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Chinatown Urbanism: Architecture, Migrancy, and Modernity in East Asia

by

Sujin Eom

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Architecture

and the Designated Emphasis

in

Global Metropolitan Studies

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Nezar AlSayyad, Chair

Professor C. Greig Crysler

Professor Aihwa Ong

Professor John Lie

Spring 2017

Chinatown Urbanism: Architecture, Migrancy, and Modernity in East Asia

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by

Sujin Eom

Abstract

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Sujin Eom

Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Nezar AlSayyad, Chair

This dissertation examines transnational spaces of Chinatowns as a point of departure to reflect upon the production of architecture and urbanism on a global scale. More specifically, I trace the genealogy of "Chinatown" in East Asia—how a Chinatown has evolved into a distinct urban type, how it has been created as a discrete category which seems to exhibit inherent propensities, and how it has been mobilized to forge a different kind of space of governance. Contrary to the popular conception of architecture as a material form grounded and fixed in a particular locale, architecture and the built environment have often been the product of moving ideas and practices that migrate across different cultural and geographic contexts. It is also important to note that such traveling of ideas and practices is mediated by human and non-human actors alike, ranging from architects, planners, and researchers to materials, ideas, and images. While illuminating how different modes of global connectivity have enabled practices to build and govern new urban space to travel, this dissertation sheds light on the underexplored role of affect and sentiment as integral to the mobility of built form.

This dissertation identifies three important historical shifts shaping and reshaping Chinatowns in East Asia: 1) the opening of East Asian ports to foreign trade and commerce in the late nineteenth century; 2) the onset of the Cold War upon the collapse of the Japanese empire; and 3) China's (re)opening to global capitalism in post-Cold War East Asia. Drawing from a combined methodology of archival research and ethnography, my analytical focus is primarily placed on how people, things, and affects become circulated at new historical junctures, how people feel while encountering with novel spaces and objects, and how things come into play when people try to make sense of their places in a changing world. I argue that the global production and circulation of affects, closely associated with the geopolitical context in which they take place, have played a significant role in governing Chinese space and subjectivity, making Chinatown as a distinct urban "type"—a self-contained entity imagined to represent a different space of governance. I further contend that it is also the capacity of affect to propel action that enables Chinese residents to question the static meanings attached to their spaces, bring in materials and ideas from elsewhere, and thus redefine the idea of Chinatown.

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Acknowledgements

I spent most of my childhood in Jeju, the southernmost island of South Korea. I grew up with things Japanese—electronic products, toys, novels, movies, snacks, even stories of those who had moved to Japan for economic opportunity, hoping for a better life. My friends and I absorbed Japanese pop culture from the very early age—X-Japan, Amuro Namie, Zard—we bought their CDs in the black market, before the ban of Japanese culture was finally lifted during the Kim Dae-jung administration, as part of "globalization" strategy. In the spring of 1998, when HIDE—a bassist from X-Japan—allegedly committed suicide, I decided not to go to school in commemoration of the death of my teenager hero. Although I had never visited the country at that point, Japan was already part of my everyday life, embedded in my emotional landscape.

And by now, after years of graduate study, I have come to recognize the particularity of my experience. It unfolded in a spatially embedded specificity of local place—the Jeju island. Isolated and set apart from the mainstream history of the peninsula, the island had cultivated its unique history, not in affiliation with Korea, but with somewhere else, Japan. To South Koreans, Jeju represented communism, underdevelopment, and exoticism, and yet its political, economic and cultural marginality paradoxically enabled the people there to develop transnational ties elsewhere. Some took the risk of crossing the sea, often in an illicit manner, to seek economic opportunity in Japan. Some died while attempting the passage from Korea to Japan; others ended up forming ethnic "ghettos" in Osaka and Yokohama. These migrants would send remittances from Japan to their home villages, which made a great contribution to the development of public infrastructure on the island. There must be plenty of explanation behind this transregional trajectory of migration, from internal marginalization and geographical proximity to the presence of ethnic networks and fluctuations of regional economies. In any case, it was not merely my personal experience but collective one.

Whenever I was asked how I began to study "Chinatowns" despite my non-Chinese identity, I hesitated to answer. On the one hand, I wanted to free myself from the problematic link that is often made between a researcher's identity and his or her chosen object of study. Recalling the curious moment when Korean cities came to capitalize on the idea of Chinatown in the 2000s, I was also anxious about somehow implicating myself in appropriative opportunism. However, it is probably because, given my own experience of place and identity, I wanted to unravel the entanglement concerning migration and place. Also, it must be that I wished to show, by surveying a number of unnamed individuals and their feelings, how a seemingly isolated locality is actually connected to the outer world, which may not be recorded in official documents but etched on things and places. I hope that this dissertation has provided, though partially, the answers.

During my graduate years, I have owed a great deal to many people. First of all, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my advisor and mentor, Nezar AlSayyad. Since our first encounter in Fall 2009 before I started the PhD program at Berkeley, he has never failed to find my potential in my work. There were a couple of moments when I felt overwhelmed about the scope of my research, but he always encouraged me to realize the

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INTRODUCTION

> *Modern and Clean* Chinatown—this was the phrase that I initially had in mind when I started to build a new Chinatown. But there was a possibility that the term "clean" might lead to misinterpretation, so I replaced it with "green." I also added another term, "planned."

While I was driving, Mr. Park spoke about how he started his Chinatown development project in Seoul after the financial crisis of 1997. In the fall of 2014, I had contacted him several times, but the developer was so busy that I ended up driving about 50 miles south to Cheonan to pick him up and interview him while driving back to Seoul. He explained that when he first conceptualized a "modern and clean" Chinatown, he wanted to make it distinguishable from old Chinatowns such as those in San Francisco and New York—what he would later refer to as "ghettos." When he said, "lead to misinterpretation," Park was anticipating the response of mainland Chinese investors who might take offense if he were to use the word "clean" to promote a new Chinatown. "Green," on the other hand, seemed neutral, without any derogatory cultural baggage, a term in sync with the changing urban paradigm. And as for the last adjective, "planned," certainly no one could take issue with a "planned" development.

Within its rhetorical grasp, Park's language captures the affective crux of "Chinatown," an imagined geography entangled with different temporalities and spatialities. The promotional phrase, deliberately calculated to appeal to potential Chinese investors and tourists, sets itself in opposition to another Chinatown, a distinct urban archetype that is allegedly neither modern, clean, green, nor planned, a place nonetheless well-established as a self-contained ethnic enclave. Park's vision for Chinatown development, especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis, is part of a complex imagining that continues to shift as Korean cities leverage their aspirations against traditional, and often negatively valenced, notions of Chinatown.

As of 2016, a dozen other local governments have been considering or are constructing new, large-scale Chinatowns in South Korea. In the development process, their commissioners have made several study tours of Chinatowns abroad, hosted international symposia to invite Chinatown-related experts, or entered into partnerships with Chinese investors. One way to interpret this new phenomenon is to read it as a function of the globalizing economy or neoliberal urbanism, which often remains faceless. However, such an account cannot fully comprehend the complexity inherent in "Chinatown" as a real and imagined place where complex and sometimes conflicting sensibilities—especially those stirred in relation to South Korea's once-imperial-and-communist neighboring country—are etched on people, things, and places.

This dissertation traces the genealogy of "Chinatown" in East Asia—how a Chinatown has evolved into a distinct urban "type." In order to look at the multifaceted dimension of Chinatown straddling different temporalities and spatialities, I take a cross-historical and trans-regional approach by examining nineteenth-century Chinese Settlements in East Asia's treaty ports, ethnic enclaves during the Cold War, and contemporary Chinatowns

in the post-Cold War years. In the Oxford English Dictionary, "type" refers to "a *category* of people or things having common characteristics." I also pay attention to one of its secondary definitions: "a pattern or *model* after which something is made."[1] Taken together, these denotations provide analytical insight into the idea of Chinatown: how it has been created as a discrete category which seems to exhibit inherent propensities and how it has been mobilized to forge a different kind of space of governance.

In tracing the history of Chinatown in East Asia, my dissertation situates the space within the transnational flow of architectural and urban forms. While highlighting the underexplored role of affect and sentiment as integral to the mobility of built form, the dissertation explores how East Asia's Chinatowns have intersected with networks of global trade and travel, shifting modes of spatial governance and shaping the movement of people and things.

Global Connectivity and the Mobility of Built Form

Moving Chinatowns beyond nationally-contained frameworks, this dissertation takes transnational spaces of Chinatowns as a point of departure to reflect upon the production of architecture and urbanism on a global scale. It is not my intention, however, to revise history by presenting an encyclopedia of site-specific case studies on architecture and the built environment across the globe. To write history of architecture and urbanism from a global perspective, one must approach the subject as a methodological question.[2] As Dell Upton has rightly noted, at stake is not what to write, but *how* to write architectural history.[3] It would be futile if the chain of assumptions, boundaries, and categories that underpin conventional architectural history remains unchallenged. It is therefore necessary to look at specific forms of transregional "webs and flows"[4] that enabled the production of architecture and urbanism on a global scale.

Architectural and urban forms in general are regarded as "material, fixed and enduring entities."[5] Contrary to the popular conception of architecture as a material form grounded and fixed in a particular locale, however, architecture and the built environment have in fact always been the product of moving ideas and practices that migrate across different cultural and geographic contexts.[6] It is also important to note how such transfer of ideas and practices is mediated by human and non-human actors alike, ranging from architects,

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[1] I referenced two different Oxford dictionaries: Oxford Living Dictionaries and Oxford English Dictionary.
[2] Swati Chattopadhyay, "The Globality of Architectural History," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 74, no. 4 (2015): 413.
[3] Dell Upton, "Starting from Baalbek: Noah, Solomon, Saladin, and the Fluidity of Architectural History," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 68, no. 4 (2009): 457-465.
[4] Ibid., 465.
[5] Michael Guggenheim and Ola Söderström, "Introduction: Mobility and the Transformation of Built Form," in *Re-Shaping Cities: How Global Mobility Transforms Architecture and Urban Form* (London: Routledge, 2010), 3.
[6] Stephen Cairns, ed. *Drifting: Architecture and Migrancy* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2004); Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Anthony King, *The Bungalow: The Production of a Global Culture* (London; Routledge, 1984)

planners, and researchers to materials, ideas, and images.[7] Recent scholarship has called into question an approach that looks at architectural and urban history as a nationally-contained entity and instead emphasized entanglements of different temporalities and spatialities. The "mobility turn" in social sciences also helps rethink bounded assumptions about place as a discrete, self-contained "space-envelope,"[8] questioning the long-held truism that place holds an iconoclastic *genius loci*. More emphasis is now placed on "the dependence of the city on multiple elsewheres"[9] and "how the *here* in the built environment is always also an *elsewhere.*"[10] In sum, architectural and urban forms are not assumed to be fixed entities confined to a particular locality, but rather, the product of routes, channels, and networks which are a function of different historical conjunctures.

The movement of architectural and urban forms across different regions in East Asia is not a phenomenon peculiar to the modern period, especially when one considers the transregional commerce and trade taking place as early as the sixteenth century.[11] However, the radical development of communications and transport technologies—telegraphs, railroads, steamships, photography— in the nineteenth century made a significant impact on this movement by increasing its speed and widening its scope. One of the most prominent changes was the increased maritime connection. As early as the sixteenth century, different parts of the world began to be connected, especially between Europe and Asia, by the Dutch and the Portuguese who founded trading outposts in Southeast Asian coastal cities, or by Muslim merchants who frequented China's southern ports across the Indian Ocean. By way of contrast, the nineteenth century altered spatial concepts more broadly by giving rise to "transpacific" maritime connections between East Asia and the Americas. Technological development and competition in the shipping industry was the driving force behind this new flow. In 1867, the San Francisco-based Pacific Mail Steamship Company (PMSSC) began its first transpacific service by operating a passenger liner between San Francisco and Hong Kong, whose trip via Yokohama took almost a month.[12] Before long other shipping companies followed suit, including those flying with Japanese, Chinese, and Korean flags.

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[7] Tom Avemaete, "Nomadic Experts and Travelling Perspectives: Colonial Modernity and the Epistemological Shift in Modern Architecture Culture," in *Colonial Modern: Aesthetics of the Past, Rebellions for the Future*, edited by Tom Avermaete, Serhat Karakayali and Marion von Osten (London: Black Dog, 2010), 130-151; Ken Tadashi Oshima, *International Architecture in Interwar Japan: Constructing Kokusai Kenchiku* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).

[8] John Urry, *Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge, 2000); Mimi Sheller and John Urry, "The New Mobilities Paradigm," *Environment and Planning A* 38 (2006): 207-226; Tim Edensor, "Building Stone in Manchester: Networks of Materiality, Circulating Matter and the Ongoing Constitution of the City," in *Re-Shaping Cities: How Global Mobility Transforms Architecture and Urban Form*, (London: Routledge. 2010), 214.

[9] Edensor, "Building Stone," 213.

[10] Guggenheim and Söderström, "Introduction," 3.

[11] Frank Broeze, ed. *Gateways of Asia: Port cities of Asia in the 13th-20th Centuries* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1997).

[12] Elizabeth Sinn, "Hong Kong as an In-between Place in the Chinese Diaspora 1849-1939," in *Connecting Seas and Connected Ccean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s*, edited by Donna R Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 229; Christopher

It was not only passengers that moved along the newly created routes. New materials, ideas, and even diseases also circulated among ports and created a new sense of space. The rapid development of technologies of transmission began to connect the world in an unprecedented way, thereby facilitating the expansion of architectural forms, ideas, and standards. Imperialism and colonialism were another potent force shaping encounters. Colonial networks were forged across metropole and colony, circulating architects and planners across regions and contributing to the emergence of hybrid architecture.[13] For instance, a number of Korean students went to Japan to study architecture and came back to work for the colonial government, whereas Japanese architects also moved to the colony to seek professional opportunities. The architectural journal *Chosen to kenchiku* (Korea and Architecture), published in colonial Korea by Japanese and Korean architects starting in the 1920s, served as a platform for discussion of how modern and scientific architectural ideas and forms could accommodate the colonial environment.

The mid-20th century witnessed a global transition from a world of empires to a world of nation-states. While some may regard the period as one of relatively closed borders, it in fact brought together different urban entities by creating new connective routes. As new national governments sought to reconfigure the spatial order of existing cities for the purposes of nation-building, the search for power and new identity was largely influenced by spatial models from elsewhere, including the latest technologies and transportation modes such as highways.[14] The dissemination of the International Style as well as the widespread use of concrete characterized this period, yet what is significant is the competition based on the bipolar world order. The Cold War competition between the two superpowers—the United States and the USSR—was manifested even in domestic space by demarcating "domesticity as a weapon" for ideology.[15] In East Asia, for instance, America's foreign policy goal of containing communist China affected trade routes and relations, thereby making an impact on architectural and urban ideas. North American and Western European cities became the urban models in the capitalist bloc, whereas the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China played a crucial role in the reconstruction of North Korea. In this way, the Cold War reconfigured connective routes through which architectural and urban ideas, capital, experts, and technologies were transferred.

The capitalist crisis of the early 1970s brought another dimension to the mobility of built form. New global markets which opened up as a consequence gave rise to the

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Lee Yip, "San Francisco's Chinatown: An Architectural and Urban History," PhD Dissertation (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 1985), 107.

[13] Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Nezar AlSayyad, ed. *Forms of Dominance on the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992); Abidin Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space, and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2000); Stephen V. Ward, "Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World," in *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*, edited by Patsy Healey and Robert Upton (London: Routledge, 2010), 47-72.

[14] Anthony King, *Spaces of Global Cultures: Architecture, Urbanism, Identity* (London: Routledge, 2004).

[15] Greg Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Jeffrey W. Cody, *Exporting American Architecture, 1870-2000* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

"consciousness" of the world as a single place.[16] Significant changes took place in architectural production on a global scale, including the removal of barriers in the building and planning sector.[17] In East Asia, the lifting of the "bamboo curtain" in the 1970s brought about renewed connectivity in the region. People came to move across the formerly closed borders, as did new images and ideas. The discursive rise of "postmodernity" is another characteristic element,[18] and a new language of architecture and urban space has since emerged in opposition to the wholesale push for modernization. "Heritage" and "Green" have come into use as new idioms of urban governance, especially in cities once subject to drastic processes of industrialization, and locality has also come into focus in the discussion of architecture.[19] Modernist buildings and structures are now being perceived as eyesores and thus replaced with new urban forms such as urban creeks and green parks.[20]

Michael Guggenheim and Ola Söderström identify four constitutive elements of the moblity of built form: people, types, media, and materials. First, human agents, such as colonial settlers, architects, engineers, planners, missionaries, and travelers, are well-known examples of transfer agents of built form. Second, types, which refer to "abstractions of built form and human activities,"[21] include "building types" such as bank, villa, church, and prison, or "urban types" such as Shanghai's Pudong, representative of a new image of a financial district, and the idea of a global city itself.[22] Third, media serve as another important element constitutive of the mobile built form, transmitting and transferring images (drawings, maps, photographs, films) and words (journals, newspapers, travel diaries). Especially in visual disciplines such as architecture and urban planning, the role of media is highly significant: architects and planners make the most of mass media in order to express their visions as well as promote themselves to the international audience.[23] Guggenheim and Söderström point to building materials as the fourth element, which not only include individual materials such as concrete and glass but also building parts such as window and door or, to a lesser extent, whole buildings.[24]

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[16] Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).
[17] Xuefei Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
[18] Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990).
[19] Kenneth Frampton, "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance," in *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, edited by Hal Foster (Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983), 16-30.
[20] Jordan Sand, *Tokyo Vernacular: Common Spaces, Local Histories, Found Objects* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).
[21] Guggenheim and Söderström, "Introduction," 5
[22] Anthony D. King, "Notes Towards a Global Historical Sociology of Buildling Types," in *Re-Shaping Cities: How Global Mobility Transforms Architecture and Urban Form*, edited by Michael Guggenheim and Ola Söderström (London: Routledge, 2010), 21-42.
[23] Beatriz Colomina, *Privacy and Publicity: Modern Architecture as Mass Media* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
[24] For further discussion on the cultural history of imported building materials such as concrete, see Adrian Forty, *Concrete and Culture: A Material History* (London: Realtion Books, 2012).

Guggenheim and Söderström's identification of different constitutive elements brings clairty to this notion of the mobility of built form. Apparently, these constitutive elements do not stand alone but combine with each other. For instance, Korean architects and planners in the 1960s (people) traveled to North American and Western European cities, where they took pictures of buildings and structures (media), signed contracts with foreign companies for new building materials (materials), and imported new urban elements such as elevated highways (types).

What seems to be missing in their discussion of these elements, however, is the constitutve role of *power relations* in the mobility of built form. The point is that power operates differently in its "relation *to* the flows and the movement."[25] Why did it have to be North American or Western European cities that Japanese and Korean mayors visited to learn, not vice versa? Connectivity is not "an abstract issue" but "an expression of power relations."[26] It is in this sense that the mobilty of built form should be understood as "a sociospatial power-laden process" by which seemingly static building types and materials acquire different meanings as they travel across regions and land in different localities.[27] How have different modes of global connectivity influenced geopolitics, thereby enabling technologies to build, manage, and govern new urban space to travel?

Equally important yet overlooked is how something considered irrational such as *affect* and *sentiment* has played a role in the production and circulation of built form.[28] Not only have people, types, media, and materials moved around to create new forms of spatial governance, but affect itself has also traveled along with the movement of individuals as well as things such as texts. While often used interchangeably with similar concepts such as emotion and feeling, affect is differentiated from these terms and understood as a *transcorporal* domain. According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, feelings become affects when they are "uprooted from the interiority of a 'subject,' to be projected violently toward into a milieu of pure exteriority that lends them an incredible velocity, a catapulting force."[29] While emotion is more or less confined to an individual experience, affect refers to "the corporeal intensity" that has the capacity to transform people, "flow between bodies by circulation, transmission and contagion," and enable "the removal of

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[25] Doreen B. Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 149.
[26] Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Friederike Kuntz, "Connectivity as Problem: Security, Mobility, Liberals, and Christians," in *Security/Mobility: Politics of Movement*, edited by Matthias Leese and Stef Wittendorp (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 20.
[27] Eugene McCann and Kevin Ward, "Introduction: Urban Assemblages: Territories, Relations, Practices, and Power," in *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), xxii.
[28] For further discussion on affect, see Teresa Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Kathleen Stewart, *Ordinary Affects* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007); Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds. *The Affect Theory Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Lauren Gail Berlant, *Cruel Optimism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Brian Massumi, *Politics of Affect* (Malden: Polity, 2015), 154.
[29] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 356.

boundaries between human and nonhuman."[30] In other words, as Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg point out, affects are forces that can *drive* bodies toward *movement*.[31]

What one might call the "affective turn" in the 1990s has been instrumental in dismantling body-mind dualisms or human-nonhuman boundaries, because the discussion of affect is related to the problematizing of the habit of thinking that there is such thing as the "interiority" of a subject. In analyzing the built environment, this theoretical construct has two implications. First, place does not have inherent propensities in and of itself, or an iconoclastic *genius loci*. Nor is it a space-envelope which has definite boundaries. Second, place is far from being a pre-given, self-contained entity but always in a constant state of *becoming* in relation to something else, human or nonhuman.

Affect produces and is produced by the built environment.[32] The making, or unmaking, of monuments, graveyards, cenotaphs, mausoleums, and museums for purposes of producing certain emotional responses is a good example. Without taking into account this emotive domain, one cannot fully comprehend the ways in which power operates. For instance, the Japanese colonial governance was not merely about military domination over and administratve restructuring of the new territory. Instead, it actively intervened in the intimate domain of its subjects by building Japanese shrines at the heart of the colonial city and governing the *mind* so that the colonial subjects could identify with the imperial house through "spiritual assimilation."[33]

The manipulation of affect was also instrumental in postcolonial states, which strove to establish legitimacy by harnessing emotive ties to architectural symbols in a way that would conjure up the image of a unified nation.[34] Among the well-known projects during the miltary regime of Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) was the redefining of "traditional" architecture and national heritage.[35] The military government invested a great deal of money in the historical preservation of traditional architecture, of palace and temple, thereby conneting the postcolonial present to the pre-colonial past and legitimating the regime as a rightful successor of the Korean nation. In "producing a past" that would make it look like a unified nation,[36] the postcolonial state also produced various affective atmospheres such as museums, in which people, places, and things that did not fit well into the formation of national identity were deliberately excised from the community of "sentiment."

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[30] Setha Low, *Spatializing Culture: The Ethnography of Space and Place* (London: Routledge, 2017), 152.
[31] Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, "An Inventory of Shimmers," *The Affect Theory Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 1.
[32] Low, *Spatializing Culture*, 154.
[33] Todd A. Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).
[34] Lawrence J. Vale, *Architecture, Power, and National Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
[35] In a sense, the military regime "invented" tradition. Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
[36] Timothy Mitchell, "Making the Nation: The Politics of Heritage in Egypt," in *Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage: Global Norms and Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism*, edited by Nezar AlSayyad (London: Routledge, 2001), 212.

In this way, affect plays an important role in governance—spatial, social, and political—which is by no means confined to the domain of rationality. In other words, governance can be "sensorial."[37] What Ann Stoler terms "affective states" conveys this constitutive role of affect in statecraft.[38] Against the grain of the Weberian account of government, which emphasizes the rationalization of bureaucracy and detachment of emotions from it, Stoler points out that the rationality of the modern state has in fact been achieved through governing "sentiments."[39] What Nigel Thrift calls "engineering of affect"[40] is also a manifestation of how the built environment can serve as a site where sentiments are expressed, enacted, and engineered for political purposes, such as nation-building projects.[41]

In this regard, my dissertation seeks to explore how Chinatowns have become the locus for new modes of spatial governance, both in colonial and postcolonial contexts, manifested through built form at different historical conjunctures. I do this by emphasizing the role of affect in the constitution of Chinatowns.

Chinatown Urbanism: Connectivity, Governance, and Affect

In my dissertation, I trace global, transpacific in particular, connections in the constitution of East Asia's Chinatowns. Despite the historical significance embedded in the formation and development of Chinese settlements as a uniquely global form, I contend that the full import of these processes has not been recognized, not in the least because of the narrow scope scholars have taken in history and geography alike, thereby failing to engage in dialogue with Chinatowns that simultaneously came to develop elsewhere outside the West. Most importantly, much of the scholarship has paid little attention to the global reach of Chinatowns, instead confining the scope of analysis to the "Western" city.[42] Within this domain of study, it is hard to explicate why similar practices of producing and representing Chinatowns were concurrently found in the non-Western cities, such as Japan and Korea. My intention is thus to situate East Asia's Chinatowns in a complex web of translocal flows of people, materials, ideas, and affects in order to show how the formation and transformation of Chinatowns has intersected with important historical conjunctures which witnessed new architectural and urban forms. In this regard, I highlight relational approaches to understanding the production of space and architecture in a global context.

What I term Chinatown urbanism thus involves paradoxes of global connection manifested in urban space, where searches for power and identity shape and are shaped

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[37] Yael Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar* Polity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
[38] Ann Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
[39] Ibid.
[40] Nigel Thrift, "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect," *Geografiska Annaler* 86, no. 1 (2004): 57-78.
[41] Christina Schwenkel, "Post/Socialist Affect: Ruination and Reconstruction of the Nation in Urban Vietnam," *Cultural Anthropology* 28, no. 2 (2013): 235-258.
[42] Kay Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875-1980* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).

by transnational flows of ideas and people. Nowhere are these paradoxes more evident than in port cities, which have long been the primary locus of long-distance trade as well as an important route for migration through which travelers, immigrants, and others moved back and forth. Port cities have also subsequently witnessed the development of infrastructures of migration established therein, including hotels, boarding houses, ticket offices, waiting facilities, and eating houses.[43] Due to their "node" functions within networks of trade and travel, port cities "render visible the multiple flows of people, goods and finances," including architectural materials and ideas.[44] At the same time, ports have functioned as the control site for migration, thereby exerting social inclusion and exclusion over migrant populations.[45] It is thus no wonder that ports in the late nineteenth century at the intersection of the expansion of global capitalism and state-formation were the primary sites to facilitate yet at the same time restrict movements of people and things.

That historic Chinatowns across the globe, from San Francisco and Vancouver to Yokohama and Incheon, tend to be located within port cities, further reveals paradoxical aspects of global connectivity. Developed along networks of trade and travel, Chinatowns have served as conduits for the circulation of new architectural materials, ideas, and imaginaries. But at the same time, Chinatowns have also been subject to various state policies and practices that seek to impose order and meaning on urban space, from control over migration in rapidly modernizing cities to nation-building projects undertaken after decolonization. Therefore, one needs to understand the complexity of what is often lumped together as Chinatown by unpacking the seemingly oppositional forces of encounter surrounding the urban phenomenon.

The new technology of mobility in the nineteenth century, which increasingly linked coastal cities across the Pacific, came with the introduction to East Asia of the modern mode of trade and commerce known as the "treaty port system" to East Asia. First implemented in China's coastal ports—Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai—upon the treaty signed between China and the United Kingdom after the Opium War in 1842, the treaty port system spread further to other coastal cities in Japan and Korea. The treaty port system involves a wide array of legal institutions and practices, from regulations for the conduct of trade to establishments of fixed rates for tariffs, which enabled Asian coastal ports to become hubs of commerce and trade with foreign subjects.[46] The treaty port system was a characteristically *modern* institution unique to East Asia. Not only did it transform the economic order of the region "from tributary to treaty,"[47] it also created the modern conception of space in a rapidly

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[43] Carola Hein, "Port Cityscapes: A Networked Analysis of the Built Environment," in *Port Cities: Dynamic Landscapes and Global Networks*, edited by Carola Hein, 1-23 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 11.
[44] Hein, "Port Cityscapes," 7.
[45] Lars Amenda, "China-towns and Container Terminals: Shipping Networks and Urban Patterns in Port Cities in Global and Local Perspective, 1880-1980," in *Port Cities: Dynamic Landscapes and Global Networks*, 43.
[46] Pär Kristoffer Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4-5.
[47] Takeshi Hamashita, China, *East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2008), 90-91.

interconnected world and introduced new building types.[48] One of the significant outcomes of this connectivity is the formation of Chinatowns.

The formation of Chinatowns in the late nineteenth century cannot be separated from the connection made among different ports, through which new building materials and architectural ideas were transferred. Chinese migrants engaged in trade and commerce, but at the same time they were skilled laborers, for example carpenters, plasterers, employed by European and American residents or Chinese government officials and wealthy merchants. In these roles, the Chinese migrants became themselves the conduit of building materials such as brick and tile and types such as temples and shophouses.

From the beginning, Chinatowns have been at the intersection of transregional flows of architectural and urban forms. It is not because Chinatowns housed a range of new building types for migrants from residential hotels, boarding houses, and eating houses to brothels, gambling houses, and opium dens. The period in which the number of Chinese migrants increased dovetailed with the development of the modern city during the late nineteenth century in East Asia. The rapid increase of migrants from within (from villages to cities) and without (from China to Japan and Korea) gave rise to a new type of city, in which architecture and city planning acquired a scientific mission to impose order on urban space.

That the formation of Chinatowns occurred in tandem with transnational flows of architectural and urban forms indicates that the idea of Chinatown in the last part of the nineteenth century was also closely bound up with the birth of modern architectural doctrine. Due in part to increased individual travels, and in part to the development of "print capitalism,"[49] architectural ideas and discourses on ideal forms were widely shared across the region.[50] At the heart of this circulation of knowledge lay the role of different groups of traveling experts, medical doctors, architects, engineers, and entrepreneurs, all of whom shared interest in urban space. During the Meiji period, new domestic discourses actively unfolded in the field of architecture, and the role of "the West, represented particularly by England and the United States," was critical in providing "ideas and images to be adopted, interpreted, and recontextualized."[51]

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[48] This form of new connectivity in East Asia was part of the broader phenomenon in the nineteenth century. Ports in the Pacific Ocean were increasingly connected with one another during the period as a consequence of the new technology of mobility such as steamships. The formation of Chinatowns along the Pacific coast—from San Francisco and Panama City to Vancouver and Lima—was indicative of this epochal change in the nineteenth century when transpacific travel and trade drastically increased. For Chinese migration to Latin America, see Lok Siu, *Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). For the discussion of new architectural spaces in Guangzhou, China, see Johnathan Andrew Farris, *Enclave to Urbanity: Canton, Foreigners, and Architecture from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016).

[49] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[50] Oshima, *International Architecture*.

[51] Jordan Sand, "At Home in the Meiji Period: Inventing Japanese Domesticity," in *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, edited by Stephen Vlastos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 192.

While the increased global connectivity gave rise to a diverse set of new urban landscapes, it also necessitated novel methods to govern the spaces.[52] Chinatown, notwithstanding its heterogeneous local variations, came to signify a commercial and residential enclave, and as such evoked ethnoracial consciousness. This coincided with the development of new legal institutions in the nineteenth century designed to complement technologies of mobility control. However, it would be an inaccurate representation to argue that the state "opposed" mobility: instead, the state sought to "control flows— to make them run through conduits."[53] When states witnessed an unprecedented level of new mobility, it was a certain type of migration that was considered a threat to social order, a problem to which the state responded by implementing legal measures to "striate" flows of mobility.[54]

This differential strategy to connectivity reveals the modern state's symbolic power that "not only naturalize(s) certain distinctions and not others" but also "help(s) constitute particular kinds of people, places, and things."[55] Chinatown, and the particular form of subjectivity it embodies, can be understood as a distinct urban space constituted by the modern state and its legal measures. In this regard, Chinatown is an example of what Aihwa Ong calls *graduated* sovereignty—"differential ordering of groups and zones across and beyond the national terrain."[56] Although Ong is chiefly concerned with the neoliberal calculations of postdevelopmental states, which fragment the national territory and population along lines of market-driven logics, the theoretical import can rather be extended to the normal condition of state sovereignty. Problematizing an analytic model that assumes sovereignty as being evenly distributed through a uniform political space, many scholars have pointed out that such an account is analytically insufficient to explicate gradated forms of imperial sovereignty,[57] flexible modes of territorial governance in neoliberal states,[58] and developmental states such as India.[59] Building on Michel Foucault's notion of biopower or the "mycrophysics of power,"[60] Ong instead

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[52] Regarding the relationship between spatial form and governance, Richard Sennett made a similar observation in his study of Jewish Ghettos in Europe. While medieval Rome had "gated" Jewish quarters in embryonic form, its urban fabric was "too disordered for the Jews to be totally sealed in." Meanwhile, the physical character of Venice being built on water enabled the city fatheres to create segregation by using canals as a moat to separate the Jewish quarter from the rest of the city. Richard Sennett, *Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 298.
[53] Tim Cresswell, "Towards a Politics of Mobility," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (2010): 49.
[54] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 363.
[55] Mara Loveman, "Traveling Abroad with a Map of a Made-in-the-USA Neoliberal City," *Ethnic and Racial Studies Review* 37, no. 10 (2014): 1655.
[56] Aihwa Ong, "Scales of Exception: Experiments with Knowledge and Sheer Life in Tropical Southeast Asia," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 29 (2008): 120.
[57] Ann Laura Stoler, "Introduction 'The Rot Remains': From Ruins to Ruination," in *Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 1-35.
[58] Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
[59] Akhil Gupta, *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
[60] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

contends that sovereignty should be understood "not as a uniform effect of state rule but as the contingent outcomes of various strategies."[61]

The fragmentation of territory and citizenship is neither a novelty nor a neoliberal formation. "Sliding and contested scales of differential access and rights" were part and parcel of the technologies of imperial rule.[62] "Imperial formations," Stoler notes, "give rise both to new zones of exclusion and new sites of—and social groups with—privileged exemption."[63] As Adam McKeown reminds us, it was the construction of difference—between Europe and non-European countries—that remained fundamental to the shape of international law,[64] which later came to provide justifications for imperial practices of European countries in Asia, including the opening of Asian ports for trade and commerce and the treaty port system. Antony Anghie also points out that it was out of colonial encounter that the basic doctrines of international law, and most importantly sovereignty doctrine, emerged.[65]

Chinatowns, especially those created out of the treaty system in nineteenth-century Japan and Korea, are a palimpsest of graduated modes of governance. Chinatowns were the product of the unique legal development called the treaty port system, which granted foreigners "near complete immunity" from local laws.[66] Even after the treaty port system was finally abolished at the turn of the twentieth century,[67] the exceptionality attached to Chinatowns had remained intact as the imperial government issued special ordinances which would prevent Chinese laborers from residing and working beyond the confines of designated Chinese settlements both in metropole and colony.

Even today, Chinatowns remain a different terrain of citizenship where different legalities are considered normal, which stimulates an imagining of Chinatown as a productive economic enclave immune from local rules. Especially in South Korea, after the financial crisis of 1997, the subjectivity of overseas Chinese is reconfigured as that of transnational agents capable of connecting local sites to Chinese capital. Following this line of thought, the idea of Chinatown has emerged as a platform to bridge various markets at a distance. In order to pull in Chinese bodies, various institutional forms of "exception" have been further devised to make economic enclaves named Chinatowns immune from regulations and amenable to investment.

The graduated mode of governance embodied by Chinatowns is also related to the mangement of negative affects. This is particuarly the case with Chinese migrants, whose

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[61] Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, 100.
[62] Stoler, "Introduction 'The Rot Remains': From Ruins to Ruination," 8.
[63] Ann Laura Stoler, *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 178.
[64] Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 155
[65] Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[66] Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment*.
[67] In Japan, the treaty port system was abolished in 1899, thereby enabling the Japanese state to regain its economic sovereignty in 1899, whereas in Korea, the Japanese annexation of the peninsula in 1910 finally brought an end to the system in 1913.

imputed status as "fugitives, disease vectors, and communists foreground[s] the limits to mobility."[68] Chinatowns, given that they were regarded as a blight on the body of society, associated with as diseases and sub-humanity, have evoked moral concerns and aroused emotional responses. While US Chinatowns had often been associated with a racialized form of diseases such as plague and leprosy,[69] Japanese observers at the turn of the twentieth century would describe Chinatown inhabitants as subhuman entities such as "a crawling worm." The association of Chinatown with negative images of corporality coincided with the increased global, transpacific in particular, connectivity, as can be seen, for example, in and through the circulation of medical reports among ports, conduits for emotional responses and idioms about a particular race and space.[70]

Language is among the main sites for the conveyance and interpretation of emotions,[71] and the landscapes of Chinatowns at the turn of the twentieth century were characterized by emotive languages such as "encroachment" or "threat" to the order of an ideal city.[72] Drawing upon these associations, built forms and objects were cited to provoke anti-Chinese "sentiment," providing the justification for the enactment of racially charged immigration policies. From narrow alleys and single-room occupancy hotels to "prisonlike brothels" and "barraklike sweatshops,"[73] the built environment of Chinatowns, which reflected its predominantly migrant, single population structure, was often used as a trope to separate the place from the imaginaries of the modern city (wide boulevards, single-family housing units, public parks, etc.) and, by extension, the Chinese from the imagining of national citizenry.[74] As evident in the history of San Francisco's Chinatown as a racially segregated neighborhood, the largest nonwhite group in the city could not cross racial boundaries drawn by white citizens who tended to define Asian Americans as an ancient and backward race.[75]

Conversely, those architectural elements believed to represent "Chinatowns"—such as sloping glazed roofs, carved columns, dragon motifs—are transferred to produce a new

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[68] Cresswell, "Towards a Politics of Mobility," 159.

[69] Leprosy was considered "an automatic ticket back to China." Susan Craddock, *City of Plagues: Disease, Poverty, and Deviance in San Francisco* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 68.

[70] These emotional responses have often devolved into violent acts, epsecially when contagious diseases such as plague broke out. See James C. Mohr, *Plague and Fire: Battling Black Death and the 1900 Burning of Honolulu's Chinatown* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[71] Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod, *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[72] In contemporary cities, the tradition of perceving "Chinatown" and Chinese migration as "encroachemnt" (e.g. neoliberal capital) to North American landscapes exists. See Mike Davis, "Chinatown, Part Two? The 'Internationalization' of Downtown Los Angeles," *New Left Review* July/August (1989): 61-86; Katharyne Mitchell, *Crossing the Neoliberal Line: Pacific Rim Migration and the Metropolis* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004).

[73] Jan Lin, *Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 2.

[74] Chinese immigrants had long been denied US citizenship because of their "unassimilable" traits. Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[75] Charlotte Brooks, *Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends: Asian Americans, Housing, and the Transformation of Urban California* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

space that stands in strong contrast to neighboring areas[76] or even imported back to China to forge a "modern" identity through the "re-sinicization" of urban image.[77] The transformative and contagious aspect of affect to drive bodies toward movement can also enable people to act upon the built environment, however. When interacting with certain forces of encounter, feelings such as hate, confusion, uncertainty, and ambiguity may gain momentum to become "uprooted" from the corporeal inside and propel person(s) to make change in the built environment. This is particularly the case with Chinatowns in East Asia in the post-Cold War years. In the wake of reopened borders and subsequently increased flows of information and capital between mainland China and its neighboring countries, Chinese residents have come to terms with their built environments and redefine the idea of Chinatown in order to make sense of their place in the world. In this way, it is through "the ability of people to confound the established spatial orders"[78] that "Chinatowns" can be reclaimed as a locus for transnational belonging.

Traveling Chinatowns, Traveling Ethnographer

Between Archive and Ethnography

My dissertation draws from a combined methodology of archival research and ethnography conducted in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States from August 2013 through January 2015. In my dissertation, the term "travel" is widely used as a crucial trope for exploring multidirectional connections and networks that help shape contemporary urban spaces. At the same time, the use of this language reveals its associated actors, "travelers," who mediate between different locations by transporting ideas, images, affects, and things. The travelers encompass Euro-American and Chinese migrants (Chapter 1), Japanese and Korean writers and politicians (Chapter 2 and 3), and myself as an ethnographer (Chapter 4). All these actors have contributed, in one way or another, to the making of what we now understand as Chinatowns by serving as transfer agents.

Archival materials that I have looked into are scattered in diverse locations in Japan, South Korea, and the United States, which reflects the characteristically transpacific range of people, institutions, and power involved in the making of Chinatowns. In Japan, I studied archival documents from the Yokohama Municipal Library, the Yokohama Archives of History, and the National Diet Library. In South Korea, I examined documents from the National Archives of Korea, the National Library of Korea, the National Assembly Library of Korea, and the Archives of Incheon Chinese Association. In the United States, I looked at documents from the Rockefeller Archive Center, the Bancroft Library, the National Archives and Records Administration, the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Hoover Institution Archives.

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[76] Chuo Li, "Interrogating Ethnic Identity: Space and Community Building in Chicago's Chinatown," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* 27, no.1 (2015): 55-68.
[77] Anne-Marie Broudehoux, "Learning from Chinatown: The Search for a Modern Chinese Architectural Identity 1911-1998," in *Hybrid Urbanism: On the Identity Discourse and the Built Environment*, edited by Nezar AlSayyad (Westport: Praeger, 2001), 156-180.
[78] Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (1992): 17.

My travel to and within these archives located in different places across the Pacific was not merely undertaken to peruse as many illuminating documents as possible. Instead, my intention was to connect the dots to complete a bigger picture of what has constituted Chinatowns on a global scale. In this regard, archives exist not as things, but as *processes*.[79] Those archival documents did not just happen to be where they were: rather, they existed there "with itineraries of their own."[80] Documents relating to Chinatowns and Chinese residents in East Asia were even categorized in differing ways according to the location of archives. At the National Archives and Records Administration, for instance, Chinese-related documents in postwar Japan are mostly in the category of "military," a classification which exhibits the modern history of East Asia with regard to the United States' military occupation of the region in the postwar years.

What Stoler terms "the feel of documents"[81] reveals how archive can be construed as a form of ethnography. It is not "an ethnography of archive" (as in participant observation of archives as an institution), but "archive as ethnography." In this sense, archival documents, however official they may seem, are neither a repository of "facts"[82] nor authentic bearers of knowledge: instead, they produce *affect*[83]—uncertainty inherent in colonial governance as found in official gazettes or police reports (Chapter 1); resentment and envy recorded in memoirs of city mayors, or Cold War orientalism as manifested in the Ford Foundation's grant records (Chapter 2); or anger and frustration of the Chinese community as expressed in legal documents (Chapter 3). I collected conference proceedings, chamber of commerce records, memoirs of politicians, personal notebooks, newspapers, government pamphlets, grant records, military records, tourist guides, correspondence, intermal memorandums, written accounts of oral history, and essays penned by local writers to analyze how people became affected by global connectivity and its paradoxes, how they felt while encountering with novel spaces, and how they made sense of their "places" in a changing world. The "sentimental texts" such as memoirs and personal notebooks, as Jun Uchida observes of the colonial context, are not "residual and unreliable sources of history" but "key repositories of knowledge about everyday life" that constituted colonial history.[84]

The scarcity of archival material is among well-known predicaments that a researcher faces when she studies populations which have long remained excluded and silenced from official history.[85] My in-depth fieldwork allowed me to get access to unpublished historical documents regarding built form and migration that would otherwise be impossible to obtain—photographs of people, events, and buildings that vividly show landscapes of old Chinatowns; address books and donor lists that help identify the

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[79] Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 20.
[80] Ibid., 1.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives," *History and Theory* 24, 3 (1985): 248. See further, Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain.*
[83] Yael Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
[84] Jun Uchida, "A Sentimental Journey: Mapping the Interior Frontier of Japanese Settlers in Colonial Korea," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 70, no. 3 (2011), 708.
[85] For instance, Brenda Yeoh, *Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1996).

demographic makeup as well as spatial distribution of Chinese immigrants. In Japan, and Yokohama in particular, it was relatively easy to get access to archival materials thanks to the tradition of local studies therein. This was not the case in Incheon, and Incheon's Chinatown in particular, not only because it is only in recent years that the Korean government came to develop interest in Chinatowns, but also because there has been the distrust between Chinese residents and Korean society at large. After long years of remaining closed to the public, the Incheon Chinese Association has recently donated its archival documents to a local university, through which I collected legal documents regarding land disputes over Chinese cemeteries.

