UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

The Politics of Globalization in a World of Global Cities

Permalink

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3wn0b37t

Author Ranganath, Aditya Narayanan

Publication Date 2018

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

The Politics of Globalization in a World of Global Cities

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Aditya Narayanan Ranganath

Committee in charge:

Professor Miles Kahler, Chair Professor J. Lawrence Broz, Co-Chair Professor Stephan Haggard Professor Marc Muendler Professor Megumi Naoi

Copyright Aditya Narayanan Ranganath, 2018 All rights reserved. The dissertation of Aditya Narayanan Ranganath is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

Co-Chair

Chair

University of California, San Diego

EPIGRAPH

How far did they fly? Five and a half thousand, as the crow. Or: from Indianness to Englishness, an immeasurable distance. Or, not very far at all, because they rose from one great city, fell to another. The distance between cities is always small; a villager, travelling a hundred miles to town, traverses emptier, darker, more terrifying space.

-Rushdie, The Satanic Verses

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Signature Pageiii |
|--|
| Epigraphiv |
| Table of Contentsv |
| List of Figuresx |
| List of Images |
| List of Tables |
| Acknowledgements |
| Vitaxix |
| Abstract of the Dissertation |
| Chapter 1: Introduction |
| 1.1: Topic and Motivation1 |
| 1.2: An Overview of the Argument |
| 1.3: Data7 |
| 1.4: The Organization of the Dissertation: Overview of Substantive Chapters |
| 1.4.1: Overview of Chapter 2: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands |
| 1.4.2: Overview of Chapter 3: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Theory10 |
| 1.4.3: Overview of Chapter 4: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Evidence from Referenda in the UK and Costa Rica . 13 |
| 1.4.4: Overview of Chapter 5: Mass Spatial Coalitions and the Legislative Politics of Foreign Economic Policy: Evidence from the United States Congress |
| 1.4.5: Overview of Chapter 6: The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions, Electoral Regimes, and Trade Policy: A Cross-National Investigation |
| 1.5: Conclusion: The Contribution of the Dissertation |
| Chapter 2: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands |
| 2.1: Introduction |
| 2.2: Preliminaries: Firm Heterogeneity, Superstar Firms, and the Firm-Level Effects of Globalization |
| 2.3: Globalization and the Emergence of Global Cities and Hinterlands as Territorial Formations30 |
| 2.3.1: The Emergence of Global Cities: Global City Agglomeration Economies and the Territorial Agglomeration of the Headquarters of Superstar and Advanced Producer Services Firms |

| 2.3.2: The Emergence of Hinterlands: Global City Agglomeration Diseconomies and the Territorial Dispersal of Domestic Firms and Superstar Branch Plants | 38 |
|---|-------|
| 2.3.3: Summary: Establishment-Level Location Incentives and the Territorial Foundations of Global Cities and Hinterlands | 42 |
| 2.4: Global Cities, Hinterlands, and the Territorial Distribution of Globalization's Benefits and Costs | 44 |
| 2.4.1: Global Cities as the Territorial "Winners" of Globalization: The Territorial Agglomeration of Superstar Headquarters and Front-Offices, the Positive Local Multiplier Effects of Globalization, and Globalization-Driven Prosperity in Global Cities | |
| 2.4.2: Hinterlands as the Territorial "Losers" of Globalization: The Territorial Dispersal of Domestic Firms and Superstar Plants, the Negative Local Multiplier Effects of Globalization, and Globalization-Driven Stagnation and Decline in Hinterlands | 48 |
| 2.5: Conclusion: Global City Agglomeration Processes, Hinterland Dispersion Processes, and the Constitution of the Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands | 55 |
| Chapter 3: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Theory | 58 |
| 3.1: Introduction | 58 |
| 3.2: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Individual Preferences Over Globalization: An Ego-Tropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions | 64 |
| 3.3: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Individual Preferences Over Globalization: A Sociotropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions | 69 |
| 3.4: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Individual Preferences Over Globalization: A Local-Tropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions | 79 |
| 3.4.1: Individuals and Locales: Why Might Individuals Care About Local Interests? | 83 |
| 3.4.2: Defining the Local Interest: How Are Local-Tropic Judgments About the Local Interest Made? | 92 |
| 3.4.3: Local-Tropic Preferences and Global City Coalitions | 96 |
| 3.4.4: Local Tropic Preferences and Hinterland Coalitions | .100 |
| 3.4.5: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and Local-Tropic Coalitions: Summary | . 103 |
| 3.5: Conclusion | . 105 |
| Chapter 4: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Evidence from Referenda in the UK and Costa Rica | .110 |
| 4.1: Introduction | .110 |
| 4.2: The Spatial Distribution of Mass Support for Globalization: Observational Patterns from Voting Over Brexit and CAFTA | .121 |
| 4.2.1: An Overview of Brexit and CAFTA | .121 |
| 4.2.2: Voting Over Brexit and CAFTA: Documenting a Spatial Political Cleavage Over Globalization | .127 |

| Models of Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions 1 | 151 |
|--|------|
| 4.3: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions in the Developed World: An Empirical Analysis of District-Level Voting Patterns in the Brexit Referendum | 1/13 |
| | 145 |
| 4.3.1: The Independent Variable of Interest: Intuition and an Overview of the Dun and Bradstreet Data | 148 |
| 4.3.2: The Independent Variable of Interest: Variable Construction 1 | 152 |
| 4.3.3: Control Variables1 | 166 |
| 4.3.4: Model Specification | 175 |
| 4.3.5: Results and Discussion1 | 178 |
| 4.4: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and the Micro-Foundations of Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: An Individual-Level Analysis of Brexit | 198 |
| 4.4.1: The Independent Variable of Interest | 203 |
| 4.4.2: Bivariate Regression Analysis | 207 |
| 4.4.3: Suggestive Empirical Evidence Against the Ego-Tropic and Sociotropic Theories of Spatial Coalitions: Results from Mediation Analysis | 209 |
| 4.4.4: Control Variables | 216 |
| 4.4.5: Multivariate Regression Analysis: Results and Discussion | 221 |
| 4.4.6: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, Skill-Based Coalitions, and the Inadequacy of "Geographically Naïve" Analyses of Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions2 | 233 |
| 4.5: The Distance-Decay of Global City Agglomeration Processes and the Spatial Distribution of Mass Support for Globalization Within Global City Commuter Zones: Deriving and Testing a Distinctive Micro-Level Implication of the Local-Tropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions | 238 |
| 4.5.1: Theories of Spatial Coalitions and Divergent Empirical Predictions About the Micro- Geography of Support for Globalization Within Global City Commuter Zones: Argument and | 042 |
| Intuition | |
| 4.5.2: Observational Evidence | |
| 4.5.3: Bivariate Regression Analysis | |
| 4.5.4: Multivariate Regression Analysis | 267 |
| 4.6: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions in the Developing World: An Empirical Analysis of District-Level Voting Patterns in the CAFTA Referendum | 275 |
| 4.6.1: Independent Variables of Interest and the Dependent Variable | 279 |
| 4.6.2: Bivariate Regression Analysis | |
| 4.6.3: Multivariate Regression Analysis: Control Variables, Results, and Discussion | |
| 4.7: Conclusion | |

| Chapter 5: Mass Spatial Coalitions and the Legislative Politics of Foreign Economic Policymaking: Evidence from the United States Congress | 304 |
|--|-----|
| 5.1: Introduction | 304 |
| 5.2: Literature Review: The History of Regionalism and American Trade Politics | 312 |
| 5.2.1: Trade Politics and Regional Coalitions in Historical Perspective | 312 |
| 5.2.2: Congressional Trade Politics in a World of Global Cities and Hinterlands: Towards a New Political Geography of Legislative Coalitions? | 321 |
| 5.3: From Mass Spatial Coalitions to Legislative Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Theory | 326 |
| 5.4: Spatial Coalitions and Congressional Foreign Economic Policy Alignments: An Empirical Examination of Roll-Call Votes on Free Trade Legislation in the Post-NAFTA Era (2004-2011). | 329 |
| 5.4.1: Adapting the Argument to the Empirical Context of the "Post-NAFTA" Era | 329 |
| 5.4.2: The Independent Variable of Interest: Developing a District-Level Measure of the Relative Size of Mass Spatial Coalitions | 332 |
| 5.4.3: The Dependent Variable | 342 |
| 5.4.4: Control Variables | 342 |
| 5.4.5: Empirical Specification and Review | 347 |
| 5.4.6: Results | 348 |
| 5.4.7: Discussion | 374 |
| 5.5: The Political Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and the Future Politics of Foreign Economic Policy in the United States Congress (and beyond) | 376 |
| 5.6: Conclusion | 384 |
| Chapter 6: The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions, Electoral Regimes, and Trade Policy: A Cross-National Investigation | 388 |
| 6.1: Introduction | 388 |
| 6.1.1: Contributions and Motivation | 392 |
| 6.1.2: Roadmap of the Chapter, and a Note on the Median-Voter Theorem | 397 |
| 6.2: Electoral Geography, Electoral Institutions, and Mass Preferences: An Introduction | 400 |
| 6.2.1: Conceptual and Theoretical Intuition | 400 |
| 6.2.2: Electoral Geography in the Industrial Age: Explaining the Politics of Redistribution | 404 |
| 6.3: The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions and Foreign Economic Policy | 408 |
| 6.3.1: The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions and Foreign Economic Policy: Argument and Intuition | 410 |
| 6.3.2: Hypotheses | 417 |
| 6.4: Empirical Analysis: Preliminaries | 419 |
| 6.4.1: The Dependent Variable | 419 |
| 6.4.2: The Independent Variable of Interest | 420 |

| 6.4.3: Bivariate Scatterplots and Correlations | 433 |
|--|-----|
| 6.5: Multivariate Analysis | 439 |
| 6.5.1: Control Variables, Interaction Term, and Estimation | 439 |
| 6.5.2: Multivariate Tests of H1: Results and Discussion | 444 |
| 6.5.3: Multivariate Tests of H2: Results and Discussion | 455 |
| 6.6: Conclusion | 472 |
| Chapter 7: Conclusion | 475 |
| 7.1: Introduction | 475 |
| 7.2: Review: The Dissertation's Arguments and Main Findings | 478 |
| 7.3: Future Research | 485 |
| 7.3.1: Global Cities, Hinterlands, and Mass Political Coalitions: Avenues for Future Research | 485 |
| 7.3.2: Global Cities, Hinterlands, and the Legislative Politics of Globalization: Avenues for Future Research | 494 |
| 7.3.3: Global Cities, Hinterlands, and the Politics of Foreign Economic Policy in Cross-National Perspective: Avenues for Future Research | 496 |
| 7.3.4: Additional Avenues for Future Research | 498 |
| 7.4: Conclusion | 499 |
| Bibliography | 501 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure 4.1: District Level Support for CAFTA Ratification in Costa Rica | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 4.2: District Level Support for CAFTA Ratification in Costa Rica (Close-up of San Jose Metro Region) | 129 |
| Figure 4.3: District Level Support For "Remain" in Brexit Referendum | |
| Figure 4.4: District Level Support for "Remain" in the Brexit Referendum (Close-up of London Metro Region) | 133 |
| Figure 4.5: Locations of Global Firm Headquarters Juxtaposed Against District-Level Support for "Remain" in Brexit Referendum | 159 |
| Figure 4.6: London commuter zone overlaid against local authority districts | 176 |
| Figure 4.7: Districts With Centroids in London Commuter Zone | 177 |
| Figure 4.8: Locations of Headquarter Establishments of Global Firms With Respect to UK Commuter Zones | 205 |
| Figure 4.9 : Distance Decay in Global City Agglomeration Processes and Distance Decay in Support for "Remain" in London CZ | 257 |
| Figure 4.10 : Headquarters Locations of Global Firms in Costa Rica Overlaid Against CAFTA Voting Districts | |
| Figure 5.1: Global city commuter zones in relation to the US's commuter zone geography | |
| Figure 5.2: Global city commuter zones overlaid against congressional districts | |
| Figure 5.3 : Intersection of global city commuter zone with First Congressional District of Massachusetts | |
| Figure 5.4: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.8 | |
| Figure 5.5: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.9 | |
| Figure 5.6: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.11 | |
| Figure 5.7: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.12 | |
| Figure 5.8: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.16 | |
| Figure 5.9: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.17 | |
| Figure 6.1 : Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in Brazil | |
| Figure 6.2 : Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in Switzerland | 424 |
| Figure 6.3 : Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in India | |
| Figure 6.4 : Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in India (close-up of Mumbai region). | 426 |

| Figure 6.5: Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in Canada (close-up of Toronto region |)427 |
|---|------|
| Figure 6.6: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (majoritarian countries) | 434 |
| Figure 6.7: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (PR countries) | 435 |
| Figure 6.8 : Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (majoritarian developed countries) | 436 |
| Figure 6.9: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (PR developed countries) | 436 |
| Figure 6.10: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (majoritarian developing countries) | 437 |
| Figure 6.11: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (PR developing countries) | 438 |
| Figure 6.12: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.2 | |
| Figure 6.13: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.2 | 448 |
| Figure 6.14: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.2 | |
| Figure 6.15: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.2 | 449 |
| Figure 6.16: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.3 | 451 |
| Figure 6.17: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.3 | 451 |
| Figure 6.18: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.3 | |
| Figure 6.19: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.3 | |
| Figure 6.20: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.4 | 458 |
| Figure 6.21: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.4 | 459 |
| Figure 6.22: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.4 | 459 |
| Figure 6.23: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.4 | |
| Figure 6.24: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.5 | 463 |
| Figure 6.25: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.5 | 463 |
| Figure 6.26: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.5 | 464 |
| Figure 6.27: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.5 | 464 |
| Figure 6.28: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.6 | 467 |
| Figure 6.29: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.6 | 467 |
| Figure 6.30: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.6 | |
| Figure 6.31: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.6 | 468 |
| Figure 6.32: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.7 | 470 |
| Figure 6.33: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.7 | |

| Figure 6.34: | Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.7 | .471 |
|--------------|--|------|
| Figure 6.35: | Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.7 | .471 |

LIST OF IMAGES

| Image 4.1: Visualizing the Geocoding Process: Headquarter locations of Global |
|---|
| Firms in London |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table 2.1: Global City Agglomeration Economies, Diseconomies, and Establishment | |
|---|---|
| Location Incentives | 3 |
| Table 4.1 : Rogowski's (1987) Framework and Mass Political Alignments Over Globalization 13 | 5 |
| Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for District-Level Brexit Analysis 17 | 3 |
| Table 4.3: Correlations Between District Variables in Brexit Analysis 17 | 4 |
| Table 4.4 : Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Supportfor Remain (Bivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Included) | 8 |
| Table 4.5 : Impact of Categorical Global City Agglomeration Variable on District-LevelSupport for Remain (Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Included)18 | 0 |
| Table 4.6 : Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level Support for Remain(Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Included) | 2 |
| Table 4.7 : Impact of Categorical Global City Agglomeration Variable on District-LevelSupport for Remain (Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Excluded) | 4 |
| Table 4.8 : Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level Supportfor Remain (Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Excluded) | 5 |
| Table 4.9 : Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Supportfor Remain (Bivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Included)18 | 9 |
| Table 4.10 : Impact of Categorical Global City Variable on District-Level SupportFor Remain (Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Included)19 | 1 |
| Table 4.11 : Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level SupportFor Remain (Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Included)19 | 2 |
| Table 4.12 : Impact of Categorical Global City Variable on District-Level SupportFor Remain (Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Excluded)19 | 5 |
| Table 4.13 : Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level Support ForRemain (Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Excluded) | 6 |
| Table 4.14: Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain (Bivariate Specifications) 20 | 8 |
| Table 4.15: Impact of Individual Location on Ego-Tropic Economic Assessments 21 | 4 |
| Table 4.16: Impact of Individual Location on Sociotropic Economic Assessments 21 | 5 |
| Table 4.17: Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain (Multivariate OLS Specifications) | 2 |
| Table 4.18 : Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain(Multivariate Probit Specifications) | 5 |
| Table 4.19 : Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain(Multivariate OLS Specification; Scottish Respondents Only)23 | 2 |
| Table 4.20: Predicted Probabilities for Geographically Naïve Model | |

| Table 4.21: Predicted Probabilities for Geographically Explicit Model | 236 |
|--|-----|
| Table 4.22 : Divergent Micro-Level Empirical Implication of Local-Tropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions | 252 |
| Table 4.23 : Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support for Remain (Bivariate Specifications) | 263 |
| Table 4.24 : Impact of Distance from CBD on Ego-Tropic and Sociotropic Economic Assessments | 266 |
| Table 4.25 : Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support forRemain (Multivariate OLS Model; London Respondents Included) | 269 |
| Table 4.26 : Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support for Remain(Multivariate Probit Model; London Respondents Included) | 271 |
| Table 4.27 : Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support forRemain (Multivariate OLS Model; London Respondents Excluded) | 273 |
| Table 4.28 : Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-LevelSupport for CAFTA Ratification (Bivariate OLS) | 285 |
| Table 4.29: CAFTA Summary Statistics | 289 |
| Table 4.30 : Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Support for CAFTA Ratification (Multivariate OLS) | 291 |
| Table 4.31 : Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Support for CAFTA Ratification (Multivariate OLS; Urban Districts Only) | 294 |
| Table 5.1: History of Sectional Conflict in US Trade Policy | 319 |
| Table 5.2: Summary Statistics (All) | 346 |
| Table 5.3: Summary Statistics (Democrats Only) | 346 |
| Table 5.4 : Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free TradeLegislation (Baseline Specification; Dichotomous Independent Variable of Interest) | 349 |
| Table 5.5: Substantive Effects for Model 1 in Table 5.4 | 350 |
| Table 5.6: Substantive Effects for Model 3 in Table 5.4 | 350 |
| Table 5.7 : Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation (Pooled Model With Controls; Dichotomous Independent Variable of Interest) | 352 |
| Table 5.8: Substantive Effects of Selected Variables From Model 1 in Table 5.7 | 355 |
| Table 5.9: Substantive Effects of Selected Variables From Model 3 in Table 5.7 | 356 |
| Table 5.10 : Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation (Democrats-Only Model With Controls; Dichotomous Independent Variable of Interest) | 358 |
| Table 5.11: Substantive Effects of Variables From Model 1 in Table 5.10 | 360 |
| Table 5.12: Substantive Effects of Variables from Model 3 in Table 5.10 | |
| Table 5.13 : Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation (Baseline Specification; Continuous Independent Variable of Interest) | |

| Table 5.14 : Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free TradeLegislation (Pooled Model With Controls; Continuous Independent Variable of Interest) |
|--|
| Table 5.15 : Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation(Democrats-Only Model With Controls; Continuous Independent Variable of Interest) |
| Table 5.16: Substantive Effects for Model 1 in Table 5.15 |
| Table 5.17: Substantive Effects for Model 3 in Table 5.15 |
| Table 5.18: Rising Geographic Polarization in Partisan Coalitions 378 |
| Table 5.19: Partisan Coalitions and Demographic Support for Free Trade 380 |
| Table 6.1: Summary Statistics for Cross-National Analysis 433 |
| Table 6.2 : Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition onApplied Tariffs (categorical measure of electoral systems) |
| Table 6.3 : Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition onTrade-Weighted Tariffs (categorical measure of electoral systems)450 |
| Table 6.4 : Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition onApplied Tariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems) |
| Table 6.5 : Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition onApplied Tariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems with district magnitude<=25) |
| Table 6.6 : Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition onTrade Weighted Tariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems) |
| Table 6.7 : Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition onTrade Weighted Tariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems with district magnitude<=25)469 |

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Miles Kahler and Lawrence Broz have been exceptionally generous and helpful advisors, and without their intellectual and professional guidance over the years, I could not have completed this dissertation. This project only came into focus after several years of work, and I am especially grateful to them for enthusiastically and patiently supporting the project even during the long stretches of time when I had little to show for my efforts. I would also like to thank Steph Haggard and Megumi Naoi for their help over the years; it was largely during the course of reflecting on their insightful questions and criticisms during important stages of the project that I was able to understand what I was trying to say, and why it might be worth saying. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Marc Muendler for graciously agreeing to serve on my dissertation committee, and for his valuable comments, particularly at my prospectus and dissertation defenses. To the extent that there are worthwhile contributions in the pages that follow, they are the product of my collaboration with this remarkable committee; I am of course solely responsible for anything that is wrongheaded or simply wrong.

Though they were not directly involved in this dissertation, I would also like to thank David Lake, Phil Roeder, and Maureen Feeley. David played an important role in my graduate career. In particular, I would like to thank him (along with Jeff Frieden) for inviting me, early in my graduate career, to collaborate on a project about the politics of economic crises. Though that project remains unpublished, it taught me an enormous amount about the study of political economy, and the research process more generally. My efforts to situate the argument of Chapter 5 within the broader historical context of US trade policy would not have been possible, had I not become familiar with the relevant historical literature in the course of working with David on that earlier project. Phil Roeder was an important teacher early in graduate school; like all of the

xvii

students at UCSD, I have benefitted from his scholarly generosity and his dedication to our graduate program. Finally, I had the privilege of working with Maureen in the winter of 2012, when I assisted her with her course on human rights; her commitment to her craft is inspiring, and I am lucky to have had Maureen as a role model while navigating my way around the classroom at UCSD.

At the UCSD library, I would like to thank Mike Smith and Annelise Sklar. Mike served as the interim GIS librarian during much of my time at UCSD; he made the GIS Lab a great place to work, and always made sure that my needs were taken care of. Over the years, he became a friend and colleague as well, and I would like to thank him for giving me the opportunity to work as his assistant, which was an intellectually and professionally rewarding experience. Annelise is an exceptionally resourceful and knowledgeable social sciences librarian who introduced me to important library resources and data sources that have helped my work on this project, and beyond.

Many friends, both within the UCSD Department of Political Science, and outside, made graduate school an intellectually and personally fulfilling time. I am unable to acknowledge all of them here by name, but I would be remiss if I did not single out Aaron Cotkin, Abhishek Sharma, Arun Giridharan, David Straszheim, Jason Kuo, Mike Nicholson, Sankeerth Rao, and Steve Oliver, for special thanks.

Finally, on a personal note, I would like to thank Judith Stewart, whose friendship, love, and generosity made the writing of this dissertation far less stressful than it otherwise might have been; my sister and friend Maya, whose visits I always look forward to; and of course my parents, Surendra and Sudha, whose large sacrifices for the sake of my education made this possible.

xviii

VITA

| 2009 | B.A in Government and Legal Studies and Economics, Bowdoin College |
|------|---|
| 2018 | Ph.D. in Political Science, University of California, San Diego |

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Politics of Globalization in a World of Global Cities

by

Aditya Narayanan Ranganath

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2018

Professor Miles Kahler, Chair Professor J. Lawrence Broz, Co-Chair

Scholarship in International Political Economy (IPE) is fundamentally concerned with the question of how the redistributive impact of globalization across different units of analysis shapes the politics of foreign economic policy. While previous work in IPE has explored the "winners" and "losers" of globalization with respect to factors of production, sectors, and firms, it has yet to grapple with the political implications of the redistributive impact of globalization across space. In particular, scholarship in economic geography and urban studies suggests that in

spatial terms, the main beneficiaries of contemporary globalization are territorial formations known as "global cities", whose globalization-driven prosperity comes at the expense of vast hinterland regions that are faced with stagnation and decline in the context of globalization. The goal of this project is to explore the implications of this economic geography of global cities and hinterlands for the politics of globalization.

Chapter 2 begins with a conceptual discussion of this economic geography, with a view towards detailing the processes which constitute global cities and hinterlands as territorial formations that win and lose, respectively, from globalization. Chapter 3 theorizes how this economic geography shapes individual preferences over globalization, and thereby engenders distinctive mass foreign economic policy coalitions organized along "global city versus hinterland" lines. Chapter 4 analyzes globalization-related public referenda in Costa Rica and the UK with a view towards documenting whether the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands does indeed underpin spatial foreign economic policy coalitions along these lines. Drawing on a range of geographically explicit data, it provides evidence that suggests the importance of internationalist "global city coalitions" and protectionist "hinterland coalitions" for the mass politics of globalization. In Chapter 5, I document the impact of these spatial foreign economic policy coalitions on patterns of legislative voting over trade policy in the US Congress. In Chapter 6, I provide suggestive evidence that the interaction between electoral regimes and the electoral geography of mass global city coalitions affects cross- national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes.

xxi

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Topic and Motivation

In a recent article in the *New York Times*, the urban affairs journalist Emily Badger highlights the emergence of the San Francisco Bay Area, along with "predominantly coastal metros like New York, Boston, and Seattle" (Badger 2017, Paragraph 5), as the primary beneficiaries of the United States economy's accelerating integration, over the past several decades, into the global market. The dramatic success and growth in prominence of such economically dynamic, globally connected metropolitan areas—which scholars have labelled "global cities"¹—raises important questions, for scholars and citizens alike. Indeed, Badger notes that in response to the globalization-driven prosperity of a handful of cities within the United States.

Economists and geographers are now questioning what the nature of their success means for the rest of the country. What happens to America's manufacturing heartland when Silicon Valley turns to China? Where do former mill and mining towns fit in when big cities shift to digital work? How does upstate New York benefit when New York City increases business with Tokyo? (Badger 2017, Paragraph 5)

¹ I develop a more precise conceptual account of "global cities" and "hinterlands" as territorial formations that, respectively, "win" and "lose" from globalization, in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.

As the article goes on to note, our answers to such questions will inevitably "have social and political implications at a time when broad swaths of the country feel alienated from and resentful of 'elite' cities" that prosper in a globalized world, at the expense of "the 'hinterland' communities" whose economies are effectively "[hollowed] out" by globalization (Badger 2017; Paragraph 6, Paragraph 9). Moreover, these political implications are not simply of parochial relevance; as a result of the emergence of an interlinked and interdependent network of global cities spanning the world—cities which in some ways have more in common with each other than other parts (i.e. the "hinterland regions") of the territorial states in which they are embedded—countries and societies across the world are confronting the political implications of this territorial economic disjuncture.

Surprisingly, however, the systematic investigation of these political implications has not been a scholarly priority within the social sciences. The academic study of global cities is part of an inter-disciplinary research program (across sociology, geography, and urban studies) that offers an extremely rich social and economic analysis of global cities; however, this literature's analysis of the "relationship between state and city under conditions of a strong articulation between a city and the world economy" (Sassen 2001, 14) has been functional, rather than political. On this account, global cities are primarily analysed as the territorial "command centres" of contemporary global capitalism that have come into their own as independent and "functional components of the world system" that "seem frequently to bypass any national connection" (Abrahamson 2004, 168), rather than as the drivers of political conflict and change.²

² In the concluding chapter to her influential book, *The Global City*, Sassen gestures toward the importance of considering the political implications of global cities, especially the "implications of the concentration of the benefits of economic growth in global cities" (Sassen 2001, 14); however, her analysis is fundamentally concerned with understanding the functional role of global cities in the global economy, and she does not pursue such a political investigation at length. This project therefore takes Sassen's concluding reflections as a point of departure

Nor has the field of International Political Economy (IPE)—which is the sub-discipline within political science that is perhaps best positioned to analyze the political implications of the territorial economic cleavage between "global cities" and "hinterlands" over globalizationexplored how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands shapes the domestic political dynamics of globalization. Rather, IPE's treatment of territorial politics in a global economy has been narrowly situated within the endogenous protection literature, which appeals to geographic explanations to account for variation in the capacity of protectionist manufacturing industries to secure trade protection (Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Busch and Reinhardt 2000; Rogowski et al 1999; McGillivray 2004)³; it does not consider the broader, and more fundamental, question of how the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands⁴ affects political outcomes of interest, such as mass foreign economic policy preferences and coalitions, patterns of political representation and interest aggregation, or foreign economic policy outcomes. Indeed, from the standpoint of the extant empirical scholarship in IPE, the dramatic territorial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands—the territorial "winners" and "losers", respectively, of contemporary globalization- might as well not exist.

In short, previous scholarship within IPE has extensively studied how the redistributive impact of globalization across factors of production, sectors, and (more recently) firms shapes

³ Though most of the existing work on the politics of economic geography in IPE is dedicated to examining manufacturing industries within the framework of the endogenous protection literature, there is also limited work on the political geography of the agricultural (Maliniak 2014) and financial (Verdier 2000) industries. However, this work is also narrowly cast, and does not consider how broader mass cleavages over globalization might arise due to the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. ⁴ To be clear, while some previous scholarship in IPE has considered the territorial unevenness of globalization's effects (see Hiscox 2003, for instance), this territorial unevenness has not been explicitly linked to the geography of global cities and hinterlands.

the politics of foreign economic policy. However, it has virtually ignored the redistributive impact of globalization along a geographic axis, between the "global cities" that are the territorial "winners" of globalization, and the "hinterlands" that are the territorial "losers" of globalization. As a result, we do not have a systematic understanding of how the territorial distribution of globalization's benefits and costs with respect to this geographic cleavage shapes the politics of globalization; this constitutes a significant oversight in contemporary IPE scholarship, one which this dissertation seeks to redress.

Indeed, investigating how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands shapes the politics of globalization is an especially important task, since political life is in its nature spatially ordered; it is thus unlikely that this economic geography is irrelevant for the sorts of outcomes that scholars of IPE care about. But how, exactly, does this economic geography affect the domestic politics of globalization? In particular, how does the territorial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands with respect to globalization shape individual foreign economic policy preferences, and by extension, the organization of mass coalitions over globalization? How does this economic geography shape the aggregation of mass foreign economic policy preferences within representative institutions, and in turn, affect foreign economic policy outcomes? As we have already noted, these questions have not been addressed, let alone formulated, in previous IPE and global cities scholarship; the purpose of this dissertation is to begin to systematically explore such questions. In particular, I investigate the ways in which the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands shapes the following political outcomes:

- 1. The individual preferences with respect to economic openness or closure that underpin societal coalitions over globalization (i.e. mass foreign economic policy coalitions).
- Patterns of legislative voting over liberalizing foreign economic policy legislation within the United States Congress (i.e. the organization and composition of legislative "internationalist" and "protectionist" coalitions)
- Cross-national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes (in particular, I focus in this project on trade policy outcomes).

These outcomes are of fundamental importance to IPE scholarship, and I have chosen them deliberately. My aim is to develop an explicitly spatial account of the international political economy that moves systematically from the micro-foundations of spatially-defined mass preferences and political behavior; to the aggregation of these preferences within political institutions and the resulting formation of spatial legislative coalitions that track the global city versus hinterland divide; and ultimately, to cross-national foreign economic policy outcomes. In other words, these outcome variables—the foreign economic policy preferences that underpin mass coalitions over globalization, legislative coalitions over globalization as they are reflected in the voting patterns of elected representatives over foreign economic policy legislation, and actual foreign economic policy outcomes—are chosen with the intention of exploring how the spatial economic divide between global cities and hinterlands affects different links in the explanatory chain of Open Economy Politics (Lake 2009).⁵

⁵ The OEP paradigm is generally viewed as one that is fundamentally committed to a materialist conception of interests. I view OEP less as a paradigm than as an analytical framework committed to developing explanations of phenomena relevant to the international political economy that move systematically from micro-foundations to macro-level outcomes; on this broader view, a scholar need not be committed to a materialist conception of interests and preferences to work within the framework of OEP. When referring to OEP, I have in mind this broader conception of OEP as an analytical and empirical framework that is committed to "bottom-up" explanations, rather than OEP as a substantive paradigm that assumes a particular view of human motivation.

1.2 An Overview of the Argument

The following chapters in this dissertation develop and test a series of arguments about how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands affects the political outcomes discussed in the previous section. These specific arguments are developed with respect to the particular dependent variable under consideration in a given chapter; however, it is important to emphasize that taken together, these arguments cohere into a more general argument (or explanatory narrative) that unifies the individual chapters. According to this overarching argument, the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands—that is, the spatial economic cleavage between the global cities that "win" from globalization and the hinterland areas that "lose"—engenders a distinctive (and previously unrecognized) spatial *political* cleavage between "global city" mass coalitions that favor globalization and "hinterland" mass coalitions that favor protection. It is important to emphasize that these spatial coalitions are not simply epiphenomena of mass foreign economic policy coalitions analyzed in previous IPE scholarship; rather, we can specifically trace the genesis of these empirically distinctive spatial coalitions to the processes (discussed in Chapter 2) that constitute the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. When territorial political institutions (i.e. electoral districts) are superimposed on the spatially defined mass political coalitions that stem from the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, the result is a particular *political* geography of "global city" and "hinterland" coalitions. This political geography of mass spatial coalitions, in turn, affects the spatial organization of legislative coalitions over globalization and the political dynamics of legislative foreign economic policymaking; ultimately, the interaction between political

institutions (in particular, electoral regimes) and the electoral geography of global city coalitions can help to explain cross-national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes.

1.3 Data

To evaluate the different aspects of this overarching argument, I draw on several datasets from a variety of sources, including a novel geospatial dataset on the locations of the headquarters of superstar and global producer services firms, which I collected and geocoded from Dun and Bradstreet's WorldBase database⁶. As I will discuss in Chapter 2, "global cities" are marked by high-density agglomerations of the headquarters of globally oriented firms; by using spatial data on the locations of these economic actors, it is therefore possible to empirically delineate the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland cleavage, and assess its impact on political outcomes. Moreover, I develop various empirical indicators of the political geography of the cleavage between global city and hinterland political coalitions by overlaying geospatial datasets of electoral boundaries and commuter zones against this underlying economic geography. In addition to using these geospatial data on business establishments, electoral boundaries, and commuter zones to develop measures of the independent variable of interest (i.e. the economic or political geography of the global city versus hinterland divide), I draw on a variety of other data sources (i.e. Census data from the US and UK, publicly available survey data from the British Election Study, data from previously published studies, Congressional roll call data, and cross-national data from the WTO and World Bank) to develop appropriate measures for the dependent variables under consideration, as well as control variables that previous scholarship has linked to these outcomes. I discuss the relevant data and their sources,

⁶ This data is discussed in detail in Section 4.3 in Chapter 4

as well as the empirical measures developed from these data, in detail as they are introduced in the relevant empirical chapters that follow.

1.4 The Organization of the Dissertation: Overview of Substantive Chapters

In this section, I provide an overview of the dissertation's substantive chapters, with a view towards summarizing their central arguments and findings, and clarifying the relationship between these chapters.

1.4.1 Overview of Chapter 2: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands

In Chapter 2, I explore the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands in conceptual terms; in particular, I investigate the spatial and economic processes that constitute global cities and hinterlands as the distinctive territorial formations that "win" and "lose", respectively, from contemporary globalization. In particular, I argue that global cities are constituted as distinctive territorial formations by the large and distinctive benefits that the headquarters of globally oriented "superstar" firms (including globally oriented producer services and financial firms) derive from clustering in space within select metropolitan locales, which become "global cities" by virtue of the concentrated presence of these superstar establishments; these global cities emerge as the territorial "winners" of globalization because the territorial agglomeration of these firms is associated with large globalization-driven multiplier effects that redound to the prosperity of the broader metropolitan economies of global cities.

On the other hand, hinterlands are constituted as territorial formations by the dispersal of low-productivity domestic firms, as well as the back-offices and production plants of global firms, across large areas that lie beyond the borders of the global city; these hinterlands become the peripheral "losers" of contemporary globalization because the firm-level implications of globalization for the domestically oriented firms that extend across these regions set in motion a globalization-driven "negative multiplier" effect that leads to the economic stagnation and decline of the broader regional economies of hinterland areas.⁷

Throughout the dissertation, I refer to the processes that constitute global cities as territorial formations that disproportionately benefit from globalization—in particular, the territorial agglomeration of the headquarters and front-offices of global firms, and the globalization-driven positive multiplier effects fueled by these agglomerations—as "global city agglomeration processes." Analogously, I refer to the processes that constitute hinterlands as territorial formations that are harmed by globalization—in particular, the territorial dispersal of low-productivity domestic firms (and the non-headquarter plants and back-offices of global firms) across areas outside global cities, and the globalization-driven negative multiplier effects associated with these patterns of dispersal—as "hinterland dispersion processes."

⁷ For reasons that I discuss in Chapter 2, the presence of the back offices and branch plants of superstar firms in hinterland areas cannot counteract the globalization-driven "negative multiplier" that is set in motion by low-productivity domestic firms.

1.4.2 Overview of Chapter 3: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Theory

After providing a conceptual account of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 begins the task of exploring the political implications of this economic geography. It does so in theoretical terms, by investigating how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (elaborated in Chapter 2) might shape patterns of political preference formation, and thereby engender mass spatial political coalitions over globalization that correspond with the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands. That is, it is not obvious or automatic that the territorial distribution of economic interests over globalization with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide shapes political preferences over globalization; the pathways from the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands to spatially defined individual political preferences that scale up into mass coalitions of "pro-globalization" global city residents and "anti-globalization" hinterland residents must therefore be explicitly theorized. In particular, Chapter 3 elaborates three distinct theories of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands described in Chapter 2 might shape individual foreign economic policy preferences, and thereby engender a mass spatial political cleavage between "global city coalitions" comprised of internationalist global city residents, and "hinterland coalitions" comprised of protectionist hinterland residents. These theories are rooted in different models of preference formation.

The first, an ego-tropic theory of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands give rise to corresponding spatial coalitions over globalization, begins from the premise that the policy preferences of individuals are rooted in a concern for their personal material interests. On an ego-tropic theory of spatial coalitions, global city and hinterland foreign

economic policy coalitions form because global city residents believe that they derive personal labor market benefits from global city agglomeration processes, while hinterland residents believe that they suffer personal material harm from the labor market effects of hinterland dispersion processes; as a result, global city residents develop systematically more favorable ego-tropic assessments of globalization than hinterland residents, leading to a spatial political cleavage that is underpinned by the tendency of ego-tropic attitudes towards globalization to diverge across the global city versus hinterland divide.

The sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions begins from the premise that individual policy preferences are animated by an individual concern with the national interest. On this account, global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes engender very different information environments; we might expect individuals in global cities to receive more positive or favorable information about globalization than their hinterland counterparts, and that this exposure to more positive economic information leads global city residents towards more favorable sociotropic assessments of globalization than hinterland residents. In other words, according to the sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions that I develop in Section 3.3, the information environments of global cities and hinterlands are fundamentally different; as a result of these differences, global city residents, leading to "global city" and "hinterland" mass political coalitions that arise from divergent sociotropic assessments of globalization across the spatial divide.

Finally, I develop a "local-tropic" (Cutler 2007) theory of spatial coalitions, which begins from the premise that individuals' policy preferences do not stem from their understanding of their personal material interests, or their conception of what is required for the national interest,

but from an intrinsic concern for the local interest (i.e. for the welfare of the locales in which they are embedded). After presenting a philosophical and psychological argument about why individuals independently care about these local interests (in Section 3.4.1)-that is, after defending the view that individual preferences are indeed local-tropic—I develop an argument about how individuals ascertain the local interest (Section 3.4.2). In particular, I suggest that the local environments which individuals inhabit are associated with place-specific narratives of prosperity or stagnation; these narratives call forth individual emotional and psychological responses that inform intuitive and affect-laden conceptions of the local interest. I then apply this local-tropic framework to explain how the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide drives the emergence of spatial political coalitions over globalization that track this geographic divide (Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). Here, my argument is that global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes lead to very different everyday experiences of globalization "on the ground" in global cities and hinterlands⁸, and that these different experiences lead to local narratives of globalization-driven ascendance (in global cities) and globalization-driven decline (in hinterlands). These different place-based narratives in global cities and hinterlands, in turn, underpin affect-laden "pro-globalization" preferences among residents of global cities who favor globalization because they believe it is good for their locales, and "anti-globalization" preferences among residents of hinterlands, who believe that globalization harms the local interest.

I suggest that all of these theories of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might engender spatial coalitions over globalization are plausible, but that the local-

⁸ McNamara (2017) and Kahler (2017) make similar points, and this section builds on their efforts.

tropic account of spatial coalitions provides the most convincing explanation for how these coalitions form.

1.4.3 Overview of Chapter 4: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Evidence from Referenda in the UK and Costa Rica

Chapter 4 is the empirical counterpart to Chapter 3's theoretical investigation of how the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland cleavage might shape mass political coalitions over globalization. Its purpose is two-fold. First, it aims to empirically investigate whether the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands does indeed underpin internationalist "global city" political coalitions and protectionist "hinterland" political coalitions that are empirically distinct from mass foreign economic policy coalitions that scholars of IPE have theorized and documented in previous scholarship. The existence of such a relationship is predicted by all of the theories of spatial coalitions elaborated in Chapter 3 (i.e. ego-tropic, sociotropic, and local-tropic), and part of the central task of this chapter is to assess whether global city and hinterland foreign economic policy coalitions are indeed independent players in the mass politics of globalization. Second, to the extent that these coalitions exist, the chapter aims to empirically assess (in a preliminary fashion) the relative merits of the ego-tropic, sociotropic, and local-tropic theories of spatial coalitions that I developed in Chapter 3. In particular, to what extent is Chapter 3's suggestion—that the local-tropic account of preferences offers the most compelling explanation of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands comes to underpin spatial coalitions over globalization—borne out empirically?

To empirically investigate the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and spatial political coalitions over globalization, this chapter leverages spatially explicit data on voting patterns from recent public referenda on issues directly related to foreign economic policy. In particular, I use referendum data from the UK's referendum, held in the summer of 2016, concerning its continued membership in the European Union (hereafter, "Brexit"), and Costa Rica's referendum concerning its ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (hereafter CAFTA). Throughout this chapter, I use "Remain" votes from Brexit, and "Pro-Ratification" votes from the CAFTA referendum, as indicators of mass "proglobalization" sentiment (I explicitly defend this move in Section 4.2).

In Section 4.2, I present district-level observational evidence which suggests that in both referenda, mass "pro-globalization" sentiment is concentrated in districts within areas conventionally understood to be global cities; in other words, the spatial distribution of political support for globalization in these countries (as indicated by referendum results) broadly corresponds with the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and is therefore consistent with the existence of the mass "global city" and "hinterland" coalitions theorized in Chapter 3.

To more systematically assess whether the spatial distribution of political preferences associated with the Brexit referendum (documented in Section 4.2) does indeed reflect the presence of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (and is not simply a by-product of how coalitions that scholars of IPE have documented in previous scholarship happen to be distributed across space), Section 4.3 carries out a multivariate analysis of district-level Brexit voting patterns in which the independent variable of interest, developed using establishment-level data on the headquarter locations of

globally oriented "superstar" firms across hundreds of industries (discussed at length in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2), captures district-level variation in the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes. Section 4.6 carries out a similar multivariate analysis of district-level voting patterns in the CAFTA referendum, using an analogous independent variable that maps the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands onto voting districts with a measure of the district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes that is built from spatially explicit data on the locations of superstar headquarter establishments. In both the UK and Costa Rica, I find evidence for a systematic positive relationship between the empirical measures of the strength of global city agglomeration processes and the magnitude of "pro-globalization" sentiment at the district level; in other words, as district-level global city agglomeration processes strengthen, district-level support for "pro-globalization" positions increases, while as district-level global city agglomeration processes weaken (and hinterland dispersion processes correspondingly strengthen), district-level support for protectionist positions increases. These results are statistically significant and substantively important even after controlling for the presence of a range of other determinants of mass foreign economic policy preferences. In particular, in the UK, I find that increasing the district-level measure of global city agglomeration processes by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with up to a 2.15 point increase in a district's share of support for the internationalist "Remain" position, after controlling for a range of alternative determinants of mass foreign economic policy preferences; in Costa Rica, I find that increasing the district-level measure of global city agglomeration processes by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with up to a 1.46 point increase in a district's share of support for CAFTA ratification, after controlling for a range of alternative determinants of mass foreign economic policy preferences. These results point to the existence of

empirically distinctive spatial coalitions over globalization that are independently engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands.

Though the district-level analyses of Brexit (Section 4.3) and CAFTA (4.6) are richly suggestive, and point to the existence of district-level spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, they are unable, given the ecological inference problem, to test the arguments of Chapter 3 at the individual level. However, Section 4.4 draws on a large publicly available survey from the British Election Study—which contains data on intended vote choice in the Brexit Referendum, as well as fine-grain data on respondent locations—to explore the individual-level micro-foundations of spatial foreign economic policy coalitions. This section begins by situating individual respondents within UK commuter zones, and using the spatial data on superstar headquarters (discussed in Section 4.3) to develop an analogous measure of the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes at the commuter zone level; it classifies commuter zones as either "global city commuter zones" or "hinterland commuter zones", depending on the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes within the areas that they delimit. I show that even after controlling for a range of individual-level confounding variables, residents of global city commuter zones are up to 4.9% more likely than residents of hinterland commuter zones to support the pro-globalization "remain" position. This finding of an individual-level spatial political cleavage between residents of global city commuter zones and hinterland commuter zones is consistent with the expectations of the theories of spatial coalitions elaborated in Chapter 3.

Finally, Chapter 4 undertakes preliminary efforts to adjudicate between the theories developed in Chapter 3, and empirically assess whether the spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands are organized along ego-tropic, sociotropic,

or local-tropic lines. In Section 4.3.3, I provide evidence that residents of global city commuter zones are no more likely to develop favourable ego-tropic or sociotropic assessments of the economic status-quo (which is of course profoundly shaped by globalization and market integration) than residents of hinterland commuter zones; I suggest that this lack of a systematic difference between the pocketbook economic assessments of global city and hinterland commuter zone residents, as well as a lack of a systematic difference in their economic assessments of the national economy as a whole, constitutes suggestive evidence against the egotropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, respectively.

In Section 4.5, I develop a distinctive micro-level implication of the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions that diverges from the expectations of the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories. In particular, I argue that in light of the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes (discussed in Section 4.5.1), the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions would expect a corresponding "distance-decay" in public support for economic openness as we move outwards from the central business districts of global city commuter zones (where global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest) towards the "metropolitan peripheries" of these global city commuter zones. However, I argue that an "intra-global city commuter zone" spatial political cleavage over globalization between residents of the "metropolitan core" and "metropolitan periphery" is *not* an implication of the ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions; to the extent that we do in fact see a systematic tendency for "pro-globalization" preferences within global city commuter zones (as coded in Section 4.4) to decline along a distance gradient that traces the distance-decay of the strength of global city agglomeration processes, it would therefore suggest support for the local-tropic account of spatial coalitions more broadly. In Sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4, I document empirical evidence for such a pattern

(using the same Brexit survey data introduced in Section 4.4). In particular, I find that for every additional 10 kilometers in distance between a respondent and a global city commuter zone's central business district, the probability that a respondent supports "remain" declines by 3.6%; in other words, even after controlling for a range of individual-level confounding variables, a global city commuter zone resident that lives 40km away from the central business district (i.e. a respondent in the global city's metropolitan periphery) is 14.4% less likely to support the proglobalization "remain" position than a global city commuter zone resident that lives within CBD, where global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest. Though more work is of course needed, these results offer suggestive support for the local-tropic account of how spatial coalitions form, and suggestive evidence against the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions.

1.4.4 Overview of Chapter 5: Mass Spatial Coalitions and the Legislative Politics of Foreign Economic Policy: Evidence from the United States Congress

In Chapter 5, I explore how the mass spatial coalitions over globalization theorized in Chapter 3, and empirically documented in Chapter 4, shape the legislative politics of globalization. In particular, I argue that office-seeking elected representatives are sensitive to the spatially defined preferences of global city and hinterland coalitions within their districts, and that to the extent that these coalitions exert political influence over these representatives, legislative foreign economic policy coalitions—as reflected in patterns of legislative voting over foreign economic policy legislation—are expected to track the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In exploring how mass spatial coalitions over globalization shape the legislative politics of globalization, I focus on voting patterns over free trade bills in the United States Congress. Understanding the contours of the "protectionist" and "internationalist" coalitions in the United States Congress, as they manifest in patterns of legislative voting over trade policy, has been an especially active area of research within IPE, given the systemic importance of US foreign economic policy. However, the contemporary literature has not considered the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and the spatial organization of these legislative foreign economic policy coalitions; the analysis in this chapter therefore fills an important gap in the literature on the congressional politics of globalization in the United States.

I focus, in particular, on the period between 2004-2011, which I label the "post-NAFTA" era of US trade politics; during this time, the US Congress ratified twelve free-trade agreements, which fuelled a climate of increasing controversy over trade policy that continues to this day (Kucik and Moraguez 2013). After reviewing the history of US trade policy through the lens of political geography in Section 5.2, I make the argument (in Section 5.3) that office-seeking representatives have political incentives to appeal to mass global city or hinterland coalitions within their electoral districts in order to build the winning coalitions that will secure their hold on office; this suggests that representatives from districts with relatively large mass "global city coalitions" will be more likely to support free trade legislation than legislators from districts with relatively large "hinterland coalitions". In the context of the time period under consideration, I argue that these spatial coalitions are likely to have played a particularly important role in shaping the voting behaviour of Democratic representatives, thereby contributing to the emergence of intra-party legislative divisions over globalization within the Democratic Party,

which in turn led to the genesis of the bipartisan legislative support coalition for free-trade that prevailed during the post-NAFTA era.

In Section 5.4, I evaluate these arguments empirically using a dataset that pools roll call votes over free trade legislation (following the approach of Broz 2011 and Milner and Tingley 2011) during this time period. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether a representative voted to support the free trade agreement under consideration, or to oppose it. My independent variable of interest—developed using spatially explicit data on superstar headquarter locations in the United States, spatial data on commuter zones and congressional districts, and micro-level data on the distribution of the US population across geographic space— is a continuous measure of the share of a congressional district's population that lives within a global city commuter zone (defined as in Section 4.4 in Chapter 4); this variable reflects the relative magnitude of districtlevel global city coalitions within representatives' districts. After estimating a series of probit and linear probability models with an extensive suite of district and legislator-level controls, I find that, consistent with expectations, the probability that Democratic representatives vote in favour of free trade legislation is significantly affected by the relative size of global city coalitions within their districts. In particular, increasing the independent variable of interest (the district's share of the population within a global city's commuter zone) by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with up to a 7% increase in the probability that a Democratic representative votes in favour of free trade legislation.

I close this chapter, in Section 5.5, with a discussion of recent developments in American trade politics, and the implications of the chapter's arguments and results for the future evolution of the legislative politics of trade (and the politics of globalization more broadly) in the United States.

1.4.5 Overview of Chapter 6: The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions, Electoral Regimes, and Trade Policy: A Cross-National Investigation

In Chapter 6, I broaden the empirical domain, and consider how the electoral geography of global city coalitions—in particular, the spatial distribution of mass global city coalitions across electoral districts—affects cross-national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes. More specifically, I theorize how the relationship between electoral regimes (in particular, the electoral rules that translate votes into seats), and the geographic distribution of global city coalitions across electoral districts, shapes the relative political clout of these global city coalitions; empirically, I evaluate whether cross-national variation in the relative clout of global city coalitions (as it is shaped by this relationship) affects cross-national variation in trade policy outcomes.

My argument draws on previous work on electoral geography and the mass politics of redistribution, as well as previous scholarship in IPE that adopts the median-voter framework to explain cross-national variation in trade policy outcomes. I argue that the relative concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions across electoral districts has an important impact on aggregate levels of trade protection in countries with majoritarian electoral rules and single member districts (or more generally, in countries with low-district magnitude electoral systems). In such institutional contexts, the relative concentration of global city coalitions with respect the electoral map leads to an "inefficient" clustering of "pro-globalization" global city residents, and weakens their electoral clout compared to the protectionist residents of hinterland areas; this relative diminution in the electoral clout of global city coalitions pulls trade policy in a relatively protectionist direction. In contrast, when global city coalitions are dispersed across the electoral

map in majoritarian systems, relatively fewer votes from "pro-globalization" global city residents are "wasted", which increases their relative electoral clout, and thereby yields relatively more internationalist trade policies. However, in proportional representation systems (or more generally, in high-district magnitude systems), votes are not "wasted" to the same extent, and so the electoral geography of global city coalitions is unlikely to condition the relative value of "pro-globalization" votes from global city residents; as a result, the relative concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions with respect to the electoral map is likely to be less important (and possibly unimportant) for trade policy outcomes in more permissive electoral regimes.

In short, these arguments suggest that increases in the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions should be associated with higher levels of trade protection in lowproportionality electoral systems (since increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions, in such electoral regimes, diminishes their electoral clout), but that variation in the geographic distribution of global city coalitions across electoral districts is not likely to have a meaningful impact on trade policy outcomes in high-proportionality electoral systems. I evaluate these arguments empirically by carrying out a cross-sectional analysis of trade policy outcomes in a sample of developed and developing countries with democratically competitive elections. My research design closely tracks that of previous work on political institutions and crossnational variation in foreign economic policy outcomes (for instance, Evans 2009). I measure levels of trade protection, the outcome variable, using measures of applied and trade-weighted tariffs provided by the WTO and the World Bank. I use country-level data on the locations of superstar headquarter establishments, as well as spatial data on the electoral boundaries used in elections, to develop a proxy indicator of the relative concentration of global city coalitions across electoral districts. To explore how electoral regimes condition the policy impact of the

spatial distribution of these coalitions across electoral districts, I interact this measure of the electoral concentration of global city coalitions with another indicator variable that classifies electoral regimes into majoritarian and PR systems. Consistent with expectations, I find that increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are associated with a statistically significant and substantively important increase in levels of tariff protection in countries with majoritarian electoral regimes, even after including a range of economic and political control variables; in particular, increasing our measure of the electoral concentration of global city coalitions by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with up to a 3.95% increase in tariff rates in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. Importantly, I also find that (consistent with expectations) this relationship does not hold in countries with electoral regimes based on proportional representation. I find analogous results when using a continuous measure of district-magnitude to capture the proportionality of electoral systems, instead of a dichotomous measure of whether a country uses majoritarian or PR electoral rules.

1.5 Conclusion: The Contribution of the Dissertation

Global cities host high-density agglomerations of the strategic activities—carried out in the corporate headquarters of "superstar" firms and in the head offices of advanced producer services firms— that help globally oriented superstar firms carry out their cross-border operations. These economic activities are associated with large globalization-driven local multiplier effects, thereby contributing to the emergence of global cities as the most prominent territorial beneficiaries of globalization. At the same time, however, firm and establishmentlevel location patterns in the context of globalization have also contributed to the stagnation and "hollowing out" of a vast hinterland of provincial and unproductive cities and regions that have become globalization's territorial "losers". In the words of Sassen (2006):

Once we focus on places, whether cities or other types of places, rather than whole national economies, we can easily take account of the fact that some places even in the richest countries are becoming poorer, or that a global city in a developing country can become richer even as the rest of the country becomes poorer. An analysis of places...produces a highly variable mosaic of results. Alongside these new global and regional hierarchies of cities is a vast territory that has become increasingly peripheral and is excluded from the major processes that fuel economic growth in the new global economy (Sassen 2006, 7).

Surprisingly, this economic geography of global cities and hinterlands has not been investigated, let alone acknowledged, by existing scholarship in IPE. As a result, our understanding of their political implications remains anecdotal. This project therefore represents the first attempt within the empirical IPE literature to systematically investigate how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and the spatial distribution of contemporary globalization's benefits and costs across these distinctive territorial formations, shapes the politics of globalization. In particular, by grafting the analytical framework of Open Economy Politics (OEP) onto the empirical study of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, it brings the political relevance of this economic geography into theoretical and empirical focus. It also suggests a rich agenda for future research; I return to this point in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 2: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands

2.1 Introduction

The analysis of the domestic politics of globalization typically begins with an attempt to specify the redistributive impact of globalization across relevant actors or units of analysis. Past scholarship has considered how globalization redistributes income or material well-being across units such as factors of production, sectors, or (more recently) firms. However, it has not considered how micro-level agglomeration and dispersion forces operating on heterogeneous firms and plants, and their corresponding regional economic effects, shape the broader distributional impact of globalization across space. In this chapter, I therefore synthesize several literatures to present an account of how specific micro-level agglomeration and dispersion incentives shaped by the emergence of a global marketplace give rise to distinctive territorial formations known as global cities and hinterlands, which in turn come to have fundamentally different economic interests with respect to globalization.

In short, this chapter presents a conceptual discussion of the fundamental independent variable of interest in this dissertation—the spatial economic cleavage with respect to globalization between "global cities" (the territorial "winners" of globalization) and

"hinterlands" (the territorial "losers" of globalization)¹—with a view towards elaborating the economic and geographic processes that give rise to this spatial structure of interests. In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of the processes which constitute global cities and hinterlands as distinctive territorial formations that win and lose, respectively, from economic globalization.

This discussion of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands sets the stage for subsequent chapters, which explore, in theoretical (Chapter 3) and empirical (Chapters 4 to 6) terms, how this spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands affects political outcomes at different levels of analysis. In short, before we can develop an explicitly spatial account of the international political economy that investigates the political implications of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, we must first clarify the nature of this economic geography, and identify the processes which constitute global cities and hinterlands as territorial formations with distinctive interests over globalization.

In what follows, I begin, in Section 2.2, with a brief introduction to the contemporary economics literature on globalization and firm heterogeneity; the central ideas of this literature provide a foundation for the discussion in Section 2.3, which explores how firm and establishment-level patterns of agglomeration and dispersion constitute global cities and hinterlands, respectively, as distinctive territorial formations. In Section 2.4, I explore the implications of these agglomeration and dispersion dynamics for broader patterns of metropolitan and regional economic growth and decline in response to globalization;

¹ I use the following terms interchangeably, to denote the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands with respect to their interests over globalization (with the former benefitting from globalization, and the latter declining): "spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands", "economic geography of global cities and hinterlands", "economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide".

specifically, I examine how and why global cities have emerged as globalization's primary territorial beneficiaries, at the expense of hinterlands. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter with a summary account of the processes that constitute global cities and hinterlands as distinctive territorial formations that win and lose, respectively, from globalization, and looks ahead to the subsequent chapters that explore how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands uncovered in this chapter affects the politics of globalization.

2.2 Preliminaries: Firm Heterogeneity, Superstar Firms, and the Firm-Level Effects of Globalization

Perhaps the most striking fact about international trade, one which has motivated the current generation of research on the topic, is that at the firm level, "engaging in international trade is an exceedingly rare activity"; in the United States, for instance, only 4% of the 5.5 million firms operating in the year 2000 engaged export markets (Bernard et al 2007, 105). This is because entering export markets entails high fixed costs that most firms (even those in comparative advantage sectors) cannot bear; they therefore remain domestic firms that produce solely for the national market. However, a small handful of firms (in both comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage industries) are able—due to their relatively high productivity levels— to bear the fixed costs of international market entry, and therefore engage in exporting and multinational production. This has been the central insight in the international economics literature on firm heterogeneity, which is colloquially known as the "new new trade theory" (Bernard et al 2012). The first wave of the literature on firm heterogeneity emphasized the productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters, and how trade liberalization leads

to the redistribution of income between firms on different ends of the productivity spectrum; Plouffe (2012; 2017) and Kim (2017) draw out important political implications of this process, showing that relatively productive firms tend to favor globalization and trade liberalization, while less productive firms seek import protection.

More recent work in the firm heterogeneity literature has underscored not only the distinctions between internationally engaged firms and domestic ones, but distinctions among internationally engaged firms. That is, even among the set of internationally engaged firms, internationalized activity is highly concentrated among a small number of especially large and productive "superstar" firms. Bernard et al (2007) note, for instance, that *among* the United States's relatively small number of exporters in the year 2000, "the top 10 percent accounted for 96% of total US exports" (Bernard et al 2007, 105). In other words, out of 220,000 trading firms in the US at this time (4% of 5.5 million), only 22,000 firms accounted for 96% of the exporting activity. Nor is this remarkable skew in international engagement a developed world phenomenon. For instance, Freund and Pierola (2015) show that in a large sample of developing countries from 2006-2008, the "top one percent of exporters [accounted] for 53% of exports" while the "top five percent of firms [accounted] for almost 80 percent of exports on average" (2). In short, the high degree of concentration of internationalized activity amongst a small number of superstar firms is a robust result, and has been documented in a number of studies across different national contexts (see, for instance, Mayer and Ottaviano 2008; Bernard, Van Beveren, and Vandenbussche 2014; Muuls and Pisu 2009).

Not surprisingly, these superstar firms disproportionately benefit from globalization and market liberalization. In their study of preferential trade agreements, for instance, Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth (2017) use a firm-level dataset of US multinationals to convincingly document

that the "largest and most productive firms disproportionately reap the benefits of liberalization...even among MNCs [multinational corporations], the most competitive economic actors in the world economy" (379). This skewed distribution of benefits from globalization at the firm level arises through what might be considered a "product market channel" and a "factor market channel" (Melitz 2003, 1715-1716).² The product market channel works through "the increase in product market competition associated with trade: firms face an increasing number of competitors; furthermore the new foreign competitors, on average, are more productive than the domestic firms" (Melitz 2003, 1716). In other words, liberalization leads to increased import competition, which puts downward pressure on firm profits. The factor market channel works through the impact of liberalization on the labor market: "trade induces increased competition for scarce labor resources as real wages are bid up by the relatively more productive firms who expand production to serve the export markets" (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008, 307). Together, these forces induce low-productivity firms to either contract, or exit the market entirely, since low-productivity firms have difficulty withstanding the increased competition and increased costs associated with globalization as it works through these product and factor market channels. On the other hand, "since the largest and most productive firms can afford to charge lower prices and can absorb higher wages, they expand sales to liberalizing countries at the expense of smaller less-productive firms" (Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth 2017, 379). In short, the labormarket and competitive effects of liberalization force firms below the productivity threshold for international engagement into decline, and eliminate the lowest productivity firms from the market altogether.

² Melitz 2003 considers the factor market channel, while Melitz and Ottaviano 2008 considers the product market channel

To be sure, it is worth noting that liberalization in period *t* lowers the productivity threshold required for exporting relative to the previous time period, *t-1*; liberalization therefore makes it possible for firms previously just below the productivity threshold to enter export markets. However, these "marginal exporter" firms are not "winners" of liberalization to the same extent as superstars. Osgood et al (2017) note, for instance, that in the wake of liberalization, a "marginal exporter who just barely earns a positive profit from exporting" benefits from expanded foreign market access, but must also confront increased competition from expanded imports (136); on the other hand, while superstars "also face increased import competition, their lower costs enable them to absorb these changes with relative ease" (Plouffe 2017, 5). In other words, superstars are less sensitive to the (profit-reducing) competition and factor market effects of liberalization than marginal exporters. The upshot is that the "biggest winners from globalization may be a relatively small group of large high-volume exporters", i.e.

In the next section (2.3) I consider how the distinctive information and skill-intensive tasks that superstar firms must carry out in order to engage global markets give rise to distinctive firm and plant-level location patterns that ultimately (when scaled up) manifest as the broader territorial formations that we call global cities and hinterlands.

2.3 Globalization and the Emergence of Global Cities and Hinterlands as Territorial Formations

Braudel (1984) famously notes that "a world-economy always has an urban center of gravity, a city, as the logistic heart of its activity" (27). Nevertheless, the continued importance

of cities in the contemporary epoch of globalization seems like something of a puzzle. After all, the dramatic reduction in transportation and communication costs has contributed to an unprecedented geographic extension of production and the growth of truly globe-spanning supply chains; why hasn't this "flattening" out of production simultaneously undermined cities as economically important territorial units? Instead, certain cities are more important than ever, leaving us to come to terms with a paradoxical situation in which geography seems at once less important than ever and more important than ever. Saskia Sassen's scholarly project (2001; 2006) might be understood as an attempt to come to terms with this paradox. She argues that certain cities are increasingly important in our globalized world not in spite of the flattening and fragmentation of global production, but rather because of it. These processes are inextricably bound together, and can only be understood in conjunction: certain cities have grown in importance as the physical sites in which cross-border flows are coordinated, mediated, and managed precisely because of the reductions in transportation and communication costs that have allowed globalization to transcend previous geographic constraints and limitations. To understand this dialectical relationship between spatial concentration and dispersal-to understand how "global cities" are formed and the role they play in the global economy-it is necessary to first step back, and consider the mechanisms that drive economic actors to cluster in space in the first place.

2.3.1 The Emergence of Global Cities: Global City Agglomeration Economies and the Territorial Agglomeration of the Headquarters of Superstar and Advanced Producer Services Firms

Why would firms cluster in space, given the obvious costs (congestion, higher rents, and more competition, to name a few) of doing so? In short, the economic geography and urban

economics literatures have suggested that they do so because clustering in urban areas offers these firms benefits that redound to their productivity. These productivity benefits of spatial clustering-known in the literature as "agglomeration economies"-flow from three distinct mechanisms. In particular, by concentrating in space, businesses benefit from the opportunity to access a diverse and specialized labor pool (i.e. labor market pooling), share access to the producers of intermediate producers (i.e. input sharing), and acquire access to valuable information and knowledge through their social and economic interactions (i.e. knowledge spillovers). It is worthwhile to consider these different drivers of the productivity benefits of agglomeration (that is, agglomeration economies) in turn. Consider, first, labor market pooling. The spatial concentration of firms leads to the simultaneous agglomeration of workers, who locate near job opportunities; the result is a thick and diversified labor market, which offers a number of benefits to firms and workers, the most important one being that it facilitates the speed and efficiency of substantive matching between the needs of employers and employees, while reducing the costs of mismatches (Puga 2010, 12). Input sharing refers to the "advantages for final producers of being able to share a larger common base of suppliers" (Puga 2010, 8). That is, if economies of scale exist in the production of intermediate goods (i.e. inputs to the producers of final good), input producers have incentives to concentrate their production geographically in order to achieve efficient scale; in response, downstream firms (which purchase inputs to produce final products for the market) choose to co-locate with their upstream suppliers, and thereby enjoy convenient access to a variety of inputs. Finally, and perhaps most intuitively, economic agglomeration facilitates the creation and transmission of new knowledge by stimulating productivity-enhancing information flows between firms (as well as between individuals). Marshall's evocative description of information spillovers contains perhaps the

most famous passage in the entire literature on agglomeration economies, and is therefore worth quoting:

The mysteries of the trade become no mystery; but are as it were in the air...Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the business have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas (quoted in Krugman 1991, 38).

Labor market pooling, input sharing, and knowledge spillovers have long been recognized as the sources of urban agglomeration economies, and scholars thus trace urbanization as a general phenomenon to these mechanisms. However, these longstanding mechanisms have more recently, in the contemporary age of globalization, given rise to a more specific and distinctive urban form, which scholars have labelled the "global city". To understand how, we must explore the different agglomeration and dispersion incentives faced by the superstar and domestic firms introduced in Section 2.2.

In particular, Sassen's (2001, 2006) model of the global city begins from the insight that in the present era of globalization, globally oriented superstar firms must negotiate not only the complexities of foreign trade, but must often also (since many of these superstars are multinationals) manage intricate and far-flung supply chains and networks of plants and subsidiaries spread across the globe. The cognitive, managerial, and operational tasks of engaging export markets and managing these far-flung operations is increasingly complex, and carried out by a highly specialized labor force, both within the headquarters of these superstar firms, but also within globally oriented business services firms ("superstars" in their own right) hired by superstar firms (given the complexity of the tasks involved) to provide the "inputs" legal, financial, managerial, communications and information technology, advertising, and

general strategic services—that superstar firms rely on to manage and coordinate their crossborder business operations. We can thus trace the emergence of the distinctive urban form of the "global city" to the ways in which the geographic clustering of the headquarters of global firms allows these firms to successfully engage global markets: to manage their global operations, superstar headquarter establishments must work in a dense information environment that facilitates information sharing and face-to-face communication (knowledge spillovers) with highly specialized business services firms that help their in-house teams carry out complex global coordination tasks (input sharing) in a setting that gives them access to highly specialized pools of labor (labor-market pooling).

In other words, the headquarters and front offices of globally oriented superstar and producer services firms derive significant benefits from clustering in select cities that, by virtue of their presence, become "global cities". These benefits, which I label "global city agglomeration economies", are underpinned by the ways in which familiar agglomeration mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the business activities (carried out in these headquarters) that enable superstar firms to engage global markets. For convenience, we can recount the ways in which spatial agglomeration in select metropolitan areas facilitates the activities of superstar and global producer services headquarters:

• Knowledge Spillovers: The management and coordination of global business activities is extremely complex and knowledge and information (of the non-routine variety) intensive. Sassen (2001) emphasizes that the producer services and financial firms which superstar firms hire to help them carry out such tasks are driven to cluster in high-density global cities because their business models require them to quickly process and exchange ambiguous, non-codifiable, and non-routine information in environments that require

high levels of trust, which often requires teamwork in face-to-face settings (Sassen 2001; Storper and Venables 2004; Drennan 1996). Superstar firm headquarters also carry out information intensive activities and benefit from information spillovers.³ Global trade and engagement, after all, requires activities such as marketing, repackaging, finding distribution channels, and meeting regulatory requirements; such activities are more effectively carried out in dense environments that offer opportunities for learning and information sharing (Bekes and Harasztosi 2009).

- Input Sharing: Sassen's account of the global city emphasizes the importance of business and producer services firms (the input suppliers of superstar firms), while other scholars draw attention to superstar firms themselves, and in particular their headquarters units (Erie 2004; Chakravorty and Lall 2007; Clark 2003). The important point, however, is that according to the logic of input sharing, superstar headquarters (which purchase services from global producer services firms, and in particular their front offices, where the most strategic activity is carried out) have an incentive to locate close to upstream suppliers that are subject to agglomeration economies (i.e. globally oriented business services; this is particularly important, because while the strategic coordination of superstars' global business is partly outsourced to business services firms, it is also partly carried out in-house, and colocation with their upstream suppliers helps facilitate the communication and collaboration necessary to carry out complementary tasks.
- Labor-Market Pooling: Successfully overseeing and managing globalized activities requires access to a highly specialized labor force. The spatial agglomeration of superstar

³ Though Sassen does not emphasize this to the same extent.

and global producer services headquarters leads to the emergence of global cities as physical sites that facilitate the efficient matching of highly specialized workers with firms that have highly specialized needs as a result of the complexity of managing crossborder activities. Global cities are formed, in other words, partly because the headquarters and front-offices of globalized superstar and advanced producer services firms need to locate where highly-specialized workers capable of managing these complex global operations are located, while highly-specialized workers with expertise in managing tasks that are global in scope need to locate where demand for their services is concentrated. These circular and self-reinforcing dynamics of spatial agglomeration lead to the creation of "thick" labor markets (Moretti 2013, 125-129), which allows firms with global operations to minimize labor market frictions (i.e. search and matching costs) that would otherwise undermine the efficiency of their operations, while allowing specialized workers the opportunity to put their skills to appropriate use. A superstar firm that needs to hire someone with expertise on arcane market regulations in foreign markets to work closely with its in-house counsel from headquarters would probably find the recruiting process considerably easier in Chicago than in Iowa City, just as an individual with this expertise would find the job-search process considerably easier in Chicago than in Iowa City; this is because the market for specialized labor with globally relevant expertise is so much thicker in Chicago.

In short, certain types of economic activity—especially high-level strategic and management activities that oversee the globalized operations of global firms—derive substantial benefits from clustering in particular cities. These cities effectively become "global cities" as a result of their role as the territorial sites of agglomeration for these large "concentrations of headquarters of global corporations [and exporters]...head offices of producer services organizations", and (often) major financial market institutions (Clark 2003, 152).

This conception of the benefits of geographic agglomeration for the headquarter operations of the most globally engaged firms (i.e. global city agglomeration economies), and its implications for the urban form of certain cities, underpins what might be called the global city "model" elaborated by Sassen (2001). Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen (2013) provide a useful and concise summary of this global city model:

Internationalizing firms need a global supply of business services to support their foreign operations; such services, in turn, are based on high information velocity, and consequently tend to be highly localized in their agglomeration patterns (Arzaghi and Henderson 2008). In particular, Dunning and Norman (1983) found that international business service firms located their European offices in London, Brussels, and Paris in order to be close to their customers (generally MNEs⁴). This means that both MNEs and their business service providers will tend to cluster around narrowly defined points in geographic space. This explanation of global city emergence, pioneered by Sassen (1991, 1994) focuses on the specialization and agglomeration of advanced producer services (e.g. finance, law, accounting, and advertising), suggesting that today's global cities-by virtue of being production spaces for the key inputs that complex organizations need for their global operations-are command and control points in the organization of the world economy (Sassen, 2012) (Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen 2013, 430).

In other words, the front offices of the advanced business services that superstar exporters and multinationals hire to help coordinate their global businesses have strong incentives to cluster together in a handful of select urban areas, in light of the unique importance of an information-rich environment with thick labor markets for these producer services firms; moreover, the headquarters of superstar exporters and multinationals (which also carry out highlevel strategic business activities) also benefit from locating nearby, so as to enjoy easy access to

⁴ Multinational enterprises

these advanced services (i.e. exploit opportunities for input sharing), as well as to independently enjoy the information and labor-market benefits made possible by agglomeration in these cities. The handful of cities in which these strategic coordination activities (dedicated to the management of the geographically dispersed production operations of superstar firms) converge, so as to realize these agglomeration benefits, are known as global cities, because of their distinctive role (by virtue of these agglomeration patterns) as the territorial "command centers" of the global economy (Sassen 2001). I therefore refer to the productivity-enhancing economic benefits that the headquarters of these superstar and advanced producer services firms derive from clustering in these cities—benefits that facilitate their global management activities and which flow, as discussed above, from the opportunities to share a labor pool, easily access input suppliers, and exchange information through spatial agglomeration—as "global city agglomeration economics".⁵

2.3.2 The Emergence of Hinterlands: Global City Agglomeration Diseconomies and the Territorial Dispersal of Domestic Firms and Superstar Branch Plants

In Section 2.3.1 above, I suggested that given the nature of the economic tasks that the headquarters of globally oriented superstar firms and producer services perform, the benefits of geographic agglomeration in major urban areas outweigh the costs (which come, for instance, in the form of higher rents and wages in large cities, as well as greater congestion) for these economic actors; as a result, they tend to cluster in a small handful of major cities that, in light of

⁵ So far as I am aware, this particular shorthand to refer to the collective benefits that these business activities enjoy from the spatial clustering that gives rise to global cities has not been used in the previous literature; of course, the underlying idea has been developed by others (most prominently, by the scholars that I cite in this section).

their ensuing role as the territorial platforms for the business activities that effectively coordinate and oversee the global economy, become known as "global cities." I use the label "global city agglomeration economies" to denote the distinctive benefits that these complex, globally oriented economic activities enjoy from clustering in the select urban areas that, by virtue of their presence, become global cities.

For low-productivity domestic firms, lower-end business services that serve domestic firms, and the production plants and back-offices of globally oriented superstar firms—unlike for the headquarters of superstar firms and the front offices of global producer services firms—the benefits of agglomeration in global cities (i.e. global city agglomeration economies) are considerably lower than the costs. I use the label "global city agglomeration diseconomies" to denote the substantial costs associated with clustering in these urban areas.

In particular, for the more routine tasks carried out by superstar production plants, domestic firms, and the less complex business services that serve domestic producers, the density of the information environment is less important for their business operations, since routine tasks and procedures can be more easily codified and standardized. Moreover, because these tasks involve less uncertainty and less complexity, face-to-face communication is less important, and collaboration across large distances more feasible. It is for such business activities that the modern revolutions in communications, transportation, and information technologies have made the "death of distance" a reality; in contrast, for business activities that require engagement with ideas and the coordination of operations that are global in scope, agglomeration is as crucial and beneficial as ever, since it facilitates access to the local knowledge and opportunities for face-toface collaboration without which (perhaps paradoxically) the global economy could not exist in its current form (Storper and Venables 2003; Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007).

It is also worth noting that domestic firms and business services don't require access to a highly specialized labor force, clustered in global cities, which possesses the expertise needed to manage global economic activities; producing for the domestic market is relatively simpler, and less skill-intensive, and it is not as important for such firms to cluster in large global cities in order to access a highly-skilled and highly-specialized labor pool. As Moretti (2013) suggests, the benefits of labor market pooling are more important for highly skilled and highly specialized workers and the firms that need to hire them, than it is for less specialized workers with more generic skills and *their* prospective employers. The intuition is best conveyed through an example: a firm could find a lawyer to draw up a simple contract in any city or town in in the country; on the other hand, a superstar firm that needs to find a lawyer with Chinese language skills to handle an intellectual property dispute that is headed towards international arbitration does not enjoy such flexibility. Locating in the thick labor market of a global city *is* important for the headquarter operations of a superstar firm which needs the second type of lawyer; it is *not* so important for a domestic firm which primarily needs the first type of lawyer.⁶

The *benefits* of clustering in a few large global cities are therefore markedly lower for firms and business services serving the domestic market, as well as for superstar plants engaged in routine production tasks dedicated to implementing strategic decisions formulated in corporate headquarters, than they are for the headquarters of superstars and global producer services; on the other hand, the *costs* of doing so are the same. As noted above, these global city agglomeration diseconomies take various forms. For instance, global cities are more congested⁷,

⁶ Nor is it important for the production plant or back office of a superstar firm, since these units are tasked with performing relatively routine tasks; if a multisite superstar firm needs to work with the second type of lawyer, that lawyer will likely work with headquarters, not a production plant or back office. ⁷ This is generally true, but anyone who has spent time negotiating traffic in the global cities of the

developing world is especially well-positioned to understand how disruptive such congestion can be)

denser economic environments are more competitive, and the direct costs of doing business (in the form of rents and wages) are also higher. For these domestic firms and superstar branches carrying out routine operations, the costs of clustering in global cities are thus considerably higher than the benefits, which makes these global cities economically unattractive locations in which to do business. In other words, for such firms and plants, global city agglomeration diseconomies outweigh global city agglomeration economies; as a result, these economic actors disperse across a broader "hinterland" outside global cities (Drennan 1996; Duranton and Puga 2005).⁸

In short, differences in the relative importance of global city agglomeration economies and global city agglomeration diseconomies for different sorts of economic activities generate different micro-level location incentives for different types of economic activity; the aggregate result of these different micro-level location incentives is a distinctive topography of economic activity whose constituent elements are global cities and hinterlands.

Global cities are cities which host large and high-density territorial agglomerations of globally oriented superstar and producer services headquarters, which disproportionately benefit from clustering in a handful of large urban environments; on the other hand, hinterlands regions lie outside these global cities, and play host to domestically oriented firms, as well as the backoffices and plants of globally oriented superstar firms, for whom the costs of spatial agglomeration in these global cities outweigh the benefits.

⁸ Bekes and Harasztosi (2009) provide empirical evidence for these location incentives by showing that internationally engaged firms benefit more from agglomeration economies than domestic firms; they show that in Hungary, a doubling of population (a proxy for agglomeration) within a given area leads to a 12% productivity boost for international firms, but only a 6% percent boost for domestic ones.

2.3.3 Summary: Establishment-Level Location Incentives and the Territorial Foundations of Global Cities and Hinterlands

We can summarize the foregoing discussion in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 as follows. The "commanding heights" of the global economy-the strategic activities that underpin and facilitate global production and exchange, typically carried out in the headquarters of superstar firms and the front-offices of the globally oriented services firms with which they collaborate benefit from spatial agglomeration. As a result of these benefits, such economic activities therefore tend to cluster in a handful of large, high-density cities. As the geographic base of operations for the headquarters and front offices of superstar and global producer services firms, these cities become the territorial linchpins of the global economy. However, the benefits of clustering in what sociologists and geographers have labelled "global cities" are considerably lower for low-productivity domestic firms, as well as the plants and back offices of superstar firms, which carry out "lower-end" economic activities that can be performed more costeffectively outside global cities; as a result, these economic actors disperse across a cheaper and lower density hinterland outside global cities (Drennan 1996, 551; Duranton and Puga 2005; Scott 2008). In other words, for the relatively simple or routine economic activities primarily carried out by domestic firms and the production plants of global firms, global city agglomeration economies (i.e. the benefits of clustering in global cities) are outweighed by global city agglomeration diseconomies (i.e. the costs of locating in global cities); these centrifugal dispersion incentives lead to the creation of a low-density hinterland that plays host to a geographically dispersed assemblage of low-end economic activities that either serve the domestic market, or which constitute links in the geographically dispersed supply chains of global firms. Drennan (1996), quoting Buck et al's (1992) discussion of producer services in

Britain, usefully summarizes the more general agglomeration and dispersion incentives faced by different economic actors, which scale up into the aggregate location patterns that we observe in the world:

The financial and producer services sector is rather diverse. Agglomeration economies are vitally important for those parts of the sector involved with the financial markets, international business and company headquarters, which tend to be concentrated in the City and West End. Other elements, including back offices carrying out more routine functions, and establishments serving a more local and regional market, are dispersed among a series of subsidiary centers with lower rent levels (quoted in Drennan 1996, 367).

The spatial distribution of economic activity arising from the operation of these forces

can be summarized in the following table (Table 2.1):

Table 2.1: Global City Agglomeration Economies, Diseconomies, and Establishment Location

 Incentives

| Economic Actors Clustering in Global | Economic Actors Dispersed Across |
|--|---|
| Cities because global city agglomeration | Hinterlands because global city |
| economies (i.e. benefits of agglomeration in | agglomeration economies (i.e. benefits of |
| global cities) are greater than global city | agglomeration in global cities) are less than |
| agglomeration diseconomies (i.e. costs of | global city agglomeration diseconomies (i.e. |
| agglomeration in global cities) | costs of agglomeration in global cities) |
| Main offices of Advanced Business Services | Domestic Firms and Financial and Business |
| and Financial Firms serving Superstar firms | Services firms serving domestic firms |
| Headquarters of globally oriented superstar | Production plants and back offices of |
| firms | "superstar" firms and business services |
| | carrying out codified and routine work |

2.4 Global Cities, Hinterlands, and the Territorial Distribution of Globalization's Benefits and Costs

The discussion in Section 2.3 underscores that global cities and hinterlands are territorial formations that arise from micro-level location incentives that operate at the firm and plant level. In particular, the headquarter operations of globally oriented superstar firms and advanced producer services are subject to centripetal agglomeration forces that pull them towards certain urban areas where they derive distinctive benefits (given the nature of the tasks they undertake) from geographic co-location (i.e. global city agglomeration economies); on the other hand, for domestically oriented firms and the production plants and back-offices that are part of the extensive supply chains of superstar firms, the costs of clustering in global cities (i.e. global city agglomeration diseconomies) exceed the benefits, and these economic activities therefore disperse across a large hinterland region outside of these global cities.

This section considers the broader territorial economic implications of the location patterns arising from these agglomeration and dispersion incentives. In particular, it provides an account of how the global cities discussed above become the territorial "winners" of globalization, while hinterland regions become globalization's territorial "losers." The answer to the question of how and why the economic benefits of globalization come to be concentrated in global cities, while the costs of globalization are borne by hinterlands, is not obvious; after all, while the headquarters of superstar firms and advanced global producer services are concentrated in global cities, they nonetheless make up only a fraction of a global city's economic base, which also includes a large share of non-tradable services that are not directly linked to the global economy. Moreover, while hinterlands contain disproportionately large shares of domestically

oriented firms and services, they are not shut out of the global economy entirely, since the supply chains of global firms extend through these large hinterland regions. We therefore need an account of how the location patterns described above generate a territorial axis of "winners and losers" over globalization that maps on to the territorial division between global cities and hinterlands. In other words, we must address the following question: what are the mechanisms that link the agglomeration and dispersion forces discussed in the previous sections to a divergence in the broader territorial economic interests of global cities and hinterlands with respect to globalization? How exactly, in short, do global cities emerge as globalization's territorial "winners", and hinterlands its territorial "losers"? In Section 2.3.1, I consider the processes by which global cities have emerged as globalization's territorial winners; in Section 2.3.2, I consider how the mirror image of the processes analyzed in Section 2.3.1 contribute to the globalization-driven stagnation and decline of hinterland regions.

2.4.1 Global Cities as the Territorial "Winners" of Globalization: The Territorial Agglomeration of Superstar Headquarters and Front-Offices, the Positive Local Multiplier Effects of Globalization, and Globalization-Driven Prosperity in Global Cities

My central argument in this section is that the economic benefits of globalization are concentrated in global cities, which thereby become the territorial "winners" of globalization, because the territorial agglomeration of the headquarters of superstar firms and advanced producer services in these cities is associated with large globalization-driven local multiplier effects that underpin the growth and prosperity of the broader metropolitan economies of global cities.

Recall that globalization leads to the reallocation of resources from declining firms to the firms which engage global markets, and especially the superstars that engage foreign markets most intensely (Osgood et al 2017, 136; see also Section 2.2 above). The increased incomes flowing to superstar firms as a result of globalization are partly paid out to their (existing and new) employees; in a recent analysis of some of the political consequences of the Melitz model's labor market effects, Walter (2017) notes that when superstars earn increased revenues as a result of expanded exports, they "partly redistribute [this additional revenue] to their high-ability workforce" (57). Superstar employees are in general more highly-skilled than the employees of domestic firms, but the most highly-skilled and highly paid of these superstar employees tend to work in headquarter operations located in global cities, where they carry out the non-routine and information sensitive tasks that benefit from spatial agglomeration (Moretti 2013: 78, 118). Moreover, we also would expect liberalization to lead to increased incomes for the employees of global producer services firms, whose businesses expand as liberalization increases demand for their services among superstars with expanded international portfolios, as well as among newly international firms that now need their assistance engaging foreign markets. The wellcompensated employees of superstar headquarters and the front offices of global producer services firms, in turn, spend a substantial part of their increased incomes on purchases of local services in the global cities in which they reside. These initial purchases lead to multiple rounds of additional spending that magnify the initial income gain, thereby giving rise to a prosperous metropolitan economy whose fortunes are positively tied to globalization on account of the spillover effects associated with the globalization-driven expansion of superstar and global producer services firms.

The mechanism that links firm-level economic interests over globalization to the broader welfare of local and regional economies is thus a "local multiplier effect." As Moretti and Thulin (2013) note, "the economy of a metropolitan area is a highly interconnected system", and increased income and employment for the globally oriented businesses (and their employees) concentrated in major global cities leads to increased demand for local services "like haircuts, restaurant meals, and medical care", which pulls up the incomes of "hair stylists, waiters, and doctors in the city"; this in turn of course pulls up the incomes of the services purchased by these "hair stylists, waiters, and doctors" (Moretti and Thulin 2013, 339).⁹ We can summarize the steps in the argument tying together the agglomeration patterns of superstar and producer services headquarters to the emergence of global cities as the territorial "winners" of globalization, as follows:

1. Patterns of Territorial Agglomeration Shaped by Global City Agglomeration

Economies: The headquarters of superstar firms (and the and global producer services firms that serve them) cluster together in certain cities because doing so offers these global firms distinctive advantages in carrying out the work that allows global firms to engage global markets and pursue their internationalization strategies (Sassen 2001).

2. **Firm-level effects of globalization**: Globalization increases the incomes flowing to superstar and producer services firms and their employees (Walter 2017). A large share of these incomes flow out to the highly skilled, high-earning employees working in the

⁹ Moretti's work is not about global cities per se, but more specifically about what he calls innovation and technology "hubs"; however, his arguments have more general applicability. In addition, though his emphasis is not on global cities, Barber (2014) offers (to my knowledge) the first serious treatment of the spillover effects of "core" industries on local economies in a political science context.

headquarters of these firms (which, as the previous step notes, are clustered in global cities) (Moretti 2013).

3. Local Multiplier Effect: These high-earning superstar headquarter employees spend part of their incomes locally, leading to local multiplier-driven spillover effects which diffuse the economic benefits of this initial globalization-driven income gain to the broader local and regional economies of global cities (Moretti 2013).

In essence, as a recent World Bank Report put it, "exports help inject income from the rest of the world to the local economy, generating employment and income spillovers for city residents" (Mukim 2014, penultimate paragraph). The local economic prosperity of global cities is thus closely tied to the openness and health of the global economy. On this account, global cities are not simply, as sociologists have emphasized, the territorial "command centers" which facilitate the management of the global economy; they are also where globalization's benefits—sometimes considered abstract and diffuse—are instantiated and concentrated in concrete spatial settings.

