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## Sir William Johnson's Reliance on the Six Nations at the Conclusion of the Anglo-Indian War of 1763-65

MICHAEL J. MULLIN

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It was 24 July 1766, and the eyes of the Ottawa and Wyandot warriors suggested they were displeased with their situation as they gathered for a conference between their spokesmen—Teata and Pontiac—and British Indian superintendent Sir William Johnson. Their disapproving stare would not have been directed at the superintendent but at the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga warriors accompanying Sir William. Johnson downplayed the Iroquois Confederacy's presence at Lake Ontario in his reports to London, although their presence was crucial to his negotiations with the western nations.<sup>1</sup> The confederacy's presence at the conference conveyed a clear message: The Six Nations Iroquois, despite some internal political problems, would remain the centerpiece of Anglo-Indian relations, even as that policy moved into the Great Lakes region. Even Pontiac, who came in the "name of all Nations to the Westward" could not ignore the implied message.<sup>2</sup>

The warriors, chiefs, diplomats, interpreters, and soldiers who gathered at Lake Ontario in 1766 were trying to put an end to the Anglo-Indian War of 1763–65, a war commonly referred to as "Pontiac's Rebellion." Thanks to writers such as Francis Parkman

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and Howard Peckham, Pontiac's Rebellion is one of the most thoroughly documented "Indian" events of the colonial period.<sup>3</sup> Only recently, however, has the Native American perspective been explored. Recent studies by Michael N. McConnell, Richard White, and Gregory Evans Dowd direct historians toward a new appreciation for the complexities of the issues faced by western Indians as they decided whether to take "up the hatchet" against the British.<sup>4</sup> This study builds on these more recent works by examining a variety of political, generational, and religious issues that Sir William Johnson tried to resolve when he met with Pontiac in July 1766.

The origins of the Anglo-Indian War of 1763–65 are found in the period between the fall of Canada in 1760 and the Proclamation of 1763. For western Algonquians, this period of transition was difficult, both culturally and economically. Polities such as the Ottawa and Wyandot had to readjust to a new "father," in this case an English king who had his own view of the parent-child relationship. The western Indians' need to create a new metaphorical relationship with the British occurred at a time when rumors concerning the fate of the Indians themselves were circulating widely.<sup>5</sup> Some reports stated that the French king had ceded his children to his English counterpart. From the Algonquians' perspective, not only did the French king have no right to make such a cession, but it was something a good "father" would not have done.<sup>6</sup> If British representatives hoped to assume influence in the West peacefully, then they had to become good fathers to their western children, just as the French had learned to do earlier in the eighteenth century. One way to do this was by providing assistance to the Indians.

At the same time, pro-English groups that had received numerous gifts for participating in the struggle against France found that gifts and presents were no longer forthcoming. England's debt crisis had produced a changed climate regarding the Indians and the importance of Indian gifts.<sup>7</sup> Curtailing presents to these polities produced economic hardship and misunderstandings—something the superintendent tried to explain to his military superior, Sir Jeffery Amherst, but to no avail.<sup>8</sup> Amherst had decided power, not friendship, would be the British *modus operandi* in the West.<sup>9</sup> If these cultural and economic issues were not enough, another rumor circulating in the Ohio and Illinois region suggested that English colonists planned to "destroy" the Indians; this rumor was reinforced by the erection of new British

outposts in the region and the haughty attitude of British officers toward their Indian neighbors.<sup>10</sup>

These cultural and economic changes occurring in the early 1760s created disaffection among groups such as the Huron, Ottawa, and Ojibwa, who had accepted the British king as their "father" in September 1761. When these western polities had agreed to accept an English presence in the region, they had done so with specific expectations. Anaiasa, a Huron sachem, told William Johnson that the Huron and other western nations expected the English to send them "plenty of goods, & that at a Cheaper rate than we have hitherto been able to procure them."<sup>11</sup> When the British provided these goods and presented the western nations with gifts, they were acting as a good father should. At this time, in 1761, Superintendent Johnson was confident that Anaiasa and his followers would not be disappointed in their new father.

Unfortunately for the western Indians and Johnson, the British commander in charge of the situation, Sir Jeffery Amherst, was unwilling to become the father they desired.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Amherst's parsimony regarding Indian gifts and supplies not only disappointed the Ottawa, Huron, Shawnee, Miami, and others but brought him into conflict with Britain's Indian agents, who argued that such a policy was an invitation to disaster.<sup>13</sup> Privately, some of Amherst's subordinates agreed with the superintendent.<sup>14</sup> By 1762, rumors of Indian unhappiness and reports of a possible rupture with the Indians were circulating along the frontier. Amherst chose to ignore the reports, telling those who would listen,

I am sorry to find, that you are Apprehensive, that the Indians are Brewing something privately amongst them; If it is Mischief, it will fall on their own Heads, with a Powerfull and Heavy Hand; and I am hopefull they are not so Blind . . .<sup>15</sup>

In 1763, when war began, the Ottawa and other Indian polities sought the support of the Six Nations Confederacy in their struggle against the English.<sup>16</sup> The Chenussio Seneca had heeded the call in 1763, and now, when the various parties were scheduled to resolve their differences, the Seneca were excluded from a place beside the victors. Indeed, the Seneca had been forced to sign a separate peace with the British and had done so in the presence of the western nations.<sup>17</sup> The warriors who now accompanied Johnson to Lake Ontario were men whom polities such as the Delaware,

Mingo, and Ottawa had struggled to undermine since the beginning of the Seven Years War.<sup>18</sup> Now these same warriors came as victors to help negotiate an end to the war called Pontiac's.

