Immigration and the election of Donald Trump: Why the sociology of migration left us unprepared…and why we shouldn’t have been surprised

Roger Waldinger
Department of Sociology
UCLA

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Abstract

Donald Trump began his campaign for the U.S. Presidency by emphasizing the supposed dangers of immigration, a theme that he then rode to victory in November 2016 won the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. This paper asks whether the sociology of migration can illuminate the sources of Trump’s success and after quickly reviewing the key contributions concludes not. Insight, rather, is to be found by understanding the ways in which population movements across state boundaries are a source of both international integration and national dis-integration, producing conflicts over the number, characteristics, and rights of immigrants from which liberal societies can find no escape.
For the immigrant population of the United States, the 2016 Presidential election produced a disaster that began on Election Day and has worsened ever since. For migration scholars, however, the election represents a daunting intellectual challenge. Despite its myriad roots, Trumpism has been linked with the politics of immigration ever since the mogul descended to the lobby of Trump Tower and launched his campaign with a screed against Mexican immigrants. If the politics of immigration helped drive Trump to the White House, he in turn has altered immigration policy and its politics. The President’s ineptitude notwithstanding, Trump has successfully sowed fear among millions of immigrants and, even if partly impeded by the courts, is using his considerable executive powers to wreak havoc.

Migration scholars can justifiably leave explaining election results to the experts: they can have the fun determining whether it was former FBI director James Comey, Vladimir Putin, or some combination of the two that put Trump over the top. In a sense, illuminating the outcome of the election is irrelevant to our task: even had Trump lost, we would still want to know why stoking immigration anxieties fueled his remarkable rise. With Trump in the White House, we also need to understand how and why he can so quickly turn immigration policy in a more coercive direction.

These are the questions to which this paper seeks to respond. In answering, I will first try to explain why we can’t look to the sociology of migration for much guidance, in large measure because the distinguishing characteristics of population movements across borders have eluded its grasp. International migration, I’ll argue, represents the liberal dilemma, a conflict of right against right in which no enduring solution, let alone a happy one, can be found. The confrontation with that dilemma has produced political responses of two sorts, one involving greater liberalism but less democracy, and the other more democracy but less liberalism. That
tension, in turn, has yielded perverse consequences that heighten the difficulties of the political task. Moreover, the politics of immigration affect immigrant politics, producing a feedback that deepens political cleavages.

**Perspectives**

A division of labor characterizes the social science study of migration, with one literature asking why people emigrate and the other asking what happens after they immigrate. Network theory contends that migrants use their most important resource—one another—to resolve the practical problems of migration, whether financing the move, securing lodging, or finding a job. Over time, immigrants implant deeper roots, increasing their helping capacity, in turn lowering the costs and risks associated with migration. Consequently, migrations become self-propelling: migrant social capital provides a resource base sufficiently strong to overpower the barriers to further migration that receiving societies might put in place (Massey *et al.*, 1987; 1994).

The theory of cumulative causation (Massey, 1990) contends that migration engenders transformations in both host and home communities that change and fortify the motivations to leave home and start afresh. Migrants use the gains from migration to build extravagant remittance houses—signaling the benefits to be had from living abroad—and expand their own holdings—which in agrarian areas go untended, reducing alternatives for those who would prefer not to leave. If it persists, migration can alter the local culture, making departure for work abroad the norm. In the host society, growing migrant density and numbers create an environment that reproduces the community left behind; by reducing the social and psychological costs of relocation, these changes spur further migration.

The overly abundant literature on assimilation and integration addresses the question of what happens after migration. This literature strains to distinguish its concerns from the
normative, political debate over what should happen after migration, in other words, assimilationism. As defined by a recent report issued by the National Academy of Sciences written with extensive input from sociologists, integration involves “the process by which immigrant groups and host societies come to resemble one another (Waters and Pineau, 2016: 19).” Alba and Nee’s now canonical work, Remaking the American Mainstream, sounds a very similar note, defining assimilation as “the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences (2003: 14).” Emphasizing the individual pursuit of rational action, Alba and Nee identified immigrants’ search for the good life as the mechanism that propels assimilation. As long as the environment that immigrants encounter rewards them for connecting with the mainstream and adopting its practices and preferences, assimilation will proceed ahead, whether wanted or not.

