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Divided and Conquered:
Why States and Self-determination Groups Fail in Bargaining Over Autonomy

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham

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2007

The dissertation of Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham is approved,
and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on
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University of California, San Diego

2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Divided and Conquered:
Why States and Self-determination Groups Fail in Bargaining Over Autonomy

by

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2007

Professor David A. Lake, Chair

This dissertation examines the politics of self-determination and asks why some pairs of governments and minority populations can successfully renegotiate autonomy status while others are unable to do so. Disputes over self-determination are among the most common kind of conflict in the international system today and autonomy-based settlements are the most widely promoted solution. I argue that the internal structure of both movements for self-determination and national governments structures the negation process in these disputes and the incentives that both sides have for settlement. Previous explanations have treated both of these actors as unitary, ignoring important variation in the internal politics of self-determination movements and governments.

I test my theory using two types of analysis – a quantitative study of self-determination disputes from 1960 to 2003 and a set of case studies within France and India. The quantitative analysis reveals that the internal structure of self-determination movements and governments has a systemic effect on both autonomy settlements and conflict. Governments with a moderate number of internal actors that can hold up policy change are most likely to implement an autonomy agreement. In contrast, self-determination movements with many internal factions are most likely receive autonomy, followed by very cohesive movements. Self-determination movements with a moderate number of internal factions are least likely to receive autonomy and most likely to be in conflict. The comparison of French government negotiations with the Corsicans since 1970 demonstrates that overcoming internal barriers to devolving autonomy at the national level was a major determinant of the type of deal the Corsicans received. Moreover, my comparison of three Indian self-determination movements illustrates the importance of coordination within divided movements and demonstrates that the Indian government responded strategically to the divisions within these movements.

Chapter One

Introduction

Disputes over self-determination have become some of the most common conflicts in the international system and are also among the most difficult to resolve. In the past 20 years, the world has seen the birth of 25 new states, with 90 percent of these created by the break up of an existing state.[1] Moreover, since the 1950s, over 75 self-determination challenges have erupted into armed conflict.[2] These conflicts are the result of a failed political process in which governments are unable to manage the demands of sub-state nationalists while trying to maintain state unity. In multinational states, governments and minority groups negotiate over how much self-rule these groups will enjoy, and at the extreme, whether they will remain part of the state.[3] When disputes over governance remain unsettled and cannot be renegotiated, many minority groups seek to change the status quo through violence.

This dissertation explains when and why bargaining over autonomy fails, and what can be done to facilitate bargaining success that maintains peace in multinational societies. To explain variation in autonomy bargaining success, I advance a theory of how domestic politics affects bargaining strategies and the ability of governments and self-determination groups to implement new agreements over governance. I argue that the degree of fractionalization within governments and movements affects the actions

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[1] Including the recent split of Montenegro from Serbia-Montenegro in May 2006.
[2] CIDCM Peace and Conflict Report (Marshall and Gurr 2003).
[3] The bargaining process is at times formal and explicit, but can also be informal and tacit.

they can take throughout the bargaining process and the strategic incentives they face for implementing a new agreement.

Internal fractionalization affects the bargaining process in two ways. First, the number of internal factions and how they are connected to each other (their degree of institutionalization) determines how leaders gain consensus over autonomy policy within both governments and self-determination movements.[4] An inability to overcome internal dissent within these actors creates a significant barrier to autonomy settlement. Second, the fact that both sides may face an internally divided opponent is important to the bargain between these actors. A divided opposition can provide opportunities to exploit these divisions and reveal information about each as a bargaining partner.

Studying Autonomy

Studies of conflict as a bargaining process typically focus on the outbreak of war as the indicator of failure. Although violent conflict is the end result of bargaining failure, the process that leads some self-determination movements into war but not others at a specific time is to some degree stochastic (Gartzke 1999). The immediate outbreak of separatist conflict may hinge on any number of factors, but the root cause is an ongoing failure to renegotiate governance status. Instead of relying on war as the indicator of failure, this dissertation focuses explicitly on autonomy bargaining. Looking directly at autonomy outcomes allows me to examine the political process that leads to conflict over time through iterated bargaining failures. By examining systematically why

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[4] "Government" always refers to the national government of a country.

autonomy bargaining succeeds or fails, this dissertation advances our understanding of a major source of conflict today.

Empirically, autonomy accommodation takes many different forms, but it is essentially a downward transfer of authority over decision making in some policy area.[5] Although some scholars place emphasis on a specific type of accommodation, there is no consensus on what type of autonomy is most important for managing self-determination claims. This project takes an expansive definition of autonomy and examines the devolution of decision making power in all areas.

The Argument

The central argument of the dissertation is that internal divisions within self-determination movements and governments significantly affect their ability to negotiate over and implement changes in autonomy status. This section describes how internal divisions vary within governments and movements, then explains how these divisions affect bargaining.

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[5] The primary distinction in type of accommodation is made between cultural, administrative, and political autonomy. Some scholars argue that cultural and political autonomy are fundamentally different. This is true to some extent – but making this distinction introduces an assumption about the relative importance of one type of demand, typically giving dominance to political autonomy. For some government/self-determination movement dyads, legislative autonomy is a crucial flash point, but for others it is the ability to teach the native language in school. We cannot judge the importance of these issues based on our objective assessment of how much or how significant the autonomy under discussion is. An exception to this might be demands for outright independence. However, demands for independence do not necessarily constitute a secession attempt as they may be a bargaining tool for savvy political actors in the self-determination movement. Thus, I examine autonomy as a broad concept encompassing all these varieties.

Variation in Fractionalization

There are two components of internal fractionalization relevant to the bargaining process. These are: 1) the number of internal divisions (or factions) that have different preferences over governance policy and 2) their degree of institutionalization (the connection between factions). The number of factions is determined by the diversity of preferences within the government or self-determination movement, as well as political institutions which shape how people aggregate their demands. Empirically, there are a variety of autonomy solutions and governance related demands made by self-determination movements. The range of demands related to governance span from minimal autonomy over specific policy areas, such as language, to full independence. In addition to different movements seeking a variety of types of autonomy, individual movements often have heterogeneous preferences, which include multiple different governance demands. For example, while the Walloons in Belgium exclusively seek autonomy through a federal structure, the Turkish Cypriots are divided between those that demand independence and those that want federal autonomy. Other movements vary their demands overtime, such as the Crimean Russians who demanded both independence and autonomy until 2000 when they dropped their call for statehood.

Internal factions include social organizations, branches of governments, political parties, or militant groups that express preferences over the level of governance for a sub-state minority.[6] Examples of factions from self-determination movements include the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), which has demanded change in governance status within Turkey since 1984, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, as well as

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[6] This is not an exhaustive list of the type of organization that can make autonomy demands.

the autonomy-seeking Oron National Forum in Nigeria. Examples of factions within governments include the Israeli governing coalition partners Likud and Shas in the early 1990s, the Constitutional Council in France, and the Senate in the United States.

The second component of fractionalization, the degree of institutionalization, describes how strongly these factions are tied together. Individual factions in highly institutionalized governments or self-determination movements are connected by political institutions which dictate the process of decision making over autonomy and bind these factions together. When factions are connected in this way, they are unable to make agreements to change autonomy status independently of one another. In contrast, a low degree of institutionalization means that disparate factions are not beholden to one another and can act on their own. The Chittagong Hill Peoples in Bangladesh exemplify a self-determination movement with a low degree of institutionalization. Some factions within the movement settled with the government in 1989, but the Shanti Bahini faction rejected the deal and continued its armed struggle.

Although there is some variation in how strongly institutionalized governments are, I assume that all governments are highly institutionalized.[7] I also assume that self-determination movements have a lower degree of institutionalization. There are some rare exceptions, such as the de facto states of Taiwan or Nagorno-Karabakh, but these are outliers in the general trend.

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[7] States with a low degree of institutionalization are those that face serious internal divisions that threaten to overturn the government – such as threat of coups.

Fractionalization and Bargaining

Fractionalization has three primary effects on the autonomy bargaining process which fall under two general categories: effects on internal bargaining and effects on external bargaining. Internal bargaining is the interaction between factions within each side. The number and institutionalization of factions determines whether internal consensus is necessary to change autonomy and how easy this is to achieve. Consensus among all internal factions is only necessary when internal factions are bound together (highly institutionalized), as they are in governments. The high degree of institutionalization means that internal factions are veto players in government.[8] The necessity of gaining consensus to transfer autonomy among factions that can block autonomy (veto players) creates a barrier to settlement with self-determination movements. The Sri Lankan government, for example, has had difficulty negotiating a new autonomy arrangement with the Tamil movement because a set of government veto players oppose significant concessions.[9]

Two factors determine how easy it will be for autonomy proponents within a government to gain internal consensus – the number of factions and the resources available for side-payments. In order to overcome internal opposition, those pushing for an autonomy solution must compensate government veto players opposed to it with some type of side-payment. The greater the amount of fungible resources available for compensation (including monetary or policy resources), the easier this will be. Moreover, overcoming internal dissent will be harder with a higher number of veto

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[8] Veto players are defined as any internal actors in government that can block change in policy (Tsebelis 2002).
[9] Among parties opposed to autonomy was the United National Party.

players because there are more actors that need to be compensated for supporting

autonomy. Figure 1.1 demonstrates this argument graphically.

Figure 1.1 Internal Bargaining in Governments (high degree of institutionalization)

The left side of the figure indicates the three possible categories of internal

divisions. Both moderately and highly-divided governments need to gain internal

consensus to devolve power. Variation in resources determines how easy it will be to

garner support for an autonomy settlement. The right side of the diagram specifies

whether the government will be likely to overcome this internal bargain and pursue an

autonomy agreement based on the number of internal veto players and resources

available.

The dynamics of internal bargaining differ when institutionalization is low and

prior consensus is not necessary for a new autonomy deal to be struck. Instead, internal

bargaining is characterized by whether or not an autonomy agreement can be

implemented in the face of continued resistance to it. This dynamic describes the internal

bargaining process for self-determination movements. For example, the Indian

government attempted to devolve power to the Bodo self-determination movement in

1985 and 1993, but internal resistance ultimately caused the autonomy arrangements to

fail and violence to continue. The ability of self-determination movements, as weakly

institutionalized actors, to enforce an autonomy agreement also depends on the resources

available to pro-autonomy factions. Organizational resources, as well as monetary and

military resources, will help factions implement an autonomy deal. Movements with pre-

existing institutions or organizations that coordinate factions will be better able to

overcome implementation challenges and prevent extremists from spoiling the deal

because they facilitate devolution and maintenance of local order. Moreover, movements

where the factions supporting the deal are larger and stronger than those opposing it will

be more likely to overcome internal dissent. Figure 1.2 illustrates the internal bargaining

dynamics of self-determination movements.

Figure 1.2 Internal Bargaining in Self-determination Movements (low degree of institutionalization)

The left side of the figure shows the three types of movements with varying degrees of internal fractionalization – unitary, moderately-divided, and highly-divided. Multiple arrows indicate that each faction can act independently of the others. The right side of the figure lists the possible outcomes given the number of factions and the level of resources available to generate consensus or enforce a settlement ex post. Both moderately and highly-divided movements will have implementation problems when resources for enforcement are low.

In addition to the internal bargaining dynamics briefly described above, fractionalization affects negotiations between government and self-determination movement representatives in what I call the external bargaining process. Internal divisions affect this external bargain in two ways. First, when governments face an internally divided opponent, they can use these divisions to their advantage by pursuing a

"divide and conquer" strategy. Governments can strategically offer autonomy deals that a subset of factions would agree to in an attempt to divide the moderates from the extremists. Marginalizing the extremists and strengthening moderates in self-determination movements benefits the state by limiting the potential for development of strong and widely-supported separatist demands. Governments can satisfy moderate factions with lesser concessions in highly-divided movements than would be necessary in more cohesive movements because there are more potential factions to buy off across a diversity of demands. Figure 1.3 graphically demonstrates the different possibilities for strategically dividing movements with varying levels of fractionalization.

Figure 1.3 Government Considerations in External Bargaining

The figure indicates the types of movements the government can face in terms of their fractionalization and the possibility for the government to further divide them. The right side of the diagram shows that governments give up the least amount of autonomy concessions when they are dealing with highly-divided movements, as smaller

concessions should buy off the most moderate factions in these cases. Thus, highly-divided movements will be less costly to further divide, and should receive limited autonomy concessions with greater frequency than the other two types of movements.

Internal divisions within governments also affect external bargaining with self-determination movements because the number of divisions determines the ability of government to commit credibly to a new autonomy deal. Although overcoming internal dissent is a hurdle for policy change in governments, it also means that changing course once an autonomy deal has been made will be difficult. Unitary governments can change autonomy policy easily but cannot credibly commit not to renege on autonomy concessions. As such, self-determination movements can trust that more internally divided governments will not as easily renege. This is important for self-determination movements. For example, some factions within the Berber movement rejected autonomy concessions from the Algerian government in 2001 because of the deep seated mistrust caused by the government having previously reneged on an autonomy concession. Figure 1.4 shows the role that internal divisions in governments play in the credibility of their commitments and how this affects the potential for a new autonomy deal.

	Government type	Internal constraint	Credible commitment	
	Unitary	No	No	agreement difficult
SD Movement	Moderately divided	Yes	Yes	agreement possible
	Highly divided	Yes	Yes	agreement possible

Figure 1.4 Self-determination Movement Considerations in External Bargaining

The left side of the diagram shows variation in government fractionalization and how constrained each type of government is in changing autonomy policy. The right side of the figure shows that unitary governments are the least credible, and this makes the implementation of a new autonomy agreement less likely. Both moderately and highly-divided governments garner more trust, which increases the likelihood of an agreement.

Aggregate Expectations: When is Autonomy Likely?

By specifying how fractionalization affects these two dimensions of autonomy bargaining I have identified a set of relationships between the number of internal divisions, degree of institutionalization and ability to change autonomy status. Some of these relationships have a positive effect on the likelihood of increasing autonomy, while others have a negative effect. The hypotheses tested in the dissertation capture the net effect of the multiple relationships presented in the theory.

The existence of multiple government factions has both positive and negative effects on the likelihood of autonomy depending on whether we are looking at internal or external bargaining. The paradox is that unitary states have more freedom to change autonomy, but it is difficult for them to convince self-determination movements that they will not renege in the future. In contrast, fractionalized governments can credibly commit to transfer autonomy when they negotiate with movements, but it is hard for them to gain internal consensus on a specific autonomy agreement. I argue that these two contrasting trends will produce a curvilinear relationship between the number of factions and the likelihood of increased autonomy. Governments with a moderate number of internal veto players will be most likely to implement an autonomy increase, as will those with a greater amount of resources for compensatory side-payments to win over internal opposition.

The existence of internal divisions in self-determination movements also has multiple, contrasting effects on the likelihood that we will observe an autonomy increase. Unitary movements are unlikely to face internal enforcement problems, and thus are most likely to be able to implement an autonomy agreement. Fractionalized movements are likely to encounter implementation problems unless the moderate factions have resources to facilitate enforcement of the agreement. However, the strategic dynamic of the external bargaining game suggests that highly fractionalized groups are more likely to get autonomy concessions because the government can buy off moderates with lesser autonomy concessions. Given these two dynamics, I argue that unitary and highly-divided movements are the most likely to gain autonomy.

Existing Literature

This approach differs from the existing literature in two ways. First, the literature on self-determination examines the incentives for groups to demand self-governance or for the government to accommodate them, but largely ignores the political process through which these demands are addressed. Second, the scholarship that focuses explicitly on the difficulties of bargaining tends to treat actors as unitary, missing the important consequences of divisions within them.

A number of scholars argue that specific economic factors shape incentives for individuals to demand a change in governance. Gourevitch (1979) and Hechter (1975) argue that relatively wealthy or relatively deprived minorities will demand greater self-determination, respectively. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue that an individual's demand for a larger or smaller state is driven by the trade off between the preference heterogeneity of the state and efficiency. Others have tested hypotheses about the effects of economic factors on the demand for more or less local control (Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore 1996; Bolton and Roland 1997; Fearon and van Houten 2002). These theories take a static approach to the political process that leads to autonomy. By focusing on intensity of individual desire to changing the level of governance, they fail to account for the strategic interaction which is central to the bargaining process.

In addition to these larger economic considerations, several scholars argue that rebel groups (whether seeking self-determination or not) will be unlikely to settle their claims with the state when there are clear benefits to continued contestation, such as easy access to finance or lootable resources in the territory (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Fearon and Laitin (2003), as well as others, identify

variables that make insurgency easier or more likely for some groups, such as political

instability or rough terrain (Gurr 1970 and 2000; Gurr and Moore 1997).[10] Recent

literature on spoilers also identifies incentives for groups to undermine negotiated

agreements (Stedman 1997; Zahar 2003). Moreover, several scholars address the

motivations for states to accommodate groups seeking self-determination. Reputation

approaches argue that current and future reputations about a government's willingness to

accommodate challenges to the state affect incentives for a bargained settlement (Toft

2003; Walter 2006a; Chiozza and Choi 2003).

In contrast to incentive-based theories, the literature addressing bargaining failure

focuses on the process of bargaining, enumerating the conditions under which agreement

is more or less likely. Scholars in the bargaining and conflict literature have identified

several prominent reasons for bargaining failure between actors (Powell 2004; Fearon

1995). Primary among these are three factors to explain bargaining failure: 1) the

inability of either party to commit credibly to a new agreement, 2) the existence of

private information and incentives to misrepresent it (which lead one or both parties to

overestimate their probability of victory), and 3) issue indivisibility. For two sides to

agree to a bargain, they both need to believe that whatever concessions are made will not

be used to create a stronger challenge over the same issue in the future once their relative

capabilities have changed. When information about the relative capabilities is not

certain, both parties have an incentive to overstate their own strength in order to get the

best deal possible, but in doing so they run the risk of provoking conflict. Finally,

bargaining failure is possible when the issue on the table is fundamentally indivisible.

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[10] Toft 2003 also examines the role of geography on mobilization.

Scholars have focused specifically on this third factor for separatist conflicts (Connor 1994; Renan 1994).

This dissertation makes two major contributions to the literature. First, though these works have advanced our understanding of the incentives for minority groups and governments to support or oppose self-determination, they have virtually ignored the political process through which these parties debate and negotiate over autonomy (Cetinyan 2002). Moreover, incentive-based theories cannot explain much of the pattern of successful accommodation of minority demands we see empirically (Bermeo 2004). In this dissertation, I bring political interaction to the forefront of the analysis and explain how the structure of the bargaining process can contribute to bargaining failure.

Second, this dissertation makes an important contribution to rationalist explanations of war. By relaxing the unitary actor assumption and exploring how different types of internal divisions affect bargaining, I have uncovered an important and frequently overlooked feature of autonomy bargaining. This contribution, however, is not necessarily limited to the study of autonomy bargaining. The number and nature of internal divisions within states should also affect their ability to bargain over issues that lead to interstate conflict. The development of two-level bargaining games constitutes a move in this direction (Putnam 1988; Milner 1997; Tarar 2001), but these models allow for little if any variation at the lower level.[11]

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[11] These models are discussed in chapter two, where I argue they do not capture the dynamics of bargaining with internal fractionalization.

Evaluating the Theory

I evaluate the theory advanced in this dissertation using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. I conduct a statistical analysis using new data I have collected on autonomy agreements and internal factions since 1960. I also employ two comparative case studies within France and India.

Statistical Analyses

The quantitative portion of the dissertation is a large-n statistical study of the effect of the number of internal factions within governments and self-determination movements on the likelihood of increased autonomy. The sample of cases for the study is a set of self-determination movements identified by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management and the criterion for selection into the sample was the existence of an autonomy-related grievance. The unit of analysis is government/movement dyad year and the dependent variable is increase in autonomy.

I have constructed a dataset which encompasses a set of autonomy disputes from 1960 – 2003. It includes new data on autonomy agreements, including information on the scope of implementation, and on the number and demands of factions within self-determination movements. The primary independent variables are the number of factions with distinct demands over autonomy within self-determination movements, which I code, and the number of veto players within governments as identified by the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).

The results of the quantitative analysis show strong support for my hypothesis that internal divisions are correlated with the likelihood that governments devolve power.

The effects of internal divisions differ between governments and self-determination movements, suggesting that the degree of institutionalization between factions plays a key role in shaping the internal bargaining dynamics and determining the likelihood of successful autonomy movements. These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables to account for alternative explanations. Internal divisions within governments and self-determination movements shape the strategies they employ in bargaining internally (within the government or movement) and between the government and the self-determination movement. The strategic interaction that takes place between internal factions and between these two internally divided actors is an important determinant of the patterns of autonomy accommodation we observe.

Case Studies

I provide additional evaluation of my theory using two comparative case studies. The case studies allow me to examine whether the correlations I find in my statistical analyses are driven by the causal processes that I present in the theory. By comparing cases that differ in the level of fractionalization within governments and self-determination movements, I examine the effect that internal divisions have on the bargaining process.

The first case study is a comparison of a series of French governments from 1970 to 2004. This comparison is ideal because the governments in this timeframe varied in the number of internal divisions, and have been actively seeking a solution to autonomy demands from Corsica. Although this series of French governments provides a wide range of values on the number of internal divisions in the government, they are similar on

many other variables thought to affect the likelihood of autonomy settlement. The relative strength, wealth, strategic value and economic value of the island are similar for each case. The series of governments also faced the same number of additional self-determination challenges, which include the comparatively weak Breton and Basque self-determination movements.

In order to evaluate the theory, I conduct a detailed analysis of government responses to Corsican demands. If my theory is correct, I should find that accommodation occurs when a relatively cohesive government has come into power. I should also uncover evidence that suggests that bargaining among divisions within French governments took place prior to autonomy change, deadlock over the issue hindered transfers of autonomy, and that the use of side-payments was important in facilitating autonomy accommodation. The analysis shows that divisions within French governments did constitute an important barrier to the devolution of autonomy to Corsica. A variety of different governments faced internal resistance to their plans for greater autonomy for the island. Through internal lobbying and policy side-payments, support was garnered for a degree of devolution in several instances. Opposition of veto players within the government, however, severely limited the type and scope of autonomy that Corsica received.

The second case study is a comparison of negotiations between the Mizo, Naga and Bodo self-determination movements in India in the post-colonial era. These movements differ in the number of internal factions, but are similar on other factors thought to affect the likelihood of agreement. To support my theory, I need to demonstrate that the existence of multiple internal factions created a barrier to

implementing a new autonomy deal and that the ability of a self-determination movement to overcome internal divisions facilitated settlement. I also expect to find that the Indian government attempted to use divisions within these movements to their advantage, by offering fewer concessions to the more highly-divided movement.

My analysis yields several primary conclusions. First, I find that self-determination factions attempt to create greater internal consensus to present their demands to the central government. They do this through both negotiations between factions and violence. Second, in a number of instances autonomy deals are preceded by an increase in the cohesion of the self-determination movement. Third, concessions to more highly-divided movements tend to be lesser in scope than those given to movements when they demonstrate greater internal cohesion. Finally, the Indian state appears to act strategically in its use of autonomy settlements, explicitly trying to separate moderate from more extreme factions through the concessions.

These two sets of cases allow me to isolate internal divisions and examine their effect on the process of autonomy bargaining, and the likelihood of successful implementation of a new autonomy arrangement. Evaluating these mechanisms is important because understanding why negotiations over autonomy fail can help the international community design interventions to make peaceful solutions viable.

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation includes six chapters. In Chapter Two, I develop a theory of bargaining under internal fractionalization. I explain how the internal dynamics of fractionalized actors affects their ability to pursue and implement autonomy settlements.

I also explicate how the existence of divisions within government and self-determination movements changes the incentives and opportunities of these actors as they negotiate over autonomy policy. This theory yields a number of hypotheses about the bargaining process. Central among these are my predictions that governments use autonomy strategically to divide and conquer fractionalized self-determination movements and that the resources available to movements to prevent successful spoiling attempts are critical to successful implementation.

Chapters Three through Five present a series of evaluations of the theory and its central predictions using a variety of methods. The quantitative analysis in Chapter Three demonstrates statistical support for a number of hypotheses developed in the theory chapter. My analysis of autonomy increases shows that governments with a moderate number of veto players are most likely to make new agreements. It also demonstrates that highly-divided movements are most likely to receive autonomy concessions, as are movements with organizational resources to facilitate implementation. The quantitative analysis provides evidence of a correlation between fractionalization and empirical trends in autonomy. This chapter also provides a detailed description of the new data the dissertation contributes to the field.

The correlations demonstrated in Chapter Three do not explicitly test the causal mechanisms I advance in the theory. The French and Indian case studies are designed to complement this analysis and to evaluate the causal mechanisms more directly. Chapter Three uncovers the process of internal negotiations over autonomy within the French government, and demonstrates how internal veto players affected the ability of the government to devolve power to Corsica. The French government has a moderate

number of veto players generally, with frequent variation over time. Transfers of autonomy were preceded by changes in the composition of the government which lessened the number of veto players. Pro-autonomy actors in the government used concessions on other policies (most clearly decentralization policy), to persuade others to support autonomy for Corsica. Moreover, the scope of autonomy ceded to Corsica was severely limited by the Constitutional Council which is one of the veto players at the national level. This case clearly shows how the dynamics of internal bargaining within the French government affected negotiations with Corsicans and policy outcomes.

The Indian case study more directly examines the other side of the bargaining game – how internal divisions within self-determination movements affect negotiations and autonomy concessions. Internal factions within the Mizo, Naga and Bodo movements created challenges for implementation of new autonomy deals. However, the ability of these movements to overcome internal divisions at various points in time facilitated some autonomy concessions. This comparison demonstrates how internal divisions within movements affect bargaining with the government and the effect that internal coordination has on the chance of getting a new autonomy settlement.

The final chapter concludes the dissertation. In it, I summarize the main findings of the project and the overall contribution of the dissertation. I also examine how these conclusions should be interpreted by scholars and policy makers. While the international community and the United States promotes autonomy as a solution to self-determination demands in principle, practical responses have varied widely. This dissertation suggests a number of ways that outside actors interested in promoting autonomy solutions can target internal actors that inhibit change in autonomy. International actors can promote

autonomy settlements by offering additional resources specifically to compensate government veto players opposed to increasing autonomy. Facilitating this internal bargain can help governments overcome a major barrier to settlement. Additionally, non-governmental organizations that promote grassroots political development should target their efforts at creating local organizations that coordinate among disparate factions within these populations which will facilitate implementation of autonomy settlements.

Chapter Two

A Theory of Fractionalization and Bargaining

This project seeks to understand the barriers to settlement and effective management of self-determination claims on states. In this chapter, I present a theory that explains how domestic politics affect the likelihood that an autonomy agreement can be successfully implemented. I argue that the internal fractionalization of both governments and self-determination movements constrains this bargaining process. Specifically, the number of internal factions and the extent of the institutionalization of each side shapes the dynamics of bargaining within and between these two actors.

The chapter is divided into five sections. The first presents a description of the political interaction that takes place between governments and self-determination movements. The second section describes variation in fractionalization and the trends we see in governments and self-determination movements. The next section specifies a set of mechanisms through which fractionalization affects bargaining incentives and actions available for governments and self-determination movements. The forth section of the chapter provides a set of predictions and testable hypotheses generated by my theory. A final portion gives a brief overview to the means and methods used to test this theory.

The Bargaining Process

The politics of self-determination are ongoing political contests over the site of governance between self-determination groups and their host states. Self-determination movements and governments bargain over the level and scope of autonomy that the

group will have. At the extreme they negotiate over whether the group will remain part of the state. Some self-determination contests degenerate into secessionist wars while others simmer at low levels of violence or remain non-violent. Behind each contest is an implicit threat of secession, however, which demands the attention of governments. Given the costliness of internal violence, and the risk of escalation, governments will attempt to settle demands when possible and minimize the potential for recurrent violence or state disintegration.[1]

Much of the work examining conflict as a breakdown in bargaining relies on a one-dimensional model in which two unitary actors are negotiating over some good. The unitary actor assumption (made for parsimony) is problematic for the analysis of self-determination politics (and possibly other types of conflicts as well). There are several implications for the bargaining game when we assume each side is unitary. First, there is no variation in the ability of actors to make an agreement once it has been identified within the range of acceptable bargains. The existence of internal divisions can limit the range of possible deals, but as I argue below, under certain conditions it can also necessitate internal bargaining within actors to gain support for a specific agreement. I argue that the ability of actors to overcome their internal divisions through a secondary bargaining process varies and affects the likelihood of bargaining success between actors.

A second implication of the unitary actor assumption is that uncertainty about the reversion point of the opponent is driven by incomplete information about strength of each actor and their incentive to misrepresent this strength. Allowing for internal

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[1] There may be conditions under which states will be willing to bear the costs of internal violence, and I will attempt to control for some possibilities in the empirical analysis. However, I argue in this theory that bargaining failure is possible even when governments have clear incentives and a desire to settle conflicts ex ante and avoid violence.

divisions adds another dimension to this calculation. If each faction can negotiate independently (as they can in most self-determination movements), then there are multiple actors with different preferences and incentives to overstate their strength on one side of the bargaining game. Not only is the aggregate strength of the movement important, but the relative strength of individual factions determines both the reversion point of each faction and its ability to force its preferred outcome on other internal factions. This makes evaluating a self-determination movement's reversion point more difficult as an overall reversion point for the group is dependent on the strength and preferences of multiple factions.

Divisions within self-determination movements and governments are common and I argue that because of this, bargaining over autonomy is a two-level process. Existing work on two-level games in international politics interact domestic and international dimensions and have productively moved in this direction (Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988; Milner 1997; Tarar 2001). These works demonstrate that domestic politics generates a set of constraints and opportunities for the larger international bargaining game. They rely, however, on specific view of this interactive process where a chief negotiator tries to satisfy both his domestic constituents and the international opponent. Domestic political actors constrain the outcome by limiting the set of acceptable policies and allowing the chief negotiator to claim his hands are tied.

My approach builds upon this idea of negotiations between internally divided actors, but moves beyond a simplified model of domestic ratification. The process of policy change within countries over governance is conducted between two dissimilar

actors, neither of which function like a legislature who needs to ratify an international

treaty. As such, my theory accounts for greater variation within bargaining parties.

When bargaining over autonomy, internally divided actors engage in two sets of

negotiations– internal and external. Internal bargaining is negotiation among constitutive

factions – for example between parties or actors in government or between factions in a

self-determination movement. External bargaining is the interaction between the

government and the self-determination movement. Internal divisions affect the dynamics

and strategy options within both of these bargaining contexts.