According to Johnson, he had invited the confederacy leaders to participate in the peace process because he "judged it necessary." By inviting them, he hoped to avoid their "suspicions" concerning the upcoming negotiations.<sup>19</sup> Most historians do not accept Johnson's assertion. Francis Jennings argues that the Iroquois presence at the negotiations was an attempt by confederacy leaders to "re-establish" their dominant position in Anglo-Indian affairs. As for the Mohawk, Jennings regards them as "feudal retainers of Johnson."<sup>20</sup> Michael N. McConnell contends that the Mohawk, Oneida, and Onondaga presence at Lake Ontario in 1766 was proof of Johnson's rejection of the political and military reality of the trans-Appalachian region.<sup>21</sup> Wilbur R. Jacobs is more sympathetic toward Johnson. Jacobs believes that the Iroquois, with the exception of the Seneca, rejected Pontiac's call for assistance because of Johnson's "astute diplomacy."<sup>22</sup> According to Jacobs, since the Mohawk, Onondaga, and Cayuga had rejected the western nations' message and remained loyal to the British, they belonged with the victors at Lake Ontario.

Each of these interpretations is credible. Yet a rereading of the same documents allows us to move beyond these explanations. This alternative interpretation emerges when one remembers that Johnson's peace initiative was intended to end more than just a military challenge to British rule. The negotiations were meant to resolve a myriad of problems that were political, generational, and religious in nature. Each of these three problems, examined in more detail below, gives rise to an interrelated set of questions: First, who was going to speak for the western Indians at conferences? Second, who was going to have the ear of the British Indian superintendent? And third, how would British policy toward the Ohio and Illinois regions be implemented?

Two treaties illustrate the political problems faced by Johnson and the British as their colonial empire moved westward. Various members of the Six Nations participated in both treaties, and an understanding of their presence at Johnson Hall and Lake Ontario helps clarify Johnson's intentions. The first of these treaties, an agreement between Johnson and the "Ohio Indians," ratified in July 1765, reasserted the "domination" of the confederacy over the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo Iroquois. This first treaty was part of Johnson's strategy to make the western and eastern Indian

nations "jealous of each other." Johnson's strategy was to separate the eastern Indian polities from their western allies: the Ottawa, Wyandot, and Potawatomi.<sup>23</sup> These later groups concluded a peace with the British, via Johnson, in July 1766. This was the Lake Ontario meeting that would cause the western Indians such consternation.

In July 1765, a conference took place at Johnson Hall, one of the two council fires of the Six Nations. By hosting the conference at one of the two fires maintained by the confederacy and not at a third fire located at Detroit, Johnson symbolically emphasized the special place the Six Nations held in Anglo-Indian affairs.<sup>24</sup>

This first treaty was Superintendent Johnson's attempt to undo the troubles associated with an earlier "preliminary treaty" that had been negotiated by Colonel John Bradstreet with the Shawnee, Mingo, Delaware, and Huron in August 1764.<sup>25</sup> In this preliminary treaty, Bradstreet demanded that his Indian counterparts acknowledge England's claim of sovereignty over the lands that housed British forts. Further, he demanded that the western Indians allow the British "to build, and erect as many Forts, or Trading houses . . ." as the British wanted. Bradstreet also insisted that the Indians renounce any claims of sovereignty over the lands they currently possessed.<sup>26</sup> The terms Bradstreet demanded were bound to cause problems on both sides of the cultural divide. Bradstreet's military superior, Thomas Gage, and Sir William Johnson understood this potential conflict. Both men repudiated Bradstreet's preliminary treaty. Johnson, for example, claimed Bradstreet had no understanding of what sovereignty meant for the Indians and suggested that trouble would result if Bradstreet's terms were enforced on the Huron, Delaware, and Shawnee.<sup>27</sup>

Gage and Johnson were wise to reject Bradstreet's treaty; the terms he demanded produced an intense power struggle within the various Indian communities of the Ohio and Illinois regions.<sup>28</sup> The power struggle that emerged after Bradstreet's treaty (but before Johnson's Lake Ontario conference) was not only bitter but violent. Sir William's deputy, George Croghan, saw the violence firsthand. In Croghan's meeting with a group of Delaware, "two Principal Warriors . . . differed in Council & stabb'd each other." Croghan went on to report that neither man was expected to survive.<sup>29</sup> The two warriors disagreed about what course the Delaware should pursue: peace on the grounds demanded by Bradstreet, or rejection of any peace that changed the relationship between the Delaware and the British. An Indian leader's chosen

course often depended on his age. The older, civil chiefs often sought the avenue of peace, while the warriors, often the young men of the polity, refused to accept peace if acceptance connoted acquiescence.

William Johnson realized that the violence Croghan had witnessed at Fort Pitt meant warriors and civil chiefs had to be reconciled to each other if peace between the British and the Indians was to be possible. Reconciliation was the second goal of the July 1765 conference. Johnson understood that there was a power struggle taking place in the West between warriors and chiefs. In this July meeting, Johnson got the chiefs and warriors to agree to the same terms. He accomplished this by assuring the chiefs that they were accepting the terms that had been negotiated by Killbuck, a Delaware warrior of the Turkey phratry, at an earlier, separate conference with Johnson.<sup>30</sup> Civil chiefs and warriors could accept Johnson's terms for peace in July 1765 because the superintendent did not demand, as Bradstreet had a year earlier, that the Indians accept English sovereignty. Instead, the 1765 treaties with Killbuck and the chiefs focused on issues concerning the return of prisoners, rights of travel, access to trade, and, finally, the role of the Six Nations in determining future Anglo-Indian relations.<sup>31</sup> Johnson had succeeded in getting the civil and military leaders of the Delaware to agree on common terms.

The importance Johnson placed on gaining acceptance among both warriors and chiefs becomes more obvious when one considers the second conference, the meeting of Lake Ontario in 1766. In July 1766, Johnson held a series of meetings with representatives of the Ottawa, Wyandot, Potawatomi, and Chippewa. The agreements that resulted from these meetings served a twofold purpose: First, the conference allowed Pontiac to emerge as an "alliance chief" of the English.<sup>32</sup> Second, the settlement brought these Indian groups into the British sphere via the "Covenant Chain."<sup>33</sup> Let us look first at Pontiac's emergence as an alliance chief, for in examining his role we see how Johnson hoped to solve a political problem.