What George Marcus defines as multi-sited ethnography involves multiple sites of observation and participation that would enable an ethnographer to examine "the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space."[86] It can be particularly effective in studying a phenomenon "that cannot be accounted for ethnographically by remaining focused on a single site of intensive investigation."[87] However, this ethnographic method is not necessarily confined to a certain kind of object of study, but can rather be used to rethink the nature of what is often conceived as an ethnographic field. James Clifford argues that a field, in many cases, may localize "what is actually a regional/national/global nexus"[88] "Localizations of the anthropologist's objects of study in terms of a 'field,'" he further claims, "tend to marginalize or erase several blurred boundary areas, historical realities that slip out of the ethnographic frame."[89] Especially in a world of advanced communications technologies, a field continues to slip out of the ethnographic frame and keeps expanding, thereby blurring the conventional boundary between what is a field and what is not.[90]

My ethnographic subjects are never secluded in far-away villages as in Clifford Geertz's times. They are instead, as John L. Jackson observes in his book *Thin Description*, "groups already researching themselves" by making the most of contemporary communications technologies.[91] They archive historical materials, interview people, host community meetings, open exhibitions, publish articles, and also are well aware of the presence of other Chinese communities outside their Chinatowns. With keen interest in the development of scholarly discussions on the subject matter, they not only visit other Chinatowns but also invite speakers, domestic or international, to have them talk about issues relating to their own histories. For this and other reasons, they wanted to hear from me about other Chinatowns as if I as a researcher were a conduit of knowledge itself. This put me in a difficult position several times, which made me contemplate what it means to be an ethnographer of a space whose boundaries are in flux. In this sense, as Arjun Appaduria aptly notes, "ethnographers can no longer simply be content with the

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[86] George Marcus, "Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 96.
[87] Ibid.
[88] James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 100.
[89] Ibid., 99.
[90] John L Jackson Jr., *Thin Description: Ethnography and the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
[91] Ibid., 13.

thickness they bring to the local and the particular."[92] Instead, an ethnographer is merely a part of processes by which localities are constructed in close interaction with elsewheres.

In the Chinatowns of Yokohama and Incheon, I conducted participant observation at a variety of community events such as meetings, excursions, and funerals and took field notes on a daily basis during all observations. I revealed my identity as researcher on Chinatowns from the beginning, which enabled me to acquire contact information for interviews. I interviewed various people, including those living in the Chinatowns as well as in other places such as Taiwan and the United States, which have become destinations for Chinese re-migration. When I undertook formal interviews, I designed the scope to include the following groups of people: 1) those born or raised in Chinatowns; 2) those who lived elsewhere but went to Chinese schools in Chinatowns; 3) those who have worked or own businesses in Chinatowns; and 4) those who have been involved in organizing community programs in Chinatowns.

As an ethnography cannot be confined to what is conventionally perceived to be as a field, but rather extended to something like archives of documents, what I experienced was that the boundary of archive itself may be as blurry. One day after getting back in Berkeley from the fieldwork, I was tracking down additional visual evidence about Incheon's Chinatown and found a blog which had a slew of pictures of South Korean cities in the late 1960s. The first glimpse was not sufficient to realize that one image was a photo of the neighborhood I was looking for. But there were some familiar elements in it, and soon I was able to recognize distinct facades of Chinese shophouses as well as the building of a particular Chinese school standing on the hill. It was Incheon's Chinatown. Serendipitously, the blogger happened to live in Berkeley. I emailed him immediately and we met at a café in North Berkeley (he even lived just a block away from my place). Born in New York City, Neil Mishalov was a GI who had once been stationed in South Korea in the years of 1968-69, where he took hundreds of pictures. After he was discharged, he has retired to the San Francisco Bay Area. I thanked him for having taken the pictures and made some of them public, expressing how meaningful his pictures were to me and how they gave me the precious opportunity to trace now lost built forms of the neighborhood. He was surprised, because he had no idea it had been a Chinese neighborhood when he took the picture. His images gave me tremendous help writing Chapter 3.

After my meeting with Neil, I told my husband, who was occasionally collecting archival documents for the National Archives of Korea, about the serendipitous encounter. Things progressed dramatically afterwards. Archivists from the National Archive of Korea visited the Bay Area in the fall of 2016 to meet with Neil, who agreed to donate his hundreds of images to the Archives. It turns out that his photographs possess value that transcends what he initially assumed. While he might have taken pictures of landscapes and buildings without knowing what they recorded (as in the case with Incheon's Chinatown), his pictures in fact contained a number of historic buildings that are now

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[92] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 54. My emphasis.

gone. On April 24, 2017, Korean mass media—from local newspapers to national TV news—ran a story of a donation of old photographs by an American veteran who once visited South Korea. More than what his pictures contain and tell, this whole trajectory of the pictures shows the afterlife of things as "active participant"[93] in the making of history.

Case Selection: Yokohama and Incheon

Yokohama, Japan and Incheon, Korea are two main sites of investigation for my dissertation. I treat Yokohama and Incheon, which had once been metropole and colony in the Japanese imperial order respectively, not as two discrete entities but as part of "a single analytic field."[94] As treaty ports forcibly opened to foreign commerce in the nineteenth century, Yokohama and Incheon have since housed the largest Chinatowns in each country. The opening of the ports in East Asia, or what is commonly referred to as the treaty port system, came with the establishment of foreign settlements to accommodate traders, merchants, and missionaries, who brought with them their own laws and institutions to the new trading outposts, ranging from clubs and bank agencies to boards of health and cemeteries. Modern infrastructure such as sewage systems and roads, hitherto unfound in Japan and Korea, was introduced, as were parks and gas lamps. Churches, hospitals, hotels, theaters, and even racetracks sprang up, adding Euro-American elements to the landscape. And it was also Chinatowns that were established in these new environments.

Unlike Busan (Korea) and Nagasaki (Japan), which had long served as international ports before the nineteenth century, the emergence of Yokohama and Incheon as flourishing ports was a characteristically modern phenomenon. Yokohama and Incheon as treaty ports were considered to be the cities where modern urban planning methods such as zoning were introduced for the first time in their respective countries. Major ports adjacent to the capital cities of each country, they were both facing a rapidly increasing population, accompanied by expanding port economies and Japanese colonial enterprises. Incheon and Yokohama were ports that began to be connected with other ports in the nineteenth century. For this very reason, they were also regarded as gateways to bad influences from without. For instance, when Incheon functioned as the major gateway for Chinese migrants to enter the peninsula via sea routes, Incheon's ports and train stations were often targeted for police surveillance and questioning.

Yokohama and Incheon developed into important ports in inter-Asian maritime connections. Yokohama, on the one hand, was a major port linking Asian markets to the American continent. This transpacific connection was clearly shown in the presence of a translocal network of medical reports published by United States public health officials. After ports were connected to one another in ways that produced massive circulation of people and goods, the transfer of diseases through passengers alarmed public health officials in the United States. News of epidemics in Hong Kong, for instance, spread fast

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[93] Shannon Lee Dawdy, "Profane Archaeology and the Existential Dialectics of the City," *Journal of Social Archaeology* 16, no. 1 (2016): 33.
[94] Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 4.

across the ocean to Yokohama, Honolulu, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. Medical reports on the condition of Yokohama were especially made note of, since the port is located on the major transpacific sea route. On the other hand, and to a less important extent, Incheon was regarded as the principal port in China-Korea trade and travel. *The Korean Repository* in August 1892 described a trip taken by a British traveler named H. Goold-Adams from Hong Kong to the Korean peninsula on the Mail Steamer for the purpose of spending the summer somewhere less hot than the British colony.[95] He arrived in the port of Incheon after calling at Shanghai, and travelled northwards to Seoul, Wonsan and Chongjin. This travel itinerary indicated the Asian ports becoming interconnected as well as the important position of Shanghai as a transportation hub of maritime Asia.

Enmeshed in a complex web of colonial connections, however, these two port cities have exhibited very different historical trajectories, with contrasting positionalities in the Japanese imperial order. Yokohama ended its treaty system by regaining its economic sovereignty in 1899, whereas in Incheon, the decline of the treaty system was the occasion for another violent colonial practice initiated by Japan. While Yokohama's opening may be interpreted as a significant watershed for the modernization of Japan, which soon became "the West of Asia," Incheon's opening merely signified the city's destiny of entrenched subordination into the global order, which ultimately led to the colonization of the whole country by Japan in 1910. These different colonial experiences came to provide a compelling point of reference for their self-understanding of what constitutes the modern. The modern histories of Japan as an empire and Korea as a colony therefore differentiate and complicate the way the two Chinatowns have been constructed, imagined, and discussed over the course of the twentieth century.

What is in a Name?

Japan and Korea's proximity to as well as historically accumulated relations with China have given rise to a unique form of ethnoracial consciousness vis-à-vis Chinese subjects. The different names which have been attached to Chinatowns in Yokohama and Incheon convey affective dimensions of spatial governance. Contrary to the popular understanding of "Chinatowns" as derived from experiences of the English-speaking countries and as circulated across contexts through mobile media such as films and texts, a variety of local terms have existed to indicate Chinese spaces in East Asia since the mid-nineteenth century. During the treaty-port era, Yokohama's and Incheon's Chinatowns were called *kyoryūchi* (居留地) and *ch'ŏngguk chogye* (清國租界), respectively, which symbolized Chinese settlements being the product of new legal institutions peculiar to the changing international order in nineteenth-century East Asia. However, ordinary Japanese residents preferred the term *nankinmachi* (南京町)—the neighborhood of people from Nanjing—in daily life, which expressed the feeling of intimacy as it was associated less with the government and more with people from the Chinese city.[96] By contrast, the term *ch'ŏngguk chogye* (which translates as Qing's

[95] "A Trip to the Mont Blanc of Korea," *The Korean Repository*, August 1892.
[96] While it remains unclear why Nanjing was used to indicate a Chinese district, some argue that Nanjing has long represented as an exemplar Chinese city as well as things exquisite imported from China. See

concession) used in Korea reflects the affective association of the Chinese space with the governmental authority. While the term conveys the Chinese government in strong relation to its military and political presence in Korea, it also implies the emergence of ethnic consciousness among Koreans vis-à-vis Chinese. Along with the rise of the Japanese empire and after the Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula, the names came to change to *shinamachi* (支那町) in Japanese and *chinajŏng* in Korean, both of which use the same Chinese characters comprised of *shina*/*china* as China and *machi*/*jŏng* as neighborhood. The term *shina*—the Japanese appellation for China—was by no means neutral but indicative of "Japan's Orient."[97]

The names changed again after the collapse of the Japanese empire. Yokohama's Chinese district was renamed *chukagai* (中華街) largely at the request of the Taiwanese government, which perceived *shina* as a derogative term. While *chuka* refers broadly to the Greater China, it also indicates the Taiwanese government (中華民國: *chukamin'goku*) itself. Therefore, the name change reflects the growing influence of the Taiwanese government upon Yokohama's Chinatown during the Cold War period. Meanwhile, Incheon's Chinese neighborhood had no distinct official name, which implies its invisibility to the Korean public during the Cold War period. Along with the increasing presence of US culture, the term "Chinatown" came into focus in Yokohama starting in the 1960s, when Yokohama's Chinatown made frequent appearances in newspapers. In contemporary Korea, by contrast, it is over the last two decades that the term "Chinatown" has received public attention, becoming a buzz word that signifies a a neoliberal mode of spatial governance that has treated the Chinese space as an exceptional economic space immune from local rules.

Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation illuminates three important transitions which have reshaped routes for movement of architectural ideas, materials, policies and practices among cities in the modern world. First, the opening of East Asian ports to foreign trade and commerce in the late nineteenth century opened new routes along which architectural and urban forms were transferred by colonial settlers, architects and planners. The new types of built form were transplanted to the increasingly interconnected ports, and Chinese settlements were among these new urban spaces that expressed and conveyed these developments. Second, the onset of the Cold War upon the collapse of the Japanese empire opened up different routes for movements of urban ideas, policies, and practices. Cultural politics during the Cold War located the United States as a pivotal node for this new flow of architecture while at the same time closing off borders between mainland China and its neighboring countries. Third, China's (re)opening to global capitalism in post-Cold War East Asia opened new routes for movement of urban ideas and imageries. By tracing urban transformations of Chinatowns in Japan and Korea, from extraterritorial foreign settlements in treaty ports to marginalized ethnic enclaves to spaces emblematic of global

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James Hoare, *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Setttlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899* (Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library, 1994).

[97] For more discussion of the origin of *shina*, see Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). I will return to this term in Chapter One.

marketplaces, the dissertation argues that specific geopolitical contexts in East Asia have produced distinct regimes for the production of architecture and urbanism, regimes which engendered characteristically different urban constellations of Chinatowns. Not only has the built environment of Chinatowns transmuted in tandem with the shifting political economy that conditioned networks and flows of people and ideas, but the presence of China in proximity has also produced both anxiety and opportunity in its neighboring countries, thereby creating room for competing urban practices and imaginations to evolve.

The dissertation is organized in chronological and thematic order, highlighting historical transitions which have opened and closed off borders in East Asia. Chapter 1 examines how Chinese settlements in East Asia came to take shape in ports increasingly interconnected in the nineteenth century. After China's defeat in the Opium War in 1842, its coastal ports were forcibly opened for foreign commerce and trade according to the treaty signed between China and the United Kingdom, which accelerated European economic expansion from Southeast Asia into East Asia. This "treaty port system" spread further to other Asian coastal cities, giving rise to new movements of people and goods as well as architectural and urban forms. One significant outcome of this process was the formation of Chinese settlements in East Asian ports. Focusing on the Japanese port city of Yokohama and the Korean port city of Incheon, this chapter shows how "Chinatown" as a distinct urban type, an abstraction of built form which would seem to indicate the fundamental difference between a modern nation and its opposite, came to emerge. The creation of this particular urban type was not solely the product of locally situated elements, I argue, but was made possible through transpacific connections and physical movements of travelers who themselves served as the conduit of texts, images, and sentiments.

The end of the Pacific War and the subsequent Allied Occupation of Japan compelled a rapid transition in its status from colonizer to colonized. Starting in the early 1950s, however, by the time the United States and Japan had signed the peace treaty in San Francisco in 1951, the meanings of the Pacific as a geopolitical region, as well as relations between the two former enemy states, had drastically changed. This was an important change not only for Japan, but also for its former colonies, with whom its relations were complicated due to shifting US political and economic interests in Asia. As Japan's symbolic transformation from a colonizing country to an occupied country under postwar US hegemony reconfigured power dynamics in the region, Japan's neighboring Asian countries also came to fall under the sway of discourse and practices of international development agencies whose influence would supplant and substitute for the dominion of the former empire. Chapter 2 situates Japan's remaking of Chinatown in the 1950s at the nexus of political economic transitions in the Pacific region. By focusing on cultural exchange programs led by postwar international institutions, the chapter interrogates new modes of disseminating planning knowledge and shaping the modern city during the Cold War. I argue in this chapter that what I call "postimperial sentiments" were manifested most vividly in and through the built environment, thereby marking the remaking of Chinatown in the 1950s as a symbolic event that shows Japan's pivotal transition from the multiethnic empire to the monoethnic nation-state.

After the collapse of the Japanese empire upon its unconditional surrender in the Asia-Pacific War, the world witnessed the sudden transformation of its former colonies into nation-states. The regionally integrated economy in Northeast Asia, previously predicated on the imperial order, also took steps to disintegrate and reorganize itself along revised neocolonial geopolitical lines. The onset of the Cold War, with the establishment of the People's Republic of China, further complicated the situation by closing off borders between mainland China and its neighboring countries. Yet at the same time, the Cold War opened up a different route for movements of new urban ideas, policies, and practices, positioning the United States as a crucial site for this new cultural flow. By examining how South Korea's effort to find its identity as a new nation manifested itself through the built environment, Chapter 3 situates the dismantling of Incheon's Chinatown starting in the 1960s at the nexus of the new state's drive for economic development and legal construction of national citizenry based on landownership. More specifically, I look at postcolonial legal reforms surrounding the built environment, the Alien Landownership Act in particular, to interrogate the ways in which the postcolonial developmentalist state pursued the goal of modernization through its construction of legitimate residency. I argue that the discursive development of "*kuk'to*" (the national land) as an object of national pathos and rationality of city planning in the postcolonial state influenced legal reforms regarding urban space in the name of its efficient use, thereby denying Chinese residents a place in the new nation and displacing them from the national space. In so doing, this chapter further illuminates the role of the built environment in South Korea's pursuit of postcolonial developmentalism and nation-building projects.

China's (re)opening to global capitalism has increased mobility of individuals from within while at the same time bringing about a tremendous impact on neighboring countries. After ports in East Asia were reconnected starting in the late 1980s, the rise of China as a leading global economic partner has also enabled urban ideas and imageries to move along new routes. This chapter seeks to capture the specific historic moment that sparked a sense of self-awareness in the diasporic Chinese community regarding their built environments, specifically, Chinatowns. With increased opportunity to visit mainland China in the post-Cold War years, the diasporic Chinese came to commune with images of their homeland: they went to see their ancestral villages, took pictures, collected souvenirs, and imported building materials back to their own Chinatowns. Arguably, it was in the midst of Cold War ruins that the diasporic Chinese came to redefine, appreciate, and perform Chinatowns as a spatial manifestation of their own ambivalent identities. Drawing from ethnographic observation, Chapter 4 sheds light on what I call the migrant mode of dwelling and delves into how the built environment serves as the main locus for diasporic claims to place-based identity in the wake of the new connections made in post-Cold War East Asia.

Chapter 1. After Ports Were Linked

This chapter examines how Chinese settlements in East Asia came to take shape in ports increasingly interconnected in the nineteenth century. After China's defeat in the Opium War in 1842, its five coastal ports—Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai—were opened for foreign commerce and trade upon the treaty signed between China and the United Kingdom, which accelerated European economic expansion from Southeast Asia into East Asia. This "treaty port system" spread further to other Asian coastal cities, giving rise to new movements of people and goods as well as space and architecture.

Along with the development of shipping industry, the treaty port system, a modern institution uniquely developed in East Asian ports in the nineteenth century, played a significant role in facilitating the movement of people, goods, and ideas among newly opened ports in Asia. After Incheon was opened by Japan in 1883, a number of Japanese merchants and engineers moved to the port from Japanese coastal cities as varied as Nagasaki and Yamaguchi,[98] transplanting their life styles and what they perceived to be ideal urban forms onto the city. This was also the case with Western missionaries, diplomats and entrepreneurs who traveled between Asian port cities and documented their experiences along the way.

One significant outcome of this process was the formation of Chinese settlements in East Asian ports. Differing from their counterparts in Southeast Asian entrepots—Melaka, Penang and Batavia—which had served as nodes of international trade in the Indian Ocean since the fifteenth century, Yokohama and Incheon were the brainchild of modern institutions in the late nineteenth century. Japan and Korea, unlike Southeast Asian countries in which Chinese migration occurred as early as the fifteenth century, had hardly witnessed the formation of Chinese settlements within their territories until the late nineteenth century. Only within limited areas of Nagasaki known as *tojin yashiki* (the settlement of Tang people) were Chinese merchants and traders allowed to live and conduct economic activities. In Korea, a country which had long held vassal-suzerain relations with China, the economic transaction between the two countries was in the form of tributary trade and no Chinese settlements were developed other than a few temporary markets along the China-Korea borders.

The massive Chinese migration into Japan and Korea and the subsequent formation of Chinese settlements in the late nineteenth century was a characteristically modern phenomenon that was influenced by infrastructures of transport and communication developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century.[99] This chapter delves into how the

[98] As of 1896, Japanese settlers of Incheon were 4,148. From Yamaguchi (1,178), Nagasaki (1,075). Their occupations varied from loansharking to trading to running restaurants. Yun Min, "Kaehangg Inchŏn chogyeji sahoe ŭi yŏn'gu: chogyeji nae kaltŭng kwa pŏmjoe ŭi yangsang ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Inchŏnhak yŏn'gu* 7 (2007): 175.

[99] Undergirding this is the transition of regional system from tributary to treaty, with a market economy dependent on modern forms of contracts and laws. The old histories entangled with new modern relations "treaties" which granted extraterritorial rights.



Figure 1-1. As seen in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha's service map in the 1890s, the ports in the Pacific Ocean were increasingly connected to each other in the 19th century. The formation of Chinatowns along the Pacific coast exemplified this new global connectivity. (Redrawn by Sujin Eom)

mode of global connectivity during this period contributed to the invention of Chinatown as a distinct urban type.

Yokohama and Incheon: Treaty Port Enclaves

Intertwined with the new technology of mobility, which increasingly linked coastal cities across the Pacific, was the introduction of the modern mode of trade and commerce known as the treaty port system. The treaty port system involves a wide array of legal institutions and practices, from regulations for the conduct of trade to establishments of fixed rates for tariffs, which enabled Asian coastal ports to become hubs of commerce and trade with foreign subjects and thereby accelerated the integration of East Asia into the global economic order.[100] The treaty port system was a characteristically *modern* institution unique to East Asia. Not only did it transform the economic order of the region from tributary to treaty,[101] it also created the modern conception of space in a rapidly interconnected world. The built environment soon became an "index" of this epochal change by reflecting noble spatial concepts.[102]

Historian Rhoads Murphey has argued that the treaty ports in Asia were where "the full force of the Western impact was concentrated, and this was far more than a commercial or industrial phenomenon." More important is, as he goes on to argue, "the flows of ideas and noneconomic institutions" which came to cast a long shadow in the decades to come.[103] Among these ideas introduced were "grid" systems imposed on the land in the treaty ports. In the modernizing city, the grid was applied independent of existing

[100] Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment*, 4-5.
[101] John King Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842-1854* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
[102] Carl Schmitt, *Land and Sea: A World-Historical Meditation.* Translated by Samuel Garrett Zeitlin (Candor, NY: Telos Press Publishing, 2015 [1942]).
[103] Rhoads Murphey, "The Treaty Ports and China's Modernization," in *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, edited by Mark Elvin and William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 18.



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Figure 1-2. The Plan of the Settlements at Chemulpo (Incheon), 1884 shows the proposed location of "bund" along the shorelines of the settlement. In contrast to Incheon, where the term bund did not develop, Yokohama's bund became the center of the city's commercial life in the late 19th century and the home to international businesses. (Image Source: The Library of Congress, above; The Japan Directory, below)



Figure 1-3. Ports of Yokohama (above) and Incheon (below). As seen in the similar visual representations of the two ports, Yokohama and Incheon were often pitted against each other.

topographical reality to establish a sense of order and rationality on irregular surfaces. In Asia's treaty ports, where the majority of land was purchased by foreigners, the grid functioned as an optic apparatus that made local lands legible to outsiders. The grid created regular lots and blocks "ideal for buying and selling,"[104] which facilitated land transactions by foreigners.

The opening of the ports in East Asia came with the establishment of foreign settlements to accommodate traders, merchants, and missionaries. Western entrepreneurs who had already engaged in trading in China's coastal cities such as Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shanghai moved to Yokohama with a view to expanding to other markets. New foreign settlements that came about in the ports of Yokohama and Incheon created some striking contrasts and revealed equally outstanding similarities. The contrasts stemmed from their different positionalities in the regional economy, whereas the similarities were due to the characteristics of the treaty port system itself as a mobile form and institution. With regard to similarity, both Yokohama and Incheon came to have residential divisions and European urban elements resembling those of Shanghai.[105]

The Western residents brought with them their own laws and institutions to the new trading outposts, ranging from clubs and bank agencies to boards of health and cemeteries. Modern infrastructure such as sewage systems and roads, hitherto unfound in Japan and Korea, was introduced, as were parks and gas lamps.[106] Churches, hospitals, hotels, theaters, and even racetracks sprang up, adding Euro-American elements to the landscape. New urban professionals on the move who emerged in the nineteenth century were the main agents behind this architectural novelty. Often called "treaty-port

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[104] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 59.

[105] The Bund, a commercial district created along the waterfront, was one of the urban elements commonly found in these treaty ports in Asia. Jeremy E. Taylor, "The Bund: Littoral Space of Empire in the Treaty Ports of East Asia," *Social History* 27, no.2 (2002): 125-26.

[106] Terunobu Fujimori, *Nihon no kindai kenchiku (Jō) (*Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), 7.

architects," this group of Western architects who found new opportunities in the booming towns of Asia's treaty ports had practiced in colonial and treaty ports in Japan, China or Southeast Asia. Participating in a wide range of construction projects for modern edifices, from consulates, residences, hospitals to railway stations, schools, they made their names known across ports in Asia. Robert. C. Boyce, a British civil engineer and surveyor based in Shanghai, was among these colonial architects who designed numerous buildings including the British Post Office in Shanghai. He later came to Incheon to design its British Consulate, which featured a colonial-style verandah.

Japanese architectural historian Fujimori Terunobu identifies two spatially distinct features of the treaty port in East Asia during this period. On the one hand, "the Bund," as the commercial center of the port city, was formed to house mercantile establishments, hotels, clubs, or custom houses on the waterfront. The Bund, after all, integrated spatial concepts uniquely developed in East Asia's treaty ports.[107] It was not only a built form with numerous "buildings along the waterfront" or the actual "embankment where land meets sea or the harbor."[108] It was also a form "to sustain a certain treaty port *lifestyle* among European residents therein."[109] Meanwhile, up in the hill with a panoramic view of the harbor, European quarters were established and colonial-style residences with verandahs attached were built. The advantageous location not only offered a fine view but also removed the European segment from the water and the rest of the city. Yokohama's Western residents called this residential area "the Bluff," which presented visually different images from the ordinary landscape of the Japanese city:

> Going up the cobbled path lined with green trees and hedges, there is a painted gate in the hill. Behind the gate is a bright house with the grass in the garden stretching to the south. When proceeding with a view of roses on the right and agaves on the left to the edge of the garden, a ceaseless line of roofs in the Bund and the sea unfold before your eyes.[110]

The hill acted as a marker that divided the two spatially distinct areas. The Japanese call the Bluff area *yamate* (up the hill), and the flatland where business facilities were concentrated, *yamashita* (down the hill). The creek that flows between the two separated the residential quarter of Europeans from the commercial streets of the city, native quarters, and the Chinese settlement. This residential division established by the natural dividers, the hill and the creek, was something the Western residents might well have desired, as they did not hide contempt toward their Asian neighbors and had little contact with them in everyday life other than in the sphere of commerce.[111] The Bluff was soon

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[107] For the description of bunds in each treaty port in China, see Robert Nield, *China's Foreign Places: The Foreign Presence in China in the Treaty Port Era, 1840-1943* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015).
[108] Taylor, "The Bund," 127.
[109] Ibid. Itaclicized by the author.
[110] Fujimori, *Nihon*, 8.
[111] Taylor, "The Bund," 132.

Figure 1-4. Typical European residences in Yokohama (above) and Incheon (below) (Image source: Leslie Helm 2013, above; The Korea Creative Content Agency, below)

filled with “handsome foreign villas and dwelling houses in various styles of architecture, all standing in pretty gardens.”[112]

This morphological composition in Yokohama, undoubtedly based on the model of Shanghai as premier treaty port for Asia, also replicated itself in the port of Incheon.[113] The General Foreign Settlement of Incheon accommodated American, British, German and Russian nationals, and was established in a location that “surrounded the Japanese settlement, and bordered the Chinese on the north.” As in Yokohama, this Western settlement was primarily located on the hillside with a commanding view of the harbor.[114] William George Aston, then British provisional consul general at the time of the signing of the British treaty with Korea, drew the outlines of Incheon’s foreign settlement based on the latest foreign settlement established in the Japanese port of Kobe.[115] With architectural splendor, European residences were primarily erected on the hillside. The handsome Chemulpo Club House,[116] for example, was opened in 1901 near these residences to provide a venue for gathering of Western residents. Public gardens[117] and “a number of handsome residences” decorated the settlement on the hill. “Three fine Consulates, two theaters, seven banks, a large number of bath houses, [and] several temples” accentuated the pleasure that could be enjoyed within the foreign settlement, in addition to “several hotels where travelers [could] find fairly comfortable quarters.”[118] Most of all, Incheon’s location facing the sea made it a popular place for European settlers in the summer.

The vivid contrast between native and European quarters was echoed in the port of Incheon. Horace Newton Allen (1858-1932), an American medical missionary and diplomat to Korea, described Incheon in his diary when he landed at the port on September 20, 1884. Allen’s general description of Incheon was “a motley place of slab shanties, mud huts, sheds and bush earth.”[119] The Treaty Powers signed on an agreement regarding the establishment of the General Foreign settlement of Incheon in November 1884. The agreement stipulated that all Korean houses should be removed from the site and restricted building materials within the settlements to brick, stone, or iron with tiled

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[112] The chronicle and directory for China, Corea, Japan, the Philippines, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Siam, Borneo, Malay States, &c. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Daily Press Office, 1890), 284.
[113] Although the term “bund” is hardly used today, a map drawn in 1884 immediately after the port was opened indicated the proposed location of “the bund” along the waterfront. *Plan of the Settlements at Chemulpo, 1884*. [1884] Map. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2007631784. (Accessed June 26, 2016.)
[114] Harold J. Noble, “The former foreign settlements in Korea,” *The American Journal of International Law* 23, no. 4 (1929): 770.
[115] Ibid., 772.
[116] The Chemulpo Club House, opened in 1901, is among the few turn-of-the-century architectural survivors of the Korean War. *The Korea Review* described the opening ceremony of the club, “The Club House with its commanding view, its spacious billiard and reading-rooms and the adjacent tennis courts, is a distinct ornament to the enterprising community of Chemulpo. Long may she wave!” *The Korean Review*, 1901, 272.
[117] The establishment of public gardens for European residents in treaty ports was to “ensure the health and good will of the inhabitants.” Taylor, “The Bund,” 140.
[118] “Chemulpo,” *The Korean Review*, 1901, 15.
[119] September 20, 1884, Horace Newton Allen Papers 1883-1923, The New York Public Library Manuscript and Archives Division.

or iron roofs. The erection of unsafe or inflammable buildings such as wooden buildings or thatched houses was prohibited within the area.[120] Such new landscapes created by the Treaty Powers provided an intriguing reminder of the "supreme self-confidence" that was characteristic of the nineteenth century West towards the "backward" Asian countries.[121] Allen himself built a villa in Incheon to enjoy the summer in the port. It was not unusual that Western observers would describe the new landscape of the foreign settlement as evidence of "a demonstrated success" of the opening of the ports:

> Look for a moment at the foreign settlement of Chemulpo, where the hammer of the house-builder is heard from dawn to dusk all the year through, and new edifices spring up like mushrooms in all directions, where tiles and thatch spread out over the levels and climb over the face of the hills like Virginian creepers, and where new roads intersect the whole area. The rapid growth of the foreign settlements as well as of the native quarter of Chemulpo proves beyond dispute that, if not an Eldorado, Korea is at least an object of attraction to the wealth-seeking classes.[122]

Buildings with European architectural styles decorated the landscapes of the treaty ports. Especially in Yokohama, these architectural styles later influenced Japan's creation of an eclectic style known as *giyōshiki* (pseudo-Western) architecture. Red bricks were one of those new materials used in a variety of buildings in the Bluff and the Bund alike, which presented a visual contrast to traditional Japanese houses mainly built of wood.[123] Traditional houses of commoners in Korea had straw roofs and walls of wattle and daub, and these stood in contrast to Chinese and Western residences built with brick and stone. Especially the straw roofs of Korean houses were denounced as bad sanitation, because the straw would become "rotten after heavy rains in summer," the cause of bad smelling and "unwholesome gases and germs of disease."[124]

In addition to glass, cement, and plaster, brick was among the new architectural materials imported through the treaty ports.[125] In 1888, a Chinese building contractor named Say Shing manufactured bricks for the first time in Incheon in order to use them for the construction of Chinese buildings.[126] The brick-manufacturing skills further improved among the Chinese, and as of 1890, an official *hong*[127] directory circulated among treaty ports in Asia, listing Incheon's Chinese brick manufactory, Shing Fung, in addition to the

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[120] "Agreement Respecting a General Foreign Settlement at Chemulpo," November 1884.
[121] Murphey, "Treaty Ports," 17.
[122] *The Korean Repository*, August 1892, 245-246.
[123] A French resident named Alfred Gérard (1837-1915) established a brick-producing factory in Yokohama.
[124] His Corean Majesty's Customs, "The Observation Report on the Climate of Three Treaty Ports in Corea," *Dispatches from Chemulpo*, August 21, 1885.
[125] Tai-young Kim, *Han'guk kŭndae tosi chut'aek (*Seoul: Kimoondang, 2003), 26.
[126] *Jinsenfushi*, 1132.
[127] Hong, a word deriving from Cantonese, refers to "European firms involved in the China trade" in treaty ports. Taylor, "The Bund," 129.

building contractors, Lei Hing & Co. and Say Shing.[128] Brick buildings erected in the foreign settlements during this period included the Meyer Co. (the General Foreign settlement, 1884), Hotel Daibutsu (the Japanese settlement, 1888) and a number of Chinese shophouses. While building regulations made in 1884 regarding the use of inflammable materials such as brick, stone and iron did play a part in the growing adoption of bricks, the availability of building materials and architectural professionals such as contractors, brick manufacturers, and laborers from Shanghai was another critical factor in the widespread use of brick in the treaty port.[129]

By the end of the 1880s, ports of Yokohama and Incheon alike experienced booming economies as well as rapidly increasing populations. As of 1888, the native population of Yokohama was 118,947, whereas foreign residents numbered 4,492, of whom 2,981 were Chinese, 708 British, 255 American, 194 German, 125 French, 43 Swiss, 41 Dutch, 53 Portuguese and others. In 1886, Incheon had a comparatively small population, yet it was experiencing considerable growth both in population and economy. The native population was approximately 2,000, and the foreign population was 976, including Japanese.[130] The economic prosperity was manifested through new construction of buildings and harbor facilities, and these visible phenomena assured the Western residents that the treaties with Japan and Korea were a success serving to benefit the two Asian nations. New roads were constructed by the settler communities in order to facilitate trade and commerce—all rationalized and promoted through the rhetoric of "civilization." For instance, one observer commented upon Incheon as follows:

> The excellent, macadamized streets are extending in all directions and must prove by far the best object-lesson our native friends have ever received. There is probably no other country in the world, laying claim to any degree of civilization, where the roads are in as deplorable a condition as in this rich and beautiful peninsula. The Chemulpo community is doing good to others as well as to itself by the construction of its fine, substantial roads. They will be still more appreciated as the town spreads, distances become greater, and wheeled vehicles are brought into use. The first material requisite to civilized life is good roads.

Undergirding such a benevolent attitude of Westerners was the narrative often found in the description of the port before the opening to expanded trade. As with the case of Yokohama, the history of Incheon before the opening was rendered insignificant, because it was merely a "sleepy" fishing village waiting to be awoken by the touch of European

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[128] The chronicle and directory for China, Corea, Japan, the Philippines, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Siam, Borneo, Malay States, &c. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Daily Press Office, 1890).
[129] T. Kim, *Han'guk*, 29. Interestingly, the Japanese settlers continued to use various woods as their primary building materials. While this was due in some part to the availability of timber and their unfamiliarity with masonic structure, it can also be understood as their attempt to transplant Japanese lifestyles to the would-be colony. Ibid., 28.
[130] The chronicle and directory for China, Corea, Japan, the Philippines, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Siam, Borneo, Malay States, &c. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Daily Press Office, 1890).

civilization equated with free trade. The importance of the new port facilities could not be overemphasized because the port was "bringing Korea more and more in touch with the world at large"[131] as a contemporary American observer described. While this "Manifest Destiny" sentiment was not uniquely found in Incheon alone, what distinguished the port from its Japanese counterpart was the growing presence of the new regional power, Japan. Within a decade after the opening, all the available land in the Chinese and Japanese settlements was rapidly built upon, and "nearly all the lots of land in the general Foreign settlement [had] been bought up."[132] Yet the increasing political and economic influence of Japan over the Korean peninsula, especially after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, brought a huge influence on the built form to the port of Incheon. Japanese merchants acquired the substantial portion of lots originally allocated for Western residents and erected thereon "buildings of the orthodox Japanese type," which in turn gave the area "a Japanese character."[133]

As such, ports in East Asia were increasingly connected with one another, which was the product of the new technology of mobility such as steamships, in conjunction with the modern economic regime known as the treaty port system. The subsequent surge in transregional flows of people, ideas, and things engendered a new sense of space and reshaped relations among discrete places. Another significant spatial phenomenon indicative of the epochal change is the production of Chinatowns. On the one hand, new economic and technological mobilities in the modern world spurred and facilitated Chinese migration. On the other hand, Chinese migration simultaneously became regulated by noble forms of governance.

Chinatowns: Architecture and Bodies on the Move

Migrant Routes

The establishment of the treaty port system in China's coastal cities and the presence of Westerners therein offered "new entrepreneurial freedom"[134] not merely to Western traders but also to the Chinese themselves. In addition to new economic opportunities made available in treaty ports, political upheavals in the late Qing dynasty such as the Taiping Rebellion that swept Guangdong and the Boxer Rebellion in Shandong, along with natural disasters such as drought, famine, and flood, spurred Chinese emigration as an escape from mounting internal disorder. In the meantime, the opening of coastal ports elsewhere in Asia and the development of commercial networks became other factors that lured Chinese migrants who sought better opportunities for fortune and life.

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[131] "News Calendar," *The Korean Review*, 1902, 31.
[132] J. F. Schoenicke, "Jenchuan Trade Report, For the Year 1888," Returns of Trade and Trade Reports (Shanghai: Inspector General of Customs, 1888), 515.
[133] Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 516. The report also made an interesting observation. "By way of contrast, the Japanese Settlement, on the other hand, becomes sprinkled with houses of European type. The flourishing Nippon Yusen Kaisha is just completing the erection, in the Japanese settlement, of a block of offices, godowns, and dwelling-houses of solid red brick structure and pretty Western design."
[134] Murphey, "Treaty Ports," 21.

Figure 1-5. Chinese migration to Japan and Korea in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Drawn by Sujin Eom on the basis of oral interviews and written documents)

Once some Chinese communities were established in new destinations, a chain migration occurred. The migrant journey began from the home place to a (newly opened) port city in China,[135] and then successive migration was facilitated through informal networks created among relatives or village members, who provided hostelries and food for new migrants as well as helped arrivals find employment in new environments. While the development of transportation networks made it much easier for Chinese migrants to travel around, the emergence of information networks among ports, such as treaty port-based journals, reports and word of mouth, also served a significant role in providing and disseminating information necessary for migration.

Yokohama and Incheon, the two major ports adjacent to the capital cities, were the primary beachheads for Chinese migration into the inland. While Incheon was the closest port to mainland China, Yokohama was the halfway point linking China to the Americas by way of the Pacific Ocean.[136] This geographical fact was not the only factor that affected the migrant pattern of Chinese into the two ports. The different positionalities of the two ports in the world economy, the nature of Western business communities, historically accumulated relations in East Asia, and Japan's changing regional power all

[135] Yip, "San Francisco's Chinatown," 34.
[136] One symbolic example of this connection between the two continents across the Pacific was the incident of Mario Luz. In 1872, the ship bound for Peru was wrecked near the port of Yokohama and Chinese indentured laborers who escaped from the ship drew international attention.

influenced and differentiated the ways in which Chinese migration was pursued in the region.

Between the opening of the port in 1859 and the official treaty relations Japan made with China in 1871, the Chinese primarily came to Yokohama as employees of Western merchants who already conducted business in Chinese treaty ports such as Guangdong and Shanghai. The Chinese were mostly compradors,[137] translators, or domestic servants to these Westerners.[138] Once the treaty port system took strong root, migration increased in diverse forms and the Chinese came to take up a wide range of occupations. The growth of the treaty port economy in Japan strongly reverberated along China's coastal ports. The majority of the Chinese migrants in Yokohama came from Guangdong province in southern China. According to a survey taken before the earthquake in 1923, the total Chinese population of Yokohama (5,721) consisted of people from Guangdong (74%), Zhejiang (15%), Jiangsu (8%), Fujian (2%), Shandong (0.9%) and other provinces.[139]

The pull factors for migration varied, from word of mouth and political upheaval to professional choice and natural disasters, or combination of these. Chen,[140] whose story illustrates many dimensions of these patterns and trends, was born as a second son to a poor family in a small village in Guangdong. After he had moved to Hong Kong to make a living, where he heard of a newly opened Japanese port and its bustling economy—Yokohama. He later found himself on board a ship traveling from Hong Kong to Japan. He first found refuge in a home village organization located within Yokohama's Chinatown when he had no access to local resources such as housing and employment. Another migrant, Chow, took a similar migrant path from Guangzhou to Yokohama. When his father, originally from Qingyuan, moved to Guangzhou and opened a stall on the street, Chow helped in the family business. His father late moved to Hong Kong, but ultimately ended up in Yokohama in 1919 when Chow was at the age of fifteen after his uncle running a trading firm in Yokohama invited his father.

These migrant experiences show forth multiple routes that existed between southern China's treaty ports and the Japanese port. Yang's migrant experience evidences another link that existed in maritime Asia, a link between Shanghai, the bustling major treaty port of China of the time, and Yokohama.[141] Born in Shanghai in 1906, when China was still under Qing's rule, Yang was adopted to a merchant family upon the death of her biological parents. Fleeing from political upheaval during China's transition from the

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[137] Compradors refer to "agents engaged by foreign companies to manage Chinese employees and acts as intermediaries in business affairs." Ito Izumi, "The Chinese Community," in Yūzō Katō, *Yokohama, Past and Present: 100th Anniversary of Yokohama's Incorporation 130th Anniversary of the Port of Yokohama* (Yokohama: Yokohama City University, 1990), 40.

[138] According to the Japan Directory, which documented information on occupation of foreign residents in Yokohama, Chinese residents were involved in occupations as varied as bookbinding, tailoring, and publication.

[139] Yokohama kaikō shiryōkan, *Yokohama Chūkagai, kaikō kara shinsai made: rakuyō kikon kara rakuchi seikon e* (Yokohama: Yokohama Kaikō Shiryōkan, 1998), 16.

[140] All the names used here are pseudonyms.

[141] Based on an interview with author and written oral history of his grandmother.

Figure 1-6. Chinese migrants coming to the port of Incheon from Shandong in the 1920s. They were mostly seasonal laborers who came to Korea in the spring and returned home in the winter (Image source: *Chosenni okeru sinajin*, 1923)

Qing dynasty to the Republic of China, she moved to Japan with her family at the age of seven. Her family lived afterwards in a two-story brick house in Yokohama's Chinatown.