Variation in Internal Fractionalization

There are two key elements of fractionalization within governments and self-

determination movements. These are the number of internal divisions and how they are

connected to each other (i.e. the degree of institutionalization). Variation in the number

of internal factions is a function both of preference heterogeneity over autonomy and

political institutions. Preferences for different levels and types of governance among

internal factions are common within self-determination movements and national

governments. These can span both the degree of autonomy (from none to complete

independence) and a range of competencies (different areas of policy control). For

example, a subset of factions in the Chittagong Hill Tribal movement want autonomy

while other factions have demanded independence from Bangladesh. Moreover,

differences in preferences over autonomy for the Tamils have dominated the Sri Lankan

government's attempts to manage the Tamil dispute. The relative strength of preferences

for different levels of autonomy also varies. Some governments and self-determination

movements are evenly divided between two autonomy options while others have majority support for some level of autonomy with only a small dissenting faction.

Variation in the degree of institutionalization describes the political process within which internal divisions operate and importantly whether specific factions can take action independently of one another. I argue below that the ability of internal factions to act independently determines who can block changes in autonomy and at what stage in the bargaining process.

In the absence of any established political context, there is a set of internal actors that must form a minimum winning coalition (MWC) to enact policy change within both governments and self-determination movements. The minimum winning coalition is the smallest possible coalition of actors that can impose their will on a decision making process. Each member of the MWC is considered a veto player because they can hold up policy change. In addition to members of the minimum winning coalition, some internal actors are veto players because they occupy an institutionally defined veto point. Institutional veto points, such as courts that review legislation or an independent executive that can veto autonomy bills, are designed to provide an additional check on policy change.

The number of veto players that must agree to policy change depending on how many institutional checks there are and who is in the MWC (Tsebelis 2002). This is determined by the type and strength of political institutions. Highly institutionalized actors, which look like consolidated states, have clear channels of decision making that are followed by domestic political elites. Deviation from these formal channels of

political interaction is sanctioned. Observing these channels and who is in power allows us to define who the potential veto players are within governments.

Where institutionalization is high, internal veto players cannot act independently of other internal veto players to increase autonomy. They must have the support of all members of the MWC and institutionally defined veto players. Existing work has demonstrated where veto players originate, as well as a number of ways in which veto players affect different political outcomes (Tsebelis 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Tsebelis 2002; MacIntyre 2003). I argue below that the number of veto players is a major determinant of the ability of governments to offer autonomy to self-determination groups and affects the likelihood of a new autonomy agreement by limiting policy flexibility but also enhancing government credibility.

In contrast, when institutionalization is low, internal factions do not have a formal apparatus that specifies recognizable and widely respected rules for political engagement. There are three consequences of this. First, there are no institutionally defined veto points, and thus only members of the MWC are veto players. Second, it is unclear ex ante who can form a minimum winning coalition among internal factions. Because the process of policy change is not clearly defined, we cannot identify who can hold up a change in autonomy. Third, internal factions can act independently of one another in an attempt to change autonomy policy. The MWC for a particular policy change when institutionalization is low is defined by the coalition of actors that can enforce policy change ex ante.[2]

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[2] This can also be affected by the government's capacity to aid in enforcement.

Thus, the key differences between different levels of institutionalization are as follows. First, high institutionalization generates both MWC and institutional veto players, whereas low institutionalization has only MWC actors. Second, under high institutionalization, the number of veto players is clearly defined and they can stop policy change prior to an autonomy agreement being made. Under low institutionalization, the MWC is not clearly defined and internal factions can act independently of one another. Thus, their ability to veto an autonomy deal is demonstrated if they prevent implementation.

Most SD movements   Consolidated States
                        Weakly
                Institutionalized States   De facto States
Low |——| High

Figure 2.1 Institutionalization Continuum

Empirically, the degree of institutionalization is a continuum (shown in Figure 2.1), and both states and self-determination movements fall between the extremes. Although governments and self-determination movements can fall anywhere along this continuum, most states are highly institutionalized and most self-determination movements are not. There are some notable exceptions to this trend, such as Nagorno-Karabakh or Taiwan, which are de facto states. These movements look structurally similar to states; they have political institutions that govern their territory and a central figure that negotiates with other actors such as their host state, other states and non-state actors. However, these movements are outliers to the general trend that self-

determination movements do not have strong institutional structures. On the other end of

this continuum are self-determination groups that are essentially collections of

individuals who share only a group identity. Between these extremes are self-

determination movements with some degree of coordination among individuals. Most

self-determination movements fall into this mid-range. [3]

Governments also fall along this range, but most functioning states are close to

the right end of the continuum. States with weak institutions (such as Somalia or Russia

during its transition out of the Soviet Union) may act more like the majority of self-

determination movements, where segments of the government try to act independently of

one another. For this analysis of autonomy bargaining, I make the simplifying

assumption that states are highly institutionalized and self-determination movements are

not. I allow some variation in this variable for self-determination movements by

theorizing and measuring the role that local institutions play in autonomy bargaining.

However, I treat this analytically as a source of organizational resources rather than a

structural determinant of internal faction behavior.

Effects of Fractionalization

Variation in the number and institutionalization of internal divisions affects both

internal and external bargaining. The number of internal divisions has differing effects

on the bargaining process depending on the degree of institutionalization. In this section,

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[3] Drawing from the sample of self-determination movements in the study, only 40% of self-determination groups have any representative or traditional political institutions which represent their interests to their parent state during the time period under examination. However, over 50% of these self-determination groups coordinated their efforts through some overarching faction within the movement; we can think of these less institutionalized movements as falling along the middle of the continuum.

I explain how fractionalization of governments and self-determination movements affects the two bargains specified above.

Internal Bargaining

The dynamic of the internal bargaining game for governments (as highly institutionalized actors) is one of consensus gathering among internal actors who can veto policy change. The process of internal bargaining consists of pro-autonomy forces in the government trying to gain support of all government veto players. This must take place before the government can settle with the self-determination movement. In order to gain consensus of all veto players, those opposed to autonomy must be induced to change their position. This is done by offering compensation in exchange for supporting the policy. Pro-autonomy actors use lobbying and side-payments, which can be either monetary or policy, to gain support.[4] Because all veto players must agree to policy change, governments with multiple veto players run the risk of becoming internally deadlocked over the issue of autonomy even when settlement with the self-determination movement is possible. This potential for deadlock during internal bargaining can severely constrain the ability of governments to negotiate a new autonomy deal.

Specific veto players may oppose an autonomy plan because it is costly to them (in terms of power or perhaps physical resources). For example, the Bangladesh National Party opposed the 1997 autonomy accord with the Chittagong Hills people because they perceived the accord as encroaching on the land of Bengali speakers in the region.

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[4] Unless the state has very weak institutions, veto players typically do not to use violence to induce other factions into either supporting or opposing autonomy change. Resorting to violence indicates a failure of political institutions and can mark a transition to civil conflict.

Internal deadlock occurs when the bargain among government veto players to gain internal consensus breaks down or is delayed for so long that the self-determination movement infers that its demands have been rejected outright.

The ability to avoid deadlock depends on both the number of veto players and the resources available to those promoting the policy change. Internal deadlock is more likely among governments that have a greater number of veto players. When there are multiple veto players, each has a simultaneous incentive to support and oppose autonomy policy change. On one hand, a new autonomy agreement is beneficial to all veto players because the government can minimize the chance of violent conflict if a successful agreement can be made ex ante (Fearon 1995). When the government can make a successful autonomy agreement without fighting, it retains the forgone costs of conflict, which creates a social surplus that benefits all actors in the state. However, even when governments as a whole have this general incentive to support increasing autonomy, each individual veto player would be best off of they were given some additional compensation for their support of the deal. This tension creates an internal bargaining situation similar to a multi-player chicken game wherein each veto player seeks compensation.[5] Each veto player's incentives for holding out and demanding compensation increases the likelihood of internal deadlock, and consequently decreases the probability of achieving a new autonomy arrangement with the self-determination movement.

To win over veto players that are opposed to the agreement, pro-autonomy actors must compensate them with fungible resources. The gains from successful ex ante

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[5] See Bornstien et al. (1997) for a discussion of n-player chicken games.

bargaining with the self-determination movement are *unrealized* gains in a literal sense. The government forgoes the costs of conflict, but does not necessarily gain more fungible resources as a result of the successful autonomy bargain. Given that the social surplus is a largely unrealized benefit, opposition veto players need to be compensated from current resources.[6] Governments with less fungible resources will have more difficulty compensating veto players who want to hold up the agreement.

The internal bargain within governments becomes more complicated and difficult to resolve as the number of veto players increases or resources decrease. The unanimity requirement for decision making among veto players creates incentives for costly delays in bargaining and can generate an empty set because government with highly constrained resources may not be able to adequately compensate veto players.[7] In this way, the number of internal divisions affects the likelihood that the state will overcome internal divisions and reach agreement over a new autonomy status.

In contrast, self-determination movements do not have a high degree of institutionalization that binds factions together and allows them to veto change ex ante. Individual factions or coalitions of factions within self-determination movements can make a new autonomy agreement without the prior consent of all factions. For example, Hamas and other Palestinian factions have opposed the PLO's negotiations with Israel at

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[6] Promises of future compensation are unlikely to be persuasive. This is because multi-veto player governments favor the status quo. The power to a veto player is to hold up change and their ability to successfully demand compensation after they have allowed policy change is limited.
[7] An empty set refers to a bargaining space which contains no potential agreements.

several points over the past 30 years, yet there have been implemented increases in the autonomy status of Palestine.[8]

Factions bargain with one another both before and after an autonomy agreement is made, and those in favor of a deal must persuade or force others to comply once it has been made. Because of this, it is not clear who will form a minimal winning coalition ex ante, and thus exactly who needs to be bought off or satisfied by the deal. (i.e. no one knows who can veto an agreement until it is being implemented). Moreover, factions advocating for a specific settlement can use force to gain compliance for a new deal. This can be done by eliminating opposition factions, or by decreasing their strength to the point that they cannot prevent agreement implementation on their own. The autonomous nature of self-determination factions means that internal bargaining is focused on the enforceability of a specific deal.

The number of factions and organizational resources of self-determination movements affects the likelihood that an agreed to increase in autonomy can be enforced. Once a government has offered an increase in autonomy, factions in favor of the deal need to overcome internal divisions to implement the change. Self-determination factions can try to gain support for an autonomy plan in several ways, including making side-payments to gain support for the agreements and using violence to force compliance.

Some factions may have greater influence over politics by resisting settlement than transitioning to a new autonomy arrangement and thus would need compensation to do so. The role of monetary side-payments to overcome resistance and induce

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[8] For example, Palestinian factions rejecting the 1993 Oslo accords formed the Alliance of Palestinian Forces to oppose the agreement.

implementation is most important when other factions find continued resistance to settlement profitable by extracting, or "looting" resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Additionally, pro-settlement factions can use the promise of future power under a new autonomy arrangement to gain support for their plan. Potential political gains and future power can be used as an internal bargaining chip, though perhaps with limited effectiveness due to constraints on the ability of factions to commit credibly to share power in the future.[9] Because self-determination factions are not bound together with a high degree of institutionalization, their guarantees to each other are less secure. Moreover, because self-determination factions are not constrained by a formal political apparatus, they can use force without inherently changing or challenging the structure of the political unit. Intra-communal conflict surrounding the question of autonomy is not uncommon among self-determination groups as factions for and against a specific accommodation try to force their favored outcome.

Given these dynamics of internal bargaining, the number of internal factions and their organizational resources will affect the ability of a self-determination movement to implement a new autonomy agreement in two ways. First, a higher number of factions will increase the likelihood of spoiler attempts which can block settlement under some conditions. The greater the number of factions with different preferences, the wider the range of autonomy related demands and the more likely any particular autonomy agreement will generate extremists who will hold out against the new agreement.[10] The

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[9] Although promises of power from self-determination factions present credible commitment problems, these can be alleviated to some extent by enshrining the power distribution in the new autonomy agreement.
[10] Extremists can attempt to impede a settlement through a variety of means, including using violence to polarize the population. Extremists can also try to prevent the effective use of new powers for the group by

existence of extremist preferences introduces the potential for spoiling attempts. In contrast, self-determination groups that are unified in their demands are less likely to encounter spoilers and internal implementation problems.[11]

The second effect is that movements with local institutions or overarching factions that coordinate internal factions will be better able to rein in internal dissent. Although movements with internal divisions are more likely to encounter spoilers, it does not necessarily follow that the chance of successful spoiling increases linearly with the number of factions. Walter and Kydd (2002) show that the ability of political moderates to suppress extremists will lower the chances that extremists can successfully spoil a peace agreement.[12] This suggests that resources available to moderates, particularly those that will assist with enforcement, will affect the likelihood of implementation in the face of internal resistance.

Coordinating institutions and factions can help rein in extremists in two ways. First, when groups have pre-existing institutions that coordinate disparate factions, these institutions can assist in the transfer of power specified by a new agreement. For example, if the new autonomy arrangement allows for local taxation power, new spending authority, or policing powers, a preexisting institutional structure will have greater resources to carry out these new activities. Second, pre-existing institutions and coordinating factions can be used for gathering information about extremists and to assist in policing functions in order to curtail extremists' attempts to disrupt the transfer of

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contesting local political decisions in various ways, thereby decreasing the importance and effectiveness of increased autonomy.

[11] Stedman (1997) suggests that a greater number of potential spoilers compounds the problems they present for peace agreements.

[12] Stedman (1997) argues that international actors can affect the success of spoilers as well. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) addresses the role of moderates in preventing extremist terrorism.

autonomy. Examples of institutions and factions that coordinate within self-determination movements are the Tatar National Assembly (Milli Majlis) in Russia and the Tamil Nationalist Alliance in Sri Lanka. They both function as points of coordination for action and debate regarding autonomy related demands.

This section addressed how the number of factions and resources available to pro-autonomy factions affect the ability of governments and self-determination groups to overcome internal divisions to increase autonomy. The next section focuses on how internal divisions affect bargaining between self-determination movements and governments.

External Bargaining

When governments and self-determination movements negotiate a new autonomy deal, the objective for both parties is to achieve the best agreement possible. They want a settlement that concedes the least to their opponent, but is still supported internally. Fractionalization affects negotiations between representatives of both sides as they try to achieve this. The number of internal factions, as well as the level of institutionalization of governments and movements, affects this external bargain in three areas: bargaining strategy, the ability to make credible commitments, and the level of uncertainty.[13]

When self-determination movements are fractionalized, governments can pursue strategies that exploit internal divisions within their opponent. They do this by strategically using autonomy to further divide the movement, pushing moderates and

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[13] Extending the logic of the Schelling Conjecture (Schelling 1960), one can argue that a more radical constraint generally gives negotiators a bargaining advantage. However, Tarar (2001) shows game theoretically that this only holds under very specific conditions, none of which characterize the politics of self-determination well.

extremists apart. Governments pursue this divide and conquer strategy by offering an autonomy deal that satisfies only the most moderate factions.[14] This will weaken the self-determination movement either by undermining its collective demands or compelling moderate self-determination factions to try to enforce a specific autonomy arrangement that the government offers. If this strategy succeeds, autonomy increases will separate out moderates from the more extremist factions.

The greater the number of internal divisions in self-determination movements, the easier this strategy is for governments to pursue. In order to cause a split, the government only needs to satisfy the most moderate factions. Unitary movements are unlikely to further divide unless there are underlying divisions that perhaps have not manifested themselves in the political arena. The most highly-fractionized movements have a wider range of preferences over governance and a greater number of factions. As such, the government can buy off the most moderate factions with lesser concessions than it would take to satisfy a more cohesive movement.[15] The least amount of concessions needs to be given to moderates in highly-divided movements, and as the number of divisions decrease, the costs of concession increase. Unitary movements are the most costly to accommodate because the government needs to satisfy their demands fully. The costliness of autonomy concessions will affect the willingness of governments to propose autonomy to these different types of movements.

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[14] Governments can also be divided by autonomy policy when a proposed deal leads to the collapse of a government. To illustrate, internal divisions over a potential autonomy plan in Belgium led to the collapse of Prime Minister Marten's government in 1980. Likewise, the EPRDF transition government in Ethiopia further fractionalized over the issues of autonomy soon after the government was formed. This is less likely to be used as a strategy however, because it does not promote settlement in the short term.

[15] This holds assuming that the median preferences of the self-determination group are the same. I attempt to control for this in the empirical analysis.

Given that limited concessions are the most attractive for governments to make, agreements with divided movements should be narrower in scope that those with unitary movements. Because they are designed to satisfy only the most moderate factions, limited autonomy concessions are likely to be contested by factions with more extreme preferences. Thus, the strategic use of autonomy will generate limited and somewhat internally contested autonomy deals.

Internal divisions within governments also affect the external bargaining process. The number of divisions determines how credibly the government can commit to a new autonomy arrangement and self-determination movements will consider this in negotiations with governments. The barriers that multiple veto players create for policy change discussed above actually benefit governments in their external bargaining with self-determination movements. Although multiple veto players create a hurdle for policy change when the government is negotiating over autonomy, this barrier makes it difficult to reverse course once an increase in autonomy has occurred. Governments with one or few veto players, such as Burma or Iraq under Saddam Hussein, have less credibility because there are no checks on their ability to renege later on. These governments are free to reach an agreement, but the self-determination movement has little or no incentive to trust that the government will abide by the agreement in the future. This is an important consideration for self-determination movements because autonomy settlements often require groups to demobilize if they are militant, and by doing so they increase their vulnerability.[16]

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[16] The ability of self-determination factions to commit credibly to a new autonomy arrangement is not enhanced by multiple factions, and it is difficult for both unitary and divided movements. Unitary

A final effect that fractionalization has on the external bargaining environment is to increase uncertainty. Uncertainty, along with incentives to misrepresent one's strength, can lead to bargaining failure (Fearon 1995). The uncertainty generated by multi-faction self-determination movements is due to both the existence of multiple demands and incomplete information about how much of the population supports any particular demand. The relative size of support for each unique demand determines how much the government should offer and, to some extent, whether a deal can be implemented. If the government is uncertain about the strength of the moderates versus extremists in a movement, it will have difficulty determining what the minimum concession is that they can use to divide the movement or satisfy the majority of the group. Assessing this information is difficult because each faction within the movement has an incentive to overstate the strength of its support base in order to get its preferred concessions.

Ceteris paribus, more factions generate more uncertainty about faction strength, and subsequently about what autonomy deals will be successful.[17] Under perfect information, governments would know exactly the extent of concessions they should offer the group. Increased uncertainty will lead governments to either overestimate or underestimate the strength of specific demands in the movement. This estimation will

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movements face credibility issues because they can easily use the gains from an increase in autonomy to re-launch another challenge for more power. Divided movements are not more credible because individual factions cannot commit to an autonomy deal with assurance that other factions will not pursue violence, or use the benefits of a new autonomy regime to launch a stronger challenge for greater self-determination in the future. Because it is unclear who constitutes the minimum winning coalition, more actors do not generate stability.

[17] This uncertainty is particularly problematic because there is often no formal mouthpiece for self-determination groups. In response to this problem of uncertainty, several governments facing self-determination demands have held referenda to directly ask the population what level of autonomy they prefer. This method was used in Scotland in 1979 and 1997, Quebec, Corsica, Chechnya, and East Timor.

determine where they try to strike a deal along a range of possible agreements. By overestimating the strength of support within a movement for a specific autonomy deal, governments will sometimes push for settlements that are not ultimately tenable and break down.

It is true that governments could also underestimate support for moderates, possibly making agreement more likely if the government was inclined to offer more than the minimum acceptable concession. However, in the absence of uncertainty, governments would know what minimal concessions would be accepted and bargaining would never breakdown. Therefore, uncertainty makes bargaining breakdown more likely due to the possibility that the government will underestimate what an acceptable agreement is.[18]

Hypotheses

This theory starts from the assumption that neither governments nor self-determination movements are unitary actors and argues that the number and nature of internal divisions within each actor critically affects their ability to bargain over and make changes in autonomy. By specifying the effects of internal divisions on autonomy bargaining I have identified a set of relationships between internal divisions and the bargaining environment. Some of these relationships have a positive effect on the likelihood of increasing autonomy, while others have a negative effect. In this section, I walk through the effects posited above and generate a set of testable hypotheses. My

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[18] Governments also generate some degree of uncertainty, but because they must come to internal agreement before a formal change in autonomy policy can be offered, it does not affect the bargaining process in the same way.

theory speaks to a number of elements of the bargaining process. These include 1) the ability of governments to make autonomy offers, 2) the likelihood that self-determination groups get offers, 3) the nature of autonomy settlements, 4) the likelihood of an actual increase in autonomy and 5) the likelihood that conflict will occur. The effect of fractionalization on each of these outcomes is specified in the hypotheses below.

Which governments will offer autonomy?

Hypothesis One: The fewer the number of government veto players, the more likely the government is to make autonomy offers.

Governments with few veto players have the greatest flexibility to offer autonomy to sub-national groups. In these cases, there are few or no institutional checks on decision making, and leaders are free to alter governance arrangements without consulting other actors in the state. Moreover, the fewer members there are in the minimal winning coalition, the less veto players that need to be compensated to support the policy change. When the government is unitary, there is essentially no internal bargaining process.

Hypothesis Two: The higher the value of fungible resources held by a multi-veto player government, the more likely a government is to offer autonomy.

Before a government can pursue a policy to increase autonomy, all veto players must support the policy. Governments with multiple veto players can become internally deadlocked if some veto players oppose a new autonomy deal. The ability to overcome internal opposition depends on whether autonomy advocates can get veto players to change position. This is done through offering side-payments in exchange for supporting

an autonomy deal. The ability of pro-autonomy actors to gain internal consensus for an autonomy offer therefore depends on whether there are adequate resources to compensate those opposed to autonomy. If those promoting autonomy have nothing to offer in return for support, they will be unlikely to overcome resistance. Governments with a greater amount of fungible resources that can be used for side-payments will be most likely to avoid deadlock, and more likely to make an autonomy offer.

Which self-determination groups will be offered autonomy?
Hypothesis Three: Unitary and highly-divided self-determination movements will receive the most self-determination offers.

Unitary and highly-divided movements are most likely to receive offers of autonomy because the former are better able to implement them and the latter are more likely to further divide over such offers. Unitary movements are unlikely to encounter spoiling attempts by extremists because their preferences over governance are similar. Any autonomy deal that the movement would sign will satisfy the central demands of the group. Because they are unlikely to encounter spoilers and the associated implementation problems, unitary groups are easier to settle with if the government is willing to give into their demand. Highly-divided movements can be harder to settle with because they may experience spoiler attempts, however, they are also less costly to settle with if extremists can be marginalized and spoiling attempts prevented. Governments can "divide and conquer" highly fractionalized movements with limited concessions by buying off the most moderate factions. If governments can satisfy a moderate segment of the group, they can then attempt to limit the relevance of more extremist positions. K.

Cunningham (2006) shows that autonomy concessions are associated with a decreased support for extremist positions overtime. Thus, the divide and conquer strategy of targeting autonomy to highly-divided movements is both less costly to governments in terms of the concessions they make and can decrease the appeal of extreme positions.

Hypothesis Four: Self-determination movements with greater institutional and organization resources will be more likely to get autonomy offers.

Self-determination movements with local institutions or over-arching factions that coordinate other factions are more likely to get autonomy offers. All divided movements have the potential to encounter internal resistance to an autonomy deal that spoils the settlement. Difficulty with internal enforcement makes it more risky for governments to offer autonomy to divide movements because of the potential for spoiling. The existence of a faction or local institution that coordinates others aids in the implementation of autonomy settlements and decreases the likelihood that a deal will fail at this stage. Thus, these movements are more likely to receive autonomy offers.

What type of agreements will we see?

Hypothesis Five: The greater the divisions within self-determination movements, the less concessions they will receive.

In Hypothesis Three, I argued that highly-divided movements will get more autonomy offers because the government can buy off parts of the movement at a lower cost than settling with a unitary or moderately-divided group. If this is the case, we should observe that both autonomy offers and autonomy concessions made to highly-

divided movements are lesser in scope than those to unitary or moderately-divided movements.

Hypothesis Six: The greater the number of self-determination factions, the more likely an autonomy agreement is to be contested by extremist self-determination factions.

If governments use autonomy strategically to separate moderates from extremists, we should observe that agreements made with highly-divided movements are contested by some other internal factions. Moreover, we should be surprised if concessions made to unitary movements are internally contested.

When will we observe autonomy increases?

Hypothesis Seven: Autonomy increase is most likely when governments have a moderate number of veto players.

The relationship between veto players and the likelihood of autonomy increase is curvilinear (inverted U shape). I argue in Hypothesis 1 that governments with the fewest veto players have the greatest flexibility to change autonomy. Although this should lead to a greater number of offers from the government, it will not lead to more instances of autonomy increase. The freedom with which these governments can change policy decreases their credibility to maintain the status quo if a new agreement is implemented, as governments with few checks on decision making can easily renege later on. This lack of credibility makes low-veto player governments unattractive bargaining partners, and self-determination movements will have little trust that increased autonomy, once implemented, will stand. Among governments with moderate or high levels of veto players, it is the moderately-divided that will be able to implement increase in autonomy.

Governments with more veto players are more susceptible to internal deadlock, which

makes offering autonomy difficult if not impossible. The propensity for deadlock that

limits autonomy offers is higher for governments with a greater number of veto players

because there are a greater number of potential hold outs to satisfy before an autonomy

agreement can be made. Figure 2.2 demonstrates graphically this aggregate expectation.

Figure 2.2 Expected Likelihood of Autonomy Based on Government Veto Players

Hypothesis Eight: The greater the amount of fungible resources the government has, the

more likely an increase in autonomy.

I argue in Hypothesis Two that a greater amount of fungible resources should

facilitate internal bargaining within governments and consequently make autonomy

offers possible. By increasing the likelihood that governments can make an offer,

fungible resources increase the likelihood that we will see an increase in autonomy.

Hypothesis Nine: Unitary and highly-divided self-determination movements will be most likely to implement an autonomy increase.

Hypothesis Ten: Self-determination movements with greater institutional and organization resources will be most likely to implement an autonomy increase.

My predictions about the relationship between the number of factions and the likelihood of an actual increase in autonomy parallels my predictions about which movements were likely to be offered autonomy. Three factors determine what types of groups will get autonomy: 1) whether the government makes them an offer, 2) whether they can implement a deal, and 3) uncertainty about what kind of deal will succeed.

Hypotheses Three and Four specify how movement fractionalization affects government expectations about both the costs of concessions and the probability of a successful agreement; the same logic applies here. Unitary and highly-divided movements are most likely to get offers. Moreover, unitary movements and those with coordinating institutions or organizations are most likely to implement a new autonomy policy successfully. It is less costly for governments to make concessions to highly-divided movements and thus these movements are more likely to get offers. The greater a government's uncertainty about what offers will be successful, the more likely it is to push a settlement that cannot be implemented, leading to failure. Movements with multiple factions increase uncertainty, and thus decrease the chance of an agreement.

There is no hard and fast rule dictating which of these contrasting forces should dominate the bargaining environment. I expect that the strategic dynamic of external bargaining, which produces the incentives for the government to negotiate with highly-

divided movements will be strongest. Figure 2.3 demonstrates graphically this expectation.

Figure 2.3 Expected Likelihood of Autonomy Based on Self-determination Factions

Table 2.1 shows three levels of internal divisions for governments and self-determination movements specified in the hypotheses and indicates in which cases we are likely to observe increases in autonomy. Agreement is most likely when the government has a moderate number of veto players and when the self-determination movement is either unitary or highly-divided.

Table 2.1 Prediction Chart Based on the Number of Internal Divisions

		Government *(High Institutionalization)*		
		Unitary/Low	**Moderate**	**High**
Self-determination Movement (Low Institutionalization)	**Unitary**	Autonomy possible	**Autonomy most likely**	Autonomy least likely
	Moderate	Autonomy least likely	Autonomy possible	Autonomy least likely
	High	Autonomy possible	**Autonomy most likely**	Autonomy possible

Increased autonomy is most likely when a government with a moderate number of veto players is negotiating with either a unitary or highly-divided movement. In these cases, bolded above, the government is able to make credible commitments and is likely to overcome the internal bargaining process that precedes an autonomy offer. Moreover, these two types of movement are most likely to implement an agreement and are low cost in terms of concessions, respectively. In all cases, the chance of a successful agreement is increased if governments have resources for side-payments and self-determination movements have organizational resources to assist in agreement implementation.

The cases where we are least likely to see autonomy are those when the government has very few or many veto players and the movement has a moderate number of factions. Governments with few veto players cannot credibly commit to abide by a new deal, while those with a high number of veto players have the most difficulty overcoming internal divisions to actually make an autonomy offer. Moderately-divided movements are likely to encounter implementation challenges, and require more concessions for the government to buy off internal factions. Thus, agreement is less likely in these types of cases. The remaining cases are those where one side of the bargain is likely to make a new agreement, though the other is not. I have designated

these cases as situations where autonomy is possible, but we should expect it with less frequency than in the "autonomy likely" scenarios.

When will we see conflict?

An additional set of hypotheses can be derived from the theory that focuses the analysis on a measure of bargaining failure rather than success. The high costs of conflict create incentives for governments and self-determination to negotiate a compromise before conflict breaks out. When that bargaining process fails, we should see conflict. My theory specifies when bargaining over autonomy is most likely to fail, and consequently, degenerate into armed conflict. The following hypotheses specify my predictions for the likelihood of civil conflict.

Hypothesis Eleven: Governments with a few or many veto players will be most likely to experience civil conflict.

Hypothesis Twelve: Moderately-divided self-determination movements will be most likely to experience civil conflict.

Hypotheses Eleven and Twelve mirror hypotheses Seven and Nine. Civil conflict is the result of repeated failures to renegotiate governance status. Thus, those governments and self-determination movements that are most likely to succeed in getting a new autonomy agreement are least likely to experience conflict.

Conclusion

Disputes over self-determination constitute a major challenge to the international system today. The disintegration of states is one of the most extreme consequences that

can follow from unsuccessful attempts to manage self-determination claims. Although the literature has identified numerous factors that may increase incentives for self-determination demands, little work has sought to explain barriers to settlement based on political interaction between groups seeking self-rule and governments. Incentive-based approaches can only take us so far in understanding the politics of self-determination. Much of what we are interested in is not why these demands emerge per se, but why and how they manifest themselves in a political context, and particularly, when they are likely to lead to violence or peaceful accommodation.

My theory focuses on the process through which governments and minority groups seeking self-determination bargain over autonomy and identifies a crucial piece of the puzzle. I explain how the likelihood of autonomy settlement is affected by strategic incentives that internal divisions create for both internal bargaining within governments and self-determination movements and for external bargaining between these actors. I also explain the barriers to agreement that internal divisions generate for both governments and self-determination movements.

In the next three chapters, I endeavor to test this theory. The quantitative analysis in Chapter Three examines trends in internal divisions and instances of autonomy accommodation. The subsequent two chapters present case studies of negotiations between governments and self-determination movements. Chapter Four illustrates how internal divisions in the French government and the Corsican self-determination movements have affected the devolution process since 1970. Chapter Five demonstrates the effects of self-determination movement fractionalization on autonomy bargaining between the Mizo, Naga and Bodo movements and the Indian government.

