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### Title

Democracy as Human Empowerment: The Role of Ordinary People in the Emergence and Survival of Democracy

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This article argues that “human empowerment” is the most important driving force behind effective democratization. Though elite agreements are central to establish nominal democracy, effective democracy does not emerge because elites concede it to the masses, but because ordinary people become increasingly capable and willing to place effective mass pressures on the elites. Effective democracy is thus the outcome of a broader process of “human empowerment.”

## Two Views of Democracy

For many years, there has been a tension between narrow and broad concepts of democracy. The narrow focus views universal suffrage as the core element of democracy. From this point of view, any regime holding free, fair, and regular elections is considered a democracy.<sup>1</sup> Adopting and sustaining democracy is relatively easy, from this perspective. It suffices that a society’s elite groups reach an agreement that “democracy is the only game in town.”<sup>2</sup> Whether the wider public desires democracy or not, does not matter much from this perspective; the essential element is a regime agreement among elites. Advocates of this claim see social requisites of democracy as unimportant. Democracy emerges and survives wherever elites find it advantageous, whether in India, Poland, or Mali.

In contrast with the narrow concept, broad concepts view democracy as more than just a method to designate government leaders: genuine democracy requires an encompassing set of civil and political freedoms that empower people to govern themselves. These freedoms include the right to vote in free elections but go far beyond it. Civil and political freedoms establish “liberal democracy,” as opposed to mere “electoral democracy.”<sup>3</sup> In the liberal notion, democracy is a way of life inspired by a worldview that considers a life based on freedom, equality, and self-governance as the best way of organizing societies. A democratic way of life in this wider sense cannot take hold in a society unless most people hold supporting values. Consequently, advocates of this view consider the emergence and survival of democracy as depending on a set of fundamental social requisites, including a wide distribution of participatory resources and the dominance of an emancipative worldview.<sup>4</sup>

Which of these contending views is closer to reality? Is democracy simply a strategic product of elite agreements, or does it reflect key developmental characteristics of the general public? If the first view is correct, the presence of democracy should be

only weakly related to key development indicators; if the second view is correct, it should be closely linked to development indicators.

### **Ambiguous Evidence**

In fact, both views hold true. They do because they reflect fundamentally different conceptions of democracy. During the explosion of democracy that took place from 1989 to 1992 (which we will refer to as the Third Wave of democratization), electoral democracy spread rapidly throughout the world and it is clear that strategic elite agreements were a driving factor in this process-- facilitated by an international environment in which the end of the Cold War reshaped the incentive structure in favor of democratic regimes.<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, the correlation between standard measures of democracy and key indicators of societal development is relatively weak, when we use narrow measures that focus on nominal democracy—but it becomes much stronger when we use broader measures that focus on effective democracy. Thus, when one uses the Polity Project's "autocracy-democracy index" as a measure of democracy, the Human Development Index<sup>6</sup> explains only 35 percent of the cross-national variation in levels of democracy (N=114). Using the Freedom House measure of democracy, which takes civil liberties into account, the Human Development Index explains a larger share of the variance—41%.<sup>7</sup> But both of these linkages became considerably weaker if we use measures of democracy made after the climax of the global democratization wave (i.e., over 2000-04) instead of before it (i.e., over 1984-88): the variation in levels of democracy explained by the Human Development Index fell from 41 to 30 percent when we measure democracy with the Freedom House data, and from 35 to 18 percent when we use the Polity data.<sup>8</sup> With the global diffusion of nominal democracy, formal democratic institutions were adopted even in poor societies, weakening the development-democracy link.

The prevalence of nominal democracy is dissociating from societal development, supporting the view that elite agreements are the major force in spreading democracy around the globe.<sup>9</sup> This view holds as long as we focus on nominal democracy.

