

UC Berkeley

IURD Working Paper Series

Title

The New Black Politics and Local Economic Development Policy: Broader Agendas or Business as Usual?

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3st087f6>

Author

Robinson, Carla Jean

Publication Date

1988-08-01

Peer reviewed

The New Black Politics and Local Economic Development Policy:
Broader Agendas or Business as Usual?

Carla Jean Robinson

Working Paper No. 487

August 1988

Institute of Urban and Regional Development
University of California at Berkeley

Carla Jean Robinson is assistant professor of city planning at the Georgia Institute of Technology, where she teaches local economic development planning. She earned her doctorate in city and regional planning from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This manuscript was prepared while she was at the Institute of Urban and Regional Development as a post-doctoral fellow during 1987 and 1988.

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction	1
The New Black Politics	2
Local Economic Development	5
Economics, Politics, and Policy	9
Relationships Between Politics and Local Economic Development Policy Approaches	11
Conclusions	17
Appendix A -- Figure and Tables	21
Appendix B -- Measurement of Local Economic and Social Conditions	34
Notes	37
References	39

The New Black Politics and Local Economic Development Policy:

Broader Agendas or Business as Usual?

Introduction

The number of Black and Hispanic elected officials in the United States has increased markedly in recent years. The number of Black elected officials rose from fewer than 500 in 1965 to 6,056 in 1985 (Williams 1987). Between 1973 and 1986, the number of Hispanic elected officials increased from approximately 1,300 to 3,202 (National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund 1986). These increases have prompted political scientists and other scholars to examine the extent to which these officials have effectively promoted the interests of their Black and Hispanic constituents.¹ Among the issues that have been addressed is the extent to which these elected officials make policy choices that reflect the needs and interests of their constituents. This issue is particularly important in the area of urban policy, given the large proportions of Black and Hispanic residents in many of the nation's cities.

In this article I examine the relationship between Black and Hispanic political representation in local government and the economic development policy approaches pursued by city administrations. The key question asked is whether Black- and Hispanic-controlled city administrations are more likely to follow economic development policy approaches that address the interests of Black and Hispanic residents, thereby broadening the local development policy agenda. I begin by reviewing some perspectives on the performance of Black local elected officials. I then describe two types of economic development policy approaches that have been identified in the literature. The more commonly followed "corporate-center" approach is

generally characterized by efforts to promote growth and assumes that growth produces benefits for all residents. In contrast, the "corporate-distributive" approach followed by some cities does not share this assumption and is generally characterized by efforts to ensure that growth produces benefits for ethnic minority, low-income, and other economically disadvantaged residents. Next, I discuss some local political and economic factors that are expected to influence which economic development policy approach is followed. Finally, I present results of tests of a model of the relationship between Black and Hispanic political representation and the policy approaches followed by city administrations.

The New Black Politics

During the 1970s and early 1980s, many observers believed that the increased numbers of Black and Hispanic local elected officials would lead to changes in urban politics and urban policy. They assumed that these officials would be instrumental in the development of policy initiatives addressing their constituents' interests in such areas as employment, housing, health care, public safety, and education. Nelson (1982) provides the following description of expectations in cities in which Blacks were able to secure political representation.

The new Black politics looked inward to the reservoir of strength in the Black community for the power required to move the struggle for Black freedom to higher levels. By electing a "new breed" of politician to public office and by the unification of the Black masses through community-based institutions, it was hoped that the social and economic position of the Black community would be transformed. In places where they represented electoral majorities, Blacks would take over local government and reorient policy priorities toward a concern for the vital needs of the Black

community. Wherever Blacks existed in significant numbers, the prevailing power structure would be compelled to address itself to the welfare of Black citizens (p. 189).

The notion of a "new Black politics" or "ballot power" (Preston 1982) rested on several assumptions concerning common interests within the Black community and the ability of Black elected officials to translate those interests into public policy. First, the new Black politics assumed that a set of community goals for urban policy could be articulated within the Black community. Second, the new Black politics assumed that Black local elected officials would be so firmly grounded in the community that they would be effective advocates for community goals and interests and would be able to place them on the urban policy agenda. Finally, it was assumed that the articulation and effective representation of these goals and interests would lead to a reorientation of urban policy priorities in these cities.

Assessments of the accomplishments of the new Black politics have generally not been favorable. Many analysts believe that the accomplishments of increased Black political representation have primarily taken the form of expanded economic opportunities for the Black middle class (Eisinger 1982; Nelson 1987; Piliawsky 1985; Williams 1987). These opportunities have been in the areas of city government employment and city government contractual relationships with Black-owned businesses.

However, analysts also note that increased Black political representation has produced little improvement in the social and economic conditions of many Black city residents, particularly the poor (Nelson 1987; Piliawsky 1985; Williams 1987). Especially noteworthy has been the apparent failure of Black-controlled city administrations to use local economic development policy to improve conditions for Black, low-income, and other

economically disadvantaged residents. In assessing Black- controlled city administrations in the 1970s, Mollenkopf (1978) viewed "the ideology of institution-building and patronage accumulation current within the Black community" as an indicator of a tendency toward "pro-growth coalitions simply manned by Black people" (p. 146). A similar view is held by Fainstein and Fainstein (1982), who state:

The major cities with Black mayors, however, have so far not produced a radical program for redevelopment. Detroit, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Gary thus never gave rise to the kind of cleavage between business and popular interests that appeared in Kucinich's Cleveland. . . This contrast suggests that the major thrust of Black governments has been to improve Black access to specific governmental benefits, especially jobs, rather than to increase the power of low- and moderate-income groups over redevelopment policy (p. 14).

