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Political Partisanship and Attitudes in a Social Identity World

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Political Partisanship and Attitudes in a Social Identity World

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University of California, Los Angeles, 2016
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The dominant theories in the study of political partisanship and policy attitude formation tend to focus on the role of either individual-level processes or large-scale political events. The series of studies that comprise this dissertation project seek to bridge that divide—highlighting the interaction of individual variation in social identities with external political events—to explain differences in partisanship and policy attitudes among members of three groups: white Catholics, Latinos, and Jewish Americans. The three studies show that the strength with which a person identifies as a member of each group is consequential to their issue priorities, and subsequently to their partisanship under conditions of partisan differentiation. Taken together, these studies provide a well-supported theoretical framework that connects and builds on research from political science, psychology, and communication studies.

The dissertation of Hovannes Abramyan is approved.

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In loving memory of

Sarkis Moskovyan (1956-2015)

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White Catholics, the Culture War, and Partisan Realignment

Abstract:

The last 50 years has seen a gradual, but significant, realignment in partisanship among white Catholics in the United States. Modern theories of realignment would suggest that Catholics—like everyone else—have sorted themselves better into more ideologically-distinct parties based on their general, individual-level political ideologies. However, the current paper makes a somewhat different argument by highlighting the role of religious identity strength as a factor in Catholic partisan alignment. Time series data strongly suggest that: 1) Catholic movement toward the Republican Party has been concentrated among white Americans with a strong Catholic identity, and 2) it has been driven by the importance they place in the issue of abortion—for which they and the Church hold especially conservative views—rather than conservative ideology in general. While conservatism has increased over time among strong Catholics, it has been a byproduct of moving toward the Republican Party rather than the cause of it. Weak Catholics, by contrast, show no such trends, further emphasizing the political importance of Catholicism as an identity.

Introduction

During the 2004 presidential election, St. Louis Archbishop Raymond Burke made international news by publicly stating that he would deny prominent Catholic and Democratic Party nominee John Kerry from receiving communion while he campaigned locally, because of his pro-choice position on abortion.[1] The incident put Kerry visibly at odds with his church, whose official position has long been staunchly pro-life, and it displayed a significant historical change in the relationship between the Democratic Party and the Catholic Church. Exit polling from the 1960 election, in which Catholic John F. Kennedy carried the Democratic nomination, saw nearly 80 percent of the Catholic vote go to the Democrats. Almost 50 years later, in 2004, Democrats lost the Catholic vote, despite nominating a fellow Catholic, receiving only 47 percent of their total votes.[2]

Preferences tend to fluctuate somewhat from election to election, reflecting public evaluations, mood on the economy, and campaign choices (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Vavreck, 2009). However, public opinion data demonstrate that among white American Catholics, preference for the Democratic Party in general has declined significantly over the last half decade. What explains this realignment of white Catholics toward the Republican Party?

The current study examines this partisan realignment of white Catholics through the lens of conflict extension and social identity theory. It finds the shift toward the Republican Party to be concentrated among Catholics with a strong religious identity—a response to the two major parties diverging on abortion and possibly other Culture War issues over the last sev-

[1]Kuhn, David Paul. 2004. "Kerry's Communion Controversy." *CBS News* http://www.cbsnews.com/news/kerrys-communion-controversy/

[2]Schneider, Bill. 2005. "The role of Catholic voters." *CNN Politics.* http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/04/08/catholic.voters/; CNN.com Election 2004: http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html

eral decades. As a result of the change in partisan affiliation, strong Catholics have adopted more conservative views on issues of lesser personal importance. The findings diverge from other theories of partisan alignment by highlight the importance of pre-political identities in establishing partisan affiliations, and the subsequent adoption of general ideologies.

Catholicism and partisanship

One of the largest and most significant sociopolitical cleavages in America over the last century has been between the country's two largest religious sects: Protestant Christians and Catholics. According to the Pew Research Center (2008), Catholics comprise nearly a quarter (23.9%) of the American population, strongly reflecting earlier waves of large-scale immigration from Ireland, Germany, Italy, and Eastern Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

For most of the 20th century, Catholics, as a group, were safely part of the Democratic coalition. The early dominance of Democratic identification has been pegged to a few different factors. One important cause was the use of explicit anti-Catholic rhetoric as a political tool. As Hofstadter (1965) detailed, American Catholics were subjects of various conspiracy theories and paranoia centered around disloyalty to country and subversion of government. This included accusations of the Pope himself working in concert with European monarchs to bring down American institutions, blurring the divisions of church and state, and spreading the Catholic creed through a well-funded and organized international effort. In service to these ends, Catholics—it was alleged, by groups such as the American Protective Association—initiated a bank run that caused the depression of 1893. Far from being a general feature of American political life, Prendergast (1999) identifies such elements of anti-Catholicism as a major tenet of Republicanism in the late 19th century. While the positioning may have attracted some non-Catholics to the party, it succeeded in pushing

members of the Catholic faith well into Democratic Party hands.

Figure 1:
The Realignment of White Catholics, 1952-2012



SOURCE: ANES 2014

Despite fluctuations over the next several decades, the Democratic stronghold persisted into the mid 20th century. As figure 1 shows, Democratic identification in American National Election Studies polling data hit its zenith in 1960. Wilson (2007) credits excitement over John F. Kennedy, himself a prominent Catholic, as rallying Catholics to his and the Democratic cause at unprecedented levels. As Wilson notes, despite expectations at the time that Kennedy's Catholicism would be a political liability, it may have actually helped him win (Converse et al., 1961). A study by Pool, Abelson and Popkin (1965) found that enthusiasm among Catholics actually translated into a net gain of 10 electoral votes for Kennedy

in 1960. Furthermore, it seemingly solidified the existing association between Catholic and Democratic identity.

The strong Democratic advantage among Catholics would not survive the entire 20th century, however. Polling data show the preference for the Democratic Party dwindled over the later half of the century and virtually disappeared by the beginning of the 21st century—especially among white Catholics. Data from the American National Elections Study, presented in figure 1, illustrate the dramatic change. White Catholic identification with the Democratic Party dropped sharply over the period for which ANES data are available, from a high point of nearly 73 percent in 1960 to a low of about 41 percent in 2002. The 30-point drop in Democratic affiliation was met with a complementary increase in Republican identification, but virtually no change in identification as a political "independent." By the 2012 election, ANES data report white Catholic identification with the Republican and Democratic Party to be virtually equal. If these trends, illustrated in figure 1 by superimposing lowess smoothers, continue on the current path, white Catholics will be increasingly more likely to self-identify as Republican than Democratic moving forward.

Theories of partisan change

How do we account for the partisan realignment of white Catholics over the last several decades? The political science literature on partisan change offers some ideas.

A major strand of research in American politics has focused on the explaining the increased correlation between reported ideology (measured on a liberal-conservative scale) and partisanship in public opinion surveys over time. In general, there is agreement that "sorting"—or the alignment of conservatives and liberals into the proper parties—has occurred over the last several decades (Mason, 2015; Abramowitz, 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Levendusky, 2009). Though, the actual effects and implications of such alignments are a

matter of some dispute (see Fiorina and Abrams (2008)). In general, however, recognition of sorting appreciates that the parties themselves have become more extreme at the elite level (Rae, 2007). Thus, if liberals and conservatives move in response to being given parties representing "a choice, rather than an echo," it implies political ideology is antecedent to partisanship—at least in the modern era. The connection between ideology and partisanship poses a "chicken-and-egg" problem, however, since it is not always obvious which precedes (and, thus, moves) the other.

Another set of literature that has focused on realignment has specifically looked at the Republicanization of white American Southerners. Once a solidly Democratic region, the South has transformed in its preference for Republican political officials and tendency, among whites, to identify as more Republican than Democratic (Black and Black, 2002; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Miller and Shanks, 1996). Interestingly, Valentino and Sears (2005) find that the South's move toward the Republican Party has been strongly driven by racial antagonism—which the authors find greater levels of in the South than outside it—independent of non-racial ideological values.

These approaches sidestep the potentially significant role of non-explicitly political identities in shaping the process of (and motivating) partisan change, however. If Catholicism, as an important social identity, has played a role in the gradual realignment of white Catholics, it suggests that more than simple sorting has taken place.

Catholicism as a politically-relevant identity

Religion plays an extraordinarily important part in the way most humans view the world and live their lives. More than 80 percent of the world's adults population claim some personal religious affiliation (Pew Research Center, 2012). In the United States, where a similar proportion of the population claim a religious identity, religious affiliation is predominantly

some form of Christianity (Pew Research Center, 2008). Thus, it is no surprise that—despite there being no official state religion in the United States—appeals to Christian values and faith often finds their way into political contests and public debates about governance.

Early studies in political behavioral recognized that membership in a religious group could play an important part in developing partisanship (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948; Campbell et al., 1960). However, these studies treated religious groups more as general sociological groups that mapped directly into the partisan landscape or that provided the basis for understanding politics in terms of group benefits (Wilson, 2007). This is in contrast with the outlook that group memberships are politically-relevant through the importance of policy attitudes.

The Social Identity Approach

One way of understanding how membership in social groups can connect to issue importance is through the social identity approach (SIA) framework, which encapsulates the contributions of both social identity theory and self-categorization theory from the field of social psychology.

Central to the social identity approach is the premise that all individuals strive to achieve and maintain a positive self-image through the maintenance of strong, favorable group memberships (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). This process involves redefining the self in terms of membership in a specific social group (depersonalization) and conforming beliefs and behaviors to those typical of the group (self-stereotyping)—as a person comes to define the self as an "interchangeable exemplar" of the group, rather than as an individual (Turner, 1985). According to self-categorization theory, the degree to which a person identifies with a specific group can vary (Oakes, 2002). And the more "prototypical" of a group a person is perceived to be, the more they are liked by other members of the group (Hogg,

1987, 1993*a*). Together, these concepts provide a theoretical explanation for group-based conformity around issues that are recognized to be of special importance and the formation of issue publics (Converse, 1964; Key, 1961).

On various issues associated with the "Culture Wars," the Catholic Church has made its own official positions very clear for its members. Prominent among the Church's positions are their "pro-life" stances against the death penalty and, especially, legalized abortion, as well as opposition to gay marriage and birth control—connected by being obstacles to the creation of life. Through its doctrine and clergy, the Catholic Church has provided its members—especially those strongly identified as a member of the Church—issues for them to care about with special importance; central among them has been abortion (Sammon, 2008).

Conflict extension and attitude/loyalty change

Even if there is some division in the general population over an issue, the major political parties still have to take divergent stances on it in order for the issue to become a partisan issue. When the parties do this, they engage in what Layman and Carsey (2002) describe as "conflict extension." This phenomenon produces greater differentiation (or polarization) between the political parties by widening the scope of issues on which they take opposing positions. It also provides a broader basis for members of issue publics to evaluate the political parties.

Sometimes conflict extension creates discordance among members of the public, whose issue preferences may conflict with the newly crafted positions of their preferred party. To resolve this incongruence, an individual can either change their policy stance or their partisan allegiance. Carsey and Layman (2006) find that when the issue is not terribly important to a person, they will simply change their issue attitude. However, if the issue is salient to

them, an individual will engage in partisan change.

On a range of Culture War issues, the major American parties have engaged in conflict extension over the past several decades (Karol, 2009; Rozell, 2008). Through a concerted effort by interest groups to control the Republican Party platform, socially conservative members of the Religious Right made the Republican Party home to a defense of "traditional values"—in opposition to the liberalization of society and toleration of non-traditional lifestyles. Catholics—at least those who adopt the official positions of the Church on such issues and consider them of central importance—would be expected to move closer to the Republican Party over time as the parties diverged on these social issues, despite having strong ties to the Democratic Party throughout most of the 20th century. On issues of lesser important, in contrast, these individuals would be expected to follow the lead of the preferred party and conform to the general Republican position, conditional on knowing what that is (Zaller, 1992; Lenz, 2013).

Theoretical implications

What explains the gradual realignment of white American Catholics? The social identity approach, outlined above, provides an alternative starting point that takes us in a different direction than the general "sorting" explanation. It begins with identity. In brief, Catholics with a strong sense of in-group identity should have a specific set of policy issues (i.e., "life issues") they strongly care about as Catholics, which allows them a manner for judging their fit within the political party system. The party that has sided with them on these salient issues will be the generally preferred party. And that party, by virtue of having stances on many issues, will provide strong Catholics a roadmap for forming attitudes on issues that are of much less central importance to them.

The suggested theory provides a few core observable implications. If the explanation is

correct, and realignment has been initiated by variations in identity strength, we should expect the data to produce the following outcomes:

1. First, realignment should be heavily, if not exclusively, a phenomenon associated with strong Catholics.

2. *Among strongly-identified Catholics*, the correlation between attitudes on salient issues and partisanship should increase over time (via partisan realignment), as should the correlation between economic attitudes and partisanship (through attitude change). In addition, the distribution of salient attitudes should not change over time, but the distribution of economic attitudes should change over time.

3. *Among weak Catholics*, we should not expect an increase in the correlation between partisanship and attitudes on the issues salient to strong Catholics over time. Further the distribution of attitudes on these issues should not change over time.

The most plausible alternative—that conservative Catholics simply sorted into the proper political party—would only find support if ideology were found to be more or less constant (but increasingly associated with partisanship) over time. On the other hand, subsequent changes in political ideology at large as a result of partisan shifting would undermine this thesis.

Data

The current study utilizes two datasets to investigate white Catholic political realignment. The first is a poll conducted by CBS News and The New York Times (2013) of the American adult population. It provides a good profile of American Catholics and their attitudes across a range of domains. The poll, conducted in the last week of February 2013, was administered to a cross section of the American adult population over both landline and cellular phones

and asked respondents about a variety of issues related to the Catholic church. The total sample included 1,629 respondents, from which there was an oversampling of self-identified Catholics. In total, there were 503 complete interviews from white Catholics.

The second data source is the aforementioned American National Elections Studies (2014) time series, which allows for an investigation of changes over time and the consequences of these changes. Data were collected regularly in various years between 1948 and 2012, including all presidential election years. Interviews for most years were conducted face-to-face, but later years also included a portion of computer-assisted interviews. The total data file includes 55,674 observations, from which 10,689 are interviews from white Catholics. The white Catholic sample size for each year varies.

Data from both surveys were filtered to include only white respondents and, where appropriate, to only people who identified as Catholic. All analyses employ survey weights provided in each dataset.

Catholicism as an identity

The CBS/NYT poll is especially useful because it asked respondents questions about their own Catholic identity, views about the church and other Catholics, and issue-specific attitudes. Toward the end of the survey, a very straightforward question was posed to those respondents who self-identified as Catholic: "Do you think of yourself as a strong Catholic, or a not very strong Catholic?" Almost every respondent (98.3%) given this question was able to provide a clear cut response, with only a handful answering that they did not know. Of those who provided a response, slightly more than half (56.4%) identified themselves as being strong Catholics. The distribution of responses is interesting, as are the differences

between the strong and weak[3] Catholics.

One particularly strong correlate of identity strength is the frequency with which a person attends mass. Figure 2 shows that strong Catholics report more frequent attendance, relative to weak identifiers. Taken at their word, the majority of strong Catholics attend church *at least* once a week—sometimes more. The majority of weak Catholics, on the other hand, attend either only once or twice per month, or less often. In fact, the plurality only attend a mass a few times per year. The two variables have a Gamma correlation of 0.64.[4] Thus, it seems fair to interpret frequency of church attendance as an indicator of the strength of an individual Catholic's religious identity.

Because the ANES time series does not include a question regarding religious identity strength, designation of "strong" and "weak" Catholics in analyses using the ANES data is estimated using religious affiliation and reported church attendance. This required, first, running a logistic regression on strength of Catholicism—a dichotomous variable—using the CBS/NYT data. In one model, predictors included frequency of church attendance (continuous) and a set of demographic variables.[5] A second model only included church attendance. Goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the first model does not provide a significant improvement over the second. Nor does inclusion of the demographic variables add any additional

[3] "Weak" is a descriptor of identity strength that I use throughout the text to refer to respondents who self-identified as a "not very strong Catholic." It is unknown how many respondents who chose this answer on the survey item would self-describe as a "weak Catholic," but the term is used for the sake of simplicity and because it is a designation that is meant to capture the relative strength of identity among members of the group.

[4] Gamma coefficients reflects the association of two ordinal-level measures in a crosstabulation and range from -1 to 1.

[5] The demographic variables are: age (continuous), gender (dichotomous), education (continuous), voter registration status (dichotomous), marriage status (dichotomous), and whether or not the respondent has children (dichotmous).