The body of scholarship associated with the concept of transnationalism straddles the gap between these literatures on emigration and immigration. One of the academic success stories of our times, the proponents of this point of view look across borders and see that connections between places of reception and origin are inherent, enduring components of long-distance migrations. As those movements have swelled, so have the activities linking migrants to the places from which they come. Though conceding that not all immigrants are “transnationals” and that the intensity of transnational ties may vary, this literature insists that today’s world allows migrants to “live lives across borders,” experiencing full incorporation in both countries of immigration and emigration (Basch et al, 2005; Glick Schiller et al, 1995)

Transnationalism represents one way of thinking about the links between globalization and migration; post-nationalism (Soysal, 1994) represents another variant. Unlike the other approaches that I’ve mentioned, post-nationalism is predicated on an understanding that
international migration is an inherently political phenomenon, involving not simply the arrival of strangers, but also the appearance of aliens, who stand outside the circle of citizenship. Yet in this view, national citizenship has lost its centrality, as rights and entitlements are increasingly determined by international treaties and conventions. Hence, while citizenship acquisition was earlier an essential component of integration or assimilation, today’s immigrants and their descendants can continue on happily as denizens, enjoying the benefits of residence in the developed world without ever having to join the people of the state where they live.

**International Migration as the Liberal Dilemma**

As this brief survey shows, whether concerned with emigration or immigration, the sociological literature is fundamentally about “them”, not “us”. Though it doesn’t quite phrase it this way, network theory provides an explanation of the ways in which international migration is a mechanism of international integration, breaking down the barriers to be found at the water’s edge and the territory’s boundary. In doing so, international migration deposits aliens, transforming what our textbooks and undergraduate courses call American society into a political community that no longer comprises the society of the Americans and the Americans alone. Consequently, international migration is a fundamentally political phenomenon, one that leaves democratic societies confronting a conundrum for which there is no democratic solution, as only the citizens can decide on the terms of membership. Moreover, as politics inherently and appropriately involve conflict, what the sociologists understand by integration or assimilation inevitably entails gaining an orientation to the prevailing political cleavages. Yet, since international migration is a political phenomenon it also shapes those divides, producing both conflict over the boundary problem as well as political incentives to resolve that problem in ways
that can be more or less favorable to immigrants and potential immigrants, both those still on foreign shores as well as those inside the territory but outside the polity.

The form of international integration produced by population movements across boundaries only goes so far. Large segments of the world’s population would benefit from migration but don’t leave, compelled to stay home by the developed world’s policies of migration control. Since those policies are a constitutive element of the state system, any individual state – even one as powerful as the United States – finds itself constrained and also influenced by the migration policies of others. Controls accommodate to a globalized world, allowing for widespread, but temporary territorial access especially by residents of other developed states, while simultaneously keeping the number of long-time stayers at a level more palatable to the existing citizenry.

Controls operate at and beyond the territorial border, regulating both immigration and immigrants, all of whom enter the destination state as aliens, and not simply strangers or ethnics as the standard sociological literature insists. Contrary to the claims of the post-nationalists, once on receiving state soil, foreigners encounter a system of civic stratification (Morris, 2002) which sorts them into different legal statuses, each with a distinctive set of entitlements, depending on the legal circumstances under which they gain entry into their new environment. Consequently, immigration yields additional migrations, this time not spatial but rather political, as the migrants move from one status to another. Whereas emigration is impelled by the migrants’ own initiative and their willingness to sacrifice for a better life, they have very limited control over their ability to cross status boundaries. Moreover, the resources that helped them get from there to here – whether their willingness to assume risk or their ability to gain help from
relatives and friends already present in the United States – are much less useful when politicians and state officials are the key decision-makers.