Chapter Three

Quantitative Analysis of Bargaining Process and Outcomes

This chapter presents a series of quantitative tests of a set of hypotheses presented in Chapter Two. I run a succession of regression analyses using an original dataset created to evaluate the hypotheses related to increases in autonomy. The chapter is divided into three primary sections: data, analysis and conclusions. The data section explains the dataset I have constructed as well as the coding procedures for the primary independent and dependent variables. I discuss the methods used for each test and report the results of all statistical analyses in the following section. Finally, the concluding section interprets the primary findings and discusses their significance in testing the theory presented in this dissertation

The Data

In order to evaluate a set of the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two, I have created a dataset of self-determination movements from 1960 to 2003. The unit of observation is the self-determination movement/government dyad year. In constructing this dataset, I have collected information on and coded original data for a random sample of cases on the following variables: increases in autonomy, factions within self-determination movements, and local institutions and organizations coordinating self-determination groups.

Cases

The universe of cases for this study is all self-determination movement/government dyads. The sample for this study is drawn from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), which publishes a list of self-determination movements in their Peace and Conflict report (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). This list is comprised of 148 self-determination groups drawn from a larger list of minority groups they specify as "at risk" in terms of their position within society.

Although there are a few alternatives, I have selected this list for two reasons. [1] First, using the CIDCM list allows me to use the large amount of information provided about these movements on the group level by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. One of the challenges to studying self-determination movements cross nationally is there is little systematic information about sub-national groups. Moreover, a number of studies show that characteristics at this level are important determinants of the patterns of peace and conflict we observe among these groups (Toft 2003, Gurr 1970).

Second, the CIDCM list uses a fairly broad criterion for including minority groups as "self-determination" groups (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). For inclusion in the list, the group must demonstrate concern in one of the following areas: general concern for autonomy, union with kindred groups, political independence, greater regional autonomy, limited autonomy, or other autonomy issues. This broad criterion includes

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[1] There are two alternative options for a list of self-determination movement. The first is Sambanis and Zinn (2005). They have created a new list of self-determination movement that add 161 new groups to the CIDCM list, however this list had not been fully created at the outset of this project. The primary difference between the Sambanis and Zinn list is the inclusion of groups that are not considered "at risk." The *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements* (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000) has also compiled a list of over 300 separatist groups since 1945, but includes little information on these movements beyond a basic description.

groups that are interested in autonomy, but not independence per se. Some self-determination groups start out demanding autonomy and eventually demand independence (such as the Corsicans in France who initially sought only autonomy until the mid-1970s or the Bengali movement in Pakistan which began with autonomy demands). On the other hand, there are also instances of groups demanding independence, then later changing their positions to demand autonomy only (such as the Dalai Lama's government in exile which downgraded its demand for Tibetan independence to autonomy in 1990). The fluidity of demands illustrates the importance including groups that make both autonomy and independence demands.

As noted above, the CIDCM list is limited to groups that the Minorities At Risk Project considers "at risk," which limits the possible universe of cases. This could bias the sample to exclude cases where the state has chosen to repress the minority and perhaps these states are less likely to use autonomy concessions than others not in the dataset. Examining the list of self-determination movements from the CIDCM report, however, there does not appear to be a bias in favor of including repressive states, and a number of movements in developed democracies are included.[2] These groups enjoy a high level of rights and are largely free from overt repression.

The construction of the dataset includes a random sample of 25% of groups from the CIDCM list. In order to generate a random sample, I divided the list into two sections – violent and non-violent movements. I alphabetized both lists and assigned numbers to each group which I used to select the cases for inclusion. The timeframe for the dataset is

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[2] For example, the Catalan in Spain and the Scots in the United Kingdom are included, as well as a number of groups from Western Europe where the groups do not appear to be especially "at risk" in a way that would bias my results.

1960 – 2003. There is, however, variation in which years are included for each self-determination movement/government dyad. A dyad is included only in years when the self-determination movement was actively making demands for self-determination. For example, some of the movements started after 1960 (such as the Bodos in India), while others were concluded before 2003 (such as the East Timorese in Indonesia). Moreover, in some cases, the country within which the group resides was not independent until after 1960 (such as the Croats in Bosnia). These cases have a correspondingly limited timeframe.

Measuring the Dependent Variable: Autonomy Increases

The primary dependent variable is increase in autonomy. A measure of change is appropriate for the study because the theory explains the likelihood of change from the status quo. The theory does not explain how the number of internal factions is likely to affect the overall level of autonomy, and the causal mechanisms advanced here should not be affected by the current level of autonomy the self-determination group enjoys. The variable is coded as a dichotomous variable on a yearly basis.

In constructing the dataset, I systematically collected information on changes in autonomy status between self-determination movements and their parent states. Although a number of country case studies offer detailed information on autonomy for a specific group, there are no existing datasets that provide cross-national data on changes in autonomy status over time. These data allows me to examine the ongoing process of autonomy bargaining across cases. This is particularly important because negotiations over governance are not a one-shot game. An analysis of more general patterns of

autonomy reveals the underlying dynamics of this ongoing process in a way that focused studies on one or two cases cannot easily do.

I use a broad definition of autonomy to judge whether a change in governance constituted an autonomy increase. Any change in the status quo that granted greater control over an autonomy issue during the time frame is coded as an autonomy increase. This measure of autonomy captures both cultural and political autonomy as well as the creation of independent states. Examples of autonomy include the creation of regional councils in Belgium for the Walloons and Flemings, the change in status of Gagauz-Eri in Moldova to an autonomous region, the formation of the Bodoland Autonomous Council in India, and the transfer of administrative control over language and education in the South Tyrol region of Italy.

I used four sources to code the autonomy increase variable: the Minorities at Risk (MAR) group profiles, Uppsala Conflict Database conflict profiles, Keesing's Record of World Events, and Lexis-Nexis News Wires and regional World News Reports. For each self-determination group, I began by reading the MAR group profiles and the Uppsala Conflict Database profile to create an initial list of instances of increased autonomy. The Uppsala database included detailed information on formal agreements between self-determination groups and states, though it is limited to violent cases after 1989. The MAR profiles provide a detailed timeline of events relating to the self-determination movement/government relations, though typically for a limited number of years.

In addition to the Uppsala and MAR profiles, I used Keesing's Record of World Events database of reports to gather additional information on instances of autonomy increases for each case. Keesing's reports begin in 1960, which allowed me to access

information about the earlier years in my dataset that were not covered by the MAR or

Uppsala profiles. I used the search menu on Keesing's to look up reports on the self-

determination groups using a series of search terms related to autonomy. My initial

inquiries used the following terms to find reports on autonomy changes: autonomy, self-

determination, self-governance, self-rule, federalism, and independence. I repeated this

process using the LexisNexis Academic search program to access news wires (355

sources) and world news reports (with hundreds of sources by region) from 1960 onward.

Once I had compiled a list of instances of increased autonomy, I used the same

sources to gain additional information about each case of autonomy change. For a

specific entry to be coded as an autonomy increase, I verified that the change was in fact

an increase in autonomy and that the change actually occurred (a number of entries from

the initial list were unimplemented autonomy agreements or proposals). I also

established the year in which the new autonomy arrangement was agreed to. There was

frequently a delay between the initial decision or agreement to change autonomy status

and the implementation of this agreement. I coded the variable for autonomy increase in

the year in which the decision was made.

Measuring the Independent Variables: Internal Fractionalization and Resources

In order to measure the number of divisions within self-determination

movements, I collected information and coded variables on the number of factions

representing the self-determination group and the specific demands of each faction. A

faction is defined as any organization that makes public demands on the state relating to

the group's autonomy status. Different types of factions include political parties, militant

groups, and social pressure groups (civil organizations). Examples of factions include the Socialist Forces Front in Algeria that calls for autonomy for Berbers, the Assembly of First Nations that represents indigenous population in Canada and seeks autonomy as well as constitutional recognition for indigenous peoples, and the Tamil Nationalist Alliance which demands autonomy for Tamils in Sri Lanka.

I compiled an initial list of factions using the Uppsala and MAR profiles. The Uppsala database includes an explicit list of parties to the conflict. Among those listed, I included any party that represented the self-determination group. The MAR profiles do not include a specific list of factions, but report on organizations representing the self-determination group in both the summaries of the group and the timelines provided. Once I had an initial list of potential factions, I used news reports from Keesing's and Lexis-Nexis (News Wires and regional World News Sources) to look up demands and duration data on this first list of factions. Many of these searches yielded names of other potential factions, and these were added to the list for investigation. I also included any factions that I found mention of while gathering data for the autonomy variable, as there was frequently mention of at least one representative faction from the self-determination group in reports about autonomy.

The first piece of information I gathered about each potential faction was whether it represented the self-determination group. If not, the faction was taken off the list. This type of scenario came up in multi-party conflicts, where a number of factions were mentioned in news reports. One caveat in the coding is that some of the groups I investigated resided outside the home country of the groups they represented. For example, the Grey Wolves seek independence for Turkish Cyprus, but are based in

Turkey. Groups that reside in another state were also included in the final coding, as long as they represented the self-determination group and pressed some autonomy-related demands.[3]

Next, I assess whether the faction was making a demand related to autonomy status. Autonomy-related demands include those for change in the location of governance such as no change in autonomy status (status quo), increased autonomy, independence, union or reunion with another state, or the creation of a super-national entity (such as a pan-ethnic state which includes groups in other states). Autonomy demands include scope-related demands, including demands for increased control in substantive areas, such as education, cultural affairs, taxing and spending powers or political organization. General democratization demands are not coded as autonomy demands unless there was specific mention of a change in the level or scope of group governance (such as federalism). Examples of different types of demands include explicit demands for cultural and linguistic autonomy from the Kurdish People's Democracy Party in Turkey, demands for a greater Albania from the National Movement of Kosovo, and demands for federalism and independence from the Democratic Crimea Movement and the Republican Movement of Crimea in Ukraine, respectively.

Once I establish that a particular faction represented the self-determination group and made autonomy-related demands, I code the tenure of each faction. Many of the factions were only active for a subset of the years in the dataset. Tenure information is coded from all four main sources (MAR, Uppsala, Keesing's, and LexisNexis). If the year of creation for a faction was reported in one of these sources, the faction was coded

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[3] D. Cunningham (2007) finds that external actors can alter bargaining in civil war.

as active starting that year. If no information was given about the date of creation, the initial year the faction is coded as active is the first year that the faction is mentioned in one of the sources. The final active year for a faction is the last year that it is mentioned as an active organization in the main sources.

One of the difficulties of coding the tenure of these factions is that not all of the factions are mentioned in the sources each year. I assume continuous activity between years where I found reports of the faction if there was three years or less between reports, and no indication that the faction had been disbanded. If I found specific reports that the faction was disbanded or defeated, I consider a new faction using the same name to be distinct and do not assume continuous activity. This is important because it is not uncommon for newer organizations to take the name of older, inactive ones.

Another issue that arose when collecting this information and coding the data is that different news sources can report slightly different names for the same factions. This is frequently a translation issue, both when the faction's name is transcribed for the news report, and when it is translated into English (which is the language I read the reports in). In order to prevent duplicate entries for factions, I record the names of leaders for factions with multiple similarly named factions in the same movement, as well as changes in leadership when an individual was reported to leave the organization. By using the names of faction leaders, which are typically not changed in translation, I can identify factions with slightly different names that are in fact the same organization.

Once I gathered information on the number and demands for factions, I constructed a measure of heterogeneity for each self-determination movement by year. The variable counts the number of factions making distinct demands, differentiating

between no change in autonomy status (status quo), increased autonomy, independence, union/reunion with another state, or the creation of a super-national entity.

To capture the number of government factions, I use a proxy measure which is a count of government veto checks. This data is from the Database of Political Institutions and indicates both institutional and partisan veto checks.[4] This variable is not a perfect measure of government fractionalization over autonomy because, unlike my coding of movement factions, it does not include a detailed examination of preferences over levels of autonomy. However, this variable is a reasonable proxy for the number of divisions within the government that could oppose and hold up an autonomy agreement. Because I am interested in the competition that will ensue among state factions for compensation, I can use a less nuanced count of the number of factions than I need for self-determination movements.

I also code original data on the institutional and organizational resources of self-determination movements, which I argue are central to the ability of these movements to enforce autonomy agreements when they are contested by extremists. I code a variable that indicates whether the groups' disparate factions are coordinated by either a specific faction or an institution. Factions were coded as a "coordinating faction" in any year that there were reports of coordination with specific mention of the other factions they coordinated. If a faction was reported to coordinate other factions, but I could not find the specific names of factions they coordinated, the faction was not coded as a "coordinating faction." Examples of coordinating factions include the Oron National

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[4] This measure is a general count of the number of parties in government and the number of branches of government that could veto policy change. See Keefer (2005) for a full description of the coding rules.

Front which served as an umbrella group for Oron factions in Nigeria, the Tamil United Liberation Front in Sri Lanka, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Israel. In addition to coordinating factions, I gathered information on local institutions that coordinate the self-determination group factions. An example of a coordinating institution is the Tatar National Assembly (Milli Majlis) in Russia.

I use a proxy measure for resources for internal bargaining within governments, which is the Gleditsch (2002) variable on gross domestic product per capita. This is not an ideal measure of state resources because it does not account for political resources that state factions may use to bargain with one another (such as policy concessions in other areas). However, this information would be difficult to gather in one state, let alone in multiple states that would allow a comparison. Even though gross domestic product is a crude measure, it is a reasonable proxy to make comparisons cross-nationally.

Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study. The Data Appendix provides additional information on sources and coding of variables not coded by the author.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Autonomy Increase	1369	0.04	0.20	0	1
Government Veto Players	902	3.00	2.39	1	18
Self-determination Factions	902	1.50	0.64	1	4
Coordinating Faction or Institution	1369	0.31	0.46	0	1
Logged Gross Domestic Product per capita	1366	8.13	1.21	6.05	10.41
Autonomy in Previous 5 years	1369	0.18	0.38	0	1
Number Ethnic Groups in the State	1369	5.30	3.21	1	13
Civil War Dummy	1369	0.17	0.38	0	1
Group Population (logged)	1366	7.29	1.43	4.66	10.83
Ethnic Kin in Adjoining State	1369	0.49	0.50	0	1
Third Party Involvement Dummy	1369	0.38	0.49	0	1
Independence Demands Dummy	1369	0.32	0.47	0	1
Democracy Dummy	1336	0.51	0.50	0	1
Contested Agreement Dummy	1369	0.05	0.26	0	2
Change in Number of SD Factions	823	0.02	0.34	-1	2
Federal State Dummy	1369	0.35	0.48	0	1
Logged Percent Mountainous Terrain	1369	2.62	1.25	0	4.56
Oil Exporter Dummy	1219	0.11	0.31	0	1
Political Instability	1219	0.13	0.33	0	1

Statistical Analyses

To evaluate my theory, I have generated four statistical analyses. These analyses include 1) a set of models testing my predictions about autonomy success or failure, 2) a set of models testing the effects of fractionalization on civil war, 3) a model evaluating the effect of fractionalization on responses to autonomy within self-determination movements and 4) an additional test analyzing whether the strategic use of autonomy further divides movements. Though the theory generates hypothesis about autonomy offers as well, I do not have data to test these hypotheses with a large-N analysis at this point.

Autonomy Outcomes Analysis

My theory generates four hypotheses on when autonomy increase is likely (H7 – H10). I test this set of hypotheses with four different models. First, I run a model that examines the effect of fractionalization of both governments and self-determination movements on the likelihood of autonomy. This model captures the strategic interaction generated by two non-unitary actors bargaining over autonomy. Next, I run two regressions including only variation in government or self-determination movement fractionalization. This allows me to include some additional controls that are likely to affect both fractionalization and the likelihood of autonomy but would introduce multicollinarity into the interactive model. Finally, in a fourth model, I include a number of controls which the literature has identified as increasing the likelihood of insurgency, as well as a measure of the status quo autonomy. Although these insurgency factors may not be directly associated with the likelihood of autonomy, they are likely to affect how easy or profitable insurgency may be, and this could influence the decision to settle with the government.

All four analyses include measures of government and self-determination movement fractionalization as well as their squared terms to capture the curvilinear relationships I predict in Chapter Two. Also included in the models are my proxy for government resources (GDP per capita) and my measure of organization resources for self-determination movements (existence of local coordinating institution or faction).

In addition to these variables, I employ a set of control variables to account for other factors thought to affect the likelihood of autonomy. These include whether there was an increase in autonomy in the previous five years, the number of other ethnic groups

in the state, whether the dyad is in civil war, the size of the minority population (logged), whether the minority has kin in an adjoining state, and whether a third party has been involved in the bargaining process.

Although the analysis treats all yearly observations as independent from each other, the political process that leads to a new autonomy arrangement cannot be divorced from the past. I expect that dyads are less likely to agree to an increase in autonomy when they have done so in the recent past. The number of ethnic groups in the state is included because the number of groups facing the government may affect the government's willingness to devolve autonomy to self-determination groups. Walter (2006a) finds that government will be less willing to grant political autonomy to separatists when they may face future challenges from other groups in the state. I also include a dummy variable for civil war between the self-determination group and the government. States in civil war are likely to have decreased resources due to ongoing conflict. Moreover, a new autonomy agreement may be a negotiated end to the conflict where the fighting has revealed information about the reversion point of each side (Slantchev 2003).

The size of the ethnic group and whether the group has kin in an adjoining state are likely to affect both the degree of fractionalization of self-determination movements and the likelihood of gaining autonomy. Large groups have a greater number of individuals with potentially disparate demands, and may provide a stronger challenge to the state. Those with kin in an adjoining state are also likely to have greater fractionalization as kin in the home state may seek to influence autonomy bargaining as well. The existence of a neighboring state with ethnic kin of the self-determination group

may also affect the government's decision to try to accommodate them with autonomy if they fear a pan-ethnic nationalist movement. Finally, I include a dummy for the involvement of a third party at some point in the bargaining process. These actors may bring an additional set of preferences to the bargaining table that can make agreement more difficult (D. Cunningham 2006).

In the individual level models (government and group level) I include a dummy for independence demands and a dummy for democracy, respectively. I cannot include the independence dummy in the strategic interaction model because it is highly correlated with the movement fractionalization variable (.63). However, the existence of this most extreme demand on its own may decrease the likelihood of accommodation if governments fear that it would cause a slippery slope eventually leading to separatist war. In the group level model, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the government in the dyad is a consolidated democracy (measured by a polity score of 7 or higher) (Bennett and Stam 2004).[5] Democracies may be more willing to accommodate groups seeking self-determination through autonomy because of the principle of rule by the people underpinning the regime type.

In addition to these variables, the final model includes a proxy for status quo autonomy arrangement and a set of insurgency variables. I include a dummy for federal states to capture the status quo arrangement. Though my theory predicts change in autonomy status, the extent of current autonomy may affect the willingness of the government to make concessions. The insurgency controls include the percent of

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[5] I exclude the democracy dummy from the first model because it is correlated with the veto players variable.

mountainous terrain in the country (logged), whether the country is an oil exporter, and the level of political instability. These variables are from the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset on insurgency. Each of these factors is argued to make insurgency easier or more profitable in some way. I include them in the final model to control for ease of rebellion in the movement's calculation of whether to settle with the government. Table 3.2 presents the results of these analyses.[6]

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[6] All regressions are clustered on country.

Table 3.2 Logistic Regressions on Autonomy (Robust Std. Errors in Parentheses, Clustered on Country)

	Coefficients			
Variable	**Model 1 Strategic Interaction**	**Model 2 Govt. Level**	**Model 3 Group Level**	**Model 4 Additional Controls**
Government Veto Players	0.45** (0.14)	0.39** (0.15)		0.67** (0.20)
Government Veto Players Squared	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)		-0.05** (0.01)
Self-determination Factions	-1.48* (0.86)		-1.23 (0.77)	-2.49** (1.35)
Self-determination Factions Squared	0.49** (0.21)		0.45** (0.18)	0.82** (0.33)
Coordinating Faction or Institution	1.00** (0.33)	0.37** (0.19)	1.07** (0.33)	1.93** (0.47)
Logged GDP per capita	0.30* (0.18)	1.10** (0.34)		0.14 (0.17)
Autonomy in Previous 5 years	-0.52 (0.42)	-0.37 (0.44)	-0.71 (0.44)	-0.84** (0.43)
Number of Ethnic Groups in the State	0.11 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)	0.05 (0.06)	0.24** (0.09)
Civil War Dummy	1.26** (0.51)	1.35** (0.52)	0.97** (0.42)	1.34** (0.66)
Logged Group Population	0.18 (0.15)	0.10 (0.14)	0.18 (0.13)	0.19 (0.24)
Ethnic Kin in Adjoining State Dummy	-0.11 (0.41)	-0.27 (0.45)	-0.29 (0.41)	0.29 (0.40)
Third Party Involvement Dummy	-0.93 (0.49)	-0.68 (0.56)	-0.86** (0.42)	-1.91** (0.80)
Independence Demands Dummy		0.12 (0.36)		
Democracy Dummy			0.96** (0.44)	
Federalism Dummy				0.40 (0.34)
Logged Mountainous Terrain				-0.42** (0.13)
Oil Exporter Dummy				-0.34 (0.60)
Political Instability				1.04** (0.50)
Number of Observations	686	902	878	566
Pseudo R-squared	.10	.11	.09	.18

** Significant at the .05 level, *significant at the .10 level

The results in model one indicate support for my hypotheses about the effects of

fractionalization. The coefficients on government veto players and the squared veto

players term indicate a curvilinear relationship between veto players and the likelihood of an increase in autonomy. An initial increase in the number of veto players within the state increases the likelihood of autonomy, but at higher values, the likelihood of autonomy decreases. This supports my prediction that autonomy increases are more likely when the government has a moderate number of veto players and less likely at the extremes. Both of these coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level.

The coefficients on the number of factions with distinct demands and its squared term indicate a curvilinear relationship and are statistically significant at the .1 and .05 levels, respectively. This suggests that an initial increase in the number of factions with distinct demands decreases the likelihood of an autonomy increase, but a higher number of factions increases the chance of autonomy.

I also predict in Hypothesis Eight that governments with greater resources will be more likely to reach agreements to increase autonomy because it will be easier to compensate opposition veto players when fungible resources are available. The coefficient on logged gross domestic product per capita (my proxy for government resources) is positive and significant at the .1 level. This indicates that higher levels of GDP are associated with a higher likelihood of an autonomy transfer and suggests that governments with more resources are able to overcome problems associated with multiple veto players. The coefficient on coordinating factions and institutions for self-determination also returned a positive and significant coefficient. Groups with coordinating institutions or factions are more likely to successfully implement an increase in autonomy.

The coefficients on fractionalization are fairly consistent across the other three models. Coefficients on veto players, self-determination factions, and their squared terms keep the same sign in all four analyses. The veto players terms are significant in all models. The movement faction terms are significant in all models except the group level model (3) where the faction term is near significant at the .1 level. The logged GDP variable is significant with positive coefficients in Models One and Two. The sign on logged GDP remains positive in Model Four, though it is statistically significant. The existence of a coordinating faction or institution is a positive and significant predictor of autonomy increase in all four models.

In addition to my theoretically motivated variables, several others achieve statistical significance. The civil war dummy variable returns a positive coefficient in all models, indicating that dyads in high level conflict are more likely to see an autonomy settlement. The democracy dummy variable yields a positive and significant coefficient, which is expected given its high correlation with veto players (.59). This is likely picking up the effects of variation in veto players which I capture more directly in the other models. When I include both measures of veto players and democracy, the veto players results still hold.

The coefficient on the dummy variable for third party involvement is negative and significant in both Models Three and Four. This suggests that the involvement of other actors in the dispute decreases the likelihood of an autonomy settlement. Model Four indicates that recent increases in autonomy decrease the chances of autonomy at any given time, but this is not found in other models. The results in Model Four suggest that a higher number of ethnic groups in the state increase the chance of autonomy, while

political instability and higher percentages of mountainous terrain decrease the likelihood.

To assess the substantive effects of the primary results, I have plotted the simulated predicted probabilities of autonomy over a range of levels of fractionalization. I also show the substantive effects of the resources variables by plotting the predicted probability holding these variables at different values. These graphs were produced using the CLARIFY program for predicted probability based on Model One. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the effects of government fractionalization at three levels of logged GDPpc.

Figure 3.1 Effects of Government Fractionalization on Likelihood of Autonomy

The above figure shows the effects of increasing government fractionalization in three contexts. The solid line indicates the effect of different numbers of government veto players holding all other variables at their median value. This figure highlights the curvilinear relationship between the number of veto players and the probability of an implemented autonomy increase. Initial increases in the number of veto players increases the probability of autonomy until approximately seven veto players, where the probability begins to decrease.

The two broken lines indicate this same relationship holding logged GDP at the 10th percentile of values and the 90th percentile of values. The dotted line above the solid line shows that the predicted probability of autonomy is higher at all levels of veto players when resources are high, though this is most pronounced at the mid-range of veto players where the effects shift. The dashed line below the solid line shows the same predicted probability at a low level of resources. Decreasing resources leads to a lower probability across the range of veto players. At the highest number of veto players, these lines converge, suggesting that at the very highest level of veto players, the amount of resources does not have much effect.

Figure 3.2 presents the predicted probability of autonomy based on the number of movement factions. The two lines indicate the difference in probabilities depending on whether the movement has a coordination institution or faction.

Figure 3.2 Effects of Movement Fractionalization on Likelihood of Autonomy

Though the coefficients on the factions term and its squared term indicate a curvilinear relationship, the graph reveals that the initial decrease in the probably of autonomy increase moving from one to two factions is very small compared to the increased probability as the number of factions changes from two to three and three to four. The relationship does not appear to be curvilinear, but is also not linear. There is little difference between the probability of one and two factions achieving autonomy, but as the number increases to three and four, there is a marked jump in the likelihood of autonomy. This suggests that the effects of the strategic interaction between governments and self-determination movements (in particular the use of strategic

fractionalization to settle with moderates) dominate the bargaining dynamics. The positive effects associated with unitary self-determination movements, lower uncertainty and lower chance of implementation problems, have a relatively small impact. Highly-divided groups, with both moderate and more extreme factions, are more likely to get increased autonomy. Moreover, the existence of coordinating institutions or factions increases the predicted probability of an autonomy increase by an additional 5.61%.[7]

In order to interpret the substantive significance of the effects of fractionalization on autonomy bargaining, we also need to recognize that the probability of a new autonomy agreement in any given year is low. Highly-divided movements are still not very likely to get autonomy in any specific year, but are more than ten times more likely to increase autonomy than less fractionalized movements. Likewise, governments are not very likely to concede autonomy in any specific year, but moderately divided governments are almost three times as likely to do so.

Civil War Outcomes Analysis

In addition to the analyses of autonomy agreements, I conduct a secondary test of bargaining failures. These models use a dichotomous measure of civil conflict as the dependent variable. This civil war measure is a dummy variable indicating the presence of civil war in each year. This was coded from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). Similar to the analyses above, I have run a set of models that examine the effects of fractionalization of each side separately and

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[7] Based on CLARIFY estimation holding all variables at their median values.

together. I include the same controls from the autonomy analysis as well as a lagged civil

war term. Table 3.3 presents the results of these analyses.

Table 3.3 Logistic Regressions on Civil War (Robust Std. Errors in Parentheses, Clustered on Country)

Variable	Coefficients			
	Model 1 Strategic Interaction	**Model 2 Govt. Level**	**Model 3 Group Level**	**Model 4 Additional Controls**
Government Veto Players	0.13 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)		0.11 (0.23)
Government Veto Players Squared	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Self-determination Factions	7.14** (1.77)		5.96** (1.95)	7.24** (2.36)
Self-determination Factions Squared	-2.03** (0.48)		-1.63** (0.58)	-2.03** (0.65)
Coordinating Faction or Institution	-0.21 (0.45)	-0.13 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.39)	-0.43 (0.57)
Logged GDP per capita	0.12 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.47)		0.24 (0.29)
Autonomy in Previous 5 years	-0.60* (0.34)	-0.28 (0.38)	-0.70 (0.46)	-0.61** (0.37)
Number of Ethnic Groups in the State	0.00 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.09)
Logged Group Population	0.00 (0.17)	0.03 (0.16)	0.01 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)
Ethnic Kin in Adjoining State	0.10 (0.43)	0.34 (0.42)	-0.11 (0.42)	0.05 (0.44)
Third Party Involvement Dummy	1.42** (0.65)	1.02 (0.55)	1.44** (0.54)	1.71** (0.72)
Lagged Civil War	5.62** (0.68)	5.60** (0.59)	5.71** (0.58)	5.10** (0.72)
Independence Demands Dummy		1.23** (0.34)		
Democracy Dummy			0.16 (0.53)	
Federalism Dummy				-0.79 (0.59)
Logged Mountainous Terrain				0.05 (0.24)
Oil Dummy				0.31 0.89
Political Instability				0.85 0.74
Number of Obs.	682	897	869	562
Pseudo R2	.71	.73	.73	.69

** Significant at the .05 level, *significant at the .10 level

The results of Models One, Two and Four all indicate that the number of government veto players is not statistically associated with the likelihood of civil war in a given year in the same way that it affects the chance of an autonomy settlement. This is not entirely surprising as the jump from policy stability being a barrier to new autonomy deals and civil war may be larger than can be picked up by this analysis. There are a number of other options for governments that are unable to successfully pursue autonomy change prior to direct conflict. The state resources variable (logged GDPpc) is also not statistically significant.

Coefficients on the self-determination factions term and its square are positive and negative, respectively in Models One, Two and Four. This mirrors my findings in Table 3.2 and shows an opposite curvilinear relationship. It indicates that civil war is most likely when autonomy increases are least likely, i.e. when there are a moderate number of factions. The substantive significance of this relationship is discussed further below. The coefficients on the presence of a coordinating faction or institution are negative, but not statistically significant.

Several other variables achieved statistical significance. The involvement of a third party to the disputes increases the likelihood of civil war each year according to Models One, Two and Four. As expected, the lagged civil war variable is a positive and significant predictor of conflict in any given year. Model Two also indicates that dyads in which the self-determination movement made independence demands are more likely to see civil conflict.

In order to assess the substantive significance of my finding that self-determination movement factions have a curvilinear relationship with the likelihood of conflict, I have plotted the predicted probabilities. Figure 3.3 below graphically demonstrates how the number of factions affects the probability of conflict.

Figure 3.3 Effects of Movement Fractionalization on Likelihood of Civil War

Figure 3.3 shows a clearly curvilinear relationship between the number of self-determination movement factions and the probability of civil war. The predicted probability of civil war increases as the number of factions increases to two and then decreases moving from two to three. The predicted probability of civil war is close to zero for both three and four factions, but the lowest probability is at the highest value on factions. These results, in combination with those above suggest that highly-divided

movements are most likely to increase autonomy and least likely to see civil conflict.

Movements with only two factions are unlikely to get an autonomy deal, and much more

likely to see conflict. Unitary movements are less likely to increase autonomy, but also

less likely to be in conflict than the moderately-divided movements.