Figure 2:
Church Attendance of Strong and Weak Catholics



SOURCE: CBS/NYT 2013

statistically-significant correlates of identity strength beyond church attendance. Thus the coefficients from the second model (which includes only church attendance) are used to estimate the probability that a respondent who has identified as Catholic is also a strong Catholic. The logistic function estimating the probability of being a strong Catholic is:

$$\mathrm{F(X)} = {}^{1}\!/_{1+e^{-(-1.7947+1.0664X)}}$$

Individuals estimated to be more likely a strong Catholic than weak Catholic (i.e., probability greater than 0.5) are categorized as such. All others are categorized as weak Catholics.[6]

[6]The rate of successfully predicting group membership using this formula with CBS/NYT data, where actual strength of Catholic identity is known, is 73.5%. Those incorrectly identified as weak Catholics were 17.2% of the total. And those incorrectly identified as strong Catholics were only 9.3% of the total. Thus, estimates using strong Catholics in ANES data are likely conservative estimates because of the added "noise." A demographic profile of the 2012 ANES data (the most recent year) by estimated identity strength of Catholics demonstrates a very close resemblance to those from the CBS/NYT dataset (table 1), which

Table 1 provides a demographic picture of white Catholics, split by strength of identity, and a limited comparison to the non-Catholic white sample from the survey. It shows that, on average strong Catholics are older than both weak Catholics (by about 9 years) and non-Catholics (by roughly 7 years). They also comprised of a higher share of females (55.7%) than either weak Catholics (43.9%) or non-Catholics (52.5%), and college graduates (by roughly 10 percentage points compared to weak Catholics and 3 points relative to non-Catholics). A greater share also report being registered to vote—95.1%, compared to 81.5% for weak Catholics and 89.8% for non-Catholics. And finally, strong Catholics are more likely than weak Catholics to be married (57.3% to 45.5%) and have children (72.7% to 64.1%). Unfortunately, the non-Catholic portion of the sample was not asked either of these final two demographic questions. A point worth noting is that, of the three groups in table 1, the two Catholic groups are the *least* similar across all demographic measures.

Table 1:
Demographic Profile of Catholics and Non-Catholics

	Weak Catholics	Strong Catholics	Non-Catholics
Average age (years)	46.1	54.6	47.4
Percent female	43.9%	55.7%	52.5%
Percent college graduates	23.8%	32%	29.3%
Percent registered to vote	81.5%	95.1%	89.8%
Percent married	45.5%	57.3%	n/a
Percent with children	64.1%	72.7%	n/a

SOURCE: CBS/NYT 2013

used an explicit identity-strength survey item. This further supports the use of the religious attendance variable as a proxy.

Defenders of the faith: Religious and political attitudes

As one would expect, strong Catholics are stronger supporters of the Church as an institution, and stronger believers in both official Church doctrine and official Church positions on political matters. Figure 2 shows that the majority (53.7%) of strong Catholics did not question the Church's authority after a recent series of sexual abuse accusations directed at officials and allegations of a cover up by Church leadership. In contrast, only slightly more than a quarter of weak Catholics were unquestioning of Church authority after the widespread news and media attention. On another issue, the 2011 decision by the Church to change the English translation of the liturgy during mass, strong Catholics were again more supportive of the institution. About six-in-ten strong Catholics expressed approval of the change, while only about half of weak Catholics thought it was a good idea.

Figure 2 also shows strong Catholics as more likely than weak Catholics to believe in specific non-material elements of Catholic dogma. Official Roman Catholic doctrine affirms both papal infallibility and the validity of literal transubstantiation. Papal infallibility refers to the belief that the Pope, as the divinely authorized successor to the Chair of the Apostle Peter, is excluded the possibility of speaking in error when delivering revelation guided by the Holy Spirit (First Vatican Council, 1870). This is a belief neither strong nor weak Catholics generally endorse, but the data do show a somewhat larger share of strong Catholics subscribing to the view (42.6%, compared to 34.2%). This difference, however, is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 2.59$, p = 0.46). The same substantive difference is seen with belief in transubstantiation—the assertion that the bread and wine used in Catholic mass *literally* become the body and blood of Jesus Christ during the ritual sacrament of the Eucharist (U.S. Catholic Church, 2003). Only 31% of weak Catholics personally accept this official position of the church, while roughly half of strong Catholics do. This difference is statistically significant.

Figure 3:
Defense of the Catholic Church and Official Doctrine



SOURCE: CBS/NYT 2013

These findings suggest that Catholics with a stronger sense of in-group identity are more receptive to adopting the general views of the Church as an institution. One could reasonably suspect that this phenomenon extends to adopting the Church's cultural values and its specific political positions, when those are clear. Certainly stronger Catholics are more likely

to know the positions of the Church. Thus, for people with a self-conception defined by their own strong sense of Catholicism, we might expect political issues of primary importance to be influenced by the Catholic Church. In general, these have been social, or more broadly "Culture War," issues—particularly abortion. The data also support this conclusion.

Life issues: Abortion and the death penalty

Abortion and the death penalty are considered "life" issues by the Catholic Church. This is to say that with each issue, the Church views the stakes involved as the preservation of life as the desired outcome, versus the termination of life. The official positions are clearly established in the Catechism's section on human life, found in Section Two, Article Five of Part Three (U.S. Catholic Church, 2003). Catholic opposition to abortion in all forms stems from a view that "[h]uman life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception" (2270). And on the issue of capital punishment, the death penalty is only acceptable when "this is the only practicable way to defend the lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor" (2267)—thus, in the act of protecting a threatened life, rather than as an alternative to other available punishments.

On abortion, strong Catholics are more pro-life than are weaker group identifiers. As table 2 shows, only 11.4% of weak Catholics think that abortion should not be available at all to those who want it. In contrast, more than a quarter of strong Catholics (28.2%) agree with this position, and would ban it under all circumstances. The plurality of strong Catholics (42.7%) think there should be limits to its availability, but would not prefer it be outright restricted. This is in contrast to the plurality view of weak Catholics (47.6%), who think abortion should be generally available. Interestingly, non-Catholics more closely resemble strong Catholics in their views on outlawing abortion than they do weak Catholics.

The CBS/New York Times poll provides a glimpse into the positions Catholics would

like church leadership to take on several issues. Because the survey was conducted after the announcement that Pope Benedict would be stepping down from his position, but before a new pope (Pope Francis) was elected by Church cardinals, it asked respondents which positions the next Pope should have. On the question of whether the Pope should be for or against legalized abortion, the difference in views between strong and weak Catholics is roughly similar to that found with personal attitudes. As shown in the second row of table 2, there is roughly a 17-point difference in attitudes between the two groups, with strong Catholics being much more favorable to a pope who is against abortion than are weak Catholics.

Table 2:
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on "Life" Issues

	Weak Catholics	Strong Catholics	Non-Catholics
Abortion should not be permitted	11.4%	28.2%	24.9%
The next Pope should be against legalized abortion	47.4%	64.1%	n/a
Oppose the death penalty	19.1%	35.3%	21.9%
The next Pope should be against the death penalty	51.6%	59.9%	n/a

SOURCE: CBS/NYT 2013

On the death penalty, again, strong Catholics are more likely to support the official position of the Church than are weak Catholics. Catholics, both strong and weak, tend to be personally in favor of the death penalty. But, as table 2 shows, strong Catholics are, on average, less favorable toward the policy than are weak Catholics or non-Catholics. Only about one-in-five (19.1%) weak Catholics oppose the death penalty, while more than a third (35.3%) of strong Catholics are against it. Differences between the two groups on this issue are also clear when looking at responses regarding the position they prefer the Pope to have. Majorities in both groups prefer a pope who is against the death penalty, but a larger share of strong Catholics (about 10 percentage points more) have this preference.

Attitudes on both issues show strong Catholics to be more pro-life than their weakly-

attached peers—which makes their views more congruent with those of the Church. Interestingly, for both groups there is a noticeable disconnect between average personal views on the issues and the average desired position of the Pope. This suggests that both groups generally prefer a Church that is more pro-life, despite many members of the Church deviating somewhat from this official position.

Sexuality issues: Same-sex marriage and birth control

Same-sex marriage and birth control are topics about sexuality that also have a connection to life, according to the Catholic Church. On the issue of same-sex marriage, the Church stands in opposition—only recognizing unions between a man and a woman. In the Catechism (U.S. Catholic Church, 2003), homosexuality is described as "contrary to the natural law," and homosexual acts as "[closing] the sexual act to the gift of life" (2357). The Catholic Church similarly condemns the use of birth control. According to Pope Paul VI, birth control is a "direct interruption of the generative process." In *Humanae Vitae* (The Vatican, 1968), he writes: "[E]xcluded is any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or as a means."

In general, Catholics tend to be more liberal than they are conservative on the issue of same-sex marriage as seen in table 3. But weak Catholics are especially liberal on the issue. Two thirds of weak Catholics (65.9%) think that same-sex marriages should be legal, a position that only about half of strong Catholics (53%) support. Although both groups are, on average, more supportive of same-sex marriage than they are in opposition, differences between the groups on this issue are most stark when considering their margins of support. Among weak Catholics, there is a 37.5 percentage point margin in favor of legalization. On the other hand, among strong Catholics, that margin is only 10.7 points. Non-Catholics, on average, resemble strong Catholics; they generally support same-sex marriage being legal,

but their support is not as strong as is found among weak Catholics. There was, unfortunately, no question asking survey respondents what position they preferred the Pope to have on this issue. However, if the previous patterns are any indication, it would be expected that enthusiasm for a pope who favors marriage equality is greatest among weakly-attached Catholics.

Table 3:
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on Same-Sex Marriage

	Weak Catholics	Strong Catholics	non-Catholics
Legal	65.9%	53%	51.6%
Not legal	28.4%	42.3%	42.7%
Don't know	5.7%	4.6%	5.7%

SOURCE: CBS/NYT 2013

Table 4 demonstrates that neither strong nor weak Catholics tend to oppose birth control, pace official Catholic teachings. However, once again, strong Catholics are more likely than weak Catholics to hold personal views that are in line with those of the Church. About one-in-five (19.6%) strong Catholics oppose the use of artificial methods of birth control, compared to the roughly one-in-ten (9%) of weak Catholics with this position. When asked what position they preferred the next Pope to have on the issue, the share of individuals in each group whose answers reflected an anti-birth control stance increased about 10 points to 18.1% and 30.4%, respectively. Non-Catholics were not asked either of the questions regarding birth control.

Table 4:
Catholic Views on Birth Control

	Weak Catholics	Strong Catholics	All Catholics
Oppose	9%	19.6%	n/a
The next Pope should be against it	18.1%	30.4%	n/a

SOURCE: CBS/NYT 2013

Despite having personal views that are less conservative on the two sexuality issues than

those of the Church, strong Catholics are still quite a bit more likely to hold attitudes congruent with official Vatican positions than are weak Catholics. It should be noted, though, that conservative Church positions on sexuality issues tend to be less strongly shared by even the strong Catholics compared to attitudes on life issues.

Trends in partisanship over time

Given that life issues appear to bind strong Catholics more strongly to the conservative political views of the Church on life issues, we might expect that these are the issues responsible for moving Catholics closer to the Republican Party. If so, we would expect to find that partisan realignment has been driven by the outflow of *strong Catholics* to the Republican Party, and not weak Catholics movement.

Figure 4 supports the expectation that political realignment has been a "strong Catholic" phenomenon. In the plot, the rate of Republican identification is mapped over time, separately for weak and strong Catholics. While both groups show fluctuation moving from one survey to the next, the individual trends are distinguishable. Lowess smoothers superimposed to the raw figures from ANES surveys show a widening gap in Republican identification among strong and weak Catholics in the later part of the 20th century and early 21st century. This widening gap has been driven by a change in identification among strong Catholics, a majority of whom preferred the Republican label to the Democratic label during the last presidential election year. By contrast, weak Catholics in 2012 identified as Republican at a similar rate (32.1%) as they did in the 1950s.

At the start of the time series, Republican identification among white Catholics was generally low. In 1952, the share of strong and weak Catholics who identified as Republican (or who leaned Republican) was 25.9% and 26.7%, respectively. The difference is insignificant both substantively—these numbers represent roughly a quarter of membership from each

Figure 4:
Republican Identification Among White Strong Catholics, 1952-2012

SOURCE: ANES 2012

group—and statistically—$\chi^2 = 0$, p = 0.99. Although there is some fluctuation from survey to survey, in general, these proportions remained fairly steady going into the 1970s, when trend lines show Republicanism began to increase somewhat among both groups.

ANES data suggest that starting in the 1970s both strong and weak Catholic identifiers moved in the direction of identification with the Republican Party, but with different patterns and in different amounts. For strong Catholics, this is a trend that shows continuity through 2012—the last year for which ANES data are available. However, the story with weak Catholics is more complicated. Rates of Republicanism leveled off for weak Catholics in the 1990s and remained steady for the next two decades at near one third. In 2012, the

percentage of weak Catholics who identified as Republican was 32.1%—an increase of about 5 points since 1952, which is a statistically non-significant difference ($\chi^2 = 0.58$, p = 0.45) that is due in part to a smaller sample size in early dataset but is also substantively small. In other words, Republican identification among weak Catholics is not much different at the end of the time series than at the beginning, despite some year-to-year volatility.

In stark contrast, strong Catholics have moved decidedly toward the Republican Party over the last 60 years. In fact, Republicanism went from the minority partisan affiliation of strong Catholics in 1952 (25.9%) to the majority political identity in 2012 (57.2%). This difference of 31.3 points is not only significant in substantive terms, it also reaches statistical significance ($\chi^2 = 45.5$, p = 0)—allowing us to reject the conclusion that the monumental growth in Republicanism over this period is an artifact of imprecise estimates. According to the data, Republican partisan preference now characterizes white Catholics with a strong sense of religious identity.

The point can be made stronger by considering that, in 2012, strong and weak Catholics were mirror opposites in terms of partisanship. According to the data, 57.2% of strong Catholics preferred the Republican Party, while 58.3% of weak Catholics preferred the Democratic Party. The share of strong Catholics preferring the Democratic Party was 32.2%, and the share of weak Catholics preferring the Republican Party was 32.1%. The partisan differences between the average strong and weak Catholic are glaring.

Natural sorting? Or issue-based movement?

Explaining the reason for the partisan realignment of strong Catholics requires more work, however. As an earlier section made clear, general ideology and partisanship have become more closely correlated over time in the American public at large. Thus, one might argue that the shift made by strong Catholics toward the Republican Party is a product of natural

Figure 5:
Self-Reported Ideology of Strong and Weak Catholics



SOURCE: CBS/NYT 2013

sorting—conservatives flowing into the Republican Party and liberals into the Democratic Party—rather than issue-based movement, as this paper hypothesizes.

Consistent with both theories, strong Catholics do see themselves as more generally conservative than do weak Catholics. Figure 5 displays the distribution of self-reported ideology among both groups along a single dimension of liberalism–conservatism. It shows a normal distribution for the ideology of weak Catholics, with a peak at the "moderate" label and roughly equal proportions falling on the liberal end of the scale as the conservative end. The distribution for strong Catholics, however, is skewed toward the conservative end of the ideology scale. While the plurality also identify as moderate, there is a smaller proportion of strong Catholics in each category *except* the two conservative ones. The difference is most striking when comparing proportions who self-identify as "very conservative"; a near 11-point difference (16.4% compared to 5.7%).

If natural sorting produced the difference in partisanship among strong and weak Catholics

Figure 6:
Self-Reported Ideology of Strong and Weak Catholics, Election Years 1972-2012



SOURCE: ANES 2012

found in contemporary polls, we should expect the time series data to show a constant ideological difference among the groups over the past several decades. On the contrary, figure 6 shows that, over the 40 years for which the ANES has measured ideological self-placement, strong Catholics have become more conservative. Weak Catholics, on the other hand, have remained constant in terms of their ideological self-assessment. Regressing ideological self-placement on time reveals a small, but statistically significant increase in conservatism among strong Catholics and essentially no change for weak Catholics.

So how have strong Catholics become more conservative? It has not been on the issue of abortion. Figure 7 reveals that, over the last several decades, abortion attitudes have remained more or less consistent, with strong Catholics expressing much stronger pro-life

Figure 7:
Abortion Attitudes of Strong and Weak Catholics, 1980-2012



SOURCE: ANES 2012

attitudes than have weak Catholics. This finding mirrors previous research on abortion attitudes (Converse and Markus, 1979; Carsey and Layman, 2006; Adams, 1997). But on the economic issue of a federally-guaranteed job (the other issue for which attitudes are consistently measured in the ANES time series), strong Catholics have increasingly adopted the more conservative position of the Republican Party. Figure 8 shows a statistically significant increase in conservatism on the economic issue over the 40-year period the ANES has measured these attitudes—but *only* among strong Catholics. Weak Catholics, who have not left the Democratic Party, have not changed their stance on this issue as a group.

Figure 8:
Attitudes on a Guaranteed Job Among Strong and Weak Catholics, 1972-2012



SOURCE: ANES 2012

The importance of Catholic identity to issue importance

The data do not support the interpretation that the increased correlation between ideology and partisanship is a result of strong Catholics conforming all political attitudes to those of the party. Neither do they support the theory that strong Catholics conformed party identification to broad, consistently conservative political views. Rather, the data suggest that strong Catholics have increasingly conformed party affiliation with long-held views regarding abortion. Increased economic conservatism over time appears to be epiphenomenal.

