, interesting monographs and articles on the Japanese Concession in the city have appeared in remarkable quality and quantity. Wan Lujian's *Jindai Tianjin Riben qiaomin yanjiu* (近代天津日本侨民研究 A Study of the Japanese Community in Modern Tianjin), for instance, is an exemplary inter-disciplinary work that provides a panoramic view of the politics, economics, and social lives of the Tianjin Japanese Concession.[86]

If this has been the status quo of the historiography on Tianjin's and Shanghai's colonial pasts, what insights would a focus on the multi-imperial character bring to the existing scholarship? To begin with, paying greater attention to the interactive dynamics of multiple empires within the cities does not just fill in some factual lacuna, but also helps undermine the Anglo-centric narratives of these two cities at the expense of colonial experiences of other foreign powers. Despite some studies of the histories of other colonial concessions in these two cities,[87] the British colonial presence still occupies a central place in this line of historiography.

[86] Wan Lujian (万鲁建), *Jindai Tianjin Riben qiaomin yanjiu* 近代天津日本侨民研究 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2010).

[87] For these exceptions, see Bickers and Henriot, *New Frontiers*; Maurizio Marinelli has published several articles on the history and contemporary legacy of the Tianjin Italian Concession. For one of his most representative works, see Maurizio Marinelli, "Making Concessions in Tianjin: Heterotopia and Italian Colonialism in Mainland China," *Urban History* 36, no. 3 (2009): 399-425.

There is no denial that Britain was the leading imperial power in China until the interwar period, but its centrality to China's colonial formations should not lead us to consider British imperialism in China as a teleologically hegemonic phenomenon untouched by any forms of entanglement with other colonial empires. Although various elements of British imperialism will feature prominently in this dissertation, I analyze the British colonial experience in China in terms of its proportionality rather than its exceptionalism and in terms of its intersections with other imperial powers rather than its originary character.

More importantly, scholarly discussions of these two cities' colonial histories have moved beyond asking *whether* these two cities experienced colonialism without being fully colonized, but should instead focus on, to quote Paul Cohen (who, ironically, has often been associated with a deemphasis of imperialism in China), "defin(ing) with precision … the specific situations with regard to which imperialism was relevant and then to show how it was relevant."[88] From this perspective, traditional notions of synarchy, as proposed by Fairbank, or what Linda Johnson has called "dual city" are useful for explaining the Sino-foreign interplay within these "contact zones," but they simply cannot capture the complexity and multiplicity at the heart of Shanghai's and Tianjin's colonial experiences.[89] It is important to underscore that these concessionary spaces did not exist in isolation from one another but were rather locked in complex entanglements and mutual influences that in turn delineated the cities' tangled political landscape.

What is at stake here is not simply the "thick histories" of foreign-foreign interactions within two large treaty port cities, but rather the ways in which we conceive of the spatial arrays

[88] Cohen, *Discovering History in China*, 147.
[89] John K. Fairbank, "Synarchy under the Treaties," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *Chinese Thought and Institutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 204-231; Linda Johnson, *Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074-1858* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 320-346.

of imperial powers. The history of European imperial expansion was often linked with the narrative of rationalization of space. As Lewis and Wigen have described in *The Myth of Continent*, the spatial manifestation of imperial powers was "a jigsaw composition of the world where space is divided into several mutually exclusive domains."[90] Homogenous internally and conflicted externally, these enclosed spaces bespeak a way of "mapping" in service of empires. This linear, teleological narration is, however, a myth. By no means was the production of imperial spaces consistent with an idealized image defined by monochrome shading of imperial maps. The administrative and political fragmentation of Shanghai and Tianjin, characterized by the coexistence of multiple foreign concessions/settlements, constituted an interesting spatial variation of imperial sovereignty. With their political fragmentation, legal differentiation, and often undefined borders between concessionary spaces, these cities were the microcosm of a certain type of modern empires' political geographies—or what Lauren Benton has called "micro-regions"—as opposed to broader geographical categories such as Orient and Occident, continents, and climatic zones.[91]

Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of scholarly debates over such terms as "space," "border," "boundary," and, perhaps most contentiously, "territory." Some China historians have adopted these theoretical formulations and applied them in their respective subject matters, most of which are centered on frontier areas and non-Han ethnicities.[92] However, rarely have these concepts been used to analyze the history of treaty port cities. This dissertation suggests that these concepts have offered a useful analytical tool for our

[90] Martin W. Lewis and Kären Wigen, *The Myth of Continent* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
[91] Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-4.
[92] Nianshen Song, *Making Borders in Modern East Asia: The Tumen River Demarcation, 1881–1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Ruth Rogaski, *Knowing Manchuria: Environments, the Senses, and Natural Knowledge on an Asian Borderland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022).

understanding of the history of Tianjin and Shanghai during the modern era. These two treaty ports should not be considered as two enclosed and bounded urban spaces, nor should the colonial concessions within the cities be viewed as self-contained geographical entities. It would be more productive to conceive of different concessionary spaces as "always under construction," constituted through constant interrelations among the foreign powers and the local Chinese, and "always in process."[93] The intersection and juxtaposition of multiple colonial concessions, along with areas under the Chinese jurisdiction, created alternate, interstitial spaces as well, involving many social groups as well as state and non-state actors.

Terms like "border" and "territory" are critical to our understanding of the formation of modern states or the expansion of empires. In the same vein, the cities of Tianjin and Shanghai, I would argue, were fundamentally defined by multiple, crisscrossing, and sometimes overlapping internal borders and territories. Neither "territory" nor "border" should be treated as a neutral object or a self-evident marker of sovereignty, especially when we consider "sovereignty" of modern empires as inherently contingent and stubbornly incomplete.[94] Instead of being a fixed unit of sovereign space, territories and borders are "a process, made and remade, shaped and shaping, active and reactive."[95] If territory is essentially an expression of "powerful processes," through which power relations are spatialized, borders then represent the parameter of certain sovereign claims on space.[96] In addition, geographer Stuart Elden has revealed another layer of the significance of territory as "a ruling strategy and political technology" that encompasses relations of terrains (military-strategic value) and land (political-economic value).[97] Similarly,

[93] Massey, *For Space*, 9-15.
[94] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 2.
[95] Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 17.
[96] Anssi Paasi, "Border Studies reanimated: Going beyond the territorial/rational divide," *Environment & Planning A* 44 (10), 2012: 2303-09.
[97] Elden, *The Birth of Territory*.

just as borders are not purely physical, delimited lines and spaces between different polities, bordering is also an important governmental practice designed to rule, regulate, and separate "us" from "others."[98] The emergence, development, and decline of the colonial concessions in Tianjin and Shanghai can be viewed through the lens of these theorizations of space, territory, and borders. The metamorphosis of Tianjin's and Shanghai's colonial spaces was essentially what Lawrence Grossberg has called a "conjuncture," which delineates "a social formation as fractured and conflictual, along multiple axes, planes, and scales, constantly in search of temporary balances or structural stabilities through a variety of practices and processes of struggle and negotiation."[99] As the following substantive chapters will show, the concessionary spaces of these two cities were not separate domains of colonial control, but rather interlinked borders and territories of geopolitical and multi-imperial entanglements.

The Story to Come

Proceeding chronologically and alternating geographically between Shanghai and Tianjin, this dissertation is divided into six chapters along the lines of international or national wars and local crises. Organizing my dissertation in this fashion brings into sharp focus how changing imperial power dynamics were mapped onto the urban space of Tianjin and Shanghai and shaped the urban politics of these crucial sites of multilateral imperialisms. It also shows how multi-imperial entanglements grew on and out of these localized crises or events, which in turn made those entanglements historically contingent, if not utterly precarious. As the titles of these chapters suggest, each chapter covers a distinctive way in which multi-imperial entanglements materially crystalized in Tianjin or Shanghai from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries and in which they came to be tangled with various elements of these urban

[98] Daniel Meier, Introduction to the special issue: Bordering the middle east. *Geopolitics* 23 (3), 2018: 495–504.
[99] Lawrence Grossberg, *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010): 40-41.

settings. Taken as a whole, these substantive chapters bring to light the diversity, variety, and implications of multi-imperial entanglements in the context of Chinese treaty port cities.

Before offering a brief overview of the following substantive chapters, it is necessary to explain why this dissertation focuses on two urban centers rather than one. By examining both cities in relation to one another, my research not only decenters Shanghai as the only representative case of colonialism in China, but also underscores the comparability between Chinese treaty port cities. What these two cities had in common, this study shows, was the fragmented administration and multiplicity of colonial powers that in turn generated complex urban governance and entangled urban politics. This comparative element of my dissertation differentiates itself from existing scholarship on colonialism in China, the overwhelming majority of which has dealt with colonial dynamics within one single site. It is certainly important to recognize the unevenness and regional variation of colonialism in China, but this need not mean overlooking broader patterns of colonialism across China's vast landscapes. By placing Shanghai and Tianjin in conjunction with one another, this dissertation emphasizes the multiple, overlapping, and crisscrossing imperial trajectories at the heart of China's colonial experience during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Chapter one— "Multi-Imperial Entanglements as Inter-Municipal Relations"—focuses on the changing relationship between the International Settlement and the French Concession in Shanghai since the Taiping Uprising (1850-1864) and explains its implications for urban construction by focusing on an infrastructural project (the Yangjingbang bridge crisis). Chapter two, entitled "Multi-Imperial Entanglements in Local Riots," revisits the two well studied popular disturbances in post-Taiping Shanghai known as "the Siming gongsuo riots," but it draws attention to the connection between multi-imperial entanglements (between the British and

French state actors in these cases) and local crises. The third chapter examines a distinctive historical moment in Chinese history where imperial encroachments reached a new height at the turn of the twentieth century. “Multi-Imperial Entanglements and Urban Governance” explains the intercorrelation between multi-imperial entanglements and urban governance in Tianjin. Chapter four— “Multi-Imperial Entanglements in the Eyes of a Major Chinese Figure”—is centered on Yuan Shikai and his diplomatic maneuvering among multiple imperial powers during the negotiations over retrocession of the Tianjin Provisional Government (TPG) to native authorities. Chapter five, entitled “Multi-Imperial Entanglements and Reterritorialization of the City” examines the impact of the First World War on the city of Tianjin by zeroing in on the negotiations over the restoration of the Tianjin German Concession. The closing chapter shifts attention to anti-colonial activists, as represented by the Korean Provisional Government (KPG, a government in exile), in colonial Shanghai during the interwar era. “Multi-Imperial Entanglements and Anti-Colonial Violence” underscores the multifaceted possibilities and challenges characteristic of the peculiar political landscape of Shanghai for both the colonial authorities and the anti-imperial activists.

"MULTI-IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS AS INTER-MUNICIPAL RELATIONS"

Good Neighbor or Archnemesis—Anglo-French Relations in Colonial Shanghai

Introduction

Historically, the British and French empires were deeply intertwined and mutually constitutive. In a recent edited volume on Anglo-French imperial interconnections, James R. Fichter describes their relationships as "*frères ennemis*—frenemies who, with one act of competitive collaboration, managed to simultaneously support and undermine each other."[100] Although these two empires interacted with other colonial powers throughout much of their histories, the Anglo-French dyad, which extended to all the continents of the world and lasted for centuries, was like no other. The fraught relationships between Britain and France had a long history, some of which even stretched back to the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) that decidedly set England (later, Britain) and France on a path of separation and antagonism. Anglo-French imperial relations played out on a truly global scale: their involvements in Atlantic slavery and slave trades were closely entangled; they were engaged in a series of colonial conflicts over India and North America during the early modern era; and even non-state actors such as seafarers, explorers, geographers, and archeologists from the two empires were often locked in a complex web of cooperation and competition. The first decades of the nineteenth century—especially after the Battle of Waterloo of 1815—witnessed significant improvements in Anglo-French relations, although their tensions and mutual suspicion never truly disappeared.

[100] J. R. Fichter (ed.), *British and French Colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies, 2019), 1.

It was around the mid-nineteenth century that the relationship between China and European imperial powers began to change dramatically. Britain and France—and, to a lesser degree, the United States—played a pioneering role in opening China to foreign trade. Anglo-French imperial intersections featured prominently in China. The best-known episode is the military co-operation between Britain and France during the Arrow War (1856-1860), also known as the Second Opium War, with China, during which a joint military force was dispatched to Beijing to force a treaty on the Manchu rulers. The southernmost city of Canton, where the Chinese boarding of the Arrow ship provided sufficient pretexts for the British aggression, was occupied by an allied Anglo-French administration from 1858-1861.[101] Despite these cases of cooperation, there were chronic frictions and strategic competition between the British and French. This is especially true after the 1880s, when imperial powers carved out their respective spheres of influence on Chinese soil. While the British viewed the French presence in the Yangzi region with gnawing anxiety, the French were constantly worried that their dominance in Southern China would be undermined by the British.[102] Anglo-French imperial connections also had clear effects in the areas of transportation and communication, as manifested primarily by the interdependence between Guangzhouwan, a French leased territory, and British Hong Kong.[103]

The city of Shanghai was, among others, a crucial site where Anglo-French interactions materially crystalized and exerted important impacts on various areas of imperial activity. Shanghai was one of the five Chinese coastal cities that were established as treaty ports as a

[101] Steven A. Leibo, "Not so Calm an Administration: The Anglo-French Occupation of Canton, 1858-1861," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 28, (1988): 16-33.
[102] Xiao Wei (肖玮), "Jiawu zhanhou Hainan dao wei lunwei Faguo zujie di beihou de Ying Fa boyi (甲午战后海南岛未沦为法国租借地背后的英法博弈)," *Hunan shifan daxue xuebao* 30, no. 7 (2017): 87-95.
[103] Bert Becker, *France and Germany in the South China Sea, c. 1840-1930: Maritime competition and Imperial Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

result of the Treaty of Nanjing following the British victory over Qing China during the Opium War (1839-1842). The city's spatial configuration was significantly transformed by the construction of a British settlement in 1843. In June 1844 and January 1848, the Americans and French respectively followed Britain's footsteps in setting up their own settlements in the city. In 1863, the British and American settlements merged into one single administrative body, known as the International Settlement. These two foreign settlements were administered in different ways. Whereas the International Settlement was run by the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC)—a municipal body consisting of members elected from local taxpayers—the French Concession was governed in a more straightforwardly colonialist manner. This tripartite division of urban administration—the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the Chinese district—persisted throughout the history of treaty-port era Shanghai (1842-1945) until its disintegration under Japanese occupation at the height of the Second World War.

No other Chinese city has attracted as much academic attention as Shanghai, so much so that some scholars have even suggested that "modern Shanghai studies must be considered a more developed and vital field in American historical circles than urban history in general."[104] There has been a substantial amount of English-language scholarship on the colonial districts of the city and on the foreign communities. These studies have delved into institutional, political, social, cultural dynamics within the Shanghai foreign settlements and revealed the complex interplay between Western imperial authorities and the Chinese society.[105] The distinction

[104] Liu Haiyan and Kristin Stapleton, "Chinese Urban History: State of the Field," *China Information* XX, no. 3 (2006): 401.

[105] The translated version of Marie Bergère's *Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity* perhaps remains the most comprehensive general introductory work. See Marie-Claire Bergère, *Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). It is also important to underscore that Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot have also made significant contributions to our understanding of the foreign governance of the city. More recently, Isabella Jackson and James Carter have both published monographs detailing the institutional frameworks of the International Settlement, as well as urban inhabitants' social and cultural lives therein.

between the British-dominated International Settlement and the French Concession has been a well-understood subject matter. However, the interaction between these two municipal entities within the city has remained a remarkably underexplored field of inquiry. There are, of course, studies that have touched on their interconnections in Shanghai, but they have tended to simply mention them in passing. [106] Therefore, more work needs to be done to tease out what their entanglements meant not only for the city of Shanghai but also for these two intersecting imperial/municipal authorities.

This chapter bridges the historiographical gap between the study of colonial Shanghai and that of Anglo-French interconnections. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in historical connections between Britain and France. These works have helped break down the analytical compartmentalization separating studies of "British empire" and those of "French empire."[107] Interestingly, though not really a popular field of inquiry in contemporary Anglophone academia, the Anglo-French relationship was nonetheless one of the main themes discussed in writings published during the treaty port era, and a cursory reading would reveal each side's deep-seated apprehension over the other's existence and over their fraught relationship.[108] This chapter suggests that more serious attention should be paid to the dynamic interplay between the British and French authorities and to the role of Anglo-French interactions

[106] Christian Henriot's most recent monograph on death in Shanghai mentions the coordination between the FMC and SMC in transporting corpses. See Christian Henriot, *Scythe and the City: A Social History of Death in Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), passim.; Isabella Jackson has touched briefly on the interaction between the SMC and FMC in the early twentieth century in the areas of sanitation, see Jackson, Shaping Modern Shanghai, 189-194; also, Chong Xu's work examines the Anglo—French common defense plan during the Taiping Rebellion, see Chong Xu, "Imperialism in the city: war and the making of the municipal administration in the French Concession of Shanghai in the Taiping period, 1853–1862," *Urban History*, 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963926819000579.

[107] See Fichter, *British and French Colonialism*.

[108] Both Couling's *The History of Shanghai* and Maybon's and Fredet's *Histoire de la Concession française de Changhaï*, on both of which this chapter draws heavily, contain an abundance of information on Anglo-French interactions in the city. See G. Lanning, S. Couling, *The History of Shanghai* (Shanghai: For the Shanghai Municipal Council by Kelly & Walsh, 1923);

in shaping the built environment of the city and in dynamizing its urban politics. In this great metropolis near the Huangpu River, Anglo-French interactions were not characterized by either incessant power rivalry or utterly harmonious synergy, nor did their relationships always reflect the relationships between their metropolitan governments in London and Paris. Instead, this chapter argues that it was the local conditions—the very complexity resulting from the city's fragmented administrative systems—that played a decisive role in defining their relationships in Shanghai. Furthermore, this chapter highlights a crucial underlying tension between the two municipalities that revolved around the separate and independent municipality of the French Concession. Over the course of many interactions between the SMC and FMC as exemplified by the few episodic moments examined in this chapter, the SMC in the International Settlement consistently attributed any administrative obstacles or practical difficulties to the separate municipality of the French Concession. However, despite the continuous efforts made by the municipal authorities in the International Settlement to merge the two settlements, the French consul, along with the FMC, always stood their ground by repudiating any plans of amalgamation. Furthermore, their profound mutual mistrust and deep-seated tensions contributed to these municipal authorities' constant attention to maintaining and policing their boundaries between their territories, as manifested in the Yangjingbang bridge question to be examined below.

Drawing heavily on the English- and French-language archival materials held at the Shanghai Municipal Archive (SMA), complemented by newspaper reports and other writings produced by contemporary observers, this chapter consists of two main parts. The first part offers a broad overview of the Anglo-French relationship in the city with a particular emphasis on how the Taiping war constituted a watershed moment in the development of their relations. The

second part—the bulk of this chapter—focuses on a joint infrastructural project known as the Yangjingbang bridge case. This over decade-long construction work gives us a clear sense of the many practical difficulties and administrative headaches, as well as the periodic contentions, between the two municipalities. My authorial choice of focusing on the Yangjingbang bridge crisis stems from two reasons. First, although the SMC and FMC were in frequent contact with one another regarding a variety of urban construction projects, the "Yangjingbang bridge question" demanded the most sustained attention from both municipalities, which resulted in much letter writing, painstaking cooperation, and mutual accusations. Second, some of the points of contention over the course of the bridge crisis—boundary policing, the independent status of the French Concession, and dissimilar administrative styles between the two—epitomized the fraught relationship between the two municipalities during the late nineteenth century.

Reunion, or Separation? —That is the Question

For Shanghai specialists, it is common knowledge that three prominent imperial powers—Britain, France, and the United States—established their respective concessions in the city in the second half of the 1840s. Although the foreign concessions in Shanghai were a result of local arrangements between the imperial consuls and Chinese officials (Taotai), it is equally important to note that the interactions between these foreign consuls also played a role in the establishment of the colonial enclaves. The British took the initiative, and the *Land Regulations*—"a municipal mini-constitution"—were jointly devised by George Balfour and Taotai Gong Mujiu (宫慕久) in 1845.[109] Originally a Sino-British invention, the "crude codes" did not lay out the procedures to be observed by non-British land buyers.[110] Despite consul Balfour's efforts to place all foreign settlers under the exclusive jurisdiction of the British

[109] Bergère, *Shanghai*, 46.
[110] Ibid., 30.

empire, the French authorities readily dismissed this proposal. This divergence of opinions soon led to the creation of the French Concession. The French and Chinese officials were engaged in prolonged negotiations, where the former adamantly rejected the latter's suggestion that a piece of land within the British enclave would be offered to the French. In 1849, the French consul Charles de Montigny secured a plot of land on the southern side of the Yangjingbang creek across the existing British Concession.[111]



Figure 1.1 "Plan of the City and Port of Shanghai, 1848." (https://www.virtualshanghai.net/Maps/Collection)

The decade-long civil war between the Taipings and the Qing drastically shaped various aspects of Shanghai's urban society. As a consequence of the occupation of the city's Chinese quarter by the Small Sword Society (*xiaodao hui* 小刀会), the foreign concession of Shanghai witnessed a considerable influx of Chinese refugees from the adjacent Chinese district. With the local Chinese bureaucracy reduced to a defunct state, the foreign authorities in Shanghai decided

[111] Ibid., 31-32.

to take upon themselves the responsibilities of urban administration. Two crucial measures, among others, to regulate Shanghai's Sino-foreign communities were the creation of the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) and the revision of the *Land Regulations* in 1854. The original SMC included all three concessions, and the 1854 *Land Regulations*, which granted the SMC the right of self-government, were accordingly applicable to all the foreign settlements and Western residents therein. These arrangements were not readily accepted by the home governments. The British government did not recognize the validity of the revised *Land Regulations* until twenty years later. Despite the French consul's participation in this arrangement, the government back in the metropole simply refused to ratify these regulations.[112]

The Taiping war also redefined the British-French relationship in the city of Shanghai. Their disputes began to emerge when the Chinese imperial troops attacked the Small Sword rebels in the city. Bordering Shanghai's Chinese district, the French Concession faced grave military menace. Therefore, a common defense plan was agreed upon by the British and French authorities. However, Anglo-French frictions soon appeared when the British authorities issued a joint declaration with the Taiping rebels about the security regulations in the British settlement in order to maintain strict neutrality policy. The French consul, Benoit Edan, and other military officials reacted to this joint declaration with indignation, as it did not include the French property and the French Concession in its limits of protection.[113] More seriously, it was found that the rebels were able to sell their spoils and purchase supplies in the British settlement. Edan wrote several long letters to his British counterpart, John Alcock, complaining about the continuous support that the British effectively provided for the rebels.[114] On January 6, 1855, the

[112] G. Lanning, S. Couling, *The History of Shanghai* (Shanghai: For the Shanghai Municipal Council by Kelly & Walsh, 1923), vol. II, 69.
[113] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession française de Changhaï*, 149-150.
[114] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession française de Changhaï*, 153-158.

French Rear Admiral Laguerre decided to unilaterally take military actions against the Taiping rebels in the city when a fort was built by the rebels within the French Concession. This military intervention had critical implications: it marked the abandonment of the "neutrality policy," undermined the common defense plan, and, most importantly, cast doubt over the vision of a unified municipality in Shanghai.[115]

The peace and order that were restored in Shanghai following the battle in early 1855 proved to be short-lived. In 1860, under the leadership of Hong Rengan (洪仁玕), the Taiping forces regained its vigor and launched another round of attacks against the city of Shanghai. Although the Anglo-French troops had fought against the Qing troops in northern China during the Second Opium War (1856-1860), they nevertheless cooperated with the Chinese local authorities in the region of Shanghai. The need to protect the foreign community in the settlements, along with the growing trade with China, underpinned their interventionist policy in the city near Huangpu River. In January 1861, Edan proposed a substantial expansion of military engagement in Shanghai, but his proposal was rejected by his British counterpart Thomas T. Meadows, who did not consider it likely for the Taiping rebels to attack the foreign settlements. The situation changed a year later when Meadows's successor Thomas Medhurst assumed the post of the British consul in Shanghai. Medhurst lost no time in convening a meeting with the British and French military authorities, during which a joint defense plan was conceived. To his dismay, however, Edan soon realized that Wusong, Dongjiadu, and Xujiahui, areas that had significant French interests, were not included in this common defense plan. On February 13, 1862, another military meeting was arranged by the French military authorities with an aim of resolving the Anglo-French disagreements. Although both sides were able to reach an agreement

[115] Xu, "Imperialism in the City," 11-16.

on a joint defense plan, it was clear that the French were more active than the British in the military intervention.[116] As a result, the combined forces of Chinese, British, and French successfully drove off the Taiping attacks from 1862 to 1863.[117]



Figure 1.2: Map of the defense plan of the British Settlement and the French Concession of Shanghai in 1860–61 (Xu, "Imperialism in the City," 21)

In the wake of the Taiping Rebellion, the foreign settlements of Shanghai witnessed steady population growth and economic development. As various urban administrative duties multiplied in its concessionary space, Edan began to contemplate the necessity of establishing a separate municipal apparatus. In April 1862, Edan officially announced that the Shanghai French Municipal Council (FMC) was instituted, whose duties included the police, the construction and maintenance of roads, installation of streetlights, and taxation.[118] On May 13, Edan informed Medhurst of the establishment of the new municipal administration. In response, the latter

[116] Ibid., 19-23; Bergère, *Shanghai*, 41-44.
[117] Earl Cranston, "Shanghai in the Taiping Period," *Pacific Historical Review* 5, no. 2 (June 1936): 159.
[118]Couling, *The History of Shanghai*, 82.

unequivocally claimed that the existence of an independent municipal body "is entirely opposed to the Shanghai Land Regulations agreed to by the Treaty Powers."[119] The divergence between these two consuls could be explained by their differences in perceiving how these foreign settlements should be governed. While the settlement on the northern side of Yangjingbang was beholden to a locally elected municipal body—the Shanghai Municipal Council, from the standpoint of the French consul-general, he exercised exclusive control and retained ultimate authorities over municipal affairs within the parameters of the French Concession.

If the establishment of an independent municipal body in the French Concession merely caused what Edan characterized as a "mild protest" from the British consul, the issuance of the *Règlementd' Organization Municipale francaise* in 1866 turned out to be a lot more polemical. In March 1866, the 1854 *Land Regulations* were under revision. It was at this juncture that Brenier de Montmorand, then the French consul-general in Shanghai, proposed that a set of separate Land Regulations "only having force in the French Concession" should be drafted given that the French consul, as well as the FMC, had never been consulted about the revision of the Land Regulations before.[120] This proposal met with some level of resistance from Charles A. Winchester, the British consul in Shanghai at the time, who found it vexing that the status of the French Concession essentially amounted to a "protectorate."[121] In the meantime, George Seward, the American consul in Shanghai, seemed to be more displeased with the *Réglement*, which he openly castigated for "(its) territorial domination, the paramountcy of French influence, the autocracy of the French Consul, [and] the abrogation of previous French co-operation."[122] None

[119] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession française de Changhaï*, 256.
[120] *North China Herald*, March 17, 1866.
[121] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession française de Changhaï*, 323
[122] Couling, *The History of Shanghai*, 85.

of these protests, however, deterred the French consul from publicizing the *Règlement*in *North China Herald* in July.

The issuance of the *Règlement*did not generate too much criticism. Compared with the relative reticence of the foreign community in the International Settlement on the *Réglement*, however, the fact that the revised *Land Regulations* could not be confirmed until 1869—three years after the revisions were first proposed—seemed to trigger more reactions on the northern side of the Yangjingbang river. In the first half of July 1869, there were intensive discussions of the delay of the revised *Land Regulations* within the SMC, and *North China Herald* published a series of editorials on this particular issue as well. These remarks closely examined the previous French consuls' involvement in formulating different iterations of the *Land Regulations* with an ultimate goal of "invit(ing) the French to lay aside their assumptions, and to take up their former position in the cosmopolitan control of municipal institutions."[123] Despite this outpouring of public opinions, the British and Prussian consuls admitted that they "were instructed to agree only to a recognition by all."[124] The only clause resulting in controversies was Clause XVI stipulating that "no investigation ordered by a foreign judge or court may be made on the (French) Concession without the authorization of the Consul General."[125] The British, American, and Prussian consuls in Shanghai unanimously protested this clause, which resulted in its subsequent withdrawal by Brenier. Eventually, on September 24, 1869, British, French, American, Russian, and Prussian ambassadors in Beijing signed an agreement that "approved on a reciprocal basis the *Land Regulations* of our (French) neighbors and our municipal

[123] Remarks on the French Municipal Regulations of Shanghai, 1869.07.05, SMA, U1-1-882; *North China Herald*, July 17, 1869.
[124] Couling, *The History of Shanghai*, 86.
[125] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession française de Changhaï*, 327.

regulations," while "making them obligatory on their respective nationals on either side of the Yang-king-pang."[126]

In summary, the Taiping Rebellion recast the political and social dynamics of the city of Shanghai. The French consul's decision of establishing a separate municipal body was partially driven by the considerable influx of migrants from adjacent regions. The ineffective Anglo-French common defense plan, compounded by intermittent disputes between the two, reinforced the French conviction that an independent and separate administration needed to be maintained. The subsequent negotiations and contentions between the two consular authorities regarding the revision of the *Land Regulations*, as well as the codification of the *Réglement*, not only revealed the underlying inter-municipal tensions but also sowed the seed for future contestation.

"The Yangjingbang Question," 1860s-1870s

Yangjingbang—or Yang-king-pang as spelled in various historical materials—was originally a branch of the Huangpu River. Though a minor creek, it was nevertheless situated at the intersection of multiple major transportation channels. Yangjingbang took on another layer of significance when Shanghai became a treaty port city as dictated by the Treaty of Nanjing. Following the establishment of foreign settlements by the late 1840s, Yangjingbang henceforth became the physical boundary between the British Settlement (later the International Settlement

[126] Ibid., 331.

since 1863) and its French counterpart.

Figure 1.3 Yangjingbang Creek (https://www.virtualshanghai.net/Photos/Images)

In the wake of the decade-long chaos brought about by the Taipings, the British and French municipal authorities set out to undertake urban reconstruction, and the agenda of improving the Yangjingbang—a point of connection between the two settlements—was brought to the table. The initial discussions between the two municipalities began in July, 1862, during which both sides agreed on the necessity of improving the Yangjingbang conditions while settling on the width of the creek (50 feet).[127] As the negotiations between the SMC and the FMC progressed, it became clear that their concerns came to concentrate on three main areas: 1) the bank along the Yangjingbang creek needed to be built and renovated; 2) bridges connecting the

[127] Shanghai Municipal Archives, ed., *The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council* (hereafter *TMOSMC*), vol. 1, Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanse (2001), 645.

two foreign settlements needed to be constructed and repaired; and 3) the sanitation and navigability of the Yangjingbang creek needed to be improved.

The building and renovation of bridges was of central importance to both municipal authorities across the Yangjingbang, not least because of the increased movements of people and commodities between the two settlements in the 1860s. As S. C. Couling stated, "the crossings of the Yingkingpang were almost as important as those over the Soochow Creek, but as French, British and Chinese were all concerned in them they were not made without difficulty."[128] From the 1850s to the 1910s, there were eight main bridges that connected these two colonial districts, the most important of which was the one at the mouth of the creek connecting the French and International Bunds (often called in official correspondence "Bridge No. 1").[129] Furthermore, the sanitary conditions along the Yangjingbang had also attracted some level of attention from both municipalities. Both municipal authorities were aware that the disposal of garbage along the bank of the Yangjingbang creek, the pollution generated by the passing boats, and the wastewater coming from the sewage all posed serious sanitary and navigation challenges to varying extents.[130]

By the second half of 1863, the SMC authorities had sought active conversation with their French counterpart for the replacement of one of the preexisting wooden bridges connecting the two foreign settlements with "an iron superstructure and stone abutments," as well as for the improvement of Yangjingbang creek in general.[131] Although the French Municipal Council "intimated a willingness to meet them (the SMC) half way" in handling these issues, several

[128] Couling, *The History of Shanghai*, 230.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Kerrie L. Macpherson, *Marshes of Wilderness: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-1893*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987: 85-86.
[131] "Report of the Shanghai Municipal Council (ROSMC), 1863.4.30-1863.9.30," Shanghai Municipal Archive (SMA), U1-1-877.

practical difficulties did arise between the two municipalities. The first obstacle concerned funding. While the approximate cost of constructing an iron bridge at the Yangjingbang mouth, according to the SMC's estimate, would amount to 11,000 taels, the FMC claimed that this sum exceeded what they could afford and said that it was only "able to open a credit for more than Tls. 2,500 to 3,000 for this object."[132] The two municipal authorities also disagreed with one another in terms of how to improve the navigability of the Yangjingbang creek. The SMC considered the construction of sluices as the most efficacious measure, whereas its French counterpart rejected it on the ground of "constant agitation of the mud land of the deposits of all kinds that form the bed of the channel."[133] Rather, the latter proposed that "the entire creek be vaulted over, and the surface laid out as a boulevard."[134]

The issue of cleansing the Yangjingbang creek and the construction of the iron bridge continued to feature prominently in the correspondence between the two municipalities in the following year (1864). Their differences in the building of the Yangjingbang bridge persisted. The FMC stated that it would only share the cost of the bridge if its total sum was limited to taels 7,000 and that the new iron bridge had to align with its newly planned French bund.[135] However, the SMC and FMC were able to reach an agreement on the necessary measures needed to cleanse the Yangjingbang, and a committee comprised of members from both municipalities was formed, with joint conferences held regularly to discuss relevant matters.[136] In addition, they even made a "joint representation…to the native authorities with a view to their defraying the expense of a work."[137]

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[132] "E. Schmidt to the SMC," 1863.11.13, SMA, U1-1-877.
[133] Ibid.
[134] "Land Renters General Meeting of the Municipal Council," 1863.11.30, SMA, U1-1-877.
[135] ROSMC, 1864.10.27, SMA, U1-1-878.
[136] *TMOSMC*, 1864.6.18, vol. 2, 479.
[137] ROSMC, 1864.7.7, SMA, U1-1-878.

The joint pleading to the Chinese Taotai gained the support of Charles A. Winchester, the then British consul in Shanghai, who subsequently initiated negotiations with the Chinese Taotai, Ying Baoshi (應寶時) in November 1865.[138] A month later, Ying accepted this proposal by appointing an officer to inspect the Yangjingbang creek and agreeing to contribute about taels 2,100 to the bridge-building project.[139] In addition to the iron bridge at the mouth of the Yangjingbang creek, a report from the Public Works Committee to the SMC revealed that other bridges "crossing the Yang-king-pang Creek are in a semi-ruined and unsafe condition," thus making "the erection of new ones absolutely imperative."[140] For the remaining years of the 1860s, these bridges were repaired and rebuilt, and the FMC generally conceded to pay for half of the expenses incurred.[141] Some costs were even equally shared between the Chinese Taotai, the SMC, and the FMC.[142] In general, however, there were not nearly as many letters written between the two municipal authorities on "the Yangjingbang question" as there had been in the years prior. The reasons, in my view, were twofold. On the one hand, the internal dynamics within the French Concession—the "1865 municipal crisis"—diverted the French authorities' attention.[143] On the other hand, the bone of contention during the second half of the 1860s was nothing but the issuance and passage of "*le Règlement*" (1866, revised 1869) followed by the multi-pronged negotiations between foreign consuls in Shanghai. The Yangjingbang question was simply of secondary importance during those years.

[138] ROSMC, 1865.11.10, SMA, U1-1-879.
[139] ROSMC, 1865.12.13, SMA, U1-1-879.
[140] "Report of the Public Works Committee for the Municipal Year ending 31st March, 1866," 1866.3.31, SMA, U1-1-879.
[141] For instance, see Conseil D'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise, 1867-1868, SMA, U38-1-2740.
[142] "Memorandum from the Public Works Committee, 1869-1870," SMA, U1-1-882.
[143] As the following chapter will discuss in greater detail, "the municipal crisis" marked the culmination of tensions between the consul-general and the municipal leaders in the French Concession. After this crisis, the authorities of the consul-general became more firmly cemented.

In the 1870s, the repairment and construction of bridges over the Yangjingbang creek once again occupied an important place in the correspondence between the SMC and FMC. During the early 1870s, both administrations were keenly aware of "the dilapidated state" of these bridges and called for more cooperation in bridge reconstruction. Although both municipalities were in favor of replacing old wooden bridges with new iron ones, some bridges had to be temporarily rebuilt with hardwood while the SMC and FMC awaited new iron bridges to be shipped from Europe.[144] At this point, neither administration seemed to be willing to allow the construction works to be further delayed, so much so that the FMC even offered to cover all the expenses incurred to strengthen the abutment on its side.[145]

One noticeable difficulty that may have vexed the two municipalities was the lack of financial support from the Chinese officials. As indicated above, the Chinese Taotai had provided funding for the construction of bridges in the early 1860s. However, according to a letter sent from Shen Bingcheng (沈秉成) to Walter H. Medhurst, the then British consul in Shanghai, such a practice was discontinued in 1867 as per the orders by the Jiangsu Viceroy. Therefore, Shen continued to say, "it is quite beyond my power to assist in carrying out the scheme."[146] The French Municipal Council found this refusal "refutable," and the French consul-general, Ernest N. M. Godeaux expressed this view to the Taotai too. Ultimately, it "had no more success than the one (plea) made previously."[147]

The above account has shown that, despite minor differences, the SMC and FMC had been able to largely cooperate over "the Yangjingbang question" by the early 1870s. However,

[144] Report of the Public Works Committee for the Year ended 31st March 1871, SMA, U1-1-884; Séance Générale du 19 Août, 1873, U38-1-2744.
[145] Séance Générale du 23 Septembre, 1873, SMA, U38-1-2744.
[146] *TMOSMC*, 1873.12.2, vol. 5, 672.
[147] Séance Générale du 27 Mars, 1874, SMA, U38-1-2744.

starting from the mid-1870s, things turned sour rather rapidly. The two municipal administrations were at loggerheads with one another over the division of costs of bridge construction and accused each other of encroachment onto the 50-feet waterway in the Yangjingbang, both of which gave rise to numerous practical difficulties and generated much contestation.

"The Encroachment Question"

While the discussions related to the iron bridge over the Yangjingbang creek carried on, the FMC began to ponder reconstructing the bund by strengthening and extending the abutment within its Concession in June 1872.[148] Soon thereafter, this proposal was adopted, and the Public Works Committee (Le Comité des Travaux) was assigned the responsibility of executing this project in November 1872.[149] This, however, met with strong resistance from its neighbor across the Yangjingbang. The SMC informed its French counterpart that the reconstruction of the quay in question would "obstruct the navigation of the canal" and that this issue had to be reported to and arbitrated by the consular body in Shanghai.[150] The consular body—an official group that brought together Euro-American diplomatic representatives within Shanghai—suggested that the SMC should direct this matter to the French consul-general instead and proposed an alternative solution—organizing an arbitration committee comprised of the French consul along with another member of the consular body. The presidents of both the SMC and FMC concurred with this plan.[151]

[148] Comité des Travaux Publics et de la Police, Séance du 10 Juin 1872, Compte-Rendu de la Gestion pour l'Exercice, SMA, U38-1-2743.
[149] Comité des Travaux Publics et de la Police, Séance du 29 Novembre 1872, Compte-Rendu de la Gestion pour l'Exercice, SMA, U38-1-2743.
[150] Séance Géneral du 4 Janvier 1873, Compte-Rendu de la Gestion pour l'Exercice, SMA, U38-1-2743.
[151] Séance Géneral du 11 Janvier 1873, Compte-Rendu de la Gestion pour l'Exercice, SMA, U38-1-2743.

By mid-1873, this proposed joint arbitration did not really materialize due to the change of personnel within the SMC. However, more serious contentions arose with regard to the reconstruction of bridge no. 4 (near Honan road) between the two municipalities. If aforementioned disagreements between the SMC and FMC mostly revolved around logistical difficulties and practical matters (such as funding), it was in this instance that the issue of "encroachment" became the central point of contention. As indicated above, the Yangjingbang Creek took on additional political significance as the boundary between the International Settlement and the French Concession. Therefore, in some ways, any construction works related to this creek were not simply a matter of infrastructural project, but rather involved some level of boundary-policing.

The term "encroachment" first appeared in the SMC's correspondence with its French counterpart in the closing months of 1874, and subsequently the 1875 *Municipal Report* featured an entry entitled "Encroachment on Yang-king-pang by the French Council."[152] On November 23, 1874, the SMC pointed out in its correspondence to the FMC that "the length of the Bridge is considerably more than the distance from the abutment on the side to the line of bunding lately made on your side (in March 1873)," thereby requesting the latter to move back its bund line in order not to obstruct the newly built bridge.[153] In addition, a separate report from the Public Works Committee also reaffirmed the SMC's position, which unequivocally claimed that the wharf under construction in the French district constituted "such encroachment on the river (the Yangjingbang creek)." The report went further by stating that "should such works be allowed to go on, the river will almost be destroyed as a channel for vessels of any size," which would have

[152] Municipal Report for the year 1875, SMA, U1-1-888.
[153] *TMOSMC*, vol. 6, 11/23/1874, 644-645.

inevitably affected the "interests of the whole community of the port."[154] Clearly perturbed by the allusion of its alleged "encroachment" onto the Yangjingbang river, the FMC refuted the SMC's accusation by writing a lengthy letter that painstakingly justified the extension of the bund within its concession on the first day of February 1875. Not only did the FMC blame the SMC for disrupting "a friendly interchange of the views of the two administrators" by "publishing a complaint of encroachment" first, but it also devoted a noticeable portion of this letter to clarifying its intention of defending "the public interests" in Shanghai. While the SMC insisted that the extension of the bund in the French Concession would harm "the public interest" by obstructing the free navigation of the Yangjingbang creek, the FMC stated that "the injury which public interest suffer" only happened through the SMC's dilatory construction of the bridge no. 4.[155] In the meantime, editorials published in *North China Herald* also echoed the views set forth by the SMC. For instance, in early December, 1873, an editorial contributor pointed out that the extension of the French bund "will still further interfere with the course of the river and make it still more difficult of navigation." It even called upon the authorities in the International Settlement, the consuls, and the Commissioner of Maritime Customs in Shanghai to "take up this matter for the public good."[156]

Given the contention surrounding the building of the bridge no. 4, both municipal authorities decided to resort to joint arbitration once again. In the SMC's reply to the FMC on February 16, it said that "a friendly meeting of two or three members of each Council" would be

[154] The Report of Public Works Committee, in reference to the Wharf Extension on the French Bund, 1874. 11.28, SMA, U1-1-887.
[155] From FMC to SMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 02/01/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136.
[156] *North China Herald*, 12/04/1873.

more "desirable."[157] In the following month, both municipalities selected their respective representatives that subsequently formed the Committee of Arbitration. However, the SMC and its French counterpart could not come to a consensus as for what questions should be put forward for arbitration. The SMC proposed that the following questions should be judged by the Committee of Arbitration: "1) Is the new Bund on the South side of the Yang-king-pang, between the rue Disery and the Rue Touranne, an encroachment? 2) In its present position is it an obstacle to navigation? 3) If so, does it prejudice the interests of property owners along the creek?"[158] The FMC's reactions to these questions to be arbitrated seemed quite opaque. While admitting that "an encroachment took place in 1872 (when the abutment was extended within the French district)," the French authorities suggested that the fact that the iron bridge "sufficient to connect the two sides of the Yang-king-pang" should have "vitiated your Council's protest and allowed this Council to consider the present line as settled."[159]

This alternation of questions was not accepted by the SMC. In its reply to the FMC, the SMC claimed that since the French Council had admitted its encroachment, the real questions to be determined should be "1) Is the Bund in its present position an obstacle to navigation? 2) Does the encroachment prejudice the interests of property owners along the line of the creek?"[160] Although the French Council did not take issue with these questions, it nevertheless raised another point about whether a similar encroachment had been made on the northern side of the

[157] From SMC to FMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 02/16/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136.
[158] From FMC to SMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 03/13/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136.
[159] Ibid.
[160] From SMC to FMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 03/18/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136.

Yangjingbang.[161] Such an invocation caught the SMC by surprise, and the latter felt so compelled by "the strong position" on the FMC's part that they could "not object to its being made part of the question."[162] Instead of addressing the question of encroachment directly, the SMC claimed that it had "given up ground to widen the creek" and that the French encroachment had narrowed the creek "by 12 to 14 feet."[163]

Eventually, these three questions were presented to Medhurst (the British consul in Shanghai) and his French counterpart, Godeaux, for arbitration, with Saigon Vignale, Consul General of Italy, selected as a third-party arbitrator. On April 23, these arbitrators made their final decision, which stated that "things be allowed to remain as they are, but that the two Councils agree for the future paying due regard to the requirements of traffic on the river and also on the adjacent roads upon a width of creek." This final arbitration went on to suggest that "every work in future upon either side of the creek shall be agreed to by the two Municipalities."[164] As a result, both sides were rather satisfied with this final decision. The secretary of the SMC reported that the Council members were "most happy to follow out the suggestions." Similarly, the FMC was also pleased with this outcome, stating that "by leaving things as they were, (this arbitration) spared the money of both municipalities and preserved the use of the wharves for the public."[165]

Contentions over Bridge Fees

[161] From FMC to SMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 03/24/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136

[162] From SMC to FMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 04/03/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136.

[163] From SMC to the Committee of Arbitration, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 04/20/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136.

[164] From SMC to the Committee of Arbitration, 上海公共租界工部局总董和法租界公董局总董间关于洋泾浜被侵占问题相互来往信件及文书, 04/24/1875, SMA, U1-2-1136.

[165] Séance Générale du 27 Avril, 1875, Compte-Rendu de la Gestion pour l'Exercice, SMA, U38-1-2744..

If mutual accusations of encroachment on the waterway of the Yangjingbang between the two municipalities presented some difficulties for the implementation of the project, the more complex trouble lay in the division of the cost. Customarily, the SMC and FMC were responsible for the expenses incurred for the construction and renovation of the Yangjingbang bridges. Although the Shanghai Taotai occasionally contributed financially to these urban infrastructural projects during the late 1850s and late 1860s, this practice ended in 1867 as per an order from the Jiangsu Viceroy. Despite the repeated attempts by the British and French municipal authorities to elicit the Taotai's financial aid, a correspondence between Ying Baoshi and Medhurst dated to mid-November 1873 attested to the former's refusal of contributing any further to the construction of bridges in Shanghai's concessionary spaces. Not only "could the Taotai provide any more funds for the building of bridges," as Ying said in his letter, but he also brought up the 1867 order issued by the Jiangsu Viceroy once again.[166]

Strangely enough, the dispute over the costs of building the bridge was closely linked to the taxation and licensing of wheelbarrows in the foreign settlements. In the wake of the Taiping Rebellion, with the influx of Chinese refugees into the foreign concessions, the use of wheelbarrows—as a common transportation vehicle for people and objects—proliferated. As the number of wheelbarrows increased in the International Settlement and the French Concession, the municipal authorities began to regulate their presence by issuing licensing of the wheelbarrows. On November 16, 1870, the two municipalities reached a preliminary agreement: taxation would be levied on wheelbarrows, and these collected taxes would be equally divided by the two municipal authorities.[167] In late 1872, this arrangement caused some disagreements between the SMC and FMC. In reviewing the total collected tax on wheelbarrows over the 1871-

[166] *TMOSMC*, 1873.12.2, vol. 5, 672.
[167] *TMOSMC*, 1870.11.16, vol. 4, 749.

