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### Author

Garcia, Nicholas Alan

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Imperialist Missionaries: English Colonizers and the Assault on Indigenous New England

By

NICHOLAS ALAN GARCIA  
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DAVIS

Approved:

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John Smolenski

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Ellen Hartigan-O'Connor

---

José Juan Pérez Meléndez

Committee in Charge

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## **Abstract**

“Imperialist Missionaries” investigates New England missionization through an analytical lens merging critical ethnic studies, Native American studies, Filipino American studies, Atlantic world history, and colonial New England history. I argue that New England missionization was governed by a transatlantic cohort of colonizers who prioritized English rather than Indian interests. Missionization was colonialism, and it existed to assimilate and weaken Indians, aid or provide an excuse for conquest, and to support colonizers’ arguments that they deserved monetary support. Thanks to Edward Winslow, the London-based Cromwellian Corporation began managing New England missionization in 1649. Members of the Corporation participated in colonizing projects across the English Atlantic world and applied that ideology to missionization. The Corporation worked with the United Colonies of New England (UCNE) to convert Indians, and they applied their own destructive colonial vision to missionization.

Chapter one reveals New England missionization’s connection to England’s colonization of Ireland, which featured several Corporation members. Chapter two compares Daniel Gookin’s missionary ideology in New England to Vincent Gookin Jr.’s colonization strategy in Ireland, showing how they informed each other. Chapter three details how, during the interregnum, the Corporation, UCNE, and missionaries like Eliot created a system that marginalized Indians in New England. Chapter four traces the Restoration’s impact on the Corporation, while revealing how the UCNE used missionization to fuel its expansion as a colony, both territorially and economically. Chapter five examines missionization on the eve of King Philip’s War, arguing that the conflict was partially the result of New England breaking from the Corporation to pursue a more aggressive form of missionization no longer regulated by England.

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## Introduction

*Missionization in Seventeenth Century New England: A Transatlantic History*

“[In Plymouth] religion and profit jump together.”<sup>1</sup>

— Edward Winslow

In 1642 Narragansett sachem Miantonomi wrote of the destruction wrought by English colonizers in New England: “these English have gotten our land, they with scythes cut down the grass, and with axes fell the trees; their cows and horses eat the grass, and their hogs spoil our clam banks, and we shall all be starved.”<sup>2</sup> The United Colonies of New England (UCNE) ordered Miantonomi’s death one year later, viewing him as a threat to English colonizers.<sup>3</sup> Then in 1649 the newly created New England Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (which contemporaries called “the Corporation”) enlisted the UCNE to manage New England missionization. UCNE commissioner and soon-to-be Corporation member Edward Winslow was responsible for this development, using Roxbury pastor and supposed “Apostle to the Indians” John Eliot’s proselytization of Massachusetts Indians in 1646 to convince Parliament to support missionary work in New England. English colonizers like Harvard President Charles Chauncy hoped missionization would bring about “the future of [Indians] perfecting,” and over the next decades the Corporation and UCNE indeed tried to remove the “savage” from New England

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<sup>1</sup> Edward Winslow, *Good Newes from New England* (1624; reis., 2018), 133.

<sup>2</sup> Lion Gardiner, “Leift Lion Gardener His Relation of the Pequot Warres,” *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ser., 3 (1833): 154-155.

<sup>3</sup> David Pulsifer, ed., *Acts of the Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England, Vol. I, 1643-1651*, Nathaniel B. Shurtleff and David Pulsifer, eds., *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth 9-10* (Boston, 1859), 10-11; John A. Sainsbury, “Miantonomo’s Death and New England Politics, 1630–1645,” *Rhode Island History* 30 (Fall 1971): 111–23.

Indians.<sup>4</sup> Behind the English's idealistic missionary rhetoric was a threat: If Indians could not "perfect" themselves in time—if they did not conform to English cultural ideals—they would be eliminated.

Missionization enflamed an already desperate situation for Indians, attacking their cultural and spiritual beliefs while swelling English populations and rampant settler colonialism stole their land. The UCNE and the Corporation designed missionization to support colonizers by creating a society that marginalized Indians and empowered the English. New Englanders were attracted to missionization because it lured investors in England and provided an administrative means for controlling Indians whose land they had taken, or whose people they had killed. For nearly three decades missionization was the primary form of colonialism employed in New England. Only King Philip's War managed to disrupt it, but even so, the colonial strategy that emerged after 1676 borrowed heavily from the groundwork laid by the Corporation and UCNE.

The Corporation and UCNE were imperialistic bureaucracies. The English parliament chartered the Corporation in 1649 to manage the conversion of New England Indians. Its 1649 charter noted that its purpose would be to fund missionary work, given that doing so would be "a burden too heavy for the English there."<sup>5</sup> In terms of its structure and power, it was to be "one Body Politique and Corporate in Law [that] shall and may without License or Mortmain purchase or acquire to themselves, any Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments in England or Wales, not exceeding the yearly value of 2000 pounds, and any goods and sums of money whatsoever,

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<sup>4</sup> George Emery Littlefield, *The Early Massachusetts Press 1638–1711* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1907), 192; Drew Lopenzina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 128.

<sup>5</sup> 'July 1649: An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England.', in *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660*, ed. C H Firth and R S Rait (London, 1911), pp. 197-200. *British History Online*, accessed 3 May 2021, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/acts-ordinances-interregnum/pp197-200>.

to the uses and purposes herein limited and expressed...and also to make conclusive bargains for Lands and Tenements, to be purchased by the said Corporation for valuable consideration.”<sup>6</sup> The charter also established that the UCNE would receive Corporation funds “to dispose of the said moneys in such a manner as shall best principally conduce to the preaching and propagating of the Gospel of Jesus Christ amongst the Natives.”<sup>7</sup> When the Corporation was re-chartered in 1661 under Charles II, the King made clear that its purpose was “to seek the outward prosperity of those colonies, but more especially the salvation of [Indians’] immortal souls.”<sup>8</sup> The Corporation’s principal purpose was to collect money in England, of which it was given a variety of means to do so, and to then send that money to the UCNE, which it oversaw from London.

Technically beneath the Corporation in power and influence, the UCNE was in fact older, being created on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 1643. The UCNE was the ultimate governing authority in the New England colonies, representing a formal alliance or confederation between Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven. Its eight commissioners answered to the Corporation with respect to missionization and were often colonial governors or people of near-equal influence and rank. The Articles of Confederation that founded the UCNE stated that the intention was to create a “perpetual league of friendship and amity for offence and defence, [while] preserving and propagating the truth and liberties of the Gospel...for their own mutual

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<sup>6</sup> “July 1649: An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England,” (1911).

<sup>7</sup> “July 1649: An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England,” (1911).

<sup>8</sup> “America and West Indies: February 1662,” in *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 5, 1661-1668*, ed. W Noel Sainsbury (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1880), 71-80. *British History Online*, accessed May 3, 2021, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol5/pp71-80>.

safety and welfare.”<sup>9</sup> The UCNE also handled colonial finances, oversaw the implementation of what was essentially a fugitive slave law, and oversaw diplomatic relations with New England Indians so “that they neither grow insolent nor be injured without due satisfaction, lest war break in upon the Confederates through such miscarriages.”<sup>10</sup> Massachusetts, being the largest and strongest colony, held the most influence at the UCNE’s near-yearly meetings, and its interests usually superseded those of the other three member colonies.

In sum, the Corporation was created to direct New England missionization, and the UCNE was empowered to carry out their designs in the colonies. From the start both organizations were intertwined, not just in their shared purpose and stated relationship in the Corporation’s 1649 charter, but in how the Corporation came to be in the first place. It was Edward Winslow, who had served as Massachusetts’ UCNE commissioner, who traveled to London to lobby for the Corporation’s creation. Perhaps hinting at the dualistic purpose that missionization served and which this dissertation addresses, Winslow’s plea to Parliament for a means to finance missionization coincided with a request for more ammunition to aid the UCNE against Indians.<sup>11</sup> As I will demonstrate later, giving control of missionization to the UCNE—a confederation created in part to organize colonizers militarily against Indians—was not so much paradoxical as it was an intended feature. New England missionization was, at each stage of its existence, used by colonizers to push Indians to the margins. There was no opportunity for Indians to join English society as equals. Colonizers never once thought that converted Indians

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<sup>9</sup> Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., “The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England,” in *The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909).

<sup>10</sup> “The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England,” (1909).

<sup>11</sup> James J. Burns, *The Colonial Agents of New England* (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1975), 30.

should be allowed to integrate. A deeper investigation of the Corporation and UCNE, including their membership, overall motivations and meeting minutes, reveals this to be true.

Separated by the Atlantic Ocean, the Corporation and UCNE counted among their members several people who devoted their lives to advancing English supremacy in the Americas and elsewhere. In 1651 John Eliot complained in a letter to Edward Winslow that neither the Corporation nor the UCNE prioritized converting Indians to Christianity: “the truth is it is one discouragement to me...that so few looke after what we doe, or so much as ask me about it.”<sup>12</sup> It was certainly true that, for both the Corporation and UCNE, converting and integrating Indians was secondary to doing whatever was necessary to remove Indians as obstacles to the English colonization of New England. Sometimes they used missionization to accomplish that, sometimes they used other strategies like conquest and transplantation.

The similarities between New England missionization and the various colonizing projects that Corporation members participated in becomes evident when viewed from the perspective of the greater English Atlantic world. Missionization could strengthen English colonizers in New England by enriching the men who governed Indian converts and establishing commercial ties between Boston and London. As was true in places like Ireland, the true benefit of missionization was its ability to destabilize Native communities, provide resources for colonizers, and create opportunities for settler colonialism. Additionally, men like Eliot never held pure motivations towards Indians either, despite their frequent lamentations about how the Corporation and UCNE operated. His complaints, as we will see, emanated from a place of self-interest rather than legitimate concern for Indian well-being. By King Philip’s War in 1675, even English colonizers historians have lauded for their sympathy towards Indians, like Daniel

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<sup>12</sup> John Eliot, "Letters of the Rev. John Eliot, the Apostle to the Indians." *New England Historic and Genealogical Register* 36: 292.

Gookin, only favored those who provided “an evident demonstration of their fidelity to the English interest,” whether they were Christian or not.<sup>13</sup>

This dissertation asks readers to reimagine the history of New England between 1646 and 1675, arguing that this period served as an era of experimentation for English colonizers seeking the best way to subordinate the region’s Indigenous population.<sup>14</sup> There was no room for middle grounds here—English colonizers had already decided Indians were inferior by 1646, and they made decisions time and again proving they believed there was no legitimate place for Indians within the quickly expanding New England colonies. From this vantage point, King Philip’s War was contingent upon the choices made by self-interested colonizers between 1646 and 1675. At the center of this thirty-year span was missionization, a transatlantic colonizing ideology formulated by many members of the Corporation and UCNE. They constructed missionization to satisfy the self-interests of colonizers across the English Atlantic world. New England missionization is not something to be cheered as a potential pathway to good relations between Indians and colonizers, and it can only be understood within the context of the English Atlantic world and colonial theory.<sup>15</sup> Understanding New England missionization begins with an analysis

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<sup>13</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections of the Indians in New England* (Boston: Apollo Press, 1674; New York: Arno Press, 1972), 49. Citations refer to the Arno Press edition unless otherwise stated.

<sup>14</sup> My use of “missionization” over “evangelism” is meant to emphasize the connection between converting indigenous people to Christianity and colonialism. “Evangelism” often has a positive connotation implying that missionaries only wished to spread the word of God and teach converts about Christ, without recognizing the greater colonial institutions and motivations scaffolding their work. That is not to suggest that all works that exclusively use “evangelism” endorse missionization. A good example of this is Linford D. Fisher’s *The Indian Great Awakening: Religion and the Shaping of Native Cultures in Early America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Fisher is concerned with how Christianity shaped Native culture mostly after 1700, demonstrating how Indians used Christianity to resist colonization and empower surviving communities, whereas I focus primarily on the era before 1700 to show how Christianity was used by the English to disrupt Native communities, and thereby created the situation Fisher describes.

<sup>15</sup> In other disciplines, missionization is associated with imperialistic endeavors, such as the United States’ attempt to institute “benevolent assimilation” in the Philippines. See Warwick Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 182.

of its fragmented leadership structure, the competing visions that drove it, and the depth of disinterest its managers showed towards non-English peoples. Competition between New England and England over how missionization should be administered—especially regarding how English supplies and silver should be disseminated in New England—prevented any possibility of integrating Indians prior to King Philip’s War as both sides sought solutions that first and foremost benefited themselves. New England colonizers displaced the English Corporation as missionization’s primary managers in the 1670s, a shift that was directly responsible for the transition towards more obviously violent and racist attitudes towards Indians.

Framing missionization as an institution concerned with the needs and interests of English colonizers aligns with the latest ethnic studies scholarship, which argues that Indians converted to Christianity to survive among the English and that colonizers’ intentions were far from benevolent.<sup>16</sup> There was no noble purpose behind missionization, and any positives that emerged from it were the result of Indian efforts. As Laura L. Mielke contends, praying Indians were “residents of a rapidly changing environment who found in Christian practice and alliances a means of challenging Euro-American authority by reviving and revising traditions of political and religious authority.”<sup>17</sup> These “native acts” turned missionization into an opportunity to resist colonialism, subverting the English’s desire to use missionization to benefit themselves.

Historians break seventeenth century New England into two eras separated by King Philip’s War (1675-1676). Before 1675, historians argue that there was potential for Indians to join English society, whereas after, racism combined with a desire for revenge caused the

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<sup>16</sup> Drew Lopezina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period*.

<sup>17</sup> Laura L. Mielke, “Introduction,” in *Native Acts: Indian Performance, 1603-1832*, edited by Joshua David Bellin and Laura L. Mielke (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 12-13.

English to remove, kill, and enslave Indians wherever they could.<sup>18</sup> In truth, missionization had been operating on behalf of English colonizers to transform New England into a land bereft of Indians long before King Philip's War commenced. This is not to say that every English person engaged in missionary activity intended to harm Indians, but it is to say that missionization historically works to marginalize the people it targets, and that this is exactly how it was managed by the Corporation and UCNE. Missionization was less about converting Indians, and more about scaffolding a power struggle between New England and England over who would dictate the future of the colonies (especially relating to how Indians would be dealt with).

### **Methodology**

This dissertation is critical of missionization and those who implemented it. My perspective stems from my reading of the sources and my identity. My ancestors did not have a positive relationship with Spanish and American colonizers. Nor have Black, Indigenous, and

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<sup>18</sup> Russell Bourne argues that Puritan missionaries brought Indians and Englishmen together, and that New England was a place of harmony before the war. Jill Lepore describes New England prior to the war as a "middle ground" or a "dividing line," with the war itself providing English colonizers with the rationale for describing Indians as savage, and thus inferior. Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougias claim that Indians and English colonizers lived "side by side" before the war, and that afterwards they were "cleared...from the land." James D. Drake argues that before King Philip's War, "the natives and the colonists of New England had enough in common to form their own unique society," and envisions missionization as something could have led to cultural syncretism between Native Americans and the English. Jenny Hale Pulsipher frames King Philip's War as a watershed where coexistence became untenable, and as the point in which racism possibly emerged in New England. Daniel R. Mandell describes King Philip's War as the "fundamental turning point in relations" between Indians and colonizers, though he notes that missionization had more of a negative impact on relations than other scholars are willing to admit. See Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England 1675-1678* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 9; Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), xiii; Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougias, *King Philip's War: The History and Legacy of America's Forgotten Conflict* (New York: The Countryman Press, 2017), 1, 5; Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "'Our Sages are Sageles': A Letter on Massachusetts Indian Policy after King Philip's War," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 58:2 (Apr., 2001): 439; and Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 4.

people of color in general fared well when subjected to missionary schemes. I know about the damage that colonizers and Christianity have inflicted upon people like me, and I have felt how that damage resonates in the present. Thus, my methods and understanding of missionization in seventeenth century New England are influenced heavily by research written by scholars of color working within the field of ethnic studies.<sup>19</sup> My intention is not to dismiss how some colonized peoples made Christianity their own, but to contend with and better understand the corrupted intentions that have historically fueled most missionary projects—including the one in New England. Missionization is not about religion, in so far as the goal of most missionary projects is not converting Indigenous people but securing their docility and subservience. In New England colonizers used missionization to support themselves financially, sequester Indian populations, and weaken the powerful Wampanoag and Narragansett communities on their western border. Indians who did convert were more likely to be ridiculed and abandoned than they were to be praised and incorporated into English society as equals. Even the missionaries historians laud for their persistent belief in Indigenous peoples' ability to be “reduced” and “uplifted” wrote and spoke in a language steeped in colonial rhetoric, and in all cases believed in their superiority over

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<sup>19</sup> BIPOC scholars are more likely to call missionization colonialism. Ghanaian academic Joseph W.S. de Graft-Johnson connected missionary work to Europeans' desire to keep Africa colonized. Cedric J. Robinson argues that European colonialism was, since the fifteenth century, fueled by “emergent merchant capitalism, national ambitions, and missionary compulsions.” Donna J. Amorso writes that U.S. colonizers in the Philippines relied on the framework established by Spanish Jesuits, and that for both “civilization was bound up with Christianity.” Aqpayuq (Fast Runner) James W. La Belle, Sr. refers to the shared colonial experience between Native Americans and Filipinos while commenting on E. J. R. David's *Brown Skin, White Minds*, describing missionization as a tool that colonizers used “to indoctrinate children in Christianity and Western worldviews.” Drew Lopezina refers to what missionaries implemented in New England as “the colonial/missionary machinery,” emphasizing their intertwined nature. See J. C. DeGraft-Johnson, *African Glory: The Story of Vanish Negro Civilizations* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1954), 50–52; Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of The Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 144; Anne L. Foster and Julian Go, eds., *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 122; E. J. R. David, *Brown Skin, White Minds: Filipino -/ American Postcolonial Psychology* (Charlotte: Information Age Publishing, INC., 2013), 268; Drew Lopezina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period*, 217.

those they tried to convert. What missionization did do was demonstrate colonized peoples' ability to adapt and survive within unforgiving colonial spaces.

Historians tend to emphasize the nuance behind New England missionization while exonerating missionaries and overlooking the lived experiences of those targeted by colonialism.<sup>20</sup> Many take missionary rhetoric at face value, never questioning if their desire to “help” Indians stemmed from unsavory motivations. In New England scholarship especially, missionization is portrayed less as colonialism and more as a benevolent attempt to integrate Native Americans into English society. The prevailing attitude is that this provides a more nuanced and contingent historical analysis that complicates the obvious narrative about missionization being used to advance white supremacy and promote colonialism.<sup>21</sup> But in immersing themselves too deeply within the former methodology, historians have gone too far in discarding the latter. This dissertation re-centers the argument that missionization was central to the English's colonizing strategy.

We can define missionization as a process whereby colonizers remove or modify an Indigenous people's cultural and spiritual beliefs with the goal of replacing them with their own.

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<sup>20</sup> Although early Americanists tend to avoid theory, theorists focusing on colonialism in the Early Modern period agree that missionization was a “colonial” project that embedded a “colonial situation” in New England. See Peter Hulme, *Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797* (London: Methuen, 1986); Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997); Robert Blair St. George, *Possible Pasts: Becoming Colonial in Early America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

<sup>21</sup> A century ago, for example, eugenicists argued that missionization was key to maintaining white supremacy and colonialism. From there one can trace nearly a direct line to sixteenth century colonial propagandists like Hakluyt, who concluded that colonialism and missionization required each other to work. See Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), 96–97. Charles Scribner's Sons previously published books on New England missionization, see Augustus Charles Thompson, *Protestant Missions: Their Rise and Early Progress* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 39-116; Charles Henry Robinson, *History of Christian Missions* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915). Thompson celebrated English colonizers involved in missionization, including Cromwell, Robert Boyle, and John Eliot, the last of which he called “The Apostle of the Indians.”

Filipino-American studies calls this process “benevolent assimilation,” rhetoric U.S. politicians developed in the progressive era to advertise missionization as a colonial system intended to benefit indigenous people.<sup>22</sup> Missionization normally follows a period of war, conquest, or disease (and often a combination of the three) that weakens the targeted population, and it offers few opportunities for those afflicted to empower themselves beyond what colonizers allow. Scholars sometimes compare missionization to the conquest that occurred during and after King Philip’s War, or to other counterfactual scenarios, to argue that, by comparison, missionization had more of a positive than a negative impact on Indians.<sup>23</sup> Franz Fanon provides a helpful

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<sup>22</sup> With respect to how benevolent assimilation/missionization impacted Native Americans and Filipinos, E. J. R. David writes that “the same idea of manifest destiny that was used to steal lands away from our Native American brothers and sisters is the same manifest destiny that was used to justify the colonization of my Peoples. I went there [to Standing Rock] because the same notion of benevolent assimilation wherein our Native American brothers and sisters were forced to attend boarding schools to erase their culture was the same benevolent assimilation that was used to miseducate Filipinos and inculcate Filipino minds with notions of American superiority.” See E. J. R. David, *We Have Not Stopped Trembling Yet: Letters To My Filipino-Athabaskan Family* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018), 156.

<sup>23</sup> The standard-bearer for this argument is Richard Cogley, who celebrates the missionary John Eliot and “his passionate commitment to the end-time conversion of the Indians [that] defied the material objectives of the Puritan magistrates.” He also gives credit to missionization for its ability to better “the economic condition of the proselytes. Through wage labor, apprenticeships, and cottage industries, as well as through consumer goods supplied free of charge by the New England Company, the natives were able to overcome the collapse of the coastal fur trade and the loss of their land base...Relative to the early settlement period, the mission improved the fortunes of the Indians.” Perhaps the most obvious encapsulation of Cogley’s argument is when he claims that “the mission is more accurately understood as a way of counteracting English domination rather than abetting it.” David Thomson argues that missionization protected Indians from prejudiced colonizers because the English tried to avoid the praying towns they resided in: “if white racism played a part at all it was in keeping white settlers at bay.” Prior to King Philip’s War, he contends, Indians had more to fear from other Indians, like the Mohawks, than they did from English settler colonizers. Kristina Bross argues that, because missionization forced New England colonizers to create an identity for themselves that included Indians in the picture (even if as converted subjects), that “English colonial discourse came to depend on the presence rather than the absence of Indians in New England.” Despite missionization’s flaws, her point is that it ultimately gave Indians a place in New England, whereas the situation after King Philip’s War did not. See Richard Cogley, “Idealism vs. Materialism in the Study of Puritan Missions to the Indians,” *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 3, no. 2, (1991): 178; Richard Cogley, *John Eliot’s Mission to the Indians before King Philip’s War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 245-246; David Thomson, “The Antinomian Crisis: Prelude to Puritan Missions,” *Early American Literature*, 38, no. 3, (2003): 410, 418; and Kristina Bross, *Dry Bones and Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in Colonial America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 21.

rejoinder in noting that colonizing strategies often appear indistinguishable from the perspective of the colonized, regardless of the intent of the colonizer.<sup>24</sup> Further still, missionization and conquest tended to complement each other rather than exist as discrete systems. As this dissertation will demonstrate, missionization could be used to justify conquest and vice versa.

In the case of New England, creating a space for missionization relied on the epidemics of 1616-1619 and the violence of the Pequot War, which allowed colonizers to entrench themselves in the land while also creating a population of displaced Indians. New England missionization was a settler colonial regime, aligning with Lorenzo Veracini's argument that settler colonialism exists wherever "the colonising effort is exercised from *within* the bounds of a settler colonialisng political entity."<sup>25</sup> More recently, Jeffrey Ostler has argued that, though settler colonialism does not perfectly describe all Indian-colonizer relations, it *does* apply to mid-seventeenth century New England and the "processes that would continue to gain momentum and lead to greater Native unity, culminating in a war of resistance...and, by the mid-eighteenth century, the massive dispossession of Native communities in southern New England."<sup>26</sup> Missionization was integral to destabilizing Indian communities and encouraging the expansion of English colonizers westward.

New England missionization operated within the English Atlantic world, its tendrils reaching out from London to Boston, and spreading from there deeper into New England. Missionization's connection to the English metropole meant that it was, by definition, colonialism. According to Veracini, colonialism involves "an expanding metropole that remains

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<sup>24</sup> Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (London: Pluto Press, 1986), 91.

<sup>25</sup> Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 6.

<sup>26</sup> Jeffrey Ostler, "Locating Settler Colonialism in Early American History," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (July 2019): 447.

permanently distinct” from the region being colonized.<sup>27</sup> Ostler provides a pithy summation: settler colonialism is “you go away,” where the desire is to take indigenous land, whereas colonialism is “you work for me,” where the intention is to extract labor and resources from indigenous populations.<sup>28</sup> New England missionization exhibited both of these features, whittling away at Native American land while also using their labor for profit. From the 1650s to the 1670s the UCNE in New England and the Corporation in England prioritized their own self-interests while operating missionization, and this held consequences for Indians. From the start, missionization reinforced colonizers’ sense of superiority over colonized populations and enabled the creation of regressive structures buoyed by the English’s belief that they were superior to Indians.<sup>29</sup>

This dissertation does not restrict itself to using historical methodologies, and indeed much of what I argue draws from the field of ethnic studies, which has a more critical approach towards missionization. Historians rarely connect New England missionization to the broader objectives of English colonialism, and few acknowledge that it was an inherently pernicious process. The landmark scholarship in the field argues that missionization protected Indians and would have saved them from colonialism were it not impeded by unsympathetic colonizers.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 6.

<sup>28</sup> Jeffrey Ostler, *Surviving Genocide: Native Nations and the United States from the American Revolution to Bleeding Kansas* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 11–12.

<sup>29</sup> For an alternative argument, see Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000). Kupperman argues that the English’s implementation of missionization meant they thought Indians could eventually be equal to them. This is an interesting contention that cites evidence from a similar process that occurred in England after the fall of the western Roman Empire. In New England, however, I believe that the English’s actions prove they never truly viewed Indians as potential equals.

<sup>30</sup> One historian argues that praying towns “provid[ed] Christian Indians with protected land and the promise of English alliance” and saved them from “exploitative sachems” who sought to extract tribute from weakened tribes. This argument, that missionization mitigated colonialism, blames opportunistic Indians for the English’s decision to create praying towns. See David J. Silverman, “Purgatory: Interpreting Christian Missions and North American Indians,” in *Converging Worlds: Communities and Cultures in Colonial America* edited by Louise A. Breen (New York: Routledge, 2012), 331.

Where I diverge is in arguing that missionization was not only connected to those unsympathetic colonizers, but shaped by them, and that its negative outcomes were not a result of outside forces, but an inevitable conclusion based on how missionization functions and the choices that colonizers made.

### **Historiography**

In the 1960s Alden T. Vaughan argued that New England missionization mitigated the effects of colonialism and connected the colonies to England.<sup>31</sup> In the 1970s and 1980s several revisionist arguments emerged arguing that missionization was linked to colonialism, though they spoke little of how missionization connected New England to England.<sup>32</sup> Then in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, historians revived Vaughan's pro-missionization arguments while maintaining the New England-centric narrative of the revisionists.<sup>33</sup> James Merrell summarizes the current

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<sup>31</sup> See footnote 16.

<sup>32</sup> See footnote 16.

<sup>33</sup> In 1965 Alden T. Vaughan argued that John Eliot and the Puritans genuinely desired to help Indians through missionization, an argument modified by Richard Slotkin and rebuked by Francis Jennings. Slotkin argued that Puritans "came to define their relationship to the New World in terms of violence and warfare," and developed a racist cultural identity as a result. Still, like Vaughan he saw missionization as separate from the violent colonialism that followed, arguing that the "Puritan missionary spirit gave way to the military spirit." Jennings was more revisionist, calling Eliot a charlatan who designed missionization to weaken Indians and steal their land. Unlike this dissertation, Jennings placed too much emphasis on Eliot's centrality to missionization's development and went too far in arguing that missionaries did not genuinely believe in Christianity or the religious purpose of conversion. In fact, missionary's Christianity informed their colonialism, rather than these two things being mutually exclusive. Neal Salisbury followed Jennings in arguing that missionaries "all agreed that native culture lacked intrinsic value and had to make way for English hegemony," and that this perspective made missionization disastrous for Indians. Eliot was a tyrant who created the model "for the management of a powerless minority" that left praying Indians vulnerable after King Philip's War. Salisbury's book *Manitou and Providence* led to the acceptance of a more negative perspective of missionization. Rather than attack the intentions of missionaries as Jennings did, he focused on New England's diplomatic relations with southern Algonquians, who English colonizers viewed as representing "the complete inversion of the world they sought for themselves." He dismantled Vaughan's argument that colonizers were "fair" to Indians by demonstrating how New Englanders used violence, land purchases, and settler colonialism in such a way that "justice was not a consideration." James Axtell added that the intent of missionization was to "reduce" Indians to civility by eliminating their culture and leaving them vulnerable

historical consensus on missionization when stating that missionaries “were genuinely committed to the biblical dictum of saving souls for Christ and to their Native charges [and that] Indian converts, in this new view, were not committing cultural suicide; rather, they were as clever about adopting Christianity as they were about buying guns and coats.”<sup>34</sup> While historians are aware of missionization’s negative impact, they choose to emphasize its ability to provide Indians with the freedom to wield Christianity to their own advantage.<sup>35</sup> Historian Edward E.

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to European colonizers. See Alden T. Vaughan, *The New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians 1620-1675* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965); Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (1973; reis., New York: HarperPerennial, 1996), 56, 195; Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975); Neal Salisbury, “Red Puritans: The ‘Praying Indians’ of Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot,” *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1974), pp. 29, 54; Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 11, 200; James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

<sup>34</sup> Here Merrell echoes the work of Richard Cogley, who argues that “the mission is more accurately understood as a way of counteracting English domination rather than abetting it.” Others, like Julius H. Rubin, think we should “shift our focus from the intentions of missionaries to Christianize and ‘civilize,’ and emphasize what Native peoples made—the hybrid beliefs (meaning-making) and their emergent religious practice (making do).” See James H. Merrell, “Indian History During the English Colonial Era,” in Daniel Vickers, ed., *A Companion to Colonial America* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 126; Richard W. Cogley, *John Eliot’s Mission to the Indians before King Philip’s War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 245; Julius H. Rubin, *Tears of Repentance: Christian Indian Identity and Community in Colonial Southern New England* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 9. Credit should also be given to Dane Morrison, whose 1995 book paved the way for many of Cogley’s arguments. See Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusetts Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995).

<sup>35</sup> Scholars of late argue that missionization was flexible about the pace of cultural and religious change among praying Indians, allowing converts to define Christianity for themselves and thus reinforce their cultural identities. The crux of this argument is that it is missionization rather than indigenous peoples’ adaptations that made this possible. Other than Cogley, David J. Silverman’s work is most indicative of this model. In *Faith and Boundaries*, he focuses on the Mayhew’s missionary project on Martha’s Vineyard, echoing Cogley in saying that they, like Eliot, provided Indians with the tools needed to survive English colonialism and “influence the pace and extent of change...by using skills and institutions borrowed from the colonists to advance Indian priorities.” For Cogley and Silverman, missionization is less a vehicle for English colonialism than it was a flawed but legitimate effort to cater to Indians interested in Christianity, one which allowed Indians to adapt to a new and difficult situation. Silverman’s case study is more convincing than Cogley’s given that Martha’s Vineyard was an island, thereby giving Indians more autonomy there than elsewhere. See David J. Silverman, *Faith and Boundaries: Colonists, Christianity, and Community among the Wampanoag Indians of Martha’s Vineyard, 1600-1871* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13, 111.

Andrews demonstrates this argumentative strategy in *Native Apostles*, stating that “Evangelical Christianity was certainly culturally imperialistic” while also contending that it directly provided Indians “the ideas, language, and rhetoric of resistance, liberation, and egalitarianism.”<sup>36</sup> Native American studies scholars like Drew Lopenzina questioned this framing using the theoretical concept of “survivance” formulated by Gerald Vizenor, in which he argues that Indians’ “native acts,” not missionization as an institution, were responsible for Indian cultural survival under New England missionization.<sup>37</sup> Rather than defending missionization and those who administered it, Lopenzina emphasizes Indians’ ability to adopt strategies to achieve survivance.

When writing the definitive account of Roxbury pastor and “Apostle to the Indians” John Eliot, historian Richard Cogley argued that Indians asked colonizers to implement missionization, citing the submission of Massachusetts sachems to the Bay Colony General Court in 1644. He uses the “affective model” to argue that missionization was benevolent rather than malicious.<sup>38</sup> Historian and Native American studies scholar Christine DeLucia disputes the idea that Indians willingly agreed to missionization as the colonizers envisioned it; instead, they

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<sup>36</sup> Edward E. Andrews, *Native Apostles: Black and Indian Missionaries in the British Atlantic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 7.

<sup>37</sup> *Survivance* describes the ways in which Native Americans crafted “a crucial set of tools and circumstances upon which survival and cultural continuance hinges,” in a way designed to combat “dominant narratives of history and literature.” Through the lens of *survivance*, Indian conversion to Christianity does not affirm European colonizing tactics or religion, but rather critiques those institutions while showing how those affected by them transformed them to preserve aspects of their precolonial culture. See Drew Lopenzina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), ix, 2.

<sup>38</sup> See Cogley, *John Eliot’s Mission*, 5, 6, 19, 22, 40. For him, the “decisive event that led to the birth of the mission was the submission of six sachems to the General Court in 1644.” Thus, it was not malice that convinced colonizers to begin proselytizing, but the perceived openness of Indians to working with instead of against them. Cogley calls this the “affective model,” or, the idea “that a mission could not begin until Indians wanted to receive one.” There is a major problem with this model. Indians’ interest in Christianity and working with the English did not have to result in missionization, which was informed by lessons learned from other examples of English colonialism in the Atlantic world. If the submission of six sachems was as significant as Cogley suggests, then it was the English who chose *how* to respond to them. English colonizers could have chosen another way to approach Indians in the 1640s, but they did not.

gravitated towards it for utilitarian reasons. Indians were not genuinely interested in English beliefs, instead they viewed Christianity as a means towards resisting and mitigating the effects of colonialism.<sup>39</sup> Cogley's celebration of missionization denies its connections to colonialism by conceptualizing it as an institution that Indians created alongside English colonizers, and makes the mistake of lionizing Eliot.<sup>40</sup> For historians like Cogley, missionization was generally a positive force for Indians that would have been even more beneficial had it not been marred by poor management and inherent bias towards Indian converts.

David J. Silverman's analysis of the Wampanoags of Martha's Vineyard proves that missionization required unique conditions to work somewhat in Indians' favor. And yet, even in those instances, it aided English colonialism. Island Wampanoags were to some degree guarded from self-interested colonizers on the mainland, providing them with the time and space needed to become "knowledgeable believers, and then, with a level of determination and enthusiasm rarely seen in anyone but new recruits, they transformed Christianity into a bulwark for

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<sup>39</sup> DeLucia notes that, though Eliot's "missionizing projects necessitated altered forms of place-connection among Natives," he often "acquiesced to Native desires for other such settlements closer to communities' customary core locations, enabling the continuance of decentralized, interconnected Native landscapes." In other words, Eliot allowed Indians to modify Christianity to their needs and take on aspects of English culture at their own pace. Despite Eliot's leniency in some areas, DeLucia writes that he alone was not reflective of New England missionization's intentions towards Indians. For instance, while managing Natick for Eliot, Daniel Gookin "amassed a sizable checkerboard of claims to Native places, in or nearby traditional homelands of Massachusetts, Pennacooks, Nipmucs, Pequots, and Narragansetts." Gookin's actions as colonizer have received little attention from scholars of missionization, which will be discussed further in chapter two of this dissertation. See Christine M. DeLucia, *Memory Lands: King Philip's War and the Place of Violence in the Northeast* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 40, 41, 44, 50.

<sup>40</sup> Cogley and Silverman acknowledge that, outside of Eliot and Mayhew, missionization did not always work in Indian's best interest, and that we must consider the impact of colonialism. Cogley devotes chapter eight to critiquing the UCNE's lack of support for Eliot, concluding that their actions prevented missionization from achieving equality among colonizers and Indians (this dissertation, by contrast, argues that the UCNE was as responsible for defining missionization's purpose as Eliot was). Silverman contends that praying Indians on Martha's Vineyard benefitted from their separation from most colonizers, in effect giving them an opportunity to shape missionization in ways not intended by the English. Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission*; Silverman, *Faith and Boundaries*.

Wampanoag communities and an expression of their own culture.”<sup>41</sup> Demonstrating Lopenzina’s survivance concept, Martha’s Vineyard Praying Indians managed to re-shape missionization from a colonizing force into one that, for a time, protected them from the English. But they were the exception, not the rule, and eventually they too would be subjected to the forces of English colonialism. As Silverman concludes, Martha’s Vineyard enjoyed “favorable conditions for Indian-English coexistence [with] bold, innovative people who capitalized on them.”<sup>42</sup> However, “its model for intercultural peace and Indian survival was not replicated elsewhere...” and in the end the English would “dispossess the praying Indians and relegate them to an abject status.”<sup>43</sup>

Literary scholars within the field of Puritan studies have gone further than historians in seeing missionization as distinct from colonialism.<sup>44</sup> Kristina Bross was the first, writing in 2003 that missionization is not “a flat and formless representation of colonial power,” rather, it is a lens through which to understand English and Indian perspectives in the Atlantic world.<sup>45</sup> David

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<sup>41</sup> Silverman, *Faith and Boundaries*, 13.

<sup>42</sup> Silverman, *Faith and Boundaries*, 284.

<sup>43</sup> Silverman, *Faith and Boundaries*, 284. Silverman’s more recent work was criticized by Wampanoag Indians for his evaluation of them prior to King Philip’s War. The main point of contention centers the way Silverman (and historians in general) characterize colonizer interactions with Indians. For instance, in *Faith and Boundaries* missionization was simultaneously a “model for intercultural peace” while also leading to Indians’ marginalized status among English colonizers. In general, there is trepidation among historians about arguing that European colonizers were intentional about colonization, preferring to err on the side of contingency to say that colonizers fell into that mode of thinking over time for quantifiable reasons, reasons perhaps even instigated by Indians. That is why scholars like Silverman characterize missionization as a potential middle ground that devolved (for historical reasons) into something that damaged Indians, rather than admitting that missionization was ideologically inclined to achieve that end. See Linda Coombs, Review of *This Land Is Their Land: The Wampanoag Indians, Plymouth Colony, and the Troubled History of Thanksgiving*, by David Silverman, *Native American and Indigenous Studies* 8, no. 2 (Fall 2021): 158-160.

<sup>44</sup> “Literary scholar” is used because these authors have backgrounds in English or literary studies. A subfield of literary studies—early American literature—branched off from the historical field of Puritan studies, and they are the ones who continue to write on New England missionization. For more on this historiographical development, see Bryce Traister ed., *American Literature and the New Puritan Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

<sup>45</sup> Kristina Bross, “‘Come over and Help Us’: Reading Mission Literature,” *Early American Literature* 38, no. 3 (2003), 39; Kristina Bross, *Dry Bones and Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in Colonial America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Thomson paints missionaries in a sympathetic light, writing that they did not invoke “conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict,” rather, they empowered Indians by granting them leadership roles. This claim is disputed by evidence provided by historians like Daniel Mandell and others, who found that Natick’s “leadership structure was designed to please the English in general and Eliot in particular.”<sup>46</sup> The praying towns by default encouraged inequality and coercion on the part of the English, even if the intent of missionaries was ambivalent.

Other literary scholars dispute the notion that missionization was inequitable, or that it was anything besides a way for Indians to achieve agency. Sarah Rivett, for instance, defends Eliot against accusations that he was ethnocentric and paternalistic, arguing that “[h]is racial observation, rather, is an attempt to establish the Indian subject as an appropriate text upon which to witness the working of God in a distilled form.”<sup>47</sup> Missionization did not assist colonizers, it was an attempt to “mobilize the potential for new spiritual knowledge encoded within the Praying Indian testimony.”<sup>48</sup> Kathryn Gray echoes this when asking us to recognize missionization for its role in fostering “Native agency in the creation of a new spiritual identity” rather than as solidifying the “power relations of colonial dominance.”<sup>49</sup> While literary scholars’ search for “more detailed and nuanced” analyses of missionization have added to our understanding of the nature of religious discourse in the early modern English Atlantic world, it

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<sup>46</sup> Mandell cited in David Thomson, “The Antinomian Crisis: Prelude to Puritan Missions,” *Early American Literature*, 38, no. 3, (2003), 421, 429; see also Daniel R. Mandell, “‘To Live More Like My Christian English Neighbors’: Natick Indians in the Eighteenth Century,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (October 1991): 554, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2938121>.

<sup>47</sup> Sarah Rivett, *The Science of the Soul in Colonial New England* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 129.

<sup>48</sup> Rivett, 149.

<sup>49</sup> Kathryn N. Gray, *John Eliot and the Praying Indians of Massachusetts Bay: Communities and Connections in Puritan New England* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2013), 83.

has done too much to exonerate missionaries while insufficiently historicizing missionization within the context of English colonialism.<sup>50</sup> Their mistake is in centering missionization as a transformative and progressive institution that enabled Native Americans to resist colonialism. Instead, Native Americans used missionization to their own advantage, despite it being a key part of English colonialism and its goal of ensuring the superiority of English colonizers.

### **The Corporation, “Praying” Indians, and New England Missionization**

The Corporation (est. 1649) was a London organization composed of merchants and politicians that collected money and supplies for New England missionization.<sup>51</sup> They sent these resources to the commissioners of the United Colonies in New England (UCNE), who distributed them as they saw fit. There were eight UCNE commissioners—two each from Massachusetts Bay Colony, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven (until 1664).<sup>52</sup> Generally, it was former or current governors, magistrates, or military commanders who served as UCNE commissioners. Most commonly, UCNE commissioners were colonial governors. The UCNE was created in 1643 to defend its four member colonies from Indians—specifically Narragansetts—in the

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<sup>50</sup> For the idea that “more detailed and nuanced” analyses of missionization envision it as something beyond a colonizing institution, see Michael P. Clark’s introduction to *The Eliot Tracts: With Letters from Thomas Thorowgood and Richard Baxter*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 8.

<sup>51</sup> William Kellaway’s *The New England Company, 1649-1776: Missionary Society to the American Indians in 1961* was the last monograph to center the Corporation. It contains a detailed account of the Corporation’s origins, its membership, its interactions with New England, and its general history. Like many histories of its time, however—and likely owing to Kellaway congenial relationship with the Corporation (which still exists—it provides a positive perspective of missionization extolling the genuine intent of missionaries and the benefits they imparted upon Indians. It does not explore the colonizing activities of Corporation members. Kellaway never critiques missionization’s effect on Indian communities. Historian Gabriel Glickman recently wrote on the Corporation; however, he focuses on its political role during the Restoration rather than on missionization in New England. William Kellaway, *The New England Company, 1649-1776: Missionary Society to the American Indians* (Glasgow: The University Press, 1961); Gabriel Glickman, “Protestantism, Colonization, and the New England Company in Restoration Politics,” *The Historical Journal* 59, no. 2 (2016): 369, 386, 391.

<sup>52</sup> A few of the commissioners of the United Colonies—Edward Winslow and Herbert Pelham—later became members of the Corporation.

aftermath of the Pequot War. They began managing missionization under the Corporation starting in 1649, taking advantage of this new connection to England to acquire silver and supplies.<sup>53</sup> As noted previously, the UCNE was a confederation of four New England colonies—Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven—and it managed situations that went beyond the purview of any one colony, in addition to handling diplomatic communications with England. The UCNE and its commissioners held more authority than any individual New England colony, though we shall see certain examples in later chapters where powerful colonies like Massachusetts were able to sway the UCNE towards decisions that benefited itself to the detriment of the three other members. Missionaries like Roxbury pastor John Eliot reported directly to the UCNE, though some (like Eliot) also maintained close ties to the Corporation in London.

New England missionization's managers were active colonizers throughout the English Atlantic world. The Corporation's first president was William Steele, who in the 1650s served as London's member of parliament and Lord Chief Justice of Ireland.<sup>54</sup> The other fifteen original members of the Corporation were, like Steele, mostly radical Independents and vehement Parliamentarians who supported Cromwell.<sup>55</sup> (They were joined by a handful of Presbyterians.)<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> "The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England; May 19, 1643," *The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America*, Compiled and Edited Under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906 by Francis Newton Thorpe Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909.

<sup>54</sup> William Steele served as M.P. for London in 1654, Chief Baron of the Exchequer in 1655, and Lord Chief Justice (or Chancellor) of Ireland in 1656.

<sup>55</sup> Independents believed in congregational control of church matters governed by no other forms of hierarchy. In this they were aligned with Massachusetts Bay Colony Puritans (or Congregationalists). The peak of their influence was 1642-1660, wherein many played significant roles within the New Model Army, the English Commonwealth, and Cromwell's Protectorate.

<sup>56</sup> A list of the men who served the New England Society between 1649 and 1660 includes: William Steele, Richard Lloyd, Edward Winslow, Herbert Pelham, Edward Hopkins, Thomas Bell, Edward Parks, Richard Hutchinson, Robert Houghton, James Shirley, Thomas Babington, George Clarke, Joshua

After the 1660 Restoration, the Corporation's membership grew to forty-five, and it was governed by Anglo-Irish philosopher and chemist Robert Boyle, who descended from English colonizers in Munster, Ireland. From 1649-1675 the Corporation facilitated commerce between England and New England, coordinating the shipment of missionization supplies and funds to the UCNE. They were also eager investors in English land and property, dedicating much of their money and attention to those causes. UCNE commissioners were likewise active in trying to profit from missionization. Poor management of missionization on both sides of the Atlantic led to deteriorating conditions for Indians who chose to convert to Christianity.

The interests of the Corporation and UCNE shaped missionization. As Karen Ordahl Kupperman notes:

“...there was no tension in [Englishmen's] minds between the genuine patriotism and religious concern that motivated them and the personal enrichment they hoped would flow to them from [a colonial] project's success. The Pilgrim Edward Winslow had praised this double promise when he wrote in 1624: ‘In America, religion and profit jump together.’”<sup>57</sup>

Winslow, accordingly, was one of the men who argued in favor of missionization and the creation of the Corporation, later becoming a member himself after having also been a UCNE commissioner.<sup>58</sup> Other prominent New England colonizers echoed Winslow in viewing missionization as a vehicle for improving their relationship with England and helping them grow

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Woolnough, William Moline, Thomas Ayres, Major William Puckle, George Clarke of Hackney, Edmond Wilson, and Henry Ashurst. Most were wealthy merchants or politicians close to Cromwell.

<sup>57</sup> Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Providence Island, 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 18. Winslow's quote is taken by Kupperman from Edward Winslow, *Good Newes from New England*, (London, 1624), reprinted in Alexander Youngs' *Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers*, 372.

<sup>58</sup> Besides Winslow, several New England colonizers argued in favor of London supporting New England missionization. These included Thomas Weld (minister of Roxbury), Hugh Peter (minister of Salem), William Hibbins (Boston merchant), John Wilson (minister in Boston), Thomas Shepard (preacher), John Eliot, and Thomas Mayhew.

as a colony.<sup>59</sup> Historian Dane Morrison was partially correct when he argued that the “economic self-interest of farmers and speculators posited the Algonkian primarily as an obstacle to their need for land and relegated the missionary crusade to a minor place in colonial affairs.”<sup>60</sup> In truth, the “missionary crusade” was not separate from the “economic self-interest of farmers and speculators,” indeed, missionization was a product of self-interested English colonizers who viewed it as a means to their own aggrandizement.

Missionization targeted Algonquian Indians living in southern New England, which included Massachusetts and Wampanoags nearer to the coast, Nipmucs inland to the west, Mohicans further west along the Hudson river, Narragansetts in Rhode Island, Pequots, Mohegans, and Niantic in Connecticut, the Wabanakis in New Hampshire, and the closely related Abenakis in Maine.<sup>61</sup> Prior to the arrival of English traders and colonizers in the seventeenth century their numbers ranged between 126,000 and 144,000 people, with the population declining precipitously after the epidemics of 1616-1619 and the violence of the 1620s and 1630s.<sup>62</sup> Southern New England Indians all “spoke one or another dialect of the

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<sup>59</sup> Other historians have suggested that silver provided by the Corporation buoyed New England’s economy, enabling it to construct an economy based around transatlantic commercial enterprise. Virginia DeJohn Anderson argued that the “correlates of trade, including freight charges, insurance, and the extension of commercial credit, enriched the region” and gave the New England economy its identity in the seventeenth century. Bernard Bailyn contended that missionization aided this process, citing the Corporation’s ability to facilitate trade and provide lines of credit to alleviate New England’s lack of small change in the 1640s and 1650s. Virginia DeJohn Anderson, “New England in the Seventeenth Century,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 209; Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1955), 183.

<sup>60</sup> Morrison, 59.

<sup>61</sup> The geographic indicators listed here are simplifications offered for the sake of the reader; the borders of these tribes of course transcended the boundaries of the English’s colonies. However, these give a rough sense of where they were located in relation to each other and to English colonizers.

<sup>62</sup> These are Neal Salisbury’s numbers, cited in David J. Silverman, *This Land Is Their Land: The Wampanoag Indians, Plymouth Colony, And The Troubled History Of Thanksgiving* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 49.

broader Algonquian language family.”<sup>63</sup> For example, Wampanoags and Massachusetts generally spoke the same dialect, whereas Narragansetts spoke a different dialect, though one understandable to their neighbors (and vice versa). Southern New England Indians did not agree on any one strategy to dealing with English colonizers, though all participated to some degree in accommodationist tactics out of necessity—sometimes at the expense of other Indians, like the Pequots.<sup>64</sup>

Historians describe Indian converts as “praying Indians” and the towns they lived in as “praying towns.” I follow Drew Lopenzina in calling for a reframing of these terms, which are forms of “powerful containment, subsuming everything that falls within its discursive properties, and whitewashing, or othering, the Native presence that remains at its locus.”<sup>65</sup> Like Lopenzina, when I refer to “praying Indians” or “praying towns,” I am defining “praying” as “praying for peace and stability more than Jehovah.”<sup>66</sup> This is to recognize that praying Indians and the towns they lived in represented both “Native presence and traditional activity,” despite the rhetoric emanating from missionaries and other colonizers.<sup>67</sup> Keeping this in mind allows us to recognize

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<sup>63</sup> Silverman, *This Land Is Their Land*, 52.

<sup>64</sup> Interested in the gaining control of the Pequot’s wampum trade and supposedly angry about the alleged murder of English colonizer John Stone, the English leveraged Mohegans’ and Narragansetts’ dislike of the Pequots to acquire them as allies. Together they defeated the Pequots, selling the survivors into slavery in the Caribbean. The removal of the Pequots created a power struggle in the region between the Mohegans and Narragansetts that was partially responsible for the creation of the United Colonies of New England in 1643. See Philip H. Round, *By Nature and by Custom Cursed: Transatlantic Civil Discourse and New England Cultural Production, 1620-1660* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1999), 235–36; Alfred A. Cave, “Who Killed John Stone? A Note on the Origins of the Pequot War,” *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 509-521; Kristina Bross, *Dry Bones and Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in Colonial America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 154; and Russell Bourne, *The Red King’s Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England 1675-1678* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 79.

<sup>65</sup> Drew Lopenzina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period*, 93.

<sup>66</sup> Drew Lopenzina, 93.

<sup>67</sup> Drew Lopenzina, 93.

the ways in which Indians employed missionization to survive among colonizers who held little faith that they could one day be equal to them.