Johnson knew, as the French had known before him, that the creation of alliance chiefs was essential for a successful relationship with the western nations. Johnson also knew that the future of Britain's western policy demanded the presence of alliance chiefs such as Pontiac. By making Pontiac an alliance chief and by providing him with the goods necessary to succeed in that posi-

tion, Johnson hoped to direct British policy in a manner similar to the French. Yet Johnson's vision of the future would have been for naught if Pontiac had been unwilling to accept such a position. At this July 1766 conference, Pontiac assumed the position of an alliance chief. To understand why Pontiac accepted the superintendent's invitation, one must be cognizant of events in the Illinois and Ohio regions during the mid-1760s.

When Pontiac met with Johnson at Lake Ontario in July 1766, the Ottawa warrior was in political trouble at home. Although Pontiac told Johnson he spoke for all the western nations, in reality he was being eclipsed politically by Charlot Kaské. Kaské was a Shawnee warrior whose rise to prominence was directly related to tribal unhappiness with political decisions made by both civil and military leaders.<sup>34</sup> Charlot Kaské repudiated the 1763 Treaty of Paris, spoke against the Delaware and Shawnee peace settlement with the English, and made Pontiac's position so untenable that the supposed leader of the warriors forsook his Ottawa village and moved to the Wabash region. As a result of Kaské's actions, Pontiac was no longer the dominant figure in the Illinois region. By becoming a British alliance chief, however, he would be able to "turn the tables" on Kaské. His new relationship with the British superintendent could restore his position and prestige among the western warriors. It is possible that the Kaské-Pontiac dispute was actually part of a larger dispute that dated back nearly two decades; in any case, Pontiac's acceptance of Johnson's implicit offer to become an alliance chief was driven by native politics, not European actions.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, both Sir William Johnson and General Thomas Gage were more than happy to see Pontiac accept the position. In this instance, native politics and English policy coalesced.

Although making Pontiac an alliance chief was an attempt by Britain to solve its political problems in the west, it is important to recall that the events of the early 1760s created political challenges not only to the British but to the six Nations as well. The western Indians and the issues they raised could not be ignored. The Indians' successes against British outposts in 1763 had made a mockery of British commander Jeffery Amherst's belief that these nations could not drive the British from the field.<sup>36</sup> William Johnson disagreed with Amherst's assessment. He believed that the western Indians could field more troops than the Six Nations, and he argued that the British military needed to recognize the trouble these western nations could potentially create.<sup>37</sup> Any



settlement must force the western nations to accept British control of the western territories and maintain Iroquois hegemony. Johnson held the treaty at Lake Ontario because it was within the traditional homeland of the confederacy. By conducting the conference in the Iroquois homeland, Johnson was reaffirming the Iroquois role in Anglo-Indian policy, even as that policy moved westward.

Iroquois Confederacy leaders must have realized that any Anglo-Indian war politically challenged their position in Anglo-Indian affairs. If Johnson were to begin negotiating directly with the western nations, then the confederacy's power and influence would be jeopardized. Confederacy leaders only had to look southward and eastward to understand the ramifications of British officials' projecting beyond Onondaga and into the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes regions as they formulated British policy. From the confederacy's perspective, British policy toward the western nations should be conducted via the Six Nations. This is why confederacy leaders endeavored to bring the western nations into the British sphere via the Covenant Chain. Under these circumstances, the Anglo-Indian war represented not just a challenge to British rule but also to the confederacy's preeminent position in Anglo-Indian affairs.

Yet Pontiac's War was not just a political war; it was also a religious conflict. For groups like the Delaware and Wyandot, participation in the war signified an allegiance to messages brought to them by various prophets. These prophets had appeared regularly in the Ohio and Great Lakes region during the decades leading up to the Anglo-Indian War of 1763–65. Originating along the Susquehanna River in the late 1730s, the prophets took their messages from the heterogeneous community of Wyoming northward and westward into Iroquoia, the Ohio Valley, and, finally, the Great Lakes region. Although Neolin is the most famous of these Indian prophets (in part because of how Pontiac used his message for military advantage during the Anglo-Indian War), there are others.<sup>38</sup> Some were male and some were female, but, no matter what their gender, their message conveyed a challenge to Johnson and the Six Nations and, thus, to the existing structure of Anglo-Indian relations. An understanding of this threat clarifies Johnson's decision to work with the Six Nations to end the Anglo-Indian War of 1763–65. Both Johnson and the sachems were threatened by the presence of these prophets and their messages. The superintendent allowed the Mohawk and the Oneida to

participate in his negotiations because their presence served a dual purpose: maintenance of the Covenant Chain and a visible statement that the British Crown supported, protected, and rewarded those groups that aligned themselves with the superintendent.

Gregory Evans Dowd's recent work, *A Spirited Resistance*, argues that the prophets' messages were an attack on the existing Anglo-Indian political structure and that, by challenging this political structure, various prophets were inherently attacking the Six Nations. By the 1760s, the Delaware associated Anglo-American expansion with Six Nations authority.<sup>39</sup> For the Delaware, participation in the Anglo-Indian War was not just an attack against colonial expansion and British policy but also against Iroquois preeminence.

The Six Nations had been the linchpin of Anglo-Indian relations since the creation of the Covenant Chain in 1676. Pennsylvanian politicians had used Iroquois spokesmen to dispossess the Delaware in both 1737 and 1744. In 1761, Johnson had used the Covenant Chain (with the blessings of Onondaga leaders) to extend British influence to the Great Lakes. Like the Delaware before them, western Indian groups resented the notion of Iroquois leadership.