In contrast to Chinese residents of Yokohama, to whom Cantonese is the main language, the majority of Chinese immigrants living in Incheon today speak the dialect of Shandong, the closest province in China to the Korean peninsula. However, in the immediate years after the opening in 1883, it was Guangdong merchants and traders who primarily came to Incheon. They were "treaty port men," as Rhoads Murphey put it, who had already engaged in businesses in Chinese treaty ports and possessed business skills for negotiating with Western trading firms. As the Japanese came to have a stronger hold on the Korean peninsula towards the end of the century, these Guangdong merchants decreased in number and small traders and laborers from Shandong gradually replaced them. The new Chinese migrants from Shandong entered the Korean peninsula through two different routes. The first was to take a maritime route through the port of Incheon. The second was to take a land route through the new town of Sinuiju, created at the China-Korea border.

The term "Chuang Gaoli" signifies this migration from Shandong to the Korean peninsula. Gaoli is a Chinese pronunciation of the Chinese character equivalent to "Korea."[142] While the majority of Shandong people moved to Manchuria, some went so far as to Korea across the sea, a migration route called "Chaung Gaoli." As ports in northeastern China were connected through new sea routes, the trip from ports of Shandong such as Yantai and Weihaiwei to Incheon took only a day.[143] The people migrating from Shandong to Korea in this period were primarily cultivators and small traders or laborers colloquially known as *coolies*.[144]

[142] "79 Nián qián de "chuǎng gāolí" huáqiáo zhèng zhēncáng zhìjīn," *Shouguang Ribao*, July 23, 2013.
[143] Seungwook Kim, "20-segi cho Inchŏn hwagyo ŭi iju net'ŭwŏk'ŭ wa sahoejŏk konggan," *Chungguk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 47 (2010), 29. For the discussion of the opening of the port of Yantai, see Chang Liu, . "Yantai ui kaehang kwa chiyok sahoe ui pyonhwa," *Hankukhak yon'gu* 21 (2009): 387-416.
[144] Diana Lary, *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 20102).

As with the case of migration to Yokohama, word of mouth was among the primary factors that stimulated migration from Shandong to Incheon. When Liu came to Incheon in the late 1920s, his home village of Rizhao in Shandong was in political upheaval. His father engaged in a trade that used mules as the primary means of transportation, linking Shandong to remote inland regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. He sold oils, which were made in his own factory in Shandong, at local markets therein in exchange for raw materials. Through this trade, his father accumulated considerable wealth. After his mother died when Liu was at the age of fourteen, he came to feel out of place at home. His father was always away on business and his sister-in-law, who was now in charge of the family's finances, began to view him as a likely cause of inheritance disputes. Just right before he was about to "enter into the mountain," which colloquially meant joining a local brigand that ran rampant at the time, his father came home hearing from a friend about the situation. Chen's father advised him to move to Korea, which was now referred to as "a different world" or "well-developed" after the arrival of the Japanese. At the age of eighteen, then, Liu moved to Incheon.

Small-scale trading was among the most common occupations for Shandong migrants. There were a number of Chinese migrants engaged in trade between China and Korea, an economic opportunity made available after the opening of sea routes between the two countries. Sun, a silk trader, came from Yangmadao near Yantai. He first went to Dairen, crossed the border to Sinuiju,[145] moved southwards to Pyongyang, Kaesong, and finally came to Incheon. Sun frequently came in and out of the port of Incheon. With his wife left behind in the village, he brought his son and daughter to Korea and continued this migratory business until the Korean War, after which he never came back to China.[146] Another type of migrant occupation was seasonal labor, which included construction workers, masons or carpenters, and farmers. As urbanization advanced in colonial Korea, there was demand from urbanites for staples, which increased the number of Chinese farmers supplying them. As of 1901, a number of Chinese farmers lived at the port, with small gardens near the Chinese settlement. Most of them were farmers from Shandong who would "come over in the spring, work their holdings, and return for the winter to their native land, thus causing a constant fluctuation in the number of Chinese residents at the port."[147]

The Formation of Chinese Settlements

Before the treaty was concluded between Japan and China in 1871, Chinese residents in Yokohama, mostly intermediaries for Western trading firms, merchants, or domestic

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[145] Sinuiju was a new town whose development was driven by colonial demand. During the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-5, when the railroad that would link Seoul to the northern part of the peninsula was necessitated, a temporary railway office was built, a few Japanese were brought in, and a town was developed afterwards. Michitoshi Odauchi, *Chōsen buraku chōsa hōkoku* (Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1924), 43.

[146] This form of chain migration was found in Gunsan, another open port during the colonial period. In 1920, Lu moved to Gunsan, where his relatives owned a textile store, and started farming five years later. From his village in Shandong, Lu boarded a boat to Incheon, and moved to Gunsan. Joong-kyoo Kim, "Hwagyo ŭi saenghwalsa wa chŏngch'esŏng ŭi pyŏnhwa kwajŏng: kunsan yŏssiga rŭl chungsim ŭro," *Chibangsa wa chibang munhwa* 10 (2): 2007, 124.

[147] "Chemulpo," *The Korea Review*, 1901, 13.



Figure 2-7. The Morphology of Chinese Settlements in Yokohama (Left) and Incheon (Right) (Drawn by Sujin Eom)

servants, remained as non-treaty nationals. By February 1862, several reclamation projects had been completed to accommodate the increasing foreign population by turning rice paddies into residential areas. The newly reclaimed area was named *Yokohama Shinden*. After the Chinese community began to lease the land in January 1863, the area became a permanent settlement of the Chinese residents in Yokohama.[148] The Chinese settlement developed rapidly in step not only with the growing Chinese population of the city, but also with the demand for housing from Western residents. By the time the Chinese Consulate was built in 1878, the Chinese settlement housed a number of carpenters' and painters' shops serving Western clients. In addition, Chinese-owned shops included tailors, shoemakers, barbers, piano makers, and bakeries. Since there were growing architectural needs from the Western side of the settlement, a number of Chinese migrants came to the port of Yokohama as carpenters, masons, painters and plasterers. With their knowledge of Western architecture from China's colonial and treaty ports such as Hong Kong and Shanghai,[149] they opened businesses within the Chinese settlement. Such construction projects flourished between 1879-1881, around the time the reclamation work of the swamp near the settlement was finished. Small snack bars known as Chinese eating houses came to appear within the Chinese settlement around this time to serve the population of migrant laborers, who were mostly single males.[150] As will be discussed later in this chapter, this specific stratum of the population—laborers—would go into decline starting from July 1899, when the treaty system was finally abolished and the entry of Chinese laborers to Japan and their residence and employment therein became restricted.

Incheon's Chinese Settlement was designated in 1884 after the port of Incheon was opened the previous year, in 1883, located next to the Japanese settlement. As soon as the Chinese Consulate was built on the highest ground in the area, the land within the

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[148] The area differs from its surroundings, in terms of the layout of streets and lots. It is also notable that only the Chinese settlement was structured differently: its streets all ran from North to South without exception, as seen in the map of 1868. It was explained that it was not derived from the Feng Shui, the Chinese traditional theory of geography. Clearly, Yokohama Shinden had the same shape, as seen in the map of 1859, before it was developed as the settlement area in 1862. Roads were laid out according to the shape of the lot. Yokohama's Chinese settlement has maintained its distinguished shape up to the present, even after the first modern city planning in Japan, which came into being after a big fire in 1866.
[149] Yokohama kaikō shiryōkan, *Yokohama Chūkagai*, 19.
[150] Chinese "restaurants" were not common until the 1890s. Ibid., 24.

Figure 1-8. The postcards depicting Yokohama's Chinese Settlement in 1909 (left) and Incheon's Chinese Settlement in 1931 (right) show the variations of Chinese shophouses in the two ports.

settlement began to be sold off at auction by Chinese merchants. Of the construction of the consulate, one observer commented that the Chinese were building "a fine house of brick which they burned themselves on the ground."[151] In its early years of the port, merchants and traders from Guangdong occupied the streets with their shophouse-type buildings. As with the case of Yokohama, treaty-port carpenters, masons and plasterers came to the new port of Incheon as construction laborers for Western residences and trading houses, and they also brought with them the treaty-port—or the British colonial—style shophouses into their own district.

Isabella Bird Bishop, an English explorer in the late nineteenth century who traveled widely in East Asia, described Incheon's Chinese Settlement when she stayed in a hotel named *Steward*:

> This inn is at the corner of the main street of the Chinese quarter, in a very lively position, as it also looks down the main street of the Japanese settlement. The Chinese settlement is solid, with a handsome *yamen* and guild hall, and rows of thriving and substantial shops. Busy and noisy with the continual letting off of crackers and beating of drums and gongs, the Chinese were obviously far ahead of the Japanese in trade. They had nearly a monopoly of the foreign 'custom'; their large 'houses' in Chemulpo had branches in Seoul, and if there were any foreign requirement which they could not meet, they procured the article from Shanghai without loss of time. The haulage of freight to Seoul was in their hands, and the market gardening, and much besides. Late into the night they were at work, and they used the roadway for drying hides and storing kerosene tins and packing cases. Scarcely did the noise of night cease when the din of morning began. To these hard-working and money-making people rest seemed a superfluity.[152]

[151] September 20, 1884, Horace Newton Allen Papers 1883-1923, The New York Public Library Manuscript and Archives Division.
[152] Isabella Bird Bishop, *Korea and Her Neighbors: A Narrative of Travel, with an Account of the Vicissitudes and Position of the Country* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Compnay, 1898), 31.

As Bishop noted, "rows of thriving and substantial shops" lined the streets in the Chinese Settlement. The brick-built structures were a novelty in Korea, which stood in strong contrast to the residential quarter of native Koreans, where "narrow dirty streets consist[ed] of low hovels built of mud-smeared wattle without windows."[153] The Chinese merchants and traders were able to procure goods from other treaty ports such as Shanghai "without loss of time," Euro-American residents therefore depended on the Chinese shops. The Chinese Settlements both in Yokohama and Incheon were the main loci for transnational flows of people and things.[154]

The Architecture of Migrants: Temples and Shophouses

In addition to residential hotels, boarding houses, eating houses, brothels, gambling houses, and opium dens, what characterized the Yokohama Chinese community is the architectural presence of a burial ground. The majority of Chinese migrants did not seek permanent settlement in the destination countries and instead intended to return to their villages once they accumulated enough capital. It was thus important to maintain connections with the home villages. As historian Elizabeth Sinn points out, "two of the most meaningful ways of maintaining ties" with their native homes were "remittances and, to a lesser extent, the repatriation of migrants' bodies for reburial."[155] Remittances sent from Chinese migrants overseas were understood in their native villages as signs of their success and accomplishments, which in turn became the source of pride for families and relatives whom they left behind. Meanwhile, bones of Chinese migrants sent back to native villages indicated their attachments to home.

After its establishment in the vicinity of the Foreign Cemetery, Yokohama's Chinese burial ground was separated from it in 1866 by request of foreign consuls, who asked the Japanese government to move coffins of the Chinese to a separate location. Relocating in 1873 to the current site, the Chinese cemetery was officially built under the name of *Chukagisō* (中華義荘) in 1892 with donations from the Chinese merchants.[156] Various sourcas indicate that the demand arose from the diūference between the Western, as well as the Japanese, and the Chinese in their burial cultures.[157] The difference refers here to the Chinese custom of sending coffins of the deceased back to their ancestral villages in order to be finally buried therein. Since this also meant that the corpses would be exhumed years after their death in order to be carried on a ship to China, it became the source of dispute among the residents.

To be noted is the presence of translocal infrastructure that enabled and sustained the transport of migrant things. What the Japanese called *hitsugi-bune*—literally meaning "coffin-ship"—was sent back and forth to carry bones of Chinese migrants to Hong Kong

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[153] Ibid., 27.
[154] For the discussion of the transregional commercial network between Incheon and Shanghai, Kazuko, Furuta Kazuko, "Inchon Trade: Japanese and Chinese Merchants and the Shanghai Network," in *Commercial Networks in Modern Asia*, edited by Shin'ya Sugiyama and Linda Grove (Richmond, Surrey, Curzon, 2001), 71-95.
[155] Sinn, "Hong Kong," 232.
[156] *Giso* in Japanese, or *izhang* in Cantonese, implies a temporary resting place for coffins.
[157] Yokohama chūkakaikan, *Jizōōbyō* (Yokohama: Yokohama chūkakaikan, 1997).



Figure 1-9. ***Jizōōbyō*** **(地蔵王廟), a temple located within Yokohama's Chinese cemetery,** ***Chūkagisō*** **(中華義荘), was built in 1892 with the donation of Chinese residents in Yokohama. Its southern Chinese architectural influence is an example of transnational flows of architectural form that existed in the late nineteenth century (Image Source: Chukakaikan, 1997).**

Figure 1-10. A lecture hall built in 1890s Guangzhou, China, was decorated with tiles produced at a craft workshop in southern China. The workshop's products are also found in Yokohama's Chinese cemetery, which indicates the presence of the transregional network of building materials in 19th century East Asia. (Image Source: Chukakaikan, 1997)

Figure 1-11. ***Kantei-byo*** **(Guandimiao in Chinese), which had originated from a small statue of** ***Guandi*** **imported from southern China in 1862, took its full shape in 1871 with the donation of Chinese merchants of Yokohama and continued to remain the symbol of Yokohama's Chinese community (Image Source:** ***Far East*****, September 16, 1871)**

Figure 1-12. A typical example of shophouse in Incheon's Chinese settlement. Some of the shophouses built in the early twentieth century had remained until the 1980s, converted into lodging houses (Image Source: Chae 2003, left; Sonh Jang-won, right)

Figure 1-13. This picture, taken by an Australian photographer in 1904, shows a street that divided the Japanese settlement (on the left) and the Chinese settlement (on the right). In the Chinese settlement, a number of shophouse-style buildings were found. (Image source: 1904 Korea through Australian Eyes 2004)

or Shanghai, based on the places of origin of the deceased. While Yokohama's Chinese association called *Zhonghua huiguan* played a role as the bone-sending institution, it was the Tung Wah Hospital based in Hong Kong which served as the receiving institution that collected bones from abroad and re-sent them to native villages in the Guangdong region. For the migrants from the Shanghai area, a guild called Siming Gongsuo handled this practice.

Up to the early 1920s, when the Great Kanto Earthquake and its aftermath deterred the Chinese community from continuing coffin shipments, Yokohama's Chinese cemetery had remained a resting place for coffins. A temple located within the cemetery is the vivid architectural evidence of this translocal movement of migrant things. Known as *Jizoobyo* in Japanese, the temple is currently the oldest building made of brick in Yokohama. The 130-square-meter temple has an enclosed courtyard commonly seen in southern China. Columns and beams were imported from Guangzhou to be assembled on the spot, while walls or roofs were provided in Yokohama. The temple's Guangdong connection is also found in its tiles. Burned in a shop located in southern China, the tiles have the maker's name engraved on them. The same tiles were found in Vancouver's Chinatown.

Another architectural example that characterizes Yokohama's Chinese community is a temple called *Kanteibyo*. Known also as *Guandimiao* in Chinese, the temple serves Guandi as a deity, the legendary Chinese general who symbolizes honesty and credibility. The first shrine in Yokohama's Chinatown was built in 1862, and then turned into a temple in 1872 with donations from the Chinese community. On account of the earthquake in 1923 and US air raids in 1945, the temple underwent several reconstructions until the third temple was erected in 1947 on the lot of the Chinese school in Chinatown.

This particular Chinese temple is an important architectural symbol of overseas Chinese communities across the globe. Johanness Widodo's research on patterns of Chinese settlements in Southeast Asian ports places the Mazu temple at their symbolic center, because Mazu, the goddess of coastal settlers, is believed to protect and promote wellness of overseas Chinese communities.[158] In Yokohama's Chinese Settlement, by contrast, it was the Guandi temple, or *Kanteibyo* in Japanese, that replaced this Mazu temple. Hideo Izumida points to the advanced development of transport technology in the late nineteenth century, when overseas Chinese started migrating to the Japanese archipelago. There are a couple of explanations which support this development unique to East Asian ports, but one plausible account is that the already advanced transport technology in the late nineteenth century, in contrast to the period when Chinese migration to Southeast Asia occurred in the sixteenth century, made the Mazu belief irrelevant.[159] More important to the new Chinese settlements in East Asia was, the argument goes on to say, the prosperity of merchant communities as symbolized by the Guandi belief.

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[158] Johannes Widodo, *The Boat and the City: Chinese Diaspora and the Architecture of Southeast Asian Coastal Cities* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004).
[159] Hideo Izumida, *Haeyŏk Asia ŭi Ch'aina T'aun hwain'ga: imin kwa singmin e ŭihan tosi hyŏngsŏng.* Translated by Nayoung Kim et al. (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2014), 141-49.

While these temples are representative architectural examples of Yokohama's Chinese "merchant" community, it is a shophouse that characterizes Incheon's Chinese society, comprised of single migrant workers. A shophouse is a vernacular architectural form of diasporic Chinese communities commonly found in Southeast Asian port cities. While its specific layout and architectural style varies by region and class of occupants, it typically refers to a building type with a shop on the ground floor opening toward the street and residential accommodation upstairs.[160] A small courtyard inside the building serves as an open space through which air and light are brought into the compound mostly occupied by multiple households or individuals. Based on its origins in Southeast Asia's Chinese quarters, the architectural form has been transferred elsewhere, and Yokohama and Incheon were not exceptions. While Chinese migrants were believed to have brought the architectural form of shophouses from the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in China to Southeast Asian ports, shophouses in the East Asian treaty ports of Yokohama and Incheon were influenced by the architectural style found in the new treaty ports of Shanghai and Guangzhou, where their primary business connections existed.

As architectural historian Abidin Kusno suggests, "the quick pace of urbanization, increased population density, and the scarcity of land" contributed to the unique development of shophouse as a building type associated with ethnic Chinese.[161] While in Indonesia the violence against ethnic Chinese might also have affected the adoption of an elevated structure to protect residents from external threats,[162] racialized housing practices in San Francisco which promoted residential segregation of Chinese immigrants within the limited space of Chinatown affected the vertical development of housing structure. In Incheon, what made the building type appealing to the Chinese is twofold. On the one hand, it was primarily the urban conditions in which the Chinese had to establish businesses and residences alike—within the confined area. On the other hand, the population structure of the Chinese migrants being single males, as with the case of San Francisco's Chinatown under the Chinese Exclusion Act, made shophouse-type buildings the preferred dwelling form.[163]

In contrast to Yokohama, where the earthquake in 1923 demolished a large portion of its buildings, Incheon retained many of the shophouses built in its early years. The dwelling form of these shophouses was closely bound up with the population structure of the Chinese who lived in the port city in the early twentieth century. In Incheon, the Chinese formed a bachelor society, mostly male singles who were either traders or employees at small businesses. In 1920, there were 1,318 Chinese, including 1,019 men and 219

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[160] Abidin Kusno, *After the New Order: Space, Politics, and Jakarta* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), 28.
[161] Ibid., 35.
[162] Ibid.
[163] In reality, the Chinese did not always reside within the Chinese settlements. This is particularly so in Incheon, because of the unequal political relations Korea had with China. The Chinese demanded more land to accommodate their growing population. But it was undoubtedly the original Chinese settlement whose land values were considered higher than those in the newly added Chinese quarter.

women.[164] In the limited area available, the dense concentration of single males necessitated such architectural forms.

The architectural characteristics of the shophouse as being comprised of multiple units and capable of expanding horizontally made itself flexible for various uses. The shophouse was in most cases used as a combination of residential and commercial form, and lodging houses were one popular example. Although Incheon did not have as many fixed Chinese residents as did Seoul, the port city was nevertheless the main gateway through which Chinese migrants from mainland China entered. For this floating population, there were eleven lodging houses known as *kezhan* in the city as of 1924.[165] *Yuanhezhan* was one of those lodging facilities. In 1926, it was recorded that twenty-two Chinese men landed at the port of Incheon and went to *Yuanhezhan* within the Chinese settlement to stay.[166] The shophouse with the arched verandah shown in Figure 1-12 is a typical example of building type in Incheon's Chinese settlement.

Differing from its counterpart in Japan, the establishment of Chinese settlement in Korea came with the provision of legally delimited burial grounds. Based on the treaty signed between China and Korea in 1884, the Chinese burial ground in Incheon was situated in the vicinity of the Chinese settlement.[167] This Chinese burial ground was also a temporary resting place for coffins before their shipment to China.[168] Compared with Yokohama, Incheon's Chinese community had a more fluid population structure and a less solid economic base given the colonial status of Korea. For this reason and others including the geographical proximity between Shandong and Incheon, which made the trip much easier than that between Yokohama and Guangdong, Incheon's Chinese cemetery did not develop significantly in architectural terms. Nonetheless, a map of the Chinese cemetery drawn in the 1920s and a donation list provide the important position of the burial ground within the overseas Chinese community.

Chinese Migration in Question: Diseased Bodies

Chinese migrants themselves are not the only agents in the production of Chinatowns in the late nineteenth century. The development of transportation networks enabled new ideas and people to move around across different regions, but at the same time it opened up new forms of control over migrant bodies. This new technology to control migration was developed in tandem with the new sense of urban space which was increasingly

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[164] Zhaoquan Yang and Yumei Sun, *Chaoxian Huaqiaoshi* (Beijing: Zhongguo Hua qiao chu ban gong si, 1991), 170.

[165] This included Tianhezhan (天合棧), Chunjizhan (春記棧), Tongshunzhan (同順棧), Xingshengzhan (興盛棧), Fuchengzhan (復成棧), Yuanhezhan(元和棧), Furenzhan (福仁棧), and the like. Jung-hee Yi, "Haebang ch'ogi Inchŏn hwagyo ŭi kyŏngje hwaltong e kwanhan yŏn'gu," *Inchŏnhak yŏn'gu* 9 (2008): 24.

[166] Dongsu Han, "Inchŏn chŏngguk chogyeji nae konghwachun ŭi yŏksa pyŏnchŏn e kwanhan yŏn'gu," *Chungguk hakpo* 60 (2009), 381.

[167] The treaty prescribed that trees should be planted surrounding the burial ground and a house built to tend the site.

[168] Few documents exist to show this practice in Korea, especially during the colonial era. However, a newspaper article published on November 25, 1958 described the conflict between the cemetery office and Chinese when the Chinese did not bury coffins completely under the ground so they could exhume easily afterwards. "Pam saieman ijang: chunggugindŭl ŭi maejang p'ungsok," *Dong-A Ilbo*, November 25, 1958.

interconnected with each other and the rise of public health as a crucial means to maintain social order.

When bubonic plague was found in Hong Kong in May 1894, the *Japan Weekly Mail*, published for the readership of Yokohama's Western residents, featured a number of articles covering the outbreak. Under the title of "The Black Death," those articles never avoided associating the epidemic with "uncivilized" characters of a certain part of Asia and with ignorance of "modern scientific discoveries" thereof:

> We do know, however, that, like most other grave epidemic diseases, it is one of nature's punishments for filthy habits. That it was the curse of the Middle Ages, was due to the fact that the cities of Europe were, at that time, filthy and insanitary to an extent only comparable with the condition of some of the towns of Asia at the present day. Filth is the great factor in the development and increase of epidemic disease; but, having begun in a crowded and dirty environment, and progressed to epidemic extent, the infection often seems to become so intense as to tend to overleap its natural boundaries, and to attack with greater or less violence those living in far better circumstances.[169]

The news that the plague was rife in Hong Kong and Chinese residents were escaping the British colony in large numbers went current even in Japan. As "the infection often seems to become so intense as to tend to overleap its natural boundaries," Japanese newspapers urged the authorities to "take prompt and full measures for the prevention of the dangerous disease," and subsequently the strict sanitary precautions were taken to prevent the entry of the disease into the archipelago.[170] The fear of the plague further created anxiety among Yokohama's Western residents. On June 8, 1894 in a letter to the editor for the *Japan Weekly Mail*, a concerned Western resident of Yokohama pointed to the regular import into Yokohama of old cottons as the unnoticed media of spreading the pest, and called for a strict investigation of such items.[171]

It was in March 1896 when the first plague in Japan was recorded. On March 30, the British steamship named *Gaelic* landed at the port of Yokohama and its Chinese crew was immediately hospitalized into a Chinese hospital located within Chinatown. He was announced dead the same night. With doubts on a possibility of the plague as to the cause of the death, the Prefectural Government of Kanagawa requested the Institute for Study of Infectious Diseases based in Tokyo to dispatch an investigator for the inspection of the

[169] *The Japan Weekly Mail*. May 26, 1894.
[170] *The Japan Weekly Mail*. June 2, 1894.
[171] *The Japan Weekly Mail*. June 16, 1894.

death.[172] The investigator excavated the grave, dissected the body, and finally diagnosed plague.[173]

There was no spread of the plague into the city until the next year. In September 1897, however, a sixteen-year-old daughter of a shipmen contractor residing in Kaigandōri 5-chōme died of fever. As deaths with similar symptoms continued in the same address, the Prefectural Government requested the Institute again to investigate the deaths, which were tentatively diagnosed plague. Subsequently, the Government blockaded the whole area and undertook the massive cleaning up. Dozens of dead rats were found, three of which contained plague bacilli, in a raw-cotton warehouse located within the area. It was estimated that the plague bacilli were attached to raw cotton imported in June and July from India and Hong Kong the same year, and subsequently transmitted to rodents in the city.[174]

The City Council convened a meeting on October 8th, in which they made a decision to divide the affected area of Kaigandōri 5-chōme and its vicinity into three districts, the first district for blockading the passage, the second for examining health conditions, and the third for eradicating rodents. The particular area where the outbreak of the plague occurred was completely sealed off and its more than one thousand residents were quarantined to a temporary barrack built near the shoreline. After massively sterilized, the affected district was incinerated the next month.[175]

On the question of how the plague was transmitted to Yokohama, "needless to say," the city government pointed to the year of 1896 as the beginning of the disease, when the first plague broke on a ship from Hong Kong entering the port. Special attention was paid to the fact that the next year's plague also took place in a house of a shipmen contractor residing near the warehouse for raw cotton imported from India and Hong Kong. A series of outbreaks in 1903 was also attributed to things coming from abroad through foreign ships such as dust, rice, ramie and cotton.[176]

The Chinese connections to "the black death" were repeated in colonial Korea. On September 16, 1910, the first plague patient was found among Chinese carpenters who were working near Sino-Russian borders. Subsequently, the plague spread among laborers who were living under poor and insanitary housing conditions.[177] The disease spread fast to Harbin, Changchun and Jilin mostly along railway tracks. As Chinese laborers went back home in Shandong province via railways in the wintertime, the plague moved even further to Beijing, Tianjin and Jinan.[178] The news about the outbreak of the

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[172] The Institute for Study of Infectious Diseases (伝染病研究所) was founded in Tokyo by prominent bacteriologist Kitasato Shibasaburo (1853-1931) in 1892 with the financial assistance of Fukuzawa Yukichi.
[173] Ryū Koezuka, *Yokohama kaikō gojūnenshi* (Yokohama: Yokohama Shōgyō Kaigisho, 1909) 258-59.
[174] Koezuka, *Yokohama*, 259.
[175] Koezuka, *Yokohama,* 259-61.
[176] Koezuka, *Yokohama,* 264
[177] Kyu-hwan Sihn, "The First and the Second Pneumonic Plague in Manchuria and the Preventive Measure of Japanese Colonial Authorities (1910-1921)," *Korean J Med Hist* 21(2012), 451.
[178] Ibid.

plague was delivered to Korea, which became Japan's colony three months ago.[179] Its move forward to the south was a grave threat to the Japanese colonial authorities, because Shandong, from which a number of Chinese laborers migrated to northern China, was close to the Korean peninsula, especially the port of Incheon.

Precautions were taken particularly against Chinese junk ships calling at ports near northern China. The movements of Chinese were strictly monitored. Incheon and Sinuiju, the two major gateway cities for Chinese migrant workers to the Korean peninsula, were designated as report areas for dead rodents. As for passengers who once stopped at the affected ports, they were quarantined to an isolated place.[180] In February 1911, Kitasato Shibasaburō, prominent Japanese bacteriologist who founded Japan's first disease institute in 1892 and discovered the infectious agents of bubonic plague when it swept Hong Kong in 1894, visited Korea on the way back to Japan from his inspection tour of plague-affected areas in Manchuria. While giving a lecture at a welcoming reception held in Seoul, Kitasato made a clear distinction between the bubonic plague that occurred in Japan in the past and the pneumonic plague now spreading beyond Manchuria. More tellingly, he pointed out that the bubonic plague was transmitted by rodents, whereas the pneumonic plague was carried by humans. In this regard, he pointed to *Chinese migrant laborers* from Shandong as the primary carriers of the current plague and further called attention to the fact that Korea shared a border with China, and Korea, unlike Japan, was not equipped with complete sanitation facilities.[181]

The second outbreak of plague in Manchuria in 1920 urged the colonial authorities to change their conceptions and practices regarding the causes of and preventive measures for the disease. Upon entering into Korea, Chinese migrant workers from Shandong were inspected at each checkpoint upon their arrivals at ports, borders and train stations, and quarantined on a constant basis.[182] As the Japanese colonial authority began to recognize that the primary carriers of the plague were, contrary to popular belief, not rodents but "Chinese migrants," the preventive measures came to change. The inspections and quarantines at "migration nodes," whether on land or sea, had no substantial effects in practice. Instead, the colonial authority turned towards house-to-house inspections, which proved far more effective in identifying plague patients. Provided that most of such house-to-house inspections were undertaken by police officials of low rank rather than by medical professionals, sanitary measures and disease management devolved into everyday surveillance and became part and parcel of Japan's colonial governance in Korea.[183]

To be noted is that the plague was, undoubtedly, a disease that was racialized as Chinese and thus spatialized in association with the Chinese quarter. In colonial Hong Kong, after the outbreak of bubonic plague, "the Chinese were clearly identified as a threat to the health" of European residents.[184] As Elizabeth Sinn points out, the plague, since its

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[179] *The Maeil Shinbo*. November 20, 1910.
[180] Jinsenfu, *Jinsenfushi* (Jinsen: Jinsenfu, 1933), 1416.
[181] *The Maeil Shinbo*. February 28, 1911.
[182] Sihn, "Pneumonic Plague," 464.
[183] Sihn, "Pneumonic Plague," 469.
[184] Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 181.

Figure 1-14. While Japanese travelers characterized San Francisco's Chinatown with dark and dirty Chinese "den," the city of San Francisco itself was equated with wide, light, and clean boulevards. The captions read, "The Policemen's raid into the Chinese den by night" (left) and "California Street, looking west from Sansome street" (right). (Image Source: Akamine Seiichiro, 1886).

appearance in Hong Kong in 1894 and spread to other port cities in Asia, was "from the beginning identified as 'Chinese,' not only because it had originated in China, but also, more tellingly, because it was carried by Chinese and recognized as a consequence of filthy, poor, Chinese habits."[185] Through the transpacific community of information, Japanese and Western residents in Yokohama were well aware of the outbreaks of plagues in Hong Kong and Honolulu, and the subsequent violence toward Chinese domestic spaces. This association of diseases stemming from living conditions with racialized spaces such as Chinese quarters crossed national boundaries. While the newly opened port networks facilitated the transfer of diseases, the development of communication networks, ranging from treaty-port newspapers to telegraphs—served themselves as the conduit of information by linking different regions.

Shinamachi: Chinatown as a Distinct Urban Type

An equally important role was played by urban professionals on the move—treaty port architects, Chinese building contractors, and Japanese entrepreneurs whose business interests were characteristically urban. These professionals also included travelers who transported knowledge and imageries regarding urban space by way of describing and documenting the cities to which they paid visits. At the turn of the century, the built environment was often evoked as the yardstick of civilization. Western merchants traveled among the new ports in East Asia, from Hong Kong and Shanghai to Yokohama and Incheon, and never failed to associate what they observed in the cities with the level of civilization. It is in this sense that Chinatowns in the East Asia should not be understood as isolated spatial entities, but as the conduits through which people, ideas, goods, and things circulated. What shaped the Chinese settlement during this time, when communication and transport networks began to develop rapidly, was not merely confined to architectural materials and practices. The imageries of Chinatown as antithetical space to the modern city was also in circulation through the means of

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[185] Ibid., 180.

publication and by traveling elites such as medical doctors and travelers. Ports in the Pacific Rim were not only the places for Chinese migration, but they also attracted and disseminated the idea of Chinatown elsewhere.

The new transport networks enabled people to travel around the world. Japanese elites including journalists were among these travelers who made trips to the United States by the turn of the century and served themselves as the conduit of circulating texts and images of spaces they observed elsewhere. In other words, these texts and images carry with them spatially referable "sentiments" and significantly influenced the construction of Chinatowns as an imagined, or imaginative, geography at home.[186] San Francisco and New York, the booming US cities at the time, were the most prominent places of origin of spatial imageries of modernity.

Akamine Seiichiro's description of San Francisco's Chinatown in his essay *Beikoku imafushigi* (1886) is but one example. In his illustrated travel essay, he portrays San Francisco's Chinatown as follows:

> They just worked like slaves to earn money and regarded returning home as their ultimate objective. In California it is assumed that mixing Chinese children with white children at primary school would spread bad customs, disturb morals, and would have harmful effects on society. So no primary schools accept Chinese children. All these treatments are the same as the African people suffered before the Civil War. But Chinese were not purchased by Americans. The difference is that they were purchased for a certain period by six companies established by Chinese businessman for migration and became their slaves and came here. Chinese in San Francisco revile at Japanese as the devil whenever they see them. They are to be pitied.[187]

While characterizing San Francisco's Chinatown with its dirty streets and opium dens, Akamine Seiichiro translates Chinatown as *shinamachi* (支那町) and Chinese people as *shinajin*. What is important here is the term *Shina*—the Japanese appellation for China—was by no means neutral but "emerged as a word that signified China as a troubled place mired in its past, in contrast to Japan, a modern Asian nation."[188] In other words, *Shina* became "Japan's Orient," from which Japan as a modern nation escaped and distanced itself in order to progress. This complex reconstruction of "China" provided the epistemological foundations for Japanese intellectuals to reposition Japan as a new leader of Asian nations. "One did not have to go to China or read widely for affirmation of

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[186] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books 1994 [1978]).
[187] Akamine Seiichiro, *Beikoku imafushiki* (Tokyo: Jitsugaku Eigakkō, 1886), 49-50. Translation is from Yoshida Ryo, "Japanese Immigrants and Their Christian Communities in North America: A Case Study of the Fukuinkai, 1877-1896," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 34, no. 1 (2007): 239.
[188] Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, 3-4.

China's backwardness," historian Stefan Tanaka wrote, "One had only to visit the Yokohama Chinatown to experience *shina* as that living past."[189]

To be noted is the transpacific construction of *shinamachi* as a distinct urban type, an abstraction of built form, that seemed to indicate the fundamental difference between a modern nation and its opposite. The mutual construction of Chineseness and space was made possible through the emergence of "print capitalism" as well as physical movements of travelers who served themselves as the conduit of texts, images, and sentiments. The imaginative geography of *shinamachi* was further reinforced and strengthened by this transpacific production and circulation of affect, carried by both human and nonhuman actors.

These observations made by the travelers in Chinatowns elsewhere found their way to Japan. In "*Yokohama Hanjōki*," published in 1903 for purposes of publicizing the development of the open port, Yokohama's Chinese settlement, then called *Nankinmachi*, was depicted as "crowded, brawling, mismatched, dark, and filthy."[190] Although the main street of the Chinese settlement was lined with three-story red brick buildings for businesses,[191] its back alleys showed a totally different picture:

> When it comes to Nankinmachi's back alley, its filth is just beyond words. Even in the winter, ominous smells are so pervasive all over the area. The eaves are low and the houses are dark inside. One would have to feel miserable upon seeing a man crawling like a worm in the dark room. A room is about three tatamis (畳),[192] and there is no place to sit on other than household goods and ragged clothes.[193]

It was not only the housing conditions that were seen as miserable in the Chinese quarter. The streets were also so messy with "coal dusts, sewage water and living or non-living entities" that one should hold his or her nose in order to move forward.[194] The book, written for the apparent purpose of flaunting Yokohama's prosperity as an emergent modern city, depicted the Chinese quarter's filth so vividly that it presented a striking contrast to the way its adjacent Western neighborhood was described with its modern buildings in pages that followed. In July 1909, Yokohama hosted a ceremony to celebrate the 50th year of the opening of the port. At the same year, the Yokohama Chambers of Commerce and Industry published a book titled *Yokohama Kaikou Gojyūnenshi* to commemorate the 50th year of the opening of port. According to the book, Yokohama's Chinatown was comprised of approximately 4,000 Chinese residents, who, whether they be wealthy or petty merchants, mostly lived within squalid and low houses.[195] The

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[189] Ibid., 190.
[190] Yokohama shimbosha, *Yokohama Hanjōki* (Yokohama: Yokohama Shimbosha, 1903), 129.
[191] Nakaku waga machi kankō iinkai, *Nakaku waga machi: Nakaku chiku enkaku gaishi* (Yokohama: Nakaku waga machi kankō iinkai, 1986), 33.
[192] One tatami is about 0.9 by 1.8 meters.
[193] Yokohama Shimbosha, *Yokohama Hanjōki*, 140-41.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid., 34.

Chinese were described with their racial traits such as indulgence in food and filth that even "the wealthy [Chinese] are not capable to improve."[196]

In Incheon, the Chinese settlement—then informally called *shinamachi* in Japanese and *chinachŏng* in Korean—was described as follows in the book titled *Jinsenfushi*, written for purposes of documenting the history of the colonial municipality:

> Speaking of Shinamachi, it is common for Japanese to be reminded of squalid alleys with the stench of oil and chives, and streets of chaos and vulgarity. Even the Chinese themselves detest well-ordered styles. Instead, they enjoy living in the world of disorder. However, our Shinamachi is very ordered and hardly shows such features.[197]

This difference in narrative shows an interesting glimpse of the Chinese settlement of Incheon under Japanese colonial rule. While Chinese and their neighborhood were closely associated with their supposed abhorrence for order and sanitation, a Japanese observer in Incheon's Chinese quarter contended that "our *shinamachi*" was free of such reprehensible Chinese characteristics found elsewhere. The reason for the unexpectedly ordered nature of Incheon's Chinese quarter was that it was a town that was not spontaneously created but, as similar to the Foreign Settlements of Incheon, a "planned" town from the inception, well-connected to streets and roads constructed following the opening of the port. While Japan's Chinese Settlements were invoked here as a point of reference in an implicit manner ("it is common for Japanese to be reminded of squalid alleys with the stench of oil and chives, and streets of chaos and vulgarity"), what distinguished Incheon's Chinese settlement from its Japanese counterparts was, according to the Japanese observer, how it was deliberately planned as a modern development after Japan opened the port.[198]

The Policing of Borders and Chinese Mobility

As Japan accelerated modernizing projects in the 1890s, the treaty revision seemed inevitable for the Meiji government because the treaties themselves were "constant reminders of inferiority" to Japan as a nascent modern nation-state.[199] In July 1894, the successful renegotiation of unequal treaties with the Western powers came in the form of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which included the termination

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[196] *Yokohama kaikō gojūnenshi*, 34.
[197] *Jinsenfushi*, 1524.
[198] In contrast to the orderliness of the streets, however, the neighborhood felt deserted and forlorn because quite a few Chinese merchants closed their businesses and returned to China especially after the Wanbaoshan Incident of 1931. Invoking architecture as the reminder of the past, the Japanese observer stated that the majority of the buildings within the Chinese Settlement were built around the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. While the life of Japanese wooden architecture built in Incheon almost came to an end, the buildings in the Chinese Settlement were solid enough to require no repairs. Still, the court house built with black bricks now looked like a vacant house full of dust and even its location remained unnoticed. See further *Jinsenfushi*, 1525-26.
[199] Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 427.

of the treaty port system in Japan.[200] When the treaty port system was abolished in 1899, at stake was how to deal with living alongside foreigners. The end of the unequal treaties paved the way for Japan to regain sovereignty and diplomatic equality, but it also allowed foreigners, including Chinese, to live anywhere beyond the formerly designated areas. This inevitably generated heated debate over "the mixed residence in the interior" (*naichizakkyo*) of foreigners with Japanese residents.[201]

Given the new mobility of foreigners, Japan as a modern state was confronted with the dilemma of how to control flows of people after regaining its sovereignty. Though Westerners were tolerated to live alongside Japanese people, it was argued that the residence of Chinese should be either prohibited or restricted.[202] The debate had two major camps. On the one hand, Chinese should not be allowed to live with Japanese because their "high earning power" and "survival skills" might be a grave threat to Japanese laborers. On the other hand, Chinese should be permitted to remain because their labor could contribute to the development of Japanese economy.[203] Beyond the supposed economic threat posed by co-residence, the Chinese question also took moral issues. An influential Meiji intellectual, Fukuzawa Yukichi contended that "[l]ower-class Chinese were 'a different *category* of people' who abandoned their country like a shoe and were willing to take any job."[204] What was also often considered to be inherent traits of these "base people" was the supposed Chinese propensity for filth and lack of morality and hygiene.[205]

After the debate over mixed residence of Chinese with Japanese, Imperial Ordinance No. 352 was issued to restrict Chinese residence and employment to designated areas. According to the ordinance, laborers needed to acquire permits from administrative ministers to reside and work outside former Settlements (*kyoryūchi*) or mixed-residence quarters (*zakkyochi*). Given that none of the Westerners living in Japan were laborers at that moment and Japanese nationals were not subject to the ordinance, such restrictions on residential mobility, in fact, effectively targeted Chinese laborers.[206]

Imperial Ordinance No. 352, targeting migrants as potential threats, whether Chinese migrant laborers or travelers in general, was replicated in colonial Korea. In August 1910, right before Japan annexed Korea the next month, the Japanese Resident-General of

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[200] Eric C. Han, *Rise of a Japanese Chinatown : Yokohama, 1894-1972* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Cente, 2014), 73.
[201] Katō, *Yokohama, Past and Present*, 73. See also Andrea Vasishth, "A Model Minority: The Chinese Community in Japan," in *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity*, edited by Michael Weiner (London: Routledge, 2009), 108-139.
[202] Sankichi Yasui, *Teikoku Nihon to Kakyō: Nihon, Taiwan, Chōsen* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2005).
[203] Ibid.
[204] Timothy Yun Hui Tsu, "Japan's "Yellow Peril": The Chinese in Imperial Japan and Colonial Korea." *Japanese Studies* 20, no. 2 (2010): 165.
[205] E. Han, *Japanese Chinatown*, 75.
[206] To be noted is that although they were also subject to forms of surveillance, other foreigners were given relative freedom of mobility. Without having to hold passports, Westerners were now allowed to travel under the condition that they comply with travel regulations, which required travelers to "inscribe their name, nationality, age, profession, etc., in the register" at inns or other travel accommodations. Basil Hall Chamberlain and W. B. Mason, *A Handbook for Travellers in Japan Including the Whole Empire from Saghalien to Formosa* (London: John Murray, 1907), 7.