1872 fiscal year, the SMC found that it had collected nearly double the amount of the FMC. It thus proposed that a fairer way of distribution would be for the SMC to take two thirds of the total amount, with the remaining one third allocated to its French counterpart.[168] In response, the FMC claimed that it would "be compelled to forbid the wheelbarrows not labeled with the FMC licensing from operating in the French Concession" unless the collected taxes were divided equally. Though displeased with "the tone of this response," the SMC nevertheless compromised by allowing the FMC to take half of the tax revenues on wheelbarrows under the condition that this issue would still be subject to discussion in the future.[169]

However, starting in 1874, the dispute over the licensing of wheelbarrows coincided with discussions about the expenditure incurred for building the Yangjingbang bridge. On April 2, 1874, the SMC pointed out that that the division of collected taxes was not "equitable" and that each municipality should "retain the license fees it collects."[170] Over a month later, the FMC retorted by claiming that "the (French) Council can also make the same objection to meeting half the expenses of the reconstruction of bridges over the Yang-king-pang" for the sake of "equitable distribution."[171] What ensued were several rounds of correspondence between the two municipalities in terms of the comparability of these two issues, but none of these negotiations led to any actual progress. A brief discussion was conducted in early 1875 regarding the possibility of replacing the bridge no. 1 with an iron bridge, as well as the reconstruction of bridge no. 4. These negotiations, however, were at a standstill when the SMC and FMC disagreed over whether the latter should only be responsible for one third of the expenses of the

[168] *TMOSMC*, 1872.7.22, vol. 5, 561.
[169] *TMOSMC*, 1872.8.26, vol. 5, 573.
[170] From SMC to FMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董关于跨洋泾浜修建铁桥的经费分担和具体工程建议等事与法租界公董局总董的来往信件及相关文, 04/02/1874, SMA, U1-2-1142.
[171] From FMC to SMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董关于跨洋泾浜修建铁桥的经费分担和具体工程建议等事与法租界公董局总董的来往信件及相关文, 05/25/1874, SMA, U1-2-1142.

reconstruction of the bridge. While the SMC insisted that "the cost of whatever style of bridge may be ultimately decided upon, shall be borne equally by the two municipalities," its French counterpart refused to budge.[172]

In the face of such an impasse, the two municipalities adopted different approaches. The FMC, which was under the direct control of the French consulate, suggested that the issue should be brought to the foreign ministers in Beijing for arbitration, whereas the SMC insisted that the differences remained "one in the discretion of the (foreign) community" and thus should not be submitted to higher authorities in the capital city.[173] In the meantime, both municipalities accused each other of delaying the reconstruction of the bridge and of interrupting the traffic between the two foreign settlements.[174]

May 1875, marked a turning point in the SMC-FMC dispute over the expenses of the Yangjingbang bridge. It was in this month that a "purely financial matter," as A. Voisin (the president of the FMC) said, was largely politicized. The issue of the separate existence of the French Concession/municipality once again became a bone of contention, with which the Yangjingbang bridge negotiations were subsequently entangled. Things had begun to change in the year prior. During a special meeting of the ratepayers in the International Settlement held on June 8th, 1874, the motion regarding amalgamation of the two settlements across the Yangjingbang river was proposed. The representatives present at the meeting agreed that "it would be a very advantageous thing to have the whole of the foreign settlements under one municipal government… in view of the many complications, and the great inconvenience and

[172] From SMC to FMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董关于跨洋泾浜修建铁桥的经费分担和具体工程建议等事与法租界公董局总董的来往信件及相关文, 02/15/1875, SMA, U1-2-1142; From FMC to SMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董关于跨洋泾浜修建铁桥的经费分担和具体工程建议等事与法租界公董局总董的来往信件及相关文, 03/01/1875, SMA, U1-2-1142.
[173] From FMC to SMC, ibid., 03/13/1875; from SMC to FMC, ibid., 03/19/1875.
[174] From SMC to FMC, ibid., 03/19/1875; from FMC to SMC, ibid., 03/29/1875.

expense arising from the present plurality of foreign municipalities at Shanghai."[175] It was the SMC's hope to address the consuls in Shanghai, as well as the foreign ministers in Beijing, about the "desirability of the amalgamation of the foreign settlements" in the city.[176]

In May 1875, the amalgamation of the two municipalities was again included in the motions proposed for consideration during the ratepayers' meeting in the International Settlement. This meeting aroused strong reaction from its neighboring municipality. During a meeting on May 18, 1875, the FMC described these proposals as "a direct attack against the rights of the Council."[177] Additionally, the FMC took offense at the SMC's non-conciliatory stance on the equitable division of costs of the Yangjingbang bridge. It further pointed out that the practical difficulties between the two municipalities resulting from the division of costs of the Yangjingbang bridge provided the ratepayers on the other side of the creek with "reasons to … invoke against the separate existence of the French Concession."[178] Noting the perceived "subtle enmity" of the SMC towards the FMC, Voisin stated that he would deliver a private correspondence to the SMC, "making known his intentions not to abandon the French Concession."[179]

Subsequently, more correspondence ensued, but there was no consensus as to how the expenses of the construction of the bridges should be divided. The FMC at one point "threatened" the SMC by saying that it would "appeal to some other quarter" if the SMC was willing to bear merely half of the total costs. The SMC rebutted by accusing its French counterpart of "claim(ing) the liberty of saying how much you will pay towards maintaining the

[175] *North China Herald*, 05/30/1874, 06/13/1874.
[176] *North China Herald*, 06/13/1874.
[177] Séance Générale du 18 Mai, 1875, SMA, U38-1-2745.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.

Bridge, but deny us the same privilege."[180] Voisin responded with a long and carefully reasoned letter to the SMC. Voisin bluntly renounced the proposal concerning "the amalgamation of the municipalities" at the ratepayers' meeting in June 1874. Such an attempt, according to Voisin, subverted "the principle upholding the right of the French concession to exist with a separate administration" and was thus "illegal or unconstitutional." He even went so far as to define "the existence of the French concession" as "a regrettable source of agitation (for the SMC)." Voisin concluded his letter by lamenting the SMC's reluctance of adopting "the method of settlement by arbitration (by the consular body)."[181]

On the contrary, the SMC did not consider it worthwhile to submit the division of the costs of the Yangjingbang bridge for arbitration by the consular body. At the same time, the SMC found it equally difficult to imagine that its demand for what it considered as "fair and liberal share towards the bridges" could nevertheless be "construed into a desire to suppress the neighboring municipality."[182] In its letter to the FMC in June, the SMC made a compromise by stating that each municipality should issue its own licenses, with "the number and rate to be equal for both settlements."[183] More importantly, it squarely denied "any insinuation that they (the SMC) have been in the slightest influenced in their action by the resolution of June 1874 regarding the amalgamation of the Municipalities North and South of the Yang-king-pang."[184] The FMC was so pleased with the new arrangement that it plainly said that "this arrangement removes any reason for it to refuse to share half the expenses of the Yang-king-pang Bridges."[185]

[180] Séance Générale du 25 Mai, 1875, SMA, U38-1-2745.
[181] From FMC to SMC, 上海公共租界工部局总董关于跨洋泾浜修建铁桥的经费分担和具体工程建议等事与法租界公董局总董的来往信件及相关文, 05/24/1875, SMA, U1-2-1142.
[182] *TMOSMC*, 1875.06.07, vol. 6, 676.
[183] Séance Générale du 10 June, 1875, SMA, U38-1-2745.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.

However, this seemingly positive agreement between the two municipalities did not last very long. Their ensuing correspondence showed that the SMC and FMC differed on the total number of wheelbarrows operating in the foreign-controlled areas. While the former considered six thousand a reasonable number, the latter thought four thousand would be sufficient. On the one hand, the SMC invoked the average number of licenses issued in its settlement (approximately 2,600) to demand a greater number of wheelbarrows to be allowed in both settlements. The FMC, on the other hand, viewed the larger number of wheelbarrows as a burden for the roads and as an extra encumbrance for the police officers.[186] Their discussions were on the path towards another standstill before the FMC proposed an alternative solution. Given the difficulty of reaching an agreement on this matter, the FMC decided to "abandon the idea of acting in conjunction (with the SMC) for the collection of taxes on wheelbarrows" and suggested instead that each municipality should issue its own licenses on its own terms within its own settlement.[187] This proposal was readily accepted by the SMC. In return, the FMC claimed that it "had no more reasons to refuse to contribute half of the maintenance of the bridges of the Yangjingbang."[188] Having resolved their differences, the two municipalities quickly put these arrangements into practice by October.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the inter-municipal relationship in colonial Shanghai in the second half of the nineteenth century through a close examination of an urban construction project. As the above account has demonstrated, their relations in the city were fundamentally conditioned by the tripartite division of urban administration that characterized much of

[186] Séance Générale du 21 June, 1875, SMA, U38-1-2745.
[187] Séance Générale du 30 June, 1875, SMA, U38-1-2745.
[188] Séance Générale du 13 Juillet 1875, SMA, U38-1-2745.

Shanghai's treaty port era. Cooperation, competition, and connectivity were all integral elements that defined their relationship in China's greatest metropolis. The SMC worked closely with the FMC in the area of urban construction, especially in the decades spanning from the 1860s to 1870s. As Maybon and Jean Fredet said, "rarely was the relationship (between the two municipalities) as cordial and close as the period (between 1865 and 1875)." As a matter of fact, the SMC and FMC were in frequent communication about a wide array of urban construction projects, ranging from cemeteries and slaughterhouses to bridges, roads, and the installation of fire wells along the Yangjingbang creek.[189] Certainly, their relationship was punctuated by tensions, frictions, and sometimes outright conflicts. The French authorities' decision to "secede"—as later Shanghailanders would describe it—from the unified municipality, accompanied by its issuance of the *Règlement*in 1866, foreshadowed future contention between the SMC and FMC. A recurring theme that ran through the history of Anglo-French relations in Shanghai was the separate and independent status of the French Concession vis-à-vis the International Settlement.

While the different governing styles of these two municipalities, as well as their influences on the various aspects of Shanghai's colonial districts, have been a well-trodden scholarly terrain, the Anglo-French relationship constituted a crucial, yet often under-acknowledged, component in the city's peculiar colonial conditions. For scholars intrinsically interested in the global dynamics of Anglo-French interactions, the inter-municipal relationship in Shanghai serves as a sharp reminder of the variety and different complexion that their imperial engagements took globally. More importantly, the second half of the nineteenth century marked the inception of what Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen have called the "transnational

[189] Maybon and Jean Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de* Changhai, 343.

municipal moment" that saw a plethora of "policies aimed at regulating… the space between the individual and the state, between the private and the public."[190] The development of municipal policies and practices in Shanghai was nonetheless conditioned by the fragmented nature of the city's administrative structure. Such an administrative assemblage, as seen through various Anglo-French intertwinements in this chapter, did not invariably result in an effective municipal system, but rather contributed to a complex set of intersecting, crisscrossing municipal and imperial dominions operating in immediate, physical relationship to one another in the city.

A final question to address is the extent to which the Chinese inserted themselves into the Anglo-French relations in the city. Based on the several case studies presented in this chapter, there is no clear evidence suggesting any conscious efforts on the Chinese part to be embroiled into the Anglo-French entanglement. The successive Shanghai Taotais certainly worked with both municipalities in urban construction projects and were willing to contribute funds to these public works. But no evidence points to the ways in which the Taotais made direct intervention into the negotiations between the two municipalities. Although Sino-British and Sino-French interactions abounded in this period, Chinese officials generally remained aloof from involving themselves in the relationship between two foreign municipalities in the city.

[190] Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen, eds., *Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850-2000* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 9-10.

MULTI-IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS IN LOCAL RIOTS
Colonialism in Contention: Reexamining the 1874 and 1898 Siming Gongsuo Riots in Qing China

Introduction

In 1797, several affluent merchants from Ningbo prefecture, Zhejiang Province, organized a native place association in Shanghai. This organization was known as the Siming gongsuo, with its primary compounds located on the northwestern side of the city moat.[191] Not only did the Siming gongsuo foster native-place ties and sentiment among its members, but it also performed a wide range of services for the sojourning community. One of the key mutual help services was death management. Upon its establishment in 1797, the Siming gongsuo acquired land to establish a repository. In the following decades, the Siming gongsuo continued to grow in size, wealth, and influence, and death management remained one of its important services for Ningbo sojourners in the city near Huangpu. By the early nineteenth century, Ningbo merchants had constituted an overwhelming presence in the city, consolidating control over a significant portion of Shanghai economy. In 1831, the Siming gongsuo members raised funds

[191] Zhang Rangsan, *Shanghai Siming gongsuo yuan qi* [The origin of the Shanghai Siming gongsuo], Shanghai Municipal Archive [hereafter SMA], Q118-2-30. Scholars have not yet reached any agreements on the proper translation of "gongsuo." In this chapter, I will use the Chinese term "gongsuo," unless noted otherwise. For more elaborate discussions of these terminological matters, see, for example, Ho Ping-ti, *Zhongguo huiguan shilun* [On the history of Landsmannschaften in China], (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1966); William Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 283-285; and Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 39-47; Christian Henriot, *Scythe and the City: A Social History of Death in Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 44-45.

and opened a charitable coffin-dispensing office.[192]

Figure 2.1 Gate of the Ningbo Guild Hall (Siming Gongsuo) (https://www.virtualshanghai.net/Asset/Preview/dbImage_ID-1668_No-1.jpeg)

The Siming gongsuo underwent a series of vicissitudes in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1842, Shanghai was opened to foreign trade in the wake of the Qing dynasty's humiliating defeat in the Opium War (1839-1842). The English Settlement was established in 1843 in pursuance of the terms of the Treaty of Nanjing. The French followed suit thereafter, claiming a settlement for themselves in 1849. The site of the Siming gongsuo was included into the French Concession in the very same year. In 1853, the city fell into the hands of the secret society of the Small Sword Uprising. Having been razed amid the turmoil, the Siming gongsuo site was rebuilt and expanded shortly after. However, as Ge Siyuan, one of the prominent Siming gongsuo directors during the early Republican era, bemoaned, "(Ever since) the Siming gongsuo was included in the French Concession, various frictions have ensued

[192] Henriot, *Scythe and the City*, 49.

afterwards."[193] Indeed, the subsequent contestations between the Siming gongsuo and the French authorities attested to Ge's lamentation.

This chapter focuses on the 1874 and 1898 Siming gongsuo riots, two violent conflicts that occurred between the Siming gongsuo members and the French authorities in the Shanghai French Concession. These two incidents were the first major popular disturbances in post-Taiping nineteenth-century Shanghai. Both conflicts originated in the French attempts to expropriate lands used by the Siming gongsuo as charitable cemeteries (*yizhong*) and resulted in numerous casualties, serious physical injuries, large-scale property destruction, and wide-ranging civil disobedience. The repercussions of these riots went beyond the local arena, as high officials and diplomats from China, France, and Britain (in the case of the 1898 riot) were all involved to resolve the conflicts.

These two riots have attracted numerous scholarly attentions in the English academic literature. The existing scholarship has approached these two riots from the perspectives of class relations within the Siming gongsuo, funerary ritual in traditional Chinese culture, the links between these riots and burgeoning nationalism, and death practices in the urban environment of Shanghai.[194] While valuable, these studies have focused almost exclusively on how and why Chinese people resisted the French authorities during the riots and have been overwhelmingly preoccupied with the struggles over the Siming gongsuo's burial ground and coffin repository without considering what these violent popular disturbances revealed about the French colonial rule in Shanghai. In filling this critical void, this chapter analyses and narrates these incidents

[193] Ge Siyuan, *Shanghai Siming gongsuo dashi* [A chronicle of the great events pertaining to the Shanghai Siming gongsuo], 1920, SMA, Y4-1-762.
[194] Susan Mann, 'The Ningbo Pang and Financial Power at Shanghai,' in *The Chinese City between Two Worlds*, (eds) Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 86; Belsky, 'Bones of Contention: The Siming Gongsuo Riots of 1874 and 1898,' in *Papers on Chinese History*, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 56-73; Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, 158-175; most recently, Henriot, *Scythe and the City*, 80-83.

from the perspectives of the French colonial establishments in Shanghai.[195] Specifically, it reveals the multi-pronged challenges facing the French authorities in Shanghai and highlights its fundamental vulnerability, including local opposition from the Chinese, internal discord within the French colonial institutions, and imperial rivalry between Britain and France.

Recent empire studies have advanced a distinctive view on modern colonial history. Debunking a typical representation of empires as hegemonic and all-powerful, scholars of imperial history have emphasized the troubles, insecurities, vulnerabilities, limits, and, above all, "normative disorder" embedded in imperial experiences.[196] These new insights have called into question what Antoinette Burton calls the "methodological imperialism" featuring conventional narrative forms that privileged imperial actors.[197] Oppositions from indigenous population should be perceived as an integral part of the imperial processes rather than episodic aberrations. Drawing on this strand of historiography, this chapter suggests that we should look beyond challenges from the colonized and thus identify more sources of "troubles with empire." Hence, I underscore the multivalence and multi-dimensionalities of imperial limitations, including not just oppositions from the indigenous populace, but also internal discord within the colonial establishments as well as threats from other competing imperial powers.

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[195] It is worthwhile to ponder to what degree the term "colonial" should be applied to the Chinese context. My sense is that, although China was never fully colonized like other total colonies (e.g. India), one should not refrain entirely from using "colonial" as a heuristic device to study foreign powers' operation in China. As Isabella Jackson has eloquently shown in her recent study of colonialism in Shanghai, 'The concessions held by individual powers – the French Concession in Shanghai and the dozens of foreign concessions in other treaty ports – should be categorized with colonies around the world. It is only if we fall into the trap of privileging the nation as a unit of analysis, only if we expect that the whole of China must be infiltrated by exploitative foreigners for it to qualify as subject to imperialism, that the concept of informal empire, or indeed semi-colonialism, makes sense.' See Isabella Jackson, *Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China's Global City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 17.

[196] Antoinette Burton, *The Trouble with Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-23; Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 12-24; Ashwini Tambe, *Codes of Misconduct: Regulating Prostitution in Late Colonial Bombay*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), xiv; Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, *Empires and the Reaches of the Global 1870-1945* (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 12.

[197] Burton, *The Trouble with Empire*, 5-7.

Based on archival sources held at the Shanghai Municipal Archive and supplemented by various published materials, this chapter offers a broader vista of the Siming gongsuo riots. This chapter does not narrativize these two events in a strictly chronological order. Rather, it is organized thematically so as to highlight the multifaceted challenges with which the French colonial administration confronted in Shanghai. It first situates these two incidents in the history of the contested relationship between the French authorities and the Siming gongsuo with respect to the latter's land property. It then addresses the oppositions from the Siming gongsuo over the course of these two riots, which took the forms of strategic negotiations, collective violence, and civil disobedience.[198] What comes next is a close examination of the internal division within the French colonial establishments during the 1874 riot with a particular emphasis on the disagreements between the French consul-general and the Municipal Council. The last section of this chapter, preceding the conclusion, deals with the ways in which the British inserted themselves into the negotiations between China and France after the riot of 1898.

Land of Contention: A Prelude to the Siming Gongsuo Riots

A few words about land registration and taxation in the Shanghai French Concession are in order. The Land Regulations—the constitution-like basic charter for the foreign settlements—were crucial in delineating the conditions under which foreign residents could settle and administer their allotted settlements.[199] According to the Regulations, foreigners were not legally allowed to purchase land in China but could only rent them "in perpetuity." A peculiar

[198] Admittedly, the processes of these riots have been studied in detail by previous scholars. I will reconstruct these events based on both primary sources and secondary scholarship. It should be noted that I am mostly concerned with the diverse oppositional approaches that the Siming gongsuo was able to maneuver. Exploring these various strategies brings into sharp focus the sorts of challenges that the French colonial administration was facing throughout the riots, which helps reinforce my central argument concerning the inherent precarity of the French colonial rule in Shanghai.

[199] The original version of the Land Regulations was formulated in 1845 and it was revised by the foreign consuls-general in 1854. As a following section will show, this constitution-like charter underwent several iterations in the following decades too.

instrument of the title deed called *daoqi* was devised to acknowledge foreign "property" in Shanghai.[200] Private purchase of land by Chinese was not legally permissible within the Concession after the establishment of foreign settlements, but *de facto* ownership with a foreign front was a commonplace ruse adopted by many Chinese merchants.[201] As for taxation, a formal tax-levying mechanism was not instituted within the French Concession until the establishment of the Municipal Council in 1862. The tax income was used to cover expenditures incurred for public works that the municipal authorities undertook. A cadastre was created by the Municipal Council as a way to register land and levy land tax, and the criteria of land tax were based on the location of land property within the concessionary space.[202]

It was under these institutional frameworks that the negotiations, as well as contestations, about the Siming gongsuo land unfolded. It all began with an agreement between a Siming gongsuo director and a French merchant in Shanghai. In 1861, Ge Fanfu, one of the chief directors of the Siming gongsuo, informed the French consul-general, Benoît Edan, of his misgivings about the possibility of the Siming gongsuo property being coercively taken by foreign merchants in the French Concession. Sympathizing with Ge's concerns, the consul-general suggested that Siming gongsuo lease the association property to his brother Victor Edan, so that the French authorities could exercise formal protections over its property. In the meantime, the consul-general required the Siming gongsuo to sign the contract and deliver it to

[200] Zhenyu Mou, 'Land, Law and Power: The Cadastre of the French Concession in Shanghai (1849-1943),' *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 14, no. 2 (2015), 288.
[201] Chen Zhengshu. 'Dao qi yu dao qi dangan zhi kaocha' [An examination of the Daotai contract and the relevant archives] *Jindai shi yanjiu*, no. 3, (1997), 134-138.
[202] Mou, 'Land, Law and Power,' 298.

the French consulate in order for the contract to be authorized, a requirement that the Siming gongsuo fulfilled soon after.[203]

However, the Siming gongsuo never received the authorized contract that Benoît Edan had promised before the latter was transferred to be the consul-general in Tianjin in 1863.[204] His successor, Pierre Mauboussin, not only refused to acknowledge the former agreement between the Siming gongsuo and Benoît Edan, but also intended to allow other French merchants to rent this property. In response, the Siming gongsuo directors spared no efforts to defend their proprietorship by pleading Benoît Edan to communicate with the incumbent consul-general, while writing a letter to the French Minister to enlist his support.[205] Unfortunately, despite Benoît Edan's intervention, Mauboussin insisted that the property registered under the name of Victor Edan belong to the French Concession.[206] Shortly after, Mauboussin passed away, leaving the issue of the ownership unresolved.

No sooner had the controversy over the proprietorship between the Siming gongsuo and the French consul-general subsided than other disputes between the Siming gongsuo and the French Municipal Council began to surface. In 1865, the Council requested that the police station, which had been originally built to the north of the Siming gongsuo premises, be relocated to a new place coterminous to the Siming gongsuo due to security concerns. The less-than-ideal landscape of the new location, according to the Council, necessitated a complete overhaul, the corollary of which was the removal of a large portion of the property owned by the

[203] 'Ge Fanfu to the Shanghai Daotai Huang,' 20 July 1863, *Siming gongsuo wengao di* [manusrcipts related to the Siming gongsuo], SMA, Q118-2-15.
[204] 'Ge Fanfu to Benoît Edan,' 29 July 1863, *Siming gongsuo wengao di*, SMA, Q118-2-15.
[205] *Ibid*.
[206] Cao Shengmei, 'Siming gongsuo shijian zhi genyuan,' [The root reason for the Siming gongsuo incidents] *Dangan yu shixue*, no. 4, (2002): 42.

Siming gongsuo.[207] Such a proposal met with strong resistance from the Siming gongsuo directors, who contended that the charitable cemeteries located near the premises were of vital importance to the association and thus could not be removed.[208]

In addition, the Council argued that the Siming gongsuo should be responsible for the expenditure that the Council spent on improving conditions of the designated area. Expectedly, the Siming gongsuo rejected this request without any hesitation. Shortly after, the Shanghai magistrate even convened the Municipal Council members and the Siming gongsuo directors for a discussion on this matter but to no avail. However, as the Council continued to exert pressure on the magistrate, the latter had no choice but to keep negotiating with the members of the Siming gongsuo and finally obtained the latter's consent of expending a reduced amount of remuneration to the Council under the condition that the charitable cemeteries would be left intact.[209]

Two years later (1867), another dispute arose with regard to whether or not the Siming gongsuo should pay tax to the French Municipal Council. When requested to pay tax for road extension within the Concession, the Siming gongsuo directors refused to comply and submitted a petition to the Council, underscoring that it did not seek any profits but rather offered free coffins for the impoverished sojourning Ningbo men. Interestingly, they even proceeded to contend that the foreign expatriates' cemeteries within the French Concession were not subject to any tax liability, thus making it unjustifiable for the Council to impose tax liability on the Siming

[207] 'The Shanghai Magistrate to the Shanghai Daotai,' 24 September 1865, *Siming gongsuo wengao di,* SMA, Q118-2-15.
[208] 'The Shanghai Magistrate to the Shanghai Daotai,' 9 December 1865, *Siming gongsuo wengao di,* SMA, Q118-2-15.
[209] *Ibid.*

gongsuo.[210] The rationale presented by these directors won sympathy from the French consul-general, Brenier de Montmorand, who not only agreed to exempt the Siming gongsuo from taxation but also made his position clear to both the Council and the Shanghai Daotai.[211] Through the intervention of the Shanghai Daotai and the French consul-general, the Siming gongsuo did not just retain the title to its property but also secured tax-free status in the French Concession.[212]

Local Opposition: Strategic Negotiations, Collective Violence, and Civil Disobedience

As Richard Belskey has argued, the reason why the charitable graveyard was so important to the Siming gongsuo was because it was "products and symbols of guild funerary patronage." In many ways, these charitable cemeteries represented the collective interests of the Siming gongsuo and constituted an essential component of its internal cohesiveness.[213] For the Siming gongsuo members, it was only natural for them to defend what they valued so much in face of French encroachment upon these cemeteries. From the perspectives of the French authorities, the urge to develop its territory in Shanghai and concerns about infectious diseases made it imperative for them to remove all the tombs and cemeteries from its concession. By 1864, they had successfully forced the Fujian and Guangdong communities to move their cemeteries.[214] The Siming gongsuo remained the last organization to stand its ground against French encroachment. More importantly, what challenged the French municipal governance was

[210] 'The Siming gongsuo directors to the Shanghai Daotai,' 2 June 1867, *Siming gongsuo wengao di*, SMA, Q118-2-15.
[211] 'The French Municipal Council to the Siming gongsuo,' 31 March 1868, *Siming gongsuo wengao di*, SMA, Q118-2-15.
[212] Ge Siyuan, *Shanghai Siming gongsuo dashi ji*, 1920, SMA, Y4-1-762.
[213] Belsky, 'Bones of Contention,' p. 70.

[214] Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, p. 160.

not simply a loose conglomeration of sojourning Ningbo men, but rather an elaborate organization with the ability to mobilize its members and a strong connection with local officials.

Strategic Negotiations Prior to the 1874 Riot

Despite occasional disputes between the French authorities and the Siming gongsuo in the 1860s over legitimate proprietorship or tax liability, both sides managed to coexist peacefully. However, the situation began to deteriorate in the 1870s, when the coffin repository and graveyard increasingly became an irritant in the eyes of the French municipality. In addition to its desire to develop its territory, the French Municipal Council was more concerned with the potential threat to public health posed by the presence of unburied coffins in the repository.[215] Although this concern was not made explicit in the French arguments to remove the coffins and the graveyard, this remained their hidden agenda. In 1873, the French Municipal Council decided to run two roads past the sides of the Siming gongsuo land, which would potentially traverse the latter's charitable cemeteries. Alerted by this decision, the Siming gongsuo directors lost no time in submitting a petition to the consul-general, in which they emphasized the philanthropic nature of the cemeteries, invoked the recognition of Siming gongsuo's ownership granted by the former French consul-general, and laid bare the strategic imprudence of the proposed project.[216] Not having heard from the French consul-general for about a month, the directors directly reached out to the French Municipal Council. Not only did they propose a new route for building the road, they also offered to cover all that the expenditure incurred so long as their charitable

[215] Henriot, *Scythe and the City*, 80.
[216] 'The Siming gongsuo to Godeaux,' 26 Decmber 1873, *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, SMA, Q118-2-15.

cemeteries could be preserved.[217]



Figure 3.1 Land in Contention (*North China Herald*, May 16, 1874)

Unfortunately, the Siming gongsuo's petition to the Municipal Council was firmly rejected. In his reply, although the president of the Council, Voisin sympathized with the Siming gongsuo's concerns, he nonetheless made it clear that the cemeteries posed menacing threats to the public health and thus should be relocated to a less populated area.[218] Frustrated with the Council's rejection, the directors resorted to the consul-general once again. In order to reinforce the legitimacy of their request, they attached two proclamations of tax-exemption, respectively issued by the former consul-general Benoît Edan and the French Council in 1862 and 1868, to their petition.[219]

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[217] 'The Siming gongsuo to the French Municipal Council,' January 1874, *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, SMA, Q118-2-15.
[218] 'The French Municipal Council to the Siming gongsuo,' April 1874, *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, SMA, Q118-2-15..
[219] 'The Siming gongsuo to Godeaux,' 28 April 1874, *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, SMA, Q118-2-15.

While tirelessly negotiating with the French authorities, these directors also enlisted support from Chinese local officials. They wrote to Shen Bingcheng, the Shanghai Daotai, and detailed the plights facing the Siming gongsuo. They bluntly pointed out that any careless handling of the charitable cemeteries would very likely result in popular disturbances given the significance of the cemeteries to the cohesiveness of Siming gongsuo.[220] In response to their plea, Ye Tingjuan, the Shanghai magistrate, swiftly issued a proclamation, informing Siming gongsuo that their concerns had been received by the French consul-general and cautioning the Siming gongsuo members not to instigate any turmoil.[221] In the meantime, the Shanghai Daotai delivered a letter to the French consulate to explain the importance of the charitable cemeteries and advised the latter to address this issue promptly and carefully.[222] Negotiations seem to have boded well thus far. The French consul-general, Ernest Godeaux, agreed to negotiate with the Municipal Council, and the Siming gongsuo directors kept its members abreast of the ongoing negotiations.[223]

The 1874 Riot: The First Collective Violence in the Shanghai French Concession

Despite the ongoing negotiations, a riot nevertheless broke out on the streets of the Shanghai French Concession. The ways in which the riot erupted corroborate Belsky's characterization of the 1874 riot as an "extramural incident."[224] On 29 April 1874, approximately 1,000 sojourning Ningbo men assembled around the Siming gongsuo premises. It was purported that these people intended to march to the consular office but were forestalled by the Siming

[220] 'The Siming gongsuo to the Shanghai Daotai,' April 1874, *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, SMA, Q118-2-15.

[221] 'The proclamation issued by the Shanghai Magistrate Ye,' 30 April 1874, *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, SMA, Q118-2-15.

[222] 'The Shanghai Daotai Shen to the French consul-general Godeaux,' 1 May 1874, *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, SMA, Q118-2-15.

[223] Shanghai bowu guan tushu ziliao shi, (ed.) *Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji* [The selected collection of stele materials in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chuban she, 1980), 427.

[224] Belsky, "Bones of Contention," 61.

gongsuo directors.[225] Increasingly frustrated with the futile negotiations, vast numbers of Ningbo men once again congregated at the same area on 3 May. However, violence occurred by happenstance. In the afternoon, a bypassing Cantonese prostitute with presumed ties to the French community encountered a torrent of verbal assault from the crowd. Frightened by their aggressive behaviors, this prostitute ran to a French police officer to enlist help. The French police then arrived at the scene. After rounds of vociferous brawls, a violent conflict immediately ensued.[226]

Outnumbered by the Ningbo men, the French police was swiftly subdued, physically assailed, and gravely wounded. With the assistance of some foreign bystanders, this officer managed to escape and reported the chaos back to the French police station. The violence inflicted harms on other foreign expatriates as well. A road inspector named Percebois, along with his wife and children, were severely assaulted by the rioters and narrowly escaped. In the meantime, another missionary lady was reportedly attacked by accident.[227] At the behest of Godeaux, who advised prudence and calm-bearing, the French Concession Police (Le Garde municipale de la Concession française) did not immediately deploy its forces. However, the tumult escalated and well continued until dusk. Over the course of the turmoil, Ningbo strong men hurled stones at foreign residence. Some of them were even engaged in arson and vandalized surrounding buildings. Consequently, more foreign residents were injured, foreign residence razed, and other properties destroyed.[228] Shortly after, violence spread to the French police station, which prompted the French consul-general to finally authorize the deployment of policing forces. It was later verified that six Chinese rioters were killed in the process of

[225] *Shenbao*, 29 April 1874.
[226] *Ibid*., 4 May 1874; Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, 161-162.
[227] *North China Herald* [hereafter *NCH*], May 9, 1874; *Shenbao*, May 4,1874.
[228] *Ibid*.

restoring order. Almost at the same time, some soldiers from the French Navy were dispatched to the scene. Under the leadership of a local military officer, Chinese soldiers were also mobilized to safeguard the area of the Siming gongsuo site. Roughly hours later, the International Settlement also sent their Voluntary Corps to the French Concession in efforts to pacify the turmoil.[229]

In addition to the use of forces, other measures were taken to repress the popular disturbance. The French consul-general issued a proclamation amid the riot, informing the members of Siming gongsuo that the Municipal Council had been dissuaded from pursuing the road-building project. Similarly, the Shanghai Daotai and magistrate issued proclamations respectively, admonished Ningbo commoners to abide by official instructions, and vehemently condemned the instigators of the riot.[230] After mid-night, the once-disturbed area was brought back to order.

The 1874 conflict was not fully resolved until 1878, four years after the violent clash. Several Chinese officials had been charged with negotiating with their French counterparts. Suffice it to say that the 1878 resolution was a result of compromise between China and France. While the French paid restitution for the killings of the Chinese, the Chinese government was responsible for even larger sums of recompense for the injuries of the foreign residents as well as the destruction of properties. This riot ended in a somewhat triumphant way for the Siming gongsuo, however: the coffin repository remained in use, and coffins continue to be deposited in the cemeteries.[231] Though accepting this agreement, the French Municipal Council insisted that no new corpses be deposited on the Siming gongsuo burial ground.[232]

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[229] *NCH*, 9 May 1874; *Shenbao*, May 5, 1874.
[230] *Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji*, pp. 426-428.
[231] *Shanghai Siming gongsuo dashi ji*, 1920, SMA, Y4-1-762.
[232] *Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji*, p. 428.

The 1898 Riot: the Storm is back

The 1878 agreement did not preclude all causes of conflicts. Scholars have generally agreed that the second half of the nineteenth century was a crucial time period where concerns with public health provided a significant pretext for foreign powers to expand their municipal authority in Chinese treaty port cities.[233] Against this historical backdrop, the Siming gongsuo coffin repository came to be identified as unsanitary, which justified the French demand of removing it once for all. Therefore, the years spanning from late 1870s to 1890s saw consistent efforts by the French authorities to eliminate all the coffins stored at the mortuary. In 1882, the French Municipal Council urged the Siming gongsuo to relocate all the coffins on the ground of their susceptibility to infectious disease.[234] In response, the Siming gongsuo directors purchased several other plots of land in less populated areas to relocate the coffin repository but failed to move the coffins as quickly as the Council wanted.[235] In the 1890s, concerns over public sanitation truly culminated. Under such circumstances, the French Municipal Council felt even more compelled to deal with the issue of coffin-storage at the Siming gongsuo. Not only did it designate a health officer named Blanc to investigate the sanitary conditions surrounding the Siming gongsuo, it also warned the Shanghai Daotai that measures must be taken to eliminate the coffins.[236] These warnings did not, however, elicit much responses from the Chinese officials.

The situation looked increasingly gloomy when Gaston de Bezaure was appointed as the French consul-general in Shanghai in 1897. In January 1898, he ordered that all coffins within

[233] Bryna Goodman, 'The Politics of Public Health: Sanitation in Shanghai in the Late Nineteenth Century,' *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 23, no. 4, 1989, pp. 816-820; Kerrie MacPherson, *A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai* (Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), preface; Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, Chapter 3.
[234] *Shenbao*, 28 June 1882.
[235] Henriot, *Scythe and the City*, p. 65.
[236] *Ibid*., p. 80 and 82. It is noteworthy, however, that this health officer did not consider the storage of coffins as hazardous to public health. But the French Municipal Council simply disregarded his professional opinions and proceeded to order the complete displacement of the coffins.

the French Concession must be removed in six months. In May, the Municipal Council submitted to the consul-general an overture concerning constructions of schools, hospitals, and slaughterhouses on the Siming gongsuo site. In support of the Council on this matter, Bezaure notified the Siming gongsuo directors of the French intent to expropriate the burial ground and coffin storage areas.[237]

The consul-general's demand obviously brought back traumatic memories from the riotous years. In fear of losing their properties, the Siming gongsuo directors submitted a petition to the Shanghai Daotai. Not only did they invoke the "field deed" (*tian dan*) as the evidence of proprietorship, but they also claimed that the consul-general's demand blatantly violated the previous agreements between his predecessors and the Siming gongsuo. In addition, they alluded to the possibility of mass disturbances if the integrity of the charitable cemeteries was infringed upon. The Shanghai Daotai, Cai Jun, was thus under dual pressures from both the Siming gongsuo and the French authorities. Caught between devil and the deep blue sea, Cai was rather reluctant to take any proactive actions.[238]

On the contrary, Bezaure decided to retrieve the land through militant means. At his behest, sailors were dispatched to execute the consul-general's scheme. Shortly after, they marched down to the cemeteries and tore down some parts of the wall.[239] Upon hearing of the French troop's invasion, local Chinese soon aggregated around the Siming gongsuo premises. Enraged by the damages done by the French soldiers, some Chinese people launched attacks on several European onlookers, which soon touched off violent clashes. Numerous Chinese people

[237] Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, 164.
[238] Yao Wenzhan, (ed) *Minguo Shanghai xian zhi* [Shanghai gazetteer during the Republican era], vol. 14, 1936, pp. 233-234.
[239] *L'écho de Chine*, 16 and 17 July 1898.

were shot and killed.[240] These killings immediately fueled other Chinese people's indignation, who flung stones and bricks at French soldiers and randomly vandalized foreign residence along the roads. However, the sporadic attacks were swiftly repressed by the French forces, and some apprehensions were made. By the midnight, peace was temporarily restored.[241]

However, during the next morning, a few Chinese rioters abruptly assaulted patrolling soldiers with bamboo sticks and self-crafted spears. Confronted with mobsters' fierce attacks, Bezaure, as well as other military officers, lost no time in launching large-scale counterattack. Four to five Chinese rioters were shot and died. Although some rioters continued to assail the French troop with stone-hurling, the vast majority of them were quickly dispersed. Simultaneously, a group of Ningbo men gathered around the Siming gongsuo and assaulted the French soldiers who stationed in that area. The French soldiers reacted with more violence resulting in the death of a few more Chinese rioters.[242] Furthermore, as in 1874, the repression of the riot involved international cooperation. Not only did volunteers from the International Settlement join in, but Italian sailors also landed to help quell the turmoil.[243]

In the middle of the crisis, a conference of exigency was organized at an American trading company, with the Shanghai Daotai, the Siming gongsuo leaders, and the French consul-general attending the meeting. The directors issued a proclamation admonishing Ningbo man for their resort to violence while denouncing the French consul-general for his use of violence. Nonetheless, Bezaure insisted on the necessity of taking back the ground in question. Despite

[240] *Ibid.*
241 Ibid.,; Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation, p. 165.
242 Ibid.
243 Belsky, 'Bones of Contention,' p. 65.

their differences, a consensus was reached in terms of prioritizing the restoration of local order. Soon after, the riot came to an end, with local order restored.[244]

Civil Disobedience: Strikes and Boycotts during the 1898 Riot

One of the striking differences, among many, between these two incidents is the Siming gongsuo members' resort to strikes and boycotts in defiance of the French authorities over the course of the 1898 riot. These resistant acts were initiated by the leading members of the Siming gongsuo. On July 18, they expressed their resentment toward Bezaure's use of violence. Therefore, a circular was issued, calling upon "fellow provincials (Ningbo men) to stop temporarily from doing all business… for reason and right is on our side… That all of you, whether merchants or artisans have temporarily stopped business and trade is a proof of your united indignation at the treatment our cemetery has received."[245]

Shen Honglai, the leader of Ningbo Changsheng Hui, played an indispensable role in the entire process. Upon receiving instructions from the directors regarding the strikes and boycotts, Shen informed his followers of the necessity of ceasing to engage in any business or trade as a gesture of resistance. It is purported that he eloquently delivered a sensational speech in front of his fellow provincials, accusing the Shanghai Daotai of "colluding and adulating the foreigners (French in particular)."[246] The strikes and boycotts gravely disrupted economy in the foreign-controlled zones. Virtually all Ningbo men in Shanghai, who were engaged in a wide range of trades and occupations, abstained from various businesses. Their shops were closed; their native banks ceased to conduct any business; most Ningbo vendors refused to go to the marketplace;

244 NCH, 25 July 1898.
[245] *Ibid*.
[246] *Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji*, p. 430; *Shanghai Siming gongsuo dashi ji*, 1920, SMA, Y4-1-762.

porters at the wharf stopped showing up for work; and businesses at post offices and ship companies were disrupted.[247]

The strikes and boycotts lasted for a few days, the repercussions of which were widely felt not only in the French Concession but also in the International Settlement. Complaints could be ubiquitously heard in the International Settlement about its sufferance resulting from Ningbo men's strike. *North China Herald* specifically pointed out that the cessation of business at Ningbo native banks had a "peculiar impact upon its import markets."[248] It is noteworthy that the International Settlement was affected by Ningbo men's strike more than its French counterpart given the preponderance of trade and commerce to the former. There was a negotiation between the consul-general of the United States and Shen Honglai. The American consul-general complained that the International Settlement should not have been affected, since the conflict was entirely between the Siming gongsuo and the French authorities. Additionally, the US consul-general warned Shen that, if the situation continued to aggravate, the only recourse left to the International Settlement was to forcefully intervene, which would certainly lead to unpleasant consequences.[249] On the other hand, intense negotiations between a committee of Chinese officials and the French consul-general were ongoing.[250] The final resolution of the 1898 riot involved multilateral negotiations between China, France, and Britain, which will be discussed in a later section.

Internal Discord within the French Colonial Establishments in 1874: The Consul-General vs the Municipal Council

Recent studies of foreign communities in Chinese treaty port cities have pointed out that the interests of colonial settlers and those of the consuls—representatives of the states—did not

[247] *Shenbao*, 19 and 20 July 1898.
[248] *NCH*, 25 July 1898.
[249] *Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji*, p. 430.
[250] *Shenbao*, 22 July 1898.

always neatly align with one another.[251] The same could be said about the French colonial establishments in Shanghai as well. In the case of the 1874 riot, there were significant tensions between the French consul-general and the Municipal Council. While the French consul-general actively sought cooperation with the Shanghai local officials and was primarily concerned with the order and stability of the concessionary space, the Municipal Council took a far more aggressive stance toward the rioters. Their friction initially appeared when they adopted different approaches to the riot, but it escalated quickly after the consul-general issued a proclamation to appease the Siming gongsuo in the middle of the crisis.

A Fraught Relationship

As indicated in the previous chapter, eighteen sixty-two was a year of significance in the history of the Shanghai French Concession. While the French did entertain the idea of joining the Municipal Council of the International Settlement during the 1850s, in 1862 a decision was made for the French Concession to be run independently under the sole authority of the French consul-general. In April 1862, the French consul-general Edan declared the establishment of the French Municipal Council (conseil d'administration municipale), which was charged with the responsibility for "contributions to the necessary expenses of police, making and keeping of roads in repair, and in general for all that was requisite for the public good in the French Concession."[252] More importantly, the consul-general deemed it imperative for the French Concession to create a municipal agency vis-à-vis the British-dominated Municipal Council so as

251 For such examples, see Bickers, Britain in China; Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai," Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 59, no. 4, 2000, pp. 927-950; Marjorie Dryburgh, 'Japan in Tianjin: Settlers, State and the Tensions of Empire before 1937,' Japanese Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, 2007, pp. 19-34.
252 George Lanning, *The History of Shanghai* (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1923), p. 82.

to establish administrative relations with its neighboring settlement across the Yangjingbang river.[253]

The French Municipal Council was originally composed of nine members who were elected from the landowning ratepayers and functioned as an administrative body. After Edan departed for his new post as the Tianjin consul-general in 1863, there were three immediate successors, none of whom lasted very long on this position. In the early years of the 1860s, the Municipal Council came to perform a variety of administrative duties, while undertaking quite a few projects of public works.[254] No serious frictions ever occurred until late 1864, when Brenier de Montmorand was appointed as the new consul-general in Shanghai. Born in a high-brow minister's family, Brenier held a very strong sense of honor, making him rather sensitive about his social standing and official status.[255] His discord with the leading members of the Municipal Council, M. Meynard and M. Schmidt, emerged soon after his appointment. Brenier first had a series of minor frictions with Schmidt due to disagreements over renovating the consular complex. Then, when a large bulk of opium owned by a friend of Meynard's was confiscated by a Chinese local official, Brenier turned a deaf ear to Meynard's plea for help.[256]

It was not until 1865 that the "municipal crisis" truly culminated.[257] From May to October 1865, there were successive conflicts between the French consul-general and the Municipal Council. At the heart of these conflicts was whether the Council should be selected by the landowners within the French Concession or it should be directly appointed by the consul-general. In May, Brenier had a fierce argument with some Council members during a meeting of

[253] C.R. Maybon and Jean Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1929), p. 260.
[254] *Ibid*., p. 308.
[255] *Ibid*., pp. 309-310.
[256] Shanghai shi wen shi guan (ed.), *Shanghai difang shi ziliao* [The materials of Shanghai local history] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan chuban she, 1984), vol. 2, p. 78.
[257] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, p. 305.

ratepayers. The worst clash happened in October, when the French police arrested two Chinese outlaws in the French Concession and handed them to the Shanghai Daotai without being authorized by the Consul-General first.[258] The Council's unilateral decision-making was considered by Brenier as a blatant challenge to his authority. In response, Brenier dissolved the existing council and replaced it with a provisional one. Shortly after, the consul also issued a proclamation, underscoring that the Municipal Council should be subject to the consular authority.[259] More importantly, a new municipal code—the Réglements d'Organisation Municipale—was framed by the French consul, which vested the consul-general with the sole charge of the municipal affairs and placed the police force under his exclusive control.[260]

Brenier's tenure in Shanghai lasted for another four years before he departed. The three subsequent successors of his did not stay for an extended period in Shanghai. In September 1872, Godeaux, who was the acting Shanghai consul-general in 1864, took the post once again. As for his relationship with the Municipal Council, nothing amounting to a municipal crisis happened in the initial years under his administration, but there were still underlying tensions between the two, as manifested in their differences over the re-election of the members of the Municipal Council in 1873.[261]

Bifurcation of Approaches to the Riot

Although the French consular authority was consolidated in the 1866 Règlements d'Organisation Municipale, it would be erroneous to presume that the consul-general was able to impose its will on the Municipal Council without any pushbacks from the latter. Certain

[258] According to the normative practices in the French Concession, any arrested Chinese nationals had to be first sent to the Consulate for documentation. Only then could the criminals be handed to the Daotai for further action.
[259] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, pp. 316-318.
[260] C. A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Shanghai*, (Shanghai: The Shanghai Mercury, 1909), pp. 224-225.
[261] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, pp. 363-365.

competitions over power and disagreements of varying degrees surely persisted after 1866. The contention between the consul-general and the Municipal Council over the course of the 1874 riot serves as a very telling example.

Prior to the eruption of the riot, the Siming gongsuo directors submitted a petition to the French consulate in the hope that the consul-general would convince the Municipal Council to relinquish its agenda of encroach upon the graveyard. This request was extended by Godeaux to the Council but was rejected because of the latter's concern over public health.[262] In response, Godeaux informed the Municipal Council that its project must be suspended to forestall any potential popular disturbances and that the consul-general would take control over this case.[263] In response, the president of the Council, Voisin, held a private meeting with the consul-general, during which they discussed this matter in greater length. While Voisin promised to "act with prudence and not to cause any disturbances," Godeaux acknowledged the validity of the Council's considerations.[264] Up to this point, both sides seemed to display a decent level of understanding of each other's concerns.

Unfortunately, this mutual understanding did not generate anything substantial. Worse still, as the Council's memorandum documents, "it was only after 3 May that the event began to take a very deplorable turn."[265] The "deplorable turn" denoted both the eruption of the riot and the quickly deteriorating relationship between the consul-general and the Council. At the heart of their discord was how the riot should be handled. As shown in preceding pages, the rioters

[262] Lettre de M. le Consul-General de France au Président du Conseil Municipal, 24 March 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai* (*North China Herald* office, 1874; reproduced by Elibron Classics of Adamant Media Corporation, 2006), pp. 4-5.
[263] Lettre de M. le Consul-General au Secrétaire du Conseil, 28 April 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 8.
[264] Lettre de M. le Consul-General au Président du Conseil, 2 May 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 9.
[265] Rapport au Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Française sur l'Affaire des rues de Ningpo et de Saigon, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 48.

wreaked great havoc during the riot. Despite the considerable destruction, Godeaux was reluctant to deploy any police force and had a great deal of faith in the Shanghai Daotai's ability to repress the riot. He forbade the local police from any direct engagement with the rioters and refused to dispatch any police forces to the riot scene, where rioters were particularly active. As the rioters continued to advance and vandalize properties along the way, the French chief police officer decided to engage the rioters in order to protect the consulate from any serious destructions, which was once again halted by the consul-general.[266]

In face of the consul-general's passivity, Voisin, along with several foreign notables, pleaded with Godeaux to deploy military forces but was told that any frontal clashes with the Chinese must be avoided at all costs.[267] So frustrated were the members of the Municipal Council that they bitterly complained during one of their meetings that "the riots could have easily been stopped right away, had the consul-general had a more energetic reaction."[268] Voisin then told Godeaux that the French residents would have no choice but to seek refuge at the consulate unless more active measures were taken. Under these tremendous pressures, the consul-general finally agreed to mobilize French sailors, dispatch local police forces, and enlist assistance from the Voluntary Corps from the International Settlement to quell the rioters.[269] However, when the chief officer of the Voluntary Corps demanded more manpower from the French police, he was told that the consul-general would not approve of any additional support.[270] In the meantime, having been reassured by the Chinese magistrate that the Chinese

[266] *Ibid*., p. 49.
[267] *Ibid*., p. 50.
[268] Lettre de Président du Conseil au M. le Consul-General, 4 May 1874, *Compte-Rendu Annuel de Gestion du Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, SMA, U38-1-2744.
[269] Lettre de Président du Conseil au M. le Consul-General, 5 May 1874, *Compte-Rendu Annuel de Gestion du Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, SMA, U38-1-2744.
[270] Rapport au Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Française sur l'Affaire des rues de Ningpo et de Saigon, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale De La Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 51.

local forces would bring the riot under control, Godeaux proceeded to announce that "the terror had ceased, and the mob had dispersed and been pacified."[271] Voisin apparently did not share Godeaux's optimism, as he witnessed that several housings were still under the threat of conflagration.[272]

On the same day, the consul-general required the president of the Council to convene its members and resolve the issue of the Siming gongsuo property. He made it clear that a decision favorable to the Siming gongsuo would enable him to initiate negotiations with both the Siming gongsuo and the Chinese officials.[273] However, Voisin found this solution unacceptable because he thought that it would be dangerous to make the Chinese people believe that they were able to achieve whatever they desired from the foreign authorities through violence and intimidation rather than peaceful and legalistic manners.[274] The French community in Shanghai wholeheartedly supported Voisin's view, urging the Council not to relent until the riot was completely quelled and the rioters penalized.[275] Voisin was also cognizant of the fact that the implications of this riot went beyond the French Concession. Therefore, he reached out to several respected figures in the International Settlement to rally support. His stance on this matter was bolstered by residents on the northern side of Yangjingbang, who even proposed to "repulse the violence with violence, if necessary."[276]

Contentions Surrounding the Consul-General's Proclamation

[271] *Ibid.*

[272] *Ibid.*
[273] Procès-Verbal de la Séance Spéciale du Conseil Municipal Tenue, 4 May 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 11.
[274] Rapport au Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Française sur l'Affaire des rues de Ningpo et de Saigon, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale De La Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 53.
[275] *Ibid.*, p. 54.
[276] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

On 4 May, the riot was successfully pacified, and the general session of the Municipal Council was scheduled to discuss the dispute over the Siming gongsuo's property. However, it was brought to the president's attention that the consul-general had already taken actions to appease the Chinese, which "rendered the convocation of the Council to be futile and derisory."[277] As a private letter between the Shanghai Daotai and a Siming gongsuo director named Zhuang Jianren details, the Daotai was reassured that Siming gongsuo's property would not be impinged upon, and Zhuang was advised to build up a wall encircling the Siming gongsuo compounds to demarcate its properties.[278] The consul-general issued a proclamation the day after, corroborating what he had promised the Daotai.[279]

Why, then, did the consul-general decide to actively pursue negotiations with the Chinese officials and issue the proclamation to appease the Chinese? Historically, the French consuls had had close and extensive communication with the Chinese Daotais since the opening of Shanghai. Their interactions were critical in laying down some of the fundamental institutional frameworks in Shanghai, including the establishment of the French Concession in 1849 and the Mixed Court within the concessionary area in 1869.[280] Additionally, the French consuls had also cooperated with the Chinese Daotais in handling a variety of issues, ranging from taxation and property management to local security and public health. For Godeaux more specifically, there is evidence indicating that he had worked with the Shanghai officials in dealing with a wide array of urban affairs ever since he assumed the post of the consul-general in 1872.[281] From this perspective, it was entirely understandable that his initial reaction was to resort to negotiations

[277] *Ibid*., p. 56.