The reach of international conventions is also far more limited than the post-nationalists contend. Depending on where they stand in the system of civic stratification, the immigrants are more or less vulnerable to the political decisions of citizens, who can either widen or narrow the gap in rights and entitlements separating the different civic strata, and similarly heighten or lower the barriers needed to pass from one status to another. While the sociology of integration or assimilation emphasizes long-term processes and identifies generational succession as the mechanism driving change, politically driven shifts in policy can significantly alter the options available to those standing outside the circle of citizenship. In the United States, the divergence between policy on the books and policy in practice has made undocumented migration a protracted feature of the environment. That disparity serves the material interests of domestic groups, as the literature has long emphasized, but it also provides a convenient target for restrictionists who can clothe themselves in the garb of being “pro-immigrant, low-immigration.” Moreover, as a function of administrative practices, the gap between policy and practice is inherently a matter of governmental discretion, which is why undocumented migrants have proven so vulnerable under Democratic and Republican administrations alike.

Territorial borders don’t simply deter mobility; they also enclose the community found inside the state, which doesn’t belong to people at large, but rather its members who are known as “the people.” However, maintaining the national community proves problematic. The sociological literature insists that assimilation is driven by the search for the good life; but since migration is good for the migrants that search actually begins at the point of origin. Though difficult, dirty, and dangerous, the developed world’s jobs beckon, yielding wages far higher
than those that could be made at home; the migrants’ children are also healthier, better educated, and live longer. In shifting from poorer to richer places the immigrants are just putting into practice the program that liberal societies have long endorsed: namely, that of trying to get ahead on the basis of their own effort, requesting no help from anyone else.

The tension between freedom and community yields reactions that change the dynamics of migration as well as settlement, precisely because in bursting territorial boundaries international migration activates the very “we” that the sociology of migration ignores. To begin with, in the developed world, greater international integration is the outcome that many, probably the majority, reject. Consequently, countries of immigration undertake policies of global dis-integration, which is why today is both the age of migration and the age of migration control (Wong 2015). Whether involving the building of walls, the deportation of unauthorized residents, the denials of visas, the tighter monitoring of identity documents, or bribing the countries through which migrants transit to put new impediments in place, the countries of immigration are doing everything they can to heighten the risks and costs of migration and thereby offset and possibly deplete the social capital that migrant networks generate. As network theory insists, migrant social capital is resilient as is the demand for migrants, with the result that control strategies never attain the goals to which policy explicitly aspires. Instead, restrictions generate an endless cycle of feedback effects, with migrant efforts at evading control eliciting more stringent exertions aimed at making restriction stick, provoking yet another migrant counter-reaction.

Thus cumulative causation can both deepen emigration pressures, as the sociological literature insists, and also heighten the obstacles to immigration, doing so in particularly perverse ways. In cracking down on unauthorized entries, immigration countries generate business for
smugglers and danger and debt for their migrant customers, while simultaneously fostering the emergence of a border-security/detention industry with a material interest in impeding immigrants’ entry. By making border crossing more perilous, these same controls also create the transnational families that the literature highlights, albeit in ways that neither yield incorporation in home nor host societies. Instead, tighter border enforcement spurs prospective undocumented immigrants to leave children behind, so as to spare them the risks of an unauthorized crossing. Yet once over the border, immigrant parents postpone return for fear of not being able to re-enter the United States. The result takes the form of deeper parental settlement in the United States and long-term familial dis-integration across borders, an experience that creates additional integration difficulties if and when cross-border families are eventually re-united.

Not only is cross-border integration an outcome that many of the people of the developed world both fear and reject; the greater international integration produced by migration yields greater national dis-integration. While proponents of open borders are absent from the political mainstream, questions regarding the degree to which globalization should be facilitated, accommodated, or kept at bay lie at the center of political debate. Whereas international currency flows are invisible, immigration represents the human face of globalization. Our iPhones can reside comfortably in our pockets, to be turned on and off as we want; immigrants, by contrast, are humans with the capacity to act on and change the societies that they join, lending an uncertainty to the long-term impacts of population movements across borders that the movement of goods doesn’t possess.