Figure 1-15. The picture of Yokohama's Chinese Settlement in the late 1920s (left) shows the aftermath of the Kanto Great Earthquake of 1923, in which the former brick buildings were replaced by wooden structures. The neighborhood had recovered from the disaster by the 1930s (right), but it came to receive police surveillance when Japan plunged into the Asia-Pacific War. (Image source: The Yokohama Archives of History)

Korea issued an ordinance regarding "Foreigners' Residence and Activities," according to which foreigners were required to live within the limits of designated places and otherwise resister with government authorities for their residences. When in violation of the ordinance, the said foreigners were subject to deportation. Given that foreign laborers in Korea were mostly Chinese and Japanese at that time, and that the latter were not affected by such an ordinance, "foreigners" here referred only to the Chinese, the ordinance being intended to restrict their mobility.[207]

In October 1916, the Japanese Governor-General of Korea amended the aforementioned ordinance, adding several items. The new ordinance stipulated that foreign laborers could work only within areas formerly designated as foreign settlements in Incheon, Gunsan, Mokpo, Masan, Chinnampo, Wonsan, Busan, and Seoul. Accordingly, foreign laborers were not allowed to work beyond the confines of the designated areas. Their choice of employment was also restricted by the ordinance: foreign laborers were only permitted to work in agriculture, fishing, mining, construction, manufacture, transportation and like employments.[208] In reality, however, the ordinance was not observed well. This prompted the Kyonggi Police Bureau, which had jurisdiction over the city of Incheon, to draft another ordinance in 1927, which stipulated that the number of Chines laborers should not exceed one third of the total number of laborers at construction sites within the jurisdiction.[209] In keeping with this legislation in its colony, the Japanese state approved another ordinance to be implemented in the metropole: in January 1918, an ordinance titled "Concerning Foreigners' Entry" was enacted to become, along with Imperial Ordinance No. 352 issued in 1899, part and parcel of immigration policies in Japan in the decades to come.[210]

Various forms of legislation to restrict Chinese migration to colonial Korea and impose spatial restrictions on Chinese residence and labor were not as strongly enforced as in mainland Japan. Behind the differential control over Chinese mobility in metropole and colony lay the differentiated needs of the empire for Chinese labor. In colonial Korea,

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[207] Yu-gwang Jin, *Junggugin diaseupola: hangughwagyoiyagi* (Paju: Hangughagsuljeongbo, 2012), 103.
[208] Ibid., 103-4.
[209] Ibid., 104.
[210] Yasui, *Teikoku*.

Chinese laborers were recruited *en masse* to work for the colonial enterprise, ranging from railway construction to mining. Their low wage benefited Japanese colonial entrepreneurs as it prevented the average wage from rising.[211]

In colonial Korea, a Chinese man named Sui was arrested with his colleagues on July 7, 1927. Working in a noodle factory located near Incheon, they had been living there since June of the previous year. Being accused of not reporting their residence to the municipal government while living outside the designated Chinese settlements, they were fined 30 *won*. With no savings for the fine, they had no choice but imprisonment.[212] In December 1928, some Chinese laborers were deported to China on charges of undocumented labor.[213] Such legislation did not go uncontested, however. On December 19 and 20 the same year, about 80 Chinese including self-employees or Japanese restaurant employees residing outside the Chinese Settlement visited the Chinese Consulate in Incheon and petitioned for permission to live outside the designated area, requesting that the Consulate negotiate with the municipal government on the matter.[214] Then the Chinese Consul visited the Incheon Police Bureau on the 20th and consulted with the Incheon police chief, who simply confirmed that the residential restrictions imposed on the Chinese could not be lifted because of the concerns relating to business and sanitation. This case was sent to the Chinese Consulate-General in Seoul, who filed official complaints.[215] While it was made clear that the residential restrictions were stipulated in the Governor-General's decree enacted in 1910 and thus lawful, the housing issue was never easy for the Governor-General to resolve.[216] Chinese labor was, after all, a necessity for the Japanese colonial government in conducting its colonial enterprises, and accommodating the Chinese to some extent seemed a necessary concession.

Spatial restrictions imposed on Chinese residence and labor, though not strictly enforced, continued well into the 1930s, with more strengthened surveillance due to the repercussions of Japan's attack on the Manchuria in 1931. On May 10, 1931, the Incheon Police Bureau took three Chinese men into custody, charging them with undocumented residence and fining them twenty *won* each. As of the 1920s, an average Chinese laborer was paid twenty *won* per month. Unable to pay the fine that was almost their monthly income, they had no choice but to go to prison, where they were abused and beaten. The Chinese Consul visited the Bureau to negotiate this matter, but to no avail.[217] On May 23 the same year, some fifty Chinese laborers in Kaesong were likewise arrested on charges of undocumented residence. They subsequently applied for residential permits together, but the Japanese police ignored the application and just kept telling them to go back to China immediately. If self-deportation was belated, the police warned, they would have to pay more fines and ultimately go to prison. They had no traveling expense, however,

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[211] Michael Kim, "Cheguk ŭi kyŏnggye rŭl chaegusŏng hanŭn kwanjŏm esŏ parabon singminji chosŏn ŭi chunggugin iju nodongja munje," in *Tonga' t'ŭrauma: singminji cheguk ŭi kyŏnggye wa t'algyŏnggye ŭi kyŏnghŏmdŭl*, edited by Sŏn-yŏng Yu and Sŭng-gi Ch'a (Seoul: Kŭrinbi, 2013), 194-196.
[212] *The Maeil Shinbo*. July 7, 1927.
[213] Jin, *Junggugin,* 104.
[214] *The Maeil Shinbo*, December 22, 1928.
[215] *The Maeil Shinbo*, December 24, 1928.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Yang and Sun, *Chaoxian,* 213.

and desperately wanted the residential permits in order to remain in Korea. It was reported that, deeply saddened, they simply cried all day long.[218]

As Japan accelerated preparations for war in the 1930s, the imperial government strengthened its border control as well as surveillance over Chinese settlements in metropole and colony alike. Communist movements unfolded in the mainland, and Chinese migrants became increasingly associated with “impure” elements that came from without. This association became even more fierce when Japan plunged into the war with China in the mid-1930s. In the wartime years, Chinese migrant laborers in particular were put under intense police surveillance because of the possibility of their involvement in communist movements abroad. Constant surveillance and policing reinforced the association of Chinatowns with a sense of illegality, and mass media only strengthened the association.

Around the time when the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 broke out, Chinese migration to Japan was highly circumscribed and put under constant police surveillance. House searches and imprisonment were not uncommon, and these practices continued until the end of the Second World War. Established in 1911, the Special Higher Police (*Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu*) was the secret police force that was to investigate and monitor civilian activities and “thoughts” in the name of maintenance of public order. Their monthly confidential report titled *Tokko Geppo*, which started publication in July 1931, featured the warfare state’s multifaceted control of anti-Japanese movements, religious activities, and Chinese migration into the Japanese archipelago.

Starting in October 1935, the report added to its content the item of “Foreign Affairs.” It covered entries, residences, and deportations of the Chinese primarily from Manchukuo. The item meticulously described names, places of origin, current addresses in Japan, reasons for deportation or denial for entry, and details for repatriation. As of 1935, the Special Police began to pay special attention to the “communizing” movement in northern China as connected to the Soviet Union, and to “bad” influences from the region that might affect public order in Japan.[219]

Almost every facet of everyday life was put under constant surveillance. Among the reasons for deportation was poverty. In February 1936, a barber who had come to Shimonoseki in 1917 and moved to Tokyo in 1924 closed his business there after he was diagnosed with lung cancer. The police decided to deport him to China because of the possibility that he would become poor on account of his jobless condition.[220] In March 1936, another Chinese barber residing in Kyoto was also deported because it was assumed that he would lose his ability to work in the near future.[221] Beyond the economic concerns, even diseases themselves were the reasons for deportation. In May 1936, a Chinese resident in Yokohama was deported to his place of origin via the port of Hong Kong after he was struck with leprosy.[222] Anti-Japanese and communist “thoughts” were

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[218] Ibid.
[219] *Tokko Geppo*, October 1935.
[220] *Tokko Geppo*, February 1936.
[221] *Tokko Geppo*, March 1936.
[222] *Tokko Geppo*, May 1936.

also standard and accepted reasons for deportation. In June 1936, a university student was deported, after being accused of "possessing" anti-Japanese and communist thoughts.[223]

What should be noted here from the police report is that the Chinese quarter was put under everyday surveillance. In particular, Yokohama's Chinatown was constantly monitored by the secret police. Undocumented labor, gambling, violence, illegal entry, theft, and even "indecent behavior" were meticulously documented and criminalized. In July 1936, a Chinese laborer living in Yokohama's Chinese settlement was deported to Shanghai because of his "illegal" labor in spaces outside the designated area of Chinatown.[224] In February 1937, seven Chinese men were caught in the act of gambling in a village association building located within Chinatown and deported to Hong Kong immediately.[225] In June 1938, a Yokohama-born Chinese man living in Chinatown was deported to Shanghai right after he was released from prison. The stated reason for the deportation was that there would be the possibility of his committing such a crime again.[226]

In colonial Korea, "thoughts" were among the main targets of censorship for colonial governance. "Impure thoughts" or espionage were one of the reasons for arresting colonial subjects in general and Chinese nationals in particular. The number of Chinese arrestees increased annually as a consequence of continuous surveillance. In 1912, the number of Chinese arrestees in Korea was 123. In 1913, the number increased to 181 and in 1921, the number reached 553.[227] What is at issue here is not whether the increase in the number reflected the actual increase in crime. More important is the way in which the Chinese settlement came to be associated with criminality, which was intensified by media representations.

As the largest port linking Chinese coastal cities to the Korean peninsula, Incheon annually witnessed an influx of Chinese migrant laborers, informally called coolies. Perceived as economic threats either to Korean laborers or Japanese entrepreneurs, Chinese laborers became associated with "bad" influences in colonial Korea as Japan strengthened its border control after Manchukuo was established. The *Maeil Shinbo* on January 13, 1933 in keeping with this paranoid stance, described some Chinese with a tone of suspicion. Immediately after their arrival at Incheon, the newspaper reported, Chinese laborers bought and read Japanese newspapers as if they were eager to seek information on current affairs. While contending that it was nonsensical to imagine that coolies would do something like read to stay informed, the newspaper suggested the possibility of the suspicious Chinese laborers' involvement with trained mercenaries of Zhang Xueliang in northern China.[228]

Opium and human trafficking were among common targets for criminalization, and Incheon's Chinatown was constantly monitored for illicit activity. Chinese residents

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[223] *Tokko Geppo*, June 1936.
[224] *Tokko Geppo*, July 1936.
[225] *Tokko Geppo*, February 1937.
[226] *Tokko Geppo*, June 1938.
[227] Yang and Sun, *Chaoxian*, 215-16.
[228] *The Maeil Shinbo*, January 13, 1933.

faced police questioning all around the neighborhood on an everyday basis.[229] Police detectives were secretly dispatched to Chinatown to monitor illegal activities in the area, and they often carried out house searches with a slender reed of evidence: suspicion. Anyone could get frisked within the Chinatown, day or night, if policemen considered a person suspicious. In April 1936, a Korean newspaper reported that the Incheon Police Bureau made a raid on a "Chinese opium den" within the Chinatown and "busted" those opium smugglers.[230] The Incheon Railway Station also was not free from such police surveillance. On September 16, 1939, the *Maeil Shinbo*, reporting on opium smuggling Chinese residents arrested within the Chinese settlement, even opined, "As Incheon is a gateway from China [to Korea], not a few crimes take place in the city."[231] This policing of Chinese migrant mobility and of activity within the Chinatowns reinforced the space's associations with criminality, thereby playing a crucial role in constructing Chinatown as means of containment for migrants.

A wide range of legal and institutional arrangements, from deportations to police surveillance, were used to control the flow of Chinese migration into the Japanese empire.[232] As with the case of the United States, where the representation of Chinese migrants as "fugitives, disease vectors, and communists" was mobilized to limit their mobility,[233] an equally moral geography was imposed on Chinese migrants in East Asia through material spaces that make visible such disciplinary discourses, representations, and categories. By the 1930s, when Japan plunged into the Asia-Pacific War, Chinese settlements, once vibrant sites for translocal movements of people and things, had, under increasing police surveillance and strengthened border control, become spaces that fettered mobility.

Conclusion

The opening of East Asian ports—the Japanese port of Yokohama and the Korean port of Incheon, for instance—to foreign commerce and the rise of the Japanese empire in the late nineteenth century created new channels for transnational migration, especially Chinese migration, across the Pacific Ocean. European and American trading firms founded their branches in East Asia's treaty ports, thereby importing new urban institutions, ideas, and forms to their landscapes. The Chinese migrants were traders and merchants hired by these Western trading firms, but at the same time they were building contractors, carpenters, and construction workers. The migrants subsequently engaged in the making of new cities, taking advantage of the growing economy of the new environments and transferring new building materials and building types such as temples and shophouses.

The Chinese migrants were among those who crisscrossed different cultures in East Asia. Yet their migration took striated paths within the Japanese imperial order: the movement

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[229] *Dong-a Ilbo*, November 30, 1933; *Dong-a Ilbo*, December 24, 1933.
[230] *Dong-a Ilbo*, Apri 29, 1936.
[231] *The Maeil Shinbo*, September 16, 1939.
[232] Tim Cresswell, *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 182.
[233] Ibid., 159.

of Chinese migrant laborers into the Japanese archipelago (metropole) was stringently restricted, whereas seasonal laborers from the Chinese province of Shandong came *en masse* to the Korean peninsula (colony) for the Japanese colonial enterprise, which entailed mining and construction on a large scale. Differentiated needs of the empire created different patterns of Chinese migration, thereby affecting social distance between Chinese migrants and the host societies as well as the built forms. Two of the architectural examples highlight how built forms have evolved to respond to different forms of migration. In Incheon, shophouses were developed in order to accommodate the transient population of Chinese migrant laborers. By contrast, Chinese temples characterized Yokohama's Chinese community, primarily comprised of merchants.

The increased Chinese migration to the two treaty ports came to shape the space and architecture of the Chinese settlements, which created unique landscapes different from neighboring areas. New urban elements introduced to the treaty port of the late nineteenth century were related to residential division along racial lines. Although the residential division did not take the form of outright racial segregation in these two ports, spatial characteristics of each residential quarter were often used as an explanatory framework to comprehend "traits" of different racial groups. Among the most important developments during this period is the invention of "Chinatown" as a distinct urban type, an abstraction of built form, which seemed to indicate the fundamental difference between a modern nation and its opposite. The creation of this particular urban type was not solely the product of locally situated elements, but was made possible through transpacific connections and physical movements of travelers who served themselves as the conduit of texts, images, and sentiments.

By the turn of the century, Japan was able to negotiate with Treaty Powers and finally regain its economic sovereignty by abolishing the treaty port system, which in turn left the new empire several problems arising from the mobility of foreigners, especially Chinese. The Japanese empire responded to this problem by dictating the terms and conditions of mobility authorizing legitimate movements, enacting *de jure* and *de facto* residential segregation of Chinese residents by confining them within the bounds of Chinese Settlements. This containment was supported by modern methods of controlling movements, and further strengthened by police surveillance, which in turn contributed to the making of Chinatowns as an emblematic site of structured mobilities. Chinatowns served as allay anxieties about Chinese migration, perceived as a threat to public health, the social order, and colonial economic interests—even while Chinese labor was essential to the advancement of the colonial enterprise.

Chapter 2. Postimperial Sentiments

On the way to the 1949 Japan Trade Fair held in Yokohama, French-educated playwright Shishi Bunroku (1893-1969) visited his hometown after a long period of absence and walked around the city to revisit childhood memories. Musing over the changed landscape of the city in the aftermath of the lost war (*haisen*), the Japanese flâneur lamented the death of "old Yokohama."[234] The Hotel New Grand, the emblem of Yokohama's grand days as the major port of the Japanese empire, had been requisitioned by the Allied Force, now a pronounced presence in the built environment. The city as a whole appeared to be "a Western-style shop" welcoming an invasion of foreign customers. Hoping to catch a glimpse of Yokohama as it was before this tragic transformation, Shishi went to have lunch in Chinatown—only to find that even the Chinese food was not as good as it had been in prewar years. "Throughout Japan," he wrote, "Yokohama represents an accurate and precise microcosm of the defeat."

As revealed through changes in the city's built environment, most poignantly in the ruined landscapes left in the aftermath of air raids, this sentiment of defeat marks Japan's postimperial topography. With the end of the World War II and the subsequent Allied Occupation (September 2, 1945 - April 28, 1952), Japan underwent a rapid transition in status from colonizer to colonized. Equally as significant as the collapse of the Japanese empire was the onset of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as global hegemon in the postwar years, a circumstance which played a pivotal role in reshaping Japanese society, politically, economically, and culturally. Under US global domination, Japan's postwar mood was fraught with ambivalence, oscillating between "love and hate towards America" (Yoshimi 2003: 432). What I call "postimperial sentiments"—resentment over lost sovereignty, regret over prewar imperialism, and nostalgia for the imperial past—were manifested most vividly in and through the built environment upon the collapse of the empire.

The Cold War in East Asia was not merely a matter of military and political power exerted by the United States in rivalry with the Soviet Union. Rather, it also reshaped the political-economic landscape, creating transpacific routes through which urban knowledge, ideas, and practices were transferred for purposes of disseminating "the capitalist vision of the urban future."[235] The United States regarded urban space as a way to maintain an anti-communist regional order, and Japan, in this scheme, was to function as a showcase for the US vision of the modern city in East Asia. Under the strong influence of American culture and in response to the needs of a growing population in urban areas, postwar Japanese elites avidly absorbed new ideas for reconstruction of their cities; at the same time, I would argue, the energetic effort to rebuild, reconstruct, and renew the cities brought postimperial sentiments into poignant relief.

By tracing the remaking of Yokohama's Chinatown in the 1950s, this chapter shows how the built environment became a contested site for postimperial sentiments. Scholars have

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[234] Bunroku Shishi, "Furusato kenbutsu," *Zuihitsu Yamanote no ko* (Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1950).
[235] Rosemary Wakeman, "Rethinking Postwar Planning History," *Planning Perspectives* 29, no. 2 (2014), 157.

noted that the legitimacy of the modern state has been established through governing of "sentiments," or what Nigel Thrift might call "engineering of affect."[236] I will show in this chapter that it was in the form of local space that the postimperial sentiments were remarkably expressed, enacted, and engineered. While any invocation of "the national" was restrained in postwar Japan due to its implicit association with prewar militarism, I argue that "the local" became the quintessential space of the national, where postwar Japanese urban elites came to reflect and mobilize sentiments for the purposes of "rebuilding" the postimperial city. In so doing, this chapter shows how these efforts to rebuild the postimperial city were partly achieved through taking Yokohama's Chinatown, and Chinese residents, off the map of the "imagined community" of sentiments in Japan.

In this chapter I draw on unpublished archival materials such as conference proceedings, chamber of commerce records, memoirs of politicians, personal notebooks, newspapers, government documents, grants records from the Ford Foundation, military records, tourist guides, correspondence exchanged in the preparation for the Seattle Conference held in 1953, internal memorandums, essays penned by local writers. My intention is to take a close look at what people wrote, said, and, more importantly, felt about places in the rapidly changing world.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section looks at the transformation of Yokohama's Chinatown in the immediate postwar years. The second section tracks the Seattle Conference held in 1953 and the national tour of American cities, which marked itself as a pivotal moment in reshaping the built environments of postwar Japanese cities. The third section traces the refurbishing of Yokohama's Chinatown after the return of the Yokohama mayors from the tour of American cities in 1953. By looking at the development of local literary production in Yokohama since the 1950s, the forth section delves further into how the Chinatown served as the place through which the national became imaginable among local Japanese residents.

Chinatown: Landscape of Defeat after the Asia-Pacific War

Japan's transition from colonizer to colonized was felt most acutely in Yokohama, where forty-two percent of the city was demolished by US air raids in May 1945 and seventy-four percent of its central business district was taken over by the 8th United States Army Headquarters.[237] General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (henceforth, SCAP), described Yokohama of this period as a "ghost town" with shops built of makeshift materials and very few people on the street.[238] In Yokohama alone,

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[236] Nigel Thrift, "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect," *Geografiska Annaler* 86, no.1 (2004), 64.

[237] Yorifusa Ishida, "Japanese Cities and Planning in the Reconstruction Perid: 1945-55," In *Rebuilding Urban Japan after 1945*, edited by Carola Hein, Jeffry M. Diefendorf and Yorifusa Ishida (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 18-21.

[238] Yokohama Shōkōkaigisho, *Yokohama Shōkōkaigisho hyakunenshi* (Yokohama: Yokohama Shōkōkaigisho, 1981), 555.

Figure 2-1. The "off-limit" residential quarter for US military in the 1950s. The sign on the left reads "This is a US Force's installation. Unauthorized entry is prohibited and is punishable under Japanese Law." (Source: Yokohama nosutarujia)



Figure 2-2. Yamashita Park in the 1930s from the rooftop of Hotel New Grand (Left) and the park area on the left during the Occupation (Right). Once an iconic landscape of the port city's modernity, the park was requisitioned by the Allied Force and used as a military housing complex (Source: Yokohama toshi hatten kinenkan, left; Yokohama Municipal Archives, right)

war victims amounted to approximately forty thousands, and a nationwide food shortage caused explosive inflation in the city.[239]

It was through the built environment that the affective power of the Occupation was manifested most sharply. The Occupation years have been remembered and narrated among Yokohama residents in a variety of ways. Some would recall the period with a sentiment of pain from poverty, while others would call it "the American period" with a rather nostalgic feeling. Probably the most prevailing memories are concerned with hardships Japanese nationals experienced as opposed to their foreign counterparts. Along with the requisition of buildings in the central business district, the presence of "off-limit" areas for the Japanese during the Occupation years aggravated feelings of loss and resentment.[240] Yamashita Park, built in 1930 in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, had long been one of Yokohama's most beloved leisure spaces along the shoreline. The park was requisitioned by the Allied Force after the Asia-Pacific War to accommodate military housing, which limited Japanese from access to the waterfront. Hotel New Grand, which symbolized modernity of the city, was among the buildings requisitioned by the Allied Force. These physical and symbolic territorial boundaries between Japanese and foreigners in their own city appeared to underscore the consequences of defeat. Resentment over the presence of foreigners was mostly felt toward the Allied Force, primarily the United States, but it was also directed at Chinese residents.

Unlike the rest of the city, Yokohama's Chinatown, then called *nankinmachi* (南京町), experienced the postwar era as "golden years" of prosperity.[241] The two-story red brick buildings which once lined the main street had been razed to the ground by US air raids, and makeshift replacement houses, erected sporadically until they filled the whole neighborhood, had mostly fallen into ruins. Nonetheless, Chinese residents were recognized as Allied nationals and therefore privileged over their Japanese neighbors in rations. They were also employed by the U.S. military as cooks, which enabled them to collect food scraps to make various dishes, from fried rice and noodles to dim sums and adzuki-bean porridges, which they then sold to starving Japanese, (Figure 3).[242] This opportunism seemed particularly egregious, especially in light of nationwide food shortages so acute that one man who lived in Kyoto was sentenced three years of imprisonment for having stolen just two pieces of potato.[243] In Japanese eyes, the prosperity of the black market underscored the nation's devastation by war, adding insult to injury. Though many Japanese residents were also involved in the operation of the black market as consumers, regulators, suppliers and retailers,[244] they perceived it as a specifically "Chinese" phenomenon. The prosperity of Chinatown's underground economy, its bustling alleyways, and its seedy character were all attributed to the peculiar

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239 Ibid.
240 "Nihonjin kinsei no ji," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, March 2, 1946.
241 "Haru wa nankinchō kara," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, February 21, 1946.
242 Kazutaka Sugawara, *Yokohamachūkagai tanken* (Tōkyō: Kōdansha, 1996), 150.
243 Sugawara, *Yokohamachūkagai tanken*, 140.
244 Timothy Yun Hui Tsu, "Black Market, Chinatown, and Kabukicho: Postwar Japanese Constructs of 'Overseas Chinese,'" *positions* 19, no. 1 (2011): 138.

Figure 2-3. The black market in Yokohama's Chinese quarter in the late 1940s (Source: Yokohama Municipal Archives; Takamura 2006)

racial traits of the Chinese.[245] At the same time, for many Japanese residents, Chinatown's prosperity under the influence of the US army also stirred postcolonial anxiety, for it lay to view an area of extraterritorial jurisdiction where even the Japanese policemen lacked authority.[246]

The "reverse course," which reflected a conservative shift in US policy as the Cold War intensified, came to change the landscape of Chinatown. Surrounded by "an unbroken arc of communist territories"[247]—i.e. communist China, North Korea, and the USSR—Japan and its geopolitical importance as an anticommunist bastion in East Asia came to be considered critical by Washington toward the end of 1948. From a former war enemy deserving punishment, Washington saw the need to transform Japan into an ally, in this case, a showcase for the US model of democracy and capitalism.[248] Since the anti-communist campaign was part and parcel of the Cold War political climate, the Red Purge was carried out with the concerted effort of the Japanese conservative elite, including capitalists such as *zaibatsu*, and SCAP. By the time the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 and, subsequently, the consolidation of the communist bloc in Asia was considered to be a major threat to US interests, most of "privileges" Yokohama's Chinese residents had enjoyed were "stripped away."[249] Chinese residents were put under daily surveillance by SCAP and activities and key individuals relating to Chinese political organizations, ranging from the Tokyo General Conference of the Chinese in Japan (*Ryujitsu Tokyo Kakyo Sokai*) to the Democratic Chinese Research Association (*Minshu Chugoku Kenkyu Kai*), were meticulously

[245] "Hamano yoru," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, January 2, 1946; "Hamano nankinmachi," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, January 14, 1946.
[246] Nakaku-sei gojūshūnen kinen jigyō jikkō iinkai, *Yokohama nakaku-shi: hitobito ga kataru gekidō no rekishi* (Yokohama: Nakaku-sei gojūshūnen kinen jigyō jikkō iinkai, 1985), 344.
[247] Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," in *Postwar Japan as History,* ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 43.
[248] John W. Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict," in *Postwar Japan as History*, 4.
[249] Tsu, "Black Market," 344.

scrutinized to ferret out supposed anti-American and pro-PRC movements.[250] It was around this time playwright Shishi Bunroku visited Chinatown on his way to the Japan Trade Fair in Yokohama. In the immediate postwar years, Yokohama's Chinatown was, he reflected, the place to which anyone starving, including those residing in Tokyo, came to find something to eat. What he observed in Chinatown was instead the deserted storefronts nobody would dare to approach.

After the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the port of Yokohama bustled with US soldiers, including those who had just returned from the war in the Korean peninsula, those about to return home to the United States, and those who would soon go onto the battlefield. Wherever their destinations were, the port of Yokohama, with its US bases, provided them with amenities. It was during these years that the Chinatown became saturated with soldier-targeted businesses such as bars and cabarets, in which American jazz was played every day and American soldiers danced with local Japanese women.[251] When night fell, the area was decorated with bright light of neon signs whose lurid glow further seemed to reinforce the exotic and even seedy character of the Chinatown. Such scenes found in the Chinatown characterized the "munitions boom" (*gunju keiki*) generated by the Korean War.[252] The armistice of the Korean War therefore signaled the end of this economic vitality.

In the immediate postwar years, SCAP purged prewar politicians who had strongly advocated for the imperialism and militarism of the Japanese state. After the Korean War broke out, however, the purged politicians took their offices back, replacing supporters of the Communist Party and thereby securing prime seats in office.[253] Among these prewar politicians were Hiranuma Ryozo (1879-1959) and Nakarai Kiyoshi (1888-1982), both of whom exerted a strong influence over politics in postwar Yokohama. Born to families with privileged backgrounds, both of them were prominent political leaders, locally and nationally. Accused of their engagement with and support for prewar militarism, they had been purged from public office by SCAP in the immediate postwar years. After the purge was reversed, Hiranuma was elected Mayor of Yokohama in 1951. Governor of as many as a half-dozen prefectures in the prewar years, Nakarai himself became president of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Many other prewar politicians followed suit and assumed important government positions as members of ruling political parties.

While the post-World War II era is regarded as the formative period of Japan's democracy, US hegemonic control during this period also transformed Japanese society. John Dower has described the political climate of this period, following the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, as the "San Francisco System." Within this system, especially in the wake of the Korean War, the United States needed Japan for "an ally, a military base, and a producer of industrial goods"[254]—aims which

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[250] From Director Mitsusada Yoshikawa of Special Investigation Bureau, Attorney-General's Office to G.S., G.H.Q, Monthly Trend of the Chinese in Japan (November), December 18, 1951, RG 331, UD 1402, Box 2275, NARA.
[251] Nakaku-sei, *Yokohama nakaku-shi,* 345-46.
[252] Ibid.
[253] Ishida, "Japanese Cities," 19.
[254] Carola Hein, "Rebuilding Japanese Cities after 1946," in *Rebuilding Urban Japan after 1945*, 2-3.

Figure 3-4. The Japanese delegation marches at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport, surrounded by the US military band. While looking at this picture, Mayor Hiranuma of Yokohama wrote that "the Japanese delegation looked as if they were children parading" (まるで我が代表団は子供の行列だったのも已むを得ない) in the midst of Americans over "six feet" in height.

played a significant role in the growth of Japan's postwar economy. This system catalyzed an important change for Japan, especially because it gave the country an opportunity to seek out a new identity as a nation. It was in the built environment that this transition became manifested most vividly.

The Seattle Conference: The Forging of Postwar Connections

It was during these years that Japanese delegates from major cities such as Tokyo, Yokohama and Osaka crossed the Pacific Ocean in order to attend the Second Japan-American Pacific Coast Conference of Mayors and Chamber of Commerce Presidents.[255]

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[255] Along with roughly nine months of preparation before the conference, the project, including the national tour afterwards, lasted 48 days and encompassed a variety of parties. The Ford Foundation financed the conference and the tour, and the Institute of International Education provided administrative support and hosted several receptions for the Japanese delegates during their national tour. In addition to Japanese Consuls in various cities across the country and the Japanese Embassy in Washington D.C., John D. Rockefeller III, the third-generation of the Rockefeller family and then-president of the Japan Society, welcomed the Japanese delegation when they visited New York City. The Japanese even appeared on local television shows, in which they were interviewed on US-Japan relations and communist movements in Japan. Seiichiro Yasui, *Taiheiyō shichō kaigi* (Pacific Mayors' Conference) (Tokyo: Shibuya Haruo, 1953). The Seattle Conference was attended by thirty-seven Japanese delegates from cities including Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Sapporo, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Sendai and Matsuyama. The American side was comprised of 47 delegates representing Pacific-coast states, such as California (San Francisco, Los Angeles, Berkeley, San Diego, Fresno, Oakland, Sacramento, El Cerrito, Long Beach, Burbank, Richmond, Glendale, and Pasadena), Oregon (Eugene, Portland, Salem, and Albany), and Washington (Seattle, Raymond, Tacoma, Longview, Mt. Vernon, Tieton, Olympia, Port Angeles, Everett, and Bremerton). Attendees were primarily mayors or presidents of chambers of commerce and industry, but harbor commissioners and directors of police bureaus also participated.

Held in Seattle from August 19 through 21, 1953, the conference was designed to provide an environment for Japanese and American city politicians to discuss issues common for Pacific cities, such as fire protection, crime, housing, city beautification, industry, trade and tourism. The two politicians representing the city of Yokohama, Mayor Hiranuma and Chamber of Commerce President Nakarai, participated in the conference. When the Seattle Conference was organized in 1953, Hiranuma was already in his seventies. Concerned with the mayor's health, his doctor advised Hiranuma not to participate in the conference. Mayor of one of the most important trade ports, however, Hiranuma felt obligated to take part in the event. The main purpose of the trip, he reflected afterwards, was to inspect urban circumstances of American cities and learn from them, because they were, as he put it, "*senpai*" (mentors/supervisors) of Japanese cities.[256] In an interview with a local newspaper before his departure, Hiranuma expressed his will and determination to discuss housing problems at the conference.[257] During the postwar years, the biggest problem felt by the city government of Yokohama, as in many other cities in Japan, was drastically increased population, which included returned soldiers, as well as returnees from the former Japanese colonies. In a letter to be distributed at the Seattle Conference, Hiranuma urged the US delegates to continue to provide the assistance that the United States had given Japan in the prewar years:

> It is already over ninety years since the City of Yokohama opened its port in 1859 to start its foreign trade. Being favored by nature, blessed with thriving trade, and fostered by the warm friendship of foreign countries, this port has grown up step by step. In addition, thanks to the strenuous efforts on the part of the citizens, various institutions and facilities of the city have year after year been expanded and adjusted, and the Port of Yokohama has at last developed into one of the greatest ports of Japan as its front door. The purpose of this small pamphlet is to introduce the Port of Yokohama to you, and at the same time to ask you for your favor.
>
> We respectfully solicit your continued assistance again.[258]

Other participants also angled for direction and assistance. In an interview with a Japanese newspaper before his departure, Yasui Seiichiro, the Governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan Areas and representative of the Japanese delegation, opined that his main concern at the conference was to discuss with Americans as varied urban issues as housing and cleaning. "If time permits," he added, "I would also like to discuss know-how of city beautification and social facilities along with a means to attract foreign investment to Tokyo."[259] For him, the purpose of the conference was also concerned with

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[256] Hiranuma, *Taibei*, 4.
[257] *Kanagawa Shimbun*, August 18, 1953.
[258] Ryozo Hiranuma, "Foreward," in *Port of Yokohama* (Yokohama: Yokohama Municipal Government, 1953).
[259] "Daihyō kesa shuppatsu: Nichibei Taiheiyō shichō kaigi" (Representatives depart this morning: Japan-US Pacific Ocean Mayors' Conference), *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 18, 1953.

"obtain(ing) a full understanding and working knowledge of the local government system,"[260] after the democratic reforms were made by the Occupation Force in Japan.

After the hosting of the first meeting in Tokyo two years before, the Seattle Conference was the second in a series of the mayors' conference, and its significance lay in that it was the first meeting hosted on American soil. This not only allowed Japanese city officials to observe actual conditions of American cities, but also opened up a new avenue for the Japanese delegates to look back and reflect upon their own cities.[261] The conference trip appeared crucial to the two Yokohama politicians. In an interview with a local newspaper, they expressed a desire to learn from precedents of American cities, city beautification and housing provision in particular. For the Japanese delegates, the conference meant the opportunity to "observe the actual conditions of American cities":

> I am grateful also that through *direct visits* to the various parts of your country, we will be able to observe the grand natural splendor of your country and your advanced ways of living as well as to meet with the democratic citizens of America and their leaders and thus acquire a true knowledge and understanding of America and especially the superiority of the American national spirit.[262]

The "Mayors' Conference Project," as framed by the Ford Foundation, which funded the conference and the tour afterwards, held contrasting implications for both sides. For Japan, it was an opportunity to see the inner workings of American cities as well as seek American financial aid and guidance in city management and foreign trade.[263] By contrast, the United States understood the conference as a means of gaining ground in the Cold War, promoting "the American way," and advancing its leadership in the Pacific. Throughout the conference, US city officials lauded "a closer relationship" and "friendship" between Japanese and American cities, terms that sugarcoated Washington's political and economic agenda in East Asia.[264]

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[260] Seiichiro Yasui, *Second Japan-American Pacific Coast Conference of Mayors and Chamber of Commerce Presidents Proceedings* (Seattle, 1953), 33.
[261] The first conference was held from October 30 through 31 in Tokyo when Japan was still under Allied occupation. Thirty delegates from twelve US cities such as Seattle and Los Angeles participated, whereas Japanese delegates were from fourteen cities including Tokyo and Yokohama. After the conference, the City of Yokohama hosted a reception in a resort town named Hakone located near the city. At the reception then Yokohama mayor Hiranuma made a speech in which he declared that "I believe that peace means the cancelation of the requisition of this economically important region and an opening of the way to reconstruct Yokohama." American delegates took a tour in Kansai area thereafter, made a visit to Yokohama on November 9, and flew back to the United States the next day. Yokohamashi sōmukyoku shishihenshūshitsu, *Yokohamashishi II dai-ni-kan (shita)* (Yokohama: Yokohamashi, 2000), 164.
[262] Yasui, *Proceedings,* 35. My emphasis.
[263] This was reflected in a memoir by Yokohama mayor Hiranuma Ryozo, who wrote that his primary motivations for attending the conference were to learn from the American "*senpai*" (mentor) how to manage urban space and also, to receive American financial aid and guidance to reconstruct postwar Japan. Ryozo Hiranuma, *Taibei Yonjuhachi nichi* (Yokohama: Yurindo, 1954), 4.
[264] The Executive Committee, "Acknowledgement," *Proceedings*, 8.

The city was a crucial site for this dissemination of the American vision of the urban future. The vocabulary of democracy acquired meanings both political and economic when it came to serve as "both the carrot of American financial aid and the stick of military operations" in planning postwar Japanese cities.[265] Phil A. Strack, President of Seattle's Chamber of Commerce, stated at his welcoming address that a strong economic foundation would be necessary in order to advocate democracy and assert national independence.[266] "Japan is a new democracy," he added, "and we know that you have much to learn about democracy."[267] The meetings of city mayors were filled with discussions on how to build "a democratic city.": the American city mayors held the view that there was a correlation between democracy and city planning, both of which they saw Japan as seriously lacking.

It is the irony of history that the former war enemies became allies in such a short period of time. At the Chamber of Commerce Presidents' section meeting, President Phil A. Strack of Seattle's Chamber of Commerce reemphasized the importance of Japan in the enterprise of securing democracy because Japanese "people are the most literate and progressive in the Far East."[268] However, a new Japan in the postwar years, undergoing democratization and demilitarization under the direction of the Occupation Force, was being differently understood by the Japanese politicians. During his speech at the first plenary session, Mayor Laurance of Berkeley stressed supposed Japanese traditional values. It was at this point that mixed feelings swept upon Hiranuma:

> After the war, we have seen many things. We have emptied the mind and aspired to rebuild a new Japan under the democracy. We have also overcome plenty of suffering and led a new road. However, when we emptied the mind and reflected upon the frame (*waku*) and fetter (*shigarami*) that the old Japan had, of course it was imperative for us to correct many errors and stupidity, but we might have also discarded the jade (*dama*) along with the tile (*kawara*) and the stone (*ishi*).[269]

Housing was among the most urgent demands of the Japanese participants. While there was a huge influx of migrants from former colonies upon the collapse of the Japanese empire, many of the housing stock in Japanese cities had been razed to the ground due to US air raids in 1945. Mass housing construction was necessary. As of the 1950s, it is important to note that many of US cities were undergoing massive transformation under what historian Christopher Klemek has termed "the urban renewal order": as developed from the 1930s through the 1960s in the United States, the urban renewal order refers to a set of policies and ideologies that would be deployed to impose a new order on existing cities. It was ideological in that master plans were applied "in the name of bringing

[265] Wakeman, "Rethinking Postwar Planning History," 157.
[266] Phil A Strack, "Welcoming Address," *Proceedings*, 21.
[267] Ibid., 22.
[268] Ibid., 91.
[269] Hiranuma, *Taibei*, 32-33.

renewal to cities;" it was policy-oriented in that it gave expansive administrative power to governments to initiate city-targeted new programs.[270]

Throughout the conference, what the US mayors emphasized was public housing as urban renewal program. Public housing programs were touted as a means to facilitate urban redevelopment and thereby to eliminate "blighted" areas of the city by attracting private capital. Highlighted was the "subtle" role of the government:

> We know also that slums and bad living conditions contribute more than their share of our delinquents and so the modern city in a democratic society with more than the enforcement of the provisions of health codes which relate to sanitary and housing conditions but is also concerned with a positive program for the elimination of slums and blighted areas and the provision of better housing. Here, democracy is understood when a policeman is transformed from a cop with "a night stick breaking up a gang of young hoodlums' to an officer 'leading a group of boys."

City planning and management were seen as efficient means to resolve urban problems, technical know-how which the Japanese delegates ought to learn in order to improve urban conditions as well as to build a truly democratic city. At the welcoming address for the conference, Mayor V. Edward Johnson of Eugene stated, "In this country the cities have come to recognize that they have many common problems and that some of these problems can be solved most effectively by joint action rather than by individual action."[271] Even this emphasis on rational city administration was considered by Hiranuma to be the meaning of "true American spirit":

> Where idealism and practicalism are merged in straightforward fashion, there is a true American spirit. We have a reliable *friend*. I clapped my hands hard out of joy.[272]

The Seattle conference came to forge transpacific connections in planning culture. The US-Japan mayoral conference was more than a one-time event, but continued to be held biannually.[273] It functioned as a platform on which to consolidate the cultural and economic relations between Japanese and American cities in the decades that followed. Moreover, the national tour that took place after the conference made quite an impression on the Japanese delegates. After all, it is natural for travelers to compare what they are seeing in a new environment with what they left behind back home. Especially after the antagonistic relations which had made travel between the two countries impossible, the comparison and its repercussions were all the more significant. The feelings and

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[270] Christopher Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2011), 5.
[271] V. Edward Johnson, *Proceedings*, 18.
[272] Hiranuma, *Taibei*. My emphasis.
[273] The third conference was held in Yokohama in 1955.

impressions they had during the trip were vividly recorded in what the Japanese mayors wrote during the trip, and reflected in what they said after their return.

The National Tour: The Transpacific Production of Sentiments

The tour was a well-planned project intended to provide the Japanese delegates with firsthand experience of American cities. In December 1952, eight months before the conference was held, Mayor Laurance L. Cross of Berkeley and Chair of the Executive Committee for the Seattle Conference approached the Ford Foundation for financing the conference.[274] Mayor Cross emphasized how critical the second conference would be, "not only for the Japanese people, but for the cause of Democracy versus Communism, to which Japan may hold the key."[275] William Devin, the former Mayor of Seattle, who had participated in the first conference in Tokyo, also sent a letter to the Ford Foundation to emphasize how "the Japanese people and officials are sincerely trying to learn and to adopt American democracy."[276] Mayor Cross's initial idea was to take a tour on the west coast, but the Ford Foundation suggested an extension of the tour to the east coast, if it were a "valuable experience" for the both sides.[277] In March 1953, as the conference planning was in progress, the Ford Foundation made another suggestion regarding the itinerary of the Japanese delegation—that they go to Honolulu on the way back to Japan, because "in view of the more nearly oriental environment," the stay in Honolulu would show that "what they have seen in the U.S. can be adapted successfully to the oriental environment."[278]

After the conference came to an end, Japanese city officials traveled to American cities, going south from Seattle, Portland, Eugene to Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Diego and then flying east to Chicago, New York and Washington D.C. Orchestrating this close-up look at port facilities, oil refineries and plants, police academies, fire departments, and housing construction sites, US officials believed that the Japanese would be able to see and understand how American cities and industries worked. But inspection of industrial sites was not the only way the visit worked to inspire the Japanese delegates. The tour also offered them "informal contact" with American cities, as well.[279]

Many of the programs during the tour were cultural, reflecting a desire on part of the Executive Committee for the Seattle Conference to achieve a deeper level of inculcation. Along with their daily inspection tours of industrial and municipal facilities, the Japanese were invited to a variety of concerts and shows which were deliberately devised to

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[274] Ford Foundation, 1953 June 08 – 1954 June 08, FA732D, Reel 0418, Institute of International Education, Inc. (05300089), Rockefeller Archive Center.
[275] Ford Foundation, 1952 December 10, FA732D, Reel 0418, Institute of International Education, Inc. (05300089), Rockefeller Archive Center.
[276] William F. Devin, Ford Foundation, 1952 December 19, FA732D, Reel 0418, Institute of International Education, Inc. (05300089), Rockefeller Archive Center.
[277] Laurance L. Cross, *Proceedings*, 15.
[278] Clarence E. Thurber, Ford Foundation, 1953 March 2, FA732D, Reel 0418, Institute of International Education, Inc. (05300089), Rockefeller Archive Center.
[279] The Japan-American Pacific Coast Mayors' Conference Executive Committee, *A Report to the Ford Foundation*.

