

UC Berkeley

IURD Reprint Series

Title

Power, Everyday Practice and the Discipline of Human Geography

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3r40m4dq>


Author

Pred, Allan

Publication Date

1981

Peer reviewed



Allan Pred

Power, Everyday Practice and the Discipline of Human Geography

Institute of Urban & Regional Development
University of California, Berkeley

Reprint No. 189

Reprinted from: *Space and Time in Geography: Essays Dedicated to Torsten Hagerstrand*,
edited by Allan Pred (Lund: CWK Gleerup,
1981).

The Institute of Urban and Regional Development serves the faculty and students of the Berkeley Campus conducting research into a wide array of policy-relevant questions. Its foci of inquiry are the processes of urban and regional growth and decline, the consequences that alternative styles of governance have for patterns of development, and the scientific bases for development policy and for policy planning.

Toward these ends, current research is directed to the economics of urbanization in the West and in the Third World; techniques of environmental management; effects of using new energy sources; emergent patterns of suburbanization and central area reconstruction; evaluation of alternative modes of transportation; design of effective means for supplying social services; contemporary issues in housing policy; determinants of urban livability and the factors shaping urban life; and potential improvements in methods of analysis, evaluation, and planning.

The Institute's members are drawn from departments throughout the Berkeley Campus. Their research findings are published in their respective professional journals and in commercially distributed books. The Institute prints and distributes many of their research papers; a catalog of publications is available on request.

Allan Pred

*Department of Geography
University of California, Berkeley*

Power, Everyday Practice and the Discipline of Human Geography

"The concept of power is by nature dialectically ambiguous; power would not be power if it was not ungraspable. It is therefore impossible to give a clear and logically unambiguous definition of what it is, for just when we believe we have it captured, it changes shape and disappears again."

Gunnar Olsson (1978)¹

"Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised. No one, strictly speaking, has an official right to power; and yet it is always exerted in a particular direction, with some people on one side and some on the other. It is often difficult to say who holds power in a precise sense, but it is easy to see who lacks power."

Michel Foucault (1977)

"Power and space-time is . . . an immense area for research in human geography which for some reason has hardly been touched."

Torsten Hägerstrand (1973)

In one of his characteristically original formulations made during the relatively early development of time-geography, Torsten Hägerstrand contended that there are important, previously unconsidered linkages between societal power relationships and the projects of institutions and individuals. These linkages, he added, cry out for the analytical and theoretical attention of human geographers. In his view the carrying out of projects, which consist of the entire series of simple or complex tasks necessary to the completion of any intention-inspired or goal-oriented behavior,² is always confronted by the limited capacity of any society to accommodate individual and institu-

tional activities either at the same time or within a given duration. Every one of a project's component tasks by definition requires the formation of activity bundles, or the convergence in time and space of the unbroken paths being traced out either by two or more people, or by one or more persons and one or more physically tangible objects or resources. Or, no project can be enacted "without at least some space and some human time or 'thing-time' being taken up" (Hägerstrand, 1977, p. 11). Yet: all individuals are indivisible—never being able to be at more than one place at a time; individuals singly and collectively only have finite daily time resources at their disposal; and no two individuals or objects may occupy the same space simultaneously. Thus, the "whole operation of a society—economic production, consumption, social interaction, recreation, and contemplation—can be viewed as a huge competition between events and states [or projects] for exclusive spaces and times" (*ibid*). In short, it is on the "battleground between projects" for time-space domains that power relations are expressed (Hägerstrand, 1973, p. 86).

Hägerstrand's call for the explicit consideration of societal power relationships has elicited little response among human geographers, although in a few exceptional cases scholars of both positivistic and humanistic persuasion have commented directly upon power (e.g., Olsson, 1978; Johnston, 1979; Ley, 1980), and in a great number of instances researchers dealing with such issues as urban land-use, regional development, and energy have implicitly addressed power relationships. In some ways the hesitancy of those within the discipline of human geography to intellectually tangle with power in an explicit manner is understandable. After all, the concept of power is slippery, elusive, and, since referring to relationships rather than things, invisible and not subject to direct measurement. Moreover, power relationships are so deeply entrenched and pervasive in our everyday practices and experiences that they go unnoticed or are taken for granted, unexamined because of ideological blindness or a conscious or subconscious fear or uneasiness as to what they might reveal.

My aim here is to deal with power and the project and path concepts of time-geography in a manner which is dialectical and thereby differs somewhat from that originally envisaged by Hägerstrand. More precisely, I will consider the production (or establishment), reproduction, and transformation of power at the level of concrete everyday life,—where individuals are socialized and society is constantly reproduced and transformed,—by attempting to further integrate the discipline-transcending language of time-geography with the school of thought regarding "structuration", or the dialectics of practice and structure, that is gaining growing recognition among social theorists and social philosophers. However, since the concept of power is the bearer of so many connotations, as a first step it is necessary to make some clarifying remarks about that concept and its connections with the everyday practices of individuals and institutions.

Power and Everyday Practice

In the massive literature of the social sciences and social philosophy concerned with power, that concept has been decked out in a chaotic variety of definitional guises. This definitional confusion is unavoidable given the inherent elusiveness of power. It is compounded by the poorly developed state of the theory of power (Elster, 1976); and by the necessity of treating power as a quality that is possessed, as a disposition or behavioral potential, and a property that is exercised in concrete situations. Further cloudiness arises because some maintain, often convincingly, that the most potent forms of power are those which are rarely exercised (e.g., Lukes, 1974).

One set of traditional views of power makes that concept synonymous with the individual's ability either to act or perform effectively, or to intentionally achieve some observable modification of the natural or social world that is external to him or her. Thus, this widely held set of views, traceable to Hobbes among others, equates power with such terms as capacity, faculty, skill, talent, aptitude, potency, mastery, and, most generally, "the physical or psychological energies underlying any and all human performances" (Wrong, 1974, p. 1).

A second major set of definitions more profoundly and explicitly centers on power as a social relation linking people as individuals or collectivities (groups or classes). According to one such recent definition, much influenced by Russell (1938): "Power is the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others" (Wrong, 1979, p. 2). Or, as a "relation of autonomy and dependence [occurring] in social interaction", it is the capacity of some persons to get others to act in a way they otherwise would not have (Giddens, 1979, pp. 91—93).

Within this set of definitions there is much variation in emphasis. Power relations have been portrayed by some, including Max Weber (e.g., 1968), primarily in terms of the ability of one or more persons to realize their own will over others because of their capacity to actually impose, or to believably threaten to impose, penalties, punishments, or deprivations of a physical or psychological nature. Thus, power, as an instrument of inducing or preventing specific behaviors, has been associated variously: with the ability to utilize force; with coercion; with inequality; with the ability to implement sanctions; with the holding back (or presentation) of material, sexual, or other rewards; with domination; and, consequently, with actual or potential resistance, the contestation and resolution of role prescriptions, and the conflict of goals and interests existing between those who are power holders and those who are power subjects.

From a social relation perspective, power, as opposed to unintended influence,³ also has been disassociated from threats or rewards and depicted in terms either of the exercise of persuasion or the more subtle resort to manipulation. In the case of persuasion voluntary acceptance is the supposed

keystone—behavior is intentionally influenced through the employment of arguments or other forms of verbal persuasion that succeed because of their apparent compatibility with the goals or values of the affected person(s). In the case of manipulation intent is deliberately concealed when verbal messages, symbolic communications, or environmental adjustments are used to call forth or discourage behavior, often with the result that those who are affected mistakenly are led to believe that they are acting out of “free choice” or in their own interests.

