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Authors

Highton, Benjamin Wolfinger, Raymond E.

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Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger Department of Political Science University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, California 94720-1950

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Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger
Department of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720-1950

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Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger

Department of Political Science University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, California 94720-1950

highton @ ucdata13.berkeley.edu

Comments Invited

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ANTICIPATING THE EFFECTS OF THE NATIONAL VOTER VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993

Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger

Unlike other democracies, the United States requires its citizens to bear the burden of registering to vote, a practice that contributes to our exceptionally low rate of electoral participation. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993 was intended to lighten this burden by incorporating registration into dealings with government offices that citizens have in the course of their ordinary lives. Transactions with state motor vehicle bureaus are the most common example of such bureaucratic encounters, hence the "motor voter" nickname.

Predictions of the consequences have been diverse. Richard Cloward, a member of the coalition that lobbied for enactment of the motor voter bill, estimated that on its enactment "turnout would go up 10 to 12 percentage points." (quoted in Schwartz and Yang, 1990) Thomas E. Mann, a former chairman of the Board of Overseers of the National Election Studies, put the likely increase at five percent (Wines, 1993). Republican aversion to the NVRA is so profound that Representative Bob Stump's (R-Ariz) bill to repeal it, H.R. 370, attracted 170 co-sponsors within three months of its introduction in 1995. On the other hand, one experienced Washington observer (Schneider, 1995) titled his early assessment "Democrats Face Motor-Voter Backfire."

Waiting for the first experience with the Act may not shed much light on its effects. Variations in national turnout from one presidential contest to the next, while perhaps a consequence of the NVRA, could also reflect some time-specific event. Moreover, all of its sections will be implemented at the same time, making it impossible to assess the effect of any single provision. Even so, its full effects will not be felt as early as 1996 because the most important transactions it links to registration are periodic. Driver's licenses, for example, are renewed every four years in most states.

Another evaluation approach would exploit state-level variations in registration procedures. Even before 1992 many states had adopted some form of one or another NVRA provision. Representative Al Swift (D-Wash), its principal author, observed that "There is nothing in this bill that isn't working well somewhere in the country already." (quoted in Sammon, 1993a) Ideally, researchers could anticipate the effects of the NVRA by isolating the effect on 1992 turnout of those provisions of the national law that already were in force in some states in that year.

Information on state registration procedures is available in various sources. Thinking it prudent to investigate further, we discovered that Swift's remark says more about the NVRA's

feasibility than about either the number of genuine state counterparts or the length of time they had been in force. For example, although dozens of states made some connection between driver's licenses and voter registration (and were classified as motor voter states in the usual sources), only a few did so in any manner resembling the NVRA's provisions; most of those had started too late to have any significant effect on 1992 turnout. The scarcity of state counterparts was even more severe for NVRA "public agency" requirements concerning offices primarily serving the poor.

In short, direct estimates of the effect of the NVRA were difficult due to the paucity of state programs that truly resembled any NVRA provision and had been in place long enough to provide a fair trial in 1992. Our evaluation of motor voter is based in part on analysis of one state that had an adequate counterpart to the NVRA. We also simulated motor voter with other state laws that seemed to create a similar unrestrained opportunity to vote. These analyses were supported with data on the age profile of driver's license holders obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation. Taken together, they permit a fairly confident estimate of the likely consequences of motor voter, particularly with respect to the kinds of people most likely to be affected. On the other hand, public agency registration remains something of a wild card.

Our major source of individual turnout and demographic data is the 1992 Voter Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is invaluable for state-level analysis because its enormous sample provides an adequate number of cases in every state. In 1992 the smallest number in any single state was 843 cases. Our use of the CPS is discussed further in the appendix.

The NVRA assumes that making registration easier will increase turnout overall and have a greater effect on less educated people. This premise is based on nearly thirty years of research (Kelley et al., 1967; Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Mitchell and Wlezien, 1995; Nagler, 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1978; Teixeira, 1992). There is

The CPS is the source of the studies of registration and turnout published after each national election by the Bureau of the Census in its P-20 series. Unlike the Census Bureau, we omit noncitizens from our tabulations and also exclude all cases where information on registration or voting was not ascertained. The Census Bureau treats these cases as nonvoters.

²Let us get some possible distractions out of the way. Demonstrating that more demanding registration procedures reduce turnout has nothing to do with explaining why turnout fell from a modern high of 62.8 percent of the voting-age population in 1960 to a modern low of 50.1 percent in 1988. Nor do registration

no scarcity of newspaper and magazine articles attempting an early evaluation of the NVRA by reporting the number of new registrations since it was implemented on January 1, 1995 (e.g., Bowers, 1995; Earle, 1995; Schneider, 1995). Tabulating registrations is not a good way to evaluate the NVRA. For one thing, there is no way of knowing how many people who were likely to register regardless of the NVRA took advantage of the convenience it offers. What is more, people registered through motor voter may be less likely to vote than those who did it the old fashioned way. This was the experience in the District of Columbia's 1990 mayoral election, in which 30 percent of motor voter registrants voted, compared to 48 percent of those who registered by other means (Fremaux, 1992).3 On the other hand, once registered, 74 percent of respondents who professed little or no interest in politics voted in the 1980 election (Squire et al., 1987). In short, there are findings to fuel varying speculations, which is why we consider it wiser to base our estimates of the Act's likely effect on voting rather than registering.

The NVRA has four major provisions: motor voter, public agency registration, universal mail registration, and a prohibition of "purging for not voting." We describe each provision in the federal law and its state counterparts. Where possible, we give our estimate of the provision's likely effect. Then we propose amendments that would simultaneously do a better job both of preserving the voting eligibility of people who move during an election year and maintaining accurate registration records.

Motor Voter

What the NVRA Says

Whether written by professors or journalists, descriptions of the signature section of the NVRA often said that it "would

requirements explain more than a part of the turnout gap between the United States and other democracies. Both points are illustrated by turnout trends in North Dakota, where registration is not required. This provides citizens of that state the same ease of voting enjoyed by residents of most European countries, where registration is automatic. As Stephen Bennett (1990, pp. 166-67) observed, turnout there "fell from 78.5% of the state's voting-age population in 1960 to 61.5% in 1988."

³Cain and McCue (1985) found that those residents of Los Angeles who were registered by groups voted fifteen percentage points less in the following election than did those who registered by other means, generally on their own initiative.

allow a person to register to vote when applying for a driver's license" (Wines, 1993)⁴ or-closer to the mark--"would require states to allow citizens to register to vote when they apply for driver's licenses." (Sammon, 1993b) In fact, this was already done by dozens of states, although in some cases merely by making registration postcards available, in much the same way that public libraries and post offices did. What the NVRA really required went far beyond such feeble steps, as can be seen from its Sections 5(a)(1) and 5(c)(1):

Each State motor vehicle driver's license application (including any renewal application) submitted to the appropriate State motor vehicle authority under State law shall serve as an application for voter registration . . . unless the applicant fails to sign the voter registration application.

Each State shall include a voter registration application . . . as part of an application for a State motor vehicle driver's license. (107 Stat. 78, 1993)

Whether the two applications had to be accomplished with a "single combined form" was left unresolved by this language, although the House committee report did observe that a single form

. . . will be both more effective and more costefficient over the long term, and encourages responsible officials to use such a combined form.

However, where two forms are used, it is expected and intended that such forms will be used simultaneously as part of a single, integrated application process. All applicants . . . must be given an application that includes both forms. (Committee on House Administration, 1993, p. 9)

Motor voter is designed to reduce the cost of voting by incorporating registration into a transaction with a public agency that citizens initiate for another purpose with a higher priority.

If it hadn't been for the voter registration form attached to the end of the application for a learner's permit to drive, LaWanda Jones probably would not be a registered voter.

"To tell you the truth, I wouldn't have really thought about it," said Jones, 18, a Howard University sophomore who lives in Northwest Washington. "But the

⁴For a similar description by a political scientist see Radcliff, 1994, p. 259.

application was right there and I said, 'I might as well go ahead now, because I doubt if I'll come back down here just to do that.'" (Nelson, 1990)

Unlike Ms. Jones, most Americans get driver's licenses before thay are old enough to vote; the driving age is sixteen in most states. This is particularly true of young men, two thirds of whom have their licenses before their eighteenth birthday (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1994a, p. 8). Other than people in their first years of driving eligibility, most applicants for a driver's license are newcomers to a state, who amount each year to less than three percent of the adult (Wolfinger and Highton, 1995, p. 46) Therefore population. those department of motor vehicles (DMV) transactions most likely to affect voter registration under the NVRA are not de novo applications for a driver's license, but license renewals, which are usually on a four-year cycle, and change-of-address reports, which the NVRA provided "shall serve as notification of change of address for voter registration . . . " (107 Stat. 80, 1993)

Despite the difference between the minimum ages for driving and voting, motor voter seems particularly suitable for young people, who are indifferent voters but enthusiastic drivers. Figure 1 displays the broad disparity between the proportions of young people who were licensed to drive in 1993 and those who voted and who were registered in the 1992 presidential election. For example, 94 percent of people aged 25 to 29 held licenses, compared to just 68 percent who were registered and 58 percent who reported voting. Another reason to expect motor voter to be particularly beneficial to young people is their tremendous rate of residential mobility, which has a strong negative impact on turnout (Squire, et al., 1987). By their early twenties, young people are extraordinarily frequent movers. In 1992, less than 40 percent of Americans aged 23 to 27 had lived at the same address for more than two years. But by age 24, 99.8 percent of all men and 96 percent of all women are licensed to drive (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1994a, p. 8).5

(Figure 1 about here)

⁵ We have seen no indication that these data on license holding by the young were ever discussed by advocates or critics of the NVRA or its precursors. Saying that blacks were less likely to own cars or to hold driver's licenses, some civil rights leaders attacked motor voter as essentially a middle-class benefit that would actually be a setback for their constituents. Although the Department of Transportation data do not include classification by race, the nearly universal rate of license-holding by the young suggests the limits of this indictment.

