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Explorations in the Deictic Field[1]

by William F. Hanks

This paper focuses on the ways in which speakers make reference to themselves, to one another, and to objects in the everyday settings of talk. Drawing on research in linguistic anthropology, sociology, and linguistics, it proposes an approach to language based on the concepts of communicative practice, deictic field, and socially constituted objects of reference. Found in all human languages, deictics are expressions like English "this," "that," "here," and "there" whose meanings depend strictly on the occasions of their use. This paper critically examines current approaches to deixis, proposes an alternative framework based on the sociological concept of field, and applies this framework to deictic practice in Yucatec Maya. Drawing on the work of Buhler, Goffman, and Bourdieu, it adapts the field concept to the semiotic structure of deixis. The result is an analysis of deictic practice as an emergent *construal* of socially embedded deictic fields involving practical equivalences, counterpart relations among objects, and rules of thumb.

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Actors engage in verbally mediated interaction under specific social conditions that both constrain and enable their abilities to relate to one another and to the world around them. These conditions are commonly treated in the literature under the rubric of "context," a term that covers phenomena as varied as the immediate interpersonal setting of face-to-face interaction, the spatial, ideological, or historical surround, speech communities, language markets, and discursive formations. One objective of this paper is to rethink the relation between language and context through the lens of practice and thereby provide an analytic framework capable of integrating the two while overcoming the debilitating dichotomy between local and large-scale contexts. Deixis occupies a central place in the study of context because it is the single most obvious way in which the speech setting is embedded in language structure itself. Although there are various definitions of the term, "deixis" as used here designates referring expressions such as "this," "that," "here," "there," "now," "then," "I," "we," and "you," joined, where appropriate, to bodily postures, gestures, and gaze. Such expressions occur in all human languages and have a number of interesting features that set them apart from other communicative resources, verbal and nonverbal alike. For present purposes what concerns us is the immediate linkage of deixis to elementary social relations of speaker, addressee, and object and the phenomenal context of utterance. To a large extent, these relations undergird our sense of copresence, of the givenness of objects, and of the immediacy of the spatial-temporal world in which speech takes place. If language is basic to human sociality, deixis is basic to language in its capacity to constitute both subjects and objects.

To study language as practice is to focus on how actual people (individuals and groups) engage in speech, writing, and other media. It is important from the outset to emphasize that practice is not merely another term for what people do understood in isolation from what they say or think they do. Rather, a practice approach to language focuses precisely on the *relations* between verbal action, linguistic and other semiotic systems, and the commonsense ideas that speakers have about language and the social world of which it is a part. It implies units of analysis distinct from those of other approaches. There is a substantial literature dealing with these and various other aspects of linguistic practice, including discourse genres, linguistic markets, symbolic capital, language ideologies, habitus, and field. In this paper I am concerned primarily with field as it pertains to verbal deixis. The special interest of habitus and field for a theory of deixis and therefore of communicative practice is that both concepts crosscut received divisions between individuals and groups, mental and bodily aspects of language, and agent positions and the encompassing "space of positions" in which they are defined. They are terms in a sociology of large-scale formations, and yet they are

precisely applicable to local aspects of communicative practice, including speakers, objects, and the co-engagements they sustain.

In what follows, I will explore the deictic field first as a theoretical construct, contrasting it with other, more familiar kinds of social field. This will lead to discussion of deictic referring as a kind of linguistic practice and then to contrasting background pictures that inform contemporary research on the topic. In the second part of the paper I will explore the field of deixis in one language, Yucatec Maya. While the facts of Yucatec are in many ways particular, they are illustrative of general phenomena that any theory of the deictic field must take into account. For the same reason, they are pointedly relevant to the description of social practice beyond deixis.

Toward a Practice Approach to Language

CONTEXT AS SOCIAL FIELD

My approach to deictic practice relies centrally on the field concept, which in turn derives from three overlapping sources. The first of these is the standard linguistic sense of a semantic field, which denotes any structured set of terms that jointly subdivide a coherent space of meaning. Thus, for instance, the expressions in any language that designate color categories, kin types, or ethnobotanical types may be treated as a semantic field insofar as they define a space of oppositions linked to contrasting linguistic forms, such as white ≠ black ≠ red, father ≠ mother ≠ grandfather ≠ grandmother, tree ≠ shrub ≠ grass, and so on. The central insight here is that the meaning of any individual item derives from its contrast with other items in the same domain. In the case of deixis, the value of a term like "here" depends upon its contrasts with other related terms including "there," "this," and so on.

The second usage of "field" was introduced by Buhler (1990[1934]), who defined speech context in terms of two interlocking fields: (1) the *Symbolfeld* (symbolic field), made up of words, other signs, and the concepts they represent, and (2) the *Zeigfeld* (demonstrative field), the experiential present of utterance production, which he labeled "Here Now I." Like a traditional semantic field, the *Zeigfeld* is grounded at least partly in oppositions among linguistic forms, hence Buhler's choice of the deictics to summarize it. But it is also based on (inter)subjective context, understood in terms of speakers' perception, attention focus, bodily orientation, and gestures. From this viewpoint, the basic function of deixis in any language is to orient the subjective attention of the interactants, who are, in turn, presumed to be in "the natural attitude," that is, wide awake, with a sense of their own bodies, integrating sensory data from vision, hearing, and touch. Hence deixis provides a basic system of coordinates, and to explain the meaning of an utterance such as "There goes Jack" we must give an account of the semantics of the expressions *plus* the orienting function of the actual utterance in situ.

The third source is social practice theory, in which the concept of field is both more abstract and more encompassing than either the semantic or phenomenological usages. According to Bourdieu (1985, 1990, 1991*a*), a field is a space of positions and position takings in which agents (individual or collective) engage and through which various forms of value or "capital" circulate. Fields in this sense are defined by relations of power, domination, conflict, and collusion among the players. Writing about cultural production, Bourdieu (1993:163) emphasizes that any field is an "independent universe" with its own logic and history, in which specific beliefs, positions, modes of engagement, and relations of force and conflict are played out.[2] For our purposes, a discursive or communicative field can be thought of as a distinctive kind of context in which practice is embedded. In a field, in contrast to most contexts, individuals have trajectories, careers occupying certain (sequences of) positions. Furthermore, viewed from outside, any field has a boundary that is usually contested but that sets it apart from other fields and limits agents' access to positions and forms of value.[3] More precisely, in any social field there are boundary processes that constrain who can engage in different positions and which moves can be made and which not. It is not that all fields have clear, stable boundaries but that the problem of limits is endogenous to any field and must figure in our description. Viewed from inside, agents' access to positions and trajectories is analogously limited by their differential power, credentials, and other factors that contribute to the specificity of the whole. Ultimately, "field" is a descriptive term whose value depends on the specificity and pertinence of the analysis it makes possible. Bourdieu has used it insightfully in analyzing academic (1988), religious (1991*a*), juridical (1987), bureaucratic (1994), political (1991*b*:chap. 8), literary (1996), and scientific (1975) fields as well as the field of cultural production (1993).[4]

The examples just cited have in common that they illustrate relatively institutionalized fields in which determinate economic, corporate, legislative, legal, ecclesiastical, educational, or media structures are at play. Discourse production could be traced through any of these and perhaps shown to play a constitutive role in their specific functioning. The capacity to produce certain kinds of discourse may be a form of social capital

2. This is best understood as designating a parameter on which fields differ, with some being highly independent, which Bourdieu called "autonomous," and others (partly) shaped by the effects of some other field, which he called "heteronomous."

3. The stipulation here is not that any field must have a clearly demarcated boundary but that it must be possible to invoke or enforce a boundary. Thus degrees and certifications restrict access to the fields of medical practice or academia, but more subtle examples are provided by scenarios such as pick-up sports at a public park, where a stranger may have trouble "breaking in" to the game, or the kin- and residence-based limits on access to domestic fields. Even with qualifications, this boundary condition is simply lacking in the traditional concept of the *Zeigfeld*.

4. See the domestic and agricultural fields of Maya households (Hanks 1990), the field of shamanic practice (Hanks 1984*b*, 1990, 1996*a*), and the field of missionary practice in sixteenth-century Yucatan (Hanks 1986, 1987, 1988, 1996*b*, 2000).

and contribute to power or authority, just as access to certain positions may require mastery of the kinds of discourse they require. But the study of linguistic practice cannot be limited to fields with such robust institutional scaffolding and clear codification. The aim is to rethink language itself and its social embedding through the lens of practice, and for that we must consider different kinds of fields.

DEIXIS: FIELD AND EMBEDDING

I will argue that linguistic expressions like "here" and "there," "this" and "that," and "I, you, we, they" are part of a single field that I will call the *deictic field*. As I use the term, the deictic field is composed of (1) the positions of communicative agents relative to the participant frameworks they occupy (that is, who occupies the positions of speaker [Spr], addressee [Adr], and others as defined by the language and the communicative practices of its speakers), (2) the positions occupied by objects of reference, and (3) the multiple dimensions whereby the former have access to the latter. To perform an act of deictic reference is to take up a position in the deictic field. Likewise, to be the object of reference is to be thrust into a position. The result is a social relation among agents and objects that has much in common with that in Buhler's approach but differs from it in two important ways. First, Buhler made clear that the *Zeigfeld* combined with the *Symbolfeld*, but he made no attempt to combine it in any principled way with broader social fields apart from language, whereas a practice approach foregrounds the embedding of language in social fields. Second, Buhler's focus on psychology led him to privilege the individual subject and face-to-face communication in a way that the present approach does not. The contrast is that the *Zeigfeld* is a strictly local construct, tied to the moment of utterance, whereas a social field is limited neither to the place nor to the time of utterance.[5]

The deictic field also differs from more standard sociological fields. Much of language, including deixis, is relatively arbitrary, "known" in a mostly tacit way, operative in nearly all institutions and fields regardless of their basis, subject to appropriation by individuals, and effectively beyond the control of any regulatory body. Second, unless we introduce further concepts, there is no *necessary* role for power in the deictic field, nor do any of its positions invariantly imply that the occupant is dominant or dominated. The deictic field is not bounded in the same sense as are, for example, the literary, political, and artistic fields. It may be that in some settings effective agents in deictic practice accumulate value just as the Spr position may be dominant and the Object position subordinate. However, these are added specifications motivated not by deixis as such but by the other social fields in which it may be embedded. Through embedding, social relations of power, boundedness, conflict, and value are merged with the deictic field. These contrasts might be taken to indicate that the deictic field is not a field at all in the relevant sense but something better described as a situation. My claim is that it is more than a situation.

In his classic paper "The Neglected Situation," Goffman defined a "social situation as an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities, anywhere within which an individual will find himself accessible to the naked senses of all others who are 'present' and similarly find them accessible to him" (1972:63). Any social phenomenon is "situated" to the extent that it emerges in a field of copresence, itself based on the mutual orientations (sensory, cognitive, affective) among copresent individuals. Like Buhler's *Zeigfeld*, the situation turns ultimately on the perceptual and cognitive orientations of copresent actors in the natural attitude. Where the two concepts differ, of course, is that the *Zeigfeld* is a semiotic (psycholinguistic) system whose origo is the "Here Now I," whereas Goffman's situation is meant to be independent of language and logically prior to any instance of its use. It is, as it were, the constitutive outside of speaking, given by nature and the monitoring capacity of the senses.

Under this definition, speech is situated in two senses. First, preexisting words, signs, and categories are instantiated in the act of enunciation, which has a grammatical structure. If a speaker says, "Leave the box over there," for instance, each of the five words and their combination in the sentence are situated simply by virtue of having been spoken. But they are "merely situated," since they instantiate grammatical types that preexist any individual utterance. By contrast, other aspects of utterance production and deixis are situated in a stronger sense, which we might call "inherently situated." This would include *inter alia* the mutual adjustments between interactants, the highly particular inferences that arise in conversational contexts, and the specific objects denoted by deictics in situ. We call these inherently situated because they are nonce, one-time productions, not mere instances of preexisting types.

The deictic field is therefore similar to Goffman's "situation" in that it organizes copresence and the kinds of emergent access (perceptual or other) that interactants have to one another and to the setting. Both involve the acting body, perceived and perceiving. It is *unlike* the situation but like the *Zeigfeld* in that it orients attention, effectively converting sheer copresence into a social act of individuated referring. This conversion may involve memory and anticipation, as Buhler noted, as well as relations of possession and habitual engagement between participants and objects, which he failed to note. Furthermore, the parameters that make up the deictic field vary cross-linguistically.[6] In short, compared with

5. Occupancy of positions in a field is a diachronic process that can be viewed through the lens of localism, but the field itself is a broader space of positions and position takings rather than a radial structure organized around the actor.

6. There has been a wave of new literature on deixis in previously understudied languages, much of it done by scholars associated with the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics (see, e.g., Van Geenhoven and Warner 1999, Senft and Smits 2000; see also Bickel

a situation, the deictic field has more structural coherence, a wider temporal diameter, and greater variability across languages. Compared with the *Zeigfeld* it is a social formation, not a phenomenological one, dependent not upon the "natural attitude" but upon the space of positions and position takings. There is a logical progression in the three units: Copresent subjects in the situation become participants with roles in the *Zeigfeld*, and these in turn become social positions in the embedded deictic field. Thus a situation belongs to the sphere of interpersonal activity, a *Zeigfeld* relates activity to language structure, and a deictic field relates a *Zeigfeld* to a broader social world. This world includes native speakers' common sense about their own language and verbal practices, something absent from both the situation and the *Zeigfeld*.[7]

The deictic field also contrasts with other social fields because of its ubiquity: whereas other fields are more or less restricted as spheres of social life, *deictic reference takes place in every field in which agents communicate with language*. To be sure, use of indexicals may differ systematically according to the social field and genres in which speech occurs. This variability follows from the fact that indexicality is a general semiotic resource that can be adapted to different circumstances and still subserve situated reference. Therefore, the relative importance of space, perception, subjectivity, or even "orientation" will also vary according to the social circumstance in which the field is actualized. As we will see, this variability poses severe problems for any account of deixis that relies on a single invariant set of features.

Deixis as a general semiotic resource articulates with broader social fields through what I will call "embedding." Embedding converts abstract positions like Spr, Adr, Object, and the lived space of utterances into sites to which power, conflict, controlled access, and the other features of the social fields attach. The distinctions between "here" and "there" or "I" and "you" may be part of a general deictic field, but when the "here" is a courtroom, the Spr a judge, the Adr a jury, and the Object a defendant, then the judicial field brings its full weight to bear on the deictic field. We will say that the deictic field is *embedded* in the judicial field. As a consequence, the space of positions defined by deixis is invested with much more specific values and relationships whose interpretation turns not on deixis but on the judicial field. If the judge later addresses a friend using the same deictic expressions as in addressing the jury, the deictic field is no longer embedded in the same way and the positions carry different values. This apparent variability follows from the fact that deixis is a semiotic code whose "design features" make it maximally flexible for use across fields: the relative absence of descriptive information in deictics, their near ubiquity in practice, and their relation to participant frameworks makes them an excellent resource through which to articulate the frame of reference with other social fields. To use Bourdieu's terms, the semiotic structure of verbal deixis is a relatively autonomous aspect of the field, whereas embedding brings with it the heteronomous effects of values from other fields. It may be that some varieties of deixis are coconstructed by words and bodily expressions, as Goodwin (1994) showed of "co-elaborating" speech and gestures in workplace exchanges. Yet, even as co-articulated signs, they are relatively autonomous in respect of social fields. The specifically linguistic systems of deixis inherit the relative autonomy of all grammatical systems. The deictic field is more than mere context, then, understood as an external surround in which an utterance happens to occur. Through embedding, the meaning and force of deictic expressions are actually reshaped by the field to which they articulate.