Even in Iroquoia there was disagreement regarding the Six Nations policy toward the British. Certain factions believed confederacy leaders had been too trusting of Johnson and his promises. These Iroquois groups often supported the Delaware and Shawnee in their struggles against confederacy domination. These Iroquois worried about colonial expansion and Onondaga's seeming acquiescence on the issue. Many of these dissenters showed their displeasure by moving westward and founding new settlements. As they moved westward, they established communities along the Ohio River where other unhappy Indians could find refuge. Known as the Mingo Iroquois, they tried to circumvent Six Nations leadership by creating their own "fire" and negotiating directly with Pennsylvania on behalf of other Ohio Valley polities.<sup>40</sup>

Having sided with the western Indians in the war against the British colonists, the confederation leaders could now assert control over the warriors who had tried to circumvent Onondaga less than a generation earlier. Now, in July 1765, the Mingo were placed in the same category as the Delaware and Shawnee. Metaphorically, these Mingo were no longer "brothers" of the

confederacy itself. Deiaquande, an Onondaga warrior, made this clear when he spoke to the Mingo, Delaware, and Shawnee at the end of the conference. "Brethren & Nephews," Deiaquande began, "[w]e are all glad that you are become the *Children of the Great King* . . . [emphasis added]." The message was clear: The Mingo were children of the British, but the nations of the confederacy were brothers to the king. As brothers, they were equals of the British; unlike Deiaquande's listeners, the Six Nations were obligated to no one. Johnson saw no reason to intercede on the Mingo's behalf.<sup>41</sup>

On the eve of the Anglo-Indian War, the Iroquois Confederacy faced more than just the external challenges of the Mingo, Delaware, and Shawnee. In some ways, the survival of the confederacy itself was at risk. Since the conclusion of the Seven Years War, the Six Nations had witnessed an internal struggle for political control of the confederacy. The encounter had become so divisive that, in 1761, the Mohawk and Oneida believed the Seneca were going to destroy them.<sup>42</sup> Civil war seemed imminent. It took a formal conference to clear the air between the rival factions.<sup>43</sup> Now, in 1765 and 1766, the confederacy appeared to be unified and thereby able to maintain its place in the Anglo-Indian network. For the time being, the Seneca acquiesced. They did not attend the Lake Ontario conference, and their absence, though noted, allowed the confederacy to maintain this appearance of unity when it came to negotiating with both the western nations and the colonists.

Although the Seneca's absence might allow the confederacy an opportunity to illustrate their cohesiveness, Deiaquande's speech to the Ottawa illustrates a second factor influencing Johnson's decision to have the other Iroquois nations accompany him to Lake Ontario. In talking about the British, Deiaquande spoke of a "Supreme Being whose Worshipper & Servant" the British king was.<sup>44</sup> Although Deiaquande did not claim to be a Christian himself, his reference to a supreme being would have captured the attention of his audience. An Onondaga prophet had appeared on the eve of the Anglo-Indian War, and another prophet, Neolin, had tried to convert some Seneca to his anti-European position.<sup>45</sup> Competing against these nativist leaders were Christian missionaries. Samson Occom, himself a Mohegan, established a Christian mission among the Oneida in 1761.<sup>46</sup> Samuel Kirkland followed Samson Occom, establishing a mission in the Seneca country in 1764. Shortly after his arrival, Kirkland alien-

ated Seneca sachems and warriors, thereby dooming his mission.<sup>47</sup>

The success or failure of the prophets and missionaries among the Six Nations, although worthy of note, is not particularly germane to the central thesis of this article. After all, this type of religious struggle had been going on for more than a century within Iroquoia.<sup>48</sup> Rather, the presence of these religious figures demonstrates that the Six Nations confronted the same types of issues faced by polities such as the Ottawa and the Delaware. Like their western and southern neighbors, Iroquois could listen to the prophets' message and turn away from the British or could reject the message, thus choosing to remain allied with the British. Those that associated with the British might have to accept the presence of missionaries. Although that presence was not essential, the Indians with whom Johnson worked were those who remained tacitly committed to accommodation. By allowing particular speakers to address their compatriots, Johnson sent a clear message: Those who rejected the prophets' words would receive better treatment than those who did not.

Even if he was not a Christian, Deiaquande represented an important aspect of Johnson's policy toward the participants in the Anglo-Indian War. Those who rejected the nativist message would be rewarded with recognition by the superintendent. This was amply demonstrated during the July 1766 conference between Johnson and the western Indians. When the negotiations began, the superintendent recognized Teata as the leader of the Wyandot. He did so despite evidence that Teata was not the only leader among the Wyandot. Teata was a Christian, but his compatriot, Takey, was not.<sup>49</sup> Johnson dealt with Teata, not with Takey. Teata had joined in the attack against Detroit only after Pontiac and his followers threatened to attack his neutral Wyandot band if they did not enlist in the cause.<sup>50</sup> Having reluctantly joined the war, Teata and his followers were the first to withdraw from the wartime coalition; therefore, in his effort to end the conflict, Johnson negotiated with Teata.<sup>51</sup> Teata, in Johnson's view, represented a rejection of the nativist religion. Again, Johnson's message was clear: Those who rejected the nativist prophecies of Neolin and the other prophets would be rewarded.

The delivery of Deiaquande's message to Pontiac and his followers at the Lake Ontario conference illustrates Superintendent Johnson's reasons for allowing members of the Iroquois Confederacy to participate. In a second speech to the Ottawa,

Deiaquande gave Pontiac a belt that came "from the Warriors" of the confederacy. Deiaquande told Pontiac that, since the message was from the warriors, "this speech is much stronger" than those from the "old chiefs[sic]." The Onondaga warrior told the Ottawa that Six Nations warriors expected the western Indians to "maintain and support" the agreements they had made with Superintendent Johnson.<sup>52</sup> Deiaquande's statement showed all present that, on this occasion, warriors and sachems were in agreement. The confederacy was united. Both established and future Iroquois leaders recognized the benefits of helping Johnson establish control over the western Indians. If the confederacy remained the center of Anglo-Indian policy decisions (and it would as long as Johnson lived), then they would derive benefits denied other, less influential polities.<sup>53</sup>

Deiaquande's belt on behalf of the warriors represents the generational struggle the Anglo-Indian War entailed in Native American societies. Deiaquande gave the belt to Pontiac, not to Teata. Ritually, Deiaquande had reaffirmed what the spokesmen had done. Again, the message was clear: On this issue, the warriors and sachems were in agreement.

For the Indians, the Anglo-Indian War represented more than just a religious struggle and more than a generational struggle for control over policy. Indeed, even more was at stake than the status of the Six Nations in Anglo-Indian relations. After all, factionalism was nothing new to many of these polities; groups like the Shawnee and Delaware had learned to operate outside of confederacy strictures.<sup>54</sup> For the followers of Neolin or other prophets such as Wamgomend, the Anglo-Indian War of 1763 was also an economic struggle. Although the prophets' message was religious, it possessed economic overtones.