Figure 2-5. The Japanese delegates took an inspection tour of harbor facilities in Long Beach (left) and housing tracts in Portland (right). (Source: Hiranuma 1954)

exhibit "the democratic processes of the American way of life."[280] This cultural diplomacy seemed to work. Governor Yasui remembered a day when the Japanese were invited to a concert held at the Hollywood Bowl in Los Angeles. Before the show started at night, the symphony orchestra, conducted by Otto Klemperer, played *Kimigayo*, the Japanese national anthem. It was indeed the first performance of Japanese music since the Bowl was built. It goes without saying that his homeland's anthem played by the American orchestra deeply moved him.[281]

Among the thirty-seven Japanese delegates, only ten people had already visited the United States before August 1953, including Governor Yasui of Tokyo and Mayor Hiranuma of Yokohama. The Executive Committee was well aware of this situation. "Had it not been for the conference," they wrote in the final report to the Ford Foundation, "few of them would have ever had a chance to visit this country."[282] Since the Japanese delegates from key cities were "in positions of authority and responsibility who stood to gain much from the trip,"[283] the Executive Committee invested in the arrangement of cultural events outside the scope of inspection tours, paying particular attention to special arrangements for female participants as well, mostly wives of the Japanese mayors. The national tour did offer much opportunity for the Japanese to observe the American model of the ideal modern city, but technological advancement and superiority of American democracy also seemed to be found in electrical gadgets such as home appliances. Female delegates were particularly enthusiastic about the chance to see American home appliances firsthand. Mrs. Tanaka Kosito was among those who were the most excited to experience "all the wonderful electrical machines and clever household gadgets which she has seen in American shops":

[280] Strack, *Proceedings*, 90.
[281] Hiranuma, *Taibei*, 212.
[282] The Japan-American Pacific Coast Mayors' Conference Executive Committee. "Second Japan-American Pacific Coast Conference of Mayors and Chamber of Commerce Presidents: A Report to the Ford Foundation," Ford Foundation Grants, FA732D, Reel 0418, Report 5300089, Part 2. Ford Foundation.
[283] The Japan-American Pacific Coast Mayors' Conference Executive Committee. "Second Japan-American Pacific Coast Conference of Mayors and Chamber of Commerce Presidents: A Report to the Ford Foundation," Ford Foundation Grants, FA732D, Reel 0418, Report 5300089, Part 2. Ford Foundation.

> I'm especially interested in the washing machine. It's a little known luxury in Japan. The Japanese housewife does her washing every day by hand in luke [*sic*] warm water.[284]

In addition to the washing machine, American refrigerators were also Mrs. Tanaka's must-see. The symbol of the postwar economic growth of Japan, "Three Sacred Treasures" (*Sanshu no jingi*: television, washing machine, refrigerator) only became accessible to common Japanese households in the late 1950s. As of 1953, most of Japanese homes had no refrigerators, and the average Japanese housewife still had to "shop daily for vegetables and meat or fish."

Women were not the only victims of the seduction by the "new world." In Los Angeles, Long Beach and New York, Hiranuma himself was fascinated how novel technologies of the United States could cultivate new lifestyles and nourish social relations. In Los Angeles, he discovered the novelty of "motel" culture and dwelled upon its applicability to the Japanese city. In Long Beach, the efficiency of standardized housing construction methods appeared to epitomize the American spirit. The mass housing construction site fascinated the mayor, as he was grappling with the issue of housing shortage in Yokohama. In New York, Hiranuma was drawn into the excitements of the three-dimensional Cinerama, which made him imagine what Japanese traditional performances would look like using such technologies.

In this way, the United States was seen to be a kaleidoscope of new technological possibilities, which seemed to symbolize the promise of "democracy" and a "free world." But this promise seemed fullest in New York City, which, even to residents therein, "felt like the center of the world" in the midst of "unprecedented material prosperity and security."[285] In his memoir, Mayor Hiranuma of Yokohama described New York City as "the world's greatest modern city." At the same time, he endorsed the unilateral "purification" of neighborhoods as progress:

> Even in New York City, in the shadow of its skyscrapers lie slums—dark and insanitary. There is a black neighborhood called *Harlem*, but it is a miserable place if you take a step further inside. To remove such a stain on the city by land readjustment is the very task of NYC's Department of City Planning, which has recently removed those unwholesome back alleys in a prompt manner. The Housing Authority supports this task by building livable public housing there, and makes every effort to purify and beatify the area.[286]

Building public housing as a way of removing slums and "purifying" the area was among common strategies employed by city officials in mid-1950s American cities. The United

[284] "Radio Reports," Ford Foundation Grants, FA732D, Reel 0418, Report 5300089, Part 2. Ford Foundation. She was wife of Tanaka Hikozo, director of the Liaison Division of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.
[285] James Clifford, "Feeling Historical," *Cultural Anthropology* 27 no. 3 (2012): 420.
[286] Hiranuma, *Taibei*, 242-43.

States Housing Act of 1949 provided a legal basis to finance urban development, including slum "clearance" and provision of public housing, which were closely interrelated. Despite the euphemistic language such as "cleanup," "livable," or "beautification," racial connotations embedded in the removal of slums were obvious. As can be inferred from the excerpt above, what the Japanese observed and learned from the American experience was not merely the technical means for efficient city management and urban redevelopment such as land readjustment methods: instead, it was rather a *modus operandi* that would internalize urban norms, define urban ills, and do away with them under the name of making the modern city. Public reflection and discussion of racial relations was undermined or even mooted when urban space was conceived of as a "problem" that would be solved with efficient methods such as urban renewal programs and policies.

It is interesting to note that "race," or any account of minorities in the United States other than Japanese Americans, was absent in delegates' travel diaries. This omission, which might appear as an insignificant or minor issue, rather tells a great deal about the complexity of what I call postimperial sentiments shared among the Japanese elites: The Japanese travelers bore a grudge against the United States and resentment over the drastic change to the built environment in the homeland, which marked defeat, but at the same time they were amazed by advanced technologies equated with the United States and ultimately identified themselves with "white" Americans. Throughout their travel diaries, there is no direct mention of non-white Americans (except Japanese Americans); however, the presence of other minorities is insinuated in spatial terms: insanitary dark slums, blighted areas, a stain on the city, and unwholesome back alleys, all of which merit clearance to make the urban landscape beautiful and livable, promote downtown urban development, and bring "renewal" to the city.

San Francisco was the final destination on the mainland for the Japanese delegates. The city was already a famous port city among the Japanese for its attractions such as cable cars and the Golden Gate Bridge. Especially for the City of Yokohama, San Francisco stood for a model port city, from which new planning ideas the city officials would import back into their own city. Probably the most important, San Francisco was not merely one of US cities: The city symbolized the economic and political potency of the US Pacific, and it was where the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, which propelled Japan into what is termed the San Francisco System. After their return to Japan, the two Yokohama city officials repeatedly invoked the model of San Francisco in their e xhortations for rebuilding Yokohama.

During his stay in the United States, Nakarai Kiyoshi, the then president of Yokohama Chamber of Commerce, allegedly discovered the existence of Chinatowns in American cities. Although it is hard to locate in specific travel records when, where, and how Nakarai visited those Chinatowns, his interviews, personal items such as notebooks and "souvenirs" he collected provide clues about the trajectory of influential notions about Chinatown. In San Francisco, which was the last destination on the U.S. mainland, the Japanese delegates were given free time so they could pick up some gifts for their families and friends in Japan. It seems probable that during this time Nakarai collected a



Figure 2-6. Nakarai Kiyoshi's notebook from his tour of American cities in 1953. He took notes about points of interest during his visit. In upper right of this page, Nakarai wrote “Chinese town” in English and annotated with Japanese words meaning “special space (*tokubetsu koukan*) / attraction (*meibutsu*).” (Image source: The Yokohaam Municipal Archives)

boxful of documents including city maps, newsletters, local magazines and pamphlets, which are now in the archive at the Yokohama City Library. Among those items were local maps that described San Francisco’s Chinatown as follows:

> Silken-voiced, rubbing hands the same delicate tint as old ivory, the Chinese merchant welcomes you to his shaded, incense-fragrant shop. For right here in modern, progressive San Francisco, you find the largest Chinatown (unclear) Orient. Yet today is forgotten as you wander past gaudy red and gold temples, past pagoda-like street lights, past ancient idols that seem to brood with the wisdom of the centuries.[287]

Published in 1949 by Crocker First National Bank, this pictorial map exhibits the apparent contrast between “modern, progressive San Francisco” and its Chinatown, where “today is forgotten.” In its subsection titled *One Meets Such Interesting People*, the Chinese are introduced along with other “interesting” San Franciscans such as a cable-car driver, a fisherman at Fisherman’s Wharf, flower vendors, a businessman on Montgomery Street, bohemian artists on Telegraph Hill, sailors at the Embarcadero, chefs at diners, and hotel doormen. However, in this survey of interesting people, the Chinese are the only category that is presented and described not according to their occupation but by their race. While the “smiling, well-tailored, tanned, debonair” “financial man of the West” represents “unending faith in the future of Western Industry,” the Chinese are surrounded by “g audy red and gold temples,” “pagoda-like street lights,” and “ancient idols that seem to brood with the wisdom of the centuries.” Nakarai brought with him another magazine to Japan, in which San Francisco’s Chinatown was described as a place

[287] “A Map of the City & County of San Francisco,” Crocker Frist National Bank, San Francisco, 1949.



Figure 2-7. From "The Map of the City and County of San Francisco" (1949)

that was "full of the bizarre [and] the mysterious" for the tourist while it was a crowded district "in need of modernization" for the "'Old World' Oriental."[288]

After Their Return: The Affective Language of Renewal

From the mid-1950s onward, Japanese cities became swept up in a surge of massive urban redevelopment projects that epitomized the urban renewal movement in American cities—public housing, slum clearance, elevated highways, and land readjustment. After the government-sponsored Japan Housing Corporation (JHC) was founded in 1955, large-scale public housing complexes called *danchi* sprang up in suburban areas to offset housing demands. According to André Sorensen, the significance of this trend was that it was the "first" state involvement in public housing in metropolitan areas in Japan's

[288] Maury Barrett Campbell, *Pay Dirt! San Francisco: The Romance of a Great City* (San Francisco: Vigilante Publications, 1949), 16.



Figure 2-8. The Shuto Expressway (left) and the public housing project called *danchi* (right) in Yokohama (Source: Sujin Eom 2009, left; Takamura 2006, right)

history.[289] Another symbolic landscape which characterized this period was the inner-city elevated express way system. The Shuto Expressway, which came to connect Tokyo to its adjacent metropolitan areas including Yokohama, was built in 1962 in order to increase efficiency of traffic flow. Subsequent urban transformation at the expense of Tokyo's historic spaces was "part and parcel of the larger drive toward the modern economy and technology of the rapid growth years."[290] The enactment of a new land readjustment act in May 1954 (*Tochi Kukaku Seiri Hō*), Japan's first "independent and comprehensive act" for land readjustment, gave the government administrative power to implement large-scale urban redevelopment projects.[291] The law has played a crucial role in promoting downtown redevelopment, new town building, public housing projects, railway and mass transit development. At the same time, as scholars have pointed out, the new legislation served as an active vehicle to promote Japan's economic growth by providing the legal foundation for large-scale development. Moreover, the law came to embody the legacy that "the state invested little in social overhead capital instead putting all available resources into aiding industrial growth, while letting the private sector, through LR, take care of discretionary spending on housing, sewage and local roads."[292]

Through the importation of American landscapes, from public housing to elevated highways, the United States inserted itself "inside" of Japan. Yokohama's Chinatown was among those imports. Upon their return from the conference and the tour, the two Yokohama city politicians, Hiranuma and Nakarai, were invited to a reception hosted by Chinese entrepreneurs and the Sino-Japanese Amity Association. The reception was held in a restaurant named *Manchinrō* within Yokohama's Chinatown on October 16. The rebuilding of Yokohama was an urgent issue for the city after the procurement economy came to an end upon the armistice of the Korean War. "To rebuild the city," Nakarai announced during the reception, "we need to revitalize our Yokohama Chinatown."[293]

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[289] André Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the Twenty-first Century* (London: Routledge, 2002), 185.
[290] Ibid., 192
[291] Ibid.,, 183.
[292] Ibid., 184.
[293] "Nankinchō no fukkō," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, October 17, 1953.

Reflecting upon their national tour of American cities, Nakarai added, "In the great cities of the United States, I learned that Chinatowns were popular places beloved by Americans. I strongly feel the need to revitalize our Yokohama's attraction (*meibutsu*)—Chinatown."[294] Among the attendees was Yokohama consul of the Republic of China, Sun Binggan, who promised the audience to collaborate with Chinese residents in the efforts of reconstruction.[295]

On November 24, 1953, a committee was organized to promote the development of Chinatown along with its adjacent shopping district. The committee, primarily comprised of Japanese city politicians and pro-Taiwan Chinese entrepreneurs, agreed on revitalizing Chinatown as a tourist destination comparable to its American counterparts. Chinatown development was regarded as part of a symbolic step towards the revitalization of the city as a whole. Yet they had no idea as to how to create "a Chinese style" ambience. After a series of meetings, the committee came up with the idea of erecting a traditional Chinese arch (*pailou*) at the entrance. The rationale behind the decision to erect the gateway was that it was believed to make Japanese visitors feel both more familiar with the neighborhood and safer. Two years after the submission of several design ideas by local architectural firms, the Chinese arch stood at the entrance to Chinatown in February 1955 (Figure 1-6).[296] 13 meters in height and 18 meters in width, it was the first of its kind not only in Yokohama, but in Japan.[297] The total construction cost was 1.4 million yen. In vibrant red color, the arch made a striking contrast to the neighboring gray buildings, thereby spatially demarcating the space of Chinatown. One observer commented that the arch gave an "exotic atmosphere" to the neighborhood, which was different from the prewar years."[298] Local newspapers ran stories about the arch with headlines such as "The construction of Chinatown's arch completed in bright red,"[299] "Chinatown's new attraction,"[300] and "The arch breathes a new life into the city's reconstruction."[301] Regarded in this light, the erection of the red arch was expected to bring life to the Chinatown and renewal to the city.

Even the inauguration ceremony was held in a grand manner, with attendance of a wide range of influential people, from city politicians such as Hiranuma and Nakarai to the prefecture governor to the Taiwanese ambassador: fireworks were let off and Chinese traditional lion dances were performed as if to signal the coming of a new age, and, odd and ironic as it may sound, a "return" to the glorious old Yokohama. A few years after

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[294] Ibid.
[295] Sun Binggan, or Sun Ping-yu, was once arrested by the Japanese police in Chongjin, Korea, in July 1936, when he was charged with engaging in espionage. *Japan Chronicle*, July 17, 1936. Nakarai's highly confident statement about the rebuilding of the city stood in strong contrast to the interview Nakarai and Hiranuma had with a local newspaper dated September 28, 1953. After their return, Hiranuma made complaints that the conference did not turn out as successful as he had expected. The conference was too "formal," he added, and the Japanese delegates had few opportunities to opine. *Kanagawa Shimbun*, September 28, 1953.
[296] Sugawara, *Yokohamachūkagai tanken*, 156-64.
[297] *Kanagawa Shimbun*, February 1, 1955.
[298] Nakaku-sei, *Yokohama nakaku-shi,* 346.
[299] *Kanagawa Shimbun*, February 1, 1955.
[300] *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 3, 1955.
[301] *Kanagawa Shimbun*, February 3, 1955.

『南京街』の復興
中日協会歓迎会で
半井会頭力説
飛行機で主要都市巡回
ハマ名物を昔に返せ
中華街・元町振興会生る
小泉八雲

Figure 2-9. Newspapers ran headlines such as "Bring Renewal to Chinatown," and "Return to the Old Yokohama's Chinatown" (Source: Kanagawa Shimbun, October 17; November 24)

the erection of the arch, Nakarai, who had already become mayor of Yokohama three years ago, said in an interview in 1962 with a Japanese magazine:

> The current Yokohama is in a transitional period from the US military occupation to the return to "the landscapes of old Yokohama" (*mukashi no yokohama no sugata*). The city government will expel drugs and prostitution and make Yokohama Japan's best "cultural" city.[302]

According to anthropologist Christina Schwenkel, "the crafting of affects" played an important role in combining postwar recovery with nation-building projects, in her work, with regard to urban Vietnam.[303] Especially in "postimperial" cities such as London in postwar years, as Jane M. Jacobs has shown, efforts to preserve historic monuments reveal the postimperial city's imperial nostalgia as well as its "adjustment to the loss of empire."[304] In Yokohama (and in Japan), where any invocation of the national was restrained, the local became a crucial site where postimperial sentiments were expressed and crafted in the service of reconstruction. The remaking of Chinatown was meant to leverage enthusiasm for the reconstruction of the city; in other words, the idea of Chinatown was mobilized as a means to "revive" the city and bring back the old days. It is symptomatic that the two politicians who played the most significant role in the reconstruction of postwar Yokohama, Hiranuma and Nakarai, had been militant supporters of Japanese imperialism in the prewar years, purged from public office by the Allied Force, but then making a comeback to office under the auspices of the same military government. It is thus not surprising that Hiranuma, during his trip to the United States, kept thinking about what Japan had lost in the aftermath of defeat, and Nakarai, after his trip to the United States, continued to emphasize the "return" to the glorious old days of the prewar years, or to the prosperity thereof at least, in his political rhetoric.

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[302] Nakaku-sei, *Yokohama nakaku-shi,* 347. My emphasis.
[303] Schwenkel, "Post/Socialist Affect," 266.
[304] Jane M. Jacobs, *Edge of Empire: Postcolonialism and the City* (London: Routledge, 1996), 40.



GATEWAY TO CHINATOWN—The completion of this Chinese-style arch at the entrance to Yokohama's Chinatown will be celebrated today. The gala program will be attended by Governor Iwataro Uchiyama of Kanagawa Prefecture, Mayor Ryozo Hiranuma, and prominent local residents.

Figure 2-10. The first Chinese-style gateway to Chinatown in Japan (Source: *The Japan Times*, February 2, 1955)

Though the Cold War had encroached on the everyday lives of the Chinese community, which divided them into two ideological factions and left indelible scars on both sides, Yokohama's Chinatown became gradually overtaken with shops having "a Chinese front"[305] that resembled the eclectic architectural style of San Francisco's Chinatown. Lampposts with dragon motifs were installed. By the late 1950s, the "exotic" Chinatown had become the city's major attraction, and an English language newspaper in Japan recommended a visit to its Western readers.[306] By the late 1960s, Yokohama's Chinatown had become a place where foreigners, especially American soldiers and seamen, sought to enjoy nightlife in a Japanese city where a number of bars and snack joints catered to Western clients.[307] Western bars with names such as Norge, Northern Light, or Windjammer appeared during this period, giving the feel of American harbor cities to the Japanese city (Figure 2-11).

[305] "Yokohama's Chinatown Erects New Landmark," *The Japan Times*, February 2, 1955.
[306] "Kanto Area Abounds in Tourist Wonders," *The Japan Times*, March 22, 1959; "Trip to Hachioji Area Including Tour of Yokohama Leisurely, Charming," *The Japan Times*, May 16, 1960.
[307] "Tokyo After Dark," *The Japan Times*, May 1, 1965.

Figure 2-11. The main street of Yokohama's Chinatown in 1959. Lampposts with dragon motifs were installed, whereas "western" bars which catered to American soldiers were increased (Source: Yokohama nostarujia, 2011).

The Imagined Community of Sentiment

> But one did not have to go to China or read widely for affirmation of China's backwardness; one had only to visit the Yokohama Chinatown to experience *shina* as that living past.[308]

The mid-1950s, by the time Yokohama's Chinatown was being reconstructed, was a crucial period when Japan was in transition from a multiethnic empire to a monoethnic nation-state. Sociologist John Lie attributed this emergence of the discursive field of "Japaneseness" to "popular nationhood" in postwar Japan.[309] The historical knowledge of *shina*, which endowed Japan with its capacity to put itself on par with Europe during the Meiji era, gained ground with the help of "everyday historiography." Not only did the politicians take initiative in remaking the Chinatown by erecting the arch along with other parties, but also ordinary people—residents, visitors, merchants and writers—played a significant part in constructing the imagined landscape of the national space, or

[308] Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, 190.
[309] John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 126.

what Arjun Appadurai has termed "a community of sentiment."[310] As in Benedict Anderson's discussion of print capitalism, Appadurai argues that "collective reading, criticism, and pleasure" enables a group to "imagine and feel things together."[311] The development of the local literary field in 1950s Yokohama can be understood as the making of this community of sentiment, which came to seek and create a new identity by reading and writing together. Playing an important role in forging and activating this community of sentiment was the local place.

In the 1950s, the local began to gain the status of the ideal in Yokohama and the search for local identity found its representational expressions in various forms. Town magazines (*taun-shi*) were among the examples of the community-based publications containing residents' oral histories reflecting upon memories of neighborhoods where they had spent childhoods.[312] In such accounts, Yokohama residents imbued everyday objects and places with their old memories. *Yokohama Konjaku* (Yokohama's Past and Present), published in 1957, well shows this tendency of the time by featuring various essays written about memories of old Yokohama, including Chinatown. In an essay entitled "Women with the Chinese Queue," Muraoka Keizō, prominent publisher born and raised in Yokohama, narrates his memory of Chinatown in the prewar years:

> The neighborhood had been called *nankinmachi* or "the settlement" from old days. Antique buildings of stone and brick lined the street, and Chinese shops decorated with primary colors—red, blue, yellow and green—exuded a unique atmosphere. A number of people came to eat here, even from Tokyo. With unfeathered chickens or beef tongues displayed at the stores, (Chinatown) was not as clean as it is now, only felt like it was a really neighborhood of *shina-jin* (people of *shina*).[313]

While local publications were not uncommon in prewar Yokohama,[314] what distinguished the postwar from its prewar counterpart is the pronounced reliance on *taishū,* or the mass, in its authorship. From Yokohama-born professional novelists to ordinary citizens, a wide range of Yokohama people (*hamakko*) participated in this collective production of locality. This mass-based literary field further undergirded the creation of popular imaginations of the *nation*. In such popular imaginings of Chinatown, repeated and thus legitimized through the collective production of texts and images, the space became increasingly equated with innate Chineseness.

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[310] Arjun Appadurai, "Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion in Hindu India, in *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, edited by Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[311] Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 8.
[312] Yokohamashi*, Yokohamashishi Ⅱ*, 471-472.
[313] Keizō Muraoka, "Ikikau benpatsuba," in *Yokohama konjaku*, edited by Mainichi Shinbunsha (Yokohama: Mainichi Shinbunsha Yokohama Shikyoku, 1957), 64. Italicized by author.
[314] For instance, prewar Yokohama witnessed numerous publications documenting its locality, such as *Yokohama Hanzoki* and *Yokohama Annai*, but they differed from their postwar counterparts in authorship: they were largely written by professional writers employed by government.

Figure 2-12. The entrance to the Chinese cemetery before its restoration in the early 1990s. (Image Source: Hengbin huaqiaozhi, 1995)

What has been overlooked in the historiography of this particular period is the effect of the practice or, as architectural historian Abidin Kusno puts it, "the practice of 'visualizing' the Chinese as an exclusive category"[315] in the spatial imaginings of the nation. The erection of the Chinese arch bears much more significance than it might appear, because it was the Japanese government's first spatial demarcation of Chinese ethnicity.

Another example that shows the excision of Chinese space and subjects from the community of sentiment is the publication of a Yokohama-based local magazine named *Shimin to bunka* (Citizen and culture), which reflected then-emergent localism in Japanese cities that would enhance a city-based local identity by discovering urban heritage. In 1981, the magazine published an essay titled "*hitsugi-bune* (coffin-ship)," written by a Japanese resident of Yokohama. Describing the custom of overseas Chinese communities to send back coffins to their native places, the author wrote in a sentimental tone:

[315] Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial*, 160.

> To those who worked so hard to be able to afford the coffin-ship in hopes of going back to their native places, I feel the weight of the *homeland*. That must have provided the Chinese with motivations to put up with hardships in foreign countries.[316]

"In essence, there is no such thing as *déraciné (*=uprootedness) to human beings," the author continued. "Although it is possible that they are abandoned by their homelands, human beings can never live without their homelands on their shoulders."[317] What influenced his writing was the ruined landscape of Yokohama's Chinese cemetery. Once a temporary resting place for coffins before they would be sent back to home villages of the deceased (see Chapter 1), the Chinese cemetery had fallen into decay by the 1970s due to the lack of management. Combined with a spine-chilling story of sending coffins back home, the ruined landscape would evoke a visceral response in Japanese residents. Although the practice had already been discontinued by the 1920s and the Chinese community had reached the third or fourth generations with many of them being as naturalized citizens of Japan by the 1970s, the cemetery was often used as a trope for demarcating the fundamental difference between Japanese and Chinese.

Yokohama's Chinatown had then occupied a peculiar space within the city of Yokohama, as if it manifested the racial traits of supposed Chineseness, fixed in time and space. Although the ambiguity inherent in the term "Chineseness" initially puzzled the politicians and architects who formulated the Chinese-style ambience in the early 1950s, the presence of the physical space came to make it possible for observers to naturalize Chinatown as a fundamental rendition of a specific group of people with immutable cultural and racial traits. Notwithstanding its arbitrary origin, the conflation of space and culture continued to activate local sentiments. An observation about the ethnic character of Chinatown was made in the late 1980s:

> Recently, what is so-called "ethnic" is set to boom. Specifically, the ethnic minority style of the frontier land seems to acquire attention. When life is filled with "things too much modernized" (*amarinimo kindaika sareta mono*), as human beings are such a strange species, they will get fed up so much that they become suffocated in the end. Rather, those "rare," special things which have not been modernized seem to now have a fresh evaluation.[318]

In the postwar contexts in which Japan was to redefine its position and identity in the world in close alliance with the United States, the radical reconceptualization required both external and internal arrangements. Externally, the redefinition of Japan's role was mostly expressed along lines of trade relations. Internally, on the other hand, the Japanese were faced with the question of who would constitute the nation, or who the Japanese

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[316] Hamazaki Ryū, "Hitsugi-bune," *Shimin to bunka* 6 (1981): 30. My translation and emphasis.
[317] Ibid.
[318] Kazutaka Sugawara, *Yokohama Chūkagai no kenkyū: Kakyō shōnin ni miru machizukuri* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1988), 113.

kokumin would be. The creation of an ethnic space within a Japanese city reflected spatially scripted imaginations of the nation in the postwar years. As in the case of San Francisco, Chinatown as a "special space" was there to affirm the presence of the rest of the city of Yokohama. It was the beginning of marking the living space of the Chinese as "special," far from the everyday landscape where one is expected to live an ordinary life. While "the modern man" was expected to represent a progressive San Francisco or Yokohama, "the Chinese man," occupying his own ethnic space, was imaginatively invested with values of tradition and immutable cultural traits. "Within the Chinatown," a Japanese observer writes in the 1990s, "everything—human beings, goods, buildings, atmospheres, colors, foods—looks like it is outside of Japanese society. You can thus soak in the illusion that you are now escaping from Japan."[319]

Yokohama's Chinatown was taken off the map of the imagined community of sentiments shared among Japanese residents. Consequently, the feeling of out-of-place in their place of residence had long shaped the self-understanding of the Chinese in Yokohama. To be noted is that it was through Chinatown's physical presence that this popular imagination of the nation became a concrete idea. As Kay Anderson has argued in the context of Vancouver's Chinatown, it is *in* space that concepts such as race and nation became "materially cemented and naturalized in everyday life."[320] But what she fails to recognize is that Chinatown is not necessarily "a European creation."[321] As Japan's postwar making of Chinatown reveals, it is also an entanglement of transregional flows of ideas and people at particular historical circumstances with intricate sentiments in the postimperial city.

Conclusion

When one considers the first Japanese Embassy to the United States in 1860, the 1953 conference and national tour provide interesting points of departure for inquiry into how traveling mediates the ways in which the modern city is experienced and translated. Although the Japanese delegates in 1860, as Masao Miyoshi has shown us, were quite impressed by what they saw with regard to Western technology during their stay, the United States was still deemed a nation of "barbarians": from the Japanese point of view, Americans knew nothing of proper etiquette, ritual, or ceremony (*rei*) critical to the political and social makeup of a country. The Japanese meticulously documented in diaries their emotions of confusion, disappointment and contempt when they observed the presence of women in formal settings, discovered the lack of well-ordered ceremony at the Capitol, and encountered non-white Americans—blacks, Chinese, Hawaiians or Native Americans.[322]

Over the course of one hundred years, circumstances surrounding Japanese travelers had dramatically changed, especially in relations between the United States and Japan. Almost a century later, when the conference took place in 1953, the United States exerted

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[319] Sugawara, *Yokohama Chūkagai tanken*, 168.
[320] Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown*, 29.
[321] Ibid., 9.
[322] Masao Miyoshi, *As We Saw Them: The First Japanese Embassy to the United States (1860)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

an unparalleled level of power in the Pacific and functioned as an arbiter of the fate of Japan as a nation. As found in the travel diaries and memoirs of the Japanese delegates to the Seattle conference, the United States was no longer a country of barbarians: it was the "model" to be followed, the "mentor" (*senpai*) to be learned from, and the reliable "friend" to be counted upon. What better characterized postwar Japan was the "contradictory attitude of resentment and gratitude toward the United States"[323]: sometimes they admired the advanced technology of the United States, and sometimes they resented their defeat, and the landscapes that affirmed it.

By tracing the remaking of Yokohama's Chinatown in the 1950s, this chapter has shown that the ambivalent sentiments, vacillating between regret over its own prewar imperialism, resentment over the defeat, and nostalgia for the imperial past, or what I call "postimperial sentiments," were manifested most vividly in and through the built environment. In the Cold War climate, which created transpacific routes through which urban knowledge, ideas, and practices were transferred, the postwar Yokohama politicians absorbed new ideas to reconstruct their city. It was in local place that postimperial sentiments were remarkably expressed, engineered, and enacted: the Japanese mayors mobilized sentiments in order to gain momentum for "rebuilding" the postimperial city, whereas city residents sought a new identity by reading and writing together about their city. I argued that Yokohama's Chinatown, and Chinese residents therein, was deliberately taken off this imagined community of sentiment in postimperial Japan.

It is symptomatic that the idea of Chinatown came to capture the minds of Yokohama politicians in their search for a new means to bring renewal to the city. The immediate postwar landscape of Chinatown was inevitably associated with the memory of defeat—of the occupation, the presence of American soldiers, poverty, and the black market. The revitalizing effort of Chinatown as promoted by Yokohama politicians reveals a search for a new urban order of the postimperial city. As this chapter has shown, the remaking of Chinatown in the 1950s was not a coincidence, but a symbolic event that formed the crux of postimperial sentiments.

Yokohama's Chinatown had appeared to the Japanese as a mysterious space that did not belong to Japanese society. At the same time, for many Japan-born generations of Chinese descent, Yokohama's Chinatown had long remained a place from which they had always wanted to escape. Back in the 1970s, it was almost impossible for them to consider Chinatown as part of their heritage. However, a wind of change began to blow in the mid-1980s, after China opened its doors to neighboring countries and Chinese residents came to embrace the changing idea of Chinatown. Chapter 4 will tell this story.

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[323] Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia As Method* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 10.

Chapter 3. Displacement from the National

Han'guo-jie, or Koreatown, is located in the Yonghe district of New Taipei City, Taiwan. Small shops line the streets selling miscellaneous goods, from clothes and groceries to shoes and cosmetics. At first glance, the neighborhood, whose tranquil ambience stands in vivid contrast with adjacent bustling streets of the Taiwanese city, would not appear to be an area with a Korean profile. Taking a step further into the district, however, a visitor notices a landscape of contrast and amalgamation, where signboards bear the Chinese character *han* (韓)—a letter which indicates Korea. Then there ensue posters advertising Korean products featuring Korean movie stars, Korean restaurants, and small street furniture, all showing that this area is *Yonghe Han'guo Shangquan* (Yonghe's Korean commercial district). Merchants and grocers will greet a customer with fluent Chinese, but the moment she speaks Korean, they are immediately able to understand the language. Unlike most of the other neighborhoods in some of Asian cities that mushroomed after the arrival of the "Korean (cultural) wave" (*hallyu*), this Koreatown is far from being a twenty-first century phenomenon: it is instead a spatial embodiment of Chinese migration that occurred during the Cold War years. Contradicting the district's name is the demographic fact that it is an area occupied by neither Korean residents nor merchants. *Han'guo-jie* is an area within a Taiwanese city, created and maintained by ethnic Chinese migrants from South Korea.

Chen is a self-made entrepreneur who owns multiple Chinese restaurants in the San Francisco Bay Area. Born in Shandong province in northern China, Chen moved to South Korea with his family in the early 1950s and spent his formative years in Seoul. After graduating from a Chinese high school in the capital city, he moved to California for a college education in the 1970s and stayed ever since. I met with Chen for an interview at one of his restaurants in Albany, which happened to be one of my haunts for Sichuan-style Chinese food. Although South Korea is the place where he spent most of his childhood, Chen was reluctant to talk about those years: rather, he seemed surprised that I had been able to find out about his upbringing in South Korea, because his restaurant had no sign of any kind that might indicate a connection. As of 2016, there are quite a few Chinese restaurants in California run by Chinese immigrants from South Korea, Chinese restaurants that primarily cater to ethnic Korean customers by serving Korean-style Chinese food.[324] Chen's restaurant was different in that regard, and he emphasized there was no Korean influence at all on his cooking. Still, it is not the case that he no longer maintains any personal ties to South Korea. Quite the opposite, he visits the country every year or so to see his schoolmates who still live there. "All I can say is that I have very bad memories of the country because of what they did to us back in the day," he said, "but it's quite remarkable to observe the economic growth there whenever I visit the country. Korea is now very different than I was there."[325]

[324] Most of Chinese migrants in South Korea originated from Shandong in northern China. Due to their linguistic and cultural difference from other Chinese communities with roots in southern China, whose residents make up the majority of Chinese immigrants in the US, they have been unable to assimilate into "Chinatowns" in the United States.
[325] Interview with the author, Albany, CA, August 2, 2016.

Chinese re-migration to Taiwan and the United States can be read as the sign of their disidentification with the Korean peninsula, where they were "denied a place in the ethno-nation."[326] Despite their century-long residence in Korea, which goes back to the late nineteenth century, however, there has been a curious lack of scholarly investment in their transnational migration history. Both public and scholarly interests have reconsidered the long-held national myth of Korea as a "homoethnic" society, especially after marriage migrants and migrant workers ignited the discussion of "multiculturalism (*damunhwa*) starting in the late 1990s. However, the discussion has rarely centered on longtime Chinese residents, or *hwagyo* in Korean, as if they were structurally irrelevant to the formation of modern Korea. When it comes to Chinatown, this lack of scholarly interest becomes even more pronounced. Chinatown is dissociated from the modern trajectory of Korean cities, as if it were an "island."[327]

In this chapter, I challenge this historiography and bring to the fore Chinese residents in the formation of modern Korean cities. By tracing how transnational Chinese migration from the Korean peninsula came to occur starting in the 1970s, I argue that the displacement of the Chinese stemmed from the postcolonial state's making of the modern city during the Cold War years. More specifically, I will demonstrate how Chinatowns were at the intersection of developmentalist nation-building projects of South Korea. As I discuss in the preceding chapter, this process was not merely "national," but interlocked with the formation of what I call the transpacific community of planning culture during the Cold War decades.

This chapter pays particular attention to the period after Park Chung-hee's military coup in May 1961, when a great deal of urban transformation came into being. This period in question was at the nexus of national, regional, and global transformations. First, the regime change brought in by Park's military junta mobilized the rhetoric of "nation-building" to establish its legitimacy. Second, East Asia as an anticommunist economic bloc was being further strengthened through Japan-South Korea diplomatic normalization in 1965. Third, as the United States saw the need to take "urban" questions of South Korea seriously, especially after urban riots expressing discontent among intellectuals and students were considered to be a threat to the anticommunist regional order, there emerged a large number of urbanization projects. This period is crucial in that it provided legal and administrative foundations for South Korea's city planning in decades that followed, establishing a series of precedents for the way South Korean urbanism would be pursued.

What I call the transpacific community of planning culture took its full shape during this period, thereby facilitating circulation of people, ideas, capital, and knowledge across the Pacific. My focus is on how Park's urban transformation was undertaken in such ways that would impose a new order on existing cities and bring "renewal" to them, thereby making the "national space" both ends and means of realizing the nation-building project of the postcolonial developmentalist state. Chinatowns, as in the case with Japan, were

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[326] Jin-kyung Lee, "National History and Domestic Spaces: Secret Lives of Girls and Women in 1950s South Korea in O Chong-hui's 'The Garden of Childhood and The Chinese Street,'" *The Journal of Korean Studies* 9 no. 1 (2004): 80.
[327] Jung-hee Oh, *Chinatown,* translated by Bruce Fulton and Ju-Chan Fulton (Seoul: Asia, 2012 [1979]).

among the spaces where the nation became imaginable; yet, in contrast to its Japanese counterpart, South Korea's Chinatowns were dismantled under the urban renewal order, which led many of Chinese residents to leave the peninsula for another country. This chapter will show how the dismantling of Chinatown in South Korea intersected with these interrelated national, regional, and global circumstances surrounding the postcolonial state as it strove to "build" a modern nation.

The intensity and scope of urban renewal is what distinguished experiences of Korean cities from their Japanese counterparts. The massive size of urban renewal programs in South Korea starting in the 1960s reveals the specificity of territorial arrangements in the circulation of ideas. The proximity of North Korea and the coercive character of South Korea's military regime gave much more weight to the symbolic language of urban renewal to remake cities. In this regard, urban renewal was not merely a program or a policy. It was absorbed as an ideology under the influence of postwar US culture of "clearance."[328] City mayors actively embraced the urban renewal order, a vigorous sponsorship often exemplified by the symbolic icon of bulldozers. The sheer scope of the culture of urban renewal in postwar South Korea leaves us with a wide array of archival documents for study. This chapter draws upon a broad range of unpublished archival materials, from city mayors' memoirs and the Asia Foundation's papers to local newspapers and legal documents.[329]

Decolonization, the United States, and Chinatown

After the collapse of the Japanese empire upon its unconditional surrender in the Asia-Pacific War, the region of its former colonies witnessed a tension-filled emergence of nation-states. Korea was among those that had to grapple with the question of national identity under lingering colonial legacy. It was not before long the country was divided along ideological lines and subject to the rule of oppositional occupational forces: south by the United States and north by the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the economic system in the Northeast Asian region once structured around Japanese imperial order transformed into that of nation-states submitting to the Cold War order, which required that the scope and channel of economic transactions be reordered along the new geopolitical lines.

This change of occupying forces effected new economic routes and alliances. The US military government implemented several policies in an attempt to cut off South Korea's trade with Japan and instead to increase its economic ties with China, including Hong Kong and Macau.[330] Moreover, the military government dealt with ethnic Chinese as Allied nationals and consequently provided them with favorable conditions for

[328] Francesca Russello Ammon, *Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).
[329] The bulk of documents has been made available with the tremendous help of the Overseas Chinese Association of Incheon (OCAI) and Professor Song Seung-seok at Incheon National University. Private archives of OCAI have been made available to the public with limited access only in recent years, and I owe a great deal to OCAI and Professor Song for providing me with access to the materials.
[330] Yi, "Haebang ch'ogi," 18.

accumulating capital, especially in trade.[331] As in Yokohama's Chinatown, the immediate postwar years meant a heyday for Incheon's Chinatown economy, mainly because its connections to the major trade ports of Hong Kong, Macau and Shanghai helped the Chinese ethnic economy flourish.[332] In 1946, the amount of imports flowing into Korea from China accounted for approximately ninety-five percent of the total imports to Korea.[333] It was through the port of Incheon that this large amount of trade between China and Korea was mainly transacted.[334] As of 1948, there were thirteen Chinese trading firms in the port city, whose volume of trade acccounted for twenty-one percent of the total volume of import and sixteen percent of the total volume of export in the nation.[335] Incheon's Chinese population increased in accordance with the economic expansion: the number of Chinese residents was 1,938 in May 1944, but within five years, it had increased to 4,989 in May 1949.[336] In the immediate post-WWII years, when few resources were available, foreign goods imported by the hands of Chinese traders held a symbolic significance. The term "*Macao shinsa* (Macau gentlemen)," which described those who wore suits made of fabric imported from Macau, gained such an iconic status that it made frequent appearances in newspapers.[337]

Upon the dominating economic performance of the Chinese traders, one newspaper lamented that "the night of foreigners" was still in progress in the port of Incheon.[338] This pointed undoubtedly to the port's history as the treaty port opened to foreign commerce in the nineteenth century as well as the major colonial port under Japanese rule. The resentment toward Chinese residents was felt acutely in the provision of "enemy property" (*chŏksan*, or vested property), which refered to properties including houses and factories that previous Japanese colonial settlers had left behind in their haste to return to Japan. The US military government confiscated these properties and took charge of their distribution, transferring the shops and houses to Chinese residents under favorable terms. According to a survey in 1948, Chinese residents owned about five hundred houses, which accounted for 11 percent of the total amount in Incheon.[339] Especially given the severe housing shortage in the immediate post-WWII years due to the return of

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[331] En-Mei Wang, "Mikunchŏngki'ŭi han'guk hwakyo sahoe: Mikunchŏng, chunghwamin'guk, han'guk'inkwaŭi kwankye'rŭl chungsimŭro," *Hyŏndae Chungguk Yŏn'gu* 7 (1): 2005, 94-99; Jung-hee Yi and Phil-sŭng Yang, *Chinatown ŏmnŭn nara: han'guk kyŏngche'ŭi ŏche'wa onŭl* (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2004), 55-56; Yi, ""Haebang ch'ogi," 13.
[332] Jae-Jeong Ri, "Han'guk ŭi hwagyo kŏjuji yŏn'gu: Inchŏn chiyŏk ŭl chungsim ŭro." Kyunghee University MS Thesis, 1993, 32.
[333] Wang, "Mikunchŏngki'ŭi," 100.
[334] Ŭn-gyŏng Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo ŭi chongjoksŏng* (Seoul: Han'guk Yŏn'guwŏn, 1986), 131.
[335] Huaqiaozhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Huaqiaozhi: Han'guo* (Taipei: Huaqiaozhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1958), 79-80; Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 131.
[336] Yi, "Haebang ch'ogi," 2.
[337] "It is common in these years to see people like Macau gentlemen and 'mannequin girls' from the South walk around wearing summer clothes and smelling like green banana…" from "Pung soso," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, November 10, 1948.
[338] "Tonggwan ŭi kihyŏnsang: manch'uidong e kkokkkok," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, November 4, 1948.
[339] Yi, "Haebang ch'ogi," 13.

overseas Koreans after the war, this economic privilege enjoyed by Chinese residents stirred the nationalist sentiments among Koreans.[340]

After the short years of economic prosperity following the war, the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) made a tremendous impact on Incheon's Chinatown. The threat posed by the communist regime in East Asia played a significant role in Washington's decision to take the "reverse course" with Japan, once a former war enemy, now a crucial anticommunist ally in the region. By the time when Japan was integrated into the US economic bloc in the Asia Pacific, the government and mass media in Korea had changed their attitudes toward the Chinese within the country. Trade with mainland China during these years was often portrayed as "illicit," and it was not uncommon that the police raided Incheon's Chinatown on suspicion of smuggling activities in the port city.[341] In 1946, Korea's trade volume with China accounted for 84 percent of the total volume of imports and 82 percent of the total volume of exports.[342] By 1954, these figures had drastically decreased to 2 percent and 0.2 percent respectively.[343]

"Urban" Problems in 1960s South Korea

Incheon's Chinatown economy had already gone into decline during the Korean War. However, it was under the Park Chung-hee government that the most damaging consequence took place, as a result of legal reforms. The majority of colonial laws had remained intact well into the 1960s, but Park's military coup in May 1961 and the subsequent establishment of the military government brought a crucial change to Korea's legislation system, thereby transforming urban landscapes. The Park regime's quest was directed toward new territory as framed by the ideal of national development. Historians have debated over how Park's government was capable of handling thorny issues such as the reform of the colonial legal system. The reform had ideological effects, but at the same time it required a great deal of negotiation among stakeholders. Many have agreed that the initial work on reform had already been in progress even before the military coup, but "coercive" characteristics of the military government were instrumental in pushing forward the plan. Through bold attack on the legacy of colonial laws, the new government was able to emphasize the former government's "incapacity" and

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[340] Yi, "Haebang ch'ogi," 14. The increased Chinese population in these years was in part an outcome of political upheaval in mainland China. Differing from its migration pattern in the colonial years, Chinese migration from this period was characteristically political. The Chinese migration to Korea that took place in the late 1940s was closely bound up with the intensifying Civil War between the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Communist Party (CCP) in Shandong. Chinese came to Korea fleeing from the subsequent seizure of the CCP after its increasing military power in the region. They fled from the communist takeover of their villages in Shandong and chose the port of Incheon because it was the closest port abroad. Shandong Huiguan, which once stood on the hill near Incheon's Chinese quarter, served as an asylum for refugees fleeing the Civil War in Shandong province. As of August 1949, about 500 Chinese came to Incheon by boats and stayed in Shandong Huiguan. "Sabaekyŏ chunggugin kuihwan chunpi wanryo," *Dong-A Ilbo*, August 8, 1949.