To demonstrate the centrality of Catholic identity strength to the realignment process described above, tables 5 and 6 present coefficients from 1980 and 2012 OLS models of

Table 5:
Predictors of Party Identification (Republicanism) Among Catholics, 1980

	(1) Partial model	(2) Full model
Strong Catholic? (0/1)	0.032	0.030
	(0.041)	(0.111)
Abortion attitude		0.176*
		(0.104)
Guaranteed job attitude		0.244**
		(0.112)
Age	−0.002	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Male (0/1)	0.022	0.031
	(0.039)	(0.043)
Education	0.049***	0.044***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Registered to vote? (0/1)	−0.042	−0.038
	(0.048)	(0.056)
Married? (0/1)	0.046	0.004
	(0.043)	(0.047)
Children? (0/1)	−0.015	−0.015
	(0.043)	(0.048)
Strong Catholic x Abortion attitude		−0.141
		(0.130)
Strong Catholic x Guaranteed job attitude		0.055
		(0.148)
Constant	0.285***	0.191
	(0.092)	(0.121)
Observations	273	223
R^2	0.086	0.160
Adjusted R^2	0.062	0.117
Residual Std. Error	0.308 (df = 265)	0.305 (df = 211)
F Statistic	3.572*** (df = 7; 265)	3.664*** (df = 11; 211)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 6:
Predictors of Party Identification (Republicanism) Among Catholics, 2012

	(1) Partial model	(2) Full model
Strong Catholic? (0/1)	0.099***	0.006
	(0.037)	(0.101)
Abortion attitude		0.046
		(0.079)
Guaranteed job attitude		0.562***
		(0.101)
Age	0.0001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male (0/1)	−0.074*	−0.047
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Education	0.007	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Registered to vote? (0/1)	0.065	0.040
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Married? (0/1)	0.080**	0.023
	(0.039)	(0.038)
Children? (0/1)	−0.052	−0.046
	(0.042)	(0.041)
Strong Catholic x Abortion attitude		0.198*
		(0.108)
Strong Catholic x Guaranteed job attitude		−0.066
		(0.140)
Constant	0.340***	0.057
	(0.108)	(0.119)
Observations	1,099	1,024
R^2	0.062	0.259
Adjusted R^2	0.042	0.228
Residual Std. Error	0.354 (df = 314)	0.323 (df = 271)
F Statistic	2.988*** (df = 7; 314)	8.593*** (df = 11; 271)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

partisanship, respectively.[7] The first column of table 5 presents a model that regresses partisanship on demographics and strength of Catholic identity based on 1980 ANES data. It shows that a person's strength of Catholic identity did not, during that time, affect their partisan affiliation. Once issue attitudes are added to the full model (column 2), they are shown to provide some explanatory power but their influence is not moderated by identity strength.

By 2012, identity strength had become an important part in explaining partisan affiliation among Catholics. Column 1 of table 6 presents results from regressing partisanship on demographics and Catholic identity strength. Unlike results using the 1980 data, here identity strength is independently correlated with partisan affiliation. Adding issue attitudes and interactions to the model (column 2) eliminates the independent effect of identity, but reveals that identity strength moderates the influence of abortion attitudes. In other words, abortion is only a significant factor in influencing partisanship for strong (and not weak) Catholics. Attitudes toward the idea of having a federally-guaranteed job are also associated with partisanship, but the effect is not dependent on (or changed by) identity strength.

These results should be interpreted within the context of changing distributions among the variables. As figure 7 demonstrated, abortion attitudes have not changed much, if at all, over the past three decades for either strong or weak Catholics. However, over time abortion attitudes became correlated with partisan affiliation for strong Catholics—who hold relatively conservative attitudes, in line with both the Church and the Republican Party—but not weak Catholics. On the other hand, economic attitudes did undergo some change, but only among strong Catholics—putting them in agreement with the Republican Party in this domain. Were the increased conservatism on this issue the cause of realignment rather than a product of it, table 6 should have shown a positive and significant coefficient

[7]Results from 1980 and 2012 data are compared because they reflect the earliest and latest years that ANES data include measures of attitudes about abortion and guaranteed jobs.

for the interaction between the policy attitude and being a strong Catholic. It did not.

Discussion

The data demonstrate a number of things about the attitudes and political realignment of American white Catholics. First, strongly and weakly-identified Catholics display different dispositions on important issues for which the Church has taken a position. Central among them, in terms of political relevance, are "life" issues—namely abortion. Strong Catholics are (and have been in recent decades) much more likely to be pro-life than are weak Catholics. Over the last several decades, as the major political parties have extended partisan conflict to include social issues, strong Catholics have aligned increasingly closer to the Republican Party. No such realignment has taken place for weak Catholics, however.

The direction of causation is straightforward, given that only the political climate and partisanship rates have changed. Abortion attitudes have remained constant. There is not the same obvious interpretation of causation for the relationship between economic attitudes and partisanship, however, since the data show they move together. Thus, inferring causation required looking to more closely into the manner in which the policy attitude and partisanship are correlated.

This paper's findings suggest that partisan realignment has not been a matter of straightforward sorting, but rather it is a phenomenon heavily reliant on the strong sense of identity many Catholics have. Pre-political social identities often become political by making some issues very salient to group members. As the earlier review made clear, there is evidence that incongruence between a person's attitude on salient issues and their party's stance can lead to partisan change. The current paper adds to this body of evidence using the example of pro-life Catholics and their gradual shift to the Republican Party.

A further test of the thesis presented in this paper would come about if the Catholic Church changed, or moderated, its position on abortion. Were this to happen—and absent any concerted efforts to alienate Catholics from one of the parties—we should expect the association between identity strength and partisanship to attenuate. One option for future study would be to simulate this scenario experimentally, by either eliminating partisan conflict on life issues or reversing it.

The Latino Ideology-Partisanship Paradox: How Immigration Mediates the Relationship between Ethnic Identity and Party

Abstract:

A frequent claim from conservative pundits is that strong religiosity and desire for economic mobility among Latinos makes them "natural Republicans." By and large, however, Latinos tend to identify with, and vote for, the Democratic Party. In fact, the extent of Democratic affiliation exceeds that of liberal ideology, creating something of a paradox. The current paper approaches this paradox by investigating the role ethnic identity plays in motivating Democratic Party preference through liberal immigration attitudes. Results demonstrate that immigration is particularly important to Latinos—especially those with a strong sense of panethnic identity, who tend to view the issue in terms of its effect on coethnics. These individuals maintain stronger affiliation with the Democratic Party entirely because they are attracted to the party's closer congruence on the issue of immigration.

Introduction

A common notion in Republican circles is that Latinos represent a natural constituency for their party, despite their general proclivity to identify with—and vote for—the Democratic Party (de la Garza and Cortina, 2007). Failures to attract Latino support at a large scale—for example, Mitt Romney only received about 27% of the Latino vote in 2012 (Lopez and Taylor, 2012)—are often seen more as failures of campaigns to mobilize, rather than disapproval of Republican values or policy positions. Thus, one often hears about the need for outreach that involves more effective messaging of conservative values, with the thought that they are congruent with the presumed interests and values of Latinos—particularly, economic mobility and social conservatism rooted in religious values. This paper investigates an alternative hypothesis that challenges the underlying assumptions of the above prescription.

The assumption that Latinos would prioritize specific economic or social values and ignore others (for which the Republican Party may be strongly at odds with the preferences of most Latinos) is central to the diagnosis and prescription, yet it requires evidence. An alternative hypothesis is that the issue of immigration—an issue on which Latinos tend to be liberal (at odds with the Republican Party) and one that affects Latinos disproportionately—provides an especially strong barrier for Latino Republican support. This provides a reasonable counter theory to the "poor messaging" argument. In fact, conservative messages on the issue of immigration have tended to emphasize the need for restriction. Thus, the message itself—rather than deficiencies in its reach—may be a strong reason Latinos are much less likely to identify as Republican than they are to be Democratic.

The current paper examines the murky link between ideological values and partisanship among Latinos, and the crucial role that attitudes about immigration play. It examines the role of panethnic identity—specifically, the *strength* with which a person identifies as a Latino—in creating the link. In examining experimental and cross-sectional data, strong

support emerges for several conclusions. First, immigration is very personal for many (but not all) Latinos. Those with the greatest sense of ingroup identity are more favorable to immigration, but only when understood to positively affect coethnics. Second, these same individuals are much more likely to name immigration as the most important issue facing the country than are Latinos with a weak panethnic identity, and are more likely to hold views on the issue congruent with the Democratic Party's more liberal position. And finally, a deeper analysis of the drivers of Latino partisanship shows that the positive relationship between ethnic identity strength and Democratic Party affiliation is completely mediated by immigration attitudes. In other words, Latinos are drawn to the Democratic Party more as their attachment to their own ethnic group increases because their immigration attitudes become more consistent with those of the party.

The implications are clear. Republicans are unlikely to make significant inroads with Latinos absent either a large shift in the party's perceived handling of immigration, or a significant change in the priorities of Latino voters. However, given the close link between prioritization of the issue of immigration and ethnic identity, the former may be more readily obtainable than the latter.

The Latino ideology-partisanship paradox

Data from a 2010 national survey conducted by NBC/MSNBC/Telemundo (2010) provide a good illustration of the Latino ideology-partisanship paradox. The study demonstrates a strongly skewed distribution in partisan identification among Latinos, especially in contrast to the partisanship of whites. A side-by-side comparison of the data is presented in figure 1, showing that whites are somewhat more likely to identify as Republican than Democratic and Latinos, in stark contrast, are overwhelmingly self-identified with the Democratic Party. In fact, the most common Latino response to the question, which provided a 7-

point scale of partisan identification, was "Strong Democrat." Roughly a quarter of Latino respondents provided this answer. One wonders, then, why Latinos—supposed "natural Republicans"—are so averse to identifying themselves as such.

Figure 1:
Partisanship, by Race



Source: NBC 2010

One obvious possibility is that Latinos see themselves as much more liberal politically, despite the conventional wisdom about Latinos' supposed conservative values or even any *actual* conservatism in policy views. If this is the case, their overwhelming likelihood to self-identify as Democratic would be congruent with their general identification as liberal. Table 1 investigates this possibility, breaking down self-reported ideology (in five categories) from the NBC survey by the race of the survey respondent. It shows is that, indeed, Latinos are more likely to self-classify on the liberal end of the ideological spectrum than the conservative end, but not overwhelmingly so. More to the point, the distribution in subjective ideology is not nearly as skewed as is the distribution in partisanship. Thus, there does appear to be something of a disconnect between general political ideology (at least as self-categorized) and partisanship among Latinos. In contrast, whites are skewed to-

ward conservative self-identification, which is consistent with their greater affinity for the Republican Party. Gamma coefficients—which are indicators of correlation between ordinal variables—demonstrate the point clearer. The correlation between ideology and partisanship is 0.51 (moderately strong) for whites, but only 0.20 (relatively weak) for Latinos. In other words, the much greater propensity among Latinos to align with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party is not so strongly a reflection of their own understanding of their ideological disposition. Indeed, there is a sense in which we might expect Latinos to be more Republican—based on their own understanding of their general ideology—than they actually are.

Table 1:
Percentage Self-Reporting each Ideological Category, by Race

	Whites	Latinos
Very liberal	7	9
Somewhat liberal	14	23
Moderate	36	39
Somewhat conservative	23	18
Very conservative	21	12

Source: NBC 2010

A possible explanation for the paradox is that Latinos evaluate the parties, and determine their preferences, in large part with respect to the issue of immigration. To investigate this possibility, the NBC/MSNBC/Telemundo (2010) poll also provides some insight. One question in the survey (Q9_1) asks respondents which party they think would do a better job handling immigration. Table 2 shows the difference in responses by race. Latino respondents were 25-percentage points more likely to believe that Democrats would do a better job dealing with the issue than they were to believe Republicans would best handle the issue. Put differently, Latinos identified Democrats as better on the issue by a 3-to-1 margin. By contrast, a plurality of whites said Republicans would better handle the issue. The difference in the share choosing Republicans compared to those choosing Democrats was

about 9-percentage points. Whites and Latinos hold noticeably different opinions on the matter, but importantly Latinos as a group view Democrats much more favorably than they view Republicans with regard to the issue of immigration.

Table 2:
Which Party Would Do a Better Job Dealing with Immigration? (Percent)

	Whites	Latinos
Democrats	18	37
Republicans	27	12
Both the same	26	27
Neither would do a good job	26	22
DK	4	03

Source: NBC 2010

Worth noting from table 2 is that about half of both whites and Latinos think both parties would either do an equally good or bad job. In the case of white respondents, those portions are equal (26%) and together make up the majority of responses (52%). For Latinos, the proportions are also somewhat similar (27% and 22%, respectively), and together are nearly half (49%) of the responses given. If attitudes on immigration have a strong bearing on partisanship for either group, one might expect dissatisfaction with the parties to be high. In such a state, partisan affiliation itself might be fragile and subject to change if one party emerged as clearly better than the other.

How can we know the extent to which evaluations of the parties on immigration policy drive partisanship for either whites or Latinos? Bivariate gamma correlations in table 3 show the association between answers to the previous question and partisanship. They also show the correlations between answers on similar questions regarding economic mobility and morality issues and partisanship. The first column of table 3 looks at just the white respondents and shows that evaluations of the parties on all three of the issue domains have very high correlations with partisanship (≥ 0.85). In addition, the correlations are all roughly similar—in other words, no single area seems to correlate with partisan identity more than

another in any substantive manner. The correlations for Latinos, however, do not show these same patterns.

For Latinos, party evaluations on immigration policy more strongly correlate with partisanship than do evaluations based on the other issues. The only correlation of a similar magnitude as those found for whites is reflected in partisan evaluations on immigration (0.82). The correlations for evaluations on economic mobility and morality are still moderately high and in the expected direction, but are also noticeably smaller—by 5 and 14 points, respectively. These statistics show that the way in which Latinos evaluate the parties on immigration coheres quite strongly to their partisan proclivities, and it has a stronger relation to party identification than evaluations on the handling of two big domains of domestic policy. In suggesting these other issues have limited impact on preferences, the data are consistent with de la Garza and Cortina (2007), who find that upward economic mobility and social conservatism had no effect on the odds of voting for George W. Bush in 2004.

Table 3:
Gamma Correlations for Party Identification and Evaluations on Policy Areas

	Whites	Latinos
Immigration	0.85	0.82
Economic mobility	0.87	0.77
Morality	0.89	0.68

Source: NBC 2010

These data begin to form a picture of the landscape, but by no means do they tell a detailed account of the nature of Latino partisanship or its determinants. Deeper study and more data are required to answer the question of how Latino partisanship is influenced by immigration attitudes. Similarly, these data do not tell us why some Latinos might care more about immigration than they do other issues. Do some Latinos have generalized sympathies for immigrants of all kinds? Or, are sympathies limited to coethnics and driven by individual-level variation in factors like ethnic identity? The current paper tackles these

questions.

Determinants of Latino immigration attitudes

While the clear majority of work on Latino attitudes regarding immigration substantiates the suspicion that Latinos are mostly supportive of permissive immigration policies, some research paints a more complex picture. For example, despite overwhelming group-level support for lenient immigration policies, Latinos have been evenly divided on the belief that there should be sanctions for employers who hire undocumented immigrants (Cain and Kiewiet, 1987). This indicates that the nature of the policy in question introduces some variation in attitudes, beyond whatever latent attitudes might exist surrounding immigration. Quite a bit of scholarship in the area of Latino public opinion has attempted to figure out how Latinos develop their political attitudes and behaviors, and much of that work has focused on immigration attitudes in particular.

Demographic factors

Among the sociological covariates of immigration attitudes are certain demographics, like age, nativity, and ethnicity. Interestingly, older Latinos (Hood, Morris and Shirkey, 1997) and those who belong to the second and third generation (Binder, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1997; Abrajano and Singh, 2009) tend to have more restrictionist views than younger and first-generation Latinos. Regarding family origin, the findings are mixed; some scholarship shows variation in immigration attitudes within and across groups (de la Garza et al., 1993; Branton, 2007), while other work finds no substantial differences across national origin groups (Hood, Morris and Shirkey, 1997).

Levels of acculturation and education have also been shown to correlate with immigra-

tion attitudes. There is evidence that Latinos who are more strongly assimilated to the mainstream values and culture of the United States are more likely to have restrictionist views than those who are more weakly assimilated (Hood, Morris and Shirkey, 1997). This is supported by recent work on anti-immigration attitudes that indicates Latino restrictionist attitudes are fueled to an extent by a sense of attachment to an American identity and nostalgia for the past (Vega, 2014). Conversely, some have argued that Latinos with much closer ties to their ancestral culture and identity typically hold more positive views toward immigration (de la Garza et al., 1993; Branton, 2007). This is consistent with the finding that conservative Latinos who hold negative attitudes towards immigrants are more likely to engage in a process of social-distancing between themselves as Americans and immigrants as outsiders (Vega, 2014). With regard to education, some scholars have found that more highly educated Latinos tend to show more favorable views on immigration (Abrajano and Singh, 2009; Fraga et al., 2012). Though more educated Latinos may themselves be more acculturated to mainstream American norms, the independent effects of these factors on immigration attitudes appear to push in different directions.

Economic concerns

Latinos also have some similarities with non-Latinos in the development of immigration attitudes. Many studies on general public views regarding immigration find only limited support for the thesis that economic concerns motivate attitudes, and the impact when present is relatively low (Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Citrin et al., 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Citrin and Sides, 2008). In fact, although Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008) find that news media reports on the costs associated with immigration tend to increase white opposition to immigration of Latin Americans, attitudes toward European immigration are unaffected. This suggests that economic concerns might reveal themselves within the

context of other, more central considerations, such as the race of the immigrants. However, a few studies do find robust support for the thesis of labor market determinants across countries (see, for example, Mayda (2006) and Scheve and Slaughter (2001)), indicating that economic concerns do seem to matter in particular contexts. Likewise, Latinos expressing greater concern for their economic situation tend to hold more conservative views on the issue (Hood, Morris and Shirkey, 1997). Moreover, Latinos who feel that immigrants take away jobs from others and aggravate the economy also generally hold more restrictionist views (Binder, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1997). Despite these findings, additional research indicates that Latino unemployment does not correlate with negative views towards immigrants, and low income Latinos do not, in aggregate, hold different opinions than other Latinos in their views about immigration (Branton, 2007).