2.4.2 Hinterlands as the Territorial "Losers" of Globalization: The Territorial Dispersal of Domestic Firms and Superstar Plants, the Negative Local Multiplier Effects of Globalization, and Globalization-Driven Stagnation and Decline in Hinterlands

Hinterland cities and regions—the vast geographic spaces of the global economy that do not host dense concentrations of superstar and global producer services headquarters—are "peripheralized", or turned into the territorial "losers" of globalization, in a mirror image of the process just described in Section 2.4.1. As we noted above in Section 2.2, as the costs of cross-

border exchange decline, the increased penetration of foreign imports lowers the market share and profits of domestically oriented firms that are below the productivity threshold for international engagement; the least productive among the import competing firms are forced out of the market entirely. This also harms business services firms located in the hinterlands that "are oriented towards domestic consumption and servicing" domestic firms in the local market (Renn 2008, second paragraph). These micro-level effects of globalization on domestically oriented firms, which cause them to shed workers and reduce wages (Walter 2017, 57), lead to income declines that dampen demand for local service sector jobs in the hinterlands. This sets in motion a "reverse multiplier effect" that magnifies these initial income losses and undermines the broader prosperity of the hinterland regions where domestic firms, as we discussed above, tend to locate. In this way, these regions become "excluded from the major processes that fuel economic growth in the new global economy" (Sassen 2006, 7). The result of these processes is a broader territorial economic antagonism between these excluded regions and the global cities whose territorial economic interests are tied to the growth of the global economy.

Of course, it is worth noting that superstar firms and advanced producer services tend to have a presence in the smaller cities of the hinterlands, maintaining production plants or back offices there that do not benefit from global city agglomeration economies to the same extent as other parts of their businesses (Warf 2007; Duranton and Puga 2005). Because these production plants and back-offices are spread thinly across cities in the hinterlands, they do not give rise to the powerful multiplier effects that headquarters and global producer services clustered in global cities are able to generate. Warf (2007), for instance, notes that back office work involves routinized and standardized tasks that "have few of the interfirm linkages associated" with head offices, and that this "paucity of backward linkages" corresponds with "low multiplier effects"

(Warf 2007, 390). Moretti (2013), makes a related point in the course of comparing Seattle (an important global city) and Albuquerque (a hinterland city), emphasizing the importance of incomes paid out in wages in shaping the relative strength of the multiplier¹⁰:

Intel and Honeywell have large production facilities there and Bank of America and Wells Fargo have large back offices in town, but far more typical are low-end jobs in value-added services...T-Mobile, the fourth largest wireless carrier in the United States, has a presence both in the Seattle area and Albuquerque. But Seattle has the company headquarters-with all the high-paying jobs and their large multiplier effect-while Albuquerque has a customer service center, with many low-end jobs and a small multiplier effect (78-79).

In short, while superstars do indeed have business operations in the hinterlands (a manifestation, it is worth noting, of the "double movement" of geographic centralization and dispersion that the global cities literature emphasizes), the "globalization multiplier" for local economies in the hinterlands is lower than the globalization multiplier for the local economies of global cities for two reasons. First, the superstar plants and back-offices located in the hinterlands do not benefit from spatial clustering to the same extent, and as a result of their relative spatial dispersal across a large hinterland region, local economies in the hinterlands cannot support the critical mass of globalized economic activity that is needed in order for a positive and high-magnitude globalization-driven local multiplier" to take hold.¹¹ Second, in addition to being more geographically concentrated, the more "high-end" globalized activity that is clustered in global cities pays out higher salaries to its employees (Moretti 2013; 78, 118), which also conduces to a larger globalization-driven positive local multiplier effect in the

¹⁰ The comparison is motivated by an interest in how the fortunes of the cities diverged after Microsoft moved its headquarters from Albuquerque to Seattle.

¹¹ See the discussion on page 62 in Moretti (2013), which suggests the importance of clustering for amplifying the strength of multiplier effects

metropolitan economies of global cities. In short, these "clustering" and "income" effects shape the magnitude of the multiplier, and these forces together imply a smaller multiplier effect for globally oriented economic activity that is located in the hinterlands compared to the globally oriented economic activity clustered in global cities. The positive multiplier for globalized economic activity in the hinterlands is thus too small to counteract the "negative multiplier" effect that occurs when domestic firms in the hinterlands contract or go out of business in response to increased cross-border exchange. As a result, globalization undermines the economic well-being of hinterland regions, and the territorial economic interests of hinterlands with respect to globalization diverge from the territorial economic interests of global cities, whose metropolitan local economies are powered by globalization. We can summarize the steps in the argument tying together the dispersion of domestically oriented firms and superstar branch plants to the emergence of hinterlands as the territorial "losers" of globalization, as follows:

1. Patterns of Territorial Dispersion Shaped by Global City Agglomeration

Diseconomies: For domestically oriented firms (including the domestically oriented producer services firms that serve them) and the branch plants of superstar firms, the costs of territorial agglomeration in global cities outweigh the benefits (i.e. global city agglomeration diseconomies are larger than global city agglomeration economies). These establishments therefore disperse across large areas outside global cities.

2. **Firm-level effects of globalization for domestic firms**: Globalization leads to the contraction or elimination of relatively unproductive domestic firms, which decreases the incomes flowing to the employees of these firms (Walter 2017).

3. Negative Local Multiplier Effects of Globalization: The firm-level globalization-driven income declines for domestic firms are amplified and transmitted by a "reverse multiplier" across hinterland regional economies. The globalization-driven negative multiplier effects associated with the contraction of domestic firms exceed the positive globalization-driven spillovers associated with the branch plants of superstar firms (which also extend across hinterland areas); this is because the positive globalization-driven multiplier effects associated with the relatively "low end" economic activities carried out in superstar branch plants are relatively small since salaries in these establishments are relatively low, and because the spatial dispersal of superstar branches dilutes the positive multiplier effects of globalization in hinterland regions.

It is also worth noting that precisely because production plants and back-offices are subject to weaker agglomeration incentives, they are also more footloose than the headquarters of superstar and global producer services firms, which are more firmly tied to their locations because of the benefits they derive from locating close to each other in global cities. Indeed, theoretical arguments in the economic geography literature suggest that even in a world of mobile capital, agglomeration economies make firms less sensitive to tax differentials between jurisdictions (thereby dampening "race to the bottom" dynamics), a suggestion validated empirically by Brulhart et al (2007). In other words, even if firms are *able* to move to lower-tax jurisdictions, the benefits of agglomeration constrain their *willingness* to move from higher-tax jurisdictions in which they reap benefits from agglomeration economies to lower-tax jurisdictions in which agglomeration benefits are lower. This suggests that firms that do not reap large benefits from agglomeration economies are relatively more footloose than firms or plants

that do benefit from agglomeration economies, which has clear implications for our argument: to the extent that global city agglomeration economies are relatively less important for the production plants and back-offices of global firms, it suggests that they are more geographically mobile than the headquarters and front-office operations that operate out of global cities. As a result, the plants and back-offices of superstars located in economic hinterlands can leave their cities and towns (either for a different part of the same country, or other countries altogether) relatively more easily. The greater range of these plants' exit options increases the credibility of their threats to leave, which is surely a source of economic insecurity and anxiety in the hinterland communities in which these superstar plants are located. Moreover, when they do leave (as they often do), the negative economic impact on the local labor market in hinterland areas is likely to be more acute and sustained than when a firm or headquarters leaves a global city, whose labor markets are more resilient as a result of labor market pooling. In other words, less dense areas do not benefit to the same extent from deep and diverse labor markets, and local employees are therefore more vulnerable when a superstar plant leaves a location in the hinterlands than when a superstar headquarter office leaves a global city. In a recent policy address, Brainard (2017), speaks to this issue when she notes that for "many less populous areas [i.e. hinterlands areas], job opportunities are less diverse than in bigger cities, so that when a plant shuts down, there are fewer local alternative job opportunities for unemployed workers, especially with comparable levels of employment security or benefits" (Paragraph 22).

In short, many communities in the economic hinterlands might be shut out of the global economy altogether, while others might play host to some superstar plants or back offices in addition to domestic firms. However, the magnitude of the positive globalization-driven multiplier effects associated with superstar plants and back-offices is relatively low, while the

magnitude of the negative globalization-driven multiplier effects associated with lowproductivity domestic firms is relatively high, which limits opportunities for globalization-driven growth in these hinterland areas. Moreover, the hinterland communities that do have a "superstar presence" cannot easily translate this presence into globalization-driven prosperity because superstar plants and back-offices are less likely to be firmly rooted in these communities; in particular, they do not derive large benefits from agglomeration, so agglomeration economies cannot constrain their mobility, which increases the credibility of their exit threats. On top of this, if and when the plants or back-offices that are part of global supply chains do leave hinterland communities, the communities that they leave behind do not have the economic resources (i.e. deep, diverse, and flexible labor markets) to quickly adapt to their departure; as Jacobs (1984; 1992) reminds us, just as diverse and varied ecosystems are more resilient than uniform or homogenous ecosystems in the natural world, so too in the economic world. The presence of footloose parts of global supply chains in hinterland areas is thus more often likely to be a wellspring of economic instability, volatility, and anxiety in the economic life of these areas than a source of prosperity.¹²

¹² This analysis suggests that the relationship between the globalization of production and economic insecurity could be linked to the agglomeration dynamics discussed in this section; while Scheve and Slaughter (2004) suggest that the globalization of production affects economic insecurity through its impact on the elasticity of labor demand, the relationship between the globalization of production and economic insecurity manifests spatially as a result of geographic mechanisms and processes such as those described here, a point that is glossed over in previous scholarship; analyzing these processes in greater detail is thus an important task, especially since political scientists are now grappling with the role that economic insecurity and anxiety played in spurring the current political backlash against globalization.

2.5 Conclusion: Global City Agglomeration Processes, Hinterland Dispersion Processes, and the Constitution of the Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands

According to the account of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands I developed in this chapter—a synthesis of previous work on global cities across several different literatures— the unprecedented geographic scope of contemporary globalization, with supply chains and financial markets spanning all corners of the world, creates the need for the large global firms that are the primary agents of globalization to carry out complex, information-intensive, and non-routine activities to oversee and manage their global trading and investment engagements; these activities benefit from "global city agglomeration economies" (which flow from opportunities for labor market pooling, input sharing, and accessing sensitive location-specific knowledge), which leads to the clustering of the headquarters of superstar firms and global business services firms in what become "global cities." On the other hand, domestic firms and the branches of superstar firms carrying out more routine production or management tasks do not benefit from these "global city agglomeration economies" to the same extent. For these business activities, the costs of agglomeration in global cities therefore exceed the benefits, and as a result, these firms and branches spread out across "hinterland" regions and cities.

As superstar and global producer services firms benefit from a liberalizing global economy, their increased incomes flow partly to their employees in global cities, who spend their money locally and set off a chain reaction of additional spending in the local urban economy; a "local multiplier effect" thus transmits the globalization-driven income gains of superstars and producer services firms to the broader local economies of the global cities in which their

headquarter establishments are clustered. On the other hand, as domestically oriented firms outside global cities experience income declines that force them to contract or exit the market, these income effects ripple through hinterland regional economies as a result of a "negative multiplier", which induces a broader globalization-driven economic decline in these hinterland regions. Moreover, the presence of global supply chains across the hinterlands cannot counteract the effects of this negative multiplier; this is because the size of the positive "globalization multiplier" associated with globalized activity in the local economies of hinterland areas is relatively small, since this "lower end" globalized activity is relatively more spread out and pays out lower incomes than the "higher end" globalized activity that is concentrated in global cities. The result is a distinctive territorial economic cleavage, between global cities, which are the economic "winners" of contemporary globalization, and outlying hinterlands, which are its economic "losers".

In short, the purpose of this conceptual chapter has been to specify the processes which constitute global cities as distinctive territorial formations that disproportionately benefit from globalization (we might label these processes "global city agglomeration processes") and hinterlands as distinctive territorial formations that are disproportionately harmed by globalization (we might label these processes "hinterland dispersion processes"). Global city agglomeration processes, in short, refer to the spatial agglomeration (due to global city agglomeration economies) of superstar headquarter establishments, and the role of these agglomerations in diffusing (via multiplier-driven spillover effects) the beneficial firm-level effects of globalization on superstar firms to the broader metropolitan economy of the global cities in which they cluster. Conversely, "hinterland dispersion processes" refer to the departure of the "high-end" globalized activity that is associated with large globalization-driven regional

and local multiplier effects from non-global cities (essentially, the flip-side of the territorial agglomeration of this economic activity within global cities), as well as the spatial dispersion (due to global city agglomeration diseconomies) of low-productivity domestic firms across these now "peripheral" regions; the low-productivity domestic firms that extend throughout these hinterlands are harmed by globalization, and these firm-level income declines in response to globalization are transmitted to the broader regional economies of hinterland areas through a "reverse multiplier", which the branch plants and back-offices of superstars firms (which also extend throughout the hinterlands, and carry out "low end" globalized economic activity) are unable to counteract.

In the remainder of this dissertation, I investigate how the spatial economic cleavage between the global cities that benefit from globalization, and the hinterlands which decline as a result of globalization—constituted by the global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes identified and described in this chapter— affects political outcomes of interest. In the next chapter, I begin this investigation with a theoretical exploration of how this territorial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands with respect to globalization might shape individual preferences over globalization, and thereby engender a corresponding spatial *political* cleavage between distinctive mass "global city coalitions" comprised of global city residents who favor globalization, and hinterland residents comprised of residents who oppose it.

Chapter 3: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Theory

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I developed a conceptual account of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands with a view towards detailing the processes which constitute these territorial formations as the "winners" and "losers", respectively, of contemporary globalization. I argued that the headquarters and front offices of globally oriented superstar and producer services firms derive benefits from clustering geographically in certain metropolitan locales, and that these metropolitan areas thereby become "global cities" in light of their role as the sites of territorial agglomeration of these superstar establishments; these cities, in turn, emerge as the territorial "winners" of globalization more broadly because these agglomerations set in motion a positive local multiplier effect that diffuses the globalization-driven income gains flowing to superstar firms throughout the broader metropolitan economy. In the conclusion to Chapter 2, I labelled these processes—by which global cities are constituted as globalization's territorial beneficiaries—"global city agglomeration processes." In contrast to the headquarter

establishments of large superstar firms and global producer services, which enjoy disproportionately large productivity gains from clustering in space to exploit global city agglomeration economies, the costs of clustering in global cities exceed the benefits for lowproductivity domestic firms and the branch plants and back-offices of superstar firms; these establishments therefore disperse across areas outside global cities, and these patterns of dispersal underpin "hinterlands" as territorial formations. These hinterland regions become the "losers" of contemporary globalization because of a globalization-driven "negative multiplier" effect that is set in motion by the negative firm-level income effects of globalization for the domestic firms that anchor these hinterland regions. Though superstar branch plants and backoffices also extend across the hinterlands, they cannot counteract the negative spillover effects associated with the globalization-driven decline of low-productivity domestic firms, since the positive globalization-driven multipliers set in motion by these superstar branches and back offices are relatively small; this is because these establishments are less skill-intensive than headquarters (leading to smaller initial income injections that set the positive multiplier process in motion), and because their relative dispersal dissipates these income gains across a large area, thereby weakening their effect. I labelled these processes—by which hinterlands are constituted as territorial formations that stagnate or decline in response to globalization-"hinterland dispersion processes."

This chapter begins to investigate the political implications of this economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. It attempts to explain, in theoretical terms, how the global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes that constitute this economic geography might shape micro-level patterns of preference formation over foreign economic policy, and thereby engender spatially organized mass coalitions over globalization that reflect

the territorial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands. As Trubowitz (1998) notes, "regional economic differentiation is a structural concept", and so geographically explicit analyses of politics must begin with an attempt to carefully map the structure of interests associated with regional differentiation to individual political preferences and behavior (7). That, in short, is that task of this chapter: to theorize how the globalization-driven prosperity of global cities, and the globalization-driven decline of national hinterlands, shapes the individual preferences of global city and hinterland residents over globalization, and thereby contributes to the emergence of distinctive "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions that favor or oppose globalization, respectively.

In the broader context of IPE, scholars have theorized and empirically explored how different economic processes might shape political coalitions over globalization organized along different lines; for instance, how the redistributive impact of economic openness across owners of factors of production underpins "high skill versus low skill" or "capital versus labor" mass coalitions (Rogowski 1987), or how the redistributive impact of globalization across industries underpins "exporting industry versus import-competing industry" political coalitions over globalization (Frieden 1998). More recently, scholars have theorized and identified mass coalitions over globalization that emanate not from the concrete redistributive impact of globalization, but which stem from individual identities, and are organized along "cosmopolitan versus ethnocentric" lines (Sabet 2014). The contribution of this chapter in the context of these broader efforts is that it identifies a novel vector of influence on the organization of mass coalitions over globalization—namely, the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands—and theorizes how the distributional effects of globalization across these territorial formations might independently shape individual preferences over globalization, and thereby

engender "global city" and "hinterland" mass coalitions (consisting of "pro-globalization" global city residents and "anti-globalization" hinterland residents) that are empirically distinct from the open economy political coalitions scholars of IPE have theorized and documented in previous scholarship.

In particular, I develop three distinct theories of how the macro-level territorial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands gives rise to *political* coalitions organized on the basis of this cleavage; these theories are rooted in different models of preference formation, and provide different accounts of the micro-level mechanisms that translate this large scale "global city versus hinterland" economic cleavage into politically salient spatial divisions over globalization. The first, an "ego-tropic" theory of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and individual preferences over globalization, posits that individuals are self-regarding, and that their preferences are rooted in their understanding of their personal material interests; on this account, spatially organized "global city" and "hinterland" foreign economic policy coalitions arise because individuals in global cities are more likely (all else equal) to believe that globalization is good for their personal material welfare than residents of hinterland regions. The second, a "sociotropic" theory of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and individual preferences over globalization, posits that individuals fundamentally care about the national welfare as a whole, and that their preferences are rooted in their understanding of how policies affect the national interest; on this account, spatially organized "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions over globalization arise because individuals in global cities are more likely (all else equal) to believe that globalization is good for national welfare than residents of hinterland regions. Finally, I develop a "local-tropic" (Cutler 2007) theory of the relationship

between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and individual preferences over globalization, which posits that individuals intrinsically care about the well-being of their locales, and that their preferences are rooted in their understanding of how policies affect the local interest; on this local-tropic account, the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders corresponding spatial coalitions over globalization because individuals from global cities are more likely (all else equal) than hinterland residents to believe that globalization is in the interest of the locales within which they are directly embedded.

Below, in Section 3.2, I develop the ego-tropic theory of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands gives rise to spatial foreign economic policy coalitions in more detail, with a view towards explaining how and why residents of global cities and hinterlands might conceive their individual material interests over globalization differently, with the former more likely to believe that globalization is beneficial for their personal material welfare than the latter (and therefore more likely to support globalization). In Section 3.3, I develop a sociotropic theory of spatially organized global city and hinterland coalitions, exploring how and why residents of global cities might support globalization to a greater extent than their hinterland counterparts because global city residents tend to develop relatively more favorable assessments of globalization's impact on national welfare than hinterland residents. In Section 3.4, I develop a local-tropic theory of spatially organized global city and hinterland coalitions, exploring how and why such coalitions might arise because of the tendency of residents of global cities to support globalization on local-tropic grounds, while hinterland residents oppose globalization on the grounds that it is harmful to the local interests of hinterland areas. Because the idea that individuals' policy preferences flow from their conceptions of the local interest, as it is shaped by environments within locales, is relatively novel within IPE (see McNamara 2017 and Kahler

2017 for recent arguments to this effect), and remains relatively undeveloped in theories of public opinion and political behavior, Section 3.4 is the longest section. I not only present an account of how and why individuals from global cities and hinterlands arrive at different "local-tropic" assessments of globalization's desirability (in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4), but also develop the rudiments of a more general local-tropic "model" of preference formation, which addresses the important issues of *why* individuals would care about the local interest (in a non-derivative sense, independent of their concern for personal or national interests) (3.4.1) and *how* individuals develop their conception of the local interest and what the local interest entails (3.4.2).

Finally, Section 3.5 concludes. Though all of the theories presented here point to the existence of spatial coalitions rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, I ultimately suggest that given shortcomings in the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories, the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions provides the most plausible account of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders corresponding foreign economic policy coalitions. In the next chapter, I carry out an empirical investigation of whether the spatially organized "global city" and "hinterland" foreign economic policy coalitions predicted by these theories do in fact exist; I also provide tentative empirical evidence in Section 4.5) that these coalitions are indeed underpinned by local-tropic preferences.

3.2 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Individual Preferences Over Globalization: An Ego-Tropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions

An "ego-tropic" theory of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders corresponding spatial political coalitions over globalization begins from the premise that the political preferences of individuals are informed by their personal material interests. On an ego-tropic account of spatial coalitions, spatial foreign economic policy coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands would therefore form to the extent that residents of global cities are more predisposed, all else equal, to believe that globalization is in their personal material interests than are residents of the hinterlands.

It is easy to imagine why this might be the case, based on our discussion of global city agglomeration processes in the previous chapter. There, we noted how the spatial agglomeration of "high-end" globalized economic activity in these cities channels the globalization-driven income benefits enjoyed by superstar firms to the metropolitan economy as a whole, by activating a powerful globalization-driven local multiplier effect that is set in motion by the concentrated presence of high earning superstar employees in global cities. Among other things, the multiplier which diffuses the globalization-driven firm-level income gains of superstar firms throughout the metropolitan economy contributes to a thriving labor market, which increases the material opportunities flowing to workers that are not directly employed by superstar headquarter establishments. For instance, consider Apple, an archetypal superstar firm in the modern global economy, with its headquarters in the San Jose suburb of Cupertino (which is within the broader San Francisco Bay Area). As Moretti (2013) notes, Apple itself only employs 12,000 workers in its Cupertino headquarters, but through the multiplier effect, "the company generates more than 60,000 additional service jobs in the entire metropolitan area, of which 36,000 are unskilled and 24,000 are skilled" (60).

This distinctively geographic perspective on the underpinnings of individual selfinterest, rooted in an account of globalization's positive local labor market effects in areas where the headquarters of global firms cluster to take advantage of global city agglomeration economies, is somewhat analogous to Scheve and Slaughter's (2001b) discussion of how trade policy affects preferences through its influence on the value of regionally specific assets.¹ Just as we have reason to expect that individual preferences over foreign economic policies flow from the ways in which the regional effects of globalization condition the value of individual assets, we might also expect that these preferences flow in part from the ways in which the local and regional effects of globalization—as they are shaped by the global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes discussed in Chapter 2-condition an individual's local labor market opportunities. Scheve and Slaughter's account aside, however, scholars of IPE have tended to conceive individual material self-interests in a geographic vacuum, without considering how the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide might condition these conceptions of material-self interest independently of skill endowments (since, after all, the beneficiaries of agglomeration-driven spillovers include both the skilled and the unskilled). Indeed, in the US, for example,

High school graduates in the top group [i.e. the most prosperous cities] often make more than college graduates in the bottom group [i.e. the least prosperous cities]. The disparity between cities is so large that it can dominate the disparity between levels of education. This underscores the fact that wage differences in the US have as much to do with geography as they do with social class...Much of the

¹ Their empirical focus is on house prices.

current debate on inequality in the US focuses on the class divide between the America of the privileged-those with a good education and solid professional jobs-and the America of the underprivileged-those with low levels of schooling who often live paycheck to paycheck with no job security. *This view reflects the intuitive notion that technological change and globalization benefit one group and hurt the other, but it misses the important point that the two groups are affected differently in different places. Technological change and globalization result in more employment opportunities for a low-skilled worker in a high-tech hub but fewer opportunities for a similar worker in a hollowed-out manufacturing town [my italics]. What divides America today is not just socioeconomic status but also geography (Moretti 2013; 96, 107).*

In short, as the spillover effects associated with the headquarters of global firms are aggregated across the urban areas in which they are clustered, the labor market opportunities flowing to workers (both skilled and unskilled) *without* direct employment ties to superstar or global producer services firms increase. Local economies, on this account, are "tightly interconnected [systems]" wherein "what is good for one group typically tends to be good for another"; within global cities, a "rising tide" of superstar incomes serves to "lift all boats" (i.e. incomes and employment prospects for the broader set of workers not directly employed by superstars) (Moretti 2013, 62-63).

These localized labor market dynamics could therefore underpin global city coalitions formed and held together by individual self-interest; on this account, as workers in global cities recognize that globalization improves their individual labor market positions as a result of global city agglomeration processes, they come to favour globalization because of its positive impact on their material welfare. We would expect the opposite to be the case in hinterlands, where the negative labor market implications of the hinterland dispersion processes discussed in Chapter Two would underpin a broader anti-globalization coalition based on material self-interest. We can summarize this ego-tropic account of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands shapes individual preferences, and thereby leads to spatial coalitions that reflect the territorial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands, as follows:

- Individuals are ego-tropic, i.e. their preferences are informed by their understanding of their material self-interests
- 2. The health of the broader local labor market in global cities benefits from globalization, while globalization contributes to a declining labor market in the hinterlands (due to global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes, respectively).
- Global city residents recognize that globalization improves their location-specific individual job prospects, while hinterland residents recognize that globalization diminishes their location-specific job prospects.
- 4. Global city residents therefore tend to develop more favourable ego-tropic assessments of globalization than hinterland residents, and are therefore more supportive of globalization (all else equal). The result is internationalist "global city" and protectionist "hinterland" coalitions comprised of individuals with favourable and unfavourable ego-tropic assessments of globalization, respectively.

This is certainly a plausible account of how a global city versus hinterland *political* cleavage underpinned by the underlying territorial *economic* cleavage between global cities and hinterlands might form; however, there are some reasons to be sceptical of the ego-tropic theory of spatial coalitions. After all, there is a growing scholarly consensus that, at least with respect to traditional materialist accounts rooted in Ricardo-Viner or Stolper-Samuelson economic models, "there is little evidence that voters actually define their interests in these rational, materialist

ways" (Hafner-Burton et al. 2016, S2). The individual level-implications for preferences of the "new new trade" perspective that is rooted in the study of intra-industry cleavages between heterogeneous firms have of course not been studied to nearly the same extent, since this perspective has only recently been imported into political science. While there is increasingly robust evidence that this perspective offers powerful leverage in clarifying the role of firms as political actors (Plouffe 2012; Osgood et al. 2016; Kim 2017), its explanatory power with respect to individual preferences, at least judging by the preliminary work that has been undertaken in this vein, does not appear to be particularly promising. Tomz and Rho's analysis (2015), for instance, turns up "no systematic evidence" of a relationship between the efficiency or profitability of firms (which are expected to correlate with firm productivity and international engagement), and the protectionist or internationalist orientations of their workers (22). Of course, more work is needed on the individual implications of firm-level arguments, but if the preferences of even the workers *directly* employed by internationally engaged firms do not appear to be informed by the interests of their employers, recent work on how informational and cognitive constraints prevent self-interested reasoning over foreign economic policy (Rho and Tomz 2017) suggests that it is even *more* unlikely that the large number of individuals who live in global cities, but do not work in superstar and producer services establishments, could in practice trace out the rather indirect causal relations tying their individual material interests (as defined by their labor market opportunities) to globalization via global city agglomeration processes.

In short, it is in principle possible that global city and hinterland political coalitions over globalization are underpinned by systematically different ego-tropic assessments of globalization among global city and hinterland residents, which stem from the systematically different labor

market effects of globalization across this spatial divide. However, recent empirical research suggests practical reasons for scepticism about the view that the spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands are underpinned by divergent ego-tropic foreign economic policy preferences along these lines. That said, it is worth noting that this same body of empirical research suggests relatively strong support for the idea that individual policy preferences are shaped by a sociotropic concern for the national interest; it is therefore worth our while to investigate whether spatial coalitions over globalization might be shaped by the tendency of global city residents (all else equal) to be more inclined towards the view, compared to hinterland residents, that globalization is beneficial for the national interest.

3.3 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Individual Preferences Over Globalization: A Sociotropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions

On a sociotropic view of preference formation, rooted in the view that individual policy preferences are oriented by a fundamental concern with the national welfare rather than individual interests (Kinder and Kiewet 1981; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Powers 2017), spatial political coalitions anchored in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands could arise if global city residents tended to adopt systematically more favorable assessments of globalization's impact on national welfare than hinterland residents, all else equal. We should be clear that sociotropic individuals are fundamentally concerned with the *national* economy (i.e. "the country as a whole"), rather than the local or regional economy for its own sake.² Nonetheless, it is possible that global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion process might underpin divergent assessments, among global city and hinterland residents, about whether globalization is indeed in the national interest, and thereby lead to systematically different foreign economic policy attitudes across the global city versus hinterland divide.

How and why, in particular, might individuals across the global city versus hinterland divide arrive at systematically different judgments about globalization's impact on the national economy, with the former thereby supporting globalization on sociotropic grounds, and the latter opposing globalization on the grounds that it is harmful to the national interest? As Mansfield and Mutz (2009) note, "sociotropic models are, at root, information-based explanations" (432). On a sociotropic account of foreign economic policy preferences, individuals care about the health of the national economy, and acquire and interpret relevant information to help them make judgments about how economic openness or closure might affect national economic welfare. Of course, some of this information might be local in nature, and to the extent that residents of global cities and hinterlands have access to different information sources, we might expect their sociotropic assessments of whether globalization is good for the national welfare, and by extension, their foreign economic policy preferences, to diverge accordingly. Mansfield and Mutz suggest two channels through which local information might shape sociotropic assessments about the implications of economic openness or protectionism for the nation as a whole, and thereby affect foreign economic policy preferences: first, through the local media environment, and second, through local experiences or interpersonal encounters. I consider these in turn.

² At least, this is how the sociotropic perspective tends to be presented in IPE research.

The importance of the media in shaping sociotropic policy attitudes has been extensively documented in the literature on public opinion; we should therefore consider the possibility that differences on the ground in global cities and hinterlands (stemming from global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes, respectively) lead to fundamentally different local media environments on different sides of the spatial divide, and that these differences in the media environment in turn contribute to systematically different sociotropic assessments of whether globalization is in fact a good thing for the nation as a whole.

To the extent that sociotropic individuals ultimately care about the national economy, how and why might local media inform these broader economic assessments? Individuals of course live within a nested media landscape, with access to local, urban, regional, and national sources of news and information. Though sociotropic individuals ultimately care about the wellbeing of the national economy, they might use local or regional media coverage, which is presumably cheaper and more easily available or accessible than national media sources, as "information shortcut[s] to ascertain the state of the national economy" (Kang 2016, 1). The on-the-ground economic circumstances of global cities are of course very different from those of hinterland regions, and the daily coverage of local and regional media outlets will presumably reflect these differences. To the extent that this is the case, the different tenor of the economic information that flows through the local media to residents on different sides of the global city versus hinterland divide may underlie divergent perceptions of national economic well-being, and ultimately result in different attitudes about the desirability of globalization. As Reeves and Gimpel (2007, 510) note, "particularly gloomy sociotropic reflections about economic conditions will result from the monitoring of local news reports emphasizing dire economic prospects"; voters in the hinterlands, on this account, might view local or regional

news coverage on the harmful local or regional effects of globalization, and develop their views about the aggregate *national* effects of globalization (which, on the sociotropic account, is their ultimate concern) on the basis of the information they acquire through this local coverage. Conversely, residents of global cities might be more inclined towards positive and upbeat assessments of the benefits of globalization for national welfare because they are embedded within a media environment that, given conditions on the ground in areas constituted by global city agglomeration processes, is more likely to offer a positive perspective on globalization's effects. In short, we might expect local and regional news coverage to emphasize the positive national economic effects of globalization in global cities, since these positive effects manifest with particular force in these settings; conversely, we might expect such news coverage to highlight the negative national effects of globalization in hinterland regions, since these negative effects are concentrated within hinterland areas. These different media environments, in turn, could animate "pro-globalization" global city coalitions comprised of residents who believe that globalization is in the national interest, and protectionist hinterland coalitions comprised of hinterland residents who believe that globalization is harmful to national welfare.

Of course, the local media is not necessarily the only source of local economic information that could influence individual perspectives on the relationship between globalization and the national interest. Individuals are also likely to look to the set of experiences and encounters that they have during the course of their daily routines, which provides them with direct and unmediated data about the state of the local economy as they go about the ordinary business of life. Individuals in the hinterlands might be more likely, for instance, to drive or walk past scenes of economic malaise, or hear about bad economic news within their local social circles; to the extent that that they link such negative local outcomes to the operation of global

economic forces, they could be more likely to assume that these global economic forces will lead to negative *national* outcomes as well (Mansfield and Mutz 2009, 453; Reeves and Gimpel 2012, 510; Kang 2016, 353). Conversely, individuals in global cities are presumably more likely to drive or walk by signs of economic prosperity, or hear positive economic news within their local social circles; as a result, to the extent that they trace these positive developments to participation in the global economy, they could be more likely to assume that participation in the global economy is good for the nation as a whole. In short, "sociotropic" global city and hinterland coalitions might form as individuals in these different settings acquire economic "data" in the course of navigating their local environments, and use these data to inform their general judgments about whether economic openness redounds to the benefit of the national economy.

We can summarize the argument about the sociotropic foundations of potential global city and hinterland coalitions developed in this section, on the basis of previous arguments in the literature on sociotropic preferences and public opinion, as follows:

- 1. Individuals are sociotropic, i.e. their policy preferences are shaped by their concern with the interests of the nation as a whole.
- Territorially specific media coverage at local and regional scales, along with locallycircumscribed everyday experiences, provide individuals with information about how globalization affects the *local* economy. They use this local knowledge as a "shortcut" (Kang 2016) to inform their views of the link between globalization and the *national* economy.
- 3. Because global city residents are disproportionately exposed to "pro-globalization" local information (through the media, and through their immediate experiences) they are predisposed to the general view that globalization is good for the national economy, and

therefore come to favour globalization on sociotropic grounds. On the other hand, because hinterland residents are disproportionately exposed to "anti-globalization" local information, they are predisposed towards the general view that globalization is bad for the national economy, and hence come to oppose globalization on sociotropic grounds.

In short, on the sociotropic account of foreign economic policy preferences, individual political preferences are oriented by a concern for the broader national welfare, and attitudes towards globalization are therefore shaped by an individual's view of whether globalization advances or impedes the national economic interest. Global cities and hinterlands have very different territorial interests with respect to the global economy as a result of the global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes discussed in Chapter 2; this leads to very different information environments-constituted by media coverage and everyday experiencesin global cities (whose residents are disproportionately exposed to information that implies a beneficial link between globalization and national welfare) and hinterlands (whose residents are disproportionately exposed to information that implies a harmful link between globalization and national welfare). These different information environments lead to systematically different inferences, across the spatial divide, about whether liberal foreign economic policies do indeed promote the national welfare; this in turn engenders "pro-globalization" global city coalitions, and "anti-globalization" hinterland coalitions, that are animated by divergent sociotropic assessments of globalization's desirability.

How convincing is the view that a sociotropic model of preference formation might underpin the relationship between the global city versus hinterland territorial *economic* cleavage with respect to globalization, and a territorial *political* cleavage that corresponds to this spatial economic divide? Though there is more robust evidence, in the IPE and public opinion

literatures, for the view that individual policy preferences are sociotropic (rather than ego-tropic), there are nevertheless reasons to be somewhat sceptical of a sociotropic theory of spatial political coalitions over globalization. One reason is that while the evidence for sociotropic preference formation is strong in general, the specific evidence for a "local information channel" that affects sociotropic preferences, wherein local information is used to make inferences about the national interest, is not particularly robust. Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 453) suggest that evidence for a link between local experiences and sociotropic preference formation is relatively underdeveloped, and more recent empirical work has been mixed. Gimpel and Reeves (2012) document evidence for the influence of local economic conditions on retrospective evaluations of the American economy, but Kang's (2016) examination of a similar question in the context of South Korea suggested that the local informational channel of influence on sociotropic preference formation (what he calls "indirect sociotropic voting") is relatively weak.³

Of course, these empirical differences could be driven by the very different national contexts of the United States and South Korea; we might expect, for instance, local conditions to matter more for sociotropic economic judgments in large countries than in relatively smaller ones. Be that as it may, there are indeed theoretical reasons why the local information channel of influence on sociotropic preferences might be relatively weak, which could explain the relative inconsistency of the empirical record. In particular, recall that sociotropic individuals fundamentally care about national economic performance; the local economy, to the extent that it matters, does so only in a derivative sense as an "information shortcut" that can help individuals make rather complex judgements about the determinants of national economic performance

³ In a multivariate analysis of the determinants of retrospective national economic valuations in South Korea, a variable measuring local economic conditions was only significant at the 90% confidence level (Kang 2016, 362).

(Kang 2016, 350). We would therefore expect that individuals rationally drawing on local information to make judgments about national economic relationships would discount (by some factor) the informational value of locally generated data; after all, this is data generated from a small and unrepresentative sample. In other words, individuals can draw on local information to make inferences about how globalization affects the national economy, but the confidence intervals on these estimates will be large, since these inferences are based on a small sample. As a result, individuals would presumably view local information as offering a suggestive, but not decisive, source of guidance in making judgments about the national economy. This rational scepticism about the value of local information for the more general task of making national economic evaluations may well help to account for the somewhat ambiguous results we see in the existing studies. More specifically, to the extent that individuals discount the informational value of local media coverage and local experiences in guiding judgments about the national economy, we would expect a relatively weak relationship between "on-the-ground" economic conditions in global cities and hinterlands, and the sociotropic judgements of their residents about the desirability of globalization.

Finally, it is worth briefly considering how the evolution of the modern media environment might affect the likelihood that global city and hinterland foreign economic policy coalitions will form on the basis of divergent sociotropic assessments of globalization that are anchored in discrete local informational environments. Recall that the rationale for individuals relying (at least partly) on local information to develop views on the relationship between globalization and the national economy is that local information is more accessible and easier to gather, which allows it to function as an information shortcut. Of course, we would expect the value of such an informational shortcut to decline as the cost of "non-local" information falls

(and as its accessibility rises). We have indeed seen significant declines in the accessibility and costs of information from more distant sources, especially as "the widespread adoption of the Internet" has enabled the rise of information networks that "are less bound by geographic considerations and are capable of disseminating information more rapidly and cheaply than many traditional networks" (Guisinger 2017, 49). If routine information is increasingly deterritorialized as a result of these new information networks, individuals presumably find it less necessary to rely on narrow slices of local information to make aggregate judgments about the national economy. This is not to say that local information will lose its relevance for sociotropic evaluations altogether; rather, it is to suggest that individuals will be able to incorporate a wider and more representative range of data (at lower cost) into their judgments of aggregate economic performance, which would lower the relative weight of local information in these sociotropic assessments. The increasing geographic reach of information (of the sort which individuals use in making sociotropic judgments) might therefore undercut, at least to some extent, a sociotropic foundation for spatial foreign economic policy coalitions underpinned the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands.

Perhaps an even deeper issue with respect to the media environment concerns the more general evolution of the relationship between individuals, information, and political judgments. On the sociotropic account, information ultimately shapes political preferences by shaping individual conceptions of the national interest; however, in an increasingly fragmented and competitive media landscape, it could well be that individuals choose their information sources on the basis of their political preferences. On this point, Baum (2011) is worth quoting at length:

Current trends toward ever more consumer self-selection and increasingly sophisticated information filtering and media targeting of consumer preferences all appear to portend greater audience fragmentation and hence continued

shrinking of the informational commons. For instance, it seems inevitable that news providers will increasingly apply the filtering technologies that allow media content distributors like Netflix and iTunes to determine the types of movies or music customers are likely to prefer-and suggest to them precisely that-to news and public affairs content. The result may be what Cass Sunstein (2007) terms 'cyberbalkanization', where the informational commons is largely supplanted by a 'daily me' in which consumers encounter only the news and information they want, most of which tends to confirm rather than challenge their pre-existing attitudes (1055).

To be clear, this is not to suggest that individual preferences are not oriented by a concern with the national interest, but rather, that in an increasingly fragmented media landscape, the independent effect of information on sociotropic attitudes about the causes of national well-being may be declining; these attitudes are perhaps more likely to be a prior cause of the information environment that individuals seek out and choose to engage with, rather than the product of an exogenous media environment. Other factors, such as partisanship and partisan cues, may have a more important independent impact on how individuals conceive the national interest. To the extent that the causal link between information and sociotropic preferences is overstated (or declining) as a result of these broader technological and social trends, we should perhaps be cautious about embracing an explanation of global city and hinterland coalitions that is rooted in a sociotropic account that emphasizes the independent importance of local information (and especially the local media environment) for the political preferences that underpin these coalitions.

Admittedly, these speculations about the evolving media environment are just that: speculations. The scholarly work on such issues within IPE appears limited; given the importance of sociotropic arguments in the recent literature, more work is needed on how changes in the media ecosystem are affecting the ways in which individuals process and absorb information, and how this information ultimately shapes the assessments of the national interest

that shape their policy preferences. Nevertheless, these are important issues, and deserved to be addressed (at least in a preliminary way) in the context of our discussion in this section.

In short, while the sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions should not be dismissed out of hand, these shortcomings are important to consider, and possibly weaken its empirical leverage as an explanation for how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands underpins spatial coalitions over globalization. In the next section, I therefore present another account of how global city and hinterland foreign economic policy coalitions might form, one that is intuitively plausible and grounded in the sort of emotional and psychological processes that recent IPE scholarship has shown to exert a quite profound influence over foreign economic policy preferences.

3.4 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Individual Preferences Over Globalization: A Local-Tropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions

Recall that on a sociotropic conception of preference formation, individual preferences are explicitly oriented by a concern with the *national* interest. The local economy is of derivative importance, as a source of information about the national economy, rather than an object of intrinsic value or concern. Indeed, as I argued above, we would expect individuals whose preferences are shaped by a view of what is best for the national interest, and who merely use their local experiences as sources of information that could help them make inferences about what is best for the national economy, to partially *discount* these local experiences and interests as unrepresentative.

Upon reflection, this view of preference formation, wherein local experiences and interests are of derivative importance, and only matter to the extent that they inform perceptions of the national interest, is a decidedly counter-intuitive one. After all, as Geeves and Rimpel (2012, 509) point out, the national economy is ultimately something of an abstraction: "no one experiences *national* conditions [their italics]...individuals do not directly experience the national gross domestic product or the national unemployment rate" and ultimately, the "state of the national economy is but a set of summary measures averaged across thousands of communities and millions of individuals" (509). A sociotropic account of policy preferences, rooted in the view that individual preferences are ultimately shaped by assessments of what is best for the national economy, must therefore answer the question: why would individuals care about an abstraction (i.e. the "national" economy)—something that, after all, they do not even directly experience— but view the economic health of the locales in which they actually live out their lives as merely a source of information, rather than something of independent and intrinsic value? Perhaps the nation as an imagined community does indeed have such a powerful hold on our collective consciousness that in considering questions of value, individuals are willing to prioritize abstract reflections on what is good for the "national economy" over the concrete experience of everyday life. This is certainly possible; after all, if individuals are willing to die for the abstraction of the "nation", it is not implausible to believe that their policy preferences over globalization are also fundamentally oriented by a concern for the nation's overall wellbeing.

However, though it is not *implausible*, we should not make the mistake of assuming that it is *probable*, especially in light of the realities of human motivation and psychology. Consider how an individual in Youngstown, Ohio (that is, a representative city in the US hinterlands)

might think about the desirability of globalization, in practical terms. Would such an individual balance the costs of globalization, spatially concentrated in cities such as hers, against the benefits of globalization, concentrated in global cities such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco? Doing so might actually lead to the conclusion that on balance, globalization is a good thing for the nation as a whole; after all, one could arguably make the case that the number of Americans living in areas that benefit from globalization is greater than the number of Americans living in areas that are harmed. Moreover, the global cities that benefit from globalization in the United States unquestionably contribute more to the nation's GDP than its hinterlands; policies of economic closure would redistribute income from global cities to hinterlands (by propping up domestically oriented firms), but in doing so, reduce the size of the national economic pie. Such considerations would presumably enter into a sociotropic calculus about national interests, and might well lead our hypothetical individual to the conclusion that on balance, once benefits and costs are aggregated across the nation, globalization is actually in the national interest, and something worth supporting. But isn't it far more intuitive and realistic to think that our hypothetical resident of Youngstown is entirely aware of the fact that many parts of the nation do benefit from globalization, and that these aggregate benefits might exceed the aggregate costs at the national level, but that she nevertheless still opposes globalization on account of its harmful impact on Youngstown? That to the individual in Youngstown, the remarkable prosperity that globalization has brought to global cities such as New York or San Francisco as a result of global city agglomeration processes cannot make up for the decline and stagnation that it has brought to her community's doorstep? That the decline and stagnation close to home actually matters more than the globalized prosperity of cities that might as well be light years away? In other words, to the extent that individuals are not completely self-regarding, and

their preferences are shaped by something broader than self-interest, it seems intuitively probable that these preferences are oriented by an intrinsic concern with the local economic environments of the communities in which they live, and that the importance of these environments for individual preferences does not simply derive from their role as "data" which inform sociotropic judgments about the national interest. It is far more likely, in other words, that local interests are of ultimate, rather than instrumental or derivative, concern.

It is therefore worthwhile to consider an alternative to the ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, which respectively begin from the premise that individual policy preferences are oriented by a concern for self-interests or the national interest, with a "localtropic" theory of spatial coalitions, which posits that individual foreign economic policy preferences flow from an independent concern with the well-being of the locale. In other words, on a local-tropic account, individual preferences stem from a conception of what is beneficial for the local interest. A local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands would therefore suggest that global city residents tend to be more supportive of globalization than their hinterland counterparts because global city residents are more likely than hinterland residents to believe that globalization is in the interest of their immediate locales. This section elaborates such a local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions, which, I will suggest, avoids some of the problems associated with the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories developed above.

Because the idea that individual preferences are oriented by a concern for local interests is relatively new in IPE (McNamara 2017; Kahler 2017), I first present an argument that individual preferences may indeed be "local-tropic". That is, in Section 3.4.1, I develop an argument that elaborates an answer to the question of why individual policy preferences might be

informed by an intrinsic concern with the local interest. In Section 3.4.2, I address the issue of how individuals might plausibly form judgments about the local interest. In other words, Section 3.4.2 develops an account of the process by which the "local-tropic" evaluations that inform policy preferences (according to Section 3.4.2) are plausibly made in practice; this account of how individuals discern the local interest draws on recent research to suggest that evaluations of the local interest are made in intuitive and emotional ways, which is in keeping with recent findings (Sabet 2014) about the non-rationalist origins of policy preferences. Once a working account of a local-tropic process of preference formation-one which addresses the questions of why individuals care about the local interest and how they ascertain the local interest—is in place, I leverage the resulting local-tropic framework to explain how global city and hinterland coalitions might form on this basis, in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, respectively. In other words, Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 apply the framework developed in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 to elaborate how and why spatial foreign economic policy coalitions comprised of internationalist global city residents, and protectionist hinterland residents, might arise from the tendency of global city residents whose policy preferences are shaped by local-tropic assessments to believe that globalization is in the local interest, and similarly local-tropic hinterland residents to believe that globalization has a deleterious impact on their locales.

3.4.1 Individuals and Locales: Why Might Individuals Care About Local Interests?

Cutler (2007) is among the first public opinion scholars (of which I am aware) to have argued for the importance of taking the relationship between local interests and individual preferences seriously. Following him, I label the view that individual preferences are shaped by a concern for the well-being of the locale, independent of ego-tropic or sociotropic concerns, a "local-tropic" conception of individual preferences.⁴ On the local-tropic account, "citizens think of their locale as a relevant group", and as a result, "features of the locale are therefore linked to political attitudes through a calculation of *local group interest* (Cutler 2007, 577; his italics). This suggests that in developing a preliminary account of local-tropic preferences, we must explain why individuals come to view their "locale as a relevant group" whose interests they should care about (for reasons that cannot be reduced to the implications of local welfare for their own personal well-being). In short, this sub-section addresses the following question: why might individuals come to view the "locale", and its place-specific interests, as an intrinsic object of concern? Developing a systematic answer to this question is an important area for future research; the relatively few existing studies on local-tropic preferences tend to gloss over this question, and move quickly to an empirical consideration of whether local-tropic preferences are indeed salient in some specific empirical context. Here, I cannot offer an extended examination of the theoretical or philosophical question of why individuals might be "local-tropic"; nevertheless, it is worthwhile to briefly set out some possibilities that could be pursued further in future work.

One possibility is that we could ground local-tropic preferences in the human tendency, all else equal⁵, to "feel closer to people who live nearby than to those who live farther away" (Kang 2016, 351). Spatial distance, on this account, mediates the emotional force of our affective ties to others; the emotional and psychological force of these ties weakens with spatial distance, and intensifies as a function of spatial proximity. This is of course a very old idea about the

⁴ I should note, however, that he considers a concern for local environments that derives from individual material interests to fall under the heading of "local-tropic" preferences, in addition to an intrinsic concern for local environments. I only consider the latter to be "local-tropic" preferences. This is for reasons of clarity.

⁵ Throughout the following discussion about how our affective ties to others weaken with physical distance, it is important to keep in mind that the ceteris paribus assumption holds.

spatial structure of our moral sentiments, one that can be traced back to the Stoic idea of *oikeiosis*, according to which "human affection and care are ordered spatially around the self in a concentric pattern" (Forman 2010, 8). This spatially explicit view of our moral sentiments has influenced thinkers into the modern era, especially in the Scottish Enlightenment; perhaps the thinker who engaged the idea of *oikeiosis* most deeply was Adam Smith, whose *Theory of Moral Sentiments* took *oikeiosis* as an empirically valid starting point for thinking about human moral psychology (Forman 2010; Forman 2005, 201). Viner (1972) notes that Smith follows the Stoics in positing that, "spatial distance operates to intensify psychological distance" and that

the sentiments weaken progressively as one moves from one's immediate family to one's intimate friends, to one's neighbors in a small community, to fellowcitizens in a great city, to members in general of one's own country, to foreigners, to mankind taken in the large, to the inhabitants, if any, of distant planets (Viner; quoted in Forman 2010, 125).

It is worth noting that Smith and the Stoics disagree about whether "this phenomenon of fading or weakening sentiment that corresponds to an increase in physical distance" is morally problematic, and whether the affective bias toward the spatially proximate is something that humans should strive to transcend. The cosmopolitan project of the Stoics was to "collapse the natural concentric structure of human relationships through the proper use of reason", while Smith viewed such a project as "absurd and unreasonable" (Forman 2005, 201). In other words, while Smith and the Stoics both agreed, as an empirical and descriptive matter, that our sense of fellow-feeling and "affection evolves through our experiences living in close proximity with others", they disagreed, as an ethical matter, about whether this was a cause for moral concern (201).

We also see such a pattern of agreement about the empirical tendency for our affective connections to others to decline as a function of spatial distance, alongside disagreement about the ethical justifiability of our partiality towards the spatially proximate, reproduced in important debates about global justice in our own time. For instance, consider Singer's (1971) famous argument that the failure of wealthy-country individuals to dedicate the bulk of their personal resources (essentially, everything beyond what is necessary to merely subsist) towards famine relief in the developing world was morally akin to an individual's failure to interrupt an afternoon stroll in order to rescue (at a relatively trivial personal cost) a child seen drowning in a small pond along the route (231). This argument is counter-intuitive, perhaps even shocking, precisely because it dismisses our intuition that our moral obligations in the two situations are different on account of our physical proximity to the drowning child, and our relative distance from the starving one on the other side of the world. One way Singer's critics have attempted to cast doubt on the moral equivalence Singer draws between these scenarios is by defending the ethical validity of our moral intuition that "distance matters." Slote's (2009) attempted defense along these lines appears to affirm, in rough and general terms, the Smithian view:

In the familiar drowning examples, someone's danger or plight has a salience, conspicuousness, vividness, and *immediacy* [Slote's italics]...that engages normal human empathy (and consequently arouses sympathy and concern) in a way that similar dangers we merely know *about* [Slote's italics] do not. So if morality is a matter of empathy-based concern or caring for/about people, we can not only explain why a failure to help in the drowning case seems worse to us than a failure to give to famine relief, but also justify that ordinary moral intuition (149).

The key point, for our purposes, is that while there is a lot at stake in this perennial debate over the ethical status of *oikeiosis*, participants on both sides of the debate share a belief in the *empirical* fact that *oikeiosis* describes the way humans intuitively conceive their affective ties and obligations. Indeed, it is precisely the *empirical* tendency for the strength of these affective ties to decay with distance that lends urgency and meaning to ethical debates about whether the moral intuitions that justify this tendency are in fact valid.⁶ Ultimately, this widespread belief in the empirical existence of *oikeiosis*⁷, together with our own awareness of our pre-reflective intuitions about the moral significance of spatial distance in regulating our obligations to others (there are very few of us, I think, that find Singer's analogy intuitive or self-evident, and this is probably because we implicitly subscribe to the spatial view of ethical obligation that underpins *oikeiosis*) should be seen as powerful testimonials for the view that the affective ties of human beings are in fact spatially ordered.

Moreover, there is also suggestive evidence for such a view in the psychological literature. For instance, Woltin et al (2011) argue that "empathic concern...consists of 'zooming in' on concrete other-oriented feelings of warmth and compassion", and find experimental evidence for the view that "empathic concern should be facilitated when people engage in a more detailed and concrete form of processing" (419). When this argument and finding is situated in the context of construal level theory—a prominent theory within social psychology that posits that events or individuals are conceived in more concrete (and less abstract) terms as our spatial proximity to them increases (Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007) — it suggests that other-directed concern decays as a function of distance (since the concreteness of our mental representations declines with distance). In his study of empathy, Hoffman (2010) also underscores the "difference that perceptual immediacy tends to make to the strength of empathic responses" (Slote 2009, 150; Hoffman 2001, 197).⁸

⁶ If, for instance, Singer did not believe in the empirical existence of these moral intuitions, there would be no reason to convince people that these intuitions are an unreliable guide to our ethical commitments ⁷ Not just in the Western philosophical tradition either; many have pointed out that Confucian ethical

thought can be interpreted in terms of the "concentric circles" model of oikeiosis as well (Ivanhoe 2014, 26).

⁸ For a consideration of how sympathetic responses to others might shape the politics of trade, see Naoi and Kume (2011) (though empirically, they find more support for a "projection" based account of agricultural protectionism).

In light of this discussion, we could plausibly ground "local-tropic" preferences in the empirical fact of *oikeiosis*, or the psychological tendency for the strength of our affective ties to decline with distance (Forman 2010, 5). On this account, individuals care about the well-being of the locales in which they live out their everyday lives because they associate the "prosperity and safety" of these locales with the "prosperity and safety" of their fellow residents (Forman 2010, 24), whom they disproportionately care about because spatial proximity (all else equal) amplifies the strength of individuals' affective ties. For the sake of clarity, the steps of the argument can be presented as follows:

- 1. Affective connections weaken with physical distance (the empirical fact of *oikeiosis*).
- 2. The well-being of the "spatially proximate" individuals with whom one shares a locale is tied to the realization of the local interest. In other words, the "prosperity and safety" of the individuals with whom one shares strong bonds of fellow-feeling (on account of their physical proximity) is tied to the creation of a flourishing economic and social environment within the shared locale.
- 3. As a result, individual preferences are independently shaped by a desire to promote the economic interests of the locale (i.e. individuals are "local-tropic")

In short, individual preferences over public policy and economic issues might be independently rooted in a concern with local interests because individuals disproportionately care about their fellow residents (on account of their physical proximity), and view their wellbeing as being tied to the collective prosperity of the locale.

An appeal to *oikeiosis* is not necessarily the only way to ground an individual concern with the local interest, and motivate the existence of local-tropic preferences. Oikeiosis is fundamentally about the spatial ordering of our affective ties to other *people*, and I have suggested that the weakening of these affective ties as a function of distance offers one possible explanation for the importance of local interests in shaping individual preferences. However, it is also plausible that individuals form emotional attachments to places qua places that cannot simply be reduced to a concern with their inhabitants; these are distinctive locale-specific emotional attachments that may encompass (and reinforce) neighborly attachments, but which are ultimately broader than these interpersonal affective ties. As Agnew (1987) notes, "places" are constituted not only by their physical locations (which encompass their unique natural and built environments), and the social and economic relations that are carried out within these locations, but also by the ways in which these various elements converge to evoke a distinctive "sense of place" or "structure of feeling" within a particular locale. These "structures of feeling" essentially create an emotional bond between people and the places in which they live (Agnew 1987, 27; Agnew 1996, 133), and this emotional bond could be the wellspring of a deep-seated concern with local interests.

Admittedly, there is something uncomfortably amorphous about the idea of the "sense of place" for the social scientist, but at the same time, there is also something undeniably "instinctive, visceral, and human" about the "attachment to place" (Long 2010, 165). The idea that humans are emotionally connected to locales through the "[webs] of meaning...that [we] ascribe to place" (166) is therefore perhaps better characterized not as amorphous, but as something so woven into the fabric of our emotional and psychological instincts that it is difficult to develop the critical distance needed to engage the idea in a scientific way. This might

suggest that the attachment to place is a purely subjective experience, and that its exploration is therefore something perhaps best left to writers, poets, and artists. But it is crucial to note that the "sense of place" is *not* a purely subjective experience. As Tuan (2001), one of the most prominent geographers studying the idea of the sense of place, notes:

Intimate experiences are difficult but not impossible to express. They may be personal and deeply felt, but they are not necessarily solipsistic or eccentric...Within a human group experiences have sufficient overlap so that an individual's attachments do not seem egregious and incomprehensible to his peers (Tuan 2001, 147; quoted in Long 2010, 154).

The "sense of place" is therefore also a shared social and cultural experience, one that emerges "through the discourse of its inhabitants" (Long 2010, 154). The subjective experience of a place felt by an individual is shared and communicated with others, and this process is repeated many times over within a locale; through this discursive process, the subjective experiences of individuals within a locale ultimately crystalize into a broader narrative that becomes an important source of place-specific identity. This narrative, in turn, affects the individual experience of place and feelings of place attachment; the individual experience of place is therefore not purely subjective, but the product of a socially and culturally constructed narrative of what it means to live somewhere.

Social scientists have shown that these narratives can be extraordinarily important for social and political outcomes; within political science, Cramer's (2016) work on rural consciousness is a prominent recent example. Nor is the narrative-driven "sense of place" and the resulting attachment to place a distinctively rural phenomenon; the ethnographic work of geographers suggests that it is just as important in urban locales, and that its importance may be increasing (rather than decreasing) in a globalized world (Long 2010; Massey 1994; Cramer 2016). What Long (2010) says of Austin, Texas, could therefore be said of urban locales more

generally: "Through the discourse of its inhabitants, Austin becomes more than a locality on a map...Austin becomes a narrative" (154). And this narrative is the basis for an affective "relationship between people and place" that underpins a concern for the locale, which in turn is the basis for a concern with local interests. In stylized form, the argument runs as follows:

- Individuals develop and experience subjective emotional responses and feelings towards places (Agnew 1987, 5).
- These feelings are discursively shared, and coalesce into a more general narrative about a locale's distinctive identity, "sense of place", or ethos.
- 3. This narrative feeds back into an individual's personal experience of a locale's "sense of place" (see Step 1), which becomes the source of emotional attachment to the locale.
- 4. This attachment to the locale leads to a concern with local well-being and local economic interests (i.e. individuals are local-tropic).

In short, places are not simply assemblages of people; they are constituted by distinctive natural and built landscapes, and distinctive social and economic relations and practices. These elements meld together to create distinctive place-specific emotional attachments that arise from an individually experienced, but also discursively created, "sense of place" or locale-specific ethos. These emotional attachments, in turn, motivate individuals to concern themselves with the well-being of the locale, and pursue the realization of locale-specific interests.

3.4.2 Defining the Local Interest: *How* Are Local-Tropic Judgments About the Local Interest Made?

In Section 3.4.2, we explored, in conceptual terms, the possible *origins* of local-tropic preferences; that is, we explored why individual policy preferences might flow from a concern with local interests and well-being that cannot be reduced to self-interested or sociotropic motivations. I suggested that the tendency of our affective ties to people to decline with distance, as well as the existence of affective connections to places qua places, might anchor such a concern with locale-specific interests.⁹ Of course, a conceptual model of local-tropic preferences must not only provide an account of *why* individuals might be local-tropic, but also address the issue of *how* local-tropic judgments are formed. Individuals may well have an intrinsic concern for the local interest, as we have discussed; but how do they define and conceive the local interest and evaluate what sorts of policies the local interest requires? This section considers this question.

Cutler (2007) suggests that "features of the locale will be linked to political attitudes through a calculation of *local group interest*" (577; his italics). The key word here, with respect to the question of how the local group interest is ascertained, seems to be *calculation*, which implies that individuals determine the local interest through a systematic cognitive process. Individuals arrive at a conception of the local interest, on Cutler's account, by systematically "reasoning about the local interest" (Cutler 2007, 577). This "cognitive" view of how individuals conceive the local interest, or form a view of the determinants of local well-being, enters Cutler's analysis as an assumption, rather than something that is explicitly tested or documented;

⁹ These mechanisms probably interact in complex ways, but I distinguish them in the interests of clarity; future work could potentially explore their possible relationship at greater length.

nevertheless, in light of recent work in IPE, we have reason to question the plausibility of this cognitive view of how conceptions of the local interest are formed. Sabet (2014), for instance, emphasizes that individual preferences are not shaped by cognitive processes, but by affective responses to issues that are shaped by "a set of broad and highly stable 'symbolic' predispositions (e.g. prejudice, nationalism, ideology)" which are "acquired early in life" (Sabet 2014, 8). Local-tropic preferences are of course not based on symbolic predispositions, but by the experience of living in and identifying with a particular locale. Nevertheless, the convincing demonstration by scholars of symbolic politics that affective responses to the world appear to be more important for political preference formation than cognitive ones suggests that it is worth considering how affective (rather than cognitive or rationalist) responses to the experience of living within particular locales might not only underpin an intrinsic concern with local interests (as we argued above), but also affect how these interests are conceived, ascertained, and evaluated.

Epstein's (1994) observations about the different ways in which individuals process and interpret the world around them is a useful starting point for thinking about how affect could plausibly shape the process of local-tropic judgment:

There is no dearth of evidence in every day life that people apprehend reality in two fundamentally different ways, one variously labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative, and experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational (Epstein 1994, 710; quoted in Slovic et al. 2002, 330).

Slovic et al (2002) label the first style of thinking and interpretation "experiential" and the second "analytical". The experiential system "encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives" and is rooted in an "affective basis"; this essentially means that our interpretation of the world is shaped by emotional responses to the images, metaphors, and narratives that are filtered through our experiential system (Slovic et al 2002, 330). In other words, the feelings elicited by our experiences of the images, metaphors, and narratives that enter our lives ultimately "guide judgment and decision-making" about various issues (Slovic et al. 2007, 1335).

Now, think back to our earlier discussion of the "sense of place" and locale-specific "structures of feeling" that shape, and are in turn shaped by, narratives that encapsulate a place's identity or ethos (Agnew 1987, 27). These narratives are complex and multilayered, and encompass many dimensions of place-specific identity; one important strand of these narratives, as Agnew (1987) notes, is a "felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time" (27), as well as the factors that enhance or diminish this quality of life (Cramer 2016). We might expect that local-tropic judgments are oriented by these place-specific narratives that concern a locale's quality of life and well-being; in particular, rather than calculating or rationally assessing the health of a locale's social and economic circumstances and the policies which might contribute to local prosperity, individuals make intuitive and instinctive judgments about the local interest that are shaped by the emotional responses (i.e. optimism, anxiety, confidence, nostalgia etc.) that these place-based narratives of local prosperity or decline evoke. In other words, local-tropic assessments of particular policies are made on the basis of an intuitive sense of how the locale is faring, what its interests are, and how particular policies might affect these interests; these intuitions, in turn, are informed by affective responses to place and environmentspecific narratives that speak to a place's identity and sense of well-being. This relationship between the affective responses elicited by local environments, and political attitudes, is usefully underscored by Leatherby (2016); speaking of geographic divides in the contemporary United States, she writes:

The *physical landscapes* both groups inhabit have become so different that it is easy for urbanites and rural Americans to lost touch with how those in other parts of the country *feel*. Environments almost certainly play a role in shaping voters' political views (quoted in Kahler 2017, 10; my italics).

The virtue of the local-tropic framework developed here is that it provides an account of the micro-foundations of this relationship. While the foregoing discussion might seem somewhat abstract, Cramer's (2016) work on the "sense of place" and place-specific identity in rural Wisconsin provides an instructive example of how local-tropic judgments are formed in the concrete context of American redistributive policy. Residents of the rural communities that Cramer spoke to tended to express support for small-government policies, based on the belief that this was ultimately in the local interest of their communities. This belief that "smallgovernment" is actually preferable from the standpoint of the local interest stems from a complex place-specific narrative of decline and marginalization; according to this narrative, rural communities are in economic decline because they are marginalized by political elites who direct resources towards affluent urban areas. Increasing the size of government would therefore simply redirect rural resources into urban communities further afield, instead of actually helping rural communities (Cramer 2016, 77). Here we see different aspects of the "local-tropic" perspective come together. Residents of rural Wisconsin appear to care fundamentally about the interests and well-being of their locales, more so than their personal interests or some conception of the national interest. And their assessment of the local interest and the policies that will improve local well-being is filtered through emotional responses (i.e. resentment and a sense of bitterness stemming from perceptions of disrespect and marginalization) that flow from a placespecific narrative that articulates a distinctive "rural" sense of place (which Cramer calls "rural

consciousness") and which encompasses an account of the causes of rural decline (i.e. government favoritism towards urban areas).

In short, the argument in this sub-section about the affective basis for local-tropic policy judgments has suggested that one aspect of the more general narrative that captures a locale's "sense of place" is a "felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time" (Agnew 1987, 27), as well as the broader forces that shape this quality of life (Cramer 2016). These geographically delimited narratives about local prosperity, stagnation, or decline (and the causes of these shared experiences) call forth emotional responses that underpin intuitive and instinctive judgments about whether particular policies are in the local interest. In the next two sections, I sketch an account of how this process of local-tropic judgment might plausibly play out with respect to globalization and foreign economic policy in global cities and hinterlands, and thereby lead to the emergence of a territorial political divide between residents of these areas over foreign economic policy.

3.4.3 Local-Tropic Preferences and Global City Coalitions

In a recent discussion of the political implications of the "divergent local effects of globalization", Kahler (2017) appears to gesture towards a local-tropic account of spatial coalitions over globalization when he argues that "economic interests can be filtered and interpreted through group narratives at the local level" (8). How, specifically, might this work in practice? In other words, how might a local-tropic view of preferences help us to explain the emergence of distinctive global city and hinterland foreign economic policy coalitions?

Let us first consider, in this section, how a local-tropic process might explain the genesis of distinctive "global city" coalitions that favor economic openness. As we discussed before,

global city agglomeration processes effectively concentrate globalization-driven economic growth and prosperity within global cities, and this enriches the quality of the everyday lived experience of global city residents in a variety of ways. For instance, the density and prosperity of global cities (not to mention tourist dollars) create large markets that support a wide variety of consumption activities and opportunities (Glaeser et al. 2001, 25; 32). As Longworth (2015) notes, "a strong economy pays for the museums, universities, symphonies, and theatres that make a city more than a labor pool" (35). When it comes to more mundane consumption activities and amenities, like shopping, nightlife, or dining, the size of the market in global cities underwrites a richer and more stimulating variety of options than what is likely to be found in smaller, domestically oriented cities and regions. In addition, cultural and artistic production, which contributes to the creative life of a locale, often thrives in global cities where people have the disposal incomes to support such activities (Currid 2007, 12). And the sheer fact of their density facilitates interpersonal exchanges, both planned and serendipitous, that lead to creative new developments across a range of fields. This is partly captured in the familiar idea of knowledge spillovers, but the traditional conception of knowledge externalities does not adequately convey the sense of excitement and atmosphere of inspiration that arises from these face to face encounters, which Storper and Venables (2004) label "buzz". "Buzz" is the evocative label for the idea that "a certain milieu can be vibrant in the sense that there are lots of piquant and useful things going on simultaneously and therefore lots of inspiration and information to receive for...perceptive local actors" (Bathelt et al. 2004, 38). The result is an economic and social environment rich with possibility and anticipation, one which gives individuals the feeling of being at the center of it all—that is, "where the action is" (Longworth 2015, 1). It is the feeling that "important and exciting things are happening here, and I am a part

of it (or will be a part of it)." These are but some examples of how the globalization-driven prosperity enjoyed by global cities filter down into the everyday experiences of their residents¹⁰, whose resulting experience of the global city's "sense of place" generates and reinforces a narrative that highlights not only a "dynamic sense of economic opportunity and vitality", but often also an atmosphere of social and cultural energy as well (McNamara 2016, 20; 24). These experiences give rise to a "sense of place" that evokes an awareness of place-specific prosperity and dynamism; this "sense of place", in turn, congeals into a general narrative of local ascendance and prosperity that stimulates certain emotional responses, such as optimism, confidence, and a feeling of empowerment. When deciding whether globalization is in the local interest, individual judgments are likely to be guided by and filtered through these positive emotional responses; this increases the likelihood that global city residents instinctively view

¹⁰ McNamara (2017) provides an insightful recent account of global cities (which she calls "superstar metros") and how differences in the everyday lived experiences of global city residents and hinterland residents might shape broader patterns of class and political polarization. While we share an interest in the spatial economic cleavages that emerge in a globalized, post-industrial world, her discussion is in several ways different from mine. Perhaps the biggest difference lies in the centrality of class to her analysis. McNamara argues that class polarization (where class is understood, following Bourdieu, in a cultural sense) maps onto patterns of spatial polarization, and that the distinctive spatial expression of class polarization amplifies overall patterns of political polarization in the United States. My own account of local-tropic preferences is more general; it is not limited to the US, and indeed, could be applied to developing countries as well (I provide suggestive evidence of its applicability to a developing country context in the next chapter). Perhaps more importantly, McNamara is fundamentally interested in how class cleavages and spatial cleavages map onto each other to create "class bubbles" that reinforce overall patterns of political polarization. In my view, the extent to which class and spatial cleavages do in fact map onto each other seems to be somewhat overstated in McNamara's account; it is not clear that for instance, that superstar metros have the sort of class homogeneity that the idea of "cultural bubbles" seems to suggest. In what respect, for instance, can upper-middle class professionals and low-income service workers, both of which are found in large numbers in superstar metros, be said to share a common class identity? At least to my eyes, they would seem to occupy very different parts of Bourdieu's social space. Be that as it may, while McNamara's concern appears to be with the ways in which class and spatial cleavages overlap and reinforce each other, my own interest is in how spatial cleavages might emerge as distinctive bases of political conflict that are not reducible to patterns of class conflict.

globalization in a positive light, as an opportunity to be seized by their locales, rather than as a threat to be feared and resisted.

We recently witnessed, in the British referendum on membership in the European Union, a concrete example of how local-tropic preferences may underpin global city coalitions in practice. Manchester and Liverpool are two former industrial-era cities that have emerged in recent decades as minor global cities that have adapted themselves to the post-industrial age; reflecting on why these cities disproportionately supported the "Remain" position—which, broadly speaking, can be associated with a pro-globalization, pro-openness posture (as I discuss in the next chapter)—downtown Manchester's chief executive noted the following:

The economic growth that has been enjoyed and the physical regeneration of Manchester and Liverpool has provided Liverpudlians and Mancunians alike with a swagger and confidence in their future. It was easier for Remain to sell continued economic prosperity to those who witness it on a daily basis—even if some of them haven't necessarily benefitted yet on a personal level...(Downtown in Business, n.d.)

This account seems to appeal, in general terms, to a broadly local-tropic explanation for why the political orientations towards economic openness of residents in the cities of Manchester and Liverpool appear out-of-step with those of their fellow-citizens residing in surrounding hinterland regions. The support of Manchester and Liverpool residents for "Remain" was not directly informed by their personal material interests ("some of them haven't necessarily benefitted yet on a personal level"), or a concern with Britain as a whole, but by a concern with the interests of their urban locales ("their future" seems to refer to the collective futures of Liverpool and Manchester, not Britain more broadly). Their concrete, everyday experience of prosperity and economic dynamism ("economic growth…physical regeneration…[witnessed] on a daily basis") created a particular "sense of place" associated with feelings and emotional

responses ("swagger and confidence") that shaped the interpretive lens through which they viewed the issue of Britain's openness to Europe and the world. Indeed, their receptivity to the argument that remaining in the EU was desirable was conditioned by these feelings; this point was certainly recognized by the "Remain" campaign in Manchester, which included appeals to optimism and future possibilities ("sell continued economic prosperity") that would resonate with the prevailing "sense of place" in these cities. This is in contrast with the national "Remain" campaign, which seemed to primarily emphasize the future risks associated with leaving, perhaps as a result of an awareness that optimistic appeals to continued prosperity would be out-of-step with the prevailing ethos of most of the nation's (hinterland) locales (Roue 2016). In other words, an optimistic appeal to future possibilities associated with economic openness was possible and successful within the urban locales of cities such as Manchester and Liverpool, because it resonated with the everyday experiences of their residents and the emotional sentiments associated with these everyday experiences; needless to say, such appeals were more difficult to make in hinterland regions, and therefore replaced with more pessimistic fear-based "pro-Remain" appeals in places where globalization has hollowed out and impoverished locales as a result of hinterland dispersion processes. The next sub-section considers the link between local-tropic preferences and the rise of "anti-globalization" coalitions in these hinterland areas.

3.4.4 Local Tropic Preferences and Hinterland Coalitions

Gest (2016) memorably characterizes the on-the-ground experience of living in hinterland locales that are hollowed out by hinterland dispersion processes in a globalizing world as "traumatic". In his case study of Youngstown, Ohio—a prominent example of such a locale he evocatively describes how the legacy of a prosperous and dynamic past remains in the form of a built environment ("two symphony halls, a world-class art museum…monumental architectural specimens") that serves as a cruel, almost mocking, reminder of how far the city has fallen.

Today, he describes the city—one of many like it—as follows:

Its core is decimated. Boarded up windows are ubiquitous, the city has thousands of empty lots, and relics of old factories and deserted railroad tracks litter the banks of the Mahoning River. There are few pedestrians at any time of day, and very few cars passing under the traffic lights that dangle from telephone wires above intersections. People drive through slowly, like submarines exploring an oxidized Atlantis of brick, mortar, and corroded metal (74-75).

There is very little external investment into Youngstown-particularly for commercial purposes. The only major retail chains that have branches in the city are Rite-Aid and CVS pharmacies, fast-food restaurants, and downscale grocery stores like Family Dollar and Save-A-Lot. Neighborhoods are filled with shuttered businesses: muffler garages, bars, tire centers, roofing and construction offices, maintenance services, and travel agencies. There are few barber shops, gyms, home furnishing outlets, hardware stores, or salons. There are few hobby stores for sports, art, photography, or crafts. There are few copy shops, stationers, clothing boutiques, cinemas, coffeehouses, candy shops, or bakeries. These are not mere luxuries, but staples of the nonessential but nevertheless conventional leisure and service industries inherent to contemporary American markets (82).

Unsurprisingly and perhaps inevitably, such environments are associated with a "sense of place" that engenders narratives of "loss and perceived decline" (Kahler 2017, 8); these narratives promote hostility towards globalization not only among those that are personally disadvantaged by globalization (for instance, factory workers who have seen their plants shuttered and moved to developing countries) but also among those within the wider community who, in individual terms, are not necessarily labor-market "losers" of external liberalization (for instance, doctors or teachers). Though these individuals may not be personally harmed by globalization, the broader narratives of local stagnation and decline that take hold in settings shaped by hinterland dispersion processes induce feelings of sadness and marginalization, but also, as Gest documents, nostalgia and a longing to recreate the shared glories of the past (Gest

2016, 83-84). When embedded within such an affective matrix, we would expect local-tropic individuals to view globalization as a destructive and pernicious force, something to be resisted and reversed for the sake of the local interest, rather than embraced; in the context of our example here, nostalgia for the prosperous Youngstown of the industrial and pre-globalization past, which arises from a local narrative of decay and stagnation, diffuses anti-globalization attitudes beyond globalization's immediate labor market losers to a community of "local-tropic" individuals that are intrinsically concerned with the broader welfare of their locales, and whose everyday environments give them the sense that globalization is not in the local interest.

The result is a mass "anti-globalization" coalition anchored in hinterland locales, one that forms not on the basis of how individuals conceive their personal material interests or process information about the national interest, but which develops as an outgrowth of the emotional investment that residents of the hinterlands have in the well-being of locales that are devastated by hinterland dispersion processes. Certain aspects of the American presidential election of 2016 suggest that preference formation over globalization works in this way; as Kahler (2017) notes, anti-globalization Trump voters did not seem to be materially disadvantaged by the current economic order in personal terms, but were drawn to the candidate promising a disruption to the globalized status-quo because "their environments—and their local cultures—would be shaped" by anti-globalization narratives stressing globalization's economically deleterious effects at a local geographic scale (Kahler 2017, 9-10).

In short, a local-tropic account traces the formation of an "anti-globalization" hinterland coalition not to spatially defined individual interests in the context of hinterland dispersion processes, or the ways in which individuals filter information through their perceptual apparatus, but on the basis of their emotional investment in the well-being of the hinterland locales that are

devastated by the hinterland dispersion processes detailed in Chapter 2. To make this point concrete, we might consider the following passage; they are the words of a local Youngstown priest interviewed by Gest, speaking of the emotional toll of Youngstown's decline:

Just like if you lose a loved one, you grieve for a long time. And when they finally imploded the oldest of the blast furnaces, there was a group of steelworkers who stood watching on a nearby hill, crying. Those were the brutish-looking steelworkers who went to work everyday and finished it at the bar with a double—sitting there, weeping (83).

It is a haunting scene, but also, for our purposes, an illuminating one, to the extent that it clarifies the distinctiveness and value of the local-tropic approach to political preference formation developed in this section as an explanation for the emergence of protectionist hinterland coalitions. It suggests that within many locales, globalization is experienced as a human tragedy, not only by the people who directly experience the effects of economic dislocation, but by those who bear witness to such pathos-filled scenes of economic and social dissolution in the course of their daily routines. The local-tropic account begins from the possibility that such human beings care independently about the well-being of the places in which they live, and that such scenes of stagnation and decline congeal into broader place-specific narratives—narratives with an emotional force that shapes the ways in which hinterland residents intuit a fundamental antagonism between the local interest and globalization.

3.4.5 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and Local-Tropic Coalitions: Summary

In short, the local-tropic theory of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders spatially organized foreign economic policy coalitions begins from the premise that individual preferences are "local-tropic" (i.e. oriented by an intrinsic concern with the local interest). Spatially organized "global city" and "hinterland" coalitions arise, on this account, because of the tendency of global city residents to form systematically more favourable local-tropic judgments of globalization than their hinterland counterparts. That is, global city residents are more likely to favour globalization than hinterland residents because they are more likely to believe that globalization is in the interests of their locales than hinterland residents. While such a conclusion about the local interest could be justified in rationalist terms on the basis of an objective calculus, I suggested that in light of recent work on the importance of affect and intuition for policy preferences, it is more likely that the divergence in local-tropic attitudes towards globalization across the global city versus hinterland divide arises from the fact that global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes give rise to very different "everyday environments" (McNamara 2017, 17), and experiences of globalization on the ground; these experiences congeal into broader narratives of locale-specific ascendance or decline in a globalized world, which in turn underpin intuitive and affect-laden judgements that globalization is in the local interest among global city residents (which animates their support for globalization), and intuitive and affect-laden judgements that it is *not* in the local interest among hinterland residents (which animates their opposition to globalization).

We can summarize the local-tropic theory of spatial foreign economic policy coalitions as follows:

 Individuals are local-tropic, i.e. individual preferences are oriented by an intrinsic concern with the local interest (i.e. the well-being of the locale qua locale, rather than personal or national-well-being)

- 2. Everyday life in the global city and in the hinterlands is shaped by the concrete experience of global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes, respectively. These everyday experiences crystallize into broader place-specific narratives of ascendance or decline in the context of globalization.
- 3. The emotional resonance of place-specific narratives of ascendance in global cities lead global city residents to an intuitive and affect-laden judgment that globalization is in the local interest, while the negative feelings associated with place-specific narratives of decline in hinterland areas lead hinterland residents to an intuitive and affect-laden judgment that globalization is harmful to the local interests of their communities.
- 4. Global city and hinterland residents come to support and oppose globalization, respectively, based on these different conceptions of the local interest. In other words, global city coalitions over globalization are comprised of global city residents who tend to believe that globalization is in the interest of their locales, while hinterland coalitions are comprised of global city residents who tend to believe that globalization is not in the interest of their locales.

3.5 Conclusion

In the previous chapter, I presented a conceptual discussion of how "global city agglomeration processes" and "hinterland dispersion processes" constitute global cities and hinterlands as distinctive territorial formations that are the geographic "winners" and "losers", respectively, of contemporary globalization. This chapter is the first step in the dissertation's investigation of how this territorial economic cleavage with respect to globalization shapes the politics of foreign economic policy. In particular, I have presented a theoretical investigation of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might plausibly engender distinctive spatial coalitions that reflect this distribution of territorial interests (i.e. internationalist "global city" coalitions and protectionist "hinterland" coalitions). In other words, the purpose of this chapter has been to explore the micro-level mechanisms by which global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes—which constitute global cities and hinterlands as territorial formations that "win" and "lose" from globalization—might shape individual preferences over globalization so as to yield spatially organized mass coalitions over globalization that reflect the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands.

In particular, I elaborated three distinct theories of how such spatial coalitions might form. In Section 3.2, I presented an ego-tropic theory of spatial coalitions. On this account, individuals' foreign economic policy preferences are oriented by their understanding of their personal material interests, and global city residents might therefore be more favourably disposed towards globalization than hinterland residents to the extent that the former believe they personally benefit from global city agglomeration processes (in the form of higher wages or an expanded range of job opportunities), while the latter believe they are personally harmed by hinterland dispersion processes (in the form of lower wages, or a reduced menu of job opportunities).

In Section 3.3 I presented a sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions, which begins from the premise that individual foreign economic policy preferences are shaped by their view of the national interest. On this account of spatial coalitions, global city and hinterland residents use local and regionally specific information sources as information shortcuts in attempting to ascertain the impact of globalization on the national economy. These territorially specific information bases are coloured by global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion

processes, respectively. We might therefore expect that global city residents tend to receive local information that emphasizes globalization's benefits, which is likely to encourage and support beliefs about globalization's favourable national impact; on the other hand, we might expect that hinterland residents tend to receive local information that emphasizes globalization's costs, which is likely to underpin beliefs about globalization's deleterious national impact. The result is a "pro-globalization" coalition of global city residents who believe that globalization is good for the national welfare, and an "anti-globalization" coalition of hinterland residents with unfavourable sociotropic assessments of globalization.

Finally, in Section 3.4, I developed a local-tropic theory of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might engender corresponding spatial coalitions over globalization. The local-tropic account of preference formation developed here suggests that individual preferences are informed by a concern with the well-being of the locales in which they live, for two distinct reasons. First, because (all else equal) they care more about individuals with whom they share a local environment than physically distant individuals who are not part of their milieu, and understandably believe that the welfare of these spatially proximate individuals is a function of the locale's economic well-being. Second, because the "sense of place" associated with a locale becomes the basis for an emotional attachment to the local environment—an attachment that cannot simply be reduced to a concern with fellow locals— that underpins a general concern with the local interest (along various dimensions). The "sense of place" that forms the basis for place attachment is codified in complex and multi-layered place-based narratives that capture a place's identity or ethos (Agnew 1987, 27); one aspect of these narratives, as Agnew notes, is a "felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time" (27). I suggested that these narratives (i.e. of local prosperity, stagnation, or decline, and their

causes), and the emotional responses associated with these narratives, provide individuals with an intuitive sense of the local interest and what it requires, which in turn informs their policy preferences. In the context of our concern here with global cities and hinterlands, I suggested that the narrative of globalized prosperity and ascendance that takes hold in global cities, and the emotions associated with this narrative—such as confidence, optimism, "swagger"—lead to an instinctively favourable view of globalization as an opportunity to be seized, one that redounds to the benefit of locales within the global city. Conversely, the narrative of stagnation and decline that takes hold in hinterlands, and the emotions associated with this narrative—sadness, anger, nostalgia—lead to an instinctively negative view of globalization as a destructive force, one that must be resisted and reversed for the sake of the local interest. The end result, on this account, is a coalition of internationalist global city residents who support globalization because they believe it is in the local interest, and a coalition of protectionist hinterland residents who oppose globalization on local-tropic grounds.

The next chapter turns to an empirical evaluation of whether the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands does indeed engender distinctive spatial foreign economic policy coalitions, as predicted by all of the theories elaborated in this chapter. In other words, it addresses the following question: to what extent do internationalist "global city" and protectionist "hinterland" political coalitions over globalization underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands indeed manifest empirically? Second, recall that in my theoretical discussion of these different explanations for how spatial political coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is is likely to have the greatest empirical purchase. Chapter 4 therefore also adopts certain empirical strategies to uncover (in a preliminary fashion)

whether these distinctive spatial coalitions, to the extent that they exist, are indeed best explained by the local-tropic account of "global city" and "hinterland" foreign economic policy coalitions developed in Section 3.4.

Chapter 4: The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Evidence from Referenda in the UK and Costa Rica

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I discussed how the spatial agglomeration of the headquarters establishments of globally oriented superstar firms within certain metropolitan areas, and the globalization-driven spillover effects and local economic multipliers associated with these establishments—which I labelled "global city agglomeration processes"—constitute territorial formations known as "global cities" as the "winners" of globalization. Conversely, I analyzed how the negative multipliers and weak globalization-driven spillover effects of spatially dispersed domestically oriented firms and superstar branch plants—which I labelled "hinterland dispersion processes"—constitute territorial formations known as "hinterlands" as the "losers" of globalization.

Chapter 3 carried out a theoretical exploration of the micro-level mechanisms by which the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands over globalization might underpin corresponding mass foreign economic policy coalitions over globalization. In other words, it investigated how the different interests of global cities and hinterlands with respect to globalization (as a result of global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes) might plausibly shape individual preferences over globalization, and thereby engender political coalitions over globalization that reflect this territorial distribution of interests (i.e. "global city coalitions" favoring globalization, and "hinterland" coalitions opposed to globalization). As Trubowitz (1998, 7) notes, "regional economic differentiation is a structural concept", and the "mapping" from territorial economic interests to spatially defined political preferences and political behaviour is not automatic or straightforward; the mechanisms that translate territorial economic interests into the individual policy preferences that underpin mass political coalitions over globalization must therefore be explicitly theorized. To that end, Chapter 3 elaborated three distinct theories of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterland might plausibly engender corresponding spatial political coalitions over globalization.

The first, an ego-tropic theory of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, suggests that individuals' preferences over globalization are shaped by their personal material interests, and that spatial coalitions over globalization form to the extent that individuals in global cities believe that they enjoy personal economic benefits (i.e. higher personal incomes and more individual job opportunities) because of the positive impact of globalization on the local metropolitan economy, while individuals from hinterland regions believe that they suffer personal economic costs (i.e. lower personal incomes and fewer individual job opportunities) because of the negative impact of globalization

on the local and regional economies of hinterlands. In other words, spatial coalitions over globalization form to the extent that individuals link global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes to their personal bottom lines.

The second, a sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, begins from the premise that individual preferences over globalization are animated by a broader concern for the impact of globalization on the national economy (i.e. individual preferences are sociotropic). On this account, spatial political coalitions over globalization form to the extent that individuals in global cities are more inclined to believe that globalization is a positive force for the national economy, while hinterland residents are more inclined to believe that globalization has a deleterious impact on the national economy. I suggested that we might expect the local information diets of global city and hinterland residents to be different (as a result of how news coverage, and personal experiences, are shaped by global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes), with the former exposed to relatively positive information about globalization and the latter exposed to relatively negative information about globalization is in the national interest among global city and hinterland residents.