The picture changes drastically when one focuses on genuinely effective democracy. A growing number of scholars have called attention to the fact that most of the new democracies show serious deficiencies in adopting the rule of law and related governance practices that make democracy truly effective. A large literature has developed emphasizing the inadequacy of purely "electoral democracy" and various forms of sham democracy in which elites corrupt people's democratic freedoms. Accordingly, researchers have increasingly emphasized the importance of distinguishing ineffective from fully effective democracies.<sup>10</sup> To do so scholars have developed an index of effective democracy that measures democratic freedoms insofar—and only insofar—as these freedoms are set into real effect by honest governance practices that respect the rule of law and keep corruption under control.<sup>11</sup> Technically speaking this index is built in that one weights the Freedom House ratings of civil liberties and political rights by the World Bank's "good governance" data on rule of law and control of corruption.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, the level of democratic freedoms for a given period is weighted down to the extent that rule of law and control of corruption are absent.<sup>13</sup>

When one focuses on this measure of effective democracy, it becomes evident that the prevalence of democracy continues to depend strongly on a society's level of development. Thus, the Human Development Index explains fully 60 percent of the variation in effective democracy around the world.<sup>14</sup> In other words, development explains twice as much of the variance in effective democracy as it does in nominal democracy; moreover, the explained variance does not decline when one measures democracy after the climax of the global democratization wave.

The achievements of the global democratization wave are considerably more modest if one focuses on effective rather than nominal democracy. Measuring democracy on a percentage scale from 0 to 100 for each country, the wave of democratization raised the mean global level of democracy from 51 percent in 1985 to 72 percent in 2000—when one focuses on nominal democracy. But the level of *effective* democracy rose only from 37 to 44 percent over the same time.<sup>15</sup> Ineffective democracies can be found under almost any conditions but effective democracy remains closely linked with advanced levels of societal development.

### **Effective Democracy**

The root idea of democracy is to empower people. From this point of view the civil and political freedoms linked with democracy are irrelevant if they are only superficially institutionalized, lacking the rule of law needed to put democratic freedoms into real effect. For freedoms that are not made effective do not empower people. Thus, it is crucial to distinguish between ineffective and effective democracy. This distinction is about to replace in significance the distinction between nominal democracy and nondemocracy.

The essence of democracy is that it empowers ordinary citizens. To accomplish this civil and political freedoms are necessary. Civil freedoms entitle people to lead their lives as they like as long as it does not impinge on others. Political freedoms entitle people to make their preferences known and count in public life. Both kinds of freedom are essential in empowering people to govern their lives. These democratic freedoms are codified in the form of civil and political rights, which together build the core institution of democracy: citizenship. Other institutional characteristics of democracy, such as a competitive electoral regime and executive accountability, are derivatives of people's democratic freedoms.

To actually empower the people, it does not suffice to simply pass laws that adopt these freedoms as formal rights. They must be put into real effect. Rule of law is crucial. Though it can also exist in authoritarian systems, it plays an essential role in making democratic freedoms effective. Accordingly, scholars measure effective democracy by using rule of law data as a weighting factor, downgrading democratic freedoms to the extent to which rule of law is absent. A country can score low on effective democracy for two different reasons: (1) if the country has little or no democratic freedom, even the most perfect rule of law will not produce effective democracy; (2) if the country nominally has extensive democratic freedom but lacks the rule of law, these freedoms become meaningless in practice. If democracy means empowerment of the people, it does


not matter for which of these two reasons there is little or no effective democracy. The people are not empowered in either case.

In the world today, effective democracy is much less widespread than nominal democracy. And although the global democratization wave brought large gains in nominal democracy, it brought much more modest gains in effective democracy: while nominal democracy increased by 21 percentage points, effective democracy increased by only 7 percentage points.

### The Human Empowerment Triad

Effective democratic freedoms contribute significantly to empower people. But they are not the entire story. Instead, as Figure 1 indicates, human empowerment is a triad consisting of (1) *democratic freedoms*, (2) *self-expression values*, and (3) *action resources*. Each of these three ingredients empowers people on a different level. Democratic freedoms empower people on the level of *entitlements*, granting people the civil and political rights that *allow* them to govern public life and their private lives. Self-expression values empower people on the level of *motivations* in making people *willing* to govern their lives. Action resources empower people on the level of *capabilities*, equipping people with the means, skills, and opportunities that *enable* them to govern their lives. Together these three elements complete human empowerment as a whole.