Two categories of reasons account for the failure of the new Black politics to generate many of the expected results. The first set of reasons involves practical factors and results from the fact that large gaps remain between the theory and practice of the new Black politics (Nelson 1987). In many cities the Black community has not moved beyond mobilizing for the election of a mayor or council members to the next stage of developing institutions capable of sustained political mobilization. In some cases, Black elected officials have placed their self- interest and party loyalty before the advocacy of community needs (Mollenkopf 1978; Nelson 1987; Preston 1982). Also in some cases, competition between rival elected officials vying for power and influence has stymied Black political development (Perry and Stokes 1987). The result of these inabilityies to translate political representation into the expected outcomes, according to Nelson (1987), "has been the perpetuation of old patterns of political

influence within the formal framework of new politics symbolized by the expansion of Black numerical representation in city government" (p. 175).

The second category of reasons causing the new Black politics not to live up to some of its expectations involves structural factors. Cities with Black mayors and/or Black- dominated city councils are among the most economically distressed cities in the country. There is little that even the most well-intentioned local officials can do to reverse trends in joblessness, housing decline, and suburban outmigration in these cities (Karnig 1976; Piliawsky 1985). Other factors influencing the policy effectiveness of Black local elected officials include the structure of city government, the form of the relationship between city and state government, the fiscal and programmatic priorities of the federal government, and the extent of opposition among key local decisionmakers (Howard 1978; Karnig and Welch 1980). Another important structural factor that has undoubtedly affected the outcomes of increased Black political representation is the fact that governance of central cities does not necessarily lead to control of the decision-making process (Nelson 1987).

Local Economic Development Policy

Issues related to the policy responsiveness of city administrations headed by Blacks and Hispanics are particularly important in the area of local economic development policy. The unstable economic circumstances confronting many Black and Hispanic residents of U.S. cities cause many of them to expect Black and Hispanic elected officials to be more responsive to their concerns than are other elected officials. Of course, many of these conditions (such as high unemployment caused by extensive disinvestment in central cities) are beyond the control of local government. However, there is evidence that suggests that city administrations, including those headed

by Blacks and Hispanics, vary in terms of the policy responses devised to cope with local economic conditions.

Two contrasting types of policy approaches used by city administrations in planning and implementing economic development activities have been identified in the literature. The more common approach is marked by an emphasis on efforts to stimulate economic growth. These efforts address the demand side of the local labor market by attempting to improve opportunities for capital investment, primarily in the form of real estate development. The attraction of establishments in growing economic sectors such as professional services is emphasized, as is the reshaping of urban space, especially in central business districts. Hill (1986) labels this approach the "corporate- center strategy" and describes it as follows.

In Detroit, as in all large U.S. cities today, the logic shaping investment priorities and the practical application of development plans is the corporate- center strategy. Overall investment priorities are to transform this aging industrial city into the modern corporate image: a financial, administrative, and professional services center for auto and related industries; a research and development site for new growth industries (e.g., robotics, new auto materials and components technology, leisure-related activities); an emphasis upon recommercialization rather than consumption that is appealing to young corporate managers, educated professionals, convention goers, and the tourist trade (p. 105).

He adds:

This urban development strategy corresponds to changes in the spatial organization of national and multinational corporations: the centralization and concentration of conception, coordination and control activities ("headquarters

functions") and the regional, national, and international decentralization of production activities (Hill 1986: 121).

A basic assumption of the corporate-center approach is that local government efforts to promote economic growth produce benefits for "the city as a whole" (Peterson 1981) and thus for all residents. This approach is not characterized by active attempts by city administrations to assure that development benefits accrue to low-income, ethnic minority, and other economically disadvantaged residents. Rather, these residents are assumed to benefit from the additional employment opportunities resulting from increased investment and also from additional or improved public services made possible by increased tax revenue.

In contrast, the "corporate-distributive" economic development policy approach addresses issues related to both growth and the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with development activities (Clavel 1986; Haupt 1980; Robinson 1987). Although this approach, like the corporate-center approach, involves efforts to promote increased investment and real estate development, it also emphasizes labor supply issues and distributional considerations. Qualitative considerations, such as the distribution of income and the types of jobs created, are addressed along with quantitative considerations, such as overall changes in local income and employment levels. These additional emphases are designed to ensure that local residents (especially economically disadvantaged residents) benefit from economic development activities.

The corporate-distributive economic development policy approach differs from the corporate-center approach in that it does not assume that significant benefits created by the corporate-center approach will either directly or indirectly flow to residents and communities with the greatest

need. Mechanisms such as the adoption of a strong local advocacy position by the city administration in negotiating economic development activities, increased public accountability requirements for private sector participants, and spatial decentralization of economic development activities are viewed as means through which the flow of benefits can be redirected toward these residents and communities. Active participation by the city administration is assumed to be essential for the effective redirection of benefits.

A recent cross-sectional study of the economic development policy approaches followed by city administrations examines whether patterns consistent with the corporate-center and corporate-distributive policy approaches can be identified (Robinson 1987). Although the data examined provide no evidence of a corporate-center pattern, they do provide evidence of a corporate-distributive pattern. For example, cities emphasizing the improvement of economic opportunities available to disadvantaged residents tend to regard policy areas related to human resource development and neighborhood issues as very important. They also tend to target economically disadvantaged workers for participation in economic development activities. The inability to identify a corporate-center pattern can be regarded as a consequence of the fact that all city administrations must attempt to foster growth within city boundaries. However, in addition to promoting growth, some city administrations build on the corporate-center approach by also attempting to address the allocational or distributive issues associated with economic development. The study results suggest that city administrations do not approach the issues of growth and distribution in an either/or fashion. Administrations following the corporate-

distributive approach are basically growth-oriented, but they balance that orientation by also addressing distributional issues.