The last theory of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands developed in Chapter 3 was a local-tropic one, and begins from the premise that individuals' policy preferences flow from their concern with the well-being of their locales, and that this concern with local interests is intrinsic, rather than derivative of a more fundamental concern with their personal well-being or that of the nation as a whole. On this account, spatial coalitions over globalization form because individuals in global cities believe that globalization

is in the local interest, while hinterland residents believe that protection is in the local interest. After suggesting explanations for *why* individuals' policy preferences might stem from an intrinsic concern with the local interest, I put forward an account of how individuals might actually discern the local interest and develop a sense of what it requires. In particular, I suggested that the shared experience of living within a locale creates an intersubjectively felt "sense of place" that helps to crystalize locale-specific narratives of prosperity or decline; these emotionally resonant narratives of prosperity, stagnation, or decline shape the affective prism through which individuals arrive at an intuitive conception of the local interest. Drawing on the observations of on-the-ground participants and recent ethnographic scholarship, I developed an account of how global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes underpin fundamentally different economic and social environments within global city and hinterland locales; these different "everyday environments" (McNamara 2017, 17), in turn, support distinctive local narratives of globalized prosperity (in global cities) or globalizationdriven decline (in hinterlands) that push global city global city residents towards very different affective judgments about whether globalization is in the local interest, with global city residents favoring globalization on local-tropic grounds and hinterland residents favoring protection on local-tropic grounds.

The theories elaborated in Chapter 3 yield a common prediction: that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands— marked by global cities as the territorial "winners" of globalization and hinterlands as its territorial "losers"—engenders political coalitions over globalization that correspond with this territorial economic cleavage. In other words, they predict the existence of mass "global city" and "hinterland" coalitions that favor and oppose globalization, respectively, and suggest that these coalitions are independent players in the mass

politics of globalization; that is, these spatial coalitions are an explicit outgrowth of global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes, and are not simply a spatial manifestation of coalitions fundamentally underpinned by processes scholars of IPE have analyzed in the past. They predict a spatial *political* cleavage over globalization, in short, that reflects the spatial *economic* cleavage between global cities and hinterlands, and posit that this spatial political cleavage between global city and hinterland residents is ultimately rooted in the spatial structure of territorial interests as it is constituted by global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes; it is not simply a by-product of how individuals already predisposed to supporting or opposing globalization for other reasons sort themselves across space. In short, the theories elaborated in Chapter 3 all predict spatially organized global city and hinterland mass coalitions over globalization that are empirically distinct from the mass coalitions that scholars of IPE have analyzed in the past.

This chapter is an empirical extension of Chapter 3. Its purpose is two-fold. First, it empirically investigates whether distinctive mass spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands—predicted in Chapter 3—do in fact exist. Second, it attempts to uncover, at least in a preliminary fashion, whether these mass spatial coalitions are indeed best explained by the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions elaborated in Chapter 3. In other words, recall that in Chapter 3, I suggested that it is plausible that global city and hinterland political coalitions over globalization are comprised of individuals with spatially defined ego-tropic or sociotropic preferences shaped by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands; however, I ultimately suggested that it is more likely that local-tropic processes of preference formation translate global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes into corresponding mass coalitions of global city and hinterland residents that favor or

oppose, respectively, globalization on local-tropic grounds. Therefore, beyond exploring whether mass spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (which are predicted by all of the theories elaborated in Chapter 3) do in fact exist, this chapter also attempts to carry out a plausibility probe of whether these coalitions are best explained by a local-tropic account of political preference formation.

In order to carry out an empirical exploration of global city and hinterland political coalitions over globalization along these lines, we require data on patterns of mass support and opposition to globalization across space. I draw on data from relatively recent globalizationrelated public referenda, from both the developed and developing worlds, to develop a proxy measure for mass preferences over globalization. In particular, I use data from the referendum held in the UK in the summer of 2016 over its continued membership in the European Union (hereafter "Brexit"), and the referendum held in Costa Rica in 2007 over ratification of the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). In the case of Brexit, I take votes to remain in the European Union as indications of "pro-globalization" sentiment, and votes to leave as reflections of "anti-globalization" sentiment; in the case of the CAFTA referendum, I take votes to ratify CAFTA as indications of "pro-globalization" sentiment, and votes to oppose CAFTA ratification as indications of "anti-globalization" sentiment (I defend the use of these cases, and these interpretations of the voting patterns, in Section 4.2). To develop an empirical measure of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, I collect spatial data on the headquarters of globally oriented "superstar" and producer services firms, which I use to develop measures of district-level and commuter-zone level variation in the strength of global city agglomeration processes. In a series of empirical tests at the district-level and individual level, I show that mass support for globalization systematically increases as a function of the strength of

global city agglomeration processes; in other words, mass support for globalization is systematically higher (at different scales of analysis) in areas where global city agglomeration processes are relatively strong than in areas where global city agglomeration processes are relatively weak, even after controlling for a range of alternative determinants of mass preferences over globalization. These results suggest that empirically distinctive spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands do indeed exist. In addition, I present preliminary evidence, drawing on individual-level survey data from Brexit, for the existence of empirical spatial patterns that are consistent with the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions, but inconsistent with the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories.

In what follows, I first briefly discuss the CAFTA and Brexit cases in Section 4.2, and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of using these cases in an empirical study that aims to investigate whether the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is an independent vector of influence on mass preferences over globalization, and thereby underpins empirically distinctive "global city" and "hinterland" spatial coalitions over globalization. In this section, I also present some observational data from these globalization-related referenda, which shows a tendency for voting patterns to track the global city versus hinterland economic cleavage, such that support for referendum-specific "pro-globalization" positions appears noticeably higher within and in the vicinity of global cities than in areas that might be considered hinterlands. I suggest that this spatial distribution of support for and opposition to globalization is consistent with the presence of mass spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide, and cannot be adequately explained in terms of existing theories of foreign economic policy coalitions in the OEP tradition.

To more systematically assess whether the empirical patterns of mass support for globalization across space, introduced in Section 4.2, do indeed reflect the presence of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, Section 4.3 undertakes a multivariate analysis of district-level Brexit voting patterns that includes an independent variable of interest that captures district-level variation in the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes. This independent variable of interest is constructed using establishment level spatial data on the headquarters of "superstar" firms; Section 4.2 therefore also discusses this data (which I use throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation), underlying coding issues, and variable construction in detail. I demonstrate evidence for a systematic positive relationship between our empirical measure of global city agglomeration processes and support for the internationalist "remain" position in the Brexit referendum; in other words, as district-level global city agglomeration processes strengthen, district-level support for "remain" increases, while as district-level global city agglomeration processes weaken (and hinterland dispersion processes correspondingly strengthen), district-level support for "remain" declines. These results are statistically significant and substantively important even after controlling for the presence of a range of other determinants of mass foreign economic policy preferences, and therefore imply that empirically distinct spatial coalitions over globalization that are underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (constituted by global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes) do indeed exist in the UK.

Though the analysis in Section 4.3 is richly suggestive, and points to the existence of district-level spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, it is important to underscore that it does not test the arguments of Chapter 3 at the

individual level of analysis; in light of the ecological inference problem, it is impossible to make individual-level inferences from district level data. Therefore, in order to more explicitly uncover the individual level micro-foundations of spatial coalitions over globalization, Section 4.4 draws on a large publicly available survey from the British Election Study containing data on intended vote choice in the Brexit Referendum and fine-grain data on respondent locations. I situate respondents within UK commuter zones, and use spatial data on superstar headquarters (discussed in Section 4.3) to develop an analogous measure of the relative strength of superstar agglomeration processes at the commuter zone level; I then classify commuter zones as either "global city commuter zones" or "hinterland commuter zones" depending on the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes within their borders. I show that the probability that residents of global city commuter zones support the internationalist "remain" position is systematically higher than the probability that hinterland commuter zone residents do so, even after controlling for a range of individual-level covariates; this result is statistically significant and substantively important.

In addition to documenting an individual-level spatial political cleavage between global city commuter zone residents and hinterland commuter zone residents—a cleavage predicted by all of the theories of spatial coalitions developed in Chapter 3—Section 4.4.3 also makes a preliminary attempt to ascertain whether this cleavage might be underpinned by the tendency of global city residents to develop systematically more favourable ego-tropic or sociotropic assessments of globalization, as suggested by the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, global city residents tend to be more supportive of globalization than hinterland residents because the former are more likely to believe that they personally benefit from

globalization than the latter; on the sociotropic theory, global city residents tend to be more supportive of globalization than hinterland residents because the former are more likely to believe that the nation as a whole benefits from globalization than the latter. To the extent that the ego-tropic theory is valid, we would therefore expect to observe that global city residents are systematically more likely to believe that they personally benefit from globalization than hinterland residents; I provide suggestive evidence that in fact, such ego-tropic economic assessments do not vary across the global city versus hinterland divide. I also provide suggestive evidence that, against the expectations of the sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions, global city residents do not appear to be more likely to believe that the nation as a whole benefits from globalization than hinterland residents. The evidence presented against the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions in this section is merely suggestive, and moreover, does not explicitly engage with the local-tropic theory at all; nevertheless, Section 4.4's findings to the effect that ego-tropic and sociotropic assessments of globalization do not seem to be systematically more favourable among global city commuter zone residents than hinterland commuter zone residents offers preliminary support for the argument in Chapter 3 that the egotropic and sociotropic theories might not offer as much leverage in explaining spatial coalitions as the local-tropic one.

In Section 4.5, I more explicitly explore the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions in relation to the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories. In particular, as I have already noted, all three of these theories predict the existence of an individual level spatial political cleavage between residents of global city commuter zones and hinterland commuter zones with respect to globalization. In finding evidence for such a pattern (as we do in Section 4.4), we can conclude (at least tentatively) that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands does indeed

shape individual preferences over globalization, and thereby underpins mass coalitions over globalization; however, leaving aside the efforts of Section 4.4.3, we cannot necessarily ascertain which of the theories of spatial coalitions best explains this finding. In Section 4.5 I argue that the local-tropic theory makes a distinctive micro-level prediction about the spatial organization of foreign economic policy preferences that is not simultaneously an implication of the egotropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions as well. In particular, I argue that according to the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions (but *not* the ego-tropic or sociotropic ones), we would expect to see a spatial political cleavage within global city commuter zones (classified in Section 4.4) between residents of the "metropolitan core" (within and in the vicinity of the global city commuter zone's central business district) and residents of the "metropolitan periphery" as a result of the tendency of global city agglomeration processes to decline as a function of distance. I present evidence for such an intra-global city commuter zone spatial political cleavage along these lines, which is consistent with a local-tropic account of the relationship between global city agglomeration processes and individual preferences over globalization, but not an ego-tropic or sociotropic one; Section 4.5's finding of such a pattern therefore suggests support for the localtropic theory of spatial coalitions more generally.

In Section 4.6, I turn to a consideration of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and spatial coalitions over globalization in the developing country context of Costa Rica. The district-level analysis of voting patterns over CAFTA in this section is analogous to Section 4.3's analysis of Brexit. As in the case of the district-level analysis of Brexit, I find that increases in the strength of district-level global city agglomeration processes are associated with increases in district-level support for globalization (as indicated by support for CAFTA), even after accounting for alternative determinants of mass

preferences; these results are statistically significant and substantively important. These results suggest that as in the UK, spatial coalitions over globalization underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands also appear to exist in Costa Rica. Given data limitations, we are not able to use Costa Rican survey data to probe the individual micro-foundations of these coalitions, or investigate the theory of spatial coalitions that best explains this result (as we were able to do in the analysis of Brexit); nevertheless, in documenting the existence of these coalitions in a preliminary way in the Costa Rican context, we underscore the important point that spatial coalitions over globalization appear to be a general phenomenon in the mass politics of globalization, and are not simply a feature of the open-economy politics of the developed world.

Section 4.7 briefly concludes and looks ahead to the next chapter.

4.2 The Spatial Distribution of Mass Support for Globalization: Observational Patterns from Voting Over Brexit and CAFTA

4.2.1 An Overview of Brexit and CAFTA

Political scientists have recently turned to analysing data on referendum voting patterns to test theories about the determinants and organization of political coalitions over foreign economic policy. This turn to referendum data is motivated in part by a desire among scholars of IPE investigating public opinion to address the "so what" question; on this account, it is preferable to test theories of foreign economic policy coalitions using data on actual behavioural outcomes, rather than responses to survey questions that are "a relatively costless form of stated preferences [which] have little bearing on the actual behaviour of individuals" (Naoi and Kuo 2015, 112-113). In addition, focusing on referendum data is useful, since a national referendum is an important national event that assumes a high degree of salience and visibility; it is more likely that individuals take a considered position on these concrete choices than on survey questions that ask rather general and sometimes abstract questions about their policy preferences. The drawback of using referendum data is that referendum results are provided at the district level; as a result, it has to be analysed at this level, since attempting to recover individual preferences from district-level data is impossible, given the problem of ecological inference (Kuo and Naoi 2015). To bypass this issue, at least to some extent, this chapter analyses survey data asking individuals about their referendum voting intentions, in addition to district-level returns.

As noted above, I analyse referendum data from Brexit and the Costa Rican referendum over accession to CAFTA. Before turning to a preliminary examination of geographic patterns in the voting patterns over these referenda, it is important to first discuss them at greater length, and assess the benefits and drawbacks of using these events as empirical test cases through which to examine the organization of foreign economic policy coalitions. As mentioned above, CAFTA is a free trade agreement, ratified in 2007, between Costa Rica, a handful of its Central American neighbors, and the United States; "Brexit" refers to the United Kingdom's referendum, held in the summer of 2016, over its continued membership in the European Union. In both cases, the final results were close; the Costa Rican referendum led to the ratification of CAFTA by a roughly 3% margin, while the "leave" position carried the day in UK's referendum on EU membership by a final vote of 51.9%-48.1%.

In what follows, I take a "Yes" vote on "CAFTA", and a "Remain" vote in the Brexit referendum, as proxies for "pro-globalization" sentiment. In the case of CAFTA, there is

admittedly the possibility of some noise interrupting this "signal" of underlying attitudes towards globalization; perhaps vote choices may have reflected not preferences over the desirable orientation of foreign economic policy, but more general attitudes towards the United States or other parties to the agreement (for instance, an anti-CAFTA stance may not necessarily have reflected a protectionist stance, but rather an anti-American one). Another possibility is that some votes against CAFTA may not have been motivated by anti-globalization sentiment, but by a "pro-globalization" rejection of trade agreements that violate the principle of non-discrimination in trade policy. This is certainly worth considering, but such calculations would have presumably required such a high degree of economic and policy sophistication that these sorts of considerations could not have been widespread.¹ More generally, the assumption that CAFTA voting is a reasonable proxy for attitudes towards a liberal global economy is one that scholars have made in previous work (Urbatsch 2013; Hicks, Milner, and Tingley 2014), and it seems reasonable to follow their lead in this regard.

With respect to the Brexit case, social scientists have tended to equate a "leave" vote with a "vote against globalisation" rather than a narrower "vote specifically against the EU" (Coyle 2016, Abstract). Observers outside the Academy, too, suggest that the referendum should be interpreted in these terms; the journalist Don Lee (2016) calls the Brexit vote "perhaps the biggest public referendum to date on globalization" (Paragraph 3), while Gordon Brown, the former British Prime Minister, agrees that vote choices could be considered a proxy for attitudes towards globalization (Rickard 2016, 120). For the purpose of this chapter, I also adopt the view that voting choices over Brexit offer a useful real-world proxy for underlying attitudes towards

¹ Moreover, it is by no means obvious that pro-globalization individuals alert to these issues would necessarily oppose regional trade agreements; after all such agreements are often viewed as an important route to external liberalization in a world where the multilateral trading system is beset with significant challenges.

the desirability of globalization; more specifically, I posit that "Leave" votes reflect antiglobalization sentiment, and that "Remain" votes reflect pro-globalization sentiment.

The assumption that voting decisions in the Brexit referendum correspond to preferences over globalization is not without its problems, however. In particular, one direct challenge to the validity of mapping preferences over globalization onto Brexit voting patterns lies in a perhaps counter-intuitive feature of the "Leave" campaign: it actually "portrayed [trade] very positively", with Pro-Brexit elites suggesting that trade-related economic benefits would increase after leaving the European Union (Owen and Walter 2017, 182; Rodrik 2017). This naturally invites the question: to what extent did the "Leave" and "Remain" coalitions simply disagree about the best *means* to promote British integration into the global economy (i.e. through the institutional framework of the EU, or by working outside it), rather than disagree about whether globalization was an end worth pursuing in the first place? To the extent that the disagreement was over the best means of promoting globalization, rather than whether globalization is an end worth pursuing to begin with, it suggests that the decision to interpret "Leave" votes as "anti-globalization" votes should give us pause.

One obvious empirical implication of this "disagreement over means" view is that amongst both "leave" and "remain" voters, the percentage of individuals expressing a belief in the desirability of trade should tend to converge towards a high number. However, we do not actually see evidence for such convergence in the empirical record. Indeed, against the view that both groups of voters supported expanded trade as a policy goal, the survey data actually points to the existence of a substantial gap, of over 40 points, in pro-trade attitudes between these groups; 89% of "Remain" voters expressed the view that British trade with Europe is a good thing, compared to 48% of "Leave" voters who felt the same way (Owen and Walter 2017, 183).

We should emphasize that this concerns trade with *Europe*, which of course includes many countries with similar factor endowments to the United Kingdom; one might expect that if asked about the desirability of trade in general, or with a country, say, like China, the gap would have been even larger. It is therefore important to keep the pro-trade "leave to liberalize" rhetoric of pro-Brexit elites in proper perspective; it should not lead us to the view that "leave" votes are such noisy indicators of anti-globalization sentiment as to be useless.²

It is also worth emphasizing the obvious but crucial point that there are many dimensions to contemporary globalization, and trade is simply one aspect of this broader economic and political order. Even if "Leave" voters may have supported trade in surprisingly high numbers, this does not necessarily suggest that their overall support for globalization, including as it does relative openness to flows in the factors of production (people and capital) and the diminution of national political autonomy at the expense of global economic forces, is also high. Indeed, the relatively high support for trade can in fact most plausibly be interpreted as a desire to roll back the multidimensional scope of contemporary globalization and replace it with the far narrower and more limited form of globalization that marked Europe's *trente glorieuses*, when dramatically increased intra-European trade in goods coincided with limits to factor flows, a relatively high degree of national policy autonomy, and a rising tide of domestic prosperity.³ If

² Hobolt (2016) finds that the belief that "international trade would be higher post-Brexit" is linked to a higher probability of voting for Brexit. Owen and Walter argue that this suggests that pro-Brexit voters support free trade. Of course, the link between this epistemic belief and support for Brexit could simply reflect the general effects of heavy exposure to the Leave campaign's ideas, rather than a serious commitment to free trade; this interpretation is consistent with the data cited above, to the effect that "remain" voters appear to be more supportive of open trade.

³ This could partly explain why the anti-globalization political movement in the United States is more fiercely anti-trade than its counterpart in the United Kingdom. As Rodrik (2017, 11) notes, the "U.S became a truly open economy relatively late" with the "share of imports in GDP more than [doubling] between the mid 1970s and the 2000s, going from 7% in 1975 to 17% on the eve of the financial crisis in 2008." In contrast, as Crafts and Toniolo (2012) note, between 1950 and 1973, Western European trade grew at an annualized rate of 8.36%." The experience of rising trade played a much larger role in the European *trente glorieuses* than it did in the American postwar boom, which suggests that trade might

"Leave" votes were in fact driven by a desire to reject the contemporary post-Cold War (or post-Bretton Woods) era of globalization⁴ for a more limited state-directed version of trade liberalization, it should not surprise us that a somewhat large share of "Leave" voters supported trade, and it also should not beguile us into thinking that "Leave" votes can be interpreted as expressions of support for contemporary globalization. In other words, Leave voters' rejection of the modern incarnation of globalization is entirely consistent with their support for trade, and perhaps even to be expected; indeed, the support for trade can most plausibly be interpreted as a desire to turn back the clock towards the far more limited form of globalization that marked the 1950s and 1960s, rather than a desire to embrace contemporary globalization (what Rodrik calls "hyperglobalization") outside the framework of the EU.

In short, "Leave" votes admittedly cannot be interpreted as expressions of a desire for autarky; however, when properly contextualized, the most plausible way of interpreting votes to leave, in my view, is as expressions of a desire to scale back contemporary "hyperglobalization" (an interpretation that is consistent with, and can even explain, surprisingly high support for international trade among Leave voters). Conversely, the most plausible way of interpreting votes to remain is as affirmations of the UK's "hyperglobalized" status-quo. This is the sense in which I interpret "leave" and "remain" votes in the analysis which follows.

hold a more positive place in the collective memory of those hostile to contemporary globalization in the UK than in the US. In other words, trade is associated with the age of "hyperglobalization" in the United States, while it is not in the UK, and this difference could account for the greater hostility to trade in the US. Another possible explanation, which Rodrik (2017) highlights, is that differences in the welfare state regime might account for these different attitudes.

⁴ An era, not coincidentally, associated with the growing importance of global city agglomeration economies.

4.2.2 Voting Over Brexit and CAFTA: Documenting a Spatial Political Cleavage Over Globalization

Both Urbatsch (2013) and Hicks, Milner, and Tingley (2014) use the CAFTA referendum as a test ground for examining different theories of foreign economic policy preferences and coalitions, with a particular focus on the leverage of explanations of preferences based on the Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo Viner models of trade . Though neither of these studies brings up the geographic distribution of public support or opposition to CAFTA (an indication, perhaps, of IPE's longstanding geographic blind spot), the dataset publicly released by Hicks, Milner, and Tingley (2014) does include information on whether a district is considered urban or rural according to the Costa Rica government's census definitions. I use this data to carry out a simple unpaired difference-in-means test between urban and rural districts, to see if there is any evidence for a systematic geographic cleavage in support for CAFTA between districts on different sides of the familiar urban/rural divide. The results show that within urban districts, the average support for CAFTA was 53.5 percent, while among rural districts, average support for CAFTA was 46.7%; this 6.8% gap is highly significant (t=5.09).

To get a better sense of these geographic patterns, it is helpful to visualize the geography of support for CAFTA in the Costa Rica referendum. The map in Figure 4.1 displays the district level results in the Costa Rica referendum in the nation as a whole; Figure 4.2 zooms in on the San Jose city region:




Figure 4.1: District-Level Support for CAFTA Ratification in Costa Rica




Figure 4.2: District-Level Support for CAFTA Ratification in Costa Rica (Close-up of San Jose Metro Region)

These maps, which I created by using ArcGIS to join Hicks, Milner, and Tingley's (2014) data on district level returns in the CAFTA referendum to a district-level GIS map of Costa Rica (Esri 2012)⁵, suggest that central Costa Rica, and the San Jose city region in particular (which includes San Jose and nearby satellite cities and suburbs), is a stronghold of support for CAFTA. On the other hand, the northwest and south appear to be hinterland regions marked by a disproportionately large number of "anti-CAFTA" districts.

Having noted the position of the San Jose urban area as a major stronghold of "proglobalization" sentiment in the developing country context of Costa Rica (as indicated by the geographic patterns associated with the CAFTA ratification vote), we now turn to the geographic patterns associated with the Brexit referendum. The spatial dimensions of Brexit received considerable attention in the popular press, where maps showing the geographic breakdown of "Remain" and "Leave" votes played an important role in the post-vote analysis; the geographic distribution of the Brexit vote has also been noted, at least in passing, by recent scholarship in IPE (Owen and Walter 2017, 182). For our purposes, the most relevant feature of this geographic distribution—as in the case of Costa Rica— is the striking tendency for "pro-globalization" sentiment in England⁶ (as indicated by district-level shares of the "Remain" vote) to cluster in select urban locales (especially in London, but also in former industrial cities such as Manchester and Liverpool, which have enjoyed a post-industrial renaissance since repurposing themselves, in the past few decades, as minor global cities). This concentration of support for the proglobalization "Remain" position in a handful of major urban areas is conveyed in Figures 4.3 and

⁵ This district-level GIS map of Costa Rican districts had to be dissolved to match the level of aggregation at which the Hicks, Milner, and Tingley data were provided, before joining the latter's data to the district-level shapefile.

⁶ The landscape was substantially different in Scotland, a point I address later in the chapter (see Section 4.4.5).

4.4. Figure 4.3 displays a map of the Brexit vote at the local-authority district level for the entire UK, while Figure 4.4 displays a map that zooms in on the London area (local authorities in inner-London are traced out in white outline).⁷

⁷ Local authorities are the local districts at which the votes were officially aggregated. GIS data on local authorities is provided on ArcGIS Online, which also provides data on district-level referendum results.





Figure 4.3: District Level Support For "Remain" in Brexit Referendum



Brexit: District Level Geography

| Lege | end |
|-------|-----------------------|
| | innerlondon_dissolved |
| loca | lareas |
| Perce | ent Remain |
| | 0.000000 - 35.000000 |
| | 35.000001 - 50.000000 |
| | 50.000001 - 60.000000 |
| | 60.000001 - 78.620000 |

0 5 10 20 Kilometers

Figure 4.4: District Level Support for "Remain" in the Brexit Referendum: Close-up of London Metro Region

Section 4.2.3 The Geography of Voting Over Brexit and CAFTA and the Limitations of Existing Models of Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions

The previous sub-section documented, using observational data on voting patterns in the CAFTA and Brexit referenda, the empirical tendency for "pro-globalization" sentiment to cluster in certain urban areas that are widely considered "global cities." The geographic distribution of mass support for globalization, as reflected in voting patterns over Brexit and CAFTA, therefore appears to reflect a "global city versus hinterland" political cleavage; this spatial distribution of political support for globalization may reflect the presence of the global city and hinterland political coalitions theorized in Chapter 3. However, one possibility is that this spatial distribution of foreign economic policy preferences simply reflects the spatial distribution of political coalitions that scholars of IPE have theorized and documented in the past; for instance, perhaps the overwhelming support for "remain" in the London area reflects the clustering of high-skilled workers who favour globalization for reasons theorized by the Stolper Samuelson theorem. Before attempting to systematically rule out these alternative explanations in a multivariate framework, it is worth our while to consider, in theoretical and conceptual terms, whether the spatial patterns documented in Section 4.2.2 could be rationalized within a Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo-Viner framework, which provide the foundation for the explanations of foreign economic policy coalitions developed by scholars in the Open Economy Politics (OEP) tradition. I will argue that we would *not* expect the operation of Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo-Viner mechanisms to yield the spatial patterns above, and that these frameworks do not provide an adequate explanation for the spatial political cleavage noted in Section 4.2.2; the upshot is that this spatial political cleavage likely reflects the presence of "global city" and "hinterland"

independently underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and is not simply an endogenous by-product of how individuals predisposed to favour or oppose globalization for other reasons happen to sort themselves across space. This discussion sets the stage for subsequent sections in this chapter, which attempt to establish that the observational patterns noted above do indeed reflect the independent existence of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, by explicitly controlling for alternative drivers of mass preferences in a multivariate framework.

We begin with a consideration of whether the spatial patterns presented above might have been expected by Rogowski's (1987) canonical account of how the effects of trade on factor prices generate class cleavages over foreign economic policy. To organize this discussion, it is useful to refer to the following table (reproduced from Rogowski's 1987 article), which summarizes Rogowski's predictions about the configuration of political alignments over globalization under different combinations of factor endowments:

| | High Land:Labor Ratio | Low Land:Labor Ratio |
|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Advanced Economy (i.e. | Class Cleavage | Urban-Rural Cleavage |
| capital abundant) | | |
| | Capital and Land Free- | Capital and Labor Free- |
| | Trading | Trading |
| | Labor Protectionist | Land Protectionist |
| | | |
| Backward economy (i.e. | Urban-Rural Cleavage | Class Cleavage |
| capital scarce) | | _ |
| | Land Free-Trading | Labor Free-Trading |
| | Capital and Labor | Capital and Land |
| | Protectionist | Protectionist |

| Table 4.1: Rogowski's (1987 |) Framework and Political Alignments Over Globalization |
|------------------------------------|---|
| | |

Rogowski's factor-based approach conceives the possibility of spatial conflict over foreign economic policy exclusively in terms of urban-rural conflict. In one scenario for spatial political conflict over foreign economic policy (top right cell), pro-globalization capital owners and laborers join forces to oppose protectionist land owners in advanced economies with low land to labor ratios; in the other scenario (bottom-left cell), protectionist laborers and capitalists join forces to oppose free-trading land owners in backward economies with a high land to labor ratio. Let us first consider how Costa Rica might fit into this framework. As a developing country, Costa Rica is relatively capital scarce; it is also, according to the Inter-American Development Bank, relatively land-scarce (Pages 2010, 56). Rogowski's framework would therefore situate Costa Rica in the bottom-right cell in the above table, and expect Costa-Rica's open economy politics to be marked by a class cleavage, one that does not manifest in spatial terms; after all, in the bottom right cell, capitalists and land-owners, who bridge the urban/rural divide, are allies. In such a world, we would not expect to see the geographic patterns described above, in Section 4.2.2. The fact of geographic polarization in mass foreign economic policy coalitions in a country with Costa Rica's factor endowments therefore represents a puzzle for Rogowski's Stolper-Samuelson framework; on the other hand, it is consistent with an approach to foreign economic policy coalitions that posits the independent existence of spatial political coalitions over globalization that stem from the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands.

On the other hand, it might seem—at least at a first glance—that the spatial patterns we noted in the United Kingdom can be explained by Rogowski's framework. As an advanced economy with a low land to labor ratio, we would situate the United Kingdom in the upper-right cell, which predicts pro-globalization urban interests and protectionist agricultural ones.

However, while Rogowski's framework predicts that in a country with the UK's factor endowments, urban factors of production would favour globalization while rural factors of production would oppose it, this analytical approach cannot account for the *intra-urban* variation in support for the pro-globalization "Remain" position that is apparent in the Brexit returns. That is, Rogowski's framework is somewhat of a blunt instrument; in positing a homogenous urban interest, it cannot explain the considerable variation in public support for globalization that exists within urban areas. In local authority areas within inner London, for instance, 72% of the overall vote went for "Remain"; by way of contrast, in the local authority containing the city of Stokeon-Trent, only 31% of the vote broke for "Remain." Rogowski's framework does not expect such differences and cannot explain them; there is no reason, on his account, why capitalists and workers in some urban areas would support openness, while capitalists and workers in other areas would oppose it. Yet such intra-urban variation in mass attitudes characterizes the Brexit referendum results, which suggests that the spatial patterns associated with this case cannot simply be rationalized in terms Rogowski's original model of factor-based foreign economic policy coalitions. Intra-urban variation in public support for economic openness is a puzzle from the standpoint of Rogowski's framework; however, we would expect such variation in a world of global city and hinterland coalitions, since global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes are not simply coextensive with the urban versus rural divide (in other words, metropolitan areas could be part of "hinterlands", and therefore host protectionist hinterland coalitions).

It is worth noting, however, that Rogowski's original framework has been adapted by scholars to analyse factor-based cleavages that did not feature in Rogowski's original analysis; particularly useful, in this regard, has been the extension of his framework to the analysis of

cleavages between workers with different endowments of human capital (i.e. high-skill workers vs low-skill workers). Could analysing factor-based conflict in terms of variation in skill endowments, wherein political conflict over globalization is between high skill workers and low skill workers, help to explain the geographic distribution of the votes over CAFTA and Brexit? High-skill workers are the relatively abundant factor of production in the United Kingdom, while low-skill workers are the relatively abundant factor of production in Costa Rica (Hicks, Milner, and Tingley 2014, 108). We would therefore expect high-skill workers to favour globalization in the United Kingdom (and low-skilled workers to oppose it), while we would expect the opposite pattern in Costa Rica. To the extent that highly skilled workers tend to disproportionately cluster in global cities in the advanced industrial world, while low-skilled workers tend to disproportionately cluster in global cities in the developing world, a Stolper-Samuelson account could rationalize the patterns documented above as the product of the geographic sorting patterns of individuals on different ends of the skill distribution.

There is a certain intuitive plausibility to this, especially when thinking about the developed world; in the United States, for instance, major global cities like New York or Los Angeles are known for their dense concentrations of human capital (some of this human capital is employed, of course, by the superstar and global producer services establishments that constitute global cities through their clustering patterns). However, we should be wary of simply assuming that human capital essentially crowds out low-skilled labor in these cities; in Manhattan, for instance, the median household income according to the recent Census was \$66,739, a fact that sits uncomfortably with the casual assumption that it is solely the province of the ultra-wealthy and the ultra-skilled (Adler 2014). There are plenty of low-skilled workers on the island as well, and indeed, there are theoretical reasons for expecting global cities to contain

large concentrations of both high-skilled and low-skilled labor. As Eeckhout et al (2014) note, the data on the skill distribution across cities in the United States, which shows that major cities host large concentrations of both high and low-skilled labor, points to the existence of "complementarities between high-and low-skilled workers, which mutually boosts their productivity" (Eeckhout et al 2014, 555). These "extreme skill complementarities", which create a heterogeneous workforce in global cities with respect to skill levels, are also highlighted in the global cities literature, which emphasizes that "the infrastructure of jobs involved in running and implementing the global economy" in global cities across the world requires a combination of both high-skilled and low-skilled labor (Sassen 2008, 480). This makes it difficult to see how a Stolper-Samuelson analysis emphasizing skill-based class-conflict could be leveraged to explain the disproportionately "pro-globalization" orientation of a handful of major urban areas. A Stolper-Samuelson explanation would work in the cases under consideration here if San Jose was dominated by low-skilled workers, or if London was dominated by the highly-skilled. In practice, however, theory and evidence suggest that global cities tend to contain workers with heterogeneous skill portfolios, and by extension, heterogeneous preferences (according to the Stolper-Samuelson model) over globalization; the fact of the skill-diversity of global cities, in short, is inconsistent with a sorting-based explanation, rooted in the Stolper-Samuelson framework, for why certain cities appear to be territorial strongholds of mass support for globalization.

In short, explanations for mass foreign economic policy coalitions that are rooted in the factor proportions model cannot adequately explain the spatial patterns documented in Section 4.2.2. This being the case, to what extent might the traditional alternative to the factor-based account of foreign economic policy coalitions—namely, the sectoral approach to foreign

economic policy coalitions that is rooted in the Ricardo-Viner model of international trade account for these patterns? The sectoral approach to political economy conceives political conflict over globalization as a conflict that is rooted in a cleavage between comparative advantage (i.e. exporting) and comparative disadvantage (i.e. importing) industries, rather than as a broader class conflict between owners of different factors of production (as in the factorproportions approach pioneered by Rogowski). Frieden (1988) offers a canonical example of how this model of trade is applied to the analysis of political coalitions over foreign economic policy. Unlike the literature on factor-based coalitions, which contains (in some versions) spatially explicit predictions about how these factor-based coalitions might be geographically organized, scholarship on the political economy of sectoral coalitions does not contain any direct arguments that could plausibly rationalize the tendency of "pro-globalization" sentiment to be territorially concentrated in a handful of major cities. To be sure, there is a small but important literature on the localization patterns of protectionist manufacturing industries and how the geography of these manufacturing industries shapes patterns of industrial political mobilization (McGillivray 2004; Rogowski et al 1999; Busch and Reinhardt 1999). However, this work implicitly presumes that the clustering patterns of these industries are exogenously given by arbitrary historical factors (Krugman 1991); in essentially presuming that industry clusters are scattered arbitrarily across the map, this industrial geography literature is unable to make any clear predictions about how or why we might observe foreign economic policy cleavages forming along more systematic "core-periphery" lines (akin to those documented above with respect to the Brexit and CAFTA cases).

On the other hand, a sectoral perspective on political economy in which service industries take center stage⁸ could plausibly offer an explanation for such "core-periphery" political cleavages, especially with respect to the case of the United Kingdom. We know that the UK, for instance, has a large comparative advantage in financial and insurance services, as well as communications and business services more generally, according to measures of revealed comparative advantage (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 22). A simple industry-level analysis might therefore suggest that pro-globalization "remain" sentiment was so strong in London because these comparative advantage industries have a large presence within the London metropolitan area, but a relatively smaller presence within the UK's hinterlands.

However, it is not clear that an explanation based on the clustering patterns of service and financial industries works in the case of Costa Rica. After all, high-end financial and business services are not considered comparative advantage sectors in Costa Rica, and we would thus expect the preferences of these industries to incline in a protectionist direction. Even to the extent that they are concentrated in San Jose, which is recognized as Costa Rica's national financial centre, it is therefore not clear that such patterns of service industry concentration could help to explain the strong support for CAFTA in the San Jose Metropolitan Area. A satisfying explanation for the patterns documented in Section 4.2.2 must be sufficiently general that it can explain both the British and Costa Rican cases; to the extent that a Ricardo-Viner framework, when applied to service industries, does not offer such general explanatory leverage (at least at a first cut), it must necessarily be considered somewhat wanting. More generally, an explanation for the geographic distribution of public support for globalization that explicitly traces the patterns documented above to the presence of spatial coalitions engendered by global city

⁸ Traditionally, service and financial industries have not been emphasized by scholars working in the sectoral tradition; but see Broz (1997) and Frieden (1988) for exceptions.

agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes is more satisfying than one that is rooted in a Ricardo-Viner framework, where the spatial distribution of industries only enters the analysis in an ad-hoc way.

In short, this sub-section has suggested theoretical reasons to be sceptical of the view that the patterns documented in Section 4.2.2 simply reflect the spatial distribution of Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo-Viner coalitions; the empirical spatial patterns noted above cannot easily be rationalized in terms of these familiar theoretical accounts of foreign economic policy coalitions. As such, this should increase our confidence that the spatial distribution of public support for globalization documented in Section 4.2.2 does indeed indicate the presence of distinctive spatial coalitions over globalization that are underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. The next section extends the discussion here by developing a precise empirical indicator of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands as our independent variable of interest, and systematically controlling for these alternative determinants of foreign economic policy preferences; the multivariate framework developed in the next section therefore provides further evidence that this spatial distribution of support for globalization reflects the distinctive presence of spatial coalitions, and is not simply an epiphenomenon of foreign economic policy coalitions documented in past scholarship. That is, while this section has suggested that it is unlikely that the spatial patterns documented above can be explained within a Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo-Viner framework, explicitly controlling for these alternative explanations could increase our confidence that this is indeed the case. Moreover, the patterns from above *are* possibly consistent with other views of foreign economic policy coalitions; for instance, it could be the case that the spatial political cleavage noted in Section 4.2.2 reflects the tendency of "cosmopolitan" coalitions (comprised of individuals who

believe in cultural openness and diversity) to cluster in major metropolises. The empirical analyses below allow us to account for such possibilities explicitly, and begin to disentangle the impact of global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes on mass preferences from these cultural vectors of influence; to the extent that the "global city versus hinterland" political cleavage tentatively documented above appears in a multivariate framework that controls for such influences, it would increase our confidence that this cleavage reflects the presence of empirically distinct spatial foreign economic policy coalitions that can be traced to the impact of global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes.

4.3 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions in the Developed World: An Empirical Analysis of District-Level Voting Patterns in the Brexit Referendum

The foregoing section presented preliminary observational evidence, from prominent national referenda that concern the scope of globalization in both the developed (Brexit) and developing worlds (CAFTA), that foreign economic policy cleavages are geographically ordered; in particular, mass support for globalization appears to be territorially concentrated in a handful of major urban areas that are conventionally thought to be "global cities". I argued that these geographic patterns cannot be easily rationalized within the Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo-Viner frameworks, which together constitute the foundation for research on foreign economic policy coalitions in the OEP tradition. This suggests important shortcomings of these traditional approaches to foreign economic policy coalitions; in addition, it clarifies the potential empirical relevance of the previous chapters' arguments about the ways in which the global city agglomeration processes that constitute global cities as the territorial winners of globalization, and the hinterland dispersion processes that constitute hinterlands as its territorial losers—that is, the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands—might engender distinctive mass coalitions over globalization that reflect this territorial distribution of interests. Indeed, the pattern documented above—wherein public support for remaining in the EU, and public support for CAFTA, appeared to be concentrated in the global cities of the UK and Costa Rica (particularly San Jose and London)—is consistent with the expectations of the ego-tropic, sociotropic, and local-tropic theories of spatial coalitions elaborated in the previous chapter.

In this section, I begin to undertake a more systematic analysis of the link between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and political coalitions over globalization. In particular, I do so by carrying out a multivariate district-level analysis of the Brexit vote, where the dependent variable is the percentage of voters within a district voting for the "Remain" position; as I argued above, this measure could plausibly be interpreted as a vote that affirms the desirability of modern globalization (i.e. the globalized status quo). As I discuss later, a district-level analysis is not without its problems, but it is a useful place to start, since it is the level at which votes were tabulated and because district-level analyses have been undertaken by other scholars studying the Brexit referendum (Goodwin and Heath 2016; Matti and Zhou 2016).

The primary purpose of this section is to tentatively establish that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders corresponding spatial political coalitions that are constituted independently of coalitions that have already been established in the IPE literature; to the extent that the spatial patterns noted in Section 4.2 are in fact simply a reflection of how coalitions with non-geographic origins— for instance skill-based, sectoral, or cultural

coalitions—happen to be arrayed across space or select into or out of global cities and hinterlands, we would expect that an empirical measure of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands would not exert a statistically significant or substantively important impact on public support for globalization (as reflected in the share of the "Remain" vote) after controlling for the presence of these alternative coalitions. To the extent that an empirical measure of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands *does* exert a statistically significant and substantively important impact on patterns of mass support for "remain", even after controlling for alternative vectors of influence on mass preferences documented in previous work on mass preferences and foreign economic policy coalitions (i.e. skill levels, cosmopolitanism etc.), it would imply the existence of spatial coalitions over globalization that are independently engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, as suggested by the theories in Chapter 3. The analysis in this section does not attempt to ascertain whether these spatial coalitions are best explained by the ego-tropic, sociotropic, or local-tropic frameworks developed in Chapter 3; its purpose, rather, is to simply document, at least tentatively, that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands does indeed independently underpin corresponding "global city coalitions" that favour globalization and "hinterland coalitions" that oppose it, and that the patterns discussed in Section 4.2 reflect the presence of these coalitions (and are not simply manifestations of how coalitions with which scholars of IPE are already familiar happen to be distributed across space). Subsequent sections will attempt to ascertain the relative empirical merits of the ego-tropic, sociotropic, and localtropic explanations for these spatial coalitions; for now, we simply want to assess whether these spatial foreign economic policy coalitions do indeed exist.

In short, the discussion in the previous chapters developed an account of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might underpin novel spatial coalitions over globalization, while Section 4.2 of this chapter presented observational evidence consistent with the existence of such coalitions; this section (4.3), in turn, attempts to more explicitly investigate the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and mass preferences over globalization within a multivariate framework, so as to ascertain whether "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions over globalization that are independently shaped by this economic geography are indeed a feature of the mass politics of globalization.

In Section 4.3.1, I first introduce my empirical strategy for transposing the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands onto Brexit voting districts (i.e. UK local authority districts), so as to develop a district-level empirical measure of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. This strategy leverages geo-located establishment level data on the headquarters of superstar and global producer services firms in the UK; this section therefore also discusses the source of the firm and establishment-level data that I leverage throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation (in different national contexts).

In Section 4.3.2, I present a detailed discussion of how I use this data to develop an empirical measure of the relative spatial agglomeration of these superstar headquarter establishments within districts, which captures the relative district-level strength of the global city agglomeration processes that constitute global cities as the territorial winners of globalization.⁹ Section 4.3.2 also attempts to validate the reliability of this district-level indicator

⁹ I take global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes to be inversely related, so in explicitly measuring the strength of global city agglomeration processes, we are implicitly measuring the strength of hinterland dispersion processes as well (i.e. district-level global city agglomeration processes are strong where district-level hinterland processes are weak, and vice-versa).

of global city agglomeration processes by comparing it to another prominent attempt to empirically delineate global cities.

Section 4.3.3 turns to a discussion of the control variables used in the multivariate analysis. Among others, I discuss controls for district-level measures of skill endowments and industry composition, so as to account for the impact of Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner mechanisms on political coalitions. I also attempt to account for a district's "cosmopolitan orientation"; as IPE scholars have recently emphasized (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Sabet 2014; Margalit 2012) dispositions towards out-groups, the product of symbolic identities acquired in early life, appear to play an important role in shaping public attitudes towards globalization. However, the informal analysis carried out in Section 4.2 could not rule out the possibility that certain major urban areas tend to be more favourably disposed towards globalization because they are cosmopolitan centres whose residents embrace an ethic of tolerance and openness to diversity. Explicitly controlling for the cosmopolitan orientations of district populations allows us to more systematically disentangle the political effects of such longstanding individual symbolic attitudes (Sabet 2014) from the independent impact of global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes on mass preferences. In addition, I also control for important demographic factors, such as the age-composition of districts, that previous work has shown to be an important driver of the Brexit voting patterns.

After discussing the operationalization of these and other control variables in detail, I discuss, in Section 4.3.4, the details of the empirical specifications used. Section 4.3.5 presents and discusses the results from a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that assess whether our measure of the relative district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes exerts a statistically significant and substantively important impact on the district-level share of

the pro-globalization "remain" vote within UK local authorities, even after accounting for various confounding variables.

4.3.1 The Independent Variable of Interest: Intuition and an Overview of the Dun and Bradstreet Data

Because results from the Brexit referendum are aggregated at the district-level, analysing district-level patterns of support for the internationalist "remain" position requires us to map the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands onto the district map of Brexit, and thereby develop district-level measures of the relative strength of the global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes that constitute global cities and hinterlands as distinctive territorial formations that win and lose, respectively, from globalization.

Recall from Chapter 2 that global city agglomeration processes refer to the spatial agglomeration of superstar headquarter establishments (out of a desire to realize the benefits of global city agglomeration economies), and the role of these agglomerations in transmitting (via a local multiplier effect) the firm-level benefits of globalization (for superstar firms) to the broader metropolitan economies in which they are clustered. On the other hand, hinterland dispersion processes are in some sense the flip side of global city agglomeration processes. As "high-end" globally oriented activity of the kind carried out in superstar and global producer services headquarters (associated with large regional and local multiplier effects in response to the growth of the global cities, which instead become home to spatial dispersed low-productivity domestic firms (for which the benefits of global city agglomeration are relatively low); the low-productivity domestic firms that extend throughout these hinterlands are harmed by

globalization, and these firm-level income declines are transmitted to the broader regional economies of hinterland areas through a "reverse multiplier", which the branch plants and backoffices of superstars firms (which also extend throughout the hinterlands, and carry out "low end" globalized economic activity) are unable to counteract.

My strategy for developing district-level measures of these processes is to develop a measure of the relative size, at the district level, of superstar and global producer services headquarter agglomerations. As the relative magnitude of these agglomerations (which constitute global cities as distinctive territorial formations) increases within districts, we would expect that the strength of the positive local spillover and multiplier effects of globalization within the district would increase as well, thereby tightening the nexus between globalization and the prosperity of the local district economy; according to all of the theories of spatial coalitions developed in Chapter 3, this would increase the relative size of district-level "global city coalitions" favouring economic openness, and lead to greater overall support for globalization within the district. For simplicity, I take global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes to be inversely related (a view consistent with the discussion in Chapter 2); as such, in explicitly measuring the strength of global city agglomeration processes using measures of the size of district-level superstar headquarter agglomerations, we would implicitly measure the strength of hinterland dispersion processes as well (i.e. district-level global city agglomeration processes are strong where district-level hinterland processes are weak, and viceversa). On this account, as our district-level measure of global city agglomeration processes declines in magnitude, we would expect a corresponding increase in the relative size of districtlevel hinterland coalitions, and a decline in district-level support for globalization.

In order to capture the relative salience of district-level global city agglomeration processes using a measure of the relative size of the agglomerations of superstar and producer services headquarters within districts, we of course require data on superstar firms and the locations of their headquarter establishments. As analysis in several fields shifts to the firm-level, scholars have increasingly turned to large commercially-licensed firm and establishment-level databases for exploratory micro-level analyses. To that end, I collect data on superstar firms in the United Kingdom, Costa Rica, and beyond¹⁰, from Dun and Bradstreet, which maintains a large repository of firm level (over 55,000,000 firms) data used in other cross-national firm and establishment-level studies of trade and economic geography (see for instance Alfaro and Chen 2014, or Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton 2009).¹¹ This data includes information on firm names, and relevant statistics such as firms' overall revenue, market capitalization and number of employees; importantly, it also includes information on the physical addresses of firm establishments (including firm headquarters), which can be used to geocode their locations. When geocoding superstar firms, I restrict attention to the locations of headquarter establishments; this follows from the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 (see especially the discussion in Section 2.3), and I return to this point below after discussing the Dun and Bradstreet data more generally.

The data on firms in the Dun and Bradstreet dataset is developed from a credit research database that Dun and Bradstreet primarily builds through its credit ratings service. Kirchoff (1994) describes this process:

¹⁰ I collect spatial data on a cross-section of countries to facilitate the empirical analysis of the US Congress in Chapter 5, and the cross-national analysis of Chapter 6.

¹¹ The Dun and Bradstreet data was accessed through LexisNexis Academic, which licenses the data. The data is from the year 2013.

Data are collected by D&B largely as a result of its credit rating service...If a firm seeks a credit rating, or a supplier or customer inquires about a credit rating, D&B contacts the firm and enters the firm's information into its file. Also, when a firm purchases commercial property and casualty insurance, a credit report is created and the firm enters the file (Kirchoff 1994, 110).

Despite its extremely large size, it is important to acknowledge that this database does not contain the population of the world's firms; nor is it a random sample of firms, since it is generated on the basis of commercial transactions (i.e. credit requests). Of course, this is not ideal, but while these limitations should be acknowledged, they are not fatal. In this regard, two considerations are worth highlighting. First, the very fact that firms enter the dataset through their use of credit services (which is not likely to be correlated with geography) underscores that firms are not sampled on the basis of geographic criteria. Because we are interested in the geographic distribution of firms and their headquarters, it is important that firms are not sampled on the basis of geographic considerations, which could lead to a misleading picture of the economic geography of global cities. Given how the data enters the Dun and Bradstreet database, such geographic biases in data collection are unlikely. Second, "superstar" and global producer services firms (whose headquarters establishments we will use to develop district-level measures of the strength of global city agglomeration processes; see below) are large and prominent; as other scholars using similar commercial databases have noted, the coverage of such firms in these databases is comprehensive and reliable (Wojicik 2009, 200). These considerations, together with the use of similar data in previous studies (as noted above) suggest that this data offers a useful starting point for developing an empirical measure of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands; future work could validate this data against other data sources (such as the US firm census data), and perhaps supplement it with original firm surveys.

4.3.2 The Independent Variable of Interest: Variable Construction

Before using spatial data on the locations of the headquarters establishments of superstar and global producer services firms to empirically capture the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes with respect to Brexit voting districts, we first need to identify these globally oriented "superstar" firms, and distinguish these superstars from those firms primarily producing for the domestic market, according to theoretically grounded criteria. Unfortunately, there is "no single way of defining which firms should be considered export superstars" (Bastos and Diaz 2012, 5). In a study of export superstars in Portugal, Bastos and Diaz (2012, 5) define "export superstars as the minimum number of firms that account for 90% of total export revenue", which works out to 2.8% of the total firms in the Portuguese economy. However, the superstar firm literature could also be read as justifying a definition which only counts the five to ten largest exporters as "superstars" (Freund and Pierola 2015). Outside of the academic literature, a report by McKinsey considers as superstars (which the report simply labels "large companies") those firms across the world that have revenue exceeding \$1 billion (Dobbs et al. 2013). Despite these differences, and the lack of a specific criterion for superstar status in the literature, the definitions adopted by the various authors working on the topic of superstar firms are motivated by the "goal of identifying a set of firms that matter the most for a nation's exports" (Bastos and Diaz 2012, 5). The definition used here is motivated by this shared goal, though it defines superstars using a slightly different standard. For our purposes, choosing the ten largest companies as superstars, or, for that matter, only companies with revenue exceeding \$1 billion, would likely be too stringent to identify meaningful geographic patterns. Moreover, the ten largest firms tend to account for roughly 50% of exports; this is significant, but it is desirable to expand the definitional criteria so that superstars account for a larger share of exports. Bastos

and Diaz's approach is elegant, but given data limitations in our cross-national sample, impossible to replicate.

Instead, I use a firm's size, as measured by the number of employees, as a proxy for superstar status. A well-established result in the firm heterogeneity literature is that trading firms are larger than domestic ones along various dimensions, such as employment and revenue (Bernard et al 2012); moreover, even within the set of trading firms, "superstar" firms are substantially larger than minor exporters, a result that can be used to justify size by employment as a rough proxy for superstar status (Neary 2015; Freund and Pierola 2015). More specifically, I define a firm as a "superstar" if it is in the top 1% of firms (by overall employment) in its sector based on the data in the Dun and Bradstreet database; I apply this standard to several hundred industries (defined by 4 digit SIC code) in the economy's manufacturing and wholesale trade divisions. In addition, as we discussed earlier, the globally oriented advanced business services (APS) and financial services firms that help superstars carry out their global operations are also subject to global city agglomeration economies, and therefore play an integral role in global city agglomeration processes. In developing a measure for an independent variable that captures the strength of global city agglomeration processes at the district level, we must therefore incorporate the locations of the headquarters establishments of these global financial and business services firms as well. Political economy scholarship on financial and services firms is very limited, so there is even less guidance from previous literature on how to distinguish a global (or "superstar") business or financial services firm that is primarily devoted to helping firms facilitate cross-national operations from a domestically oriented producer services or financial firm that primarily assists national firms with their domestic operations. I therefore simply apply the same employment size threshold as above to each of the four digit SIC

industries classified as Business Services (Major Group 3); Legal Services (Major Group 81)¹²; Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services (industries with SIC codes beginning with 87); and Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (SIC codes beginning with the number 6). That is, I consider firms in these sectors to be "superstar" services firms oriented to the global economy if the size of their overall workforce places them among the top 1% of firms in their respective 4-digit industry.

In addition to coding firms with employment in the top-1% of their respective 4-digit sectors as "superstars", I also consider as "superstars" any firms that are not in the top 1% of employment in their specific four-digit sector, but are nevertheless in the top 1% of employment among all firms in the Dun and Bradstreet sample (for the sectors under consideration). It is important to underscore that the employment data used to code firms as globally oriented "superstars" refers to the firm's overall global employment, aggregated across all of its plants.

After coding these "superstar firms" from the Dun and Bradstreet database based on the employment-based criteria just described, I turn to the task of using this data to develop a district-level measure of the strength of global city agglomeration processes. In order to do so, I first use the physical address information that is part of each superstar firm's data profile¹³ to geocode the location of its headquarters establishment. Before turning to a description of the geocoding process, it is important to be clear about this point, regarding what exactly is being geocoded. In particular, a very large share of the firms that are considered "superstars" on the basis of employment size are multisite firms, with dispersed networks of plants and branches. To

¹² I consider firms classified as legal services (SIC Code: 811); in the data, they are not subdivided into four digit sectors

¹³ In some instances, the physical address data provided by Dun and Bradstreet could not be geocoded; in these cases, I carried out online searches for more accurate or up-to-date physical address data or used Google Earth to find firm location coordinates directly. Because we are dealing with large and prominent firms, address data was usually easily accessible on firm websites.

develop a measure of global city agglomeration processes at the district level, I only geocode the location of the superstar or global business service firm's headquarters.¹⁴ This is in keeping with the discussion in Chapter 2 (especially Section 2.3), which emphasized that the headquarters of superstar firms carry out high-level strategic activities that derive especially large benefits from clustering in select metropolitan locales, and that the resulting agglomerations of these establishments constitute global cities as territorial entities; the metropolitan clustering patterns of these superstar headquarters, in turn, give rise to urban spillover effects that concentrate the benefits of globalization within the local urban economy. In Chapter 2, I labelled these processes, which collectively constitute global cities as the territorial formations that "win" from globalization, "global city agglomeration processes"; in Chapter 3, I elaborated different theories about how these processes might propel the growth of a distinctive "global city coalition" that favours economic openness. Recall, however, that the plants and branches of these globally oriented superstar firms do not benefit from clustering in global cities, since the work carried out within these non-headquarter establishments is more routine; in other words, these superstar establishments are less sensitive to global city agglomeration economies than superstar headquarters, and therefore disperse across the hinterlands (along with the establishments of domestically oriented non-superstar firms). To incorporate the locations of these superstar branches and plants, which are not subject to global city agglomeration economies, into a measure that seeks to empirically pinpoint the strength of global city agglomeration processes across districts, would thus be wrongheaded and self-defeating. Doing so would conflate global city agglomeration processes with hinterland dispersion processes, and thereby lead to an

¹⁴ I include national and regional headquarters, in addition to global headquarters. For instance, the global headquarters of Goldman Sachs is in New York City, but it has its UK headquarters in London; the location of the UK headquarters is factored into the measure here.

inaccurate and confused empirical measure of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands that essentially folds these territorial formations into each other; it would not make sense, in short, to use the locations of the branches and back offices of superstar firms in an empirical measure of global city agglomeration processes, since these processes do *not* encompass the territorial agglomeration of these non-headquarter and back-office establishments.

Geocoding is essentially the process of translating address data into geographic coordinates that can be read by GIS software. The geocoding in this project was carried out using batchgeo.com, an online mapping software that has been used in other academic scholarship that requires the translation of address data into geographic coordinates (McCarthy et al 2009, Oreskovic 2012 et al)¹⁵, and ArcGIS's online geocoding service. This geocoding process is generally able to obtain latitude and longitude coordinates to within street (and often rooftop level) accuracy; Image 4.1 presents a visual representation of the outcome of the geocoding process, with the geographic coordinates of the headquarter establishments of globally oriented firms (based on the coding scheme discussed above) shown in white circles against their backdrop in the physical built environment of London.

¹⁵ Batchgeo.com uses Google's geocoding API, which is commonly used by scholars in a variety of disciplines for geocoding purposes (Alfaro and Chen 2014; Bahar 2014; Goldstein, Tager-Flusberg, and Lee 2015; Hollands et al. 2013).



Image 4.1: Visualizing the Geocoding Process: Headquarter locations of Global Firms in London

By specifying the geographic coordinates of superstar headquarter locations, the geocoding process allows us to load the firm headquarter data into GIS software, where we can overlay the resulting point layer of superstar headquarter locations against another GIS dataset of UK local authority districts that contains information on the "Remain" share of the vote within each voting district (Esri 2016). In Figure 4.5, I present a map of the geocoded superstar headquarter establishments juxtaposed against a map showing support for "Remain" by local authority districts.




Figure 4.5: Locations of Global Firm Headquarters Juxtaposed Against District-Level Support for "Remain" in Brexit Referendum

Using ArcGIS's "spatial join" tool, it is possible to precisely calculate the number of superstar headquarters within each district. For each district, I calculate the ratio of the number of these establishments within the district's borders to the total number of superstar headquarters establishments within the national sample as a whole (in other words, the district's share of the overall number of superstar headquarters in the sample). I label this measure of the district's fraction of superstar headquarters in relation to the number in the national economy (based on our sample), which captures the relative size of superstar headquarter agglomerations within each district (and thereby indicates the relative salience of global city agglomeration processes for the district economy), *globalcity_agglomeration*.

In short, we would expect that increases in this district-level measure of superstar headquarter agglomeration would be associated with a corresponding increase in the agglomeration-driven multiplier and spillover benefits of globalization for the district economy; increases in the value of *globalcity_agglomeration* thus point towards a strengthening of global city agglomeration processes more generally. As this happens, we would expect an increase in the size of district-level internationalist "global city coalitions" organized on the basis of either ego-tropic, sociotropic, or local-tropic preferences. Conversely, relatively lower values of *globalcity_agglomeration* (in districts where the presence of superstar headquarter agglomerations is smaller to non-existent) would be associated with weak to non-existent district-level global city agglomeration processes, and relatively stronger hinterland dispersion processes; on Chapter 3's account, we would expect this to yield relatively larger coalitions of hinterland residents who oppose globalization on ego-tropic, sociotropic, or local-tropic grounds. To the extent that such spatial coalitions, independently shaped by the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes, do in fact exist, we would thus expect to see a positive and significant relationship between *globalcity_agglomeration* and district-level support for the proglobalization "remain" position in the Brexit referendum, even after holding other determinants of mass preferences constant.

It is worthwhile to briefly review the steps involved in calculating the *globalcity_agglomeration* measure, and the intuition underlying it. These steps can be summarized as follows:

- I first define firms within the chosen sectors of the Dun and Bradstreet database as "superstar" firms based on an employment threshold. According to this threshold, a firm is considered a "superstar" if its overall employment places it in the top 1% of firms within its 4 digit SIC sector, or if its employment places it in the top 1% of firms in the overall Dun and Bradstreet country sample.
- 2. Having identified "superstar" firms according to these criteria, I geocode the locations of the headquarter establishments of these firms, using information on the physical addresses of these establishments from the Dun and Bradstreet database. The result is a point-layer of superstar headquarter establishments.
- 3. I overlay a shapefile of local authority districts (i.e. Brexit voting districts) against the point layer of superstar headquarter establishments (i.e. see Figure 4.5). I then use ArcGIS's spatial join tool to produce a count of the number of superstar headquarter establishments within each district.
- 4. I calculate the district-level share of superstar firm headquarters (with respect to the overall number of superstar firm headquarters in the national sample). This variable—a

continuous measure of the extent of superstar headquarter agglomeration within each district—is labelled *globalcity_agglomeration* and is the independent variable of interest in this section. This variable reflects the district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes; to the extent that we observe a positive relationship between *globalcity_agglomeration* and district-level support for "Remain" (even after controlling for alternative drivers of mass preferences over globalization), it points to the existence of spatial "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions that are independently engendered by the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide (as theorized in Chapter 3).

Because it is common practice in the literature on urban economics and economic geography to use categorical variables to classify geographic processes and units of interest¹⁶, I use the continuous *globalcity_agglomeration* variable described above to code a categorical variable, labelled *globalcity*, that takes on the value one if the value of *globalcity_agglomeration* is at least one standard deviation above its mean. Below, I present results from models that use both the continuous (*globalcity_agglomeration*) and categorical (*globalcity*) measures of the relative strength of district-level global city agglomeration processes.

Finally, before turning to a discussion of the district-level control variables used in this section, it is important to note that my use of a threshold based on overall firm employment, rather than revenue, to code firms as "superstars" is driven by practical issues of data

¹⁶ For instance, Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2013) are interested in urban areas with tight housing markets, which they label "superstar cities." They code a metropolitan statistical area as a "superstar city" if its "ratio of housing price growth to housing unit growth is at or above the ninetieth percentile of the distribution for all metropolitan areas" and "the sum of its housing unit and housing price growth is above the sample median for the relevant period of analysis" (74).

availability; in particular, data series on firm-level employment are more complete than those for firm revenue, and so my decision to use employment as a proxy for size (and by extension, superstar status) was borne of a desire to use the full extent of the available data. This decision to use employment size as a proxy for the extent of a firm's international engagement is justified in light of the literature on firm heterogeneity; for instance, in an important review article on the economics of firm heterogeneity, Bernard et al. (2012) note that "exporters are 97% larger in employment" than domestic firms (286). Nevertheless, this choice is not without its problems, especially since recent work emphasizes the disproportionately large revenues of superstars rather than their disproportionately large employment; indeed, the ratio of employment size to revenues for superstar firms is actually relatively low (Autor et al 2017). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in the United States (which contains the most complete data on firm revenues within the Dun and Bradstreet dataset), the correlation between the log of firm employment size and the log of firm revenue is 0.85; this high correlation suggests that it is unlikely that using firm employment, rather than revenue, as an indicator of superstar status would undermine our attempt to identify the most globally engaged firms. Firm size is a highly reliable index of international engagement, and whether we measure size in terms of employment size, or in terms of overall revenue, the same set of firms are likely to be identified as "superstars".

To more systematically assess whether using revenue, rather than employment, as an indicator of superstar status might meaningfully alter the sample of superstar firms (and thereby alter our empirical measures of the strength of global city agglomeration processes, which is based on the locations of the headquarter establishments of these superstar firms with respect to districts), I construct an alternate measure of the aforementioned *globalcity_agglomeration* variable, which I label *globalcity_agglomeration_revenue*; these two variables are analogous,

with the only difference between them being that the underlying firms used to compute *globalcity_agglomeration_revenue* are selected on the basis of revenue thresholds rather than employment thresholds. More specifically, in calculating *globalcity_agglomeration_revenue*, I define a firm as a superstar if its annual revenue places it in the top 1% of firms within its 4-digit SIC industry¹⁷ or if its revenue is in the top 1% of the overall national sample of firms (in the selected industries). I then calculate globalcity_agglomeration_revenue by applying Steps 2-4 from the immediately preceding list to this new set of superstar firms, defined according to this revenue threshold. The correlation coefficient between *globalcity_agglomeration* and globalcity_agglomeration_revenue is 0.97; the high correlation between these variables suggests that either coding scheme to identify superstar firms yields a virtually identical measure of district-level variation in global city agglomeration processes. In other words, whether superstar firms—whose headquarter establishment locations underlie the measure of global city agglomeration processes that is our independent variable of interest—are classified as such on the basis of revenue thresholds or employment thresholds, the resulting empirical picture of the relative magnitude of global city agglomeration processes within districts is substantially the same.

Finally, it is worthwhile to briefly assess whether the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable's empirical mapping of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands onto districts is consistent with our prior expectations, as well as with surveys and rankings of global cities carried out by other researchers in the global cities research program. In other words, do our measures of global city agglomeration processes have face validity, as well as convergent validity? In considering the latter, perhaps the most prominent effort to develop indicators of

¹⁷ Firms in the database for which revenue information is missing are excluded from the analysis.

global city status comes from the Globalization and World Cities Research Network (2018), which is based in the Geography department at Loughborough University, and provides an influential classification scheme for global cities. This classification scheme is developed using data on the presence of advanced producer services within a city, which in turn is used to "compute a city's network connectivity", which "measures a city's integration into the world city network" (and, by extension, the importance of the global economy for its broader metropolitan economy) (Globalization and World Cities Research Network, 2018). The details of how this measure is computed need not detain us, but, we can compare GaWC classications with the empirical effort undertaken here; to the extent that they point in the same direction, it may give us some confidence that *globalcity_agglomeration* is indeed capturing the distinctive agglomeration processes that constitute global cities as the externally oriented winners of globalization, and thereby reflects the broader economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. The GaWC rankings suggest that (not surprisingly) London is the UK's most "global" city (i.e. it is an "Alpha" global city), followed by Manchester (a "beta" global city) and Birmingham (a "gamma" global city). In addition, Bristol and Leeds are also considered global cities according to the GaWC classification scheme, while Liverpool is a borderline case. Turning to the measured developed here, we note that the UK districts with the highest value on the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable are, as one would expect, in the major commercial areas of inner London; indeed, the district with the strongest global city agglomeration processes, as indicated by *globalcity_agglomeration* is (not surprisingly) the City of London's local authority district. Outside London, it is worth noting that districts that encompass areas (particularly downtown areas) within cities identified as "global cities" by the GaWC project do indeed tend to be identified as "global city districts" according to our dichotomous globalcity measure; in

other words, cities identified as "global cities" tend to contain districts with values on the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable that are one standard deviation above the mean, indicating particularly strong global city agglomeration processes in these districts. The consistency of the measures we have developed here with our intuitions about the international orientations of the UK's cities, as well as previous attempts to systematically measure and rank cities by their claims to global city status, is encouraging, and should increase our confidence in the validity of our district-level mapping of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands using the globalcity_agglomeration and globalcity variables. At the same time, despite this convergence with other measures, the approach to measuring global city agglomeration processes that I develop here—based on highly granular geocoded establishment data—is considerably more flexible than previous approaches, and unlike these previous empirical indicators of the economic geography of global cities, can be adapted to different spatial scales. Indeed, it would be impossible to capture the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands at the district level using the data and methods of previous global cities scholarship, which would preclude the sort of analysis undertaken below. In short, the district-level measure of global city agglomeration processes developed here is broadly consistent with other economic measures of the international orientations of cities, and measures of global city activity and status (like GaWC), but facilitate empirical analyses that could not be undertaken using these coarser measures.

4.3.3 Control Variables

In addition to the independent variables of interest discussed in Section 4.3.2, which capture the district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes, I also control for other

district-level variables that, according to previous IPE scholarship, could be expected to shape mass preferences over globalization, and hence, voting patterns over Brexit. I collected data for these control variables from the most recent UK Census, which provides data at the local authority level.¹⁸

First, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that relatively high-skilled districts will favor globalization, since external openness raises the returns to highly-skilled labor in a skill-abundant economy such as the United Kingdom. To account for this mechanism, I use a control variable that measures the percentage of a district's population that has completed an undergraduate degree (*highereducation*). To the extent that skill-based coalitions based on Stolper-Samuelson effects are salient, we should expect to see a positive and significant relationship between *highereducation* and the district-level share of remain, indicating the presence of a "pro-globalization" coalition of the highly skilled.

Educational levels have traditionally been used to capture Stolper-Samuelson effects in the IPE literature, based on the reasoning that educational attainment represents an investment in human capital that increases an individual's skill endowment. However, some scholars have pointed out that an undergraduate education not only affects human capital formation, but also affects other factors, unrelated to Stolper-Samuelson effects (such as an intellectual familiarity with comparative advantage) that could also shape foreign economic policy attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). In light of these criticisms, I also collect Census occupational data that measures the percentage of the district's population employed as "managers, directors, and senior officials" and in "professional occupations"; for robustness, I use this variable, analogous to measures used to capture Stolper-Samuelson effects in studies of the US congress

¹⁸ UK Census data was accessed through Nomis, a service provided through Durham University (2018).

(Broz and Hawes 2006; Milner and Tingley 2011) as an alternative (possibly less noisy) measure of skill-based coalitions rooted in the Stolper-Samuelson effect. I label this variable as *professionals*.

While the Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests that highly skilled areas will be more likely to favor globalization (and therefore vote to remain), the Ricardo-Viner approach to foreign economic policy preferences and coalitions puts the analytical microscope on the industrial composition of districts, and expects that districts with high concentrations of comparative disadvantage industries will be relatively more likely to oppose globalization (and therefore vote to leave). To proxy for the import-competing orientation of districts, I use a measure of the percentage of a district's population that is employed in the manufacturing sector (manufacturingpercent). This is a relatively coarse measure, since the Census industry-level data is not sufficiently granular to create measures that disaggregate the manufacturing sector into import-competing and export-oriented industries (as is done in studies of American politics). Nevertheless, a recent government study of the UK's comparative advantage industries noted that as an exporter, the UK "tends to be weak across manufacturing sectors" (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 22), which suggests that a district's manufacturing footprint is a good first-cut proxy for the economic importance of comparative disadvantage industries to the local economy. Conversely, it is well-known that the UK has a large comparative advantage in services industries, especially in finance and insurance; to proxy for the export-orientation of districts along Ricardo-Viner lines, I include a variable, labelled FIRE, that measures the district share of the population that is employed in the FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate) industries, in which the UK is internationally competitive.¹⁹ To the extent that district-level sectoral

¹⁹ Real estate is perhaps note technically tradable, but a measure of finance and insurance employment sans real estate was not available from the Census. In any case, it is well-known that UK property is

coalitions rooted in Ricardo Viner effects are indeed present, we should expect to see a negative and significant coefficient on the *manufacturingpercent* variable (since employees of comparative disadvantage industries are expected to oppose economic openness) and a positive and significant coefficient on *FIRE* (since employees of comparative advantage industries are expected to favour economic openness).

In addition to these workhorse materialist approaches to explaining foreign economic policy coalitions, more recent work has suggested that deep-seated symbolic and cultural identities acquired early in life (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Sabet 2014) may be a fundamental driver of attitudes towards globalization. To disentangle the impact of global city agglomeration processes on mass preferences from the impact of pre-existing cultural attitudes—that is, to distinguish the presence of cultural coalitions based on cosmopolitan or ethnocentric attitudes from the presence of spatial coalitions that stem from global city agglomeration processes—it is therefore important to explicitly control for district-level cosmopolitan or ethnocentric identities. Accounting for the impact of cultural preferences on the Brexit vote, and thereby distinguishing cultural coalitions from spatial coalitions, is difficult, particularly at the district-level; it is much more straightforward to account for cultural attitudes at the individual level, which I am able to do in the individual-level analysis carried out in Section 4.4. Here, I attempt to account for the potential impact of cultural values on the vote using two separate measures. First, following previous work that suggests using measures of cultural diversity or multiculturalism to proxy for cosmopolitanism (Warf 2015), I proxy a district's cultural openness with a variable that measures the foreign migrant share of the local area population (*migrantspercentage*). To the

highly sought after across the world, so a measure that includes real estate is perhaps not inappropriate. More generally, the global property market is a central aspect of the global economy, but remains understudied by IPE scholars. It is therefore an important area for future research.

extent that district-level cosmopolitan or ethnocentric coalitions exerted a meaningful impact on the vote, we would expect to see a positive and significant coefficient on *migrantspercentage*.

Though the decision to use this proxy to account for the impact of cultural identity on mass preferences over globalization is grounded in the literature on cosmopolitanism (Warf 2015), it is not without its problems; most importantly, immigration also has labor market effects, and the impact of the district-level share of immigrants on the vote may therefore be a noisy indicator of the presence of cosmopolitan or ethnocentric coalitions grounded in cultural preferences. As an alternative measure, I therefore account for the impact of district-level cultural identity on the vote by controlling for the district-share of individuals with a valid passport; I label this variable passportshare. As Kahler (2017) notes, "transnational experienceliterally crossing borders as a result of family background or practices in work or leisure" (7) is linked to cosmopolitan orientations. To the extent that passports are quite literally the keys to transnational experience, they could be a useful proxy for such cosmopolitan cultural attitudes; controlling for district-level passport ownership could therefore help us to distinguish the impact of cultural identity on voting patterns from the impact of global city agglomeration processes (and thereby reassure us that global city and hinterland political coalitions rooted in global city agglomeration processes are empirically distinct from cosmopolitan and ethnocentric political coalitions rooted in the effects of cultural identity).

While political coalitions over globalization organized on the basis of class and skilllevels; industry-level patterns of comparative advantage; and cosmopolitan or ethnocentric identities have been well-studied by IPE scholars, the role of generational or age-based coalitions has received relatively less attention. Though Rogowski (2008) flagged this as a potentially important area of research several years ago, it has not (to my knowledge) become an active area

of research, and remains under-theorized. However, one of the most striking cleavages that opened up in the Brexit vote was generational, with only 27% of 18-24 year-olds voting to leave the European Union, compared to 60% of those 65 and older (Kelly 2016). Though it is not clear that we yet have a theoretical explanation for this pattern, its empirical importance in the case of Brexit²⁰, as suggested by observational data and the results of previous studies, suggest that it is important to account for such a cohort effect by controlling for the age-composition of districts; this helps to ensure that the observed relationship between our measures of global city agglomeration processes and patterns of mass support for "remain" does not actually reflect the residual impact of a cohort effect. I account for the age composition of districts with a variable, labelled *over65share*, which reflects the share of the district population that is over 65 years of age.

Previous empirical studies of Brexit have not emphasized the role of global city agglomeration processes in shaping the Brexit vote. However, as a result of the observed geographic divide between London and the rest of England, these studies have nonetheless attempted to account for the impact of more general spatially defined processes—such as urbanization—on the vote. For instance, some district-level studies, such as Matti and Zhou (2016) use district-level population density to control for the broader effects of urban

²⁰ Interestingly, an analogous generation gap opened up between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in the American presidential election, with Hillary Clinton-the internationalist candidate-winning voters in the 18-29 bracket by 18 percentage points. However, a significant age gap featured in the previous two American elections as well (featuring more or less internationalist Republican candidates), so it's less clear that the generational gap in the US was driven by a populist/internationalist divide. To the extent that it was, though, it's interesting to note that in the recent French presidential election, Le Pen, the populist candidate, garnered substantial youth support, while Macron, the internationalist, won a sizable share of older French citizens. These cases offer fertile ground for future research on how generational divides and cohort effects might shape the domestic politics of globalization. It could be especially interesting to explore how generational cleavages intersect with other lines of cleavage (for instance, geographic cleavages, or the divide between cosmopolitans and ethno-nationalists).

agglomeration on the referendum voting patterns. I therefore follow them in including a population density variable in the analysis (labelled *popdensity*). The inclusion of this variable allows us to distinguish the impact of global city agglomeration processes on the voting patterns from the impact of urban agglomeration effects more generally; to the extent that the coefficients on the *globalcity_aggmlomeration* and *globalcity* variables remain positive and significant even after accounting for the impact of the broader phenomenon of urban agglomeration, it would suggest that "global city" and "hinterland" spatial political coalitions over globalization are empirically distinct from, rather than coextensive with, more traditional urban and rural political coalitions. In other words, by including *popdensity* in the specifications below, we are able to establish that the large-scale spatial political divisions over the Brexit vote (documented in Section 4.2.2) can indeed be traced specifically to the existence of global city and hinterland coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and are not simply the byproduct of aggregate patterns of urban agglomeration.

Summary statistics for the independent and dependent variables, are presented in Table 4.2. To assess the extent of collinearity between the measure of district-level global city agglomeration processes (i.e. the continuous independent variable of interest, *globalcity_agglomeration*) and various control variables that attempt to account for other sources of foreign economic policy coalitions, I also present a table that displays correlations among the various independent variables. This information is contained in Table 4.3.

| Variable | count | mean | sd | min | max |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| percentstay | 381 | 46.88265 | 10.4119 | 24.44 | 78.62 |
| globalcity | 381 | 0.0419948 | 0.2008409 | 0 | 1 |
| highereducation | 348 | 21.38375 | 6.074746 | 10.85051 | 52.71689 |
| professionals | 348 | 13.20761 | 3.419652 | 7.26159 | 31.4726 |
| globalcity_agglomeration | 381 | 0.2624672 | 0.5299002 | 0 | 6.433088 |
| manufacturingpercent | 348 | 4.406307 | 1.843702 | 0.8329911 | 10.88491 |
| migrantpercentage | 380 | 11.17015 | 3.051181 | 6.38089 | 24.78787 |
| over65share | 379 | 19.26816 | 4.534157 | 5.991139 | 32.68029 |
| popdensity | 380 | 584.4593 | 926.321 | 2.481847 | 6007.641 |
| unempincrease | 378 | 0.1357143 | 0.9984177 | -5.2 | 2.6 |
| FIRE | 348 | 7.336119 | 3.69288 | 2.398482 | 31.8379 |
| passportshare | 348 | 67.21334 | 3.470896 | 58.99871 | 82.82999 |

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for District-Level Brexit Analysis

| | globalcity_agglo meration | higheredu cation | migrantperc entage | over65perc entage | manufacturin gpercent | professi onals |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| globalcity_agglo meration | 1 | | | | | |
| highereducation | 0.3793 | 1 | | | | |
| migrantpercent age | 0.3926 | 0.4943 | 1 | | | |
| over65percentag e | -0.3306 | -0.1741 | -0.5034 | 1 | | |
| manufacturingp ercent | -0.2366 | -0.5348 | -0.4977 | 0.2776 | 1 | |
| professionals | 0.351 | 0.9437 | 0.3252 | -0.1334 | -0.4308 | 1 |

Table 4.3: Correlations Between District Variables in Brexit Analysis

It is worthwhile to note that in Table 4.3, the correlations between

globalcity_agglomeration and the variables that capture district-level skill and industry endowments, are relatively low. These low correlations suggest that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, as captured in our measure of the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes (*globalcity_agglomeration*), is empirically distinct from more traditional vectors of influence on political coalitions such as Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo Viner dynamics (or for that matter, the effects of cultural identity) and that is not simply a manifestation of processes described or predicted by these traditional models; it is worth noting that these empirical patterns are consistent with certain aspects of the discussion in Section 4.2.3.

This has important implications for our empirical strategy. Recall that this strategy is rooted in the premise that to the extent that our measures of global city agglomeration processes exert a positive and significant impact on district-level "pro-Remain" voting shares after accounting for alternative determinants of mass preferences over globalization, it points to the existence of independently constituted spatial coalitions rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands—coalitions which are distinct from coalitions organized on the basis of skill-levels, industrial affiliation, or cultural identity. If the correlations between the measures

of global city agglomeration processes and some of the other independent variables were especially high—for instance, if districts with high values on *globalcity_agglomeration* also tended to be highly skilled districts—multi-collinearity may have been an issue. This would have made it difficult to ascertain the independent impact of *globalcity_agglomeration* on the remain vote, and frustrated our efforts to disentangle spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands from skill-based coalitions based on Stolper-Samuelson processes. The low correlations between the measures of global city agglomeration processes and control variables suggests that multicollinearity is not likely to be a large concern in the empirical analysis; this makes our strategy for discerning the existence of spatial political coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands a viable one.

4.3.4 Model Specification

Following other district-level studies of Brexit (Matti and Zhou 2016), I estimate the following models with OLS. To account for spatial correlations across districts, I cluster the standard errors by travel to work areas, which are the British equivalent of commuting zones in the United States²¹. As Dorn notes, commuting zones delineate what are essentially local labor market areas; "commuting ties" are strong within commuting zones, but weak across them (Dorn 2009, 135). This suggests that spatial correlations in the error term, to the extent that they exist, are likely to exist between districts that share a commuting zone, and that it is therefore appropriate to cluster standard errors at this level. In using clustered standard errors to account

²¹ Throughout, I use the terms travel-to-work areas, commuter zones, and commuting zones interchangeably

for spatial correlations, I follow the approach taken by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Dorn (2009).

Because district geographies and travel to work area geographies do not perfectly overlap, I consider a district to be within a particular travel to work area if its centroid falls within that travel to work area; I use ArcGIS to assign districts to commuter zones based on this criterion. For illustration, Figure 4.6 shows the outline of the London commuter zone (also known as the London travel to work area) juxtaposed against local authority districts, while Figure 4.7 shows (in turquoise outline) districts which have their centroid within the London Commuter zone.




Figure 4.6: London commuter zone overlaid against local authority districts




Figure 4.7: Districts With Centroids in London Commuter Zone

GIS boundary data on travel to work areas on the UK is provided by the UK's Office for National Statistics (2017). The baseline specifications do not include commuter zone fixed effects, but subsequent specifications do include CZ fixed effects. I discuss these choices further below, in the course of discussing the results.

4.3.5 Results and Discussion

In the first set of specifications, I carry out simple bivariate regressions that regress the percentage of voters within a district voting to "remain" (which, as I argued above, should be construed as a "pro-globalization" position) on either the continuous or categorical measure of the relative strength of district-level global city agglomeration processes (the independent variables of interest, as defined above). These baseline bivariate results are presented in Table 4.4 below.

| | (1) | (2) |
|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity | 14.88^{***} | |
| | (4.232) | |
| | | |
| globalcity_agg | | 13.17*** |
| lomeration | | 10.17 |
| | | (2.922) |
| | | |
| _cons | 44.89^{***} | 42.14^{***} |
| | (1.093) | (0.762) |
| Ν | 378 | 378 |
| FE | No | No |

Table 4.4: Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Support for Remain(Bivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Included)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by commuter zone

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Using either specification of the independent variable of interest, we see a positive and significant relationship between the strength of district-level global city agglomeration processes and the district-level share of the "remain" vote. The specification using the categorical variable, *globalcity*, suggests that the "remain" share of the vote was close to 15 points higher in districts in which the relative district-level concentration of superstar headquarter establishments (as measured by *globalcity_agglomeration*) is one standard deviation above the mean (which we might consider "global city districts") than in the remainder of the districts (which we might consider "hinterland districts"). According to the specification using the continuous independent variable, *globalcity_agglomeration*, increasing this variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the district-share of the "remain" vote. In both cases, the measure of the strength of district-level global city agglomeration processes is highly significant (p<0.001).