[278] 'The Shanghai Daotai to Zhuang Jianren,' *Siming gongsuo wen di gao*, 4 May 1874, SMA, Q118-2-15.
[279] *Shanghai bei ke ziliao xuanji*, p. 427.
[280] Marie-Claire Bergère, Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009; first published as Histoire de Shanghai, Fayard, 2002), pp. 11-15 and 28-36.
[281] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, pp. 359-362.

with the Chinese officials in Shanghai so as to resolve the violent conflict. Another factor needs to be considered for us to understand the urgency with which the proclamation was issued. The Siming gongsuo riot erupted in 1874, only four years after the 1870 Tianjin massacre, during which foreign residents were attacked while the French consul-general in Tianjin was beaten to death by the Chinese. This incident was widely reported in China, and there was a general understanding in Shanghai that attributed the violence to the French consul-general's excessively belligerent attitude and to Chinese people's strong anti-foreign sentiments.[282] Given the degree to which the Tianjin massacre had shocked the entire foreign community in China, it is rather plausible that Godeaux was simply trying to prevent something similar to that from happening again in Shanghai during the riot.

Upon seeing the proclamation, the Siming gongsuo lost no time in constructing the wall as suggested by the consul, which greatly upset the president of the Council. In his subsequent correspondence, Voisin bitterly complained about the lack of communication between the consul-general and the Council and accused the former of "interfering" in the Council's affairs.[283] The consul-general's reply sounded no less firm, in which he made it clear that the expansion of the road "compromised the public order" and that no further actions should be taken unless instructed otherwise by the French Minister in Beijing, M. de Geofroy. As for the newly-built wall, the consul-general described it simply as an expedient means to appease the Chinese.[284] These explanations did not, however, persuade Voisin, who considered his discussion with Godeaux "hardly satisfactory" and lamented the "fatigue and tension" of the

[282] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, pp. 349-350.
[283] Procès-Verbal de la Séance du Conseil Municipal, 8 May 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 16.
[284] Lettre de Mr. le Consul-General au Président du Conseil Municipale, 6 May 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 14.

Council resulting from this incident.[285] On 12 May, Voisin extended a letter to the French Minister in Beijing to elaborate on their concerns.

To Voisin's dismay, Geofroy did not sympathize with the Council's position. Not only did he condemn the disparaging remarks that Voisin made about the consul-general, he also annulled the expansion of the roads onto the Siming gongsuo properties.[286] However, Voisin did not budge in the face of the Minister's admonition. In his reply, he described the consul-general's role as "of little assistance and even a hindrance" to the municipality and even unequivocally laid bare the "incompatibility between the current municipal system with the administration of Mr. Godeaux."[287] Voisin's response obviously displeased Geofroy, who sent back his ultimatum to the Municipal Council. In this correspondence, Geofroy berated Voisin for taking inopportune measures in response to the riot and for his public opinion assault against the consul-general. More importantly, he made it crystal clear that his duty in China was to defend France's national interests and that "the interests of our Concession should always be elevated above personal questions."[288] Deterred by the Minister's stalwart stance on this issue, the Municipal Council agreed to make compromises and relinquished its agenda of building new roads.

As it must be clear by now, there was a cleavage between the Municipal Council and the French consul-general in their approaches to the riot. Was there any sort of underlying logic that operated to make French reaction so split during and after the violent clash? If so, how do we

[285] Lettre du Président du Conseil Municipal Adressée à Mr. le Consul-General, 7 May 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, pp. 14-15.
[286] Lettre du le Ministre de France au Président du Conseil Municipal, 22 May 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, p. 66.
[287] Lettre du Président du Conseil Municipal Adressée à Mr. le Ministre de France, 1 June 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, pp. 67-68.
[288] Lettre du le Ministre de France au Président du Conseil Municipal, 17 June 1874, *Conseil d'Administration Municipale de la Concession Francaise à Shanghai*, pp. 69-70.

explain such a rupture? At the heart of their divergence, I would suggest, was the operation of power dynamics in the French-administered area of Shanghai. Though institutionally affiliated with the consul-general, the Municipal Council should not be viewed simply as an extension of consular administration in practice. The Municipal Council was primarily composed of land-renters in the French Concession, and not all members in the service of the Council were French nationals.[289] What is more, there were other foreign residents in the Concession who did not come from France but were nonetheless under the French consular protection. Therefore, the French Municipal Council represented what we might call local interests, and it was in many ways a local authority. On the contrary, despite the fact that the French consuls' responsibilities included managing local affairs, they were appointed by the home government in Paris, which meant that their predominant duties still lay in diplomatic works and defense of French national interests in Shanghai. The dissonance between metropolitan authority and local interests thus created significant tensions, as evident in the case of the 1874 riot.

While there was an obvious rupture of good will between the consul-general and the Municipal Council during the 1874 riot, such a split no longer existed over the course of the 1898 riot. What was it about the colonial situation that had changed so much that the sort of conflict between local colonial authorities and the national representatives was almost non-existent in 1898? I must confess that a good answer to this question would require a more systematic examination of how the relationship between the consul-general and the Council changed between 1874 and 1898, a topic that is certainly beyond the scope of this chapter. However, I would venture to offer some tentative answers. First, the French Concession had undergone significant developments during the decades spanning from 1874 to 1898. The same

[289] Maybon and Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de Changhai*, p. 324.

could be said about the relationship between the consul and the Council. Over three decades after the passage of the *Règlements d'Organisation Municipale* in 1866, the French consular authority had been more firmly established by the end of the 1890s, and the status of the Council as an advisory apparatus had been reinforced as well. Moreover, another noticeable change was the increasing degree of convergence between national/metropolitan interests and local interests during this time period. While the continual developments of the Concession necessitated further expansion beyond its original limits, the growing assertiveness of the French imperial power in the context of the New Imperialism (roughly, from the 1880s to World War I) provided extra momentum for its expansionist agenda in Shanghai.[290]

Anglo-French Rivalry during the Local Crises

British and French empires were historically connected and entangled. As a recent edited volume on Anglo-French interactions has laid bare, 'they (British and French empires) were co-imperialists—not in the sense that they always collaborated but in the sense that their empires grew up, lived, and died entwined.'[291] During the second half of the nineteenth century, the British imperialists interacted with their French counterparts in significant ways in China, most notably their joint military expedition in Beijing during the Second Opium War (1856-1860). Indeed, Anglo-French entanglements in China exerted remarkable impacts on various areas of imperial activity, a topic that has been explored in previous scholarship.[292] They were more often rivals than collaborators. Their competing interests and imperial ambitions often drove them to

[290] How dynamics of colonial expansion changed in China during the period of New Imperialism will be explored in the following section.

[291] James Fichter, "Introduction," in *British and French Colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Connected Empires across the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, ed. James Fichter (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 1.

[292] See, for instance, Ernest Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Erik Ringmar, *Liberal Barbarism: The European Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor of China* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Robert Bickers, *The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914* (London: Penguin UK, 2016).

direct rivalry, if not confrontation. As the previous chapter has shown, late nineteenth-century Shanghai was a crucial site where Anglo-French inter-municipal relations shaped the dynamics of urban governance.

Debates over the Independent Municipality of the French Concession during the 1874 Riot

Chapter one has demonstrated that the Yangjingbang bridge case involved protracted negotiations, punctuated by several frictions, between the two municipalities. The French Concession's independent municipality appeared to be a major hindrance in the eyes of its British counterpart in the questions of the implementation of unified municipal policies. Shortly after the violence broke out on the streets in the French Concession, the separation of its municipality once again surfaced as a point of contention. A close reading of the leading English-language newspapers reveals how foreign communities in the two settlements reacted to and interpreted the eruption of these riots. It shows that the outbreak of the popular disturbance in the southern side of the Yangjingbang prompted the foreign residents in the International Settlement to critique the administrative efficacy of the French Concession, as well as the very legitimacy of its separate municipality.

In May 1874, nearly all the newspapers published in the International Settlement—most notably the *North China Herald* and *Shanghai Evening Post*—opined that the French authorities should be to blame for the occurrence of the popular disturbance. Approximately a week after the outbreak of the riot, the editorial sections of *North China Herald* (*North China Daily News*) published numerous articles on the incident. While lamenting the occurrence of such a "regrettable event," these editorials relentlessly launched their castigations against the French Concession. These commentaries first took up the issue of "unnecessary violence." Before M. Godeaux deployed any police forces, it was "voluntary defenders" who were charged with the duty of pacifying the disturbance. However, it was shown that some informants witnessed abuse

of violence by these "voluntary defenders." It was also reported that when an informant attempted to dissuade a certain defender from hewing down a fatally wounded victim, he was simply scolded to "mind his own business." As the editorials showed, the use of "unnecessary violence" was correlated with the French administration's delinquency of keeping a close eye on volunteers bearing arms. It was deemed dangerous that "men under no organization" carried deadly weapons and cruised around the concession.[293]

Moreover, another editorial article harshly lambasted the follies of both the French consul-general and the Municipal Council. One the one hand, the trifling practical value of the roads in contention made the incident even more "deplorable." According to the commentary, the conflict would well have been averted, had the French Municipal Council taken Chinese people's sentiments into account and acted with more prudence. On the other hand, the consul-general's reluctance of using military forces was considered imputable to the escalation of the violence. At the same time, this editorial took exception with the proclamation issued by the consul-general. The editorial bemoaned that "the precedent of yielding to the mob violence is a dangerous one… M. Godeaux's action can hardly fail to encourage the Chinese in a belief that riot is a good means to their ends, in case of future dispute."[294]

In the following weeks, the editorials directed their most severe castigation at the legitimacy and validity of the French Concession as a whole. They argued that local Chinese people's animosity against the French administration mainly resulted from the latter's "anomalous and arbitrary rule." For the Chinese residents in the French Concession, contended the editorial, the "exclusive jurisdiction" was a pure grievance. It even went further to say that the outbreak of the riot epitomized the complete breakdown of the exclusive administration of

[293] *North China Herald*, May 9th, 1874.
[294] Ibid.

the French concession.[295] Noticeably, these critiques of the French Concession echoed the SMC's grievances towards its neighbor across the Yangjingbang during previous decades. Some British residents even sought to defend the Ningbo association in the editorials. One of them argued that the reason for the Ningbo association's opposition to the Municipal Council was because of its misconception of the Municipality as the "tax collectors or police." Although he acknowledged the guild members' ignorance, he also pointed out that "the logic of events had demonstrated that the Municipal Council is regarded by the French authorities merely as a body meant only to play at administration." Therefore, when they saw the Municipal Council acting against the will of the consulate, the Ningbo association simply assumed that "resistance to the Municipality seemed to be obedience to the consulate."[296] Once again, this commentary pointed to the incoordination between the Municipality and the consul-general.

In addition to the more seriously toned editorials in *North China Herald*, other petty newspapers published a series of parody, caricature, and satirical limerick, all of which targeted the French consul-general. For instance, in of the most widely circulated stories, the author lampooned M. Godeaux, ridiculing that when the riot first occurred, the consul-general was so "sick" (as in intimidated) that he had to hide underneath his bed. In another sarcastic commentary, the author wryly said that had M. Godeaux been appointed as the consul-general in Tianjin, the 1870 Tianjin Massacre could have been well avoided, alluding to the pusillanimity of the French consul-general in the face of the mobsters.[297] Consequently, mockery of the same kind appeared on all types of local newspapers in the following days.

The 1898 Riot: Britain's Intervention into the Sino-French Negotiation

[295] *North China Herald*, May 16th, 1874.
[296] *North China Herald*, May 23rd, 1874.
[297] Maybon and Jean Fredet, *Histoire de la Concession Francaise de* Changhai, 383-384.

Although the 1874 and 1898 riots originated from the same set of issues, primarily struggles over the Siming gongsuo's burial ground, these two incidents took place in very different domestic and international contexts. By the time the 1898 riot occurred, the world had entered a period of what scholars describe as 'New Imperialism' (circa, 1880s-1914). This new imperialism fundamentally reshaped the global order and reorganized global relations of power, with one-fourth of earth's surface redistributed territorially.[298] The emergence of global capitalist economy ushered in a new era of imperial expansion around the world. One of the distinctive characteristics of the "New Imperialism" was intensified rivalries among European powers for resources and markets outside of Europe. The heightened international rivalries among imperial powers drastically changed the dynamics of colonial expansion, which was most clearly manifested in Western powers 'scramble for Africa' during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The effects of formal colonization rippled into China as well. By the 1880s, China, especially the coastal port cities, had been firmly integrated into the global commercial networks. Relative cooperation among great powers in China gradually gave way to more cutthroat competition and renewed aggression. This process culminated in the wake of the first Sino-Japanese War of 1895, after which imperial powers in China became more aggressive in claiming territorial possessions. At the end of the nineteenth century, the specter of partition of China loomed large, with numerous foreign powers craving out their respective spheres of influence on the Chinese soil.[299]

It is thus important to analyze the 1898 Siming gongsuo riot from the perspective of accelerating imperial expansion in China in the late nineteenth century. As the foreign powers

[298] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1876-1914* (New York: Vintage, 1987), p. 59; Hevia, *English Lessons*, p. 158.
[299] Stephen Hallsey, *Quest for Power: European Imperialism and the Making of Chinese Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), pp. 46-48.

worked strenuously to establish more territorial footholds and sheltered economic zones in China, Shanghai, too, became a contested arena where authorities from both the International Settlement and the French Concession sought to expand their respective territories in the city. In 1895, the Shanghai Municipal Council demanded to the Diplomatic Delegation in Beijing that the International Settlement should be expanded given the increase of population, houses, and various businesses.[300] A year later, the French Minister in Beijing, Auguste Gérard, informed the Diplomatic Delegation that the French Concession needed to be expanded too. An expanded French Concession, according to the French Minister, was beneficial to both 'general interests and national interest (of France),' given that 'the French Concession included residents of different nationality.'[301] It is noteworthy that France's demand to expand its Concession in Shanghai preceded the riot.

Throughout the first half of 1898, the consular body, consisting of consuls-general from various imperial states, repeatedly extended their petition to the Shanghai Daotai in demand of the expansion of their respective concessions in Shanghai.[302] The question of the enlargement of the foreign settlements coincided with the riot. Shortly after the outburst of violence, the Qing government dispatched Liu Kunyi, one of the most influential high officials in southern China, to resolve the conflict. On July 19, 1899, Liu entrusted Cai Jun, the Shanghai Daotai, to negotiate with the French consul-general, Bezaure, while shoring up the military defense along the

[300] F. L. Hawks Pott, *A Short History of Shanghai: Being an Account of the Growth and Development of the International Settlement* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1928), pp. 137-138.
[301] Gérard (the French Minister in Beijing) to Colonel Denby (the American Minister in Beijing), 19 March 1896, Ministère des Afaires Etrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques, Chine, 1898-1899* [hereafter *DDC*] (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1900), p. 90.
[302] Zhang Qian (ed.), *The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), vol. 13, 23 March, 25 May, and 6 July 1898, p. 569, 580 and 586.

coastline in case French naval forces made any aggressive moves.[303] The initial stage of negotiation mainly revolved around two issues. The first question concerned which party should be held accountable for the outbreak of the riot, and the second issue was about expanding the French Concession.[304]

In the French consul-general's mind, the issue of expanding its territory in Shanghai clearly took precedence over the accountability of the riot, which Liu quickly realized. A proposal was made on July 20 to grant further expansion to the French authorities in exchange of the latter relinquishing their demands to expropriate the Siming gongsuo's burial ground. [305] However, in the subsequent discussions, they failed to hammer out an agreement with respect to the exact extent of the expansion.

The negotiations began in late July and continued into August without yielding any results that satisfied both parties. From October to November, the French consul-general, at the behest of the French Minister in Beijing, Stephen Pichon, proposed another expansionary plan to Liu, which detailed France's scheme to extend its Concession in Shanghai.[306] This plan was once again rejected by Liu. Frustrated with the stagnant state of negotiations, the French Minister grimly stated that France's naval force was always ready to disembark if its demands failed to be satisfied.[307]

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[303] *NCH*, 25 July 1898; Liu Kunyi to the *Zongli yamen*, 19 July 1898, Wang Yanwei and Wang Liang (eds.), *Qing ji waijiao shiliao* [The historical materials of diplomacy during the Qing dynasty] (Taipei: Wenhai chuban she, 1985), vol. 133, p. 495.
[304] Bezaure to Delcassé, 22 July 1898, *DDC*, pp. 66-68; the *Zongli yamen* to Qingchang (the Chinese ambassador in France), 20 July 1898, *Qing ji waijiao shiliao*, pp. 495-496.
[305] Liu Kunyi to the *Zongli yamen*, 19 July 1898, Wang, *Qing ji waijiao shiliao*, p. 495.
[306] *Shenbao*, 23 January 1899. These six chapters were: 1) the opening and extension of Saigon and Ningbo roads adjacent to the Siming gongsuo compounds; 2) inclusion of the Siming gongsuo compounds under the protection of the municipal administration; 3) removal of the coffins at the charitable cemetery; 4) prohibition of the storage of new coffins; 5) expansion of the French Concession; 6) the most favored country status associated with the expansion of concessions.
[307] Pichon to Delcassé, 10 August 1898, *DDC*, p. 70.

At this critical juncture, Britain's involvement complicated the ongoing Sino-French negotiations to a considerable degree. There are two primary reasons that can explain the decision by the British to intervene. First, in the context of 'scramble for China,' to use Robert Bickers's term, the Yangzi delta was deemed as a central sphere of influence by the British. The French agitation for more territory in Shanghai was thus considered by the British as a threat to its commercial dominance in this area. Second, the potential expansion that the French authorities proposed included not only the area of Siccawei (today's Xujiahui) but also some parts of the right bank of Huangpu River as well as the Pudong areas, where numerous British shipping firms were located.[308]

On 11 December 1898, the British Minister in China, Claude Macdonald, delivered an official correspondence to the *Zongli yamen* (the prototype of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in opposition to France's demand for expansion of its territory because of the potential of subjecting the British businesses to the French authority.[309] Macdonald was subsequently informed by the *Zongli yamen* to contact the British consul-general in Shanghai so that the latter could commence negotiations with his French counterpart. In addition to diplomatic measures, Britain also deployed three warships to Nanjing, where Liu Kunyi conducted negotiations with Bezaure.[310]

In the meantime, both Liu Kunyi and the *Zongli yamen* exploited the opportunity of Britain's intervention to their own advantages, which resonated with one of Qing's traditional diplomatic strategies, namely 'to use barbarian to control barbarian (*yiyi zhiyi*).' In one of Liu's letters to his close confidant, he observed that the reason why Britain deployed navy to Nanjing

[308] Pott, *A Short History of Shanghai*, pp. 138-139.
[309] MacDonald to Salisbury, 19 December 1898, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers: The Nineteenth Century, *British Parliamentary Papers, China*, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), vol. 23, p. 436.
[310] *Shenbao*, 11 and 25 January 1899.

was to help China gain more leverage against France. He also said, 'under the current circumstances, we have to ally with Britain, the United States, and Japan… so that they would be willing to help us with military defense.'[311] Moreover, as the tension between Britain and France escalated, the *Zongli yamen* proposed that these two countries conduct direct negotiations with one another rather than drag China into their rivalry.

Under these circumstances, the French had no choice but to cease negotiations with the Chinese while seeking to open dialogues with the British government. Under the French Minister's instruction, Bezaure reached out to the British consul-general, Bryon Brenan, and discussed with him about protecting the British properties located in the French Concession. On 13 December 1898, Bezaure agreed with Brenan on several basic issues: the British land deed would be registered in the British consulate, but the titles, areas, and limits of these properties had to be documented under the French consul-general. At the same time, no rules or regulations could be imposed by the French authorities on the British subjects and their properties unless they were submitted for approval of the British consul-general.[312]

Just as the British protested the French attempts to expand its territory in Shanghai, the French opposed the Anglo-American agenda to extend the city's International Settlement as well. On 24 February 1899, Pichon pointed it out to the French Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé, that the expansion of the International Settlement did not take its original direction but rather included land already earmarked for the French Concession.[313] A couple of weeks later (17 March 1899), Pichon delivered a letter to the *Zongli yamen*, in which he 'formally protested'

[311] Liu Kunyi, *Liu Kunyi yi ji* [The posthumous writings of Liu Kunyi] (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 1959), vol. 5, p. 2239.
[312] Arrangement intervenu entre M. de Bezaure, Consul Général de France, et M. Brenan, Consul Général d'Angleterre, 13 December 1898, *DDC*, pp. 107-108.
[313] Pichon to Delcassé, 24 February 1899, *DDC*, p. 86.

the expansion of the Shanghai International Settlement.[314] The main point of contention between the British and the French concerned Baxian qiao, the southern end of the International Settlement. Shortly after, Bezaure initiated negotiations with the consular body and the Municipal Council to resolve the differences.[315]

While the Anglo-French sparring was going on, the consular body in Shanghai, along with the Shanghai Municipal Council, did not stop negotiating with Liu Kunyi and the Shanghai Daotai, while the Diplomatic Legation in Beijing continued to put pressure on the *Zongli yamen*. On May 8, Liu formally authorized an expansion of the International Settlement in a local announcement. [316] Approximately a month after the question of expanding the Shanghai International Settlement was resolved, Liu, as well as the Shanghai Daotai, resumed negotiations with the French consul-general. According to a letter from Bezaure to the French Foreign Minister, the Chinese and French reached an agreement on the extent of extension of the French Concession, with Xujiahui, an area that the French had been coveting for over thirty years, included in the expanded area too.[317]

That both the British and French had unilaterally secured expansions of their respective settlements in Shanghai did not mean that there were no more tensions between the two. On 23 June, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a telegraph to the French ambassador in London, asking him to plead to the British Prime Minister, Salisbury, so that the latter would convince the British diplomatic representative in Beijing to drop its opposition to the extension of the Shanghai French Concession.[318] On 17 July, Salisbury responded that the British would

[314] Pichon to the *Zongli yamen*, 17 March 1899, *DDC*, p. 89.
[315] Delcassé to Paul Cambon (the French ambassador in London), 23 June 1899, *DDC*, p. 93.
[316] Feng Shaoting, 'Qingdai Shanghai difang zhangguan guanyu kuozhan zujie de liang jian gaoshi [Two proclamations regarding the expansion of concessions issued by local officials in Shanghai during the Qing dynasty]', *Shanghai dangan*, no. 1, 1985, pp. 31-33.
[317] Bezaure to Delcassé, 25 June 1899, *DDC*, p. 94.
[318] Delcassé to Paul Cambon, 23 June 1899, *DDC*, p. 93.

only support the expansion of the French Concession, provided that 'the French settlement shall be confined to the Pasinjow (Baxianjiao) district' and that the same rules, on which the British and French consuls had agreed in December, were to be applied to 'the British owned property in the French Concession at Hankow.'[319]

The French authorities simply rejected these two conditions on the ground that the concessionary expansion had been approved by the Chinese government. The issue surrounding the French Concession in Hankow, the French Foreign Minister said, did not help 'facilitate the resolution of this affair.'[320] In response, while willing to make compromise on the expansion of the Shanghai French Concession, the British government insisted that the same rules should be applied to Hankow.[321] In order to resolve this one last difference, the French Minister in Beijing sought direct negotiations with his British counterpart and hammered out an agreement. This agreement stated that, in the case of further extension of the Hankow French Concession, all the British-owned properties therein would be subject to the same rules and regulations that had been applied to Shanghai. For the time being, though, any disagreements over the validity of the titles of the property in the Hankow French Concession would be referred to the British and French consuls-general in Shanghai. A neutral arbitrator would be appointed to resolve the conflict 'in accordance with precedent and local usage,' if the consuls-general failed to reach any agreements.[322]

On 15 December, the British government approved of this arrangement and formally retracted its objection to the expansion of the Shanghai French Concession. On 25 December, the

[319] Salisbury to Paul Cambon, 17 July 1899, *DDC*, p. 99.
[320] Delcassé to Paul Cambon, 20 October 1899, *DDC*, p. 107.
[321] Balfour (British Treasurer and interim Foreign Minister) to Paul Cambon, 29 November 1899, *DDC*, pp. 108-109.
[322] Memorandum in Paul Cambon to Delcassé, 23 December 1899, *DDC*, pp. 113-114.

French Minister in Beijing demanded "approval" from the Diplomatic Legation and asked the Zongli yamen to 'officially confirm the agreement' that had been made between the British and French consuls-general.[323] The expansion of both the International Settlement and the French Concession obtained approval from both the Diplomatic Delegation and the Zongli yamen in January 1900.[324] As a result, the International Settlement grew over 40 times its original size at 5583 acres, whereas the French Concession nearly doubled its original size.[325]

Conclusion

What this chapter has attempted to do is to bring the colonial actors in Shanghai fully into the picture during the 1874 and 1898 Siming gongsuo riots. While previous scholarship of these two riots has tried to make sense of the actions of the Siming gongsuo members—were they motivated by incipient nationalism? Or was there a rational defense of community interests? — the present study focuses instead on the colonial reactions to these popular disturbances. In addition, earlier studies have also explained the similarities and differences between the riots of 1874 and 1898. Scholars have generally agreed that both incidents originated in and revolved around the struggles over the graveyard and the coffin repository. They have also pointed out significant dissimilarities. For instance, Bryna Goodman has shown that the differences between these two riots reveal some key developments in late-nineteenth-century Shanghai, namely 'the rising popular nationalism that followed the Sino-Japanese War' and 'the gradual internal restructuring of power relations between elite and non-elite elements' within the Siming gongsuo.[326] Richard Belsky has drawn our attention to 'the relative lack of communication

[323] Pichon to Delcassé, 25 December 1899, *DDC*, pp. 114-115.
[324] Pichon to Delcassé, 21 January 1900, *DDC*, p. 116.
[325] Isabella Jackson, "Habitability in the Treaty Ports: Shanghai and Tianjin," in *The Habitable City in China: Urban History in the Twentieth Century*, (eds.) Toby Lincoln and Xu Tao (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 180; Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, p. 171.
[326] Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, pp. 169-175.

between the guild and the French authorities before the latter (1898) incident' as opposed to the frequent negotiations prior to the 1874 riot.[327] More recently, Christian Henriot has reminded us that these two riots occurred in very different historical contexts. Unlike 1874, there was a greater understanding of the factors that caused the infectious diseases, which gave rise to the French attempts to remove all the unburied coffins within its Concession altogether. Another reason, Henriot explains, is the 'legal ground on which the French could argue for removal of the coffins.'[328]

Other striking differences become quite visible when we view these two riots through the lens of the French colonial actors in Shanghai. First, whereas there was an obvious split within the French community in terms of how to handle the riot of 1874, such a rupture seems to have disappeared by the time the riot of 1898 took place. There were significant tensions between the local interests represented by the French Municipal Council and the metropolitan/national interests represented by the consul-general over the course of 1874. In 1898, however, these tensions came to be superseded by a greater confluence of interests, for territorial expansion served the purposes of both developing the Shanghai French Concession and aggrandizing France's national interests in the city. Moreover, if Henriot has brought to light such elements as greater attention to public health and changing legal ground that differentiated the two events, we need to add another dimension—changing international climate. Unlike 1874 where there was relative cooperation among foreign powers in China, the last years of the 1890s saw increasingly aggressive imperial competition on the Chinese soil, as manifested in their efforts to partition the Qing empire to secure respective territorial and economic footholds. As a city characterized by

[327] Richard Belsky, "Bones of Contention," p. 64.
[328] Christian Henriot, *Scythe and the City*, pp. 82-83.

overwhelming foreign influences, Shanghai was embroiled into the era of competitive imperialism.

At the heart of this chapter is the emphasis on the underlying vulnerability of the French colonial administration in Shanghai in the second half of the nineteenth century. As demonstrated above, there were multi-pronged challenges facing the French colonial rule in China's greatest seaport. It is true that the French Concession functioned as a colonial enclave under the authority of the French government, but it was an enclave that was not just inhabited and surrounded by mass Chinese residents but was also juxtaposed with a more autonomous and economically powerful International Settlement dominated by British interests. Throughout its history, the authorities of the French Concession endeavored to protect their autonomy both vis-à-vis its neighbor across the Yangjingbang river and the successive Chinese administrations. In many cases, the French municipal policies could not be imposed on an extremely heterogeneous society dominated by community interests, as evidenced by the strong resistance mobilized by the Siming gongsuo members. Moreover, given that the personality of the consul-general—who acted much like a colonial governor—was of paramount importance, the relationship between the consul-general and the Municipal Council was punctuated by personal animosities when the former was perceived as either too authoritarian or simply too weak to take care of the local French community. Finally, there was the presence of France's perennial foe—British empire—that constantly saw a competing French municipality as a thorn in the flesh and an obstacle to pursuing its imperial interests in the lower Yangzi region. All these factors were present during the 1874 and 1898 riots. Therefore, a close examination of the Siming gongsuo riots of 1874 and 1898 helps bring into sharp focus the fundamental precarity particular to France's most important possession in China.

MULTI-IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS AND URBAN GOVERNANCE
An Urban Microcosm of Global Imperial Politics in Tianjin, 1900-1902

Introduction

If the unique spatial configuration of Tianjin during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was qualitatively different from what scholars would usually categorize as "the colonial city," which is by and large characterized by the bilateral relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, what the city, along with its inhabitants and governing authorities, experienced at the turn of the twentieth century stood out as an even greater exception to its already complex spatial arrangement. At the height of the Boxer Uprising (1899-1901), a massive anti-imperialist movement that wreaked havoc in northern China, the city of Tianjin was captured by the eight-nation allied expeditionary force, which came to the rescue of the foreign legations and concessions in Beijing and Tianjin that had been under the siege of the Boxers. In the absence of any governing body following the city's fall, the allied force decided to form an international colonial administration named the Tianjin Provisional Government (hereafter, TPG). The TPG was headed by a Council, which initially consisted of military representatives from Britain, Japan, and Russia and later included four more members from France, Germany, the United States, and Italy. The TPG ruled the city of Tianjin for 25 months and exercised a broad range of powers over the urban inhabitants. The original boundaries of the TPG administration were limited to the city of Tianjin and the surrounding territory within "the mud wall" except for foreign concessions.

At the heart of this chapter is this distinctive historical phenomenon of Tianjin: the coexistence of a multinational military government alongside several foreign, colonial concessions. The distinctive commercial and strategic importance of the city—its geographic

proximity to Beijing, its connection with Shanhaiguan (a city nearly 200 miles east of Tianjin) and Manchuria via newly developed railway lines, and its pivotal position at the intersection between advances of Euro-American and Japanese imperialisms—drew attention from all major international powers. Prior to the formation of the TPG in August 1900, five imperial powers—Britain, France, the United States, Germany, and Japan—had secured their colonial concessions in Tianjin. Another four international powers—Russia, Italy, Belgium, and Austria-Hungary—established their own settlements in the city during the TPG administration. Such an urban environment made Tianjin a quintessential "city of empires."

The political and cultural intricacies of multiple imperialisms within shared geographic spaces have been explored in the English-language scholarship, most notably in Ruth Rogaski's *Hygienic Modernity*. Rogaski coins the term "hyper-colony" to "draw attention to the potential implications that arise when one urban space is divided among multiple imperialisms."[329] The idea of "hyper-colony" is productive in thinking about how imperialists represented and negotiated its identity vis-à-vis the Chinese and in relation to other foreign powers. Continuing this line of analysis, this chapter interrogates the relationship between the spatial configuration of Tianjin and the unique colonial experience of the multiple international powers who governed it.

The TPG has attracted remarkably little scholarly attention in the English language scholarship. Although there have been a few important studies on the city of Tianjin, they have either mentioned the TPG in passing or left it out from their accounts altogether.[330] The academic literature devoted specifically to the history of the TPG has either been marred by the lack of

[329] Rogaski, *Hygienic* Modernity, 11.
[330] These studies include but are not limited to the following: Stephen MacKinnon, *Power and politics in late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908* (Berkeley: University of California, 1980); Gail Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); Man Bun Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); and more recently, LaCouture, *Dwelling in the World*.

sources or focused almost exclusively on a single realm of activity, such as sanitation and policing work.[331] The juxtaposition and intersection of multiple foreign settlements and a multinational colonial government and their implications for the urban politics and cityscape, though noted, have never been fully explicated. In other words, although the significance of the TPG as a critical juncture in the history of Tianjin has been discussed in previous scholarship, its multi-imperial character, along with its implications for the city and the imperialists, has not yet been unraveled.

This chapter consists of three parts. The opening section offers a brief overview of the origins, organization, personnel, power relations, and jurisdictional boundaries of the TPG. The following two sections, preceding the conclusion, constitute the bulk of this chapter, which revolve around two types of multi-imperial engagements: the reterritorialization of Tianjin by multiple imperial powers (namely, the political dynamics animated by the establishment of new colonial concessions and the expansion of old ones) and the multifarious ways that the TPG and other foreign consular authorities interacted within the city.

The Establishment of the TPG: An Overview

Historically, Tianjin has been an important administrative and economic center in the north of China. The significance of Tianjin stems from its proximity to Beijing and its geographical location on the coastline. By the seventeenth century, the city's status as a granary, transportation hub, and a strategic defense area had been firmly established.[332] Following the Qing military's humiliating defeat in the Second Opium War (1856-1860), Tianjin was opened

[331] Lewis Bernstein, "A History of Tientsin in the Early Modern Times, 1800-1910" (PhD, diss. University of Kansas, 1988), 213-263; and Lewis Bernstein, "Tianjin under Foreign Occupation, 1900-1902," in *The Boxers, China, and the World*, eds. Robert Bickers and R. G. Tiedemann (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 133-146; Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, chapter 6; Robert Nield, "Tientsin," *China's Foreign Places: The Foreign Presence in China in the Treaty Port Era, 1840–1943* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), 244-245.
[332] Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 52; Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin*, 16.

as a treaty port. One of the provisions of the Beijing Convention required the Qing government to grant privileges to the British, French, and American imperialists to establish their respective concessions in Tianjin.

The year 1900 was significant for the city of Tianjin. As a gateway to Beijing, Tianjin was the Qing city that was most affected by the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) and its aftermath. The city's proximity to the capital made it an obvious target for the Boxer aggression, while the Allies were keenly aware of the pivotal position of Tianjin as a base for supplies and troops. On June 17, 1900, the Boxer rebels lay siege to the foreign concessions in Tianjin. Compared with the substantial hardships that foreign legations in Beijing underwent, the 27-day siege of foreign enclaves in Tianjin, which ended on July 14, has often been overlooked. The immediate danger of European civilians in Tianjin prompted the Allies to dispatch a relief force comprised of sailors, marines, and regular soldiers, which arrived in the city on June 23. Two days later, the Seymour expedition, which had previously marched to Beijing, returned to Tianjin.[333] The Battle of Tianjin has been largely lost in most general accounts of the Boxer Uprising. It was in Tianjin, however, that the Chinese, both the Boxers and the Imperial troops, mounted the strongest defense against the Western armies. The Boxer rebels, the Qing military forces, and the foreign troops fought a series of protracted and bloody battles in Tianjin, resulting in massive civilian casualties and large-scale property destruction.[334] During the months of late June and early July, the Chinese launched attacks against the Western armies, with their primary strategies being sniping and artillery fires from concealed spots behind the walls. The main goal of the Chinese was to capture the railroad at the northeastern side of the foreign concessions, but, despite their

[333] Frederic Sharf and Peter Harrington, *China 1900: The Eyewitnesses Speak* (London: Greenhill Books, 2000), 99.
[334] Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London; New York; Bombay; Calcutta, 1918), vol. 3, 215, 243, 245; Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 165-166.

initiatives, they were deterred by the coalition of allied forces. On July 13, the Allies summoned up their military strengths and launched a massive attack of the Chinese walled city. By the end of July 14, the city of Tianjin fell to the allied forces.[335]

It is worth noting that the military operations in and near Tianjin consisted of soldiers and troops from various nationalities and ethnicities. Their co-operation proved to be effective and triumphant in many instances. On July 9, when the civilian population of the foreign districts were under heavy bombardment and assaults from the Chinese, a joint British, Japanese, American, and Russian force attacked the Chinese units, drove the imperial troops off, and forced the Chinese to retreat back to behind the city walls. The British and Japanese armies, in particular, showed well-balanced coordination in the battles near the railway station and Western Arsenal.[336] More importantly, the concentrated assault on the walled city of Tianjin on July 14 was an even more salient example of how military forces from each country all had its role to play. While the Russians and Germans attacked from the east, the British, Japanese, American, French, and Austrians attacked from the south.[337]

At the same time, however, the military cooperation of Western armies was undermined by internal divisions, imperial suspicion, and racial tensions. For instance, as a French Lieutenant named Marie Daoulas observed, when the French, Russian, and Japanese armies were deployed to the French Concession in Tianjin, the tension between the Russian and Japanese soldiers could not have been more evident. “The hidden enmity prevailed between these two countries for a long time,” said Daoulas, “and it had only grown since the Sino-Japanese War.”[338] Such an

[335] David J. Silbey, *The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China: A History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), 144-158.
[336] Lu Yao (路遥), ed., *Yihetuan yundong wenxian ziliao huibian* (义和团运动文献资料汇编) vol. 2, (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 2011), 99-124.
[337] *Ibid*., 124-140.
[338] Marie Daoulas, *Le Siege de Tien-tsin, 15 juin-15 juillet 1900* (Paris :Berger-Levrault, 1903), 41-42.

animosity was clearly shaped by the tense situation at Port Arthur (today's Lüshun), where the Japanese and Russia armies jostled for supremacy. In a similar vein, the process of appointing Baron Alfred von Waldersee as the chief commander of the united coalition forces was fraught with complications resulting from longstanding imperial rivalry and mistrust.[339] Other conflicts resulted from racial tensions inherent of Western imperialism. For instance, a Sikh soldier, having been racially abused by a German soldier, assailed the latter and was subsequently shot to death himself.[340]

When the allied forces occupied Tianjin, all local officials fled from the city. In the absence of a central governmental apparatus, the Allies "consider it their duty to establish in the city a temporary administration," which aimed at restoring peace for Tianjin's inhabitants.[341] Known as the Tianjin Provisional Government, this international military administration took over the governance and policing of the city and surrounding suburbs. One defining feature of the TPG is that it was headed by a Council comprising military leaders from multiple nations. Initially, the Council was composed of three members from Russia, Japan, and Britain, with representatives from the United States, Germany, France, and Italy added later following some negotiations. Under the TPG Council were the following departments: General Secretary, Police, Board of Health, Treasury, Military, Judicial, Public Food Supply (later Public Work), and Chinese Secretary, all of which were headed by foreigners with great knowledge about the Chinese language and customs.[342] The position of General Secretary was seized by the Russian representative, with the rest of the departments headed by other national representatives: Chinese

[339] Silbey, *The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China*, 142-144; Thomas G. Otte, *The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 227-229.
[340] Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 170.
[341] "Tientsin: Allied Proclamation to the Inhabitants," Navy Department. Annual Report of the Navy Department for the Year 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), 1165-67.
[342] Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 292-293; *Decennial Report of Imperial Maritime Customs* (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1933): 579-582.

secretariat by the Japanese, Public Works and Health by the French, Police by the German, Treasury by the British, and Justice to the American.

Figure 3.1 the headquarter of the Provisional Government (University of Bristol - Historical Photographs of China reference number: NA02-24; https://www.hpcbristol.net/visual/na02-24)

It is important to recognize that the TPG itself was not a monolithic political entity. The original composition of the TPG Council—the Russian general Wogack, the British colonel Bower, and the Japanese colonel Aoki—reflected the military predominance of imperial nations in Tianjin.[343] Therefore, military representatives from all countries that had been involved in the military operations in Tianjin all intended to have a member of its own nation to be represented in the TPG Council. The French and German military officials had both complained to the TPG Council about the lack of representation in this governing body. Following a series of correspondence and negotiations, the TPG decided, on November 14, to add three more military representatives from France, Germany, and the United States to the existing Council.[344] The inclusion of representatives from relatively less influential colonial powers, such as Italy and

[343] *Ibid.*
[344] *Procés-verbaux des séances du gouvernement provisoire de Tientsin* (*PVGPT*), translated into Chinese as Baguo lianjun zhanling shilu (Tianjin: Tianjin shehui kexue yuan chubanshe, 2004): 11/14/1900, 81.

Austria-Hungary proved to be more difficult due to their limited participation in the military campaign in Tianjin. It was not until April of 1901, nearly a year after the founding of the TPG, that an Italian representative was included in the Council. In the meantime, the Austria-Hungarian general never managed to have its representation integrated into the Council despite repeated attempts to negotiate with other foreign powers.[345] This was chief because of the Austria-Hungary's limited military presence in the allied troops. The length of these representatives' tenures during the TPG rule was also associated with their disparate imperial agenda and interests in Tianjin. To cite a specific example: while the United States representative decided to withdraw from the TPG Council in late April 1901, the Russian representative, who was keenly aware of the territorial ambitions of his home government, remained in the Council until the dissolution of the TPG in August 1902.[346]

The jurisdiction of the Council included not only the city of Tianjin itself but also the surrounding areas up to the Mud Wall, but it did not encompass any foreign concessions or

[345] *PVGPT*, 01/22/1901, 147; 01/26/1901, 153; 04/09/1901, 243.
[346] *PVGPT*, 04/29/1901, 273.

military facilities already occupied by the allied force (camps, arsenals, railways, etc.). [347]



Figure 4.2 The Native City of Tianjin during the Qing era (http://tianjin.virtualcities.fr/Asset/Preview/vcMap_ID-1629_No-1.jpeg)

In February 1901, the TPG acquired permission from the foreign commanders-in-chief in Beijing to extend its jurisdiction in order to "ensure the safety of Tianjin's communications and sources of supply."[348] After the expansion, the jurisdiction of the TPG came to include not just the city of Tianjin, but also the surrounding environs. Shortly after, the territory under the TPG administration was divided into five districts: Tanggu (east), Junliangcheng (west), Tianjin south, Tianjin north, and the Tianjin city. With the exception of the Tianjin city, each district was administered by a military officer under the designation of the chief of the district.[349]

[347] The Mud Wall was originally built in 1860 by a Manchu General Senggelinqin as an additional defense line against the Anglo-French allied armies.
[348] *Decennial Report*, 581.
[349] PVGPT, 02/08/1901, 170-172.

As an executive body, the TPG Council exercised a wide range of powers in the city of Tianjin. It acted as a legislative and judicial apparatus, with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to "inflict a range of punishments" on the Chinese. It could impose laws and tax lability on the Chinese inhabitants in the city, while having the rights to dispose of properties within its jurisdiction. The TPG had a very different relationship with the foreigners than it did with the Chinese population. The territories under the TPG administration were not subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese officials, and instead the presence of any Chinese officials had to be approved of by the TPG Council first.[350] Although the TPG exercised unmitigated control over the Chinese populace, its authority was very limited with respect to foreign residents in Tianjin. It only had policing authorities over foreigners but was not invested with any power to adjudicate or punish them. Additionally, some of its policies were simply considered as invalid when it came to the foreign residents.[351]

A Multi-Imperial Government in a Multi-Imperial City

The political environment of Tianjin at the turn of the twentieth century was like no other city in the world. The city and its suburb, as well as its inhabitants, were administered by an international colonial government, which coexisted alongside multiple foreign concessions. The TPG Council, comprising military commanders of up to seven nationalities at one point during its tenure, ran nearly all the urban affairs of the native city, whereas the power of governing the colonial enclaves rested in the hands of the consuls, with a variety of municipal bodies playing advisory roles. The juxtaposition of a multinational military administration and several colonial

[350] Even Li Hongzhang, arguably the most influential Chinese official at the time, was subject to the same rule. Upon his arrival in Tianjin, he had to act on an explicit instruction from the Commander-in-Chief that he was in Tianjin as a private person and had no effect on the working of the TPG. Morse, 300; PVGPT, 09/29/1900, 47.
[351] A case in point is the injunction against selling and fabricating ammunition and weapons. Despite the injunction issued by the TPG, many Europeans simply disregarded it and continued to sell or fabricate them because of the considerable profits generated thereby. See Charles Condamy, "Histoire du gouvernement provisoire de Tien-tsin (1900-1902) , » *Revue des Troupes colonial*, no.1 (1905): 18-20.

concessions constituted a crucial element in shaping the urban politics of Tianjin in the first two years of the twentieth century. The multi-layeredness and multiplicity of foreign powers within this shared geographical space had important implications not only for the developments of political dynamics but also for the transformations of the city's physical landscape.

In theory, the relationship between the TPG and the various consular authorities in Tianjin had been clearly defined in *the Administrative Regulations of the City of Tianjin* (*Règlement du governement provisoire du district de Tientsin*). According to the *Regulations*, when the TPG Council had any differences with any consuls, these matters should be adjudicated by a committee comprised of military commanders of the Allies.[352] In practice, the actual relations between the TPG council and the individual consuls were far more complex and extensive than what the Regulations represented. As a matter of fact, rarely did either the TPG or the consuls resolve their differences through the committee's intervention. This section examines two specific types of multi-imperial interactions 1) the interactions between the TPG and the diplomats in the areas of power transference as well as regulating the urban population; 2) the negotiations and contestations between the TPG and the foreign consuls in ameliorating the physical landscape of the city.

Managing a Multi-Imperial City: Transition of Power, Mutual Assistance, and Differential Jurisdictions

The relationship between the TPG Council and the consular authorities was off to a decent start after the former took control of the city. Although it took the TPG nearly two months to inform the consular body in Tianjin of its establishment, the General Secretary of the TPG Council did reach out to the consular body and expressed their intent to maintain a "cordial

[352] *PVGPT*, Règlement du governement provisoire du district de Tientsin, 2.

relationship" with the latter.[353] As a matter of fact, despite the fact that the TPG and concessionary authorities—that is, the consular authorities—controlled different areas of the city of Tianjin, they were in frequent contact with one another. In many ways, the relationship between the TPG and the foreign consuls depended upon the level of development of these concessions. On the one hand, for the concessions that had existed in Tianjin for a longer time, such as the British and French Concessions, there were extensive mutual assistance and communication, but the TPG usually left the administrative and policing issues to the consular authorities.[354] On the other hand, however, as for the newly established settlements including the German, Japanese, Italian, Belgian, and the Austria-Hungarian ones, the TPG often adopted what one might call an interventionist approach, taking charge of policing and administrative powers of these concessionary spaces.[355]

The TPG took over policing authorities in several foreign concessions, where formal regulatory mechanism had not yet been put in place.[356] Though established in 1895, the German Concession had been managed by a commercial bank named the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank until 1905, when the German Municipal Council, presided by the German consul, was formed. Therefore, most, if not all, administrative and policing duties were left for the TPG to deal with. On May 13, 1901, the TPG Council received a letter from the German consul, in which the latter pleaded that the TPG continued to exercise policing powers within the German Concession.[357]

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[353] *PVGPT*, 08/21/1900, 18.
[354] In fact, most of their interactions revolved around reconfiguring the physical landscape of the city, which is the subject matter of the next section.
[355] Unlike other Tianjin Concessions, the TPG did not intervene into many areas of activity of the Russian Concession, despite the latter's late coming status. Nield, *China's Foreign Place,* 248.
[356] The British and the French Concessions had already had their own policing forces, whereas the Russian Concession was managed by its military officers that remained after the Battle of Tianjin.
[357] *PVGPT*, 05/13/1901, 288. Additionally, the TPG, upon the German consul's request, put up notices in the German Concession, which prohibited the Chinese dwellers in the Concession from building any houses. See *PVGPT,* 06/19/1901, 322.