Economics, Politics, and Policy

A general hypothesis examined in this article is that local economic and political factors influence whether a city administration is likely to follow the corporate-center or the corporate-distributive policy approach. The structural position of local government provides city administrations with a bias toward policies designed to stimulate investment (Fainstein and Fainstein 1986). Local government is dependent upon locally raised revenue in carrying out its functions and providing services. This revenue is generated largely from taxes levied against real estate. Efforts to promote the expansion of the tax base and to attract high-income residents who are not highly dependent on public services are common policy responses to the need to generate local revenues. Within this context, private control of revenue-producing resources endows business interests with what Stone (1980) labels "systemic power" in the economic development process. Systemic power is exercised primarily through control of resources that are crucial for the effective performance of the local economy, rather than through overt control of the local economic development planning process (Feagin 1986).²

Although some groups, such as business interests, are able to influence public policy indirectly through their control of economic resources, other groups are more likely to influence policy through their active participation in political processes. This is particularly true of low-income and ethnic minority residents, since the economic resources they control do not grant them powerful positions within local political and economic structures. In cases in which low-income and ethnic minority residents are politically powerful, they may be able to use that power to

counterbalance the systemic power enjoyed by business interests. Such counterbalancing is especially important in the area of economic development policy, given the structural dominance of business interests. According to Judd and Ready (1986):

The mobilization of new urban constituencies may well repoliticize economic development policies. The promises that accompany local versions of supply-side economics may not satisfy coalitions made up of poor people and minorities. Minority electorates are likely to demand that economic development be directly targeted to providing local jobs and housing and to improving neighborhoods (p. 6).

The potential importance of political representation as a means of incorporating the interests of low-income and ethnic minority residents into economic development policy can be seen in examples provided by Chicago, Atlanta, and Cleveland. Under the administration of the late Mayor Harold Washington, Chicago followed an economic development policy approach that emphasized the distribution of benefits to low-income and ethnic minority residents and their communities. This was in stark contrast to the approaches followed by previous administrations, which tended to emphasize downtown development (Judd and Ready 1986; Mier, Moe, and Sherr 1986). Former Mayor Maynard Jackson of Atlanta chose to focus attention on the distributional issues associated with development. Jackson was a strong advocate of minority contracting programs as a means of reformulating "the allocational element of the development agenda" (Reed 1987). The contracting programs served as a means of directing development benefits to a segment of the minority community.

In contrast, Cleveland provides an example of how the lack of effective political representation can stifle efforts to reformulate the development

agenda. Between 1969 and 1979 the staff of the Cleveland City Planning Commission adopted an equity-oriented approach toward its responsibilities. The staff's general approach was to support only those economic development projects having the potential to produce direct or indirect benefits for the poor in the form of increased employment opportunities or additional tax revenue which could be used in low-income communities (Krumholz, Cogger, and Linner 1975). This approach led the staff to refuse to support the large Tower City downtown redevelopment project on the grounds that the city would suffer a net loss from the project (Krumholz 1982). In some situations (among them the Tower City project), the staff was unable to implement its equity approach because of opposition from the city council and the business community. Thus although the poor found support for their interests in the Commission staff, they did not have sufficient political allies to allow the staff's proposals to be adopted.

Relationships between Politics and Local Economic Development Policy

Approaches

The Model

A model that can be used in examining the relationship between political representation and local economic development policy approaches is shown in Figure 1. Within this model, local economic development policy is viewed as responding to local economic and social conditions. Which local conditions are addressed by policy is assumed to depend partly on the distribution of political power. Politically powerful groups are able to influence public policy in ways that cause it to address local conditions that adversely affect their interests (Friedland 1983). The model assumes that in situations in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful, they use their power to cause local economic development policy to address

economic and social conditions affecting their interests. The corporate-distributive economic development policy approach, which is characterized by attempts to create direct benefits for low-income and ethnic minority residents, is expected to be followed in these situations. In contrast, the corporate-center approach is expected in situations in which Black and Hispanic residents are not politically powerful.

The political power of Black and Hispanic residents can be thought of in terms of their ability to influence public policy. Such influence can be exerted through their mayoral and city council representation. These residents can be said to be politically powerful if the mayor is Black or Hispanic or if the majority of the members of the city council are Black or Hispanic. Such representation is expected to allow economic and social issues of concern to these residents to be incorporated in economic development policy.

The economic interests of Black and Hispanic residents revolve primarily around their basic living conditions, such as their access to and the availability of employment opportunities providing adequate wages (Howard 1978; Welch and Karnig 1979). In general, these interests pertain to the quantity and quality of economic opportunities and resources. Local social and economic conditions that can constrain these interests include general economic distress, high levels of dependency, high levels of inequality in the distribution of economic resources between ethnic minority and nonminority residents, low levels of economic well-being, low-quality human resources, and the underutilization of human resources. Measures for these conditions are discussed in the appendix to this article. The general expectation that these conditions will be related to aspects of the corporate-distributive policy approach in cities where Blacks and Hispanics

are politically powerful can be more specifically elaborated in terms of the policy variables in the model. The relationships to be examined are listed in Table 1.

In cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful, the public sector is expected to play a guiding role or both guiding and supportive roles with respect to private sector economic development participants. Under the guiding role, the public sector attempts to guide private investment to ensure that its results are consistent with the city's development goals. Under the supportive role, the public sector provides incentives for development and attempts to create a good business climate. The guiding role is more consistent with the assumption that the development process does not necessarily produce significant benefits for low-income and ethnic minority residents. In cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful, the guiding role is expected to be associated with economic distress and low levels of economic well-being.