That uncertainty is heightened because the forces bearing down on the politics of international migration extend far beyond destination state, a further reason why the view that integration or assimilation can quietly unfold without disturbance misleads. As international
phenomena, migrations are intrinsically prone to unexpected and unwanted events transpiring in the international arena. Because the international movements of people facilitate the international movements of disease, epidemics breaking out on distant shores generate the types of anxieties that clever opponents of migration can convert into panic. Conflicts in faraway places can suddenly and unpredictably push people into motion with a timing that is more often opportune for the opponents of immigration than its supporters, as indicated by the 2015 refugee surge into Europe and the slightly earlier surge of families and unaccompanied minors from Central America converging on the U.S. And those impacts get amplified when violence-induced migrations of people coincide with the migration of disease – as happened in 2015 when the Zika virus broke out in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America just when migration from Central American began to climb after a few months’ hiatus.

And yet among some members of the population immigrants are both wanted and welcomed. While Americans are sincere in expressing their preference for a bounded community, they also feel entitled to their freedoms – of which recruiting the most malleable or cheapest or best and brightest labor force, regardless of national or ethnic background, has never been seen as an unimportant right. The residents of the rich democracies tell others to stay home, yet they themselves like moving around the globe, whether as so-called “expats,” e.g., corporate officials and or technocrats, or as tourists, students, or visiting university professors interested in encountering foreign people and places. Those experiences often yield relationships that are too important to break when the time to return home arrives, turning citizens with intimate foreign connections into advocates of greater immigration. Moreover, liberal humanitarians look askance at the harm caused by restriction, whether involving indifference to the plight of refugees or the use of coercion against people whose only offense is crossing a
border in search of a better life. In reaction, ethnic and human rights advocates mobilize in the public arena to circumvent or overturn the same restrictive immigration policies and practices that their more nationalist fellow citizens prefer.

Consequently, migration is a source of both international integration and national disintegration. With few exceptions, international migration generates deep domestic conflicts; like international trade, it is often seen as a global force compelling governments to bend. Given its strength, that force can leave voters with the impression that established parties and politicians are incapable of meeting their needs, making them prey for leaders who contend that they and they alone can stem the tide.

**The American Politics of Immigration**

If the politics of immigration creates the cleavages and sets the scene for the rise of Trump and others like him in the developed world, the questions of why now and why here remain on the table.

The roots of the answer, I would suggest, lie in the gap between public preferences for restriction and public policies which have promoted expansion. As the political scientist Gary Freeman contended almost a quarter of a century ago, public preferences for restriction were initially easy to ignore, as immigration usually ranks low in salience, lagging behind other issues. While salience could be heightened, attaining that goal proved difficult, largely because opposition to immigration struggled to find an acceptable voice. The discourse over immigration was “constrained”, to borrow Freeman’s terms, precluding “argument over the ethnic composition of migrant streams and subjecting those who criticize liberal policies to abusive charges of racism (1995: 884).” In this environment, policies were shaped by established interest groups from both right and left. With employers eager to tap into foreign
sources of labor, whether high or low skilled, and ethnic group and human rights activists, feeling an affinity with the immigrants and increasingly viewing the multiculturalism produced by immigration as a good in and of itself, this coalition of strange bedfellows recurrently mobilized to secure policies produced expanded flows (Tichenor 2002).

The last major changes in U.S. immigration legislation – now more than three decades behind us -- exemplify the workings and the efficacy of that strange bedfellow coalitions. The first move was aimed at the immigration backdoor. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act or IRCA served the ends of the business immigrationists and their humanitarian/ethnic advocacy counterparts, yielding legalization for established undocumented immigrants and a special amnesty for agricultural workers with virtually no record of prior residence in the United States. IRCA also prohibited the employment of undocumented immigrants, a goal long championed by organized labor (and also sought by nativists worried about the “Hispanicization” of the United States) and slapped fines on employers unwilling to comply with the new restrictions. In the end, these measures proved toothless: the funding needed to maintain enforcement was never supplied and employer resistance to meaningful enforcement predictably overwhelmed occasional efforts to apply the law. Consequently, when the U.S. economy heated up in the 1990s, unauthorized migration surged, though this time adopting a new pattern which made its impact felt nation-wide.