In addition, those regarding power as a social relation frequently have isolated authority as one of its distinct and singularly important forms.⁴ As usually conceived, authority is that form of power by which compliant behavior is elicited through the issuance of commands, rather than through persuasion or manipulation. Thus, “authority is a bond between people who are unequal” (Sennett, 1980, p. 10), between the socially strong and the socially weak, the high-status and the low-status, the resource-controlling and the resource-deficient, the one who is perceived to have certain qualities and the other who perceives those qualities as unattainable. In recent interpretations at least five types of command-obedience relationships have been subsumed under authority (Wrong, 1979). These different authority relationships may be based respectively on: coercion; inducements (or exploitation, insofar as one party is in much more of a position to induce by virtue of having a greater control over the means or resources necessary to production); and legitimacy (or any situation “in which the power holder possesses an acknowledged *right to command* and the power subject an acknowledged *obligation to obey*”). They also may be based on the belief that others possess competence or knowledge enabling them to “decide which actions will best serve the subject’s interests and goals,” and on “the desire to please or serve another person” because of “love, admiration, friendship or the presence of psychological dispositions towards dominance or submissiveness” (*ibid.*, pp. 49, 53, 60—61). Political power, in turn, is usually defined as assuming the form of either coercive authority or legitimate authority. And, like other manifestations of authority, it has been connected conceptually in a variety of ways with discipline, control, recognized norms, rules and constraints, limits and borderlines, dependence, deference, subordination, repression, and the presence or absence of fear.

The preceding paragraphs by no means provide a full picture of the definitional mist in which power is enshrouded. Little has been said of those definitions that conceptualize power as “the human ability to . . . act in concert” (Arendt, 1970, p. 44), and power or authority as properties of an entire social system.⁵ Nor has anything been said about Hegelian and other interpretations of the influence- or dependence-based reciprocity that is present within asymmetrical power relationships. Moreover, the subtleties, niceties, interrelations, interpenetrations, and overlaps contained in a wide range of conceptualizations have been distilled or ignored, and the theoretic-

cal debates and philosophical controversies between and within different schools of thought have gone unmentioned.⁶ However, it is vital to recognize that, in whatever way defined, power and power relationships always involve one or more acting individuals and actually performed or potentially executable behaviors. That is, *whatever power and power relationships are*, however elusive they may be, and to whatever degree they are "extensive", "comprehensive", or "intensive", *they cannot be separated from the realm of action and everyday practices* (cf. Giddens, 1976, 1979). And since, at one level of observation, time-geography is capable of providing rich insights into the occurrence of everyday practices, or the detailed situations of everyday life, there would appear to be ample grounds for considering the commonplace practical dimensions of power and power relationships within the linguistic framework of paths and projects.

If power may be viewed in one way or another as covering the individual's capability to intentionally achieve some particular observable outcome through participation in the everyday events of the world, it also may be viewed as involving the individual's capability to personally carry out some or all of the component tasks of a particular project, or to couple her path with the paths of one or more people or physically tangible objects at a specific time and place for some intention-inspired or goal-oriented purpose. As should become apparent from my later discussion of structuration and the underlying dialectics of time-geography, whatever particular project-performing power is held by an individual, it cannot be an attribute that is merely given, an attribute that has been bestowed or acquired in a vacuum. Whether the project an individual has the power to participate in has been defined within an institutional context or "independently" by that same individual, and whether that person's project-performing power is ascribable to physical skills, knowledge, or some other qualification(s), the production (or past establishment) of the power in question, as well as the possibility of its reproduction, is rooted in time-space specific practices that have been incorporated within the individual's life-path, or biography. In other words, both the production and reproduction possibilities of the power in question *are rooted in past project participation and thereby are inseparable from powers exercised in the past and from previously encountered power relations associated with the structure of society*.

Of course, in the sense just referred to, the individual power produced and reproduced in conjunction with everyday project participation often may be trivial rather than significant. From an alternative and generally more important perspective, if power is viewed as a social relation within which some individuals or groups bring about intended and foreseen effects on others, it also may be viewed as the capacity: to more or less precisely define the content of a particular project involving others; to supervise, administer, coordinate, or otherwise somehow control the component tasks of a particular project involving others; or to prohibit or prevent the par-

tipication of others in a particular project by, for example, the application of rules, formal laws, negative sanctions, and economic barriers, or the actual or threatened utilization of force.

Put otherwise, as a social relation power may be conceptualized both as the capacity to require, permit, or facilitate the time and space specific path couplings of others for the purpose of bringing off some particular everyday practice, and as the capacity to forbid or hinder such path couplings. (Both of these social-relation forms of power are double-edged to the extent they rest on "ought to" and "must not" norms. For: "That which ought to be done is that which must not be left undone, and vice versa. That which ought to be left undone is that which must not be done, and vice versa" [von Wright, 1963, p. 83].) Whether separate individuals or groups of individuals are involved, such power relations usually are embedded within institutions, or those "organized elements" (Williams, 1976, p. 140), including the family, which are the basic building blocks of any society and which normally are largely distinguishable from one another by the everyday practices, modes of behavior, or *projects* associated with them. Moreover, power in the guise of controls or constraints on the particular practices of others does not appear out of nowhere, does not spring full bloom out of nothingness. Instead, as the subsequent consideration of structuration and the underlying dialectics of time-geography also should make apparent, any such relationship between power holder(s) and power subject(s) *is rooted in the previous becoming of individual and society, in the historically unbroken and dialectically intertwined process of individual socialization and social reproduction and transformation which, in turn, is one with the past channeling of individual paths into and out of institutional projects at specific geographical and temporal locations and thereby with past power relationships.*

Whether or not institutionally based power relations of the type just depicted are entered into voluntarily, and regardless of the degree of asymmetry or reciprocity involved in those relations," they are in essence synonymous with a *disciplining* of the details of everyday life—details that are usually unspectacular and that may be routine and frequently occurring (e.g., in association with work or school) or may be nonroutine and infrequently occurring (e.g., in connection with a wedding or funeral). Close to the heart of discipline—as Foucault (1979) has pointed out with respect to schools, factories, hospitals, prisons, military barracks, and all the other institutional "micro-power" centers of modern society,"—lies the coordination and control, the more or less detailed and overt management or surveillance, of others' behavior in time and space. Insofar as discipline in this pervasive sense involves a separation of subject and object, or the thingification of individuals on the part of its exercisers, it represents a temporal and spatial concretization of "instrumental reason" (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; Held, 1980). And, in a somewhat more conventional sense, disci-

pline is a matter of submitting to and following rules and norms—rules and norms that are more or less explicit, formal, and strict; rules and norms that are produced, reproduced, and transformed by the power holders of all kinds of nonstate and state institutions; rules and norms that establish and intensify the limits of the permissible; rules and norms that demarcate and cast a naked spotlight on the borderlines of the forbidden.

The former and latter senses of discipline are interrelated to the extent that individual or group participation in the temporally and spatially specific activity bundles of everyday institutional projects means, among other things, following the “internal logic” of those projects; i.e., following the explicitly stated or practically acquired rules as to who does what, when and where, and in what sequence, and thereby following a pattern of norm-alized behavior.” Conversely, individual or group exclusion from the temporally and spatially specific activity bundles of everyday institutional projects means the application of rules as to who cannot do what, when and where, and a consequent norm-alization of behavior.