Before King Philip's War, most praying Indians were affiliated with the Massachusetts and resided in Bay Colony praying towns. Proximity to English settlements prior to 1646 led to Massachusetts populations being devastated by disease and threatened by colonizer encroachment, thus making them vulnerable to missionary activity. Other praying Indians included the Wampanoags of Martha's Vineyard, the Pennacooks (members of the Wabanaki confederacy), and the Nipmucs.<sup>68</sup> Most praying Indians resided in one of the seven praying towns established within Massachusetts Bay Colony between 1651 and 1670, which included Natick, Punkapoag, Hassanamesit, Okommakamesit, Wamesit, Nashoba, and Magunkaquag.<sup>69</sup> Seven more praying towns were established in Nipmuc territory on the western edges of Massachusetts Bay Colony between 1670 and 1674, but they had little time to develop.<sup>70</sup> In 1674, Daniel Gookin estimated that 2,287 Praying Indians existed in New England, the majority being in Massachusetts (1,100) and Plymouth (497), with the rest in Martha's Vineyard (360), Nantucket (300), and Connecticut (30).<sup>71</sup>

Most southern New England Indians avoided missionization. The Mohegans, who allied with the English to defeat the Pequots, were able to do so thanks to the sachem Uncas' negotiating ability and the geographical distance between them and the English. The

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<sup>68</sup> Alden T. Vaughan, *The New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians 1620-1675* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 292-295.

<sup>69</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusetts Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 152.

<sup>70</sup> Morrison, 152. These towns were Manchage, Chabanakongkomun, Maanexit, Quantisset, Wabquisset, Pakachoog, and Waeuntug.

<sup>71</sup> Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 34. Vaughan's numbers are from Daniel Gookin, *Historical collections of the Indians in New England* (1674), 40-70.

Narragansetts maintained enough military power and distance from the English to protect their sovereignty, boasting a fighting force four thousand strong as late as 1675.<sup>72</sup> Prior to and throughout the period of missionization, the Narragansetts faced constant threats from hostile Mohegans to the west and the UCNE to the east, who together orchestrated the murder of their grand sachem Miantonomi in August 1643.<sup>73</sup> The Pokanoket—a Wampanoag tribe led by their grand sachem Massasoit and later his sons Alexander and then Philip—resided just east of the Narragansetts and, like them, maintained their sovereignty while remaining skeptical of missionization and the UCNE.<sup>74</sup> Eventually, the threat of missionization and the pressures created by a growing English population convinced Narragansetts and Philip’s Wampanoags alike to launch an offensive against the UCNE in 1675.

In New England, UCNE commissioners were active in ensuring that missionization benefitted colonizers. From 1649 until 1675 they persecuted and subdued Indians so effectively that Cromwell cited them as a model when building his Western Design.<sup>75</sup> They endorsed missionization because it kept Indians subdued, not because they believed in converting Indians to Christianity and incorporating them among the English. Indeed, in 1675 they eagerly grasped at the opportunity to violently pursue non-Christian and Christian Indians alike. Corporation members also valued missionization’s ability to secure a colonized space (most were familiar

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<sup>72</sup> Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougias, *King Philip's War: The History and Legacy of America's Forgotten Conflict* (New York: The Countryman Press, 2017), 11.

<sup>73</sup> Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 235.

<sup>74</sup> Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

<sup>75</sup> According to Alison Games, Cromwell aligned with those “who preferred stark separations in their worlds, between Christian and heathen, English and Irish, circumspect and profligate, saved (they hoped) and damned.” He especially identified with New England colonizers who did not “appreciate the diversity of humanity,” and as such “sought to replicate the intolerant regime of Massachusetts or New Haven” across the English Atlantic world. See Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion 1560-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 272.

with how effective it was in Munster, Ireland). However, by the early 1670s they were wary about making it subordinate to conquest. Between 1670 and 1675 the Corporation and UCNE debated over how to pursue missionization in New England, with the latter's vision ultimately winning out. The battle between the Corporation and the UCNE reflected a larger debate occurring in the English Atlantic world, one concerned with whether missionization was superior to transplantation or conquest in managing indigenous populations. Most colonizers ultimately settled on a model fusing all three tactics. Indeed, many Corporation members and UCNE commissioners were connected to Irish colonization, and they drew from their familiarity with it in conceptualizing how missionization would be implemented in New England.

King Philip's War allowed the UCNE to focus on a policy of removing Indians from New England while continuing to employ missionization in spaces occupied by the English. They prioritized missionization between 1646 and 1675 because it fostered commerce with England and presented an adequate solution to dealing with southern New England's population of displaced Indians. For a new colony seeking stability and a way to prove to London that it was spreading Christianity, missionization was an attractive strategy.<sup>76</sup> As Philip Round states, missionization allowed New Englanders to "persuade the metropolis that they were worth supporting."<sup>77</sup> Whether missionization was the optimal strategy or not, there was value in using it to extract resources and support from England. Indeed, New England received thousands of pounds worth of silver, goods, and munitions before 1670 thanks to missionization. UCNE commissioners, unlike some missionaries, did not pursue missionization to establish positive

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<sup>76</sup> For more on the ideology guiding the English's desire to spread Christianity in the Americas, see Richard Hakluyt's *Discourse Concerning Western Planting*, published in 1584, where he wrote that "the people of America crye oute unto us their nexte neighbours to comme and helpe them, and bringe unto them the glad tidings of the gospel." See also Peter C. Mancall, *Hakluyt's Promise: An Elizabethan's Obsession for an English America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 140.

<sup>77</sup> Round, *By Nature and By Custom Cursed*, 11.

relations with Indians, and thus missionization made it more difficult for Indians to survive the expanding population of English colonizers.<sup>78</sup>

### **Sources and Chapter Outline**

This dissertation draws upon records and correspondences left by the Corporation and the UCNE to argue that missionization made New England a space hostile to Indians before 1675. To that end I examined every Corporation meeting held between 1656 and 1675, creating a personal database that kept track of how many times they discussed Indians, what their expenditures looked like, who was involved in managing missionization, and how their relationship with New England changed over time. I also created separate databases on members of the Corporation, members of the UCNE, the merchants who worked with them, and the colonizing schemes connecting them all. This dissertation is not a prosopography, though it does rely on its methods at times to reveal how missionization was embedded within seventeenth century English colonialism. The business of missionization entailed far more than the act of missionaries converting Indians, and examining the social and familial connections of those involved is crucial to proving that. As my analysis of the sources reveals, missionization used the

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<sup>78</sup> The idea that missionization was both culturally destructive and regenerative for Native Americans was proposed by Hilary E. Wyss, who argues that missionaries imparted the alphabetic literacy allowing Indians to resist colonizers with the written word. However, it is unclear if Indians needed missionization to adapt to alphabetic literacy, or if we should be crediting Indians rather than missionaries for this development. In a later edited collection Wyss wrote with Kristina Bross, both imply that missionization's importance was that it gave Indians the ability to leave a historical record. However, they also point out that Indians were entirely capable of leaving a readable material record without alphabetic literacy, which again contests the notion that they needed colonizers to develop both literacy and forms of resistance. Perhaps we should understand this the other way around—that colonizers were ironically aided in their ability to proselytize thanks to Indians' ability to quickly learn English and adapt to their customs. Perhaps the best example of this is John Eliot's reliance on interpreters, owing to his inability to grasp indigenous grammar structures even after four decades of study. See Hilary E. Wyss, *Writing Indians: Literacy, Christianity, and Native Community in Early America* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); and Kristina Bross and Hilary E. Weiss, *Early Native Literacies in New England: A Documentary and Critical Anthology* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008).

rhetoric of conversion to hasten the colonization of lands held by indigenous peoples, with said conversion being incidental to colonizers' true motivations. This is how New England missionization operated, with the English repeating conversion rhetoric while simultaneously taking actions that had little to do with Indians and much to do with empowering the English in colonized spaces.

I begin with two chapters exploring the ideological origins of New England missionization. Chapter one investigates the early careers of UCNE commissioners and Corporation members, exploring their role in facilitating the colonization of Ireland in the 1640s and Scotland, Virginia, and Barbados in the 1650s. I place this in context with the creation of the UCNE in 1643 and New England's early missionary efforts from 1646 to 1650 to show that, from the beginning, missionization would be managed by self-interested English colonizers. Chapter two more deeply explores the ideology driving missionization, one which I argue informed and was informed by concurrent colonization efforts in Ireland. In the English Atlantic world, missionization often existed in competition with another colonizing strategy—transplantation. For that reason, I center the chapter on a discussion of writings by the Superintendent of the Praying Indians Daniel Gookin and his first cousin, Vincent Gookin Jr., to show how missionization and colonization in both regions shared specific features and portrayed Indians and Irish in a similar manner.

Chapters three through five provide a chronological account of the Corporation and UCNE from the 1650s up to the eve of war in 1675. More specifically, chapter three investigates the management strategies employed by the Corporation and UCNE before the Restoration, focusing especially on how the latter leveraged missionization to profit at praying Indians' expense. Chapter four begins by exploring how the Corporation transitioned from Cromwell to

Charles II, examining how it operated under the leadership of Henry Ashurst and Robert Boyle in the 1660s and tracing the changes this created in its relationship with New England. This was a transitional period for the Corporation, as although they devoted considerable effort to creating the Indian Bible, they were less willing than they had been in the 1650s to give considerable resources to the UCNE. The Great Fire of London in 1666 disrupted the Corporation further, killing many of its members and destroying much of its property. Its recovery led to another transitional period during which the Corporation became increasingly frustrated with how the UCNE managed missionization in New England.

Chapter five covers the years 1668-1675, charting the Corporation's attempt to seize control over New England missionization by overseeing how its resources were spent. Simultaneously, the UCNE broke with England over how it conducted Indian relations, making missionization secondary to dealing more aggressively with Indians remaining beyond colonizers' grasp. They pursued a combative treaty policy and negotiation strategy that resulted in war between them and Philip's Pokanokets, during which missionization suffered significant collateral damage, though it would indeed survive into the eighteenth century.

Between 1646 and 1675, the Corporation and UCNE competed over how best to implement missionization in New England. The Corporation wanted to empower missionaries, build New England's network of praying towns, and develop an assimilative missionization project akin to Munster, Ireland. In other words, they wanted missionization to be central to the colonization of New England. The UCNE remained subservient to the Corporation's vision for a time, but from the start preferred a system whereby missionization complemented conquest and transplantation as New England's colonizing tactics. The shift towards missionization being more influenced by the UCNE occurred over multiple decades—with the Restoration and the

Corporation's post-1668 strategy representing significant watersheds. Missionization was, in many ways, an English colonial project that New Englanders took hold of and shaped to better serve their interests, creating an expedient strategy for dealing with the remaining Indians living in their midst.

# Chapter 1

## *The Ideological Origins of New England Missionization*

“Religion is the organization of spirituality into something that became the hand maiden of conquerors. Nearly all religions were brought to people and imposed on people by conquerors, and used as the framework to control their minds.”

— Dr. John Henrik Clarke

The English Parliament created the Corporation on July 27<sup>th</sup> 1649 to manage and provide for New England missionization from London. It was originally composed of sixteen members, all of whom were wealthy Puritan merchants and politicians.<sup>79</sup> In 1662 Corporation membership expanded to forty-five, its demographics changing to include more Presbyterians and Anglicans—a shift designed to please King Charles II. This chapter argues that these men viewed missionization as part of a greater colonizing effort to spread English influence across the globe—with Ireland being a region they were heavily involved in both prior to and after missionization commenced. Studies investigating missionization through the lens of New England missionaries like John Eliot often conclude that, despite the mission’s ethnocentrism and insensitivity to indigenous beliefs, it would have eventually succeeded in incorporating Algonquian Indians had it not been for those outside of the mission who “reframed the Algonkian as a marginal people.”<sup>80</sup> In truth, the ideology driving the men in charge of Eliot

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<sup>79</sup> “Wealth,” according to Kellaway, “was an important qualification for membership and it was always hoped that members might make free with their personal fortunes on the Indians’ behalf.” I have found no evidence, however, that Corporation members used their personal wealth to fund missionization prior to the Restoration. William Kellaway, *The New England Company 1649-1776: Missionary Society to the American Indians* (London: Longmans, 1961), 18.

<sup>80</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusetts Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 199.

determined missionization's implementation and were responsible for English colonizers' disdain and apathy towards Indians.

Scholars of New England missionization devote little attention to the Corporation. They note its creation and the role it played in gathering and transmitting funds to New England, but neither delve into the activities of its members nor how their actions affected the character of the missionization project they managed. Even William Kellaway, principal historian of the Corporation, spends mere pages on who its members were and what they did to advance English colonialism. This is not to say that Corporation members had more direct influence on the lives of praying Indians than missionaries like John Eliot or Thomas Mayhew, but it is to say that *how* missionization was structured and *why* it eventually disintegrated into violent conflict reflected the Corporation's influence. King Charles II acknowledged the Corporation's significance in shaping New England on May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1661, when he made its rechartering the objective of his "Committee touching the settlement of the Government of New England."<sup>81</sup> Charles II described the Corporation's new charter as "the charter for New England," demonstrating the extent to which he thought the Corporation and missionization had defined New England's purpose.<sup>82</sup>

Many of the Corporation's original members had ties to New England. Edward Winslow arrived in Plymouth aboard the *Mayflower* in 1620 and perhaps had more influence over the early stages New England colonization than he did on missionization. Herbert Pelham helped establish Sudbury, Massachusetts in 1635, later serving as a UCNE commissioner after 1643 before returning to England to join the Corporation in 1649.<sup>83</sup> In 1677 Pelham's son Major

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<sup>81</sup> "America and West Indies: May 1661," in *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 5, 1661-1668*, ed. W Noel Sainsbury (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1880), 27-35.

<sup>82</sup> *C.S.P. America and West Indies: Volume 5, 27-35*.

<sup>83</sup> William Kellaway, *The New England Company 1649-1776: Missionary Society to the American Indians* (London: Longmans, 1961), 17.

Waldegrave Pelham received from brother-in-law Josiah Winslow King Philip's possessions, including his wampum, belt, and figurines.<sup>84</sup> Henry Ashurst, who replaced Richard Lloyd as the Corporation's treasurer in 1659, shipped cloth to New England in the 1640s and traded annually with John Pynchon until 1660—Pynchon would later serve as “commander in chief in the western theater of operations” of King Philip's War.<sup>85</sup> Besides Winslow and Pelham, Edward Hopkins and Thomas Bell were the only original members of the Corporation to have set foot in New England. Hopkins was Governor of Connecticut and then a UCNE commissioner, while Bell lived in Roxbury and “knew first hand something about Eliot's labours.”<sup>86</sup>

Corporation member Richard Hutchinson—the brother of William Hutchinson, Anne Hutchinson's husband—had several children who lived in New England. Though he did not live there himself, his will reveals that he counted “houses, lands, a sawmill, and the like among his possessions in New England.”<sup>87</sup> He had an interest in securing his property in New England, something which missionization assisted in by subduing Indian populations and funneling resources to the UCNE. Hutchinson played an active role in the English Civil War, being one of several merchants who organized the London committee of safety established by Parliamentarians in July 1642, a militia committee created to oversee the fight against King Charles I.<sup>88</sup> He later managed Parliament's assessment plan, under which “each part of the kingdom was to be assessed a certain sum which would vary according to the prosperity and

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<sup>84</sup> Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougias, *King Philip's War: The History and Legacy of America's Forgotten Conflict* (New York: The Countryman Press, 2017), 139.

<sup>85</sup> Philip Arthur Muth, “The Ashursts: Friends of New England,” PhD Diss. (Boston University Graduate School, 1967), 40. On Pynchon's role as negotiator to Indians, as Springfield leader, and as military commander, see Douglas Edward Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958), 86-96.

<sup>86</sup> Kellaway, 18.

<sup>87</sup> Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (London: Verso, 2003), 365.

<sup>88</sup> Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 397.

resources of the section,” payment of which would go towards the war effort.<sup>89</sup> Hutchinson was not the only Corporation member who served as an assessor: William Pennoyer was another.

Hutchinson and Pennoyer also served on the committee for regulating customs and the navy, which worked with the council of state to solve its disputes with English colonies. The committee was composed primarily of merchants who, like Hutchinson, traded with the Americas and India, and thus were ostensibly familiar with the needs of colonizers.<sup>90</sup> On March 15<sup>th</sup>, 1649 for instance, the council of state asked the committee to evaluate the tumultuous situation in Barbados and “decide whether it was safe to continue to license the exportation of horses there in case of the colony’s disaffection.”<sup>91</sup> In short, men like Hutchinson and Pennoyer held influence over the English government and the course of its colonization efforts once Parliament assumed control from Charles I. Indeed, Hutchinson eventually became Treasurer of the Navy, meaning he oversaw the money Parliament used to repair and provision the fleets carrying out its colonial agenda. When they joined the Corporation, they did so because the goals of New England missionization complemented the other colonial operations they were involved with.

Several members of the Corporation were deeply involved in the colonization of Ireland. Their experiences there influenced how they treated New England missionization and vice versa. The Corporation’s first president, William Steele, abdicated his responsibilities to Corporation Treasurer Richard Lloyd after becoming Lord Chief Justice of Ireland in 1656, a position he

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<sup>89</sup> Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 431-32; and John J. Schroeder, “War Finance in London, 1642-1646,” *The Historian* 21, no. 4 (August 1959): 361.

<sup>90</sup> Hutchinson, like many in the Corporation, was a member of the East India Company. See Maurice Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy Under the Cromwellian Protectorate* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1961), 113.

<sup>91</sup> Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 587.

hoped to leverage into acquiring Irish lands and resources.<sup>92</sup> Upon arrival he found most of the available land taken, leaving him to lament that “he had not an acre left for him to covet.”<sup>93</sup> Fellow Corporation member Erasmus Smith had more luck, having taken a large swath of that land. According to Michael Quane, Smith was a “war profiteer, amassing a vast fortune in supplying large consignments of oatmeal, wheat and cheese for the use of the troops in Scotland and Ireland.”<sup>94</sup> In 1643 his father Sir Roger Smith gifted him £375 worth of Irish land, to which Erasmus attempted to expand by spending £13,082—greater than the total amount spent on New England missionization—on debentures held by other Irish adventurers (or investors).<sup>95</sup> The 1653 Act of Settlement resulted in Smith receiving 21,067 acres in County Tipperary, 12,596 acres in County Louth, and 5,750 acres in Connaught.<sup>96</sup> Smith later arranged for the creation of three “grammar schools” in Ireland at the behest of King Charles II in 1669, whose goal was to teach Irish children the “fear of God and good literature and to speak the English tongue.”<sup>97</sup> Just as he did in New England as a member of the Corporation, Smith invested time and money into reducing the Irish to English civility.<sup>98</sup>

Corporation members’ colonizing adventures in Ireland and elsewhere forces us to reconsider the ideologies driving New England missionization. Was it a genuine spiritual

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<sup>92</sup> William Kellaway, *The New England Company 1649-1776: Missionary Society to the American Indians* (London: Longmans, 1961), 19.

<sup>93</sup> William Steele, in Oliver Joseph Burke’s *The History of the Lord Chancellors of Ireland from A.D. 1186 to A.D. 1874* (1879)

<sup>94</sup> Michael Quane, “Drogheda Grammar School,” *Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society* 31, no. 1/2 (1964/1965): 39–70.

<sup>95</sup> Quane, “Drogheda Grammar School,” 39-40.

<sup>96</sup> Quane, “Drogheda Grammar School,” 39-40.

<sup>97</sup> Quane, “Drogheda Grammar School,” 43; and W.J.R. Wallace, *Faithful to Our Trust: A History of the Erasmus Smith Trust and The High School, Dublin* (Dublin: Columba Press, 2005), 19.

<sup>98</sup> Michael C. Coleman explores how Smith’s Irish schools may have served as an antecedent to the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs’ nineteenth century boarding schools for Native American children. It may be true instead that the New England praying towns were the antecedent to Smith’s Irish schools. See Michael C. Coleman, *American Indians, the Irish, and Government Schooling: A Comparative Study* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).

endeavor defeated by self-interested Englishmen? Or did self-interested Englishmen direct the mission and define its core values and motivations? Across the English Atlantic world in the 1640s and 50s, Corporation members were busy advancing both their own interests and those of Parliament and Cromwell. Similar motives guided their compatriots in New England as well. Indeed, the Corporation's charter granted the UCNE the "power and authority to receive and dispose of the moneys brought in and paid to the said Treasurer for the time being, or any other moneys, goods and commodities, acquired and delivered by the care of the said Corporation at any time."<sup>99</sup> Considering that several men served both the Corporation and the UCNE, it is little wonder that they failed to "dispose of the said moneys in such maner as shall best and principally conduce to the preaching and propagating of the Gospel of Jesus Christ amongst the Natives, and also for maintaining of Schools and Nurseries of Learning, for the better education of the children of the Natives."<sup>100</sup> Their negligence towards Indians and penchant for self-aggrandizement would define New England missionization.

### **The 1641 Irish Rebellion as Prelude to Missionization**

The English employed missionization in colonized regions throughout the Atlantic world. In both Ireland and Virginia, colonizers initially sought to subdue indigenous populations by promoting English culture and converting them to Christianity.<sup>101</sup> However, before missionization could take root in these regions, violent conflicts like Opechancanough's

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<sup>99</sup> C H Firth and R S Rait eds., "July 1649: An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England.," in *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1911), 197-200.

<sup>100</sup> "Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England," 197-200.

<sup>101</sup> For a deeper discussion of the connections between colonizing tactics in Virginia and Ireland, see James E. Doan, "'An Island in the Virginian Sea': Native Americans and the Irish in English Discourse, 1585-1640," *New Hibernia Review* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 96; Audrey Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea: Colonialism in the British Atlantic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).

rebellion of 1622 and the Irish rebellion of 1641 caused the English to be more willing to use violence as the default solution against Indians and Irish alike. Though there has been an abundance of scholarly attention given to the connections between Ireland and Virginia, none have tried to connect Ireland to New England's strategy of converting, subduing, and conquering Indians. In truth, the Irish rebellion of 1641 and the ensuing colonization of Ireland precipitated how Indians would later be treated in New England. In both Ireland and New England, English colonizers wrestled over whether missionization and incorporation was superior to war and transplantation in dealing with indigenous populations.

Several future Corporation members participated in quelling the Irish rebellion during the 1640s, which preceded a decade of conflict culminating in the "settlement" of Ireland in the 1650s.<sup>102</sup> There they funded and managed the logistics of invading English armies, viewing the colonization of Ireland as an opportunity to acquire land and wealth, in addition to being ideologically motivated against Catholicism. Through their participation in Irish colonization, future Corporation members demonstrated their penchant for implementing self-interested and violent colonizing strategies when dealing with people they deemed inferior.

William Pennoyer is exemplary of Corporation members' involvement in advancing English colonialism in the 1640s and 1650s, as he participated in almost every aspect of it. Pennoyer was a moderately wealthy Independent English merchant whose influence expanded once Parliament and later Cromwell supplanted King Charles I.<sup>103</sup> He is best remembered for working with merchant Maurice Thomson to pass the Navigation Act of 1651, which prevented

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<sup>102</sup> Two recent books place 1641 within a broader Atlantic world context, though neither say much about its connection to New England. Micheál Ó Siochrú and Jane Ohlmeyer eds., *Ireland: 1641 Contexts and reactions* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); John Gibney, *The Shadow of a Year: The 1641 Rebellion in Irish History and Memory* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2013).

<sup>103</sup> Raymond Lounsbury, *Pennoyer Brothers: Colonization, Commerce, Charity in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1971), 116.

the Dutch from (legally) trading with English colonies.<sup>104</sup> During the interregnum he, like Erasmus Smith, supported the English war effort against Ireland and Scotland and tried to acquire Irish land. Pennoyer joined the Corporation in 1668, leveraging that position to become a prominent investor in Harvard College. Though not an original member of the Corporation, Pennoyer nonetheless shared their religious and political ideology and worked with them closely. That he was able to join the Corporation—which after 1662 restricted new membership to those related to current members—reveals both his wealth (which the Corporation wanted to use to help rebuild itself after the Great Fire of London) and his devotion to its cause.<sup>105</sup>

Because Pennoyer's career reflects that of other Corporation members, investigating it clarifies the ideology driving missionization. Like other merchants involved in New England missionization, Pennoyer was a member of the Drapers' Company. He was also a leading member of the East India Company's primary English competitor, the Assada Adventurers, which later merged with the EIC.<sup>106</sup> Consequently he often traded with India, once exporting £7,000 of gold in exchange for saltpeter, a key ingredient in the making of gunpowder—always in high demand in Cromwellian England.<sup>107</sup> He invested in Barbados sugar, assisting Barbados'

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<sup>104</sup> J.E. Farnell, "The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and the London Merchant Community," (1964), 445. Cromwell was initially against the Navigation Act as he viewed the Dutch less as enemies and more as potential Protestant allies. Eventually he reversed his position to appease the Independent merchants who supported his cause in the 1640s. For more on Pennoyer's career with Maurice Thompson (though with a focus on the latter), see Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (London: Verso, 1993).

<sup>105</sup> Between 1649-1660 the Corporation maintained sixteen members at any given time, with twenty-nine total having served in that period (encompassing those who replaced members who left or died). In 1662 the Corporation expanded to forty-five members, with replacements chosen mainly from the relations of the departed member. See "The Ashursts and some of their New England Company ties", ca. 1965, *Massachusetts Historical Society Misc. Manuscripts*.

<sup>106</sup> Ethel Bruce Sainsbury, ed., *A Calendar of the Court Minutes, Etc., of the East India Company, 1655-1659* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), XV, XXII. See also Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 209.

<sup>107</sup> *Minutes of the East India Company, 1655-1659*, 340.

development as a colony just as “war between the Dutch and Portuguese for [Brazil’s] plantations caused sugar prices to rise to very high levels in the 1640s.”<sup>108</sup> Profit drove Pennoyer, as in the 1640s Barbados experienced what John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard call “the Barbadian sugar revolution,” where “Barbados transformed from a colony of small farmers who grew minor staples for export and provisions for home use into ‘the most flourishing Island in all those American parts...’”<sup>109</sup> By 1655, merchants like Pennoyer were importing “103,067 hundredweight (5,236 metric tons) of sugar from Barbados, worth roughly £130,000 at the island, £180,000 in London.”<sup>110</sup>

During the English Civil War, Pennoyer supplied and transported the English invasion force that fought the Irish rebellion beginning on October 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1641. As an Independent, Pennoyer sided with Parliament in opposition to King Charles I.<sup>111</sup> He helped spearhead the Sea Adventure to Ireland enacted by a Parliamentary ordinance on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 1642, which saw several merchants pooling their resources to help conquer Ireland.<sup>112</sup> In November 1642, Pennoyer was one of the “leading city activists” tasked with raising the funds to mobilize a company of Dragoons against the King’s army, and these “ad hoc committees, composed of self-selecting urban radicals, [became] essential to the birth of a new parliamentary revenue

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<sup>108</sup> Ralph Davis, *English Overseas Trade 1500-1700* (London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1973), 36.

<sup>109</sup> John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 150.

<sup>110</sup> McCusker and Menard, *The Economy*, 150.

<sup>111</sup> David R. Como calls Pennoyer one of the “pillars of city independency.” See David R. Como, *Radical Parliamentarians and the English Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 321. Most London merchants with ties to New England identified as “Independent,” which was a political and religious identification closely related to the Puritanism practiced in Massachusetts Bay Colony. Pennoyer was no exception. This in part explains the close affinity he had with New England and the cause of missionization. The other two major Protestant religious factions in England were Presbyterians and Anglicans. Pennoyer was ideologically more like Puritans than the Anglican and Presbyterian majorities who dominated English politics prior to the rise of Oliver Cromwell and his “Rump” Parliament. Cromwell dissolved the Rump Parliament on April 20, 1653, replacing it with his protectorate.

<sup>112</sup> *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660 vol. I*, 10.

machine.”<sup>113</sup> Then, amid the conflict between Presbyterians and Independents in 1645, Pennoyer was among those who defended Cromwell against claims of “double-dealing,” cementing his relationship with the future Lord Protector.<sup>114</sup>

Pennoyer, like others who became Corporation members, was part of a radical merchant class that supported Parliament and its allies militarily and economically. As David R. Como writes, Pennoyer and merchants like him came from the “prosperous middling rank of substantial citizens, well below the heights of the city elite.”<sup>115</sup> But what men like Pennoyer lacked in wealth, they made up for with a “fierce commitment to parliament's cause, often coupled with overt godly zeal.”<sup>116</sup> The Corporation’s first members were ideologically aligned with Pennoyer, and the strategies they employed on behalf of Parliament to assist English colonizers would go on to influence their management of New England missionization. The blueprint was clear: raise funds to support those sympathetic to you, establish the means to organize military force to crush resistance, and create a safe space for yourself and your allies. Parliament and its radical merchant backers supported New England missionization not because they viewed Indians as potential equals, but to replicate in North America the colonizing agenda they had already been executing across the English Atlantic world.

### **Creating the United Colonies of New England (UCNE)**

While future Corporation members mobilized to assist Parliament’s war against Ireland, New England colonizers devised a strategy to manage Indians. First introduced on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 1643, and ratified by Edward Winslow and William Collier on September 7<sup>th</sup>, the UCNE’s

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<sup>113</sup> Como, *Radical Parliamentarians*, 143.

<sup>114</sup> Como, *Radical Parliamentarians*, 321.

<sup>115</sup> Como, *Radical Parliamentarians*, 143.

<sup>116</sup> Como, *Radical Parliamentarians*, 143.

Articles of Confederation called for a political and military alliance between Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven. The reasons why were stated as such:

“...we live encompassed with people of several nations and strange languages which hereafter may prove injurious to us or our posterity. And forasmuch as the natives have formerly committed sundry Insolence and outrages upon several Plantations of the English and have of late combined themselves against us: and seeing by reason of those sad distractions in England which they have heard of, and by which they know vie are hindered from that humble way of seeking advice, or reaping those comfortable fruits of protection, which at other times we might well expect.”<sup>117</sup>

The uncertainty wrought by the English Civil War—the instability from which might encourage the Dutch, French, or Spanish to invade—coupled with the threat of attack from Indians (especially Narragansetts) led to colonizers concluding that it was prudent to join together “into a firm and perpetual league of friendship and amity for offence and defence.”<sup>118</sup> Part of that offensive and defensive strategy with respect to Indians would be missionization, or, as they called it, “preserving and propagating the truth and liberties of the Gospel.”<sup>119</sup> The UCNE was built to contain Indians through martial and spiritual means. It remained devoted to both colonizing strategies after it began managing missionization under the direction of the Corporation in 1649.

Preceding Eliot’s sermons held at the Massachusetts village of Nonanetum (twelve miles west of Boston) by three years, the creation of the UCNE reflected colonizers’ belief that Indians were threats. Its Articles of Confederation described missionization as a strategy to deal with

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<sup>117</sup> Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., “The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England,” in *The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909).

<sup>118</sup> “The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England”; for more on the creation of the UCNE being a response to Narragansett threats, see Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip’s War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 20.

<sup>119</sup> “The Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of New England”

Indians unable to militarily resist English colonizers. Indeed, the two most-studied groups of Indians targeted by missionaries—the Wampanoags of Noepe (Martha’s Vineyard), who Thomas Mayhew began proselytizing to in 1642, and the Massachusett—had been decimated by the 1616-1619 epidemics and lived in regions surrounded by colonizers. As argued by Dane Morrison, “English missionaries took advantage of the disintegration of Algonkian culture to press beyond their own congregations for converts.”<sup>120</sup> Indians valued Christianity because its principles were comparable to their own traditional spiritual beliefs, and because it provided a means for survival amid English colonizers. With few remaining powwaws (shamans), sachems (headmen), and pnieses (counselors or sages) to lead them, those who became praying Indians turned to men like Eliot and Mayhew, who seemed to have the waantamoonk (wisdom) and manitou (spiritual power) to guide them from the despair caused by disintegrating communities and the deaths of loved ones.

Violence was the UCNE’s preferred way of dealing with Indians who threatened New England. One of their first acts was to order the death of Miantonomi, nephew of the Narragansett grand sachem Canonicus. In the summer of 1643, a Mohegan sachem named Uncas was attacked by one of Miantonomi’s allies, an Indian named Sequassen. One of Sequassen’s men succeeded in killing one of Uncas’ men, to which Uncas demanded retribution from Connecticut Governor John Haynes. Standard procedure called for Sequassen to give Uncas the killer, but he refused, citing this man’s close connection to his ally Miantonomi. In short, Sequassen felt that it was Miantonomi’s decision, not his, to give up the culprit to Uncas. Governor Haynes then gave Uncas permission to attack Sequassen’s village, which he set aflame

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<sup>120</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusetts Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690*, 7.

in a way Michael Leroy Oberg describes as reminiscent of “the scorched-earth tactics the English had first employed at Mystic” during the Pequot War.<sup>121</sup>

When Miantonomi asked Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop if he could respond by attacking Uncas, Winthrop appeared to answer in the affirmative. Unbeknownst to Miantonomi, Uncas leveraged the English’s suspicions towards the Narragansett to his own benefit. He contacted the English and accused Miantonomi of harboring a Pequot assassin who tried to take his life. Specifically, he accused Miantonomi of executing the culprit before, as Winthrop wrote, his “treachery would be discovered.”<sup>122</sup> Unaware of Uncas’ plot, Miantonomi and “as many as one thousand warriors [moved] to attack the Mohegans at Shantok.”<sup>123</sup> Uncas met Miantonomi before the assault began, challenging him to single combat in lieu of a battle between their armies. This was a ploy, with Uncas surprising Miantonomi and his forces with a sudden volley of arrows. The battle ended quickly, and Uncas took Miantonomi as his captive.<sup>124</sup>

While captive, Miantonomi asked Uncas to join with him and the Wampanoags against English colonizers. Together, he argued, they could remove the English before it was too late. The alliance could be solidified through marriage, with Miantonomi marrying one of Uncas’ daughters, and his younger brother Pessicus marrying the Wampanoag grand sachem Massasoit’s daughter Amie. Such an alliance would have combined the strength of the three most powerful Indian tribes remaining in southern New England. But it was not to be. Uncas instead met with the UCNE for direction, who told him in August 1643 that he could “justly put such a false and bloodthirstyemie [as Miantonomi] to death.”<sup>125</sup> Fulfilling their role as bulwark against

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<sup>121</sup> Michael Leroy Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 101.

<sup>122</sup> Oberg, *Uncas*, 101.

<sup>123</sup> Oberg, *Uncas*, 102.

<sup>124</sup> Oberg, *Uncas*, 103.

<sup>125</sup> Oberg, *Uncas*, 105.

Indians, UCNE commissioners had ended, in the words of Neal Salisbury, “the last possibility of an effective native resistance to English Puritan hegemony.”<sup>126</sup> Even after the UCNE began managing missionization in 1649, they remained willing to use violence to subdue Indians remaining outside the grasp of missionaries.<sup>127</sup>

Emanuel Downing, John Winthrop’s adviser and brother-in-law, later wrote in a 1645 letter to Winthrop (then also a UCNE commissioner) that he preferred Narragansetts to be conquered, captured, and exchanged for African slaves:

“If upon a Just warre the Lord should deliver them into our hands, wee might easily have men woemen and children enough to exchange for Moores which wilbe more gayneful pilladge for us than we conceive, for I doe not see how wee can thrive until wee get into a stock of slaves sufficient to doe all our business, for our children’s children will hardly see this great Continent filled with people...And I suppose you know verie well how wee shall mayneteyne 20 Moores cheaper than one Englishe servant.”<sup>128</sup>

Precipitating policies instituted following King Philip’s War, Downing offered a vision for New England that emphasized the removal of the indigenous population, to be replaced by enslaved African people. Though Winthrop and the UCNE did not pursue that exact strategy in the 1640s, they clearly sought out opportunities for the “just war” Downing yearned for.

While the UCNE determined its Narragansett strategy, John Eliot coordinated with Edward Winslow to develop missionization, which would soon involve the UCNE. As far as Eliot’s connections to Downing, he was familiar with him on some level, enough that he was able to describe his daughter Mary Downing Stoddard as a “lusty strong woman” when writing

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<sup>126</sup> Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 235.

<sup>127</sup> The UCNE’s hostility towards the Narragansetts, specifically Pessicus and Ninigret, continued into the 1650s. See Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip’s War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty*, 23–27.

<sup>128</sup> Quoted in Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 130.

of her death in 1647.<sup>129</sup> Ultimately, the UCNE's adjusted its Indian strategy depending on Indians' potential military strength. Those who could not resist colonizers were subjected to missionization, those who could were targeted with violence and unfair treaties that eroded their sovereignty.<sup>130</sup>

### **The Sea Adventure to Ireland**

While UCNE commissioners formulated their Indian strategy, future Corporation member William Pennoyer was directing the Sea Adventure to Ireland, which between 1641 and 1649 provided supplies, ammunition, and ships to assist Parliamentary forces in Ireland. The Sea Adventurers' vision for Ireland, stated on October 24<sup>th</sup>, 1645, was to have "Adventurers, soldiers, foreigners, and London merchants...satisfied, in that order, with Irish land. Irish Protestants were to be restored to their lost estates...and Irish Catholics were to be 're-educated' to Protestantism by the removal of their children to England."<sup>131</sup> As in New England, missionization in Ireland was not implemented to incorporate the indigenous population within English society. As Cedric J. Robinson argues with respect to the Irish adventurers, "no determined effort was ever made to reform the Irish, but rather that at the least pretext—generally resistance to the English—they were dismissed as a 'wicked and faythless peopoll' and put to the sword."<sup>132</sup> Whereas individual missionaries might have held positive intent towards or

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<sup>129</sup> Quoted in Frederick Johnson Simmons, *Emanuel Downing* (n.p., 1958), 51.

<sup>130</sup> For a thorough account of the UCNE's quest to eliminate sovereign Indians in southern New England prior to 1675, see Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty*.

<sup>131</sup> Karl S. Bottigheimer, "English Money and Irish Land: The 'Adventurers' in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland, *Journal of British Studies* 7, no. 1 (1967): 24.

<sup>132</sup> Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of The Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 114. For more on the similarities between how the English treated Indians, African, and the Irish with respect to how the rhetoric of "uplifting" them was mostly a ruse designed to provide an excuse for their elimination or removal, see Nicholas Canny, "The Ideology

even cared for indigenous converts, English colonizers on the whole tended to use missionization to serve their own self-interest.

Pennoyer and his associates colonized Ireland with the intent of receiving a return on their investment. The act creating the Sea Adventure stated that the “Adventurers and their Associates shall have all captures Ships, Goods, Monies, Plate, Pillage, and Spoil...and the same to hold and enjoy for their own Use, without any Accompt whatsoever thereof to be made.”<sup>133</sup> The adventurers were entitled to whatever they pillaged and looted. In 1642 they funded and organized a fleet comprised of “eighteen ships and a thousand soldiers” bound for southern Ireland. By 1649, however, the adventurers had received only a fraction of conquered Irish land.<sup>134</sup>

Parliament criticized the adventurers, arguing that they did a poor job of strategizing the colonization of Ireland, especially with respect to the disbursal of funds. Some in Parliament considered disbanding the adventurers and taking over the endeavor themselves.<sup>135</sup> In 1643 King Charles I tried to persuade the adventurers to support his forces instead. If the adventurers betrayed Parliament, Charles promised them more autonomy and more Irish land.<sup>136</sup> However, he underestimated the adventurers desire to see Ireland overtaken “by a new mass of Protestant freeholders,” overriding an unlikely alliance with an Anglican King who sympathized with Catholicism.<sup>137</sup> Though the adventurers’ were supplanted by the Commonwealth’s council of

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of English Colonization: From Ireland to America,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 30, no. 4 (October 1972): 596–97.

<sup>133</sup> *Acts vol. I*, 9.

<sup>134</sup> Bottigheimer, “English Money and Irish Land,” 13, 17.

<sup>135</sup> Bottigheimer, “English Money and Irish Land,” 19, 22-3.

<sup>136</sup> Bottigheimer, “English Money and Irish Land,” 19.

<sup>137</sup> Bottigheimer, “English Money and Irish Land,” 24.

state in 1649, their vision for a Protestant Ireland would inform the scope and direction of the Cromwellian Settlement.

The Sea Adventure to Ireland was nonetheless profitable for Pennoyer.<sup>138</sup> Although the adventurers' records are lost, evidence of Pennoyer's involvement survives within English state papers. Between May 3<sup>rd</sup> and September 23<sup>rd</sup> of 1642, Pennoyer and Maurice Thomson invested at least £1,200 into purchasing munitions for the Committee for Irish Affairs.<sup>139</sup> In return the adventurers acquired £103,592 worth of ships and supplies, making at least £100,000 in revenue from participating in the colonization of Ireland.<sup>140</sup> For a radical Independent like Pennoyer, funding the colonization of Ireland proved to be an effective means for a "middling" merchant to expand their wealth and further their ideological agenda at the expense of Irish people.

The adventurers were also entitled to Parliamentary reimbursements for all Ireland-related expenditures. Throughout the 1640s Parliament made several payments to the adventurers to compensate them for resources devoted to the war effort. To give an idea of the numbers involved, between 1644 and 1646 the adventurers spent £16,007 on the defense of Munster, specifically on "money, goods, [and] artillery for [Protestant forces and] ships for the defense of the Irish coasts."<sup>141</sup> This was a small fortune, but the promise of reimbursement and the potential profit of plundering encouraged them to spend. Munster was significant to Protestant forces, as it was an English colony established earlier in the seventeenth century by Protestant families like the Gookins and Boyles, both of which conceived strategies to deal with rebellious Irishmen and

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<sup>138</sup> On Cromwell's ascendance benefitting Pennoyer, see Lounsbury, *Pennoyer Brothers*, 116.

<sup>139</sup> William Douglas Hamilton and Sophia Crawford Lomas, eds., *Calendar of state papers, Domestic series, of the reign of Charles I, Addenda: March 1625 to January 1649*, v. 23 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1897), 643.

<sup>140</sup> *Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Charles I [S.P 16] volume 539*, pt. 1, no. 106.

<sup>141</sup> Robert Pentland MaHaffy, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Ireland, 1647-60* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1903), 382; MaHaffy, *C.S.P. Ireland, 1660-62* (1905), 368.

had family members who led New England missionization.<sup>142</sup> Munster employed missionization to reduce and incorporate the Irish, but, as in New England, it existed alongside more violent tactics used against the Irish who remained beyond the English's grasp.

Pennoyer financed and provisioned the offensive against Irish forces outside of Munster, as those who did were guaranteed to acquire "Rebel Lands in Ireland forfeited...when it shall please God that Kingdome shall be reduced, in proportions...and according to the...sums of money...brought in...as the Adventurers for Lands in Ireland."<sup>143</sup> On December 28<sup>th</sup>, 1644, "Maurice Thompson, William Pennoyer, and others...desirous to have Irish acres" partnered to invest a combined total of £6,000 into Parliamentary troops.<sup>144</sup> Pennoyer alone later gave Parliament an additional £2,950.<sup>145</sup> The initial £6,000 was partly derived from a £3,000 reimbursement made by the Committee of the House of Commons to the adventurers for "ships provided by them for Ireland."<sup>146</sup> In other words, the adventurers used profit derived from prior investments in Irish colonization to invest yet again in that endeavor.

### **Corporation Members and Irish Colonization**

Pennoyer also worked independently from the adventurers to move gunpowder and related equipment to protestant forces preparing to invade Ireland. On October 7<sup>th</sup>, 1642, Pennoyer was "employed by the State [to ship to parliamentary forces gathering in Bristol] Six hundred Barrels of Gunpowder, Forty Ton of Match, and other Necessaries, for the present

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<sup>142</sup> Daniel Gookin speaks about this in *Doings and Sufferings* (1677), which will be discussed in chapter two.

<sup>143</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, pp. 70-73

<sup>144</sup> *C.S.P., Dom., 1625-49*, p. 670.

<sup>145</sup> Lounsbury, *Pennoyer Brothers*, 108; *State Paper Office: State Papers Ireland, Elizabeth I to George III* [S.P. 63] *Volume 282*; *S.P. 63 Volume 283*, 2, 242, 292; *S.P. 63 Volume 284*, 29; *S.P. 63 Volume 285*, 149, 154.

<sup>146</sup> *C.S.P., Dom., 1625-49*, p. 670.

Relief of the miserable Condition of *Ireland*, with all possible Speed.”<sup>147</sup> To accomplish this, the House of Lords and Commons allowed Pennoyer to requisition “all such *Bristol* and Western Waggon, Carts and Carriages, as now are, or shall be in Town within Five Days.”<sup>148</sup> Pennoyer’s involvement in the gunpowder trade escalated throughout the conflict, resulting in him “delivering a thousand barrels of gunpowder a month to the State” during portions of the English Civil War.<sup>149</sup> In 1650 alone, Pennoyer delivered 1,893 barrels of gunpowder to Parliament and received £8,114 in payment from council of state’s Excise Treasurer John Jackson.<sup>150</sup> English colonization relied on men like Pennoyer, and so it is little surprise that they were drawn upon to manage the Corporation.

Erasmus Smith, who managed the Corporation from 1649-1661 and received Irish land from his father in 1643, also proved crucial to the English war effort in Ireland. On March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1650, the council of state granted a warrant permitting Smith “for the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, to ship 100,000 lbs. weight of oatmeal, customs’ free, for Youghall, for the use of the army in Ireland.”<sup>151</sup> On May 10<sup>th</sup>, 1650, they granted another warrant allowing Smith “to ship and transport 400 quarters of wheat [to] Dublin, Carrickfergus, or Coleraine.”<sup>152</sup> On November 14<sup>th</sup> Sir John Wollaston paid Smith £300 for fifty tons of Oatmeal “delivered at Youghall in

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<sup>147</sup> *Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 2, 1640-1643* (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1802), 799; *Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 6, 1643* (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1767-1830), 157.

<sup>148</sup> *Journal of the House of Commons Volume 2*, 799

<sup>149</sup> Samuel E. Morrison, *History of Harvard University 17th Century Vol. 1* pp. 383-387.

<sup>150</sup> "Warrants of the council of state for Payments of Money," in *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1876), 569-608.

<sup>151</sup> "Warrants from the council of state and Admiralty Committee," in *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1876), 525-568.

<sup>152</sup> *C.S.P. Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*, 525-568.

Ireland.”<sup>153</sup> Smith’s role in provisioning the English colonization of Ireland mirrored how the Corporation would provision New England missionization, in that most of the resources sent assisted colonizers managing Indians, rather than Indians themselves.<sup>154</sup>

While Pennoyer helped to transport, outfit, and provision Commonwealth troops in Ireland, Richard Hutchinson managed the disbursal of funds to help soldiers injured or killed in battle. On August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1644, the House of Commons met to confirm that Hutchinson, one of three “Treasurers appointed for the maimed Soldiers,” would receive £200 per week to be distributed “for the Relief of wounded and maimed Soldiers, and for the Satisfaction of Physicians, Apothecaries, and Surgeons, for the Cure of such Soldiers, and for the Relief of such Widows and Children as have lost their Husbands and Fathers in the Service of the Commonwealth.”<sup>155</sup> Hutchinson, like Pennoyer, was crucial to Parliament’s war effort to colonize Ireland by force.

Hutchinson’s role providing for the families of soldiers killed or wounded in Ireland mirrored actions taken by the Corporation in the aftermath of King Philip’s War. When Pennoyer died in 1671, his will pledged £10 per year in perpetuity to the Corporation.<sup>156</sup> It also provided “that the Sume of eight hundred pounds shalbe laid out in the best goods and merchandizes fitt for New England,” which would be shipped to New England on two separate vessels by the “Corporation for the propogation of the Gospell in New England,” where they were then sold to

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<sup>153</sup> "Warrants of the council of state for Payments of Money," in *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1876), 569-608.

<sup>154</sup> Chapter three delves into the Corporation’s transmission of funds and resources to New England.

<sup>155</sup> "House of Commons Journal Volume 3: 3 August 1644," in *Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 3, 1643-1644* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 576-579.

<sup>156</sup> In 2019 dollars this would equal about \$2,365.27. Initially, Pennoyer planned to give the Corporation £600 plus an extra £20 per year to Harvard College on top of the £10 per year he planned to give the Corporation. However, he was unable to make proper arrangements before his death. Eric W. Nye, Pounds Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency, accessed Thursday, October 17, 2019, <https://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm>.

New England colonizers.<sup>157</sup> Pennoyer hoped the proceeds would equal “the vallue of Eight hundred pounds Ster in goods and comodities of that Country [New England],” which would then be given to his family in New England, with his brother Robert receiving eight hundred pounds and his sister Elinor receiving the remainder.<sup>158</sup> Pennoyer divided this into two separate shipments to reduce the risk inherent to transatlantic trade, being “not willing to adventure the whole in One Shipp.”<sup>159</sup> His caution was validated when the ship carrying Elinor’s goods sunk while crossing the Atlantic.<sup>160</sup>

Elinor therefore never received her deceased brother’s money. The significance of this became clear after King Philip’s War, which devastated Elinor and her family. As she explained to the Massachusetts General Court:

“[She had been] Burned out of hir Dewelling as allso shee had hir Catele Destroyed by ye Insurrection of ye blud thusty and Barberous Heathen so that thereby Shee is Brought to a Very poor Deorable Condition as allso by hir Lameness shee beeing not Able to Labour whereby to procure hir selfe a poor Lifyhood and Therefor In All Liklyhood Shee is In a perishing Condition for Shee Lost hir two Sonns...”<sup>161</sup>

Having lost her home, livelihood, and two sons to Indian forces, Elinor decided to petition Boston magistrates for help. She cited the £10 per year that her brother left to the Corporation, arguing that she deserved that money over New England’s Indians:

“Shee being Informed that hir Late Deceased Brother Mr. William Pennoir hath Left a Considerable Summ of Mney as a Leggacy towards ye Education and Instruction of these heathen To the true knowledge of ye Gospel And now Confirming that most of these heathen Hath proved [Enemies] To the English in the Last Insurrection and that they have Utterly Undone mee and Ruined my ffamily it Seems not alltogether unreasonable or

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<sup>157</sup> “Will of William Pennoyer of London,” 13 February 1671, PROB 11/335/241, *The National Archives, Kew*.

<sup>158</sup> “Will of William Pennoyer of London,” 13 February 1671.

<sup>159</sup> “Will of William Pennoyer of London,” 13 February 1671.

<sup>160</sup> *Massachusetts Archives Collection Volume 69*, 246. A ship under the command of a Captain Scottow carried the goods meant to be converted into money for Elinor. It sunk while sailing from Boston to Maine, having been heading there to sell the items for Elinor. Unluckily for Elinor, the Corporation’s goods survived the dangerous transatlantic crossing only to sink during the shorter trip up the coast.

<sup>161</sup> *Massachusetts Archives Vol. 69*, 246.

unsuitable...that I should have so Much of the said Legacy as is Needful for my preservation...”<sup>162</sup>

Although many praying Indians had fought against Philip, Elinor, like most colonizers, viewed them as enemies. “Heathen” Indians were unworthy of Corporation money. Boston magistrates, many of whom had governed missionization as UCNE commissioners, agreed with Elinor’s reasoning and paid her using Corporation funds.<sup>163</sup> In this way, money pledged to missionization was redirected to colonizers who cared little for the survival New England Indians. As we will see, this was how the UCNE usually disbursed money earmarked for missionization, mirroring the ways in which Corporation members disbursed funds in Ireland. New England missionization, like Irish colonization, prioritized the interests of English colonizers.

William Pennoyer would have agreed with the magistrates’ decision to give Corporation money to Elinor. Putting aside that she was his sister, Pennoyer’s career demonstrated a consistent record of showing little regard for the subjects of English colonialism. Had he been alive during King Philip’s War, he would have been among the first Corporation members to argue that their resources should be leveraged in the war against Indians, and if he saw any remaining value in missionization it would have been as a form of control, as it had been employed in Munster and elsewhere. Further, it would be a mistake to assume that King Philip’s War altered how Corporation money was used. Even before the war, the UCNE, who managed Corporation money, had consistently been in favor advancing English interests at the expense of Indians.

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<sup>162</sup> *Massachusetts Archives Vol. 69*, 246.

<sup>163</sup> *Massachusetts Archives Collection Volume 100*, 365. There were two commissioners each from Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Haven (until 1664), and Plymouth. Those from Massachusetts were granted the most authority because it was the most populous and had the strongest economy.