Faction Responses to Autonomy Analysis

I conduct a further analysis to test Hypothesis Six, that higher faction groups are

more likely to reach contested agreements. I use a multinomial logistic analysis to

compare instances of no agreement, uncontested agreement, and contested agreement.

Contested agreements are instances of autonomy increase that have been largely

implemented where one or more of the self-determination factions publicly rejects the

settlement. Three other variables are included that are likely to affect both the number of

factions and the likelihood that the group gets autonomy: whether the group is

coordinated by a local institution or coordinating faction, whether the group received a

transfer of autonomy in the past five years, and the size of the group.

Table 3.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression on Contested and Uncontested Autonomy
(Robust Std. Errors in Parentheses, Clustered on Country)

Variable	Coefficients	
	Uncontested Autonomy	**Contested Autonomy**
Self Determination Factions	0.23 (0.24)	1.10** (0.51)
Coordinating Group or Institution	0.72** (0.30)	1.60* (0.92)
Received Autonomy in Previous 5 Yrs.	-0.28 (0.39)	-0.24 (0.61)
Logged Group Population	-0.03 (0.14)	0.37 (0.23)
Number of Obs.	902	
Pseudo R2	.04	

** Significant at the .05 level, *significant at the .10 level

Table 3.4 presents the results of the multinomial analysis and indicates that
groups with a greater number of factions are more likely to reach an agreement that is
contested by other factions in the movement.[8] The coefficient on the number of factions
with distinct demands variable is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level for
contested agreements. However, the coefficient for uncontested agreements is positive,
but not statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient on coordinating
organizations/institutions is positive and significant for both contested and uncontested
agreements. The presence of a coordinating faction or institution increases the
probability of an uncontested autonomy increase by 3.5% and a contested increase by
.87%. This difference in the effect of coordinating factions and institutions suggest that
they do play a role in reining in opposition to regional autonomy settlements. The fact
that higher faction movements are more likely to experience contested autonomy

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[8] I also ran this analysis including the squared factions measure, but it did not yield significant results.

increases supports my assertion that states can use autonomy strategically to divide self-determination movements.

Government Strategy Analysis

This final analysis tests one of the key theoretical links is the causal story presented in the dissertation. I argue that transfers of autonomy can be used strategically to divide self-determination movements and that this "divide and conquer" strategy will appeal to states that face highly-divided movements. If this is correct, and the strategy works, we should observe new factions emerging in the wake of autonomy transfers. To test whether this is occurring, I run an ordered logistic analysis on the change in the number of factions making distinct demands within self-determination movements. The dependent variable is the change in the number of factions with distinct demands over a two year period.[9] The primary independent variable is a lagged measure of autonomy increase. I also include the variable for the presence of a coordinating faction or institution which may make fractionalization less likely. Additionally, measures of civil war and the size of the group are included, as both can affect the chance of an autonomy increase and of further divisions within self-determination movements. I expect that an increase in autonomy should cause an increase in the number of factions with different demands as moderates are separated from more extreme factions.

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[9] I use two years as opposed to one to account for time for agreement implementation and the formation of new factions.

Table 3.5 Ordered Logistic Regression on Change in the Number of SD Factions
(Robust Std. Errors in Parentheses, Clustered on Country)

Variable	Coefficients
Lagged Autonomy	1.12** (.40)
Coordinating Group or Institution	-.05 (.24)
Civil War	-.25 (.25)
Logged Group Population	-.07 (.10)
Number of Obs.	823
Pseudo R2	.01

** Significant at the .05 level, *significant at the .10 level

The results in Table 3.5 indicate that increases in autonomy are positively associated with a subsequent increase in the number of factions making distinct demands. Gaining an autonomy increase in the prior two years increases the chance on gaining at least one faction by 10%.[10] The coefficient on the presence of a coordinating institution or faction has a negative sign, as expected, but is not statistically significant. The size of the self-determination group population returns a negative, but insignificant coefficient.

Conclusion

The quantitative analyses presented in this chapter test a number of the hypotheses advanced in Chapter Two. Broadly speaking, the results support my claim that internal fractionalization affects the ability of governments and self-determination movements to implement agreements on autonomy. All four analyses of autonomy increase indicate that the number of internal factions within these actors is a statistically significant determinant of the likelihood of increased autonomy. Governments with a

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[10] Based on Clarify predicted probability values for the ordered logistic regression.

moderate number of veto players are most likely to devolve autonomy. Highly-divided self-determination movements are most likely to receive concessions and least likely to see conflict.

Despite the curvilinear relationship found in the analysis, unitary and moderately divided movements appear to have a similar probability of autonomy increase. The finding that unitary movements are not much more likely to see autonomy increase is not consistent with my prediction. I expect that unitary movement should have an advantage over moderately-divided movements because they generate less uncertainty and they are unlikely to have implementation problems. However, although unitary movements are not necessarily more likely to receive autonomy than moderately-divided ones, they are less likely to have bargaining break down into conflict (an alternate specification of bargaining failure). One explanation for this is that unitary movements present a greater challenge to the state in terms of conflict, but are too costly to give autonomy to in many instances. It may be that governments have found alternative ways to compensate these movements without conceding autonomy.

The higher probability of accommodation to highly-divided movements supports my claim that government are acting strategically. Divisions within these movements allow governments to buy off moderates with relatively few concessions. Although the quantitative analysis does not test for differences in scope of concessions, this is evaluated in Chapter Five. Moreover, the resources available to government and self-determination movement factions to overcome internal divisions are an important factor in explaining the likelihood of an autonomy increase. These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables to account for alternative explanations.

I also test two links in my theory related to the strategic use of autonomy. The first test examines my claim that concessions made to highly divided movements are more likely to be internally contested as moderates separate from extremists. My analysis of agreement contestation demonstrates support for my contention that changes in autonomy will be more likely to be internally contested the greater the number of self-determination movement factions. Second, I argue that strategic governments will use autonomy to further divide already fractionalized movements. I test whether autonomy increases are associated with subsequent splits within self-determination movements. The analysis on changes in the number of internal factions indicates that this strategy actually works.

The findings of this chapter suggest that the unitary actor assumption for autonomy bargaining is inappropriate and that the existence of internal divisions within actors alter their incentives to pursue different strategies, as well as their ability to negotiate a new autonomy deal. The strategic interaction that takes place between factions of both sides is an important determinant of the patterns of autonomy accommodation we observe empirically. Governments facing divided self-determination movements are presented with an opportunity to use autonomy strategically, but also face a higher risk of agreement failure if extremist spoilers are successful. Moreover, movements facing internally divided governments can use these divisions to assess the likelihood that the government will renege on a settlement later on. Both of these calculations affect the likelihood that we will see new autonomy agreements, and ultimately, whether conflict will break out.

This chapter has presented a large-n quantitative test of some of the hypotheses set out in Chapter Two. However, the statistical relationships found in the results cannot fully substantiate the causal story I have told. These analyses demonstrate correlation between fractionalization and autonomy, but I cannot make inferences about specific causal claims based on them. The next two chapters present a series of comparative case studies designed to provide additional testing of the theory. The case studies allow me to test the mechanisms I have presented more clearly and in combination with the quantitative analysis demonstrate significant support for the theory advanced in this dissertation.

Chapter Four

The Corsican Self-determination Dispute in France

For the past 37 years the French state has been challenged by the Corsicans for greater self-determination. This small but distinct island population resisted French efforts to assimilate the local culture over several hundred years, but only relatively recently has demanded self-rule from Paris. The French/Corsican case is puzzling in large part because of the persistence of this governance dispute despite repeated attempts by the French government to renegotiate the status of the island.

Promoting autonomy in a country which places primacy on indivisibility and equality is a significant and challenging undertaking.[1] The Jacobin tradition born out of the French revolution promotes equality through unity of the state and uniformity of rule.[2] However, Corsica's place in France is unique. The island is geographically as close to Italy as it is to France. Even though Corsica is a Mediterranean island, with a distinct culture and history, it is considered by the French people to be an integral part of France. The tension between demands from Corsicans for self-determination and the legacy of strong centralization has made bargaining over autonomy a highly contentious issue in France.

This chapter explores the political process of autonomy negotiations in France from 1970 – 2005. The purpose of the analysis is to evaluate additional propositions from

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[1] These two principles – indivisibility of the French nation and equality – are found in Article One of the French Constitution.
[2] There is a historical basis for this tension in French society. The centralizing Jacobins won out over the federalist Girondists during the French revolution (Phillipe 2004).

the theory that cannot be tested in the large-n quantitative analysis. In this chapter, I focus on a series of propositions regarding the behavior of government veto players during internal bargaining over the devolution issue and the strategic considerations of governments in their interaction with the Corsican movement. The study examines a series of devolution attempts over time in France, which provide variation in government fractionalization and autonomy outcomes.

This case was selected using a most-similar case study framework designed to isolate and evaluate the effects of internal divisions within state governments on the autonomy bargaining process. The ideal cases for this study would allow me to compare a set of governments that vary in their number of internal divisions but are similar on other factors relevant to autonomy bargaining (King et al. 1994). This comparative analysis of French governments meets this primary criterion. From 1970 to 2005, the French state underwent a series of changes in the number of internal divisions in government. The relative cohesion and number of parties in the ruling coalitions in government varied widely across administrations. Moreover, there were three periods of cohabitation government, where the President and Prime Minister were from opposite sides of the political spectrum, increasing government fractionalization.

Although this series of French governments provides a wide range of values on the independent variable (internal veto players), they are similar on many other variables thought to affect the likelihood of autonomy settlement based on the literature. These governments faced a persistent challenge from the Corsican movement over time. Though the level of nationalist activity on the island vacillated, the Corsican movement for greater self-rule maintained pressure on Paris throughout this time period. The

relative strength, wealth, strategic value and economic value of the island are also similar across time. The movement in Corsica has enjoyed a steady base of support within the population, but has never been universally supported on the island. Corsica is a relatively poor region in France and has consistently been the recipient of transfers from the center. The primary industry in Corsica is tourism which has suffered to some extent by the separatist violence. Corsica has little strategic value for France in military terms. The series of governments in the study also faced the same number of additional self-determination challenges, including the comparatively weak Breton and Basque self-determination movements.

This comparison cannot hold the Corsican self-determination movement constant in terms of its internal fractionalization, which changes overtime. However, I deal with this explicitly in both the propositions and analysis. Examining French negotiations with the Corsican movement over a series of decades introduces variation between cases as the Corsican movement has evolved during this time. The degree to which the Corsican movement has been fractionalized has varied overtime, as well as the relative strength of moderates versus extremists on the island. My theory models the role that variation in the heterogeneity of self-determination movements should have on the bargaining process, and this variation is addressed explicitly in the propositions below. This variation will affect my predictions in that I expect autonomy will be a more attractive option for governments when groups are more highly divided. Importantly, the pattern of fractionalization of the movement does vary within French administrations, which means that although the Corsican side of the equation is not held constant, it also does not co-vary with fractionalization of the government. Moreover, this variation provides an

opportunity to examine the role played by heterogeneity of preferences in the Corsican movement on the decision calculus of governments.

An over time examination of French/Corsican negotiations also allows me to control for a number of cultural differences inherent in cross-country comparisons. The central elements of the Corsican question remained stable over time, such as the effect of recognizing a Corsican identity on the integrity of French nationality and the historical adversity of the French to administrative changes that could generate inequality. The French case also allows me to control for overall support from the French people for a negotiated solution with the Corsicans. Although there are clearly differences of opinion about autonomy among actors in the government, there is general support from the French population that some autonomy for Corsica is a viable solution to the troubles there. The French newspaper Le Monde reported that 59% of French people supported autonomy during the extensive devolution negotiations in 2000 (Daftary 2000).

I use the 1970 – 2005 time-frame because the modern Corsican movement emerged as a political force around 1970. One of the disadvantages of using an over time set of cases is their temporal connection to each other. The bargaining processes between these governments and the Corsicans are not wholly independent of each other. This none-independence has two potential effects that may alter my theoretical expectations. First, I expect that specific governments will not repeatedly concede autonomy, but instead will allow any changes made to the governance arrangement adequate time to affect politics in Corsica. Second, over time perception of the relative success of autonomy policies may affect the likelihood of subsequent attempts at accommodation. Those governments elected following failed or negatively viewed autonomy concessions

may be less likely to pursue negotiations over autonomy. The subsequent analysis will consider these time-related factors.

Theoretical Expectations

The theory presented in Chapter Two generates two sets of propositions – one that addresses trends in autonomy agreements and one that focuses on the causal story I advance. This second set of propositions deals with actor incentives and negotiation tactics that cannot be tested by the quantitative analysis. This and the subsequent chapter on Indian self-determination movements evaluate this second set of implications from the theory. The following propositions focus on portions of the causal logic I advance in the theory, specifically related to the behavior, function and intentions of internal divisions in the government that constitute veto players.

Proposition One: In governments with internal divisions, veto players stop or hinder the transfer of autonomy.

I argue that increasing the number of actors who can veto policy change in government will make the process of transferring autonomy more difficult, even when leadership of the government support granting autonomy. Chapter Three demonstrates a correlation between the number of veto players and autonomy increases, but cannot demonstrate that these actors are actually stopping the devolution of power to self-determination groups. It is possible to observe the opposition of internal veto players in two different ways in France. First, partisan veto players (configurations of members of the legislature) can block an autonomy transfer by withholding their support. Second, institutional veto players can veto change as legislation passes through a specific segment

of the legislative process. In the French case, I expect to see institutional vetos exercised when the administration has successfully avoided a legislative veto. I do not expect to observe many formal vetos (such as a failed vote in the National Assembly) by legislative veto players because administrations would be unlikely to call for a vote on a bill they do not have support for. The important role of legislative veto players is in the lead up to this stage, which Proposition Two addresses.

Proposition 2: Pro-autonomy actors in the government will use side-payments to overcome opposition by other veto players.

The ability of pro-autonomy actors in government to make autonomy concessions depends on their capacity to generate consensus among the internal veto players. I expect to observe side-payments being made when governments devolve power. Side-payments can take three forms. First, alteration of the autonomy legislation to compensate veto players is a direct legislative compromise side-payment wherein the government advancing the legislation accepts an altered bill to satisfy other veto players at the national level. Second, additional legislative side-payments can by made by trading off concessions on other policies. This type of indirect side-payment will be limited because the French legislature does not engage in log-rolling akin to the American system. Third, there is the potential for illicit side-payments if pro-autonomy actors in the government use non-policy side-payments such as monetary compensation. This type of side-payment, though it may exist, is probably difficult to observe.

Proposition 3: Governments grant limited autonomy to satisfy the most moderate factions in autonomy movements.

This proposition addresses the motivation of French government leaders for pursing autonomy. I argue that when faced with divided movements for self-determination, governments have an incentive to use limited autonomy concessions to strategically buy-off the most moderate of factions. This strategy will be most appealing when the government expects that more extreme factions can be marginalized and/or restrained in some way by the more moderate factions. Second, this strategy is more attractive when the government believes that limited concessions will satisfy a majority of the population.[3] I expect to find that French governments attempt to accommodate the Corsicans when the more moderate factions appear strongest. Moreover, I expect that this strategic consideration has played a strong role in government decision making.

Overview of the Case

Though it is considered an integral part of France by many, Corsica has been culturally distinct throughout its historical connection to France. Its distinctiveness has been protected in part by its physical separation from mainland France and by the persistence of the Corsican language well into the twentieth century. The French language only became widely spoken in Corsica after World War II. Moreover, the traditional clan system, in which the Corsican population is inter-connected through a series of dense family networks, maintains political relevance today.

Despite the longstanding cultural and, to some degree, political differences between the island and mainland France, the contemporary dispute over Corsica's status only became politicized in the 1970s. Initial demands by Corsicans for self-rule focused

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[3] As opposed to the general population demanding more substantial concessions.

on increased autonomy for the island. These demands gained strength and factions within the Corsican movement resorted to violence beginning in 1975. Demands for independence for Corsica surfaced in 1974 and have been made concurrently with demands for greater autonomy.

Divisions within the Corsican movement have persisted throughout its tenure and take three forms. First, since the mid-1970s there has been a firm split between those who seek autonomy, *autonomists*, and organizations that seek independence, *separatists* or *nationalists*. It is uncommon for factions within the movement to demand both autonomy and independence. Moreover, organizations seldom change their demands from one to the other.[4] Demands for both independence and autonomy have been present since the mid-1970s, but the separatists were fairly inactive from 1983 to 1990. Second, the relative strength of the autonomists versus separatists has varied overtime within the Corsican movement. A majority of active self-determination organizations supported independence in 1980 and in the late-1990s. In contrast, autonomists were relatively dominant in the 1980s and early 2000s. Third, within this general split between autonomists and separatists, the number of factions supporting each demand varied over time. For example, in 1981, there were two active factions seeking independence, while in 1996 there were five such organizations.

An additional dimension on which the Corsican factions are divided is between those factions that employ violence and those who use conventional political strategies. In general, the separatists have been more apt to use violence and tend to target

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[4] Both of these changes occur in other self-determination movements.

infrastructure and other separatist factions.[5] The level of violence within the larger

movement has varied considerably over time and spikes in violent activity have elicited a

variety of responses from the government.

The response of French governments to the Corsican question has varied widely

across the timeframe under examination. At the outset of violent mobilization, Union

pour la Défense de la République (UDR) member Alexandre Sanguinetti argued that "all

autonomist movements must be stopped because they are an evident attack on the unity

of the nation and the republic" (Hossay 2004, 411). Since then, the movement has been

met with alternating attempts to negotiate a solution to the problem and strong repression

(Foster 1993; Hintjens et al. 1995; Büttner 2000; Hossay 2004).[6] Governments have

focused on autonomy, economic aid and increased political representation as the primary

concessions for a negotiated solution. The Socialist Party was the first to pursue

recognizing Corsica's uniqueness and ceding local control as a way to solve the

problem.[7] However, autonomy accommodation has not been an exclusively leftist

strategy, as conservative governments have also attempted to devolve power. Moreover,

the left/right split does not precisely map onto the preferences that politicians have over

self-determination for Corsica.[8]

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[5] An important exception to this targeting tendency is the murder of the Prefect for Corsica Claude Erignac.
The role of this specific act of violence against a government official is discussed later in the chapter.
[6] Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua (1986-1988) in particular engaged in a campaign of "terrorizing
the terrorists," (Hossay 2004, 418). Corsican nationalists were not tried through the local judicial system,
but through a special State Security Court in Paris specifically designed to try people "accused of
threatening the French State" (Foster 1993, 252).
[7] The Left's shift in the 1960s to support decentralization in principle was partially a response to their
anticipation of being out of power for some time (Gourevitch 1977, 82).
[8] Author interview with Jean-Louis Andreani, senior reporter on the Corsican Question for Le Monde. Le
Monde offices, Paris, France. April 2006.

Although successive governments have varied in their chosen strategy to address the Corsican question, no administration has enjoyed unmitigated support for any type of policy. The institutions of the Fifth Republic were designed specifically to avoid a high degree of fractionalization and the immobilization that can accompany it.[9] However, internal divisions within the government over autonomy policy maintain relevance despite a design that limits fractionalization for two reasons. First, the legal framework for changing the status of a territorially concentrated minority population like the Corsicans requires assent by multiple branches of government and the statutes of the Fifth Republic Constitution bare directly upon the issue. Second, unlike many issues in French politics, voting discipline within political parties over questions of sovereignty and governance is low. The Corsican question relates directly to the question of nature of the Republic and this type of question is considered an "issue of conscience," wherein individual politicians are not bound as tightly by the position of their party.[10] Thus, a lack of legislative cohesion can constitute a major barrier to autonomy policy as small blocs of legislators can veto autonomy changes. Depending on the size of the legislative majority and the general cohesion of the government of the day, individuals or small blocs of deputies can constitute veto players.

Evaluating the Propositions

Before delving into specific debates over autonomy bills, I provide a brief examination of the French legislative process. The French system was designed to have a

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[9] This decision was born out of the Algerian Crisis in which the government failed to respond with decisive action of any type to the conflict in Algeria.
[10] Author interview with Jean-Louis Andreani, Le Monde offices, Paris, France, April 2006.

strong government and a relatively weak legislature. The government of the day is responsible for directing policy, initiating legislation, has agenda setting powers, and overall, has a strong position in terms of creating and enacting policy.[11]

Legislation is initially seen by a committee in the National Assembly (the lower house), then typically reviewed in three rounds of debate wherein the bill travels back and forth between the National Assembly and the Senate (the upper house).[12] These two houses represent different interests as the National Assembly is directly elected, while members of the Senate are indirectly elected. The Senate can amend bills; but the National Assembly is not bound by these amendments and the Senate cannot formally block legislation if the National Assembly votes in favor of a bill. Though the Senate's consent is not required for the passage of bills, it does provide a check on the legislative process. A set of sixty or more senators, in addition to the President, the speakers of both houses of Parliament or sixty deputies from the National Assembly, can refer a bill for constitutional review where legislation can be altered or vetoed.[13] Review by the Constitutional Council is the final stage at which legislation can be stopped or altered, however, the initiation of this process only occurs when bills are formally referred to the Council.

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[11] The government has two means to push legislation through parliament in the face of resistance – the package vote procedure (article 44 of the Constitution) and the confidence vote procedure (article 49) (Huber 1996, 31). The package vote allows the government to force a vote on legislation as a whole, without allowing further amendments. The confidence vote allows the government to pass legislation without a vote, but the legislature can void this with a vote of no confidence in the government.
[12] There are six standing committees and the ability to create committees specifically to address a piece of legislation.
[13] Article 16, French Constitution 1958.

Proposition One: Veto Players and Devolution Attempts

This section addresses all attempts to transfer autonomy to the Corsicans since 1970 and the extent to which veto players at the national level limited government success in doing so. I find that veto players at the national level blocked or fundamentally altered devolution to the Corsicans during attempts by the government to increase autonomy to the island. By examining proposed and implemented autonomy legislation which passed through the various veto points in government, I will demonstrate that portions of each articulated autonomy plan were vetoed despite government of the day and majority legislative support for these bills. Specifically, I will address the major devolution initiatives of the past four decades: the 1982 special statute for Corsica, the 1991 special statute, Jospin's devolution plan in 2001 and Chirac's plan in 2003.

The series of French governments since the 1970s have responded to the Corsican challenge in different ways. Government responses in the first decade of the struggle focused on re-establishing order and addressing some of the economic problems on the island through increased subsidies. There were no attempts to devolve power during these early years of the dispute, however, there were several instances of administrative reform. An early instance of this was the 1972 *Loi Frey*, which designated Corsica as a *region* and restructured some competencies of the regions generally. This legislation followed upon President de Gaulle's failed referendum on decentralization and Senate reform in 1969, which led to his subsequent resignation. Though the referendum failed, its fate is largely considered to be the result of a referendum on de Gaulle, as opposed to decentralization policy. There was wide support for decentralization despite the vote on

the referendum. *Loi Frey* was the government's superficial nod to this support, but did not constitute a significant transfer of power. The bill offered little to the regions and was considered "decentralization in disguise, designed less to open the government up to local populations than to streamline control from Paris" (Gourevitch 1978, 50).[14]

The government of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (1974-1976) also engaged in a limited administrative reform which divided the island into two departments – the sub-unit just below regions. Although this reform restructured Corsican administration, it did not devolve any power to the island. Moreover, the division of Corsica was opposed by segments of the Corsican government, and called "a diversionary manoeuvre" by Senator François Giacobbi, President of Corsica's Regional Council.[15] In addition to this administrative reform, President Giscard attempted to pair increased enforcement of order with economic aid, promising in 1976 that "the firm enforcement of republican law in Corsica will go hand in hand with the scrupulous implementation of social and economic reforms."[16] Despite his clear recognition of a particular problem in Corsica, Giscard was careful to avoid recognizing Corsicans as distinct from French, addressing them as "French people, French people of Corsica" (Hossay 2004).

The Socialist victory in 1981 brought a critical change in the composition of the government regarding the Corsican question. The transition ended *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) and *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF) control of the National Assembly and Giscard's presidency. Additionally, the overwhelming victory of

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[14] Though the *Loi Frey* devolved some minimal powers to the regions and included Corsica, I do not consider this to be one of the major devolution acts because it is not considered a significant transfer of power and its net effect is not considered to be increased control over decision making for the regions.
[15] Keesings, January 1976.
[16] Keesings, December 1976.

the Socialists in the National Assembly brought about a degree of cohesion in the legislature that had not been seen in recent administrations, limiting the number of potential veto players at the government level. The Socialists paired with the Communist party to gain a majority of 68% in the National Assembly.[17]

This legislative coup by the left brought two necessary conditions for an attempt at devolution to Corsica. First, the cohesion of the legislature and control of the presidency by the Socialists freed the government to pursue major policy changes with greater ease than if they had either a smaller majority or more coalition partners.[18] This limited the number of veto players likely to oppose to devolution. Second, the Socialists took power with a broad program for decentralization and a desire to see autonomy for Corsica. President Mitterrand openly alluded to Corsican "specificity" and discussed the "Corsican people [as a] small homeland in a great nation" (Hossay 2004, 414). This preference for decentralization of power meant that the government was more amenable to devolution to Corsican than the hard-line Jacobins of previous administrations.[19] This general preference for decentralization, as I will argue below, created a policy space for intra-government negotiations regarding both decentralization and autonomy for Corsica that facilitated devolution.

The government proposed a general decentralization legislation in June 1981 (called the *Statute Defferre*),[20] and a Special Statute for Corsica in January 1982.[21]

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[17] Of the 333 government seats, 285 were held by Socialists, and 44 by Communists.

[18] During other periods in power, the Socialists have had a smaller majority and/or more coalition partners.

[19] "Jacobins" are politicians that support the Jacobin tradition of highly centralized government emanating from Paris.

[20] The *Statute Defferre* was named for Interior Minister Gaston Defferre who led the government's decentralization program. Law number 82-213, March 2, 1982.

Lengthy discussion and debate ensued regarding both bills in the National Assembly and Senate. The general decentralization plan, which was approved in January of 1982, entailed several years of legislative changes to nearly all levels of government (Schmidt 1990). The major reforms in the Defferre legislation included a transfer of power away from the prefects (the traditional hand of the centralized administration of the republic initially set up by Napoleon) to regional and departmental governments (the two largest sub-units in French government). The decentralization included the creation of new regional bodies with decision making powers and increased flexibility in the internal structure of these units and the execution of their designated competencies (Schmidt 1999).

The Corsica statute went beyond the general plan for decentralization of power to regions in several respects. First, it created a unique directly elected body called *Assemblée de Corse* (Corsican Assembly) rather than *Counsiel regional*, which were given to all regions. Though the Assembly had no legislative power, it had unique advisory and consultative functions with respect to the national government. The Corsican Assembly had the power to communicate directly with the government and to be consulted on all matters regarding Corsica.[22] The Statute also established two consultative councils on economic, social and cultural matters and devolved more extensive powers over culture, transport, planning, and education (Daftary 2000).

There was large-scale support among governing parties at the national level for the Corsican statute. The law passed by 329-154 in the National Assembly, with the

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[21] The basis of the special statute for Corsica was first advanced by the Corsican Socialists in 1977, where it did not progress in the right-dominated National Assembly (Loughlin 1989).
[22] Article 17. Law number 82-214, *Statut de la Collectivite terriroriale de Corse*.

main opposition coming from the Gaullist RPR, which argued that decentralization and

the special status for Corsica was a threat to national unity.[23] Despite large-scale

legislative support for the bill, some dissent existed within the government over the plan

– particularly over the issue of recognizing a Corsican people. Early drafts of the bill

included a reference to "Corsican People" in the text. Then Research and Industry

Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement voiced dissent over the inclusion of this term in the

Bill in a private meeting among the top government ministers. President Mitterrand,

Prime Minister Mauroy, and Interior Minister Defferre were not opposed to its inclusion,

however, Defferre suggested a compromise which would use the phrase "The Corsican

people, a component of the French people." Chevènement's resistance to any recognition

of the Corsican people eventually led to the term being moved from the bill's text to a

section on motivations behind the law (Hossay 2004).

Though Chevènement himself did not necessarily constitute a clear veto point on

this debate ex ante, his popularity conferred greater weight to his opinion and indicated a

potential veto that the administration wished to avoid. Unity on the issue was especially

important as deputies are not required to vote on party lines on an issue such as

devolution, and the ability of the pro-autonomy actors to maintain support of individual

legislators wavering in their support was essential to the success of the bill. The original

version of the bill, first introduced in 1977, also included the devolution of powers to the

Corsican Assembly that would require the national government to respond to their

petitions within a certain timeframe. Both elements of the Socialist party and limitations

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[23] Keesings, April 1983.

placed by the Constitution Council kept these provisions out of the final legislation (Loughlin 1989).

The process leading up to the implementation of the 1982 Corsica statute illustrates the important role that multiple veto players within the government played in shaping the legislative outcome. Negotiations over the bill among government leaders indicated an early veto of the official recognition of the Corsican people, which would be repeatedly vetoed at later stages in subsequent autonomy bills. However, the relative cohesion of this government (compared to those considered below) decreased the overall number of veto players and increased the ease with which the administration could pursue this change in status for Corsica.

The 1982 devolution legislation was followed by a successful first election of the Corsican Assembly. However, a combination of flawed institutional design (low electoral threshold)[24] and divisions among the Corsicans left the Assembly chronically unstable. The Assembly held four elections between 1982 and 1991. This electoral instability and continued disorder on the island led Interior Minister Pierre Joxe to propose a new statute for Corsica in 1990. Joxe's plan had two primary aims – to make the Assembly functional and to satisfy Corsican demands for a recognition of their status as a distinct people.[25] The initial proposal included a description of the "Corsican People" as a component part of the French people (as previous Interior Minister Defferre had suggested nearly a decade earlier). It also provided for several important institutional reforms, including the creation of a regional executive council with stronger powers to

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[24] The original threshold was 1.6% of the vote for one seat (Loughlin 1989). This was changed to 5% to reach the second round of the election in the Joxe Statute (Loughlin and Daftary 1999).
[25] The Joxe Statute is law number 91-428, 13 May 1991.

direct the Assembly, and increasing the electoral threshold to 5% to increase stability. Moreover, the bill proposed to combine the two consultative committees created in 1982 into one *Conseil économique, social et cultural*, which would engage in medium-term planning for the island (Loughlin and Daftary 1999).