Latinidad: Group consciousness and identity

The concept of a politically-important Latino panethnic identity has also been the subject of some study. *Latinidad*, a term referring to the common basis for the panethnic identity, is rooted in a shared language (Spanish), similar cultural values, and often heightened religiosity and religious affiliation (Stavans, 1995; Gracia, 2000). For many Latinos, a keen awareness and embrace of their own Latinidad affects the way in which they understand the political world.

Latino identity and group consciousness have been studied as important predictors of attitudes about immigration. While some scholars do not find support for the hypothesis that group identification is a relevant factor in forming an opinion on the issue (Hood, Morris and Shirkey, 1997), others find support for the assertion that the more "Mexican" an individual feels, the more likely they are to be supportive of immigration (de la Garza et al., 1991). Sanchez (2006) finds that group consciousness is an important determinant of Latino

opinion on issues that are salient to Latinos such as immigration and bilingual education.[8] The findings from his work reveal that Latino group consciousness has the biggest influence on issues that specifically relate to shared ethnicity—as opposed to those that do not—and that group consciousness is in fact a strong driver of Latino opinion on immigration.

The literature portray a complex relationship between ethnic identity and immigration attitudes among Latinos. First, it suggests that identification in and of itself may not be enough to influence policy attitudes; some threshold of psychological commitment to the group commonality is likely necessary. And, although strong group identification has been shown to be correlated with more positive attitudes toward immigration, it is not clear if these positive attitudes transfer over to immigration policies that benefit non-Latin American immigrants specifically. These issues will be explored more deeply in the current paper.

Research and theoretical framework

In order to investigate the extent to which panethnic identity influences the relationship between immigration attitudes and partisanship for Latinos, the current paper is guided by a social identity framework.

The application of identity theory to political attitude formation has been relatively limited in political science, despite having developed an extensive theoretical and empirical foundation in closely-related areas of research (see Huddy (2001); Oakes (2002); Huddy (2002)). However, social identity theory and self-categorization theory, collectively known as the "social identity approach," have great utility in examining individual-level variation

[8]Sanchez examines the effect of Latino group consciousness by looking at four dimensions: 1) general Latino commonality (whether the various national origin groups have a lot or little in common); 2) political commonality; 3) perceived group discrimination; and 4) a belief that one's collective actions can improve status of group.

in attitudes among members of the same social group.

The social identity approach starts with the recognition that individuals largely think of themselves in terms of membership in distinct social groups—whether ethnic, racial, religious, or based in some other socially-relevant characteristic—that provides them a basis for self and outward evaluations (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). According to self-categorization theory, the degree to which a person identifies with specific groups can vary greatly (Oakes, 2002). And as Alcoff (2006) notes, social identities are often very fluid due to their being subjective, contextual, and multifaceted.

An important consequence of having a particularly strong group identity is the pressure to conform one's attitudes to those stereotypically-held by exemplars of the group (Turner, 1985; Hogg, 1987, 1993*b*). This is a phenomenon seen repeatedly in the realm of identity politics. Price (1989) demonstrated this process by showing how information about a topic—for example, immigration—tends to prime group identities (such as ethnic identity) by highlighting group conflict on the issue. The result is exaggerated impressions of group-level differences in attitudes, and subsequent conformity to those exaggerated ingroup views. For this reason, individuals with a greater sense of group belonging tend to show the greatest conformity to more extreme views, while those with weaker identities do not.

Identity theory would lead us to expect that, in the case of attitudes about immigration, Latinos with the strongest sense of ethnic identity would develop views most favorable to permissive policies—the stereotypical stance for the prototypical member—given that the issue is so clearly associated with benefit for members of their ethnic ingroup. However, the prediction becomes less clear if the policy is understood to center on members of *other* ethnic groups. This is the focus of the first study. In the second study, the effects of Latino identity on partisan identity—through immigration attitudes—are investigated.

Study 1: Latino identity and immigration attitudes

This first study investigates the link between Latino identity and immigration attitudes using original data from an experiment embedded within a large national survey. Specifically, this study examines Latino attitudes toward amnesty for undocumented immigrants.

The theoretical framework provided by the social identity approach, as discussed above, suggests that attitudes on immigration may develop differently for Latinos with a strong panethnic identity, as contrasted with those that have a weak identity. This is because immigration involves and strongly affects the livelihood of members of their ingroup (i.e., other individuals with a Latin American family background). Thus, we would expect that Latinos with closer psychological ties to the ingroup would be more supportive of permissive immigration policies that benefit other members of the group. Also, we would expect that this relationship is muted—if not absent or even reversed—when it is understood to benefit members of an outgroup. The current study tests this theory through experimental manipulation that separates immigration policy from the ethnic group commonly understood to be the beneficiary of more permissive policies (i.e., Latin Americans).

Data

This study uses data collected by Abramyan and Alexander (Forthcoming). The aim of the Abramyan and Alexander study was to determine the extent to which cultural concerns and prejudice impact attitudes regarding amnesty, and did not focus exclusively on the attitudes of Latinos. The total original sample is comprised of 5,250 respondents, and is demographically-representative of the adult American population. The Latino subsample, which is used for the current study, is comprised of 514 interviews. All surveys were completed between April 30 and June 11, 2013.

The survey was administered by YouGov, a polling firm that specializes in online sampling. Respondents originally opted in to participate in the YouGov panel, but were selected for participation in the study through a process that mimics a random digit dial (RDD) sample representative of the U.S. adult population. YouGov's methodology requires, first, creating a sampling frame based primarily on data from the U.S. Census's American Community Study. A stratified random sample is drawn from this frame and then matched to members of YouGov's opt-in panel to create a target sample. Matching occurs on numerous demographic factors—resulting in, on average, 2-3 matches per member of the target sample. All are invited to take the study, and a final sample is drawn using panelists who most closely match their counterparts in the target sample. See Vavreck and Rivers (2008) for a more detailed explanation of YouGov's sample construction.

Research question and measurement instruments

The survey was designed to measure attitudes across a wide range of concepts, and relies upon many commonly-used measurement instruments. The current study uses data from the survey to answer a set of specific, related questions.

The first question is whether the high levels of Latino support for permissive immigration policies—which have been noted elsewhere—are a function of the policy content, or are perhaps driven by support for the understood beneficiaries of such policies. Another way of thinking about this question is to ask whether large shares of Latinos might favor permissive immigration policies because of things like ideology and a sense of connection to a transethnic community affected by immigration laws, or whether the support is fairly non-ideological and more limited to members of their ethnic ingroup.

The second question is an extension of the first. It asks what role ethnic identity plays in the formation of attitudes on immigration. If support for permissive immigration policies

reflects support for ethnic ingroup members, we should expect to find an association between identity strength and support for such policies—but only when the beneficiaries are understood to be members of the ingroup. If, on the other hand, strong support is not driven by support for the ethnic ingroup, we should expect to find no difference in the relationship between identity strength and probability of support when the beneficiaries of a permissive immigration policy are members of an outgroup as compared to the ingroup.

One might also wonder the relation between immigration attitudes and explicitly political predispositions, such as partisanship and ideology. These dispositions contrast panethnic identity in that they are directly within the realm of politics and policy attitudes, and thus might be expected to also strongly influence attitudes about immigration.

Dependent variable: Attitudes toward amnesty

This study investigates attitudes toward amnesty for undocumented immigrants. The original survey item contained an experimental manipulation of the beneficiaries of the policy. The basic form of the question is as follows:

> "In recent years, the number of undocumented immigrants from certain parts of the world—notably [Latin America / Eastern Europe]—has increased. Some lawmakers have proposed providing a 'pathway to citizenship' for undocumented immigrants who have been in the country for many years to address this issue. Would you support such a policy to address recent illegal immigration from [Latin America / Eastern Europe]?"

Each respondent only received one version of the above text, containing *either* "Latin America" *or* "Eastern Europe". Thus, no respondent was pressured to moderate their views in order to avoid appearing more favorable to one group over the other. Because of random assignment into a treatment condition, each respondent had an equal probability of receiving

the text with one region or the other.[9]

The original survey item contained five response options: "strongly favor," "somewhat favor," "somewhat oppose," "strongly oppose," and "don't know; no opinion." Approximately 16 percent of respondents gave a response of "don't know" or skipped the question, and thus were dropped from the analysis. The remaining respondents had their responses coded as either "support" or "oppose."

Explanatory variables: Latino identity strength and political and demographic covariates

As mentioned earlier, the primary explanatory variable is the strength of a respondent's panethnic identity. Because the survey does not contain any items directly measuring strength of Latino identity, relative ingroup favoritism is used as proxy variable.

An important note must be made about the use of ingroup favoritism, which has empirical and theoretical ties to social identity.[10] The intergroup comparison principle—that ingroup favorability is heightened by relative positivity compared to evaluations of outgroups—has long been grouped with contempt for outgroups (the outgroup hostility principle) (Sumner, 1906). However, as Brewer (2007) notes, the positive ingroup affect characteristic of stronger

[9]The experiment also contained a second manipulation—stringency of the requirements for amnesty—and thus followed a two-by-three design. For the current study, however, responses across policy manipulations within region of the beneficiaries (Latin America or Eastern Europe) are collapsed. This was done to preserve statistical power, but is justified based on the survey design; since each respondent had an equal probability of being assigned each experimental condition, respondents are well stratified across them on demographic markers, including identity strength. Thus, collapsing the groups in this manner does not bias results in any direction.

[10]See, for example, Brewer (2007) and Hogg (1993*a*). The link between ingroup favoritism and ingroup identity strength was empirically validated using data from the American National Election Study. Relative ingroup favoritism (as measured in the current study) and strength of ethnic identity have a positive, moderately-strong correlation.

ingroup identifiers has been empirically demonstrated as orthogonal to outgroup dislike on numerous occasions (see, for example, Herring, Jankowski and Brown (1999) and Brewer (1999)). This is important to keep in mind when interpreting the effects of social identity strength in the current study. These effects should be interpreted as deriving from strong positive ingroup evaluations, rather than negative evaluations of outgroups (a hallmark of ethnocentrism). The discussion at the end of the second study provides further thoughts on the practical and theoretical issues involved with measuring ingroup affect.

The measure of Latino identity strength used in the current study is constructed using eight survey items. This measure is derived by subtracting from the composite score given to Latinos on two measures of stereotypes (lazy v. hardworking, and unintelligent v. intelligent) the average of the composite scores given to whites, blacks, and Asians. A higher score indicates a more favorable evaluation of the ingroup (relative to the outgroups), and thus a greater association with the ingroup. A lower score, on the other hand, proxies as a weaker association with the group. Scores are standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Models also include covariates that can reasonably be expected to correlate with attitudes on immigration. Classical works on the formation of policy attitudes highlight the role of both partisanship and ideological disposition. Thus, this study utilizes a seven-point measure of party identification keyed in the direction of Republicanism and a five-point measure of ideology keyed in the direction of conservatism. Both are also standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Additionally, a set of demographic variables are included in the models. The continuous variables (i.e., age and education) are standardized in the same manner as the identity and political disposition variables. While dichotomous variables (female/male and non-South/South) are coded 0/1.

Hypotheses

The social identity framework provides a set of expected results to the aforementioned research questions. If the theory appropriately explains the variation in policy attitudes under investigation, we should observed the following:

1. Latinos in general will be more supportive of amnesty for coethnics (i.e., immigrants from Latin America) than for immigrants from Eastern Europe, who are members of an ethnic outgroup.

2. Support of amnesty for undocumented Latin American immigrants will vary as a function of ethnic identity strength, as Latinos with a stronger sense of group membership will be especially likely to support a policy benefiting other ingroup members. Latinos with a weaker ingroup identity will feel less compelled to support coethnics, and thus be relatively less supportive of granting amnesty.

3. Support of amnesty for undocumented Eastern European immigrants will not vary as a function of ethnic identity strength, because disassociating immigration from an ingroup beneficiary removes the motivation for especially fervent support among Latinos with a strong panethnic identity.

Validating these hypotheses will lend strong support to the notion that the especially strong support for permissive immigration policies found among Latinos is motivated by (and works through) attitudes toward the individuals who are assumed to be the beneficiaries, Latin Americans. It will also contradict notions that support is linked to general sympathies toward immigrants (of whatever ethnicity or race) and spills over into equally high levels of support when the policy is understood to benefit non-Latinos.

Results

Figure 2 presents aggregate responses for the dependent variable—support for amnesty of undocumented immigrants—by experimental condition. Of interest here are two questions. First, we wondered whether the generally high Latino support for more permissive immigration policies would persist when the beneficiary is understood to be a member of an ethnic outgroup (in other words, an immigrant *not* from Latin America). And, if so, whether there would be differences in support levels dependent on whether the beneficiary is an ethnic ingroup or outgroup member.

Figure 2:
Percent of Latinos Supporting Amnesty, by Origin of the Immigrant



Source: Abramyan & Alexander Forthcoming

To the first question, figure 2 shows support levels among Latinos are generally favorable to amnesty regardless of the origin of the immigrant. Figure 2 shows the proportion of Latinos in each condition supporting amnesty is both above and statistically different than 50 percent (a level designated by a dashed line). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, and show that even when the expressed beneficiaries of amnesty are undocumented Eastern European immigrants, Latinos are, on the whole, more likely to support than oppose the policy.

Figure 2 also demonstrates that Latinos are generally more supportive of amnesty when the beneficiaries are from Latin America than when they are from Eastern Europe. Support in the Latin American condition is about 10 percentage points higher (70.4%) than in the Eastern European condition (60%). Although error bars for these two estimates slightly overlap, this difference is statistically significant at conventional levels of confidence (χ^2 = 4.8, p = 0.03). Thus, we can say with a fair degree of certainty that Latino support for amnesty is greater when the permissive immigration policy is understood to benefit coethnics, relative to support when it benefits members of an ethnic outgroup.

These aggregate figures do not tell us which Latinos are more likely to support permissive immigration policies for coethnics, however. The theory developed from the social identity framework hypothesized that Latinos with the strongest sense of panethnic group membership would show the largest gap in support. Put differently, it was expected that when the immigration policy is understood to benefit other members of the same panethnic group (i.e., immigrants from Latin America), Latinos with a strong sense of ethnic identification would be most supportive. Because ingroup favorability is not necessarily associated with outgroup dislike, however, Latinos with a strong ethnic identity would not necessarily be expected to be less supportive of policies benefiting non-Latinos.[11]

[11] A possible exception, though, would be if the policy was understood as zero-sum at the group level. In that scenario, Latinos with a stronger ethnic identity would be expected to oppose amnesty for non-Latin

To test this hypothesis, logistic regressions predicting the probability of support in each of the two experimental conditions are conducted. The explanatory variable of interest is strength of Latino identity, but each model also includes a set of demographic variables, a measure of political ideology, and also partisanship. Figure 3 plots the predicted probability of support for amnesty in each experimental condition as identity strength varies, holding all other explanatory variables at their statistical means.

Figure 3 demonstrates that, among Latinos, the stronger a person's panethnic identity, the more likely they are to support amnesty—but only when the beneficiary is understood to be from Latin America. In this condition, moving across roughly 95 percent of the scale (from two standard deviations below the mean level of Latino identity to two standard deviations above the mean), the predicted probability of support for amnesty jumps almost 30 points (53.2% to 80.2%). In the condition specifying Eastern Europeans as the beneficiaries of amnesty, ethnic identity strength is neither a substantively nor statistically significant factor influencing policy attitudes.

The predicted probabilities also demonstrate that differences in attitudes across the experimental conditions are concentrated among those Latinos with a stronger panethnic identity. At the lower end of identity strength, predicted probabilities of support for amnesty are similar in the two experimental conditions. Further, 90% confidence intervals in figure 3 show a significant overlap across the two plots at the lower end of the scale—meaning, Latinos with a weak panethnic identity are not affected in their support for amnesty by the experimental manipulation, in the aggregate. A gap in support that becomes statistically significant appears at roughly the midpoint of the identity scale, however. And this gap continues to widen as strength of Latino identity increases. In other words, Latinos with a stronger panethnic identity are driving the aggregate higher rate of approval for amnesty in the Latin American experimental condition.

American immigrants because such a policy would be understood to lessen the benefit received by coethnics.

Figure 3:
Predicted Probability of Policy Support across Identity Strength, by Condition



Source: Abramyan & Alexander Forthcoming

Results from the full models show that the drivers of support for amnesty differ in the two conditions in additional ways. The first column of table 4 shows that strength of panethnic identity and region (living in the South) have a statistically significant positive relationship with support for amnesty in the Latin American condition of the experiment. But neither partisanship nor ideology are associated with differences in attitudes. On the other hand, in the Eastern European condition (modeled in column 2 of table 4), age and conservative ideology are both negatively correlated with probability of support for amnesty. Strength of ethnic identity, as figure 3 demonstrated, is not correlated with attitudes.[12]

[12]Although the estimated effect of identity strength is substantively significant in the Latin American condition, it just barely achieves statistical significance at the tested level. This lower degree of precision in estimation is due largely to the limited number of observations available for the analysis. In contrast, the estimated effect in the Eastern European condition is essentially zero, even with the limited number of observations.