To speak of rules and everyday institutional practices in the context of power as a social relation is really to speak of the structure of society and its component relations between individuals, collectivities, and institutions (cf. Giddens, 1979). And, to speak of the structure of society is to open the gates for an introduction to the basic formulations of the “structuration” school of thought which, when integrated with time-geography’s path and project concepts, should help to further clarify the production, reproduction, and transformation of power.

The Process of Structuration

Over the last decade or so there has been a convergence of thought among an increasing number of social theorists and social philosophers regarding the dialectical relationships between individual and society as expressed in the interwoven processes of socialization and social reproduction. Although many of the authors in question (e.g., Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Giddens, 1976, 1979; Bourdieu, 1977; Touraine, 1977; Williams, 1977; Kosík, 1978; Bhaskar, 1979a, 1979b; Garnham and Williams, 1980) differ in their selection of foci and categories, they for the most part share the following set of overlapping and interlocking views.¹¹

Social reproduction is a constantly ongoing process whereby, in a given area, the everyday performance of institutional activities (including those mundane practices associated with the institution of the family) results in the perpetuation, in stable or altered form, of the institutions themselves, the knowledge necessary to repeat or create activities (cf. Thrift, 1979), and

already existing structural relationships." In the simultaneous unfolding of socialization and social reproduction the individual and her consciousness are shaped by society while society is unintentionally and intentionally shaped by the individual and her consciousness. In order to deal with the dialectical relationships between individual and society, the constant becoming of both, one must really deal with material continuity and the dialectics of practice and structure, or with the process of *structuration* whereby the structural properties of any social system express themselves through the calling forth of everyday practices at the same time that everyday practices generate and reproduce the micro- and macro-level structural properties of the social system in question.

Several of the social theorists and social philosophers associated with the structuration school are in various ways sensitive to the fact that all practices, all social activities, take the form of concrete interactions in time-space. Yet, nobody identifiable with the structuration perspective has succeeded in conceptualizing the means by which the everyday shaping and reproduction of self and society, of individual and institution, come to be expressed as *specific structure-influenced and structure-influencing practices occurring at determinate locations in time and space*, as time-space detailed situations that at one and the same time are rooted in past time-space detailed situations and serve as the potential roots of future time-space detailed situations. They all fail to inform us precisely how the everyday functioning and reproduction of particular institutions in time and space are continuously bound up with the temporally and locationally specific actions, knowledge build-up, and biographies of particular individuals.

If it is recognized that each of society's component institutions is synonymous with the everyday and longer-term projects for which it is responsible, then it becomes possible to conceptually augment the theory of structuration and overcome its shortcomings with respect to the uninterrupted flow of detailed situations in time and space. To begin with, it may be asserted that *the details of structuration, and thereby of social reproduction and individual socialization, are continuously spelled out by the intersection of particular individual paths with particular institutional projects occurring at specific temporal and spatial locations*.

Continuity arises in the process of structuration partly because as the individual traces out her unbroken path she does not encounter separate institutional projects (or "independently" undertake separate projects outside of an institutional context) in a disjointed or unconnected manner. Instead, her incessant progress through time-space from project to project, from one here and now to another, is characterized by a complex "external-internal" dialectic, by a repeated dialectical interplay between her corporeal actions and her mental activities and intentions, between what she does and what she knows and thinks. In rather oversimplified terms, external physical action,—or the steering of an individual's path through specific temporal

and spatial locations in order to participate in (and get to and from) a project,—cannot occur without resulting in internal mental activity because it always involves confrontation with environmental stimuli, personal contacts, influences, information in general, or emotions and feelings that otherwise would not have been experienced. Yet, the addition of external physical actions to an individual's path prerequisites internal mental activity,—the formation of intentions or conscious or unconscious goals, the making of choices between existing project alternatives that are time-geographically feasible,¹³—mental activity that itself is intricately based on the experience and knowledge acquired by that individual through previous physical participation in temporally and spatially specific projects. In this connection it is to be emphasized that even when an individual physically enters a project that she has defined for herself outside the workings of any institution, she cannot escape the mental imprint left by the previous intersection of her path with particular institutional projects. For, whether it is a matter of the satisfaction of either nonphysiological or physiological “wants” and “needs”, there are always culturally arbitrary mental dispositions or elements of practical knowledge associated with “independently” defined projects that can only be acquired via socialization, or path intersections with institutional projects.¹⁴

Continuity in the process of structuration also is linkable to another dialectical relationship that is closely akin to the external-internal dialectic. This “life path-daily path” dialectic centers on the interplay between long-term commitment and everyday practice; between, on the one hand, an individual's previous succession of long-term institutional roles and resultant record of everyday project participation and, on the other hand, the objective long-term opportunities that remain open to her (cf. Wallin, 1974). Through the operation of this dialectic the long-term institutional roles that an adult person may realistically choose among at any point are, in whole or in part, both hemmed in and thrown open by the manner in which her previous institutional role commitments have affected, and been affected by, certain of her specific daily paths. More precisely, when an individual's life path, or biography, becomes associated with a given family role or committed to a specialized role with some other institution she must as a consequence intermittently steer her daily path to activity bundles belonging to specific routine or nonroutine projects. Yet, when participating in those activity bundles at precise geographic locations and more or less fixed temporal locations, *and when thus having her participation in other types of activity bundles and projects constrained*, the individual daily undergoes experiences, interacts with other people, acquires or reinforces competencies and encounters symbolically laden inanimate objects, first- and second-hand ideas, and information stimuli in general that otherwise would not have come her way in exactly the same form. These daily-path experiences, interactions, and encounters occasionally result in the intentional or unintentional

tional discovery of additional or alternative long-term institutional role possibilities that, on the basis of her life history and competition from other individuals, she may or may not have a realistic chance of entering into. Moreover, these daily-path experiences, interactions, and encounters help her to define and redefine herself, to renew and initiate strengths and weaknesses (Erikson, 1975), to form intentions, and to crystallize the consciously or unconsciously motivated choices she subsequently makes about which other long-term institutional roles, if any, to seek. When new long-term institutional role choices are realized, of course, new activity bundles intermittently must be incorporated into the individual's daily path and new experiences, interactions, and encounters ensue.

With these highly abbreviated observations serving as a foundation, the production, reproduction, and transformation of power may be considered anew. In interpreting what follows it is vital to recognize that the institutional elements and macro-level properties to be focussed on in any empirical undertaking will vary with the historical formation under consideration.

Structuration and the Everyday Production, Reproduction, and Transformation of Power

If power is regarded as the "power to", that is, as an individual's ability to act or perform effectively, and thereby as the capacity to personally carry out some or all of the component tasks of a particular project, its production, reproduction, and transformation may be attributed to the details of structuration. In other words, its production, reproduction, and transformation may be attributed to the intersection of the individual's path with particular institutional projects occurring at specific temporal and spatial locations, and to the inseparable personal working out of an external-internal dialectic or a life path-daily path dialectic.

The individual's "power to" can only be produced through the intersection of her path with institutional projects, or through the everyday interweaving of socialization and social reproduction in detailed situations, for only in this way can a person obtain the skills, knowledge, "rights", or whatever other prerequisites are necessary either for participation in an institutionally defined project or for carrying out an individually defined *but culturally arbitrary* project.¹⁸ (To the extent that an individual's "power to" depends on her previous involvement in institutional projects, or on the "power to" she held with respect to those projects, it may be said that power begets power in connection with the unfolding temporal and spatial details of structuration.) Not only is the reproduction of the "power to" part of the process of structuration since it occurs through application in actual practice, but it also is rooted in past intersections of individual path and institu-

tional project since that power cannot be reproduced prior to its constitution or establishment.