[341] As seen in newspaper articles published in the immediate post-liberation years, the Chinatown economy seemed to thrive upon illicit trade routes primarily to Macau. "Chunggugin milsuja wangyŏngrae tŭng ŭl ch'epo*," Dong-A Ilbo*, March 30, 1949; "Arrested a Chinese merchant smuggling in the amount of 150 milliion won," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, October 26, 1949.

[342] Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 130.

[343] Ibid., 132.

"inefficiency" and thus gain legitimacy for the current regime.[344] The legal reform paved the way for the Park regime's urgent quest for industrialization and modernization, which was the paramount mission for the military government given that economic development would help justify its dictatorial rule.[345]

The timing was fortuitous. A series of street demonstrations against the previous government, which culminated in the massive democratic movement in April 1960 (the April Revolution, also known as *sa-il-gu*), alarmed US government officials both in Seoul and Washington. These demonstrations appeared to them as a warning to democracy, which might lead to more grave consequences. The Asia Foundation (henceforth, the Foundation), which established its office in Seoul in 1954 in an attempt to transform South Korea along the lines of the US model of democracy, diagnosed that the intensity of the protests was not merely derived from bitterness about the Rhee Syng-man government corruption. It was, after all, a reflection of "deeper grievances against the failures of both the United States and the South Korean government to improve socio-economic conditions in their country."[346] While it was during this period that modernization theory was intensively disseminated through various US channels (publications, conferences, research funds, exchange programs), it was the Foundation that took up measures to address "urban" issues in South Korea, seeking to prevent social unrest.

Political instability and unrest in Asia had already been well noted by the US government as a possible threat to the anticommunist regional order. In other parts of Asia, however, it mainly took the form of discontent among "farmers and peasants." When it came to South Korea, "if there are to be unrest, agitation, demonstrations, and attempts to overthrow the government," it would occur in the "*urban* area—areas which are badly in need of improved facilities."[347] This assessment was remarkable and unmistakable given the successful city planning in North Korea at the time. The effective postwar reconstruction of North Korean cities, and their relative economic growth in the 1960s, added more weight to the gravity of the situation.[348] While attributing the factors to "the devastation of the major cities" and "the monolithic control of the government" of North Korea, the Foundation was cautious about the possiblity that word of successful city planning of the North would spread to the general populace of the South through Korean residents in Japan (who held strong ties to the North) or communist English language publications. The "marked contrast" between North and South in city planning was troublesome enough.

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[344] For more, see Youngran Hur. "Haebang ihu sikminji pŏmnyul ŭi chŏngni wa talsikminhwa: kupŏmnyŏng chŏngni saŏp kwa sijang kwan'gye pŏmnyŏng ŭi kaep'yŏn ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Che 2 ki hanil yŏksa kongdong yŏn'gu pogosŏ* 5 (2010): 19-21.
[345] Lee, "National History," 62.
[346] Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, "Koreanizing Modernization: Modernization Theory and South Korean Intellectuals," in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, edited by David C Engerman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 256.
[347] David Steinberg, "Urban Planning—Project Proposal," August 21, 1964, Seoul Office Memorandum, Asia Foundation. My emphasis.
[348] See Charles K. Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

The lack of facilities including adequate housing, employment, and recreation in urban areas, in spite of the rapid growth of urbanization (five percent per year) and exploding urban populations[349] in the early 1960s, emerged as thorny urban issues in this Cold War climate. They were considered to be likely causes of social unrest against "the established governmental structure" and "discontent with the democratic processes." "Urban dwellers [would] feel that if democracy can offer them no better a life, perhaps some other form of government could," the Foundation reported. Urban problems, cast as a potential threat to the political stability of the Korean peninsula, gave urban planning political relevance both for the South Korean and US governments. On the one hand, the new military government associated the current urban problems with the previous government's administrative incapacity and absence of planning experts therein.[350] Therefore, effective city planning would establish the new regime's legitimacy. On the other hand, the Foundation pointed to the lack of "rational" planning in South Korea by noting, "A large percentage of the Korean budget is without doubt wasted on bad planning of urban centers."[351] The Foundation's role was therefore to assist the Korean government to "use its resources rationally and efficiently to transform the urban environment and to plan for future urban needs." Indeed the project of the modern city took on a political importance for the US side as a bulwark against social unrest that might spur communist movements.

To address the urban issues, the Foundation came to invest a large amount of capital in the transfer of urban knowledge and experts. While urban planning was considered to be a rational method to ensure the maximum use of land, educating planning experts became one of major goals in city planning. They purchased a large number of books published in the United States and distributed them to Korean universities. In 1964, the Foundation appointed New York-based architect Oswald Nagler as an advisor to Korea's urban planning. In an interview with the *Korea Times* during his six-week pilot study, Nagler concluded that one of the most fundamental problems with urban planning in Korea was "the shortage of trained technical staff" capable of producing a "logical and comprehensive master plan."[352] What he emphasized in urban planning was not to spend a lot of money but to make "the best utilization of land." He further recommended a thorough survey of cities, education of relevant planning experts, and provision of consultant services, indicating the importance of government's initiatives. With the help of Nagler, The Housing, Urban and Regional Planning Institute (HURPI), Korea's first government-sponsored research institute for urban management, was founded for purposes of training planning experts.[353]

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[349] The population of Seoul had increased from 3 million in 1963 to 5 million in 1970. Hyungmin Pai, "Modernism, Development, and the Transformation of Seoul: A Study of the Development of Sae'oon Sang'ga and Yoido," in *Culture and the City in East Asia*, edited by Won Bae Kim, Mike Douglass, Sang-Chuel Choe and Kong Chong Ho (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 115.
[350] Il-Sŏk Cha, *Yŏngwŏnhan kkŭm sŏul ŭl wihan chŭngŏn* (Seoul: Dongsŏ Munhwasa, 2005), 84.
[351] David Steinberg, "Urban Planning—Project Proposal," August 21, 1964, Seoul Office Memorandum, Asia Foundation.
[352] "Too much Emphasis on Roads," *The Korea Times*, July 8, 1964.
[353] Inha Chung, Hyung-min Pai, Myung-rae Cho, Bumsik Min, Junghan Bae, and Kyung-jin Cho, *Kŏn'chuk, tosi, chogyŏng ŭi chisik chihyŏng* (Koyang: Namu Tosi, 2011), 32. Architect Kyu Sung Woo was among those who participated in urban design projects with Nagler and later moved to the United States with help of Nagler.

The role of the Japan-South Korea Treaty in 1965 was another significant factor in the transfer of knowledge and capital. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the early 1950s marked a watershed in postwar Japan's economic growth within what John Dower has famously termed "the San Francisco System." Entering the 1960s, Washington saw the need to share the financial burden with Japan in providing foreign capital necessary for South Korea's economic development. The normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries was inevitable to this end. The Japan-South Korea treaty granted Japan a new role in reconfiguring the region along the Cold War lines, thereby propelling it to follow a problematic trajectory post-empire. While the treaty faced massive opposition movements in South Korea, the normalized diplomatic ties established after decolonization played a considerable role in South Korea's economic growth by facilitating the transfer of foreign capital and technological aid between the two countries.[354] The consequences of the alliance with the former colonizer were also manifest in urban space. The Korean Engineering Consulting Corporation (KECC) was founded in 1963 as the International Industry Technological Group, which provided building materials and technologies necessary for large-scale urban redevelopment projects.[355] The Foundation further facilitated this flow of ideas and people by underwriting "study tours" of Korean mayors and academics to Japanese cities.

Urban Renewal Gone Abroad

The Foundation's investment in mayoral trips to the United States was crucial in the constitution of modern urbanism in South Korea. The role of the trips was considered significant, especially when urban design and planning was understood as a way to "alleviate economic, political, and social ills." Thus, the tours were to provide "foreign materials, advice, and experience to leaders, both governmental and academic, in the field of economics and developmental planning."[356] Huh Chung (1896-1988) was among the mayors who took trips to the United States with the financial help of the Foundation. In his memoir published in 1979, *Testimony for Tomorrow*, Huh reflects on his visit to US cities during his tenure. Upon an invitation of Philadelphia's mayor, Huh visited Philadelphia and traveled to other cities in 1959.[357] The Foundation also funded a study tour of the Ministry of Construction government officials in 1964; a tour of city officials of Taegu to Japanese cities; a trip for intellectuals to study urban planning in Hong Kong; and participation of intellectuals in conferences overseas.

But the most remarkable was the trip of Mayor Kim Hyun-ok of Seoul (1966-1970). Mayor Kim represents an insatiable and modernist desire for development. Kim brought a drastic transformation to planning culture under his mayoral terms, which earned him a nickname the "bulldozer mayor." His iconoclastic personality was partly derived from his military background and close ties to President Park, but his taste for reconstruction should also be situated in the developmentalist planning culture forged across the Pacific,

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[354] John Lie, *Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
[355] Pai, "Modernism," 119-120.
[356] "Letter of Agreement," Memorandum KO-SX-1213, November 25, 1966, Korea Office, The Asia Foundation, Hoover Institution.
[357] "Tongnipkwan tŭng pangmun hŏ sijang nyuyok hyangpal," *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 18, 1959.

Figure 3-4. "The Linear City," drawn by Cha Il-sok after his return to South Korea. Cha was the most influential technocrat in the late 1960s. (Image source: Cha 2005)

Figure 3-5. Mayor Kim and Vice Mayor Cha with Mayor John F. Shelley of San Francisco in November 1966 (left); Cha illustrated New York City as "the mega city with clear lines based on elaborate urban planning" (Image source: Cha 2005)

which he would soon come to embrace. The Foundation was quite aware that Kim was "well connected to the President who is eager to push planning in Seoul." Although they assessed that the mayor lacked "broad knowledge of the field" (of city planning) and may not work "always wisely," his style of dealing with business "quickly and effectively" made them decide to fund his study tour of American cities in 1966.

Accompanying Mayor Kim was Cha Il-sok, the then vice mayor of Seoul, who was the most important technocrat in city planning of 1960s South Korea. In contrast to Kim, who had little knowledge of city planning and administration, Cha earned a degree in city planning when he studied in New York City (Figure 3-1). He also possessed intimate knowledge of the New York area from his six years of residence there. His Christian upbringing had enabled him to learn English from an early age. His language ability and planning knowledge convinced the Foundation that he would make the trip more meaningful to the party.

During their "study tour" of the United States in November 1966, the mayor and vice mayor visited San Francisco, Washington D.C., and New York. For instance, they were invited on a tour of urban renewal projects in San Francisco. Cha was particularly impressed with the Golden Gateway Center, which was one of the iconic urban renewal projects. It was New York City, gigantic skyscrapers and wide roads in particular, that drew Mayor Kim's attention. "The car that carried us," Cha wrote in his memoir, "continued to run straight without stopping." Mayor Kim marveled at the road system and exclaimed, "New York is the linear city, the fruit of advanced technology and art!" This physical experience in New York City made a great impression on Mayor Kim.

After their trip, the two mayors paved the way for urban planning of Korean cities and changed landscapes therein. Declaring 1967 as the year of "onrush," Mayor Kim announced several urban development plans: 1) urban renewal to increase land efficiency; 2) clearance of slum districts; 3) urban redevelopment; 4) modernization of traditional market areas; 5) development of urban fringes; and 6) expansion of green areas and urban beautification. The mayors rushed forward to realize the plans: they rearranged road systems by constructing elevated expressways in city centers (the Sam'il Expressway), conducted urban redevelopment projects such as Sae'oon Sang'ga, drew up plans for a new administrative center called Yoido, dubbing it the Manhattan of Seoul, developed the waterfront of the Han River with marked reference to the Hudson River,[358] and implemented public housing and slum clearance programs. Slum clearance was among the most visible consequences in their urban renewal projects. Vice mayor Cha likened shanty towns to "poisonous mushrooms" that spread fast. Slum clearance was among the most visible of their urban renewal projects, a priority in the ambitious project of modernizing the nation (Figure 3-3).

All of these large-scale urban redevelopment programs took place during Kim's five-year tenure. It is no coincidence that Mayor Kim acquired the nickname "bulldozer," the machine that symbolizied the culture of slum clearance and highway construction in the

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[358] The riverside road was completed in September 1967. Cha, *Yŏngwŏnhan kkŭm*, 118.

Figure 3-6. Urban renewal programs, from Sam'il Expressway (above) and public housing/slum clearance project (below), took place during Mayor Kim's five-year tenure. (Image source: H. Kim 1969; The National Archives of Korea)

postwar American landscape.[359] It was an era in which brazen destruction and grand renewal projects went hand in hand: the infamous American city planner Robert Moses's "bulldozer approach" to planning, for example, epitomized what Christopher Klemek has termed the urban renewal order in the United States.[360] However, this culture of creative

[359] Ammon, *Bulldozer*.
[360] Klemek, *Transatlantic*.

destruction insinuated by the machine was not exclusively American; in fact, it gained more purchase in South Korea. The bulldozer made frequent appearances in developmentalist landscapes of Korean cities during the middle of the twentieth century: it dug up ground for construction of elevated highways; it demolished a slew of shanty towns and kicked the poor out onto the street. The figure of the bulldozer came to embody the "philospohy behind city planning" that the Foundation had wanted the mayors to absorb from their trips to US cities. It is notable that since bulldozers were costly, it was not uncommon to borrow them from the US army. Literally and figuratively, the iconic machine soon came to represent the developmentalist planning culture of South Korea, transferred from across the Pacific to South Korean cities.

What gave the "bulldozer" such power and momentum in South Korea? I contend that the machine for "construction" (*kŏnsŏl*) effectively dovetailed with the pathos of the postcolonial state's mission to "build" a nation. In pages that follow, I will argue that the discursive development of "*kuk'to*" (national land) as an object of national pathos in the postcolonial state united with the modernist rationality of city planning for efficient land use. The upcoming sections will show how this combination influenced legal reforms regarding urban space in the name of efficient use of *kuk'to*, which in turn led to the exclusion of the Chinese from the national space.

Kukt'o: Rationality and Pathos of Nation-Building

Originally coined in the colonial period, the term *kukt'o* (國土)—national land or soil—came to hold great significance after independence, with much more symbolic weight than its literal meaning. In postcolonial Korea, *kukt'o* did not merely indicate the land owned by the government. It signified the whole territory of the Korean peninsula, even half divided and war-devastated after the Korean War, elevated to sacred status. Under the name of national development, there was an urgent need to secure more land, which should be harnessed in the most efficient way possible. The whole nation was mobilized to industrialize the country, and any attempt to hinder national development was considered inimical to the wellbeing of the nation. What is critical here is to understand how the rationality of the modern state was achieved and realized through governing "sentiments." As Ann Laura Stoler has pointed out, "pathos and statistics," however antagonistic they might seem to each other, are "at the political heart of state inquiries."[361] In other words, the rational mind of the modern state that won control of the national space was in effect entrenched in a conscious effort to demonstrate its mastery of the domain of feelings, harnessing pathos to achieve its own ends.

The notion of *kukt'o* gained so much currency that it was widely embraced among public intellectuals across the political spectrum. Chang Chun-ha, pro-democracy journalist and Park's political opponent, penned an essay in 1961 asking, "Why should we undertake construction projects of *kukt'o*?" Chang gave two reasons: first, the peninsula was devastated after the Korean War; and second, almost three-fourths of the national land is mountainous, which makes it difficult to use for practical purposes.[362] While emphasizing

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[361] Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain,* 30.
[362] Chun-ha Chang, "Kukt'o kŏnsŏl saŏp ŭi ŭiŭi," *Chibang haengjŏng* 10, 89 (1961): 9.

the role of roads in pursing the goal of economic development, the association between "beautify (*mihwa*) the national land" and "enrich the state" was seamlessly drawn.

The most efficient and productive way to achieve this national goal to modernize *kukt'o* was regarded as construction of roads, highways and bridges—symbols of economic mobility par excellence, the pulsing "arteries of the nation."[363] In November 1968, a tabloid magazine titled *Sunday Seoul* featured two competing visions of the capital city. Mayor Kim Hyoun-ok vehemently affirmed that Seoul would make the grade of world class, international metropolis within a decade. In his futuristic imagination of the city, state-of-the-art subways replaced old-fashioned buses, overpasses resolved the traffic congestion, bridges and expressways connected both sides of the Han River, and belt highways provided a circular connection between the city center and suburbs. By contrast, architect Kim Joong-up squarely criticized the mayor's notions as "impulsive" and "fanciful," insisting that they would ultimately make Seoul an "ugly" city. If built in the city center, argued the architect, overpasses only aggravate traffic congestion during rush hours, worsen noise and air pollution within the city, and impede the passage of pedestrians.[364] To Kim Joong-up, who instead advocated a more measured approach to planning Seoul's urban future, what the mayor envisaged as a "masterpiece" (*gŏljak*) would never be anything but "hideous" (*ch'uakhan*). Not unexpectedly, such an opinion as the architect's represented a toothless minority. In the Bulldozer Mayor's term, the total length of the city's roads increased by 267 percent, from 1.44 million kilometers in 1965 to 5.29 million kilometers in 1970.[365]

Imperatives to build more roads were closely bound up with the need to formulate policies that would help secure more usable land. Policymakers' immediate task was to locate useless and purposeless—seizable—pieces of land. The cemetery, a space deemed functionless par excellence in the modern city, increasingly came to be subjected to such "tidy imperatives of the productive state."[366] After Park's military coup, the Burial and Graveyard Act was first enacted in December 1961, replacing colonial legislation regarding funerary practices. Even after the law was revised in 1968 with additional clauses emphasizing the legislative imperatives,[367] however, its regulatory effects seemed to remain marginal. Then, starting in the early 1970s, another cemetery reform with stronger and stricter measures was called for in order that "the entire *kukt'o* might not be covered with cemeteries."[368] The 1973 amendment made significant and consequential changes to funeral practices and spaces. As opposed to the previous legislation, which provided ambiguous rationales and little legal binding force, the amendment clearly emphasized that the fortification of the cemetery law was needed to "expand the utilizable area of *kukt'o* and contribute to its industrialization."[369] Additionally, the category and definition of *muyŏnbunmyo* was first introduced in 1973 as "graves without

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[363] Jini Kim Watson, "Roads, Railways, and Bridges: Arteries of the Nation," in *The New Asian City Three-Dimensional Fictions of Space and Urban Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 167.
[364] "10 nyŏn dwi sŏul: gŏljak sŏul, ch'uakhan sŏul," *Sunday Seoul* 1 (10), November 1968.
[365] Seoul Yoksa Pakmulkwan, *Annyong! Kogatoro* (Seoul: Seoul Yoksa Pakmulkwan. 2013), 42.
[366] Watson, "Roads, Railways, and Bridges," 190.
[367] In the 1968 revision, public health, national defense and urban development were added.
[368] "Myoje kaesŏn chŏlsil," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, October 13, 1972.
[369] The Burial and Graveyard Act, as amended in 1973.

families or relatives." If no one reported to the authorities during a certain period, the grave would subsequently be considered *muyŏnbunmyo* and the government would have the right to claim the site. With penal regulations strengthened, this addition had the apparent purpose of rationalizing land use of *kukt'o*; yet it was at the discretion of the state to determine what would be legitimized as rational land use. Since cemetery reform was such a necessity in an era when national land development (*kukt'o kaebal*) was seen as crucial to the wellbeing of the nation, a newspaper editorial argued in January 1973 that every possible means—from local administrations to mass media—should be mobilized to enlighten and educate the people on this matter.[370]

In addition to such newspaper articles, local administrations were instrumental in propagating governmental campaigns to promote reduction of cemeteries to individual households. The 1970s campaign, "The more cemetery, the less national land" (*Nŭlŏnanŭn myoji, churŏdŭnŭn kukt'o*), was carried out foremost at the local level.[371] Since increase of cemeteries was considered to damage *kukt'o*, the development of the cemetery law unfolded in a way that would increase and reinforce the government's regulatory interventions on burial grounds. The government even came to dictate what would be the appropriate size and shape of individual tombs as well as location of cemeteries. In the 1981 revision, the Cemetery Law became more precisely articulated, making it impossible to establish funeral facilities—cemeteries, crematoria or cineraria—in areas "crucial to the future development of *kukt'o*."[372] Media efforts to enlighten and educate the public as to modern funeral practices continued. In February 1983, a newspaper editorial strongly urged upon the public the necessity for stricter reforms of cemetery law in order to "prevent cemeteries from encroaching on *kukt'o*."[373]

As such, the Cemetery Law has developed in accordance with *kukt'o* as emblematic of the prosperous nation itself. While the change in the law is indicative of how the space of the dead served the interests of the modernizing and industrializing state, another legal development progressed regarding the use of national land: The Alien Landownership Act, enacted in September three months earlier before the Burial and Graveyard Act was legislated in 1961. The Alien Landownership Act of 1961 moved to prohibit and restrict landownership of foreigners based on the principle of reciprocity, replacing the colonial legislation of 1936.[374] While the 1961 act was part of Park's legal reform, many of the clauses remained almost identical to its colonial counterpart, as in the case with other laws.

In 1968, the Alien Landownership Act was amended, with more restrictions on foreign ownership. The Ministry of Home Affairs investigated in 1967 that there was

[370] "Myojije ŭi kaehyŏk," *Dong-a Ilbo*, January 29, 1973.
[371] Ilwoong Seo and Kyonghwan Park, "Han'guk kŭntae chugŭm kyŏnggwan e taehan kukka ŭi chedojŏk kaeip," *Munhwa Yŏksa Chiri* 26, 3 (2014): 103.
[372] The Burial and Graveyard Act, as amended in 1981.
[373] "Kukt'o chamsik ŭl pangjihanŭn kil," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, Feburary 23, 1983.
[374] As of 1962, the Chinese were the largest group of foreigners residing in South Korea, amounting to approximately 24,000. "Seoul chogye: hwagyodŭl asea ŭi yutaein," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 24, 1962.

外國人土地所有 嚴格히規制키로

政府는 外國人의 토지소유가 음성적이고 不法的으로 늘어가고 있는實情과 현재까지 5百여만평의 土地가 外國人소유로 돼있는 실정을 감안、앞으로는 보다 엄격한 제한 조치를 취할방침을 세웠다。이러한 방침은 29일 관계기관에의해 朴正熙대통령에게 보고됐는데、이자리에서 朴대통령은 ①현행外人土地法案을改定、相互주의에입각해서 철저히 정비할것②앞으로의 外人에 대한 土地소유허가는 반드시 國務會議의 의결을거치도록 제한하는立法조치를취할것등을 지시했다고 소식통은전했다。

政府는곧 外國人土地法개정안을마련、國務會議에 올릴것이며 外交관계에영향을미치지않는범위내에서 外人의 土地소유를 제한할것이라고 同소식통은전했다。內務部에서 그동안 대체적으로조사推計한 外國人土地소유내역은 ▲美國人이 4백19만2천평 ▲中國人이 59만9천평 ▲西獨人이 7만평 ▲愛蘭人이 5만8천평 ▲日本・英國人등이 9만9천평으로 4백92만8천평이지만 면밀한조사가끝나면 5백만평이훨씬넘을것이라고 한다。

Figure 3-7. "Stricter restrictions on foreign landownership"; "Your money is my money" (Dong-A Ilbo, August 30, 1967)

approximately five million *pyŏng* (1 *pyŏng* = 3.3 m^2) owned by foreigners in the whole country. The largest amount of land was possessed by US nationals (4.2 million *pyŏng*), followed by Chinese (0.6 million), Western Germans (0.07 million) and Irish (0.05 million).[375] Although it was the US nationals who owned the largest amount of land, public sentiment was directed against the Chinese owners, who took the biggest hit with the advent of more regulatory measures on landownership. An editorial cartoon of the *Dong-A Ilbo* clearly reflects this anti-Chinese sentiment of the time. On the same page that introduced the government decision to impose stricter restrictions on foreign landownership, a sly-looking Chinese farmer tending crops was depicted with the caption, "Your money is my money" (Figure 3-4). The 1968 amendment restricted landownership of foreigners to no more than 50 *pyŏng* (165 m^2) for commercial use and 200 *pyŏng* (660 m^2) for residential use. This limitation on landownership confined the Chinese economic activity to small-scale businesses with limited capital and prevented it from expanding.[376]

The ultimate effect of the legal decision was to make Chinese land rights conditional and temporal, far more tenuous. In many cases, landownership was recognized only under a condition that basically allowed the government to seize the land for its own use. Archival documents describing the property permit issued to a Chinese resident in Incheon named Wang Zhao-gang (born. October 17, 1931) vividly show this conditionality. Foreigners were eligible to have land rights that, however, always came with a proviso that when municipal authorities required the space for the sake of "city planning," the owner should "follow directions provided." This precarious legal status of land ownership rights contributed significantly to the formation of the Chinese self-identity in postcolonial Korea and their dis-identification with their place of residence.

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[375] "Oegugin to t'oji soyu ŏmkyŏkhi kyujekiro," *Dong-a Ilbo*, August 30, 1967.

[376] En-Mei Wang, *Higashiajia gendaishi no naka no Kankoku kakyō: reisen taisei to 'sokoku' ishiki* (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008), 219-220.

Bulldozer: An Affective Machine of Displacement

The lawsuit surrounding the Chinese cemetery in Incheon in the 1960s was a symbolic event that foreshadowed the displacement of Chinese residents from what was considered to be Korea's national land. As an extraterritorial jurisdiction in nineteenth century treaty ports, Chinese settlements in Korea came into being, from the outset, with the provision of legally delimited Chinese burial grounds. Based on the treaty signed between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea in 1884, the Chinese burial ground in Incheon was situated in the vicinity of the Chinese settlement.[377] This burial ground for the Chinese departed continued to exist in the same location even after decolonization. However, as Incheon city limits expanded further, the cemetery faced relocation in 1958, when the original area was slated for urban development.[378] The incident, which has been poignantly remembered and narrated in the Incheon Chinese community as the "*hwagyo* (=overseas Chinese) cemetery dispossession incident," took place after the relocation was completed in 1962:

> The School has trespassed on our community property numerous times and *bulldozed* it to clear the way for the school.[379]

The incident was concerned with the right to a plot of land measuring 8,874 *p'yŏng* (29,284 m^2), on which the Overseas Chinese Association of Incheon (henceforth, the Association) had been intent on erecting a Chinese school after the relocation.[380] Immediately after the Chinese corpses were evacuated from the land, the Sŏngkwang Academy (henceforth, the Academy),[381] which owned schools in the vicinity, began to encroach little by little on the territory of the former Chinese burial site to construct its own school building. The Association sent an official letter to the Academy on May 13, 1963 asking for an apology after the Academy had its own students dig up the large amount of earth from a former burial site, under the supervision of teachers.[382] A prompt

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377 The treaty prescribed that trees should be planted surrounding the burial ground and a house built to tend the site.

378 In the process of relocation, there were 515 *yuyŏnmyo*, 1,482 *muyŏnmyo*, and 876 newly buried. From the cenotaph at the Chinese Cemetery located within the Bupyeong Family Cemetery of Incheon. Starting in 1958 and even to this day, as relocations take place, the Overseas Chinese Association of Incheon (henceforth, the Association) renews burial registers for administrative purposes, which serve themselves as valuable archival sources to help keep track of names of the deceased as well as the bereaved, dates of birth and death, places of origin, and where they lived before death. Three months before this burial register was produced in November 1958 and the actual relocation occurred afterwards, an Incheon-based newspaper article reported the arrest of two Korean teenagers accused of excavating a grave in the Chinese cemetery. These two Koreans allegedly dug up the grave out of curiosity after reading *Treasure Island*, expecting that "there might be gold bars inside of the Chinese coffin." They failed to open the coffin because it was made of solid planks of wood. "Punmyo palgulbŏm kŏmgŏ," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 30, 1958.

379 Inchŏn hwagyo hyŏphoe, No. 0111, July 10, 1964. My emphasis.

380 Inchŏn hwagyo chach'igu, No. 00100, June 28, 1964.

381 The owner of the Academy, a high-ranking military officer, was closely connected to Park Chung-hee's military government. The Academy was renamed later the Sŏnin Foundation and became Incheon's largest educational institute.

382 Inchŏn hwagyo hyŏphoe, "chaŭi ro hŭlgŭl p'agande taehan choch'i yogu," No. 0069, May 13, 1963.

apology was issued from the school the next day. The principal explained that they had not been aware of the fact that the land was the Association's property, giving assurances that such a tresspass would not happen again.[383]

The promise was never kept, however. From March 5, 1964 onwards, by clearing the ground several times with a bulldozer loaned from the US army, the Academy came to occupy the large amount of land, which had amounted to 500 *p'yŏng* (1,650 m^2) by November.[384] As explained earlier, bulldozer is language crucial for understanding how the incident mirrors the postwar landscape of the Korean city, in which the "Bulldozer Mayor" type took center stage as the ideal city official.[385] The word was symptomatic of the developmental landscapes in the 1960s, when the image of the machine that bulldozes over backwardness and poverty represented the national aspiration to build up the new landscape of the modern city, in the process razing the past and disregarding affective ties to the landscape. It is thus significant that the word "bulldozer" was frequently used in the Association's petition to the city government. Especially given its strong connection to the US military (*migun*) within this context, the bulldozer is not just a technical term for a machine used to clear the ground or demolish buildings. Instead, it becomes part of an affective language that vividly conveys strong sentiments aroused by urban development in postcolonial Korea, in this case underscoring the violence of that process.

The Association further appealed to "the rule of law" by arguing, "Such an act is an absolute impossibility in a law-abiding country."[386] However, it is the law to which the Association was appealing that ultimately became an entrapment. While the Association began to seek out ways to legally secure land rights by reaching out to the Overseas Chinese Association of Korea for administrative assistance,[387] they also simultaneously continued to send letters to Korean authorities, from the city government[388] to the police bureau,[389] in order to stop the Academy's "illegitimate" construction of the school. Yet the appeals had minimal effect. The Korean authorities did not want to get involved, or even if they did, the Academy just repeated the same statement that it would follow due process.

The incident entered a whole new phase in August 1966. Now the Academy filed a complaint with the court against the Association, pointing to colonial law regarding its landownership. According to the lawsuit, two Chinese leaders had purchased the land on November 27, 1936, one month before the colonial law prohibiting foreign

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[383] Sŏngkwang chungsangyŏp kodŭng, "undongjang kyŏnggyesŏn yakkan t'oryang sayonghan te taehan hoebo," unnumbered, May 14, 1963.
[384] Inchŏn hwagyo hyŏphoe, "Chinjŏngsŏ," November 1964.
[385] Myungku Kang, "1960-yŏndae tosi paldal ŭi yuhyŏng kwa t'ŭkching: paljŏnjuŭi kukka ŭi konggan chojak," in *1960-yŏndae sahoe pyŏnhwa yŏn'gu: 1963-1970*, ed. Han'guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn'guwŏn (Sŏul: Paeksan Sŏdang, 1999): 57.
[386] Inchŏn hwagyo hyŏphoe, "Chinjŏngsŏ," November 1964.
[387] Inchŏn hwagyo chach'igu, No. 00100, June 28, 1964; Inchŏn hwagyo chach'igu, No. 00101, June 29, 1964.
[388] Inchŏnsichŏng, "Kŏnch'uk kongsa chungji choch'i hoebo," No. 444.1-8683, May 16, 1964.
[389] Inchŏn hwagyo hyŏphoe, "Kongyuchaesan mudanch'impŏm e taehan choch'i," No. 0111, July 10, 1964.

landownership was enacted and implemented by the Japanese government. The law dictated that foreigners must report their land acquisition to the authorities, but the plaintiff found out that the Chinese leaders had not followed the process. The Chinese landownership should thus be adjudicated as illegal, argued the Academy, because even after decolonization, the colonial legislation remained retroactively effective. In so doing, the Academy successfully made a case that that its construction was lawful. The court decided in favor of the plaintiff in the end. By 1973, the Academy had completed "Asia's biggest gymnasium" on the former Chinese burial ground, while a new road connecting Incheon and Seoul was constructed right next to the massive sports complex to mark it as "Incheon's new attraction."[390]

In the early 1970s, another lawsuit against a Chinese cemetery was pressed in Seoul. Located in what was then the outskirts of the city (then Sadang-dong, Yongdungpo-gu), the *Fenghuangshan* Cemetery had been the burial ground for Chinese since 1945. On November 7, 1972, however, the Korean government announced its confiscation of the land. Upon learning of this abrupt decision, the ambassador of the Republic of China demanded an explanation. The answer was as follows: A Korean resident named Shin claimed that the owner of the gravesite was in fact Japanese. In May 1945, when Korea was still under Japanese rule, a Chinese man named Feng Zi-zhou had purchased the land from a Korean named Kayama Masafumi (originally with the Korean name Lee Chang-mun), and registered that piece of property in his son's name. Instead of his son's Chinese name, Feng Qing-yi, the father had used his son's Japanese name, Umeda Keiichi, for the registration, because his son was living in Japan for his studies at the time of purchase. Feng Zi-zhou did change the name into his son's Chinese name in January 1955, but too late, it seemed. The son, who was staying in Japan as of 1973, went to Seoul in attempt to prove the following facts pertaining to his lawful land ownership:

> 1. Feng Qing-yi is the biological son of Feng Zi-zhou, an overseas Chinese in South Korea. Since he did not make any formal request to relinquish his Taiwanese citizenship, Feng Qing-yi thus holds Taiwanese citizenship.
>
> 2. Feng Qing-yi adopted his Japanese mother's last name only for purpose of schooling, which does not indicate that he was intent on relinquishing his Taiwanese citizenship.
>
> 3. Feng Qing-yi was listed on his Japanese mother's family register as an illegitimate child only for the sake of his education in Japan. But other documents produced while he was a student in Seoul attested that he is the legitimate son of Feng Zi-zhou.

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[390] "Inchŏn e kŏdaehan silnae ch'eyukgwan," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, November 7, 1973; *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 31, 1974.

> 4. If Feng Qing-yi should be adjudged to be Japanese, there must be a proof of his being not Taiwanese. But the Seoul District Court provides no jurisprudential explanation on this matter and the verdict is thus not legitimate.
>
> 5. The Fenghuangshan cemetery is the burial ground of the overseas Chinese of Seoul and it has been twenty-eight years since their remains were relocated to this site in 1945. Both countries have longstanding traditions for commemoration of their long history and ancestors, especially including respect for their gravesites. The Korean government's confiscation of this (Chinese) cemetery would result in the desecration of Chinese ancestral graves. Since this would incur the wrath of the overseas Chinese in Korea, it is strongly advised that this issue should be treated with circumspection lest grave consequences ensue.

Despite the Taiwanese consul's complaints, the court ruled that Feng Qing-yi was Japanese and adjudicated that the Korean government's confiscation was lawful on account of the landowner being a Japanese national. This litigation reveals the crux of the ambiguity stemming from the nature of the postcolonial legal system. In the post-liberation years, properties of the former colonial government and Japanese nationals were transferred to the US military administration. Since no legal distinction was drawn between "Koreans" and "Japanese" at the time, the temporary Regulation of Korean Nationality was established in May 1948 when South Korea was still under US military rule. The legislation was introduced so as to provide a legal definition for who would be deemed Korean nationals as opposed to Japanese residing in Korea.[391] In the immediate post-liberation years after August 1945, conflicts abounded in landownership disputes because distinguishing Koreans from Japanese in the postcolonial context was hard to accomplish. Among the major complicating factors were names: Since Koreans were forced to change their names into Japanese under the colonial rule, it was nearly impossible to judge who was Korean by names on papers and it was thus not uncommon that banks oftentimes froze deposits of Koreans who had Japanese names.[392] The in and outs of Feng's name change reflect the complexity of postcolonial legal construction of national citizenry with respect to property rights.[393]

As a consequence of the litigation, the two Chinese cemeteries were relocated to the periphery of each city. Different legal rationales were employed in each case. In Incheon, it was argued that the cemetery was owned by the Chinese nationals, whose land rights were ambiguous and hence open to question both in the colonial and postcolonial years. On the other hand, in Seoul, rights to the cemetery were at stake due to its association

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[391] This provisional legislation provided the legal foundation of the Nationality Law enacted in December 1948 after the government of the Republic of Korea was established. Wang, *Higashiajia*, 183.

[392] Soo-ja Kim, "Taehan Min'guk Chŏngbu surip chŏnhu kukchŏkpŏp chejŏng nonŭi kwajŏng e natanan 'kukmin' kyŏnggye sŏlchŏng," *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 49 (2009): 119.

[393] The relocation of corpses was completed by January of 1980, the burial site redeveloped into a commercial area. "Pudongsan Mundap," *Maeil Kyungje*, February 7, 1980.

with the Japanese, whose property was regarded as "enemy properties" and thus confiscated by the US military administration. What is common in these two cases, more importantly, is that the Chinese cemeteries became contested sites because they were conceived as the illegal occupation of national soil.

These legal documents are not a repository of "facts,"[394] or authentic bearers of legal knowledge. They rather reveal uncertainty inherent in postcolonial legislative structures. In a postcolonial society like South Korea, colonial legislation had long remained in effect even after decolonization, often adding another layer of complexity to the already messy reality of postcolonial legal reform.[395] These documents rather show the uncertainty and ambiguity lurking in legal workings of postcolonial society, which was manifested in its blunt efforts to define its legitimate members and assert its domain. The Chinese cemetery serves as a reminder of how a particular polity understands itself and dictates who is entitled to be buried in its territory. In the colonial city, the cemetery was often subject to the colonial authority's rhetoric of maintaining a sanitized city, whereas the postcolonial developmentalist state of South Korea replaced such colonial concerns with the pursuit of nation-building projects. The lawsuits involving the Chinese cemeteries show how urban space constitutes and is constitutive of "the way in which the nation imagines its body,"[396] when the question emerged as to whose bodies should be considered the legitimate residents of the new nation.

The bulldozing out of the two Chinese cemeteries is symbolic of the postcolonial construction of national citizenry based on property rights. The legal reform subsequently forced Chinese residents out of what was considered to be national soil. The culture of development through destruction was epitomized by the icon of "construction" par excellence in 1960s South Korea, a violent wrecking machine. The machine opened up new roads, which were both the ends and means of modernization, but at the same time it mercilessly eliminated the "illegitimate" use of the national land as in the case of the Chinese cemeteries.

Another destructive incident in more direct connection to the drive for urban renewal occurred in the national capital in the 1970s, under the ongoing influence of the sixties. Mayor Kim finally resigned in April 1970, ending his four-year tenure. Behind his resignation lay the devastating collapse of Wawoo Apartment, one of public housing projects he had initiated. The tragic accident, which resulted in dozens of casualties, was owing to poor construction under the bulldozer mayor's administration. But his resignation did not end the culture of urban renewal. The new city government continued to pursue the former mayor's planning agenda. In the midst of ongoing urban renewal programs based on American models, the city announced a large-scale urban redevelopment plan in 1970. The first urban renewal project slated was the clearance of Chinatown to make way for high-rise buildings. The shabby appearance of the buildings in the neighborhood, located right across from the city hall in the central business district,

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[394] Spivak, "The Rani of Sirmur," 248. See further, Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain.*
[395] The patriarchal law, which had existed well into the 1990s, was but one famous example of this colonial legacy in law.
[396] Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial*, 97.

Figure 3-8. Chinatown bulldozed-out. Aerial photographs taken in 1973, 1976, and 2016 show the transformation (above). Seoul Plaza Hotel was built in 1976 where a century-old Chinatown had once stood (below; Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 22, 1976)

seemed at odds with the modernizing impulse of the nation. The rationale behind the redevelopment was to increase the efficient use of land, beautify urban space, facilitate urban functions, and ameliorate insanitary conditions.[397] A land readjustment method was used to combine numerous small-scale lots into three large-scale ones. Chinese-owned lots totaling 12,900 m^2 were purchased by large landowners and about fifty low-rise Chinese restaurants, stores, and houses were demolished to make room for high-rise buildings.[398] While the government originally promised the Chinese landowners new buildings so that they could continue their businesses, the promise was never fullfilled.[399]

In September 1976, a 22-story high-end hotel was built on the previous site of Seoul's Chinatown. The nation's largest hotel when constructed, the Seoul Plaza Hotel promoted the use of "made-in-Korea" (*kuksan*) elevators, steel frames, aluminum sashes, and the like.[400] Its significance exceeded a single building, because the edifice, marking itself as the symbol of the nation's modernization, heralded an era in which large-scale urban

[397] "Mugyo, Sogong-dong chaekaepal hwakchong," *Dong-A Ilbo*, November 24, 1970.
[398] "Seoul Sae Sallim: Doshimchi Chongbi," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, January 29, 1971.
[399] The Chinese were relocated to a temporary structure in the adjacent area afterwards, but they were eventually dispersed. "Shi saop hyopcho hannunde," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 9, 1975.
[400] "Kuksan Sungkangki Bokup kupchung," *Maeil Kyungje*, June 5, 1975; "Kochung konmulyong cholkuchomul kuksan taeche," *Maeil Kyungje*, June 17, 1975; "Aluminum karashashi saengsan opkye hwalki," *Maeil Kyungje*, July 19, 1975.

redevelopments would dramatically change Seoul's skylines.[401] And with this, the capital city's Chinatown, with its century-old history, disappeared.