Following IRCA attention immediately shifted to front door policies regulating the arrival of legal immigrants. Whereas agricultural interests had weighed in on back door matters, the higher tech wing of the business immigrationists prioritized expanded avenues for highly skilled workers. The business immigrationists and their champions in Congress initially sought to shift the share of available slots from entries based on kinship ties of citizens or permanent
residents to those based on possession of scarce skills. As that proposal would have left overall number of entries unchanged, it created a firestorm within the immigrationist camp. In the end, the huddled elites, as the journalist John Judis (1996) described them, came to agreement, adding entries for skilled workers while also increasing opportunities for family migration, all of which occurred on the eve of a major recession and while the legalization program was under full swing. As with IRCA, the 1990 Immigration Act substantially added to enforcement capacity aimed at undocumented migration.

Thus, the politics of immigration bred policies that liberalized immigration but were not terribly democratic, as they produced more expansion than voters wanted. Simultaneously, humanitarian advocates of immigration found another tool of undemocratic leverage, as courts could be moved to advance liberalization further. As Christian Joppke has noted, “the typical conflict in immigration control is…a restrictionist executive pitted against independent courts who defend the family or resident rights of immigrants on the basis of domestic law (264).” Of course, those rights-expanding decisions resulted from the mobilization of the same humanitarian advocates pushing expansion in the legislative arena. Whereas in the United States, the judiciary had historically deferred to the executive, understanding immigration as a matter of state sovereignty and therefore principally pertaining to the sphere of foreign policy, Courts increasingly abandoned that view. Symbolizing that new jurisprudence was the Supreme Court’s decision in *Plyler v Doe*, which made primary and secondary education a constitutional right available to all persons and as such set the stage for the Americanization of unauthorized migrants (Motonura, 2014), a development which has since taken the form of the Dreamers.

As Freeman saw it, “the self-interested incentives that politicians have to follow the lead of organized groups are reinforced by a strong antipopulist norm that dictates that politicians
should not seek to exploit racial, ethnic, or immigration-related fears in order to win votes (1995: 886).” But as he also noted, the politics of immigration worked at a different tempo than the processes of integration or assimilation as generally understood. In the conventional view, immigrants are at their most foreign at the time of their arrival, becoming increasingly like the native-born as time wears on. Popular opinion, however, evolves in the opposite direction, not noting the immigrant presence at the outset, but becoming increasingly sensitive to and disturbed by the demographic changes that immigration inevitably produces. That pattern particularly applies to the United States, where a phenomenon once limited to a few states – California, New York, Florida, and Illinois -- has spread to every corner of this country, as evidenced by the presence of a Mexican consulate serving the needs of Mexican immigrants in Alaska! Moreover, the feedback from immigration to immigration politics and policy further pulls immigration out of the insulated arena in which strange bedfellows cut their deals.

Thus, the stage was set for what Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) have described as a democratic illiberal response to undemocratic liberalism. In the United States that response first emerged in the early 1990s, when an unpopular Republican governor of California – who, when Senator, had engineered the fraud-prone amnesty for agricultural workers – concluded that running against immigration was the ticket for re-election. His triumph, coupled with another populist venture -- a successful effort to run around California’s normal legislative process and severely curb immigrant rights by referendum -- sent a message to which U.S. politicians immediately responded. No one was more rattled by the populist thunder of the early 1990s than Washington’s most important Democratic resident – Bill Clinton – who, in his eagerness to stave off the threat from the right (all the more dangerous as it was aimed at his base in California), pushed for greatly stepped-up enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border, taking the
first steps towards building the very wall that today’s President insists we need. Not wanting to be outflanked, Republicans then controlling congress sought to further tighten the vise; a trio of bills passed in 1996 and duly signed by Bill Clinton, denied access to certain benefits to authorized and unauthorized immigrants, increased penalties for immigration-related crimes, bolstered immigration enforcement, and made it easier to arrest, detain and deport non-citizens.