Figure 1. The Environmental Model of Human Empowerment



In order to attain human empowerment, effective democracy must be embedded in a cultural environment that emphasizes self-expression values and in an economic environment that provides action resources. Consequently, effective democracy is much more likely to be found in societies with strong self-expression values and abundant action resources.

Self-expression values come close to what Lasswell<sup>16</sup> once described as the “democratic character” or what Rokeach<sup>17</sup> characterized as an “open belief system.” This belief system holds that ordinary people are: (1) to be entitled to make their views count in shaping public life; (2) active in expressing their preferences in public; (3) to be tolerated in their lifestyle choices; (4) efficacious in shaping their lives; and (5) to generally trusted. These components are measured by people’s responses to questions asking (1) for priorities on “giving people more say in important government decisions,” “seeing that people have more say in how things are done in their jobs and communities,” and “protecting freedom of speech”; (2) reported participation in such activities as “signing petitions”; (3) an acceptance of “homosexuality” as a justifiable human orientation, (4) a sense of efficacy in “shaping one’s life”, and (5) a sense of “trust in people.” Factor analyses clearly show that publics that score high in one of these orientations tend to score correspondingly high in the other four orientations, so there is a common underlying dimension integrating these components into common whole. This commonality reflects a generally pro-people orientation in emphasizing the practice and tolerations of human self-expression. To measure how strong this emphasis on self-expression is pronounced in a society one calculates a population average over the five components (each component weighted for its loading on the common factor).<sup>18</sup>

Self-expression values are a central component of human empowerment, together with democratic freedoms and action resources. We find these three components sequentially related to each other. This sequence involves two regularities.

First, a culture that emphasizes self-expression values emerges in an economic environment that expands ordinary people’s action resources. Since material sustenance and physical security are the first requirements for survival, under conditions of scarcity, people give them top priority; while under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize self-expression. Moreover, people tend to adjust their aspirations to their capabilities, making democratic freedoms a more highly valued asset when people have the resources needed to practice them. Thus, self-expression values emerge where resources are widespread: knowing how widespread action resources are in a given society one explains 80 percent of the cross-national variation in how strongly that country’s people emphasize self-expression values.<sup>19</sup>

Second, effective democratic freedoms emerge in societies that emphasize self-expression values. Where self-expression values are weak, people place little value on democratic freedoms. Hence, mass pressures to respect democratic freedoms remain weak, leaving the elites’ power-maximizing interests largely unconstrained. This does not necessarily prevent elites from adopting democratic freedoms. In fact, tactical considerations or pressures from outside might prompt them to do so. But since the power holders are under no domestic pressure to make these freedoms effective, they will be likely to corrupt them, rendering democracy ineffective. Again empirical evidence supports this claim: knowing how widespread self-expression values are in a society one explains 79 percent of the cross-national variation in effective democracy.<sup>20</sup>

Conceivably these relations might be spurious: some unobserved third factor might account for them. For instance, the relation between action resources and self-expression values might simply reflect the fact that historically Protestant societies tend to rank high on both, reflecting the historical linkage between Protestantism, prosperity, and liberty. The relation between self-expression values and democratic freedoms might also be spurious. Both widespread self-expression values and effective democratic freedoms might result from the fact that given societies have been governed by democratic institutions for a relatively long time.

If the former hypothesis is correct, then the relation between action resources and self-expression values would disappear when one controls for the proportion of Protestants in a society. And if the latter hypothesis is correct, the relation between self-expression values and democratic freedoms would disappear when one controls for the number of years a country has experienced under democratic institutions. But as the two diagrams in Figure 2 demonstrate, both relations remain robust even controlling for the impact of a Protestant heritage, and that of democratic traditions respectively. The linkages underlying the human empowerment syndrome do not seem to be spurious.