Shophouses: A Vanished Architectural Type

> Those Western-style houses were strange, their steeply slanting roofs and pinched ridgelines looking out of place with their bulk. Perched on a hill that stood alone like a distant island amid the swarm of people on their way to the wharf, they radiated an air of cool contempt. Facing out to the sea, their orifices closed tight like shells, they seemed somehow heroic even in the shabbiness. How old were they? What history did they contain?[402]

What Oh Jung-hee describes as "strange" and "shabby" houses were actually a building type known as Chinese shophouses. The relocation of the two Chinese cemeteries and the clearance of Seoul's Chinatown were reflective of how the legal reforms as well as the culture of urban renewal in the 1960s afflicted Chinese residents in Korea. Unlike its counterpart in the capital city, Incheon's Chinese neighborhood was not completely bulldozed out. After all, Incheon was not Seoul, the cultural, economic, and political heart of the nation. Once a prosperous port, Incheon had even suffered from closed trade routes to mainland China since the establishment of the PRC. In contrast to Seoul, the location of Incheon's Chinatown was not attractive enough to merit clearance.

But the impact of the clearance came in a different form. The clearance of Chinatown did not just entail demolition of buildings, but the systemic exclusion of the Chinese from the Korean nation. Although the neighborhood at large remained intact, Chinese shophouses, which had once been the symbol of transnational architectural flow, came to disappear one by one as the neighborhood became gradually depopulated by out-migration. Incheon Chinese had engaged primarily in agriculture as of the 1960s, but the legal abolishment of foreign landownership brought an end to the Chinese agricultural economy. After the 1961 enactment of the Alien Landownership and the 1968 revision with more restrictions on property rights, making it illegal to own land in Chinese names, many Chinese landowners sold their land and re-registered the property in the names of their Korean acquaintances, including their own wives and friends. This change often devolved into legal conflicts later on between Korean name holders and Chinese landowners. But Chinese residents' illiteracy in Korean language and laws made it impossible to effectively resist their progressive disenfranchisement.[403]

According to an aerial photograph taken in 1947, a large number of shophouse-type buildings are found in Incheon's Chinese neighborhood (Figure 3-7). These structures even survived the Korean War. But the number of shophouses began to dwindle by the seventies as the Chinese families left the neighborhood. The disappearance of shophouses

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[401] The mid-1970s witnessed a slew of large-scale construction of high-rise buildings in downtown Seoul, including the Hotel Plaza (1976), the Hotel Lotte (1973), and the Daewoo Building (1977).
[402] Oh, *Chinatown*, 17. She spent her childhood living close to Incheon's Chinatown.
[403] Hsu, Interview with the author, November 5, 2014.

Figure 3-9. This picture of Incheon's Chinese neighborhood, taken by an American GI in the late 1960s, shows shophouses that had been converted into cheap inns. (Photo courtesy of Neil Mishalov)

Figure 3-7. Aerial photographs of Incheon's Chinese neighborhood in 1947 (left, above), 1967 (right, above), 1986 (left, below) and 2008 show the disappearance of shophouse-type buildings. (right, below).

Figure 3-8. This picture, taken in Incheon's Chinese neighborhood in the 1970s, shows shophouses on the right side. The one next to the building of the association was demolished in the 1980s. (Photo courtesy of the Overseas Chinese Association of Incheon)

Figure 3-9. A police file of the Overseas Chinese Association of Incheon in the 1970s. Police surveillance had continued within Incheon's Chinese neighborhood. (Image Source: The National Archives of Korea)

was the ramification of symbolic violence exerted upon the Chinese during the Cold War decades, which displaced them from what was construed as the "national" space. It was the product of state violence exerted upon Chinese residents, a form of violence legitimated in the name of the nation. Even those buildings left in the neighborhood were, as Oh Jung-hee portrays aptly in her novel, "closed tight like shells." This left the outsider to resort to the "appearance," or *façade* in architectural jargon, of the shophouse building. The inside of the shopshouses, and lives of Chinese residents by extension, had long remained obscure.

Deprived of opportunities for upward mobility, Chinese residents began to re-migrate to other countries such as Taiwan, Japan, and the United States starting in the late 1970s. Wang, a third-generation Chinese immigrant born in Incheon in the mid-1950s, remembered how their family had to give up on farming and start a small-scale restaurant business after the landownership act.[404] As Wang recollected, the Chinese had no "future" back then and almost every high school graduate opted to pursue a career in Taiwan, not only because Korean universities were hard for them to get in to, but because there were few job opportunities available to them in Korea after their graduation. If not given a chance to pursue higher education, they instead engaged in small-scale trades importing goods from Taiwan to South Korea, or moved to Japan to work in Chinese restaurants. This re-migration was by no means unrestrained, but took striated routes during the Cold War decades. The major destinations were Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. Migrants chose these countries not because economic conditions elsewhere were necessarily better than those in South Korea, but because these countries were South Korea's Cold War allies, which made the travels back and forth available.

Japan became a destination of temporary employment for the Chinese. Lin went to Japan in the early 1970s, invited by his father, who had already moved to Japan two years before. After his failed attempt to enter into Japanese college, he went to Osaka on a three-month tourist visa and worked at restaurants or pachinko shops. Every three months when his visa expired, he moved to Taiwan, spent some weeks with his relatives, and then re-entered Japan. His inability to speak Japanese did not bother him much. He was able to communicate in Chinese characters with Japanese people wherever he went. Quite a few Incheon Chinese had experience of working in Japan's Chinese restaurants. One Chinese resident in his early thirties said that almost every one of his father's generation had gone to Japan to work. The relatively high pay scale in Japan made it a preferable destination. As of the early 1980s, a cook in a Chinese restaurant in Japan was paid three times higher than in Taiwan.[405]

As in the case of Chen, whose story was related in the introduction to this chapter, the United States was also among the destinations for Chinese re-migration. The 1965 Immigration Act was one of the pull factors. Many Chinese migrants to the United States did not end up in existing Chinese communities in the US because of differences in native places and languages. According to a survey taken in 1983, more than ninety percent (94.6%) of Chinese residents in South Korea came from Shandong province in

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[404] All the names used here are pseudonyms.
[405] Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 264.

Figure 3-10. ***Han'guo jie*** **(Koreatown) in New Taipei is in fact a district occupied by ethnic Chinese residents and merchants. (Photo by Sujin Eom, 2015)**

northern China.[406] Their dialect and culture was different than those from southern China, who comprised the majority of Chinese immigrants in the United States, making it difficult for the newcomers to integrate into US Chinatowns. Instead, the Chinese immigrants from South Korea tended to gather near neighborhoods of Korean immigrants in Los Angeles or Atlanta, maintaining cultural and economic ties to Koreans and opening Chinese restaurants with Korean characteristics.[407]

The major destination for Chinese re-migration was Taiwan. Taiwanese governmental policies supporting overseas Chinese in their education played an important role. Overseas Chinese schools in Korea follow a Taiwanese curriculum, using textbooks donated by the Taiwanese government and teaching the history of Taiwan to students as their "national" history. This educa tional background made it much easier for Chinese students to enter Taiwanese colleges rather than Korean ones, which are already highly competitive even for Korean students. Thus, education plays a pivotal role in increasing the probability that Chinese students sojourn in Taiwan for higher education and employment, which are mostly attained through social networks established while studying in college.

Aside from educational purposes, Taiwan was the major destination for the Chinese migrants. As of the 1970s, Taiwan's economic development was more advanced than that of South Korea, and it was easy for Chinese migrants to move there as overseas Chinese. As a consequence of this out-migration, the Chinese population in South Korea decreased from 31,918 in 1970 to 27,662 in 1984.[408] Quite a few Incheon Chinese moved to Taiwan, opened their businesses, or settled down permanently, getting married to Taiwanese. They engaged in small-scale trade, importing goods from Taiwan and selling them in Korea's black market or vice versa. Korean imports ranged from blankets and clothes to ginseng and amethyst, whereas Taiwanese imports were traditional medicine and Japanese electronic devices such as Nintendo, whose import was prohibited in South

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[406] A survey was conducted by the ROC consulate in South Korea. Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 200.
[407] Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 285-286.
[408] Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 210.

Korea until the 1990s.[409] As mentioned in the introduction, this particular population of Chinese formed a Koreatown in Yonghe District in New Taipei City.[410] Their transnational positioning corresponds well with what James Clifford describes as "transregional identities," which have enabled this group of migrants to avoid "an increasingly risky future in a single nation."[411]

Those who were left behind continued their lives in Chinatown or somewhere else, isolated from the rest of Korean society. Lin, for example, born and raised in Incheon's Chinatown, could not speak Korean until her twenties because she did not have to. "It was like an island," confirmed one of my interviewees, reflecting upon her childhood living near Incheon's Chinese neighborhood. This social isolation of the Chinese community can be glimpsed in a survey taken in the early 1980s: over the half of people (59%) surveyed reported that they interacted with Chinese only in their daily life.[412] Subjected to the onslaught of the postcolonial state's nation-building project, Incheon's Chinatown had gradually faded away from the public memory.

The postcolonial condition of the Korean state along with the Cold War division even rendered it almost impossible to live freely as Chinese. Police surveillance continued within the neighborhood. "Do not stand out" was an unspoken rule, a mantra for the Chinese. Kids learned from the early age that they ought not to chatter in Chinese language while on bus or in public space. Directly or indirectly, they might have heard from their families or village elders about numerous incidents in which "Chineseness"—from their mother tongue to "dubious" loyalty to the economic regime of the postcolonial state—would become the target of attacks and land seizures.

Conclusion

The new capitalist order in the post-WWII years compelled South Korea to make semi-voluntary alliances with the material forces of US empire. The political economy of postcolonial South Korean state was entangled with Cold War geopolitics, which dynamically reconfigured the region, with US policy moves effecting the elimination of Japanese imperialism and its attendant modes of production, even while giving Japan a leading role in the fortification of an anticommunist stronghold in Asia. This paradoxical shift reached a climax when, according to Washington's political scheme, the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty was signed in 1965, a treaty which created new economic connections with the former colonial power under the US-led global order. Despite its apparent attempts to disengage itself from the colonial legacy, South Korea's postcolonial government was entrapped in this broader geopolitical economy.

What I termed the transpacific community of planning culture captures this particular historical time in which a nation's "urban" issues moved beyond the boundary of a single

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[409] Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 239-240; Interview with Zhou.
[410] Yonghe District was originally established as a city in 1979, but later integrated as a district into New Taipei City in 2010. By the time Chinese immigrants moved to the region, the area was newly developed where land was relatively cheaper. Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 27-28.
[411] Clifford, *Routes*, 256.
[412] Pak, *Han'guk hwagyo*, 201-202.

nation-state and came to assume a transnational character. The Asia Foundation's institutional efforts to urbanize South Korea along capitalist lines reflect this cross-boundary characteristic of city planning during the Cold War years. It was not merely "transatlantic" cities that shared a vision of the urban future.[413] As this chapter and the preceding chapter have shown, "transpacific" city mayors also aggressively embraced the capitalist vision of the modern city and formed the community of planning culture by sharing the means and ends alike to impose a new urban order to remake cities.

Urban renewal's symbolic language of creative destruction dovetailed well with South Korea's postcolonial developmentalism and nation-building projects. It dramatically changed the urban landscapes of Korean cities and provided the material base for economic growth. More important than urban renewal as a program and a policy during Mayor Kim's tenure is that it incubated the culture of creative destruction that came to dominate South Korea's city planning in years that followed.

The dismantling of Chinatowns in tandem with the outmigration of Chinese residents from the Korean peninsula was a function of this postcolonial state's nation-building projects with the transpacific community of planning culture during the Cold War years. Probably there was no one in the 1970s who could imagine that the idea of Chinatown would emerge to bring a new landscape to Korean cities decades later. Hardly anyone could think that the bleak and desolate neighborhood left in the wake of the urban renewal boom would be re-evaluated as Korea's architectural heritage. The next chapter will recount how these once-unthinkable ideas came to pass starting in the 1990s.

After mainland China opened its doors to neighboring countries in the 1980s, it was not only city mayors who played a role in urban change: Chinese residents themselves came to embrace the idea of Chinatown as a way to claim their transnational yet place-based identities. Considering the Chinese residents' sense of identity with regard to the built environment, the next chapter shows how the new language of heritage became entangled with the legacy of the Cold War.

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[413] Klemek, *The Transatlantic Collapse*.

Chapter 4. The Migrant Mode of Dwelling

In December 2014, local newspapers in the Japanese city of Yokohama and the Korean city of Incheon ran two different stories respectively: In Yokohama, the newspaper article introduced a story on a book about *kanteibyo*, a temple in Yokohama's Chinatown dedicated to a Chinese legendary general named Guan Yu. In Incheon, the newspaper article denounced the city government's plan to build a Chinese history museum without soliciting the involvement of Chinese residents. One article reflected a celebration of the Chinese community, whereas the other article, bemoaning the absence of Chinese participation in the construction of their own history museum, drew attention to how that community lacked respect and legitimation.[414] This adventitious coincidence of journalistic renditions, as it turns out, captured the conflicting and contrasting landscapes of two Chinatowns with shifting identities in a changing Asia.

A month before the two newspaper articles were published, I was conducting fieldwork in Incheon. A Chinese resident in Yokohama sent me an invitation to the aforementioned book party, so I flew to Yokohama without hesitation because I was well aware of how significant the event was to the Yokohama Chinese community there. The party was held at a famous restaurant in Yokohama's Chinatown. Many familiar faces that I had known during my fieldwork were there to celebrate the 150th year of *Kanteibyo* as well as the publication of the book. Then, a few days after I had flown back to Incheon, I sat together with the chairperson of a Chinese local association. It was not a formal interview, but I was asking him a couple of questions about an old shophouse in Incheon's Chinatown where his family had once lived—a shophouse which by that time had been razed. We looked at reddish-brown pictures and maps and tried to figure out how those images corresponded with his memories.

As the conversation came to an end, Zhu, a physically fit man in his early forties, pressed me, as if he had been waiting for the moment.[415] "Because of my position being the chairman (of the association), people now ask me to voice our opinions about the Chinatown and the history museum. But you tell me, as you have been to many Chinatowns in Japan and elsewhere, what it means to make our voice heard and how to do it." He was pointing to the recent polemic surrounding the lack of Chinese involvement in the planning process of the history museum. He continued to ask how Koreans would normally react in such a circumstance, and how people in other Chinatowns would respond in similar situations. I tried to answer to the best of my knowledge. After the meeting, however, this question stuck in my head, a question from someone in a community whose voice had never been made heard beyond its confines. It was also, after all, a question that made me contemplate what it means to be an ethnographer, seeking to maintain impartiality but also seeking in-depth knowledge that makes it impossible to remain aloof.

In this chapter, I reflect upon the conflicting and contrasting landscapes of these two Chinatowns since the 1980s, when China began to open its doors to neighboring

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[414] *Kanagawa Shimbun*, December 25, 2014; *Kyong-in Ilbo*, December 18, 2014.
[415] All the names used here are pseudonyms.

countries. The preceding two chapters discuss how Chinatowns became tangled up with nation-building projects in the two postcolonial states during the Cold War. I will turn in this chapter toward those excluded in this imagination of national citizenry and show how the two different diasporic communities have embraced the built environment as a means to claim their transnational yet place-based belonging after long years of exclusion from the two national polities.

The Chinese communities in Incheon and Yokohama are well aware of each other's presences. They visit each other to learn from precedents and to build ethnic networks which may transform into economic and business ties in the future. Yu, a former head of the Chinese Association of Incheon, remembers when a Yokohama-born professor of Chinese descent visited Incheon's Chinatown with her Japanese husband and son. It was a pleasant encounter for him: they sat together and drew contrasts and connections between Chinatowns of their own and elsewhere in order to find meaning.

It is not only between Yokohama and Incheon that these illuminating comparisons are made. Chinatowns elsewhere, especially in North America, are a popular point of reference for members of the diaspora to reflect on the character of their own Chinatowns. Yamashita, one of the community leaders in Yokohama's Chinatown, told me in a rather proud tone that their Chinatown differed from US Chinatowns. He diagnosed that while North American Chinatowns are something that Chinese immigrants want to leave, Yokohama's Chinatown, quite the opposite, is where Chinese immigrants are eager to settle as it is the very symbol of the "Japanese dream."

This chapter is an ethnography of the two Chinatowns. I first visited the sites in 2008 to undertake preliminary research, which enabled me to establish networks with people in both locales. I returned to the sites in August 2013 and stayed through January 2015. Some of the residents still remembered me and helped to reconnect the researcher to the communities. Over the past five years, the Chinatowns had undergone significant transformation. A number of businesses had been closed with the new influx of capital and people from mainland China. I witnessed the rapidly changing landscape of the Chinatowns. When I made my very first visit to Yokohama in 2008, there were a number of "Western" bars, which had sprung up in the 1970s to cater to American seamen and soldiers. The bar owners were diverse in ethnic background, ranging from American to Greek. A Japanese woman in her eighties named Keiko was among the bar owners I had interviewed. In 2008, her bar was on the verge of being closed because the new landlord from mainland China was planning to convert the whole building into a Chinese restaurant. When I visited Yokohama again in 2014 for my extended fieldwork, the bar had already gone.[416] Incheon's Chinatown was no different. When I first visited in 2006, a handful of new Chinese restaurants had begun to fill the neighborhood, but there was still plenty of rubble and ivy creeping up the walls of empty buildings. Eight years later, in 2014, a large number of tourists visited the Chinatown, even on weekdays. A slew of placards found here and there were written in simplified Chinese, which indicated the increasing number of tourists from mainland China.

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[416] New Chinese migrants called "*shinkakyo*" reflect the new influx of capital from mainland China. Ma came to Japan from Shanghai in the late 1990s and now owns multiple restaurants in Chinatown.

Behind the changing landscapes of the two Chinatowns lay the growing influence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) upon the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. After long decades of closing-off borders, the movement of people, capital, and ideas between once-estranged countries increased in an unprecedented way. Scholars have noted the historical significance of this period in East Asia, whose epochal transition upon the dissolution of the Cold War brought about a significant political, economic, and cultural impact on the region.[417] Economic routes were reopened, diplomatic relations were normalized, and "East Asia" was rediscovered as an object of intellectual and cultural production. It was in cities, and port cities in particular, that this festivity was most strongly felt. Renewed trade with one of the leading global economic partners was seen as a sign of new capital that would come into the cities.

My focus in this chapter is placed on how the diasporic Chinese in Japan and South Korea came to terms with a changing idea of Chinatown in the midst of different contours of rupture and disjuncture during the Cold War. In so doing, this chapter traces the cultural repercussions of the built environment after once-disconnected economies were reconnected. When assessing these impacts, I draw upon Ann Stoler's thinking about *ruins*.[418] Ruins, according to Stoler, do not simply refer to monumental relics or buildings that have fallen into decay. Rather, I highlight her use of "ruination," by which she focuses on "what people are 'left with,'" that is, "the material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things."[419] While her primary analytical emphasis is geared toward ruination effected by "empire," I shed light on the equally if not more protracted violent process and indelible traces of the Cold War, the memory of which still inflicts pain on people in East Asia, especially migrants, stateless, and diaspora. After long years of exclusion from the national polity as well as forced isolation from their homeland, what is it that people are "left with" in their ruined landscapes?

In order to examine the place-making practices of the diasporic Chinese, I thereby consider the role of confusion and ambiguity felt by people in the post-Cold War years. It is not my intention to deal with these feelings as negative forces, but instead I treat them as urban sentiments with a productive capacity that propel people to make urban change.

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[417] For instance, Giovanni Arrighi, "The Rise of East Asia: World Systemic and Regional Aspects," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 16 (7/8): 1996, 6-44; Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Ge Sun, "Reconceptualizing 'East Asia' in the Post-Cold War Era," in *The Trans-Pacific Imagination: Rethinking Boundary, Culture and Society*, edited by Naoki Sakai and Hyon Joo Yoo (Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific Pub. Co., 2012), 253-277; Young-seo Baik, "An Interconnected East Asia and the Korean Peninsula as a Problematic: 20 Years of Discourse and Solidarity Movements," *Concepts and Contexts in East Asia* 2 (2013): 133-166; Lisa Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

[418] Walter Benjamin's rumination on "ruin" has long been a famous metaphor for the futility of human civilization as well as the fragility and destructiveness of capitalist culture. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). Through the materiality of the past—patina, dirt, debris, rust, lichen—embedded in ruins, the history of the present can be "read backwards." C. Greig Crysler, "Introduction: Time's Arrows: Spaces of the Past," in *The SAGE Handbook of Architectural Theory*, edited by C Greig Crysler, Stephen Cairns and Hilde Heynen (London: Sage, 2012), 302. But I pay more attention to Stoler's analytical focus on ruination.

[419] Ann Laura Stoler, "Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination," *Cultural Anthropology* 23 (2): 2008, 194.

As I will show in this chapter, however, the contrasting ways in which the two Chinese communities came to terms with their built environments reveal quite different traces of the Cold War ruins.

Yokohama: After the Bamboo Curtain Was Lifted

After US President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972, Japan finally normalized diplomatic relations with the PRC in September 1972. "I never thought I would be able to live until the day our country established diplomatic relations with Japan," said one resident in Yokohama's Chinatown the next day, when the joint statement was signed.[420] There followed the so-called "Panda boom" (*pandabūmu*) in Japan, after the PRC government sent two pandas—named *Kang-Kang* and *Lang-Lang* respectively—to Tokyo's Ueno Park as a gift to celebrate the historical event. After Ueno Park put the pandas on display for the public, the number of visitors drastically increased to the point of causing "panic" among the park employees, amounting to more than 200,000 visitors per day.[421] This panda boom spurred a great deal of interest in Chinese culture, which included food, martial arts, and Chinese neighborhoods in Japan.

The "panda boom," a sign of the increasing interest in China, was an indication of a new era of Japan-PRC relations toward the end of the Cold War. However, this did not necessarily mean the dissolution of the longstanding Cold War legacy among Chinese residents in Yokohama. In reality, the diplomatic recognition of the PRC government denoted that it would be the *only* legitimate Chinese government on the stage of international politics. It translated as the diplomatic abandonment of another Chinese government, the Republic of China (ROC). The historical transition in the political economy of the region relegated Yokohama Chinese to a legally precarious status, pushing them to choose which country should remain the homeland. After August 1972, the majority of pro-ROC Chinese residents became naturalized Japanese, because they were reluctant to be associated with the Communist government. Meanwhile, this polemical homeland politics made some residents in effect "stateless." Among Chinese residents fleeing the Communist Party, there were not a few people who had long been deeply involved in the Kuomindang (the Chinese Nationalist Party). For ideological reasons, they refused to naturalize either into the PRC (obviously "communist") or Japan (they even denounced Japan as "communist" after its normalization with the PRC).

Even when they had no history of political involvement in the Kuomindang, some people became stateless because, from their past experience of communism, they could not trust the PRC as a protector of their rights. It appeared to them that the international organizations, such as the UN and the Red Cross, were far more reliable institutions than the communist PRC; they supposed that being stateless under the protection of the international human rights agreement would be "safer" than being the PRC nationals. Based on statistical data given by the Ministry of Justice of Japan, Chen Tien-shi, a Yokohama-born Chinese whose parents came from Hunan and Manchuria and who had

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[420] "China-Japan Trade Office Remains Calm," *The Japan Times*, September 30, 1972.
[421] "Pandabūmu, 1-nichi ni 20 man-ri ijō ga oshiyosete panikku" (Panda boom, more than 200,000 visitors per day caused panic), *Shūkan Josei Prime*, January 20, 2015. Accessed September 16, 2016. http://www.jprime.jp/articles/-/5780.

Figure 4-10. Scenes captured from the film "Yokohama BJ Blues" (1981). Behind two men running is the gate to Chinatown.

long been stateless herself, estimates that there were only 930 persons whose legal status was stateless in 1971: however, the number dramatically increased to 9,200 in 1974 after the 1972 diplomatic normalization.[422]

Despite the euphemistic language of "panda boom," Chinatown continued to remain a site of conflict. Police surveillance implicitly continued and children were oftentimes involved in fights with Japanese kids on their way home to Chinatown. The Chinese communities themselves were divided into two ideological factions between pro-China and pro-Taiwan. More frequently than with Japanese kids, they picked fights within Chinatown whenever they ran into each other in the streets. This political strife made a tremendous impact on the community during the Cold War decades.

Chinatown had appeared to the Japanese as a mysterious and dangerous space that did not belong to Japanese society. Chinatown was often used as backdrops of Japanese gangster movies, for example, where its dark nightscape exuded a film noir feel (Figure 4-1). This was itself a replication of Hollywood traditions of rendering Chinatown as a space of difference that is unfathomable. The large presence of American bars in Chinatown, which had expanded by the time of the Vietnam War, even accentuated the seedy and dark image of the neighborhood. A resident described the Chinatown of the time as "a dirty and dangerous place like Chinatowns in the USA."[423] As such, to many Japan-born generations, Chinatown was far from a place that they regarded as part of their heritage. It was a place from which they had always wanted to run away.[424] Japanese was their first language, and it was Japanese society they aspired to enter as smoothly as possible. Chinatown only appeared to them as a physical barrier that might delay or hinder this process of assimilation.

One night alone could not change longstanding legacy, but it could and did become a trigger that put change into motion through a chain reaction of events. On the night of New Year's Day in 1986, the neighborhood woke up to abrupt news of a fire breaking

[422] Tien-shi Chen, "Minorities 'In-between' China and Japan: Complexity of Legal Status and Identity," *Bulletin of National Museum of Ethnology* 31 (3): 2007, 419-437. However, the number decreased steeply to 2,900 in 1977. Chen notes that this is either because they finally naturalized into Japanese or because they migrated to other countries that were more sympathetic to the stateless, such as the US and Canada.
[423] Interview with the author, Yokohama, February 7, 2009.
[424] Interview with the author, Yokohama, June 9, 2014.

Figure 4-2. National division of labor. Construction was completed by mainland Chinese (left), whereas traditional motifs were provided by Taiwanese (right) (Source: Kanteibyō to Yokohama Kakyō Henshū Iinkai, 2014).

out in *Kanteibyo*, a Chinese temple located within the Chinatown.[425] Allegedly set around seven o'clock in the evening, the fire consumed over a half of the then one-hundred-year old temple, a one-story wooden structure. No injuries were reported, yet the cause of the fire remained unknown.[426] This accident marked itself a watershed for reconstruction of the Chinese community and Chinatown. For the first time, after long years of enmity between the political factions, leaders from the two sides sat down together to discuss how to rebuild the temple. In 1988, a committee for the reconstruction was organized by seven community leaders.[427] They advertised the reconstruction widely, reaching out to overseas Chinese communities. More than two thousand people donated money from Japan and abroad, which amounted to 0.6 billion yen.[428]

The new era required the new temple be relocated from its previous site. Under the management of the pro-ROC organization, the temple had long been located on the grounds of the pro-ROC school, unexposed to public sight. The new temple, in order to reflect the collaboration between the pro-Taiwan and pro-China organizations, had to move from its "hidden" location to a more public site that would face the street directly. This location change was in fact partly derived from a concern raised in a lawsuit that took place in 1983. A pro-PRC Chinese resident filed a suit against the pro-ROC association, in which he argued the temple should be under management of the whole community, not exclusively under pro-ROC guardianship.[429] This location change of the temple from the rear to the front of the lot reflected the new status of the temple as "community heritage" apart from ideological factions, signaling the broader change that would take place in the Chinatown.

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[425] "Kanteibyōo hanshō," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, January 3, 1986.
[426] "Kokoro no kokkyō dō kaishō," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, January 6, 1986.
[427] "Yokohama Seki teibyō, asu 14-nichi ni shinchiku rakusei," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, August 13, 1990.
[428] Kanteibyō to Yokohama Kakyō Henshū Iinkai, *Kanteibyō to Yokohama kakyō: Kansei teikun chinza 150-shūnen kinen* (Yokohama: Kabushiki Kaisha Jizai, 2014), 53. The list of donors included the famous Japanese baseball player Sadaharu Oh, who had long held a Taiwanese citizenship.
[429] Iinkai, *Kanteibyō*, 126.

Figure 4-3. Kanteibyo after completion (Image source: Kanteibyō to Yokohama Kakyō Henshū Iinkai, 2014

Central to this reconstruction of the temple was the role of an architect of Chinese descent named Suzuki, who had designed several of restaurants in Chinatown, as well as houses of business owners. Kimura, the then leader of pro-ROC group and a business connection, contacted him. Reflecting on this moment, Suzuki said that it was not an easy decision for him to accept the offer. He had never studied Chinese traditional architecture, and what he specialized was in Japanese modern housing. Perhaps more important, Suzuki had long shied away from the Chinese community, instead living as Japanese with a Japanese name in Japanese society. Solicited to play this role in the affirmation of Chinese culture and community, he was confused and even scared. The temple was qualitatively different from the restaurants and houses he had designed. After all, it was a community project funded through donations from overseas Chinese, from Japan and abroad, who prayed for the success of the architectural project. He had to answer their prayers. If he were to "screw up," he could never be able to get projects again in the Chinatown.[430] All eyes were on the temple.

After accepting the offer, or having to do so for "unexplainable reasons" as he put it, Suzuki started "a journey for tradition" to the "homeland" he had never visited. He asked the committee to give him one year to study temples. He visited cities both in China and Taiwan. He brought back dozens of books to Japan and began perusing images and text to learn about the design of traditional temples. Whenever he drew up design drafts, Suzuki presented them to the committee members. Everyone looked at the designs

[430] Interview with the author, Yokohama, June 9, 2014.

together even while almost no one was able to fully understand them. After all, they were neither architects nor historians but ordinary owners of small businesses. As of the 1980s, travel to mainland China was still rare. Most of them had never seen "traditional" architecture or even thought about what that might entail. Kimura, the chair of the construction committee, was the only one who could understand the designs:

> One day, he came over to me and said, "When I look at those images you've shown us these days, my heart *races*. I have a feeling that it will be an excellent temple." Upon hearing that, I tried even harder. The temple became my first work of art. My very first. [Interview with the author, Yokohama, June 9, 2014. My emphasis]

"My heart races." It was this statement that empowered the architect in the midst of confusion and ambiguity as to what traditional architecture should look like. Suzuki even thought he would not mind dying after he finished the temple. His rather exaggerated enthusiasm does convey the historic and symbolic significance that the temple held for the community. *Kanteibyo* was the only temple in Yokohama's Chinatown and there had been three reconstructions within the century. It was thus an opportunity of a lifetime to design this temple. He was given the opportunity and, with that, he didn't want to think what would come next after *Kanteibyo*. It was such an important project for him as an architect and for the Chinese community alike.

The architect was not alone in this new migrant route in search of tradition. Not only were architectural materials necessary to build the traditional temple imported from Taiwan and China, but also Taiwanese and Chinese craftsmen were invited to Japan so they could work on construction. Before his trips, Suzuki was introduced to a professor of a Taiwanese university, who accompanied Suzuki as a guide to temples in Taiwan. Suzuki continued this journey to visit the temples afterwards by himself. Whenever there were good temples, he tried to get in touch with carpenters and craftsmen in charge of their construction and maintenance. One day, in a Taiwanese city, Suzuki found out what he had long painted as an ideal type of temple. He asked around everywhere to find the carpenter, finally met him, and brought him to Japan to work with on the *Kanteibyo* project.

The committee chair wanted to build the temple with "Chinese hands." The main concrete frame was laid out by a Japanese construction firm, but the finishing was done with local materials from China or Taiwan and by Chinese or Taiwanese craftsmen. The labor was divided again along national lines. Suzuki reasoned that it was primarily owing to the "disconnect" that mainland China had experienced until the 1980s:

> When we built the temple, there were twenty-five people from China. They didn't know how to use Japanese tools. How could they use them? They just had no idea. The country was closed off for forty or fifty years. No information from without was available. It took a lot of time to educate them. The Taiwanese were different. They knew all. [Interview with the author, Yokohama, June 9, 2014]

Subsequently, the main hall and the gate, which required more elegant "traditional" design motifs, were done by the Taiwanese, whereas floors and banisters, which heavily relied on "construction," were by the mainland Chinese (Figure 4-2). Building materials were all brought in from China and Taiwan. "Without local materials," confirmed Suzuki, "it can't be considered original."

The temple was finally completed in June 1990, with the total construction costs amounting to 0.6 billion yen.[431] The Chinese community as a whole helped out with the construction in one way or another. For the carpenters and craftsmen from Taiwan and China, one Chinese resident eagerly provided accommodations at no cost.[432] When it was completed, its southern Chinese-style arched roofs received admiration (Figure 4-3). Its style was an architectural solution conceived by the architect. Within the confines of the lot, he had to find a way to express the sacred space of the Chinese traditional temple, which often possesses a corridor that separates the main hall from the entrance. The corridor should also serve as a spatial device that divides between worlds of humans from god. Given the limited land (962 square meters) within Chinatown, which was already subdivided into tiny lots, it was difficult to materialize these traditional architectural ideas. In order to solve the dilemma, Suzuki turned the horizontal layout of the traditional architectural temple into vertical form. The lot was unable to provide enough space for a corridor, so Suzuki instead raised the main hall from the ground about 1.5 meters high.[433]

Learning Chinatown: Tradition Revisited

The new temple turned out to be a success. Its flamboyant architectural design with colorful decorations, an influence of Southern Chinese style, attracted more visitors than ever, and soon became the symbol of Chinatown. The new location played another part in making the temple more visible to the public. The old temple used to serve as a religious site for the Chinese residents only, but this time the temple came to draw wider attention and appeal to the broader range of people. After the successful design of the temple, Suzuki was able to gain more recognition from the Chinatown community and was commissioned again to design four arches surrounding the neighborhood. This experience, the construction of the temple with community funds as well as design and construction conducted by people from the community, implanted in Yokohama Chinese a sense of confidence and pride, thereby paving a new way for the Chinatown. It was not the same Chinatown, as discussed in Chapter Two, refurbished by the Japanese city officials in the 1950s as reflected through the Western imagination. Now the Chinatown became something that made the people feel proud and keep telling the story of how it came to be built. It empowered them to narrate the past "collectively" on their own for the first time.

After the success of *Kanteibyo*, construction of another temple of symbolic importance to overseas Chinese, Mazu Temple, followed. The proposed site was originally slated for the construction of a mansion. In fear of losing the character of Chinatown with

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[431] "Chūkamachi-seki teibyō de senzashiki," *Kanagawa Shimbun*, August 11, 1990.
[432] Iinkai, *Kanteibyō*, 123-124.
[433] This architectural method was used in San Francisco's Chinatown when Chinese residents built shrines within the limited land and constructed vertically developed temples. Yip, "San Francisco's Chinatown."

construction of multi-family housing units, the construction committee collectively purchased the land and decided to build a Mazu temple there. Suzuki also participated in the design process. This time, he wanted more. Upon the construction, the Datianhou Temple, or Tainan Grant Matsu Temple, located in Taiwan, began to support cultural and ritual activities within Yokohama's Chinatown, whose denizens in turn learned how to put on the festival. It was in this context that the once stopped ritual of Guandi's birthday reappeared after long years. The construction of the two temples opened up new routes for origins. From the 1990s on, the Chinese began to visit various cities, ranging from Yuncheng, Luoyang, Xiamen, Quanzhou, Shanghai in China to Tainan in Taiwan, to take in the temples and witness related ceremonies.[434]

Positive change came in the form of renewed interest in cultural identity among Chinatown residents. As Chinatown came to invite more visitors and public attention from Japanese society, Chinese residents began to initiate cultural programs and research the history of Chinatown themselves (Figure 4-4). Kotobuki, a Yokohama-born businessman of Chinese descent, started organizing a lecture series. The Chinatown lecture series started in 2009 and every year more people have come to attend the lectures, including university students, people interested in Chinatown's history, and those who have business connections to Chinatown. Even a tourist rickshaw driver came by the lectures in order to provide a better guide on the history of tourist destinations to his customers.[435] When Kotobuki commenced the project in collaboration with a Japanese university professor, he was not very enthusiastic about the Chinatown itself. Born to Japanese mother and Chinese father, he was educated as Japanese with little ability to speak Chinese. By the time of diplomatic normalization in 1972, he acquired Japanese citizenship as he intended to live in Japan. He adopted his Japanese mother's last name in the process of naturalization. As he had little knowledge about Chinatown, he consulted with community insiders. His grandmother's reputation within the community helped.

Kotobuki explained that quite a few people involved in the Chinatown's cultural programs were actually "half Japanese." While Kotobuki belongs to this category of "half Japanese, half Chinese," Yamamoto, who teaches traditional Chinese lion dance in the Chinese school and organizes several performances in Chinatown, is a "quarter Japanese" because of his Japanese grandmother. When I was in Yokohama's Chinatown, he was to be found everywhere because of his active involvement in Chinatown's cultural programs.

The "half" or "quarter" generations, who have never been comfortable with their ethnic identities, make up the majority of those who participate in Chinatown's cultural programs. Born and educated in Japan, they speak Japanese more comfortably than Chinese. They share the experience of casting doubt on what a "nationality" means upon their naturalization into Japan after 1972. Most of their parents wanted them to have a Japanese passport because of its "convenience." After all, as in the case of Yamamoto's

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[434] Iinkai, *Kanteibyō*, 146.
[435] Interview with the author, Yokohama, June 24, 2014.

Figure 4-4. "In-town Campus" (*machinaka kyanpasu*) is a lecture series to promote the history and culture of Yokohama's Chinatown

father, they did not want to risk another possibility of China-Japan relations worsening again, which may inflict pain on their children, who would have to live in Japan.

Yamamoto said, "Chinatown is where I was born, where I work, and where the core of my identity is." And as if to confirm his own statement, Yamamoto told me that he came to Chinatown almost every single day. This strong statement, however, is actually an outcome of years of agony that he endured by asking himself "what kind of person he was."[436] It took him a long time to finally process what a Chinatown would mean to him as a person who straddles two countries. If his roots are in China but Japan is his home, he said, Chinatown is a bridge between the two. The metaphor of "bridge," an oft-used rhetorical trope for government-led Chinatown development projects to conjure up images of connected economies, takes on a different meaning among the diasporic Chinese community. The politics of dwelling in multiple places, or dwelling somewhere in-between as reflected in his choice of word "bridge," speaks to the diaporic mode of place-making.

Even in the Chinese community, this renewed interest in Chinatown is partly a product of a specific historical conjuncture when new connections were made available after the 1980s. "It is only in recent years," Kotobuki says, "when people in Chinatown came to talk about tradition." Until the 1980s, when China began to open its doors to the world, there had been no conscious effort to encourage tradition or Chinatown itself. This was particularly the case for the pro-China group, who had experienced, though from afar, the Cultural Revolution, which denounced "tradition" as the embodiment of backwardness. Chinatown did exist as a tourist spot for Western visitors in the 1970s, but it was far from a place that most of Chinese residents could identify with.

[436] Interview with the author, Yokohama, January 22, 2014.

It was not coincidental that the rediscovery of “tradition” in the built environment of Chinatown intersected with the specific moment when the routes to China, which had long been considered the “fons et origo” of Chinese culture, were reopened. With increased opportunity to visit the mainland, they came to commune with images of their home villages, which they took pictures of, importing building materials to Japan to replicate some of what they’d seen in Chinatown.[437] In other words, they began to learn to “Chinatown”:

> Traditional culture, much of which has long gone extinct in mainland China, remains here in Japan or in Taiwan. Some of traditions were imported back to the mainland, because they no longer have. Lion dance is a good example. In China, Mao oppressed traditional cultural activities such as lion dance or dragon dances. They don’t know the history and meaning of traditional dances now. However, such traditional cultures are preserved by “people outside,” such as in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Without Chinatowns overseas, folklore rituals or ceremonies would already have been extinguished. Without Hong Kong, Taiwan or Singapore, we would not be able to see lion and dragon dances in their current form. [Interview with the author, Yokohama, January 22, 2014]

Yamamoto’s statement was particularly geared toward the form of lion and dragon dances, but it applies more generally to the animating force of Chinatown. Their “Chinatown” is far from a replicated built form that showcases China in miniature, but a guardian of tradition that “has long gone extinct in mainland China.” That people outside the purview of nation-states such as overseas Chinese have preserved traditions makes a strong claim for their cross-boundary identity. Through this claim for tradition, overseas Chinese, who have long been accused as “traitors” or “residual Chinese” by native societies, are able to position themselves in the narrative of China’s modernity. If their economic performance in global capitalism is the primary rhetoric used by the Chinese government to embrace them,[438] this claim to ownership of tradition reflects the way in which the overseas Chinese seek to negotiate their identity and “articulate with global flows.”[439] To be noted is that it was in the aftermath of the confusion and ambiguity caused by the disconnect from mainland China during the Cold War years that the diasporic Chinese came to redefine Chinatown as a spatial manifestation of tradition.

Incheon: The Era of the West Coast

These feelings of confusion and ambiguity that Yokohama Chinese had to face in the post-Cold War found expression in more complicated forms in the Korean city of

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[437] Interview with the author, Yokohama, June 9, 2014.
[438] Aihwa Ong and Donald Macon Nonini, “Introduction: Chinese Transnationalism as an Alternative modernity,” in *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, edited by Aihwa Ong and Donald Macon Nonini (New York: Routledge, 1997), 3-33.
[439] Gavin Shatkin, “Global Cities of the South: Emerging Perspectives on Growth and Inequality,” *Cities* 24 (1): 2007, 4.

Incheon, where the Cold War was a more protracted and violent process. The immediate post-WWII years was a heyday for Incheon Chinatown, a time when the Chinatown economy thrived upon its trade routes, primarily to Macau.[440] As political circumstances dramatically reshaped East Asian geographies by strengthening national boundaries, Chinatown finally brought a halt to the growth. Along with the Cold War division, the postwar nationalism of South Korea rendered Chinese residents "foreigners," whose political as well as economic loyalty to the regime came to be put into question. Under the anticommunist regime of President Park Chung-hee, furthermore, the Alien Landownership Act of 1961, which was designed to prohibit foreigners' land acquisition, was enacted in order to intentionally limit Chinese economic opportunities and activities in South Korea.[441]

Cold War politics had long hindered the movement of people and ideas between mainland China and its neighboring countries. It had remained impossible for Chinese residents in South Korea to visit their home villages in the mainland and even send letters to their families and relatives. Lin's father, who moved to Incheon from Shandong province before the Korean War broke out, became unable to return to China afterwards. Whenever the father missed his parents and home village, he relied on the help of alcohol. It was just before they were allowed to visit China via Hong Kong in the early 1980s when he passed away:

> He drank whenever he missed his parents in China. The pain… how should I say it, how can I describe it… He missed home so badly. If he were here now, he would be able to go there whenever he wants. But back in the day, it was even impossible to have a correspondence with people in China. As the door opened little by little, exchange of letters became available, to some extent, via Hong Kong. The letters, I wrote most of them. No sooner than we were able to go to the home village (in Shandong) through Hong Kong, he passed away. I know, that's how the story went. He might be able to go home now in the otherworld. [Interview with the author, Incheon, November 24, 2014]

Incheon's Chinatown gradually fell into decay. As I discuss in Chapter Three, many of the Chinese moved out and on to other countries such as Taiwan, Japan, and North America starting in the 1970s. For those left behind, the bleak landscape of the Chinatown was a blunt reminder of Cold War ruins and ruination—immobility, isolation, and exclusion. The old shophouses disappeared one by one and rubble and ivy replaced those which were left. As one resident recounted, only those who had a means of moving out left. In 1984, one of the largest restaurants in Incheon's Chinatown, *Gonghwachun*, was finally shut down after long years of financial deadlock. Many of the restaurant owner's descendants had already migrated to Taiwan for a new life by the time it was closed. People of power, wealth and intellect emigrated, leaving only people with no

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[440] "Arrested a Chinese smuggler," *Dong-a Ilbo*, March 30, 1949; "Arrested a Chinese merchant smuggling in the amount of 150 million won," *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, October, 26, 1949.
[441] Interview with the author, Incheon, November 6, 2014.

means of upward mobility remained.[442] While the causes and motivations of the re-migration varied, the residents who remained were overtaken with the feeling of "being left behind."