The public sector is expected to assume a leadership position in the planning and implementation of economic development activities in cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful. Public sector leadership can be exercised solely or can be shared with the private sector. In either case, public sector leadership is expected to serve as a means of ensuring that economic development activities provide significant benefits for low-income and ethnic minority residents. Public sector leadership is expected to be associated with economic distress and low levels of economic well-being.

The improvement of economic opportunities available to economically disadvantaged residents is expected to be more important than the

stimulation of economic growth in the economic development policies of cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful. Administrations in these cities are expected to place more emphasis on economic development issues concerning the distribution of opportunities and resources than on the promotion of growth. The emphasis of distributive issues is expected to be associated with economic distress, high levels of dependency, high levels of inequality in the distribution of economic resources between minority and nonminority residents, low levels of economic well-being, low- quality human resources, and high underutilization of human resources.

The economic development planning process is expected to be more accessible to a wide range of local interests in cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful. In these cities, participation in the economic development planning process can be expected to extend beyond the business/government coalitions associated with the corporate-center approach. Broad participation is expected to be associated with economic distress and low levels of economic well-being.

Locally determined conditions for the provision of public assistance for privately sponsored economic development activities are expected to be used in cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful. Such conditions provide a means of incorporating these residents' interests in the economic development process and of linking their needs to projected development outcomes. The use of locally determined conditions is expected to be associated with economic distress, high levels of inequality in the distribution of economic resources between minority and nonminority residents, low levels of economic well-being, low-quality human resources, and high underutilization of human resources.

Areas of intervention addressing human resources and neighborhood issues are expected to be important in cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful. The targeting of economically disadvantaged workers is also expected in these cities. These types of intervention represent efforts to provide benefits for low-income and ethnic minority residents. They are expected to be associated with economic distress, high levels of economic dependency, high levels of inequality in the distribution of economic resources between minority and nonminority residents, low levels of economic well-being, low- quality human resources, and high underutilization of human resources.

Methodology

Data for this study were obtained from a survey questionnaire and secondary sources. Information about the economic development policy approaches of city administrations was obtained from a mail survey of public sector economic development officials representing all U.S. cities with 1980 populations of 100,000 or more. Because there were only 175 such cities, the entire target population was surveyed. Of the 175, 141 provided usable responses to the questionnaire and constitute the study sample. Data used to measure independent variables were available from the 1980 U.S. Census, directories of Black and Hispanic elected officials published by the Joint Center for Political Studies and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund, annual statistical summaries published by the International City Management Association, and a listing of the economic condition of cities published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Each test of the model involves three steps. First the cities are separated into two groups based on whether Black and Hispanic residents are

or are not politically powerful. Second, the relationship between an aspect of the economic development policy approach and a local condition reflecting the economic opportunities and resources available to Black and Hispanic residents is examined separately for each group of cities.³ A separate chi-square test is performed for each group. Finally, the results for the two groups are compared. A statistically significant relationship is expected between the policy variable and the local condition variable in situations in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful.⁴ No relationship is expected in situations in which these residents are not politically powerful.⁵

Results⁶

The assumption that Black and Hispanic residents are able to use political power to cause local economic development policy to respond to their interests is not supported by the data examined. Statistically significant relationships identified in the tests of the model are presented in Tables 2 through 11 and are summarized in Table 12. Ten out of a possible total of 53 relationships are identified based on the tests of the model. Only two of the relationships identified confirm the expected results. Locally determined conditions for the provision of public resources are related to economic performance in cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful (Table 2). Use of these conditions is more common among economically distressed cities, with 100 percent of the distressed cities and only 50.0 percent of the nondistressed cities using them. The public sector economic development role is related to the economic well-being of Hispanic residents in cities in which Black and Hispanic residents are politically powerful (Table 3). The public sector is more likely to play a guiding role or both the guiding and

supportive roles in cities in which the level of economic well-being of Hispanic residents is relatively low (100 percent of these cities versus 57.1 percent of cities in which the level of economic well-being is high).

Most of the relationships identified do not confirm the expected results (Tables 4-11). In these cases, local condition variables and policy variables are related in situations in which ethnic minority residents are not politically powerful. However, consistent with initial expectations for cities in which ethnic minority residents are politically powerful, aspects of the alternative economic development policy approaches are related to local conditions limiting the economic opportunities and resources available to Black and Hispanic residents.

Conclusions

In this article, I have examined the impact of the political power of Black and Hispanic residents on the economic development policy approaches followed by city administrations. The corporate-distributive approach, which balances efforts to promote growth with efforts to direct benefits toward low-income and ethnic minority residents, was expected to be followed in cities having Black or Hispanic mayors. The data examined do not confirm this expectation. Local economic development policy in cities having Black and Hispanic mayors does not deviate significantly from the growth-oriented policy approach typically followed by city administrations. Thus, development policy in these cities can be fairly accurately characterized as "business as usual." This conclusion is consistent with those of much of the previous research on the policy impacts of Black elected officials.

At least three possible reasons for the failure to identify the expected relationships can be suggested. First, the political power of ethnic minority residents was operationalized in terms of descriptive, rather than

substantive, representation. Descriptive representation refers to the extent to which the demographic characteristics of elected officials match the characteristics of the general population, while substantive representation refers to the extent to which the actions of elected officials mirror the interests of their constituents (Meier and England 1984; Karnig 1976; Henderson 1978). Considering the range of local economic interests to which they must respond (including those of powerful business interests), Black and Hispanic elected officials cannot be assumed to place primary emphasis on the interests of low-income, Black, and Hispanic residents. Control of the mayoralty and/or city council may not be sufficient to allow Black and Hispanic residents to secure economic development policy approaches that address their interests. This is especially true given the complexity of the economic problems confronting these residents, the lack of agreement concerning the most effective policy responses, and the limited effectiveness of policy responses initiated at the local level.