The transformation of an individual's "power to" is likewise relatable to the process of structuration and its associated personal-level dialectics because such transformation involves modification of or additions to her already held stock of qualifications in a given area of practice—changes that are equivalent to re-constitution and therefore only possible via the intersection of path and institutional project. Moreover, the transformation of an individual's "power to" sometimes involves the age-based loss or institutionally centered deprivation of once possessed qualifications, and thereby the elimination or prevention of everyday intersections between her path and specific institutional projects. However, it becomes quite apparent in this last-named connection that there are extreme difficulties and limitations in any attempt to keep the concept of "power to" completely isolated from power as a constraining social relation. Sooner or later any consideration of the links between structuration and the production, reproduction, and transformation of the individual's capability to act or perform effectively slips into the more important issue of the links between structuration and the production, reproduction, and transformation of the power relations, or discipline, associated with the everyday workings of institutions in general and society's dominant institutions in particular.

If power is regarded as "power over", as an institutionally embedded social relation within which intended and foreseen effects are brought about on others, and thereby as the capacity to define, control, prevent, or prohibit the participation of others in particular projects, its production is in some measure equatable with the production of both institutional project definitions and administrative or other rules that are used in controlling project execution and governing project participation. The specific project definitions and loose, flexible, or rigid disciplinary rules associated with the everyday functioning of an institution are, from one angle, produced as a consequence of the goals established and decisions reached by one or more of its power holders (e.g., business executives, public administrators, teachers, parents), and therefore as a consequence of the external-internal and life path-daily path dialectics of those individuals. That is, the informational inputs, interpretative schema, values, and anticipations underlying the formulation of project- or rule-determining goals and decisions are always unmechanistically derived from the earlier path and project-participation record of the goal-setters and decision-makers themselves. Or, the project-defining and rule-evoking goals and decisions arrived at by individuals holding institutional positions of varying importance cannot be split apart from the "environmental images" those people have built up through their limited acquisition of imperfect information (cf. Persson, 1979; Törnqvist, 1979; ERU, 1980), from the way in which they interpret and react to political and economic occurrences outside the institution, from any anticipation

they may hold of rewards or penalties, and from their absorption or rejection of prevailing values, all of which, in turn, cannot be divorced from their own uniquely accumulated path histories, or the temporal and spatial details of their own past involvement in the dialectical process of structuration.¹⁸

It also is contendable that the production of specific institutionally embedded power relations largely has its roots in the accumulation of resources either by the concerned institutional unit as a whole, or by its present or past power wielders. For, without some institutional or personal acquisition of either allocatable material resources (or physical property) necessary to project enactment, or some other socially recognized resources (e.g., wealth, symbolic capital, status, specialized knowledge), individual role holders within institutions cannot be in a position to arrive at project definitions or disciplinary rules that will have an impact on others. In modern societies the accrual of such "bases" or "vehicles" of power (Giddens, 1979, p. 67) is most likely to come about either through economic competition and other forms of institutional interrelations (*or structural relations*) that are expressed in and generated by everyday practices, or through the life path-daily path dialectics that make the obtaining of resources easier for individuals socialized in certain family and educational (or class) backgrounds rather than in others.¹⁹ Here too, then, the production of "power-over" social relations is identical with structuration and the intersection of particular individual paths and particular institutional projects.

Since power as an institutionally embedded social relation inevitably involves one or more power subjects as well as at least one power holder, its production in specific circumstances also requires—except where force is employed—a predisposition on the part of the former to freely or grudgingly accept the project definitions or disciplinary rules of the latter. Such a specific predisposition,—whether it be conscious or unconscious, whether it be sharply or poorly defined,—clearly only can be the result of the power subject's socialization (and development of a self-identity) in a given historical situation. That is, it only can result from her internalization of, among other things, language and other systems of signs, historically and culturally shaped values, and collectively recognized, more or less taken for granted knowledge about what kinds of general and specific behavior are appropriate in the surrounding world (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Therefore, yet again, the production of "power over" social relations emerges from the everyday and continuous process of structuration and its component time-space details inasmuch as individual socialization is definitionally an intricate part of that process.

The connection between the details of structuration and the reproduction of institutionally embedded power relationships lends itself more easily to summary. Reproduction occurs *in practice* by way of the application of specific project definitions, project execution rules, and project participation

hindrances and, thereby by way of steering specific individual paths through or away from temporally and spatially specific intersections with institutional projects. Through repeated reproduction "power over" social relationships very often assume an insidious form. This is not only so because through the everyday duplication of practice power subjects frequently learn to accept their dependence as "natural" and beyond questioning—even though such passivity actually may be contrary to their own interests. In addition, when an institutional power holder either has for a long time overseen the same project definitions and rules, or has not been responsible for their formulation, he or she may exercise power over others "in a perfunctory manner" that is lacking in immediate design or understanding of purpose and that is "subject to no more than pragmatic matter-of-fact legitimations" (Wrong, 1979, p. 251). Routinization, or repeated reproduction, is especially apt to lead to such exercise of power in modern, highly centralized, large-scale state and private-sector institutions (where most power subjects are never directly confronted and thereby faceless) as well as in the family.

The only ways in which the transformation of institutionally embedded power relations, as delineated here, can occur is either through the modification of already employed project definitions and rules, or through the total elimination of a project and its associated content definition and rules.

The modification of either the defined contents or the disciplinary rules of an institutional project, while contributing to the process of structuration, may be occasioned by a variety of conditions that are themselves relatable to the dialectical interplay between structural relations and everyday practices. Modification is frequently necessitated or induced by the response to or the partial resolution of conflicts: conflicts that inherently exist between power wielders and power subjects within almost all separate institutions; conflicts that arise between institutions when their actual or intended projects bring them into economic, political, or social competition with one another; or macro-level conflicts that manifest themselves between either different groups (or classes) or groups and institutions owing to the "structural totality" of society."

The redefinition of institutional project contents and disciplinary rules, and thereby of power relations, is sometimes precipitated by the appearance of unforeseen project consequences or crisis situations that contradict the goals underlying definition or rule formulation. The occurrence of "contradiction" in the course of social reproduction, and thereby in the course of structuration, is usually attributed to the simultaneous implementation of similarly defined and motivated projects by institutional units of the same type, such as firms within the same branch of production (cf. Elster, 1978; Giddens, 1979). However, modification sometimes can be postponed in the presence of contradiction when institutional power holders succeed either in denying its existence or obscuring its origins.

In the eyes of some, the modification of institutional projects and any of their associated rules of execution and participation also may transpire owing to the emergence of some form of consensus regarding the necessity or benefits of change. However, unless the consensus affecting an institution is confined either to those who hold power within that institution, or those belonging to a single interest-sharing group, then it is likely to represent the (partial) resolution of some intra-institutional or larger scale conflict. And, it should be emphasized, where consensus is restricted to institutional power holders or a single power holding social group it in all but unusual circumstances reflects an open or latent conflict with those who are institutional power subjects or outside the power holding social group in question.¹⁹

Whether conflict, contradiction, consensus, external disruption, or some more or less complex combination of these and other practice-based circumstances provide the determining stimulation, the actual modification of the content and rules of institutional projects involves goal establishment and decision-making on the part of institutional power holders. Such activity, as already argued, is indissolubly connected with the external-internal and life path-daily path dialectics of those power holders, and hence with the dialectics of practice and structure of which they are a part.