The Joxe Statute was introduced while the Socialists controlled the legislature and the Presidency; however they commanded only a bare majority in the National Assembly with their coalition partners, the *Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche* (MRG) and one independent.[26] Thus, the Presidency was unlikely to constitute a veto point on this issue, but the low degree of legislative cohesion increased the potential for small groups of legislators to form a veto player and hold up an autonomy deal. An initial reading of the bill in the legislature revealed significant internal divisions over the proposal. The administration, however, was able to garner majority support for the bill with 282 votes in favour of the plan and 258 against it.[27] Opposition to the bill came predominantly from opposition parties, the RPR and UDF, as well as from some members of the Socialist's coalition partner, the MRG (Hintjens et al. 1995). The basis for MRG resistance to the bill came from the Corsican segment of the MRG, which was split on the issue of autonomy (Daftary 2000). Notably, the Corsican leader of the MRG, Émile Zuccarelli, opposed autonomy while MRG deputy and renowned local leader Paul Giaccobbi supported it.[28] After its first vote in the National Assembly, the bill was subsequently examined by the Senate in March, where the body rejected major portions of the bill before sending it back to the Assembly. In an attempt to gain greater

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[26] Data on electoral composition from the Database of Political Indicators 2003 (Keefer 2005).
[27] As reported by Foster (1993).
[28] M. Zuccarelli adheres to the Jacobin philosophy on French unity.

consensus on the bill, a joint committee of Assembly and Senate representatives met to negotiate but failed to find common ground. A final vote in the National Assembly (297-275) passed the legislation ignoring most of the changes proposed by the Senate.

Despite majority support for the Joxe Statute in the National Assembly, portions of the bill were vetoed in the next stage of the legislative process. A sufficiently large group of National Assembly deputies and senators opposed to the bill exercised their right to refer the legislation to the Constitutional Council for review on May 9, 1991. This collection of deputies and senators – because of their ability to demand constitutional review – formed another veto player at the national level. The veto occurred when the Council struck down several major tenets of the bill. Those opposed to the legislation challenged the bill on a number of fronts. The central opposition of the legislators referring the bill was to use of the term "Corsican People" and the underlying principle of a bill that singled Corsicans out for special status. They also opposed the portion of the statute that sought to create a more direct link between the Prime Minister and the Corsican Assembly that was designed to assuage dissatisfaction with a lack of local input in policies that affect Corsica.

Two of the key provisions of the bill – the recognition of a Corsican people and the creation of a direct link from the Corsican Assembly to the government – were vetoed by the Constitutional Council. The provisions which set up the direct link to the government were deemed unconstitutional by the Council because they placed stipulations on the government regarding legislative procedure, which the Council argued is dictated by the Constitution. The recognition of the Corsican people was ruled in violation of Article Two of the Constitution which prohibits the recognition of peoples

other than "French people."[29] Veto through constitutional review requires a minimum set of deputies or senators opposed to the autonomy deal to "seize the court" to review legislation, and this avenue for blocking legislation has been used effectively in two out of three attempts to devolve power to the Corsicans.[30] Despite the fact that a majority of the National Assembly, the government in Paris and the President supported the bill, a significant portion of the devolution plan was vetoed. This is because the Constitutional Council, in combination with the legislators opposed to the bill, formed another veto player and exercised this veto power. Although the Joxe statute implemented some reforms which stabilized the Corsican Assembly, demands for greater self-rule continued and nationalist violence re-emerged several years later.

In late 1999, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin undertook the most extensive attempt to renegotiate the status of the Corsicans in France thus far. His innovative approach to the Corsican problem entailed large-scale negotiations between representatives of the Corsican Assembly, including the radical nationalist group *Corsica Nazione*.[31] The focus of the talks was on administrative reform (including legislative powers) and a number of concessions not related to autonomy. Notably, a formal recognition of the "Corsican People" was not on the agenda, and was not pushed by the Corsicans. After engaging in seven months of negotiations with the Corsican representatives (known as the Matignon process),[32] the Jospin government presented a new autonomy proposal to the Corsican Assembly. With the Corsican Assembly's consent, the plan was finalized in Jospin's

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[29] Decision 91-290 DC, 9 May 1991.
[30] The 1982, 1991 and 2001 devolution bills were each referred, with the Constitutional Council vetoing portions of the 1991 and 2001 bills.
[31] *Corsica Nazione* met Jospin's minimum requirement of condemning violence (particularly the murder of Prefect Erignac, but would not condemn the men thought responsible for the murder) (Daftary 2000).
[32] This was named after the residence of the French Prime Minister, Matignon.

cabinet. As in 1982, notable resistance from within came from Interior Minister Jean-
Pierre Chevènement. Jospin, however, overcome this early dissent in the government to
present his plan to the National Assembly in July 2000.

Jospin's plan was to proceed with devolution in two stages. The first stage would
entail the experimental transfer of powers to the Corsican Assembly, whereby they would
be able to modify legislation from Paris to suit the particular needs of the island. Plans
for the first stage also included a provision that required Corsican language be taught
during normal school hours (though the instruction would not be compulsory). The
second phase, contingent upon a successful cessation of violence, would entail an
amendment to the French constitution allowing for the creation of a single
political/administrative body for Corsica, which would replace the current arrangement of
two departments under one region (Daftary 2000).

Divisions within Paris over the bill were evident early in the legislative process
when President Chirac delayed the legislative process by refusing to put the bill on his
cabinet agenda in February in 2001.[33] Jospin responded to Chirac's maneuver with a
refusal to change the legislation and demanded the President place it on the agenda.
Though Chirac allowed consideration of the bill shortly after, his initial refusal was
symbolically important and indicated significant dissent over the program in Paris (Elgie
2002). Debate in the National Assembly finally began in May 2001. By late July, the
Corsican Assembly formally accepted the proposal and the following month Interior
Minister Chevènement resigned his post in protest over the bill.[34] Chevènement's

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[33] Bills must be presented to the Council of Ministers prior to their introduction on the floor of the National
Assembly (Malnes 2003).
[34] This was Chevènement's third protest resignation during his political career.

opposition stemmed from his concern that the concessions would pave the way for a patchwork of laws among local governments that would both undermine the unitary nature of the state and prevent equal treatment of all citizens (Malnes 2003). Conservatives shared this fear. The conservative paper *Le Figaro* argued in 2000 that the statute would "[open] the way for a multiplication of new statutes -- linguistic, financial, legislative -- which others can now claim, from the Basque country to Brittany and Alsace."[35]

Despite opposition from large portions of the legislature, the bill passed the National Assembly with a margin of 287 to 217,[36] and moved on to the Senate, where nearly all of the main tenets of the law were rejected. Again, the National Assembly chose to reverse the Senate amendments and a joint committee of deputies and senators illusively attempted to find a compromise. Jospin's plan, with some modifications, passed the second reading in the National Assembly with a much smaller margin that in its first reading (249 to 228).[37] Support came mainly from the Socialists, Greens and some Communists (with other Communists abstaining).

Immediately after the passage of the bill, a group of centre-right deputies and senators coalesced to attempt to veto the bill through the constitutional review process. The legislators challenged a number of sections of the bill, but most notably the legislative amendment powers afforded to the Corsican Assembly and the teaching of Corsican during regular school hours. Jospin's team, anticipating this opposition, had carefully crafted a bill which they believed had a constitutional grounding based on

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[35] As reported by the Agence France Press, July 21, 2000.
[36] As reported by the Agence France Press, May 22, 2001.
[37] As reported by the London Financial Times, December 20, 2001.

precedent set by the Constitutional Council in a previous decision.[38] However, on

January 17, 2002 the Council once again vetoed transferring power to the Corsican

Assembly. The most damaging portion of the veto for pro-autonomists was the

Constitutional Council's rejection of devolving experimental powers to Corsica that

would allow deviation from statutes passed by the national legislature (essentially this

was a form of legislative power for the Corsican Assembly). This veto, though based on

the text of the Fifth Republic Constitution, was seen by proponents of the legislation as

overtly political. Corsican deputy Paul Giacobbi claimed the decision was "a partisan,

political act… directly inspired by Chirac the candidate. It was part of his campaign."[39]

Prime Minister Jospin also called the decision a form of "political sanctions" imposed by

the predominantly right-wing court on the parliament.[40] Although this major tenet of the

program was vetoed, the Council did maintain the constitutionality of non-compulsory

teaching of the Corsican language during school hours. Once again, a devolution attempt

supported by a majority of the legislature and the government of the day was

substantially limited by other veto players at the national level.

One of the major tenets of Jospin's plan – institutional simplification – was

resurrected for another autonomy proposal in 2003 led by President Chirac as part of his

overall decentralization plan.   Chirac's plan would eliminate the two departments and

retain just one regional council with some taxation and spending powers.[41] Importantly,

the French Constitution was changed via referendum in March to allow for this

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[38] In the case cited for precedent, the Constitutional Council had allowed experimentation at the local level with policy related to education.
[39] As reported by the Agence France Press, January 18, 2002.
[40] "Biased, Says the Prime Minister," *The Economist*, January 26, 2002.
[41] BBC, "Corsica seeks stake in future," July 5, 2003.

concession. This change opened the way for regional experimentation of the type that

Jospin envisioned during the previous devolution attempt. In the month following the

constitutional amendment, the Corsican Assembly voted to seek greater autonomy.[42]

Following this, the government announced that the island would be given a referendum in

July and would be asked to choose whether they wanted to be governed by one regional

council. If the referendum passed, draft legislation would be presented to the National

Assembly later in the year.[43] Surprisingly, the referendum in Corsica failed by 51% to

49%, and the autonomy legislation was not introduced to the legislature. Because Chirac

choose to start with a referendum on the island, divisions over the bill at the national

level became a moot point. However, we can surmise that the institutional veto used to

block several other devolution attempts – the Constitutional Council's review – would be

ineffective because of the constitutional change preceding the Corsican referendum. The

elimination of the basis for previous vetos of this kind of autonomy deal should have

reduced the number of veto players for this legislation.

Since 1981, a series of French governments have tried to transfer autonomy to

Corsica and in three of four instances, internal veto players blocked the transfer of greater

autonomy. The final attempt (in 2003) failed when Corsicans rejected the plan. Despite

support by the majority of legislators in the National Assembly and the government of the

day, partisan (legislators that opposed the concession) and institutional veto players (the

Constitutional Council) exercised their veto power to fundamentally alter the legislation

of Corsican devolution and limit autonomy. Even though it appears that the median

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[42] BBC, "France offers Corsica a new deal," Friday, April 4, 2003.
[43] Agence France Press, April 7, 2003.

legislator would have given more autonomy to the Corsicans in the majority of devolution attempts, the island received only limited concessions because these veto players successfully blocked greater autonomy compromise.

Proposition Two: Internal Side-payments

The second proposition I evaluate in this chapter is that pro-autonomy actors in government use side-payments to induce sufficient support among possible veto players for their devolution policy. I find that pro-autonomy actors in the French government used both direct and indirect policy side-payments to gain support for specific autonomy policies. In Chapter Two, I argue that in order to grant autonomy in situations where there are multiple veto players in the government, those veto players opposed to the deal must be induced to change their position. In this general theory, I discuss a number of types of side-payments that could be used in this fashion. These include monetary transfers, concessions in different policy areas (log-rolling), transfers of power among veto players, or concessions on autonomy policy. In French politics, the process of devolving autonomy is governed by legislative rules similar to other policy changes, but the provisions within the French constitution on recognition of distinct peoples and the homogeneity of governance create a unique basis for potential vetos by the Constitutional Council. Attempts to devolve power emanate from the government of the day, must gain support of a majority of deputies of the National Assembly, and must pass a constitutional review process if the Constitutional Council is seized.

Unlike some legislatures, the French National Assembly does not engage in log-rolling, or the trading of votes over policies of particular importance to certain legislators.

There is a high degree of party disciple for voting in the National Assembly on most issues. Parties vary in how they cope with internal differences – some hold formal votes on policy at the party level, others have less formal mechanisms for decision making – but once a party line has been set, deputies typically follow suit.[44] Although votes on devolution policy are an exception to this general rule of tight discipline, the existence of party discipline on other policies makes vote trading an unusable strategy for pro-autonomy governments. Moreover, because the structure of political power (at least until the 2003 constitutional change) has been centered at the national level, there is little deputies can receive by way of increasing power to their geographic constituency. Direct monetary side-payments, such as illegal bribes, are also unlikely to occur over autonomy policy within the government but have been attempted in the government's dealings with Corsican nationalists (this discussed more in Proposition Three).

Due to the nature of the legislative process which governs autonomy changes in France, my expectations about observable side-payments need to be altered. As politicians seek to gain consensus over a particular policy among internal veto players, I expect to find that pro-autonomy actors are willing to discuss changes in related policy areas to gain support for an autonomy deal, even though I do not expect to observe log-rolling per se. Second, if concessions are being made to internal veto players, I expect to see some compromises directly on the proposed autonomy deal. The government's initial devolution plan should be altered in response to internal veto players by the time it is implemented.

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[44] Author interview with Jean-Louis Andreani, Paris, France, April 2006.

The political process that led to the 1982 devolution for Corsica demonstrates the importance of pro-autonomy actors in the state using promises about another piece of legislation to gain support for the Corsica deal. The Corsican autonomy plan was pursued in conjunction with a larger decentralization plan that the government was able to use as an inducement for supporting the Corsica deal. The larger decentralization bill, Statute Defferre, created 22 elected councils at the regional level and increased decision-making power for other local actors (Cole 2006). Notably, this reform was designed to limit the role of the prefect – the hand of the national government instituted by Napoleon. The tax-collecting ability of local governments were also enhanced by the legislation (Safran 1985). Because Corsica received a special statute, the primary decentralization legislation did not directly determine the resulting devolution to the island.

Although Corsica was not covered directly by the Defferre Statute, this legislation played an important role in facilitating these concessions to the island. Prime Minister Mauroy's government deftly used its larger legislative agenda on decentralization to quell fears related specifically to the statute for Corsica. Concern over the devolution plan has two bases among those who were not staunchly opposed to the plan. First, some deputies worried that giving Corsica autonomy would encourage other minority groups to step up their demands (such as the Basques and Bretons). *Le Figaro*, the conservative French daily paper gave voice to these fears, "Every time there has been the question of granting a special status to sovereign national territories, it has begun an irreversible process that has ended up with those territories' separation from France."[45] Second, other legislators were concerned that the special statute for Corsica would lead to an uneven distribution

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[45] The Associated Press News Wire, January 10, 1982.

of local powers. Support for general decentralization had several bases among Socialists at the time. In addition to a normative preference for decentralization, many deputies were also local politicians in their constituencies, which added an additional incentive to demand local power for their own area. Defferre and two of his primary advisors all held prominent positions at lower levels of government.[46] Socialist deputies had an additional incentive to favor the Defferre decentralization plan as their party controlled over half of the regional councils (13 of 22) in 1981 (Schmidt 1990).

By advancing the Corsican autonomy plan concurrently with the larger decentralization program, Mauroy's government was able to alleviate the two primary concerns among an important set of legislators regarding autonomy for Corsica. The government argued that the concurrent decentralization to other sub-units would mute the effect of making Corsica particularly special.   Daftary (2002) argues that "The impact of the reforms was diluted by the process of decentralization (1982–86) which extended the same measures to mainland France" (207). This promise to mitigate the particularity of the Corsican statute with general decentralization was fulfilled to an even greater extent in the years following. Subsequent laws in 1985 and 1986 "further weakened the recognition of Corsica's special character" and made Corsica seems increasingly like other regions (Hintjens et al. 1995, 124). Moreover, though the Corsican Assembly had some unique powers, its policy domain was not substantially larger than that of other regions.

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[46] Defferre was the mayor of Marseilles. His advisors Delebarre and Marnot both held local offices as well. They were the general secretary of Lille and the general secretary of Nantes, respectively (Schmidt 1990).

A similar strategy was pursed in conjunction with the 2001 autonomy legislation connected to the Matignon negotiations process. The coalition government, led by Jospin's Socialist Party, also included the Communists and the MRG. However, Jospin could not rely on the full support of the deputies from these parties.[47] The leader of the Communist Party (which held approximately 7% of the National Assembly) expressed "strong reticence" prior to debate on the bill and the Communist deputies abstained in the final vote (Malnes 2003). The MRG had a history of opposition to autonomy on the island, though divisions over the issue had surfaced recently.[48] During the first reading of the bill, it emerged that a primary concern of more moderate deputies on the right was that the bill made too much of an exception out of Corsica through the devolution of greater power. To circumvent this opposition, Interior Minister Vaillant announced that a parallel transfer of regulatory powers could be made to other French Regions. Vaillant stated that "certain dispositions that are included in the project and that resurrect the classical transfers of competence might be extended to other regions on the mainland" (Malnes 2003). Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy also marketed the change for Corsica as part of a larger plan where Corsicans would be the "trail-blazers" for the new plan. This link was highlighted specifically to pre-empt charges by the RPR that the legislation would threaten the unity of the state.[49]

As with the 1982 statute Defferre, pro-autonomy actors used the enactment or promise of larger decentralization policy to gain support of other potential veto players for Corsican autonomy. By linking support for the Corsican plan to other

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[47] The Socialists alone held only about 41% of the seats in the National Assembly.
[48] "Corsica struggles to protect identity," The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 9, 1978.
[49] Keesings, July 2002.

decentralization policy questions, pro-autonomy actors in the government used this policy as a side-payment to induce support among other veto players at the national level.

In addition to the use of indirect side-payments, pro-autonomy forces in the Jospin government used direct compromise on the content of the autonomy bill to gain consensus among veto players. During the second reading of the 2001 autonomy bill in the National Assembly, Jospin's government made further adjustments to the bill in order to retain the support of the Greens in the legislature. The Greens objected to a key provision in the law that devolved power to the Corsican Assembly over the development of the island's coastline. While generally in support of the devolution strategy, the Greens feared the exploitation of the island if the national government did not regulate its development. Jospin removed the provision for this aspect of the devolution plan in response to the Greens' demands in order to prevent a veto of the bill.

During the drafting of the Joxe Statute in 1991, the language of the bill was designed specifically to alleviate fears about a nationalist contagion spreading to other minorities. The section of Article One which recognized the Corsican people "stipulated that the French Republic guaranteed to uphold for this community those rights that were connected to its geographical insularity" (Hintjens et al. 1995, 126). The text focused on cultural identity and particular economic and social interests of the island, but with a geographic basis. This manner of recognition, based on geographic features of the Corsican territory, was designed to "pre-empt any attempts by other French regions to claim similar prerogative for their regions," thereby alleviating a major concern among those whose support for the plan wavered (ibid, 126).

Across these devolution attempts, key determinants of overcoming internal veto player resistance to autonomy for Corsica were policy adjustments on the autonomy legislation and the use of promises regarding other policies to persuade deputies to support the bill. The strategic connection between decentralization policy and concerns over the Corsican bills enabled both the Mauroy and Jospin governments to gain support of potential veto players for autonomy. Specific policy adjustments in response to veto player demands also allowed the government to push devolution plans forward despite quite limited support in the National Assembly.

Proposition Three: Strategic Motivation

This section evaluates my prediction that governments use autonomy strategically when faced with highly-divided movements for self-determination. I find that French governments intentionally used autonomy concessions in a strategic manner to "divide and conquer" the Corsican self-determination movement. Actors in the government were cognizant of existing divisions within the movement and sought to further separate extremists from moderates with their policies. To demonstrate this, I examine both the stated intentions of French politicians and their behavior towards the Corsicans. If pro-autonomy actors in the French government were motivated to use autonomy strategically to further divide the movement and advantage moderate Corsican groups, I expect to find the following. First, the goal of autonomy should be to cleave the moderate Corsicans from the extremists and, through the implementation of autonomy, co-opt the moderates into the larger French governing apparatus more fully. Second, I expect to find that autonomy deals are offered and/or made when moderates appear relatively strong, as this

is when the strategy would be most likely to work. I also expect to observe attempts to "divide and conquer" through other means, such as monetary buyoffs or repression.

To assess the motives behind devolution policies, I interviewed French politicians and academics knowledgeable of the devolution process, and examined public statements and reports on government strategy. The first major use of autonomy (1982) is widely considered to be an explicit attempt to divide the nascent self-determination movement and bring previously alienated non-violent elements into the government (Loughlin 1989; Daftary 2000). Prime Minister Mauroy's government hoped the local elections to a Corsican body would succeed in bringing these identity-based political groups into mainstream politics, obviating the need for extra-legal action and violence.[50]

In subsequent devolution attempts, politicians directly involved in the process reveal that the primary objective in devolving power has been to satisfy what the government perceives to be the most moderate demands. The impetus behind Pierre Joxe's reforms in 1991 was to create efficient governing institutions in which Corsicans would exercise some degree of power over their own affairs. He argued that limited autonomy would satisfy moderates, and the bulk of Corsicans, but that it needed to function effectively.[51] Similarly, Corsican deputy Paul Giaccobi argues that Corsicans currently have sufficient autonomy, and that if the powers devolved to Corsica since 1982 were properly used, Corsicans would be satisfied.[52] During the 2003 devolution attempt, Interior Minister Sarkozy stated that "Sardinia, just nine km away, has enjoyed autonomy

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[50] As reported by Associated Press, August, 8, 1982.
[51] Author interview with Pierre Joxe, Paris, France, April 2006.
[52] Author interview with Paul Giaccobi, Paris, France, April 2006.

since 1948 and has no independence seekers," and expressed his hope that the same could

be true in Corsica if they were given a greater measure of autonomy.[53]

An additional indication of strategic behavior on the part of the government is that

autonomy has been given to the Corsicans when the moderates have appeared relatively

strong in relation to the extremists on the island. An examination of the demands of

Corsican factions reveals that implemented devolution took place when a majority of

factions representing the movement made autonomy, rather than independence demands.

Figure 4.1 shows which demand was dominant at any given time, based on the number of

factions supporting each demand.[54]

Figure 4.1. Dominance of Autonomy or Independence Demands Overtime

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[53] Quoted in "Corsica rejects autonomy offer by Paris," CNN.com posted 3:35 PM EDT, July 6, 2003.
[54] This representation does not capture the relative size of each of the factions and this does vary.
However, it is difficult to compare size and support across conventional and militant organizations.
Moreover, the relevance of these two types of factions to the French government does not depend only on
size, but also on tactics and the effect they have on politics.

All successful and attempted autonomy transfers occurred during times when the majority of self-determination factions sought autonomy. Moreover, the 1982 and 2001 accommodations occurred when it appeared that the movement was becoming more moderate on the whole.

The "divide and conquer" strategy can be considered successful in its immediate aims, but has not necessarily had the long term consequences hoped for. On one hand, the first major transfer of autonomy succeeded in solidifying the split between autonomy-seekers and independence-seekers. While some nationalists joined in the new regional government with the autonomists, others vowed to maintain their armed struggle (Corsica Report 1999). The first election of the Corsican Assembly also led to the election of Assembly President Prosper Alfonsi – a supporter of decentralization, not independence.[55] The moderation of demands by some Corsican factions led to further splits between moderates and extremists, which resulted in the emergence of two new extreme factions, the *Armée de liberation nationale de la Corse* and the *Brigandes Révolutionnaires Corses*. However, both the political left and right formed the organizations "to mobilize the population against violence," including the *Mouvement Corse Démocratique* and the *Corse Française et Républicaine*, respectively (Loughlin 1989, 325). The emergence of moderating forces in Corsica provides additional support for my prediction that the "divide and conquer" strategy was used when the more moderate proponents of self-rule appeared to be able to limit the effectiveness of extremists.

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[55] As reported by the Associated Press, August 20, 1982.

Assessing the longer-term success of this policy is more difficult. The relatively low level of support for extremists in Corsica is an indication of successful marginalization of the nationalist movement. However, the strategy cannot be seen as an unqualified success for several reasons. First, though support for the nationalists is low, their tactics remain effective in disrupting order on the island, and they continue to be a thorn in the side of the French government. The bombing campaigns began in the 1970s, and a number of attacks have occurred in subsequent years.[56] Second, the fratricidal conflict that has ensued between nationalist factions is, in part, a result of the successful fractionalization of the Corsicans (Daftary 2000). In 2001, separatist leader François Santoni was killed leaving a wedding and his death is believed to be related to statements he made about other nationalists on the Island. Former leader of a pro-independence movement, Jean-Michel Rossi of the National Liberation Front of Corsica-Historical Trend, was also killed in 2000. Police suspected inter-faction rivalry as the motivation.[57]

The government also tried to buy off moderates and marginalize extremists through illicit dealings. Successive administrations used covert negotiations and illicit side-payments in their dealings with Corsican factions. In 1978, the French prefect for Corsica consulted autonomists informally, but could not engage them officially. Pierre Joxe held private negotiations with the *Mouvement pour l'autodétermination* (MPA) prior to the statute proposal in 1990. Between 1993 and 1995, Interior Minister Charles Pasqua (of RPR) negotiated covertly with both *FLNC-Canal Historique* and MPA. The leader of *FLNC-Canal Historique* was also offered money to leave France in 1996 by

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[56] Notably, in 1976, 20 targets were attacked in Corsica and Paris. During 1980, there were 378 total bomb attacks, up from 287 in 1979 (Keesings, June 1981).
[57] Keesings, August 2001.

Prime Minister Alan Juppé's government (Daftary 2000). The nationalist faction, *A Cuncolta*, also claims to have engaged in secret negotiations with the government in 1996. It is unclear whether these covert dealings with nationalists succeeded in driving any of them from the island or co-opting the moderates in these organizations, but this strategy was employed a number of times in an effort to do so.

Accounts from politicians involved in autonomy negotiations, as well as academic sources, indicate that French governments used autonomy strategically. The goal of autonomy policy has been to make the minimum concessions necessary to bring moderate Corsicans into mainstream politics. Moreover, grants of further autonomy have taken place when the moderate Corsicans were perceived as relatively strong or gaining strength relative to the more extreme nationalists.

Alternative Explanations

In addition to evaluating the causal mechanisms I advance, the French case allows me to evaluate some of the existing explanations outlined in Chapter One. These alternative explanations are drawn from the literature on conflict and minority politics generally, and some of the variation they focus on does not occur in the France/Corsica case. Theories focused on economic incentives (such as Hechter 1975; Gourevitch 1979; Alesina and Spolaore 2003) cannot be fully evaluated in a comparative sense because there is a lack of significant variation in the economic status of Corsica during the analysis time period. The Corsican case fits the prediction that deprived and underdeveloped regions will experience persistent nationalist claims. Corsica is relatively poor and consistently receives subsidies from Paris. In 1999, approximately

50% of aggregate income in Corsica came from transfers from the national government (Smyrl 2004). In 2003, Corsica also received the highest amount of EU structural funds per capita in France (Lefevre 2003). High rates of unemployment are a persistent problem in Corsica, with typically higher percentages than the national rate. The economic disparity of the island has clearly been a basis for demands on the French state, and these are sometime made in conjunction with demands for greater self-rule. The argument that disputes continue when there are positive economic incentives to do so for insurgents (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) is not supported by the Corsican case. There do not appear to be any direct monetary benefits to maintaining the dispute on the part of the Corsicans, such as outside aid to nationalists.

The intractability of the low-level of violence also cannot be accounted for by the nature of the terrain in Corsica. The French government has been fairly effective in finding and arresting nationalists, despite the mountainous topography. There have been some exceptions to this trend, wherein nationalists sought by the government are effectively hidden. The role of Corsican people, as opposed to terrain, appears to be a factor in this and is discussed in the role of culture below.

The case study shows some support for the reputation approach advanced by Walter (2006a). A number of French politicians cite fears of encouraging other nationalist identities (such as the Breton and Basques) to mobilize for greater autonomy as a reason for their opposition to autonomy for Corsica. They are concerned that these groups will become violent, but also that their existence as non-violent political movements would constitute a direct threat to the unity of France. Jean-Pierre Chevènement's vehement opposition to the Jospin autonomy plan stemmed this concern.

At the heart of these fears about challenges to a French unitary state, however, is a fundamental concern about equality. Opponents to what they term a "patch work" French state argue that this type of state cannot ensure equality among individual citizens. Reputation, along with a concern for state unity, is clearly important to some at the national level, but it has not been able to stop devolution to Corsica or decentralization more generally.

The French case also provides support for several elements of bargaining-based theories. The multiple hurdles to enacting autonomy legislation demonstrate that reversing implemented policy would be difficult. This confers credibility on the government as a bargaining partner. The Corsicans have voiced little concern that concessions would be overturned in the future, despite the fact that alternating administrations had different views on autonomy for the island. Moreover, many factions – both violent and non-violent – have been willing to negotiate with the government over time.

The role of private information also played an important role in Corsican dispute. The 2003 referendum failure in Corsica is an important example of uncertainty derailing the devolution process. The 2003 referendum asked Corsicans if they supported the proposed autonomy legislation, which would entail the largest transfer of power thus far. Chirac's government was confident that the island would approve the measure through a popular referendum, and that this would confer legitimacy on the legislation. In fact, the referendum was not a necessary part of the legislative process, but was held specifically for this reason. Despite the fact that the Corsican Assembly has already voted to support the autonomy bill, the referendum failed by a 51% to 49% vote.   The incorrect

estimation of popular support for the plan caused an embarrassing failure for the administration and took devolution off the table for the short term.

It is difficult to assess whether the uncertainty generated about support for the 2003 autonomy bill was the result of Corsican factions intentionally withholding private information. Local Corsican organizations ran both strong "Yes" and "No" campaigns in the lead up to the vote. Both local and national politicians attempted to garner support for one position or the other. These campaigns indicate that, at a minimum, these actors perceived a "swing" population of Corsicans who were undecided on the issue. This may have increased the degree of uncertainty over whether the autonomy bill would gain popular support. After the fact assessments of the referendum failure attribute the vote to several factors, some which are not directly related to the proposal. A set of entrenched local politicians who stood to lose power from the new arrangement advocated for a no vote. Moreover, the arrest of Yvan Colonna (the prime suspect in the 1998 murder of Corsican Prefect Claude Erignac) just prior to the vote was widely seen as strategically timed and manipulative on the part of the French government. This soured some on supporting the government's proposal for Corsica.[58]

Issue indivisibility does not appear to be a barrier to settlement in the French case. Both the Corsicans and the French government have negotiated over significant transfers of power down from the central government. Moreover, one of the key barriers to further devolution – the constitutional limitations on uneven decentralization – has been overturned through constitutional amendment in 2003. One issue that could be seen as indivisible is the primacy of French nationality, as repeated efforts to recognize the

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[58] Author interview with Jean-Louis Briquet. Paris, France. November, 2005.

"Corsican People" have been stopped. Though the government has not made concessions on this issue, many French politicians and citizens have supported the recognition of Corsica's particular status. The primacy of the French nation remains enshrined in the constitution, but this is clearly not a failsafe against challenges to it, as recent constitutional changes have demonstrated.

Additional Factors

In addition to the alternative explanations drawn from the general literature on conflict and autonomy settlements, several other factors have been argued to play a central role in the Corsican dispute. Specifically, the role of separatist violence is argued to drive the negotiations process between Corsica and the French government and local culture has been identified as a barrier to peace.