THE SEMIOTIC SPECIFICITY OF DEIXIS

In order to appreciate the dynamic variability of embedding, we need a more precise understanding of deixis, which includes, as stated above, pronouns (e.g,. English "I," "you," "we," "he," "she," "they"), demonstratives ("this," "that," "those"), and spatial ("here," "there"), temporal ("now," "then"), and various other adverbs (Hanks 1984*a*, 1990; Levinson 1983, 2003; cf. Enfield 2003*b*). All of these are what Sacks (1992) called "indicator terms" and what linguists and philosophers variously call "indexicals" (Morris 1946, Peirce 1955, Eco, Santambragio, and Violi 1988, Husserl 1978, Benveniste 1974; cf. Searle 1969), "shifters"(Jespersen 1965[1924], Jakobson 1971[1957], Silverstein 1976), or, as here, "deictics" (Fillmore 1997, Levinson 2003, Hanks 1990). Research over the past few decades has shown that all languages have such expressions, and yet there is significant cross-linguistic variation in the kinds of distinctions encoded in different languages.

Verbal deictics have in common a set of features which distinguish them from other linguistic resources for individuated reference. The first is that they are typically used for singular, definite reference to objects (persons, places, objects, times, actions, etc.). An utterance form such as "This is Bob," or "You wait here and I'll be over there" would typically be used to make reference to individuals (Bob, the Adr, the Spr, the two places). The fact of referentiality distinguishes these forms from nonreferring indexicals such as regional or other accents, speech levels, or stylistic variants. All of these may index features of context, but they do so without shifting the reference. Second, deictics can usually be lexically expanded with further descriptors that characterize the object. Hence one could say simply "this" or "this old table with the broken leg," "this book of yours," "here" or "here in the East Bay," "you" or "you my friend," and so on. For some deictics, especially the adverbial ones,

1997; Bohnemeyer 1998; Burenhult n.d.; Enfield 2003*ab*, Haviland 1993, 1996; Kita 2003; Levinson 2003; Senft 2001; Wilkins 1999; and also Diessel 1999, Himmelmann 1996).

7. For Goffman, commonsense framing and typifications would become significant not in constituting the situation but in defining more structured phenomena such as *face* (1967) and *footing* (1983). Like the deictic field, these are rich in semiotic structure and or subject to commentary, evaluation, and typification by native speakers.

the referential scope of the expression varies according to context: "here" may refer to a point on the Spr's own nose, the room, the house, the neighborhood, or the country where it is said. Similar extensions apply to "there," "now," "then," and others. Finally, while both indexicality and gesture are pervasive in language, referential deictics are unique in joining the two systematically.

Standard approaches relate deictics to the physical or perceptual situation of utterance, but such uses are only part of the story. They are what some linguists have called "exophoric," as in "That one's mine" spoken in reference to a coffee cup on a table. By contrast, "endophoric" uses are ones in which the object need not be physically present but has been mentioned in prior speech, as in "That guy is my nephew," where the guy is nowhere on the scene but has just been mentioned by the Adr. Because deixis and prior discourse combine to determine the object, Buhler considered anaphora to be a blend of the *Symbolfeld* (what is already represented in prior discourse) and the *Zeigfeld* (what is given in the situation). Such blending is at play in many exophoric uses as well, in which the determination of the object of the deictic depends upon the cooperation of the *Zeigfeld* with prior discourse, memory, commonsense knowledge, and other features of the social setting.

Particularly in their exophoric uses, deictics also have a directive force, often expressed in co-articulated gestures. Imagine the utterance "There he goes right over there! (Point)" spoken in reference to a runaway dog streaking across a field. The underscored deictic does more than merely individuate the place at which the dog is running: along with the gesture, it directs the Adr to attend to the event. In this sense, it conveys as much as "Look over there!" and the uptake on the part of the Adr is typically an act of shifting attention focus to the object. As noted by Peirce (1955) and Buhler (1990), there are traces of directivity in all deictics, although they are not all of the same salience or strength (Hanks 1990).

Another kind of blend of deictic and symbolic elements arises in reported speech. For example, "I'll be here with you" becomes "Bill said he'd be there with me." In the expressions "I'll be at home" versus "Bill said he'd be at home," "at home" remains the same in direct utterance and in the indirect report of it. By contrast, the deictics "I," "here," "you" in the first pair shift in report to "he," "there," "me." If a speaker chooses to use a verbatim quote of a deictic utterance, the result is different again: "I'll be here with you" becomes "Eric said, 'I'll be here with you.' " What is special about the verbatim quote is that the deictics are interpreted not relative to the situation in which the quote is produced but relative to the original situation. In effect, the terms "I," "here" are anaphoric to the prior reference to Eric.

If deictics typically contribute to acts of singular definite referring, it is not because they describe their objects in any way. On the contrary, they seem to signify whatever they point at in a given situation so that "now" can be used indifferently for any moment, day or night, long or short, "here" can denote wherever it is uttered, "I" is whoever says "I," and so on. This covariation between the meaning of the form and the occasion of its use is the hallmark of indexicality in all its guises. It is due to what Peirce called the "dynamical (including spatial) connection [of the deictic form] both with the individual object, on the one hand, and with the senses or memory of the person for whom it serves as sign, on the other" (1955:107).

As a result of this covariation, it is impossible to define the usage constraints on deictics in terms of features their objects must share the way we might for terms like "table" or "chair."[8] There is no property of "thisness," "hereness," or any other deictic that must be shared by all the objects it can be properly used to denote. In light of their formidable generality, Sacks (1992:520) called them "altogether 'abstract'. . . capable of invoking the sheer fact of the setting." Here Sacks trades on a distinction between symbolic representation and utterance setting, treating the latter much as Goffman would treat "situation."[9] Symbolic representation corresponds in Sacks's lecture to "formulating," by which he means description and categorization. For example, the statement "This is a required seminar" spoken at the first meeting performs a categorization of what is going on in the setting of the utterance. The statement *formulates* the setting as of such-and-such a kind, just as it might formulate or describe some other setting, as in "Anthro 240 is a seminar." By going on to say, "I am Professor Quigley," the Spr would formulate an identity in terms of the category "professor" plus the proper name. By contrast, if the Spr were simply to say, "Here we are," the setting would not be formulated as a seminar or the Spr as professor. The difference is that "here" and "we" are indicators that, in Sacks's terms, *invoke* the setting but in no way *formulate* it.

The distinction between indicators and formulators is a familiar one for any student of the literature on indexicality. At least since Morris (1946), philosophers have tended to treat indexicals as lacking any descriptive information and therefore semantically minimal (cf. Searle 1969, Levinson 2003). Yet the flip side of abstractness and variation is the highly regular way in which deictics covary. "Here" may be wherever you utter it, but that is already a powerful constraint: "here" must be (part of) a speech setting. Anyone can be an "I," but only by engaging in speech. Paradoxically, deictics are among the preferred resources for singular, definite reference to specific objects, yet they provide virtually no identifying information as to the objects picked out. How does an Adr to whom a deictic utterance is directed ever find the referent? The standard answer is that individuation pro-

8. In some languages, deictics do encode features of objects, but these are general classifying features such as shape, orientation, or number. The point that these expressions are semantically lean remains valid.

9. One qualification is in order here: Sacks's setting has an emerging relevancy structure, whereas Goffman's situation is an ethologically natural zone of potential monitoring prior to the imposition of any relevancy structure.

ceeds on the basis of "context," but this answer is only as good as the theory of context that backs it.

TWO BACKGROUND PICTURES: SPATIALIST AND INTERACTIVE

In the foregoing remarks there are hints of what I will treat as two different background pictures of utterance context and particularly of deixis. These are usually tacit, schematic conceptions, not precise theories or hypotheses about which convincing evidence can be easily adduced. The first picture is what I will call "spatialist," according to which deictic acts take place when the Spr, the Adr, and the Object are physically copresent and perceptible. The deictic utterance directs the Adr's attention to a particular zone of the broader sphere of perceptual accessibility, not unlike a pointing gesture (which may indeed be part of the utterance).

For words such as "here" and "this," that zone is what is close at hand to the Spr. For "there" and "that," things are less clear, but on the whole it is outside or removed from the zone of contiguity. This initial conception is consistent with the idea that the ground of deixis is the gesticulating body. To understand a deictic is therefore not to "interpret" it but simply to grasp by observation what it singles out in the physical situation of utterance. The situation may be interperspectival, but it is the Spr who produces the utterance and the Spr's body that serves as the anchor point: a self-contained individual body, oriented in material space and endowed with a sphere of proximity and sensory access.

The egocentric spatialist picture is more or less obvious in much of the English-language literature on deixis. Russell's (1940) analysis of "egocentric particulars" is one classic statement of it (cf. Evans 1982), albeit emphasizing perception more than physical space. It is also the standard default for most modern linguistic descriptions, especially in typological and psycholinguistic work, for which it seems to offer a controlled basis of cross-linguistic comparison (see Anderson and Keenan 1985; Diessel 1999:158; Lyons 1977; Senft and Smits 2000:65–80; Levinson 2003). It underwrites the linguistic notion that deictic oppositions between pairs such as "this, that" and "here, there" are best described in terms of relative proximity, *where proximity is defined as spatial contiguity in relation to the Spr.* The idea is that what deictics do is individuate objects and places spatially arrayed at different distances from Spr, "here" and "this" for close, "there" and "that" for far, and so on.[10]

This picture has wide appeal because it fits with the commonsense idea that speech is ultimately a matter of individual persons' expressing private experiences and thoughts to other individuals in a material world. Like any other commonsense construct, this one has a history and a social distribution. It is hard to miss in it the modern Euro-American notions of the isolated individual, the universality of the body, and the naturalness of the physical (cf. Mauss 1973). But this common sense obscures critical aspects of deixis, including the mutual orientation of interactants, all nonperceptual modes of access such as background knowledge, memory, and anticipation, and all that is part of a social setting and the relations between participants but not embodied in physical objects. Nonspatial aspects of deictic speech assume a secondary position; they are either ignored or derived from other, nondeictic principles (see Levinson 2000).

There is another background picture discernible in the literature, one whose basis is not space but social interaction. People speak to other people in various settings, and their interactions can be face-to-face, mediated, dialogic, and multiparty, involving, *inter alia*, the following factors (see Sacks 1992, Goodwin 1981, Schegloff 1984, Heritage 1984):

1. The perceptual fields of the parties are reciprocal, especially vision in the face-to-face (Goodwin 1981, 1994, 2000; Kendon 1992).
2. There is a broader "reciprocity of perspectives" whereby each party assumes that the other has a perspective and that if one adopted that perspective the world would look as it does to the other.
3. Participants' bodies are expressive through gestures, as well as receptive through the senses, and gesture is a key aspect of deixis (Goodwin 1994, 2000; Kita 2003).
4. The interaction has sequential organization embodied in turn taking, adjacency, contiguity, and "proximateness" (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 1987, 1992).
5. The interaction has a motivational structure: the Spr speaks in response to something and in order to achieve something else; the Adr responds in the light of the aim of the first utterance in order to achieve his or her own aim, which then serves as the "because" motive of the next turn, and so on back and forth.
6. Any utterance has a "relevancy structure" according to which certain things matter and others do not (Goodwin 1994; Goodwin and Heritage 1990; Sacks 1992; Schegloff 1972, 1992).
7. Utterance meaning must be "negotiated" or worked out by the co-engaged parties. It is not given in advance, nor is it fixed by the intentions of the Spr (Clark 1992).
8. Participants display to one another their sense of the current situation, the relevancy structure they are assuming, and their current relation to their own speech. Deixis is a primary resource for such display precisely because it points into the situation and thereby "positions" the Spr.

Clearly, if our background picture of speech is an interactive one, we will be led to ask questions quite different from those suggested by the egocentric spatialist picture. As a starter, we no longer have an isolated Spr in a material world but instead a reciprocity of perspectives and a dovetailing of motivations among different parties. The *doxa* that egocentric space is the basis of the speech situation is replaced by a combination of multiple perspectives and relevancy structures, both of

10. There is significant debate as to whether the ground is the Spr, the Adr, the Spr-Adr relation, or the discourse itself. I will not engage these arguments here but have elsewhere (Hanks 1990, 1992).

which are subject to rapid change in talk. Hence there is an emergent space of interaction, but it is not the kind of space presumed by the spatialist view (Kendon 1992). The first consequence of this is that an interaction-based account of deixis must attend to variation in usage. Thus, whereas the spatialist picture treats spatial relations as the basis of all "true" deixis, in the interaction-based picture what matters most is situated variations and the ways in which deixis articulates with the relevancy structures of different settings. One can be committed to careful empirical study of deixis under either perspective, but the result differs relative to the operative background picture. The spatialist picture leads to physical settings that can be controlled in the experimental lab, whereas the interaction picture leads to micro-ethnography of conversation in ordinary settings.

For deixis in interaction, a relevancy structure is established and displayed by the participants. This ties the participants into coordinated relations to certain objects according to their engagements. Under the right circumstances, it may be that proximity to Spr is the most relevant frame of reference, yet to assume this a priori is to take as fixed what must actually be achieved. In other words, relevance overrides spatiality by determining whether or not space is what counts in the given utterance. Under many circumstances, what counts most for proper construal of the referent object is not its location but its accessibility in memory, anticipation, perception, or prior discourse. There are two primary sources of relevance: what is going on in the present actuality of the utterance and what comes with the social embedding of the deictic field. The first includes the speech-act context, the sequential context, the move the speaker makes in uttering the deictic, and the immediate spatial, perceptual, conceptual, and corporeal situation. Here relevance emerges over the time course of the turn in the most immediate and "local" sense.

The second source of relevance is the embedding of the deictic field in a broader social field that extends far beyond the present. It matters a great deal to the effect and felicity of deictic utterances *where, when,* and *to and by whom* they are uttered, where each of these conditions is defined socially. Social fields can constrain or even determine the reference of deictic tokens. Thus in the agricultural field, a senior male landowner speaking Maya can say, "I am opening a ditch here," when his sons are doing the work right in front of him, whereas a landless young man could make no such statement unless he was digging out the ditch. It is the embedding of the deictic field in the hierarchy of positions in the agricultural field that authorizes the transposition, in the absence of which the statement would be patently false. Analogously, the reference of spatial deictic tokens when used in domestic space is determined not by space in some "objective" sense but by social relations of ownership, kinship, and activity spheres (Hanks 1990).

The position of this paper is that both of these background pictures are distorting, because each makes exclusive claims about phenomena that cannot be explained in terms of either alone. The spatial picture provides grammatical descriptions comparable across languages and fits well with a certain common sense, but this comes at a high price. It also preemptively reduces the deictic field to a single dimension and the Spr to a homunculus unclouded by judgment, shifting relevance, or history (personal or collective). By contrast, the interactive picture is more realistic to actual talk. It focuses on emergent engagements between subjects and objects with interests, mutual orientations, common ground, and memories shared and unshared. However, an exclusive focus on interaction would bypass much of the linguistic system of deixis, effectively collapsing the variety of different deictics into the function of "invoking the setting." Sacks's early statement of this was so strong as to obscure the self-evident fact that deixis invokes only some aspects of the setting, always under a perspective and almost always pointing at a unique object.

In the more recent literature on interaction, the trend has been to combine a modified spatialist view with the interactionist one, yielding a blended picture of utterance space with properties of both kinds (Goodwin 1994, Ochs, Schegloff, and Thompson 1996, Schegloff 1972). But when applied to deixis the combination is difficult to sustain, because the two pictures make contradictory claims regarding egocentricity versus interaction-centricity and the primacy of space versus the primacy of situated relevance. Prematurely combining the two in a division of labor shields each one from the critical claims of the other. The resulting theory of deixis would be along the following lines: the linguistic forms encode semantic values of the sort predicted by the spatialist picture (contiguity to ego), but the pragmatics is governed by interactional principles (including inference from relevance). This is consistent with linguistic research in which spatialism is the presumed semantic basis of deixis and pragmatic inferences derive from semantics enriched by context (cf. Enfield 2003*b*). A series of studies shows that, whatever the proper semantics, contextual enrichment of deictics relies on gestures (Goodwin 1994), sequential placement, relevance relations, and conversational inferences (Levinson 2000). Some such division of principles is likely to be correct and is consistent with the position of this paper. But once we grant the lessons of interaction analysis, what is actually left of the spatialist position? The argument here is that spatialism is wrong in ways that cannot be corrected by simply combining it with interaction. Critically, even combined accounts fail to give proper weight to the embedding of deictic practices in social fields defined nonlocally.

