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(Re)ordering the Arab City:
Transforming the Urban Public Realm in Cairo and Doha

by
Riem Abdel Moniem El-Zoghbi

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requirements for the degree of

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Committee in charge:
Professor Nezar Alsayyad, Chair
Professor Karen Christensen
Professor Michael Watts

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(Re)ordering the Arab City:
Transforming the Urban Public Realm in Cairo and Doha

ABSTRACT

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Transforming the Urban Public Realm in Cairo and Doha
by
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Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional Planning
University of California, Berkeley

Professor Nezar Alsayyad, Chair

In this dissertation, I conduct a transnational analysis of Cairo, Egypt and Doha, Qatar to examine how dominant constructions and narratives of nationalism, put forth by various regimes, valorize particular groups of people in each city -- the military in Cairo, and the idealized, patriarchal family in Doha -- while rendering others unworthy of the full exercise of citizenship or engagement with urban, public life. Though narratives deeming particular groups as "worthy" or "unworthy" are propagated through discursive measures, they are also spatialized via particular socio-spatial practices that (re)order the city into sanctioned spaces for the valorized groups, versus dangerous, undesirable, unsanctioned spaces for the groups of people deemed unworthy of full engagement with urban life.

The first part of this dissertation looks at the privileged position of the Egyptian military and its role in the production of urban space in Cairo. I examine the military's attempt to position itself as the embodiment of Egyptian nationalism, and how it uses this privileged position to obfuscate its economic activities, including its interests in urban development. I argue that since the 2013 military coup, which ousted Egypt's first democratically elected president, the construction of narratives emphasizing the differentiated citizenship of Islamists -- a group whose disenfranchisement is seen as pivotal to the unfettered apotheosis of the Egyptian Military -- is manifest in various socio-spatial practices that demarcate, isolate and deem such people unworthy of full citizenship, and the claims with which such citizenship is associated. This, coupled with narratives valorizing the military establishment as heroic guardians of Egyptian nationalism, who saved Egypt from the Islamists, and who continue to protect the country from impending Islamist threats, underpins the paradigm of differentiated citizenship playing out in Cairo today. This facilitates the stigmatization of public space and de-legitimization of the public realm.

In the second half of this dissertation, I argue that contrary to the situation in Cairo, in which Islamists are deemed unworthy subjects of rule, in Doha, the current project of Qatari nation building promotes notions of Qatari nationalism that valorize an idealized, Qatari, "family," and associated Islamist modes of being. Nationalist narratives and development schemes have led to a series of physical interventions into Doha's urban realm that attempt to promote an idealized, unified, Qatari identity; one that is rooted in a markedly Islamic, Qatari culture and privileges an idealized Qatari family, which the state seeks to espouse through its many human development

schemes. In the case of Doha, the valorization of an idealized, pious, patriotic family privileges the (re)ordering of the city to serve the family, and sanitize the city of low-income workers.

Though the cases of Cairo and Doha are very different, the socio-spatial processes that are currently (re)ordering these cities reinforce the paradigm of differentiated citizenship(s) prevalent in Arab societies today, and are examples of the deep barriers to democracy that currently exist in cities throughout the Arab world. The stigmatization of the public realm in both cities imposes the performance of differentiated citizenship(s), which exposes residents to a host of potentialities tied to their status as "worthy" or "unworthy" actors. To be in the public realm in Cairo is to be subject to contesting claims and the possibility of discipline and potential use of violence imposed by conflicting regimes of rule. To be in the public realm in Doha is to be subject to highly stratified, unwritten expectations, and social hierarchies based on citizenship, class, national origin, and gender.

The labeling and association of certain types of spaces with particular people, ways of life, modes of being, religiosity, and degree of belonging to the "nation" serves to brand particular groups as worthy of the exercise of full citizenship, yet render others unworthy of basic rights based on their perceived personal failings and complex axes of differentiation that inform social interactions. Groups of people who do not fit into current nation building processes and dominant narratives of nationalism -- who are deemed outside the frame of the "nation," as defined by ruling regimes of rule -- are made legible by the demarcation and creation of governable spaces in which they are managed and disciplined. Additionally, the control and stigmatization of urban public space in both cities serves to facilitate the disenfranchisement of the majority of urban residents in Cairo and Doha.

*For my beloved parents, Sanaa Badran
and Abdel Moniem El-Zoghbi (1930-2002)*

And for the loves of my life, Samer, Omar, and Mariam Shehata

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Acknowledgements

This dissertation was a long time in the making. Being a woman with young children pursuing a doctoral degree is hard. My own mother, Sanaa Badran, made it look easy; she had five children, two of whom she gave birth to while doing her Ph.D. But, my mother had something considered scandalous in the late seventies and early eighties when she was pursuing her degree, and unthinkable even now -- a stay-at-home husband. My father, Abdel Moniem El-Zoghbi, was at the height of his career when he put it on hold to support my mother's dream of pursuing a Ph.D. She had been awarded a scholarship to study in the U.S. and, with no intention of immigrating, she naively thought she could quickly finish her degree and return to Egypt, while my sisters and I were cared for by our father, nanny and grandmother. One semester into her journey, alone and miserable, she asked my father, sisters and me to board a plane to Minnesota to join her. At the time, her American colleagues and professors were amazed by how "different" my Arab, Muslim mother and father were -- weren't women in the Arab world oppressed by their husbands? Weren't Arab women the ones who were expected to sacrifice their careers for their husbands? How could it be that my parents did not fit this stereotypical construct of Arabs and Muslims? How could a Muslim, Arab women attempt, so brazenly, to "have it all?"

Despite the progress made during these subsequent decades, many things have not changed in academia. It is still a liability to have children; an inconvenience begrudgingly tolerated, but not welcome, by the academy. Women's bodies have always been monitored, censored and controlled, and despite what we would like to believe, it is no different in the academy. My mother hid her pregnancy when she was pregnant with my youngest sister, Sarah, because of fears her dissertation committee would not take her seriously knowing she was to give birth two months before her dissertation defense. Imagine my sisters' and my surprise when she brought home a newborn baby one day after school. My teacher asked me why I had not told her my mother was expecting a baby, to which I naively replied "because she was never pregnant."

Though I was already a mother to my son, Omar, the audacity of my being pregnant, giving birth, undergoing a Cesarean section, suffering from post-partum depression, breastfeeding, and so on while pursuing my Ph.D. solicited a range of reactions. It was met with genuine compassion and support by my dissertation committee and most of my colleagues, yet also with utter disdain by some within my community of scholars. For many, pregnancy, childbirth, and the physicality of childrearing young kids signifies not "being serious" about academia. For a woman, it is seen by many as a conscious, bourgeois choice to prioritize something other than the academy and the pursuit of knowledge. "Why are you here?" a female professor asked me when I came back to campus after giving birth to my daughter. Yet, for my male colleagues, who have the luxury of outsourcing pregnancy and childbirth to their female partners, becoming a father represents a laudable achievement that is praised by most. Praise is showered onto them in multiple ways, including recognition and validation of their involvement in childrearing -- "you are such a good father for leaving early to be with your child," they are told. Compliments for a mother, when given, are most often couched in variations of "we can't even tell you have kids," suggesting that having children, for a woman, necessitates their invisibility. Any acknowledgment or evidence of caring for children is seen as a lack of professionalism and not "being serious" about one's career.

Thirty years after my mother was derided by her academic colleagues for attempting to "have it all," sitting across a desk from a highly respected female professor, after giving birth to my daughter, Mariam, I cried in despair while she told me I "cannot not have it all." Implicit in this narrative of women attempting to "have it all" is a critique of women's reproductive choices, whether or not they have children. Women are still seen as not being able to pursue knowledge and academic careers while being successful mothers to children to whom they give birth or for whom they are responsible. The two are somehow mutually exclusive. They are mutually exclusive -- even outside the realm of the possible -- for millions of women worldwide, who do not have access to basic primary education or maternal healthcare. Yet, for this to be the standard within the U.S. academy speaks volumes about the types of structural inequities still facing women in academia in the world's most advanced economy. We take for granted that we operate in a male dominated, neoliberal intellectual space; one that rewards income generating pursuits as well as being a man who does not have to take "time off" to give birth. My own spouse's decision to take paternal leave when our daughter was born was viewed mostly with derision by the majority of his overwhelmingly male colleagues. Though some thought he was a great father to take "time off," others thought it was not only unnecessary, but unintellectual and unmanly. Most women in the U.S. do not have the choice or means to not work after giving birth. In a country and economy that systematically discriminates against women, and does not provide adequate support structures for working mothers, or working parents of all kinds, it is not surprising that U.S. academic institutions look the other way while women of childrearing age drop out of graduate programs, suffer micro-aggressions related to their reproductive choices, and get passed up for promotion and tenure. As I watch my own mother's mind and body succumb to the ravages of Alzheimer's, I am thankful for the choices she and my father made decades ago, and the battles she fought as a Muslim, Arab women.

These battles are far from over, as it is still a liability to be of Arab and Muslim descent. Arabs and Muslims are monitored, harassed, intimidated and made legible by governments, law enforcement agencies, watch groups, and others. My mother faced open discrimination for being an Arab, Muslim women, often from people who thought they were progressive for acknowledging or engaging someone who, in their eyes, was so blatantly other. Arab-Americans and Muslims are still targeted on university campuses by groups who seek to silence their voices, negate their identities, and brand them as dangerous interlocutors whose allegiances lie elsewhere. The tactics and narratives used by repressive regimes to demonize particular groups of people in Cairo and Doha, which I discuss in this dissertation, are not an anomaly; similar tactics and narratives are used against Arab-Americans and Muslims to brand them as an internal threat to the U.S. and its academic institutions. I vividly remember being called "just a stupid Arab" who was "just like the rest of them" by a teaching assistant at Columbia University, who threatened to use her influence to have me banned from teaching because "stupid Arabs" don't deserve the privilege of influencing students. As much as I would like to believe that this incident and others did not affect me, I have often censored myself, both on and off campus, out of fear. Fear of identifying myself as an Arab-American, fear of speaking my mind, fear for my safety, fear for my children's safety. As we witness the rise in racism, antisemitism and hate crimes that grip our country, validated by a president and administration that repeatedly seek to further disenfranchise the most vulnerable amongst us, outrage is not enough. We must proactively work to change the insidious spread of racism, sexism, misogyny, Islamophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment, antisemitism, and other forms of bigotry that seep through the veins of our country and its institutions.

Many people graciously supported, encouraged and guided me as I researched and prepared this dissertation. I wish to thank Nezar Alsayyad for his unwavering support, mentorship and generosity as an advisor and advocate of my work. Thank you for recognizing and respecting the multiple aspects of my life, encouraging me to rekindle my curiosity about cities in the Arab world, and allowing me the intellectual freedom to add Doha to my project. Your kindness, intellectual guidance and mentorship are unparalleled. I will never be able to sufficiently thank Karen Christensen for her mentorship and unwavering support throughout these many years. Professor Christensen's encouragement to keep going played a pivotal role for me, academically and personally. I thank you from the bottom of my heart. I am also greatly indebted to Michael Watts for his generosity, mentorship and support. Professor Watts is an intellectual force with whom it is humbling to work. Thank you for your guidance and kindness. I am greatly indebted to Gillian Hart for her mentorship and guidance during my comprehensive exams. Professor Hart is another intellectual force whom one rarely has the privilege to encounter, let alone work with. Her generosity of spirit is humbling. I am also deeply indebted to Ananya Roy for her mentorship and support during my comprehensive exams, and for the privilege of working with her as a graduate student instructor for her Global Poverty class at U.C. Berkeley.

Dawn Jourdan has been a friend and mentor since the day I met her. I am grateful for her friendship and support. Clayton Hall was always available to help me when I needed it. Thank you for your guidance, graciousness and support throughout these years. Bassem Adly and Ayman Ismail were a lifeline for me while doing my fieldwork in Cairo. In Doha, I was privileged to forge friendships with many people from Qatar and around the world who gave meaning to the city. Thank you all for your kindness, generosity, and friendship.

My mother never stopped encouraging me to keep going and finish my dissertation. I am privileged to have her unwavering support and that of my siblings, Ghada, Mayada, Muhamed and Sarah El-Zoghbi, without whom I cannot imagine my world. Thank you for being present in my life, supporting me throughout this journey, and for a lifetime of memories. You are my best friends, whom I greatly love and admire. Thank you, Mariam, for being you; you occupy a special place in my heart, are a role model for Omar and little Mariam, and we love you very much. Benjamin, Oliver, Jonathan, Adam and Leena also occupy a special place in my heart and make the world a happier place. Thank you, Christine, Dohm, and William for sharing your homes and extending your kindness. And, thank you, Dr. Said and Soraya Shehata, for your unwavering support.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the humor, generosity, support and love of my partner, Samer Shehata, and our beautiful children, Omar and Mariam Shehata. The love, respect and gratitude I feel for Samer, Omar, and Mariam, and the exuberance I feel in their presence is limitless. You are the loves of my life. Thank you for making my world.

SECTION I: A TRANSNATIONAL ANALYSIS

Chapter 1. Nationalism and Constructions of Difference

The 2011 popular mobilizations of the so-called "Arab Spring" brought with it the hope of change in the Arab world. The image of millions of people converged upon Tahrir Square, demanding their rights to inclusion in Egyptian society, embodied aspirations for more inclusive Arab societies. The anticipation of democratic processes taking hold in the Arab world filled the aspirations of a generation, yet, on the seventh anniversary of the Arab Spring, cities in the Arab world remain the battlegrounds in which political, economic and social struggles play out daily.

In this dissertation, I examine how dominant constructions and narratives of nationalism, put forth by various regimes, fuel these struggles by valorizing particular groups of people -- the military in Cairo, and the idealized, patriarchal Qatari family in Doha -- while rendering others unworthy of the full exercise of citizenship or engagement with urban, public life. Though narratives deeming particular groups as 'worthy' or 'unworthy' are propagated through discursive measures, they are also spatialized via particular socio-spatial practices that (re)order the city into sanctioned spaces for the valorized groups, versus dangerous, undesirable, unsanctioned spaces for the groups of people deemed unworthy of full engagement with urban life.

A key element in this construction of difference is nationalism. Both Cairo and Doha are experiencing what I call a spatialized othering of the undesirable in which the urban, public realm is cleansed of undesirable elements and populations, on the basis of safety, order, morality and degree of belonging to "the nation." Nationalism is deployed to deliberately marginalize particular groups of people who do not fit into dominant frameworks of "the nation," as defined by dominant regimes. This not only produces undesirable subjects and leads to the cleansing of the city, it stigmatizes the urban public realm, thus reinforcing the deeply rooted structures that define privilege and difference, as well as ones' ability to engage in urban public life. In the process, public space is devalued.

To traverse Cairo and Doha, to exist in these cities' streets, alleyways, *ha'wary*, bus stops, and squares, or to walk along their roadsides and the other public spaces outside of the highly programmed, sanctioned spaces of the dominant groups, is to exist in a state of liminality. Anything can happen; ones' rights claims are diminished by the simple act of being in the public realm. In Cairo, the breakdown of societal relations and interpersonal trust in the aftermath of the 2011 popular uprisings, and subsequent demonstrations, protests and confrontations in public space, leaves one open to potentialities of infringement and violation -- enter at your own risk; anything is possible. In Doha, othering and liminality take on another form, a polite, sanitized notion of difference, coupled with a refusal to allow certain elements of society the full engagement with the city. It is not based on a breakdown of interpersonal trust, but reinforced by legal, political and societal structures that do not allow the building of such trust, one that necessitates the suspicion and association of threat with the millions of non-Qatari migrants who build and service the city. In both cities, public space is demeaned and ones' existence in the urban, public realm embodies an implicit declaration of lower social status and subjugation.

1.1. Differentiated Citizenship

The othering of particular segments of society legitimates the stigmatization, separation, and in some cases, use of violence against those deemed unworthy. As public urban space in cities throughout the Arab world increasingly becomes the domain of particular actors -- the military, state security apparatuses, or various social groups -- which increasingly impose their own forms of social and political rule, the implications for governance in such cities is striking, promoting what James Holston (2011) calls "differentiated citizenship." According to Holston, such a paradigm is one in which access to rights depends on one's status and is only bestowed on the "right people," embedding a conception of citizenship in which many urban residents are seen as subjects of rule, as opposed to full citizens, who may claim rights and exercise agency in the urban realm.

As Holston explains, the paradigm of differentiated citizenship creates "internally marginalized citizens on the basis of social differences that the citizenship regime deems legitimate grounds for discrimination. On the basis of that legitimation, some citizens deny other citizens' rights; they feel justified in treating other citizens as if they were not citizens because they are the wrong sort of person or exhibit the wrong sort of behavior or belief" (Holston 2010). Thus, the denial of rights to certain groups is normalized via the assertion of their personal inadequacies.

1.1.1. Cairo

The first part of this dissertation looks at the privileged position of the Egyptian military and its role in the production of urban space in Cairo. I examine the military's attempt to position itself as the embodiment of Egyptian nationalism, and how it uses this privileged position to obfuscate its economic activities, including its interests in urban development. I argue that since the 2013 military coup, which ousted Egypt's first democratically elected president, the construction of narratives emphasizing the differentiated citizenship of Islamists -- a group whose disenfranchisement is seen as pivotal to the unfettered apotheosis of the Egyptian Military -- is manifest in various socio-spatial practices that demarcate, isolate and deem such people unworthy of full citizenship, and the claims with which such citizenship is associated. This, coupled with narratives valorizing the military establishment as heroic guardians of Egyptian nationalism, who saved Egypt from the Islamists, and who continue to protect the country from impending Islamist threats, underpins the paradigm of differentiated citizenship playing out in Cairo today. I argue that this facilitates the stigmatization of public space and de-legitimization of the public realm.

1.1.2. Doha

In the second half of this dissertation, I argue that contrary to the situation in Cairo, in which Islamists are deemed unworthy subjects, in Doha, the current project of Qatari nation building promotes notions of Qatari nationalism that valorize an idealized, Qatari, "Islamic family," and associated Islamist modes of being. Nationalist narratives and development schemes have led to a series of physical interventions into Doha's urban realm that attempt to promote an idealized, unified, Qatari identity; one that is rooted in a markedly Islamic, Arab culture and privileges an idealized Qatari family, which the state seeks to espouse through its

many human development schemes. In the case of Doha, the valorization of an idealized, pious, patriotic "Islamic family," privileges the (re)ordering of the city to serve the family, and sanitize the city of "workers."

I argue that physical interventions exploit Qatar's proclaimed Islamic essence, in an effort to position the country as the leader of the so-called Islamic Renaissance, and brand it as a forward-thinking, globally-oriented, modern, Islamic country that maintains its Islamic values, despite rapid modernization. This has resulted in the proliferation of highly regulated and controlled "Islamicized public spaces" (Singerman 2006, Abaza 2006, Roy 2009) that are made for the exclusive use of an idealized, Islamic family, as well as to showcase Qatar's role as the modern caretaker of Islamic culture to the foreign gaze. It has also resulted in the clearing out of people and spaces that do not serve this overarching goal.

In Doha, the paradigm of differentiated citizenship is complicated by the fact that the majority of Qatar's residents are not citizens, but migrant workers who are allowed to reside in the country only through the sponsorship of Qatari citizens and institutions, and who have no legal citizenship rights, and limited claims to social and economic rights. As Zahra Babar (2014, 404) states, "Citizenship is still a privilege that is conferred by a state on an individual, and is built around an accepted right to exclusivity. Citizenship bestows a certain form of membership within a state to a person, and not just anyone located within a particular geopolitical territory can claim to be its citizen through sheer virtue of being there." In the case of Doha, citizenship is *the* primary axes of social differentiation, with the difference between citizen (*muwa'tin*) and noncitizen (*ghayr muwa'tin*) being the primary distinction (Nagy 2006). This distinction between citizens and non-citizens is spatialized via a variety of socio-spatial practices, laws, and unwritten, yet highly scripted and socially codified performances of citizenship(s) in the public realm.

1.1.3. Governable Spaces

These social-spatial processes and exclusionary narratives have resulted in what Rose (1999, 32) calls governable spaces or "modalities in which a real and material governable world is composed, terraformed, and populated." As Rose explains, "The government of a population…become possible only through discursive mechanisms that represent the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics" (1999, 33). Such governable spaces reflect the spatialization of government and 'territorialization' of 'social thought' -- for example the slum in the late nineteenth century (Rose 1999, 35-6). Each governable space possesses a distinct topology and is "modeled" through various frames and "systems of cognition" that render it recognizable and (re)model space itself (Watts 2004). Spaces such as '*ashwa'iyyat* in Cairo and Labor City in Doha, represent such governable spaces in which particular groups of people are ordered, made legible, and, thus, rendered governable by various regimes. This dissertation attempts to unpack the narratives and nationalist myths behind the "systems of cognition" that center and inscribe differentiated citizenship(s) in Cairo and Doha.

1.2. Why Cairo and Doha?

As I discuss in Chapter 2, much of the contemporary scholarship on cities in the Arab world posits neoliberalism as the unquestionable logic behind urban transformations, including in Cairo and Doha. In much of the literature on cities in the Arab world, neoliberalism is

assumed to be an external "model" imposed by Arab governments on their populations and cites that promotes the privatization of public space, the creation of consumption-oriented spaces and enclaves, and the criminalization of the urban poor. The prevalence of informal/ illegal areas, and creation of exclusionary urban forms, among other things, are also attributed to neoliberalism. But, though exclusionary urban forms are posited as expressions of neoliberalism, the rationality of the neoliberal ethos and techne (Barry 1996), and the spatial expression of such in the Arab city are less explored by urban theorists. Thus, despite the appropriation of the meta-narrative of neoliberalism in contemporary understandings of Arab cities, such understandings do not address specific articulations of neoliberalism or its subsequent expression in the "neoliberal Arab city." Even after the popular protests of the so-called Arab Spring, neoliberalism remains the leading factor posited in the spatial restructuring of cities in the Arab world.

This is most definitely the case for Cairo, where numerous studies position urban processes in relation to state-sponsored neoliberal development policies that, in conjunction with the retreat of the welfare state, privilege the ascendancy of capital over the needs, rights, and claims of ordinary people (Singerman 2009, Denis 2008, Kuppinger 2004, Mitchell 1999, Elsheshtawy 2004, Bagaeen 2007). Most of the scholarship on Doha, which focuses on the city's efforts to compete with its rival Dubai, reinforces the notion that cities in the Arab world employ neoliberal techniques, such as branding and the employment of so-called starchitects, gigantism, and mega-projects to inform urban development efforts in their attempt to attain global city status. One such attempt is Doha's hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

My study breaks from this assumption, as I do not take for granted that neoliberalism is the central logic behind the urban articulations and practices witnessed in cities in the Arab world today. While I recognize that regimes impose neoliberal polices to promote their countries as sites of transnational investment by the implementation of globalized, free-market oriented policies to attract foreign direct investment, I argue that understandings of such cities cannot be reduced to a hegemonic logic such as neoliberalism.

This follows Roy and Ong's (2011, 10) contention that contemporary paradigms and discourses by which cities in the so-called global south, such as Cairo, Doha and Dubai, are often analyzed do not sufficiently deal with the "problem space" that is the city. Roy and Ong introduce the concept of worlding as a "counterpoint" to dominant narratives that privilege "singular logics," such as globalization and post-colonialism. Whereas western-centric paradigms, such as the global cities paradigm, posit capitalism as the main driver behind globalization, in so-called developing cities "There is the implicit suggestion that outside the West, the Rest is inescapably postcolonial, sharing the same set of global effects of former colonialism" (Ong 2011, 8). In contrast to such understandings of the city as "an exclusive site of capitalism or postcolonial activism," the city is conceived of as a "milieu that is in constant formation, drawing on disparate connections, and subject to the play of national and global forces" (Ong 2011, 3). Thus, "the concept of worlding seeks to recover and restore the vast array of global strategies that are being staged at the urban scale around the world" (Roy 2008, 10).

In doing so, the city is considered in its entirety, as an organic being, not just as a static entity fixed in a particular locality and dominated by a particular essential logic, but a dynamic assemblage of transnational ideas, norms, flows, practices, actors, and institutions that constantly constitute and reconstitute the urban. The city as an organic being breathes with the life of its residents, grows with the expansion of its neighborhoods, and learns from its fellow metropolises. Ong contends that the "practices of inter-city comparison, referencing, or

modeling" (Ong 2011, 4), among other things, are ubiquitous in the "planning imagination" as well as built form of cities in the so-called global south. As Ong suggests, "The discourses that sustain this inter-referentiality shape an intense inter-city consciousness of contrast, comparison, and rivalry, as well as an idiom that initiates and legitimizes the extravagant claims of mega urban makeovers" (Ong 2011, 23).

If we consider Cairo and Doha in this sense, not as static entities fixed in their respective nation states, but as dynamic entities in constant flux, which are tied together in multiple ways -- by transnational flows of people, capital, ideas, references, and norms -- we may begin to unpack the seemingly disparate assemblages and practices that constitute the urban in these cities. The discourses, narratives, and strategies that inform the trajectories of these cities are interconnected; Doha and Cairo are within a field of cities that reference and are inherently in dialogue with each other, both in the global imaginary, as so-called "Arab cities," and in more tangible ways, such as the flow of migrants, money, and ideas between these cities. As I discuss in Chapter 2, the interconnectedness of cities in the Arab world has traditionally been seen in terms of a city's relationship to Islam, with the assumption that Islam is instrumental in producing a particular urban morphology or specific urban conditions and processes that are played out and reproduced throughout so-called "Islamic cities," such as Cairo and Doha. Although understandings of Islam's supposed impact on the city are fluid and contemporary urban scholars have decentered the essentialism of earlier studies of Islamic cities, the notion that Islam influences urban processes, space, governance and modes of being still resonates in contemporary urban scholarship. As with the singular logic of neoliberalism, understandings of such cities cannot be reduced to the influence of Islam or these cities' so-called Islamic essence.

The interconnectedness, inter-city referencing and rivalry prevalent amongst cities in the Arab world today is most visible between Doha and its rival, Dubai. As one scholar contends "an iconic war of hyper-signification is taking place in the realm of architecture" (Adham 2008, 244) in cities throughout the Arab Gulf region, which has led to the various mega-projects, such as Education City in Doha or Dubai Healthcare City in Dubai. The "Dubai model" (Elsheshtawy 2006) of megaprojects, megamalls and technology parks developed by international real estate interests is posited to influence not only Doha, but cities such as Cairo, as well as other cities throughout the so-called global south. The discourses that promote rivalry and "practices of inter-city comparison, referencing, or modeling" (Ong 2011, 4), are not only played out on a city scale, but a national scale and in relation to national, as well as global forces.

This dissertation explores these national and global forces in the transnational, intra-Arab context of Cairo and Doha, and attempts to illustrate the complex assemblages of narratives, discourses, and socio-spatial practices that continually influence, order, and reorder the urban realm in these cities. My point of entry into this analysis is one such national force that has greatly impacted the trajectory of these cities -- contemporary constructions of nationalism, which are articulated both discursively and spatially, that attempt to define/ valorize/ influence/ construct the people and spaces belonging to "the nation." I posit that exclusionary urban articulations and the stigmatization of the public realm in both cities imposes the performance of differentiated citizenship(s), which exposes residents to a host of potentialities tied to their status as "worthy" or "unworthy" actors. To be in the public realm in Cairo is to be subject to contesting claims and the possibility of discipline and potential use of violence imposed by conflicting regimes of rule. To be in the public realm in Doha is to be subject to highly stratified, unwritten expectations and social hierarchies based on citizenship, class, national origin, and gender.

The labeling and association of certain types of spaces with particular people, ways of life, modes of being, religiosity, and degrees of belonging to the nation serves to brand particular groups as worthy of the exercise of full citizenship, while rendering others unworthy of basic rights based on their perceived personal failings and complex axes of differentiation that inform social interactions. Groups of people who do not fit into current nation building processes and dominant narratives of nationalism -- who are deemed outside the frame of the nation, as defined by ruling regimes -- are made legible by the demarcation and creation of governable spaces in which they are managed and disciplined.

The erosion of democratic ideals, which were brought to the fore in Egypt with the 2011 Egyptian uprising, has been aided by exclusionary constructions of nationalism that pit the military establishment against Islamists, and deny the rights and liberties of millions of Cairo's residents. The spatialization of the "Islamist threat" in the public imaginary, narratives linking extremism and acts of terrorism to mainstream Islamists, coupled with tangible restrictions on and limitations to the rights of Egyptian citizens, all serve to further the claim that some citizens should be subject to a different, more restricted form of citizenship. This, coupled with the valorization of the military establishment and privileging of military real estate developments, creates a city in which various neighborhoods, as well as their residents, are demarcated as patriotic, belonging to the nation, and entitled to the privileges this entails, whereas others are seen as an encumbrance and obstacle to development and the narrow construction of nationalism prevalent in Cairo.

The rigid social hierarchies and scripted performance of citizenship(s) that define Doha's public realm serve a similar purpose; to exclude the majority of the city's residents from the exercise of rights and claims available only to certain segments of Qatari society. In Doha, the infusion of Qatari culture and religiosity, and marking of public space as the exclusive domain of families and tourists, the separation of respectable "families" from "workers," and the clearing out of workers from the central city, all serve to reinforce the social hierarchies that define Doha's public realm.

This creates a city in which the majority of the city's residents are seen as a necessary, but inconvenient nuisance to the greater nation-building project, an encumbrance to the national identity and social norms of the dominant, valorized Qatari citizen. Their presence is diminished and masked in the governable spaces of their existence -- the construction sites, labor camps, and leisure facilities made specifically to serve the lowest spectrums of non-citizens. Their mobility and visibility is marginalized by the physical planning of the city, as well as imposition of spatialized social hierarchies. Non-Qatari Arabs, Indians, Nepalese, Bangladeshi, Afghans, South Asians and the numerous other national and ethnic groups that make up the majority of the country's residents are not the targeted beneficiaries of Qatar's National Vision 2030, which informs many of the socio-spatial processes currently occurring in Doha. That distinction is reserved for Qatari citizens. Some non-citizens may be the passive recipients of the benefits bestowed upon Qatari citizens by state sponsored development initiatives -- the public spaces, cultural exhibits, museums, festivals and other projects that are subsidized by the Qatari State for the human development and enjoyment of its citizens -- but their status as noncitizens affords them no claims on the direct and indirect privileges Qatari citizenship endows.

1.2.1. The Blockade of Qatar

The June 2017 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and others, which was based on allegations that Qatar supports terrorism and

undermines regional stability, highlights the deep political rifts between Qatar and Egypt. Qatar is viewed by Egyptians as one of the leading supporters of Islamists and financier of extremist Islamist groups. Qatar has long been a refuge for Egyptian Islamists, with prominent figures such as Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian cleric who has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood[1], exiled to the country since the 1960s. In May 2015 Al-Qaradawi was sentenced to death, in absentia, by the Egyptian judiciary in a trial in which over 100 Islamists, including former president Mohamed Morsi, received death sentences.[2] In response to Qatar's alleged support of Islamists and other extremist elements attempting to undermine Egypt's progress towards stability, many Egyptians boycotted Qatar's state-funded news network, *Al Jazeera*, claiming that the channel's coverage of Egypt highlights the country's instability, and is skewed in favor of Islamists by emphasizing their oppression, while ignoring the violence perpetrated by such groups in Egypt.

The relationship between the Egyptian military and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is more nuanced. As one scholar argues, "Egypt is essentially bankrupt and kept afloat by financial support from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, which have infused some $20 billion into Egypt's economy since 2013" (Ottaway 2015: 5). Though its relationship with Qatar is more strained than its relationships with the other GCC countries, Egypt accepted funding from Qatar after the 2011 revolution, but was asked to repay its commitments after the 2013 military coup that deposed its Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi. Efforts before the blockade were made to improve ties between the two countries, despite their disagreements over Islamists, but the current relationship between Cairo and Doha is defined by recriminations and accusations over the support of terrorism and Islamists.

Prior to the June 2017 blockade of Qatar, mainstream Egyptian public opinion was already vehemently opposed to sympathetic portrayals of Islamists and "foreign interference" in domestic affairs, particularly from Qatar. A viral video by the Egyptian belly dancer, Samia ElMasri, released in 2014, articulates popular attitudes towards the alleged supporters of Islamists. The video, entitled *Obama, Your mother, Your father* (*Obama*, *abuk wa um'ak*), insults President Obama for allegedly supporting the Muslim Brotherhood during the 2013 military coup.[3] Though the U.S. State Department did not endorse the overthrow of Islamist president Morsi by the Egyptian military, it did not officially label the transition of power a coup, as this would have necessitated the termination of over $1.5 billion in U.S. aid to Egypt. The video alleges that President Obama, Israel, Turkey and Qatar are supporters of Islamist extremists who actively attempt to undermine Egyptian nationalism and stability. The nationalistic, pro-el-Sisi video is vehemently anti-American and anti-Islamist. Dancing in front of derogatory images of Islamists and alleged Islamist supporters, ElMasri dishes out insults between phrases that

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[1] Egyptians who express public solidarity with the cleric are routinely targeted by the regime. Al-Qaradawi's daughter, Ola al-Qaradawi, and her husband, Hosam Khalaf, were arrested without warrant on July 3, 2017. According to State Information Service, on October 13, 2014, a student and Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer in Gharbiya was arrested and charged for possessing leaflets expressing support for Al-Qaradawi and Muslim Brotherhood founder, Hassan El-Banna.

[2] According to the Interpol website, Al-Qaradawi is wanted by the Egyptian judiciary to serve his sentence for alleged "Agreement, incitement and assistance to commit intentional murder, helping the prisoners to escape, arson, vandalism and theft." These charges are related to a 2011 jailbreak incident during which Muslim Brotherhood members, including former president Mohamed Morsi, escaped from prison. The death sentences were referred to the country's highest religious authority, the Egyptian Grand Mufti, who upheld the sentences in June 2015. The trial and death sentences sparked an international outcry against the Egyptian judiciary and ruling regime's use of the judiciary to uphold its arbitrary and politically motivated measures against the country's more than 40,000 political prisoners. <http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2014-58772> . [accessed January 20, 2016]:

[3] Samia ElMasri <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcXXy-Jb6wU> [accessed June 2015].

valorize the Egyptian Army ("our army is strong and tough") and the Egyptian people. The sentiments expressed in the video highlight the widely held nationalistic view that many of Egypt's problems are the result of Islamists and foreign intervention into domestic affairs. The blockade of Qatar highlights the exclusionary forms of nationalism and struggles for prominence and influence in the Arab world.

1.2.2. Arab Cities?

I do not use the term "Arab city" uncritically. How do we define an Arab city? The discussion of what constitutes a Near Eastern, Middle Eastern, Muslim, Islamic, and Arab city has been raging since the publication of Brown's *From Madina to Metropolis* (1973), which represented the first significant attempt to problematize these notions in the urban literature. All of these categories embody particular cultural, identity and geo-political discourses and assumptions. For example, "Arab" is closely tied to Arab nationalism and identity, exemplified by the pan-Arabism of the 1950s and 60s under populist leaders such as Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser. In line with this conception, most contemporary understandings of the Arab city entail cities within the geo-political construct of the Arab world -- most commonly understood as the 22 member countries of the League of Arab States -- that predominately share a common language (Arabic). But understandings of "Arab" are not singular, as contemporary usage of the Arab city may refer to cities in the Arabian Peninsula or in so-called "Gulf Arab" states that presumably share a more common identity and may be tied by specific geo-political alliances, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), specific to that sub-region of the Arab world. Other understandings of the Arab city may extend beyond the Gulf to include Egypt and the Levant, but exclude North Africa. Reference to the "Middle Eastern" city may include Israel, Turkey or Iran; whereas reference to the "Greater Middle East," a term coined after the events of 9-11-2001 that reflects the Bush administration's analysis of a region more broadly defined by Islam and terrorism (and not by an Arab identity), that includes Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It is not my intent to engage in an exercise of essentializing what makes an Arab versus a Middle Eastern city, yet, this study acknowledges the sometimes interchangeable use or conflation of these categories in the urban literature.

Like the construct of the "Islamic city" that proceeded it, the term "Arab city" is highly problematic. Yet, I use this problematic construct, not as an endorsement of a singular identity or insistence that Cairo and Doha be recognized as so-called Arab cities, but as a reflection of the deeply exclusionary contemporary narratives and forms of nationalism that animate the socio-spatial processes influencing these cities today. Arab nationalism has greatly diminished; in its place is the exclusionary nationalism of the nation state -- Egyptian, Qatari, Saudi, Emirati and so on -- each vying for influence, position, and power in the Arab world. In contrast to the pan-Arabism that defined the not-so-distant past, the forms of nationalism witnessed today pit nations in the Arab world against each other -- even nations that "traditionally" identified with each other, such as Qatar and the GCC states -- and narrowly defines who, within the nation state, is worthy of being part of the nation. These non-pluralistic notions of nationalism reflect the social and political realities that fuel state rivalries and narratives, as well as practices that attempt to limit and subvert rights, liberties, and freedoms in the Arab world.

Doha and Cairo are within a field of cities in the global imaginary that reference and are inherently in dialogue with each other, as so-called Arab cities. Arab cities are not only externally defined by the west as "Arab," but are internally defined as such by regimes vying for position and leadership in the Arab world. After the events of the so-called Arab Spring,

dominant regimes have attempted to entrench particular signifiers, "Arab" being amongst them, into complex notions of nationalism that intentionally exclude particular groups of people. My usage of the term Arab city does not accept or endorse all that is implied by the literature on so-called Arab cites. For Doha, I use the term Arab city to reflect the deliberate proclamations and attempts to redefine Doha in terms of an Arab city, despite its multiethnic, multicultural, multi-religious reality. In a city in which over eightyfive percent of the population is non-Qatari, the entrenchment of the city's Arab, Muslim identity reflects the current project of nation building and Qatari subject formation that valorizes this identity, to the exclusion of the overwhelming majority of the city's residents. For Cairo, I use the term Arab city, in part, to reflect that Egypt's capital is the most populous city in the Arab world, as well as to reflect the entrenched belief by the Egyptian military and many Egyptians that Egypt is the rightful leader of the Arab world, despite its diminished role and the challenges it faces by emergent powers.

1.3. Arab Authoritarianism

In Cairo and Doha, the intersection between nationalism and authoritarianism is clearly reflected in the discourses, processes, and socio-spatial practices that reinforce the paradigm of differentiated citizenship(s) prevalent in Arab societies today. Following Ong and Roy (2011), my transnational framework of analysis situates these cities not only as sites within their respective nation states, but as dynamic assemblages of transnational ideas, norms, flows, practices, actors, and institutions that constantly constitute and reconstitute the urban. Just as cities such as Cairo, Doha, and Dubai are in dialogue and reference each other in their constant making and remaking, so too, do the authoritarian regimes that impact the urban public realm of these cities. The adaptive capacity of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, characterized by Heydemann and Leenders (2011) as "recombinant authoritarianism," facilitates regimes' abilities to learn from and adapt to internal challenges, and hence, supports their survival. Authoritarian regimes converge "around a similar constellation of tactics and practices designed to maximize their probability of survival" (Heydemann and Leenders 2011, 651). From preventing internal discord and fractions, particularly the defection of militaries, to the development of "discourses aimed at affecting the strategic calculus of citizens," and the implementation of strategies that manage and gear up support, while punish dissent, authoritarian regimes engage in a range of practices that are adopted and modified to support their survival (Ibid, 649-650).

We see this at play in both Cairo and Doha, in the discourses and narratives that attempt to define who belongs to the nation, is privy to special treatment, are "worthy" actors, and who falls outside these frames and, thus, must be managed and disciplined. The discursive and spatial practices of authoritarian regimes impact Cairo and Doha in multiple ways. At their most basic level, not only do they attempt to define the nation and who belongs to the imagined community (Anderson 1991) of the nation-state, they also attempt to normalize their claims to the tangible and intangible assets of the nation, including its physical land and public spaces. As I discuss in this dissertation, in Cairo, the military's claim to land and areas deemed sensitive to national interests, as well as its extensive involvement in land-related decisions and veto powers over urban development distorts the market for land and privileges particular urban development schemes. This uniquely positions key military personnel to gain enormously from military-endorsed land dealings and schemes. Additionally, the stigmatization of the urban public realm and its association with 'trouble makers' and the urban poor further disenfranchises the majority of city residents. In Doha, land is not only parceled out to Qatari citizens by a seemingly

benevolent rentier state, the city's public urban spaces are redefined in terms of an exclusively globally-oriented Qatari, Arab, Muslim identity that supports the imagined community of the Qatari state and authoritarian regime's claim to sovereignty.

As I discuss in the following chapters, land and the subsequent production of urban space is deployed by authoritarian regimes to enable redistribution and valorize particular subjects. Although neoliberalism is not the singular logic that animates these processes, neoliberal techniques are used by authoritarian rulers to facilitate urban transformations in Cairo and Doha.

1.4. Methods and Approach

The purpose of this study is to investigate the socio-spatial processes occurring in Cairo, Egypt and Doha, Qatar that have transformed the urban public realm in these cities over the past decade. Specifically, it investigates the impact of dominant nationalist narratives, schemes, and development patterns on urban public space in the two cities, and identifies similarities in the socio-spatial processes occurring in both cities. At its core, this dissertation deals with issues of social justice and inequity, and the socio-spatial ways in which social justice is undermined, and inequity perpetuated, in cities in the Arab world.

My hypothesis is that, over the past decade, dominant narratives of nationalism and urban development patterns and schemes in both Cairo and Doha have led to greater stigmatization of urban public space and the imposition of differentiated citizenship in the urban public realm. Thus, the objective of this research is to: 1) identify dominant nationalist narratives 2) investigate the impact of these narratives and development schemes on the urban public realm 3) demonstrate how particular associations are formed in public discourse regarding the role urban space in both cities plays in contemporary constructions of Egyptian and Qatari nationalism.

The transnational analysis that informs my dissertation is based on over two years of primary research in Doha and Cairo in which I employed a variety of methods, including socioeconomic, policy, and discourse analysis, interviews, focus groups, and participant observation, as well as site visits and land use analysis. Specifically, I reviewed national development schemes, laws pertaining to public space and urban development, city planning documents, and master plans for Cairo and Doha. I conducted interviews with city planners, property managers, developers, architects, project managers, community organizations and city residents. I also conducted sites visits and participant observation of public spaces in Cairo and Doha. Additionally, I conducted a discourse analysis of public speeches, press releases and news programs regarding urban public space in both cities, as well as analyzed census data.

Chapter 2. Problematizing the City in the Arab World

The literature on cities in the Arab world is vast, including centuries of writings by medieval scholars such as Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun and others, and continues through the modern period. In this chapter, I do not attempt to present a comprehensive review of this literature, but instead focus on the genealogy of various conceptualizations of cities in the Arab world in contemporary urban scholarship. I have organized my inquiry around the most prominent conceptualizations of cities in the Arab world: the Islamic city and the neoliberal city, and attempt to problematize contemporary understandings of cities in the Arab world that appropriate these meta-narratives.

2.1 Islam and the City

As the notions of religion and religiosity have figured prominently in studies of cities in the Arab world, I begin by initially exploring the Orientalist concept of the "Islamic city," a concept widely propagated in the non-Arabic urban literature in the early nineteenth century (by Marcais, von Grunebaum, LeTourneau and others), and later adopted by some Arab urban scholars (most notably Hakim and Al-Hathloul). Fundamental to this concept is the proposition that religion, or more specifically, Islam, is instrumental in producing a particular urban morphology or specific urban conditions and processes that are played out and reproduced throughout so-called Islamic cities. Earlier understandings of Islamic cities conceived this by virtue of a host of rationales, including Islam's fundamentally "urban essence," as well as specific cultural, legal and juridical notions ascribed to the religion.

This chapter explores the concept's genealogy and contemporary meaning. A survey of the literature suggests that understandings of the Islamic city have evolved from an initial focus on the urban form of the pre-industrial city (e.g. Sauvaget), to understandings of social processes and socio-economic conditions tied to Islam within cities (e.g. Lapidus, Brown), to its current focus on Islamic organizations (e.g. Ismail, Harb, Fawaz) and the *practice* of Islamic piety and religiosity in the urban realm of cities in the Islamic world (e.g. Bayat, Mahmood, Alsayyad).

Though understandings of Islam's posited impact on the city are fluid and the essentialism with which earlier studies of Islamic cities has been decentered by contemporary urban scholars (most notably Lapidus, Brown, Alsayyad, Abu-Lughod), the notion that Islam influences urban processes, space, governance and modes of being is resonate in contemporary urban scholarship. Islamism is posited as a pertinent organizing principle and, thus, has emerged as one of the principal lenses through which cities in the Arab world are viewed, both externally by the west (particularly after the events of 9/11/2001), and internally by Arab governments, planners, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens. Additionally, the fervent "Islamic heritage industry" (Mehrez 2009) and attempted re-signification, re-inscription and exploitation of many city's "Islamic" character has brought debates on the religion's impact on cities in the Arab world to the fore.

Today, the Islamic city extends beyond its traditional space of the *madina* (Brown 1973), and is embedded in emergent spaces of consumption, leisure, work, and residence. The following chapter explores the resurgence of the discourse on religion and religiosity in the urban literature on Arab cities, or what many have called the "Islamicization" of the Arab city (Singerman and Amar 2006, Roy 2009). It also explores the ways in which cities in the Arab world are

conceptualized as neoliberal, and the links between neoliberal technologies and spaces of informality/ illegality.

The deployment of the "Islamic" is used in a variety of ways by various actors influencing the urban realm. For example, women use Islamic dress to legitimate their presence and facilitate access to public space; opposition groups deploy Islamic identity and legal principles to question political and economic structures and legitimate rights claims; planners and governments deploy Islamic urbanism to brand cities and facilitate entrepreneurialism through the creation of theme park-type spaces where tourists may consume culture in "authentic," yet highly controlled and scripted environments. As opposed to a static artifact that may be dissected, essentialized, and known, the contemporary Islamic city is no longer an ideal type, but an instrumental reference for capital accumulation through Islamic urban spaces, as well as the site of social and political contestation expressed via emergent forms of Islamism.

How are contemporary understandings of Islamism, construed as a pertinent basis for social organization and rights claims, shaping cities in the Arab world? Have we arrived at "the fundamentalist city" (Alsayyad 2011), as recent scholarship implies? What is the discourse on each of these categories and what questions do these discourses raise regarding the study of cities in the Arab world today? How do the notions of "Islamic urbanism" and Islamic urban practices animate current debates about planning, development, governance and identity in cities in the Arab world? How has this paradigm manifested itself and framed our understanding of contemporary Arab cities?

As outlined in Chapter 1, closely related to the discourse on Islam and Islamism's influence in the urban realm are the notions of the "Arab," "Near Eastern" and "Middle Eastern" city. All of these categories embody particular cultural, identity and geo-political discourses and assumptions. This study acknowledges the sometimes interchangeable use or conflation of these categories in the urban literature. Though I use the problematic term Arab city to reflect the exclusionary nationalist narratives and rivalries witnessed in the Arab world today, I attempt to avoid endorsing a particular conceptualization of such cities; instead, my inquiry simply pertains to cities in the Arabic-speaking world, be they "Arab," "Near Eastern," "Islamic," "Middle Eastern" or simply cities in the so-called global south.

What are the conceptions of such cities in the urban literature, and, how, once seen as collections of semi-autonomous neighborhoods organized around religious norms, have they come to be viewed as complex urban metropolises struggling to locate themselves within a globalized world economy? A question that arises from the preponderance of categories used to describe cities in the Arab world is whether such cities are tied together by something unique, be it Islam, culture, or particular geo-political conditions. Though I do not assume a culturalist understanding of urban processes within these cities, the emphasis on religion and culture within analysis of the region warrants inquiry.

2.1.1   Problematizing the Arab City

We must problematize the most prominent conceptualizations of cities in the Arab world to create a multiplicity of interpretations that moves beyond the predominant tropes defining cities in the Arab world today. Conceptualizations of cities in the Arab world have evolved from the Orientalist Islamic city trope to narratives espousing notions of neoliberalism. It may be argued that the trope of neoliberalism has replaced the Islamic city trope in contemporary

scholarship of Arab cites, resulting in narratives that position urban processes in such cities in the context of neoliberal development, urban "entrepreneurism", and the global cities paradigm. Neoliberal narratives have been appropriated by many Middle East urban theorists, despite the limitations of these frameworks. Though the essentialized notion of the Islamic city, in which Islam is the prime factor animating urban processes and form, has been decentered, narratives linking Islam to urban articulations within cities remain prominent in contemporary readings of the Arab city. Such narratives are articulated in terms of various notions of "Islamic urbanism" and exemplified by the physically-deterministic discourse linking militant Islam to spaces of urban informality/ illegality. Counterpoints to these narratives attempt to conceive of an urbanism that articulates the multiple potentialities and "modalities of agency" (Mahmood 2005) of such cities and their residents, thus unsettling entrenched beliefs about facets that animate cities throughout the Arab world.

After the 2011 popular uprisings, much of the scholarship on Cairo and cities in the Arab world focused on the role of media and social networks in mobilization the masses and bringing about social change. At one point, scholars were referring to the Egyptian uprising as a "Facebook revolution" (Ghonim 2012). Organized resistance, increased contestation and attempts to reclaim the public realm, as well atomized struggles reflected in everyday life, were expressed in terms of "street politics" (Bayat 2010, 2011). Bayat defines street politics as contestations between "authorities and the deinstitutionalized or "informal" people over the active use of public space and the control of the public order" that extends its scope to include others that "find streets arenas for the extension of collective sentiments" (Bayat 2010: 212).

The uncertain, contested trajectories of identity and citizenship in the wake of the so-called "Arab spring" -- the recent wave of secular revolutions, mass uprisings, and political contestations sweeping the Arab world -- complicate narratives on Islam in Arab cities. The attempts by residents of cities in the Arab world to reclaim the public realm led scholars to theorize socio-spatial processes in such cities in terms of *the right to the city* (Lefebvre 1991, 2003), which embodied aspirational, optimistic notions of agency and inclusion. It remains to be seen how such events rearticulate notions of citizenship, governance and the politics of everyday life. As Faranak Miraftab (2009, 40) argues, "tangible citizenship does not arrive through the state's legislative institutions" but is constructed via the "insurgent practices of marginalized communities." The tentative itineraries of Cairo and Doha make possible a multitude of understandings that may decenter dominant paradigms regarding the Arab city.

2.2 Beyond the Islamic City Trope?

"Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors" (Said 1979, 23).

The "Islamic city" concept, constructed in the early twentieth century, profoundly influenced the study of cities in the Arab world, and still resonates in contemporary scholarship, despite its deconstruction. The influence of Islam on spatial and social formations in cities in the Arab world was posited as a fundamental principle that distinguished Islamic cities from their European counterparts. As Janet Abu-Lughod (1987) argues, the notion of an Islamic city is an Orientalist concept, developed by Western scholars in an attempt to understand the Islamic city in reference to medieval European cities. Andre Raymond (1994) attributes the Orientalist interest (and particularly the French Orientalist interest) in the Islamic city to Western colonialism and the inability of colonial powers to understand cities in the colonized Arab world

via the lens of Western theories on urbanism. Additionally, the ability to conquer and order the Islamic city was viewed "as a victory of civilization and progress over the anarchy that had characterized Arab urbanism" (Raymond 1994, 4).

As Abu Lughod (1987) contends, the *isnad*, or "chain" of references that authenticate and give credibility to the Islamic city concept, may be traced back to the work of William and Georges Marcais. Abu-Lughod (1987) notes that William Marcais (1928) introduced several foundational components of the Islamic city concept: that Islam is an urban religion with the congregational mosque as the center of its urbanism; that the Islamic city is organized around religious beliefs, laws and society; that physical traits quintessential for every Islamic city include a congregational mosque, market (suq) and public bath. Georges Marcais (1940) developed this conception by noting a distinct difference between ethnically organized residential areas and nonresidential areas, as well as introducing a hierarchical spatial organization of markets. All of these components became the basis upon which subsequent scholarship on Islamic cities was based, including the work of Roger LeTourneau (1949) and Carleton Coon (1951). But, as Abu Lughod argues, these foundational principles were based on the Marcais brothers' narrow empirical research of North African cities that could not be extrapolated to characterize cities throughout the Islamic world.

Nevertheless, the Islamic city concept was perpetuated by a process of self-reference in the subsequent urban literature, and the project of knowing, describing, and essentializing the Islamic city resulted in a slew of academic work that consolidated the concept by the mid-twentieth century. Among this is the so-called "Syrian School" that includes the work of Jean Sauvaget. Sauvaget's studies of Damascus and Aleppo alleged that Islamic cities evolved from earlier ancient city forms (Abu Lughod 1987, 159), a finding contradictory to the "Islamic essence" of such cities. But, despite this, Sauvaget introduced the notion of the Islamic city as a city devoid of physical logic and order, and that of a "non-administered city left to the self-interest of individuals and therefore doomed to anarchy" (Raymond 1994, 10). According to Alsayyad, Xavier de Planhol (1959) popularized this notion, claiming "the religion of Islam leads to a negation of urban order" (De Planhol 1959, quoted in Alsayyad 1992, 33).

The work of Sauvaget, Weulersse and Marcel Clerget explains the Islamic city as a "dislocated city, broken up into closed, inward-looking sectors" (Raymond 1994, 5). The Islamic city was also construed as an unproductive, parasitic entity without connection to the surrounding countryside (*ibid*). These claims are reproduced by Gustave von Grunebaum (1955). These earlier works essentialized the Islamic city in terms of its pre-industrial urban form and defined its social structure through the lens of Islamic norms and laws. From the breakdown of the orthogonal plan of the ancient city to the assertion, based on Max Weber's (1958) affirmation of what constituted a city, that cities in the Arab world did not qualify as real cities because they lacked partial autonomy from the state (Hourani 1970), the Islamic city was defined in terms of what it lacked in comparison to the European city.

A shift in the treatment of Islamic cities began in the 1950s and 1960s with a body of revisionist work, led by Ira Lapidus, among others, that scrutinized central tenants of the Islamic city concept. Writing against the notion of a "pan-Islamic urban order," Lapidus examines the government of Islamic cities and challenges the notion of "Muslim cities as unique, bounded or self contained entities" (Lapidus 1969, 73). Albert Hourani and S.M. Stern's *The Islamic City* (1970) posed a fundamental question regarding how much of the so-called Islamic city may be attributed to Islam as opposed to other elements not tied to Islam, such as political, social, and economic conditions. Focusing on Medieval cities, Hourani and Stern refute many of the earlier

assertions regarding Islamic cities, such as the Islamic city's corporate nature (a concept introduced by Massigon who posited that professional corporations, or guilds, shaped the Islamic city), and that Islamic cities are disconnected from their hinterland. Hourani (1970) posits the notion of the Islamic city as an "agro-city" that consists of an urban conglomeration and its rural hinterland (defined in terms of town and country as well as "government and society"). Stern attempts to describe the "constitution" of the Islamic city, positing that Islam was characterized by a lack of corporations because it privileged the *Umma* of individual believers over any corporate being. A chapter by Ira Lapidus examines the notion of Islamic social structure and political organization as fragmented, not espousing forms of common public life, (and not being autonomous), and concludes "people nevertheless shared a common society" (Lapidus 1970, 205).

The conception of cities in the Arab world evolved beyond the predominant static, pre-industrial Islamic city narrative with Carl Brown's (197) *From Madina to Metropolis,* which challenged the "unfortunate convention" of examining cities in the Islamic world via the Islamic city trope. By focusing on the modern "Near Eastern city," Brown unsettles the notion of the Islamic city as a stagnant, essentialized object by suggesting that such cities deal with similar issues facing cities worldwide (such as increased urbanization, migration, congestion etc.) and, thus, their character cannot be construed in terms of Islam alone. Case studies of Cairo, Beirut, Omdurman, and Kuwait detail how socio-economic, ecological and global pressures impact these cities' urban evolution. The residual category of the "Islamic," used to explain urban processes in earlier scholarship, was denied and reinterpreted via the lens of global urban processes shared by, as opposed to being unique to, cities in the Arab world. This represents a shift in the treatment of cities in the Arab world to understandings based on socio-economic and geo-political processes.

Despite these challenges to the tenants of the Islamic city narrative, scholars, such as R.B. Serjeant, continued to reinforce the trope. For example, a case study of Fez by Titus Burckhardt in Serjeant's (1980, 166) *The Islamic City* delineates attributes that "clearly distinguish a Muslim town from a Christian one," and concludes by reinforcing Orientalist notions such as the separation of public and private domains and location of commercial activities within Islamic cities. Abdulaziz Saqqaf's (1987) *The Middle East City* builds on Serjeant's assertion of the uniqueness of Islamic cities and examines the notion of an Islamic city "as a contemporary entity that provides a harmonious environment for its inhabitants" (Saqqaf 1987, 4). Saqqaf's edited volume demonstrates how, as the predominant trope for understanding cities in the Arab world, the Islamic city narrative was appropriated by Arab urban scholars.

Perhaps the most egregious example of this appropriation is Besim Hakim's (1986) *Arabic-Islamic Cities*. Using Tunis as a case study, Hakim claims that cities "in the western regions of the Islamic world were the 'purest' in terms of their general Islamic framework" (Hakim 1986, 13). Based on this assumption, Hakim analyzes Tunis' urban form in relation to *Shari'a* (Islamic law) and *Hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) concerning the built environment. He concludes by reaffirming the Orientalist position regarding Islamic cities, stating "the earlier reliance on Islam as a basis for analysis was essentially sound" (Hakim 1986, 137). A similar argument is made in Al-Hathloul's (1981) *The Arab Muslim City: Tradition, Continuity and Change*.

Alsayyad (1988) suggests that Hakim's and Al-Hathloul's insistence upon the uniqueness of Islamic cities may be attributed to nationalistic tendencies that characterized the work of many Arab scholars, whom he calls the *nationalist*, who inadvertently revive Orientalist tropes in their

attempt to highlight the desirable aspects of cities in the Arab world. Alsayyad also attributes the renewed interest in the Islamic city in the 1970s to the rise of "fundamentalist regimes" (Alsayyad 1988, 63) throughout the Islamic world and the need to define what is Islamic about the city in order to reproduce its virtues in state-sponsored planning efforts. But, even Janet Abu Lughod, an ardent critic of the Islamic cities trope, claims to have fallen "into the trap set by the Orientalists by accepting many of the earlier authorities about the nature of the Islamic city" (Abu Lughod 1987, 160) in her book *Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious* (1971).

By the late 1980s, the deconstruction of the Islamic city trope, led by Janet Abu Lughod and Nezar Alsayyad, was well established. Alsayyad's *Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism* (1991) focused not only on critiquing, but subverting the Islamic city concept by suggesting that individual caliphs' political visions had more influence on the genesis of Islamic cities, such as Damascus and Cairo, than did Islam. Alsayyad's *Forms of Dominance* (1992) further unsettles the Islamic city trope by asking why cities in the Arab world are described in the context of "Islamic urbanism and not colonial urbanism" (Alsayyad 1992, 27). Alsayyad puts forth a new paradigm, attempting to understand the "Islamic city as a colonial enterprise."

With the increased visibility of Islamism after 9-11-2001, the turn of the millennium witnessed an increase in scholarship that attempts to understand the relationship between Islamic religiosity, the *practice* of Islamic piety, and urban social and spatial processes. This body of work includes Mona Fawaz's (2009) analysis of Hezbollah's role in urban planning, and specifically the post-2006 war reconstruction of Beirut's southern suburbs. Fawaz argues that Hezbollah's planning efforts aided in consolidating the group's position within the suburbs, as well as connecting "them with a supra-national Islamic political project" (Fawaz 2009, 331). Mona Harb (2011) takes this further by examining the link between Islamic *religiosity* and spatiality in Beirut. Harb analyzes Hezbollah's spatial strategies in Beirut's southern suburbs and how the group appropriates, controls, and orders public space via processes of symbolization that mark territory and render it with specific meanings. Harb argues that Hezbollah's strategies, including clientelistic social service networks, religious symbolism and territorial markings, embody the "Islamic milieu" and are a primary reason for the group's success. For Hezbollah, whose "religiosity varies according to geopolitics" (Harb 2011, 127), the urban realm is an instrument of social control.

In addition to inquiries into Hezbollah's manipulation of the urban realm, Harb and Laura Deeb (2007) explore the rise of Islamic spaces of "fun" and leisure. They suggest that such spaces allow the negotiation of "values and norms" within the "Islamic milieu." From the increase in restaurants and parks catering to pious Muslim youth, to women-only beaches, they posit that the "Islamic recreation industry" is transforming cities such as Beirut by creating markedly urban, sanctioned spaces that mitigate the risk of moral transgression. Harb and Deeb's work is in dialogue with Asef Bayat's (2007) exploration of "fun" and the Islamic milieu in Tehran. Bayat contends that "fun" is a potentially subversive element, and thus, is regulated in sanctioned public spaces in an effort to mitigate its spontaneity. Bayat (2007) also inquires into the politics of "Islamizing" other aspects of urban space in Tehran and Cairo, arguing that the "Islamist order" of undemocratic and socially conservative Islamist movements has reinforced the notion of Islamic exceptionalism which is "expressed most visibly and immediately in urban public space" (Bayat 2007, 50) by explicit, as well as implicit, interventions. From the proliferation of cultural centers celebrating Muslim achievements, to

symbolic markings and the construction of mosques, the city is ordered into sanctioned versus unsanctioned spaces of piety.

Perhaps the transformation in the discourse regarding Islam and the city is best summed up by Alsayyad's conceptualization of the *fundamentalist city*. Alsayyad posits that the city is being transformed into a space in which "religious fundamentalisms…claim it as a new domain beyond the idea of the nation" (Alsayyad 2011, 24). Such fundamentalisms include "Islamic" fundamentalism, as practiced in various forms throughout cities in the Arab world. Alsayyad contends that such cities are being transformed "into fragmented landscapes made up of spaces of exception" (Alsayyad 2011, 24). Bayat's idea of *post-Islamism,* on the other hand, offers a more optimistic conceptualization of the role of Islam in the city, as he suggests it is an emergent contemporary "endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty" (Bayat 2007, 11) based on recent trends in Iran and that country's experience with Islamism.

Yet, a different conceptualization of Islam's impact in the urban sphere is offered by Saba Mahmood (2005), who positions the women's mosque movement in Egypt, which is part of the larger Islamic Revival, as a leading impetus in the "Islamization" of Egyptian society. Mahmood's inquiry begins in the most sanctioned space of Islamic piety in which religious *da'wa* (or to urge people to become more pious or proselytize) and its emphasis on "exteriority" (or the practice of religious rituals such as prayer and veiling) as a means for moral formation manifests specific socio-cultural practices that not only impact the pious self, but society as a whole. Mahmood unsettles conventional understandings of the role of women in Islamist movements by suggesting that these *practices* of piety express different "modalities of agency" that subvert Western-liberal conceptions of freedom and agency.