With the election of George W Bush in November 2000 the tables appeared ready to turn again, as Bush, who had gained 40 percent of the Latino vote, represented the business wing of the immigrationist coalition. But that option disappeared on September 11, 2001, which was followed by a raft of new, mainly restrictive legislation and reorganization of the immigration bureaucracy, which then began implementing the tools produced by the legislation of the mid-1990s. By the advent of Bush’s second term in office, the climate seemed propitious for another stab at policy reform; true to his colors, Bush made enactment of a guestworker program a top legislative priority. At the end of 2005, instead, House Republicans passed a harsh immigration enforcement bill, which then triggered mass demonstrations; involving millions of people marching in cities throughout the country calling for immigration reform, those demonstrations were nonetheless viewed unfavorably by the majority of the population. Consequently, when the Senate next began work on bills designed to change front and back-door policies simultaneously, those measures involved a combination of expansion with stepped-up enforcement. Nonetheless, those efforts, undertaken in both 2006 and 2007, proved fruitless, though with Democratic as well as Republican votes Congress did pass the Secure Fence Act of 2006, requiring construction of an estimated 700 miles of double-fencing and additional surveillance structure along the Southwest Border. In 2009, with Democrats controlling the Presidency and both houses of Congress, the prospects for comprehensive immigration reform appeared improved, but
eventually foundered on the shores of ever greater political polarization. The years since then have produced little forward movement.

Thus whether under Democratic or Republican Presidents, liberal, elite-driven policy expansion has given way, not to policy contraction, but rather a tilt towards illiberalism and greater enforcement. As Marc Rosenblum has argued (2011), enforcement has become the default policy: its goals are straightforward, easy to understand, and widely supported; sometimes even immigration reformers will lend their support. The simplicity of the restrictionist agenda also makes it easy to foment opposition to measures that would entail expansion or liberalization.

Paradoxically, implementing the restrictionist agenda has had a boomerang effect: as, in comparative perspective, U.S. citizenship is relatively easy to acquire and non-citizens enjoy the rights needed to make their voices heard, immigrants and their defenders could be successfully mobilized to defend or expand rights. Moreover, what became the immigrant rights movement successfully recast the issue by invoking the civil rights frame of the 1960s, leaving unsaid the fact that the earlier civil rights struggle sought citizenship rights for persons who were already status citizens, as opposed to rights for non-citizen residents, which nonetheless has an appeal that a claim of rights to immigrate lacks. While that civil rights frame has proven resonant, the emergence of an autonomous immigrant rights movement provided yet another pressure point moving immigrant policy out of those shadows in which the strange bedfellows had earlier cut their deals. That movement’s capacity for mobilization added to the potential for controversy, as demonstrated when the Obama administration’s response to the surge of unaccompanied minors led humanitarian organizations and rights advocates to harshly condemn intensified efforts at enforcement that Washington put in place – which turned out to be the very same measures that
Republicans loudly lambasted for their supposed laxity. Consequently, the visibility of the immigrant rights movement repeatedly generated its own, restrictionist response, with the pattern of mobilization and counter-mobilization entrenching policy deadlock. The strategy pursued by immigration reformers who sought to change back and frontdoor policies simultaneously also lacked political traction, as it entailed a high level of complexity, unpalatable trade-offs, and, with the exception of legalization for the undocumented, issues of interest to only limited and well-informed publics.