What is needed, instead, is a way of describing how the positions that make up any deictic field are configured according to the social field and what relationship these positions bear to language at the levels of situated utterances, deictic types, and whole deictic systems. We need to know how interactants take up those positions and occupy and vacate them in ordinary practice and how the field varies under social embedding (including different discourse genres [Hanks 1987]). These questions

have important consequences for research methodology and for the description of specific languages and societies. We need a different idea of space, a better theory of how it is integrated with nonspatial aspects of context, and a more thorough treatment of the social embedding of the deictic field.

The clearest way to draw out these consequences is through a sustained example. What follows is a brief description of deixis in one language, Yucatec Maya, as spoken in the region of Oxkutzcab, Yucatan, Mexico. We will start from a synopsis of the linguistic system of deixis in Yucatec in order to introduce the forms and get a first sense of the range of distinctions they mark (see Hanks 1990, Bohnemeyer and Stolz n.d.). This is then followed by a sequence of examples, each of which consists of an utterance or exchange with notes on social context, as required. Let me briefly foreshadow the conclusions.

The linguistic system of deixis in Yucatec consists of a lexicon of about 15 bimorphemic forms plus a set of syntactic processes that combine the forms to yield a much larger set of expressions. [A fuller description of the system appears in the electronic edition of this issue on the journal's web page.] Running across the system is a single opposition between two items, *a'* and *o'*, which form a (near) minimal pair in each of five major categories. All of the *a'* forms stand for objects relatively immediate to the Spr, whereas all of the *o'* forms stand for objects removed, remembered, or backgrounded. From a spatialist perspective, these are taken to encode proximal and nonproximal, respectively. Even in Buhler's *Zeigfeld*, although he summarized it as "Here Now I," he clearly included in it the gestural sphere of the speaker and the perceptual, attentional, and memory-based spheres of both participants. If our point of reference is the *Zeigfeld*, then deixis must be understood relative to all of its dimensions, not just space. Even this expanded view, however, fails to take into account how the *Zeigfeld* or some close relative of it is embedded in a social context. In effect the spatialist picture preemptively answers the questions of how the deictic field is configured as a whole, how individual deictic utterances are understood, and how actual interactive contexts (i.e., fields) hang together. The examples of ordinary usage were selected in order to defeat the spatialist claim that relative proximity is the basis of the system, to identify interactional features, and to demonstrate the following propositions:

1. Nonspatial features are distinctive, and spatial values can be contextually canceled. Much of what looks like space is really about memory, prior talk, background knowledge, perception, ownership, and other social relations.

2. The Yucatec system defines a multidimensional *Zeigfeld*, all of which is available to speakers as a resource for referring.

3. Any interactive situation supports several alternative ways of identifying referents. Deictic selection is therefore a *construal* both of the object and of the perspective under which it is accessible to the participants.

4. Part of the practical knowledge that allows Yucatec-speakers to engage deixis fluently consists of instrumental heuristics, or "rules of thumb." These allow for phenomenally different situations to be treated the same and enhance the automaticity of practice.

5. Depending upon how the deictic field is embedded, specific spheres of reference are automatically available to interactants, and, moreover, specific kinds of transposition are authorized (which would otherwise not be interpretable according to standard usage).

6. Embedding and authorization are closely related field effects, whereas standard approaches ignore one or both.

With this summary in mind, we now turn to the linguistic system in order to establish the semiotic skeleton of the deictic field in Yucatec.

Deictic Practice in Yucatec

SYNOPSIS OF YUCATEC DEIXIS

Table 1 shows the inventory of deictic roots in Yucatec—holding aside for the moment the person markers and the temporal adverbs. On the left side are "bases," which are specified for grammatical category and occur initially in the syntactic constituent. On the right are enclitics, which are (mostly) unspecified for category and occur in phrase or sentence-final position.[11] From these roots the basic lexicon is derived by combining bases with enclit-

11. Yucatec Maya consonant phonemes are /p, t, k, p', t', k', b, s, x, h, tz, ch, tz', ch', m, n, w, y, l, r/, where /'/ = glottal stop following a vowel and glottalization following a consonant, /b/ = voiced bilabial implosive, /x/ = voiceless alveo-palatal fricative, /h/ = voiceless glottal fricative, /tz(')/ = (ejective) voiceless alveolar affricate, and /ch(')/ = (ejective) voiceless palatal affricate. Syllable nuclei are made up of combinations of five vowels (i, e, a, o, u), three tones (high ⟨́⟩ , mid [no accent], low ⟨̀⟩), length, and glottalization. Length is indicated by the doubling of a vowel, and glottalization is indicated by an intervocalic glottal stop ⟨'⟩ . The canonical vocalic patterns are /i, e, a, o, u/, /íi, ée, áa, óo, úu/ ìi, èe, àa, òo, ùu/, and /i'i, é'e, á'a, ó'o, ú'u/. However, short vowels with tones also occur and are derived either by grammatical processes or by paralinguistic ones. Glottalization is also realized as creaky voice or even by eliminating the glottal stop completely. The latter case results in a long vowel with high- to mid-falling pitch but remains distinct from the (nonglottalized) high tone series /íi, ée, áa, óo, úu/, which is pronounced variably with rising or falling pitch. Spellings of place-names such as Oxkutzcab are orthographically unmodified from their Spanish spellings.

TABLE 1
Synopsis of Deictic Morphemes in Yucatec (Partial)

Bases		Enclitics	
hé'e(l)	Ostensive evidential	*-a'*	Immediate
té'e(l)	Locative "here/there"	*-o'*	Nonimmediate
way	Locative "here"	*-be'*	Auditory/olfactory
to(l)	Locative "(out) there"	*-i'*	Anaphoric
ti'	Locative [focus]	*-ti'*	Individuated
bey	Manner "thus"	*-e'*	[Topicalizer]
le	Definite article		

ics according to the rule [one base + one enclitic]. If all of these bases combined freely with all of the enclitics, the result would be a starting lexicon of 42 forms, but in fact the combinations are severely constrained and the resulting set is much smaller. Table 2 shows the basic lexicon of 15 citation forms (likewise omitting the temporal and person deictics).

For present purposes, the first thing to note about the basic lexicon is how the system is constrained. Certain bases *(way, tol)* co-occur with only a single enclitic, while three of the six enclitics *(be', i', ti')* co-occur with only one base apiece. The locative series (DLOC) is unique in showing four distinct bases in a single category and in making a five-way distinction. Thus the locative category is the most finely subdivided and the most irregular in formation. Furthermore, the first two rows are strictly parallel in that the opposition between *a'* and *o'* occurs in every major category, which yields eight minimally distinct forms. This is a powerful regularity, and it accounts for 8 out of the 15 items. In addition to the DLOC forms, the spatialist picture is most likely to apply to these forms because they distinguish proximal from distal in each of the categories.[12] Examples of some of the forms are as follows:

1. *hé'el a'* "Here it is (Take it!)"
2. *kubin té'el o'* "He goes there."
3. *kó'oten way e'* "Come here (to me)."
4. *le máak o'* "that person"
5. *hé'e kubin Juan o'* "There goes Juan (Look!)."
6. *kubin té'e Oxkutzcab o'* "He goes there (to) Oxkutzcab."
7. *way tinwotoch e'* "here in my house"

In 1–3, the two-part deictic occurs without lexical expansion, whereas in 4–7 the accompanying lexical description intervenes between the two parts of the deictic. The resulting discontinuities pose various problems that will not be addressed here.

In addition to the forms in table 2, there are lexical pronouns that will play a part in the argument that follows (table 3). These are one of three series of person markers, the other two being affixal and usually called A and B series, as is standard in the literature on Mayan languages. As is evident, the Yucatec pronoun system is fairly minimal. It distinguishes three persons and two numbers, with a simple first-person plural opposed to a marked form for inclusion of plural Adr. The nonparticipant, so-called third-person forms are marked for definiteness but unspecified for animacy, gender, or any other distinction. Plural marking in the Other category is almost always optional.

Given that the different series of deictics in table 2 are associated with different grammatical categories, it is unsurprising that a single utterance can have multiple deictic terms that correspond to its phrasal constituents.

12. I have argued that this opposition between *a'* and *o'* is actually a privative one, between + immediate and ∅ immediate (Hanks 1983; 1990:58).

TABLE 2
Lexical Deictics in Citation Form

OSTEV	DLOC	DNOM	DMAN
hé'ela'	*té'ela'*	*lela'*	*beya'*
hé'elo'	*té'elo'*	*lelo'*	*beyo'*
hé'ele'	*waye'*	*leti'*	*bey*
hé'ebe'	*tolo'*		
	tí'i'		

Consider an utterance such as 8, in reference to a runaway dog scampering off:

8. *hé'* *kubin* *leti'* *té'* *háal* *kòot* *té'elo'!*
OSTEV VC DNOM DLOC prep N DLOC-TD
"There goes the one along the wall there!"

This utterance would expectably be performed along with a pointing gesture: the OSTEV brings directivity (look!) redirecting the Adr's visual attention to the referent. The DNOM refers directly to the referent but in terms of its having already been established as a focus in prior interaction. Hence this utterance would not be used unless the Adr already knew whom or what it was about. The DLOC then specifies the spatial nonproximity of the object, implying that its locus is known or visually available. In combination with the directive OSTEV, it would usually pick out a place within sight, but if we simply omit the OSTEV in initial position, leaving *kubin leti' té' háal kòot té'elo'*, "He's going over there along the wall there," the result suggests visual access but could be readily used even if the dog were out of sight. In simple examples like this one the multiple deictics index distinct but complementary aspects of the utterance setting: attention focus, memory, spatial proximity, reference to the dog, the dog's running, and the location. The nondeictic elements combine seamlessly with the deictics to codetermine objects to which the speaker is referring, illustrating blends between deixis and the *Symbolfeld*.

Before moving to a series of utterances illustrating deictic practice in Yucatec, let us consider how the language looks at first blush, in terms of our three pictures, based on space, interaction, and practice. The spatialist picture has to contend with several difficult features of Yucatec. First, whatever the role of space, it is limited in comparison with the larger array of indexical distinctions that the language makes in the deictic system. We will not try to spell out here the multiple functions conventionalized in these forms, but it is clear from the outset that spatial relations (proximity, inclusion, exclusion) are only part of it and much is left in the shadows of the spatialist picture. The greater part of referential specificity in Yucatec deixis comes not from the simple morphemes or even the lexical citation forms but instead from the productive syntax of the system. Since Sprs draw on the entire inventory, we cannot select any part of it a priori and claim that it sets the basic frame of reference for practice.

The sheer interactionist picture is similarly troubled

TABLE 3
Yucatec Lexical Pronouns (Participant Deictics)

	Singular			Plural		
1	*t-en*	Spr	I	*t-ó'on*	Spr + Other	We
				t-ó'on-é'ex	Spr + Adr (pl.)	We (me + you pl.)
2	*t-ech*	Adr	you	*t-é'ex*	Adr (pl.)	You (pl.)
3	*le ti'*	Other	he/she/it	*le ti'-ó'ob*	Other	They (pl.)

by these linguistic facts, since it is obviously implausible that all of these forms invoke the setting in the same way or that their meanings are entirely negotiated utterance by utterance. There is simply too much linguistic structure—too many oppositions and too much evidence that the different forms invoke systematically different aspects of settings—for it to be plausible that they derive their meaning merely from an invocation of the setting. What the early interactionist picture failed to grasp is that the deictic field is partly structured by the *semantic field* of deixis, that is, the conventional linguistic array of oppositions and contrasts that defines the potentials of the forms for acts of referring. In other words, it treated deixis much as Goffman would treat a situation rather than as a semiotically complex *Zeigfeld* in which the choice of deictic expresses a construal of both the object and the situation. This more accurate view is consistent with current research in interaction and is the minimum necessary for a realistic description of communicative practices.

Part of the question of how the deictic field is structured in Yucatec will turn on how we analyze the opposition between the enclitics *a'* and *o'*. These occur in all categories except the so-called pronouns, and it is plausible at the outset that the basic distinction is between + proximal ≠ ∅ proximal, applied across different categories. If by proximity we mean spatial contiguity, then our hypothesis runs into two problems. First, the lexical deictics in different categories do not all distinguish the same things, even though they deploy the same two enclitics: the DLOCs may be spatial, but the OSTEVs distinguish perceptual modalities and the DNOMs are quite abstract and are frequently used in nonspatial contexts such as relative salience or accessibility in discourse. The manner adverbials are especially associated with gestures enacted by the Spr ("demonstrative" *a'*) versus prior discourse (anaphoric *o'*). Hence it is already clear that the spatialist hypothesis will need to be supplemented by principles that yield nonspatial contrasts (perhaps via metaphor or some other trope). Returning to the interactionist picture, we could hypothesize that the opposition between the two enclitics is more abstract, more like Sacks's "invocation of setting," and that they receive further determination from other co-occurrent elements (starting with the initial deictic base with which they are combined). After all, this picture may be inadequate for the deictic field as a whole but revealing in relation to some of its subparts.

The practice view incorporates the complexity of the *Zeigfeld* but makes two further claims: (1) the deictic field is a socially embedded *Zeigfeld* (not only a locally anchored one, as Buhler suggested) and (2) Yucatec-speakers, who use this system automatically and repeatedly in the course of everyday practice, therein reproduce crucial elements of a linguistic habitus. This habitus, which has other sources as well, disposes them to adopt and recognize ordinary perspectives on objects, other persons, and themselves.

EXOPHORIC REFERENCE TO SPATIALLY LOCATED OBJECTS

There are, of course, uses of these deictics that index relative spatial proximity and therefore appear to fit the spatialist picture. Examples 9 and 10 are ordered, roughly, from the most proximal to Spr through an intermediate range to the most distal.[13] In the most proximal scenario, where the referent is part of the Spr's body, the *a'* form is chosen (9), whereas in the remaining scenarios, as soon as any appreciable distance is introduced between the Spr and the object, the expected form is *o'* (10).

9. Spr, pointing to one tooth in his own mouth, says,
'in koh hé'ela' túun k'í'inam
"My tooth right here (touching) is aching."

10. The referent is easily visible to both Spr and Adr at a distance of about five paces. Spr asks,
tz'axohk e lìibro o' ?
"Have you read that book?

Example 11 appears equally straightforward in that *lel a,'* "this," combines with the inclusive (typically proximal) deictic way, "(around) here," to yield "this here."

11. Speaking to me, Lol concludes a long story of woes and mishaps that he and his family have suffered "around here" by saying,
sí, le way a', paklan tòop

13. Examples 9 and 10 are drawn from data collected by Jürgen Bohnemeyer, using the Demonstrative Questionnaire developed by David Wilkins (1999). All remaining examples come from ordinary usage in Yucatec (unelicited but observed and recorded by WFH). References are to WFH fieldnotes (BB book.number.page) and audio recordings (field tape number.side A/B.footage). I am very grateful to Bohnemeyer for sharing his results with me and for our dialogue regarding the results.

"Yup, (around) this here, people screw each other." [BB.4.12]

In 12 we see a typical case in which the spatial distance of the referent from the Spr is contracted but still sufficient to warrant deictic construal of the scene with *o'*. However close the object is to the Spr, it is saliently closer to the Adr, who is "playing" with it. The second-person verb form, the directive force, and the admonitive particle all focus on the activity sphere of the Adr, which is the search domain for the object. We might hypothesize a pragmatic correspondence relation between Adr and the nonimmediate zone of *o'*, in contrast: to the one between Spr and *hé' ela'* in 1.