The Role of Violence

The Corsican movement has engaged in terrorist activity over the past 30 years leading to a large amount of damage to infrastructure and a number of high-profile deaths. Despite the persistence of violence over time, the level of violence has not remained constant. The effect of upward swings in violent activity has consistently been to put the Corsican question back on the agenda at the national level in France. Though violence has engendered more attention to the island, the response of the French state in these instances has not been consistent. Different administrations tried a variety of tactics for dealing with Corsican violence – ranging from police crackdowns to negotiations. The most striking act of violence took place in 1998 when the Corsican Prefect Claude

Erignac was murdered as he went to a concert. The opinion of French politicians on Corsica was polarized in response to the murder. Some saw it as evidence that Corsica's problem was a lack of order that could not be remedied by transferring more power downward. Others saw the act as an indication that the political status quo could not be maintained on the island. Though violence has played a clear role in bringing French attention to Corsica, it has not had a consistently positive or negative effect on attempts to devolve autonomy to the island.

The Role of Culture

A number of scholars have identified the distinctive culture of traditional Corsican society as a large determinant of the persistent trouble on the island – both in terms of violence and the inefficient government (Tarrow 1974; Briquet 1997). Corsica has a strong network of clans which have formed the basis of the traditional society on the island. The role of the clan system in Corsica has been discussed at length by others (see Briquet 1997), but it is important to note in this chapter the effect it has had on the devolution process.

Though the clan system itself does not play a central role in the official governance of the island today, the clans remain politically relevant and have affected the politics of devolution to Corsica in two primary ways. First, inter-clan rivalry has helped to maintain a level of violence on the island. Second, the clientalistic system of the clan network tends to favor the status quo and this holds true for proposed changes in governance (Smyrl 2004).

Elements of the traditional clan system have been linked to the local mafia in Corsica and this segment of society in particular has been connected to the nationalist movement. A number of factions supporting claims for independence are thought to be criminal organizations (including the prominent FLNC) (Loughlin 1989). The connection between the mafia and the nationalist movement appears to account for some of the persistence of radial factions on the island. In a larger sense however, the mafia element has little to lose from autonomy, and perhaps more influence to gain if decisions are made more locally.

The clan system also maintains a legacy of clientalism in Corsica (Hintjens et al. 1995; Smyrl 2004). The dense network of patronage relationships in place through the traditional clan system creates incentives for those in advantaged positions to resist change. Evidence of this is seen in the opposition of some traditional leaders of the community to changes in autonomy that will restructure the process through which business and politics are carried out. During the 2003 referendum campaigns, a number of traditional leaders urged their networks of contacts to vote no.[59] These individuals stood to loose some power with the restructuring of Corsican government and opposed the change despite the fact that the reform would make government more efficient and powerful. To the extent that clan ties remain an important connection between individuals and families, the leaders of this traditional network can influence local support for autonomy policy negatively.

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[59] Author interview with Jean-Louis Briquet. Paris, France. November, 2005.

Conclusion

This chapter presents evidence to support the causal story I advance in Chapter Two about the dynamics of inter-governmental bargaining and the strategic consideration of governments. In it, I have focused on three key propositions regarding the internal working and intentions of the French national government during the Corsican dispute. The French case offers an opportunity to examine a series of governments that attempted to devolve autonomy despite internal divisions over the issue. As such, it allows me to uncover how internal veto players affect the devolution process – what effects these actors had on policy and what types of concessions and tactics were used to induce support for autonomy policy in a multi-veto player state. An examination of the government's decision making process about autonomy for Corsica also allows me to evaluate my claims about government intentions and the possibility that autonomy was used strategically.

In Proposition One, I demonstrate that internal divisions in the French state constituted veto players in debates over autonomy policy for Corsica. For three major attempts to devolve power, coalitions of legislators and the Constitutional Council effectively vetoed portions of each autonomy plan. These vetos occurred at various stages of the legislative process, including during negotiations among government ministers, negotiations within the governing coalition, and at review by the Constitutional Council after legislation had already been approved by the National Assembly. The effect of the vetos was to limit the overall transfer of power to the island and prohibit certain types of autonomy despite the support of legislative majorities for increasing autonomy.

The second proposition evaluated in this chapter is that pro-autonomy actors in the government – in this case the Prime Minster and his cabinet – must compensate other veto players at the national level in order to devolve autonomy. During the process leading up to each successful devolution of power (in 1982, 1991, and 2001), concessions were made by the government to veto players opposed to autonomy. In both 1982 and 2001, the government was able to use changes in greater decentralization policy to alleviate concerns over special status for Corsica and this helped to gain support for the bill. The text of both these pieces of legislation was altered in response to specific demands of other veto players to prevent a veto of the bill. In 1982, the term "Corsican People" was removed from the legislation and in 1991, a similar recognition of the island's specificity was made based on geographic particularly as opposed to nationality. In 2001, Jospin made concessions to the Green party over the autonomy deal in order to retain its legislative support of the bill. Each of these attempt to grant autonomy to the Corsicans involved important concessions by the government in order to garner and maintain support of other veto players.

The final proposition evaluated in this chapter is that French governments acted strategically in their use of autonomy. I argue in Chapter Two that governments facing divided autonomy movements have an incentive to use autonomy strategically to attempt to create a greater rift between more moderate autonomy seekers and more extreme elements in a self-determination movement. I also argue that governments are most likely to pursue this strategy when the most moderate elements of the self-determination movements appear relatively strong. I find, in fact, that autonomy concessions are made to Corsicans when the majority of factions representing the Corsicans support autonomy

as opposed to independence. Moreover, the limited autonomy concessions have been designed to bring Corsican activists more clearly into the French system and marginalize extremists who seek independence using violent tactics.

Through this in-depth analysis of the inner workings and motivations of the French government over time, I demonstrate the existence of several causal mechanisms integral to the theory of this dissertation.   The existence of multiple veto players in government constitute a significant barrier to the granting of autonomy, even when there is majority support in the government for such policies. Moreover, the ability of pro-autonomy actors to make side-payments to gain support through concessions in autonomy policy and, in some cases, other policies, was critical to the limited success that French governments have had in devolving autonomy.

The next chapter provides an analysis that focuses on the internal dynamics within several self-determination movements in North East India. It will demonstrate how multiple factions within such movements interact, and the effect of this process on autonomy negotiations with the government.

Chapter Five

The Mizo, Naga, and Bodo Self-determination Disputes in India

Since independence, the Indian government has faced persistent challenges from minority self-determination movements throughout the country. The ability of these movements for self-determination to gain greater self-rule from the central government has varied widely. In particular, the self-determination movements in the strategically important North Eastern region of the country have had different levels of success in gaining autonomy concessions from the Indian government. This chapter focuses on three self-determination movements in the Assam State in North East India. This state was initially constructed based on the British administrative unit in the region. It has faced at least six movements for greater self-determination, with four eventually separating from Assam and achieving statehood within India, several gaining greater autonomy and one receiving no concessions related to self-rule.[1]

This chapter explores the process by which several of these movements sought and, in some cases, gained greater autonomy from India, focusing on the internal dynamics of the movements. An examination of the Mizo, Naga and Bodo groups in India, which were all subsumed under the Assam state, allows me to explore how variation in divisions within these movements affects their ability to bargain for greater self-determination from the state. Although the time frame of these movements differs to some extent, each sought greater self-rule from India in the post-independence period.

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[1] Groups that gained statehood are the Nagas, the Mizos, and the Khasi-Jaintia tribes. The Bodos and Mizos received other autonomy concessions. The Gorkhas have received no autonomy from the Union government.

The central government of Indian Union (hereafter referred to as the Union Government) has demonstrated a clear willingness to accommodate demands for self-determination within the context of the Indian Constitution, but the ability of minority populations to secure concessions and the magnitude of these concessions has differed across cases. I will demonstrate in this chapter that the relative success of these movements for self-determination is, in part, a function of their ability to overcome internal divisions and also of the ability of the government to use autonomy strategically in some situations.

This comparison is designed to isolate and evaluate the effects of internal divisions within self-determination movements on the autonomy bargaining process. An ideal set of cases would allow me to compare minority movements that were similar in all aspects except their internal structure (King et al. 1994). However, no two nationalist minorities achieve this degree of similarity, even those that share the same basic ethnic identification but reside in different areas (such as the Gorkhas in the West Bengal and Assam states of India). Moreover, movements for self-determination are dynamic, and their internal structure changes over time.

Given these constraints, I have chosen a set of cases that face similar bargaining environments in post-independence India, vary in their internal structure, but are similar along a number of other dimensions thought to affect the success of such movements. By selecting movements that took place in the Assam territory, I compare groups that share broad similarities in terms of their relative position to the central government and, importantly, operate in the same basic institutional context for their negotiations with the government. Utilizing variation in the Assam region also allows me to control for the

fact that these movements take place in the strategically important North East border region of India.[2]

There were six possible self-determination movements I could examine from the Assam region. These include the Assamese, Nagas, Bodos, Mizos, Khasi-Jaintia,[3] and Gorkhas.[4] I selected the Nagas, Mizos and Bodos to compare, while excluding the others for the following reasons. Each of the three selected cases made both autonomy and independence demands. Each involved some degree of violent activity associated with their demands. Although the Bodo population is larger than both the Naga and Mizo, all of these movements' populations are relatively small compared to India as a whole (ranging from .01% to .4% of the population of India).[5] Moreover, these movements are all territorially concentrated and the territory claimed by each of these groups includes other ethnic populations. The Mizos, Nagas and Bodos also adhere to minority religious practices in India; the Mizos and Nagas are both predominantly Christian, while the Bodos practice Bathauism (George 1994).[6]

Though the remaining groups share some of these traits, they are also unique in important ways. The Assamese, while seeking greater self-determination within India, have been dominant in local politics compared to these other movements. Although the

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[2] See Adeney (2007) for a discussion of the importance of being a border state in the North East.

[3] The Khasi-Jaintia are also grouped with the tribes of the Goro Hills.

[4] I do not include Arunchal Pradesh here because there was no internal movement for change in governance. Buruah (2003b) argues that the status of the region called Arunchal Pradesh, previously the North East Frontier Agency, was changed by the Union government as a larger campaign to create small, more malleable states in the North East region, and was not the product of an internal movement for self-determination.

[5] These figures are based on the Minorities At Risk assessment of population based on census data in 1990 (Bennett and Davenport 2003). The Bodo population is .4%, the Mizos are .07% and the Nagas are .1% of the population of India at this time. The MAR project does not include group size data for earlier years. There is no indication of major demographic shifts in these populations (such as in or out migration) prior to this.

[6] The dominant religious practice is Hindu.

Assamese share many cultural traits with other groups in this region, they are also share in practicing the dominant religion in Indian, Hinduism. Moreover, much of the Assam dispute with the central state has been focused on migration issues and their fear of a growing Bengali population in the region, rather than their degree of autonomous power. The Gorkhas are Nepalese Indians which, compared to all other groups in the area, are recent immigrants to the region. This group is also spread across a number of states in India and the Gorkha movement for greater self-determination began in the state of West Bengal. Their struggle has been predominantly about establishing their rights as Indians, as opposed to their rights to self-determination per se. The early Gorkha movement in West Bengal even demanded inclusion in the Assam state to unify the population. The Khasi of the Khasi-Jaintia hills demanded political autonomy, but also had distinct preference for inclusion in the Assam state (Hazarika 1996). Moreover, the Khasi-Jaintia area was not administered in the same way as many of the other groups. While groups such as the Mizo and Nagas were designated as "excluded" by British policy, the Khasi-Jiantia and Garo Hills areas were "partially excluded" and because of this difference in policy, had a higher level of political development prior to Indian independence.

I argue in Chapter Two that the number and connection between factions within movements for self-determination affect the ability of such movements to negotiate autonomy concessions. I focus on the positive effect of group unity in bargaining, but also on the critical role played by coordination among multiple factions within internally divided movements. The degree of internal cohesion and ability to overcome internal divisions has varied across the three cases I examine, as well as within each case over time. All of these minority movements have some degree of internal heterogeneity. This

is especially true through the early development of the movements, when open political debate over the appropriate status of the groups took place. It is likely that extremists and moderates could be found in basically every minority population once identity has become politicized. However, it is the political manifestation of these internal divisions within movements that is central to the bargaining process and how the minority population engages with the state. The emergence of multiple factions which operated independently of one another in the same movement alters the bargaining situation and, as I argue in Chapter Two, has several effects on the bargaining process. The next section outlines my theoretical expectations about the role of internal divisions on the autonomy bargaining process. Following that, I provide a brief overview of governance politics in India and the three self-determination movements. I then examine each of these movements in detail, tracing the role that internal divisions have played in their negotiations with the government and their effect on the ability of the group to gain autonomy-related concessions.

Theoretical Expectations

Although the large-n analysis indicates support for the theory by demonstrating correlation between patterns of autonomy settlement and internal divisions, it cannot directly examine the causal links in the theory. This and the previous chapter present propositions on elements of the causal story not tested in the quantitative analysis. The propositions in this chapter focus on the dynamics of bargaining within self-determination movements and the effects of the internal bargaining negotiations with the central state.

In Chapter Two, I present three basic types of self-determination movements: unitary, moderately-divided and highly divided. Unitary groups are those that present the state with a cohesive demand, while moderately-divided and highly-divided groups challenge the state for a variety of autonomy related demands. I argue that there are bargaining advantages for unitary groups but that divided groups can also achieve autonomy when divisions can be overcome or dissenters sidelined. Based on the theory presented in Chapter Two, there are two types of groups that are most likely to get an autonomy deal – those that are unitary and those that are highly divided. The capacity of factions within self-determination movements to overcome internal divisions is central to their ability to get a new deal in divided cases. Among internally divided movements, there are two ways that self-determination movements get a new autonomy deal. First, they can generate a degree of internal consensus that allows the external bargain with the government to move forward. Second, some internal factions can make a limited and "contested" agreement, where a high degree of consensus has not been reached internally, but the pro-settlement faction tries to enforce a deal ex post. I advance three propositions based on the theory. Proposition One examines the how factions overcome internal divisions and the role this plays in bargaining for autonomy. Proposition Two focuses of the scope of concessions that I argue groups should achieve given different levels of internal fractionalization. Proposition Three deals with the effects of limited autonomy concessions.

Proposition One: Divided self-determination movements will attempt to overcome internal divisions to gain autonomy.

I argue in Chapter Two that divided self-determination movements face a number of challenges when bargaining with the central state over autonomy. These include: presenting the state with multiple autonomy-related demands which increases uncertainty about the movement's reversion point and a higher chance of spoiler attempts by extremists. Movements with multiple internal factions will try to overcome these barriers through a number of ways in order to present the state with a more unified, stronger challenge for greater self-determination. I expect to observe the following behaviors by self-determination movement factions in order to generate greater internal cohesion: pro-settlement factions using the promise of future power to induce others to support a deal, factions using force to gain consensus, and factions using other side-payments to induce consensus. Although internal self-determination factions will not always succeed in creating internal consensus, increasing their cohesion will facilitate autonomy settlement when it does occur.

Proposition Two: In the absence of consensus among major internal factions in the movement, autonomy deals will be more limited in scope and designed to incorporate moderates into the state.

When groups are internally divided, and full consensus cannot be found over autonomy, state governments can still press for an autonomy settlement designed to satisfy the most moderate of factions. A lack of general consensus means that a major faction has refused to participate in negotiations or support settlement. In these instances, where there is no clear consensus among the minority group, I expect that the autonomy concessions offered will be smaller in scope relative to those offered to movements that

find a higher degree of internal consensus. Moreover, concessions will be designed to bring the most moderate factions into the conventional political system.

Proposition Three: Limited concessions will be followed by moderate factions' increased integration into the official governing apparatus and a government crackdown on more extreme factions.

In Chapter Two, I argue that when faced with a highly divided movement states will use autonomy strategically to satisfy the most moderate factions. The goal of such a policy is to bring the moderates into mainstream politics and thereby weaken the movement. This will likely be accompanied by an explicit policy to marginalize the more extreme factions through repression or a crackdown attempting to provide greater order.

Overview of Governance Politics in India and the Mizo, Naga and Bodo Cases

This section provides an overview of the greater context of the transition to post-colonial Indian politics and of each of the three cases before delving into an evaluation of these propositions. These movements all took place within a larger changing Indian polity at the end of British rule. At the time of independence, the government was set up as a federal system with three types of states, each having varying degrees of autonomous power from the Union Government. These early states were based on the colonial administrative divisions already in existence, and Assam was created as an "A" state, which had a maximum level of autonomy under the new federal system.[7] At this point,

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[7] Assam was a colonial administrative unit which underwent a number to changes to its physical integrity and powers prior to Indian independence. Assam was a separate province until 1905 when it was merged

the Assam region included much of North Eastern territory and a multitude of minority populations. Under colonial rule, the minority populations in Assam were isolated from the rest of India.[8] As a whole, the region was economically backward and the British administration facilitated the large-scale introduction of tea plantations in the region. Aside from the imposition of the tea industry, the people were left a high degree of autonomy to deal with their internal affairs relative to other parts of India.

The transition to independent India critically altered the position of the North Eastern groups. As a strategically important area, its incorporation into the new Indian Union was a key concern for India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Negotiations over the status of the North East groups took place between local leaders and the emerging Indian government, with the exiting British administration also playing a role. Nehru was not willing to concede any of the territory and the British eventually supported this decision, preferring to see a larger Indian Union with autonomous sub-units. In practice, this meant that the Assam region lost the degree of autonomy it had enjoyed during British rule and received increased attention from the central government. This attention included greater efforts to control the region through force. Attempts to integrate the region met with resistance, but this largely took the form of non-participation in the early stages of independent India.

The North East was not the only portion of the country that chafed at the new Indian administrative scheme. Dissatisfaction throughout the country with the

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with East Bengal. It became a Chief Commissionership in 1912, then a Governor's Province in 1921. Finally, it became an "A" state at independence (Hazarika 1996).

[8] There was some variation in the internal administration of Assam that was designed to restrict movement between the hills and plains people of the region. The "Inner Line" was an internal border designated for this purpose. Moreover, the hill districts had a simpler administrative set up than the plains areas as designated by the Frontier Tract Regulation, II (Hazarika 1996).

organization of the Indian Union led to riots and eventually the State Reorganization Act in 1956. This legislation mandated a large-scale reorganization of states along linguistic lines and was designed to quell the rumblings of a myriad of distinct ethno-linguistic populations. This change in governance set the stage for the contemporary movements for self-determination as the country became divided between linguistic groups that gained their own state and those that did not.[9]

The Reorganization Act led to the creation of a new Assam state where the Assamese population formed a bare majority. It also included the Nagas, Mizos, Bodos, Gorkhas, Khasi-Jainita/Garo Hills tribes, and other smaller tribal groups. Despite positive relations between these groups and the Assamese, demands for self-determination within Assam continued among them. The majority of these groups started movements for language protection and language education rights, which later developed into demands for greater self-rule. This development was assisted, in part, by exclusionary policies in Assam that increasingly threatened minority culture in the region. For example, the 1963 Official Language Bill passed by the Union Government allowed states to select an official language. The Assam government chose their own language (Assamese) to the consternation of other groups in the territory.[10] Over time, the growing Assam movement propagated a policy of explicit Assamization in an attempt to maintain hegemony in the state.

In addition to the self-determination movements in the Assam region, the Indian government faced a number of challenges for greater autonomy throughout the country,

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[9] The linguistic distinction also mapped onto what we call ethnic, or sometimes nationalist, divisions in many instances.

[10] There was pressure at the national level for Hindi as a national language, but this was met with resistance throughout the country.

and responded in varying ways. Among the most prominent challenges outside the Assam region were the Tripura (also in the North East), the Kashmirs on the border with Pakistan, and the Sikhs in the North West. The Indian Constitution provided a number of ways for the government to respond with accommodative policies (though it also used force with regularity). The creation of new federal states afforded the highest degree of autonomy, however, there are a plethora of other provisions for minority protection as well. Among the range of concessions available to the government (from smallest to largest in terms of autonomous power) include the creation of autonomous sub-units such as the "sixth schedule" district councils within existing states, Union Territories, and States. Empirically, the government makes modified or hybrid concessions along this continuum as well. The Sixth schedule of the Indian constitution allows for the creation of district councils at the local level for minority populations within Indian states.[11] The powers of district councils include land use regulation (a major issue for most self-determination groups), local tax collection, road maintenance and the administration of primary school education among others.[12] District councils are subject to the control of state-level governments, which severely limits their ability to act independently in these areas if their parent state disagrees with policy. Variants on this type of autonomy are possible as indicated by the Bodo Autonomous Council created in 1993 (discussed below).

The creation of a Union Territory entails greater autonomy from the parent state of a region in that it separates the administration of the territory in question from that

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[11] This is specific to the Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
[12] Other powers include control over irrigation, inheritances, marriage, social customs and the appointment or succession of chiefs (Dommen 1967).

state. The Union Territory (UT), however, is more directly administered by the Union

Government because it is led by an appointee of the President of India. The UT

administrative unit was initially created with the States Reorganization Act of 1956

discussed above.[13] Subsequent creation of UTs involves the Union Government

officially designating the area as a Union Territory through legislative amendment to the

constitution.[14] In practice, the Indian constitution is fairly easy to amend and is among

the most amended constitutions in the world (Aruna 2001). Several areas in India have

achieved UT status since 1956, including Mizoram from Assam in 1971.

The most autonomous sub-unit in India is the State. The creation of new states

requires an official bill to be passed by the Union legislature and must be agreed to by the

President of India. States have their own legislature and a greater degree of freedom

from the Union Government than all other subunits. The current competencies of states

are delineated in the Seventh schedule of the constitution. Education policy, a major

issue in many self-determination movements, is treated as a concurrent responsibility of

the state and Union Governments.

State governments also have some control over the structure of local governance.

The administration and function of local government is included in the "State List,"

which specifies as a realm of control

> Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal
> corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement
> authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-
> government or village administration (Seventh Schedule, Article 246)

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[13] The State Reorganization Act also eliminated the type A, B, and C distinctions for the state, which had
delineated varying types of local governance.
[14] "Reorganization of North-Eastern States – Decline of Rebel Activities in Nagaland and Mizo Hills."
Keesing's Record of World Events. March 1972.

This means that state governments can also create local administrative bodies (such as district councils) and delineate powers that will be controlled at the local level.

The granting of each of these types of autonomy accommodation typically follows extensive negotiations between representatives of the Union Government, the state government involved and the self-determination movement. Most include the formal signing of a Memorandum of Settlement, which specifies the terms of the agreement to confer autonomous status, though designation as a Union Territory does not always include this step.

The Mizo, Naga and Bodo Cases

It is in this larger context of an ethically and linguistically diverse India that the Mizo, Naga and Bodo movements emerged in Assam. The Mizo, Naga, and Bodo cases provide a range of variation in internal divisions throughout the post-independence period and have achieved varying degrees of autonomy. The remainder of this section includes a brief overview of trends in both internal divisions and autonomy accommodation for each of these movements. The subsequent section will provide a more detailed account of these cases with a specific focus on the facts as evidence to evaluate the three propositions advanced in the chapter.

The Mizos began as a divided movement, expressing a diversity of autonomy related demands through multiple representative organizations. With a baseline internal division between independence and autonomy seeking factions, the movement vacillated between periods of relative cohesion and internal cooperation and extreme divisiveness. The Mizos achieved two substantial autonomy concessions – elevation to Union Territory

status in 1971 and full statehood in 1987. The Mizos were at their most highly divided when the moderates negotiated the concession of Union Territory status in 1971. This concession co-opted the moderate Mizos into local governance. The 1987 concession, in contrast, was achieved when the movement had overcome its most significant internal divisions.

The Nagas began as a highly cohesive movement for independence. They felt as little affinity with India as with the British Empire and saw themselves as clearly distinct from any emerging Indian polity in the 1940s. The Nagas were near uniformly supportive of a demand for independence, but expressed a second order preference for extreme autonomy in the Indian Union if this was not achievable. The movement maintained its coherence until the early 1960s when the Union Government successfully co-opted a small emerging group of moderates to sign an autonomy deal leading to the creation of a Naga state within India. Subsequent to this concession, the Naga movement has been divided between moderates who accept this new status quo autonomy and militant extremists who seek independence through insurgency.

Like the Mizos, the Bodos began as a heterogeneous movement for self-determination, with demands articulated for varying levels of autonomy, including independence. The movement has never achieved the degree of cohesion seen by the early Naga movement or the Mizos during periods of intense cooperation among factions. Moreover, violence between factions has plagued the movement intermittently. Despite their divisions, coalitions of factions within the Bodos have come together to negotiate with the Assam State and Union Government a number of times, and these periods of increased cohesion have led to the signing of limited autonomy deals in 1993 and 2003.

Evaluating the Propositions

Each of these propositions presented above addresses part of the causal story I advance in Chapter Two regarding the role of internal factions in self-determination movements in the autonomy bargaining process. In this section, I examine the political history of each of these three movements and provide evidence to show that internal divisions hindered autonomy bargaining, that more fractionalized movements get lesser concession and that limited concessions caused moderates to more closely ally with the government.

Proposition One: The Role of Internal Consensus in Gaining Autonomy

To evaluate Proposition One, I examine trends in internal divisions of the Mizos, Nagas, and Bodos since the time of Indian independence, focusing on the interaction between internal factions within these movements and the effect that this fractionalization has had on their attempts to gain increased autonomy. I demonstrate that internal factions attempt to overcome divisions within the movements to press autonomy demands. Moreover, I show that when these movements present the state with a more cohesive bargaining position they gain autonomy in a number of instances.

The Mizo Movement for Self-Determination

The Mizo movement varied significantly in its degree of internal fractionalization since its inception. A divide between those that favored autonomy and independence emerged early in the movement. Over time, both the autonomy-seekers and

independence-seekers suffered internal divisions, with the overall degree of fractionalization peaking in the early 1970s (when the Indian state offered a limited autonomy concession to buy off moderates). The mid to late-1980s saw increased coordination and cohesion among all factions and culminated in an autonomy concession that led to the creation of the Mizoram State. The moderate autonomy seekers in the Mizo movement made a number of attempts to overcome internal divisions, and their success in doing so led to greater autonomy. The extremists also attempted to generate internal consensus for their position, typically though violence; however, it was non-violent efforts to generate consensus that led to autonomy.

As the British pulled out of India in the late 1940s, the Mizo group was divided over its status in the newly forming Indian Union. Prior to Indian independence, the movement was dominated by a conventional[15] political organization, the Mizo Union (MU), which called for local autonomy. At the same time, however, the more radical United Mizo Freedom Organization (UMFO) demanded an independent country for the Mizos.[16] Despite this early split between the MU and the UMFO, the later supported inclusion in India as the date of Indian independence approached. However, no agreement was made between the internal factions as to what exactly the status of the Mizo should be in the new state.

The MU continued to dominate local politics in Mizo territories and advance its agenda to alter the character of local governance by ending the traditional chief system that governed the group previously. Once the Indian government announced plans to

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[15] Reference to "conventional" parties or factions denotes that these are not militant organizations and many of them participated in the official government.
[16] This organization was formed with the encouragement of the traditional chieftains as an opposition to the MU. The MU's early platform centered on the elimination of the chieftain system.

reorganize the state along linguistic lines in 1956, the MU increased agitation for greater

self-rule. Simultaneously, a number of other Mizo regional parties and organizations

emerged with varying demands over self-determination. The most important of the new

organizations was the Mizo National Famine Front, which initially formed as an

organization to relieve famine in the region in 1960. Shortly after its inception, it became

known as the Mizo National Front (MNF) and began campaigning for greater local

control. The organization was led by Pu Laldenga, who agitated for independence as

early as 1962, but wavered in his long career as a Mizo nationalist between independence

and autonomy demands. This organization would lead the demand for independence in

the coming years, while most other factions pursued some form of autonomy short of

independence.

During this period, the Mizos faced a Union Government dominated by

Jawaharlal Nehru and his Congress Party that pursued the creation of a strong center

federal system. At the beginning of British disengagement from the region, many

politicians supported a loose federation similar to the American Articles of Confederation

which would include modern Pakistan. The partition of Pakistan from India led those in

power in India – specifically Nehru and B.R. Ambedkar (the chairman of the drafting

committee for the constitution) – to support a strongly central federal system instead (Rao

and Singh 2005). The Congress Party supported this vision of a dominant center. The

only substantial voice of dissent in the early formation of the Union was Mahatma

Gandhi, who envisioned the country as a "nation of villages," with local government

playing the largest role in daily life (Rao and Singh 2005). However, despite this general

preference for a strong-center federal system, there was little opposition to the

reorganization that look place in the 1950s. Of particular importance, the major Hindu nationalizing forces (the Hindu Mahasabha and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh) did not directly oppose it or other autonomy concessions in the 1960s (Adeney 2005). Though the Union Government had a preference for a strong center, it clearly remained flexible on the autonomy issue.

Over time, fractionalization of the Mizos increased and two important splits within the Mizo movement affected their bargaining with the Union Government. The first was the split between the MNF (who became an underground organization) and the conventional political parties (initially led by the MU, and later the People's Conference (PC)). The MNF and conventional political party factions differed in both their preferences (independence versus autonomy) and their tactics (insurgency versus conventional political participation) (Lalchungnunga 1994). A second important division in the Mizo movement took place within the MNF. Although this organization maintained a unified structure for much of its tenure, the MNF had deep divisions over both policy and tactics. The "Blue Group" of the MNF favored negotiations with the Union Government and openly considered an autonomy compromise; the leadership of the larger MNF organization, however, favored holding out and using militancy to achieve independence for most of the movement's history. Despite these divisive undercurrents, the unity of this organization was maintained throughout most of the organization's tenure. This unity was achieved using both internal democratic process and violent coercion, with Laldenga personally maintaining control most of the time.[17]

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[17] The MNF's shadow government elected leaders from within its ranks, but did not hold wider elections including the Mizo population.

The effect of this split in the MNF is discussed at greater length in the evaluation of Proposition Two below, which focuses on the varying scope of autonomy concessions.

Both the moderates and extremists attempted to overcome internal divisions over time in different ways. The moderate Mizo Union attempted to overcome internal barriers through internal negotiations among Mizo factions and at times supported the inclusion of the MNF in negotiations with the Union Government. They solicited the MNF for negotiations in the late 1960s when the movement was at its most divided. At this time, the MNF pursued a harassment strategy to dissuade moderates from using conventional political channels to press their demands. In 1967, the MNF Special Forces burned houses of electoral candidates in the region (Verghesem and Thanzawna 1997). This strategy yielded some short term success, as the MU boycotted several elections in fear of repression from the MNF. However, the harassment of moderates did not ultimately stop their engagement with the central state or the legal government of the Mizo area.

In the 1960s, the Union government continued to pursue a strategy of piecemeal reorganization to deal with self-determination demands, but there was dissent within the government over this strategy. The Bombay and Punjab reorganization acts both created new states in other regions of the country. The most ardent pro-Hindu party, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, (which would be least likely to support local autonomy to ethnic or other religious submits) also indicated a willingness to compromise on autonomy questions, but opposed the division of Punjab specifically (Adeney 2005). In the late 1960s, Indira Gandhi's leadership of the reigning Congress Party was being challenged from within. The party was splitting over a number of issues, including the issue of further autonomy

for sub-regional groups. Prior to the 1969 split of her party into two factions, Prime

Minister Gandhi was able to gain support for her pro-autonomy policies (Mukerjee

1969). Moreover, despite the split within the Congress Party, Gandhi's "New Congress"

party was returned to power in parliament in the next election in 1971.[18] Under her

leadership, the government was willing and able to grant autonomy concessions.