However, the tilt towards enforcement has made lives miserable for millions of immigrants without curbing immigrant numbers. The emphasis on enforcement notwithstanding, the fundamental architecture of the immigration system was put in place a half century ago and has never since been significantly altered; the result is a system designed to produce expansion. Consequently, the number of foreign-born residents, now comprising a little over 13 percent of the U.S. population, has doubled since 1990. The undocumented population stopped growing in 2007 and tumbled further under the impact of the great recession. Nonetheless, numbers have remained stable at a little over 11 million ever since 2009, with the arrival of new unauthorized entrants roughly off-setting deportations that have averaged 300,000 a year. The build-up of enforcement resources on the U.S.-Mexico border has had a deeply performative aspect. Yet the government’s efforts to attack the issue could neither quell the complaints of border vigilantes, for whom any level of irregular migration was unacceptable, nor satisfy human rights advocates, who pointed to the migrant lives that were lost and endangered. Thus, for all its investment in border control, the Obama administration may have simply shown that the problem lay beyond any government’s reach.
Consequently, the immigration reality on the ground has changed, but immigration policy stasis endured and with it a political stalemate providing fodder to the types of populist politicians whom Freeman thought were unlikely to exercise much influence. Hence, by the time that the Republican primary began, all the ingredients were in place for a political entrepreneur willing to break with anti-populist norms.

**Feedbacks**

But it is one thing to use anti-immigrant appeals as a way of mobilizing a sizeable fraction of the electorate; another to secure an electoral majority. As we know, that goal eluded Trump, indicating that the political incentives did not all point in the direction of a campaign based on anti-immigrant appeals. Historically, immigration has fed back into immigration policy via the access to the vote enjoyed by immigrants and their immediate descendants. In the 19th century, both Republicans and Democrats competed for the votes of immigrants and their offspring, one of the reasons why restriction remained elusive until the 1920s. As of the turn of the millennium, the situation didn’t seem all that different: while immigrants leaned towards the Democrats, Republicans retained a capacity to capture a significant share of the immigrant vote.

In principle, the incentives to gain immigrant votes and loyalties should rise over time, as the number of voters linked to the immigrant experience steadily grows. Instead, political entrepreneurs on the right discovered that immigration had the capacity to alter partisan loyalties and ideological orientations. Over the past forty years, the probability of self-identifying as a conservative, as Massey and Pren have shown (2012), has increased with rising apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border. Behind those associations lies media framing, which has spotlighted immigration, especially of unauthorized immigrants, has cast it as out of control, and has spun a narrative in which the growing Latino population is portrayed as a threat. As Marisa Abrajano
and Zoltan Hajnal have argued (2015), these media treatments have fomented growing anxiety among white voters, who in turn proved increasingly susceptible to conservative, Republican populists ready to break with the business-oriented, immigrationist wing of the party. As Abrajano and Hajnal show, these anti-immigrant appeals have been sufficiently potent so as to change partisan identities among whites, transforming erstwhile Democrats into Republicans.

Thus, as anti-immigrant voters came to comprise a core Republican electoral block, Republican politicians and office holders were stuck between a rock and a hard place. Business, though generally favorable to expansion, no longer weighed in on migration matters with force, especially when the questions at stake involved the low skilled (Peters, 2017). Just as the sociological research had predicted, the networked nature of migration funneled new arrivals to the relatively small number of places where earlier migrants had settled, thereby generating spillovers from migration to the policy but also constraining their geographic spread. A few years into the new millennium and long-established immigrant destinations, such as California, saw rejection turn into acceptance, a shift that led some analysts to hopefully conclude that the mainstream was already expanding its boundaries to take in the sidestream (Alba and Foner, 2017). Elsewhere, however, trends took a different direction. Though greater immigrant dispersion proved an emerging trend from the 1990s onwards, the diffusion of the immigrant population mainly had negative political consequences – nationalizing the issue -- all the while leaving a disproportionate fraction of Republican-held districts with heavily white, native-born majorities (Wong, 2017). Hence lacking the motivation to swivel toward the preferences of immigrants and the business immigrationists, the Republicans increasingly opted to sacrifice a group of voters whose importance is only likely to grow with time.
Republican anti-immigrant politics have in turn pushed the voters produced by immigration into the Democratic camp, a current that included Muslims, Asian Americans, and Latinos whose partisan loyalties had until very recently been up for grabs. Hand in hand with the changing political demography has come a similarly aligned set of elected officials, as the new voters pulled the levers for Democratic leaders who would also be descriptively representative of their electoral base. Though intra-party divisions pushed both recent Democratic Presidents in the direction of greater enforcement – with Obama labeled “deporter-in-chief” -- the 2016 party platform adopted by the Democrats envisioned a far-ranging set of liberalizing reforms. Thus, by the time of the election, the two parties had moved into parallel universes (Chishti and Pierce, 2016) – an event reflecting how much had changed since 2008, when the Republican platform called for embracing immigrant communities and expressed gratitude to new immigrants whereas the Democratic platform insisted that “We cannot continue to allow people to enter the United States undetected, undocumented, and unchecked (Peters and Wooley, 2008).”