Similarly, the Japanese Concession had also been rather underdeveloped, although it had been set up in August 1898. Therefore, the TPG temporarily policed the Japanese Concession until its dissolution.[358] For the newly established Belgian, Italian, and Austria-Hungarian Concessions, the TPG was authorized by the consuls to exercise policing powers and secure the order in these areas when they had not yet acquired the formal ratifications from the Chinese government.[359]

After the foreign powers had formally gained the consent of the Chinese government to set up their respective concessions in Tianjin, the TPG began to work with the diplomats to arrange for the transference of power. On November 15, 1901, the Italian consul informed the TPG Council that he planned on taking over the right of taxation in the Italian Concession. He also requested that all inhabitants in the newly established Italian settlement should pay tax to the consul rather than to the Treasury Department of the TPG. At first, the TPG seemed somewhat reluctant to accept the Italian consul's proposal, stating that the Council could not relinquish the right of taxation unless it received the notification from the Chinese government that formally acknowledged the establishment of the Italian Concession in Tianjin.[360] Ten days later, the Italian ambassador sent a letter to the TPG, in which he claimed that the TPG should stop exercising any forms of control in the Italian Concession as soon as an agreement was reached between the Italian authorities and their Chinese counterparts. In response, the TPG Council explained that it had not realized that the Italian Concession should be categorized as "areas under military occupation," which, in accordance with the Réglement, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the TPG. It then instructed the head of the Treasury Department to stop levying

[358] *PVGPT*, 11/22/1900, 92; 01/16/1901, 142; 01/18/1901, 146.
[359] *PVGPT*, 03/25/1901, 226; 03/27/1901, 229; 04/01/1901, 234; 11/04/1901, 473.
[360] As the Règlementstated, the TPG had the power to tax the populations in this area before the Italian Concession was established. *PVGPT*, 11/15/1901, 484.

any tax from the population within the Italian settlement.[361] Finally, on August 6 1902, the Japanese consul informed the TPG that he would recuperate the governing and policing power of the Japanese Concession starting from the 10th.[362] A week later, Ijūin Hikokichi, the Japanese consul in Tianjin, sent a letter of appreciation to the TPG, which acknowledged the assistance provided by the TPG for the Japanese, especially the temporary take-over of jurisdiction over the Concession.[363]

In the case of the Austria-Hungarian Concession, the power transference was slightly more complicated, chiefly because the areas that the Austria-Hungarian authorities planned on incorporating as their concession had long been under the German military control. Although in principle the German General Erich von Falkenhayn acknowledged Austria-Hungary's right of acquiring a concession in Tianjin, he insisted on reserving the rights of running the German hospital and barracks therein. In the meantime, the TPG demanded that the Dongfu Bridge and the road connecting this bridge with the railway station should be open for free traffic.[364] In his reply, the Austria-Hungarian consul accepted the TPG's demand but remained reticent on what the German military authorities proposed. The Austria-Hungarian authorities never heard directly from their German counterpart with regard to this issue.[365] The legitimacy of the Austria-Hungarian Concession subsequently came to be acknowledged by the TPG, as the latter agreed to help the former to conduct census in its settlement.[366] On July 28, 1902, the Austria-Hungarian consul informed the TPG that he would take over all the administrative duties of the concession on August 4.[367]

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[361] *PVGPT*, 11/25/1901, 493.
[362] *PVGPT*, 08/06/1902, 773.
[363] *PVGPT*, 08/11/1902, 786.
[364] *PVGPT*, 11/08/1901, 477; 04/14/1901, 635.
[365] *PVGPT*, 04/23/1902, 643; 05/07/1902, 656.
[366] *PVGPT*, 05/12/1902, 669; 06/04/1902, 687.
[367] *PVGPT*, 07/28/1902, 754.

Not only did the TPG facilitate the transition of power for various foreign consuls, but it also came to their assistance in various occasions. As the *Règlement*stated, the TPG Council should "comply with all requests addressed to it, whether coming from the Commandants of the Allied forces or from the Consuls of Foreign Powers."[368] At the same time, the foreign consuls did not passively accept the TPG's assistance. Rather, they facilitated the TPG's rule in Tianjin in various ways as well. It is simply impossible to enumerate all the instances of mutual assistance, so this section will focus on several representative cases.[369]

One of the issues about which the foreign powers were apprehensive was the seizure of and speculation in land by certain parties, which they all sought to prevent when issuing their respective circulars. Among all the consular authorities in Tianjin, the British consul took the initiative to draw the TPG Council's attention to the act of speculation in land outside of the concessionary areas by foreigners. Soon after receiving this correspondence, the TPG Council transferred it to the consular body in Tianjin and then asked the latter to distribute it to all the foreign consuls. The French consul was the first one to accept the proposal set forth by the British. In the meantime, the TPG unequivocally stated that no transference of land ownership was allowed unless the title deeds were properly documented and registered.[370]

One of the most salient examples of the TPG aiding the Tianjin foreign consuls was the protection of telegram lines in the city, particularly the ones built by the Germans. The allied forces began to establish their telegraphic system after the TPG was founded, but these efforts were hampered by the intermittent harassment by the local Chinese. On October 15, 1900, the German military authorities established a telegram that connected Tianjin and the Baoding

[368] PVGPT, Règlement du governement provisoire du district de Tientsin, 2.
[369] Some other types of mutual assistance will be discussed in the following section, as they pertain to the areas of improving the physical landscape of the city.
[370] *PVGPT*, 12/17/1900, 114; 12/28/1900, 123; 01/07/1901, 134.

County (approximately 130 miles to the west of Tianjin). The German consul was instructed to ask the TPG to issue a proclamation to the local Chinese that prohibited any attempts to obstruct the building of these telegraphic lines, with which the TPG complied.[371] In March 1901, however, one of the lines was cut off by some Chinese people, which prompted the Germans to press on the TPG to take more active measures to safeguard the telegrams. In response, the TPG instructed the military officer charged with the security of the southern part of the city to investigate this matter.[372] Nonetheless, similar incidents still occurred in the early days of April, leading to more telegraphic lines built by the Germans being cut off and destroyed. The solution that the Chief of the Police Department proposed was to hold the *Shendong* (local elites) accountable and used their assistance to locate the ones that committed the crime of cutting off the telegraphic lines. This proved rather effective, as those who had severed the lines were soon arrested.[373] In the meantime, the Chief of the Police Department also requested that all military authorities in Tianjin should submit a map that specified where their telegraphic lines were located. The TPG soon received the maps from the British, Japanese, and French authorities.[374]

It would be misleading to assume, however, that there was no tension between the TPG and the foreign consuls in Tianjin. As a matter of fact, one of the most common administrative predicaments that the TPG encountered revolved around conflicting jurisdictions between the TPG and the consular authorities. As shown earlier in this chapter, the TPG exercised unlimited authority over the Chinese populace in Tianjin. However, the degree to which the TPG had the authority to arrest, adjudicate, and penalize Chinese inhabitants, whose alleged illegal activity

[371] *PVGPT*, 10/15/1900, 58; 10/18/1900, proclamation, 800-801.
[372] *PVGPT*, 03/18/1901, 219; 03/20/1901, 220-221.
[373] *PVGPT*, 03/27/1901, 228; 04/01/1901, 233; 04/05/1901, 240-241; 04/11/1901, 249; 04/15/1900, 254; 04/17/1901, 256.
[374] *PVGPT*, 04/11/1901, 249; 04/19/1901, 260-261.

had transpired WITHIN the foreign concessions, prompted a series of contestations and negotiations between the TPG and other consular authorities.

On December 14, 1900, the French consul-general contacted the TPG Council with regard to the Chief of the Police Department having arrested a Chinese person within the French Concession. Since the TPG had no power to police the foreign concessions, the Chief suggested that, as for similar cases in the future, the TPG Council should issue an arrest warrant first and then send it to the appropriate consul for his approval. It was only after receiving the consuls' authorization that the arrests could be made by the Chief of the Police Department.[375] This proposal was adopted by the TPG, and shortly thereafter the General Secretary of the TPG delivered a letter detailing this policy to all the foreign consuls in Tianjin. While the Japanese consul was quick to respond and agree on this policy, the British, French, and German consuls (other imperial powers had not yet established their concessions in Tianjin at this point), all uttered their reservations about the TPG's proposal.[376] Specifically, the British and French consuls held divergent views on how many of the TPG Council members were needed to approve the arrest warrant before it could be issued. The British contended that only one member's approval would suffice, the French consul insisted that the arrest warrant had to have all members' signatures. The British's stance eventually prevailed, for the process of acquiring all members' signatures would have potentially led to the Chinese criminal's fleeing.[377] The German consul largely agreed on this revised proposal under the condition that he had to be informed if any arrests were to be made in a German residency within its Tianjin Concession.[378]

[375] *PVGPT*, 12/14/1900, 113; 12/17/1900, 115.
[376] *PVGPT*, 12/20/1900, 116; 12/28/1900, 123; 12/31/1900, 125.
[377] *PVGPT*, 01/07/1901, 134; 01/11/1901, 138.
[378] *PVGPT*, 02/06/1901, 165-166.

Another case in point occurred in February 1901 and dragged on for months. One of the most severe problems that disrupted the normal economic life of Tianjin following the founding of the TPG was the falsification of money. Faced with an increasing amount of fake currency circulating in the city, the TPG issued a proclamation on December 20, 1900, prohibiting the Chinese inhabitants from minting copper and producing their own false currency.[379] On February 27, 1901, the Chief of the Police Department noticed that some Chinese people in the French Concession were engaged in the business of smelting copper coins, for which they had acquired the permit from the French consular authority. However, the Chief deemed it as illegal and arrested these Chinese after showing the French consul-general the arrest warrant.[380] A few days later, the TPG informed the French ambassador in Beijing of its decision of arresting these Chinese.[381] Upon receiving the notice from his superior in Beijing, the French consul-general filed his complaint to the TPG and argued that the arrest warrants were not valid in this case, because those Chinese had been allowed by the French consul authority to produce copper coins within the boundary of the French settlement. In reply, the TPG simply said that it was illegal for the Chinese to produce currency.[382] The French consul did not drop this case easily, but rather insisted that producing copper coins in the French Concession was for the "interests of the general public." Unable to persuade the French consul, the TPG decided to invite the chief commander Waldersee to adjudicate.[383] Waldersee clearly agreed on the TPG's position and corresponded with the French ambassador in the hope that the latter would take some measures to prevent unofficial-copper-money-minting in the city from happening again. The French

[379] *PVGPT*, 12/20/1900, 116.
[380] *PVGPT*, 02/27/1901, 200.
[381] *PVGPT*, 03/08/1901, 210.
[382] *PVGPT*, 04/15/1901, 253.
[383] *PVGPT*, 04/22/1901, 263.

ambassador complied with Waldersee's request and made a public announcement on May 4 that outlawed the production of copper currency by unauthorized parties.[384]

Multi-Imperial Interactions and the Reconfiguration of Tianjin's Cityscape

Another area, where the dynamics of multi-imperial entanglements materially crystalized under the TPG administration, was physical construction of the city. Soon after its establishment, the TPG set out to implement what some scholars have described as "an effective benevolent dictatorship."[385] The TPG played a critical role in changing the urban landscape and introducing to Tianjin numerous elements of Western-style urban planning and management, which bequeathed the most enduring legacy for the city of Tianjin.

For the purpose of better air circulation and of improving the communication between Tianjin and outside areas, one of the first major public works projects by the TPG was to build new roads and ameliorate old ones. The TPG intended to build or widen roads that facilitated the traffic between 1) the native city and the concessions; 2) the native city and surrounding villages; 3) the foreign concessions and "exterior establishments" (the racecourse, the arsenal, etc.); and 4) the city of Tianjin and outside areas.[386] Since many of these avenues or boulevards had to go through the foreign concessions or lead up to them, negotiations and correspondence between the TPG and the concerned consular or municipal authorities were necessary.

Among all the improved or newly built roads in Tianjin from 1901 to 1902, no other roads than the Taku (Dagu) Road led to more discussions, if not always contentions, between the TPG and various foreign consuls as well as municipalities. On August 6, 1901, the President of the British Municipal Council requested that the TPG take some measures to ensure the

[384] *PVGPT*, 05/03/1901, 277; 05/04/1901, 280.
[385] Nield, *China's Foreign Places*, 244.
[386] Condamy, "Histoire of the TPG," 166-167.

"neutrality" of the sectors of the Dagu Road that either came close to or crossed the German and French Concessions. The TPG Council complied with this demand, corresponded with the German and French consuls, and informed them that those sectors of the Dagu road should remain neutral for the sake of the interests of all parties involved.[387] The TPG's suggestion met, however, a bit of resistance from the French consul-general, who refused to acknowledge the neutrality of the sectors of the road in question. Therefore, the alternative that the TPG came up with was to have the British consul negotiate with his French counterpart and that the Council would cover the expenses of road maintenance once the two sides reached an agreement.[388] However, instead having any direct conversation with one another, both sides once again resorted to the TPG for further assistance. The British authorities inquired about when the portion of the Dagu Road within its Concession could be improved, to which the TPG replied that it could not give any definitive answers until it heard from the French consul general.[389] Nearly a month later, the French consul replied and pushed his demand even further by suggesting that he would only recognize the neutrality of the road when the TPG provided such services as maintenance, amelioration, and lighting. Unwilling to accept the French consul's proposal, the TPG turned to Captain Julian and asked him to convince the French consul that the TPG was not able to provide the French Concession with more assistance than other foreign settlements in Tianjin. The TPG did, however, promise that it would cover part of the expenses of improving the Dagu Road that was within the boundary of the French Concession.[390]

In addition to the issue of the neutrality of the Dagu Road, the TPG also conducted extensive negotiations with the Tianjin foreign consuls with regard to the maintenance and

[387] *PVGPT*, 08/06/1901, 369.
[388] *PVGPT*, 08/12/1901, 378.
[389] *PVGPT*, 11/29/1901, 498; 12/06/1901, 507.
[390] *PVGPT*, 01/20/1902, 547; 02/21/1902, 581.

widening of the road. In early April of 1902, both the President of the British Municipal Council and the German consul requested that a portion of the Dagu Road should be improved and widened by the TPG. Additionally, the German consul also suggested that the area near the portion of the Dagu Road that was to be widened should be occupied by the Germans, if they were to undertake the construction project. Naturally, the TPG was not in a position to grant the portion of the Dagu Road to the Germans and therefore transferred the German consul's demand to his British counterpart. Having gained the impression that these amelioration works would not be too cumbersome based on the correspondence from the German consul, the British did not take any exception with the proposal made by the Germans. The Germans soon began this project in May.[391]

Another important public works project was the building of bridges linking the western side of the Hai River (which at the time was known as "Pei-Ho") with its eastern bank. Since a certain bridge often connected at least two foreign concessions, the building or reconstruction of bridges naturally turned into another crucial arena where extensive negotiations and contentions between the TPG and the foreign consular/military authorities took place. Prior to the military occupation, there were only two boat bridges that connected the eastern and western sides of the river. By the end of 1900, another boat bridge was built by the French troops, which linked the French Concession with the Russian Concession as well as with the railway station of Tianjin.[392] However, a bridge of this kind could hardly carry the considerable amount of traffic by carts, pedestrians, and rickshaw pullers. Therefore, on June 12, 1901, the French general Voyron (华伦) proposed that the bridge should be supplanted by a new iron swing bridge and that the TPG should provide the funds for its construction. Considering a bridge with better capacity as

[391] *PVGPT*, 04/02/1902, 616; 04/04/1902, 626; 04/18/1902, 638; 04/25/1902, 645; 05/12/1902, 661.
[392] Charles Chumdony, "Histoire of the TPG," 172.

important and necessary, the TPG agreed to cover the expenses incurred for replacing the bridge and entrusted this project to the Department of Public Works.[393] Although the original goal of building a new iron swing bridge was to promote free communication between various districts of the city, the French consul-general, M. Leduc, seemed to prioritize the interests of his fellow French nationals by saying that he would put a halt to the construction of this bridge unless the French construction company—Compagnie de Fives Lille—undertook this project. The TPG replied that it had to consult with other foreign consuls instead of "placing the French company's interests above others'."[394] In the meantime, the TPG sought the Russian consul's agreement on having one end of the bridge to be located within the Russian settlement. Moreover, another bone of contention concerned the naming of the bridge. While the French consul wanted to name the bridge "the French Bridge," the TPG insisted that only "the International Bridge"—which should be "open to all, Chinese and foreigners alike"—should be an appropriate appellation.[395] The end result of these negotiations was a mutual compromise: the TPG allowed the Compagnie de Fives Lille to undertake the bridge construction, whereas the French consul-general ceased to take any issue with the title "International Bridge." The TPG also claimed that the bridge would be handed over to the French authorities once the rule of the TPG came to an end.[396]

In addition to the aforementioned issues, the French also demanded that the TPG should be responsible for policing and securing the bridge. The TPG responded by saying that it would accept this request in principle but had to consult with the Russian consul before taking any actions. The Russians accepted this proposal readily but made it clear that the end located within

[393] *PVGPT*, 06/12/1901, 314; 06/17/1901, 321.
[394] *PVGPT*, 06/24/1901, 326-327.
[395] *PVGPT*, 07/12/1901, 346.
[396] *PVGPT*, 07/12/1901, 346; 07/17/1901, 349.

the Russian Concession was still subject to the jurisdiction of the Russian authorities.[397] The actual construction process proved to be more convoluted and slower than what one might have expected at the time. For one thing, the Compagnie de Fives Lille had not submitted its blueprint of the bridge to the French consul-general until late April of 1902, which the latter subsequently transferred to the TPG.[398] Some lengthier negotiations soon ensued, which mainly revolved around how the French authorities and the TPG should divide the payments for building the bridge. A contract was signed between the French consul-general, the company, and the TPG Council on June 3, 1902, with more revisions and clarifications added until the dissolution of the TPG.[399]

No other public works were as widely celebrated and enthusiastically lauded as the conservancy work of the Hai River during the TPG administration. As O. D. Rasmussen, the author of *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History*, later described, "probably at no other point did the TPG touch so vitally the interests of the foreign community of the port."[400] The physical environment of Tianjin imposed capricious constraints on the city. Because Tianjin is located on a flat and low plain that was crisscrossed by multiple rivers, it was historically subjected to either inundation or obstruction of navigation.[401] By the turn of the twentieth century, the mouth of the Hai River had been severely obstructed, which posed menacing threats to the normal navigation from and to Tianjin. Under this circumstance, the TPG Council began to plan the conservancy project in January 1901, and the Public Work Department of the TPG formulated detailed

[397] *PVGPT*, 12/09/1901, 511; 12/16/1901, 518.
[398] *PVGPT*, 04/23/1902, 644.
[399] *PVGPT*, 06/03/1902, 685-686. Interesting enough, this project was never actually commenced under the rule of the TPG. Its construction only began in March 1903 and ended slightly less than a year later (Jan. 1904). See Charles Chumdony, "Histoire of the TPG," 173.
[400] Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, 229.
[401] Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, 52.

proposals in the following month.[402] The TPG was certainly not the only party that was concerned with the navigability of the Hai River. Hence, a couple of weeks later, the Council invited the Chamber of Commerce, the consular body, presidents of the British and French Municipal Council, the Tianjin Maritime Customs Commissioner, and the consular authorities from the Russian, German, and Japanese Concession to attend an informal meeting about the conservancy work of the Hai River, among whom only Gustav Detring, the Tianjin Maritime Customs Commissioner, showed up at the meeting.[403]

Despite the vigor with which the conservancy work was planned, the TPG Council initially failed to act in concordance with the various consuls in Tianjin. While the consular body organized its committee, the TPG appointed from its members a committee to supervise the river work as well. Thus, misunderstandings arose as for which committee should oversee the conservancy project.[404] Additionally, there were disagreements between the TPG, the consular body in Tianjin, and other local interest groups (the Chamber of Commerce in particular) in terms of funds needed for the conservancy project. Eventually, it was Waldersee who intervened and created the Haihe Conservancy Board and limited the members of the Board to only three: a member from the Consular Body, a member from the TPG (this position would be transferred to the Chinese Taotai once the TPG was returned to the native authority), and the Commissioner of the Maritime Customs in Tianjin.[405] The necessary funds were provided by both the TPG and by the mercantile communities of the foreign concessions, with the former offering to duplicate the amounts raised by the latter. From June 1901 to August 1902, the TPG Council also made monthly contributions (Taels 5000) to the Haihe Conservancy Board. The initial conservancy

[402] PVGPT, 01/22/1901, 148 and 02/01/1901, 161.
[403] PVGPT, 02/13/1901, 184. 02/16/1901, 189.
[404] 03/15/1901, 217.
[405] Decennial Reports, 557; 05/03/1901, 277; 05/10/1901, 284.

work was supported through the funds provided by the TPG, which laid a solid foundation for future construction.[406]

A key characteristic of the Haihe Conservancy Board was coordination between various administrative bodies and personnel. It was in this area that some frictions occurred between the TPG, the Haihe Conservancy Board, and the military authorities in Tianjin. On April 4, 1902, the Haihe Conservancy Board requested funding from the TPG to finance its project of surveying the Dagu Sandbar.[407] Originally conceived of as an enterprise of international cooperation, the French, Italian, British, German and Japanese naval officers all expressed interests in participating in this work.[408] However, in June 1902, the Haihe Conservancy Board decided to let the captain of a British warship named Rambler undertake the project of surveying the Dagu Sandbar and, shortly thereafter, requested that, on its behalf, the TPG thanked all the other naval officers who had offered their assistance for this project. This obviously caused a bit of displeasure of the TPG Council, which, as its letter to the allied commanders indicated, considered such an arrangement as "inappropriate," especially given that the Haihe Conservancy Board had already enlisted help from all the naval officers. The TPG also informed the Haihe Conservancy Board that, "misunderstandings of similar kinds have to be avoided in the future" and that all the other naval officers had to receive a copy of the hydrographic map designed by the British naval captain. [409] In response, the Haihe Conservancy Board contended that it had only given this project to the British based on a "thorough investigation of all factors involved" and thus should not shoulder any blames for the misunderstanding. The wording of the TPG Council's reply sounded even stronger. The Council said unequivocally that it was

[406] Decennial Reports, 586; Morse, 298; Condamy, 178-179.
[407] *PVGPT*, 04/04/1902, 626.
[408] *PVGPT*, 04/09/1902, 630; 04/14/1902, 635.
[409] *PVGPT*, 06/13/1902, 699.

"inconceivable" that the Haihe Conservancy Board did not consider itself as being subject to any criticisms. It continued to argue that the "international character" of Conservancy Board had to be underscored, not least because all the allied commanders had approved of the formation of this organization while financing its various activities.[410]

The Scramble for the City: Tianjin as a Center of Imperial Contestation

Tianjin became a microcosm of "the scramble for China" by various imperial powers at the turn of the twentieth century. The first two years of the new century witnessed dramatic reterritorialization in the city of Tianjin: the foreign powers that had previously secured concessionary territories sought to expand what they already had, while those having no existing concessions coveted to acquire their own. By the time the TPG was established, Tianjin had already been home to five territorial concessions: the British, French, American, German, and Japanese ones. During the first two years of the twentieth century, three more imperial powers—Russia, Austria-Hangry, and Belgium—secured their respective settlements in the city. The coexistence of an international colonial regime and a total of nine foreign concessions resulted in

[410] 06/30/1902, 720-721.

Tianjin's unique political environment and spatial configuration.

Figure 5.3 Map of Tianjin, 1900 (with added indication of the location of foreign concessions) (http://tianjin.virtualcities.fr/Asset/Preview/vcMap_ID-1464_No-1.jpeg)

"The Grab Game" in Tianjin

The beginning of what Edwin Conger, the American Minister in China, called the "grab game" in Tianjin began with Russia's unilateral action of establishing a territorial foothold in the city. Though part of the allied expeditionary force, Russia was hardly of one mind with other Western powers. Shortly after the capture of Beijing in August 1900, Russia was engaged with the Qing imperial troops in a string of confrontations along the right-of-way of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Between September and October, Russia took possession of the entirety of southern Manchuria. In addition, it also seized the railways from Tianjin to Beijing and from

Tianjin to Shanhaiguan.[411] In the city of Tianjin, Russia's territorial ambition was perhaps the most conspicuous. This is partially indicated by the preponderance of Russian military presence in the allied expedition following the siege of foreign legations and consulates in Beijing and Tianjin, respectively.[412] During the Battle of Tianjin, Russian army fought and occupied an area on the east side of the Hai River across the British and French Concessions. After the city was captured by the allied troops, the Russians remained there and occupied this land, where the railway station and its sidings were located. On November 6, 1900, the Russian authorities issued a circular announcing the formal establishment of the Russian Concession.[413]

On November 7, 1900, the Belgian consul issued a circular that declared its government's occupation of a track of land on the eastern side of the Hai River about one mile below the newly claimed Russian territory.[414] The acquisition of territorial concession by individual governments clearly did not accord with the "Open Door Policy," the guiding principle of the United States' policy in China designed to keep the trade in China open to all countries equally and to mediate the competing interests of various imperial powers in China. Though initially hesitating to accept this policy, all foreign powers involved in China agreed on it in principle.[415]

Under these circumstances, Conger expressed strong oppositions to the Russian authorities' action of taking territorial possession in Tianjin. He contended that Russia's acquisition of concession was "in violation of their publicly declared intentions" and that "all action in relation to securing new or extending old concessions should be deferred until order is

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[411] Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 321-322.
[412] Stats: see "Tientsin: Relief of the Beseiged Europeans, 24 June 1900," Navy Department. Annual Report of the Navy Department for the Year 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), 1150-52.
[413] Morse, *The International Relations with the Chinese Empire*, 324; russian circular announcing occupation of left bank of the peiho, opposite foreign concessions at tientsin. Tientsin, November 6, 1900. *Papers on Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter, *FRUS*), 41.
[414] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay," December 31, 1900; *FRUS*, 40.
[415] For a more elaborate discussion of "the Open Door Policy," see Esthus, Raymond A. "The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46, No. 3 (Dec., 1959), 435–454.

restored, the Chinese Government reestablished, and the rights and interests of all can be considered."[416] At the same time, Conger instructed James Ragsdale, the United States consul in Tianjin, to protest against the actions of the Russian and Belgian consuls.[417] Ragsdale, however, did not file his complaint immediately for the reason that no American properties were included in either the Russian or the Belgian Concession. In response, Conger insisted that, "consent of the Chinese Government should first be obtained, and all the public or international rights of the other powers should be respected" before any concessionary space could be granted, while advising Ragsdale to continue protesting.[418] A week afterwards, Conger delivered a letter to the Russian Minister in Beijing, in which he argued that the new Russian Concession included "an important public railway station and other property necessary for international use" in Tianjin and therefore should not be expropriated by one single power.[419] The Russian Minister in Beijing, Michail N. Giers, had no qualm about the action that its home government had taken. He even claimed that "there is no question whatever of acquiring territory by conquest on the part of Russia nor of the taking possession of the railway station at Tientsin by the Russian Government" and that "the object of the Russian military authorities has been to prevent the seizure of and speculation in land by certain parties within the radius occupied by the Russian troops for military purposes since last June."[420] In the meantime, Conger expressed his protest against the Belgian action to its minister in Beijing, albeit in relatively more moderate tone. Compared with the Russian Minister, the Belgian Minister, Joostens, seemed to be more

[416] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay," December 31, 1900, *FRUS*, 40.
[417] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Ragsdale," November 13, 1900, *FRUS*, 41.
[418] "Mr. Ragsdale to Mr. Conger," November 26, 1900, *FRUS*, 42; "Mr. Conger to Mr. Ragsdale," November 30, 1900, *FRUS*, 43.
[419] "Mr. Conger to the Russian Minister at Pekin," November 14, 1900, *FRUS*, 45.
[420] "The Russian Minister at Pekin to Mr. Conger," November 16, 1900, *FRUS*, 45.

sympathetic with the American concerns with Tianjin as "an open port" and said that it only reserved a piece of land for future building of a consulate rather than a settlement.[421]

Despite the strong resistance on the American part against any unilateral actions in Tianjin, other powers proceeded with their respective agenda of expanding their existing concessions. France was the first to do so. On November 20 1900, the consul-general of France in Tianjin, Jean Marie G. G. du Chaylard, issued a proclamation, announcing its government's decision to extend the French Concession beyond its original limit to the west.[422] As soon as he received the circular that presented the French intent upon expanding its concession in the city, the American consul informed Conger that the proclamation made by the French consul-general was "arbitrary and extraordinary" and that he needed to investigate to what extent "it may be important to American ownership."[423] In response, Conger said that he could not understand "by what right the French forcibly seize and annex property to their settlement in an open treaty port," and he went on to state that no extension of any concessions should be done until order was restored in Tianjin.[424]

The Austria-Hungarian Minister to China, Moritz Czikann von Wahlborn, also viewed the Russian approach with great skepticism, and the so-called "concert of powers" seemed to be endangered. On November 28, 1900, Czikann informed his counterparts in the Beijing Legation that its government considered it necessary to establish a consulate in Tianjin, which "it will require for this purpose a settlement like the others already have."[425] Unlike other imperial powers, however, Czikanna made it clear that Austria-Hungary would only extract a suitable

[421] "Mr. Conger to the Belgian Minister at Pekin," November 14, 1900; "The Belgian Minister at Pekin to Mr. Conger," November 18, 1900, *FRUS*, 46.
[422] "French circular announcing the occupation of certain territory at tientsin in addition to its former concession." November 20, 1900, *FRUS*, 42.
[423] "Mr. Ragsdale to Mr. Conger," November 24, 1900, *FRUS*, 41.
[424] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Ragsdale," November 30, 1900, *FRUS*, 43.
[425] "The Austrian Minister at Pekin to Mr. Conger," November 28, 1900, *FRUS*, 46-47.

tract from the Chinese government when order was restored in the city. Three days later (December 1, 1900), Italian Minister to Beijing, Salvago Raggi, proposed the same demand as his Austria-Hungarian counterpart to the foreign representatives in Beijing on roughly the same ground.[426] There is evidence indicating that the Austro-Hungarian and Italian envoys were in dialogue with one another with regard to acquiring settlements in the city. Their desires to achieve territorial gains in Tianjin have been interpreted by some scholars as driven "less for 'imperialist' considerations than for the satisfaction of their own vanity."[427] Japan was the last imperial power that raised any issues with respect to the limit of its concession in Tianjin. In the notice promulgated by the Tianjin Japanese consul, it stated that Japan would not recognize "the validity of any transfer of right of ownership of land or premises" and presented a detailed layout of the boundaries of its settlement.[428] This notice was nonetheless interpreted by Conger as indicative of Japan's intention of extending its Tianjin concession, with which the American Minister took exception.[429]

The United States was not alone in opposing the partition of Tianjin. The Russian acquisition of territorial concession created practical difficulties for the British authorities that were responsible for safeguarding their subjects' proprietary rights in Tianjin. Shortly after the Russians established its concession on the left bank of the Hai River on November 6, 1900, the British acting consul in Tianjin, C. W. Campbell, raised objections to the circular issued by the Russian consul. He contended that the stretch of land that the Russian military authorities had seized contained significant vested interests by the British subjects. He thus stated that he

[426] "The Italian Minister at Pekin to Mr. Conger," December 1, 1900, *FRUS*, 47.
[427] Monika Lehner, "Österreich-Ungarn und der „ Boxeraufstand " : Die Friedensverhandlungen aus der Sicht der k . u . k . Diplomatie und die Tätigkeit der Eskader in Ostasien im Jahr 1901," in *Das Deutsche Reich und der Boxeraufstand*, edited by Susanne Kuss and Bernd Martin, (München: Iudicium, 2002): 204-217.
[428] "notice promulgated by the japanese consul at Tientsin," December 28, 1900, *FRUS*, 47.
[429] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Ragsdale," December 31, 1900, *FRUS*, 48.

reserved "British rights on the ground seized by General Linevitch" and specially refused "to permit the titles of British subjects, which are satisfactory to me, to be called in question by Russian authorities under any circumstances."[430] In the meantime, Campbell made the same reservation to the Belgian consul as he had to his Russian counterpart, although he admitted that "there is no British property in the terrain mentioned" in the circular issued by the Belgian authorities.[431]

In mid-November 1900, another dispute arose between British and Russian authorities over the issue of Russian flags being hoisted upon properties owned by two British Company in Tianjin—the Eastern Wharf and Godown Company and Butterfield and Swire Company. On November 13, 1900, the owner of the Eastern Wharf and Godown Company, William Forbes, informed the British consul in Tianjin that the Russian authorities had put up two flags and a noticeboard on the company's frontage facing the Hai River. Although Forbes had attempted to persuade the Russian officer, Prince Wolkonsky, to discuss with General Linévitch about this issue, the latter simply refused to remove the flags.[432] On the next day, however, General Linévitch offered to remove the Russian flags on the land in question under the conditions: 1) "documents relating to the proprietary title to this land" had to be acknowledged "as having been transferred before the occupation by the Russian military authorities;" 2) neither the Russian nor the English flags shall be planted "until this flag question has been settled mutually."[433] Campbell was nonetheless displeased with this proposal, stating that he did not see any valid reason "why the British owners of this property should subscribe to conditions imposed at the

[430] Consul-General Campbell to Sir E. Satow. Tien-tsin, November 8, 1900. 56-57; Acting Consul-General Campbell to M. Poppe'. Tien-tsin, November 8, 1900, 58-59.
[431] "Acting Consul- G eneral Campbell to Sir E. Satow," *Correspondence respecting the Imperial Railway of North China* (*CRIRNC*) (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1901): November 8, 1900, 59.
[432] "Messrs, Forbes and Co. to Acting Consul- General Campbell," *CRIRNC*, November 13, 1900, 68.
[433] "Prince Wolkonsky to Messrs. Forbes and Co. Tien-tsin," *CRIRNC*, November 13, 1900, 69-70.

will of the Russian military authorities." He then asked the company to further press its case and demand the removal of the Russian flag. Following Campbell's instructions, Mr. Forbes sent a letter to General Linévitch, telling him that the company could not admit any of the Russian rights over their properties and that the flags must be removed.

The Russian authorities did not budge in face of protests made by the British, and the Russian flags and noticeboard were still standing on the land in question. Considering the Russian action as a "trespass" on the British properties in Tianjin, Campbell formally lodged a protest to the Russian military authorities on November 17. In his letter to General Linévitch, Campbell recounted the entire process of the dispute and concluded that "The planting of Russian flags and notice-boards on the private property of British subjects without their authorization and in defiance of their repeated objections is a trespass on their rights, and, as such, cannot be defended by any principle of law with which I am acquainted."[434]

Not only were private property owners opposed to the Russian appropriation of land on the left side of the Hai River, the British Municipal Council—an administrative body managing various affairs within the Tianjin British Concession—also protested the Russian action, primarily for the reasons of defending private interests of the British subjects and improving the financial vitality of the concession. In a letter from the Chairman of the Council, ED. Cousins, to Campbell, the chairman claimed in unambiguous terms that "if the time has come for the territory in question to pass under foreign control, this Municipality has, without doubt, the strongest claim to its acquisition." Cousins invoked several reasons to support his argument: 1) the Russian expropriation of the opposite side of the British Concession would reduce the latter's revenue from shipping, chiefly because the opposite shore was generally used to handle river-

[434] "Acting Consul- General Campbell to Lieutenant-General Line'vitch," *CRIRNC*, November 17, 1900, 73.

borne cargoes; 2) a considerable portion of the proposed Russian Concession already had British-owned properties; it was deemed unreasonable by the British Municipal Council that the Russian authorities would claim an area so vastly out of proportion to its commercial interests in the city.[435] Campbell, the acting consul-general in Tianjin, expressed these concerns to his Russian counterpart, M. Poppe. In response, the latter explained that, though Russia did not have considerable commercial interests in Tianjin, it was for political reasons that its government decided to take possession of a large tract of land in Tianjin. He then gave Campbell the assurance that the interests of British subjects would be "scrupulously respected."[436]

The protection of private proprietorship, on which the British authorities had been insisting, was eventually ratified in a circular that the Russian consul delivered to his counterparts in Tianjin on December 24. According to this circular, it was clearly stated that "there is no infringement of the rights which foreigners might have by virtue of regular titles previous to 17th June last, and that these rights will on the contrary be scrupulously safeguarded."[437] At the same time, the owners of the aforementioned British companies were informed that the property belonging to them were not included in the newly established Russian Concession.[438]

While the British and Russian authorities were at loggerheads with one another over territorial issues, the British consul in Tianjin had no qualm about accepting the extension of the preexisting French and Japanese Concessions. When receiving the notification from the French consul-general declaring the extension of its concession in Tianjin, Campbell simply commented that "in principle there can be no objection to the extension of the French municipal control over

[435] "Mr. Cousins to Acting Consul-General Campbell. Tien-tsin," *CRIRNC*, November 26, 1900, 74.
[436] "Acting Consul- General Campbell to Sir E. Satow. Tien-tsin," *CRIRNC*, January 7, 1901, 116-117.
[437] "M. Poppe to Consuls at Tien-tsin. (Circulaire.) M. et cher Collegue," *CRIRNC*, January 6, 1901, 94.
[438] "Sir E. Sutow to the Marquess of Lansdowne," *CRIRNC*, January 9, 1901, 93.

the ground mentioned."[439] He then proceeded to say that, after the Tianjin British Concession had been expanded in 1897 and 1898 respectively, it was only natural for the British to expect that the French would pursue the same expansionist agenda. The only concern that Campbell mentioned was related to verification of the British-owned properties in the expanded French Concession. Just as "in the British extension non-British owners were not required to verify their titles at this Consulate," Campbell said, the same would be expected from its French counterpart in Tianjin.[440] By the same token, on December 28 1900 when the Japanese notification was issued, Campbell stated that the observations made in his correspondence to the French consul-general regarding the extension of its concession should "apply equally to the Japanese."[441] It is also worth mentioning that, on the very same day, the French consul-general—H. Leduc—and his Japanese counterpart—Tei Nagamasa—had a secret deal, which allowed them to agree upon the exact boundary separating these two concessions.[442]

Not only did the British authorities resolutely resist any attempts by other foreign powers to expand their own concessionary spaces in Tianjin, but they also sought to secure more territorial gains for themselves. On April 23, 1901, the German consul-general in Tianjin, Alfred Zimmermann, announced that an extension of its concession to the south and southwestern ends of its original site had been confirmed by the Chinese government. Shortly after hearing of this, the British ambassador in China, Ernest Satow, expressed his concerns to Li Hongzhang, one of the most influential Han Chinese officials in charge of negotiating with the foreign powers. As Satow said, the fact that both Russians and Germans had secured expansions of their respective

[439] "Acting Consul- General Campbell to Sir E. Satow," *CRIRNC*, November 24, 1900, 95.
[440] Ibid., 95.
[441] "Acting Consul-General Campbell to Sir E. Satow," *CRIRNC*, January 3, 1901, 96.
[442] Lü Yinig (吕颖), "Fa Ri liangguo zai jin guanxi yanjiu (1900-1945) (法日两国在津关系研究（1900—1945）)," *Nankai xuebao*, no. 1 (2020): 140.

concessions in Tianjin made the British authorities wary of the possibility of their property rights being infringed upon. As a result, Satow wanted to persuade the Chinese government to reserve a triangular shaped area (around 238 hectare) to the south of its existing settlement for the future expansion of the Tianjin British Concession.[443] Coincidentally, another triangular shaped area to the north of the German Concession created a bit of miscommunication between the German, British, and the Chinese officials, for it was not entirely clear whether this piece of land could be integrated into the German Concession. This misunderstanding was soon resolved, when the rectified maps were exchanged between these officials.[444] After the boundaries of these areas were clarified, the expansions of the German and British Concessions were formally ratified by the Chinese government a few months later.[445]

The fate of the American Concession seemed to be an exception to what happened to other foreign concessions in Tianjin. The resistance against the expansionist agenda by the Russians notwithstanding, the American military authorities did ponder the possibility of restoring its old Concession in Tianjin for commercial and military considerations, especially given the circumstance where all territories available in the city had been occupied by other imperial powers.[446] Ragsdale concurred with this opinion, claiming that it would be wise for the United States to have some forms of control in Tianjin, since "the trouble in North China is not over, and final settlement day is a long ways off."[447] This insistence on obtaining territorial gains in Tianjin seemed to be at odds with what the American home government preferred. As Conger

[443] "Li Hongzhang wei Ying kuochong zujie shi zhachi Qian Rong (李鸿章为英扩充租界事扎敕钱嵘)," 04/29/1901, *Tianjin zujie dangan xuanbian* 天津租界档案选编 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1992), 7-8.
[444] Ibid., 166-167; 168; 12-13.
[445] The German Concession was ratified on July 20, whereas there was no exact date as for the expansion of the British one. Ibid., 14-15; 173;
[446] "General Chaffee to Mr. Conger," February 21, 1901, *FRUS*, 49; "Major Foote to Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition," February 17, 1901, *FRUS*, 49-50.
[447] "Mr. Ragsdale to Major Foote. Consular Service," February 15, 1901, *FRUS*, 50.

explained in his correspondence to General Chaffee, "the emphatically declared policy of the United States is that it would not make the present military movement in China a pretext for securing possession of Chinese territory… (and) our Government also favors international settlements where possible."[448] In order to reconcile these two positions and, more importantly, find a more affordable way to sustain the American Concession, the American diplomats initiated negotiations with their British counterpart in the hope of having its concession be integrated into the British Concession.[449] The incorporation did not materialize until a year later, partially because of the Chinese opposition and partially because the American Department of State considered running such a settlement as excessively costly and hardly necessary.[450] Eventually, it was in October 1902, roughly two months after the dissolution of the TPG, that the American Concession was formally integrated into the British Concession.

"The Siding Incident": Anglo-Russian Disputes over Railway Rights

Railway imperialism was of vital importance to Manchuria and to the entirety of northern China. In the context of great scramble during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, railways enabled imperial powers to extend their reaches beyond coastal enclaves into the interior, which facilitated military and commercial access within the vast Chinese territory. Acquiring railway rights in China meant very different things for British and Russian empires. For the Russian empire, the railways in Manchuria and northern China "had tremendous importance for the inner topology of the Russian Empire, becoming part of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1916)."[451] For the British, railway rights had another layer of meaning. The

[448] "Mr. Conger to General Chaffee," February 25, 1901, *FRUS*, 51-52.
[449] "Mr. Satow to Mr. Squiers," July 24, 1901, *FRUS*, 53-54.
[450] Nicolas Vaicbourdt, "De la « me too policy » aux ambitions contradictoires: la brève histoire de la concession américaine de Tianjin, 1860-1902" in *Outre-Mers*, T102, N° 382-383 (2014).
[451] Ivan Sablin, *The Rise and Fall of Russia's Far Eastern Policy, 1905-1922: Nationalisms, Imperialisms, and Regionalisms in and After the Russian Empire* (Milton: Routledge, 2019), 7.

British government saw mutual recognition of railway rights as an integral part of the "Open Door Policy" that it adopted by the end of the nineteenth century, because a formal understanding of railway rights amounted to mutual recognition of spheres of influence in China. From late 1898 to mid-1899, the British and Russia worked painstakingly to hammer out a railway sphere arrangement. On April 29, 1899, the Anglo-Russian Agreement, also known as the Scott–Muravev agreement, was eventually reached, which effectively recognized British and Russian railway spheres in China.[452] This agreement did not just define their respective positions toward each other in China, but also for the time being stabilized the quarrelsome international politics concerning "the China Question."

The power equilibrium was drastically destabilized during the Boxer crisis. The disintegration of the central authority in China during the Boxer Uprising contributed to the Russian expansionist drive in the northern provinces of China. As mentioned in the previous section, Russian military authorities in China swiftly launched military operations in northern China after the relief of the Tianjin foreign settlement in July 1900. In the space of several months, Russia took control over the Tanggu-Tianjin section of the Imperial Chinese Northern Railways, which was built and run by the British, and then seized the section from Tanggu to Shanhaiguan. Because of the vested interests by the British bondholders, the British government was forced to react to the Russian occupation of these railway lines. As for the British "men on the spot," under the instruction of the British Minister in China, Claude M. MacDonald, General Sir Alfred Gaselee, the commander of the British contingent in China, engineered an occupation of parts of the Beijing-Tianjin line to counteract the Russian proceedings. What induced the strongest resistance from the British government was the Russian occupation of Niuzhuang, an

[452] Philip Joseph, *Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900: A Study in Political and Economic Relations with China* (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 387-390.

important railway juncture in south Manchuria where the Imperial Chinese Northern Railways met with the south Manchurian line of the Eastern Railways. This forceful seizure by Russian troops signaled to the British the ominous prospect of the collapse and potential partition of the Chinese empire. The British government formally protested the Russian occupation of Niuzhuang on November 3, to which the government in St. Petersburg simply gave a hollow assurance that the 1899 Anglo-Russian Agreement would be honored without really addressing the question of Niuzhuang.[453]

On March 27, 1901, *North China Herald*—the largest English-language newspaper in Shanghai—covered what they called "the Tianjin Crisis" that had happened in the city a few days ago. According to this report, the occurrence of this conflict was intertwined with "Russia's recently claimed concession in Tianjin," which included most of the British property next to the railway station. The British wanted to make rail sidings down to the river, but this project was obstructed by the Russians. Neither side was willing to make any concessions and denied each other the rights of proprietorship. At the same side, both sides "backed its opinion by the presence of armed guards." The report even went on to say that "the situation throughout the day has been so serious and strained that…we should think ourselves within measurable distance of war."[454] Commonly referred to as "the siding dispute" by the contemporary observers,[455] this incident was eventually resolved through diplomatic negotiations and did not lead to any major military confrontation between the two countries. This, however, should not diminish the significance of this fracas, not only because it illustrated the specific ways in which divergent imperial interests clashed in the city of Tianjin, but also because it was symptomatic of the

[453] Otte, *The China Question*, 219-225.
[454] *North China Herald*, March 27, 1901.
[455] Gordon Casserly, *The Land of The Boxers* (London, New York And Bombay: Longmans, Green, And Co. 39 Paternoster Row, 1903), 33.

Anglo-Russian contention over railways in northern China.



Figure 2.4 Railways in China circa 1900 (from Elisabeth Köll, *Railroads and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2019), 5)

It was in the context of Anglo-Russian rivalry over railway rights that the "siding dispute" in Tianjin took place. On March 9 1901, Lieutenant-General Gaselee reported that "Russians have stationed sentries on a piece of land at Tien-tsin, where the British military authorities were constructing a siding." According to a telegraph sent from Satow to Lansdowne a week later, Satow stated that "this land is claimed by the Chinese Northern Railway, and forms part of the ground seized as a concession by the Russians."[456] On March 15, Campbell, the general in charge of military operations in Tianjin, was informed that collisions with the Russian

[456] "Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne," March 15, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 98; "Major-General Barrow to India Office," March 15, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 103.

military should be avoided until he received further instructions from the home government.[457] On the next day, Campbell met with Russian General Wogack, who, Campbell said, "was anxious to avoid collision, but…preclude withdrawal." Therefore, neither side withdrew their guards on the scene, though no aggressive actions were seen.[458]

While there was still a certain degree of apprehension of military clashes over the property in question, Gaselee suggested that Count Waldersee, as Commander-in-chief of the allied forces in China, should be invited to settle the contentious issue between the British and Russian authorities.[459] There was nothing surprising about Gaselee's proposal, as Waldersee had been involved in the Anglo-Russian contention over railway rights ever since his arrival in China in October 1900. Caught in the rancorous rivalry between Russia and Britain, Waldersee had to go through protracted diplomatic negotiations to settle their disputes over railway lines from Beijing to Tianjin and from Tianjin to Shanhaiguan during the last months of 1900. He was eventually able to reach an agreement with the Russian authorities, which transferred the control of the railway line from the British to Waldersee in his capacity as commander-in-chief on December 26, 1900.[460] This agreement was approved by the British government under the conditions that the rights of the British bondholders were recognized and that the agreement was "a purely military and provisional measure."[461]

Having had the precedent of inviting Waldersee to settle the question of military possession of the railway lines, the British government was quick to enlist his intervention once again. On March 17 1901, Frank Lascelles, the British minister in Germany, was instructed to

[457] "Major-General Barrow to India Office," March 15, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 103.
[458] "Major- General Barrow to India Office," March 16, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 104.
[459] "India Office to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Gaselee," March 16, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 104.
[460] Otte, *The China Question*, 227-232.
[461] "Mumm von Schwarzenstein, in Peking, to the German Foreign Office," January 12, 1901, *German diplomatic documents, 1871-1914*, selected and translated by E.T.S. Dugdale, v.3 (New York, Barnes & Noble), 136.

inform the German government to apply to Waldersee to settle the dispute.[462] Upon receiving this request, Count von Bulow, expressed reservations about having Waldersee involved in the Anglo-Russian hostilities once again, given that it was outside of Waldersee's power to handle non-military affairs.[463] Although Waldersee was instructed to take note of the Anglo-Russian dispute in Tianjin, he was also told "to decide the question from a military point of view only."[464]

While the British diplomatic representative in Berlin tried to persuade the German government to give Waldersee the requisite instruction, Major-General Barrow in Tianjin did not cease to negotiate with his Russian counterpart. Despite his efforts, Russian general Wogack refused to arrange any "mutual and synchronous withdrawal."[465] At the same time, Barrow suggested to German General Schwartzoff, who was charged with settling the dispute temporarily due to Waldersee's departure for Jiaozhou a few days earlier, that both Russian and British guards should be withdrawn from the disputed land.[466] However, Schwartzoff responded by saying that the order of having both sides' guards withdrawn could only be given when a settlement between the two governments was worked out. Not only were the British anxious to avoid any complications with regard to the dispute in Tianjin, but the Russian government also contemplated the possibility of "simultaneous withdrawal of troops of both nationalities from the ground in dispute, while the question of title and proprietary rights shall be reserved for examination between the two governments."[467]

[462] "Sir Frank to the German Foreign Office," March 17, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 137.
[463] "Count von Bulow to the Emperor William," March 19, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 138-139.
[464] "Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne," March 21, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 108.
[465] "Major-General Barrow to India Office," March 17, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 106.
[466] "Major-General Barrow to India Office," March 17, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 107.
[467] "Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne," March 20, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 106-107.