But, the notion of "Islamic" practices and space extends beyond spaces of Islamic piety and religiosity into the realm of global capital. Thus, a different kind of ordering, marking, and "Islamicizing" the city is put forth in Alsayyad, Bierman and Rabbat's (2005) *Making Cairo Medieval* in which the authors detail the numerous efforts to redefine Cairo in terms of its medieval or Islamic past to promote specific understandings of the city's history, international tourism and consumption in sanitized urban space. In this case, the "Islamic" is a "theme" deployed in the branding of cities such as Cairo. Today, projects such as Al Azhar Park, the recently opened "public" park on the site of a former garbage dump near Cairo's Islamic core, adjacent to the popular area of *Al Darb Al Ahmar*, invoke Islamic design principles in an attempt to re-signify and re-inscribe the unquestionable nature of Cairo's "Islamic tradition." Al Azhar Park exemplifies what Diane Singerman (2006), Mona Abaza (2006) and Ananya Roy (2009) have called "Islamicized public spaces." In the case of Cairo, the re-signification of Cairo's Islamic tradition extends beyond spaces of tourism and leisure into spaces of education, as in the case of the newly built American University in Cairo campus in New Cairo, as well as spaces of consumption, as in the case of shopping malls and developments that invoke idealized Islamic "streets" and "bazaars" that attract an increasingly "Islamized" middle class (Abaza 2006).

Recent work on Islam and the city has created a multiplicity of understandings regarding the role of Islam in transforming, influencing and defining the urban realm. This work has decentered the deterministic treatment of cities in the Arab world as one-dimensional entities in which social relations, space, and urban governance are structured in accordance with an inescapable "Islamic essence." Though the discourse has shifted, the notion of the "Islamicization" of the Arab city is ubiquitous in the urban literature. Implicit in debates regarding Islam and cities is that of modernity and the Arab city.

2.2.1   Modernity and the Arab City

> *"the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West"* (Edward Said 1979, 5).

By positioning so-called Islamic cities in opposition to the European city, the Islamic city trope perpetuates the notion that cities in the Arab world, by virtue of their relationship to Islam, espouse some sort of "traditionalism." Alsayyad (1992) argues that this dualistic positioning of the traditional against modernity, as well as notions of "progress," imposes an insider/outsider dichotomy that serves to naturalize and stabilize the "traditional." What are the subtle mechanisms by which this is done? How are notions of "modernity" and "traditionalism" constructed and articulated with respect to cities in the Arab world?

A large body of work engages this fundamental issue and attempts to deconstruct how knowledge is created and reproduced in relation to conceptions of the Arab city and modernity. A significant amount of this scholarship deals with two pertinent themes: interventions into the social and physical urban realm that attempt to demarcate the modern versus traditional city; and the colonial project of *knowing, transforming* and *enframing* (Mitchell 1988) the Arab city and society.

This body of work follows and builds upon Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1979) in which Said contends that "Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West" (Said 1979, 21). Said uncovers the subtle mechanics of how such "knowledge" of the Orient is constructed, valorized and perpetuated, while serving to devalue local forms of knowledge in the process. Central to this project is the notion that "Orientals" did not know how to govern themselves and needed the knowledge, expertise and ethics of superior colonial minds to be rescued from their own undeniable backwardness, obscurity and alienation.

Orientalism also emphasizes the exceptionality of Islam, and thus, the "Islamic city" becomes the laboratory for testing "modern" interventions aimed at reshaping society. By transforming the "Oriental" city into a modern city that reflects European design principles and tastes, societies in the Arab world may be transformed, and the Oriental subject remade in the image of the modern, rational European.

Paul Rabinow's *French Modern* (1989) demonstrates how the emergence of this "modern rationality" -- a rationality that transformed French thought, modes of being, and society -- impacted the colonized Arab city. As French colonized North Africa was the laboratory for such a rationality, interventions in the colonized Arab city, carried out under the auspices of colonial rule, transformed cities such as Rabat, Casablanca and Algiers, both socially and physically. Rabinow proposes two stages of transformation: "techno-cosmopolitanism" and "middling modernism", and argues "It was in Morocco, under Lyautey's leadership, that France's first comprehensive experiments in urban planning took place" (Rabinow 1989, 277). He investigates the role of Lyautey, and other powerful colonial figures, in attempting to create a "controlled diversity" in the colonized Arab city via mechanisms of city planning, and highlights the paradoxical repression and social control espoused in the supposedly progressive French planning efforts.

Timothy Mitchell argues that the French colonial city's "layout and buildings were to represent…'the genius for order, proportion and clear reasoning' of the French nation" (Mitchell 1988, 161). In *Colonising Egypt* (1988), Mitchell uses the analysis of the Egypt exhibit in the Paris Exhibition of 1889 and the objectification of the "Oriental" *person* and *city* as entrée into the making of the modern Egyptian state and Egyptian subject formation, under capitalist transformation. Mitchell's work builds upon Said's argument that "Orientalism" emerged out of a self-referential "re-presentation" in which "what is represented is not a real place but "a set of references…from someone else's work on the Orient'" (Mitchell 1988, 31). In an argument reminiscent of Walter Benjamin, Mitchell posits that through its search for "reality" and authenticity, nineteenth century Europe created a "world as exhibition," in which representation of reality and "phantasmagoria" replaced the actual thing.

Mitchell argues that in the case of the colonial subject, this logic explains difference in terms of the inferiority of the colonial mind, devalues local forms of knowledge, and relegates the colonial subject to a childlike status of subordination. It is also instrumental to the capitalist transformation of society that commoditizes social relations and disciplines labor to serve capitalist accumulation. Mitchell considers the consequence of disciplinary power on the colonial subject and argues "as power relations become internal… they now appear to take the form of external structures" (Mitchell 1988, xii). He argues that "scientific" methods of population management and discipline were used to "enframe" the colonial subject and conquer their bodies, as well as minds. In Egypt, this enframing included the restructuring of the army, reorganization of village life and promotion of model villages, institution of schools, and the urban renewal of Cairo. All employed the panoptic principle and served to subjugate the population to surveillance, penetrate local social networks, rendering none out of reach of the authorities (particularly the social realm of women), as well as replace the use of direct coercion with self-discipline and the imperative of the market.

Gwendolyn Wright (1987, 1991) explores further the colonial restructuring of the North African Arab city and argues that understandings of the "traditional" are often as much creations of colonial urban policies as are "indigenous" practices. The "traditional" city in the Arab world is construed as the *medina* of the Islamic city. Wright argues that the colonial treatment of the *medina*, which represented the domain of the underdeveloped indigenous subject, circumscribed its modernity and reflected colonial biases. Wright identifies the French colonial policy of "assimilation", which was based on the dominance of French language and laws in addition to the "destruction of indigenous cities and towns and embodied in a continuing, visible military presence" (Wright 1987, 289), as an example of such. In contrast, the subsequent policy of "association", applied during later periods of French colonization, aimed at appeasing the locals, and thus, being more effective than brute military strength by preserving the local culture and architecture. Association bifurcated the city, physically, socially and economically, into the modern and traditional by a "sanitary corridor" that set off "two scales of construction, periods of history and often two races" (*ibid*, 301). Lyautey's "dual city" objectified the "traditional," "authentic" or "indigenous" *medina*, attempting to freeze it for the exploitation and consumption of French tourists, while allowing for "progress" in the modern European section of the city. Assimilation also allowed for modern forms of control and rationalized mixing of the indigenous and modern. As Wright argues, "Traditionalism and modernism thus formed a unified urban policy" (*ibid*, 315).

Michele Lamprakos (1992) takes up a similar line of inquiry in his exploration of how Le Corbusier's Plan Obus envisioned a sanitized, segregated Algiers. Lamprakos details various

colonial tools, such as the segregation of "traditional" Arab quarters from the sanitized, modern European city. These colonial practices translate into larger traditions of knowledge and representation, as well as articulate particular notions of national and subject identity. They also demonstrate a dialectical process of creation, definition and perpetuation between the different constituent parts and manifestations of the "modern" Arab city.

Such cities represent what Marshall Berman (1982) calls the "modernism of underdevelopment". Berman conceptualizes such a modernism as a borrowed, warped modernity -- mainly found in the non-European city -- that is limited, mimics and is envious of a more expansive, dialectical notion of modernism, embodied in cities such as Paris. Berman argues that this expansive notion, or what he calls "the broad and open way," extends beyond the purely physical realm to encompass the social and political domain. The so-called modernism of underdevelopment, articulated in Haussmann-style boulevards and grand public spaces, defined the transformation of cities like Cairo.

Berman's conception of the modernism of underdevelopment moves beyond the dichotomy of modern versus traditional, implicit in the Islamic city trope, by suggesting that cities may espouse modernism, yet remain "underdeveloped." The notion of development, as defined in relation to underdevelopment, articulates an understanding of cities that valorizes specific economic, social and political attributes presumably manifest in the capitalist cities of the West. By the mid-1990s, conceptions of cities in the Arab world gradually shifted from notions of Islamic urbanism and modernism to understandings of the Arab city in terms of neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism. Today, these concepts, which embody many of Berman's notions regarding (under)development, have supplanted the Islamic city narrative as the predominate trope by which cities in the Arab world are understood. It is to the idea of neoliberal urbanism in cities of the Arab world that I now turn.

2.3 Neoliberal Urbanism

How has it come to be that "Neoliberalism has become naturalized as the "only" choice available to cities in the United States and elsewhere" (Hackworth 2007, 11)? Though a comprehensive analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, in order to understand the widespread appropriation of the meta-narrative of neoliberalism in the literature on Arab cities, it is essential to interrogate the premise upon which neoliberalism is based. Following Hackworth's (2007, 11) assertion that the "geography of neoliberalism is much more complicated than the idea of neoliberalism," the following section attempts to address the concept's appropriation and its presupposed urban manifestations in the Arab city. In the first part of the section, I discuss the notion of development and how it is predominantly articulated in terms of neoliberalism in the Arab world. The subsequent parts discus the notion of a neoliberal Arab city, and how this growing body of scholarship draws upon conceptions of neoliberal and global cities beyond the Arab world.

2.3.1   Discourses on Development and the Arab City

Development discourse wishes to present itself as a detached center of rationality and intelligence… The West possesses the expertise…that the non-West is lacking
(Mitchell 2002, 241).

There have been numerous attempts to "develop" the Arab city and society, from the colonial projects briefly described above, to the modernization efforts carried out by newly formed nation states. It is not my aim to engage in a comprehensive historiography of these projects or the notion of "development," but simply to problematize contemporary understandings of development in the Arab city, and emphasize that such notions are predominately articulated in terms of neoliberal conceptions.

It is difficult to draw a line between colonial and contemporary notions of (under)development in the Arab city, as many of the rationales used to justify colonial interventions are reproduced in contemporary policies and views towards to the Arab city. As Edward Said (1979) contends, "development" of the underdeveloped Oriental subject was a justification of Western imperialism, and particularly the remaking of Egypt under British colonial rule. In fact, as Said points out, Egypt's "development" was viewed as a "vindication of Western imperialism" because the country had risen "from the lowest pitch of social and economic degradation" to a unique position of "prosperity, financial and moral" that could be measured, in part, by the number of British exports to Egypt (Said 1979, 35). As Gayatri Spivak (1999) argues, the roots of contemporary notions of development lie in these tropes of the colonial project. Spivak positions the contemporary project of development and globalization (or financialization) as the "the new imperialism" and implicates *postcolonial reason* for its complacency in such a project. The role of "foreclosure" of what Spivak calls "the native informant" is crucial, as postcolonial reason repeats the process of foreclosure through "sanctioned ignorance" that turns a blind eye to the contradictions inherent in the ethnocentric foundational ideas that it incorporates. Spivak aims to dislodge this position by exposing the origins of foreclosure and the subtleness by which it operates.

In dialogue with Spivak, Timothy Mitchell's *Rule of Experts* (2002) challenges the underlying notions upon which modern social science is built by demonstrating the centrality of colonialism in contemporary ways of knowing. Hence, Mitchell positions the rise of "techno-politics" as a vehicle by which problems of development are naturalized and depoliticized, thus rendering invisible "questions of social inequality and powerlessness" (Mitchell 2002, 221). Mitchell argues that "development," particularly neoliberal development, represents itself "as the external intelligence that stands outside the objects it describes" (*ibid*). Based on his analysis of Egyptian development, he challenges the policies and views articulated by development institutions towards these "empirical objects" and demonstrates how they perpetuate a convention of representation that fails to recognize local specificity and places anything not easily ascribed to the logic of capital outside the realm of "the market." Mitchell posits that neoliberal reforms, such as privatization and monetary stabilization, are instrumental to the workings of such a project, as not only do they extend capitalism into the purview of most social relations, but also propagate the notion of "the market" and "the economy" as a universal system espousing its own "interior logic." Mitchell destabilizes this self-evident interior logic by showing how contemporary fields of knowledge, such as economics, a discipline that constructs contemporary notions of development and underdevelopment, bring forward notions implicit in colonialism.

Julia Elyachar (2005) takes up this issue in her ethnographic research with young craftsmen employed in the informal market in *Madinet El-Hirafiyeen* (Craftsmen's Town) on the outskirts of Cairo. Elyachar argues that neoliberal conceptions of development dominate the discourse in Egypt. She highlights disconnections between theories of neoliberalism and their practical implementation in the work of NGOs promoting economic development and technical

assistance. Specifically, Elyachar challenges the neoliberal notion of "the market" and microenterprise as a development mechanism. Her analysis of microenterprise development projects in Egypt highlights the issues facing young craftsmen who lack skill and have locally specific notions of "the market" that do not correspond to the universalistic understandings of market mechanisms inherent in neoliberal conceptions of development. Elyachar implies that this disjuncture facilitates dispossession.

Arguing that such dispossession is implicit in the imperial project of development, David Harvey (2003) proposes the concept of "accumulation by dispossession," and positions international aid, and the development institutions through which aid is managed, as a new form of social relation that facilitates such accumulation. According to Harvey, "what accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets (including labor power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost" (Harvey 2003, 149) that over accumulated capital can seize and make profitable, but "the same goal can be achieved, however, by the devaluation of existing capital assets and labour power" (Harvey 2003, 150). Additionally, it transfers the negative externalities associated with this transaction to the dispossessed, as opposed to capital, through legal and extralegal means, enforced by the state and institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Harvey argues that increased monetization and credit markets are instrumental to this aim, as they create social relations that imbed capitalism into new spaces.

Anna Tsing furthers this notion with her conceptualization of "spectacular accumulation", or accumulation that is premised on speculation around a "product that may or may not exist" (Tsing 2005, 75). Tsing argues that the prospect of "development" often makes possible spectacular accumulation by promoting the notion of market imperative (Brenner 2004), or the self-regulating market as the mediator of social relations, premised on purely "economic" forces. Thus, "the market" increasingly acts as a moral arbitrator of social property relations, in which the means of subsistence and reproduction are bought and sold, rendering obsolete traditional structures of knowledge and value.

The types of accumulation and social relations articulated in Harvey's and Tsing's conceptualizations are inherent in the conditionality embodied in "development capital" (Roy 2010), from the multimillion-dollar infrastructure loans that impact the physical form and lived experience of cities worldwide, to the micro-loans targeting the "entrepreneurial" poor. Ananya Roy's (2010) critique of the project of development, and specifically the ethos inherent in development discourse and the best practices by which it operates, further problematizes contemporary, normative notions of development. In the Arab city, Roy posits that Islamic organizations, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, fill the void left by the state by directly engaging in development through "charitable" service delivery. As Roy argues, though Hezbollah positions itself in opposition to U.S. imperialism and Zionism, "it is not possible to interpret Hezbollah as an Islamic alternative to neoliberalism" (Roy 2010, 177) as the organization's microfinance apparatus, Al-Qard al-Hassan, espouses an ethos that "valorizes an ethics of the self" based on neoliberal principles.

Other scholars (Bayat 2007, Harb 2011, Ismail 2006, Mahmood 2005) have also suggested the increased role in development of Islamist groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in response to the retreat of welfare states throughout the Middle East. As argued by Diane Singerman (2006, 2009), the discourse of Islamist threats and neoliberal development permeates government rationales for urban interventions aimed at delegitimizing and curbing the influence of Islamist groups in Arab cities. Much of this rationale deploys "expert," normative planning knowledge.

As Roy argues, "development capital is an agent of planning" (Roy 2011, 12). In the Arab city, as elsewhere, normative, rational planning is the instrument upon which proponents of development rely to neutralize its aims. As Mitchell argues, *"Development is a discourse of rational planning"* (Mitchell 2002, 233). Mitchell's claim reflects what Leonie Sandercock (2003) calls the "heroic model" of modernist planning, one which is based on "rationality; comprehensiveness; scientific method; faith in state-directed futures; faith in planners' ability to know what is good for people generally, 'the public interest'; and political neutrality." Sandercock argues that "planning's enlightenment epistemology" does not allow for a multiplicity of knowledge, as it is based on a rational, objective, value-free conception of knowledge creation that reinforces and valorizes particular meanings, understandings and cultures. Thus, it is instrumental in naturalizing these meanings. Sandercock calls for an "epistemology of multiplicity" that acknowledges and appreciates other ways of knowing.

Iris Marion Young (1990) suggests that the accumulation of knowledge, resulting in the formation of "experts," serves to legitimate implicit forms of societal domination. Rational "expert" knowledge is instrumental in reinforcing the structures that perpetuate inherent forms of domination and oppression espoused by such knowledge and the institutions or structures by which it is valorized. Thus, "expert" knowledge serves to depoliticize inherent forms of domination and oppression by framing such knowledge and the structures that reproduce it as scientific, or in terms of the public interest, or as espousing political neutrality. Thus, it may be argued that the "expert" knowledge behind development initiatives throughout the Middle East is instrumental in reinforcing and naturalizing particular neoliberal conceptions of urban development.

Though this epistemology is challenged by feminist, postmodern and postcolonial critiques that unsettle its underlying assumptions (Young 1990), as Agnes Deboulet (2009) argues, normative, neoliberal planning principles dominate contemporary planning practice in Egypt. As described in subsequent sections of this statement, normative, neoliberal development discourse is echoed in the urbanism of cities throughout the Arab world.

2.3.2   Neoliberal Arab Cities?

The only moral principle which has ever made the growth of an advanced civilization possible was the principle of individual freedom…No principles of collective conduct which binds the individual can exist in a society of free men. (Hayak 1979, 152-3, quoted in Rose 1999, 63-4)

freedom… has come to define the problem space within which contemporary rationalities of government compete (Rose 1999, 94).

Cities are the sites of both the most acute articulation of neoliberalism and of its most acute opposition (Hackworth 2007, xii).

As noted above, neoliberal development is the normative mode of development in cities in the Arab world. This follows a trend in the appropriation of neoliberal ideologies and modes of urban governance over the past half century throughout the world. How has neoliberalism "become naturalized as the "only" choice available to cities in the United States and elsewhere" (Hackworth 2007, 11)? The answer is linked to the "problem space" occupied by freedom, identified by Rose above, which follows a linage of liberal theorists (e.g. Lock, Hume, Mill) who

privilege the autonomy of individuals and other "private" entities conducting themselves "in ways conducive to particular conceptions of collective and individual well-being" (Rose 1999, 49). According to Graham Burchell (1996, 23), conceptions of governing in early liberalism involved "pegging the principle for rationalizing governmental activity to *the rationality of the free conduct of governed individuals themselves*. That is to say, the rational conduct of government must be intrinsically linked to the natural, private-interest-motivated conduct of free, market *exchanging* individuals."

Contemporary incarnations of liberalism shifted this emphasis on the "*rationality*" of individual actors toward a privileging of the creation of opportunities for "free" trade and entrepreneurism. As Burchell (1996, 23-4) contends, "By contrast, for neo-liberalism, the rational principle for regulating and limiting governmental activity must be determined by reference to *artificially* arranged or contrived forms of the free, *entrepreneurial* and *competitive* conduct of economic-rational individuals."

According to Andrew Barry (1996, 10), the emergence of neoliberal political reason espouses a rationality that emphasizes the "responsibility of political government to actively create the conditions within which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct is possible." Thus, "Neo-liberalism, in these terms, involves less a retreat from governmental "interventions" than a re-inscription of the techniques and forms of expertise required for the exercise of government" (ibid, 14). This is in contrast to common understandings of neoliberalism that espouse a belief in "non-interventionist" government. The global restructuring of production after the Second World War and the fiscal crisis of the 1970s are generally cited as turning points in the move toward neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). Thus, David Harvey contends that neoliberalism took hold in the 1970s and supplanted the "embedded liberalism" of the 1950s and 60s in which entrepreneurial activities were constrained via social and political regulatory mechanisms. Neoliberalism entails the de-embedding of "capital from these constraints" (Harvey 2005, 11).

If freedom defines this problem space on a philosophical/ ideological level, the city represents the manifestation of this problematic on a spatial level. As Rose contends, the manifestations linking the "arts of government" to the "practice of freedom" are clearly visible in the contested terrain of the city. The city signifies the space by which "dangerous and unhygienic aggregations of persons" may be transformed into healthy "liberal" cities, representing "well-ordered topographies for maintaining morality and public health" (Rose 1999:73). As such, "spaces of well-regulated liberty," such as museums, exhibitions and department stores, replace spaces deemed "outside the gaze of civilization" (*ibid*).

The entanglement of urban space with conceptions of freedom, as articulated via various rationalities of governing, is expressed in contemporary discourses on neoliberal cities. Hackworth (2007) considers the city the primary articulation of neoliberalism, as well as its main site of contestation. Taking neoliberalism as a political-economic project as its point of departure, a significant body of scholarship construes the "neoliberal city" as an "entrepreneurial city" (Leitner et al 2007) in which pro-market ideology trumps social welfare and austerity measures abound. Yet, much of the scholarship on neoliberal cities does not directly tackle the question of what actually constitutes a neoliberal or entrepreneurial city. Greenberg's *Branding New York* (2008) and Hackworth's *The Neoliberal City* (2007) illustrate that the definition of a neoliberal city (and neoliberalism) is highly contested and elusive. Both posit that the neoliberal city facilitates a *realignment* of urban priorities which value private sector interests, and that the neoliberal city's priorities are expressed via mechanisms by which corporations are subsidized by city residents. But, neither offers a theoretical formulation of the neoliberal city.

In the Arab world, numerous studies position urban processes in cities such as Dubai, Beirut and Cairo in relation to state-sponsored neoliberal development policies that, in conjunction with the retreat of the welfare state, privilege the ascendancy of capital over the needs, rights, and claims of the urban poor (Singerman 2009, Denis 2008, 2006, Kuppinger 2004, Mitchell 1999, Elsheshtawy 2004, Bagaeen 2007). It is widely believed that Arab governments' attempts to promote development by promoting their countries as sites of transnational investment, have led to the implementation of globalized, free-market oriented policies to attract foreign direct investment in many cities in the Arab world. Many have speculated that the implementation of austerity measures directly impacts urban articulations in Arab cities by providing incentives for investment in exclusive enclaves and suburban, gated communities throughout the Middle East (Denis 2008 and 2006, Kuppinger 2004, Mitchell 1999).

The spatial restructuring of cites in the Arab world in response to neoliberalism is posited to take on various articulations, including exclusionary urban forms, spaces of exception, as well as so-called slums, or spaces of informality/ illegality. Increasingly, these urban articulations are differentiated from "traditional" physical forms in Arab cities. For example, Sameer Bagaeen (2010) contends that exclusionary urban forms have existed in "traditional" cities in the Middle East for centuries and are, thus, nothing new, yet he argues that they have taken on new forms of gating and enclosure. But, though gated communities and exclusionary urban forms are posited as expressions of neoliberalism, the physical sites and conditions that manifest neoliberal rationalities of governing in cities in the Arab world is an area less explored by urban theorists.

Thus, despite the appropriation of the meta-narrative of neoliberalism in contemporary understandings of Arab cities, such understandings do not address specific articulations of neoliberalism within the Arab world, or its subsequent expression in the "neoliberal Arab city." In much of the literature on neoliberal cities in the Arab world, neoliberalism is conceptualized as an external "model" imposed by Arab governments on their populations and cites. Yet, the rationality of neoliberal *ethos* and *techne* (Barry 1996, 10), and the spatial expression of such in the Arab city are not interrogated.

The Cairo School of Urban Studies' two publications, *Cairo Cosmopolitan* (2006) and *Cairo Contested* (2009), situate the analysis of Cairo within a framework of cosmopolitanism and "neoliberal globalization" that implicitly assumes a causal relationship between neoliberalism and spatial formations in the city. According to its leading interlocutor, Diane Singerman, the School espouses a degree of "methodological ambivalence" (Singerman 2009, 29) that seeks to avoid reductionist understandings and meta-narratives, such as Cairo as a "bomb" about to explode or Cairo-as-chaos. This methodological approach seeks to produce empirically detailed analysis of the city. Singerman (2006, 2009) positions "Neoliberalism from the Sky" (or neoliberal globalization) and "the neo-liberal model" as the logics behind urban transformations such as the privatization of public space, creation of consumption-oriented spaces and enclaves, criminalization of the urban poor, prevalence of informal/illegal areas and so on.

The Cairo School's conception of neoliberalism (as well as the majority of scholarship that engages neoliberalism in cities in the Arab world) is based on an understanding of neoliberalism as a political-economic project aimed at reconfiguring society and space to serve the aims of global capital. This conceptualization of neoliberalism is in dialogue with, and adopts the central framework of theorists such as David Harvey (2005), Jamie Peck (2010) and Brenner et al (2010). Though the vast literature on neoliberalism offers no consensus on the meaning of

the concept, conceptualizations of neoliberalism fall into three general frameworks. The first, based primarily on the work of the aforementioned theorists, conceives of neoliberalism as a political-economic project; the second, following Foucault, interrogates the *ethos* and *techne* (Barry 1996, 10) of neoliberal rationalities of governing; closely related to this, the third theorizes neoliberalism in terms of the formation of the neoliberal subject.

The Cairo School's use of neoliberalism is in dialogue with the theorists who interpret neoliberalism as a "political-economic philosophy" that promotes "the extension of market (and market-like) forms of governance, rule, and control" into all social spheres (Peck and Tickell 2007, 28). Yet, it diverges from such understandings in a number of significant ways. The Cairo School conceives of neoliberalism as an external model applied "from above," as opposed to a nuanced, path dependent articulation that differs from place to place. This is in distinct contrast to the general consensus amongst scholars that neoliberalism may not be solely construed as an external force imposed on a society, as its articulation in a particular locality is path dependent and tentative.

This point is most strongly articulated in David Harvey's (2005) exploration of the various path dependent articulations of neoliberalism in several countries. Arguing that neoliberalism's "uneven geographical development" attests to its "tentativeness," Harvey does not construe neoliberalism as a static external formation, but one that differs from state to state and takes on various social formations. According to Harvey, neoliberalism may be construed as either "a theory of political economic practice" or a "political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites" (Harvey 2005, 19). Harvey argues that neoliberalism espouses universalistic utopian ideals expressed in the notion that society is best served by "individual entrepreneurial freedoms" liberated in the context of an "institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade" (Harvey 2005, 2).

In line with this rationale, Brenner et al conceptualize neoliberalization as "*an historically specific, unevenly developed, hybrid, patterned tendency of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring*" (Brenner et al 2010, 330, emphasis in original). Brenner et al highlight the three distinguishing dimensions in their formulation of the concept: "(i) regulatory experimentation; (ii) inter-jurisdictional policy transfer; and (iii) the formation of transnational rule-regimes" (Brenner et al 2010, 329). Thus:

"neoliberalization processes assume place-specific forms within cities and city-regions, but this increasingly occurs within a geo-regulatory context defined by systemic tendencies towards market-disciplinary institutional reform, the formation of transnational webs of market-oriented policy transfer, deepening patterns of crisis formation and accelerating cycles of crisis-driven policy experimentation" (*ibid*).

This conceptualization challenges the "world is flat" view propagated by Thomas Friedman (2005), as well as Fukuyama's (1992, 2006) "end of history" argument. Yet, following Fukuyama's (1992, 2006) argument that asserts the apotheosis of liberal democracy as the undeniable paradigm for human development, neoliberalism has also been theorized in terms of Denzau-North's Shared Mental Models framework (1994) as a "mental model" of market-oriented policies. As such, in the Arab world, neoliberalism is posited as an opposing "mental model" to Islamism (Snider 2007). This understanding of neoliberalism positions the extension of neoliberalism "through the extension of capitalism" not only opposed to, but in *conflict with*

"Islamic ideals" (Roy et al 2007:12). "This conflict can be thought of as a clash of mental models. One based on neoliberal values and capitalist economies, the other based on Islamic ideals and clientalist economies" (Roy et al 2007:12).[4] This echoes Samuel Huntington's (1993, 1996) clash of civilizations argument by which "the West" is placed in opposition to "the rest," and specifically the "Islamic world." The placement of neoliberalism in opposition to "Islamic ideals" and conflation of such ideals with clientalism is contrary to the experience of Islamist groups in Turkey, Egypt and elsewhere, as evidenced by their general receptiveness to neoliberal ethics and policies.

Another attempt to locate the physical expressions of neoliberalism in the Arab city is Petra Kuppinger's (2004) studies of high-end hotels and gated communities. Kuppinger terms high-end hotel developments sites of "in situ globalization" and argues that such projects are local manifestations of extraterritorial, globalized projects that situate Cairo in a global context, yet are "reterritorialized" in a local context. Kuppinger situates the plethora of gated communities and restructuring of buildings, streets, neighborhoods and public space as spatial expressions of neoliberalism. Kuppinger's work is in dialogue with Samer Bagaeen's (2007) studies of city branding and commoditization in Dubai. Bagaeen details Dubai's efforts to position itself as the major hub of commerce within the Arab world, in large part via branding. He explores the city's branding strategies, epitomized by the Burj Al-Arab hotel and an insatiable appetite for high-end consumerism, and argues that Dubai, unlike older established cities in the West, is an "instant" city made up of "cities" within the city. His analysis of the creation and deployment of a unique "Dubai" brand is in dialogue with Greenberg's (2008) analysis of New York City's attempt to rebrand itself in response to a series of crisis in the 1970s.

In this study, Greenberg (2008) argues that New York City shifted its economic development efforts to an emphasis on *urban branding* in order to project a pro-business, tourist-friendly image, as opposed to addressing the city's underlying structural problems. Greenberg contends that through branding efforts, New York managed to transform its image as a liberal, working class town, in which unions have power and welfare policies take precedent, into the capital of neoliberalism. Greenberg makes a distinction between the city as physical commodity (or the space of the city), and the city "brand" as commodity (or image of the city), yet she does not fully theorize this, instead suggesting her research may be the basis of a theory of urban branding. Nonetheless, Greenberg argues that this is a vital difference between the old brick and mortar economy, and new economy that relies on a very different set of indicators and ascription of value. Branding embodies the priorities of this new economy. It seeks to inculcate a different set of values and depends on intangible, quality of life indicators (or what she refers to as "selling snake oil"). Greenberg contends that branding does not necessarily result in a decrease in government spending; it represents a *realignment* of priorities that value private sector interests.

Branding as a strategy of the neoliberal (and entrepreneurial) city is addressed by Mike Davis' (2006) study of Dubai. Davis contends "Dubai has become the new global icon of imagineered urbanism" (Davis 2006, 50), and details the "gigantism" and other branding

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[4] The full quote reads: "although the preservation of Islam and the war against non-believers (jihad) are commonly cited reasons for launching a campaign of global terror against the West (and the US in particular) in fact what is being resisted is the extension of neoliberal values into the Middle East through the extension of capitalism. This conflict can be thought of as a clash of mental models. One based on neoliberal values and capitalist economies, the other based on Islamic ideals and clientalist economies" (Roy et al 2007: 12).

strategies employed by Dubai to propel its growth. Yet he argues that though Dubai offers the world's tallest buildings and largest shopping malls, "an indentured, invisible majority" of exploited laborers lurks behind the façade of high-end city brand. Davis highlights the extremes of Dubai's development -- the spectacle of "extreme building," "gigantism" and other superlatives -- and race to position itself as the preeminent Middle Eastern global city. As Ananya Roy (2008, 321) argues, the focus on Dubai's excesses and extravagance, embodied in these "discursive frames of hysteria," situates Dubai's "development trajectories as beyond the bounds of reason", thus delegitimizing it as "a monstrous caricature of development." The focus on Dubai's "hysterical modes of worlding" (*ibid*) also ignores the deeply rooted political and social issues that define Dubai at another level. I discuss this problematic in the following section of this chapter.

In contrast to the studies cited above, Ahmed Kanna (2010, 2011) proposes a different conceptualization of the articulation of neoliberalism in Dubai, one based on neoliberal subject formation. As opposed to a "monolithic," homogenizing set of ideologies and policies, Kanna argues that the implementation of neoliberalism in Dubai exhibits highly localized "inflections" reflective of Dubai's ethnic, gender, and social context. Kanna (2010) uses Dubai Internet City as a case study of a "zone of exception" in which, following Aihwa Ong (1999), what he terms "flexible citizens" are cultivated in major corporations, such as Tecom and EMAAR, operating within such zones. These flexible citizens espouse a neoliberal ethos of work, personal responsibility, value, and governance, and view Dubai in terms analogous to a "city corporation," with Dubai's ruler at its head, functioning as the "CEO of Dubai." "Neoliberalism, with its valorization of the individual entrepreneur, its provocation to question "tradition," and its commodification of culture, has in the Dubai context strongly resonated with elites' interest in fashioning a usable, postpurist sense of identity" (Kanna 2010, 122-123).

Kanna follows Ong's theorization of neoliberalism as a "technology of rule" (Ong 1999, 2007; Ferguson 1994), deployed by cities and states to create physical spaces of "exception," including export processing zones and enclaves, such as Dubai Internet City, that cultivate particular identities and conceptions of the self. Within such exceptional spaces the rule of law, and, thus, the privileges associated with such rule, are suspended by the sovereign, rendering them spaces of "graduated citizenship" (Ong 1999). Ong (1999) suggests that "differentiated zones of sovereignty" have the potential to create new opportunities in the context of "authoritarian" rule. Such spaces of exception are often linked to narratives on national development, though numerous examples from the global south demonstrate the limitations of such entities (Ferguson 1994).

This formulation of neoliberalism as a technology of government follows Foucault's conception of governmentality. As Nikolas Rose argues, such technologies are "imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting other undesired events" (Rose 2008, 52). Ong (2006) situates neoliberalism as a "biopolitical mode of governing" centered on the harnessing of populations by "governing regimes." Ong argues that the resultant "optimizing technologies" include "technologies of subjectivity," based on "expert systems" and "self-government," as well as "technologies of subjection" that "regulate populations for optimal productivity" (Ong 2006, 6). Increasingly, this is done at a distance (Rose 2008) and via spatial strategies such as enclaving (Ong 2006).

Kanna's adopts this rationale in his exploration of how neoliberal subjects are cultivated in companies operating in Dubai's zones of exception. He argues that in such companies, "politics have been erased" and "modernity is equated with consumerism, authoritarian

capitalism, and free-trade ideology. These companies have also become the milieus in which Dubai's flexible citizens reframe cultural values in neoliberal terms and vice versa" (Kanna 2010, 108). Kanna suggests that his analysis of Dubai's flexible citizens differs from Ong's theorization of neoliberal technologies of rule in Southeast Asia in that, in the Dubai context, "issues of productive and worthy citizenship are not framed in terms of economic value. Rather, they are formulated in terms of national ethics and the modes of proper and authentic citizenship" (Kanna 2010, 124).

Farha Ghannam (2002) explores such "technologies of subjectivity" from a different spatial perspective, that of the low-income public-sector housing community of al-Zawiya al-Hamra in Cairo. Ghannam's analysis situates al-Zawiya al-Hamra as a site in which religious identities successfully compete with secular modernist discourse, forging alternate identities and spatial interventions that arbitrate top-down state planning policies and discourses. As opposed to de-legitimized subjects of a benevolent state, many residents of al-Zawiya al-Hamra espouse acutely religious identities as counterpoints to the planned "modernity" of the neighborhood, as well as to cultivate a sense of belonging in response to their forced displacement by state planning policies. Neighborhood residents forge such identities through everyday social and spatial practices, from creating informal mosques in public spaces, to adding balconies and enclosures to their public-sector apartments. Ghannam's ethnography situates such practices in the context of residents' mediation with the "global," in contrast to a growing body of scholarship on cities in the Arab world that uncritically appropriates the notions of "globalization" and Arab "global cities," as discussed below.

2.3.3   *Worlding Practices and Arab Global Cities*

The appropriation of globalization is most evident in another body of literature, related to neoliberalism, by which cities in the Arab world have been conceptualized that engages the notions of "global cities" and "worlding practices." The global cities narrative[5] positions the

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[5] Prefaced by Immanuel Wallerstein's (1976) world-systems perspective, the global cities paradigm positions "world cities," according to Friedman and Wolff (1982), as the "control centers of the global economy." Friedmann and Wolff argue that the juxtaposition of extreme wealth and poverty within such cities is functional, as well as spatial. This relationship influences social divisions in the city and further increases the divisions at the bottom tiers of society, resulting in an exclusionary social structure in which large segments of the traditional working class are pushed further down the socio-economic scale as their increased exclusion from the formal economy leads to impoverishment and destitution.

Paul Knox (1995) cites that the geo-economic and geo-political changes that have led to the increase in economic decentralization are the main driving forces in the creation of global cities. Of these changes, the "New International Division of Labor" has manifested itself in the creation of a location hierarchy in which high-level management functions of trans-national corporations are concentrated. Saskia Sassen (1994) argues that this neo-Fordist global restructuring has resulted in the increased importance of cities as agglomeration centers of trans-national corporations, which has, in turn, created the increased need for lower end, non-digital, support services provided by the new class of peripheral workers. These workers are not directly linked with the global economy, but are necessary to sustain its existence.

More sophisticated internationalized financial and business services are also needed in centers of corporate agglomeration to support the new system of digitized economic activity and capital investment. Manuel Castells (1989) notes that the introduction of new production technologies and advances in information technology have created an "informational economy" in which the magnitude and speed of economic transactions has resulted in the production of a fast paced, exclusionary socio-economic environment characterized by the global compression of time and space. The resultant "informational city" may be more linked to specific spaces of flows beyond the city rather than a particular space of places within it.

"new international division of labor" as the main driving force in the creation of global cities in which high-end coordination and management functions (or command and control functions) are concentrated (Knox 1995, Knox and Taylor 1995, Sassen 1994, 2001). The global cities literature does not engage directly with cities in the Arab world, nonetheless, recent scholarship has extended the global cities framework to cities such as Dubai (Elsheshtawy 2004, Bagaeen 2007) to highlight the stark extremities of its unequal, exploitative development.

It is speculated that cities throughout the Arab world adopt development strategies that attempt to reference the global economy and "global" counterparts in other parts of the world. Saskia Sassens' *The Global City* (2001) would suggest that Cairo's competition with cities like Beirut to become the regional provider of auxiliary technical and financial services exhibits such an attempt. Critiques of the global cities narrative emphasize its western-centric approach and disengagement with the majority of cities around the world (Robinson 2006, Roy and Ong 2008, Mayaram 2009). Additionally, the mechanisms by which space is actually produced within cities are not addressed by the global cities paradigm. Yet, as noted below, contemporary scholarship on cities in the Arab world has oftentimes appropriated the global cities narrative, as well as conflated globalization with neoliberal urban development.

The leading interlocutor for extending the global cities narrative to cities in the Arab world is Yasser Elsheshtawy. His two edited volumes, *Planning Middle Eastern Cities* and *The Evolving Arab City*, attempt to provide a rationale for the Arab global city. Speaking about Dubai in *Planning Middle Eastern Cities* (2004), Elsheshtawy argues "the city is being created to respond to globalizing tendencies - tourism, large corporation headquarters, events" (Elsheshtawy 2004, 172). Elsheshtawy makes this case for "Arab oil cities," but also extends this narrative to "Traditional cities such as Cairo or Beirut (that) effectively manufacture their heritage and culture – their 'image' – to attract investments, tourists etc." (*Ibid*). He cites Dubai's intentional use of megaprojects, such as the Burj Al-Arab Hotel, financial centers and planned communities, in its attempt to create a "global" image and brand as proof of the city's emersion in the project of globalization.

Elsheshtawy's *The Evolving Arab City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development* (2008) further develops this line of argumentation. In a chapter introducing the book's framework, Fuad Malkawi advocates a "new research agenda" focused on elucidating the processes of "metropolisation" in "the new Arab metropolis." Malkawi argues that the Arab city is being affected by globalization, yet is not included in the global cities narrative, despite the emergence of cities such as Dubai and international importance of cities like Mecca and Medina. He contends that though Arab cities are not quite global cities, they nonetheless are important, and, thus, should be given greater credence. Malkawi advocates that if Arab cities cannot be included in the global cities framework, the study of Arab cities through the paradigm of "metropolisation" is the next best thing. Thus, a hierarchy of Arab cities may be established depending on a city's "degree of metropolisation." Malkawi's argument is constructive in that he advocates the study of the Arab metropolis, yet his uncritical appropriation of the global cities paradigm is reminiscent of the appropriation of the Islamic cities paradigm by Arab scholars before him. In attempting to highlight the merits of the Arab city and position it within the global cities framework, he adopts the assumptions and biases inherent in the global cities paradigm.

Khaled Adham is more critical in his assessment of Doha's strategies to achieve global city status. Adham posits "an iconic war of hyper-signification is taking place in the realm of architecture" (Adham 2008, 244) in cities throughout the Arab Gulf region. Citing the various

mega-projects under construction and attempts to position Doha as the cultural capital of the Gulf with projects such as Education City, Adham questions the motives behind such schemes and suggests that attaining global city status is as elusive as the global cities concept itself.

Recent scholarship has also extended the global cities narrative to Cairo. Elsheshtawy (2006) suggests that in Cairo's attempt to position itself as a Middle Eastern global city, it has adopted the "Dubai model" of development, reflected in megamalls and technology parks developed by international real estate interests. Similarly, Anouk de Koning (2009) situates Cairo within an analogous framework. Though she does not explicitly endorse the global cities construct, she implicitly adopts it by positioning Cairo as the "cosmopolitan capital" in Egypt's "search for the global" (Koning 2009, 163). Koning argues that in cities like Cairo, neoliberal reforms, the growing multinational sector, and other socio-economic processes have increased the number of "Western" oriented, high-end wage earners whose cosmopolitan lifestyles and patterns of conspicuous consumption have altered the city in drastic ways. She argues that the chasm between workers engaged in the "new" versus "old" economy is reflected in social and cultural affinities, as well as spaces of consumption, and uses Western style coffee shops, high-end malls, and cosmopolitan identities as the main indicators of this claim.

In contrast, Eric Denis and Leila Vignal argue that understandings of cities like Cairo via the global cities paradigm lead "toward a superficial understanding of the complexities of globalization in Third World cities" (Denis and Vignal 2006, 101). Specifically, these narratives do not address the transformations in the manufacturing and industrial sectors in such cities, as the framework privileges the importance of the financial and service sectors. Arguing that economic liberalization has occurred without increased political liberalization, they contend "Cairo cosmopolitan, the globalizing metropolis, will not make us free" (Denis and Vignal 2006, 147).

Obviously, Dubai, Cairo, and Beirut are not "control and command centers" of high-end coordination and management services. Nonetheless, such spaces are often understood as attempts to position Arab cities within the hierarchy of global cities. At the heart of the global city discourse is the impact of finance and changing patterns of work, both high- and low-end, on spatial arrangements and inequality within the city. For example, Sassen (1991) demonstrates how the new structure of the workforce, with its concentration of both highly paid skilled and poorly paid low-skilled labor, has resulted in increased inequality in cities of the global north. Her analysis departs from the traditional analysis of inequality in terms of deindustrialization, which is not applicable to cities in the Arab world. It also privileges certain sectors, such as finance and insurance, in defining a global city. Additionally, it does not engage with urban governance, as government is a secondary actor, which is not the case in Arab cities such as Dubai, Doha, Beirut and many others. Government plays a pivotal role in facilitating urban change. As argued by Roy in reference to Dubai, "it is difficult to distinguish between the practices of "free enterprise" and the enterprise of the emirate" (Roy 2008, 321).

In *Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global* (2011), Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong introduce the concept of worlding as a "counterpoint" to the western-centric global cities narrative. Roy argues that contemporary paradigms do not sufficiently deal with the "problem space" that is the city, thus "the concept of worlding seeks to recover and restore the vast array of global strategies that are being staged at the urban scale around the world" (Roy 2011, 10).

Shail Mayaram (2009) attempts to subvert the meaning of a global city by suggesting that the criteria upon which the global city paradigm is based ignores the "complex pasts" of global

cities around the world. Mayaram argues that Sassen's framework "negates the prior and present existence of other global cities that have been and are based not merely on financial, but on other transactions" (Mayaram 2009, 5). She faults Castells for espousing a reductionist argument that ignores the right of other knowledges, beyond his definition of "information", to exist. Instead, she espouses a view of the "Other Global City" based on "multiple pasts" and "cross-regional heterogeneous politico-cultural space" (*ibid*). For Mayaram, cities such as Bombay, Cairo, Bukhara and Kula Lumpur embody the multiplicity of potentialities in "Other Global Cities."

Such critiques are in dialogue with Jennifer Robinson's (2006) contention that the global cities narrative renders invisible much of the world's cities, thus making it an insufficient construct to elucidate urban processes in cities throughout the world. At the heart of these critiques is the demand for a conception of cities that recognizes and privileges the complex actors and assemblages that constitute the urban realm.

2.4 Governable Spaces and Subjects

"outside the communities of inclusion exists an array of micro-sectors, micro-cultures of non-citizens, failed citizens, anti-citizens, consisting of those who are unable or unwilling to enterprise their lives or manage their own risk" (Rose 1999, 259).

"Poverty and many other social ills are cast not in economic terms but as fundamentally subjective conditions" (Rose 1999, 265, in reference to neoliberal ideology).

As discussed above, the articulation of neoliberalism in the Arab city is posited to produce specific spatial formations such as gated communities, enclaves, and spaces of "exception". If the technology parks, shopping malls, gated communities and coffee shops of Arab "neoliberal cities" represent the apotheosis of neoliberalism's urban expression, as suggested by many urban theorists, what is to be said of the spaces that fall outside these communities of neoliberal "inclusion"? From the Cairo School to Mike Davis (2006), theorists position spaces of informality/ illegality as both a consequence of neoliberalism, as well as sites of its contestation. If neoliberalism is inscribed as such in the urbanism of cities in the Arab world, how can we interrogate its spatial expressions in a manner that facilitates an understanding "of local structures of meaning and symbolism in reshaping neoliberalism, and to how everyday people cultivate selves and subjectivities in contexts of neoliberal" (sic) (Kanna 2011, 32)?

Following Rose's (1999, 32) conception of "governable spaces", or "modalities in which a real and material governable world is composed, terraformed, and populated", the following section explores the inscription of informal/ illegal areas as sites of neoliberal governmentality. For Rose, "The government of a population…become possible only through discursive mechanisms that represent the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics" (1999, 33). Such governable spaces reflect the spatialization of government and "territorialization" of "social thought" (for example the slum in the late nineteenth century) (Rose 1999, 35-6). As Watts (2004) notes, each governable space possesses a distinct topology and is "modeled" through various frames and "systems of cognition" that render it recognizable and remodel space itself. Rose identifies two "underlying thematics" that "produce" modern conceptions of space, the biological and the economic. The "biological

geographies" models space as a system of national spaces and populations, distinguished as advanced and civilized, in contrast to primitive and degenerative. The economic model of space is the "model of political economy" that "differentiates between the appearance of things on the surface and their real nature and determinants" (Rose 1999, 39).

2.4.1   Governable Space of Informality/ Illegality

"*the liberal project incorporates authoritarian practices in the governing of subject populations whose members are thought of as incapable of improving or governing themselves*" (Ismail 2006, xxx).

While maintaining reservations regarding the causal relationship between the expansion of informal/ illegal spaces and neoliberalism in the Arab city, as theorized by the Cairo School and others, discursive frames on such spaces may be construed in terms of the spatialization of neoliberal "social thought" that reflect various technologies of rule instrumental to the governing of such space. Following Watts' (2004) exploration of the (un)governable spaces of the Niger Delta in Nigeria, I explore the main discursive frames on informal/ illegal spaces and their link to Islamism.

In cities in the Arab world, the discourse on property rights, registration, and legalization frames the "problem" of informality/ illegality in terms of urban property relations, and, in effect, extends the neoliberal ethos of individual property and the privileging of contractual relations into the realm of such spaces. For Hernando de Soto (1987, 2000), one of the foremost proponents of urban property rights reform, insecurity of tenure, or lack of urban property rights, is the defining challenge of informality, and one that may be "fixed" by legalization, or the institution of legal property rights that incorporate informal/ illegal area dwellers into mainstream systems of registration and credit. Aided by Egyptian scholar Ahmed Soliman (2004, 2010), they suggest that residents of informal areas are not really that poor if their informal assets, mainly their informal housing, are taken into consideration. de Soto and Soliman claim that what is needed is a way of formalizing this so-called "dead capital" through the establishment of legal property rights that would subsequently allow people to leverage their homes to get loans, start businesses, and pull themselves up from their bootstraps. This, they argue, is a crucial element of development needed in many Arab cities.

Critics of this ideology claim the emphasis on entrepreneurship gives the poor exclusive responsibility for their poverty. Additionally, the regulation of many aspects of daily life through bureaucratic means (such as registration, mortgage systems etc.) creates new forms and increases the scope of domination. Iris Marion Young describes this in Habermasian terms as the "colonization of the life world" in which citizen consumers are subjected to "meshes of microauthority" by various institutions, thus comodifying, normalizing and universalizing a wider scope of "life activities" (Young 1990, 79). This "colonization" of social relations once outside the purvey of the state and extension of "the market" as a self-regulating moral arbitrator for social property relations, is a pillar of neoliberal thought and facilitates the conditions for capital accumulation through urban space. As Nikolas Rose posits, "advanced liberal rule is characterized by the politics of the contract, in which the subject of the contract is… a customer or consumer" (Rose 1999, 165). Like the French in Algeria who believed that private property "was the foundation of civilization" (Mitchell 2002, 55), current discourses on regularization and

the focus on property rights may be construed as a "civilizing" mission couched in the narrative of economic development.

Another neoliberal technology evident in spaces of informality/ illegality that attempts to allow the poor to "enterprise their lives or manage their own risk" (Rose 1999, 259) is the emphasis on "slum rehabilitation" and "upgrading". In Egypt, upgrading is rooted primarily in the belief that if residents gain access to basic infrastructure and social services they will be less susceptible to the influence of Islamist groups that often provide such services, and will be less willing to transgress the authority of the state. Diane Singerman (2009, 129) argues this notion is reinforced by the view that "The residents of informal housing areas, and Imbaba more particularly, are not agents but objects of rule. Without a history, they have no historical destiny and no legitimate right to exist, prosper, or engage in politics, but they can be rehabilitated to become better and more productive objects of rule."

Upgrading deploys particular "inscription devices," or mechanisms "for producing conviction in others. Inscriptions thus produce objectivity…that make possible the extension of authority over that which they seem to depict" Rose (2008, 36-37). Thus, the maps, charts, diagrams and quantitative measures used to render legible informal/ illegal spaces are instrumental to the techniques of spatializing and governing such spaces. As Asef Bayat (2002, 16) notes, often such work is organized via "state-sponsored NGOs, such as the Egyptian Community Development Associations… (which are) an extension of the state" that explicitly entrench such technologies in informal/ illegal spaces. This reflects Rose's contention that "A new territory is thus emerging, after the welfare state, for the management of these micro-sectors, traced out by a plethora of autonomous agencies working within the 'savage spaces', in the 'anti-communities' on the margins" (Rose 1999, 259).

Upgrading is also organized around self-help efforts, or what is known as *al-majhud al-dhati*. The notion of self-help was popularized in the 1960s in so-called "slums of hope" which were thought to provide residents opportunities to improve their lives and achieve levels of self-reliance, despite poor living conditions (Stokes 1962, 187-197). But the reality in cities in the Arab world is far from this idealized rendering. As Ben Nefissa argues, in Egypt, a "neoliberal" version of self-help has been codified in urban practices and governance systems. She posits that "The neoliberal norm of *al-majhud al-dhati* dictates that inhabitants of working-class neighborhoods must pay both politically and financially for their own access to public services and resources, and perhaps eventually 'buy' formal administrative recognition from the state" (Ben Nefissa 2009, 179). Self-help efforts and the eventual purchase of administrative recognition mitigate the precarious relationship between informal/ illegal spaces and the bureaucratic and political apparatuses, that revolves around intimidation by state officials and the police, and politicians' attempts to gain political support. Thus, these techniques enable informal/ illegal spaces in the Arab city to be imagined as precarious spaces of patronage, in which risk is mitigated via the buying and selling of official recognition and endorsement. In this imaginary, the codified practices around neoliberal self-help efforts contravene the formal/ informal, legal/ illegal divide, incorporating them into systems of "legitimate" governance, yet still rendering such spaces as illicit, illegitimate and in need of discipline and control.

Rose posits that "Governable spaces are not fabricated counter to experience, they make new kinds of experience possible" (Rose 1999, 32). The notion that everyday experience and practices play a significant role in the shaping of urban spaces of informality/ illegality is seen in a growing body of literature (Bayat 2010, Simone 2004). At the forefront of this debate, Abdou Maliq Simone (2004) attempts to construct a new conceptual framework to address such issues

premised on the notion that the existing lexicon and analytical resources in mainstream, western-oriented urban theory cannot adequately theorize or explain the specificity of African urban social processes. Simone's proposed lexicon, including constructs such as "the invisible" and "the spectral," attempts to problematize understandings of notions such as "formal" and "informal" as he shows how seemingly informal processes are highly formalized through systematic, almost codified, societal practices, and how greater agency may be obtained by recourse to such practices. Simone argues that residents of African cities are resourceful players whose agency shapes the city through elaborate systems and networks of action. In contrast to the equation of networked infrastructure with physical assets, such as roads, bridges, and water systems, as articulated by Graham and Marvin (2001), Simone (2004, 2008) posits the notion of *people as infrastructure*. Simone contends that the meanings derived from the complex systems of bodies and networks traversing the city allow us to theorize the city not in terms of nodal points or spaces of capital, but in terms of the "conjunction" of open-ended relationships that aim to "derive maximal outcomes from a minimal set of elements" (Simone 2004, 411).

Another interlocutor of this view is Asef Bayat (1997, 2002, 2010) who posits that informality exemplifies the "quiet encroachment" of ordinary citizens into the realm of urban space. He suggests that this represents a crucial way in which residents of informal areas shape and claim urban space, and thus create systems of enfranchisement that extend their scope beyond the constraints faced by most informal dwellers. Bayat suggests that most scholarship to date on informal areas focuses on "survival strategies" employed by low income and working class people to make ends meet in the face of limited resources and oppressive social and economic conditions (Bayat 2002, 3). This emphasis on survival strategies, which is often carried out at great expense to those pursuing them, fails to articulate the underlying individual and collective power inherent in what he terms as a "non-movement" of actors acting in a fashion that not only provides access to basic services, but erodes implicit power relations embedding in discriminatory societal structures (*ibid*).

Bayat argues that despite the recent wave of popular protests and public demonstrations in the last decade, the semi-authoritarian nature of the Egyptian state makes collective demand making and protest risky and less effective. Bayat posits that in its stead, "a grass-roots non-movement," in which ordinary citizens encroach on the privileges of the wealthy and resources of the state, at minimum cost to them, replaces collective demand making. "Quiet encroachment is characterized by direct actions of individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, urban collective consumption, informal jobs, business opportunities) in a quiet and unassuming, illegal fashion. These prolonged and largely atomized struggles bring about significant social changes for the actors" (Bayat 2002, 3). It is a tactic that forces the semi-authoritarian state to deal with the reality on the ground and the needs of commonplace people. The so-called Arab Spring, marked by explicit power struggles and revolutions throughout the Arab world, complicates this theoretical conceptualization of agency and Arab semi-authoritarianism.

Bayat's conception of agency inherent in the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary" does not seek to find the heroic subaltern man or woman who dwells within the ranks of informal/ illegal areas. On the contrary, it theorizes an agency of the ordinary. Invoking Foucault's idea that "power exists only in action," Iris Marion Young suggests that the way in which power is enacted and reproduced is dispersed or decentralized (Young 1990). Thus, may we view "quiet encroachment" as the tactic (de Certeau 1984) by which dispersed power is enacted and infitesimal shifts that produce new norms, relationships and opportunities for negotiating the iron

hand of "structure" are produced in the context of informaility/ illegality? Bayat suggests that "quiet encroachment" is instrumental to the evolution of those structures and norms. But, as Rose cautions, "modern forms of subjectivity, contemporary conceptions of agency and will, the present-day ethics of freedom itself – are not antithetical to power and technique but actually the resultants of specific configurations of power, certain technological interventions, certain more or less rationalized techniques of relating to ourselves" (Rose 1999, 54).

2.4.2   Informality and Islam

Arguing that "modern" practices of government are linked to "traditional" sources of authority, thus rendering difficult the division between modern and traditional expressions of power, Salwa Ismail (2006, xxix) argues that "Islamism, whether militant, moderate, or conservative, is only one of the forms of collective action aiming at control of spaces and at the investment of space with a particular moral outlook." These configurations of power are expressed in the narratives linking spaces of urban informality/ illegality to discourses on militant Islam and the militant "Islamicization" of cities in the Arab world.

As many argue (Ismail 1996, 2006, Bayat 2007, Singerman 2009), the most prominent societal conceptualization of informal areas in the Arab world is one that defines them in terms of chaos, illegality and subversion. This discursive characterization of informality in terms of illegality and subversion extends beyond the physical into the realm of identity. Mona Abaza argues that "In official discourse, *'ashwa'iyyat* (informal/ illegal areas in Egypt) became the equivalent of chaotic and "uncivilized" relations" (Abaza 2006). In that sense, informality has come to signify much more than unplanned, low-income neighborhoods. As Abaza argues "The term has been used in different contexts, for example in relation to unregistered and therefore illicit forms of marriage, such as *'urfi*. It is an attribute of the poor and has entered the official discourse of the state as a label for anything that is not ordered" (Abaza 2006, 244). Diane Singerman (2009) argues that residents of informal areas are the "Internal Other" in the Egyptian context. "Not only were the unplanned, lower-income, and poorly serviced *'ashwa'iyyat* portrayed as a deviant phenomenon, but by association the residents of those areas… were constructed as deviants themselves and their life-world stigmatized and devalued" (Singerman 2009, 21).

The discourse of chaos and illegality is instrumental in portraying informal/ illegal areas as urban dystopias on the verge of imminent social collapse in need of government surveillance, control and intervention. In cities in the Arab world, this discourse is linked to the threat of militant Islamists and the vulnerability of informal/ illegal areas to the influences of Islamist groups active in these neighborhoods. As Asef Bayat notes, informal/ illegal areas are often alleged to be "a Hobbesian locus of crime, lawlessness and extremism that produce a 'culture of violence' and an 'abnormal' way of life, a breeding ground for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism" (Bayat 2007, 582). Though contemporary narratives of the dystopia of the urban 'slum' have diminished with the decline of the urban ecology school, the most influential is Mike Davis' (2006) *Planet of Slums,* in which Davis speculates that the unprecedented growth of slums has fostered increased interest in populist, humanitarian religious traditions, such as Islam and Pentecostalism, thus, furthering the slums-as-urban-ecology of militant Islam myth.

Bayat challenges this notion of so-called slums as the ecological and cultural urban area disposed to militant Islamism, by virtue of its concentration of poverty. He argues that the association between Islamic militancy and the spaces of informality is based on a false

presupposition, backed by government assertions, the media and various experts, that Islamists are concerned with the "political mobilization of the urban subaltern" (Bayat 2007, 585). He argues that, unlike Latin American liberation theology that was inexplicitly linked to the plight of the urban disenfranchised via narratives of "development, underdevelopment, and dependency" prevalent in Latin America, Islamist groups' primary concern is the "establishment of an Islamic order," as opposed to the mobilization of the urban poor (*ibid*). Thus, though Islamists have often stepped in to fill the void in primary services left by the retreat of the welfare state, the notion that informal/ illegal areas are instrumentally linked to the larger agenda of Islamic fundamentalists is mistaken.

Nonetheless, this discourse has been instrumental in portraying informal/ illegal areas in the Arab world as urban dystopia*s* predisposed to militant Islam. As Salwa Ismail notes "the production of new popular areas in public discourse as *'ashwa'iyyat* is part of a dominant system of representation that coheres with the Egyptian state's security objective of discipline and control" (Ismail 2006, xiii).

These physically deterministic meta-narratives of chaos, illegitimacy and militancy seek to silence entire populations, but are met with less influential counter-narratives that seek to legitimize the lived experience of informal/ illegal area residents. We see similar meta-narratives taking root in other contexts, whether in representations of African cities as out-of-control, or the "talk of crime" in Brazil (Caldeira 2000) that legitimizes the transgression of lower-class bodies and rights. Caldeira (2000) links the erosion of citizenship in Brazil, or what she calls "disjunctive democracy," marked by the rise in democracy but decrease in human rights, to the "talk of crime" and process of enclaving that serves to devalue public space. She posits that this creates variegated rights depending on ones' access or lack of access to certain spaces, and thus, undermines democracy. Caldeira argues that the widening between social groups, reflected in greater inequity and enclaving, facilitates the erosion of citizenship, as different social groups do not acknowledge the rights of others.

In his essay in the *The Fundamentalist City*? (2011), James Holston suggests this inegalitarian paradigm of citizenship is one in which access to rights depends on one's status and is only bestowed on the "right people." As Holston explains, "the exclusions of differentiated citizenship often appear to result less from legal and political causes than from personal failings" (Holston 2011, 65). As we have seen, the dominant societal discourse towards informal/ illegal areas in the Arab city renders their residents the "wrong" kind of people. Additionally, this discourse extends the notion of informality/ illegality into the realm of personal identity, thus embedding a conception of citizenship in which residents of informal/ illegal areas are seen as subjects of rule, as opposed to full citizens who may claim rights and exercise agency to shape their futures.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter attempts to problematize the most prominent conceptualizations of cities in the Arab world to create a multiplicity of interpretations of the so-called Arab city. The tentative itineraries of such cities make possible a multitude of understandings that may decenter dominant paradigms regarding Islam and the Arab city. Conceptualizations of cities in the Arab world have evolved from the Orientalist Islamic city trope to narratives espousing notions of neoliberalism. It may be argued that the trope of neoliberalism has replaced the Islamic city trope in contemporary scholarship of Arab cites, resulting in narratives that position urban processes in

such cities in the context of neoliberal development, urban "entrepreneurism," and the global cities paradigm. Neoliberal narratives have been appropriated by many Middle East urban theorists, despite the limitations of these frameworks. Though the essentialized notion of the Islamic city, in which Islam is the prime factor animating urban processes and form, has been decentered, narratives linking Islam to urban articulations within cities remain prominent in contemporary readings of the Arab city. Such narratives are articulated in terms of various notions of "Islamic urbanism" and exemplified by the physically-deterministic discourse linking militant Islam to spaces of urban informality/ illegality. Counterpoints to these narratives attempt to conceive of an urbanism that articulates the multiple potentialities and "modalities of agency" (Mahmood 2005) of such cities and their residents, thus unsettling entrenched beliefs about facets that animate cities throughout the Arab world.