Once issued, driver's licenses must be renewed, in almost all states on a four-year cycle (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1994b, pp. T8-9). At least once every four years, then, license renewals will register movers at their new address. Reporting address changes between renewals, although generally required, doubtless is overlooked by many people. On the other hand, to the extent that driver's licenses are the identification of choice for check-writers, awkwardness might result if the same address did not appear on both the check and the license. Moreover, a belief that traffic violators will be less harshly treated with up-to-date licenses might encourage compliance with the law. In short, obtaining a license should put citizens in a system that updates their voter registrations automatically.

State Motor Voter Programs

The number of state programs in the 1980s led to a Congressional Research Service study that reached this conclusion: ". . . from 1972 to 1988, seven of the ten States with motor-voter registration systems display declines in voter turnout in Presidential election years after the introduction of motor-voter registration procedures." (Crocker, 1990, p. 41)⁶ The Federal Election Commission reported that two dozen states had some sort of motor voter program at the beginning of 1992 (National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, 1992). By midyear, "thirty states already have motor voter programs . . . [and] motor voter states have higher turnout than states without the program." (Cloward and Piven, 1992)

Any analysis of pre-1995 state motor voter programs intended to anticipate the effects of the NVRA should take into account the extent to which state programs resembled the federal law. As we will see, although thirty states might have adopted some semblance of a motor voter program by the fall of 1992, very few had implemented programs similar to the NVRA in time to have much effect on participation in that year's general election. Among

⁶Two years later, these findings were cited by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky), the leading Senate opponent of the NVRA (Krauss, 1992). They also have been accepted by some scholars (e.g., Calvert and Gilchrist, 1993, p. 697).

⁷Teixeira (1992, p. 120) believed that the differences between state practice and the NVRA were so great that the effects of the federal law "cannot be properly modeled with existing data."

the necessary points of similarity are these:8

1. Using license renewals and change-of-address notices for purposes of voter registration;

2. doing so for at least most of one renewal cycle before

the election;

3. how closely voter registration is integrated in the driver's license procedure.

As we have seen, the NVRA requires that the procedures be simultaneous and intertwined, although stopping short of requiring use of a <u>combined</u> form, which a few states did by 1992. A second group of states had <u>active</u> programs, which had two variants. One variant used separate forms but included a question about registration on the DMV form; applicants who checked the appropriate box were to be given a registration application. The other variant had DMV officials asking license applicants if they would like to register, with those who said "yes" to be given a registration form. Finally, some states merely displayed registration applications more or less conspicuously without providing any prompting during ordinary DMV transactions.

Information about each state's motor voter program, if any, is available from several sources, including the League of Women Voters. Thinking it advisable to investigate the subject ourselves, we interviewed officials in motor voter states, often more than once, and obtained copies of the relevant forms that these people kindly sent us. We had the inestimable benefit of two long conversations with Jo-Anne Chasnow of HumanSERVE, whose encylopedic knowledge of voter registration procedures helped us understand what happens on the ground of day-to-day bureaucratic encounters.

The interviews led us to remove the "motor voter" designation from some states classified that way in the published sources. For example, Texas, coded as an active motor voter state by the League of Women Voters, had implemented its program only in September 1992, too late to have much effect on the presidential election in November. Iowa is described by some sources as a single-form state, which is true as far it goes. A single form is used only for initial applications, not for renewals or address changes; most of the people who got the form were sixteen or seventeen and therefore unable to take advantage of this easy registration method. In all of 1994, just 400

⁸Another consideration is the trend in turnout nationwide compared to that in the states selected for analysis. One problem with Crocker's method is simply that the national official turnout declined over five percentage points from 1972 to 1988.

Iowans registered with the combined form. We do not classify Iowa as a motor voter state.9

By far the most important use of the interviews was as a guide to the realities of implementation in the putatively active states, which sometimes led us to classify them as passive. Nevada, for example, DMV employees were supposed to ask everyone who appeared at the counter if they wanted to register. the question was not asked, reportedly for reasons as simple as laziness. Sometimes the issue seemed to be asking officials to do something they considered beyond or beneath their job description. West Virginia's motor voter law prescribed a license application with a box to be checked by applicants who wanted a registration card. Budget problems caused state troopers to be pressed into service as clerks in motor vehicle bureaus. Displeased with this arrangement, they were said to ignore the checked box frequently. A Federal Election Commission study reported that "Ohio has had the same experience with motor voter -- staff does not ask the voter registration questions, in spite of the fact that they are statutorially mandated to ask specific voter registration questions of every applicant." (Rosenfield, 1992, p. 12)¹⁰

As a result of our interviews and consultations we narrowed the list of dozens of motor voter states down to just two that met our specifications. Only Colorado and Minnesota had implemented a program closely resembling the NVRA for an entire renewal cycle before the 1992 election. But Minnesota also registers citizens at the polls on election day, which led us to delete it from our motor voter analysis because we could not

⁹The Iowa Department of Transportation reported 30,403 new registrations and address changes in the first three months of 1995, after the NVRA was implemented (Bowers, 1995).

¹⁰ Even states with long histories of energetic attempts to make voting accessible to everyone can have implementation problems. By 1995 Minnesota had used three different combined forms. The first one (Figure 2), used from 1987 through 1990, seemed to work. It was abandoned in 1991 for a three-page combined form (Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c). The first page was a license application, the second was a carbon copy. Behind them was the voter registration card. Much smaller in size, it was all too easy to overlook and motor voter registration declined. It was replaced in 1994 by the form in Figure 4.

This example suggests an important caveat to our analysis: the possibility that the NVRA's clear intent may be frustrated in some states by inept or deliberately awkward implementation.

differentiate the effects of the two programs. 11 So we have just one state as our prime exhibit to ascertain the effects of motor voter. And even the Colorado program is a bit different from the NVRA, which requires that every applicant be given a voter registration application, either in the license application or accompanying it. Beginning in July 1985, applicants for a Colorado driver's license were to be asked if they wanted to register to vote. Those saying "yes" were to be given a combined form (Figure 5); the others received an application only for a Applicants who were not asked about registration did not receive the combined form. Unlike the NVRA, which does not so depend on the cooperation of DMV staff, the old Colorado law made it possible to miss applicants who were not asked the filter question. Our consultant was concerned about the potential for abuse of official discretion, while our Colorado informant assured us that failures to ask were infrequent. Applications for renewal and change-of-address notices were applied to voter registration.

(Figure 5 about here)

Turnout in Colorado Before and After Motor Voter

Another skeptic about the Colorado program was Curtis Gans, who frequently observed that between 1984 and 1988 the state "experienced a 13 percentage point increase in unadjusted registration and only a 0.1 percentage point increase in turnout." Gans, 1990, p. 176) We assume that the turnout measure Gans used is the familiar estimate obtained by dividing the total vote for presidential candidates by the voting-age population, which we term the "official turnout." According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, Colorado's official turnout actually increased from 55.1 percent in 1984 to 56.2 percent in 1988, a gain of 1.1 percentage points, while national turnout declined from 53.1 percent to 50.1 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992, p. 272). In other words, turnout in Colorado was two percentage points above the national figure in 1984 and 6.1 points higher after four years of motor voter. The

[&]quot;With election-day registration at the polls since 1976, Minnesota, like Wisconsin, is exempt from the NVRA. Wyoming is exempt because, prior to March 11, 1993, it enacted election-day registration that would take effect if the NVRA were to be enacted. North Dakota is exempt because it does not have voter registration. Election-day registration at the polls is not universal in Maine, which therefore is subject to the NVRA.

Current Population Surveys for these years indicate that the proportion of citizens in Colorado's voting-age population declined a bit more than that of the entire country. Using these numbers to adjust the aggregate turnout figures yields a more precise comparison. Colorado turnout increased 2.1 percentage points from 1984 to 1988; national turnout declined 2.6 points. By this measure, turnout in Colorado was .7 percent higher than the national figure in 1984 and 5.4 points higher in 1988. A similar calculation for 1992 shows that Colorado's turnout remained higher than the national average by the same amount, 5.3

percentage points.

Table 1 contrasts changes in turnout from 1984 to 1988 by people of different ages, races, and educational attainment, in Colorado and the rest of the country. Our expectation that motor voter would have the greatest effect on young people was confirmed. 12 All across America the turnout of citizens under the age of thirty fell by five percentage points from 1984 to 1988-except in Colorado, where it increased by four points; the net shift was nine points. As predicted, the effect of motor voter declined as age advanced, except for Coloradans in their sixties, whose turnout jumped eleven percentage points, against a national decline of one percent. This is the probable explanation: People in this age group ordinarily are turnout champions, as can be seen in three of the four relevant columns of Table 1. The exception is the 1984 cell for Colorado, which shows citizens aged sixty to sixty-nine with lower turnout than either their elders or people aged forty-five to fifty-nine. We believe this underestimate is responsible for the anomalous finding.