In this bargaining context in the late 1960s, both the MU and the MNF tried to

increase internal cohesion around their demands but failed. Seeing the Mizo movement

at its most divided, the Union Government offered a limited concession to the most

moderate factions in 1971. The Mizo Union, having failed to gain greater internal

consensus through internal negotiations with other factions, accepted the concession of

Union Territory (UT) status from the government with the express view that this was a

step towards its demand for statehood. This settlement was contested by the MNF who

continued to seek independence and the Mizo Labour Party who pushed for statehood.

Subsequent to the implementation of this new status in 1973, the most moderate factions

who now ran the UT administration continued their efforts to overcome the persistent

internal divisions. Talks between the local government, the Union Government and the

MNF were held as early as 1973 when status was officially changed.

In addition to its attempts to create consensus by harassing moderate legal

factions, the MNF engaged in a number of violent and non-violent tactics to maintain

unity within the organization itself. In 1976, the MNF held a conference in Calcutta to

come to an agreement about the organization's aims. This conference was sponsored by

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[18] The government was in fact more cohesive after the 1969 Congress Party split and subsequent 1971
electoral victory of the Indira Gandhi faction (Weiner 1971).

the Indian government, whom MNF leader Laldenga had convinced that the faction

needed to overcome its internal divisions before it could settle with the government

(Verghesem and Thanzawna 1997). This conference did not overcome the divide

between sub-factions within the MNF and was followed by the arrest of Laldenga's main

internal challenger, Biakchhunga, by the MNF forces in 1978 (Verghesem and

Thanzawna 1997). Other leaders had been removed from their post for disagreeing with

Laldenga's positions throughout the tenure of the organization.

The Union Government continued to negotiate with the conventional government,

the Union Territory administration (the moderates), and the more extreme MNF. In the

late-1970s, the government, led by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, negotiated directly with

the head of the MNF (Laldenga). Despite Laldenga's double dealings with the

government (having earlier signed an accord agreeing to stay in India and almost

instantaneously refuting it to his supporters),[19] Gandhi recognized the importance of

direct negotiations with the MNF. The reigning local government in the Mizo Union

Territory (led by the People's Congress Party) held little sway over the militant

organization.

In 1981, the Union Government appeared ready to give in to the Mizos' demands

for a state within the Union (Verghesem and Thanzawna 1997). However, divisions

within the larger Mizo movement prohibited the settlement at this point. One of the

preconditions for the MNF accepting the deal and disarming was that they gain control of

the local government. Laldenga demanded that the administration of T. Sailo (of the

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[19] This accord conceded that the Mizos were indeed part of India and would disarm. Laldenga almost
immediately changed position on this, calling the accord an "understanding" but claiming that the MNF
was not conceding anything.

People's Congress Party) be dissolved in the Union Territory. Sailo, as head of the

Union Territory government, opposed the negotiated deal with the underground MNF,

and rejected the legitimacy of its demands for independence (Chatterjee 1994). Because

this internal split could not be overcome, the talks leading up to the statehood offer

faltered and the MNF resumed violent tactics.

Another round of negotiations with the MNF was held after this failure. These

yielded an agreement because the Mizos overcame the internal divisions that had

prevented settlement earlier. Laldenga once again led the delegation from the MNF and

on June 30, 1986, he signed an accord to create the state of Mizoram and disarm the

MNF. The deal signed in 1986 was essentially the same concession offered to the Mizos

in 1981. However, in 1986 the Mizos were able to overcome the split between the MNF

and conventional political parties in the Mizoram government. At this point, the Union

Territory government was led by Lal Thanhawla of the Congress (I) party.[20] Prior to the

new autonomy agreement, Thanhawla agreed to step down as administrator and allow the

formation of an MNF/Congress (I) coalition government under Laldenga. The generation

of consensus among these two major divisions over both the level of autonomy and the

structure of post-settlement political power was essential to the conclusion of the

autonomy accord. It also illustrates the use of future power as an internal bargaining chip

for negotiations among internal factions. On August 7, 1986 the State of Mizoram bill

passed through Lok Sabha (the lower chamber of the Indian parliament) and the region

officially changed status on February 20, 1987. Throughout this negotiation process, the

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[20] This was the Mizo branch of the national Congress (I) party, though the state level parties exercised a
much higher degree of autonomy from the national party structure that earlier in the post-colonial period.

Indian government was led by the Congress Party and by Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi (until her assassination in October 1984) and Rajiv Gandhi. Both Prime Ministers commanded a majority in the legislature which allowed them to pursue their pro-autonomy agenda.

Although the earlier, more limited, concession in 1973 illustrates the government's strategic use of autonomy to co-opt moderates, the greater concession in 1987 highlights the importance of internal cohesion. The lead up to the 1987 autonomy deal that resulted in Mizoram becoming the 23rd state clearly illustrates that internal divisions prohibited settlement until greater consensus could be achieved among the internal factions. The MNF was successfully incorporated into the Mizoram State government after the accord and abandoned its demand for independence.

The Naga Movement for Self-Determination

The Naga movement began as a unified movement and became increasingly divided over time in the wake of concessions from the Indian government. At the time of British decolonization, the Nagas were united in their demands for exclusion from the Indian Union, who they felt little attachment to. However, the prospects for an independent Naga country were non-existent in the eyes of both the emerging Indian administration and the British government. Instead, the Nagas negotiated for autonomy within the newly forming Indian Union.

From the beginning of the transition to independence in India, the Naga movement presented the Union Government with consistent and cohesive demands for greater self-rule. It won an early success with the negotiation of the Hydari agreement in

1948, which was to dictate its autonomous status in the Union. The Naga Hill District Tribal Council first represented the movement and demanded autonomy (Hazarika 1997). The council became the Naga National Council (NNC) by 1948 and was led by T. Aliba Imti. The NNC was recognized as the single legitimate representative of the Naga people by both their constituent population and the emerging Indian government (Ao 2002).

The NNC, as the sole representative of the Nagas, negotiated over the status of the Nagas with Sir Akbar Hydari, the governor of Assam during June 26 to 28, 1947. The resulting agreement included nine points which specified the right of Nagas to develop themselves as they saw fit and included provisions for local control over judicial matters, local government, legislation, land rights and taxation. These powers would be assumed directly by the NNC (Franke 2007). Jawaharlal Nehru, just beginning his time as the first Indian Prime Minister, had initially indicated a favorable view of this settlement and forwarded it to the constituent assembly (Franke 2007). However, disagreement over whether the Naga settlement included a right to future secession became a major sticking point on implementation and Nehru ultimately reneged on the agreement.[21]

The British plan for post-colonial transition envisioned substantial autonomy for sub-units in India. However, the principles of the final British administrative act, the 1935 Government of India Act, were overturned after partition. As noted above, the partition of Pakistan had a profound effect on Indian leaders during the transition (including Nehru) and pushed the maintenance of territorial integrity to the top of the

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[21] This agreement caused controversy because Article 8 of the agreement was interpreted by the Nagas to mean they could opt out of the Union in ten years time. The Union Government, led by Prime Minister Nehru, denied this fully and instead of abiding by the terms of the deal, wanted to grant autonomy on his own terms.

agenda. This explains, in part, the failure of the Hydari agreement after what appeared to be a successful agreement on local autonomy for the Nagas.

In the years following the Hydari agreement, the Naga movement remained unified. Nagas demonstrated their unity by boycotting the 1952 Indian elections, which effectively prohibited the formation of an elected government in the region (Aosenba 2001). The NNC continued as the sole organization representing Naga autonomy demands, though its leadership changed hands, with Agnami Zapu Phizo taking over control in 1950 (Kowtal 2000). With a lack of progress on achieving independence through diplomatic negotiations with the Union Government, the NNC set up its own government, called the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) on March 22, 1956.[22] Though Nehru had reneged on the Hydari autonomy deal, the Union government was clearly willing to negotiate over autonomy within the Union with the Nagas and even the Hindu nationalist forces throughout the country saw the necessity of some accommodation.

At this point in time, there were no overt splits within the Naga movement, and the NNC, through the Federal Government of Nagaland, continued to press the demands of the Nagas. In 1956, however, a small number of more moderate NNC members contacted the Union Government about the possibility of a settlement. The Union Government was willing to negotiate an agreement wherein the Nagas remained part of India with autonomy, but refused to discuss independence for Nagaland. Given the Federal Government of Nagaland's intractable bargaining position, insisting that

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[22] This is also called the "Tatar Hoho" at times, which refers to the legislative branch of the government (Kotwal 2000). It also set up the Naga Homeland Guard (NHG) as their security force.

independence be up for debate, the Union Government seized on the opportunity that

contact with the moderates presented. Indian Intelligence Bureau S. M. Dutt set out to

encourage coordination among the relatively unorganized moderates to create a new

bargaining partner with whom the Union Government could reach an autonomy

settlement (Aosenba 2001). This was an explicit strategy to try to divide the consistently

unified Naga movement.[23]

The fruit of this effort by the Indian intelligence bureau was the creation of the

Naga People's Convention (NPC), which operated as an intermittent forum for discussing

settlement options short of independence. The NPC met for several day conferences over

the course of three consecutive years (from 1957 – 1959) and pursued an open dialogue

with the Union Government (Means 1971). Each of the meetings yielded a series of

resolutions about moderate Naga preferences. The conference achieved some early

success inducing the Union Government to make administrative change designating the

Naga area a separate administrative unit. In 1959, it issued a 16-point resolution which

included the demand for autonomy for Nagaland in the form of statehood within the

Indian Union. The NPC, led by Dr. Imkongliba,[24] presented these demands to the state

and Union Government conceded statehood based on the proposal.[25]

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[23] I argue in Chapter Two that governments will be more likely to pursue this type of intentional division
strategy when the self-determination movement is highly divided. However, that does not mean that
governments will never try to employ this strategy with more unified groups if they see an express
opportunity to do so as in the Naga case. I would still expect the general trend that this strategy is used
more often in cases where the movement is highly divided. Some parts of the Indian government
questioned the advisability to such a strategy out of fear that it would make further dealings with the Nagas
more difficult.

[24] Dr. Imkongliba was killed allegedly by supporters of the independence demand shortly after the
agreement was made.

[25] Though statehood was granted, there are other elements of the proposal that have not been fully
implemented (Ao 2002). There also remains a dispute over the border of Nagaland which has led to
clashes with neighboring states (Means 1971).

The Naga Federal Government did not recognize the legitimacy of the NPC to sign a deal for statehood for the Nagas and the creation of the Nagaland solidified a divide between moderate and extremist Nagas. The strength of the Naga movement clearly played a role in the Union Government's decision to accommodate the group before many others. However, the government was able to use autonomy strategically to split in the movement. The official Nagaland state government held its first assembly election in 1964, and achieved a 50% turnout.[26] Mass participation steadily increased in the following years with voter turnout between 74% and 83% in the next four elections (1977 – 1982), indicating a large-scale acceptance among the Naga population of the new Naga state government.

Despite this acceptance of the concession among the Nagas, the NNC refused to participate in the government and continued its armed struggle for independence. After the successful transfer of statehood status to Nagaland, the NNC and its government (the Federal Government of Nagaland) suffered a number of internal divisions and ultimately have been unable to gain any additional autonomy concessions. An internal coup took place in July of 1967 in the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), led by General Kaito (Means 1971). This was followed by another internal crisis in October of the same year.[27] The divide within the FGN widened and led to the creation of an alternative "Revolutionary Government of Nagaland" (RGN) led by Kughato Sukhai (Means 1971). In 1975, a segment of the FGN signed the Shillong Accord which recognized the Nagas

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[26] The NPC elites became the Naga Nationalist Organization (NNO), which gained control of the state government (Means 1971).

[27] Frustrated with deadlocked talks between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and FGN representatives, the FGN legislature elected new "pro-Phizo" leaders, who promptly suspended the underground government's constitution.

as part of the Union Government and brought some militants back into conventional politics. This overt backing-down by elements of the FGN led to the creation of the radical National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980 who rejected the accord (Kotwal 2000). The NSCN has suffered further splits after its creation as well.[28] Other organizations emerged in the following years with unique agendas including the Nagaland People's Council, two NNC factions (one led by Phizo's daughter and another by Khadao Youthan), and the Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee (Baruah 2003a). Although the Union Government continued to pursue both negotiations and force to end the insurgent activity, it has not made further concessions on autonomy.

Although the negotiations for statehood did not take place through the NNC, the cohesion of the early movement clearly played a role in the early concessions the Nagas got from the Union Government.[29] They were among the first minority groups to be accommodated with autonomy in the country after the restructuring of the federal government. Their early negotiating success with the Hydari agreement paved the way for the government to make further concession which it had essentially promised at this time. The split between moderate and extremist Nagas after the statehood concession demonstrates an effective use of autonomy to divide the movement, which was strategic on the part of the government. Although my theory predicts that this strategy will be easiest to use when the self-determination movement is already divided, the Indian case indicates that this is also possible when the group is fairly unified. This particular case does not lend support to my assertion that governments will use this strategy when the

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[28] The NSCN subsequently split into two factions, the NSCN (I-M), led by Isak and Muivah and NSCN (K), led by S.S. Kahplang.

[29] Nehru and the emerging Union government were also facing a challenge from the Punjab at this point, but unlike the Nagas, Nehru did not support autonomy for Punjab (Adeney 2007).

movement is highly divided and moderates appear strong, but suggests another possible condition that may favor the use of a divide and conquer strategy – when the government believes they can create a legitimate partner for pursuing settlement.

The Bodo Movement for Self-Determination

The Bodo movement has been consistently highly divided throughout its tenure, though there have been many attempts to increase internal cohesion when presenting demands to the Union Government. In general, the Bodos have been less successful in generating and maintaining the degree of internal consensus that the Nagas or Mizos have in their negotiations with the Union Government. Examining the trends in internal divisions in the movement, I find that the two instances of autonomy increase that the Bodos have secured (in 1993 and 2003) were each preceded by an increase in internal cohesion during the bargaining process.

The early Bodo movement was highly divided in large part because it attempted to encompass other minority populations to form a multi-ethnic "tribal state."[30] The Plains Tribal Council (PTCA),[31] started in 1967, represented this early demand for tribal autonomy, but subsequently split and was challenged by the United Nationalist Liberation Front (UNTLE)[32] which also demanded tribal autonomy (Chaklader 2004).[33]

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[30] Earlier roots of the movement included the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS), which formed in 1952, and promoted Bodo culture and language.

[31] This organization is referred to as both the PTC and PTCA in the literature.

[32] This organization was started by an expelled PTCA member, Binai Khungur Basumatari (Bhattacharjee 1996).

[33] In general, the PTCA was characterized by weak leadership which wavered in its demands between autonomy and Union Territory status (Bhattacharjee 1996). A break in this organization led to the formation of the PTCA (Progressive), which formed in 1979 to demand Union Territory status (called Mishing-Bodoland). In 1984, the PTC (Progressive) dissolved and joined in the creation of the United Nationalist Liberation Front (UNTLE).

A lack of popularity among non-Bodos eventually led the UNTLE to demand an exclusively Bodo state. Despite the narrowing of interests as the movement became more exclusively "Bodo," the group remained divided in terms of both its demands and organizational structure. These early organizations were all unsuccessful at negotiating greater autonomy for the Bodos.[34]

These Bodo organizations made little progress in gaining greater local power in the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1980s, the All Bodo Student Union (ABSU)[35] gained prominence among the Bodo organizations and demanded a separate state for the Bodos (Dutta 1997).[36] The ABSU announced its slogan "Divide Assam Fifty-Fifty" as it pushed for the formal recognition of a distinct Bodo political unit. The Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC) was formed as a militant arm of the ABSU, and these two organizations dominated the Bodo factions. The ABSU, through the BPAC, unsuccessfully attempted to create consensus through force. The BPAC targeted both non-tribals and supporters of the PTCA, which they saw as a rival for Bodo allegiance. In 1987, the militant Bodo Security Force also emerged to pursue a separate Bodoland through violence (Bhattacharjee 1996).[37]

The ABSU and the BPAC began negotiations over autonomy with the government in the late-1980s and between 1989 and 1993, they engaged in nine rounds of tripartite talks which included the Assam government and the Union Government

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[34] Indira Gandhi held early talks in 1966 with the Plains organizations, though these did not yield concessions (Mukerjee 1969).

[35] The ABSU organization initially formed in 1967.

[36] The ABSU had initially supported the PTCA, but withdrew its support in 1979 because the organization failed to gain concessions and decreased the scope of their demands (George 1994; Bhattacharjee 1996).

[37] The Union Government negotiated the Assam Accords in the 1980s, which encouraged the Bodos that their demands may also be fulfilled at that time. However, additional concessions to the Bodos were not forthcoming at the time (George 1994).

(Chaklader 2004). The initial offering by the Union Government was for an autonomous three-tier local government for Bodo areas with devolution of administrative and fiscal powers. This was rejected by both the ABSU and BPAC, however they continued to negotiate to increase autonomy short of their full demand for statehood as the Union Government refused outright to discuss statehood for the Bodos. Though the ABSU and BPAC dominated the Bodo factions, they were not seen as the only legitimate representatives of the group, which included additional conventional and militant factions. In 1993, however, the PTCA (a longstanding rival to the ABSU) ceased its independent operation and joined up with the larger Bodo struggle led by the ABSU. This shift essentially recognized the ABSU and BPAC as the legitimate representatives of the Bodos (George 1994). This increase in the cohesion of the Bodos occurred just prior to the signing of a settlement which created the Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) after three years of negotiations. The BAC created a unique regional council for the Bodos which increased the number of issues over which the Bodos enjoyed self-rule. The settlement also created a Bodo Executive Council to administer the BAC.

Despite the increase in internal cohesion which allowed for the 1993 accord, the process of implementing the BAC was rife with difficulties. The increase in consensus that preceded the signing of the agreement was not maintained in the Bodo movement and the militant Bodo Security Force (BSF), which never supported the deal, rejected the settlement terms in favor of continued struggle for statehood (George 1994). Other Bodo factions, who had favored the agreement, later rejected the settlement because the issue

of contested territory was never settled.[38] Disagreement between the Bodos and the

Assam government led to the borders of the Bodo administrative region remaining

unsettled at the signing of the accord and the BAC never functioned as a significantly

autonomous source of power for the Bodos. Instead, it became a forum for in-group

competition and the process of implementing the BAC led to a series of fissures in the

Bodo movement. The ABSU split after the accord, as did the Bodoland Legislature Party

(BLP), which splintered to create the New Bodoland Legislature Party. The Bodoland

People's Party also split into factions supporting Brahma and Bwiswmutiary (the two top

leaders of the newly formed BAC) (George 1994).

Though the Bodos received an official concession from the Assam government in

the form of the BAC, this autonomy deal did not include any guarantees from the Union

Government regarding their status and due to the unsettled boundary issue, was largely

considered a failure in terms of transferring substantial power to the Bodos. Because the

Bodo Accord did not rely on a constitutional basis for its creation, the Assam government

remained the residual source of authority for the body. Despite this eventual failure, the

increased cohesion that came from recognition of the ABSU and BPAC as legitimate

negotiators by other Bodo factions led to the signing of the accord which brought some

measure of stability to the region in the subsequent years.

The years following the creation of the BAC were characterized by a high degree

of internal fractionalization of the Bodo movement. The BSF maintained its insurgency

and the conventional factions split over trying to make the BAC functional, abandoning it

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[38] The leadership of the new BAC accused the Assam government of reneging on verbal promises
regarding the territory.

in favor of a new settlement and pursuing statehood.[39] The Bodo Liberation Tigers
(hereafter called the Tigers) emerged after the BAC settlement and were linked to the
supporters of Brahma's Bodoland People Party in the BAC administration. The Tigers
and the already existing militant BSF both tried to force more internal cohesion through
violence and this erupted into open conflict between the two groups. The mid-1990s saw
an increase in violence associated with autonomy demands and a general escalation of
demands in the face of the impotent BAC (Dasgupta 1997).

   At the same time, the Union Government experienced a period of unrest and
change during the late-1980s and early-1990s. The 1989-1990 period has been
characterized as "polarized pluralism," when the highly fractionalized coalition
governments could not effectively govern at the national level (Singh 1992). After this
period, there were three shifts in control between 1993 and 2000. The Congress Party
lost control in 1996 and was briefly succeeded by the Bharatiya Janata Party who quickly
ceded control to the United Front Coalition within a month. The Bharatiya Janata Party
took the reins again in 1998 and held power until 2004. In addition to these quick
changes in the Prime Minister position, the parliament maintained a high degree of
fractionalization throughout this period. This fractionalization should have limited the
ability of the government to pursue autonomy changes and may account to the length of
negotiations with the Bodo factions given that they were willing to settle for less than
their full demand for statehood. Moreover, the 1993 concession to the Bodos was made in
the context of Assam state government policy, as opposed to legislation at the national

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[39] The ABSU continued to press for statehood when the BAC appeared unable to fulfill its aspirations.

level. The high degree of fractionalization at the national level, which made policy change more difficult, may also have contributed to this outcome.

In 2000, the Union Government again pursued talks with the Bodos, and this round of negotiations was conducted by the Tigers, acting as the sole representative of the Bodos (SATP). The Union Government, the Assam State government and the Tigers engaged in ten rounds of tripartite talks between 2000 and 2001 (Indian Ministry of Home Affairs). The Tigers were able to gain the support of the non-militant factions within the Bodo movement for their negotiations with the government. The Tigers functioned as the exclusive negotiator, but their demands were supported by the All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU), Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC), All Bodo Employee Federation (ABWWF) and Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS) (Indian Ministry of Home Affairs). This allowed the Bodos to present a fairly united front in the negotiating process. With this more cohesive bargaining stance, the Tigers gained a further autonomy concession from the Union Government in the form of a new Bodo Territorial Council (BTC). The initial BTC settlement was approved by the state level government on February 13, 2002 (SATP).

The BTC negotiations process did not operate without any internal resistance, however, and the Bodos as a whole remained organizationally fragmented. Yet their engagement with the government indicated a higher degree of cohesion at this point in the bargaining process than in their general interactions with the government. An important source of resistance came from the National Democratic Front of Bodoland

(NDFB)[40] who maintained a more extreme demand for total independence of Bodoland from India. Moreover, there was some reticence over the agreement from portions of the BAC leadership as the body would be replaced by the BTC. Former BAC chairman Kanakeswar Narzary issued a legal challenge to the Memorandum of Settlement which created the BTC in February 2003 (SATP). Though contested on several fronts, the BTC agreement was signed and was successfully implemented in 2003. The ability of the Bodos to overcome their internal divisions to some extent aided in the signing of the agreement. However, as I will argue below, the residually high degree of fractionalization in the movement led to smaller concessions relative to other groups.

Proposition Two: The Use of Limited Concessions and Varying Scope of Autonomy

Proposition Two focuses on differences in autonomy settlements and argues that the scope of autonomy will be less when movements are more highly divided during negotiations. I argue in Chapter Two that states will be likely to use autonomy strategically and make more limited concessions to movements with a higher degree of fractionalization. These movements present an opportunity for governments to buy off moderates with lesser concessions than would satisfy a greater portion of the movement. In this section, I compare concessions across and within cases, demonstrating that autonomy concessions are smallest when a movement is more highly divided. Both the Mizos and Bodos received two autonomy concessions of varying degree which I compare within case. I also briefly compare the scope of concessions made with the relatively unified Nagas and the two other movements.

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[40] Formerly the Bodo Security Force.

Before examining the differences in bargaining dynamics and scope of autonomy concessions, I will briefly review the range of concessions available to these movements in India from smallest to largest in terms of autonomous power. The smallest autonomous unit used to address self-determination demands is the district council. Local autonomy through district level councils can be conferred by state governments, or through the Union Government using the "Sixth schedule" designation. Greater autonomy can be granted by the creation of a Union Territory, which removes the contested territory from the control of a specific state and allows for a more autonomous local administration under the authority of the Union Government. Finally, States have the greatest autonomous powers and include their own legislature that governs over a set of competencies specified by the Indian constitution.

As noted above, both the Mizos and Bodos have received two sets of concessions with different levels of autonomy. Comparing these sets of autonomy concessions within each movement, I find that more limited concessions are made when each movement is more highly divided and that greater concessions are made when they demonstrate a higher degree of internal cohesion.

The degree of internal division within the Mizo movement varied over time, with the 1987 Accord being preceded by unprecedented internal consensus over the concession. In contrast however, an earlier concession made to the Mizos (its designation as a Union Territory in 1971) took place when the movement was at its most highly divided. Based on my theory, I would expect an autonomy concession for the highly divided Mizo movement that was designed to integrate moderates and this

concession should be relatively smaller in scope than a concession given when the movement is cohesive.

The change to Union Territory status was negotiated between the Union Government and Chhunga (then president of Mizo Union) who represented the conventional Mizo movement. This concession occurred when the split between conventional and militant parts of the movement was strongest. Though the moderates offered to negotiate with the extremists, the MNF refused. Moreover, concurrent with the MU's demands, several other conventional organizations made different autonomy-related demands. The Mizo Democratic Party (formed in 1969) demand integration with another state (Meghalaya), while the Mizo Integration Council (formed in 1970) pressed its demand for greater Mizo integration in the Indian Union. In direct opposition to the MU's negotiations, the Mizo Labour Party (formed in 1971) opposed UT status and advocated continued struggle for statehood.

In addition to the fractionalization of the moderate conventional parties, the MNF was the most divided it had ever been. The MNF "government" collapsed in 1971 leading to the formation of the "National Emergency Council" (Verghesem and Thanzawna 1997). At this point, Laldenga was residing outside the country in exile (which continued intermittently for ten years). Although divisions within the movement had been evident, the MNF had maintained its integrity up to this point. The total collapse of its internal administration was a stark manifestation of these divisions and a signal that Laldenga could no long keep dissenters in his organization in line. In addition to talks with the Mizo Union, the Union Government attempted negotiations with the more moderate MNF members in an attempt to split them from the more radical MNF members. Given

this landscape of extreme fractionalization of the Mizo movement, the 1971 concession appears designed to satisfy the most moderate of the Mizo factions and as I will discuss below in Proposition Three, was successful in bringing the moderates into more mainstream politics.

Contrasting the concessions of 1971 with 1987, we see that the movement achieved greater autonomy when they overcame internal divisions in their negotiations with the Union Government. The autonomous powers of the Indian states far exceed those of the Union Territories. The UTs are ruled directly by an administrator appointed by the Union Government, while State governments are ruled by an elected legislature and executive.

This difference in the scope of these concessions to the Mizos cannot be accounted for by either Mizo demands or the overall willingness of the state to make larger autonomy concessions over time. The Mizos were asking for statehood prior to their acceptance of the UT concession and the MU saw the UT agreement as a step in this direction. Moreover, with the same legislation that created the Mizoram UT, the Union Government created the states of Meghalaya, Tripura, and Manipur (Singh 1987). This indicated a willingness of the Union Government to create new states at the time the UT concession was made and without the intermediate step of the Union Territory status. Thus, the 1987 concession of statehood to the Mizos entailed a greater transfer of autonomy. Moreover, the upgrade to Statehood status was in fact a choice to greatly increase autonomy, as opposed to the next step in a natural progression of devolution as

other Union Territories have been given greater autonomy short of statehood.[41] The

larger increase in autonomy is also not accounted for by a difference in starting points for

the two sets of negotiations (i.e. the second concession would necessarily be greater if it

moved along a scale). The UT concession transferred some power to the Mizos, but

moved the residual site of authority from the Assam state to the Union Government. The

Statehood concession entailed an objectively larger concession because it moved the

residual site of authority to the Mizo people from the central government. Comparing the

scope of concession made, the statehood concession entailed a greater transfer of power

and authority.

The two sets of autonomy concessions to the Bodos also differed in scope. The

Bodo movement has been relatively highly divided throughout its tenure, achieving some

short term cohesion during the bargaining process preceding both the 1993 and 2003

concession. The 2003 creation of the Bodo Tribal Council was a greater transfer of

autonomy than the 1993 concessions and the movement demonstrated greater cohesion

throughout and after the 2003 autonomy transfer process.

Although the 1993 Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) included increased local

powers in a number of substantive areas, the BAC did not have the power to make laws

and its jurisdiction was not separate from that of the Assam state government.

Ultimately, the BACs decisions could easily be overturned by the Assam state

government (George 1994). Though the accord was signed by the ABSU and BPAC,

whose leaders were nominated to fill the BAC administration, the temporary cohesion

among these and other factions that lead to the agreement dissolved almost immediately

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[41] Such as Delhi and Puducherry. See Seventieth Amendment, Act 1992 of the Indian Constitution.

and the Bodos could not finalize the boundary of the BAC or exercise the increased

autonomous powers to any great extent. No elections were ever held for the BAC after

its creation.

The 2003 Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) concession surpassed the BAC deal in

several ways. First, the number of villages covered in the new BTC was increased from

those agreed to in the earlier BAC negotiations. As noted above, this was a major point

of ongoing contention in the BAC and substantially hindered the functioning of this body

and the full implementation of the first agreement. Second, the new council also had its

powers vested in the Indian constitution, which was not true for the earlier council. The

BTC was created in accordance with the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution which

more clearly protects the powers conferred to the local council. [42] The earlier body did

not have this distinction and was ultimately beholden to the Assam state government.[43]

The Bodo movement was more cohesive, both in the bargaining process with the

government (which was represented exclusively by the Bodo Liberation Tigers) and as a

whole during the BTC negotiations. The implementation of the BTC was not met with

the extreme fractionalization that followed the BAC concession and it has been able to

function more effectively than the BAC was able to. As with the Mizos, the difference in

scope of concessions cannot be accounted for by differences in demand as the Bodos

consistently demanded statehood with at least one extreme faction pushing for

independence. Moreover, the difference in concessions is not accounted for by different

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[42] Rajya Sabha Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, "Hundred-Second Report on The Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2003 and The Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Bill 2003.
[43] The BAC was created through legislation at the Assam state level (George 1994), whereas the BTC was created through legislation at the Union Government level.

starting points at the time of negotiations. The BAC was in some ways a uniquely weak concession because it was not a "Sixth schedule" concession. The choice of the Union Government to reject grounding the council in the constitution meant that the BAC's authority would remain vested in the Assam government. When the Bodo Tribal Council was created, the constitutional basis of this council conferred objectively more power on the Bodos and such "Sixth schedule" designation had been made to other groups in India already.