SECTION II: CAIRO

This section explores the privileged position of the Egyptian military and its role in the production of urban space in Cairo. I examine the military's attempt to position itself as the embodiment of Egyptian nationalism, and how it uses this privileged position to obfuscate its economic activities, including its interests in urban development. I argue that since the 2013 military coup, which ousted Egypt's first democratically elected president, the construction of narratives emphasizing the differentiated citizenship of Islamists -- a group whose disenfranchisement is seen as pivotal to the unfettered apotheosis of the Egyptian Military -- is manifest in various socio-spatial practices that demarcate, isolate and deem such people unworthy of full citizenship, and the claims with which such citizenship is associated. This, coupled with narratives valorizing the military establishment as heroic guardians of Egyptian nationalism, who saved Egypt from the Islamists, and who continue to protect the country from impending Islamist threats, underpins the paradigm of differentiated citizenship playing out in Cairo today. I argue that this facilitates the stigmatization of public space and de-legitimization of the public realm.

Chapter 3. Nationalism, the Military and Urban Space in Cairo

"I would like to say to the media and those with us now, the army and police, who represent the Egyptians, sacrifice fallen martyrs and casualties… If anyone insults the army or police they are defaming all Egyptians and that is not freedom of opinion…no, that is not freedom of opinion. The mother who sacrificed her son or the wife who sacrificed her husband…what will she say when she confronts their defamation…No one will insult the army or police as long as I am here…Go see the sons of Egypt…who sacrifice their souls for you…so you can live in peace and safety… Defaming (the army or police), legally, for me now equals high treason. What does it equal? High treason!"

-- President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, Nationally televised remarks at
launch of El Alamein Al Gadidah (New Alamein), March 2018

3.1 The Army and People Are One Hand (الجيش و الشعب يد واحدة)

On Feb 11, 2011, after 18 days of popular protest calling for political change, Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president of Egypt, ending his three decade-long dictatorship of the Middle East's most populous country. Mubarak's resignation, announced by his chief of intelligence and newly appointed vice president, Omar Suliman, marked the transfer of power to

the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or the SCAF, and the beginning of Egypt's uncertain transition to democratic rule. Like all of Egypt's previous presidents, Mubarak hailed from the ranks of the Egyptian military and, was once revered as a national hero for his service as commander of the Egyptian Air Force and participation in the 1973 war. It is largely believed that Mubarak did not leave on his own accord, but was pushed out by the military. For many Egyptians, the military junta that succeeded him, led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussien Tantawi, as well as the entire Egyptian military, were hailed as national heroes for their refusal to turn against protesters in Tahrir during the popular revolt, and for the SCAF's expressed commitment to oversee Egypt's transition to a popularly elected civilian government.[6]

Figure 3.1: Tahrir During Revolution
Cairo, February 2011   *Photo: Ghada El-Zoghbi*

The popular slogan "the army and people are one hand" (*al gayish w'al sha'ab 'eed wah'dah*), most vividly expressed this sentiment. For weeks after the popular revolt, families posed with soldiers near tanks, and the military establishment basked in its restored glory as the guardian of the Egyptian people's rights and aspirations.

For the first time in decades, Egyptians articulated a new sense of patriotism and optimism for the future. A sense that "Egypt is ours again" motivated numerous civilian-led

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[6] Like the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military did not turn against protesters in Tunisia, the first country to experience the so-called Arab Spring. The military's refusal to use violence against protesters is cited as the primary reason the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions succeeded in a relatively peaceful transition of power, unlike in Syria and Libya. The trajectory of popular protests in each country that experienced popular revolts since 2011 is largely linked to the military's response to protests, and the pivotal decision of whether to deploy violence against civilian protestors. For further insight, see Eva Bellin (2012) Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring. *Comparative Politics, 44,* 2, 127-149.

efforts, such as efforts of youth groups to sweep and paint dilapidated streets, collect garbage, and to reclaim public space and the public realm. Gallup polling data, based on surveys conducted from late March to early April 2011, suggests that 93% of Egyptians were optimistic that they could ""get ahead by working hard."[7] Amidst this optimism, despite the emergence of evidence that military facilities were used for the detainment and torture of protestors[8] and anyone who allegedly provided food or supplies to protestors, 89% of Egyptians had faith in the SCAF and 82% believed they would hand over power to a popularly elected civilian government. For the time being, the military was spared from the types of demands made against Mubarak's close group of political cronies, demands that they be tried and held accountable for their unabashed fleecing of Egyptian society during his reign. Instead, the military was represented as being "one with the people."

Figure 3.2: Protester, Tahrir Square
Cairo, February 2011   *Photo: Ghada El-Zoghbi*
The poster reads: *"Finally, there is hope that, when I grow up, I will be able to get an apartment and get married"*

The myth of *the army and people are one hand* is immersed in the ideal of nationalism and the imagined community (Anderson 1991) of the nation-state. The myth of the military as

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[7] *Egypt From Tahrir to Transition.* Gallup News
 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/157046/egypt-tahrir-transition.aspx> [accessed January 7, 2015].
[8] See *The Gaurdian* (April 10, 2013): Egypt's army took part in torture and killings during revolution, report shows.
< https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/10/egypt-army-torture-killings-revolution> [accessed May 8, 2016].

being an embodiment of Egyptian nationalism and fundamental to the project of nation building is not new. Since the making of the modern republic, the Egyptian military has held a revered status in the hearts and minds of Egyptians, largely for its role in Egypt's military-led soft or noble coups. The 1952 "revolution" and Free Officers Movement, which overthrew the British-supported Egyptian monarchy, solidified the status of the military as the preeminent institution embodying Egyptian nationalism. As with the 2011 revolution, in 1952 Egyptians embraced the Free Officers as national heroes, and the military was praised for breaking the bonds of decades of British dominance, and establishing Egypt as the leader of the Pan Arab movement, as well as placing Egypt on the international stage.

3.2 Rise of the Military Officers

The 1952 "revolution," and subsequent socialist government established in the early 1960s, ushered in numerous political reforms and social change that unsettled prevailing social hierarchies and redistributed resources to the lower and middle classes. The military considered itself the agent of this social transformation. This period also marked the beginning of six decades of effective military rule and the ascendance of the Egyptian military to its current privileged status, in which it is not only viewed as one of the few legitimate institutions of the Egyptian state, though it faces much more scrutiny for its handling of the transition and heavy-handed response to crisis, which I will discuss below, but is effectively beyond the rule of law.

This period also marked the rise of a new social order in which military careers paved the way for social mobility, allowing military officers and their families to join the ranks of a new elite (Sayigh 2012). Through the nationalization of private assets and socialist industrial planning, the state gained control of numerous businesses and industries in which military officers were placed at the helm. Thus, it was the beginning of the transformation of the military from an institution whose main mission is national security, to an institution whose main focus is its own economic enterprise.[9] Sadat's Open Door policy curbed this militarization and somewhat sidelined the military. But, after Sadat's assassination and succession of Hosni Mubarak to the presidency in 1981, a remilitarization of the state occurred (ibid). It is widely believed that the 1979 Camp David peace treaty with Israel largely aided this, as the military was no longer engaged in wars with Israel, yet, it was unviable to lay off thousands of military officers. Instead, a reorientation of the military toward the production of civilian and military goods, and the absorption of officers by state-owned organizations, such as the National Services Projects Organization (NSPO) and Arab Organization for Industrialization, which controlled these industries, occurred. This, too, was largely supported by the myth of nationalism in that the military was seen as providing important "strategic" goods, such as jets and building materials, vital to Egypt's national security, in addition to supplying the masses with everything from jams to wastebaskets.

Under Mubarak, a system of patronage proliferated which gave military officers, who were loyal to the president, payoffs in the form of highly lucrative positions in these state-owned enterprises upon their retirement. Sayigh argues that in exchange for their loyalty to the president, military officers could become the chairperson or be placed on the board of directors

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[9] Yezid Sayigh argues that in addition to controlling state-owned industries, military personnel also colonized the Egyptian cabinet and infiltrated the government bureaucracy.

of state-owned enterprises, and receive lucrative salaries, in addition to their military pensions.[10] The most well connected officers reportedly receive the most lucrative positions, but a system of automatic promotion of '*ameed* (brigadier general) to the rank of major general upon retirement, and hence a bigger pension, was a strong incentive for loyalty to the president (ibid). The prevalence of retired military officers at the helms of state and military owned enterprises has led some scholars to call Egypt the "republic of retired generals" or "the officers' republic."[11] Sayigh defines the "officers' republic" as "the self-perpetuating military networks that permeate virtually all branches and levels of state administration and of the state-owned sectors of the economy."

3.3 The Military and Urban Development

Not only are military officers afforded the opportunity to run state-owned enterprises upon their retirement, they and their families are privy to numerous privileges during their active duty. Many of these privileges revolve around subsidies in the form of access to military supermarkets, entertainment facilities and clubs, but one of the most important for many military families is access to subsidized housing. So, while upwards of 7 million people[12] live in informal/ illegal, low-income neighborhoods, which make up over half of Cairo, military personnel have access to "modern" housing that they can resell for additional income. Increasingly, this housing is being constructed in new communities outside of urban corps, further isolating military officers from other parts of Egyptian society (Sayigh 2012).

The military has been active in so-called desert areas for decades, as the deserts around Cairo house numerous military-owned bases and establishments, ranging from national security compounds and active bases, to military-run factories. According to David Sims (2010, 73), the most notable of such establishments is the Heikastep camp, which was developed in the 1940s and is located on Cairo's northeast periphery, between the Ismailiya Desert Road and Suez Desert Road. Land from the camp's western section was used to subsequently establish the Cairo International Airport in the 1950s. By the 1970s, the Military controlled large areas of desert in Cairo's periphery, in both the eastern and western deserts. Though some of this land still houses active military bases, much has been repurposed for urban uses, such as housing for military officers. In the 1980s, a significant section of the Heikastep camp was repurposed into the Heikastep New Town, which primarily serves the military's officer corps and includes numerous apartment blocks for military officers. Though the Heikastep New Town was never fully

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[10] For example, Sayigh notes that a military officer who retires at the rank of major general receives a lump sum of 40,000 EGP ($6,670) and a monthly pension of 3,000 EGP ($500). A position in one of the many military-owned enterprises could potentially yield this officer monthly earnings reportedly ranging from 100,000 EGP ($16,670) to 1 million EGP ($166,670) (based on an exchange rate of approximately 6 EGP/1 $US, which was the rate for several years prior to the 2011 uprising. The 3 November, 2016 devaluation of the Egyptian Pound greatly impacted the exchange rate, which currently stands at approximately 18 EGP/1 $US.

[11] See also Abul-Magd, Zeinab (2012). "The Egyptian Republic of Retired Military Generals." *Foreign Policy*, May 8, 2012.

[12] Sims (2010, 69). These estimates are based on a 2000 study by Hernando Desoto's Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) that estimates 7.1 million people living in approximately 129 km^2 of informal areas. These numbers have only increased during the last decade. According to a 2009 population census, sixty (60) percent of Egypt's population lives in informal areas nationwide. Citing an AlBorsa News article, The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights estimates that "the informal private sector has built some 6.5 million units in the last three years*, at a rate of 1.8 million units annually." See <http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2014/12/07/2296> [accessed January 7, 2016].

developed, it represents a significant project in the transition of the Egyptian military's activities into the realm of urban and real estate development, as well as the increasing remilitarization of the state during the Mubarak regime. Since the 1980s, numerous housing developments for state-security, military and police personnel have been built in the eastern and western deserts outside of Cairo.[13]

Not only is the military involved in housing development for its officer corps, commercial land development and construction represent a significant economic activity for the institution. In Egypt, land is currency, and Egypt's vast desert and other areas of "national security," controlled directly by the military, are a land bank of opportunity for the institution. The military is engaged in a wide range of real estate development throughout the country and military enterprises are involved in the development of everything from sports arenas to hotels, particularly in Cairo and the surrounding areas, Sinai and Red Sea coast, as well as the north Mediterranean coast. To date, there is no comprehensive inventory of military-controlled and affiliated real estate developments, and I have not attempted to quantify such developments. But, military owned developments are highly diversified and range from convention centers to tourist infrastructure, such as hotels and beach resorts, particularly along the Red Sea and North coasts. The military employs its monopoly over military controlled land in areas deemed sensitive to "national security" to facilitate its heavily involvement in the development of hotels, office parks and other commercial projects. The designation of land sensitive to "national security" is usually understood in the most expansive sense possible, with the consequence of allowing the military control over greater expanses of land, and hence, more opportunity to profit from such lands.

Figure 3.3: Tiba Rose Plaza
El-Moshir Tantawy Axis, Nasr City, Cairo

An estimated 11-15% of the Egyptian economy is directly controlled by the military (Sayigh, 2012). Military controlled enterprises are not subject to the same taxes, rules,

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[13] Examples of such projects include a 3,000- unit housing project for police officers near Midan al-Rimaya built in the 1980s as well as another compound near the Sixth of October Road built in the 1990s (Sims 2010).

regulations, or reporting standards of private enterprises, so many argue that this estimate largely under-represents the military's share by not accounting for military activities in sectors dealing with the built environment (such as construction, tourism, land transactions). Some estimates place the share of the military's involvement in the economy at 30-50% (Ottaway, 2015, 4). The difficulty of estimating the military's involvement in the economy, and particularly in these sectors cannot be overemphasized, as there is no central repository or even accounting of the military's economic activities. The military "exercises exclusive control over the defense budget, U.S. military assistance, and military-owned businesses" (Sayigh, 2012), so estimates must be pieced together, and the involvement of military personnel in the governance or ownership of certain enterprises has to be traced in a reverse fashion.[14]

Figure 3.4: Military Officer Villas
Under Construction, July 2017. Marassi North Coast, Sidi Abd El-Rahman   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*
The construction contractor responsible for construction is a military firm.

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[14] Because military-owned enterprises are not subject to the same taxes, rules, regulations, or reporting standards of private enterprises, the military's highly diversified activities in sectors dealing with the built environment (e.g. construction, tourism, land transactions) are particularly difficult to trace. The military's large share of the economy is likely to be primarily a result of its control of land and its activites related to land development and exploitation.

3.4 Differentiated Citizenship and Urban Space

In the months directly following the Jan 25, 2011 uprising, as numerous Mubarak-era officials, including former minister of housing Ahmed Maghrabi, were found guilty of corruption in land-related transactions, a national debate began regarding the right to land, urban space, housing, and economic privilege. This debate called into question the inequitable norms that informed politics, systems of economic privilege, and land development practices that defined the Mubarak-era, and continue to define the practices of the current ruling regime of President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi.

Figure 3.5: Protest Poster, Tahrir Square
March 2011

The poster calls to bring corrupt politicians -- including Susan Mubarak, Gamal Mubarak, Alaa Mubarak, and Fathi Sorrour -- to justice. The poster reads: "The Heads of Corruption -- They left for Egypt: poverty, disease, ignorance"

Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi

Public demands for the right to land and housing, such as those by popular actor Mohamed Sobhi,[15] who advocated the recognition of such rights in Egypt's new constitution, were instrumental in calling into question the il/legitimacies and il/legalities[16] associated with

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[15] Mohamed Sobhi is considered a legendary actor and director whose importance and influence cannot be overemphasized. His many plays, movies, and television dramas are iconic in Egyptian popular culture.
[16] I use the plural "il/legitimacies" and "il/legalities" to emphasize their complex, layered, and multiple forms in Cairo.

certain institutions, norms, and practices of urban development. Sobhi, a member of the National Council for Human Rights, has repeatedly demanded housing and land rights for residents of informal/ illegal areas ('*ashwa'iyyat*) in the popular press and in his address to the People's Assembly on Feb. 28, 2012. Echoing public outrage, demands for justice for Mubarak-era land-development abuses, and basic rights to housing by Egypt's first civilian, Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi,[17] began to unsettle further the long-held attitudes regarding the privileging of particular segments of Egyptian society, and their role in urban development.

In his Armed Forces Day speech on Oct. 6, 2012, Morsi asserted a populist, rights-based notion to land and housing as he highlighted Mubarak-era land development abuses and demanded justice for what he characterized as the blatant abuse of power by Mubarak cronies. Not since Gamal Abdel Nasser (and the socialist government of early the 1960s and subsequent nationalization of land) has an Egyptian president problematized the role of land development in Egyptian society to such an extent. But, Morsi was widely criticized for continuing the same policies of the ousted Mubarak regime, from the country's loan negotiations with the IMF (in 2012), to the neoliberal economic policies encouraging foreign investment. Though Morsi and the Islamists were largely regarded as "more of the same," Morsi had taken up the issues of inequality and inequitable access to resources that is endemic in Egypt.

3.4.1   *Corruption, Land and Capital Accumulation*

One of the earliest high-profile corruption cases that initiated these societal debates involved the Talaat Moustafa Group (TMG), one of Egypt's largest developers known for its numerous luxury developments throughout the country. In 2010, an Egyptian court annulled the sale of 8,000 acres of state-owned land to the TMG on grounds that the land was illegally obtained via non-competitive bidding. A special commission allowed TMG to keep the land and continue development of its upscale suburban town, *Madinaty* (literally meaning "my town"), in the name of the public interest and the maintenance of investor confidence in Egyptian markets. The committee also confirmed the "good will" of TMG and stipulated that in the event of the project's cancelation, TMG and its investors should be compensated. The land scandal that mired TMG was augmented by another courtroom drama as Hisham Talaat Moustafa - the billionaire businessman who formerly headed TMG, and at the time, held a seat in Egypt's parliament - was sentenced, in a retrial that revoked an initial death sentence, to a 15-year jail term for contracting the execution of his former mistress in Dubai.

Another highly publicized case involves former presidential candidate and Mubarak cabinet member, Ahmed Shafiq, who stood trial in absentia for the alleged sale of land owned by a pilots' housing association to the former president's sons at below-market rates. Shafiq faced other land-related allegations, and charges of alleged financial corruption during his term as aviation minister (he faced trial in five criminal cases). He was acquitted, in absentia, in December 2013, along with several other Mubarak-era officials, including Mubarak's sons, Gamal and Alaa, who faced additional corruption charges, but were released from prison in 2015. The acquittal and overturning of rulings against Mubarak-era officials by the current

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[17] Morsi was declared the winner of Egypt's first post-revolution presidential election on June 24, 2012 with 51.7 percent of the vote. See <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/egypt-the-new-founders> by Samer Shehata for a more detailed discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral strategy.

government has alarmed many Egyptians, further fueling the national debate regarding the il/legality of various forms of urban development and rights to urban space.

At the forefront of such debates is how access to urban space and land is used to buttress the "right" kinds of citizens, such as military officials and political cronies, and dispossess the "wrong" kinds, such as residents of low-income informal/ illegal areas.[18] In the context of a semi-authoritarian state, in which the military is omnipresent in all aspects of society, the military plays a major role in regulating the creation and control of urban space in Cairo. This is true even at the neighborhood level. The military's ability to control urban space includes the classification of land, control of what *type* of urban development occurs, *who* has access to urban space, as well as the use of police power to control activities within urban areas.

The military's involvement in urban development schemes gives military personal unprecedented power in both the direct allocation of military land to certain developers, as well as the indirect decisions that affect property values and the development potential of private land. The military's role in the production and control of urban space centers on its control of land. Mechanisms of land control include legal means of regulation such as laws governing land tenure and development; direct government interventions, such as master planning, and infrastructure and economic development policies that favor investment in specific areas; as well as direct subsidies and tax incentives for specific types of land development. The state's ability to thwart private sector activity is evident through its excessive regulation of all economic activity, regardless of size, whether that means opening a neighborhood grocery store; which requires compliance with over twenty-four government entities; or developing large tracts of land.

The Egyptian military's involvement in the development of urban space (and control of both urban and nonurban land), particularly in periods of transition, raises pertinent theoretical issues. Urban theorists have postulated that space plays an important role in capitalist accumulation, as it is part of the secondary circuit of capital, or the circuit of capital invested in real estate and the built environment. This, of course, is based on Marx's notion that the capitalist mode of production is premised on the separation of labor from the means of production. Marx suggests that this is done through a process of primitive accumulation, in which producers are "divorced" from the means of production through "the forcible expropriation of the people from the soil" (Marx 1990, p. 898) in order to form a set of social relations[19] that transforms money and commodities into capital. The way in which this is achieved includes, among other things, the enclosure of public lands, slavery, and coercive legislation that criminalizes the unemployed, forcing them to join the "free laboring poor" (after their means of subsistence has been taken from them). This is contrary to Adam Smith's concept of the capitalist mode of production originating naturally through hard work, ingenuity and specialization. Castells (1972) posits that the city is the main site for the reproduction of labor, whose physical and social space is shaped by capitalist relations. Lefebvre (1991) takes the argument further, stating that, in addition to being the site of the social and physical reproduction of labor (and hence, of class struggle), urban space is a commodity, as well as a means of capitalist production. He postulates that in times of over accumulation, capital moves between the primary and secondary circuits, thus commodifying and alerting the value of urban space.

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[18] See Mitchell, 2002 for a discussion of the role of land in Egyptian state-society relations since the articulation of "modern" private property laws in the nineteenth century.

[19] This is predicated on the "setting free" of labor, which must then "obtain the value of the means of subsistence from his new lord, the industrial capitalist, in the form of wage" (Marx 1990, 909).

Lefebvre notes that as demand for urban space increases, it is valued in terms of its exchange value, or the value the market attributes to it, as opposed to its use value, or the value that represents how individual users *experience* space. He suggests that only through social contestation can urban residents alter capitalist social relations to make use value take primacy over exchange value.

Harvey makes a similar argument noting that crisis compels capital to look for new frontiers of investment that result in "spatial-temporal fixes." Arguing that there have been substantive shifts in the dominant mode of capitalist accumulation and the political economy of advanced capitalism since the early 1970s, Harvey (1990) suggests that this has resulted in corresponding compressions of time and space, and greater uncertainty. Additionally, Harvey puts forth the notion of capitalist "accumulation by dispossession" that "release(s) a set of assets (including labor power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost" (Harvey 2003, p. 149) that over accumulated capital can seize and make profitable, which may otherwise be achieved by the devaluation of existing assets (including labor power). Using his logic, the dispossession of urban space offers tremendous opportunities for capitalist accumulation, as increased commoditization of urban space and reliance on credit markets create social relations that imbed capitalism into new spaces.

As one of the main agents of this transformation, the Egyptian military stands to gain unprecedented advantages via its control of land and urban space. Harvey posits that accumulation by dispossession transfers the negative externalities associated with this transaction to the dispossessed, as opposed to capital, through legal and extralegal means enforced by the state and other institutions that manage capitalist social relations, such as the Egyptian military.

3.4.2   Military Veto Power

This unique position of the military is codified into laws that give the Ministry of Defense the final say in the approval of all types of real estate development, urban planning efforts and construction projects, whether public or private. The military's right to deny urban development and construction projects is accepted as a given condition that repeatedly came up during my interviews with government planners, as well as private developers.

According to a former Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development engineer,[20] the military's absolute veto powers over urban development do not pose an impediment to urban development or represent a conflict of interest for the military, as it is her belief that the military is only interested in safeguarding the national security of the county and preventing the promotion of "short-sighted" and "self-interested projects pushed at the local level" by local municipal officials. She stressed that government planners view this protocol as being "designed to inform municipalities of state mandated regulations to promote the national development vision" and prevent self-interested actions on the part of municipalities, such as projects that contradict approved development schemes, priorities and budgets set at the national level. The government planner noted that since the national development schemes are drawn up in consultation with local municipalities, local municipalities are obligated to follow them, as they had ample input into the planning process. This top-down, nationalistic view toward urban development expressed by the government planner is prevalent throughout the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development and other agencies.

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[20] Interviewed on March 26, 2015 in Cairo, Egypt.

3.4.3 Clientalism

Legally, the military reserves the right to deny any project anywhere in Egypt, with "national security" being the logic behind this centralized system of decision-making. As the Ministry of Defense reserves the right to deny development on both publically and privately owned land, the cultivation of clientalistic relationships with the military establishment is of primary importance to private developers. Many developers explicitly state that the right connections are crucial to the facilitation of access to land, the development of infrastructure, and the approval of permits.

The former CEO of a leading real estate development company specializing in upscale gated-communities articulated it in this manner:

> *You know how it is. Someone knew the right people so we got what we wanted. We'll get the investments we need. That's how things work. We're no different than anyone else*.[21]

He was referring to his relationship with key military personnel and the now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP), who were involved in decisions to allocate infrastructure, including the placement of a major road that would increase the development's value. The road in question linked the Cairo-Alexandria desert road with another major roadway in Sixth of October City, the site of the developer's upscale gated-community. The new infrastructure investment altered the path of the road, as well as the placement of a strategic *bawaba,* or tollgate, that significantly impacted potential buyers' willingness to invest in the new gated community. The road was indeed diverted. An important aspect of the CEO's description of "how things work" is the fact that he directed his request to key military officers and influential members of the NDP, not the Ministry of Transportation, which is the government agency directly responsible for the roads in question. In fact, the CEO, through his NDP links, was given detailed knowledge of the planned roadway before such plans were made public.

Numerous examples like this may be cited, and, as noted above, many Mubarak-era land-related deals are the subject of on-going corruption trials. But, such deals are not exclusive to the Mubarak era. A February 23, 2015 article in the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Masry Al-Youm* claims that:

> *Official sources have revealed a deal made between senior officials and leaders from the Transportation Ministry to divert the path of the regional ring road project, thereby favoring a famous businessman who owns land and resorts on the Cairo-Alexandria desert road…In remarks to Al-Masry Al-Youm, sources said that the businessman requested that the road pass by the borders of his land in order to raise the value of his resorts*.[22]

As in the previous case, it is important to note that negotiations took place between "senior officials" and the Ministry of Transportation, which acquiesced to the requests to divert the road made by the senior officials on behalf of the famous businessman. In the current political climate of the military-backed government of president Abdel Fatah el-Sisi (who is

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[21] Interviewed on August 12, 2006 in Cairo, Egypt.
[22] <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/regional-ring-road-construction-diverts-famous-businessman>
[accessed February 25, 2015].

Egypt's former head of military intelligence and defense minister), it may be assumed that military officials were among the senior officials involved in the decision to divert the road.

Because the military is so heavily involved in land development related decisions, such as the preferential placement of infrastructure, and because it directly controls so much land and largely allocates it at its discretion, the "market" for land is distorted by the release of large parcels of land and decisions regarding infrastructure that advantage or disadvantage particular developments. Thus, though the military's involvement in land development is premised on national security, the role of the military in creating the conditions for capital accumulation through urban space negate the so-called "free market" for large land parcels, as the military may singlehandedly alter and/or influence the market with key decisions regarding the sale of land, placement of infrastructure and demarcation of land as "in the national security interest", thus rendering it undevelopable. Even in cases in which there is no direct corruption or questionable transactions, the military's veto powers over urban development uniquely position key military personnel to gain enormously from military-endorsed land dealings. Though to date there are no scholarly estimates regarding the monetary value appropriated via such windfall profits, we may assume significant amounts of money are at stake.[23]

The notion that the military approves the production of urban space on the basis of national security interests and for the sake of national development obscures the market imperative inherent in these transactions. Wood (2002) and Brenner (2004) argue that through market imperative, the market acts as the mediator of social relations, premised on so-called purely "economic" forces. Thus, the market increasingly acts as a moral arbitrator for social property relations, in which the means of subsistence and reproduction are bought and sold, despite the central role of the state in imposing market relations (Wood 2002).

3.5 Military Sponsored Housing Projects

Since the 2011 uprisings, the military has repeatedly positioned itself as the guardian of Egyptian nationalism to expand its domain in public security and domestic affairs, and further the institution's economic and political interests. Yet, the institution finds itself in a difficult position in which it seeks to silence and discipline particular segments of society, yet attempts to gain popular support from those same segments. In an effort to bolster popular support, the military has embarked upon an ambitious housing project to develop one million low and moderate-income housing units for "Egyptian youth." The project aims to address the housing crisis, and in particular, provide an alternative to informal housing in Cairo's rapidly expanding *'ashwa'iyyat,* or low-income, informal/ illegal neighborhoods, which ironically are the neighborhoods subjected to increased policing since the revolution. The project also aims to garner widespread support by promoting employment (a projected estimate of over one million jobs), in addition to legitimizing the current government and steering people away from Islamist groups by increasing their access to the material needs of daily reproduction. Since the 1950s, many such projects aimed at low-income "youth" have come and gone, with limited impact on the growing housing crisis. Projects such as the Mubarak Housing Program, which included the

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[23] David Sims argues that windfall profits and opportunities for land speculation have been a driving force in the development of the desert areas around Cairo: "it is inescapable to suspect that much of this development represents an opportunity for pure land speculation and windfall profits, especially for state agencies and those who have influence with the government" (Sims 82, 2010).

Ibnee Baytak, or "Build Your Home," component that encouraged youth to build their own homes on subsidized land, were showpieces of the Mubarak regime, yet resulted in negligible advances, despite over LE34 billion in expenditures.[24] Though the military's new housing project is one of the few projects that launched in an environment of ongoing public demands for the right to land and housing precipitated by the 2011 uprising, the project was fraught with problems since its inception.

The military has partnered with the Emirati developer, Arabtec, to develop the housing units, despite the firm's inexperience with affordable housing projects of this scale. Arabtec is best known for building the Burj Khalifa[25] (2010) and has been awarded the Louvre Abu Dhabi project, a 64,000 square-meter complex on *Saadiyat* Island that will house the Emirati satellite site of the Musée Du Louvre.[26] According to one scholar, "The Egyptian Army facilitated the deal by pledging to donate 160 million square meters of land in 18 locations nationwide," but has since rescinded its commitment to donate land and limited the project's scope (Golia, 2015). The housing project reflects the strong regional support for the Egyptian military by Saudia Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, that have channeled an estimated $20 billion into the Egyptian economy since 2013 to help legitimate the el-Sisi regime after the overthrow of Egypt's first civilian president, Mohamed Morsi (Ottaway 2015). Tracing this money is difficult, as the military is not legally obligated to disclose its finances, but in the case of this housing program, financial support also comes in the form of state-sponsored stakeholders, such as the Abu Dhabi state fund Aabar, which has a 22 percent stake in the project (Golia, 2015).

Though the military has branded this project as a reflection of the institution's benevolence toward, and solidarity with, the Egyptian people, the project largely promotes the institution's own interests. The deal with Arabtec, announced in March 2014, two months before presidential elections, by then defense chief, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, positioned el-Sisi favorably as a presidential candidate. El-Sisi's popularity soared after the announcement, and his image as a leader who knows how to get things done and is in touch with the peoples' needs was one of his primary election platforms. Though the underlying goal of increasing access to low-income housing is imperative, the project is largely a public relations campaign to position el-Sisi and the military as heroes by attempting to solve the festering housing crisis. Additionally, it is yet another example of the military's ability to deploy land when needed, to use land as one of its many resources to secure its position as the preeminent institution in Egyptian society.

In addition to this project in partnership with Arabtec, the Egyptian government has also initiated a "social housing" project targeting the underserved "middle income" sector. As with prior housing projects, mechanisms assuring accountability for the production, completion and equitable distribution of housing units are nonexistent. In addition to the military's new housing projects, president el-Sisi has created a new military company, by a presidential decree, that encompasses a wide scope of services, including housing construction, real estate development

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[24] Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights: "Social Housing between Old Policies and Future Opportunities", December 7, 2014.
<http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2014/12/07/2296> [accessed December 10, 2015].
[25] Arabtec participated in the construction as part of a joint venture that included Samsung Engineering and Construction and Besix.
[26] The Louvre Abu Dhabi is "*conceived as a complex of pavilions, plazas, alleyways and canals, evoking the image of a city floating on the sea*" and is being developed by the Tourism Development Investment Company (TDIC), at an estimated AED 2.4 billion. <http://www.arabtecuae.com/Page.aspx?PageId=108&id=146> [accessed Oct 15, 2014].

and infrastructure development, among other things.[27]

The military's strategy of "development through new towns" (التنمية بالمدن الجديدة), which channels billions of pounds into the development of new towns such as the new administrative capital located east of Cairo, while ignoring the development of existing poor areas in Cairo and throughout the country, affords the institution unfettered opportunities to award contracts to military-owned construction companies and enterprises tied to key military personnel. According to the New Urban Communities Authority, there are currently over thirty new towns in various stages of development throughout Egypt. Since the land upon which new towns are built is controlled by the state, and in many cases, directly by the military, mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability are nonexistent. Instead, the military touts results, such as the number of units built and speed at which the towns are built, and promises to change Egyptian society through its new towns and housing programs. In his March 2018 nationally televised remarks at the launching of the new town on the Mediterranean coast, El Alamein Al Gadidah or New Alamein, president el-Sisi pressed project managers to complete new towns at breakneck speed, telling one project manager from Upper Egypt to complete the new town in less than two years, by the end of 2019. He pressed other project managers to deliver new housing units that are not only finished and have access to services and infrastructure, but are "fully furnished" so that poor Egyptians would not have to bring decrepit furniture and belongings into their shiny new housing. Such displays and promises are part of a larger narrative of the military-as-benevolent-savoir of Egypt and are strategic attempts to increase popular support for the former military-chief-turned-president ahead of the March 26-28, 2018 elections, in which he will run unopposed.

Not only are these new towns and housing projects viewed as economic development vehicles that will generate new jobs and solve the nation-wide housing crisis, they are conceived of as vehicles of social change and patronage. Yet, who has access to the types of resources such developments provide, versus those who are left behind in the informal/ illegal existing spaces of Cairo is not clear cut. The new administrative capital, in particular, is conceived of as an elite space of government officials and business leaders, off limits to the majority of Egyptians.

3.6 The Myth of Nationalism and the Islamist threat

In the months leading up to the July 3, 2013 popularly-supported military coup, in which Islamist President Morsi was removed from power, the military found itself in a tenuous position, as it attempted to espouse the democratic ideals of the January 25, 2011 revolution, yet maintain a status quo that affords it unprecedented control and access to resources. In response, the military repeatedly invoked national security to obfuscate its economic activities and control of resources, including land. Previous efforts to shield the military establishment from scrutiny, such as the amended Constitutional Declaration issued by the SCAF on June 17, 2012, attempted

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[27] According to Ottaway (2015, 7): *A presidential decree issued on May 18, 2015 has created a new military company called Military Production Company for Engineering Projects, Consultancies and General Supplies. The decree authorized the company to engage in a wide range of activities including development, contracting, and construction for housing, sports facilities, schools, hotels, tourist resorts, hospitals, factories, and roads, as well as urbanization and urban development activities, public relations and advertisement, real estate development, and tourism - very little seems to be omitted from the scope of the new military company. The military is thus poised to become the new, dynamic face of state intervention, but like everything that involves the military it will remained shrouded in secrecy.*

to enshrine its powers in the new constitution, limit the role of the democratically elected president, and give itself power to rewrite any constitutional articles that the constituent assemble put forth, as well as protect itself from prosecution for any previous "illicit" activities.[28] During the eighteen days of the uprising in 2011 and again in 2012, the military publicized the idea of unity with the Egyptian people through a series of public billboards and posters that declared *the army and the people are one hand*. The image shows a heroic army solider -- representing the military and SCAF -- cradling a cute baby, representing the Egyptian people. Versions of this poster have white fluffy clouds in the background. Initial responses to this public propaganda campaign were met with popular declarations that the Egyptian people are not children. Nonetheless, the symbolism of the images emphasizes the military's role as the heroic, powerful defenders of Egyptian national interests, in contrast to the infantile, weak Egyptian people, who are incapable of defending themselves or knowing their own interests.

Ironically, this slogan was used once again in government propaganda in 2013, particularly during the events leading up to the July 3, 2013 coup. As anti-Islamist and anti-Morsi sentiment swelled, and popular calls for the military to "save" Egypt from Islamist president Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood grew, the slogan's reception was more favorable. "*The army and the people are one hand*" was adopted as the chant of the millions of Egyptians who filled Tahrir Square on June 30, 2013, calling for the removal of the Islamist president. According to Samer Shehata (2015), the protests "were the largest demonstrations in the country's history, even larger than the 2011 protests against Hosni Mubarak…The protests clearly had the backing of the Egyptian military. American-made jet fighters drew enormous hearts of smoke in support of the protesters below. And a procession of military helicopters flew above Tahrir Square waving large Egyptian flags, to the delight of the crowds."[29]

For decades, the military's invocations of national security have been closely linked to the perceived threat of Islamists. Sayigh (2012) argues that without the imminent threat of attack from Israel since the signing of the 1979 Camp David peace treaty, national security narratives have shifted toward the domestic threat posed by Islamists and religious extremists. Since the June 30, 2013 anti-Morsi protests, which led the way for the July 3, 2013 coup that restored military power, the military has repeatedly framed Egyptian nationalism and the country's transition to democracy as a struggle against Islamists. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis are accused of being disloyal and anti-democratic terrorists interested solely in hijacking the country for their own aims, which allegedly includes the creation of an Islamic *umma*, or community, that transcends national borders.

To curb political participation of Islamists, the post-Morsi military government enacted a 2013 law outlawing political groups affiliated with religious groups, specifically targeting the Muslim Brotherhood's *Ḥizb Al-Ḥurriya Wal-'Adala* (Freedom and Justice Party), with which former president Morsi was affiliated, as well as *Hizb Al-Nour* (Party of the Light), a Salafi political party formed after the 2011 revolution. This has since been enshrined in Article 74 of

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[28] The constitutional articles favoring the military were largely overturned by the democratically elected civilian president, Mohamed Morsi, who also forced two key members of the SCAF into retirement. Morsi himself was forced out of power on July 3, 2013 by a popularly supported military coup. For an English translation of the 2012 amended Constitutional Declaration see: <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45350/Egypt/Politics-/English-text-of-SCAF-amended-Egypt-Constitutional-.aspx>

[29] Shehata, Samer (2015). "Egypt: The Founders," in *The Islamists Are Coming*. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/egypt-the-new-founders>, accessed April 10, 2015.

Egypt's new constitution,[30] which explicitly prohibits political action or the formation of political parties "on the basis of religion", in addition to outlawing acts that are of a "military or quasi-military nature."

Though the military enjoys widespread popular support, it is not immune to criticism. The military's heavy-handed response to subsequent crises has eroded public trust in the institution and led to the growing belief that the Egyptian military is a pillar of the ousted Mubarak régime and beneficiary of the corrupt policies that defined the Mubarak era. Particular displays of military brutality -- such as the military's role in the massacre of Egyptian Copts on October 9, 2011, in which at least 25 people were killed and hundreds wounded when the military assaulted peaceful protesters outside the state media headquarters in Maspero; its violent response to anti-military demonstrations outside the Ministry of Defense in Abbasiya, in which at least 20 people[31] were killed, hundreds injured and over 300 people arrested in May 2012;[32] its repeated abuse of protesters, exemplified by the beating of a young veiled woman (known as the "blue bra girl") whose cloths were ripped off, and who was dragged through the streets by soldiers, as well as the killing of a peaceful political activist, Shimaa Sabbagh, who was killed one day before the fourth anniversary of the revolution during a peaceful protest in downtown Cairo -- punctuate peoples' memories and make many Egyptians uneasy with the increased role the institution plays in domestic affairs. In the past few months, the military has been the focus of increased public criticism, but has hit back with new waves of arrests in an effort to subvert and intimidate critics.

Yet, the military continues to construct and disseminate narratives branding anyone opposed to its activities as terrorists, traitors or "unauthentic" Egyptians. This was most evident in the August 14, 2013 massacre of Islamists protestors and supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi in the *Raba'a Al-Adiwiya* Square in Cairo, in which approximately 900 people were killed and thousands imprisoned. The massacre of Islamists in Raba'a was widely supported by the popular press, which played an integral part in the demonization of Islamists as heavily armed traitors committed to the hijacking of the Egyptian state for their own aims. In an open letter to president Obama, a number of individuals and institutions that include prominent thinkers from the Brookings Institution, Carnagie Endownment and others stated:

> *The post-coup crackdown has left more than 2000 protesters dead -- including more than 1000 killed deliberately and systematically on a single day in August 2013, rivaling the Tiananmen massacre. Tens of thousands more are in prison, many detained without*

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[30] Article 74 of the Egyptian Constitution states: *All citizens shall have the right to form political parties by notification as regulated by Law. No political activity may be practiced and no political parties may be formed on the basis of religion or discrimination based on sex, or origin, or on sectarian basis or geographic location. No activity that is hostile to democratic principles, secretive, or of military or quasi-military nature may be practiced.*

[31] The number of people killed varies from one to over 20 depending on the source. The BBC claims 20 people whereas official Egyptian sources claim that one soldier was killed.<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17920053>[accessed March 10, 2015].

[32] The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights' issued a statement condemning the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) decision to use the military to violently disperse protesters in Abbasiya: *We condemn the ongoing policy of arbitrarily arresting everyone near the site of the sit-in and referring detainees to the Military Prosecution, which evidences that the SCAF continues to refer civilians to the military court system. Instead of the Public Prosecutor announcing an investigation into the crimes committed, more than 300 people in the environs of the Ministry of Defense were arrested, in addition to 7 more in the governorate of Suez. All of them were referred to the Military Prosecution, and some of them having been injured and admitted to various hospitals…* <http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2012/05/07/1410> [accessed March 10, 2015].

charge for extended periods or subject to mass trials in rigged courts, suffering torture and inhumane conditions.[33]

These public displays of brutality have spurred countless protests and grass-roots efforts to counter the military's message and reclaim the public realm.[34] Though pro-Morsi and anti-military protests have continued since the July 2013 coup, including in public universities in Cairo and the Nile Delta towns of Benha, Zagazig and Mansoura, Islamists, activists, and regular civilians have routinely been rounded up and imprisoned.[35] But, despite calls for greater transparency and accountability, the military continues to imprison activists and anyone who voices political dissent, and remains an opaque institution obfuscated by invocations of nationalism and national security.

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[33] <https://freedomhouse.org/article/open-letter-president-obama-about-egyptian-president-al-sisi#.VLgs8I6JUTM>[accessed Jan 15, 2015].

[34] Examples are numerous, including protests, sit-ins and graffiti campaigns by university students at Al-Azhar, Cairo, Zagazig, Mansoura and other universities, public murals against the military establishment, and countless anti-military protests nationwide.

[35] Even before the 2013 military coup, it was common for civilians, particularly young men, to be imprisoned and held without charge. The torture and killing of 28-year-old Khalid Said by two policemen in Alexandria on June 6, 2010, incited popular protests and the "We are all Khalid Said" campaign that helped mobilize support for the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Recent egregious examples of detention and torture are numerous, and include 19-year-old Mahmoud Hussein, who, according to Amnesty International, was imprisoned on January 25, 2014 on his way home from a peaceful demonstration for wearing a "Nation Without Torture" t-shirt and a scarf marking the "25 January Revolution." He was released in March 2016, after serving 789 days in prison, where he was allegedly tortured and forced into signing a confession.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/take-action/egypt-release-student-held-for-anti-torture-t-shirt/> [accessed January 7, 2016].

Table 3.1: Muslim Brotherhood Protests and Violence at Universities, July 2104-March 2015, Reported by State Information Service

Date	Location	Description / State Action
July 7, 2014	Zagazig University	20 students sentenced to one year in prison for inciting violence and riot at Zagazig University
September 19, 2014	Mansoura University	Terrorist cell arrested and charged with plotting to disrupt new academic year at Mansoura University
October 12, 2014	Ain Shams University	Students demonstrated and clashed with non-MB students, attacked security guards, chanted anti-regime slogans and stormed gates
October 14, 2014	Aswan University	3 students arrested for inciting violence, participating in illegal demonstration, membership in MB
October 16, 2014	Suez University	Student arrested for inciting violence
October 21, 2014	Zagazig Unviersity	2 students dismissed by University President, Ashraf al-Shehhi for organizing protests and inciting violence
October 29, 2014	Minya University	
November 11, 2014	Minya University	7 students arrested during on-campus protest for possession of petrol bombs and firecrackers
December 8, 20014	Al-Azhar University	4 students arrested during protests
Dec 12, 2014	Minya University	15 students arrested for inciting violence and attacking security guards
January 2, 2015	Mansoura University	7 students referred to military court over charges relating to protests at Mansoura University
January 18, 2015	Al-Azhar University	Protests at Faculty of Engineering and Faculty of Humanities
March 3, 2015	Zagazig University	Female-led protest calling for release of imprisoned colleagues
March 3, 2015	Cairo University	Clash with security

Data Source: Government of Egypt, State Information Service.

Chapter 4. "Talk of Crime" and The Islamist City

The Egyptian military's invocations of nationalism are enshrined in Egypt's new constitution, written in 2014 by a fifty-member constitutional committee that included representatives of the military, but specifically excluded representatives of the banned Muslim Brotherhood.[36] The only Islamist member of the constitutional committee was Mohammed Mansour, a representative of the Salafi backed *Hizb Al-Nour* (Nour Party). It is important to note that the Salafis supported the ouster of president Mohamed Morsi during the July 3, 2013 military coup. Presidential Decree No. 570 of the Year 2013, issued by interim president, Adly Mansour, mandated the makeup of the constitutional committee.

The constitution invokes the popular notion put forth by the military that *the army and the people are one hand* by emphasizing "the strong bond between the Egyptian people and their national army." The military's heroism and historical role as defenders of revolutionary actions by the Egyptian people are touted in the preamble as follows:

> *We, Egyptians, strived to keep up with the pace of advancement and offered up martyrs and made sacrifices in several uprisings and revolutions until our patriotic army stood up for the overwhelming will of the people in the "Jan 25 – June 30" Revolution that called for freedom, human dignity and social justice for all, and for Egypt to regain its independent will…*
> *This revolution is an extension of the revolutionary march of Egyptian patriotism, and enhances the strong bond between the Egyptian people and their national army that assumed the duty and shouldered the responsibility of protecting the homeland...*
> *This Revolution is further unique because of its peacefulness and ambition to achieve freedom and social justice combined.[37]*

Years after the second post-revolution presidential election, which occurred May 27-28, 2014, Egypt once again finds itself ruled by a military dictatorship under the leadership of president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who will run unopposed for a second presidential term in March 2018. The intertwining of the military establishment with the office of the president has resulted in the military's increased control over political affairs and unchecked power.[38]

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[36] The only Islamist member of the constitutional committee was Mohammed Mansour, a representative of the Salafi backed *Hizb Al-Nour* (Nour Party). It is important to note that the Salafis supported the ouster of president Mohamed Morsi during the July 3, 2013 military coup. Presidential Decree No. 570 of the Year 2013, issued by interim president, Adly Mansour, details the makeup of the constitutional committee. For an English translation of the decree see: <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2013.09.01_-_presidential_decree_establishing_50_member_committee_-english.pdf>

[37] January 2014 Egyptian Constitution, page 4. An English version is available at <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf>

[38] According to Freedom House: *Sisi reportedly used military resources in his campaign for the presidency, and his election and inauguration have left the military in long-term de facto control of the country's highest office. Reform of the security sector and checks on military influence in politics and the economy appear virtually impossible for the foreseeable future."* <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/EDC%20JUNE%202014.pdf> [accessed Jan 15, 2015].

The former military chief ran on an anti-Islamist platform, which included promises to rid Egypt of the "Islamist threat" posed by the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis and other Islamist groups. During his presidential campaign, he appeared on numerous television shows in which he openly warned Brotherhood supporters that their days were numbered, and openly asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood would not exist under his rule.[39]

With the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood, reversal of "Islamist-friendly" policies put in place by former Islamist president Mohamed Morsi, and reestablishment of domestic security and public safety as his primary campaign platforms, el-Sisi implemented a strategy to imprison Muslim Brotherhood supporters and other Islamists immediately upon his ascendancy to the presidency.

4.1 Spatializing the Islamist threat

The construction of narratives construing Islamists as an imminent threat to Egyptian nationalism and national security is not new, as it follows several decades of such narratives propagated by the Mubarak regime. The portrayal of Islamists as criminals, terrorists and social deviants is not only implemented via discursive practices and propaganda,[40] but relies heavily on the spatializtion of the "Islamist threat" to certain *'ashwa'iyyat.* Though the majority of Islamists groups active in *ashwa'iyyat* are not militants, the threat of militant Islam within low-income neighborhoods throughout Cairo has been instrumental in portraying *ashwa'iyyat* as bastions of extremism, illegality, and violence. [41]

4.1.1   *'Ashwa'iyyat*

The linking of the Islamist threat to particular *'ashwa'iyyat* is also not new. One of the most important episodes, that occurred in the 1990s, which established this link, was the raiding of a neighborhood commonly known at the time as the "Islamic Republic of Imbaba" (Singerman 2009). Imbaba is a low-income, informal area in Giza, which was a stronghold of militant Islamists in the 1980s and 90s. The neighborhood was largely controlled by the outlawed Islamist group - *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* - that espoused the use of violence through its practice of *hisba*, or "commanding good and forbidding evil" (Meijer 2011, 143). This practice "…leaves the believer room to remain passive but also calls on him or her to actively interfere in

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[39] For example, el-Sisi made these assertions in two May 5, 2014 interviews on private Egyptian satellite channels, CBC and ONTV. A clip of his interview with the popular talk show host Ibrahim Eissa on the liberal ONTV (which is strongly anti-Islamist, and until recently, was owned by the Coptic Egyptian billionaire, Naguib Sawiris) can be viewed at
 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/06/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-muslim-brotherhood-egypt>
[40] For more on these discursive practices, see Brand, Laurie. *Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria*, Stanford University Press, 2014. Chapter 3.
[41] Asef Bayat has long challenged the association between Islamic militancy and *'ashwa`iyyat* arguing that this link is based on a false presupposition that Islamists are concerned with the "political mobilization of the urban subaltern" (Bayat 2007, 585). He argues that, unlike Latin American liberation theology that was explicitly linked to the plight of the urban disenfranchised via narratives of "development, underdevelopment, and dependency" prevalent in Latin America, Islamist groups' primary concern is the "establishment of an Islamic order", as opposed to the mobilization of the urban poor (ibid). Thus, though Islamists have often stepped in to fill the void in primary services left by the retreat of the welfare state, the notion that informal/ illegal areas are instrumentally linked to the larger agenda of Islamic fundamentalists is mistaken. Nonetheless, the performance of religiosity and Islamist governance practices have had direct implications for public space and everyday life in such areas for several decades.

the lives of others and exhort or even force them to lead a pious life" (ibid, 144). Thus, the deployment of *hisba* manifests in a multitude of ways, from personal invitations to piety, to the explicit use of violence. The group's performance of piety includes the adoption of *gallabiyyas* and beards for men, *hijab* (and later *niqab*, or the full-face veil) for women, as well as the physical and social policing of neighborhoods in Imbaba, including limiting access to certain physical spaces and using violence as a means of enforcement (Meijer 2011, 147). Meijer argues that *hisba* infiltrated everyday life and practices in certain *'ashwa'iyyat*, and that though it did not originate as a political practice, its politicization and espousal of violence subverts state governance, as well as the state's monopoly on the use of violence (ibid), and may thus be understood as an attempt to delegitimize the state.

Salwa Ismail argues that "the production of new popular areas in public discourse as *'ashwa'iyyat* is part of a dominant system of representation that coheres with the Egyptian state's security objective of discipline and control" (Ismail 2006, xiii). Practices of *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* and other Islamists were instrumental in portraying *'ashwa'iyyat* as Islamist safe havens and urban dystopias on the verge of imminent social collapse in need of government surveillance, control and intervention. Thus, *'ashwa'iyyat* have come to signify the legible *habitus* of Islamist extremists, in addition to "subversive" elements associated with the urban poor. In the months after the January 25, 2011 revolution, Islamist youth groups were particularly active in *'ashwa`iyyat*, mobilizing political support and spearheading social and "cultural" campaigns to stake claim on public space. Previously outlawed Islamist groups, including "mainstream" groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as more radical Salafi groups, like *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, articulated an open, visible presence in *'ashwa`iyyat*, further promoting the link between these spaces and subversive Islamist activities.

It has been posited by many scholars that Islamist groups are often active in informal/ illegal neighborhoods precisely because of the inattention given to and stigmatization of such neighborhoods by "neoliberal" and semi-authoritarian regimes of rule, that exclude these populations from the privileges of full citizenship (Bayat 2007, Harb 2011, Ismail 2006, Mahmood 2005). Islamists have often stepped in to fill the void in primary services left by the retreat of the welfare state.

In an interview on the popular pro-government television show *90 Minutes*, Mostafa Madboly, the current Minister of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, framed the projects and the ministry's work of "rebuilding" communities as a national security imperative in response to terrorism. The host began the interview by saying: "The world does not only have destruction. The world does not only have bombings." His opening remarks framed the Ministry as a beacon of hope amongst the depravity of the uneducated, barbaric terrorists who inhabit low-income communities and attempt to incite violence and perpetrate chaos through terrorist activities in these communities.

The host's opening question was: "How do you clean up after terrorist operations? (*Into bit limu izay ba'ed al e'maleeat al ir'habi'yah*?)." It implies ubiquity and frequency of terrorist activities and destruction that they reek on urban neighborhoods -- no one is immune from the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorism the outlawed group spreads. Madboly began his remarks by offering his condolences to the families of martyrs and casualties of terrorist activities. He went on to portray the ministry on the frontline of battle with Islamists and terrorist -- they "clean up" after terrorist activity to bring normalcy back to the everyday lives of Egyptians. Like the police and state security forces, the ministry is tasked with doing what it can to help Egyptians lead dignified lives. The minister proceeded to outline the housing initiatives

implemented by the regime, including the program targeting middle income Egyptians. Yet, absent from the discourse was the notion of the right to housing and acknowledgment of the failure of the many initiatives that proceeded the regime's new housing initiatives. Also absent, was mention of the existing conditions in which millions of Egyptians live or any initiative to improve these conditions, as opposed to embarking on new housing programs, built in areas far from the sources of livelihood and existing social networks of the millions of people who need low and moderate-income housing. Building new housing, new cities, new neighborhoods is the normative planning practice the state has pursued for decades.

4.2 "Talk of Crime"

Under the current government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the link between militant Islamists and particular *'ashwa'iyyat* has reemerged as an instrumental narrative on national security. It is undeniable that since the revolution, the crime rate in Cairo has soared, in large part due to the release of criminals from government prisons by the Mubarak regime in an effort to undermine the revolution,[42] the prevalence of illegal weapons on the black market, smuggled in from Libya and the Sudan, and the abandonment of their posts by large numbers of the police force. Neighborhoods in Cairo that were once perceived as "safe" are no longer perceived as such, and an escalation in what Caldeira (2000) refers to as the "talk of crime" is evidenced in the mainstream media, and amplified on social media and by the practices of everyday life.

4.2.1 The Police and Chaos

The first protests of the 2011 Egyptian revolution were planned to correspond to Police Day (January 25), as a protest of corrupt police practices. As Salwa Ismail argues, "The experience of being humiliated in encounters with the police underpins affective dispositions such as anger, disdain, and revulsion toward the police" (Ismail 2012, 438). During and after the 2011 uprising, the police abandoned their posts and went into hiding, leading to a state of chaos and increase in crime in many neighborhoods. This led to the creation of *Legan Shabiya*, or Popular Committees, that consisted of neighborhood residents who self-policed their neighborhoods in order to maintain some semblance of public order in the absence of the police. Quoting military sources, Mohamed El-Bendary estimates that over 24,000 prisoners were "ordered to escape" from prison between January 25 and February 11, 2011, with approximately 11,000 prisoners "recaptured" during February 2011 (El-Bendary, 2013: page 63). It is widely believed that the Mubarak regime paid *baltagiya* or thugs, many of whom were ex-prisoners, to attack protestors and spread fear and chaos throughout Cairo, in an effort to highlight the importance of "security" and divert public support for political reform.

Egypt has strict gun control policies, governed by Law No. 394 of 1954 and subsequent amendments that greatly restrict gun ownership to military and police personnel, a select group of government officials, village chiefs, and a small group of private civilians who apply for permits. Yet, since the 2011 uprising, there has been a flood of illegal weapons available on the black market and, many civilians have purchased illegal weapons in response to the deterioration of the security situation. Thousands of weapons were reportedly stolen from police stations

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[42] See El-Bendary, Mohamed (2013). *The Egyptian Revolution: Between Hope and Despair: Mubarak to Morsi*. Algora Publishing.

during the revolution, and claims that illegal weapons are being smuggled into the country via Libya, the Sudan and Gaza are ubiquitous in the Egyptian media.[43]

4.2.2   *The Muslim Brotherhood as Instigators of Violence*

I cannot overemphasize the extent to which public acts of violence and terrorism are attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood in popular culture and the media. This mirrors the widely-held belief that the Muslim Brotherhood is responsible for instigating violence that was articulated by a wide range of people I spoke with and interviewed in 2015 and 2017. Many people I have interviewed even make the claim that the Muslim Brotherhood was responsible for masterminding the "Battle of the Camel," in which protestors were attacked by men on horseback and camels in Tahrir Square during the 2011 uprising (the night of February 1-2, 2011). It is known the attack was orchestrated by former Mubarak-regime officials, including the former speakers of Egypt's parliament, Fathi Surur and Safwat al-Sherif. Twenty-four Mubarak-regime officials faced charges of manslaughter and attempted murder related to their involvement in the "Battle of the Camel," but were acquitted by the Egyptian Judiciary in October 2012. Though the acquittals were decried by human rights activists, opposition leaders and regular citizens, they have led to a host of conspiracy theories regarding the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in the incident, as well as claims that the group regularly incites violence against civilians.

The claims that the Muslim Brotherhood is the main instigator of violence against civilians and the police is regularly made by people of all walks of life, and is perpetuated by the media, which often acts as a mouthpiece for state accusations and campaigns against the MB. The Ministry of Interior, the government ministry under which the police and domestic state security apparatus falls, and the State Information Service, play a unique role in the dissemination of such claims. In the period between July 2014 and March 2015, the government released information regarding every alleged act of violence perpetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood. During this nine month period, the government reported the arrest of 5,090 Muslim Brotherhood members on charges varying from membership in an outlawed terrorist organization, participation in illegal protests, to murder and incitement of violence. Additionally, an undisclosed number of Muslim Brotherhood members, alleged to be members of terrorist cells, were also arrested (see Table 4.1 below).

The State Information Service also made public a "photo album of MB violence" highlighting alleged violence perpetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, including graphic images of bombings, attacks on personal property, state security installations and other graphic, violent acts. The imagery of alleged Muslim Brotherhood violence circulated widely in the Egyptian media, both on state-controlled channels as well as pro-government privately owned media. Pro-government television stations repeatedly showed images of violence, including a handful of protestors at the *Raba'a Al-Adiwiya* sit-in firing at police during the operation to clear the square. These images and video clips were constantly looped on television in the period immediately after the massacre of civilians that occurred during this operation to reinforce the notion that those present in *Raba'a Al-Adiwiya* Square were armed militants and terrorists whose removal necessitated the use of force.

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[43] For example, see <http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/authorities-intercept-weapons-smuggling-libya

Table 4.1: Muslim Brotherhood Violence, July 2104-March 2015, Reported by State Information Service

Month	Number of Incidences Reported	General Categories of Crimes**	Number of Reported Muslim Brotherhood Arrests
July 2014	47	- Murder - Staging illegal protests - Cyber crimes - Illegally protesting on Anniversary of Revolution - Protest at Al Azhar University	- **286 arrested** - **264 sentenced** - Undisclosed number of MB members arrested and accused of involvement in terrorist cells
August 2014	48	- Protest at Mansoura University - Protest at Faculty of Engineering, Shebin el Koum (no arrests) - Possession of illegal weapons - Possession of explosive devices - Burning police vehicles - Instigating violence - Inciting protests - Attacking police stations - Sabotaging public institutions	- **328 arrested** - **2 sentenced** - 12 released - 11 acquitted - 280 referred to court over allegations of violence - Undisclosed number of MB members arrested and accused of involvement in terrorist cells
September 2014	40	- Disturbing public order - Membership in outlawed group (MB) - Road blockade - Targeting policemen - Setting fire to Emirate NBD and KFC restaurant	- **305 arrested** - **72 sentenced** - Undisclosed number of MB members accused of involvement in terrorist cells arrested
October 2014	53	- Possession of leaflets instigating violence - Burning electricity transformers - Anti-police graffiti - Plotting terrorist acts	- **781 arrested** - **73 sentenced**
November 2014	40	- Plotting to overthrow regime - Plotting terrorist acts against churches - Plotting terrorist acts against tourist facilities	- **773 arrested** - **20 sentenced**
December 2014	43	- Committing violent acts - Inciting riots - Instigating violence - Possession of extremist literature - Protests against security forces and armed forces	- **405 arrested** - **7 sentenced to life imprisonment** - 400 referred to court over allegations of violence - 15 referred to court martial - 6 acquitted
January 2015	82	- Staging protests without permission from security forces - Terrorist plots against police and government buildings - Planting homemade bombs - Attacking private and public facilities - Use of fireworks - Administration of FaceBook pages that incite violence	- **1,551 arrested** - **23 sentenced** - Undisclosed number of MB members arrested and accused of involvement in terrorist cells
February 2015	44	- Possession of illegal weapons - Attacking police stations - Possession of explosive devices - Possession of opposition leaflets	- **311 arrested** - **28 sentenced**
March 2015	29	- Burning police vehicles - Attempting to flee - Protest at Zagazig University (no arrests) - Protest at Cairo University (no arrests) - Spying for Hamas	- **350 arrested** - **1 killed**

** This list of crimes is based on State Information Service descriptions of crimes instigated by suspected Muslim Brotherhood members involved in terrorist activity. It is not exhaustive and does not represent the final legal charges in court cases brought against Muslim Brotherhood members.
Data Source: Government of Egypt, State Information Service.

4.2.3 The Conflation of Islamists with Terrorists

On February 24, 2014, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters issued a ruling declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Though many Egyptians believe that the uptick in Cairo's crime rate, as well as explicit acts of terrorism, are directly associated with efforts of Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to undermine Egypt's political transition and subvert president el-Sisi's rule by creating fear and chaos, little evidence has been found linking such attacks with mainstream Muslim Brotherhood members. A host of previously unknown Islamist terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for various attacks perpetrated since ex-president Morsi's ouster in July 2013. For example, a relatively unknown "jihadist" group called *Ajnad Misr* ("Egypt's Soldiers") claimed responsibility for several 2013 bombings, which are largely still attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of these groups now have links with the self-declared Islamic State (or *Daesh* in Arabic), blurring the lines between mainstream political Islamists and terrorist groups.

Nonetheless, high profile terrorist attacks, such as the October 22, 2014 bombing outside Cairo University that wounded 11 people,[44] attacks on government installations such as the Kerdasa police station in August 2013,[45] and the March 2015 attacks on police stations in Wa'rak and Ouiseim, are attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Kerdasa attack resulted in the killing of 11 policemen, and was largely viewed as retribution by Muslim Brotherhood supporters for the July 2013 massacre of Islamist protestors in *Raba'a Al-Adiwiya*. An Egyptian court ruling on April 20, 2015 sentenced 22 people, mostly Muslim Brotherhood members, to death for this attack. The night of the attack, the widow of one of the policemen was broadcast live on Egyptian television, grieving her husband. The state sponsored program showed the widow crying, clocked in a black *'abaya*, speaking about her orphaned children and the poverty in which they will live without their father. The families of the slain police officers were portrayed as real people, worthy of sympathy, whereas the families of the alleged perpetrators are portrayed as animals and dehumanized.