### Corporation Members and New England Colonization

While some future members of the Corporation were busy colonizing Ireland in the 1640s, others were in New England planning to assault the Narragansetts. These were Herbert Pelham of Massachusetts and Edward Hopkins of Connecticut, both UCNE commissioners for their respective colonies. On July 28<sup>th</sup>, 1645, they met with their fellow commissioners John Winthrop, Thomas Prence, John Browne, George Phenwick, Theophilus Eaton, and Steven Goodyear to recount the events surrounding a war that nearly broke out between Mohegans and Narragansetts, no doubt enflamed by the decision to allow Uncas to execute Miantonomi two years prior. In response to rumors of an impending Narragansett invasion, the commissioners sent messengers to meet with Narragansett and Mohegan sagamores (chiefs) and ask why they chose to pursue conflict despite the peace brokered at Hartford by Governor Haynes in 1640.<sup>164</sup>

The questions UCNE commissioners prepared for their messengers reveal their bias towards suspecting the Narragansetts as instigators, with one stating “you shall acquaint them that the English are engaged to assist against these hostile Invasions, and that they have sent some of their men to defend Uncas.”<sup>165</sup> The UCNE’s suspicions were confirmed when their messengers returned with a letter from Roger Williams stating his belief that “war would presently break forth and that the Narragansett Sachems had lately concluded a neutrality with Providence and the towns upon Aquidneck Island.”<sup>166</sup> The UCNE leapt to “aid and defend the Mohegan Sachem” and themselves from the apparent Narragansett threat, ordering the raising of an army of 300 men, composed of 190 from Massachusetts, 40 from Plymouth, 40 from Connecticut, and 30 from New Haven.<sup>167</sup> They also arranged for a smaller force of 40

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<sup>164</sup> David Pulsifer, *Acts of the Commissioners of the United Colonies, Vol. 1. 1643-1651*, 32.

<sup>165</sup> *Acts Vol. 1*, 33.

<sup>166</sup> *Acts Vol. 1*, 33.

<sup>167</sup> *Acts Vol. 1*, 33-34.

Massachusetts soldiers to be rapidly delivered to Uncas' fortress, which they did without the consent of the Massachusetts "general court or of the standing council."<sup>168</sup>

It took three days for the UCNE to rally their 40-man force, who were "armed and victualed under the Command of Lieutenant Humphrey Atherton and Sergeant John Davis with four horses and two of Cutshamekin's Indians for their guides."<sup>169</sup> Their orders were to entrench themselves at Uncas' fortress and await further orders from Captain John Mason, who was to lead the bulk of UCNE forces into battle. While en route Atherton wrote to Mason, stating that whatever "booty you take or prisoners whether women or children you may send them to Seabrook fort to be kept and improved for the advantage of the Colonies in several proportions answering their charge."<sup>170</sup> Simultaneously, the Massachusetts General Court disputed the UCNE's right to declare war on the Narragansetts. The UCNE agreed to make some concessions to the Court while defending their right to declare war, stating that "In the Articles of Confederation power is given to the Commissioners to consult order and determine all affairs of war and the word determine comprehend all acts of authority belonging thereunto."<sup>171</sup>

Commissioners Pelham and Hopkins, who would return to England and join the Corporation in the 1650s, were architects of New England's Indian policy in the 1640s. They declared war against problematic tribes, marshaled the aid of allied and soon-to-be Praying Indians like the Massachusett sachem Cutshamekin, employed destructive and violent colonizers and enslavers like Humphrey Atherton, and strongarmed Indians through the threat of military force. Before war broke out with the Narragansetts, the UCNE forged a new treaty with them in

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<sup>168</sup> Massachusetts militia men were chosen over those from Connecticut or New Haven so as to not alert the Narragansett of English troop movements. See *Acts* Vol. 1 1643-1651, 34.

<sup>169</sup> *Acts* Vol. 1, 34-35.

<sup>170</sup> *Acts* Vol. 1, 35.

<sup>171</sup> *Acts* Vol. 1, 35.

Boston in August 1645, orchestrated in part by the Narragansett sachem Pessicus. The terms of the treaty were harsh, forcing Narragansetts to pay the Massachusetts commissioners the following:

“...two thousand fathome of good white wampum or a third part of good black wampum paid in four payments namely five hundred fathome within twenty days, five hundred fathome within foure months, five hundred fathome at or before next planting time, and five hundred within two years next after the date of these presents which two thousand fathome the Commissioners accept for satisfaction of former charges expended.”<sup>172</sup>

Along with the wampum payments, Narragansetts were to return Mohegan captives and canoes to Uncas—Uncas was ordered to do the same for the Narragansetts—and in all future disputes with the Mohegans the Narragansetts were told to voice their grievances directly to the commissioners rather than to engage in traditional methods like captive raiding.<sup>173</sup> They were also to avoid “assaults, hostile attempts, invasions or other injuries, to any of the United Colonies” or against “other Indian Sagamores and their companies, who are in friendship with or subject to any of the English,” and finally were required to give notice to the UCNE if they heard of any Indians who “conspire or intend hurt either against the said English or any Indian subject.”<sup>174</sup> The UCNE wanted New England free of Indian threats, and they were willing to go to any lengths—including using missionization to empower English colonizers—to accomplish that.

### **John Eliot’s Mission**

The next year saw the commencement of John Eliot’s effort to convert Indians, starting with the remaining populations of Massachusetts residing within several miles of Boston. Stricken

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<sup>172</sup> *Acts Vol. 1*, 45-46.

<sup>173</sup> *Acts Vol. 1*, 46.

<sup>174</sup> *Acts Vol. 1*, 46.

by epidemics and left vulnerable to encroaching waves of settler colonizers, a large number of Massachusett sought “an avenue of escape from their splintering culture, from the crumbling of their social identity, from becoming, as the English described, ‘a lost people.’”<sup>175</sup> Their leader was a man named Waban, whose name was the Algonquian word for “East” or “Dawn.”<sup>176</sup> According to Drew Lopenzina, the name Waban was “perhaps adopted for this new stage in the lives of the Massachusett, [signifying] the hope of a new dawn for his people after suffering the combined floods of disease, destabilization, colonization, and warfare that had marked the previous thirty years, or the bulk of Waban’s adult life.”<sup>177</sup> Waban was not a sachem, but he held considerable influence over the Massachusett, guiding them towards Puritan teachings in search of a spiritual meaning for the trials they endured, and the source of the English’s strength. It helped too that Puritanism was relatable, with its good and evil deities, ritualistic behavior, coming-of-age rites, and importance placed on acquiring wisdom through the spiritual knowledge.<sup>178</sup>

Eliot delivered four lectures to the Massachusett through the fall and winter of 1646, seeking to convince Indians of Christianity’s superiority and offering all those interested in converting the opportunity to do so. The first meeting in September had Eliot visiting Neponsett, home of the Massachusett sachem Cutshamekin. There he found an unreceptive crowd who Eliot later recalled “rather despised what I said.”<sup>179</sup> For this he blamed Cutshamekin, who he claimed purposefully “instigated an indifferent reception.”<sup>180</sup> Eliot faced a more receptive

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<sup>175</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusett Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690*, 42.

<sup>176</sup> For the definition of “Waban,” see Drew Lopenzina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 104.

<sup>177</sup> Drew Lopenzina, 104.

<sup>178</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People*, 58.

<sup>179</sup> Morrison, 43.

<sup>180</sup> Morrison, 43.

audience at his next meeting on October 28<sup>th</sup>, whereupon he visited Waban's people at Nonanetum (meaning "Rejoicing") and attempted to preach using a broken version of Massachusett made interpretable by his translator Cockenoe. With each lecture Eliot faced questions from Massachusett Indians, ranging from those concerned with the nature of God to those seeking to comprehend the English's understanding of how the world worked.<sup>181</sup> Others cut to the core of Puritan beliefs, asking questions like "How all the world is become so full of people, if they were all once drowned in the Flood?"<sup>182</sup>

Eliot never reflected on the limits of his own understanding when faced with difficult questions. Instead, he argued that ignorance was the purview of Indians, and that because ignorance was sin it was their responsibility to know Christianity, not to question it. Instead of answering Massachusett questions in a satisfactory manner, he emphasized the inferiority of their spiritual ability compared to the English, reminding them that they "could not make any long prayers as the English could," and that if they continued in such ignorance God would "deny them the knowledge of Jesus Christ or any thing else because of their sinnes."<sup>183</sup> After his last lecture in 1646, Eliot again warned the Massachusett that if they did not accept Christianity, "God would bee greatly angry with them, especially considering that now they must sinne against knowledge, whereas before...they knew not any thing of God at all."<sup>184</sup> Massachusett Indians, in particular the group led by Waban, took Eliot's threats seriously. By the winter of

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<sup>181</sup> [John Wilson], *The DAY-BREAKING IF NOT THE Sun-Rising OF THE GOSPELL With the INDIANS in New-England.*, (London, 1647), 4, 12; Thomas Shepard, *The Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel Breaking Forth Upon the INDIANS in NEW-ENGLAND OR, An Historicall Narration of Gods Wonderfull Workings upon sundry of the INDIANS, both chief Governors and Common people, in bringing them to a willing and desired submission to the Ordinances of the Gospel; and framing their hearts to an earnest inquirie after the knowledge of God the Father, and of Jesus Christ the Saviour of the World* (London, 1648), 47.

<sup>182</sup> Morrison, 51.

<sup>183</sup> *Day-Breaking*, 5.

<sup>184</sup> *Day-Breaking*, 10.

1646-47, Eliot believed enough Indians were receptive to missionization that he could proclaim the “time of knowledge was now come.”<sup>185</sup>

In 1647 Massachusetts living in Nonanetum led by Waban, and Musketaquid led by Tahattawan, began laying the groundwork for what would eventually become New England’s “praying towns.” Both groups created prospective town charters which established the rules or “conclusions and orders” by which Massachusetts praying Indians would adhere to within the English-style towns they were required build. The Musketaquid charter established fines for engaging in traditional Massachusetts behavior, including “*Pawwowing*,” which carried a twenty shilling fine, the act of picking lice to “eat them, and whosoever shall offend in this case shall pay for every louse a penny,” and “The old Ceremony of the Maide walking alone and living apart so many dayes.”<sup>186</sup> The Nonanetum charter was similar, enforcing laws which fined unmarried men twenty shillings for sex with “a young woman unmarried,” compelled nonmarried non-servant men “to set up a *Wigwam* and plant for himselfe,” fined five shillings for non-English style haircuts, and two shillings six pence for the display of “naked breasts.”<sup>187</sup>

A segregated judicial system created by the Bay Colony General Court on May 26<sup>th</sup>, 1647 enforced these laws. It tasked English magistrates with visiting Indian villages on a quarterly basis to handle Indian criminal and civil cases. Praying Indian sachems were given authority over administrative work like “carrying out summonses and attachments and...appointing deputies to execute [court] orders.”<sup>188</sup> They could also monthly act as magistrates, attending to lesser cases when the English were unavailable. With the spiritual and legal foundation for

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<sup>185</sup> Morrison, 66.

<sup>186</sup> Morrison 68-69; and Shepard, *Sun-shine*, 39-40.

<sup>187</sup> Morrison, 70; *Day-Breaking*, 20-21.

<sup>188</sup> Morrison, 74.

missionization established, Eliot and his new cohort of potential converts moved towards the establishment of what would become the first praying town, Natick.

### **Establishing the Corporation**

Before England could react to Eliot's efforts in New England, it first had to deal with its Civil War. In May 1646 Charles I surrendered to Parliament, which led to a renewed emphasis on conquering Ireland. William Pennoyer and the Sea Adventurers were among those insistent about expediting the conquest and acquisition of Irish land. On December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1647 they petitioned Parliament for more control over the funding of Irish colonization. The petition was approved, and forty-one of the original adventurers, including Pennoyer, were appointed to a parliamentary subcommittee tasked with establishing England's policies regarding "the present and future relief of [Ireland] and carrying on of war there."<sup>189</sup> To the adventurers' chagrin, their quest for Irish land was halted by the resumption of conflict between Royalists and Parliamentarians in March 1648, which was finally resolved with the execution of Charles I in January 1649 and the creation of the Commonwealth four months after. With the Civil War over, England could focus on its colonizing efforts across the Atlantic world.

In 1649 the Commonwealth invaded Ireland, created the Corporation, developed plans to eliminate Anglicans in Virginia and Barbados, and began mobilizing against Charles II and his Scotch Presbyterian sympathizers. The Corporation was the brainchild of Edward Winslow, who left New England for England late in 1646 intending to, among other things, advertise John Eliot's four meetings with Massachusetts Indians and seek funding for further missionary efforts

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<sup>189</sup> Lounsbury, *Pennoyer Brothers*, 120; *Committee of Both Kingdoms ("Derby House Committee")*: *Books* [S.P. 21] *Volume 26*, 120-122.

from Parliament.<sup>190</sup> Upon Winslow's arrival, an anonymously written tract now credited to the preacher John Wilson entitled *The Day-breaking if not the Sun-rising of the Gospel with the Indians in New England* appeared in London, which Winslow likely brought and circulated himself.<sup>191</sup> This was the first of the ten "Eliot Tracts," which were pamphlets published between 1647 and 1670 advertising New England missionization to people in England in order to acquire their monetary support.<sup>192</sup> *Day-breaking* argued that missionization's slow start in New England was because the English, unlike the Catholic French and Spanish "do not force [Indians] to baptisme," while also giving an account of Eliot's proselytizing efforts in Massachusetts villages and emphasizing that missionization was too expensive for New England to handle on its own.<sup>193</sup>

In March 1648 the second of the Eliot Tracts appeared in London—again due to Winslow's efforts—entitled *The Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel breaking forth upon the Indians in New-England*. Authored by Thomas Shepard, it included two dedicatory epistles, one of which beseeched Parliament for assistance, and the other which stated "Schools, clothing and food were needed for Indian children, and implements and tools were needed for their parents, so that they could be kept from that idleness which was their besetting sin."<sup>194</sup> Parliament responded to Shepard's call, with the House of Commons bringing up the question of whether they should assist New England on March 13<sup>th</sup>, 1648. On March 17<sup>th</sup> the Committee for Foreign Plantations, which in the 1640s had been primarily concerned with resolving issues in the Caribbean, began

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<sup>190</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 10-11.

<sup>191</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 11.

<sup>192</sup> Michael P. Clark, ed., *The Eliot Tracts: With Letters from Thomas Thorowgood and Richard Baxter* (Westport: Praeger, 2003). Clark notes that some scholars consider *New Englands first fruits* (1643) to be the first of the "Eliot Tracts," but Richard Cogley argues that this should be attributed to *The Day-breaking if not the Sun-rising* (1647) as it was the first to reference Eliot's work.

<sup>193</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 11-12.

<sup>194</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 12.

writing a bill to address New England missionization.<sup>195</sup> Winslow, who had the support of the Earl of Warwick and influence over the Committee for Foreign Plantations, had the bill drafted and read in Parliament throughout 1648, until on December 4<sup>th</sup> it was rejected, the reason being that the bill gave “insufficient powers to the feoffees,” or in other words, the people who would control the money sent to New England.<sup>196</sup>

Winslow tried several times to bring Parliament’s attention to New England missionization between December 1648 and April 1649, but to no avail. It was not until the publication of the third Eliot Tract, *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel, amongst the Indians in New England. Manifested by three Letters, under the Hand of that famous Instrument of the Lord Mr. John Eliot. And another from Thomas Mayhew jun.*, that Winslow was able to gain traction on another bill. In sum, *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel* repeated the point made in 1647’s *Day-breaking* that missionization was not cheap—praying Indians needed financial support and supplies. It specifically lobbied London’s wealthy merchants in its appendix, reminding them that “If you give any thing *yearly*, remember Christ will be your *Pensioner*. If you give any thing into *banke* Christ will keep account thereof, and reward it.”<sup>197</sup> Shortly thereafter, on June 13<sup>th</sup>, “An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England” was read in Parliament.

Some members of Parliament tried to amend the bill to state that any financial support sent to New England would be dedicated to missionization *and* “the maintaining of the universities of Cambridge in New-England [Harvard], and other schools and nurseries of

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<sup>195</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 12. For an example of the Committee for Foreign Plantations’ work in the Caribbean, see “House of Commons Journal Volume 5: 4 March 1647,” *Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 5, 1646-1648* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1802), 105-106.

<sup>196</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 13. “Feoffee” is a term related to feudal law, with the closest modern cognate being a “trustee” who invests in something for a charitable or philanthropical cause.

<sup>197</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 14.

learning there.”<sup>198</sup> While this amendment failed, the motivations behind its original implementation never died. There would be several instances in the proceeding decades where Harvard received funds intended for missionization. Indeed, Pennoyer himself created a scholarship at Harvard intended for his descendants that still exists today.

“An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England” was printed on July 27<sup>th</sup>, 1649, with its preamble repeating the points made in the first three Eliot Tracts. It established the Corporation, composed of a president, treasurer, and fourteen others who would be “granted the usual powers of corporate bodies—to purchase or acquire without licence in mortmain, lands, tenements or hereditaments in England and Wales not exceeding the yearly value of £2,000. It could sue or be sued, plead or be impleaded, make a common seal and by-laws.”<sup>199</sup> It also gave full control over missionization funds sent to New England to the UCNE, and recommended that money be collected for that purpose from all parishes located in England and Wales.

UCNE commissioners heard of the Corporation’s creation sometime before their meeting on September 5<sup>th</sup>, 1650, during which they responded to a letter from William Steele sent March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1649. Steele praised Edward Winslow, citing his relation to the UCNE and “his great interest and acquaintance with the members of Parliament and other gentlemen of qualities in the respective counties of this Commonwealth” as being responsible for the Corporation’s creation.<sup>200</sup> He then asked the UCNE if “some honorable and equal recompense may be allowed [Winslow] for his past pains and charges.”<sup>201</sup> Steele suggested that Winslow be paid either by Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven, or from the “the three or four hundred pounds”

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<sup>198</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 14.

<sup>199</sup> Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 15.

<sup>200</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 162-3.

<sup>201</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 162.

Massachusetts had placed in its “Collections for the Indians.”<sup>202</sup> Steele preferred the first option, noting that Winslow’s salary could count towards what those three colonies still owed the Indian account. UCNE commissioners from Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven responded icily:

“Mr. Winslow was sent forth [in] 1646 upon particular occasions and concernments of the Massachusetts [commissioners] and...they never [advised us] about his going stay return or how to improve him there; so that [we] know not upon what grounds or by what arguments to propound or persuade [our] respective courts to contribute to the charge past.”<sup>203</sup>

If Winslow wanted a salary, it would have to come from what Massachusetts deposited into the Indian account.

The UCNE assured Steele that above all else they desired “that the Gospel of peace may be further published to these miserable Indians,” and proceed with paying Winslow £100 extracted from the Indian account, ironically before any Indians ever benefited from it.<sup>204</sup> Seeing an opportunity to recoup their losses, the UCNE pivoted to requesting that the Corporation pay Eliot’s assignees in England £100 for his labor, and £1,000 to Herbert Pelham and Edward Winslow (both former UCNE commissioners now in England) for their role in securing “stockings that are strong and most Irish,” canvas for clothing and beds, broadaxes, hoes, saws, nails, hooks, hinges, and spades, “strong carsies of a low price,” blankets, and thread for praying Indians.<sup>205</sup> In paying Winslow with Indian account money before Eliot, who had “spent much time and labor in fitting himself and preaching to the Indians,” the UCNE demonstrated that they valued Winslow’s ability to forge a connection between New England and London more than

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<sup>202</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 162.

<sup>203</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 162. The commissioners from these colonies were Thomas Prence and John Browne (Plymouth), Edward Hopkins and John Haynes (Connecticut), and Theophilus Eaton and Stephen Goodyear (New Haven). Massachusetts’ commissioners were Simon Bradstreet and William Hawthorne.

<sup>204</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 164.

<sup>205</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 165.

they did Eliot's proselytization.<sup>206</sup> This began a trend that would last until King Philip's War—the UCNE did what they needed to do to keep the money flowing from England, but rarely showed much interest in providing a legitimate means for Indians to become equal to them in New England.

The UCNE confided to Herbert Pelham and Edward Winslow in a separate letter that “if so much [money] be come in upon that Collection [of the parishes in England],” then they should request of the Corporation not £1,000 but £1,200 “to improve yourselves in bringing the work to a greater perfection.”<sup>207</sup> Pelham and Winslow were both former UCNE commissioners who became members of the Corporation, and so the UCNE viewed them as agents who could acquire more money from England. Indeed, in writing to Pelham and Winslow, the UCNE made clear that missionization's purpose in New England was to attract English investors. Beyond keeping up appearances, did not want to support Indians with Corporation money.

The UCNE told Pelham and Winslow that “in the present year the Honored Governor of the Massachusetts and the Commissioners for that Colony” would take the lead in managing missionization, being responsible for “any Considerable sum more then is already wrote for” sent from England. Massachusetts had the authority to choose the “commodities as may best conduce to the furtherance of the work; and to receive such goods as are sent; make provision for their preservation from damage; and if need be dispose of the value of one hundred pounds to or for such Indians as are inclinable to attend ways of civility and the things of the Gospel.”<sup>208</sup> Crucially, even if the Corporation sent money and commodities in excess of what was requested, Indians would receive a mere £100 from that “if need be”—and only if they performed the

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<sup>206</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 164.

<sup>207</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 166.

<sup>208</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 167.

impossible task of assimilating into English society within a few months. On the eve of Natick's establishment in 1651, it was clear that praying Indians could expect little assistance from those who managed missionization.

### **The Corporation and Cromwellian Colonialism**

Several Corporation members assisted the Commonwealth's and Protectorate's colonization efforts in Ireland, Scotland, Virginia, and Barbados. A holistic view of English colonization in the Atlantic World thus demonstrates that New England missionization was part of a broader colonizing agenda. Pennoyer, for example, remained one of the Commonwealth's sources of gunpowder, which they needed to hasten the conquest of Ireland and begin distributing Irish land. On September 11<sup>th</sup> 1649 the council of state asked Pennoyer "to deal with the East India Company for their saltpetre...as the pay will be good, being upon 150,000li on the excise of Ireland, which will come in within two months, perhaps sooner."<sup>209</sup> They reminded Pennoyer to "use diligence, it being a considerable service to the commonwealth."<sup>210</sup> Between 1649 and 1650, Pennoyer manufactured and sold 3,359 barrels of gunpowder to Parliament, acquiring "14,769li. 8s." in the process.<sup>211</sup>

In addition to gunpowder, Parliament sometimes tasked Pennoyer with delivering silver to English forces. On January 1<sup>st</sup> 1650 they gave Pennoyer £10,000 to "send to Ireland," with half destined for forces in Dublin and half for those in Carrickfergus "to be disposed by direction of the Irish Committee."<sup>212</sup> The role Pennoyer played in colonizing Ireland was reminiscent to

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<sup>209</sup> Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1649-1650* (London: 1875), 306.

<sup>210</sup> *C.S.P. Dom.*, 1649-50, 306.

<sup>211</sup> *C.S.P. Dom.*, 1649-50 and *C.S.P. Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*.

<sup>212</sup> "Warrants by the council of state for Payment of Money," *C.S.P. Dom.*, 1649-50, 597.

the Corporation's strategy in New England. In both instances, wealthy English merchants were responsible for gathering and transporting resources to be used by English colonizers dealing with a colonized region's indigenous population. Further reinforcing the analogy was Pennoyer's use of the Irish Committee to disperse funds, which mirrored the role UCNE commissioners had in New England. For many working in the Corporation, the role they played in supporting missionization aligned with their colonizing activities elsewhere.

Cromwell's forces arrived in Dublin on August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1649, and within nine months Irish forces were defeated, leading to the passage of the Act of Settlement in 1652. It stipulated that Pennoyer—and other adventurers who played key roles in Parliament's effort to colonize Ireland—would be granted Irish land in proportion to the amount of money they invested into “relieving” Ireland. For Pennoyer, this meant that he was given land in Leinster, Queens County, Stradbally and Maryborough, and Slievemargy.<sup>213</sup> On September 1<sup>st</sup>, 1654, Pennoyer and Maurice and Robert Thompson petitioned “the Protector [Cromwell], for lands in cos. Caterlough and Kildare in Ireland, at the same rates as granted to the adventurers and soldiers, for payment of 4,555*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* furnished in money and goods for relief of the distressed protestants in Ireland.”<sup>214</sup> In supporting English colonialism, Pennoyer was able to advance his ideological agenda, eliminate indigenous populations, and acquire wealth.

Some Corporation members participated in the Cromwellian invasion of Scotland, which began shortly after Cromwell defeated the Irish. Scotch forces who opposed Cromwell hoped to create a Presbyterian monarchy led by Charles II. They launched a campaign to take London, leading to Charles II's defeat by Cromwellian forces at Worcester on September 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1651.

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<sup>213</sup> S.P. 63 *vol.* 283, 242, 284, 292; S.P. 63 *vol.* 285, 149, 154; S.P. 63 *vol.* 301, 58.

<sup>214</sup> Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic: Interregnum, 1654* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1880), 351.

Erasmus Smith played a key role in provisioning Cromwell's forces, sending 271 quarters of wheat "for the army in Scotland," for which he was paid 237 pounds, 2 shillings, and 6 pence on September 13<sup>th</sup> and October 6<sup>th</sup> 1650.<sup>215</sup> He also sent "50 tons of oatmeal [to] Youghall in Ireland" and was paid £300 for that.<sup>216</sup> Francis Warner, who joined the Corporation in the 1650s, sent 5,422 shirts "for the army in Scotland" and was paid 813 pounds and 6 shillings on November 14<sup>th</sup>, 1650. He and Thomas Andrews also sent "seven bales of tent canvas for Ulster," presumably to help house Cromwell's troops, and was paid 153 pounds, 8 shillings, and 7 pence on December 16<sup>th</sup>.<sup>217</sup> Tempest Milner, who joined the Corporation after 1662, was paid 236 pounds and 5 pence on that same date for "provisions for Scotland, for demurrage, primage, and average."<sup>218</sup>

English colonies in the Caribbean, specifically Barbados, also drew on the labor of Corporation members. At the start of the English Civil War Barbados switched to a free trade policy, which Charles I had prevented.<sup>219</sup> In 1645, Barbados Governor Philip Bell reaffirmed that Barbadians would align neither with Royalist or Parliamentary factions, maintaining neutrality "until God shall be so merciful unto us as to unite king and Parliament."<sup>220</sup> Bell's endorsement of free trade encouraged merchants like Pennoyer to invest heavily into the production of Barbadian sugar, which Richard S. Dunn says "fetched a far higher and steadier profit than any other American commodity" in the 1640s because it "commanded a higher price per acre or laborer,

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<sup>215</sup> Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., "Warrants of the council of state for Payments of Money," *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1650* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1876), 569-608.

<sup>216</sup> *C.S.P. Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*, 569-608.

<sup>217</sup> *C.S.P. Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*, 569-608.

<sup>218</sup> *C.S.P. Domestic: Interregnum, 1650*, 569-608.

<sup>219</sup> Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 120.

<sup>220</sup> Leo Francis Stock, ed., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America*, Volume I, 1542-1688 (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1924), 189-90; Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves*, 79.

paid lower English import duties, and suffered less from a glutted home market.”<sup>221</sup> Bell’s free trade policy was threatened in 1647 when James, the Earl of Carlisle, returned to Barbados to assume the proprietary rights inherited from his father.

Carlisle was a former Royalist who became a Parliamentarian after they arranged to have his father’s proprietary rights in Barbados returned to him.<sup>222</sup> Parliament hoped that Carlisle would convince Royalist and Parliamentarian Barbadians away from neutrality. However, Pennoyer and other merchants invested in the sugar trade worried that Carlisle’s Parliamentarian leanings would alienate Royalists and disrupt sugar production. They sent a petition to the Committee for Foreign Plantations arguing that Carlisle’s appointment would disrupt Barbados’ sugar trade, preventing them from “reap[ing] some considerable benefit by the customs and trade from thence.”<sup>223</sup> If Barbados did not remain neutral, “the whole plantation would in likelihood perish...[and] the planters and people there, instead of laboring, should be vexed and turmoiled by suits or quarrels.”<sup>224</sup> They concluded by saying “that the going of the Earl of Carlisle to the Charibee Islands will tend to the disturbance thereof, the Hindrance of Trade, and the Discouragement of the Planters, and will endanger the Defection of the Planters from the Parliament.”<sup>225</sup> Their arguments worked and Parliament allowed Barbados to maintain a free trade policy, demonstrating the extent those like Pennoyer could shape an English colony’s direction.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves*, 188.

<sup>222</sup> Lounsbury, *Pennoyer Brothers*, 137.

<sup>223</sup> Stock, *Debates*, 188-89.

<sup>224</sup> Stock, *Debates*, 188-89.

<sup>225</sup> *Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 9, 1646* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office), 53b.

<sup>226</sup> Ironically, these arguments contradict those Pennoyer later used to lobby in favor of the 1651 Navigation Act, which restricted free trade. There is, however, an explanation. In cases where mercantilism led to greater profits, Pennoyer supported mercantilism. In cases where free trade led to greater profits, he supported free trade. He may also have been spurred to support the Navigation Act

Virginia, like Barbados, stood at a crossroads during the English Civil War. In the 1640s Virginia's population was largely Anglicans loyal to Charles I. Future New England missionary Daniel Gookin was one of many forced to leave Virginia after Governor William Berkeley banished Puritans from the colony. In 1649, Pennoyer and several other merchants presented plans to Parliament's Admiralty Committee "for reducing Virginia to the interest of the Commonwealth."<sup>227</sup> The creation of the Puritan English Commonwealth had convinced Virginians to begin trading with their erstwhile enemies, the Dutch. Pennoyer, along with Parliament, sought to prevent that.

The Dutch encroachment into Virginia occurred just as Royalists were causing renewed tensions in Barbados, having recognized Charles II as king on May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1650. Soon after, Royalist Francis Lord Willoughby arrived in Barbados to assume control of its government. Facing Royalist threats in two colonies, the Commonwealth began pursuing a strategy reminiscent of what they executed in Ireland and Scotland—merchants would fund a fleet of ships laden with troops and supplies, who would then invade Virginia and Barbados and subdue them into allegiance with Cromwell.<sup>228</sup> However, because most of the Commonwealth's men were deployed in Ireland and Scotland, they could not take immediate action. In the meantime, they decided to pass an Act "prohibiting trading and commerce to the Barbados, Virginia and

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because it punished the Dutch, who supported his royalist enemies. Either way, for Pennoyer self-interest ruled over economic philosophy. Other scholars have noted how enslavers treated the intercolonial slave trade in a similar manner, shifting from endorsing restricted trade to free trade depending based on what led to the greatest profits. See especially Gregory E. O'Malley, "To El Dorado via Slave Trade: Opening Commerce with Foreign Colonies, CA. 1660-1713," *Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of British America, 1619-1807* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2014).

<sup>227</sup> Thomas J. Wertenbaker, "Virginia Under The Stuarts," *The Shaping of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), 332.

<sup>228</sup> Stock, *Debates*, 219.

other colonies in rebellion,” which did not do much besides obstruct merchants loyal to the Commonwealth, as the navy was stretched too thinly to restrict Dutch traders.<sup>229</sup>

By January 22<sup>nd</sup> 1651 the Commonwealth had gathered enough men to send seven ships to Barbados and two to Virginia. Both colonies submitted to the Commonwealth without a fight, although initially Governor Willoughby in Barbados and Governor Berkeley in Virginia planned to resist. In Barbados, Willoughby was undermined by a moderate faction of Royalists who preferred negotiation to rebellion. Berkeley was undermined by planters who feared that Virginia was too weak to stand against England, and that rebellion would lead to their wealth dissipating. After Berkeley surrendered, he was replaced by the Puritan Richard Bennett.

In Barbados Daniel Searle succeeded Willoughby as governor, and he planned to continue “as great a freedom of trade as ever,” arguing that only foreign traders like the Dutch provided the “negroes, horses and other necessaries and provisions” required to fuel the island’s sugar plantations.<sup>230</sup> Searle ignored Parliament’s 1651 Navigation Act, which Pennoyer had helped develop. Pivoting from the pro-free trade stance he once held with respect to Barbados, Pennoyer lobbied Parliament to remove Searle and protect his economic interests, employing the same strategy he used when threatened by the Earl of Carlisle’s appointment in 1650, but this time in favor of restricted trade.

On January 14<sup>th</sup> 1654 Pennoyer signed a petition asking Lord Protector Cromwell to replace Searle with “seven persons, selected for their affection to the Commonwealth...with

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<sup>229</sup> Stock, *Debates*, 218. One of Pennoyer’s vessels, the *Paramour*, was impeded by Parliament’s trade restrictions. Having just arrived in England from a trip to Barbados, the *Paramour*’s cargo was inspected to ensure that none of it originated from “those who are in rebellion in Barbados.” To begin the inspection Pennoyer met with the council of state, an onerous process.

<sup>230</sup> Vincent Todd Harlow, *A History of Barbados, 1625-1685* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 89.

power to elect annually one of their number president.”<sup>231</sup> Cromwell did not accept their petition and kept Searle in power, not because he sympathized with Searle, but because he had a more expedient solution in mind. In 1655 he ordered Admiral William Penn to patrol the waters around Barbados and seize or destroy unlicensed vessels. It was England’s navy, previously occupied by the Civil War, that enforced the mercantilist restrictions of the 1651 Navigation Act. In the case of Barbados and Virginia, Pennoyer worked with the Commonwealth and Protectorate to shape the destiny of English colonies and benefit economically.

Corporation member Richard Hutchinson was also an active participant in Cromwell’s designs in the 1650s, though in Jamaica rather than Barbados and Virginia. While working for the Corporation, Hutchinson facilitated the movement of “provisions bought in New England for supply of the fleet and army at Jamaica” as the Protectorate’s Treasurer of the Navy in 1656.<sup>232</sup> Having facilitated New England missionization from 1649-1656, Hutchinson had presided over many transactions between the Corporation and the UCNE. He knew who New England’s “merchants and traders” were and worked through them to supply Jamaica. This was a massive operation involving the movement of goods and silver across the English Atlantic world. The value of the “Provisions to be speedily provided for Jamaica” on May 29<sup>th</sup> 1656 alone was £14,000.<sup>233</sup> In sum, Hutchinson used his ties to New England to better meet Cromwell’s demand to colonize Jamaica.

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<sup>231</sup> *Privy Council and related bodies: America and West Indies, Colonial Papers (General Series)* [C.O. 1] volume 12; W Noel Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 1, 1574-1660* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1860), 413.

<sup>232</sup> W Noel Sainsbury, ed., "America and West Indies: March 1656," *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 1, 1574-1660* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), 437-438.

<sup>233</sup> W Noel Sainsbury, ed., "America and West Indies: May 1656," *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 1, 1574-1660* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), 440-441.

In the 1640s and 1650s, the men who would manage New England missionization for the next three decades were spearheading English colonialism throughout the Atlantic world. Corporation members played crucial roles in supporting the colonial agendas of Parliament and Cromwell both during and after the Civil War. In New England, UCNE commissioners developed anti-Indian strategies that would guide them when they began overseeing missionization, while missionaries like Eliot created the rhetoric that would allow for the formation of a systemically inequitable institution that would segregate, reduce, and subdue Indians seeking to learn more about Christianity. With these three forces combining to shape the future of New England's praying Indians, tragedy was nearly inevitable.

## Chapter Two

### *Missionization vs. Transplantation: Colonizing Ideologies in the English Atlantic World*

“Doubtless one great end God aimed at was the punishment and destruction of many of the wicked heathen...for the [Pokanokets] and the Narragansetts, those who great nations upon whom the dint of war hath most especially fallen, (for they are almost totally destroyed,) had once and again the Gospel offered to them.”<sup>234</sup>

— Daniel Gookin

During the 1650s John Eliot and his Massachusetts followers built several “praying towns” that reflected missionization’s colonizing strategies. This period also saw the rise of Daniel Gookin, a missionary, writer, politician, and soldier who in 1656 became Superintendent of the praying Indians in Massachusetts Bay Colony.<sup>235</sup> Gookin’s family, like the Corporation members referenced in chapter one, influenced Cromwellian policy in Ireland and Jamaica. Daniel Gookin’s first cousin Vincent Gookin Jr. argued in a pamphlet published in 1655 that missionization and assimilation were preferable to transplantation as colonizing tactics—a

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<sup>234</sup> Daniel Gookin, “An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677,” in Louise A. Breen ed., *Daniel Gookin, The praying Indians, and King Philip's War: A Short History in Documents* (New York: Routledge, 2020).

<sup>235</sup> Gookin was selected in 1656 but did not officially take the role until 1661. As Superintendent he was responsible for “sitting as a judge at the quarterly Indian courts, installing new town officials, as well as ‘making of orders, and giving instructions and directions, backed with penalties, for promoting and practising morality, civility, industry, and diligence in their particular callings.’ In addition, the superintendent was responsible for providing teachers for the Indians, distributing ‘encouragement’ among the rulers, supervising the collection of tithes, and insuring that the Indians observed the Sabbath and attended religious services.” Alden T. Vaughan, *The New England Frontier* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 294.

conclusion he arrived to in part from seeing missionization's early successes in New England.<sup>236</sup> In some sense, colonizers in Ireland and New England influenced each other in the 1650s, as the praying towns employed the strategies Vincent advocated for in dealing with the Irish. For those involved, missionization's connection to English colonialism was clear.

Besides the Eliot Tracts, Daniel Gookin's 1674 *Historical Collections of the Indians in New England* is the most significant piece of Corporation propaganda published before King Philip's War.<sup>237</sup> It advertised the seven "old" Massachusetts praying towns created prior to 1670 as well as seven "new" Nipmuc praying towns created after 1670 to show that praying Indians were making good progress with Christianity. He also wrote a posthumously published account of King Philip's War, *Doings and Sufferings*, which, unlike histories written by contemporaries like William Hubbard and Benjamin Church, defended praying Indians by advertising their usefulness to the English.<sup>238</sup> *Doings and Sufferings* encapsulated Gookin's desire to see praying Indians become an integrated but subordinate population, a controversial opinion at a time when most wished to see Indians transplanted, enslaved, or executed. For most colonizers Gookin's name was synonymous with praying Indians, with many calling them "Mr. Gookin's Indians."<sup>239</sup>

Scholars have echoed Gookin's contemporaries in calling him an Indian proponent during King Philip's War, who put their defense over his own personal advancement—a martyr

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<sup>236</sup> Vincent Gookin Jr., *The great case of transplantation in Ireland discussed; or Certain considerations, wherein the many great inconveniences in the transplanting the natives of Ireland generally out of the three provinces of Leinster, Ulster, and Munster, into the province of Connaught, are shewn. / Humbly tendered to every individual member of Parliament by a well wisher to the good of the common-wealth of England* (London: Printed for I.C., 1655; Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership, 2011), 3, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A85446.0001.001>.

<sup>237</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections of the Indians in New England* (Boston: Apollo Press, 1674; New York: Arno Press, 1972), 49. Citations refer to the Arno Press edition.

<sup>238</sup> Daniel Gookin, "Doings and Sufferings"; William Hubbard, *Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England* (1677); Benjamin Church, *Entertaining Passages Relating to King Philip's War* (1716).

<sup>239</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusetts Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 152.

whose actions caused him to lose favor with English colonizers.<sup>240</sup> They often cite the anonymous death threat Gookin received in February 1676, emblematic of the unpopularity that led to his ousting as magistrate of the Massachusetts General Court in May.<sup>241</sup> The praying Indians who survived King Philip's War demonstrated their appreciation by requesting in March 1683 that Gookin be trained in the Massachusett language and receive a salary increase.<sup>242</sup> Certainly Gookin disagreed with fellow colonizers about how to deal with praying Indians, but did this mean that he was any less invested in establishing English dominion over New England at Indians' expense?<sup>243</sup> His words prove that he was a model colonizer who advocated for praying Indians only because he felt missionization advanced English (and his own) interests.

Indeed, Gookin did not let his involvement with praying Indian get in the way of engaging in settler colonialism and the slave trade. He relished speculating in and procuring Indian land.<sup>244</sup> He enslaved Indians and sent them to the Caribbean, in one instance condemning 32 praying Indian children to slavery, keeping two for himself.<sup>245</sup> One was "a Boy named Joshua

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<sup>240</sup> Literary scholar J. Patrick Cesarini argues that Gookin's *Doings and Sufferings* demonstrated "sympathy for the native converts," while presenting a "critical depiction of a Puritan colony unable to control itself either politically or spiritually..." J. Patrick Cesarini, "'What Has Become of Your Praying to God?' Daniel Gookin's Troubled History of King Philip's War," *Early American Literature*, 44, no. 3 (2009): 500.

<sup>241</sup> Cesarini, "Gookin," 502-503; Breen, *Gookin*, 23.

<sup>242</sup> "From 16 Indians at Natick, Massachusetts, to the Rev John Eliot, 19th March 1683," *New England Company Archives, Guildhall Library*, London, ms. 07957

<sup>243</sup> Kristina Bross portrays Gookin as someone who "understood that the undifferentiated hatred many colonists felt for all Indians could prove fatal not only to individual converts but to the missionary enterprise." Bross, *Dry Bones*, 156.

<sup>244</sup> Daniel Mandell emphasizes how Gookin took "the lead in establishing and settling [former Nipmuc land at] Worcester." He notes Gookin's desire to deliver rations to starving Indians on Deer Island, while also disclosing a disconcerting moment where Gookin gleefully advertised how his praying Indians have "killed more than four hundred Natives." See Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 66, 116.

<sup>245</sup> Breen, *Gookin*, 7, 23. Breen says that Gookin "recognized the prejudice that made it difficult for praying Indians thought to have been disloyal to the English to get a fair trial under the law." It is unlikely that Gookin's recognition of prejudice towards Indians spurred him to action. His words and actions

aged about eight yeares, son to William Wunuko late of Magunkoog; his father dead, [and the other] a girle aged about six yeares daughter to the widdow Quinshiske late of Shookanet beymond Mendon.”<sup>246</sup> By no means did missionization reflect “the utopian dreams of John Eliot, Daniel Gookin, and other advocates of Indian inclusion,” as one historian recently concluded.<sup>247</sup> As a colonizer, Gookin’s support for missionization was designed to advance the “more private dimensions of his interests—notably his steadily expanding land investments.”<sup>248</sup> Gookin, DeLucia notes, had “amassed a sizable checkerboard of claims to Native places, in or nearby traditional homelands of Massachusetts, Pennacooks, Nipmucs, Pequots, and Narragansetts.”<sup>249</sup> Far from demonstrating that he cared for Indians, Gookin’s actions reveal he “actively shaped outcomes for personal benefit.”<sup>250</sup>

Gookin was not an Indian sympathizer, he was a colonial propagandist tasked with advertising missionization on behalf of the Corporation. Proof of this can be gleaned from *Doings and Sufferings*. Gookin began his account on King Philip’s War listing five reasons why God brought violence to New England. According to Gookin, God wanted to use “the barbarous heathen to chastise and punish the English for their sins,” to “teach war to a young generation” of New Englanders, to try “the faith and patience of the Godly English and Christian Indians” so as to reveal the hypocrisy of those who used the war to critique missionization, to punish enemy

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suggest that he was motivated by protecting missionization, not a moral aversion to how praying Indians were treated. When taking Indian land and enslaving Indian children, Gookin was just as prejudiced as other English colonizers.

<sup>246</sup> Christine DeLucia, *Memory Lands: King Philip’s War and the Place of Violence in the Northeast* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 56.

<sup>247</sup> Mark Peterson, *The City-State of Boston: The Rise and Fall of an Atlantic Power, 1630-1865* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 133.

<sup>248</sup> DeLucia, *Memory Lands*, 44.

<sup>249</sup> DeLucia, *Memory Lands*, 44.

<sup>250</sup> DeLucia, *Memory Lands*, 45.

Indians who chose not to convert to Christianity, and lastly to allow for the “destroying [of] the greater part of the enemy, and subduing [of] others under them.”<sup>251</sup>

Gookin was “sympathetic” to Indians who served the English. The rest could be destroyed or subjugated. Gookin emphasized repeatedly that praying Indians who “fell off from the English and joined the enemy in the war,” namely the Nipmuc Indians living in the “new” praying towns established between 1670 and 1674, were not among the “Christian Indians belonging to the old praying towns” in Massachusetts—who he and Eliot had been managing since the 1640s and on whom he focused his defense.<sup>252</sup> Gookin had no problem with colonizers using violence on non-praying Indians, something which differentiated him from Eliot.<sup>253</sup> But even when discussing loyal praying Indians, Gookin wrote of them only in terms of their utility to the English: “The situation of those towns was such,” Gookin wrote, “that the Indians in them might have been improved as a wall of defence about the greatest part of the colony of Massachusetts.”<sup>254</sup> Had the praying towns been converted into forts with garrisons of one-third English soldiers and two-third praying Indians at the start of the war, “great mischiefs might been (according to reason) prevented.”<sup>255</sup> While it is true that Gookin argued against the transplantation of praying Indians to Deer Island, he had no problem sacrificing them on the battlefield to protect English lives.

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<sup>251</sup> Daniel Gookin, “Doings and Sufferings.”

<sup>252</sup> Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, in Breen, 43. Gookin discusses the new praying towns at length in his *Historical Collections* (1674), 189-195.

<sup>253</sup> After reading *Doings and Sufferings* Eliot lamented the fact that he did not write his own account of King Philip’s War. While Eliot himself was not as pure in his intentions as has been reported by some historians, it is doubtful he would have relished violence towards Indians to the extent Gookin did. See Breen’s Introduction in *Gookin*, 19.

<sup>254</sup> Gookin, “Doings and Sufferings,” 43.

<sup>255</sup> Gookin, “Doings and Sufferings,” 43.

Gookin believed in missionization's ability to help English colonizers. This is what separated him from most other colonizers during King Philip's War—not his supposed sympathy for Indians. He viewed missionization in much the same light as the UCNE—it was only worth pursuing to a point, after which violence was justified. This is why the UCNE continued to use Gookin after the war—he never stopped believing that missionization was a method to control praying Indians and destabilize non-praying Indians.

### **The Gookin Family: English Colonizers in the Atlantic World**

The second Munster Plantation in Ireland was led by Richard Boyle and colonized by Gookin's father and others in the early seventeenth century.<sup>256</sup> It was a successful colony, being “the most efficiently managed, and the most profitable plantation in Ireland.”<sup>257</sup> Relatively little has been written about Munster compared to Ulster, the failures of the latter lending it to comparative analysis, making it “more closely linked [to] and reflective” of Roanoke and Jamestown.<sup>258</sup> Munster's success makes it outwardly difficult to compare to other early seventeenth century English colonizing efforts in the Atlantic world. However, if we move the timeline forward to New England in the 1640s, Munster becomes useful as a comparative tool. Indeed, if Ulster is relevant when compared to Virginia, then Munster is the same in relation to New England, especially when considering the Gookin family's prominence in each region.

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<sup>256</sup> Gookin's father's name was also “Daniel Gookin.” For clarity I will usually refer to him as “Gookin's father.” See Frederick William Gookin, *Daniel Gookin: 1612-1687; Assistant and Major General of the Massachusetts Bay Colony; His Life and Letters and Some Account of His Ancestry* (Chicago: Privately Printed, 1912), 44.

<sup>257</sup> Nicholas Canny, *Making Ireland British, 1580-1650* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 308.

<sup>258</sup> Audrey J. Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea: Colonialism in the British Atlantic* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia by the University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 181.

According to Audrey Horning, the second Munster Plantation benefitted from infrastructure leftover from the English first attempt to colonize the region in the sixteenth century. Richard Boyle spent £14,000 on “restoring established settlements in Munster as well as creating four new towns.”<sup>259</sup> Ulster, by comparison, was “far more rural,” forcing the English to actively reshape the landscape with violence. Nicholas Canny argues that Munster was spared this tumultuous situation in the seventeenth century because it had already experienced it in the 1580s, when the Desmond Rebellions left the region depopulated and open to English plantation on the principle of *res nullius*.<sup>260</sup> When the Nine Years War destroyed the first Munster plantation, it became an example for how “such settlements could never endure if left in isolation, [validating Edmund] Spenser’s idea, that the entire country would have to be subjected to a scheme of plantation which would be promoted by the army.”<sup>261</sup> Ulster would be where that strategy was tested, whereas in Munster the English employed a missionization scheme not dissimilar from what they would later implement in New England.

Unfortunately, little has been written on Munster after the first decades of the seventeenth century, with most histories closing their analysis with the end of Ireland’s Nine Years’ War in 1603.<sup>262</sup> Even less attention has been paid to how Munster links the colonization strategies employed in New England and Ireland. Given Munster’s implementation of missionization, and that many of the English families who colonized Munster would play significant roles in New England—namely the Boyles, Gookins, and Winthrops—Munster serves as an effective lens for comparative analysis. Richard Boyle—father to Corporation Governor, Robert Boyle—became

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<sup>259</sup> Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea*, 246.

<sup>260</sup> Canny, *Making Ireland British*, 133.

<sup>261</sup> Canny, *Making Ireland British*, 164.

<sup>262</sup> The exceptions being D. B. Quinn, “The Munster plantation: problems and opportunities,” *Cork Historical Society Journal*, lxxi [71], (1966); and Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland 1583-1641* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Earl of Cork in 1620 and eventually “owned one-third of the plantation land in Munster along with George Courtney, enabling the pair to essentially chart the destiny of that portion of Ireland.”<sup>263</sup> Pennoyer’s Sea Adventure to Ireland also used Munster as a staging ground for the invasion force they supplied and transported. Munster was thus linked to the people who worked together to convert Indians and “reduce” Ireland.<sup>264</sup> For the people directing New England missionization, Munster loomed heavily in their minds.

Gookin’s father and uncle colonized Munster in 1616, specifically lands in Carrigaline.<sup>265</sup> While most of the Gookin family remained on their Munster plantation, Daniel’s father journeyed overseas to participate in other colonial ventures. He remained tied to Munster through Carrigaline, using it as a source of income and a commercial entrepôt. Eventually he sold his Carrigaline manor to Richard Boyle for £1,250.<sup>266</sup> Boyle also signed “a new lease thereof for 21 yeares” permitting him to rent the lands surrounding the manor.<sup>267</sup> With this money Gookin’s father funded his passage to Virginia, joined the Virginia Company, and became a close associate of Sir Ferdinando Gorges.<sup>268</sup>

Gookin’s father died in 1633, by which point Daniel Gookin, born in 1612, had already been living in Virginia for at least two years. At some point during the 1630s, he sailed to England and served in the military, returning to Virginia in 1641. His time in the English

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<sup>263</sup> Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea*, 246.

<sup>264</sup> Karl S. Bottigheimer, “English Money and Irish Land: The ‘Adventurers’ in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland,” *Journal of British Studies*, 7, no. 1 (Nov., 1967): 16.

<sup>265</sup> Located in the province of Munster in Ireland.

<sup>266</sup> Alexander B. Grosart, ed., *The Lismore Papers (First Series), Viz. Autobiographical Notes, Remembrances, and Diaries of Sir Richard Boyle, First and ‘Great’ Earl of Cork*, volume I (Chiswick Press, 1886), 182. Richard Boyle wrote in his diary that he “rodd to carrickeleyne, where owld Mr John gookin sealed & perfected (as his son daniell, upon my payment to him of 1250li ster : had formerly don) my deed of bargayn and sale of the Mannor of Carrickeleyn.” Thus, two men central to New England missionization—Daniel Gookin and Robert Boyle—were tied to the Munster Plantation through their fathers.

<sup>267</sup> *Lismore Papers, Series I*, Vol. I, 213.