Using the notion of "sacred power," the prophets argued that contact with the Europeans had ruined Indian culture. Furthermore, they argued that Indians must break Britain's economic control over their lives; otherwise, Indian peoples would be unable to recapture lost lands, and traditional game would always be scarce. The message suggested that Indians needed to disengage themselves from the colonial-Indian trade. Since the British had stopped supplying the Indians with gunpowder for the hunt, this message received a more sympathetic hearing than it might have a few years earlier.<sup>55</sup> In stressing the need for economic divorce from the Europeans, the prophets also emphasized that Indians and colonists were created separately.<sup>56</sup> This

message of separation challenged those Indians who had committed themselves either to Christianity or to a policy of accommodation with Anglo-Americans.

In emphasizing a separate creation (and implicitly a separate afterlife) for the various ethnic groups making up the colonial landscape, certain nativist adherents, such as those at Wyoming, were also challenging Six Nations claims to political control over the Delaware.<sup>57</sup> This political struggle centered on the role of Teedyuscung and his leadership of eastern Delaware who had moved into the Wyoming Valley (technically territory claimed by the Six Nations in the 1750s).<sup>58</sup> What the Delaware objected to was their subordinate place at the council fire whenever they met with the English in the presence of the Iroquois.

The Delaware's subordinate position was the result of their having been given "skirts" in 1744. The Six Nations, having made the Delaware "women," now claimed responsibility for conducting Delaware diplomacy.<sup>59</sup> It is against the backdrop of this political change in Delaware-Iroquois relations that a female prophet appeared in the 1750s. Emerging out of the heterogeneous community of Wyoming, this female prophet called for a return to Delaware traditional practices. Implicit in her message was a return of Delaware autonomy. The Delaware wanted to disassociate themselves from the Six Nations and the confederacy's foreign policy.<sup>60</sup> This desire for autonomy led some Delaware to ally themselves with the French during the Seven Years War and, later, led some Delaware to join in Pontiac's War in 1763.

How did the Delaware situation relate to the confederacy's presence at Lake Ontario in 1766? In part, the Mohawk and Oneida were the most forceful advocates of accommodation with the English. As early as 1754, other members of the Iroquois Confederacy had complained of the Mohawk's close relationship with Johnson and the English.<sup>61</sup> During the Seven Years War, Six Nations leaders appointed the Mohawk as the guardians of the Delaware and Shawnee, only to have them reject the arrangement.<sup>62</sup> Later (at the 1761 Detroit meeting between Johnson and the western nations), the Ottawa and Huron made it clear that they believed they were the equals of the Mohawk.<sup>63</sup> In 1765 and 1766, the Indians who were standing behind the Indian superintendent became victors, not equals. The most vocal proponents of accommodation stood victorious over their nativist rivals. The message was difficult to miss.

If this interpretation is correct, one can assume a new understanding of the meaning of Johnson's assertion that he hoped to create jealousies between the western nations and the Six Nations.<sup>64</sup> The superintendent wanted to create religious divisions among the polities so that he could work with the accommodationists of the region and build up their influence and power. By building the accommodationists' power among the indigenous communities, Johnson hoped to tacitly establish English hegemony and to use the same model that had evolved between the Six Nations and New York—a working alliance that produced benefits for both sides. Thus, the Six Nations received a special place in Anglo-Indian affairs, and, in return, the English government had a group of Indians with whom it could always negotiate.<sup>65</sup>

Such an interpretation suggests that the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga chose to accompany Johnson to Lake Ontario in 1766 for more than just symbolic reasons. Superintendent Johnson needed them politically. Without confederacy support, Johnson would have trouble accomplishing anything in the Ohio Valley. The Mohawk, for one, recognized this fact. At one meeting between Johnson and the Wyandot and Ottawa, Nickas, the Canajoharie speaker, told the Wyandot that Johnson was extending the Covenant Chain to embrace the western nations. The inference could not be missed. The Covenant Chain ran through Iroquoia, including Canajoharie.<sup>66</sup> In extending English power, Johnson was advancing Six Nations power.

What is often forgotten regarding Johnson's relationship with the Six Nations is that he was as dependent on them as the easternmost members of the confederacy were on him. Without confederacy support, even the most basic functions of the Indian superintendent system—intelligence-gathering, for example—were difficult. This was particularly true in the 1760s. One must remember that the Ohio and Great Lakes region was in a state of demographic, political, and cultural flux during this period.<sup>67</sup> The British had to cope not only with these changes but with a changing cultural milieu for Anglo-Indian relations. At the same time, the British government at Whitehall was undergoing a period of transition. Imperial politicians were attempting to curtail colonial expenses, and, given the removal of a formal French presence in North America, the administration of Indian affairs was an obvious place to cut expenses.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, one of the causes for the Anglo-Indian War was English economic retrenchment.<sup>69</sup> In order to secure his future, Johnson needed Six Nations

support more than ever. Fortunately for him, the Six Nations needed his help, too.

It was for this reason—mutual benefit—that the Six Nations accompanied Johnson to Lake Ontario. They recognized that the Anglo-Indian War of 1763–65 represented more than just a military challenge to British rule in the Ohio and Great Lakes region. The war also challenged the Six Nations' precarious position in Anglo-Indian relations. This war manifested itself in religious, political, and generational forms. Together, Johnson and members of the confederacy worked to undermine those who would challenge British rule. To accomplish their objectives, Johnson and the confederacy established a common cause. Iroquois polities such as the Mohawk, Oneida, and Onondaga faced the same challenges as the British. Their position as the centerpiece of Britain's Indian policy would be undermined if any of the challenges presented to the British succeeded. Therefore, they had a vested interest in seeing the Anglo-Indian War end. They wanted the western Indian nations brought to peace via the Covenant Chain rather than by a new arrangement that bypassed Onondaga. As Johnson needed the confederacy, so the confederacy leaders needed Johnson. This explains why representatives of the various Iroquois nations accompanied Johnson to Lake Ontario in July 1766.