The instrumental use of victims' families makes tangible the charge that "mainstream" Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, support terrorism. This charge is often invoked to justify heavy-handed policing tactics in certain neighborhoods that allegedly harbor Islamists, and to imprison, detain, and execute Islamist opposition members, as well as to use excessive force to put down protests by pro-Islamist students and activists. As Salwa Ismail argues, "there is an important spatial dimension to policing practice with popular quarters being subject to the most intrusive and continuous campaigns" (Ismail 2012, 439).

4.2.4 Popular Representations of Crime

The intensity and ubiquity with which assertions linking *'ashwa`iyyat* to militant Islamists are made is unprecedented and extends beyond explicit government narratives to Egyptian popular culture. A slew of contemporary Egyptian films and television dramas portray *'ashwa`iyyat* as bastions for Islamic extremists, illegal drugs, violence and personal vice,

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[44] <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/113717/Egypt/Politics-/Officials-say-Cairo-University-bomb-was-detonated-.aspx> [accessed October 28, 2014]. Also see <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/us-egypt-blast-idUSKCN0IB1W720141022> [accessed October 28, 2014].
[45] See <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/egypt-sentences-22-death-attack-police-150420105312825.html>[accessed April 21, 2015].

deeming their residents social deviants and extremists unworthy of public sympathy. Several private satellite television stations, such as ONTV, actively promote the discourse denouncing and demonizing Islamists.

A particularly popular television drama that depicts the societal problems associated with *ashwaiyaat*, entitled *Ibn Halal* (Good Guy), aired in 2014 during the month of Ramadan (June 28 – July 28, 2014). The drama revolves around a young man from a humble non-urban background who relocates to Cairo in search of work. He, his mother and sister live in an informal/illegal area, where he is unable to secure a full-time job or any form of stable employment other than as a day-laborer who paints houses. The family barely gets by under oppressive class, gender and religious constraints that necessitate the performance of masculinity that puts him at constant risk and in conflict with local thugs, as well as the law. Unable to secure the financial means to get married to the neighbor with whom he has fallen in love (who is subsequently married off "informally," against her will, to a Gulf-Arab man, in return for a cash payment to her father), or care for his female dependents, his sister marries an old widower to secure her future.

The drama highlights the vulnerability of the Egyptian poor, as well as the excesses and corruption of the Egyptian elite. The hero is framed for the murder of a wealthy divorcee, and is jailed and tortured for a crime he did not commit. He eventually escapes and ultimately embraces a life of criminality, which includes the assembly of an informal "army" of thugs that allows him to rule his informal/illegal area and create a state within a state. An important aspect of the drama is that despite being a "good guy," the hero, by virtue of his socioeconomic condition and association with *'ashwa`iyyat*, ultimately embraces a life of criminality. It portrays *'ashwa`iyyat* as the legible *habitus* of the "criminal" urban poor, and promotes the notion of *ashwaiyaat* being lawless states within the state that exist outside of the rule of law. This dramatic narrative further propagates the societal narrative of *'ashwa`iyyat* as spaces of criminality in need of discipline, surveillance and control. Another popular Ramadan series, entitled *Sigin AlNisaa* (The Women's Prison), depicts the complicated stories of several female inmates, most of whom are associated with criminality in *'ashwa`iyyat* in various ways through drugs, prostitution, murder, or other forms of social deviance. These dramas reflect the most predominant societal understandings of *'ashwa`iyyat* and the subsequent criminality of the urban poor associated with the informal/ illegal spaces in which the poor reside.

4.3 The Islamist City

Narratives linking terrorism and the increase in violent assaults to mainstream Islamists claim that such incidences signify a new level of moral discipline and control of public space by Islamists and others who seek to imbue the public realm with their particular moral perspective. Such practices allegedly reached their height during Morsi's rule (2012-2013). Many women I interviewed in Cairo in March 2015 alleged they had experienced various forms of intimidation by Islamists during ex-president Morsi's rule. In addition to public attacks on "un-pious" women,[46] another particularly ubiquitous form of intimidation involved the "shaming" of women by other women. Many women claim being "shamed" by women wearing *niqab* (the full-face veil) who reproached and publically ridiculed them for not wearing *niqab*. Many of the women

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[46] For example, forms of discipline include the cutting of unveiled women's hair, including two highly publicized cases involving a 13-year-old Christian girl in the Cairo metro and Muslim schoolgirl by her teacher in Luxor in 2013.

subjected to public shaming are "respectable," middleclass women in their seventies, who dress conservatively and are themselves veiled.

Other forms of public intimidation include Islamist attempts to undermine the authority and reputation of highly visible professional women. A university professor told me she was reproached while she was lecturing in front of thousands of students by her self-identified Islamist male students for "standing in front of a room full of men" and allowing her voice to be heard by men other than those who were her "*mihram*" (such as her husband, father, brothers, or sons). As she states: "*They told me I was going to hell because my voice was enticing.*" Many women believe that societal views and the general atmosphere toward women, of all social classes and ages, deteriorated during ex-president Morsi's rule, who, as many women claimed, allowed Islamists to function with impunity.

4.4 Governance Practices and Islamist Regimes of Rule

Islamists regimes of rule have widely engaged in what Salwa Ismail (2006, 34) calls multiple "societal practices of government" manifest through "everyday forms of governance" in *'ashwa'iyyat,* yet since the Morsi presidency, such practices have expanded beyond the spaces of *'ashwa'iyyat* into Cairo's general public realm. Such practices include "the control of public morality," including the monitoring of gender relations and women's movements in public space, and "the management of quotidian conflicts" (Ismail 2006). As Ismail argues, such practices include disciplinary measures, in addition to the mediation of disputes and conflicts using informal, "Islamic" mediators - or *majlis 'urfi*. Ismail details how official governance structures (such as courts) are bypassed in favor of informal *majlis 'urfi*, who rule on disputes within a specific domain (sometimes defined as a certain street, building, physical area, or in terms of a particular social network).

Though these practices facilitate the resolution of disputes by bypassing the slow, inefficient governance structures of the state, they reinforce hierarchical and patriarchal structures, as well as codify strictly regulated social norms. The social norms imposed in such mediations encompass both relationships within families, as well as those between neighbors, and are most often tied to Islamic norms of civility, morality, inheritance etc. But it may be argued that they also encompass the *performance* of Islamic piety and religiosity, as issues of personal ritual practice may also be mediated via Islamic mediators.

Ismail argues that many of these practices are aimed at the monitoring and control of public space, and imposition of Islamic norms governing morality, family and gender relations. The "governance of morality," is deployed via the use of "gossip, social ostracism, and threats of eviction from the neighborhood" (ibid 42) to maintain "respectable" social relations in accordance with Islamic understands of morality and transgression. In effect, such practices discipline residents by demanding acquiesce to certain moral and social codes.

Current debates posit such practices as manifestations of the "hidden agenda" of Islamist groups to further Islamicize Arab cities and societies via the implementation of Islamic *shari'a*, or Islamic law. As these attacks and types of disciplinary practices escalate, public space in Cairo increasingly becomes a contested terrain. Such practices exemplify what Nezar Alsayyad has

called "the fundamentalist city," defined by the exclusion of certain groups and normalization of such exclusions in everyday practices.[47]

4.5 Islamic Heritage and Plans for Cairo

The disciplinary activities of Islamists in Cairo's public realm threaten the official image of Cairo put forth in ambitious plans – such as the Cairo 2050 and 2052 Plans[48] - to reshape and position Cairo as a modern metropolis in which Cairo's Islamic heritage is deliberately appropriated and deployed to brand the city. Such plans attempt to create a city devoid of *'ashwa`iyyat* by instituting aggressive measures, including "slum" clearance and the relocation of millions of people from Cairo's so-called Islamic or medieval neighborhoods, as well as other "strategic" neighborhoods (such as near the Pyramids), to facilitate this goal and create "open museums" in such neighborhoods. The Housing Ministry's plans for turning the "City of the Dead" cemeteries into a "museum" area, necessitates the displacement of over 500,000 residents.

Though the government insists that it will offer fair compensation and resettle displaced residents, critics of these plans note that Cairo's poor continue to be pushed out and asked to subsidize middle class needs through displacement from their livelihoods, neighborhoods and homes. Similar homogenizations of space and extensions of abstract space may be seen in Rio and Caracas, where "favela tours" or tours of the "city of the red roofs" attempt to create order and orient informal/ illegal areas towards "productive" purposes, tourism, and further capital accumulation via space. These redevelopment plans also attempt to refashion the city into an organized denizen of middle- and upper-class homeowners by promoting planned developments in the form of gated communities in newly developed areas outside of central Cairo, as well as promote the new mortgage system, which caters exclusively to higher income wage earners employed in the formal economy.

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[47] Alsayyad posits that such practices are transforming the city into a space in which "religious fundamentalisms…claim it as a new domain beyond the idea of the nation" (Alsayyad 2011, 24). The transformation of such cities "into fragmented landscapes made up of spaces of exception" (ibid) underpins what he calls the fundamentalist city, and implies that the institutions of the nation state are circumvented or subverted by "fundamentalists" actors within this domain. The result is a city in which the ruling power or majority religious group exclude minorities, denying them access to services and space; that demands public conformity to its religious codes; limits women's access to public space; and normalizes these exclusions in everyday practices (ibid, 16). Though the processes taking place in cities like Cairo today may be viewed in terms of Alsayyad's notion of a fundamentalist city, this conceptualization may restrict our understanding of the underlying aspects that inform socio-spatial processes in cities throughout the Arab world by ascribing them to a particular determinant – religious fundamentalism. It is not my goal in this dissertation to engage with the notion of "fundamentalism," which is problematic, but to highlight that an understanding of complex socio-spatial processes through the lens of religious "fundamentalism" does not stress the multitude of factors that inform and animate urban actors' motives, actions, and beings. If one views these processes via the lens of Lefebvre's dialectical notion of the urban, as something that "lives" through social practices, such as the scripted performance of piety (Mahmoud, 2005) many Islamists view as necessary in the making of the pious self, it allows us to view the urban as something continuously in flux with the needs, desires and potentialities of ordinary people. This is critical to a holistic understanding of the socio-spatial practices that constitute the urban (and the active production of space) through lived experience in cities such as Cairo.

[48] The Cairo 2050 Plan (and Cairo 2052 Plan) proposes several interventions, including the redevelopment of business districts, transportation corridors, and "public" spaces that will necessitate the clearance of large tracts of informal/ illegal neighborhoods. It has been widely criticized by the Egyptian press and academics as insensitive to the needs of Cairo residents, and for espousing a top-down, non-participatory approach.

The 2001 Mortgage Law, and subsequent amendments to promote the accessibility of market-based mortgages to potential homebuyers, have had negligible impact on the low-income housing market. The mortgage laws establish a framework for market-based low-risk mortgages, and the eventual creation of a secondary mortgage market via previously unavailable mortgage-backed securities. Ultimately, the mortgage system aims to shift the burden of housing finance onto the newly developed private housing finance market, thus improving liquidity in the real estate market, with potentially positive consequences for Egypt's overall economic development. Yet, despite these laudable goals and efforts to make housing finance affordable for the average household (including a maximum LE10,000 upfront cash subsidy, in addition to a three-month mortgage payment guarantee for low income households), Egypt's relatively new mortgage system is created in the image of other government-backed market-based systems that privilege a small middle class at the expense of the great majority. The mortgage system benefits middle-income households who can afford a minimum LE400 monthly mortgage installment, well outside the means of millions. Additionally, the basic steps involved in securing a mortgage – everything from verifying the buyer's income to appraising, insuring and registering the property – remain out of reach for low-income workers, most of whom are employed in informal sector jobs and are in the "informal" low-income housing market. The mortgage laws place particular emphasis on the *nature* of the property, meaning it must be registered or eligible for registration, thus the majority of low-income housing falls outside the realm of mortgage eligibility, making the mortgage system inaccessible to potential low-income home buyers.

Normative modernist planning principles, as espoused by the above-mentioned redevelopment plans, dominate Egyptian planning practice and "the ideology of *tanzim* (conformity to norms) flows through all of the planer's discourses" (Deboulet 2009: 213). These top-down planning practices valorize expert knowledge and attempt to negate the agency of particular segments of Egyptian society deemed dangerous or uncivilized. The construction of "exceptional spaces" outside of the normative planning and social realm legitimates the need for intervention and, ultimately, the extension of disciplining and control efforts within these spaces.

4.6 Good Versus Bad Islam

A struggle for signification over the meanings and appropriations of Cairo's "Islamic" heritage, modes of being and urbanism is tacitly underway, with intense tensions between official notions that promote a forward-looking, "good" Islam, as manifest through official plans that exploit Cairo's Islamic architecture and heritage, versus the "bad" Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, which is linked to Islamic militancy and "backwardness." Projects such as Al Azhar Park, the "public" park on the site of a former garbage dump near Cairo's Islamic core, adjacent to the popular area of *Al Darb Al Ahmar*, invoke Islamic design principles in an attempt to re-signify and re-inscribe the unquestionable nature of Cairo's "Islamic tradition." Al Azhar Park exemplifies what Singerman (2006), Abaza (2006) and Roy (2009) have called "Islamicized public spaces." In the case of Cairo, the re-signification of Cairo's Islamic tradition extends beyond spaces of tourism and leisure into spaces of education, as in the case of the newly built American University in Cairo campus in New Cairo, as well as spaces of consumption, as in the case of shopping malls and developments that invoke idealized Islamic "streets" and "bazaars" that attract an increasingly "Islamized" middle class (Abaza 2006).

Figure 4.1: Al Azhar Park, Cairo
Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi

Though highly controlled and scripted Islamic public spaces, such as those described above, are used by planners, bureaucrats, and developers to brand Cairo and facilitate tourism and capital accumulation, the "Islamicized" urban spaces of Cairo's informal/ illegal neighborhoods and streets remain the messy theater in which popular struggles for the future of Egypt are articulated. The ruined façade of the Islamic Museum in Cairo, located on Port Said Street in central Cairo, the largest and most significant collection of Islamic art in the world, stands testament to this struggle. The museum was bombed by a car bomb on January 26, 2014 by Sinai-based Islamist extremists, who were targeting the police headquarters on the other side of the street. The museum suffered significant damage and is currently being restored.

The ruined façade of the Islamic Museum in Cairo and other such images of Islamist carnage are used to garner support for aggressive anti-terrorism measures against mainstream Islamists, including the reintroduction of the Emergency Law[49] in 2013 after Morsi's overthrow

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[49] The Emergency Law was declared after the assassination of ex-president Anwar Sadat in 1981. Egypt was under the Emergency Law for the entire duration of the Mubarak regime (1981-2011). The Law was allowed to expire in May 2012, shortly before the first post-revolution presidential election, but was reintroduced in January 2013 for two months under ex-president Mohamed Morsi. In August 2013, shortly after Morsi's overthrow by the Egyptian Army, the interim government reintroduced the Emergency Law for three months. It was imposed for the Sinai in July 2015, as a result of the escalating violence associated with self-declared "Islamic State" militants in the peninsula.

and the *Raba'a Al-Adiwiya* massacre, as well as the 2013 Protest Law, which severely curtails citizens' rights of assembly in public space and defines a protest as any gathering that "exceeds ten to express their opinions or demands, or political discontentment" (Law No.107 for 2013, Article 4).[50] The Protest Law was issued by interim president Adly Mansour, on November 24, 2013, largely in response to on-going pro-Morsi protests, as well as to limit the ability of Islamists and opposition groups to stage public demonstrations against the interim military regime. The law imposes strict guidelines for public meetings, processions and protests, as well as potential harsh penalties on participants, including imprisonment and monetary fines. Article 8 of the law stipulates that "Whoever wishes to organize a public meeting, or conduct a procession or protest should submit a written notification….at least three working days prior to the start of the meeting, procession, or protest…" Article 10 gives the "Minister of Interior or the specialized Director of Security" discretion to prohibit, suspend, relocate or alter the route of any public meeting or protest, whereas Article 14 designates "'specified safe area' in front of vital facilities" that are off-limits to public meetings. Article 13 grants security forces the right to use non-lethal, as well as lethal force against participants, including "Firing non-rubber cartouche bullets" if deemed necessary.

Non-Islamist civil society groups have also been targeted, and the lines between Islamist and non-Islamist opposition have been blurred and are often ignored in the military's attempt to stifle opposition to el-Sisi's rule. The national security rhetoric used to justify the banning of Islamist political parties and activity is aggressively applied to other sectors of Egyptian civil society, with comedians, journalists, activists, academics, musicians and others being targeted, disciplined, imprisoned or subject to charges of espionage and treason. The list of civilians subjected to intimidation and/ or imprisonment by the Egyptian regime is extensive and includes high-profile media figures such as comedian Bassem Youssef, who was summoned for questioning by the Morsi regime in 2013 for allegedly "insulting Islam" and ex-president Mohamed Morsi. Youssef is wanted by the el-Sisi government and currently resides outside of Egypt, to escape persecution. A more recent case involves television anchor Azza AlHenawy, who was suspended and summoned for interrogation for criticizing el-Sisi and other government officials for their response to flooding in Alexandria and Beheira that resulted in several fatalities in November 2015. Additionally, several Egyptian Al Jazeera correspondents, formerly based in Cairo, have fled the country, for fear of persecution. On May 6, 2016, an Egyptian court sentenced, in absentia, two Al Jazeera journalists, Alaa Omar Sablan and Ibrahim Mohammed Helal, along with journalist Asmaa al-Khateeb, to death for allegedly leaking state secrets. Additionally, on September 17, 2016, an Egyptian criminal court froze the personal assets of five prominent civil society leaders -- Hossam Bahgat, Mostafa Al-Hassan, Gamal Eid, Abdel Hafez Al-Tayel and Bahey ElDin Hassan. More recently on March 5, 2018, Khairy Ramadan, a pro-government talk-show host, was detained for allegedly insulting the police, an act el-Sisi proclaimed is treasonous. Currently, Al Jazeera journalist Mahoud Hussein remains in custody, without charge, after being arrested in December 2016 by security forces while on vacation in Cairo.[51] Today, in an atmosphere of fear and distrust, the military, with coordinated effort from the state security services, continues to stifle political dissent and imprison activists and protestors. The establishments' rhetoric promotes the notion that people who voice dissent or

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[50] An English translation of the Protest Law or Law No.107 for 2013 may be found at
<http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/protest_law_issued_nov_24.pdf>
[51] See <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/al-jazeera-mahmoud-hussein-detention-renewed-12th-time-180312154606857.html> [accessed March 15, 2018].

protest in the streets are attempting to undermine the regime and deserve to be imprisoned or killed. [52]

4.7 Exporting Islamism

With the increase in repression and imprisonment, as well as rise of narratives linking Islamists to escalating acts of public violence and terrorism in Cairo, many "mainstream" Islamists, particularly those with ties to the once-again banned Muslim Brotherhood, have gone into hiding. In contrast to their visible, assertive presence directly after the January 25, 2011 revolution and throughout the Morsi presidency (2012-2013), many Islamists have attempted to deflect attention to themselves by disengaging in the active performance of piety[53] that was ubiquitous throughout the last decade, opting instead to shave their beards and wear western attire. Since president Morsi's overthrow, those who could flee the country did so, with many taking refuge in Qatar and Turkey, which are viewed by many Egyptians as strongholds for Islamist political parties and regimes of rule.

Turkey was once seen as a model for Egyptian Islamists, a model in which "modern" Islamist parties govern in accordance with democratic ideals. As Ashraf Khalil argues, the Egyptian military was open to the Turkish model, but "The unspoken implication was that the military would retain the right to step in and overthrow any elected government that it deemed was straying from the proper path" (Khalil 2011, 275). Khalil quotes a senior general, and advisor to the SCAF, as saying: "We want a model like Turkey, but we won't force it…Egypt as a country needs this to protect our democracy from the Islamists. We know this group doesn't think democratically" (ibid 275). As Egyptian-Turkish relations have significantly deteriorated since Morsi's overthrow, Turkey is now viewed mainly as a safe haven for Islamist extremists aimed at undermining Egyptian nationalism.

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[52] An editorial by Amr Hamzawy calls the regime's tactics to stifle political dissent "ridiculing politics" – or "a conscious attempt by the regime to discredit civilian political life in its entirety, while promoting the belief that only the generals are capable of governing the country." See <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/24150/the-general-knows-best_ridiculing-civilian-politicn> [accessed April 6, 2016].

[53] Saba Mahmood (2005) notes that the *practice* and *performance* of Islamic piety is regarded as instrumental to the constitution of the pious self and has manifested specific socio-cultural practices that greatly impact everyday life. Such socio-cultural practices and performances are articulated in various ways including through measures such as veiling, prayer, crying during prayer (which is the "ultimate sign of *salat* (prayer) performed with consummate excellence" (ibid, 129)), as well as the espousal of "Islamic" virtues such as shyness and modesty, traits valorized as reflective of women's true submission to God. This emphasis on what Mahmood calls "exteriority" (or the practice of religious rituals) as a means for moral formation manifests specific socio-cultural practices that impact both the pious self and social realm in which such practices are exercised. Mahmood claims that this, coupled with the practice of religious *da'wa* (or to urge people to become more pious or proselytize), has promoted the "Islamization" of Egyptian society, as witnessed by the proliferation of the spaces of religious piety (e.g. mosques, Islamic associations) as well as by the trend toward increased religiosity and displays of religious piety in everyday practices/ life.

Figure 4.2: Pro el-Sisi, Anti Qatar, Turkey and Obama Poster

Corniche El-Nil, Shop Front Near the Ministry of Interior, Cairo. March 2015   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

The poster declares that President el-Sisi is the best leader ever to lead Egypt who will successfully achieve what other leaders have previously failed to achieve. It also depicts President Obama, as a bearded Islamist, walking his dogs, Hamad Al Thani (the Father Emir of Qatar) and Tayyip Erdogan (president of Turkey).

Near Obama it reads: Obama's biggest supporter and producer of terrorism in the world. Toz Feek (screw you) Omaba, you and the dog, Erodgan, and the traitor dog Emir of Qatar.

In response to the exodus of Islamists after the 2013 military coup, the Egyptian government recently established new protocols for overseas travel to countries such as Turkey, Qatar and the Sudan,[54] stipulating that men between the ages of 18 to 45 must obtain an Egyptian government-issued security clearance prior to leaving Egypt. This measure is allegedly to curtail the flight of Islamist fugitives attempting to flee the country. Additionally, Egyptian women between the ages of 18 to 40 must also obtain security clearances prior to traveling to Turkey,[55]

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[54] The Sudan is one of the few countries where Egyptian nationals do not need visas.
[55] <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/egypt-restricts-women-travelling-turkey-150517131121635.html> [accessed Dec 3, 2015].

allegedly to stop Islamist women from seeking refuge in Turkey or traveling to Syria to join the self-declared Islamic State via Turkey.

4.8 Differentiated Egyptian Citizenship

These measures, employed under the rhetoric of national security, are but a few ways in which the formation of "unworthy" subjects of rule is promoted in post-Mubarak Egypt. The spatialization of the Islamist threat in the public imaginary, narratives linking extremism and acts of terrorism to mainstream Islamists, coupled with tangible restrictions on and limitations to the rights of Egyptian citizens, all serve to further the claim that some citizens should be subject to a different, more restricted form of citizenship, based on the short-comings of particular segments of society. In Egypt, many such categories of people fall into this classification (the poor, the mentally and physically disabled etc.), but, since the 2013 military coup, the construction of narratives emphasizing the differentiated citizenship of Islamists - a group whose disenfranchisement is seen as pivotal to the unfettered apotheosis of the Egyptian Military - is manifest in various socio-spatial practices that further demarcate, isolate and deem such people unworthy of full citizenship, and the claims with which such citizenship is associated. This, coupled with the construction of narratives valorizing the military establishment as heroic guardians of Egyptian nationalism, who "saved" Egypt from the Islamists, and who continue to protect the country from impending Islamist threats, serves to create distinct groups of citizens who are deemed worthy or unworthy based on their alleged affiliations and intrinsic limitations associated with their subjectivity.

These narratives reject the idea that Islamists can be sincere, loyal members of the nation. They are portrayed as violent, subhuman traitors whose allegiances are elsewhere and thus, are a threat to the nation. This justifies the use of violence against them and limits their claims to national belonging. In his address to parliament on February 13, 2016, president el-Sisi reiterated the notion of an Islamist conspiracy to undermine Egypt's progress towards "democracy" and nationalism, stating in different parts of his speech:

> *We - the Egyptians - have completed the future road map that was approved by all of us when we decided to restore the nation from those who had tried to hijack it for attaining their warped goals and narrow interests….*
>
> *The great Egyptian people managed to accomplish freedom and democracy and to restore their dream for the future in the face of backwardness…*
>
> *We should never forget that we have managed to thwart a plot and foil a conspiracy. We should be aware that some people are lurking for us in the dark and who do not want for this nation to be an exception from countries of the region which suffer from turmoil and instability. Those people are seeking to sabotage our national project for development and stability.[56]*

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[56] These quotes are from an English translation of President el-Sisi's February 13, 2016 address to the Egyptian Parliament on the Egyptian State Information Services website: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=99450#.VsgSu46CimF> [accessed February 19, 2016].

El-Sisi's remarks exemplify the discursive narratives that promote a paradigm of differentiated citizenship between Islamists and the rest of "the Egyptian people," one that justifies the use of violence against those who allegedly seek to "sabotage our national project." At the same time, el-Sisi's praise for the military establishment and emphasis on the sacrifices made by the military and state security forces, furthers the narrative of the heroic military establishment, who saved Egypt from "backwardness," and without whom the country would fall into chaos and be hijacked by disloyal, treacherous, self-serving Islamists.

The president's continued identification with, and valorization of, the military, is evident in his assertion that:

> *I belong to the Egyptian military institution as a fighter. I have learned inside this institution the meanings of patriotism and the principles of honesty, honor and sacrifice as well as devotion.*

Assertions such as this serve to set military men apart from the rest of Egyptian society, whom he refers to as *"the simple and ordinary people of this nation."* [57]

4.9 Conclusion

"Talk of crime" and the perceived threat of mainstream Islamists is creating a city in which residents not only fear each other, but also fear the potential Islamist infiltration of Cairo's neighborhoods, streets, and institutions. This fear is exacerbated by the military's efforts to brand mainstream Islamists as the root of most of the city's and country's contemporary problems, and position itself as the only viable institution that can subvert the alleged Islamist plan to spread chaos, terrorism, and oppressive Islamist rule. In its efforts to undermine the legitimacy and popular support for mainstream Islamists, the military has branded groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood as traitors, terrorists, and instigators of violence. These charges are made against Islamists as well as non-Islamists who oppose el-Sisi's rule, question the role of the military in Egypt's society and economy, or openly criticize the military and state security apparatus.

Not only are narratives valorizing the military and demonizing Islamists and civil society propagated through discursive measures, but, as previously argued, they are spatialized via the demarcation of particular neighborhoods as Islamist strongholds in need of disciplining, as well as the privileging of military urban developments and land dealings. The current limitations on personal and political rights, and demarcation of particular subjects as deviant, un-Egyptian, and in need of discipline and elimination, and the valorization of the military as a breed of Egyptians that is "one hand" with the people, yet is set apart from the "simple" masses, is undermining Egypt's prospects of achieving a viable and vibrant democracy, in which all citizens are appropriated the same rights and may make claims to such rights.

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[57] El-Sisi emphasized the increased threat of "black terrorism" and praised the security forces for their sacrifices, stating: "In the forefront of this confrontation were the men of the great Egyptian army and the brave policemen who are sacrificing their blood and lives for maintaining the sanctuaries of this nation." -- President el-Sisi's February 13, 2016 address to the Egyptian Parliament.

Chapter 5. Public Space and its Discontents

Narratives construing particular Egyptian subjects as dangerous, "un Egyptian," and unworthy of particular rights, and the corresponding closure of political and social space, serves to devalue the public realm in general, and public space in particular. As the regime has defined a congregation of over ten people in public space as a "protest," and actively propagates the notion that those who publically express political opinions or hold opposing political views than those of the ruling regime are instigators of violence and deserve to be disciplined, opportunities for political expression have considerably narrowed since el-Sisi's election in 2014. As spaces such as Tahrir Square were once revered as sanctioned spaces of political expression and self-determination, they are now stigmatized as the spaces of "troublemakers," dissidents, and political instigators aimed at undermining Egyptian nationalism and progress.

Not only are so-called "opposition spaces" stigmatized and devalued, the recent politicization of public space and breakdown of social relations precipitated by the events of the 2011 popular uprising have further stigmatized the public spaces of daily life. Millions of Cairo residents inhabit and traverse the public realm as they go about the practices of their everyday lives. They walk down public streets, wait at bus and microbus stations, ride in public buses, sit at coffee houses on public sidewalks, work in workshops that occupy public roads, sidewalks and alleyways, pray on public sidewalks, sell their produce and wares in public markets, sidewalks and roads, and go about a host of other activities that Bayat (2010) has described as "the quiet encroachment of the ordinary" into the public realm.

But, despite the robust, active utilization of public space in Cairo, public space is highly stigmatized, and being in public space is an implicit statement about social class, and, in effect, a statement about ones' access to rights and privilege. The avoidance of the public realm is not just a gender issue, for fear of sexual harassment, though this is one of the most pertinent issues facing women in Cairo, it is about the opening up of adverse opportunities that being in the street makes one susceptible to. The street marks one as lower class and open to violation; it promotes the dehumanization of the person, as they become one of the millions of disposable bodies to which various regimes of rule may impose discipline. In the context of semi-authoritarianism, the lack of respect for individuals and limited rights to which people have access, creates a sense of liminality that is made more real, tangible, and urgent in public space.

Residents of Cairo do all they can to avoid its un-programmed public spaces; all attempt to avert the liminality associated with being in public space with subtle declarations of worthiness -- the veil, the suit, the phone, the bag -- all act as superficial indicators of status and social standing. Cairo residents attempt to avoid the urban public realm outside the confines of ones' community -- the gated communities of the rich, the middleclass neighborhoods, the *hawary* (allyways) and *'ashwa`iyyat* of the poor. Those who can send their drivers to do errands, their maids to stand in lines, their office "boys" to cross the city streets. Those who cannot avoid such spaces are made to recognize their liminality and the possibility of infringement upon their person, dignity etc. Those with greater resources can bypass public space, and may outsource the inconvenience and potential risks and violations associated with ones' presence in the public realm. The stigmatization of public space aids in the maintenance of an invisible class of people to which rights, wealth, access etc. is bestowed; everyone else is on the streets. The ability to not be in the street reflects one's advantages, both materially as well as socially and politically, as in

order to shield oneself from public space, one requires privilege, and only the wealthy and connected can circumvent the street to not have a presence in public space.

5.1 The Negation of the Street

Layla, a thirty-something-year old engineer, works at Orascom Construction. An AUC graduate, holder of advanced degrees, and fluent speaker of multiple languages, she quickly worked her way up the corporate ladder. She calls into conference calls with counterparts in London, Washington D.C. and project sites around the world, and frequently travels to attend meetings and manage initiatives worldwide. Her travel schedule is exhausting, so she prefers to stay in Cairo when possible. Her office, in the Nile City Towers, a complex completed by Orascom in 2003 that includes two thirty-four floor skyscrapers, a five-star hotel and mall, which houses the headquarters of the Orascom Group, commands sweeping views of Cairo below. Layla drives to work every day from her home in Maadi. The security guards know her well and acknowledge her as she parks in the tower's underground garage. Moments later, she emerges into the secluded world of one of Egypt's largest multinationals. Layla works late almost every day; she has lunch at Casper and Gambini's, in the mall below the office towers, usually surrounded by other Orascom employees. The mall is open to the public, so sometimes she encounters groups of people she does not know, but usually, she is completely within her element, greeting friends and colleagues, instructing the waiters to customize her food the way she prefers, making and finalizing appointments etc. Layla tells me she has everything she needs at the Nile City complex -- a drycleaner, flower shop, stores, and gym. She gets her hair done weekly at the Fairmont Hotel branch of Mohamed Al Sagheer, a high-end salon she has frequented since the 1990s. The Fairmont Hotel is nestled between the two Nile City office towers, so she does not have to exit the complex to fulfill this weekly task. She can accomplish and procure most things she needs within the complex. The shop assistants in the mall know her and she can deploy one of the many workers within the complex on simple errands, if needed.

Working at the Nile City Towers is one of the reasons she stays with Orascom. She has thought, on multiple occasions, of leaving the company, although she has a highly coveted job, which makes her the envy of many of her peers, the environment is laced with the sexism that plagues most Egyptian engineering firms. Though she holds a high managerial position, it is assumed, by many male colleagues who do not know her, that she is "just a secretary," and she is exhausted by always having to assert herself in ways in which her male subordinates are not required. But, the insular space of the Nile City Towers, the ease with which she can enter and exit her office, get her hair done and fulfil her errands, without stepping foot on a public street, is enough to delay her departure. Her daily life is structured around the ease of being insulated, to a certain extent, from *al sha'ab* and all that entails. Though she drives to and from work, and deals with the incessant flow of cars and pedestrians on the streets through which she maneuvers, she is shielded from the types of interactions most Egyptian women dread. In the Nile City Towers, threats are managed and social class is controlled. If someone dares to harass her, the security guards who line the perimeter of the mall, monitor the garage, and control who goes into and out of the complex, may be deployed to assist her. They are good at keeping certain people out, and thus, even the "public" spaces within the mall are sanitized of the most notorious offenders – low-income men. She deals with a type of sexism she can manage, particularly given her leadership position, which gives her a type of authority and agency she does not wield on the street.

Beyond driving in her car, Layla rarely interacts with the Egyptian street. She does not walk, even to neighborhood cafes; she does not sit on public benches, or wait on public sidewalks. The extent of her interactions in the public realm entail driving her car and walking to and from her parked car. She always has her car readily available, either parked nearby or with her driver. Growing up, she used to walk to school and walk within her neighborhood, but now, given the social changes precipitated by the 2011 uprising and increased crime, she always drives her car. The public street is a space that is off limits to her. She has no interest in engaging in the types of interactions she sees occurring on public streets, or with the types of people she sees inhabiting the public realm. She is comfortable traversing public space in the confines of her car, only stepping foot into the public realm when accessing her automobile. The closer she can park to her destination, the better. She structures her outings with friends around the exclusivity of the venue and ease of parking. If she knows parking is a problem, she takes her driver. If not, she risks it and drives herself. It used to be the case that one could trust the *manadee,* or the men who parked cars on public streets, but now, random criminals may act like a *manadee* and steal ones' car. If she goes somewhere new, she never interacts with anyone claiming they are a *manadee*. She has simply refused to park places in which groups of men, claiming to be *manadee*, loitered on the street. She would rather go home than put herself in a compromising situation or deal with a potential criminal.

Layla's ability to shield herself from the street, to fulfil her daily needs within the confines of private space, lies in her being of a certain social class and the resources to which she has access. This is not something she is willing to give up, despite the daily expressions of deeply rooted sexism and patriarchy within her professional realm. To leave the relative comfort and socially exclusive space of the Nile City Towers would be to potentially subject herself to the necessity of being in the public realm. An increased presence in the public realm is simply not worth the tradeoff for her, as she expects to face the same expressions of sexism, or worse, in any engineering firm. Orascom has a reputation of attracting highly educated engineers from "good" backgrounds, so if sexism is rampant at Orascom, imagine what it is like elsewhere, she argues. The challenges she currently faces are manageable, and she does not want to place herself at a disadvantage by not having daily access to the controlled environs of the Nile City complex.

Layla would like to extend this social exclusivity to other aspects of her life, and has purchased a villa in a gated community in Sixth of October City. She did a significant amount of market research to determine which development was worth her investment and concluded on a high end gated community in Sixth of October City because it provided the type of exclusivity, amenities and security she feels is now necessary in her residential environment. She is no longer amenable to living in a building on a public street, where the garage attendant often parks her car on the street. Her neighborhood is changing, and she does not want to interact with the types of people she increasingly sees on her street. Like others of her social class, Layla sees the signs signifying the inevitable decline of her street and questions how long she should wait to make the move to a more exclusive development. Her siblings have already moved to Sixth of October City, and she is convinced her imminent move to a gated community is the right choice for her family.

5.2 Being Left Behind

"No one lives in Zamalek anymore. It's full of *bawabeen* (doormen). If anyone tells you they live in Zamalek, that means their dad is a *bawab* (doorman)," says Yasmeen. Yasmeen, a

forty-five-year old Zamalek native and American University in Cairo graduate, tells me about the apartment building in which she grew up, in what she says is the nicest section of Zamalek, near *Ganaynat Al Asmak* (the Fish Garden). The doorman, who initially lived in a shack on the roof, built a permanent structure for his family on the roof. His son, who went to college and now thinks of himself as a Zamalek native, drives around in a Mercedes and tells people he lives in the "penthouse" of their building. Yasmeen is indignant that the *bawab's* son could claim to be from the same building. She says he brings friends to the building; he even brought foreign girls once, who obviously did not realize he is just the *bawab's* son. The *bawab* and his family have taken over the building, and now there are slews of questionable people coming into and out of the building. The *bawab* calls them "business" associates; Yasmeen thinks they are drug dealers. How else would he have amassed enough money to build a penthouse and buy a Mercedes? The social hierarchy that once defined respectable society, *nas muhtar'ra'meen*, has broken down and now the *bawab* thinks he is one of, if not better than, them.

The breakdown of the old order is not only facilitated by the egregious claiming of space by *bawabeen*, but by the great migration of the upper class to gated communities and "compounds," as they are called. Many of the original families who lived in the building have left, leaving behind closed apartments and renters. The social fabric of the building is not what it used to be when Yasmeen was a child, when the *bawab* could never dream to act with such audacity and impunity, and pull off his penthouse and drug scheme. Back then, no one could walk into their apartment buildings, or barely down the street, without being questioned. The *bawab* was a *bawab*, not a "business man," and he knew his place. Now, he hires someone else to sit in his place while he and his family exploit the building, as if it is their personal property.

As Yasmeen laments the social changes taking place in her beloved Zamalek, one of the issues that most upsets her with the preponderance of *bawabeen* asserting their control of space and changing the dynamics within buildings, is the erosion of family life within her building. It used to be that her building was a safe space in which the children could move about freely, without their parents worrying about strangers entering or harassment by neighbors. Everyone in the building was known; the *bawab* would greet the children after school and help carry their backpacks and packages when they arrived home; her mother could deploy the *bawab* and his wife to do errands for her; one word from her father was all it took to put the *bawab* in his place. Though the street outside carried the risk of unwanted or potentially dangerous encounters with strangers, the space inside the building was a refuge for the family. Strangers would not even be allowed to sit on the building steps, let alone enter the building. As a child, once she reached the building threshold, Yasmeen felt safe, within a bubble, shielded off from the uncertainty of the street outside. Now, this uncertainty follows her to her apartment doorstep, as a host of shady characters move freely amongst them. There is no shared space within the building in which children do not need to be monitored. The loss of the primacy of her upper-class family, and their claim on the shared spaces of the building, is devastating to her sense of belonging. She is being pushed out, made to feel a stranger in her childhood home. With the influx of renters, prominence of the *bawab*, and breakdown of interpersonal relations amongst those who remain, the dynamics have changed, and, facilitated by her father's death, her family no longer has the social clout it once commanded, with ease, within the building.

Yasmeen's sense of nostalgia is palpable. Her longing for the socially insular structure of the building's past reveals a growing sense, amongst her peers, that their upper-class families are being besieged, both socially and physically, by the noxious aspects of Cairo's growth. The neighborhoods that were once insulated from the most pervasive externalities of unfettered urban

expansion, which were shielded from the masses by their expensive real estate and social exclusivity, are succumbing to the physical and social demise brought on by overcrowded streets, deteriorating infrastructure, and a subversion of the deeply ingrained class structure the flows of both low and high-income residents into and out of the neighborhood have precipitated. Yasmeen indignantly describes the audacity of the *tuktuk* drivers who dare cross the bridge from Midan Kitkat in Imbaba, into Zamalek. Kitkat was once an invisible barrier that separated the two worlds. Those from Imbaba who needed to cross into Zamalek, such as the thousands of maids and shop assistants who service upper class homes and businesses, often crossed the bridge by foot, or took the water taxi, as both were less expensive, and, often, quicker than risking an indefinite wait on a microbus, taxi or bus. Now, *tuktuks*, and their lower-class riders, swerve in and out of traffic, clogging up Zamalek's arteries, both literally and figuratively.

"Look at what happened to Garden City," argues Nagy, a forty-eight-year old American University in Cairo graduate, entrepreneur, and father of three. "Garden City used to be nice," he says, before the 1970s and 80s, when old, historic villas were converted into banks, embassies and other commercial and governmental uses. Garden City is not the only example Nagy invokes; just look at *Wust Al Balad*, or downtown, which, during his father's time in the 50s and 60s, used to be beautiful and respectable. Nagy is certain that the demise of these neighborhoods are harbingers of what is to become of other neighborhoods; no one is immune from the barrage of the Egyptian *sha'ab* , or people, destroying their environs. Nagy grew up in Maadi in the 1970s, before the onslaught of apartment buildings, built in the 80s and 90s, outnumbered the idyllic villas that had previously defined Maadi's character. Many of the villas have been torn down and in their place, massive apartment buildings tower over the gardens of the villas that still stand. Worse is the build out of *Maadi Gadeedah*, or New Maadi, in the 1980s and 90s, and the onslaught of characterless apartment buildings into which hundreds of thousands of middle class Egyptians moved. Worse yet, is the migration of hundreds of thousands of poor people who built thriving *'ashwa`iyyat* in the spaces and fringes between the new formal developments and Old Cairo, and even in the crevices of Maadi proper. Maadi, Nagy claims, has turned into an informal/illegal area -- *monti`aa 'ashwa`iyyah.* His street still retains its character, but how long should he wait until it is engulfed by middle class apartment buildings and *'ashwa`iyyat*? He feels it is inevitable that Maadi will turn into a Garden City, inundated with apartment buildings, full of people not from the neighborhood, too congested to drive one's car or park, unsafe for one's children. Many of his friends have already moved out; he is one of the few holdouts, securing his property with additional fences, gates, motion activated floodlights, and dogs. Nagy describes his plight as if he were a foot soldier in a war against the common masses.

In the mid 2000s, at the time the American University in Cairo was constructing its new campus in New Cairo, Nagy bought each of his daughters an apartment near campus. Specifically, he looked for apartments near the faculty housing the university was developing, on a few streets adjacent to the campus. At the time, he was uncertain about New Cairo's development into a respectable, upper class area, and did not know if New Cairo would ever be as desirable as the Maadi of his youth. But, he did know that, even if his daughters never lived there, his investment would most likely be profitable, because apartments near the AUC campus will always be in demand. For him, these streets, filled with AUC professors and their families, were the only guarantee of a neighborhood of a social class he could tolerate. Other areas in New Cairo may flounder, but the area near AUC is destined to flourish due to its proximity to faculty housing and the wealthy, educated offspring of his peers. For Nagy, moving to another neighborhood is only possible if it promotes the maintenance of his social class. He would have

to inhabit a space surrounded by other upper-class people, or, if it lacked this critical mass, it would at least have to be looked upon favorably or approved of by other rich people.

Social class is everything to upper class Egyptians. Dina, a forty-something mother of three and AUC graduate who completed her graduate studies in London, argues that you can discern a family's social class by its female members. Even if a family lives in a nice area, has a nice apartment and drives nice cars, she must interrogate the females of the family before allowing them entre into her social circle. She argues that a man can wear a sports coat and a pair of jeans and look cool or upper class, but a woman will always betray her *baladi*[58] (popular) taste and upbringing, even if she is wearing Gucci from head to toe. Regardless of how expensive her clothes are, *baladi* touches shine through -- garish makeup, ostentatious accessories that try too hard, ill-fitting clothes, over processed hair, outdated hair color, cheap or unpolished shoes. Worse than these fashion faux pas, women assert their social class through their every action, particularly the way they speak and act; it just oozes out of them in ways they cannot help -- inappropriately calling someone *habibti* (darling), low class hand gestures and body language, even the way a woman kisses another woman on the cheek while greeting her, all of these things reveal social class. Men can easily cover up their social shortcomings and ill-breeding by acting intellectual, aloof or cool, in ways that women can never pull off. According to Dina, you can take an Egyptian girl out of the *balad* (village),[59] but you cannot take the *baladi* out of an Egyptian girl. For Dina, where a person's family is originally from, for the large part, determines their social class, even if they have moved to a nicer neighborhood. The social sensibilities of *baladi* culture, associated with their lower-class neighborhoods, will follow them, despite their efforts to acquire more sophisticated taste and cleanse themselves of their *baladi-ness*.

A friend of mine once told me he would never marry a woman from Heliopolis because there were too many nouveau riche families who had moved into the neighborhood after its heyday in the 1950s and 60s. The old families had moved out, leaving only *baladi* newcomers who latched onto Heliopolis's past identity and claimed the glory of its sophisticated history for themselves. But these new comers were neither sophisticated nor glorious, just middleclass masses who infiltrated a formerly exclusive neighborhood. Worse than these people, were the middleclass military types from *Madinat Nasr*. He would not talk about them, as it was beneath his dignity to even acknowledge them.

There is an understood, but often unspoken, sense of environmental determinism with regard to social class, in which where one lives automatically acts as a proxy for ones' social class. It is inconceivable that an upper-class family live in Imbaba, maybe a lower-class nouveau riche family that may be richer than Dina, Nagy or Yasmeen, but they live in Imbaba, and hence, are not upper class, but the Gucci wearing, *baladi* types about whom Dina laments. These narratives of social class are all tied to place and espouse the most simplistic notion of environmental determinism -- particular places are understood to be home to particular types and classes of people, who implicitly espouse particular sensibilities, values and ways of life.

Being from Shobra, Zamalek, Maadi, Imbaba, al Darb al Ahmar, Abassiya or any other neighborhood means something; it implicitly reveals social class, and is understood to embody

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[58] *Baladi* is often used in a derogatory sense of something espousing lower-class sensibilities, vulgarity or being devoid of sophisticated taste. But, it may also imply the notion of authenticity, as it is associated with *al sha'ab* (the people). See Messiri 1978; Singerman 1995; Armbrust 1996; Ghannam 2002.

[59] *Balad* (بلد) literally means country, or land, whereas *kar'iyah* (قرية) means village, but *balad* is used colloquially as a proxy for village. For example, if one is going to ones' *balad*, it implies ones' village or area of origin, often a rural village.

commonalities of identity and belonging. "Where do you live," is often the first question people ask each other when getting acquainted. It is never an irrelevant question, as it is pivotal to the categorization of the person with whom one is meeting for the first time. It is part of the social class dance -- let us figure out where you live and who our common connections are, so I may assess if you are my social equal and hence, worthy of my acquaintance. According to Dina, this has long been the case for vacation homes; where one vacations signifies a lot, and where one owns a vacation home signifies everything -- Agamy, Marina, al Diplomassien, Sidi Abdul Rahman, Al Gouna, Marassi, Hacienda -- each implies a particular affiliation. Before the first generation of gated communities was developed in the 1990s, developments such as Dreamland and Katamiya Heights, "desirable" residential neighborhoods were understood to be Maadi, Zamalek, Dokki, Mohandessien, and Heliopolis. Parts of these neighborhoods were off limits, as they were infiltrated by or too close to informal/ illegal developments. But, if someone asked where one lives and one replied Mohandessien, one was at least given the benefit of the doubt, and it was assumed one was a person of means. The recent prevalence of gated communities and compounds has somewhat subverted this, as financially successful, upwardly mobile people of multiple social classes have access to new housing opportunities, outside the traditional domains associated with the upper classes, in which barriers to entry were often insurmountable. Now, anyone with financial means can purchase one of the thousands of oversupplied apartments or villas in any of the new gated communities. This class reshuffling is abhorrent and exhausting to upper class Egyptians, who prefer the old, inflexible indicators and physically determinant expressions of social class that put them and kept them on top of the social hierarchy.

The fear and social stigma associated with being left behind by the social class with which one identifies is tangible in narratives regarding neighborhood change and relocation. How long does one wait before deserting the traditional spaces of the upper classes? Yasmeen does not want to live in a neighborhood of *bawabeen* and the leftover people who did not have the foresight to move. Nagy does not want to be surrounded by middle class apartment buildings and *'ashwa`iyyat*. There is enormous risk associated with being left behind, of not keeping up with ones' peers and isolating oneself in neighborhoods that may soon lose their social clout. Yet, there is also great risk in buying a property in a new community that may not attract a significant cluster or critical mass of similarly situated people, from an equal or higher social class. Discerning how exclusive a new development will be, and how its exclusivity will be maintained, is a matter of social survival.

5.3 Public Access

Nagy took a risk and bought apartments in New Cairo, in a building on a public street near AUC, and hopes their proximity to the university will maintain their value and social appeal. Others are not so risk tolerant. The idea of anything public -- an apartment in a building on a public street, a public park, anything to which the masses have access -- is perceived negatively in the Egyptian real estate market. The more physically and socially exclusive a development is, the more desirable it is to high-end consumers. Public access and public space are viewed as liabilities, as allowing "regular" people into high-end neighborhoods erodes their social exclusivity. Having poor people, or the majority of regular Egyptians, within their physical and social realm is something upper class Egyptians try to avoid at all costs.

Many gated communities, such as Dreamland, are designed as mixed-use spaces which have townhouses and properties that target middle income Egyptians. Dreamland also has a

theme park, a mall and retail establishments, which can be accessed by the masses, or anyone with a car who can get there. This makes Dreamland inexcusable to people like Yasmeen and Dina. Just the name -- Dreamland -- is enough to make an upper class Egyptian nauseous. It is so passe, so blatantly aspiring to be upper class, a thing of the middle class. But, when upper class Egyptians buy real estate, they fear they will end up living in a Dreamland-like development, a pastiche of mediocrity and bad taste, or worse. Many high-end consumers rushed to buy property in Dreamland in the 1990s, only to be confronted with the horror of moderate-income people, and lower-class expatriate Egyptians, who had saved money in the Gulf, claiming that they, too, lived in Dreamland. The more discerning upper class Egyptians avoided Dreamland, and bought into Katamiya Heights. There, the possibility of lower class infiltration was warded off by exorbitant property costs and an informal screening of potential buyers by the developer. According to a project engineer, one had to have an "in" in order to buy; not just anyone was allowed to shell out their money, one had to be connected and allowed access. This is how exclusivity is maintained. This, as well as not allowing public access. The more exclusive the development, the better it is in the eyes of rich Egyptians.

Gates and the lack of publically accessible space act as bulwarks against the infiltration of lower class Egyptians into their realm. There will always be poor people around, the maids, drivers, repair men, workers and others who serve them, but upper class Egyptians do not want anyone who does not have a legitimate cause, just anyone off the street, to be within their social and physical realm, inhabiting the same space. In order to be desirable, the new developments to which the upper class migrate have to be exclusive, impenetrable to the infiltration of the lower classes and mediocrity of the middle classes. As the "desirable" neighborhoods of the 1980s and 1990s signaled social class and class affiliations, the new generation of gated communities and compounds have also come to be affiliated with particular social classes and degrees of exclusivity.

5.4 Aspirations of Exclusivity

> *Egypt is moving forward at a pace that has never been witnessed before. With steadfast economic reforms by the government, the country is moving in a new direction. Real estate sector reform, disposable income and consumer demand has changed the dynamics of the real estate sector. Additional factors such as congestion and pollution have created burdens on city life and people have come to desire a better way of life for their families.*
>
> Sodic Marketing Material, 2015

For an Egyptian developer of high-end real estate, "a better way of life for their families" translates into the maintenance of social class in gated communities, shielded from the masses, with all the amenities necessary for a modern lifestyle within reach. The bourgeois utopias (Fishman 1987) of Cairo's new gated communities attempt to supplant the old neighborhoods of the rich by creating more exclusive neighborhoods on Cairo's fringes. The 1997 Cairo Master Plan paved the way for the expansion of the metropolis on an east-west axis into the desert (see figure 5.4). Sodic advertisements suggest that, with the onslaught of uncontrolled, rampant development, families such as Yasmeen's are besieged by the ubiquitous social, environmental and security threats that are, literally, at their doorsteps. Cairo's problems have come to them, yet they are not resigned to the new conditions in which they find themselves. Having resources

gives one choices, and for many high-end consumers, the choice is simply to move and recreate the idyllic neighborhoods of an imagined past, or anticipated future.

Sodic's advertisements emphasize that basic aspects of urban life have been eroded -- the right to inhabit public space, to live in a pollution-free environment, to live in a neighborhood -- and subsequently, notions such as childhood, happiness, and community have been stolen from Egyptians. These elusive aspirations are not things that can be recreated and reinstated in the overcrowded, polluted, uncontrolled, socially non-uniform spaces of Cairo's older neighborhoods. They are things that may be created and managed in the exclusive, manicured developments of Cairo's gated communities. Sodic positions itself not just as a developer, but a lifestyle company that can reinstate the things lost by Yasmeen and Nagy; they can deliver and maintain the types of environments high-end consumers want -- socially exclusive, well maintained, immune to the infiltration of lower classes and potential loss of social exclusivity.

The family plays a central role in the marketing of Sodic's developments, as the developer attempts to convince high-end consumers that their developments are not just high-end residential communities devoid of character and family life, they are *communities* and *neighborhoods* that allow upper class families the opportunity to recapture what is being eroded by Cairo's overcrowding, pollution and environmental degradation. Families, women, children, the elderly may truly *inhabit* public space, not simply traverse public space. Children may live out childhood, protected from the uncertainty of Cairo's streets and public spaces. In its advertisements for its October Plaza Development,[60] children play, uninhibited, with their dog in green grass; the words *play* and *playground* are penciled in handwritten script. Another advert features a child in costume, on play equipment, surrounded by greenery. The references -- the dog, costume, manicured grass -- are western reference that do not reflect the reality of most Egyptians' lives. "*An Exclusive Neighbourhood*" reads the advertisement, in English. Sodic's gated communities represent an attempt to reclaim the right to experience childhood, public space, happiness, and neighborhood by invoking the notion of a gated community as a happy neighborhood, or *Happyhood*, as Sodic calls it. These notions play upon consumers' nostalgia, which was articulated by Yasmeen and Nagy, for the socially insular residential units of the past -- the Maadi villas and Zamalek apartment buildings of the 1970s and before -- in which upper class families had social dominance and control of their physical environments. In which there was more certainty and a uniformity of social class. The maintenance of social class and realignment of the social order to what it once was, and shielding of the family from the socio-economic and environmental reality of Cairo is a significant part of what is being offered.

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[60] The advertisements appear throughout Cairo, but are heavily concentrated in Zamalek and the *Mihwar*, which connects Zamalek with Six of October City.

Figure 5.1: Sodic Advertisement for October Plaza Development
Zamalek, Cairo. July 2017   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Sodic's developments are portrayed as spaces where one can simply *be* in public space, without the risk of harassment, crowds, noise, pollution, encounters with beggars, or regular people who gawk at one's privilege. Sodic offers the amenities and conditions under which residents of their communities may live unfettered by the limits of Egyptian society. Central to the ability to simply exist in the public realm is the sense of social exclusivity; keeping out the lower classes and managing public space are pivotal to the maintenance of this.

October Plaza and Sodic's many other "happyhoods" fall under the framework of what the developer calls "human developments." Sodic envisions its developments as instruments of social change, with the ability to change how people live and experience the city around them. These ambitious goals are rooted in an environmentally deterministic conviction, espoused by Sodic management, that if residents are given access to well-planned mixed-use communities, public spaces, and amenities that support an active lifestyle, in which people engage with and not simply exist within their urban environments, certain aspects of Egyptian society may be salvaged and improved. Sodic attempts to build these "human developments," as opposed to traditional gated or golf course communities, such as Katamiya Heights, in which there is a golf course, club house and little else. One cannot inhabit a golf course, cannot simply exist, without purpose, on a golf green. Sodic attempts to subvert the notion that Egyptians cannot be outside or inhabit public space for fear of harassment or because of the social constraints placed upon simply being in public. The developer attempts to reclaim public space for activities such as going for a run, or using public space for activities that are perceived as purposeless, do not

necessitate a reason, but, at the same time, do not signify lower social class. Sodic management reference Hyde Park in London, where one may simply sit or go for a run without being bothered. Thus, a central space that is accessible, well maintained and devoid of the types of issues plaguing public space in Cairo is an essential aspect of its new developments. Sodic creates a controlled, closely monitored, socially exclusive "public" realm within each of its communities by incorporating master planning and landscape elements that shield various types of residents and nonresidents from one another.

For example, Sodic's mixed-use Allegria compound targets the highest-end residential consumers, or what is known in the Egyptian real estate market as A and A+ consumers. The developer aims to attract a certain type of person within this market -- one who is highly educated and integrated into the global economy. This new global elite is connected to what Castells (1989) calls the space of flows, that defines and maintains their privilege, and who are more attuned to the lifestyles and sensibilities of their peers and counterparts in London and New York, than to residents of Cairo. These consumers do not consider mixed-use a positive selling point, but perceive such developments as places for lower socio-economic strata. Previous attempts at mixed use development, such as Dreamland, have been successful with B- to B+ consumers, but at the time Sodic embarked on its Allegria project in the mid-2000s, there were no models of mixed use developments in Cairo that successfully attracted the population of high end villa and residential buyers to which Allegria is targeted. The Allegria masterplan is based on a mixed-use concept, yet, it is planned in such a way so as to incorporate the various uses in a manner that provides access to all land uses, while buffering residential areas, particularly high-end, single-family villas. Though the master plan aims to create an innovative and integrated community, residential exclusivity is *the* guiding principle. The villa and townhouse neighborhoods are buffered to ensure the creation of completely residential neighborhoods.

Allegria's master plan incorporates design elements and orients land uses and access to mitigate the potentially negative aspects associated with public access in the Egyptian real estate market. The development attempts to balance the needs for residential privacy with public access to commercial areas, and maintain the private and exclusive nature of residential areas. A very clear demarcation is made between areas that are totally exclusive and private, and those that are more public in nature and accessible to nonresidents. In order to create this demarcation, zones of public, semi-public and private spaces are created throughout the development. The demarcation of each zone is facilitated by the use of design elements to physically shield and demarcate private spaces from public or semi-public zones. Such design elements include landscaping and trees, as well as gates and walls.

Allegria's residential area, or private zones, is buffered from commercial uses, or public zones, by the use of semi-private zones. Semi-public and public uses are located at the intersection of the public and private domains to facilitate access to both residents and non-resident patrons. The mix between residents and nonresident is a difficult aspect to navigate, as the perception of exclusivity must always be maintained, but allowing the right type of people access to the commercial areas and facilities is financially beneficial to the development. The developer allows open access to all areas of the development for residents, as there is no control of access between neighborhoods, but design elements limit access between the most exclusive high-end villas and the rest of the residential community. The various residential areas are not walled off from each other, but design elements such as landscaping, are used to discourage access to the most exclusive parts of the development.

Management of public space is one of the biggest problems for Sodic. According to a senior sales manager, the developer is considering developing a group to privately manage public space within their developments. Conformity, cleanliness, and uniformity of space is vital, as they do not want another Beverly Hills, which had become a liability for the developer because of inconsistent design and bad phasing that resulted in some plots not being developed and others taking too long to develop, resulting in constant construction and chaos. Sodic wants cohesive uniformity in which buyers will know what they are getting and can be assured that they will live in one of the most exclusive gated communities in the country. The key dilemma is how to keep people out and make it exclusive, but bring in enough "desirable" people who will spend money at the many commercial operations, thus making the commercial developments financially viable.

5.5 Liminality and the Public Realm

> *"If our parents knew what happens every day, they wouldn't let us out of our houses."*
> -- Eman

Eman, a twenty year-old college student, waits with her girlfriends on the campus of a public university wearing a light blue hijab that matches the long grey tunic she wears over her dark blue pants. The tunic is loosely fitted and extends to just above her knees, a style popular with veiled young college students. Though the tunic is long-sleeved and has a high yoke, she wears a turtleneck underneath, and the folds of her headscarf extend over her shoulders and chest. Aya, her friend, wears a brown *khimar*, a more conservative headscarf that fastens in the front and entirely covers the neck, shoulders and chest. She wears a long black blazer over a floor-length black skirt. Israa, their friend, wears dark pants and a loose-cut, dark blue, flared sweater that extends to her knees. Her ivory hijab is accented by layers of blue scarves, neatly arranged underneath her outer scarf, to frame her face and match her outfit.

Eman and her friends have recently finished a class and await another; they are careful not to sit at the few tables outside of their college, as, they tell me, that is where the *shabab* (young men) and girls who want their attention sit. Professors can look out their windows and see who is congregated there, so they dare not risk being associated with the "social" crowd. Instead, they linger inside the building, near the secretary's office, with whom they are friendly. Though there are no tables, and students are not allowed to congregate near the administration, the secretaries and janitors allow Eman and her friends to wait there because they are good students and know they will not cause trouble. Sometimes, when the dean of the college is present, or on exam days, they are not allowed into the building, except a few minutes before their classes, when guards diligently check each student's ID before letting them in. On such days, Eman and her friends must wait outside, and usually find a tree to stand under in an area where other young women are waiting.

Navigating the university campus is exhausting, despite it being physically small, as there is nowhere on campus in which they are not being monitored or judged. Inside the buildings, guards and janitors monitor their every move; who has gone upstairs, who is speaking with a professor, who has stayed too long in the lecture hall, who is loitering in the corridor. Even their use of the bathroom is monitored, as a bathroom attendant is always present, and not every floor has a female bathroom. Many times the bathrooms are locked and they must ask the janitors or secretaries if they can unlock them, or use the bathrooms reserved for professors or

administrators. Sometimes, they are required to go to another building, and hope no one will ask them for their IDs, which clearly indicate they are from another college. Nothing is subtle or can be taken for granted; if an administrator makes a scene, or a janitor refuses to let them in, it is not only embarrassing, but can potentially result in their not being able to use a bathroom all day. This is why it is best, Eman tells me, not to drink or eat anything once she leaves her house, so she will not be stuck and have to ask for a favor if the bathrooms are locked. Asking to use the bathroom requires both social and hard capital, and every time a janitor or administrator accommodates a request, it is seen as a favor -- a favor she most often cannot afford.

Eman and her friends try to balance being seen by administrators and professors, to signal that they are present and diligent students -- something important in a college with thousands of students, in which a professor may never see you or know your name -- with being invisible on campus. Being with ones' friends, out of the house, is liberating, but the costs incurred are steep, both socially and financially, and the closely monitored space of the campus does not provide a respite from the ever-present stress she feels while being in the public realm. On campus, one must be careful and deliberate about every action, as government informants pose as students, and anything she and her friends say can potentially cause problems for her and her family. She is careful not to be too casual or befriend other young women who have not been vetted by her friends. Eman tells me that, on several occasions, unscrupulous students have taken photos, from windows above, of females students congregated below. If a photo of her talking to a group of male students is circulated or reaches her parents, it will make her life miserable. She is fearful that someone may target her or her friends, and avoids male students whenever possible. Of course, she must sometimes interact with male students, and sometimes must sit beside them in the lecture halls, but it is better to avoid them, especially because "*ma en'da'homsh da'mm* (they have no shame)," she says.