12. Elena is walking in courtyard, just past her small daughter Manuelita, who is playing in the dirt after having bathed. Passing within 2 feet of the child, Elena scolds,
má'a baxk e bá'a susyo wal o'
Neg Adr Vb transitive NP ADMON
"Don't play with the/that dirty thing (I'm warning you)." [BB.5.65]

EXOPHORIC REFERENCE TO PERCEPTIBLE OBJECTS

I have argued elsewhere (Hanks 1983, 1984*a*, 1990, 1992, 1996*a*, *b*) that perceptual distinctions are critical in Yucatec deixis because tactual, visual, and audible relations to referent are systematically distinguished in at least certain categories (see also Bohnemeyer and Stolz n.d.). In 13, Don Chabo, a shaman, refers to the image in the divining crystal he is holding in his hand at the moment of utterance. A young man has arrived unaccompanied at Don Chabo's asking for a divination to diagnose his infant daughter's illness. Since the man has not brought the infant with him, the diagnosis will be long-distance. For this Don Chabo needs the name and hometown of the child, and he learns that she is Laura from the town of Akil. He recites and opens the crystals, with the anxious father standing immediately behind him to the right, looking over his shoulder at the crystals. Immediately upon finishing the opening prayer, while holding a crystal and staring intently into it, he makes his first statement of diagnosis.

13.

le	*chambal a',*	*chokow*	
DNOM	N	Pred Adj	
This child		(was) hot	
yoól	*ká*	*'uúch*	*ti'*
her-N	Comp	Vb	to-∅
her heart	when	(it) occurred	(to her)

"This child was overheated when it (illness) happened to her. [BB.4.11]

The ultimate referent of the underscored noun phrase is the actual child, although it is the visual trace of the child in the crystal that motivates his choice of deictic. In uttering "this child" Don Chabo conveys that he can see her "right now." The link between the image and the child is a counterpart relation in the sense developed by Lakoff (1968, 1996) and more broadly in cognitive grammar (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996). The counterpart relation is guaranteed by Don Chabo's extensive and systematic theology and by commonsense ideas about shamans. This common sense includes the proposition that a competent shaman can use his own divining crystals to see things normally not visible, including body states and events not actually given in the situation, that is, not accessible for monitoring with the unaided senses. What concerns us in the example at this point is that the image is tactually and visually immediate and the deictic form is *a'*. If we assume that perceptual immediacy is practically equivalent to spatial proximity, the spatialist picture could be slightly incremented by an equivalence heuristic saying simply that tactual/visual corresponds to proximal.

Example 14 is similar in that the Spr makes reference to something with which she has current physical contact, namely, her own body. Hence we find a deictic construal in *a'*.

14. In Don Chabo's back room, by the altar, a woman is explaining where her husband's leg is hurt, demonstrating on her own leg.
mèn le hé'el a'. . . bey túun uúchih té'e bey a'
"'Cuz this one here, . . . this is how it happened to him right here" [BB.4.9]

REFERENCE TO AN OBJECT OFF-SCENE

In the next two examples, the denotatum is simply not accessible spatially. In 15 the "kid" is nowhere to be seen, and hence we get *o'*. The Spr goes on to assert that he has not seen the referent in a while, thus canceling any inference of visual access that might have been projected by the deictic in *le pàal o'*, "that kid." Yet as coparents he and his addressee both know that he is asking about Manuelito, their ten-year-old son, who, as it turns out, has gone on an errand.

15. Father arrives home from travel and notices that one of his four children is not around and so asks his spouse:
kux tuún le pàal o', tz'ú chan xantal má'a tinwilik
"How about that kid? It's been a while since I've seen him." [BB.4.153]

Example 16 is again similar in that the "stuff" is missing and none of the Sprs knows where it is or even precisely what it is, but they know of its existence and they know that the Adr knows where it is. Hence we get *o'*.

16. Don Chabo and Lol are bawling out Victor, who took some items from my luggage earlier in the day. They know of the theft, and Lol has retrieved some of the items, but they do not know what else was taken. Threatening to beat the boy, they shout,
tú'ux tatz'áa le bá'al o', k'ub e bá'al o'
"Where'd you put the stuff, hand it over!" [BB.4.32]

A true believer in the spatialist picture might simply say that when the referent is saliently off-scene, we

should treat it as distal. This amounts to positing a practical equivalence relation whereby off-scene > distal.

REFERENCE TO DISCOURSE

Example 17 is metalinguistic in that what is referred to is speech itself, the preceding utterance. We are concerned with the first word in B's response, an erstwhile distal deictic. This form refers directly to the preceding assertion and thereby sets it up as an object for comment. The comment then follows in the endorsement, which means literally "true your speech (word)."

17. A: *hach chokow le k'iin o'* "That sun's really hot."
    B: *lel o' hàah a t'àan* "That one, you're right (there)."

For examples like this we might just assimilate metalinguistic uses to anaphora, since the language referred to is immediately preceding in discourse. Hence we get *o'*, as expected.

INTERIM SUMMARY

To summarize the analysis so far, in terms of the spatialist picture, the basic distinction between *a'* forms and *o'* forms in Yucatec is that the former stand for objects close to the Spr (proximal) and the latter for objects not close to the Spr (nonproximal). The simple opposition of proximal versus nonproximal to Spr accounts for 9–12. For 13–17, straightforward spatial proximity is lacking and we need to extend the spatialist picture by what I have been calling "correspondences." A correspondence is a practical equivalence whereby one sort of context counts for—is practically equivalent to—another. In 13 and 14, visual-tactual immediacy counts as proximity, and therefore the Spr selects the *a'* forms. The correspondence says tactual, visual > proximal. In contrast, 15, 16 and 17 involve reference to objects neither close at hand nor perceptible. These involve Peircean "indexicality by memory." The correspondence says memory > distal; in other words, when the referent is spatially and perceptually off-scene and therefore accessible only by memory, it should be treated the same as any other distal. Hence we get the *o'* forms rather than the *a'* forms.

These correspondences seem so natural as to be virtually transparent, but there is reason for caution. Examples 14–17 show that spatial proximity blends or alternates with other dimensions of the deictic field. The apparent simplicity of close versus far hides the operation of these other dimensions, including perception and memory. There is a compelling similarity between these correspondences and the counterpart relations illustrated in 13 and 14. Both involve a currently accessible feature of the situation standing in for another, unavailable one. But there is also a basic difference between the two ideas. Counterparts are identity relations between objects, like the image in the crystals with the child and the Spr's body with the body of someone else. By contrast, the practical equivalences, for instance, off-scene > distal, are correspondences between modes of access that interactants have to objects, not between objects themselves. Counterpart relations rely for their intelligibility on the existence of more or less arbitrary conventions whereby one thing can stand for another—conventions that may preexist an interaction or be created on the spot. Practical equivalences are presumptive analogies between situations. The need for such analogies depends in the end on the structure of the *Zeigfeld:* if the spatialist version is our model, then such correspondences will be essential for handling speech under different phenomenal circumstances. If, however, the *Zeigfeld* is modeled in a more abstract way, then we need not begin by assuming a spatial substrate augmented by correspondences. Still, even in the more abstract solution, something akin to the correspondences will come into play in resolving reference. If we claim that *a'* encodes something like "high focus" rather than proximate or tactual, then we will call on the correspondences to flesh out the meaning in 13: high focus > tactual. The general issue here is how the indefinitely variable phenomenal situations of speech are resolved into the more coherent *Zeigfeld.*

There is a second line of reasoning to which these examples point, and it has to do with the social embedding of the deictic field. It may be that we can explain the practical equivalence relations among situational parameters in a theory based on the *Zeigfeld,* but no such explanation is viable for the counterpart relations. The utterance in 13 is produced by an expert who is in the process of exercising his expertise with the aid of a highly specialized technology. The divining crystals might appear less exotic if one compared them to an X-ray machine or a weather vane attached to a set of measuring instruments. Both of the latter provide exacting signs of processes and objects removed from the current situation, and both require some special ability to interpret the signs. Just as a radiologist at a cocktail party could not point at the internal spaces of the body of a distant person, so too the shaman could not utter anything like 13 if he were walking through the market. It is because he is an authorized expert currently engaged with the technology, having properly prepared it with prayer, that he can make the utterance he does. By virtue of his social position as a shaman he is presumed to have professional vision (Goodwin 1994). The counterpart relation relies for its intelligibility on the embedding of the utterance in a full-blown deictic field. There is nothing in the language and nothing in the *Zeigfeld* that can anchor this. My claim, then, is that whenever reference relies on counterpart relations like this one or the one in 14, it relies thereby upon the social embedding which authorizes the deferred reference. Even 14 may appear straightforward but would fail in any society or social field in which it was improper for a woman to demonstrate on her own body something that happened to the body of another. In the case of a shaman, this authorization has the full weight of his reputation and authority among

his patients; the same utterance by a nonshaman would be infelicitous.

So far we have been exploring relations between different types of access that interactants have to objects in the deictic field where a given situation supports some kinds but not others. The purpose is to show precisely how the linguistic system of deixis adapts to these different field conditions. Turning to a slightly more complicated set of examples, we will now explore how different modes of deictic access combine with one another. The question may be simply stated: When an object is simultaneously accessible in two or more deictic dimensions, which one determines the construal? The spatialist picture predicts that spatial contiguity will override other considerations. To test this, we must look to examples in which space, perception, prior discourse, and mutual knowledge *fail to line up* as neatly as in the preceding examples. What happens if an object is both remembered and spatially close or spatially distant yet focal? Under such circumstances, the conditions for *a'* and the conditions for *o'* are simultaneously met but in different dimensions of the deictic field. These examples provide pointed evidence, I will argue, against the spatialist picture by demonstrating that spatial relations can be readily defeated by other aspects of the deictic field.[14] In effect, I will argue that much of what masquerades as space in the standard literature is nothing of the kind. The spatialist picture underwrites the debilitating misrecognition of socially defined modes of access between actors and the fields in which they engage and thereby disfigures the very practices it purports to describe.

REFERENCE TO OBJECTS BOTH CLOSE AND GIVEN IN MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE

Examples 18–20 show acts of referring in which the denotatum is very close at hand—even maximally so—and yet is also accessible via mutual knowledge. Example 18 was uttered in the course of a curing session in which it was simply given that Don Chabo would prepare medicine for the patient to take home. This was a standard part of his clinical practice, and most of his patients were regulars. Moreover, he was already engaged in preparing the medicine at the moment of utterance, and therefore the giving was anticipated by his bodily activity and the object to be handed over was taking shape as the Adr watched. In short, even though Don Chabo has the medicine in his hand when he utters 18, his deictic construal ignores space and perception, construing the object in terms of joint activity, as the interactionist picture would predict.[15] Therefore, even when the spatial and perceptual conditions for *a'* are saliently met, he selects a deictic in *o'*.

18. Preparing medicine to give to a woman patient, wrapping the powders in a piece of paper, Don Chabo says to the woman,
leti e hé' kin tz'áa tech o',
"The one I'm giving you,"
leti kin tó'ok o'
"it's the one I'm wrapping." [BB.4.9]

If *a'* is proximal and *o'* is distal or nonproximal, why is 18 not contradictory or at least odd? There are actually two questions here: (1) Why does the erstwhile proximal meaning of *a'* not guide the Spr's choice of deictic even when its conditions are saliently met? Would it not have been better to use the alternative noun phrase *leti e hé' kin tz'áa tech a'*, "this one I'm giving you"? Not only is the spatio-perceptual scene maximally close but the relative clauses that describe the medicine in both noun phrases explicitly assert the conditions for *a'*, namely, "I (hereby) give it to you" and "I'm wrapping it (right now)," both of which entail that the object be in the Spr's hand at the time of utterance, which it is! (2) Why does the choice of *o'* not flagrantly contradict the circumstances? Even if we assume that *o'* is unmarked and therefore can be used in a wide variety of contexts, still in this context it should at least imply that the object is not immediately accessible. There is no evidence of such an implication, though, and the circumstances would cancel it if there were.

In response to question 1, it would indeed have been appropriate on spatio-perceptual grounds to use the *a'* form, although in this context it would have triggered yet another inference due to the presentative force of *hé'el a'* and *hé'el o'*. The prototypical presentative deictic is *hé'el a'* "Here it is (Take it!)," but *hé'el o'* is also used to present an object to the Adr. The difference is that the *a'* form signals that the presentation is simultaneous with the utterance, whereas the *o'* form leaves a small lag time. This temporal distinction represents the application of the *a'* ≠ *o'* division within the anticipatory frame of the presentatives (see Hanks 1990). In 18 Don Chabo must finish wrapping the medicine before he can give it to the patient, and this short interval may partially motivate his choice of the *o'* form. Given the circumstances, if he had used the *a'* form, it would have implied that he was hurrying to hand over the medicine. There are therefore two potential motivations for his choice of deictic: first, the fact that the object in question was already accessible to both participants on the basis of mutual knowledge, and second, the fact that the presentative act was not yet happening but would occur in a moment. There is no *logical* relation between these

14. The logic of the argument is straightforward: If spatial features are the basis of the semantics, then they should not be defeasible by the addition of other factors to the situation. The examples systematically introduce other factors, and the result is to block or override the spatial readings. This demonstrates that the erstwhile spatial values of the Yucatec forms are easily defeasible and therefore best viewed *not* as semantic features but as occasional inferences.

15. That activity has already started and anticipates that the medicine will be handed over accompanied by instructions for proper use, and cash payment received for the services. Both parties know this and can jointly access both the retrospective elements and the anticipated ones.

two conditions, since they pertain to different features of the deictic field—current access to the object via memory and anticipated fulfillment of the presentative. Yet there is a *sociological* consistency to them in that they both express the typical demeanor adopted by Don Chabo with his patients. This demeanor can be roughly summarized as "laid back" and unhurried. It is part of what we might call his "bedside manner," which he maintained even in the face of sometimes grave conditions in his patients.

The next example illustrates a similar case, in which the Spr has the referent in her hand and under her direct control and yet chooses to construe it in *o'* rather than *a'*. The similarity turns on the facts that the action being executed is routine and the physical fulfillment of a presentative is slightly deferred.

19. Pilar is sprinkling water around the plants in the yard and on the ground to settle the dust. There are kids playing about 12 feet from her in the direction in which she is going. She says to the kids, while continuing to approach them sprinkling water,
hé' kutàal wal le' ha' o'
"Look out, here comes the water." [BB.5.41]

When Pilar uttered 19 she was engaged in an activity familiar to the Adrs, namely, sprinkling water in the yard to settle the dust during a time of dry weather. When she uttered it, the kids scattered, thereby avoiding the water. Her utterance was a warning to them, issued with enough anticipation that they could take it in stride and move away. That brief interval, along with the mutual familiarity of the entire scene, is what the deictic responds to. Accordingly, if she had intended to douse the kids with water and had already been throwing it their way, the *a'* form is what she would have used.

These delicate distinctions of timing, mutual knowledge, and demeanor appear exotic from the spatialist perspective. After all, they lack the commonsense object-like solidity of spatial distance and go far beyond the instrumental task of referring to a thing in the situation. But on this point the interactionist picture is more accurate by far: the deictic field is a field of social engagement and not only a field of reference to objects. Because engagements necessarily involve memory, anticipation, demeanor, and shades of reciprocity, these aspects inevitably enter into deictic practice. They may appear less "objective" than spatial arrays, but examples like the ones presented here demonstrate that they are in fact more basic. Given a combination of spatial relations along with the others, it is space that is canceled out and the others that motivate practice.

REFERENCE TO OBJECTS BOTH CLOSE AND ANAPHORICALLY GIVEN

In 20, Pilar had been telling me of her mother's recent death. She was weeping and trying to figure out how to get a picture of her to put on the altar so that she could pray (something she felt impelled to do). All she had was a single photo in which her mother stood alongside her father and her father's mother, neither of whom was deceased. The problem was that she simply could not put a picture of living people on her altar and therefore would have to crop the photo in order to exclude all but her mother. The utterance in 20 was performed as she showed me the photo in her hand and distinguished the quick from the dead. The *o'* form in the first clause presents the people in the photo as already in joint focus, and the *a'* form in the second clause partitions off the subset of the living.