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### NOTES

1. Confederacy members are not mentioned in a listing submitted to the board of trade about who participated in the conference. However, the minutes of this same document mention an Onondaga speech to the Ottawa and



Wyandot assembled for the conference. See E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 vols. (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1853–87): 854, 866. Hereafter cited as *DRCHNY*.

2. Despite Pontiac's assertion, it was Teata, a Wyandot leader, who took hold of the "chain of freindship [sic]." See "Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pondiac [sic] and other Indians," *DRCHNY* 7: 858, 862.

3. Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac: After the Conquest of Canada*, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1870); Howard F. Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947). Peckham claims he is not attempting to "rewrite Parkman"; instead, he is trying to eradicate the notion that the war in question was a "conspiracy." See Peckham, *Pontiac*, x. The War of 1763 is one of the few events mentioned in many college textbooks regarding Native American events in the late colonial period. See, for example, James West Davidson et al., *Nation of Nations: A Narrative History of the American Republic* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 169; Mary Beth Norton et al., *A People and a Nation: A History of the United States*, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 110–11; James Kirby Martin et al., *America and Its People* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 106–107; Paul S. Boyer et al. *The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 133; James A. Henretta et al., *America's History*, 2d ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 1993), 124, 135.

4. See Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 269–314; Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1992), 32–37, 42–45; Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724–1774* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 142–206. In many ways, these recent studies replace earlier attempts, such as Wilbur R. Jacobs, "Was the Pontiac Uprising a Conspiracy," *Ohio History* 59 (1950): 26–37, and Thomas J. Maxwell, "Pontiac Before 1653," *Ethnohistory* 4 (1957): 41–46, to understand Native American motives during the 1760s. In at least one instance, recent scholarship differs with the earlier attempts. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 270n.

5. During the early part of 1763, frontier commanders received information concerning the preliminary peace agreement between France and England. British officers in the West, however, received no orders to acquaint the Indians with the agreement, and the Indians seem to have been notified in a haphazard manner; see "Colonel Henry Bouquet to Colonel William Amherst," in *The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet*, ed. Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent (Harrisburg, PA: Department of Public Instruction, Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1940–43), 132, hereafter cited as *Bouquet Papers*.

6. Richard White, building on the work of Roy Wagner, Anthony Giddens, Marshall Sahlins, and Cornelius J. Jaenan, has shown how the French and Algonquians developed a "middle ground" that was neither wholly French nor Algonquian and the symbolic and ceremonial importance of the terms *father* and *brother* to the French, Algonquian, and Iroquoian peoples of the *pays d'en haut*. Although writing about an earlier period in Algonquian-European relations, White notes, "A father was kind, generous, and protecting. A child owed a father respect, but a father could not compel obedience . . . . Within the alliance, these ritual forms for father and son thus had a built in ambiguity . . . ." This

description is equally applicable to the 1760s. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 84–85, 306.

7. For what the military hoped to accomplish by reducing Indian expenditures, see *Bouquet Papers*, series 21652: 230, "Colonel Henry Bouquet to Colonel George Mercer"; *ibid.*, series 21634: 57, "General Jeffery Amherst to Colonel Bouquet"; *ibid.*, series 21648, 2: 1, "Captain Donald Campbell to Colonel Bouquet." For Amherst's view of reducing Indian expenses, see "Sir Jeffery Amherst to William Johnson," in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, ed. James Sullivan, 14 vols. (Albany, NY: University of the State of New York Press, 1921–65), 3: 345, hereafter cited as *JP*.

8. *JP* 3: 333, "Sir William Johnson to Jeffery Amherst"; also see *ibid* 4: 169, "Johnson to Cadwallader Colden." As Johnson saw it, presents were essential to continued good relations with the Indians. See "Johnson to the Board of Trade," *DRCHNY* 7: 525–27.

9. Amherst believed that presents were unnecessary when dealing with the Indians. He told Johnson, "[W]hen men of what race soever behave ill, they must be punished but not bribed." See *JP* 3: 345, "Sir Jeffery Amherst to William Johnson."

10. For mention of the Indians' belief that the colonists were going to "destroy" the Indians, see *DRCHNY* 7: 525 and 532; for their unhappiness with the construction of British forts in the region, see *JP* 4: 169, "Johnson to Cadwallader Colden." Colin G. Calloway challenges the idea of the haughty British officer in his *Crown and Calumet: British Indian Relations 1783–1815* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 3.

11. *JP* 3: 485, "A Treaty held at D'troit." Among the western Algonquians present were the Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Miami. Representatives of the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mohican nations were also present. See *ibid.*, 3: 475.

12. *JP* 3: 421, "Sir Jeffery Amherst to Johnson."

13. *JP* 3: 330–33, "Sir William Johnson to Sir Jeffery Amherst"; also see *JP* 4: 6, "Sir William Johnson to Governor Horatio Sharpe." In this letter, Johnson tells Sharpe that unless the British begin "shewing [sic] the Indians . . . some favour [sic] & bestowing a few presents," then British policy cannot succeed. For George Croghan's view on the problems associated with Amherst's Indian policy, see "George Croghan to Bouquet," *Bouquet Papers* 2: 177.

14. *Bouquet Papers* 2: 64, "Lieutenant Francis Gordon to Bouquet"; also see "Gratz Collection," case 4, box 9, "Walters to Johnson," Pennsylvania Historical Society.

15. *JP* 3: 421, "Sir Jeffery Amherst to William Johnson."

16. There were rumors of a Seneca warbelt circulating throughout the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region in 1761. Johnson spent much of his 1761 tour through this region trying to ascertain who sent the belt. See *JP* 3: 450, "At a Council held at the Wiandot [sic] Town near Fort Detroit." For Seneca participation in the war itself, the Miami told Johnson that they only joined after "[o]ne of their [the Senecas] Chiefs" had convinced them to join the war. See *JP* 4: 97, "Speech made by the Chiefs of the Miami Indians."

17. For the speeches of the peace conference, see *JP* 11: 313–24, 327–28; for the actual peace terms, see *DRCHNY* 7: 652–53, "Articles of Peace between Sir William Johnson and the Genesee [sic] Indians."