Though Eman's classes have several thousand students in them, she is well aware of the various groups of male students in her program. She and her friends tell me that these groups of men are the ones who must be avoided, as they can use being in the same program as an excuse to transgress social boundaries. But, they know better than to fall for such things, as they interact with these male students outside the walls of the university campus, during their commutes, and see just how low these men really are. The many pitfalls that they face on the university campus, however draining, are minor in comparison with the challenges they face once they exit the campus and attempt to secure their rides home.

Eman's university campus is in the city of Benha, in the Nile Delta, 60 kilometers north of Cairo, and approximately 80 kilometers from her home in Giza. She had arrived earlier that day, after having spent three hours in public transportation. Eman left her home, in an informal area near *El Barageil*, early that morning. She tells me that it is important to leave early, but not so early that there is no one on the street except food peddlers and factory workers on their way to early morning shifts. In her neighborhood, she feels relatively safe and no one bothers her, as most people know she is "*min al hita*" or from the area, and leave her alone. The problems begin as soon as she emerges onto the main street, where she waits for a microbus that will take her to another microbus stop, where she then catches another microbus to the metro stop. The metro takes her across the city, to the *Koliet El-Zaraa* stop in Shobra. There, she waits for another microbus to Benha. The *Koliet El-Zaraa* stop is notorious for attracting all sorts of shady characters -- the Imam of an informal mosque, a well-respected figure amongst microbus drivers, who frequently gave advice and mediated between them, but was imprisoned for dealing drugs in a government crackdown; the beggars who appear malnourished and downtrodden, but

apparently own apartment buildings in Imbaba; the gangs of thieves and criminals who orchestrate distractions to steal cellphones from unsuspecting commuters; and the host of other petty criminals and vagabonds who flock to the station like moths to a fire, in search of opportunities to steal, harass, and pillage the millions of commuters who traverse the area. Despite the chaos of the *Koliet El-Zaraa* stop, she most often can secure a microbus to Benha, and get to her classes on time. The trip home is not as easy, as thousands of students exit the campus after each class, and securing a seat in a microbus may take hours. And, she is on the street in Benha, with nowhere to go.

Eman and Aya are grateful that they both commute back to Cairo and can stick together during their microbus ride to *Koliet El-Zaraa*, when their schedules allow. But, Israa, who lives in a village north of Benha, must take a microbus to the train station, where she boards a train to her village station. From there, she must take another microbus and *tuk tuk* to her home, a trip that can take her several hours to complete. Israa's commute is often marked by gang activity on the trains, which, she says, is ubiquitous. She tells me that the trains are extremely dangerous, as groups of *baltagiya* (thugs) roam between carriages wielding *matawey* (blades), demanding money and cellphones. She tries to sit in a crowded carriage and not bring attention to herself, but says that if one of them ever demands money, she will give them the spare cash she carries with her at all times specifically for this purpose.

Eman and her friends say that after class, at the microbus stop, is where the real character of their male colleagues becomes apparent.

Eman: "They don't get embarrassed (*ma bi-yat'ki'shafush*)! They have no shame (*ma en'da'homsh da'mm*)! They don't hesitate to push you or shove you out of their way so they can get a seat on a microbus. If there's one more seat, they'll shove you with their arms or their bodies, so they can get it. I've been pulled off a microbus by *shabab* in my college. I was halfway inside the microbus and they pulled me off and shoved me to the side so they could get on. They act all respectable and decent, but when you see them at the microbus stop, they are like uncivilized animals (*bahay'im*)."

Aya: "They will do whatever it takes to put themselves ahead of you. They don't care if you're a girl or if they're in your college. Out on the street, they just care for themselves. It's either me or them in the microbus, so of course they'll do whatever they can to take my place."

Eman: "Even if you have been waiting before them or they see you in distress, they won't let you on first or offer any assistance. And, I would never ask them for anything because they are not *welad nas* (sons of respectable people). Of course, there are *welad nas* at the college, but they're not the ones riding the microbuses; they drive their own cars or have drivers… The *shabab* who we deal with are not trustworthy. You can't trust what they'll do."

Israa: "And, you can't trust the microbus drivers either. They all have weapons. Switchblades, metal rods, even guns. Before, few of them had guns -- they would carry switchblades and metal rods-- but now most of them have guns. So you really can't argue with them… Sometimes, when there are few microbuses on the road, the microbus drivers want to

increase fares, and if you say no or don't have the money, they'll just take the next person and leave you there. We are forced to pay whatever they want. They even increase fares midway during the ride, and if you don't pay, they'll pull over and let you out. Or they'll threaten you. We have to get home somehow, and they know that. My parents don't have a car and I can't just call someone to pick me up."

Aya: "Yes, they all have guns and weapons. And they race each other, so you have to be careful who you ride with. I have refused to ride with certain drivers, because they're on drugs and have weapons. Sometimes, they'll also coordinate with other people on the road -- like a group of men will be waiting for them at a certain point on the road and they'll come on the microbus, even if there's no room. They'll let them ride up front or force someone off and take their place. It's usually a criminal gang or something. Sometimes they do nothing, but you never know what they'll do or if they're stealing from passengers."

Israa: "You have to be really careful that you're not the only person on the microbus, because if you're the only girl, or if there are only two girls left, they'll call their friends and meet them further up the road. Then, they won't let you off and may attack you. I've gotten off of microbuses, because people have gotten off before me and I was the only person left, even though I still had a long distance to go. I either just get off with the last person or ask the driver to stop a hundred meters after the last person gets off."

All three young women say they have been in situations in which microbus drivers have demanded more money, and they have all paid. It happens often, as often as once a week. It is important, they tell me, to have extra money stashed away -- somewhere other than ones' purse, in case it is stolen -- just in case drivers demand more money, or one must take additional transportation. Otherwise, one will be stuck on the street. The risk of being stuck on the street is real and informs all of the decisions the young women take. The risk of being the last person in a microbus, with an untrustworthy driver, must be weighed against the risk of being left on the street, alone, on the side of a major highway. There are certain times, Israa says, it is safer to be in a microbus than alone on the street.

Israa: "There are certain stretches of the road, near certain villages, that are really dangerous. The entire village is full of criminals and *baltagiya* (thugs), so it's not safe to get off a microbus, even if you're scared."

I ask her how she knows this; is this well-known knowledge about particular areas? The three young women tell me that, though they have no definitive proof, certain areas are known to be more dangerous than others. And, thus, it is important to diligently keep track of ones' environment and when one has entered a potentially dangerous stretch of road. Certain areas have more criminal and gang related activity, so if one finds oneself stuck in one of these areas, it is not safe to stand in the street for what could be potentially hours until one finds another ride, or to approach anyone on the street for help.

Being on the street opens one up to a host of potentialities -- no one is on the side of the road because they want to be, or if they had resources that could get them off the street; a car, a driver, a home within walking distance. This is obvious to Eman and her friends, who say that only young women who do not have access to such resources find themselves on the street. They realize this reality is closely tied to their social class; they are *mi'ta'reen*, forced or obliged, to be on the street because they do not have the means by which to bypass the street. On the street, anything can happen; their bodies, possessions, and dignity are open to the possibility of infringement and violation. But, it is not just the street that is problematic, as the simple act of being in the public realm makes possible multiple scenarios of infringement. In the public space on their university campus, at the microbus stop outside the campus gates, in the microbuses that transport their bodies to and from Benha, in the metro station where they navigate crowds and position their bodies to occupy the least amount of space possible, in the *tuk tuks* that transport them to their *hawary*, or alleyways; the act of being in the public realm marks them as liminal subjects, on the boundary between being "respectable" young women, and lower class actors who are *mi'ta'reen*, or obliged, to be there, due to their social status. Those who have a choice -- who have cars, drivers, or live in privatized communities that effectively negate the public realm -- have a different engagement with the public realm, one that is minimized, managed, and shielded from the types of potentialities the young women face in their daily lives.

The apprehension Eman and her friends feel about being in the public realm is exacerbated by the breakdown of societal relations and interpersonal trust in the aftermath of the 2011 popular uprisings. "You can't trust anyone, even *banat* (girls)," Eman tells me. Before, when she was a teenager, if she felt threatened or insecure, she would stand next to or walk close to other girls or women. Now, there is no way to tell if other girls or women on the street are threatening or will treat you decently. They could easily steal from you or be part of a criminal gang operating in the area. *Munaqabat*, or women who wear the *niqab*, are the most threatening because they hide their faces, and so one cannot be sure they are even women, as sometimes men dress up as *munaqabat*, as cover for their criminal endeavors. The young women will not stand next to a *munaqbah* at a microbus station, unless she is with her mother or children, who are well dressed, and it is obvious she is a woman. Inside a microbus, the young women tell me, it is dangerous to sit to next to a *munaqbah* who gets onto the microbus at a later stop because of a well-known scheme that often occurs. The scheme works like this: a *munaqbah* will get on the microbus, which is usually crowded, and sit in the seat next to another passenger; she will have a *matwa*, or blade, underneath her *niqab* and gently press it against the passenger's side; the passenger is forced to discreetly give her their cellphone or wallet, and the *munaqbah* then asks the driver to stop and gets off. Of course, this happens with non-*munaqabat* also, as men and petty criminals widely engage in this type of theft in microbuses. But, the young women say, with a *munaqbah*, the feeling of violation is amplified because one does know who is behind the *niqab*. Additionally, for the veiled young women, who pride themselves in their modesty and adherence to widely recognized, socially sanctioned religious norms, the use of the *niqab*, a form of Islamic dress, to perpetrate a crime is an affront to their sense of religiosity.

The notion that social markers of Islamic faith, such as the *niqab*, or even the *hijab*, for that matter, no longer signify high moral standards, and oftentimes are associated with the opposite -- theft, prostitution, disguise -- is troubling to the young woman's sense of self and worth. It is not enough to be veiled or modest, they say, as people will still treat you with disdain or disrespect if you are in the public realm. What is important is to indicate that you cannot be pushed around, that you have someone "*wa'raky*" or "behind you," who can come to your aid;

that you are not completely alone, and have access to resources, regardless of how limited they may be. It is important, they say, to be dressed nicely and carry a decent bag. Having a cell phone is also important, to indicate that you can call your family, and that you can afford to maintain a phone line. These superficial indicators of social status are pivotal to the way in which people treat you, the young women claim. Eman says that many of her colleagues flaunt their cellphones precisely for this reason, even though it is dangerous to do so in public, because of the omnipresent risk of theft. She has friends whose cellphones have been snatched from their hands, from the window of a microbus, or in the street while they talked on it. These friends have immediately purchased another cellphone and continue to engage in the conspicuous use of their phones in public. She is careful not to show her cellphone on the street, because anyone can snatch it, but she tries to discreetly signal social status in other ways, such as by her bag or how well maintained her clothes and shoes are. It is important, she says, to look respectable and put together, but not too extravagant, so as not to attract unwanted attention or become a target.

The extent to which the young women I spoke with may circumvent the public realm, remove themselves from it and hence, render it obsolete, is tied to almost every decision they make whist going about their daily lives. What they wear, where they go, how they carry themselves, the risks they were willing to take, are all tied, whether directly or indirectly, to their need to be in the public realm and ability to get themselves off the street, to exit the public realm into the perceived safety of private space. Physically being in the public realm, where anyone "off the street" may engage them, is not only a source of stress, but is viewed by the young women as a marker of social class. For upper class women, such as Yasmin and Dina, circumventing the public realm is much more attainable than for women such as Eman, Aya, and Israa, who face significant resource constraints, and, thus, for whom the luxury of exit is not an option. The discomforts associated with being in the public realm, coupled with the risk of being "stuck" in the street, inform most of their choices and decisions.

Gigi, a twenty-five year old graduate student, who knows Eman and her friends, but is not part of their social circle, makes similar choices. She is practical and knows the risks and discomforts of being on the street; she takes shawls to cover herself on public transport and styles her *hijab* in a manner that allows her cover her jewelry and chest. But, she says that knowing her father or uncle, who own cars, can potentially pick her up if she cannot find a microbus home allows her more choice. Though Gigi navigates the street with caution and is acutely aware of potential threats in her environment, she does not fear waiting hours for a microbus or being stuck on the street. For Gigi, riding microbuses is a way to gain more freedom from having to coordinate rides with her father to and from Shobra, and as uncomfortable as it may be, it is liberating for her to have control over her movement around the city. Gigi does not feel vulnerable in the ways that Eman and her friends do, as she has the means to pay extra for the two front seats of a microbus, take a taxi, or call her father. Her presence in the public realm is a choice, not a necessity, and she does not feel *mi'ta'rah*, or obliged, to engage with the public realm in the way in which her colleagues are obliged. Her social clout and status are reflected in the clothes she wears and her assertive presence. If anyone bothers her, she says, she or her father will teach them a lesson.

But even having a car and being in the semi-private space of ones' car does not grant one full access to the city or the complete ability to exercise choices. Simply being in public space, whether in a car or on the street, subjects one to potential infringement.

5.6 Ibn El Omdah

"'Ala fikrah, ana ibn el 'Omdah (By the way, I'm the village leader's son)."

-- Ibn El 'Omdah, El Barageil

As I rode through Eman's neighborhood in *El Barageil* on a Saturday morning in March, the streets were empty. 'Am Ahmed, the driver, and I passed a group of women walking toward *al Wahdah al Madiniyah*, the municipal headquarters, and continued down a narrow street with tall buildings on either side. The street was wide enough for only one car to pass at a time. Moments later, another car was behind us. When we reached a place where the road widened because of an empty lot, the car sped up, passed our car and stopped in front of us, forcing us to stop. Seconds later, two young men in their twenties appeared behind us on a motorcycle. The driver of the maroon Peugeot that forced us to stop, a man in his late fifties wearing a brown leather jacket and slacks, got out of the car and approached us. The motorcycle men stood on either side, slightly behind him, with one hand in their jackets to indicate they were armed. 'Am Ahmed and I remained in our car, with the doors locked. The man began yelling "*Into mean wa bi'ta'milo aah h'ina* (who are you and what are you doing here)." 'Am Ahmed rolled down his window slightly, asked him who he was, and told him that I am an engineer and he is a driver. The man insisted that I must be a journalist doing an expose on the neighborhood. He tried to open the car door, banged on the window and attempted, several times, to reach into the car to grab my cellphone, demanding to see my identification. I refused to comply and politely told him he was mistaken. He was irate that I had not sought his permission to write an article on the neighborhood and accused me of attempting to smear its image. He said he knew my kind, journalists who just want to cause trouble and paint Egypt in a negative light. His daughter is a journalist and he "knows what we do." But, unlike me, she writes nationalistic articles, instead of "running after dirt" in neighborhoods like his. "By the way," he said, "I'm the Omdah's son." His assertion that he is the village leader's son made it clear that we were in his domain, and needed his permission to drive down his streets. Apparently, the women we passed moments earlier had called him to report that a journalist was in the neighborhood, and he bolted out of bed, instructed his *baltagiyah* (thugs) to assist him, and tracked us down.

'Am Ahmed attempted to explain that he is from neighboring Ousiem, and I am the daughter of "respectable people," who could potentially complicate his life, and that I really am an engineer who was observing building methods and the growth of the neighborhood. After over twenty minutes of accusations and threats, he realized we were well connected to the neighborhood and that I am not a journalist. After signaling to his *baltagiyah* to leave, he completely changed his demeanor, gave me his business card, and said he was "*tahat umrik* (under my command, or obliged)" if I needed anything.

I use this story to illustrate the contingent nature of the public realm and the implicit assumptions made regarding class and social status that influence ones' interactions within public space. The use of intimidation by actors who claim ownership of public space or demand compliance with particular norms is ubiquitous and well documented. Salwa Ismail (2006) details the multiple ways in which public space in *'ashwa'iyyat* is monitored and controlled by "the everyday state," Islamists and others. This, coupled with the talk of crime and narratives emphasizing the criminality of particular groups of people, has led many Egyptians to associate the public realm with risk. The breakdown of interpersonal relationships and norms in the period

after the 2011 uprising exacerbates the risk and negative potentialities associated with the public realm. People use various tactics to signal their "worthiness" within the public realm; Eman and her friends emphasize the importance of being dressed nicely and looking "respectable." Others have told me they carry the business cards of well-known influential people or officials so they can demonstrate they are well connected in case they are stopped or intimidated by security personnel. Ibn El Omdah changed his assumptions and demands only after he was made to feel that I may be more trouble than was worth pursuing.

  The interaction I experienced with *Ibn El Omdah* in *El Barageil* could easily have been a carjacking -- stories of carjackings and theft circulate widely within the Egyptian media and between friends who have experienced theft. Almost every middle and upper class family who has access to a car participates in the circulation of car theft stories experienced personally or within their social circles. Personally within my own social circle, I can detail several such thefts -- my mother's car was stolen while parked outside her house, her neighbor's car was also stolen, several acquaintances have had cars stolen off of public streets, and a family friend was carjacked. From cars being stolen while parked on the street, *manadee* (valets) and criminals posing as *manadees* to facilitate car thefts, to criminal gangs orchestrating carjackings by blocking roadways or forcing cars to stop on streets and highways, these widely circulated stories have brought the risk traditionally associated with walking on the street into the semi-private space of the automobile.

  Stories of the claiming of public space, demands for "permission" to use public roadways, and the imposition of "taxes" on the use of public space are also ubiquitous. 'Am Ahmed tells me of a police officer from the neighboring village of *Saq'il* who, after the 2011 uprising, set up a private *lagnah*, or checkpoint, on the main road between *Tanash* and *El Warak*, a popular microbus route that connects the northern villages and *'ashwa`iyyat* in Giza to the greater metropolitan area. He employed junior officers and *baltagiyah* to collect a "fee" from microbus drivers each time they passed, while he sat on a chair by the side of the road and monitored his enterprise. If anyone objected, he would demand their license and registration; as many microbuses along that route are not registered, employ underage drivers, or drivers with suspended licenses, the threat of potential legal action or imprisonment deterred drivers from not paying the demanded fee. 'Am Ahmed says that this lasted a few months until the microbus drivers "*masakou wa masahou bi al ard,*" a phrase that literally means "caught him and wiped the ground with him," implying that he was severely beaten. I did not manage to track down this officer in *Saq'il*, but 'Am Ahmed's story was corroborated by three other drivers who drive that route. The idea that a public roadway which services thousands of residents can be regulated by one person, such as *Ibn al Omdah*, or taxed for the private benefit of another, such as the police officer, is viewed as an everyday occurrence in a city where anything can happen in the public realm.

5.6.1   *The Growth of 'Ashwa`iyyat*

  El Barageil is home to thousands of people; from its humble beginnings as a sleepy village in Giza, it has grown to become a sprawling urban area. Many of its residents are happy with its trajectory as a bustling neighborhood on the outskirts of Mohandaseen, adjacent the *Ard Al Lewa* -- "*nidifit* (it has been cleaned up)" people tell me, usually prefaced by "*lama agza (excuse me),*" as if they do not mean to insult its former state or imply that it was previously dirty. I usually take the back road to *El Barageil* from *Ousiem*. Most people access the

neighborhood by the makeshift ramp located near the intersection of the *Mihwar* and Cairo Ring Road, both of which are designed to bypass the neighborhood. Others, who do not have cars or live in areas far from this ramp, climb up the embankment supporting the Cairo Ring Road, using makeshift paths and stairs. The climb up the embankment is the daily commute of thousands who cross over the traffic barricade, walk onto the Cairo Ring Road, and flag down microbuses at one of the many makeshift stops. Others use the back road, though this is less popular, because it is less frequented by microbuses and takes one away from the Cairo-Giza metropolitan area, to the neighboring villages of *Saq'il*, *Ousiem* and *Tanash*. I have been to *El Barageil* countless times and have witnessed its transformation from a rural village to a thriving urban neighborhood, in which nine-story apartment buildings tower over the remaining fields within their vicinity. The ceaseless development, fueled by an insatiable demand for low-income housing within the Cairo metropolitan area, is evident at every turn.

Figure 5.2: *El Barageil* **Informal/Illegal Development**
Giza, March 2015   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

The trajectory of *El Barageil* mirrors that of countless *'ashwa`iyyat* throughout the Cairo-Giza metropolitan area, which has experienced unprecedented expansion of informal/ illegal housing during the last four decades. An estimated 50-65% of housing in the Cairo metropolitan is informal, and upwards of three quarters of all housing is in violation of the law.[61] Initially

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[61] Estimates vary depending on the source. The estimates cited are based on CAPMAS and Ministry of Planning studies.

spurred by large waves of rural-urban migration, which has since tapered off, Cairo's population increased from 1 million residents in 1930 to over 6 million in 1965.[62] With the increase in population came an increase in demand for low-income housing. The Egyptian government attempted to assuage this demand by embarking on public housing financing that generated 5,000 units in the 1950s, mainly in *Helwan* and *Shurba El-Kheima*, and subsequently less units in the follow decades, before discontinuing public subsidies in the 1980s (Steinburg 1991, Soliman 1995, Harris and Wahba 2002).

In the 1970 and 80's, efforts to curb the pressures on Cairo aimed at decentralizing population growth to new communities outside of the capital. Master planning and industrialization policies attempted to shape the urban frontier and create new industrial cities and population centers outside of Cairo (Hegab 1985, El-Shakhs 1994, Khoury 1996, Stewart 1996, Sutton and Fahmi 2001, El Shakry 2006). Cities such as Sadat City and 10th of Ramadan City were planned in desert regions to the north and east of Cairo, but did little to relieve the demand for low-income housing. This demand was exacerbated by rent stabilization laws that provided a disincentive for property owners to rent to low-income households who could not afford the "key money"[63] often insisted upon by landlords. Additionally, real estate investment and speculation provided one of the few investment opportunities in a financial market characterized by strict government controls and the lack of investment vehicles. Thus, while millions of households sought housing, millions of units, bought as investments by middle class and wealthy Egyptians, remained empty for decades (El- Batran and Arandel 1998).

This period witnessed the rise in illegally built informal housing on land zoned for agricultural use on Cairo's outskirts (Stewart et al 2004, Alsayyad 2004). Most of this housing occurred on small plots of land, though it was not necessarily self-constructed, as owners contracted tradesman and small contractors to build housing (El Kadi 1988). The government largely ignored this piecemeal, unregulated urban expansion, in part due to its inability to provide competitive alternatives to the inexpensive housing it produced (Ismail 2006, Soliman 2004, Harris and Wahba 2002, Assaad 1993). As government divestment from publicly subsidized housing continued, many of Cairo's low income households found few alternatives to 'a*shwa`iyyat* on the urban fringe.

The Cairo Ring Road, built in the mid 1990's, also facilitated the development of 'a*shwa`iyyat*. The Ring Road attempted to curb Cairo's expansion onto prime arable land by providing an urban growth boundary around the capital city (see figure 5.4), but it had the opposite effect of facilitating the development of 'a*shwa`iyyat* on agricultural land along the transportation corridor by increasing accessibility to previously inaccessible areas. Today, the Cairo metropolitan area is home to over 20 million people,[64] despite numerous attempts to curb the city's expansion. Cairo continues to expand and the demand for low-income housing continues to grow.

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[62] Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS 2006).

[63] Key money is an informal payment made by renters that is often required by landlords for the privilege of renting an apartment. Landlords rationalize this payment as an offset to rental laws that deflate rents and the likelihood that tenants will remain in a unit for generations, limiting the landlord's ability to use the property or increase rents between subsequent renters.

[64] According to the 2017 Census, Cairo's official population stands at 7,734,614 persons and Giza's population at 2,443,203 persons. Egypt's total population stands at 94.8 million, marking a 2.6% increase from the 72.6 million counted in the previous census conducted in 2006. The population is projected to exceed 102 million by 2020.

5.6.2   Productive Space

The government's response to the growth of *'ashwa`iyyat* involves multiple strategies, including the elimination of those deemed unsafe (see figure 5.3), as well as the transformation of those within what are considered key "strategic" corridors, such as 'a*shwa`iyyat* near tourist areas, like the Pyramids and Cairo's Islamic or medieval neighborhoods, into "open museums" that are envisioned to support Egypt's tourist industry. In addition to slum clearance, upgrading, registration and formalization are other strategies promoted by Egyptian scholars, non-profits and government agencies.

The debate regarding *'ashwa`iyyat* is one that considers space, and particularly the spaces of *'ashwa`iyyat*, as a dead, inert object, or a thing "in itself" that can be made more efficient and "fixed" via formalization and market mechanisms. Two of the biggest proponents of the notion of "registration" or "formalization" of *'ashwa`iyyat*, and Egypt's new mortgage system, which has been operable only since 2004, are Hernando de Soto and Egyptian scholar Ahmed Soliman, who have been working on a solution for *'ashwa`iyyat* in Cairo for over a decade. Soliman and de Soto posit a solution that is based on the extension of formal market mechanisms, including contractual obligations, deeds, loans, mortgages etc., into the realm of *'ashwa`iyyat*, which, in the case of Cairo, constitute well over half of the built environment. Central to this notion is the utilization of the "dead capital" embodied in *'ashwa`iyyat* and informal assets for "productive" purposes, such as entrepreneurial projects that can be used to lift residents of *'ashwa`iyyat* out of poverty. De Soto and Soliman suggest that residents of *'ashwa`iyyat* are not really poor if their informal/illegal housing is somehow formalized through the establishment of legal property rights, so that the so-called dead capital embodied in their homes may be subsequently leveraged to get loans, start businesses, and pull themselves up from their bootstraps.

The premise of this logic is based on the notion that unregulated space of *'ashwa`iyyat* only obtains usefulness or value from the market (or via its exchange value), and that the "lived" experience of its inhabitants is something that may be ignored and devalued. According to Lefebvre, this subjugation of lived space to conceived space is fundamental to the creation of abstract space. But, as Merrifield argues, Lefebvre notes that "abstract space has real ontological status and gains objective expression in specific buildings, places, activities, and mode of market intercourse over and through space…Its ultimate arbiter is value itself, whose universal measure (money) infuses abstract space" (Merrifield 2006: 111-112). Thus, not only do the mechanisms of registration and the extension of the mortgage system, which privileges particular "modes of market intercourse" further enmesh *'ashwa`iyyat* into the "mystified" realm of the "market," they are pivotal to the creation of such abstract space.

At the heart of this idea is the "productive" use of space and the legal transfer of property (space) to banks in case of foreclosure. De Soto and Soliman promote the valorization of *'ashwa`iyyat* as something tied to "productive" activities that may be expressed and leveraged via its exchange value (over its use value). They disregard the ways in which space is actually used in the daily lives of residents, or the lived experience of informal/ illegal space and the meanings associated with it. They conceive of a "participatory" planning approach in *ashwa`iyyat* to the extent that people are willing to participant in and see themselves as productive entrepreneurs. The creation of abstract space via bureaucratic means "through the application of technocratic rationality" (Gardiner 2000: 90) is expressed in redevelopment plans that aim to rid Cairo of "hazardous" *'ashwa`iyyat*. Examples of this are the redevelopment of

Figure 5.3: "Informal Areas in The Greater Cairo Region", as Designated by the GOPP
Source: General Organization for Physical Planning. The National Urban Development Framework in the Republic of Egypt, April 2014.

Figure 5.4: Cairo Master Plan, 1997
Source: World Bank Review: The Case of Cairo

Imbaba Airport and North Giza, an area characterized by its informality/ illegality, which were projected to displace at least 3,500 households.

5.6.3   Public Space in 'Ashwa`iyyat

In addition to a host of issues caused by the prevalence of informal/illegal housing within *'ashwa`iyyat*, the lack of public space within these neighborhoods is acutely felt by residents. Though Eman feels safe in her neighborhood because she is recognized as a resident who has ties to the area and does not have the same fear of "being stuck" in public when she is there, she has nowhere to simply *be* outside. Eman spends as little time as possible outside on the streets of her neighborhood because she has no place to go. The public realm, she tells me, is associated with *shawaryi* people (which literally means people "of the street"), implying vulgar, low-class, less sophisticated or less educated people. Unless one works in public space -- as an officer, porter, food and vegetable vendor, mechanic, or other tradesperson whose workshop infringes on public space, or other profession that necessitates being on the street, there is no reason to voluntarily be in public. The time she spends on the street waiting for microbuses is enough to deter her from leaving her house once she arrives home.

Figure 5.5: *El Barageil,* **Typical Street**
Giza, March 2015   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

The dream of egalitarian public spaces in which one can simply be outside, without a particular purpose, such as that articulated by SODIC management and promised in its gated communities, is not within the realm of the possible for Eman or her friends. The strains this places on residents of *'ashwa'iyyat,* where the lack of greenery, playgrounds, pedestrian walkways, benches, and open spaces, coupled with the risks associated with "the street" prevent many residents from venturing outside if not necessary. Several women told me they do not allow their children to play outside, despite not having adequate room for them to play indoors. The fear of encountering *shawaryi* kids and neighborhood troublemakers is now coupled with the threat of kidnapping, trafficking and theft.

In *A'Stable 'Entar*, an informal/illegal neighborhood in central Cairo known for its precarious location on an unstable hilltop near the Cairo Ring Road, a local Islamic non-profit charity is attempting to address the lack of public space by creating indoor spaces for children to congregate and play. The NGO currently has a building which houses a school for neighborhood children and workshop that teaches local teenagers and women various handicrafts. The only play area available, besides the unpaved streets, is a space in front of the building where they have built a play table on which children play variations of billiards. The current building is not large enough to expand their programs or allow for indoor play. Currently, in order to engage in sports or extensive outdoor play, children from the neighborhood must walk to the adjacent "formal" neighborhood, located down the hill, in which there is a public community center. The pedestrian path down the hill consists of a narrow unpaved walkway, strewn with litter, that local residents say is dangerous and hazardous. Residents say the pathway is conducive to crime and muggings occur frequently, as pedestrians have limited sightlines and no way off the path if attacked. The paved road leading to the neighborhood adds significant distance and time to the commute down the hill, so residents still take the pedestrian pathway, despite the risks. In 2015, when I interviewed the director and a board member of the NGO, the organization was in the process of acquiring land in the neighborhood on which to build an additional building in order to expand operations. The land and building costs exceed one million pounds[65] and there is no guarantee that the NGO will be able to complete the building, as building in this area is illegal and they cannot register the property or gain approval for building plans.

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[65] This is equivalent to approximately $100,000 before the devaluation of the Egyptian pound in November 2016.

Figure 5.6: *A'stable 'Entar*: **Outdoor Play Area Adjacent NGO and Pedestrian Pathway to Main Road**
Cairo, March 2015   *Photos: Riem El-Zoghbi*

5.7 Conclusion -- Nationalism, Authoritarianism and the Public Realm

The public realm is complicated for most residents of Cairo. The 2011 uprisings and occupation of the city's streets and public squares brought with it the hope of a more inclusive society, in which simply being Egyptian secured access to fundamental rights and the prospect of a brighter future. The optimism that briefly defined this moment has given way to the stark reality of a persistently, deeply stratified society under the governance of an even more repressive regime. What theorists jumped to describe as struggles over the "right to the city" -- premised on "demands for maximal difference" (Kipfer et al 2013, 120) and the notion of revolutionary "demand for a transformed and renewed right to urban life" (ibid, 127) that creates "new forms of spatial centrality" (ibid, 128) -- feels like a distant dream for most Egyptians. Public spaces such as Tahrir Square, which once embodied the aspirations of a nation, have been sanitized of all evidence of what they once represented. The closure of political and social space is reinforced by narratives that mark particular groups of people as un-Egyptian, unpatriotic, dangerous and unworthy of engagement with the city. The corresponding politicization of public space and breakdown of social relations precipitated by the events of the 2011 popular uprising have further stigmatized the public spaces of daily life.

Figure 5.7: Tahrir Square
Cairo, March 2011   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

      The discourses and narratives that demonize particular groups of people are often couched in terms of nationalism and a struggle against the insidious attempts of Islamists, their sympathizers, and other opposition groups to unsettle and disrupt Egypt's stability and progress. The intersection between nationalism and authoritarianism is reflected in theses discourses and the corresponding socio-spatial practices that facilitate fear, suspicion and mistrust between residents of Cairo in the public realm. As Heydemann and Leenders argue "regime strategies are not simply defensive or reactive. Rather, they should be seen as complex, multilevel games involving regimes, publics, and external actors, in which regimes develop strategies that aim to affect the strategic calculus of citizens, allies, and adversaries" (Heydemann and Leenders 2011, 649). The authoritarian regime uses multiple strategies to stigmatize the public realm and impact citizens' willingness to fully inhabit public space or engage in behaviors that draw attention to themselves; "regimes develop discourses aimed at affecting the strategic calculus of citizens, stressing the personal costs of participation in protests, as well as the negative consequences that would follow should regimes be overthrown" (Ibid 650). The onset of protest laws that limit residents' ability to congregate in public space or publically voice dissent aids in this stigmatization, as to inhabit the public realm is to ask for trouble. Any public gathering of ten or more persons may be treated as a protest and subject one to arrest or imprisonment. The constant monitoring of public space, potential use of intimidation and violence by both state and non-state

actors, coupled with the breakdown of social relations following the 2011 uprisings opens residents up to a host of potentialities tied to their status as "worthy" or "unworthy" actors based on the perceived limits of their subjectivity.

Not only are the discourses and practices that stigmatize the public realm circulated by the authoritarian regime via propaganda and the media, they are circulated by ordinary people through the "talk of crime" (Caldeira 2000) that dominates peoples' perception of criminality in the public realm. The dialectical making and remaking of the urban public realm is continuously in flux with the fears, needs, desires and potentialities of ordinary people. For upper class Egyptians, this facilitates their disengagement with public space and isolation in gated communities and compounds in which the public realm is closely guarded off to potential infiltration by the lower-classes and others associated with criminality in the public imaginary. The daily lives of upper-class Egyptians revolve around their ability to negate the street -- to remove themselves from public streets and shield themselves from the types of interactions and inconveniences that define being in Cairo's public realm. For Cairo residents who do not have this ability, the liminality associated with being in the public realm is carefully managed and minimized using multiple strategies aimed at signaling status, worthiness, and access or affiliation with more powerful actors. This creates a city in which the transgression of lower-class bodies and rights is legitimized and may potentially occur every time one ventures into the public realm. Anything is possible.

The socio-spatial practices that constitute the active production of the urban public realm are produced through residents' lived experience and create a city in which public space is stigmatized. They are also produced by the practices of the Egyptian military and an elite segment of military officers who are positioned to gain personally from the increased role of the military in the production of urban space. The intertwining of el-Sisi's presidency with the military establishment and the institution's involvement in land development aids in the valorization of military affiliated developments and stigmatization of particular neighborhoods affiliated with Islamists. The valorization of the military as the only viable defense against Islamists who attempt to destabilize the nation and impose their oppressive rule has created a new class of actors who position themselves as the only legitimate "saviors" of the nation.

SECTION III: DOHA

Chapter 6. The Inscription of Tradition in Doha's Urban Realm

> *Despite rapid economic and social gains, as well as political change, Qatar has maintained its cultural and traditional values as an Arab and Islamic nation that considers the family to be the main pillar of society.*
>
> *-- Qatar National Vision 2030, page 1*

The tension between a forward-looking Islam that is linked to and channeled into international circuits of capital, and propels a country forward, versus a "fundamentalist" Islam that underlies Alsayyad's (2011) notion of the fundamentalist city, is playing out in Doha, as well as Cairo. In this chapter, I argue that contrary to the situation in Cairo, in which Islamists are deemed unworthy subjects of rule, in Doha, the current project of Qatari nation building promotes notions of Qatari nationalism that valorize particular Islamist practices and modes of being, premised on the notion of Qatar being a forward-thinking, modern state that maintains its Islamic values, despite rapid modernization. This tolerance, and indeed support of "soft" Islamism, is manifest in many aspects of Qatari society, and is explicitly articulated in Doha's urban realm via a series of interventions that create exclusive Islamic public spaces and designated *family housing zones* for a small group of privileged city residents and tourists.

In addition to being the largest construction site of international standard sports arenas, in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, as well as hotels, educational complexes and other high-profile projects that cater to a carefully scripted engagement with the west and, appropriation of "western" modernity, Qatar is also the largest construction site of Islamic urban spaces. I argue that these spaces play a central role in the subject formation of an idealized, modern, Islamic, Qatari subject, as promoted in national development schemes, including the Qatar National Vision 2030 and National Development Strategy 2011-2016. Central to this subject formation is the religious, ethical, patriotic family, which the Qatari constitution declares to be the "basis of the society," to which "real," worthy men and women are associated and, for which Doha's urban realm is primarily organized.

6.1 Social Differentiation and Citizenship

In Doha, citizenship is the primary access of social differentiation (Nagy 2006). Though the main vector through which rights are attributed and apportioned is citizenship, with the distinction between *muwa'tin* (citizen) and *ghayr muwa'tin* (non-citizen) being the primary differentiator, not all Qatari citizenship is equal, as an Arab, purist notion of Qatari citizenship is the most valorized and codified into law. As Babar (2014, 414) argues: "Qatari nationality law currently draws distinctions between different tiers of citizenship, so that those members who are original or native Qataris are entitled to more rights of citizenship than are those who acquire

citizenship through naturalization. There is a difference between original citizens and naturalized citizens both in terms of how they are allowed to participate in the state, and also in terms of their right to access a host of state benefits." The second-class citizenship status of naturalized Qatari citizens is passed down to offspring, who are apportioned rights based on their parent's citizenship status. This impacts both political rights, as well as socioeconomic rights by limiting the economic entitlements to which these citizens have access. Even amongst "original" or "native" Qatari citizens, there are distinct differences based on family linage and tribal affiliations, with members of the ruling Al Thani family and their affiliates being privy to the most benefits.

It is the valorized Qatari subject -- whose citizenship status and affiliation with an idealized, patriarchal, Islamic family -- who is rendered more "worthy" of the full engagement with public life. "Unworthy" subjects of rule are relegated to particular parts of the city, imposing upon them a restricted engagement with the public realm informed by the complex, unwritten, yet highly scripted performances of differentiated citizenship(s). As I argue in the following chapters, the imposition of Qatari tradition and culture via Islamicized public spaces, displacement of low-income "workers" from the urban core, reclaiming of urban space from undesirable populations, and organization of urban space to encourage segregation based on citizenship, socioeconomic class, and affiliation with an idealized Islamic family, are but a few of the socio-spatial processes shaping the city today.

6.2 The Project of Nation Building

As the wave of uprisings swept the Arab world in 2011, Qatar was quiet. Qatar and the UAE are the only GCC countries that did not witness popular protests during this period. Earlier that year, the Emir of Kuwait distributed over $40 billion in grants and free food to Kuwaiti citizens, in an effort to quell increasing social strife. Similarly, the Saudi king distributed over $36 billion in social benefits to Saudi citizens.[66] Other Arab counties followed suit, with the UAE raising base wages for its citizens, and poorer countries, such as Jordan, increasing subsidies for basic goods. Following the lead of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Qatari government distributed generous material incentives to appease its citizens. Perhaps it had learned important lessons from the deposed authoritarian regimes of its more populous Arab neighbors, as well as neighboring Bahrain, in which the ruling, Sunni, Al Khalifa family was threatened by popular protests. On September 6, 2011, the then Deputy Emir and Heir Apparent of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, issued Emiri Decree No. 50 for 2011 that increased the base salaries and social benefits for Qatari civilian government sector employees by 60%, and 120% for Qatari military officers.

Article 1 of the Emiri Decree stipulates a 60% increase in base salaries and social benefits for civilian government employees and details eligibility (for example, employees of ministries and government agencies, judges and their deputies, employees of the Emiri Diwan, Diplomatic and Consular employees, university employees, Qatar Petrol employees, employees of the Accounting Diwan). Article 2 stipulates an increase in base salaries and social benefits of 120% for military officers and 50% for other military employees. Article 3 raises civilian

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pensions by 60%, and Article 4 raises military pensions by 120% and 50% for officers and other military employees respectively.

Though attempts by other members of the GCC to stifle domestic opposition were met with mixed reactions, including additional protests in Kuwait, Qatar's attempts to appease its citizens were met with widespread praise and acceptance. Gengler et al (2013, 259-60) argue that a primary reason for Qatar's "relative immunity to the sort of popular political pressures that continue to challenge Arab regimes elsewhere" is because "In Qatar, civic participation cannot lead individuals toward a greater appreciation for democracy, for those who least value democracy tend to be most actively engaged." While this initial conclusion provides insight into motivations behind political engagement, it does not fully elucidate the complex processes underlying constructions of nationalism that inform Qatari subject formation and citizenship.

In addition to generous benefits portioned out by the rentier state,[67] and mechanisms for wealth distribution that reach the majority of Qatar's relatively small number of citizens, constructions of Qatari nationalism promote notions of *Qatari exceptionalism.* This is exemplified in the slogan "*Qatar Deserves the Best,*" the official slogan of Qatar's public works authority, Ashghal, that is seen throughout Doha on public works project fences and used widely in the popular media. M.E. Tok et al. (2016, 22) argue that unlike other GCC rentier states, which apportion benefits to appease and buy complacency from their citizens, Qatar is a transformative state, or a state "that seeks to introduce and implement, in a comparatively short time, a radical reconfiguration of social, economic, and political institutions in a country" (emphasis in original). Through its extensive public-private initiatives and investments, not only is Qatar attempting to appease its citizenry and reconfigure its domestic institutions, the country is also attempting to position itself as the leader of the so-called renaissance of Islamic civilization, or Islamic revival.

Qatar's role in the Islamic revival attempts to position the country as an exemplar of what an Islamic country can be -- a role model for the Arab and Islamic world[68] -- in which progress and modernity are integrated with, and tied to, an appreciation of the country's "traditions" and "values," and are firmly rooted in the notions of social cohesion, Islamic faith, and a valorization of the Islamic family. This notion of Qatar as an exceptional Islamic state, and the foundational categories of "Islamic," "tradition," "Arab," and "family," through which Qatari nationalism is circumscribed and articulated, are actively constructed via Qatari laws, policies, and socio-spatial practices, all of which have profound impact on Doha's urban realm, and the ways in which particular segments of society interact within public urban life.

6.3 Qatar National Vision 2030

In our pursuit of growth, can we remain rooted to our values and our culture, and still embrace the modern world?

<div align="right">--- Msheireb Enrichment Center</div>

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[67] Zahra R. Babar (2014) argues that the "cost of citizenship" for the Qatari state is extremely high, given the material benefits the state allocates to its citizenry. "In Qatar, citizens benefit not only from occasional government stipends, but also from guaranteed employment in the public sector, free education, training, healthcare, land grants, subsidized housing, free electricity and water, and a host of other benefits" (409).

[68] The Qatar National Vision 2030 emphasizes, under the goals set for Qatar's social development, the increased importance Qatar aims to have with respect to the GCC and Islamic world: "Qatar will also enhance its important and constructive regional role, especially within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference" (QNV 2030, Page 20).

The Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV), produced by the General Secretariat for Development Planning in 2008, under the auspices of former Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the current Father Amir, guides Qatar's human, social, economic, and environmental development. The QNV and subsequent development documents -- such as the National Development Strategy 2011-2016, which identifies specific development goals and projects, based on the guiding vision articulated in the QNV -- promote the making of a modern state and Qatari subject that embraces modernity, and all the material and technological advances that Qatar's extensive financial resources can buy, yet maintains strong Islamic, traditional Qatari values. Constructions of Qatari nationalism, articulated in the documents, place particular emphasis on Qatari "traditions" and "values" and, are tied to notions of Qatar as an exemplar of Islamic society. So-called Qatari traditions, values, and Qatar's Islamic essence are explicitly articulated by the Qatari constitution, as well as the QNV. The QNV highlights the five main perceived challenges facing the country, one of which is "modernization and preservation of traditions," and asserts "it is possible to combine modern life with values and culture" (page 4).

التطلعات
ASPIRATIONS

النجاح
SUCCESS

الوعد
PROMISE

الحداثة
MODERNITY

تحقيق الذات
SELF REALISATION

العولمة
GLOBALISATION

التقدم
PROGRESS

القيم
VALUES

الجذور
ROOTS

التقاليد
TRADITION

الثقافة
CULTURE

Figure 6.1: Sidra Tree Diagram, Msheireb Enrichment Center
Doha, July 2017   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

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The narrative behind many of Qatar's national development initiatives may be summed up by a diagram of a Sidra tree that hangs in the Msheireb Enrichment Center (see figure 6.1). The diagram depicts the tree's structure, with deep roots, a strong trunk, and large canopy of leaves and branches. Written below the roots are the words *Values*, *Tradition*, *Culture* and *Roots*, each represented as a node that are all tied together by a dotted line. On either side of the trunk are the words *Globalisation* and *Progress*. Above the canopy, the words *Modernity*, *Success*, *Aspirations*, *Promise*, and *Self Realisation* each represent a node, which are metaphorically tied together by another dotted line. The caption beside it reads: *In this Sidra tree, we can find nature's greatest example of a balanced relationship between life and environment. Ambitiously spreading out its branches, it reaches out higher, while staying firmly rooted in the ground and drawing sustenance from the earth and the elements.*

Figure 6.2: Qatar National Convention Center
Education City, Doha. November 2015   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

This metaphor for Qatari society suggests that, as a Sidra tree gains strength from being firmly rooted in the ground, yet branches off and soars to unprecedented heights, so too can Qatari society. By staying rooted in Qatar's values, traditions, culture and roots, Qatari society has a firm foundation that allows it to grow and build a solid trunk, to harness globalization and

progress, upon which a flourishing canopy of modernity, success, aspirations, promise, and self-realization may be actualized. The metaphor suggests building a foundation for a better society, for better opportunities, for better subjects; it is hopeful and optimistic, yet acknowledges the realities of globalization and inevitable progress, and appropriates them to further the growth of Qatari society. It suggests that the instrumental use of globalization and "progress" can lead to the blossoming and attainment of modernity, success, aspirations, promise, and self-realization.

The Sidra tree is indigenous to Qatar and figures prominently in Qatari folklore, as the shade of its canopy represents a place of refuge, community, and shelter, yet also a place of strength. This analogy is in dialogue with Qatar Foundation's use of the symbol of the Sidra tree to represent its mission of transforming Qatari society through education and research, while building upon and integrating Qatar's heritage and culture to produce a modern society.[69] The nonprofit organization, founded by Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, the Father Emir, and Sheikha Moza bint Nasser in August 1995, prominently uses the Sidra tree in its logo. The imagery of the Sidra Tree is expressed in the design of the Qatar National Convention Center in Education City, a member of Qatar Foundation, in which the branches of the Sidra Tree grow over the façade of the building, five stories high and 250 meters wide, to appear as if they are literally supporting the enormous structure.

Metaphorically, the Sidra tree not only supports the physical structure of the convention center, it supports the innovation, art, music, and other cultural and scientific activities and innovations that take place within the convention center. In a similar way, the Sidra Medical and Research Center, a member of Qatar Foundation, also located in Education City, adopts the name of the Sidra tree. As a medical center devoted to the mission of improving the health of Qataris, particularly its women and children, the imagery of the Sidra tree implies the importance of health in supporting a productive, prosperous society. Sidra's focus on women and children, which are regarded as the foundation of the family, hence the foundation of Qatari society, implies that the roots upon which all else is based, is the family. This is consistent with the valorized position the family plays in national development schemes, as detailed below.

6.4 Qatari Subject Formation

The Sidra Tree, growing strong and proud in the harshest of environments, has been a symbol of perseverance and nourishment across the borders of the Arab world. What is the significance of this glorious tree? With its roots bound in the soil of this world and its branches reaching upwards toward perfection, it is a symbol of solidarity and determination; it reminds us that the goals of the world are not incompatible with the goals of the spirit.

--- Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser[70]

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[69] Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development has a special role in the National Vision 2030, which emphasizes the unique role of Qatar Foundation in the human development of Qatari citizens, as the local driving force behind a diverse spectrum of educational and research initiatives.

[70] Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser delivered these remarks at the inauguration of Education City on 13 October 2003. See https://www.qf.org.qa/about/about. Sheikha Moza is the cofounder, with her husband, Sheikh Hamad, the *Father Emir*, of the Qatar Foundation. She continues to serve on the board, as chairperson. In February 2016, her daughter, Sheikha Hind bint Hamad Al Thani, assumed the position of CEO.

The notion, expressed by Shiekha Moza in her inaugural speech at Education City in 2003, that the "*goals of the world are not incompatible with the goals of the spirit*" is integral to the approach toward national development, and subsequent subject formation of the pious Qatari subject. This subject is one who is afforded all the worldly comforts associated with great prosperity and wealth, yet is grounded in values that recognize and nurture Islamic spirituality and morality. The subject the Qatari state seeks to cultivate is one who successfully navigates between the material and spiritual worlds, guided by a sense of morality that is rooted in Qatar's Islamic heritage and culture. It is based on a notion of *Qatari exceptionalism* -- or Qataris as exceptional subjects, undergoing the exceptional development of their country.

This subject is not just a globalized subject who espouses consumerism, capitalism, and materialism; it is one who is cognizant of the demands of Islam, of the spirit, of the soul, yet is able to harness the material world to further the attainment of spiritual growth and self-realization. The development schemes that reinforce the formation of this subject do not just employ rampant development for the sake of development; they are deliberate, thoughtful schemes that reinforce the morality of the Qatari subject, yet provide them with material goods and advantages. It represents a moral, conscious subject who partakes in deliberate development, who harnesses the powers of globalization, education and scientific progress, as a means to self-realization, success, modernity and the promise of a better self and society. It is a thoughtful, deliberate, transformative process, and implicit in it is the promise and potential of something better – a better self, a better society, something beyond the consumerism and materialism that animates the so-called developed world. *Qatari exceptionalism* is premised on the ability of Qataris to be modern, engage in progress, partake in all the luxuries that modernity, globalization and progress have to offer, all the while being cognizant of the demands of Islam and requirements for leading a moral, pious life. Shiekha Moza suggests that the two are not incompatible, that Qataris may be ideal, exceptional subjects.

Inherent in this subjectivity is the notion of moral superiority. The Qatari state positions itself as a beacon of light that shines in a treacherous world; it protects the disenfranchised, supports the poor, yet does so humbly, without fanfare because this is what differentiates Qatar from the rest. The state promotes the notion of Qatari subjects as moral, pious, and gracious, yet modern, educated, and forward-looking. This is the new Islamism -- the Islamism of privilege, not of the backstreets of Cairo, of struggle, poverty, superstition or ignorance that animates the Islamism of *Salafis* or others. This is Qatar, *balad al kheyr*, the land of prosperity.

In a publication by the National Human Rights Committee and Qatar Islamic Cultural Center (FANAR) entitled *Islam and Human Rights*, sayings from the Prophet Mohamed, or hadith, and verses from the Koran are juxtaposed to Qatari laws and initiatives as evidence of Qatar's moral righteousness. For example:

> *"Prophet Mohammed (Peace be Upon Him) Said,*
> '*An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety. All mankind is from Adam and Adam is (created) from clay.'*"
> -- *Islam and Human Rights* (page 7)

As indicated in the *hadith* above, though Islam rejects the notion of discrimination based on race, color, ethnicity and many other socially constructed notions of differentiation, piety is viewed as a legitimate axis of differentiation and marker of superiority. One who possesses

greater piety is superior to one of lessor piety. This gradient of differentiation, based on piety, is pivotal to the notion of *Qatari exceptionalism* and promotion of morality.

The emphasis on morality and morals necessitates the management of moral and immoral behavior and social practices, as well as the displays and control of morality in public space. Morality is not only controlled via laws that prohibit particular behaviors (such as intoxication, wearing inappropriate clothing, public displays of affection etc.), and criminalize certain social relations (such as premarital sex, adultery, homosexuality etc.), but is mediated through the control of public space. For example, malls routinely display codes of conduct which prohibit particular behaviors. The Festival City Mall code of conduct advises "please wear respectful clothing. Shoulders and knees should be covered. No kissing or overt displays of affection." This is standard in malls and many public places.

Figure 6.3: Al Meera Courtesy Policy
Public notice at the entrance of a neighborhood Al Meera shopping complex advising patrons:
Help Us Preserve Qatar's Culture and Values.
Please Dress Modestly in Public Places
No Overt Display of Affection

Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi

6.5 The Valorization of the Family

> *The family is the basis of the society. A Qatari family is founded on religion, ethics, and patriotism. The law shall regulate adequate means to protect the family, support its structure, strengthen its ties, and protect maternity, childhood, and old age.*
>
> Qatar Constitution, Article 21

The family plays a pivotal role in the formation of a pious, moral Qatari subject. The link between families and morals is particularly important, as families are seen as the bulwark against the insidious influence of non-Islamic, non-Qatari social practices and beliefs. Families and morality are intrinsically linked and cannot be separated. A moral society is understood to be one in which social relations are centered around family life, and the resultant socio-spatial processes that emerge from this are viewed as a necessary element in the maintenance and support of the family unit.

The valorized position of the pious, ethical, patriotic, patriarchal family is privileged in Article 21 of the Qatari constitution, stated above. The emphasis on the family is reiterated in the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV), which states "*Strong Islamic and family values will provide our moral and ethical compass.*" The family is pivotal to the QNV's social development goals, as it functions as the foundation upon which social development takes root. Specifically, the QNV aims to foster the creation of "*Strong cohesive families that care for their members, and maintain moral and religious values and humanitarian ideals*" (QNV, pg. 22).

Article 18 of the constitution states that "*The Qatari society is based on the values of justice, benevolence, freedom, equality, and high morals.*" Not only is Islamic morality necessary for and linked to the family unit, it is promoted as a fundamental characteristic of Qatari national identity. This is explicitly stated in the Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016:

> *Basic Islamic principles state that care and respect must be given to the vulnerable and that individuals must proactively contribute to a productive society. So it is critical that the wider Qatari society adhere to this aspect of national identity.* (page 200, QN Development Strategy 2011- 2016)

The valorization of the Qatari family and Islamic morals leads to the construction of narratives deeming particular groups of people "worthy" of full engagement with public life, yet renders others as "unworthy" subjects of rule, relegated to particular parts of the city, and upon whom a restricted engagement with the public realm is imposed and expected. The emphasis on this idealized, pious Qatari subject and family is contrasted with the necessary evil of the presence of over one million low-income foreign workers, who serve and maintain the city for the use of families and, whom, for the large part, are visible only in their capacity as workers in Doha's public realm. This social and physical divide is aided by socio-spatial practices that separate these groups and create so-called governable spaces (Rose 1999) in which particular subjects are delineated, known, and easily managed.

The reordering of urban space in Doha into sanctioned spaces for the idealized family is not only expressed via the creation of Islamicized public spaces of family leisure and consumption, it is also done through explicit measures aimed at clearing out the city of low-income, male workers, and limiting their visibility and access to public space.

6.6 Assertion of Qatari Values and Traditions

Additionally, the anxiety over the loss of Qatari tradition in the face of modernization has prompted the implementation of interventions that attempt to highlight existing traditions, as well as create new traditions. The active creation of Qatari culture and tradition may be understood in terms of Hobsbawm's (1992) notion of invented traditions. Hobsbawm argues that such traditions seek to "inculcate certain values and norms." Hobsbawm posits that invented traditions have multiple purposes, including the promotion of social cohesion and membership, legitimization of power relations, and promotion of socialization or conventions of behavior. He implies that the imposition of tradition is, by virtue, a manifestation of power relations within a society. The active, top-down creation of Qatari culture and tradition, which relies heavily on the appropriation of non-Qatari Islamic cultural production, which I will discuss further, and identification of Qatar as an important steward of Islamic civilization, as well as a modern producer of Islamic tradition, is a pivotal part of the construction of the imagined community (Anderson 1991) of the Qatari nation, and Qatari subject formation. Not only is this explicitly articulated in national development documents, tradition is codified into law.

Article 57 of the Qatari constitution explicitly turns Qatari traditions into law, stating: "… abiding by public order and morality, observing national traditions and established customs is a duty of all who reside in the State of Qatar or enter its territory." Qatar and other states where nationals are the minority face the challenge of potentially being overshadowed by the customs, traditions and identity of their large foreign populations. Thus, the need to legislate such matters such as the public celebration of non-Qatari or non-Islamic holidays and traditions. Non-Qatari holidays such as Christmas, Valentine's Day and Halloween are mediated and micromanaged by laws and governmental decrees aimed at minimizing their importance and prominence, and imposing the celebration of Qatar's invented traditions, such as Qatar National Day and Qatar National Sports Day, in their stead.[71]

The goals articulated in the QNV are supported by the creation of "Effective public institutions and strong and active civil society organizations that… Preserve Qatar's national heritage and enhance Arab and Islamic values and identity" (QNV). Additionally, Qatari traditions and culture are promoted via "A national network of formal and non-formal educational programs that equip Qatari children and youth with the skills and motivation to contribute to society, fostering: A solid grounding in Qatari moral and ethical values, traditions and cultural heritage (and) A strong sense of belonging and citizenship" (QNV, page 1). Children

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[71] Article 50 of the Constitution states: "Freedom to practice religious rites shall be guaranteed to all persons in accordance with the law and the requirements of the maintenance of public order and morality." Though this may be interpreted to generally grant religious freedom, the maintenance of "morality" is often used to limit such freedoms, as certain religious rites or traditions may be deemed immoral under Shari' law. In December 2015, several private daycares and schools canceled celebrations scheduled before the winter break after receiving a two-page memo from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), which regulates daycares in Qatar. The memo, entitled "Celebration of non-Islamic rituals," reminded administrators of the laws regulating religious and educational matters (stating that Qatar is a Muslim country, governed by Shari' law), as well as the special obligation daycares have toward their students, including instilling culturally appropriate morals and ethics, and not exposing children to harmful rituals. The memo stated "Therefore it is prohibited on all nurseries to celebrate with non-Islamic rituals as it violates the constitution of Qatar and violates the rules of the …law no. 1 of the year 2014." Several schools, including the Montessori school my daughter attended, decided to cancel celebrations, though they were not Christmas-related, for fear that disciplinary action could be taken against them. Similarly, in February 2016, many hotels and restaurants canceled Valentine's Day celebrations and packages, in response to directives by the Ministry of Interior.

are taught, from an early age, about the QNV. The following passage is from a fourth grade *Qatar History and Civilization Schoolbook*, published by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Qatar

> *Qatar National Vision 2030, which is approved by the Amiri Decree of Qatar No. 44 of 2008, aims to transform Qatar into an advanced country by 2030. The goal is to ensure Qatar's capability of sustaining its own development and provide a high standard of living for its entire population for generations to come. The Qatar National Vision 2030 outlines the goals that the country seeks to achieve by 2030. It also provides the general foundation for the progress of national plans and ensures they are implemented.*

This inculcation of tradition and heritage occurs via a multitude of processes; through law, education, discursive practices, information dissemination, as well as through socio-spatial practices and interventions that create and mark spaces as "traditional," significant to Qatari "culture," and "Islamic." In the following section, I highlight one of the most significant socio-spatial processes through which the notions of maintaining Qatari culture and tradition in the face of modernization, and the cultivation of spaces for an idealized, pious Qatari family are reinforced in Qatar's capital and largest city, Doha -- the proliferation of cultural heritage sites that inscribe Qatari tradition, most often in the form of Islamicized public spaces, for the exclusive use of an idealized, "Islamic" family.

6.7 Analyzing Tradition and National Identity in the Urban Realm

Many scholars have suggested that the built environment is an instrumental tool for analyzing the making and evolution of national identity. Components of the built environment -- individual structures, building components, and neighborhoods -- may be used as analytical tools to breakdown and demonstrate specific aspects of the complicated notion of national identity. Alsayyad posits that the concept of national identity can be examined through the evolution of "traditional" settlement forms and that national identity manifests itself in various other traditions, many of which are reflected in the built environment. Vale analyzes national parliaments; Anderson uses the census, map and museum as points of inquiry into imagined nationalism; and Mitchell uses the analysis of the Egypt exhibit and the objectification of the "oriental" person and city as an entrée into the making of the modern Egyptian state and Egyptian subject formation. Each of these scholars demonstrate how, various aspects of the built environment translate into larger traditions of knowledge and representation, and articulate notions of nationhood and national identity. Each also demonstrates a dialectical process of creation, definition and perpetuation between the notion of national identity and its constituent parts and manifestations. This may be a very effective way of breaking down the monolithic notion of national identity, or the nation state, into something more tangible. It shows how subtle, insidious, and powerful seemingly benign signs and representations are in actuality, which reinforce Hobsbawm's (1988) assertion that tradition is power.

Vale, Anderson and Mitchell's analysis of national identity also raise the question of agency; the agency of the dominant group, as well as that of the subject in creating, adopting and perpetuating these signs and traditions of the nation and national identity. The implication, made by many scholars, that tradition is unconsciously passed down and recreated, which implies a

lack of agency on the part of subjects involved in its transmission, is challenged by the notion that, as is the case in Doha, the creation and perpetuation of tradition is not unconscious. Various actors participate in very deliberate ways to construct and fashion what then becomes the "traditional" in Doha. Other scholars (Kellett, Napier) have called into question the effectiveness of analyzing the built environment and spatially manifest traditions, suggesting that a study of the genealogy and evolution of vernacular forms may lead to incorrect conclusions about the underlying societal norms from which particular vernaculars arise, mainly because the "architectural object" only provides a "partially informed view." They argue that the processes through which traditions originate and are perpetuated may not be understood through such an analysis.

Though I contend that numerous obstacles are inherent in the "reading" of the built environment, one may argue that it is precisely because the most valued aspects of a vernacular are maintained and reproduced by the imposition of the traditional, and other aspects of society are not represented, it is particularly important to understand just what is being represented as traditional and what is absent from such representations. As I will demonstrate in my analysis of representations of tradition in Doha, what is not represented is just as important. This manifests in the devaluing and exclusion of particular notions, histories, forms of knowledge, and experiences, or what Spivak (1999) refers to as the silence of the archives. The deliberate absence in the representation of history and traditions of knowledge in dominant narratives is particularly salient in Doha, which, over the past two decades, has experienced an unprecedented building boom, and is currently redefining itself in terms of its so-called traditions and modernity, as well as its relationship with its past and future, which are arguably defined by a well scripted gaze with western modernity.

According to Hobsbawm (1988), though particular invented traditions are seemingly more benign than others, all propagate underlying societal power relations. Thus, the processes through which the imposition of tradition is manifest gives us valuable insight into the underlying power relations within a society due to their influences on subjects' action, thought, and lived experience -- whether directly via institutions that overtly influence societal relations, or indirectly via processes of self-censorship, including the self-censorship of social relations in public space and life in Doha, as I will discuss. Following Hobsbawm's contention that the imposition of tradition is, by virtue, a manifestation of power relations within a society, with regard to the built environment, traditional forms of architecture -- or in the case of Doha, the imposition of imagined traditional forms of architecture -- inherently reflect societal power relations. Thus, the built environment may elucidate a map of societal processes and power relations.