The transformation of power relations via the total elimination of a project and its accompanying disciplinary rules likewise may be triggered by more or less extreme forms of conflict, contradiction, consensus, and external disruption. (For example, in extreme cases institutional projects may cease because of revolution or the overthrow of power holders [resolution of conflict], depression [economic contradiction], or war [external disruption].) In addition, projects may be obliterated because their spatial attributes and temporal requirements become incompatible with the new or modified project demands of those institutions that dominate a society, or those institutions in which a society's most important material or symbolic resources are concentrated.²⁰ That is, in any given locality, the projects of a society's dominant institutions usually occupy a position of temporal dominance over both the projects of other institutions and extra-institutional individual projects insofar as they are given scheduling precedence and make prior claims on the finite daily time resources of the locality's population as a whole—*thereby automatically constraining the project participation alternatives of some of the locality's indivisible individuals.*²¹

Inasmuch as it is the possession of socially critical material or symbolic resources by dominant institutions that enables their projects to eliminate or modify other projects through the exclusive control of specific time-space blocks, the activity-allocation struggle within time-geographic constraints that Hägerstrand originally pointed to does not occur on its own. It occurs, instead, as a by-product of the accumulation of socially recognized resources that may or may not be fixed in space. This observation does not undermine the utility of a time-geographic perspective. For the accumulation of re-

sources within dominant institutions occurs through everyday practice in the context of structural power relations; through practices and structural conditions that produce, reproduce and transform one another in an endless dialectical spiral; through the continuous intersection of particular individual paths with particular institutional projects occurring at specific temporal and spatial locations.

Everyday Practice, Power, and Knowledge

The most potent aspect of "power over" is not to be found at the surface in the capacity to define, control, prevent, or prohibit the project participation of others (and thereby frequently treat them in a thingified manner); but, at the almost always hidden underside, in the consequent capacity to affect both what others know (and are able to say) and how they perceive and think.

The most essential links between the institutionally embedded power relations affecting participation in everyday practices and the knowledge and thought of individuals are forged by language and other systems of signs. (Language, in turn, is itself constituted, reproduced, and transformed primarily through institutional practices [cf. Wittgenstein, 1968; Giddens, 1979; Pred, 1981c] and thereby through the exercise of power.) The culturally arbitrary categories of the language prevailing in any given period and place (or the culturally arbitrary words and style of discourse that are used to describe, group, and differentiate things and events, and thereby determine what can be seen and known and thus made or created of the world [cf. Foucault, 1970, 1972; Olsson, 1974, 1982]), can only be acquired, given meaning, and internalized by an individual through becoming engaged in the workings of society (cf. e.g., Coward and Ellis, 1977), or through participating in institutional projects.²² Or, the limits of what one can say, know, and think through language,—the words, meanings, and syntax one is confined to and the wordless silences one is condemned to,—vary with the particular situations in which one is a power subject, with the temporally and spatially specific institutional projects with which one's path intersects (cf. Gouldner, 1976; Olsson, 1980a).

Largely through the signification, communication, and discourse accompanying the habitual and unreflective usage of language in the execution of everyday institutional projects, and through what simultaneously goes without saying, the relations and previous social activity embodied in the things and events facilitating those projects usually remains opaque. Consequently, the involved individuals frequently come to think of the detailed situations and social order characterizing their project participation as natural rather

than humanly created and culturally arbitrary (cf. Kosík, 1978). To the extent that this is the case,—to the extent that the institutional control mechanisms, objects, and events confronting men or women in any everyday practice become taken for granted, unmentioned or unexamined, and regarded as undeniable facts that are apart from themselves and incapable of being otherwise (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1967),—power subjects are blind to the ultimate power being exercised over them. Thus, the institutionally based power relation in question acts as “an ingredient in the ideological . . . cement that holds individual and society together” (Olsson, 1978, p. 64). In modern societies there is perhaps a somewhat greater chance for individuals to at least partially unmask or demystify such distortion of knowledge because of the coexistence of different belief systems and the circulation of information among participants in differently oriented and complexly interdependent institutional projects (cf. Thrift, 1979).²³ Nevertheless, for most individuals some awareness—however dim—of the unnatural character of a given cultural reality apparently is most likely to come about (if at all) during or after a massive or abrupt transformation of dominant institutions and their projects: when the social system malfunctions and power relations are transformed greatly via conflict, contradiction, or external disruption; when there is a radical altering of the temporally and spatially specific daily path couplings demanded by dominant institutions; and when the way is thus paved for a new vision of what is natural.

The individual's acceptance as natural and normal of all that is part of an institutional project usually goes hook in eye, tongue in groove, with an unwitting (or witting) absorption of the views held by the institution's power holders with respect to what is unnatural, abnormal, unreasonable, unthinkable, illogical, illegitimate, improper, irresponsible, or out of bounds both in action and discourse (cf. Foucault, 1970, 1972; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). What *is* consciously or unconsciously becomes regarded as what *ought* to be. Preservation of the status quo, moral control, and law and order are the result. For, to repeat somewhat, participation in an institutional project is synonymous with the willing or grudging acceptance of discipline, or the submission to rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion: rules and norms that not only spell out more or less explicitly and strictly who may do (*and say*) what, when, and where, but also, by extension, at least implicitly indicate who may not do (*and say*) what, when, and where. Or, as Lacan (1968) and others have argued in a closely related manner, the rigid categories of language employed in the everyday practices of the family and other institutions are at the root of the repression which forms the unconscious, at the root of the “perverse”, “decadent”, and taboo laden, at the root of subdued desire, “self-discipline”, and that which is absolutely forbidden to become a part of the individual's path (cf. Olsson, 1980c).²⁴

All of this is not to deny that through participation in projects individuals learn to recognize the physical (and linguistic) symbols of those institutional-

ly embedded powers that dominate the historical situation in which they find themselves—government buildings, banks, corporate skyscrapers, cathedrals, palaces, manor houses, or other symbols that are visibly prominent on the landscape from afar, as well as application forms, elements of attire, official reports, computer terminals, or other objects that only become arresting from close up. (The existence of “power over” without recognizable physical and linguistic symbols is difficult to imagine, perhaps even impossible [cf. Olsson, 1978], for without either one everyday institutional practices and social reproduction are not feasible [cf. Goldmann, 1977].) It is to suggest, however, that even if those symbols are recognized they are either usually perceived as symbols of concentrated resource possession (which thereby legitimate the exercise of power), or occasionally understood as symbols of the capacity to influence the everyday practices of the observer (or to directly channel and constrain her daily path and thereby frequently thingify her). And, only exceptionally are those symbols stripped almost naked as symbols of ideological domination, of the capacity to affect both what a person knows and says and how she thinks.²⁵ Normally then, even with symbol recognition the essence of domination remains concealed and full emancipation does not occur.

The institutionally embedded power to define and control the project participation of others also disguises a capacity to affect the knowledge and thought of others by shaping the contours of individual “unknowing” (Thrift, 1979; Thrift and Pred, 1981). When one or more individuals commits themselves to the discipline of an institutional project, joining activity bundles at specific times and places, they cannot (owing to their indivisibility) directly know, *or be aware*, of events and phenomena occurring elsewhere at the same time. Nor, because of their individually finite time resources and the time demands of all travel, can they come to directly know of later happenings and created information that are placed outside their “reach” by virtue of such a commitment.²⁶ Moreover, the frame of meaning provided by project-based language acquisition may place certain knowledge, *or understanding*, of events and information beyond the mental access of an individual or an entire group of power subjects (cf. Bernstein, 1975).