18. See, for example, *An Account of Conferences held and Treaties Made, between Major-General Sir William Johnson, Bart. and the Chief Sachems and Warriours of the . . . Indian Nations in North America* (London: A. Millar, 1756; New York: s.n., 1930), 44–45. Hereafter cited as *An Account of Conferences held and Treaties Made*.

19. "Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade," *DRCHNY* 7: 851.

20. Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988), 451, 261.

21. Michael N. McConnell, "Peoples 'In Between': The Iroquois and the Ohio Indians, 1720–1768," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800*, ed. Daniel K. Richter et al. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 108.

22. Wilbur R. Jacobs. *Francis Parkman, Historian as Hero: The Formative Years* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 76.

23. "Johnson to the Board of Trade," *DRCHNY* 7: 626. Most scholars interpret Johnson's remark as an attempt to solve military affairs. The issue is more complex than just military affairs. By isolating the Mingo, Delaware, and Shawnee from the Ottawa, Wyandot, and Potawatomi, the superintendent's task of counteracting the nativist revival occurring in the region, regulating the trade, and working to pacify disgruntled warriors could be more easily accomplished.

24. The two council fires burned at Onondaga and at Johnson's home. See *JP* 3: 444, "At a Meeting . . . with Several Sachems and Warriors of Onondaga." Johnson established a council fire at Detroit in 1761 when he met with the western nations. Yet he did so with a "brand" from the confederacy's fire and reference to the Covenant Chain. He also established this fire in the presence of Mohawk, Oneida, and Seneca sachems and warriors. See *JP* 3: 476-77, "Proceedings at a Treaty held at D'troit . . . with the Sachems and Warriors . . ."

25. For a copy of the treaty, see *JP* 11: 328–33, "Treaty of Peace."

26. *JP* 11: 329, "At a Treaty."

27. "Johnson to the Board of Trade," *DRCHNY* 7: 575.

28. For a summation of the difficulties Bradstreet's treaty had, see White, *The Middle Ground*, 291–94.

29. *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library*, 20 vols. (Springfield, IL: Illinois State Historical Library, 1903–40), 11: 8.

30. For the peace terms of this treaty, see *DRCHNY* 7: 738–41; for the actual quote, see *ibid.*, 7: 750; and for the Delaware's confirmation of the terms negotiated by Killbuck, see *ibid.*, 7: 754. For a reference to Killbuck's identity, see White, *The Middle Ground*, 295n.

31. For the terms agreed to by Killbuck, Squash Cutter, David, and Long Coat, see "Treaty of Peace Concluded with the Delawares by Sir William Johnson," *DRCHNY* 7: 738–41.

32. What Johnson did not understand initially was that alliance chiefs, at least among the Algonquians, did not claim the ability to command their followers. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 39, 304.

33. The Covenant Chain itself is the subject of tremendous debate. Perhaps the best short description of the Covenant Chain and how it operated is found in Michael N. McConnell's *A Country Between*, 55–58.

34. Richard White argues that Kaske's effort to produce an anti-British alliance in the Illinois produced an ill-timed attack against Sir William Johnson's deputy agent, George Croghan, who had traveled into the Illinois region in

hopes of securing an end to the Anglo-Indian war. The attack had killed not just colonists traveling with Croghan but three Shawnee chiefs. In the months that followed, it appeared that Shawnee, Delaware, and Iroquois warriors would avenge the chiefs' deaths along the Wabash, and the villagers of the Wabash region needed someone to mediate on their behalf. Enter Pontiac, and so it was that Pontiac met with Johnson at Lake Ontario in July 1766 in his role as "alliance chief," a role that not only the Wabash villagers but also Sir William Johnson and General Thomas Gage wanted Pontiac to play. See White, *The Middle Ground*, 301–305.

35. Thomas J. Maxwell, citing the "Journal of Occurrences in Canada," concludes that the Ottawa were divided in their loyalty to various leaders. See Maxwell, "Pontiac Before 1763," 41–44. For a discussion of Johnson's and Croghan's attempt to make Pontiac an alliance chief, see White, *The Middle Ground*, 300, 302–305. For a short examination of alliance chiefs, see *ibid.*, 175–85, especially 175–77.

36. Amherst wrote Johnson, "I am sorry to find, that you are Apprehensive, that the Indians are Brewing something privately amongst them; If it is Mis-chief, it will fall on their own Heads, with a Powerful and Heavy Hand; and I am hopeful they are not so Blind . . ." See JP 3: 421, "Sir Jeffery Amherst to William Johnson." Also see Canadian Archives, *Bouquet Papers A 4*, 223–35.

37. DRCHNY 7: 582–84. For how both Johnson and George Croghan reacted, see JP 4: 6, and J.C. Long, *Lord Jeffery Amherst: A Soldier of the King* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1933), 183.

38. For an examination of this nativist revival during Pontiac's War, see Gregory Evans Dowd, "The French King Wakes Up in Detroit: 'Pontiac's War' in Rumor and History," *Ethnohistory* 37:3 (1990): 254–71; for how Pontiac altered Neolin's message, see pages 259–60. Also see Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 35–36, and Jacobs, *Francis Parkman, Historian as Hero*, 80.

39. Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 29.

40. Michael N. McConnell, "Peoples 'In Between,'" 98.

41. "At a Conference . . . with the Shawanese [sic] Mingoës of Ohio and Delawares," DRCHNY 7: 757.

42. JP 3: 439, "Jeffery Amherst to William Johnson."

43. JP 3: 466–67, "At a Meeting of the Mohocks [sic] & Oneidas with the Senecas."

44. "At a Conference . . . with the Shawanese Mingoës of Ohio & Delawares," DRCHNY 7: 757.

45. Anthony F.C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York: Vintage, 1969) 121, 117.

46. JP 13: 218–19, "Journal to Detroit." For a short summary of Samson Occom's educational background, the role of the First Great Awakening in his life, and his connection with Eleazar Wheelock, see Margaret Connell Szasz, *Indian Education in the American Colonies, 1607–1783* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 191–201. For a discussion of how the religious struggle affected the Six Nations after Pontiac's War, see Barbara Graymont, *The Iroquois and the American Revolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1972), 33–47.