Table 4:
Attitudes toward Latin American Immigrants and European Immigrants

	Support for amnesty:	
	Latin Americans	Eastern Europeans
	(1)	(2)
Latino identification strength	0.369*	−0.033
	(0.201)	(0.164)
Age	−0.236	−0.540***
	(0.157)	(0.150)
Male	0.014	0.447
	(0.327)	(0.328)
Education	−0.077	0.016
	(0.184)	(0.167)
South	0.611*	0.397
	(0.353)	(0.379)
Partisan (Republicanism)	−0.303	−0.138
	(0.200)	(0.175)
Ideology (Conservatism)	−0.059	−0.731***
	(0.248)	(0.266)
Constant	0.649**	0.211
	(0.267)	(0.259)
Observations	212	177
Log Likelihood	−100.757	−101.373
Akaike Inf. Crit.	217.515	218.746
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These findings strongly support the theoretical expectations in a couple of ways. First, they show that identity is an important predictor of Latino attitudes on a policy that affects members of the ingroup—rather than broader, more inclusive communities (i.e., immigrants as a whole). This creates the overwhelming level of support for amnesty for undocumented Latin American immigrants (and perhaps permissive immigration policies oriented toward the group, generally), and it also explains a lack of spillover to support for amnesty for undocumented non-Latin American immigrants. The findings also point to differentiation in salient considerations about differently understood policies. Once the policy under review (amnesty) was stripped of a connection to the ingroup, Latino attitudes could be best explained by traditionally-studied factors: demographics (i.e., age) and political dispositions (ideology).

In sum, the current study supports the notion that Latinos do not think about all policy proposals in a similar fashion. The available evidence points to the conclusion that issues with a direct connection to the ingroup are more personal for those individuals with a stronger sense of ingroup identity. In other words, immigration is not just another policy issue for many Latinos; it is different and more personal, at least so far as it is understood by Latinos with a strong panethnic identity to affect other people who share in the common attributes that define "Latinidad."

Study 2: Latino identity, attitudes, and partisanship

Study 1 showed that immigration, when it is understood to be an issue affecting coethnics, has a personal connection to Latinos with a higher sense of ingroup identity. This personal link to immigration policy could lead us to reasonably expect that the stronger a person identifies as Latino the more likely they are to prioritize the issue—in addition to holding more liberal views on immigration policy. Further, attitudes on immigration might mediate

a relationship between ethnic identity and partisanship—an important connection to, and lens for understanding, the political world. These suspicions form the basis for the second study.

Data

The analyses in this study utilize the Latino sub-sample of the 2012 American National Elections Studies (2013) time series. The ANES surveyed a sample of U.S. citizens who were 18 years or older on a variety of areas including demographics, policy preferences, and vote choice, among other items. In previous years, the ANES had extremely small samples of minorities, but in more recent years the ANES has oversampled both African Americans and Latinos in order to obtain more nationally-representative samples of each group. The oversample from the 2012 ANES provides a relatively large sample of 1,005 Latino interviews.[13] The 2012 ANES has certain other qualities that are beneficial for this particular study. Notably, the breadth of the survey allows for proper investigation of identity, political attitudes, and partisanship.

Research question and measurement instruments

The current study starts by asking: Who are the weak and strong panethnic identifiers? Put differently, what attributes differentiate Latinos who have a stronger sense of their panethnic group membership from those who have relatively weak psychological ties to the group? Do the groups differ politically? Addressing these questions creates context for later

[13]The 2012 ANES used two different modes for conducting interviews. The first mode follows convention in using face-to-face interviews. The second mode follows a more recent practice of supplementing the sample with web interviews. With regard to the Latino subsample in the 2012 ANES, about 47% of interviews were collected via face-to-face methods (472) and 53% (533) were web-based interviews.

analyses of political attitudes and affiliations.

Subsequently, the study investigates a set of questions regarding the political consequences of having a stronger panethnic identity. First, are there differences in the perceived importance of immigration between strong and weak Latino identifiers? Put differently, is one group more likely than the other to consider immigration the top issue facing the nation today? Then, attitudes on immigration are investigated. Are there substantive differences in the dispositions of strong and weak panethnic identifiers on immigration? And finally, the link between ethnic identity and partisanship is investigated. Are the differences in partisan affiliation between strong and weak Latino identifiers a direct product of ethnic identity? Or, does the relationship operate through immigration attitudes, as we might deduce from the social identity framework?

This study provides a detailed investigation of the political primacy of panethnic identity among Latinos. It also sheds light on complexities of Latino partisan attachment.

Dependent variables: Issue priority, immigration attitudes, and partisanship

In investigating the political landscape among Latinos, the current study focuses on three main areas: 1) issue priority, 2) immigration attitudes, and 3) partisanship.

Issue priority is measured in the ANES by a question (paprofile_mip) given to a subset of respondents asking which issue they believe is the most important facing America today. The original survey item contained 15 response choices, including options like "immigration" and "healthcare," but in the current analysis these choices are collapsed into six more general categories (immigration, economic, racial, foreign policy, social, and other).

Immigration attitudes are measured through responses to five policy items. The first item (immig_policy) asks respondents what should be done with illegal immigrants, and provides the following choices: 1) deportation, 2) a guest worker program, 3) qualified amnesty, and 4) unqualified and unpenalized amnesty. The second item (immig_citizen) gauges views

about extending citizenship to some undocumented immigrants, with a three-point scale ranging from "favor" to "oppose." The third item (immig_checks) asks whether the law should allow for status checks on suspected undocumented immigrants, with a three-point scale ranging from "favor" to "oppose." The fourth item (immigpo_level) asks respondents about their preferred level of immigration, providing them a five-point scale ranging from "increased a lot" to "decreased a lot." And the final item (immigpo_jobs) asks whether immigrants take away jobs from Americans, with response choices on a five-point scale from "extremely" to "not at all." Responses to these five items are modeled as contributors to a general component (or disposition) regarding immigration policy using principal component analysis, and standardized component scores are extracted. These have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Finally, partisanship is measured by a seven-point scale (pid_x) anchored by "strong Democrat" on one end and "strong Republican" on the other. When it is used as an interval-level variable, it is standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Main explanatory variables: Latino identity strength and ideological covariates

The main explanatory variable in the proceeding analyses is Latino panethnic identity strength. This is measured by a survey question (ident_hispid) asked of Latinos regarding the importance of being "Hispanic" to their identity. The five-point response scale ranges from "extremely important" to "not at all important."[14] In some analyses the variable is kept categorical, in others it is dichotomized to investigate "weak" and "strong" identifiers, and in others still it is used as an interval-level variable that is standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Treatment of this variable, and coding procedures are discussed further in the sections describing the different analyses.

[14]This is a more direct measure of Latino identity strength than was used in the previous study. However, self-categorization of social group identity has strong theoretical and empirical connections to ingroup favorability (the "intergroup comparison principle"), as elaborated upon in the first study.

Ideology is measured in a few different ways. When considering ideology as a general overall metric of conservatism, a single item from the ANES is used (libcpre_self). This item provides respondents a seven-point scale to use that ranges from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative." When finer distinction is preferable, separate scales of economic and social/moral values are created. Economic values (standardized and keyed in the direction of conservatism) are determined by component scores using four items: 1) the reason for government getting bigger (govrole_big), 2) efficacy of the free market (govrole_market), 3) preference for less government generally (govrole_lessmore), and 4) views regarding government regulation of business (govrole_regbus). Social/moral values (standardized and keyed in the direction of traditional values) are determined by component scores using a different set of four items: 1) views about whether society ought to adjust to changing morality (trad_adjust), 2) agreement that newer lifestyles are breaking down society (trad_lifestyle), 3) tolerance toward the moral standards of others (trad_tolerant), and 4) agreement that there ought to be more emphasis on traditional family values (trad_famval).

A number of demographic variables are used at various points in the analyses below, mostly as controls. These are: age (dem_age_r_x), gender (gender_respondent_x), education (dem_edugroup_x), living in a union household (dem_unionhh), Southern region (sample_region), married status (dem_marital), indication of being foreign born (dem_nativity), Catholicism (relig_7cat_x), importance of religion (relig_import), and being of Mexican heritage (hisp_type).

Hypotheses

The social identity framework provides a theoretical narrative for why patterns of Latino ideology do not map directly and neatly onto partisanship. According to the framework developed earlier, Latinos with a greater attachment to their panethnic group care more about

immigration, have more positive attitudes about immigration, and conform their partisan attachments to reflect greater affinity for the party more favorable to immigration and immigrants. This explanation—that immigration attitudes mediate the relationship between ethnic identity and partisanship among Latinos—contrasts with alternative explanations in which general political ideology or identity directly influence partisanship. The following are four theoretical implications of the social identity approach:

1. Prioritization of immigration is more strongly related to panethnic identity strength than it is to non-ethnic political dispositions.

2. Panethnic identity strength is a driver of immigration attitudes independent of general ideology, party affiliation, and other covariates.

3. Latino identity is correlated with differences in partisan affiliation—with stronger panethnic attachment associated with greater attachment to the Democratic Party.

4. This aforementioned relationship is completely mediated by immigration attitudes.

Weak and strong panethnic identifiers

The most straightforward and relevant survey item for the purpose of examining panethnic identity strength among Latinos is one that asked: "How important is being Hispanic to your identity?" The response options available were: (1) "extremely important," (2) "very important," (3) "moderately important," (4) "a little important," and (5) "not at all important." Respondents were not allowed to answer "don't know" or refuse to answer the question, however, some were not asked the question due to incomplete interviews. Table 5 shows the weighted breakdown of responses that fell into each category, overall and by ancestry.[15]

[15]Ancestry is determined using the dem_hisptyp_1st variable, which asks "Are you Mexican, Mexican-American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Cuban-American, or some other Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino

Table 5:
"How important is being Hispanic to your identity?" (by Ancestry)

	All	Mexican	Non-Mexican
Not at all important	10.3%	11.2%	5.9%
A little important	8.8%	6.8%	8%
Moderately important	25.3%	11.7%	22%
Very important	28.7%	35%	27.3%
Extremely important	26.9%	35.3%	36.9%

SOURCE: ANES 2012

While there are some slight distributional differences between Mexican and non-Mexicans, the patterns revealed in table 5 are the same. The majority of Latinos—both Mexicans (70.3%) and non-Mexicans (64.2%)—report that being Hispanic is either "very" or "extremely" important to their identity. This strong skew in the distribution might suggest that there are noteworthy differences between those individuals who place strong importance on being Latino and those who only give moderate to low importance to their panethnic identity.

To help determine whether this is the case, responses to this question are investigated against feelings of linked fate. One item from the 2012 ANES (link_hisp) asks Latinos: "Do you think that what happens generally to Hispanic people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" A follow-up question then asks: "Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?" Responses to these question are combined and coded continuously from 0 to 1 to signal a person's individual sense of linked fate. Figure 4 shows the mean level of linked fate expressed by Latinos at varying levels of panethnic identity strength. Greater values correspond to a greater sense of linked fate.

Most notably from figure 4, individuals who place stronger importance in their Latino

group?" The majority, 56.5%, self-identified as having Mexican ancestry (Mexican, Mexican-American, or Chicano). Puerto Ricans (12.7%), Cubans (4.8%) and Cuban-Americans (1.9%), and "Other" (24.1%) make up the remainder of respondents.

Figure 4:
Mean Level of Linked Fate, by Strength of Latino Identity



SOURCE: ANES 2012

identity have the greatest sense of linked fate. This supports previous findings and theoretical expectations of a link between the two concepts (Masuoka, 2006; McClain et al., 2009). However, also important is our inability to statistically distinguish between the two groups at the lower end, and our inability to statistically distinguish between the two groups at the higher end. On this important metric of psychological attachment, it appears there are not significant differences between people who do not give any importance on their Latino identity and those who only place a little importance in it. Likewise, there are not significant differences between those who say their Latino identity is very important and those who say it is extremely important. Although overall differences are not huge, weak and strong identifiers can be statistically distinguished from one another; confidence intervals for the two groups at the low end do not overlap with those of the two groups at the high end. As expected,

those who give a moderate amount of importance to their ethnic identity fall between these two groups in terms of linked fate. At conventional levels of statistical significance (95% confidence), these individuals cannot be distinguished from either the weak or the strong panethnic identifiers. However, the data show a slightly greater likelihood that moderate identifiers differ from strong identifiers (92%) than weak identifiers (90%). For this reason, when discussing Latinos with a weak panethnic identity, moderates will be included with individuals who place little to no significance in their panethnic identity. Those who say it is very or extremely important will be considered strong identifiers.

Table 6:
Demographics of Weak and Strong Latino Identifiers

	All	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.	p-value
Average age	41	40	42	0.37
Percentage male	49.2%	56.9%	43%	0.00
Percent w/ college degree	16.2%	16.6%	15.9%	0.90
Percent in union household	14.3%	15.3%	13.6%	0.64
Percent Southern (region)	39.2%	38%	40.2%	0.64
Percent married	44.7%	44.2%	45%	0.90
Percent foreign born	30.5%	22.2%	37.2%	0.00
Percent Catholic	44.1%	36.3%	50.4	0.00
Percent saying religion is important	75%	66.7%	81.5%	0.00
Partisanship (percent)				
Democrats	48.3%	41%	54.1%	0.00
Independents	35.1%	37.3%	33.2%	0.51
Republicans	16.7%	21.7%	12.7%	0.00
Average conservatism (0-1)	0.50	0.53	0.48	0.00

Note: p-values for differences in averages are from t-tests, while p-values for differences in percentages are from chi-square tests
SOURCE: ANES 2012

Table 6 shows how weak and strong identifiers compare across a number of demographic measures. In general, strong identifiers are comprised of more women, foreign born, Catholics, and people who say that religion is important to them, compared to weak identifiers.[16] They

[16]The strong association between ethnic identity and being foreign born mirrors a finding by Citrin and

are also more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and are, in aggregate, slightly more liberal than weak identifiers. The partisan distribution is highly skewed among strong identifiers. More than half (54.1%) identify with the Democratic Party, which is more than four times the proportion that identify with the Republican Party (12.7%). This is in contrast with weak identifiers, who are almost twice as likely to identify as Democratic (41%) than Republican (21.7%). Weak identifiers are nine points more likely to identify as Republican than are strong identifiers.[17]

Results: Prioritization of immigration

The web administered portion of the 2012 ANES contained a question asking respondents what is the most important issue facing America today. Responses to the question were categorized into several general policy areas, including "immigration." Answers to the question are certainly dependent, to a large extent, on events and circumstances specific to the time period during which the survey was conducted. However, since these factors are more or less shared by all respondents, variation in answers reflect personal differences in prioritizations. Table 7 displays the correlations between prioritization of immigration and 1) ethnic identity, 2) conservatism, and 3) Republicanism.

Table 7:
Percent Prioritizing Immigration, by Scale Placement

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Gamma
Latino identity strength (low to high)	0	2	3	10	19	-	-	0.71
Ideology (liberal to conservative)	14	4	4	12	7	1	1	-0.33
Partisanship (Democrat to Republican)	12	7	15	4	0	11	0	-0.30

SOURCE: ANES 2012

Sears (2014), who also find being foreign born to correlate with greater group consciousness among Latinos.

[17]Estimates of all other differences (age, percent with a college degree, household union membership, region, and share of Independents) are not statistically significant (i.e., $p > 0.05$).

Table 7 demonstrates that panethnic identity is much more strongly correlated with prioritizing immigration than are either of the expressly political dispositions. Latino identity strength, which is measured on a five-point scale, shows a strong monotonic positive relationship with prioritization of immigration. In fact, there is a 19 percentage point difference in the share of Latinos who consider immigration to be the most important issue when comparing those with the weakest sense of panethnic identity to those with the strongest. The gamma correlation coefficient, 0.71, signals that the two variables are very strongly correlated. In contrast, ideology and partisanship do not have a monotonic relation to prioritization of immigration, though they do show a general relationship. The negative gamma correlations (-0.33 and -0.3, respectively) signal that the more conservative or the more Republican a person is, the less likely they are to prioritize immigration over other issues.[18] With regard to ideology, there is a 13 percentage point difference in the share of Latinos who prioritize the issue comparing the most liberal to the most conservative. And comparing the most Democratic to the most Republican, there is a 12 percentage point difference. In terms of the magnitude of differences and correlations, table 7 establishes the relative importance of ethnic identity in prioritizing immigration over all other political issues.

Using the prior designations of "weak" and "strong" identifiers, we can see just how different these two groups are with respect to the saliency of immigration and other issues. Table 8 provides a breakdown of the share of Latinos in each group whose most important political issue fits in each of several general categories. It also provides the absolute values of the differences in percentages and p-values for chi-square tests of the differences.

[18]Since the correlations do not reveal causation, they could also be interpreted to say that the more likely Latinos are to prioritize immigration, the less likely they are to be conservative and Republican.