In Table 4.5, I present results from specifications that add the control variables discussed above to the baseline specification that uses the categorical measure of district-level global city agglomeration processes, *globalcity*. Models 1 and 2 contain the results with the district-level share of college graduates as a proxy for skill-endowments, while Models 3 and 4 contain the results with the district-level share of individuals working in professional and highly-skilled occupations as a proxy for district-skill endowments. Models 1 and 3 use district-level multiculturalism (measured by the share of immigrants) as a proxy for cosmopolitan cultural identity, while Models 2 and 4 use district-level international social ties (measured by the share of individuals with a passport) as a proxy for cosmopolitan cultural identity.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-----------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity | 4.502** | 4.518** | 4.414 | 5.220^{*} |
| | (1.373) | (1.549) | (2.308) | (2.347) |
| highereducatio n | 1.538*** | 1.569*** | | |
| | (0.138) | (0.116) | | |
| manufacturing percent | -0.645*** | -0.680*** | -0.979*** | -1.239*** |
| | (0.157) | (0.133) | (0.222) | (0.161) |
| migrantpercent age | 0.0625 | | 0.531*** | |
| -9- | (0.136) | | (0.138) | |
| over65percent age | -0.539*** | -0.551*** | -0.300** | -0.423*** |
| | (0.0819) | (0.0614) | (0.0974) | (0.0738) |
| popdensity | 0.000772^{*} | 0.000827** | 0.00272*** | 0.00337*** |
| | (0.000347) | (0.000297) | (0.000783) | (0.000737) |
| fireshare | -0.710* | -0.731** | -1.096* | -1.473*** |
| | (0.303) | (0.224) | (0.481) | (0.363) |
| passportshare | | -0.0374 | | 0.0967 |
| | | (0.124) | | (0.151) |
| professionals | | | 2.658*** | 2.936*** |
| | | | (0.364) | (0.369) |
| _cons | 29.60*** | 32.65*** | 20.36*** | 22.02** |
| | (2.949) | (6.702) | (3.283) | (7.589) |
| Ν | 347 | 347 | 347 | 347 |
| FE | No | No | No | No |

 Table 4.5: Impact of Categorical Global City Agglomeration Variable on District-Level Support
 for Remain (Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Included)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by CZ $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

I find that across all specifications in Table 4.5 except Model 3, the categorical global city variable is statistically significant at conventional thresholds (p<0.05); in Model 3, this variable is statistically significant at the 10% confidence threshold (p<0.1). The results suggest that support for "Remain" within "global city districts" is at least 4.4 percentage points higher than in hinterland districts. In Table 4.6, I present analogous models, with the continuous *globalcity_agglomeration* variable as our measure of global city agglomeration processes.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity_agg lomeration | 2.796*** | 2.815*** | 3.030* | 3.982** |
| | (0.634) | (0.765) | (1.256) | (1.323) |
| highereducatio n | 1.543*** | 1.564*** | | |
| | (0.138) | (0.117) | | |
| manufacturing percent | -0.684*** | -0.708*** | -1.025*** | -1.273*** |
| | (0.166) | (0.138) | (0.226) | (0.166) |
| migrantpercen tage | 0.0386 | | 0.501*** | |
| | (0.141) | | (0.140) | |
| over65percent age | -0.499*** | -0.505*** | -0.257* | -0.359*** |
| | (0.0871) | (0.0655) | (0.112) | (0.0820) |
| popdensity | 0.000917** | 0.000951*** | 0.00287^{***} | 0.00347*** |
| | (0.000337) | (0.000282) | (0.000725) | (0.000672) |
| fireshare | -0.760* | -0.768*** | -1.165* | -1.540*** |
| | (0.300) | (0.215) | (0.460) | (0.342) |
| passportshare | | -0.0323 | | 0.108 |
| | | (0.133) | | (0.157) |
| professionals | | | 2.682*** | 2.938*** |
| | | | (0.357) | (0.360) |
| _cons | 28.88*** | 31.30*** | 19.58*** | 19.77* |
| | (3.103) | (7.359) | (3.578) | (8.184) |
| Ν | 347 | 347 | 347 | 347 |

Table 4.6: Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level Support for Remain (Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Included)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by CZ $p^* < 0.05$, $p^* < 0.01$, $p^* < 0.001$

The continuous variable is statistically significant at conventional thresholds across all specifications; in particular, increasing the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with an increase in district-level support for "remain" of between 1.51 to 2.15 percentage points. Because the London metropolitan region is in many ways unique, I also present regression results for specifications that exclude districts from the London commuting zone in Tables 4.7 (which considers the results using the dichotomous *globalcity* variable) and 4.8 (which considers results using the continuous *globalcity_agglomeration* variable).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity | 6.547*** | 6.668*** | 7.853*** | 8.468*** |
| | (1.406) | (1.356) | (1.346) | (1.400) |
| highereducatio n | 1.413*** | 1.514*** | | |
| | (0.0780) | (0.0830) | | |
| manufacturing percent | -0.394 | -0.541** | -0.595* | -1.126*** |
| | (0.219) | (0.171) | (0.260) | (0.213) |
| migrantpercent age | 0.246 | | 0.762*** | |
| - | (0.152) | | (0.169) | |
| over65percenta ge | -0.396*** | -0.463*** | -0.151 | -0.366*** |
| | (0.0796) | (0.0698) | (0.0967) | (0.100) |
| popdensity | 0.000815 | 0.00120 | 0.00155 | 0.00277** |
| | (0.000681) | (0.000667) | (0.000835) | (0.000985) |
| fireshare | -0.322 | -0.485*** | -0.563* | -1.241*** |
| | (0.165) | (0.143) | (0.269) | (0.267) |
| passportshare | | -0.0279 | | 0.126 |
| passportshare | | (0.128) | | (0.167) |
| | | (0.120) | | (0.107) |
| professionals | | | 2.323*** | 2.757*** |
| | | | (0.222) | (0.304) |
| _cons | 23.43*** | 28.90*** | 14.12** | 19.25* |
| | (4.268) | (6.784) | (5.310) | (8.576) |
| Ν | 318 | 318 | 318 | 318 |
| FE | No | No | No | No |

Table 4.7: Impact of Categorical Global City Agglomeration Variable on District-Level Support for Remain (Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Excluded)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by CZ

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity_agg lomeration | 3.769*** | 3.914*** | 5.218*** | 6.095*** |
| | (0.879) | (0.903) | (1.182) | (1.392) |
| highereducatio n | 1.412*** | 1.498*** | | |
| | (0.0750) | (0.0810) | | |
| manufacturing percent | -0.452* | -0.586** | -0.669* | -1.166*** |
| | (0.228) | (0.175) | (0.266) | (0.211) |
| migrantpercent age | 0.234 | | 0.734*** | |
| | (0.148) | | (0.167) | |
| over65percenta ge | -0.350*** | -0.417*** | -0.0835 | -0.283** |
| | (0.0822) | (0.0748) | (0.0958) | (0.106) |
| popdensity | 0.000757 | 0.00108 | 0.00150 | 0.00257^{**} |
| | (0.000684) | (0.000647) | (0.000833) | (0.000950) |
| fireshare | -0.391* | -0.568*** | -0.680^{*} | -1.362*** |
| | (0.170) | (0.149) | (0.265) | (0.255) |
| passportshare | | 0.0129 | | 0.176 |
| | | (0.137) | | (0.176) |
| professionals | | | 2.347*** | 2.741*** |
| - | | | (0.213) | (0.290) |
| _cons | 22.72*** | 25.65*** | 12.93* | 14.42 |
| | (4.306) | (7.247) | (5.279) | (8.947) |
| Ν | 318 | 318 | 318 | 318 |
| FE | No | No | No | No |

Table 4.8: Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level Support for Remain (Multivariate OLS; Random Effects; London Districts Excluded)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by CZ $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

The results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 indicate that both the categorical and continuous independent variables of interest remain statistically significant and substantively important even when London districts are excluded.

These results point to the existence of "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions that are independently shaped by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and which are not simply geographic by-products of more fundamental cleavages that derive from more familiar processes of coalition formation (such as those driven by Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo Viner mechanisms). To put the results for our measures of global city agglomeration processes in perspective, we can consider how variables that capture these alternative mechanisms fared; this allows us to assess the relative importance of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, compared to these alternative processes, in shaping the organization of mass coalitions over globalization. The coefficients on our measures of district skill endowments are statistically significant and substantively large (in a positive direction); this suggests the empirical importance of skill-based coalitions anchored in Stolper-Samuelson processes for the politics of globalization, which is consistent with other studies (but see Section 4.6.3 below for a qualification). In Table 4.5, increasing the *highereducation* variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a roughly 9 point increase in the districtlevel vote share for "Remain", while increasing the *professionals* variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a 9 (Model 3) to 10 (Model 4) point increase in district-level support for remain. Turning to the impact of industry-based variables that are included with a view towards controlling for Ricardo-Viner mechanisms, the variable on districtlevel manufacturing employment, which is a proxy for employment in comparative disadvantage industries, is consistently negative and significant, which is in line with the expectations of a

Ricardo-Viner account of political coalitions over globalization; in Model 4, where this variable has the greatest impact, a one standard deviation increase in a district's manufacturing employment is associated with a 2.28 point decrease in the "Remain" share of the vote. However, the coefficient on *fire* (district-level employment share in the finance, insurance, and real-estate industries) is negative, rather than positive (as a Ricardo-Viner framework would expect for a comparative advantage industry). The negative sign on this variable may reflect the tendency of districts with large shares of domestically oriented financial services firms, or the back-office branches of globally oriented FIRE firms, to vote "Leave" (which would be consistent with the account provided in Chapter 2); this suggests possible problems with the assumption that preferences are formed at the industry level, and by extension, problems with the Ricardo-Viner approach to explaining foreign economic policy coalitions more generally. Turning to the impact of cultural identity on the district-level vote, we note that the district-level cosmopolitanism measures are not robustly associated with increased district-level vote shares for "Remain"; the coefficient on the variable measuring the district-level share of immigrants (*migrantpercentage*) is, according to expectations, positive and significant in specifications that use the district-level share of professionals (*professionals*) as the Stolper-Samuelson variable, but not in specifications that use the district-level share of college graduates. The variable measuring the district-level share of individuals with valid passports never attains statistical significance. Taken together, these results on the control variables suggest that district-level measures of skillendowments exert a larger impact on district-level patterns of support for globalization than our measures of global city agglomeration processes; this might suggest that skill-based coalitions rooted in Stolper-Samuelson processes may be more salient than spatial coalitions rooted in global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes. However, it is worth noting that

the link between our measures of district-level global city agglomeration processes and support for "remain" appears more robust than the link between district-level measures of industry composition, or cultural identity, and support for "remain." This suggests that the evidence for spatial coalitions rooted in global city agglomeration processes is more robust than the evidence for industry based coalitions rooted in Ricardo-Viner mechanisms, or cultural coalitions rooted in cultural identity.

In the next set of specifications, I impose travel to work area (i.e. commuting zone) fixed effects; in these models, the coefficients are computed based on variation across districts within the same commuting zone, whereas in the previous models (without commuting zone fixed effects), they were computed based on variation between all districts in the sample. Using commuting zone fixed effects allows us to effectively control for omitted variables at the scale of the commuting zone by only focusing on district-level variation within commuting zones. For instance, Colantone and Stanig (2017) show that areas of the United Kingdom with local labor markets that were especially hard hit by the "China Shock" (i.e. import surges from China after it gained membership in the WTO in 2001) tended to vote against "Remain"; this raises the possibility that the district level results presented above may actually be driven by interregional variation in the vulnerability of labor markets to the China shock. By essentially limiting our consideration of district-level variation to intra-commuter zone variation, we are able to increase our confidence that district-level results are not driven by the omitted variable of the China shock (since commuter zones delimit the scale at which local labor market effects are experienced, all districts within a common commuter zone would have the same exposure to the China shock). In other words, if we find that our measures of global city agglomeration processes matter for outcomes even within areas where the effects of the China shock (or potentially other economic

or social factors) are effectively held constant, it would increase our confidence in the robustness of the link between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and mass preferences over economic openness, and reassure us that spatial coalitions that correspond the global city versus hinterland divide are not simply manifestations of the labor-market effects associated with the China Shock.

In Table 4.9, I present results from bivariate regressions of the district-level "Remain" share on the dichotomous and continuous independent variables of interest using commuting zone fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered by commuting zone:

| | (1) | (2) |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity | 13.91*** | |
| | (2.857) | |
| | | |
| globalcity_agg lomeration | | 11.55*** |
| | | (2.302) |
| cons | 46.25*** | 44.02*** |
| _ | (0.0925) | (0.535) |
| Ν | 378 | 378 |
| CZ Fixed | YES | YES |
| Effects | | |

Table 4.9: Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Support for

 Remain (Bivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Included)

Across all bivariate specifications, we see that both the continuous and dichotomous global city variables are highly significant and exert a substantively important impact on district-level support for "Remain". Tables 4.10 and 4.11 contain the results for models that add control variables to the bivariate fixed- effects specifications presented in Table 4.9; in particular, the

independent variable of interest in 4.10 is the dichotomous *globalcity* variable, while the independent variable of interest in 4.11 is the continuous *globalcity_agglomeration* variable:

| | (1) | (2) | (2) | (4) |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| globalcity | ercentstay 4.100** | percentstay 3.333 ⁺ | percentstay 2.646 | percentstay 2.730 |
| giobalcity | | | | |
| | (1.570) | (1.978) | (2.785) | (3.170) |
| highereducatio n | 1.751*** | 1.681*** | | |
| | (0.186) | (0.217) | | |
| manufacturing percent | -0.701 | -0.536 | -1.402** | -1.495*** |
| | (0.426) | (0.355) | (0.528) | (0.382) |
| migrantpercen tage | -0.412+ | | 0.133 | |
| | (0.225) | | (0.289) | |
| over65percent age | -0.845*** | -0.553*** | -0.516* | -0.594*** |
| - | (0.148) | (0.0652) | (0.256) | (0.123) |
| popdensity | 0.00151*** | 0.00146*** | 0.00352*** | 0.00361*** |
| 1 1 2 | (0.000354) | (0.000402) | (0.000979) | (0.000881) |
| fireshare | -1.006** | -0.877* | -1.107 | -1.127+ |
| | (0.314) | (0.367) | (0.729) | (0.658) |
| passportshare | | -0.214 | | 0.0112 |
| Lhouring | | (0.148) | | (0.169) |
| professionals | | | 2.755*** | 2.804*** |
| F | | | (0.645) | (0.612) |
| _cons | 38.46*** | 42.49*** | 29.67*** | 31.76*** |
| | (5.806) | (6.526) | (7.679) | (8.432) |
| Ν | 347 | 347 | 347 | 347 |
| CZ Fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Effects | | | | |

Table 4.10: Impact of Categorical Global City Variable on District-Level Support For Remain(Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Included)

Standard errors in parentheses $p^{+} p < 0.10, p^{*} p < 0.05, p^{**} p < 0.01, p^{***} p < 0.001$

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity_aggl omeration | 3.065*** | 2.397* | 2.884 | 2.990 |
| | (0.813) | (1.153) | (1.959) | (2.257) |
| highereducatio n | 1.771*** | 1.693*** | | |
| | (0.192) | (0.219) | | |
| manufacturing percent | -0.687 | -0.520 | -1.358* | -1.422** |
| | (0.457) | (0.391) | (0.561) | (0.426) |
| migrantpercent age | -0.438+ | | 0.101 | |
| - | (0.231) | | (0.280) | |
| over65percenta ge | -0.801*** | -0.504*** | -0.487+ | -0.547*** |
| | (0.167) | (0.0642) | (0.284) | (0.146) |
| popdensity | 0.00157*** | 0.00151*** | 0.00353*** | 0.00359*** |
| | (0.000323) | (0.000365) | (0.000881) | (0.000775) |
| fireshare | -1.079*** | -0.927* | -1.241+ | -1.261* |
| | (0.313) | (0.358) | (0.657) | (0.587) |
| passportshare | | -0.223 | | 0.0193 |
| | | (0.149) | | (0.158) |
| professionals | | | 2.844*** | 2.879*** |
| | | | (0.601) | (0.567) |
| _cons | 37.31*** | 41.71*** | 28.48** | 29.40** |
| | (6.234) | (7.111) | (8.557) | (8.934) |
| Ν | 347 | 347 | 347 | 347 |

Table 4.11: Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level Support For Remain (Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Included)

Standard errors in parentheses $p^{+} p < 0.10, p^{*} p < 0.05, p^{**} p < 0.01, p^{***} p < 0.001$

Note that in the results from specifications presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, the independent variables of interest are statistically and substantively significant when using highereducation as the Stolper-Samuelson variable (Models 1 and 2), but not when using professionals as the Stolper-Samuelson variable (Models 3 and 4). These inconsistent results should give us pause, but a close look at geographic patterns in the data suggests that one possible explanation for the lack of robust results on our measures of global city agglomeration processes is the somewhat unique district-level geography of the London metropolitan area, where districts are relatively smaller than they are in other commuter zones (where local area districts tend to be large enough to encompass downtown and immediate suburban areas of cities); as a result, there were several strongly "pro-Remain" districts in suburban London adjacent to the districts of inner London's with large agglomerations of superstar headquarters, but without large superstar agglomerations themselves (since they are primarily residential). The presence of a large number of residential London districts that broke decisively for remain but did not themselves contain a large number of headquarters of globally oriented firms (and therefore have low values on the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable)—an artefact of London's unique district geography—may decisively weaken the district-level relationship between our measure of the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes and support for the proglobalization "remain" position in specifications that use commuter zone fixed effects.

To the extent that the non-robust findings in the first set of specifications with commuterzone fixed effects is driven by the idiosyncratic district-level geography of the London area, we should find more consistent results in specifications that exclude districts from the London metropolitan area. Tables 4.12 and 4.13 present results from multivariate fixed-effects

specifications that exclude districts from the London commuter zone; the dichotomous *globalcity* variable is the independent variable of interest in the former, while the continuous *globalcity_agglomeration* is the independent variable of interest in the latter:

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay | percentstay |
| globalcity | 7.153*** | 7.146*** | 7.530*** | 8.350*** |
| | (1.176) | (1.144) | (1.499) | (1.043) |
| highereducatio n | 1.346*** | 1.380*** | | |
| | (0.114) | (0.176) | | |
| manufacturingp ercent | -0.370 | -0.403 | -0.679+ | -1.150*** |
| | (0.410) | (0.338) | (0.409) | (0.337) |
| migrantpercent age | 0.0436 | | 0.675*** | |
| | (0.161) | | (0.196) | |
| over65percenta ge | -0.502*** | -0.516*** | -0.0737 | -0.497*** |
| | (0.106) | (0.0846) | (0.138) | (0.118) |
| popdensity | 0.00120+ | 0.00128+ | 0.00180^{*} | 0.00250^{*} |
| | (0.000700) | (0.000678) | (0.000909) | (0.000998) |
| fireshare | -0.0659 | -0.0949 | 0.570 | 0.0668 |
| | (0.218) | (0.269) | (0.359) | (0.425) |
| passportshare | | -0.0485 | | 0.172 |
| | | (0.138) | | (0.180) |
| professionals | | | 1.584*** | 1.978*** |
| | | | (0.309) | (0.422) |
| _cons | 27.44*** | 31.06*** | 16.22* | 20.77^* |
| | (5.731) | (6.852) | (7.059) | (8.959) |
| N CZ Fixed | 318 | 318 | 318 | 318 |
| | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Table 4.12: Impact of Categorical Global City Variable on District-Level Support For Remain(Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Excluded)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by CZ

 $p^{+} p < 0.10, p^{*} p < 0.05, p^{**} p < 0.01, p^{***} p < 0.001$

| tay *) |
|---------------|
| * |
| ** |
| |
| |
| |
|) |
| |
| |
| |
| * |
|) |
|)* |
| 1) |
| |
|) |
| |
|) |
| * |
|) |
| |
|) |
| |
| |
| |

Table 4.13: Impact of Continuous Global City Variable on District-Level Support For Remain (Multivariate OLS; CZ Fixed Effects; London Districts Excluded)

Standard errors in parentheses $p^{+} p < 0.10, p^{*} p < 0.05, p^{**} p < 0.01, p^{***} p < 0.001$

The results in Tables 4.12 and 4.13, which exclude London districts from the fixedeffects specifications, do indeed indicate that our measures of global city agglomeration processes have a large and robust impact on district-level support for "Remain". Table 4.12 suggests that the "remain" share of the vote in "global city districts" is up to 8.35 points higher than in "hinterland" districts, while Table 4.13 suggests that increasing the value of the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with up to a 1.66 point increase in the district-level share of the "Remain" vote. These results suggest that the apparent lack of a robust relationship between our measures of global city agglomeration processes and support for "Remain" in the fixed-effects specifications presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 may well have been driven by the London region's unique district-level geography, and should not be taken to reflect the absence of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide.

In concluding this section, we note that the relatively robust finding that our district-level measures of global city agglomeration processes exert a statistically significant and substantively important impact on mass preferences over globalization (as proxied by the district-level "remain" vote), even after controlling for a range of other factors that might shape these mass preferences, is consistent with the existence of distinctive "global city" and "hinterland" mass spatial coalitions that stem from the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In other words, these results point to the existence of distinctive spatial political coalitions over globalization that are rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and which are not simply spatial manifestations of coalitions fundamentally organized on the basis of skill levels, industrial affiliations, cultural orientations, or age.

In the next section, I turn to an investigation of the individual-level microfoundations of these spatial coalitions by exploring whether individuals embedded in environments characterized by especially strong global city agglomeration processes are more favourably disposed to economic openness.

4.4 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and the Micro-Foundations of Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: An Individual-Level Analysis of Brexit

The benefit of an econometric district-level analysis of the sort undertaken in Section 4.3, especially compared to the preliminary observational analysis presented in Section 4.2, is that it provides a useful setting in which to more systematically assess whether the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands underpins corresponding spatial coalitions over globalization. By demonstrating a relationship between an empirical measure of district level variation in global city agglomeration processes and mass support for globalization (as indicated in the district-share of "remain" votes), even after controlling for a range of alternative explanations for mass preferences over economic openness, the results in Section 4.3 point towards the existence of empirically distinct spatial foreign economic policy coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and suggests that the spatial distribution of public support for globalization documented in 4.2 does not simply reflect the spatial distribution of foreign economic policy coalitions underpinned by mechanisms other than global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes.

However, a district-level analysis is vulnerable to ecological inference issues, and as a result, we cannot make inferences about individual level preferences on the basis of the results presented in Section 4.3. In addition, while the findings in the previous section do point towards the existence of global city and hinterland coalitions that are underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, they are less useful for investigating the question of *why* and *how* this relationship emerges at the micro-level; that is, the district-level results do not cast light the relative merits of the ego-tropic, sociotropic, and local-tropic theories of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands shapes spatial coalitions over globalization that were elaborated in Chapter 3.

This section therefore uses individual-level survey data on Brexit to examine how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands shapes individual preferences over globalization; in doing so, it uncovers the individual-level micro-foundations of the district-level spatial coalitions documented in the previous section. Beyond allowing us to ameliorate the ecological inference problem associated with the previous section's district-level investigation of global city and hinterland foreign economic policy coalitions, the individual-level data also allows us to begin to assess some of the theories from Chapter 3 empirically, at least in a preliminary way. In particular, this section uses responses to survey questions to assess whether Chapter 3's scepticism about the plausibility of the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, developed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 (from Chapter 3), is justified. This analysis sets the stage for the subsequent section of this chapter, Section 4.5, which more directly explores possible evidence for the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions developed in Section 3.4.

This section draws on data from Wave 7 of the British Election Study, which includes a question on how respondents intend to vote in the European Union referendum.²² Our dependent variable, labelled *remain*, is based on responses to a question in which respondents are asked about how they planned to vote in the (then upcoming) European Union referendum. This binary dependent variable takes on a value of one if the respondent indicated a preference to remain in the European Union and zero if the respondent expressed a desire to leave the European Union. Though the survey question asks about expected, rather than actual, votes, it is worth emphasizing, as Hobolt (2016) notes, that "there is very considerable stability in the predictors of vote intention and actual vote choice" (1266). Importantly, for our purposes, the British Election Study is an especially rich resource for uncovering the individual-level micro-foundations of spatial coalitions over globalization because it is relatively large (at 30,895 respondents), and includes relatively fine-grain data on respondent locations. More specifically, it provides data on the parliamentary constituency to which an individual belongs; though this is not ideal (it would of course be preferable to have actual address data, but this information is kept private in the interests of maintaining respondent confidentiality), it nevertheless offers (given the large number and relatively small size of British parliamentary constituencies) a fairly impressive degree of granularity for the purpose of precisely locating individuals in geographic space and thereby assessing their location with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide.

Below, Section 4.4.1 discusses the construction of the independent variable of interest. In particular, I use respondent location data to situate individuals within the UK's commuter zones (i.e. travel-to-work areas). I then use the spatial dataset on superstar headquarter establishments

²² Hobolt (2016) also uses this survey to investigate the correlates of individual-level support for Brexit, though her analysis does not have a spatial dimension. The British Election Study surveys can be found at http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/.

in the UK to measure the strength of global city agglomeration processes at the commuter-zone level (this is analogous to the *globalcity_district* variable from above, but at the commuter zone level); I classify commuter zones which contain a share of superstar establishments that is one standard-deviation above the commuter-zone mean as "global city commuter zones" and the remaining commuter zones as "hinterland commuter zones." The independent variable of interest, labelled *globalcity_CZ*, takes on the value of one if an individual respondent lives within a global city commuter zone, and zero otherwise. In other words, the independent variable of interest is a dichotomous measure of whether or not an individual is a resident of a "global city commuter zone."

Section 4.4.2 turns to an exploration of whether an individual's location with respect to the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands, as it is mapped onto the UK's commuter zone geography, is systematically linked to individual preferences over the Brexit referendum (as the theories developed in Chapter 3 would predict). In particular, Section 4.4.2, presents results from simple bivariate regressions of the dependent variable of interest, *remain*—which indicates individual-level support for the status-quo of contemporary globalization and market integration (as indicated by individual support for the "Remain" position in the Brexit vote)— on *globalcity_CZ*. The results from these baseline bivariate regressions indicate that the probability that individuals from these "global city commuter zones" support remaining in the European is notably higher than the probability that residents of "hinterland commuter zones" do so.

Before turning to a multivariate analysis (in Section 4.4.4) by adding individual-level control variables to the baseline regressions presented in Section 4.4.2, Section 4.4.3 briefly explores whether this relationship between an individual's location with respect to the global city

versus hinterland divide and support for economic openness (as indicated by support for the "remain" position in the EU referendum) might be explained by the ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions that were developed in Chapter 3. Leveraging survey questions that reflect ego-tropic and sociotropic economic assessments, I provide evidence that ego-tropic or sociotropic economic assessments are not systematically more positive among global city residents than their hinterland counterparts, as these theories would predict. This suggests, in other words, that the spatial political cleavage between the internationalist coalition of global city commuter zone residents and the protectionist coalition of hinterland commuter zone residents is not shaped by a systematic divergence in the ego-tropic or sociotropic attitudes of global city and hinterland residents. This analysis sets the stage for Section 4.5, which probes the empirical support for the different theories of spatial coalitions more systematically and more generally.

In Sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5, I build on the analysis in Section 4.4.2, by adding a suite of individual-level control variables to the initial set of bivariate regressions of individual-level support for "remain" on the independent variable of interest (*globalcity_CZ*). I show that even after controlling for a range of other possible determinants of "remain" preferences, residents of global city commuter zones (as defined in Section 4.4.1) have a higher probability of voting for the pro-globalization "Remain" position than individuals from "hinterland" commuter zones; in establishing evidence for this individual-level spatial political cleavage between residents of global city commuter zones and residents hinterland commuter zones over globalization within a multivariate framework, these results provide strongly suggestive micro-level evidence for the existence of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In Section 4.4.6, I turn to a broader discussion of the implications of these individual results for our understanding of the mass politics of globalization; I underscore why it is

important for future analyses to explicitly consider how the spatial coalitions documented here might contribute to the emergence of societal foreign economic policy alignments and alliances that are surprising and counter-intuitive from the standpoint of traditional theoretical approaches, but which may become increasingly common in the coming years.

4.4.1 The Independent Variable of Interest

We are interested in creating an independent variable that situates individuals with respect to the UK's economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and which thereby captures whether a survey respondent is embedded within an environment in which global city agglomeration processes are salient, or one in which hinterland dispersion processes predominate. To that end, we must first settle on the spatial scale of analysis, and delimit environments using spatial boundaries that are (preferably) drawn according to a consistent set of economic (rather than administrative) criteria. After measuring the strength of global city agglomeration processes with respect to these areas using techniques similar to those used in Section 4.3, we can pinpoint individual locations with respect to these boundaries, and develop a variable that indicates whether or not a given individual resides within an environment whose economy is significantly shaped by global city agglomeration processes.

To delimit these environments, I use the boundaries of travel-to-work-areas, or commuting zones, which I used in the previous section to define the spatial relationships between districts. Using commuting zone boundaries for the purpose of situating individuals with respect to the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is in some sense ideal, since these boundaries are specifically drawn to specify local labor market areas, and therefore effectively delineate discrete local economic environments at the scale of everyday experience. Using the same spatial dataset of superstar headquarter establishments from Section 3.3, I locate

superstar headquarter establishments within travel to work areas, by applying ArcGIS's "spatial join" tool to the shapefile of travel to work areas; the resulting spatial dataset identifies the number of superstar headquarters within each of the UK's 228 travel to work areas (TTWA). To help make this more concrete, Figure 4.9 shows the headquarter locations of globally oriented firms superimposed against UK commuter zone boundaries:




Figure 4.8: Locations of Headquarter Establishments of Global Firms With Respect to UK Commuter Zones

I use this information to compute the percentage of superstar headquarters within each commuting zone (as a share of the total number of superstar headquarters within the sample; the procedure is analogous to that described above for local area districts). I label commuter zones in which the commuter-zone share of superstar headquarters is at least one standard deviation above the mean for commuter zones in the sample "global city commuter zones", and those that do not meet this threshold "hinterland commuter zones."

Having classified commuter zones as "global city commuter zones" or "hinterland commuter zones" according to the relative strength of commuter zone-level global city agglomeration processes (as indicated by the clustering behaviour of superstar headquarter establishments with respect to commuter zones), I then use ArcGIS to identify electoral districts with centroids that are within these specified "global city commuter zones"; individuals that live within these electoral districts (recall that the most granular individual location data is at the electoral district level) are considered residents of global city commuter zones, whose environments are meaningfully shaped by global city agglomeration processes. Individuals that live in all other districts (that is, in electoral districts with centroids that lie outside of global city commuter zones) are considered residents of hinterland commuter zones, whose environments are characterized by weak to non-existent global city agglomeration processes (or alternatively, relatively strong hinterland dispersion processes), and which therefore lose out from globalization as a result of the processes described in Chapter 2. I define a dichotomous variable, labelled *globalcity_CZ*, which takes on a value of one if a given individual is considered a resident of a global city commuter zone, and zero if a given individual is considered a resident of a hinterland commuter zone.

The strategy of capturing the possible extent of individual exposure to spatially explicit economic or social processes (here, exposure to global city agglomeration processes or hinterland dispersion processes) by using a categorical location-specific independent variable that indicates whether an individual lives within an environment in which those processes are relatively important (or even simply exist) is common in previous work on foreign economic policy and individual attitudes (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mayda 2006). It is also used in survey analyses in economics and political science that are concerned with investigating how residence in particular areas shapes attitudes more generally (Loughran 2008; Aklin et al. 2014).

4.4.2 Bivariate Regression Analysis

If the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands does indeed shape patterns of individual support for economic openness, and thereby give rise to spatially organized "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions, we would expect to observe a spatial political cleavage between residents of global city commuter zones and residents of hinterland commuter zones over Brexit, even after controlling for other possible determinants of individual preferences. To the extent that such a cleavage exists, we would expect to find a positive and significant coefficient on the *globalcity_GC* variable in multivariate linear probability and probit regressions of *remain* on *globalcity_GC*, which would suggest that residents of global city commuter zones tend to support the remain position with higher probability than residents of hinterland commuter zones.

However, before exploring the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and individual preferences in a multivariate setting, so as to document the individual-level microfoundations of the district-level spatial coalitions identified in the previous

section, I first assess whether we do in fact see such a relationship in simple bivariate regressions of *remain* on the *globalcity_CZ* location variable that situates individuals with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide. In Table 4.14, I present these regression results. I follow Colantone and Stanig (2017), who analyse a similar BES survey, in using region (i.e. NUTS-1) fixed effects and clustering the standard errors at the NUTS-3 level. Throughout, I use sampling weights provided by the BES.

Table 4.14: Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain (Bivariate Specifications)

| | (1) | (2) |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| | remain | remain |
| | | |
| | 0.100*** | 0.000*** |
| globalcity_CZ | 0.102^{***} | 0.258^{***} |
| | (0.0190) | (0.0485) |
| | | |
| _cons | 0.471^{***} | -0.0730^{*} |
| | (0.0133) | (0.0336) |
| N | 20320 | 20320 |
| Region Fixed | Yes | Yes |
| Effects | | |
| Model | Linear Probability | Probit |
| Standard errors in pa | arentheses, clustered by NU | TS-3 |

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In Table 4.14, Model 1 presents results from a linear probability model, while Model 2 contains results from a probit specification. The coefficients in a linear probability model can be read as marginal effects, which suggests that the probability that residents of global city commuter zones support "Remain" is 10.2% higher than the probability that residents of hinterland commuter zones support "Remain." Coefficients in a probit model of course cannot be interpreted as marginal effects, so I use Stata's *margins* command to compute the marginal effect of the *globalcity_CZ* variable in Model 2; the result is virtually identical to the marginal effect

suggested by the linear probability model. In both cases, the *globalcity_CZ* variable is highly significant (p<0.001).

4.4.3 Suggestive Empirical Evidence Against the Ego-Tropic and Sociotropic Theories of Spatial Coalitions: Results from Mediation Analysis

In this section, I draw on questions within the BES survey dataset to explore whether the link between individual residence within global city commuter zones and a higher probability of support for "remain"—documented in Section 4.4.2—might be explained in terms of the egotropic or sociotropic theories of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and spatial coalitions over globalization. The evidence presented here is tentative, and does not explore the local-tropic theory at all (which is taken up in Section 4.5). Nevertheless, it uncovers empirical grounds for scepticism that spatial coalitions over globalization, rooted in the global city versus hinterland economic divide, result from divergent ego-tropic or sociotropic economic assessments across the spatial divide; this suggests that the theoretical scepticism about ego-tropic and sociotropic explanations for spatial coalitions, articulated in Chapter 3, may have been well-founded.

Recall that on the ego-tropic account of how spatial coalitions over globalization form, global city residents are more likely than hinterland residents to support economic openness because the former are systematically more likely to believe that globalization is good for their personal material welfare. In Chapter 3, I suggested that such an ego-tropic account of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and spatial coalitions is plausible. After all, the local labor markets of global cities are powered by globalization, given the territorial agglomeration of superstar headquarters and their spillover-

driven multiplier effects in response to globalization (i.e. because of global city agglomeration processes); global city residents might feel that they personally benefit from these positive globalization-driven local labor market effects, and therefore support globalization on the grounds that it is good for their personal material welfare. Conversely, the labor markets of hinterland areas are hollowed out by globalization (due to the hinterland dispersion processes detailed in Chapter 2); hinterland residents might feel that they personally "lose" from the negative globalization-driven labor market effects of hinterland dispersion processes, and therefore oppose globalization on the ego-tropic grounds that it harms their personal material welfare.

On the sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions developed in Chapter 3, global city residents are more supportive of globalization because they are systematically more likely to believe that it is in the national interest than individuals from the hinterlands. In light of the possible informational implications of global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes, I suggested that spatial foreign economic policy coalitions underpinned by individuals with divergent sociotropic assessments of globalization across the global city versus hinterland divide was feasible. We might expect, for instance, that global city residents are exposed to information that suggests a positive relationship between globalization and the national economy, while hinterland residents might be exposed to more pessimistic economic news, from which they infer that globalization has negative implications for the national interest; these divergent information bases, in short, could underpin a divergence in sociotropic assessments of globalization across the global city versus hinterland lines, which in turn leads to systematically higher support for globalization among global city residents than among hinterland residents. Though Chapter 3 suggested that ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions are possible, it nevertheless argued that there are reasons for scepticism about the empirical viability of these explanations, and that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is more likely to engender spatial coalitions through local-tropic mechanisms than through ego-tropic or sociotropic ones. Though this section does not undertake an empirical investigation of the local-tropic theory (I pursue this in Section 4.5), we can exploit data in the BES survey to begin to explore whether Chapter 3's theoretical scepticism about the ego-tropic and sociotropic accounts of spatial political coalitions was indeed justified.

To do so, I first code two variables that reflect an individual's ego-tropic and sociotropic assessments of the contemporary economic environment. The first, labelled *personal_evaluation* is based on a survey question that asks the following question: "How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?" This variable takes on the value one if a respondent answers "Got a Little Better" or "Got a Lot Better" and zero otherwise. The second, labelled *general_evaluation*, is meant to capture sociotropic evaluations of the economy, and is based on responses to the following question: "How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?" If a respondent answers that the general economic situation has "got a lot better" or "got a little better", this variable is coded as one, and zero otherwise. That these evaluations are made only with respect to the past calendar year, and do not directly ask about globalization or the EU, is not ideal; nevertheless, responses to these questions capture individual assessments of the economic status-quo, of which globalization within the framework of EU membership is an important part. To the extent that an individual believes this status-quo is personally beneficial, or beneficial for the nation as a whole, we would expect them to believe that globalization is also personally beneficial, or

beneficial to the nation as a whole. Moreover, other studies of Brexit use responses to questions worded in this way to measure the impact of ego-tropic and sociotropic economic assessments on the vote (Hobolt 2016, 1267), and other recent studies of foreign economic policy preferences more broadly also make use of similarly worded survey questions to empirically infer ego-tropic or sociotropic assessments of globalization (Nguyen 2015, 131).

On the ego-tropic account of spatial political coalitions, global city commuter zone residents are expected to support globalization with higher probability than residents of hinterland commuter zones because the former are more likely to believe that they personally benefit from globalization than the latter (as a result of the beneficial labor market effects of global city agglomeration processes). In other words, the relationship between residence in a global city, and a higher probability of support for globalization, is mediated (or "channelled through") the tendency for global city residents to form more favourable ego-tropic attitudes towards globalization. In schematic terms (where higher numbers represent later sequences in the explanatory chain):

- 1. Individual lives in global city.
- 2. Individual from global city is more likely to believe globalization is in her individual material interest than individual from hinterland area.
- 3. Individual from global city is more likely to support globalization.

Adapted to our empirical context here, here, this suggests that the positive relationship between residence in a global city commuter zone (the independent variable, labelled *globalcity_CZ*) and individual support for remaining in the European Union (the dependent variable, labelled *remain*), is mediated (or "flows through") the tendency for residents of global city commuter zone residents to develop favourable economic assessments of globalization as it relates to their

personal pocketbooks (i.e. favourable ego-tropic evaluations), as reflected in the intermediate (or mediating) variable, *personal_evaluation*. In schematic terms, this empirical relationship is as follows (where higher numbers subsequent steps in the explanatory chain):

- 1. *globalcity_cz* (independent variable)
- Leads to higher likelihood of positive value on *personal_evaluation* (mediating or intermediate variable)
- 3. Leads to higher likelihood of *remain* (dependent variable)

In short, the ego-tropic theory suggests an empirical relationship wherein the tendency for residents of global city commuter zones to support "remain" with higher probability than residents of hinterland commuter zones (documented in Section 4.4.2) is driven (or mediated) by the systematically higher likelihood that global city commuter zone residents develop optimistic ego-tropic assessments of globalization (as reflected in the *personal_evaluation*) variable than hinterland residents.

In short, on an ego-tropic account of spatial coalitions, we would expect global city residents to favour the pro-globalization "remain" position with relatively high probability because living in global cities gives them a relatively favourable view of the impact of the globalized status quo on their personal material welfare. To what extent do we observe such a relationship between these three variables, wherein the relationship between global city residence (*globalcity_CZ*) and a higher probability of support for globalization (as captured in *remain*) is driven by the tendency of global city residents to develop more favourable ego-tropic assessments of globalization (as reflected here by the *personal_evaluation*) variable? Barron and Kenny (1986, 1177) note that one of the requirements that is necessary to establish that a variable (M) mediates the impact of a particular independent variable (X) on the dependent

variable (Y) is that in a regression of the purported mediator variable on the independent variable, the independent variable must have a significant impact on the mediator variable. This suggests that if *globalcity_CZ* is *not* a significant predictor of *personal_evaluation* in a bivariate regression, we can be reasonably confident that *personal_evaluation* does not mediate the impact of *globalcity* on the choice to "Remain"; this is because a variable cannot mediate the impact of an independent variable with which it does not have a systematic relationship. With this in mind, I present bivariate regressions of *personal_evaluation* on *globalcity_CZ*, using both linear probability and probit specifications, in Table 4.15 below.

| | (1) | (2) |
|---------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | personal_evaluati | personal_evaluati |
| | on | on |
| | | |
| globalcity_CZ | 0.0198 | 0.0683 |
| | (0.0118) | (0.0402) |
| cons | 0.184^{***} | -0.898*** |
| _ | (0.00734) | (0.0270) |
| Ν | 23207 | 23206 |
| Region Fixed | Yes | Yes |
| Effects | | |
| Model | Linear Probability | Probit |

Table 4.15: Impact of Individual Location on Ego-Tropic Economic Assessments

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at NUTS-3 p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.01

Note the lack of a statistically significant relationship between *globalcity_CZ* (our initial independent variable) and *personal_evaluation* (our initial mediator variable), which suggests that global city commuter zone residents do not in fact tend to develop more positive pocketbook assessments of the economy than hinterland residents; this being the case, it is difficult for the ego-tropic account of the link between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands

and spatial political coalitions—which posits that these coalitions form because of systematic differences in such assessments— to get off the ground.

On a sociotropic account of spatial coalitions, the tendency for global city residents to favour globalization with higher probability than hinterland residents is driven by the tendency of global city residents to develop more favourable sociotropic assessments of globalization's impact on the national economy. In our empirical context here, this suggests that the tendency of residents of global city commuter zones to favour remaining in the EU with higher probability is driven by the higher likelihood that they believe that the contemporary globalized status quo is good for the national economy, as indicated in the *general_evaluation* variable. To the extent that this is the case, we must necessarily observe a positive and significant relationship in a regression of *general_evaluation* on *globalcity_CZ* (indicating that global city commuter zone residents are more likely to develop favourable sociotropic assessments of the globalized statusquo). In Table 4.16, I present results from this regression:

| | (1) | (2) |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | general_evaluatio | general_evaluatio |
| | n | n |
| | 0.00260 | 0.0110 |
| globalcity_CZ | 0.00369 | 0.0118 |
| | (0.0113) | (0.0396) |
| _cons | 0.182^{***} (0.00841) | -0.908*** (0.0316) |
| N | 24041 | 24040 |
| Region Fixed | Yes | Yes |
| Effects | | |
| Model | Linear Probability | Probit |
| Standard errors in pa | arentheses | |

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Again, note the lack of a statistically significant relationship between the initial independent variable (*globalcity_CZ*) and *general_evaluation*, which, on a sociotropic account of spatial political coalitions, is expected to mediate the link between *globalcity_CZ* and *remain*. The finding that sociotropic economic assessments do not systematically vary between residents of global city and hinterland commuter zones is incompatible with a view of spatial political coalitions that traces these coalitions to the tendency of global city residents tend to develop systematically more favourable sociotropic evaluations of globalization than their hinterland counterparts.

The upshot of this analysis is that the positive and significant relationship between *globalcity_CZ* and the decision to "Remain" (documented in Section 4.4.2) does not seem to be driven by a tendency for global city commuter zone residents to develop rosier economic views of globalization, with respect either to their pocketbooks or with respect to the nation as a whole, than their counterparts in the hinterlands (as the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, respectively, would suggest). Of course, this is a very suggestive analysis, and does not even begin to establish an affirmative empirical case for a local-tropic link between global city residence and favourable attitudes towards globalization. However, it does suggest some empirical support for our earlier argument that we should be somewhat sceptical that ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of preference formation can indeed account for the spatial coalitions over globalization that are underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. I return to these issues below, in Section 4.5.

4.4.4 Control Variables

In this section, I discuss additional control variables that are to be added to the bivariate specifications from Section 4.4.2, so as to assess whether the positive relationship between

globalcity_CZ and remain, indicating that residents of global city commuter zones support "remain" with higher probability than residents of hinterland commuter zones, is spurious. In choosing control variables, I am guided by Hobolt's recent individual-level analysis of the Brexit vote, which suggests a "base" sociodemographic model for analysing the vote; I use this sociodemographic model as a starting point, and add additional controls for symbolic identities and partisan ties, which the IPE literature suggests could be important in shaping individual preferences over foreign economic policy. As part of the base sociodemographic model, I include controls for respondent gender (the variable gender_f takes on the value one if the respondent is female, and zero otherwise) and respondent age (age) which is measured as a continuous variable. Hobolt also controls for egotropic economic evaluations (based on answers to the question "How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?", which I used to code the *personal_evaluation* variable above) in her demographic model; I therefore also include *personal_evaluation* and *general_evaluation*, which I also discussed above, as controls. As Section 4.4.3 demonstrated, the impact of *globalcity_CZ* on remain does not appear to be mediated by ego-tropic or sociotropic economic assessments (as measured by *personal evaluation* or *general evaluation*). As a result, they are not "bad controls" (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 64), and it is therefore safe to include them as controls in an empirical model with the *globalcity_CZ* variable as the independent variable of interest; it is therefore important to do so, especially since we might expect, based on past scholarship, that egotropic and sociotropic economic assessments might have an independent impact on vote choices even if they do not mediate the impact of spatial location on foreign economic policy preferences. Educational background is also included as a control in the sociodemographic model; though studies that include education as a demographic control do so in a somewhat

atheoretical way, for our purposes, education could be interpreted as a proxy for skill-levels, which might shape preferences through a Stolper-Samuelson channel. The education variable, labelled *highered*, takes on the value one if the individual has completed at least a bachelor's degree, and zero otherwise. As an alternative proxy for Stolper-Samuelson effects, I code a variable, labelled *highskill*, that takes on the value one if an individual works in "higher supervisory occupations" or in "higher managerial and administrative occupations" and zero otherwise.

Beyond "bottom-up" economic and demographic drivers of foreign economic policy preferences, individual partisan loyalties could serve as a conduit for "top-down" elite influence over voters (Naoi and Urata 2013; Hicks, Milner and Tingley 2014). On this account, partisan coalitions are partly shaped by the efforts of parties to frame issues, and cue their members to vote in particular ways; we might expect that rank-and-file party members will be receptive to these partisan messages, and that their own choices will to some extent reflect the preferences of the political party with which they identify. To account for the ways in which individual partisan identities might condition the receptivity of individuals to partisan messages, frames, and cues from political elites, I control for individual party identification. In particular, I create indicator variables to mark whether an individual belongs to the Labor Party (labor); the Conservative Party (tory); the Liberal Democrats (*libdem*); or the United Kingdom Independence Party (*ukip*), a relatively small party that nonetheless played an outsized role in the EU referendum. I also create a residual category, *otheparty*, which is coded as 1 if an individual does not identify with a party or belongs to a party that is not one of the aforementioned four. In the specifications below, tory is the excluded variable.

According to the theory of symbolic politics "people acquire early in life a set of broad and highly stable 'symbolic' predispositions (e.g., prejudice, nationalism, political ideology) which drives their attitudes toward particular political issues in adulthood" (Sabet 2014, 33). Sabet's (2014) work suggests that such symbolic predispositions exert a powerful influence over attitudes towards globalization and foreign economic policy; the result is a "cultural" or symbolic dimension to the politics of globalization, wherein the relevant cleavage is between coalitions organized around the "cosmopolitan" or "ethnocentric" identities of their individual members. To measure individual-level symbolic identities, Sabet codes a trichotomous variable that she labels "Cultural Sentiment", which is based on responses to the following survey question: "People have different views on whether exposure to cultural influence from other countries is positive or negative for American society. In your view, what is the impact of foreign cultural influences on American society?" (Sabet 2014, 38)²³. The closest analogue to this question in the British Election Study is a question that asks respondents whether they think that "immigration undermines or enriches Britain's cultural life." Sabet's question is somewhat broader, to the extent that it does not specifically mention immigration as the vector of cultural influence, but given the historical salience of immigration and its status as an important contemporary issue, it would be surprising if her respondents did not actually consider the role of immigration in transmitting cultural influences from abroad. More generally, both questions seem to effectively uncover the extent to which individuals reject or affirm the values of cultural diversity, tolerance, and openness, and therefore offer a useful starting point from which to

²³ Respondents in Sabet's survey are offered five possible responses, ranging from "Very Positive" to "Very Negative", which she uses to create the trichotomous "Cultural Sentiment" variable; this variable ranges in value from 1 (positive attitudes towards foreign cultural influence) to 3 (negative attitudes towards foreign cultural influence), with the value 2 denoting neutral attitudes towards foreign cultural influence.

measure how the deep-seated symbolic predispositions that orient individual worldviews might have shaped the vote. This is particularly helpful for our purposes here, to the extent that it can help to ensure that the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and the individual-level propensity to support "remain", documented in Section 4.4.2, did indeed reflect the impact of global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes, and was not simply picking up a possible tendency for global cities to attract more "cosmopolitan" individuals receptive to foreign influence and engagement. Responses to the question of whether "immigration undermines or enriches Britain's cultural life" are recorded on a scale ranging from 1-7, with lower numbers indicating stronger agreement with the claim that immigration is deleterious to British cultural life and higher numbers indicating a stronger belief in the claim that immigration enriches British cultural life. I incorporate responses to this question into the empirical analysis by coding three categorical variables: *cosmopolitan*, ethnocentric, and indifferent. Cosmopolitan is coded as 1 if the respondent indicates a strong belief or belief (numbers 7 and 6 on the response scale) that immigration enriches Britain's cultural life and zero otherwise, while *ethnocentric* is coded as 1 if the respondent indicates a strong belief or belief (numbers 1 or 2) that immigration undermines Britain's cultural life and zero otherwise. *Indifferent* is coded as 1 if the respondent only indicates a weak belief that immigration either undermines or enriches British cultural life (numbers 3 and 5 on the response scale, respectively) or indicates that immigration neither enriches nor undermines British cultural life (4 on the response scale).²⁴

²⁴ Grouping individuals with weak symbolic attitudes in either direction with those that have strictly neutral symbolic attitudes is of course a judgment call, based on the intuition that those with weak symbolic attitudes have more in common with each other and with "neutrals" than they do with those at the further ends of their half of the spectrum. The results below do not change if those with weak symbolic attitudes are removed from the "indifferent" category, and included in either the cosmopolitan or ethnocentric categories, with "indifferent" reserved only for those who feel that immigration neither

4.4.5 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Results and Discussion

Table 4.17 contains results on the individual-level determinants of support for "Remain" from multivariate linear probability models; Model 1 controls for Stolper-Samuelson effects using the education variable (*highered*), while Model 2 does so using the occupation-based measure (*highskill*).

undermines nor enriches British cultural life (i.e. those who are strictly neutral with respect to the question).

| | (1) | (2) |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | remain | remain |
| globalcity_CZ | 0.0450^{***} | 0.0489^{***} |
| | (0.0107) | (0.0111) |
| 200 | -0.00324*** | -0.00346*** |
| age | (0.000283) | (0.000285) |
| | (0.000285) | (0.000283) |
| highered | 0.0713*** | |
| | (0.00758) | |
| personal_evaluation | 0.0487*** | 0.0524*** |
| | (0.00990) | (0.00999) |
| general_evaluation | 0.0211* | 0.0228^{*} |
| | (0.0105) | (0.0107) |
| gender_f | 0.0207** | 0.0183^{*} |
| | (0.00769) | (0.00754) |
| ethnocentric | -0.321*** | -0.328*** |
| | (0.00933) | (0.00930) |
| | | |
| cosmopolitan | 0.200*** | 0.207*** |
| | (0.0103) | (0.0103) |
| labor | 0.187*** | 0.183*** |
| | (0.0114) | (0.0114) |
| ukin | -0.189*** | -0.198*** |
| ukip | (0.0123) | |
| | (0.0123) | (0.0124) |
| otherparty | 0.0481*** | 0.0472*** |
| | (0.0114) | (0.0114) |
| libdem | 0.239*** | 0.245*** |
| | (0.0147) | (0.0148) |
| | (0.0117) | (0.0110) |
| | | 0.0420* |
| highskill | | 0.0439* |
| | | (0.0169) |
| _cons | 0.564*** | 0.600^{***} |
| _ | (0.0393) | (0.0383) |
| N | 19846 | 19846 |
| Region Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes |

 Table 4.17: Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain (Multivariate OLS)
 Specifications)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by NUTS-3 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The coefficients for variables in linear probability models can be interpreted as marginal effects; here, we see that in Model 1, the probability that global city commuter zone residents support "Remain" is 4.5% higher than the probability that individuals in hinterland commuter zones support "Remain", while in Model 2, the probability of global city commuter zone residents supporting "Remain" is 4.9% higher, holding other variables constant. These results are highly statistically significant (p<0.001). To put these results in perspective, it is worth noting that individuals with (at least) 4-year college degrees are approximately 7% more likely to support "Remain" than those with less than a college education; Model 2 suggests that individuals working in highly skilled professional occupations are 4.4% more likely to vote "Remain" than those working in less skill-intensive jobs.

Though these effects are substantively significant, they are considerably smaller than the effects of symbolic and partisan identities on the vote. For instance, Model 1 suggests that relative to an individual with weak or neutral symbolic attitudes, an "ethnocentric" individual is 32 points less likely to vote "Remain", while a "cosmopolitan" individual is 20 percentage points more likely to vote for the pro-globalization "Remain" position. Turning to the role of partisan affiliations on the vote, we note that compared to a member of the Conservative Party, an average Labour party member is almost 19% more likely to vote to remain in the European Union, while an average UKIP member is almost 19% *less* likely to vote to remain than the average Conservative party member. The upshot of these results is that while the impact of residence in a global city commuter zone (compared to a hinterland commuter zone) on foreign economic policy attitudes—as measured by support for "remain" in the Brexit referendum—is substantively modest, it is nonetheless comparable in size to the impact of individual skillendowments on preferences. Moreover, these results are consistent with the view that the

economic geography of global cities and hinterlands exerts an independent impact on individual foreign economic policy preferences, and in doing so, engenders distinctive spatial coalitions over globalization that reflect the global city versus hinterland divide. The results are *not* consistent with the view that global city coalitions are simply spatial manifestations of coalitions fundamentally rooted in preferences shaped by symbolic identities or skill endowments.

This point about the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engendering an independent line of cleavage over foreign economic policy is underscored when looking at the results of the specifications that use probit models; these results are presented in Table 4.18

| | (1) remain | (2) remain |
|---------------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | |
| globalcity_CZ | 0.156*** | 0.168^{***} |
| | (0.0396) | (0.0409) |
| age | -0.0111*** | -0.0118*** |
| | (0.000981) | (0.000987) |
| highered | 0.236*** | |
| 0 | (0.0255) | |
| personal_evaluation | 0.170*** | 0.179*** |
| | (0.0363) | (0.0364) |
| general_evaluation | 0.0749^{*} | 0.0814^{*} |
| | (0.0376) | (0.0381) |
| gender_f | 0.0767^{**} | 0.0658^* |
| | (0.0270) | (0.0263) |
| ethnocentric | -0.949*** | -0.969*** |
| | (0.0296) | (0.0294) |
| cosmopolitan | 0.692*** | 0.709*** |
| | (0.0398) | (0.0394) |
| labor | 0.573*** | 0.558*** |
| | (0.0371) | (0.0366) |
| ukip | -1.282*** | -1.321*** |
| | (0.132) | (0.132) |
| otherparty | 0.124*** | 0.123*** |
| | (0.0359) | (0.0359) |
| libdem | 0.767*** | 0.782*** |
| | (0.0535) | (0.0536) |
| highskill | | 0.152** |
| <u> </u> | | (0.0583) |
| _cons | 0.198 | 0.321* |
| | (0.131) | (0.132) |
| Ν | 19845 | 19845 |

Table 4.18: Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain (Multivariate Probit Specifications)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by NUTS-3; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Again, we see that the *globalcity_CZ* variable is highly significant. Of course, we cannot interpret probit coefficients as marginal effects, so I use Stata's margins command to compute marginal effects that can be more easily interpreted. Consider a male individual (gender_f=0), 47 years of age (the weighted mean in the dataset; age=47) who is not college educated (*highered=0*), does not have a positive personal (*personal_evaluation*) or sociotropic (general evaluation) view of the economy, is neither cosmopolitan nor ethnocentric (cosmopolitan=0; ethnocentric=0) and is a member of the Labor Party (labor=1). Setting the variables at these values, the marginal effect of the *globalcity_CZ* variable is 0.057 (p<0.001), which suggests that an individual with this demographic profile who lives in a global city commuter zone is 5.7% more likely to vote for "Remain" than an individual with an identical profile who lives in the hinterlands. To put these locational effects in perspective, we can consider the marginal effects of the higher educational variable (*highered*), when setting the value of the other covariates to the same values as those just mentioned, and the value on the globalcity covariate set to 0. With this specification of covariates, the marginal effect of highered is 0.085 (p<0.001), suggesting that the probability that someone with at least a college degree supports "remain" is 8.5% higher than the probability that someone who is otherwise identical, but does not have college degree, does so.²⁵

Kahler (2017) suggests that it is possible for individuals who do "not benefit directly from economic and cultural openness" to nevertheless support globalization because they experience its positive location-specific effects (10). The results just presented suggest some empirical support for the existence of such individuals; this underscores the salience of global city coalitions for the mass politics of globalization. That is, the results highlight the existence of

²⁵ The marginal effect of the highered variable when we set the *globalcity* covariate to one is virtually identical.

global city commuter zone residents who do not necessarily personally benefit from globalization economically (in light of their skill-endowments) or culturally (recall that we set the values on the covariates such that we were considering a representative individual without a college degree, who does not have a strong cosmopolitan identity, and who does not feel like he has personally benefitted from the recent trajectory of the UK's globally oriented economy) but are nevertheless more likely to support globalization by virtue of their residence in the commuter zones in which global city agglomeration processes are particularly salient.

Indeed, we can go a step further. Not only are individuals who do not necessarily benefit (in material or symbolic terms) from globalization pulled towards support for economic openness due to the salience of global city agglomeration processes within global city commuter zones; the foreign economic policy preferences of individuals who are actually *harmed* (in economic and symbolic terms) by globalization are also sensitive to the global city versus hinterland divide. Consider, for instance, an individual with the exact demographic profile as the one described above, with the only exception being that he is in the *ethnocentric* category with respect to symbolic identities, rather than in the *indifferent* category (as above); the marginal effect of *globalcity_CZ* for a 47 year-old male Labor party member without a bachelor's degree, who does not favourably evaluate the economy in personal or sociotropic terms, and holds ethnocentric symbolic attitudes, is 0.0525. That is, the probability that a voter with this particular demographic profile who lives in a global city commuter zone would vote to "Remain" is 5.25% higher than the probability that a voter with an identical demographic profile from a hinterland commuter zone would vote to remain.

This suggests, in short, that low-skilled residents of global city commuter zones with ethnocentric symbolic identities are significantly more likely to support globalization than

otherwise similar low-skilled ethnocentric residents of hinterland areas. The analysis in Section 4.4.2 suggested that the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and individual preferences over economic openness, does not appear to be consistent with an ego-tropic or sociotropic account of preference formation and spatial coalitions. Nevertheless, this pattern could possibly be understood within a local-tropic framework (akin to the one suggested by Kahler 2017 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation). On this account, perhaps ethnocentric individuals in global cities trade off the cultural costs of globalization (in their view, as individuals with ethnocentric symbolic identities and preferences) to the nation as a whole against their sense that globalization delivers tangible benefits to the local communities in which they are embedded; as a result, they are more inclined to support globalization than their counterparts in the hinterlands, who do *not* confront such a tradeoff between their sense of globalization's cultural costs and globalization's local economic benefits (since the effects of globalization on hinterland locales are of course generally negative as result of hinterland dispersion processes).

Interestingly, it appears that cultural cosmopolitans are somewhat less sensitive to economic geography of global cities and hinterlands than ethnocentric or "indifferent" individuals; nevertheless, the impact of location with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide matters for strong cosmopolitans as well. The marginal impact of the *globalcity_CZ* variable for a cosmopolitan individual with otherwise the exact same characteristics as those just described is 0.035 (p<0.001); this suggests that the probability that a cosmopolitan global city commuter zone resident with this demographic profile votes "Remain" is 3.5% higher than the probability that a cosmopolitan hinterland commuter zone resident with an otherwise identical demographic profile does so. The fact that the foreign economic policy preferences of both

individuals with strongly ethnocentric views (who past research suggests are particularly hostile to globalization), *and* individuals with strongly cosmopolitan views, (who are virtually by definition indifferent to local interests and considerations), are sensitive to the effects of their location with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide, is a mark of the importance of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands in shaping the organization of political coalitions over globalization.

Indeed, the finding that the foreign economic policy preferences of individuals with strong ethnocentric or cosmopolitan symbolic identities are sensitive to the ways in which their environments are shaped by the global city versus hinterland divide is an especially important one, in light of Sabet's (2014, 44) finding that individual-level materialist factors (she focuses on an individual's industry of employment) do not affect the foreign economic policy preferences of individuals with deep-seated ethnocentric or cosmopolitan symbolic identities; the results here suggest that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is a meaningful vector of influence *even* for individuals with strong symbolic identities. In other words, the existence of deep-seated symbolic identities does not obviate the impact of economic geography on foreign economic policy preferences in the way that Sabet suggests these strongly-held identities obviate the impact of industry-based material interests on foreign economic policy preferences. This offers powerful evidence against the possibility that global cities appear as strongholds of support for economic openness simply because they contain large concentrations of individuals with cosmopolitan symbolic identities; if support for globalization among global city residents was simply a by-product of spatial sorting along a cultural or symbolic axis, rather than the existence of an independently constituted "global city coalition" engendered by global city agglomeration processes, we would not expect to see ethnocentric global city residents

significantly more likely to support globalization than their ethnocentric counterparts from the hinterlands, or, for that matter, cosmopolitan global city residents significantly more likely to support globalization than their cosmopolitan counterparts from the hinterlands. Similarly, if support for globalization among global city residents was simply driven by the tendency of the highly-skilled individuals predisposed to favour globalization selecting into these areas, we would not find, as we in fact do, that highly skilled individuals in global cities are more likely to support globalization than their similarly highly-skilled counterparts in the hinterlands, or that low-skilled individuals in global cities are more likely to support globalization than their lowskilled counterparts in the hinterlands. These results are consistent with the view that the apparent geographic political cleavage between global cities and hinterlands (documented in Section 4.2.2) does not arise endogenously because of how skill-based or cultural coalitions happen to be distributed across space; rather, it reflects the presence of distinctive global city and hinterland coalitions that are an independent outgrowth of the global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes, respectively, that constitute the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In other words, the results suggest that spatial political coalitions arise from the independent impact of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands on individual foreign economic policy preferences, and that the spatial political cleavage between global city and hinterland political coalitions is not epiphenomenal, but rather constituted independently of other cleavages over globalization.

The marginal effects for the probit model using the occupation-based measure of skills (*highskill*) instead of the education-based measure (*highered*) were similar (Model 2 in Table 4.18), so I do not discuss them at length.

Finally, it is worth noting the case of Scotland, where support for "Remain" did not appear to be geographically organized along "global city versus hinterland" lines; indeed, even a casual glance at the district-level returns suggests that support for "Remain" was strong across the board, rather than geographically polarized. Table 4.19 presents the individual-level results for only Scottish respondents; here, the *globalcity_CZ* variable is highly insignificant:

| | (1) | (2) |
|------------------|-------------|---------------|
| | remain | remain |
| globalcity_CZ | 0.00165 | -0.000492 |
| | (0.0181) | (0.0182) |
| ge | -0.00328*** | -0.00343*** |
| | (0.000456) | (0.000467) |
| ighered | 0.0586** | |
| - | (0.0189) | |
| ersonal_evaluati | 0.0360 | 0.0404 |
| | (0.0220) | (0.0221) |
| eneral_evaluatio | -0.0558 | -0.0546 |
| - | (0.0307) | (0.0305) |
| gender_f | -0.00905 | -0.0112 |
| | (0.0200) | (0.0204) |
| thnocentric | -0.375*** | -0.384*** |
| | (0.0282) | (0.0287) |
| cosmopolitan | 0.179*** | 0.188^{***} |
| | (0.0183) | (0.0187) |
| abor | 0.116** | 0.110^{**} |
| | (0.0345) | (0.0349) |
| ıkip | -0.348*** | -0.357*** |
| 1 | (0.0364) | (0.0344) |
| therparty | 0.0261 | 0.0231 |
| 1 5 | (0.0303) | (0.0314) |
| ibdem | 0.145** | 0.151** |
| | (0.0420) | (0.0432) |
| ighskill | | 0.0411 |
| | | (0.0484) |
| cons | 0.798*** | 0.829*** |
| | (0.0474) | (0.0463) |
| V | 3493 | 3493 |

Table 4.19: Impact of Individual Location on Individual Support for Remain (Multivariate OLSSpecification; Scottish Respondents Only)

Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The results clearly indicate that residents of global city commuter zones in Scotland are not significantly more likely to support "remain" than residents of hinterland commuter zones; this points to the absence of spatial political coalitions over globalization, shaped by the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and individual foreign economic policy preferences, in Scotland. The absence of a political cleavage between global city and hinterland residents in Scotland is indeed interesting, and deserves further investigation. It could be that the lack of salient geographic divisions here is driven by unique features of Scottish politics. Another, more interesting possibility, is that there are specific conditions under which spatial coalitions rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands are more or less likely to form. This project is concerned with making the case that spatial coalitions rooted in global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes are indeed an important phenomenon worth taking seriously, just as (for instance) Rogowski's (1987) work was concerned with making the case that factoral coalitions rooted in Stolper-Samuelson processes are worth taking seriously. However, just as Hiscox (1999) specified the scope conditions under which these factor-based coalitions are more or less salient, future work on the politics of economic geography could attempt to specify the conditions under which global city and hinterland coalitions are likely to be more or less prominent.

4.4.6 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands, Skill-Based Coalitions, and the Inadequacy of "Geographically Naïve" Analyses of Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions

In concluding this section, it is worthwhile to more explicitly consider how the spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might relate to

other lines of cleavage over foreign economic policy; doing so helps to clarify the "value added" of accounting for the role of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands in shaping foreign economic policy coalitions. In particular, I overlay the geographic cleavage shaped by the existence of spatial coalitions rooted in global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes against the skill-based cleavage underpinned by coalitions rooted in Stolper-Samuelson mechanisms (a cleavage which appears highly salient in the empirical context of Brexit and which tends to be emphasized in materialist accounts of IPE²⁶) and briefly explore how considering these lines of cleavage in conjunction might alter our understanding of the nature of the mass political alignments that could form in a globalized world.

To establish a baseline, let us follow the approach of traditional IPE scholarship by specifying a "geographically naïve" probit model that does not account for the impact of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands on foreign economic policy preferences (that is, a model that does not include the *globalcity_CZ* variable in a regression with *remain* as the dependent variable). First, I run a probit regression similar to Model 1 in Table 4.18, but exclude the *globalcity_CZ* variable; I then use Stata's "margins" command to calculate the predicted probability that a highly skilled respondent (based on the college education variable) supports "Remain", and compare this with the probability that a low-skilled respondent does so.²⁷ Table 4.20 presents the resulting probabilities for this geographically naïve model, with associated 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.

²⁶ But see the discussion on Costa Rica, below, for a qualification

²⁷ The other covariates are set at the following values: *personal_evaluation=0*, *general_evaluation=0*, *general_evaluatio*

| Skill-Level | Probability of Supporting "Remain" (age=47; all other covariates set to 0). | |
|-------------|---|--|
| High | 0.73 (0.7, 0.75) | |
| Low | 0.64 (0.62, 0.67) | |

Table 4.20: Predicted Probabilities for Geographically Naïve Model

The nine point difference between the predicted probability that highly skilled individuals support "Remain" and that relatively low-skilled individuals do so is theoretically consistent with the Stolper Samuelson theorem's prediction of skill-based political coalitions, and it is substantively important; it is therefore important to account for relative skill levels in this analysis, and, for that matter, in any analysis of foreign economy policy preferences and coalitions. But a political cleavage underpinned by coalitions with different skill endowments should not be seen as the whole story; to see it as the whole story is to implicitly assume that this skill-based conflict plays out in a geographic vacuum, and that to be a low-skilled worker in Manhattan or Los Angeles is no different than being a low-skilled worker in Youngstown; or that to be a high-skilled worker in London or Manchester is no different than being a high-skilled worker in Newcastle Upon Tyne.

To demonstrate the shortcomings of a geographically naïve approach, and highlight the ways in which it may cloud our understanding of the mass politics of globalization, I empirically transpose the skill-based cleavage uncovered in Table 1 onto an explicitly spatial grid. To do so, I first run the probit model *with* the *globalcity_CZ* variable (i.e. this is Model 1 from Table 4.18). I then calculate the probability that individuals with different skill endowments in different residential locations across the global city/hinterland divide (as it is mapped onto commuter zones) support remaining in the European Union. Only the skill and location variables are

allowed to vary; the resulting 2x2 table, showing the predicted probabilities associated with different location/skill combinations, is presented in Table 4.21 below.

| | High Skill (At least college graduate) | Low Skill (No college degree) |
|---------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Global City Commuter Zone | 0.76 CI: (0.73, 0.79) | 0.68 CI: (0.65, 0.71) |
| Hinterland Commuter Zone | 0.71 CI: (0.68, 0.73) | 0.62 CI: (0.6, 0.65) |

Table 4.21: Predicted Probabilities for Geographically Explicit Model

This table of predicted probabilities allows us to get a sense of how the relationship between these skill-based cleavages (rooted in Stolper-Samuelson processes) and geographic cleavages based on the global city versus hinterland divide (based on global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes) might affect the politics of globalization. First, it is useful to note that within both skill groups (i.e. among high-skill individuals and among low-skill individuals), we see that global city residents have a higher probability of supporting remain. At the same time, even *within* global cities and hinterlands respectively, higher-skilled workers are more likely to support the pro-globalization "Remain" position than lower-skilled workers. This suggests that geographic divisions driven by the global city versus hinterland cleavage bisect skill-based coalitions, and skill-based cleavages, in turn, bisect geographic coalitions.

Explicitly accounting for the existence of spatial coalitions rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands affects our understanding of traditional skill-based coalitions in important ways. For instance, recall that on the geographically naïve account from above, the probability that a highly skilled respondent supports "Remain" is roughly 0.09 probability points greater than the probability that a relatively low-skilled respondent does so. When we juxtapose this skill-based division against the spatial political divisions arising from the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, however, it becomes clear that a

geographically naïve account, by assuming that individuals occupy an undifferentiated politicalgeographic space, at once overstates *and* understates the magnitude of skill-based cleavages. To see how it *understates* the magnitude of skill-based cleavages, consider a comparison between a highly skilled individual from a global city commuter zone, who supports "Remain" with probability 0.76, and a low-skilled individual from the hinterlands, who supports "Remain" with probability 0.62; this 0.14 point gap is considerably larger than the 0.09 point gap between highskilled and low-skilled workers with respect to the likelihood of supporting "Remain" that is suggested by the "geographically naïve" model. To see how it *overstates* the magnitude of skillbased cleavages, consider a comparison between a highly skilled individual from a hinterland commuter zone, and a low-skilled individual from a global city; the former is expected to support "Remain" with probability 0.71, while the latter is expected to do so with probability 0.68. This 0.03 point gap is of course considerably smaller than the 0.09 point gap predicted by the "geographically naïve" model.

This exercise in spatially decomposing skill-based coalitions has important substantive implications. It is worth noting that the predicted probabilities of supporting economic openness for a low-skilled worker in a global city commuter zone (top-right cell in Table 4.21) and a high-skilled individual in the hinterlands (bottom-left cell) are close enough (indeed, the confidence intervals on these predicted probabilities substantially overlap) that it opens up coalitional possibilities that a geographically naïve approach would not expect. The results from a geographically naïve specification might encourage the view that highly-skilled workers form a unified internationalist coalition that is national in scope, and that this unified "high-skill coalition" stands against a protectionist "low-skill coalition" that similarly transcends geographic divisions within the polity. However, when considering the geographic and skill-based cleavages

in conjunction, other possibilities come into focus: for instance, one possibility is that highly skilled individuals from global cities will form an alliance not with their similarly highly-skilled counterparts from the hinterlands, but with their relatively lower-skilled neighbours in global cities. The discussion in the next chapter suggests that foreign economic policy coalitions in the United States are indeed increasingly organized on this basis, with potentially profound implications for partisan politics. More generally, the exercise of spatially decomposing skill-based coalitions empirically validates, at least in a suggestive way, McNamara's (2017) intuition that "flattening out people's circumstances into universal" categories (such as the high-skill and low-skill categories of the geographically naïve model), as current IPE scholarship tends to do, instead of considering how individuals are shaped by their local environments, will prevent us from developing a meaningful understanding of the coalitional politics associated with modern globalization (McNamara 2017, 10).

4.5 The Distance-Decay of Global City Agglomeration Processes and the Spatial Distribution of Mass Support for Globalization Within Global City Commuter Zones: Deriving and Testing a Distinctive Micro-Level Implication of the Local-Tropic Theory of Spatial Coalitions

In the previous section (Section 4.4), I showed that individuals within global city commuter zones (as defined in Section 4.4.1) had a higher probability of voting for the proglobalization "Remain" position than individuals from "hinterland" commuter zones; it thereby documented a spatial political cleavage between residents of global city commuter zones and hinterland commuter zones that is shaped by the impact of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In doing so, it established the individual-level micro-foundations of the district-level global city and hinterland political coalitions documented in Section 4.3.

In Section 4.4.3, I suggested that the apparent tendency of global city commuter zone residents to support economic openness with higher probability than hinterland commuter zone residents could not be explained by the tendency for individuals in global city commuter to develop systematically more favourable ego-tropic or sociotropic assessments of globalization than hinterland residents (as suggested by the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, respectively). In particular, I showed that global city residents are not systematically more likely to express favourable ego-tropic or sociotropic assessments of the economic status-quo (which is of course profoundly shaped by contemporary globalization) than hinterland commuter zone residents, as the ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of the link between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and foreign economic policy preferences would predict.

This section continues to empirically investigate the plausibility of different theoretical explanations for how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders spatial political coalitions over globalization. In particular, Section 4.4.3 may have validated (at least in a preliminary way), Chapter 3's scepticism about the empirical viability of the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and spatial political coalitions over globalization; however, Section 4.4.3 did not directly investigate the local-tropic theory, which, on Chapter 3's account, offers the most plausible explanation of how spatial political coalitions over globalization might form. As such, this section turns to a more explicit evaluation of the local-tropic theory of how the economic

geography of global cities and hinterlands comes to underpin spatial foreign economic policy coalitions.

In particular, I suggest that one strategy to explore the plausibility of the local-tropic theory of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders spatial political coalitions over globalization is to shift the scale of analysis, and derive micro-level implications of the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions that diverge from the expectations of the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories. More specifically, I suggest that we might consider whether the local-tropic theory yields predictions about the micro-level geography of support for globalization, *within* the global city commuter zones defined and operationalized in Section 4.4, that diverge from the expectations of competing theories; to the extent that we do indeed find evidence for micro-level empirical spatial patterns that are predicted by a local-tropic framework, but not by its competitors, it should increase our confidence in the local-tropic explanation (developed in Chapter 3) for how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands gives rise to spatial coalitions over globalization.

In particular, a well-known finding in the literature on the economics of agglomeration is that agglomeration economies (that is, the productivity benefits of economic agglomeration that incentivize establishments to cluster in space), and their attendant spillover effects, decline rapidly with distance. We would therefore expect global city agglomeration economies, and the positive globalization-driven spillover and multiplier effects set in motion by the superstar headquarter agglomerations engendered by global city agglomeration economies (which we have collectively been referring to as global city agglomeration processes), to decline along a distance gradient that runs from the "metropolitan cores" of global city commuter zones (in effect, their central business districts and locales in the immediate vicinity) to their "metropolitan

peripheries." I argue that in a world of local-tropic preferences, this distance gradient is likely to be associated with a corresponding distance-decay in support for globalization within global city commuter zones; in other words, on the local tropic account of spatial coalitions, we would expect public support for globalization within global city commuter zones to decline with distance, as we move from the metropolitan core, where global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest, to the metropolitan periphery, where they are at their weakest (within global city commuter zones). On the other hand, I suggest that the emergence of an intra-global city commuter zone political cleavage in support for economic openness between residents of the "metropolitan core" and residents of the "metropolitan periphery" that is driven by the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes is *not* an implication of either the ego-tropic or sociotropic accounts (developed in Chapter 3) of how the global city agglomeration processes that constitute global cities shape support for globalization. To the extent that we do in fact observe an intra-global city commuter zone spatial political cleavage over globalization—a distinctive micro-level implication of the local-tropic framework— it would therefore suggest support for the local tropic theory of spatial coalitions more generally. Below, I elaborate the argument that such an intra-commuter zone cleavage is indeed a distinctive implication of the local-tropic framework; I then empirically assess whether we do in fact observe a systematic tendency for individual support for globalization to decline along the distance gradient that runs from global city commuter zones' central business districts to their metropolitan peripheries.

In what follows, Section 4.5.1 briefly discusses work in the economic geography and urban economics literatures about the distance decay of agglomeration economies and their corresponding territorial implications. It then develops the argument that on a local-tropic account, we would expect the distance-decay in global city agglomeration processes within

global city commuter zones to be associated with a corresponding distance-decay in political support for economic openness, but that a systematic and marked "metropolitan core versus metropolitan periphery" spatial political cleavage within global city commuter zones is *not* an implication of either ego-tropic or sociotropic accounts of how and why spatial political coalitions form. In Section 4.5.2, I present preliminary anecdotal evidence for the existence of a spatial political cleavage over globalization within global city commuter zones, and use these concrete examples to clarify how the distance-decay of public support for economic openness can be rationalized within the local-tropic framework. In Section 4.5.3, I draw on the Brexit survey data introduced in Section 4.4 to carry out a more systematic bivariate econometric exploration of whether the micro-geography of support for globalization is indeed organized along the lines suggested by the local-tropic approach to spatial coalition formation. In particular, for each global city commuter zone, I define the "central business district" (CBD) as the local-authority district with the highest concentration of superstar headquarter establishments (i.e. the local authority district from Section 4.3 which takes on the highest value of the globalcity_agglomeration variable); this allows me to specify the area within the global city commuter zone in which global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest. I show that as the distance between an individual and the central business district (CBD) of the global city commuter zone in which he or she lives increases, the probability of individual support for the "remain" position declines. In Section 4.5.4, I extend the bivariate econometric analysis from 4.5.3 to a multivariate setting, and present evidence for a steep decline in individual-level support for "Remain" as a function of distance from the central business district, even after controlling for a range of individual-level confounds. The results from the multivariate analysis in Section 4.5.4 increase our confidence that the within-global city commuter zone "metropolitan core versus metropolitan periphery" spatial cleavage over globalization documented in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 is not spurious, and does indeed flow, as the local-tropic framework would predict, from the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes.

4.5.1 Theories of Spatial Coalitions and Divergent Empirical Predictions About the Micro-Geography of Support for Globalization Within Global City Commuter Zones: Argument and Intuition

A well-established finding within the economic geography and urban economics literatures is that agglomeration economies—that is, the productivity benefits of spatial concentration driven by labor market pooling, input sharing, and access to knowledge spillovers-tend to decline rapidly with distance. Combes and Gobillon (2015, 306-307), in their survey of the empirics of agglomeration economies, cite several important studies that quantify the distance decay of agglomeration economies; perhaps most relevant, given our country of focus here, is Rice et al.'s (2006) study of the distance decay of agglomeration economies in the UK, which shows that while the productivity and local wages at establishments at a particular location are affected by distant markets, markets "located 40-80 min away have one quarter the effect of those located less than 40 min away, and markets located 80-120 min away have no significant impact" (Combes and Gobillon 2015, 307). In order to benefit from agglomeration economies, in short, establishments must locate very close to each other within high-density clusters; an establishment that moves away from these clusters—even by a relatively short distance—will very quickly lose access to the productivity benefits associated with labor market pooling, input sharing, and knowledge spillovers.

Recall that the headquarters establishments of superstar and global producer services firms cluster in space within a handful of major metropolitan areas because they undertake distinctive management and innovation tasks that facilitate the international operations of their global firms, and the productivity-benefits associated with labor market pooling, input sharing, and knowledge spillovers are especially important for these tasks. In principle, establishments clustering in metropolitan areas to benefit from global city agglomeration economies could do so at various scales with varying degrees of intensity, but in practice, to the extent that global city agglomeration economies tend to decline with distance, we would expect these clusters to be highly localized in space, even within urban areas (as they are delineated by commuter zones). To the extent that agglomerations of superstar establishments are highly localized, even within global city commuter zones, we might expect their associated territorial economic effects to also be localized in space, and to decline in intensity as a function of distance from the main urban centres of superstar agglomeration, i.e. a city's central business district (CBD). Indeed, previous work has suggested that the spillover-driven multiplier effects associated with agglomeration economies tend to decline as a function of distance (Farole and Winkler 2014; Weber and Freshwater 2016, 156). As Farole and Winkler (2014) note, while the "the benefits of agglomeration are reaped by [the] major metropolitan regions, [which have] large consumer markets, deep labor pools, and links to international markets", it is important to note that "spillovers from the core, both in terms of economic multipliers and knowledge, tend to fall off sharply with distance, confining most benefits to" the urban centres that host the highest density agglomerations of business activity (Farole and Winkler 2014; 397, 400).

To the extent that global city agglomeration processes are highly localized in space even within urban areas— and tend to decline as a function of distance from these localized

clusters of superstar headquarter establishments, what are the implications for the spatial organization of political support for globalization within global city commuter zones? Would the tendency for global city agglomeration processes to decline along a distance gradient running from the "metropolitan core" of global city commuter zones towards the "metropolitan periphery" engender an *intra*-global city commuter zone spatial political cleavage in political support for globalization, with pro-globalization sentiment highest in the "metropolitan core" (close to the CBD) and weakest in the "metropolitan periphery"?

The existence of such a pattern appears to be an implication of a local-tropic account of the relationship between global city agglomeration processes and political preferences over globalization. In particular, the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes suggests that the everyday experience of globalized prosperity, as it is shaped by global city agglomeration processes, is felt with the greatest immediacy by residents within the urban locales that are coextensive with (or relatively close to) high-density clusters of superstar headquarter establishments. That is, individuals within these "center city" locales²⁸, close to the central business districts (CBDs) where superstar establishments are concentrated due to global city agglomeration economies, experience the economic dynamism that flows from global city agglomeration processes, along with the social and cultural opportunities (and the kinetic "urban buzz" that stems from these opportunities) as an aspect of their everyday residential environments. On the other hand, given the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes, this sense of globalized prosperity is not woven (to nearly the same extent) into the fabric of everyday environments in urban locales along the metropolitan outskirts; it is therefore experienced with less intensity by residents within the metropolitan peripheries of global city

²⁸ And their immediate suburbs

commuter zones. As a result, the "sense of place" that is associated with locales in the immediate vicinity of a global city commuter zone's CBD—which contains particularly dense concentrations of the superstar headquarter agglomerations that constitute global cities—is likely to crystallize into local narratives of globalized prosperity that encourage individuals to associate (in intuitive and emotional terms) the local interest with globalization and economic openness. On the other hand, as a result of the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes, the "sense of place" that is associated with locales in the metropolitan periphery is perhaps less likely to support locale-specific narratives of globalized ascendance that engender an intuitive and affect-laden belief that globalization is a vehicle of the local interest. In short, the local tropic theory of the link between the economic geography of global cities and global city political coalitions suggests that preferences over globalization are likely to be sensitive to the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes; to the extent that the local-tropic explanation of how global city coalitions emerge is valid, we would therefore expect to observe a distancedecay in support for globalization within global city commuter zones that tracks the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes, leading to a "metropolitan core versus metropolitan periphery" cleavage in support for globalization within global city commuter zones.

However, the intra-global city commuter zone distance-decay of public support for globalization in response to the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes is *not* a micro-level empirical implication of ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions. Consider, first, an ego-tropic account of why and how the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes might induce a distance-decay in support for globalization within global city commuting zones. On an ego-tropic account, we might observe a distance-decay in proglobalization preferences because individuals in the metropolitan periphery are less likely to

believe that globalization is in their personal material interests than residents of the metropolitan core. The prospect of intra-global city commuter zone variation in ego-tropic assessments of globalization along these lines is plausible, especially at first glance; given the distance-decay in global city agglomeration processes, individuals may feel that they have greater personal access to globalization-related economic opportunities in the vicinity of the CBD, where global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest. It is worth noting, however, that we are considering individuals within a common commuting zone, and it is not the case that individuals from the metropolitan periphery cannot personally access the economic opportunities clustered in the vicinity of the CBD as a result of global city agglomeration processes; this is virtually be definition, since commuting zone borders are drawn such that it is feasible to travel between any two bounded points as part of a daily commute. More concretely, the economic opportunities available in inner-London or Midtown Manhattan, are by definition, personally accessible to individuals living in the metropolitan peripheries of London or New York (say, in East London or Staten Island); these metropolitan peripheries are barely 35 kilometres away, not in the remote national hinterlands. To the extent that individuals in East London or Staten Island do have personal access to the economic opportunities, created by global city agglomeration processes, that are concentrated in inner-London or Manhattan, it is not clear that "pro-globalization" preferences formed on the basis of ego-tropic assessments would weaken noticeably along the distance gradient running outwards from the CBDs of global city commuter zones. In other words, if the global city coalitions that arise from the global city agglomeration processes that underpin the economic geography of global cities are best explained by an ego-tropic theory of this relationship, we would not expect to observe a within-global city commuter zone cleavage open up between the metropolitan "core" and the metropolitan "periphery"; rather, pro-

globalization preferences would be evenly distributed across global city commuter zones, since the personal benefits of global city agglomeration processes are accessible to everyone within the commuter zone's borders.

Nor would a sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions predict a micro-level intra-global city commuter zone spatial political cleavage over globalization between the "metropolitan core" and the "metropolitan" periphery. Admittedly, it seems plausible that individuals closer to the metropolitan centres of global city commuter zones, where global city agglomeration processes are maximized, develop more favourable sociotropic perceptions of globalization's impact on national economic welfare than individuals further away in the metropolitan periphery, where global city agglomeration processes are relatively weaker. One might think, for instance, that the media's economic coverage, or an individual's personal experiences with respect to the economy, are more positive in locales within the metropolitan core (close to the CBDs that host high density clusters of superstar headquarter and front-office establishments) than in locales further away in the metropolitan periphery (which are less exposed to global city agglomeration processes as a result of the distance gradient). Against this view, however, it is once again important to recall that individuals in the metropolitan core and the metropolitan periphery are ultimately part of the same global city commuting zone, which means that they presumably share the same media market, and will be exposed to much of the same local and regional news (though there may be variation at the margins). To the extent that the media environment does not vary noticeably within global city commuter zones, it is unlikely that media coverage would drive a distance-decay in public support for globalization that tracks the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes (we cannot explain a variable with a constant, after all). To be sure, individuals also draw on information gleaned from local encounters to make sociotropic

judgments about the desirability of globalization, and the information gleaned from such encounters is likely to systematically vary across locales within global city commuter zones as a result of the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes. However, we would expect that individual experiences and encounters do in fact extend across commuter zones, and are not simply confined to their individual locales (individuals often commute along the distance gradient, after all); to the extent that individuals incorporate information across the breadth of commuter zones into their sociotropic judgments about globalization, we would not expect to observe the weakening of pro-globalization preferences as a function of distance from the CBD (where global city agglomeration processes are maximized). Indeed, as I argued in Section 3.3, rational sociotropic individuals deliberately attempt to develop a wide information base, and so we would expect individuals to consider their experiences across their commuter zones of residence in forming their judgments about how globalization affects national welfare.

In short, the theoretical discussion in this section has introduced the intuitive idea (validated by previous empirical work in the literature on economic agglomeration) that agglomeration economies decline with distance, as well as the corresponding implication that the global city agglomeration processes that constitute global cities decline with distance as well, even at relatively small intra-urban scales. I then explored the implications of the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes for the spatial organization of public support for globalization *within* global city commuter zones. I argued that on a local-tropic account of how variation in the strength of global city agglomeration processes shapes individual foreign economic policy preferences, public support for globalization within global city commuter zones is likely to be sensitive to the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes; that is, the nature of local experiences, and (by extension) emotional and intuitive perceptions of the local

interest, are likely to systematically vary along the distance gradient that traces the declining strength of global city agglomeration processes as a function of distance from the CBD. Empirically, a local-tropic theory would therefore predict a systematic decline in public support for globalization as we move away from locales within city centres (where global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest) towards locales in the metropolitan periphery. In contrast, I argued that neither the ego-tropic nor sociotropic theories of how global city agglomeration processes shape public support for economic openness would predict a systematic relationship between the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes and the distance decay of public support for globalization within global city commuter zones. In particular, I suggested that ego-tropic assessments of globalization are unlikely to vary along the distance gradient, since the economic opportunities associated with global city agglomeration processes in the metropolitan core are necessarily accessible to those living in the metropolitan periphery; to the extent that ego-tropic assessments of globalization are not likely to systematically vary across space within global city commuter zones, an ego-tropic theory of spatial coalitions would not predict the systematic distance-decay in public support for economic openness along the distance gradient. Similarly, I suggested that sociotropic assessments of globalization are unlikely to vary along the distance gradient, since commuter zones encompass a common media market; as a result, the information environment is unlikely to systematically vary across space within global city commuter zones, and a sociotropic theory of spatial coalitions would therefore not predict the distance-decay in public support for economic openness along the distance gradient.

More generally, the importance of the results from the previous sections in this chapter is that they provided suggestive evidence for a macro-level "global city versus hinterland" political cleavage over globalization engendered by the economic geography of global cities and

hinterlands. However, despite documenting a relationship between district and commuter-zone level empirical indicators of global city agglomeration processes (used to reflect the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands) and mass preferences, these sections did not explicitly address the question of which theory of spatial coalitions (from Chapter 3) best explains this relationship.²⁹ After all, the systematic relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and mass preferences over globalization (a relationship which points to the existence of spatial coalitions that are independently shaped by this economic geography), was predicted by *all* of the theories elaborated in Chapter 3. More concretely, all of the theories would have predicted the finding, in Section 4.4, of an intercommuter zone cleavage in support for globalization between residents of global city commuter zones and residents of hinterland commuter zones. I have argued, however, that when we confine our attention to the micro-level scale of global city commuter zones themselves, the empirical predictions of the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, and the local-tropic theory, actually diverge. In particular, sociotropic or ego-tropic accounts of spatial coalitions would not also predict an intra-global city commuter zone spatial political cleavage between residents of the "metropolitan core" and the "metropolitan periphery" that corresponds with the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes. On the other hand, a local-tropic approach to spatial coalitions *would* predict an *intra*-global city commuter zone cleavage along these lines. This discussion is summarized in Table 4.22 below:

²⁹ Though Section 4.4.3 above did make an effort to rule out the sociotropic and ego-tropic theories, this effort was of course only preliminary and suggestive, and did not attempt to uncover evidence for the local-tropic theory.