(Table 1 about here)

Table 1 also shows that motor voter was associated with an increase of six percentage points in black and Latino turnout, compared to eight percent for whites. We are reluctant to attach much meaning to this difference.

Viewing motor voter as a way to reduce the cost of voting for those who otherwise might not take the trouble to register and stay registered, we were surprised to see that it had the least effect on Coloradans without high school diplomas,

¹²In the first seventeen months after the District of Columbia adopted motor voter, two-thirds of those who registered this way were under thirty-five (Fremaux, 1992).

ideal target group. 13 On the other hand, the more modest effect on college graduates is unsurprising. Their eighty-seven percent turnout in 1984 indicates less need for motor voter and also less room for an improvement.

This comparison of changes by Coloradans and all other Americans is no more than suggestive. There are some anomalous findings and we are reluctant to place too much reliance on a single state when other analytic possibilities remain.

Simulating the Effect of Motor Voter in 1992

Motor voter reduces the cost of voting by removing any need for the separate preliminary step of registering. The same cost reduction is available in states where registration is not required or can be done on election day: one can register and vote in the same trip. Consequently we anticipate the effects of the NVRA's motor voter provision by estimating the turnout effects of election-day registration, which we will call one-trip voting. 14 This has the great advantage of basing our analysis on several states, thus reducing the possibility of ideosyncratic factors. The disadvantage is that this simulation will slightly overestimate the effect of motor voter by including all state residents, including the approximately eight percent without driver's licenses or DMV identification cards, as well as those license-holders who have moved, failed to report the change of address to the DMV, and not yet renewed their licenses. 15

¹³We could not measure the effect on recent movers, the prime target population for motor voter, because residential mobility was not ascertained in the 1984 and 1988 Voter Supplements.

¹⁴One-trip voting is also available in North Dakota, whose citizens need not register in order to vote. This poses a problem for analyzing the effect of registration laws. Rather than code North Dakota in those registration categories imposing the least burden on individuals, as others (Teixeira, 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) have done, we excluded North Dakota cases from our analysis.

¹⁵On the other hand, there is reason to expect that this simulation may underestimate the effect of NVRA-style motor voter. Both election-day registration and motor voter eliminate any need to make a special trip to register in advance of election day. But the names of motor voter registrants appear on registration lists, a feature that should enhance their turnout. Registration lists are the basis for direct mail campaigning and sample ballots, as well as get-out-the-vote drives. People registered before election day are more likely to be contacted by

We estimate the effect on turnout of one-trip voting by comparing the actual turnout under 1992 closing dates to the estimated turnout if closing dates were removed. We calculated two probabilities of voting for each individual in the Voter Supplement sample. First, using equation 1 in the Appendix, a predicted individual probability of voting was calculated using demographic characteristics and the relevant state registration laws. Then a second probability was calculated substituting the value zero for the closing date, thus representing no need for a separate bureaucratic encounter before election day. The difference between the two probabilities is the estimated effect of switching to election-day registration, keeping all other variables constant. 16

Before describing our findings we digress to discuss here rather than in the Appendix the vexing question of coding closing dates. Previous studies (Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1992; Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1978; Teixeira, 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) used a variable that indicates the number of days prior to the election that registration books in each state were closed. Studies of elections after 1972 coded election-day registration at zero on the closing date variable. We share Brians and Grofman's (1994) doubts about this procedure because the essence of election-day registration (and no registration) is that a separate trip to register is unnecessary. This distinguishes the one-trip states from those with a closing date of even three days. Hence it may be inappropriate to treat election-day registration as merely the end point on the closing date continuum.

The statistical evidence supports this point. A turnout model that includes a variable to indicate election-day registration in addition to the usual closing date variable results in a positive effect estimate for the election-day estimator. This estimate suggests that turnout is four percentage points higher in election-day registration states than would be predicted by coding election-day registration as zero on the closing date variable. In other words, the difference in

party workers, an experience that has "a substantial impact" on turnout (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994, p. 226). Registration in advance of election day also provides the option of voting by absentee ballot, another factor that increases turnout (Oliver, 1996).

¹⁶See Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, pp. 121-23) for an extended description of this procedure.

¹⁷Even so, the estimate of the effect of the closing date remains large and negative, indicating that the relationship between closing date and turnout is not simply a result of higher

turnout between a state with election-day registration and one with a registration deadline one day before the election is greater than the difference between turnout in states where the closing dates are a single day apart.

Rather than including both an election-day registration indicator and the usual closing date variable (number of days before the election), we used a single variable, the square root of the number of days prior to the election that registration closed. This functional form specifies the largest effect to be from election-day registration to a one-day close, with a diminishing effect as the closing date lengthens. For example, using the square root treats the difference between a one-day and a two-day closing date as equal to the difference between a twenty-six-day and a thirty-day closing date. This makes sense intuitively: each day further away from election day has a smaller effect.

Table 2 summarizes the projected effect of nationwide election-day registration in 1992. The left column in Table 2 reports the estimated effect of living in a state with one-trip voting compared to living in a state with a thirty-day closing date, the earliest deadline in force in 1992. The right column reports the estimated turnout increase if all states had permitted registration on election day in 1992. The result would have been a national turnout increase of 8.7 percent. The gain would be about eight percent in the North and nearly ten percent in the South, where closing dates tend to be earlier.

turnout in states with election-day registration. Another way to demonstrate this point is to estimate the effect of closing dates on turnout after excluding states with election-day registration. This produces an estimate for the effect of the closing date that is virtually identical to the one produced in an equation including all states.

¹⁸We also estimated a model that included an indicator for election-day registration as well as the square root of the closing date, which seemed to be the most realistic specification. But with this specification the estimate of the election-day indicator could not confidently be distinguished from zero, which is statistically noteworthy in view of the enormous sample size. We concluded, therefore, that using just the square root of the closing date sufficed to express the effect of having to make two trips to vote instead of only one trip.

¹⁹Well over half of all Americans live in states with at least a four-week closing date.

(Table 2 about here)

As expected, one-trip voting would be most important to young people; it would lead to an increase of more than thirteen points for those under thirty. The effect would diminish with age, but even citizens over seventy would experience a gain of about five points.

The projections for people with different levels of schooling are similarly predictible, with the same exception we found in Colorado: somewhat lower effects for citizens who had not completed high school. Otherwise, one-trip voting would produce the smallest gains for the best-educated and progressively greater benefits as years of schooling diminish.

Public Agency Registration

What the NVRA Says

Although motor vehicle bureaus are public agencies, this term was understood to be reserved for offices serving the poor. Drafts of the bill were never quite this explicit, but the same could not be said of all the measure's most enthusiastic supporters. Not surprisingly, this was the NVRA section most alarming to Republicans. In the endgame, the votes needed to defeat the last filibuster were obtained with several concessions, including the addition of all armed forces recruiting stations to the core list of public agencies.

Section 7 of the NVRA requires certain public agencies to give their clients an opportunity to register and allows individual states to designate other offices to do so. "voter registration agencies" shall "distribute with each application for such service, and with each recertification, renewal, or change of address form relating to such service or assistance" a mail registration form and an offer to help fill it As defined either in the NVRA itself or the Conference Committee report, "voter registration agencies" include all offices administering any of these programs: food stamps; Medicaid; Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); Aid to Families with Dependent Children; aid to the disabled; and armed forces recruiting. These offices are required to offer registration. States may designate any other state, local, federal, or nongovernmental offices as voter registration agencies. The NVRA says that these might include a variety of places, including libraries, schools, offices of city and county clerks, and unemployment compensation offices.

Unlike motor voter, where registration is to be incorporated more or less seamlessly into DMV transactions, public agency

registration is a cumbersome and self-conscious business.²⁰ The NVRA's procedural requirements can best be described by quoting from its instructions about how to treat each client who has not declined in writing to register. Along with a mail registration card, the agency will:

(B) provide a form that includes--

(i) the question, "if you are not registered to vote where you live now, would you like to apply to register to vote here today?";

(ii) if the agency provides public assistance, the statement, "Applying to register or declining to register to vote will not affect the amount of assistance that you

will be provided by this agency.";

(iii) boxes for the applicant to check to indicate whether the applicant would like to register or declines to register to vote (failure to check either box being deemed to constitute a declination to register for purposes of subparagraph (C)), together with the statement (in close proximity to the boxes and in prominent type), "IF YOU DO NOT CHECK EITHER BOX, YOU WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE DECIDED NOT TO REGISTER TO VOTE AT THIS TIME.";

(iv) the statement, "If you would like help in filling out the voter registration application form, we will help you. The decision whether to seek or accept help is yours. You may fill out the application form in private."