Table 8:
Percent Prioritizing Different Issue Areas, by Latino Identity Strength

	Weak	Strong	Difference	p-value
Immigration	2	14	12	0
Economic	88	79	9	0.03
Other (unspecified)	7	2	5	0.06
Racial (general)	0	2	2	0.25
Foreign policy	3	3	0	-
Social	0	0	0	-

SOURCE: ANES 2012

The most glaring point to be made from the figures in table 8 is that the overwhelming majorities of both weak and strong Latinos identify economic issues as most important, and by a large margin. Almost nine in 10 weak identifiers (88%) and eight in 10 strong identifiers (79%) consider economic issues more important than all others. The difference—9 percentage points—is statistically significant, however. This suggests that some non-trivial portion of strong identifiers do have unique priorities.

Importantly, the biggest difference in priorities between weak and strong Latinos, according to table 8, is with regard to immigration. There is a 12-point statistically significant difference between the groups. This is larger than the next largest difference (identifying an economic issue as most important). These findings hint that a large percentage of the Latinos with a strong panethnic identity who prioritize immigration may have otherwise selected an economic issue as most important. No other differences between the two groups are statistically significant at the conventional level of 95 percent confidence.

Latinos with a strong panethnic identity are seven times more likely to name immigration as the most important issue than are Latinos with a weak panethnic identity. Although it comes second to economic issues, immigration receives a relatively high share of the responses from strong Latino identifiers. In contrast, a very small share of Latinos with a weak sense of ethnic identity name immigration as the most important issue compared with economic

issues, foreign policy issues, and other (unspecified) issues.[19] The results show, consistent with expectations, that stronger Latino identification is associated with greater prioritization of immigration.

Results: Support for liberal immigration policies

The social identity framework provides a theoretical basis for expecting that Latinos with a stronger sense of panethnic identity have more favorable views toward permissive immigration policies than those with a weaker ethnic identity. And the experimental results from the first study supported this claim, at least with respect to amnesty for undocumented immigrants who also have a Latin American background. To determine whether this conclusion generalizes to other immigration policies, support for a broader set of policies is examined.

The 2012 ANES contains five questions specifically about immigration. These questions ask respondents what should be the policy toward undocumented immigrants currently in the country (immig_policy), whether citizenship ought to be extended to some immigrants currently in the United States illegally (immig_citizen), whether the law should allow for status checks of those suspected of being in the country illegally (immig_checks), what should be done about the level of immigration allowed into the United States (immigpo_level), and whether immigration takes away jobs from Americans (immigpo_jobs). Each respondent received a weighted composite scores calculated on the basis of responses to these five questions using principal component analysis.[20]

[19] Although respondents were able to provide a clarification when selecting "other," the public ANES data file does not provide these responses.

[20] Exploratory factor analysis shows that responses to all five items load highly on one underlying dimension. However, principal component analysis was used for data reduction because the purpose was to create a score based on all items, rather than uncover an underlying factor that may not relate very well to any particular indicators. The single component accounted for 40% of variance in the set, and loadings for

Table 9 provides two OLS models of these immigration attitudes, one without identity strength and the other including it as a covariate. In both models, the dependent variable is the composite measure of immigration views, coded in the direction of liberal attitudes and standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Most interval level explanatory variables are also standardized, with identity strength coded in the direction of stronger identity, ideology in the direction of greater conservatism, and partisanship in the direction of greater Republicanism. Thus, correlations for these variables have some basis for comparison; correlations represent the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the explanatory variable on the dependent variable, also measured in standard deviations. Age is measured in years, with coefficients reflecting the effect of a one-year increase in age. All other variables are dichotomous.

The first column of table 9 provides a model based on political and demographic factors. It shows that, for Latinos, partisanship—but not general political ideology—correlates with immigration attitudes. As expected, greater Republicanism is correlated with less liberal immigration attitudes. Older Latinos also tend to be less liberal on the issue. On the other hand, being male, a member of a union household, and foreign born are factors that correlate positively with liberal immigration attitudes. This model accounts for 17 percent of the variance in immigration views among Latinos.

In the second column of table 9, panethnic identity strength is added to the previous model. Introduction of this variable not only allows for the determination of its influence, but also tests the robustness of the first model. The positive correlation for identity strength mirrors the finding from the first study; the more strongly a person identifies as Latino, the more liberal their disposition on immigration. Also positively correlated are being a male, being a member of a union household, and being foreign born—all robust findings from

the individual items were as follows: 0.67 (immig_policy), 0.57 (immig_citizen), 0.66 (immig_checks), 0.61 (immigpo_level), and 0.65 (immigpo_jobs).

Table 9:
Predictors of Liberal Immigration Views

	Immigration preference model:	
	(1)	(2)
Latino identity strength		0.22**
		(0.03)
Ideology (conservatism)	−0.06	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Partisanship (Republicanism)	−0.33**	−0.28**
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	−0.01**	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male	0.17**	0.26**
	(0.06)	(0.07)
College degree	0.08	0.21*
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Union household	0.23*	0.28**
	(0.09)	(0.09)
South	0.12	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Married	0.07	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Foreign born	0.37**	0.29**
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Constant	−0.04	−0.07
	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	951	873
R^2	0.17	0.21
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01

the first model. Having a college degree also emerges as a positive correlate. The negative correlates mirror those from the first model. Greater Republicanism and age are both associated with less liberal views about immigration. These findings support the conclusion that ethnic identity has a strong and unique effect on immigration attitudes, above and beyond those associated with demographic and more expressly political factors. Further, the greater R^2 in the second model shows the improved ability to account for variance in immigration attitudes when identity is included.

Results: Drivers of partisanship

The previous analysis showed that immigration attitudes are correlated with both ethnic identity and partisanship among Latinos. But, are ethnic identity and partisanship both simply independent drivers of immigration attitudes? Or, is partisanship itself influenced to some extent by identity through attitudes on immigration? The social identity framework provided a basis for expecting that Latinos with a stronger ethnic identity would be more likely to support permissive immigration policies and, as a result, align with the party whose disposition on immigration is most congruent with that preference.

In order to test the mediation hypothesis—that Latino identity strength influences partisanship through immigration preferences—the four step procedure elaborated in Baron and Kenny (1986), Judd and Kenny (1981), and James and Brett (1984) is used. Step one requires showing that Latino identity strength and partisanship are correlated in the absence of the potential mediating variable. This is demonstrated by regressing partisanship on Latino identity strength, including a number of other covariates that may also affect the relationship between the variables. The statistically significant standardized coefficient of -0.08 (found in column 1 of table 10) means that an increase of one standard deviation in identity strength produces a 0.08 standard deviation drop in Republicanism. The second step requires show-

ing that Latino identity strength affects the potential mediator, immigration attitudes. This relationship was demonstrated in table 9, but is replicated by modeling the relationship with the same set of covariates as controls as in step one. It produces a standardized coefficient of 0.2—meaning a one unit increase in Latino identity strength produces a statistically significant 0.2 standard deviation increase in support for liberal immigration policies. Step three in the mediation test requires showing the potential mediator, immigration preferences, is correlated with the outcome variable, partisanship. This is done by regressing partisanship on both Latino identity strength and immigration preferences simultaneously, controlling for numerous covariates. The statistically significant standardized coefficient of -0.16 reflects that an increase of one standard deviation in liberal immigration attitudes produces a decrease of 0.16 standard deviations in Republicanism. Finally, step four requires showing a drop in the effect of Latino identity strength from the model produced in step one (absent the mediator) to that of step three (including the mediator).

Table 10 provides the criteria for testing the mediation hypothesis with two OLS models. Column 1 (step one) displays the relationship between Latino identity strength and partisanship, while column 2 (step three) demonstrates complete mediation in the relationship once immigration preferences are accounted for. The effect of identity strength is statistically indistinguishable from zero in this second model—importantly, this is as a result of including immigration preferences into the model, rather than the possibility of low statistical power (n = 877).

The results from this four step procedure are consistent with the mediation hypothesis deduced from the social identity framework. Latinos with a stronger ethnic identity are less likely to align with the Republican Party—even when controlling for economic and social values—but this relationship disappears when controlling for immigration attitudes. This means that the effect of panethnic identity on partisanship works through preferences on immigration policies. Importantly, these results are inconsistent with the alternative

Table 10:
Complete Mediation of Latino Identity on Political Partisanship (Republicanism)

	Partisanship model:	
	(1)	(2)
Latino identity strength	−0.08**	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Immigration preferences (liberal)		−0.16**
		(0.03)
Economic values (conservative)	0.26**	0.22**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social/moral values (conservative)	0.27**	0.24**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male	0.04	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)
College degree	−0.05	−0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Union household	0.13	0.18*
	(0.09)	(0.08)
South	0.23**	0.24**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Married	0.17**	0.19**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Foreign born	−0.09	−0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Catholic	−0.29**	−0.27**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	0.00	−0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Observations	877	877
R^2	0.28	0.30
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01	

hypothesis that Latino identity strength is directly linked to partisanship; its direct effect (shown in the last column of table 10) is statistically indistinguishable from no effect, even with the statistical power available from having 877 observations. The model comparison from table 10 tells us that stronger Latino identity motivates greater Democratic Party preference through the more proximal variable, immigration attitudes.

Discussion

This paper began by discussing the Latino ideology-partisanship paradox, and the popular notion in some political circles that Republican failures to attracted greater support among Latinos reflects poor messaging—rather than unappealing messages—from Republican candidates. If correct, the solution for Republicans would be to emphasize those areas where the Republican Party and Latino voters might find common ground, for example in economic mobility and traditional morality. However, the analyses in this paper demonstrate that immigration remains a very important issue for Latinos because it is strongly attached to their notion of ethnic identity—and it provides a very powerful motivator away from the Republican Party.

The first study demonstrated the very personal link between immigration and ethnic identity for a subset of Latinos—those with a stronger sense of panethnic identity. The next study showed that these individuals are also more likely to align with the Democratic Party, and investigated the vague set of correlations between identity, immigration attitudes, and partisanship. The results suggest that Latinos with a stronger ethnic identity are more likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party because they are more likely to hold liberal views on immigration—a disposition more consistent with the platform and rhetoric of the Democratic Party than the Republican Party. This result provides valuable insight into why, even after accounting for general ideological considerations, Latinos are more likely to align

with the Democratic Party.

This paper provides several contributions to the literature on Latino political attitudes. First, it provides a reason why general ideology and partisanship do not correlate as highly for Latinos as they do with whites. And, although the sources of Latino attitudes on immigration have been investigated by other scholars, this paper is unique in showing the mediating role that immigration attitudes play in connecting ethnic identity to partisanship. These analyses also show that panethnic identity strength is an important determinant in the political prioritization of immigration issues. And they demonstrate that the increased favorability toward immigration that is found as ethnic identity strength increases is not transferable to immigration policies known to benefit ethnic outgroup members (i.e., non-Latin American immigrants).

This last point highlights the current paper's venture into themes of intergroup relations, as well. Measuring group affect can be a difficult process on its own (Conover, 1988). However, measuring relative affect—which was done to proxy for ingroup identity strength in the first study—brings potential concerns about the influence of outgroup disdain. Are Latinos with a stronger panethnic identity more likely to support amnesty for Latin American immigrants purely because of a closer connection to coethnics? Or, do differences in support reflect a dislike for, and an intentional distancing from, an outgroup (Eastern European immigrants)? Fortunately, empirical evidence from the first study answered that question, showing that outgroup disdain was not driving differential policy views. These findings fit well into a body of literature that finds ingroup favorability is unrelated to negative feelings about outgroups.

The findings from the two studies also provide some practical value for political practitioners attempting to appeal to Latino voters. The results strongly undermine the common prescriptions heard about attracting Latino voters to the Republican Party. Rather than concede the issue of immigration and focus on other areas of policy, Republicans would be

advised to work on improving their image with regard to immigration. While Latinos are more likely to identify Democrats as better than Republicans on the issue, almost half think the parties are more or less similar (see table 2). This shows that the issue is still somewhat up for grabs as far as Latinos are concerned.

Admittedly, any large shifts in the disposition of Republican candidates on the issue of immigration could come with costs. Table 2 also demonstrated that, while whites are more likely to choose Republicans as better on immigration, about half of white Americans are also unable to determine which party is better on the issue. Differences between whites and Latinos on immigration might move the two groups in opposite directions if there are shifts in party platforms. That possibility, however, is deserving of its own investigation and is a possible avenue of future research.

Jewish Republicanism in the 21st Century: The Motivating Influence of Social Identity and Israel

Abstract:

Although Jews are among the most solidly Democratic groups in the American electorate, recent trends appear to show the Democratic advantage diminishing. The reasons for a partisan shift are somewhat unclear, though some commentators have suggested it may stem from a domestic politicizing of the relationship between Israel and the United States. The current paper examines this theory within a social identity framework. Results show that strong ingroup identity among Jews is tied to stronger personal attachment to Israel and prioritization of Israel as politically important. These feelings about Israel mediate the relationship between Jewish identity and Republican affiliation. Furthermore, the relationship between a person's attachment to Israel and partisanship seems to be a recent phenomenon, supporting the notion that it has recently become a motivator toward Republican affiliation.

Introduction

In modern American politics, very few segments of the electorate have been more loyal to a single party than American Jews. Part of the "New Deal Coalition"—a collection of economically-liberal political interests and demographic-based voting blocs who supported Roosevelt's New Deal policies and subsequent liberal candidates—Jews have remained solidly Democratic in their partisan affiliation for the majority of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century (Stanley, Bianco and Niemi, 1986; Petrocik, 1987; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006).

Recently, however, many pollsters, journalists, and political commentators have discussed the appearance (and potential importance) of a drift toward the Republican Party among Jews (Newport, 2015; Henderson, 2015; Green, 2014). For example, an article in the *Washington Post* looking at changes in self-reported party identification described a "slow but significant shift" (Henderson, 2015). To be sure, there are some detractors from the narrative of increased Republicanization among Jews (for example, see Zeitz (2015)). However, the discussion poses interesting questions regarding the potential for Jewish realignment and the underlying stability of Jewish partisanship.

This paper investigates partisan affiliation among American Jews using a framework informed by both the social identity approach and conflict extension theory. It suggests that identity can play an important role in defining for strong ingroup identifiers which political issues are personally and politically important. These issues are among the main criteria on which strongly-identified group members evaluate the parties, determining which is more friendly (or less hostile) to people like them.

In support of this theory, the data show that Jewish Americans with a strong ingroup identity are more likely to be personally and politically attached to Israel. This attachment to Israel is also shown to strongly influence the likelihood of affiliating with the Republican

Party, independent of demographics and ideological factors. These findings suggest that, in the context of Jewish partisanship, identity motivates issue concern and issue concern strongly motivates partisanship.

Recent trends in historical context

The apparent political realignment of American Jews centers around changes in the shares identifying as Democratic and Republican over the period coinciding with Barack Obama's presidency. Figure 1 shows this movement over time using yearly averages from Gallup (Newport, 2015). The first year plotted, 2008, is the final year of George W. Bush's presidency—a period when the Democratic advantage among Jewish Americans was nearly 50 points. By 2014, well into the Obama Presidency, that Democratic advantage had dropped by 17 points, with about three in 10 Jews aligning with the Republican Party.

The numbers could be explained in a few different ways. For example, they could present the early stages of an actual overall realignment of American Jews toward the Republican Party. Alternatively, they could reflect a simple regression back to historical mean levels of Republican identification. And a third possibility, which this paper explores, is a gradual realignment among a specific subset of Jewish Americans.

The thesis of a regression to historical levels of Republican affiliation appears to be undermined by available historical data. Table 1, reproduced from Abramowitz and Saunders (2006), shows the average Democratic advantage over several decades. The upshot is that, although the Democratic advantage among Jewish Americans has fluctuated somewhat over the decades, it has historically been much larger than the advantage in more recent years. Further, the data do not demonstrate any long term trends toward Republicanization, at least prior to 2000. Thus, the movement toward greater Republican identification in recent years appears to be motivated by something other than the gravity of time.

Figure 1:
Partisan affiliation among Jewish Americans (Percentages)



SOURCE: Gallup (2015)

What remains uncertain, however, is whether this tendency toward greater Republicanism among Jewish Americans is generalizable, or whether it is being led by a distinct subset in the group. This paper analyzes recent survey data to assert that Jews with a stronger sense of group identity show greater attraction to the Republican Party. However, this relationship is mediated by a personal attachment to the nation of Israel. Moreover, the data suggest this relationship is a more recent phenomenon, supporting the notion that it is a byproduct of recent partisan differentiation on the issue of American support for Israel.

Table 1:
Jewish net Democratic identification, 1962-2004

1962-1970	1972-1980	1982-1990	1992-2000	2002-2004	Change
+72	+58	+46	+72	+67	-5

SOURCE: Abramowitz and Saunders 2006

Political attitudes and partisanship of Jewish Americans

A review of the literature demonstrates that at least as much has been written about attitudes towards Jews as about the attitudes of Jews.[21] Indeed, Jews—both in the United States and abroad—have been subject to disproportionate amounts discrimination and violence, a fact that has motivated important studies in the field of public opinion, including foundational works in prejudice and the susceptibility to certain political appeals (Adorno et al., 1950). However, several relevant findings on the political attitudes and partisanship of Jewish Americans should be discussed.

That Jewish Americans tend to be politically liberal and Democratic has been recognized for quite some time (Cohen, 1989). However, these political tendencies are seemingly at odds with expectations based on their relatively high socioeconomic status (Goldstein, 1992; Parenti, 1967). After all, an established finding in political science is that wealth correlates with political conservatism and Republican preference in the broader public. But, as Milton Himmelfarb famously noted, "[Jews] are like Episcopalians in income, but vote as if they were Puerto Ricans" (Glazer, 1995, p. 133). In brief, despite demonstrating upward mobility and the occasional vote for non-liberal candidates, Jews have remained distinctively liberal and Democratic, especially in comparison to the rest of the American public (Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000).