6.8 Tradition as Development

> *Katara was born out of a long held vision to position the State of Qatar as a cultural beacon, a lighthouse of art, radiating in the Middle East through theatre, literature, music, visual art, conventions and exhibitions… Katara is where the grace of the past meets the splendour of the future.[72]*

As noted previously, the tension between the development of a "modern" society versus the maintenance of traditional, conservative Qatari values is one of the driving principles behind Qatar's national development schemes. One of the pillars of the Qatar National Vision (QNV) is the promotion of human development through education and culture. For the past two decades, the Qatari state has placed particular emphasis on culture as a means of promoting development and strategically positioning the country as an international tourist destination. The role that Doha's urban space plays in the project of development and nation building, as well as maintenance and promotion of Qatari morals, culture, and traditions, is critical.

When tradition is deployed as a tool of development, the focus on "development" obscures and depoliticizes the underlying notions that animate and inform interventions that inscribe tradition in the urban realm. Doha's public spaces of culture and tradition are portrayed as rational, depoliticized instruments that promote the growth and development of the city and its residents. In Doha, as elsewhere in the Arab world, normative, rational planning is the instrument upon which proponents of development rely to neutralize its aims.

Many scholars have interpreted urban interventions, such as the proliferation of cultural heritage sites in Doha, in light of Qatar's attempt to position Doha as an international travel hub (see Wiedmann et al. 2012). And, much focus has been placed on Doha's (re)development to meet the challenges and demands imposed by Qatar's hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, which puts the spotlight on the country, and to which Qatar aims to engage the foreign gaze by demonstrating Doha's modernity and progress. But, little exploration has been made into the role these spaces play in the inculcation of "tradition" and subsequent formation of a modern, educated, pious, patriotic, Islamic subject, which the Qatari state aims to cultivate through its cultural and educational programs, as repeatedly expressed in Qatar's national development schemes. In addition to making Doha an international travel hub, positioning Qatar in the international circuit of sporting events -- such as the 2022 FIFA World Cup, 2016 UCI Road World Championship, Qatar Open tennis tournaments, and numerous golf, sailing, swimming, gymnastics, and racing events -- as well as promoting "Islamic" tourism from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia,[73] tradition is instrumental to the larger project of nation building and Qatari subject formation.

The emphasis on culture and tradition is also a means of differentiating Qatar from its GCC rivals, most notably, Dubai. Many Qataris view Dubai as engaging in rampant, capitalist

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[72] Katara website <http://www.katara.net/en/About-Katara> [accessed January 14, 2016]

[73] Singapore based Crescent Rating, which markets itself as the "World's Leading Authority of Halal Tourism" and publishes the Global Muslim Travel Index (GMTI), ranked Qatar as the fifth best country for "halal tourism" in 2016. Malaysia ranked first, Saudi Arabia ranked sixth, and the United States ranked 36. The ranking assesses the following criteria for Muslim travelers: Family Destination, Safe Travel, Visitor Arrivals, Halal Dining Options, Prayer Space Access, Airport Services, Accommodation, Ease of Communication, Awareness and Reach-Out to Muslim Travelers, Air Connectivity, and Visa Requirements.

expansion at the expense of its Arab, Islamic culture and identity.[74] Qatar's attempt to position Doha as the cultural capital of the GCC and Arab world is promoted by the creation of institutions engaged in cultural production, such as the Qatar Philharmonic, Qatar Music Academy, and the Doha Film Institute, all of which are based at Katara Cultural Village. Additionally, the creation of museums and urban spaces that define and celebrate an imagined "ancestral" Qatari culture and tradition are instrumental in furthering this goal. Such spaces include Katara, Souk Wakif, Souk Wakra, the Qatar National Museum, National Library, and other newly constructed cultural heritage sites. These sites are instrumental in portraying this imagined past and rewriting Qatar's history to position it within the larger history of Islamic civilization. Not only do they highlight the invented traditions of Qatari culture and heritage, I argue that they facilitate the appropriation of Islamic histories and cultures for the purpose of embellishing and creating Qatari culture and traditions. But, perhaps more importantly, cultural heritage sites such as Katara and the Museum of Islamic Art, position Qatar as the modern caretaker and benefactor of a larger Islamic culture and history, one in which Qatar claims a significant role and upon which Qatar relies to assert its importance in the Arab and Muslim world. Qatar Museums (previously the Qatar Museum Authority), under the patronage of the Qatari royal family, has acquired billions of dollars' worth of art and cultural artifacts in the past decade. These cultural artifacts are stored or displayed at Qatar's various museums, including the Museum of Islamic Art (MIA), and Mathaf, which specializes in contemporary Arab art. Many of the museums are still in the process of being built, yet they appear in children's textbooks as sites of Qatari culture and heritage, alongside assertions of Qatar's rich Islamic tradition.

The deployment of traditional architectural vernaculars and Islamic urbanism is a way to lend authenticity to the place in which they are situated. Yet, the notion of any tradition in the built environment as "genuine" is fraught with difficulty because the very notion of authenticity is obscured by the argument that tradition is invented (Hobsbawm 1988) or imagined (Anderson 2006). Thus, all possible indicators of a tradition's authenticity, such as origin or duration, are arbitrary. As Roy points out, mimicry often leads to the incorporation of various icons, images, and vernaculars into "traditions" of architecture from which they are completely unrelated. Given that forms of meaning ascribed to any tradition are socially produced, the source of traditions or relationships they inherently manifest is ultimately obscured in their reproduction and perpetuation.

6.9 Katara

> *The attachment to our ancient roots together with premeditated modernisation and technological advancement form the solid foundation of Qatari personality and values.*

> *It was decided to revive Qatar's olden name to uphold our connection to ancient heritage and to honour Qatar's distinguished position since the dawn of history.[75]*

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[74] As Sean Anderson points out, "Chief among the internal revolutions for which the Emir is notable is what has been termed an "Islamic renaissance", a turn toward cultural capital with the proposed construction of no less than nine new museums that can be read as a conscious resistance to the prevailing ethos of his neighbours' relentless commercial development" (Anderson 67, 2012).

[75] <http://www.katara.net/en/About-Katara> [accessed March 12, 2016].

The name Katara is derived from the ancient name of Qatar, which first appeared as Catara in 150 AD, as a designation for the Qatar Peninsula in a map by the Greco-Roman scholar Claudius Ptolemaeus or Ptolemy (100-170 AD). The lineage of the name is important, as it situates modern-day Qatar within the larger history of Islamic civilization and, makes claims to an important role within that history. The representation of Catara on historic maps is emphasized as proof that the region was significant and worthy of mention prior to the emergence of modern-day Qatar in 1971. A 1616 map, entitled *Arabia,* designates Catara in the location of present-day Qatar. The map is a reprint of a 1598 map by Jodocus Hondius (1563-1612), a Flemish cartographer and engraver, and is part of the Qatar National Library Heritage Collection. As a historical document, the map plays a central role in the narrative, put forth by the Qatari state, that modern-day Qataris are bound together by a shared ancient heritage and traditions.

The map occupied a hallowed position in the Qatar National Library's exhibit in the 2016 Qatar National Day celebrations at *Darb al Saai*, where it was prominently displayed, as proof that the region currently occupied by modern-day Qatar was recognized as a contiguous area and documented as such. The map is an inscription device, or a mechanism "for producing conviction in others" Rose (2008, 36) in the ideal of nationalism and the imagined community (Anderson 1991) of contemporary Qatar. "Inscriptions thus produce objectivity…that make possible the extension of authority over that which they seem to depict" Rose (2008, 36-37). The claims implicit in this are significant on several fronts, most notably that Qatar is not just another part of Saudi Arabia; it was recognized as a region worthy of mention on its own accord, even in ancient times. This logic reinforces the legitimacy of the modern sovereign state and provides a basis for autonomy from Saudi Arabia, if not politically, at least geographically. This legitimacy and notion of sovereignty has taken on a new importance in the context of the ongoing blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt and others. Qataris were encouraged to visit the exhibit through a series of shows, broadcast on Qatar National Radio, highlighting the significant cultural and historical artifacts and exhibits at *Darb al Saai*, the grounds of state-sponsored Qatar National Day events.

The dissemination of information about ancient names, traditions and heritage, tied to the Qatar Peninsula, plays a pivotal role in Qatari subject formation, as it suggests a unified people from the region that is recognized, cataloged, written about, and documented. The narrative goes like this: Qataris should be proud of their heritage, as it is recognized and documented by others. Qatar is significant; it was significant in the past and will be even more significant in the future. Katara plays a central role in this narrative. Katara is conceived as a space that celebrates multi-culturalism, a project and physical space that brings together the past and what Qatar aspires for itself in the future. It incorporates a diverse spectrum of architecture, art, heritage and festivals from the Islamic world and west into a theme park-like, cultural entertainment and shopping destination.

Figure 6.4: Arabia Map, 1616
1616 map designating "Catara" in the location of present-day Qatar. The map is a reprint of a 1598 map by Jodocus Hondius (1563-1612), a Flemish cartographer and engraver.

Source: Arabia, Qatar National Library Heritage Collection, 2921, in Qatar Digital Library
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/qnlhc/2921> [accessed May 11, 2016]

The cultural village is situated on a highly controlled and monitored campus, accessible by two entrances, which are staffed by security personnel and equipped with security cameras that digitally record the image of every driver and license plate of every vehicle that enters. The campus is still under construction and will consist of Katara Plaza, a high-end mall and climate controlled outdoor esplanade; the Katara Amphitheatre; the family-only Katara beach; an agglomeration of galleries and venues stylized as a traditional Islamic city; the Katara Mosque and Golden Mosque; the Katara esplanade; and an agglomeration of restaurants, representing multiethnic cuisines from around the world.

Figure 6.5: Katara Plaza Brochure
Katara Plaza Brochure showing location and plan of Katara Cultural Village. Note that the main esplanade and open spaces (in yellow) are designated for "family activities."

Source: http://kataraplaza.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KATARA-PLAZA-Brochure-022016.pdf [accessed March 12, 2016]

The 3,275 square-meter, 5,000-person capacity Katara amphitheater is situated at the heart of the cultural village. The amphitheater is a modern interpretation of a classical Greek theater, with Islamic architectural elements incorporated throughout, such as grand doors typical of mosques throughout the Muslim world. The amphitheater is rarely used and an army of security officers monitor the premises, instructing kids to stop running up and down its tiered seating. On weekends, families and children fill the amphitheater seats and stage, performing their own entertainment, taking pictures on stage, and delighting in the commanding views of the Arabian Gulf.

Figure 6.6: Katara Amphitheatre
Doha, February 2016   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

The main ceremonial doors to the amphitheater most often remain closed, but several ramps and side doors, all of which are carefully monitored by security guards, lead into the grand space. People mainly pass through the amphitheater as a shortcut from the parking area to the Katara esplanade or one of the many restaurants along the walkway. One of the most popular

restaurants, particularly amongst Qatari patrons, is Chac'Late, a Qatari, European-themed café situated near the amphitheater's ceremonial entrance. Patrons of Chac'Late sit in the shade of the Islamically stylized theater while enjoying Arabic tea and European pastries. The utility of an open-air theater in a country where temperatures regularly exceed one hundred degrees is questionable, yet, the symbolism of the amphitheater is arguably more important than its use value. Amphitheaters are the ultimate symbol of "great" civilizations. In addition to the tremendous wealth and labor resources necessary to build an amphitheater, the construction of amphitheaters in antiquity symbolized "advanced" civilizations that possessed technological innovation, status and power. "Great" civilizations built amphitheaters in important places, in cities that were seats of power and culture -- cities whose sphere of influence extended well beyond their immediate geographic area, such as Alexandria, Egypt. Thus, amphitheaters are implicitly associated with important civilizations that espoused culture and the arts. The existence of a modern, world-class amphitheater in Katara situates Qatar within this historical narrative, and implicitly situates it as a powerful society that espouses culture, status and aspires for influence beyond its national borders. The existence of Katara's grand amphitheater implicitly allows Doha to stand amongst other historically and culturally important sites in the Arab world, in which amphitheaters are located, such as Alexandria, Egypt, Zouk, Lebanon, Petra, Jordan, El Djem, Tunisia, and Bosra, Syria. It references a history the country never had, yet one that is easily recognizable, significant, and gives credibility to its benefactor.

The types of events that take place in the amphitheater are equally as important. I attended a sold out lecture entitled "Does God Exist?" by the Islamic cleric Dr. Zakir Naik, which drew a diverse crowd of mainly South Asians, Qataris and Arabs. Dr. Naik had previously lectured in Doha and he and his son, who is also a cleric, are highly regarded in Qatar's Islamist circles. Another high profile performance was a concert by the Palestinian singer and winner of the second season of *Arab Idol*, Mohammed Assaf, in May 2016.


Figure 6.7: Zakir Naik Lecture Entitled "Does God Exist?"
Katara Amphitheatre, Doha. May 26, 2016.   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

The concert was staged to correspond with the unveiling of the world's largest key, representing the keys to Palestinian homes that were dispossessed by the forced migration of Palestinians from their homeland and are held or worn by Palestinian refugees as symbols of their loss and potential return to Palestine. These events and others like them associate Doha as an advocate and protector of Islamist ideas and the rights of oppressed peoples and Muslims throughout the Islamic world.

Two ornate masjids, or mosques, are situated around the perimeter of the amphitheater. The Katara Masjid, designed by Turkish architect, Zainab Fadil Oglu, is the largest and most significant. The architectural elements of the mosque, including windows, minaret, mihrab (prayer niche), dome, and arched doorways, "are all inspired by several famous mosques found in various cities and capitals of the Muslim world."[76] The Golden Masjid is located adjacent the amphitheater, to the north. Decorated with thousands of gold chips, the mosque glistens in the sunlight, yet is much smaller and less ceremonial than the Katara Mosque. To the west of the amphitheater, the Katara esplanade – the cultural village's largest open space - curves around the beach and ties together the restaurants and galleries on either side of the amphitheater.

The esplanade is dotted with several well-regulated food stalls from Katara's ethnic restaurants and, on most evenings, families can be seen leisurely strolling, or sitting on one of the many wooden benches, enjoying fresh chapattis and karak. To the east of the amphitheater, a myriad of alleyways, courtyards, pigeon towers, water elements, and Islamically stylized buildings - which house galleries, studio spaces, the Katara Opera House, and various halls and venues - create a modern interpretation of a traditional Islamic city. The Katara Plaza, which is still under construction, is the main retail destination that will include a mall for kids, shaped like a giant present, complete with bow, leaning in its side (inside will be toy and clothing stores, a candy store, and "edutainment" facilities and displays).[77] The main section will include a climate controlled, outdoor pedestrian plaza, Evian Spa, and branch of the French department store, Galleries Lafayette.

Figure 6.8: Katara Plaza Concept Illustration
"Families can also enjoy a horse carriage ride to travel through the beautifully decorated promenades and enjoying the open-air experience in a climate-control environment.
The Classical Victorian-inspired architectural designs add to the allure of Katara Plaza as a place of wonder, wellness and an enriching, family-friendly lifestyle."
http://kataraplaza.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KATARA-PLAZA-Brochure-022016.pdf
[accessed March 12, 2016]

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[76] http://www.katara.net/en/visting-katara/venues-landmarks/the-masjid-of-katara [accessed March 15, 2016].
[77]< http://kataraplaza.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KATARA-PLAZA-Brochure-022016.pdf > [accessed March 12, 2016].

Figure 6.9: Katara Plaza Construction
Doha, May 2016
Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi

Figure 6.10: *Chac'Late,* **Katara**
Doha, April 2016
Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi

6.10   Festivals and Tradition

The Katara esplanade and adjacent beach is host to hundreds of festivals, performances, and exhibits each year, including the Winter Festival, Qatar International Food Festival, and Cultural Diversity Festival, which lasts from January to May and highlights the dance, theater and musical traditions of many countries. Qatari "traditional" crafts and culture are frequently on display in festivals -- not a month goes by without a festival celebrating carefully curated traditions of Qatar's Bedouin and pearl diving past. Four of the most important events are the Halal Festival, Senyar Championship, and Dhow Festival, which celebrate traditional Qatari life before modernization, in addition to Qatar National Day, which not only highlights Qatari traditions, but showcases Qatar's modern achievements.

Figure 6.11: Dhow Festival – Katara
Doha, November, 2016.
Photos: Riem El-Zoghbi

Many of the dhows are built for the sole purpose of "heritage" by the Emiri Engineering Office, a special office that operates under the auspices of the Emiri Diwan which controls high profile special, public projects deemed strategic to Qatar's national interests.

The Halal Festival focuses on traditional sheep breeding practices, with contests, demonstrations and educational activities taking place over a 10-day period. Barns, Bedouin tents, and a traditional market are set up to recreate life in Qatar before the discovery of oil. The Senyar Championship and Dhow Festival celebrate Qatar's fishing and pearl diving past. Over 50 teams compete in the Senyar Championship in the categories of fishing, pearl diving and *Allafah* using Dhows (the traditional boats used in the Arabian Gulf). Dhows, sea-related crafts, tools, food, music etc. are exhibited in traditional tents and workshops in the annual Dhow Festival, which features over one hundred dhows from throughout the GCC, and culminates in a pearl diving competition. Other competitions include trap and hand-line fishing, rowing, and traditional dhow racing. An imagined traditional fishing village is recreated on the Katara beach, in addition to a gold souk, and families can take free Dhow rides in the Gulf. Qatar National Day has taken on considerable significance since its inauguration in 2007. It includes multiple festivities over the span of a week, with heritage themed events and exhibits.

The carefully crafted display of Qatari tradition and heritage in these festivals is instrumental to the goals of preserving Qatari culture and traditions expressed in the Qatar National Vision 2030, and Katara literature and brochures identify it as such. The representation of a shared, easily identifiable heritage and traditions that center around pre-modern Bedouin and pearl-diving life, implies a unified state, tied together by a shared past -- one that is expressly Arab, Muslim and derived from the dominant tribes that rule modern-day Qatar. The influence of non-Arab peoples -- many of whom migrated and assimilated into Qatari society before independence in 1971, or the millions of South Asian migrant workers who constitute over half

of Qatar's present-day population -- are not acknowledged in the myths surrounding the representation of Qatari culture.

Yet, despite the emphasis on and assertion of a shared Qatari heritage, the two main frames of reference by which Qatari heritage is defined, Bedouin and pearl-diving, can only be expressed via a limited number of highly localized traditions, which have limited influence beyond the GCC. These references are ubiquitous in festivals, exhibits and cultural heritage sites. This brings us to the increased importance placed on the role of Islamic culture in Qatari society and in defining Qatari traditions and, the related emphasis of the QNV on the development of a pious, Islamic Qatari subject.

The claim that Qatar's pre-modern past has greatly influenced Arab or Islamic culture is a difficult argument to make, given the unique claims neighboring Saudi Arabia has over its importance to the Islamic faith, as the seat of Sunni Islam and site of Islam's holiest shrines, Mecca and Medina. The Kingdom's historic cultural dominance with respect to Islam will always surpass Qatar's claims. But, Qatar's emphasis on being a modern, forward thinking benefactor of Islamic culture gives it an equally unique role, and allows it to assert its importance in modern Islamic cultural production and as a protector of Islamic civilization. The assertion of Qatar's role in celebrating, preserving, archiving, protecting and being a benefactor for Islamic art, architecture and culture is one that widens the country's scope of influence beyond its national borders and the GCC, and makes significant Qatar's importance to Islamic culture and society.

Katara serves an important role in this strategy, as do spaces such as the Museum of Islamic Art. The mission of both institutions is to enhance the "human development" of Qatari citizens by creating multicultural spaces that educate them about Islamic culture. Yet, the strong nationalist narratives tied to such spaces position Qatar as a modern caretaker of Islamic culture and civilization and, facilitate the appropriation of this wider Islamic heritage and culture. By housing Islamic artifacts in the most expensive, most revered, most exclusive, well designed, "best" venues possible, Qatar claims to exalt Islamic culture, while using it to define its own role and significance in the world. The Museum of Islamic Art is a modern Islamic building by I.M. Pei that references Cairo's Ibn Tulun mosque.[78] In a keynote address at the opening of the MIA, the speaker noted that, at the time of the museum's inauguration, not one artifact from Qatar was in the MIA collection; yet, narratives that stress Qatar's exceptional and pivotal role in Islamic civilization permeate public discourse and spaces such as Katara and the MIA act as backdrops that highlight Qatar's status in the Arab and Muslim world. The Islamically stylized buildings and artifacts also highlight Qatar's ability to buy "culture," as they are commodities to be showcased and consumed by the world and segments of the society deemed worthy of their patronage, more than they promote Islamic multiculturalism. In Doha, the segments of society deemed worthy of their patronage are, most importantly, the idealized Qatari family, which is the specific target and beneficiary of Qatar's human development goals.

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[78] I.M. Pei is quoted in the book *Museum of Islamic Art: Doha, Qatar,* sold in the museum's gift shop, as saying "The Museum of Islamic Art is more influenced by the mosque of Ibn Tulun than any other building. This mosque is very austere and beautiful, and it has the most refined geometry. What inspired me the most was the small ablution fountain in the middle of a large courtyard. That little building is a poem."

6.11   Public Spaces of Islamic Leisure

Asef Bayat (2007) has argued that in countries throughout the Middle East, undemocratic and socially conservative Islamist regimes of rule have reinforced the notion of Islamic exceptionalism through explicit, as well as implicit, interventions in urban public space. In cities such as Cairo and Tehran, the proliferation of cultural centers celebrating Islamic achievements, symbolic markings, and the construction of mosques, serve to order the city into sanctioned versus unsanctioned spaces of piety (ibid). The prominence of Katara, the Museum of Islamic Art, and other such spaces not only imbues Doha with an undeniable sense of the city's "Islamic essence," it orders the city into sanctioned public spaces of Islamic culture and leisure for use of the idealized family, high-income expatriates, and tourists, who are deemed acceptable in the highly stratified society.

Public spaces of Islamic leisure, such as Katara, are infused with religious markings that endow such spaces with specific Islamic meanings, codes and values. Katara, the Museum of Islamic Art, and the multitude of other urban interventions aimed at marking Qatari culture, tradition and heritage in the urban realm are highly controlled, scripted Islamic public spaces, that mitigate the risk of moral transgression by being family-focused, and by the monitoring and control of public interaction between the sexes and movements of women and single men. This follows Bayat's (2007) contention that Islamist regimes of rule regulate entertainment and the exercise of "fun" to sanctioned spaces, in an effort to mitigate its spontaneity, as they view "fun" as potentially subversive. The control of entertainment, "fun" and spontaneity is spatialized via practices that attempt to mitigate the risk of moral transgression and possible subversion of order. Katara and the Museum of Islamic Art arguably play this role in the case of Doha.

The infusion of religiosity and religious markings into public spaces of leisure is one of the socio-spatial practices that serve to mark particular spaces as "Islamic," worthy of patronage by the imagined righteous, Islamic families that the Qatari state aims to cultivate. As is the case in Cairo, in Doha, planners and government agencies deploy "Islamic" urbanism to brand the city through the creation of theme park-type spaces where families and tourists may consume culture in authentic, yet highly controlled and scripted environments.

Chapter 7. Sanitized Bodies in a Sanitized City

Nannies, maids, baby-sitters, personal trainers, personal-assistants and drivers are not permitted to enter the club

-- Dana Club Membership rules, page 3

The history of Doha is reflected in the waning and waxing of the millions of migrants, who have traversed the city over the past century. Since the exploration for and discovery of oil and natural gas in the mid-twentieth century, Qatar has relied on foreign workers and immigrant populations to build and service its oil fields and industrial sites, service its industries, build its cities, care for its children, and work in the homes of its citizens.

In 1970, Qatari citizens constituted approximately 60% of the total population, with the remaining 40% being non-Qatari expatriates. The proportion of Qatari citizens with respect to the total population has decreased steadily ever since, as, since Qatari independence in 1971, more foreign workers were recruited to build and service newly formed Qatari state institutions. The 1986 census reveals that Qatari citizens constituted less than 27% of the total population, and, thus, were a minority in their own country. This has continued to be the case. The period between 2004 and 2010 witnessed a dramatic rise in both the total population --- which grew from 744,029 in 2004 to 1,699,435 in 2010[79] -- and in the proportion of non-Qatari expatriates, with grew from approximately 75.9% of the total population in 2004, to approximately 85.7% of the total population in 2010.[80] This dramatic increase in population was facilitated by the national development schemes launched during this period, in accordance with the Qatar National Vision 2030.

7.1 The Social Construction of a "Worker"

The figure of the "worker" permeates all aspects of Qatari society. The state does everything it can to mitigate the threats and shield Qatari society from the potential adverse effects of such a large, foreign migrant population. This need informs many of Qatar's development goals and public policies, and is the primary reason behind the inscription of Qatari tradition in the urban realm, as the disproportionately large percentage of non-Qataris is feared to facilitate the erosion of Qatari tradition and culture (see figure 7.2). Many public policies that support this aim, such as particular housing laws detailed in Chapter 9, lead to the physical and social segregation of certain population groups, particularly low-income men, who are viewed as the largest threat to Qatar's social and moral fabric.

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[79] Population data source: *The Simplified Census of Population, Housing & Establishments, 2015*
[80] Estimates of proportion of Qatari and non-Qatari populations data source: *Françoise De Bel-Air, "Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar," Explanatory Note No. 8/2014, Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) programme of the Migration Policy Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), http:// gulfmigration.eu*

According to April 2015 census figures, almost half (512,395 persons) of Qatar's employed population (1,233,110 persons) was employed in construction. Of those employed in construction, 511,690 persons, or almost one-fifth of Qatar's total 2015 population, are non-Qatari workers. This number is projected to grow as more construction projects come online in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

The category of *worker* is often interchangeable with *laborer*. Article 1 of labor code No. 14 of 2004 defines "labour" as "any human effort, whether intellectual, technical, or physical exerted in return for a wage," though it does not define "laborer." *The Annual Omnibus Survey: A survey of life in Qatar 2014*, conducted by the Social and Economic Research Institute of Qatar University, defines "laborers" as "lower income contract employees who typically reside in labor camps unaccompanied by family" (Executive Summary Report, page 53). Both are used to describe low-income, unskilled, migrants from the global south. It most often implies men, but female domestic workers are also considered workers, though they are never referred to as laborers. Most female workers are employed in the service sector or as domestic workers.

Figure 7.1: Artwork by Qatari Artist, Faraj Daham
Mathaf, Arab Museum of Modern Art. Doha, June 2016   *Photo: Samer Shehata*
This work is part of Mathaf's permanent collection and was exhibited at the Katara Art Center in the artist's "Street Language" exhibition, March 15-April 28, 2012. The artist's work is exhibited in public spaces throughout Doha.

Though the designation *worker* is used in official documents, including the census, the precise definitions of *worker* and *laborer* are not readily available in such documents. Law No. 4 of 2004 (Qatar Labor Law) defines a worker as "any natural person who works in return for a wage for an employer or under his control or supervision."[81]

The National Human Rights Committee, which describes itself as "one of the statutory organisations that work for the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of all under the jurisdiction of Qatari laws,"[82] defines a worker as "any male or female or Qatari or non-Qatari worker."[83] The requirements mandated by Qatar Labor Law are explained in a document published by the National Human Rights Committee entitled the *Workers Rights Book,* published in June 2009. The document attempts to provide a simple, accessible explanation of Qatar labor laws for foreign workers and is published in multiple languages including English, Urdu, Persian, Nepali, Filipino, and Indonesian.

Figure 7.2: Qatar Total Population and Estimate of the Proportion of Non-Nationals by Census Year (1970, 1986, 1997, 2004, 2010)

* 1986; 1997; 2004: mid-year population estimate.
Source: GLMM calculations using QSA data.

Source: Françoise De Bel-Air, "Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar," Explanatory Note No. 8/2014, Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) programme of the Migration Policy Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), http:// gulfmigration.eu

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[81] Law No. 4 of 2004 (Qatar Labor Law), Part One, Definitions and General Provisions, Article 1.
[82] *Workers Rights Book*, page 9
[83] *Workers Rights Book*, page 13

This is one of the many National Human Rights Committee documents produced to publicize the notion of human rights in Qatar and preempt criticism of the Qatari government for limiting certain rights under Qatari law, such as the right to unionize, hold public protests against the ruling regime, and prohibitions on collective bargaining. Qatar labor laws have been the focus of international scrutiny since Qatar was awarded the 2022 World Cup in 2010. Organizations such as the National Human Rights Committee attempt to counter the narrative that Qatari law limits the rights of workers, women, and other members of Qatari society viewed at risk of having their basic human rights eroded.

Act No. 21 of 27 October 2015 -- which regulates the entry and exit of expatriates and their residence -- defines an expatriate as "any non-Qatari who enters the country for work, residence or visit or for any other purpose." Yet, the category of *expatriate*, which is sometimes interchangeable with *resident* -- or *mukeem* -- implies higher-income, educated professionals, most often from the global north and Arab world. *Mukeem* inherently implies someone who has a connection to and stake in the country. *Mukeemeen* (residents) are not perceived as foreigners solely in the country on short-term work contracts; they are perceived as people for whom Qatar is home. *Workers* are not afforded this privilege, regardless of the length of time they have resided in Qatar. There is a temporal element to being a worker; being a worker it is to occupy a temporary position, with the expectation of not forging lasting relationships or ties within Qatari society. Workers are in the country to work, and once that work is finished, they are expected to move on or go back home. The notion of a worker embodies assumptions that workers are not professionals, are temporarily in the country, are expendable and replaceable, and are "single."

The special status of domestic workers, is reinforced by their exclusion from Qatari labor laws, most notably labor code No. 14 of 2004 and code No. 4 of 2009, which do not apply to domestic workers such as nannies, drivers, gardeners, cooks, babysitters, domestic personal assistants, butlers, and others household workers.[84] The new law covering domestic workers -- Law No. 15 of 2017, ratified into law on August 22, 2017 -- grants them the right to specify the terms of their employment in a written contract with their employer, a privilege previously not mandated for domestic workers by other laws. Additionally, the law limits the number of hours worked by domestic workers to ten hours per day, as well as defines the work week as six days, thus guaranteeing one day off per week.[85] It also grants domestic workers the right to have adequate breaks, food and accommodation, though the law does not stipulate what constitutes sufficient rest, meals and housing. In contrast, labor code No. 14 of 2004, mandates a rest period every five hours.

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[84] Article 3 of Labor Code No. 14 of 2004 (Qatar Labor Law) details exceptions to the labor law and specifically excludes "The persons employed in domestic employments such as drivers, nurses, cooks, gardeners and similar workers." Additionally, it excludes employees of Qatari Ministries, governmental organizations, public institutions, Qatar Petroleum, the armed forces, police, "workers employed at sea," family members, agricultural workers, and "workers employed in casual works."

[85] According to the *Annual Omnibus Survey: A survey of life in Qatar 2014*, conducted by the Social and Economic Research Institute of Qatar University, 72% of workers worked six days a week, 23% worked seven days a week, and only 4% worked five days a week. The trend, compared to previous years, is toward a seven-day work week, as only 10% and 7% of workers worked seven days a week in 2011 and 2012 respectively.

Figure 7.3: Qatar Total Population by Gender and Year, 1986-2016

Note: Estimates are mid-year estimates. Years with an asterisk (*) indicate a census year. This is why 1997, 2004, 2010, and 2015 appear twice: for those years, there is one mid-year estimate and one census result.
Data Source: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics.

7.1.2 *The Family as a Marker of Status*

Being affiliated with a family is one of the many markers that differentiates non-workers from workers. With the state's valorization of the family as the basis of Qatari society, a family is a marker of social status and privilege. Bringing a foreign family into Qatar is a difficult task that is strictly regulated by a series of laws restricting family residency to a select group of expatriates who meet eligibility.[86] Workers are legally not allowed to sponsor family members, as they are specifically prohibited by law from doing so because they do not meet the financial requirements of family sponsorship mandated by the state. Qatari law prohibits any foreign resident whose monthly wage is less than 10,000QR ($2,775), or 7,000QR ($1,940), in addition to a family housing allowance, from sponsoring spouses and children.[87] The average monthly

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[86] These laws include Act No. 21 of 27 October 2015 which regulates the entry, exit of expatriates and their residence and Law No. 4 of 2004 (Qatar Labor Law).

[87] According to the Ministry of Interior, the application for family residence visa must be printed in Arabic and requirements are as follow:
  1- The applying resident shall have a valid residence permit in the country.
  2- Produce the marriage certificate attested by the competent authorities as required.
  3- The employee of the government and semi-government entities shall have family housing from his employer, or family housing allowance shall be provided as specified in his employment contract.

wage for a worker is less than 1,500QR ($300), yet the Gross National Income Per Capita (purchasing power parity in dollars in 2011) is $129,916 (UNDP, Human Development Report 2016).

Those who meet the financial requirements are required to be eligible for employer-provided family housing, or receive a housing stipend. Additionally, only employees in "non-labor" professions are eligible to sponsor family to reside in Qatar. These professions are defined, by the Ministry of Interior, as technical or specialized employment in the private sector, government or quasi-government sectors.

Thus, having a family in Doha is an indicator and marker of social status and privilege. In effect, ones' affiliation or non-affiliation with a family who resides in Qatar is integral to the social construction of a worker in Doha. The distinction between workers and those with families begins when one arrives at Hamad International Airport. As is the case in most countries, one is categorized by citizenship; Qatari nationals have their own line, as do nationals of other GCC countries, who, prior to the June 2017 blockade of Qatar, bestowed reciprocal priority treatment in their respective countries to Qatari nationals. All other nationalities are channeled into the *other nationality* line. In addition to this differentiation by citizenship, there is a dedicated line for families, which any family with an infant or toddler may use, regardless of citizenship. Privileges for families, such as this, are ubiquitous in Doha in both subtle and explicit ways; from dedicated family seating areas to restrictions placed on worker access to gardens, malls, restaurants and other public spaces. Ones' experience in the urban realm is linked, in large part, to ones' status as a worker and affiliation with a family. The city is organized into spaces of economic and social exclusivity and privilege, contrasted by spaces for those who build and service such spaces, who do not meet the requirements of inclusion into respectable Qatari society. Family is pivotal in this distinction.

Over half of Qatar's population does not meet the eligibility requirements set forth by Qatari law that regulates family residence in Qatari society. Workers are thus often referred to as "unaccompanied," "single" or "bachelors," though the majority of unaccompanied foreign male workers are married and have families in their counties of origin.[88] The special status of unaccompanied foreign male workers is highlighted by their special designation in national plans and narratives. They are a different subject population in need of special consideration and control. Though census information released by the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics does not detail information regarding the national breakdown of workers and whether

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4- An official letter confirming the profession and the salary of employees of government and semi-government entities, shall be submitted.

5- Private sector employees shall have technical or specialized (non-labor) professions, and his salary shall not be less than 10,000QR or 7,000QR with a family housing facility.

6- Private sector employees shall produce six moth bank statement from one of the accredited banks in the country to prove his salary.

7- He shall also submit notarized employment contract and copy of educational certificate to prove the profession.

8- Copy of attested work contract citing profession and salary.

9- Attested certificate to prove the relation.

10- Good conduct certificate attested by concerned authorities for adults.

11- Pass the medical test outside the country as per the mechanism laid by the concerned authorities. Any other condition deemed by concerned authorities.

[88] According to the *Annual Omnibus Survey: A survey of life in Qatar 2014*, conducted by the Social and Economic Research Institute of Qatar University, 60% of male workers are married, though their spouses remain in their country of origin.

workers are unaccompanied by family, it does collect this information.[89] The 2015 Census collected information regarding nationality, in addition to the national ID number (*Iqama*) of each individual, whether they are present, temporarily absent, or outside the country at the time of the census, and how many Qatari and non-Qatari males and females reside in the dwelling. Thus, this information is readily available, and may be correlated to individual housing units, neighborhoods etc. Yet, it is not made public, as this information would clearly delineate the spatial distribution of Qataris and non-Qataris and highlight the corresponding segregation of particular nationalities that are highly represented in the "worker" category. This information is subsequently used by Qatari ministries for strategic planning initiatives.

For example, *The Qatar Healthcare Facilities Master Plan 2013*-2033, published by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Council of Health in 2014, analyzes healthcare needs based on information obtained from the 2010 Census. It breaks down the population into three specific categories: *Nationals*, defined as Qatari citizens; *Non-Single Male Laborer* Expatriates, defined as white collar expatriates; and *Single Male Laborer Expatriates*, defined as "people living in labor gatherings." The national healthcare facilities plan attempts to meet the healthcare facility needs of the various populations, necessitating an understanding of the spatial distribution of these population categories. Thus, the plan provides a breakdown of the three population groups by municipality. This disaggregated data is privy only to government ministries and agencies. Though the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics releases monthly population data that details changes in Qatar's population and other statistics, specific information regarding nationality and "single male laborer expatriates", including the spatial distribution of population by nationality, is highly guarded. This information must be pieced together from various sources.

The *2015 Census Analysis of the Results of Population, Housing and Establishments Census 2015,* published by the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, refers to various categories of subjects, such as *bachelors* and *workers*, but the population analysis provided in the document carefully obfuscates details regarding specific population segments. Information is aggregated into general categories such as *households* and *employed population*. Detailed information is released only for Qatari nationals, whereas specific information regarding Qatar's foreign population is not disaggregated.

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[89] See page 100 of the Simplified Census of Population, Housing and Establishments, 2015 for the Households, Institution or Labor Gatherings Questionnaire used by census workers.

Table 7.1: Qatari, Expatriate and Single Male Laborer Population Distribution by Municipality

2010 Population Over 10 Years of Age Distribution 10+ Population by Municipality and Type of Qatari, Expatriate and Single Male Laborer			
Municipality	**Qatari Citizens (%)**	**Expatriates (%)**	**Single Male Laborers (%)**
Al Rayyan	45.3	23	
Doha	32.4	49.3	
Umm Slal	9.0	2.6	
Al Wakra	6.1	8.7	
Al Daayen	2.9	2.5	
Al Khor & Al Thakhira	3.5	13.5	
Madinat Al Shamal	0.9	0.4	
Total 10+ Population	174,278	512,052	845,511
Percent of Total Population in Qatar	10.3%	30.1 %	49.8%

Source: *The Qatar Healthcare Facilities Master Plan 2013*-2033

The distinction between Single Male Laborer Expatriates and other segments of the population highlights the way in which these men are perceived, and inherently implies the importance of family affiliation within Qatari society. A foreigner accompanied by family is less likely to be perceived as a worker, irrespective of the nature of their work or whether they have family sponsorship. Instead, they are most likely considered a resident (*Mukeem*) or, more generally, an expatriate. Affiliation with a family often trumps race as the primary marker of differentiation, though race is integral to the social construction of a worker. An Indian man accompanied by his wife and children is less likely to be perceived as a worker, despite the dominant, often subliminal, associations made between Indians, who constitute the largest foreign worker population, and workers in Qatari society. If a group of Indian men unaccompanied by family walk down the street, they most often are assumed to be workers, irrespective of their socioeconomic status, educational attainment, or nature of their work.

Having a family in Doha implies much more than being able to meet the income requirements placed upon foreigners; it implies a higher educational attainment that is associated with professional, higher income employment, as the law specifically excludes non-professionals from family sponsorship. Additionally, being affiliated with a family implies adherence to moral and societal codes that value the traditional, patriarchal family unit, as Qatari public policies specifically valorize the family and promote it as the basis of society, as detailed in Chapter 6. Being outside of this coveted unit implies nonadherence to moral codes that govern societal norms of behavior. It, in effect, implies a potential lack of religious observance and represents a moral threat to the fabric of society. As the family is the basis of society, single men are not only viewed as a threat to social morality, they are viewed as "unnatural," a phenomenon necessitating the imposition of limits and controls on their movements and influence in society.

7.1.3   Single Male Laborers

The omnipresent, potential threat that large groups of foreign men pose dates back to pre-independence, with the exploration for oil and subsequent operations of the Petroleum Concessions Limited (P.C.L), referred to as "the Company,"[90] which operated the oil concession in Qatar until the nationalization of the oil industry. The archives of the Petroleum Concessions Limited (P.C.L), which are housed in the British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, have been digitized and made available online in an initiative sponsored by the Qatar Foundation. The resultant *Qatar Digital Library* includes these archives, as well as archives that are part of the Qatar National Library Heritage Collection. Archival evidence indicates that, as was the case in other former colonials and protectorates, the British colonial rulers expedited the transfer and movement of British subjects to Qatar from other colonized areas to meet specific labor needs. India/Pakistan was the main source of cheap, readily available labor that serviced the needs of the Company. The Indian/Pakistani men brought to Qatar by the British, were housed in camps. The camp served as a way to control the workers and limit their association and interaction with the indigenous Qatari population. Qatari workers were also housed in camps. Before the creation of the nation state, the designation of who constituted a Qatari worker was fluid, as national borders and boundaries were not established prior to independence in 1971, and movement between the countries that constitute the modern-day GCC was not restricted. A Company document, dated 6th December 1947, detailing the roster of employees, describes the ambiguity of who was a "Qatari" worker:

> *For your information, among the Daily Paid "Qataris" shown in the P.D.Q. roster, figure 150 (?) men who were recruited in Doha through the Ruler's Representative and though considered by us as Qataris, are in reality Omanis, Baluchis, Saudi Arabians, Muscatis, etc. The majority are illiterate and none have any identity documents.[91]*

In the early days of the oil concession, thousands of Qataris worked in the industry. Mansour bin Khalil Al-Hajiri, whose profile adorns the walls of Company House, one of the four Msheireb Museums housed in the *Heart of Doha*, Msheireb redevelopment project, is said to be the first Qatari to be employed by the Company. These men were considered workers, in the same way that the foreign men who constitute the contemporary *Single Male Laborer* subject population are considered workers. They were poor, in need of jobs, worked long hours, and endured the hardships associated with their jobs as construction workers, drivers, guards, "boys," mechanics, machine operators, riggers, carpenters; the sand, winds storms, heat, physical exhaustion, and precariousness of working on oil exploration sites, were endured equally by Qatari and non-Qatari laborers. Somewhere along the way, non-Qataris became "workers" and Qataris became a different subject population, embodying a different subjectivity, sense of self, position in society, and having access to different rights. The creation of the modern state

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[90] 'Agreement Relating To The Refining Of Crude Oil. His Majesty's Government In The United Kingdom And Petroleum Concessions Limited Dated 5TH February, 1937.' [1r] (1/6), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/18/B457, in *Qatar Digital Library*
<https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100029482105.0x000002> [accessed 4 October 2017]
[91] 'File 28/39 Roster of Petroleum Concessions Limited Employees' [4r] (7/180), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/2/1736*, in Qatar Digital Library*
<http://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023548254.0x000008> [accessed 4 April 2017]

brought about this transformation, with the attribution of rights to a certain set of people defined as Qatari, with claims to the resources of the state, and identification with a shared, albeit created, Qatari heritage. But, there is something in addition to citizenship that animates the social construction of a worker in Doha.

Figure 7.4: Statue of a Qatari Oil Worker
Company House, Msheireb Museums.
Doha, July 2017

Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi

In the eyes of the Qatari state, everyone who works in return for a wage is a worker, regardless of gender or nationality. Yet, the social construction and meaning of a worker is very different. Though the category technically encompasses everyone who works, being a *worker* in Qatar reflects a complex axis of social class, nationality, gender, race, and nature of work; it implies particular associations and internalized codes, with which only a select group of subjects are identified. To be a worker in Doha is to inhabit a particular habitus; workers are a specific group who are automatically known and marked in Doha's urban realm. The socially constructed notion of a worker applies only to specific echelons of society, despite the category's encompassing a multitude of nationalities and ethnicities.

The distinctions between who is a worker, bachelor, *mukeem*, *khadamah* (maid/ domestic worker), Madame, Qatari citizen and so on are pivotal to the social hierarchies and socio-spatial processes currently shaping Doha. The revered status of the family permeates all aspects of

Qatari society and has distinct ramifications on the use and organization of space, as well as one's interactions within the public realm, as I will discuss in the following chapters.

Figure 7.5: Artwork by Qatari Artist, Ali Dasmal Al Kuwari
Katara Art Center, Katara. Doha, April 2017   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*
"Trucks, excavations, and the countless workers have become one of the daily scenes which grows into an obsession in our memories." -- Ali Dasmal Al Kuwari

7.2 The Sanitized Body of a Worker

> *"Keeping Qatar disease free."* -- *Medical Commission*

> *"You will be expelled by Qatari authorities if the medical examination finds you unfit."*

> -- *Workers Rights Book, page 17*

Wafaa stood in front of the x-ray machine, her scarf slipping from her neatly braided, long, black hair. She had taken off the top of her salwar kameez, long gold necklace, gold earrings and bangles, and stood in the white hospital robe she had been told to wear by the healthcare worker who led her into the room. A Filipina nurse instructed her to reach forward, put her chest on the x-ray plate, and grab her hands at the back. "This way," she said, drawing her hands forward to demonstrate. Wafaa hesitated. "*Kid'aah*, (like this)," the nurse said, again demonstrating the position with her own body. When Wafaa again hesitated, the nurse stepped forward, grasped Wafaa by her shoulders and nudged her to the x-ray panel. She lifted Wafaa's left arm and positioned it around the panel, then patted her right elbow, as a sign for Wafaa to lift that arm, too. Wafaa lifted her arm, but clearly did not understand what was being asked of her. The nurse nudged Wafaa to step forward, so her chest could align with the plate. She reached behind the plate to position Wafaa's arms, making sure the teenager did not overextend or grasp too tightly. The nurse pressed on the small of Wafaa's back to instruct her not to arch it. Wafaa straightened up and stood awkwardly in this position, in a room full of women awaiting their turn to be x-rayed, separated by a fixed panel that clearly displayed the girl being processed.

She looked behind her. "No, look forward. *Kid'aah*," the nurse said, as she turned Wafaa's head. "Don't breathe, ok. Hold your breath. *Ma fee naffass* (do not breath)," she said. Wafaa stood, uncertain, clearly unable to understand the nurse's instructions, in English or Arabic. "*Ma fee naffass, ma fee naffass*," the nurse instructed again. The nurse left Wafaa standing, grasping the x-ray plate, and went around a barrier while an x-ray of Wafaa's chest was taken. Wafaa dare not move, even after the nurse came back and instructed her to put her arms down. The nurse walked over to the girl and tapped her arms, as a sign she may put them down. She grasped Wafaa's shoulders, turned the girl to the side, so her body was perpendicular to the plate, and positioned her arms. Wafaa stood attentively, allowing the nurse to manipulate her body as needed. The nurse nudged Wafaa closer to the plate, so her side was flush with the cold metal. An inch this way, an inch that way. "*Ma fee naffass*," she said, then once again disappeared behind the barrier, leaving Wafaa on display.

Once again, Wafaa dare not move, even after the nurse came back and instructed her to retrieve her clothes. The nurse walked over to the girl and tapped her back, saying "*Khalas, khalas* (finished, finished)." Wafaa looked at the women looking at her then was led to the door by another Filipina nurse, who had held her gold jewelry as her x-rays had been taken. As this nurse helped Wafaa put on her jewelry, from behind the barrier, the x-ray technician spoke in Tagalog. The nurses abruptly stopped what they were doing and sprang to attention. The first nurse, who was instructing another woman on how to position her body on the x-ray panel, went behind the barrier, where a conversation ensued in Tagalog. "Doctor" was the all I could understand. The other nurse stopped helping Wafaa with her jewelry and told her to wait. After several minutes of discussion, the nurse instructed a security guard outside the room to get the doctor. A moment later, a female doctor, of Arab decent, came into the room to look at Wafaa's x-ray. Something had been spotted, possibly tuberculosis, and additional x-rays were needed. The Arab doctor instructed the technician and nurses, in Arabic, to repeat the chest x-ray, and take additional views.

Wafaa stood patiently by the door, scanning the faces of the nurses, technician and doctor, who were discussing her body, for clues about what was transpiring. She was told to wait, yet clearly did not know why. Wafaa looked at the other seven women in the room, who

were staring at her from behind the partition. Her every move became the focus of the women's attention, her predicament the focal point of our shared humanity. She had been brought in separately and cut the line. She had not been made to wait her turn, as the others were doing, and now this. A few women were obviously annoyed -- "*Ya Rab'bee* (my god)," one woman said, rolling her eyes, as she shook her head. She had waited hours to get to this stage in their own processing, and an additional delay was not welcome. The women clutched their handbags and passports -- Jordanian, American, Egyptian, Canadian, Indian -- as they waited for their own bodies to be subjected to the intrusive bio-politics of the Qatari state. Some women looked sympathetically onto Wafaa, smiling at her, in their own feeble attempts to reassure her. She was clearly a teenager, did not understand what was happening, and had no ability to communicate with anyone in the room. Her juvenile vulnerability was evident in her nervous smiles and attempt to discern information from the faces of the healthcare workers who would determine her fate.

When the doctor left, the nurses raced around the room, in a flurry of activity. Wafaa was told she would need additional x-rays, "X-ray *tan'ee* (again)," the nurse said, to which she reacted with the same uncertainty and trepidation. She allowed the nurse to lead her back to the x-ray plate; when it became evident to Wafaa that she would be getting another x-ray, she smiled and nodded vigorously. Perhaps the fact that she now knew what to expect was reassuring; she enthusiastically positioned herself and pressed her chest unto the plate. The nurse nudged Wafaa over, contorted her arms to further rotate her shoulders and instructed her to inch closer and hold her breath. Wafaa allowed her body to be contorted and positioned to allow the series of x-rays to reveal if she was, in fact, harboring tuberculosis in her lungs. When the technician was satisfied they had taken the necessary x-rays, Wafaa was escorted out of the room, and the nurse began processing the other women.

After my own x-ray, the nurse instructed me to wait in the waiting hall for my name to be called. This was the final step in a process that had taken several hours and involved multiple intrusions into the bodies of the many women being processed. Wafaa was not in the hall. Instead, there were Indian women -- a young mother with her child and mother, a young professional, a group of Hindi-speaking women who stuck together and followed the lead of one outspoken woman amongst them -- Filipinas, Egyptians, Sri Lankans, a Romanian, and others, all of whom clutched their passports and paperwork while waiting. An Egyptian woman had left her toddler son unaccompanied in the hall while she went into the x-ray room. The child started crying inconsolably, demanding his mother, as nurses flurried about trying to quiet him. "Is this your child? *Haza waladak*?" they asked several women, all of whom shook their heads and scrutinized the boy.

Ten minutes into the boundless waiting, an older Qatari women approached the waiting area from the adjacent corridor we had passed through, more than an hour earlier, to the tuberculosis screening room that housed the x-ray equipment. Her flowing black abaya filled the corridor, touching the walls on either side as she extended out her arms and yelled "*Wan al bint* (where's the girl)?" from behind her *battula.*[92] "*Wan al bint*?" she demanded. The bustling waiting hall fell silent; activity ceased as all eyes turned to behold the woman whose voice reverberated throughout the hall. "*Wan al bint*?" she demanded once more. The nurses, who were at the receiving end of her wrath, sprang to attention. "Get Wafaa," one said. "Where is Wafaa?" said another. A nurse ran into the screening area.

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[92] A *battula* is a traditional face covering worn over the eyes and nose by Bedouin women in the Gulf region.

"*Jibuo al bint halan* (get the girl now)!" the Qatari woman demanded
"*Wan al bint? Hazah ta'kheer ma lazam, ma yuseer. Ana ma gadrah astanna aktar*
(Where's the girl? This delay is not necessary, not acceptable. I cannot wait any longer)."

"Ok, mad'dame. *Ma fee moushkillah*, mad'ame, (Ok, madam. There is no problem, madam)," a nurse tried to reassure her.

Wafaa was hurried out of the screening area by a nurse, who, holding her arm, led her to her Qatari patron. She had changed back into her light cream salwar kameez, her long gold necklace framing the intricate maroon embroidery of its yoke, and adjusted her many gold bangles and headscarf as she hurried toward the woman who demanded her presence. She smiled and nodded as her sponsor grasped her arm from the nurse and instructed her to walk toward the corridor by motioning with her hand, saying "*Yallah, imshee* (come on, walk)." The nurses held their breath as the Qatari woman mumbled one last admonishment, and everyone stepped out of their way, standing motionless while Wafaa and her sponsor made their way down the corridor. A few women lowered their heads and looked keenly at their passports and paperwork, as if concentrating on something else would lessen the burden of what they had witnessed. Many women looked at each other in disbelief, shaking their heads. Some followed Wafaa and her sponsor with their eyes. For many of the women waiting, Wafaa's treatment was a harbinger of what awaited them.

7.2.2 The Medical Commission

Wafaa was the Qatari woman's newly imported domestic worker. She was being processed, like the rest of us, as part of the medical examination required to receive her residency permit, or *Rokhsat Iqama*. The medical exams are conducted at the Medical Commission (*Al Comiss'oin al Tib'bee*), located on Al Muntazah Street in Abu Hamour, which is a facility run by the Ministry of Public Health. The facility is segregated by gender, with separate entrances and processing areas for males and females. The female section has a separate entrance for domestic workers; the day I was processed, the domestic worker entrance was closed, and all women were instructed to use the entrance for "women." The men's section has two main entrances, one for "workers", and the other for "men." In December 2013, the Supreme Council of Health opened a branch of the Medical Commission in the Industrial Area specifically for male workers.

The distinction between "workers" and "men" and "women" is one that permeates all aspects of Qatari society. Ones' status as a "worker" places upon one certain restrictions and expectations, which I will discuss below, and necessitates the adherence to informally codified social norms that mark various groups of people and define their privileges in Doha's public realm. This distinction informs most aspects of urban life in Doha, from ones' ability to drive a car, to ones' right to inhabit particular residential or commercial spaces. I argue it is second only to Qatari citizenship in its importance in defining ones' privileges and rights in Doha's urban realm.

I was driven to the medical commission by the administrative officer affiliated with my spouse's employer, who was responsible for facilitating the processing of professors' families. He had printed the necessary paperwork, given me a company credit card to pay the 100QR medical examination fee (as the facility only accepts credit card payments, like most Qatari government facilities), and escorted me, another spouse, and the unmarried adult daughter of another professor to the door. He apologized profusely for not being able to escort us inside, as

the facility is segregated by gender. A security guard at the "woman's" door asked what type of residency permit we were applying for; the administrator who escorted us quickly showed his credentials and told the guard we were with him. We were ushered in, ahead of several "workers" waiting on the landing. Upon entering, a woman in *niqab* seated at the entrance desk again asked what type of residency permit we were applying for. She made sure we had the proper paperwork, and told us to take a number and wait to be called to the cashier to pay and register.

I had been to the Medical Commission a week earlier, but the computers were down, and, after several hours of waiting, the computers had not been repaired. That day, we were told to wait for the system to reactivate, but were given no guarantee that would happen. I asked if we could leave and call the Commission later to inquire if the computers were working again, but was told they would not release that information. I approached a Qatari employee and explained, in Arabic, that we had children to pick up from school and could not wait all day. She told me she usually does not give out direct numbers of medical commission employees, but because I am "respectable (*mohtarama*)," she gave me a special number to call. Maybe, she said, the person answering would be willing to tell me if the system was working that day, but I would have to risk it. The computer issues happened regularly, so they did not want to be inundated with phone calls asking if it was a good time to come. She made it clear that it was my responsibility to attempt to finish my *Iqama*, no matter the circumstances. Though she granted me the privilege of engaging with me as a fellow Arab and Arabic speaker, she made it clear that I was a foreigner who had to comply with Qatari law and complete my *Iqama*; the burden was on me to accommodate the Qatari state, not the other way around.

7.2.3   Iqama

Getting a Qatari *Iqama* is a long and arduous process. Before arrival in Doha, all foreign documents, such as educational degrees, transcripts, and marriage certificates must be attested in ones' country of origin, or the country in which they were obtained, to prove their authenticity. For many foreigners -- those from labor exporting countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Sudan -- the process begins with a medical exam at an approved medical facility in their countries of origin. Other foreigners, from the United States and Europe, are allowed to enter Qatar without the medical prescreening, but are made aware that their residency permits will not be approved if they are found to currently have or have had certain diseases in the past. Ultimately, the process for all foreigners culminates in the collection of various biometric data within six months of their arrival in Qatar.

The biometric data is collected in two separate, but interrelated, stages of the *Iqama* process -- the medical exam and post medical screening. The results of the medical exam, which includes the collection of blood samples and a chest x-ray, to rule out tuberculosis, HIV/ Aids, and Hepatitis B and C, determines if the applicant is able to proceed to the last stage of processing. The post medical screening includes a retinal eye scan of both eyes, face imaging, and fingerprinting of all fingers and palms. This is conducted in the facilities of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of Interior. The biometric data is stored in Ministry of Interior databases, and linked to a resident's *Iqama*, which is issued by the General Director of Nationality, Borders and Expatriate Affairs. The information may be pulled up when deemed necessary, such as at immigration, which deploys retinal eye scans to allow entry to Iqama holders, by the police in the event of suspected criminal activity, or at security checks in hotels

and other venues deemed sensitive to national security, or which are off-limits to particular groups of people, in which a resident's *Iqama* is required for entry.

The *Iqama* contains vital information about the resident; their state-issued ID number, *Iqama* serial number and expiration date, date of birth, nationality, occupation, passport number, passport expiration date, residency type, and host (or sponsor). Additional information, such as religion, marital status, and address, is also linked to the *Iqama* and may be retrieved, via databases used by authorized security personal. My *Iqama* states that I am a citizen of the USA, a housewife (*Rab'at Manzal*), and that my residency type is Family (*'aa'il'iyah*). My sponsor is my spouse, whose sponsor is a Qatari university.

All foreigners residing in Qatar must be sponsored by a Qatari employer, institution, or individual in order to obtain an *Iqama*. The sponsorship system, known as *Kafala*, grants sponsors significant privileges and control over sponsored employees. Changes to the *Kafala* laws, which took effect on December 14, 2016, allow foreigners to change sponsors and actively look for other employment without having to leave Qatar and reapply for residency, as was previously required, if their current sponsor agrees to the change in sponsorship.

Though the term "sponsorship" has been eliminated from the law's framework, modifications to the law do not address the underlying issues regarding sponsorship. In effect, foreigners still require "sponsorship" while working and residing in Qatar. In place of "sponsorship", the law states that foreign workers are bound to Qatari employers (which are effectively "sponsors") for the duration of an agreed upon contract, up to a maximum of five years, which may be renewed upon the agreement of both parties. Additionally, foreigners can only transfer sponsorship with the approval of their current sponsor, and after the issuance of a "good conduct" certificate and other requirements that give employers considerable leverage over foreign employees. *Kafala*, coupled with labor laws, which prohibit the ability of sponsored foreigners to easily transfer jobs, have created a society in which the majority of non-Qataris are regarded as dependent laborers, in the country for the sole purpose of selling their labor power to Qatari sponsors. Yet, even within this framework, only certain categories of non-Qataris are identified as "workers."

The *Iqama* serves as a national ID, but at its basic level, the information contained in an *Iqama* differentiates who in Qatar is a "worker". Wafaa's *Iqama*, if she was indeed granted one, states that she is a citizen of Bangladesh, a domestic worker, has a single (non-family) residency, and is personally sponsored by her Qatari employer. The privilege of being a US citizen, affiliated with a family, and married to someone linked to a prestigious Qatari institution is one that precludes the overwhelming majority of Qatar's foreign residents. And this is precisely why these indicators - nationality, occupation, host (sponsor) and residency type – are contained on the *Iqama* card. These indicators are pivotal in determining the rights and privileges to which the *Iqama* holder is privy, in a country in which rights and privileges are linked to citizenship and one's status as a worker or professional.

7.2.4   *The Threat of Contagion*

The premise of the Medical Commission is to determine if foreigners seeking Qatari *Iqamas* are infected with certain diseases the state deems unacceptable, such as tuberculosis, HIV/ Aids, and Hepatitis B and C. If the *Iqama* applicant is found to have one of these, or other highly contagious or communicable diseases, or to be otherwise "physically unfit", their *Iqama*

is denied, and the foreign national is deported back to their country of origin.[93] With over eighty-five percent of the population comprised of foreigners, the task of *Keeping Qatar Disease Free* is one the state takes very seriously. The threat of contagion from foreigners is palatable in public narratives that depict the bodies of Qatar's foreign population, and particularly the bodies of low-income foreign men, as the harbingers of foreign diseases and societal ills. The threat of physical contagion via the bodies of foreign workers is coupled with the threat of social contagion via foreign traditions and social norms. The bodies of foreign workers, particularly low-income men and domestic workers, are often spoken about in terms of risk and contagion. This was the case with Latifa.

7.2.5   Latifa

Latifa wore a long brown skirt, untucked, loose, white button-down shirt, and plastic slippers. Her head was covered by a brown hijab. She was introduced to me as the Kenyan. We met at the office of a manpower agency located in an old shopping center in Al Sadd, the kind once popular in the late 1990s, when developers moved away from the strip malls that lined Doha's major roads, building, instead, more sophisticated centers with escalators and atriums. Most of the shops stand empty. An Asian restaurant as well as an Indian clothing store dominate the street storefronts. Inside, a stairway circles around a defunct fountain, leading upward to a desolate second floor. The agency is tucked inside several adjacent storefronts on the ground floor. There are hundreds of such manpower agencies throughout Doha that supply domestic workers to Qatari and non-Qatari residents. This particular agency allows patrons to either pay for the services of a domestic worker on an hourly or monthly basis, or directly sponsor the worker, in which case the patron assumes legal responsibility for the worker, who is then obligated, by law, to work exclusively for them.

My spouse and I had an appointment with Mr. Ahmed, with whom we had previously spoken to about hiring a babysitter or nanny. Due to labor laws that prohibit workers from engaging in "casual work," such as babysitting, for anyone but their sponsor, it is exceedingly difficult to hire a babysitter in Doha.[94] Most childcare arrangements between nonfamily members are formalized, with domestic workers fulfilling the overwhelming majority of in-home childcare. Mr. Ahmed was upfront about what could "supply" and had asked our preference. Our request for hiring someone educated, who can speak English, prompted him to inform us that "*Al Philipinoeen mish mutawaffereen* (Filipinos are not readily available)." He may get one in a few weeks, but he cannot be sure, as things change all the time. But, he thinks he has one coming. She will, of course, be educated and speak English, but will also be more expensive. Would we be willing to take a Sri Lankan? He could get us one quickly, if we were amenable. She may not speak English well, but if we need someone right away, he could get us a Sri Lankan and we could always exchange her for a Filipino, when he gets one. He also has a Kenyan available.

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[93] Article 23 of Law No. 4 of 2004, the Qatar Labor Law, stipulates "The non-Qatari national must be medically fit", though it provides no definition of what constitutes "medically fit". The Ministry of Health guidelines specifically rule out the possibility of a foreign national gaining employment in Qatar if they have or have had tuberculosis, HIV/ Aids, and Hepatitis B and C. Other diseases are dealt with on a case by case basis, in relation to the type of employment the foreign national is seeking.

[94] The 2017 Labor Law upholds the ban on causal work. Article 25 of the law makes possible the termination of a non-Qatari's work permit "if the worker works for an employer other than the employer the worker has been granted the work permit to work with."