The NVRA's public agency provisions were developed to help people too poor to have driver's licenses, who were believed to be largely nonwhite. The size of this pool of potential registrants is unknown. One writer estimates that "There are approximately 20 million recipients of public assistance at any one time." (Earle, p. 26) The number of such clients is considerably greater over any appreciable time period. Moreover, there is no way of knowing how many unpoor people also will have bureaucratic encounters that provide an opportunity to register. Most such people, and most welfare clients, for that matter, probably also have reason to use the services of motor vehicle bureaus; as we have seen, more than ninety percent of the adult population have driver's licenses or DMV identification cards. In short, we cannot estimate the extent to which agency registration expands opportunities to register beyond those

²⁰To be sure, a state determined to sabotage motor voter could make the registration aspect of any DMV transaction somewhat more separate. Our point is that the federal law requires a far greater degree of self-consciousness in agency registration.

provided by motor voter.21

State Public Agency Programs

State motor voter programs often were adopted amid talk of efficiency and easing the registration burden; in a word, their inception seemed nonpartisan. The same is true of a variety of state and local outreach programs, e.g., binding mail registration postcards in state income tax forms, adding questions about registration to marriage license applications (Rosenfield, 1992, pp. 8, 34). For the most part, however, public agency registration had explicitly ideological goals: altering the political balance by bringing millions of poor people to electoral politics. Initially conceived as an issue around which "rallies, demonstrations, and sit-ins" might "dramatize the conflict" (Cloward and Piven, 1983, p. 13), agency registration had a tumultuous and largely frustrating history in many states. For example, in 1984 New York Governor Mario Cuomo issued an executive order for public agency registration that

. . . has no enforcement provision and no funding. The State has had difficulty enforcing the amending of agency intake forms to include voter registration questions and had to discontinue the providing of postage-paid registration forms for lack of funds (Rosenfield, 1992, p. 6).

As was the case with putatively active motor voter programs, successful implementation requires the cooperation of agency staff, which was by no means guaranteed. In her review of state public agency programs for the Federal Election Commission, Margaret Rosenfield reported a conclusion from one state that typified her findings:

A 1988 California evaluation of active agency voter registration programs revealed that the incorporation of a mandatory question on voter registration into the agency intake forms was necessary or the agency program was in reality passive. If the agency depended on its staff to ask clients orally about voter registration, the staff simply did not do so (Rosenfield, 1992, p. 12).

²¹Agency registration might be more effective at updating the registrations of people who move. Incentives to keep a public agency informed of one's whereabouts would be stronger where this might contribute to keeping the benefits flowing, a consideration lacking with motor voter.

Only one state had what seemed to be a genuinely active agency registration program in 1992. Unfortunately for our inquiry, it was Minnesota, which also had a combined-form motor voter program and election-day registration. Nine other states had programs that we considered passive, in which registration forms were available at public agencies. The estimated coefficient for these nine states in our logit equation could not confidently be distinguished from zero, i.e., these programs had no discernible effect on turnout in 1992.

We conclude that agency registration is unlikely to have much effect on turnout. For one thing, the increment in coverage that it could add to motor voter registration is modest. In the second place, implementation of agency registration, being less integrated into the agency's normal procedures than is the case with motor voter, is much more suspectible to staff resistance, whether motivated by laziness or lack of sympathy. And in the third place, we suspect that the cumbersome procedures required by the NVRA will be off-putting to many clients whose interest in voting may be insufficient to the challenge.

Mail Registration

Five states permitted mail registration in 1972. Without regard to requirements that the postcards be notarized or witnessed, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, pp. 76-77) found that this innovation had no effect on turnout. Twenty years later most states permitted mail registration, in many cases with no need either for a witness or the services of a notary public. The same type of mail registration is required of all states by the NVRA. Our analysis found that the availability of either sort of mail registration had a small negative effect on turnout in 1992. We have no explanation of this surprise and conclude by noting the possibility that mail registration was a significant aid to voting only in places where organizations distributed the postcards, in much the same way that party activity greatly enhances the effect of absentee ballots (Oliver, 1996).

"Purging for Not Voting"

Nearly a third of all adult American citizens move at least once in any two-year period. Because few of those who are registered tell election officials that they have departed, the others' names remain on the registration lists at their old addresses. This "deadwood" inflates the costs of administering elections and of campaigning. It also is the principal raw

material for vote fraud.²² Until recently the only remedy for deadwood used by any state was based on the assumption that failure to vote was a good sign that the individual had moved.²³ Most states act on this assumption by removing the names of nonvoters; all but five of them send notices to the affected individuals, giving them a chance to remain registered if they have not moved.

Election officials prefer to call these procedures "list maintenance" or "list cleaning," To most other people they are "purging for not voting," a particularly sensitive issue for blacks. In part this reflects the tradition that "registration drives are an emotionally charged and even revered component of southern black politics." (Vedlitz, 1985, p. 644) Groups that so valued putting names on registration lists understandably were cool to any method of taking them off. Beyond emotion was the plain fact of selective purges of blacks, particularly but not exclusively in the South (Barber et al., 1988, pp. 487-97; Kimball, 1972, p. 251). Some civil rights activists also believed that poor mail service in minority neighborhoods and lower levels of functional literacy and bureaucratic skill would keep African-Americans who had skipped an election from receiving or responding effectively to confirmation notices (Cunningham, 1991, pp. 393-96).

Part of the Washington civil rights community opposed the purging section in the first motor voter bill, delaying its passage from committee to the House floor for seven months in 1989 and 1990. These groups' influence expanded once House Democrats decided in 1991 to abandon their previous efforts to draft a bipartisan bill. The NVRA's list-cleaning provisions reflect these organizations' concerns about their constituents' vulnerability to over-zealous purging.

What the NVRA Says

The purging section of the NVRA is scarcely shorter than the motor voter, agency registration, and mail registration sections

²²Republicans often express concern about fraud when measures to ease registration are discussed. A former Republican congressman, recalling cloakroom conversations, reported that much of this is hypocrisy (Buchanan, 1990). Civil rights activists, however, appear a bit cavalier in dismissing the issue as "outmoded" (Cunningham, 1991, p. 397).

²³It might indicate a death, but dead people do not contribute much to deadwood. Death certificates usually are reported to election officials and in any event the mobility rate far exceeds the death rate.

combined. This complexity reflects the drafters' attempts to strike a balance between two goals: 1) "a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters" but 2) not "by reason of the person's failure to vote." (107 Stat.83) A failure to vote cannot be the occasion for initiating a procedure to purge an individual.²⁵

The NVRA provides that a name cannot be removed from a list unless the registrant has confirmed in writing a move outside the registrar's jurisdiction or has failed to respond to a written notice and then has failed to vote in two consecutive federal general elections after the date of the notice. The notice in question contains a postage-paid return card that is sent by forwardable mail. People who fail to return the card and then show up to vote must confirm their address.

The question is how registrars determine who gets a notice that initiates a process that might take effect in four years. A nonforwardable first class letter could be sent to all registrants (this would be expensive), or to those who registrars reasonably believe have moved. This might include people to whom sample ballots or jury duty notices could not be delivered. The key point is this:

. . . targeting those who have failed to vote may disproportionately affect minority groups, the poor, and illiterate. Thus if States rely solely on "failure to vote" as the trigger for confirmation mailings, they may run afoul of the non-discriminatory provisions of the National Voter Registration Act as well as of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, 1994, p. 5-23).

The NVRA provides one alternative to its somewhat daunting list-cleaning procedure: states may identify movers with the Postal Service's computer file of address-change information, known as the National Change of Address (NCOA) program. About forty million permanent change-of-address notices are filed each year with the Postal Service. The NCOA file is updated daily and

²⁴If motor voter and agency registration work as intended, license renewals and reports of new addresses will clean up much of the deadwood, leaving many fewer names to be purged. Indeed, we believe that driver's license renewals probably will be the single most effective provision in the NVRA with respect both to turnout and list cleaning.

²⁵The exceptions are people who die and purging "by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity."

each change is kept for three years. This information has a variety of commercial applications and can be obtained from two dozen licensed vendors who pay an annual fee for the right to distribute customized NCOA datasets. The NVRA requires that people purged by NCOA who move inside the same county (about sixty percent of all movers) be automatically reregistered at their new address.

Finally, the NVRA requires various "fail-safe" voting procedures. These direct states to allow voting, at either their old or notional new precincts, by people who have stayed put but are recorded as having moved or who have not responded to attempts to confirm their whereabouts. By the same token, registrants who move can vote at their old or new locations, subject in some cases to state law.

State Purging Programs

In 1992 Kentucky and Louisiana used NCOA to purge movers, with no reregistration involved (Mullins, 1992). In the same year counties in California with about half the state's population used NCOA both for purging movers and reregistration of intracounty movers (Wolfinger and Highton, 1995). Forty-one states purged registrants who had not voted. Some did this if no vote had been cast in a two-year period; others waited longer, in some cases as long as eight years.

Past multivariate research shows that purging has, at most, a modest effect on turnout. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, p. 76) found that variations in purging laws were unrelated to voting in 1972. On the other hand, Teixeira (1992, pp. 112-13) and Mitchell and Wlezien (1995) both found that turnout was as much as two percentage points lower in the presence of purging. Our own analysis of the 1992 Current Population Survey produced similar results: turnout was two points lower in the states that purged for nonvoting, compared to the states that did not purge and the three that used NCOA. Neither the number of years of missed elections nor notification had any effect on this relationship.

The same analysis found no differential racial effects; whites, Latinos, and blacks were similarly affected by purging. 27

²⁶This is to be expected, given what is known about the high rate of residential mobility and high turnout of the registered.