On March 19, 1901, the situation in Tianjin became increasingly "acute" when Wogack accused the British soldiers of having moved Russian boundary pillars and "offering affront to Russian flag," for which he demanded formal apology from the British military authorities. In face of this circumstance, Barrow even proposed to dispatch more military forces to reinforce the Tianjin garrison in case of further conflicts with the Russians.[468] However, this confrontational attitude did not really materialize, and the idea of avoiding any direct conflicts prevailed.[469] On March 21, both the British and Russian military authorities decided to simultaneously withdraw their troops from the disputed points on the next day (March 22). Barrow explained that the alleged removal of the Russian flag was carried out without any instructions from the British authorities. He also refused to discuss any question of proprietary rights, which, he argued, should be left for further examination by the two governments.[470]

Despite the agreement reached between the British and Russian military authorities in Tianjin, as Barrow said in one of his telegraphs to the Indian Office, the Russians continued work and planted new flags on the siding itself. He then insisted that it was necessary for the Russians to remove all the new flags and landmarks that had not been at the disputed land.[471] Shortly after this brief episode was reported, Scott was instructed to urge the Russian government in St. Petersburg to resolve it.[472] Count Lamsdorff replied that no fresh Russian flags were planted after the occurrence of the most recent incident according to the report by the Russian military authorities. But he promised that he would send another instruction to ensure

[468] "Major- General Barrow to India Office," March 19, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 107; March 20, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 108.
[469] "Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne — (Received March 25)," March 20, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 111-112.
[470] "Major-General Barrow to India Office. (Telegraphic.)," March 22, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 110-111.
[471] "Major- General Barrow to India Office," March 22, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 111.
[472] "Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne," March 25, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 113.

"the strict observance of our Agreement."[473] In the end, between April 2 and 4, the work ceased to continue, and the Russian flag disappeared at the siding.[474]

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to make sense of what the coexistence of multiple foreign colonial settlements alongside an international colonial government meant for the urban politics, spatial configuration, and physical transformation of the city of Tianjin. It might be tempting to claim that, in such a volatile political environment as Tianjin, the formation of the TPG played an important role in promoting colonial cooperation and facilitating the establishment or expansions of foreign concessions in the city. This certainly has a grain of truth, as evident in the ways in which the TPG reorganized the urban space of Tianjin and in which it coordinated with other colonial officials in various realms of activity. At the same time, it should be emphasized, however, that such a cooperation was, at best, tenuous: not only were there internal divisions and rivalries within the TPG Council, the TPG administration often ran counter to other foreign consular authorities in terms of disparate jurisdictions and practical difficulties. Another factor to consider is that rancorous imperial competitions and mutual suspicion were not by any significant measures diminished by the establishment of a multi-national government. As the section on "reterritorialization" indicates, conflicts, contradictions, and miscommunications among various imperial powers abounded during the first two years of the twentieth century. It is difficult to delineate to what extent the political dynamics in turn-of-the-century Tianjin reflected global developments of imperial politics. It would be fair to say that the local urban politics within the city became, in some ways, a microcosm of international alliance and political positions, but the colonial spatial arrangements in Tianjin—the geographical concentration,

[473] "Count Lamsdorff to Sir C. Scott," March 28, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 121.
[474] "Lieutenant- General Sir A. Gaselee to India Office," April 4, 1901, *CRIRNC*, 117.

density, and proximity of various imperial powers alongside each other—force us to recognize the different ways in which the imperial politics in Tianjin deviated from general trends of global imperial politics.

MULTI-IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS IN THE EYES OF A MAJOR CHINESE FIGURE

A Resourceful Diplomat and A City in Transition—Yuan Shikai and Tianjin at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

Introduction

"Dr. Morrison has interviewed Yuan-Shi-Kai, the viceroy, on the subject… He has indisputable claims to British consideration…Yuan has recently gained the approval of all the foreign Ministers… The Viceroy speaks energetically to Dr. Morrison in favor of his right to take over the native city of Tien-Tsin, urging that there was nothing in the settlement protocol to suggest that China should be deprived of the control of the chief trading city in Pe-chi-Li Province. He urged that the powers must believe him able to preserve order… and would continue the scheme to effect this…"

----*New York Times*, March 7, 1902

The above epigraph is extracted from a newspaper article published in *New York Times* entitled "Asks the Power to Surrender Tien-Tsin—An Interview with Yuan-Shi-Kai, Viceroy of Pe-Chi-Li." This interview was conducted in a pivotal historical moment: by March 1902, the city of Tianjin—the gateway to China's capital Beijing and a commercial center in Northern China—had been under the control of the Tianjin Provisional Government (TPG), a multinational colonial government run by military representatives from seven global imperial powers for nearly two years. Tianjin had also witnessed something analogous to what happened to the African continent almost two decades earlier— "the Scramble for Africa." In the space of three years, foreign imperial powers were engaged in what Edwin H. Conger—then the American ambassador in China—called "the grab game of Tianjin," which has been discussed in the previous chapter.[475] The subject of the interview, Yuan Shikai, was relatively new to the scene, having just been appointed as the new governor-general of Zhili/the Imperial Minister (北洋大臣) in the wake of the death of Li Hongzhang, the former viceroy of Zhili, in late 1901. Certain elements from this interview speak to some of the central themes of this chapter: Yuan's

[475] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay. Legation of the United States," Peking, December 31, 1900, no. 491, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), 40.

determination to regain sovereignty over the city of Tianjin, the significance of "settlement" and "protocol" in his negotiations, and the urgency of restoring order and maintaining peace in the city.

Yuan Shikai was one of the most important historical figures in the last decades of the Qing Dynasty and early years of the Republic. He was one of the most influential Han Chinese officials under a Manchu-ruled regime and later became the first president of the Republic of China. Yuan was also an extremely controversial figures in the history of modern China, who was traditionally portrayed as the betrayer of the 1911 Republican revolution and whose restoration of the monarchy in 1916 led to the ignominious end of his political career. In recent decades, however, historians in both the English- and the Chinese-language scholarship have developed a strong interest in Yuan, and they have reassessed the positive contributions that Yuan made to state-building and modernizing reforms over the course of modern Chinese history.[476] One crucial aspect of this historiography is the growing appreciation of Yuan's role as a shrewd diplomat. However, these studies have focused primarily on Yuan's diplomatic activity during his presidency over the Beiyang Government (1912-1916), with Yuan's earlier diplomatic activity receiving very scanty attention.[477] In filling this void, this chapter stretches the time frame back to the turn of the twentieth century and examines Yuan's diplomatic maneuvering during that period.

[476] For a succinct, yet thorough, summarization of the secondary literature on Yuan, see the introduction of Patrick Fuliang Shan, *Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal*, UBC Press, 2018, 3-9.
[477] These studies include but are not limited to: Jerome Chen, *Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859–1916: Brutus Assumes the Purple* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and Japan, 1911—1915* (London, Macmillan , 1969); Chan Lau Kit-ching, *Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy , 1906 —1920 in the Careers of Sir John Jordan and Yuan Shih-kai* (Hong Kong University Press , 1978); Ernest Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-kai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China*, University of Michigan Press, 1977; Hirata Koji, "Britain's Men on the Spot in China: John Jordan, Yuan Shikai, and the Reorganization Loan, 1912–1914," *Modern Asian Studies* 47, 3 (2013) pp. 895–934; Shan, *Yuan Shikai*, 194-200.

This chapter also bridges the historiographical gap between the study of Yuan Shikai and that of the city of Tianjin. Tianjin occupied a central place in the history of modern China. It was opened as a treaty port in the 1860s as dictated by the Beijing Conventions and became the largest industrial and commercial center in northern China throughout the entire Republican era (1912-1949). The multi-colonial character of the city is also noteworthy: from 1860s to 1940s, Tianjin was home to up to nine foreign concessions (Britain, France, America, Germany, Japan, Russia, Belgium, Italy, and Austria) along with a sequence of evolving Chinese municipalities. Historically, Yuan Shikai and Tianjin were deeply intertwined. Scholars have acknowledged that Yuan played a critical role in installing a variety of modernizing and reformist programs in Tianjin in the areas of military, police, finance, politics, and education during his tenure as the governor-general of Zhili, all of which left important legacy for the city.[478] Tianjin, in turn, was the headquarter of Yuan's governorship in Zhili and a safe haven for him following his dismissal from the official post during the 1911 Republican Revolution.[479] Moreover, although there are some studies in Anglophone academia devoted to Tianjin under the rule of the TPG, these studies have either merely offered a general account of the TPG or emphasized the role of the TPG in propelling the city's spatial, structural, and administrative changes.[480] Ruth Rogaski's *Hygienic Modernity* is particularly relevant in that it is the only work in English that deals with the interrelationship between Yuan Shikai and the TPG. Rogaski reveals the continuity of disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms implemented by the TPG— most notably health

[478] See Shan, *Yuan Shikai*, 67, 110-115; Zhang Hong, "Yuan Shikai and the Significance of His Troop Training at Xiaozhan, Tianjin, 1895-1899." The Chinese Historical Review 26, no.1 (April 2019): 37-54.
[479] Ibid., 132-133.
[480] Lewis Bernstein, "A History of Tientsin in the Early Modern Times, 1800-1910" (PhD, diss. University of Kansas, 1988), 213-263; and Lewis Bernstein, "Tianjin under Foreign Occupation, 1900-1902," in *The Boxers, China, and the World*, eds. Robert Bickers and R. G. Tiedemann (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 133-146; Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, chapter 6; Robert Nield, "Tientsin," *China's Foreign Places: The Foreign Presence in China in the Treaty Port Era, 1840–1943*, 244-245; and more recently, Elizabeth LaCouture, *Dwelling in the World: Family, House, and Home in Tianjin, China, 1860-1960*, Columbia University Press, 2021, 37-45.

institutions and police—and underscores how Yuan inherited these institutions upon taking over the city.[481] Yuan's diplomatic activity during this period, however, is not addressed.[482]

This chapter investigates two sets of Yuan Shikai's diplomatic interactions with foreign powers at the turn of the twentieth century: the negotiations over the return of Tianjin from the TPG to the native authorities and negotiations over the establishment or expansion of foreign concessions in Tianjin. By highlighting the role of Yuan Shikai in these diplomatic negotiations, this chapter argues, first and foremost, that Yuan's diplomatic maneuvering played an instrumental role in facilitating Tianjin's transition from a city administered by an alien regime to a poly-centric city with multiple colonial concessions juxtaposed with a Chinese municipality. Second, Yuan Shikai was able to deploy a variety of strategies in his diplomatic activity. This is most clearly manifested in his ability to negotiate with multiple foreign powers on multiple levels: direct negotiations with the foreign ambassadors in Beijing, reliance upon the local officials that he appointed to negotiate with the foreign consuls (e.g. Tang Shaoyi 唐绍仪), and communication with the metropoles by virtue of Chinese diplomats overseas (e.g. Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳). Third, Yuan Shikai had to position himself at the intersection of multiple nodes of power of the Qing Imperial Court and the foreign powers and navigate across different types of tensions—not just Sino-foreign tensions, but also divisions within the imperial powers. Yuan's top priority in his early years as the governor-general in Zhili was to restore order, and Tianjin, as the commercial center of Zhili province, was certainly at the forefront of Yuan's agenda. One of the striking characteristics of Yuan's diplomatic maneuvering during these years was his consistent efforts to strike a delicate balance between accommodating the foreign powers and

[481] Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, chapter 6.
[482] Some scholars have touched on this topic but only mentioned it in passing. See MacKinon, *Power and Politics*, 39-40; Shan, *Yuan Shikai*, 106-107.

protecting the local Chinese populace. Yuan acted in accordance with the treaties that the Qing signed with foreign powers, but these treaties also served as tools for Yuan to defend China's jurisdiction over its land, population, and property.

Drawing mainly on the diplomatic archives held at the Modern History Institute of Academic Sinica (MHIAS) in Taiwan, *Yuan Shikai Quanji* (*YSKQJ*, The Complete Collections of Yuan Shikai, 《袁世凯全集》), and *Tianjin Zujie Shiliao Xuanbian* (*TJZJSLXB*, The Selected Compilation of the Historical Materials about Tianjin Foreign Concessions, 《天津租界史料选编》), complemented by diplomatic documents in English and Japanese, the TPG meeting minutes, and other secondary scholarship, this chapter consists of three parts. The first part focuses on the beginning of the negotiations on the retrocession of the city of Tianjin and explains the tensions between the foreign military authorities and diplomatic representatives with regard to the dissolution of the TPG. The second part examines Yuan Shikai's involvement in the negotiations over the restoration of Tianjin, with a particular emphasis on the diverse strategies mobilized by Yuan in his interactions with the imperial powers. The third part is centered on the efforts of Yuan Shikai, as well as other local Chinese officials, to define the specific boundary of newly created or extended foreign concessions in Tianjin and cope with potential issues that arose from the new organization of the city.

The Beginning of the Negotiations on the Return of Tianjin

The discussion on the retrocession of Tianjin to the Chinese authorities was intimately connected with "the Peace Negotiations" between China and various foreign powers shortly after the allied troops captured the city of Beijing. The negotiations commenced in October 1900 and were not fully completed until the signing of the Boxer Protocol in September 1901. A noticeable portion of the negotiations was devoted to preventing something like the siege of

Foreign Legations in Beijing and foreign concessions in Tianjin from ever happening again. Therefore, keeping garrisons and maintaining some form of military control along the Beijing-Tianjin corridor seemed necessary. During the rest of 1900, Chinese diplomatic officials, with Li Hongzhang being a leading negotiator, reached a tentative agreement with representatives of various imperial powers that allowed the foreign troops to occupy "certain points" (including Tianjin) along the route from Dagu to the capital city.[483] However, what had remined unresolved was the transfer of Tianjin to the administration of the native authorities. Given the importance of Tianjin as "a pivotal location near the capital," some Chinese officials argued, its continuous occupation by the TPG would "generate many administrative difficulties."[484] In February 1901, the leading officials of the newly formed Chinese Foreign Ministry (外部 or 外务部) initiated another round of negotiations with the Diplomatic Corps in Beijing with regard to the recovery of Tianjin.

There were divergent views towards the restoration of Tianjin between the military authorities and diplomatic representatives in Beijing. In April 1901, Count von Waldersee, commander-in-chief of the allied troops, sent a letter to the Diplomatic Corps, in which he stated that "the provisional government of Tientsin will continue in the exercise of its functions,"[485] so long as various military garrisons still occupied Tianjin. On the contrary, William Rockhill, the American Minister in China, unequivocally expressed the view that "this Provisional Government should cease to exist as soon as conditions justified handing over the city of Tientsin to the Chinese authorities."[486] His stance gained support from the British, French,

[483] Wang Yan, ed., *Qingji Waijiao Shiliao* (Historical Materials on Diplomacy during the Qing《清季外交史料》), Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, vol. 147, p. 21 (127) , 1901.7.28; David Silbey, *The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China*, New York: Hill and Wang (2012), 227-228.
[484] Ibid.
[485] "Field Marshal Count von Waldersee to Mr. de Cologan." April 16, 1901. *FRUS*, 136.
[486] "Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay." April 17, 1901. *FRUS*, 138.

Russian, and Japanese ambassadors, and, as a result, the Diplomatic Corps in Beijing claimed that "the Provisional Government shall hand over to the Chinese authorities the powers which belonged to them in normal times as soon as the situation will permit it and without prejudice to the military occupation."[487]

In a letter directed at Bernardo Jacinto Cólogan y Cologan, the Spanish ambassador in Beijing who negotiated with the Manchu court on behalf of the foreign powers, on April 29, Waldersee explained his rationale for why the TPG should continue to exist. First, according to the proceedings of the Hague Conference in 1899, for any territories under military occupation, "the military commanders must have full authority over the civil administration."[488] Second, the strategic importance of Tianjin as a gateway to Beijing as well as a pivotal point on the railway made it necessary for foreign military forces to be present so as to prevent any future conflicts with the Chinese. Finally, what Waldersee also had in mind was the expedition of peace negotiations with the Chinese. "The placing of the civil administration under military supervision," Waldersee reasoned, would elicit "a speedy fulfillment of the terms of peace" by the Chinese government.[489]

Despite Waldersee's insistence on maintaining the TPG, the Diplomatic Corps in Beijing still held the view that the TPG should hand over its power back to the Chinese authorities at the earliest date possible. This in part resulted from the concerted efforts made by the Chinese government to expedite the negotiations with foreign diplomatic representatives.[490] More importantly, however, it was no longer desirable for foreign powers to maintain a multinational

[487] Ibid.
[488] "Field Marshal Count von Waldersee to M. de Cologan." April 29, 1901, *FRUS*, 163.
[489] Ibid. Approximately a month later, Waldersee reiterated these points in another letter delivered to de Cologan. See "Count von Waldersee to M. de Cologan," May 25, 1901, *FRUS*, 179-180.
[490] Wang Yan, ed., *Qingji Waijiao Shiliao*, vol. 147, p. 22 (128) (1901.7.28).

occupying administration. As Mori Etsuko points out in her study of the TPG, in the wake of the Boxer Uprising, the continual existence of the TPG constituted an obstacle when all imperial powers intended to negotiate with the Qing government individually.[491] Indeed, although to some extent the TPG played an important role in mediating the territorial disputes between various imperial agents at the early stage of its occupation of Tianjin, the internal division within the TPG Council, along with the tensions between the TPG and different consular authorities, gradually came to erode the efficacy of its governance over the city.[492]

Yuan Shikai's Diplomatic Maneuvering over the Retrocession of Tianjin

On September 7, 1901, the peace negotiations were finally concluded, and the Boxer Protocol was signed between the Manchu Qing government and the allied powers. Article VIII and IX of the Boxer Protocol dealt directly with the city of Tianjin, which respectively dictated the elimination of the forts of Dagu (Taku) and the continuing occupation of certain points (Tianjin included) between the capital and the sea.[493] Following the signing of the Boxer Protocol, the evacuation of occupying troops in Beijing was carried out. Approximately a month later, the imperial court that had been in exile in Xi'an since the fall of Beijing, began its return to the capital city. Things seemed to revert to normalcy except in Tianjin, where imperial powers were primarily focused on advancing their projects of improving the cityscape and on securing new territorial gains. The evacuation of foreign troops was nevertheless delayed.[494]

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[491] Mori Estuko (悅子森), "Tenshinto tÔgamon no tsuite" (On the Tianjin Provisional Government), TÔyÔshi Kenkyu 67, no. 2 (1988): 325.

[492] I have discussed the multi-faceted relationship between the TPG and various foreign consular authorities in the preceding chapter.

[493] Spencer Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History*, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009, 950.

[494] Pierre Singaravélou, *Tianjin Cosmopolis: Une autre histoire de la mondialisation*, Paris: Seuil (2017), 313; William R. Manning, "China and the Powers Since the Boxer Movement," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1910), 863.

Another momentous event that occurred in late 1901 was the death of Li Hongzhang on November 7. Yuan Shikai, who had been the governor of Shandong province from 1899 to 1901, took over Li's position as the governor-general of Zhili (Hebei) and as an Imperial Minister. Upon his appointment, Yuan wasted no time in negotiating with the foreign diplomatic representatives in Beijing about the return of Tianjin. On December 5 and 6, Yuan paid a visit to diplomatic representatives from eleven nations to discuss this matter. During his meeting with Uchida Kōsai, the Japanese ambassador in China at the time, Yuan enlisted his help in the hope of bringing about a speedier retrocession of the city to the Chinese authorities. Yuan first pointed out that the TPG's rule did not eradicate the rampant banditry within and around the city, which severely undermined commercial activity and led to reduced tax revenue. "The continual military occupation of Tianjin by foreign powers not only generated much inconvenience," Yuan went on to explain, but it also deprived the city of enjoying the benefits of reconstruction projects that the Qing government set out to implement in Zhili Province. Moreover, Yuan also invoked his previous success as the governor of Shandong Province in maintaining peace and order amid the Boxer Uprising.[495]

However, these conversations did not yield what Yuan had initially hoped to achieve. According to Yuan's explanation, the commanding officers that had been controlling the city were reluctant to return the city to the native authorities, not only because they believed Article IX of the Boxer Protocol gave them the rights to continue their military presence in Tianjin, but also because they felt it was incumbent on them to complete their various urban planning projects in the city before the Chinese authorities could be reinstalled.[496] The foreign

[495] *Nihon gaiko bunsho* (Japanese Diplomatic Documents『日本外交文書』), XXXV/XV, no. 302, 565-566; Mori, "Tenshinto tÔgamon no tsuite," 326-327.
[496] "A Telegraph to the Grand Council" (Zhi xingzai Jun Ji Chu dian 致行在军机处电), *Yuan Shikai quanji* (*YSKQJ*), December 9, 1901, Henan Daxue chubanshe (2013), vol. 10, 50; Manning, "China and the Powers," 865.

ambassadors in Beijing approved these views. In response, Yuan refuted these claims by contending that the stationing of foreign troops did not justify the continual existence of a multinational governing body in Tianjin and that those projects in the city would be carried on by the Chinese authorities. According to his report, most foreign diplomatic officials did not react positively to Yuan's rebuttal with the only exception of American and Japanese ambassadors.[497]

Having been frustrated with foreign ambassadors' lukewarm reaction, Yuan began to contemplate taking alternative measures. Based on a correspondence between Yuan and Cai Jun (蔡钧), the Chinese ambassador in Japan at the turn of the twentieth century, the latter suggested that Yuan should not confine himself to merely negotiating with the foreign diplomats in China but should rather reach out to their home governments via Chinese diplomats overseas.[498] In mid-January of 1902, Wu Tingfang (伍廷芳), the Chinese ambassador in the United States, was instructed by Yuan to bring the matter before John Hay, the American Secretary of State, with the request that the latter would initiate conversations with other great powers to carry out "an immediate restoration of the city of Tianjin…to the Chinese authorities."[499] In favor of a speedy retrocession of Tianjin, Hay sent out instructions to American ambassadors based in several imperial nations. According to these instructions, Hay explained that "the continued existence of the provisional government of the Chinese city…hampers the efforts of the Chinese Government to control the people and administer the laws, and interferes with the collection of duties pledged to the payment of the indemnities."[500]

[497] Ibid.
[498] *Nihon gaiko bunsho*, XXXV/XV, no. 304, 568.
[499] "Mr. Wu to Mr. Hay," January 20, 1902, *FRUS*, 184.
[500] "Mr. Hay to Mr. Porter," January 29, 1902, *FRUS*, 185-186.

While most countries did not object to Hay's views,[501] Germany seemed hesitant to accept an accelerated abolition of the TPG. On the one hand, Germany was primarily concerned with the "early completion of the improvement of the river Peiho (the Hai River)," which it deemed as "indispensable for the safety of the foreign legations in Peking."[502] On the other hand, Germany also differed from other imperial powers in terms of when exactly to revert the city of Tianjin to the Chinese authorities. While most foreign powers found April 1, 1902 to be an ideal date for Tianjin's retrocession, Germany insisted that the city could not be returned to the native authorities until two months later (June 1).[503]

Not only did Yuan negotiate with foreign diplomats, both in Beijing and their home countries, he also sought to initiate direct communications with the TPG. On December 6, 1901, Yuan appointed Tang Shaoyi (唐紹儀), an American-educated young official whom he considered as "possessing outstanding courage and vision," to be the Tianjin Maritime Customs Daotai (津海關道) responsible for diplomatic negotiations related to the return of Tianjin.[504] Shortly after his appointment, Tang, on behalf of Yuan, had an informal meeting with the TPG Council to discuss when the latter planned on returning Tianjin to the Chinese authorities. In response, the Council replied that such a matter did not fall within its jurisdiction and that only their home governments had the final say.[505]

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[501] This includes Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. See, specifically, "Mr. Porter to Mr. Hay," February 17, 1902, *FRUS*, 186; "Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay," February 12, 1902, *FRUS*, 187; "Mr. Meyer to Mr. Hay," February 24, 1902, *FRUS*, 189; "Mr. Buck to Mr. Hay," March 7, 1902, *FRUS*, 190.
[502] "Baron von Richthofen to Mr. White," February 25, 1902, *FRUS*, 190.
[503] "Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay," February 12, 1902, *FRUS*, 187.
[504] "Appointing Tang Shaoyi as the Tianjin Maritime Customs Service Taotai" (yi Tang Shaoyi shu Jin haiguan dao pian 以唐绍仪署津海关道片), *YSKQJ*, December 6, 1901, vol. 10, 49.
[505] Tianjin Social Science Academy, ed., *Proces-verbaux des Seances du Gouvernement Provisoire de Tientsin* (*PVGPT*), Tianjin: Tianjin shehui kexue yuan chubanshe (2004), vol. 2, 01/04/1902, 563; 02/03/1902, 566.

Although this direct negotiation with the TPG Council was not successful, the restoration of Tianjin to the Chinese, along with its conditions, was eventually brought to the surface by Colonel Harada, who also delivered another separate letter to the commanding officers in Tianjin.[506] Shortly thereafter, the British major-general Creagh demanded that the TPG Council prepare a report that detailed the specific conditions under which the city of Tianjin would be reverted to the native authorities, with which the TPG Council complied.[507] Existing sources do not explain why there was such a change of attitudes of the TPG Council towards the retrocession of Tianjin, but it is plausible that the Council changed their position because of their awareness of the discussions between Yuan and foreign diplomats in Beijing as well as their governments in the metropoles.

Despite the consensus that Tianjin would eventually be returned to the Chinese, a great deal of disagreements persisted with regard to the specific conditions for the dissolution of the TPG. The bone of contention was concerned with whether the Chinese troops could be present in the city of Tianjin or in its surrounding areas. As Conger pointed out in his correspondence with Hay, the majority of diplomatic representatives in Beijing agreed that their troops would only be withdrawn from the province of Zhili under the condition that no Chinese troops—with the exception of the police force—would ever be allowed to be brought "within a radius of 30 kilometers of the city." In contrast, however, "foreign troops may go and come at will within the said zone," according to this newly added condition. Such a provision was considered by Conger as "humiliating to the Chinese" and, even more importantly, "inconsistent with the promises of the (Boxer) protocol."[508] Hay approved Conger's judgement. The United States was not alone in

[506] *PVGPT*, vol. 2, 03/17/1902, 602.
[507] *PVGPT*, vol. 2, 03/26/1902, 612; for these tentative conditions, see 05/23/1902, 671-672.
[508] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay," June 11, 1902, *FRUS*, 190.

opposing these proposed conditions. Russia, too, announced that it would withdraw from all responsibilities associated with the return of Tianjin in late June. This act was interpreted by some contemporary British newspaper reports as "throwing onus on Britain" the purpose of which was to attribute all "responsibility of the retention of the TPG" to the British.[509]

It is necessary to pause and explain why different imperial powers adopted different approaches to the retrocession of the TPG. The reasons had as much to do with their respective policies in East Asia as to do with the global geopolitical circumstances. As explained in the previous chapter, the United States had been opposed to any foreign powers taking unilateral territorial gains in the city of Tianjin since the turn of the twentieth century. This was because of the Open-Door Policy, a diplomatic principle that allowed for equal trading relationship with China among all foreign countries, was proposed by American diplomats in 1899. It is equally clear that the British government also found a speedy retrocession of the TPG more favorable. Not only did the British generally accept the Open-Door Policy, but it was also knee-deep in trouble in South Africa because of the Boer War. At first glance, Russia's willingness to allow Qing China reclaim sovereignty over Tianjin seemed to contradict its aggressive and expansionist approach in the city. It should be noted, however, that Russia had successfully created its concession in Tianjin and that it had occupied several pivotal connecting points along multiple railways. The continual existence of the TPG would not serve any more of Russian's agendas. The only exception is Germany. Throughout the entire negotiation process, Germany was quite reluctant to accept a speedy recovery of the sovereignty by Qing China and instead insisted that certain demands had to be met before the TPG could be dissolved. Count de Waldersee in his capacity as the commander-in-chief of the Allied troops might have played an

[509] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay," July 2, 1902, *FRUS*, 195-196; "Russia Helps out China," *New York Times*, Jun 23, 1902; "Russia Gains a Point: Again Poses Conspicuously as The Friend Of China," *The Sun*, Jun 24, 1902.

important role in affecting German diplomats' approach, as the latter did not want to leave the unfortunate impression that Germany's diplomatic and military officials were not able to act in coordination with one another.

As the governor-general of Zhili province, to which Tianjin was of vital importance, Yuan Shikai evinced great desire for a speedy recovery of this pivotal city.[510] Just as before, Yuan decided to bring the matter directly to the imperial powers' home governments, but he directed his recourse to Russia this time via the Chinese ambassador in St. Petersburg. It is obvious that Yuan was keenly aware of the vested interests that Russia had in northern China, so was he well-informed that Russia had been exceedingly active in dealing with the situations related to Tianjin since the outbreak of the Boxer Uprising. In his letter to Hu Weide (胡惟德), the Chinese ambassador in Russia, Yuan invoked the fact that "the commercial activity in the North (China) was at heart of Russia's concern" in entrusting Hu to convince the Russian Minister of putting more pressure on other foreign governments to ensure the abrogation of the TPG as early as possible.[511] However, Russia was no longer involved in the subsequent negotiations regarding the restoration of Tianjin due to the early exit of General Oberst Wogack, the Russian commanding officer in the city, a week prior, but it is unclear to what degree this military general's withdrawal was linked with Yuan Shikai's diplomatic maneuvering (or I shall say attempted maneuvering) in St. Petersburg.

Compared with Russia, Yuan clearly had more faith in his relationship with diplomats from the United States.[512] For Yuan, the most egregious demand that the military commanding

[510] "A Letter in Consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (zi Waiwubu wen 咨外务部文), 06/30/1902, *YSKQJ*, vol. 10, 315.
[511] "A Telegraph to Hu Weide, the Ambassador in Russia (zhi zhu E gongshi Hu Weide dian 致驻俄公使胡惟德电), 06/30/1902, *YSKQJ*, vol. 10, 315.
[512] Yuan expressed his mistrust in one of his replies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See "A Telegraph to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (zhi Waiwubu dian 致外务部电), 07/06/1902, *YSKQJ*, vol. 10, 334.

officers in Tianjin proposed was, as indicated above, the 30-kilometer protective zone around the city of Tianjin where no Chinese military force was allowed to be present. Given that the city of Tianjin, as well as its adjacent areas, had been plagued by rampant banditry during and after the Boxer Uprising, Yuan considered that the lack of Chinese military force in this region would make it prohibitively difficult to "pacify the locale."[513] Since the Boxer Protocol did not include such provisions, Yuan complained that the commanding officers in Tianjin proposed these newly created conditions as a way to delay the ongoing negotiations. On July 3, at Yuan's behest, Wu Tingfang sent another plea to the American government in the hope that it would implore all other imperial powers to instruct their military representatives serving in the TPG to expedite the discussion over its dissolution. [514]

Sympathetic to Yuan's concern, Hay soon began his communications with diplomatic dignitaries from other imperial nations to which Britain and Japan soon responded positively. It was Germany that was reluctant to make too much compromise on these conditions, which in many ways was consistent with Germany's stalwart stance since the outset of the peace negotiations. However, after holding a collective meeting attended by the five ministers of the powers having representatives on the TPG Council, they were able to agree upon a set of new conditions, which reduced the originally planned 30-kilometer limit of the protective zone to 6-kilometers instead and allowed "an efficient body of police force" to be present in the city as well.[515] On July 18, the conditions for the dissolution of the TPG—including 28 items and two recommendations—were delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which the Qing

[513] "A Letter in Consultation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (zi Waiwubu wen 咨外务部文), 06/30/1902, *YSKQJ*, vol. 10, 315.
[514] "A Telegraph to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (zhi Waiwubu dian 致外务部电), 07/03/1902, *YSKQJ*, vol. 10, 325.
[515] "Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay," July 15, 1902, *FRUS*, 198; "A Telegraph to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (zhi Waiwubu dian 致外务部电), 07/09/1902, *YSKQJ*, vol. 10, 335.

government ratified. Yuan was then given the responsibility by the Imperial Court for taking over the city of Tianjin.[516] On August 15, the TPG Council officially declared that it transferred the jurisdiction over the city of Tianjin to Yuan Shikai.[517]

The above account has demonstrated that the restoration of Tianjin was not simply a matter of power transference from an alien regime to the hands of the Chinese. It involved conflicts and disagreements between China and foreign powers, between the imperial powers themselves, and between the military and civilian authorities, all of which necessitated compromises and coordination. There is no evidence that suggests that Yuan Shikai deliberately played different imperial powers off of each other, but Yuan was certainly aware of the power dynamics between these imperial powers and knew how to mobilize one to pressure another in order to achieve his goals. It is easily discernible that Yuan developed closer ties with the American, British, and Japanese, which in many ways foreshadowed his future relationships with these nations during his presidency.

Dealing with the Aftermath: Yuan Shikai's Negotiations with Foreign Diplomats in Post-TPG Tianjin

The political landscape of Tianjin at the turn of the twentieth century underwent significant transformations. Not only was the city occupied and administered by an international colonial government for twenty-five months, but it also witnessed drastic reterritorialization. From 1900 to 1902, various imperial powers sought to either establish new concessions in the city or expand the ones that they had already secured in the years prior.[518] This "grab game of Tianjin,"—or what the German diplomats described as "die Tientsin Frage (the Tianjin

[516] Wang Yan, ed., "A Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Foreign Ambassadors—on the Retrocession of Tianjin to be handled by the Imperial Minister" (Waibu fu geguo gongshi Tianjin qing jiao Beiyang dachen jieshou zhaohui 外部覆各國公使天津請交北洋大臣接受照會), 07/18/1901, *Qingji Waijiao Shiliao*, vol. 147, 7-8 (279-280).
[517] *PVGPT*, vol. 2, 08/15/1902, 792.
[518] The multi-imperial rivalry in the city of Tianjin has been discussed in the preceding chapter.

Question)"—generated a series of practical problems for the foreign diplomats and Chinese officials alike. The size, periphery, location, and land prices of these enclaves all entailed painstaking and careful negotiations between foreign diplomats (primarily the consuls in Tianjin) and Chinese officials.

Creating anew or expanding preexisting concessionary spaces in Tianjin involved a highly complex and contentious process. Not only did frictions and conflicts occur between different imperial powers in contending the legality/legitimacy of these concessions,[519] but it was also often the case that the boundaries of some of the concessions were not clearly defined. The locations of some foreign enclaves also presented difficult situations for the Chinese officials, because these concessions inevitably included a large number of Chinese properties and land. The presence of the enormous amounts of salt stacked in these contested spaces, for instance, often became the center of contention between the Chinese officials and their Western counterparts. Historically, salt was of great importance to the city of Tianjin: it was the city's main industry, and it was home to the government-run salt administration.[520] In his capacity as the governor-general of Zhili/the Imperial Minister, Yuan Shikai was responsible for negotiating with the foreign diplomats to determine a definite periphery of each concession while handling

[519] The establishment of the Russian Concession in 1900 sparked immense controversies over this issue.
[520] Toby Lincoln, *An Urban History of China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University of Press (2021), 144.

any potential issues that might have arisen from these newly created foreign enclaves.

Figure 4.2 Salt Stacks in Tianjin, circa 1870s (University of Bristol - Historical Photographs of China reference number: bo01-049)

It should be noted that most of these negotiations had already begun prior to Yuan's appointment in late 1901. Starting from the last months of the year 1900, Li Hongzhang, along with other local Chinese officials, had already been engaged in multilateral communications with foreign diplomats with respect to their new territorial gains. When Yuan Shikai became the Imperial Minister following Li's demise, he inherited the unfinished negotiations from his predecessor while initiating communications with other foreign powers that had just acquired the approval from the Manchu Imperial Court with their requests to set up concessions in Tianjin. Yuan's negotiations with foreign diplomats played out in different ways, and in general there were two types of situations. On the one hand, for the British, American, French, German, Japanese, and Belgian Concessions, Yuan did not encounter too much of an obstacle in reaching to an agreement with imperial agents from these nations, chiefly because these nations' diplomatic representatives had already settled their agreements with Yuan's predecessor, Li

Hongzhang. On the other hand, however, Yuan, accompanied by Chinese officials on the local level, was involved in protracted and difficult negotiations with the Italian, Austrian, and Russian officials, with the newly created Russian Concession causing the greatest headache for Yuan. This is mainly because of the presence of the sheer amount of salt piles, as well as a large number of Chinese properties, within these newly established concessionary spaces.

In 1901, the expansion of the British Concession was ratified by the Qing Imperial Court, and the negotiations were largely completed even before Yuan's appointment as the governor-general of Zhili. It was the fate of the American Concession, which had only had a nominal existence since its establishment in 1862, that was not entirely resolved. On August 6, 1902, following a series of negotiations between the British and American diplomatic officials,[521] Ernest M. Satow, the British ambassador in China, informed Yuan that the British municipal authorities had agreed to integrate the American Concession into the British Concession.[522] Given that the two concessions were originally coterminous with one another and that the diplomatic representatives from the two nations had already agreed upon the merger, Yuan did not see any reasons for objecting to these two concessions' amalgamation.[523] On October 23, under Yuan's instruction, Tang issued an official proclamation that announced the incorporation of the former American Concession into the British Concession.

As for the German and French Concessions, by the time Yuan was appointed as the Imperial Minister, the French and German authorities had already reached an agreement with the Chinese government in determining the boundaries of their expanded enclaves. Although minor

[521] This is beyond the scope of this essay, but the detailed negotiations have been discussed in my previous chapter.
[522] "A Letter to the Imperial Minister regarding Britain's Agreement on Taking over the Tianjin American Concession (Ying tongyi jiang Tianjin Mei zujie you Ying guanxia shi zhi han Beiyang dachen 英同意将天津美租界由英管辖事致函北洋大臣)," 08/06/1902, *TJZJDAXB,* 16-17.
[523] "Yuan Shikai's Reply to the British Ambassador in China (Yuan Shikai zhi Ying zhuhua gongshi fu han 袁世凯致英驻华公使复函)," 08/07/1902, *TJZJDAXB,* 18.

differences and logistical issues occurred occasionally, they never really hampered the expansion of the preexisting concessions.[524] Similarly, by the time Yuan came to oversee these negotiations, Li Hongzhang and Belgian ambassador Maurice Joostens had decided on the location and precise parameter of the Belgian Concession. On February 6, 1902, at Yuan's behest, Tang Shaoyi, along with two Tianjin Daotais Zhang Lianfen (张莲芬) and Qian Rong (钱鑅), signed the agreement with the Belgian consul Henri Ketels, which officially stipulated the size and boundary of the Belgian Concession.[525]

The Japanese Concession's expansion took slightly longer to be finalized, but the negotiations with the Chinese officials boded rather smoothly. The Japanese ambassador Komura Jutarō (小村壽太郎) proposed the extension of the Tianjin Japanese Concession in December 1900, shortly after other major imperial powers had made similar demands. In January 1901, Tei Nagamasa (郑永昌), the Japanese consul in Tianjin, announced the extension of Japan's concession in the city, but this unilateral act was not ratified by the Qing government. This, however, did not halt the negotiations between the Chinese officials and their Japanese counterparts. Over the next few months, under Yuan Shikai's instruction, Qian Rong, Tang Shaoyi, and another newly appointed Daotai named Pang Hongshu (庞鸿书) were able to convince the Japanese consul of allowing the Chinese to live in the expanded concession. Additionally, these Chinese people's ownership of land, house, and property was protected as well, and they would be compensated accordingly, if the Japanese authorities intended to

[524] Specifically, the French was concerned with how to handle the properties that had been owned by a Chinese company before the Boxer War and that were then included into the newly extended French Concession. As for the German authorities, the German consul raised a series of questions with regard to the land prices. See *TJZJDAXB*, 105, 177-180.

[525] "Submitting the Agreement and Map following the Resolution of the Belgian Concession for Documentation (Banli Bilishi zujie shi jun jiang ditu hetong zi cheng beian 辦理比利時租界事竣將地圖合同咨呈備案)," 1902.10.22, MHIAS, 02-11-019-18-001.

expropriate their property for public use (e.g. construction/extension of roads).[526] The agreement was signed on April 24 1903.[527]

While the size, parameter, and location of the aforementioned concessions had been largely settled during Li Hongzhang's tenure, negotiations with other imperial powers still dragged on even after his death. To begin with, the Italian Concession's periphery remained unresolved. Although the initial negotiations between Li Hongzhang and the Italian diplomats had decided on the location of the Italian Concession, there were still two remaining issues: 1) how to handle the vast amount of stacked salt that would have been included in the new Italian Concession. 2) how to enable the Italian authorities to expropriate some Chinese residents' houses and lands within the new concession without inflicting too much harm or loss on the local Chinese. Yuan considered these issues very urgent, and he upheld the principle of "not harming (China's) interests and rights, and not allowing people's business to suffer." He then instructed Zhang Lianfen and Qian Rong to open new negotiations with the Italian diplomatic officials in order to locate an alternative site for the Italian Concession.[528]

However, the Italian ambassador Giovanni Gallina was impatient with the slow progression of things and first initiated conversations with the Foreign Ministry. In a somewhat aggressive tone, Gallina expressed his grievances in that the Qing officials had been unresponsive to his government's demand for establishing an Italian Concession in the city of Tianjin even though this proposal had already been countenanced by the Qing Imperial Court in

[526] "Submitting the Agreement regarding the Expansion of the Tianjin Japanese Concession for Documentation (Riben kuochong Tianjin zujie jin jiang shangding hetong chengsong beian 日本擴充天津租界謹將商訂合同呈送備案)," 1903.7.13, MHIAS, 01-18-075-02-002.
[527] "The Agreement on the Expansion of the Japanese Concession (Riben tuiguang zujie hetong 日本推广租界合同)," 1903. 4. 24, *TJZJDAXB*, 199-201.
[528] "Correspondence from Yuan Shikai to Qian Rong with Respect to the Handling of Salt Stacks and Residential Houses in the Italian Concession (Yuan Shikai wei tuoban Yi jie yantuo, min fang shi zha chi Qian Rong 袁世凯为妥办意界盐坨、民房事札饬钱鏐)," 1901.12.19, *TJZJDAXB*, 393-394.

late 1900. Therefore, he ordered the Italian troops to begin construction works in preparation for the concession in Tianjin and even claimed that the stacked salt piles in its future concession would be taken over unless the negotiations were initiated immediately.[529] Upon receiving this complaint through the Foreign Ministry, Yuan explained that he had already instructed Tang Shaoyi to conduct in-person negotiations with the Italian authorities. Not only was the "insulting and disrespectful tone" of the Italian ambassador's letter not helpful in this case, Yuan went on to say, but he also took exception to Gallina's instruction of deploying Italian troops to carry out construction works on the very land in question.[530]

In the subsequent months, despite Yuan Shikai's and Tang Shaoyi's efforts to persuade the Italian authorities to consider an alternative site for its Concession, the Italian ambassador was not willing to make many compromises.[531] It was not until June that both sides came to an agreement on this issue. Whereas the Italian Concession would remain where it had originally planned to be, Yuan and Tang managed to convince Gallina of allowing the local Chinese to carry on their businesses in the Concession so that not all commercial activity would be monopolized by Italian merchants. The stacked salt piles, as this agreement stipulated, would also be moved to a different location.[532] In his report to the Foreign Ministry, Yuan described

[529] "In Hope of a Speedy Response regarding the Italian Ambassador's Claim that Construction within the Italian Concession had been Ordered to Begin (zhun Yi Luo shi zhao cheng zai Jin zujie yi chi kaigong deng yin ying ruhe shang ban xi fu su you 準意羅使照稱在津租界已飭開工等因應如何商辦希復速由)," 1902. 1. 19, MHIAS, 02-11-007-03-002.

[530] "Decisions to be Considered until Taotai Tang had Adequate Negotiations with regard to the Tianjin Italian Concession (Tianjin Yi guo zujie yishi yi chi Tang Dao tuo wei shang kan si bing fu zai zhuo duo you 天津意國租界一事已飭唐道妥為商勘俟稟復再酌奪由)," 1902.1.20, MHIAS, 02-11-007-03-003.

[531] "Instructing Taotai Tang to Report the Result of his Negotiations with the Italian Ambassador (Zhuan chi Jin guan Tang Dao yu Yi Ga shi shangban Jin di zujie reng suishi bao bu chahe you 轉飭津關唐道與意嘎使商辦津地租界仍隨時報部查核由)," 1902.4. 17, MHIAS, 02-11-007-03-004.

[532] "A Detailed Response to the Imperial Minister Yuan Shikai with an Attachment of the Agreement about the Italian Concession (Zhanchao Yi zujie zhangcheng xiang fu Beiyang dachen Yuan Shikai 粘抄意租界章程详复北洋大臣袁世凯)," 1902.6.8, *TJZJDAXB*, 396-399.

this Sino-Italian Agreement as "generally acceptable and appropriate."[533] On October 7, a proclamation was issued to the inhabitants of the city of Tianjin, which promulgated relevant regulations about the handling of Chinese land, houses, and property in the new Italian Concession.[534] Finally, on December 14, another notice regarding the establishment of the Italian Concession was issued, which prescribed that any relocation of Chinese property had to be either compensated or partly paid by the Italian authorities.[535]

The negotiations with the Austrian authorities were equally cumbersome. In June 1901, the Austrian diplomat proposed to the Qing government the establishment of an Austrian Concession in Tianjin. Although the Imperial Court accepted this request, the negotiations could not happen until 1902 because of the delay of the Austrian government to dispatch a consul to the city of Tianjin. On March 28, 1902, the conversation resumed, and Yuan Shikai instructed Tang Shaoyi, in collaboration with Zhang Lianfen and Qian Rong, to negotiate with the newly appointed Austrian consul Carl Bernauer.[536] Yuan took the Sino-Italian Agreement as a template and informed Tang that the agreement with Austria should be largely modeled on the one with Italy.[537] However, the prospect at having another foreign concession within Tianjin aroused a great deal of anxiety among Chinese merchants in the city. From July to October, Chinese

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[533] "The Generally Acceptable Agreement between the Tianjin Taotai and Italy with regard to the Concession (Jin Haiguan Dao suo ding Yi guo zujie zhangcheng shang shu tuoxie you 津關道所訂意國租界章程尚屬妥協由)," 1902.7.2, MHIAS, 02-11-007-03-006.

[534] "A Proclamation to the Tianjin Residents (Xiao yu Jin jun minren gaoshi 曉諭津郡民人告示)," 1902. 10. 7, *SYKQJ*, vol. 10, 473.

[535] "A Proclamation on the Newly Created Italian Concession (Xiao yu xin ding Yi guo zujie gaoshi 曉諭新定意國租界告示), 1902. 12. 14, *YSKQJ*, vol. 10, 530; Shan, *Yuan Shikai*, 107-108.

[536] "Yuan Shikai's Correspondence with Zhang Lianfen and Qian Rong with regard to the Establishment of the Austrian Concession (Yuan Shikai wei Ao guo sheli zujie shi zha chi Zhang Lianfen, Qian Rong 袁世凱為奧國設立租界事札飭張蓮芬、錢鑠)," 1902. 3. 28, *TJZJDAXB*, 433.