Second, the level of bureaucratic enfranchisement of Black and Hispanic residents was not addressed in the tests of the model. Bureaucratic enfranchisement refers to the ability of particular groups to influence the implementation of policies decided upon by elected officials (Fainstein and Fainstein 1982). City administrators occupy key positions to the extent that they play important roles in the setting and implementation of policy. It is possible for Black and Hispanic residents to be politically powerful but to exercise little influence in the formulation and implementation of public policy. This is especially true in the area of economic development policy, given the technical shroud frequently placed around the economic development planning process.

Third, conflicts exist between the notion of popular control of certain local government processes, on the one hand, and private control of the resources providing the basis for local economic performance, on the other hand (Kantor 1987). All city administrations are faced with this conflict. However, it presents a more serious challenge for administrations headed by Black and Hispanic officials, since their constituents are likely to expect the economic development policy agenda to be reformulated in ways that reflect community concerns. Although these expectations place a degree of political pressure on Black and Hispanic officials, they may not be as compelling as the pressure exerted by the officials' need (whether perceived or real) to accommodate the interests of the business community.

Despite these findings, recent events in some cities indicate that under certain circumstances political influence can lead to the redirection of economic development policy. For example, many of the reforms made by the Washington administration in Chicago, including some of those in the area of local economic development, were spurred by ethnic minority and neighborhood-based political movements. Based on their study of ten California cities, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) concluded that the chances that local policy will be responsive to the interests of Black and Hispanic residents increase if Black and Hispanic elected officials are able to form coalitions with liberal and other sympathetic officials. Among the outcomes in cities where ethnic minorities were effectively incorporated into political coalitions were increased city employment of minority residents, the appointment of minorities to city boards and commissions, increased city contracts for minority-owned businesses, and increased government responsiveness to minority concerns in areas such as economic development (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1986).

A possible implication of these recent events is that as Black and Hispanic residents become more sophisticated in their voting behavior, they will shift attention from issues of descriptive representation to issues of substantive representation. Such issues may be especially likely to arise in cities such as Atlanta, where ethnic minority residents constitute a majority of the population and where minority candidates compete with each other for elective offices. Perhaps as these issues are increasingly debated during campaigns, candidates will be challenged to address their constituents' concerns about economic development and, once elected, to broaden the economic development policy agenda in ways that reflect those concerns.

Appendix A -- Figure and Tables

Figure 1

Local Conditions, the Political Power of Ethnic Minority Residents, and
Economic Development Policy Approaches




Table 1

Relationships Examined in Tests of the Model

<u>Policy Aspect</u>	<u>Local Condition</u>
Public sector economic development role	Economic performance Economic well-being
Lead sector	Economic performance Economic well-being
Relative importance of growth and the improvement of economic opportunities	Economic performance Dependence Distribution of economic resources Economic well-being Quality of human resources Underutilization of human resources
Accessibility of the planning process	Economic performance Economic well-being
Use of locally-determined conditions	Economic performance Dependency Distribution of economic resources Economic well-being Quality of human resources Underutilization of human resources
Importance of human resources and neighborhood issues	Economic performance Dependency Distribution of economic resources Economic well-being Quality of human resources Underutilization of human resources
Targeting of economically disadvantaged workers	Economic performance Dependency Economic well-being Underutilization of human resources

Table 2

Economic Performance, Local Determination of Conditions Under Which
Public Sector Resources Provided, and Mayoral Political Power

<u>Economic Performance</u>	<u>Local Determination of Conditions</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Distressed	13	100.0	0	0	13
Nondistressed	1	50.0	1	50.0	2
	—		—		—
Total	14	93.3	1	6.7	16
Chi-square (1) = 6.964, p < .008					
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Distressed	54	87.1	8	12.9	62
Nondistressed	31	79.5	8	20.5	39
	—		—		—
Total	85	83.2	16	15.8	101
Chi-square (1) = 1.040, p. < .308					

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1984).

Table 3

Economic Well-Being of Hispanic Residents,
Public-Sector Economic Development Role,
and Mayoral Political Power

Economic Well-Being of Hispanic Residents	Public-Sector Economic Development Role						Total
	Supportive		Guiding		Both		
	Row		Row		Row		
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	

Minority Mayoral Political Power

Low	0	0	2	20.0	8	80.0	10
High	3	42.9	0	0	4	57.1	7
	—		—		—		—
Total 3	17.7	2	11.8	12	70.6	17	
Chi-square (2) = 5.990, p < .050							

Nonminority Mayoral Political Power

Low	11	18.0	7	11.5	43	70.5	61
High	17	27.9	8	13.1	36	59.0	61
	—		—		—		—
Total	28	23.0	15	12.3	79	64.8	122
Chi-square (2) = 1.973, p < .373							

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1983a), Table 155.

Table 4

Economic Performance, Public-Sector Economic Development Role,
and Mayoral Political Power

<u>Economic Performance</u>	<u>Public-Sector Economic Development Role</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>Supportive</u>		<u>Guiding</u>		<u>Both</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>							
Distressed	2	13.3	2	13.3	11	73.3	15
Nondistressed	1	50.0	0	0	1	50.0	2
	—		—		—		—
Total	3	17.6	2	11.8	12	70.6	17
Chi-square (2) = 1.747, p < .417							
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>							
Distressed	10	15.6	4	6.3	50	78.1	64
Nondistressed	18	31.0	11	19.0	29	50.0	58
	—		—		—		—
Total	28	23.0	15	12.3	79	64.8	122
Chi-square (2) = 10.866, p < .004							

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1984).