²⁷A report that purging disproportionately affected minorities was widely circulated in the voting rights community. The evidence consisted of a study of New York City assembly districts showing that application of state purge laws would affect eleven percent of the registrants in white districts and fiften percent of those in minority districts (Lichtman, 1989). More than anything else, this reflects a level of residential

The likelihood of being purged is primarily a function of residential mobility. In the country as a whole, blacks and Latinos are very slightly more mobile than whites. The more interesting difference is the extent of their moves: minorities are more likely to move inside the same county (Wolfinger and Highton, 1995), making them more eligible to benefit from the NCOA option, which requires automatic reregistration of intracounty movers.

A conclusion about the likely effect of the NVRA's purging provisions is elusive. Allowing a person to vote for four years after failure to respond to a confirmation notice is pretty close to no purging at all. We would expect, then, that this would give turnout a modest boost. The potential for the NCOA option is more promising, but also highly conditional, for reasons to be discussed in the next section of this paper.28 There appears to be no reason why states could not decide at any time to adopt the The NVRA's authors expected that it would become increasingly popular, if only for cost considerations. The cost depends on the extent to which a state's records are in machinereadable form. If they are, the NCOA option involves a simple computer interaction that produces at little cost a list of the names and new and old addresses of movers.29 Making registration records machine-readable requires some extra expense, but also has advantages for various other purposes, of which perhaps the most obvious is detection of duplicate or illegal registrations.

Improving the National Voter Registration Act
The NVRA embodies two important general principles. First,

mobility among New York minorities that is not common nationwide. Analysis of the 1980 Current Population Survey discloses that thirty percent of the adult minority citizens had moved within two years, compared to just twenty-three percent of white New Yorkers.

²⁸Experience with NCOA in California, Kentucky, and Louisiana showed that its drawbacks were largely a result of "patron error": 1)Some individual movers mistakenly checked the box on the change-of-address notice indicating that the entire family was moving, thus purging relatives who had not left home; and 2)people planning only a temporary absence sometimes indicated that their move was permanent.

²⁹In states with registration by party, that information is also available, an important but by no means essential consideration in the use that parties have been making of NCOA data since the late 1980s.

it exploits, for purposes of voter registration, contacts with public agencies undertaken for another purpose that has a higher priority for the individual, e.g., renewing a driver's license, qualifying for food stamps, getting a library card. Second, it recognizes that any step to maintain the voting eligibility of registrants who move will purge them at their old address. Exploiting movers' bureaucratic encounters satisfies both the goal of maximal participation and that of efficient and honest election administration. Any step to make this exploitation more efficient should appeal alike to advocates of easier access to the ballot box and those whose greatest concern is clean elections.

These observations introduce the postponed report of our study of how NCOA affected turnout in California: We could not evaluate NCOA's effect on turnout because list cleaning in California, by whatever method, is done in January. Names can be added to the list until twenty-nine days before the primary, and again until twenty-nine days before the general election. But the "general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters" required by the NVRA takes place in January. Fourteen percent of the Californians in the November 1992 Current Population Survey said that they had moved in the past six months (Wolfinger and Highton, 1995, p. 31). Purging by either method used in 1992 and reregistration through the NCOA missed all these people.

Californians' moving patterns are not unique. Seventeen percent of all adult American citizens moved within a year of November 1992; fully 12 percent had done so within six months. This is nearly three-quarters of everyone who moved within the past year. The basic point, of course, is that most people move in the summer, the best time with respect to the school year. This rhythm guides not only parents of school-age children but also numerically significant groups like teachers and university students. This homely--and generally overlooked--fact leads to an obvious conclusion: list-cleaning and reregistration should be scheduled to reflect the way most people live.

This standard is met by most of the NVRA provisions that prescribe methods of keeping movers registered and purging them at their old address: driver's license renewals, address-change reports to DMVs and public agencies, and mail registration postcards. As a general rule, states must accept and act upon notices produced by all of these methods up to five days past their closing dates for voter registration. But the NVRA sets very different limits for information obtained pursuant to the

³⁰We do not mean to suggest a connection between the NVRA and the timing of list cleaning in California, which has been mandated for the beginning of the year for quite some time. This timing is not in conflict with the NVRA.

two methods prescribed in Section 8 for conducting a "general program . . . to remove the names of ineligible voters [emphasis added]." Such programs must be completed "no later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office . . . " Unlike other methods of maintaining movers' eligibility to vote and, inevitably, purging the old-address registration, achieving the identical goal under the purging rubric is subject to a ninety-day closing date.

This disparity evidently is a result of the NVRA's classification of NCOA as a purge technique rather than a way to keep movers registered. Purging is a suspect category to the civil rights groups that were the NVRA's most fervent constituency, hence any procedure deemed to be purging was to be restricted. But the Act's "fail-safe voting" procedures amply protect people who might not reregister soon after moving. Therefore we believe that the ninety-day limit in Section 8 should be amended to put information obtained through "general programs" of list cleaning on the same basis as that resulting from individual initiatives. Moreover, we recommend that Congress consider legislation to require states to conduct general list cleaning within a reasonable time prior to each general election for federal office. Finally, we believe that federal incentives to encourage statewide computeriztion of voting records would go a long way toward making election administration more efficient, economical, and timely. People genuinely worried about vote fraud should welcome this step.

The Political Consequences of the NVRA

A Republican President vetoed the NVRA and his Democratic successor signed it. After February 1990 neither the NVRA nor its precursors received more than a trivial number of Republican votes on either side of the Capitol. Representative Stump's bill to repeal the NVRA is co-sponsored by the majority leader and majority whip and at least nine full committee chairmen. The governors who refused to implement the NVRA until they were required to do so by court orders are all Republicans. On the assumption that successful politicians are good judges of their

³¹Those few Republican votes, however, were essential to defeat of the filibusters led by their party's Senate leadership in 1992 and 1993.

The earliest version of the NVRA, H.R. 2190, was the product of a genuine bipartisan collaboration. It was co-sponsored by much of the House minority leadership, including Newt Gingrich, and passed with the votes of almost all Democrats and a third of the Republican membership. Its Senate counterpart was blocked that fall by a Republican filibuster.

own interests, it appears that these leaders share the conclusion of Michael Avey (1989, p. 117), a decidedly non-Republican political scientist: "Nonvoters are overwhelmingly likely to vote Democratic. . . . If turnout were substantially increased, the Democrats would likely win overwhelming victories in nearly all elections." 32

There is no doubt that most observers agree with the politicians and ideologues. Standing on the other side are almost all empirical researchers, whose number crunching invariably produces the same result:

The conclusion seems inescapable: registration reform, under virtually any conceivable scenario, will have negligible partisan impact. The Democrats will not be significantly helped and the Republicans will not be significantly hurt. The tremendous partisan concern about the impact of registration reform is therefore profoundly misplaced (Teixeira, 1992, p. 143)

We share Teixeira's reading of his own and other scholars' work, and will report similar conclusions shortly. First, however, we tackle directly the commonsense rebuttal to findings like Teixeira's: "How can getting a lot more people to vote fail to help the Democrats when everybody knows that most of the people who don't vote are Democrats?" Walter Dean Burnham (1982, p. 237) concisely sums up this conventional wisdom: "Evidence is overwhelming that nonvoting is concentrated in the lower half of the American social structure." Beginning with the belief that nonvoting is concentrated among the lower classes, how could one escape the conclusion that more voters equals more Democratic votes? Those of us who reach a different conclusion after data analysis usually say (or think) something like: "Well, it may seem strange, but that's what the data show, so have a little respect for science and accept what we're telling you."

We can make these findings more credible by using the Current Population Survey to describe those citizens who did <u>not</u>

³²A more careful formulation of Avey's proposition would take account of the possibility that the method by which higher turnout was achieved might have something to do with the partisan consequences of more people voting. This explains, for example, Republican insistence on adding recruiting stations to the list of public agencies required to offer an opportunity to register.

We do not assume that enabling more people to vote is likely to alter their policy preferences. In this we differ from the argument that "the same processes that draw people into the system may encourage a greater appreciation of what one's interests are and which party best serves those interests." (Radcliff, 1994, p. 271)

vote in 1992. Contrary to Burnham's assertion, the largest group, amounting to 43 percent of all nonvoters, were people who had lived at their current address for no more than two years. The second-largest group, 34 percent of all nonvoters, were less than thirty years old. Only in a near-tie for third place do we find the kinds of citizens who are usually considered reservoirs of potential Democratic votes: people had not graduated from high school (31 percent) and those with incomes below the poverty line (30 percent). Just 22 percent of nonvoters were minorities, Here, then, is an explanation for the including Latinos. finding, widely accepted only in the empirical research community, that registration reform will not be a Democratic bonanza: the largest categories of nonvoters are not individuals who can be assumed to like Democratic candidates, but the residentially mobile and young people; neither group has identifiable partisan inclinations.33 These are also the most likely targets for the NVRA in general and its motor voter provisions in particular.

With these preliminaries out of the way, we turn to the 1992 National Election Study to examine more directly the likely political consequences of the NVRA. We measure partisan affinities two ways: 1)collapsing the familiar NES seven-point party identification scale into a three-point measure with partisan Independents allocated to the parties they say they are closer to; and 2)excluding those who insist on their neutrality between the two parties and computing the percentage of the remainder who have Democratic inclinations.