<sup>268</sup> *Lismore Papers, Series I*, Vol. I, 34.

military, as train band Captain in Virginia, and as a Massachusetts militia officer led many in New England to describe him as “Captain Daniel Gookin.” While living in Virginia in 1642, Gookin—along with John Hull, the future mintmaster of Massachusetts, Richard Bennett, who would become Governor of Virginia in 1652 after the Commonwealth ousted Berkeley, and 71 others—created the Nansemond Petition, which asked New England to send Puritan ministers to the Chesapeake. Specifically, the petition “bewail[ed] their sad condition for want of the means of salvation and earnestly entreat[ed] a supply of faithful ministers, whom, upon experience of their gifts and godliness might call to office.”<sup>269</sup> New England ministers William Thompson of Braintree, John Knowles of Watertown, and Thomas James of New Haven arrived in the winter of 1642 and 1643, only to be swiftly turned away by an act passed by Governor Berkeley in March enforcing “the puritie of doctrine & unities of the church,” effectively banning those who did not conform to “the church of England.”<sup>270</sup>

Nansemond was a Puritan stronghold in Virginia—Richard Bennett and his two brothers owned 10,100 acres of land there—and it is where Gookin cultivated the colonizing philosophy guiding his understanding of missionization.<sup>271</sup> He held at least 1,400 acres of land in Nansemond and owned three plantations, serving within the House of Burgesses from 1641-1642.<sup>272</sup> Additionally, he owned at least 27 indentured servants and an enslaved African person named Jacob Warrow, all of whom he shipped to Virginia in 1642 to work his plantations.<sup>273</sup> Along with being an enslaver, Gookin was tasked with managing Virginia’s Indians. In November of that year Gookin’s brother John brought to the attention of the General Court of

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<sup>269</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 67.

<sup>270</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 68-69.

<sup>271</sup> John Bennett Boddie, *Seventeenth Century Isle of Wight County, Virginia* (Chicago: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1973), 55.

<sup>272</sup> Boddie, 91.

<sup>273</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 67.

Virginia how “Indians belonging to Nanzemond in the county of the lower Norfolk [have committed] certayne Outrages and Robberyes.”<sup>274</sup> Foreshadowing Gookin’s later role in governing Indian behavior as Superintendent, the General Court gave the Gookins the “power to apprehend any of the Indians they can and to keepe them in hold until satisfaction and restitution can be accordingly made.”<sup>275</sup> Gookin’s time in Nansmond, however, was short-lived. Berkeley’s 1643 “act of conformity” and the subsequent death of John in November of that year were enough to convince Gookin to leave Virginia behind. In May 1644—just after Opechancanough launched his April 18<sup>th</sup> assault on Virginia—Gookin set sail for Boston, where he soon befriended John Eliot and joined him in his cause of converting Massachusetts Indians to Christianity in 1646.

Gookin was thus connected to New England missionization from its inception. He was Eliot’s neighbor in Roxbury, reporting that he “was pleased to communicate unto me his design, and the motives that induced him thereunto; which as I remember, were principally these three.”<sup>276</sup> According to Gookin, Eliot was motivated to convert Indians for “the Glory of God,” due to his “compassion and ardent affection to them,” and to fulfill “the covenant and promise, that New England people had made unto their King, when he granted them their patent or charter.”<sup>277</sup> A devout Puritan, Gookin was immediately attracted to Eliot’s agenda, and was one of the three men who accompanied Eliot to his October 28<sup>th</sup> 1646 meeting with Waban and the Massachusetts at Nonanetum. Gookin frequently attended Eliot’s lectures between 1646 and 1650, and during that period was also in contact with Thomas Mayhew Jr.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 66.

<sup>275</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 66.

<sup>276</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 127.

<sup>277</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 127.

<sup>278</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 128.

In 1649 Gookin was elected to serve as Deputy from Cambridge to the Massachusetts General Court. He left this position a year later to go to England and acquire support from the council of state at Westminster. There he may have encountered Edward Winslow, who was also in England lobbying on behalf of New England (specifically Massachusetts) at the time. Perhaps they discussed what was needed to assist missionization. On July 24<sup>th</sup>, 1650, Gookin acquired “a warrant...to export to New England 30 barrels of powder, 10 tons of shot and lead, and fifty arms for the use of the plantation.”<sup>279</sup> It is likely that this transaction involved future Corporation members Richard Hutchinson or William Pennoyer, the latter of whom oversaw much of the Commonwealth’s gunpowder trade in 1650. The gunpowder Gookin procured for New England went to the UCNE, who used it against Indians and enemy European colonizers. Gookin moved between New England and England several times during the 1650s, his experiences on both sides of the Atlantic informing his colonizing ideology as Superintendent or “ruler” of the praying Indians.<sup>280</sup>

Gookin’s frequent trips to England were likely also a product of his family’s influence, the majority of whom still resided in Ireland. Recall that his father was a wealthy English merchant who colonized Ireland, established a plantation in Virginia, and bought shares in the joint-stock company funding the colonization of New England.<sup>281</sup> Gookin never cut ties to the region’s colonized by his father and other family members, and his continued association with them influenced Cromwell’s decision to have Gookin spearhead the colonization of Jamaica. As

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<sup>279</sup> W Noel Sainsbury, ed., "America and West Indies: July 1650," *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 1, 1574-1660* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), 341.

<sup>280</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 128.

<sup>281</sup> The joint stock company referenced here was called the “New England Company”, not to be confused with the Corporation at the center of this dissertation, which also went by the New England Company after 1662. This earlier “New England Company” was involved in the initial effort to colonize New England in the 1620s.

a colonizer, Gookin's defended praying Indians during King Philip's War because he thought it was in the English's best interest. He held no affection for non-praying Indians, revealed both by how he treated them in Virginia and New England, and as an enslaver demonstrated little care for Indians and people of African descent. He was much more like the racist New Englanders seeking to exterminate Indians during King Philip's War than scholars are often willing to admit, a product of the missionary colonialism that drove him.<sup>282</sup> Analyzing Gookin within the context of his and his family's engagement with English colonialism reveals what fueled his support for missionization.

### **Natick and the Establishment of Assimilative Colonialism in New England**

Natick was formally established in 1651 and developed amid debates over Cromwell's Irish resettlement policy. Given the timeframe, it likely also influenced Vincent Gookin Jr.'s arguments against transplantation. Located north of the Charles River and eight miles from Dedham, Natick was chosen based on its distance from English colonizers. Originally Eliot believed that Nonanetum could serve as the location for the first praying town, but Massachusetts Indians overruled him because they did not want to compete with encroaching colonizers from neighboring Watertown.<sup>283</sup> An influential praying Indian named Monequasson wanted to settle at Cohannet, a former Massachusetts stronghold prior to the epidemics, but its land had already

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<sup>282</sup> In 2020 historian Louise Breen concluded that "In entertaining a vision whereby the English would uplift native peoples and incorporate them into English Puritan society, Gookin ran up against a colonial populace that had begun to characterize people more by ethnicity, or 'race,' than religion." I am arguing against the idea that missionization, as an ideology, negated the prejudices Breen describes here. As a form of colonization, missionization would never have "uplifted" or "incorporated" Indians as equals, and did more to fuel negative perceptions towards Indians than ward against them. See Breen, *Daniel Gookin*, 28.

<sup>283</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusetts Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690*, 79.

begun to be parceled out to colonizers.<sup>284</sup> And so they chose Natchik, or Natick, meaning “place of hills,” which was the ancestral home of the Massachusetts Speene family. As Dane Morrison put it, “praying Indians considered Natick far enough away from the English, ironically, for them to learn Puritan ways.”<sup>285</sup>

Natick took inspiration from other New England towns, with a planting field, three “faire long streets”—two north of the Charles River and one south—and individual family house lots along those streets.<sup>286</sup> In the spring of 1651 praying Indians built a bridge over the river, and in April began constructing a palisaded fort with walls about ten to twelve feet high enclosing a quarter acre of land and the Natick meetinghouse. The meetinghouse itself was two stories tall, fifty feet long, and twenty-five feet wide. On the first floor “converts heard services, and during the week Totherswampe, Wampas, or John Sassamon kept the school for the children.”<sup>287</sup> On the second floor was a place to store valuables and “a drying room for pelts and furs,” along with a guest room that Eliot stayed in after delivering sermons, which occurred about every two weeks.<sup>288</sup>

In constructing Natick’s meetinghouse Eliot relied primarily on the work of English carpenters, which praying Indians took as evidence that Eliot distrusted their abilities. Eliot in turn argued that he used English laborers to demonstrate “civility [to the] dregs of mankinde.”<sup>289</sup> Disease ravaged Natick in 1651 and 1652, killing praying Indian leader Wampas, which Eliot described as “a great blow and damping to our worke...”<sup>290</sup> Besides Wampas, Eliot recounted

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<sup>284</sup> Dane Morrison, 80.

<sup>285</sup> Dane Morrison, 80.

<sup>286</sup> Dane Morrison, 85-86.

<sup>287</sup> Dane Morrison, 86.

<sup>288</sup> Dane Morrison, 86.

<sup>289</sup> Dane Morrison, 87.

<sup>290</sup> Dane Morrison, 87.

how “sundry of our praying Indians...whereof some with great torments in their bowels died.”<sup>291</sup> Nevertheless, the devotion these “dying Indians” maintained for Christianity encouraged both Eliot and surviving praying Indians. When Governor John Endecott, Reverend John Wilson, and English agent Edward Rawson attended Eliot’s sermon on October 8<sup>th</sup>, 1651, they remarked at the “industry and ingenuite” of praying Indians, with Endecott calling the speed at which they absorbed English language and culture “remarkable.”<sup>292</sup> It must have seemed so to him, given Eliot’s and the English’s difficulty learning Indian languages. Early on the English viewed Natick as a promising experiment to build from in the coming years.

Praying Indians believed they were ready to create a government to manage Natick. They knew that the English associated government with civility, and having it, praying Indians argued, would go a long way towards legitimizing their presence in English society. As Totherswampe stated, “you ask me why do I love God? I answer, Because he giveth me all outward blessings,...especially that he giveth us a Minister to teach us, and giveth us Government...”<sup>293</sup> Eliot, however, did not believe Natick’s Indians to be capable of creating a government. In his mind they had failed to reach even earlier markers of civility, such as showing proficiency at English-style farming. Teaching Indians how to farm required Corporation support in the form of shipments of supplies and tools, but Eliot found such support to be lacking by 1652.<sup>294</sup> Several times he complained that praying Indians were “hindred for want of Tooles, and by bad Tooles discouraged...”<sup>295</sup> Eliot eventually moved forward with a plan for governing Natick, but he

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<sup>291</sup> Dane Morrison, 88.

<sup>292</sup> Dane Morrison, 89.

<sup>293</sup> John Eliot, *Tears of Repentance: Or, A further Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New-England* (1653), 229-230.

<sup>294</sup> Dane Morrison, 93-94; Henry Whitfield, *Strength out of Weaknesse, Or a Glorious Manifestation of the Further Progresse of the Gospel among the Indians in New England* (1652), 171.

<sup>295</sup> Dane Morrison, 86-87.

spearheaded it himself, and it would only be implemented when he deemed praying Indians ready.

Eliot's vision for Natick's government drew from his 1649 pamphlet entitled *The Christian Commonwealth: Or, The Civil Policy Of The Rising Kingdom of Jesus Christ*.<sup>296</sup> In it he advocated for a "Scripture-Platform Government," which he described as "a Divine Institution of a Civil Government [that] will well suit the present condition of England, Scotland, and Ireland..."<sup>297</sup> This "Scripture-Platform Government" was based on a hierarchy of rulers and courts. At the top was the Ruler of a thousand, under him were the Rulers of a hundred, who oversaw Rulers of fifty, who in turn monitored the Rulers of ten, who "are next [to] the people ; hence they see them most : and therefore they need be singularly wise, patient, loving, faithful, and zealously holy men."<sup>298</sup> Rulers and courts would be overseen by the Office of the Supreme Council, which saw "that all Rulers of thousands, yea, all Rulers and Officers, of all orders and degrees, do their Office and Duty faithfully ; and to receive difficult Cases and Appeals..."<sup>299</sup> Ultimately though, everyone policed each other and made sure that all who "offend either morally or politically, by rigor, partiality or remisness, his or their next Superiours have power to correct such evils, according to the Word of God."<sup>300</sup> For Eliot, scripture, or the word of God—not secular creations—was the only legitimate basis upon which to create a government.

On August 6<sup>th</sup>, 1651, Eliot convened the praying Indians within the town's palisaded walls and began the process for electing officers. Cutshamekin was elected Ruler of Hundreds—

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<sup>296</sup> Eliot feared reprisal for his promotion of theocratic government, and so his pamphlet was not officially published until 1659. John Eliot, *The Christian Commonwealth: Or, The Civil Policy Of The Rising Kingdom of Jesus Christ* (London: Livewell Chapman, 1659).

<sup>297</sup> John Eliot, *The Christian Commonwealth*, xvi.

<sup>298</sup> John Eliot, *The Christian Commonwealth*, 21-23.

<sup>299</sup> John Eliot, *The Christian Commonwealth*, 24.

<sup>300</sup> John Eliot, *The Christian Commonwealth*, 25.

being a former sachem, most Massachusetts praying Indians already looked up to him. Waban and Tahattawan, the two Massachusetts leaders (but not sachems) who played a crucial role in legitimizing Eliot's efforts in 1646 and 1647, were elected as Rulers of fifties. They each selected Rulers of ten, among whom included Monequasson, Totherswampe, and John Sassamon.<sup>301</sup> With a government in place, praying Indians had attained "civil order...legal protection of their lands from the acquisitive English, a system of public regulation and discipline, and the political structure necessary to safeguard their founding principles."<sup>302</sup> All that remained was to form a church.

While Eliot established Natick's government, Daniel Gookin was serving as Deputy from Cambridge to the Massachusetts General Court and attending to business in England. On May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1651, he "was appointed [to] one of the committees to draw up instructions" for the UCNE.<sup>303</sup> Four days later he became one of Massachusetts' eighteen magistrates, a post he held for the following 35 years—the exception being 1676, where he was removed from office for defending praying Indians' usefulness. Because Massachusetts played a leading role in creating the Corporation and held considerable influence over the UCNE, Gookin as magistrate had more sway than most over the direction of missionization in New England.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Dane Morrison, 97.

<sup>302</sup> Dane Morrison, 99.

<sup>303</sup> Frederick William Gookin, 82.

<sup>304</sup> Recalling the introduction, the United Colonies of New England (also known as the New England Federation and referred to here as the UCNE) was formed in 1643, and was composed of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven (until 1664). The UCNE survived until 1684, when King James II attempted to re-organize New England into a singular entity governed by Edmund Andros. The UCNE sought to divide power equally among its four member colonies, with two commissioners representing each colony. In practice, however, Massachusetts' authority consistently superseded that of Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven.

Indeed, Gookin knew every UCNE commissioner, many of whom were fellow magistrates or friends of his.<sup>305</sup> And as Superintendent of the praying Indians he worked alongside the UCNE to manage missionization in New England. In 1661 one of the Bay Colony's commissioners was Simon Bradstreet, who was an Atherton Company shareholder. Bearing the name of Humphrey Atherton, who served as Superintendent in Gookin's stead from 1656-1661, it was a company created by the UCNE to take Narragansett land—an objective Gookin shared as he too was an Atherton Company member.<sup>306</sup> As a colonizer, Gookin defended missionization because it was in his own interest to do so. Like the UCNE, he saw no problem with simultaneously taking Indian land and managing the conversion of Indians to Christianity.

### **Vincent Gookin Jr. and the Defense of Missionization in Ireland**

On January 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1655 Daniel Gookin's first cousin, Vincent Gookin Jr., published a critique of Cromwell's plan to transplant the Irish.<sup>307</sup> Vincent was a member of the Protectorate's first Parliament, and, like supporters of New England missionization, argued that conversion, acculturation, and subjugation were more effective than violence and transplantation. Though an ostensibly more humane position than those endorsed by Lord Deputy of Ireland Charles

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<sup>305</sup> In 1661, for instance, the two UCNE commissioners from Massachusetts were Simon Bradstreet and Daniel Denison. Bradstreet was a Massachusetts magistrate like Gookin, later becoming Governor in 1679. Denison, like Gookin, was captain of a train band and otherwise frequently involved in Massachusetts' colonial militia. David Pulsifer, ed., *Acts of the Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England, Vol. II, 1653-1678/9*, in Nathaniel B. Shurtleff and David Pulsifer, eds., *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth 9-10* (Boston: 1859), 253-255.

<sup>306</sup> Lisa Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin: A New History of King Philip's War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 45, 57-61.

<sup>307</sup> Other scholars, most prominently Louise Breen, have noted the connection between Daniel Gookin's "Doings and Sufferings" and Vincent Gookin Jr.'s "The Great Case of Transplantation In Ireland Discussed &c." However, this connection is usually cited to reinforce the idea that the Gookins shared a progressive vision towards indigenous people superior to the destructive English colonialism favored by contemporaries. See Breen, *Gookin*, 125-126.

Fleetwood or the UCNE, it hinged upon subduing native populations.<sup>308</sup> Vincent’s critique of transplantation emerged from his belief that missionization was the most effective colonizing model.

Daniel was in England when Vincent produced his pamphlet, and historian Audrey Horning argues that they probably met and “shared concerns and broadly agreed on the principles” of anti-transplantation rhetoric.<sup>309</sup> Whereas historians have cited the Gookins disdain for transplantation as evidence that they were “integrationist,” and therefore opposed to the prevailing mindset that indigenous populations needed to be eliminated, the reality is that they believed in an alternative method to achieving English domination over colonized peoples. An analysis of their words and the missionization ideology that drove them shall prove this to be the case.

Vincent’s pamphlet argued against conquering and transplanting the Irish, using argumentative strategies Daniel copied twenty years later in *Historical Collections* and *Doings and Sufferings*.<sup>310</sup> According to Audrey Horning, Vincent cited how in the Americas

“colonizers subdued the people they invaded [and] settled among them, for indeed it was the indigenous people of the Indies who made the place profitable for the Spanish [and thus] American models suggested examples that might be followed in Ireland.”<sup>311</sup>

His arguments against Irish “resettlement” did not anger Cromwell, perhaps because his “acquaintance with Vincent Gookin was intimate and long standing,” or more likely because he framed his arguments to highlight that his colonizing strategy—like those employed in the

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<sup>308</sup> Fleetwood served as Lord Deputy of Ireland from 1652 to 1655 and played a key role in leading the Cromwellian Settlement.

<sup>309</sup> Audrey Horning, “The Irish Worlds of William Penn: Culture, Conflict, and Connections,” Andrew R. Murphy and John Smolenski, eds., *The Worlds of William Penn* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2019).

<sup>310</sup> For Gookin’s thoughts on Irish colonization and how it influenced his views, see Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections of the Indians in New England* (1674), 221-222.

<sup>311</sup> Horning, *Virginian Sea*, 266.

Americas—held more potential for profit.<sup>312</sup> Vincent did not set out to defend Irish Catholics so much as he wished to praise and advertise the efforts of English colonizers in Munster, where many of the techniques outlined in his pamphlet had already been employed to great effect.

Positioning the Gookins as heralds of a progressive integrationist approach has obscured the colonialist nature of their ideology. Indeed, for scholars of colonialism, assimilationist policies like missionization have long been known to be destructive to indigenous communities. Colonizers have historically rarely offered full integration to colonized people, indeed, in most cases racialization has emerged from assimilationist forms of colonialism to keep colonized people subdued. As Natsu Taylor Saito writes:

“absorption does not happen, except in isolated instances, because maintenance of settler privilege requires unassimilable difference. In the meantime, however, assimilationist ideology ‘allows indigenous people to be envisaged as only *temporarily* excluded’ and supports settler claims to be ‘*ultimately* representing all residents.’”<sup>313</sup>

In other words, to argue that the Gookins legitimately believed Native Americans and Irish could integrate into English society is to believe their “assimilationist ideology” and perpetuate a Eurocentric understanding of colonizer-colonized relations. Their language must be understood through a lens recognizing that their intent, like all colonizers, was to create a space for themselves and not for indigenous peoples.

For Munster colonizer Vincent Gookin Jr., New England missionization was the perfect example to draw on when defending his assimilationist model for Irish colonization. Indeed, in

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<sup>312</sup> Frederick Gookin, 87. John Cunningham argues that Cromwell was sympathetic towards those who were against transplantation, and that it was the Irish government under Henry Ireton and then Charles Fleetwood that pushed for its implementation. He has advocated that we discard phrases like “the Cromwellian settlement of Ireland.” See John Cunningham, “Oliver Cromwell and the ‘Cromwellian’ Settlement of Ireland,” *The Historical Journal* 53, no. 4 (December 2010): 919-937.

<sup>313</sup> Natsu Taylor Saito, *Settler Colonialism, Race, and the Law: Why Structural Racism Persists* (New York: New York University Press, 2020), 73.

his pamphlet he used missionary rhetoric to advocate for the conversion rather than elimination of the Irish. He especially lamented how “Garrisons are placed in every quarter where the Irish inhabite, Ministers in none,” arguing that Irish Catholics should be targeted by Protestant missionaries, not the English military.<sup>314</sup> Vincent believed it would be more effective to convert Irish Catholics to Protestantism than to transplant or kill them. He implored English readers to remember that many Irish were loyal:

“[All did not] act against the English in the Irish Rebellion, but did eminently act with them, and for them; and were instrumental...[in] securing some, & reducing other publique places of strength to the power not onely of the English Nation, but of the Parliament.”<sup>315</sup>

Similarly, Daniel wrote after King Philip’s War that praying Indians “might have been a living wall to guard the English frontiers...[and] might have prevented the desolation and devastations that afterward ensued.”<sup>316</sup> The Gookins argued that Indians and the Irish could be “reduced to civility,” uplifted, and in that state better serve English society. Neither ever suggested that colonized peoples could become equal to the English.

Before missionization began in the 1640s, New England pursued a strategy of elimination and transplantation akin to 1650s Ireland. Thomas Morton’s 1624 settlement Merrymount was built on an assimilative colonialist model open to “intimacy with the Indians” and faced repeated harassment from Plymouth separatists before being burned to the ground in 1630.<sup>317</sup> Later the

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<sup>314</sup> Vincent Gookin Jr., *The great case of transplantation in Ireland discussed; or Certain considerations, wherein the many great inconveniences in the transplanting the natives of Ireland generally out of the three provinces of Leinster, Ulster, and Munster, into the province of Connaught, are shewn. / Humbly tendered to every individual member of Parliament by a well wisher to the good of the common-wealth of England* (London: Printed for I.C., 1655; Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership, 2011), p. 3, <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A85446.0001.001>.

<sup>315</sup> Gookin Jr., *The Great Case*, 7.

<sup>316</sup> Gookin, “Doings and Sufferings,” 44.

<sup>317</sup> Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1996), 58-61.

English accused the Pequots—who represented a threat to the English wampum and fur trade—of killing John Stone in 1634 and John Oldham in 1636. This resulted in a war of conquest culminating in the May 26<sup>th</sup>, 1637 Mystic Massacre.<sup>318</sup> William Bradford described what happened at Mystic:

“It was a fearful sight to see them [the Pequots] thus frying in the fire and the streams of blood quenching the same, and horrible was the stink and scent thereof; but the victory seemed a sweet sacrifice...”<sup>319</sup>

The Pequot were permanently weakened in New England, and though they persisted many were either executed or enslaved and sent to the Caribbean after the war. Prior to missionization, New England colonizers preferred eliminating and transplanting Indians.

In the 1640s, John Eliot and others began arguing in favor of missionization by painting it as the English’s response to Spain and the Black Legend.<sup>320</sup> Whereas the Spanish had used Indians as slave labor—leading to millions of deaths—the English could focus on converting Indians to Christianity to prove that they were the superior colonizers. Why had the English not pushed for missionization before then? Eliot cited language barriers, early settlement issues, heresy and the antinomian crisis, the threat of French invasion, and the English’s apparent refusal to convert Indians until they admitted Christianity’s superiority and asked to be taught the gospel.<sup>321</sup> There is a more likely explanation for why the English did not pursue missionization before the 1640s—they required a significant number of southern New England Indians to be dead or defeated before enough were vulnerable to missionization. In Ireland, Vincent Gookin Jr.

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<sup>318</sup> Alfred A. Cave, “Who Killed John Stone? A Note on the Origins of the Pequot War,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (July 1992): 509–21; Russell Bourne, *The Red King’s Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England 1675-1678* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 46-79.

<sup>319</sup> Bourne, 71.

<sup>320</sup> Michael P. Clark, *The Eliot Tracts: With Letters from Thomas Thorowgood and Richard Baxter* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 2.

<sup>321</sup> Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusetts Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600-1690* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 38-39.

was similarly persuaded by the Irish massacres of the 1640s to advocate for assimilation in the 1650s.

In advertising an assimilative strategy, Vincent's pamphlets echoed the Eliot Tracts—five of which were printed in London before he began writing in 1655. They detailed everything from Eliot's first meetings with the Massachusett in 1646, to the establishment of Natick in 1651, and issues related to the creation of Natick's governing structure and church.<sup>322</sup> Vincent was not the first to defend the tactics of missionization while colonizing Ireland—William Steele also vied for the land vacated by transplantation, as did his colleagues and contemporaries Richard Hutchinson, Erasmus Smith, and William Pennoyer.

### **Missionization as Colonialism in Ireland and New England**

Like his cousin Daniel, Vincent Gookin Jr. believed that the English had “some special obligations which in conscience and religious duty more binds us to continue these poor Natives (though Papists) with us, then that general fear and possible hazard of infection binds to transplant them.”<sup>323</sup> Daniel endorsed this plan, as he did missionization in New England, later writing that if Vincent's plan had been “effectually taken with the Irish, their enmity and rebellion against the English [would have] been long since cured or prevented, and they better instructed in the protestant religion.”<sup>324</sup> Daniel approved his cousin's designs for Ireland because they mirrored his own for New England, and because his views toward Indians were—like Vincent's towards the Irish—informed by his belief that the English were superior to those they colonized.

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<sup>322</sup> See chapter one for more on the Eliot Tracts.

<sup>323</sup> Lisa Brooks, 6.

<sup>324</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections*, 221-222.

Missionization was central to Vincent's plan to colonize the Irish. Just as the Pequot War left Indians vulnerable in New England, so too did the 1641 and 1649 massacres leave the Irish susceptible to the designs of proselytizing missionaries and the English colonizers they heralded.<sup>325</sup> Jane Ohlmeyer argues that Irish colonization efforts after 1641 were used "to confirm [English] assumptions of savagism, paganism and barbarism," and that these were "applied... 'to the indigenous population of the New World'."<sup>326</sup> Vincent's writings demonstrate that the reverse was also true, that New England taught some Irish colonizers that missionization was more effective than conquest and transplantation in subduing native populations.

If missionization could remove the "savagism" from New England, then it could do the same in Ireland. Vincent was aware of the strategies undergirding missionization—the similarities between what he wrote in 1655 and what Natick ultimately became under Daniel Gookin's rule reveal this to be true. Neal Salisbury describes Daniel Gookin's responsibilities as Superintendent of the praying Indians as follows:

"[Under Gookin] the Indian member's function was at best advisory, for the English superintendent designated the time and place of all court sessions, and, more importantly, approved or vetoed all decisions. The same superintendent exercised broad discretionary powers over the towns' religious, moral, political, and educational affairs."<sup>327</sup>

Vincent similarly called for a system of English rule over converted Irish subordinates, which, while seemingly more progressive than transplantation and conquest, was intended to ensure the dominance of English colonizers.

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<sup>325</sup> For more on the 1641 Irish massacres, see Aidan Clarke, "The '1641 massacres,'" Micheál Ó Siochrú and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., *Ireland: 1641 Contexts and reactions* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016). For more on the 1649 Drogheda Massacre, see Cunningham, "Oliver Cromwell," (2010). Troop numbers taken from Jane H. Ohlmeyer, "A Laboratory for Empire?: Early Modern Ireland and English Imperialism," Kevin Kenny, ed., *Ireland and the British Empire: Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 32.

<sup>326</sup> Ohlmeyer, "A Laboratory for Empire," 54.

<sup>327</sup> Neal Salisbury, "Red Puritans: The 'praying Indians' of Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (Jan., 1974).

Just as Daniel would later argue in *Doings and Sufferings*, Vincent implored readers to consider that many of the Irish could be made useful to the English:

“[Many of the Irish] not only did not act against the English in the Irish Rebellion, but did eminently act with them, and for them; and were instrumental, not only in the serving of some privat persons...but also of securing some, & reducing other publique places of strength to the power not onely of the English Nation, but of Parliament.”<sup>328</sup>

He then asked whether it was right that “these Innocents be punished with the Guilty?”<sup>329</sup> If creating sympathy for the Irish proved insufficient, he also provided another argument—one he hoped would resonate with self-interested colonizers. Transplantation, he contended, was not “conducive to the publick good of the English Nation,” and would in fact lead to Cromwell’s army being deprived of the “Bread, Meat, Drink, [and] all the most necessary means of living [derived] from the labours of the Irish.”<sup>330</sup> The thrust of Vincent’s argument was clear: transplantation would weaken the English’s ability to subdue and colonize the Irish, making it more difficult for English colonizers to profit in Ireland.

These arguments resonated with Daniel, as he echoed them two decades later in his *Historical Collections of the Indians in New England*. Writing on the course of Irish colonization, he argued that one of its failures was that it did not, as Vincent had argued for, focus on assimilation:

“...changing of the language of a barbarous people, into the speech of a more civil and potent nation that have conquered them, [as it] hath been an approved experiment, [should have been used] to reduce such a people into the civility and religion of the prevailing nation.”<sup>331</sup>

In defending Vincent, Daniel was also defending New England missionization. It was because he believed in missionization’s power as a colonizing tool that he argued against removing or

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<sup>328</sup> Gookin Jr., *Transplantation*, 7.

<sup>329</sup> Gookin Jr., *Transplantation*, 7.

<sup>330</sup> Gookin Jr., *Transplantation*, 14, 17.

<sup>331</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections*, 221-222; Louise A. Breen, *Daniel Gookin*, 126.

eliminating praying Indians, preferring instead to keep them as an inferior population whose purpose once converted and assimilated was to serve the English. Just as Vincent was influenced by New England missionization, Daniel was inspired by how his cousin applied those strategies to Ireland.

The colonizing ideology Daniel and Vincent adhered to—one developed through English efforts to colonize New England Indians and Catholic Irish—called for reducing and assimilating indigenous populations for the sake of strengthening colonizers. Rather than be conquered militarily, native populations would have their land taken, their cultures and religious beliefs replaced or modified, and be made to live as inferiors among the English. This was not a strategy sympathetic to native populations, it was one designed to address the needs of the English. The Gookins argued in favor of missionization and assimilation because they thought it was the best way to advance English colonialism.

Vincent Gookin Jr. was a colonizer who benefitted from the English conquest of Munster. The distinction between his philosophy and that of pro-transplantation colonizers was his belief that the “conversion of...those poor blind Natives...will be a more pious work than their eradication.”<sup>332</sup> Conversion of Irish Catholics justified the English’s presence in Ireland and provided colonizers with the subjects needed to preserve their dominance. Vincent argued continually that “the power and advantage of [Ireland is] in the hands of the English,” and so it was unnecessary to disrupt what had been a successful colonization effort with a risky transplantation scheme.<sup>333</sup> In his mind, not converting and assimilating the Irish was wasteful, depriving the English of a potential advantage.

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<sup>332</sup> Gookin Jr., *Transplantation*, 29.

<sup>333</sup> Gookin Jr., *Transplantation*, 17.

Vincent was probably influenced by his father, who, like Daniel's father, was an ardent Puritan. Vincent Gookin Sr. was infamous for an "impassioned outburst in 1633, which managed to upset all levels of Munster society, [and included] several indications of puritan thinking."<sup>334</sup> Going on an anti-Irish Catholic tirade, he, as paraphrased by Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, argued that "intermarriage, intimacy, and social relations between new English and locals were unchecked...and must be stopped."<sup>335</sup> He also stated that "I have done and never will stand at a distance with the Irish, and will not so much as suffer my children to learn the language."<sup>336</sup> Vincent Gookin Jr.'s writings reveal how he absorbed his father's anti-Irish sentiments. Like his father, he did not see the Irish as equals and saw no value in their culture. While his father was more conservative with respect to disapproving English and Irish interacting on any level, Vincent Gookin Jr. would have agreed with him that it should be made clear to the colonized that they held an inferior status.

The English's disdain for the Irish was echoed by New England colonizers who interacted with Indians. Ethnocentrism and notions of cultural superiority shaped and informed missionization, affecting both the attitudes of missionaries like Eliot and those who opposed his project. As we have seen, Eliot refused to allow praying Indians to form their own government and was reluctant to allow them to create a church, worrying that praying Indians "were not so capable to be trusted with that Treasure of Christ, lest they should scandalize the same, and make it of none effect..."<sup>337</sup> Eventually Eliot agreed to test praying Indians to see if they were ready for a church, subjecting their oral confessions to an evaluation by "Magistrates, Elders, and other

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<sup>334</sup> MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 201.

<sup>335</sup> MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 201.

<sup>336</sup> MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation*, 277.

<sup>337</sup> John Eliot, *Tears of Repentance: Or, A further Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New-England* (1653), 227.

Christian People” led by Richard Mather.<sup>338</sup> Mather later reported to the Corporation on October 13<sup>th</sup>, 1652 that praying Indians spoke “with such grave and somber countenances...[and] did argue to us that they spake with much good affection, and holy fear of God, and it much affected our hearts.”<sup>339</sup> Nonetheless, Mather and the other evaluators denied praying Indians the right to build a church, writing that they were “primitive [and] uncivilized,” and that no church could be made from “such rubbish as amongst Indians,” with Mather adding that missionization needed to be slowed, it moving “in so much forwardness as it is” given the “Salvages [savages]” involved.<sup>340</sup>

Both the Irish in Munster and praying Indians in New England were subjected to systems painting them as inferior to English colonizers. As a form of assimilative colonialism, missionization cannot grant equality to colonized peoples. It is a form of control that, at best, pretends to integrate indigenous people while fulfilling the needs of colonizers. The “failure” of New England missionization was not caused by missionaries failing to educate and acculturate Indians before settler colonialism and racism dismantled everything they worked for.<sup>341</sup> The failure of missionization was that it, as a colonizing institution, sought to reform people with techniques that reinforced their inferiority vis-à-vis colonizers. Missionization was a self-fulfilling prophecy, proving to colonizers that the colonized could never be truly reformed, and later complementing and justifying the violent conquest and transplantation usually following such efforts.

### **Missionization Under Siege in Ireland and New England**

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<sup>338</sup> Eliot, *Tears*, 244.

<sup>339</sup> Eliot, *Tears*, 223.

<sup>340</sup> Eliot, *Tears*, 221, 223.

<sup>341</sup> Dane Morrison, 100-101.

After Vincent published his first pamphlet attacking transplantation, a man named Colonel Richard Laurence released a pamphlet accusing Vincent of being “an abettor of the Irish Rebels, a Malignant, an incendiary, an opposer of the Authority, etc.”<sup>342</sup> To this Vincent wrote a second pamphlet defending himself and his motivations, arguing that he disapproved of the plan to transplant Irish people to Connaught not because he cared for them, but because he believed it would slow the colonization of Ireland. Positioning himself firmly on the side of English colonizers, he stated that stopping transplantation is in “the Interest of the State, Adventurer, Souldier, Planter, [and] Inhabitant,” warning that going through with that plan would only make “a wilderness...of *Ireland*” once more.<sup>343</sup> Vincent believed transplantation to be the path towards savagery and chaos, whereas his plan to acculturate, convert, and assimilate the Irish led to civilization and order.

A year after Vincent wrote his response to Laurence in 1655, Daniel Gookin became Superintendent of the praying Indians. Because he was conducting business in England and colonizing Jamaica, Gookin was unable to officially assume that role until 1661. Between 1656 and 1661 Humphrey Atherton served in Gookin’s stead. Atherton was an inauspicious choice were missionization intended to benefit Indians, as he normally served as muscle for the UCNE whenever they needed to bully the Mohegan, Narragansett, and Niantic.<sup>344</sup> Perhaps Atherton was the right choice after all, as Gookin described the Superintendency as a role about enforcing “such necessary and wholesome laws, which are in force, and may be made from time to time, to

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<sup>342</sup> Vincent Gookin Jr., *The author and case of transplanting the Irish into Connaught vindicated, from the unjust aspersions of Col. Richard Laurence. By Vincent Gookin Esquire* (London: Printed by A.M. for Simon Miller at the signe of the Starre in St Pauls Church-yard, 1655; Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership, 2011), p. 2, <http://name.umd.umich.edu/A85445.0001.001>.

<sup>343</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 4.

<sup>344</sup> Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip’s War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 23.

reduce [Indians] to civility of life.”<sup>345</sup> More specifically, he was to give “instructions and direction, backed with penalties, for promoting and practising morality, civility, industry, and diligence in their particular callings.”<sup>346</sup> Gookin believed that “improvidence are the Indians’ great sin, and is a kind of second nature to them” and hoped that his presence and the application of English laws and Christianity would lead to these flaws being “rooted out.”<sup>347</sup> The UCNE described Gookin’s work as being “of much use and benefit to them; and therefore could not but desire him to go on in that worke.”<sup>348</sup> UCNE commissioners, who placed great value in anything that kept Indians marginalized, were happy to recommend to the Corporation that Gookin should continue receiving a salary for his efforts.

Gookin spoke of Indians as inferiors who needed his direction were they to be brought up to English standards of civility. This was, of course, the foundation upon which missionization as a colonizing ideology sits. As R.L. Green notes:

“...the point of [a] missionary project was to spread empire and to eradicate Indigenous culture. To soften the concepts or notions that were used to justify a theology of extirpation would be to misrepresent the symbolic violence deployed against the colonized.”<sup>349</sup>

Of all of Colonel Laurence’s accusations then, Vincent Gookin Jr. was incensed by the idea that he harbored sympathy for the Irish. On the contrary, he described Lord Deputy Charles Fleetwood as being “a fountain of much good to *Ireland*, [who] stands in the gap between that

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<sup>345</sup> Frederick William Gookin, *Daniel Gookin: 1612-1687*, 129.

<sup>346</sup> Gookin, *Historical Collections*, chapter VI.

<sup>347</sup> Gookin, *Historical Collections*, chapter VI.

<sup>348</sup> Frederick William Gookin, *Daniel Gookin: 1612-1687*, 131.

<sup>349</sup> R. L. Green, *Tropical Idolatry: A Theological History of Catholic Colonialism in the Pacific World, 1568-1700* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), 2. Green discusses missionization in the Pacific world rather than the Atlantic world, and by Spanish Jesuits rather than English Puritans. However, his point about missionization’s purpose is a universal one. Strangely, scholars have been more willing to condemn Catholic missionaries as colonizers while defending Puritan missionization as nuanced and above colonialism.

poor people, and much ill.”<sup>350</sup> Fleetwood promoted transplantation, citing in a 1655 petition to Cromwell that the Catholic Irish should not “be left untransplanted here, or unminded in England, whose continuance amongst us do palpably hazard the very being of protestant interest in these nations.”<sup>351</sup> Fleetwood, unlike Gookin Jr., did not believe there was a system that could control the Catholic Irish population, so he preferred removing them.

Vincent argued that his plans were in favor of the “protestant interest,” and therefore congruent with what Fleetwood wanted, stating that “all that ever I propounded in *England* did exceedingly tend to advance the interest of the *Army* in *Ireland*.”<sup>352</sup> He even agreed with England’s bloody efforts to colonize Ireland in 1641 and 1649, arguing that the treatment of the Irish then was justified. Where he disagreed with Laurence, Fleetwood, and other colonizers was with the notion that transplantation was the only way to deal with the Irish. He explained by saying “What is it that I am proving there? ‘Tis, that after Justice is done on a Community, Mercy may take place; which Mercy that the *Irish* may taste of, I shew Justice is done on them.”<sup>353</sup> But he made clear that only some Irish deserved mercy—those who furthered the English’s ability to colonize Ireland. Vincent Gookin Jr. believed some Irish people could be useful, whereas pro-transplantation colonizers like Colonel Laurence did not.

Indeed, to not take advantage of the Irish population would have been, in Vincent’s words, a missed opportunity to create further “publique profit” and enhance “publique safety.”<sup>354</sup> Transplantation was unnecessary, he argued because the Irish had been defeated and were ready to be used by English colonizers for whatever purposes:

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<sup>350</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 17.

<sup>351</sup> Elizabeth Sauer, *Milton, Toleration, and Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 71.

<sup>352</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 9.

<sup>353</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 15.

<sup>354</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 4.

“...because the face of things in Ireland was much altered; Now was it a rational collection (or rather like one of his) to say, The Irish are as much, or more rebellious than ever, as high, as numerous, as powerful, Therefore have pity on them, do not transplant them: Or rather thus, Their courage is exhausted, their numbers decayed, their Souldiers (most of them) sent beyond sea, their Priests banished, the remainder lie at your feet, therefore do not transplant them (though heretofore you thought on that course) since now there is not the same necessity which made it then fit, but many expedients which make it now unfit; this discourse he might have found more at large [on] page 13.”<sup>355</sup>

With the Irish rebellion crushed, there was no point wasting resources and endangering English troops by moving them to Connaught. Daniel Gookin felt similarly about “those poor creatures [who] were shipped in three vessels and carried away to Deer Island” on October 30<sup>th</sup>, 1675, by order of the Massachusetts General Court, who he feared would be “transported out of the country.”<sup>356</sup> Rather than leave them sequestered there, Gookin wanted to use loyal Indians against King Philip’s forces. He praised Uncas for his tactical brilliance during the war, writing in *Doings and Sufferings* of how he instructed English troops under his command to wear moccasins instead of “creaking” shoes and “wet [their breeches] in water to prevent their rustling.”<sup>357</sup> As for enemy Indians, Gookin had no sympathy, indeed in one instance he ordered praying Indian Peter Ephraim—who he had sent on a scouting expedition—to capture or kill all Indians who resisted him.<sup>358</sup> Neither of the Gookins wanted to give native populations autonomy or protect those who were rebellious; they simply believed that some within the colonized population could further the English’s agenda.

Indeed, one of Vincent’s central critiques of transplantation was that it would give the Irish greater autonomy. He argued that supporters of transplantation were guilty of what they

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<sup>355</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 21.

<sup>356</sup> Gookin, “Doings and Sufferings,” 76.

<sup>357</sup> Gookin, “Doings and Sufferings,” 48.

<sup>358</sup> Breen, 35; *Massachusetts Archives Collection Volume 30*, 233.

accused him of: sympathy for the Irish. He believed he was the one taking the hardline stance, while pro-transplantation factions threatened to leave England vulnerable to a future Irish threat:

“It is irrational [to think] That the scattering of the *Irish* among the *English*, was the cause of the *English* ruine; for whilst they continued scattered, they wronged them not, but when they became imbodyed, they did the mischief; which is the design this Gentleman pursues; and therefore provides doubtily for the *English* safety, from that which was the cause of their destruction.”<sup>359</sup>

Vincent felt that limiting Irish sovereignty required leaving them scattered and marginalized within a dominant English population. To “embody” them by allowing them to congregate in Connaught and conspire against the English was a recipe for disaster.

Daniel Gookin and other New England missionaries thought similarly, with the governing structure of praying towns like Natick being designed with English oversight in mind. For both missionaries and the UCNE commissioners overseeing them, the greatest threats were sovereign Indian tribes with large numbers of warriors, such as the Narragansetts and Philip’s Wampanoags, whom the English tried and failed to subject to missionization prior to the outbreak of war in 1675. Vincent was probably correct that his strategy would limit Irish autonomy, as in New England praying Indians were constantly monitored by overseers like Daniel Gookin. Writing from Roxbury in 1675, Eliot admitted that missionization left praying Indians vulnerable to the English, noting that “The prophane Indians prove a sharp rod to the English, and the English prove a very sharp rod to the praying Indians.”<sup>360</sup> The “prophane Indians” were the ones who existed beyond the grasp of Gookin’s Superintendency; the praying Indians were those overseen by English colonizers who impeded and critiqued their attempts at assimilation.

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<sup>359</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 37.

<sup>360</sup> William B. Trask, ed., “Rev. John Eliot’s Records of the First Church in Roxbury, Mass,” *New England Historic and Genealogical Register* 33 (January, April, July 1879): 297.

Vincent clarified why he and his cousin preferred missionization over transplantation, stating that it was because it would allow the English to strip away Irish religion and culture and replace it with their own:

“...Cohabiting with the English was a means probably to have quashed the Rebellion, if other wholesome concurrents (appointed by Law) had been duly executed; [such] as, 1. Care taken from spreading the Protestant Religion, the neglect of which left them on their own, the strongest incentive to Rebellion, and tie to unanimity in it, and this would do well to be heeded for the time to come, which would work a change in their mindes, for changing of place will never make them honest. 2. Educating their Gentry in Civility and Religion, for which the Court of Wards was erected, and doubtless was then convenient there for that Nation. 3. Suppressing their Language, Manners, Laws, Septs, etc. Many more are observed by Historians.”<sup>361</sup>

In Vincent’s ideal English Ireland, the conversion and anglicization of the native population would feature as the primary colonizing strategy.

Vincent’s belief that the Irish were inferior informed his critique of transplantation. Transplantation, he argued, was a privilege granted to civilized people like the English, Dutch, French, and Spanish, all of whom had successfully “transplanted” to the Americas. This was, in his mind, an impossible task for the Irish, who were capable only of “go[ing] naked and unarmed to be furl’d upon other Lands.”<sup>362</sup> Keeping the Irish in close proximity to English colonizers, Vincent argued, would let the English “overspread them, and incorporate them into ourselves, and so by an onensesse take away the foundation of difference and fear together ; we may breed up their youth, habituate them to our customs, cause a disuse of their Language.”<sup>363</sup>

New England missionaries also believed in targeting Indian youths with education meant to gradually weaken their ties to indigenous beliefs. In 1654 John Eliot completed a catechism in the Massachusetts language for Natick’s children, and before that implemented a system whereby

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<sup>361</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 38.

<sup>362</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 51.

<sup>363</sup> Gookin Jr., *Vindicated*, 41.

praying Indians “trained up & schooled unto ability for the work” would reach out to the “blind, thin & scattered, wild people” who had thus far refused Christianity.<sup>364</sup> There was also the Indian College at Harvard, built in 1656, and the Indian Bible published in the Massachusett language in 1661. In all instances, educating Indians was designed to bring them closer to the English so that they could be more easily controlled, or be used as cultural brokers who could attract more Indians to English missionaries. Daniel Gookin tried to continue this practice after King Philip’s War, drawing on his cousin’s 1655 pamphlets in calling for the construction of English-speaking schools in Marlborough, Massachusetts that would attempt to civilize Indian youths while stripping them of their Native language.<sup>365</sup> In postwar New England, however, colonizers responded icily to such proposals, believing that what Gookin offered was a kind of concession to Indians rather than the assimilative colonialism it actually was. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Gookins preferred missionization as a colonizing ideology because they believed that luring native populations close and “reducing them to civility” was the best way to manage them.

### **Daniel Gookin, Colonizer of the English Atlantic**

Soon after Vincent Gookin Jr. published his response to Colonel Laurence, Oliver Cromwell chose Daniel Gookin to lead the effort to colonize Jamaica. He chose Gookin because of his importance in New England—a colony he hoped Jamaica would mirror. It also helped that Cromwell had a prior relationship with Vincent, assisting him with protecting Irish protestants in

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<sup>364</sup> John Eliot, *A Brief Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England, in the Year 1670* (London, 1671), 3; John Eliot, *A Letter of the Reverend John Eliot of Roxbury to the Reverend Thomas Shepard of Charlestown, August 22, 1673, Concerning the State of the Gospel Work among the Indians* (Portland, ME: Anthoensen, 1952), 3.

<sup>365</sup> Edward E. Andrews, *Native Apostles: Black and Indian Missionaries in the British Atlantic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 57.

Munster.<sup>366</sup> Furthering the connection between the Gookins' ideology, Alison Games confirms that it was important for Cromwell that Daniel Gookin colonize Jamaica "precisely as Vincent Gookin had suggested would be the case for a new Ireland."<sup>367</sup> On September 21<sup>st</sup>, 1655 the council of state ordered that "300l. [£300] be advanced to Daniel Gookin, to defray the charges of that service" in Jamaica.<sup>368</sup> Cromwell ordered Gookin to "offer to the people of New England to remove to Jamaica in convenient numbers, for certain specified reasons, viz., to enlighten those parts, 'a chief end of our undertaking the design,' by people who know and fear the Lord."<sup>369</sup> For Cromwell, there was no better person to spearhead the Western Design than Gookin, who was familiar with the English's colonizing strategies in both New England and Ireland.

Gookin made little progress in Jamaica. On June 24<sup>th</sup>, 1656 he explained in detail what had transpired to John Thurloe, secretary to the council of state and Cromwell's spymaster:

"I visited all the united colonies of the English, which are four in number, and a good distance from each other, and in all of them endeavoured the promotion of his highnes desires and offers of transplantation to Jamaica. Indeed I found sundry considerable persons, who have had much motion upon their harts to gratifie the cordiall offers of his highness; but discouradgments from the great mortalitie of the English upon the place, the prophaneness of the generalitie of the souldiery, the continuall hazard of mens lives by the sculking Negroes and Spaniards, all which and sundry other matters were and are strongly reported here, which doth (for the present) cause many to suspend their resolves, and desire to wait longer, intreating the Lord to guide them in a right way for them and their wives and little ones."<sup>370</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> John Cunningham, "Oliver Cromwell and the 'Cromwellian' Settlement of Ireland," *The Historical Journal* 53, no. 4 (December 2010), 926.

<sup>367</sup> Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion 1550-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 268.

<sup>368</sup> W Noel Sainsbury, ed., "America and West Indies: September 1655," *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 1, 1574-1660* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), 428-431. *British History Online*, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol1/pp428-431>; Interregnum, *Entry Book., Vol. CIV.*, pp. 297-299.

<sup>369</sup> *C.S.P. Colonial, America and West Indies*, 428-431; Interregnum, *Entry Book., Vol. CIV.*, 304-306.

<sup>370</sup> Thomas Birch, ed., "State Papers, 1656: June (6 of 7)," *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Volume 5, May 1656 - January 1657* (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), 146-158. *British History Online*, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol5/pp146-158>.

New Englanders had failed to realize how challenging colonizing Jamaica would be, and decided they were better off in North America. Gookin told Cromwell that Jamaica's situation might improve in the future but doubted that he or his fellow transplanted New England colonizers were up to the task. He left Jamaica in June 1657, writing to Thurloe "I hope it may be no offense, if I returne for England by the next shippis."<sup>371</sup> Despite his failure, Cromwell gave Gookin five hundred acres of land "in the Pequot countrie...in reference to [his] publick service donne."<sup>372</sup> Gookin willingly engaged in colonialism when it benefitted him—both in trying to transplant colonizers to Jamaica and in taking Pequot land in New England. Like his cousin Vincent, Daniel Gookin had no sympathy for those who made enemies of the English or refused to convert to Christianity.

Gookin's return to New England was brief. He was soon back in England on November 13<sup>th</sup>, 1657 to conduct missionary business. As he describes it, he traveled on a ship commanded by John Pierce alongside "Mr. Hezekiah Usher senior of Boston and several other persons."<sup>373</sup> Usher was a prominent Boston merchant who handled transactions between the Corporation and UCNE commissioners after 1656. Gookin's ship was partnered with another that sank while crossing the Atlantic. Among its passengers was Thomas Mayhew Jr., the Martha's Vineyard missionary who equaled Eliot in his zeal to convert Indians to Christianity. Gookin remained in England for three years, fleeing the country in 1660 upon Charles II's return. He was joined by Edward Whalley and William Goffe, regicides escaping reprisal for their role in executing

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<sup>371</sup> Thomas Birch, ed., "State Papers, 1657: June (4 of 4)," *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Volume 6, January 1657 - March 1658* (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), 362-375. *British History Online*, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol6/pp362-375>.

<sup>372</sup> John Russell Bartlett, ed., *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, in New England volume I, 1636-1663* (Providence: 1856), 155-6. Gookin received the land on May 15, 1657.

<sup>373</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections of the Indians in New England*, chapter IX.

Charles I. With Cromwell's Protectorate at an end, Gookin recognized that his prospects were brighter in New England, where the Superintendent position was waiting for him.