An early study by Fuchs (1955) examined the Jewish vote during the 1952 presidential

[21]For example, see Rosenfeld (1982) and Gudkov and Levinson (1994).

election. This followed a period in which Jews went from consistent support of Republican presidential candidates (during the first decades of the 20th century) to overwhelming Democratic Party support during the New Deal era. In his study, Fuchs observed that the typical demographic correlates of partisanship (e.g., income, education, and occupation) failed to predict party affiliation among American Jews. Rather, it was the liberal internationalism and domestic policies of Roosevelt that were appealing to them generally. Fuchs found that Jews tended to favor liberal immigration, international conflict resolution, and economically liberal policies for historical and cultural reasons. What distinguished Republican defectors in 1952 was a high level of outgroup (i.e., non-Jewish) contact.

In an overview of the literature on Jewish liberalism and Democratic support, Cohen and Liebman (1997) identify five major categories of explanations. The first is the theory of "universalized compassion," or the notion that charity and compassion are strongly connected to Jewish religious culture (Walzer, 1986; Fuchs, 1955). In fact, Cohen (1989) found that many Jews understand their political liberalism to be consistent with, and derived from, Jewish values. The second explanation asserts a cultural history of "argumentative individualism." According to Levey (1995), this most strikingly includes a disdain for traditional authority, resulting in a widespread secularism among American Jews and strong support for the protection of civil liberties. Third is an explanation rooted in modern Jewish history. In brief, it posits that pre-migration European and New Deal era political loyalties have been passed down to establish modern partisan loyalties and political liberalism (Spinrad, 1990). The fourth explanation regards group interests (Cohen, 1989). It focuses on Jews as a minority community that perceives greater discrimination from conservative groups associated with the Republican Party, and protective policies from liberal groups (Liebman and Cohen, 1990). And finally, liberalism among Jewish Americans has been explained in terms of isolation from the conservative influence of Christian churches. In contrast with American Christianity, American Judaism (except for Jewish Orthodoxy) has mostly adopted an

acceptance of more modern notions of morality (Liebman, 1969).

While these theories help explain the general advantage Democrats have enjoyed with Jewish Americans over the last several decades, they fall short of explaining any recent shifts that have occurred and current day variations in partisanship.

Social identity and conflict extension

This paper investigates partisan variation among Jewish Americans using a social identity framework. While there is plenty of debate over the exact motivators of partisanship—whether it is rooted in issues and ideology (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006) or group identities (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002)—the current paper argues that both identity and issue concerns are at play, and are linked in an important way.

Identities are usefully thought of as the link between how one sees oneself and how others see them (Erikson, 1963). "Social identities," on the other hand, refer more specifically to how one sees oneself based on membership in groups—be they based on race, religion, or something else (Tajfel, 1981). Tied to this self-conception are inward and outward evaluations of social status, and the maintenance of positive self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Phinney, 1992). Despite the obvious personal component, these manufactured self-images serve as subjective evaluations of a person's belonging in society—rather than a statement of individuality. Thus, what is important when considering social identity is not objective group membership, but rather subjective psychological attachments to sometimes unclearly defined social groups (Turner et al., 1987). These psychological attachments, of course, will vary within membership of the same social group (Oakes, 2002).

Although social identity theory came from an attempt to explain intergroup conflict, the framework that has developed around the social identity approach also has some important

contributions to the study of public opinion. Members of different groups often care about different issues. And sometimes they care about the same issues, but in different ways. Group members with strong attachments also tend to be more uniform in their opinions on issues of particular importance (Turner, 1985; Hogg, 1987, 1993*a*). Thus when there is partisan differentiation—i.e., when the parties take different stances—on issues that group members find particularly important, it motivates several possible outcomes. One, of course, is that individuals make their partisan and non-partisan identities congruent around the issues of importance. This might involve changing political allegiances to make them congruent with a person's preferred position on a deeply important issue. The other possibility is that personal and political identities be discordant, but with one identity made subordinate to the other (Brewer, 2001; Walsh, Ferrell and Tolone, 1976).

These outcomes hinge on issue-based partisan differentiation, which seems to have widened over the last several decades. According to Layman, Carsey and Horowitz (2006), the two major American political parties have increasingly polarized on each of the important domains of domestic policy. This "conflict extension" has produced an overall greater differentiation between the parties by widening the scope of issues on which they take opposing positions (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Layman, 1999; Layman et al., 2010). Thus, it has increased the potential for members of a social group to distinguish the parties on issues of personal importance. This polarization makes it easier for people to choose between parties, as one political group will be perceived as friendlier to people like them, whereas the other may be viewed as hostile (Conover and Feldman, 1981).

This interaction between personal and outward factors provides an explanation for differentiation both across and within groups. If members of different groups tend to value different issues, it may lead to differences in the criteria (and, thus, outcomes) of partisan judgments. Likewise, variation in the strength which members of the same group identify with the group could produce differences in party evaluations by changing the relative im-

portance of political issues. This explanation provides a plausible reason for differences in partisanship among Jews.

As the Pew Research Center (2013*a*) notes, a large share of American Jews feel a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people. This conceivably transfers to caring about Jews internationally, as well as the interests of the Jewish nation of Israel—a country borne from the international response to World War 2 atrocities faced by European Jews. And, consistent with the social identity approach, we would expect Jews with a strong sense of ingroup identity to care more about the vitality of Israel than Jews with a weaker identity, on average.

Although the two dominant American parties have not taken diametric positions on American support for Israel, there are reasons Jewish Americans may evaluate the parties differently on the issue. For example, some have argued that the Republican Party has assumed the mantle of supporting Israel most vocally and fervently, especially in recent years (Podhoretz, 2009; Lipton, 2015). And public opinion reveals a strong divergence among members of the two parties on supporting Israel. A Brookings Institute study found that 51% of Republicans want the United States to side with Israel in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Telhami, 2014). In contrast, only 17% of Democrats think the United States should side with Israel. The vast majority of Democrats think the United States should take no side. This matches very closely with a recent CNN/ORC Poll (2015) that found Republicans are 58% more likely than Democrats to say that the United States should take Israel's side in the Middle East conflict.

For these reasons, we might expect Jewish Americans with a strong ingroup identity to not only care about Israel more than Jews with a weak identity, but also identify with the Republican Party at a higher rate.

Research question

Figure 1 demonstrates a 17-point decrease in the Democratic advantage among Jews from 2008 to 2014. However, Democrats still enjoyed a 2-to-1 advantage in party identification among Jewish Americans in 2014. What distinguishes the roughly 30% of Jews who chose to identify as Republican? Is it merely general conservatism, in contrast with the broader liberalism that typifies the rest of the group? Or do ingroup identity and concern for Israel also motivate Republican identification? This study tests that theory.

Hypotheses

In order to test the theory outline in this paper, a set of hypotheses are investigated. Each of these directly relates to a different component of the thesis connecting Jewish identity to partisanship.

1. The personal importance of Israel: Jews with a stronger ingroup identity are more likely than weak identifiers to say that caring about Israel is essential to being Jewish and be more personally attached to Israel.

2. The political salience of Israel: Jews with a stronger ingroup identity are more likely than weak identifiers to name Israel as a top issue relating to their vote.

3. The link between identity, Israel, and Republicanism: Jewish identity strength is correlated with the probability of Republican identification, but the relationship is mediated by an attachment to Israel.

4. The recency of Israel's partisan domestic salience: The relationship between attachment to Israel and partisanship is reflected in recent data, but is absent in older survey data.

Data

The survey data analyzed in this paper mainly come from two datasets. Both are from studies designed specifically to investigate the attitudes of Jewish Americans, in contrast to others that merely include Jews as a very small subset of the overall sample. Thus, analyses of these data are more generalizable, since samples are constructed to be representative of the Jewish American adult population.

Most analyses employ Pew's 2013 "A Portrait of Jewish Americans" respondent dataset (Pew Research Center, 2013*b*). The full study was administered to 5,132 American adults who were either self-identified as Jewish, raised Jewish, or had a Jewish parent. It was designed to cover a number of topics, including identity, religious beliefs, and political attitudes. All surveys were completed between February 20 and June 13, 2013 through landlines and cellphones.

The second source of data is the 2012 Jewish Values Survey (Public Religion Research Institute, 2012). This study was conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute using a random sample of 1,004 self-identified adult Jews in the Knowledge Networks KnowledgePanel. For the purposes of the study, Jews were identified as individuals who reported being Jewish by religion or those who claimed no religion but still considered themselves ethnically or culturally Jewish. All interviews were conducted online between February 23 and March 5, 2012.

A third dataset is employed briefly at the end of the analytical section of the paper to make a historical comparison. These data come from the 2000-2001 National Jewish Population Survey (Jewish Federations of North America, 2001). This is a dataset of 4,523 interviews completed by Jewish American adults between August 21, 2000 and August 30, 2001 via telephone.

The nature of Jewish identity

The first question to be investigated is the extent to which American Jews identify as members of a cohesive group. Because they belong to a social group commonly characterized by both religious and ethnocultural components, Jews may identify with individual aspects, multiple aspects, or perhaps no aspect of Judaism. And, as with all religious and ethnic identities, the extent to which an individual identifies with a particular aspect may vary tremendously.

The Jewish Values Survey contains an item that measures the strength with which a person identifies as Jewish (jewishim). Specifically, it asks respondents how important being Jewish—undefined, and thus left to be interpreted subjectively—is in their lives. The available responses are: 1) "The most important thing," 2) "Very important," 3) "Somewhat important," 4) "Not too important," and 5) "Not important at all." Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses.

Figure 2: "How important is being Jewish in your life?"



SOURCE: Jewish Values Survey 2012

As figure 2 demonstrates, importance skews toward the higher end, with about 40%

saying that being Jewish is at least very important in their lives. The most common sentiment—chosen by a full third in the study—is that being Jewish is very important. In addition, almost eight percent feel it is the most important thing in their lives. The second most popular response in the study is that being Jewish is somewhat important. Slightly less than 30% say that being Jewish is not too important or not important at all.[22]

In the current paper, some analyses use collapsed categories to differentiate between strong and weak identifiers. Strong identifiers are individuals who report that being Jewish is either very important or the most important thing in their lives. Weak identifiers are the remaining 60% who consider being Jewish either somewhat important, not too important, or not important at all. Where more precision is needed, original gradations in ingroup identity strength are preserved by using the complete scale.

The importance of religion and ancestry

There are striking differences between strong and weak identifiers when it comes to religion. As the top panel in table 2 demonstrates, virtually all Jews with a strong identity (97.8%) claim a religion. This is in contrast to the 72.9% of weak-identity Jews who claim a religion. The correlation between having a strong ingroup identity and having a religion is incredibly high: 0.88.[23]

Table 2 also shows that, among those who claim a religion, strong identifiers are much more likely to consider their religion personally important. Sixty percent of Jews with a

[22]Pew gives a very similar breakdown, though respondents were not provided the "most important" response option. The following breakdown of percentages come from Pew's item (qh5b): 1) "Not at all important" = 6.3%, 2) "Not too important" = 14.6%, 3) "Somewhat important" = 36.2%, and 4) "Very important" = 42.8%.

[23]This type of correlation is known as Yule's Q. It is a special case of Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, measuring the association between a pair dichotomous variables.

Table 2:
Adherence to a Religion and the Importance of Religion

	All	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.	p-value
Have a religion	83.2%	72.9%	97.8%	0.00
Don't have a religion	16.8%	27.1%	2.2%	
How important is religion in your life?				
Not at all important	18.4%	29.1%	3.3%	0.00
Not too important	22.9%	35.9%	4.4%	0.00
Somewhat important	31.7%	31.4%	32.3%	0.80
Very important	22.4%	3.6%	48.9%	0.00
Most important	4.6%	0%	11.1%	0.00

SOURCE: Jewish Values Survey 2012

strong identity say that religion is either very important or the most important in their lives. In contrast, among Jews with a weak identity, only 3.6% assign religion this level of importance. Put differently, Jews with a stronger identity are more than 16 times as likely as those with a weak identity to say that religion is a very important part of their lives.

Strong identifiers and weak identifiers also differ markedly in their denomination of Judaism. As demonstrated in table 3, the plurality of Jews with a weak identity (44.2%) say they belong to no particular denomination. By contrast, only about seven percent of strong identifiers say they belong to no specific denomination. Compare this with figures on Conservative Judaism, the most popular denomination among Jews with a strong identity (about 40.8%). Only about 16% of Jews with a weak identity practice Conservative Judaism. The differences are also clear when comparing the shares who claim Orthodox Judaism. Only about two percent of Jews with a weak identity are Orthodox Jews, whereas almost a fifth (18%) with a strong identity are Orthodox. Interestingly, nearly half of all Jews with a strong ingroup identity are either Conservative or Orthodox. And about 80% of Jews with a weak identity claim Reform Judaism or no particular denomination.

Not surprisingly, then, we see that strong identifiers also view Jewish identity in more religious terms than do weaker identifiers. Data from Pew, presented in table 4, demonstrate

Table 3:
Breakdown of Judaic Denominations

	All	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.	p-value
Reform	35.1%	36.5%	32.8%	0.27
Conservative	26.3%	16.1%	40.8%	0.00
Orthodox	8.5%	1.7%	18%	0.00
Other	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	1.00
No denomination	28.8%	44.2%	7.1	0.00

SOURCE: Jewish Values Survey 2012

that those with a weaker identity overwhelmingly see being Jewish in terms of only ancestry and culture (75.6%). Only about a quarter consider being Jewish to be about religion, either partly or exclusively. In contrast, a much higher share of Jews with a strong identity see being Jewish as being about religion in some way. And strong-identity Jews are more than twice as likely to see being Jewish as being about all things (religion, ancestry, and culture).

Table 4:
"To you personally, is being Jewish..."

	All	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.	p-value
Religion only	16.3%	10.4%	24.7%	0.00
Ancestry/culture only	62.7%	75.6%	43.1%	0.00
Religion/ancestry/culture	20.4%	13.7%	31.6%	0.00
Other	0.6%	0.3%	0.6%	0.00

SOURCE: Pew 2013

Table 5 demonstrates that the relationship is robust when examined using multivariate logistic regression. Personally defining Jewish identity in more comprehensive terms—as about both religion and ancestry—is associated with an increased probability of having a strong ingroup identity. People who define being Jewish in this manner are almost three times as likely to be strong identifiers. The only other noteworthy correlate is conservatism, for which a one standard deviation increase comes a 47% jump in the likelihood of having a strong Jewish identity.

Table 5:
The Correlates of a Strong Jewish Identity

	Dependent variable: Strong ingroup identification	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Age (years)	0.015***	1.02
	(0.0004)	
College graduate	0.078***	1.08
	(0.016)	
Sex: Male	−0.139***	0.87
	(0.016)	
South	−0.001	1.00
	(0.017)	
Republicanism (standardized)	−0.047***	0.95
	(0.009)	
Conservatism (standardized)	0.383***	1.47
	(0.009)	
Being Jewish about religion and ancestry	1.059***	2.88
	(0.019)	
Constant	−1.290***	
	(0.026)	
Observations	3,958	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	
	SOURCE: Pew 2013	

Related attitudes

In addition to asking about the personal importance of being Jewish, Pew asked whether respondents were "proud to be Jewish" (qe9a), whether they had a "strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people" (qe9b), and if they felt a "special responsibility to take care of Jews in need around the world" (qe9c). Table 6, which presents the share of people who responded in the affirmative to each question, shows a strong positive correlation for each with identity.

Table 6:
Sense of Pride, Belonging, and Responsibility Among Jewish Americans

	Importance of being Jewish				
	Not at all	Not too	Somewhat	Very	Gamma
"I am proud to be Jewish"	63.6%	81.8%	94.2%	99.0%	0.76
"I have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people"	22.4%	32.7%	71.2%	94.5%	0.80
"I have a special responsibility to take care of Jews in need around the world"	35.7%	26.8%	59.2%	83.3%	0.63

SOURCE: Pew 2013

As we might expect, placing a stronger importance on ones Jewish identity is correlated with pride in being a member of the group. Table 6 shows a strong, monotonic, and positive relationship (gamma = 0.76) between a stronger identity and the propensity of a person to say they are proud to be Jewish. Although most Jews report they are proud to be Jewish, those with the strongest sense of identity are 56% more likely to feel pride than are people with the weakest identity (63.6%). In fact, practically all (99%) Jews who say their identity is very important feel proud to be Jewish.

Likewise, people with a greater sense of Jewish identity have a much stronger feeling of belonging to the Jewish people (gamma = 0.80). The shares who have a strong sense of belonging to the group vary greatly as you move across the levels of Jewish identity strength. Only about a fifth (22.4%) of those who say being Jewish is not at all important

have a strong sense of belonging to the group. This is about four times smaller than among the group with the strongest Jewish identity (94.5%). Interestingly, there is nearly a 40-point gap in responses between those who say being Jewish is not too important and those who say it is somewhat important.