(Table 3 about here)

Respondents under thirty, just 22 percent of the NES sample, accounted for 35 percent of the nonvoters. Among voters, they are more Democratic than anyone else except those who have

³³The major exception in recent historical experience came in 1972, when George McGovern won the votes of 47 percent of people under the age of thirty while barely exceeding the 30 percent level among older people. Otherwise, young voters' weaker party identifications make them somewhat more inclined to vote for third-party candidates. The residentially mobile, a group only in the categorical sense, seem to think and vote like the more settled two-thirds of the population (Squire et al., 1987).

³⁴Readers will notice that the NES and CPS demographic percentages sometimes differ. We believe this reflects the greater sampling variability resulting from the much smaller NES sample (2485 respondents).

reached the age of sixty. The story is very different for nonvoters, where the twentysomethings are less Democratic than their counterparts who voted. In every other age group the nonvoters are more Democratic than the voters. Reading down the column of Democratic affinity, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, ceteris paribus, registering more people thirty or older might help the Democrats, but bringing more younger people to the polls probably would not do so. If votes for Ross Perot are any guide, the most obvious beneficiary of higher turnout by young people would be almost any third-party contender.³⁵

On the other hand, Table 3 suggests that getting more residentially mobile people to the polls would be a wash in partisan terms. Whether across rows or columns, the differences in Democratic sympathies are modest and generally statistically insignificant. The same is true of voting for Perot.

The poor, although contributing less to the nonvoting population than the young or the transient (according to the more reliable CPS), nevertheless are indeed light voters. Unlike those other two groups, they are mostly Democrats, therefore registering more of them would help Democratic candidates. Although poor people would benefit from motor voter, we are unsure about the effect, if any, of public agency registration, the NVRA provision tailored for their needs. In every income category from poor to affluent, the proportion of partisans identifying with the Democratic party is greater among the voters, in some cases by more than ten percentage points. We are unsure what to make of this. The same is true for Latinos and blacks. In their case small sample size may be a factor.

Independents are more than twice as numerous among the nonvoters in the entire NES sample. More noteworthy is the repetition of this ratio in every comparison of voters and nonvoters in Table 3 with the exception of respondents at least sixty years old. This suggests that a note of caution should permeate all expectations of the partisan implications of higher turnout. More Independents in the mix of previous nonvoters brought to the polls by the NVRA would bring more volatility about the partisan outcome but also, as in the case of young voters, more openness toward third-party candidates (Keith et al., 1992, p. 68).

³⁵In 1968 young voters were the most sympathetic of any Americans to civil rights laws, but also the strongest supporters of George C. Wallace, known primarily for his hostility to those measures (Converse et al., 1969, p. 1103). We interpret this as evidence of the positive relationship between age and strength of party identification, which inclines youthful voters toward support of third-party candidates.

Conclusions

We would expect that any even-handed program to raise turnout would have its greatest effect on groups with low rates of participation. The consequences for aggregate turnout would, of course, depend on the size of each affected group. This consideration is one explanation of our emphasis on the young and the transient. Not only are they the largest categories of nonvoters, their nonpolitical behavior makes them particularly susceptible to the NVRA provisions likely to have the greatest effect: motor voter and NCOA updating of The young, especially in their mid-twenties, are registrations. the most transient part of the population. But Americans of all ages have a propensity to move that is seldom matched elsewhere; the experience has about the same dampening effect on turnout irrespective of age. Young people are also such a potential target for the NVRA because of the wide gap between their nearuniversal possession of driver's licenses and their puny turnout. Like other transients, they stand to benefit from the various NVRA provisions that should come close to erasing the depressive effect of moving on turnout.36

Our focus on reducing the costs of voting, which are primarily the costs of registering, has bypassed any concern for motivation—why anyone would want to vote. If voting were costless, then motivation would be the sole determinant of turnout. Of the low turnout groups we have identified, people with the least schooling have the weakest interest in politics and least concern about election outcomes. This might explain why, in both Colorado and our simulation, motor voter seemed to have rather modest effects on the turnout of those without a high school diploma. The residentially mobile, on the other hand, display as much political interest as people who have stayed put for more than two years (Squire et al. 1987; Wolfinger and Highton 1985). This provides another reason for thinking that this politically neutral group will be the most important beneficiaries of the motor voter act.

To conclude, the turnout of those who take little or no interest in the political system will be mostly unaffected by attempts like the NVRA to reduce the costs of voting. Similarly, small effects will be observed among the highly motivated. Little deterred by registration laws by registration costs, they already vote heavily. Laws like the NVRA ought to have their greatest impact on individuals with moderate levels of motivation, as these are the people for whom a change in costs matter most.

³⁶This is particularly the case should the NVRA be amended to reverse its present bias by deleting the ninety-day restriction and requiring list cleaning closer to election day.

Appendix Multivariate Estimation

- I. Coding of Variables Used in Logit Analysis of Current Population Survey
 - A. Demographic and Regional Variables

Four demographic and one regional variable were used in the analysis. Previous research (especially Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) shows diminishing effects of both age and income, which we model in the multivariate analysis by using the square root of each of these variables. For the estimation reported in Table A2 all of the variables were scaled on a 0-1 interval. The codings for the variables, before being transformed and rescaled, are below.

age: age in years

family income: less than \$5,000=0; \$5,000-7,499=1; \$7,500-9,999=2; \$10,000-12,499=3; \$12,500-14,999=4; \$15,000-19,999=5; \$20,000-24,999=6; \$25,000-29,999=7; \$30,000-34,999=8; \$35,000-

39,999=9; \$40,000-49,999=10; \$50,000-59,999=11; \$60,000-74,999=12; \$75,000 and

over=13.

length of time at current address:

(residential stability) less than 7 months=0;
7-11 months=1;
1-2 years=2;

3-4 years=3;
5 years or more=4.

south/nonsouth: other=0; 11 Confederate states=1.

B. Registration Laws

We constructed a set of variables to indicate the specific laws to which each respondent was subject. With the exception of

the registration closing date, all the variables are coded 0 or 1, with 1 indicating that an individual lives in a state with a particular law. The closing date was coded as the square root of the number of days prior to the election that registration books closed (see text for further explanation). For the estimation, this variable (like all the others) was rescaled on a 0-1 interval. Table A1 reports our coding of all the state registration laws for the estimation reported in table A2. The variables are described below.

registration closing date: square root of the number of days prior to the election that registration books close. Election day registration is coded 0.

DMV registration:

Ideally we would have estimated the effects of different types of active and passive programs, taking into account the length of time they had been implemented. However, our phone interviews led us to believe that such attempts would be Two states with nearly identical laws might fruitless. experience very different turnout effects due the way the program was implemented. Rather than drawing dubious distinctions, we therefore employed a quite crude classification system. variable, passive, designates laws which specify that registration applications merely be displayed, more or less conspicuously, without providing any prompting during ordinary DMV transactions. The other, active, refers to laws that provide more integration of voter registration into application, renewal, and change-of-address transactions (see text for descriptions of the ways this was attempted).

We coded five states that had some form of motor voter programs as non-motor voter states. Texas and Mississippi implemented their programs in the summer of 1992, too close to election day to have much effect. Connecticut had a passive law on its books, but the Secretary of State was never given money to fund the program. Iowa's unified form applied only to initial applications. Louisiana had a pilot program in effect in a few parishes.

Mail registration

We distinguish two types of mail registration laws. One requires that the mail registration applications be either notarized or witnessed, or both. The other specifies no such requirements. We termed these hard and easy programs, respectively.

Purging

As discussed in the text, we found that the key distinction is between states that remove individuals from registration lists for nonvoting and states with no provisions, except NCOA, for purging nonvoters from the registration lists. That is, the

number of missed elections and the provision of a notice before purging had no effect. We coded individuals living in a state without a purge law or in a state which employed NCOA as 0. People in states with other purge laws were coded 1.

Agency Registration

Only one state, Minnesota had an active agency registration program. Basing an estimate for the effect of active agency registration on a single state is not advisable, especially when the state also permits election-day registration and has an active motor voter program. Consequently, we grouped Minnesotans with people in states with laws that specified only that registration forms be available at public agencies. These people were coded 1 on the agency variable. Others were coded 0.

Registration Offices

Two variables were used to describe registration office operations. One indicates whether an individual lives in a state where offices are open regularly for at least forty hours per week. The other indicates whether offices are open on evenings and weekends.

II. Weighting

Because the variables of primary interest in our analyses are state level, we recalibrated the sample weights to provide an equal number of cases from each state. The weights were adjusted to provide 843 cases per state. We chose this number because it represents the fewest number of unweighted cases from any state. Because the other states had more respondents, the reported standard errors from the logistic regression are larger than the true ones.

III. Estimation

As discussed in the text, we used logistic regression to estimate the turnout equation. The estimates are reported in table A2. Because North Dakota has no voter registration laws respondents from this state were excluded from the analysis.