The colonizing ideologies guiding missionization—specifically those outlined in this chapter—made it attractive to those seeking to profit from the conversion and acculturation of Indians. Indeed, the Corporation and UCNE were firm believers in missionization's ability to benefit the English in the 1650s and 1660s. Not only did it provide New England with a source of income, but it provided the means of sequestering and surveilling what the English believed was a dangerous population of Indians. Once Indians were converted and anglicized, they would remain useful as a marginalized population under the English. Missionization became unpopular after King Philip's War because colonizers came to associate the mere presence of Indians with treachery and danger, and decided, much like pro-transplantation factions in 1650s Ireland, that removing Indians was the better strategy. Still, it did survive in a more limited fashion in New England well into the eighteenth century, proving its utility as a colonizing policy. How missionization developed in the 1650s, 60s, and 70s will be explored in the following chapters.

## Chapter Three

### Cromwellian Missionization

“It is apprehended by some that according to the intent of the Act of Parliament an eye may be had in the distributions to the enlargement of the College at Cambridge whereof there is great need and furtherance of learning not so immediately respecting the Indian design...”<sup>374</sup>

— Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England

Throughout the 1650s, the Corporation in London worked with the United Colonies of New England (UCNE) to manage missionization, facilitating the shipment of supplies and money across the Atlantic. Like the East India Company, the Corporation was concerned with securing faraway lands for English colonizers. Several Corporation members either worked for the EIC or were familiar with its work, and were aware that it wanted to implement missionization in India but was prevented by the lack of English settlements and the fear that proselytization would turn indigenous populations against them.<sup>375</sup> In New England, where colonizers outnumbered Indians and where missionaries could sequester praying Indians in towns like Natick, missionization was an optimal colonizing strategy that Corporation members were willing to invest in. Corporation members were attracted to the idea of Christianizing New England, more concerned with ensuring that colonizers were spreading English culture and religion than they were with integrating Indians within English society. They of course protested in certain instances where Indians were treated poorly, but ultimately demonstrated through their actions that the needs of colonizers mattered more than even the most assimilated Indians.

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<sup>374</sup> *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, in New England: Acts of the Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England, 1643-1679, vol. I*, 198.

<sup>375</sup> Ian Barrow, *The East India Company, 1600–1858: A Short History with Documents* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2017), 125.

The UCNE managed missionization in New England on behalf of the Corporation, and they too always acted in the interests of English colonizers. Indeed, an analysis of resources expended by the Corporation and UCNE demonstrates that the majority went to colonizers rather than to praying Indians. Praying Indians benefitted little from Corporation money, with most of it going to missionaries and the English (not Indian) printers who produced missionary texts, with a fraction spared for the education of the handful of Indians who attended various grammar schools or Harvard.<sup>376</sup> Massachusetts Bay Colony printer Samuel Green recalled in 1675 that working for Eliot was “the most considerable of any work in the country because of the pay for it.”<sup>377</sup> The Corporation acted as a mechanism for Puritans in England to send money to Puritans in New England, meant to ensure the success of the only successful Puritan colony.<sup>378</sup> They published propaganda stating the contrary, that they were in fact devoted to caring for Indians, but ultimately they were a colonizing institution just as much as the EIC was. An examination of the Corporation’s meetings between 1656 and 1660 reveals that Indians were an afterthought compared to the concerns of colonizers, only being referenced in about thirty percent of their gatherings.<sup>379</sup>

Most Corporation resources given to the UCNE went towards strengthening the position of English colonizers at the expense of Indians. If this was not the Corporation’s intent, then one wonders why they chose the UCNE to manage missionization given that it was originally a

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<sup>376</sup> Richard W. Cogley, *John Eliot’s Mission to the Indians before King Philip’s War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 216.

<sup>377</sup> Cogley, 217.

<sup>378</sup> Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the 17th Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), 183.

<sup>379</sup> For example, Indians are referenced in only 27 of 89 meetings held between January 19<sup>th</sup>, 1656 and May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1660. If we remove meetings focusing on the Indian Bible in 1660, Indians are only referenced in 19 meetings. Meanwhile, acquiring money—in the form of collections, investing, and issues related to receiving rent payments on time—is referenced in 78 meetings, or 88% of the time. Numbers are derived from an unpublished database created by me.

military alliance designed to deal with Indian threats. As the previous chapters demonstrate, however, missionization was congruent with colonization and could weaken indigenous populations. For the UCNE, it made sense to pursue a two-pronged assault on Indian sovereignty—one based on bullying sachems, offering misleading treaties, and martial action, and the other which used missionization to make Indians more vulnerable to English colonizers. Either way, pursuing missionization was important to the UCNE because in the 1640s and 1650s it was the only way to attract investors in England.

The Corporation sought to convert and civilize the “savage” Indians existing among English colonizers in New England. It did not want to help Indians and cared little for their wellbeing. In this the Corporation drew from a blueprint established by the East India Company’s earlier attempts to colonize India, in which they postulated that missionization would break indigenous peoples’ ability to resist colonizers, making it easier for the English to establish a commercial base there. While serving as EIC director later in the seventeenth century, Corporation Governor Robert Boyle would expand its missionary emphasis, perhaps feeling encouraged by the success he had in New England.<sup>380</sup>

The UCNE was, like the Corporation, an organization interested in assisting English colonizers. However, being based in New England meant that it was more invested in missionization being leveraged to boost New England’s economy and dismantle Indian sovereignty. The UCNE tacitly assisted the formal missionary project pursued by the Corporation and missionaries like John Eliot, approaching it as a secondary objective. Often the Corporation’s and UCNE’s interests aligned, as building missionization is what granted the

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<sup>380</sup> Ian Barrow, *The East India Company, 1600–1858: A Short History with Documents*, 125; Gabriel Glickman, “Protestantism, Colonization, and the New England Company in Restoration Politics,” *The Historical Journal* 59, no. 2 (2016): 377.

UCNE access to English money and the means to pursue aggressive diplomatic relations with neighboring Indians. From the perspective of Indians segregated within praying towns, however, it would have seemed like all Englishmen distrusted them. Eventually, English colonizers deemed all Indians in New England, converted or not, as “not civil, not Christian; perhaps not quite human in the way that white Christian Europeans were.”<sup>381</sup> In the meantime, missionization created a hostile environment for Indians living in New England, one shaped by the shifting proclivities of the Corporation and UCNE.

The Corporation sent resources to Boston and the UCNE received and distributed them to missionaries tasked with “civilizing” and converting Indians in praying towns. This business was conducted through bills of exchange. Bills of exchange allowed buyers and sellers separated by the Atlantic to trade without having to worry about the risks associated with transoceanic shipping. Instead, merchants assumed the risk. For example, a buyer could give a bill of exchange to a Boston merchant and have them handle the procurement of items needed in London. If the buyer was lucky, these items would already be available in a local warehouse. If not, the merchant would send the bill of exchange to their assignees or “factors” in London.<sup>382</sup> The assignee would then procure the items needed and arrange for their shipment back to New England.<sup>383</sup> Buyers and sellers paid merchants a fee in exchange for not needing to worry about the risks associated with shipping and handling. With respect to missionization, the UCNE wrote bills of exchange and delivered them to a Boston merchant, who then forwarded it to the

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<sup>381</sup> Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), 233.

<sup>382</sup> For more on the role of the “factor” in facilitating Atlantic commerce, see David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785* (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>383</sup> A detailed description for how bills of exchange worked can be found in John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 19-20.

Corporation. Once received, the Corporation arranged the shipment of what was requested back to Boston.

The Corporation reestablished the commercial link between New England and England that languished during Charles I's reign. The English Civil War placed Puritans in control of the English state, and they were the ones who staffed the Corporation. This coincided with the end of mass migration from England to New England, meaning that colonizers needed to find new ways to ensure continued growth. They were motivated further by Boston's economic crisis in the 1640s, which led to a lack of "small change" and trade commodities, forcing it to mint its own currency and re-shape itself into an economy based on conducting Atlantic commerce.<sup>384</sup> New England's support for the Corporation intensified, in other words, just as it transitioned into a commerce-based economy.<sup>385</sup>

Between 1650 and 1660, the Corporation sent £4,673 to New England.<sup>386</sup> Some came from parish donations from across England, while the majority was collected from the interest produced from £11,957 worth of Corporation land and property in England.<sup>387</sup> According to Richard Cogley, "nearly £16,000" of donations to the Corporation were sent to assist the "Indian work" in New England.<sup>388</sup> This was no small sum, representing a fifth of what Plymouth colony

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<sup>384</sup> For more on how Boston's economy adapted to the end of Puritan migration, see Mark Peterson, *The City-State of Boston: The Rise and Fall of an Atlantic Power, 1630-1865* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 86-138.

<sup>385</sup> Mark Peterson provides an excellent breakdown as to why "small change" was important to have in New England. Basically, it allowed merchants to buy goods from people living in the countryside, goods which could be shipped to overseas markets for profit. Without small change, there would have been no way to equitably transfer goods from families in the countryside to merchants in the city. See Peterson, *City-State*, 100.

<sup>386</sup> George Parker Winship, "Introduction," George Parker Winship, ed., *The New England Company of 1649 and John Eliot: The Ledger for the Years 1650-1660 and The Record Book of Meetings between 1656 and 1686 of the Corporation For The Propagation Of The Gospel In New England* (Boston: The Prince Society, 1920), xxxvi.

<sup>387</sup> Winship, *The New England Company*, xxxvi.

<sup>388</sup> Cogley, *John Eliot*, 208.

spent on King Philip's War.<sup>389</sup> Despite the amount of money raised for missionization, praying Indians rarely benefitted from it. Most of what was given to the Corporation was dedicated to its investments, and most of what was sent to UCNE commissioners in New England went towards supporting English colonizers.

### **A Corrupted Process: Regulating a Transatlantic Missionization Effort**

As early as 1649, Thomas Weld reported that ministers throughout England were wary of giving money to the "General Contribution all over England" to support missionization because "they were unsatisfied in monies they had formerly collected for transporting children to New England and never knew how it was disposed and some went further in blaming those that had been agents in that worke."<sup>390</sup> Weld, who was one of those agents along with Hugh Peter, wrote a defense of his actions on behalf of the Corporation. Arguing that he did not want to impede missionization efforts, Weld assured readers that money previously sent to New England in 1645 was not mishandled. Nonetheless he admitted that much of it did not go to "transporting poor children," instead being devoted "for the good and benefit of the plantation in Generall," as well as "for pious uses in N. Engl. According as it pleased the donors."<sup>391</sup> Weld's account foretold how the UCNE spent money on behalf of the Corporation, in that they used it "for the good and

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<sup>389</sup> Increase Mather noted that Plymouth Colony disbursed "during a period of the war" 3,692 pounds, 16 shillings, and 2 pence, which he implies is a great sum. Mather also cites the UCNE's report that Plymouth colony spent in total approximately £100,000 on the conflict. See Francis Baylies and Samuel G. Drake, eds., *An Historical Memoir of the Colony of New Plymouth, from the Flight of The Pilgrims into Holland in the Year 1608, to the Union of that Colony with Massachusetts in 1692: With Some Corrections, Additions, And A Copious Index, Volume II. Containing Parts Three, Four And Five* (Boston, 1866), 191, 192.

<sup>390</sup> Thomas Weld, "Innocency Cleared," *The New-England Historical and Genealogical Register*, Volume XXXVI, (1882), 66.

<sup>391</sup> Thomas Weld, "Innocency Cleared," 66.

*benefit*” of New England to a greater extent than they used it to convert and support praying Indians.

Corporation President William Steele sent a letter to UCNE commissioners on April 17<sup>th</sup>, 1651 asking them to provide an account of missionization-related expenditures. His suspicion reflected the situation described by Weld, whose apologia apparently convinced nobody, as Steele continued to hear that New England received money from England “of which no account hath been given to the donors.”<sup>392</sup> These critics, wrote Steele, accused both the UCNE and Corporation of being dishonest, the primary charge being that New England, much as it had in 1645, embezzled funds rather than investing in what donors wanted—the implementation of an extensive missionization project:

“...some [donors] personally Reflecting upon Mr [Thomas] Wells [or Weld] and Mr [Hugh] Peters [and] some [reflecting] upon ourselves the Corporation as if we had so much propound of what is collected or might feast ourselves liberally therewith whereas through mercy we never yet eat or drank of the fruit or charge of that; and neither have had or expect a penny or pennyworth for all the pains we shall take therein...”<sup>393</sup>

In his letter, Steele also responded to a previous request that the UCNE made in 1650, in which they asked that Edward Winslow be paid £100, and that he and Herbert Pelham be given £1,000 to send to New England. Steele denied the UCNE’s second request, noting that the Corporation “[is] not in a capacity to send so much at present.”<sup>394</sup> Steele also refused to pay Winslow’s salary, stating that “he accepted the public service of the state,” and thus if he is to be paid, “it should be done by yourselves then by us.”<sup>395</sup> The UCNE had also asked that Pelham and Winslow—both former UCNE commissioners—be put in charge of the money sent to New

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<sup>392</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 193.

<sup>393</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 193.

<sup>394</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 193.

<sup>395</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 194.

England. Steele found this to be a ridiculous request given that Pelham “is seldom in towne” and Winslow “will by no means be persuaded to meddle with the Receipts of Money.”<sup>396</sup>

Edward Winslow penned a separate letter to UCNE commissioners delivered simultaneously with Steele’s, and it sheds further light on the situation. Winslow thanked the UCNE for asking the Corporation to pay him, adding that without financial support he “might sink under the pressure of following public business at my private charge.”<sup>397</sup> Like Steele, Winslow noted “several sorts of objections” made by critics of the Corporation’s work, citing those who argued that they should not “Raise great sums to promote the Gospel amongst naked people [when] the Gospel is going away from us and we...had more need to support learning at home then abroad.”<sup>398</sup> According to Winslow, the levelers were the faction most against New England missionization, stating that “they will have nothing to do to promote humane learning [given] there is too much of it already.”<sup>399</sup> The Corporation’s English critics did not trust New England colonizers, and believed any money going to Indians would be put to better use in England.

Winslow was a true believer in missionization’s colonizing potential, having written positively about the need to “convert” Indians as early as 1624.<sup>400</sup> Then he described missionization as “a sufficient reason to prove our going thither to live, lawful.”<sup>401</sup> Colonization, in Winslow’s mind, was justified by the need to convert Indians to Christianity. “To us they cannot come,” Winslow surmised, because “our land is full; [but] to them we may go, their land

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<sup>396</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 194.

<sup>397</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 196.

<sup>398</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 196.

<sup>399</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 197.

<sup>400</sup> Edward Winslow, *Good Newes from New England: A True Relation of Things Very Remarkable at the Plantation of Plimoth in New England* (1625; reis., 2018), 68.

<sup>401</sup> Winslow, *Good Newes*, 68.

is empty.”<sup>402</sup> Winslow argued that Indians “neither have art, science, skill or faculty to use either the land or commodities of it; but all spoils, rots, and is marred for want of manuring, gathering, ordering, &c.”<sup>403</sup> Indians’ single redeeming feature was their potential to be converted to Christianity, which to Winslow was not evidence that they could be equal to the English, but a sign that God was calling the English to implant their society within North America. For Winslow, missionization was central to justifying the seizure of Indian land and proving that New England deserved England’s economic support. He also believed missionization could push colonizers to New England, noting that the “profit which is made by the preachers in most places” might be enough to “drive the zealous to the heathens.”<sup>404</sup> Thus, in 1651 Winslow had an interest in protecting missionization’s integrity and ensuring that it remained a featured aspect of English colonization.

The UCNE replied to Steele on September 10<sup>th</sup>, 1651, arguing that those accusing New England of mishandling English money cited “ancient Gifts and sums of money raised for New England...expended in foundation work not only before the Colonies did combine but before two of them had any being.”<sup>405</sup> UCNE commissioners made no effort to deny the accusations, arguing that they were not liable for actions taken before the United Colonies’ creation in 1643. Nevertheless, they promised that “the money which by the favor of the state and the pious care of the Corporation shall be collected and sent over may be not only duly improved but that a just account be kept.”<sup>406</sup> To this end, the UCNE selected Boston resident Edward Rawson to manage and distribute money placed in its Indian Account. Rawson would later serve as a member of the

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<sup>402</sup> Winslow, *Good Newes*, 68.

<sup>403</sup> Winslow, *Good Newes*, 68.

<sup>404</sup> Winslow, *Good Newes*, 71.

<sup>405</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 195.

<sup>406</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 195.

Council of Massachusetts in 1675, penning the order restricting praying Indians to five towns, making it “lawful for any person, whether English or Indian, that shall find any Indian travelling in any of our towns or woods, contrary to the limits abovenamed, to command them under their guard and examination, or to kill and destroy them as they best may or can.”<sup>407</sup>

The UCNE sent a separate letter to Winslow that justified concerns about their conduct. In it they requested that Corporation funds be given to Harvard College rather than to Indians, stating the following:

“It is apprehended by some that according to the intent of the Act of Parliament an eye may be had in the distributions to the enlargement of the College at Cambridge whereof there is great need and furtherance of learning not so immediately respecting the Indian Design though we fully concur not yet desire to know what the apprehensions of the honored Corporation are herein.”<sup>408</sup>

Despite Natick’s establishment that year, UCNE commissioners were searching for ways in which they could use Corporation funds to serve English colonizers. Regarding the accusation that New England merchants were profiting from gunpowder traded to England’s enemies, UCNE commissioners deflected the blame onto the “mischievous trade of guns powder and shot carried on by [the] French Dutch and Swedes with Indians,” which caused “temptations arising to some of ours thereby which hath occasioned many to urge to a setting open that trade amongst ourselves.”<sup>409</sup> The UCNE did not admit to any ongoing trade with English enemies, stating instead that there only existed a desire for free trade due to the threat of armed Indians. If Parliament wanted to prevent New England merchants from engaging in free trade, they needed to deal with the Indians being equipped by England’s European enemies.

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<sup>407</sup> Daniel Gookin, “Doings and Sufferings,” 56. The five towns praying Indians were restricted to were Natick, Punkapoag, Wamesit, Nashobah, and Hassanamesit.

<sup>408</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 198.

<sup>409</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 198-199.

John Eliot sent a letter to Edward Winslow on October 20<sup>th</sup> 1651 detailing his problems with the Corporation and the UCNE. First, he critiqued the Corporation's strategy of sending items to be sold rather than silver to New England, as the former required additional steps before missionization funds could be acquired. Eliot was also concerned about the UCNE's policy of meeting once per year, and that Edward Rawson—the man in charge of selling Corporation goods and managing the Indian account—worked on that same inconvenient timeline. He wrote to Winslow that this led to items sent by the Corporation being devalued:

“Some things [the UCNE commissioners] have sold and must sell more, lest they perish by reason of the salt water...it is doubted the goods will take hurt by lying as they do and pity it is that such goods should, but nothing can be done till next year unless it be to save and sell off that which is like to perish.”<sup>410</sup>

To avoid the problem of Corporation goods deteriorating in UCNE storehouses, Eliot suggested that “it may be best to send for none, but let the moneys be laid out to buy annuities.”<sup>411</sup> It is unclear whether Eliot meant that UCNE commissioners should sell its goods and invest that money towards missionization's future, or that the Corporation should invest the money it used to buy supplies for UCNE commissioners and send the principle derived from that. Both would eventually be strategies undertaken after 1657, when the Corporation began sending UCNE silver via bill of exchange for supplies the latter purchased for themselves.

Eliot's letter to Winslow reveals his difficulties with UCNE commissioners, his relationship with the Corporation, and his distrust of praying Indians. He recounted an instance where he asked UCNE commissioners to use the Indian account to buy “Cows which may be lent to Indians for awhile,” but that they refused.<sup>412</sup> The UCNE's obstinacy led to Eliot building a

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<sup>410</sup> John Eliot, "Letters of the Rev. John Eliot, the Apostle to the Indians," *New England Historic and Genealogical Register* 36: 292-293.

<sup>411</sup> Eliot, letter to Edward Winslow, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1651, 293.

<sup>412</sup> Eliot, letter to Edward Winslow, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1651, 292.

closer relationship with the Corporation. Indeed, he thanked both Winslow for a £5 “gift” he sent him, as well as Corporation member Thomas Bell for the £20 he “freely sent it over to me hitherto.”<sup>413</sup> This was money that Eliot technically should not have received, given that the UCNE was responsible for paying him. Eliot again went against procedure when asking Winslow if he could personally ship him “bibles, paper, [and] inkhorns” on account that “if Mr Rawson have them I shall not have them till next Court of commissioners which would lose time.”<sup>414</sup> If nothing else, missionization faced numerous logistical issues during its first two years.

Eliot’s critiques of the UCNE’s laxity should not be mistaken as evidence that he held more progressive thoughts about Indians compared to other English colonizers. He, like everyone who managed missionization, doubted Indian’s ability to be civilized. In his letter to Winslow, Eliot wrote that the Corporation should caution against providing Indians with too many supplies, and that he did not trust Indians with English-style farming tools:

“Sir you intimate in your letters not to give too much to the Indians but as it may told which is good wisdom, I do practice, and the hoes and other tools, I do not give but lend and keep them in a common stock. 4 dozen of narrow hoes I have all ready for them and this day granted that I might take up for the Indians use to the value of 20£...”<sup>415</sup>

Eliot wanted the Corporation to order UCNE commissioners to not give “all the tools...as a gift to the Indians,” stating that “it is too much at once or should be long dispensing.”<sup>416</sup> Eliot wanted to control the tool supply, doling them periodically to ensure that “no man may sit idle, or lose a days work for want of a tool.”<sup>417</sup> On the one hand, Eliot constantly complained about a lack of supplies, but on the other, was reluctant to equip Indians when given the opportunity. Like

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<sup>413</sup> Eliot, letter to Edward Winslow, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1651, 294.

<sup>414</sup> Eliot, letter to Edward Winslow, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1651, 294.

<sup>415</sup> Eliot, letter to Edward Winslow, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1651, 294.

<sup>416</sup> Eliot, letter to Edward Winslow, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1651, 294.

<sup>417</sup> Eliot, letter to Edward Winslow, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1651, 294.

Winslow, Eliot was not inclined to sympathy for Indians. He originally only tried to learn Indian languages to convert enslaved Pequots in 1637. Further, the man who taught him Indian languages was himself an enslaved Pequot living in Dorchester, and Eliot would remain reliant on such Indian labor moving forward.<sup>418</sup> For Eliot, missionization was an extension of his belief that Indians needed English direction. Securing New England meant removing Indians' ability to exist outside the purview of English overseers.

In truth, Eliot was a poor student compared to his Indian converts, being slow to comprehend Indian religion and culture. Whereas Indians were perceptive enough to poke holes in the logic of English religion, asking such questions as "Why doth God punish in hell for ever? man doth not so, but after a time lets them out of prison again," Eliot struggled to understand Indian beliefs, appearing consistently befuddled by concepts like "manit," which he thought represented an Indian god and not spiritual power.<sup>419</sup> Eliot's dealings with the Corporation and UCNE reveal him to be skilled at navigating the intricacies of English colonial politics, and effective at advertising his need for monetary and material support. He was also gifted at advertising missionization in a way that gave himself more credit than he probably deserved. Eliot was crucial to the facilitation of New England missionization in mediating between the Corporation and UCNE, and he should perhaps be remembered more for that role than as "Apostle to the Indians."

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<sup>418</sup> Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), 234.

<sup>419</sup> Edward Winslow, "The Glorious Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England . . ." (1649), Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, 3d Ser., IV (1834), 84-85; Constance A. Crosby, "From Myth to History; or, Why King Philip's Ghost Walks Abroad," Mark P. Leone and Parker B. Potter, eds., *The Recovery of Meaning: Historical Archaeology in the Eastern United States* (Washington, D.C., 1988), 194.

In 1651 the Corporation and UCNE rarely agreed on how to pursue missionization, each guided by their own interests. And yet, both viewed Indians as an afterthought, with the Corporation sending them only a “few hoes and Iron tooles” that Eliot was reluctant to “gift.” Meanwhile UCNE commissioners were more concerned with funding Harvard, paying Winslow, maintaining New England merchants’ ability to remain competitive, and fending off Indian threats. Steele wrote to the UCNE that he expected them to “confer with Mr Eliot & Mr Mayhew” about what they needed regarding “maintenance to ministers and schoolmasters” and to convey “the charge of all this...to maintain per annum” so that the Corporation could know how much money it needed to save for New England and how much it could invest in “lands to raise some yearly profits.”<sup>420</sup> The UCNE never gave Steele much direction, and in turn the Corporation almost always chose to invest its money in England when given the choice. UCNE commissioners further ignored Steele’s request that they “train up English and Indian together for the better obtaining each others language.”<sup>421</sup> The segregated Indian College at Harvard in 1656 might have accomplished this eventually, but in New England colonizers prevented intermixture before missionaries deemed Indians “ready” for it.

### **Hugh Peter and English Critiques of New England Missionization**

Between April 1651 and May 1652, the Corporation sent four shipments valued at £500 to UCNE commissioners. John Cotton and John Wilson received the first two, while Edward Rawson handled the rest. The UCNE went on to request goods valued at £468 in 1654, £500 in 1655, and £1,000 in 1656.<sup>422</sup> The steady flow of money led to renewed accusations that New

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<sup>420</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 193-194.

<sup>421</sup> *Acts vol. 1*, 193-194.

<sup>422</sup> Cogley, *John Eliot*, 210.

England missionization was fraudulent. In late 1652 the Corporation again questioned the UCNE's accounts, and by February 1654 had discovered that they were underpaying Eliot:

“[We] are ashamed of and know not how to answer viz. the many complaints made by Mr. Eliot to sundry of his friends here that you allow him but £20 per annum which doth not bear his charges in so much as he runs in debt every year more and more and is disabled for giving his children that education he otherwise would.”<sup>423</sup>

They accused UCNE commissioners of negligence, arguing that missionization will “suffer some thousands of pounds...for it flyeth like lightning and takes like tinder, men being extreme[ly] glad to meet anything that may colour over their covetousness and dull their zeal in so good a work.”<sup>424</sup> The Corporation heard also from Winslow that the radical Independent preacher Hugh Peter was spreading rumors “the [Indian] work was but a plain cheat and that there was no such thing as Gospel Conversion amongst the Indians.”<sup>425</sup>

Hugh Peter was a Puritan pastor from Massachusetts who served as its agent in England from 1641-1645. He was related by marriage to the Winthrops and was perhaps most famous for replacing and then excommunicating Roger Williams, as well as for his execution as regicide at Charing Cross, London in 1660. He was one of three Bay Colony agents sent to England in 1641 to raise money for missionization, after which he remained to assist Parliament until his death.<sup>426</sup> In 1643 he defended New England against accusations that it had forsaken its duty to convert Indians, being responsible—along with Thomas Weld and Harvard President Henry Dunster—for authoring *New Englands First Fruits*.<sup>427</sup> Presenting an alternative vision to Roger Williams'

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<sup>423</sup> *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, in New England: Acts of the Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England, 1653-1678/9, vol. II*, 118.

<sup>424</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 118-19.

<sup>425</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 118-19.

<sup>426</sup> Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 253. Vaughan notes that Peter, Thomas Weld, and William Hibbins did receive “several hundred pounds,” but almost none of it “was earmarked for conversion of the Indians.”

<sup>427</sup> [Thomas Weld, Hugh Peter, and Henry Dunster], *New Englands First Fruits* (London: 1643).

*A Key into the Language of America* (1643), *First Fruits* cited New England's early Indian conversion efforts and advertised Harvard College's potential to educate colonizers.<sup>428</sup>

According to Alden T. Vaughan, Peter, Weld, and Dunster "hoped that both the proselytizing and collegiate projects would benefit from a new surge of generosity [from England]."<sup>429</sup> *First Fruits* was a less-successful version of the Eliot Tracts, which convinced Parliament to create the Corporation. Though, as Vaughan notes, *First Fruits* was successful in granting Harvard its first scholarship as well as a "£20 annuity [from Lady Mary Armine] to support 'the Preacher to the poore Indians in N.Engl.," of which Eliot became the recipient in 1647.<sup>430</sup>

As to why Peter called missionization "a plain cheat," the reasons are unclear. Historians range from calling it simple "insidious carping [of] ex-New Englanders who vented their aggravations against the Bay Colony by belittling its missionary efforts," to citing it as legitimate evidence that the results of New England missionization were "disappointingly meager."<sup>431</sup> The most convincing evaluation comes from Peter biographer Raymond Phineas Stearns, who argues that Peter's attitude was a result of accusations that he had been responsible for the bungling of missionization funds gathered in 1641—that he personally was to blame for New England's reputation for mishandling English donations. When evidence emerged that Massachusetts Bay Colony tried to assume "control of [Corporation] funds sent over...to be administered by UCNE commissioners," it was also revealed that they had previously mishandled the money Peter and

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<sup>428</sup> Linford D. Fisher and Lucas Mason-Brown argue that Williams' pamphlet was more effective than *First Fruits* in giving "English officials great confidence that he was actually going to do the work of evangelizing the Natives, not just talk about it, putting himself at the forefront of missionary efforts and thereby remedying earlier accusations of evangelistic disinterest exhibited by New England's colonists." Linford D. Fisher and Lucas Mason-Brown, "By 'Treachery and Seduction': Indian Baptism and Conversion in the Roger Williams Code, *The William and Mary Quarterly* 71, no. 2 (April 2014): 185.

<sup>429</sup> Vaughan, 253.

<sup>430</sup> Vaughan, 253.

<sup>431</sup> Vaughan, 273; Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America*, 250.

Weld sent to New England.<sup>432</sup> This new information exonerated Peter of wrongdoing. Peter, naturally, was incensed both by previous accusations and by the Bay Colony's refusal to give Eliot the £20 annuity he secured from Lady Armine in 1643 until 1647. Thus, "his anger with the Bay Colony for its shabby treatment of him, of Weld, and of Eliot, led him to denounce the entire project" as a cheat.<sup>433</sup>

Peter's perspective can be better understood if accounting for his Independent ideology, which placed him in alignment with several Corporation members. Indeed, he served as chaplain to the Irish adventurers in 1641, and in the records of the House of Commons could be seen discussed alongside William Pennoyer with respect to business relating to the Committee for Irish Affairs.<sup>434</sup> He also wrote the preface to Richard Mather's 1643 *Church Government and Church Covenant discussed*, which defended radical Independent ideology.<sup>435</sup> Recall that Mather had prevented Eliot from creating a church at Natick in 1652 because he thought missionization was proceeding too rapidly. If Peter thought similarly, then perhaps another reason why he called missionization a "cheat," beyond his hatred for the Bay Colony, was that he thought it impossible that enough Indians could legitimately convert to Christianity within a few years to justify the amount of money New England requested.

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<sup>432</sup> Raymond Phineas Stearns, *The Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peter 1598-1660* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1954), 179.

<sup>433</sup> Stearns, 180.

<sup>434</sup> Hugh Chisholm, ed., "Peters, Hugh," *Encyclopædia Britannica*. 21 (11th ed.), (Cambridge University Press, 1911), 299–300; "House of Commons Journal Volume 4: 23 June 1646," *Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 4, 1644-1646* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 585.

<sup>435</sup> Richard Mather, *Church-government and church-covenant discussed, in an answer of the elders of the severall churches in New-England to two and thirty questions, sent over to them by divers ministers in England, to declare their judgments therein. Together with an apologie of the said elders in New-England for church-covenant, sent over in answer to Master Bernard in the year 1639. As also in an answer to nine positions about church-government. And now published for the satisfaction of all who desire resolution in those points*, (London: 1643).

Peter, a Puritan minister who originally served as the Bay Colony's agent, wrote *First Fruits*, and who was—like most Corporation members—Independent, was qualified to pass judgement on missionization. His skepticism of it was informed by his distrust of Massachusetts politics, his belief—shared with Mather—that Indians would never make much progress with the gospel, and his judgement that New England was a poor imitation of what he hoped to cultivate in England. Because of how he was treated, Peter cared little for the fate of New England as a colony or the extent to which missionization assisted colonizers there.

This was not the case elsewhere in the English Atlantic world, as he participated fully in “the reducing of the Rebels of *Ireland* into obedience...to receive such recompence out of the Rebels estates as the Parliament should think fit.”<sup>436</sup> Indeed, he was a member of the 1642 Forbes expedition that invaded Ireland to “infest, spoil, and waste the Rebels by Land and Sea,” which included a fleet led by his half-brother, the London merchant Benjamin Peter.<sup>437</sup> Hugh Peter joined the expedition, Stearns notes, because “he went to crush the papist revolt which threatened the progress of reformation in England—to uproot popery and to plant Protestantism in its stead.”<sup>438</sup> Peter may have disliked New England missionization from a strategic perspective as well. In Ireland he preferred transplantation and extermination—instituting Protestantism by force—to assimilating indigenous populations.

In 1643 Roger Williams' primary critique of the Bay Colony's first attempt at missionization—and by extension Peter's *First Fruits*—was that it was bluster seeking England's approval, with no real care for cultivating knowledge of or relationships with Indians.<sup>439</sup> Given Peter's role in Ireland, Williams was probably right that *First Fruits*' writers

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<sup>436</sup> Stearns, 189.

<sup>437</sup> Stearns, 190.

<sup>438</sup> Stearns, 191.

<sup>439</sup> Fisher and Mason-Brown, “By ‘Treachery and Seduction,’” 184-195.

felt little sympathy for Indians. Williams instead found solidarity with missionaries like Eliot, who reminded him of his own struggles in dealing with those administering missionization, and who seemed genuinely interested in interacting face-to-face with Indians curious about Christianity.

Why did Peter not join the Corporation to steer New England missionization? He certainly had the connections and pedigree as an Irish colonizer. The answer again relates to his conviction that New England would improperly handle missionization funds. Corporation President William Steele, who, like Peter, promoted “religious policies that favored independency and discriminated against anglicans and presbyterians” in Ireland, was the one who originally wrote to the Bay Colony seeking “Vindication of Mr Weld and Mr Peters especially.”<sup>440</sup> He was also the one to tell UCNE commissioners in February 1654 of Peter’s accusation that missionization was a cheat:

“wee have otherwise charitable thoughts of Mr. Peters yett he hath been a very bad instrument all along towards this worke, who (though of a committee in the army for the advance of it [missionization] amongst them [the Irish]) yett protested against contributing a penny towards it in person, and indeede some of us have been saine to intreate the rest of the gentlemen not to trouble him any further in the busines, nor know wee any cause unlesse it be that the worke is coming to such perfection and he hath not had the least hand or finger in it.”<sup>441</sup>

Steele respected Peter and his efforts in Ireland, and in relaying his concerns to New England demonstrated that he found his accusations somewhat convincing. Steele and Peter kept in contact throughout the 1650s, and thus New England was continually pestered by news of Peter’s critiques. It was repeated accusations of malfeasance that forced UCNE commissioners to entertain the idea of raising Eliot’s and Mayhew’s salaries.<sup>442</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> John Cronin, “Steele, William,” *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, Royal Irish Academy, October 2009, <https://www.dib.ie/biography/steele-william-a8271>; Stearns, 179.

<sup>441</sup> Stearns, 180.

<sup>442</sup> Stearns, 180.

While Peter never joined the Corporation, his influence provided oversight over UCNE commissioners. Ultimately, New England missionization's ambivalence towards Indians aligned with Peter's own regressive views towards colonized people, and had the UCNE not slighted him, he probably would have ignored their poor management of missionization. Even so, he cared less about *how* New England approached missionization, and more that it maintained a project to spread radical Protestant beliefs while securing funding for English colonizers. Given his biases, he likely would have preferred to see the Corporation's money spent on pursuing the Protestant interest in England, Ireland, or elsewhere. Altogether, this explains why he was critical of New England trying to "cheat" England of its money.

### **Defending Missionization's Legitimacy, 1652-1656**

Accusations that New England missionization was a "cheat" pushed the Corporation to use the Eliot Tracts to assure the public of its legitimacy.<sup>443</sup> 1652's *Strength out of weakness* began with a dedication to the Corporation written by Eliot, in which he advertised missionization's progress, thanked the English for their monetary support, and refuted critics who claimed New England was misusing money.<sup>444</sup> Eliot went so far as to challenge all those who questioned missionization's credibility to check the Corporation's account books in London:

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<sup>443</sup> A collection of all texts considered to be part of "The Eliot Tracts," along with some related documents, can be found in Michael P. Clark, *The Eliot Tracts: With Letters from Thomas Thorowgood and Richard Baxter* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003). Not all the Eliot Tracts were in fact authored by John Eliot, though the Corporation often referred to them as though they were.

<sup>444</sup> John Eliot, *Strength out of weakness. Or A glorious manifestation of the further progresse of the gospel amongst the Indians in New-England. Held forth in sundry letters from divers ministers and others to the corporation established by Parliament for promoting the gospel among the heathen in New-England; and to particular members thereof since the last treatise to that effect* (London: 1652).

“if any desire to be satisfied what our receipts, disbursements, or manner of proceedings are, our Bookes are open at *Coopers Hall, London*... where they may without offence see what is given, and by whom, when brought in, and how employed or improved.”<sup>445</sup>

Of course, the Corporation’s accounts did not contain evidence of the malfeasance men like Peter critiqued—New England was where missionization funds went through the hands of several intermediaries before trickling down to Indians. Eliot knew this, but he had nothing to gain from giving missionization’s detractors further cause for worry. Eliot instead emphasized the legitimacy of the Corporation, which to him was the most effective means of ensuring further investment in missionization.<sup>446</sup>

Despite Eliot’s claims in *Strength out of weakness*, the situation in New England revealed how colonizers rarely prioritized the needs of Indians. In 1652 the Corporation sent “60 barrels of powder” along with “20 barrels of shot, 2 barrels of flints, 80 muskets, and 100 snapchance locks,” half of which were supposed to be put up for public auction by UCNE commissioners to fund missionization, but which they instead used to equip New England soldiers.<sup>447</sup> As Richard Cogley reveals, “the guns, powder, and shot [were distributed] to Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven troops in the event of war with the Dutch and their alleged Eastern Niantic allies.”<sup>448</sup> This meant that praying Indians would be severely undersupplied and underfunded, as besides the arms and ammunition earmarked for sale, the Corporation’s 1652

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<sup>445</sup> Eliot, *Strength out of weakness* (1652). Cooper’s Hall contained all the Corporation’s records, but they would not have revealed how New England dealt with the funds sent to them, which was the primary critique leveled at missionization’s legitimacy.

<sup>446</sup> *Strength out of weakness*’ publication came when the Corporation was trying to convince the UCNE to double Eliot’s salary (along with Thomas Mayhew’s). Eliot would have been doubly motivated to advertise the legitimacy of missionization and its success in converting Indians, for his personal wellbeing depended on the perceived success of his work. See *Acts vol. II*, 118.

<sup>447</sup> Cogley, *John Eliot*, 211.

<sup>448</sup> Cogley, *John Eliot*, 211.

shipment contained only cheap tools and cloth for the praying towns.<sup>449</sup> In other words, if New England was going to use those supplies for themselves rather than sell them to support missionization, then Indians suffered. Early on it was clear that the Corporation and UCNE disagreed over how missionization should be used to further colonization. The former wanted to reduce and civilize Indians, whereas the latter focused more on supporting and empowering New England.

UCNE commissioners met on September 24<sup>th</sup>, 1653 to respond to their many critics in England. They argued that it was Eliot who had corrupted the process outlined by the Corporation by requesting aid directly from England, citing a shipment of tools he ordered delivered on May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1653. They proclaimed that Eliot and other missionaries should be working with the UCNE to receive payment and supplies from England:

“we cannot but approve the continued care of the corporation...in sending such commodities as you hear may suit [missionization] ; yet we have advised Mr Eliot and others that hereafter they forbear such writing and consult with UCNE commissioners first what to send for...”<sup>450</sup>

The UCNE bristled at the prospect of Eliot circumventing them to access Corporation funds. Nevertheless, the UCNE’s poor management of missionization money and Eliot’s insatiable appetite for English silver and supplies meant that the missionary would continue to contact the Corporation with his “begging letters”—a tactic we saw earlier in his correspondence with Winslow.<sup>451</sup>

There is some evidence that the UCNE embezzled Corporation money. In September 1653 UCNE commissioners contacted Indian account manager Edward Rawson regarding a

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<sup>449</sup> William Kellaway, “Arms and Ammunition for New England,” *Journal of the Arms and Armour Society* 3, no. 7 (September 1960): 198-203.

<sup>450</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 104.

<sup>451</sup> A discussion of these “begging letters” can be found in Kellaway, *New England Company*, 32-33.

Corporation shipment containing gunpowder. Rawson was supposed to sell the gunpowder and place the profit in the Indian account to pay missionary salaries and purchase tools and other supplies for praying Indians. In this instance the Corporation monitored how the UCNE handled the gunpowder and soon suspected them of keeping it for themselves, likely to be used to resupply colonial militias. When the Corporation confronted the UCNE with their suspicions, they claimed that they “take none of the commodities to our private use that we may avoid suspicion of indifferent dealing or self respects,” while repeating their demand that “the ministers who labor in the work...send over no bills for their own supplies until they be approved by UCNE commissioners...”<sup>452</sup> UCNE commissioners added that they “left to Mr Rawson’s care to receive from the several colonies the respective sums due to the Indian’s account both for the powder...”<sup>453</sup> In total, however, Rawson collected a mere £100 from the sale of gunpowder.<sup>454</sup>

Though there is no record of how much gunpowder the Corporation provided the UCNE in 1653, we can contextualize based on the value of gunpowder just how paltry the £100 given to the Indian account was. In 1653 gunpowder was sold at around 3 pounds, 19 shillings, and 6 pence per barrel, give or take a handful of shillings.<sup>455</sup> A single ship could usually hold at least one hundred barrels of gunpowder, as evidenced by a previous shipment made by Corporation

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<sup>452</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 105.

<sup>453</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 107.

<sup>454</sup> The UCNE relayed that, after Winslow received his £100 cut, UCNE commissioners contributed the following amounts to the Indian account: Massachusetts (43 pounds), Plymouth (21 pounds, 3 shillings, 1 pence), Connecticut (22 pounds, 18 shillings, 4 pence), and New Haven (12 pounds, 17 shillings, 1 pence). See *Acts vol. II*, 108. Edward Rawson’s experience working with the UCNE on behalf of the Corporation may have informed his account on King Philip’s War. Edward Rawson, *The Present State of New-England with Respect to the Indian War. Wherein is an Account of the true Reason thereof (as far as can be Judged by Men.) Together with most of the Remarkable Passages that have happened from the 20<sup>th</sup> of June, till the 10<sup>th</sup> of November, 1675*, (Boston, 1675).

<sup>455</sup> The historical price of gunpowder is cited in James Edwin Thorold Rogers, *A History of Agriculture and Prices in England: From the Year After the Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement of the Continental War (1793), Compiled Entirely From Original and Contemporaneous Records Vol. V 1583-1702* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1887), 738-739.

member Edward Hopkins to New England in July 1652 consisting of “100 barrels of powder, shot, and 1,000 swords,” all aboard one vessel.<sup>456</sup> If the Corporation’s 1653 shipment to the UCNE consisted of a similar number of barrels, and these were sold at the going rate, then Rawson should have deposited £300, not £100 into the Indian account. We must also consider that New England pounds were worth less than English pounds, and so that number would have been even higher. Altogether, it is easy to see why the Corporation suspected the UCNE of mishandling its resources.

How did the sale of a valuable commodity like gunpowder result in only £100 pounds for the Indian account? This is partly explained by the UCNE using some of the gunpowder sale to pay £100 to Winslow.<sup>457</sup> The Corporation specifically requested the UCNE *not* do this, telling them that Winslow should be paid by colonial treasuries. Another £60 from the gunpowder sale went to Rawson for his services.<sup>458</sup> However, even if we account for Winslow and Rawson’s salaries, £260 is still less than the value of one ship’s worth of gunpowder, and there is no record of where the rest of the money went. The £160 paid to Winslow and Rawson totaled more than the total sum of payments directly concerning Indians in 1653, which included £19 to the wife of a man named William Daniell for her role in “teaching several Indians to Read,” 10 pounds and 40 shillings to Thomas Stanton for the printing of “five hundred or a Thousand Catechisms in the Indian language,” and a small sum paid for cheap tools that Eliot described as being of poor quality and liable to “rust or receive damage by keeping...”<sup>459</sup> When given the choice, UCNE

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<sup>456</sup> W Noel Sainsbury, ed., "America and West Indies: July 1652," *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies: Volume 1, 1574-1660* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), 384-387. *British History Online*, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol1/pp384-387a>.

<sup>457</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 107.

<sup>458</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 106.

<sup>459</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 106, 109. The UCNE delivered to Eliot 12 felling axes, 4 broad axes, 3-4 cross-cut saws, 2-3 whip saws, 12 spades, 12 chisels, 2 sets of wimbles, 2 grinding stones, and 36-48 hoes.

commissioners used Corporation money to pay colonizers who supported missionization's bureaucracy, rather than those who worked with Indians or Indians themselves.

The UCNE again went against the Corporation by refusing to pay £100 to build the Indian college at Harvard. In September 1653, the Corporation asked the UCNE why they had not begun sending Indians to Harvard to be educated as missionaries, to which the latter replied that there was no room for them there, and that they would need more money to build a segregated Indian college:

“the college being already too strate [cramped] for the English Students we shall be forced to raise some building there for the convenience of such Indians wherein probably we shall expend at least an hundred pounds desiring the building be strong and durable though plain ; But we have neither yet agreed with any workmen nor are we come to any full resolution about the manner of building...”<sup>460</sup>

The estimated cost of constructing the Indian college was £100, a small sum given the amount of money the UCNE had access to in 1653. Even so, they refused to build the college for three years, instead prioritizing paying Winslow and Rawson. They later clarified that the cost of the Indian college might actually be £120, and that they would only pay for it with money “allowed out of the parcel the Corporation hath lately sent over upon the Indian account...”<sup>461</sup> If the Corporation wanted to the UCNE to educate Indians, they would need to send more money and supplies to New England.

Whether intended or not, the Corporation provided the UCNE with the resources needed to arm colonial militias and pay the salaries of officials working for colonial governments. Functionally, the relationship between the Corporation and UCNE worked similarly to how the Sea Adventure to Ireland organized funds and supplies to English colonizers in Ireland. Just as Pennoyer and the Sea Adventure to Ireland arranged for the shipment of gunpowder to assist in

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<sup>460</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 105.

<sup>461</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 107.

the English's offensive against the Irish, so too did the Corporation effectively send arms, ammunition, and gunpowder to the organization created to "defend" New England from Indians. In both regions English colonizers sought to convert and conquer the native population to secure their dominance. What was unique in New England compared to Ireland (with the exception perhaps of the defense of Munster) was that missionization enabled the distribution of munitions to English colonizers. The system devised by the Corporation, the UCNE, and Eliot to govern missionization not only provided the means of sequestering, reducing, and converting Indians, but also the tools needed to destroy Indians beyond the grasp of English colonizers. In New England, missionization fueled English colonialism in ways that mirrored other examples throughout the Atlantic world.

Ultimately, the UCNE felt little need to encourage or support the praying towns or Indian conversion. Their goal was to ensure English supremacy, and to the extent that missionization could support that, they would support missionization. They would never go out of their way to actively better the lives of Indians or provide them with what was needed to integrate into colonial society as equals. Those Indians who participated in this system did so to survive English colonization. Daniel Gookin illustrated this in 1674 when recounting how Eliot threatened the sachem Wannalancet, son of the Pawtucket's chief sachem Passaconaway, to accept Christianity. Eliot told him that Indians' traditional beliefs would lead to "death and destruction to soul and body," and that converting to Christianity would result in "everlasting rest."<sup>462</sup> Wannalancet eventually accepted Eliot's arguments and began converting to Christianity. It is only because he made that choice that he, according to Gookin, "continues and persists," implying a darker outcome had Wannalancet rejected missionary overtures.<sup>463</sup> Most

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<sup>462</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections*, 47.

<sup>463</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections*, 47.

colonizers endorsed missionization for its ability to control and contain Indians. It was not there to provide *for* Indians, but to take *from* them, both in the form of their spiritual and physical labor and their land and resources. As an alternative to “death and destruction,” many Indians accepted missionization to survive. Unsurprisingly, many of those same Indians abandoned praying towns to join Philip when given the opportunity to resist colonizers militarily in 1675.

### **Evaluating the Corporation’s Meetings, 1656-1660**

The Corporation started taking meeting minutes in 1656, and they detail how missionization was built to cater to the needs of English colonizers. Prior to Charles II’s return in 1660, the Corporation’s focus was on managing its property and investments in England. Its members—many of whom had a stake in Irish colonization—would have agreed with Hugh Peter that the interests of English colonizers came before those of praying Indians. The Corporation’s choice to give the UCNE free reign over missionization led to Indians becoming further burdened in a region where they were surrounded by bigoted settler colonizers.

The Corporation first referenced New England missionization on March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1656, in which they ordered that “Sythes Thread Nayles & Horne bookes &c. Be provyded & sent over unto them [UCNE commissioners] accordinge to the Invoice now send over.”<sup>464</sup> If UCNE commissioners needed more, they needed to purchase it themselves and then “bee paid in money by Bill of Exchange Drawn by them upon the Corporation heere,” after “send[ing] over a formall Discharge for all the Goodes sent &c accordinge to the said Act.”<sup>465</sup> The Corporation also asked the UCNE to ensure “that some fitt persons might bee prepared & encouraged to Assist Mr Eliott

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<sup>464</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1656, Winship, ed., *The Record Book of Meetings between 1656 and 1686 of the Corporation for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England*.

<sup>465</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1656.

& Mr Mahew in carryinge on the worke of the Commissioners.’’<sup>466</sup> Though strained earlier in the 1650s, the Corporation and UCNE had by 1656 constructed a relationship where New England was given responsibility over missionization. The Corporation continued to ask the UCNE for an account of what they purchased, but ultimately trusted their judgement. Still, they remained critical of the UCNE’s tendency to “meete soe seldome”—echoing Eliot’s language from 1651—and advised that they hire more people like Eliot and Mayhew who could handle the groundwork of missionization.

By 1656 the Corporation had stopped sending physical supplies to New England, instead using bills of exchange to reimburse the UCNE. The UCNE could now buy whatever was necessary for missionization and send the bill to the Corporation to be reimbursed. The Corporation capped what that they would reimburse per year at around £500, though the UCNE often went over this amount by a substantial amount. When the UCNE wanted to make missionization-related purchases, they worked with Boston merchant Hezekiah Usher—Edward Rawson’s replacement—who procured the items requested. Usher then drew up a bill of exchange and shipped it (and several copies) to London. Once in London, the bills made their way to the Corporation, which paid Usher’s factor (or assignee) John Harwood £500.<sup>467</sup> Harwood then sent the payment back to Boston, reimbursing Usher and completing the transaction.

How did this new arrangement benefit the UCNE? We know they desired English silver, which would have made Corporation reimbursements an enticing prospect. Given the devalued nature of New England silver, purchasing supplies with it and then being reimbursed with

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<sup>466</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1656.

<sup>467</sup> Harwood was related to Usher via marriage to his sister.

English silver was equivalent to buying items at a discounted rate.<sup>468</sup> Under the previous system, the UCNE would have to sell Corporation supplies in the colonies, turning it into New England silver. More importantly, reimbursements meant the UCNE could buy whatever they wanted, since the Corporation never regulated their purchases beyond asking for accounts written by the UCNE themselves. The Corporation knew about this loophole, asking the UCNE to appoint a minister tasked with overseeing transactions.<sup>469</sup> The UCNE refused, and the Corporation did not bring up the issue again until after it was re-chartered in 1662. In general, lack of accountability was a feature of missionization during the 1650s. As Kellaway put it, “if the Society [i.e., the Corporation] found it difficult to extract satisfactory accounts from the Commissioners, the Commissioners found it difficult to persuade Eliot to submit any accounts at all.”<sup>470</sup>

Accountability may have been achieved had the Corporation not dedicated most of its attention to collecting and investing money in England. On September 27<sup>th</sup>, 1656—several months since their last meeting devoted to New England—they ordered that “a letter bee prepared to bee sent to Mr Eliot & Mr Mayhew that in regard to these various reports that are here concerning this business they would send letters signed by themselves & Elders to attest the truth of this business.”<sup>471</sup> This “business” referred to the extent to which the UCNE supported Eliot’s and Mayhew’s efforts, and whether they could be doing more to assist them. The Corporation’s frequent decision to send letters directly to missionaries reflected New England missionization’s structural flaws. As mentioned previously, the UCNE met only once per year, and so if the Corporation needed answers quickly, they often turned to Eliot. They also did this when they suspected the UCNE of malfeasance, though this became much more common after

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<sup>468</sup> In this period one English pound was worth roughly one and one third New England pounds.