In her 2006 article, Sharon Nagy highlights the stereotypes affiliated with various ethnicities and nationalities of domestic workers in Doha. "A Filipino" versus "a Sri Lankan" means something particular; a particular skill set, socialization, professionalism and risk associated with the national stereotypes affiliated with the workers' nationality and ethnicity. A Filipino implies a higher educational attainment, fluency, or at least working knowledge, of English, and higher degree of professionalism. But, it also implies a greater degree of risk associated with more liberal, and perceivable unethical, expressions of sexuality and individualism. A Filipino is more likely to be a "loose" woman, who may get into trouble if she is not closely monitored and controlled.

All of the women Mr. Ahmed could supply were spoken of in terms of nationality and ethnicity; they had no names or other unique or identifying characteristics besides nationality and ethnicity. The degree to which they could speak English was implicit in their national origin and pointed out as a selling point or drawback. We just had to tell him what nationality we would be willing to accept and he would get us what we wanted.

A Qatari man, the owner of the agency, welcomed us and directed us to a storefront across the corridor in which Mr. Ahmed and three Pilipino female office staff worked. The room was arranged with four desks, lined side by side in two rows. Mr. Ahmed's desk was furthest back, allowing him to monitor the Filipino workers. "Make Payment Here," read a sign on one desk, next to a credit card machine and large file.

A bookcase adjacent to the entrance was filled with files that read *Pilipino Residency Permits and Passports, Pilipino Salary Payments, Ethiopian Residency Permits and Passports, Ethiopian Salary Payments, Sri Lankan Residency Permits and Passports, Sri Lankan Payments.* A brown faux leather couch, matching armchair and coffee table were arranged in the front of the storefront. Mr. Ahmed was pleased we had come and instructed one of the women to procure Latifa from another storefront.

Mr. Ahmed: Here she is, the Kenyan. Ask her whatever you want to know.
              And by the way, the results of her medical exam came back, and everything is well. She doesn't have anything. She's well (*natee'gat al kashf al tibyee till'oa we kol hag'gah saleemah. Maf'hash hag'gah. Heya Saleem'ah*).

Mr. Ahmed reassured us that Latifa was disease-free – "*heya saleem'ah*". He did not tell us her name. Latifa stood, head down, at the door; Mr. Ahmed instructed her to move inside. I stood and approached her, offering my hand. She timidly shook it and remained at the door. It was not clear what was expected of her and us; I had expected him to introduce her and tell her that we needed a babysitter, and thus, were interested in meeting her to see if she would be interested in working for us. I asked him what he wanted us to do.

Mr. Ahmed: Ask her whatever you want (*is'alouha al into e'zeen*). She speaks English and can answer. Whatever you want to know, just ask her and she'll reply. You can talk to her here; you won't disturb us.

I asked Latifa to sit down next to me on the couch, a request that she hesitantly complied with. "Madame, I can stand," she said. I asked her where she was from, how long she had been in Qatar and if she had left family in Kenya. Latifa was 28 years old and had been in Qatar for a

little over two weeks. She was from Nairobi and had lived there her entire life; it was her first time outside of Nairobi. She lived with her mother and younger siblings. Her brother had moved to Mombasa to look for work several years ago. He occasionally visited the family in Nairobi, but they did not have the financial means to visit him.

Latifa started working in an office at age eight; her family needed the income, so she left school and worked for a nearby office. She cleaned, ran errands, cooked, and took care of anything her employers needed. She slept in the office but was allowed to go home often. They were very nice, she said, to let her work because her family could not have supported her otherwise. "We need money," she said. Her office job meant she could not attend school, but she was proud that she had been educated and spoke English. It is very important, she told me, to know how to speak English. Her friends who did not attend school and did not learn English have "no chance" of finding dignified work. She can read and could even help with small administrative tasks when needed.

She also worked cleaning houses and did a variety of other jobs. She attributed her success working in offices to her fourth-grade education and was proud of her ability to manage several complex tasks and make her employers happy. She stressed that she liked receiving direction from her employers, so she "can make Madame happy". If I did not like something, or she did something wrong, she would like me to tell her how she could improve, in order to "make Madame happy." The thing she dislikes the most is if "Madame is not happy. If there is a problem." She assured me she works hard and can do many things. "Madame, I love you. I want to work for you," she said. I told her I loved her, too.

Latifa had worked for twenty of her twenty-eight years. As we sat in the office discussing her experiences, as Mr. Ahmed and the Filipina office workers keenly looking on, I was intensely cognizant of the structural inequality defining the situation. Latifa was not a person interviewing for a job; she could not oppose working for me or articulate particular concerns or grievances. Though I asked repeatedly if she had questions about my family and the conditions in which she would work, she insisted that she welcomes the opportunity and is happy with any conditions I mandated. Her only request was access to a cell phone, so she could call her family in Kenya. Latifa was effectively being "sold" to anyone who would take her. The transaction entailed an exchange between me and Mr. Ahmed. Latifia was the goods; she had very little agency in the exchange. We were exchanging a Kenyan -- could we wait for a Filipina? Mr. Ahmed may or may not get one in the next few weeks. We could risk it, but he could not guarantee getting one with the specifications we wanted. First and foremost, we are transacting the exchange of a nationality, the unique qualities of the actual person who embodied that nationality were secondary and, according to Mr. Ahmed, of little consequence.

The primacy of nationality in determining the worth of the domestic worker is tied to several factors, including the national stereotypes Nagy (2006) argues are associated with particular nationalities and, subsequently, define the worth of workers of certain nationalities. It is widely accepted that workers of certain national origins will be more or less skilled, trustworthy, or moral. Thus, to a large degree, risk is ascribed to national origins, not individuals. Additionally, because domestic workers, until the adoption of what is locally known as the "Domestic Workers Law" in August 2017, were not protected by labor laws that mandate the existence of a signed contract stipulating the terms of employment between employers and domestic workers, foreign governments attempted to secure rights for their migrant laborers through formal agreements negotiated directly with the Qatari state. In 2012, the Philippines requested that Qatar and other GCC countries implement the country's standard contract for

overseas domestic workers, which guarantees a 1,425QR ($400) minimum monthly wage. In 2015, Nepal attempted, but failed, to secure a minimum monthly wage for its overseas workers. As reported on Qatar Radio in February 2016, an agreement between the governments of Qatar and Bangladesh increased the minimum monthly wage of Bangladeshi domestic workers from 700QR ($200) to 1,200QR ($337). Thus, certain employment conditions that are necessary for a Filipina do not apply to a Bangladeshi or Indian, as basic wages and benefits are primarily negotiated at the national level.

Mr. Ahmed assured us Latifa was a "good girl" ("*heya bint qawisah*"). She had worked hard for the Qatari family for whom she previously worked, but they did not want to keep her. He could tell we were good people, he said, because in all the years he has been at this job, no one has taken the time to speak with the *khadamah* (maid) about her background the way we did. He said people usually just ask about their domestic skills, cleaning, cooking, can they handle several kids, do they know how to iron? It would be good for Latfia to be with us because she needed a break. It became apparent that Latifa had suffered abuse with her previous employers. Mr. Ahmed felt sorry for her and had given her two days' rest to recover from two weeks of nonstop work at the Qatari family's house. They had worked her constantly, she had collapsed, and they returned her.

They had asked Mr. Ahmed to stipulate in the contract that she would work twenty-four hours a day, that she should be available anytime of the day or night they needed her. Mr. Ahmed told them he could not agree to that, that she needs to sleep and be given time to eat. They took her on a trial basis, but returned her because she could not keep up with their needs. Madame complained profusely about her; she was lazy, needed direction, and was not always ready to serve them when needed. Mr. Ahmed expressed his dismay with the situation because this family was a personal contact of another employee in the agency; in fact, it was his colleague's brother's household. He knew the family and they were decent people; he did not understand how they could expect Latifa to work twenty-four hours a day without rest.

One of the benefits of taking Latifa was that she had passed her medical exam. "*Heya Saleem'ah. Maf'hash hag'gah* (She is well. She doesn't have anything)," Mr. Ahmed reiterated. He was quick to point out that sometimes a *khadamah* starts work then has to be sent back if she does not pass the medical exam; we will not have this problem with Latifa because "*Heya Saleem'ah*". Mr. Ahmed's focus on the medical exam not only reflects the obstacles involved in the processing of foreigners, but highlights the apprehension associated with foreign bodies as the carriers of physical and social aliments. She was young, physically fit, obedient, hardworking and not demanding -- in Mr. Ahmed's view, the ideal *khadamah*.

7.3 Sanitized Bodies

For Mr. Ahmed, the possibility of Latifa's body harboring disease presents a significant liability. Many maids are deported to their country of origin for this reason. The health and physical condition of a migrant domestic worker is a liability that can easily result in financial loss for a manpower agency dependent on the steady employment of procured labor. The multiple steps involved in securing a domestic worker's placement in a household, and thus a steady stream of income for the agency, is costly and time consuming, from their *Iqama* processing, housing, and food, to the costs involved in their placement. Thus, the worker's body takes on a new focus. The initial risks associated with the body are two-fold; the worker may be

sent back without being placed, or may be placed and found to be faulty or contain disease. Each scenario is bad for business.

Though labor code No. 4 of 2009 entitles any worker in Qatar to sick leave after three months of employment, provided a doctor-issued medical certificate is approved by their employer, this does not apply to domestic workers, who are excluded from the law. Thus, domestic workers are not afforded protections other workers are entitled to, such as two weeks paid leave, and an additional four weeks of half-pay, after which, leave without pay is applied until the employee returns to work, resigns, or is terminated for medical reasons. The ability of a domestic worker to perform physically demanding domestic work is pivotal to the earning potential of the agency. If a worker's body is found to harbor disease, the costs incurred to send her back are often borne by the agency, whereas the costs of recruitment are often incurred by the domestic worker, though Qatari law expressly prohibits recruitment fees paid to third parties in the workers' county of origin. If a domestic worker is incapacitated due to an illness not screened out during the *Iqama* process, the worker becomes an even greater liability, a body of unproductive labor that must be housed, fed and monitored. Thus, the body of the worker, the embodiment of labor power, is of great importance, and only the migration and maintenance of productive bodies is allowed, as the only reason a migrant's body is present in Doha is to work and supply labor.

Before Latifia left Kenya to work in Qatar, she had undergone a physical and obtained a "good conduct certificate", a police clearance issued by the Kenyan state after a corresponding background check to make sure she was not convicted of crimes in her home country. As with all her paperwork, this document required attestation by the Qatar Embassy in Kenya. Yet, her presence in Qatar and her body is associated with both tangible and intangible risk. The fear of physical, social and moral contagion from domestic workers is mediated, partly, through the national stereotypes Nagy (2006) argues are associated with different nationalities. Women I spoke with expressed a desire to employ certain nationalities because they perceived them to espouse particular characteristics, and are thus associated with particular degrees of risk, deemed acceptable or manageable.

Dana, a thirty-something Lebanese mother of two, employs a Bangladeshi *khadamah* who has worked for her for years. Despite her comfort with her *khadamah*, she takes great pains to limit her domestic worker's interactions with her sons. Though *al bint* (the girl) cooks and serves them food, cleans their rooms, washes and irons their clothes, straightens up their toys, takes care of their cat, and does a host of other things for the boys, Dana prefers *al bint* maintain physical distance from her sons. This is partly because Dana says she is obsessive compulsive about cleanliness and does not want her *khadamah* touching her children, who can do most things for themselves, and partly for fear of establishing intimacy in their relationship with her. Certain things, which Dana considers too personal or intimate, are deemed off limits. Waking up the children in the morning is one of them; this is a right reserved exclusively for the parents. Dana rubs her boys' backs and coddles them while waking them; she is horrified by the thought of *al bint* having moments such as this with her boys. This is a point of contention between her and her husband, who does not consider waking up the children anything special or intimate. He deploys *al bint* to do everything for the boys, but Dana closely manages the level of perceived intimacy the children have with *al bint*. Dana attempts to establish strict parameters regarding the types of interactions that are acceptable or not acceptable between *al bint* and her sons. *Al bint* is not allowed to engage in anything Dana considers intimate -- joking around, physical contact,

prolonged personal discussions; *al bint* is also not allowed in the boys' rooms when they are there.

Dana's reluctance to allow *al bint* to have physical contact with her children highlights the implicit association of worker's bodies with physical contamination, disease and risk. In addition to the physical risk of contagion her maid's body poses, Dana considers the establishment of intimacy an unnecessary social risk, that may erode the social boundaries between her *khadamah* and her family. Women often expressed dismay at the possibility of domestic workers having certain diseases that may contaminate the family. A suspicion of Africans in particular, was repeatedly articulated by many women I spoke with, as they are seen as susceptible to diseases such as hepatitis and HIV/AIDS. Yet, it was argued by several women that, though they have a higher chance of having HIV/AIDS, since the government does not allow anyone with HIV/AIDS into the country, an African maid is guaranteed "safe", whereas other diseases that remain undetected are potentially more dangerous and problematic. According to *Qatar's Fourth National Human Development Report*, just 16% of Qatari males, and 10% of Qatari females, and 28.2% of non-Qatari males and 23% of non-Qatari females reported they would purchase vegetables from a shopkeeper who has AIDS, reflecting the lack of knowledge and intense stigmatization surrounding the disease. Only certain illnesses are acceptable to be harbored in the bodies of migrant workers, while others potentially result in the worker being "exchanged" or terminated.

The social stigma surrounding certain diseases, coupled with social anxiety regarding the influence of non-Qatari culture and social norms, reinforces narratives that many diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, and societal ills, such as incivility, are not indigenous to Qatar, but are brought into the country only via the bodies of foreign migrants, and spread only through non-Islamic social practices. The notion that Qatari society is at risk, besieged by the physical and societal aliments that may be harbored in the bodies and social norms of migrant workers, is one that is articulated in the media and reinforced by public policies aimed at curtailing the influence of non-Qatari traditions and morals.[95]

7.4 Nadia's *Khadamah*

Nadia, an Egyptian mother of three in her thirties, argues that Indonesian domestic workers are the best because they are Muslim. "They tend to be modest and less pushy," she says. Her maid can speak and read Arabic, having learnt it in her youth at a religious school in Indonesia that taught her how to pray. She is veiled, modest, and religiously observant, making her an ideal *khadamah*. Indonesians, she says, are Muslim, and tend to be clean, decent and espouse high standards of morality. Their domestic habits are "not disgusting and their food does not smell particularly bad," she says, even though she restricts what food is allowed into the house. Her *khadamah* likes a particular fermented fish, but she has prohibited her from eating it in the house, because of the smell.

Nadia argues that the drawbacks of hiring an Indonesian, as opposed to a Filipina, who speaks better English and is better educated, are marginal, particularly when weighed against the benefits of having a Muslim caregiver for her children. She is particularly pleased that her *khadamah* is veiled, has children of her own, and is a little older, so she will not tempt her

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[95] Additionally, narratives regarding disease and contagion are fraught with implications that workers somehow take advantage of the quality of healthcare in Qatar and the generosity of the Qatari state.

husband. Having an attractive *khadamah* who wears tight clothes around the house and does not abide by Islamic social practices and standards of morality is not acceptable, she argues, as it sets a bad example for her children, and presents her husband with unnecessary temptation. Nadia herself is not veiled, and prefers to push the limits of "respectable" attire in Doha. As we talk on the beach in Qanat Qarteier, she is dressed in a black cover-up, over a bikini. As the wife of a professional and Madame, she is entitled to such privileges, whereas her *khadamah* is not.

Nadia's *khadamah* sleeps in her daughter's room. Her family rents a 120 square-meter, three-bedroom apartment in the Pearl, which does not have separate maids' quarters, so her *khadamah* occupies a bed in her toddler's room and shares the living space and kitchen with the family. At night, the bedroom door is left open so Nadia may hear and see everything that occurs in her daughter's room. She makes a point to enter anytime she wants, so her *khadamah* does not claim the child's room. The room is the toddler's; the *khadamah* shares it only in her capacity as a caregiver. She keeps her belongings in one of the closets in the room, but must change and do anything private in the bathroom. When she calls her family in Indonesia, the *khadamah* speaks her language, which they do not understand, so Nadia says it is not important that she have a private space. She can have privacy when the family is out of the house. When they are present, her *khadamah*'s focus should be the children and the family's needs, not her own. She allows her *khadamah* to watch television with her family when her husband is not present. If he is home, the *khadamah* is expected to limit her motion within the apartment, entering the living room only when the children need her or the family requests something. Otherwise, her space is the kitchen. She sits in the kitchen, which is adjacent to the living room, so she is within hearing distance of any requests the family makes. Though Nadia trusts her *khadamah* and leaves her children with her while she is out, she tells me it is important to monitor her and assert the family's claim on the apartment. She wants her to feel at home, but not comfortable to the point that she imposes her own standards and norms onto the family. It is a difficult balance, she tells me, to maintain the primacy and privacy of her family unit, while having a stranger live with them in such a small apartment.

The *khadamah* eats with them, usually as she feeds the children, but she is not obligated to eat the food the family provides, as she prefers Indonesian food and often cooks for herself. Nadia does not mind this at all, so long as she cleans up after herself and does not cook anything that leaves lingering smells in the apartment. She can cook if the children are sleeping or do not need her, and she has finished her household chores. But, once they are up, Nadia expects her to focus her attention on them. Her primary role is taking care of the children, dressing them, feeding them, bathing them, playing with them, escorting them to play dates and events, accommodating their everyday needs, being available should they require anything Nadia does not want to do for them herself. Nadia insists she is involved in every aspect of her children's life, that she does not forfeit control or decision making to her *khadamah*. Her *khadamah* simply implements what Nadia tells her to do. Nadia does appreciate that her *khadamah* is a mother and can make informed decisions about certain things, such as if a child is really injured, or if they have a temperature or diarrhea. It is helpful, she says, that she can deal with some things without direction, as this frees up Nadia's time and reduces her stress. Nadia says it is vital to train any *khadamah* how to perform certain tasks and clearly articulate what is expected from her so she can be assured her children and house are being taken care the way she wants. This also allows Nadia to have a sense of distance between the routine childcare and housekeeping tasks otherwise her life would solely consist of managing her *khadamah*. But, equally important is not allowing the *khadamah* complete autonomy regarding the children or housework, because this

will empower the *khadamah* to increase her control of various aspects of the family's life, and upset the balance of power between the Madame and *khadamah*.

Nadia wants her *khadamah* to be happy, but to know her place and role in the household. No matter what, she says, her *khadamah* is not family and has her own self-interest in mind. To her, her *khadamah* is just doing a job, regardless of the bond she forges with her family. She respects and appreciates her, yet fears her potential power over her family and what she can potentially do to her children. The acknowledgment of her *khadamah's* ability to harm her children underlies many of Nadia's choices and treatment of her *khadamah*. She has heard terrible stories about *khadameen* (maids) turning on families, mistreating children, even stories about *khadameen* killing children in their charge. Nadia could not recall a concreate example in which this happened, but she tells me that it happens all the time. The threat is omnipresent, and one must be diligent in identifying any signs that a *khadamah* is mentally unstable, or "about to crack." That is why monitoring her *khadamah* is very important, constantly keeping an eye on her, just in case she exhibits any questionable or aggressive behavior. Equally as important is knowing when she is physically ill, so Nadia can keep her children away from her. She is reassured that her *khadamah* does not have any serious contagious diseases, because she passed her physical exam, but she worries that she may somehow contaminate her children. That is why maintaining her personal hygiene is as important as any other aspect of her job. Nadia buys her toiletries -- shampoo, soap, pads, toothpaste -- and makes sure she showers often. She also regulates her handwashing and insists upon the maintenance of a particular level of cleanliness.

Her *khadamah* wears a uniform both inside and outside of the house, which she is responsible for changing daily, along with her headscarves and undergarments. The uniform marks her as a maid whenever she is out with the family. She rarely goes out alone, and when she does, she is allowed to wear her personal clothes, if it is her day off. When she accompanies the family, she must wear her uniform, even at the beach, where we speak. Nadia's *khadamah* accompanies the family on most outings, to take care of the children. She is responsible for most of their needs when they are out; she accompanies them to the restroom, monitors their movements, pushes them on swings, and feeds them when they are hungry. She is responsible for making sure they have everything they need when they are out, clothes, snacks, napkins, wet wipes, toys. Nadia usually accompanies them, as she does not like her *khadamah* to be alone with the children in public, especially at a place like the beach, where the children require diligent monitoring. Nadia does not have a driver, so she is responsible for driving her kids and *khadamah* around town, which takes up a significant amount of time and is one of the main reasons she and her *khadamah* are with each other almost twenty-four hours a day. The constant presence of her *khadamah* is something that bothers Nadia, as she says she does not have privacy in her daily life, but she needs her *khadamah* and is willing to endure this inconvenience for the sake of her children. Though she is constantly accompanied by this stranger, having her *khadamah* also allows her to have limited freedoms she would not have if she could not leave her children with her *khadamah* when needed.

Her *khadamah* is allowed to pray at prayer times. They cannot hear the call to prayer from their apartment in The Pearl, so her *khadamah* keeps track of the time and excuses herself for her prayers. If the kids do not need her, she is allowed to take a break and pray right away, but if the family has needs, she must wait until a more appropriate time to take a break. Nadia appreciates that her children see her *khadamah* pray and recite Koran, as this instills a respect for religion that she considers vital in her children's upbringing. Nadia tells me that a Filipina would not share this sense of Islamic morality, thus, her Indonesian *khadamah* is wonderful in that

sense. Though Nadia appreciates this positive influence on her children, she hesitates to call her *khadamah* a role model, as she is a *khadamah*, and "*Hiya a'la ad'daha*, (she is limited)," Nadia says. Her *khadamah's* modest demeanor and dress is also appreciated. Because she is a religiously observant woman, Nadia trusts her *khadamah* to go out by herself on her day off, as she feels she will act with dignity and not get into trouble. But, living in The Pearl makes it difficult for her *khadamah* to go out, as there is no public transportation to and from the island, so sometimes Nadia takes her to City Center on her day off, where she is allowed to walk around for a few hours by herself. Walking in The Pearl is not enjoyable for her *khadamah,* as she cannot afford anything in any of the establishments. Nadia says she sometimes sits on the public benches and looks at the yachts, but it is obvious she is a *khadamah* and sometimes feels uncomfortable sitting alone. Usually her *khadamah* sleeps, cooks, does her laundry, or calls her family in Indonesia on her day off. Nadia prefers her *khadamah* to be out of the apartment on her day off, so her family can have some privacy, but she does not mind her being in the apartment, and is relieved when she comes home, as Nadia is ultimately responsible for her.

Nadia does not think it unreasonable that her *khadamah* is deprived of personal space, as she lives with them only to serve her family and is always with the kids. Amr, an Egyptian father of three, says his *khadamah* also sleeps in his daughter's room. *Khadameen* really do not need their own room because they are with the children all the time, he tells me. Any place in the house will do, so long as they have a bed and a place to keep their belongings. He is certain that any dwelling in which he or any of his friends reside in Doha is better than any of the dwellings *khadameen* occupy in their countries of origin, so it is probably a step up for them, even if they have no personal space. Nadia's *khadamah* has limited physical and social space in which she may exist; her *khadamah's* life and livelihood are tied to Nadia's family and the physical space they allow her to occupy, and social spaces to which they grant her access.

7.5 Madame

> "*Zuki, zuki*, (push, push)," says a four-year old Lebanese girl on a swing in a park in The Pearl.

> "Yes, Madame," replies her South Asian nanny.

"Madame is a student here," responds a *khadamah* when asked why she is sitting on a bench outside a university classroom. Her employer is a twenty-something year old Qatari graduate student attending her weekly graduate seminar. She waits every week as Madame attends class; when Madame finishes class, she gets up, takes Madame's bag and follows her to the car waiting for them. The *khadamah* accompanies Madame on most of her errands and waits.

Every day, Sally, a twenty-something year old Filipina, stands outside the school in which her employer's daughter attends kindergarten. Sally and the girl are driven to school in a white Toyota Land Cruiser; Sally accompanies the kindergartner inside, carrying her school bag, as she shelters her from the sun with an umbrella. Sally helps the girl find her teacher in the assembly hall and line up with her classmates; she stands beside her, carrying her bag. Once the class enters the classroom and she makes sure the girl is situated, Sally exits the assembly hall and stands outside, beside the large green side gate that separates the school yard from the drop

off area where buses and cars pull up during drop off and pick up. Sally waits, standing, in the sun. She avoids eye contact and does not talk with the other nannies who accompany children to school or the guards, who secure the two large gates that separate the drop off area from the public roadway. She waits. Some days, the driver comes back before the outside gates are secured and picks Sally up. But, usually, she waits.

When the guard asks her what she is waiting for, Sally replies that she is waiting for Madame. Sally waits in case Madame requires her assistance. In the beginning of the school year, Sally waited until school was out, at 1:30pm. She stood in the sun from 7:30am until 1:30pm in case Madame needed help going to the bathroom, felt scared, needed help with her lunch, or anything else a five-year-old could require while attending kindergarten. Sally's daily waiting at the gate caught the attention of parents whose children attend school with Madame. Why does she stand by the gate all day? The issue was referred to the school principal who requested that Sally be allowed to go home. Madame's parents were not happy about this, as they argued that their daughter had never been out of the house by herself for such a long period of time and may feel anxious. Sally is Madame's personal *khadamah,* and their daughter is entitled to her assistance when needed, they argued.

Madame has certain rights and particular standards that must be maintained, irrespective of the circumstances the maintenance of those standards imposes on Sally. The subjection of Sally's body to hours of exposure in the sun, in a school yard on the fringe of the desert, is a condition of her work, necessary for her to deliver the care she is hired to give Madame. There is an implicit understanding in her employment that she will do what is required to serve Madame; all she was asked to do is wait and be available in case Madame needs her. Waiting is not egregious. Besides, as Sally's employers argue, they have the right to determine how she spends her time.

7.6 The Control of Workers' Bodies

Sally and Nadia's *khadamah* are in Doha only to work as *khadameen* (maids). They gain their legitimacy by their affiliation with their Madames and the families for whom they work. They have very few claims to being in Doha independent of them. Sally and Nadia's *khadamah* are expected to be attached to a family, to be on call and ready to serve them whenever needed. When they are in public space, their presence in the public realm is justified by their work -- they actively take care of the children, carry bags, do whatever is needed by the family, and wait until they are called upon to perform other tasks. While they wait, they are expected to be quiet and ready, always ready should their employers need something. They know not to wander off, make phone calls, gossip with other *khadameen*, or attend to their own needs without notifying their Madames. In the most straightforward way, their bodies are marked by a uniform. Nadia's *khadamah* wears her uniform to mark her position as the family's domestic worker. Her uniform separates her from those for whom she works. Sally's two-piece uniform, which resembles nurse scrubs, also marks her as a domestic worker. In a similar way, the construction vests and overalls of the country's over half a million construction workers mark them as workers. A uniform separates those who serve from those being served. But, a worker's body is also marked in more subtle ways.

The control of Nadia's *khadamah's* body -- where she sleeps, what and when she eats, what she wears, if and when she is allowed out, where she goes, when she may pray, how often

she is allowed to rest, when she must wash her hands, shower and change her clothes -- is implicit in the conditions of her *khadamah's* employment. Similarly, the subjugation of Sally's body is regarded as a necessary condition in her service to Madame. As her parents argue, it is within Madame's rights to subject Sally to such conditions. If Nadia's *khadamah* does not observe the specific parameters and restrictions placed upon her person, she is encouraged to do so with a simple reminder that her employment, and residence in Doha, depends on it. Nadia treats her *khadamah* with dignity and respect, and so does not view these impositions as degrading or controlling, just necessary requirements in order to maintain her desired familial logistics, domestic cleanliness, and the safety of her family and *khadamah.*

Khadameen literally and socially occupy the space of the family, and it is through the family that they gain legitimacy for their own tenure and access to physical and social space in Doha. For workers such as Sally and the over one million low-income male workers who reside in Doha, access to urban space is predicated on work and is controlled, almost always, by the workers' employer. As I will detail in the following chapter, particular subjects are prohibited, by law, as well as by informally codified social norms, to access particular urban spaces. For low-income male workers, their presence in the city is justified only in the context of work -- on construction sites, in petrol stations, in the establishments in which they work, in streets which they clean, driving heavy machinery, driving taxis and employer's cars, etc. -- or in the physical spaces specifically made for their residence and leisure -- labor camps, the Industrial Area, Labor City, Asian Town, and specific neighborhoods in which they are allowed to live.

Between their dedicated places of residence and the urban spaces of their work, their presence is justified only as a flow of bodies to and from work -- waiting in bus lines near work sites, waiting at public bus stations, in buses moving to and from work, taking a break from work on the side of a road, actively walking to a construction site, actively looking for a ride on the side of a road etc. Outside of the context of work, and in particular residential neighborhoods, congregations of low-income men are not tolerated. Many low-income men experience Doha only in the work sites in which they work, and in the corridors through which their bodies move to and from work. Outside of certain neighborhoods that are known to house them, or in the spaces made specifically for their leisure, their presence is open to challenges from the police, as well as private citizens, and their bodies are subject to discipline.

Figure 7.6: Worker Buses in Al Sheehaniya
Bus from UCC Lusail Office Tower to worker housing in Al Sheehaniya
Doha, May 2017
Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi

Figure 7.7: End of Worker Shift, The Pearl Porto Arabia, Tower 29
Doha, May 2016   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Figure 7.8: Workers Near Qatar University
Doha, May 2017   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Chapter 8. The Segregation of Male Workers

These bachelor workers are threatening the privacy and comfort of families, spreading like a deadly epidemic that eats through our social fabric…There is no doubt that the existence of bachelors among families is a violation that is unacceptable by all customary, legal and constitutional standards… We are fed up with their unpleasant presence, and do not need to list what has resulted from housing them next to families… Logic requires dealing with this crucial, overwhelming, popular rejection of the existence of bachelors among families by building a city for them in the Industrial Zone…We also suggest regulatory and legislative regulations, including building bachelor quarters on the main road outside residential areas, at least 700 meters away from girls' schools…We expect authorities to respond to our demand to bring back tranquility and comfort to families.

-- Qatari Journalist Rashed Al Audah Al Fadly[96]

Editorial, The Peninsula Newspaper, 2014

The State of Qatar aspires to advance and develop the social dimensions of its society by nurturing Qatari citizens capable of dealing effectively and flexibly with the requirements of the age they live in, and by preserving a strong and coherent family that enjoys support, care and social protection.

-- Qatar National Vision 2030, Page 19

The reordering of urban space in Doha into sanctioned spaces for the idealized family is not only expressed via the creation of Islamicized public spaces of family leisure and consumption, it is also done through explicit measures aimed at clearing out the city of low-income, male workers, and limiting their visibility and access to public space, to which I will now turn.

The segregation of dangerous and undesirable low-income men from respectable, pious families is a foundational principle upon which the city is organized, structured and made legible. Metaphorically, a map of Doha may be read as delineated spaces for the idealized, pious family, versus those for "single" men. In Doha, there is very little space for low-income, single men, or the poor, and the spaces that do exist are clearly delineated and designated as such --

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[96] These excerpts are quoted from a 2014 editorial Mr. Al Fadly wrote in The Peninsula Newspaper, entitled "Why do bachelors live in family areas?" <http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar-perspective/-rashed-al-audah-al-fadly/274126/why-do-bachelors-live-in-family-areas> [accessed March 2, 2016]. It has since been removed from the Peninsula Newspaper website.

Labor City, the Industrial Area, and the multitude of labor camps that house Qatar's low-income workers.

As Cairo's *ashwaiyyat* are the created "governable spaces" (Rose 1999) of Islamists in the public imaginary, Labor City, the Industrial Area, and the multitude of labor camps are the created spaces of low-income men, or workers, in Doha. In both cases, particular urban spaces are associated with certain people, modes of being, and imbued with meaning through both discursive practices, as well as socio-spatial practices aimed at disciplining a particular population of urban dwellers. In Doha, this discipline takes on a literal, physical meaning, with laws and decrees that limit the housing options, mobility, and visibility of workers and low-income men.

8.1 Family Housing Zones

Law No. 15 of 2010 - *Prohibition of Workers Camps within Family Residential Areas*, makes it illegal to "lease, rent or allocate property or parts of property of whatever nature to be a residence for workers groups." In October 2015, the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning[97], or *Baladiya*, published a series of maps delineating "family housing zones", or *mana'tak al-sakan al-'ai'lee*, in Qatar's eight municipalities, within which housing for male workers is prohibited. The entirety of Doha's urban core lies within designated family housing zones, with only a few areas, such as the Industrial Area, and other areas designated for service workers adjacent to high-income neighborhoods, such as The Pearl, excluded from the family housing zone designation.

The nine private islands in the Isola Dana section of the high-income development, The Pearl, are also not designated as family housing zones. This is most probably not to restrict the use of the islands by their owners, who include the Emir of Qatar, King of Bahrain, and other members of the Qatari ruling family. It is particularly interesting to note that one of the areas excluded from the family housing zone designation inside metropolitan Doha is a strip which houses the thousands of male workers employed in non-construction related activities in The Pearl (construction workers are housed in labor camps and are bused into and out of The Pearl daily). Most female workers, including building cleaning staff and receptionists, are not housed in the "worker" zone, but are provided housing within the residential towers. The movement of both male and female workers within The Pearl is heavily monitored and restricted, with curfews in place and "no-go" zones delineated to avoid the mixing of Pearl residents, patrons and workers.

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[97] In a government cabinet reshuffle that occurred in February 2016, the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning merged with the Ministry of Environment to become the Ministry of Municipality and Environment.

المناطق المخصصة لسكن العائلات فقط

بلدية الدوحه

وزارة البلدية والبيئة
Ministry of Municipality and Environment

Figure 8.1: Map of Designated Family Housing Zones, Doha Municipality
Source: Ministry of Municipality and Environment, Qatar

8.2 Workers' Camps

As the municipality does not allow for worker housing in designated family housing zones, workers who are not housed in worker compounds or provided housing by their employers are either pushed into the Industrial Area or outside of the city. The Industrial Area is one of the last remaining areas within metropolitan Doha in which low-income men are allowed to live. According to 2015 census figures, The Industrial Area is the most heavily populated area in Qatar, with over 364,710 residents, 95% of whom are male. Between 2010 and 2015, the area experienced the third largest increase in population of any of Doha's neighborhoods, with an increase of 103,309 residents. The Industrial Area has a relatively high population density, with 11,362.5 persons per square kilometer in an area of 32.1 square kilometers.

Most workers are housed in gated, heavily secured worker compounds in the Industrial Area, Al Khor, Ras Laffan, and Al Rayyan. These areas had the largest populations of non-Qatari, male, low-income workers, according to 2015 census figures.

According to 2015 census figures, a total 1,442,882 persons -- 60% of the total population -- lived in labor camps in 2015. Of those living in labor camps, 1,347,032 were men and 95,850 were women. Thus, 74% of the total male population in Qatar, and 16.3% of the total female population resided in labor camps in 2015.

Table 8.1: Population Living in Labor Camps, 2015 Census

		Male	**Female**	**Total**	**% Total Population**
Population Living in Labor Camps, 2015					
	Doha	514,879	64,470	579,349	24%
	Qatar	1,347,032	95,850	1,442,882	60%
Total Population in Qatar, 2015					
		1,816,981	587,795	2,404,776	100%
% of Total Male and Female Population Living in Labor Camps					
		74%	**16.3%**	**60%**	

Data Source: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, 2015 Census

The Qatar based Al-Asmakh Real Estate Development estimates an additional 500,000 to 800,000 beds are needed to relocate workers from substandard labor camps and accommodate the influx of additional migrant construction workers in the lead up to the 2022 World Cup. Most compounds have strict controls regarding access, with non-residents often not permitted in,

curfews imposed on residents, and other controls on worker mobility, including the busing of workers into and out of the compounds to their workplaces.

A change in housing guidelines issued by the Ministry of Municipality and Environment in April 2016 makes it legal to house workers in garages and scrap shops located within a designated area in the Industrial Area. This measure is purportedly to help alleviate the shortage of worker and low-income housing.

8.2.1   Requirements for Worker Housing

Employers have the legal obligation to provide safe, adequate housing that meets the specifications stipulated in Ministerial Order No. 18 of 2014: *Determining the Requirements and Specifications of Adequate Housing for Workers*. The order requires that employers must provide worker housing outside of urban areas (خارج المناطق العمرانية), reinforcing the segregation of workers from other segments of Qatari society. Employers must also provide a minimum area of six meters per bed, screened windows that prevent insects from entering the accommodations, adequate ventilation and natural light, in addition to adequate artificial light, air conditioning, a water cooler and emergency lighting. Each worker must be provided a bed and appropriate sheets and covers, a place to store their personal belonging, have access to a well-ventilated bathroom (at a ratio of one bathroom for every six workers) that has a water heater and separate showers. Employers are obligated to provide porcelain lined kitchens that contain a water filter, exhaust fan, refrigerator, gas stove that is adequate for the number of workers, and covered trash can with strong plastic bags. Employers must maintain the housing and provide maintenance when needed. In the case of temporary housing, such as onsite worker accommodation, employers are obligated to provide a lunch room or place to eat suitable for the number of workers who are accommodated, a medical emergency room that can provide necessary medical treatment, if more than 100 workers are housed at the temporary facility, and proper disposal of waste water and sewage.

Figure 8.2: Daruna Development Rendering of Worker Housing
Source:darunadevelopment.com

The order outlines these minimum standards in detail. At a minimum, the standards provide workers protection from "warehousing," a practice in which workers are crowded into substandard housing lacking adequate facilities, commonly practiced by small subcontractors to cut costs or in cases in which they cannot afford appropriate accommodation. Yet, the minimum standards deemed appropriate for workers by the Qatari state are telling, as the body of the worker is maintained in a state of minimal comfort, with access to the resources necessary to maintain bare life in order to facilitate the extraction of labor. Workers are not in worker housing for just the duration of a contract or until the completion of a project, they live in worker accommodations throughout their tenure in Qatar, which may be several years or decades.

Most workers do not have access to other housing options, and, thus, are housed in worker housing that may or may not meet the minimum requirements stipulated by law. These standards were not met prior to the issuance of the order in 2014, and claims that these standards are still not being met are ubiquitous and widely circulated. According to the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, in February 2015 alone, there were a total of 160 Violations of Labor Accommodations, with Doha municipality having the highest number of violations (75), followed by 54 in Al Rayyan. Additionally, there were ten enforced evacuations of labor accommodations -- 4 in Doha and 6 in Al Rayyan -- due to unsafe or substandard conditions.

8.2.2   Labor City and Barwa Al Baraha

In an effort to meet demand for international-standard worker housing, several worker housing developments have recently opened. Labor City, a development in the Industrial Area, which opened in November 2015, is projected to accommodate 100,000 low-income workers in 55 buildings. Additionally, Barwa Real Estate, a state-backed real estate developer, has embarked upon a 1.8-million square meter project - Barwa Al Baraha – described as "an integrated city for workers." The labor camp is one of the projects initiated by the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy to house workers employed on World Cup related projects, and is projected to accommodate over 53,000 workers in Al Khor, the site of Al Bayt Stadium. Both projects are hailed as model projects, as they include recreation facilities, complete with gyms, soccer pitches, etc., in addition to health care and other "community" facilities. One of the highlights of the Barwa Al Baraha project is that rooms will house no more than four men per room, which is significantly down from the typical 10-15 men per room, and bunkbeds will be eliminated.

Labor City, like most other labor camps, is a highly controlled space, surrounded by walls, security gates, and CCTV cameras. Though such developments have been praised as "a home away from home" for expatriate workers, the limitations on personal freedoms within the camps, and severe restrictions on worker mobility suggest otherwise. There is speculation that workers may be subjected to technologic monitoring of their whereabouts, as is the case in other camps. According to Qatari news source, "another labor camp developer addressed this issue by signing a $2.5 million contract on technology that would help track the construction workers who will live in its new housing projects."[98]

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[98] See Doha News <http://dohanews.co/qatar-answers-call-for-better-worker-housing-with-new-labor-city/ > [accessed April 19, 2016].

Figure 8.3: Labor City Advertisement
Source: Gulf Times Newspaper. Sunday, April 10, 2016.

As labor camps have the highest crime rates in Qatar, the increased surveillance and security measures imposed on workers are often justified by the need to curtail crime and other forms of potentially subversive behavior, such as worker protests or attempts at collective action, which are illegal under Qatari law.[99]

Labor City, *Barwa Al Baraha* and other "modern" labor camps are heralded as progressive measures that promote worker welfare, in line with the Qatar National Vision 2030. Yet, the sheer existence of labor camps, and the spatial concentration of low-income male workers that results from housing them in particular parts of the city, and country, not only segregates workers from other segments of society, limits their mobility and engagement with the public realm, but also creates a separate category of subject, defined in terms of their status as labor in an economic exchange, unworthy of rights claims outside of their capacity as workers. The prevalence and special status of workers in Qatar has prompted the creation of a special category of building type -- labor buildings -- in the census. According to 2015 census figures, there were 805 labor buildings in Doha and 1,770 nationwide. Of the total nation-wide labor buildings, 1,575 were completed, 151 were under construction, 23 were under maintenance and 21 were under demolition.

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[99] Labor Law 2004 and 2009, as well as the 2017 labor law, specifically prohibit protests and collective action. These offenses are punishable by imprisonment, termination of employment, and deportation.

Table 8.2: Number of Labor Buildings, 2015 Census

Labor Buildings	Doha	Nation-Wide
Completed		1575
Under Construction		151
Under Maintenance		23
Under Demolition		21
Total	**805**	**1770**

** A Labor Gathering is defined by the 2015 as: "The housing unit is occupied by a group of laborers."

Data Source: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, The Simplified Census of Population, Housing and Establishments, 2015

Figure 8.4: Typical Worker Housing, Industrial Area
Doha, June 2017   *Photo: Samer Shehata*

Figure 8.5: Population Dot Distribution, 2015

التوزيع السكاني بالنقاط 2015
Population Dot Distribution 2015

بلدية الشمال
Al Shamal Municipality

بلدية الخور و الذخيرة
Al Khor and Al Thakhira Municipality

Areas with large
concentrations of
workers residing
in labor camps and
labor buildings

*annotated by the author

بلدية الظعاين
Al Daayen Municipality

بلدية ام صلال
Umm Slal Municipality

بلدية الدوحه
Doha Municipality

بلدية الشيحانية
Al Sheehaniya Municipality

بلدية الريان
Al Rayyan Municipality

بلدية الوكرة
Al Wakra Municipality

مفتاح الخريطة - Legend

1 Dot = 100 Persons

التوزيع السكاني - Population
By Muncipality

Below 10,000

10,001 - 100,000

100,001 - 200,000

200,001 - 600,000

Above 600,001

Source: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics. The Simplified Census of Population, Housing, and Establishments, 2015

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Figure 8.6: Qatar Population by Place of Residence and Gender, April 2015
Source: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar, 2016 Census Summary

السكان حسب مكان تواجدهم ليلة التعداد والنوع
أبريل ٢٠١٥

POPULATION BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE AT THE CENSUS NIGHT AND GENDER
April 2015

TABLE (8) — جدول رقم (٨)

Place of Residency on Census Night	G.Total المجموع العام			Public Housing مساكن عامة			Labour Camps تجمعات عمالية			Households اسر		
	مجموع Total	إناث Females	ذكور Males	مجموع Total	إناث Females	ذكور Males	مجموع Total	إناث Females	ذكور Males	مجموع Total	إناث Females	ذكور Males
Doha الدوحة	956,457	250,027	706,430	1,496	137	1,359	579,349	64,470	514,879	375,612	185,420	190,192
AL Rayyan الريان	605,712	198,929	406,783	3,158	0	3,158	244,135	10,646	233,489	358,419	188,283	170,136
AL Wakrah الوكرة	299,037	50,934	248,103	1,029	0	1,029	218,922	10,435	208,487	79,086	40,499	38,587
Umm Slal أم صلال	90,835	30,140	60,695	344	0	344	40,022	1,629	38,393	50,469	28,511	21,958
AL Khor الخور	202,031	21,031	181,000	98	0	98	168,026	3,506	164,520	33,907	17,525	16,382
AL Shamal الشمال	8,794	2,271	6,523	0	0	0	4,691	57	4,634	4,103	2,214	1,889
Al Dayyan الظعاين	54,339	18,294	36,045	0	0	0	24,276	686	23,590	30,063	17,608	12,455
Al Shahniaa الشحانية	187,571	16,169	171,402	0	0	0	163,461	4,421	159,040	24,110	11,748	12,362
Total المجموع	2,404,776	587,795	1,816,981	6,125	137	5,988	1,442,882	95,850	1,347,032	955,769	491,808	463,961

The prevalence of camps in Doha evokes Agamben's notion of bare life and the role of the camp in reducing/ exposing/ excluding bare life. Ewa Plonowska Ziarek's analysis of bare life is particularly productive in the context of Doha, as she argues "Bare life is always already captured by the political in a double way: first, in the form of the exclusion from the polis - it is included in the political in the form of exclusion - and, second, in the form of the unlimited exposure to violation, which does not count as a crime" (Ziarek 2012). [100]

Workers are constantly monitored, and constant claims are made on workers' bodies, both at work and in their accommodations. Workers' bodies are maintained in a minimally acceptable state of being, in order to extract that labor -- once the worker's body is no longer capable of extraction, if it is depleted or diseased, it is no longer needed in the country. This is the case for elderly workers and expatriates, who, if unable to continue working, must leave the country or be sponsored by offspring who have legal residency. The worker becomes a liability and is replaced. This is facilitated by the maintenance of workers in fortress-like enclosures that foreclose the possibility of integrating or forging ties within Qatari society.

8.2.3   *Allegations of Systematic Abuse*

The housing and work conditions of workers have been the focus of much international scrutiny since 2010, the year it was announced Qatar would host the 2022 World Cup. In response to international pressure from over a dozen countries alleging Qatar's failure to uphold a UN convention on forced labor, minimum work and housing standards for workers employed on World Cup-related construction projects have been adopted by the Qatar Foundation and the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, the government body responsible for the World Cup facilities. In 2014, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and Building and Wood Workers International issued a complaint to the International Labour Organization (ILO) regarding the treatment of migrant laborers in Qatar, alleging the widespread prevalence of repressive work and housing conditions, as well as systems of forced labor. The ILO upheld the complaint and, in March 2016, based on the initial findings of an ILO delegation deployed to Qatar to investigate the matter, the United Nations warned Qatar to address the issue of forced labor within 12 months or face the possibility of a UN investigation. On November 8, 2017, at its 331st Governing Body Session in Geneva, the ILO decided to close the complaint, citing recent changes to the *kafala* system and the launch of a 3-yeat ILO technical cooperation program in Qatar.[101] Nonetheless, allegations by Amnesty International of widespread and systematic human rights abuses have refocused the spotlight on the plight of laborers in Qatar.

8.3 Redefining the Narrative on Forced Labor

"*For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains but to live in a way that enhances the freedom of others*" – Nelson Mandela

"*Freedom is not an attribute specific just to one civilization, but it is a human value, one that I believe is the driving force behind the making of human history*"
                                                                --- Her Highness Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser

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[100] Quoted in *Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 2.*
[101] ILO.org [accessed November 9, 2017]

The focus on forced labor and scrutiny which the international community has applied to the work and housing conditions of low-income migrant workers in Qatar has led to a host of interventions that attempt to highlight the state's proactive, progressive role in addressing these issues. But despite these efforts, the state is not able to divert attention from the underlying structures that disenfranchise millions of low-income migrant workers. One of these efforts is the newly opened Bin Jelmood House, one of the four Qatari "heritage houses" renovated and converted into museums in the Msheireb *Heart of Doha* Downtown redevelopment project.

The museum focuses on what it calls "Slavery in the Indian Ocean World." The narrative is that slavery, which is still a global issue, was rife worldwide, as well in the *Indian Ocean World*, which included the areas of the Arabian Gulf. Historically, in the Islamic world, various ruling elites, such as the Ummayad and Abbasid caliphs in Syria, heavily relied on slaves as domestic servants, but ordinary households also owned slaves, and "the distinction between enslaved and free people was often blurred." The status of slaves varied greatly, from low-level slaves who performed grueling manual labor, enslaved wives, known as *surias*, to enslaved people who obtained prominent positions, such as Bilal bin Rabah Al-Habashi, a companion of Prophet Mohamed and renowned figure in Islam, who is believed to have been chosen and taught by the prophet to perform the first call to prayer. Another example of prominent slaves are the Mamluks, who ruled Egypt and Syria. The exhibits emphasize the complex relationships between free and enslaved people in early Islam, stressing that enslaved persons were oftentimes considered part of the family, and could have higher social status and standards of living than free people.

Methods of enslavement, such as warfare, punishment for crime, raids and kidnapping, sale of dependents, debt bondage, and displacement, are also highlighted in the museum, as is the fact that enslaved people came from several regions of the world, ethnic backgrounds and religions. Africa, with its links to the Arab world, was a long-standing source of enslaved black people, as were Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Persia, which, until the eighteenth century, supplied most enslaved people to the Arab world. These "white" enslaved persons, called *Saqaliba*, "played a major role in various Muslim caliphates." Though violence was often used to perpetuate enslavement, exhibits in the museum assert that "The arrival of Islam had a positive influence on the way enslaved people were treated as it advocated kindness and encouraged manumission." A quote by Dr. Salman bin Fahd Al-Odah, a board member of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, asserts that "The first ever charter to abolish enslavement as a result of war was, in fact, instigated by a Muslim caliph."

Nonetheless, owning slaves was a sign of wealth and people engaged in the "conspicuous consumption" of slave ownership. In Qatar, the population of enslaved people reached its peak in the early twentieth century, a period corresponding to heightened international demand for pearls. This facilitated the use of enslaved persons in the domestic pearl industry, which "was the principal employer of enslaved workers in Qatar." Of the 27,000 people who constituted the tribal sheikhdom of Qatar during that period, "some 6,500 were Africans of whom around 4,500 – or 1 out of every 6 people – were enslaved."

In the late nineteenth century, most enslaved persons were from East Africa (corresponding to modern-day Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Eastern Congo) and the Red Sea areas of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, but by the early twentieth century, due to anti-slavery measures in East Africa, most enslaved people came from Baluchistan, where Persian tribal leaders kidnapped or lured people by offering them nonexistent jobs in the Gulf.

Additionally, "In a destitute region stricken by poverty and hunger, some preferred the security of slavery to the hardships of freedom and sold themselves willingly to caravans…" The narrative painted by the Bin Jelmood House attempts to complicate the history of forced labor in Qatar. In one of the galleries a female narrator says in Arabic:

> *The house you are now in was once the home of the slave trader nicknamed Jelmood – 'the rock.' We invite you to consider the lives of those enslaved people who once passed through these doors. This gallery tells the story of slavery and the slave trade in Qatar. It will take you back to a time when slavery in Qatar was at its most prolific. Here we learn about how enslaved people were brought to Qatar, the rich cultures they left behind and the arduous work they did. Here we can reflect on what it means for two people to work alongside each other but for one of them to be stripped of their free will. These men and women were once free people. They or their descendants were brought to Qatar against their will – removed from their families and their homes.*

In another gallery on domestic servitude, the narrator says:

> *The enslaved in Qatar lived closely with the families they served. Masters were obligated to feed, clothe and house their slaves. In a middle-class household, an enslaved person was, in many respects, treated as one of the family, eating the same food, wearing similar clothes and sharing in the family's daily life. However, knowing that they could be sold with little notice was a constant concern. The fear of separation was sometimes made worse by close ties between the slave and the household.*

The historical context of slavery at the turn of the twentieth century is more easily problematized than modern slavery and Qatar's role in the alleged forced labor of millions of migrant workers. The museum attempts to make visible the ubiquity of human trafficking, the most pervasive form of modern day slavery, and implicate most nations around the world, including Qatar. As a way of lessening the claims of egregious, systematic abuse of migrant workers in Qatar, the museum highlights Qatar's abolition of slavery and the prolific use of forced labor throughout the world. Qatar's significant donation to the trust fund for the UN Global Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking and its 2003 adoption of a National Strategy for Combating Human Trafficking is presented as evidence of the state's commitment to the abolition of slavery, as is its banning of the use of children in camel racing in 2005, which were replaced with Swiss-made robots. "I used to personally balance (and fasten) the harness, out of fear for those children," Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Faisal Al-Thani, President of the Qatar Camel Racing Committee is quoted as saying.

The displays on modern-day slavery attempt to humanize victims of human trafficking, mostly victims outside of Qatar including: Agnes, an eleven year-old girl who was kidnapped and enslaved by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. She was forced to kill another child and was taken as a "wife" of a rebel commander; Sirana, a twenty-seven year-old Sri Lankan who was sold to a Lebanese family in Beirut for $15,000; Ali, an eleven year-old Malian who was sold for $2 in the Ivory Coast where he worked twelve hours a day on a cocoa plantation; Nadia, a twenty-two year-old single parent from Moldovia who was trafficked across Serbia to Italy

where she was forced into prostitution; and Mariano, a 30 year-old Guatemalan who was illegally trafficked and sold to a U.S. farmer for $500.

The narrative shifts in a display entitled *Contractual Enslavement*: "Many construction workers in rapidly industrializing parts of the world, especially the Gulf region, are considered to be contractually enslaved." In addition to *Workers having lunch in Doha*, which shows workers sitting in traffic island on the Corniche having lunch and notes that "the abuse of the *kafala* (sponsorship) system directly affects large numbers of foreign migrant workers," migrant workers from elsewhere in the world are highlighted. These include *Migrant worker in a vineyard*, U.S. 2004, that shows a Mexican migrant worker from Oaxaca clearing brush; *Migrant farm workers in the U.S., which* shows a migrant worker in a make-shift shelter and states that the U.S. and U.K. are increasingly dependent on migrant agricultural workers; and *Migrant farm workers in the United Kingdom*, which shows lettuce production in Warwickshire. These and other displays highlighting forced labor throughout the world, including in Thailand, India, Cuba, and Cambodia, situate the allegations of forced labor amongst migrant workers in Qatar within a larger field of forced labor in a range of developing and developed countries. Qatar is made to look like any other country in which forced labor occurs, and given the fact the forced labor is widespread worldwide, Qatar's experience with forced labor is portrayed as nothing particularly special or alarming. On the contrary, the dedication of an entire museum to the issue of slavery and acknowledgment that contractual enslavement occurs within Qatar positions it as "progressive" with regard to the issue. Forced labor is represented as a ubiquitous global issue, not a uniquely Qatari issue affecting the lives of the majority of the nation's population.

8.4 The Sanctity of Human Privacy

> *The sanctity of human privacy shall be inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of residence, correspondence, or any other act of interference that may demean or defame a person may not be allowed…*
>
> -- Article 37, Qatar Constitution

The spatial segregation of low-income men is justified, in part, by the need to preserve the privacy and sanctity of urban space for the family. This gives rise to a host of laws and regulations governing personal freedoms, from taking a photograph in public, to ones' mobility within certain neighborhoods. Seemingly innocuous personal freedoms, such as taking a picture of a family or posting online photos or videos of oneself that include images of other people, even those exposing criminal activity, may be punishable by legal sanctions, arrest, and incarceration. Law Number 14 of 2014, or Qatar's Cybercrime Law, severely restricts personal freedoms and makes punishable a host of offenses that include infringement of *social principles*, privacy, defamation and blackmail. The definition of *social principles* is not precisely defined, and, thus, may be widely interpreted, leaving it to the discretion of the courts to determine what constitutes a criminal offense under the law. The ambiguity regarding *social principles* and what constitutes an infringement of privacy allows the law to encompass a wide range of innocuous behaviors, such as emailing or posting online photos of someone's house or car.

For workers, the infraction into the sanctioned spaces of the family and home are met with little tolerance. Though workers are most often housed in labor camps and in the Industrial Area, many small employers and subcontractors routinely "warehouse" workers in old, overcrowded buildings or villas to cut costs. As evidenced by the editorial quoted in the

beginning of this section, workers living in the proximity of families are regarded as a societal nuisance and threat to the sanctity, privacy, and moral wellbeing of the idealized, pious family. In response to such perceived threats, the Ministry of Municipality and Environment encourages Doha residents to expose violations of workers living within designated family zones; residents may submit a "labor next to family housing" complaint/ inquiry through a form on the ministry's website,[102] whereby an investigation is launched by the Ministry. Workers found living in family housing zones are subject to eviction and landlords are subject to property seizure and fines of up to 50,000QR (approximately $14,000).

The mobility of low-income workers is restricted in other ways as well. In June 2013, the Ministry of Interior issued new drivers licenses restrictions that prohibit persons employed in over 150 professions, ranging from laborer to waiter, from obtaining drivers licenses. All foreign expatriates -- both professional and non-professional -- require a "no-objection" letter stating that their sponsors or employers do not object to them obtaining a driver's license. Though sponsors do not allow the majority of workers (other than drivers, heavy vehicle operators etc.) to obtain drivers licenses, this social differentiation is now codified into law. The restriction this places upon the mobility of workers is unprecedented, as previously, low-income men could often hitch rides with other workers. Those who are allowed out of their compounds must rely on Doha's ill-serviced public bus system, as the vast distances between neighborhoods, lack of pedestrian infrastructure on public roadways, and extreme heat make walking virtually impossible. The one area in which the state facilitates the movement of workers is the Industrial Area, within which workers are allowed free rides on public buses.

Qatar's property and land laws, which provide land,[103] low-cost loans[104] and grants[105] to Qataris, yet limit the ownership of land and property by non-Qataris outside of special investment zones (such as The Pearl, West Bay Lagoona, and Lusail), facilitates the creation of "Qatari" neighborhoods, that almost exclusively house Qatari families. High-income expatriates live almost exclusively in gated housing compounds - either private compounds owned or leased to their employers, or private commercial compounds that lease to expatriates - in The Pearl or West Bay Lagoona, where they are allowed to own freehold property, or in

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[102] An electronic form entitled "*Report Workers Lodging Within Family Housing Areas*" is also available on the Qatar Government *Hukoomi* website, which provides online access to a wide range of government services. In order to file an online complaint, one must input the municipality, building number, street, zone name and electricity number of the residence. This launches a formal investigation into the property.

[103] Qatari citizens may apply for a plot of land from the Ministry of Justice, which administers a special hotline to help them navigate the application process.

[104] The Department of Housing in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs makes available low-cost housing construction loans to Qatari citizens, who may take out a loan of up to 1.2 million QR ($337,000) from the Qatar Development Bank (QDB). The fee incurred is one percent of the loan amount, or 213,549QR ($59,985) maximum. The monthly installment is 3,365QR ($945) for a period of 35 years. Payments begin two years after the signing of a loan agreement, or upon receipt of the full amount, whichever is earlier. In order to qualify for these loans, the Qatari citizen must have available a loan guarantee of 150,000QR ($42,135), in addition to a bank guarantee from the applicant's bank in which they deposit their wages, original property documents, professionally certified architectural drawings, and a valid construction permit. Though these low-cost loans are beneficial to a majority of Qatari citizens, the requirements stipulated to secure a loan are prohibitive for some Qataris, as they require significant investment prior to the issuance of the loan. During 2016 and 2017, this issue was raised by several Qatari citizens on the Qatar Radio show *Watani Al-Habib, Sabah Al-Kher* (Good Morning, My Beloved Country) who called in to voice their grievances regarding the high upfront costs associated with the loan requirements.

[105] Qatari citizens are also entitled to a 50,000QR grant from the Ministry of Finance and Economy, upon written request from the Department of Housing.

residential buildings clustered in Doha's West Bay and Downtown. Lower-income professional expatriates predominantly live in apartments in Doha's older neighborhoods, many of which are being redeveloped.

The organization of urban space around gated, single-family, detached housing, gated housing compounds, and luxury developments for the exclusive use of families and high-income expatriates, facilitates the isolation of low-income expatriates and male workers. Doha's low-density residential development centers around gated housing complexes and suburban neighborhoods planned for subdivision into single-family, private villas, based on a *fireej* concept of neighborhood development. A *fireej* is the traditional neighborhood unit that consists of several private residences positioned in a manner that ensures the privacy of individual homes around shared services or a courtyard. Services, such as a mosque and state subsidized Al Meera grocery store, may be located at the center of the neighborhood unit. Schools and gas stations may also be located within neighborhood units, though in general, there is a shortage of government and private schools in the city, and many students are bused long distances to attend schools outside of their neighborhoods.

Figure 8.7: Typical Single-family Residential Development   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Housing under construction in Umm Salal, a low-density neighborhood in the northern part of metropolitan Doha with a high population of Qatari households.

Figure 8.8: Qatar Population by Gender, 2015
Source: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar, The Simplified Census of Population, Housing and Establishments 2015

Chapter 9. Redefining Doha

It is the intersection of the spaces for families and those for workers, the borders and fringes where these spaces meet, that cause the most unease, and for which redevelopment plans are in the making to repurpose and clear out "undesirable" spaces, replacing them with developments that target the most preferred persons in Qatar, members of the moral, righteous, patriarchal family. We see this taking place in Doha's old downtown area, which for decades has been an agglomeration of "Indian" stores, restaurants, and middle-to-low-income housing, where thousands of South Asian migrant workers and professionals previously lived. The area is currently being redeveloped into a mixed-use, high-end, tourist and family-oriented residential and entertainment district by Msheireb Properties, a government-backed real estate development company and subsidiary of Qatar Foundation, which functions under the auspices of Sheika Moza, wife of the Father Emir.

9.1 Msheireb[106]

The QR20 billion (approximately $5.6 billion) Msheireb Downtown Doha project, which began in 2010, encompasses 35-hectares, in the Mohamed bin Jassim district, near Souk Wakif and the Emiri Diwan. According to Msheireb Properties, the project is heralded as "the world's first sustainable downtown regeneration project" with the objective of "reverse(ing) the pattern of development in Doha, which has tended towards isolated land use, reliance on car transportation and energy hungry structures."[107] The project is envisioned as a pedestrian-friendly, urban center that will be serviced by a dedicated tramway and includes "premier office space, retail, leisure facilities, townhouses, upscale apartments, hotels, museums, civic services, and exciting cultural and entertainment venues" (ibid).

A key component of the redevelopment project is its focus on restoring Qatari heritage to the urban fabric of the old downtown, a space that has been associated with "Indian" Doha for decades. As the developer notes, the project "is innovative in its design, yet clearly inspired by our Qatari heritage, and is built to enrich the lives of the people of Qatar. It will become a meeting point for all Qatari families who will be proud to see their city return to its roots".[108] The city's roots are defined as markedly Arab, and particularly Qatari, rooted in the notion of an imagined, idealized Qatari past. Additionally, as the project is part of the urban strategy related to the Qatar National Vision 2030 (and subsequent National Development Strategy 2011-2016, that promotes sustainable development), the focus on reclaiming space for the family figures prominently in the project narrative and literature.

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[106] The word *Msheireb* is derived from the Arabic word - مشيرب - derived from the Arabic root "to drink." It is spelled in different ways, depending on where it appears. The Msheireb Downtown Doha project, or *Heart of Doha Project,* as it is also called, uses two spellings throughout the project signage and literature -- *Msheireb*, in which the Arabic accent vowel is omitted in the English translation, and *Musheireb*, in which the vowel is stressed. Both are used in signage throughout Doha. I use both spellings, depending on the spelling of the original reference to which I am referring.