Table A1 State Registration Laws

	closing <u>date</u>	active <u>m.v.</u>	passive m.v.	purge for nonvoting	easy mail	hard mail	agency	evening/ weekend	40 hours
alabama	10	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
alaska	30	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
arizona	29	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
arkansas	20	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
california	29	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
colorado	25	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
connecticut	14	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
delaware	17	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
d.c.	30	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
florida	30	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
georgia	30	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
hawaii	30	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
idaho	10	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
illinois	29	0	1	1	0	. 0	0	1	1
indiana '	29	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
iowa	10	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
kansas	14	0	0	1 .	0	1	0	1	1
kentucky	28	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
louisiana	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
maine	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
maryland	29	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
massachusetts	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
michigan	30	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
minnesota	0	1	0	1	1	0	. 1	1	1
mississippi	30	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
missouri	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
montana	30	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
nebraska	10	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
nevada	30	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
new hampshire	10	0	0	1	. 0	0	0	1	0
new jersey	29	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0

Table A1 continued State Registration Laws

	closing <u>date</u>	active <u>m.v.</u>	passive m.v.	purge for nonvoting	easy mail	hard <u>mail</u>	agency	evening/ weekend	40 hours
new mexico	28	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
new york	25	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
north carolina	28	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
north dakota									
ohio	30	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
oklahoma	10	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
oregon	20	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
pennsylvania	30	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
rhode island	30	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
south carolina	30	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
south dakota	15	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
tennessee	30	0	1	1	. 0	1	0	1	0
texas	30	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
utah	5	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
vermont	17	0	1	1	1	0	. 0	1	0
virginia	30	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
washington	30	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
west virginia	30	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
wisconsin	0	0	0 ·	1	0	1	0	0	1
wyoming	30	0	0	1	0	0	0	. 0	1

Table A2

Logit Estimates of the Effects of Demographic Variables and Registration Laws on Turnout in 1992

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Constant	-2.7355	.1839
<u>Variables</u>		
Age (square root)	1.9543	.2087
Education	3.8181	.2293
Family Income (square root)	1.0546	.0554
Residential Stability	.9150	.0381
South	1278	.0357
Closing Date (square root)	4624	.2029
Closing Date * Education	7656	.2579
Closing Date * Age	.2897	.2377
Active Motor Voter	.1437	.0391
Passive Motor Voter	.1297	.0373
Purge for Nonvoting	1397	.0384
Easy Mail	1186	.0351
Hard Mail	0599	.0343
Agency	0252	.0392
Evening/Weekend Office Hours	.0694	.0295
Office Hours 40/week	.0592	.0308
Full Absentee Voting	.0503	.0377

-2 log likelihood: 44017

% correctly predicted: 75

sample mean: 70

N: 36,176

Source: 1992 CPS Voter Supplement

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Table 1. Turnout by Age in Colorado and the Rest of the United States, 1984-1988

		Colorado	ado	Re	st of	Rest of U.S.	
	1984	1988	Change	1984	1988	Change	Net Difference in Change
Age 18-29 .	49	53	+4	51	46	J G	+9
30-44	68	70	+2	68	64	14	+6
45-59	80	81	+1	76	74	2	+3
60-69	75	86	+11	78	77	Ļ	+12
70+	78	77	1	70	70	0	-1
Race/Ethnicity White (non-Latino)	67	74	+7	67	66	卢	+8
Other	54	<u>ភ</u>	+1	60	55	: 51	+6
Education 0-11 years	51	50	1	50	46	-4	+ 3
12 years	56	63	+7	64	60	-4	+11
1-3 years college	67	74	+7	74	71	- 3	+10
4+ years college	87	90	+ 3	86	84	-2	+5

Source: Current Population Surveys

Table 2. The Effect of Registration Closing Dates on Turnout

	•	Difference Between 30 day close and Election Day Registration	Increase with Election Day Registration
Tota	1	10.1	8.7
<u>Educ</u>	<u>ation</u> 0-11 years	8.3	7.2
	12 years	11.8	10.1
	some college	11.8	9.9
	Bachelor's deg.	8.3	6.9
	Advanced deg.	4.5	3.6
Age	18-29	15.1	13.2
	30-44	10.9	9.2
	45-59	7.8	6.6
	60-69	6.7	5.6
	70+	5.8	4.9
<u>Resi</u>	dential Stability < 1 year	14.0	12.4
	1-2 years	12.2	10.6
	3-4 years	10.5	9.0
	5+ years	8.3	7.0
Reg	ion South	10.5	9.9
	Nonsouth	9.7	8.1

Source: 1992 Current Population Survey and estimates from appendix.

Table 3

Characteristics of Voters and Nonvoters in 1992

\$50,000+	\$30,000-49,999	\$13,000-29,999	Family Income < \$13,000	60+	45-59	30-44	<u>Age</u> 18-29	
28	26	27	19	22	21	36	22	Percent of Sample
16	15	35	35	16	15	35	3 5	Percent of Nonvoters
41	48	60	66	53	50	49	51	Dem
ω	6	11	9	10	7	9	12	Ind
51	45	29	26	37	43	43	37	<u>Voters</u> <u>Rep</u>
45	52	67	72	59	54	5	58	<u>rs</u> <u>D/(D+R)*</u>
22	21	18	9	12	17	20	28	Vote <u>Perot</u>
23	40	ភ	49	60	47	4 5	42	Dem
30	18	14	24	7	19	25	20	Ind
47	42	မ	27	32	34	31	38	Nonvoters Rep
33	49	62	64	65	5 8	59	5 3	<u>D/(D+R)*</u>


Table 3 continued Characteristics of Voters and Nonvoters in 1992

	Nonsouth	Region South	Nonwhite or Latino	White (non-Latino)	Race	stayer	mover	Residential Mobility	
	ਸ		Ф О Н	tino)				1 Mobility	Of Pe
	69	31	23	77		68	32		Percent of Sample
TOTAL	57	43	32	68		57	43		Percent of Nonvoters
51	49	53	73	45		50	52		Dem
9	9	v	10	9		9	9		Ind
40	42	38	17	46		41	39		<u>Voters</u> <u>Rep</u>
57	54	58	81	49		55	57		<u>s</u> <u>D/(D+R)*</u>
19	22	12	б	22		18	22		Vote Perot
46	45	47	59	40		48	44		Dem
20	17	23	17	21		18	21		Ind
34	38	30	24	39		3 4	ນ 5		Nonvoters Rep
58	54	61	71	51		59	56		<u>D/(D+R)*</u>

*Democratic identifiers as a percentage of all identifiers.

source: 1992 NES

Figure 1. Driver's License, Voter Registration, and Turnout Rates by Age



Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1994, p. 8, and 1992 Current Population Survey.

Figure 2. Minnesota Motor Voter Form, version 1

READ THE DIRECTIONS ON THE COMPLETING THIS DRIVER LI	REVER!	SE SIDE BEFOR				•
Class A B	CENSE	CC Office Use		FIRST	MIOOL	E LAST NAME
Duplicate Regular Under-21		W	Address	Ω .	EET NO. OR R.FD.	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Duplicate Under-21 Instruction Permit Moped Permit	ш	L			STATE	ZIP CODE COUNTY
Motorcycle Endorsement Original	Renewal			:		Male
If duplicate why necessary?				C. Date of	MONTH DAY YE	AR Female
PLACE AN "X" IN CORRECT SQUARE	BELOW	(If answer is	VISION CHECK	_	1 1 1	_
"Yes" to questions 1, 2, or 3, give detail		1		E. COLOR E	YES HEIGHT WEIGHT EX	W OR DRIVER LICENSE NO.
1 Have you ever had a convulsive or paralysis, diabetes, or any other type	sorder. "bla e of impair	sck out", stroke, ment?	PASS. no restriction			
2 Have you had a driver license or perithe last 5 years? Where? Surrende reason.	mit in any o	other state within not surrendered.	Pass, restrict to corrective lenses			
	- maa w	enerie nove under	Incomplete	1		•
3 syour license or privilege to operate denial, cancellation, suspension, discount of the care of the			refer to Eye Doctor			
in any state or jurisdiction? Where?	Jaie Nea:]		
4 Do you wish to receive a Donor D Application Form? Please indicate.	ocument a See #9 or	nd/or Living Will Reverse Side				
5 Do you wish a Medical Alert Identifit (No medical information to be cone	er on your	Driver License?				and and and but the see since it correct
Are you spoken for a Commercial	Drivers' Li	cense?	AGE VERIFICAT	ION: If applicant is under Approve		on and certify that the age given is correct. [Relationship (Parent, Guardian)
6 [If yes must answer # 10 on Re	werse Side	P)			•	·
		Date	Subscribed and	sworn before me. a not	ry public Signature	Notary Public
Applicant's Signature		00.0	on this	day ol	19	
	X	VOTER REGIS Name Township or Cit	Last	D, Type or print in i	(EEP ALL PARTS TOG	OFFICE USE ONLY W P
STOP	X	Legal Residence	eTownst	nip or (ity County	
		Complete Addr	ess			
COMPLETE THE REGISTRATION CARD ONLY IF	X	of Legal Reside		House Number and St	reet or Rural Route Number	
		(include street mail route add				
You are eligible to vote and have never registered in					City	Zio
Minnesota.			Apt. No. or R	ural Box No.	•	24
Hillinesous.	X	Date of Birth	Month Day	Year	Telephone	
or			1,01			
- -	X	Address of You				
2. You have moved or changed		Last Registrati	ion	Number/Street Na	me or Route Box Number	·· Apt. No.
your name since the last time you registered or voted.		II NONE				•
ipgiatored of votae.			С	ty or Township	County State	Σφ
	1	Previous Name (il	changed since last	registration)		
	!	R I certify that I will above and will ha of the person, ha	EAD INSTRUCTION be at least 18 year leave resided in Min we not been found	NS ON BACK TO DETI rs old on election day nesota for 20 days im	and that I am a citizen of th mediately preceding election by incompetent to vote, and talke information to procure	TE QUALIFIED TO REGISTER TO United States, reside at the address shown to day, and that I am not under guardianship I have not been convicted of a felony without a a registration is a felony punishable by not
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Passed / Waived DT									te B		If name change, previous name	
Donor Document I have made the decision to make an anatomica Valid for the type of license indicated above. Void if department record shows applicant not entitled to issuance of license. If new license is not received within 45 days notify: Donor Document I have made the decision to make an anatomica I certify the information on this application is correct and I am aware of the duties are section 169.444 regarding the safety of chalcren around school buses. Applicants Signature												
Minn	iesot:	Drive 39 Tra	r and 5 John nspor St Pau	Vehic n Irela tation I MN.	it Of le Servand Blv Buildi 55155	rices rd ng	lic S	Safety	, 	REINS	ES PAID PUCATION STATEMENT	
PS 33100-02									L	FHO	VALID ONLY WITH STAMP	