Table 4.22: Divergent Micro-Level Empirical Implication of Local-Tropic Theory of Spatial

 Coalitions

| Theoretical explanation for relationship between economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and corresponding spatial coalitions over globalization | Macro-Level Implication | Micro-Level Implication |
|---|--|--|
| Ego-Tropic | Individuals in global city commuter zones support globalization with higher probability than individuals in hinterland commuter zones | No spatial cleavage over globalization within global city commuter zones |
| Sociotropic | Individuals in global city commuter zones support globalization with higher probability than individuals in hinterland commuter zones | No spatial cleavage over globalization within global city commuter zones |
| Local-Tropic | Individuals in global city commuter zones support globalization with higher probability than individuals in hinterland commuter zones | Within global city commuter zones, probability of individual support for globalization declines as a function of distance from CBD (where global city agglomeration processes are at their peak) due to the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes; we therefore expect an intra- global city commuter zone "metropolitan core versus metropolitan periphery" cleavage over globalization |

In short, all of these approaches would expect a macro-level cleavage over globalization between residents of global city commuter zones and hinterland commuter zones, an expectation tentatively validated in Section 4.4. As a result, while the analysis in Section 4.4 was useful in

establishing the existence of a relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and foreign economic policy preferences at the individual level, it could not help us to ascertain the theory of preference formation that best accounts for this link. However, Table 4.22 points toward a strategy for uncovering evidence for a local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions. In particular, a within-global city commuter zone spatial cleavage over globalization is only an implication of the local-tropic approach to spatial coalitions; to the extent that we do in fact see evidence for such a pattern, therefore, it would point towards support for the argument that spatial coalitions are indeed underpinned by local-tropic preferences. In other words, to the extent that we in fact discern evidence for the distance-decay in support for globalization in global city commuter zones-a distinctive implication of the local-tropic framework-it should increase our confidence in the argument of Chapter 3, namely, that spatially defined individual preferences over globalization stem from different assessments of the implications of globalization for the local interest. On the other hand, to the extent that we do not see evidence for such a micro-level pattern, it would substantially reduce our confidence in the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions over globalization more generally.³⁰

4.5.2 Observational Evidence

This section undertakes a preliminary exploration of the organization of public support for globalization within global city commuter zones. More specifically, I begin to investigate whether public support for globalization within global city commuter zones does indeed appear

³⁰ In this case, we admittedly could not distinguish between the sociotropic or ego-tropic mechanisms, since they are observationally equivalent at the micro-level as well. Nevertheless, the strategy developed here offers us a useful starting point for teasing out the plausibility of an underlying local-tropic nexus between global city agglomeration processes and spatial coalitions.

to decline along a distance gradient that radiates outward from central business districts, as the local-tropic framework (but not the ego-tropic or sociotropic frameworks) would expect (as discussed above), in light of the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes.

Anecdotally, we do indeed see patterns consistent with the distance decay of support for globalization along a distance gradient. Consider, for instance, patterns of support for Donald Trump in the New York City metropolitan area during the US Election in 2016. Trump was of course decisively routed in Manhattan, but actually won 57% of the vote in Staten Island, located approximately 30 kilometres away in New York City's metropolitan periphery (Waterhouse 2016). If we take pro-Trump votes as proxies for anti-globalization sentiment³¹, such a pattern does indeed point to a decline in pro-globalization sentiment as a function of distance from the city centre (i.e. Manhattan), as the local-tropic framework would expect. On this account, the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes gives rise to a very different "sense of place" in Staten Island compared to the globalized ethos of Manhattan; perhaps this led to different conceptions of the local interest as it relates to globalization within these locales, which, in turn, led to different patterns of support for the anti-globalization candidate. In other words, the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes leads to a very different everyday experience of globalization on the ground in Staten Island than in Manhattan; as a result, its "sense of place" does not support the local narratives of globalized prosperity that presumably prevail in Manhattan, which may have increased the relative appeal of the nationalistic and nostalgic "make America great again" campaign in Staten Island.

³¹ Of course, as with taking Brexit voting patterns as proxies for preferences over globalization, this is problematic; nevertheless, to the extent that Trump ran a campaign aggressively hostile towards globalization, it is useful to a first approximation

It is worth underscoring, within this concrete empirical context, that it is difficult to rationalize such a pattern in terms of an ego-tropic account of spatial coalitions; after all, many Staten Islanders commute into Manhattan, where they are able to personally benefit from the strong global city agglomeration processes concentrated in that part of the city. Indeed, per capita income is actually higher in Staten Island than in Manhattan (Adler 2014), which underscores that there are plenty of Staten Islanders who benefit in personal terms from global city agglomeration processes within New York City, despite their location relatively far away from the metropolitan locales where those processes are concentrated; that being the case, an ego-tropic account of preference formation would not expect the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes to engender a micro-level spatial political cleavage over globalization within metro New York. Moreover, to the extent that Staten Islanders and Manhattanites are part of the same media market, and thereby exposed to similar information, an information-based sociotropic account would not predict a notable intra-urban spatial cleavage between New York's metropolitan core and its metropolitan periphery either.

To take another example, let us return to the Brexit referendum, and consider voting patterns in the Manchester and Liverpool urban regions, where the "core" downtown areas (i.e. the Manchester and Liverpool local authorities) voted decisively to "Remain", but surrounding metropolitan peripheries (i.e. areas within the Manchester and Liverpool commuter zones farther away from these "core" areas) voted to leave; in explaining why the urban cores of Manchester and Liverpool "found themselves out of step not only with the majority of the country" but the "majority of the region [i.e. their urban peripheries] too", Manchester's Chief executive appeared to appeal to an explicitly local-tropic explanation. Though I have already discussed this account in Chapter 3, it is worth quoting again here:

The economic growth that has been enjoyed and the physical regeneration of Manchester and Liverpool has provided Liverpudlians and Mancunians alike with a swagger and confidence in their future. It was easier for Remain to sell to those who witness it on a daily basis-even if some of them haven't necessarily benefitted yet on a personal level...(Downtown in Business)

In a world where global city agglomeration processes decline quickly with distance, it is unsurprising that these confident local narratives of globalized ascendance that are rooted in the everyday experience of globalization-driven prosperity in concrete local environments— which, on a local-tropic account, underpin the belief that globalization is in the local interest and thereby lead to support for economic openness—do not travel particularly far. This is seen in especially dramatic fashion in the London commuter zone; consider Figure 4.9, which displays a map of all London local authority districts whose centroids are within the borders of the London travel-towork-area (i.e. the London commuting zone).




Figure 4.9: Distance Decay in Global City Agglomeration Processes and Distance Decay in Support for "Remain" in London CZ

The map in Figure 4.9 clearly indicates a high degree of localization among superstar establishments within the London commuter zone, a spatial pattern that reflects the distance decay of global city agglomeration economies (discussed in Section 4.5.1); this high degree of localization, in turn, points to a corresponding localization of global city agglomeration processes, and their distance-decay as a function of distance from the highly concentrated cluster of superstar establishments in inner London. Moreover, we note that locales close to the areas of inner London where global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest voted overwhelmingly for the pro-globalization "remain" position; as we move away from these "center city" local authorities (which host dense concentrations of superstar headquarter agglomerations) towards London's metropolitan periphery, we see a rather dramatic decline in the district-level share of the "remain" vote. As I have been arguing, this correspondence between the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes and the distance decay of support for economic openness, which results in an intra-global city commuter zone cleavage between the urban "core" and urban "periphery" over globalization, is consistent with a localtropic account of preference formation.

Particularly striking, for instance, is East London's strong support for the antiglobalization "Leave" position, which can readily be rationalized within a local-tropic framework. As Gest (2016) documents, East London's economy has declined in the globalized era of the post-1970s, as industrial jobs departed overseas, without being replaced by the highend technology and service sector jobs that were the wave of the future (and which concentrated, as a result of the growing importance of global city agglomeration economies, just a few miles away in central London). Given the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes, the

experience of globalized prosperity that marks daily life in locales within inner London has not travelled to East London; there, narratives of decline and stagnation have taken hold instead. These disempowering narratives have promoted feelings of nostalgia and sadness (16), coupled with anger and bitterness, that have in turn contributed to a locale-specific hostility towards the contemporary globalized order that was reflected in a strong "Leave" vote. At a first glance, it is perhaps surprising that these disempowering narratives of collective decline and loss at the local level (Kahler 2017, 9-10) have taken hold in East London, in such close relative proximity to the forward looking narratives of prosperity and ascendance that appear to promote public support for globalization in locales within inner London. Within a local-tropic framework, however, such a pattern is expected. Indeed, we might interpret the striking spatial organization of these narratives with respect to the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes—such that pro-globalization narratives take hold in locales close to the metropolitan core, while antiglobalization narratives take hold in locales further away in the metropolitan periphery—as tentative validation for our view that intra-global city commuter zone spatial cleavages over globalization flow from local-tropic mechanisms. It thereby also increases our confidence, more generally, in the local tropic underpinnings of the spatial coalitions documented in previous sections of this chapter.

4.5.3 Bivariate Regression Analysis

The anecdotal evidence in Section 4.5.2 suggests that there is a tendency within global city commuter zones for the distance-decay in global city agglomeration processes to correspond with a distance-decay gradient in support for globalization, such that support for globalization is considerably lower in the "urban periphery" than in the "urban core" of these global city

commuter zones. As I argued in Section 4.5.1, such a pattern is consistent with a local-tropic theory of how global city agglomeration processes shape preferences over globalization, but neither the ego-tropic nor sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions would predict such an intraglobal city commuter zone cleavage. In this section, I carry out a more systematic assessment of whether public support for globalization tends to decline along a distance gradient running from the metropolitan core to the metropolitan periphery, in conjunction with the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes. More specifically, I place the empirical microscope on the global commuter zones identified in Section 4.4, and using survey data on Brexit preferences as a proxy for foreign economic policy preferences (the same data used in Section 4.4), explore whether there is a tendency (within these global city commuter zones) for the probability of individual-level support for "remain" to decline as a function of an individual's distance from a global city commuter zone's central business district (CBD). For empirical purposes, I define the CBD as the local authority district within a global city commuter zone in which global city agglomeration processes are maximized (i.e. the local-authority district within a global city commuter zone with the largest agglomeration of superstar headquarter establishments, as indicated by the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable from Section 4.3).

In short, this sub-section addresses, within a bivariate econometric framework, the question of whether individuals that are further away from a commuter zone's CBD tend to support "Remain" in the Brexit referendum with lower probability than individuals that are relatively close to the CBD. To carry out this analysis, I take the following steps. For each of the commuter zones coded as "global city commuter zones" in the previous section (4.4), I first identity the local authority district which contains the largest percentage of superstar headquarter establishments (relative to other districts within that commuter zone), using the same spatial

dataset on superstar headquarters that I have been using throughout this chapter. That is, within each global city commuter zone, I identify the local authority district which has the highest value on the globalcity_agglomeration variable (defined in Section 4.3's district-level analysis of Brexit). I consider this district the global commuter zone's central business district (CBD), or the locale within which global city agglomeration processes are strongest within a given commuter zone. I then use ArcGIS to measure the distance (in kilometres) between the centroid of the central business district, and the centroid of every electoral district within the commuter zone; since the most fine-grain individual location data is provided at the level of the electoral district, the distance between an individual's residence and the global city commuter zone's central business district is approximated by this distance between the centroid of the electoral district in which an individual lives and the centroid of the CBD.³² This distance variable is labelled distance_km.³³ In addition to this continuous measure of distance, I also code a dichotomous variable, labelled *metropolitan_periphery*, if an individual is located more than 25 kilometers away from the centroid of the central business district of the global city commuter zone in which he or she lives; in other words the categorical *metropolitan_periphery* variable takes on the value one if the *distance* km variable is greater than 25, and zero otherwise.

As in Section 4.4, the dependent variable is a categorical variable, labelled *remain*, that takes on the value one if a given respondent expressed a preference to remain in the European Union, and zero if the respondent expressed a preference to leave. As before, I take an expression of "pro-remain" sentiment as an indication of a preference to maintain the contemporary status-quo as it relates to globalization and economic openness. To the extent that

³² While it would of course be preferable to have actual address data for respondents, the relative small size of electoral districts in the UK allows us to make a reasonable approximation of their actual distance from an urban area's CBD.

³³ Distance calculations were carried out in the "British National Grid" projection.

the distance decay in public support for globalization does in fact correspond with the distance decay in global city agglomeration processes—a pattern that would be consistent, I have argued, with a local-tropic pattern of preference formation—we would expect to see a negative relationship between an individual's distance from the CBD and the probability that he or she supports "remain"; a negative and significant coefficient on the *distance_km* variable, in other words, would indicate that increases in the distance between an individual's residence and the CBD (which correspond with weakening global city agglomeration processes due to the distance gradient) are associated with decreases in the probability that an individual supports the remain position. Analogously, a negative and significant coefficient on the *metropolitan_periphery* variable, indicating that individuals further than 25 kilometres away from the CBD are less likely to support "remain" than individuals within a 25 kilometre radius of the CBD, would represent an empirical manifestation of an intra-global city agglomeration processes— underpinned by the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes— between residents of the metropolitan core, and the residents of locales situated in the metropolitan periphery.

Table 4.23 presents bivariate OLS regressions of the intention to vote "Remain" on the *distance_km* and *metropolitan_periphery* variables, respectively; all specifications in this section include commuter zone fixed effects and (following Colantone and Stanig 2017) standard errors clustered at the NUTS-3 level.³⁴ As before, I apply the BES survey weight.

³⁴ I use commuter zone fixed effects to account for heterogeneity across commuter zones; in particular, the different commuter zones may have different internal physical geographies that affect the operation of the distance variable. Since we cannot explicitly control for such factors, commuter zone fixed effects control for them implicitly. In any case, all of the results discussed below remain robust when commuter zone fixed effects are not used.

| | (1) | (2) |
|---------------------|---------------|---------------|
| | remain | remain |
| distance_km | -0.00954*** | |
| | (0.000896) | |
| | | |
| metro_periphe ry | | -0.181*** |
| - 5 | | (0.0334) |
| | | |
| _cons | 0.702^{***} | 0.594^{***} |
| | (0.0289) | (0.0362) |
| Ν | 7023 | 7023 |
| CZ Fixed | Yes | Yes |
| Effects | | |

Table 4.23: Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support for Remain (Bivariate Specifications)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by NUTS-3

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Because the models in Table 4.23 are estimated using linear probability models, the coefficients on the variables can be interpreted as marginal effects. Model 2 suggests that individuals living in the "metropolitan periphery" of global cities are 18% less likely than individuals from the "metropolitan core" to vote in favour of remaining in the European Union. The coefficient on the *distance_km* variable, -0.0095, suggests that in increasing this variable by one standard deviation above its mean (8.23), the probability of supporting "Remain" declines by roughly 8%. Compared to an individual who lives 5km from the global city commuter zone's CBD, the coefficient on *distance_km* suggests that an individual 40km from the CBD is roughly 33% less likely to support the remain position. Because the marginal effects in the analogous bivariate probit specifications are virtually the same as those in the linear probability models, I do not present them here.

As I argued above in theoretical and intuitive terms, a micro-level implication of the local-tropic account of spatial coalitions is that we should observe a correlation between the

distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes and individual support for economic openness. On this account, given the distance decay in global city agglomeration processes, optimistic narratives of globally-oriented local prosperity are less likely to take hold in places within metropolitan locales that are relatively far from the central business districts that host dense concentrations of superstar establishments, and local-tropic individuals would be less likely to view globalization in a positive light. Indeed, as we saw with East London, it is not simply that optimistic pro-globalization narratives are weaker in the metropolitan periphery; in some cases, counter-narratives rooted in a sense of disempowerment and longing for a preglobalized world take root in the metropolitan periphery, where the effects of global city agglomeration processes are not woven into the fabric of the everyday environment, and therefore experienced with considerably less immediacy and intensity than in locales in the metropolitan core. However, an intra-global city commuter zone cleavage spatial political cleavage over globalization is *not* a micro-level implication of an ego-tropic or sociotropic account of spatial coalitions, since the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes within global city commuter zones is unlikely to lead to systematic within-commuter zone variation in ego-tropic assessments of globalization (driven by labor-market effects), or variation in information-driven sociotropic assessments of globalization. Our preliminary finding that such a cleavage does in fact exist should therefore increase our confidence, generally speaking, in the view that spatial coalitions shaped by global city agglomeration processes are indeed underpinned by local-tropic preferences over globalization, which are shaped by emotional and intuitive assessments of the local interest as it relates to globalization (see Chapter 3).

Earlier, I argued in theoretical and intuitive terms that individual access to the information or labor market opportunities associated with global city agglomeration processes

would not meaningfully vary across the geographic domain of global city commuter zones, and that as a result, sociotropic or ego-tropic assessments of globalization would also be unlikely to vary spatially across global city commuter zones. To the extent that at these micro-level scales, ego-tropic or sociotropic assessments of globalization are insensitive to the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes, it suggests that an intra-global city spatial cleavage over globalization between residents of the metropolitan core and the metropolitan periphery could not be rationalized within an ego-tropic or sociotropic explanatory framework.

Moreover, it is possible to go beyond the intuitive argument presented above, and to empirically rule out the possibility that the distance-decay of individual support for remain is driven by the fact that sociotropic or ego-tropic assessments of globalization are more favourable in the vicinity of the CBD than further away. In particular, I examine whether the distance variables from this section are significant predictors of the *personal_evaluation* and general_evaluation categorical variables used in Section 4.4 as proxies for individual-level egotropic and sociotropic economic evaluations of the current globalized order. To the extent that the ego-tropic or sociotropic theories could plausibly account for the pattern documented in Table 4.23, we would expect to observe a negative and significant relationship between our distance variables and *personal_evaluation* and *general_evaluation*, indicating that ego-tropic and sociotropic economic assessments worsen with distance. However, to the extent that my earlier argument—namely, that ego-tropic or sociotropic economic evaluations are not likely to systematically vary along a distance gradient because the economic opportunities available to individuals, as well as the information which they are able to access, do not substantially vary across the distance gradient—is correct, we should observe that our distance variables are not significant predictors of these proxies for egotropic or sociotropic economic assessments of

globalization. In Table 4.24, I present evidence that egotropic or sociotropic evaluations are not,

in fact, significantly affected by an individual's distance to the CBD, where global city

agglomeration processes are maximized:

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|----------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | personal_evaluatio | personal_evaluatio | general_evaluation | general_evaluation |
| | n | n | | |
| metro_peripher | 0.0121 | | 0.00914 | |
| У | | | | |
| | (0.0204) | | (0.0219) | |
| distance_km | | -0.000954 (0.000878) | | 0.00141 (0.000922) |
| _cons | 0.177 ^{***} (0.0146) | 0.210 ^{***} (0.0208) | 0.186 ^{***} (0.0180) | 0.202*** (0.0237) |
| Ν | 7023 | 7023 | 7023 | 7023 |
| CZ Fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Effects | | | | |

Table 4.24: Impact of Distance from CBD on Ego-Tropic and Sociotropic Economic

 Assessments

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by NUTS-3

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Across all specifications, both the *distance_km* and *metro_periphery* variables are not statistically significant predictors of *personal_evaluation* or *general_evaluation*. This suggests the absence of a systematic relationship between an individual's location with respect to the distance gradient that traces out the systematic decline in the strength of global city agglomeration processes from the metropolitan core to the metropolitan periphery, and an individual's ego-tropic or sociotropic economic assessments of globalization. The absence of such a systematic relationship is consistent with my earlier theoretical argument, which suggested that within global city commuter zones, the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes is unlikely to shape ego-tropic or sociotropic evaluations of

globalization, and that ego-tropic or sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions would therefore *not* predict a corresponding within-global city commuter zone spatial political cleavage over globalization.

4.5.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis

In Section 4.5.2, I interpreted the dramatic drop-off in support for "remain" in moving from the London commuter zone's "metropolitan core" towards East London—as depicted in Figure 4.9—through a local-tropic lens that drew on Gest's (2016) ethnographic research on that area of the London region. However, we cannot exclude the possibility, based on an observational account, that such a pattern simply reflects the relatively less-educated, working class composition of East London (relative to inner London). Even a more systematic bivariate analysis could not exclude the possibility that the apparent distance-decay in public support for "remain" is simply a by-product of individuals that are more predisposed to support "remain" sorting into areas in the vicinity of the CBD, and those more predisposed to support "leave" sorting into the metropolitan periphery.

While a multivariate analysis cannot entirely exclude such a possibility either, this section adds a suite of control variables to Section 4.5.3's bivariate analysis of the relationship between distance and support for "remain". Doing so might increase our confidence that the distance-decay of support for "remain" documented in previous sections is not spurious, and is indeed a spatial phenomenon that reflects the impact of the distance-decay of global city agglomeration processes (as predicted by the local-tropic framework).

In the multivariate analyses that follow, I include the same set of control variables in these specifications as I do in the survey analysis in 4.4; because I already discussed these

controls in detail in Section 4.4.4, I do not discuss them further here. As in Section 4.5.3, I include commuter zone fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the NUTS-3 level.

Table 4.25 contains results from a series of linear probability models that incorporate these control variables into the baseline bivariate specifications from the previous section. Models 1 and 2 use the continuous distance measure (*distance_km*), while Models 3 and 4 use the dichotomous distance measure (*metropolitan_periphery*); Models 1 and 3 use the *highered* variable as a proxy for Stolper-Samuelson effects, while Models 2 and 4 use the occupation-based skill measure (*highskill*).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| distance lam | remain -0.00275*** | remain -0.00305*** | remain | remain |
| distance_km | (0.000658) | -0.00303 (0.000664) | | |
| | (0.000038) | (0.000004) | | |
| age | -0.00312*** | -0.00342*** | -0.00322*** | -0.00354*** |
| C | (0.000589) | (0.000598) | (0.000583) | (0.000592) |
| | | | | |
| highered | 0.0863^{***} | | 0.0867^{***} | |
| | (0.0127) | | (0.0126) | |
| personal_evalu | 0.0527** | 0.0579** | 0.0536** | 0.0589^{**} |
| ation | 0.0527 | 0.0377 | 0.0550 | 0.0507 |
| | (0.0197) | (0.0200) | (0.0197) | (0.0199) |
| | 0.0202 | 0.0242 | 0.0070 | 0.0227 |
| general_evalua tion | 0.0292 | 0.0342 | 0.0279 | 0.0327 |
| uon | (0.0181) | (0.0185) | (0.0182) | (0.0185) |
| | (0.0101) | (0.0105) | (0.0102) | (0.0105) |
| gender_f | 0.0357^{*} | 0.0329^{*} | 0.0361^{*} | 0.0334^{*} |
| | (0.0144) | (0.0143) | (0.0145) | (0.0143) |
| 1. | 0.100*** | 0 101*** | 0 10 4*** | 0 102*** |
| cosmopolitan | 0.182*** | 0.191*** | 0.184*** | 0.193*** |
| | (0.0180) | (0.0177) | (0.0180) | (0.0177) |
| ethnocentric | -0.335*** | -0.342*** | -0.336*** | -0.343*** |
| | (0.0166) | (0.0164) | (0.0166) | (0.0164) |
| | | *** | | |
| labor | 0.162*** | 0.159*** | 0.164*** | 0.162*** |
| | (0.0214) | (0.0212) | (0.0214) | (0.0211) |
| ukip | -0.215*** | -0.230*** | -0.216*** | -0.230*** |
| p | (0.0256) | (0.0251) | (0.0254) | (0.0250) |
| | | | | |
| libdem | 0.242^{***} | 0.253*** | 0.244*** | 0.255^{***} |
| | (0.0310) | (0.0307) | (0.0310) | (0.0307) |
| otherparty | 0.0387 | 0.0332 | 0.0402 | 0.0349 |
| otherparty | (0.0247) | (0.0246) | (0.0247) | (0.0247) |
| | (0.0247) | (0.0240) | (0.0247) | (0.0247) |
| h: ah ah 1.11 | | 0.0000 | | 0.0000 |
| highskill | | 0.0290 | | 0.0282 |
| | | (0.0336) | | (0.0336) |
| metro_peripher | | | -0.0892*** | -0.0955*** |
| у | | | | |
| | | | (0.0199) | (0.0207) |
| λ7 | 7022 | 7022 | 7022 | 7022 |
| N | 7023 | 7023 by NUTS-3; CZ Fixe | 7023 | 7023 |

 Table 4.25: Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support for Remain (Multivariate OLS)
 Model; London Respondents Included)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by NUTS-3; CZ Fixed Effects Included * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Across all of these specifications, the distance variables have the expected sign, are highly significant, and are substantively important. The coefficients on the *metropolitan_periphery* variable in Models 3 and 4 suggest that individuals that are greater than 25km from their global city commuter zone's CBD are 8.9% to 9.6% less likely to vote "Remain" than their counterparts in the global city's "metropolitan core" (i.e. within 25 km of the CBD). The coefficients on the continuous *distance_km* variable suggest that in moving from the very heart of the metropolitan core (0km away from the CBD, i.e. within the CBD itself) to the metropolitan outskirts 40km away, the probability that an individual favours remaining in the EU declines by either 11% (Model 1) or 12.2% (Model 2). To put these distance-decay effects in perspective, an individual with at least a bachelor's degree is roughly 9% more likely to support "Remain" than a less educated individual.

Below, Table 4.26 presents results from an analogous distance analysis that uses Probit (rather than Linear Probability) specifications.

| | (1) remain | (2) remain | (3) remain | (4) remain |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Temam | Temam | Telliani | Temam |
| distance_km | -0.00940*** | -0.0102*** | | |
| | (0.00233) | (0.00230) | | |
| ge | -0.0111*** | -0.0121*** | -0.0114*** | -0.0125*** |
| | (0.00210) | (0.00213) | (0.00209) | (0.00211) |
| nighered | 0.295*** | | 0.295*** | |
| 6 | (0.0445) | | (0.0444) | |
| personal_evaluat | 0.194** | 0.209** | 0.197** | 0.212** |
| | (0.0753) | (0.0754) | (0.0750) | (0.0751) |
| general_evaluati | 0.118 | 0.134* | 0.115 | 0.130 |
| | (0.0677) | (0.0682) | (0.0681) | (0.0685) |
| gender_f | 0.134** | 0.121* | 0.136** | 0.123* |
| _ | (0.0519) | (0.0506) | (0.0521) | (0.0507) |
| cosmopolitan | 0.705*** | 0.727*** | 0.709*** | 0.731*** |
| | (0.0783) | (0.0767) | (0.0782) | (0.0765) |
| ethnocentric | -0.984*** | -0.999*** | -0.988*** | -1.003*** |
| | (0.0524) | (0.0517) | (0.0524) | (0.0517) |
| labor | 0.503*** | 0.487*** | 0.511*** | 0.495*** |
| | (0.0706) | (0.0691) | (0.0705) | (0.0690) |
| ukip | -1.306*** | -1.387*** | -1.307*** | -1.389*** |
| | (0.217) | (0.217) | (0.217) | (0.216) |
| libdem | 0.862*** | 0.886*** | 0.866*** | 0.891*** |
| | (0.123) | (0.121) | (0.124) | (0.121) |
| otherparty | 0.0903 | 0.0701 | 0.0949 | 0.0752 |
| | (0.0791) | (0.0782) | (0.0790) | (0.0781) |
| highskill | | 0.100 | | 0.0991 |
| шунакш | | (0.119) | | (0.120) |
| metro_periphery | | | -0.299*** | -0.319*** |
| _periphery | | | (0.0687) | (0.0695) |
| N | 7023 entheses* $p < 0.05$, ** p | 7023 | 7023 | 7023 |

Table 4.26: Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support for Remain (MultivariateProbit Model; London Respondents Included)

To calculate the marginal effects of the distance variables in the probit specifications from Table 4.25 (which I do, as above, using Stata's margins command), I set the independent variables to the following values: *highered*=0, *highskill*=0, *personal_evaluation*=0, general_evaluation=0, cosmopolitan=0 and ethnocentric=0 (i.e. the individual is in the indifferent category with respect to symbolic identities), gender_f=0, age=47, labor=1. With the covariates set at these values, the marginal effect of *metro_periphery* in Model 3 (which uses the highered proxy for Stolper-Samuelson effects) is -0.107; this indicates that an individual from the metropolitan periphery of a global city commuter zone is roughly 10.7% less likely to vote "Remain" than an individual from the metropolitan core. The marginal effect of this variable in Model 4 (which uses the occupational skill proxy for Stolper-Samuelson effects) is -0.111; this indicates that an individual from the metropolitan periphery of a global city commuter zone is 11.1% less likely to vote "Remain" than an individual who is within the "metropolitan core". The marginal effect of the continuous distance_km model is -0.0034 in Model 1 and -0.0036 in Model 2; this suggests that the probability that an individual who lives within the CBD (for whom the *distance_km* variable would be 0) supports "remain" is 13.6% to 14.4% (respectively) higher than the probability that an individual who lives 40 km away from the "city center" district, in the outer edges of the metropolitan periphery, does so.

As a robustness check, I explore whether these results are robust to the exclusion of individuals from the London commuting zone. Results for linear probability models in which respondents from the London commuter zone are excluded are presented in Table 4.27.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|----------------|--------------------------|---|---------------|-----------------|
| 1 | remain | remain -0.00214** | remain | remain |
| distance_km | -0.00210** (0.000710) | (0.000707) | | |
| | (0.000710) | (0.000707) | | |
| age | -0.00311*** | -0.00342*** | -0.00320*** | -0.00351*** |
| | (0.000770) | (0.000795) | (0.000770) | (0.000792) |
| | | | | |
| highered | 0.0799^{***} | | 0.0799*** | |
| | (0.0135) | | (0.0134) | |
| personal_evalu | 0.0557^{*} | 0.0581^{*} | 0.0553 | 0.0577^{*} |
| ation | 0.0557 | 0.0501 | 0.0555 | 0.0377 |
| | (0.0278) | (0.0286) | (0.0279) | (0.0287) |
| | | | | × , |
| general_evalua | 0.0236 | 0.0272 | 0.0230 | 0.0266 |
| tion | (0.000 | (0.02.10) | (0.0225) | (0.02.40) |
| | (0.0236) | (0.0240) | (0.0236) | (0.0240) |
| gender_f | 0.0292 | 0.0252 | 0.0294 | 0.0254 |
| gender_r | (0.0170) | (0.0169) | (0.0170) | (0.0169) |
| | (/ | (1111) | | (/ |
| cosmopolitan | 0.169*** | 0.179*** | 0.170^{***} | 0.180^{***} |
| | (0.0241) | (0.0239) | (0.0241) | (0.0239) |
| othnooontria | -0.338*** | -0.346*** | -0.339*** | -0.346*** |
| ethnocentric | -0.338 (0.0199) | -0.346 (0.0197) | (0.0199) | -0.346 (0.0197) |
| | (0.0177) | (0.0177) | (0.0177) | (0.0177) |
| labor | 0.168^{***} | 0.162*** | 0.170^{***} | 0.163*** |
| | (0.0241) | (0.0247) | (0.0239) | (0.0245) |
| | | | | *** |
| ukip | -0.217*** | -0.232*** | -0.217*** | -0.232*** |
| | (0.0331) | (0.0326) | (0.0328) | (0.0324) |
| libdem | 0.254*** | 0.262^{***} | 0.255*** | 0.263*** |
| nouom | (0.0358) | (0.0359) | (0.0356) | (0.0357) |
| | . , | · · · · | . , | × , |
| otherparty | 0.00451 | -0.00286 | 0.00554 | -0.00180 |
| | (0.0311) | (0.0316) | (0.0312) | (0.0317) |
| | | | | |
| highskill | | 0.0525 | | 0.0521 |
| IIIZIISKIII | | (0.0423) | | (0.0423) |
| | | (0.0120) | | (0.0 120) |
| metro_periphe | | | -0.0523** | -0.0535** |
| ry | | | | |
| | | | (0.0183) | (0.0181) |
| Ν | 4075 | 4075 | 4075 | 4075 |
| | | $\frac{4073}{1 \text{ by NUTS-3:} * p < 0.7}$ | | |

Table 4.27: Impact of Distance From CBD on Individual Support for Remain (Multivariate OLSModel; London Respondents Excluded)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by NUTS-3; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Though the magnitude of the local-tropic distance effects is somewhat reduced when we exclude London's commuter zone from the analysis, the distance variables remain substantively important and statistically significant. Because the marginal effects for probit models that exclude London are very similar to the marginal effects for the linear probability models presented in Table 4.26, I do not present or discuss probit models that exclude London.

Taken together, the results presented in this section present suggestive evidence for a novel implication of the local-tropic argument developed in Chapter 3, namely, that in light of the empirical fact of the distance decay of global city agglomeration processes, we should expect to see individual support for globalization decline along a distance gradient running from a global city commuter zone's central business district toward its metropolitan periphery. However, I argued that the existence of a micro-level "metropolitan core versus metropolitan periphery" cleavage over globalization within global city commuter zones is inconsistent with ego-tropic and sociotropic accounts of how global city agglomeration processes shape spatial coalitions over globalization. The empirical evidence that such a micro-level spatial cleavage does in fact exist—which is consistent with a local-tropic explanation of the relationship between global city agglomeration processes and mass foreign economic policy preferences—increases our confidence in the view (developed in Chapter 3) that more broadly speaking, the local-tropic account of preference formation best explains how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders the distinctive spatial coalitions over globalization documented in previous sections of this chapter.

4.6 The Economic Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and Spatial Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions in the Developing World: An Empirical Analysis of District-Level Voting Patterns in the CAFTA Referendum

As Chakravorty and Lall (2007) note, the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is a salient feature not only of developed country economies, but is also an important

part of the economic landscape in in developing world economies as well:

With empirical regularity, we observe high degrees of spatial concentration where a few cities account for much of the national employment and investment. This is evident if we look at a map of Brazil, or Mexico, or Indonesia, or China, or India, using broad regional definitions (that is, at the state level) or using more finegrained geographical demarcations (that is, at the district level). This uneven spatial distribution, whereby high income and productivity are concentrated mainly in large agglomerations, translates into differentials in economic performance across cities and regions within a country. Naturally, it raises questions about the growth potential for secondary cities, particularly those in lagging regions, and villages that are far less prosperous than even the secondary cities (2).

In Section 4.2, I presented evidence on the spatial distribution of public support for globalization (as indicated by patterns of voting in the CAFTA referendum) in Costa Rica that is broadly consistent with the presence of spatial foreign economic policy coalitions in that developing country context. To rule out alternative explanations for this spatial distribution of mass political support for globalization, and more systematically assess whether the patterns documented in Section 4.2 reflect the presence of spatial political coalitions engendered by the

economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, this section carries out an analysis that is akin to the district level analysis of Brexit in Section 4.3, but in the empirical context of Costa Rica; in particular, I explore, in a multivariate setting, whether the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands systematically shapes mass preferences over globalization in that country, as measured by district-level voting patterns in the CAFTA referendum. To translate the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands to the district level, I develop a district-level measure of the strength of global city agglomeration processes analogous to the one developed in Section 4.3; to the extent that we do in fact find a systematic link between this district-level measure of global city agglomeration processes and patterns of district-level support for CAFTA, even after accounting for other determinants of mass preferences over globalization, we can tentatively conclude that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands engenders spatially organized "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions over globalization in developing country contexts as well.

Unfortunately, survey data related to the CAFTA referendum is not geographically explicit, so our analysis of spatial foreign economic policy coalitions in the Costa Rican context is confined to this district-level analysis of the relationship between global city agglomeration processes and support for CAFTA; unlike with the analysis of Brexit, we therefore cannot investigate the individual-level micro-foundations of spatial coalitions in Costa Rica (so as to avoid the ecological inference problem), or explore the theoretical foundations of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and mass foreign economic policy preferences (as we did with the Brexit referendum in the UK, in Section 4.5). Despite these limitations in our investigation of district-level spatial political coalitions in Costa Rica, such an investigation in the context of a country with very different factor endowments than the

UK can be very instructive. That is, it offers us the opportunity to establish, in a preliminary way, that the existence of independent spatial coalitions over globalization that reflect the global city versus hinterland divide is a feature of the mass politics of globalization in both the developing and developed worlds (as the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3 would suggest), and not simply an artefact of the populist wave that has recently enveloped certain advanced industrial countries. This could have important implications for how we think about the politics of economic geography in the global economy going forward. If the empirical evidence points to the emergence of spatial political coalitions rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands as a general phenomenon, rather than simply a spatial expression of developed-world populist politics, it suggests that this way of thinking about political coalitions is something that scholars doing cross-national work, or studying the international and comparative political economy of developing countries, should pay attention to as well.

In what follows, Section 4.6.1 briefly describes how I empirically transpose the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands onto the district-level geography of Costa Rica by using spatial data on superstar headquarter establishments to develop district-level measures of the strength of global city agglomeration processes; in other words, I describe how I create Costa Rican analogues of the *globalcity_agglomeration* and *globalcity* variables developed above, in Section 4.3, in the district-level analysis of Brexit. More generally, I discuss the creation of the dataset that is used to facilitate the analysis of the relationship between these district-level measures of global city agglomeration processes and district-level voting patterns over CAFTA; in particular, aside from the district-level measure of global city agglomeration processes (which I use to capture the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands), the remaining data used in this section—including data on district-level shares of the "pro-CAFTA" vote, as well as

control variables—are provided through the previous efforts of Hicks, Milner, and Tingley (2014), who have already carried out an extremely thorough empirical analysis of the CAFTA referendum³⁵, and released the data associated with their analysis. Section 4.6.1 also presents results from a bivariate regression analysis of district-level "pro-CAFTA" voting shares on our measures of the district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes. Section 4.6.2 then turns to a multivariate analysis of this relationship that includes a suite of control variables that could plausibly also shape mass preferences over economic openness. I find that even after including these control variables, the variables measuring the district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes (the continuous *globalcity_agglomeration* variable and the dichotomous globalcity variable) continue to exert a substantively important and statistically significant positive impact on district-level support for CAFTA; in other words, support for CAFTA tends to increase as district-level global city agglomeration processes strengthen (or, analogously, as hinterland dispersion processes weaken), and declines as district-level global city agglomeration processes weaken (or, analogously as hinterland dispersion processes strengthen), and this relationship cannot be explained in terms of variables traditionally used to explain mass preferences over globalization. These results therefore suggest that in Costa Rica as in the UK, the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands independently shapes the emergence of distinctive spatial political coalitions that reflect this economic geography.

³⁵ Though their analysis does not consider whether or to what extent the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands contributed to the emergence of a district-level spatial political cleavage along these lines, which is our focus here.

4.6.1 Independent Variables of Interest and the Dependent Variable

In order to systematically analyse the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and popular support for globalization (as indicated by support for CAFTA), we must develop district-level measures of the global city versus hinterland divide. Our task, in this regard, is analogous to the one in Section 4.3, where we had to map the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands to the level of UK local authorities in order to assess its impact on district-level voting patterns over Brexit.

As such, my approach to creating the independent variables of interest in this section is identical to the one described in Section 4.3.2. That is, I use data on the locations of superstar headquarter establishments to develop a continuous district-level measure of the relative magnitude of their agglomeration within districts, which captures the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes at the district level. I begin by using the Dun and Bradstreet firm-level data for Costa Rica to identify superstar firms operating in Costa Rica; as before, I identify these superstar firms using thresholds based on the firm's overall employment. For details on these thresholds, and the 4-digit SIC industries considered in the analysis, please refer to Section 4.3.2; the details presented in the discussion in that section apply here as well. Having identified a set of superstar firms based on these criteria, I geocode the locations of the headquarter establishments of superstar firms in Costa Rica, and overlay the resulting point layer of these headquarter locations against a district-level GIS shapefile of Costa Rica districts³⁶; Figure 4.10

³⁶ The shapefile of Costa Rican districts was retrieved from the following site: http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=29462fe665444063b69ac35fa82f4bc0. Districts had to be dissolved to match the level of aggregation at which the Hicks, Milner, and Tingley data were provided, before joining the latter's data to the district-level shapefile.

presents a district-level map of the Costa Rica referendum results with Costa Rican superstar headquarters superimposed against districts.




Figure 4.10: Headquarters Locations of Global Firms in Costa Rica Overlaid Against CAFTA Voting Districts

Using ArcGIS's spatial join tool, I compute the number of superstar headquarters establishments within each district. Using this district-level data on the number of superstars, I then calculate the percentage of superstar headquarter establishments within each district (as a share of the total number of superstar headquarter establishments in the sample). As in section 4.3, I label this measure of the relative size of the agglomeration of superstar headquarter establishments within districts, which represents the strength of global city agglomeration processes at the district level, *globalcity_agglomeration*. I assume that as this measure (labelled *globalcity_agglomeration* as in Section 4.3) increases, it indicates relatively stronger districtlevel global city agglomeration processes; as before, I take global city agglomeration processes and hinterland dispersion processes to be inversely related, so in explicitly measuring the strength of global city agglomeration processes are implicitly measuring the strength of hinterland dispersion processes as well (i.e. district-level global city agglomeration processes are strong where district-level hinterland processes are weak, and vice-versa).

According to the arguments developed earlier, increases in *globalcity_agglomeration* are associated with stronger district-level global city agglomeration processes, which tightens the nexus between globalization and the prosperity of the local district economy. As these global city agglomeration processes intensify, therefore, we would expect an increase in the district-level footprint of "pro-globalization" global city coalitions (based on the arguments of Chapter 3); conversely, as they weaken (and hinterland dispersion processes correspondingly strengthen), we would expect a relative increase in the size of district-level hinterland coalitions that oppose globalization. This chain of reasoning suggests that to the extent that spatial coalitions that are independently shaped by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands do in fact exist, we should expect to see a positive and significant relationship between

globalcity_agglomeration and district-level support for CAFTA, even after controlling for potential confounding variables.

In addition to this continuous measure of global city agglomeration processes at the district level, I also (as before in the district-level analysis of Brexit) create a dichotomous measure of the strength of global city agglomeration processes that classifies districts into "global city districts" and "hinterland districts". This variable, as in the district-level analysis of Brexit, is labelled *globalcity*; it takes on the value one if a district's value on the *globalcity_agglomeration* variable is one standard deviation above the mean, and zero otherwise. Below, I present results using both the continuous measure of the strength of global city agglomeration processes (globalcity_agglomeration) and the dichotomous measure (globalcity) that represents the cleavage between the "global city districts" in which global city agglomerations processes are especially strong and the balance of "hinterland districts" in which these processes are relatively weak to non-existent (and hinterland dispersion processes are relatively strong). To the extent that "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions shaped by the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands do indeed exist, we would expect to find systematically higher support for CAFTA in global city districts than in hinterland districts (i.e. we would expect the coefficient on *globalcity* to be positive and significant) in a multivariate analysis.

After mapping the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands to Costa Rica's district geography by using spatially explicit establishment data to map to create the district-level *globalcity_districtagglomeration* and *globalcity* variables, I join these measures to Hicks, Milner, and Tingley's tabular data on the Costa Rica referendum. The result is a dataset containing data on the relative strength of district-level global city agglomeration processes (and

by extension, hinterland dispersion processes as well), district-level referendum returns, and district-level control variables (discussed below). The dependent variable, as with the Brexit analysis, is a measure of "pro-globalization" sentiment; here, the dependent variable is the percentage of a district's electorate voting in favor of CAFTA ratification. It is labelled *percentyes*.

4.6.2 Bivariate Regression Analysis

In this section, I carry out preliminary bivariate analyses of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands—as captured by our district-level measures of the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes—and district "pro-CAFTA" shares (*percentyes*). Following Hicks, Milner, and Tingley (2014), I estimate these models using ordinary least squares, both with and without canton fixed effects; I also follow their lead in clustering the standard errors by canton.³⁷ The results are presented in Table 4.28.

³⁷ Cantons are a broader regional unit in which districts are embedded.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| | percentyes | percentyes | percentyes | percentyes |
| globalcity | 12.01*** | 5.988^{*} | | |
| | (2.163) | (2.644) | | |
| globalcity_a gglomeration | | | 1.141*** | 0.658*** |
| Science | | | (0.232) | (0.138) |
| _cons | 48.43*** | 49.29*** | 48.39*** | 49.27*** |
| | (1.173) | (1.056) | (1.173) | (1.055) |
| Ν | 469 | 469 | 469 | 469 |
| Canton | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Fixed Effects | | | | |

Table 4.28: Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Support for

 CAFTA Ratification (Bivariate OLS)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton $p_{n}^{+} = 0.10^{+} p_{n}^{-} = 0.05^{+} p_{n}^{+} = 0.01^{+} p_{n}^{+} = 0.001^{+}$

 $^{+} p < 0.10, \,^{*} p < 0.05, \,^{**} p < 0.01, \,^{***} p < 0.001$

Note that across all specifications, the district-level measures of global city agglomeration processes have a statistically significant and substantively important impact on district-level support for CAFTA, in the expected direction. In the specifications using the dichotomous measure of global city agglomeration processes, the share of the pro-CAFTA vote in "global city districts" is, on average, 12 points (in the model without fixed effects), or 6 points (in the model with canton fixed effects) higher than in "hinterland" districts. In the specifications using the continuous *globalcity_agglomeration* measure of the strength of global city agglomeration processes, increasing this variable by one standard deviation above its mean (see Table 4.29 for summary statistics) is associated with a 0.96 (in the specification with canton fixed effects) to 1.68 (in the specification without canton-fixed effects) point increase in a district's pro-CAFTA vote share.

4.6.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Control Variables, Results, and Discussion

Section 4.6.2 established, tentatively, a relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (as measured by the district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes) and mass support for CAFTA at the district level. In this section, I add a suite of control variables to the baseline bivariate regressions from Section 4.6.2; this allows us to more systematically assess whether the relationship documented in the previous subsection is spurious, or does indeed reflect the existence of spatial political coalitions over globalization that arise from the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands.

In particular, I include control variables used in Hicks, Milner', and Tingley's (2014) initial analysis. The first is a variable that attempts to capture the impact of skill-based coalitions (engendered by Stolper-Samuelson processes) on the vote by controlling for district level skill endowments. Hicks, Milner, and Tingley code this variable (labelled *lowSoEcon*) by drawing on previous work to classify occupations into "high skill" and "low skill" categories, and then using district-level occupational data from the Census to calculate the district-level share of workers in low-skill occupations. Since low-skill labor is the abundant factor of production in Costa Rica (unlike in the developed country context of the United Kingdom), the expectation is that low-skilled labor will favour globalization, and by extension, CAFTA ratification; the Stolper-Samuelson framework would therefore predict that the coefficient on this variable will be positive. In addition, they include a variable to capture industry-level coalitions underpinned by Ricardo-Viner mechanisms; this variable (*manufexports_pcnt*) is a measure of the district-share of employment in relatively high-skill manufacturing industries, which constitute Costa Rica's

main export-industries. Of course, the Ricardo-Viner model suggests that this variable should be positive and significant.

In addition to these important economic variables, which help to account for political coalitions over globalization driven by economic processes flowing from Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo Viner processes, I follow Hicks, Milner, and Tingley in also controlling for the unemployment rate $(totalunemp)^{38}$, district share of public employment (*pubempperc percent*) ³⁹, and district level economic development (proxied as the percentage of households with a television, tv%). In addition to district-level economic and demographic variables, I also follow them in including district level vote shares for the major pro-CAFTA political party (the PLN), the major anti-CAFTA party (the PAC), as well as minor parties (the PUSC and libertarian parties). As Hicks, Milner, and Tingley note, controlling for these partisan effects allows us to distinguish the "top-down" influence of elites on the vote from the "bottom-up" impact of district-level coalitions stemming from economic and demographic factors.

I also follow Hicks, Milner, and Tingley in including a categorical variable that reflects whether a district is a "free trade zone" (ftz), which are areas designated by the Costa Rica investment promotion agency (CINDE), as an economic development tool to attract exporting industries to particular areas using favourable regulatory incentives. The authors use this variable as an additional proxy for Ricardo-Viner coalitions, on the assumption that these districts will host disproportionately high shares of exporting industries. It should be noted that there is some overlap between these "free trade zones" and districts considered "global city districts" according to the *globalcity* variable⁴⁰, but that many free trade zones are in districts that would

³⁸ Unemployment data is only available at the canton, rather than district, level

³⁹ Hicks, Milner, and Tingley suggest that their conversations with country experts indicated that public/private sector cleavages over trade policy would be salient in the Costa Rican context. ⁴⁰ Only 19.5% of the districts coded as "global city" districts are part of free trade zones

be considered hinterland districts from the standpoint of our measures of global city agglomeration processes. By adding explicit empirical measures of the global city versus hinterland divide to their original model, we can ensure that Hicks, Milner, and Tingley's finding of a positive and significant impact of free trade zones on pro-CAFTA preferences was truly driven by a coalition of exporting industries formed by Ricardo-Viner effects, and not actually capturing the impact of spatial coalitions formed by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands; to the extent that the latter is the case, we would expect the *ftz* variable to fall out of significance after explicitly accounting for the impact of global city agglomeration processes on the CAFTA referendum voting patterns.

Finally, I also include a categorical variable that indicates whether a district is considered part of an urban or rural area (labelled *urban*, it takes on the value one if a district is part of an urban area and zero otherwise).⁴¹ Including a measure to control for the traditional urban versus rural cleavage helps to ensure that to the extent that our measures of the global city versus hinterland cleavage are significant and substantively important in the ensuing multivariate analysis, they indeed reflect the political impact of spatial coalitions stemming from the distinctive geographical and political processes analysed in Chapters 2 and 3, and are not simply a manifestation of more traditional territorial coalitions stemming from the impact of urban agglomeration processes more generally. Summary statistics for the CAFTA variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.29 below.

⁴¹ This variable is included in the Hicks, Milner, and Tingley dataset, but they do not control for it in their specifications, presumably because an urban-rural cleavage is not expected to appear in Costa Rican trade policy coalitions given the structure of its factor endowments.

| | (1) | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | count | mean | sd | min | max |
| percentyes | 469 | 48.63163 | 12.02169 | 12.03651 | 79.86577 |
| globalcity_ag glomeration | 469 | .2132196 | 1.469429 | 0 | 20.15366 |
| globalcity | 469 | .0170576 | .1296242 | 0 | 1 |
| pcntPLN | 469 | 40.46385 | 9.878015 | 16.43655 | 83.85965 |
| pcntPAC | 469 | 23.07323 | 7.957858 | 2.033898 | 48.68977 |
| pentPUSC | 469 | 9.449152 | 6.069605 | 1.95258 | 44.32359 |
| pcntLiber | 468 | 7.805698 | 5.025913 | .3257329 | 40.43024 |
| manufexports pcnt | 458 | .3764935 | .4550018 | 0 | 4.338624 |
| ftz | 469 | .098081 | .2977418 | 0 | 1 |
| lowSocEcon | 458 | 25.47606 | 22.37307 | 1.394729 | 92.62296 |
| totalunemp | 469 | 4.877612 | 1.783804 | 2 | 13.1 |
| pubempperc_ | 458 | 12.33426 | 7.051876 | .8474576 | 39.28129 |
| percent | | | | | |
| tv% | 458 | 78.16427 | 15.93094 | 7.427536 | 99.6139 |
| urban | 457 | 0.2407002 | 0.4279771 | 0 | 1 |

 Table 4.29: CAFTA Summary Statistics

As in the bivariate specifications, I estimate models using canton fixed effects and models without canton fixed effects. The advantage of using canton fixed effects, as noted by Hicks, Milner, and Tingley (2014), is that it allows us to effectively control for omitted variables; they make the plausible argument, for instance, that cultural variables that are important drivers of trade policy coalitions (such as cosmopolitan or ethnocentric sentiment) are more likely to vary across cantons than across districts. Though the models do not explicitly control for cultural coalitions of cosmopolitans and ethno-nationalists, the inclusion of canton-fixed effects therefore implicitly controls for them; if canton-fixed effects do indeed implicitly control for the impact of these cultural coalitions on the vote, it would increase our confidence that the finding of a positive and statistically significant relationship between our measures of global city agglomeration processes and support for CAFTA does indeed reflect the independent impact of spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, rather than the residual impact of cultural coalitions constituted by symbolic attitudes towards outgroups. However, following Hicks, Milner, and Tingley, I also estimate random effects models in addition to fixed effects models, since the unemployment variable is a canton-level measure; because it does not vary among districts within a canton, it drops out of the fixed effects specifications.

Table 4.30 contains the results from the multivariate specifications. Models 2 and 4 present results from models using canton fixed effects with the dichotomous and continuous measures of global city agglomeration processes, respectively; Models 1 and 3 present analogous models, except they do not include fixed effects.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------------|---------------|------------|-------------|--------------|
| .1.1.1.4. | 4.926*** | percentyes | percentyes | percentyes |
| globalcity | | 3.502^+ | | |
| | (1.234) | (1.956) | | |
| pentPLN | 0.407^{***} | 0.279*** | 0.407*** | 0.277^{**} |
| | (0.102) | (0.0784) | (0.102) | (0.0868) |
| ocntPAC | -0.0453 | -0.269** | -0.0449 | -0.271** |
| | (0.127) | (0.0953) | (0.127) | (0.0785) |
| ocntPUSC | 0.503** | 0.343* | 0.505** | 0.343** |
| | (0.146) | (0.146) | (0.147) | (0.0972) |
| ocntLiber | 0.270^{*} | 0.181 | 0.269^{*} | 0.177 |
| | (0.128) | (0.227) | (0.128) | (0.183) |
| nanufexports_p cnt | 2.759* | 1.911* | 2.806* | 1.960+ |
| | (1.096) | (0.925) | (1.127) | (0.963) |
| ftz | 1.248 | 1.278 | 1.099 | 1.075 |
| | (1.112) | (1.121) | (1.144) | (1.222) |
| owSocEcon | -0.221*** | -0.178*** | -0.221*** | -0.178*** |
| | (0.0400) | (0.0486) | (0.0401) | (0.0341) |
| totalunemp | 0.993* | | 0.992^{*} | |
| | (0.393) | | (0.390) | |
| oubempperc_per cent | -0.636*** | -0.347** | -0.634*** | -0.343** |
| | (0.122) | (0.107) | (0.123) | (0.109) |
| colortv_percent | 0.272*** | 0.175** | 0.272*** | 0.174^{*} |
| — <u>r</u> | (0.0461) | (0.0653) | (0.0463) | (0.0616) |
| urban | 3.636** | 1.625 | 3.572** | 1.616 |
| | (1.128) | (1.038) | (1.157) | (1.183) |
| globalcity_agglo | | | 0.525*** | 0.407*** |
| neration | | | (0.0907) | (0.0924) |
| _cons | 11.77 | 32.90*** | 11.77 | 33.05*** |
| | (7.860) | (8.926) | (7.851) | (6.758) |
| N G Fi I | 457 | 457 | 457 | 457 |
| Canton Fixed Effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |

Table 4.30: Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Support for CAFTA Ratification (Multivariate OLS)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The coefficient on *globalcity* in the fixed effects model (which does not include unemployment as a control variable) suggests that on average, "global city districts" voted in favor of CAFTA by a margin of 3.502 points over "hinterland districts", while the coefficient on this variable in the model without fixed effects (and which includes the control for unemployment) suggests that on average, global city districts voted in favor of CAFTA by a 4.93 point margin. The impact of *globalcity* is statistically significant in the fixed effects specification at the 10% level, while in the random effects specification, the impact of *globalcity* is significant at less than the 1% significance level. The continuous measure of global city agglomeration processes (globalcity_agglomeration) is statistically significant at conventional thresholds, and substantively important in both the models without (Model 3) and with (Model 4) canton fixed effects. In Model 3, increasing *globalcity* agglomeration by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a 0.78 point increase in support for CAFTA, holding other variables constant; in Model 4, which incorporates fixed effects, increasing the concentration measure by one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a 0.605 point increase in a district's support for CAFTA.

It is worth noting that the indicator variable that delineates whether districts are considered "urban" is significant in the specifications without fixed effects, but fails to attain significance at conventional thresholds in specifications that incorporate canton fixed effects. Importantly, controlling for general patterns of urbanization isolates the distinctive impact of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands on mass preferences, and ensures that our findings above are driven by the presence of spatial coalitions that stem from this distinctive economic geography, rather than the impact of urban agglomeration more generally. This is further underscored in the regression results presented in Table 4.31, which restricts attention

only to districts classified as "urban" according to Census definitions.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------|------------|
| globalcity | percentyes 3.656* | percentyes 3.475* | percentyes | percentyes |
| giobalenty | (1.314) | (1.351) | | |
| pcntPLN | 0.715*** | 1.081*** | 0.711*** | 0.983** |
| - | (0.109) | (0.257) | (0.109) | (0.265) |
| pcntPAC | 0.0519 | 0.403 | 0.0671 | 0.313 |
| | (0.151) | (0.406) | (0.138) | (0.396) |
| pentPUSC | 0.122 | 0.560 | 0.146 | 0.612 |
| | (0.0959) | (0.300) | (0.0915) | (0.302) |
| pcntLiber | 0.175 | 0.452 | 0.186 | 0.398 |
| | (0.199) | (0.380) | (0.208) | (0.456) |
| manufexports_p cnt | 0.410 | 4.661** | 0.688 | 4.762** |
| | (1.328) | (1.605) | (1.490) | (1.587) |
| ftz | -0.481 | 0.803 | -0.890 | 0.146 |
| | (1.234) | (1.360) | (1.243) | (1.272) |
| lowSocEcon | -0.305*** | -0.332*** | -0.321*** | -0.343** |
| | (0.0706) | (0.0738) | (0.0758) | (0.0879) |
| totalunemp | 1.481 | | 1.496 | |
| | (0.763) | | (0.726) | |
| pubempperc_pe rcent | -0.714** | -0.336* | -0.709** | -0.316 |
| | (0.181) | (0.157) | (0.183) | (0.149) |
| colortv_percent | 0.890*** | 0.682*** | 0.874*** | 0.709** |
| | (0.171) | (0.171) | (0.182) | (0.212) |
| globalcity_aggl omeration | | | 0.482*** | 0.497*** |
| | | | (0.0919) | (0.108) |
| _cons | -48.84** | -61.49*** | -48.14** | -58.44** |
| | (13.75) | (14.24) | (14.39) | (15.85) |
| N | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 |
| Canton Fixed Effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |

 Table 4.31: Impact of Global City Agglomeration Variables on District-Level Support for
 CAFTA Ratification (Multivariate OLS; Urban Districts Only)

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton $p^* < 0.05$, $p^{**} < 0.01$, $p^{***} < 0.001$

Even in this "urban-only" sample, our measures of global city agglomeration processes continue to exert a statistically significant and substantively important impact on district-level patterns of support for CAFTA after controlling for a range of control variables; this further underscores that the "global city versus hinterland" political cleavage underpinned by the presence of spatial foreign economic policy coalitions is not simply coextensive with the traditional urban-rural political cleavage stemming from the more general effects of urban agglomeration. In this restricted urban sample, support for CAFTA ratification among urban districts coded as "global city districts" according to the dichotomous *globalcity* variable is up to 3.66 points higher than in "hinterland districts" (in the model without canton fixed effects). Turning to the continuous measure of global city agglomeration processes, we find that increasing the value of *globalcity_agglomeration* by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with up to a 1.46 point increase (in the specification using canton fixed effects) in a district's support for CAFTA.

Turning back to the specification that includes all observations (Table 4.30), we do not find evidence for the existence of skill-based coalitions rooted in Stolper-Samuelson effects. In other words, the skill-based variable does not perform according to the expectations of the Stolper-Samuelson framework. Recall that in Costa Rica, low-skilled workers are the relatively abundant factor of production, and are therefore expected to favour the increased trade that CAFTA would presumably bring; however, the coefficient on the *lowSocEcon* variable is negative and significant, which suggests that districts with high shares of low-skilled labor actually tended to *oppose* CAFTA at higher rates than more highly-skilled districts. Substantively, this effect is quite large (easily larger in magnitude than the continuous measures of global city agglomeration processes and the Ricardo-Viner variable measuring the district-

level footprint of exporting industries); in the specification in which the *lowSocEcon* variable has the largest effect, increasing this variable by one standard deviation over its mean is associated with a 4.94 point decline in a district's support for CAFTA, holding other variables constant. The finding that a higher district-level share of low-skilled workers is associated with decreases in district-level support for CAFTA is also presented in Hicks, Milner, and Tingley's work. Of course, this is counterintuitive from the standpoint of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which would predict relatively low-skilled workers to favour globalization (since relatively low-skilled workers are the relatively abundant factor of production in a developing country such as Costa Rica). A Stolper-Samuelson account would thus expect a *positive* relationship between the *lowSocEcon* variable and support for CAFTA, which is the opposite of what we in fact observe.

This finding with respect to the skill variable suggests that we should be cautious about assuming that Stolper-Samuelson processes underpin the relationship between skill levels and support for globalization, even in contexts where skill-related variables relate to support for economic openness in a way that is consistent with the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson model. In particular, this caution should inform our interpretation of the underpinnings of skillbased coalitions over voting in the Brexit referendum. That is, the effects of variables measuring educational and occupational measures of skill endowments could be rationalized in terms of a Stolper-Samuelson mechanism given the UK's factor endowments (i.e. we observed a positive relationship between skill endowments and support for the remain position); however, the appearance of a similarly positive relationship between skill endowments and support for economic openness in the Costa Rican context (where the Stolper-Samuelson framework would predict the opposite relationship) should give us pause in assuming a Stolper-Samuelson

could provide a coherent explanation for the observation of high-skill coalitions in favour of globalization in both developed and developing country contexts.

Admittedly, we should acknowledge the possibility that the consistent performance of the skill variables across developing and developed world contexts stems from the fact that the skill variables are actually picking up the effects of cultural preferences (Mansfield and Mutz 2009) or policy sophistication (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006), which presumably do not vary across countries with different factor endowments. In principle, explicit skill variables should be less correlated with ideational or cultural factors than education-based measures (and therefore less vulnerable to these confounds), but in practice, the correlation between skill-levels and education is very high; the view that "coalitions of the highly skilled" are at their core coalitions of intellectually sophisticated cosmopolitans is therefore plausible. That said, it is worth recalling that earlier analyses of Brexit did indeed control for cultural preferences, and in the case of Costa Rica, the use of canton fixed effects would presumably go some way towards accounting for such factors, if we accept Hicks, Milner, and Tingley's plausible argument that these factors are more likely to vary across cantons than across districts (Hicks, Milner, and Tingley, 2014; 112). Moreover, Hicks, Milner, and Tingley note that in individual survey analyses related to CAFTA preferences that use education (rather than an occupational measure) as a proxy for skill levels, the education variable is not significant, which calls into question an "educated preferences" explanation for skill based coalitions in Costa Rica.

We should therefore entertain the possibility that though the existence of skill-based coalitions over globalization are not best explained by a Stolper-Samuelson mechanism, a different mechanism rooted in material-interests may in fact underpin skill-based coalitions over foreign economic policy. One possible mechanism is the mechanism of skill-biased trade. The

literature on skill-biased trade (Epifani and Gancia 2008; Meschi, Taymaz, Vivarelli 2016), has developed in response to the empirical observation that, against the expectations of the Stolper-Samuelson framework, trade openness in the developing world has grown in conjunction with a rise in the skill premium.⁴² The rise in the skill premium in liberalizing developing countries has been explained in different ways⁴³, but the general intuition underlying these explanations is that increased trade leads to technological diffusion, which in turn pushes up demand for the relatively high-skilled workers that can successfully exploit these technological advances. The phenomenon of skill-biased trade has in fact been documented in the case of Costa Rica (Epifani and Garcia 2008, 928), and may therefore underpin the results on the skill variable here. Moreover, to the extent that "engaging in export activities encourages hiring more skilled than unskilled workers as a response to a more sophisticated foreign demand and a tougher international competition" (Meschi et al 2016, 660), it is plausible that the phenomenon of skillbiased trade underpins pro-globalization "high-skill coalitions" in developed countries such as Britain as well; the skill-based cleavages that appeared in the Brexit voting could be a manifestation of such a process.

That the skill-biased trade framework predicts high-skilled "pro-globalization" coalitions in both the UK and Costa Rica is encouraging, given its consistency with the empirical record as documented in this chapter; this suggests that the link between skill-biased trade and foreign economic policy coalitions deserves greater attention from IPE scholars. Be that as it may, from

⁴² But see Davis (1996) for the view that this pattern is not necessarily inconsistent with Stolper-Samuelson expectations.

⁴³ The explanations I have encountered have been economic in nature; this seems to be an area that deserves greater attention from IPE and CPE scholars. For instance, Epifani and Gino Gancia note that there is considerable cross-country variation in the skill premium, and in some developing countries, increased trade actually seems to have reduced inequality (at least in some time periods). Developing a political economy explanation for this variation could be an interesting topic for future research.

the standpoint of our central purpose in this chapter, the most important point is that regardless of the process that underpins the genesis of skill-based coalitions, these skill-based coalitions (possibly driven by the effects of skill-biased trade) are empirically distinct from the spatial political coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands; the latter are not simply spatial manifestations of skill-based coalitions. That is, spatially organized "global city" and "hinterland" foreign economic policy coalitions are not simply a product of how highly skilled individuals happen to sort themselves across space, but rather, are empirically distinct coalitions that can be traced to the independent impact of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands on individual preferences over globalization. Were that not the case, our empirical measures of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (i.e. our measures of the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes, *globlcity* and *globalcity_agglomeration*) would presumably have fallen out of significance after controlling for the impact of district skill-endowments on support for CAFTA.

Finally, the district-level share of employment in export-oriented industries, which serves as a proxy for industry-based coalitions shaped by Ricardo Viner dynamics, is, as expected, positive across all specifications; in general, it is statistically significant at conventional thresholds, but it does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 4, which uses a fixed-effects specification and the continuous measure of district-level global city agglomeration processes. Increasing the Ricardo-Viner variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with an increased margin of support for CAFTA of up to 1.27 points. Moreover, it is worth noting that the variable indicating whether a district is a governmentdesignated "free trade zone" (ftz), which Hicks, Milner, and Tingley interpret as an additional proxy for Ricardo-Viner effects, is not significant after controlling for our empirical measures of

global city agglomeration processes.

The results presented in this section provide suggestive evidence for an empirical relationship between the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide (as measured by empirical measures of global city agglomeration processes rooted in spatially explicit superstar headquarter establishment data) and mass preferences over globalization in Costa Rica that is robust to the inclusion of an extensive battery of control variables that account for alternative explanations of mass foreign economic policy preferences. This suggests that the spatial political cleavage over globalization in Costa Rica that is coextensive with the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands-which we documented in Section 4.2-does indeed reflect the existence of spatial foreign economic policy coalitions engendered by this economic geography. This suggests that the existence of such spatial coalitions over globalization is not simply a developed world phenomenon driven by uneven subnational patterns of geographic decline as a result of shifting patterns of international specialization; it appears to be a more general phenomenon. The emergence of populist backlash politics in certain parts of the developed world is certainly one reason why it is important for scholars of IPE to begin investigating the politics of global cities and hinterlands more systematically; it is difficult to see how one could understand the politics of populism without tracing it, in part, to impact of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (McNamara 2017, Kahler 2017). But we should not make the mistake of assuming that the most prominent or familiar manifestations of global city versus hinterland political cleavages—for instance, between the United States' dynamic coastal metropolises and its declining rust belt or Appalachian areas (see Chapter 5) are the only such manifestations. The evidence suggests that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is an independent vector of influence on foreign economic policy coalitions

even outside the context of developed-world backlash politics, and this is a finding that is consistent with our theoretical expectations. This highlights the need for scholars of IPE to begin to clarify and investigate the implications of political conflict between global city and hinterland political coalitions in developing world contexts as well.

More generally, is worth noting that when we consider our investigation of spatial coalitions in the UK and Costa Rica together, it underscores the relative robustness of the empirical evidence for spatial coalitions over globalization rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, compared to the evidence for skill-based coalitions based on Stolper-Samuelson processes or industry-based coalitions underpinned by Ricardo-Viner effects. The sign and significance of the skill variable in Costa Rica casts doubt on the empirical leverage of the Stolper-Samuelson framework, while the impact of the industry-based proxies for Ricardo-Viner effects was somewhat less than robust across specifications in the Brexit districtlevel analysis.⁴⁴ In contrast, this chapter has documented a statistically significant and substantively meaningful relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and patterns of public support for economic openness in both the UK and Costa Rica, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation that spatial coalitions rooted in this economic geography exist across both developed and developing country contexts. At least in this sense, the evidence for spatial coalitions over globalization engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is more robust than the evidence for skill-based coalitions engendered by Stolper-Samuelson effects, or industry-based coalitions rooted in Ricardo Viner processes; this speaks to the importance of explicitly accounting for these spatial foreign economic policy coalitions in future IPE scholarship on the mass politics of globalization, as

⁴⁴ Though admittedly, this may actually reflect the weakness of the proxies, rather than the lack of a robust Ricardo-Viner effect.

well as the potential value of extending the work of this chapter, and making these spatial coalitions an independent focus of research and investigation going forward.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided evidence, through an analysis of voting patterns in globalization-related referenda in the UK and Costa Rica, that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (which I elaborated in conceptual terms in Chapter 2) does indeed engender spatial foreign economic policy coalitions that reflect this territorial economic cleavage (as suggested by the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3). In particular, I developed a measure, drawing on relevant spatial data on the headquarter establishments of superstar firms, that captures the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes across space, and demonstrated that patterns of mass support for globalization systematically vary with this measure in the way that we would expect (i.e. support for globalization increases as a function of the relative strength of global city agglomeration processes), even after controlling for a range of confounding variables. These results point to the existence of spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands as an important feature of the mass politics of contemporary globalization. Moreover, I also presented suggestive evidence, in Sections 4.4.3 and 4.5, that cast doubt on the ego-tropic and sociotropic explanations of these spatial coalitions, and which provided tentative support for the local-tropic theory; this pattern of results provides some empirical support for Chapter 3's theoretical argument that the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and spatial coalitions over globalization is best explained within a local-tropic framework. However, more research is required before we can conclude this more definitively.

Indeed, more generally speaking, the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and mass spatial coalitions over globalization deserves to be explored in greater depth in future work, especially with a view towards more systematically identifying causal effects, which this chapter's correlational (but nonetheless highly suggestive) results could not do. However, rather than further investigating the nature of the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and corresponding spatial foreign economic policy coalitions⁴⁵, subsequent chapters in the dissertation instead turn to a consideration of how the political geography of the global city and hinterland mass coalitions documented in this chapter might shape broader political and policy outcomes relevant to contemporary IPE scholarship. To that end, the next chapter turns to a consideration of how, and to what extent, the global city and hinterland *mass* coalitions documented in this chapter give rise to corresponding *legislative* coalitions organized on the basis of the global city versus hinterland divide. More specifically, to what extent does the support or opposition of elected representatives to trade liberalization reflect the district-level electoral influence of the mass global city and hinterland coalitions that we have uncovered in this chapter? The next chapter investigates these questions in the context of the recent history of the congressional politics of trade policy in the United States.

⁴⁵ The concluding chapter of this dissertation provides suggestions for future research in this vein.

Chapter 5: Mass Spatial Coalitions and the Legislative Politics of Foreign Economic Policy: Evidence from the United States Congress

5.1 Introduction

In orienting this chapter with respect to the previous one, and the arguments of the

dissertation more broadly, it is perhaps useful to begin with Lake's (2009) discussion of the

explanatory chain of open economy politics (OEP):

OEP begins with individuals, sectors, or factors of production as the units of analysis and derives their interests over economic policy from each unit's position within the international economy. It conceives of domestic political institutions as mechanisms that aggregate interests (with more or less bias) and structure the bargaining of competing societal groups. Finally, it introduces, when necessary, bargaining between states with different interests. Analysis within OEP proceeds from the most micro-to the most macro-level in a linear and orderly fashion, reflecting an implicit uni-directional conception of politics as flowing up from individuals to interstate bargaining (Lake 2009, 225).

Chapter 2 argued that in part as a result of the emphasis, in Lake's words, on "sectors or factors of production as the units of analysis", contemporary IPE has failed to adequately consider the dramatic geographic cleavage that runs through open economies, between "global cities", which prosper in a globalized world, and "hinterlands", which suffer stagnation and

decline. Chapter 2's central task central task was to explain the emergence of this distinctive economic geography by investigating the micro-level economic processes that constitute global cities and hinterlands as distinctive territorial formations that "win" and "lose" respectively, from globalization. In Chapter 3, I explored how the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands with respect to globalization, explained in Chapter 2, might plausibly shape mass political coalitions over foreign economic policy; I presented different theoretical accounts of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might engender spatial political coalitions over globalization that reflect the global city versus hinterland divide. In Chapter 4, I documented a systematic empirical relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and mass preferences over economic openness, even after controlling for a range of alternative determinants of mass preferences; I suggested that this pointed to the existence of "global city" and "hinterland" foreign economic policy coalitions that are distinct from the coalitions documented in previous IPE scholarship. I also presented suggestive evidence that the emergence of these spatial foreign economic policy coalitions is best understood in terms of a "local-tropic" theory of preferences.

Broadly speaking, this chapter investigates the second link in the explanatory chain described by Lake; that is, it shifts the focus from the question of whether societal global city and hinterland coalitions exist and how they arise, to the question of how the geographically explicit "demands" of these coalitions for liberalization or protection are filtered through and aggregated within representative institutions, and thereby affect the spatial organization of the legislative coalitions that "supply" foreign economic policies. To the extent that elected representatives are sensitive to the demands of the societal global city and hinterland coalitions documented in the previous chapter, we would expect to see the emergence of legislative "protectionist" and

"internationalist" coalitions—as revealed in patterns of legislative voting over foreign economic policy legislation—that reflect the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide.

In pursuing this investigation, this chapter makes an important contribution to the IPE literature on US trade politics, where the question of how congressional foreign economic policy coalitions are organized—as indicated in congressional voting over foreign economic policy bills—is an important and widespread topic of scholarship. In light of the United States's traditional postwar role as the world's hegemon and the political guarantor of a liberal international economy, congressional preferences and the organization of legislative foreign economic policy coalitions have systemic implications for the global economy as a whole, and the composition of "internationalist" and "protectionist" coalitions in Congress is therefore a subject of intrinsic interest. Moreover, the study of congress provides a laboratory in which scholars of IPE can explore issues of broader theoretical interest, such as the relative explanatory power of Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner models of political economy (Hiscox 2002), the challenges of global public goods provision (Broz and Hawes 2006), policy interdependence (Peters 2014), and the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the foreign economic policymaking process (Milner and Tingley 2011).

However, contemporary studies in IPE have not explicitly addressed the spatial organization of these legislative foreign economic policy coalitions, as it is shaped by the global city versus hinterland divide. While the study of globalization and territorial politics is part of a rich intellectual tradition in the field of American political development (and to a lesser extent in IPE itself), this tradition of scholarship is primarily historical in nature. Indeed, many scholars of IPE seem to have adopted V.O. Key's view that the spatial orientation of American politics,

which had its economic origins in a macro-level cleavage between "resource-based, extractiondependent" economies and an urban industrial core, has become increasingly irrelevant due to increased industrialization and urbanization in the historic American periphery; in a world of increased spatial equality, Key believed that the politics of sectionalism would give way to political competition that cleaved along class-based lines (quoted in Bensel 1984, 2013). Indeed, in light of this presumed obsolescence of the sectional divide, IPE scholars shifted their attention towards the class and sector-based analyses that now dominate modern studies of the political economy of globalization in the United States.

In light of the work presented in earlier chapters, however, the contemporary obsolescence of the nation's traditional regional cleavage, constituted by its physical geography, between a northern manufacturing core and an agrarian and extractive periphery, should not necessarily be seen as the death knell for political geography as an analytical and empirical approach to the study of the legislative politics of American foreign economic policy. Indeed, in our globalized post-industrial age, spatial inequality is once again a defining feature of the economic landscape; the renewed importance of spatial inequality in our post-industrial age is driven, of course by the new divide between global cities and hinterlands (discussed in Chapter 2). IPE scholarship on the congressional politics of foreign economic policy has not yet grappled with the question of how this new economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is affecting the congressional politics of foreign economic policy; especially in light of the growing salience of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands in the American economy, this is an important oversight, one which this chapter attempts to redress.

In what follows, I begin, in Section 5.2, with a review of the literature on regional coalitions in American foreign economic policy, as well as studies of Congress in IPE. This

review provides useful historical and intellectual context against which to situate the chapter's arguments and findings; importantly, it highlights the possibility of revitalizing the moribund tradition of regional and sectional analysis in studies of American foreign economic policy by shifting our attention from the industrial-era cleavage between a manufacturing "core" and an extractive and agricultural "periphery", to the post-industrial cleavage between "global cities" and "hinterlands".

My central theoretical argument in this chapter is presented in Section 5.3. In particular, I argue that office-seeking representatives have political incentives to appeal to mass global city and hinterland coalitions (documented in the previous chapter) within their districts (whichever happens to predominate in their districts) in order to build the winning coalitions that will secure their hold on office. Given these incentives, we would expect to see the emergence of legislative coalitions over foreign economy policy that reflect the global city versus hinterland divide, and which manifest in voting patterns over free-trade legislation. In particular, this suggests that the probability of representatives voting in favor of free-trade legislation increases as the relative size of the global city coalition within their respective districts increases; conversely, we would expect that the probability of representatives voting in favor of free-trade legislation decreases as the relative size of the hinterland coalition within their respective districts increases.

In evaluating this argument about how the political geography of spatial coalitions with respect to congressional districts leads to legislative foreign economic policy cleavages organized along global city versus hinterland lines, I analyze congressional roll call votes over trade policy legislation during what we might call the "post-NAFTA" era. In particular, the passage of NAFTA inaugurated a new era in the history of American trade politics; traditionally a champion of multilateral liberalization under the auspices of the global trade regime overseen

by institutions such as GATT and the WTO, the United States (like other countries) responded to growing obstacles to multilateral liberalization by pursuing an alternative strategy to advance the cause of international economic integration, namely, the negotiation of bilateral and regional liberalization agreements with trading partners. In the post-NAFTA era, the United States negotiated and ratified 12 trade agreements; eleven of these agreements were ratified by Congress in the period 2004 to 2011.¹ As Kucik and Moraguez (2013) note, "NAFTA raised the profile of PTA formation and heightened the controversy around them" (4); needless to say, this controversy was leveraged to great effect by Donald Trump in the 2016 American Election. To understand the origins of our present political moment as it relates to the politics of globalization—to understand how we arrived at the Age of Trump—we must therefore understand this crucial post-NAFTA period, and the forces that contributed to the bipartisan legislative coalition that made these agreements possible.

In Section 5.4.1, I adapt my theoretical argument from Section 5.3 to the historical and empirical context of the Post-NAFTA period. In particular, during this time, Republicans overwhelmingly supported free trade for partisan and ideological reasons; on the other hand, the Democratic platform on free trade during this time was considerably more ambiguous, and indeed, a notable intra-Democratic party cleavage over trade existed during this time, with some Democrats supporting protection, and others joining with Republicans in an internationalist coalition. Given the absence of a coherent Democratic platform on trade, I argue that Democratic representatives during this time period are likely to have been considerably more sensitive to the bottom-up "demands" of district-level spatial coalitions than Republican representatives, and that we might therefore ascribe the emergence of an intra-Democratic Party

¹ A trade agreement with Jordan was ratified in 2001 by a voice vote; I therefore do not consider it in my analysis here.

cleavage over trade policy, in part, to variation in the relative strength of global city and hinterland coalitions within Democratic districts. This suggests that the intra-Democratic Party cleavage over trade policy—the defining feature of this era in the US's trade politics—was likely organized along global city versus hinterland lines, with Democratic representatives from global cities significantly more likely to join with Republicans in a bipartisan "internationalist" coalition than Democrats from the hinterlands. In short, I suggest that the intra-Democratic Party cleavage over trade policy during this era of US trade politics was shaped by the global city versus hinterland divide, with variation in the relative strength of district-level global city and hinterland coalitions across Democratic districts shaping the composition of the Party's internationalist and protectionist wings; as a result, the intra-Democratic cleavage over trade policy that prevailed during the Post-NAFTA era may have been organized spatially, in a way previously unrecognized, by the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide.

In the remainder of Section 5.4, I first discuss (in Section 5.4.2) the construction of our empirical measures of the relative size of the district-level global city coalition in relation to the size of the hinterland coalition. In particular, I discuss how I bring together a variety of data sources—including spatially explicit data on US superstar headquarter establishments, congressional districts, US commuter zones, and gridded population data—to estimate the percentage of global city residents within congressional districts, which serves as the independent variable of interest in the analysis. In Section 5.4.2, I discuss the dependent variable in the analysis, a dichotomous indicator of whether a given representative voted for or against a given piece of free trade legislation (the sample pools votes on the eleven roll-calls from the post-NAFTA period). Section 5.4.3 discusses the dependent variable, while 5.4.4 then turns to a discussion of control variables that are used in the analysis, to account for other possible

determinants of congressional voting choices over foreign economic policy and to ensure that the relationship between spatial coalitions and congressional voting is not spurious. Finally, Sections 5.4.5 and 5.4.6 discuss model specification issues, and present the results. I find that as the percentage of global city residents within congressional districts increases (i.e. our empirical measure of the relative size of district-level global city coalitions), the probability that Democratic representatives vote in favor of free trade legislation increases, and that this effect is statistically significant and substantively important. However, district-level spatial coalitions do not exert a significant impact on the voting choices of Republicans during the time period under consideration. These results, which are consistent with the discussion in Section 5.4, suggest that at least in part, we can indeed trace the (perhaps surprising) emergence of a bipartisan internationalist coalition during the Post-NAFTA period to the role of district-level global city coalitions in pulling substantial numbers of Democrats towards membership in the internationalist coalition. In Section 5.5, I discuss how the relationship between mass spatial coalitions and the political parties may evolve in the coming years, and how the changing nature of this relationship may lead to fundamental changes in the structure of Congress's internationalist and protectionist coalitions, as US foreign economic policy leaves behind the "post-NAFTA era" and moves into a new and uncertain era. Section 5.6 concludes.

5.2 Literature Review: The History of Regionalism and American Trade Politics

5.2.1 Trade Politics and Regional Coalitions in Historical Perspective

While political geography has not been emphasized in recent scholarship on the politics of foreign economic policy in the United States Congress, IPE scholars cannot be accused of entirely ignoring the role of sectionalism in shaping the legislative politics of globalization. In particular, historically oriented IPE research, taking its cue from the field of American political development, has emphasized sectionalism in its analysis of the United States' relationship to the global economy in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Indeed, O'Halloran's (1994) claim that "historically, preferences regarding the tariff have been geographically determined" represents the starting point for much of this research (quoted in Chase 2015, 320). Typically, this research tradition posits the existence of three, or in some cases four, large-scale "macroregions" with different factor endowments-the Northeast (and sometimes the Midwest), the South, and the West-and different political preferences over foreign economic policy stemming from differences in their endowment-based production profiles. Foreign economic policy outcomes, in turn, were determined by a "winning coalition" of regional partners, consisting of an alliance of any two regions against the third. Peter Trubowitz, who is one of the few IPE scholars to insist on the relevance of regional coalitions in the modern era (his analysis extends into the 1980s) usefully describes this framework as follows:

America's three great regional formations-the Northeast, the South, and the Westhave always occupied different positions in the national and international economies and have had their own economic trajectories and social imperatives...these conflicts of interest...drive domestic debates over foreign policy...policy shifts represented the victories of new political coalitions that united two of the country's great regions (the Northeast and West in the 1890s; the Northeast and South in the 1930s; and the South and West in the 1980s) at the expense of the third (Trubowitz 1998, xiii-xiv).

James and Lake's (1989) explanation for the passage of the 1846 Walker Tariff (a liberalizing bill designed to open the American market) is rooted in an analysis of the economic incentives of "politically relevant regional groupings", and therefore provides an example of how this analytic framework has been applied by IPE scholars. During the period that they analyze, the antagonistic regional interests of the North and South with respect to trade policy were welldefined, with the industrializing North favoring protection for its manufacturing industries, and the extractive Southern economy, based on the production of primary products, favoring free trade. The agrarian West, however, was a wild-card, with interests cutting in both directions. Protectionist policies could increase the size and wealth of the domestic market, and thereby expand domestic sales opportunities for Western farmers; on the other hand, pursuing an international strategy of production for the global market also had promise. As James and Lake note, "logically, both [options] were feasible directions for Western farmers to pursue", and both the North and the South lobbied congressional representatives from the West to join either a freetrade or protectionist congressional coalition on the basis of these arguments (2). Ultimately, for the West, the relative profitability of pursuing either a protectionist or an internationalist strategy would depend on the openness of foreign markets to its agricultural exports. If foreign markets were closed, the success of Western agricultural interests would hinge on their ability to expand sales within a robust national market; on the other hand, to the extent that foreign markets were open for business, pursuing overseas sales opportunities presented a more lucrative path forward. James and Lake argue that it was Britain's abolition of the Corn Laws, which opened up its

market to agricultural imports from the United States, which ultimately drove the West's decision to join forces with the South and form an internationalist "winning coalition" that would secure passage of the (liberalizing) Walker Tariff in Congress. In short, the repeal of the Corn Laws increased the attractiveness to Western farmers of an alliance with the South, and this coalition pushed through liberalizing reform in the United States; in a counterfactual world where the Corn Laws were not repealed, the West would have presumably thrown in its lot with the North, since a robust internal market may have compensated for relatively limited export opportunities. While James and Lake investigate the question of whether British politicians deliberately made their decision to unwind the Corn Laws with a view towards encouraging the emergence of an internationalist coalition in the United States (i.e. did British politicians make a "conscious choice" to exercise "hegemonic leadership"?), this issue need not detain us here; the key point, for our purposes, is that their account exemplifies a tradition of analysis which views the United States in terms of three distinct regions carved out by the nation's physical geography, and explains policy outcomes in terms of the regional coalitions that form (through the efforts of political entrepreneurs) based on the pattern of spatially defined economic interests.

Perhaps the most ambitious and wide-ranging analysis of sectionalism in the United States (in terms of the range of issues it seeks to explain through a sectional framework, as well as its temporal domain) is contained in the work of Richard Bensel (1984).² Though Bensel is not an IPE scholar, and the scope of his work extends well beyond foreign economic policy issues, his analysis nevertheless provides a useful organizing framework for thinking about sectionalism in American trade policy in the century from 1880-1980. Bensel views "sectional

 $^{^2}$ Parts of my discussion of Bensel, and related authors, in this section draw on the discussion from Frieden et al's work on economic crises and political change (2016). I was the primary author of the discussion of Bensel's work in that working paper; the discussion here has been rewritten, since the concerns of that paper are very different from my concerns here.

stress", defined as "political conflict over significant public decisions in which a nation is divided into two or more regions each of which is internally cohesive and externally opposed to the other", as the "massive fact" of American political development (Bensel 1982, 658), and the decisive influence on the country's "institutional structures, political parties, and ideological belief systems" (Bensel 1984, 411). Rather than adopting the traditional three-region framework of traditional sectional analysis, which he criticizes as atheoretical and empirically imprecise, Bensel's unit of analysis is the "trade area", which is a geographic zone encompassing an urban center and its relatively less developed regional surroundings.³ Based on the votes of congressional delegations within the nation's trade areas, Bensel calculates an index of sectional stress, which captures the "relative degree to which regional delegations [i.e. trade area delegations] are internally cohesive and externally opposed to each other" (Bensel 1982, 660). He finds that regional delegations from trade areas in the "industrial, commercial-seaport core" of the Northeast and Midwest are consistently "pitted against an agrarian periphery [consisting of trade areas in the South and West, i.e. the Sunbelt]" in the sample of roll calls for which he calculates sectional stress scores in the century between 1880-1980 (Bensel 1984, 55; 22).