The relation between self-expression values and democratic freedoms does not seem to result from democratic freedoms causing self-expression values to emerge. For democratic freedoms show no impact on self-expression values when we control for a society's level of economic development. Emancipative values emerge when economic development widens people's action repertoires, regardless of whether they live in democracies or authoritarian societies.

These findings help understand why so many studies have found that economic development seems conducive to democracy. It is because economic development increases ordinary people's action resources and because this process gives rise to mass self-expression values, as a result of which people place high priority on freedom of choice. Since democratic freedoms meet this priority, people with self-expression values inevitably value these freedoms.

In a regression analysis, a society's level of action resources explains about 75 percent of the variation in effective democracy; but if one includes the strength of self-expression values in the regression, the explanatory power of action resources drops to 35 percent, while self-expression values by themselves account for 45 percent of the variance in effective democracy. In short, growing resources contribute to effective democracy mostly insofar as they give rise to self-expression values.

Effective democracy does not emerge because elites make cost-benefit calculations and then choose in a vacuum whether and to what extent to make democratic freedoms effective. In fact elites have little choice in the matter as publics develop to a point where they become capable and willing to practice democratic freedoms. Effective democracy is not an outcome of rational elite choices; it is part of a wider human empowerment process summarized by Figure 3.

Figure 2. The Human Empowerment linkages, after controlling for the influence of historic traditions








Figure 3. Chain of Processes Promoting Human Empowerment



Action resources, self-expression values, and democratic freedoms each make a distinctive contribution to human empowerment, yet human empowerment is the common underlying theme integrating these contributions into a whole. This helps better understand the connection between previously separate approaches to explain democracy, such as the modernization approach and the civic culture approach. These two approaches stood separate from each other in that the modernization approach emphasized the importance of resources for democracy whereas the civic culture approach emphasized the importance of values. The human empowerment framework integrates both approaches in relating resources and values to the same underlying theme. Thus, the human empowerment framework moves our understanding of democracy on a higher level of theoretical integration.

## The Role of Self-Expression Values

The emancipative worldview emerging with self-expression values is inconsistent with unlimited political authority and is inherently conducive to support for democratic freedoms. Surprising as it may seem, self-expression values—which do not explicitly refer to democracy—are much stronger predictor of democracy than are explicit measures of support for democracy, such as saying that democracy is better than any other form of government.<sup>xxi</sup> Indeed, when one controls for the extent to which a given public explicitly endorses democracy, the impact of self-expression values on democracy is only slightly weakened; but when one controls for a society's level of self-expression values, the impact of explicit endorsement of democracy disappears almost completely.

In public opinion surveys strong majorities of the public in most countries say favorable things about democracy. But this does not necessarily tap deep-rooted desires to actually practice democratic freedoms-- in some cases it simply reflects social desirability effects or the belief that democracy is linked with prosperity. If this is so, people are interested in the economic output of democracy and not necessarily motivated to struggle for democratic freedoms. Self-expression values, by contrast, provide an inner motivation to struggle for democratic freedoms, for these freedoms are needed to practice self-expression. Accordingly, a recent study finds that self-expression values do indeed translate into pro-democratic mass actions even when the absence of democracy makes such actions risky.<sup>xxii</sup>

Self-expression values provide a psychological disposition to struggle for democratic freedoms. Dispositions to struggle for democratic freedoms are more important for democracy than overt endorsements of democracy. Dispositions are implicit but their motivational power is strong because they are anchored in people's affections. Regime preferences are explicit but their motivational power can be weak because *expressed* preferences do not always reflect *affectively anchored* preferences. Preferences are often expressed for reasons of social desirability or because of instrumental benefit expectations. In neither case do the expressed preferences reflect affective preferences, so their motivational power is weak. It is not the explicitness but the affectiveness that gives preferences motivational power.