Lastly, table 6 shows us that people whose Jewish identity is stronger are also more likely to feel a unique sense of responsibility for other Jews around the world. There is roughly a 48-point difference in affirmative responses between people who consider their Jewish identity not at all important (35.7%) and those who consider it very important (83.3%). This moderately strong relationship (gamma = 0.63) hints that Jews with a stronger identity likely have greater concern for Israel—a primarily Jewish nation—and may prioritize Israel-related issues more strongly than those with a weaker Jewish identity.

Personal and political concern for Israel

The first two hypotheses of the social identity thesis, those relating to Israel, are tested in this section. If it is true that Jews with a stronger ingroup identity have a greater concern for Israel, as hypothesized, the data should unambiguously reveal that relationship.

Two aspects of concern about Israel are investigated: personal importance and political salience. Do strong identifiers exhibit stronger personal connections to Israel than do weak identifiers? And, does concern for Israel carry over into the realm of political importance? In other words, is there any evidence that strong identifiers are more likely than weak identifiers to exhibit a concern for Israel that is politically consequential?

The personal importance of Israel

Is caring about Israel generally considered an important component of being Jewish? Pew asked this question (qe5h) of its full Jewish sample, and table 7 shows the breakdown of responses for strong and weak identifiers.[24]

Table 7:
Importance of Caring about Israel

	All	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.
Not important	13.2%	17.7%	7.1%
Important	42%	49.6%	31.9%
Essential	44.8%	32.7%	61.1%

Gamma: 0.48
SOURCE: Pew 2013

Table 7 reveals a moderately strong relationship (gamma = 0.48) between a person's ingroup identity strength and the personal importance they place in caring about Israel. Jews with a strong ingroup identity are almost twice as likely (61.1%) as those with a weak identity (32.7%) to consider caring about Israel an essential part of being Jewish. Only about seven percent of strongly-identified Jews say it is not important. This is in contrast to the nearly one-fifth (17.7%) of weakly-identified Jews who say it is not important.

It would also be expected that Jews with a strong ingroup identity are more likely than those with a weak identity to place caring about Israel above other considerations regarding Judaism. To test this expectation, similar questions that asked about other things related to being Jewish were examined. These are: 1) "Remembering the Holocaust" (qe5a), 2)

[24]Pew's item (qe5h) reads: "Please tell me how important each of the following is to what BEING JEWISH means to you. Caring about Israel. Is that essential, OR important but NOT essential, OR not an important part of what BEING JEWISH means to you?" The response options given were: 1) "Essential part of what BEING JEWISH means to you," 2) "Important but not essential," and 3) "Not an important part of what BEING JEWISH means to you." Respondents were also allowed to offer a response of "don't know," which was recoded to "not an important part."

"Leading an ethical and moral life" (qe5b), 3) "Observing Jewish law" (qe5c), 4) "Having a good sense of humor" (qe5d), 4) "Working for justice and equality in society" (qe5e), 5) "Being intellectually curious" (qe5f), 6) "Eating traditional Jewish foods" (qe5g), and 7) "Being part of a Jewish community" (qe5i). Responses to each of these items was coded 1 to 3 (in the direction of "essential"), averaged, and then subtracted from the score given to "Caring about Israel." Computed scores reflect the degree to which caring about Israel is considered more or less important than the other issues, generally. Individuals with positive scores consider caring about Israel more essential in importance than the other items, while those with negative scores consider it less important. The findings are summarized in table 8.

Table 8:
Caring about Israel: More/Less Important than Other Issues?

	All	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.
-1: Less important	35.6%	40.4%	29.3%
0: Equal importance	8.1%	9.2%	6.7%
1: More important	56.3%	50.4%	64.1%

Gamma: 0.25
SOURCE: Pew 2013

Table 8 shows a moderate relationship (gamma = 0.25). In the Pew study, strong identifiers were 27% more likely than were weak identifiers to express that caring about Israel is more important to being Jewish than the other things, on average. This relationship also withstands analyses using multivariate logistic regression.

Table 9 provides a summary of three models predicting the primacy of caring about Israel. The first regresses this dependent variable on a set of demographic factors, political variables, and a dichotmous variable signaling whether a respondent sees being Jewish as being about both religion and ancestry (rather than just one aspect, or neither). All variables, except having a college degree, have a statistically significant relationship with 95% confidence. Further, both Republicanism and conservatism are associated with primacy of caring about

Israel. The effect of understanding ones Jewish identity as a reflection of religion and ancestry is an increased probability in the dependent variable of about nine percent ($e^{0.09} = 1.09$).

Table 9:
Care for Israel as a More Important Part of What it Means to be Jewish

	Dependent variable: Primacy of caring about Israel		
	Model		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ingroup identity strength (standardized)		0.226***	0.227***
		(0.008)	(0.008)
Being Jewish about religion and ancestry	0.090***		−0.020
	(0.019)		(0.019)
Age (years)	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Sex: Male	−0.113***	−0.086***	−0.090***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
College degree	0.029*	−0.003	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
South	0.270***	0.269***	0.267***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Republicanism (standardized)	0.185***	0.194***	0.194***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Conservatism (standardized)	0.317***	0.275***	0.275***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	−0.342***	−0.233***	−0.232***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Observations	3,958	3,977	3,958

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

SOURCE: Pew 2013

The second model in table 9 demonstrates that ingroup identity strength also has a strong

association with the primacy of caring about Israel. The configuration of this model is almost identical to the first; however, in this model, the indicator of seeing Jewish identity as a reflection of religion and ancestry is replaced by ingroup identity strength. Here the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in identity strength is a 25% increase ($e^{0.226} = 1.25$) in the probability of viewing concern for Israel as relatively more important.

Finally, model three shows that the effect of identity is robust, and that—as we would expect from the analysis in table 5—identity mediates the relationship of the dependent variable with defining Jewish identity as being about both religion and ancestry. This model employs all explanatory variables from the first two models to complete the final stage of a mediation analysis. In short, models 1 and 2 show that viewing ones Jewish identity as a reflection of religion and ancestry, and having a strong Jewish identity, are correlates of primacy of caring about Israel. That the effect of the former disappears in the presence of the latter, however, suggests that ingroup identity strength mediates the relationship seen in model 1.[25]

To make the point about the personal importance of Israel among strongly-identified Jews even clearer, figure 3 plots average emotional attachment to Israel (qg2 in the Pew study) for people at each level of ingroup strength. Those who say that being Jewish is not at all important in their lives generally are not very emotionally attached to Israel. On the other hand, the average person who says being Jewish is very important in their life reports being somewhere in the range of somewhat-to-very emotionally attached to Israel.

These findings support the first of the hypotheses laid out earlier. Among Jewish Americans, people with a stronger sense of ingroup identity are more likely to express the personal importance of Israel and feel personally attached to it.

[25]This mediation analysis follows the four-step procedure described in Baron and Kenny (1986), Judd and Kenny (1981), and James and Brett (1984).

Figure 3:
The Relationship Between Attachment to Israel and Ingroup Identification



SOURCE: Pew 2013

The political salience of Israel

To evaluate the second hypothesis—that Jewish Americans with a stronger ingroup identity are more likely to view Israel as a top issue relating to their vote—responses to two items in the Jewish Values Survey are investigated. The first item (ispres1) provides a list of 10 issues—including "the economy," "same-sex marriage," and "Israel"—and asks respondents which is most important to their vote for president. The next item (ispres2) provides the same list, and asks which is second most important. Responses to these two questions are collapsed and dichotomized to signal whether or not an individual identified Israel as one of the top issues relating to their presidential vote.

Jewish Americans with the strongest sense of identity are 26 times as likely as those with the weakest identity to select Israel as one of the two most important issues relating

Table 10:
Most Important Issue to R's Vote for President

	How important is being Jewish in your life?				
	Not at all	Not too	Somewhat	Very	Most
Israel	1.3%	0.6%	9.8%	11.1%	34.4%
Other	98.7%	99.4%	90.2%	88.9%	65.6%
Gamma: 0.58					

SOURCE: Jewish Values Survey 2012

to their vote for president. In fact, as table 10 shows, people who say being Jewish is not at all important in their lives virtually never identify Israel as a top issue. In contrast, slightly more than a third of those who said being Jewish is the most important thing in their lives in the Jewish Values Survey chose Israel as a top political issue relating to their vote. The correlation between these two variables is strong (gamma = 0.58), signaling that Israel emerges as politically important to a much larger share of Jews at the highest level of ingroup identity strength.

Table 11 shows that this relationship is robust in a multivariate logistic regression. Identification of Israel as one of the most important issues is regressed on a standard set of demographic and political variables, along with ingroup identity strength. The results demonstrate that the strength of a person's Jewish identity has a strong effect on their probability of considering Israel a top issues relating to their choice for president. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in identity strength is associated with a 187% increase in the probability of considering Israel of top importance. Put differently, someone who is one standard deviation above the mean, in terms of identity strength, is almost three times more likely than someone at the mean to identify Israel as a top electoral issue.

The calculated probabilities of identifying Israel as a top electoral issue across the range of identity strength (with all other variables held at their respective means) are plotted in figure 4. They demonstrate that Israel is basically a non-issue, as it relates to presidential

Table 11:
Identifying Israel as One of the Most Important Electoral Issues

	Dependent variable: Israel as a top electoral issue	
	Coefficient	Odds ratio
Ingroup identity strength (standardized)	1.053^{***}	2.87
	(0.146)	
Age (years)	-0.011	0.99
	(0.007)	
Sex: Male	0.973^{***}	2.65
	(0.262)	
College degree	-0.430^{*}	0.65
	(0.245)	
South	-0.010	0.99
	(0.276)	
Republicanism (standardized)	0.356^{**}	1.43
	(0.141)	
Conservatism (standardized)	0.334^{**}	1.40
	(0.160)	
Constant	-2.756^{***}	
	(0.444)	
Observations	992	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

SOURCE: Jewish Values Survey 2012

vote, to all but the most strongly identified Jewish Americans. However, the share who do consider Israel among the most important issues to their vote is significant at the highest levels of Jewish identity.

Figure 4:
Probability of Identifying Israel as a Top Issue



SOURCE: Jewish Values Survey 2012

Jewish Identity, Attachment to Israel, and Partisanship

The third hypothesis outlined earlier is that identity strength is positively correlated with the probability of Republican affiliation. However, the effect of identity on partisanship is hypothesized to operate through an attachment to Israel. In order to test the hypothesis, mediation analysis is done following the same steps used earlier in table 9.

Table 12 demonstrates that the effect of identity strength on Republican affiliation works almost entirely through an attachment to Israel. Each model in table 12 includes a set of

demographic and political controls.[26] Model 1 shows that, indeed, stronger ingroup identity strength is associated with a greater likelihood of Republican affiliation. Model 2 shows that attachment to Israel is also strongly associated with a greater probability of identifying as Republican. And model 3 shows that the effect of identity strength is attenuated almost completely with attachment to Israel in the model. In contrast, the effect of attachment to Israel is robust; a one-standard deviation increase in attachment to Israel is associated with a 39% increase in the probability of identifying as a Republican.

The results in table 12 support the third hypothesis. Republican affiliation, as we would expect, is associated with ideological and social conservatism—measured here as support for smaller government and opposition to homosexuality. But, it is also associated with an emotional attachment to Israel. The more attached people consider themselves to the nation of Israel, the more likely they are to be Republicans. Figure 5 plots this relationship, holding everything else in model 3 constant at their respective means. It shows that the predicted share of Republicans at the lowest levels of attachment to Israel is quite low. Predicted share increases noticeably, and to significant proportions, when attachment to Israel is much stronger.

Having demonstrated the link between Jewish identity strength and concern for Israel (both personally and politically), and the subsequent link between concern for Israel and Republican affiliation, the question remains as to whether this set of relationships is a recent phenomenon or whether it pre-dates the shift in partisanship presented in figure 1. The fourth hypothesis is that this set of relationships is recent—reflecting a more recent partisan polarization on the issue of Israel—which means it should be absent in an analysis of older

[26]Rather than use general conservatism as a control, as is done in previous models, two more specific items are used that gauge conservatism in specific domains of domestic policy. These items were used because of the risk that general conservatism (as a catch-all) might be affected by identity or attachment to Israel directly and mask the effect of these variables on partisanship.

Table 12:
Effects of Ingroup Identity and Attachment to Israel on Republican Affiliation

	Dependent variable: Republican affiliation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	O.R. (3)
Ingroup identity strength (standardized)	0.171^{***} (0.010)		0.032^{***} (0.011)	1.03
Attachment to Israel (standardized)		0.388^{***} (0.010)	0.327^{***} (0.012)	1.39
Age (years)	-0.007^{***} (0.001)	-0.008^{***} (0.001)	-0.008^{***} (0.001)	0.99
Sex: Male	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.064^{***} (0.020)	0.94
College degree	0.124^{***} (0.021)	0.018 (0.019)	0.085^{***} (0.021)	1.09
South	0.300^{***} (0.021)	0.212^{***} (0.020)	0.296^{***} (0.021)	1.34
Support smaller government (standardized)	1.127^{***} (0.011)	1.079^{***} (0.010)	1.112^{***} (0.011)	3.04
Oppose homosexuality (standardized)	0.713^{***} (0.009)	0.647^{***} (0.009)	0.704^{***} (0.009)	2.02
Constant	-1.247^{***} (0.032)	-1.116^{***} (0.030)	-1.141^{***} (0.032)	
Observations	4,110	4,481	4,110	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

SOURCE: Pew 2013

Figure 5: Probability of Republican Affiliation



SOURCE: Pew 2013

survey data.

To test the fourth hypothesis, the historical relationship between attachment to Israel and party affiliation is examined. The first set of figures from table 13 show the relationship in 2000 and 2001, using the 2000-2001 National Jewish Population Survey. While the second set of figures use the Pew data from 2013.[27]

The data in table 13 support the final hypothesis. In the earlier data, personal attachment to Israel is not positively correlated with Republican identification. In fact, it is somewhat negatively correlated (gamma = -0.09). However, in the 2013 data, there is a positive relationship between the two variables of moderate size (gamma = 0.21). Assuming we can rely on these data to accurately portray the attitudes of Jewish Americans during these two

[27]There is a 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, however, it cannot be used for this analysis since it contains a different scale to measure attachment to Israel and did not include a question on partisanship.

Table 13:
Partisanship, by Strength of Attachment to Israel

A. 2000-2001 (NJPS 2001)

	Not at all	Not very	Somewhat	Very
Democrat	51	58	62	61
Independent	28	24	22	20
Republican	21	17	16	19
Gamma: -0.09				

B. 2013 (Pew 2013)

	Not at all	Not very	Somewhat	Very
Democrat	53	60	50	41
Independent	39	30	36	33
Republican	9	10	14	26
Gamma: 0.21				

Note: Leaners are kept as Independents to conform with the NJPS 2001 scale

time periods, the numbers suggest a change in at least one aspect of how Jews form their partisan loyalties during the last 15 years. Either American support for Israel became a more salient issue, the parties began to diverge on the issue, or both.

Discussion

Whether or not Jews as a whole have become significantly more Republican over the past decade, several things are clear about Jewish partisanship in recent years. First, as the analyses made clear, Republican affiliation is greater among Jews who have a stronger ingroup identity. This relationship is not direct, however. As the framework linking social identity and conflict extension theorized, the effects of identity work through issue-based party evaluations. More specifically, for Jews with a stronger sense of membership in the group, partisan evaluations seem to be affected greatly by an attachment to, and concern for, the Jewish nation of Israel. Not only do strongly identified Jews feel more personally attached to Israel, they also express a greater propensity to base their vote—and party—on

the issue of Israel. Having parties that seemingly represent different approaches to this issue is essential.

A series of analyses provided support for each of the four hypotheses discussed, however, the fourth deserves extra discussion. Central to the claim that Israel has become an issue motivating growth in Republican affiliation is the idea that the parties have polarized on support for Israel. While divergence has not happened in any explicit way at the level of party elites and platforms, polling data discussed earlier demonstrate very large partisan differences on the issue in the general public. Thus, the impression that Republicans are more friendly to the state of Israel—and by extension Jews, generally—is likely enough to alter partisan judgments based on the issue. The analysis in table 12 strongly supports this interpretation.

It should be noted that limitations in the available data prevent a more extensive analysis on the historical relationship between attachment to Israel and party affiliation. This is unfortunate because it prevents a tracking of when the development of that relationship began. However, the absence of a simple bivariate relationship between an attachment to Israel and partisanship in 2000 and 2001 suggest that it is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Also, the implications of this recent change in the relationship between attachment to Israel and partisanship are interesting, given the role of social identity in motivating the process. Only Jews with a relatively strong identity seem to elevate support for Israel to the highest levels of political significance (table 10 and figure 4). This suggests that any potential partisan realignment is likely come from these individuals with the highest levels of ingroup identity. From the perspective of campaign politics, the findings suggest that Republican office-seekers could even attempt to expand the saliency of Jewish identity to increase the likelihood of defection from otherwise loyal Democrats.

While there may be some debate as to whether enough Jews have left the Democratic

Party over the last several years to significantly change the Democratic advantage, this paper provides a rationale as to how and why further defection might occur. Changes in the political environment, specifically any explicit divergences the parties take on support for Israel can only accelerate that process.

Finally, this paper attempts to bridge a divide in the study of partisanship, between those emphasizing the role of social group identities and those who promote issue-centric theories. These findings demonstrate that both identity and issue concern can play an important role in establishing and, perhaps, renegotiating partisan allegiances.

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