Bensel argues that this regionally defined political antagonism between trade areas in northern industrial regions and those in the Sunbelt was driven by their antagonistic economic interests, and that this "sectional alignment of political conflict has been extraordinarily stable" over time (6). However, temporal variation in the intensity of sectional conflict, as well as periodic shifts in the sectional support bases of the country's political parties, help to explain the dynamics of American political development. The historical variation in US foreign economic

³ Bensel's trade areas are constructed from various historical sources, and the precise techniques he uses to define these trade areas are beyond the scope of this discussion. For more information on trade area boundaries, please consult pages 421-443 in Bensel (1984).

policy coalitions can be situated within this larger narrative. Essentially, we can identify three main phases in the history of sectional conflict between 1880 and 1980: the "pre-New Deal" era of the 1880s to the early 1930s, the New Deal era of the early 1930s to the early 1970s, and a "post-New Deal" period from the 1970s onwards. The first era, between 1880 and the early 1930s, was marked by extremely high degrees of sectional stress between trade areas in the northern manufacturing belt, which was dominated by Republicans, and those in the periphery, which was controlled by Democrats. One of the central sources of sectional stress during this period was of course trade policy, since industries located in northern trade delegations benefitted from protective tariffs, while agricultural and extractive regions stood to gain from liberalization.

The Great Depression disrupted this pattern of partisan and sectional conflict—one in which the partisan divide closely coincided with the sectional one—by giving rise to the New Deal coalition, which consisted of an interregional alliance, brought together under the auspices of the Democratic party, between northern labor interests and capital-intensive industry (Ferguson 1984), and interests from the traditional Southern periphery.⁴ By encompassing interests on both sides of the sectional divide, the New Deal Democratic coalition ushered in an era of declining sectional stress across a range of issues⁵, relative to the previous era of partisan and sectional competition. With respect to trade policy in particular, the New Deal era prior to World War II witnessed substantial declines in sectional conflict over trade policy, a development that could be traced to the inclusion of free-trading interests on *both* sides of the sectional divide. More specifically, while northern industry had

⁴ These changes are also discussed in Frieden et al (2016), who are concerned with showing how changes in American political coalitions more generally can be traced to the effects of economic crises.

⁵ Though it by no means disappeared entirely; see Bensel 1984 (151)

traditionally been uniformly protectionist, a split in the business community opened up in the 1920s between mechanized, capital-intensive industries, which favored free trade, and laborintensive industries, which favored protection (Ferguson 1984); by including northern freetrading capital-intensive industries in its coalition along with northern workers and free-trading agricultural and extractive interests from the periphery, the historical pattern of sectional polarization over trade policy weakened.

Sectional polarization continued to decline over the course of the postwar era, partly due to changes in the Republican coalition. In the immediate postwar era, the trade policy preferences of labor intensive industries from the northern core—a traditionally protectionist constituency that formed the base of the Republican coalition—shifted after they suddenly found themselves internationally competitive in the wake of the wartime destruction of overseas markets (Hiscox 1999, 687). In addition, even after foreign competitors recovered, the Republicans did not return to their protectionist roots in part because of the increasing heterogeneity of their coalition, which grew to encompass not only their traditional constituency of labor-intensive northern industry, but also export industries from the South and West (Hiscox 1999, 687). In short, two related developments—the "steady decline in the regional concentration of the US economy", and the increasing sectional heterogeneity of partisan coalitions—contributed to a decline in sectional conflict over trade policy during the New Deal era and into the postwar period (Hiscox 1999, 687).

Bensel dates the breakdown of the New Deal coalition to the passage of Civil Rights legislation in the mid-1960s, a development which set the stage for the reactivation of sectional stress over trade policy in the ensuing years. As a result of Democratic support for Civil Rights legislation, the southern wing of the New Deal coalition essentially defected to the Republican

Party, while the Democrats increased their strength in the Northern core. As the northern industrial economy entered a period of decline, accelerated by the oil shocks of the 1970s, differences in regional economic interests, which had declined during the New Deal period, reemerged. In response, the Democrats moved in a protectionist direction to help their constituents—northern labor and capital interests—arrest the decline of northern industry (Bensel 316, 274). On the other hand, as the Republicans shifted into an increasingly dynamic and internationally competitive Sunbelt region (that, unlike the Northern core, benefitted from the higher commodity prices triggered by the oil shocks), they became increasingly supportive of free trade (Bensel 1984, 259; Trubowitz 1998, 200; Hiscox 1999, 687). Whereas the pre-New Deal era was characterized by a Republican-dominated northern core opposed to free trade and a Democratic periphery in support of it, by the 1980s, Trubowitz suggests that the partisan and sectional inversion of trade policy coalitions was complete; as its sectional support base shifted increasingly to the former periphery, "the Republicans...had become the party of free trade", while Democrats, whose base of support was anchored in the declining Northeast and Midwest, had become the party of protection (Trubowitz 1998, 200). Bensel and Hiscox, writing in different time periods, are more circumspect than Trubowitz, but also anticipate the sectional and partisan repolarization of trade policy coalitions. Bensel, whose work was published in 1984, documents the sectional inversion of the parties' support bases (406), and anticipates the reemergence of sectional stress over trade policy (along the lines suggested by Trubowitz) in the future, once the "representatives of the old manufacturing belt come to advocate a full program of economic protectionism in the now declining industrial core" (408). Hiscox, more than a decade after Bensel, also views the full inversion of the sectional support bases of the parties (relative to the pre-New Deal period) as a process that is underway, but does not (like Trubowitz)

view it as complete. Nevertheless, within the "next decade or two", he points to the possibility of

the

Final completion of the historic switch in party positions on trade: with the Democrats taking a unified stand in opposition to liberalization. The Democrats might simply grow more dependent on electoral support from labor and business in the older urban-industrial regions of the East and North from which emanates the most ardent opposition to trade liberalization (Hiscox 1999, 689).

We can summarize this tripartite history of American trade policy coalitions from the late

19th century onwards, suggested by the work of the authors discussed above, in the following

table:

| Era | Intensity of Sectional Conflict over Trade Policy | Pattern of Sectional Conflict |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| Pre-New Deal (1880-Early 1930s) | High-Intensity | Protectionist northern core represented by Republicans versus Free-trading Sunbelt periphery represented by Democrats |
| New Deal (Early 1930s-mid 1960s) | Low Intensity | Sectional conflict over trade policy declines as regional economic heterogeneity declines; and as parties become more regionally diverse and encompass both free-trading and protectionist interests |
| Post-New Deal (early 1970s onwards) | High-Intensity | Protectionist northern core represented by Democrats versus Free trading sunbelt periphery represented by Republicans |

| Table 5.1: History of Sectiona | l Conflict in US Trade Policy |
|--|-------------------------------|
| Tuble CH . Thistory of Beetiona | |

To what extent have the expectations of scholars predicting the emergence of a "Post-

New Deal" era in US trade politics, marked by sectional and partisan conflict between a

protectionist northern "core" represented by Democrats, and an internationalist sunbelt "periphery" represented by Republicans, come to pass? In their analysis of eleven trade bills ratified by Congress between 2004-2011 (the post-NAFTA era that I analyze below), Kucik and Moraguez (2017) note that partisan polarization over trade policy during this period was surprisingly low, especially when compared to the growing polarization of American politics as a whole, and in light of the predictions about the return of partisan polarization along sectional lines that we discussed above; in fact, as Kucik and Moraguez document, voting patterns in roll calls over free trade agreements through the 00's and into the second decade of the 21st century do not appear to have cleaved along strictly partisan lines. While Democrats have been more hostile to liberalizing free trade bills than Republicans, these bills have tended to pass with bipartisan coalitions of Democrats and Republicans.

In addition to the persistence of a bipartisan internationalist coalition, the predictions of scholars theorizing the prospective regional alignments of the post-New Deal era also seemed inconsistent with empirical findings about the regional underpinnings of legislative support for globalization during this time period. For instance, Milner and Tingley's (2011) study of foreign economic policy cleavages in the US Congress covers the post-New Deal era, when scholars such as Trubowitz and Bensel expected that protectionist sentiment would be concentrated in the traditional industrial "core", and that the rising Sunbelt—the traditional American periphery—would once again assert itself as the regional stronghold of American internationalism. Milner and Tingley control for regional effects, to account for arguments along these lines; however, their empirical results do not vindicate the expectations of the traditional sectional framework. Though they do not discuss their somewhat puzzling regional findings at length (a powerful testament to sectionalism's contemporary status as a scholarly afterthought), the coefficients on

their regional dummies (West, Midwest, and South, with the Northeast excluded) suggest that representatives from the South during the post-New Deal period were no more likely to support free trade legislation than representatives from the Northeast, and that representatives from the Midwest were *more* likely to support free trade than representatives from the South (Milner and Tingley 2011, 53). Needless to say, this empirical pattern—which suggests that during this time, the South's preferences over foreign economic policy were closer to the Northeast's than to the West's, and that the Midwest's preferences were closer to the West's than to the Northeast's sits uncomfortably with expectations about the resurgence of "core versus periphery" conflict between a protectionist industrial core and a free-trading periphery in the "post-New Deal" era.

5.2.2 Congressional Trade Politics in a World of Global Cities and Hinterlands: Towards a New Political Geography of Legislative Coalitions?

Perhaps as a result of the failure of sectional or partisan conflict to rematerialize along the lines predicted by scholarship carried out within the traditional sectional framework, interest in the spatial underpinnings of legislative coalitions waned, with scholars of IPE turning to traditional explanations of foreign economic policy based on "top-down" factors such as ideology and "bottom-up" factors such as district-level skill endowments or industrial composition (which would capture the relative strength of "demand" for particular foreign economic policies from district-level coalitions that stem from Stolper-Samuelson or Ricardo-Viner processes) to explain the persistence of the bipartisan "internationalist" coalition long into the post-New Deal era, and patterns of congressional voting more generally (Kucik and Moraguez 2017; Milner and Tingley 2011). As I discussed above, some scholars (for instance, Beaulieu 2002; Milner and Tingley 2011) do continue to include dummy variables for regional

groupings (i.e. West, Midwest, South, Northeast) to control for effects posited by scholars such as Trubowitz (1999) and Bensel (1984)⁶, but such considerations tend to be viewed as a historical artifact, and are of such little interest that they are rarely discussed, even when included in empirical specifications. Indeed, some scholars do not control for regional effects at all (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Fordham and McKeown 2003; Kucik and Moraguez 2017). In short, the possibility of systematic spatial cleavages in congressional coalitions is now an afterthought, with the scholarly agenda shifting to the class and sectoral composition of congressional districts and how these district-level variables, along with ideological factors, affect the voting of congressional representatives. In some cases, "geography enters [research examining class or sectoral models] ad-hoc when certain advantages and disadvantages happen (or are believed) to be unevenly distributed in space" (Chase 2015, 23), but societal foreign economic policy coalitions underpinned by spatially explicit interests stemming from economic geography are not viewed as an independent vector of influence on congressional coalitions (as they once were, during the time period analyzed by scholars of sectionalism in American politics).

However, it would be a mistake to simply accept that the persistence of the New Deal era's tradition of bipartisan and interregional cooperation over foreign economic policy issues, and the failure of partisan conflict to rematerialize along the traditional "core-periphery" axis analyzed by scholars such as Bensel, is a sign that political geography is a spent force in the political economy of American trade policy. Instead, the relevance of political geography might manifest differently, by working through the new set of "postindustrial" geographic fault lines that define the spatial economic cleavage between prosperous global cities whose local

⁶ Though Bensel, as previously discussed, uses the trade area, rather than these aggregate regional groupings, as his empirical unit of analysis.

economies are powered by the global economy, and national hinterlands whose local economies have been metaphorically "carpet-bombed by the global economy" (Tomasky 2017). This new spatial cleavage appears at a more disaggregated scale than the previous core-periphery division; global cities in the United States appear within both the historic core (i.e. New York, Chicago, and Boston) *and* the historic periphery (i.e. Atlanta, Los Angeles), just as the new peripheries can be found on both sides of the former sectional divide. Moreover, its origins are different. The macro-level core-periphery axis of the past century was "ecologically predetermined" (21) by features of the nation's physical geography, such as "geographical proximity to the advanced industrial economies of Europe and the location of deep harbors, inland transportation routes, and industrial raw materials" (Bensel 1984; 6, 17). On the other hand, the more granular economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands is not exogenously formed by physical geography ("first nature", in Cronon's terms), but is the product of the "second nature" processes discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

We must therefore consider the possibility that this new spatial cleavage over globalization, between global cities and hinterlands, could become the basis for a "new political geography" of legislative trade politics. Indeed, though Bensel himself was one of the scholars who (as we discussed above) anticipated renewed sectional stress over trade policy along the traditional core-periphery axis, between a Democratic industrial core and a Republican Sunbelt periphery, he presciently acknowledges the possibility of a "new political geography" of legislative politics developing along precisely these lines in the longer run. Writing during the initial years of the postindustrial economic restructuring of the American urban landscape, Bensel points to the possibility of a "postindustrial renaissance" within certain "metropolitan regions"—such as New York, San Francisco, and Boston—driven by the agglomeration of

multinational headquarters and highly productive "high-technology manufacturing, professional services, and export-oriented consulting firms in business, engineering, and finance", which congregate in these cities to exploit the benefits of labor market pooling, input sharing, and information exchange (Bensel 1984, 313-315).⁷ Though Bensel does not use the term "global city" to describe these metropolitan areas, his discussion appears to anticipate Sassen's (2001) understanding of this distinctive urban form. Looking ahead to the longer term future, Bensel anticipates political consequences stemming from this novel post-industrial economic geography, marked by the "growing divergence of interests between the low-technology, heavy industrial regions" that lose out from globalization (part of what I have been referring to as "hinterlands") and the urban centers of the "postindustrial renaissance" (which I have been referring to as global cities) that are at once the territorial control centers of the present globalized order (Sassen 2001) and that order's primary territorial economic beneficiaries.

Bensel was writing in 1984, when global city agglomeration processes were just growing in importance along with the growth of global supply chains (Baldwin 2012), as well as the proliferation of new information and communications technologies that increased the returns to innovation, which attracted firms into certain urban "knowledge and innovation hubs" in order to benefit from knowledge spillovers (Glaeser and Kolko 2010). From this temporal vantage point in the early to mid-1980s, Bensel writes that it "is far too early to project the political form this divergence will assume [but that] intense struggles over tariff barriers and other types of protectionist measures are likely"—possibly on a "historic scale"—as a result of territorial

⁷ If anything, Bensel's prescient anticipation of a "postindustrial renaissance" in which the New York, Boston, and San Francisco metropolitan regions emerge as the regional bases of a new "proglobalization" coalition was too geographically limited; several other metropolitan regions-from Seattle to Houston to Los Angeles to Chicago-have also repurposed and redefined themselves as global cities in the years since Bensel was writing.

distribution of interests associated with the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In other words, Bensel identified the embryonic formation of a "global city versus hinterland" cleavage, and predicted that over time, as this cleavage matured and grew in salience, congressional trade policy coalitions would come to reflect this economic geography. Of course, Bensel's prediction was made with the (at the time) relatively distant future in mind, and there have not been systematic scholarly attempts (of which I am aware) to assess whether, how, and to what extent his prediction about the emergence of legislative foreign economic policy conflict organized along global city versus hinterland lines has come to pass. However, in the thirty years since Bensel anticipated this new political geography of congressional trade politics, the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands has arguably become the defining feature of the contemporary economic geography of the United States; now is therefore a particularly opportune time to return to these issues, and more systematically investigate whether we can indeed detect evidence for a systematic relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and the legislative politics of foreign economic policy. Before turning to an empirical exploration of these issues (in Section 5.4), Section 5.3 briefly specifies an intuitive theoretical argument that explains how the micro-level incentives of office-seeking legislators beholden to mass spatial foreign economic policy coalitions (documented in Chapter 4) might contribute to the emergence of congressional coalitions organized along global city versus hinterland lines.

5.3 From Mass Spatial Coalitions to Legislative Foreign Economic Policy Coalitions: Theory

Why, in particular, might we expect to see congressional coalitions over foreign economic policy organized along global city versus hinterland lines, with representatives from global cities more likely to support liberalizing trade legislation than their counterparts from the hinterlands? The link between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and the micro-level incentives that shape the "choices and strategies of politicians" (Trubowitz 1998, 7) with respect to trade policy, is an intuitive one.

In particular, as we documented in the previous chapter, global cities are home to "global city coalitions" that favor globalization as a result of its beneficial impact on the local economy of global cities; on the other hand, hinterland locations are home to "hinterland coalitions" that oppose globalization because of the deleterious impact of global city versus hinterland locales. The location of congressional districts with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide is likely to shape the relative size—and by extension, electoral leverage—of mass "global city" and "hinterland" coalitions at the district level. Presumably, the voting behavior of office-seeking politicians attempting to consolidate and maintain district-level "winning coalitions" (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2004) is sensitive to the preferences of the spatial political coalitions (whether "global city" or "hinterland" coalitions) that predominate within their districts. We might therefore expect that office-seeking politicians representing districts that are strongholds of the nation's "global city coalition" would be more likely to vote to "supply" liberalization in response to the "demand" of these global city constituents; conversely, we might expect that politicians from districts in which the "hinterland" coalition is relatively larger would be more

likely to vote to "supply" protection in response to the protectionist "demands" of hinterland constituents.

It is of course worth acknowledging that to the extent that we live in a world in which the principal-agent relationships between constituents and their congressional representatives are characterized by a meaningful amount of agency slack, legislators may have considerable autonomy with respect to their voting decisions over trade policy. Moreover, local elections turn on many issues, and it is possible that membership in global city or hinterland coalitions notwithstanding, issues of foreign economic policy are second-order considerations for constituents voting for local representatives (Guisinger 2009)⁸; to the extent that this is the case, it would also increase the scope of legislator autonomy with respect to foreign economic policy issues. Admittedly, these considerations may diminish the relative sensitivity of legislators to the preferences of district-level global city or hinterland coalitions; nevertheless we would still expect office-seeking representatives to be sensitive, at the margin, to the preferences of these coalitions with respect to trade policy. Moreover, it is worth noting that even in a world in which representatives are not directly held accountable for their votes on foreign economic policy legislation, we would nevertheless still expect that the location of a district with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide, and the resulting balance of power between district-level global city and hinterland mass coalitions, would be consequential for legislative preferences and voting behavior. After all, even in a world of considerable agency-slack in which roll-call votes

⁸ To be clear, Guisinger's analysis suggests that the salience of trade is low even for individuals who have clear material interests with respect to trade policy. However, it is important to emphasize that this finding does not necessarily imply that the salience of trade is low for individuals whose preferences over trade are formed local-tropically, in response to the ways in which global city agglomeration processes shape their local environments; in other words, Guisinger's finding that trade policy is not salient for affected groups may not indicate trade policy's lack of salience, but weaknesses in the underlying model of political coalitions that she uses to derive individual preferences.

are not carefully scrutinized and foreign economic policy is a second-order issue for constituents, office-seeking politicians nevertheless have an independent interest in "promoting the fortunes of geographically defined constituencies" (Trubowtiz 1998, 7) for electoral purposes; to that end, we would expect that as the relative importance of the global city coalition (i.e. global city residents) to a prospective district-level winning coalition increases, politicians are more likely to embrace a free trade agenda (all else equal) as a means of promoting the welfare of global city locales within their districts, and thereby securing the support of these global city constituents. Conversely, as the relative importance of the hinterland coalition (i.e. hinterland residents) to a prospective district-level winning coalition increases, politicians are more likely to embrace a protectionist agenda (all else equal) as a means of promoting the welfare of hinterland locales within their districts, and thereby securing the support of members of the hinterland coalition therein. In other words, even if we live in a world in which the average voters that comprise mass coalitions are generally oblivious to the foreign economic policy records of their local representatives, politicians would nevertheless still have an incentive to infer the tacit preferences of district-level global city or hinterland coalitions (understood as the district-level share of constituents living in either global cities or hinterlands) in light of globalization's anticipated local effects across the global city versus hinterland divide, and "supply" liberalization or protection accordingly.

In short, office-seeking politicians have incentives to cater to the preferences of districtlevel spatial coalitions that "demand" liberalization or protection in light of globalization's local effects; even if the foreign economic policy preferences of these mass spatial coalitions are not directly expressed and this "demand" is not explicit (i.e. as would be the case if voters are inattentive), representatives would still presumably anticipate or infer these demands based on

their considered judgment about how globalization would affect the health of the district's local economy, which *is* of more direct concern to the average citizen (Arnold 1992).

In short, if representatives are indeed sensitive to the preferences of district-level spatial coalitions—as we would expect in a world where politicians care about winning and securing their hold on office—the spatial organization of congressional coalitions over foreign economic policy, as reflected in patterns of support and opposition to legislation concerning economic openness, would necessarily reflect the global city versus hinterland divide. In the next section, I begin to empirically assess whether district-level mass spatial coalitions do indeed exert such an impact on congressional voting, thereby leading to a legislative "global city versus hinterland" cleavage that reflects the mass spatial political cleavage documented in the previous chapter.

5.4 Spatial Coalitions and Congressional Foreign Economic Policy Alignments: An Empirical Examination of Roll-Call Votes on Free Trade Legislation in the Post-NAFTA Era (2004-2011)

5.4.1 Adapting the Argument to the Empirical Context of the "Post-NAFTA" Era

According to the argument in the previous section, we should expect the relative size of district-level global city and hinterland coalitions to shape the voting behavior of elected representatives with respect to foreign economic policy. However, before proceeding, it is important to note that the bipartisan "internationalist coalition" of the post-NAFTA era legislative era, which is our period of focus, was not "symmetrical"; it did not, in other words, consist of equal shares of the Democratic and Republican legislative delegations. Rather, the

composition of the bipartisan internationalist coalition could best be described as an asymmetric alliance between a Republican coalition almost always nearly (though not fully) unified in favor of trade agreements, and a Democratic caucus in which large minorities joined the Republicans to vote in favor of liberalizing agreements. The Republican unification around a free-trade position is unsurprising; in fact, the scholars of sectionalism that I discussed in Section 5.2 predicted this very outcome, arguing that as the party of capital with a geographic base of support in the Sunbelt (a traditionally pro-free trade region of the country), the Republican party would increasingly come to favor open markets for office-seeking reasons. Moreover, as Kucik and Moraguez (2017) note, politicians also have "policy-seeking" reasons to favor or oppose trade, and given the strong commitment of the Republican Party to free markets and small government, the allegiance of Republican legislators to the free trade cause was also cemented by a strong partisan and ideological consensus in favor of trade liberalization.

In light of the Republican unification behind a free-trade legislative agenda, and the existence of convincing explanations that trace this Republican consensus to policy-seeking incentives, it is unlikely that Republican representatives would have had strong office-seeking motives to respond to the "bottom-up" demands of district-level spatial coalitions during this time. On the other hand, the continued support of a relatively large share of Democrats for trade liberalization was *not* expected by scholars looking ahead to the Post-New Deal era, and therefore represents something of a puzzle. The task of explaining the bipartisan internationalist coalition of this time period, therefore, is fundamentally one of explaining why Democrats did *not*, as Hiscox expected, "[take] a unified stand in opposition to liberalization." One possible explanation, suggested by the argument in the previous section, is that in the absence of a strong ideological consensus over trade policy, Democratic politicians were especially sensitive (for

office-seeking reasons) to "bottom up" pressures over trade policy, and were therefore pulled in different directions over trade policy because of variation in the relative size of global city and hinterland coalitions across Democratic districts; in other words, some Democratic representatives may have supported trade openness in light of the large presence of global city coalitions within their districts, while others may have supported protection in response to the demands of large hinterland coalitions within their districts.

Such an argument is historically plausible; for instance, Geismer (2014) documents a gradual spatial shift in the structure of the Democratic coalition since the 1970s, from its "roots in the labor union halls" of Northern industrial cities (i.e. Bensel's traditional "core") towards the major metropolitan centers of the post-industrial economy emerging across the country, including, but not limited to, Boston (the empirical focus of Geismer's study), New York, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and the Bay area (Geismer 2016; Geismer 2014, 1). Given the fairly stark geographic polarization of the Democratic Party's representatives with respect to the global city versus hinterland divide, which continued into the post-NAFTA period, we might expect that Democrats from districts in the old industrial strongholds, with constituencies firmly part of the nation's hinterland coalition, would have been more likely to support protection than Democrats from districts in the emerging global cities, answering to constituents from the nation's global city coalition.

In short, Geismer's historical account suggests that from the 1970s into the new millennium, the Democratic Party's geographic base straddled the global city versus hinterland divide, as its geographic strongholds slowly shifted from the traditional manufacturing centers of the industrial belt (the emerging hinterlands) into the major metropolitan centers of the new postindustrial "core" (the emerging global cities). The existence of the mass global city versus

hinterland coalitions documented in the previous chapter, together with district-level variation in the strength of these spatial coalitions (as a result of the Democratic Party's straddling of the global city versus hinterland divide), may therefore have shaped intra-party variation in support for free trade within the Democratic legislative caucus. To the extent that it did, the resulting intra-Democratic legislative cleavage over trade, which helped to helped to facilitate the emergence of the bipartisan internationalist coalition that took hold during the post-NAFTA era, would have reflected the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide.

This discussion implies that we should expect the preferences of district-level spatial coalitions to exert a considerably stronger impact on the voting patterns of Democrats, compared to the voting patterns of Congress as a whole. To the extent that we do in fact see a strong relationship between increases in the relative size of district-level global city coalitions and the probability of Democrats supporting free trade legislation, it points to the geographic underpinnings of the intra-Democratic trade policy cleavage that opened up during this time. To evaluate these arguments empirically, we must first develop a district-level measure of the relative balance of power between global city and hinterland coalitions that could be used as an independent variable in an analysis of congressional voting patterns. Section 5.4.2 turns to this task.

5.4.2 The Independent Variable of Interest: Developing a District-Level Measure of the Relative Size of Mass Spatial Coalitions

As we discussed before, residents of global cities constitute the "global city coalition", while residents of hinterlands constitute the "hinterland coalition". The "global city coalition", in other words, is simply a coalition of global city residents, while the "hinterland coalition" is simply a coalition of hinterland residents. A first-cut measure of the relative size or extent of

global city or hinterland coalitions within districts, therefore, would simply reflect an estimate of the district-level percentage of global city (or hinterland) residents. As the percentage of global city residents within a district rises as a share of the district's overall population, for instance, it suggests (virtually by definition) a relatively larger global city coalition with a more powerful district-level political footprint.

To develop an independent variable that specifies how district populations break down in terms of global city and hinterland residents (and which therefore reflects the relative balance of power between the global city and hinterland coalitions constituted by global city and hinterland residents, respectively), we must first systematically relate the political geography of congressional district boundaries to the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide. In other words, we must map the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands onto congressional districts, and assess the extent to which a given congressional district encompasses a global city. Once we have clearly defined areas within congressional districts that could be considered global city locales, we can use population data to measure the ratio of the district population within global city locales, to district populations as a whole; as this ratio increases, which indicates a growing share of global city residents within a district's population, it points to an increase in the size of the district's global city coalition relative to its hinterland coalition.

In order to delineate the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, I use boundaries on commuter zones in the United States. Commuter zones in the United States are "clusters of counties that are characterized by strong commuting ties within CZs [commuter zones], and weak commuting ties across CZs" (Dorn 2009, Appendix); they are analogous to the travel-to-work areas that I used, in similar fashion, to delineate the economic geography of

global cities and hinterlands in the UK (See Section 4.4 in Chapter 4). After making a GIS dataset of commuter zones in the US⁹, I overlay a spatially explicit point layer of the headquarter establishments of the US's superstar firms over the shapefile of US commuter zones.¹⁰ I then calculate the percentage of superstar headquarter establishments in each commuter zone with respect to the total number of superstars headquarters in the sample as a whole, which captures the relative spatial agglomeration of superstar headquarters within each commuter zone.¹¹ I define the top 5% of the commuter zones according to this measure of the extent of superstar headquarter agglomeration as "global city commuter zones" since the boundaries of these commuter zones delimit urban areas whose economies are strongly shaped by global city agglomeration processes; the remaining commuter zones are considered "hinterland commuter zones", since the boundaries of these commuter zones delimit local and regional economies that are not heavily influenced by global city agglomeration processes, and therefore oriented to the domestic economy. In Figure 5.1, I present a map of global city commuter zones (i.e. commuter zones that meet the 5% threshold; labeled "global commuter zones" in the map) along with the remaining "hinterland" commuter zones (labeled "USA commuter zones" to denote the domestic orientation of the economies within these areas).¹²

⁹ I made the commuter zone shapefile by using information from the United States Department of Agriculture on how USA counties are related to commuter zones to collapse a standard county-level shapefile by CZ (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service).

¹⁰ The point layer of US superstar headquarter establishments is analogous to the spatial datasets of superstar headquarter establishments created in Chapter 4 for the analyses of the UK and Costa Rica. For details on how superstar firms are defined and identified, how their locations are geocoded, and data sources, please see Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.

¹¹ Again, this procedure to quantify the extent of superstar headquarter agglomeration with respect to spatial units was also used in Chapter 4.

¹² As I discussed in the previous chapter, the distance decay of agglomeration effects leads to intra-global city commuter cleavages over foreign economic policy; however, accounting for them here would be intractable.




Figure 5.1: Global city commuter zones in relation to the US's commuter zone geography

Next, I begin to relate the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands (as defined with respect to commuter zones in Figure 5.1) to the geography of congressional districts. In particular, I overlay the global city commuter zones identified above (and displayed in Figure 5.1) against district boundaries for the Congress in which a given vote was taken.¹³ As an example, the map in Figure 5.2 transposes the global city commuter zones shown above in Figure 5.1 onto congressional districts from the 108th Congress.

¹³ Congressional district shapefiles are provided by Lewis et al (2013).




Figure 5.2: Global city commuter zones overlaid against congressional districts

I then compute the intersection of these two geographic layers (using ArcGIS's "intersect" tool) to capture the physical area of each congressional district that falls within a "global city commuter zone." Many districts fall entirely within a global city commuter zone, and other congressional districts fall completely outside global city commuter zones (i.e. completely within hinterland commuter zones). Still other congressional districts, however, encompass both global city commuter zones and hinterland commuter zones. Consider, for instance, Figure 5.3, which shows the first congressional district in Massachusetts (in beige), which falls partly within a global city commuter zone (the boundaries of the relevant commuter zone are in thick black outline) and partly outside.




Figure 5.3: Intersection of global city commuter zone with First Congressional District of Massachusetts

Using high-resolution population rasters from Landscan (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), I apply ArcGIS's zonal statistics tool to compute total district populations within every congressional district, as well as the population within each congressional district in areas that overlap with a global city commuter zone. I then calculate the ratio of the population in each congressional district in areas that overlap with a global commuter zone to the total district population; I label this value globalcity_districtshare. Increases in this variable are associated with increases in the district's share of global city residents with respect to the overall district population. In congressional districts that fall entirely within a global city commuter zone, globalcity_districtshare is of course one, indicating that the district's entire population consists of global city residents; in districts that fall entirely outside global city commuter zones, and solely encompass hinterland commuter zones, globalcity_districtshare would be zero. In congressional districts in which there is a partial overlap with the boundaries of a "global" commuter zone, this ratio is somewhere between zero and one, and would depend on the spatial distribution of the district's population with respect to the relevant global commuter zone. To make this more concrete: in the context of Figure 5.3, globalcity_districtshare would be the population in the area that lies at the intersection between the beige area and the black outline divided by the population in the beige area.

I code a categorical variable, labelled *globalcity*, which takes on the value one if *globalcity_districtshare* is 0.5 or above, and zero if it is below 0.5. The intuition for the 50% threshold is simply that if global city residents are in the district majority, it implies that the median voter is a global city resident, and that it would therefore be rational for an office-seeking politician to cater to the pro-globalization preferences of the global city coalition. Conversely, if *globalcity_districtshare* is below 0.5, indicating that hinterland residents are in the majority,

340

office-seeking politicians would be beholden to the hinterland coalition. In other words, the *globalcity* variable indicates whether the relative size of the global city coalition renders it politically dominant, or politically impotent, in light of political incentives to cater to the median voter.¹⁴

I use this dichotomous *globalcity* variable as the measure of whether a district could be considered a "global city district" that is politically dominated by the global city coalition, or a "hinterland district" that is politically dominated by the hinterland coalition, since it is intuitive, theoretically grounded, and facilitates easy interpretation of the empirical results. However, for robustness, I also present specifications in which I use the continuous *globalcity_districtshare* variable, which reflects the district share of global city residents, as the independent variable of interest; we would expect increases in this variable to be associated with increases in the probability of office-seeking politicians supporting free trade legislation.¹⁵

¹⁴ Of course, this discussion presupposes that the spatial distribution of the population and the spatial distribution of the electorate are the same. This assumption is of course problematic, especially since global cities may have a larger share of non-citizens (who are not eligible to vote) than hinterland regions. Unfortunately, there is not reliable GIS data at a sufficient level of disaggregation on the spatial distribution of eligible voters, so I am forced to use the overall population in framing the hypothesis and empirical tests. The assumption that there is at least a correlation between the spatial distribution of the population and the spatial distribution of eligible voters seems valid to a first approximation, however, and given that this is a preliminary investigation of the topic, offers a useful basis on which to proceed.

¹⁵It is worth noting that the population based measures of the relative electoral clout of a district's global city or hinterland coalition developed here are preferable to alternatives, such as a simple district-level measure of the magnitude of superstar headquarter agglomeration. In this context, simple district-level measures of the agglomeration of the headquarters of superstar and global producer services firms unlikely to give us a fully accurate picture of a district's global city coalition, given the distortions produced by gerrymandering; for instance, it is conceivable that a district has a large share of superstar headquarters, but that a large share of the district population lives within hinterland areas of the district (or vice versa).

5.4.3 The Dependent Variable

Following recent studies of congressional voting over foreign economic policy (Broz 2011; Milner and Tingley 2011; Owen 2017; Kucik and Moraguez 2017) I pool votes over several trade bills into a single panel dataset to allow for a comprehensive yet efficient examination of voting patterns. The dependent variable, *pta*, is a dichotomous variable that records whether a representative voted in favor of (1), or against (0), a particular bilateral or regional free trade agreement. I include roll-call votes on eleven free-trade agreements concluded between the mid-2000s to 2011; the analysis therefore offers a comprehensive picture of the post-NAFTA era of US trade politics¹⁶. The roll-calls I use to code the dependent variable are over free trade agreements with the following countries: Singapore, Chile, Australia, and Morocco (from the 108th Congress); CAFTA-DR, Bahrain, and Oman (from the 109th Congress); Peru (from the 110th Congress); Colombia, Panama, and Korea (from the 111th Congress).¹⁷

5.4.4 Control Variables

In assessing how the relative size of a district's global city coalition affects congressional voting over trade policy, I control for several potentially confounding variables. These control variables are suggested by the large literature on the congressional politics of foreign economic

¹⁶ As I noted above, the only post-NAFTA free trade agreement not included in the analysis, with Jordan, was ratified by a voice vote.

¹⁷ Data on Congressional roll calls is from the website www.govtrack.us, which is a standard source of information on roll call voting. Of course, the district-level independent variables used in the analysis— both the independent variables of interest discussed above, and control variables—correspond to the district-level geography that obtained at the time a given vote was taken, from the year closest to that in which the vote was taken for which data is available.

policymaking. Unless otherwise noted, data for control variables comes from Foster-Molina's (2016) historical district-level dataset on congressional district demographics and legislator characteristics.

First, to account for the presence of district-level coalitions that form along Stolper-Samuelson lines, I control for district-level skill endowments using a measure of the district's population that possesses at least a college degree (prcntba). While this is a useful and oftenused proxy for skill-levels, in light of research that points to the potential noisiness of education as a proxy for skills, I also follow Broz and Hawes (2006) and Milner and Tingley (2011) in using an occupation-based measure of skills that calculates the district-share of individuals working in executive, managerial, and professional occupations. I collect data on this occupation-based measure, labelled *highskillpcnt*, from the US Census, which I access through Social Explorer.¹⁸ I control for industry-based coalitions driven by Ricardo-Viner effects using a measure of a district's "export orientation"; it is computed as the district-level ratio of the number of employees in comparative advantage (exporting) industries to the number of employees in comparative-disadvantage (import-competing) industries (exportorientation). I follow Broz's (2011) coding of exporting and import-competing industries, as well as his methods for assigning county-level employment data to congressional districts. Following Milner and Tingley (2011), I also control for additional district-level economic variables, including unemployment rates (*prcntunemp*), and the market value of district-level agricultural production (*marketvalue_agriculture*); agricultural economic data is taken from the Census of

¹⁸ There are fewer observations in models that use *highskillpcnt* because I was only able to access this data for the 111th Congress; in using this district-level data for other Congresses (on the assumption that these values should be relatively stable), I exclude districts from states that underwent redistricting (in which case districts across congresses are not comparable).

Agriculture.¹⁹

To capture the potential confounding effect of district-level "cultural coalitions" comprised of individuals with cosmopolitan or ethnocentric preferences stemming from deepseated symbolic identities—which previously discussed research (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Sabet 2014) suggests is an important driver of individual trade attitudes—I control for the percentage of foreign born individuals within a district (prentforeignborn). The assumption that underlies the use of this proxy is that districts with a larger share of the population born overseas are likely to have more globally oriented values and connections, which in turn attract cosmopolitan individuals, as well as encourage cosmopolitan sentiments more generally. This measure is analogous to one of the measures of cosmopolitanism used in the previous chapter's district-level analysis of Brexit (Section 4.3), and is rooted in Warf's (2015) argument about the mutually reinforcing association between urban diversity and cosmopolitanism. To the extent that global cities tend to contain individuals with more cosmopolitan symbolic attitudes than rural or domestically oriented urban areas, controlling for such a measure of cosmopolitanism give us some degree of confidence that our independent variables of interest are not simply endogenous to culture, but rather reflect the independent impact on congressional voting patterns of mass coalitions formed by the distinctive link between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and individual preferences (that was theorized and documented in previous chapters).

In addition to these district-level characteristics, I also control for confounding factors at the legislator level. Studies of congressional voting over trade policy consistently show that

¹⁹ The Census of Agriculture is taken at 5-year intervals; I use Census data that is closest in time to the relevant Congress.

legislator ideology is an important determinant of voting patterns, with more right-wing members of congress voting for liberalizing bills at higher rates than left-wing members. Following other studies, I use DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) to measure legislator ideology (*dwnom1*). In addition to ideology, I control for interest group donations from labor unions (*laborshare*), corporations (*corpshare*), and financial firms (*finshare*). Following Milner and Tingley (2011), donations from these sources are from the previous election cycle, and expressed as a share of overall donations to that representative. Data on PAC contributions is taken from the Center for Responsive Politics.

Finally, I include traditional regional dummies to specify the "grand region"—either the Northeast, South, Midwest, and West—in which a congressional district is located. This controls for traditional regional dynamics analyzed in past IPE scholarship (discussed in previous sections), and allows us to distinguish the impact of coalitions formed by the "old" economic geography of macro-regions (to the extent that they are still relevant) from the impact of spatial coalitions formed by the "new" economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In the models presented below, the Northeast is the excluded category.

Summary statistics for the independent variables are presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for the entire sample, while Table 5.3 restricts its attention to Democratic legislators.

345

| Variable | Count | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|--------------------------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| ptavote | 4681 | 0.655629 | 0.475213 | 0 | 1 |
| globalcity | 4779 | 0.471647 | 0.499248 | 0 | 1 |
| globalcity_districtshare | 4779 | 0.464522 | 0.44655 | 0 | 1 |
| prentunemp | 4771 | 7.144393 | 2.371084 | 2.8 | 22.9 |
| prentforeign | 4771 | 12.60384 | 11.27885 | 0.6 | 57.2 |
| laborshare | 4771 | 11.38006 | 12.19565 | 0 | 54.72346 |
| fireshare | 4771 | 17.33737 | 9.251174 | 1.532873 | 63.89922 |
| corpshare | 4771 | 52.71411 | 13.40507 | 13.1331 | 87.86611 |
| dwnom1 | 4776 | 0.154136 | 0.514907 | -0.751 | 1.361 |
| highskillpcnt | 4505 | 0.312879 | 0.070774 | 0.142674 | 0.551879 |
| prentba | 4771 | 27.1044 | 9.676935 | 6.8 | 65.7 |
| marketvalue_agriculture | 4533 | 6.21E+08 | 1.20E+09 | 0 | 1.21E+10 |

 Table 5.2: Summary Statistics (All)

| Variable | Count | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|--------------------------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| ptavote | 2185 | 0.36659 | 0.481984 | 0 | 1 |
| globalcity | 2231 | 0.616316 | 0.486392 | 0 | 1 |
| globalcity_districtshare | 2231 | 0.59595 | 0.444221 | 0 | 1 |
| prentunemp | 2231 | 7.865979 | 2.68995 | 2.8 | 22.9 |
| prentforeign | 2231 | 16.63862 | 12.88721 | 0.6 | 51.8 |
| laborshare | 2228 | 21.1583 | 10.29811 | 0.040236 | 54.72346 |
| fireshare | 2228 | 14.95338 | 8.442054 | 1.532873 | 63.32052 |
| corpshare | 2228 | 46.7607 | 12.27333 | 13.1331 | 82.49686 |
| dwnom1 | 2231 | -0.3678 | 0.129031 | -0.751 | 0.01 |
| highskillpcnt | 2137 | 0.310534 | 0.081948 | 0.142674 | 0.551879 |
| prentba | 2231 | 27.33411 | 10.98862 | 6.8 | 65.7 |
| marketvalue_agriculture | 2062 | 3.88E+08 | 8.38E+08 | 0 | 6.57E+09 |

5.4.5 Empirical Specification and Review

To test the relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables discussed above, I estimate both probit models with vote fixed effects, following Broz (2011) and Milner and Tingley (2011), who follow a similar strategy in their pooled analyses of roll call votes.²⁰ In addition, some studies of congressional voting over foreign economic policy, such as Bellemare and Carnes (2015) use the linear probability model to investigate congressional voting over foreign economic policy; for the sake of comparison, I therefore also specify linear probability models with vote fixed effects to estimate the determinants of congressional vote choices. As is standard practice in previous studies, I estimate models with robust standard errors.

I estimate models that include the entire population of Democratic and Republican legislators (i.e. pooled models), as well as samples that are confined only to Democrats. In light of the discussion above, we would not expect district-level spatial coalitions to exert a particularly large influence on Republican voting choices over trade policy legislation, since the strength of the Republican Party's partisan commitment to open trade during this time led to a virtually unified caucus with respect to support for free trade agreements (leaving relatively little variation on the dependent variable to explain). Empirically, this suggests that we would expect the coefficients on the *globalcity* and *globalcity_districtshare* variables to be small or statistically insignificant in pooled models that include Republican legislators. In contrast, we do know that there was considerable variation in Democratic support for free trade legislation, and to the extent that this variation was organized along "global city versus hinterland" lines as a result of

²⁰ Results for logistic regression were substantively very similar, so I omit these and focus on the probit model results

the sensitivity of Democratic legislators to the preferences of district-level spatial coalitions, we would expect increases in the size of district global city coalitions to be associated with an increased likelihood of supporting free trade legislation among Democratic representatives. Empirically, this suggests that in samples that are restricted to Democratic legislators, we would expect the coefficients on the *globalcity* and *globalcity_districtshare* variables to be statistically significant, and to reveal a substantively important positive relationship between the relative size of district-level global city coalitions and the probability of supporting free trade legislation.

5.4.6 Results

In Table 5.4, I present baseline models, both for models that pool Democrats and Republicans, and for those that include Democrats only; following Broz (2005, 485), the only variables I include in these simple baseline models are the measure of legislator ideology (*dwnom1*), and my independent variable of interest, the dichotomous *globalcity* measure, which takes on the value of one if the global city coalition is constitutes a district majority, and zero otherwise.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote |
| globalcity | 0.282*** | 0.0529*** | 0.588*** | 0.170^{***} |
| 6 | (0.0505) | (0.0112) | (0.0715) | (0.0194) |
| dwnom1 | 1.971*** | 0.567*** | 4.571*** | 1.332*** |
| | (0.0622) | (0.0109) | (0.293) | (0.0721) |
| 2020 | 0.00517 | 0.496*** | 0.810*** | 0.713*** |
| _cons | (0.0830) | (0.0193) | (0.141) | (0.0435) |
| Ν | 4681 | 4681 | 2185 | 2185 |
| Model | Probit | Linear | Probit | Linear |
| Sample | All Observations | Probability | Democrats Only | Probability |
| - | | All Observations | • | Democrats Only |

Table 5.4: Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation

 (Baseline Specification; Dichotomous Independent Variable of Interest)

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

The coefficients on *globalcity* in both linear probability models (Model 2, which pools Democrats and Republicans, and Model 4, which only includes Democrats) are highly statistically significant, and can be can be interpreted as marginal effects. The results from the pooled model suggest that the probability that representatives from districts in which at least a majority of the population is considered part of the global city coalition (i.e. where *globalcity=1*) support free trade legislation is 5.29% higher than the probability that representatives from districts with relatively powerful hinterland coalitions (i.e. where *globalcity=0*) do so. The results from the model estimated on the Democratic sample suggest that the probability that Democratic legislators from "majority global city districts" (*globalcity=1*) support free trade legislation is 17% higher than the probability that their partisan counterparts from "majority hinterland districts" do so. To uncover the substantive effects of the probit specifications throughout this chapter, I use Tomz et al.'s *Clarify* software (1998). Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present the substantive effects of *globalcity* for (respectively) Models 1 and 3 from Table 5.4.

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding dwnom1 at mean value) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|---|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity | From majority hinterland district (globalcity=0) to majority global city district (globalcity=1) | 0.093 | (0.062, 0.125) |

 Table 5.5: Substantive Effects for Model 1 in Table 5.4

Table 5.6: Substantive Effects for Model 3 in Table 5.4

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding dwnom1 variable at mean value) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|---|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity | From majority hinterland district (globalcity=0) to majority global city district (globalcity=1) | 0.201 | (0.154, 0.244) |

Here, the Clarify simulations suggest that in shifting the *globalcity* categorical variable from 0 to 1 while holding the ideological measure at its mean, the probability that a representative votes in favor of a PTA rises by 9.3% in the pooled model; in the model estimated on the Democratic sample, the corresponding figure is 20.1%. Again, these effects are highly significant. It is interesting to note that even though the impact of *globalcity* is highly significant and substantively important in the expected direction across these specifications, we see substantial partisan effects even in these simple baseline models; Democratic representatives appear substantially more sensitive to the relative size of global city or hinterland coalitions within districts than representatives in general.

In Table 5.7, I present results that include the control variables discussed above for linear probability and probit models that pool Democratic and Republic legislators.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote |
| globalcity | 0.108 | 0.00732 | 0.115 | 0.0110 |
| | (0.0697) | (0.0145) | (0.0721) | (0.0156) |
| prcntunemp | -0.0242* | -0.00625** | -0.0168 | -0.00515 |
| | (0.0140) | (0.00312) | (0.0140) | (0.00318) |
| prcntforeignborn | 0.00674^{**} | 0.00194*** | 0.00731*** | 0.00218*** |
| | (0.00264) | (0.000688) | (0.00273) | (0.000709) |
| exportorientation | 0.0760^* | 0.0159 | 0.0722 | 0.0151 |
| | (0.0460) | (0.00982) | (0.0461) | (0.00992) |
| midwest | 0.0913 | 0.0205 | 0.100 | 0.0224 |
| | (0.0728) | (0.0165) | (0.0727) | (0.0166) |
| south | 0.230*** | 0.0503*** | 0.205*** | 0.0509*** |
| | (0.0671) | (0.0165) | (0.0695) | (0.0172) |
| west | 0.331*** | 0.0649*** | 0.334*** | 0.0641*** |
| | (0.0762) | (0.0182) | (0.0763) | (0.0183) |
| laborshare | -0.0259*** | -0.00928*** | -0.0256*** | -0.00893*** |
| | (0.00446) | (0.000984) | (0.00447) | (0.00101) |
| fireshare | 0.0280^{***} | 0.00481*** | 0.0278^{***} | 0.00500^{***} |
| | (0.00413) | (0.000804) | (0.00415) | (0.000831) |
| corpshare | 0.00993*** | 0.00207^{***} | 0.00916*** | 0.00204*** |
| | (0.00323) | (0.000667) | (0.00321) | (0.000686) |
| dwnom1 | 1.366*** | 0.347*** | 1.367*** | 0.353*** |
| | (0.0884) | (0.0200) | (0.0904) | (0.0206) |
| prentba | 0.00925*** | 0.00186** | | |
| | (0.00335) | (0.000792) | | |
| marketvalue_agri | 7.60e-11*** | 1.31e-11*** | 7.52e-11*** | 1.40e-11*** |
| culture | (2.83e-11) | (4.20e-12) | (2.89e-11) | (4.41e-12) |
| highskillpcnt | | | 1.428*** | 0.289*** |
| | | | (0.440) | (0.110) |
| N | 4441 | 4441 | 4187 | 4187 |
| Model | Probit | Linear Probability | Probit | Linear Probability |

Table 5.7: Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation

 (Pooled Model With Controls; Dichotomous Independent Variable of Interest)

Robust Standard errors in parentheses; vote fixed effects included; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

The most important thing to note is that across the models in Table 5.7, our indicator of whether a district's global city coalition is sufficiently large for the median voter to be a global city resident (*globalcity*) does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the probability that legislators will choose to "supply" liberalizing trade legislation; this is consistent with the expectations set out above, in Section 5.4.1. Other results generally track those of other studies. Campaign contributions have significant effects on voting patterns, across model specifications; not surprisingly (given the United States' factor endowments), a higher share of contributions from labor unions is associated with a lower probability of support for trade agreements, while higher shares of contributions from finance-related and corporate PACs are related to a higher probability of support. Ideology also has a large impact on the probability of supporting trade agreements that is in the expected direction, with more right-wing legislators (as indicated by DW-NOMINATE scores) more likely to support liberalization through FTAs than their left-wing counterparts. Turning to district-level economic characteristics, district level skillendowments do appear to affect legislative coalitions over trade policy, as indicated by the positive coefficients on *prnctba*, the variable which measures the percentage of the district's population with at least a college-degree, and *highskillpcnt*, which measures the district share of individuals that work in skill-intensive occupations. Though the sign on the *exportorientation* variable is consistently in the correct direction, it only attains statistical significance in Model 1. The apparent importance of district-level skill-based coalitions arising from Stolper-Samuelson mechanisms to legislator voting decisions over trade policy, alongside the apparently weak or non-existent impact of industry-based coalitions arising from Ricardo-Viner effects, is consistent with Milner and Tingley's (2011) empirical findings about the importance of the factor-based (rather than sectoral) underpinnings of legislative foreign economic policy coalitions in the postNew Deal era. Higher district-level unemployment is associated with a lower probability of support for voting in favor of free-trade agreements, but its impact does not appear robust; the effect of district-level unemployment on the probability of supporting PTAs is statistically significant in specifications that use the education proxy for Stolper-Samuelson effects (*prcntba*, in Models 1 and 2), but not in specifications that use the occupational proxy (*highskillpcnt* in Models 3 and 4). The proxy for the size of district-level cosmopolitan coalitions, *prcntforeignborn*, is positive and significant, and, as expected, representatives from districts which produce a high dollar value of agricultural products (*marketvalue_agriculture*), and are therefore presumably involved in export agriculture, are more likely to support trade agreements than representatives from districts in which agriculture is less important for the economy, all else equal.

To help get a sense of the substantive impact of the variables from Table 5.7's probit specifications, Table 5.8 presents substantive effects for selected variables in Model 1 from Table 5.7, while Figure 5.4 presents these substantive effects in graphical form; Table 5.9 presents substantive effects for selected variables in Model 3 from Table 5.7, while Figure 5.5 presents these results in graphical form.

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding other variables at mean values) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|---|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity | From majority hinterland district (globalcity=0) to majority global city district (globalcity=1) | 0.0349 | (-0.007, 0.0757) |
| prentba | One standard deviation above mean | 0.031 | (0.01, 0.052) |
| laborshare | One standard deviation above mean | -0.11 | (-0.152, -0.07) |
| fireshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.075 | (0.054, 0.093) |
| corpshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.04 | (0.014, 0.064) |
| dwnom1 | One standard deviation above mean : | 0.172 | (0.158, 0.187) |

 Table 5.8: Substantive Effects of Selected Variables From Model 1 in Table 5.7




Figure 5.4: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.8

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding other variables at mean values) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|---|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity | From peripheral district (globalcity=0) to "global city" district (globalcity=1) | 0.038 | (-0.009, 0.082) |
| highskillpent | One standard deviation above mean | 0.032 | (0.0129, 0.052) |
| laborshare | One standard deviation above mean | -0.11 | (-0.15, -0.07) |
| fireshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.076 | 0.0566, 0.0957) |
| corpshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.038 | (0.0115, 0.062) |
| dwnom1 | One standard deviation above mean | 0.176 | (0.16, 0.19) |

Table 5.9: Substantive Effects of Selected Variables From Model 3 in Table 5.7




Figure 5.5: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.9

In Table 5.10, I present the results from linear probability and probit models that add the full suite of controls to the baseline specifications from samples that *only* include Democratic representatives.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-----------------------------|------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote |
| globalcity | 0.345*** | 0.0767^{***} | 0.417*** | 0.0925*** |
| | (0.0972) | (0.0243) | (0.100) | (0.0248) |
| prcntunemp | 0.0174 | 0.00624 | 0.0211 | 0.00685 |
| | (0.0186) | (0.00435) | (0.0188) | (0.00435) |
| prentforeignborn | 0.00557 | 0.00145 | 0.00708^{*} | 0.00200** |
| | (0.00352) | (0.000951) | (0.00376) | (0.00101) |
| exportorientation | -0.0929 | -0.0197 | -0.0970 | -0.0223 |
| | (0.0669) | (0.0168) | (0.0675) | (0.0169) |
| midwest | 0.0986 | 0.0351 | 0.102 | 0.0375 |
| | (0.120) | (0.0269) | (0.121) | (0.0270) |
| south | 0.592*** | 0.153*** | 0.580^{***} | 0.153*** |
| | (0.106) | (0.0266) | (0.110) | (0.0279) |
| west | 0.659*** | 0.175*** | 0.660^{***} | 0.173*** |
| | (0.105) | (0.0262) | (0.107) | (0.0265) |
| laborshare | -0.0288*** | -0.00709*** | -0.0280*** | -0.00677*** |
| | (0.00641) | (0.00142) | (0.00652) | (0.00144) |
| fireshare | 0.0298*** | 0.00724^{***} | 0.0314*** | 0.00761*** |
| | (0.00563) | (0.00144) | (0.00578) | (0.00147) |
| corpshare | 0.00981** | 0.00206^{*} | 0.00851^{*} | 0.00180^{*} |
| | (0.00437) | (0.00108) | (0.00441) | (0.00109) |
| dwnom1 | 3.740*** | 0.991*** | 3.854*** | 1.016*** |
| | (0.389) | (0.0906) | (0.401) | (0.0920) |
| prentba | 0.0237*** | 0.00622*** | | |
| | (0.00453) | (0.00118) | | |
| marketvalue_agri culture | 7.09e-11 | 1.61e-11 | 6.90e-11 | 1.55e-11 |
| | (4.62e-11) | (1.28e-11) | (4.63e-11) | (1.28e-11) |
| highskillpcnt | | | 2.903*** | 0.773*** |
| | | | (0.572) | (0.151) |
| Ν | 2023 | 2023 | 1941 | 1941 |
| Model | Probit | Linear Probability | Probit | Linear Probability |

Table 5.10: Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation
 (Democrats-Only Model With Controls; Dichotomous Independent Variable of Interest)

Robust Standard errors in parentheses; vote fixed effects included * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

In contrast to the results from the pooled specifications in Table 5.7, the results in Table 5.10 suggest that the impact of *globalcity* on the voting patterns of Democratic representatives is statistically significant and substantively important. Consider, first the linear probability models, which are easy to interpret. In Model 2, which controls for Stolper-Samuelson effects with an educational proxy (*highered*), moving from a congressional district in which hinterland coalitions are in the majority (*globalcity=0*) to one in which global city coalitions are in the majority (*i.e. globalcity=1*), leads to a 7.6% increase in the probability that a Democratic representative votes in favor of a preferential trade agreement, all else equal. In Model 4, which controls for the presence of skill-based coalitions with an occupational-skill proxy (*highskill*), shifting the *globalcity* variable from 0 to 1 is associated with a 9.25% increase in the probability that a Democratic legislator supports free trade legislation.

Turning to the probit specifications, Table 5.11 below conveys the substantive effects of the different independent variables— including *globalcity*—for Model 1 in Table 5.10, while Figure 5.6 presents these effects graphically in a substantive effects plot:

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding other variables at mean values) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|---|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity | From majority hinterland district (globalcity=0) to majority global city district (globalcity=1) | 0.113 | (0.05, 0.17) |
| prentba | One standard deviation above mean | 0.094 | (0.057, 0.133) |
| laborshare | One standard deviation above mean | -0.088 | -0.122 |
| fireshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.092 | (0.054, 0.126) |
| corpshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.04 | (0.0009, 0.08) |
| dwnom1 | One standard deviation above mean | 0.185 | (0.145, 0.225) |

 Table 5.11: Substantive Effects of Variables From Model 1 in Table 5.10




Figure 5.6: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.11

In Table 5.12, I present the substantive effects for Model 3 in Table 5.10, while Figure 5.7 conveys these results visually.

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding other variables at mean values) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|---|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity | From peripheral district (globalcity=0) to "global city" district (globalcity=1) | 0.137 | (0.076, 0.195) |
| highskillpcnt | One standard deviation above mean | 0.084 | (0.05, 0.116) |
| laborshare | One standard deviation above mean | -0.085 | (-0.122, -0.049) |
| fireshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.095 | (0.056, 0.13) |
| corpshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.036 | (-0.0009, 0.071) |
| dwnom1 | One standard deviation above mean | (0.189) | (0.147, 0.234) |

 Table 5.12: Substantive Effects of Variables from Model 3 in Table 5.10




Figure 5.7: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.12

In short, in Table 5.10's Model 1, we see that moving *globalcity* from 0 to 1 (i.e. from a district in which more than a majority of the population are hinterland residents to one in which more than a majority are global city residents) while holding other variables at their means is associated with an 11.3% increase in the probability that a Democratic legislator supports free-trade legislation; in Model 3, the analogous increase in probability is 13.7%

In general, the substantive impact of the control variables in the Democratic sample are roughly similar to their impact in the pooled sample. The district-level skill variables, campaign contribution variables, and the legislator ideology variable (dwnom1) all remain significant and have the same sign; notably, however, the substantive impacts of the skill variables are substantially larger in the Democratic sample. Here, as in the pooled sample, the measure of the size of district-level employment in export industries (*exportorientation*) is not a significant predictor of congressional voting choices.²¹ In addition, unlike in the pooled sample, the agricultural orientation of districts, measured by the market value of a district's agricultural production, does not exert a significant impact on the voting of legislators in the "Democratic only" sample. This is noteworthy, since one might have expected that the different interests of agricultural and industrial districts contributed to variation in trade policy voting choices among Democrats; the results here suggest that such a division did not structure the intra-Democratic cleavage over trade, or that at the very least, the spatial organization of this cleavage tracked the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands more closely than a more conventional "industrial versus agricultural" or "urban versus rural" divide. It is also worth noting that while the variable that measures the district-share of foreign born individuals (prcntforeignborn)—our proxy for the district-share of individuals with cosmopolitan identities—is consistently

²¹ Unlike in the pooled sample, however, the sign on the Ricardo-Viner variable is negative; this is somewhat puzzling, but since the variable never attains significance, I set this issue aside.

significant in the pooled sample from Table 5.7, its effects do not appear robust in the Democratic sample; in Table 5.10 it is positive and significant in models that use the occupational measure of Stolper-Samuelson coalitions, but not in models that use the educational proxy for district-level skill endowments.

While using a categorical measure of whether the majority of a district consists of residents from global city commuter zones is an intuitive, theoretically grounded, and empirically useful index of a district's profile with respect to the relative size of its global city and hinterland coalitions, it is worthwhile to also assess the results of models in which the relative size of global city coalitions is measured on a continuous scale, as the percentage of district residents who live within global city commuter zones; as we discussed above, this variable is labelled *globalcity_districtshare*. In Table 5.13, I present baseline specifications that are analogous to those presented for the dichotomous *globalcity* variable in Table 5.4:

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote |
| globalcity_di strictshare | 0.304*** | 0.0556*** | 0.638*** | 0.186*** |
| | (0.0551) | (0.0126) | (0.0778) | (0.0217) |
| dwnom1 | 1.970*** | 0.567*** | 4.650*** | 1.358*** |
| | (0.0619) | (0.0109) | (0.293) | (0.0729) |
| | | | | |
| _cons | -0.00331 | 0.495^{***} | 0.820^{***} | 0.716^{***} |
| | (0.0835) | (0.0195) | (0.140) | (0.0435) |
| Ν | 4681 | 4681 | 2185 | 2185 |
| Model | Probit | Linear | Probit | Linear |
| Sample | All observations | Probability | Democrats Only | Probability |
| | | All observations | | Democrats Only |

Table 5.13: Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation(Baseline Specification; Continuous Independent Variable of Interest)

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

We note a similar pattern to the one that appeared in Table 5.4: the

globalcity_districtshare variable is consistently positive and statistically significant across the probit and linear probability models, but increases in the district-level percentage of global city commuter zone residents are associated with a considerably larger increase in the probability that a representative votes for free trade legislation in the Democratic sample than in the pooled sample. That is, the substantive impact of the *globalcity_districtshare* variable is considerably larger in the Democratic sample, which indicates that Democratic legislators are relatively sensitive to the size of global city coalitions within their districts, and that variation along this dimension contributed to the intra-Democratic Party cleavage over trade policy. Taking the linear probability models first, the results show that increasing the *globalcity_districtshare* variable by one standard deviation above its mean in the pooled sample is associated with a 2.4% increase in the probability that a representative supports free trade legislation, while in the

365

Democratic sample, it is associated with an 8.1% increase in the probability that a Democratic representative supports free trade legislation. In the probit specifications, increasing *globalcity_districtshare* by one standard deviation above its mean in the pooled and Democratic samples is associated, respectively, with a 4.2% and 9.6% increase in the probability that a representative votes in favor of a free trade agreement (while holding other variables at their means)

In Table 5.14, I present results for models that add additional controls to the baseline specifications for the pooled sample that uses the continuous independent variable of interest:

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote | ptavote |
| globalcity_distri ctshare | 0.117 | 0.00349 | 0.117 | 0.00601 |
| | (0.0808) | (0.0172) | (0.0846) | (0.0183) |
| prentunemp | -0.0241* | -0.00614* | -0.0167 | -0.00501 |
| | (0.0140) | (0.00313) | (0.0140) | (0.00319) |
| prentforeignborn | 0.00663** | 0.00202*** | 0.00733*** | 0.00229*** |
| | (0.00270) | (0.000705) | (0.00280) | (0.000727) |
| exportorientation | 0.0748 | 0.0158 | 0.0712 | 0.0149 |
| | (0.0461) | (0.00983) | (0.0463) | (0.00992) |
| midwest | 0.0894 | 0.0210 | 0.0996 | 0.0232 |
| | (0.0730) | (0.0165) | (0.0731) | (0.0167) |
| south | 0.230*** | 0.0500*** | 0.205*** | 0.0504*** |
| | (0.0670) | (0.0165) | (0.0695) | (0.0172) |
| west | 0.332*** | 0.0652*** | 0.336*** | 0.0644*** |
| | (0.0764) | (0.0183) | (0.0764) | (0.0184) |
| aborshare | -0.0260*** | -0.00927*** | -0.0257*** | -0.00893*** |
| | (0.00446) | (0.000985) | (0.00448) | (0.00101) |
| fireshare | 0.0279*** | 0.00482*** | 0.0278*** | 0.00501*** |
| | (0.00414) | (0.000804) | (0.00416) | (0.000831) |
| corpshare | 0.00993*** | 0.00207*** | 0.00917*** | 0.00204*** |
| | (0.00323) | (0.000667) | (0.00321) | (0.000686) |
| lwnom1 | 1.363*** | 0.347*** | 1.363*** | 0.352*** |
| | (0.0883) | (0.0201) | (0.0903) | (0.0206) |
| orentba | 0.00922*** | 0.00193** | | |
| - | (0.00336) | (0.000798) | | |
| narketvalue_agr culture | 7.61e-11*** | 1.28e-11*** | 7.45e-11** | 1.36e-11*** |
| | (2.85e-11) | (4.23e-12) | (2.91e-11) | (4.45e-12) |
| nighskillpent | | | 1.426*** | 0.301*** |
| N 7 | 4 4 4 1 | 4441 | (0.444) | (0.111) |
| V Model | 4441 Probit | 4441 Linear Probability | 4187 Probit | 4187 Linear Probability |

Table 5.14: Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation

 (Pooled Model With Controls; Continuous Independent Variable of Interest)

Robust Standard errors in parentheses; vote fixed effects in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

As in the analogous pooled models that use the dichotomous *globalcity* measure and include a large suite of controls (Table 5.7), we see that across the models in Table 5.14, the *globalcity_districtshare* variable is not statistically significant at conventional thresholds.

In Table 5.15, I present results for models that add additional controls to the baseline specifications for the Democratic-only sample that uses the continuous independent variable of interest.

| | (1) ptavote | (2) ptavote | (3) ptavote | (4) ptavote |
|------------------------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | plavole | plavole | plavole | plavole |
| globalcity_distric tshare | 0.405*** | 0.0911*** | 0.488*** | 0.109*** |
| | (0.113) | (0.0284) | (0.118) | (0.0293) |
| prentunemp | 0.0176 | 0.00616 | 0.0206 | 0.00662 |
| | (0.0186) | (0.00436) | (0.0188) | (0.00438) |
| prentforeignborn | 0.00475 | 0.00126 | 0.00605 | 0.00177^{*} |
| | (0.00362) | (0.000976) | (0.00388) | (0.00104) |
| exportorientation | -0.0980 | -0.0213 | -0.101 | -0.0238 |
| | (0.0668) | (0.0169) | (0.0673) | (0.0170) |
| nidwest | 0.0759 | 0.0298 | 0.0747 | 0.0312 |
| | (0.120) | (0.0271) | (0.121) | (0.0272) |
| south | 0.593*** | 0.154^{***} | 0.583*** | 0.154*** |
| | (0.106) | (0.0265) | (0.110) | (0.0278) |
| west | 0.662*** | 0.176^{***} | 0.665*** | 0.173*** |
| | (0.106) | (0.0263) | (0.108) | (0.0266) |
| laborshare | -0.0289*** | -0.00715*** | -0.0281*** | -0.00686*** |
| | (0.00642) | (0.00141) | (0.00653) | (0.00143) |
| fireshare | 0.0296*** | 0.00716*** | 0.0310*** | 0.00751*** |
| | (0.00563) | (0.00144) | (0.00578) | (0.00146) |
| corpshare | 0.0101** | 0.00209^{*} | 0.00877^{**} | 0.00183^{*} |
| | (0.00437) | (0.00108) | (0.00441) | (0.00109) |
| dwnom1 | 3.778*** | 0.998*** | 3.891*** | 1.022*** |
| | (0.387) | (0.0902) | (0.398) | (0.0916) |
| prentba | 0.0234*** | 0.00614*** | | |
| | (0.00456) | (0.00119) | | |
| marketvalue_agri culture | 7.35e-11 | 1.72e-11 | 7.12e-11 | 1.65e-11 |
| | (4.68e-11) | (1.29e-11) | (4.70e-11) | (1.29e-11) |
| highskillpcnt | | | 2.808*** | 0.751*** |
| mgnokinpent | | | (0.582) | (0.154) |
| N | 2023 | 2023 | 1941 | 1941 |
| Model | Probit | Linear Probability | Probit | Linear Probability |

Table 5.15: Impact of District-Level Spatial Coalitions on Support for Free Trade Legislation(Democrats-Only Model With Controls; Continuous Independent Variable of Interest)

Robust Standard errors in parentheses; Vote fixed Effects included; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Across all models in Table 5.15, we see that *globalcity_districtshare* is statistically significant and substantively important. First, we consider the substantive effects of globalcity_districtshare in the linear probability models (Models 2 and 4). In Model 2, which uses the education proxy for the size of district-level high-skill coalitions (prcntba), a one standard deviation increase in *globalcity districtshare* is associated with a 3.96% increase in the probability that a representative supports free trade legislation; in Model 4, which uses the occupational proxy (highskillpcnt), a one standard deviation increase in globalcity_districtshare is associated with a 4.79% increase in the probability that a representative supports free trade legislation. In the probit specifications, a one standard deviation increase in globalcity_districtshare is associated with a 5.79% increase in the probability that a representative supports free trade in the model that uses an educational proxy for skill-levels (Model 1 in Table 5.15), and a 6.9% increase in the probability that a Democratic representative supports free trade in the probit model that uses an occupational proxy for Stolper-Samuelson effects (Model 3 in Table 5.15). In calculating these effects, all other variables are held at their means. Below, Tables 5.16 and 5.17, and Figures 5.8 and 5.9, provide additional details on the substantive effects of various variables used in the probit specifications for the Democratic-only sample.

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding other variables at mean values) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|--------------------------|--|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity_districtshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.0579 | (0.0245, 0.91) |
| prentba | One standard deviation above mean | 0.092 | (0.055, 0.129) |
| laborshare | One standard deviation above mean | -0.089 | (-0.12, -0.055) |
| fireshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.09 | (0.056, 0.125) |
| corpshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.042 | (0.0049, 0.08) |
| dwnom1 | One standard deviation above mean | 0.18 | (0.145, 0.227) |

 Table 5.16:
 Substantive Effects for Model 1 in Table 5.15




Figure 5.8: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.16

| Independent Variable | Change in Independent Variable (Holding other variables at mean values) | Change in Probability of Voting for PTA | 95% Confidence Interval |
|--------------------------|--|--|----------------------------|
| globalcity_districtshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.069 | (0.036, 0.1) |
| highskillpent | One standard deviation above mean | 0.08 | (0.0475, 0.116) |
| laborshare | One standard deviation above mean | -0.086 | (-0.119, -0.0475) |
| fireshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.09 | (0.058, 0.134) |
| corpshare | One standard deviation above mean | 0.0367 | (0.00026, 0.0758) |
| dwnom1 | One standard deviation above mean | 0.192 | (0.154, 0.23) |

 Table 5.17: Substantive Effects for Model 3 in Table 5.15




Figure 5.9: Substantive effects plot for results in Table 5.17

Finally, it is worth noting the impact of the regional dummy variables, which are included to clearly distinguish the impact on legislative voting of the spatial coalitions engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands from the impact of regional coalitions that emanate from the macro-level economic geography of "grand regions" (which was the focus of the older tradition of sectional analysis). Interestingly, though the effects of the regional dummy variables in Milner and Tingley (2011) were inconsistent with the "post-New Deal" account of sectionalism offered by scholars such as Trubowitz (see the discussion earlier), the regional dummy variables in the empirical analysis here consistently perform according to some of the expectations of the "post-New Deal" view of foreign economic policy coalitions. In particular, representatives from districts in the Northeast and Midwest (the old "core" defined by the industrial belt) are significantly less likely to support trade liberalization than representatives from the South and West (the old resource-based "periphery"). For the Democrats, this suggests that during this period of time, within any particular macro-region, representatives from districts with larger shares of residents from global city commuter zones (i.e. a larger district-level global city coalition) were significantly more likely to vote in favor of free trade, but that in the aggregate, representatives from the South and West were more likely to vote in favor of liberalization than representatives from the Northeast and Midwest. The apparent persistence of these traditional macro-regional cleavages for the organization of congressional coalitions (as indicated in the results here), alongside the relevance of the newer global city versus hinterland cleavage (for Democrats) is interesting, and future research could perhaps investigate the relationship between the old industrial divides and the emerging geography of the post-industrial economy (of which the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands is the most salient aspect) in more detail. The joint relevance of both of these spatial cleavages perhaps suggests

373

that from the standpoint of political geography, the "post-NAFTA" period was one of political transition, the historical moment when the declining regional cleavage of the past intersected in space and time with the ascendant geographic divide of the future; to the extent that this is the case, it would be interesting to assess whether, in the future, the legacy of the old industrial cleavages declines as the global city versus hinterland political cleavage becomes increasingly important.

5.4.7 Discussion

Thinking back to our earlier discussion of previous scholarship on regionalism and American trade politics, we can recall that in some historical periods, regional economic cleavages mapped on neatly to partisan cleavages over foreign economic policy, contributing to a high degree of regionally organized partisan polarization ("sectional stress" in Bensel's account) over the politics of globalization. The pre-New Deal era (i.e. the late 19th century to the early 1930s), for instance, was marked by Republican party dominance in a protectionist industrial core, and Democratic dominance in a free-trading agrarian and extractive periphery; as a result, regional economic cleavages were, ipso facto, partisan in nature, and trade politics was highly polarized along party-lines. In other eras (most dramatically, in the postwar era) trade policy interests were not geographically-defined to the same extent, and partisan coalitions were also more regionally heterogeneous; both factors contributed to a reduction in the salience of sectionalism in trade policy. In response to economic and political developments of the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as Trubowitz (1996), Hiscox (1999), and Bensel (1984) suggested that sectionalism in American trade politics was poised to revive, although in a pattern that would invert the partisan and sectional alignments of the pre-New Deal era: with the Democrats now the protectionist party of the (now-declining) industrial core, and the Republicans now the free-

374

trading party of the ascendant Sunbelt. This scenario did not quite come to pass, however. Indeed, one of the central facts of American trade politics in the post-NAFTA period was its persistent bipartisanship (even amidst a climate of increased partisan polarization more generally), a point stressed in Kucik and Moraguez's (2017) study of this era.

What accounts for this (somewhat unexpected) bipartisanship? Writing from the vantage point of the early 1980s, Bensel acknowledged the emergence of post-industrial metropolitan regions propelling and benefitting from an increasingly innovation-based, globally oriented economy, but suggested that it was "far too early to project the political form" that the divergence between these dynamic metropolitan areas (i.e. global cities) and declining hinterlands would take. The results and discussion in the previous section suggest that in the recent "post-NAFTA" period in the history of American trade policy, this divergence appears to have been one of the factors—along with internal class divisions, and perhaps the rise of ideological "third way" politics—shaping Democratic divisions over trade policy. The "bipartisan coalition" of internationalists in Congress appears to have formed, in part, because of the tendency (all else equal) of Democratic representatives beholden to district-level global city coalitions to break from the protectionist wing of their party and join Republicans (who more or less unified under a free-trade banner) in advancing liberalizing trade agreements. As a result of the sensitivity of Democratic legislators' voting behavior to the relative size of global city and hinterland coalitions within their districts, the intra-partisan Democratic cleavage that opened up during this time reflected the underlying economic geography of global cities and hinterlands.

On the other hand, Republicans, don't appear, during this period, to have been sensitive to spatial coalitions within their districts; as I discussed earlier, this relative insensitivity to the size of district-level spatial coalitions on the part of Republicans is perhaps to be expected, given

the strength of the free-trade consensus within the Republican ranks (a policy consensus underpinned by an underlying ideological and partisan belief against government intervention in the economy, as well as their status as the party of big business) during this time. The much larger impact, within the Democratic-only sample, of district-level skill-based coalitions organized along Stolper-Samuelson lines might also be explained by this feature of the era's trade politics.

Of course, American politics is now in a very different place than it was during the early days of the Obama administration, when the last of the post-NAFTA trade agreements were approved by Congress, and it is not at all clear that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands will continue to manifest politically within Congress as an intra-Democratic cleavage over foreign economic policy; that being the case, what might the future hold? In particular, what might the evolution of the American economy since the Great Recession, and the dramatic election of 2016, suggest about how the global city versus hinterland economic cleavage might come to order the congressional politics of foreign economic policy in the uncertain years ahead?

5.5 The Political Geography of Global Cities and Hinterlands and the Future Politics of Foreign Economic Policy in the United States Congress (and beyond)

It seems likely, now that we are well into the Age of Trump, that we will look back upon the post-NAFTA era of foreign economic policy as a transitional period. It will be remembered as an era in which the global city versus hinterland divide underpinned an intra-Democratic cleavage over trade policy because the slow and historic geographic shift of the Democratic coalition—from the declining cities of the industrial belt to the rising global cities of the postindustrial age (Geismer 2014)—was still underway. However, recent events—especially the presidential election of 2016—suggest that this spatial reorientation of the Democratic Party has more or less concluded, and that the consolidation of the Democratic coalition within the country's global cities is now virtually complete. Conversely, recent patterns suggest that the Republican Party is increasingly consolidating its geographic base of support in an American hinterland hurt by globalization, seizing ground (as evidenced in the 2016 election) in the Democratic bastions that were once the "heartlands of 20th century liberal populism" (Confessore and Cohn 2016). Moreover, with its traditional identity as the party of free trade weakened by the rise of a protectionist standard bearer, we might expect the Republican Party to become increasingly sensitive to the anti-globalization preferences of the hinterland residents who increasingly represent the Party's base. The era in which the global city versus hinterland divide shaped an intra-partisan cleavage within the Democratic Party may thus be remembered as a prologue to a new era, one in which the global city versus hinterland divide underpins renewed inter-partisan conflict over globalization, wherein the Democratic Party becomes the unified vehicle of America's global city coalition, while the Republican Party becomes the unified vehicle of its hinterland coalition. Such a development would indeed be momentous, potentially a new "massive fact" of political geography for the post-industrial age.

The current era in American politics appears to be marked by the return of two developments—the renewed regionalization of the parties' coalitional support bases, and the growing spatial polarization of economic interests over globalization—that fueled regionally organized partisan polarization over foreign economic policy in the pre-New Deal era. First,

consider the trend towards the increasing spatial segregation of the two parties' coalitions. The increasingly dramatic "political divide between the densest economic centers and the rest of the country-between... ' high-output' and 'low-output' America" (Muro and Liu 2016, Paragraph 6), and the evolution of this partisan spatial cleavage over the past decade and a half, is brought home in the following data from a Brookings Institute study (Muro and Liu 2016; reproduced in McNamara 2017, 17). It points to the increasing concentration of the Democratic coalition in an ever-smaller number of highly productive counties over time (a point consistent with Geismer's analysis of the shifting geographic base of the Democratic Party), as well as a simultaneous trend towards the increased dispersal of the Republican coalition across the US hinterlands:

Table 5.18: Rising Geographic Polarization in Partisan Coalitions

| Year | Candidates | # of Counties won | Aggregate share of GDP |
|------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| 2000 | Al Gore | 659 | 54% |
| | George W. Bush | 2397 | 46% |
| | | | |
| 2016 | Hillary Clinton | 472 | 64% |
| | Donald Trump | 2584 | 36% |

Source: Muro and Liu (2016)

In short, the spatial organization of the Democratic and Republican coalitions increasingly maps onto the global city versus hinterland divide, setting the stage for partisan conflict organized along the global city versus hinterland geographic axis analyzed in this dissertation. Indeed, this is a central narrative of the Election of 2016, a narrative in which the global city versus hinterland divide orients broad patterns of inter-partisan, rather than intrapartisan (as in the post-NAFTA era), political and legislative conflict: Mrs. Clinton won the America of big, racially diverse cities and centers of the new economy, from Silicon Valley to the Silicon Slopes of Utah, where many traditionally Republican voters rejected Mr. Trump. But lining up for Mr. Trump was a parallel urban America of smaller cities — places like Scranton, Pa.; Youngstown, Ohio; and Dubuque, Iowa — that boomed during the industrial era, and are still connected by the arteries of the old American economy (Cohn and Confessore 2016).

The increasing concentration of the Democratic coalition in an ever-smaller number of highly productive counties over time, as well as a simultaneous trend towards the increased dispersal of the Republican coalition across the hinterlands, coincides with the acceleration of the *economic* divergence between global cities and national hinterlands (a process underway since at least the early to mid-1980s, as we discussed earlier) in the wake of the Great Recession, as "superstar" metropolitan areas were able to leverage the benefits of global city agglomeration processes and their global economic ties into a relatively quick recovery, while the hinterlands continued to stagnate (McNamara 2017, 12-13; Frieden et al 2016). The crisis-driven acceleration of this divergence, in turn, has meant that the spatial distribution of economic interests over globalization increasingly maps on more closely than ever to the global city versus hinterland divide, just as the spatial distribution of economic interests over globalization in the pre-New Deal era mapped on neatly to the manufacturing belt/agrarian divide.

The account of spatially defined preferences and coalitions put forward in previous chapters suggests that the increasing concentration of the Democratic coalition in prosperous metropolitan areas that reap the benefits of economic openness, and the increasing dispersal of the Republican coalition across a less productive hinterland that is ever-further removed from this prosperity, will be reflected in the trade policy preferences of the parties' coalitions. Indeed, survey research from the Pew Research Center released in March 2016 showed that 56% of Democrats and "Lean Democratic" respondents believe that "free trade agreements between the

US and other countries have been a good thing for the United States" while only 34% of these voters believed that free trade agreements had been a bad thing²²; on the other hand, only 38% of Republican and "lean Republican" voters favored trade agreements, while 53% of these voters opposed them (Stokes 2016). It is interesting to disaggregate these numbers by demographic group; the table below, part of the same Pew study, shows the percentage of various demographic groups favoring free trade agreements:

| Group | Percentage Agreeing that "Free trade agreements between the US and other countries have been a good thing for the United States" |
|------------|---|
| Women | 54 |
| Men | 48 |
| Age: 18-29 | 67 |
| Age: 30-49 | 53 |
| Age: 50-64 | 43 |
| Age: 65+ | 41 |
| Hispanic | 72 |
| Black | 55 |
| White | 45 |

 Table 5.19: Partisan Coalitions and Demographic Support for Free Trade

Pew Research Center (Stokes 2016)

It is interesting to note, for instance, that key parts of the Democrats' metropolitan coalition—such as younger voters just starting their careers and members of minority groups (large shares of which are working class individuals who do not directly benefit from globalization in material terms)—are strongly supportive of liberalizing trade agreements. This

²² Interestingly, the study suggests that the difference between Sanders supporters and Clinton voters on this issue was small; majorities of both Clinton (58%) and Sanders (55%) voters said they supported free trade agreements, suggesting that that the Clinton-Sanders primary battle wasn't driven by an internal split over globalization among the Democratic electorate. Enthusiasm for Sanders may have come in spite of his anti-globalization rhetoric, rather than because of it.

underscores that going forward, intra-party factionalism over trade policy within the Democratic coalition may well decline. Much was made during, and in the wake of the election, about the difficulty of "accommodating the party's upscale pro-trade, globalist wing; its underdog minority wing; and organized labor" (Edsall 2016, Paragraph 2). Yet while intra-party factionalism over trade has been an important feature of Democratic politics for several years, such commentary may overstate its relevance for the future. The foreign economic policy preferences of both its "upscale wing" and its minority wing, may well converge on the basis of their shared membership in the nation's global city coalition; indeed, the data on the preferences of minorities (presented above) is consistent with such a view, suggesting as it does that the party's minority wing (which comprises a large share of working-class voters) shares the "globalism" of its professional wing. As for labor unions, it is worth noting that the future of the labor movement is in the organization of working-class service workers (primarily from major city regions), whose jobs are not directly exposed to trade, and indeed, who tend to benefit from globalization not only in their capacity as the residents of global cities whose economic growth is powered by globalization, but also in their capacity as consumers (Yglesias 2016; Baker 2005). The antipathy of the labor movement towards trade may well decline in response (Yglesias 2016), making it easier for the Democratic coalition's disparate elements to converge on a pro-globalization agenda. Of course, polling and survey data of this sort needs to be taken with a grain of salt; the numbers are sensitive to factors such as question wording and framing effects and the partisan climate at the time (Democratic voters' support for trade at the time may have reflected their antipathy towards Donald Trump, for instance), but these numbers may well reflect (at least partially) the fact (for instance) that the "everyday environment for Clinton voters is much more

likely to be an urban and economically vibrant one, against the small towns, exurbs, and rural everyday world that Trump voters live in" (McNamara 2017, 17).

In short, the Democratic coalition is increasingly concentrated in prosperous metropolitan areas whose prosperity is tied to globalization (as a result of global city agglomeration processes), while the Republican coalition is increasingly anchored in hinterlands that are harmed by globalization (due to hinterland dispersion processes); in response, Democratic voters (even those that are not in any concrete sense highly skilled "winners" from globalization) appear to be increasingly supportive of liberal foreign economic policies, a development that is consistent with the account of global city coalitions developed earlier in this dissertation. The Democratic Party's electoral coalition, and America's "global city coalition", in short, seem to be increasingly coextensive with each other. On the other hand, Republican voters—even those who, on grounds of individual material self-interest, would not necessarily be considered "losers" from globalization²³—appear to be increasingly opposed to such policies, a development that could perhaps be traced to the fact that these Republican voters are increasingly concentrated in hinterland locales, where the shared experience of decline animates a local-tropic rejection of globalization (Kahler 2017, 9). In short, just as the Democratic coalition becomes increasingly coextensive with the global city coalition, the Republican coalition is necessarily becoming increasingly coextensive with the hinterland coalition.

We might expect, in turn, that party platforms and agendas will evolve accordingly; this is certainly an important implication of the arguments and analysis in this chapter, which linked societal global city and hinterland coalitions to the incentives and preferences of politicians. To be sure, we are not yet in a world in which Democrats are fully the party of economic openness,

²³ Indeed, as Kahler (2017) notes, "Trump voters did not seem disproportionately disadvantaged by recent economic developments" (9)

and Republicans, the party of closure. But there are certainly signs that we may be headed in such a direction, and scholars of IPE should pay attention to these signs; consider, for instance, Barack Obama's full-throated defense of the TPP, an affirmation of the value of an internationalist foreign economic policy that stood in stark contrast to the Republicans' decision, after years running under the banner of free trade, to write a protectionist platform in their national convention (Azari 2016).

Given the emphasis in this paper on congressional coalitions, it's also important to emphasize that these economic dynamics are likely to be reflected not just at the presidential level, but at the congressional level as well; moreover, as we have discussed earlier, they are likely to be salient *even* in the absence of explicit bottom-up pressure from global city coalitions, as politicians infer their preferences and anticipate their demands (Arnold 1992). Representatives from districts that encompass these global cities, as self-interested actors with an interest in reelection, are likely to recognize the link between globalization and their districts' economic prosperity, and act accordingly. One political journalist recently made precisely this point in admirably clear terms, and is therefore worth quoting:

The big American companies with a strong interest in new trade deals tend to be located in the blue coastal states that elect Democrats...The local and regional economies underpinned by these big exporters are increasingly located in areas represented by Democrats—Democrats who may not have come to Washington to do favors for big business but who certainly appreciate the importance of creating jobs back home (Yglesias 2016, Paragraph 11).

In short, the bipartisan "support coalition" for globalization in the halls of Congress that marked the post-NAFTA era may be headed towards dissolution (if it has not dissolved entirely), giving way to a partisan support coalition of Democrats (the party of the nation's global cities) and a "protectionist coalition" of Republicans (the party of the nation's hinterland). If this comes to pass, we would have come full circle, with the Republicans returning to their protectionist roots from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the Democrats returning to their traditional position as the advocates of global integration. In terms of the sectional support bases of the parties, though, such a scenario implies a 180-degree turn, with the Republicans now the party of the "periphery" and the Democrats the party of the "core"; however, these terms must now be understood, in our post-industrial age, in terms of the spatial divide between global cities and national hinterlands, rather than in terms of the regional cleavage of the industrial era, between the manufacturing belt and agricultural or extractive areas, which represented the "massive fact" of 19th and 20th century American politics.