20. Pilar shows me a photo of her mother and father and her father's mother.
tumèen le hé'elóob o', má' kimen le ká'atúul a'a'
"'Cuz those ones (look), these two are not dead." [BB.5.26]

The first underscored noun phrase, "those ones," denotes a group of three people by way of a photo held in the hand of the Spr. This is parallel to 13, in which a perceptually immediate object stands in a counterpart relation to something or someone off-scene. The difference is that in 13 Don Chabo uses the *a'* form whereas in 20 Pilar uses an *o'* form. The reason is that in 20 Pilar and I have been discussing the photo and the people it represents, so that both the pivot and the counterpart objects are mutually accessible to us in the discourse. In 13 the image in the crystals is not already mutually accessible but has to be conjured by the shaman, and his utterance in effect announces its appearance in the crystal. Given that both involve deferred reference to counterparts, we cannot explain Pilar's deictic construal on the grounds that the ultimate referents of her noun phrase are off-scene. Rather, it is because the photo is already mutually accessible that she uses the *o'* form. In effect, anaphora overrides spatial and perceptual immediacy as a motivation for deictic construal. In the second clause, curiously, she switches to an *a'* form. The spatial and perceptual field has not changed. What has changed is that, having now established reference to the people in the photo, she wants to individuate a subset of them, contrasting the two who are alive from the one who is deceased. This contrastive individuation is, I believe, what motivates her construal in *a'*.

REFERENCE TO AN OBJECT BOTH OFF-SCENE AND ANTICIPATED

We have seen that anticipation and temporal deferral play a role in the use of presentative deictics in Yucatec. In 21 we have another usage of anticipatory *a'*, this time in the nominal (DNOM) category. It makes no difference to the felicity of the utterance in 21 whether the guy referred to by the underscored noun phrase is close, far, or not even locatable. What matters is that the Spr is setting off in his direction with the intention to find him. This demonstrates that anticipation can override spatial

location in general and not only in the special case of presentatives.

21. *aká awil bíx kín intop e maák a'*
"Now you'll see how I tuck it to this guy." [B.4.131]

In general, objects given in retrospect are construed with *o'* and objects given in prospect are construed with *a'*. Thus, anaphora, reference to preceding discourse, and reference to objects already given by mutual knowledge among the participants are all construed with *o'*, whereas cataphora, immediately forthcoming objects, and objects anticipated are construed with *a'*. What is special about the presentatives (OSTEVS) is that the *a'* ≠ *o'* distinction is deployed within the prospective subfield to yield immediate ≠ deferred anticipation. Taken together, these examples show that this relation to retrospect/prospect can easily override spatial-perceptual access to the object. This is troublesome if we assume that deixis is about pointing to things in the situation of speech, but it is straightforward if we assume that deixis is a species of social practice and therefore endowed with an emergent past and future as well as a synchronous present.

REFERENCE TO AN OBJECT BOTH OFF-SCENE AND BELONGING TO A PARTICIPANT

The next three examples pose a different challenge to the spatialist picture. In examples, 22–24, the denotatum is inaccessible in space or perception but *is* accessible by way of a privileged relation to one of the interactants. In 22 Manuel recounts how the "Turks" complain to an official that the local market is dominated by other merchants and that their own merchandise doesn't sell as a result.[16] The merchandise, the referent of "ours," is nowhere on the scene, but because it belongs to the Sprs it is construed with *a'*.

22. *le tó'on a' má' tu má'anah, kih e turkos*
"This ours, it doesn't get bought," say the Turks. [BB.4.160]

In the limiting case, the official who was the Adr of the quoted utterance in 22 need not even know exactly what merchandise they sell. The fact that it is theirs, in contrast to the merchandise of the other merchants, is enough to fulfill the reference.

By contrast, in 23 and 24, objects which are nowhere on the scene belong to the Adr and are already known to both interactants. Consequently, they are construed in *o'*. In 23 I have just asked Manuel and Margot to make a couple of hammocks for me to purchase and give as gifts. Margot asks me if the new ones should be like the ones I have bought from her in the past.

23. *má'alob b'ey hé'ex e yan tech o'*?
"Is it good the way that one is that you have?" [BB.4.74]

In 24, Margot is about to leave for the market and asks Manuel, her husband, for money. In her first utterance, the DLOC in final position refers, ostensibly, to Manuel's location, as in the English "you, there."[17] After he asks how much she wants, she responds by making reference to whatever money he has. The rule for examples like these is simple: Spr's domain gets *a'* and Adr's domain gets *o'*, where "domain" refers to socially recognized possession, irrespective of space or perception.

24. Margot: *tz'áa algo té'el o'* "Give some (money) there."
Manuel: *bahux?* "How much?"
Margot: *le yan tech o'* "What you've got." [BB.4.92]

In all of these examples, the spatialist picture makes the wrong predictions or fails to make any enlightening predictions about how ordinary scenes are construed. No native Spr to whom 22 is addressed or retold is going to expect the Turks to have their merchandise along with them on the scene—as if a spatio-perceptual search would yield up the referent. Instead, the relation to Spr encoded in the *tó'on*, "ours," is fully adequate, and the form selected is *a'*. In 23 the practical equivalence whereby off-scene > distal may suffice to predict the correct deictic form, but this prediction explains nothing about the utterance. It is not the location of the hammock that matters to Margot but the fact that it is mutually known to be mine. The latter information is what resolves the reference. In 24 the Adr is immediate to the Spr, but the money in question is in his possession as contrasted to hers, and this factor motivates the construal. Deictics index a Spr's stance relative to the Adr and the object, and 22–24 illustrate cases in which stance overrides spatio-perceptual access (cf. Ochs 1992, DuBois 2003).

The preceding examples have been adduced to demonstrate that nonspatial aspects of the deictic field can readily stand in for, or simply trump, the spatio-perceptual aspects of the situation. This is true even when the latter are salient to all participants. From a computational perspective, the resulting multiplication of dimensions in the *Zeigfeld* would entail much more complex calculation on the part of an Adr. After all, how would the Adr know in which dimension to apply a contrast such as *a'* ≠ *o'*, and would it not require subtle calculation to determine the answer and find the referent? Surely, one of the core aspects of deictic practice that any theory must account for is the extreme ease and automaticity with which interactants perform deixis. Under the spatialist account, we must infer from what is said that the object is in a nonproximal relation to what is conveyed—that it is the one recalled or especially

16. In Yucatec, the term "Turcos" refers to Lebanese people, who collectively play a central role in the economy of the state and are stereotyped by some Maya people as wealthy, politically corrupt merchants.

17. Alternatively it could be a transposition, with "there" referring to her own location but from his perspective. Either way, it is the discrepancy between her sphere and his sphere that underlies the construal.

associated with one participant to the exclusion of the other. But as we have seen, from nonproximity in space we can infer many things via the practical equivalences—the object could be off-scene, anaphorically determined, associated with Adr, or simply unremarkable. The question remains how the Adr decides which of these potential correspondences is in play so as to get the point. The interactionist picture helps here by emphasizing that any deictic field is already part of an unfolding social process and, as such, is always already embedded in a relevancy structure. If certain dimensions of the field are already more relevant than others, then there may be no need to figure out what is being referred to, because it is already known. This work of relevancy is achieved by several features of the field: (1) the local practical circumstances, as predicted by the interactionist picture; (2) the broader social field in which the interaction is embedded, which is missing in both spatialist and interactionist pictures but predicted by the practice approach; and (3) the existence of stereotypical ways of handling ordinary deictic practice. The remaining examples will focus on the latter two factors, starting with 3.

Examples 25–30 illustrate a few "stereotypical" uses that might be best described in terms of something like maxims or rules of thumb guiding how Sprs deal with commonly occurring situations. I leave open the question of whether these uses can be adequately explained on the basis of the linguistic meanings of deictics or whether they represent independent social conventions of some unexplained sort. My point is that, interacting with all of the foregoing factors, there are routine ways of speaking in the language that involve types of deictic construal.

DEIXIS IN GREETINGS AND SCOLDINGS

Deixis is also an integral part of ordinary greetings and scoldings, both of which operate on participant relations and in some cases basically alter them. In 25 the DLOC *té'elo'* refers to the location of the Adr. The utterance is shouted as the Spr crosses the outer threshold of the homestead, entering the inner space, which is the home and current location of the Adr.[18]

25. *hé' kintaal <u>té'elo'</u>*
"Here I come over there!" [BB.4.59]

This usage of *té'elo'* to refer to the place of the Adr is echoed in another greeting heard very often, namely, *bix awanih té'elo'!*¿ "How're ya doin' over there!?" The common feature is that the DLOC refers directly to the location of the Adr: when there is a separation between Spr and Adr, Adr's space is *té'elo'*, "there."

When adults address children or animals, the association between *o'* and Adr is especially strong. Thus whenever an adult scolds a child, the child and whatever he or she is doing at the time are always construed in *o'*. We saw this in 14, but 26 shows the same rule of thumb applying even when the object referred to is very close to the Spr. Elena, the Spr, is sitting at her own cooking fire in her kitchen, and one of her kids is standing nearby. The kid has been distractedly touching the warm wood that lies close to the fire (as close to Elena as to the child). She scolds him, saying,

26. *tz'ínwaáik tech ma a machk <u>e k'áak' o'</u>.*
"I've told you not to grab that fire!"
ká'akate ka chú'ukuh
"Next thing you'll get burned." [B.5.46]

What the greetings and scoldings have in common is that they focus on the Adr apart from the Spr. They are in this sense pragmatically contrastive to contexts in which what is emphasized is the common ground shared by participants. Under the same contrastive circumstances, the Spr's domain is construed in *a'*. Thus to point at something saliently more immediate to the Spr than the Adr, one says things like *tí'an té'ela'*, "It's right here (by me)," *chich le che' a'*, "This wood is hard," and so forth. The same pairing of *a'* with the Spr's domain occurs in 13, where the shaman's "this child" is accessible to his expert's gaze but is not visible to the patient—who lacks the expertise required to find the child in the crystal. If a Spr is in motion, say, walking, driving, or riding a bike, then the forward path is part of his or her domain. When one is walking on a road, the forward path is *té'el a'* and the path traversed is *té'el o'*.

Example 27 illustrates a type of exchange that occurs very commonly in everyday comings and goings. A is a neighbor or familiar figure, usually located in his or her yard or place of work, and B is passing by on foot or bicycle. B's response makes reference to the forward path using the *a'* form. This utterance tells A nothing about where B is going or how far away it is, only that he is heading there.

27. A: *'oólah wiíl! tú'un ka bin¿* "Hi, Will, where'ya' goin'?"
B: *chén <u>té'el a'</u>* "Just over here."

The rule of thumb is therefore simply, in pragmatically contrastive contexts such as greetings and scoldings, to treat Spr's field as *a'* and Adr's field as *o'*. When I state this association as a rule of thumb I mean to underscore that it is not part of the semantics of Yucatec deixis, since it is easy to find examples in which the association is canceled. It is, however, part of the routine handling of types of exchange that happen throughout any ordinary day.

18. Maya homesteads are typically walled or fenced compounds with multiple structures, courtyards, and back areas (see Hanks 1990 for extended discussion with maps). The greeting is shouted as one enters the bounded space and effectively recognizes the (ritual) transition from outside to inside. Despite the anticipatory meaning and the fact that the deictic refers to the Spr's forward path (both of which would indicate a deictic in *a'*), the *o'* is used to respect the boundary being traversed. The corresponding *a'* form, however, is never used and is rejected out of hand by native speakers.

REFERENCE TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

A different class of uses has to do with reference to features of what we would call the "natural environment." This includes things like the weather, the lay of the land, vegetation, and animals. Here the rule of thumb is that the natural environment, when simply given, is treated in *o'*, whereas features of the environment are construed in *a'* when they are especially salient. In 28 there are three ordinary utterances that make reference to the sun, the hills, and the types of forest described as "low wood," respectively. Note that "hills" and "low woods" both function simultaneously as descriptions of ecological types and as the names of known regions. The last is the lowland region of the Oxkutzcab area, as opposed to the hills directly to the south of town. It is typical of these examples that the most likely English gloss has the definite article "the" rather than the deictic "that."

28. *chokow le k'ìin o'* "The sun is hot"
nùuktak e hwiitz o' "The hills are big"
le kabah che o' "the low woods"

In examples 29 and 30, a feature of the natural environment is especially salient as an object of reference in the situation of utterance, and therefore the deictics chosen are all in *a'*. Both interactants are inside a built structure (the soda stand and the home, respectively), and the accessibility of the referent is auditory. Both utterances have a directive force in that they point the Adr's attention to a noteworthy sound made by the referent.

29. I am sitting in Cres's *refresquería* (soda stand) with Cres's elder brother. The weather is clear, hot, and windy after several days of cool overcast. Now, the wind is howling outside, and Cres's brother takes it as a sign of the approach of Yaxkin, the hot season. He says,
k'àam e 'ìik' a' (pointing up) *astah bey u tàal camyon e'*
"This wind is loud. It's as if a truck were approaching." [BB.5.56]

30. I am sitting with Don Ponzo inside his home, and we hear a distinct bird song from outside. Don Ponzo says,
hatz' e chan ch'ìich' ku k'ay a' sakbakal
"This little bird singing is beautiful. It's (a) dove." [BB.5.7]

Rules of thumb, like the practical equivalences, hint at the operation of conversational principles in deictic practice. From a linguistic viewpoint, they effectively increase the flexibility of deictic usage relative to the semantics of deictic forms (whatever we take the core semantics to be). The effect of practical equivalences is to increase the situational dimensions in which the binary opposition of *a'*≠*o'* can be deployed. This is necessary if the deictic system is to be applicable to the indefinitely many contexts in which Sprs make deictic reference. It is fair to say that any system lacking practical correspondences would be too restrictive or too abstract to be useful under the variable conditions of actual talk. The rules of thumb, for their part, increase the automaticity of the mapping between forms and types of deictic reference. In effect, the routine quality of typical usage under ordinary circumstances frees the Spr and the Adr from the need to calculate, measure, or evaluate alternative deictic phrasings (Hanks 2001, Levinson 2000). In a description based on the deictic field, such rules of thumb are keyed to the broader social field in which the current *Zeigfeld* is embedded, including the lived environment.

In every one of the foregoing examples, there are multiple deictic dimensions in play in the actual field of utterance. The interactants are copresent, with relatively rich background knowledge of the setting and each other, memories (shared and unshared), bodies, and social identities. Most of the objects denoted in ordinary practice are not anonymous "points of reference" but known more or less intimately. This background knowledge alters the accessibility of the object before any deictic reference is even produced. The utterance is always one in an unfolding series of exchanges, a stream of anaphoric and cataphoric ties. Any of these factors can be the basis of a deictic construal, and deixis is precisely the articulation of copresence through speech. The multistranded makeup of the deictic field is the key problem: At any moment in interaction, multiple dimensions of access (among participants, objects, and settings) are simultaneously available for interactants. The selection and understanding of deictics relies on the simultaneous articulation of space, perception, discourse, commonsense and mutual knowledge, anticipation, and the framework of participation in which Sprs and Adrs orient to one another. Any one of these factors can provide the basis for deictic construal according to the demands of the ongoing relevance structure in which it is produced.

DYNAMIC CONSTRUALS OF OBJECTS IN THE DEICTIC FIELD

In 31 Don Chabo and I are talking in his home in Oxkutzcab. We are a contrasting two places, Chicago ("over there" in my utterance) and Yucatan (the referent of *way e'*, "around here," in his). The spatial contrast between the two places is what is relevant to construing them, one being the broader region in which we are as we speak and the other being over 1,000 miles away. Therefore there is no need to use place-names or any other descriptors. Within the state of Yucatan there is another town called Mayapan, about 20 km away. Once Yucatan has been established as the frame of spatial reference at the outset of Don Chabo's turn, the same deictic *te'. . . o'*, "over there," that I have used in reference to Chicago can be redeployed in reference to Mayapan. The reference of *way e'* excludes the referent of the first token of *té'el o'*, "over there," but includes the referent of the second token. The sequential organization of these references is what makes them intelligible: first, "over there"-*o'* in contrast to our present location, second the region encompassing our present location "around here"-*way e'*,

in contrast to the first reference, and third "over there"-*o'*, in contrast to the second reference.