Starting in the late 1980s, the economic development of post-reform China has made a huge impact on its neighboring countries, reshaping their political and economic landscapes in an unprecedented way. Concomitant social changes were particularly significant in South Korea, not only because of its geographical proximity to China but also because of its political economic regime, which had long severed connections between the nations under Cold War politics. Even before August 1992, when diplomatic relations were finally normalized, the city of Incheon was bubbling with expectations that the port city would reemerge as a trade center reconnecting to the previously cut-off Chinese market. The late 1980s catchphrase *Sŏhae'an Sidae*, or the Era of the West Coast, was very indicative of the growing aspirations for renewed trade with the once-estranged neighbor across South Korea's West Ocean.[443] The negotiation of new sea routes linking Incheon to Shanghai added to the festive mood of the new era. A thriving port that played a major role in trade with China before the Cold War, Incheon began to reconnect to the Chinese port cities of Shandong province, including Weihai and Qingdao, from which the majority of Chinese residents in South Korea came. This epochal change enabled new economic imaginations to emerge, not only among local governments, which would seek to capitalize on their Chinese neighborhoods, but also among the Chinese residents themselves. For those residing in Incheon, the re-opened border meant that they would be able to visit their home villages in mainland China after long years of separation between the states. They hoped that the resumed trade could eventually make it possible for people like themselves to move freely between the two countries.[444]

Lin was born in Incheon's Chinatown in 1961 and has lived there ever since. She could not speak much Korean until her graduation from high school, simply because she did not have to learn Korean as long as she lived in the Chinatown. Back in the 1970s, there were Chinese churches, a Chinese senior center, a Chinese school within the Chinatown, and one did not have to speak Korean. Lin's inability to speak Korean in her childhood, notwithstanding her upbringing in the Korean city of Incheon, suggests the extent of social distance that existed between Chinese residents and their Korean neighbors. After graduating from high school in 1980, she got employed at a travel agency that targeted tourists from Taiwan and Hong Kong. It was her first job. She sold Korean fabric goods such as bags and pants to the tourists. After quitting the job at the travel agency, Lin worked as a translator at a maritime transportation trade union, where she translated correspondence with a Taiwanese port city. It was not until after this experience of working for a Korean organization that she learned the Korean language and made Korean friends. It was her first official encounter with Korean society. The formal employment by the Korean firm also earned her a national medical insurance card for the first time in her life. As a foreign resident, she had been unable to use the medical care

[442] Interview with the author, Incheon, November 24, 2014.
[443] "Sŏhae'an sidae: Inchŏn 'haesang tosi' kŏnsŏl kkume sŏlrenta," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, July 5, 1988.
[444] "Chungguki molyŏ onda: sŏhae hanggu hwalki," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 24, 1988.

system of Korea until then, access to which she described as "unthinkable" for the most of the Chinese residents.

The shifting political economic relations in East Asia affected everyday lives. The day when the South Korean government announced its diplomatic normalization with the PRC, which caused its diplomatic relations with the ROC to terminate, Lin was near the Taiwanese Embassy in Seoul. When Korean reporters approached to ask her opinion about the news, Lin declined the interview request. But after a few seconds she changed her mind and made a comment, "We don't care which country the (Korean) government has diplomatic relations with. We are orphans. This whole thing has nothing to do with us."[445]

Lin's strong statement conveyed the feeling of confusion that swept upon the Chinese residents in South Korea in the 1990s. During the Cold War decades, they were educated in a pro-Taiwan school, in which the history of Taiwan was taught as the "national" history. Although it was Shandong in mainland China that her parents originally came from, Lin, along with other Chinese residents in South Korea, had to choose the Republic of China (Taiwan) as her homeland in the Cold War political climate. It is almost impossible to understand the modern history of South Korea without taking into account anticommunism (*pan'gong*) as a state ideology which has long infiltrated into everyday lives. What Hee-Yeon Cho has termed "the anticommunist regimented society" reflects the extent to which anticommunism has functioned as a fine-tuned, self-censoring mechanism to mobilize economic growth.[446] Chinese residents, above all those coming of age in the Cold War era, cannot be the exception to a populace set against communism. Educated in a pro-Taiwan school with textbooks provided by the Taiwanese government, they had internalized anticommunist sentiments. A thousand Chinese residents in Incheon even organized a rally in 1971 to denounce the decision to allow the People's Republic of China to join the United Nations. They issued a statement that the decision is "a self-destructive act upon 'free world.'"[447]

Regardless of confusion of cultural identity experienced by the Chinese residents, the rapprochement between the two antagonistic states triggered nationwide interests, economic and cultural, in China. As a response to the once-disconnected and now-reconnected market, development interest reached a feverish peak. Chinatowns in South Korea accordingly began to receive public attention: municipal governments turned toward their Chinese settlements to transform the built environment to accommodate tourists. Incheon spearheaded this municipal effort not only because the city still had a distinctive Chinese settlement, but also because it also faced the Shandong peninsula across the sea, which had emerged as a new economic powerhouse.[448] In 1992, the city

[445] Interview with the author, Incheon, November 24, 2014.
[446] Hee-Yeon Cho, "The Structure of the South Korean Developmental Regime and its Transformation: Statist Mobilization and Authoritarian Integration in the Anticommunist Regimentation," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 1 (3): 2000, 410.
[447] "Chunggong yuen kaip pandae chaeinchon hwagyo tul temo," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 21, 1971.
[448] Xiangming Chen, *As Borders Bend: Transnational Spaces on the Pacific Rim* (Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 128.



Figure 4-5. The design team derived "distinctive façade elements" (*oegwan t'ŭksŏnghwa yoso*) from the facade of a shophouse in the Chinatown to give a coherent "appearance" to what they termed a "China Mall" (Source: Jin 2006).

Figure 4-6. Shophouses in the early 1980s (Above) and after the design guidelines applied in 2008 (Below, left) and in 2014 (Below, right). Chinese shophouses, once the symbol of the transnational mobility of architecture, used to serve Chinese traders and merchants up to the early 1950s but had been converted into cheap lodging houses or laundromats by the early 1980s. They were refurbished in the 2000s. Photograph by Jang-won Sohn (above) and Sujin Eom (below).

government began to develop the area, a neighborhood with worn-out houses and few people on the streets, into a tourist destination by encouraging the development of Chinese-style restaurants, cultural centers, shops, and the like.[449] In 1997, the Chinese cities of Qingdao and Weihai joined hands with Incheon's city government to further develop the Chinatown plan by building cultural centers in Incheon named after each Chinese city.[450] In 2000, a Chinese arch donated by the city of Weihai was erected at the entrance to Chinatown, which became the first of its kind in Korea.[451]

What should a Chinatown look like? No one seemed to have clear answers. Study tours seemed to provide easy solutions as they might learn from precedents elsewhere. It was Yokohama's Chinatown that became a point of reference when the city officials formulated Chinatown images. They went on several study tours and researched physical elements of Yokohama's Chinatown, ranging from lampposts and signs to museums and building facades. Yokohama's Chinatown had already become a major tourist destination in Japan, promoting itself as the largest Chinatown in Asia. Yokohama being a historic port city also assured Incheon's city officials that its Chinatown could be adapted to the urban context of Incheon. What concerned them were not different historic experiences of the Chinese communities, but merely morphological conditions of the two port cities—Yokohama's Chinatown being located on a flatland versus Incheon's on a hillside—which they feared would hinder successful adaptation of physical elements.

In 2000, the city government held a design competition for the Chinatown and its vicinity where a large number of buildings from the early twentieth century had remained. Through the competition, the city wanted to come up with "models of modern architecture by national characteristics" in order to create a unique street atmosphere and "a street museum" that would exhibit different architectural styles.[452] The preservation value of a building was determined on the basis of whether 1) it was considered significant at the city and national level; 2) it related to major historic events of the city; and 3) it represented a distinctive architectural style. Buildings not in harmony with surrounding urban structures or "related to modern history of the city but week in characteristics" were seen as "insignificant." Buildings that appeared to be at odds with these preservation norms was regarded as "poor architecture" (*pullyang kŏnch'uk*) which should be improved with the application of proper design guidelines so the neighborhood as a whole could create a coherent, distinctive landscape.

After the design competition, a Korean architectural firm was selected to take up the mission of formulating design guidelines to refurbish the Chinatown, creating a commercial street named "China Mall." The selected design team derived what they termed "distinctive façade elements" (*oegwan t'ŭksŏnghwa yoso*) from the front sides of Chinese shophouses built in the early twentieth century, which included slanted pitched roofs, "*ch'ŏngp'ung*" (Qing-style) awnings, protruded pilasters, balconies with

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[449] "Hwalki toechat'nŭn Inchŏn Chinatown," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, October 17, 1992.
[450] "Inchŏn Chinatown ponkyŏk kaepal," *Hankyoreh*, September 27, 1997.
[451] "Puksŏngdong Chinatown 'panjjok taemun' wigi," *Incheon Ilbo*, November 1, 2000.
[452] Rin Jin, "Inchŏn kaehang'gi kŭndae kŏnchukmul pochŏn mit chubyŏn chiyŏk chŏngbi pang'an e kwanhan yŏn'gu (The Preservation of Historic Buildings and Economic Renewal in Jung-Gu, Incheon Metropolitan City)," *Kŏnchuk kwa sahoe* (2006), 184.

balustrades, arched shutters, and lattice windows (Figure 4-5). These elements were meant to be uniformly applied to facades of other buildings to form a coherent "Qing-style" atmosphere, the period in which the Chinese neighborhood was originally established.

What is to be preserved as heritage is fundamentally a question of how to remember and narrate the past. The making of heritage is not simply an act of imposing values on what is perceived as historical at risk of erasure, but, as Jane M. Jacobs has succinctly pointed out, a process whereby certain forms of artifacts and places are "incorporated into sanctioned views of the national heritage."[453] In the city government's plan to preserve historic buildings within the Chinatown, the migrant history of the diasporic Chinese, which has never comfortably fallen under the category of single nation-states, was given meanings *only when* it had to do with the modern history of the city of Incheon and the Korean state. What these design guidelines also reveal is that the transnational nature of buildings was reduced to stylistic dimensions that would express "national characteristics," but it is questionable as to which "national" characteristics count as such. In order to represent the "Qing-style" atmosphere, the city government even encouraged the use of "blue" pavement materials within the Chinatown, based on the Chinese character of "qing" used to refer to the Chinese dynasty (淸) and blue (靑) alike. What does the "Qing-style" atmosphere entail? Is it to Qing China that most Chinese residents today have emotional attachments? And why should it be Qing China that the contemporary Chinatown should resemble?

Aside from these questions that must not have been raised among the city officials or designers in the first place, one may laugh off this genre of historical approximation as an instantiation of blithe insensitivity to different cultures. Moreover, the refurbishing of the Chinatown did not proceed in a more methodical manner but instead by fits and starts. It was often swayed by the whim of city officials or poor communications with the Chinese cities. First erected in 2000 with a donation from the Chinese city of Weihai, the arch at the entrance to the Chinatown has undergone a process of construction and destruction three times. The design guidelines for facades of shophouses and street furniture have changed a number of times in a capricious manner, thereby creating visual inconsistencies in the neighborhood (Figure 4-6).

The long-forgotten architectural form of shophouses was perceived as heritage to be preserved, yet it was the appearance of buildings that seemed to matter. This can be understood as the city government's facile attempt to commercialize architectural heritage, the evidence of lack of sufficient academic research on its architectural history, the social distance between Chinese residents and the Korean government, or a combination of any of these. I would argue that the inconsistency is rather a reflection of the sheer level of confusion and ambiguity felt by all parties after the end of the Cold War, when the idea of Chinatown was mobilized under the influence of a sudden influx of information, ideas, capital, and imageries. Not only were the city officials and designers confused about what a Chinatown should look like. More important is that it was also the Chinese residents themselves who had to "learn" about Chinatowns after

[453] Jacobs, *Edge of Empire*, 35.

long years of disconnect from their homeland and isolation from Korean society. When I asked if he had any pictures from the time his family lived in a shophouse, a Chinese restaurateur in his fifties said, "I wish I had one now! It is unfortunate that we did not recognize back then it would become valuable heritage of ours today." In any case, the visual display of Chineseness, however defined, now appeared as a lucrative business opportunity.

Learning Chinatown: In the Aftermath of Ruins

Incheon was not alone in municipal attempts to refurbish or even newly construct Chinatowns: as of 2016, almost a dozen other local governments have undertaken or are considering Chinatown projects. The reconnected economies upon the rapprochement of the formerly antagonistic countries as well as the neoliberal economic restructuring after the financial crisis of 1997 fostered different imaginations of Chineseness. Overseas Chinese (*huaqiao*) in South Korea have come into focus as transnational "entrepreneurs" who could help build a bridge (*qiao*) to the Chinese market and Chinese capital. While construction of the new Chinatowns is a spatial strategy to attract Chinese capitalists overseas, ethnic Chinese residents in South Korea are given the role of intermediaries, interpreters, or agents who are expected to eventually "forge a strategic alliance with other ethnic Chinese as well as with—and by extension—China."[454] This punning use of the Chinese word *qiao* ironically reveals "their new prominence as transnational capitalists".[455] Developers and politicians wanting to build new Chinatowns have visited Chinese neighborhoods nationwide—in Incheon, Busan, or Gunsan—and sought out their knowledge. Once regarded as "residual Chinese," overseas Chinese subjects have become "triumphant moderns"[456] not only for the Chinese state itself, but also for other states such as South Korea, which are vying for their investment capital, interpersonal relations, and "ethnic" knowledge. At the peak of this transition came the repeal of the Alien Landownership Law in 1998, which had long restricted land ownership of foreigners, namely ethnic Chinese. Further, in 2002, the Permanent Residency System was introduced for long-term residents of Chinese descent in Korea, who had long been excluded from the national polity.[457] The subjectivity of overseas Chinese is reconfigured as that of transnational agents capable of connecting local sites to Chinese global capital. Following this line of thought, the idea of Chinatown has emerged as a platform to bridge various markets at a distance.

In order to pull in Chinese bodies, various institutional forms of "exception" have been further devised to make economic enclaves named Chinatowns immune from regulations and amenable to investment. The exceptions include tax breaks, visa waiver programs, land use deregulations, simplified administrative procedures, and special facilities such as

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[454] "Ethnic Chinese Move to Build Chinatown in Seoul," *The Korea Times*, February 12, 2000.
[455] Ong, *Flexible Citizenship*, 133.
[456] Ong and Nonini, "Introduction."
[457] Although the new residency rule was not exclusively for the ethnic Chinese residents, it was not difficult to expect that they would be the primary "beneficiaries" provided that the number of ethnic Chinese accounted for approximately 95 percent of those who were eligible for permanent residency as of 2001. "Bill Calls for Granting Permanent Residency to Long-Term Foreigners," *The Korea Times*, March 28, 2001.

casinos especially for Chinese investors.[458] Within a designated zone, exceptions are made to simplify immigration procedures for employees of Chinese ethnicity and to accommodate the efficiency of their financial transactions. For overseas Chinese investors, the policy recommendation goes so far as to claim that a "Korea-China Entrepreneurial Card" should be issued to ease immigration restrictions almost to the same levels that apply for Korean citizens.[459] Some also advocate the use of business startup funds exclusively for residents of Chinese descent in Korea and further, the official recognition of Chinese schools in order to produce Chinese- speaking professionals.[460]

In the midst of the nationwide development boom of Chinatown, Chinese residents in Incheon got caught up in mixed feelings. When he heard the word "Chinatown" in the early 1990s to describe the neighborhood in which he had spent most of his childhood, Wang felt strange:

> We called the neighborhood *xijie* (the West Street). During my school years, there was only one class in each year, which had an average of fifty students. About five of them lived in the neighborhood, and others lived throughout Incheon. Now people call it Chinatown. It was very early in high school when I first heard the word, and I felt strange. When I came back to the neighborhood, the feeling became much stronger. [Interview with the author, Incheon, May 13, 2009]

It was not merely because the residents had their own name for the neighborhood—*xijie*, which literally means the west street. Most of all, the English word "Chinatown" as a tourist destination sounded to them a little odd, when they had already seen many of their better-off Chinese neighbors leave the neighborhood. Is there anything in the neighborhood that deserved to be visited and seen? What was left behind was a handful of old shophouses which had been converted into either cheap lodging houses or laundries. Many of the buildings that had once exhibited the prosperity of the Chinatown—trading offices, restaurants, travelers' inns—had already fell into ruin (Figure 4-7). It was not merely the built environment that appeared at odds with the idea of Chinatown as a tourist destination. Who could truly revitalize the neighborhood into whatever form after all the people with the means and power had already gone? In an interview with a foreign reporter curious to know how Chinese residents themselves would react to this unique development of Chinatown in Korea, one Chinese shopkeeper in Seoul said rather bluntly, "I think we already have a Chinatown here."[461] He was

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[458] A number of local level policy reports consider unconditional no-visa entry for Chinese visitors to be infeasible, because it may produce "illegal stays" of Chinese tourists. Instead, they suggest "conditional" and diversified visa policies only for those who qualify based on professions or incomes. Seong-jin Park, "Kyŏngbuk kurandu Ch'aina billiji kibonkusang mit t'atangsŏng kŏmt'o," *Daegu Gyeongbuk Development Institute Report* (Daegu, Korea: DGDI, 2011), 10.
[459] Byeong-wook Lee, "Sŏbisu sanŏp kyŏngchaengryŏk taech'aekkwa hyanghu kwankwang sanŏp chŏngch'aek banghyang," *Han'guk kwankwang chŏngch'aek* 28 (2007): 19-24.
[460] The Federation of Korean Industries, "Chinatown ui hawlsonghwa bang'an," FKI Issue Paper 59 (2006).
[461] "Once Shunned, Chinese in Korea Courted Again," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 2000.

Figure 4-7. Buildings had long stood in neglect, with ivy creeping up or paint flaking off the walls. (Photograph by Sujin Eom (2006-2009)

pointing to a neighboring district catering to Chinese residents where karaoke and restaurants were concentrated. What is a Chinatown after all?

The idea of Chinatown sounded like an oddity at first. Yet, the nationwide Chinatown fever came to have an impact on Chinese residents in Incheon, for whom China as well as "Chinatown" became an object of learning. This changed orientation had to do with a new economic space opened up for the Chinese. Before the normalization in 1992, they mostly engaged in small-scale trades between South Korea and Taiwan. But as the port of Incheon began to reconnect to Chinese port cities of Shandong province, business ties between the two countries increased. Courted as "bridges" to connect the economies, Chinese began to see more economic opportunity in their home villages. Pan, an Incheon-born Chinese businessman, was among those who developed economic ties to Shandong. Pan had never learned Korean until his twenties due to his personal resentment against Korean society. Although he picked up some elementary Korean language from comic books in his childhood, he had not been able to speak Korean until after he learned how to speak Korean in a legal firm where he got employed as a translator.

This changing circumstance dovetailed with the increasing disillusionment of the second-generation Chinese, who had regarded Taiwan as the "homeland." After graduating from high school in Incheon, quite a few graduates moved to Taiwan to receive a college education and ultimately find employment. However, it was not the homeland they had long hoped for. They felt out of place even more severely than they did in Korea. This feeling of being a stranger in what they had long dreamed of as the homeland was enormously painful:

> They always said to me, "You Koreans." I had vaguely imagined that they would embrace me like a mother if I went to Taiwan. But it was not true. I spent ten years in anguish after returning from Taiwan. Later on, I came to realize that "national boundaries" are something that is artificially drawn and "where I am *now*" is my country and home. It was Incheon that I felt "at home." I don't know why. After all, Incheon is where I was born and everything looks familiar. I hated Koreans, but at least I could understand their behavioral patterns. I had no clue in Taiwan, let alone China. [Interview with the author, Incheon, November 5, 2014]

After his return, he engaged in various occupations, from running a Chinese restaurant to intermediary trades with Taiwan and Hong Kong. One day in the early 1990s, his Korean acquaintance advised him to "learn" China. "Isn't it funny? It was a Korean who told a Chinese to go to China, to learn China," Pan recounted, "He went on to say, 'If you get to know China well, it will get you money at the end no matter what you will end up with.' He was proved right." In 1995, Pan moved to Weihai in Shandong province. Like other Chinese residents in South Korea, Pan was able to speak the Shandong dialect and thus easily tap into the Chinese market and bureaucracy. He did whatever he could in order to win favor of Communist Party officials: he cleaned their houses and emptied the garbage. After five years of hard work, Pan came to acquire knowledge of the "system" there.[462] He accumulated wealth by running logistics companies in Weihai and came back to Incheon to open a restaurant business in the Chinatown. After his return from Shandong, Pan also came to serve as an inside informant for the city government while they formulated a development plan for the Chinatown.

Along with changing international politics, especially regarding China and Taiwan, nationwide Chinatown fever enabled the Incheon Chinese to rethink their own neighborhood. The Chinese residents began to invest in the idea of Chinatown: they organized a redevelopment committee in 2003 to attract Chinese investment from the mainland and visited China two or three times a month to meet Chinese officials. Their in-between identity to speak the two languages earned them a new identity in this

[462] There were other people like Pan in Shandong. Many of the Chinese residents in South Korea moved to Shandong to take advantage of the growing economic connections between the states as well as their ethnic capital. They worked as managers at Korean-run factories, served as translators, or established their own trading firms. As economic interests in this sub-region of East Asia increased, they also came to play an important role in connecting the once-estranged economies between the two states.

changing economy.[463] In 2003, the Overseas Chinese Economic Association of Korea succeeded in hosting the Overseas Chinese Convention in Korea to be held in 2005.[464] Upon the hearing of the Chinatown development, one Incheon-born Chinese even moved his business from the Chinese port city of Dairen to Incheon's Chinatown.[465]

Yokohama's Chinatown was the politically divided community that people had been left during the Cold War. Incheon, by contrast, was the aftermath of physically ruined landscapes and displacement. The idea of Chinatown was equated with the new influx of capital, ideas, and people to the once-abandoned neighborhood. People came to see their Chinatown with hopes of bringing those who had left back into town. Wang, a Chinatown-born university lecturer I interviewed in 2009, showed mixed feelings over the change brought to the neighborhood. He did not like the city government's direction to commercialize the area as if it were a theme park, but he still held a faint hope that if the Chinatown would "develop" along whatever lines, the neighborhood might be able to bring back those who had gone:

> Due to the education we received, we grew up in a belief that "we are Chinese." But I know nothing about China. I do not know anything about Taiwan either. In China and Taiwan, we were treated as Koreans. Despite the "brainwashing" education that I have grown up with, I feel helpless before this reality. I often ask these questions to my schoolmates at reunion gatherings. "Which country do you think you belong to?" No one has clear answers. This means that we have no perception of our roots or, even if we had, it is no longer solid. I want to put my "root" there (in the Chinatown), a root to which those who have left can come back. [Interview with the author, Incheon, May 13, 2009]

Wang was not alone in his hope of bringing people back in through the development of Chinatown. Lin expressed a similar desire, recollecting her classmates from the Chinese school. Many of her friends, who are now in their fifties and sixties, live outside of Korea. She showed me plenty of pictures that she had taken with her schoolmates at reunion gatherings, which were held in various locations ranging from Incheon to Taiwan. One of her friends had moved to Taiwan for a college education, become a journalist, and settled in the city of Tamsui after getting married to a Taiwanese man. One of them had moved to the United States and started up a Japanese restaurant in Chicago, which he still runs. "My friends often told me," she said, gazing at the pictures, "they want to come back":

> It is because this place means a root to us. I have no idea what the Korean government would think about this, but when it comes to home, this Chinatown is our home, a home to overseas Chinese. That's true.

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[463] "Bonto hwasang ul yuchihara," *Chosun Ilbo*, October 18, 2004.
[464] "Segye hwasangdon yuchihae Chinatown konsol," *Chosun Ilbo*, February 7, 2003.
[465] "Bonto hwasang ul yuchihara," *Chosun Ilbo*, October 18, 2004.

> Even when they travel abroad, like France, it is this Chinatown that is always in their thoughts. They have a great longing to come visit here again before they die. They feel like they must come. [Interview with the author, Incheon, November 24, 2014]

The strong longing for bringing back former residents, combined with anticipation of economic benefits, came in the form of aspirations for "development." Upon hearing of a new atmosphere for development, a Chinese Mexican named Zheng approached Pan to propose a development plan for Incheon's Chinatown. Zheng's development plan was simple: he wanted to build a multi-story shopping mall to attract and accommodate tourists from mainland China. The plan involved demolition of a Chinese church, built in 1917 by Chinese missionaries. The size of the church was small, but the building retained an early twentieth-century style of religious architecture. There were objections to the demolition, especially among local Korean artists who appreciated the historic value of the religious site, because the church had stood in the neighborhood for over eighty years, marking itself as the oldest Christian church in the city.

Central to this demolition was, however, the role of an Incheon-born Chinese pastor. In order to solicit public support for the demolition, he visited every household in the Chinatown. Before the decision was made to demolish the church, about thirty church-goers gathered to vote on whether the church should be demolished for development, or preserved as community heritage. Only one person, a Korean photographer who had long taken pictures of Chinatown's ruined landscape, made strong objection in fear of losing the architectural heritage for good. Everyone else voted yes for the demolition of the church. They agreed that demolition would be the only way to develop the neighborhood, thereby bringing prosperity to the Chinese community which had yet to grow. More important, they hoped that the development of the Chinatown would bring people back to the neighborhood.

The historic church, whose building retained the memory of Chinatown, was razed to the ground in 2002 (Figure 4-8) and replaced by a multi-story building; however, the financial promise of the new development was not as large as originally anticipated. It did not take long for the community to realize what they had lost. The community denounced the pastor for the deed and he was ousted from the church, the neighborhood, and even the Chinese Christian community in Korea at large.

This demolition driven by development fever reflects both anxiety and aspiration in the Chinese community. Paradoxically, the creation of what they imagined to be a Chinatown appeared possible only through the act of demolishing what they already had. The interdependent process of construction and demolition—that is, *creative destruction*—is, according to David Harvey, the internal logic of capitalism to overcome its periodic crises of overaccumulation by absorbing surplus capital or, according to Marshall Berman, the condition of modernity itself, which destructs "all that is solid" to make

Figure 4-8. The Chinese church before it was demolished to make room for construction of a shopping mall (left) and after the demolition (right). Photo courtesy of the Overseas Chinese Church of Seoul.

things anew.[466] Yet, as Christina Schwenkel has described in her analysis of "postsocialist affect" in urban Vietnam,[467] the process is markedly significant in societies that have gone through great transition. It is particularly the case when there is a sudden transport of capital, ideas, and people between what were formerly closed economies, such as mainland China and South Korea in the post-Cold War years.

This creative destruction unveils the complexity of the Chinese diasporic community, whose sense of uncertainty about the future has complicated their relationship to the built environment. This self-awareness regarding the built environment did not occur in a vacuum but in in the midst of a repetitious cycle of construction and destruction. Playing a significant role in perpetuating this self-initiated process of creative destruction was the unprecedentedly active involvement of the Korean city government, whose indifference to and ignorance of the material consequences of the Chinatown development on Chinese residents continue to cause ruination to the built environment. Starting in the 2010s, the city government announced the new design plan to refurbish the Chinese cemetery into an eco-friendly cemetery park, according to which Chinese graves would have to be relocated somewhere else. The proposed design for the Chinese cemetery contains a traditional Chinese arch, which may remind of typical Chinatown landscapes, to demarcate the space from other "multicultural" graves such as Japanese tombstones. The decision, once again, left the Chinese residents with feelings of confusion, despair, and frustration. In order to build the new cemetery park, they had to relocate scores of graves, an act which involves the violence of digging up coffins and moving corpses. It was inevitable that the burial grounds, to which they had tended with care for decades, would be destroyed (Figure 4-9). A Chinese resident denounced that the city government's whole plans to develop Chinatown were none other than making the neighborhood

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[466] Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*; Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1988).
[467] Schwenkel, "Post/Socialist Affect," 257.

Figure 4-9. In the name of building a cemetery park, quite a few Chinese graves had to be excavated in the process of relocation. (Image courtesy of the Incheon Chinese Association, above; Photo by Sujin Eom, 2014, below)

"accessories" to Korean society, something they could put on and take off whenever they wanted.[468]

After the connections were remade between mainland China and South Korea, the Chinese came to acknowledge the idea of Chinatown as a way to improve their lives. "Chinatown," the place where they have long lived in, suddenly became a subject they had to learn about. Like their counterparts in Yokohama, Incheon Chinese started thinking about what Chinatown would mean to them. They have remarkably varied ways of making sense of their relationship to the built environment, especially after the changing circumstances required them to serve, all of the sudden, as agents who could

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[468] Interview with the author, Incheon, November 5, 2014.

"bridge" the cultural and economic connections between the two countries. With the change being too abrupt, however, the years of closed-off borders left them with ambiguous feelings about their seemingly shifting positions. In December 2014, when I sat with the chairman of the association in his restaurant, he asked me what they were supposed to do. "During those years, we were always told not to stand out," he continued, "Please tell me, because you have been to plenty of Chinatowns out there, what we should do to make our voice heard."[469]

Conclusion: Chinatown, or The Migrant Mode of Dwelling

At the reception to commemorate the publication of a book written on the history of *Kanteibyo* held in a restaurant within Yokohama's Chinatown, Yamashita, a Yokohama-born businessman of Chinese descent in his seventies who chaired the editorial board for the publication, came on the stage prepared at the center of the Chinatown and made an opening remark. In a gentle voice with a pleasant sense of humor, Yamashita talked about how valuable the temple was to the community and how important it was to record and publish its history. He concluded the speech by reminding the audience of the story of Studio Ghibli's famous anime film *Spirited Away* (Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi):

> Day by day, Sen became oblivious about her original name. Then somebody told her that she ought not to forget her name, because if one forgets one's real name, one cannot return to where one came from.

Ethnic Chinese in Japan and Korea have hardly been recognized as proper and legitimate members since their arrival in the nineteenth century. Their positions have always been in-between, either as colonial subjects and compradors (as in Japan) or as colonialists and collaborators (as in Korea). The two polities have hardly treated them as relevant to the making of national identity. The turbulent international politics in East Asia rendered it almost impossible for the diasporic Chinese to claim their membership in a single nation-state. In Japan and Korea, which tend to see themselves as monoethnic societies, the supposedly different Chinese ethnicity, combined with political tensions with mainland China, has discouraged the Japanese and Korean societies from fully incorporating their Chinese residents as national members.

As this chapter has shown, Chinatowns have remained the only places they could call home. The paradox here is that this is a claim of transnational subjects to place-based identity. In the case of the diasporic Chinese, this place-making practice of the diasporic Chinese reflects what James Clifford reminds us—that diaspora is meant to maintain "community."[470] In pinpointing the different modalities of migrancy between diaspora and travel, notwithstanding diasporic identity formation having to do with several forms of physical movement, Clifford suggests that diaspora differs from travel as it fundamentally entails the politics of "dwelling."[471] It is in this sense that diaspora is concerned with "roots and routes" alike in order to make sense of their transnational

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[469] Interview with the author, Incheon, December 21, 2014.
[470] Clifford, *Routes*, 263.
[471] Ibid., 251-252.

forms of belonging. Contemporary Chinatowns in East Asia represent a claim to and longing for home, as Yamamoto's invocation of "where one came from" in his speech, but the claim is not simply a physical return to the homeland. Instead, entangled in longing, it entails the impossibility of confining identity in a fixed location.

In the context of each locale, Chinatowns are not pre-given, static entities, but rather they are performed and staged according to cultural or economic necessity. In order to understand "who they are," the diasporic Chinese came to redefine and embrace what Chinatowns mean to them. In Yokohama, Chinatown is understood as the guardian of a venerable tradition, now long gone in the homeland. In Incheon, by contrast, Chinatown is construed as a fleeting spatial phenomenon in the course of migration history.[472] In differing ways, the communities are elaborating on their positions in the narrative of China's modernity by making sense of their relationship to the built environment. Without the consideration of this ambivalent standing toward the homeland, it is hard to account for the contradiction surrounding the place-making practices. It is in this sense that the ambiguity inherent in the term "Chinatown," which had been an idea foreign even to ethnic Chinese residents, propels them to question the static meanings attached to identity and thus create material consequences.

The changing political economy of East Asia, especially after the opening of the PRC state to global capitalism, has opened up routes for these multidirectional searches for home to emerge in the diasporic Chinese communities. However, the different contours of rupture and disjuncture these communities experienced during the Cold War years have produced mixed responses to this new global flow, thereby creating heterogeneous place-making practices. In Yokohama, residents' attachment to traditional architecture accords with their identity, which is a product of long years of negotiation. In Incheon, the idea of Chinatown has emerged as an economic opportunity to achieve development and prosperity of community yet to come. "China," imagined or real, can no longer be the *fons et origo* of the diasporic Chinese identity. Instead, by rerouting their roots to make sense of their own spatial belonging, or by learning the idea of Chinatown, once uprooted Chinese are articulating ways of repositioning themselves in a world of shifting boundaries.

[472] Interview with the author, Incheon, November 5, 2014.

Conclusion

The mid-nineteenth century witnessed the opening of transpacific routes for the movement of people and ideas. A number of Chinatowns established in the nineteenth century are the product and expression of this uniquely modern phenomenon. Although Chinese settlements were formed in Southeast Asian ports as early as the sixteenth century, it is in the nineteenth century that Chinatowns began to emerge along the Pacific Coast. It is at this historical juncture that massive Chinese migration to Japan and Korea took place. The opening of East Asian ports—the Japanese port of Yokohama and the Korean port of Incheon—to foreign commerce, and the rise of the Japanese empire in the late nineteenth century, created new channels for transnational migration, especially Chinese migration, across the Pacific Ocean. European and American trading firms founded their branches in East Asia's treaty ports, thereby importing new urban institutions, ideas, and forms to these landscapes. The Chinese migrants were traders and merchants hired by these Western trading firms, but at the same time they were building contractors, carpenters, and construction workers. The migrants subsequently engaged in the making of new cities, taking advantage of the growing economy of the new environments and transferring new building materials and building types.

An equally important role in the making of East Asia's Chinatown during this period was played by the force of affect, as circulated by human actors such as medical doctors and travelers as well as non-human agents such as texts and images. European and American merchants traveled among the new ports in East Asia—from Hong Kong and Shanghai to Yokohama and Incheon—and recorded what they observed, Japanese travelers to the United States by the turn of the century also served as the conduit of circulating texts, images, and affects. While documenting spatial imageries of modernity as they traveled in San Francisco and New York, the Japanese travelers recorded the contrasting landscapes of Chinatowns with emotive languages that found their way to Japan (and further, to Korea) and contributed to the idea of Chinatown as a distinct urban type. This imagining of Chinatown continued to exist in the narratives of official gazettes or municipal history books published in Yokohama and Incheon alike for purposes of publicizing the development of the ports.

I have argued that the global production and circulation of affect played a significant role in governing Chinese space and subjectivity. By the time the treaty port system was abolished in Japan, the Chinese were treated as "a different category of people" based on the supposed Chinese propensity for filth and lack of morality and hygiene. This moral judgment provided the justification for legal measures taken to restrict their residence and employment to the confines of designated settlements both in metropole and colony. Chinese migration also took striated paths within the Japanese imperial order: the movement of Chinese migrant laborers into the Japanese archipelago (metropole) was stringently restricted, whereas seasonal laborers from the Chinese province of Shandong came *en masse* to the Korean peninsula (colony) for the Japanese colonial enterprise, which entailed mining and construction on a large scale. Differentiated needs of the empire created different patterns of Chinese migration, consequently affecting built forms and the social distance between Chinese migrants and the host societies. Two examples in particular highlight how built forms have evolved to respond to different patterns of

migration: In Incheon, shophouses were developed in order to accommodate the transient population of Chinese migrant laborers. By contrast, temples characterized Yokohama's Chinese merchant community.

The shifting political economy of the Pacific region in the course of the twentieth century gave a new shape to modalities of governance over Chinese space and subjects. The collapse of the Japanese empire and the onset of the Cold War in the mid-twentieth century reconfigured once interconnected worlds. The route to mainland China was cut off, whereas connections to the United States increased. During the Cold War years, an important shift occurred in the global flow of planning ideas and built forms as former colonial relations were replaced by new international agencies that promoted technical aid and cultural exchange programs. The Cold War served as a major vehicle for facilitating the movement of architectural designs and ideas. For instance, urban renewal programs adopted by Japanese and South Korean city mayors, such as public housing, slum clearance, and elevated highways, came to represent the capitalist vision of the modern city. The two Chinatowns were consequently transformed; however, given different constellations of Chinese migration, relative political positioning of the two postcolonial states, and significant roles played by individual agents such as city mayors, the two Chinatowns met with very different fates: One was refurbished, the other vanished.

What is important, and hitherto underexplored, is how something often considered irrational such as emotions came into play in constitution of the new urban landscapes. I have argued that the postwar urban reform of Yokohama should be understood as an outcome entangled with what I term "postimperial sentiments" in the aftermath of defeat—resentment over lost sovereignty, regret over prewar imperialism, and nostalgia for the imperial past. The Japanese mayors mobilized sentiments in order to gain momentum for "rebuilding" the postimperial city while avidly absorbing new urban ideas from the United States, whereas city residents sought a new identity by reading and writing together about their city. It is in this context that, I contended, Yokohama's Chinese was excised from the imagined community of sentiments in postimperial Japan. Meanwhile, the notion of *kukt'o* (the national land) emerged as an object of national pathos in postcolonial South Korea united with the modernist rationality of city planning for efficient land use. My argument is that it was this form of affect that led to the exclusion of Chinese space and subjects from what was imagined to be the national space.

The relationship between Chinese migration and urbanism changed again starting in the late 1970s, when China opened its doors to neighboring countries little by little upon the dissolution of the Cold War. The rise of China as a leading partner in trade made it possible to ascribe new narratives and meanings to Chinese migrant figures, now portrayed as transnational entrepreneurs and tourists who embodied global marketplaces. These new meanings imposed on Chinese migrants are communicated in and through a large number of Chinatown construction projects in Japan and South Korea. However, the new connectivity also enabled the Chinese residents in the two cities to open up a new avenue for engaging their spaces and making meanings when they began to use architectural space as a means of claiming their transnational yet place-based belonging.

Ruins and ruination characterize the landscapes of the two Chinatowns in the post-Cold War years after long years of exclusion from the national polity as well as forced isolation from the homeland. I have therefore highlighted emotive responses such as confusion and ambiguity felt by Chinese residents regarding their built environment as having a productive capacity to bring about urban change: Chinese residents imported building materials and types from elsewhere, mainly China and Taiwan, in order to make sense of their "place" in the world. However, the contrasting ways in which the two Chinese communities came to terms with their built environments reveal quite different traces of Cold War ruins. In Yokohama, Chinatown is understood as the guardian of a venerable tradition, now long gone in mainland China, and residents' attachment to traditional architecture accords with their identity as a product of long years of negotiation. In Incheon, by contrast, the idea of Chinatown has emerged, in the midst of ruined landscapes, as an economic opportunity to achieve development and prosperity of community yet to come. Their confusion often found expression in destructive form, revealing a paradoxical circumstance that the creation of what they imagined to be a Chinatown appeared possible only through the act of demolishing what already had its own existence.

With a particular emphasis on how global connectivity has come into play in the mobility of built form, this dissertation has identified three important historical shifts shaping and reshaping connective routes through which architectural and urban ideas were transferred. However, the identification of these shifts is not meant to demarcate different temporalities. It is almost impossible to contain the history of spaces to the bounds of particular historical periods, and what Lisa Yoneyama calls "conjunctive cultural critique" also points to "the not-so-obvious linkages and connections" among different temporalities.[473] When I consider the newness of the treaty port system, it is not my intention to claim that premodern Japan and Korea were "closed countries" as expressed by the terms such as *sakoku* or "hermit kingdom." Nor is my intention to disregard the long history of transregional commerce in East Asia before the nineteenth century. Instead my emphasis has been on how the treaty port system, enabled by new legal ideas and institutions, gave rise to massive Chinese migration and the formation of Chinese settlements, thereby bringing in novel spatial concepts and building types.

Although the Cold War regime opened up new connective routes for urban ideas, one also needs to recognize that old imperial relations continued to remain effective in the planning and bureaucratic ethos of postcolonial states. The legacy of the notion of *kukt'o* in Korean (*kokudo* in Japanese), which is far from being a postcolonial invention, is another example that shows the not-so-clear boundaries among different time periods. While it is difficult to trace its exact origin, recent scholarship has shown that the notion of *kokudo* (the national land) made frequent appearances in the Japanese empire's tour guides for purposes of propagating a certain image of the nation among its imperial

[473] Lisa Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 206.

subjects.[474] As such, the enduring legacies of colonialism continued to exist in Cold War culture only to be transmuted for different purposes.[475]

This is also the case with the geographical scope of the dissertation. Although the United States came to exert strong influence on South Korea's city planning, it was evident that the seemingly new legal reform under Park's regime in fact inherited the disposition of colonial law. However, my discomfort with the previous scholarship on planning culture in postwar Japan and South Korea was that too much focus has been placed on the "colonial" legacy in the postcolonial state, whereas little has been written about the transnational dimension of urban questions of the postcolonial state. Although this problematizing directed much of my approach to look at transpacific routes that have shaped local spaces in East Asia, the connections between old and new planning regimes remain to be further explored. In addition, the role of non-American models, such as those determined by German and British influence upon postwar planning culture, has to be further examined.

In tracing the genealogy of the idea of Chinatown in East Asia, from nineteenth-century Chinese Settlements in treaty ports to ethnic enclaves during the Cold War to contemporary Chinatowns, the dissertation explored Chinatowns as an affectively charged entanglement of different temporalities and spatialities. People and things on the move—from Euro-American merchants, Chinese carpenters, Japanese writers, and Korean developers to building materials, texts, and images—as well as affects carried by these human and nonhuman actors have contributed to the making of what we now understand as Chinatowns. Highlighting the underexplored role of affect and sentiment as constitutive of the mobility of built form illuminates architecture and urban space not as a pre-given, self-contained entity, but as something in a constant state of *becoming*.

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