5.6 Conclusion

The examination of legislative coalitions in American foreign economic policy through the lens of political geography is part of a rich scholarly tradition; however, studies within this tradition have been fundamentally concerned with the sectional political implications of the industrial era's economic geography, which was marked by a division between an industrial core and an agrarian and extractive periphery. As the United States shifted into a postindustrial era, these old geographic divides, and the political coalitions associated with them, came to be seen by most scholars as increasingly irrelevant to the task of explaining the legislative politics of contemporary foreign economic policy issues (though as I discussed above, the results presented here suggest they may still be relevant); instead, they turned their attention to the class and ideological divisions thought to be more salient in developed economies. But though the economic geography of the industrial age may seem less relevant to explaining the legislative

politics of our time than class or ideological divides, this should not be seen as a marker of political geography's obsolescence; rather, the transition to the postindustrial age should be seen as an opportunity to investigate the political implications of the economic geography of this new era, the most salient feature of which is the economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands. While other scholars are beginning to take up a political geography analysis of IPE and the postindustrial economy of the United States (McNamara 2017), this is the first study within IPE that (to my knowledge), carries out a concrete empirical investigation of this topic, by uncovering an independent link between the spatial coalitions associated with the global city versus hinterland divide (theorized and documented in previous chapters), and systematic features of legislative policymaking.

In the previous chapter, I provided evidence for the existence of previously unrecognized "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions, which are independently engendered by the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide, and cannot be accounted for by more traditional models of foreign economic policy preferences and coalitions. In this chapter, I have investigated and documented how these spatial coalitions affect patterns of decision-making in representative bodies, and thereby contribute to a corresponding "global city versus hinterland" *legislative* political alignment over globalization. The evidence presented here suggests that representatives from global cities—especially Democrats—who are politically beholden to global city coalitions within their districts, are more likely to favor liberalization than representatives from the hinterlands, who are beholden to anti-globalization hinterland coalitions within their districts.

I argued that the uneven sensitivity of Democrats and Republicans to the influence of district-level spatial political coalitions, and the corresponding emergence of an "intra-partisan"

global city versus hinterland political cleavage within the Democratic caucus, is to be expected, in light of the distinctive historical circumstances of the Post-NAFTA period considered in the analysis. As these circumstances change, however, we might expect the role of spatial coalitions in the congressional politics of foreign economic policy to evolve as well. Indeed, I suggested that we may be in the early stages of a new era in US foreign economic policy; as the party system as a whole increasingly maps onto the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, the politics of foreign economic policy may well be driven by the emergence of the Democratic Party as the internationalist vessel of the country's global city coalition, and the emergence of the Republican Party as the protectionist vessel of its hinterland coalition. It is therefore likely that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands will become increasingly relevant for scholars of American foreign economic policy (and possibly American politics more generally). The contribution of this chapter, then, is not that it simply adds another variable to existing studies of the congressional politics of trade policy; the contribution of the chapter is that it offers a starting point—historical, theoretical, and empirical— for showing how we might renew the rich tradition of American political geography within IPE in ways that might allow us to more fully understand this uncertain new world.

In this chapter, I have explored how the preferences of the mass spatial coalitions theorized and documented in previous chapters are filtered through representative institutions and affect the organization of legislative protectionist and internationalist coalitions (as they manifest in patterns of legislative voting over foreign economic policy). In the next chapter, I shift from a specific focus on patterns of legislative voting within representative institutions in the United States, to a broader comparative focus on electoral regimes, which mediate the relationship between societal coalitions, political representation, and policy outcomes. In

particular, I investigate how the interaction between political institutions (specifically, electoral regimes) and the electoral geography of global city coalitions (i.e. the relative concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions across the electoral map), shapes cross-national variation in trade policy outcomes.

Chapter 6: The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions, Electoral Regimes, and Trade Policy: A Cross-National Investigation

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I provided a conceptual account of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, with a view towards detailing the "global city agglomeration processes" and "hinterland dispersion processes" by which global cities and hinterlands are constituted as territorial formations that "win" and "lose", respectively, from globalization. In Chapter 3, I built on this discussion to develop different theoretical explanations of how this economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might engender distinctive spatial *political* coalitions over globalization that are empirically distinct from the foreign economic policy coalitions IPE scholars have documented in the past. Ultimately, I argued for a local-tropic explanation of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands underpins corresponding spatial political coalitions over globalization. According to the local-tropic theory, individuals care independently about the well-being of their locales, and therefore support or oppose globalization to the extent that they believe doing so promotes the local interest; global city and hinterland coalitions are formed, on this account, because global city residents tend to form optimistic beliefs about the positive impact of globalization on the local interest, while hinterland residents tend to arrive at the belief that globalization has a negative impact on the well-being of their locales. In Chapter 4, I documented the existence of a novel empirical relationship between empirical measures of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and mass preferences over globalization, even after controlling for a range of confounding variables; together, the results presented in that chapter pointed towards the existence of "global city" and "hinterland" political coalitions over globalization that are a distinctive product of the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. I also presented suggestive evidence that the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and these spatial coalitions is best explained within a local-tropic framework. In Chapter 5, I provided evidence for a link between the relative district-level size of the mass global city and hinterland political coalitions documented in Chapter 4, and patterns of legislative voting over free trade legislation; in particular, I showed that during the post-NAFTA era of US trade politics, variation in the district-level presence of global city coalitions contributed to an intra-Democratic Party cleavage over trade policy, with Democratic representatives from districts in which members of the global city coalition comprised more than half the district's population significantly more likely to support free trade legislation than Democratic representatives from districts in which hinterland residents comprised a majority of the district population. These results suggested that during the time period under consideration, legislative coalitions over free trade within the Democratic Party were underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands; given the political salience of district-level

spatial coalitions associated with this economic geography, representatives from global cities were significantly more likely to support legislation advancing the cause of economic openness than Democratic representatives from districts in the hinterlands.

In this final empirical chapter, I widen the empirical domain compared to the previous chapter, and explore how spatial coalitions affect the mass politics of globalization in a comparative cross-national setting, rather than in the context of a single country. Moreover, compared to the previous chapter, which examined how the preferences of mass spatial coalitions are filtered through representative institutions and affect legislative foreign economic policy coalitions (as they are reflected in congressional voting behavior) in the empirical context of the US Congress, this chapter also widens the analytical focus, towards a more general consideration of the broader electoral regimes that translate societal preferences into political representation, and which thereby effectively mediate the link between mass preferences, political representation, and policy outcomes. In developing an account of how variation in the electoral geography of global city coalitions (that is, the relative concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions across electoral districts) affects the translation of the internationalist preferences of global city coalitions into policy in different institutional settings—and thereby shapes cross-national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes—I draw on the tradition of IPE scholarship that appeals to the median-voter theorem to explain policy outcomes, as well as the tradition of electoral geography within comparative politics that has recently been revived by Rodden (2005; 2011).

My argument in this chapter is that in low-proportionality electoral regimes (especially in systems with single-member districts and plurality or majoritarian electoral rules), the relative sensitivity of national foreign economic policy choices to the internationalist preferences of the

country's global city coalition is likely to be highly sensitive to the electoral geography of its global city coalition. In particular, in low-proportionality institutional contexts, the spatial concentration of global city coalitions with respect to the electoral map leads to the "inefficient" electoral clustering of pro-globalization global city residents (i.e. the members of the global city coalition), whose votes are effectively "wasted" beyond the plurality or majoritarian threshold. To the extent that this is the case, politicians and parties have relatively weak incentives to court internationalist voters from global cities, and stronger incentives to appeal to more efficiently distributed members of the protectionist hinterland coalition, which in turn yields relatively protectionist trade policies. On the other hand, the relative electoral dispersal of global city coalitions implies that relatively fewer "pro-globalization" votes from members of the global city coalition are "wasted" in the translation from votes to seats; this makes their votes relatively more valuable, which in turn increases the responsiveness of politicians and parties to the internationalist preferences of the global city coalition, and leads to relatively more open trade policies. In short, I argue that in low-proportionality electoral systems, the electoral geography of global city coalitions affects the balance of power between global city coalitions and hinterland coalitions with respect to their relative influence over policy; when global city coalitions are highly concentrated on the electoral map, they wield relatively less influence over foreign economic policy than when they are relatively dispersed across the map (since higher degrees of electoral concentration yield larger numbers of "wasted votes" from the global city coalition). As a result, in low-proportionality electoral systems—where the problem of wasted votes arises because of political incentives arising from the plurality or majoritarian threshold for victory we would expect variation in the electoral geography of global city coalitions to affect variation in foreign economic policy outcomes, with the degree of protectionism increasing as a function

of the electoral concentration of global city coalitions. However, I argue that variation in the electoral geography of global city coalitions is likely to be less consequential for policy outcomes in countries with more proportional electoral regimes, where the fact of proportional electoral rules means that votes are not "wasted" (at least to nearly the same extent) as in lowproportionality electoral regimes. In other words, in more proportional electoral regimes, I argue that the electoral geography of global city coalitions does not have as large an impact on the incentives of politicians to court global city voters (since votes are not "wasted" beyond the plurality or majoritarian threshold), which therefore leads to a weaker (or perhaps non-existent) relationship between the electoral geography of global city coalitions and trade policy outcomes in these institutional settings. After developing this argument in greater detail below, I develop a spatially explicit measure of the electoral geography of global city coalitions, and test the hypothesis that increases in the electoral geography of global city coalitions are associated with more protectionist trade policies in low-proportionality electoral regimes, but that this relationship between the electoral geography of global city coalitions and trade policy outcomes weakens as the proportionality of the electoral regime increases.

6.1.1 Contributions and Motivation

The work carried out in this chapter makes important contributions that are worth highlighting, before proceeding further. First, to return to a theme that I have emphasized throughout this dissertation, the exploration carried out in this chapter could be seen as a worthwhile contribution to the global cities literature. Chapters 3 and 4 underscored that far from being functional units responsible for the coordination and management of the global economy, global cities have an independent impact on the political alignments that structure political

conflict over globalization within society; moreover, Chapter 5 suggested that these conflicts have shaped patterns of political representation and legislative politics within the American polity, whose foreign economic policy choices exert profound systemic consequences for the globalized order as a whole. This chapter further reminds us that for all their economic prosperity and global ties, global cities are not politically autonomous; the economic interests of global cities can only be secured through favorable policies that are adopted at the national level, and global cities themselves—by giving rise to global city coalitions—play a role in shaping these national-level political choices over globalization. In short, global cities scholars cannot fully understand the role or evolution of global cities as economic actors without understanding their role within the national polities in which they are embedded (Kahler 1991). In investigating how the electoral geography of global city coalitions affects the translation of mass "proglobalization" foreign economic policy preferences into policies, this chapter provides global cities scholars with an example of how we might "[build] more rigorous analytical models of politics onto economic geography's intellectual infrastructure" (Wibbels 2009, 44) with respect to the study of global cities. To the extent that global cities scholars are relatively unfamiliar with the political and institutional modes of analysis that are at the heart of international and comparative political economy research, this chapter-though it is specifically focused on electoral geography and electoral rules—could be read by such scholars as a primer on how to go about this task in a more general sense.

Second, this chapter contributes to the literature in International Political Economy on electoral geography. Previous work in this vein has primarily focused on the electoral geography of narrow special interests, whether within manufacturing (Rogowski et al 1999; McGillivray 2004; Rickard 2012a) or agriculture (Maliniak 2014). The purpose of this work has been to

specify why certain special interests, but not others, "get their way" on specific issues of foreign economic policy; or, to identify the conditions under which politicians cater to narrow special interests rather than broader society-wide interests (Rickard 2012a). Though scholars working in the special-interest politics literature within IPE have recognized and exploited the rich intellectual possibilities of electoral geography, the same cannot be said of scholars working within the alternative, median-voter approach to IPE, which stresses the importance of mass political conflict between broad-based coalitions that encompass large segments of society. The failure to consider electoral geography in median-voter approaches to IPE certainly cannot be ascribed to electoral geography's irrelevance in the intellectual context of the median-voter tradition; after all, the "British School" of electoral geography (Gudgin and Taylor 1979; Johnston 1976; Erikson 1972), which Rodden (2005; 2010; 2011) has recently done much to revive and recast at an even higher level of theoretical and empirical sophistication, explicitly appeals to the intuition underlying median-voter approaches to political economy in developing its arguments. By situating the median-voter approach to IPE within an electoral geography framework, the chapter underscores the broader relevance of electoral geography for IPE scholars, beyond its traditional field of application in the special interest politics literature.

Indeed, this is an especially opportune time to introduce the electoral geography perspective to the study of mass politics in IPE, for reasons which bring us to the third contribution of this chapter. In particular, electoral geography has traditionally been applied to the study of mass politics by comparative politics scholars interested in explaining the politics of redistribution and the left versus right divide of the industrial era. Their central insight was that this left versus right divide mapped systematically onto an urban versus rural divide created by the industrial revolution, and that this unequal spatial distribution of preferences over

redistribution meant that electoral geography had a particularly important role to play in explaining patterns of competition between the pro-redistribution left and the anti-redistribution right, as well as the policy outcomes flowing from these patterns of competition. However, the political earthquakes of 2016 have brought into focus the importance of a different political fault line, namely, the post-industrial fault line between advocates of openness and globalization and proponents of economic closure and protection. This fault line has been visible for some time, both to political observers and participants. More than ten years ago, Tony Blair observed that "the real dividing line to think of in modern politics has less to do with traditional positions of right versus left, and more to do today, with what I would call the modern choice, which is open versus closed" (Quoted in Bloodworth 2017, Paragraph 3). This is a point that scholars have also recognized (Rodrik 1997; Wren and McElwain 2009; Toly 2016); indeed, the increasing salience of the open versus closed fault line over globalization (in addition to democratization in the developing world) may have motivated the initial wave of IPE research that attempted to link mass politics to policy outcomes through the framework of the median voter theorem. Of course, just as seismologists, aware as they are of the existence of physical fault lines, cannot necessarily predict earthquakes with any degree of precision, political scientists, though they recognized (at least to some extent) these shifting political fault lines, did not predict our recent political earthquakes; judging by the response, the events of 2016 were probably a surprise even to observers attuned to the growing importance of the open versus closed divide for contemporary politics. In the wake of these political earthquakes, however, it is clear that this post-industrial "open versus closed" fault line deserves to be the topic of more sustained and systematic inquiry. In renewing this line of inquiry, it is crucial that scholars pay attention to the geographic dimensions of the conflict between the advocates of openness and the advocates of closure (Toly

2016); previous work on the mass politics of globalization and the open versus closed divide in IPE ignored the spatial underpinnings of this conflict, and this should be recognized as a serious oversight. Just as scholars of redistribution working within the British school of electoral geography recognized that the left versus right conflict over redistribution was spatially organized as a result of the economic geography of industrialization, the analysis in the foregoing chapters of this dissertation highlights that the "open versus closed" conflict over globalization is spatially organized as well, in part because of the emergence of global city and hinterland mass political coalitions over globalization that stem from the growing prominence of the underlying economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. And, as the students of industrial-era politics understood, where mass political conflicts are underpinned by geographic divisions, electoral geography has an important role to play in helping us to understand the organization and outcomes of those conflicts. In applying electoral geography to the analysis of the open versus closed divide, this chapter therefore represents a preliminary attempt to chart a course that would allow us to update the analytical tradition of electoral geography for our time, and thereby provide a starting point for future scholarship that investigates the spatial and comparative dimensions of this new and uncertain era of political conflict.

In short, this chapter lies at the intersection of several distinct literatures that have thus far not explicitly spoken to each other. The electoral geography literature on mass politics is primarily a comparative politics literature, and has not analyzed political fault lines over globalization; on the other hand, the electoral geography literature in IPE focuses on special interests rather than mass politics. Meanwhile, the cross-national literature on mass politics and foreign economic policy outcomes in IPE has ignored electoral geography entirely, while the literature on global cities has ignored both electoral geography and political institutions. The

central contribution of the investigation undertaken here, which involves an analysis of how the electoral geography of global city coalitions affects national foreign economic policy choices to varying degrees in different institutional contexts, is that it brings these disparate strands of scholarship together for the first time.

6.1.2 Roadmap of the Chapter, and a Note on the Median-Voter Theorem

In what follows, I first present (in Section 6.2) the framework of electoral geography that this chapter uses in its comparative analysis of the relationship between the electoral geography of global city coalitions and trade policy outcomes under different electoral regimes. I do so by discussing this framework conceptually, as well as by reviewing how it has been applied by comparative political economy scholars to explain the mass politics of redistributiongeographically organized on the basis of an "urban versus rural" political divide—during the industrial era. Section 6.3 then applies the framework of electoral geography initially developed to analyze the politics of redistribution during the industrial era (discussed in Section 6.2) to the post-industrial context of political conflict over economic openness between spatially organized global city and hinterland coalitions. It develops a theoretical account of how the electoral geography of global city coalitions affects the political clout of these coalitions in different institutional settings, and thereby shapes national foreign economic policy choices. On the basis of this discussion, I draw out the hypothesis that in low-proportionality electoral regimes, variation in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions affects variation in trade policy outcomes. More specifically, in these low-proportionality electoral regimes, the hypothesis suggests that increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions—which imply a more "inefficient" electoral distribution of support for globalization in which large numbers of

"pro-globalization" votes from global city residents are wasted—are associated with higher levels of trade protection; conversely, decreases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions—which imply a more "efficient" electoral distribution of support for globalization in which comparatively fewer "pro-globalization" votes from members of the global city coalition are wasted—are associated with lower levels of trade protection. Furthermore, I hypothesize that this link between the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions and trade policy outcomes is likely to be considerably weaker in more proportional electoral regimes.

The remainder of the paper is dedicated to an empirical assessment of this hypothesis. In Section 6.4, after discussing how I measure the relative electoral concentration or dispersion of global city coalitions—the main independent variable of interest—I turn to a preliminary plausibility probe of the argument using a series of bivariate scatterplots. Then, in Section 6.5, I evaluate the argument in a cross-national, multivariate framework. To capture how electoral regimes condition the impact of the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions on trade protection, I use both a plurality/PR dummy variable, as well as a measure of district magnitude, as conditioning variables in the multivariate analysis.

Given data constraints, it is challenging to empirically test the argument developed in this chapter, and the empirical results presented here should be regarded as preliminary. Nevertheless, in light of the suggestive support for the argument presented here, this chapter's ideas deserve to be explored further, both empirically and conceptually, in future work. The final section of the chapter (6.6) concludes with a summary of the argument and findings.

Finally, before proceeding, it is worthwhile to say a few words on the median-voter theorem, which (following Rodden) I draw on to develop the intuition for my argument. The median-voter-theorem of course makes several assumptions, some of which are more realistic

than others. If we could only appeal to the median voter theorem when these restrictive empirical conditions actually obtain, the median-voter theorem would be virtually useless for empirical research. When scholars in comparative and international political economy draw on the median voter theorem, they therefore "appeal to this theorem simply to capture the basic idea that any government is likely to be responsive to the wishes of the majority when key distributional issues are at stake" (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, 466). Or, as O'Rourke and Taylor (2006), who explicitly draw on the median voter in a cross-national study of trade policy, put it: "We should never take the median voter model too literally, given its simplistic assumptions and dubious implications about voting behavior, [but] we think it nonetheless proves revealing as a way of illustrating the power of the 'middle of the road' electoral group to drive commercial policy" (14). When deployed in this spirit, the median voter theorem also allows empirical scholars to develop new ideas about the institutional and societal conditions under which policy biases—or departures from the benchmark suggested by the median voter theorem—might occur, which is one of the central tasks of empirical IPE scholarship (Lake 2009). Following most empirical scholars, I therefore draw on the median voter approach to politics as a source of theoretical intuition that can be leveraged to formulate testable arguments about outcomes of interest; it is possible to do so, as previous scholars have recognized, without committing to the view that its assumptions are an empirically valid description of reality (Dutt and Mitra 2002, 107).

6.2 Electoral Geography, Electoral Institutions, and Mass Preferences: An Introduction

6.2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Intuition

The central insight of the canonical electoral geography literature, which this chapter adapts to explore how the electoral geography of global city coalitions shapes trade policy outcomes, is that in low-district magnitude electoral systems—especially in systems with single member districts and majoritarian or plurality electoral rules-electorally concentrated interests lose out in the translation from votes to seats, which ultimately lowers their leverage over public policy. The intuition is straightforward, and especially for observers of American politics, likely to be familiar. In particular, in electoral regimes with single-member districts and majoritarian or plurality electoral rules, votes beyond the winning threshold are effectively "wasted"; it makes no difference to a party whether it wins a seat with 50 percent of the vote or 90 percent of the vote. A seat is a seat, and votes beyond the threshold needed to win are therefore superfluous. When a coalition of voters with a shared preference for some policy—call it Policy X—is therefore electorally clustered in a small number of single-member districts, many of the votes for Policy X will be "wasted", making it less likely that Policy X will be adopted for one of two reasons. First, if a party operating in a low-proportionality electoral system runs on a platform calling for Policy X when the support coalition for Policy X is highly concentrated on the electoral map, it will win a lot of superfluous votes from advocates of Policy X in the small number districts in which these voters are concentrated, but would not be competitive in the relatively large number of districts in which support for Policy X is less intense, and indeed, not

the majority position. As a result, incorporating Policy X into the platform would inevitably lead to a relative decline in the party's seat share, which of course points toward a decline in legislative influence for supporters of Policy X. Second, in an attempt to increase its seat share, the party might moderate its position on Policy X, moving away from the ideal point of highly concentrated "hard-core" Policy X supporters towards the ideal point of Policy X skeptics (or outright opponents), who are more efficiently distributed across electoral space, and whose votes are therefore more valuable. Either way—whether the partisan agents of the coalition of Policy X supporters sacrifice seats by remaining committed to the cause, or "sell out" in a bid to increase their seat share by appealing to more efficiently distributed skeptics or opponents of Policy X the political clout of Policy X supporters is reduced on account of their electoral concentration (Rodden 2005; 2011).

These dynamics have extremely important implications for political incentives to represent the preferences of the median voter in plurality-rules systems. Assume, for instance, that the median voter in our hypothetical example supports Policy X, and that as above, Policy X supporters are highly concentrated on the electoral map. In light of the discussion above, it is clear that public policy is unlikely to reflect the preference of the median voter with respect to Policy X; recall that since votes in favor of Policy X (which is the position preferred by the median voter) are highly concentrated (and therefore less valuable to rational parties concerned with their seat share), seat-maximizing parties have an incentive to move away from the ideal point of the median voter, since votes that reflect this position are effectively less valuable on account of their electoral concentration. The key point is that there are circumstances in majoritarian systems—circumstances conditioned by electoral geography—under which it is *not* rational for politicians to target policy towards the preferences of the median voter.

Indeed, according to the formal analysis of Hinich and Ordeshook (1974), rational politicians in majoritarian contexts where there are multiple districts will *not*, in general, cater to the preferences of the national median voter; rather, in light of the political dynamics described above (wherein parties and politicians must consider the geography of preferences in considering which positions to adopt), they will maximize seat shares by catering to the preferences of the median voter in the median district (Rodden 2005, 2; Rodden 2010, 325). Of course, in a world in which median district-level preferences are the same across districts, this is a distinction without a difference; under these circumstances, the national median voter and the median voter in the median district are one and the same. But this is of course a special case, one which we would not expect to obtain frequently as an empirical matter, if at all. After all, economic activity and (by extension) economic interests are unevenly distributed across space, and so we would expect district-level median preferences to be skewed; under these empirically more realistic circumstances, the national median voter and the median voter in the median district likely will *not* be the same, and it is the preferences of the latter that are decisive for party platforms and policy. The key point of the electoral geography perspective, then, is that because votes beyond the majority or plurality threshold are effectively wasted, policy will only reflect the preferences of the national majority (i.e. the national median voter) in specific circumstances; in general, policy reflects not the preferences of the majority, but the preferences of mass coalitions that are efficiently distributed across electoral districts.

In high district-magnitude proportional representation systems, on the other hand, the electoral geography of preferences is far less consequential in shaping patterns of political representation, and ultimately policy, than in highly disproportional majoritarian and plurality systems (and perhaps low district-magnitude proportional representation systems as well). The

reason is simple: just as the importance of electoral geography in low-proportionality systems stems from the desire of parties and politicians to avoid "wasted votes", the relative unimportance of electoral geography in high-proportionality electoral systems flows from the fact of electoral proportionality itself, which minimizes "wasted votes" as a feature of its institutional design, and therefore does not frustrate the efforts of highly concentrated voters with shared preferences to translate these preferences into effective representation and policy influence. To make this more concrete, consider a multimember district with ten representatives: if a party wins 50% of the vote within this district, it gets 5 members from its slate of candidates into office, and if it wins 90% of the votes within the district, it gets 9 members from its slate of candidates into office. This of course represents a stark contrast to the electoral dynamics in systems single-member districts with majoritarian electoral rules; in those institutional contexts, there is no difference between winning with 90 percent of the vote and 50 percent of the vote (both win shares yield one seat), while in the proportional case, the difference between winning with 90 percent of the vote and 50 percent of the vote is four additional seats. The upshot is that proportional electoral systems do in fact efficiently register the preferences of electorally concentrated voters with common interests, instead of artificially deflating their votes relative to the voters who are part of coalitions that are efficiently distributed across the electoral map. As a result, in a world in which the value of votes is not weighted by geography, parties have incentives to target policy towards the national median voter, regardless of how preferences happen to be arrayed across the electoral map (Rodden 2011, 9).

6.2.2 Electoral Geography in the Industrial Age: Explaining the Politics of Redistribution

Though these ideas, which constitute the core of the electoral geography perspective, are perhaps intuitive, they have been applied in powerful ways, most prominently (as I mentioned above) in the context of explaining the industrial era's mass political conflicts over redistribution. This scholarship was pioneered by scholars such as Gudgin and Taylor (1979), Johnston (1976), and Erikson (1972); in more recent times, Rodden (2005; 2011) has notably refined and expanded this work, both theoretically and empirically. To get a sense of this literature's central argument, one might simply replace references to "Policy X" in the discussion of the previous subsection with the word "redistribution." That is, Rodden argues that an important political legacy of the industrial revolution was that it led to the geographic concentration of left-wing coalitions that supported government redistribution; as peasants from the countryside poured into "cities, and in most cases, to a single, relatively well-defined manufacturing core", political entrepreneurs (especially in the context of an expanding franchise) decided to politically mobilize the new urban proletariat around a platform of risk sharing and redistribution (Rodden 2005, 4). This platform resonated among these workers, who found themselves in an alien and rootless urban environment in which they no longer had access to the traditional risk-sharing mechanisms of the countryside. These high-density urban areas, which constituted the industrial era's geographic "core", thus became the political strongholds of a political left committed to generous social insurance, while the "sparsely populated agricultural hinterland"-where individuals could continue to access traditional instruments of social insurance such as extended families, the Church, or nature itself (i.e. gardens, livestock)—

became the geographic bases of support for Right parties hostile to the cause of redistribution (Rodden 2005, 4).

Rodden shows that this political geography of the early industrial era, marked by a high degree of urban concentration among supporters of left-wing parties favoring redistribution (which tended to lead, in turn, to their concentration within electoral districts), and the relative spatial dispersal of supporters of right-wing parties skeptical of redistribution, persisted long into the future (Rodden 2005, 6-8). In light of the discussion in the previous section, the potential implications of this geographic concentration of the left (and the corresponding ideological concentration of preferences for redistribution) should be clear: "due to the concentration of leftists in cities, voter preferences might be arranged across districts such that the ideology of the median voter in the country as a whole is to the left of the preferences of the median voter in the median district", leading to a bias against the redistributive agenda of the left in plurality systems as politicians shift their platforms and (ultimately) legislation away from the relatively left-wing preferences of the national median voter towards the relatively conservative preferences of the median voter from the pivotal district (Rodden 2011, 5). To be sure, the geographic concentration of the left in urban areas was a general phenomenon that prevailed across countries, regardless of their institutional arrangements; however, even to the extent that proredistribution left-wing voters were electorally concentrated in proportional representation countries, parties did not move their distributive agendas in a conservative direction in order to increase their appeal to spatially dispersed voters, since proportional electoral rules do not artificially deflate the electoral clout of concentrated interests relative to dispersed ones.

Rodden provides extensive empirical evidence that these expectations of the electoral geography perspective were in fact borne out during the industrial era. In the case of majoritarian

countries, left-wing redistributionist coalitions did indeed tend to be electorally concentrated, giving rise to difficulties in translating their votes into seats that their more efficiently distributed right wing competitors did not face; in a painstaking empirical analysis of postwar majoritarian countries, Rodden (2005) documents that "parties of the left [required] around 48% of the vote in order to win half the seats, while parties of the right only [required] 43 percent" (15). On the other hand, in more proportional systems—which, as we discussed above, are relatively more favorable to geographically concentrated political interests because they impose a less severe penalty for "wasted votes"—the structural bias against the left essentially disappears; in Rodden's sample of PR countries during the postwar period, "parties of the left and right both require around 48% [of the vote to win half the seats]" (2005, 15). Parties in majoritarian countries thus moved to the right to court more efficiently distributed (and hence more powerful) conservative voters; in PR countries, parties faced no such incentive to disregard left-wing urban voters in pursuit of seat shares, and could therefore adopt platforms closer to the ideal point of a national median voter with pro-redistribution preferences, regardless of the electoral geography of redistributionist preferences (Rodden 2005, 21-22).

Thus far, Rodden has put forward an extremely thorough empirical effort to document geographically-driven structural biases in the translation from left-wing votes to seats in majoritarian countries, but his efforts to empirically link these structural biases to actual policy outcomes is somewhat less developed.¹ Nevertheless, he provides highly suggestive evidence that as a result of the spatial dynamics of electoral geography, policy was in fact keyed to the preferences of more conservative voters to a greater extent in majoritarian contexts than in

¹ Much of Rodden's work on electoral geography is in the form of publicly available working papers and manuscripts; according to these sources, these explicit tests will be presented in his upcoming book on the topic.

proportional ones. The fundamental objective of the left during this era was of course to increase the generosity of social insurance and expand the scope of the welfare state. This suggests that in light of the electoral concentration of the left, which diluted its partisan representation in majoritarian systems, countries with majoritarian electoral regimes would have adopted stingier social insurance programs and smaller welfare states than their PR counterparts. Of course, the finding that there is a positive correlation between electoral system proportionality and the generosity of the welfare state is an established finding in the comparative politics literature, and has been explained in different ways (Persson and Tabellini 2000; Iversen and Soskice 2006), but Rodden suggests specific hypotheses to assess whether this relationship might be driven by the mechanism of electoral geography; for instance, to the extent that the relationship between the proportionality of electoral systems and the generosity of the welfare state is driven by electoral geography, we would expect that increases in the electoral concentration of the "left should only curb the growth of the welfare state in the presence of plurality electoral rules" (Rodden 2005, 21). Though his existing work has not yet presented results for explicit tests of this hypothesis, he presents intriguing observational evidence that is consistent with a political geography perspective on the relationship between electoral regimes and the welfare state; for instance, he presents correlations suggesting that as a political system's bias against the urban left's highly redistributive preferences decreases (a function of the interaction between the electoral system and the electoral concentration of the left) social transfers as a function of GDP increase.

6.3 The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions and Foreign Economic Policy

In previous investigations of the link between mass politics and foreign economic policy outcomes, IPE scholars have essentially ignored the issue of how preferences over globalization are arrayed across physical and electoral space, implicitly assuming that they "scattered at random over the various constituencies" (Kendall and Stuart 1950) and that electoral geography is therefore irrelevant to the analysis of the mass politics of globalization. For instance, much of the literature on the mass politics of globalization and its impact on cross-national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes has concerned the broad distinction between autocracy and democracy, and how regime transitions lead to shifts in the identity of the median voter, which in turn drives changes in trade policy (Milner and Kubota 2005; O'Rourke and Taylor 2006; Tavares 2008); in this literature, it is simply assumed that irrespective of electoral regimes or the geographic distribution of voters, policy in democratic regimes is inevitably keyed to the preferences of the median voter. Admittedly, when considering the broad distinction between democratic and autocratic regimes, this is perhaps a useful simplifying assumption. However, even in work that limits its attention to broadly democratic regimes, and investigates how the structure of the economy (for instance broad patterns of economic development or inequality) determines the endowments—and hence the preferences—of the median voter with respect to foreign economic policy (Mayer 1984; Dutt and Mitra 2002), the spatial distribution of mass preferences over globalization is simply set aside without acknowledging its potential importance.

In short, as a result of its implicit assumption that mass preferences over globalization are indeed "scattered at random over the various constituencies", and that median district

preferences over foreign economic policy are therefore identical across the electoral map, the existing literature on mass politics in IPE has not recognized the potential value of the electoral geography perspective in explaining cross-national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes. However, in light of this dissertation's discussion of how mass political cleavages over globalization manifest spatially as a result of the geographic divide between global city and hinterland coalitions, it is clear that the geographic distribution of public support for globalization is highly uneven, and reflects the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. In such a world, it is unlikely that mass preferences over globalization will be "scattered at random over the various constituencies", which suggests that this assumption might profitably be relaxed, and that the cross-national policy implications of the electoral geography of mass preferences (as it is shaped by spatial coalitions) ought to be explicitly investigated.²

In particular, this section draws on the framework of electoral geography to explore how the geographic distribution of global city coalitions across electoral districts (i.e. the electoral geography of global city coalitions) affects foreign economic policy outcomes in different institutional settings; after developing the argument theoretically, I draw out testable hypotheses that are evaluated in subsequent sections.

² Of course, there is a separate literature on how electoral regimes affect foreign economic policy independently of electoral geography; much of this work flows from Grossman and Helpmann's important work (2005). The irrelevance of electoral geography (as understood in the sense I have been describing) for this literature on electoral regimes is underscored by Grossman and Helpmann's important assumption that voters within "districts are heterogeneous in their political preferences" (Grossman and Helpmann 2005, 1252; 1240). Of course, the whole point of the electoral geography literature is that in a world where district-level preferences are arrayed according to a "core-periphery" pattern, we *cannot* posit heterogeneous district-level preferences, since political preferences within the core will tend to be homogeneous (indeed, the homogeneity of district-level preferences is how wasted votes occur). In addition, aside from this broad literature on electoral regimes, it is worth noting once again that the electoral geography literature that *does* exist within IPE is focused on the electoral geography of special interests (i.e. particular industries or sectors), and focuses not on aggregate patterns of economic openness or closure in response to the demands of mass coalitions, but on narrower dependent variables that can help us to uncover whether and under what conditions (with respect to electoral geography) these special interests can successfully achieve their particularistic ends.

6.3.1 The Electoral Geography of Global City Coalitions and Foreign Economic Policy: Argument and Intuition

As we have discussed in previous chapters, global city agglomeration processes underpin a distinctive *political* coalition of pro-globalization residents who live within the borders of the global city (i.e. the global city coalition); as I argued and tentatively demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, the emergence of this distinctive coalition arises from the shared experience of globalization-driven prosperity within the context of everyday life in the global city, which contributes to "local-tropic" support for globalization. To the extent that these territorially concentrated global city coalitions are also concentrated on the electoral map, the result, in lowproportionality electoral systems, is an "inefficient" distribution of global city residents that weakens political incentives to appeal to these internationalist voters. In other words, when the global city coalition of a given country with a low-proportionality electoral system is highly concentrated in electoral space, large numbers of "pro-globalization" votes from members of this coalition are essentially wasted, giving politicians incentives to court (by proposing more protectionist policies) more efficiently distributed "anti-globalization" voters from the hinterland coalition. In contrast, if electoral districts are superimposed on global city coalitions such that these coalitions are actually relatively dispersed across the electoral map, fewer "proglobalization" votes from global city residents are wasted, increasing political incentives to appeal to these voters. In short, in low-proportionality electoral systems, as the electoral concentration of global city coalitions increases, it leads to a diminution of their relative electoral clout (by increasing the number of wasted votes from global city residents), which in turn yields more protectionist policies; in contrast, as the electoral concentration of global city coalitions decreases, it amplifies their relative electoral clout (by decreasing the number of wasted votes

from global city residents), which in turn yields more open trade policies. However, in more proportional electoral regimes, the electoral geography of global city coalitions is unlikely to have a strong impact on trade policy outcomes; this is because in these regimes, where the proportional translation from votes to seats obviates the issue of "wasted votes", the relative concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions is unlikely to condition incentives for politicians to appeal to voters within the global city coalition. In these systems, the sensitivity of politicians to the preferences of global city coalitions is a function of the absolute size of global city coalitions within the polity, not their distribution across electoral districts.

We can couch the argument more explicitly in the language of the median-voter framework by considering an analogy with the politics of redistribution during the industrial era. Back then, as we discussed, the clustering of left-wing coalitions in a small number of urban districts led (in plurality or low-proportionality regimes) to a situation in which the national median voter was considerably more supportive of redistribution than the median voter in the median district. Analogously, to the extent that global city coalitions are clustered in a small number of "global city districts", we might expect the "pro-globalization" preferences of the national median voter (i.e. a global city resident) to be considerably stronger than the median voter in the median district (i.e. a protectionist voter from the hinterland coalition). In a proportional representation context, this is more or less irrelevant; because votes are not wasted, parties generally have incentives to compete for the allegiance of the median voter regardless of where she is located. But, as we noted above, it has large political consequences in low proportionality contexts; indeed, it effectively empowers a minority that is efficiently distributed across electoral districts at the expense of an inefficiently concentrated majority. If the electoral concentration of global city coalitions is sufficiently high, and large numbers of pro-

globalization votes are thereby "wasted", policy would be pulled in a relatively protectionist direction by an efficiently distributed protectionist minority from the hinterlands, even though the majority of the population (global city residents from densely populated global cities who are part of the internationalist global city coalition) favors a relatively liberal foreign economic policy.

To make this discussion more concrete, we might consider the case of the United States, and how the electoral geography of its global city coalition, with respect to the borders defined by the Electoral College (i.e. US state borders) shaped the 2016 Presidential Election. A poll in July 2016 carried out by the Washington Post and ABC News asked respondents "if they wanted the next president to be someone who supports trade agreements or opposes them". The response was striking: 75 percent "of respondents said they wanted a supporter and 17 percent favored an opponent" (Calmes 2016, Paragraph 13). Admittedly, this may have been an outlier poll, but the trend of overall public support for trade treaties, and economic openness more generally, seems fairly robust. A Gallup poll from around this time "found that 58 percent of Americans viewed trade as an economic opportunity, 34 percent as a threat", while another July 2016 poll, from NBC, showed that "55 percent of registered voters agreed with a statement that trade was good 'because it opens up new markets and we cannot avoid the fact that it is a global economy" (Calmes 2016, Paragraph 14). These polls suggest that the median voter in the United States in fact supports globalization and international exchange, which brings into focus an important puzzle: why did *both* candidates in the election run against trade agreements when the majority of the electorate appears to favor globalization? Perhaps Trump's criticisms of trade agreements, and international integration more broadly, are not puzzling; his campaign strategy, after all, was clearly to mobilize disaffected voters from the American hinterland, and incorporate these voters

into the Republican coalition. Clinton, however, is a different matter. Her campaign positions and rhetoric on trade and globalization could best be described as ambivalent or, perhaps more charitably, as nuanced; for instance, she expressed support for TPP, but criticized some of its features, which she pledged to fix (Margolis 2016). This ambivalence—she was clearly the internationalist candidate, relatively speaking, but did not mount as robust a defense of globalization as she could have—is indeed puzzling, especially in light of the increasing support within the Democratic coalition for economic openness (a point I discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, in Section 5.5).

Why didn't Clinton try to more aggressively mobilize the US global city coalition to counter Trump's aggressive mobilization of its hinterland coalition, in the way that Macron, for instance, aggressively mobilized an internationalist coalition anchored in France's global cities to counter Le Pen's French coalition of closure from the hinterlands? There are of course many ways to possibly explain her hedge, but the logic of electoral geography suggests one reason why she ran as the candidate of ambivalent, rather than full-throated, internationalism. In particular, it suggests that Clinton tempered her pro-globalization positions because mounting a more enthusiastic defense of openness in her platform and campaign may have brought her more votes among the global city residents that make up the global city coalition—votes that, at the end of the day, would have been wasted in any case because of their inefficient geographic concentration with respect to the Electoral College map—while losing votes among more efficiently distributed skeptics of openness from the hinterlands, some of whose votes she would need in order secure victory.

Of course, this calculus was primarily shaped by the incentive structure established by the Electoral College, rather than the majoritarian electoral system; that said, the central principle,

namely, that the spatial distribution of mass coalitions across districts can be hugely consequential in winner-take-all contexts in which concentrated votes are effectively wasted, is essentially the same. The problem of wasted votes in majoritarian or plurality electoral systems forces parties to target the median voter in the median district rather than the national median voter (who is likely to be less protectionist than the median voter in the median district in light of the spatial and electoral clustering of global city coalitions). Analogously, Electoral College votes are allocated on the basis of a plurality-based winner-take-all system (in almost all cases), which makes wasted votes and the efficiency of political support across states a salient consideration in the electoral strategies of presidential candidates. On this account, Clinton could not fully embrace her role as the internationalist candidate and move towards the preferences of the pro-globalization national median voter (since doing so would have simply yielded superfluous extra votes in global cities); instead, she was forced to move towards the more protectionist preferences of the median voter in the pivotal states of the Electoral College. If Clinton, like Macron, ran in a direct presidential election in which all votes counted equally (i.e. the analogue of a proportional representation system), her strategy of hedging over globalization would have been unnecessary; she would not have had to worry that mounting a comprehensive and unapologetic defense of globalization would sacrifice valuable votes in the hinterlands for superfluous votes in global cities. Indeed, in a direct election in which every vote counted equally, mounting such a defense of globalization would likely have been (judging by the polling data on Democratic preferences and the American electorate more generally) an optimal strategy.

Of course, her efforts to appeal to the relatively protectionist pivotal voter from the hinterlands did not work, perhaps because the pivotal hinterland voter did not believe that she truly had reservations about globalization; in light of her personal and political history, Clinton's

globalization-skeptic rhetoric might have seemed like a bluff, and this perhaps contributed to the massive disjunction between her electoral and popular vote shares.

But the failure of her strategy is largely beside the point. Rather, the central point is simply that the United States' global city coalition is inefficiently distributed with respect to the state-level electoral map that is used to aggregate votes within the Electoral College, and that as a result, the "pro-globalization" votes of its members (i.e. global city residents), are effectively less valuable than the protectionist votes of the efficiently distributed protectionist voters from the hinterlands. In other words, though the national median voter may favor globalization (as indicated by the polling data which suggests that the majority of Americans favor globalization), the inefficient electoral concentration of "pro-globalization" voters from the country's global city coalition means that the median voter in the pivotal state of the Electoral College-the voter that actually matters in the context of presidential politics—is likely to be a hinterland voter who is considerably more hostile to globalization than the national median voter. This suggests a complication in the previous chapter's suggestion (See Section 5.5) that the Democrats may well be turning into the pro-globalization party of America's global cities before our eyes; in particular, the politics of the Electoral College suggest that at least in the context of today's geographic landscape, the Democratic Party will continue to have to peel off parts of the hinterland coalition in order to win presidential elections. As a result, though the Democrats could be evolving into the partisan agents of the United States' global city coalition, this transition is unlikely to be a smooth one, given the punishing logic of electoral geography. This of course has extremely important political implications; for instance, the structural bias in the Electoral College in favor of efficiently dispersed protectionist hinterland voters and against inefficiently concentrated global city voters that favor globalization, should temper optimism (if

such optimism indeed remains) that the United States might credibly resume its role as a leader of an international political order conducive to globalization in the post-Trump era.

More generally, though the Electoral College is an idiosyncratic feature of the American political system, Hillary Clinton's geographic balancing act, and the geographic balancing act that future Democratic presidential candidates will presumably confront as the global city versus hinterland divide grows ever starker, is the very same calculus that all parties operating within the framework of disproportional electoral regimes must face in a context of electorally concentrated global city coalitions; the foregoing discussion of the Electoral College in the context of the politics of globalization in the United States therefore helps bring into focus the more general issue of how the electoral concentration of global city coalitions generates possible biases in the aggregation of pro-globalization preferences under different electoral rules, which is of course an issue of comparative significance. Although the Electoral College is certainly unique, all contemporary democracies are representative democracies, and use different electoral regimes to aggregate preferences (as they are expressed at the ballot box) into political representation; different regimes, in turn, accord different levels of political clout to concentrated interests in the translation of votes into seats. In electoral regimes based on geographic representation and majoritarian or plurality electoral rules—that is, in elections with more or less "winner-take-all" rules—the political dynamic is more or less analogous to the political dynamic we see at work in the Electoral College, where the electoral concentration of the US global city coalition diminishes its electoral clout, and in turn shifts policy in a relatively protectionist direction. On the other hand, proportional electoral regimes are essentially analogous to direct presidential elections, wherein the salient consideration is the absolute size of a given coalition, rather than its geographic distribution.

6.3.2 Hypotheses

As we discussed above, Rodden (2005) suggests that one implication of the electoral geography perspective, as applied to the politics of redistribution, is that increases in the electoral concentration of the "left should only curb the growth of the welfare state in the presence of plurality electoral rules" (25). The electoral geography perspective on the mass politics of globalization, developed in the previous sections, suggests an analogous hypothesis, namely, that *ceteris paribus*, increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions should lead to less globalization-friendly foreign economic policies, but only in the presence of plurality electoral rules, or, more generally, low-proportionality electoral rules. The reasoning, as developed previously, is that in the context of electoral regimes with single member districts and plurality electoral rules, increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions lead to more "wasted" pro-globalization votes from global city residents, which in turn pushes policy in a relatively protectionist direction (as politicians compete for the more valuable "antiglobalization" votes of individuals from the hinterlands). On the other hand, in the context of more proportional electoral regimes, increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions should *not* be associated with less globalization-friendly policies, since the votes of electorally concentrated coalitions are not "wasted" in systems that translate votes into seats in a proportional manner. Stated explicitly, our discussion suggests the following hypothesis:

H1: Ceteris paribus, increases (decreases) in the electoral concentration of national global city coalitions are associated with more (less) protectionist foreign economic policies in countries with plurality-rules electoral regimes. Variation in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions does not affect foreign economic policies (at least to the same extent) in proportional representation (PR) countries.

Of course, while attempting to capture the extent of an electoral system's proportionality using the plurality/PR dummy is common practice in the empirical literature, it is nevertheless the case that even among PR systems, some regimes (i.e. those with higher average district magnitudes) are more proportional than others; Rodden therefore suggests that an alternative, and possibly better, "way to see the relationship between electoral rules and electoral bias is to examine the full range of variation in district magnitude rather than focus on the SMD-PR dichotomy" (Rodden 2005, 16). This suggests the following hypothesis, which is analogous to the one presented above, but which instead distinguishes between electoral regimes on the basis of district magnitude:

H2: Ceteris paribus, increases (decreases) in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are associated with more (less) protectionist foreign economic policies in low district-magnitude electoral regimes; as district magnitude increases, the tendency for increases (decreases) in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions to be associated with more (less) protectionist foreign economic policies weakens, and eventually approaches zero.

In the next section, I discuss my empirical approach to assess the plausibility of these hypotheses about how electoral regimes condition the impact of variation in the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions on foreign economic policy outcomes. In this chapter, I focus in particular on trade policy outcomes.

6.4 Empirical Analysis: Preliminaries

6.4.1 The Dependent Variable

As a measure of trade policy, I use a country's average applied tariffs, with higher applied tariffs of course indicating a more protectionist trade policy stance, and lower applied tariffs indicating a more liberal trade policy orientation. Using tariffs as a measure of national trade policy orientations is common in the literature on how political institutions shape foreign economic policy; indeed tariffs are perhaps the most common dependent variable in the literature on the relationship between the mass politics of globalization and cross-national variation in foreign economic policy (Milner and Kubota 2005; Tavares 2008; Dutt and Mitra 2002; Dutt and Mitra 2005), and the use of applied tariff rates as the dependent variable here therefore follows in the vein of relevant previous work. In particular, I use a measure of average applied tariffs (from the year 2013) that I collected from the World Trade Organization's country Tariff Profiles. This measure is essentially a country's average statutory tariff, based on the country's tariff schedule. More specifically, the WTO averages duties at the tariff-line level to create average tariff rates at the level of HS six-digit subheadings; it then uses these 6-digit averages to generate an aggregate measure of average applied tariffs (World Tariff Profiles, 2016). I label this measure of average applied tariffs as *wto_tariff*. As a robustness check, I also use a measure of trade-weighted tariffs collected from the World Bank Development Indicators, labelled worldbank_tariff.

6.4.2 The Independent Variable of Interest

In order to test the hypotheses specified in Section 6.3.2, we must develop an indicator that can capture the relative concentration of global city coalitions across the electoral map in a large cross-section of countries. For the purpose of developing such an indicator, we must bring together data on the spatial distribution of global city coalitions across physical space with GIS data on the electoral boundaries that countries use in their elections. I discuss each of these in turn, before turning to a discussion of how I bring them together to develop an empirical indicator of the electoral geography of global city coalitions in a cross-section of countries.

Developing explicit population-based measures for the spatial distribution of global city coalitions in a large cross-section of countries is not possible at this time, and I therefore simply use data on the spatial distribution of superstar headquarter establishments as a proxy for the spatial distribution of mass global city coalitions.³ My reasoning begins from the premise that (as discussed at length in earlier chapters) superstar headquarters establishments constitute global cities through their agglomeration patterns, and data on the locations of these establishments can therefore be used to empirically delineate the economic geography of global cities. Global city coalitions, in turn, are comprised of the residents of these global cities, we can use empirical indicators of the economic geography of global cities (i.e. data on the spatial distribution of superstar headquarter establishments) to approximate the spatial distribution of the mass global city coalitions that stem from this economic geography. In other words, global cities and global

³ For all countries in the sample, the procedures used to code superstar firms and geocode their headquarter locations is analogous to the procedures used in Chapter 4 for the UK; please refer to the relevant sections in Chapter 4 (particularly 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).

city coalitions are physically coextensive (since global city coalitions are necessarily embedded within global cities), and the locations of superstar headquarter establishments trace out the economic geography of global cities; the spatial distribution of superstar headquarter establishments should therefore track the spatial distribution of mass global city coalitions. This seems an entirely reasonable assumption in light of the analysis presented in Chapter 4 (particularly Section 4.4), which suggested that the territorial footprint of global city coalitions is especially strong in the immediate vicinity of these establishments.

However, to capture the relative concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions across electoral districts, we cannot necessarily rely on firm or headquarter level measures of concentration or dispersal across physical space developed by economists (Alfaro and Chen 2014). It is perhaps intuitive to assume that the physical concentration of global city coalitions points to their analogous concentration on the electoral map, and such an assumption may be valid as a first-cut approximation. Indeed, Rodden, for instance, finds that the physical concentration of pro-redistribution left-wing voters tended to be reflected on the electoral map. However, he acknowledges that this was not necessarily inevitable, and generally uses explicit measures of left party concentration across electoral districts (rather than across physical space) in his comparative analysis (Rodden 2005, 8; 10). In their discussion of the electoral geography of protectionist industries, Reinhardt and Busch (1999) make a similar point about the possible disjunction between economic and electoral geography, suggesting that it is possible for "an industry clustered within a given region [to be] dispersed across electoral districts." It is for essentially these reasons that Maliniak (2014) argues for the importance of explicitly measuring the spatial distribution of interests and economic actors at the scale of politically relevant boundaries, rather than attempting to develop proxies purely based on economic geography or by

aggregating data to politically irrelevant administrative districts. Luckily, in light of the growing availability of cross-national, geographically explicit data on electoral districts (Kollman et al 2017), we need not use the *physical* dispersion or concentration of global city coalitions—which we proxy, as noted above, with data on the physical locations of the headquarters of superstar and global producer services firms—to infer the electoral dispersion or concentration of global city coalitions discussed in the previous chapter with spatially explicit data on electoral districts, we can assess their electoral dispersion or concentration directly.

Before proceeding to discuss how I use these data to develop systematic empirical indicators for the spatial distribution of superstar headquarter establishments across electoral districts (i.e. our proxy for the electoral geography of global city coalitions), it is useful to overlay these superstar establishment locations against GIS data on the spatial boundaries of electoral districts, and visualize the resulting electoral geography. To that end, I present (below) several maps that display the spatial distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts in four different countries: Brazil, Switzerland, India, and Canada⁴. These countries differ along two axes of variation: economic endowments (or levels of development), and type of electoral system. Brazil and India are both developing countries; Brazil employs multimember districts with proportional representation, while India uses single member districts with plurality electoral rules. On the other hand, Canada and Switzerland are both developed countries; Switzerland employs multimember districts and proportional representation, while Canada uses single member districts and plurality electoral rules.

⁴ Canada is too large a country for a full country-level map to be of much use, so in this case, I zoom in on particular regions to illustrate the spatial distribution of superstars headquarters across electoral districts




Figure 6.1. Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in Brazil




Figure 6.2: Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in Switzerland




Figure 6.3: Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in India




Figure 6.4: Geographic distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in India (close-up of Mumbai region)




Figure 6.5. Geographic Distribution of Superstar Headquarters Across Electoral Districts (proxy for electoral geography of global city coalitions) in Canada (close-up of Toronto region)

Across these different economic and institutional contexts, we do see a tendency for superstar and global producer services headquarters—and by extension, global cities and global city coalitions—to be concentrated on the electoral map. Just as the geographic concentration of pro-redistribution left-wing voters tended to lead to their electoral concentration, so too with proglobalization global city voters; at the same time, just as the extent of the industrial era electoral concentration of pro-redistribution voters tended to vary across national contexts (Rodden 2005, 24), leading to cross-national variation in policy outcomes, the maps presented above also point to meaningful cross-national variation in the geographic distribution of global city coalitions across electoral districts. Even casual observation suggests, for instance, that superstar headquarter establishments in Mumbai (Figure 6.4) are concentrated within a smaller number of electoral districts than superstar headquarter establishments in Toronto (Figure 6.5). More broadly, this might suggest that the economic geography of global cities spills over a larger number of electoral districts in Canada than in India; to the extent that this is the case, it would suggest that Canada's global city coalition is more evenly (i.e. "efficiently") distributed across electoral districts than India's global city coalition, which points to the relatively greater electoral clout of the former. In other words, the relatively high concentration of superstar headquarter establishments in India points to a highly concentrated economic geography of global cities with respect to the electoral map; this in turn suggests that its global city coalition dominates a handful of "global city districts", but that in doing so, it tends to "waste votes" at the ballot box, and therefore sees its clout diminished. In Canada, in contrast, the relative dispersal of superstar headquarter establishments across the electoral map points to an electorally dispersed economic geography of global cities; instead of constituting a super-majority in a small number of districts (as in India), the relatively efficient distribution of Canada's global city coalition suggests that it

constitutes a relatively small majority in a larger number of districts, which leads to fewer wasted votes beyond the plurality or majority threshold, and a corresponding increase in the political leverage of Canada's global city coalition over policy.

To develop a more systematic empirical indicator that serves as a proxy for the extent to which global city coalitions are concentrated or dispersed across electoral districts, I first use ArcGIS's "spatial join" tool to compute the number of superstar and global producer services firm headquarters within each district. I then calculate the Gini coefficient (Jenkins 1999) of the distribution of these firms across electoral districts, which yields a measure of the electoral concentration or dispersal of the superstar and global producer services headquarter establishments that constitute the economic foundation of global cities. The Gini coefficient is commonly used in economic geography to ascertain the inequality of a distribution across territorial units (Ramcharan 2009; Krugman 1993). As the Gini coefficient of superstar headquarters across electoral districts rises, it indicates that the electoral concentration of these establishments—and by extension, the electoral concentration of global cities and global city coalitions- is increasing. On the other hand, lower Gini coefficients are associated with a more dispersed distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts, which suggests that global cities spill over a larger number of districts across the electoral map; this indicates an electoral geography of global city coalitions that is relatively less polarized and hence more "efficient", leading to fewer "wasted" pro-globalization votes from global city residents.

Using geospatial electoral boundary data collected by the CLEA project at the University of Michigan (Kollman et al 2017)⁵, and country-level data on the locations of superstar and

⁵ I supplement electoral boundary data collected from the CLEA project with boundary data collected from arcgisonline.com, and from gadm.org, in the case of PR countries that use administrative boundaries as electoral districts. I use Grofman and Handley (2008) for guidance on which countries follow this practice.

global producer services firm headquarter establishments⁶, I calculate the Gini coefficient of superstars for a cross section of 68 countries; this variable is labelled *electoralconcentration_gc*, and serves as the proxy measure for the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions used in the analysis below.⁷ As the value on this variable increases, it points to increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions (i.e. a more "inefficient" electoral geography of global city coalitions). My sample is restricted to countries for which I was able to find geospatial electoral boundary data, and which have democratically competitive legislative elections. To classify the competitiveness of a country's elections, I use the World Bank's Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC) from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016); this variable is measured on a 7 point scale, with 7 indicating the highest level of competitiveness and 1 indicating the lowest level of competiveness. In order to be included in the sample, countries must have a LIEC score that is six or above, which is the threshold for democratically competitive elections suggested in the DPI's codebook. Other studies in IPE, such as Betz (2017), Keefer (2007), and Leblang and Satyanath (2006) also use the LIEC variable, and a similar threshold, for the purpose of classifying countries with competitive elections in which democratic political institutions are likely to have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes.

Recall that the hypotheses put forward above suggest that the electoral concentration or dispersion of global city coalitions should have an important impact on trade policy outcomes in the context of low-proportionality electoral systems, where increases in the electoral

⁶ For all countries in the sample, the procedures used to code superstar firms and geocode their headquarter locations is analogous to the procedures used in Chapter 4 for the UK; please refer to the relevant sections in Chapter 4 (particularly 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).

⁷ The Gini coefficients were calculated using electoral boundaries in the most recent election prior to the summer of 2013.

concentration of global city coalitions increase the number of "wasted" pro-globalization votes from members of the global city coalition (which in turn increases the relative electoral clout of more efficiently distributed protectionist voters from the hinterlands); on the other hand, in more proportional electoral systems, the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions should not matter for policy (at least to the same extent), since the electoral concentration of political coalitions in such systems does not lead to a corresponding diminution in their electoral clout. In highly proportional systems, in other words, votes are aggregated such that even if global city coalitions are highly concentrated in electoral space, pro-globalization votes are not wasted. In order to account for the conditional effects of the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions (*electoralconcentration_gc*) we therefore need data on the proportionality of a country's electoral system. As discussed above, and following other studies of electoral systems such as Rodden (2005), I classify the proportionality of electoral systems using a dichotomous plurality/PR categorical variable, as well as a measure of mean district magnitude. Below, the variable *plurality* takes on the value one if a country uses a plurality-rules electoral system, and zero otherwise. The variable *districtmagnitude* is simply the mean district magnitude of a country's electoral system; higher district magnitudes are markers of relatively more proportional electoral systems. Following other studies (Evans 2009; Hatfield 2014), I use the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) to classify electoral systems as "plurality" rules systems (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016; I use data on district magnitude from Norris (2009).

Finally, it is important to note that a handful of countries have adopted "mixed" electoral systems, wherein representatives are elected from two "tiers": a "nominal" tier consisting of candidates running in single-member districts based on plurality rules, and a "list" tier, in which candidates are elected from multimember districts on the basis of proportional representation.

Countries with mixed electoral systems can be further subdivided into those with mixed member proportional systems (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian systems (MMM). It is generally accepted that MMP systems are, in principle and in operation, relatively "close" to pure proportional representation systems while MMM systems are likewise "close" to pure majoritarian systems (Thames and Edwards 2006). These mixed systems of course do not fit neatly into the plurality/PR dichotomy, but because they both contain elements of proportional representation, I classify them as PR systems when applying the dichotomous plurality/PR coding; in other words, only "pure" plurality systems are considered as such in the analysis below. Dropping mixed systems from the analysis (following Evans 2009), or grouping MMM systems with "pure" plurality systems and MMP systems with "pure" proportional representation systems (following Rickard 2012b) does not affect the results below, and so to save space I do not present or discuss the results under these alternative coding schemes. Finally, when calculating the spatial distribution of superstar headquarters across electoral districts in mixed systems, I compute the Gini coefficient using the list tier for MMP systems, since ultimately, in these systems, "a party's total number of seats is determined by its percentage of the vote in the list tier" (Thames and Edwards 2006, 6). In MMM systems, unlike MMP systems (where the list and nominal tiers are essentially "linked"), these tiers are independent; in these systems, I compute the Gini coefficient with respect to the tier in which over 50% of the legislative seats are allocated.

Summary statistics for the dependent variable (*wto_tariff*), independent variable (*electoralconcentration_gc*), electoral system variables (*plurality* and *districtmagnitude*), and other control variables (discussed below) are presented in Table 6.1.

| Variable | Observations | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---------------------------|--------------|----------|--------------|----------|----------|
| wto_tariff | 67 | 7.576119 | 3.473017 | 0.2 | 13.9 |
| worldbank_tariff | 66 | 4.073939 | 3.149857 | 0.07 | 10.89 |
| presidential | 68 | 0.352941 | 0.481438 | 0 | 1 |
| polconiii | 67 | 0.366231 | 0.133349 | 0.0858 | 0.711 |
| leftparty | 68 | 0.323529 | 0.471301 | 0 | 1 |
| logGDP_PC | 68 | 9.537272 | 1.070213 | 6.919684 | 11.42543 |
| plurality | 68 | 0.264706 | 0.444457 | 0 | 1 |
| electoralconcentration_GC | 68 | 0.734523 | 0.228868 | 0 | 0.987613 |
| britcol | 68 | 0.338235 | 0.476627 | 0 | 1 |
| spanporc | 68 | 0.235294 | 0.427336 | 0 | 1 |
| districtmagnitude | 64 | 12.45529 | 27.21039 | 1 | 150 |
| othercol | 68 | 0.191177 | 0.396151 | 0 | 1 |
| leg_british | 68 | 0.338235 | 0.476627 | 0 | 1 |
| leg_socialist | 68 | 0.132353 | 0.341394 | 0 | 1 |
| leg_french | 68 | 0.352941 | 0.481438 | 0 | 1 |

Table 6.1: Summary Statistics for Cross-National Analysis

6.4.3 Bivariate Scatterplots and Correlations

Before turning to a multivariate analysis, I assess the plausibility of the arguments presented above through a series of simple scatter plots with *wto_tariff* on the y-axis, and *electoralconcentration_gc* on the x-axis. Recall that we expect that higher levels of *electoralconcentration_gc* (our measure of the extent of the electoral concentration of global city coalitions) are associated with higher levels of trade protection, but that this effect is conditional on the electoral system. In countries with low-proportionality electoral systems, the argument suggests that we should expect a relatively strong association between *electoralconcentration_gc* and *wto_tariff*, since higher levels of *electoralconcentration_gc* imply higher numbers of "wasted" pro-globalization votes from electorally concentrated global city coalitions, leading to a

trade policy that is relatively more beholden to the preferences of protectionist hinterland voters; on the other hand, lower levels of *electoralconcentration_gc* suggest that global city coalitions are distributed across the electoral map with greater efficiency, which points to fewer "wasted" pro-globalization votes, and a trade policy that is therefore relatively less beholden to protectionist voters from the hinterland. However, in relatively proportional systems, where the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions does not lead to "wasted" pro-globalization votes (since votes are valuable regardless of where they are cast), we would expect to see a substantially weaker (and perhaps non-existent) relationship between *electoralconcentration_gc* and *wto_tariff*.

Below, I graph the relationship between *electoralconcentration_gc* and *wto_tariff* in lowproportionality electoral systems (i.e. where *plurality*=1) in Figure 6.6, and the same relationship in more proportional electoral systems (i.e. where *plurality*=0) in Figure 6.7.




Figure 6.6: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (majoritarian countries)




Figure 6.7: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (PR countries)

As expected, we see a stronger positive relationship between *electoralconcentration_gc* and *wto_tariff* in the low-proportionality context depicted in Figure 6.6 (where the correlation coefficient between the variables is 0.86) than in the high-proportionality context depicted in 6.7 (where the correlation coefficient between the variables is only 0.37).

To investigate whether these differences are driven by differences in economic development, I create additional plots in which countries are separated by levels of development. I define "developed" countries as countries with a per-capita GDP, in terms of purchasing power parity, that is more than \$22000; "developing" countries are those with per-capita-GDP levels, in terms of purchasing-power-parity, less than or equal to \$22000.⁸ In Figures 6.8 and 6.9, I present bivariate scatterplots that are analogous to Figures 6.6 and 6.7, but with the difference that they are restricted to "developed" countries (defined according to the threshold just described).

⁸ I use this cut-off because the mean per-capita GDP, in PPP terms, in the dataset is just over \$22,000.




Figure 6.8: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (majoritarian developed countries)




Figure 6.9: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (PR developed countries)

In Plot 6.8, which is a scatterplot of *wto_tariff* as a function of *electoralconcentration_gc* for developed countries with low-proportionality electoral systems (*plurality*=1), the correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.7; in Figure 6.9, which presents the scatterplot of

wto_tariff as a function of *electoralconcentration_gc* for developed countries with high-proportionality electoral systems (*plurality=*0), this correlation is considerably lower, at 0.42.This divergence is once again consistent with the expectations of the argument developed above.

Finally, Figures 6.10 and 6.11 are analogous to Figures 6.8 and 6.9, with the exception that they are restricted to developing countries, rather than developed countries. In Figure 6.10, a scatterplot of *wto_tariff* as a function of *electoralconcentration_gc* for developing countries with low-proportionality electoral systems (*plurality=1*), the correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.72; in Figure 6.11, a scatterplot of *wto_tariff* as a function of *electoralconcentration_gc* for developing countries with high-proportionality electoral systems (*plurality=0*), the correlation coefficient between the two variables is only 0.11.




Figure 6.10: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (majoritarian developing countries)




Figure 6.11: Scatter plot of WTO applied tariffs as a function of electoral concentration of global city coalitions (PR developing countries)

These patterns suggest that the tendency for highly concentrated global city coalitions to be associated with high degrees of tariff protection in low-proportionality electoral systems (but not in high-proportionality systems), holds across developing and developed-world contexts.

In short, the correlational patterns presented in this section provide suggestive evidence for the argument (and the associated hypotheses) presented above, in Section 6.3.2. In line with expectations, we do see that more electorally concentrated global city coalitions (*electoralconcentration_gc*) are associated with higher levels of tariff protection, and that this relationship is notably stronger in the low-proportionality context of plurality systems than in relatively more proportional PR systems. In the next section, I assess the argument in a multivariate empirical setting.

6.5 Multivariate Analysis

6.5.1 Control Variables, Interaction Term, and Estimation

In this section's multivariate analysis of how electoral systems condition the trade policy impact of the electoral geography of global city coalitions, I control for several variables that have been shown to have an important impact on trade policy outcomes in previous work on the relationship between institutions and trade policy outcomes in economics and political science. Following Evans (2009), I control for a country's colonial and legal origins by including the following categorical variables: britcol (which takes on the value one if a country is a former British colony and zero otherwise), spanporc (which takes on the value one if a country is a former Spanish or Portuguese colony and zero otherwise), othercol (which takes on the value one if a country is a former colony of a country other than the aforementioned three, and zero otherwise), *leg_british* (which takes on the value one if a country's legal system has British origins and zero otherwise), *leg_socialist* (which takes on the value one if a country's legal system is traced to the former Soviet Union and zero otherwise), and *leg_french* (which takes on the value one if a country's legal system has French origins and zero otherwise). Though Evans does not include a variable that measures a country's level of economic development in her cross-sectional analysis, to account for the effects of economic development on trade policy, I control for the log of per-capita GDP in purchasing-power-parity (PPP) terms, in the year 2012; this variable is labelled *logGDP_PC*. Data on colonial and legal origins is from Persson and Tabellini (2003), while data on GDP per capita is from the World Bank's Development Indicators.

In a comprehensive review of the political economy of trade policy, Busch and Mansfield (N.D) write that in political economy analyses of trade policy outcomes "the influence of four institutional factors has generated particular interest: (1) partisanship, (2) the number of "veto points" in a government, (3) whether the democracy has a presidential or a parliamentary system of government, and (4) the average size of the constituencies that are represented" (Busch and Mansfield, 13). I do not explicitly control for the average number or size of constituencies, since these variables are a direct product of electoral systems, which we already explicitly account for⁹; however, I control for the other three factors Busch and Mansfield highlight—partisanship, the separation of powers (which maps on, broadly speaking, to the presidential versus parliamentary distinction), and veto points-in the specifications below. I control for partisanship with a variable labelled *left*, which takes on the value one if a country's executive is classified as being a member of a left-wing party in 2012¹⁰ and zero otherwise.¹¹ I control for the separation of powers with a categorical variable that is labelled *presidential*, which takes on a value of one if a country is considered a presidential system, and zero otherwise. Both the *left* variable and the *presidential* variable are based on data from the World Bank's Database of

⁹Proportional representation systems generally have larger and fewer districts than plurality systems with single-member districts. It is unclear, a priori, whether that might lead to systematically higher or lower values of *electoralconcentration_gc* in plurality-based systems with single-member districts. To explore this further, I carried out an unpaired difference of means test for the variable *electoralconcentration_gc* between countries for which *plurality=*0 and for which *plurality=*1. The difference in the average value of *electoralconcentration_gc* between plurality and proportional representation systems is not statistically significant.

¹⁰ I also experiment with setting *left* equal to the percentage of years a left-wing executive is in power in the 3-5 years prior to 2013, but this alternative coding scheme does not alter the results.

¹¹ According to Stolper-Samuelson logic, left-wing governments should favour trade openness in developing countries, but oppose it in developed countries. I tested for such a conditional effect, but did not find evidence for such a Stolper-Samuelson dynamic (more specifically, left-party control is associated with higher tariffs even in developing country contexts). This is perhaps not surprising, since earlier results in the dissertation (see Chapter 4), as well as other scholarship (for instance, Milner, Tingley, and Hicks 2014) suggests that we should be sceptical about the prevalence of Stolper-Samuelson effects in a world of skill-biased trade. Accordingly, in the specifications presented below, I simply include *left* as an unconditional variable, and do not present interactions of *left* and *loggdp_pc*.

Political Institutions. Finally, I control for veto points using the value of Henisz's (2002) political constraints index from 2012, labelled *polconiii*; this variable increases in value as institutional and partisan veto players present additional obstacles to policy change.¹²

Recall that the argument and hypotheses presented above posit that the positive impact of the electoral concentration of global city coalitions on the magnitude of trade (tariff) protection is conditional on the electoral system; that is, we expect to see a strong positive association between *electoralconcentration_gc* and *wto_tariff* in plurality systems but not in PR systems. To assess *H1* in a multivariate setting, I use an interaction term between *electoralconcentration_gc* are associated with higher tariffs in plurality systems (*plurality=1*) but not in PR systems (*plurality=0*), the coefficient on this interaction term should be positive. To evaluate *H2*, I include an interaction term between *electoralconcentration_gc* and *districtmagnitude;* here, we would expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative, indicating that higher values of district magnitude are associated with a reduced positive impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* on tariff levels.

It is important to acknowledge that estimating models using a purely cross-sectional dataset, and a relatively small one at that, is not ideal; however, time-series geospatial data is extremely difficult and labor-intensive to compile, making a panel analysis impossible at this time. However, previous studies of electoral systems and trade policy have used cross-sectional analyses with similar numbers of countries, to useful effect (Evans 2009). The multivariate cross-sectional analysis might therefore be seen as a plausibility probe of the arguments

¹² I also experiment with using the average value of *polconiii* in the 3-5 years prior to 2013, but these alternative coding schemes do not alter the results, as there is a high degree of year-to-year stability in the value of *polconiii*.

presented above, before undertaking the effort needed to carry out a more rigorous test in the future. On a related note, it is also important to acknowledge that the research design cannot exclude the possibility that the electoral concentration or dispersion of global city coalitions is driven by political choices to draw district boundaries so as to dilute or amplify the power of global city coalitions with a view towards affecting trade policy, and that the electoral concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions is therefore not exogenous to trade policy.¹³ Hence, it is important to be clear, in light of the endogeneity concerns that arise from the possibility that trade policy itself shapes the electoral concentration or dispersion of global city coalitions, that this is a correlational study, not a causal one. While this is a limitation of the current study, the value of the research undertaken here should nevertheless not be entirely dismissed on this account. After all, there are no previous attempts within the global cities literature, or in political science, to embed the study of global cities within the empirical framework of a cross-national political economy analysis; despite this limitation, therefore, the analysis here of how the electoral geography of global city coalitions affects trade policy in

¹³ One possibility, for instance, is that electoral boundaries, and the resulting concentration or dispersal of global city coalitions across the electoral map (and by extension, the electoral geography of mass preferences over globalization) are the product of firm-level lobbying (by either globally oriented superstars or protectionist firms). However, in practice it is not clear why these firms would focus their energies on lobbying over the shape of electoral boundaries, with the expectation that favorable boundaries will lead to favorable foreign economic policy outcomes, rather than lobbying directly over foreign economic policy issues of interest; it is unclear, in other words, why firms would lobby over means when they can cut to the chase and lobby over ultimate ends. Nevertheless, this could be an interesting avenue for future research; as questions over globalization become more important for mass politics, it may well prove worthwhile for firms to attempt to influence foreign economic policy by attempting to shape the electoral geography of global city coalitions by influencing how district lines are drawn. More broadly, firms might try to push for institutional change in response to the role of electoral rules in shaping the relative electoral clout of global city coalitions. In the United States, for instance, the Electoral College may become an object of firm-level conflict, with large multinationals joining efforts to abolish the Electoral College—which effectively dilutes the power of pro-globalization global city voters in the US by inducing the electoral concentration of these voters—and protectionist firms joining efforts to preserve it.

different institutional settings should be viewed as a an important first-step in an exploratory research project, rather than an attempt to make decisive causal inferences within the context of a mature research program.

Finally, it is also worth noting here that the political economy literature does not seem to have reached a consensus on how countries from the European Union should be treated in crosscountry studies (Weinberg 2016). Some scholars treat all European Union countries as separate countries (Evans 2009; Dutt and Mitra 2002; Dutt and Mitra 2005; Hatfield and Hauk 2014). Others exclude European Union countries entirely (Kono 2006; Kucik and Reinhardt 2008) on the grounds that they delegate a large amount of trade policymaking authority to the European Union, and cannot really be considered separate countries when it comes to trade policy (especially since they share a common external tariff). Still others make the case for including European Union member states, but argue that we should account for the distinctive trade policymaking process of the European Union through the inclusion of a categorical variable that indicates whether a country is a member of the EU (Ehrlich 2009; Ehrlich 2011). Rather than take a position on this debate, I present results that treat the European Union countries in each of the three ways suggested by the literature. In each of the regression tables that present the results, Model 2 is a pooled model that includes European Union countries (note that, due to data limitations, all EU countries are not in my sample) without including an EU dummy variable; Model 3 is a pooled model that includes European Union countries, but includes an EU dummy variable; Model 4 excludes all EU countries in the sample.

Following Evans (2009), I estimate regression models for this cross-sectional dataset using ordinary least squares (OLS), with robust standard errors.

6.5.2 Multivariate Tests of H1: Results and Discussion

Table 6.2 presents results from a series of models that evaluate *H1*, the hypothesis from above that that *ceteris paribus*, increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are associated with higher levels of trade protection in plurality countries, but that the impact of the electoral concentration or dispersion of global city coalitions is attenuated in proportional representation systems.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|----------------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------|
| | wto_tariff | wto_tariff | wto_tariff | wto_tariff |
| plurality | -8.622*** | -9.810*** | -11.08*** | -9.898*** |
| | (1.952) | (2.439) | (2.586) | (3.360) |
| electoralconc | 4.781*** | 2.221 | 0.250 | 2.422 |
| entration_GC | | | | |
| | (1.293) | (2.141) | (2.001) | (2.487) |
| plurality*c.el | 12.52*** | 13.07*** | 15.17*** | 13.17*** |
| ectoralconcen | | | | |
| tration_GC | | | | |
| | (2.422) | (2.744) | (3.065) | (3.881) |
| presidential | | 1.505 | 1.271 | 1.379 |
| | | (1.117) | (1.122) | (0.986) |
| polconiii | | -1.926 | -2.405 | -3.346 |
| | | (3.465) | (3.527) | (4.529) |
| | | | | |
| leftparty | | 1.369* | 1.318* | 1.515* |
| | | (0.704) | (0.705) | (0.868) |
| logGDP_PC | | -0.711 | -0.665 | -0.654 |
| | | (0.510) | (0.517) | (0.612) |
| britcol | | -1.955** | -3.308*** | -4.541** |
| | | (0.850) | (1.216) | (1.799) |
| spappore | | -2.375* | -3.075** | -4.568*** |
| spanporc | | (1.319) | -3.073 (1.410) | -4.308 (1.317) |
| | | | | |
| othercol | | -1.067 | -0.965 | -2.447 |
| | | (1.248) | (1.254) | (2.385) |
| leg_british | | 1.419 | 1.966** | 2.176** |
| | | (0.931) | (0.939) | (0.863) |
| leg_socialist | | -1.947 | -1.925 | -3.652* |
| | | (1.339) | (1.346) | (2.027) |
| | | | | |
| leg_french | | 0.0126 | 0.549 | 0.311 |
| | | (1.043) | (0.884) | (1.828) |
| eu | | | -1.824* | |
| | | | (0.988) | |
| _cons | 3.630*** | 13.40** | 15.22*** | 15.06** |
| | (0.724) | (5.465) | (5.083) | (6.366) |
| Ν | 67 | 66 | 66 | 51 |
| EU Countries | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |

Table 6.2: Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition on Applied

 Tariffs (categorical measure of electoral systems)

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Model 1 presents a baseline model, without any control variables; it only includes *electoralconcentration_gc, plurality*, and *electoralconcentration_gc*plurality* (i.e. their interaction). As expected, the interaction term is positive and significant, which indicates that the effects of *electoralconcentration_gc* are more consequential in plurality systems than in PR systems. Because it is difficult to interpret the coefficient of interaction terms from a regression table (Brambor, Clark, Golder 2006), I present a marginal effects plot for Model 1 (Figure 6.12) that allows us to clearly visualize the different coefficients on *electoralconcentration_gc* for PR and plurality systems.




Figure 6.12: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.2

The plot clearly indicates that while *electoralconcentration_gc* is statistically different from zero even in proportional representation systems, the electoral concentration of global city coalitions (*electoralconcentration_gc*) has a larger impact on tariff levels in plurality systems than in proportional representation systems (plurality=0), and that this difference is statistically

significant. The results from the baseline model suggest that increasing *electoralconcentration_gc* by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a 3.95 point increase in tariff levels in plurality systems, but that an equivalent increase in *electoralconcentration_gc* is only associated with a 1.09 point increase in tariff levels in proportional representation systems.

Turning to the models that include the control variables discussed above, we find that in Model 2 (the model which includes EU countries, and does not include an EU dummy variable), Model 3 (which includes EU countries, and includes an EU dummy variable), and Model 4 (which excludes EU countries), the interaction term between *electoralconcentration_gc* and *plurality* remains positive and significant. As indicated in the corresponding marginal effects plots (see Figures 6.13 to 6.15), the effects of *electoralconcentration_gc* are not statistically different from zero (at the 90% confidence level) for proportional representation countries; however, the impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* is statistically significant and substantively important for countries with plurality electoral systems across Models 2-4. According to these results, increasing the *electoralconcentration_gc* variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated, in countries with plurality-rules electoral systems, with a 3.49 point increase in tariffs in Model 2; a 3.53 point increase in tariffs in Model 3; and a 3.57 point increase in tariffs in Model 4.






Figure 6.13: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.2








Figure 6.15: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.2

Next, I assess the robustness of these results when using an alternative measure of trade protection. Table 6.3 presents the results from models that use a measure of trade-weighted tariffs from the World Bank, instead of a measure of average applied tariffs from the WTO. Unlike *wto_tariff*, which is essentially an average measure of applied statutory tariff rates based on a country's tariff schedule, trade-weighted tariffs are measured as a country's tariff revenues divided by the value of its imports (Ehrlich 2009, 588). Because my data on trade-weighted tariffs is from the World Bank, I label this variable *worldbank_tariff*. As before, I also present marginal effects plots for *electoralconcentration_gc* in Figures 6.16 to 6.19.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) worldbark tariff |
|--------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| alurality | worldbank_tariff -4.476** | worldbank_tariff -3.736 | worldbank_tariff -4.850* | worldbank_tariff -2.695 |
| plurality | (1.934) | (2.661) | (2.709) | (3.219) |
| | (1.954) | (2.001) | (2.709) | (3.219) |
| electoralconcentr | 5.576*** | 2.986^{*} | 1.252 | 3.137 |
| ation_GC | | | | |
| | (1.310) | (1.585) | (1.830) | (2.073) |
| olurality*electora | 7.852*** | 5.477 | 7.324** | 4.302 |
| concentration_G | 1.052 | 5.477 | 1.524 | 4.502 |
| 2 | | | | |
| | (2.544) | (3.453) | (3.571) | (4.094) |
| | | 0.646 | 0.440 | 0.244 |
| presidential | | 0.646 | 0.440 | 0.244 |
| | | (1.208) | (1.221) | (1.234) |
| polconiii | | 1.748 | 1.332 | 0.731 |
| | | (2.910) | (2.871) | (4.044) |
| | | 0.005 | 0.040 | 0.00050 |
| eftparty | | 0.285 | 0.242 | -0.00350 |
| | | (0.642) | (0.639) | (0.841) |
| ogGDP_PC | | -1.039** | -0.999** | -1.211** |
| | | (0.474) | (0.460) | (0.549) |
| | | | | |
| britcol | | 0.793 | -0.397 | -1.782 |
| | | (0.833) | (0.986) | (1.706) |
| spanporc | | -0.0459 | -0.665 | -0.242 |
| -F F F | | (1.439) | (1.436) | (1.600) |
| | | | | |
| othercol | | -1.079 | -0.990 | -2.741 |
| | | (0.922) | (0.878) | (1.706) |
| leg_british | | -0.0655 | 0.415 | 0.842 |
| | | (0.914) | (0.822) | (0.943) |
| | | | | |
| leg_socialist | | -0.765 | -0.747 | -1.215 |
| | | (1.074) | (1.016) | (1.471) |
| leg_french | | -0.641 | -0.170 | -1.837 |
| | | (0.628) | (0.608) | (1.786) |
| | | (| | (|
| eu | | | -1.603** | |
| | | | (0.750) | |
| cons | -0.542 | 10.91** | 12.52** | 14.58** |
| _cons | -0.542 (0.807) | | | |
| N | 66 | (4.983) 65 | (4.689) 65 | (5.735) 50 |
| EU Countries | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |

Table 6.3: Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition on Trade-Weighted Tariffs (categorical measure of electoral systems)

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01






Figure 6.16: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.3








Figure 6.18: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.3




Figure 6.19: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.3

When using this alternative measure of trade protection, the results provide less robust support for *H1* compared to the results found when using *wto_tariff* as the dependent variable; nevertheless, the results are more or less in line with the expectations of the argument. In Model 1—the baseline model without control variables—a one standard deviation increase in *electoralconcentration_gc* is associated with a 3.07 point increase in trade-weighted tariffs for plurality countries, and a 1.28 point increase in trade-weighted tariffs for proportional representation countries. The effect of *electoralconcentration_gc* is statistically significant (at the 90% confidence level) for countries with proportional representation, as well as those with plurality electoral rules; however, the positive impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* is significantly larger in the latter than in the former, a finding that is consistent with the conceptual argument presented earlier. Turning to the substantive effects of Models 2-4, we find that increasing the *electoralconcentration_gc* variable by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with the following tariff increases:

- In Model 2: 1.93 points (for countries with plurality-rules electoral regimes) and 0.68 points (for countries with proportional representation electoral regimes).
- In Model 3: 1.96 points (for countries with plurality-rules electoral regimes) and 0.29 points (for countries with proportional representation electoral regimes)
- In Model 4: 1.7 points (for countries with plurality-rules electoral regimes) and 0.72 points (for countries with proportional representation electoral regimes).

Across Models 2-4, the *electoralconcentration_gc* variable is significantly different from zero (at the 90% confidence level) for countries with plurality-rules electoral regimes; for PR countries, *electoralconcentration_gc* is only significantly different from zero at this confidence

threshold in Model 2. After accounting for the effects of EU membership either with a EU dummy variable (in Model 3) or excluding EU countries altogether (in Model 4), *electoralconcentration_gc* is no longer significantly different from zero for PR countries, but remains significantly different from zero for plurality countries. Broadly speaking, the results from Models 3 and 4 are consistent with the expectations of H1: in relatively permissive electoral systems in which "wasted votes" are not an issue (i.e. PR systems), the electoral geography of global city coalitions does not exert a statistically significant impact on trade policy, but in systems where "wasted votes" shape electoral strategies (i.e. plurality systems), the impact of the electoral concentration of global city coalitions is statistically significant and exerts a positive impact on levels of trade protection. However, the results from Model 2, with respect to the effects of *electoralconcentration* gc, are not quite in line with expectations; in this case, *electoralconcentration_gc* is statistically significant (at the 90% level) in *both* plurality and PR countries, and as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals (see Figure 6.17), the effects of *electoralconcentration_gc* do not appear to be significantly different from each other across institutional settings.

In general, the substantive impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* is smaller, and the role of electoral regimes in conditioning the impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* appears weaker, when using trade-weighted tariffs as the dependent variable than when using a summary measure of applied statutory tariffs. Nevertheless, the results when using this alternative measure of the dependent variable still offer suggestive support for *H1*. Moreover it is worth noting that one could make the argument that trade-weighted tariffs are a less effective measure of protectionist, anti-globalization policies than applied tariffs; as Ehrlich (2009) notes, because "extremely high tariff rates can discourage any importing of a product, thus meaning that no tariffs are collected

on the product" (589), low measures of trade-weighted tariffs, could, in some cases, actually mask high levels of tariff protection. More generally, applied tariffs do not depend on import levels, and are therefore under the more direct political control of governments and politicians. The somewhat weaker results when using *worldbank_tariffs* could potentially flow from these weaknesses in the measure itself; however, the question of whether the weaker results are in fact driven by measurement error with respect to the dependent variable, or whether these results should give us pause about the argument itself, is something that can only be determined with additional research.

6.5.3 Multivariate Tests of H2: Results and Discussion

I now turn to multivariate tests that assess the second hypothesis presented above (*H2*). This hypothesis is based on the same fundamental ideas as *H1*; however, instead of classifying electoral systems in strictly dichotomous terms on the basis of the categorical distinction between plurality and PR systems, it conceptualizes electoral systems as lying along a continuum of proportionality based on district magnitude. Rodden (2005), too, uses the "full range of variation in district magnitude" (16) in addition to a simple plurality/PR dummy variable to test arguments about electoral geography and redistribution; using district magnitude as an alternative measure of electoral systems provides another way to test arguments about how electoral regimes condition the political and policy impact of electoral geography, and indeed, may even uncover patterns that a categorical measure of electoral systems would obscure. For instance, some of the results presented above suggested that the electoral geography of global city coalitions is in fact consequential for trade policy outcomes in PR systems as well as in plurality systems (though the magnitude of the effect is always greater in the latter, and the

difference is usually statistically significant); we might expect that this result is driven by the presence of relatively low-proportionality PR systems (i.e. those with low district magnitudes) in the sample, but this is not something we can directly assess when all PR systems are grouped together. Therefore, to the extent that we do see that the magnitude of the positive impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* on tariff levels declines as a function of district magnitude, it would suggest additional support for the broader argument.