31. Over lunch, Don Chabo and I are discussing a birth defect he has noticed in which the child's head grows far too large. I remark that we see this too in the U.S.A. sometimes.
WH: *kuyuúchul le k'ohá'anil o' tak ti tó'on té'elo'*
"That illness happens, even among us over there."
DC: *way e', té' mayapàan o', tinwilah unten*
"(Around) here, over there in Mayapan, I saw it once." [BB.4.120]

Hence the deictic construals rely on two relations at once: (1) the sequential relation between the preceding talk and the referent and (2) the accessibility of the referent in the current situation, via space and memory (cf. Schegloff 1972). The references are all spatial, but the frames they presuppose depend upon the mutual relevance of adjacent utterances. The shifting levels of spatial contrast and the key role of sequence indicate that this is not the kind of space depicted in the egocentric spatialist picture.

Example 32 is no less mundane in Yucatec but shows a more elaborate social embedding and a more startling shift in deictic construal. At the time of the exchange, Lol, Fi, and I are discussing how things work around the homestead, which includes the three sections marked by parallel dotted lines in figure 1. Each section is the property of a single nuclear family: Don Chabo's house (the two oval structures in the rightmost section), his oldest son Manuel's house (two rectangular rooms with a raised cooking fire behind the house), and his younger son Lol's house (two rectangular rooms). The three are ordered by seniority, with the eldest son directly alongside the father and the younger son on the other side of his brother. Lol is married to Fi, Manuel is married to Margot, and Don Chabo is divorced (fig. 2). (His former wife lives elsewhere.) I am godfather by baptism of the youngest son of Manuel and Margot, and I sleep in their home. Margot's cooking fire is shown as the gray rectangle behind



FIG. 1. *Floor plan of Don Chabo's homestead (cf. Hanks 1990:323).*



FIG. 2. *Kinship in a homestead (cf. Hanks 1990:95).*

her house. Fi's cooking fire is the gray square inside her house. The property lines inside the homestead are never marked by walls or fences but are scrupulously attended to by all residents. They function equally as inclusionary and exclusionary borders (Hanks 1990), providing a modicum of privacy and "respect" among the residents. In other words, the spatial setting of the domestic field is saturated with social relations that constrain and potentiate certain kinds of engagement, including deixis.

During the interaction, the three of us are sitting in the main room of Lol and Fi's house (locus marked by black triangle). We have been discussing the way in which members of the extended household relate to one another, which is regulated by a relatively elaborate etiquette.[19] Lol explains to me that each nuclear family pays for its own food, each woman cooking for her own family. On this day (January 30, 1987), however, Margot is away, and I have asked who has cooked for her children in her absence. The answer is that Fi has cooked for the entire homestead, including Don Chabo, Lol, and the four children of Manuel and Margot.

32. Lol: *tu bèetah leti té'elo'* "The one did it there."
WH: *bix té'elo'* "What do you mean, there?"
Lol: *leti' bèet* (hesitation) *tée, h té way beya'* "She did it there—right there here like this." [F.137.B.165]

In his first utterance, Lol has told me that his wife, whom he refers to as *leti'*, has done the cooking "there," meaning at her own fire. His use of the unadorned DNOM in reference to his spouse is typical, and there is no need

19. See Hanks (1990), where the etiquette is spelled out and related to speech patterns. The key points for this example are that the three households within the homestead are economically semi-independent, each making its own way but with the guiding assumption that brothers help one another and everyone tries to look out for the head of homestead. In addition, there are important constraints on who can interact with whom under what circumstances. A man, for instance, would avoid directly addressing his brother's wife, as a woman avoids directly addressing her husband's brother, the principle here being that these potential dyads cross the lines of marriage and gender. People rationalize the avoidance on the grounds that potential sexual misconduct is thereby avoided.

for him to clarify that "the one" is his wife and not someone else. Fi's cooking fire is in the same house that we are in at the time, albeit in the adjoining room and out of sight. Margot's fire is also out of sight but slightly farther away, outside and on the other side of a property line. If spatial proximity were the basis of his deictic choice, even in the extended sense of inside ≠ outside, then we would expect *té'elo'* to denote Margot's fire, which is, after all, more remote. But space is not the basis of his construal. The basis is the socially sanctioned and intimate relation between Fi and her own cooking fire, where she spends many an hour every day. This is another routine feature of deictic practice in Yucatec—that a man's fields and a woman's kitchen are often referred to with unadorned *té'el o'*. The habitual labor relation between the individual and the place is sufficient to make the deictic interpretable (cf. 23–25 above) and is reproduced in deictic practice.

It also helps to know that the relation between coresident sisters-in-law is often strained and Margot and Fi's is no exception. Women typically move into the homesteads of their husbands, and these homesteads are highly structured fields infused with differential power, potential conflict, and constraints on behavior. Age grading is integral to hierarchy among the men and is carried over to their wives, such that the wife of a junior man is de facto junior to the wife of a more senior man. In the present case, Fi is the wife of the junior brother, and, moreover, she does not yet have children of her own, which further decreases her authority. As I subsequently came to appreciate, all of these factors would have made it virtually impossible for Fi to cook over Margot's fire without an explicit invitation. Like direct address between in-laws of different gender or the use of *leti'* in reference to someone else's spouse, for a woman to use another's fire would be perceived as a flagrant invasion—all the worse if she were the junior. Lol, of course, knows all of this and assumes that I do as well.

In my response to Lol, I give evidence that I do not understand the reference and make a bid for more information by asking, "How so 'there'?" (What do you mean?)." To clarify, he repeats the terse and stereotypical reference to his spouse as *leti'* and amplifies the deictic reference. He already knows that I know Fi and know that Fi has her own cooking fire, but my utterance confirms for him that I don't know whether her fire is the one she used that day. His amplified reference is not a formulation; he maintains a strictly deictic construal without any lexical description. Yet he reverses his footing in the locative reference, switching from *té'elo'* to the proximal phrase *té' way bey a'*. This might be clumsily glossed, "Right there here (this side) like this" or, more idiomatically, "She did it (cooked) right here, (in) the near one (fire)." Based on the oppositions organized in the semantic system of deixis, Lol's switch is almost maximal, from (erstwhile) nonproximal to immediate and ostendable. The brief recycle that he performs at the onset of the rephrasing—*'tée, té h way*—indexes his momentary recalibrating of the situation. The rephrased construal relies not on the habitual relation between Fi and her fire but on the spatial relations of proximity *(té . . . a')* and inclusion *(way)* between the place of the fire and our own location at the time of utterance: we are in the same house (hence here), yet it is in the next room (hence there).[20] The DMAN *bey a'* usually indexes a performance of a gesture indicating the object, but my notes are insufficient to specify whether Lol actually executed a gesture in the course of this utterance. The stereotypical one would have been a hand motion or perhaps a nod in the direction of the referent, a usage commonly attested in route directions. In other words, whereas habitual use/ownership trumps space in the first reference, space trumps habitual use/ownership in the second. What matters most is that both kinds of construal are available as resources for referring. It is interesting that the first expression presupposes that I know that Fi would cook only over her own fire, which I had failed to recognize, and the second shifts to the mutual knowledge that she has a fire in the next room. The reconstrual is much more specific semantically, with three initial deictic bases, but it is also less dependent upon detailed knowledge of the routine operations in the homestead.

The sorts of shift illustrated in 32 license the inference that interactants have access simultaneously to different ways of construing the deictic field of reference. Therefore Lol was able to shift footing between reference grounded in a possession relation between Fi and the fire and reference grounded in the relation of spatial presence in the context of utterance. Nothing in the spatial setting had changed, although the interactive context had been shifted when I queried his first reference, eliciting a clarification. Not only do deictic fields vary widely, then, but in a single one, two or more frames of reference are simultaneously available. If reference in one frame fails, as it did in 32, or if the context needs to be updated, as in 31, the Spr can simply shift the terms of deictic construal.[21]

Once we recognize the simultaneity of alternate framings in the deictic field, the sorts of variation across contexts illustrated by examples 1–30 begin to make sense. What the early examples show is that different actual fields support different deictic construals, but this is hardly surprising given that single fields do as well. Part of this multiplicity is due to the multidimensional structure of the local *Zeigfeld*,which includes participation frameworks, perception, attention focus, memory, discourse, and anticipation, as well as space. And part of it derives from the embedding of the deictic field in social fields such as shamanic practice, agricultural labor, the market economy, and domestic relations. These embeddings bring with them universes of reference and varieties of stances that interactants take up in relation to objects

20. Combinations of *tè'* and *way* pose interesting problems for analysis (cf. Hanks 1990:473–504).

21. This simultaneous availability of multiple frames of reference is precisely ruled out by experimental design which reduces the deictic field to one parameter, such as space in the questionnaire developed by Wilkins (1999). This questionnaire is important and revealing, but its design makes it impossible to use the data it yields to determine when parameters other than space are critical. Wilkins is careful to note this fact and recommend the combination of the questionnaire with observed ordinary usage.

and to each other. Embedding also changes the stakes of deictic practice, thereby calling forth certain forms of deixis such as the shaman's power expressed in uttering "this child" in reference to an image in a crystal or the injunction to respect the threshold of the homestead by referring to the inside as *té'el o'*, "(over) there," before entering. To model deixis on a purely local articulation of anonymous objects picked out by faceless people may provide the appearance of comparability across contexts and languages, but it erases multiplicity and embedding, that is, the objective conditions of actual deictic practice.

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to open up an area for research bearing on speech and its relation to other varieties of practice. I have argued that referential practice takes place in what I have called a "deictic field." The general organization and dynamic of the deictic field can be summarized as an articulation of several logically ordered layers. The simplest is what Goffman called the situation, understood as a field of copresence in which embodied interactants are reciprocally available to each other's senses. The next simplest is the conversational setting, which entails a situation plus a relevancy structure locked into an unfolding interaction. This is the level at which Sacks defined "indicator expressions," which invoke the "sheer setting." Settings, so defined, are semiotically impoverished for the purpose of explaining referential practice because they pay too little heed to language systems and too much homage to the purely local production of meaning. Buhler's *Zeigfeld* makes a great contribution here by joining the setting of speech to a grammatically committed description of the semantic fields of deixis in actual languages. Unlike a setting, a *Zeigfeld* is organized around the act of referring and oriented by the intentional arc which projects from referential speech to its objects. The semiotic organization of the *Zeigfeld* also affords a much more precise description of the ways in which deictic elements combine with the *Symbolfeld*, something foreshadowed but undeveloped in Sacks's distinction between invoking and formulating.

The *Zeigfeld* is a necessary unit of description, but it is still inadequate for explaining ordinary deictic practices. This is because it sheds little or no light on several factors of consequence: (1) The phenomenal context is embedded in a broader social one, which overdetermines aspects of relevance and provides an *already established* space of positions and position takings. This vastly simplifies the task of resolving reference by providing a ready-made universe of objects, boundaries, and relations to which any deictic utterance can articulate. Without this universe, much deictic practice would be radically indeterminate. (2) Embedding also converts the Spr and the Adr into social agents of certain kinds. This has the noteworthy result of authorizing deferred reference by way of counterpart relations in which a present object is used as the pivot for reference to an absent one. The general mechanism of counterparts may well be a feature of language in general, as cognitive linguists have argued (Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996), but the enactment of deferred reference is socially charged (recall the shaman's crystals, the photo of the deceased, and the wife who enacts her husband's body on her own). Authorization is not an add-on to reference after the fact but a condition of possibility for referring. (3) The repertoire of stances that actors adopt is a function of the field they are in and the social relations they can legitimately sustain to objects (e.g., the scolding parent, the laid-back therapist, the coresident keeping proper distance from others). The various stances that speakers adopt in practice impinge directly on how they construe the world through language. Phenomenologists such as Schutz and Buhler start from the *natural* attitude and the postulate of the reciprocity of perspectives. What I am calling "stance" is an alternative to these idealizations: the *social* attitude is not only "wide awake" but evaluative, discerning, and predisposed in certain ways by the habitus (Ochs 1992, Ide 2001, DuBois 2003). Moreover, reciprocity is a worthy achievement, but much of ordinary deictic practice operates on the barriers, divisions, and conflicts between interactants in the field. (4) The practical equivalences and rules of thumb for engaging in deictic practice in the field might be appended to linguistic description or even related to the phenomenological ideas of typification and routinization. In a practice approach they belong to the habitus of the people who speak. We would therefore expect them to relate closely to both stance and embedding as well as to the genres in which people interact (Bauman 1992; Briggs and Bauman 1992; DuBois 2003; Hanks 1987, 1996*a*; cf. Sidnell 2000). This remains a topic for future research.

The object relation is essential to the deictic field for several reasons. The *Zeigfeld* entails the individuation of an object (i.e., something to *zeigen*, "show") and establishes a schematic relation in which Spr and Adr achieve mutual orientation to the Object. At the level of the deictic field, the Object is no longer an anonymous semiotic potential, nor is the relation merely schematic. This is because in the deictic field we are dealing with the actual occupancy of the positions, not only the potential. The persons, places, events, and things that occupy the Object position are themselves socially defined. This is part of what comes with embedding, and it implies that not all objects are equal, either as kinds or as individuals. It also implies that the kinds of "space" articulated in deixis are socially constituted, not sheer physical relations (cf. Rumsey 2003).

It is standard in discussions of deixis to observe that these forms fail to describe their objects but are, as it were, blind to the inherent properties of objects. Anything can be a "this" or a "that." But this fact of semantic paucity must not be confused with the notion that the properties of objects are irrelevant to what is going in the talk. The objects that deictics actually denote in ordinary practice *do* have properties, and those properties are consequential for deictic practice, even if not for deictic semantics. The difference here can be likened to the contrast between the Spr role, a sheer semiotic potential that can in principle be filled by anyone capable of speech, and the social fact

of so-and-so's actually speaking at a given moment. As soon as we pass from potential to actuality, as we must in studying all forms of social practice, both the participant roles and the object position are converted into sites on which social values converge.

This conversion has several features bearing on the object relation. The first is that any object has what Schutz (1967) called an "inner horizon," that is, an open-ended range of associations with other objects, with the interactants, and with other social actors. This is what is commonly called "background knowledge." Crucial to the horizon is the history of interactions with the object, including previous acts in which it is referred to. Any object makes available many other objects, according to its associations. From the wife to her cooking fire to the stones that shape it, from the diagnosis to the medicine, from the leg injured to the pain felt, from the bird song to the bird. The horizon leads from the object to many others, and any act of referring lays the groundwork for further references. At the moment of any utterance, the universe of reference is already structured, and this is a simplifying resource for speakers.

Objects also come to be denoted in typical ways, and this is part of the horizon of background knowledge. This is self-evident in terms of how they are *described*, but it also applies to how they are *construed* with deictics. Unadorned *leti'* is so standard in reference to spouses that a stranger overhearing a conversation in which it was used could guess that, failing counterindications, the referent was the spouse of the speaker. Similarly, unelaborated *té'elo'*, "there," becomes associated with the habitual places of persons, just as *lelo'* is the standard deictic for mutually known features of the environment. These associations are part not of the semantics of the forms but of the practices in which they are used. The combined result of these two aspects of the horizon is to simplify the task of referring by making objects already available before they are picked out. Of course, the flip side of this simplification is that it becomes more difficult to control reference. The question, then, is not how interactants manage to identify referential objects but how they manage to limit the chain of reference to a unique individual.