[537] "The Agreements about the Tianjin Austrian Concession being Acceptable Notwithstanding, the Various Issues Reported by Liu should be Verified (Tianjin Ao guo zujie zhangcheng sui shang tuoxie wei Liu Xiangrong deng suo bing ge jie shifou shu shi ying zhuo he sheng fu 天津奧國租界章程雖尚妥協惟劉向榮等所稟各節是否屬實應酌核聲復)," 1902. 7.13, MHIAS, 02-11-006-02-001.

business owners filed multiple complaints and expressed their fear of their property and land being seized by the Austrian authorities without any compensation.[538] A local elite named Liu Xiangrong (劉向榮) considered that the establishment of an Austrian Concession would seriously encumber the business and ordinary life of the local Chinese. He even went on to suggest that the Austrian Concession should be relocated to an area akin to the Russian and Belgian Concessions, where there was no such density of business or population present.[539]

However, Liu's idea proved to be untenable. Unlike other foreign concessions in Tianjin the location of which were usually designated by the Chinese government, the Austrian Concession was created by virtue of military occupation by the Austrian troops during the battle against the Boxers. With the relocation of the concession out of the question, Yuan advised Tang Shaoyi to prioritize the protection of Chinese property within the concession. As in the Italian Concession, the stacked salt and Chinese houses as well as property were at the center of discussions. Yuan did not see the need to relocate the stacked salt within the Concession given its small amount. He also stated that any relocation of Chinese property should be compensated and paid fairly and that the practices in the Italian Concession should be emulated so as not to

[538] "A Report from Zhang Enrui to the Concessionary Authorities about the Philanthropist Organization in the Eastern Side of the Austrian Concession not being an Official Land (Zhang Enrui wei qing zhaohui Ao guo dong yan shengshe shi mo chang shi fei guandi shi bing zujie ju 张恩瑞为请照会奥国东延生社施馍厂实非官地事禀租界局)," 1902.9.29, *TJZJDAXB*, 434-435; "A Report from Yang Chengmo to the Concessionary Authorities about Protecting the Philanthropist Organization (Yang Chengmo wei shefa baohu mo chang qingxing shi bing zujie ju 杨承谟为报设法保护馍厂情形事禀租界局)," 1902.10.4, *TJZJDAXB*, 435-436.

[539] "The Agreements about the Tianjin Austrian Concession being Acceptable Notwithstanding, the Various Issues Reported by Liu should be Verified (Tianjin Ao guo zujie zhangcheng sui shang tuoxie wei Liu Xiangrong deng suo bing ge jie shifou shu shi ying zhuo he sheng fu 天津奥國租界章程雖尚妥協惟劉向榮等所稟各節是否屬實應酌核聲復)," 1902. 7.13, MHIAS, 02-11-006-02-001.

obstruct local business and livelihood.[540] The Sino-Austrian Agreement was signed on December 27, 1902 and was reported and documented by Yuan to the Foreign Ministry.[541]

The negotiations about the Russian Concession perhaps created the greatest difficulty for Yuan Shikai. Although Russia was the first imperial power that, according to American Minister Edwin Conger, initiated the "grab game" in Tianjin, disagreements between the Russian diplomatic officials and their Chinese counterparts led to a string of long and complicated negotiations. Their main differences revolved around the land surrounding the railway that ran through the Russian Concession and around the disputes over some property located within the concession. The initial draft of the Sino-Russian Agreement was submitted to Li Hongzhang for his approval in April 1901, but these differences could not be successfully resolved by the time of Li's death.[542]

On April 3, 1902, Tang Shaoyi and Qian Rong provided a detailed report for Yuan Shikai, in which they laid out two major difficulties in negotiations with the Russian consul in Tianjin. First, the part of the Russian Concession adjoining the railway was a source of conflicts between the Russians and British (the railway was under British ownership). While the British resisted any attempts on the Russian part to impinge upon the railway, the Russian consul refused to recognize the validity of the map sent to Qian Rong by the British-run railway company. Therefore, the specific boundary between railway and the Russian Concession could

[540] "Austria's Intent to Establishing its Concession and the Difficulty of Changing Location as Suggested by Liu Xiangrong (zi fu Ao guo zujie xi zixing zhanju Liu Xiangrong suo qing ze di dihuan zhi chu ainan zhun ban qing cha you 咨復奧國租界希自行佔據劉向榮所請擇地抵換之處礙難准辦請查由)," 1903.1.1, MHIAS, 02-11-006-02-002.

[541] "Yuan's Correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Submission of the Sino-Austrian Agreements and Map for Documentation (Yuan Shikai wei jiansong Ao zujie hua yang hetong ditu qing cunan bei cha shi zi cheng Waiwu bu 袁世凯为检送奥租界华洋合同地图请存案备查事咨呈外务部)," 1903. 3.29, *TJZJDAXB,* 439-440.

[542] See, for instance, "A Letter from Qian Rong to the Russian Consul in Determining the Boundary of Railway (Qian Rong wei heading tielu jiezhi shi zhi E lingshi han 钱鑅为划定铁路界址事致俄领事函)," 1901.7.25, *TJZJDAXB,* 334-335.

not be defined. The second contentious issue did not originate from foreign powers, but rather from the local Chinese who were uncooperative when the Chinese officials required them to submit their land deeds and get their lands measured and registered. This, as Qian Rong explained, would ensure that the Chinese government would be able to come up with an estimated price for these lands.[543] In reply, Yuan stated that the dispute over the railway should be resolved between a Chinese official, the Russian consul, and a member of the railway company.[544] At the same time, Yuan took a firm position towards the local Chinese by admonishing all the Chinese households located within the concession to comply with this order. "(This) should be finalized within days and can no longer be postponed," Yuan said, "and the negotiations over the Russian Concession should not be tempered with."[545]

The vast amount of salt piles stacked within the Russian Concession constituted another area of discussion between the Chinese officials and the Russian authorities. In the wake of the Battle of Tianjin in July 1900, the possession of salt took on another layer of significance for the occupying powers, because it helped finance the foreign concessions for their reconstruction in a city ravaged by war.[546] In January 1901, the Russian authorities informed Li Hongzhang of their desire to expropriate the land on which the stacked salt was located, and the Russians were even willing to use another piece of land within its concession to exchange for it. In response, Li claimed that in principle the land in question should not be seized by any concessionary authorities and that the Russian authorities should discuss with the Chinese merchants—the

[543] "A Report from Zhang Lianfen, Tang Shaoyi, and Qian Rong to Yuan Shikai with regard to the Difficulty in Dealing with the Russian Concession and Considerations of Solutions (Zhang Lianfen, Tang Shaoyi, Qian Rong wei banli E guo zujie kunnan qingxing yiji zhuo ni banfa deng qing bing Yuan Shikai 张莲芬、唐绍仪、钱鑅为办理俄国租界困难情形以及酌拟办法等情禀袁世凯)," 1902.4.3, *TJZJDAXB,* 338-340.
[544] This was eventually resolved as a result of the intervention of Gustav Detrilin, the President of the Tianjin Municipal Council.
[545] "Yuan Shikai's Instruction (Yuan Shikai pi 袁世凯批)," 1902.5.6, *TJZJDAXB,* 340-341.
[546] Singaravelou, *Tianjin Cosmopollis,* 239-259.

owners of these salt piles—to come up with a solution. Qian Rong was entrusted to facilitate these discussions.[547] The following negotiations lasted for several months. Although the Chinese merchants had no issue with relocating their salt piles, they struggled to find a decent location suitable for salt storage. Qian then found that there was a large opening of land on the east bank of the Hai River, where the salt piles could be relocated and stored. Yuan advised Qian to conduct careful inspections of this new location in case a hasty relocation of piled salt would disrupt its transportation from Tianjin to other places.[548] In the meantime, the Russian consul began to hesitate to execute this land-swapping deal but instead considered purchasing the land in question once and for all. Although Qian initially had some qualm about the new location, his extensive investigation revealed positive results: not only was the land well-suited for salt storage, but this new location was even spacious enough to include the salt that had been kept in the Italian and Austrian Concessions. Qian soon contacted the director of the Hai River Conservancy Bureau and inquired about the opening land. He then made an agreement with the Russian authorities with regard to the latter's purchase of the land where the salt was previously stored.[549]

On July 23, 1903, Yuan Shikai reported to the Imperial Court the results of his negotiations over the foreign concessions, in which he described the process as follows:

"Britain, Germany, Japan, and other countries have possessed concessions in the port city of Tianjin. During the Boxer upheaval, foreign troops from different countries occupied different parts of land in Tianjin. Those (countries) without any concessions demanded establishment of concessions, whereas those that had already acquired one considered expanding theirs. The agreements on the Italian, Austrian, and Japanese Concessions were formulated on the basis of precedents (援案辦理), that is, the agreements with Russia, Belgium, and other countries, and it would not be

[547] "A Report from Zhang Lianfen, Qian Rong, and Tang Shaoyi to Yuan Shikai with regard to the Inspections of the East Side of Hai River as a New Location for Storing Salt Piles (Zhang Lianfen, Qian Rong, Tang Shaoyi wei kancha Haihe dong an bo zuo tuo di shi bing Yuan Shikai 张莲芬、钱鑅、唐绍仪为勘察海河东岸拨作坨地事禀袁世凯)," 1902. 5.19, *TJZJDAXB*, 341-343.

[548] "Yuan Shikai's Instruction (Yuan Shikai pi 袁世凯批)," 1902.6.16, *TJZJDAXB*, 343.

[549] "A Report from Zhang Lianfen, Tang Shaoyi, and Qian Rong with regard to the Inclusion of the Land of Salt Piles into the Russian Concession (Zhang Lianfen, Tang Shaoyi, Qian Rong wei E zujie yan tuo di gei jia guizuo zujie shi 张莲芬、唐绍仪、钱鑅为俄租界盐坨地给价归作租界事)," 1902.11.24, *TJZJDAXB*, 344-345.

favorable for us to handle them differently. After scrutinizing the agreements in detail, (I can say with confidence) these agreements are all sound and appropriate."[550]

Conclusion

In her recent monograph, the historian Elizabeth LaCouture characterizes the history of Tianjin at the beginning of the twentieth century as "a city with multiple centers" that "produced conflicts and disjunctures that came to define the modern experience of twentieth-century urban China."[551] Foreign occupation, social disorder, demographic dislocation, and a diverse range of Chinese-foreign as well as foreign-foreign conflicts continued to roil the city of Tianjin. Upon his appointment as the governor-general of Zhili/the Imperial Minister, Yuan Shikai prioritized bringing back normal order for the city and its inhabitants, which included ending foreign occupation of the city, rebuilding a stable life for the local populace, and avoiding Sino-foreign conflicts. If the negotiations over the recovery of Tianjin ensured and expedited the transfer of power from the TPG to the native authorities, the discussions about the foreign concessions contributed to defining clear-cut boundaries of these colonial spaces while protecting Chinese properties and land. Without these efforts, it would have been difficult for any statesmen to envision the host of political, economic, and social reforms that Yuan Shikai would go on to implement for the city.

What, then, is the broader significance of Yuan's diplomatic interactions with these foreign officials in this critical historical juncture? First, this chapter offers some food for thought on Yuan Shikai as a statesman and diplomat. It is important to recognize the continuity between Yuan Shikai's diplomatic approaches and those of Li Hongzhang in their negotiations

[550] "Copies of the Memorials on the Newly Created Tianjin Italian, Austrian, and Japanese Concessions (Tianjin xin ding Yi Ao Riben zujie yi zhe chao gao zi cheng you 天津新訂意奧日本租界一折抄稿咨呈由)," 1903.7.23, MHIAS, 02-11-007-03-009.
[551] Elizabeth LaCouture, *Dwelling in the World: Family, House, and Home in Tianjin, China, 1860–1960*, New York: Columbia University Press (2021), 46.

over the foreign concessions. Not only did Yuan carry on the negotiations left off by Li after the latter's demise, but he also inherited most of the principles and *modus operandi* laid out by Li. The central principle that Li upheld in formulating Sino-foreign agreements over the foreign concessions was to "clearly investigate the local situation, ensure that the foreign concessions would not constitute any obstacle (for the local population and its livelihood), and then discuss the set-up of the concessions."[552] Yuan clearly adopted this principle, as evident in his negotiations with the Italian, Austrian, and Russian authorities. In addition, Li was skilled at combining direct communications with the foreign ambassadors in Beijing with what some scholars have conceptualized as "local diplomacy"—a type of diplomatic maneuvering that relied on local Chinese officials, most often Daotai, to negotiate with foreign consuls.[553] Similarly, while officials like Qian Rong and Zhang Lianfen continued to assist Yuan in his diplomatic endeavors, the American-educated Tang Shaoyi came to play a greater part in this "local diplomacy" as well.

Moreover, it is a common assumption that the Chinese state at the turn of the twentieth century was extremely weak and that the signing of the Boxer Protocol sounded the death knell for a defunct regime. However, Yuan's shrewd diplomatic maneuvering, his prioritization of protecting Chinese properties, and his insistence on acting in accordance with existing Sino-foreign treaties and agreements, as well as his close coordination with other local Chinese officials, help rectify this overly negative portrayal of the Chinese state during this period.

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[552] "Austria's Intent to Establishing its Concession and the Difficulty of Changing Location as Suggested by Liu Xiangrong (zi fu Ao guo zujie xi zixing zhanju Liu Xiangrong suo qing ze di dihuan zhi chu ainan zhun ban qing cha you 咨復奧國租界希自行佔據劉向榮所請擇地抵換之處礙難准辦請查由)," 1903.1.1, MHIAS, 02-11-006-02-002.

[553] Guo Weidong (郭卫东), "The Change of Duties of Li Hongzhang and the Imperial Minister" (Jianzhi da guo benchai: Li Hongzhang yu Beiyang dachen de zhiwu zhuanhuan 兼职大过本差：李鸿章与北洋大臣的职务转换) *Xuzhou gongcheng xueyuan xuebao*, vol. 28, no. 6 (2013): 31-37.

Additionally, the TPG's twenty-five-month rule, along with multiple imperial powers' scramble for the city, made Tianjin a total colony, which epitomized the real possibility of China's being partitioned at the time. Some scholars have captured the idiosyncratic colonial character of the TPG and its impact on various aspects of urban life during these two years.[554] By drawing mainly on Chinese-language primary sources and analyzing closely Chinese officials' diplomatic activity in this moment of heightened colonization, this chapter strives to produce a "counter-narrative," one that not only restores the "agency" of Chinese actors but also privileges the perspectives, concerns, logics, and strategies of the Chinese vis-à-vis the Western imperialists. It also challenges the implicit tendency of viewing "the Western powers" as a monolithic entity and makes a case for being attentive to the internal division, as well as conflicting interests and agenda, among these imperial powers in the Chinese context.

[554] Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*; Singaravelou, *Tianjin Cosmopollis*.

MULTI-IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS AND RETERRITORIALIZATION OF THE CITY

Internationalization or Nationalization: The Concession Questions in Tianjin during and after WWI, 1917-1919

Introduction

"The Chinese authorities today asked permission to send 300 armed police through the Concessions to take over the control of the German Concession. Permission being given, the police, headed by the standard bearer, drums and bugles, marched through the British Concession and entered the German Concession with drums and bugles playing. They proceeded to the German police station, where the Chinese flag was hoisted and saluted. Detachments were then stationed at various points, while the leading company proceeded to the German barracks and took charge in the presence of the German Consul and Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.

Large crowds of foreigners witnessed these events which passed off quietly."

--"German Concession in Tientsin," *The North China Daily News*, March 17, 1917

The above epigraph describes the scene of the retrocession of the German Concession in the city of Tianjin in 1917, three years into the First World War. A few months later, the control of the Austrian Concession would be reverted to the Chinese authorities as well. While the takeover of the former colonial spaces might have "passed off quietly," as the above report showed, these events nevertheless constituted a crucial chapter in the history of modern China. The historian Guoqi Xu has defined the recovery of sovereignty in the German Concession as "China's first successful effort to rid itself of unequal treaties."[555] At the heart of this chapter is the restoration of the German and Austrian Concessions in Tianjin by the Chinese authorities as well as the diplomatic activity resulting from this retrocession during and after WWI.

Though once a curiously neglected field of inquiry, China's role during World War I has attracted more scholarly attention in recent years. Guoqi Xu is perhaps the most authoritative and prolific scholar on the historical relationship between China and WWI, who has published major monographs on China's participation in the Great War as well as on Chinese laborers'

[555] Guoqi Xu, *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 169.

contribution to the war effort.[556] Other historians have investigated the impact of WWI on different aspects of Chinese society, with a particular focus on the city of Shanghai. These studies have examined how China's greatest metropolis, as well as its urban inhabitants, was influenced by military conflicts that erupted thousands of miles away. These include China's involvement in economic warfare and Shanghai's multifaceted relations among diasporic populations over the course of the European war.[557] Chinese-language scholarship has also witnessed renewed scholarly interest in China's role in WWI. This has been largely driven by Chinese historians' revisionist interpretation of the Beiyang regime's history. While "the Beiyang period (北洋时期)" was traditionally portrayed as an era of political disintegration, social disorder, and diplomatic incompetence under the guidance of the ideologically charged "revolutionary view of history (革命史观)," scholars of the new generation have recognized the positive role of the Beiyang authorities in terms of its diplomatic accomplishments.[558]

Shanghai—with its pivotal position in domestic and international economy, striking cosmopolitanism, complex colonial character, and uneasy coexistence of Chinese and Western elements—certainly seems to be an ideal site for historians to study how the Great War affected Chinese cities. However, it was not the only Chinese city embroiled in China's involvement in

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[556] Xu, *China and the Great War*; Guoqi Xu, *Strangers on the Western Front*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011). Additionally, Paul Bailey also deals with the issue of Chinese laborers during WWI. See Paul Bailey, *Chinese overseas labour and globalisation in the early twentieth century: Migrant workers, globalisation and the Sino-French connection* (Milton: Routledge, 2017). For a concise and accessible overview of China's role in WWI, see Klaus Mühlhahn, "China," in *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, Jan. 11, 2016, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/china.

[557] Ghassan Moazzin, "From Globalization to Liquidation: The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the First World War in China," in *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 4, no. 2, (November 2015): 601-629; Tobit Vandamme, "The Rise of Nationalism in a Cosmopolitan Port City: The Foreign Communities of Shanghai during the First World War," in *Journal of World History* 29, no. 1, (March 2018): 37-64.

[558] For the most representative works, see Tang Qihua (唐启华), *Bei feichu bu pingdeng tiaoyue zhebi de Beiyang xiuyue shi* (被废除不平等条约遮蔽的北洋修约史，1912-1928), (Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010); Tang Qihua, *Bali hehui yu Zhongguo waijiao* (巴黎和會與中國外交) (Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2014).

WWI. As the largest treaty port city and a crucial industrial center in northern China, the city of Tianjin was shaped by WWI in ways that other Chinese cities did not experience. Undoubtedly, just as other Chinese urban centers—most notably Shanghai, Jinan, Hankou, and Guangzhou—were crucial sites of liquidation of "enemy properties" and deportation of "enemy residents", so was Tianjin. By 1919, nearly a year after the end of WWI, the overwhelming majority of German properties and assets—most prominently the Tianjin Branch of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank—were either repossessed by the Chinese government or auctioned to other foreign property owners in the city.[559] What differentiated Tianjin's encounter with WWI, however, was the fact that the city was home to German and Austrian colonial concessions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The historiography on colonialism and WWI in China has been preoccupied with "the Shandong Question," namely the transfer of Qingdao from imperial Germany to Japan. The nearly exclusive focus on this particular historical episode, I would suggest, has tended to portray the Beiyang government in a more negative light, one that perhaps overly emphasizes its ineptitude and powerlessness in face of foreign powers' political machinations. By shifting attention to Tianjin's experience during and after WWI, this chapter offers a more nuanced interpretation of the Chinese government's diplomacy during those tumultuous years.

Despite this qualitative distinction, neither the scholarship on China's relations to WWI nor that on the history of Tianjin has delved into the effects of the Great War on the city.[560] In filling this critical void, this chapter examines the historical process whereby the Chinese authorities—the Beiyang government—recovered the German and Austrian Concessions in

[559] See Wei Bingbing (魏兵兵), "Gongfa, zhuquan yu liyi: Yizhan shiqi Beijing zhengfu dui Deqiao caichan zhi chuzhi 公法，主权与利益: 一战时期北京政府对德侨财产之处置," *Shixue yuekan*, no. 12, (2019): 52-69.
[560] Most studies only mention in passing the recovery of these concessions to the Chinese authorities. A case in point is Xu's *China and the Great War*.

Tianjin. Additionally, that multiple imperial powers held colonial concessions and invested heavily in Tianjin meant that these imperialists had significant vested interests in the city and were thus compelled to watch the retrocession of the ex-German and Austrian Concessions with gnawing anxiety and great speculation. Therefore, this chapter also deals with the diplomatic negotiations between China and imperial powers as well as among imperialists themselves embedded in the retrocession process.

This chapter advances three arguments. First, the effects of WWI on the city of Tianjin played out in different ways than other Chinese urban centers in that Tianjin's former German and Austrian Concessions were transformed from colonial enclaves to "Special Administrative Districts," where the Chinese government could exercise administrative authorities. Second, the Beiyang authorities' diplomacy over the course of negotiations about the retrocession was neither completely triumphant nor utterly catastrophic. While the recovery of the German and Austrian Concessions was not complete, China did manage to abrogate the extraterritorial privileges enjoyed by the German and Austrian residents in the city and resist other imperial powers' attempts to integrate these two concessions into their existing concessionary spaces in Tianjin. Third, just as China's involvement in the First World War was fundamentally shaped by its interaction with Western and Japanese empires, the retrocession of these ex-concessions was no exception. Despite China's status as a wartime ally, the Allies had no qualms about pursuing their own local aims during the retrocession negotiations. These interventions had mixed outcomes, as well: under their pressure and diplomatic maneuvering, the control of the Tianjin Special Administrative Districts did not completely rest with the Chinese. But any attempts by imperial powers to monopolize the political control of these former enclaves all ended up being

either forestalled by the Chinese diplomats or undermined by objections from other Allied powers.

This chapter draws mainly on diplomatic documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beiyang Government (北洋政府外交部) held at the Academia Sinica in Taipei and the Foreign Office Files on China held by the National Archives in Kew, complemented by American diplomatic sources, newspapers, and secondary academic literature. It consists of four interrelated parts. Part I offers a broad overview of the history of the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions prior to WWI as well as China's entry into the First World War. The second part documents the retrocession process, with a particular emphasis on diplomatic contention between China and Netherlands. Part III deals with the British approach to the question of the former German Concession. Part IV centers on Italy's intention of overtaking the Austrian Concession and the resistance as well as objections it met. The conclusion of this chapter offers some comparative notes on how Tianjin's encounter with WWI differed from other former German colonies and territories and draws out the broader significance of this localized study.

Historical Contexts: The Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions and China's Entry into WWI

The late 1890s witnessed a series of encounters and entanglements between Germany and China. In the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed between Qing China and Meiji Japan, which stipulated the annexation of the Liaodong peninsula by the Japanese empire. Alerted by Japan's expansionism in northeast Asia, Russia, which had significant strategic interests in the same region, was quick to intervene and managed to persuade France and Germany to put diplomatic pressure on Japan as well. Unable to resist three European powers simultaneously, Japan reluctantly accepted the intervention and agreed on

the return of the territory to China in exchange for a larger sum of indemnity. This diplomatic intervention by Russia, France, and Germany later came to be known as the "Triple Intervention." In October 1895, as a result of its involvement in the negotiations, Germany managed to acquire a thin strip of land in the city of Tianjin.

The Tianjin German Concession was in a geographically advantageous location: it was coterminous to the British Concession—the most prosperous concession in the city, closer to the sea, and had a longer bund.[561] Though initially underdeveloped, the German Concession soon underwent a series of dramatic transformations. As discussed in previous chapters, in 1901, as part of the Peace Negotiations following the Boxer Uprising (1899-1901), the German Concession was expanded into double its original scope. Although this colonial enclave only existed in the city for slightly over two decades, it was nonetheless one of the most habitable and well-developed concessionary spaces. Wilhelm Strasse, the continuation of Victoria Road, was perhaps the most popular shaded and tree-lined street in Tianjin's foreign controlled areas. It was also the site of an impressive array of architectures, most notably exemplified by the Concordia

[561] Nield, *China's Foreign Places*, 247.

Club and German Consulate.[562]



Figure 5.1 Ex-German Concession in Tianjin, circa 1920s (University of Bristol - Historical Photographs of China reference number: Gr01-099)

The Austro-Hungarian empire was certainly a latecomer to the "scramble for China"—to use Robert Bickers's term—in general and to the partition of Tianjin, more specifically, at the turn of the twentieth century.[563] It was the last of the Eight-Nation Alliance that claimed a piece of its own territory in the city of Tianjin. As I have explained in previous chapters, the main reason that underpinned Austria-Hungary's intention of establishing a concession in Tianjin was what some scholars have conceptualized as "imperial vanity."[564] The Austrian Concession was located north of the Italian Concession and included over 20 kilometers along the riverbank. For the most part of the concession's short-lived history (1901-1917), very few Austrians or Hungarians actually lived in the city, and it was almost exclusively Chinese who were active in this enclave. Similarly, there were very few Austrian or Hungarian properties in Tianjin, and the

[562] Ren Yunlan (任云兰), "Tianjin De zujie de jiedao yu Xishi jianzhu (天津德租界的街道与西式建筑)," *Chengshi wenhua*, no. 1 (2012): 76-79.
[563] Robert Bickers, *The Scramble for China* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).
[564] Lehner, Österreich - Ungarn und der „ Boxeraufstand," 214.

investment the Austro-Hungarian empire made there was negligible to those of other imperial powers.[565]



Figure 5.2 Baron Czikon Strass, ex Austrian Concession, circa 1930s (University of Bristol - Historical Photographs of China reference number: Gr01-103)

If the years spanning the late 1890s and early 1900s were characterized by Germany's heightened colonial ambitions in China, as manifested in the seizure of Jiaozhou Bay in 1897 and the punitive expedition during the Boxer Uprising, Sino-German relations became increasingly cooperative in the years leading up to the outbreak of World War I. As William Kirby has pointed out, Germany's imperialist adventure during this period "did not appear to have a major impact on the size or nature of Sino-German trade."[566] On the eve of WWI, Germany was the second largest investor in China, second only to Great Britain. As for Sino-German trade, there was "an equitable trade balance between imports and exports."[567] However, the eruption of the

[565] Nield, *China's Foreign Places*, 248-249.
[566] William Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 12.
[567] Moazzin, "From Globalization to Liquidation," 603; Joanne Miyang Cho, "introduction," in *Sino-German Encounters and Entanglements: Transnational Politics and Culture, 1890–1950* edited by Joanne Miyang Cho (London: Palgrave Series in Asian German Studies, 2021), 5.

Great War in Europe destabilized this equilibrium to a considerable extent. Germany's economic relationship with China was "dealt a severe blow" during the war, and, in accordance with the data provided by Kirby, only two out of the 300 German firms remained in China after the war.[568]

The Chinese Republican government's response to the outbreak of WWI underwent a transformation from remaining neutral to active involvement. When military conflicts broke out in Europe, the new Republican government had only taken national power for two years. Soon after the war began in Europe, the Beiyang Government proclaimed "Regulations of Neutrality" (《局外中立条规》), which declared China's intent to remaining neutral during the war. The underlying reasons for this proclamation were to prevent Western powers, including Japan, from seizing this opportunity to expand their imperial interests in China and to ensure that Chinese sovereignty would not be further impinged upon. These attempts to remain neutral during the war, however, were foiled by Japan's increasing aggression in China. In November 1914, Japan forcefully took over Germany's colonial holdings in Jiaozhou Bay, and after the signing of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, Jiaozhou Bay effectively became a Japanese-occupied territory.[569]

The loss of Jiaozhou Bay, accompanied by the signing of the Twenty-One Demands, rang a sounding bell for the Chinese government that subsequently became acutely aware of the futility of remaining neutral during the war. Prior to his death in 1916, Yuan Shikai made repeated pleas to join the war efforts against the Central Powers, none of which bore any fruits because of Japan's resistance to allowing China to join the Allied camp.[570] It was under the

[568] Kirby, *Germany and Republican China*, 16.
[569] Xu, *China and the Great War*, 81-106.
[570] Zhang Huateng (张华腾), "Cong zhongli dao canzhan 从中立到参战," *Nankai xuebao*, no. 2, (2020): 114-115.

presidency of Duan Qirui (段祺瑞), Yuan's successor, that China formally entered WWI. The factors contributing to China's war entry policy were a combination of pressure from Allied powers, domestic political debate, and an incident involving Chinese workers who fell victim to Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare. Ultimately, it was the encouragement and invitation of the United States, spearheaded by its Minister in China Paul S. Reinsch, that catapulted China into entering the war.[571] Despite the domestic political crises triggered by China's decision to participate in WWI—that is, heightening power struggles between various warlord factions, its war entry policy eventually prevailed.[572]

China's war aims did not just revolve around forestalling further Japanese encroachment onto Chinese sovereignty, but also included a series of benefits that China had long coveted, such as obtaining economic assistance from the Entente powers, recovering sovereign rights after the war, and enhancing its international status. On March 14, 1917, China officially severed diplomatic ties with Germany. Unlike the United States that only declared war on Germany, China also broke off relations with Austria-Hungary a few months later in August with an aim to revert the Austrian Concession in Tianjin back to native authorities.

From Colonial Enclaves to "Special Districts": Reverting the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions to Chinese Control

One of the central aims of the Chinese government's decision to enter the war was to recover some of its sovereignty. Upon China's declaration of war on Germany in March and on

[571] Xu, *China and the Great War*, 156-163; China's amity with the United States was also embodied in the following anecdote about Tianjin. On December 6, 1918, the specially designated negotiator Huang in Tianjin proposed to the Chinese Foreign Ministry the idea of selecting a street within the German Concession and renaming it as Woodrow Wilson Street. Such an act, according to Huang, was inspired by what other allied powers, especially Britain and France, had done in their home countries. The renaming of this street, Huang continued to utter, would "demonstrate the profound affinity between China and the United States" and "commemorate China's alliance with the victorious camp—the Entente nations."

[572] For a more elaborate account of these political debates and the crises they generated, see chapter 6 of Xu, *China and the Great War*.

Austria in August 1917, the central government in Beijing took a series of measures to abolish the special rights and privileges that Germany and Austria had acquired in China through unequal treaties, most notably the Boxer Protocol (1901): German war vessels anchored along Chinese shores were confiscated by the Chinese navy; the German and Austrian Concessions in Tianjin and Hankou (Hankow) were taken over by the Chinese; the extraterritorial privileges that German and Austrian nationals had enjoyed in Chinese treaty ports were swiftly abrogated; German troops that had previously stationed in China were forced to withdraw; the Chinese Ministry of Communication (交通部) regained the ownership of the northern part of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway; China also ceased the repayment for the Boxer Indemnity to Germany and Austria; and China formulated several laws and regulations to monitor German and Austrian activities in China.[573]

The retrocession of the Tianjin German Concession was carried out by a specially designated negotiator (特派员) named Huang Rongliang (黃榮良) along with Yang Yide (楊以德), the head of the Police Department in Tianjin, accompanied by an armed police squad of 300 people. The Tianjin police force did not encounter any difficulty when marching through the Japanese, French, and British Concessions in the city to reach the German enclave. The actual takeover mostly involved removing German elements in the concessionary space and replacing them with Chinese ones. German flags were taken down and replaced by Chinese national flags. The buildings that had previously been used as German schools, consulate, and Municipal Council's office spaces were all taken over, with Chinese police detachments stationed there. The police proceeded to the German barrack and took charge of it in the presence of the German

[573] *Ibid*., 168-174.

consul. The Chinese police working in the former German Concession were enjoined to remain at their original posts, but they were all required to wear Chinese uniforms.[574]

Although Germany did not directly confront Chinese attempts to reclaim its national sovereignty, Beelaerts van Blokland, the Dutch ambassador in Beijing, presented a major challenge for the Beiyang government. On March 17, 1901, the Dutch Consul Quarles van Ufford, under van Blokland's instruction, claimed that the Chinese police force that had occupied the buildings formerly owned by Germans should withdraw. He further stated that German properties in Tianjin should be under the protection of the Dutch consulate by invoking a deal reached between the German consul and himself three days prior—an agreement that granted the Netherlands, as a neutral country, the authority to manage the former German Concession.[575] This request was rejected by Zhu Jiabao (朱家寶), the provincial governor of Zhili, on the ground that he had not yet received any official instruction from the central government. In addition, Zhu claimed that the Netherlands "only had a weak presence" in Tianjin and thus was not able to bring order and security to the former German Concession.[576]

Unwilling to easily relinquish his demand, van Ufford made repeated attempts to negotiate with Huang Rongliang. Huang, however, consistently replied that he "was not authorized to make any decision on this matter unless instructed by the central government."[577] Frustrated with such an impasse, van Ufford lodged an official protest to the Chinese

[574] "Tianjin jieshou De zujie qingxing 天津接受德租界情形," *Xinwen bao*, 03/19/1917; "German Concession in Tientsin," *North China Herald*, March 16, 1917.
[575] 中研院近史所檔案 (MHIAS)，"He canzan yaoqiu jieshou De jie qi mishi yibian yingfu 荷参赞要求接受德界乞密示以便应付," 03-36-130-04-004, 03/17/1917.
[576] MHIAS，"jieshou De jie qingxing 接收德界情形," 03-36-130-04-005, 03/17/1917.
[577] MHIAS，"jieshou De zujie yu He guan Gui canzan tanpan shimo qingxing bing chaosong Gui canzan Zhongxi zhaohui quan 接收德租界與荷館桂參讚談判始末情形並抄送桂參讚中西照會全," 03-36-130-04-009, 03/19/1917.

government on March 19, 1917. A secret correspondence sent by Huang to the Chinese Foreign Ministry revealed his true concerns with regard to the Netherlands's request:

> "The Dutch ambassador proposed to the State Council (國務院) that the (German) Municipal Council would be taken over by members designated by the Netherlands. According to my knowledge, the Municipal Council, in actuality, has full authority over administrative issues in the Concession, including policing, tax-levying, and judicial power… people in China and abroad are watching (this situation) closely. If we were to cede (municipal authorities) to the Dutch members, the administrative authorities would no longer belong to us. We would have no power to run the concession, nor can we fulfill our obligation to protect (this concessionary space)… (this) would mean substituting a Dutch Concession for the original German Concession. This matter is at the center of Chinese and foreign attention and is thus of paramount importance…"[578]

Huang went on to suggest that Chinese officials should take a firm line and not yield to any demands propounded by van Blokland.

On March 24, van Blokland doubled down on his complaints against the measures and practices Chinese officials had enforced in the former Tianjin German Concession. In a scathing letter, the Dutch ambassador stated that what China did in the German enclave "was in diametrical opposition to the principle of upholding international treaties and was therefore debased and malicious." "The fact that Chinese officials exercised administrative authorities," he proceeded to utter, "constituted a blatant violation of international law."[579] Netherlands was not alone in its concern over what Chinese officials had implemented in the former German Concession. Although imperial powers from the Allies such as Britain and France countenanced China's formal entry into war, they grew to be apprehensive over China's increasing assertiveness on the recovery of its national sovereignty in treaty port cities. The French, for instance, first devised the idea of "internationalizing" the Tianjin German Concession based upon the model of Shanghai's International Settlement.[580]

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[578] MHIAS, "Tianjin De zujie He shi yaoqiu shouguan shiyi jianchi fouyun 天津德租界和使要求收管事宜堅持否允," 03-36-130-04-010, 03/22/1917.
[579] MHIAS, "Zai kangyi qiangshou Deguo zujie shi 再抗議強收德國租界事," 03-36-130-04-011, 03/24/1917.
[580] Xu, *China and the Great War*, 174.

That the Dutch diplomats accused the Chinese government of violating "international law" raises two interesting questions: 1) to what extent was China bound by international law during this period? 2) why did the Dutch concern themselves with the protection of German interests in China? Before addressing these questions, the centrality of colonialism for the generation of international law should be emphasized. To quote legal scholar Antony Anghie, "colonialism was central to the constitution of international law in that many of the basic doctrines of international law… were forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds."[581] In the first half of the twentieth century, China had a complex relationship with international law. On the one hand, international law provided Euro-American powers with a tool to extract sovereign rights from China, as the Dutch did in this specific situation. On the other hand, as will be shown in the following pages, the Chinese government gradually learned how to instrumentalize international law to either preserve its sovereign rights or even reclaim some of the rights that had been lost previously.[582] Although the Netherlands never invaded or occupied any part of Chinese territory, it was nevertheless an active participant in the treaty port system. The fact that the Dutch adopted a "neutral" foreign policy did not preclude its participation in the system of collective imperialism in China. The most salient example was how the Dutch managed to claim compensation for the damages inflicted upon its legation in Beijing in the 1901 Boxer Protocol.[583] In the meantime, it should be recognized that the Netherlands had had a long history

[581] Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3.
[582] Shin Kawashima, "China," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law*, edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 472-473.
[583] Vincent K. L. Chang, *Forgotten Diplomacy: The Modern Remaking of Dutch-Chinese Relations, 1927–1950* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 86.

of taking an active stake in Chinese treaty port cities by being involved in the Municipal Councils and in consular bodies.[584]

Faced with these challenges on multiple fronts, the Beiyang government responded by adopting a conciliatory approach. On March 30, the central government issued two separate regulations: Brief Regulations on the Provisional Administrative Bureau of the Special Districts in Tianjin and Hankou (天津漢口特別區臨時管理局簡章) and Regulations on Overtake of the German Concessions (接管德國租界辦法). According to these regulations, the Tianjin Provisional Administrative Bureau of the Special District would be headed by a Chinese director administering the district who answered to the provincial governor. The original Municipal Council of the former German Concession would continue to exist, albeit under the director's oversight. All original municipal laws and regulations on governance, policing, and tax-levying would remain unchanged unless they came into conflict with their Chinese counterparts, in which case the original ones would be modified.[585] These regulations ensured that the sovereignty over these former concessionary spaces would be restored to the Chinese, all the while allowing some level of autonomy within these special districts.

The issuance of these regulations, however, triggered further contentions from the Dutch ambassador in China. On April 5, van Blokland sent another letter to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in which he denounced China's overtaking of the former German Concession as "illegal." Just as in his previous correspondence with Chinese officials, van Blokland deemed the provisions of these regulations as "a violation of the original treaty signed between China and

[584] Vincent K. L. Chang, "Allies as adversaries: China, the Netherlands and clashing nationalisms in the emergence of the post-war order, 1942–1945," *Nations and Nationalism*, no. 27 (2021): 1257-1258.
[585] MHIAS, "Zisong jieguan De zujie banfa 咨送接管德租界辦法," 03-36-130-04-012, 03/30/1917; "Zi song jieguan De zujie banfa 咨送接管德租界辦法," 03-36-130-04-013, 03/30/1917.

Germany… and of international law." He further pointed out that there was no guarantee for the Chinese director in charge of the affairs within the Special District to be able to uphold the original German laws and regulations. Above all, the most crucial reason for van Blokland's negative reactions to these regulations was that he considered them as detrimental to the old treaty port system. As he bitterly complained, "Chinese government's acts in the former concession severely affected all property owners' interests… and Chinese government would eventually have to face the consequences resulting from the harms their policies brought to the former German Concession."[586]

On April 16, Wu Tingfang (伍廷芳), the Minister of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, along with Wang Jingqi (王景岐), the secretary of the Foreign Ministry, held a face-to-face conversation with van Blokland and discussed the proper manners of governance of the former German Concession. There were considerable disagreements between the two sides, all of which were documented by Wang in his report to the Foreign Ministry. For van Blokland, the former German Concession should continue to be administered by the Municipal Council, and the Council should be headed by three representatives each from Germany, the Netherlands, and China.[587] On the contrary, Chinese diplomats insisted that the Council should be headed by a specially designated Chinese official whose authorities included overseeing the Municipal Council and ratifying the proposals formulated by the Council members. The Dutch ambassador found this unacceptable and even questioned the legitimacy of such an approach. "Even though the diplomatic ties have been severed," van Blokland stated, "the 1895 Sino-German treaty is

[586] MHIAS, "Jieguan Hankou Tianjin Deguo zujie deng shi qing zhuyi 接管漢口天津德國租界等事請注意," 03-36-130-04-015, 04/05/1917.
[587] MHIAS, "Jieshou Tianjin De zujie hou zhuoni guanli banfa 接收天津德租界後酌擬管理辦法," 03-36-130-04-016, 04/16/1917.

still valid." Wang rebutted this claim by questioning why the Dutch diplomat considered it legitimate to "meddle with what China does in the former German Concession." He went on to reason that while it was within van Blokland's rights to protect the German private properties by proxy of the German consul, the issue of governing the former concession did not fall within his jurisdiction.[588]

These differences were not readily reconciled, and the administration of the former German Concession remained an unresolved issue for another few months. The Chinese government at one point experimented with the idea of allowing more autonomy within the former concessionary spaces. On May 2, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered a new set of regulations on the former German Concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. The provisions of these regulations prescribed that the former German Concession would be run by a Local Autonomous Council (地方自治會) whose function and composition bore a striking resemblance to other ratepayers' meetings in other foreign controlled concessions.[589] These ideas, however, proved to be rather short-lived.

On August 15, the Tianjin Austrian Concession was reverted to the Chinese authorities as well, and the former Austrian enclave was turned into the Second Special Administrative District, with the former German Concession designated as the First Special Administrative District. The takeover of the Austrian Concession was largely modeled on what had been done in its German counterpart. The Tianjin police force was dispatched to occupy former Austrian buildings, while the Austrian troops that had stationed in the city were ordered to withdraw.[590]

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[588] MHIAS, "De zujie guanli Zhongguo pai xngzheng weiyuan quanxian shi 德租界管理中國派行政委員權限事," 03-36-130-04-017, 04/16/1917.
[589] MHIAS, "Zi song Jin Han De zujie zizhi deng zhangcheng 咨送津漢德租界自治等章程," 03-36-130-04-021, 05/02/1917.
[590] MHIAS, "Ao jie shouhui Ao ling niqing He daily qi shizun ji fagei Ao ling huozhao shi 奧界收回奧領擬請和代理乞示遵及發給奧領護照事," 03-36-130-04-024, 08/15/1917.

On August 21, a new set of regulations entitled "The Measures of Administering the Belligerent Nations' Concessions" (管理敵國租界辦法) came into being, which reinforced the policies and principles that had been laid out in the regulations issued in March.[591]

Just as the German consul entrusted the Dutch diplomat to look after the German properties in its former Concession, the Austrian consul made the same request. The Beiyang government was wary of the potential possibility for "the Dutch ambassador to seize this opportunity as a pretext to interfere with China's attempts to recover some of its sovereignty." On September 4, under Huang Rongliang's recommendation, Cao Kun (曹錕), the provincial governor of Zhili, suggested to the Foreign Ministry that it should inform the Dutch ambassador of the regulations and proclamations issued by the Chinese government regarding the handling of enemy nations' citizens and properties in China. Cao made it clear that the Dutch diplomats' rights should be confined to merely protecting the belligerent nations' properties in Tianjin and Hankou. The consular jurisdiction and extraterritorial privileges that Germany and Austrian had enjoyed in Chinese treaty ports, Cao also pointed out, had been canceled upon China's declaration of war on these two nations.[592]

The end of WWI in 1918 had a major impact on the ways in which the Beiyang authorities approached the administration of former concessionary spaces. One of the chief goals of the Chinese government was to obtain more favorable considerations at the peace conference to be held in Versailles in the following year. To this aim, the Chinese government made numerous compromises and sought to accommodate the demands and requests made by other major international powers. The most telling example was the repatriation of German and

[591] MHIAS, "Guanli diguo zujie banfa 管理敵國租界辦法," 03-36-130-04-026, 08/21/1917.
[592] MHIAS, "Ao guo zai Zhongguo liyi shi 奧國在中國利益事," 03-36-130-04-027, 09/04/1917.

Austrian residents, or what the Allies called "enemy subjects," where China was willing to accommodate the British demands for deporting vast numbers of Germans in China.[593] By the second half of 1918, the negotiations regarding proper manners of administering the ex-German and Austrian Concessions in Tianjin had dragged on for over a year. An internal correspondence between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that the Chinese government viewed the regulations issued over the past year as "wartime expedient measures" that needed to be revised now that war with Germany and Austria had ended. This correspondence even included an outline of measures to be taken in Tianjin's former concessions. These measures were a result of reconciliation by and large. The former German and Austrian Concessions, according to this outline, would remain intact as an open port, where business and commercial activity would carry on just as in other foreign-run settlements, though there should be no ambiguity that the administrative authorities should rest with the Chinese Special Administrative Bureau.[594]

The plan of internationalizing the German and Austrian Concessions resurfaced shortly before the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. On May 7, 1919, Lu Zhengxiang (陆征祥), who headed the Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, and Shi Zhaoji (施肇基), the Chinese ambassador in London, were invited to discuss the demands/provisions they were to bring to the peace conference with the British and American representatives. Over these discussions, the internationalization of the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions were brought up. Upon receiving the report about this situation, the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded:

> "Several consuls from the Entente side have proposed various plans in the hope of turning these Special Districts into International Settlements. When the British ambassador (John Jordan) visited us, he mentioned

[593] Guoqi Xu, *China and the Great War*, 192-198; Wei Bingbing (魏兵兵), "Diyici shijie dazhan zhihou Beijing zhengfu zhi qiansong De qiao yu dui Ying jiaoshe 第一次世界大战之后北京政府之遣送德侨与对英交涉," *Shilin*, no. 3, (2015): 114-126.
[594] MHIAS, "Deguo zujie shi 德國租界事," 03-36-130-04-059, 10/10/1918.

> that the situations in the Tianjin and Hankou Special Districts were not entirely satisfactory… I have also heard that foreign merchants in Tianjin have contacted their national diplomats to demand for turning these Special Districts into concessions… The Tianjin and Hankou Special Districts are located within the treaty ports alongside other foreign concessions. There is a significant presence of foreign businesses and properties… the best solution would be to open these districts for commercial trade and to allow local autonomy within these Special Districts, so that both Chinese and foreign businessmen can enjoy these benefits. We (China) are responsible for installing policing authorities, and tax will be levied as per existing regulations. (In this way,) not only can (we) protect our sovereignty, (we) can also prevent any further disputes."[595]

In essence, this statement reiterated the Chinese government's position on the administration of the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions following the end of WWI. These conditions were eventually ratified at the Paris Peace Conference and contained in Articles Nos. 128 to 132 of the Treaty of Versailles.[596] Although the Chinese delegation never signed the Treaty of Versailles in protest of the clause regarding Western imperial powers' acquiescence of Japan's takeover of former German colonial holdings in Qingdao, the restoration of the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions was nevertheless reaffirmed during the post-WWI negotiations between China and Germany as well as between China and Austria (the Austro-Hungarian empire was dissolved shortly after WWI). The retrocession of these concessions in Tianjin was eventually included in the 1924 Sino-German Agreement and 1926 Sino-Austrian Agreement, respectively.[597]

The above account has shown that the retrocession of the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions was not a straightforward transition from colonial spaces to Chinese-governed territories by any means. It was rather a process fraught with negotiations and contestations between China and other international powers. Netherlands's strong reaction to China's takeover of these foreign enclaves might strike some as somewhat surprising, for it was not a major international power that invested heavily in China at the time. However, its neutral status during the military conflicts in Europe meant that it did not have to woo China to join war efforts. As

[595] MHIAS, "Tianjin Hankou zujie shi 天津漢口租界事," 03-36-130-04-041, 05/07/1919.
[596] Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris," *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 07/12/1919, 763.72119/6223, 117.
[597] Tang, *Bei feichu bupingdeng tiaoyue zhebi de Beiyang xiuyue shi*, 82-153.

Maartje Abbenhuis has convincingly argued, one of the key factors contributing to Netherlands's neutrality in an age of "total war" was its "conscientious adherence to international laws" bolstered by shrewd diplomacy.[598] At the same time, although the Netherlands was merely entrusted to protect the German and Austrian properties in Tianjin by proxy, it certainly did not want to see the disruption of the old treaty port system, a system in which they had had an active stake. Moreover, while the Allied powers were willing to allow China to recover its sovereignty to some extent, they were not happy to see their traditional privileges eroded and abrogated in treaty port cities.

The Beijing government's response to all of these should be assessed in a more balanced manner. In the face of the Dutch diplomats' repudiation the Beiyang government, Chinese officials were able to firmly stand their grounds in disputing their claims and to insist upon the restoration of the administrative rights of the former concessionary spaces. However, its original agenda of restoring full control over these two former colonial enclaves was not fulfilled, as these spaces were eventually transformed into "Special Districts," an open port where Westerners retained full autonomy and privileges in conducting trade and engaging in commercial activity as in other foreign-controlled settlements. Even so, the Chinese government did manage to abolish extraterritorial privileges and consular jurisdiction that Germany and Austria had enjoyed in these cities. Additionally, the authorities of policing and taxing the population within these quarters were restored by China as well.

Tianjin's "Ex-German Concession Question" for the British

There is no doubt that the restoration of the German Concession held different meanings for the Chinese authorities than for the Allied powers. If China was mainly concerned with

[598] Maartje Abbenhuis, *The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

recovering its national sovereignty, the Allied powers had to strike a delicate balance between allowing China to restore some of its lost sovereignty and circumscribing its growing assertiveness to a manageable level. In addition to the state authorities of the Entente nations, the change of administration in the ex-German Concession had a more direct impact on the foreign residents in the city, most notably the British community. That a foreign concession having been run along the lines of western ideas and values was now under Chinese control deeply alarmed the Tianjin British community.