<sup>469</sup> Kellaway, *New England Company*, 63.

<sup>470</sup> Kellaway, *New England Company*, 93.

<sup>471</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, September 27<sup>th</sup>, 1656.

1662. Eventually, the Corporation came to trust New England missionaries more than they would the UCNE, contributing to increased tensions between both organizations that came to a head by the eve of King Philip's War.

Specifically, the Corporation's letter to Eliot and Mayhew asked for a status update on two of its agents—Thomas Weld and Hugh Peter—sent earlier in 1656 to assess missionization.<sup>472</sup> Weld and Peter reported that New England's missionaries were “not lookt upon...constrayned to take course cloth att Boston.”<sup>473</sup> Eliot and Mayhew confirmed this, stating that they “are not comfortably provyded for to carry on the worke.”<sup>474</sup> The Corporation responded by ordering that seven new missionaries be hired and spread out across New England. Four were assigned to Massachusetts, with Connecticut, Plymouth, and New Haven receiving one each.<sup>475</sup> All would be paid £20 a year, a fifth of the £100 paid yearly to Eliot and Mayhew, whose years preaching “to ye Indians” made them more valuable to the Corporation.<sup>476</sup> Eliot argued he deserved to have “his present Condicon [be] more comfortable,” telling Weld and Peter how he succeeded in sending five converts to Harvard's new Indian college.<sup>477</sup>

If measured by his ability to confuse and reprimand Indians, Eliot certainly was successful. 1653's *Tears of Repentance* made clear that Eliot was never satisfied with his Indian converts, forcing them to repeat their conversion narratives before English authorities again and again, whereas English converts only needed to do so once.<sup>478</sup> Eliot measured his “success”

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<sup>472</sup> Thomas Weld and Hugh Peter were originally tasked to be agents for New England in England. However, they decided to stay and live in England after being sent on their first assignment.

<sup>473</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 25<sup>th</sup>, 1656.

<sup>474</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 25<sup>th</sup>, 1656.

<sup>475</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 25<sup>th</sup>, 1656.

<sup>476</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 25<sup>th</sup>, 1656.

<sup>477</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 25<sup>th</sup>, 1656.

<sup>478</sup> Eliot, *Tears of Repentance* (1653), 13. See also Nan Goodman, “The Deer Island Indians and Common Law Performance,” Joshua David Bellin and Laura L. Mielke, eds., *Native Acts: Indian Performance, 1603-1832* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 60.

based on how much effort he poured into subjecting Indians to missionization's benevolent assimilation, not on how humane or successful he was in integrating Indians within English society as equals. Indeed, the "five converts" he sent to Harvard were bound for the so-called "Indian college," which Daniel Gookin describes as follows:

"[It is] strong and substantial, though not very capacious. It cost between three or four hundred pounds. It is large enough to receive and accommodate about twenty scholars with convenient lodgings and studies; but hitherto not much hath been improved for the ends intended, by reason of the death and failing of Indian scholars. It hath hitherto been principally improved for to accommodate English scholars, and for placing and using a printing press belonging to the college."<sup>479</sup>

Eliot sought to profit from sending Indians to Harvard, but once they were there the English did little to support them, using the space to benefit themselves instead. The Indian college was emblematic of missionization—it was significant symbolically, and it allowed English colonizers to advertise their success to the Corporation, but it was never did much to help Indians.

At the end of 1656 the Corporation reported that "severall sumes of money [sent to New England] have been lost."<sup>480</sup> This did not prevent them from investing further in England, paying Sir Robert Josselin £1,500 on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 1657 for property and land to rent.<sup>481</sup> A week later the Corporation convened to discuss the UCNE's accounts as well as the extent to which they controlled missionization:

"That Mr Josias Dewey bee earnestlie desired to joyne with John Hooper Clerk of this Corporacon in abstactinge & examinge the Accounts sent from New England and that they drawe the same into a ballance, & present the same to the Corpor for wch this Corporacon will satisfy the said Mr Dewey [and] That Mr Molins one of the Members of this Corpor bee desired to attend Mr Jenkes Councillor att Law, and consult his advice concerninge the Corporacons Power, & the Power of UCNE commissioners for the united Coloneys &c...John Hooper is ordered to attend att the same tyme."<sup>482</sup>

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<sup>479</sup> Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections*, 86.

<sup>480</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1656.

<sup>481</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 14<sup>th</sup>, 1657.

<sup>482</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1657.

It is unclear what came of Molines' and Hooper's meeting with the lawyer, and whatever was stated about the nature of the UCNE's power in relation to the Corporation has been lost.<sup>483</sup> The act creating the Corporation in 1649 gave it control over New England missionization, but the difficulties of coordinating a transatlantic project made it impossible for them to wield that authority over the UCNE. There is no evidence that the Corporation did anything to address the UCNE's power from a legal standpoint in the 1650s, and after Charles II returned the UCNE would only grow more potent in its ability to control missionization.

On March 21<sup>st</sup>, 1657, the Corporation reaffirmed their desire to send New England a maximum of £500 per year.<sup>484</sup> They then sent a letter to Eliot on April 11<sup>th</sup> informing him of their decision to limit the money sent to the UCNE.<sup>485</sup> As had been the case previously, they quickly broke that rule, sending £700 and £800 to New England in February 1658 and 1660. If the £500 limit intended to stymie the UCNE's ability to embezzle Corporation funds, it was ineffective. Meanwhile, the Corporation redoubled efforts to collect money in England, perhaps concluding that, if they could not control the UCNE's spending habits, they could at least ensure that their treasury remained flush with silver.

The Corporation relentlessly pursued debts owed to them in England, which stood in contrast to their limited oversight and regulation over the UCNE. As debt collectors the Corporation were highly effective, going to great ends to retrieve small sums of money. In one instance they pursued a "£50 or £60" donation from a "Mr Morgan late of Wells in the County of

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<sup>483</sup> According to Kellaway, Molines derived his wealth from combining "trade with extremely lucrative government employment." See Kellaway, *New England Company*, 18.

<sup>484</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 21<sup>st</sup>, 1657.

<sup>485</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 11<sup>th</sup>, 1657.

Sommerset.”<sup>486</sup> Morgan’s widow, “Mrs Morgan,” held her husband’s money and “refuseth to pay” the promised sum.<sup>487</sup> The Corporation told her that if she continued to withhold the money they would send Colonel Thomas Gorge—a distant cousin of Sir Ferdinando Gorges—to collect it.<sup>488</sup> Thomas Gorges was a New England colonizer who returned to England during the Civil War. In 1657 he was a member of Parliament and staunch supporter of Cromwell and Irish colonization.<sup>489</sup> Political opponents described him as a vicious man who “racked the consciences, flayed off the skins and broken the bones of the poor people, making them swear against themselves.”<sup>490</sup> If Gorges failed to extract the debt from Morgan’s widow, the Corporation threatened legal action, informing her that they “will endeavour to recover the [money] accordinge to the Powers given unto them by the sd Act.”<sup>491</sup> Morgan’s widow was not alone in being harried by the Corporation—there was also an unnamed “Gent” in “the County of Lincolne” who reportedly “refuseth to pay...some moneys collected” there.<sup>492</sup>

Why was the Corporation more invested in extracting debts from individuals than it was in ensuring that their money was not wasted in New England? Had they put a similar amount of effort into regulating the UCNE, it is likely that they could have prevented missionization from

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<sup>486</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1657.

<sup>487</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1657.

<sup>488</sup> Corporation records describe him as “Colonel Gorges,” but this is almost certainly Colonel Thomas Gorges, zealous supporter of Parliament during the English Civil War and later a member of Parliament from Taunton. See James Phinney Baxter, *Sir Ferdinando Gorges and his Province of Maine. Including the Brief Relation, The Brief Narration, His Defence, The Charter Granted to Him, His Will, And His Letters. Edited with a Memoir and Historical Illustrations, Volume II* (Boston: The Prince Society, 1890), 186-192.

<sup>489</sup> Thomas’ brother, Robert, helped colonize Ireland while serving as secretary to Henry Cromwell. *History of Parliament Online – Gorges, Thomas*, <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/gorges-thomas-1618-70>.

<sup>490</sup> Baxter, *Sir Ferdinando Gorges*, 188.

<sup>491</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1657. The act referred to here is the one that created the Corporation in 1649, which gave them the right to collect money from Englishmen to support missionization in New England.

<sup>492</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 14<sup>th</sup>, 1657.

being used to enrich colonizers at Indians' expense. The most obvious answer is that the presence of the Atlantic Ocean prevented such oversight, though this is not entirely satisfying as the Corporation demonstrated an ability to extend its influence via sending agents to New England. It is more likely that the Corporation did not judge what the UCNE was doing to be wrong, or at least, not to an extent worth pursuing. Composed of people who colonized Ireland and who had a stake in colonizing New England, the Corporation never took issue with colonizers benefitting from missionization money. For them missionization was first and foremost a way to advance English colonialism, as it had been in Ireland and India. They would have preferred that the UCNE be more forthright, but ultimately, the Cromwellian Corporation did little to ensure that their money went specifically to converting Indians. As is true in nearly all historical cases, missionization existed to complement colonialism, not as a benevolent method of integrating indigenous populations among colonizers.

The Corporation continued to be amenable to UCNE requests for money, receiving in early 1658 a £500 bill of exchange from UCNE commissioners featuring items purchased by Boston merchant Hezekiah Usher.<sup>493</sup> The Corporation paid Usher's London factor, John Harwood, £500 worth of Spanish pieces of eight, a generous decision given the fact that Spanish currency was legislated to have an inflated value in New England.<sup>494</sup> They then sent a response to a letter Usher sent on February 6<sup>th</sup> about two Connecticut men—merchant John Blackleach and trader Thomas Stanton—who were candidates to become New England missionaries. In his letter Usher had noted that Blackleach “hath some Generall Nocons [Notions], but [is] not fixed

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<sup>493</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, January 16<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

<sup>494</sup> Kellaway, 73. Given their inflated value in New England, Spanish pieces of eight were a viable alternative to English silver. Spanish currency also made the exchange less risky for the Corporation, since for them it was less valuable than English silver.

& fitted for this worke.”<sup>495</sup> Stanton, on the other hand, was “a knowen man in the Indian tongue & one that UCNE commissioners make use off as an Interpreter but [is] not...Godly & soe qualified for the spirituall parte of this work as hath beene suggested.”<sup>496</sup> Stanton had served as an interpreter during the Pequot war, and from 1636-1670 was involved in most of New England’s transactions with Indians—such as when he wrote Uncas’ will—and later served in King Philip’s war. Though he never became a missionary, from 1666-1677 he served as “overseer-general of the Coassatuck Indians [and] commissioners in Indians affairs.”<sup>497</sup> Usher also added that the UCNE paid for Stanton’s son to attend Harvard.<sup>498</sup>

The Corporation corresponded with Hezekiah Usher frequently, a product of him being the merchant who facilitated trade between them and the UCNE. Usher was often in England and had probably befriended several Corporation members. In turn the Corporation trusted Usher with the funds and supplies they sent and were in contact with him more than they were the UCNE proper. Ironically, Usher may have been embezzling Corporation money, given that he controlled the flow of silver and supplies to and from England. He was also close friends with Boston’s mintmaster John Hull, who needed English currency to ensure that the “trickle of silver flowing into Boston [was] melted down and remade into the small change that accelerated the domestic economy of New England.”<sup>499</sup> There is no direct evidence that Usher supplied Hull with Corporation silver, though it is possible given New England’s limited access to silver. Adding further credence to this theory is that Hull’s effort to boost New England’s economy

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<sup>495</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 6<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

<sup>496</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 6<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

<sup>497</sup> William Richard Cutter, ed., *New England Families, Genealogical and Memorial: A Record of the Achievements of Her People in the Making of Commonwealths and the Founding of a Nation*, vol. 1 (Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1913), 163.

<sup>498</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 6<sup>th</sup>, 1658

<sup>499</sup> Peterson, *City-State*, 134-35.

with small change began only after the Corporation started sending over supplies and money. The Corporation continued to trust Usher up to King Philip's War, a mistake if its priority was to convert Indians.<sup>500</sup>

In the weeks after corresponding with Usher, the Corporation agreed to fulfill a new £700 request “for carryinge on the Indian Worke,” which came closely on the heels of the UCNE's £500 request the month prior.<sup>501</sup> The Corporation initially asked that the £700 “bee paid in such manner and accordinge Dirreccion & advise as Mr Trear [Richard Lloyd] Mr [Richard] Hutchinson Mr [George] Clerke Mr [John] Rolfe Mr [Thomas] Bell & Mr [Henry] Ashurst...shall thinke fitt.”<sup>502</sup> However Usher, who was in England, reported to the Corporation on February 27<sup>th</sup> that he had already paid UCNE commissioners £700 though “his Assignees” in New England.<sup>503</sup> In other words, the payment had already been made and there was nothing to oversee. All that needed to be done, Usher argued, was to reimburse him £700. The Corporation asked no further questions of Usher, ordering “that he sd summe of £700 bee forthwth paid; & Mr Treasurer is heerby ordered & Desired to pay the same accordingly.”<sup>504</sup>

The Corporation relied on confidants like Usher to oversee missionization for them, trusting them with their money while they focused on English investments. Usher took advantage of this and the opaqueness of the bill of exchange process to negotiate additional payments to New England. The question is whether the UCNE and Usher conspired to abuse the Corporation's trust and acquire more money from England. If Usher said he delivered £700 of

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<sup>500</sup> Mark Peterson reveals that Usher was, along with John Hull, responsible for organizing the importation of “large numbers of military guns—upward of six hundred firelock muskets and cavalry carbines—eighteen months before the outbreak of war in 1675.” The consequences of this will be explored more in chapter five. Peterson, *City-State of Boston*, 122.

<sup>501</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 13<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

<sup>502</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 13<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

<sup>503</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 27<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

<sup>504</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 27<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

silver to UCNE commissioners for the “Indian Worke,” the Corporation would have believed him. Usher could have used his relationship with the Corporation to allay fears about embezzlement and keep the silver moving to New England. Because of his position as go-between, Usher would have theoretically been aware of any economic deception occurring between the UCNE and the Corporation, and yet he never reported anything to London. However, while deception was a possibility, the more likely scenario is that there was no conspiracy here. The Corporation and UCNE had administrative disputes over how to manage missionization, but the connections and ideological similarities between its members suggest that all ultimately endorsed a missionization project that catered only tangentially to Indians.

Some of the Corporation’s other financial transactions show that bills of exchange neither needed to be vague nor facilitated by Usher. That this was the norm suggests this was a choice, not an oversight. While dealing with the UCNE’s £700 request, the Corporation also received a bill of exchange from Boston merchant Robert Nanny requesting a £10 reimbursement for “Phisicall Drugges bought of him for the use of the Indians.”<sup>505</sup> This they paid to Nanny’s factor in England, William Stonestreete. This is the only payment recorded prior to the Restoration not involving the UCNE or Usher, and one of the few that reimbursed items purchased specifically for Indians. If the Corporation prioritized supporting and converting Indians, they would have used this method more frequently. Smaller payments made to reimburse items of need to Indians would have allowed the Corporation to better account for how its funds were used. Instead, they chose to work with larger sums and through Usher to reimburse vaguely written bills of exchange produced by New England colonizers. Some of this can be explained by how bills of exchange worked. Trust was of utmost importance and ensuring consistent shipments through a

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<sup>505</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, Feb. 13<sup>th</sup>, 1658.

reliable merchant was paramount. Thus, the Corporation would have been reluctant to use anyone besides Usher, who had a track record of safely conducting Atlantic commerce. Still, the fact remains that the Corporation could have constructed a system that better assisted Indians, and they chose not to do so.

Despite being sent £1200 earlier in the year, the UCNE argued in September 1658 that they should be receiving even more silver, responding to the Corporation's refusal to send an additional £500. In the process they critiqued the Corporation's habit of investing in England rather than in New England, arguing that they needed that money to conduct missionization:

“it was never our desire or intent to hinder the purchasing of Lands there [in England], by drawing over any great [sums] of money hither, further then the encouragement of the work might require & to preserve ourselves from running into debt or taking up money or good with disadvantage...”<sup>506</sup>

The UCNE reminded the Corporation that £500 was little compared to the “£2000 p. Annum” they could spend on investments according to “the act of parliament of the trust imposed therein.”<sup>507</sup> Indeed, the act did allow the Corporation to spend up to £2,000 per year “to purchase or acquire to themselves, any Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments in England or Wales.”<sup>508</sup> From the UCNE's perspective, £500 was not much of an ask compared to the Corporation's other investments.

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<sup>506</sup> “The Commissioners of the United Colonies to Mr. Richard Lloyd, Treasurer of the Company, September 26th, 1658,” *Some Correspondence Between the Governors and Treasurers of the New England Company in London and the Commissioners of the United Colonies in America The Missionaries of the Company and Others Between the Years 1657 and 1712 to which are added the Journals of the Rev. Experience Mayhew in 1713 and 1714* (London: Spottiswoode & CO., 1896), 3.

<sup>507</sup> *Some Correspondences*, 3.

<sup>508</sup> *An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England* (1649). One scholar interpreted this line incorrectly to mean that the Corporation was paid 2,000 per year by Parliament, but there is no evidence of that occurring. See John F. Fulton, “The Honourable Robert Boyle, F.R.S. (1627-1692),” *Notes and Record of the Royal Society of London* 15 (July 1960): 131-132.

The UCNE argued that they needed more silver to fulfill the Corporation's vision for New England:

“[T]he truth...is had we not bene more then once stirred up by yourselves (as by...your Letters you may please to see) to inlarge our allowance to deserving instruments employed in the work the charge had not bene altogether so much as it is, yet notwithstanding we find it very difficult to procure fitt persons to ingage heerein as the worke calls for.”<sup>509</sup>

In other words, it was the Corporation's desire to build missionization as a colonizing institution that necessitated constant infusions of silver. The Corporation eventually acquiesced to the UCNE, agreeing on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1659 to pay them £500.<sup>510</sup> In leveraging the Corporation's sense of duty towards missionization, UCNE commissioners received an additional payment.

The Corporation made another £500 payment to the UCNE on February 29<sup>th</sup>, 1659, while also ordering that John Endecott, John Eliot, and Thomas Mayhew be “especially recommended to the care of Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Ashurst & Mr Clerke.”<sup>511</sup> On October 11<sup>th</sup>, 1658, Endecott and Eliot had sent a letter to the Corporation asking if they would support the creation of a Bible translated into the Massachusetts language (Endecott was the Bay Colony's governor and had authority over the UCNE). They were referred to Lloyd and Ashurst because they were next in command to President William Steele, who was busy colonizing Ireland. Lloyd was the Corporation's treasurer until he died in 1659, whereupon he was replaced by Ashurst, who served until his death in 1680. Lloyd responded to Endecott and Eliot on February 26<sup>th</sup>, stating that a search was underway for someone who could print three thousand Bibles in “the Indian

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<sup>509</sup> *Some Correspondence*, 3-4.

<sup>510</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1659.

<sup>511</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 29<sup>th</sup>, 1659.

Language.”<sup>512</sup> Additionally, he asked a Doctor Reynolds to “peruse & methodize & prepare an Epistle [to the Bible] & [ensure] that his heart is in the worke.”<sup>513</sup>

The Corporation agreed to print three thousand Indian Bibles, however, production was delayed by a prolonged search for ways to reduce the cost of printing. On March 19<sup>th</sup> they asked Lord Protector Richard Cromwell, Oliver’s third son, whether he would “grant the duty of Custom & Excise, for paper to bee free in regard of their Charge of printinge the Bible.”<sup>514</sup> They also asked him “to commend it unto the Judges...that they inquire what panes have been employed in collectinge moneys [for the Indian Worke] in the several Hundreds & Devisions of the Countyes,” and requested “that such moneyes as remaine in their hands, may bee by them forthwith paid to the Treas appoynded for that purpose.”<sup>515</sup> The Corporation was reluctant to print the Bible unless the state subsidized it. Most likely this was done in the interest of frugality, thought it could also be interpreted as evidence that they were not enthralled by the prospect of publishing in an Indian language when the purpose of missionization was to convert and assimilate, thereby removing the need for non-English texts.

After Ashurst replaced Lloyd as the Corporation’s treasurer on October 8<sup>th</sup>, 1659, he sent a letter to Eliot imploring him to “expedite the printinge of the New Testament in the Indian language, accordinge to the Corporation’s Desires intimated in their letter unto UCNE commissioners for the united Colonies the 7 May 1659.”<sup>516</sup> The Corporation contacted Eliot

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<sup>512</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 26<sup>th</sup>, 1659.

<sup>513</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 26<sup>th</sup>, 1659.

<sup>514</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 26<sup>th</sup>, 1659.

<sup>515</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 1659. The Corporation appointed treasurers in every county in England, where they collected money. These treasurers are not to be confused with the treasurer of the Corporation, Richard Lloyd, or later, Henry Ashurst.

<sup>516</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, October 17<sup>th</sup>, 1659. The Corporation’s “Indian Bible” was made through the translation efforts of Eliot and several Indians, the latter of whom did most of the work. Previously, Eliot had published an Indian Grammar book detailing how he thought their languages

because the UCNE was unresponsive.<sup>517</sup> While the Corporation gathered the materials to produce the Indian Bible, they also continued investing in England. In November 1659 they spent £1,800 on land in Northamptonshire, also approving on that same date a smaller £800 payment to New England.<sup>518</sup>

In March 1660 the Corporation executed a plan to subsidize the cost of the Indian Bible. Ashurst and four other members tried to convince “the Provinciaall Assembly of London at Sion College [to] contrybute their Endeavors towards the printinge of the Bible in the Indian tongue.”<sup>519</sup> They also arranged for the printing of fifteen hundred pamphlets containing the confessions of praying Indians, designed to get Englishmen to contribute monetarily to the production of the Bible. The Corporation searched for someone who could print these pamphlets at the cheapest rate possible, first naming a Mr. Symones, who had worked for them previously, before stating that they would accept any “such others as shall print the said bookes cheaper.”<sup>520</sup> Eventually they chose a “Mr Maycoke,” who offered “to print the Indianes Confessions at a farthinge per sheete.”<sup>521</sup> Then they consulted John Harwood regarding “what orders or Instruccons hee hath recd [from Hezekiah Usher regarding which] materyalls [to buy] for printinge [the Bible].”<sup>522</sup> Harwood’s response determined what the Corporation would purchase and ship to New England.

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worked. For the Corporation to publish three thousand Indian Bibles, they first required accurate translations.

<sup>517</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, October 17<sup>th</sup>, 1659.

<sup>518</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 19<sup>th</sup>, 1659. The Corporation did not complete the £800 payment until February 1660, whereupon they delivered two separate £400 payments to John Harwood to complete the initial transaction.

<sup>519</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1660.

<sup>520</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1660.

<sup>521</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1660.

<sup>522</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1660.

In April 1660 the Corporation hired Marmaduke Johnson to print the Indian Bible given that he agreed to these terms:

“[He is] willinge to goe & bee Employed in that service at the Salary of £40 per Annum. Besides Dyett [food], lodginge & washinge, & a Quarters Salary advance & his tyme to bee there for three years, & more if the Corporacon or commissioners for the united Coloneys please to commence from the tyme of his goinge on shipp board, & the Corporacon to pay his passage thither.”<sup>523</sup>

The Corporation sent Johnson to New England aboard the *Prudent Mary* in May 1660, paying five pounds and eighteen shillings for his voyage.<sup>524</sup> Printing the Indian Bible required cooperation between Eliot, the UCNE, and the Corporation. Eliot’s rudimentary understanding of Indian languages, which relied on Indian tutors and interpreters, formed the basis of the manuscript. The UCNE arranged for Marmaduke Johnson’s passage from England to New England and took care of his meals, lodging, and payment. The Corporation sourced the materials needed to print the Bible, with Ashurst and William Puckle responsible for “buy[ing] such printinge paper to bee sent to N. Engl for printinge the Bible in the Indian language, as they shall thinke fitt,” and assisting the UCNE in managing Johnson.<sup>525</sup>

Why was the Indian Bible the only major project the Corporation and UCNE collaborated on specifically addressing the needs of Indians? There was, indeed, far more emphasis placed on literature designed for an English audience—for example, the “Eliot Tracts”—compared to those meant for an Indian audience. The Corporation could command members of Parliament to collect debts for them, seek donations from parishes and colleges across England, spend thousands of pounds on land, and call upon the Lord Protector himself. If they wanted to, they could have placed greater emphasis on developing the infrastructure needed to support Indians interested in

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<sup>523</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 21<sup>st</sup>, 1660.

<sup>524</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1660.

<sup>525</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 21<sup>st</sup>, 1660.

Christianity. If missionization's purpose was to protect Indians from colonialism, then the Indian Bible should have been one of several projects designed to make the lives of praying Indians easier. As we have seen, many Indians learned English and came to understand colonizers' culture better than Eliot did theirs—had the English intended missionization to uplift Indians as equals, Indians would have quickly and easily taken advantage of this. That this did not occur speaks to missionization's purpose as a colonizing institution—the integrationist rhetoric was a myth, one which the English never intended on pursuing and never dedicated resources to.

On May 29<sup>th</sup> 1660 Charles II arrived in London. Between May and August, the Corporation ceased its management of New England missionization, instead attending to its properties and investments in preparation for the coming transfer of power.<sup>526</sup> On August 29<sup>th</sup> Parliament passed the Indemnity and Oblivion Act, which nullified the 1649 act creating the Corporation. New England missionization's future was now unclear. Would it continue to receive support from England? How would New England respond to the demise of Cromwell's sympathetic Puritan government? Would Charles II dissolve the New England colonies entirely and create something else in its place?

During the 1650s the Corporation viewed missionization as a legitimate colonizing strategy, one its members pursued across the English Atlantic world. They never demonstrated empathy for Indians, focusing most of its efforts on collecting and investing money in England and telling UCNE commissioners how better to implement their vision. The UCNE pursued this vision to an extent, with emphasis on using missionization to benefit the development of the New England colonies. This was enough to satisfy the Cromwellian Corporation, as, after all, they

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<sup>526</sup> For instance, the Corporation's meeting on July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1660, was devoted entirely to the subject of renovating a house and barn lying on a property they managed, in order "to make them tennantable & fit to Dwell in." See Corporation Meeting Minutes, July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1660.

endorsed missionization because they wanted to empower colonizers and identified ideologically with New England. Though the Corporation and UCNE squabbled throughout the 1650s, they were ultimately similar organizations that employed different approaches towards achieving the same end—a stronger New England that could subdue and manage its Indian population. In the coming decades they would diverge further, with the UCNE losing faith in missionization's ability to marginalize Indians and benefit colonizers. They became more interested in pursuing a strategy of conquest and removal, one they previously engaged with in the 1640s, and which they became better equipped to execute as colonizer populations surged and Indian populations declined. Simultaneously, Charles II's Corporation became more insistent about creating a missionization project devoted to reducing and converting Indians, and stricter about how its money was distributed towards that end. Either way, missionization would continue to aid and abet colonization.

## Chapter Four

### The Restoration's Impact on New England Missionization

“For the ways we employ to convert and instruct them [in New England], are chiefly these: First, we have caused the holy scriptures and some few choice practical books to be translated into their chiefest language...Next, we have caused some of ours to learn their tongue; having convinced them of their idolatry and the sinfulness of their courses...And then we breed some of their hopeful forward youths to that knowledge of the English tongue and European learning, that they may afterwards be able to confute the idolatrous priests, and convert and instruct their own countrymen.”<sup>527</sup>

— Robert Boyle

Charles II's return heralded a new era of New England missionization. England would no longer be under the control of Cromwellians who sympathized ideologically and religiously with New England Puritans. Whereas the Corporation of the 1650s avoided micromanaging the United Colonies of New England (UCNE), the Corporation of the 1660s and 1670s was more active in trying to implement its missionary agenda in New England. The UCNE was less than thrilled with this development, and indeed New England would consistently ignore the Corporation's directions, instead choosing to implement their own vision for missionization, one which they believed would more effectively subdue and remove those Indians who continued to stand in their way.

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<sup>527</sup> Here Boyle was writing to another member of the Corporation in reference to how the English might apply New England missionization to other colonies, specifically India. From how he writes it is clear he views missionization as a blueprint for colonizing indigenous peoples. Robert Boyle, *The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle: In Six Volumes. To which is Prefixed the Life of the Author. Volume the First. A New Edition* (London: 1772), cix.

The Corporation had been focused on completing the Indian Bible in the months leading to Charles II's return. Their correspondence with the UCNE at the time regarded the performance of printer Marmaduke Johnson, who had been "absenting himself 9 weeks from the press," leading the Corporation to question whether he "hath performed the Conditions" agreed upon.<sup>528</sup> Though the UCNE could neither confirm nor deny that Johnson was printing Bibles, the Corporation still paid him £10 via bill of exchange in December 1660.<sup>529</sup> This was more than what they paid Indian missionaries, revealing that a negligent colonizer could expect to benefit economically from missionization more than the most pious Indian.

An unpaid Indian named Wawaus "James" Printer, not Johnson, did most of the labor in printing the Bible.<sup>530</sup> Before Johnson even arrived in New England, Printer—a former Eliot student who lived in Hassanamesit and later fought the English in King Philip's war—had printed portions of the Bible at Harvard College's Cambridge Press in 1659.<sup>531</sup> With some help from Samuel Green, Printer finished two hundred copies of the New Testament by September 1661. They delivered most of these to praying Indians and shipped a few samples to the Corporation. Printer finished the Old Testament in 1663, and the completed Bible was titled *Mamusse Wunneetupanatomwe Up-Biblum God Naneeswe Nukkone Testament Kah Wonk Wusku Testament* and was dedicated to Charles II—part of an effort to gain his favor.<sup>532</sup> Eliot received £50 from the Corporation for translating the Bible, a disproportionate amount

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<sup>528</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1660.

<sup>529</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1660.

<sup>530</sup> The idea that James Printer performed the unpaid and unrecognized labor to produce the Indian Bible was proposed by Drew Lopezina. See Drew Lopezina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 106–14.

<sup>531</sup> For more on Printer, see Lisa Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin: A New History of King Philip's War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 5.

<sup>532</sup> The translation of this title is "the Christian Bible translated into a local dialect of the Algonquian language." Drew Lopezina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period*, 92.

considering Indians did most of that labor.<sup>533</sup> Translating the Bible was a group effort mostly conducted by Indians like Job Nesuton and John Sassamon. Nesuton played a significant part, and yet even so, the Corporation only recognized him as one of Eliot's "interpreters," and he was not paid at all for his efforts.<sup>534</sup>

Although the Indian Bible was perhaps the Corporation's greatest accomplishment to date, the return of Charles II put its future as an organization in jeopardy. In New England, many people connected to the Corporation reacted to the Restoration by recasting themselves as Royalists. According to Mark Peterson, Boston merchant Hezekiah Usher was "among the First Church dissenters who signed petitions to the General Court expressing their loyalty to the crown and necessity for compromise with royal officials."<sup>535</sup> Usher was motivated by his business requiring good relations with England, and possibly also by his friend John Hull needing English silver for his mint. In 1662 Usher and Hull funded a diplomatic envoy to London to meet with Charles II, likely derived from Corporation funds.<sup>536</sup>

### **Establishing the New Corporation**

It was Corporation Treasurer Henry Ashurst who convinced Charles II of missionization's importance in New England. Ashurst acted as the Corporation's "Executive Secretary [and] general administrator," overseeing daily operations and missionaries employed in New England.<sup>537</sup> It was fortuitous that Ashurst rose to power a year prior to Charles II's

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<sup>533</sup> Vaughan, *New England Frontier*, 278-279.

<sup>534</sup> Drew Lopenzina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period*, 113.

<sup>535</sup> Mark A. Peterson, *The Price of Redemption: The Spiritual Economy of Puritan New England* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 30.

<sup>536</sup> Mark A. Peterson, 30.

<sup>537</sup> Philip Arthur Muth, "The Ashursts: Friends of New England" (Diss, Boston University Graduate School, 1967), 42.

return. His presence balanced that of the Corporation's president, William Steele, who was one of four men originally appointed to prosecute Charles I in 1649. An illness kept him from accepting the appointment—had he done so he would have been executed in 1660 along with the other prosecutors. In 1659 Steele left Ashurst in command of the Corporation while he focused on colonizing Ireland. Between May and October of 1659 Steele kept Ireland “peaceable” by placing “key military positions in the hands of reliable men,” and appointing Independent religious figures to Irish churches.<sup>538</sup> But as the Protectorate crumbled, Steele's pro-Parliamentarian ideology put him in opposition to General George Monck—the commander and chief of Commonwealth forces who supported Charles II and aided his return.<sup>539</sup> Monck removed Steele from Ireland after hearing he helped Parliamentarians seize Dublin castle. The 1660 Indemnity and Oblivion Act pardoned Steele, though he still fled to the Netherlands soon after.<sup>540</sup>

Thus, Ashurst was responsible for working with the now Royalist Parliament to recharter the Corporation. His familial connections suited him for the task. Though he was a Puritan who supported Cromwell, his brothers John and William were Presbyterians who became Royalists after Pride's Purge and the execution of Charles I.<sup>541</sup> Ashurst had also formed connections with Richard Baxter and Robert Boyle, two men who Charles II trusted. Ashurst's job was especially difficult considering Fifth Monarchist Thomas Venner's 1661 plot to usurp Charles II, causing the monarch to distrust further anything connected to dissenters.<sup>542</sup> Nonetheless, Ashurst and

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<sup>538</sup> John Cronin, “Steele, William,” *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, Royal Irish Academy, October 2009, <https://www.dib.ie/biography/steele-william-a8271>.

<sup>539</sup> Terry Calvin, “Monck, George,” *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, Royal Irish Academy, October 2009, <https://www.dib.ie/biography/monck-george-a5885>.

<sup>540</sup> Cronin, “Steele, William.”

<sup>541</sup> Muth, “The Ashursts,” 17, 21.

<sup>542</sup> John Smolenski, *Friends and Strangers: The Making of a Creole Culture in Colonial Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 36.

Boyle were successful in disassociating the Corporation from Cromwell, facilitating the passage of a royal charter creating the New England Company for the Propagation of the Gospel on February 7<sup>th</sup>, 1662.<sup>543</sup> They made little “reference to the ‘late pretended Corporation’” in the charter.<sup>544</sup> Colloquially, however, members of the New England Company continued to call their organization “the Corporation.”

The new Corporation differed from the old one in a few ways. It staffed forty-five members rather than sixteen and contained mostly Anglicans and moderate dissenters, a great shift from the radical Independents and Presbyterians it contained previously. Membership was hereditary—if someone died or resigned their position, their families provided a replacement.<sup>545</sup> Indeed, Ashurst’s relations by blood or by marriage would lead the Corporation and serve as missionaries in Massachusetts well into the eighteenth-century.<sup>546</sup> Robert Boyle became the new Corporation’s governor, akin to the role of “president” held by William Steele. Unlike Steele, Boyle was more active in enforcing a vigorous missionary agenda. According to Gabriel Glickman, Boyle envisioned the Corporation as a way “to heal the splits between Protestant

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<sup>543</sup> On Boyle using his relationship with Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, to influence Charles II’s decision regarding the Corporation’s charter, see John Wolfe Lydekker, “The New England Company: The First Missionary Society, Some Account of Its Foundation and Early History With a Brief Summary of Its Later Activities,” *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church* 13, no. 2 (June 1944): 114.

<sup>544</sup> George Parker Winship, “Introduction,” *The New England Company of 1649 and John Eliot* (1920), xli.

<sup>545</sup> “The Ashursts and some of their New England Company ties,” ca. 1965. (Ms. 1965, Masshist) *Massachusetts Historical Society Misc. Manuscripts*.

<sup>546</sup> For instance, John Sergeant, a descendent of Ashurst, worked as a missionary in Stockbridge Massachusetts in the mid-eighteenth century. He was also active in supporting other missionary endeavors, such as the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG), which mainly focused on converting Mohawks in New York. In 1737 Sergeant assisted SPG missionary Henry Barclay by lobbying the Boston Board of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel to support Barclay monetarily. See R. Pierce Beaver, *Church, State, and the American Indians: Two and a Half Centuries of Partnership in Missions Between Protestant Churches and Government* (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1966), 17.

congregations by reframing the church for the purpose of evangelical projects overseas.”<sup>547</sup> In other words, people in the new Corporation agreed that missionization could heal the rifts caused by the Civil War by joining Englishmen together in pursuit of the the shared purpose of advancing colonialism across the globe.

Boyle zealously supported missionization, not only in New England, but in Ireland and India as well. Between 1660 and 1677 he also served as Director of the East India Company, using its wealth to support various missionary activities.<sup>548</sup> This included funding Edward Pocock’s 1660 translation of Hugo Grotius’ *Christian religion* into Arabic, as well as “similar translations of Scripture into Turkish, Arabic and Malayan.”<sup>549</sup> He was inspired by the 1663 Indian Bible, using it as a template to create a Gaelic Bible in 1681 (New Testament) and 1685 (Old Testament).<sup>550</sup> Boyle was born in Ireland, his father having led the colonization of Munster—the same region that housed the Gookins and informed Vincent Gookin Jr.’s defense of missionization. Boyle believed missionization entailed the “humanitarian aim of improving the social condition of the native population,” viewing it as opposed to the “exploitation” of other forms of colonialism.<sup>551</sup> He was unable to understand that a philosophy portraying Indigenous populations as “uneducated and unprivileged,” as he put it, left them vulnerable to English exploitation.<sup>552</sup>

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<sup>547</sup> Gabriel Glickman, “Protestantism, Colonization, and the New England Company in Restoration Politics,” *The Historical Journal* 59, no. 2 (2016): 369.

<sup>548</sup> John F. Fulton, “The Honourable Robert Boyle, F.R.S. (1627-1692),” *Notes and Record of the Royal Society of London* 15 (July 1960): 132.

<sup>549</sup> John F. Fulton, 132.

<sup>550</sup> John F. Fulton, 132.

<sup>551</sup> John F. Fulton, 132.

<sup>552</sup> John F. Fulton, 132.

## New England Responds to the Restoration

The UCNE learned of the old Corporation's dissolution on September 5<sup>th</sup>, 1661 via a letter from its clerk John Hooper.<sup>553</sup> They immediately sent a letter to the "most dread sovereign" Charles II, arguing in favor of him continuing to support New England.<sup>554</sup> They made sure to emphasize their success in converting and assimilating Indians:

"...many of the wilde *Indians* being taught, and understanding the Doctrine of the Christian Religion, and with much affection attending such Preachers as are sent to teach them, many of their Children are instructed to Write and Reade, and some of them have proceeded further, to attain the knowledge of the Latine and Greek Tongues, and are brought up with our English youth in University learning."<sup>555</sup>

They embellished most of these points. Indeed, English colonizers built the Indian College at Harvard with the specific intent of segregating them from the "English youth," refusing to allow them into Harvard College proper. Throughout their plea to Charles II the UCNE emphasized that missionization required "the Charity and Piety of diverse of our well-affected Countrymen in *England*."<sup>556</sup> Crucially, though the UCNE argued that England should continue supporting New England with silver and supplies, they made no mention of the Corporation or its continuation. If England under Charles II continued to support the UCNE, then that support did not necessarily have to come from the Corporation. The UCNE was also likely unsure of Charles II's attitude toward Cromwell's Corporation and would not have wanted to anger him with an inopportune reference to it.

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<sup>553</sup> *Acts vol. II, 255.*

<sup>554</sup> The UCNE commissioners in 1661 were Simon Bradstreet and Daniel Denison (Massachusetts), Thomas Prentice and Thomas Southworth (Plymouth), John Mason and Samuel Willis (Connecticut), and William Leete and Benjamin Fenn (New Haven).

<sup>555</sup> *Acts vol. II, 255.*

<sup>556</sup> *Acts vol. II, 255.*

The UCNE continued to try and draw funds from the Corporation despite the chaos caused by the Restoration. After sending their 1661 letter to the Charles II, they wrote Richard Hutchinson and Ashurst to tell them that they just sent a bill of exchange valued at £800:

“[We hope that] there may be no interruption but that they money may be transmitted to us in the same manor and way that it hath been these diverse years last past in which we find much ease and convenience to ourselves; and a universal satisfaction of those that Receive their salaries.”<sup>557</sup>

The UCNE also sent an account “of the Indian Stocke,” which showed 352 pounds and 12 shillings left to spend on missionization. With an additional £800 the UCNE argued it could pay remaining expenses, leaving 414 pounds, 4 shillings, and 4 pence in the account, “a great part of whereof will be expended in printing the bible and a new impression of the Catechism and little or nothing will remain to discharge the Charges of the Indian youthes at the univesities.”<sup>558</sup>

Based on their account, the UCNE prioritized operational costs related to paying and supplying English colonizers in its service (including missionaries like Eliot). Next in priority was completing projects such as the printing of the Indian Bible and related texts. What the UCNE prioritized least, unsurprisingly, was paying Indians seeking to educate themselves about English religion and culture. Time and again, the rhetoric of missionization’s proponents faltered when it came time to pay for the education and assimilation of Indian converts with the silver ostensibly generated for that purpose.

Analysis of the UCNE’s 1661 Indian account reveals questionable usage of Corporation money. They spent £196 on “sundry Disbursements upon the account of printing ,” along with several smaller purchases unrelated to missionization.<sup>559</sup> The Governors of Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven received £5 each to “distribute amongst well deserving Indians,”

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<sup>557</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 260.

<sup>558</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 260.

<sup>559</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 261-263.

with no guidelines provided beyond that.<sup>560</sup> Three of the UCNE's commissioners in 1661—Thomas Prentice, William Leete, and John Mason (infamous for leading the attack on Fort Mystic during the Pequot War)—served as governors of Plymouth, New Haven, and Connecticut respectively. In other words, they were paying themselves with money intended to support missionary activities. Another £60 was originally earmarked to fund Indians studying at Harvard but was instead given to an English administrator working there.<sup>561</sup>

When the UCNE did give money to Indians, they received far less than colonizers. For example, eight “Indian Schoolmasters and Teachers of the Indians” had to split £30 amongst themselves, whereas Thomas Mayhew Sr. and John Eliot received £30 and £50, respectively. Some colonizers received funds for reasons unrelated to missionization, such as “Mistress Mayhew,” who received £10 for her “encouragement and support.”<sup>562</sup> Most of the money devoted to the Indian account went to English colonizers, either for them to distribute how they saw fit, or to pay their salaries. We know from previous chapters that the UCNE was willing to lie to the Corporation when it benefited them, and so we must also consider that this version of the Indian account was what the UCNE *wanted* the Corporation to see. There is a possibility, then, that the silver spending situation in New England was more stilted in favor of colonizers than is revealed to us here.

The UCNE convened the next week on September 12<sup>th</sup> to draw the £800 bill of exchange to be sent to the Corporation.<sup>563</sup> This was against the wishes of the Corporation, who a few months prior had asked the UCNE not to draw further bills of exchange, to which the UCNE

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<sup>560</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 261-263.

<sup>561</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 261-263.

<sup>562</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 261-263.

<sup>563</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 264. This second bill of exchange is the one the Corporation refused to pay in full, instead offering £500.

protested that they needed more silver to produce the Indian Bible.<sup>564</sup> But analyzing the UCNE's account of the Indian stock alongside a September 13<sup>th</sup> letter sent by UCNE commissioner and Plymouth Governor Thomas Prence to Hezekiah Usher reveals that they already had enough money to pay for the Indian Bible. In his letter to Usher, Prence reported on the Corporation's status, mentioning the £800 bill of exchange he and the UCNE had created the day before. He warned Usher that there "is some change made concerning [the Corporation's] power," but reassured him that "out of the hopes we have and the encouragement they give that the business will [continue]."<sup>565</sup> Prence proceeded to tell Usher that the "Indian stocke [agrees] with our accounts and is 911=2=4 [911 pounds, 2 shillings, four pence] which we have passed leaving it to the Commissioners of the Massachusetts."<sup>566</sup> This was nearly three times the 352 pounds and 12 shillings they claimed was in the Indian stock in their letter to the Corporation just seven days prior, an amount which they stated justified the drawing of a new bill of exchange worth £800.

Prence continued by telling Usher that, even without the Corporation's assistance, the UCNE could afford the "materials and furthering [of] the printing of the bible," along with "the salaries and other payments," after which "the balance resting in [Usher's] hands will be 414-4-3-1/2."<sup>567</sup> Contrary to what the UCNE told the Corporation regarding the urgency of needing a new £800 bill of exchange, they notified Usher that they could continue operating without that money. As to why they decided to request that figure, it was not because they needed £800 to print the Indian Bible, but because Prence simply "thought it best to charge a bill of eight hundred pounds."<sup>568</sup> The Corporation eventually sent that £800 to the UCNE after it was

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<sup>564</sup> Richard W. Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission to the Indians before King Philip's War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 212.

<sup>565</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 264.

<sup>566</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 264.

<sup>567</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 264.

<sup>568</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 264.

rechartered in 1662.<sup>569</sup> What, then, did the UCNE spend this money on if not on the Bible? There is no evidence they paid praying Indians; more likely it continued to go to English colonizers who either held positions within the UCNE or were crucial to its operation.

### **The United Colonies' Continued Exploitation of Indians**

The UCNE's first responsibility was to defend New England from Indian and European threats, and it tended to view missionization as part of its Indian strategy. Indeed, land-hungry missionaries often benefitted from the UCNE's harsh treatment of Indians. For instance, in 1661 the UCNE worked to forcibly remove Pequot Indians from 500 acres of ancestral lands located in Southertown (an English outpost along the Pawcatuck river), which they created in the aftermath of the Pequot War. The UCNE did this at the request of Daniel Gookin, who wanted the land for himself, asking that the Pequots be moved and "accommodated with some other free lands to plant on."<sup>570</sup> The UCNE noted that they, with the "consent of the said Captain Gookin [Amos] Richardson and Mr Dean Winthorp," would arrange for the Pequots to "quietly and peacefully [have] the lands they have now broken up."<sup>571</sup> Gookin received that land in September 1661, after which he "grant[ed] to the said Pequots after they are Removed from the said lands free liberty to pass and repass to the usual places," what he thought to be a generous consolation.<sup>572</sup> Like other missionaries, Gookin was content living among Indians so long as they recognized their subordinate position.

In this example, the UCNE used their influence to remove Pequots and give their land to Gookin. Gookin's interest in stolen Indian land demonstrates yet again how missionization

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<sup>569</sup> Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission to the Indians before King Philip's War*, 212.

<sup>570</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 266. It is unclear if this is the same 500 acres given to Gookin by Cromwell in 1657.

<sup>571</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 266.

<sup>572</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 266.

worked in the interest of colonizers. In the years following, Gookin would expand his Indian land holdings; receiving 500 acres of land next to the praying town Nashobah in 1665, 50 acres in Worcester in 1674, and 120 acres in the praying town Okommakamesit in 1677.<sup>573</sup> Richard Cogley suggests that Gookin's theft of indigenous land was "sufficiently modest that it would be difficult to argue that he viewed the Superintendency as a vehicle for personal aggrandizement at the Indians' expense."<sup>574</sup> We cannot know whether Gookin viewed missionization as a vehicle for personal gain. However, the evidence proves that the UCNE and its missionaries worked to advance themselves at Indians' expense, and that, in this case specifically, Gookin used the Superintendency to acquire Indian land. Missionization, as Gookin argued in *Doings and Sufferings*, was about the English profiting from converted and subdued praying Indians.

The UCNE was also responsible for collecting and managing wampum tributes from Pequots who survived the war in 1637. They kept this wampum in a designated account, much like the one used for missionization funds. On September 14<sup>th</sup>, 1661, the total amount of wampum reported to be lying in the "Colonies Stocke" was 796 fathoms, with 464 belonging to Massachusetts, 105 to Plymouth, 147 to Connecticut, and 80 to New Haven.<sup>575</sup> With a fathom of wampum equating about 4.5 shillings, this meant that the UCNE had on hand a bit less than £200.<sup>576</sup> According to Mark Peterson, the wampum tribute represented a "substantial sum of money, [in some years] comparable to the total amount that the colony received in taxes from its own citizens in an average year."<sup>577</sup> Anthropologist Lynn Ceci estimates that "about 5,000

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<sup>573</sup> Cogley, 228.

<sup>574</sup> Cogley, 228.

<sup>575</sup> *Acts vol. II*, 270.

<sup>576</sup> This exchange rate is according to Mark Peterson's calculations in *The City-State of Boston*, 51.

<sup>577</sup> Peterson, *City-State*, 52. In 1645 Massachusetts received a 2,000 fathom wampum tribute worth roughly 460 pounds, which according to Peterson was "comparable" to the amount derived from taxes that year.

pounds in English currency [of wampum] entered colonial coffers during this period [~1664], more if double-valued purple beads were included.”<sup>578</sup> According to Cogley, the UCNE withheld from the Corporation the extent of their income as an organization—including wampum tributes—to pretend they were reliant on England for money.<sup>579</sup> The UCNE’s refusal to disclose their access to the wampum tribute leaves little optimism that they truthfully reported missionization expenditures or gave an accurate account of the money available to them. If missionization was an institution run by “conscientious” people who believed they were helping converts, then praying Indians should have been far better supported than they were given the resources (derived from stolen Indian wealth) available to the UCNE.<sup>580</sup>

### **Charles II’s Corporation: Its Ideology and Early Dealings with New England**

The Corporation’s first meeting after being rechartered by Charles II occurred on March 27<sup>th</sup>, 1662. There are few differences in how the Corporation kept its meeting notes before and after the Restoration. One of the more significant stylistic changes is that, between 1656 and 1660, each entry began with “At a court meeting of the Corporation for New England.” After the Restoration, the Corporation amended that opening to “At a Court or Meeting of the Corporation for Propagating of the Gospel amongst the Heathen Natives in New England and parts adjacent in America.” The new Corporation emphasized its role in converting “Heathen Natives” in New England, whereas previously the Corporation professed only to be “for New England.” This

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<sup>578</sup> Lynn Ceci, “Native Wampum as a Peripheral Resource in the Seventeenth-Century World System,” Laurence M. Hauptmann and James D. Wherry, eds., *The Pequots in Southern New England* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 61.

<sup>579</sup> Cogley, 209.

<sup>580</sup> This is Cogley’s language when describing Gookin, who he calls “a conscientious official who wanted to improve the quality of the mission by educating the proselytes about the behavioral norms they were expected to follow and by punishing persons who violated those norms.” Cogley, 229.

reflects Boyle's belief in missionization as an effective colonizing philosophy for dealing with indigenous populations. It also reveals how closely the Cromwellian Corporation associated itself with New England and its development, whereas Charles II's Corporation was more distanced from them, and thus more singularly focused on missionization. One of the subtle changes between the old and new Corporations would be the latter's more limited tolerance for the UCNE's extracurricular usage of funds intended for missionization.

The new Corporation's adjusted focus should not be mistaken as evidence that they were more sympathetic towards "Heathen Natives" than their Cromwellian counterpart. Its colonizing intentions remained the same, what changed was its more narrowed focus on supporting missionization *in* New England, rather than New England as a whole.<sup>581</sup> For Governor Robert Boyle and Treasurer Henry Ashurst, presenting the Corporation as missionization-focused distanced it from its organizational past, where it essentially functioned as a source of political, military, and monetary support to New England colonizers. If they had not made this change, it is unlikely that Charles II would have allowed the Corporation to be rechartered. Functionally, however, the relationship between the Corporation and UCNE during the early 1660s would largely mirror what occurred in the 1650s. Moving closer to the 1670s, however, it was clear that New England and England were constructing two separate visions for how to deal with Indians.