A third aspect of the horizon or background can be summarized in the notion that objects have value for the interactants and the social world around them. They are dirty, clean, evil, good, avoided, private, self-evident, secret, mine, yours, or someone else's. Such qualities and their evaluation may appear far removed from sheer indexicality, but they figure prominently in deictic practice and in many of the examples adduced in this paper. The value dimension contributes to the sort of simplification spelled out above, since a Spr's evaluative stance in an utterance can help resolve the reference. At the same time, a Spr who refers to an object enters into a social relation with it and thereby engages with its value. Sometimes the engagement is formulated in an evaluative description such as 11, the scolding in 12 and 26, and the admiration in 29 and 30. But even when unformulated it may play a central role in what is communicated. The shaman's reference to "this child" in 13 involves the counterpart relation between a sign in the crystal and a child in the world. In producing this utterance in that field, Don Chabo took up a position in relation to the patient, the object, and the field at large: he reproduced his identity as an agent authorized to understand a visual sign that no nonshaman could interpret, a knower and a doer who sees the counterpart relations hidden to nonexperts. Similarly, when Lol referred his wife's fire as "there," he enacted his insider status as one authorized for such usage. The speaker who uses an *a'* form in reference to the natural environment enacts the familiarity needed to recognize when it is salient and the presence of mind to notice it. We tend to think of the object as something that the Spr represents, but the inverse also holds: the object reciprocally stands for the Spr who denotes it. He or she is, after all, the sort of person who could and would denote such an object in just such a manner. To perform an act of deictic reference is inevitably to thrust oneself into a relation with the object. Thus in denoting objects Sprs articulate their social relations to them.

In much of deictic practice, therefore, there is little or no need for an Adr to "figure out" which object the Spr is talking about, and the "individuating function" of the deictic is minimal. The object may be already identifiable, self-evidently perceptible and immediate, already foregrounded in the Adr's attention, anticipated on the basis of other objects already in mutual focus, inferable from the evaluative stance of the Spr, or predictable given the field in which the utterance is embedded. Embedding does not mechanically determine reference, but it does *overdetermine* it for those interactants who have the right habitus. The divination example is especially clear on this point, even though the point is more general. By the time Don Chabo utters "this child," there is no question as to the identity of the object. The divination has been requested, the child has been named, the prayers have been performed, the crystal is in his hand, and he and the parent are both gazing intently at it. He could equally well have used the *o'* form without any confusion. Indeed, in a closely related setting (18) he does use an *o'* form where we would have expected a form in *a'*. The layering of situation, setting, *Zeigfeld*, deictic field, and social embedding so thoroughly prepares the ground for reference that it is misleading to analyze such utterances *as if* the semiotic function of the deictics were to convey information sufficient to identify a referent, much less to "locate" it. The standard analytic bias toward "informativeness" masks the critical fact that speakers often engage in deictic practice not to position objects but to position themselves. Rather than only being the target end point of an intentional arc, the object functions as a landmark off which the Spr can position himself. In such cases, although the semantic potential of the deictic is still realized, the critical vector is not from Spr to Object but from Object to Spr.

The Object relation is crucial, therefore, precisely because deictic reference is a social engagement emergent in practice. The standard approaches to indexical reference treat the object as something merely represented

or indexed, whereas most of the objects of everyday life are highly reflective. They bounce the intentionality back at the representation or relay it onto a counterpart, which may in turn relay it, and so on. In this dynamic, the deictic field provides a space of positions and position taking in relation to objects and their values in the embedding social field. To explore the deictic field is therefore to explore a special kind of threshold in the fine structure of communicative practice, a threshold at once individual and social, cognitive and embodied, emergent and durable, language and nonlanguage.

Comments

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Grammatical tradition supplies the linguist with neither the means nor the motivation to account for the way demonstratives are actually used and successfully interpreted in real life. As Hanks's Yucatec examples show, the inadequacy of traditional distance-based treatments of demonstratives becomes clear the moment one looks at actual usage. Hanks's paper is a welcome illustration of the fact that demonstratives operate with respect to distinctions more general than spatial distance (cf. Kirsner 1979, 1993; Wierzbicka 1980; Himmelmann 1996; Enfield 2003*b*). Part of the problem he is addressing is the dismal failure of modern linguistics to acknowledge that the system of formal distinctions in morphosyntax has structured relationships with the facts of particular speech situations, relations between interlocutors, and prevailing cultural and social structures. He is showing that these structured relations are describable and belong in a comprehensive description of communicative practice. While the problem of indexical reference is too easily dismissed with a remark such as "Well, that gets worked out from the context," Hanks rightly insists that the language-context relation occupies a single analytic domain. After all, human social action does not observe disciplinary boundaries. For everyday people, the formulation and deployment of morphosyntactically complex indexical expressions and the resolution of their reference are part of a unified process of engaging in physically, emotionally, and socially situated talk. Hanks's model of embedded fields is a significant move toward explicating the structural links between grammar and the physical and social world. It holds promise for a coherent integration of language and context.

Worthy of closer investigation in Hanks's account are psychological factors leading to recognition of relevance. With respect to demonstratives, Clark, Schreuder, and Buttrick (1983) have shown experimentally that resolution of reference is done not by perceptual or cognitive salience alone but by *mutual* salience for a given set of interlocutors. The contextual monitoring required for successful deployment and interpretation of demonstratives involves a kind of reciprocal awareness. It entails taking one's interlocutors' access to the context into constant account in planning and assessing the specific design of utterances.

Hanks acknowledges the importance of gesture and bodily movement in communicative practice. I view this as part of a growing recognition that linguistic anthropology needs to turn to a careful working out of the specifics of gesture's structural relationship to linguistic utterances and to the social and cultural fields that Hanks builds into them. A key issue is the structural relation between hand gestures and the "linguistic." It is known that gestures are in many ways linguistic (McNeill 1985, Goldin-Meadow 2003). For example, some gestures—"emblems"—are lexical items, conventional in form and meaning and functioning as independent utterances (e.g., the middle-finger sign meaning "Fuck you"). Other gestures—"iconics" and "metaphorics"—occur in tight combination with speech, comprising structurally composite utterances. Pointing gestures are also integrated with spoken utterances, as Hanks notes, but there are many cases in which such gestures occur without speech. Suppose I ask, "Have you seen my keys?" and you simply point to them without speaking. One might want to argue that such a case involves ellipsis, but this would not hold for prelinguistic infants, for whom the independent pointing gesture is a primary communicative tool. One-year-olds use finger pointing to perform a range of communicative acts, including sharing information (Liszkowski 2004, Tomasello 2004). This is not language as we know it, but neither is it pure indexicality or some other "natural meaning." To understand a child's pointing gesture as having a meaning of, say, informing, one needs to recognize the child's intention to communicate and furthermore to "share intentionality" (Tomasello et al. n.d.). When a prelinguistic infant uses a pointing gesture to say the equivalent of "It's there" or "Gimme that," all the elements of Hanks's structure of embedded fields are in place. This may warrant a broadening of what is meant by "language," giving indexicality a more central place than many linguists may want to acknowledge. It certainly supports a more central placement in the structure of language of the kind of model Hanks is developing.

Hanks shows us why linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology are indispensable in an account of communicative practice. His article is a masterful reminder that context can and must be structurally integrated within a theory of meaning.

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In this important paper, Hanks solidifies his position as our preeminent theorist of deixis. Where his previous work on Yucatec spatial reference might have been (er-

roneously) construed as an elaborate ethnographic account of Maya demonstrative practice, there is no mistaking his general theoretical aims here. I find especially useful his analytical separation and subsequent contrastive relamination of, first, two highly schematic, austere, and rarely juxtaposed frames of reference for talk, the Bühlerian spatial field and the conversation-analytic space (if we may call it that) of sequential organization, and then two socially richer frames of reference for action, Goffman's "situation" inhabited by "gatherings" or persons in minimal copresence and Bourdieu's "field," historically and politically constituted and richly populated. By embedding deictic usage in these superimposed frames of reference he shows how, despite apparently schematic semantics, deictic contrasts can signal widely varied, sometimes (apparently) contradictory situations and perspectives on situations.

One problem, for me, in the analytical juxtaposition of these analytically separable frames of reference is that each is somewhat caricatured in the process. For example, Hanks suggests that "native speakers' common sense about their own language and verbal practices" is "absent from both the situation and the *Zeigfeld*." But Goffman explicitly defines the neutral copresence of a "gathering" by subtracting from it highly structured, semiotically rich, verbally relevant configurations (such as his "with"). Thus, the typified understandings of native interactants are, in some sense, inherent in the "situational" stage, if only by their suspension for analytical purposes. Hanks's own move thus seems exactly parallel to Goffman's: the deictic frame is precisely like an empty "situation" waiting to be filled.

I am also somewhat confused by the dual metaphors of "embedding" and "layering." When a deictic field and some other field are juxtaposed, how is one to decide which is embedded in which, or whether they are merely to be layered together? If the latter, what coincides with what? If the former, what are the relations of precedence or dominance that govern the embedding? Hanks writes that "effective agents in deictic practice" may "accumulate value" but that these are "added specifications motivated not by deixis as such but by other social fields in which it may be embedded." However, in his own account of the deictic field there is an essential "inherent" (i.e., highly naturalizable) power parameter of (potentially asymmetric) "access." Thus, different agents in the deictic field may have differential access to referents, and this differential access is routinely semanticized in the linguistic contrasts available. This sounds like "value" to me. (Consider, further, the complexities of differential access given by perceptual modalities—blindness, deafness, or supernatural omniscience—presumably the products of "embedding.") Hanks is reluctant to concede priority to a *Zeigfeld*-based semantics for Yucatec deictics, but his example 32 could be read as suggesting just such a priority. The interlocutor's "more careful" second try could be taken as evidence for the spatial reading as primary, unmarked, and hence "basic." In a somewhat parallel context, Leslie Devereaux and I interpreted the noncommittal Tzotzil *te* 'there' in response to a specific question about somebody's whereabouts—the equivalent of the "habitual association" Hanks describes—not as habitual or conventional but as maximally and strategically noninformative, hence, "polite" in the context of obsessive Tzotzil privacy (Haviland and Haviland 1983). It relies, precisely, on the unmarked semantics of the system of contrasts of which the deictic partakes.

Finally, Hanks's perspective insistently fills "pure" space with conceptual and social complexity. When it comes to gesture, however, this complexifying sophistication evaporates. In the same crucial example 32, he notes that the space-prioritizing second reformulation uses a deictic which "usually indexes a performance of a gesture" (which, significantly, his "notes are insufficient to specify"). He correctly notes that "while both indexicality and gesture are pervasive in language, referential deictics are unique in joining the two systematically." And yet his few remarks about gesture concede to it little of the complex layering and embedding shown to characterize spoken deictics. (He does argue that gestured deictics have "directive" force—in fact, pointing gestures carry this directivity on their faces, as it were, as well as in their ontogenesis.) The "directive" force of deictics, spoken or gestured, extends precisely to the fact that they are noncharacterizing. Since they "provide virtually no identifying information as the objects picked out," they inherently constitute directives to interlocutors to engage in the appropriate inferential procedures. Pointing gestures are no less complex than their spoken counterparts, and the different morphologies of pointing gestures (Kita 2003) as well as the frequently prestructured spaces or places in which they operate may parallel both the elaborated paradigmatic contrasts and the social complexity in practice of verbalized deictics.

Hanks has given us here another example of the best sort of linguistic anthropology, and I hope others will heed his call to open up research embedding speech in "other varieties of practice."

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Hanks's article is of great importance, indicating as it does an area needing further research. He begins his argumentation with Western discussions of the concepts of field and situation and develops his own idea of the deictic field, convincingly showing that past analyses do not do justice to the topic. Although he accepts some of the concepts, he finds them wanting in that they do not adequately explain such factors as the embedding of the *Zeigfeld* in the broader social context, the socially determined roles of the speaker and the addressee, and the roles they fulfill in particular situations. These factors play a particularly dominant role in high-context languages such as Japanese, where the broader social context

is described in terms of background knowledge called *wakimae*. *Wakimae*, a philosophy that can be traced back to the seventeenth century, is the speaker's sense of place in relation to the addressee and the setting as well as the sense of the speaker's place in society relevant at the moment of speaking.

It seems that the concept of *wakimae* could also be applied to the interpretation of the data presented in Hanks's article. In example 18, Don Chabo uses the *o'* form when referring to a proximal object. Analyzed according to the *wakimae* framework, the choice of the *o'* enclitic could be interpreted as the expression of discernment by the speaker, indicating that he is a dignified and poised person. In a similar way, high-status Japanese businessmen speak with high honorifics as a way of showing *wakimae*, their sense of place. It is evaluative, discerning, and predisposed in a certain way, defined in each community by the habitus, as Hanks indicates.

With the background knowledge of *wakimae* as a frame, the speaker's choice of honorifics, which are social deictic linguistic features, is determined by the appropriate interpretation of the context in terms of the roles of the participants and/or such concepts as *uchi* and *soto* (in- and out-group membership). For example, addressee honorifics are always present in conversations between participants with a *soto* relationship, and violation of this rule leads to such creative meanings as high involvement in the topic of conversation. Conversely, the use of addressee honorifics in conversations between people with an *uchi* relationship marks the speaker's attitude as "resentment" or "formality." It is because of this interlocking articulation between linguistic forms (honorifics as social deictic linguistic features) and the contextual deictic field that ordinary deictic practice operates dynamically.

The embedding of the participants and their conversation in the context makes most conversations understandable at a very basic level. A person joining a group discussion may understand every word that is said and still not understand what the conversation is about. It takes time in the context with the interactants to appreciate what is being discussed. By the same token, in high-context languages such as Japanese, where subjects, objects (especially when they are personal pronouns), and even verbs (especially copula) are often suppressed, it is only by virtue of the embedding of the conversation that the meaning is clear to the participants or to third parties. Rather than looking at the speech event from an outside perspective as is the rule when speaking English, the speaker must place him- or herself as a factor in the context. For example, "He is a high-school boy" is the translation of "*Koutou gakkou* ('high school') *no* (POSS) *gakusei* ('student') *san* (honorific title) *yo* (sentence-final particle)." There is no subject (*kare* = 'he') and no predicate (*desu* = 'is'), but the utterance has an honorific title indexing the speaker's respectful attitude toward the referent (a high-school boy) and a sentence-final particle indexing the speaker's kind and informative orientation toward the addressee (her sister, who does not have this information).

It therefore seems appropriate to posit the object relation as crucial, as Hanks says, "precisely because deictic reference is a social engagement emergent in practice." By expanding the area of investigation beyond the individual to the social, cultural, and even nonlanguage frame, Hanks has pointed the way towards necessary research for understanding language at a deeper level.

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Hanks explores the deictic field, focusing on language and other semiotic systems. My own work on communication between monkeys and humans deals with nonverbal semiotic systems. Since speech is not involved, the deictic field involved in monkey-human communication is composed of (1) the positions of the monkey and the human, (2) the position of objects referred to in the communication (e.g., a jar with a lid that screws on and off, pieces of apple or sweet potato, or a camera), and (3) the gestures, sounds, body orientation, etc., through which the former indicate the latter in communication.

In my research, the relative positions of the monkey and the human seem to influence the monkey's imitation of the human. In a position facing the right-handed human researcher, monkeys generally used their left hand, the one facing the hand used by the researcher.

The positions of objects referred to in the communication also influenced the monkey's responses in some studies. When food for them was present, the monkeys immediately pointed to it, but when it was not present they demonstrated the model of the behavior they had been taught to imitate. (Then the researcher gave them food from a concealed location.)

The gestures, sounds, body orientation, etc., through which monkey and human indicate objects and models of action are more complex. Here memory and anticipation as well as relations of possession and habitual engagement between participants and objects come into play. For example, one monkey did not imitate my model of clapping. However, several days later, when I gave him a different action to imitate, he suddenly clapped and then imitated the new action I had just shown him. Clearly, his memory was a factor in the deictic field.

Once a monkey got tired of extending his arm in our pointing activity and tried to use other actions he had already learned instead, touching his hand to his nose or clapping. He looked at my eyes to see if he was successful in changing the activity, and when I ignored him he gave up and returned to the pointing activity. He and other monkeys would also suddenly demonstrate previously learned actions when there was no food visible and they wanted some.