Table 5

Economic Performance, Lead Sector,
and Mayoral Political Power

	<u>Public-Sector Economic Development Role</u>						
	<u>Private</u>		<u>Public and Private</u>		<u>Public</u>		
<u>Economic Performance</u>	<u>Row Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Row Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Row Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>							
Distressed	1	6.7	8	53.3	6	40.0	15
Nondistressed	0	0	2	100.0	0	0	2
	—		—		—		—
Total	1	5.9	10	58.8	6	35.3	17
Chi-square (2) = 1.587, p < .452							
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>							
Distressed	4	6.2	45	69.2	16	24.6	65
Nondistressed	15	26.3	24	42.1	18	31.6	57
	—		—		—		—
Total	19	15.6	69	56.6	34	27.9	122

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1984).

Table 6

Economic Performance, Targeting of Economically
Disadvantaged Workers, and Mayoral Political Power

	<u>Economically Disadvantaged Workers Targeted</u>				
	<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		
<u>Economic Performance</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Distressed	6	42.9	8	57.1	14
Nondistressed	0	0	2	100.0	2
	—		—		—
Total	6	37.5	10	62.5	16
Chi-square (1) = 1.371, p < .242					
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Distressed	20	32.8	41	67.2	61
Nondistressed	34	68.0	16	32.0	50
	—		—		—
Total	54	48.6	57	51.4	111
Chi-square (1) = 13.638, p < .000					

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1984).

Table 7

Dependency Among Black Residents, Targeting
of Economically Disadvantaged Workers, and Mayoral Political Power

Dependency Among Black Residents	Economically Disadvantaged Workers Targeted				Total
	Yes		No		
	Number	Row Percent	Number	Row Percent	
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	8	80.0	2	20.0	10
High	2	33.3	4	66.7	6
	—		—		—
Total	10	62.5	6	37.5	16
Chi-square (1) = 3.484, p < .062					
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	16	32.0	34	68.0	50
High	41	67.2	20	32.8	61
	—		—		—
Total	57	51.4	54	46.6	111
Chi-square (1) = 13.638, p < .000					

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1983a), Tables 150 and 151.

Table 8

Economic Well-Being of Black Residents, Targeting
of Economically Disadvantaged Workers, and Mayoral Political Power

Economic Well-Being of <u>Black Residents</u>	<u>Economically Disadvantaged Workers Targeted</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	6	54.52	5	45.5	11
High	4	80.0	1	20.0	5
	—		—		—
Total	10	62.5	6	37.5	16
Chi-square (1) = 0.950, p < .330					
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	38	69.1	17	30.9	55
High	19	33.9	37	66.1	56
	—		—		—
Total	57	51.3	54	46.7	111
Chi-square (1) = 13.733, p < .000					

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1983a), Table 137.

Table 9

Economic Well-Being of Hispanic Residents, Targeting
of Economically Disadvantaged Workers, and Mayoral Political Power

	<u>Economically Disadvantaged Workers Targeted</u>				
<u>Economic Well-Being of Hispanic Residents</u>	<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		<u>Total</u>
		<u>Row</u>		<u>Row</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	7	77.8	2	22.2	9
High	3	42.9	4	57.1	7
	—		—		—
Total	10	62.5	6	37.5	16
Chi-square (1) = 2.049, p < .152					
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	38	66.7	19	33.3	57
High	19	35.2	35	64.8	54
	—		—		—
Total	57	51.3	54	48.7	111
Chi-square (1) = 11.001, p < .001					

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1983a), Table 155.

Table 10

Underutilization of Human Resources of Black Residents, Targeting
of Economically Disadvantaged Workers, and Mayoral Political Power

Underutilization of Human Resources of Black Residents	Economically Disadvantaged Workers Targeted				Total
	Yes		No		
	Row	Row	Row	Row	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	6	75.0	2	25.0	8
High	4	50.0	4	50.0	8
	—		—		—
Total	10	62.5	6	37.5	16
Chi-square (1) = 1.742, p < .187					
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	17	33.3	34	66.7	51
High	40	66.7	20	33.3	60
	—		—		—
Total	57	51.4	54	48.6	111
Chi-square (1) = 12.261, p < .000					

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1983a), Table 134.

Table 11

Underutilization of Human Resources of Hispanic Residents, Targeting
of Economically Disadvantaged Workers, and Mayoral Political Power

Underutilization of Human Resources of <u>Hispanic Residents</u>	<u>Economically Disadvantaged Workers Targeted</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Row Percent</u>	
<u>Minority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	6	85.7	1	14.3	7
High	4	44.4	5	55.6	9
	—		—		—
Total	10	62.5	6	37.5	16
Chi-square (1) = 2.861, p < .091					
<u>Nonminority Mayoral Political Power</u>					
Low	20	37.0	34	63.0	54
High	37	64.9	20	35.1	57
	—		—		—
Total	57	51.4	54	48.6	111
Chi-square (1) = 8.621, p < .003					

Sources: Joint Center for Political Studies (1986); National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund (1986); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1983a), Table 152.

Table 12

Summary of Relationships Identified in Tests of Models

<u>Policy Aspect</u>	<u>Local Condition</u>
<u>Expected Results Confirmed</u>	
Use of locally-determined conditions	Economic Performance
Public sector economic development role	Economic well-being: Hispanic residents
<u>Expected Results Not Confirmed</u>	
Public sector economic development role	Economic performance
Lead sector	Economic Performance
Targeting of economically disadvantaged workers	Economic Performance
	Dependency: Black residents
	Economic well-being: Black residents
	Economic well-being: Hispanic residents
	Underutilization of human resources: Black residents
	Underutilization of human resources: Hispanic residents

Appendix B

Measurement of Local Economic and Social Conditions

Economic performance is treated as a dichotomous nominal variable indicating whether the city has been classified as economically distressed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD's criterion for distress is based on population growth, job lag, unemployment, and labor surpluses. A city receives one point for each item for which the local value exceeds a specified threshold. A minimum total score of three is required for a city to be classified as distressed.