Table 6.4 presents results from regression models that are analogous to those in 6.2, with the exception that they that include a measure of district magnitude (*districtmagnitude*) instead of the dichotomous *plurality* variable, and an interaction term between *districtmagnitude* and *electoralconcentration_gc* instead of an interaction term between *plurality* and *electoralconcentration_gc*. Here, to the extent that increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are associated with relatively lower increases in trade protection as district magnitude increases, we would expect the coefficient on the interaction term between *districtmagnitude* and *electoralconcentration_gc* to be negative.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| | wto_tariff | wto_tariff | wto_tariff | wto_tariff |
| districtmagnitude | 0.0447*** | 0.0396*** | 0.0446*** | 0.0792*** |
| | (0.00836) | (0.0144) | (0.0130) | (0.0218) |
| electoralconcentr ation_GC | 11.35*** | 7.245*** | 8.788*** | 12.72*** |
| | (1.508) | (2.381) | (2.256) | (2.641) |
| districtmagnitude *electoralconcent ration_GC | -0.0996*** | -0.0963*** | -0.104*** | -0.149*** |
| | (0.0148) | (0.0234) | (0.0221) | (0.0355) |
| presidential | | 0.379 | 0.655 | 1.073 |
| | | (1.008) | (0.892) | (0.731) |
| polconiii | | -1.402 | -1.499 | -5.068 |
| | | (3.445) | (3.328) | (4.260) |
| leftparty | | 1.838** | 1.908** | 2.355** |
| | | (0.736) | (0.733) | (0.927) |
| logGDP_PC | | -1.260*** | -1.200*** | -0.974* |
| | | (0.458) | (0.440) | (0.521) |
| britcol | | -1.069 | -0.371 | -4.313*** |
| | | (0.987) | (1.338) | (1.567) |
| spanporc | | -2.935** | -2.427 | -4.367*** |
| | | (1.396) | (1.466) | (1.477) |
| othercol | | -2.004* | -2.048* | -4.415*** |
| | | (1.112) | (1.058) | (1.412) |
| leg_british | | 0.194 | -0.0978 | 1.535* |
| | | (0.798) | (1.074) | (0.796) |
| leg_socialist | | -2.579* | -2.628* | -4.685*** |
| | | (1.497) | (1.371) | (1.433) |
| leg_french | | 0.572 | 0.215 | -0.816 |
| | | (0.955) | (1.047) | (1.806) |
| eu | | | 1.429 | |
| | | | (0.985) | |
| _cons | -0.859 | 15.38*** | 13.10** | 11.07^{*} |
| | (1.041) | (5.320) | (5.115) | (6.230) |
| Ν | 63 | 62 | 62 | 47 |

Table 6.4: Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition on Applied
 Tariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems)

Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Indeed, we note that across all models in Table 6.4, we do in fact observe a negative coefficient on this interaction term. As before, it is useful to visualize the effects of this interaction using a marginal effects plot that indicates the coefficient on *electoralconcentration_gc* for different values of the electoral systems variable (here, for different values of district magnitude). Marginal effects plots for Models 1-4 are presented below, in Figures 6.20 to 6.23.




Figure 6.20: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.4




Figure 6.21: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.4




Figure 6.22: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.4




Figure 6.23 Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.4

The marginal effects plot in Figure 6.20 (the baseline model), for instance, shows that when district magnitude is equal to one, increasing *electoralconcentration_gc* by one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a 2.57% rise in tariff levels (where tariffs are measured according to the *wto_tariff* measure), but that this positive impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* on trade protection decays as district magnitude becomes progressively larger. In other words, increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are associated with smaller increases in tariff protection as the electoral system becomes more permissive. The other marginal effects plots convey a similar pattern (but in Models 2 and 3 the substantive effects of electoralconcentration_gc are lower, though still statistically significant at low levels of district magnitude).

One somewhat surprising and unexpected feature of these marginal effects plots is that they reveal that at very high levels of district magnitude, increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are actually associated with *decreased* tariff levels, and that this relationship is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. It is not clear why this might be the case; the argument presented above would simply expect that at very high levels of district magnitude, the impact of *electoralconcentration_gc* would be negligible. It is worth noting, though, that when we exclude countries that simply elect representatives in one large national district, the highest district magnitude in the sample is 25. Because these countries with one national district—with district magnitudes in the range where we see this puzzling effect—may be unique, I also estimate models that exclude these extremely high district magnitude countries that use a solitary electoral district. Results for these models are presented in Table 6.5, with associated marginal effects plots displayed in Figures 6.24 to 6.27.

| | (1) wto_tariff | (2) wto_tariff | (3) wto_tariff | (4) wto_tariff |
|---|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| districtmo onitudo | 0.403** | 0.459* | 0.436 | 1.490** |
| districtmagnitude | (0.161) | (0.237) | (0.270) | (0.653) |
| | (0.101) | (0.237) | (0.270) | (0.055) |
| electoralconcentr ation_GC | 14.89*** | 11.24*** | 11.33*** | 18.02*** |
| | (2.223) | (2.899) | (2.872) | (4.132) |
| | (2.223) | | (2.072) | |
| districtmagnitude *electoralconcent ration_GC | -0.540* | -0.568* | -0.539 | -1.703** |
| lution_de | (0.296) | (0.306) | (0.339) | (0.749) |
| presidential | | 0.697 | 0.733 | 1.037 |
| | | (0.929) | (0.937) | (0.821) |
| nolooniii | | -1.414 | -1.444 | -3.112 |
| polconiii | | | | |
| | | (3.055) | (3.079) | (3.655) |
| leftparty | | 1.789^{**} | 1.808^{**} | 1.913** |
| i i j | | (0.750) | (0.764) | (0.893) |
| logGDP_PC | | -1.048** | -1.042** | -0.753 |
| | | (0.495) | (0.498) | (0.547) |
| | | () | () | |
| britcol | | -1.214 | -1.080 | -2.875 |
| | | (0.815) | (1.140) | (1.762) |
| spanporc | | -2.458* | -2.398 | -4.615*** |
| punpore | | (1.340) | (1.439) | (1.278) |
| - (1 1 | | 2.02<** | 2 0.22** | 4 00 4*** |
| othercol | | -2.026** | -2.033** | -4.224*** |
| | | (0.950) | (0.950) | (1.456) |
| eg_british | | 0.950 | 0.860 | 1.805** |
| 2- | | (0.650) | (0.788) | (0.803) |
| an appialist | | 2 502* | 2 505* | -3.540** |
| leg_socialist | | -2.593* (1.296) | -2.595* (1.298) | -3.340 (1.503) |
| | | (1.290) | (1.290) | (1.505) |
| leg_french | | 0.230 | 0.180 | 0.609 |
| - | | (1.016) | (1.037) | (1.793) |
| | | | 0.242 | |
| eu | | | 0.262 (1.242) | |
| | | | (1.242) | |
| _cons | -3.916** | 9.459 | 9.274 | 2.230 |
| - | (1.653) | (6.191) | (6.218) | (7.954) |
| N | 60 | 59 | 59 | 45 |

Table 6.5: Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition on AppliedTariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems with district magnitude<=25)</td>




Figure 6.24: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.5




Figure 6.25: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.5




Figure 6.26: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.5




Figure 6.27: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.5

Again, we see that the coefficient on the interaction term between *districtmagnitude* and *electoralconcentration_gc* is negative; the marginal effects plots consistently show that at relatively low levels of district magnitude, *electoralconcentration_gc* exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on *wto_tariff*, suggesting that increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are associated with higher levels of trade protection. However, this effect decays fairly quickly; in the models with control variables (Models 2-4), the effect of *electoralconcentration_gc* tends to fall out of statistical significant as *districtmagnitude* approaches ten, and remains statistically insignificant thereafter. This pattern is consistent with the expectations of the argument; while it is worth noting that the tests generally lack the statistical power to discern statistically significant differences in the effects of *electoralconcentration_gc* between countries that are relatively close together in district magnitude (as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals), the results are nevertheless suggestive.

The regression specifications in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 are analogous to those in 6.4 and 6.5; the only difference is that unlike Tables 6.4 and 6.5, which use the measure of applied tariffs (*wto_tariff*) as the dependent variable, the specifications in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 use the measure of trade weighted tariffs (*worldbank_tariff*). Below, I present these regression tables along with their corresponding marginal effects plots for the spatial concentration variable.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|------------------|---|------------------|------------------|
| | worldbank_tariff | worldbank_tariff | worldbank_tariff | worldbank_tariff |
| districtmagnitude | 0.0400*** | 0.0206* | 0.0209* | 0.0211 |
| | (0.00790) | (0.0114) | (0.0120) | (0.0250) |
| electoralconcentr ation_GC | 10.99*** | 5.605*** | 5.683** | 6.356* |
| | (1.403) | (1.995) | (2.195) | (3.356) |
| districtmagnitude *electoralconcent ration_GC | -0.0894*** | -0.0533*** | -0.0537*** | -0.0546 |
| _ | (0.0139) | (0.0188) | (0.0198) | (0.0379) |
| presidential | | -0.0931 | -0.0793 | -0.0488 |
| | | (1.013) | (1.083) | (1.237) |
| oolconiii | | 1.078 | 1.072 | -0.510 |
| | | (2.564) | (2.599) | (4.190) |
| eftparty | | 0.754 | 0.758 | 0.682 |
| 1 | | (0.595) | (0.595) | (0.793) |
| ogGDP_PC | | -1.228*** | -1.225*** | -1.337** |
| 6 – | | (0.437) | (0.445) | (0.589) |
| oritcol | | 1.176 | 1.211 | -0.936 |
| | | (0.730) | (0.844) | (1.637) |
| spanporc | | -0.545 | -0.519 | -0.574 |
| | | (1.341) | (1.325) | (1.423) |
| othercol | | -1.117 | -1.119 | -2.799* |
| | | (0.812) | (0.816) | (1.460) |
| eg_british | | -0.302 | -0.317 | 0.565 |
| | | (0.619) | (0.628) | (0.924) |
| eg_socialist | | -1.539 | -1.541 | -2.119 |
| | | (0.972) | (0.989) | (1.401) |
| eg_french | | -0.381 | -0.398 | -1.804 |
| | | (0.655) | (0.680) | (1.703) |
| eu | | | 0.0713 | |
| | | | (0.720) | |
| _cons | -4.067*** | 11.30** | 11.18** | 13.56* |
| | (0.894) | (5.210) | (5.448) | (7.188) |
| N | 62 | 61 | 61 | 46 |
| EU Countries | Yes | $\frac{\text{Yes}}{1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01}$ | Yes | No |

Table 6.6: Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition on Trade

 Weighted Tariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems)

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01




Figure 6.28: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.6




Figure 6.29: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.6




Figure 6.30: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.6




Figure 6.31: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.6

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | worldbank_tariff | worldbank_tariff | worldbank_tariff | worldbank_tariff |
| districtmagnitude | 0.269** | 0.215 | 0.300 | 1.059 |
| | (0.131) | (0.180) | (0.183) | (0.732) |
| electoralconcentr ation_GC | 13.07*** | 7.136** | 6.788** | 10.12** |
| | (2.172) | (2.787) | (2.831) | (4.719) |
| districtmagnitude *electoralconcent ration_GC | -0.453** | -0.294 | -0.399 | -1.251 |
| | (0.225) | (0.274) | (0.271) | (0.862) |
| presidential | | 0.0256 | -0.104 | -0.00144 |
| | | (1.111) | (1.148) | (1.338) |
| polconiii | | 1.191 | 1.306 | 0.894 |
| L | | (2.608) | (2.622) | (3.698) |
| leftparty | | 0.696 | 0.629 | 0.502 |
| | | (0.603) | (0.609) | (0.725) |
| logGDP_PC | | -1.183** | -1.205** | -1.224** |
| 0 – | | (0.456) | (0.453) | (0.597) |
| britcol | | 1.139 | 0.652 | -0.0147 |
| | | (0.756) | (0.752) | (1.854) |
| spanporc | | -0.269 | -0.494 | -0.783 |
| | | (1.399) | (1.354) | (1.561) |
| othercol | | -1.130 | -1.103 | -2.492 |
| | | (0.828) | (0.815) | (1.936) |
| leg_british | | 0.00301 | 0.334 | 0.695 |
| 2- | | (0.639) | (0.543) | (0.916) |
| leg_socialist | | -1.601 | -1.596 | -1.334 |
| 0- | | (0.996) | (1.007) | (1.662) |
| leg_french | | -0.514 | -0.334 | -0.807 |
| 6_ | | (0.644) | (0.648) | (1.989) |
| eu | | | -0.958 | |
| | | | (0.704) | |
| _cons | -5.525*** | 9.374 | 10.06^{*} | 7.857 |
| | (1.571) | (5.840) | (5.803) | (8.867) |
| N | 59 | 58 | 58 | 44 |
| EU Countries Included | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |

Table 6.7: Impact of Relative Electoral Concentration of Global City Coalition on Trade Weighted Tariffs (continuous measure of electoral systems with district magnitude<=25)




Figure 6.32: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 1 in Table 6.7




Figure 6.33: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 2 in Table 6.7




Figure 6.34: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 3 in Table 6.7




Figure 6.35: Marginal effects of electoral concentration for Model 4 in Table 6.7

In short, the results on the interaction between *districtmagnitude* and

electoralconcentration_gc are generally robust when using this alternate measure of trade protection. Indeed, across the specifications in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, we see a very similar general pattern to the one described above, in the discussion of the results from Tables 6.4 and 6.5: *electoralconcentration_gc* has a statistically significant and substantively important positive impact on trade-weighted tariffs at relatively low values of district magnitude, but this effect loses statistical significance as the proportionality of the electoral regime rises.

6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have extended the work of the dissertation's previous empirical chapters—which documented the existence of societal "global city coalitions" (Chapter 4), as well as their implications for political representation and the legislative politics of foreign economic policy (Chapter 5)—by undertaking a more general investigation of the implications of these political alignments for the mass politics of globalization in a comparative setting. In particular, I attempted to explore the domestic political and institutional conditions under which foreign economic policy is more or less sensitive to the internationalist demands of global city coalitions, and how variation in the electoral clout of global city coalitions across countries shapes variation in foreign economic policy outcomes.

In investigating this issue, the chapter synthesized three distinct literatures—on electoral geography and mass politics, on the mass politics of globalization, and on global cities—to develop a framework that future scholarship on the increasingly important "open versus closed" political divide might leverage in investigating mass political cleavages over globalization and their geographic underpinnings.

My specific theoretical argument in this chapter was that when global city coalitions are relatively concentrated on the electoral map in low-proportionality electoral systems, large numbers of "pro-globalization" votes from electorally concentrated global city residents are effectively "wasted", which weakens political incentives to appeal to these voters, and thereby translates into relatively protectionist trade policies; as the electoral concentration of global city coalitions declines, however, and fewer "pro-globalization" votes from the global city coalition are wasted, political incentives to appeal to these voters increase, and trade policy becomes relatively more open. However, as the proportionality of the electoral system rises, I argued that the electoral geography of global city coalitions would be less consequential for foreign economic policy outcomes, since electoral geography does not affect the translation from votes into seats to nearly the same extent in these more permissive electoral regimes.

After developing this argument, the empirical sections of the chapter tested the hypothesis that increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are associated with increased levels of trade protection in low-proportionality electoral systems, but that the sensitivity of foreign economic policy outcomes to variation in the electoral geography of global city coalitions declines as the proportionality of the electoral system rises. I investigated this hypothesis using fine-grain data on the spatial distribution of superstar and global producer services firm headquarters across electoral districts as a proxy for the relative electoral concentration of global city coalitions. Though the empirical analysis has important limitations—discussed at length in the relevant sections—the results from the exploratory and more systematic multivariate analyses presented above offered suggestive support for the argument. Though more work is needed to draw definitive conclusions, the tentative results presented in this chapter suggest that increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions are

indeed associated with increased levels of trade protection among countries with lowproportionality electoral systems. However, this systematic link between increases in the electoral concentration of global city coalitions, and increased levels of trade protection, does not appear to hold in high-proportionality electoral regimes. This finding that the relationship between the electoral geography of global city coalitions and trade policy outcomes is conditional on the electoral regime is consistent with our theoretical expectations.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

Research in International Political Economy (IPE) is guided by Susan Strange's famous question (Cohen 2008, 56): Cui bono? Who benefits? Who benefits from the global economy? And who is harmed by it? Over the years, scholars of IPE have offered different answers to these questions, rooted in different models and schools of thought. To the question "who benefits?" some have answered that globalization's winners (at least in developed countries, on a Stolper Samuelson account) are highly skilled workers, or perhaps the owners of capital. Others have pointed to exporting industries, or more narrowly, to the large and highly productive exporters and multinationals, relatively few in number, that engage the global economy most directly. Others have argued that we shouldn't think of "benefits" in strictly materialist terms; perhaps the "winners" are not necessarily those who see their incomes rise the most, but individuals with cosmopolitan values who enjoy the opportunities that globalization offers for cultural and social exchange (the "material" winners and the "cultural" winners may overlap, but this is not necessarily the case). On the other side of the ledger, we have globalization's "losers", the mirror image of its winners: low-skilled workers (especially in the developed world, on a Stolper-Samuelson account), import-competing industries, small and unproductive firms producing for the domestic market, "nationalists" who feel like strangers in their own homes as globalization dissolves the economic, cultural, and ethnic landscapes of their memories.

This is certainly not an exhaustive list, and we could expect a wider range of answers than those listed here. However, until recently, few (if any) scholars of IPE would have

highlighted the relatively small number of "global cities"—which serve as sites for the agglomeration of the headquarters of large exporters and multinationals (i.e. "superstar firms"), and the front offices of the large complex of advanced producer services firms that help these superstar firms navigate the complexities of the global marketplace—as the "winners" of our contemporary phase of globalization, and the hinterland areas outside these distinctive urban areas as the "losers". This would perhaps be surprising to scholars outside of political science, for whom the most salient feature of globalization, as it affects national economies, is the territorial unevenness of its effects.¹ As Sassen (2006, 7) emphasizes:

Once we focus on places, whether cities or other types of places, rather than whole national economies, we can easily take account of the fact that some places even in the richest countries are becoming poorer, or that a global city in a developing country can become richer even as the rest of the country becomes poorer. An analysis of places...produces a highly variable mosaic of results. Alongside these new global and regional hierarchies of cities is a vast territory that has become increasingly peripheral and is excluded from the major processes that fuel economic growth in the new global economy" (Sassen 2006, 7).

As I noted earlier in the dissertation's introduction, scholars of IPE working in the OEP tradition have not acknowledged these spatial patterns, let alone investigated their political implications. As a result, we do not have a systematic understanding of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands—a central feature of the economic landscape in countries across the world—affects the politics of globalization. The central purpose of this project has been to carry out such an investigation. Its central contribution has been to develop a political economy analysis of global cities and hinterlands that situates this aspect of the

¹This is not to say that political scientists have not considered the territorial unevenness of globalization's effects; see Hiscox (2003), for instance. However, scholars in other disciplines would be surprised that political scientists have not linked this territorial unevenness to global city agglomeration economies.

contemporary world's economic geography within the analytical and empirical framework of open economy politics (broadly understood); in doing so, it clarifies and explains the relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and three distinct (but interrelated) sets of political outcomes:

- 1. The individual preferences over globalization that underpin mass foreign economic policy coalitions.
- 2. The spatial organization of legislative foreign economic policy coalitions, as they manifest in patterns of legislative voting over foreign economic policy.
- 3. Cross-national variation in trade protection

The various chapters develop theoretical and empirical arguments that link the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands to these various outcomes. Each chapter has its own logic, but together these individual chapters cohere into an overarching argument that unifies the different elements of the project.

This synthetic argument might be summarized as follows. My starting point is that global cities are the territorial "winners" of contemporary globalization, while hinterlands are its territorial "losers", for reasons explained in Chapter 2. This economic geography, in turn, underpins a corresponding spatial *political* cleavage between "global city coalitions" that favor globalization, and "hinterland coalitions" that oppose globalization; these coalitions are empirically distinct from mass coalitions analyzed by IPE scholars in the past. The political geography of these spatially-organized mass global city and hinterland coalitions shapes the foreign economic policy preferences of office-seeking elected representatives, whose voting decisions over matters related to globalization are shaped by the relative size of global city and

hinterland mass coalitions within their districts; as a result, legislative coalitions over globalization come to partly reflect the territorial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands. Finally, the interaction between electoral regimes and the electoral geography of mass global city coalitions (i.e. their relative concentration or dispersal across electoral districts) shapes the relative political clout of global city coalitions within the polity, and thereby contributes to cross-national variation in foreign economic policy outcomes.

In what follows, Section 7.2 offers a more detailed review of the dissertation's central arguments and findings. I then turn to a discussion, in Section 7.3, of possible directions for future research. In raising questions for future research, I first discuss (in Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.3) possible extensions of the research presented in the individual substantive chapters, before concluding (in Section 7.3.4) with some additional suggestions for future research that are not directly related to the chapters in this project, but which should be included in a broader research program on the politics of globalization in a world of global cities.

7.2 Review: The Dissertation's Arguments and Main Findings

In Chapter 2, I explored how global cities are constituted as the territorial formations that "win" from globalization by a set of processes that I refer to as "global city agglomeration processes." These processes encompass the territorial agglomeration of the headquarters and front offices of globally oriented "superstar" firms within a handful of metropolitan areas (to reap the benefits of "global city agglomeration economies", i.e. the distinctive economic benefits of spatial agglomeration for strategic economic activities oriented to the management and coordination of globe-spanning business operations), and the globalization-driven multiplier effects associated with these agglomerations, which diffuse the firm-level income benefits of globalization (for superstar firms) throughout the metropolitan economies in which they are clustered. On the other hand, hinterlands are constituted as the territorial formations that "lose" from globalization by a set of processes that I refer to as "hinterland dispersion processes." These processes encompass the "hollowing out" of economies outside global cities by the departure (for global cities) of the globally oriented economic activity that is associated with large globalization-driven local multiplier effects, and the territorial dispersal (due to global city agglomeration diseconomies) of unproductive domestic firms, which transmit the firm-level income declines associated with globalization (for low-productivity firms) to hinterland regional economies through a globalization-driven "reverse multiplier" effect.²

In Chapter 3, I then explored, in theoretical terms, how this spatial *economic* cleavage between global cities and hinterlands with respect to globalization might engender a corresponding spatial *political* cleavage, between "global city" mass political coalitions that favor globalization, and "hinterland" mass political coalitions that favor economic protection. In other words, how might the global city agglomeration processes that constitute global cities as globalization's territorial "winners", and the hinterland dispersion processes that constitute hinterlands as globalization's territorial "losers", shape individual preferences over globalization and thereby yield spatial foreign economic policy coalitions that are independently underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands? I developed three theoretically distinct accounts of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might engender corresponding spatial political coalitions over globalization, rooted in different accounts of

 $^{^2}$ As I discussed in Chapter 2, the non-headquarter and back-office plants of superstar firms also extend throughout the hinterlands, but are not associated with sufficiently large globalization-driven positive multiplier effects to counteract the globalization-driven negative multiplier effects of low-productivity domestic firms.

individual preference formation: an ego-tropic theory of spatial coalitions (rooted in the view that individual political preferences flow from individual material interests), a sociotropic theory (rooted in the view that individual political preferences flow from their concern with the national interest), and a local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions (rooted in the view that individual political preferences stem from an intrinsic concern with the local interest). I suggested that while it is plausible that spatial foreign economic policy coalitions rooted in the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands arise because of the tendency of global city residents to develop systematically more favorable ego-tropic or sociotropic assessments of globalization than their hinterland counterparts (as suggested, by the ego-tropic and sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, respectively), it is more likely that these coalitions form because of the tendency of global city residents to be more likely to develop favorable local-tropic assessments of globalization (as suggested by the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions).

Chapter 4 was the empirical counterpart to Chapter 3's theoretical exploration of how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might engender distinctive spatial coalitions over globalization. All of the theories developed in Chapter 3 suggested that the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands independently underpins corresponding spatial coalitions over globalization that are empirically distinct from foreign economic policy coalitions documented in previous IPE scholarship; the primary task of Chapter 4 was therefore to empirically investigate whether such coalitions do indeed exist. Drawing on referendum voting results over Brexit (in the UK) and CAFTA ratification (in Costa Rica) as a proxy for mass preferences over globalization, I first showed (in Section 4.2), that the spatial-distribution of "pro-globalization" mass preferences in both the UK and Costa Rica appear to track the spatial economic cleavage between global cities and hinterlands. To more systematically assess whether

these patterns reflect the presence of global city and hinterland coalitions that are engendered by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, Section 4.3 used originally collected establishment level data on the headquarter locations of superstar firms to transpose the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands to Brexit voting districts by developing a measure of the relative district-level strength of global city agglomeration processes; the results in this section demonstrated a positive and statistically significant relationship between this measure and district-level support for the pro-globalization "remain" position, even after controlling for a wide range of confounding variables. More specifically, increasing the districtlevel measure of the strength of global city agglomeration processes by one standard deviation above its mean was associated with up to a 2.15 point increase in a district's share of support for remaining in the EU. In an analogous multivariate district-level analysis of the CAFTA referendum, I showed that increasing the district-level measure of the strength of global city agglomeration processes by one standard deviation above its mean was associated with up to a 1.46 point increase in a district's share of support for CAFTA ratification. The findings in the district-level analyses of Sections 4.3 and 4.6— that districts with stronger global city agglomeration processes tend to be more supportive of "internationalist" foreign economic policy positions, even after controlling for a range of potential confounding variables—point to the presence of empirically distinct spatial coalitions underpinned by the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands.

In light of the ecological inference problem associated with district-level analyses, Chapter 4 also carried out a spatial analysis of individual-level Brexit preferences (in Section 4.4); in particular, I found that even after controlling for a range of individual-level confounding variables, the residents of what I defined as "global city commuter zones" were up to 5% more

likely to support the internationalist "remain" position than residents of "hinterland commuter zones." This finding of an individual-level spatial political cleavage over globalization between residents of global city and hinterland commuter zones is consistent with the expectations of Chapter 3, and provides suggestive evidence for the individual micro-foundations of the districtlevel spatial coalitions documented in Sections 4.3 and 4.6.

Finally, Chapter 4 explored, in a preliminary fashion, the relative empirical purchase of the different theories of spatial coalitions elaborated in Chapter 3. The suggestive finding, in Section 4.4.3, that the economic assessments of global city and hinterland residents (either with respect to their pocketbooks, or with respect to the national economy as a whole) do not significantly differ, suggests that global city and hinterland coalitions do not form because of the systematic tendency of global city residents to view globalization more favorably in either egotropic or sociotropic terms. This is inconsistent with the ego-tropic and the sociotropic theories of spatial coalitions, respectively. In addition, Section 4.5 documented the within-global city commuter zone "distance decay" of support for economic openness as a function of distance from the central business district (CBD); in particular, I found that every additional ten kilometers in distance between a respondent and the global city commuter zone's CBD (i.e. the local authority district within the commuter zone where global city agglomeration processes are at their strongest) is associated with a decline in the probability that the respondent supports the (internationalist) "remain" position by 3.6%. I argued that this pattern is consistent with a localtropic theory of spatial coalitions, but not with the sociotropic or ego-tropic theories; as such, the suggestive micro-level empirical patterns documented in Section 4.5 point to the relative merits of the local-tropic theory of spatial coalitions more generally.

In Chapter 5, I explored how the territorially defined preferences of the spatial political coalitions theorized in Chapter 3, and empirically documented in Chapter 4, are aggregated within territorially organized political institutions, and thereby shape the legislative politics of globalization. My argument was that to the extent that office-seeking elected representatives are sensitive to the preferences of spatial coalitions within their districts, we would expect to see legislative foreign economic policy coalitions—as they manifest in patterns of legislative voting over free trade agreements (or liberalizing foreign economic policy legislation more generally) that correspond to the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. I assessed this argument in the context of the "post-NAFTA" period of US trade politics, when the US Congress voted to ratify twelve free trade bills with a variety of trading partners from both the developing and developed worlds. I made a context-specific argument that during this time period, districtlevel spatial coalitions likely exerted a stronger influence over Democratic representatives than Republican representatives. Indeed, I found that district-level spatial coalitions had a statistically significant and substantively meaningful impact on the voting choices of Democratic representatives during this time period; in particular, increasing the district-level percentage of the population living within a global city commuter zone (i.e. the independent variable of interest, which measures the district-level footprint of global city coalitions) was associated with up to a 7% increase in the probability of Democratic representatives voting to support free trade legislation. However, I found that district-level spatial coalitions do not have a statistically significant or substantively meaningful impact on the voting choices of Republican representatives, a finding that was consistent with my expectations. In short, during the time period under investigation, it appears that an *intra*-partisan cleavage over trade policy within the Democratic Party's legislative caucus mapped onto the global city versus hinterland divide. I

concluded the chapter by situating these findings within the broader history of US trade politics, and discussing what these results suggest about its possible future trajectory.

In Chapter 6, the final substantive chapter, I extended the analysis to a broader crossnational context, with a view towards explaining how the interaction between electoral regimes and the electoral geography of global city coalitions shapes cross-national variation in trade policy outcomes. In particular, Chapter 6 argued that in countries that use majoritarian electoral systems, a high degree of spatial concentration of global city coalitions with respect to the electoral map leads to large numbers of "wasted" internationalist votes from global city residents, which weakens political incentives to appeal to these voters, and leads to relatively protectionist trade policies. In contrast, when global city coalitions are relatively dispersed across the electoral map, relatively fewer "pro-globalization" votes from members of global coalitions are "wasted"; this increases political incentives to appeal to these voters, and thereby yields relatively more open trade policies. However, I argued that in proportional representation regimes, the electoral geography of global city coalitions is less consequential for the translation of votes into seats, and ultimately, policy; as a result, in these institutional contexts, we would expect the spatial distribution of global city coalitions across electoral districts to be less consequential for trade policy outcomes. I found support for these arguments in an empirical analysis that used a Gini coefficient of the spread of superstar and global producer services headquarters across electoral districts as a proxy for the spatial distribution of global city coalitions across the electoral map; increasing this measure of the electoral concentration of global city coalitions by one standard deviation above its mean was associated with up to a 3.95% increase in tariff protection in countries with majoritarian electoral regimes, but was not significantly associated with tariff increases in countries that use proportional representation.

7.3 Future Research

In this section, I consider possible directions for future research on the political economy of global cities and hinterlands. First, I consider possible extensions of topics taken up in the foregoing chapters (in Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.3). I then briefly turn, in 7.3.4, to broader issues that I have not directly addressed in this dissertation, but which a future research program on the political economy of global cities and hinterlands should explore.

7.3.1 Global Cities, Hinterlands, and Mass Political Coalitions: Avenues for Future Research

In Chapter 4, I provided evidence for the existence of a relationship between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and mass preferences over globalization; to the extent that this relationship was robust to the inclusion of controls for a variety of confounding variables in multivariate analyses, I suggested that it pointed towards the existence of distinctive global city and hinterland foreign economic policy coalitions. Nevertheless, future work could attempt to document the link between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, and corresponding spatial coalitions over globalization, with greater rigor. For instance, future research could use matching designs, in which respondent attributes along various dimensions (i.e. sector or even firm of employment, cultural preferences etc.) are matched; to the extent that individuals on opposite sides of the global city versus hinterland divide who are otherwise similar have different preferences over globalization, it would provide even more powerful evidence for the existence of independent global city and hinterland coalitions. Another (potentially more complicated) route is to carry out spatially-explicit

longitudinal surveys that could explicitly track how residential changes across the global city versus hinterland divide shape individual foreign economic policy preferences; previous studies in political behavior (Gallego et al. 2014) could provide guidance in thinking about such an approach in the context of issues raised in this chapter.

In Section 3.4, I built on previous work to develop a local-tropic account of policy preferences, which I then leveraged to explain how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands might engender spatial political coalitions over globalization; in Section 4.5, I provided suggestive evidence for the local-tropic foundations of these coalitions. Future research could investigate the local-tropic theory of the nexus between the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands and spatial foreign economic policy coalitions in considerably more detail. Qualitative methods could prove particularly useful in such investigations. For instance, interviews with individuals who have moved across the spatial divide could prove valuable in helping to pinpoint how the local environments within global cities and hinterlands shape individual attitudes towards the global economy. More specifically, as Kahler (2017, 10) and McNamara (2017, 27) suggest, ethnographic studies also have a role to play in investigating and clarifying how "economic interests can be filtered and interpreted through group narratives at the local level" (Kahler 2017, 8) and how these narratives, in turn, shape individual foreign economic policy preferences. Though ethnographic approaches are not commonly used by scholars working within the contemporary IPE literature, the suggestive results presented here point to the potential payoffs of adapting Walsh's (2012) methods to the study of questions relevant to this research tradition; after all, the local-tropic framework's emphasis on a localespecific "sense of place" and its corresponding place-based economic and social narratives is consistent with her "conceptualization of public opinion as the understandings that people create

together" (518). Ultimately, the most direct way to reconstruct how these understandings emerge in local environments that are shaped by the dynamics of global city agglomeration and hinterland dispersion processes is, as Walsh suggests, "to do more listening" (531). In a world of deterritorialized cross-border flows that directly operate on individuals, the ethnographic approach of scholars such as Walsh would not be particularly relevant to the study of public opinion and political coalitions in IPE; however, if we live in a world in which individual preferences are possibly shaped by the ways in which these cross-border flows are instantiated and collectively experienced in concrete local settings (as the analyses of Chapters 3 and 4 suggest) adopting such an approach could have a rich empirical payoff for scholars of IPE.

More generally, it is worth noting that the local-tropic approach offers a useful framework for thinking about how we might link spatial explanations of political phenomena to psychological and affective ones. After all, the relationship between geography, environments, and psychology is a topic that the "behavioral revolution" in international relations research (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017) has more or less ignored (or treated in an incidental way), despite recent research that has taken up such issues in other areas of political science (Enos 2017). Given the profound importance of both geography and psychology in both international security and political economy, ignoring their possible points of intersection in various empirical domains seems like a significant oversight. The account of local-tropic preference formation and foreign economic policy coalitions developed in this dissertation therefore points the way to future international relations and political economy research that brings together a concern with structural spatial processes with psychological and emotional accounts of political choice and preference formation. To take one example, consider the relationship between nostalgia and political attitudes. The theme of nostalgia is especially important in Gest's (2016) account of

locale-specific narratives of decline in places like East London and Youngstown that I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, but even for IPE scholars unfamiliar with this work, the relevance of nostalgia to contemporary developments in the global economy needs no belaboring (i.e. consider the explicitly nostalgic sentiment conveyed in "make America great again"). It is therefore surprising that scholars of IPE have had little to explicitly say about it (as far as I am aware). On the other hand, perhaps it is not surprising; nostalgia is often closely tied to a sense place, and so the tendency to ignore nostalgia is perhaps a product of the field's somewhat impoverished conception of space and place more generally. Be that as it may, the study of the relationship between nostalgia and opposition to the global economy could be an intriguing topic of future research for IPE scholars, and lends itself to systematic inquiry within a "local-tropic" framework; this is just one example of how the local-tropic approach to preference formation could open up new avenues of empirical research in IPE.

In a more abstract and philosophical sense, the local-tropic view of "pro-globalization" global city coalitions that I have developed in Chapter 3 raises interesting and counter-intuitive theoretical and conceptual ideas about how we might think about preferences and political cleavages over globalization within the field of IPE. To take one example, it suggests that "cosmopolitan" pro-globalization attitudes need not be rooted in universal moral commitments that emanate from symbolic identities forged early in life (Sabet 2014); indeed, the "cosmopolitan" pro-globalization preferences of global city residents might actually be rooted in *particularistic* affective ties to their locales. That we can ground pro-globalization sentiment in particularistic geographic commitments is perhaps surprising, in light of "symbolic politics" approaches to IPE which almost inevitably (indeed, virtually by definition) associate particularistic orientations with skepticism or hostility towards globalization.

In addition, Section 4.5's demonstration of an intra-global city commuter zone cleavage over globalization between the "metropolitan core" and the "metropolitan periphery", which (I argued) suggested local-tropic foundations for spatial coalitions, raises several interesting issues for future research. For instance, the role of scale and distance in shaping political outcomes has been the topic of interesting work in comparative politics (Herbst 2000), political economy (Campante and Do 2014), and economic and political history (Stasavage 2010). However, at least with respect to the advanced industrialized world, it is often assumed that the political relevance of spatial factors such as scale and distance is declining in importance, and perhaps even a historical artifact; the very title of Stasavage's article---"When Distance Mattered"--explicitly sets up a contrast between a past when factors such as scale and distance were politically consequential, and the present, when advances in communications and transportation technologies have presumably eroded their relevance. Of course, some scholars have pushed against this view, but to the extent that such factors *are* seen to be politically salient, the distances under consideration tend to be very large. For instance, Berezin and Diez-Medrano (2008) show that support for the European Union is linked to an individual's distance from Brussels. The reasons behind the tendency of individual support for the EU to decline with distance from the European capital need not detain us here, but the important point for our purposes is that the distances involved are of course continental in scale (the mean distance from Brussels in the dataset is 1011 KM). Campante and Do (2014) are primarily concerned with distances from county centroids to the state legislature of the state in which the county is located; while these distances are not quite continental in scale, we should of course keep in mind that some American states are larger than entire European countries. The implication of recent studies insisting on the contemporary relevance of scale and distance for political outcomes might

therefore be that reports of the "death of distance" have been greatly exaggerated, but only when the relevant distances happen to be large. Moreover, they might suggest that the effects of large distances are especially profound in developing countries where the transportation and communications infrastructure remains underdeveloped. In the context of this set of intellectual assumptions about the conditions under which issues of scale and distance are likely to matter for politics, the results from Section 4.5 documenting the distance decay of support for globalization within global city commuter zones might come as something of a surprise. The Brexit referendum took place roughly two years ago (though it admittedly feels like it has been much longer), and the urban areas under consideration in this section are relatively small (the mean distance between points of interest is only about 22 km), not to mention some of the wealthiest, best-connected cities in the history of the world. We might have expected that the confluence of these circumstances—the contemporary (rather than historical) nature of the event, the small magnitude of the spatial scales involved, and the advanced transportation and communications technologies that connect locales within these urban areas—would have precluded any possible role for spatial factors such as distance and remoteness in shaping the course of political events. In short, this is the easiest possible test case for the "death of distance" hypothesis; that it fails the test in circumstances so favorable to it suggests that the effects of distance and scale may be more important and pervasive than previously realized, especially when agglomeration economies are involved. Recognizing this fact could help to bring new research questions in international and comparative political economy into focus.

It is also worth considering what the results in Section 4.5 suggest about the relationships between global cities and their urban peripheries more generally. Some scholars of global cities, such as Scott et al (2001) argue that there is a deep economic interdependence between the

"urban core" of the global city and its metropolitan periphery, and that these elements of the global city should be analyzed in conjunction as an intertwined economic and social system. Sassen has provocatively dissented from this view, suggesting the possibility that in fact, the metropolitan centers, and particularly the central business districts of global cities "tend, in part, to disconnect [economically] from their" metropolitan peripheries (Sassen 2005; 30, 38). This suggestion runs counter not only to scholars such as Scott, but the general thrust of urban history and urban affairs scholarship since Cronon's (1991) influential historical work, which powerfully elucidated the economic interdependencies between a city's urban core (his focus is on Chicago) and its urban periphery. Though Sassen is not quite clear about the reasons for the growing economic disjuncture between the metropolitan core and metropolitan periphery of global cities, her intuition seems to be that as global city agglomeration economies become ever-more potent in a world of increasingly complex globe-spanning supply chains that increase the returns to innovation and face to face contact, the metropolitan cores of global cities have become increasingly attractive location options for superstar headquarter establishments that were previously located in the metropolitan outskirts of these cities; as a result, global city agglomerations of superstar establishments are becoming increasingly concentrated, even at a local scale. This is consistent with important recent trends (still admittedly anecdotal) in corporate location strategies, especially in the United States; corporate headquarters, which were often located in the suburbs of global cities (at least in recent history), rather than their downtowns, are increasingly moving into the urban core. In Chicagoland, which became, as a result of Cronon's work, the archetype of mutually interdependent "urban core/urban periphery" relations, we see executives at McDonalds, a company long headquartered in the suburbs of Chicago,

[Announce] last year that they were putting the property up for sale and moving to the West Loop of Chicago where "L" trains arrive every few minutes and construction canes dot the skyline. In Chicago, McDonald's will join a slew of other companies-among them food conglomerate Kraft Heinz, commodities giant ADM and telecommunications firm Motorola Solutions-all looking to appeal to and be near young professional versed in the world of e-commerce, software analytics, digital engineering, marketing and finance (O'Connell 2017, Paragraph 3-Paragraph 4).

It continues:

Such relocations are happening across the country as economic opportunities shift to a handful of top cities and jobs become harder to find in some suburbs and smaller cities. Aetna recently announced it will relocate from Hartford, Conn., to Manhattan; General Electric is leaving [Fairfield] Connecticut to build a global headquarters in Boston; and Marriott International is moving from an emptying Maryland office park into the center of Bethesda [just miles from DC] (O'Connell 2017, Paragraph 6).

In short, the centripetal forces of global city agglomeration economies, seem, of late, to be drawing the headquarters of superstars not only away from the "national hinterlands" (as we discussed in Chapter 2), but away from the *metropolitan* peripheries of global cities as well; these trends are consistent with (and to some extent perhaps explain) Sassen's account of the urban cores of global cities becoming at least partially detached from their urban peripheries.

A local-tropic perspective on foreign economic policy coalitions therefore brings into focus not only patterns of "urban-urban" political conflict between global cities and domestically oriented "hinterland" cities, but also the potential for even finer-grain intra-urban cleavages *within* global cities between global cities' metropolitan cores and their metropolitan peripheries, as the distance-decay function global city agglomeration processes becomes increasingly steep. Section 4.5 documented the existence of these micro-level political cleavages, but the discussion here suggests that they could grow in importance as the territorial economic bifurcation between the global city's metropolitan core and metropolitan periphery becomes increasingly stark; they should therefore be investigated in greater detail in future work. For instance, future work might explore how these micro-level spatial political cleavages within global cities affect distributive politics within global cites attempting to formulate coherent "international strategies" (Kahler 1993). Indeed, one of the more intriguing developments in global governance is the rise of "subnational diplomacy", as mayors and governors increasingly attempt to project their influence and strike deals on the international stage (Moore 2013). Though this trend is only beginning to become a topic of investigation (Barber 2013; Tavares 2016), scholarly efforts to understand these processes are likely to gather steam as the underlying trends themselves accelerate, especially in light of the antagonistic relationship between the Donald Trump administration and the United States' global cities. Just as understanding national foreign policies requires us to understand how foreign economic policy coalitions are constituted nationally, and how the prospective winners and losers from particular policies bargain over different options, understanding metropolitan "foreign policies" will require us to understand how coalitions are constituted within metropolitan areas; the analysis and discussion here suggests that these intrametropolitan coalitions might be organized spatially, and the implications of the spatial organization of these coalitions for the content of metropolitan foreign policies are worth exploring as the research agenda on subnational foreign policies takes shape.

Finally, the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 also raise more general and policy-relevant questions. For instance, what are the implications of global city versus hinterland political alignments for the politics of redistribution as it relates to globalization? Should a new politics of embedded liberalism designed to shore up a fraying pro-globalization consensus be keyed to interregional redistribution, rather than interpersonal redistribution, in light of the territorial distribution of globalization's benefits and costs across the global city versus hinterland divide?

Such a proposal would involve (to some extent) redistribution from global city coalitions to hinterland coalitions, which would perhaps entail (for instance) the redistribution of wealth and resources from low-skilled workers in global cities to relatively higher-skilled workers in the national hinterlands; consider how different this is from more conventional calls to preserve a pro-globalization consensus by redistributing income from high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers without respect to location (Scheve and Slaughter 2007). Empirically, are there countries that do in fact pursue location-based redistributive policies to aid their national hinterlands, and are they better able to sustain a national political consensus in favor of globalization by limiting the growth of protectionist hinterland coalitions? Or does redistribution along such lines actually exacerbate regional political tensions? Addressing such questions could be important not just for scholarship, but for policy as well; as globalization's spatial inequalities grow ever more stark, and hinterland areas become bastions of anti-globalization political sentiment, calls for place-based redistribution to counteract the market forces that hollow out national hinterlands are likely to increase. Recently, for instance, Austin, Glaeser, and Summers (2018) put forward a call to "save the heartland" of the United States through the pursuit of place based economic policies. In a world of global city and hinterland coalitions, such proposals are likely to be politically fraught; political scientists could therefore have a role to play in clarifying the conditions under which such policies are politically feasible, as well as their expected political and economic effects, in ways that contribute to such policy debates.

7.3.2 Global Cities, Hinterlands, and the Legislative Politics of Globalization: Avenues for Future Research

Chapter 5's analysis of how mass global city and hinterland political coalitions shape the legislative politics of globalization in the United States suggests several opportunities for future

research, both for scholars of international political economy, and scholars of American and comparative politics as well. For scholars of IPE, a natural extension of the work presented in that chapter would be to assess the extent to which legislative coalitions on issues besides trade, such as immigration (Facchini and Steinhardt 2011) and financial policy (Broz 2005; Broz 2008; Broz and Hawes 2006) are shaped by the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide.

For scholars of American politics, there is the potential not only to study how the rise of spatial coalitions might shape patterns of political polarization (a topic recently pursued by McNamara 2017), but a wide range of other outcomes as well, from the internal organization of Congress to patterns of ideological conflict. Indeed, Bensel (1984) explicitly argues that the previous pattern of sectional conflict in American politics (between the industrial "core" and agrarian and extractive "periphery"), rooted in the economic geography of industrialization, was the "massive fact" of American political life, with bearing on such broader outcomes.³ It is therefore certainly possible that the new form of spatial political conflict analyzed here, rooted in the post-industrial economic geography of global cities and hinterlands, will have an equally profound impact on such fundamental political and institutional outcomes.

For scholars of comparative politics, it could be useful to investigate how the increasing prominence of global cities in the world economy over the past several decades has contributed to the evolution of partisan and spatial alignments in legislative coalitions over globalization in other national contexts. Such an investigation could also yield insights into a variety of important related topics, such as a comparative understanding of the political geography of the legislative coalitions that underpin political developments such as "third way" or anti-immigration

³ The increased prominence of the committee system in Congress, for instance, was traced to temporal variation in the extent of sectional stress.

movements, as well as broader political issues such as distributive politics or the politics of the welfare state. Just as the regional divisions analyzed by Bensel (1984) constituted the "massive fact" of modern American political history, the regional division between global cities and hinterlands may well turn out to be the "massive fact" of the contemporary political period, not just in the United States, but across the world.

7.3.3 Global Cities, Hinterlands, and the Politics of Foreign Economic Policy in Cross-National Perspective: Avenues for Future Research

Though journalistic accounts (and, for that matter, scholarly analyses in sociology and geography) tend to emphasize the economic autonomy, power, and influence of global cities visà-vis hinterland regions, an important implication of Chapter 6's analysis is that because of particular institutional biases in how preferences are aggregated, these hinterland regions might actually be particularly well-positioned to compensate for their economic marginalization by wielding disproportionate electoral influence within the polity; the role of the United States's hinterland coalition in electing Donald Trump is simply the most prominent and dramatic illustration of this possibility. Generally speaking, then, investigating the sources and effects of institutional biases (Rogowski 1999) in a world of global cities and hinterlands (and the spatial coalitions associated with these territorial formations) is an important task for research. Doing so could help to cast light on important developments in the world, such as the recent populist backlash to the global economy. Further investigating how institutions condition the balance of political power between global city and hinterland coalitions could help to clarify, for instance, the conditions under which we might expect this populist backlash, in the years ahead, to be more or less politically salient or consequential across different national contexts.

Beyond electoral regimes, and the specific issue of institutional bias, an important avenue for future research is to investigate the relationship between global city coalitions and the vertical organization of the state—that is, patterns of federalism versus unitary government, or centralization versus decentralization-and how this relationship shapes economic policy outcomes. Moreover, future research in this vein could treat institutions, rather than policy, as the outcomes to be explained. For instance, Hooghe and Marks (2010) document cross-national and temporal trends in political regionalization and decentralization; it could be worthwhile to explore the extent to which patterns of change in such territorial political institutions are driven by the ways in which global city coalitions shape the mass politics of globalization. To the extent that political conflict between global city and hinterland coalitions does in fact shape these patterns of institutional change, future work in which institutions and institutional developments such as federalism or decentralization are right-hand side variables will have to seriously grapple with this previously unrecognized source of endogeneity, arising from the spatial political cleavages uncovered in this dissertation. Exploring such questions points the way to a potentially rich comparative research agenda on the complex relationships between the distinctive global city and hinterland coalitions uncovered in this dissertation, political institutions, and policy outcomes.

In addition, future work might extend the work in Chapter 6 by investigating how the relationship between the electoral geography of global city coalitions, and electoral institutions, shapes cross-national variation in foreign economic policies besides trade. Such policies might include, for instance, finance or immigration policy, or perhaps even broader patterns of international cooperation, delegation, and global governance (Kahler and Lake 2003; Rickard 2010). It is likely that in its broad outlines, the arguments advanced in Chapter 6 could be a

starting point for these efforts, though of course, we would expect that the theoretical discussion presented in that chapter would need to be refined in order to successfully investigate these different outcomes.

7.3.4 Additional Avenues for Future Research

In considering directions for future work on the politics of global cities and hinterlands, it is also useful to briefly highlight possibilities that would require a more significant departure from the immediate concerns of this dissertation. In particular, I have focused on how the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands affects political outcomes in *democratic* contexts; moreover, in analyzing the political and policy impact of global cities and hinterland mass coalitions stemming from the economic geography of global cities and hinterlands. I have emphasized the *political* geography of these coalitions—that is, their distribution across territorially organized electoral districts. Future work might profitably depart from these specific points of focus.

First, analyzing the politics of the global city versus hinterland divide in authoritarian contexts is one promising direction for research. This divide is extremely pronounced, for instance, in China (Yang 2018), but we do not have a systematic understanding of its political implications. To what extent do global city and hinterland political coalitions exist in authoritarian contexts, and what impact do these coalitions have on authoritarian political leaders, institutions, and policy outcomes? This dissertation has not addressed these important issues, but they merit systematic future consideration.

Second, in exploring the implications of global city and hinterland coalitions on political and policy outcomes, my independent variable has been the *political* geography of these

coalitions, which is shaped by their spatial distribution with respect to the electoral districts that organize voting and representation. However, it is also feasible that the very fact that global city coalitions are concentrated in *physical* space, while hinterland coalitions are dispersed across physical space, might affect political outcomes through other channels. Reinhardt and Busch (2000), for instance, note that geographic concentration facilitates collective action over foreign economic policy, and indeed, the political power and influence of firms (for instance) in Silicon Valley or the City of London appears to flow in important ways from their concentration in physical space as a result of global city agglomeration economies. This invites the question of how, and to what extent, the global city versus hinterland divide affects patterns of collective action (for instance, through lobbying and other forms of non-electoral mobilization) over foreign economic policy. Political scientists have generally emphasized the collective-action advantage of protectionist interests (i.e. concentrated protectionist industries versus consumers benefitting from lower prices), but it is worth considering whether the economic geography of the global city versus hinterland divide confers a collective action advantage on internationalists, to the extent that global city coalitions are relatively concentrated in physical space.

7.4 Conclusion

From the beginning of the field in the 1970s, one of International Political Economy's central intellectual concerns has been the political sustainability of an open international economy. Over the years, it has addressed various political challenges to international economic openness, and explored how political and institutional mechanisms might help to circumvent those challenges. In the wake of recent events, such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump (who has recently proposed tariff hikes that could spiral into a trade war), the present historical

moment appears to be one of particular vulnerability for the cause of an open world. That the events which have brought us to this historical moment appear to have been shaped by the "inequality between global cities and their regions [i.e. hinterlands]—like that between London and the rest of England—" is thus significant (Toly 2017, 143). It suggests that in the coming years, as scholars of IPE are called to weigh in with renewed urgency on questions regarding the liberal order's sustainability and political viability, their work must be informed by a clear understanding of the political implications of the economic geography of contemporary globalization, marked by the territorial economic cleavage between the global cities that "win" from globalization and the hinterlands that "lose." If this dissertation's investigation of these long-neglected (but increasingly urgent) issues ultimately helps to inform such an understanding, it will have made a useful contribution.

Bibliography

Abrahamson, Mark. 2004. Global Cities. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and Todd Mitton. 2009. "Determinants of Vertical Integration: Financial Development and Contracting Costs." *Journal of Finance* LXIV(3): 1251-1290.
- Adler, Ben. 2014. "Brooklyn's Median Household Income is Less than \$45,000: So how can Anyone Afford to live there?" *Slate Magazine*, January 9, 2014. http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/01/new_york_city_census_data_ manhattan_and_brooklyn_are_much_poorer_than_you.html.
- Agnew, John. 1987. *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Agnew, John. 1996. "Mapping Politics: How Context Counts in Electoral Geography." *Political Geography* 15(2): 129-146.
- Aklin, Michael, Patrick Bayer, SP Harish, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. "Quantifying Slum Electrification in India and Explaining Local Variation." *Energy* 80(1): 203-212.
- Alesina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik. 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 109(2): 465-490.
- Alfaro, Laura, and Maggie Chen. 2014. "The global agglomeration of multinational firms." *Journal of International Economics* 94(2): 263-276.
- Angrist, Joshua and Pischke, Jorn-Steffen. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1992. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence Summers. 2018. "Saving the Heartland: Place Based Policies in 21st Century America." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: BPEA Conference Drafts, March 8-10, 2018. 1-96.
- Autor, David, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson. 2013. "The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States." *American Economic Review* 103(6): 2121-2168.

- Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2016. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure." NBER Working Paper 22637. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22637.
- Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence Katz, Christina Patterson, John Van Reenen. 2017. "The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms." NBER Working Paper 23396. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23396.
- Azari, Julia. 2016. "The Platforms Are a Window Into The Future Of The Parties." *538*, July 19, 2016. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-platforms-are-a-window-into-the-future-of-the-parties/.
- Baccini, Leonardo, Pablo Pinto, and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. "The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence." *International Organization* 71(2): 373-395.
- Badger, Emily. 2017. "What Happens When the Richest U.S. Cities Turn to the World?" *New York Times*, December 22, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/upshot/the-greatdisconnect-megacities-go-global-but-lose-local-links.html.
- Bahar, Dany. 2014. "Heavier than Air? Knowledge Transmission Within the Multinational Firm." Working paper available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dbaharc/files/bahar_jmp_final.pdf?m=1396880495.
- Baker, Andy. 2005. "Who wants to globalize? Consumer tastes and labor markets in a Theory of trade policy beliefs". *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924-938.
- Baldwin, Robert and Christopher Magee. 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting On Recent Trade Bills". *Public Choice* 105(1): 79-101.
- Baldwin, Richard. 2012. "Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are Going." CTEI Working Papers, Center for Trade and Economic Integration, Graduate Institute of International and Area Studies, Geneva and Oxford University. Available at http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/working_paper s/CTEI-2012-13.pdf.
- Barber, Benjamin. 2013. If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Barber, Benjamin IV. 2014. "The Political Economy of Decline." *PhD Dissertation:* Duke University.

- Baron, Reuben and David Kenny. 1986. "The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51(6): 1173-1182.
- Bastos, Paul and Daniel Dias. 2012. "The Life Cycle of Exporting Firms." Working paper available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgibin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=MWITFall2012&paper_id=51.
- Bathelt, Harald, Anders Malmberg, and Peter Maskell. "Clusters and knowledge: local Buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation." *Progress in Human Geography* 28(1): 31-56.
- Baum, Matthew. 2011. "Red State, Blue State, Flu State: Media Self Selection and Partisan Gaps in Swine Flu Vaccinations." *Journal of Health Policy, Politics, and Law.* 36: 1021-1060.
- Beaulieu, Eugene. 2002. "The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem Faces Congress." *Review of International Economics* 10(2): 343-360.
- Bekes, Gabor and Peter Harsztosi. 2013. "Agglomeration Premium and Trading Activity of Firms." *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 43(1): 51-64.
- Bellemare, Marc and Nicholas Carnes. 2015. "Why do members of congress support agricultural protection?" *Food Policy* 15: 20-34.
- Bensel, Richard. 1982. "Sectional Stress and Ideology in the United States House of Representatives." *Polity* 14(4): 657-675.
- Bensel, Richard. 1984. *Sectionalism and American Political Development: 1880-1980.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Berezin, Mabel and Juan Diez-Medrano. 2008. "Distance matters: Place, political legitimacy, And popular support for European integration." *Comparative European Politics* 6(1): 1-32.
- Bernard, Andrew, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen Redding, and Peter Schott. 2007. "Firms in International Trade." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21(3): 105-130.
- Bernard, Andrew, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen Redding, and Peter Schott. 2012."The Empirics of Firm Heterogeneity and International Trade." *Annual Review of Economics* 4: 283-313.
- Bernard, Andrew, Ilke Van Beveren, and Hylke Vandenbussche. 2014. "Multi-Product Exporters and the Margins of Trade." *Japanese Economic Review* 65(2): 142-157.

- Betz, Timm. 2017. "Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the Politics of Trade." *The Journal of Politics* 79(4): 1237-1252.
- Bloodworth, James. 2017. "Will the politics of 'open and closed' replace 'left versus right'?" *International Business Times*, March 8, 2017. https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/will-politics-open-closed-replace-left-versus-right-1606328.
- Brainard, Lael. 2017. "Why Persistent Employment Disparities Matter for the Economy's Health." Speech delivered at conference sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Disparities in the Labor Market: What Are We Missing? https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170926a.htm.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses." *Political Analysis* 14(1): 63-82.
- Braudel, Fernand. 1984. *The Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism* 15th-18th Century. Harper and Row.
- Broz, Lawrence. 1997. *The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Broz, Lawrence. 2005. "Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 479-496.
- Broz, Lawrence and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. "Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund." *International Organization* 60: 367-399.
- Broz, Lawrence. 2008. "Congressional Voting on Funding the International Financial Institutions." *The Review of International Organizations* 3(4): 351-374.
- Broz, Lawrence. 2011. "The United States Congress and IMF Financing, 1944-2009." *The Review of International Organizations* 6(3): 341-368.
- Brulhart, Marius, Mario Jametti, and Kurt Schmidheiny. 2007. "Do Agglomeration Economies reduce the sensitivity of firm location to tax differentials?" *The Economic Journal* 122(563): 1069-1093.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2004. *The Logic of Political Survival.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

- Busch, Marc and Edward Mansfield. *N.D.* "The Political Economy of Trade Policy." Working paper available at http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/Trade%20–%20Determinants%20of%20Policies.pdf.
- Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt. 1999. "Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of US Nontariff Barriers." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 1028-1050.
- Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt. 2000. "Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in US Industries." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 703-719.
- Calmes, Jackie. 2016. "Who Hates Free Trade Treaties? Surprisingly, Not Voters." *New York Times*, September 21, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/politics/whohates-trade-treaties-surprisingly-not-voters.html.
- Campante, Filipe and Quoc-Anh Do. 2014. "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States." *American Economic Review* 104(8): 2456-81.

Center for Responsive Politics. n.d. "Interest Groups." http://www.opensecrets.org/industries.

- Chakravorty, Sanjoy and Somik Lall. 2007. *Made in India: The Political Geography Political Economy of Industrialization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chase, Kerry. 2015. "Domestic Geography and Policy Pressures." In *The Oxford Handbook* of *The Political Economy of International Trade*, edited by Lisa Martin, 317-334. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, David. 2003. Urban World/Global City. New York: Routledge.
- Cohen, Benjamin. 2008. International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Colantone, Italo and Piero Stanig. 2017. "Global Competition and Brexit." Working paper available at http://www.italocolantone.com/research.html.
- Combes, Pierre-Philippe Combes and Laurent Gobillon. "The Empirics of Agglomeration Economies." In *Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics Volume 5*, edited by Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson, and William Strange, 247-348. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

- Confessore, Nicholas and Nate Cohn. 2016. "Donald Trump's Victory Was Built On Unique Coalition of White Voters." *New York Times*, November 9, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/donald-trump-voters.html.
- Coyle, Diane. 2016. "Brexit and Globalisation." VOX: CEPR's Policy Portal, August 5, 2016. https://voxeu.org/article/brexit-and-globalisation.
- Crafts, Nicholas and Gianni Toniolo. 2012. "'Les Trente Glorieuses': From the Marshall Plan to the Oil Crisis." In *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, edited by Dan Stone, 356-379. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cramer, Katherine. 2016. The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cronon, William. 1991. *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*. New York: WW Norton and Company.
- Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer and Carlos Scartascini. 2016 "Database of Political Institutions Codebook, 2015 Update (DPI2015)." *Inter-American Development Bank*. Updated Version of Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions." *World Bank Economic Review* 15(1): 165-176.
- Currid, Elizabeth. 2007. *The Warhol Economy: How Fashion, Art, and Music Drive New York City.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cutler, Fred. 2007. "Context and attitude formation: Social interaction, default information, or local interests?" *Political Geography* 26(5): 575-600.
- Davis, D.R. 1996. "Trade liberalization and income distribution." NBER Working Paper No. 5693. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5693.
- Department for Business Innovation and Skills. 2012. "Benchmarking UK Competitiveness In the Global Economy." BIS Economics Paper No. 19.
- Dobbs, Richard, Jaana Remes, Sven Smit, James Manyika, Jonathan Woetzel, and Yaw Agyenim-Boateng. 2013. "Urban world: The shifting global business landscape." *McKinsey Global Institute*. McKinsey and Company.
- Dorn, David. 2009. "Essays on Inequality, Spatial Interaction, and the Demand for Skills." *PhD Dissertation:* University of St. Gallen.
- Downtown in Business. n.d. "Why Did Manchester and Liverpool Vote Remain?" http://www.downtowninbusiness.com/manchester-liverpool-vote-remain/.

- Drennan, Matthew. 1996. "The Dominance of International Finance by London, New York, and Tokyo." In *The Global Economy in Transition*, edited by P.W Daniels and W.F. Lever. Longmans Ltd.
- Duranton, Gilles and Diego Puga. 2005. "From Sectoral to Functional Urban Specialization." Journal of Urban Economics 57(2): 343-370.
- Durham University. 2018. "Nomis: Official Labor Market Statistics." https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/.
- Dutt, Pushan and Devashish Mitra. 2002. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(1): 59-72.
- Dutt, Pushan and Devashish Mitra. 2005. "Endogenous Trade Policy Through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation." *Journal of International Economics* 58(1): 107-133.
- Edsall, Thomas. 2016. "Hillary Clinton's Juggling Act." *New York Times*, November 3, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/opinion/campaign-stops/hillary-clintons-juggling-act.html.
- Eeckhout, Jan, Roberto Pinheiro, and Kurt Schmidheiny. 2014. "Spatial Sorting." *Journal of Political Economy* 122(3): 554-620
- Ehrlich, Sean. 2007. "Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies." *International Organization* 61(3): 571-605.
- Ehrlich, Sean. 2009. "How Common is the Common External Tariff? Domestic Influences on European Union Trade Policy." *European Union Politics* 10(1): 115-14.
- Enos, Ryan. 2017. *The Space Between Us: Social Geography and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Epifani, Paolo, Gino Gancia. 2008. "The Skill Bias of World Trade." *The Economic Journal* 118(530): 927-960.
- Erie, Steven. 2004. *Globalizing LA: Trade, Infrastructure, and Regional Development.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Erikson, R. 1972. "Malapportionment, gerrymandering, and party fortunes in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 66(4): 1234-1245.
- Esri. 2012. "Distritos de Costa Rica." Last modified October 26, 2012. http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=29462fe665444063b69ac35fa82f4bc0.

- Esri. 2016. "EU Referendum 2016 Results (Excluding Gibraltar)." Last modified July 5, 2016. http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=9e8b9dbdfd604ad2912c9821af08727a.
- Evans, Carolyn. 2009. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation." *Economics and Politics* 21(2): 278-307.
- Facchini, Giovanni, and Max Steinhardt. 2011. "What drives U.S. immigration policy? Evidence from congressional roll call votes." *Journal of Public Economics* 95(7-8): 734-743.
- Farole, Thomas and Deborah Winkler. 2013. "Firm Location and the Determinants of Exporting in Low and Middle-Income Countries." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper.
- Ferguson, Thomas. 1984. "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression." *International Organization* 38(1): 41-94.
- Fordham, Benjamin and Timothy McKeown. 2003. "Selection and Influence: Interest Groups And Congressional Voting on Trade Policy." *International Organization* 57(3): 519-549.
- Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. 2005. "Sympathy in Space: Adam Smith on Proximity." *Political Theory* 33(2): 189-217.
- Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. 2010. *Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Foster-Molina, Ella. 2016. *Legislative and District Data: 1972-2013*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Dataverse.
- Freund, Caroline and Martha Pierola. 2015. "Export Superstars." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 97(5): 1023-1032.
- Frieden, Jeffry. 1988. "Sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy." *International Organization* 42(1): 59-90.
- Frieden, Jeffry, David Lake, Michael Nicholson, and Aditya Ranganath. 2016. "The Coming Realignment? Economic Crisis and Political Change in the United States." Working Paper.
- Gallego, Aina, Franz Buscha, and Patrick Sturgis. 2014. "Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of Self-Selection and Contextual Effects." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 529-550.

- Geismer, Lily. 2015. Don't Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Geismer, Lily. 2016. "Atari Democrats." *Jacobin*, February 8, 2016. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/geismer-democratic-party-atari-tech-silicon-valley-mondale.
- Gest, Justin. 2016. *The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration And Inequality.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Glaeser, Edward, Jed Kolko, and Albert Saiz. 2001. "Consumer City" *Journal of Economic Geography* 1(1): 27-50.
- Glaeser, Edward and Giacamo Ponzetto. 2007. "Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?" NBER Working Paper 13710. Available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/did_the_death_of_distance_hurt_detroit_and _help_new_york.pdf.
- Glaeser, Edward. 2010. "Introduction". In *Agglomeration Economics*, edited by Edward Glaeser, 1-15. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Globalisation and politics: The new political divide. 2016. *Economist Magazine*, July 30, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21702750-farewell-left-versus-right-contest-matters-now-open-against-closed-new.
- Globalization and World Cities Research Network. 2018. "Welcome to GaWC—the leading academic thinktank on cities in globalization." Last modified March 27, 2018. http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/index.html.
- Goerzen, Anthony, Christian Asmussen, and Bo Nielsen. 2013. "Global cities and multinational enterprise location strategy." *Journal of International Business Studies* 44: 427-450.
- Goldstein, Neal D, Helen Tager-Flusberg, and Brian Lee. 2015. "Mapping Collaboration Networks In the World of Autism Research." *Autism Research* 8: 1-8.
- Goodwin, Matthew and Oliver Heath. 2016. "The 2016 Referendum, Brexit, and the Left-Behind: An Aggregate Analysis of the Result." *The Political Quarterly* 87(3): 323-332.
- Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpmann. 2005. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120(4): 1239-1282.
- Gudgin, Graham and Peter Taylor. 1979. Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organization of *Elections*. London: Pion.

- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" *International Organization* 63: 533-557.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2017. American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gyourko, Joseph, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai. 2013. "Superstar Cities." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 5(4): 167-199.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Stephan Haggard, David Lake, David Victor. 2017. "The Behavioral Revolution in the Study of International Relations." *International Organization* 72(S1): S1-S31.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Michael Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education And Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60: 469-498.
- Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman. 2008. "Appendices." In *Redistricting in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, 285-307. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hatfield, John and William Hauk. 2014. "Electoral Regime and Trade Policy." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 42: 518-534.
- Henisz, W.J. 2002. "The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment." *Industrial* and Corporate Change 11(2): 355-389
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hicks, Raymond, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley. 2014. "Trade Policy, Economic Interests, and Party Politics in a Developing Country: The Political Economy of CAFTA-DR." *International Studies Quarterly* 58: 106-117.
- Hinich, Melvin and Peter Ordeshook. 1974. "The Electoral College: A Spatial Analysis." *Political Methodology* 1(3): 1-29.
- Hiscox, Michael. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53(4): 669-698.
- Hiscox, Michael. 2002. "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation." *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 593-608.

- Hiscox, Michael. 2003. "Political Integration and Disintegration in the Global Economy." In *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority In Transition*, edited by Miles Kahler and David Lake, 60-87. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hobolt, Sara. 2016. "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(9): 1259-1277.
- Hoffman, Martin. 2001. *Empathy and Moral Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hollands, Simon, M. Karen Campbell, Jason Gilliland and Sisira Sarma. 2013. "A Spatial analysis of the association between restaurant density and body mass index in Canadian adults." *Preventive Medicine*. 57: 258-264.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2010. *The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies*. New York: Routledge.
- Ivanhoe, Philip. 2014. "Confucian Cosmopolitanism." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 42(1): 22-44.
- Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 165-181.
- Jacobs, Jane. 1984. Cities and the Wealth of Nations. New York: Random House.
- Jacobs, Jane. 1992. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Vintage Books.
- Jenkins, S.P. 1999. "ineqdeco: Stata module to calculate inequality indices with decomposition by subgroup." Statistical Software Components S366002, Department of Economics, Boston College. https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s366002.html.
- Kahler, Miles. 1993. "New York City and the International System: International Strategy and Urban Fortunes." In *Capital of the American Century: The National and International Influence of New York City*, edited by Martin Shefter, 27-49. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kahler, Miles and David Lake. 2003. "Globalization and Governance." In *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition*, edited by Miles Kahler and David Lake, 1-33. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Kahler, Miles. 2017. "Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Economy, Culture, and Political Conflict." Paper presented at the conference Cultural Interests and Values, Institute for International Cultural Relations, School of Social and Political Science, The University of Edinburgh, June 14-16.
- Kang, Woo Chang. 2016. "Local Economic Voting and Residence-Based Regionalism in South Korea: Evidence from the 2007 Presidential Election." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 16: 349-369.
- Keech, William and Kyoungstan Pak. 1995. "Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Politics." *Journal of Politics* 57(4): 1130-1143.
- Keefer, Philip. 2007. "Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 804-821.
- Kelly, Jon. 2016. "Brexit: How much of a generation gap is there?" *BBC News Magazine*, June 24, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36619342.
- Kendall, M.G and A. Stuart. 1950. "The Law of the Cubic Proportion in Election Results." *British Journal of Sociology* 1(3): 183-196.
- Kim, In Song. 2017. "Political Cleavages Within Industry: Firm-level lobbying for Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 11(1): 1-20.
- Kinder, Donald, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case." *British Journal of Political Science* 11(2): 129-161.
- Kirchoff, Bruce. 1993. Entrepreneurship and Dynamic Capitalism: The Economics of Business Firm Formation and Growth. Praeger.
- Kollman, Ken, Allen Hicken, Daniele Caramani, David Backer, Joel Selway and Fabricio Vasselai. 2017. *Georeferenced Electoral Districts Datasets* (Beta).
 Produced and distributed by Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.
- Kono, Daniel. 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency." *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 369-384.
- Krugman, Paul. 1991. Geography and Trade. Boston: MIT Press.
- Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62: 477-505.

- Kucik, Jeffrey and Ashley Moraguez. 2013. "The Domestic Politics of Trade Agreement Ratification." Working paper available at https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/filerepository/public/PTA-Voting-in-the-US-House-Kucik-and-Moraguez.pdf.
- Kucik, Jeffrey and Ashley Moraguez. 2017. "Balancing Multiple Goals: Analyzing Votes on Free Trade Agreements in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Congress and the Presidency* 44(1): 29-54.
- Kuo, Jason and Megumi Naoi. 2015. "Individual Attitudes." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of Trade*, edited by Lisa Martin, 99-119. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lake, David. 2009. "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review." *The Review of International Organizations* 4(3): 219-244.
- Leatherby, Lauren. 2016. "US Urban-Rural Political Divide Deepened in 2016." *Financial Times*, November 15, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/f7c7dd96-ab65-11e6-ba7d-76378e4fef24.
- Leblang, David and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. "Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises." *International Organization* 60(1): 245-262.
- Lee, Don. 2016. "Will the 'Brexit' Mark the End of the Age of Globalization?" *Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 2016. http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-brexit-globalization-future-20160624-snap-story.html.
- Lewis, Jeffrey, Brandon DeVine, Lincoln Pitcher, and Kenneth Martis. 2013. *Digital Boundary Definitions of United States Congressional Districts*, 1789-2012. http://cdmaps.polisci.ucla.edu/.
- Long, Joshua. 2010. Weird City: Sense of Place and Creative Resistance in Austin, Texas. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Longworth, Richard. 2015. On Global Cities. Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
- Loughran, Tim. 2008. "The Impact of Firm Location on Equity Issuance." *Financial Management* Spring: 1-21.
- Maliniak, Daniel. 2014. "The Electoral Geography of International Political Economy." *PhD Dissertation:* University of California, San Diego.
- Mansfield, Edward and Diana Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63(3): 425-457.

- Margalit, Yotam. 2012. "Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(3): 484-500.
- Margolis, Jason. 2016. "Hillary Clinton's stand on NAFTA and the TPP: It's complicated, and evolving." *PRI's the World*, July 28, 2016. https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-07-28/hillary-clinton-s-stand-nafta-and-tpp-it-s-complicated-and-evolving.

Massey, Doreen. 1994. Space, Place, and Gender. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Matti, Joshua and Yang Zhou. 2016. "The political economy of Brexit: explaining the vote." *Applied Economics Letters* 24(16): 1131-1134.
- Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why are some people (and countries) more Protectionist than others?" *European Economic Review* 49: 1393-1430.
- Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Towards Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3): 510-530.
- Mayer, Wolfgang. 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation." *American Economic Review* 74(5): 970-985.
- Mayer, Thierry and Gianmarco Ottaviano. 2008. "The Happy Few: The Internationalisation of European Firms." *Intereconomics* 43(3): 135-148.
- McCarthy, William, Ritesh Mistry, Yao Lu, Minal Ptel, Hong Zheng, and Barbara Dietsch. 2009. "Density of Tobacco Retailers Near Schools: Effects on Tobacco Use Among Students." *American Journal of Public Health*. 99(11): 2006-2013.
- McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade And Industry.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- McNamara, Kathleen. 2017. "Bringing Class Back In: Cultural Bubbles and American Political Polarization." Paper presented at Seminar on the State and Capitalism since 1800, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, March 10. Available at https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/events/20170302---CLASS-BUBBLES-McNamara-Harvard-March-2017.pdf.
- Melitz, Marc. 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity." *Econometrica* 71(6): 1695-1725.
- Melitz, Marc and Gianmarco Ottaviano. 2008. "Market Size, Trade, and Productivity." *Review Of Economic Studies* 75: 295-316

- Meschi, Elena, Erol Taymaz, Marco Vivarelli. 2015. "Globalization, Technological Change And Labor Demand: A Firm Level Analysis for Turkey." IZA Discussion Papers, No. 9453.
- Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59(1): 107-143.
- Milner, Helen and Dustin Tingley. 2011. "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy." *International Organization* 65: 37-68.
- Moore, Scott. 2013. "California's Sub-National Diplomacy: The Right Approach." *The Diplomat*, October 11, 2013. https://thediplomat.com/2013/10/californias-sub-national-diplomacy-the-right-approach/.
- Moretti, Enrico. 2013. The New Geography of Jobs. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Moretti, Enrico and Per Thulin. 2013. "Local multipliers and human capital in the United States and Sweden." *Industrial and Corporate Change* 22(1): 339-362.
- Mukim, Megha. 2014. "To Maximize the Gains from Trade-Focus on Firms and Cities." *The World Bank: Future Development.* http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/maximize-gains-trade-focus-firms-andcities
- Muro, Mark and Sifan Liu. 2016. "Another Clinton-Trump Divide: High-Output America vs Low Output America." *Brookings Institute: The Avenue*, November 29, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/11/29/another-clinton-trumpdivide-high-output-america-vs-low-output-america/.
- Muuls, Mirabelle and Mauro Pisu. 2009. "Imports and Exports at the Level of the Firm: Evidence From Belgium." *World Economy* 32(5): 692-734.
- Naoi, Megumi and Ikuo Kume. 2011. "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession." *International Organization* 65(4): 771-795.
- Naoi, Megumi and Shujiro Urata. 2013. "Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of TPP." *Asian Economic Policy Review* 2(2): 326-349.
- Neary, Peter. 2015. "Superstar Firms in the Global Economy." The Corden Lecture. http://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/alumni/events/public/2015/the-corden-lecture-2015.
- Nguyen, Quynh. 2015. "To Trade or Not to Trade: Examining the Social Foundations of Individual Trade Policy Preferences." *Phd Dissertation*: ETH Zurich.

- Norris, Pippa. 2008. *Driving Democracy: Do power sharing institutions work?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). 2016. LandScan Data Availability. *Geographic Information Science And Technology (GIST)*. https://landscan.ornl.gov/.
- O'Connell, Jonathan. 2017. "As Companies relocate to big cities, suburban towns are left scrambling." *Washington Post*, July 16, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/as-companies-relocate-to-big-citiessuburban-towns-are-left-scrambling/2017/07/16/81c12cea-618d-11e7-84a1a26b75ad39fe_story.html?utm_term=.1b9e8f037b10&wpisrc=nl_rainbow&wpmm=1.
- Office for National Statistics. 2017. "Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) boundaries." https://data.gov.uk/dataset/1b3604bc-8fd3-4b01-a0fd-0f3bf7fcd160/travel-to-work-areasttwa-boundaries.
- O'Halloran, Sharyn. 1994. *Politics, Process and American Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan Press.
- Oreskovic, Nicolas, Jeff Blossom, Alison Field, Sylvia Chiang, Jonathan Winickoff and Ronald Kleinman. 2012. "Combing global positioning system and Accelerometer data to determine the locations of physical activity in Children." *Geospatial Health* 6(2): 263-272.
- O'Rourke, Kevin and Alan Taylor. 2006. "Democracy and Protectionism." NBER Working Paper 12250. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12250.
- Osgood, Iain, Dustin Tingley, Thomas Bernauer, In Song Kim, Helen Milner, and Gabriele Spilker. 2016. "The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy." *Journal of Politics* 79(1): 133-152.
- Owen, Erica. 2017. "Exposure to Offshoring and the Politics of Trade Liberalization: Debates and Votes On Free Trade Agreements in the House of Representatives." Forthcoming in *International Studies Quarterly*.
- Owen, Erica and Stefanie Walter. 2017. "Open economy politics and Brexit: insights, puzzles, and ways forward." *Review of International Political Economy* 24(2): 179-202.
- Pages, Carmen with Carlos Ludena. 2010. "Productivity in Latin America: The Challenge of the Service Sector." In *The Age of Productivity: Transforming Economies From the Bottom Up*, edited by Carmen Pages, 45-69. Inter-American Development Bank.

- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2005. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Peters, Margaret. 2014. "Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States." *International Organization* 68: 811-844.
- Plouffe, Michael. 2012. "The New Political Economy of Trade. Heterogeneous Firms and Trade Policy Positions." Working paper available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900256.
- Plouffe, Michael. 2017. "Firm Heterogeneity and Trade Policy Stances: Evidence from a Survey Of Japanese Producers." *Business and Politics* 19(1): 1-40.
- Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Powers, Ryan. 2017. "Economic Anxiety and Trade Policy Preferences." Working paper available at http://ryanpowers.net/files/Powers_10_2017_EconAnxTradePref.pdf.
- Puga, Diego. 2010. "The Magnitude and Causes of Agglomeration Economies." *Journal of Regional Science* 50(1): 1-26.
- Ramcharan, Rodney. 2009. "Why an economic core: domestic transport costs." Journal of Economic Geography 9(2009): 559-581.
- Reeves, Andrew and James Gimpel. 2012. "Ecologies of Unease: Geographic Context and National Economic Evaluations." *Political Behavior* 34(3): 507-534.
- Renn, Aaron. 2008. "Chicago: Corporate Headquarters and the Global City." *Urbanophile*, October 8, 2008. http://www.urbanophile.com/2008/10/08/chicago-corporate-headquarters-and-the-global-city/.
- Rho, Sungmin and Michael Tomz. 2015. "Industry, Self-Interest, and Individual Preferences Over Trade Policy." Working paper available at https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/RhoTomz-2015-04-01.pdf.
- Rho, Sungmin and Michael Tomz. 2016. "Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self Interest." *International Organization* 72(S1): S85-S108.
- Rice, Patricia, Anthony Venables, Eleonora Patacchini. 2006. "Spatial determinants of productivity: Analysis for the regions of Great Britain." *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 36(6): 727-752.

- Rickard, Stephanie. 2010. "Democratic Differences: Electoral Institutions and Compliance With GATT/WTO Agreements." *European Journal of International Relations* 16(4): 711-730.
- Rickard, Stephanie. 2012a. "Electoral Systems, Voters' Interests and Geographic Dispersion." *British Journal of Political Science* 42(4): 855-877.
- Rickard, Stephanie. 2012b. "A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government Subsidies and Electoral Institutions." *International Studies Quarterly* 56: 777-785.
- Rickard, Stephanie. 2016. "Populism and the Brexit Vote." APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter 26(2): 120-122.
- Rodden, Jonathan. 2005. "Red States, Blue States, and the Welfare State: Political Geography, Representation, and Government Policy Around the World." Working paper available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/conferences/cpeworkshop/Rodden.pdf.
- Rodden, Jonathan. 2010. "The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences." *Annual Review Of Political Science* 13: 321-340.
- Rodden, Jonathan. 2011. "The Long Shadow of the Industrial Revolution: Political Geography and the Representation of the Left." Working manuscript available at https://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/wp/shadow.pdf.
- Rodrik, Dani. 1997. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2017. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." Working paper available at https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/events/Populism-and-the-Economics-of-Globalization.pdf.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121-1137.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1999. "Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choices." In *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, edited by David Lake and Robert Powell, 115-137. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rogowski, Ronald, Mark Kayser, and Daniel Kotin. 1999. "How Geographical Concentration Affects Industrial Influence: Evidence from US Data." Working paper available at http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_00/20000003.pdf.

- Rogowski, Ronald. 2008. "Trade, Immigration, and Cross-Border Investment." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Edited by Donald Wittman and Barry Weingast, 814-831. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roue, Lucy. 2016. "NW business leaders back remain campaign." *Manchester Evening News*, June 22, 2016. https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/business/nw-businessleaders-back-remain-11510296
- Sabet-Esfahani, Shahrzad. 2014. "Essays at the Intersection of International Political Economy and Psychology." *PhD Dissertation:* Harvard University.
- Sassen, Saskia. 2001. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, Saskia. 2005. "The Global City: Introducing a Concept." *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 11(2): 28-43.
- Sassen, Saskia. 2006. Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Sassen, Saskia. 2008. "Two Stops in Today's New Global Geographies: Shaping Novel Labor Supplies and Employment Regimes." *American Behavioral Scientist* 52(3): 457-496.
- Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2001a. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133-145.
- Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2001b. "What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54(2001): 267-292.
- Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2004. "Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 662-674.
- Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2007. "A New Deal for Globalization." *Foreign Affairs* July/August Issue.
- Scott, James and David Lake. 1989. "The second fact of hegemony: Britain's repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846." *International Organization* 43(1): 1-29.
- Scott, Allen, John Agnew, Edward Soja, and Michael Storper. 2001. "Global City-Regions" In *Global City Regions: Theory, Trends, Policy*, edited by Allen Scott, 11-33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Scott, Allen. 2008. "Resurgent Metropolis: Economy, Society and Urbanization in an Interconnected World." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32(3): 548-564.
- Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1(3): 229-243.
- Slote, Michael. 2009. "Famine, Affluence, and Empathy." In *What's Wrong: Applied Ethicists and Their Critics*, edited by David Boonin and Graham Oddie. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Slovic, Paul, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald McGregor. 2002. "Rational Actors Or Rational Fools: implications of the affect heuristic for behavioral economics." *Journal of Socioeconomics* 31: 329-342.
- Slovic, Paul, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald McGregor. 2007. "The Affect Heuristic." *European Journal of Operational Research* 177: 1333-1352.
- Stasavage, David. 2010. "When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development Of European Representative Assemblies." American Political Science Review 104(4): 625-643.
- Stokes, Bruce. 2016. "Republicans, especially Trump supporters, see free trade deals as bad for U.S." *Pew Research Center*, March 31, 2016. http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/03/31/republicans-especially-trump-supporters-see-free-trade-deals-as-bad-foru-s/.
- Storper, Michael and Anthony Venables. 2004. "Buzz: face-to-face contact and the urban economy." *Journal of Economic Geography* 4(4): 351-370.
- Tavares, Jose. 2008. "Trade, Factor Proportions, and Political Rights." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(1): 163-168.
- Tavares, Rodrigo. 2016. *Paradiplomacy: Cities and States as Global Players*. Oxford: University Press.
- Thames, Frank and Martin Edwards. 2006. "Differentiating Mixed Member Electoral Systems: Mixed-Member Majoritarian and Mixed-Member Proportional Systems and Government Expenditures." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(7): 905-927.
- Toly, Noah. 2017. "Brexit, Global Cities, and the Future of World Order." *Globalizations* 14(1): 142-149.

- Tomasky, Michael. 2017. "Republicans have lost touch with Blue America." *The Daily Beast*, December 5, 2017. https://www.thedailybeast.com/republicans-have-lost-touchwith-blue-america.
- Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 1998. *Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results.* Version 1.2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University.
- Trope, Yaacov, Nira Liberman, and Cheryl Wakslak. 2007. "Construal Levels and Psychological Distance: Effects on Representation, Evaluation, and Behavior." *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 17(2): 83-95.
- Trubowitz, Peter. 1998. *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 2018. "Commuting Zones and Labor Market Areas." Last modified January 19, 2018. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-market-areas.aspx.
- Verdier, Daniel. 2000. "The Rise and Fall of State Banking in OECD Countries." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(3): 283-318.
- Walsh, Katherine Cramer. 2012. "Putting Inequality in its Place: Rural Consciousness and the Power Of Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 517-532.
- Walter, Stephanie. 2017. "Globalization and the Demand-Side of Politics: How Globalization Shapes Labor Market Risk Perceptions and Policy Preferences." *Political Science Research and Methods* 5(1): 55-80.
- Warf, Barney. 2007. "Embodied Information, actor networks, and global value-added services." In *The Handbook of Services Industries*, edited by John Bryson and Peter Daniels, 379-395. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Warf, Barney. 2012. "Global Cities, cosmopolitanism, and geographies of tolerance." *Urban Geography* 36(6): 927-946.
- Waterhouse, Mike. 2016. "Borough Breakdown: How NYC voted for the president (hint: Clinton didn't win them all." *ABC7NY*, November 9, 2016. http://abc7ny.com/politics/how-each-nyc-borough-voted-(hint-clinton-didnt-win-themall)/1598306/.
- Weinberg, Joe. 2016. "European Union Member States in Cross-National Analyses: The Dangers Of Neglecting Supranational Policymaking." *International Studies Quarterly* 60: 98-106.

- Wibbels, Erik. 2009. "Cores, Peripheries, and Contemporary Political Economy." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44: 441-449.
- Wojcik, Dariusz. 2009. "Financial centre bias in primary equity markets." *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy, and Society* 2: 193-209.
- Woltin, Karl-Andrew, Olivier Corneille, Vincent Yzerbyt, and Jens Forster. 2011.
 "Narrowing Down to open up for other people's concerns: empathetic concern can be enhanced by inducing detailed processing." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 47: 418-424.
- World Trade Organization, International Trade Center, and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2016. "World Tariff Profiles." https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles16_e.pdf.
- Wren, Anne and Kenneth McElwain. 2007. "Voters and Parties." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, 555-582. Oxford: University Press.
- Urbatsch, Robert. 2013. "A Referendum on Trade Theory: Voting on Free Trade in Costa Rica." *International Organization* 67(1): 297-214.
- Yang, Yuan. 2018. "Rust belt decline poses threat to Chinese growth: Once key to the Planned economy, heartland provinces such as Jilin are struggling." *Financial Times*, March 1, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/ed8523ac-de36-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c.
- Yglesias, Matthew. 2016. "American politics could be ready for a realignment on trade." *Vox*, July 1, 2016. https://www.vox.com/2016/7/1/12060994/trade-public-opinion-realignment.