## The Emergence of Self-expression Values

Democracy does not need to be in place for self-expression values to emerge. Evidence from the World Values Surveys indicates that in the years preceding the Third Wave of democratization, self-expression values had emerged through a process of intergenerational value change not only in Western democracies, but also within authoritarian regimes.<sup>xxiii</sup>

Self-expression values emerge when a large share of the population grows up taking survival for granted. This worldview tends to emerge even under the most repressive political regimes, as people's action resources develop. As this happens, people become economically more secure, intellectually more independent, and socially more connected. This emancipates people, giving them more choice about how to spend time and money, what interpretations of the world to believe, and with which groups of

people to connect. Undergoing modernization even the most repressive regime finds it difficult to check these tendencies, for they are intimately linked with modernization.

By increasing people's material means, cognitive skills, and social opportunities, modernization widens people's action resources. And people tend to use the expanding action repertoire that their growing resources provide because free choice and control over one's life has a deep-rooted psychological payoff: It increases people's life satisfaction.<sup>xxiv</sup> This seems to be a universal psychological regularity that leads people to make use of their growing action resources. As the repertoire of actions that people actually perform is expanding, a basic sense of human agency emerges, giving rise to an emancipative worldview that values ordinary people as to-be-entitled, to-be-tolerated, to-be-trusted, active and efficacious individuals.

There is no guarantee that economic development and modernization will take place. Some authoritarian regimes may do so and others may not. But in so far as they do modernize, they tend to experience the emancipative effects of modernization. Self-expression values are not endogenous to democratic regimes. They emerge in any regime where modernization widens people's action resources.

### **The Consequences of Self-expression Values**

Rising self-expression values make democratic freedoms an increasingly valued goal, eroding the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. People who are strong in self-expression values are accustomed to using their own initiative and judgment in their daily lives. They become increasingly likely to question rigid and hierarchical authority, which loses its legitimacy. If the idea of democracy were not already known, it would be invented wherever self-expression values are on the rise. For the appeal of the idea to grant people democratic freedoms is not uniquely Western. The desire for free choice and autonomy are universal aspirations. They may be subordinated to the needs for subsistence and order when survival is precarious, but they tend to take increasingly high priority as survival becomes more secure. The specific institutional manifestations of democracy that have emerged during the past two hundred years are largely a product of Western political history. But the basic impetus of democracy, the human desire for free choice, is the natural product of an environment in which expanding action resources give rise to self-expression values.

Democracy has rarely emerged as a gift freely granted by those holding power. Elites almost always prefer to retain as much power as possible. Accordingly, democratic freedoms have generally emerged because people struggled for them, as was the case from the liberal revolutions of the 18<sup>th</sup> century to the democratic revolutions of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. People's motivations and values have played an important role. People do not struggle for democratic freedoms solely for instrumental reasons. If they did, it would be relatively easy to buy off the leaders of democratic movements. The most dedicated activists in the struggle for democracy are those who value freedom intrinsically.

Self-expression values place an inherent value on freedom, and in recent decades these values have been expanding in most of the world. Does this mean that authoritarian systems will inevitably crumble?

Some scholars hold that any authoritarian regime survives as long as its rulers are determined to use any means, including military violence, to stay in power. This notion is based on the idea that legitimacy does not matter for authoritarian regimes because they are capable to repress dissenting majorities. The same view holds that authoritarian regimes are usually confronted with dissenting majorities, for democracy is always the naturally preferred system of ordinary people.

Contradicting this view, cross-national survey data clearly demonstrate that people's desire for democratic freedoms varies massively across countries, depending on how strongly a public has embraced self-expression values. Self-expression values in turn grow stronger in response to expanding action resources. This means that when people's willingness to struggle for democratic freedoms is growing, their capability to do so has been grown as well. An authoritarian elite then finds it increasingly costly to deny democracy, risking mass opposition that can grow too massive to resist it. So then indeed, a society in which self-expression values are arising will for short or for long become democratic and even effectively democratic.