[107]< http://mdd.msheireb.com/exploreproject/projectoverview.aspx#sthash.LBhmzOjZ.dpuf > [accessed April 19, 2016.]

[108] <http://mec.msheireb.com/en-us/explore.aspx#sthash.HrNiKFuz.dpuf > [accessed April 19, 2016.]

Census figures indicate that 215 buildings were "under demolition" in the project area in April 2015. Most of the demolished buildings are low-rise structures, consisting of a few floors of apartments over commercial storefronts, which typified Doha's urban form in the 1970s and 80s. Only four Qatari "heritage houses," or iconic courtyard houses are preserved. These have been renovated and converted into the four museums that constitute Msheireb Museums -- Company House, Radwani House, Bin Jelmood House and Mohammed Bin Jassim House.

Figure 9.1: Msheireb Project Site
Doha, July 2017. *Photos: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Figure 9.2: Typical Building Slated for Demolition
Doha, April 2016. *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

As I detail in the following sections, the narrative promoted in these museums, as well as the Msheireb Enrichment Center, is equally important as the physical interventions put forth by the Msheireb project. As is the case with Katara and other cultural heritage sites discussed in Chapter 6, the anxiety over the loss of Qatari tradition and reassertion of Qatari culture in the urban realm is facilitated through urban interventions informed by a specific reimagining and definition of what it means to be Qatari. These narratives, and subsequent interventions, that justify the clearing out of urban spaces and redefinition of the city are, once again, tied to Qatari subject formation and the valorization of Qatari tradition and family. In the case of the Msheireb Downtown Doha project, the dominant narrative is one of national pride in Qatari heritage and the reclamation of the area's uniquely Qatari identity.

9.2 Msheireb Enrichment Center

> *Discover the history of Qatar's traditions, culture and heritage at the Msheireb Enrichment Center*
> --- Plaque in Front of Msheireb Enrichment Center

> *Musheireb – Heart of Doha beckons Qatari families back to the centre of the city.*
> --- Msheireb Enrichment Center

The Msheireb Enrichment Center is a curious building, built into the waters of the Arabian Gulf, on the Corniche, near Sheraton Park. The location is popular with families, who fill the park on weekends, when the Enrichment Center is closed, and sit at the Costa Coffee directly across. The playground adjacent to the Costa Coffee is always crowded on weekends; finding a place to sit anywhere along this stretch of the Cornice is difficult. Families bring their blankets, chairs, coolers, toys, bikes, strollers, and sit for hours. Siting along the corniche is one of the last free activities available in Doha. This part of the corniche constantly bustles with activity when the weather allows. To access the Msheireb Enrichment Center, one must cross a bridge to the barge-like structure on which the Center is built. It is one of the only places in Doha in which children are not allowed. I was told by several Qataris and expatriates that, in order to really understand Doha, a trip to the Msheireb Enrichment Center is a must.

The Enrichment Center is a special project museum, managed by Msheireb Properties, dedicated to the dissemination of information about the Msheireb Downtown Redevelopment Project -- or *Heart of Doha*, as it is also known. When I enter the museum, I am greeted by a Filipina receptionist who asks if it is my first time to visit the Center. A man in Qatari national dress walks around, and directs her to ask for my name and contact information. The first exhibition hall is a room filled with photos, maps and artifacts of Doha's past. Glass display cases adorn the center of the room; in the cases are artifacts that represent Qatari history and culture. In one case, an old Koran, in another, a wooden trunk containing tools used in the pearling trade. A traditional sieve, bowl, coffee cups, and gas *waboor*, a small gas burner used in the making of coffee, are displayed in another case. An old razor, comb, scented water dispenser, *khol* bottle, and mirror, highlight the tools of everyday life, as do currency and legers. A guard stands at the far end of the room, avoiding direct eye contact whenever I look his way, while still watching me navigate my way around the room.

Another display on the back wall is an interactive cabinet of drawers containing old artifacts. Press on the drawer and it opens to display the gem hidden within – a net with oyster shells, attached to rope on the end of which a stone is tied, used by pearl divers to collect oysters. The stone weighs down the net, preventing it from floating away while the diver is under water. The first edition of the *Qatar Industrial and Trade Directory, Exporters & Importers*, issued by the CODCO Est. in 1977, is contained in another drawer. Stone samples from the *Heart of Doha* project; a brass scented water dispenser, a model of a dhow, an oyster shell containing natural pearls and tools used in pearl extraction and classification, a green glass bottle. When each drawer is activated, an explanation of the artifact appears on a screen display in Arabic and English. The rest of the back wall is adorned by displays highlighting various pillars of Qatari culture and society -- *learning, living, economy, community, buildings*. The symbols of Qatar appear in each display; the dhow, ropes, net and pearling knife represent *economy*, the *mubkhara* (incense burner) and *dallah* (coffee pot) represent *community*, stone represents *buildings*, a straw basket, an iron cooking vessel and utensils represent *living*, and a primary school certificate issued by the Ministry of Education of the newly independent State of Qatar represents *learning*.

The main wall is adorned with historic maps and photos of Doha, before independence and the nationalization of oil. An important narrative highlighted by the maps is that of Qatar's (and Doha's) pre-modern significance. Qatar's significance to the history and development of the region is asserted by the claim that settlement on the Qatar Peninsula dates back 50,000 years, to the Stone Age, based on evidence found at the Jebal Al Jassasiya archeological site. It is argued that not only does settlement of the peninsula pre-date modern Qatar, its cultural significance predates the discovery of oil, as evidenced by the fact that historians and Arab travelers mention Qatar in texts dating back to the 5th century BC. This claim is consistent with the logic that informs other urban interventions and cultural heritage sites, such as Katara, discussed in Chapter 6.

The oldest map depicts Doha in 1947. In the timeline accompanying it, two important events, which set one of the primary narratives promulgated throughout the project, are highlighted – the building of the house belonging to "the son of Jassim bin Mohammed, the founder of the modern State of Qatar," and the electrification of Kahraba Street (the name literally translates into Electricity Street), the first street to receive electricity in Doha. These events are pivotal to the narrative that the *Heart of Doha* project represents the restoration of Qatari heritage to the urban fabric of the old downtown, which, for the past four decades, has been eroded and subverted by non-Qatari influences. The construction of "Qatari" houses, linked to the ruling Al Thani family lineage, is central to the claim that Doha is essentially "Arab" and "Qatari", hence the legitimate need to restore its "Arab" and "Qatari" origins. The conservation and restoration of the Mohammed Bin Jassim House, and its subsequent conversion into a museum, operated under the auspices of Msheireb Museums, is pivotal to this narrative. Likewise, the electrification of Kahraba Street is central to the narrative that the area encompassed by the project was the center of Qatari life in the mid-twentieth century, the meeting point of Qatari families who came to shop, socialize and congregate in homes and establishments along Kahraba Street and the adjacent area. Kahraba Street and the "original" homes and buildings built by "original" Qataris are represented as the focal point of authentic Qatari life during this period. These narratives appear throughout the project and are explicitly promoted in the artifacts displayed in the Mohammed Bin Jassim House.

The *Heart of Doha* is portrayed as authentic Qatar. It is represented as not only being a space tied to Qatari history, it is, as its name suggests, represented as the heart of Qatari cultural and social life, in which the family, national pride, and social connections are paramount. This is expressed, quite explicitly, in a video that continually runs at the Msheireb Enrichment Center, entitled *Lost connections: Three Perspectives*, in which three generations of Qataris express their longing for a connection with Qatar's past and the truly authentic, family and community-oriented relationships that have been lost with the onset of modernization and subsequent changes in Doha's urban form and Qatari lifestyles. The protagonists embody the nostalgia for a Qatar that has been lost by urbanization and the erosion of close-knit communal ties. Mohamed Bin Salem Al Marekhi (Bu Salem Mohamed), a 63 year-old Qatari gentleman, represents the older generation of Qataris: "He grew up in a closely-knit world where family and friends were at the center of life. His memories of the past live on…And he lives in those memories." Youssef Rashid Al Suwaidi, a 43 year-old Qatari gentleman, "represents a generation that embraced change, and put the country on the country on the world map. Even amidst progress and modern comforts, he misses some elements of the past. He is resolved to pass on the pearls of timeless wisdom to his next generation…" Sheikha Al Salat, an 18 year-old Qatari woman, represents contemporary Qatar: "Born into modern, cosmopolitan Qatar, she is the future of the nation. Her experience of the past and tradition lies in the stories she has heard. Those stories and the rare glimpses…fascinate her."

First Vignette
Dawn. The sun rises over the Arabian Gulf and Doha's modern skyline. Bu Salem Mohamed stands near the water looking at the skyline. The call to prayer can be heard in the background. He holds prayer beads. Images of old Qatar are projected on nine smaller screens.

"Qatar…My Country, my home…how much do I miss your past…A world where we all used to know each other…as family, and neighbors."

He walks along the harbor, where wooden dhows are berthed, and smiles at two young boys who pass him on their scooters. Historic images of children learning the Koran, in *madrasas* and traditional learning environments are projected around him.

An image of a group of boys running through a traditional neighborhood *sikka* (or ally way), is projected on all of the screens at once.

Souk Wakif at daybreak. Hundreds of pigeons take flight in the main square, with Al-Fanar Islamic Cultural Center in the background.

Bu Salem Mohamed stands on the top landing of a staircase in a traditional Qatari structure. As he walks down the stairs, imagines of traditional Qatari houses are projected in the background.

"Today, I am alone…looking for a gathering of friends and neighbors… wishing for company. Every day a new building rises, reaching out to the sky…the country looks different now."

Images of the old city and houses are projected around him as he walks through Souk Wakif. This is followed by images of cars speeding by, large congregations of foreign men on the street, juxtaposed with images of a group of Qatari men gathered together at a table, and photos of old Doha.

"*Even the breeze has changed…and so have the people,*" he says as an image of Filipinas and other foreigners at City Center is projected, surrounded by old photos of Doha.

Bu Salem Mohamed walks in the souk.

"*all that they think about is work…and more work…Oh God, in my solitary moments…I dream of the past and the beloved memories of a life long gone!*"

The viewer sees his back as he walks in the souk. The screen goes blank.

Second Vignette
Youssef Rashid Al Suwaidi is seated at a modern café, reading a newspaper.

"*Memories? Of course I have memories. So many and so different…Memories of my grandmother and her stories*!" (close up of the coffee thermos on his table)

"*Yes, old times were different. We were all like a big family and Doha was like a big house that brought us all together.*"

Close up of the narrator, surrounded by historic images of Doha.

"*But now, the whole world has changed…and Doha has grown impressively.*"

Images of Aspire Park and tower (site of 2006 Asian Games), modern developments, malls, hotels, Qatar Exchange, and helicopters are projected on the screen.

Third Vignette
Sheikha Al Salat walks with a book in her hands in Education City.

"*I have heard many tales of a past that each of us treasure.*"

"*My father studied abroad…he worked hard to graduate from a European University,*"

She flips through an atlas while images of the Qatar Foundation campus - Education City, including Weill Cornell medical school - are projected around her.

"*Now we are much better off and I can choose from some of the best international universities, right here in my country…without leaving my family.*"

She walks down a university corridor.

"Our generation is well aware of our world, and has our own vision for the future. For example, we are conscious of the energy issues and consider it our duty to raise awareness among people about conservation…Believe it or not, our ancestors knew how to use the wind direction to their benefit."

She walks out the library with a book. The screen goes blank.

Final Vignette
Images of non-Qataris appear on the screen: a blonde woman, a black man, various non-Qatari men, a veiled Arab women, Arab children, various people of different ethnicities. They are surrounded by images of sporting events – Qatar 2022, the 2006 Asian Games, Doha Open Tennis tournament, and track events.

The screen goes blank.

The next image is a scene of driving through the old section of downtown Doha, the Msheireb project site.

"We welcomed the whole world in our country…" says Mr. Al Suwaidi.

Time lapse photography of overpass and road – cars and lights stream past.

"Buildings have changed, architecture is so different from what it used to be. We barely know each other or see each other…people chat all the time, but only through the phone or computer."

Images of modern villas, Doha skyline, large buildings, people talking on their phones, passing each other on crowded streets.

"Today, even amidst the comfortable life we lead, we long for many things from the past…I miss the simple, intimate gatherings…that brought me closer to my family and friends."

Image of man drinking coffee, man pouring coffee from a traditional *dallah*, historic picture of gather of women, traditional *maglis*, men greeting each other.

The screen goes blank.

Museum of Islamic Art -- the 43 year-old Qatari protagonist walks toward it.

"Of course, times have changed and those wonderful days will never come back," says Mr. Al Suwaidi, as he stands by a dhow and the Arabian Gulf, with the Doha skyline in the back, just as the older gentleman did in the beginning of video.

"But we are proud of our history, and our pearl diving days… the memories of which shape our customs and traditions that we uphold…which we should pass to our children to build their future upon… Our past is precious, just as the pearls…"

Image of Qatari flag blowing in the wind.

He turns to the camera and takes off his sunglasses: *"One who has no past has no future."*

Museum of Islamic Art -- Sheikha Al Salat, the 18 year-old protagonist walks on the plaza.

"As I told you,, even though I don't belong to the past, I feel it is a part of me…I cherish it as much as it values me. I am proud of it, as it is of me… Often, the past visits me, and I visit the past."

She passes the older Qatari gentleman as they walk past each other on the bridge leading to the MIA. She also passes the middle-aged Qatari man. She walking in the direct away from the MIA, as they walk into the MIA.

The camera follows her footsteps as she walks on the plaza away from the MIA.

The screen goes blank.

"Yes…our glorious past with its traditions is truly the beating heart of our modern world."

     Lost connections: Three Perspectives, perfectly embodies the narrative of Qatari authenticity, traditions, and nostalgia that informs nationally promoted urban development projects and interventions aimed at inscribing Qatari tradition and culture in Doha. Its narrative of national pride in Qatar's history, the social cohesion implicit in traditional familial and communal relationships, and longing for a connection to something purely (and authentically) *Qatari* is tangible and serves to justify the types of interventions deemed necessary in the restoration of Qatari tradition and culture in the urban realm. Also tangible is the anxiety over the loss of this "authentic Qatar", facilitated, not only by modernity, but by the influx of non-Qatari people and culture into the country. The narrative stresses that Qatar welcomes non-Qataris and modern "progress", as it is a forward-looking country that implements cutting edge, thoughtful, initiatives for the betterment of its people and residents, yet strives to maintain its "glorious past with its traditions."
     This narrative of "lost connections" continues in the next display, a board entitled *Progress…At A Cost* that lays out some of the main challenges facing Doha residents identified by the *Heart of Doha* project stakeholders. It poses the following questions: "Is it possible to strike the right balance between the time we spend apart and the time we spend together?"; "Isn't there more to the way we spend our leisure time than looking at a screen?"; "As the city grows,

we ask 'are we heading in the right direction?"; "Can we create a city where it is comfortable to walk and where the things we need are close by?"; "Can we re-connect with our environment?"

The solutions to these problems are offered through design. The project is built around the idea of restoring aspects of traditional Qatari life, such as human bonds, seen as integral to the Qatari family and society, to the fabric of the *Heart of Doha*. This is done via design; physical design is proposed to facilitate particular socio-spatial processes. For example, "Tradition-inspired urban form will replace car dominated roads with pedestrian-friendly streets." These pedestrian-friendly streets, laced together around inter-connected buildings, interspersed with pedestrian squares, shade-providing colonnades, and oriented along a north-south grid to take advantage of the sea breeze, are thought to increase human interaction by getting people out of their cars and into the street, where they can run into old friends, gather with family or make new acquaintance. Additionally, the pedestrian link to Souk Wakif and the old water channel, in which Wadi Msheireb formerly flowed, "will enhance the bond to past traditions." One of the main guiding principles of the project is "to achieve continuity between the past, the present and the future by finding timeless motifs and techniques. Respecting time-honoured traditions and applying them in a new way." The *Heart of Doha* offers an environmentally deterministic response to the notion of restoring "human connections" to the city and its past.

The entire project site rests upon a basement in which service-oriented functions are relegated – parking, utilities, service roads for service vehicles, plant rooms, and service yards. Above ground functions are reserved for "spaces of well-regulated liberty" (Rose 1999:73) such as housing, retail, cultural spaces and hotels. Housing consists of apartments and townhouses that aim to serve "international residents and local families." The challenge identified by project architects is to design apartments that "cater for all aspects of Qatari lifestyle and domestic culture in a central urban setting." Privacy is particularly important, as the project aims to draw Qatari families back to the dense city, instead of the surrounding suburbs, and into the *Heart of Doha* townhouses, where they can walk and not be reliant on cars, instead of living in single-family houses that necessitate excessive use of cars and create a sense of alienation. Townhouses have private elevators, shaded rooftop terraces with private pools and indoor-outdoor living spaces. The orientation of townhouses is based on the *Fireej* concept, with each *Fireej* having six townhouses. The project architects claim this is a modern reinterpretation of the traditional Qatari urban form. Each townhouse has access to a private *sahan*, or courtyard, communal gardens and a *majlis*. This arrangement is designed to facilitate community interaction, while still maintaining privacy for individual families.

Table 9.1: Msheirab, Heart of Doha Project

Component	Quantity / Size / Capacity
New Buildings	226
Residential Space	283,500 sq. m
Hotel Space	94,200 sq. m
Community and Culture Space	75,800 sq. m
Retail Space	106,300 sq. m
Office Space	276,300 sq. m
Primary School	1
Hotels	1"Luxury" hotel + several "Business" hotels
Theatre and Cinema	350 seats
Basement Car Parking	10,500 spaces

Source: Msheirab Properties, Msheireb Enrichment Center, Doha

Another important aspect of the project is sustainability and "excellence in design." "The project master plan is guided by a series of design principles and quality standards that observe traditional architectural values within a robust modern framework." Again, as with other nationally backed projects in Doha, the notion of maintaining tradition while embracing modernity figures prominently in the project ethos. This is portrayed through the many models, cross sections, posters and other project artifacts on display at the Msheireb Enrichment Center. The Enrichment Center inundates visitors with project models and information about the design aspects of the project, with elaborate models that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to produce. Every design aspect of the project is highlighted, and portrayed as an essential part of the project's sustainability and holistic ethos of getting people back into the city, and alleviating the reliance on cars and an unsustainable way of life.

One display, in particular, attempts to relay a comprehensive overview of the project. This project model is set upon a table that consists of a screen that lights up to highlight particular aspects of the project, which plays on a continuous loop. At the beginning of the loop, the project model stands out against the black screen, with an image of the solar eclipse at the bottom of the screen. The Earth grows larger, and details of Earth's surface come to light. As the image grows, the viewer sees the project suspended above the Middle East, with Qatar highlighted on the map. The image continues to become more detailed, and the project model appears over Doha, whose streets, buildings and neighborhoods appear with more clarity, until the model is perfectly lined up with the exact area of the project area, on a map of Doha below. The surrounding image of Doha then disappears, and the viewer is presented with an animated display of the project characteristics. The model lights up at each corresponding change of information. Different parts of the glass display board light up to show the following:
- *Quarters*: Diwan Amiri Quarter, Heritage Quarter, Retail Quarter, Mixed-Use and Residential Quarter, Business Gateway Quarter,
- *Zones/ Usage*: Residential, Commercial, Cultural Zone, Historical building Zone, Retail Zone, Hotels,

- *Main Streets*: New Ukaz Street, Abdulah Bin Thani Street, Kharaba Street, Massat Street, Al Rayyan Street, Sikkat Al Wadi,
- *Accessibilities from the City*: Connectivity / Transportation, Metro Lane, Underground Station, Main Arteries / Vehicular Movement, Pedestrian Circulation, Basement / Parking, Tram Route,
- *Sustainability*: Sun / Shade, Sikkas, Wind / Cooling, Parks, Squares, Shade and Wind,
- *Key Areas*: Emiri Diwan Annex Guard Building, National Archives, Radwani House, Mohamed Bin Jassim House, Company House, Jalmoud House, Cultural Forum, Baraha, Mandarin Oriental Hotel, Galleria, School, Town Houses, Apartments, Offices, Eid Prayer Ground, Mosques, Kahraba Street,
- *Construction Phasing*: Phase 1A, Phase 1B, Phase 1C, Phase 2, Phase 3, Phase 4,
- *Precincts*: Entertainment and Dining Precinct, Heritage Precinct, Lifestyle and Leisure Precinct, Retail Precinct, Luxury Court Precinct, Urban Living Precinct, Home Furnishing Precinct, Qatar Living Precinct, Diwan Amiri Precinct,

Yet, despite the inundation of visitors to the Msheireb Enrichment Center with historical narratives and detailed project models highlighting every design aspect of the project, what is missing is equally as important as what is explicitly portrayed. Nowhere are the fundamental issues behind the reclamation of Qatari identity that facilitate the forced displacement of thousands of people from the project area acknowledged. The narrative and project models stress the sustainability and innovativeness of the project, reclamation of Qatari heritage to the project area, restoration of pedestrian and street life and so on. Yet, nowhere is it acknowledged that thousands of people previously lived in the *Heart of Doha*, thousands already walked its streets, congregated in its ally ways and open areas, rubbing shoulders with their fellow Doha inhabitants. This is because they are wrong type of person. They are the low- and middle-income men that have inhabited the area since the 1970s and 80s -- the Indian taxi drivers, Afghan porters, Pakistani cooks, Iranian shop assistants, Sri Lankan cleaners, Nepalese tailors, Bangladeshi bakers, Filipino waiters, and other non-Qatari men, who displaced the middle income families who once occupied the area before them.

The exhibits on display are project models and renderings of Doha's past, present and future that depict an idealized Arab, "Qatari" Doha, devoid of migrant labor and the hundreds of thousands of South Asian men who literally built and serviced the city for decades, many for whom the *Heart of Doha* was home. Though official discourse promotes the project as a model of sustainable development, the underlying notions that inform the displacement of thousands of low-income men and, negates their history within this neighborhood, highlight the contested terrain of the city. As Nicholas Rose contends, it is within such spaces in which "dangerous and unhygienic aggregations of persons" may be transformed into healthy "liberal" spaces, representing "well-ordered topographies for maintaining morality and public health" (Rose 1999:73). The project represents an attempt to reclaim the city from these "dangerous and unhygienic aggregations of persons" -- the Indians, South Asians and other low-income men who have lived and worked there for decades -- and make it Qatari again, by reasserting its identity as a space rooted in Qatari heritage, designed for the exclusive use of the Qatari family, "international residents," tourists, and other desirable populations. As such, what Rose calls "spaces of well-regulated liberty," such as the retail and leisure facilities, hotels, museums, cultural and entertainment venues that define the Msheireb project, replace the spaces in the *Heart of Doha* deemed "outside the gaze of civilization" (*ibid*).

Figure 9.3: Msheireb Enrichment Center, Project Model
Doha, June 2017   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

The notion of the forced displacement of non-Qataris is not something that can be discussed in Qatar. How can people be forcibly displaced from an area in which they have no stake, no legitimate claim? Low-income migrants live in Doha due to the good will and grace of the Qatari government and their sponsors; they are temporary guests in the country, workers whose rights claims are limited to their ability to work and tied specifically to their employers, as detailed in Chapter 7. They are not Qatari, and hence, have no actionable claim on the Msheireb area, or any other area in Qatar. People who are not authentically *of* the area -- unlike the three generations of authentic Qataris portrayed in *Lost Connections*, to which the area's history is tied and made apparent by the project -- cannot be dispossessed of something to which they have no legitimate claim. The thousands of low-income residents whose buildings were condemned are not stakeholders in the area. And they were not displaced; the project site was simply

consolidated and cleared. Former residents simply moved. The failure to acknowledge or problematize the diverse histories, connections, and lived experience of the area's former non-Qatari residents reflects an issue fundamental to the city and to a societal structure that makes temporary over eighty-five percent of the country's population. At its core, the city, and country, acknowledge only Qatari claims of authenticity, belonging, and rights. Everyone else has a limited, temporal relationship to the city, contingent on their temporary service to Qatari patrons and institutions. All of Doha's residents, except its Qatari citizens, are disposable and replaceable. The narrative put forth by the Msheireb Enrichment Center obscures and justifies the cleansing of Doha of low-income migrants from the city's core. Their space is elsewhere -- the Industrial Area, labor camps and other spaces made specifically for their use. These are areas to which they "authentically" belong, given their status in a society that views them as inconvenient, potentially dangerous, temporal, but necessary subjects, employed in the building of the nation state. The new Doha is one for families, tourists, and valorized Qatari subjects.

The narrative of reclaiming the *Heart of Doha* as an authentically Qatari space, rooted in Qatari history and culture, continues in the Mohammed Bin Jassim House, one of the four "heritage houses" preserved on the Msheireb *Heart of Doha* project site, which has been converted to a museum managed by Msheireb Museums. The house is claimed to have been the first house built in Msheireb, by the son of Sheikh Jassim Bin Mohammed Al-Thani, the founder of modern Qatar. It is instrumental in tying Msheireb to the founder of Qatar and the claim of returning the neighborhood to its original Qatari roots.

9.3 The Performance of Differentiated Citizenship in Doha's Urban Realm

The reassertion of Qatari identity via the infusion of Qatari tradition into public spaces, creation of designated family zones, and clearing out of workers from the city's core reflect the complex axes of differentiation that inform Doha's urban form and urban realm. The urban interventions and laws governing Doha's urban realm are coupled with citizenship laws and unwritten social norms and practices that influence social interactions and promote a paradigm of differentiated citizenship(s). Nagy (2006) has previously argued that gender, class and citizenship are the main markers of social differentiation within Doha's urban realm, with citizenship being the most important axes of differentiation. The primary distinction is between Qatari citizens (*muwa'tin*) – who are allocated particular social, legal and economic privileges and rights - and noncitizens (*ghayr muwa'tin*), whose rights are often tied to national origin. Qatari citizens are a minority in the society, which consists predominantly of foreign expatriates and migrant workers.

The idea of a unified, homogenous, Arab, Islamic, Qatari subject is one that is forged through national development schemes and the active creation of Qatari traditions and heritage, which is spatialized in cultural heritage sites throughout the city, as described above. Yet, despite these attempts, as well as the Qatari constitution's explicit declarations of Qatari democracy, the impact of these hierarchies and distinctions underscores the differentiated citizenship(s) of Qatar's residents. This is evidenced in social interactions through a variety of ways in Doha's public realm, as many social interactions are informed, either explicitly or inexplicitly, by the citizenship status of the participants.

9.3.1 Workers and the Public Realm

Not only are low-income male workers excluded from the bulk of urban space through the physical planning of the city -- which clearly delineates acceptable locations for labor camps and neighborhoods that serve low-income male workers -- in previous years, low-income men, or groups of men unaccompanied by family, were not allowed in malls that serviced Qatari families. Such restrictions are not enforced on professional European and Arab men. Though such bans have been lifted in most malls, mainly in response to international criticism, recent media reports indicate that public opinion is in favor of reinstating "family days" in Doha's most popular malls. Family days are currently in effect in several public parks and, some parks, such as the recently reopened Al Khor Park, are family only parks that prohibit the entry of unaccompanied South Asian men. Additionally, Al Khor Park allows entry to "women and children only" on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Many public spaces enforce similar policies, with entry allowed for women and children on certain days, special family seating areas, or women-only areas, in which men are not allowed. For example, men are only allowed in the swimming area of Al Barzan Olympic Park on Thursdays; all other days are dedicated for women and children. These regulations of public space are intended to protect women and families from potentially subversive and unpleasant interactions with workers, who outnumber women by a ratio of three to one and, are seen as uncivilized, and thus, capable of infringing upon the social values, customs and privacy of the valorized Qatari family.

Qatari women are expected to be shown deference and respect by lesser stratum of society and the intrusion into their personal space is seen as a major offence. Typically, non-Qatari men are expected to give way to Qatari women in their vicinity; if the woman appears to be foreign, men have more discretion as to whether to move or make way for her. The fear of invading a Qatari woman's personal space is not only due to cultural and religious norms, but is also for fear of offending an important, well-connected Qatari woman, who may have the power to cause significant problems for the offender. Many non-Qatari women of less "worthy" national origins have adopted the *a'baya,* or tradition black cover up Qatari women wear over their clothes in public*,* as a way of marking their importance in the public realm. In crowded retail establishments many Qatari women go directly to the front of the queue if it consists of low-income men or foreigners; in cases where other patrons complain, Qatari patrons put immense pressure on clerks to service them, claiming that they are entitled to priority treatment. Shop workers, who are often scared to talk back to Qatari patrons, for fear of disciplinary measures, most often concede to their demands.

The Corniche, and other public spaces that are not regulated by policies limiting accessibility to low-income men, are routinely crowded with workers on Fridays, the one day of the week some workers have off.[109] This is talked about in the Qatari media in terms of a crisis and calls to limit the accessibility of such spaces to workers are widespread. The sight of thousands of workers spending leisure time in public parks, traffic circles, traffic islands and any unregulated green or open space, has prompted the creation of special worker recreation areas, such as an area that opened in 2013, known as Asian Town. Located in the Industrial Area, adjacent to Labor City, Asian Town includes recreation facilities such as a cinema, sports facilities, and a shopping plaza catering to the needs of workers. Like the housing component of

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[109] According to the *Annual Omnibus Survey: A survey of life in Qatar 2014*, conducted by the Social and Economic Research Institute of Qatar University, 72% of workers worked six days a week, 23% worked seven days a week, and only 4% worked five days a week.

Labor City, Asian Town is conceived as a progressive measure to promote worker welfare by improving worker accessibility to open space and recreation facilities.

But, Asian Town, and other projects like it, including the Barwa Workers Recreation Complex in Al Khor, create identifiable, delineated spaces of social segregation associated with low-income workers that make the presence of workers outside of these designated spaces of worker leisure increasingly untenable. This further limits their mobility and engagement with Doha's public realm.

Figure 9.4: Workers in the Industrial Area
Doha, June 2018. *Photo: Samer Shehata*

Figure 9.5: Workers in Traffic Circle Near Msheireb
Doha, June 2018.   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

9.3.2   Souk Wakif

　　The discipline and control of particular groups of people in the public realm is extended to unregulated public spaces, which are also restricted via continuous monitoring and unwritten social norms (Cooke 2014). One's experience of Souk Wakif is tied to one's social status, as Souk Wakif is closely monitored by security personnel and police who impose strict, unwritten policies, to restrict the access and movement of single men within the souk. The souk is situated just south of the Emiri Diwan, between Msheireb, one of the most densely populated neighborhoods in which workers live, and the Corniche, one of the last remaining public spaces to which they have access. The walk from Msheireb to the Cornice may easily traverse the souk, yet workers know they are not allowed. The souk is a popular tourist and family destination and, thus, the presence of workers is not encouraged, though they are not explicitly prohibited from entering. Yet, the continual monitoring of the souk via CCTV and omnipresence of the police, who monitor the souk on foot and horseback, deters workers from entering the souk. The Souk Wakif police station is located directly on the main pedestrian corridor that is lined with restaurants, cafes and shops; police are routinely stationed in the corridor.

　　Two respectably dressed twenty-something South Asian men walk toward the police station on the main pedestrian corridor. One man wears a white button-down shirt and brown slacks. His hair is short and neat, with just enough length in the front to give him sweeping bangs that fall to the side of his face. He wears brown slippers. His friend wears a blue button-down shirt and slacks. He also wears brown slippers. Though the two men are dressed respectably, their ethnicity, body language, and other superficial markers, such as the style of their slippers, mark them as workers. Subtle indicators give them away; they are uncomfortably

dressed up, are not holding bags of items acquired in the souk, or engaging in consumption. They are simply walking and looking around. Something catches the interest of one man; he looks intently on as he walks.

When the police officer sees them walking toward him, near the beginning of the corridor, he subtly signals to the side corridor with his finger and nods his head. The officer does not speak to the offenders, or make a scene, so as not to offend the families and tourists enjoying themselves; all it takes is the movement of one finger and nod of his head to indicate to the men that they must leave. The men know what to do and where to go; they quickly and quietly turn into the side corridor, which leads to the main road, outside of the souk.

The invisible barrier and unspoken norms that limits the access of over a million workers to the Souk is intangible, yet real. It is beyond social class; it speaks to the social construction of a worker and how easily identifiable a worker is in the context of Doha. During Eid, the garden adjacent to the Souk, which is constructed above the underground parking garage, fills with thousands of workers, yet they do not enter the souk. Those who do are redirected out of the souk, as it is off limits to workers who do not work there.

Figure 9.6: Souk Wakif
Main pedestrian corridor. Doha, October, 2015   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Souk Wakif is the reimaged town square and central gathering point of Doha. It plays an instrumental role in the association of downtown Doha with Qatari identity and the inscription of Qatari heritage in the urban realm. The common folklore regarding the souk is that its name, which means standing souk, comes from the practices of its original vendors, who conducted business while standing, instead of sitting in their stores because of the risk of potential floods.[110] The souk is located along Wadi Mshrireb, a primary transportation corridor that ran through the old city, which was a road in the dry months, but flooded and turned into a waterway during the rainy season. Though the souk is not more than a century old and was completely reconstructed in the early 2000s, the narrative regarding the souk is that of an "ancient," authentically Qatari space. This example, from a third grade *Qatar History and Civilization* textbook, issued by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education illustrates this discourse:

> *Souk Wakif is one of the ancient places in Qatar. The State is keen to preserve it as the market has been subject to the design renovation process while maintaining its authenticity and heritage.*

The claim that Souk Wakif is an unquestionably Qatari space that represents an intractable Qatari identity is promoted by the display of Qatari traditions and heritage in festivals throughout the year. Like their counterparts in Katara, these festivals are only accessible to families and tourists from whom the souk is made. Though many establishments are owned by Qatari patrons, most workers in the souk are not Qatari, but the low-income South Asian men to whom the souk is off limits. In addition to the display of Qatari traditions via festivals, the souk's Qatari identity is promoted in other more subtle ways. In the daytime, police frequently ride horses through the souk streets as a way to connect the souk's history to its modern makeover. Parking lot attendants wear traditional Qatari clothes, though most (if not all) are not Qatari. Most will not reveal their national origins, but it is clear from their accents that they are non-Qatari Arabs. The scripted creation of Qatari heritage in the souk, for the consumption of tourists, families and high-income expatriates, is premised on the exclusion of low-income men from the souk's grounds and the careful monitoring of social interactions within its Islamically stylized public spaces.

9.4 Conclusion -- Nationalism, Authoritarianism and the Redefinition of Doha

Allah, Al Watan, Al Amir (God, the Nation, the Amir) — الله ، الوطن، الامير

The June 2017 blockade of Qatar facilitated a wave of unbridled nationalism that stressed the notion of Qatari exceptionalism. A mood of unshakable defiance gripped the nation, bolstered by the belief that not only were the allegations of supporting terrorism and attempting to destabilize the region made against Qatar false, but that Qatar's neighbors were envious of its success and resentful of its increased importance on the international scene and in the Arab and Islamic world. Despite the unprecedented aggression displayed by Saudia Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, the Qatari state had metaphorically taken the high road and refused to fight

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[110] This common story of the souk is retold in the Mshrireb Enrichment Center, which displays several photos of the souk in the 1950s, both dry and flooded.

back with similar tactics. The Qatari state's response was seen to be morally and politically superior to the tactics used by its aggressors. Narratives stressing Qatar's exceptionalism -- as a state that is guided by an unshakable moral compass, that knows right from wrong and always does the right thing, even while under attack -- circulated widely in the media. During this unique sequence of events, the Qatari state called upon everyone living in Qatar, citizens, expatriates and low-income workers, to come together. For a brief moment, the differentiated citizenship(s) that animates Qatari society and defines its social hierarchies was put aside and all residents were asked to have a stake in the country. All of Qatar's residents, despite their citizenship status or income level, were under attack, and all must rally together in defiance.

As Qatari citizens, expatriates, and low-income workers rallied behind the Amir, Sheik Tamim, a narrative that Qatar is being unfairly targeted because of its unique position in the Arab and Muslim worlds circulated in the media and was reproduced in public displays of solidarity throughout Doha. *Allah, Al Watan, Al Amir* (God, the Nation, the Amir), *Tamim Al Majid* (Tamim the Magnificent) and *Kolinah Qatar* (literally "We are all Qatar," but it implies "we all support Qatar") declared two-story signs throughout the city. Nationalistic songs dominated the airwaves, while drivers and motorists decorated their vehicles with images of *Tamim Al Majid* and declarations of solidarity with the Qatari state and Amir.

Figure 9.7: *Allah, Al Watan, Al Amir* (God, the Nation, the Amir) Sign
Doha, June 2017   *Photo: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Qatar's majority foreign population was encouraged to share stories of their bonds with Qatar on social media via #QatarIsMyHome and sign billboards of *Tamim Al Majid* installed in shopping malls and public spaces throughout the city. Stories and photos of workers waiting for hours to sign a *Tamim Al Majid* sign in the Industrial Area made their way into public discourse. Those who eagerly participated in these displays of solidarity were touted as proof that Qatar is an extraordinary country, home to millions of non-Qataris who are loyal and willing to sacrifice

for the country. The implication that Qatar is a fair and just society for all of its residents reinforces the narrative of Qatari exceptionalism.

The narrative of Qatari exceptionalism permeates many aspects of Qatari society and, as I have argued in this section of my dissertation, informs many of the country's development schemes and interventions into Doha's urban realm. The blockading countries undoubtedly wanted to facilitate regime change, weaken the Qatari state, and diminish its regional influence, but what resulted was a show of national strength and defiance. The ability of the Qatari state to exploit the blockade to its benefit speaks less to its exceptionalism, as the state would like it's population to believe, and more to its status as a rentier state that has access to unlimited resources it may deploy when necessary. The Qatari state is unfettered by its citizenry or a government structure that limits the ability of the Amir to implement whatever measures top officials see fit in times of crisis. As witnessed during the Arab uprisings, when the state increased wages and benefits for Qatari citizens in an effort to curb potential unrest, the blockade was dealt with by the deployment of billions of dollars toward the appeasement of Qatari citizens and residents. In an effort to maintain "business as usual," the state subsidized the functioning of Qatari society so its population would not feel the impact of the blockade -- everything from subsidizing financing for firms that were negatively impacted by the blockade, to the import of dairy products by air from Turkey -- no cost was spared to maintain normalcy and stifle discontent amongst its population.

Figure 9.8: *Tamim Al Majid* **(Tamim the Magnificent) Signs Downtown and in Ezdan Mall**
Doha, June 2017   *Photos: Riem El-Zoghbi*

Authoritarian governments stay in power due to oppression and coercion, but also retain power via the promises and concessions they make to their constituents. In Qatar, a small group of constituents reap the benefits of a state in which Qatari citizenship makes possible access to services, subsidized lifestyles and opportunities for profit. The promise of development, continued prosperity, opportunities for the accumulation of wealth, safety and security are tied to the maintenance of a regime that privileges the needs and desires of a select group of people, to the determent of the majority of the population. The Amir has the Qatari peoples' back, so to speak, and will protect their interests regardless of the circumstances or cost. Not only are Qatari citizens and families valorized by the state, the urban public realm is organized for their almost exclusive enjoyment, security and reproduction. Laws impacting land and urban development, and the organization of space in Doha have created a city in which exclusive family housing zones, that limit access to housing and other services for the majority of Doha residents, are normalized and the spatial segregation of low-income workers is seen as a necessary precursor to the maintenance of privacy, morality and safety. Narratives emphasizing the potential threats posed by low-income workers reinforce their exclusion from the city; they are omnipresent in the construction sites, bus stops, shops, and streets in which they work, yet hidden in certain sections of the city designated exclusively for their residence and leisure.

The prohibition of certain subjects, by law as well as informally codified social norms, to access particular urban spaces reinforces the paradigm of differentiated citizenship(s) upon which the country and city are structured. The anxiety felt by Qataris over the potentially negative influence of foreign workers on Qatari society and social norms is reflected in narratives demonizing low-income workers and codified by a host of laws that privilege and impose Qatari social norms and traditions. Additionally, the loss of Qatari tradition in the face of modernization has prompted the implementation of interventions that attempt to highlight existing traditions, as well as create new traditions. The active creation of Qatari culture and tradition is displayed in the many festivals, museums, and cultural heritage sites throughout Doha. These and other "Islamicized public spaces" are instrumental in the assertion of Qatari heritage and tradition, as well as support for an idealized Qatari subject.

In the same ways that the blockade of Qatar was represented as an attack on Qatar's sovereignty and society by hostile external actors, the Qatari state positions the existence of millions of non-Qatari expatriates and workers as an insidious internal risk to Qatari morals, traditions, heritage and social norms. This internal risk must be fought and stifled, as what is at stake is Qatari society. The potential subordination of Qatari traditions and social norms to those of its non-Qatari workers is a tangible risk that inspires dread in Qatari citizens. The state bolsters support from its citizens through this narrative of risk. The authoritarian state positions itself as a bulwark against the erasure of society's Qatari essence through its ability to impose Qatari traditions, facilitate the creation of "authentically" Qatari spaces, and promote the "Qatarization" of society. This involves the redistribution of resources to Qatari citizens, as well as the redistribution of urban space to inscribe Qatari heritage and traditions in the urban realm. Projects such as Msheireb and Souk Wakif, at their core, are premised on the dispossession of certain areas of the city from non-Qatari residents and redistribution of urban space to groups within Qatari society the state wishes to support, such as Qatari citizens and high-income expatriates. The remaking of such urban spaces into "authentically" Qatari spaces, tied to an inextricable Qatari identity, is part of a larger project of reclaiming such spaces and (re)inscribing Qatari tradition within the urban realm. The reordering of public urban space to privilege and highlight Qatari identity and heritage also reinforces the notion of differentiated

citizenship(s) that privileges Qatari citizens over the majority of the country's non-Qatari population. Social interactions are mediated by the scripted performance of differentiated citizenship(s), with the claim to Qatari citizenship being the ultimate marker of social privilege. The authoritarian state's support for the entrenchment of such markers of social status in the public urban realm through its redevelopment schemes, such as Msheireb, and proliferation of Qatari heritage sites and museums, positions the regime as the advocate and protector of its Qatari citizenry in the face of the ever-present internal risk of a majority non-Qatari society.

The right to inhabit urban space, receive priority service, or act with impunity in certain interactions are all tied to Qatari citizenship and a regime that supports and facilitates the privileging of its citizens over the rights, claims, and histories of non-citizens. The authoritarian state's restrictions on its own citizens -- including laws that limit the ability to criticize the state or private citizens, laws prohibiting immorality, or making collective action illegal -- benefit Qatari citizens as well, as the majority non-Qatari population is less able to voice dissent or criticize their treatment by Qatari citizens or the state. Thus, in addition to the Faustian bargain Qatari citizens have made with the rentier state premised on the exchange of resources for political rights, their acceptance of the authoritarian state's limits on personal freedoms and rights claims, while limiting their own rights claims, supports their privileged status and role in society. Without such laws and limitations on personal freedoms, the deference shown to Qatari citizens by the majority of the population may not persist.

The maintenance of a society and economy which relies on foreign labor to build its cities, work in its shop and restaurants, support its hospitals and healthcare system, service its industries, extract its natural resources, sustain its agricultural production, protect its borders, educate its pupils, and care for its children, among other things, is contingent on the steady flow of low-income foreign labor. Though the Qatari regime has unprecedented power over this foreign workforce, this structure subjects the society, economy and regime to a great deal of vulnerability and potential risk of breakdown. The authoritarian state is acutely aware of these vulnerabilities and manages them with a delicate balance of appeasement and oppression. The attribution of risk to an internal other garners support from Qatari citizens, who view themselves as potential targets of fraud, theft, and who can be taken advantage of by unscrupulous employees and businesses. The state's ability to protect its citizenry from the vulnerabilities posed by being minorities in their own country is not only premised on its monopoly on the use of force, but on its control of national resources and redistributive powers. The state's ability to redistribute land, urban space, capital and other resources at will facilitates its ability to respond to internal crisis in a fast decisive manner that aids in the maintenance of Qatari citizens' hegemony in society. The state subsidized mega-projects, stadiums, infrastructure projects, high-rises, malls, redevelopment projects and other urban developments in Doha reflect these structures of privilege and access. As does the spatial segregation, inaccessibility, and physical and social barriers that define much of Doha's urban realm.

SECTION IV: CONCLUSION

"What soon becomes apparent is that this public land is rarely used to the benefit of the public, that it seems to be used mainly to satisfy certain private-sector interests, and that in addition the state enjoys powers over lands that marginalize large segments of the population."

-- *David Sims (2014, 279)*

Chapter 10. Nationalism, Authoritarianism, and Urban Space

The protagonist and namesake of Amr Salama's 2011 film, *Asma'a*, is a modest, poor women who dons a *hijab* and attempts to remain invisible as she walks through the streets of Cairo. Asma'a hides her HIV positive status from her daughter, colleagues, and neighbors, fearing that she will be shamed and ostracized if the truth about her condition is revealed. Her fears materialize when her colleagues, fellow custodians at the Cairo Airport, vote to banish her when they learn of her HIV status. Though fictional, this theatrical vignette highlights many of the issues that characterize everyday life and practices of urban governance in Cairo and elsewhere in the Arab world. As in the film, the consensus to exclude certain people from the rights and privileges enjoyed by other urban actors influences the experiences of millions of people who are deemed unworthy to inhabit the urban public realm of cities such as Cairo and Doha.

10.1   Spatialized Othering and the Stigmatization of Urban Public Space

In Cairo and Doha, the paradigm of differentiated citizenship(s) defines the experiences of the majority of the city's residents. To be in the public realm in Cairo is to be subject to a host of potentialities -- the possibility of discipline by the state security apparatuses, potential use of violence by *baltagiya* (thugs) or criminal gangs, sexual harassment, petty theft, exclusion and a host of other potentialities tied to one's status and "worthiness." The public realm in Cairo is by no means exclusively a space of alienation and violence, it is also enjoyed by city residents and is the workplace of millions; but it is a stigmatized space of egregious injustice with has come to be associated with social stigma and risk. Residents of Cairo actively look for ways to limit their engagement with the public realm as being in public space is an implicit statement about social class, and, in effect, a statement about ones' access to rights and privilege. Being in the street or any unexclusive space made accessible to the masses marks one as lower class and open to violation. The sense of liminality this creates for residents in the public spaces of daily life serves to dehumanize and make vulnerable the millions of people for whom rendering the street obsolete is not an option. The politicization of public space and breakdown of social relations precipitated by the events of the 2011 popular uprising have further stigmatized the public spaces of daily life. Additionally, the closure of political and social space is reinforced by narratives that

mark particular groups of people as un-Egyptian, unpatriotic, dangerous, and unworthy of engagement with the city.

In Doha, to be in the public realm is to be subject to highly stratified, unwritten expectations and social hierarchies based on citizenship, class, national origin, and gender. Particular people are given preferential treatment, others are instantly excluded or subjected to performative norms that expect and anticipate their subjugation to other more "worthy" actors. Though the public realm in Doha is not associated with the same types of risk and liminality as in Cairo, being in Doha's public realm imposes on residents highly scripted expectations that influence social interactions and confine the possibilities of what may be experienced in public space. This is particularly true for segments of society -- such as low-income workers or single men of particular ethnic groups -- that are limited from the full engagement with urban public life, either by law or in response to social expectations and norms.

The stigmatization of public space and imposition of stringent performative social norms aids in the creation of an invisible class of city residents who have the resources and ability to circumvent the street, rendering it obsolete. For this group of people, the experience of being in public is limited to walking to and from ones' car, being driven on public streets, or seeking entertainment in the exclusive, scripted leisure spaces of the city. In a similar way in which the bodies of low-income workers are transported through Doha's urban corridors to and from their places of work to the labor camps in which they live, so too are the bodies of wealthy Qataris or Cairo residents transported through their city's public streets while having no interaction with the urban public realm. In both cities, this privileged group of urban actors is shielded from interaction with the masses by their wealth and status, as well as by urban governance practices that valorize these subjects and make possible this type of lifestyle.

The assemblages of social, economic, and political norms and practices that constantly constitute and reconstitute the urban shape these cities in ways that not only limit people's access and ability to fully engage with urban public life, but have significant ramifications on their rights, claims, and subjectivity as residents of these cities. The making and remaking of urban space in these cities involves complicated, dialectal processes, narratives, discourses, and socio-spatial practices that continually shape both the city and urban actors who inhabit them.

What does this urban experience -- marked by differentiated citizenship(s), stigmatization of the urban public realm, closure of political space, spatial segregation, and the imposition of stringent performative social norms in Cairo and Doha -- tell us about cities in the Arab world? May we generalize from the experience of two cities that are clearly different in significant and obvious ways? As previously argued in the introduction to this research, Doha and Cairo are within a field of cities in the global imaginary that reference and are inherently in dialogue with each other, as so-called Arab cities, yet it is not my intention to engage in an exercise of essentializing what makes a so-called Arab city or endorse a singular identity or experience upon these two cities. In what follows, I will highlight the interplay between various elements that animate the experience of Cairo's and Doha's residents and production of space in the two cities

10.2   Conclusion

الله ، الوطن، الامير -- Allah, Al Watan, Al Amir (God, the Nation, the Amir)

الجيش و الشعب يد واحدة -- The Army and People Are One Hand

The intersection between exclusionary, non-pluralistic forms of nationalism, such as those witnessed in Egypt, Qatar and elsewhere in the Arab world, and authoritarianism is clearly reflected in the discourses, processes, and socio-spatial practices that reinforce the paradigm of differentiated citizenship(s) prevalent in Cairo and Doha. In both cities, nationalistic narratives and discourses render particular parts of the city as productive and patriotic, whereas other spaces are linked with impending contagion and threats to the nation. The risks posed by Islamists in Cairo's *'ashwa'iyyat* and workers in Doha's labor camps are made legible by the clear demarcation of such spaces in the public imaginary. The risks associated with these spaces and their residents are managed by a host of laws, social norms, and the imposition of stringent performative social practices that allow city residents to mitigate the potential uncertainty involved in their interactions with such spaces and people.

In Doha, laws impacting urban development and the organization of space have created a city in which exclusive family housing zones are normalized, and the resulting spatial segregation of low-income workers is seen as vital to the privacy, morality and safety of families and higher-income residents. Narratives emphasizing the potential threats posed by low-income workers reinforce their exclusion from the city -- their access to housing, leisure and services is limited to the parts of the city made exclusively for their use. The prohibition of certain subjects, by law, to access particular urban spaces is reinforced by informally codified social norms that limit their access their unregulated public spaces, such as public parks, the Corniche and Souk Wakif. The Qatari state's privileging and imposition of Qatari social norms and traditions subordinates the histories, knowledges, traditions and social norms of non-Qatari subjects and valorizes an idealized Qatari subject, for whom access and privilege is demanded.

In Doha, citizenship is the primary access of social differentiation through which rights are attributed and apportioned, with the distinction between *muwa'tin* (citizen) and *ghayr muwa'tin* (non-citizen) being the primary differentiator. This reinforces the paradigm of differentiated citizenship(s) upon which the city is structured. The existence of millions of non-Qatari expatriates and workers is seen as an insidious internal risk to Qatari morals, traditions, heritage, and social norms that must be fought and stifled. The anxiety felt by Qataris over the potentially negative influence of foreign workers on Qatari society is reflected in narratives demonizing low-income workers and codified into a host of laws that privilege and impose Qatari social norms and traditions on the entire population. The loss of Qatari tradition in the face of modernization has led to interventions that attempt to highlight existing traditions, as well as create new traditions in the many festivals, museums, and cultural heritage sites throughout Doha. These and other "Islamicized public spaces" are instrumental in the assertion of Qatari heritage and tradition, as well as support for an idealized Qatari subject.

Constructions of Qatari nationalism promote notions of *Qatari exceptionalism* -- as a state that is guided by an unshakable moral compass, that balances material needs with the demands of Islamic piety, that protects the poor and advocates against oppression in the Muslim world, that knows right from wrong and always does the right thing, even while under attack.

This exceptional Qatari state nurtures exceptional Qatari citizens who embody these righteous traits. Social interactions are mediated by the scripted performance of differentiated citizenship(s), with the claim to Qatari citizenship being the ultimate marker of social privilege. The authoritarian state's support for the entrenchment of such markers of social status in the public urban realm through its redevelopment schemes, such as Msheireb, and proliferation of Qatari heritage sites and museums, positions the regime as the advocate and protector of its Qatari citizenry in the face of the ever-present internal risk of a majority non-Qatari society.

In Cairo, the internal risk facing residents is portrayed as an impending Islamist conspiracy to infiltrate, capture, and destabilize the city and Egyptian society. The association of Islamists with the city's *'ashwa`iyyat* follows a lineage of discourse that portrays these spaces as the natural habitus of radical Islamist groups intent on subverting rule of law and declaring Islamist rule. The recent rekindling of this narrative has been pushed by the military, particularly after the 2013 military coup that deposed Egypt's first democratically elected president. The narrative positions the military as the only legitimate institution that can counter the insidious Islamist plan to destabilize Egypt's progress and development. The institutions' effective rule, under the presidency of Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, enables it to disseminate such narratives and use the presidency to position itself as the embodiment of Egyptian nationalism. Narratives valorizing the military establishment as heroic guardians of Egyptian nationalism, who saved Egypt from the Islamists, and who continue to protect the country from impending Islamist threats, underpins the paradigm of differentiated citizenship playing out in Cairo today. This closure of political and social space is reinforced by narratives that mark Islamists, activists, and opposition groups as un-Egyptian, unpatriotic, dangerous and unworthy of engagement with the city.

The attribution of risk to an internal other is used by both the Egyptian and Qatari regimes to garner support from its constituents. In both cities, the risk is spatialized to make legible the segments of society that pose the biggest perceived risk to the maintenance of the authoritarian regime. This spatial othering deems such segments of society unworthy of engagement with public life and the claims with which it is associated.

Not only are the discourses and practices that stigmatize the public realm circulated by the authoritarian regime via propaganda and the media, in Cairo, they are circulated by ordinary people through the "talk of crime" that dominates peoples' perception of criminality in the public realm. The dialectical making and remaking of the urban public realm is continuously in flux with the fears, needs, desires and potentialities of ordinary people. For upper class Egyptians, this facilitates their disengagement with public space and isolation in gated communities and compounds in which the public realm is closely guarded off to potential infiltration by the lower-classes and others associated with criminality in the public imaginary. The daily lives of upper-class Egyptians revolve around their ability to negate the street -- to remove themselves from public streets and shield themselves from the types of interactions and inconveniences that define being in Cairo's public realm. For Cairo residents who do not have this ability, the liminality associated with being in the public realm is carefully managed and minimized using multiple strategies aimed at signaling status, worthiness, and access or affiliation with more powerful actors. This creates a city in which the transgression of lower-class bodies and rights is legitimized and may potentially occur every time one ventures into the public realm.

In Doha, the "talk of contagion," as opposed to crime, animates residents' perceptions of particular spaces and groups of people. Not only do interactions in the public realm reflect the social hierarchies, fears, and stigmas that inform these narratives, they make difficult the full engagement with urban pubic life for the majority of Doha's residents.

Urban space and land potentially play a central role in the maintenance of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. It is taken for granted that regimes parcel out land amongst their networks of allies, cronies, and loyalists, and that they deploy land development schemes and urban development initiatives whenever such schemes align with their interests. Yet, much of our understanding of authoritarian Arab regimes excludes an exploration of the role played by the production of urban space in cities in the Arab world.

I do not suggest a normative mode in the production of the urban public realm in cities in the Arab world. Authoritarian regimes do not impose a particular process or specific logic that results in what we witness today in Cairo or Doha. Though authoritarian regimes wield significant power and may interject at will into processes that shape urban space, the making and remaking of urban space in these cities involve complicated, dialectal processes that shape both the city and urban actors. We see this in the interactions residents of Cairo and Doha have on their city streets, in their choices to engage with or negate public streets, to shelter themselves in exclusive spaces and "compounds" or live where the perceived risk of the other may come knocking on ones' door, in their fears, desires and perceptions of these cities, their roles within them, and how they shape their lives.

Nonetheless, if we take seriously Lefebvre's (1991) notion of the production of space as a means for capital accumulation -- as well as a means for the accumulation of social relations and other advantages -- we see how important the state's access to urban space and land, and its ability to deploy it at will are. Not only does the Egyptian military engage in the primitive accumulation of the means of production for its own benefit, its control of land and involvement in the production of urban space is pivotal to its ability to deploy land to position itself and its constituents favorably within society. In Egypt, the new business elite is heavily intertwined with the military establishment, which has expanded its engagement in exploiting urban development and land. The institution's ability to obfuscate its economic activities, including its activities in construction and the production of urban space, is pivotal to its ever-increasing role in the exploitation of national resources to further its economic gains.

In the case of Cairo, the military is heavily involved in land development, both as a developer and in decisions regarding land development, such as the preferential placement of infrastructure. It also directly controls large quantities of land and largely allocates it at its discretion. Though the military's involvement in land development is premised on national security, the role of the military in creating the conditions for capital accumulation through urban space greatly impact the markets for urban space and land. The military may singlehandedly alter or influence the market with key decisions regarding the sale of land, placement of infrastructure and demarcation of land as in the national security interest, thus rendering it undevelopable. Additionally, the military's veto powers over urban development uniquely position key military personnel to gain enormously from military-endorsed land dealings.

In the case of Doha, the Qatari state also wields significant control of land and impacts land development processes in a similar manner. The state's ability to grants land to Qatari citizens and subsidize housing and urban development positions it as the main agent that influences urban development in Doha and throughout the country. The intertwining of the state with the dealings of Qatar's business elites and opaque nature of the financing of megaprojects, such as Lusail City and the Pearl, as well as other urban redevelopment initiatives, such as Mshereib, makes it difficult to differentiate between the state and so-called free market.

In both cases, the state's ability to deploy land and influence urban development circumvents the market and political decision making channels. Additionally, in both cases, the

state's monopoly over significant quantities of land decreases its accountability and allows the authoritarian regime to function with impunity in land-related transactions and developments.

My argument does not support much of the recent literature on Arab cities that positions neoliberalism as the singular logic that animates spatial formations in such cities. The neoliberal "model," applied from above by authoritarian regimes, is posited as the normative logic that guides planning practices and urban (re)development. I argue that though authoritarian regimes may adopt the ethos of neoliberalism or neoliberal techniques to facilitate urban transformations, it is difficult to attribute the socio-spatial formation of cities such as Cairo and Doha to the exclusive logic of neoliberalism, or any singular determinant. As I argue in Chapter 2, neoliberalism supplanted the Islamic cities narrative that proceeded it, which influenced understandings of cities in the Arab world for generations. In this case, Islam is positioned as the unquestionable influence on the so-called Islamic cities' essence, social and spatial formations.

Heydemann and Leenders (2011) characterize authoritarian regimes' adaptive capacity as "recombinant authoritarianism," or an ability to learn from and adapt to internal challenges. May these regimes' deployment of land and influence over urban public space be considered in such terms? Though this research does not fully answer this question, we see from the experiences of Cairo and Doha, land and the subsequent production of urban space is deployed by authoritarian regimes to enable redistribution, promote capital accumulation, as well as valorize particular subjects -- all of which may impact and support their survival.

10.3   Opportunities for Future Research

The Islamically stylized architecture in Doha's public spaces -- such as that found on the main pedestrian esplanade and shopping arcades on Porto Arabia, on the artificial islands of The Pearl -- gains its authenticity from Islamic tradition. It is instantly recognizable and legible as Islamic, yet is dissociated from the history of the Arabian Gulf and Qatar and that which originally imbues it with authenticity and meaning. Much of the architecture of Porto Arabia is an Orientalized hybrid that incorporates Mamluk references, an architecture associated with the former Ottoman Empire in Egypt and Syria. The mimicry of various signifiers from unrelated parts of the Islamic world often leads to the incorporation of icons, images, and vernaculars into that such as the highly stylized "Islamic" architecture of Porto Arabia. The source of such traditions and relationships they inherently manifest is ultimately obscured in its reproduction in the commercial corridors of the Pearl.

Figure 10.1: Porto Arabia Pedestrian Esplanade
Doha, June 2017   *Photos: Riem El-Zoghbi*

The appropriation of Islamic architecture that is completely unrelated to Qatar or the Gulf may be thought of as a form of orientalism -- an American or European designer's notion of the Islamic in a city far away from their New York and London studios. In Doha, as in Cairo, Islamic architecture and the cities' Islamic essence are used as tools in the branding of the city. In the case of Doha, Islamic architecture is not only a way to brand the city, but to make claims about Doha's importance and role in the Arab and Muslim world. The "Islamic" not only is an easily recognizable vernacular, it has become a signifier of Qatar's moral righteousness, religiosity, and proclaimed special role in the Islamic world. In the city's sites of consumption, as well as its public spaces of Islamic leisure, the Islamic is used to imbue the city with meaning and reference to a greater Islamic realm beyond its borders. Qatar has adopted this expansive, forward-looking notion of Islam and views itself as the champion, protector and leader of the Islamic revival. The Islamic signifies progress and is linked to international circuits of capital.

My study engages this notion only to explore how this supports Qatari subject formation and situates Qatar within the larger framework of the Islamic revival, yet it does not analyze in detail the many sites and spaces of Islamic leisure that appropriate a hybrid Islamic architecture, such as the Pearl, Souk Wakra, Souk Wakif, the Museum of Islamic Art, and others. Further research on this subject can not only provide empirical data regarding these sites and the ways in which residents of Doha interact with them, but can investigate the limits and challenges to such spaces and the appropriation of Islamicized public spaces.

My study points out the spatial segregation of low-income workers in Doha, yet I did not have the necessary data to map out this information and spatially demonstrate patterns of segregation by nationality and ethnicity. In Doha, though data broken down my national origin is readily available to Qatari ministries and government agencies, the state does not make public data that could be used to produce such maps. My attempts to procure data that would allow me to map out spatial segregation in terms of citizenship status and national origin were met with suspicion. Additionally, it is difficult to compare the physical patterns of spatial segregation in Cairo and Doha, as they are really very different beasts. Thus, my focus has been on the socio-spatial *processes* that lead to spatial segregation and the creation of what Rose calls "governable spaces." How are the physical manifestations of these segregated spaces -- *'ashwa`iyyat* in Cairo or the Industrial Area and proliferation of labor camps in Doha -- different from the physical manifestations of segregation in other cities in the Arab world? An exploration of the patterns of spatial segregation in other Gulf Arab states would tell us more about the policies and socio-spatial processes that impact these cities. For example, using master plans and physical analysis of the many cities in the UAE and Saudi Arabia that have designated industrial areas similar to that of Doha, one could determine similarities in patterns of spatial segregation and the implications this has for residents of these cities.

Additionally, the experiences of segregation in other cities in the Arab world, the so-called 'global south,' and 'global north' have not been considered in my research. Particularly important is the experience of segregation in U.S. cities, as there is a significant body of literature that deals specifically with segregation in the United States, which was heavily influenced by discriminatory racial policies, including red-lining, sundown laws, mortgage laws, public subsidies to white neighborhoods, transportation policy and other such policies that facilitated racial and economic segregation. The comparison of Doha and Cairo to cities in the U.S. may help us understand the impact of such socio-spatial processes and policies in the context of authoritarianism and democracy.

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