This criterion was designed for the express purpose of determining eligibility for the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program. Consequently, it might not be the best measure of local economic performance. However, since it is used in the determination of eligibility for the UDAG program and since such eligibility is likely to influence local economic development policy, the criterion is a suitable measure for purposes of this study.

Dependency reflects the proportion of the total population that is assumed to be supported by or dependent upon employed members of the population. It is measured by a pair of dichotomous nominal variables created by dividing the numbers of Black and Hispanic residents under 18 years of age or over 64 years of age by the total Black and Hispanic populations. High dependency is marked by values greater than the median dependency value for all cities in the study sample. Low dependency is marked by values less than the median value.

Dependency is frequently conceptualized and measured in this manner in economic development research, although this approach is more commonly used in research concerning developing countries than it is in urban economic

development research. In the latter, dependency is frequently conceptualized in terms of residents who have low income levels and are reliant on government transfer payments. This conceptualization is related to the economic well-being variable used in this study and described below.

The distribution of economic resources reflects the extent to which ethnic minority and nonminority residents control equal shares of economic resources. It is measured by a pair of dichotomous nominal variables created by dividing the median household income of Black and Hispanic residents by the median household income of white residents. High inequality is marked by values less than the median ratio for all cities. Low inequality is marked by values greater than the median ratio.

This measure of inequality has the advantages of being relatively easy to interpret and to calculate. Other measures of inequality, such as measures based on the Gini coefficient, could possibly have been used. However, these measures tend to have less straightforward interpretations.

Economic well-being reflects the ability of residents to satisfy their basic needs. It is measured by a pair of dichotomous nominal variables based on the percent of Black and Hispanic residents below the poverty line. High economic well-being is marked by values less than the median poverty rate for all cities, while low economic well-being is marked by values greater than the median poverty rate.

Although other measures of economic well-being, such as per capita income, could have been used, these measures tend not to provide information on the proportion of the local population that is unable to satisfy its basic needs. This information is important because it provides a more specific indication of the extent of economic need among ethnic minority residents.

The quality of human resources is measured by a pair of dichotomous nominal variables based on the percent of Black and Hispanic residents 25 years of age and older with four or more years of college. A high quality of human resources is marked by values greater than the median value for all cities, while a low quality of human resources is marked by values less than the median value.

The underutilization of ethnic minority workers is measured by a pair of dichotomous nominal variables created by dividing the numbers of unemployed Black and Hispanic workers by the Black and Hispanic civilian labor forces. High underutilization is marked by values greater than the median value for all cities. Low underutilization is marked by values less than the median value.

Each of the independent variables indicating social conditions is dichotomized based on the median value for all cities in the study sample. In general, values below the median represent low levels for the variable and values above the median represent high levels. This method of dichotomizing the variables has two advantages. First, it is based on a measure (the median) that is not sensitive to extreme values (as the mean is). Second, it provides a balanced division of the cities into two categories for each variable, thereby not contributing to problems of low expected cell frequencies. A potential problem of this method is related to the creation of only two categories for each variable. In some cases, the categories might be too grossly defined to allow relationships between these variables and the dependent variables to be identified. However, the relatively small size of the sample and particularly the small numbers of cities with ethnic minority control of the mayoralty or city council make use of more than two categories impractical.

Notes

1. See, for example, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Eisinger 1980; Fainstein and Fainstein 1982; Jones 1978; Karnig 1976; and Stone 1986.
2. The findings of a study of urban renewal conducted by Friedland (1983) illustrate the importance of systemic power. Friedland found a direct relationship between urban renewal spending and local conditions constraining business interests in cities with high concentrations of corporate headquarters. This relationship did not hold for cities with low concentrations of corporate headquarters. According to Friedland, "because they controlled private investment, they controlled the economic conditions necessary to the success of urban renewal" (p. 121). This finding supports Friedland's thesis that public policy responds to groups that are powerful and are therefore able to have issues of interest to them placed on the political agenda.
3. All local condition variables except economic performance are measured separately for Black and Hispanic residents.
4. Only results for Black and Hispanic political power measured in terms of the mayoralty are presented. Results for political power measured in terms of city council composition are not presented here because of the small number of cities in which Black and Hispanic members hold the majority of council seats. Only nine such cities are represented in the study sample. Six of these cities also have mayors that are Black or Hispanic.
5. Many of the contingency tables used in this analysis have relatively large numbers of cells with small expected frequencies. Often use of

the chi-square test is not recommended for tables having more than one degree of freedom if more than 25 percent of the cells have small expected frequencies. However, based on the results of a comprehensive set of experiments evaluating the Type I error rate of the chi-square test in R X C contingency tables, Bradley et al. (1979) suggest that an unadjusted chi-square statistic can often be used in such situations. Consistent with this finding, and because there is no commonly agreed upon adjustment mechanism, in this article the unadjusted chi-square statistic is used to examine relationships between pairs of variables. However, results produced by following the unadjusted approach recommended by Bradley et al. may not be completely accurate in this situation, since the approach is based on samples of at least 20 and some of the tables presented in this article have fewer than 20 cases.