In addition to comparing concessions within these movements, a comparison of the concessions across the three movements indicates that the groups that presented the Indian government with the more cohesive movement (the Nagas), or clearly overcame internal divisions (the Mizos in 1987) achieved larger concessions than the more consistently fractionalized (the Bodos). The Nagas clearly demonstrated mass support for greater local autonomy though popular plebiscite in 1951 where voters nearly unanimously supported Naga independence (Aosenba 2001). Both more moderate and extreme Nagas worked within the framework of the NNC to press their demands on the Union Government until the negotiations for statehood. The Mizos also achieved the larger statehood concession when they were able to overcome internal divisions discussed in the previous section. The willingness of the more moderate factions to compromise on power sharing with Laldenga's MNF opened the door for settlement between the Union Government and the MNF and led to an autonomy compromise. The consistently divided Bodos have never demonstrated the degree of cohesion that the Nagas and Mizos showed prior to their statehood autonomy deals. The Bodos have been offered lesser concessions that are more limited in the scope of autonomy allowed to the

group. By comparing across cases, we see that the more cohesive movements achieve larger concession with a greater scope of autonomy than more divided movements.

Proposition Three: Post-settlement Integration and Repression

The third proposition I evaluate in this chapter is that the effect of granting limited autonomy to divided movements will be to further the integration of moderates into mainstream politics, and that this is likely to be accompanied by a government attempt to marginalize or repress more radical elements of the movement. In this section, I examine three instances of limited autonomy transfer to highly divided movement and demonstrate that, in each case, moderates were brought into the governing apparatus and extremists were pursued more vigorously. The autonomy increases are the 1971 concession to the Mizos and the 1993 and 2003 concessions to the Bodos.[44] I argue in Chapter Two that the strategic use of limited autonomy will further the goal of integrating moderates, and that this is a major incentive for governments to pursue such policies. Moreover, I argued that this use of autonomy will likely be paired with attempts to decrease the role of extremist factions, often through repression.

As discussed above, the autonomy deal that led to the Union Territory status for the Mizos took place when the Mizos were at their most highly fractionalized. The transfer of autonomy in 1971 had a marked effect on the moderate organizations within the Mizo movement, particularly the Mizo Union (MU). The MU had led the local Mizo government prior to the UT status change and had been among the strongest of the

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[44] The Nagas also experienced a separation of moderates from extremists as the new Nagaland government was formed. This separation also appears to have been an explicit strategy on the part of the government as it became clearer that an extremist element was emerging from the Naga movement.

conventional parties. After the transition (in 1973), however, the MU made the decision to formally dissolve and join with the Congress (I) party. Congress (I) is a national party which had previously had limited success competing with regional parties in the Mizo area. The merger of the MU with Congress (I) indicates a clear integration of the dominant Mizo moderate party into mainstream Indian politics.[45]

By 1973, at the time of full implementation of the UT status, the Union Government began talks with the MNF National Emergency Council, seeking further settlement with the recently fractured organization (Verghesem and Thanzawna 1997). Negotiations continued on and off after the implementation of the UT concessions, but were paired with strong efforts to repress the most extreme elements of the Mizo movement. The Union Government had already been taking a hard line stance with the MNF and in 1973, declared the area "disturbed" which allowed for great security measures to be taken in the region (Dommen 1967). Since 1967, the government had pursued a resettlement policy for Mizos specifically designed to isolate MNF rebels from the larger population (Dommen 1967). Post settlement, raids on the MNF intensified and in 1974, the government extended emergency security measures that had been in place.[46]

The 1993 Bodo accord, though in many ways a failure, did bring the more moderate ABSU and BPAC into the BAC apparatus and as such, set the terms of Bodo political competition. The interim Executive Council for the BAC was appointed by the Assam government from the ranks of the ABSU and BPAC (Roy 1995). Though the early years of the BAC were rife with splits in Bodo organizations, the ABSU continued

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[45] Like many parties, the MU was resurrected years later, but was not a significant force in Mizo politics.
[46] Keesings , April 1974.

to lend its support to the BAC leadership.[47] This brought a measure of order to the region

for some time after the accord (Bhattacharjee 1996). In combination with the BAC

concession, the government used force to repress the militant Bodo Security Force (BSF)

who rejected the settlement from the start. The army launched Operation Kranti

subsequent to the agreement to clear the Barpeta District of BSF militants. Similar

operations took place in other districts where the BSF were reported to have refuges

(George 1994).

The BTC agreement of 2003 also led ABSU and the Bodo Liberation Tiger

leaders to join in the new local governing apparatus. The newly formed Bodo People's

Popular Front emerged from supporters of these two groups to contest the May 2005

Council election. It subsequently split into two factions, the BPPF-H and the BPPF-R

(Singh 2005). This concession was paired with government efforts to decrease the

influence of the militant holdout – the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).

Subsequent to the agreement, the Indian Security Forces arrested a key leader of the still

militant NDFB who had evaded capture since 1993.[48] The NDFB began talks for a

cease-fire with the government shortly after and have maintained some level of

suspended hostilities since then.

The limited concessions offered to the Bodos and Mizos when these groups were

highly divided did lead moderate factions within both groups to join in mainstream

politics. The Bodo concessions created a forum for Bodo political competition that could

be regulated to some extent by the Assam and Union Governments and as such set the

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[47] Following the resignation of the BAC chairman Bwismutiary, the ABSU maintained ties with his predecessor Premisng Brahma.
[48] BBC, January 2, 2003. "Indian police capture Bodoland rebel leader."

terms for how Bodo demands were expressed. The moderate factions' response to the Mizo accords in 1973 were even more marked as the long-standing Mizo Union dissolved to join into a larger Indian political party. Each of these concessions was also paired with increased attempts by the government to militarily pressure the extremists.

Interestingly, even the larger statehood concession had a similar, if not immediate, effect on Naga politics. As discussed above, this concession was explicitly designed to legitimize a set of more moderate politicians through which the Union Government could negotiate and that would assume control of the new governing apparatus. Though the Naga insurgency raged after the statehood deal, the large-scale acceptance of the conventional Nagaland government indicates that this strategy was to some degree successful.

Alternative Explanations

In addition to evaluating these propositions focused on the causal mechanisms I advance in Chapter Two, a comparison of multiple self-determination movements in the Assam state of India allows me to evaluate alternative explanations. The following alternatives are drawn from the literature on self-determination and conflict presented in Chapter One.

A number of scholars have focused on the economic incentives of insurgents to explain their decision to press demands or to settle with the government (Hechter 1975; Gourevitch 1979; Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Le Billon 2001; Ross 2003; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Examining the variation in economic incentives across these groups in North East India does not reveal support for economic incentive-based theories in

general. There is not a great deal of variation across cases in terms of their economic standing in the state. Because the North East had been isolated by British policy pre-independence, all of the tribes tended to be economically backwards compared to the center (Lanunungsang 2002). Moreover, the highly organized insurgencies of the Naga and Mizos did not appear to have additional economic incentives for continuing their struggle at any given point in time. One economic factor that has played a role in preventing settlement is the existence of oil in the area contested by the Bodos. The dispute over the jurisdiction of the BAC included contestation over a district with oil that both Bodo and Assam leaders wanted control of. However, this was only one aspect of the continuing dispute regarding the contested territory.

A comparison of these North Eastern self-determination movements provides some variation on terrain where the groups operated, which several scholars have advanced as a factor in determining when groups will maintain insurgency (Gurr and Moore 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The Nagas and Mizos both inhabit hilly and forested areas, which approximate relatively "rough" terrain, while the Bodos inhabit the plains. The use of this relatively rough terrain by Naga and Mizo insurgencies has likely aided in their evasion of capture to the extent that they each maintained rebel forces in these areas. However, the role of rough terrain does not appear to be a major factor in determining the effectiveness of the Indian Security Forces in countering insurgent activity. The Bodos, without the aid of such terrain, have also maintained a militant presence in their area despite Security Force attacks on them as well.

The Indian case provides support for some aspects of a reputation approach to self-determination conflicts. Given the wide range of accommodations made by the

Union Government both near independence and afterwards, the government did not appear to worry about the reputation costs of making autonomy concessions. However, the success of such movements had a clear effect on the decision of other potential challengers to engage the state for greater self-determination, which supports Walter's (2006b) argument. The success of movements that chose to employ violent tactics also informed this decision for others and as such, likely contributed to the degree of militancy we observe across cases.

The Indian cases do not generally support bargaining approaches that focus on private information or issue indivisibility.[49] Access to private information about the capabilities of the Indian government or the self-determination movements has not proven central to their ability to settle disputes over autonomy. The Union Government has vastly superior armed forces, but the guerrilla nature of the armed disputes has made outright victory over militants unlikely. As such, the government has openly pursued a dual track of political and military engagement with these movements. Issue indivisibility also does not appear to play a central role in prohibiting settlement with any of these groups. Autonomy has been openly negotiated over and transferred by the Indian state in a number of cases. Moreover, even the most ardent independence-seekers (such as Laldenga of the Nagas) have been willing to compromise on this demand in the long run.

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[49] The role of credible commitment is important for the government and is discussed earlier in the chapter.

Additional Factors

In addition to the alternative explanations drawn from the literature, there are several other factors that need to be addressed which could influence the autonomy bargaining process between these groups and the Indian government. These include variation in external aid to these movements, variation in the timing of the movements, and a more explicit look at the different Indian governments that each of these movement faced during their struggle.

Both the Mizo and Naga self-determination movements benefited from aid from foreign countries at various times in their struggles. The willingness of Pakistan to allow militant bases in its territory and of China to aid in training and supplying the Mizo National Front undoubtedly contributed to the ability of the movement to maintain insurgency and to the positive outlook that Laldenga held for independence for so long. Aid from these countries also benefited the Nagas in the later stages of their struggle once Nagaland had already been established. There is no indication of substantial outside aid made to the Bodos, however. An alternative story to the one I have told here is that the Bodos accepted more limited concessions because they (and the government) had a lower estimation of their ability to carry on insurgency and of the strength of their armed movement because of the lack of outside aid.

The role of outside aid, however, does not appear to have had a systematic or consistent effect on these movements' perceptions of the likelihood of future success. Though Laldenga of the Mizos spent much of his time trying to secure outside aid for the MNF, other leaders in the movement were routinely unimpressed with his ability to do so and there is no indication that the MNF as a whole thought what aid they did get made a

significant difference in their chances of achieving independence.[50] The Nagas received

aid after the Union Government had conceded statehood to the group, so it is unlikely

that this played a role in the government's decision to accommodate the group in this

way.

An additional difference between these cases that may affect the likelihood of

autonomy accommodation is the timing of the movements. The Naga movement

presented a strong demand for self-determination prior to Indian independence, whereas

the Mizo and Bodo movements developed as stronger movements later on. In particular,

one could argue that the reason the Bodo have not been accommodated with the same

scope of concessions at the Mizos and Nagas is because they essentially came too late,

(i.e. Assam had already been divided to the point where both the Assam government and

the Union Government refused to entertain the idea for more states in the North East).

Though the witling down of Assam is likely to have an effect on the willingness

of the Union Government to allow further division, the timing upon which this

explanation rests is incorrect. The Bodo movement did not start much later than the Mizo

movement, and all three movements had similar roots before the independence period.

The early Bodo movement, however, was pushing for a greater tribal state (as was the

Mizo movement at the very early stages), and thus the overall movement was inherently

more fractionalized than the other two groups. The Bodo PTCA lobbied for a separate

state in the mid-1960s, prior to all but the Nagaland concession in Assam.

A final factor that needs attention here is the role that the Union and Assam

governments played in the bargaining process that took place in the post-independence

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[50] Disagreement over this was the root of some of the splits within the Mizo National Front.

period. Though each of these movements faced the Indian and Assam governments, these changed overtime as well. An examination of the trends in leadership in the Union Government reveals that autonomy concessions were made to minority populations under six different prime ministers and under both the Indian National Congress and Bharatiya Janata parties. Moreover, there does not appear to be a clear pattern of times when the government is more or less willing to accommodate self-determination movements that co-varies with the variation in internal cohesion of the movements I have examined here. Similarly, autonomy concessions were allowed when both of the major Assam parties of the last 40 years, the Congress and Asom Gana Parishad parties, were in power.

In addition to the role of divisions within self-determination movements, I argue in Chapter Two that divisions within the central government will affect the ability of the government to credibly sign an autonomy deal. Specifically, I expect that unitary or highly divided governments will not concede autonomy because the first are non-credible bargaining partners and the second can be mired by internal divisions. The Indian government is never unitary in the time period under examination, but varied quite a lot in the number of internal factions that can hold up decision making (veto players). In general, the government has had a moderate number of internal veto players, with the exception of the early and late 1990s.[51] As such, the high degree of internal fractionalization in the government may account in part for the fact that the 1993 concession to the Bodos was made through the Assam government rather than the Union Government.

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[51] This period was among the most fractionalized in the history of the Union government, both in terms of the number of coalition partners necessary to form a government and the quick succession of failed administrations.

Conclusion

This chapter presents evidence to support the causal story I advance in Chapter Two about the dynamics of internal bargaining within self-determination movements with varying degrees of fractionalization. In it, I have focused on three key propositions regarding the role that internal cohesion plays in achieving autonomy settlements, the scope of autonomy concessions for divided movements and the effects of autonomy on divided movements. This set of Indian self-determination movements in the North Eastern state of Assam offers an opportunity to examine a series of movements over time that have negotiated with the central government for greater self-rule. As such, it allows me to uncover how these internal factions of the self-determination movements affect the bargaining process.

In Proposition One, I demonstrate that factions within divided self-determination movements try to increase internal cohesion in order to present the state with a stronger bargaining position. The success of these attempts varies, but when internal factions are able to overcome divisions, this facilitates the successful bargaining of an autonomy increase. The Mizo and Bodo movements both signed autonomy deals when they clearly overcame some of the internal divisions within the movements.

The second proposition evaluated in this chapter compares the scope of autonomy concessions across more or less fractionalized movements. I demonstrate that more limited (i.e. smaller in scope) concessions are made to more highly divided movements, and larger concessions are achieved when movements show greater unity. Comparing within movements over time, I find that both the Mizos and Bodos got more autonomy

when they demonstrated greater internal cohesions. Moreover, the Nagas initially achieved greater autonomy relative to the other movements that were more divided.

The final proposition evaluated in this chapter is that the limited autonomy concessions led to increased integration of moderates in these self-determination movements and that this was accompanied by an increase in government attempts to marginalize extremists. I find that the more limited autonomy concessions (to the Mizos in 1973 and the Bodos in both instances) are followed by greater integration of the moderate factions into local governance structures. The government also appears to increase its pursuit of those illegal organizations that did not consent to the agreement during and after the settlements are made.

Through this in-depth analysis of the bargaining process between these self-determination movements and the government, I demonstrate the existence of several causal mechanisms integral to the theory of this dissertation. The ability of self-determination movements to overcome internal divisions clearly facilitates the signing of autonomy settlements in most of these cases. Factions within divided self-determination movement try explicitly to overcome internal division. When they are able to increase internal cohesion, they are more successful in gaining autonomy from the state.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

This dissertation explains why some pairs of governments and minority movements for self-determination can successfully negotiate over autonomy while others are unable to do so. The plethora of nationalist conflicts and apparent intractability of disputes over territory necessitates a closer look at why compromise over governance has been possible in some cases and not in others.[1]

Disputes involving internally divided actors present unique challenges for bargaining by creating the potential for extremist spoilers and internal deadlock for self-determination movements and governments. When these divisions can be overcome through an internal bargaining process, they increase the ability of governments to settle with separatists. Moreover, this ability of pro-settlement forces to use side-payments to gain internal consensus is a major determinant of who can make an autonomy deal.

The explicit focus of this dissertation on internal fractionalization is an important contribution to the study of self-determination politics. Asking questions about why the "government" or the "nationalists" behave in certain ways misleads both researchers and practitioners. In many cases, neither the "government" nor the "nationalists" are unitary. Trying to understand behavior, outcomes and incentives in this context has led many to believe that disputes over identity and territory are inherently or especially intractable because of the issues they deal with as opposed to the political process surrounding them. This project demonstrates that the seemingly indivisible question of national identity is in

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[1] Hassner (2004) argues that territorial disputes are less likely to be resolved over time.

fact up for debate and earnestly negotiated over as a question of governance in many cases. The ability of state governments and minorities to renegotiate governance status is driven in large part by the internal structure of these actors and how it shapes their interaction with one another.

The study advances our understanding of the politics of self-determination and separatism by conceptualizing the process of negotiating over governance as a two-level bargaining game among two dissimilar actors (state governments and minority movements for self-determination). I present a theory of multi-level bargaining focused on the effect that internal factions in governments and self-determination movements have on the capacity of these actors to negotiate new autonomy deals. Through quantitative and qualitative analyses, I demonstrate that internal divisions within these actors shape their ability to negotiate over governance as well as their incentives to do so. In this chapter, I review the major findings of this dissertation and discuss the implications and importance of the results of the study.

Findings

Quantitative Analyses

Chapter Three provides a series of quantitative analyses designed to test the effect of internal fractionalization on autonomy bargaining outcomes. The key findings of the chapter indicate that the unitary actor assumption for autonomy bargaining is inappropriate and that the dynamic process of bargaining among fractionalized actors has predictable consequences for bargaining success. Different levels of internal fractionalization have systematic effects on the likelihood of autonomy settlement.

The number of internal factions that can veto policy change within state governments affects both their ability to overcome internal divisions and how credible their commitment is to abide by governance changes. When we examine this bargaining process as interactive – taking into account the perceptions of each side as they face a complex bargaining partner – we find that governments with a moderate number of internal divisions are best able to implement a change in autonomy status. These governments have some internal barriers to changing autonomy policy because internal veto players create hurdles to policy change. Yet, if they can overcome these barriers (as multi-veto player governments must do for all policy change), the resulting governance policy will be more stable than if the government faced no hurdles in making the concession. This feature of policy stability makes the government a more credible bargaining partner than it would otherwise be. Exceptionally highly-divided governments are more likely to be immobilized by a high number of veto players, however, and are unable to benefit from this enhanced credibility because policy change in incredibly difficult.

Though moderately-divided governments are most likely to implement a change in autonomy, it is highly-divided self-determination movements that are most likely to make and implement such an agreement. Again examining the bargaining process as an interaction between two internally complex actors, I find that internal divisions can hinder the ability of self-determination movements to get autonomy concessions when there is a strong possibility that some factions will try to "spoil" the deal through violence. Overcoming internal divisions can constitute a barrier to autonomy settlement. However, I also find that strategic considerations on the part of the state create incentives

for governments to try to accommodate highly-divided movements. When facing a highly-divided self-determination movement, the government can use limited concessions to co-opt the moderates, as opposed to trying to settle all the demands of the population outright. This is an attractive strategy for governments to pursue because, all else being equal, the government can concede less to a highly-divided movement than a more cohesive movement with the same median preferences. Moreover, because mustering internal support within a divided government for an autonomy deal is not costless, it may be easier to garner support for more limited concessions.

These findings on the effects of internal fractionalization on autonomy settlement are supported by further analysis of the effects of the fractionalization on conflict. Assuming that repeated failure to reach an autonomy settlement will increase the chance of conflict between a minority population seeking self-determination and its parent state, we should expect conflict to be more likely in the most difficult bargaining situations. An examination of the effect of internal fractionalization on conflict demonstrates that those self-determination movements mostly likely to get autonomy – highly-divided – are least likely to see conflict; whereas moderately-divided and unitary movements are more likely to experience armed conflict with the state.

Qualitative Analyses

The French and Indian case studies evaluate a number of the propositions regarding the causal links advanced in my theory. The goal of these chapters is to demonstrate that internal divisions within state governments and self-determination movements affect the bargaining process in the ways I describe in Chapter Two. Though

each study provides analysis of the bargaining process as a whole, the French study emphasizes the role of intra-governmental bargaining while the Indian study focuses on the effect of splits within several self-determination movements.

The comparative analysis of a series of French government negotiations with the Corsicans demonstrates that divisions within the government in Paris – in the form of both partisan and institutional veto players – constituted significant barriers to devolving autonomy to Corsica since 1970. Despite a strong pro-autonomy agenda by the government of the day and majority legislative support for specific devolution bills, the transfer of autonomy to the Corsicans was hindered or stopped in a number of instances by these internal veto players. The existence of multiple veto players at the national level had the effect of limiting the scope of autonomy concessions prior to the introduction of specific bills in the 1982, 1991 and 2001 devolution processes. Pro-autonomy forces at the national level were able to garner support for devolving power by making targeted concessions to veto players on the autonomy bill, as well as using compromise on decentralization legislation unrelated to the Corsican bill. For several devolution attempts, the French Constitutional Council vetoed autonomy change ex post. Once autonomy legislation had been passed through the French National Assembly, the Constitutional Council, in conjunction with anti-autonomy legislators, overturned parts of the bill. In addition to demonstrating the effect of veto players on autonomy bargaining and the importance of side-payments in overcoming internal divisions, the French study supports my assertion that governments act strategically in their decisions to grant autonomy concessions. The autonomy plans proposed for Corsica were designed to

satisfy the most moderate of autonomy demands and were pursued when more moderate factions on the island appeared relatively strong.

The comparative study of three North Eastern Indian self-determination movements demonstrates the importance of overcoming internal divisions within self-determination movements in order to bargain a new autonomy agreement. Though the historical pattern of internal fractionalization differed for the Naga, Mizo and Bodo movements, each attempted to overcome its internal divisions to gain greater autonomy. When internal factions in these movements were able to coordinate among themselves to present the Indian government with a coherent autonomy demand, they were better able to gain such concessions from the state. The Indian study also provides additional support for my claim that the government uses autonomy strategically to satisfy moderates when self-determination movements are divided. Actors at the national level debated the advisability to trying to drive a wedge between the moderate and more extreme Nagas using autonomy concessions prior to Nehru's decision to accommodate them. The Mizos and Bodos were also accommodated with more limited concessions when they had overcome some internal divisions, but were relatively less coherent.

The quantitative analysis demonstrates systematic differences in the pattern of autonomy settlement based on how divided governments and self-determination movements are. The results suggest that highly-divided movements are more likely to be accommodated, but that this chance is greatly enhanced by coordination among internal factions. The French and Indian analyses further highlight this finding and show the extent to which heterogeneous preferences over autonomy status can hinder settlement and how internal coordination facilitates settlement. The ability of the Mizos to

overcome internal divisions with a compromise on power sharing at the local level in 1987 is a clear illustration of this. The qualitative study also demonstrates the strategic nature of autonomy negotiations. Both governments and self-determination movements see divisions in their opponent as relevant to the bargaining process.

Implications of the Study

This dissertation has important implications for understanding nationalist conflict and advances the political science literature on bargaining and conflict in a number of ways. It explains the underlying political dynamics of bargaining over autonomy and their importance for bargaining success. Moreover, it opens up the black box of unitary actors, to reveal the consequences of internal structure for conflict and negotiation outcomes.

Creating consensus and cooperation within self-determination movements

The comparison across Indian self-determination movements indicates that some strategies for overcoming internal divisions have been more successful than others. Of particular relevance to conflict studies, I find that the use of inter-faction violence had limited success in promoting internal cohesion. Factions within all three Indian movements attempted to coerce other factions to support their position at different times during their respective bargaining processes with the Indian government. The effect of such violence has been to limit activity by more moderate factions in the short term (such as the Mizo Union's decision not to contest elections in the late 1960s); however, it has

not proven effective at generating greater cohesion behind either a specific autonomy demand or a strategy for pursing it.

In contrast, both moderate and extreme factions within self-determination movements have effectively used inter-faction negotiations and side-payments to create greater consensus over particular autonomy deals. The extreme Mizo faction (the Mizo National Front) and the conventional Mizo government came to an internal agreement over post-settlement power sharing that facilitated the creation of the Mizo state. Moreover the Bodo Plains Tribal Council agreed to let the All Bodo Student Union, with whom they typically competed for support, represent the group in negotiations with the Indian government. These talks led to the first regional council concession to the Bodos. Governments and other actors seeking to promote autonomy settlement for a divided self-determination movement may increase the likelihood of an autonomy deal by facilitating this type of coordination among group factions.

The consequences of bargaining failure

The comparative analysis of French negotiations with Corsica highlights the importance of short term failures on the larger bargaining process, specifically for the ability of pro-autonomy forces in the government to garner support for devolution. In governments with multiple internal veto players, negotiating and making an autonomy deal is not costless. Because veto players opposed to autonomy need to be compensated with side-payments, pro-autonomy governments must spend some resources to do this. In the case of France, the political capital spent advancing a devolution agenda were not recoverable in the wake of bargaining failure. This was especially true during the

Matignon devolution process led by Prime Minister Jospin. In order to create the 2001 devolution bill, the government's negotiating team overcame significant resistance by other actors at the national level and gained major concessions from nationalists on the island. The subsequent rejection of major parts of the plan by the Constitutional Council, which was deemed by many to be an explicitly political decision, derailed the entire effort despite progress on a number of issues. The political capital used to create internal agreement was not unlimited and the veto of the bill took the issue off the political agenda for a time. Similarly, the 2003 devolution failure at the referendum stage limited the ability of the French government to pursue its agenda for changes to Corsica's status.

Failed negotiations can also be driven by internal divisions as the level of the self-determination movement, which can hinder the overall bargaining process. Violent spoiling attempts by dissatisfied factions can stop negotiations with the government. For example, talks with a set of Mizo nationalists were cut off by the Indian government when the MNF continued to use force in late 1970s and early 1980s. The detrimental effects of spoiling have been illustrated by others (Walter and Kydd 2002; Zahar 2003). However, this should be seen not just as a failure of the state to provide order or avoid conflict, but as a problem of internal bargaining with self-determination movements. When an agreement is spoiled by internal factions opposed to the deal, this is a situation in which in-group negotiations may be the key to settlement. The eventual settlement of the armed conflict between the Mizos and the Indian government was brought about through negotiations between both the Indian government and the armed rebels, and the armed rebels and other Mizo factions.

The statistical analysis in Chapter Three demonstrates a larger link between iterated bargaining failure and conflict for self-determination movements. Those movements most likely to implement an autonomy compromise – highly-divided movements – are least likely to be in direct conflict with the state. Thus, short-term failures to reach agreement over governance, though not unexpected in complex bargaining situations, can pave the way for higher levels of conflict.

Dynamic interaction and internal fractionalization

One of the key findings of the study is that governments are using autonomy concessions strategically to buy off moderate self-determination movement factions. I find evidence of this in both patterns of autonomy agreement, where the most highly-divided movements are most likely to be accommodated, and from accounts of government decision making in France and India. This "divide and conquer" strategy helps explain why some groups are more likely to be accommodated (because it is easier to do), but it also raises other issues for the long-term strategies of governments. For the strategy to be successful in the long-run, the effect of buying-off the moderates must be to gain a legitimate partner in the region.[2] The comparison of Indian self-determination movements indicates that prior coordination among the self-determination factions facilitates a greater degree of settlement of the dispute both in the short and long term.

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[2] In some sense, we might think that states would prefer to face divided movements because the movement will be weaker than if it were unified. However, the goal of governments that use autonomy policy is not to crush the enemy, and in fact, when these divisions prohibit settlement, it is a disadvantage for governments that a bargaining partner cannot overcome internal divisions.

Further research needs to be done to identify when this strategy is most likely to be effective in achieving this goal.

Implications of this project for political science

      In addition to the empirical relevance of these findings, the study contributes to the political science literature by explaining how the internal structure of these actors both constrains their behavior and alters the incentives to settle based on the internal structure of their bargaining partners. Though some advances have been made in recognizing that many of the actors we are interested in are non-unitary, much of political science theorizing and empirical work still treats them as such. Moreover, this dissertation demonstrates that it is not just a question of number (i.e. how many players there are at the bargaining table), but that the connection of internal factions to one another matters. The dynamics of internal bargaining differ based on the degree of institutionalization between factions, as indicated by the differential effects of multiple veto players at the state level and multiple factions at the self-determination movement level.

      This study also advances the literature and political science theory by presenting a theory that merges structure and strategy. Often a dichotomy is set up between theories that examine structural determinants of behavior and those that examine more strategic interaction or considerations. In particular, other two level game approaches to politics look at the constraints placed on actors by a "domestic" element. This study goes further by explaining how politics within these "elements" might alter who can be settled with or

the credibility of such a settlement. As such, the project advances our understanding of complex bargaining between non-unitary actors.

Understanding the politics of self-determination has becoming increasingly important as sub-state nationalist challenges have emerged as a major source of civil conflict around the world.   The intractability of disputes based on identity and territory have led many to believe that these issues are indivisible or primordial. However, the success of some governments in managing self-determination demands through autonomy demonstrates that this is a negotiable governance question. This dissertation explains how that negotiation process takes place and the major barriers to achieving success. As such, it uncovers a series of important impediments to the peaceful resolution of disputes over self-determination.

Data Appendix

Variables	Source
Autonomy Increase 　　Description in text above.	Author
Government Veto Players 　　This variable is a count of partisan and institutional veto points.	Database of Political Institutions CHECKS
Self-determination Factions 　　Description in text above.	Author
Coordinating Faction or Institution 　　Description in text above.	Author
Logged Gross Domestic Product per capita 　　This variable is a yearly measure of per capita gross domestic product.	Gleditsch (2002)
Autonomy in Previous 5 years 　　Description in text above.	Author
Number of Ethnic Groups in the State 　　A count of all ethnic groups in the country.	Fearon (2003)
Civil War Dummy 　　The variable is a yearly dummy for the presence of a civil war between the government and self-determination movement.	Armed Conflict Database
Group Population 　　The variable is created with the MAR GPRO variable and country population data. The average percent of the country population for the group for years reported is used to generate the variable. Each year uses the average percent, but yearly population data. When population data is unavailable for recent year, the last year reported was expanded to fill in the missing values.	MAR[1] and Gleditsch Expanded Trade and GDP Data

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[1] MAR data generated using MARgene (Bennett and Davenport 2003).

Ethnic Kin in Adjoining State The variable is a dummy for segments of ethnic kin in adjoining states. It was created using the MAR NUMSEGX variable which is a count of ethnic segments in adjoining countries.	MAR
Third Party Involvement Dummy This is a dummy variable which indicates whether a third party actor was involved in the bargaining process at any time during the active dyad years. This is coded from Keesing's Record of World Events and LexisNexis news sources.	Author
Independence Demands Dummy This variable is a yearly dummy indicating whether any factions within the self-determination movement demanded independence in that year.	Author
Democracy Dummy This variable is a dummy indicating the government had a polity score of 7 or more.	Polity IV
Contested Agreement Dummy Description in text above.	Author
Change in Number of SD Factions Description in text above.	Author
Federal State Dummy This variable is a dummy measure indicating whether the country is a federal state.	Handbook of Federal Countries (Forum on Federations, 2002)
Logged Percent Mountainous Terrain This variable is the logged value of the percent of the country covered by mountains.	Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Oil Exporter Dummy This variable is a dummy measure indicating whether oil comprises one third or more of the government exports.	Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Political Instability This variable is a dummy for a greater than two change in the polity measure in the previous three years.	Fearon and Laitin (2003)

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