The continuing discussion of whether to internationalize the former German Concession did not mitigate the British property owners' apprehension over their economic wellbeing and vested interests in the city. It should be clarified that the interests of the British Municipal Council (BMC), a municipal body primarily concerned with safeguarding the British commercial interests in the city, did not invariably align with those of the British government. However, unlike the Shanghai Municipal Council beholden only to locally elected ratepayers, the BMC was merely a municipal body under the direct control of the British consul-general, which constituted an important constraining factor for its operation. On November 9, 1918, E. W. Carter, the chairman of the BMC, pleaded to John Jordan, the British Minister in Beijing, that "the administration of this area (the German Concession) should be under British control."[599] This was not only because the ex-German Concession bordered the British Concession, but also because there was a large number of British residents and properties within the former German enclave. On the very same day, the British Chamber of Commerce, along with the Tianjin Brach of the British China Association, expressed their support of the BMC's proposal.[600]

[599] "Carter to Jordan," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 11477, 11/09/1918.
[600] "Robertson to BMC," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 11477, 11/09/1918; "Mounsey to BMC."

In addition, according to a correspondence sent by H. J. Handley-Derry in November 1918, acting British consul-general in Tianjin, neither of the existing proposals—restoration by the Chinese or turning it into an international settlement—seemed satisfying. While the administration of the concession by the Chinese would "place the Britons there at a great disadvantage," internationalizing the ex-German Concession would mean that "the administration, on an election basis, would fall into the hands of the Germans" because of the presence of numerous German residents there.[601] Moreover, Handley also noted that the Japanese authorities might very well make "extension of their present concession…in that area (the former German Concession)." Therefore, Handley suggested that "the occupation and administration of that area would seem to be advisable."[602]

However, when John Jordan consulted with his American counterpart Paul Reinsch in Beijing about this matter, he was told that the United States "declined to consider it except in connection with a general settlement (of the war)" and that internationalization of the ex-German enclave seemed to be a more favorable solution.[603] Until March 1919, neither the home government nor John Jordan took any proactive measures to put these proposals into practice. Carter was aware that the transfer of municipal control from Germans to British might have encountered resistance from other Allied powers. Therefore, he proposed an alternative approach. The ex-German Concession, as Carter suggested, would be internationalized, and Land Regulations would be drawn up and approved by the Diplomatic Corps as well as the Chinese government in Beijing. The electors in the former concession would be vested with the same power as their counterparts in the British Concession, but the executive works would all be

[601] "Handley to Jordan," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 11477, 11/11/1918.
[602] Ibid.
[603] "Jordan to Balfour," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 22060, 11/14/1918.

carried out by the British officers, thus enabling "the British Municipal Council… (as) the mandatory power to carry out the wishes of the landrenters." And finally, the expenses incurred to administer the ex-German Concession would be divided between the two areas.[604] These suggestions certainly met with the approval of Herbert Goffe, the newly appointed British consul-general in Tianjin, who described this approach as "eminently sound…with the advantage of avoiding the creation of another municipal executive."[605]

In April 1919, the British residents and property owners in the ex-German Concession submitted a petition to John Jordan via the British consul-general in Tianjin. This petition revealed these British taxpayers' grievances about the Chinese administration of the former concession as well as concerns with their tax liability. "The administration," these petitioners said, "is carried out on arbitrary lines… We have moreover no security that taxation will be maintained at the present reasonable rates." Therefore, they proposed that the ex-German Concession should be either placed under the control of the BMC or amalgamated with the British Concession.[606] Additionally, the reluctant attitudes of other Allied and neutral nations can be discerned from those whose signatures did not appear on this petition. According to Carter's report, some American and Dutch property owners were advised by their national ambassadors to not sign the petition.[607]

The British residents' efforts to convince John Jordan of the urgency of bringing the ex-German Concession under British control notwithstanding, their petition was not ratified by the British Minister in Beijing. To attribute Jordan's refusal to accommodate the demands set forth in this petition to the tension between state authorities and the foreign expatriate community

[604] "Carter to Goffe," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 74060, 03/11/1919.
[605] "Goffe to Jordan," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 74060, 03/12/1919.
[606] "Goffe to Jordan," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 90978, 04/21/1919.
[607] "Carter to Goffe," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 90978, 04/16/1919.

would be somewhat far-fetched. As a matter of fact, the Chinese resistance against this internationalization scheme, accompanied by the British home government's favorable attitude towards it, prevented Jordan from acting in his fellow nationals' favor. For one thing, the British government had been clearly aware of the inherent hypocrisy and hubris embedded in the plan of internationalizing the ex-German Concession in Tianjin. As early as 1917, one British diplomat opined, "(in terms of) the internationalization of the German and Austrian concessions which would mean the ejection of the Chinese and a serious loss of face for China…it is unreasonable and unfair for the Allied Powers should at the same time pursue local aims of their own at her (China's) expense."[608] What is more, as noted above, the negotiations between the Allied representatives and their Chinese counterparts prior to the actual peace conference reinforced the British conviction that China was not willing to relinquish its sovereign control on these former colonial enclaves. On April 25, 1919, John Jordan enjoined the British consul-general Herbert Goffe to inform the British community in the former concession that "China, the sovereign of the soil, (is) also interested in this matter" and that "the proposal is (not) one likely to prove easy of adoption."[609] As it turned out, these British landowners' desires were not realized. On June 26, 1919, the signatories of the petition received a copy of the Peace Treaty that sealed the fate of the ex-German Concession in Tianjin. As the articles of this treaty prescribed, "the restoration of China's sovereign powers over the areas in question and their future administration rests therefore with the Chinese government."[610]

Italy's Intention to Overtake the Former Austrian Concession

[608] Cite from Xu, *China and the Great War,* 174.
[609] "Jordan to Goffe," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 90978, 04/25/1919.
[610] "FO to Jordan," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 90978, 06/26/1919.

One imperial nation's approach to the Austrian Concession diverged from that of the rest of the other foreign powers in China. While the majority of imperial powers in China sought to internationalize the former concessionary space, Italy intended to take over the administration of the former Austrian Concession in Tianjin. Though not an imperial juggernaut, Italy still managed to acquire a small plot of land as its enclave in 1901 because of its participation in the punitive expedition during the Boxer Uprising. Italy and Austria-Hungary were the last two countries that claimed their concessions in the city. As a matter of fact, it was the Italian envoy that informed Czikann von Wahlborn, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Beijing at the time, of the location for the creation of a settlement in Tianjin.[611] As a result, the two concessions were adjacent to one another, with the Italian Concession located to the south of its Austrian counterpart.[612]

On October 2, nearly two months after China's decision to restore sovereignty over the Austrian Concession, the Italian consul wrote a long letter to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that detailed his frustration with the newly appointed Chinese director's capability in administering the former enclave. The Italian consul provided two reasons to justify his complaints about the new Special Administrative District. First, the Italian consular authorities in Tianjin had a "moral obligation" to see to the proper development of both the Italian and Austrian Concessions. More importantly, the Italians were not pleased with how the Special Administrative Bureau had been implementing urban construction projects since taking over the administration of the former concession. The Italian consul was particularly concerned with the border area between the two concessions, which the Italians claimed to have spent a large sum of money ameliorating. He even bluntly said that he was "baffled at what the Special Administrative Bureau has been

[611] Lehner, "Österreich - Ungarn und der „ Boxeraufstand," 215-217.
[612] Nield, *China's Foreign Places*, 248-249.

doing."[613] According to a report by Huang Rongliang, the Italian ambassador even demanded that a part of the Austrian Concession should be ceded to the Italian authorities, but this proposal was resolutely denied by the Chinese government.[614]

However, the cession of the Tianjin Austrian Concession to the Italians—known then as "the Tientsin Question"—was brought up once again at the meeting of the heads of delegation of the five great powers—Britain, France, the United States, Japan, and Italy—during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Signor Crespi, the Italian representative at the meeting, proposed the cession based on three reasons. First, the existing Italian Concession in Tianjin only consisted of 124 acres, which was of a much smaller size than other enclaves in the city. Second, the Italian Concession "was very limited and surrounded by marshy ground … (and) did not even contain any land suitable for setting up a hospital." Third, the boundary between the Italian and Austrian Concessions should be altered so that the former would have easier access to the Hai River and would not be affected severely in the event of flooding. Despite the Italian authorities' repeated attempts to enlist the Chinese government's assistance, Crespi continued to say, they had not yet received any "satisfactory reply."[615]

Crespi's proposal was not received well at the meeting, and all great powers attending the conference were opposed to this proposal. The American representative Henry White argued strongly against this proposal on the ground that the United States "had renounced all claims to any concession and was, moreover, opposed to concessions in principle."[616] The French

[613] MHIAS, "Zhu Jin Yi ling zhizhai guanli jiu Ao jie zhi banfa lusong yuanhan qingjian heshi zun 駐津意領指摘管理舊奧界之辦法錄送原函請鑒核示遵," 03-36-130-04-029, 10/02/1917.
[614] MHIAS, "Ao zujie qian Yi shi suo yaoqiu yi bucheng wenti ruhe guanli yi suishi zhuyi 奧租界前意使所要求已不成問題如何管理宜隨時注意," 03-36-130-04-030, 10/04/1917.
[615] "Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris," *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 07/12/1919, 763.72119/6223, 117-118.
[616] Ibid., 118-119.

representative Stephen Pichon objected to Italy's attempt to merge the two concessions, and he pointed out that the retrocession of the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions had been included in the Treaties between China and these two belligerent nations. Therefore, Crespi's proposal, as Pichon claimed, was "no less than an abrogation of the principle accepted by the Conference."[617] The Japanese representative concurred with Pichon.

Arthur Balfour, the British representative, consulted Max Muller, a senior diplomatic official in London, about whether the Italian proposal should be accepted. In reply, Muller squarely rejected this proposal for two reasons. First, despite the small size of the Italian Concession, there were only very few Italians in China, which did not justify "the practical urgency of extending the Italian Concession." More importantly, as Muller explained, the Allied powers were all inclined to acceding to "an international concession" in the place of the ex-German and Austrian Concessions, and China, upon regaining the sovereignty over the former concession, promised to "open them to international residence and trade and to (uphold) existing property rights of Allied nationals." Furthermore, Muller even invoked the British government's previous decision of not having accepted the Tianjin British community's demands of incorporating the former German Concession into the British Concession so as to show that "we (the British) consistently favored the establishment of international concessions."[618] According to the 1919 annual report sent to the Foreign Office, Italy's intention of bringing the Austrian Concession under its control was characterized as a "preposterous claim."[619]

Deterred by the other powers' resistance, Crespi had to make compromises, but he insisted upon organizing a committee to examine whether a clause regarding the cession of the

[617] Ibid., 118.
[618] "Muller to Turton," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 102714, 07/11/1919.
[619] Kenneth Bourne & Cameron Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Part II, Series E, vol. 19, China, 1919-1926, 1991, 28.

Austrian Concession into its Italian counterpart should be introduced into the treaty with Austria-Hungary. The representatives present accepted his request "with reservation."[620] The Commission on Tianjin made its decision five days later. According to its report, the Commission found it "inadvisable" to change the original principles embodied in the Peace Treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary while trying to provide the Italians with what they desired to achieve. It suggested that the Allies should request from China "a formal promise that within a period of one year from the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria the necessary works of sanitation in the late Austro-Hungarian concession and the necessary works of improvement in the course of the river shall be undertaken with all desirable promptness."[621]

A telegraph sent by Wang Guangqi (王廣圻), the Chinese ambassador in Italy, to the Chinese Foreign Ministry revealed the former's role in negotiating with the Italian delegation at the Peace Conference as well as with Tommaso Tittoni, the Italian Foreign Minister. Even prior to the decision made by the Committee on Tianjin, Wang had already negotiated with the Italian representative and urged him to forego the agenda of extending control over the former Austrian Concession.[622] After the Committee reached its final decision, Signor Crespi had a face-to-face conversation with Wang once again. Crespi essentially reiterated what the Committee on Tianjin had reported at the Peace Conference and referred to the 1917 Sino-Italian negotiations with respect to the boundary between the Italian and Austrian Concessions. Wang replied by claiming that "such a proposal would not be received well by the public opinion in China."[623]

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[620] Ibid., 117, 119.
[621] "Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris," *FRUS*, 763.72119/5955, 07/17/1917, 172.
[622]MHIAS, "Yi qing jiezu Tianjin Ao jie shi keyun quxiao 義請接租天津奧界事可允取消," 03-36-130-04-049, 07/23/1919.
[623] MHIA, "Guanyu Tianjin zujie wenti chaosong Yi waijiao zongzhang mianjiao zhi jielve ji benshi yu Yi zhuanyuan lai 關於天津租界問題鈔送義外交總長面交之節略暨本使與義專員來," 03-36-130-04-051, 09/27/1919.

The Beiyang regime's reaction to the conditions proposed by the Italians revealed the extent to which it was willing to accommodate the demands of the Allied powers. The Chinese government exercised a great deal of caution and prioritized avoiding future contentions over these issues. On the one hand, the works of sanitation and the project of improvement of the Hai River were readily accepted by the Chinese government. This did not just come from China's own initiative, but China was also advised by foreign powers, most notably the American and French diplomats, to satisfy the Italians' demands on these matters. Successful fulfillment of these requests, as these foreign officials suggested, would strengthen other nations' conviction in China's commitment to acting in accordance with international law and principles, which would be of avail to China's interaction with other foreign powers in the future.[624] The Ministry of Internal Affairs (內務部) was assigned the duty of carrying out these projects. On the other hand, however, the Beiyang government steadfastly resisted any attempts by imperial powers to extend their authorities onto the former German and Austrian Concessions.[625] In the meantime, concrete measures were taken on the ground as well. In December, the specially designated Office of Negotiation (交涉署), in collaboration with the Special Administrative Bureau, was instructed to "examine in detail all dossiers held at the Austrian Consulate related to the boundary (between the Italian and Austrian enclaves) and conduct a field investigation of the precise boundary demarcating the two concessions."[626] As for the construction works in the area that connected the Italian and Austrian Concessions, the Chinese government acceded to working with the Italian

[624] MHIAS, "Guanli Tianjin Ao jie shi 管理天津奧界事," 03-36-130-04-056, 10/15/1919.
[625] MHIAS, "Guanyu jiu Ao zujie zhengli shixiang xi zhuohe banli 關於舊奧租界整理事項希酌核辦理," 03-36-130-04-055, 07/28/1919.
[626] 中研院近史所檔案，"天津奧界內勘界衛生及筑壩防水等事," 03-36-130-04-058, 12/06/1919.

consul in implementing a series of improvement projects, with the incurred expenditures evenly divided between the two.[627]

Conclusion

The Frist World War was essentially a war of empires, and one of the most significant aftermaths of the war was the redistribution of colonial possessions among imperial powers. Germany was clearly the biggest loser: it lost all its overseas colonies and non-Germanic territories in Europe. Although the British and French initially did not intend to seize any of the enemy colonies, they acted swiftly to take over former German colonial territories in East Africa and the Pacific when they saw the opportunity. Japan saw the outbreak of the Great War as "a 'divine' opportunity for empire-building."[628] Its demands of taking over German colonies in China (Shandong peninsula) as well as on the Pacific islands were fulfilled. The case study of the recovery of the Tianjin German and Austrian Concessions offers a window onto understanding the diversity and variety of how the effects of the war played out in different geographic regions. Unlike other German overseas colonies and territories that ended up being taken over by other colonial powers, the sovereignty over these concessionary spaces, albeit incomplete, was eventually reverted to the Chinese despite western powers' intention of bringing these ex-concessions under their control. In the meantime, Tianjin's experience during WWI differed from other Chinese urban centers, most notably Shanghai, not least because of the existence of former German and Austrian Concessions in the city.

The story of the retrocession of the former German and Austrian Concessions in Tianjin also sheds light on our interpretation of the Beiyang authorities' diplomatic activity during the

[627] Ibid.
[628] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, "Empires after 1919: old, new, transformed," *International Affairs* 95: 1 (2019), 92.

Great War. The Beiyang regime's diplomacy during this period has been conventionally portrayed as a total failure, most saliently exemplified by its disappointing experience at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Scholars of both English-language and Chinese-language academia have, however, reassessed the Beiyang government's diplomacy during this era and acknowledged its role in recovering Chinese sovereignty to some extent. The most memorable quote perhaps comes from William Kirby, who has stated that "the story of Chinese diplomacy in the Republican era is one of stunning accomplishments from a position of unenviable weakness."[629] These positive evaluations cannot be stretched too far. As Guoqi Xu has shown, China's experience during and after WWI was a "story of frustrations."[630] These frustrations ranged from its being betrayed on multiple fronts during the war to the notorious "Shandong Question" at the Peace Conference. My case study shows that the Beiyang authorities' diplomacy during and after WWI should indeed be interpreted in a more measured way. On the one hand, it was clearly not a story of total victory, as the recovery of these colonial concessions was not complete. And the Beiyang government did make efforts to accommodate the Allied powers (most prominently British and Italians) by allowing the former German concession to operate as an "international concession"—to use John Jordan's words—and by dedicating itself to the improvement of sanitary situations and river navigability in the former Austrian Concession.[631] On the other hand, however, the Beiyang regime did stand its ground firmly, especially when it came to the issue of sovereignty over these concessionary spaces.

Finally, comparing the British empire's approach to the "question of ex-German and Austrian Concessions" in Tianjin with that to the issue of "enemy properties" and "enemy

[629] William Kirby, "The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Era," *The China Quarterly*, No. 150, Special Issue: Reappraising Republic China (Jun.,1997), 436.
[630] Xu, *China and the Great War*, 198.
[631] "Jordan to Goffe," Foreign Office (FO) Files China, FO 371/3694, no. 90978, 04/25/1919.

subjects" on Chinese soil enables us to gain some insights into the British imperial project in China in this period. Scholars working on the history of China's interaction with the British during WWI have revealed that Britain repeatedly pressured the Chinese government into enforcing a complete liquidation of German properties as well as into deporting nearly all German subjects in China.[632] The Chinese government was not entirely cooperative at various points, and it attempted to make compromises by acquiescing to the British demands while making it possible for German businesses to resume and for German expatriates to return to China after the war. Britain did not allow China much leeway of compromises for these issues. This is especially true for the liquidation of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, where the British essentially took control of the liquidation process from the hands of the Chinese government.[633] On the contrary, despite the Tianjin British community's demands of amalgamating the ex-German Concession into the British Concession, the British government rejected their petition and eventually allowed the sovereignty of these former concessions to be restored by the Chinese. Several reasons, in my view, can explain this difference. First, Germany had been locked in economic competition with the British in China since the 1880s, and the outbreak of military conflicts in Europe provided the British with an opportunity to undermine Germany's economic position in China. The liquidation of German properties and deportation of German subjects were not just a matter of economic warfare, but also helped eliminate German economic influences in China. Second, by the late 1910s, the set of principles of the Open Door Policy had been generally accepted by western powers having trading relations with China, and upholding the Open Door policy meant that China's territorial and administrative integrity should be

[632] Wei, "Gongfa, zhuquan yu liyi: Yizhan shiqi Beijing zhengfu dui Deqiao caichan zhi chuzhi," 52-69; Wei, "Diyici shijie dazhan zhihou Beijing zhengfu zhi qiansong Deqiao yu dui Ying jiaoshe," 114-126; Moazzin, "From Globalization to Liquidation," 629.
[633] Moazzin, "From Globalization to Liquidation," 610-617.

preserved. The proposal of having the ex-German Concession monopolized by the British Municipal Council, in the eyes of the British, would constitute an encroachment on China's sovereignty and thus ran counter to the principles embedded in the Open Door policy.

MULTI-IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS AND ANTI-COLONIAL VIOLENCE

The 1932 Hongkou Bombing Incident: Its Multiple Meanings in a Multi-Imperial City

Introduction

In today's Hongkou district of the city of Shanghai, there is a municipal park known as the Lu Xun Park, named after the famous revolutionary writer Lu Xun during the 1919 May

Fourth Movement. Formerly known as the Hongkou (Hongkew) Park, it is now the site of the tomb of Lu Xun, as well as a grand museum dedicated to one of the most renowned intellectuals in modern China. Right next to the tomb of Lu Xun sits a pavilion-looking memorial hall in honor of a Korean nationalist named Yin Fengji (Yun Bongil, 尹奉吉). The memorial hall is called Mei Xuan (梅軒, the hall of plum). This appellation is carefully selected: Mei Xuan was Yun's style name (hao, 號) in Chinese, while the fruit "plum" carries the connotation of rectitude and perseverance in accordance with traditional Chinese culture. Curious readers may ask: why is there a memorial hall dedicated to a Korean independence activist in a Chinese city? The answer is quite simple: the location of today's Mei Xuan was where the Hongkou bombing Incident—a bombing attack directed at chief Japanese military and civil officials during a

celebration of the Japanese Emperor's birthday—transpired on April 29, 1932.

Figure 6.1 Mei Xuan (The Hall of Plum), photo taken by the author

There has been a diverse range of interpretations of the Hongkou Incident. According to the Korean nationalist historical view, this bombing affair has often been described as a heroic act of a Korean revolutionary who gallantly sacrificed his life for his nation's freedom and independence.[634] The Chinese-language scholarship has tended to view this incident as a culmination of the overseas Korean independence activism during its colonial era.[635] This incident, however, has only received scant scholarly attention in Anglophone academia. More

[634] A representative case in point would be Kim Ku, *Doweshilg* (도왜실기 屠倭實記), (Shanghai: Hanren aiguo tuan, 1932).
[635] For interpretations like this, see, for instance, Shi Yuanhua (石源华), *Hanguo duli yundong xueshi xinlun* 韩国独立运动血史 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1996).

often than not, it appears as a footnote to the Shanghai Incident, a bloody military conflict between China and Japan that began on January 28, 1932.[636] The only work that has investigated the bombing incident in relatively greater length is Erik Esselstrom's study of the Japanese consular police during the first half of the twentieth century. Esselstrom explains that the activity of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was a main target of and presented serious challenges for the Japanese policing authorities operating in Manchuria and other treaty port cities. The March Hongkou bombing was a "pivotal moment," as Esselstrom suggests, "in the explosion of anti-Japanese 'terrorism'… [and] in the imperial Japanese state's commitment to crushing subversive left-wing movements."[637]

The different interpretations of this bombing affair in various strands of historiography force us to recognize that the Hongkou Incident had multiple facets and generated different meanings: an anti-colonial struggle, an independence movement that caused a major headache for the imperial Japanese state, a potential ally for the fledging Chinese nationalists, and a destabilizing factor for the vibrant, yet precarious, urban environments of Shanghai, to name a few. The multi-faceted nature of the bombing affair leads us to raise some important questions. Why did the Korean nationalists decide to carry out their bombing attack in the city of Shanghai—the crux of Western imperialism in mainland China? What did the very fragmented nature of the administrative and political realm of Shanghai mean for the Korean activists launching independence movements in the city? What did the bombing incident mean for the municipal authorities—the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the Chinese

[636] Donald Jordan, *China's Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 226-227.
[637] Erik Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2020), 114.

district—within the confined urban space of Shanghai, as well as for various communities therein, Chinese and foreign alike?

These questions do not lend themselves to simple answers, and to address these questions, one needs to re-situate the Hongkou incident in the urban setting of Shanghai. The unique status of Shanghai during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries spawned various colonial, anti-colonial, and nationalist activities. At the center of this chapter is what this bombing incident meant for the Western and Chinese authorities and communities in the city. It reveals the remarkably different ways in which Shanghai's separate municipal polities reacted to and became embroiled into this incident. It shows, first of all, that the unique geopolitical reality in treaty-port-era Shanghai fostered an environment favorable to the nationalist movements of the KPG while imposing restrictions on their activities as well. This chapter also argues that the ongoing peace negotiations between China and Japan immediately after the Shanghai Incident had major effects on how the Chinese and Western authorities reacted to the bombing affair. The resolution of military conflicts between two great East Asian nations featured prominently in various discussions of the bombing attack in its wake. By examining closely various newspaper reports and editorials, this chapter reveals a variety of observations and reactions across disparate communities in the city of Shanghai.

Extraterritoriality and the juxtaposition of separate jurisdictions created multiple, overlapping, and oft-competing, spaces in the city of Shanghai. Along these imperial fault lines emerged myriad social groups that pursued various agenda, ultimately carving out alternate and contingent spaces. Since the 1910s, Shanghai had been a hotbed of nationalist movements, with Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean, Indian, and Vietnamese anti-imperial activism present in the city. These activists were not only able to adroitly take advantage of the administrative fragmentation

of Shanghai, but they also created new issues for the colonial and Chinese authorities within the city while prompting new forms of entanglements among these authorities. By closely examining the Hongkou Bombing Incident, this chapter shows the rivalries, collaborations, and complications that shaped Shanghai's population along different national, imperial, and ethnic lines. This episode of bombing violence epitomizes the multiple historical forces at play in China's greatest metropolis—the rise of anti-colonial struggles, the growing imperial ambition of the Japanese empire, the heightened tension between China and Japan, the flourishing of Chinese nationalism, the decline of Western colonial influence in the Far East, the increasing level of cross-imperial cooperation (as in the case of Sino-French cooperation in arresting colonial subjects to be discussed below). It was in this complex web of interpenetrating interests and activities before, during, and after the bombing incident that multiple municipal, national, diplomatic, and imperial powers were entangled.

Drawing on a wide range of primary documents, most notably the municipal records of the SMC and FMC, the police archive, diplomatic documents in the Chinese and English languages, newspaper reports, and writings produced by contemporary observers, this chapter consists of four parts. The first part offers the broader historical backdrop against which the Hongkou bombing incident took place with a particular emphasis on the activity of the KPG as well as on Japan's growing imperial ambition in mainland China. Then come three chapters, dealing respectively with different ways in which the three separate administrative entities in the city—the Chinese, the SMC (British), and the French authorities—were tangled up in the bombing incident.

Historical Contexts: The Establishment of the KPG and Japan's Growing Imperial Aggression in China

A proper understanding of the 1932 Hongkou bombing incident needs to be situated in two broader historical contexts: 1) the Korean independence movement at home and overseas; and 2) Japan's growing imperial aggression in China. Having lived under the Japanese colonial rule for nearly a decade, Korean nationalist sentiment reached a high point. This culminated when various cultural and religious leaders launched massive demonstrations and protests in the capital city of Seoul on March 1, 1919. Though eventually repressed by the Japanese a year later, the March First Movement was nevertheless of great historical importance. It forced the Japanese rulers to reconsider their colonial policies in the Korean peninsula, catalyzed a significant increase in organized resistance by Koreans, and enhanced the rise of the Korean Communist Party. What is more relevant to the present study is that, at the height of the nationalist movement in Korea, an exile government—known as the Korean Provisional Government (hereafter KPG)—was founded in Shanghai on April 10, 1919.

The French Concession in Shanghai became a haven for Korean revolutionary activity. The choice of the Shanghai French Concession is not inconceivable—after all, slightly over two years after the founding of the KPG, the same foreign quarter saw the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party. Be that as it may, why did the Korean independence activists choose a foreign settlement in a treaty port city as the place to establish their government-in-exile? First, Shanghai was home to vast numbers of the Korean population, second only to Manchuria. Even prior to the founding of the KPG, there had been a steady influx of Korean migrants into the city of Shanghai. Second, and more importantly, the French Concession, where the headquarter of the KPG was based, afforded the Korean independence activists a reasonable degree of freedom of movements and expression. The French authorities did not suppress the Korean independence movement within its jurisdiction, partially because the provisional government solicited their

protection by paying "squeeze" and partially because it sent delegates to Paris to explain the legitimacy of its government.[638] That the KPG chose the French Concession rather than the International Settlement also requires some explanation. This is because of the difference in governing structure between the two foreign settlements. While the French Concession was under exclusive control of the French consul-general, the governing body of its neighbor across the Yangjingbang river was the Shanghai Municipal Council that remained autonomous and functioned like a "city state." The KPG could not have been formed in the International Settlement, where Japan "had treaty rights" and where "the municipal police had to liaise with the Japanese consular police to harass the Koreans."[639]

Figure 6.2 Contemporary Site of the Former KPG in Shanghai (photo taken by the author)

By no means was the Shanghai KPG the only exile government of Korea, but it was nonetheless the most vibrant and visible one.[640] Many internationally renowned Korean

[638] Nym Wales and Kim San, *Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution* (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1972): 113.
[639] Robert Bickers, "Incubator City: Shanghai and the Crises of Empires," *Journal of Urban History* 38, no. 5, (2012): 871.
[640] Other branches were in Seoul, Irkutsk, and Vladivostok.

independence leaders were affiliated with the KPG in Shanghai. In addition, Shanghai was not the only Chinese city where Korean independence activists operated. Tianjin, Beijing, Canton, and Nanjing were all crucial sites of anti-Japanese activism by Koreans.[641] Unable to mount any effective military resistance to the Japanese empire, the main strategy of the KPG leaders during its nascent days was to build alliance with and seek financial aid from the international community. Under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, who was the first provisional president of the KPG and decades later became the first president of the Republic of Korea, the KPG worked painstakingly to seek recognition from the United States and other European powers. Possibly due to his previous connection with the United States, Rhee spared no efforts in sending diplomatic communications to the American representatives during the Paris Peace Conference.[642] Between April 30 and June 28, Rhee dispatched five official communications to President Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. State Department. He also made efforts to reach out to the European powers, albeit to a lesser extent. To his dismay, the Euro-American powers did not really respond to Rhee's proposals, and the Korean question was not addressed at the Peace Conference. This was chiefly because a formal recognition of the KPG would have been an unveiled affront to the Japanese empire, a situation that none of the Western powers would have been willing to face.[643]

The Soviet Union was another country with which the KPG was eager to establish a close tie. This was closely linked to the original composition of the KPG members that included leaders of different political ideologies. While the Korean nationalists and communists worked closely for the common cause of Korean independence, political contact with the Russian

[641] Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 68.
[642] Rhee moved to the United States in 1904, where he was educated. He later returned to Japanese occupied Korea but fled to America again after being implicated in the 105-Man Incident in 1912.
[643] Young Ick Lew, *The Making of the First Korean President* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2014): 103-119.

Bolshevik expanded around the same time. Although it is not clear whether a state-to-state relationship was ever formally established between the Soviet Union and the KPG, the former did offer to fund the fledging government-in-exile in 1920. However, the dispute between the Korean nationalists and communists began to escalate over the distribution of the funds received from Russia. This, compounded by factionalism within the KPG, undermined the coalition between the Korean nationalists and communists that only lasted for two years. In 1921, the Communist Party split and formed its own institutions, which led to the Soviet decision to indefinitely suspend its material and financial support for the KPG.[644]

In addition to the United States and Soviet Union, the KPG also sought to establish formal diplomatic ties with the Chinese government. Plagued by internal disorder brought about by national disunity and international pressure (China's tense relationship with Japan), the Beiyang government did not respond positively to the KPG's efforts to form diplomatic relations. It was the Guangzhou Military Government (護法軍政府)—established in 1917 by Sun Yat-sen in opposition to the Beiyang government—that conducted the most extensive diplomatic activities with the KPG. As the president of the political junta, Sun had long been sympathetic of the subjugation of the Koreans by the Japanese empire. As early as 1919 when the March First Movement erupted, Sun issued a public statement that unequivocally expressed his support of the Korean activists' endeavors to strive for national independence.[645] These two governments' relationship reached a new height in 1921, when Sun Yat-sen held a formal meeting with Shin Gyu-sik, one of the founding members of the KPG. In the same year, the

[644] Robert A. Scalpino and Chong-Sik Lee, "The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (I)," *Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 1 (1960): 13-18.
[645] Min Shilin (闵石麟), *Zhong Han waijiao shihua* 中韩外交史话 (Chongqing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1942), 27.

Guangzhou Military Government established formal diplomatic relations with the KPG, thereby recognizing its independent status as a legitimate government.[646]

If the KPG had mobilized its anti-Japanese activities through more moderate measures, such as diplomatic communications with other Western powers, other organizations preferred a more radical approach. The most well-known organization consisting of radical Korean activists was called Üiyõldan. First organized in 1919 in Jinlin Province of Manchuria by Kim Wõn-bong, the headquarters of Üiyõldan moved about in later years. Its main goals were to carry out bombings of colonial offices in the peninsula, assassinate important Japanese officials and their Korean collaborators, and launch attacks on symbols of Japanese power throughout northeast Asia.[647] During the early 1920s, Üiyõldan was allegedly responsible for at least eight well-known bombing or assassination incidents in Seoul, Tokyo, and Shanghai. The most notable attacks were its assassination attempt on General Tanaka Giichi in Shanghai on March 28, 1922, and the attempted assassination of the Japanese Emperor in Tokyo on January 4, 1924.[648] Noticeably, it was the attempted assassination of General Tanaka that alerted the Gaimushô police. Shortly after the assassination attempt, the consular police in Shanghai acquired crucial information about the radical anti-Japanese Korean groups in Shanghai through intelligence work and made numerous arrests.[649]

The Japanese empire's growing ambition and aggression in China during the interwar era is a much more familiar story for China historians than that of the KPG. While the interwar period has often been overshadowed by "the turbulent decades which flanked them,"[650] Japan

[646] Ibid.
[647] Wales and San, *Song of Ariran*, 336; Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 68.
[648] Wales and San, *Song of Ariran*, 336-337.
[649] Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 69.
[650] Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 1.

historians have rightly observed that this era saw Japan's remarkable national/empire rebuilding and transformation.[651] This period was also marked by a replacement of the old "diplomacy of imperialism"—a harmonization of various imperial interests in China—with the new power equilibrium as defined at the 1922 Washington Conference.[652] Although Japan adopted an internationalist approach and took measures to generate a new order of peace and prosperity in China, this experiment ended in abysmal failure because of both the heightening tide of Chinese nationalism and the internal division between civil and military groups within the Japanese government. The global economic crisis beginning in 1929 exacerbated these tensions, which oriented Japan towards economic autarky and greater political control.

Japan's rising militarism and heightening imperial ambition culminated in the Mukden Incident (the Manchurian Incident). On the night of 18 September 1931, the locally garrisoned Kwantung Army blew up a section of the South Manchurian Railway, which they subsequently blamed on the Chinese soldiers. The Manchurian Incident marked the beginning of Japan's invasion of mainland China. Soon thereafter, the entire region of Manchuria was occupied by Japan, and the client state of Manchukuo was established as well.[653] The situation in Shanghai developed in lockstep with that in Manchuria. Fomented by the Manchuria Incident, anti-Japanese sentiments became widespread, massive student protests occurred on the Shanghai streets, and boycott against Japanese products constituted a severe blow to Japan's trade with the Shanghai area. Under these circumstances, hostility between the Japanese residents in Shanghai and the local Chinese became salient.[654] Having requested the Nanjing government to contain the

[651] Frederick Dickinson, *World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919–1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[652] Iriye, *After Imperialism*, 1-22.
[653] Rana Mitter, "The War Years, 1937-1949," in *The Oxford History of China*, ed. Jeffrey Wasserstrom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 176.
[654] Jordan, *China's Trial by Fire*, 10.

boycott activities but to no avail, Japan resorted to military measures. On January 28, 1932, Japanese troops attacked a Shanghai urban district called Zhabei, where they confronted desperate resistance from the Chinese Nationalist Army. Though often overshadowed by other larger-scale warfare, this battle was nevertheless "the first instance of a modern war waged in a large city," where modern weaponry was used.[655] This military clash lasted for about five weeks, captured headlines worldwide, and was not fully resolved until protracted, multi-pronged negotiations had taken place. The Shanghai Incident is of paramount importance to the present study, not only because it framed the historical context of the Hongkou Bombing Incident, but also because it continued to loom large in people's minds during and after the bombing incident took place.

The Hongkou Bombing Incident: Where, Who, and How

The Hongkou Bombing Incident was intimately linked with another assassination attempt on the Japanese Emperor over three months prior. On January 8, 1932, a young Korean radical activist named Yi Pongch'ang hurled a bomb at the moving motorcade of the Japanese Emperor outside of his palace but narrowly missed him. Yi was arrested on the spot, and the interrogation of this Korean revolutionary revealed that Kim Ku, the premier of the KPG at the time, singlehandedly engineered and sponsored this "terrorist" attack.[656] The Japanese authorities were deeply shocked by this turn of events, not least because "the struggle of Korean resistance fighters in treaty port China had been unleashed within the very core of the empire's metropolitan center."[657]

[655] Christian Henriot, "The Battle of Shanghai (January-March 1932): A Study in the Space-time of War," *Journal of Military History* 85, no. 1, (2021): 76-94.
[656] Kim Ku, *Paekpom Ilchi* (The Autobiography of Kim Ku), trans. Jongsoo Lee (Lanham: University Press of America): 234-240.
[657] Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 113.

Kim Ku masterminded the bombing incident in Shanghai in the same way that he engineered the assassination attempt on the Japanese Emperor a few months prior. Following the Tokyo Incident, Kim decided to continue his works of assassination against the Japanese and was eager to recruit members to execute his plans.[658] It was at this moment that Yun Bongil presented himself to Kim. A letter sent by Kim himself to the English-language press over ten days after the bombing incident affords us some insights into who Yun was and why he decided to take up the assassination task. Originally born of an impoverished family in Reisan, Korea, in 1908, Yun grew up in Korea and witnessed "the economic and political oppression of the Japanese" that propelled him to "seek revenge and leave home." He acquired his first job in Qingdao (Shandong province) at a Japanese-owned laundry shop but, having saved enough travel fares, moved to Shanghai, and worked at a local vegetable stand.[659] Both subsequent Japanese intelligence report and Kim's own autobiography revealed that Kim obtained explosives through his connection with local connections and that they were "installed inside a water bottle and a luncheon box."[660] During the days prior to the planned attack on the Japanese Emperor's Birthday, Kim secretly transported the objects tied with explosives to Yun, while the

[658] Kim, *Paekpom Ilch*, 241.
[659] *The China Press*, 05/10/1932.
[660] "Shanhai bakudan jiken han'nin Ni kanshi Shanhai ni okeru Desaki kanken wa kyōgi no ue hon muika gogosanji no Gotoku happyō seri"上海爆弾事件犯人に関し上海に於ける出先官憲は協議の上本六日午後三時左の如く発表せり, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (National Archives of Japan, hereafter NAJ), A03023776600.

latter paid frequent visits to the Hongkou Park in order to find a favorable spot to launch his attack.[661]



Figure 6.3 bomb used by Yun (an image taken from the Hall of Plum at today's Lu Xun Park)

The bombing incident occurred on April 29, 1932, the birthday of the Japanese Emperor. Prominent Japanese dignitaries—the Japanese Minister to China, the cosul-general, and senior military officials—all assembled at the Hongkou Park in the International Settlement. This occasion was not only an observance of a national holiday, but was also orchestrated as a victorious parade, as Japan had just concluded its military conflict with China a couple of weeks before. General Shirakawa first addressed the Japanese civilians and military, lauding Japanese soldiers' "valor and discipline" during the Shanghai Incident. What ensued was a speech by Kawabata Teiji, civilian president of the Japanese Residents' Association in Shanghai, during which he expressed his gratitude to the Japanese emperor as well as the Japanese military. The

[661] Kim Ku, *Paekpom Ilch*, 244-245.

national anthem of Japan was played thereafter, where Minister Shigemitsu, consul general Murai, Shirakawa, Admiral Nomura, General Ueda, and Kawabata all gathered on the podium.[662] Suddenly, a bomb thrown by a Korean nationalist named Yun Bongil threw the celebratory event into chaos.

On the following day, leading Chinese- and foreign-language newspapers all devoted numerous pages to covering this bombing incident in detail. Despite the differences in their comments on the nature of this incident and the tones adopted, a topic that will be addressed in the next section, these reports, to varying degrees, described the gruesome details of bomb-detonation, the capture of Yun, and the condition of the injured Japanese officials. As these reports stated, Yun threw a bomb onto the platform where the Japanese military and civilian officials were standing. A loud explosion ensued, which seriously injured Minister Shigemitsu, consul-general Murai, General Shirakawa, and Admiral Nomura, among others. Kawabata, president of the Japanese Residents Association, also suffered from severe wounds that proved to be fatal after a few days. There was a brief moment of silence and confusion right after the bomb was hurled, but it was followed by "pandemonium." The injured Japanese dignitaries were rushed into the nearby hospitals in the International Settlement. Amid chaos, Yun managed to throw another bomb, but it did not detonate. Having remained hidden behind the stage, he was soon spotted by the surrounding crowds and was swiftly subdued. He was severely beaten and was nearly lynched by an angry spectator before the Japanese military police intervened and arrested him. Other arrests were made as well, as some Chinese bystanders were being considered as the suspects.[663] Kawabata died on May 1, and General Shirakawa's bomb injury,

[662] "Shanhai bakudan jiken han'nin Ni kanshi Shanhai ni okeru Desaki kanken wa kyōgi no ue hon muika gogosanji no Gotoku happyō seri," Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, NAJ, A03023776600.
[663] *North China Herald*, April 30, 1932; *Shenbao*, April 30, 1932.

compounded by his internal ailment, took his life on May 26.[664] Shigemitsu's right leg was so damaged by the explosion that it had to be amputated, whereas Nomura lost a right eye after his surgery did not go particularly well. Murai, though not sustaining any fatal wounds, was bedridden and thus removed from any administrative obligations.[665] Shortly after the bombing incident, Kim made a "confession of Hongkew Park Bombing" in a letter addressed to the English press. In this public statement, Kim took responsibility for the bombing attack and provided some concise information about Yun Bongil and their independence movements.[666] Kim found refuge at the residence of an American named Mr. Fitch. He was able to hide there for over twenty days until his whereabouts were discovered by Japanese spies. With the assistance of Mr. Fitch and his Korean compatriots, Kim managed to escape from the Shanghai French Concession to Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province.[667] Yun, however, ended up sacrificing his life for this "nationalist cause." After his arrest, he was brought back to the military prison in Osaka

[664] *North China Herald*, May 1, 1932; *The Shanghai Times*, May 27, 1932.
[665] *Shenbao*, May 1, 1932.
[666] *The China Press*, May 10, 1932.
[667] Kim Ku, *Paekpom Ilch*, 247-250.

in May, sentenced to death, and was executed in December 1932.[668]

Figure 6.4 the arrest of Yun by the Japanese Military Officers (from *North China Herald*, April 30, 1932)

Chinese Reaction: Restrained Sympathy and Surreptitious Assistance

By the time the Hongkou Bombing Incident occurred, China's Nanjing government had been engaged in protracted and difficult negotiations with the Japanese officials in Shanghai. In the wake of the assassination, Chinese government and newspaper media paid close attention to how the situation unfolded. On April 29, 1932, the day of the bombing attack, Zhang Zhizhong (張治中), a commander of the Chinese Nationalist Army in Shanghai, telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and briefed him on the occurrence of the incident.[669] Soon thereafter, on the very same day, Wu Tiecheng (吳鐵城), the Shanghai mayor, sent a more detailed report to the Nanjing

[668] "Niji-guchi kōen bakudan jiken Han'nin in hōkitsu ni taisuru Hanketsu-shoSho oku Tsuki no kudan 虹口公園爆弾事件犯人尹奉吉に対する判決書寫送付の件," Kaigun-shō kōbun bikō 海軍省公文備考, Gaiji maki 6, 外事巻6, 1932, NAJ, C05022017600.

[669] 台灣國史館 (Taiwan Guoshi guan, hereafter TWGSG) "Zhang Zhizhong dian Jiang Zhongzheng 張治中電蔣中正," Songhu shijian 淞滬事件, 002-090200-00005-273，04/29/1932.

government regarding this incident, in which he underscored that five Japanese military and civil officials were injured by the explosion.[670] On the following day, as more information about the incident surfaced, Wu and Zhang lost no time in updating Chiang on the situation in Shanghai. A telegraph sent by Wu on April 30 revealed the name of the assassin, Yun, and informed Chiang of the conditions of the injured Japanese dignitaries. The same telegraph conveyed a sense of apprehension, as it mentioned that the Japanese Minister to Japan, Shigemitsu, would not be able to continue his peace negotiations with the Chinese representatives due to the injures he had sustained during the bombing attack. [671] However, a letter exchanged between two Chinese division commanders showed that the Japanese representatives were willing to resume the negotiations despite the temporary interruption.[672]

The outbreak of the Hongkou Incident constituted a watershed moment in the relationship between the KPG and the Nanjing government. Between the founding of the Nanjing government in 1927 and the outbreak of the 1932 Hongkou Incident, the Nationalist government did not really offer any concrete assistance for the KPG, despite its avowed sympathy and support of the latter's nationalist cause.[673] The occurrence of the Hongkou bombing incident, however, forced Chiang's government to reconsider its relationship with the KPG. The Nanjing government, henceforth, began to materially support and fund the KPG activities. Shortly after Kim Ku released his public statement regarding the bombing attack, the Japanese consular police spared no efforts to scour the entire Shanghai French Concession to locate Kim and other

[670] TWGSG, "Wu Tiecheng dian Jiang Zhongzheng 吳鐵城電蔣中正," Songhu shijian 淞滬事件 （一）, 002-090200-00005-274，04/29/1932.
[671] TWGSG, "Wu Tiecheng dian Jiang Zhongzheng 吳鐵城電蔣中正," Songhu shijian 淞滬事件 （一）, 002-090200-00005-275，04/30/1932.
[672] TWGSG, "Fan Juchuan dian Chen Dingxun 樊巨川電陳鼎勳," Gefang Minguo 21 nian 5 yue wanglai dianwen lucun, 各方民國 21 年 5 月往來電文錄存（一）, 116-010108-0202-004, 05/02/1932.
[673] Mu Tao (沐涛) and Sun Kezhi (孙科志), *Da Han Minguo linshi zhengfu zai Zhongguo* 大韩民国临时政府在中国 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1992).

important members of the KPG. With the help of other Korean revolutionary activists, Kim managed to flee to Hangzhou.[674] Upon Kim's arrival in Hangzhou, Chen Guofu (陳果夫), the provincial governor of Jiangsu, instructed one of his subordinates named Xiao Zheng (蕭錚) to go to Zhejiang and offer Kim any necessary aid he might have needed.[675] In May 1933, Chiang Kai-shek held a meeting in Nanjing with Kim Ku, during which he agreed to offer his assistance for the KPG. After their meeting, Chiang also instructed Chen Guofu to offer the KPG monthly funds.[676] It should be noted, however, that all this financial support and funding were offered to the KPG in secrecy. This is mainly because the Nanjing government was not willing to further antagonize the Japanese government in a time when Sino-Japanese relations were rife with tensions and conflicts. It was not until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 that the Nationalist government openly supported the KPG.

In the meantime, Chinese newspapers covered the bombing incident extensively. This was not the first time that the Chinese media ran special reports of Korean "terrorist" attacks. As early as January 9, 1932, a day after the attempted assassination of the Japanese emperor by Yi Pongch'ang, *Minguo Ribao*, a newspaper based in Qingdao, reported with the heading "A Korean Named Yi Pongch'ang Threw a Bomb at the Japanese Emperor but the Bomb 'Unfortunately' Missed Him (韓人李奉昌狙擊日皇不幸不中)." The term "unfortunately" angered the Japanese deeply. As a result, the newspaper's offices were raided and destroyed by the Japanese police, and the Japanese government also lodged a strongly worded protest to the Chinese government.[677] Similarly, Shanghai's *Shenbao* also published a report on the

[674] Kim Ku, *Paekpom Ilch*, 250.
[675] Xiao Zheng (萧铮), ed., *Zhongguo xiezhu Hanguo guangfu yundong shiliao* 中国协助韩国光复运动史料 (Taipei, 1965), 19-22.
[676] Kim Ku, *Paekpom Ilch*, 259-263.
[677] Kim Ku, *Paekpom Ilch*, 239.

assassination event with the title "A Korean Man of Lofty Ideals (or more loosely, A Korean Martyr) Did Not Succeed in Killing the Japanese Emperor (韓國志士阻擊日皇未成)."[678] The term "Zhishi (志士, man of lofty ideals)" clearly indicated a sense of approbation of Yi's action. On the following days, *Shenbao* published other commentaries that overtly commended Yi's "ambition of reviving his nation."[679]

However, things changed dramatically a few months later. When the Hongkou Incident took place, China had just entered the phase of ceasefire with Japan, and many Japanese armies were still stationed in Shanghai. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the reports on the April 29 bombing attack would not evince any effusively anti-Japanese stances. On April 30, extensive reports on the event that had occurred the day before appeared on *Shenbao*. These reports were all written in fairly neutral and descriptive proses that did not leave the impression of strong sympathy with the Korean activist. A noteworthy point is that, throughout these reports, Yun was referred to as the "perpetrator (*xiongshou* 兇手)," which was in sharp contrast with how Yi Pongch'ang was represented as "a man with lofty ideals."[680] Additionally, the report also touched upon the potential implications of this bombing incident for the ongoing Sino-Japanese peace negotiations and predicted that "for the time being, a meeting between the Chinese and Japanese negotiators would likely be postponed."[681]

If a sense of caution and restraint prevailed in these reports on April 29, an implicit tendency to show sympathy with the Korean revolutionaries can be discerned the day after. A central theme that occupied an important place in the reports of the 30th about the bombing

[678] *Shenbao*, 01/09/1932.
[679] *Shenbao*, 01/12/1932.
[680] *Shenbao*, 04/30/1932.
[681] Ibid.

incident was "the potential perilous position of Korean residents in the French Concession." On the heel of the bombing attack, the Japanese consular police cooperated with the French Municipal Police in launching districtwide arrests of those suspected to be associated with the KPG, a topic that will be explored in greater detail below. The arrest of Ahn Changho, an internationally recognized Korean independence activist, stirred up the greatest controversy. In addition to reporting the apprehension of Ahn, *Shenbao* also provided a brief biography of Ahn himself, in which he was portrayed as analogous to China's Sun Yat-sen in terms of his "revolutionary spirit."[682] Not only did *Shenbao* publish its own reports and editorials on the Hongkou incident, but it also translated and published those from the English-language newspapers in Shanghai. For instance, on May 2, the editorials on Ahn's arrest from *North China Herald* and *The China Press*, both of which were opposed to his arrest, were published in *Shenbao*. Then, on May 10, the public statement that Kim Ku had released to the English press about Yi Pongch'ang and Yun Bongil, which has been alluded to in previous sections, also appeared in *Shenbao*. Although publishing the content from other English newspapers did not necessarily mean that *Shenbao* approved or endorsed their views entirely, at the very least, it indicated the newspaper's intention of sharing this information with the Chinese reading public.