### **Redistribution and Democracy**

Influential recent work by Boix<sup>xxv</sup> and by Acemoglu et al.<sup>xxvi</sup> interprets democracy as the result of a struggle over economic redistribution between elites, who are assumed to be the propertied class, and property-less masses. In this view, democracy is a struggle for universal suffrage in which both sides are motivated by conflicting interests in economic redistribution. The masses want democracy because universal suffrage would enable them to redistribute income from the elites, and the elites oppose it for precisely the same reason. Consequently, the elites will only concede universal suffrage if they have reason to believe it will not lead to extensive redistribution—otherwise, they will repress mass demands for suffrage.

Boix version of this model postulates that the elites' fear of redistribution diminishes if income distribution becomes more equal. This reduces the gap between the elites and masses, and in so far as income distribution approaches a normal curve, it reduces the proportion who have a great deal to gain by radical redistribution, making it impossible to build majorities for radical redistribution.<sup>xxvii</sup>

Several assumptions underlie this model. First, variation in mass demands for democracy cannot account for the emergence and survival of democracy, since the model assumes that the masses are always in favor of democracy. Second, the decisive choices are all in the hands of the elites, not the masses: It is the elites who decide whether to repress mass demands for democracy or whether to concede democracy. Third, this implies that nondemocracies survive because of the elites' capability to repress dissenting majorities. Fourth, modernization influences the chances to democratize by changes in income equality and capital mobility that make universal suffrage more acceptable to the elites.

In light of our research, each of these assumptions is highly questionable. Empirically, we find a tremendous amount of variation in the degree to which given publics desire democratic freedoms: mass emphasis on self-expression varies greatly from one society to another. Second, the decision to expand political rights remains exclusively an elite choice only as long as ordinary people's action resources are meager.

But this is precisely what modernization changes: It greatly increases ordinary people's action resources, enabling them to mount more powerful collective actions, putting increasingly effective pressure on elites. Third, the survival of authoritarian regimes is not simply a question of whether elites choose to repress the masses—it reflects the balance of forces between elites and masses, which tends to shift to the mass side with ongoing modernization. The Third Wave of democratization was, in large part, a story of effective mass mobilization, motivated by strong emphasis on self-expression values among people who had become increasingly articulate and skilled at organizing mass movements. The major effect of modernization is not that it makes democracy more acceptable to elites. It is that modernization increases ordinary people's capabilities and willingness to struggle for democratic freedoms.

It is important to note that both Boix and Acemoglu *et al.* use narrowly electoral definitions of democracy. Their analyses have great historic interest, but they are analyzing how elections emerge, not how effective democracy emerges. As the evidence we have just presented demonstrates, they are not at all the same thing. The major motivational force behind the emergence of effective democracy is not a redistributive interest in universal suffrage but an emancipative desire to practice democratic freedoms.

Democracy does not simply emerge from a redistributive interest in universal suffrage. It emerges from a struggle for democratic freedoms that go far beyond the right to vote. Throughout most of human history, despotism and autocracy prevailed. This was not simply because elites were able to repress dissenting majorities, but because until the modern era the masses lacked the organizational skills and the resources needed to grasp democratic freedoms, and obtaining freedom was not their top priority. To understand how democracy emerges, it is not sufficient to focus solely on elites—increasingly, one must also study developments among the masses. As events in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, simply overthrowing an authoritarian elite does not ensure that democracy will emerge.

## Conclusion

The evidence points to several conclusions.

First, during the most recent global wave of democratization many countries became nominally democratic. Most of the new democracies show major deficiencies in honest governance practices that are needed to empower people effectively. In the struggle for effective democracy, there is still far to go.

Second, as nominal democracy spread rapidly into countries that lacked the infrastructure of effective democracy, the power of modernization variables to predict nominal democracy declined sharply. But effective democracy is as strongly linked with development indicators as ever.

Third, although economic development is strongly linked with effective democracy, its explanatory power drops drastically when one takes self-expression values into account.<sup>xxviii</sup> This helps explain *why* economic development has repeatedly been found to be linked with democracy: economic development, in so far as it brings rising education, a modern occupational structure, and rising levels of existential security, leads ordinary people to place increasing emphasis on democratic freedoms. Some societies

have been able to become rich by pumping oil without following this trajectory; their people do not share the same drive toward democracy, which is why the oil-exporting states have not become democratic yet.