The Corporation met frequently between March and May of 1662 to handle the business of resuming its former operations. They began by auditing missionization related accounts—both theirs and the UCNE's. They also reminded those who rented land and property from the old Corporation that they would need to keep paying the new Corporation.<sup>582</sup> Henry Ashurst was

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<sup>581</sup> This is not to say that the Cromwellian Corporation intended to support New England's development, but that its ideological foundation made it more sympathetic towards that purpose. See chapter three.

<sup>582</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 27<sup>th</sup>, 1662. At this meeting they also received a £150 gift from a "Mr Secretary Morrice."

given his older position of treasurer on April 3<sup>rd</sup> to ensure this process went smoothly. John Hooper also returned as clerk, being given a £40 salary and assigned the role of collecting “all of the rents belonging [to us] thereunto and pay[ing] them into the hands of [Ashurst].”<sup>583</sup> The Corporation resumed payments to New England as well, with Ashurst arranging a payment of “eight hundred pounds for carrying on the printing of the Bible in the Indian language in New England and other business there.”<sup>584</sup> This was in fulfillment of the £800 bill of exchange requested by the UCNE in September 1661, which the Corporation initially refused to pay. As it had been before, the Corporation’s focus was on cultivating their investments in England and sending money to the UCNE. What changed, primarily, was the Corporation’s desire to see that this money was spent specifically on missionization.

In New England, the UCNE worried that the Corporation’s rechartering would drastically change the system they had benefited from in the 1650s. In early 1662 UCNE commissioner Simon Bradstreet and minister John Norton crossed the Atlantic “to report to the Corporation” and convince them that missionization “should be carried on as formerly by such Commissioners as the several Colonies made choice of.”<sup>585</sup> Bradstreet and Norton’s meeting occurred sometime between March and April 1662, just as the Corporation was resuming operations. They had reason to fear that the Corporation would adjust the status quo, given its new ideological and religious foundation, Charles II’s influence, and the frequent concerns about the UCNE’s reliability during the 1650s.

After meeting with Bradstreet and Norton, the Corporation informed the UCNE in April 1662 that they could continue to serve as missionization’s managers in New England. However,

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<sup>583</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1662.

<sup>584</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1662.

<sup>585</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 10<sup>th</sup>, 1662.

they also informed the UCNE that they were drawing too much money from them. Indeed, in 1661 the UCNE had requested not one but two £800 payments, the first of which the Corporation paid in full. They refused to pay the full amount for the second request, offering £500 instead. The Corporation explained that their treasury was nearly empty with rent owed to them being in arrears, in addition to them already having sent New England money that year. They asked that the UCNE “forward the said work with all care and diligence and with all prudence in respect of charge because at present the Corporation stock is very low and the greatest part of their revenue unrighteously withheld from them.”<sup>586</sup> If the UCNE could be frugal with their purchases, and perhaps draw from their own funds, missionization might continue in earnest while the Corporation recuperated. Compared to the old Corporation, which responded liberally to requests for money, the new Corporation already seemed more conservative with its money. They, more than their Cromwellian counterparts, needed to see the UCNE align with its missionary vision if it wanted to keep receiving English money.

Their May 15<sup>th</sup> meeting reveals more about the Corporation’s relationship with the UCNE, while also revealing their focus on managing investments in England. They were particularly concerned with re-acquiring several properties previously owned by them, but which were now contested by those who argued that all purchased made by the Cromwellian Corporation were illegitimate:

“[We are suing Colonel Thomas Bedingfield] and others for the recover of several manors and lands called Ersewell Hall and Chamberlynes in the Parish of Ersewell within the county of Suffolk, which said manors and lands ought in equity to be enjoyed by the said Corporation.”<sup>587</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 10<sup>th</sup>, 1662.

<sup>587</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 15<sup>th</sup>, 1662.

Bedingfield was a Royalist who argued his lands were unjustly seized by the Corporation during the 1650s; now that Charles II had returned, he thought those lands rightfully belonged to him. The Corporation and Bedingfield went on to engage in a legal dispute through 1669. Though the Corporation won, victory came “at great expense in legal fees.”<sup>588</sup> This was indicative of how the Corporation operated in the 1660s, its property and investments taking much of its attention away from managing New England. Whether this was worthwhile is questionable, given they brought in only £440 per year from 1662 to 1690.<sup>589</sup> Given New England’s voracious appetite for silver, the Corporation’s focus on cultivating a guaranteed income makes some sense. Indeed, they often connected their moneymaking efforts to the need to support missionization. For example, in April 1662 Robert Boyle (upon request from others in the Corporation) used his influence with Edward Hyde, Lord Chancellor and Earl of Clarendon to organize “a general contribution for the carrying on the good work of propagating the Gospel amongst the heathens in New England and parts adjacent in America.”<sup>590</sup> None of this meant much for Indians in New England, however. The Corporation’s colonizing ideology was not one sympathetic to Indians, and their efforts were further corrupted by the UCNE, which was increasingly apathetic towards the idea of devoting funds to anything involving Indians—even a missionary project intending to entrench them as inferiors within New England.

Robert Boyle wrote a letter to the UCNE in May that arrived in New England sometime before September 4<sup>th</sup>, 1662, when the UCNE read it at their yearly meeting. Boyle confirmed that Charles II permitted the continuation of the Corporation’s work, and that “most of those Gentlemen that were formerly employed in the like work are authorized and appointed to

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<sup>588</sup> Richard W. Cogley, *John Eliot’s Mission to the Indians before King Philip’s War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 209.

<sup>589</sup> Cogley, 209.

<sup>590</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 10<sup>th</sup>, 1662.

endeavour the Carrying on of the pious design of converting the heathen Native.”<sup>591</sup> But Boyle also critiqued the UCNE’s management of missionization in the 1650s, stating that henceforth there would need to “be a prudent and faithful management of what we send over by the UCNE that we shall appoint in New England and such as they shall employ.”<sup>592</sup> Citing the Corporation’s diminished treasury, Boyle also asked the UCNE to take responsibility in funding missionization themselves, drawing “as little money...for this year to come [from us] as will possibly consist with the not neglecting of what is necessary to be done.”<sup>593</sup> The Corporation’s immediate goal, Boyle reminded the UCNE, was for New England’s Indians to be instructed in the Catechism so as to “conduce unity and order.”<sup>594</sup> He also wanted the UCNE to “consider of some employment in the way of trade and manufactory to employ the Indians.”<sup>595</sup> Boyle’s requests demonstrate his familiarity with the praying towns, where much of this work was already being conducted, albeit with only tacit support from the UCNE. From this point forward, Boyle hoped, the UCNE would play a more active role in integrating missionization within New England.

Mere months had passed since the Corporation’s rechartering, and already it was apparent that several systemic issues plagued New England missionization. The new Corporation was not as amiable to the UCNE as its Cromwellian predecessor, less eager to give money and more forceful in asking New England to pay bills themselves. The UCNE refused to pay for missionization, preferring a colonizing strategy focused on attacking Indian sovereignty. For instance, in 1662 Plymouth used martial force to intimidate the Wampanoag sachem Wamsutta (Massasoit’s eldest son, brother of Metacom or King Philip) to prevent him from selling more

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<sup>591</sup> *Acts Vol. II, 272.*

<sup>592</sup> *Acts Vol. II, 273.*

<sup>593</sup> *Acts Vol. II, 273.*

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<sup>595</sup> *Acts Vol. II, 273.*

land to Rhode Island, which was not part of the UCNE. Wamsutta died while being transported to Plymouth to negotiate with English officials, possibly the result of poisoning, but if not then almost certainly related to his “humiliating detainment and interrogation.”<sup>596</sup> The UCNE would continue to use bullying tactics and deceptive treaties when dealing with King Philip after Wamsutta’s death.

The UCNE’s refusal to fund missionization was a result of choice rather than necessity. Given the wampum tributes they received from Indians in southern New England and Long Island—a source of income they never reported to the Corporation—they were stronger economically than their counterparts in London.<sup>597</sup> Meanwhile, the Corporation was fully invested in missionization, but its implementation left much to be desired for praying Indians seeking to integrate within English society. In 1663 Caleb Cheeshateaumauk, the only praying Indian to graduate from Harvard’s Indian college, wrote a letter to the Corporation (which he calls “Most honored benefactors”) that is “considered to be the first extant writing by a Native American from the North American continent.”<sup>598</sup> The letter references the story of Orpheus, and Drew Lopenzina argues that it is “engaging in a process of weaving the elements of two traditions together in an attempt to locate common ground.”<sup>599</sup> However, it also speaks to Cheeshateaumauk’s awareness of “a white European hegemon that views its destiny on the

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<sup>596</sup> Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip’s War: The Conflict Over New England* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), 47–48; Drew Lopenzina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period*, 148.

<sup>597</sup> Lynn Ceci, “Native Wampum as a Peripheral Resource in the Seventeenth-Century World-System,” Hauptman and Wherry, eds., *Pequots in Southern New England*, 61–62; Cogley, 209.

<sup>598</sup> Drew Lopenzina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period*, 132. The letter is printed in Wolfgang Hochbruck and Beatrix Dudensing-Reichel, “‘Honoratissimi Benefactores’: Native American Students and Two Seventeenth-Century Texts in the University Tradition,” Helen Jaskoski, ed., *Early Native American Writing: New Critical Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5.

<sup>599</sup> Drew Lopenzina, 132.

American continent as manifest,” employing a “medium that [he thinks] seems to matter to [Indians’] aggressive neighbors.”<sup>600</sup>

Cheeshateumauk’s message was clear: praying Indians were willing to find ways to assimilate themselves within English society—would colonizers accept them as equals? Cheeshateumauk died two years later of consumption, with Gookin claiming that “he wanted not for the best means the country could afford, both of food and physic.”<sup>601</sup> Given what we know of Gookin’s disregard for Indian life, and of how the UCNE and Corporation managed missionization in way that deprived Indians of resources, it seems unlikely that colonizers made a real effort to nurse Cheeshateumauk back to health. If they valued Cheeshateumauk at all, it was for his ability to attract more donors to the Corporation, not because they cared for his wellbeing. Praying Indians suffered both because of the UCNE’s preference for martial force and bullying tactics in its dealings with Indians, and the Corporation’s belief in missionization as a colonizing ideology that subordinated Indians beneath the English.

### **Making Missionization Work for English Colonizers**

The UCNE met on September 4<sup>th</sup>, 1662 to reply to Boyle’s May 15<sup>th</sup> letter. Their response emphasized the apparent success of the Indian College at Harvard, the publication of the Indian Bible’s New Testament, and the work of Eliot and Mayhew Sr. in Natick and Martha’s Vineyard. However, they also cautioned against too much optimism regarding missionization’s future in New England. Indians they argued, were “beheld in their own savage ways and customs [and] there is very little more of the relics of the glorious image put upon our

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<sup>600</sup> Drew Lopezina, 133.

<sup>601</sup> Gookin, *Historical Collections*, 73.

first parents to be seen in them; then this is that they are of that race.”<sup>602</sup> Thirteen years prior to King Philip’s War, the UCNE had already made clear their belief that Indians lacked the potential to equal the English. Seeing little point in devoting too much towards proselytizing Indians, the UCNE asked the Corporation to provide the £200 needed to complete the printing of the New Testament.<sup>603</sup> Contrary to Boyle’s request, the UCNE refused to invest any of its own money into the endeavor.

The UCNE also provided a list of expenditures derived from the Indian stock, adding that the Corporation would find no evidence of embezzling or other malignant spending practices:

“you will plainly see that neither our colonies nor particular governments have been any diminishers thereof; but the whole is improved according to the will of the doners; and for the future we shall be ready to observe the more particular directions of your honors; humbly intreating this favor that no information or complaint may be received against us to the prejudice of our trust until we have first had advice thereof with a seasonable opportunity to return answer thereto.”<sup>604</sup>

The UCNE requested that the Corporation refrain from critiquing its spending practices before it was able to defend itself, speaking more to its guilt than its innocence, especially since we know they left vast sums of income unreported to the Corporation.

The UCNE’s 1662 account of the Indian stock was nearly identical to the one provided for 1661. It again listed several costs related to missionization, equaling 728 pounds, 8 shillings, and 6 pence. They then subtracted this amount from the 1214 pounds, 4 shillings, and 3 pence in the stock—a number derived by adding the 414 pounds, 4 shillings, and 3 pence supposedly remaining in Usher’s hands to the £800 requested of the Corporation. This left Usher 485 pounds, 5 shillings, and 9 pence to spend on “the printing and those that make disbursements on the accounts of those youthes that are brought up to learning,” costs which totaled 237 pounds

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<sup>602</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 274.

<sup>603</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 274.

<sup>604</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 276.

and 5 shillings.<sup>605</sup> According to these numbers, Usher would be left with 248 pounds and 9 pence once all expenses had been paid for. Unlike in 1661, there is no record of how much money was really left in Usher's hands, but it assuredly exceeded the number reported here.

It is important to contextualize the UCNE's Indian stock against what little funding was provided to praying Indians. Recall how Boyle asked the UCNE in May to devote their resources to training praying Indians in "manufactory," a request echoed by Daniel Gookin in September, when he proposed "for allowing some encouragement towards the Employing of the Indians at Natick in spinning or manufactory."<sup>606</sup> The UCNE's response was to allot "ten pounds for that end; provided that stock be kept entire and the Indians to receive benefit of their labors and to...put into the hands of such as the UCNE of the Massachusetts shall appoint."<sup>607</sup> Not only was ten pounds a small sum compared to the total amount available, but it was to be doled out by English colonizers selected by Massachusetts commissioners Simon Bradstreet—a member of the settler colonial Atherton Company—and Daniel Denison—Artillery Company member and owner of Niantic land on Block Island—rather than given directly to praying Indians in Natick.

Despite Boyle making "manufactory" a priority alongside translating and printing religious texts into Indian languages, the UCNE devoted little to the former compared to the latter. Unlike the Indian Bible, which was an effective advertising tool capable of attracting donors in England, equipping and training praying Indians with the tools and knowledge to be self-sufficient did nothing to immediately benefit colonizers. If anything, most colonizers feared the idea of self-sufficient praying Indians living in their midst. They distrusted the idea that Indians were capable of self-sufficiency in the first place—recall how Eliot refused to allow

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<sup>605</sup> This quote and the entirety of the UCNE's account for the Indian stock in 1662 can be found in *Acts Vol. II*, 277-278.

<sup>606</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 280.

<sup>607</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 280.

Indians to construct the Natick meetinghouse, and the UCNE's repeated sentiment that Indians showed little evidence of becoming civilized like the English. Missionization was constructed to benefit colonizers. Indian converts were necessary insofar as their presence was needed to convince England that New England was worth supporting. In the few instances that Indians did receive funds from the UCNE, they were beholden to men who profited from Indian suffering like Bradstreet and Denison.

The UCNE used coercion to compel some Indians to convert and maintain the image of a successful missionary project. This is captured by their strategy to train Indian scholars using money from the Indian stock. In 1662 they told Thomas Weld of Roxbury to send Indian scholars training under him to Harvard by the end of the year.<sup>608</sup> They reassured Weld that they would replace them "another youth now sent from Martha's Vineyard that came to him about the 9th of this instant and another Pequot youth if he may be procured."<sup>609</sup> "Procuring" was a euphemism, as the record suggests that Pequots did not willingly release their children to English colonizers. In this instance, the UCNE's "procuring" of a Pequot youth was related to the Pequot lands in Southertown stolen on behalf of Daniel Gookin. When the UCNE sent Captain Daniel Denison, Thomas Stanton, and James Auerell to what was now Gookin's land to address "all matters of controversy and difference that may arise between any of the English about Pawcatuck and the said Indians," they also told them to "Improve their Interest with the said Pequots to procure some towardly youth to be brought up in learning for future service and to send him up to Mr Weld of Roxbury."<sup>610</sup> While many Indians chose Christianity willingly and used it as a means of

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<sup>608</sup> This was the son of Thomas Weld, the missionary who wrote *First Fruits* (1643) alongside New England missionization critic Hugh Peter.

<sup>609</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 280-81.

<sup>610</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 280-81.

empowerment, some, like this anonymous Pequot youth, were forced or coerced into that role after their land had been taken by colonizers.

Indians who refused missionization and displeased the UCNE or Superintendent Gookin risked having their lands taken and being sold into slavery.<sup>611</sup> In 1662, Thomas Minors of Southertown complained to the Massachusetts General Court “of great abuses and Injuries which he suffered by the Narragansett Indians under the sachem Shawattocke [Shamatocke] by detaining and concealing his horses.”<sup>612</sup> The Court asked Daniel Gookin, whose land neighbored Minors’, to intercede on his behalf. Gookin reported that “satisfaction hath been demanded of the said Shawattocke,” but that he had “been affronted and could obtain nothing but frivolous answers,” leading to Gookin ordering Shamatocke to appear before the UCNE. Shamatocke refused, instead sending a subordinate named House, who stated that Shamatocke “knew no reason why he should pay anything to Thomas Minor; seeing he had his mares again.”<sup>613</sup> Despite House’s revelation that Shamatocke returned Minors’ horses, the UCNE concluded that Shamatocke must pay £20, with £15 going to Minors and £5 to the UCNE for threatening “the peace of the country.”<sup>614</sup> If Shamatocke refused payment, two of his closest men would be “apprehended and sold to such person or persons as will pay the said sum of 20 who are [then] empowered to transport them out of the country or otherwise dispose of them as they shall see [fit].”<sup>615</sup> Additionally, Captain Denison, Thomas Stanton, and the “Constables of Southerton” would be authorized to “seize so much more of the said Sachems estate as may make meet

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<sup>611</sup> This provides an additional layer to Denison, Stanton, and Auerell’s journey to “procure” a Pequot youth. The Pequots no doubt knew that if they did not comply, they faced severe consequences.

<sup>612</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 281.

<sup>613</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 281.

<sup>614</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 281.

<sup>615</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 281.

satisfaction to themselves.”<sup>616</sup> When Indians went against the will of the UCNE and Gookin, they risked fines, dispossession, slavery, and execution. The English dealt harshly with Indians who refused their orders and did not embrace missionization.

The UCNE again interceded on Gookin’s behalf with respect to a land dispute with Rhode Island, which in 1662 had yet to receive a Royal Charter.<sup>617</sup> Rhode Islanders had begun settling Gookin’s land and threatened to jail Gookin’s tenants, “drive away his cattle, [cut] his grass,” and worst of all, gave “ill example to the Pequot Indians that are in subjection to us, by profaning the sabbath and selling great quantities of liquors to them.”<sup>618</sup> Rhode Island’s General Court also ordered Gookin to “forebeare any further or future possession of any of the lands at or about Pawcatuck as they will answer the contrary at their peril.”<sup>619</sup> What likely spurred the UCNE to action was Rhode Island’s threat that it would help Pequots resist both missionization and English control over the land.

The UCNE responded by brandishing the Charter of Incorporation recently granted to them by Charles II, arguing that England had chosen them and not Rhode Island as the legitimate colonizers of New England. They implicitly suggested that Charles II favored the UCNE’s method of dealing with Indians, which included missionization. The UCNE ordered Rhode Island “to withdraw themselves and desist from future disturbance; otherwise [we assure] you that the United Colonies are engaged to assist and defend each other in their just Rights and possessions.”<sup>620</sup> In this instance the UCNE fulfilled its role as a governing body designed to defend and advance the interests of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven.

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<sup>616</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 281.

<sup>617</sup> That would come a year later, in July 1663. Benedict Arnold—great-grandfather of the Revolutionary War general—became the colony’s first Governor.

<sup>618</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 288.

<sup>619</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 288.

<sup>620</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 288.

This included vouching for Superintendent Gookin and his stolen Indian land and preventing Rhode Island from interfering with its management of Indians. The UCNE was unafraid to use its power to defend English colonizers. This came at Indians' expense, as the UCNE's defense of Gookin left the Pequots in Southertown susceptible to having its population taken by missionaries or enslaved by coercive colonizers.

### **The Corporation's Failed Attempts to Regulate the UCNE, 1663-1666**

The Corporation received the UCNE's September 1662 letters in April 1663. While "perus[ing] the accounts sent from new England the last year," they noticed something strange about the UCNE's expenditures:

"[There is] moneys laid out for books and gratuites to several persons which (in regard of the smallness of the Revenue) they conceive might be forborne, [and that] the Commissioners for the United Colonies may be desired in the next general letter sent over unto them from this Corporation to forebears the same unless the said Commissioners do find [payment] of absolute necessity."<sup>621</sup>

The Corporation had caught on to the UCNE's habit of sending frequent small payments to people who had no connection to missionization. Given the Corporation's reduced income in the 1660s, they preferred that these payments be extirpated, in favor of a policy concerned primarily with funding missionaries like Eliot. Notably, they left in that the UCNE would still be allowed to make extraneous payments if they found it "of absolute necessity," revealing how the Corporation ultimately bended to the will of New England colonizers with respect to their vision for missionization. There was another instance of this occurring in 1663—the Corporation told the UCNE to end payments to Gookin, deeming his Superintendency to be a position that should

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<sup>621</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 9<sup>th</sup>, 1663.

be paid by colonizers, but they relented after pushback from both the UCNE and Eliot.<sup>622</sup> While the Corporation and UCNE's philosophies towards missionization differed, each acted in colonizers' best interest when given the choice, leading to the further marginalization of Indians.

The Corporation's halfhearted attempts to regulate the UCNE was the result of their fixation on managing its land and property. Of particular concern was Ersewell Manor and Chamberlynes Farm, in which the Corporation battled Colonel Thomas Bedingfield for ownership. Recall that Bedingfield had declared all property sales made during Cromwell's reign to be invalid. He further argued that the Corporation had used its influence with Cromwell to undersell him by £2,000.<sup>623</sup> In August 1663 the Corporation opened a lawsuit against Bedingfield, on which they spent 132 pounds, 6 shillings, and 6 pence in legal fees to their attorney John Cressett.<sup>624</sup> Ironically, it was the Corporation's connection to Charles II and Lord Chancellor Edward Hyde, not Cromwell, that won them the case.<sup>625</sup> The drama at Ersewell Manor continued, however, for several years after Bedingfield's defeat. The tenant who the Corporation rented the manor to, John Cheston, proved to be uncooperative. In 1665 they entrusted Cheston with £150 to renovate Ersewell, only to have him refuse to pay rent soon after. On October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1668, the Corporation ordered Cheston's arrest. Then, in November, Cheston agreed to pay the Corporation "the sum of £580 for arrears of rent," to be divided into several smaller payments.<sup>626</sup>

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<sup>622</sup> Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission to the Indians before King Philip's War*, 227. Eliot and Gookin were good friends. In 1666 they became family after John Eliot Jr. and Elizabeth Gookin married. This contributed to Eliot's lobbying in favor of maintaining Gookin's salary.

<sup>623</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1663.

<sup>624</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, August 19<sup>th</sup>, 1663.

<sup>625</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, July 31<sup>st</sup>, 1663.

<sup>626</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1668, and November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1668.

The trouble over Ersewell Manor does not, of course, directly relate to the Corporation's management of New England missionization. Its significance lies in that it was the Corporation's primary focus throughout the 1660s, with nearly every meeting devoted to it. Of the 21 meetings held between its rechartering in 1662 and the eve of the Great Fire of London in 1666, only 10 mentioned missionization, the majority being in 1662 and 1663. Bedingfield, Cheston, and other activities relating to monetary collection were discussed in 19 meetings, often at length. Additionally, the Corporation's meetings after returning from the fire in 1668 also focused on property management rather than missionization.<sup>627</sup> Though the Corporation's meetings reveal little, there are clues about how they managed missionization prior to 1666.

In April 1663 the Corporation informed the UCNE that its treasury was bare, and that their focus would be on building up its strength. Boyle specifically cited their trouble managing Ersewell Manor as well as other property investments as why they could no longer support the UCNE to the extent it did in the 1650s. The Corporation's annual income, he noted, had been reduced to £320, and this was devoted to "officers salaries [and] a chargeable suit for an estate we bought at about five hundred pound per annum."<sup>628</sup> Rather than cut costs in London, Boyle asked the UCNE to print fewer copies of the Indian Bible and forebear "charges concerning mistress Mayhew, Matthew Mayhew, Mr Stanton's son, Captain Gookin; extraordinary gifts to Indians; or any other expenses that you upon your place shall think fit to be spared."<sup>629</sup> As mentioned previously, Boyle was citing payments he viewed as extraneous to missionization. It

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<sup>627</sup> Between February 20<sup>th</sup>, 1666, and September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1668, the Corporation did not meet thanks to the Great Fire of London and an outbreak of plague, which destroyed Corporation property and killed several of its members.

<sup>628</sup> Robert Boyle to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, April 9<sup>th</sup>, 1663, in *Acts Vol. II*, 291.

<sup>629</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 291.

made little sense for the Corporation to curtail its spending if there were easier cuts to be made by the UCNE.

The transatlantic bickering between the Corporation and UCNE did little to improve the situation for praying Indians. English officials in London and New England wrestling over whose salaries were justifiable did not make it easier for them to convert to Christianity, nor did it improve the material conditions of their lives. Indeed, in 1664 the UCNE ignored requests from Eliot that John Sassamon be supported in his effort to teach King Philip to read, which had been going so successfully that Philip specifically asked Eliot to provide him reading materials that ostensibly never arrived.<sup>630</sup> The UCNE and Corporation were reluctant to use missionization to improve relations with Indians, likely because neither seriously believed in a society where English colonizers and Indians lived as equals. Revealingly, the Indian Bible lauded as missionization's great achievement and cited as evidence that missionization catered to Indians, was, in the very year of its publication, first on Boyle's list of proposed spending cuts. For the Corporation and UCNE, praying Indians' needs were secondary to their own, leaving them in an increasingly vulnerable position.

The Corporation still managed to find ways to send money to the UCNE despite its strained treasury and Boyle's desire for spending cuts. Indeed, in 1663 Boyle was the one who suggested that the Corporation send Spanish pieces of eight to New England in lieu of English silver. Boyle reasoned that this the optimal solution, as it saved the Corporation money while allowing the UCNE to continue sending salaries to whomever it wanted (pieces of eight were valued more in New England than in England).<sup>631</sup> Sending 433 pieces of eight to the UCNE cost

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<sup>630</sup> John Eliot, "Letter to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, 25 Sept. 1664," *Acts Vol. II*, 383–384.

<sup>631</sup> See chapter three.

the Corporation only “one hundred pounds sterling.”<sup>632</sup> If this proved unsatisfactory to the UCNE, Boyle said they could melt it down “into your coin and according to your standard.”<sup>633</sup> Given the silver shortage in New England, and Hezekiah Usher’s connection to mintmaster John Hull, this was likely something the UCNE had already been doing. Boyle’s continued backing of the UCNE demonstrates that his zealous support for missionization did not benefit Indians. Time and again, colonizers proved that supporting missionization did not mean supporting Indians.

The UCNE replied to Boyle in a letter dated September 18<sup>th</sup>, 1663. They thanked the Corporation for accepting their previous bill of exchange valued at £500 and for the Spanish pieces of eight, which they converted to £117 of New England currency. They were predictably incensed by Boyle’s scrutinization of their accounts, first citing the difficulty “of making particular payments and keeping accounts which we can not with any conveniency attend [to] living dispersed in the Country and seldom meeting together once in the year.”<sup>634</sup> They refused to end payments to Mistress Mayhew, Matthew Mayhew, and Daniel Gookin, stating that they had already agreed to pay them for that year. They defended Mistress Mayhew’s annual £6 payment at length, citing how her late husband Thomas Mayhew Jr. was one “whom god made instrumental for the spiritual good of very many of the poor Natives of Martha’s Vineyard.”<sup>635</sup> In the end they did end payments to her, but not before reminding the Corporation that they were depriving a “poor desolate widow with six children.”<sup>636</sup>

The UCNE’s defense of Daniel Gookin’s salary was more vigorous. Revealing that they had “spoken with Mr Eliot” about the matter, the UCNE recounted Gookin’s role “among the

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<sup>632</sup> Boyle to the UCNE, *Acts Vol. II*, 292.

<sup>633</sup> Boyle to the UCNE, *Acts Vol. II*, 292.

<sup>634</sup> The Commissioners of the United Colonies to Robert Boyle, September 18th, 1663, *Acts Vol. II*, 293.

<sup>635</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Acts Vol. II*, 293.

<sup>636</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Acts Vol. II*, 294.

Indians in governing them in several plantations [and] ordering their town's affairs (which they are not able to do of themselves)."<sup>637</sup> Casting Gookin as crucial to missionization's success, the UCNE concluded that they would continue paying £15 "towards his expenses."<sup>638</sup> That the UCNE sought Eliot for support reveals they knew of his connection to the Corporation. Certainly, if the Corporation did not take their word for it, they would believe Eliot.<sup>639</sup> Ultimately, while the Corporation of the 1660s sought to regulate the UCNE more vigorously than their Cromwellian counterparts, they failed to drastically alter the course of New England missionization. The UCNE concluded their letter to the Corporation by requesting £400, £100 less than the year prior. They again added their account of the Indian stock, this time reporting total available funds at 1102 pounds, 16 shillings, and 4 pence and total expenses equating 598 pounds and 3 shillings, leaving 504 pounds, 13 shillings, and 4 pence in Usher's hands.<sup>640</sup>

With Boyle finding it difficult to regulate the UCNE, he turned his attention instead to the Corporation, ordering an audit of its accounts and treasury in a February 26<sup>th</sup>, 1664 meeting. The Corporation's treasury consisted of a locked chest requiring three keys to open. One key each was given to Henry Ashurst, George Clarke, and Thomas Gillibrand, with Ashurst ultimately being "accomptable unto this corporation at the usual times wherein the accounts of the same shall be audited."<sup>641</sup> Accordingly, when the Corporation performed the internal audit of its treasury in 1664, Ashurst, Clarke, and Gillibrand were among the members tasked with verifying

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<sup>637</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 294.

<sup>638</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Acts Vol. II*, 294.

<sup>639</sup> For instance, despite Marmaduke Johnson's apparently subpar performance as a printer, Boyle requested that the UCNE continue to employ him based on Eliot's recommendation. The UCNE complied, though not without reservation, stating that, while they would continue to employ Johnson, they preferred their own printer, Samuel Green. See Boyle's letter to the UCNE is dated April 9<sup>th</sup>, 1663, and the UCNE's reply is dated September 18<sup>th</sup>, 1663, both in *Acts Vol. II*.

<sup>640</sup> "Account of the Indian Stock," September 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1663, *Acts Vol. II*, 296-297.

<sup>641</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, February 26<sup>th</sup>, 1664.

its accounts. Whatever they found is unknown, as their report was struck from the Corporation's meeting minutes for May 13<sup>th</sup>, 1664.<sup>642</sup>

Boyles next letter to the UCNE, sent March 7<sup>th</sup>, 1664, demonstrated more willingness to spend whatever was necessary to satisfy the UCNE's needs. Apparently moved by the UCNE's account of Mistress Mayhew's plight, he agreed to let her £6 allowance be "continued until further order."<sup>643</sup> He also shifted his position on Gookin, citing the UCNE's and Eliot's characterization of him as a "useful instrument amongst the Indians" as reason to continue paying him his £15 salary.<sup>644</sup> He denied, however, the UCNE's request that Hezekiah Usher be paid a salary equal to twenty percent of the silver sent to New England. Instead, he countered that it be "very reasonable and meet that Mr Usher allow 15 or 14 at least percent for all such money as shall be drawn upon us."<sup>645</sup> Boyle added that, for the foreseeable future, this would be paid to John Harwood in London, who would then give it to Usher at a later date.<sup>646</sup> This was a severe blow to Usher, as £500 sent from England converted at 14% meant £70, whereas it equaled £100 converted at 20%. This may seem insignificant, but consider again Usher's connection to Massachusetts Mintmaster John Hull, and that £30 was often more than the total amount given directly to praying Indians and double Gookin's salary.

The UCNE replied to Boyle's letter on September 10<sup>th</sup>, 1664. They began by lamenting "the Devil and the old Dragon" impeding the progress of missionization. Turning to the issue of

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<sup>642</sup> The report struck out contained information regarding the inspection of "the accounts of this Corporation and for inspecting Mr Cressetts account, and making allowances for persons for extrordinary paines: sitting at Coopers Hall." The "extrordinary paines" referred to the labor conducted by Corporation members to advance its agenda in England and New England. See Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 13<sup>th</sup>, 1664.

<sup>643</sup> Robert Boyle to the UCNE, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 1664, *Acts Vol. II*, 313.

<sup>644</sup> Boyle to the UCNE, *Acts Vol. II*, 314.

<sup>645</sup> Boyle to the UCNE, *Acts Vol. II*, 313.

<sup>646</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 313.

Usher's fee, they reported that they will "urge and persuade to our utmost to allow after 14 percent," but that it would be "difficult to draw him [Usher] thereunto" to accept those terms.<sup>647</sup> "[N]or doe wee know," they added, "any marchant heer (whom we may confide in) that will give that allowance [of 14 percent]; nor is Mr Usher willing to disburse moneys beforehand upon those terms."<sup>648</sup> The solution, from the UCNE's perspective, was to ask for more money from the Corporation to make up the 6% difference. Whereas in 1663 they requested £400, now they asked for £500, which covered the £30 difference created by the lower 14% allowance and would be used "to defray the next year's expenses."<sup>649</sup>

The UCNE closed by referencing a letter that the Corporation sent to Eliot, in which they asked the missionary "how a greater revenue might best be improved for the furtherance of this good work."<sup>650</sup> Answering for Eliot, the UCNE admitted that they "find it easier to expend money than to improve [i.e. invest] it to any good advantage," limiting them to the strategy of "settling fit instruments amongst [Indians] to teach and instruct themselves and children."<sup>651</sup> Of course, the UCNE had the wherewithal to know how to invest money sent to them from England, and they surely benefitted from the "improvement" of the funds sent from England. They simply had no intention of giving England an excuse to stop sending them money, or of applying that money directly to programs that would assist Indians.

The Corporation continued to believe the UCNE's arguments, perhaps distracted by their desire to manage a growing collection of properties in England. Indeed, on May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1664, they

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<sup>647</sup> The UCNE to Robert Boyle, September 10<sup>th</sup>, 1664, in *Acts Vol. II*, 315.

<sup>648</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 315. By this they referred to the practice of Usher paying the UCNE with his own money before he was reimbursed by the Corporation. There is an example of this in chapter three, where Usher arrived in England seeking repayment for a bill of exchange that he, unbeknownst to the Corporation, had already paid to the UCNE.

<sup>649</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 315.

<sup>650</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 315.

<sup>651</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 315.

“deputed” their clerk John Hooper to act as their official collector of rents. Hooper received a £25 salary and would also have to pay Henry Ashurst a £400 “bond for security, & account with [him] 4 times in the year, yearly.”<sup>652</sup> Despite the wealth of the Corporation’s individual members—even its clerk could afford a £400 bond—as an organization they were proportionately stingy about funding certain aspects of missionization. Even in instances where the Corporation was convinced about the necessity of New England’s efforts, such as the creation of Eliot’s Indian Bible, they typically opted to pay as little as they could. At their May 17<sup>th</sup> meeting, for instance, they quibbled over how much to pay Eliot for “his extraordinary pains in translating the bible into the Indian language.”<sup>653</sup> Some wished to pay Eliot £100 for his work, but this was quickly cut to the lesser sum of £50. They also discussed paying him an additional £100 in 1664 and a £50 bonus in 1665 “upon the finishing of the books that are now printing in the Indian language in N.E,” but canceled that as well.<sup>654</sup> In the end they wrote that they would “consider of a further reward for him” at a later date.<sup>655</sup> Even Eliot, whom the Corporation viewed as integral to missionization’s success, could in the 1660s rely only on minimal support from England.

The conflict between the Corporation and UCNE in the 1660s was further inflamed by a key event in 1664—the arrival in New England of Charles II’s royal commission, which, among other things, sought to re-establish England’s authority over the colonies that had maintained close ties to Cromwell.<sup>656</sup> The royal commissioners were unimpressed by Massachusetts’ handling of Indian relations, in particular the establishment of the 1658 Atherton Company and

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<sup>652</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1664.

<sup>653</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1664.

<sup>654</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1664.

<sup>655</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1664.

<sup>656</sup> Daniel R. Mandell, *The Lost Tradition of Economic Equality in America, 1600–1870* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2020), 29.

the Atherton Deed of 1660 (named after former Superintendent of the praying Indians Humphrey Atherton), which were designed to allow colonizers to take Narragansett land and weaken Rhode Island.<sup>657</sup> Ultimately, Charles II's commissioners "rejected the Atherton Deed as fraudulent," while also giving King Philip their blessing that he had the right to retain "autonomy and rights to land."<sup>658</sup> In protecting the sovereignty of Narragansetts and Wampanoags, the royal commissioners made no allies among the UCNE, who viewed both tribes as major threats. This situation coincided with the Corporation's newfound allegiance to Charles II and its insistence that the UCNE focus specifically on missionization rather than other strategies to manage New England's Indian population, specifically sovereign tribes like the Narragansetts and Wampanoags. Ultimately, these trends indicated the extent to which the relationship between missionization's managers in England and New England had changed after Charles II's return, and explains why the Corporation and UCNE found themselves disagreeing with each other more often as the 1670s approached.

The Corporation's first 1665 meeting occurred in March and concerned rent collection and London's taxes on Corporation property.<sup>659</sup> Over a year passed before they discussed missionization again, agreeing to pay a bill of exchange valued at £400 to John Harwood on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1666. They denied the UCNE's request for £500, which they had asked for to make up for Usher's reduced salary. The Corporation also reported that Eliot wanted his salary of £50 be "disposed unto such as Mr Ashurst & Mr Bell...shall think fit."<sup>660</sup> Eliot's decision is curious given his constant requests for more funding. Why he chose to relinquish his salary to the Corporation remains a mystery. Most likely, he saw more value in building relations with

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<sup>657</sup> Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: The Conflict Over New England*, 42.

<sup>658</sup> Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: The Conflict Over New England*, 42, 48.

<sup>659</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes March 18<sup>th</sup>, 1665

<sup>660</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1666.

England than in investing that money towards assisting praying Indians, who he deemed unworthy or incapable of handling such resources. It is also possible that, given the UCNE's refusal to cut spending, Eliot took it upon himself to help the Corporation eke out more resources for missionization.

On September 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1666, the Great Fire of London swept through the city and paralyzed the Corporation, destroying much of its property and killing several of its members. The fire was accompanied by a deadly plague, which ravaged London's population through the next year. Understandably, the Corporation was unable to meet, and all correspondence to New England ceased until Boyle sent a letter to the UCNE on June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1668. Several Corporation members had died or left the organization, leaving nineteen positions unfilled. 1666 thus represented another point of transition for the Corporation, much like 1660. The organization that rose from the ashes of London's inferno was even more aggressive about pursuing its agenda in New England. Many of its original members, as well as those who had taken on significant roles after Charles II's return, were gone, replaced by a new generation that included former Cromwellians like William Pennoyer. This new version of the Corporation, which blended aspects from its Cromwellian and post-Restoration counterparts, would try and fail to manage New England missionization in the years leading to King Philip's War.

## Chapter Five

### Missionization on the Eve of King Philip's War

“From the fifteenth century and before, the missions had all along served as a part of the rationale for European colonialist and imperialist aspirations.”<sup>661</sup>

— Cedric J. Robinson

Nathaniel Saltonstall's 1675 account of King Philip's War, entitled *The Present State of New England*, argued that the Wampanoag's supposed treachery proved no Indians could be trusted, least of all the Christian converts who lived in colonizers' midst. Like Saltonstall, most New England colonizers believed praying Indians intended to betray them when expedient. They were, Saltonstall argued, less praying Indians and more “*Preying Indians*,” in that “that have made Preys of much English Blood.”<sup>662</sup> Saltonstall's language was, perhaps unsurprisingly, directly connected to the Corporation and the UCNE, as he credited Hezekiah Usher as the one who first used “preying” instead of “praying” in reference to converted Indians. Usher was prejudiced towards praying Indians despite working since 1656 to further missionization in New England, proving that working to expand the missionary project often emerged from a place of self-interest rather than from a desire to see Indians as equals within English society.

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<sup>661</sup> Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of The Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 215.

<sup>662</sup> Nathaniel Saltonstall, *The present state of New-England, with respect to the Indian war : Wherein is an account of the true reason thereof, (as far as can be judged by men.) : Together with most of the remarkable passages that have happened from the 20th of June, till the 10th of November, 1675* (London: 1675), 19.

Preceding chapters demonstrated how the Corporation, UCNE, and individual missionaries like Eliot rarely held Indians' interests at heart. At best they were ambivalent towards Indians, and at worst they sought to destroy them. King Philip's War was significant because it made clear that New England colonizers wanted to prioritize conquest over missionization as its colonizing strategy. This does not mean that missionization, as directed by the Corporation and UCNE, helped Indians, indeed it created the situation that allowed colonizers to pursue war. Missionization prejudiced colonizers against Indians long before 1675, being, by definition, an institution that chooses potential converts based on the idea that their culture and religion are inferior, and which only exists in colonized spaces featuring uneven power structures.<sup>663</sup> Further, the English in charge of the Corporation and UCNE had demonstrated time and again between 1646 and 1675 how their interests superseded those of converts.

Why would the UCNE pursue something like King Philip's War? For one, it would allow them to remove sovereign Indians from its borders—part of their agenda since 1643. Secondly, by killing or enslaving most of the Indians living in New England, the UCNE could reduce the size and scope of future missionary projects and thus eliminate the Corporation's influence over them. Missionization persisted after King Philip's War, but in a smaller capacity that survived

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<sup>663</sup> Here I am using a definition for missionization that has emerged out of Native American Studies and Filipino American Studies, or Critical Ethnic Studies in general. Drew Lopezina notes that missionization only occurs "within a colonized space," and that Indians who choose conversion do so because it is the best way to survive amongst colonizers who already hate and distrust them. He goes on to say that colonized spaces featuring missionization are liable to develop into spaces of martial conflict: "Resistance may be fully anticipated and even assumed, but historically speaking, it remains difficult to pinpoint its locus unless it erupts in outright rebellion." E.J.R. David notes that missionization uses conversion as a weapon to conduct cultural erasure and "inculcate" within the minds of marginalized people the idea that the converting culture is somehow superior. See Drew Lopezina, *Red Ink: Native Americans Picking Up the Pen in the Colonial Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012) 18; and E.J.R. David, *We Have Not Stopped Trembling Yet: Letters To My Filipino-Athabaskan Family* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018), 156.

primarily within the praying towns at Natick and Martha's Vineyard, and in a way that no longer received much Corporation oversight. The war also revealed how New England would no longer accept the presence of Indians, even if that presence had been limited to fourteen praying towns dedicated to ensuring that Native converts did not obstruct the expansionary desires of English colonizers. To be sure, it had been missionization that enflamed conflict in the first place, given that it angered King Philip to such an extent, had been responsible for placing John Sassamon and other Indians in a position that necessitated their conversion to Christianity to survive, had provided the UCNE with the money it needed to pursue its colonizing agenda, and had been what convinced English merchants and politicians in London to actively participate in the shaping of the New England colonies. King Philip's War was the natural if not inevitable conclusion to the missionary project created and directed by the Corporation and UCNE.

As Drew Lopenzina has argued, the presence of an inherently prejudicial system like missionization sows the seeds of rebellion and ensures that conflict between colonizer and colonized is practically inevitable.<sup>664</sup> As we shall see, the Corporation's heavy-handedness in desiring to see missionization continue in New England as it had prior to 1675 put it at odds with the UCNE, which caused further destabilization as both organizations began endorsing different colonizing strategies for New England. This perhaps explains why men like John Eliot and Daniel Gookin—both more aligned with the Corporation—became enemies in the eyes of so many New England colonizers during the war. It was not their supposed desire to see Indians as equals, but the fact that they continued to support a mode of colonization no longer prioritized by the UCNE. Ironically, even if the Corporation had been able to prevent a war in 1675, it probably would have happened anyways due to the situation that they and the UCNE had created in New

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<sup>664</sup> Lopenzina, *Red Ink*, 18.

England. The conflict between the UCNE and Corporation that this chapter explores is significant insofar as it explains why the UCNE chose to increase hostilities towards Philip when it did. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the relationship between the UCNE and Philip soured at the exact moment it began to clash with the Corporation.

Historians of late have paid more attention to how colonizers' poor relations with Indians prior to 1675 resulted in King Philip's War, blaming Puritan assaults on Indian sovereignty and culture to explain the causes of the conflict.<sup>665</sup> Not only was there no chance for peaceful coexistence—no missionary project launched by a large population of settler colonizers has ever resulted in equal power relations—but King Philip's War occurred because missionization normalized an anti-Indian mindset among colonizers. In the early 1670s, the UCNE stood at a crossroads: it could expand the missionization project per the Corporation's instructions, or it could pursue martial conflict with those New England Indians who remained outside its purview (namely, the Wampanoags and Narragansetts). The UCNE chose the latter, rejecting the Corporation and pursuing a colonizing agenda that removed London's influence and featured the use of both war to destroy Indian sovereignty and missionization to deal with those who remained.

This chapter thus focuses on the period between 1668 and the outbreak of war in New England on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1675, and traces how the Corporation and UCNE came to disagree over how to manage New England Indians. By 1675 the UCNE no longer valued missionization as the centerpiece of its colonizing agenda, whereas the Corporation did. While both strategies would

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<sup>665</sup> Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Christine M. DeLucia, *Memory Lands: King Philip's War and the Place of Violence in the Northeast* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); Lisa Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin: A New History of King Philip's War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).

have likely resulted in conflict, the Corporation's constant pressure on the UCNE encouraged them to quickly pursue a war of conquest against Indians. The result was King Philip's War, which reshaped the missionary project and dismantled the system governing it—a system which has been at the center of this dissertation. Rather than signaling the start of poor Indian-English relations, King Philip's War was the culmination of a thirty-year-old discriminatory missionization scheme designed by the Corporation, the UCNE, and the missionaries they employed to empower colonizers and push Indians to the margins. In short, the war was significant not because it represented a change in Indian-English relations, but because it highlighted the negative impact missionization had on Native communities, demonstrated that the Corporation and UCNE had always desired to help colonizers at the expense of the colonized, and exposed the connections between the missionary colonialism the English employed in New England and the strategies they implemented elsewhere across the Atlantic world.

### **New Missionization Strategies Emerge**

On June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1668 Robert Boyle wrote to the UCNE about the death and destruction wrought by the Great Fire of London. This, and the Corporation's debts and lawsuits, had prevented them from sending New England money the previous year. Boyle thus asked the UCNE to “abate all charge that is not essential to the being of this good work; as printing and binding of books, and salaries to Governors, & gratuities to those that do not actually contribute to the work.”<sup>666</sup> Boyle's demand that the UCNE cut missionization-related costs coincided with the Corporation reducing the amount of money sent to New England. This trend held up to the

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<sup>666</sup> “From the Hon. Robert Boyle, Governor of the Company, to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1668,” *Some Correspondence*, 17.

eve of King Philip's War. Between 1668 and 1675 the Corporation did not allow the UCNE to draw a bill of exchange greater than £300. Instead, the Corporation began establishing a new system to govern missionization, one that featured them delivering funds directly to colonizers entrusted with fulfilling their demands. In other words, they were working to reduce the UCNE's role in managing missionization. Eventually they hoped to eliminate them altogether, and give control to John Eliot, a plan which was close to being executed in 1675. The Corporation's plan took much of its attention, with half of its 28 meetings held between September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1668, and March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1675 referencing missionization, proportionally a significant increase compared to previous eras.

The UCNE replied to Boyle in September, assuring him that "the greatest frugality shall be from time to time exercised in the discharge of the trust committed to us in this affair," while contesting the notion that they were governed by self-interest rather than dedication to praying Indians.<sup>667</sup> They claimed to not be aware of the extraneous spending Boyle accused them of:

"[We do not] know of any salary that hath been given to any Governor or Governors only sometimes their names are mentioned in the accompt as having the sums therein specified put into their hands for the distributing thereof for the encouragement of such Indians as they know to be active in their several Colonies for the promoting of the work and are by them accounted well deserving thereof."<sup>668</sup>

They critiqued Boyle further, arguing that "Nor do we understand that your caution therein respects Captain Gookin, whose great labour and good success therein is of such use that if not attended by him must be by some other..."<sup>669</sup> Despite the UCNE's defense of their spending practices, the Corporation never warmed to the idea of having their money disbursed to colonial Governors and distributed as they saw fit. The Corporation's continued suspicion of Gookin is

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<sup>667</sup> "From the Commissioners of the United Colonies to the Hon. Robert Boyle, Governor of the Company, September 10<sup>th</sup>, 1668," *Some Correspondence*, 18.

<sup>668</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 18.

<sup>669</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 19.

understandable too, given it took Eliot's good word in years prior to convince them that he deserved a salary.

The UCNE ended their letter to Boyle signaling their diminished dedication to missionization. They cited John Eliot Jr. 's poor health and the difficulty of finding other “instruments” to continue his father's work, lamenting how it seemed “the Lord in his wise providence is drawing a black line over [missionization].”<sup>670</sup> They proposed a shift in strategy: rather than using Corporation money to convert more Indians, they would use it to arm those who already professed their faith in Christianity. Merging their roles as stewards of missionization and defenders of New England, the UCNE reported to Boyle that they planned to take £20 from the Indian stock to purchase ammunition to equip “the Indians whose faces are Godward...for their defence against the Maquas a people that lives up above two hundred miles west of us, who live by making inroads and depredations upon other Indians, who formerly were in open hostility with the French in Canada but the last year they made people with them.”<sup>671</sup> The UCNE, much like the Corporation, viewed Eliot as crucial to its new plan. They wanted him to take the ammunition and disburse it among praying Indians, envisioning him not as a missionary but as a General leading New England's defense against hostile Indians and Europeans. As they always had, the UCNE looked for ways to make missionization work for them, in defiance of the Corporation's wishes and regardless of the impact on Indians.

When the Corporation received the UCNE's letter on January 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1669, they accepted the £300 bill of exchange drawn upon them—which included the £20 earmarked for Eliot's ammunition. However, they also assigned two members with analyzing the UCNE's accounts, their findings to be reported upon at their next meeting on March 22<sup>nd</sup>. What exactly they found

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<sup>670</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 20.

<sup>671</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 20.

is not disclosed in the meeting minutes, however, the Corporation's response reveals that, whatever it was, it was not good. Moving forward, the Corporation decided that it would continue to reimburse the UCNE, but only if it was given much more oversight over how those funds were spent:

“[We] conceived it fit that such monies as hereafter shall be made over and towards the charge of propagation of the gospel in New England and the parts adjacent in America should be cosigned and paid to...persons there as will give a better rate and profit for the same then hath been formerly allowed for the monies formerly sent over for that purpose.”<sup>672</sup>

Previously, money was sent from John Harwood in London to Hezekiah Usher in Boston, now it would go from Henry Ashurst to Robert Thompson or Edmond White in London, who would then transfer it to New Englanders with ties to the Corporation, namely John Richards, Peter Sergeant (or Sargent), or Humphrey Davey, who would then oversee the money's transfer to Usher and UCNE commissioner and Major-General of the Massachusetts militia John Leverett.<sup>673</sup> Ashurst devised this scheme, with those involved hand-selected for their loyalty to him. For instance, Robert Thompson's son Joseph was married to Ashurst's granddaughter, whereas Sergeant was a “kindsman” of Ashurst.<sup>674</sup> One of the first instances of this new system being executed was in the Corporation's handling a £360 gift from a Parisian man named Monsieur Mowsche (also written as Montrye or Mowchee), which he asked to be spent specifically on missionization in New England. How the Corporation proceeded in disbursing that money would further weaken the UCNE's allegiance to them.

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<sup>672</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1669.

<sup>673</sup> Usher's assignee John Harwood would still be used, albeit less frequently than before.

<sup>674</sup> See *The Ashursts and some of their New England Company ties*, ca. 1965. (Mis. 1965, Masshist) Misc. Manuscripts.