Not only did Chinese newspapers run special reports on the bombing incident, but other Chinese-language periodicals also published editorials and commentaries about this event. These editorials generally did not view Yun's assassination attempt as a "terrorist" attack, but rather showed a great deal of sympathy and admiration for his action. In addition, they also denounced the Japanese imperial aggression and its wartime atrocities in China while attributing the occurrence of such an incident to the oppression of the colonized subjects by the Japanese

[682] *Shenbao*, 05/01/1932.

empire.[683] Others even published their eulogies prior to Yun's execution in December 1932. In an editorial entitled "Crying for Hero Yun Bongil," Yun's action was described as a "glorious sacrifice," as he lost his life for the sake of "his nation's independence and freedom."[684] Other commentaries took the form of poetry. Below is an excerpt from a poem in commemoration of Yun

> "(Yun) singlehandedly entered a tiger's lair and faced the crowd of criminals [meaning, the Japanese] with ease. His action shocked the heaven, and nearly half of the criminals lost their lives. Even though he was not able to eradicate all Japanese war criminals, he managed to avenge his own nation—Korea. He gallantly stood among the Japanese criminals and proudly counted the number of heads that he had severed."[685]

There were also a number of editorials that used Yun's action to bemoan the lack of resistance and fighting spirit among the Chinese population. A short essay entitled "Where is China's Yun Bongil?" lamented the lack of action by the Chinese people in the context of the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria and attack in the Shanghai region. This essay concluded by asking, "Alas, where are you, China's Yun Bongil? A national crisis is befalling us, so please don't spectate!"[686] In another editorial, a writer with the pen name Jun Du drew a connection between Yun's sacrifice and the youth in China. After a brief summarization of the bombing incident, Jun Du ruefully claimed that "Despite the fact that China lost part of its territory to Japan… brave Chinese young people who are willing to shed blood and die for their country have not yet seemed to emerge." He then stated that whether a nation had the ability to revitalize itself was intimately linked with whether its young population had the bravery to die

[683] A representative editorial appeared in *Shanghai Ribao*. "Yin Fengji an zhi wogan 尹奉吉案之我感 (My understanding of the Yun Bongil Case)," *Shanghai Ribao*, 05/02/1932. See also, "Cong An Chonggen shuodao Yin Fengji 从安重根说到尹奉吉," *Jiu yi ba zhou bao* (九一八周报), 1932, vol. 1, no. 10, 9-11.
[684] "Ku Yin Fengji Lieshi 哭尹奉吉烈士," *Shehui ribao*, 06/05/1932.
[685] "Zeng Yin Fengji yishi (shici)赠尹奉吉义士(诗词)," *Yi ba shekan*, 1932, no. 2, 101.
[686] "Zhongguo de Yin Fengji na qule 中国的尹奉吉哪去了," *Kongjun*, 1932, no. 5, 17.

for it. He ended his piece by calling upon the Chinese youth to "develop their fortitude and gain the courage to die for their country."[687]

British Reaction: the SMC, State, and the Shanghai Media

The Hongkou Bombing Incident took place in the International Settlement in Shanghai, the most prosperous foreign quarter predominated by Anglo-American interests. As one may expect, the British authorities, as well as the Shanghai Municipal Council (the governing body of the International Settlement), were deeply involved both before and after the bombing explosion happened. The years spanning from 1925 to 1932 were a crucial period of Anglo-Japanese interactions in China. During these years, their relationship shifted from active co-operation to irreconcilable tensions. Between 1925 and 1928, the British wanted to act jointly with the Japanese because of the Chinese people's animosity towards their presence in the city in the wake of the May Thirtieth Movement. After 1928, however, Sino-Japanese relations became increasingly strained, as the second Shandong Expedition of the Japanese government led to a serious clash between the two nations in the city of Jinan.[688] Japan then became the main target of Chinese nationalism, whereas the British government managed to adopt a more liberal policy in China.[689] British attitudes towards Japan in the early 1930s can be best characterized as "lukewarm." Although the British government did not approve of Japan's accelerated imperial expansionism in mainland China, it could not afford to entirely alienate and antagonize Japan due to the growth and strength of Chinese nationalism.[690]

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[687] "You Yin Fengji xiangdao qingnian yinggai zenyang si 由尹奉吉想到青年应该怎样死," *Da lu zazhi* 1, no. 1, (1932): 2-3.
[688] The Second Shandong Expedition (April 1928) was a deployment of a Japanese division into the city of Jinan in order to (at least ostensibly) protect the Japanese commercial interests and civilian lives.
[689] Harumi Goto-Shibata, *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-1931* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1995): 144-145.
[690] Ibid., 142-143.

By the end of the 1920s, the city of Shanghai had been a crucial site where Anglo-Japanese tensions became increasingly visible. This was most clearly manifested in the demand of the Japanese for greater representation in the SMC and for more involvement in the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP). As the historian Joshua Fogel has shown, "in the early 1920s, Shanghai had been transformed into an essential organ of the Japanese political-economic animal."[691] Most of the Japanese residents lived in the International Settlement. With its growing population and investment, it was natural for the Japanese to press hard for greater representation in the SMC. Similarly, Japan also demanded greater participation in the SMP. Prior to the outbreak of the 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military presence was occasionally welcomed by the British authorities due to the latter's lack of defense force in the region. In 1931, the Japanese even participated in a joint defense of the International Settlement, especially the Hongkou area that was home to the largest number of Japanese residents in the city. In the wake of the Sino-Japanese military conflicts in 1932, Japan's Naval Landing Party kept a garrison in Hongkou. As a result, "the authority of the Municipal Police in this area was increasingly challenged by Japanese security organs."[692]

Since the celebration of the Japanese emperor's birthday was set in the International Settlement, the SMC, through the Municipal Police's intelligence reports, was kept abreast of the activities that had been planned for this national holiday. According to the reports of the SMP's Special Branch, detailed arrangements—including the traffic arrangements as well as the positioning of civilian spectators—were made in preparation for the parade of the Japanese troops on the day of the Japanese Emperor's birthday. In addition, a separate police car was

[691] Joshua Fogel, "Shanghai-Japan: The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4, (2000): 931.
[692] Bernard Wasserstein, *Secret War in Shanghai* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 11.

requested by the SMP to escort General Shirakawa. The communique issued by the Japanese consulate was also translated by the SMP and included in its daily intelligence reports.[693] The SMP also informed local Chinese-language newspapers that some gun shots would be fired as part of the celebration of the emperor's birthday, so that the population would not be alarmed.[694] The SMC, however, was not pleased with allowing activities of armed Japanese forces within its jurisdiction. According to the SMC meeting minutes days after the occurrence of the bombing attack, the chairman of the SMC—A. D. Bell—stated that he and the British consul-general had paid a visit to the Japanese consul-general in the hope of convincing him to relinquish the program before the 29th. This suggestion was nonetheless "courteously" declined by the Japanese consul-general.[695]

Neither the SMC nor the SMP stood idly by in the face of this bombing incident. The newspaper reports showed that the SMP "offered their service to the Japanese authorities and joint investigations were proceeding."[696] In the meantime, the SMC officially expressed its sympathy for the injured Japanese officials two days after the bombing incidents happened. J. R. Jones, the secretary of the SMC, also conveyed his condolences for the death of Kawabata, who sustained fatal wounds during the bombing attack.[697] However, by no means did this mean that the SMC approved all the activities the Japanese had orchestrated. In the aforementioned meeting minutes, Bell also emphasized that the SMC had not received any official notice about these activities until the day before the event. As a result, the SMC lodged a formal protest "against troop movements on a major scale in times of such tension and without adequate notice

[693] SMP, special branch, Series Number/ID, RG263, Box number: M1750, D3566, 04/25/1932.
[694] Ibid., 04/27/1932.
[695] *TMSMC*, 05/05/1932, 340.
[696] *North China Daily News*, April 30, 1932.
[697] *The Shanghai Times*, May 1, 1932.

being given to the Council."[698] This was later interpreted by one of the English-language newspapers as the Council being completely free from any accountability for the bombing affair, despite the fact that it had happened in the International Settlement.[699] On May 18, another formal protest was sent to the consular body in the hope that the latter would "induce the Japanese naval and military forces to refrain from interfering with and obstructing the municipal police and other Council employees."[700]

On the state level, the British statesmen watched the situation in Shanghai with a degree of anxiety. The outbreak of the Shanghai Incident in January alarmed the British greatly, who were not only concerned with their tremendous economic interests in the city but also became increasingly wary of Japan's expansive ambitions towards the International Settlement following its occupation of the Chinese district of the city. In the wake of the ceasefire in March, the British authorities, along with their American and French counterparts, placed diplomatic pressure on the Japanese government, and the ensuing Sino-Japanese peace negotiations owed a great deal to the intervention of the Western powers.[701] The Hongkou Incident put a halt to the ongoing peace talks between China and Japan, which worried the British considerably. Upon hearing about the bombing affair, Miles Lampson, the British Minister to China at the time, evinced serious apprehension and admitted that "he awaits with anxiety the effect of this outrage on Sino-Japanese relations and on the Shanghai peace negotiations in particular."[702] An official message from Katsuo Okazaki, the Japanese consul general in Shanghai, brought a breath of relief. Lampson was informed that "the Japanese Government desired to proceed with

[698] *TMSMC*, 05/05/1932, 340-341.
[699] *The Shanghai Times*, May 10, 1932.
[700] *TMSMC*, 05/18/1932, 345.
[701] Jordan, *China's Trial by Fire*, 205-234.
[702] "Sir M. Lampson to Sir John Simon," 04/29/1932, in *Shanghai Political & Economic Reports, 1842-1943*, edited by Robert Jarman (Slough: Archive Editions, 2008), vol. 17, 441.

negotiation of agreement for cessation of hostilities notwithstanding Hongkew Park incident" and that General Tashiro wished to "treat the two things quite separately."[703]

A close inspection of the English-language newspapers published in Shanghai affords us some insights into how the foreign community in the International Settlement perceived this incident. On April 30, the bombing affair quickly garnered headlines in nearly all major English newspapers in the foreign settlement. These headings unanimously used the phrase "bomb outrage" to describe what had happened at the Hongkou Park, which conveyed a strong sense of condemnation and denunciation of Yun's bombing attack.[704] This day's reports were largely divided into three parts: 1) coverages of the actual event; 2) expression of sympathy for the injured Japanese officials; 3) concerns with the ramifications of the bombing attack for the ongoing Sino-Japanese armistice conference. These newspapers' reports of the incident, as well as their sympathy with those injured, were essentially identical to those in the Chinese newspapers such as *Shenbao*. As indicated in the previous section, some of the reports on the Chinese newspapers were originally from their English-language counterparts. The English newspapers, however, devoted much more space to discussing the repercussions of the bombing incident on the peace talks between China and Japan. *North China Daily News*, among others, covered extensively the reactions to the "bomb outrage" in Geneva, where the peace conference was held. The tone and verbiage of these reports conveyed a sense of uncertainty and carried a generally somber aura. A memorable quote appeared in a section with the subheading "Peace Parleys May Be Delayed":

> "The hope for the resumption of the Sino-Japanese armistice conference in a week or two, which appeared bright following the acceptance by both the Japanese and Chinese delegations of Sir Miles Lampson's 'compromise plan,' once again was dimmed at least temporarily, yesterday when Mr. M.

[703] "Sir M. Lampson to Sir J. Simon," *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, Ser. 2, Vol. 10, Reference: F 3847/1/10. (May 1, 1932).
[704] See *North China Daily News*, 04/30/1932; *The China Press*, 04/30/1932; *The Shanghai Times*, 04/30/1932.

Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China and chief Japanese delegate to the armistice conference, was injured seriously in the bombing outrage at the Hongkew Park."

On May 1, some of these newspapers even reprinted what appeared in various newspapers back in London. Newspapers including *The Times*, *The Daily Herald* (a labor organ publication), and *The Daily Express* all denounced this bombing attack as an "abominable outrage" in a moment of high tension between China and Japan.[705] *The Daily Telegraph*'s analogy between the Hongkou Incident and the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914 was perhaps the most memorable one, in which it was stated that "no act of political violence in our time has been so fraught with disastrous possibilities."[706]

In the following days, one of the most prominent topics in the Shanghai English newspapers was the arrests of Korean residents in the city. These reports and editorials not only showed the sympathy of the western community in the International Settlement for the Koreans in its neighboring concession, but also revealed its underlying anxiety about an increasingly assertive presence of the Japanese forces in the city. *The China Press* on consecutive days published reports on the raids into Korean residence in the French Concession by the Japanese gendarmerie, as well as the arrests of the Koreans therein. Among those apprehended, Ahn Changho attracted the most attention because of his status as a high-profile Korean revolutionary leader.[707] The newspaper ran a special report introducing who Ahn was, while indicating that his arrest should have been of interests to the American government because of Ahn's connection with the US.[708]

[705] *North China Daily News*, 05/01/1932.
[706] *The Shanghai Times*, 05/01/1932.
[707] *The China Press*, 05/01/1932, 05/02/1932.
[708] *The China Press*, 05/03/1932.

The high-handed manner in which these arrests were carried out aroused immense ill-feeling and dissatisfaction among the western residents in the International Settlement. The editorial sections of *The China Press* provided them with an outlet to voice their opinions. An editorial entitled "Have Japanese Annexed French Town" contained an effusive passage comparing the Hongkou Incident with the Shanghai Incident that preceded it:

> But what fundamental difference would there have been between such an act, and the bombing by Japanese planes of Chapei and Kiangwan and Tazang and Nanziang and Woosuing? I have been trying ever since the Emperor's birthday to figure it out. Of course the unfortunate victims of this bombing outrage were important men, but if it takes 100 humble villagers to equal one general or rear-admiral there were many more than that. Or if it takes a thousand, you still have them—killed or wounded by Japanese bombing—and plenty more left over! I wonder if the Japanese have thought of that?

This author went on to blame the French Municipal Police for providing aid for the Japanese to arrest many Koreans in the French Concession. He concluded his essay by saying "No Korean—for the simple fact that he is a Korean—is safe in the French Concession today."[709]

Sympathetic to the Koreans' experience after the bombing affair, *the China Press* devoted a section to publishing a public statement issued by the Shanghai Korean community that sought to distance themselves from the "terrorist" attacks by Korean independence activists. In addition, an author who called himself "a Korean" wrote a scathing editorial that remonstrated the "unlawful and illegal" arrests of Korean residents without warrants by the joint French-Japanese police activity. It wryly said "If I say that the French Concession of Shanghai has become a part of the Great Empire of Japan, the French authorities would naturally disagree. However, the latest policy taken by them after the Hongkew Park incident tends to actualize my supposition."[710] A week later, another article with the title of "The Life of Mr. Ahn" appeared on the same newspaper, which pleaded for the release of Ahn. It portrayed Ahn as a peace-loving

[709] *The China Press*, 05/03/1932.
[710] *The China Press*, 05/05/1932.

man with "amiable disposition," who was "a great moralist and believed in 'equality and fraternity'… [and] never advocated terrorism, bloodshed, or murder." Such a person, according to this piece, could not have possibly been "connected with the Korean bomb thrower."[711]

The French Reaction: Towards Joint French-Japanese Actions

Although the Hongkou Incident transpired in the International Settlement, it was the French authorities of the neighboring concession that were more actively involved. As some of the aforementioned newspaper reports have alluded to, the French police, upon the request of the Japanese authorities, offered its assistance to arrest Korean independence activists in the French Concession. Prominent revolutionary leaders such as Ahn Changho, among others, were arrested, and other Korean residences were raided and searched by joint French-Japanese police operations. Why were the French authorities willing to aid their Japanese counterparts in apprehending Koreans within their very own concessionary space? The answers to this question are closely related to these two imperial powers' interactions on issues of colonial security during earlier years.

As indicated in previous sections, the KPG was established in the French Concession, which in turn was a haven for a considerable number of Korean independence activists. Unlike the International Settlement, the French authorities maintained a generally tolerant attitude towards revolutionary activism, regardless of the activists' national or ethnic backgrounds. This tolerance, however, came with important caveats. First, it was expected that the Korean independence activists would not engage in any "political acts" within the boundary of the French Concession, and police surveillance was put in place to nip any suspicious actions in the bud. Second, the Koreans in Shanghai were under the jurisdiction of the Japanese consulate, and

[711] *The China Press*, 05/12/1932.

the French authorities could not reject any request of their Japanese counterpart to extradite the Korean "criminals" to the Japanese consul-general. The French concessionary authorities would thus be compelled to expel any Korean activists who were suspected of participating in activities that "would have jeopardized Japanese-French relations."[712]

As Erik Esselstrom has suggested, the French assisted the Japanese in suppressing the KPG's activities in Shanghai as early as 1919.[713] Their cooperation at the time, however, was at best tenuous. The French authorities, for instance, did not agree to hand over any Korean activists on the ground of purely political reasons. More importantly, although the French consul-general rarely rejected the requests of their Japanese counterparts to arrest any Korean "suspects," they did not always offer their assistance in a timely and proactive manner.[714] Both sides shared the problems resulting from colonial security. Whereas the French were anxious to learn more about the whereabouts of Vietnamese independence activists in Tokyo, the Japanese saw the KPG in Shanghai as a thorn in their side. A certain level of tension was certainly at play between the two governments. In the early 1910s, the government in Tokyo was not so cooperative in turning over intelligence information regarding Vietnamese activists in Japan. Helping a European colonial power to repress another Asian nation's independence movements apparently did not sit well with Tokyo's top leaders, not in a time where the idea of Pan-Asianism was still a fledging one. In return, it was understandable that the French Concession authorities were less than eager to provide any concrete help to the Japanese in the suppression of the KPG.[715]

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[712] Zhu Xiaoming (朱晓明), "20 shiji ersanshi niandai Shanghai de Chaoxian gemingdang yu Fa zujie de guanxi 20世纪二三十年代上海的朝鲜革命党与法租界的关系", *Nandu xue tan* 32, no. 1, (2012): 46.
[713] Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 67.
[714] Zhu, "Shanghai chaoxian geming dang yu fa zujie de guanxi," 47.
[715] Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge*, 70.

The year of 1925 was a turning point in the French authorities' attitudes towards the Korean independence movement. According to the recounting of a Korean communist named Kim San, the French ceased to show any sympathy towards the Korean nationalist cause and "began to extradite Koreans in 1926 because of their participation in the Chinese Revolution."[716] Kim's explanation certainly held a grain of truth, but a more convincing reason lay in the fact that both the French and Japanese governments were willing to make compromises in providing for each other intelligence regarding Vietnamese and Korean people's anti-colonial activities. In 1925, the Japanese government agonizingly realized that suppressing the Korean independence movements should take precedence over protecting Vietnamese activists in exile. Having reached a consensus on the issue of colonial security, the Japanese police agreed to provide intelligence about Vietnamese in exile for the French, whereas the latter no longer had any issue with reducing, if not removing, their protection of the KPG in Shanghai.[717]

During the second half of the 1920s, joint Japanese-French police operations began to increase. The apprehension of three alleged Korean communists by the French police in the French Concession in 1927 showed the extent to which the French were willing to cooperate with the Japanese on the suppression of Korean activists. These arrests, as a matter of fact, were a happenstance. On June 26, 1927, the French consular authorities received a letter from Zeng Kiong, a Chinese general of the Nationalist Army based in Shanghai, who demanded that a Communist suspect named Lü Meisheng (呂枚生) residing in the French Concession should be arrested. The French police offered its assistance most likely because of both authorities' hostility towards Communist activities.[718] The French police arrived at the residence provided by

[716] Wales and Kim, *Song of Ariran*, 113.
[717] Zhu, "Shanghai chaoxian geming dang yu fa zujie de guanxi," 47.
[718] "Garde Municipale Service de la Sureté," 06/26/1927, Shanghai Municipal Archive (SMA), U38-2-49.

the Chinese, only to find out that the address was inaccurate. Those who lived at this address were three Koreans named Oh Gyeseong, Kim Dohyeon, Lee Hyeonsang, who claimed to be naturalized Chinese citizens. The French police then searched this residence anyway and discovered copious amounts of Communist literature in both Chinese and Korean. Upon the request of the Chinese military authorities, the French police extradited the Koreans to the Chinese police force, where they were imprisoned. It was only revealed on the day after that these Koreans did not have their naturalization certificates and that they claimed that the Communist literature belonged to their friends.[719] Since the three Koreans were not actually Chinese citizens, they were legally under the jurisdiction of the Japanese consular authorities. On June 29, these Koreans were extradited to the Japanese police by the French on account of them "keeping seditious materials."[720]

If the year of 1925 marked the beginning of the changing attitudes of the French authorities towards cooperating with the Japanese on the issue of cracking down on anti-colonial struggles, their joint actions culminated in the wake of the 1932 Hongkou bombing incident. The Japanese consular police acted swiftly shortly after the bombing attack occurred. On April 30, the Japanese authorities reached out to their French counterpart and acquired the latter's agreement in carrying out a joint operation in the French Concession.[721] On May 1, the joint police forces ramped up their efforts and basically "rounded up" the Korean community in the French Concession. With the assistance of the French police, the Japanese gendarmerie raided numerous Korean residences and arrested twelve Korean residents therein, among whom was

[719] "Garde Municipale Service de la Sureté, Compte-Rendu," 06/27/1927, SMA, U38-2-49.
[720] Ibid., 06/29/1927.
[721] "Futeisenjin no Sakuradamon-gai Shanhai niji-guchi kōen bakudan tōteki jiken 不逞鮮人ノ桜田門外大逆事件及上海虹口公園爆弾投擲事件," Ajia rekishi shiryō sentāajia rekishi shiryō sentā アジア歴史資料センター, B13081236900, Gaimushō gaikō shiryō-kan 外務省外交史料館.

Ahn Changho.[722] According to the French police, all the arrested Koreans "were in possession of documents pertaining to the Korean independence movement."[723]

The large-scale apprehension of Korean independence activists by the Japanese police, along with its draconian suppression of the KPG, alarmed revolutionary leaders immensely. By the end of 1932, the majority of the Korean activists had already fled Shanghai and carried out nationalist movements elsewhere in China.[724] This did not mean, however, that the cooperation between the French and Japanese police forces stopped in the year 1932. Cha Yi-suk, the Minister of Interior of the KPG, still remained in the Shanghai French Concession even when nearly all his colleagues had escaped from the city. On May 18, 1934, Hashizume, chief Japanese consular police officer in Shanghai, discovered Cha's residence in the French Concession and requested the French police to assist him in arresting Cha. Having obtained the permission of the French consul-general, the French police raided Cha's alleged residence on the very same day, only to realize that Cha had fled five minutes before their arrival.[725] Roughly a month after narrowly escaping from the attempt at arresting him, Cha wrote a letter to Gustave Meyrier, the French consul-general in Shanghai, in which he stated that the Japanese no longer had the right to arrest him given that he was a naturalized Chinese citizen already.[726] Meyrier, along with the chief police officer of the FMP, did not accept Cha's reasoning on the ground that "there is a conflict in terms of his nationality." More importantly, Meyrier bluntly said that the acquisition of the Chinese citizenship would necessarily mean that "(Cha) has to sever all

[722] Ibid.
[723] *The China Press*, 05/01/1932.
[724] Kim Ku, as mentioned above, moved to Zhejiang Province.
[725] "Fa di bufang xiezhu Ri di lingshi jingcha shu nibu Chaoxian linshi zhengfu neizheng buzhang Che Lixi shi 法帝捕房协助日帝领事警察署拟捕"朝鲜临时政府"内政部长车利锡事," 05/24/1934, SMA, U38-2-50.
[726] Ibid., 06/21/1934, SMA, U38-2-50.

connections with Korea and does not get involved in any political acts of this nation."[727] As a result, Cha departed from Shanghai for "an unknown destination" in July 1934, after failing to persuade the French consul-general about his stance.[728]

The French-language newspapers in Shanghai showed different interpretations of the Hongkou Bombing attack. By the 1930s, the most widely circulated French newspaper in Shanghai was *Le Journal de Shanghai*. Its initial reports of the bombing affair were very similar to what appeared in the Chinese and English newspapers around the same time. They evinced strong shock at the bombing "outrage," showed sympathy with the injured Japanese officials, and denounced the act of anarchism vehemently.[729] An editorial published on May 3, however, displayed different interpretations of the bombing event. After succinctly summarizing the bombing affair and its repercussions, it began to draw connection between the Hongkou incident with an attempted assassination in Canton in June 1924, where a Vietnamese revolutionary hurled a bomb into a room where a banquet was held in honor of Martial H. Merlin, the then governor-general of Indochina. The analogy, according to this editorial, was that "the scene of the (Hongkou and Canton) crimes was in Chinese territory, the assassin was a foreigner and the victims were foreigners."[730] It went on to castigate the Canton government that, as this editorial claimed, had not only provided a "hospitable environment" for revolutionary agitation but also allowed commemoration of the bomb-thrower after his death. The author of the editorial then shifted his attention to more contemporary concerns—an institution called "League of Oppressed Peoples" in Nanjing. It then suggested that this organization should be abolished by the Nationalist government, as "its very existence … constitutes an anomaly as well as a sort of

[727] "Observation de le directeur des services de police et de surete," 06/27/1934, SMA, U38-2-50.
[728] "Rapport," 07/04/1934, SMA, U38-2-50.
[729] *Le Journal de Shanghai*, 04/30/1932.
[730] *Le Journal de Shanghai*, 05/03/1932.

challenge to the (Western) powers."[731] This editorial immediately touched off some debates on *Le Journal de Shanghai*. Three days later, another commentor took exception to the idea that the Canton government should have done more in providing security by pointing out that the bombing attack had occurred within the British Concession, where Chinese had no right to intervene. Similar explanations, this commentary continued, could be offered for the Hongkou Incident, where the Japanese police were responsible for the security at the scene.[732] The author of the original editorial soon published his rebuttal, in which he reiterated three points: 1) the Canton government should have been to blame for having created an environment favorable to the revolutionary fanatics; 2) it should have been reproached for having honored someone who had committed crimes against the French officials; 3) the Nanjing government should take active measures to dismantle the "League of Oppressed Peoples" in Nanjing.[733]

Moreover, *Le Journal de Shanghai* also published the official responses of the French authorities to various comments and editorials that had appeared in the Shanghai media regarding the arrests of Korean residents in the French Concession. As noted in previous sections, the numerous arrests by Japanese and French police greatly unsettled the Korean community in the French Concession, a situation that gained traction in the press (especially *The China Press*). The French municipality thus communicated with the newspaper to clarify some its intentions. It first touched upon the issue of "extradition." "In accordance with Sino-Western treaties, the arrest warrants issued by the judicial authorities of the countries having jurisdiction over their nationals in China," this public response went, "are enforceable as of right on the territory of the concessions."[734] This public statement further pointed out that all apprehended

[731] Ibid.
[732] *Le Journal De Shanghai*, 05/06/1932.
[733] Ibid.
[734] *Le Journal De Shanghai*, 05/13/1932.

Koreans had regular arrest warrants issued by the Japanese and that none of them declined the jurisdiction of Japanese court. It was concluded with such a firm statement as follows: "it is out of ignorance of the legal status of foreigners on the concessions that some people have made unfounded reservations."[735] Just as the reports published in the English-language newspapers in Shanghai questioned the validity of the arrest of Korean residents in the French Concession, these responses published on *Le Journal de Shanghai* justified the actions taken by the FMC and the French Municipal Police.

Conclusion

During my visit to this memorial site in early Spring 2022, a nearby large stone with inscriptions describing Yun's life in both Korean and Chinese caught my eyes. At the end of the description is the following sentence: "The heroic act of the martyr (Yun) was a great fight for independence and freedom, which was grounded on the mutual assistance and cooperation between China and Korea."[736] Such a portrayal of Yun and his self-sacrifice certainly fits in the CCP's discourse that underscores the anti-imperial solidarity between China and other former colonies in East Asia, but it's only part of the story.

This chapter has focused on what local "terrorist" violence against its colonial overlord meant for the different municipal administrations, as well as various foreign and Chinese communities, of the city of Shanghai in the early 1930s. What, then, does this chapter reveal about the city of Shanghai more broadly? The intersection and juxtaposition of physical and administrative realms defined the peculiar spatial configuration of Shanghai, which gave rise to a wide array of colonialist, nationalist, and anti-colonialist activities. The tripartite division of the city, along with the interplay between these administrations, opened up endless possibilities and

[735] Ibid.
[736] Stone inscription, The Lun Xun Park, Hongkou District, Shanghai.

opportunities for these activities and counteractivities while imposing significant restrictions on them simultaneously. The very fragmented nature of the urban administrations created opportunities for Korean nationalist activity and fostered connection between the Koreans and their Chinese counterparts. But the city near Huangpu was also a site of constant surveillance and policing acts, as most saliently manifested in the joint police operations between the French and Japanese authorities. The same, single bombing incident held wildly different meanings for different municipal, colonial, and national authorities in the city, each of which reacted to and observed the affair through its own distinctive lens.

What else can the study of a single bombing incident say about global imperial politics during the interwar era? While sandwiched between the great changes and catastrophes of the two global wars, the interwar era carried on the unresolved issues from the end of the First World War and harbingered the horror and conflicts the world was to witness. Based on my case study of the Hongkou Incident, many trends or phenomena became increasingly clear. The decline of British influence in China more specifically and in East Asia more broadly was apparent, although economic interests of Shanghai were still of central importance to the Anglo-dominated Shanghailanders. The growing assertiveness of the Japanese empire was quite evident, but its rise was punctuated by challenges from not just colonial societies in East Asia but also more traditional Western colonial powers. The dwindling colonial power and influence of the British empire vis-à-vis the accelerated expansionism of the Japanese empire reshuffled the urban politics in the city of Shanghai. The growth and strength of Chinese nationalism reached a new height in the wake of the 1925 May Thirtieth Movement, but it was constantly conditioned by broader geopolitical realities. These forces and activities overlapped, interrelated, and shaped one another, all of which collectively formed the peculiarities of Shanghai during the turbulent years.

CONCLUSION

Comparing Tianjin and Shanghai

This dissertation has examined a sequence of events where multi-imperial entanglements shaped the urban politics of Tianjin and Shanghai and constituted a crucial force in their spatial (re)configuration. That this dissertation is centered on Tianjin and Shanghai naturally raises the question of comparison and contrast. As the all-important and much-studied symbol of China's urban modernity, Shanghai has been compared with other cities in China and beyond.[737] Tianjin and Shanghai have often been placed within the same comparative framework. This seems perfectly reasonable, as the list of similarities between these two cities is long. Historically, both cities were the largest treaty port cities in China, and, at present, they both fall into the category of "centrally administered municipality (zhixiashi 直辖市)" devised by the CCP government. Even in historical travel writings produced by western voyagers during the past century, Shanghai and Tianjin were often placed within the same urban type in conjunction with one another.[738] Although scholars of urban China are generally aware of the comparability between Tianjin and Shanghai, they have tended to mention it in passing save some isolated exceptions.[739] By foregrounding this contrast-sensitive approach, this conclusion offers some observations on various points of comparison between China's two largest treaty port cities during its modern era though the vantage point of their multi-imperial characters.

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[737] For a survey of different ways in which Shanghai has been compared with other cities, see Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Having Fits about Where to fit," in *Remaking the Chinese City*, ed. Joseph Esherick (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 192-210.

[738] For an example of this, see H.A. Cartwright (1908) 'Shanghai', in Arnold Wright (ed.) *Twentieth-Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports of China* (London: Lloyd's); 'Tientsin', in the same volume, p. 728.

[739] Isabella Jackson has compared the Shanghai International Settlement and the Tianjin British Concession in terms of their urban planning policies. See Isabella Jackson, "Habitability in the Treaty Ports: Shanghai and Tianjin," in Toby and Lincoln and Tao Xu, eds., *The Habitable City in China: Urban History in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016): 169-191; Joshua Fogel has offered some suggestive comparisons on the Japanese experiences in different Chinese urban centers, see Fogel, "Little Japan in Shanghai," 941-945.

The first point of comparison comes from the fact that both cities acquired their status through their distinctive geographical locations. Both cities had striking geographic advantage for involvement in regional, national, and global trade. Shanghai was situated at the mouth of the Yangzi River that ran through a delta region, whereas Tianjin was positioned at the mouth of the Bohai Sea. A huge volume of maritime trade passing through these cities shaped their economic ties with the outside world, and both Tianjin and Shanghai were centers of industry and factory as well. Despite their gateway status of some sorts, some geographical factors differentiated these two cities. Tianjin's significance, for instance, was closely linked with its proximity to Beijing, the capital city of China. Finally, the rapid development of the railway system in the closing decades of the nineteenth century further enhanced Tianjin's status, which connected it with Beijing, on the one hand, and with other northern regions such as Shanhaiguan and Manchuria, on the other.

The reason why this dissertation is centered on Tianjin and Shanghai is that both cities' urban spaces were defined by a patchwork of multiple colonial concessions. That neither city was dominated by one single colonial power generated strikingly similar patterns and left similar legacies for the cities. The American Concessions in these two cities, for example, followed a largely identical path. Even though the United States was granted the right to establish its concessions in Shanghai in 1848 and in Tianjin in 1860, respectively, and despite its involvement in urban administration, the existence of an American Concession in both cities was largely nominal. Both concessions were eventually merged with the British (or British-dominated) settlements (1863 in Shanghai, and 1902 in Tianjin). Both cities underwent the same trajectory from a multi-imperial city to a city under Japanese occupation during WWII. The architecture of the two cities also reflects their distinctive colonial past. The neoclassical and art deco

architecture of the Bund stands out as the symbol of foreign commerce and financial prowess during the treaty-port era, while a short stroll along the Hai River in Tianjin would allow one to see a juxtaposition of German, English, Japanese, Austrian, and Italian style buildings.

The experience of Chinese population in these treaty-port settings is another aspect worth highlighting. To portray large parts of the cities' Chinese inhabitants' experiences in these colonial contexts as abjection would be rather far-fetched, as it loses sight of class distinctions within the Chinese populace. Two recent monographs—Elizabeth LaCouture's *Dwelling in the World* and James Carter's *Champions Day*—have both drawn our attention to how Chinese urban elites navigated across different administrative and jurisdictional spheres and appropriated a wide-ranging mixture of Sino-foreign elements at their disposal within the cities in order to benefit themselves.[740] In the meantime, it would be worthwhile to remember, as Lu Hanchao has convincingly shown, that the overwhelming majority of the cities' populations were Chinese and that this large Chinese underclass undertook most of the difficult and dirty works within the city.[741] Racial segregation and institutionalized racism played out in the cities in different ways. Racism in Shanghai seemed to be more pronounced than in Tianjin and other treaty ports, as manifested in the adamant denial of granting Chinese nationals any representative positions in the SMC and exclusion of Chinese from public parks.[742] This was closely linked to the city's sheer size of population and its pressure on public spaces. Tianjin, on the contrary, did not encounter the same challenges, as foreigners and Chinese urban elites shared ample space in concessionary areas throughout much of its treaty-port era.

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[740] LaCouture, *Dwelling in the World*; Carter, *Champions Day*.
[741] Lu, *Beyond Neon Light*.
[742] Wang Min (王敏), "Guoji xing, difang xing yu liyi gongtongti—yi Shanghai Gonggong zujie huaren daibiao quan wenti wei xiansuo 国际性、地方性与利益共同体———以上海公共租界华人代表权问题为线索," *Jindai shi yanjiu*, no. 2 (2021): 63-78; Robert Bickers and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Shanghai's 'Dogs and Chinese Not Admitted' Sign: Legend, History, and Contemporary Symbol," *China Quarterly* 142 (1995): 444-466.

There was, however, an apparent numerical difference: Shanghai was characterized by its tripartite governance in its treaty-port incarnation, whereas Tianjin was at one point home to as many as nine foreign concessions. At different historical junctures, the fact that Tianjin had more foreign concessions than Shanghai meant that the dynamics of urban politics played out in very disparate ways in these cities. The two historical episodes that have been studied in preceding chapters—the Boxer Uprising and WWI—are both cases in point. Despite the subtle impact of the Boxer upheaval that originated in Shandong province on the foreign community in Shanghai,[743] the city was never ravaged by any military conflicts and remained intact by and large at the turn of the twentieth century. The city of Tianjin, however, was fundamentally reshaped by the Boxer crisis. The city was ruled by a multinational colonial government for 25 months, and foreign powers either extended or created anew concessions in the city. Similarly, in the wake of WWI, a crucial change in Shanghai was that German expatriates and properties were liquidated. But serious administrative and political changes took place in Tianjin, with the retrocession of the German and Austrian Concessions to the native authorities. This numerical difference also had a direct bearing on the decolonizing processes of these two cities. Whereas the Western extraterritorial prerogatives in Shanghai were all relinquished during China's war against Japan, decolonization had a much more patchy and protracted history in Tianjin. In addition to the former German and Austrian Concessions, Russia and Belgium gave up their extraterritorial privileges in the city and returned the control of their concessions to the Chinese authorities in the 1930s. As indicated above, the British, French, and Italian handed their respective concession over to the Chinese government during WWII.

[743] Jeffrey Wasserstrom, *Global Shanghai, 1850-2010: A History in Fragments* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009): 48-61.

The invocation of the Boxer Uprising and WWI leads to another observation on the impact of war on these two cities. One of the most exciting topics in recent scholarship on urban history is the growing interest in the connection between war and cities. The colonial history of Tianjin and Shanghai were fundamentally shaped by these cities' encounter with war. They represent two exceptional cases, as very few cities in other parts of the world suffered from successive cycles of destruction and reconstruction brought about by war. From its brief occupation by British troops in 1842 to the Civil War between the KMT and CCP, the city of Shanghai was engulfed in several military conflicts (the Taiping Rebellion, the Northern expedition, and the Sino-Japanese War). It should also be noted that Shanghai was the first city that bore the brunt of modern warfare during the 1932 Shanghai Incident (see chapter six), where the city was exposed to modern weaponry that led to a horrific level of violence. The city of Tianjin was perhaps even more affected by war than Shanghai. In addition to the aforementioned warfare or military clashes, the Second Opium War and the Boxer Uprising both fundamentally reshaped the city's international status (as a treaty port) and its physical landscape (see chapter three).

The different governing styles between these two cities also merit some exploration. The most prosperous district in Old Shanghai was the International Settlement, the indisputable center of Anglo-American commercial and financial interests in China. Its *sui generis* colonial nature notwithstanding, the International Settlement was not beholden to any one single colonial power but was rather administered by a locally elected municipal body known as the SMC. Such an institution never existed in Tianjin, where the British Concession was under the control of the British consul in the city. The administration of the British Concession bore a striking resemblance to the French Concession in Shanghai, a foreign quarter that was run in a more

straightforwardly colonial manner. Even though most foreign concessions in Tianjin had their administrative bodies, also known as the municipal councils, they were nevertheless all under the aegis of consular authorities and had a direct tie to a single colonial power.

Despite their commonality as treaty ports, there needs to be a measured understanding of Shanghai and Tianjin's multiple functions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is no doubt that both cities boasted strong mercantile characters. The foreign concessions, into which the hand of the state could not reach, spawned a distinctive type of Sino-foreign capitalism dominated by trade, commercial transactions, and financial activity as well as monetary institutions. The treaty-port-era Shanghai has been described by historian Marie-Claire Bergère as "a republic of merchants."[744] Tianjin's status as an economic and commercial hub did not come into full fruition until the Republican period when Beijing's position as a political center was displaced. Tianjin henceforth became the most important economic center in northern China.[745] What needs to be stressed, however, is that the city of Tianjin was a diplomatic center during the late Qing period. This is especially true after the Restoration Movement in the 1860s when the official post of Imperial Minister (Beiyang dachen 北洋大臣) was formed. A key responsibility of the Imperial Minister was to deal with Sino-Western relations, and Tianjin was where the Imperial Minister office was seated. Tianjin thus became the city where most diplomatic negotiations between Qing China and the West were conducted, and it was under Li Hongzhang's tenure as the Imperial Minister that Tianjin's status as a diplomatic center was consolidated.

[744] Bergère, *Shanghai*, 43.
[745] Madeleine Yue Dong, *Republican Beijing: The City and Its Histories, 1911-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

The histories of these two cities are uniquely poised for scholars to reflect on some of the conventional typology and conceptual frameworks of urban studies and beyond. The introduction to this dissertation has pointed out that Tianjin's and Shanghai's distinctive colonial pasts challenge us to reconceptualize the well-established category of the "colonial city." If we consider urban typology more specific to the Chinese context and invoke the urban type laid out in *Remaking the Chinese City*, both cities, though undoubtedly placed under the category of "treaty ports," can fall into other categorizations such as "industrial cities" and "tourist cities," at times do not seem to be amenable to any categorization at all, and have the potential of generating other theoretical or conceptual formulations. This dissertation has suggested the possibility of conceiving of these cities as "multi-imperial cities" where the urban spaces were defined by the multiplicity of colonial presence and poly-centric system of power. Other alternative approaches can be taken as well, depending on what specific aspects of these urban societies one focuses on. While "global cities" have often been defined through a more quantifiable method, one that focuses on economic criteria, Shanghai's "stop-and-start progression" towards a more "global" formation—meaning the cosmopolitan nature of the city in its treaty port incarnation, the aberration thereof during the early years of the Communist rule, and its regaining of such a status since the Reform and Opening Up in 1980s—has prompted scholars to think about the possibility of looking at social and cultural factors when discussing "global cities."[746] As noted above, the ways in which Tianjin was embroiled into multi-pronged diplomacy between China and foreign nations is perhaps a keen reminder that a diplomatic center might not have always been the country's political center.

[746] See Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Is Global Shanghai "Good to Think"? Thoughts on Comparative History and Post-Socialist Cities," *Journal of World History* 18, no. 2 (June 2007): 199-234.

Finally, situating the colonial history of Shanghai and Tianjin in a comparative framework further reveals the historiographical and conceptual relevance of these urban centers. When one thinks of China's colonial past, Hong Kong and Macau have often been discussed in conjunction with each other, not least because both colonial settings were full colonies dominated by one single imperial power (Britain and Portugal, respectively). This dissertation suggests that the pairing of Shanghai and Tianjin deserves as much attention as that of Hong Kong and Macau, as it unravels important aspects of China's colonial history that differentiated itself from those of other colonized contexts. Moreover, some scholars have noted the comparability between Old Shanghai and Hong Kong of the 1950s-1980s,[747] but more comparative moves like this are worth pursuing. Admittedly, it would be foolhardy not to reckon with the differences between these two pairings. Despite the prevailing colonial influences on the urban societies of Tianjin and Shanghai, neither of these cities was ever fully colonized by one single imperial power but was rather subjected to colonial domination by multiple foreign empires. Hong Kong and Macau, by contrast, were full colonies under the control of one single empire. However, if we were to zero in on a sequence of important issues, such as the close and yet complex interaction between the colonists and the local Chinese population, racial segregation and racism within these urban spaces, cosmopolitan demographic composition of these cities, as well as amalgamation of Chinese and foreign elements as manifested in the urban built environment, to name a few, the parallels and commensurability between urban centers under the influence of multiple foreign powers and those governed by one single empire would become a lot more apparent.

[747] Wasserstrom, "Locating Old Shanghai," 195-196.

If we stretch the comparative framework beyond the bounds of China, and if none of the existing typology of cities, either the urban types specific to China as proposed in *Remaking the Chinese City* or other more commonly seen ones pertaining to urban studies (such as global cities, colonial cities, metropolitan cities, and port cities, etc.), seems entirely satisfying in capturing the dynamics of colonialism in Tianjin and Shanghai, it might be worthwhile to envision an alternative urban category of what I would call "fragmented cities" or "divided cities." Examples of cities divided along national, racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural lines abounded in modern global history. The most salient cases would be cities demarcated by physical divisions (the construction of walls), such as Berlin during the Cold War or pre-1967 Jerusalem, where the urban spaces were fundamentally shaped by localized elements of broader national or ethnic conflicts.[748] At the same time, nineteenth-century Eastern Mediterranean and Ottoman cities bore a striking resemblance to the urban conditions in Tianjin and Shanghai. Such a similarity is not entirely surprising. As happened to China during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where multiple empires colonized different parts of China, similar historical phenomena happened to the Ottoman empire. As the preceding chapters have shown, the concessionary spaces of China's two largest treaty port cities were not stable colonial categories defined solely by national characteristics. Instead, the boundaries between these spaces were fluid and porous, shaped, and recast through a host of debates, conflicts, and negotiations over the control, use, interpretation, and management of material resources and symbolic connotations therein. Many crucial seaports—most notably Salonica, Izmir, Beirut, and Damascus—in Ottoman empire during the nineteenth century all shared similar characteristics: plurality of urban societies and population, interconnection between multiethnic and multinational polities,

[748] Saul B. Cohen, *Jerusalem – Bridging the Four Walls: A Geopolitical Perspective* (New York: Herzl Press, New York, 1977).

and multilayered as well as contingent nature of institutional practices and civic culture. The coexistence of, and interplay between, communities and stakeholders across ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, and imperial divides within these cities left a poly-centric and pluralistic imprints on these urban societies and dynamized urban politics while generating issues and challenges difficult to resolve for any administrators of these fragmented, or divided, urban centers.[749]

The outbreak of WWII altered the political landscape of Tianjin and Shanghai in significant ways. As Wen-hsin Yeh and Christian Henriot have demonstrated, "there were … multifaceted experiences of war in Shanghai across class, gender, and ethnic lines."[750] During the eight long years of the Sino-Japanese military conflicts, the Shanghainese were locked in a nexus of relationships reaching beyond the city's territorial boundaries. The "New Order" imposed by the Japanese empire in the city of Shanghai sealed the fate of the concession authorities and that of the foreign community therein. Despite their pronounced state of "neutrality," the social fabric and political dynamics within these Western-dominated areas underwent dramatic changes. Wartime Shanghai is generally divided into two phases: from 1937 to 1941 (also known as the "Lone Island/*gudao*" 孤島 period), the entire Chinese district of the city was occupied by the Japanese save the International Settlement and French Concession. On December 8, 1941, in the wake of military skirmishes between the Japanese and Anglo-American gunboats moored at the port, "Lone Island" gave way to full occupation by the Japanese empire.[751] Although the SMC

[749] For the study of some of these cities, see Sibel Zandi-Sayek, *Ottoman Izmir: The Rise of a Cosmopolitan Port, 1840-1880* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Cyrus Schayegh, *The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017); Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430-1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).
[750] Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13.
[751] For a comprehensive literature review of the study of wartime Shanghai, see Taoyu Yang and Hongquan Han, "When a Global War Befell a Global City: Recent Historiography on Wartime Shanghai," *Journal of Chinese Military History* 10, no. 2, (2021): 129-151.

and FMC reacted differently to the accelerated Japanese encroachment onto their existing interests, they ultimately gave in to Japanese demands at the expense of Chinese sovereign rights and institutions. The rule of the SMC came to an end in 1941, and the French authorities relinquished their extraterritorial privileges two years later.[752]

Tianjin did not fare that much better compared with its "twin city" near the Huangpu River during WWII, and the political and administrative divisions within the city gave rise to different sets of tensions and conflicts. In July 1937, the city of Tianjin was captured by the Japanese army as part of the latter's military campaign against China. Tianjin made worldwide headlines in the summer of 1939 when the Anglo-Japanese relations was severely strained by a local crisis known as the Tianjin Incident. Originally a minor jurisdictional dispute involving the apprehension of several Chinese, who were suspected of assassinating a Japanese collaborator of Chinese origin, in the British Concession, it escalated into a major diplomatic controversy. Their tense relationship culminated on June 14, 1939, when a hostile military Chief of Staff General Tomoyuki Yamashita ordered the blockade of the Tianjin British Concession. The blockade was immediately carried out and was not lifted until two months later following a series of diplomatic negotiations.[753] Just as in Shanghai, the Sino-Japanese War expedited the removal of Western municipal authorities in Tianjin as well. In the space of three years from 1943 to 1946, all remaining Western concessions—British, French, and Italian—were formally returned to China. In the wake of Japan's surrender which marked the end of WWII, the Japanese Concession ceased to exist in Tianjin as well. By the end of the Second World War, the formal Western

[752] Robert Bickers, "Settlers and Diplomats: The End of British Hegemony in the International Settlement, 1937-1945," in Henriot and Yeh, eds., *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, 229-256; Christine Cornet, "The Bumpy End of the French Concession and French Influence in Shanghai, 1937-1946," in Henriot and Yeh, eds., *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, 257-276.
[753] The most comprehensive study of the Tianjin Incident is: Sebastian Swann, "The Tientsin Incident (1939) A Case-Study of Japan's Imperial Dilemma in China," (PhD diss., University of London, 1998).

colonial presence in both cities had come to an end. But the unique spatial configurations of the city persisted, albeit adopting different forms, into the post-1949 period.

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