These preceding observations reemphasize the difficulty of conceptually holding the institution-centered “power over” completely apart from the individual’s “power to”. Put otherwise, the production, reproduction, and transformation of an individual’s “power to”, in the particular sense of the build-up and modification of knowledge necessary to act or perform in a certain way, depends on the accumulated history of her path intersections with institutional projects, and hence on the succession of institutional powers that have been exercised *over* her as a consequence of the unique unfolding of her external-internal and life path-daily path dialectics and the macro-level structuration process of which they are a part. But, “power over” is almost inevitably buttressed by the formation of some form of

knowledge: by scientific and technical knowledge (or knowledge enabling some control over nature); business knowledge; knowledge of how to politically or psychologically persuade or manipulate; or some other kind of means-to-end knowledge.²⁷ The possession of such knowledge by institutional power holders, however, also may be construed as a form of "power to" built up and modified through the details of everyday life, through the intersection of particular paths with spatially and temporally specific institutional projects. And, thus, the production, reproduction, and transformation of "power over" via the exploitation of such knowledge is once again in some measure ultimately a matter of the continuous process of structuration and the individual-level external-internal and life path-daily path dialectics which it subsumes. Hence, to state that socialization and social reproduction are interwoven in the process of structuration,—the one becoming the other and the other becoming the one,—is in a sense to state that the "power to" and the "power over" are interwoven through everyday practice and knowledge (and the discourses through which the latter is expressed)—the one becoming the other and the other becoming the one.

Some Clarifying Afterwords

After reading this far you, the reader, may feel frustrated or exasperated. Such feelings may be very well justified, but they also may reflect a misreading of both contents and intents.

The patience of some undoubtedly will have been taxed by the seeming familiarity of the very general statements made about power and the individual and society. To react in this manner is to see the old in the new rather than the new in the old. Most of the separate observations made on both individual behavior and the functioning of society are old in the sense that social theorists and social philosophers have previously put them in writing in often more profound and elaborate ways. My intent, however, has not been to make new separate observations of this type. Instead, I have striven to newly conceptualize how the detailed situations in which power is produced, reproduced, and transformed hang together in an incessant dialectical spiral through the society-encompassing process of structuration. What is new is the portrayal of that process in terms of the continuous intersection of particular individual paths with particular institutional projects at specific temporal and spatial locations.

Some readers will have grown uneasy or irritated by the many-sided overlaps and entanglements of the sometimes blatant, sometimes wispy contents. Perhaps these qualities were unavoidable.²⁸ They were not fully unintended. If power and power relations are everywhere, everynow, everyday;

if power and power relations are in actions enacted and actions forbidden, in thoughts thought and thoughts unthought, in knowledge known and knowledge unknown; then power and power relationships are sometimes blatant, sometimes wispy, always many-sided, overlapping, and entangled. And, therefore, perhaps power and power relations ought to be treated that way.

Others, in turn, may be disturbed at the persistent and repeated emphasis on the bonds between structuration (and thereby individual socialization and social reproduction), and the production, reproduction, and transformation of the "power to" and "power over" (*and thereby discipline*) in everyday practice. Behind this emphasis two unstated intents have been kept hidden. One of these has been to indirectly suggest that since individual socialization and social reproduction are not possible without some forms of "power to" and "power over", individual self-preservation and the survival of a society and its culture (in stable or altered form) are not possible without some forms of "power to" and "power over".²⁰ The other has been to indirectly suggest that for human geographers and social scientists in general, the ultimate problem in studying and *living* everyday practice is to critically penetrate power relations and—by extension—ideology, to critically search out the essence of domination, and thereby to seek emancipation for self and others from the micro- and macro-level abuses and exploitation created by others and self through the details of everyday life. I wish to suggest that in the absence of any awareness of the bonds between structuration and the power relationships beneath their own everyday experiences and all of the locational, interactional, and man-environment phenomena which they study, human geographers can only produce scholarly chimera that reproduce and legitimate the world around them. And, in such an absence the promotion of any understanding of self and society, of any enhancement of autonomy, of any significant change in the structural relations of society, will remain for others.

Quite certainly many readers will have been perturbed by the thought that what I have written is not human geography. However, anybody who has been thus discomforted has forgotten that my primary objective was not to write human geography but to attempt to further integrate the discipline-transcending language of time-geography with the "structuration" school of thought by considering the production, reproduction, and transformation of power at the level of concrete everyday life.

Final Questings

And what about the

	discipline	
d		d
i		i
s		s
c	of	c
i	human	i
p	geog-	p
l	raphy?	l
i		i
n		n
e		e
	discipline	

What about the everyday practices which produce our discipline and the discipline that produces our everyday practices? (Cf. Claval, 1980.)

Why are certain categories, questions, concepts, theories, and research-practice alternatives conventionally regarded as unnatural, unreasonable, improper, unacceptable, or out of bounds?

What micro- and macro-level power relationships steer your path toward certain research projects and away from others?

Why do most human geographers only explore things and categories of behavior that are visible or measurable and frozen in past or present time rather than also seek the invisible relations, structures, and processes without which those actually transitory things and categories of behavior are possible? (Cf. Olsson, 1980b; Walker, 1981.)

Why are the statics of what is or was preferred to the dialectics of becoming?

Why do those operating within the limits of conventional human geography fragment the individual and divorce her from society?

Why is the individual normally treated in a thingified manner as a migrant, a commuter, an employee, a resident, a perceiver of the environment, but not as an integrated and feeling person whose unbroken biography dialectically and concretely interplays with the institutions of society?

Why do human geographers as a rule treat locational, interactional, and man-environment phenomena as if they occurred outside the realm of power relationships and the society-encompassing process of structuration?

Why, in their everyday disciplinary practices, do human geographers normally borrow concepts and methods from other culturally arbitrary disciplines but refuse to actively contribute to the theoretical debates and developments now occurring within the social sciences and social philosophy?

What institutionally embedded power relationships have brought you right here and now and are affecting your reactions?

And who will be in power when you steer your path elsewhere after completing the project of reading these pages?

Undisciplined?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This contribution was written while the author was receiving research support from the U.S. National Science Foundation.

NOTES

- 1 This quote represents my own free translation of Olsson's original Swedish statement.
- 2 For further commentary and diagrams pertaining to the project concept as employed in time-geography see, e.g.: Hägerstrand (1973, 1974); Pred (1978, 1981a, 1981b, 1981c); ERU (1980); Parkes and Thrift (1980); Carlstein (1981).
- 3 Although definitions resting on intention are generally emphasized here, it is to be recognized that: "Other conceptions do not take intention, or the realization of will, to be essential to power; such conceptions broaden the application of the concept to cover the actions, and perhaps inaction, of (individual or collective) agents which further their interests (which may or may not coincide with their intentions, if such they have)" (Lukes, 1979, p. 635).
- 4 Some, including Talcott Parsons, at times do not consider authority as a special form of power. They instead emphasize its consent-based dimension and define it in a questionable manner as "mutually exclusive" from "naked" power (Gouldner, 1970, p. 324), as "the integration of the collectivity in the interests of its effective functioning" (Parsons, 1960, p. 752). Others regard only some forms of authority as forms of power.
- 5 However, see note 4, above.
- 6 For reasonably exhaustive treatments of the broad conceptual spectrum associated with power see Wrong (1979); Lukes (1979). For relatively recent and important considerations of particular aspects of power see, e.g.: Habermas (1975, 1977); Offe (1976); Foucault (1978, 1979); Giddens (1976, 1979); Sennett (1980).
- 7 The "extensiveness" of a power relationship usually refers to the relative number of subjects whose behavior complies with the wishes of a power-holding individual, group, or institution. The "comprehensiveness" of a power relationship depends upon the variety of behavioral situations in which power holders can demand compliance from power subjects. The "intensiveness" of a power relationship pertains to the extremity of circumstances under which power holders can still extract a specific form of compliance from power subjects; i.e., the more extreme the circumstances the more intensive the relationship. Normally, the more extensive a power relationship the less likely it is to be either comprehensive or intensive. Cf. Wrong (1979), pp. 14—20.
- 8 Giddens (1979, p. 149) has asserted that "all power relations, or relations of autonomy and dependency, are reciprocal: however wide the asymmetrical distribution of resources involved, all power relations manifest autonomy and dependence in both directions."
- 9 Foucault's "micro-power" centers refer both to institutional practices and their attendant relationships of strength or power. "Micro-power" centers are seen to be