Hence, whereas the National Academy panel was correct in contending that “immigrants experience change once they arrive and native-born Americans change in response to immigration (2015:2),” the panel was entirely wrong in thinking that these two-fold changes would lead to integration. Instead, the politics of immigration fed into and deepened existing political and cultural cleavages, as both parties advanced towards increasingly divergent stances on immigration, divisions which fed on and added to political polarization. With deadlock at the national level, those divisions also trickled down to lower levels of government: as states and localities increasingly implemented their own policies directed at immigrants, they did so in increasingly divergent ways, as exemplified by the contrast between the neighboring states of California – where immigrant rights significantly expanded – and Arizona – where immigrant
rights were instead curtailed. Those disparate reactions created additional grounds for cleavage as states often parted with policies preferred by Washington, whether for reasons of greater liberalization or greater enforcement. Thus, whereas Republican-ruled Texas successfully took the Obama administration to court in opposition to an executive order that would have provided work authorization to the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens, Hawaii and Arizona returned the favor once a Republican came to occupy the White House, twice blocking Trump’s ban on migration from a handful of Muslim minority countries.

In the end, 2016 has a variety of lessons for the sociologists of migration, beginning with the reminder that the history of humanity is a history of migration. To be sure, people weren’t always free to take off and move as they see fit, but in a liberal society like our own, the capacity for physical movement is understood as an inalienable right, without which other fundamental rights would be fatally weakened.

Yet those rights are observed only within state borders. Since migration is good for the migrants and most migrants are moving simply in order to improve their lives and those of their families, migration control inevitably entails coercion. That coercion produces the violence at the border that has grown under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, and not just under the reign of Donald the Terrible. Moreover, as Cecilia Menjivar and Leisy Abrego have pointed out (2012), the violence generated by migration control extends beyond territorial boundaries, producing suffering as migrants struggle to circumvent barriers to entry, and generating threats, after entry, that seep down deeply into everyday life. There is something manifestly wrong when liberal societies use guns to keep otherwise harmless migrants at bay. Nor can the residents of the rich democracies take great pride in the privileges they have gained from winning the birthright lottery.
On the other hand, there is no political community without boundaries, no people that can take responsibility for one another without some prior agreement as to the terms of belonging. Boundaries imply discrimination, in favor of the citizens and against the aliens, though some exceptions can be made. Moreover, in a world where the population of would-be migrants exceeds the number that any state is willing to accept as potential citizens, there are neither good choices to be had nor admissions criteria that are unambiguously more just than others. Consequently, conflict over the number, characteristics, and rights of immigrants is an inherent part of the phenomenon and one from which there is no escape. As the immigrants arrive, not just as strangers, but as aliens lacking the full complement of rights enjoyed by citizens, the experiences undergone after migration – not just by the migrants, but by their descendants as well – are shaped by the politics of immigration. Thus, for migration scholars the challenge posed by Trump and Trumpism is that of understanding how politics and policy shape migrant options, and how migrant reactions in turn feedback into politics and policy. Assuming that this administration’s ineptitude doesn’t lead to atomic war, the Presidency of Donald Trump will provide us with ample opportunities to learn.
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