With Ashurst's plan in motion, Boyle openly questioned the UCNE's claim that God had abandoned missionization in New England, arguing that if the UCNE had tried, God would have provided them with missionaries and people otherwise qualified to convert Indians:

“[We know] the Lord appears in this behalf and whether any considerable number there are or like to be qualified for future supply of this service [and] whether there be any obstructions that put discouragement upon persons otherwise fitly qualified for studying the Indian language without which we know not how this matter can be promoted.”<sup>675</sup>

It was the UCNE's failure to support the development of more missionaries like Eliot, rather than God's will, that prevented missionization from progressing further in New England.

Boyle also introduced the UCNE to Ashurst's new method for transferring money to New England, stating that the money gifted by Mowsche would serve as its first test. It would be distributed in two parts, with £300 going to London merchant Thomas Blauer, who would convert it into £375 of New England money and then send it to his brother in Boston, Habbucuck Blauer. Blauer would then pass the money on to Hezekiah Usher and John Leverett. The remaining £60 of Mowsche's money would go to London merchant Robert Thompson, who would transfer it to Boston merchant John Richards, who would then invest the money to provide a yearly interest of £36 “to be paid to some *godly able man* for preaching to the Indians.”<sup>676</sup> Now that the Corporation had more control over the money sent to New England, they felt it reasonable to provide a 25% conversion rate to merchants, whereas previously they refused to give Usher more than 14%. The message was clear: play by our rules and we will give you more money.

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<sup>675</sup> “From the Hon. Robert Boyle, Governor of the Company, to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1669,” *Some Correspondence*, 22.

<sup>676</sup> “From the Hon. Robert Boyle, Governor of the Company, to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1669,” *Some Correspondence*, 23.

The last part of Boyle's letter addressed complaints from New Englanders who preferred their salaries be paid in commodities rather than silver. He also commented on the UCNE's decision to arm praying Indian, repurposing them into a shield wedged between New England and its enemies. For those complaining about silver-based salaries, Boyle sympathized, but ultimately concluded that they were being paid enough to buy the commodities they needed:

“[Being paid in] necessary Commodities rather than in specie [might be] a more easy way for them that lives remote and know not otherwise how to come by Commodities at their need, [however it] was judged by many of us that a larger advance in their salary by about 9 or 10 in the hundred more will put them to find out a means to accommodate themselves.”<sup>677</sup>

Boyle likely also worried that commodity-based salaries gave more control to the UCNE, as it allowed them to decide what items should be purchased and sent to recipients, and to use any leftover silver for themselves. At least with silver salaries the Corporation knew that the money it sent over was being used towards its intended purpose.

Boyle cited the ammunition sent to Eliot to prove why silver salaries made more sense. Had Eliot received £20 of silver rather than £20 worth of a commodity like ammunition, he could have purchased the tools, clothes, and other necessities he constantly asked for. Indeed, Boyle despised the UCNE's decision to use Corporation money to arm praying Indians, arguing instead that they should be looking to convert rather than exterminate hostile Indians:

“[I ask that you not] draw any more for what is desired as to a supply of arms and powder we conceive it is not within our trust and so can do nothing in it But are of opinion that the Colony in which those Indians are is as equally bound to protect them as others they being now his majesty's subjects and as we are informed all the colonies by your association are engaged to assist in such cases.”<sup>678</sup>

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<sup>677</sup> “Robert Boyle to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, April 28th, 1669,” *Some Correspondence*, 24.

<sup>678</sup> “Robert Boyle to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, April 28th, 1669,” *Some Correspondence*, 26.

It was not the role of missionization, Boyle argued, to engage in martial action against those it was supposed to be converting. If the UCNE encountered hostile Indians, their first response should have been to try and convert them, not arm existing praying Indians to be used against them. Boyle was perhaps being overly idealistic here, as missionization has almost always been connected to conquest, with one feeding naturally into the other. In some respects, the UCNE's vision for missionization was truer to how it has historically acted as an institution.

### **The UCNE Protests Corporation Control**

The UCNE replied to Boyle on September 8<sup>th</sup>, 1669, accusing the Corporation of misunderstanding the situation in New England and arguing that it would be impossible to accomplish what they asked of them. If the Corporation was serious about forcing the UCNE to pay salaries derived from the Indian stock in silver rather than in commodities, then New England might as well “forbear the charging of any bill of exchange as formerly for that end.”<sup>679</sup> They also complained that Ashurst's new strategy for distributing funds would require “bills be ordered to be paid to those that have power from yourselves to make the distribution, whose names and numbers will inevitable be from time to time uncertain to yourselves.”<sup>680</sup> In this the UCNE was mistaken, being unaware that Ashurst had already selected the men who would handle Corporation money in New England.

The UCNE nevertheless went on to warn the Corporation that Ashurst's system “must be of necessity be the work of one man to receive and pay out, which happily will not be done without such a salary as may take away the advance that this change may produce.”<sup>681</sup> Here they

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<sup>679</sup> “From the Commissioners of the United Colonies to the Hon. Robert Boyle, Governor of the Company Sept. 8<sup>th</sup>, 1669,” *Some Correspondence*, 31.

<sup>680</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 31.

<sup>681</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 31.

were defending the person they had assigned to this role, Hezekiah Usher. Were Usher replaced by men appointed by the Corporation, the money he received from monopolizing the facilitation of bills of exchange would go to them. In turn the UCNE would benefit even less from the money sent from England. The UCNE's greatest fear was that the Corporation's enhanced presence in New England would prevent them from managing missionization funds. Rather than Usher having the money be "good to him," and by proxy, UCNE commissioners, it would be in the hands of Corporation men who would distribute money directly to missionaries converting Indians.<sup>682</sup> This explains why more money went to John Eliot between 1669 and 1675 than had ever been sent previously. Sensing that they had already lost on this issue, the UCNE closed by stating that they would "leave it to [the Corporation's] wisdom to transmit what you shall judge meet, and in your own way."<sup>683</sup>

The UCNE also commented on Boyle's critique that they were lax in finding more "instruments" like Eliot. To this, the UCNE replied that, in fact, they wanted nothing more than to do as their English benefactors asked, but that "God hath made by the Death of Sundry of our Reverend Elders, that they who survive, being generally but one Minister in a place, their work is great, that unless the Lord be pleased to stir up a Spirit more than ordinary it is hard to put any on that work."<sup>684</sup> There is some truth to this of course, and it is likely that Boyle was both overly optimistic about the ease by which missionaries like Eliot could be produced, and too distracted by other affairs to grasp what was occurring in New England. Of course, the UCNE's management of missionization also contributed to the lack of viable candidates. Given the trouble Eliot experienced in receiving adequate supplies for praying Indians and a living wage

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<sup>682</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 31.

<sup>683</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 32.

<sup>684</sup> UCNE to Boyle, *Some Correspondence*, 32-33.

for himself, New England ministers' busy schedules, and the general hostility colonizers felt towards Indians, it is unlikely that many would leap to engage in proselytization unless it was in their self-interest. But this is how missionization operated—it was a messy colonial endeavor featuring many moving parts that nearly always negatively affected the populations it intended to convert. Had more men like Eliot been found, doubtless colonizers would have found ways to ensure that missionization remained beneficial to them, if proven only by how Eliot treated and viewed those he converted.

If the Corporation had asserted itself earlier, what would missionization have looked like? More likely than not, a conflict like King Philip's War was inevitable, as colonizing systems tend to foment violence. Perhaps such counterfactual questions are unhelpful, as the Corporation and UCNE were very much aligned ideologically in the 1650s, and it was not until after the Restoration that tensions between the organizations would cause significant problems. Though the Corporation's missionization strategies could and did diverge from the UCNE's, this did not mean Indians would have fared better under them. Even John Eliot viewed Indians as inferiors subordinate to the English, and Daniel Gookin—the other person lauded for his sympathy for praying Indians—was ultimately a settler colonizer who assisted Cromwell and enslaved African people and Indians alike. If anything, the Corporation and UCNE were guided by an ideological amalgamation reminiscent of that guiding Vincent Gookin Jr. and his pro-transplantation enemies in Cromwellian Ireland. Like Gookin Jr., the Corporation believed in missionization over transplantation and conquest. The UCNE also drew from aspects of Gookin Jr.'s ideology, viewing praying Indians in terms of how they would benefit colonizers (something Daniel Gookin would try to remind them of in *Doings and Sufferings*). However, unlike Gookin Jr., they were willing to pursue transplantation and conquest when missionization

outlived its usefulness (though Gookin Jr. likely would have agreed with such tactics being used on hostile indigenous populations).

The Corporation received the UCNE's letter on January 27<sup>th</sup>, 1670, making no comment besides that they would continue "to make further trial of the way they have begun for remitting money and that they intend this year to remit £300."<sup>685</sup> Despite the UCNE's objections, the Corporation moved forward with their plan to take control of missionization in New England. On March 31<sup>st</sup> they prepared a letter to the UCNE disclosing their plan to move materials from the Cambridge Press in Harvard to England, being "contented to lend their printing press & letters & implements to [Harvard] to be by them used upon necessary occasions."<sup>686</sup> If New England wanted to produce more missionary texts, they would need to go through the Corporation.

The Corporation's next meeting on May 5<sup>th</sup> proposed a slight modification to Ashurst's new system for managing £300 missionization payments to New England. First, the money would be divided into two payments of £200 and £100. The former went to Robert Thompson, who transferred it to John Richards in Boston. Richards pocketed that money, converted it to New England currency at a rate of 25%, and delivered the resulting £250 to John Leverett and Hezekiah Usher. The latter was given to Edmond White, who sent the money to Boston, whereupon it was usually received by Humphrey Davey, who converted it to £125 of New England silver and delivered it to Leverett and Usher. While the Corporation sometimes used alternative intermediaries from those listed above (usually Peter Sargent in lieu of John Richards), they stuck to this system through the 1670s.

The UCNE's next letter to the Corporation signaled their tacit acceptance of this new arrangement. They maintained, however, that it was "very difficult" for them to "procure an

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<sup>685</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, January 27<sup>th</sup>, 1670.

<sup>686</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 31<sup>st</sup>, 1670.

addition of fit persons to labour in that worke of the Lord.”<sup>687</sup> With the Corporation assuming control over missionization, the UCNE became disinterested in managing it. Indeed, they told the Corporation that if they wanted “more particular information on the present state of Indian affairs, we shall refer the Honorable Corporation to the narratives enclosed [written by John Eliot].”<sup>688</sup> The UCNE, which to this point had protested when the Corporation dealt directly with Eliot, now relinquished their responsibilities to him.

### **Eliot and the Corporation vs. the UCNE**

In September 1670 John Eliot sent Henry Ashurst a letter stating that missionization suffered from mismanagement and a dearth of financial support. Specifically, he blamed the UCNE for missionization’s slow expansion, highlighting their infrequent meetings and ignorance of Eliot’s needs:

Our Commissioners meet but once a year, I am persuaded my acting will meet with approbation, when they meet, especially considering that I touch none of the expenses, so much as with one finger, I reap nothing it is expended only upon the work and that in a prudent, and I hope we shall find in a successful way. Upon some advice I have made bold to give unto Mr Usher bills for £40 which he is willing to lend and expend, for the encouragement of the work.<sup>689</sup>

Central to Eliot’s critique was the notion that the UCNE had money, but rarely spent it in ways acceptable to the missionary. Despite his work being crucial to the UCNE’s ability to advertise to England its need for more resources, Eliot was never the primary recipients of Corporation funds. Eliot also revealed to Ashurst how he circumvented the UCNE and went directly to Usher

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<sup>687</sup> “From the Commissioners of the United Colonies to the Hon. Robert Boyle, Governor of the Company, September 8th, 1670,” *Some Correspondence*, 35-36.

<sup>688</sup> “From the Commissioners of the United Colonies to the Hon. Robert Boyle, Governor of the Company, September 8th, 1670,” *Some Correspondence*, 35-36.

<sup>689</sup> “From the Rev. John Eliot to Mr. Henry Ashurst, Treasurer of the Company, September 30th, 1670,” *Some Correspondence*, 37.

for payments—evidently, he did not trust that he would ever benefit from the money in the UCNE’s Indian stock.

This information confirmed Ashurst’s suspicions about how the UCNE allocated funds. Eliot knew his audience, lauding Ashurst and the Corporation for adding “much oil unto the wheels” of his work whereas the UCNE had impeded him at every turn.<sup>690</sup> If Eliot hoped to continue receiving money and resources for missionization, he would need to establish closer ties to London. To that end, Eliot wholeheartedly endorsed the Ashurst’s decision to reduce the UCNE’s influence over the Indian stock, noting that Ashurst’s “kinsman Mr Sargent doth very well, for ought I can see or hear.”<sup>691</sup>

Between 1670 and 1675 Eliot and the Corporation worked more closely together than they ever had before. Indeed, Eliot became part of Ashurst’s plan to set siege to the UCNE’s dominion over missionization. Little wonder then that the situation in New England deteriorated so quickly, with the UCNE launching a war against King Philip soon after the Corporation became more active in managing New England’s affairs. In other words, the war resulted partly from the UCNE’s decision to wrest control over New England’s Indian policy from the Corporation. The UCNE wanted missionization to persist, but under its control and without Corporation meddling. They also wanted missionization to be a complementary colonization strategy to conquering sovereign tribes. This did not stray far from how the UCNE had treated sovereign Indians since its creation in 1643, the main difference being that its power in 1675 exceeded what it had been then. Though the Corporation and UCNE had disagreed before—as covered in prior chapters—what differed now was the Corporation’s refusal to pay New England colonizers without oversight, whereas previously they buckled and paid the UCNE thousands of

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<sup>690</sup> Eliot to Ashurst, *Some Correspondence*, 38.

<sup>691</sup> Eliot to Ashurst, *Some Correspondence*, 38.

pounds of silver without much protest. Indeed, post-1668 represented the first time that the Corporation actively impeded the UCNE, something which never occurred prior to 1668, both under Charles II and Cromwell.

One explanation for the Corporation's adjusted New England strategy post-1668 might relate to its refreshed roster of members. One of the men who joined after the Great Fire of London was none other than William Pennoyer, the merchant who had been so close to the original Cromwellian Corporation members in the 1640s and 1650s. In November 1670, a dying Pennoyer made it his last act to strengthen the Corporation's power and influence. Just as he had spent exorbitant amounts assisting the English effort to "reduce" Ireland after the uprising in 1641, so too did he gift the Corporation the money it needed to continue influencing New England missionization. He planned to give the Corporation £600 to be used in rebuilding properties lost to the fire in 1666, in addition to whatever else would be "for the benefit of this Company."<sup>692</sup> Part of that money was to be invested and paid back to Pennoyer in the amount of £60 per year for as long as he lived. Once he died, he arranged for a £20 per year payment to Harvard "forever," and a £25 per year payment to his wife Martha until her death.<sup>693</sup> Pennoyer died before the Corporation's meeting on March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1671, at which point they asked Robert Thomson and William Kiffin "to speak with mr Pennoyer's Executors about the £600 by him promised to be paid to this Company."<sup>694</sup> Eventually, it was decided that Pennoyer's money would go towards building Corporation property in London's Trinity Lane. It was largely thanks to Pennoyer, then, that the Corporation was rebuilt and ready to oversee missionization in New England with a renewed sense of zeal. His payments to Harvard—which continued into the

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<sup>692</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 21<sup>st</sup>, 1670.

<sup>693</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, November 21<sup>st</sup>, 1670.

<sup>694</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1671.

twenty-first century—likely also made the Corporation feel entitled to the UCNE’s subservience (recall how vehemently New England had argued in favor of Corporation money funding Harvard in the 1640s).

In March 1671 the Corporation allowed New England to draw another £300 bill of exchange from them, once again to be overseen using Ashurst’s method. There was, however, one major change between the money sent to New England in 1671 compared to 1670. Distrustful of the UCNE and convinced by Eliot’s letter to Ashurst that he lacked the resources needed to carry on the missionization effort, the Corporation decided to send a separate payment of £40 directly to Eliot through their men in New England, circumventing the UCNE, Usher, and the Indian stock. Interestingly, they first thought to ask if “the said Commissioners shall think meet and approve of the same,” but decided against asking their permission, striking it from the record.<sup>695</sup>

The Corporation did however write to the UCNE asking about how they had invested Mowsche’s £360 gift, paid in £450 of New England silver back in 1669. They were particularly interested in knowing how the UCNE planned to spend the £36 they had ordered be “yearly bestowed towards the maintenance of preachers for the conversion & instruction of the Indians there.”<sup>696</sup> Throughout the 1670s, the Corporation included the interest created from Mowsche’s gift within their account of how much money was sent to New England. As we will see, however, the UCNE did not invest this money exactly as intended.

Eliot’s October 1<sup>st</sup> letter to Ashurst complained further about the UCNE’s unwillingness to financially support him. Though the £40 sent by the Corporation in 1670 helped, there remained “some great charges this year” that the UCNE refused to pay, “answer[ing Eliot] with

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<sup>695</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1671.

<sup>696</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1671.

silence, as it is wont to be.”<sup>697</sup> Eliot therefore asked Ashurst for another £80 from the Corporation, stating that “my humble requests is that it may be paid, and that I shall be out of debt but if it should be refused, then my hands are tied.”<sup>698</sup> With continued assistance, Eliot swore he would “never give over the work so long as I have legs to go.”<sup>699</sup> More money meant that he “might push the work, and fire the hearts of the Indians,” less money prevented that from happening “for want of means.”<sup>700</sup> Eliot’s intention with this letter was clear—Ashurst and the Corporation should rely on Eliot over the UCNE to advance missionization.

Indeed, for Eliot the solution to ensuring missionization flourished in New England was to transfer the UCNE’s oversight role to himself. He suggested to the Corporation that he could singlehandedly find more missionaries, pay them, and find better ways to invest English money towards those endeavors:

“[A] humble request unto yourselves the honorable Corporation is that you would put me into such an order or way, that I may know where to pay such instruments as I set on work, if instruments fail, the work will fall, instruments are the wheels of our motion if they want oil, they will soon want power of motion. I could employ a great revenue, in promoting the work.”<sup>701</sup>

Whereas the UCNE had failed to employ additional missionaries and provide for those already under its employ, Eliot promised that he could deliver the results the Corporation sought.

The Corporation agreed to pay Eliot the requested £80 on March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1672, while also approving a £300 payment to the UCNE.<sup>702</sup> Proportionally, Eliot alone received more missionary funds in 1672 than Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut combined, demonstrating the

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<sup>697</sup> “From the Rev. John Eliot to Mr. Henry Ashurst, Treasurer of the Company, October 1st, 1671,” *Some Correspondence*, 49.

<sup>698</sup> Eliot to Ashurst, *Some Correspondence*, 49.

<sup>699</sup> Eliot to Ashurst, *Some Correspondence*, 50.

<sup>700</sup> Eliot to Ashurst, *Some Correspondence*, 50.

<sup>701</sup> Eliot to Ashurst, *Some Correspondence*, 50.

<sup>702</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1672.

Corporation's willingness to make Eliot's role more prominent. John Harwood handled the transfer of money to Eliot, whereas Ashurst's kin Peter Sargent and Robert Thomson supervised what was sent to the UCNE. The Corporation's decision to pay Eliot likely angered the UCNE, as it meant that they no longer had direct control over the English silver sent to them. This was a major shift compared to how missionization operated in decades prior, where Eliot was beholden to the whims of the UCNE, and where the Corporation abided by this.

To make matters worse for the UCNE, Ashurst's system for overseeing missionization payments meant that what money they did receive once Sargent converted it to New England currency and delivered it to Leverett and Usher would be carefully monitored. The Corporation was doing its best to ensure that the UCNE used its money in the intended manner. Indeed, the Corporation emphasized in their March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1672 meeting that the UCNE would need to devote far more attention to supporting the labors of missionaries if they wanted bills of exchange to be reimbursed in the future:

“[It is paramount that you] reward Mr Eliot and other ministers and instruments to be employed in the said work as the said Commissioners shall find them and their labour respectively deserve and as their stock and moneys remitted to them by this Company will afford.”<sup>703</sup>

The Corporation would no longer allow New England to spend its money on items deemed extraneous to missionization in New England. If they did, then the Corporation had demonstrated twice already that they were willing to transition to a system based around directly funding missionaries like Eliot. Thus, in the early 1670s, the UCNE found themselves with little room to maneuver vis-à-vis what they were accustomed to in the 1650s and 1660s.

The Corporation did not stop there. In 1672 they also tried to take control of Mowsche's gift, which they had given to the UCNE to manage three years prior. This was in response to a

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<sup>703</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1672.

letter sent by the UCNE, in which they “expressed their doubt of making so good an improvement of Mr Mowches gift.”<sup>704</sup> The Corporation responded by telling the UCNE that, were that the case, they should no longer be entrusted with that money:

“[We] ordered that intimation be given to the said Commissioners that this Company conceive that if the Gentlemen with hath the money now in his hands [referring to the holder of Mowsche’s gift] shall not think fit to hold it longer the Commissioners may find other security in New England for the same who will give as good an allowance for it as that Gentleman now doth.”<sup>705</sup>

When the Corporation gave Mowsche’s gift to the UCNE in 1669, Ashurst had yet to fully implement his strategy to better manage New England missionization. This had changed by 1672, and Ashurst now had several factors in New England whom he trusted more with Mowsche’s gift. No doubt the "other security" offered by the Corporation referred to the Boston merchants under their employ, namely John Richards, Peter Sargent, and Humphrey Davey. With Mowsche’s gift the Corporation could further remove the UCNE from its responsibilities over missionization and create a new pool of funds by which to compensate Eliot.

### **The UCNE Seeks Independence from the Corporation**

By September 1672 the UCNE had grown increasingly disinterested about following Corporation orders while continuing to use their money to advance themselves over Indians. That month they wrote a letter to Robert Boyle again reporting that, despite “all the encouragement that is given [from England], we find it far more difficult to obtain suitable instruments to labour therein all which tells us that it is the Lord and not man, who must thrust forth those that are indeed faithful labourers.”<sup>706</sup> Without enough missionaries, New England

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<sup>704</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1672.

<sup>705</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 12<sup>th</sup>, 1672.

<sup>706</sup> “The Commissioners of the United Colonies to the Hon. Robert Boyle, September 9th, 1672,” *Acts Vol. II*, 354.

would be unable to convert more Indians. The UCNE's problems were self-inflicted, as they chose to shape missionization to attend to the needs of colonizers. Finding or training people who could match John Eliot would have been a costly undertaking they had no desire to pursue. Thanks to Ashurst's strict oversight and their unwillingness to pay more missionaries, the UCNE admitted that they "shall not be able to make so good improvement" of Mowsche's gift, insofar as it could be used to convert more Indians. Their focus instead had been on improving Harvard with the construction of "a New building of bricke and stone" for English students.<sup>707</sup> Meanwhile the Indian college built in 1656 languished.

Hezekiah Usher's September 6<sup>th</sup> account of the Indian stock reveals some of the adjustments the UCNE had made to its missionization strategy. It shows that they cut certain expenditures cited as extraneous by the Corporation—particularly the money sent to colonial governors—and that they now paid salaries to John Eliot, Thomas Mayhew, Richard Bourne, and Daniel Gookin.<sup>708</sup> Additionally, the UCNE devoted £60 to paying twenty "Indian Teachers and Rulers" working under Eliot, and £57 to "several" on Martha's Vineyard. Considering the number of Indians these sums were to be divided by, these were not impressive amounts. Still, it was better than what the UCNE had offered before. Despite changes made to ameliorate the Corporation, some old habits remained. Connecticut's two UCNE commissioners were paid £10, to be spent on whatever they wanted. John Cotton, who worked briefly to convert Indians in Plymouth, received a £20 payment. Hezekiah Usher received 23 pounds, 5 shillings, and 6 pence as payment for distributing funds. One "Indian Youth" received support to attend the Indian

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<sup>707</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 355. The UCNE claimed that the new building would be "a blessing to the Indians as well as to the English," but there is little proof that the few Indian Scholars the UCNE funded were allowed to use anything besides the Indian College hastily built in 1656.

<sup>708</sup> "Account of the Indian Stock," September 6<sup>th</sup>, 1672, *Acts Vol. II*, 356. They made £50, £40, £35, and £20 respectively.

College at Harvard, which cost the UCNE roughly £18.<sup>709</sup> The UCNE's missionization strategy had not changed much—as it had been before, conversion and integration of Indians was secondary if not entirely overlooked compared to paying colonizer salaries.

Usher's account also revealed how the UCNE allocated the 31 pounds and 10 shillings derived from Mowsche's gift. Recall that the Corporation had asked them to use it to fund more "instruments" like Eliot. And they did, giving the money to James Fitch of Hartford, along with an additional £10 for him to distribute to "well deserving Indians...helpful to him in the work."<sup>710</sup> That Fitch was chosen is exemplary of how missionization operated in New England. While Fitch was indeed a missionary like Eliot or Mayhew, he also served as a cultural broker or go-between used by the UCNE to weaken sovereign Indian tribes, specifically the Mohegans, Narragansetts, and Wampanoags. For instance, he spearheaded the UCNE's plan to weaken Uncas by strategically converting Mohegan Indians to Christianity.<sup>711</sup> He was also crucial to rallying Indians against Wampanoags in 1675.<sup>712</sup> Then, at the end of King Philip's War, Fitch was key in negotiating the surrender of several of Philip's remaining troops.<sup>713</sup> In New England missionization complemented colonization, and organizations like the UCNE employed it alongside conquest to achieve the greatest effect in weakening Indians.

It is fitting that Fitch benefitted from the largest financial gift given to the Corporation, which Mowsche specifically requested go towards furthering missionization in New England. His career is emblematic of how most colonizers envisioned the ends of missionization. Whereas

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<sup>709</sup> Amounts listed in *Acts Vol. II*, 356.

<sup>710</sup> *Acts Vol. II*, 356.

<sup>711</sup> "Fitch, James, 1622 – 1702," *Yale Indian Papers Project*, Retrieved February 20, 2020.

<sup>712</sup> Roscoe Conkling Fitch, *History of the Fitch family, A.D. 1400-1930: a record of the Fitches in England and America, including "pedigree of Fitch" certified by the college of arms, London, England. Volume II* (London: 1930), 1.

<sup>713</sup> "Letter from James Fitch to John Allyn," *Yale Indian Papers Project*, Retrieved February 20, 2020.

missionaries like Eliot have been lionized as the “Apostle to the Indians,” it was perhaps men like Fitch who more truthfully represented how missionaries operated in New England. Indeed, like Fitch, Eliot and the Mayhews were not fond of Indians who impeded New England’s progress. The UCNE’s support of Fitch was designed to please the Corporation—if New England provided more “instruments” then perhaps they would continue to receive English silver. Unfortunately for them, the Corporation continued to push for more control over missionization, which including taking over the management of Mowsche’s gift. From the UCNE’s perspective, English meddling in its affairs was becoming more overbearing than it was worth. They wanted Corporation money without the oversight, something they would achieve after King Philip’s War.

Eliot sent a letter to the UCNE a year prior clarifying their relationship with Fitch and revealing the status of missionization. In it Eliot reprimanded the UCNE for assuming he was familiar with all ongoing missionary operations in New England, telling them that Mayhew and Bourne should be consulted about Martha’s Vineyard and Mashpee. That the UCNE was unaware of this reveals how little they prioritized conversion as part of their missionization project. Eliot also reported on Fitch’s efforts, noting his progress in converting Mohegans:

“[Fitch] is upon the work, he holdeth a lecture at his own house every fortnight, Uncas and his son have promised to attend it. This Mr Fitch by his letters informed me of, Uncas his coming in, is a great matter. I desire the work may be countenanced and supported on that end of the country.”<sup>714</sup>

Perhaps the UCNE had asked Eliot to evaluate Fitch to see if he was worthy of Mowsche’s gift, or maybe the UCNE knew that Fitch and Eliot were already in correspondence and felt asking the latter for an update was expedient. Either way, it made sense for Fitch to be in contact with

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<sup>714</sup> “From the Rev. John Eliot to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1671,” *Some Correspondence*, 44.

Eliot were he trying to learn how best to convert Indians to Christianity. Both Eliot and Fitch executed strategies to try and convert the sachems of sovereign Indian tribes in the early 1670s, Philip and Uncas respectively, a strategy encouraged by the UCNE to again make missionization work to the benefit of colonizers.

Eliot also complained about the UCNE's decision to "abate" his salary because they were "so short in means."<sup>715</sup> The £40 the Corporation supplied him with was all that enabled him to "set to work, sen[d] out messengers to many parts, [and give] entertainments to such [Indians] as attended the lectures."<sup>716</sup> He then told the UCNE his plan to ask the Corporation for an additional £80, further requesting that "because I am fallen into debt I owe unto Mr Usher £100 at least for which all year's salary is bound before it come and more also... I request you to pay this debt of mine."<sup>717</sup> He also expected the UCNE to pay for the "powder and shot, for the necessary defense in the times of danger" requisitioned by Daniel Gookin and a "Mr Hinksman" through Hezekiah Usher.<sup>718</sup> "Mr Hinksman" was Major Thomas Henchman, who negotiated and traded with praying Indians at Wamesit on behalf of Massachusetts Bay Colony, fought in King Philip's War, and later speculated in Indian land. Gookin and Henchman's purchase of gunpowder and ammunition was related to the strategy Gookin endorsed in *Doings and Sufferings*, in which he argued that arming and garrisoning praying Indians to serve as New England's defenders was one of missionization's benefits. Regardless, Hezekiah Usher's account dated September 6<sup>th</sup>, 1672, reveals that the UCNE neither paid Eliot's debts nor reimbursed Gookin and Henchman, meaning they, like Eliot, would be in debt to Usher.

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<sup>715</sup> Eliot to the UCNE, *Some Correspondence*, 45.

<sup>716</sup> Usher pocketed the £40 of English silver sent from the Corporation, converting it at a 25% rate to £50 of New England silver, which was what Eliot received. Eliot to the UCNE, *Some Correspondence*, 45.

<sup>717</sup> Eliot to the UCNE, *Some Correspondence*, 46.

<sup>718</sup> Eliot to the UCNE, *Some Correspondence*, 46.

The UCNE's refusal to reimburse Eliot or Gookin represented a shift in their missionization strategy. Whereas previously they endorsed arming praying Indians so that they served as a buffer between hostile Indians and English colonizers, they now perceived this as arming an internal enemy. They would continue to support missionization—and indeed it remained crucial to their objective of subduing Indians—but they would no longer pursue approaches that gave Indians autonomy or which allowed the Corporation control over New England affairs. Perhaps revealing this change in strategy was the UCNE's infrequent meetings in the years prior to King Philip's war—after they met in September 1672 to address Corporation demands, they did not meet again until late 1675, long after the conflict had begun. In addition, few letters (beyond those examined here) were exchanged between Eliot, the UCNE, and the Corporation between December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1671, and October 17<sup>th</sup>, 1675.<sup>719</sup> The transatlantic system that had managed missionization since 1649 was breaking down, to be replaced by one entirely ruled by New England colonizers. To acquire a better understanding of this transition requires us to return to the records left by the Corporation.

### **The Corporation on the Eve of King Philip's War**

In April 1673 the Corporation met to raise “some objections” about the UCNE's report on John Eliot and James Fitch, while also questioning why they “should find it difficult to make a good improvement of Mr Mowchees gift, [with] some of this Comp[any] knowing that private men can find means to make a good improvement of their monies there.”<sup>720</sup> Though their

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<sup>719</sup> There was a four-year gap between the letters Eliot sent to the Corporation on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1671, and October 17<sup>th</sup>, 1675. This, combined with the UCNE's three-year hiatus between September 1672 and 1675, leaves a significant gap. Corporation records suggest that letters were sent between the Corporation and the UCNE during that period, but they appear to have been lost.

<sup>720</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 30<sup>th</sup>, 1673.

patience for the UCNE wore thin, their dedication to missionization remained true, and so they again arranged for a £300 payment to New England. They also continued to show sympathy for colonizers in need of financial aid, in May taking 2 pounds and 10 shillings from Daniel Gookin's salary and giving it to a widow named Alice Hatton (this was at Gookin's request). It was common for missionization funds to go towards supporting English colonizers rather than praying Indians, as several preceding examples have shown. The amount paid to Hatton eclipsed the sums received by many praying Indian teachers and scholars. That this money came from Gookin's salary only contributed further to funds being diverted from Indians, as what he gave Hatton could have gone to praying Indians.

The Corporation did not meet again until April 1674, the yearlong gap a result of New England's reluctance to correspond with London about its Indian relations. Corporation members nevertheless kept conducting business related to missionization, noting a £258 gift given to them by Andrew Daudy, Nathaniel Hawes, and Benjamin Albin to further the work in New England. They were of course even more excited about the £1,800 Thomas Bromhall gifted them to construct three new houses on Corporation land in Bucklersbury—the Corporation always prioritized investing donations rather than sending it to New England straight away. The Corporation also audited Ashurst's accounts, managed the rent at Ersewell Manor and Chamberlynes Farm, and made a £19 payment to Captain John Cressett for his work prosecuting Colonel Bedingfield. They also paid £40 to Eliot, which Ashurst delivered through John Harwood. Though the Corporation was clearly enamored with its role as property managers, they

remained committed to missionization, and to their plan of giving Eliot the support he needed to build the project further in New England.<sup>721</sup>

In May 1674 the Corporation took further actions designed to reduce the UCNE's influence over New England missionization. First, they approved a £300 payment to New England, telling the UCNE that it would be managed by Peter Sargent and Humphrey Davey, both Boston merchants loyal to the Corporation. They made no mention of the £40 payment made to Eliot the previous month. The Corporation made an additional payment of £370 directly to Peter Sargent and John Richards, a sum composed of money held by Ashurst and the gift given by Daudy, Hawes, and Albin. Sargent and Richards were to "put forth upon improvement and the interest thereof to be disposed of in such manner this Company shall from time to time order and appoint for the better propagation of the gospel in New England."<sup>722</sup> The Corporation did not want to repeat their mistake with Mowsche's gift, having given it to the UCNE only to see it mismanaged and squandered in the following years.

The Corporation hoped to replace the UCNE. For several years they had been grooming and investing in a cadre of New England men loyal to them, who were tasked with making disbursements to advance missionization according to what was desired in England. As King Philip's War neared, the Corporation was close to developing a transatlantic missionization effort that excluded the UCNE. With a trio of Boston merchants ready and willing to do as they asked, the Corporation, along with Eliot, were primed to take control of missionization in New England.

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<sup>721</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, April 16<sup>th</sup>, 1674. While there was no actual mention of John Eliot at this meeting, it is heavily implied that he was the recipient of the £40 payment referenced. For one, the amount coincides with the first payment that Eliot received. Second, the Corporation no longer sent money to the UCNE through Harwood and Usher, which is what they did here. This was the same method used to make previous payments of £40 and £80 to Eliot, as referenced in his letters.

<sup>722</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, May 21<sup>st</sup>, 1674.

The Corporation met twice before the start of King Philip's War, both on March 9<sup>th</sup> and March 24<sup>th</sup> 1675. At the first meeting they audited the UCNE's account of the Indian stock. They also arranged for two more payments to Eliot, one of £70 "charged upon the Treasurer [Ashurst]," and another of £30 sent directly from Robert Boyle.<sup>723</sup> Benjamin Albin donated another £50 to the Corporation, a sum which was destined for either Eliot or the Corporation's merchants in Boston. At its next meeting, the Corporation announced their acquisition of the late William Pennoyer's New England farm, from which they planned to expand their American land and property investments. They also arranged for a £300 payment to the UCNE, but it would again be funneled through Sargent and Davey. Though they had made much progress in shifting missionization's priorities and decentering the UCNE, the Corporation ultimately failed in their attempt to restructure New England missionization. By the time it met again on November 9<sup>th</sup>, King Philip's War was well underway, and Hezekiah Usher had coined the phrase "preying Indians" to describe the people whose account he managed for two decades.

King Philip's War did not signal an abrupt shift in colonizers' relations with Indians; colonizers had for decades been using missionization to empower themselves at Indians' expense. What it did represent was the UCNE's victory over the Corporation, in that the war ensured that New England would be defined by its vision for Indian relations. The UCNE had always treated Indians poorly, being an organization composed of conquerors, colonizers, and land speculators who since 1649 had wanted missionization to be complementary to those practices. The Corporation had, for its part, mostly allowed the UCNE to do what it wished until 1669, after which it turned sharply towards a strategy of replacing the UCNE with its own men.

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<sup>723</sup> Corporation Meeting Minutes, March 9<sup>th</sup>, 1675.

This is not to suggest that, had the Corporation succeeded, Indians would have been better off. Perhaps a better way to understand what happened is that the Corporation wanted a return to the status quo of the 1650s, when many of its members (such as Edward Winslow) had served in the UCNE or were more active in New England. The Corporation of the late 1660s and 1670s lacked those connections—owing to its Restoration origins—and was unable to embed itself in New England to the extent it had once been. From the UCNE’s perspective, King Philip’s War was an opportunity to achieve several objectives. Not only did it prevent the Corporation from meddling in their affairs, but it also enshrined the UCNE’s colonial vision, one in which the remaining population of Indians was conquered, eliminated, enslaved, or converted within praying towns.

Recent scholarship on King Philip’s War tells us that colonial histories written during and immediately after the conflict built “a narrative of Indian treachery” that justified their displacement.<sup>724</sup> What the preceding evidence has shown, however, is that these narratives described a sentiment that had existed for decades prior to the war. There was no need to justify the displacement of Indians when colonizers everywhere already wanted that. One could ask then why King Philip’s War did not occur until 1675, which might require another dissertation to answer in its totality. Suffice it to say that there were numerous reasons why colonizers who hated Indians would continue to work with the Corporation to build missionization between 1646 and 1675—economic incentives being one. One could also say that there were several instances where the UCNE *did* show an inclination for pursuing strategies reminiscent of those employed

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<sup>724</sup> Lisa Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin: A New History of King Philip’s War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 11; Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 5.

during King Philip's War, such as in its treatment of Miantonomi in the 1640s, its arming of praying Indians in the 1650s, and its potential murdering of Alexander in the 1660s.

Evaluating King Philip's War through the lens of missionization provides insight into the "sympathetic" accounts of praying Indians written by Daniel Gookin and John Eliot. To a certain extent their rhetoric would have been influenced by the clash between the UCNE and Corporation, especially given their alignment with the latter's vision. If the Corporation's plans for New England succeeded, their power and influence over the affairs of converted Indians stood to increase exponentially. Indeed, we have already discussed Gookin's desire for Indian land and the zeal with which he pursued the micromanagement of Indian lives in Natick, as well as Eliot's consistent yearning for a version of New England missionization that removed the UCNE from its position of authority and allowed him greater autonomy to work with the Corporation directly. Ashurst's strategy would have given Eliot more power and funding than he had ever had previously, and would have allowed Gookin to maintain his position of authority. Characterizing Eliot and Gookin as "sympathetic" to praying Indians risks misunderstanding their motivations. When they wrote of praying Indians, they were defending the form of colonialism they deemed effective, and their belief that they, along with the Corporation, were best equipped to oversee New England Indians.

### **King Philip's War**

After considering the evidence documented in this dissertation, King Philip's War appears to be a near-inevitable conflict. The UCNE's influence here is obvious: Not only did Charles II's Royal commissioners scold them in the 1660s for taking "more power than was ever given, or entended them" in relation to taking Indian land, but they had in their employ John

Sassamon, the man whose murder historians often cite as the principle causes of the conflict.<sup>725</sup> In 1671 the UCNE paid Sassamon to manipulate King Philip into signing the Taunton treaty, which forced Native Americans to surrender their guns to the English.<sup>726</sup> Sassamon himself should not bear the brunt of the blame here—his actions are best understood as a means to survive as best he could amid the tide of English colonialism. The UCNE used the Indians they educated and converted to their advantage, revealing how missionization and related assimilative practices intended to assist colonizers hungry for Indigenous territory. When the UCNE is positioned as central to New England missionization, rather than peripheral to it, it becomes difficult to ignore missionization as one of the key causes of King Philip’s War.

In 1675 and 1676, English colonizers in support of missionization shifted their rhetoric about the three-decade long effort to convert Indians. Clearly, missionization would no longer be the vanguard of English colonization now that the UCNE had decided to use violence to forcefully remove the Indigenous presence from New England. Instead, conversion would be used “as a potentially effective means to contain perceived threat, portray[ing] converts as captives or ‘conquered enemies’ who should be tamed and restrained, like domestic animals, by the ‘yoke’ of the colonial ‘government.’”<sup>727</sup> This explains why the UCNE, or any governmental organization in New England, would never again directly manage missionization to the extent they did prior to King Philip’s War. The war itself signaled the commencement of a more direct approach towards using violence to enable settler colonialism, with missionization used as a support mechanism to subdue and marginalize those Native Americans who survived. The Corporation would maintain a presence in New England under the UCNE, serving in a much-

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<sup>725</sup> Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 61.

<sup>726</sup> Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 62.

<sup>727</sup> Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 81.

reduced capacity as an organization that arranged for the payment of missionaries up until the start of the American Revolution, its influence over New England never again reaching what it was prior to 1675.

The first military advances against Philip occurred in June 1675, in which the English endured multiple defeats despite assistance from a third of the “able men” living within New England praying towns.<sup>728</sup> One may speculate here that the English’s declining opinion of converted Indians was hastened by their initial failure to aid colonizers in their campaign against Philip’s forces. If praying Indians could not serve the English’s needs, what was the point in harboring a potential enemy? The English campaign against Philip initially only involved Plymouth colony, but they were immediately aided by the entirety of the UCNE, who jumped at the opportunity to eliminate one of the last strongholds of Indigenous military power in the region. Narragansett officials questioned the UCNE’s decision to join Plymouth, deeming it hypocritical that they did so after forbidding them from joining Philip and the Wampanoags in battle against Plymouth.<sup>729</sup>

In July 1675 UCNE forces led in part by Edward Hutchinson, whose uncle co-founded the Corporation, moved into Narragansett territory to try and prevent them from joining Wampanoag forces against the English.<sup>730</sup> Hutchinson employed a tactic commonly used by the UCNE by that point: The English would arrive in force and try to bully Indians into signing treaties that stripped them of their land or committed them to a bad position vis-à-vis the English. In this instance Hutchinson’s efforts failed, and eventually the Narragansetts would enter the war against the UCNE in December 1675 after suffering six hundred casualties at the Great Swamp

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<sup>728</sup> Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 153.

<sup>729</sup> Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 143.

<sup>730</sup> Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 156.

Massacre.<sup>731</sup> Meanwhile, Philip had moved his soldiers to what is now upstate New York, hoping to convince the Mahicans to join forces with him. Instead, Mohawk soldiers allied with the English attacked, pushing Philip back towards New England. Despite his new Narragansett allies, Philip's position looked weaker in the spring of 1676 than it had before.<sup>732</sup>

On April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1676, the English captured Narragansett leader Canonchet, and despite the bumbling nature of English tactics, they made rapid progress against Philip thanks to support from Mohegan and Pequot allies, whom they relied upon both for tactical and navigational support. Praying Indians did their part as well, despite the constant distrust shown towards them. So significant was the impact of Indian allies in tipping the scales in the English's favor, that some historians have suggested Philip would have easily won had it simply been a contest of Wampanoag and Narragansett versus the UCNE.<sup>733</sup> By August 1676 Philip and his troops were essentially cornered, and it was on the twelfth of that month that Benjamin Church ambushed and killed the Wampanoag leader.

In the immediate aftermath of Philip's death, the English relished the opportunity to punish defeated Indian forces. Some were executed within the Boston Common, the Nemasket leader Tispaquin was shot and killed by Plymouth authorities after being promised forgiveness, and on March 20<sup>th</sup>, 1677 Philip's son was sold into slavery—a fate shared by many others as well.<sup>734</sup> The war did not officially end until April 12<sup>th</sup>, 1678 with the Treaty of Casco signed in Maine. The Treaty was the result of the Crown's influence, who viewed in a poor light the UCNE's treatment of defeated Indians and the way in which it had autonomously conducted the war. As such, the Treaty of Casco attempted to make amends to some extent, stipulating “the

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<sup>731</sup> Schultz and Tougias, *King Philip's War*, 51-53.

<sup>732</sup> Schultz and Tougias, *King Philip's War*, 54.

<sup>733</sup> Schultz and Tougias, *King Philip's War*, 61.

<sup>734</sup> Schultz and Tougias, *King Philip's War*, 109, 112, 128.

return of all [Abenaki] captives without ransom, and that each English family in Maine extend an annual quit-rent payment of one peck of corn to the Abenaki.”<sup>735</sup> Of course, Charles II’s influence in New England was tenuous at best, and the Treaty did nothing to assist Indians south of Maine, or to provide reparations for those who suffered under the UCNE between 1676 and 1678.

As historian Daniel Mandell has noted, King Philip’s War “destroyed most of the Natives and left the survivors clearly subordinate to colonial authority.”<sup>736</sup> Missionization was one of the means through which the English would subordinate Indians between 1676 and 1776. Though the Corporation retained its role as titular head of the missionary effort, its ability to direct the UCNE diminished considerably, and eventually it was reduced to paying missionary salaries as the New England colonies enjoyed the salutary neglect of the eighteenth century.<sup>737</sup> Indeed, those who advocated most strongly for English oversight of New England missionization did not live to see the eighteenth century. Henry Ashurst died two years after Philip’s death in 1676, followed a decade later by Daniel Gookin in 1687, John Eliot in 1690, and Robert Boyle in 1691. While the Corporation continued to fund New England missionization until the Revolutionary War—and in fact persists as an organization to this day—it never again held as much influence over American affairs as it did in the early 1670s. By 1721, all that remained of the Corporation’s influence was Natick, where praying Indians continued to reside after the war and currently live today. In 1721 Natick received a new minister whose salary was paid by the Corporation—a recent Harvard graduate named Oliver Peabody. Peabody was the embodiment

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<sup>735</sup> Schultz and Tougas, *King Philip’s War*, 73.

<sup>736</sup> Mandell, *King Philip’s War*, 143.

<sup>737</sup> Jean M. O’Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650-1790* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Daniel R. Mandell, *Behind the Frontier: Indians in Eighteenth-Century Eastern Massachusetts* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).

of missionary colonialism, viewing his role as minister less in terms of how he could accommodate praying Indians, and more in terms of how he could assist English colonizers. Indeed, in an essay written in 1731, he emphasized that his goal was to use missionization to “subdue them under us,” and in the next decades took actions that caused Natick’s praying Indian population to dwindle.<sup>738</sup>

Though Indians persisted in New England, their status there was continually affected by colonizers’ desire to segregate, assimilate, and eliminate them. Missionization fused all three tactics, bearing much of the responsibility in leaving Indians in a marginalized and subdued state. By its very nature, missionization infused English colonizers with a sense of superiority over Indians, and this guided their actions. Missionization did not create opportunities for unity or equality in New England, rather it did the opposite, creating the conditions that allowed English colonizers to dominate Indians. Indians who survived and sometimes thrived within this system did so thanks to their own agency and initiative, not because the English sympathized with them. What Indians did with Christianity should be celebrated—the tactics colonizers used to introduce it should not be. In the end, it was the choices made by the English colonizers running missionization that shaped and reinforced New Englanders’ belief in Indian inferiority, defining interracial relations there for centuries to come.

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<sup>738</sup> Oliver Peabody, *An essay to revive and encourage military exercises, skill and valour among the sons of God's people in New-England, printed by Thomas Fleet for John Eliot at the South End, and John Phillips near the town dock, Boston* (1732; reis., Gale, Sabin Americana, 2012), 31; Nicholas A. Garcia, “‘Subdue Them Under Us’: Oliver Peabody and the Limits of Acculturation in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts,” *The New England Journal of History* 77, no. 2 (Spring 2021): 49–78.

## Afterword

The idea for this dissertation emerged while I was writing my second-year thesis in graduate school, which was on one English minister's structural abuse of praying Indians within eighteenth century Natick.<sup>739</sup> While researching I discovered frequent references to a "New England company," or Corporation, as they called themselves, and all I could find was that it played some role in paying missionaries. A few more deep dives into the subject left me unsatisfied about what scholars had said about this organization, and so I endeavored to provide an account that centers its role in building New England missionization. This took me about a century earlier than my original research, forcing me to consider historiographies far afield from the eighteenth-century Atlantic world histories I was originally trained in. Discussing the Corporation in-depth required reading up on English history, Irish history, Native American history, religious studies, colonial studies, ethnic studies, and cultural studies. Going into graduate school, I saw myself principally as an historian of the mid-eighteenth-century British colonies and the British slave trade who dabbled in the early republic and nineteenth century Europe. It was not until this dissertation that I turned my attention to events occurring prior to 1700.

Another turn occurred during the writing of this dissertation, sometime in the middle of 2018. It was at that point that I became deeply involved in critical ethnic studies, a result of co-founding the Bulosan Center for Filipino Studies at UC Davis and becoming more invested in that field. As a Filipino American, never had I been encouraged or given the opportunity to study my ancestors' histories. I became interested in the United States' colonization of the Philippines

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<sup>739</sup> This paper was published (after much revision) in 2021. See Nicholas A. Garcia, "'Subdue Them Under Us': Oliver Peabody and the Limits of Acculturation in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts," *The New England Journal of History* 77, no. 2 (Spring 2021): 49–78.

and began seeing connections between what occurred there with respect to missionization and “benevolent assimilation” and what afflicted praying Indians in New England. A question sat at the back of my mind: “why do New England histories exceptionalize missionization when other fields call it colonialism?” As an historian, I first concluded that perhaps there were period-specific oddities about New England missionization that differentiated it from other forms of missionary colonialism. But as I studied the Corporation, how its members were involved in English colonial projects, and how it managed missionization, I realized that what was different about New England missionization was not its (poor) treatment of colonized people, but how scholars treat the subject.

And so my task became to prove that New England missionization, like other forms of missionization, complemented if not formed the foundation of English colonialism. This argument remains controversial, and I wrote this dissertation knowing that some early Americanists will continue to view Protestant missionization in a more positive than negative light. Proving that missionization was complicit in the destruction of Indigenous people and Indigeneity is difficult, primarily because there is an extremely high bar of evidence required to show that people like John Eliot and Daniel Gookin were colonizers who did more to hurt Indians than help them. One cannot only cite what they said or did, their intent, or even the consequences of their actions to prove that missionization was colonialism—such evidence is often disputed by those who argue that it is presentist to expect Eliot and Gookin to speak and act in ways that would satisfy marginalized peoples today.

Therefore, I focused less on the individual intent of the most “sympathetic” New England missionaries, and more on demonstrating that missionization was a vast operation structurally and ideologically aligned with other English colonial projects in the Atlantic world. I also had to

prove that missionization was, at its core, not a progressive mindset for the seventeenth century, but a regressive one whose rhetoric stanchioned English colonial projects and was consistent with other instances of colonization that employed conversion as one of its strategies to subdue Indigenous populations.

In the introduction I made clear that part of my methodology is derived from my identity. I wrote this not to justify radical arguments atypical within New England historiography, but to remind readers of a fact: that the history of seventeenth century New England has largely not been written by Black people, Indigenous people, or people of color in general. As a person of color, and as someone who has ancestors who suffered under “benevolent assimilation,” I understand that I bring a unique perspective to New England missionization. In writing about seventeenth century Native Americans, I have tried my best to understand how they themselves might have felt about the colonialisms the English brought with them. The work of critical ethnic studies scholars like Drew Lopezina and E. J. R. David helped me greatly in developing this approach.

If anything, I hope that this dissertation has proven how complex New England missionization was. If future scholars take anything from what I have written, it should be that missionization was not exceptional, and that it existed within the gamut of English colonialism. John Eliot was not the “Apostle to the Indians,” he was a colonial operator who profited from the English’s need to justify colonialism via the conversion of indigenous peoples. Whether he believed in what he was doing or not, his actions helped to create a societal structure in New England that continues to oppress people of color in the present. In the end, English colonialism would not have functioned without missionization, and in all our evaluations of it we must keep that in mind.

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