The monkey-human deictic field, like that described by Hanks, "orients attention, effectively converting

sheer copresence into a social act of individuated referring. This conversion may involve memory and anticipation . . . as well as relations of possession and habitual engagement between participants and objects." Monkeys did not respond in the same way to a researcher they knew and to one strange to them. They had gotten used to me and were to longer afraid of me. They came near me, touched my arm, or made sounds when they were with me. With a researcher they did not know, they performed the pointing and imitation I had taught them but did not go near the person, touch him or her in a friendly way, or utter sounds. Instead, they pushed the person away if he or she came too near or even bit the person. If I was present, too, a monkey would look at me before performing the pointing or the imitation of the stranger.

The emotional component of social relationships can be a factor in the monkey-human deictic field. When a monkey scratched the table in the direction of the object to which he was supposed to be pointing, I became annoyed. I raised my voice and scolded him. "You are wrong! That is not pointing. Look at my pointing. Look!" The monkey became afraid because my voice was raised. He pointed properly at two objects, but the other was near me. He was afraid to extend his arm there, although I had never hit him. Gradually, he began to relax. I did not raise my voice again, and he regained his confidence and then moved his hand toward the object near me.

Monkeys show anticipation of human actions. In a break between training sessions, I was reading aloud from a journal article I was preparing. The monkey closed his eyes. From time to time, he opened his eyes and glanced at my eyes. Several times he reached over and turned the pages I had not yet read, as though checking to see how many there were. Then, apparently resigned to my continuing to read, he closed his eyes again.

Speech is not involved in the monkey-human deictic field, but sounds are. One monkey sometimes greeted me with a sound. When I repeated the sound, he made eye contact with me and repeated the sound. Another monkey would utter a sound when I said his name but not when I said other words.

The monkey-human deictic field is far less complex than that of humans, but it includes positions of Speaker, Addressee, and object, body orientation, gestures, and sounds, and memory, anticipation, and emotions play a role.

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This article builds interestingly upon previous arguments by Hanks (e.g., 1990, 1996*c*) about the relational character of verbal deixis and the need for an approach which treats it both as a systematic aspect of language and as situated social practice. In particular, Hanks here elaborates on his long-held view that the deictic field "cannot be reduced to any set of would-be objective dimensions such as spatial contiguity" (Hanks 1992:70). Two of the most innovative and valuable aspects of the article are (1) the kinds of empirical evidence Hanks adduces in relation to this claim and (2) the way he develops the distinction between interactionist and spatialist background pictures as a theoretical context in which his arguments about spatial contiguity can be taken as a test case.

Hard-core "spatialists" will no doubt find bones to pick with Hanks's argument for the overall defeasibility of spatial aspects of the deictic field. Since the examples he uses are isolated ones chosen specifically for this purpose rather than, say, a random sample from among all the deictic expressions occurring in a given textual corpus, it could be questioned whether they are adequately representative. Even in the data he adduces there is one example—example 32, line 3—in which, on Hanks's own account, spatial factors "trump" relevant non-spatial ones. Thus it may be an overstatement to claim that other aspects of the deictic field are, categorically, "more basic" than spatial ones. More solidly supported is Hanks's conclusion that "the selection and understanding of deictics relies on the simultaneous articulation of space, perception, discourse, commonsense and mutual knowledge, anticipation, and the framework of participation in which Sprs and Adrs orient to one another. Any one of these factors can provide the basis for deictic construal according to the demands of the ongoing relevance structure in which it is produced."

Regarding Hanks's typology of "background pictures," the alignment it presupposes—spatialism : objectivism : : interactionism : subjectivism—does accurately characterize the predominant approaches taken to these matters by linguists, but this is not a *necessary* alignment, as is shown by Hanks's own work and a long anthropological tradition going back at least as far as Evans-Pritchard's (1940) treatment of the social "valuation" of space (and time) among the Nuer. Hanks is certainly right that it is erroneous to treat space as the only dimension to which the deictic forms respond systematically or the one from which all others derive. But if that be "spatialism," then I think it is important not to concede "space" to the "spatialists." What is really wrong with such a view is not the importance that it accords to the spatial but its objectivist treatment of space as a pre-social given from which everything else about deixis derives. Instead, as is demonstrated in detail by Hanks (1990, 1996*c*), the space of deictic fields is always already socially construed, and acts of deixis figure crucially in its reproduction and transformation. This being the case, the proper antidote to "spatialism" is not a demotion of spatial considerations per se but, as Hanks says, "a different idea of space, a better theory of how it is integrated with nonspatial aspects of context, and a more thorough treatment of the social embedding of the deictic field."

Here Hanks chooses to demonstrate this through a single case study from Yucatec Mayan, but, as he realizes (cf. Hanks 1992), arguments as general in scope as these—pertaining as they do to a feature of "all human languages"—also call for assessment in comparative

terms. The available evidence for this is limited, since most existing accounts of deictic systems in the linguistic literature give scant attention to non-spatially based uses of the relevant deictic terms even where they are acknowledged to occur. But there are exceptions. In a comparative, text-based study of the use of demonstrative pronouns in five languages, Himmelmann (1996) takes accout of *all* their uses and agrees with Hanks that "an account of actually occurring uses is not possible in terms of speaker, hearer, and physical utterance situation alone. Instead, the context for seemingly straightforward situational uses is as complicated as the context for other uses and involves interactional as well as cultural knowledge" (p. 223). This is consistent with Merlan and Jacq's recent (2004) conclusions concerning the Australian Aboriginal language Jawoyn and with aspects of Diessel's (1999*b*) study based on a comparison of the uses of demonstratives in 85 other languages from around the world. Therefore, although the matter calls for further comparative study, it seems likely that the patterns which Hanks has brilliantly revealed in this article are indeed generic to language and human social life as such.

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Hanks's "Explorations" places Yucatec Mayan deictic denotation in a discursive field between two contemporary theoretical traditions, one characterized as "spatialist" and the other as "interactionalist." (These terms serve to index, broadly, the work of the Max-Planck-Institut für Psycholinguistik [see n. 6] and that of Goffman and conversation analysis [see nn. 7, 9, 10, 12].) Representing these accounts as opposed essentializing commitments to the deictic location of talk and its objects literally in dimensionalized space versus as positionalities relationally projected from the state of conversational activity, Hanks intends here to mediate and blend them. The *tertium quid* invoked for these purposes is Bourdieu's "(social) field." This concept, once stripped of its linkage (in Bourdieu's own works) to a questionable market metaphor, posits implicit yet institutionalized ways of framing discursive interaction involving not merely individuals' sensorial cognitions but their statuses as intentional social beings with perduring macrosociological interests in micro-contextual outcomes.

We can therefore take Hanks's paper as a further argument for the necessary dialectical bridging of the (micro-)contextual and (macro-)sociocultural in any account of interaction's emergent trajectory and consequential outcome. Indeed, work professing to study the "contextualization" of language has too often construed "context" in overly microscopic terms, inviting social scientific critique of its irrelevance to issues of more global concern. And many social scientific approaches to "practice" have rested on vague presumptions of the transparency of "mere" communicative practice to their readings of what goes on when people interact. These have prompted disdain from connoisseurs of the real-time textual subtleties of games people play. Yet Hanks's presentation of deixis seems itself to be situated on the somewhat narrow terrain of denotational deixis between two schools of microscopists whose characteristic data are lexical paradigms and single utterance-turns. What seems problematic from this view may not seem so to those both within linguistic anthropology and beyond who have become "bridgers" both in—and of—word and deed.

As denotational forms, to be sure, deictics primordially contribute to the descriptive capacity of language. But Hanks's critical examples of deixis beyond mere "spatiality" reveal how language functions as semiotic action in the more generalized realm of indexical—that is, context-projecting—*but not specifically denotational* sign value. To be sure, actual deictic grammatical categories such as the Yucatec ones surveyed have a salience among indexical functions not only for analysts of language but for native users as well (see Hanks 1993, Lucy 1993, Silverstein 2001 [1981]). That is why there are transcontextual—and in this sense "decontextualized"—defaults (or "unmarked" pragmatic values) for the specifically spatial denotational meanings of deictic forms as these enter into systematic paradigms of contrast. So much is this so that one might at first be tempted to read all indexical functions of language as determinate "metaphors" of spatial deixis.

But, as Hanks's examples indicate, excepting a few idiomatic lexicalized frozen forms, there are no unique and decontextual normative mappings to or from social space as such. In the course of interaction a determinate intersubjective sense that one or more social spaces is being indexically invoked as the relevant "field" emerges only gradually over the course of segments of actual discursive-interactional time longer than the single utterance-turn (see, e.g., Keane 1997:94–223; Manning 2001; Matoesian 2001; Sawyer 1997, 2001, 2003; Silverstein 1998, 2003, 2004; Wortham 1994, 1997, 2001*a*, *b*).

It is of course a truism that indexicality as such imposes a radical topology, in any number of dimensions, onto whatever is the "surround" of an indexical sign (hence its iconic figuration by the pointing arrow or "index" finger). It is also a truism that deictics are forms that contribute to denotation by mapping such radially structured schematizations of the communicative situation into the very plane of reference and predication, imposing on the denoted one or more structured radialities of role relations (linguistic category: "person"), of locus of referent with respect to role structure (linguistic category: "spatial deixis"), of locus of predicated event interval with respect to interval event of communication (linguistic category: "tense"), of prior communicative or perceptual role inhabitance of current sender of message (linguistic category: "evidentiality"), etc. But, once we discern these saliently "core" or grammaticopragmatic domain-defining structural categories, we can go on to see that their use in the indexicality of actual discourse is far wider than their respective core conceptual domains such as are projected by default into denotation.

Nondeictics, that is, nonindexical (strictly semantic) denotational forms, such as English ". . . screen in front of . . ." always occur morphosyntactically linked in their respective referring or predicating phrases to deictics, that is, indexical (strictly pragmatic) denotationals, such as English "this . . . me" (structurally intercalated with the preceding), allowing elements strictly of *langue* to be, thereby, mapped into *parole*—to appear as the cohesive textual form of "what we say" when we communicate. Systems of deictics are opportunistically used to structure ongoing information in intersubjective space so as to make it indexically effective in projecting relevant social "fields," that is, in allowing communicators to accomplish effective social actions with words. By laying out information in the very space-time of discursive acts, deictics figuratively array the information with the givens of the communication situation. Through such a "poetics of deixis" in addition to the franker poetics of orderliness in discourse, identities are projected, stances taken in respect of social activities, etc. I have attempted a summarizing synthesis of just how this is accomplished in a recent CA paper (Silverstein 2004).

Reply

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It is gratifying to receive such generous responses and to be read by this group of scholars, all of whom understand the paper and have captured its aims. Several note limitations in the paper: that it is focused on "a narrow terrain of denotational deixis" (Silverstein), that there is relatively little attention to gesture and speech-gesture relations (Haviland, Enfield), and that it assumes a relatively physicalist understanding of space (Rumsey). All of these observations are true but not all for the same reason. The paper deliberately focuses on practices of referring, mostly mundane. There are several reasons for this: although deictics are polyfunctional, their contribution to referring is at the heart of their structure and use. To study deixis is necessarily to study the practices in which people make reference. While the term "social deixis" is used productively in the literature to designate nonreferential aspects of deixis, I have eschewed this usage in favor of a more restrictive one: "deixis" is that variety of referring in which an object is denoted according to its relation to an indexical ground. This is a more restrictive definition because social indexicality runs the gamut from regional accent to honorification, whereas referential deixis is a "shifter." The narrow definition best captures what is distinctive about the phenomenon. The referential values of deictics have also been subject to more sustained cross-linguistic analysis than other kinds of indexicality, and the centrality of reference to such phenomena as conversational inference and semantics gives it a special cross-disciplinary salience. Therefore the focus is narrow, by design. There is little controversy regarding the existence of nonreferential indexicality, whereas there is real disagreement over the basis of referential deixis. My aim was to take the lessons of "social deixis" straight to the heart of referential deixis, in effect to show that even mundane referring is shot full of social context in ways unforeseen by either spatialism or interactionism. In arguing this, I am granting relative centrality to referential features of language but denying that those features can be analyzed apart from the social worlds in which they function. Hence, my perspective is that of a linguistic anthropologist already convinced of the importance of indexicality and committed to generalizing it to the bare bones of singular definite reference.

The relative paucity of gestural analysis is a fair critique. Enfield is right in pointing to the slow turning toward gesture for many of us, with some notable exceptions including Haviland, who has made important contributions to the topic. Haviland is also correct in reminding us that gestures, referential or not, may be just as complex as words, something he has himself demonstrated. [In the electronic edition of this issue I offer video data as a promissory note for future work.] In any case, a better treatment of gesture would improve the argument, but I do not think it would not change the nature of the challenge for a language-centered analysis, which must come to grips with the morphosyntactic facts of deictic expressions. It is also true, as Rumsey notes, that the most basic problem with the spatialist view is not the privileging of space but the reification of space, a line of critique familiar to ethnographers. Here too, rather than expand the terms to a more inclusive usage, the paper aims to take the standard spatialist position at its word and demonstrate that, for a language like Maya, it is futile *in its own terms*. If the argument succeeds, then the importance of nonreferential indexicality, nonverbal gesture, and nonphysical space will all be sustained, but they cannot be treated as supplements to the main business of denotation; they are at the very core of denotational practice.

Ide relates what I have called "construal" to what she calls "discernment" within the scope of the Japanese philosophy of *wakimae*. This is an excellent comparison consistent with the aims of the paper. *Wakimae* designates the Spr's sense of place relative to an Adr and relative to the social setting. This dual orientation is also present in deixis, through what I called "embedding." At the same time, *wakimae* is actualized in the Spr's fulfilling expectations so as to produce "harmony," whereas the analogous values for Maya Sprs would be centered on legitimacy and what I briefly described as the ethic of reference: in uttering a deictic, the Spr expresses a commitment to the existence and accessibility of the object, and in felicitous (cf. harmonious) usage the commitment is fulfilled. Ide is precisely correct in suggesting that the omission of arguments and the copula in Japanese illustrates the role of embedding, since it is only in the context of embedding that the corresponding information is recoverable. Hence even lean literal meaning

depends upon context beyond language. Finally, I am grateful that Ide has picked up on the importance of the Object: this is a rich topic for future research in linguistic anthropology (cf. Silverstein's comment). As is pointed out by both Ide and Enfield, a central aim of the paper is to open up an area for future work and show how the research can be conducted. There are alternatives to the received paradigms, and while referential practices are very subtle, they are tractable to empirical study so long as we ask the right questions.

Rumsey and Haviland both question the status of example 32 as evidence that "space" is not the basis of Maya deictic distinctions. My point is that physical space *may be* the key factor in some utterances, but it depends upon what is most relevant in the deictic field at the moment of utterance. *Space is subordinate to relevance.* When Lol reverts to a spatial reference in the example, I think it is because he judges this to be the parameter most accessible to me, not because space is linguistically unmarked or semantically basic. Rumsey and Enfield call for more comparative research. As they say, it is critical that such research be cut loose from the debilitating assumptions of traditional spatialism, and Enfield is right to call for closer collaboration with psychology. Silverstein's synthesis of the paper from his uniquely semiotic perspective is accurate, and the references he suggests are most appreciated. Just as the narrowness he cites was deliberate, so is the austere juxtaposition of frameworks, which Haviland finds somewhat caricatured. The objective is surely not to misrepresent these frameworks but to strip them to their minima in order to sharpen contrasts and force questions of integration. Haviland is probably correct in saying that "access" is a power parameter, and this suggests that the argument of the paper should be pushed even farther in future work.

Finally, Kumashiro's use of the framework to analyze human-monkey interactions is fascinating and indicates a direction for future work foreshadowed in Enfield's call for developmental psychology. Both make the provocative suggestion that rudiments of the deictic field are prelinguistic. Like human infants, monkeys point, monitor mutual attention via gaze, and evidently track other's intentionality. The terse illustration of how monkeys use the participant positions, body orientation, gestures, sounds, memory, and anticipation points toward a basic question for all of us: What difference does language make? I thank all the commentators for their generative contributions and CA for making them happen.

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