VOTER REGISTRATION CARD

STOP

COMPLETE THE REGISTRATION CARD ONLY IF

1. You are eligible to vote and have never registered in Minnesota.

2. You have moved or changed your name since the last time you registered or voted.

READ FORM CAREFULLY BEFORE REGISTERING

Items Indicated By A Red "X" Must Be Completed By The Registrant Before The Registration Will Be Accepted.

ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE					
	F١	ICIRII	ITV	TO	VOTE

You are eligible to register and vote if you:

- 1. will be 18 years of age or older at the time of the next election;
- 2. are a United States citizen and;
- 3. have resided in Minnesota for 20 days.

You are not eligible if you:

- 1. have been convicted of a felony or treason without having your civil rights restored; 2. are under guardianship of the
- person or 3. have been found by a court to be legally incompetent to vote

ASSISTANCE TO HANDICAPPED VOTERS Call your county auditor or city clerk if you need information

about registration or voting assistance for elderly and handicapped individuals or residents of health care facilities or hospitals. Registration and absentee instructions can be made available in large type, in Braille, or on cassette tape.

v	VOTER REGISTRA		·			OFFICE USE ONLY	
X	Name	ast	First		Middle	_ W P	_
X	Township or City of Legal Residence	.		~	1	_ S.D. No	
X	Complete Address of Legal Residence		or e Number and	City Street or Rural F	County -		
	7	Apt. No. or Rural Box	No.		City	<i>Z</i> ip	
X	Date of BirthMonth	Day Ye	ear	Tele	phone		
X	Address of Your Last Registration						
	or check if NONE	N	umber/Street	Name or Route B	x Number	Apt. No.	
	•	City or To	wnship	County	State	Zip	
Pre	vious Name (if changed	since last registration	on)		•		
fou	nd by a court to be legal	it 18 years old on ele for 20 days immedia v incompetent to vot	ection day and stely preceding e. and have or	I that I am a citize g election day, an of been convicted	o mai i am not under o	O TO REGISTER eside at the address shown above and will puardianship of the person, have not beer g my civil rights restored. I understand tha nment and a line of not more than \$10,000	}

MINNESOTA DRIVER'S LICENSE/IDENTIFICATION CARD APPLICATION VOTER REGISTRATION CARD

Birthdete Month / Day / Year	First Middle Last		Number Street Apt.#	Siste Zip Code County	P.O. Bax or Number Street Apt 8	State Zip Code Locks / Watch / Watch		Date Applicant's Bignature (f applicant to under 18 years of age, I approve the application and certify that the age given is correct.		e, a notary public	Date	N CARD No. Co., elistrilis information on below)	request to be registered to vote: 1see enguing injuriants and accepted fraction of the United States, reside at the address I certify that I will be at least 18 years old on electron day and along a lectrion day, and that I am not under shown and will have resident in Minneson for 20 days immediately preceding electron day, and that I am not under shown as have not been convicted.	guardianship of the person, have not every journey men. of a felony without having my civil rights restored. I understand that giving false information to proxume a registration is a felony punishable by not more than 5 years imprisonment and a fine of not more than \$10,000 or both.	Date Served District	Phone Number (if known)
VISION MN Driver's License/Identification Card Number	☐ PASS, NR Name Name No Nucheaned No Nucheaned No Nucheaned No Nucheaned Name Name Name Name Name Name Name Name		PROPER ID Address		Address (() different)	DL / ID CIty/Township ISSUE CODE Physical Description	Eye Coor it license or identification on duries, responsibilities, and pena		Parent / Guardian's Signature	Subscribed and sworn before me, a notary public	6 response): Notary Public's Signature and Seal let denial, cancellation,			•		Phone Number
PASSED TESTS RESTR	<u> </u>	☐ MBOP ☐ ADD / ☐ GK ☐ REMOVE	☐ AIR FEES PAID	□ DBL/TRIP APPLICATION	☐ se MC ENDORSEMENT	☐ TANKER ☐ HAZ MAT ☐ RT PSDWVD	DONOR DOCUMENT (16 years of age or older) I have made the decision to make an enatomical gilt and I want my lic and to show that I consent to be a donor.	visician and/or attorney, initication card show the octor have a Medication card have a Medication card have a Medical Information.	years. State	Social Security Number OPTIONAL for all applicants EXCET 1 mose styry. Driver's License, MN Statule 171.08, Subd. 3. Social Security Number.	DRIVERS LICENSE AND PERMIT APPLICANTS ONLY (circle response): YES NO Is your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle now under denial, cancellation,	suspension, revocation, or disqualitication in any other state or jurisduction. Do you have any medical condition that may impair your ability to safety operate a	motor venicies in you, experimentally by you use insulin? Ob you use any medication, other than insulin, to control loss of consciousness or Do you use any medication. If yes, explain.	COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE (CDL) applicants only:	. As C.F.n. 331 to ope .R. Minnesota Statutes.	commercial vehicle within the State of Minnesota.
RX #) Š	HEADER	SENIOR MED ALERT LTD MOBIL	DONOR DO	APPLIC NO	Year	Social Security Number of Chiver's License, MN Sta	DRIVERS LICE	9	YES NO DO	COMMERCIAL	I possess a v interstate and	commercial

Figure 5. Colorado Motor Voter Form

AGE GROU	MICLE USF ONLY						_			
		TINST NAME	ISE I_ IDENT	IFICATION O	SABO LI	DUPLICAT	E LIC			HANGE NAME/DOB
CLASS	ree									VOTER ID NUMBER
PHOTO	NO PHOTO	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (Street and Number, Ap	ertment No. Spac	A No. elc)					PRECINCT NUMBER
DAIVER	LICENSE	CITY/IOWN			71	P CODE	COLDITY			PASCINCI NUMBER
TIP					1					CITY CODE
1	SEMENT	DATE OF BIRTH	CHANGE DOR FROM	SEX	WERSHT	HER	1111	HAIR COLOR	FYE COLOA	
TYPE	ATE LIGENSE	CURRENT LICENSE NUL	1959	ITRICTIONS		SECTION IN	ILLAND DE	DONOR	ARE YOU A U.S	MINICIPAL WARD
1		COMMENT CICENSE MIN		imenews	SOLIA	SECTION A	JAGF A	12	CITIZEN	MUNICIPAL PRECINCT
CURRENT	ICENSE NUMBER	I CERTIFY MY SIC	NATURE, UNDER P	ENALTY OF PER	JURY, THAT T	IE ABOVE II	NEORMATIO	IN IS THE AND		
		DRIVER LICENSE/ID CAL	ID APPLICANT SIGNA	tune	DAIL	LYAMINETAC	I FRE SIGNA	ATURNE.		SCHOOL PRECINCT
PREVIOUS	LICENSE NUMBER									
EXPIRES	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	FOR VOYER REGISTRA POST OFFICE ADDRESS	TION, MUST BE 18.	CITY/TO			ZIP CODE	TELEPHONE		REMARKS
EIPIMES								İ		
LOSAU	I ICATION CARD	US CHIZEN BY:	PARTY AFFICIATIO	N Political Orga				-COLO	RADO ONLY-	·
<u> </u>	CATE ID CARD	☐ Naturalization	□ Democret	D Unaffillated				~	EB 🗆 NO .	
CURRENT	I NUMBER	FORMER NAME - FIRE		MIDDLE HAME			LAST HADE		JA, SA, ETC	
		FORMER RESIDENCE AC	DAESS	CITYAO	wh		STATE	ZIF CODE		
PREMOUS	ID NUMBER								REGISTRAR	
EXPIRES		WARNING: It is a arime	to ewear felsely as to	your qualifications	to register to w	IL I CEATIFY	THE ABOVE	FACTS ARE TRU	JE.	
		the date of the nest enach			_ do solemnly ==	ver (or altima) i	hat i am a els	ran of the United	States and that on	
DRIVE	NO DRIVE	days and in my precings a place of residence and I	t least thirty two days t	oolore the election	I further execute	office) that t	recised in the No procent so	i mate at Coloreda Libeas i bated here	ist med thuty fue in to my sale legal	
TIP	OFFICE NO	VOTER REGISTRATION				I SREY BINIMO	5 BY		DATE	
L		L								J

U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES

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