6. For purposes of brevity, only results that are statistically significant at the .05 level are presented here.

References

- Bradley, Drake R., T. D. Bradley, Steven G. McGrath, and Steven D. Cutcomb. 1979. "Type I Error Rate of the Chi-Square Test of Independence in R X C Tables That Have Small Expected Frequencies." Psychological Bulletin 86, 6: 1290- 1297.
- Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 1984. Protest is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- _____. 1986. "Protest is Not Enough: A Theory of Political Incorporation." PS 19, 3: 576-581.
- Clavel, Pierre. 1986. The Progressive City: Planning and Participation, 1969-1984. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Eisinger, Peter K. 1980. The Politics of Displacement: Racial and Ethnic Transition in Three American Cities. New York: Academic Press.
- _____. 1982. "Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black Political Power." The American Political Science Review 76, 2: 380-392.
- Fainstein, Norman I. and Susan S. Fainstein. 1982. "Neighborhood Enfranchisement and Urban Redevelopment." Journal of Planning Education and Research 2, 1: 11-19.
- _____. 1986. "Regime Strategies, Communal Resistance, and Economic Forces." In Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Development, by Susan S. Fainstein et al. New York: Longman.
- Feagin, Joe R. 1986. "The Corporate Center Strategy: The State in Central Cities." Urban Affairs Quarterly 21, 4: 617-628.

- Friedland, Roger. 1983. Power and Crisis in the City: Corporations, Unions, and Urban Policy. New York: Schocken Books.
- Haupt, Roy C. 1980. "The Power to Promote Growth: Business and the Making of Local Economic Development Policy." Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.
- Henderson, Lenneal J. 1978. "Administrative Advocacy and Black Urban Administrators." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 439 (September): 68-79.
- Hill, Richard Child. 1986. "Crisis in the Motor City: The Politics of Economic Development in Detroit." In Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Development, by Susan S. Fainstein et al. New York: Longman.
- Howard, John R. 1978. "A Framework for the Analysis of Urban Black Politics." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 439 (September): 1-15.
- International City Management Association. 1982. The Municipal Yearbook 1982. Washington, DC: International City Management Association.
- Joint Center for Political Studies. 1986. Black Elected Officials: A National Roster, 15th Edition. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political Studies.
- Jones, Mack H. 1978. "Black Political Empowerment in Atlanta: Myth and Reality." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 439 (September): 90-117.
- Judd, Dennis R. and Randy L. Ready. 1986. "Entrepreneurial Cities and the New Politics of Economic Development." In Reagan and the Cities, edited by C. Lewis and G. Peterson. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.

- Kantor, Paul. 1986. "The Dependent City: The Changing Political Economy of Urban Economic Development in the United States." Urban Affairs Quarterly 22, 4: 493-520.
- Karnig, Albert K. 1976. "Black Representation on City Councils: The Impact of District Elections and Socioeconomic Factors." Urban Affairs Quarterly 12, 2: 223-242.
- Karnig, Albert K. and Susan Welch. 1980. Black Representation and Urban Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Krumholz, Norman. 1982. "A Retrospective View of Equity Planning: Cleveland 1969-1979." Journal of the American Planning Association 48, 2: 163-174.
- Krumholz, Norman, Janice M. Cogger, and John H. Linner. 1975. "The Cleveland Policy Planning Report." Journal of the American Institute of Planners 41, 5: 298-304.
- Meier, Kenneth J. and Robert E. England. 1984. "Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?" The American Political Science Review 78, 2: 392-403.
- Mier, Robert, Kari J. Moe, and Irene Sherr. 1986. "Strategic Planning and the Pursuit of Reform, Economic Development, and Equity." Journal of the American Planning Association 52, 3: 299-309.
- Mollenkopf, John H. 1978. "The Postwar Politics of Urban Development." In Marxism and the Metropolis: New Perspectives in Urban Political Economy, edited by William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers. New York: Oxford University Press.
- National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund. 1986. 1986 National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials.

Washington, DC: National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund.

Nelson, William E. 1982. "Cleveland: The Rise and Fall of the New Black Politics." In The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power, edited by Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul Puryear. New York: Longman.

_____. 1987. "Cleveland: The Evolution of Black Political Power." In The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power, second edition, edited by Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul L. Puryear. New York: Longman.

Perry, Huey L. and Alfred Stokes. 1987. "Politics and Power in the Sunbelt: Mayor Morial of New Orleans." In The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power, second edition, edited by Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul L. Puryear. New York: Longman.

Peterson, Paul E. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Piliawsky, Monte. 1985. "The Impact of Black Mayors on the Black Community: The Case of New Orleans' Ernest Morial." The Review of Black Political Economy 13, 4: 5-23.

Preston, Michael B. 1982. "Black Politics and Public Policy in Chicago: Self-Interest Versus Constituent Representation." In The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power, edited by Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul Puryear. New York: Longman.

Reed, Adolph Jr. 1987. "A Critique of Neo-Progressivism in Theorizing about Local Development Policy: A Case from Atlanta." In The Politics

- of Urban Development, edited by Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Robinson, Carla Jean. 1987. "Economic Development Policy Approaches of City Administrations: Types and Influential Local Conditions." Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Stone, Clarence N. 1980. "Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory." The American Political Science Review 74, 4: 978-990.
- _____. 1986. "Atlanta: Protest and Elections are Not Enough." PS 19, 3: 618-625.
- U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1983a. 1980 Census of Population, Volume 1, Chapter C. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- _____. 1983b. County and City Data Book, 1983. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1984. "Urban Development Action Grant Large City and Urban County Universe List." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- Welch, Susan and Albert K. Karnig. 1979. "The Impact of Black Elected Officials on Urban Expenditures and Intergovernmental Revenue." In Urban Policy Making, Sage Yearbooks in Politics and Public Policy, Vol. 7, edited by Dale Rogers Marshall. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Williams, Linda. 1987. "Black Political Progress in the 1980s: The Electoral Arena." In The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power, second edition, edited by Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul L. Puryear. New York: Longman.