Fourth, it is not the have-nots, as some political economists assume, who desire democracy most strongly. Instead, it is when people have considerable action resources and move from emphasizing survival values toward emphasizing self-expression values, that they strive most strongly for democratic institutions.

Fifth, self-expression values provide a deep-rooted motivation for people to strive to obtain democracy. As we have seen, self-expression values—which do not explicitly refer to democracy—are a much stronger predictor of democracy, than are explicit measures of support for democracy. Self-expression values reflect a syndrome of interpersonal trust, tolerance and political activism that plays a crucial role in the emergence and survival of democratic freedoms.

For some time, two leading ways of explaining democracy have been pursued, largely in isolation from each other: an economic modernization approach, which emphasizes the role of objective resources, and a political culture approach, which emphasizes the role of subjective values. The view taken here integrates these two approaches, relating them both to the underlying theme of human empowerment. From this perspective, objective resources increase people's capability to practice democratic freedoms while subjective values increase their willingness to practice these freedoms. When both come together, elites cannot resist effective democratization.

If one views democratization as a process by which power increasingly moves from the hands of a narrow elite into the hands of ordinary citizens, then a broad concept of democracy becomes relevant. The human empowerment framework provides such a broad concept.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Electoral definitions refer back to Joseph Schumpeter and are pursued, for example, by Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi (1997). "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49:155-83.

<sup>2</sup> The notion that democracy emerges as a product of strategic elite agreements has been established by O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>3</sup> The liberal notion of democracy which considers a wide set of civil and political rights as an integral part of democracy can be found in Dahl, Robert A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

<sup>4</sup> With evidence based on some 70 societies included in the World Values Surveys, the claim that democracy emerges and survives in response to widespread participatory resources and self-expression values can be found in Welzel, Christian (2006). "Democratization as an Emancipative Process." *European Journal of Political Research* 45:871-96.

<sup>5</sup> On the role of Western foreign aid see Whitehead, Laurence (1986). "Three International Dimensions of Democratization." In L., Whitehead (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Democratization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-25.

<sup>6</sup> The Human Development Index is published every year in United Nations Development Program (ed.). *Human Development Report*. New York. The index summarizes data on per capita GDP, life expectancy, literacy and tertiary enrollment ratios, providing a standardized index.

<sup>7</sup> The Polity Index measures democracy in terms of constitutional limitations on executive power and channels of popular participation. Data are downloadable at: [www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity](http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity). The Freedom House ratings measure on the basis of negotiated expert judgments the implementation of civil liberties and political rights. Usually the two indices are combined into an overall measure of democracy. Data are downloadable at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

<sup>8</sup> An inspection of Freedom House and Polity IV data over time indicates a pronounced climax in the global democratization wave between 1989 and 1993. Before and after this period there is little change in the global democracy level.

<sup>9</sup> Since they include a civil liberties scale, one might suspect that Freedom House's freedom ratings measure liberal democracy rather than merely electoral democracy. However, using Freedom House's dichotomous distinction between electoral democracies and nondemocracies one explains 77 percent of its freedom ratings, even though electoral democracy is only a dichotomous distinction while the freedom ratings measure variation on a scale with 13 grades. Accordingly, these ratings do not go much beyond electoral democracy or nominal democracy.

<sup>10</sup> See Collier, David and Steven Levitsk (1997). "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research." *World Politics* 49: 430-51. Diamond, Larry (2002). "Elections without Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 13:21-35.

<sup>11</sup> An index of effective democracy has been introduced by Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2003). "The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis." *European Journal of Political Research* 42:341-79. A detailed description can be found in the Internet Appendix to Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press (see #21 under Variable List at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevlopment.html>).

<sup>12</sup> In the most recent version of the effective democracy index the Freedom House civil liberties and political rights ratings are added, inverted so that higher numbers measure higher levels of democratic freedoms, and standardized to maximum 100. The World Bank "good governance" data on rule of law and control of corruption are averaged and standardized into a scale of maximum 1.0 indicating the most honest governance practice. Then the 0 to 100 scores for democratic freedoms are multiplied by the 0 to 1.0 scores for honest governance, yielding weighted percentages to measure effective democratic freedoms.