- "organized in infinite matrices over the social body as a whole" (Daudi, 1980, p. 38). For further explication and interpretation of this and other related concepts contained in Foucault's extensive writings see White (1979); Daudi (1980); Sheridan (1980); and Rorty (1981).
- 10 For elaboration on the "internal logic" of institutional projects, which may range in complexity from the preparation of a family meal to the manufacture of a high-technology good, see the sources cited in note 2, above.
 - 11 The brief distillation of views presented here is unavoidably oversimplified in certain respects. For a somewhat more extensive summary of Berger and Luckmann, Giddens, Bourdieu, Kosik, and Bhaskar, see Pred (1981c). Also note Gregory (1981a, 1981b).
 - 12 Biological reproduction of an area's population is also a consequence of social reproduction.
 - 13 Time-geographically feasible projects are those in which project participation is not barred by among other things: simultaneity conflicts, or the individual's indivisibility; the finite daily time resources remaining at an individual's disposal after the completion of physiologically necessary projects and any already fixed institutional project commitments; or the fact that the time required to travel from the spatial location of one project to the spatial location of another project exceeds the duration of the period separating the termination of the former and the commencement of the latter. Cf. Hägerstrand (1975); Pred (1978); Parkes and Thrift (1980); Carlstein (1981).
 - 14 Since socialization occurs through participation in institutional projects inside and outside the family, it is to be regarded as coinciding with social reproduction and continuing throughout one's life, rather than coming to an abrupt halt at maturity (cf. Giddens, 1979, pp. 129—130; Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 137). For a fuller treatment of the external-internal dialectic as well as the life path-daily path dialectic see Pred (1981a, 1981c).
 - 15 Cf. the above discussion on the influence of past participation in institutional projects upon individually defined projects. Also note that path intersection with institutional projects is necessary to production even where the individual's "power to" is based upon hereditary privilege. This is so since an individual presumably cannot be identified with a privilege-bearing family, and therefore become privileged herself, unless she has lived with that family for some period, or participated in some of its projects.
 - 16 Because this formulation of the role of individuals in the constitution of institutionally embedded power relations has a dialectical emphasis which allows structural properties to impinge on individual practice, and vice versa, it is not in any way to be confused with the "voluntaristic" interpretations of individual-society relations put forth by Max Weber, Talcott Parsons (1949), and others.
 - 17 For brief additional comments on the links between the life path-daily path dialectic, the everyday functioning of institutions, and the reproduction of class and institutionally based class relationships see Pred (1981c). Also note, e.g.: Giddens (1973, 1979); Peet (1975); Bourdieu and Passeron (1977).
 - 18 According to the structuration perspective any "structural totality" is dialectically related to everyday practices. Cf. Kosik (1978).
 - 19 Given the objectives and length limitations of this piece, it is not appropriate to attempt any summary of those opposing schools of thought which primarily view society and its power relationships either in terms of conflict or in terms of consensus. As should be apparent from this paragraph, I prefer to view conflict and consensus as dialectically intertwined.
 - 20 The modification of project definitions and rules also may result from the conflicting temporal and spatial project demands made by a society's dominant institutions.

- 21 Cf. Parkes and Thrift (1979) on the "entrainment" of some projects by others.
- 22 Actually, in a literate society elements of language also can be obtained via "independently" defined reading projects. However, such language acquisition is not possible without prior participation in education-providing institutional projects and the words thus added to a person's repertoire are not apt to take on any general or particular lasting meaning(s) until used or heard in a social context (Bernstein, 1975).
- 23 On the other hand, owing to hegemony (or the similarity of belief systems, meanings, and values inculcated by participation in the projects of different institutions), the individual may find it especially difficult to see through the "natural" and taken-for-granted. For an excellent treatment of the concept of hegemony, as developed by Gramsci, see Williams (1977, pp. 108—114). The production and reproduction of hegemony, the permeation of all or most major institutions by a similar ideology, can be interpreted in terms of the connections existing between the life path-daily path dialectics of their power holders and the society-encompassing process of structuration. Cf. note 17, above.
- 24 Also note Habermas (1971) on social institutions, repressed needs, and power and ideology as distorted communication.
- 25 Power symbols cannot be stripped totally naked, for beneath each unveiled social relation (and its associated words, concepts, and meanings) there always lies another historically sedimented social relation (and its associated words, concepts, and meanings) which, through the process of structuration, has contributed to the emergence of the seen relation. Cf. Giddens (1979); Olsson (1982).
- 26 Cf. note 13, above, and the sources cited therein. Also note Lenntorp (1976) on the time-space reach of individuals after activity commitment, and cf. Törnqvist (1981) on relative mobility and knowledge acquisition.
- 27 The implications of knowledge for power, and their reinforcement of one another, are considered in various interrelated ways in the writings of Foucault (1970, 1972, 1979), and Horkheimer and Adorno (1972), as well as by Nietzsche (1968). Those implications deserve much more than the superficial mention made here. Cf. Held (1980), pp. 151—157.
- 28 Given the length restrictions on this piece, as well as its general objectives, it also was unavoidable that inadequate attention was given to among other things, the operation of power within the family and the nature of political and state power.
- 29 Compare and contrast with Freud (1961) on societal institutions as centers of power and discipline that repress individual instinctual drives in order to insure collective self-preservation.