47. James P. Rhonda, "Reverend Samuel Kirkland and the Oneida Indians," in *The Oneida Indian Experience: Two Perspectives*, ed. Jack Campisi et al. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 24.

48. See, for example, Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: Jesuit Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642–1686," *Ethnohistory* 31:1(1984): 1–12.

49. M. Agnes Burton, ed., *Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy 1763* (Detroit, MI: Clarence Monroe Burton, 1912), 18.

50. *Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy 1763*, 80.

51. "Proceedings of Sir William Johnson and Pontiac and other Indians," *DRCHNY* 7: 854–66. Teata was the Wyandot spokesman who responded to Johnson's initial speech, and only after Teata spoke did Pontiac respond to Johnson.

52. "Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with Pontiac and other Indians," *DRCHNY* 7: 864.

53. This is what happened. At the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768), the only Indian polity specifically exempted from having to observe the boundary line drawn was the Mohawk. Other groups, such as the Delaware, were ordered westward. Whatever one thinks of the Fort Stanwix Treaty, the Mohawk received special privileges. See "Deed determining the Boundary Line between the Whites and Indians," *DRCHNY* 8: 135.

54. For an example of Delaware independence, see Anthony F.C. Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung 1700-1763* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1949), 149–60, especially 151–55. For a theoretical examination of factionalism among Indian communities, see Robert F. Berkhofer, "Faith and Factionalism among the Senecas: Theory and Ethnohistory," *Ethnohistory* 12:1(1965): 99–112. For a discussion of factionalism in Indian society as a whole, see Robert F. Berkhofer, "The Political Context of a New Indian History," *Pacific Historical Review* 40:3 (1971): 357–82.

55. *JP* 3: 345, "Amherst to Johnson"; for a discussion of the curtailment of ammunition and gunpowder to the Indians, see "Johnson to the Lords of Trade," *DRCHNY* 7: 575.

56. Although not specifically part of this particular revival, the Creek account of human creation demonstrates that many Indian people identified a common experience among Indians, Europeans, and, though not part of this particularly study, Africans:

Three Indians were once out hunting. One went after water and found a nice hole of water but was afraid to drink. Another went down to it, dipped his fingers in, and said, "It is good. Let us go into it." So he dived in and came out. When he came out he was white. From him came the white people. The second dived in and came out darker because the water was somewhat [muddy]. From him came the Indians. The third dived in and came out black because the water was now very [muddy]. From him came the Negroes . . . .

Cited in Charles Hudson, ed. *Red, White, and Black: Symposium on Indians in the Old South* (Athens, GA: Southern Anthropological Society/University of Georgia Press, 1971), 1.

57. Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 29; for another discussion of Delaware nativist revivals, see Charles E. Hunter, "The Delaware Nativist Revival of the Mid-Eighteenth Century," *Ethnohistory* 18:1 (1971): 39–47.

58. For a discussion of Teedyuscung, his relationship with the Six Nations, and the Six Nations' reasons for inviting the Delaware to the Wyoming Valley, see Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 262–67, 171–280.

59. Many scholars have mentioned the Delaware's status as "women." As "women," the Delaware were not responsible for the continuing negotiations that took place between European leaders and the "male" Iroquois. European observers transformed the Delaware's status into a stigmatization; see Jay Miller, "The Delaware as Women: A Symbolic Solution," *American Ethnologist* 1 (1974): 508, 513. For earlier discussions of the Delaware position, see Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Woman, Land, and Society: Three Aspects of Aboriginal Delaware Life," *Pennsylvania Archaeologist* 17:1 (1947): 1–35; C.A. Weslager, "The Delaware Indians as Women," *Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences* 34:12 (1944): 381–88; "Further Light on the Delaware Indians as Women," *Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences* 37:9 (1947): 298–304. For a discussion of the connivance of Pennsylvania politicians, see Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 301–302, 322–24. For the problems this "skirt" caused Sir William Johnson, see Wallace, *King of the Delawares*, 98–100, 152.

60. Gregory Evans Dowd sees the woman's appearance as a challenge to the Wyoming leadership that was "bound to the powerful Six Nations Iroquois to the north." Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 30. For a short discussion of Delaware attempts to undermine Six Nations hegemony, see C.A. Weslager, *The Delaware Indian Westward Migration* (Wallingford, NJ: Middle Atlantic Press, 1978), 20–21.

61. *DRCHNY* 6: 867. During the Albany Congress (1754), some Indian participants accused the Mohawk of being "Coll. Johnson's Councillors [sic] . . ." For a discussion of this incident, see Michael J. Mullin, "The Albany Congress and Colonial Confederation," *Mid-America: An Historical Review* 72:2 (1990): 102–103.

62. *An Account of Conferences held and Treaties Made*, 44–45.

63. *JP* 3: 488. Anaiasa, the Huron spokesman, told the Mohawk, "[W]e beg you will consider that this Alliance which you have made is not an inconsiderable one, being made with all the Nations of the North [the Iroquois] and West [Huron, Ottawa, and Potawatomis, Miamis, and many more]." For a list of all of the western Indians present, see *ibid.*, 3: 475.

64. "Johnson to the Lords of Trade," *DRCHNY* 7: 626.

65. Johnson sent confederacy war parties against the Delaware during the Anglo-Indian War, in part to try to satisfy colonial officials' demands that the Six Nations be punished just like other Indian groups. Yet, by sending these war parties, Johnson further divided the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo from the Onondaga Confederacy. For reports of these war parties, see *DRCHNY* 7: 625–26. The first was during the Seven Years War and the second occurred during the Anglo-Indian War of 1763–65. For details regarding colonial demands that the confederacy be punished, see "Cadwallader Colden to the Earl of Halifax," *The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden 1711–1775*, 9 vols. (New York: New York Historical Society, 1918–37), 2: 209.

66. "Niagara and Detroit Proceedings [1761]," *JP* 3: 481.

67. For a brief history of the demographic and political changes occurring in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region, see Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed.,

*Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 43–47.

68. See, for example, Peter Marshall, "Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy 1764–1768," *Journal of American Studies* 5:1 (1971): 1–17.

69. *Bouquet Papers* 2: 64.