<sup>13</sup> Even though the 26-point Freedom House checklist includes three or four checkpoints for rule of law and corruption, downweighting the Freedom House ratings by rule-of-law and control-of-corruption data by the World Bank is no tautological or redundant procedure because factor analyses show that these two sets of information represent two distinct dimensions of cross-national variation.

<sup>14</sup> This finding refers to an index of effective democracy introduced by

<sup>15</sup> Results of these regressions are available on request. Contact: [c.welzel@jacobs-university.de](mailto:c.welzel@jacobs-university.de).

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<sup>16</sup> Lasswell, Harold D. (1951). *Democratic Character*. Glencoe: Free Press.

<sup>17</sup> Rokeach, Milton (1960). *The Open and the Closed Mind*. New York: Basic Books.

<sup>18</sup> Factor loadings on the common underlying dimension are as follows (pooled individual-level data from World Values Surveys 1981-2006): (1) .566 for an emphasis on entitling people to shape public life, (2) .598 for an active orientation to express one's views in public, (3) .575 for toleration of people's lifestyle choices, (4) .566 for a sense of efficacy in shaping one's life, and (5) .366 for trust in people. Each of these component measures is standardized to a scale with minimum 0 and maximum 100 and then multiplied by its factor loading. These weighted attitudes are then added up and the sum divided by the sum of the factor loadings (to keep variation between 0 and 100). All this happens with individual-level data. Then for each nation the average score on this 0 to 100 index is calculated.

<sup>19</sup> Welzel/Inglehart/Klingemann, op. cit., p. 368.

<sup>20</sup> Welzel/Inglehart/Klingemann, op. cit., p. 369.

<sup>xxi</sup> Inglehart, Ronald (2003). "How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Do We Measure It?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 51-57. This finding is confirmed in Inglehart/Welzel, op. cit. (chapter 11); and gets further support in Welzel, Christian (2007). "Are Levels of Democracy Influenced by Mass Attitudes?" *International Political Science Review* 28:397-424.

<sup>xxii</sup> Welzel (2007), op. cit., p. 418.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Inglehart/Welzel, op. cit., chapters 8 and 9.

<sup>xxiv</sup> For the well-being effect of mastery and control see Inglehart/Welzel, op. cit., p. 140

<sup>xxv</sup> Boix, Carles (2003). *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>xxvi</sup> Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson and Pierre Yared, « Income and Democracy » NBER working paper No. W11205, 2005, downloaded from:

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=689386](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=689386); and Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2005). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>xxvii</sup> Aristotle claimed already 2,500 years ago that democracy is the typical regime of egalitarian middle class societies. The argument was formulated anew by Dahl and has been demonstrated in empirical analyses by Muller and Vanhanen. Also, the more sophisticated variation of the distributive argument that there is a u-shaped relationship is not so entirely new as Acemoglu and Robinson claim. In fact it has a long tradition in democratic theory as is obvious from the work of Midlarski and Bollen/Jackman. See Bollen, Kenneth and Robert W. Jackman (1985). "Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income." *American Sociological Review* 50:438-57. Dahl (1971), op. cit. Midlarski, Manus (1999). *The Evolution of Inequality*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Muller, Edward N. (1988). "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality" *American Sociological Review* 53:50-68. Vanhanen, Tatu (1997). *Prospects of Democracy*. London: Routledge.

<sup>xxviii</sup> In response to Inglehart/Welzel, op. cit., Teorell and Hadenius try to question this finding showing that modernization has a stronger and more significant effect on democracy than self-expression values. In addition to the fact that different model specifications reverse this result to its opposite, even the findings of Teorell and Hadenius confirm that when one introduces self-expression values, the effect of modernization drops substantially. See Teorell, Jan and Axel Hadenius (2006). "Democracy without Democratic Values." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 41:95-111.