REFERENCES

- Arendt, H. (1970): *On Violence*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1967): *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City: Anchor Books.
- Bernstein, B. (1975): *Class, Codes and Control: Theoretical Studies towards a Sociology of Language*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Bhaskar, R. (1979a): "On the Possibility of Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism", in J. Mepham and D.-H. Ruben (eds.), *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, vol. 3, *Epistemology, Science, Ideology*. Sussex: Harvester Press.
- Bhaskar, R. (1979b): *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*. Sussex: Harvester Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977): *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, C. (1977): *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage Publications.
- Carlstein, T. (1981): *Time Resources, Society and Ecology: On the Capacity for Human Interaction in Space and Time*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Claval, P. (1980): Epistemology and the History of Geographic Thought. *Progress in Human Geography*, 4, 371—383.
- Coward, R. and Ellis, J. (1977): *Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Daudi, P. (1980): *Power and Knowledge: A Discussion Based on the Theory of Michel Foucault*. (Studies in the Economics and Organization of Action [unnumbered].) Lund: Department of Business Administration, University of Lund.
- Elster, J. (1976): "Some Conceptual Problems in Political Theory", in B. Barry (ed.), *Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives*. London: John Wiley.
- Elster, J. (1978): *Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds*. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Erikson, E. (1975): *Life History and the Historical Moment*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- ERU [Expertgruppen för forskning om regional utveckling] (1980): *Offentlig verksamhet och regional välfärd: Perspektiv på det politiska beslutsfattandet och den offentliga sektorn*. Stockholm: Statens offentliga utredningar, 1980: 6.
- Foucault, M. (1970): *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Random House.
- Foucault, M. (1972): *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. New York: Random House.
- Foucault, M. (1977): *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Foucault, M. (1978): *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, *An Introduction*. New York: Random House.
- Foucault, M. (1979): *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Freud, S. (1961): *Civilization and its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Garnham, N. and Williams, R. (1980): Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Culture: An Introduction. *Media, Culture and Society*, 2, 209—223.
- Giddens, A. (1973): *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. London: Hutchinson.
- Giddens, A. (1976): *New Rules of Sociological Method*. London: Hutchinson.
- Giddens, A. (1979): *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Goldmann, L. (1977): *Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1970): *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1976): *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Gregory, D. (1981a): Human Agency and Human Geography. *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, N. S. 6, 1—18.
- Gregory, D. (1981b): *Social Theory and Spatial Structure*. London: Hutchinson.
- Habermas, J. (1971): *Knowledge and Human Interests*. London: Heinemann.
- Habermas, J. (1975): *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Habermas, J. (1977): Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power. *Social Research*, 44, Spring, 3—24.
- Hägerstrand, T. (1973): "The Domain of Human Geography", in R. Chorley (ed.), *Directions in Geography*. London: Methuen.
- Hägerstrand, T. (1974): On Socio-Technical Ecology and the Study of Innovations. *Ethnologica Europaea*, 7, 17—34.

- Hägerstrand, T. (1975): "Space, Time and Human Conditions", in A. Karlqvist, L. Lundquist and F. Snickars (eds.), *Dynamic Allocation of Urban Space*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
- Hägerstrand, T. (1977): On the Survival of the Cultural Heritage. *Ethnologica Scandinavica*, 7—12.
- Held, D. (1980): *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. (1972): *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York: Herder and Herder.
- Johnston, R. J. (1979): *Political, Electoral and Spatial Systems: An Essay in Political Geography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kosik, K. (1978): *Det konkretas dialektik: En studie i människans och världens problematik*. Göteborg: Röda Bokförlaget AB. Also available in English as *Dialectics of the Concrete*. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 52.)
- Lacan, J. (1968): *The Language of Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lenntorp, B. (1976): *Paths in Space-Time Environments: A Time-Geographic Study of Movement Possibilities of Individuals*. (Lund Studies in Geography, Series B, no. 44.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup.
- Ley, D. (1980): *Power and the Geographical Lifeworld*. Ottawa: Paper presented at the 19th annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.
- Lukes, S. (1974): *Power: A Radical View*. London: Macmillan.
- Lukes, S. (1979): "Power and Authority", in T. Bottomore and R. A. Nisbet (eds.), *A History of Sociological Analysis*. London: Heinemann.
- Nietzsche, F. (1968): *The Will to Power*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Offe, C. (1976): "Political Authority and Class Structures", in P. Connerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Olsson, G. (1974): Servitude and Inequality in Spatial Planning: Ideology and Methodology in Conflict. *Antipode*, 6, no. 1, 16—20.
- Olsson, G. (1978): "Om makt", in *Nordplan 10 år, 1968—1978*. Stockholm: Nordiska institut för samhällsplanering.
- Olsson, G. (1980a): "Hitting Your Head against the Ceiling of Language", in idem, *Eggs in Bird*. London: Pion Limited.
- Olsson, G. (1980b): "Of Ambiguity or Far Cries from a Memorializing Mamafesta", in idem, *Eggs in Bird*. London: Pion Limited.
- Olsson, G. (1980c): Ord om tankar/tankar om ord. *Svensk Geografisk Arsbok*, 56, 89—94.
- Olsson, G. (1982): "—/—", in idem and P. Gould (eds.), *A Search for Common Ground: Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Geography*. London: Pion Limited.
- Parkes, D. and Thrift, N. (1979): Time Spacemakers and Entrainment. *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, N. S. 4, 353—372.
- Parkes, D. and Thrift, N. (1980): *Times, Spaces, and Places: A Chronogeographic Perspective*. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Parsons, T. (1949): *The Structure of Social Action*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Parsons, T. (1960): Max Weber. *American Sociological Review*, 25, 750—752.
- Peet, R. (1975): Inequality and Poverty: A Marxist-Geographic Theory. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 65, 564—571.
- Persson, C. (1979): "Environmental Images and Decision Processes: Some Theoretical and Methodological Reflections", in P. W. Daniels (ed.), *Spatial Patterns of Office Growth and Location*. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Pred, A. (1978): The Impact of Technological and Institutional Innovations on Life-Content: Some Time-Geographic Observations. *Geographical Analysis*, 10, 345—372.
- Pred, A. (1981a): "Of Paths and Projects, Individual Behavior and Its Societal Context",

- in R. Golledge and K. Cox (eds.), *Behavioral Geography Revisited*. London: Methuen.
- Pred, A. (1981b): Production, Family, and Free-Time Projects: A Time-Geographic Perspective on the Individual and Societal Change in Nineteenth-Century U. S. Cities. *Journal of Historical Geography*, 7, 3—36.
- Pred, A. (1981c): Social Reproduction and the Time-Geography of Everyday Life. *Geografiska Annaler*, 63, Ser. B, 5—22.
- Rorty, R. (1981): Beyond Nietzsche and Marx. *London Review of Books*, 3, no. 3, 5—6.
- Russell, B. (1938): *Power: A New Social Analysis*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Sennett, R. (1980): *Authority*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Sheridan, A. (1980): *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*. London: Tavistock.
- Thrift, N. (1979): *The Limits to Knowledge in Social Theory: Towards a Theory of Practice*. Canberra: Department of Human Geography, Australian National University.
- Thrift, N. and Pred, A. (1981): Time-Geography: A New Beginning (A Reply to Alan Baker's Historical Geography: A New Beginning). *Progress in Human Geography*, 5, 119—128.
- Törnqvist, G. (1979): *On Fragmentation and Coherence in Regional Research*. (Lund Studies in Geography, Series B, no. 45.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup.
- Törnqvist, G. (1981): "On Arenas and Systems", in this volume.
- Touraine, A. (1977): *The Self-Production of Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Walker, R. A. (1981): On Left-Wing Libertarianism: An Academic Disorder. *Professional Geographer*, 33, no. 1, 5—10.
- Wallin, E. (1974): "Yrkeskarriär och stabilitet i bosättningen", in ERU (Expertgruppen för regional utredningsverksamhet), *Ortsbundna levnadsvillkor*. Stockholm: Statens offentliga utredningar, 1974: 2.
- Weber, M. (1968): *Economy and Society*. 3 vols. New York: Bedminster Press.
- White, H. (1979): "Michel Foucault", in J. Sturrock (ed.), *Structuralism and Since: From Lévi Strauss to Derrida*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, R. (1976): *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. London: Fontana.
- Williams, R. (1977): *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1968): *Philosophical Investigations*. 3rd edition. New York: Macmillan.
- Wright, G. H. von (1963): *Norm and Action: A Logical Inquiry*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Wrong, D. H. (1979): *Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses*. New York: Harper & Row.