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THE COST OF INCLUSION

Public Opinion on the Cultural and Economic Bases of
Immigrant Inclusion across Western and Central/Eastern Europe

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by
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DEDICATION

to

My grandmother

who could laugh in any language

My parents

for crossing oceans and mountains
so that I could make my own decisions and my own mistakes

My little brother

for coming along
so neither of us have to grow up alone

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

The Cost of Inclusion

by

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This dissertation examines the determinants of immigrant sentiments and support for immigration in Europe using a comparative framework that focuses on new contexts of reception in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In the last two decades, the social and political landscapes across Europe were reshaped by economic and humanitarian crises. Conflicts in Syria resulted in an unprecedented number of refugees seeking protection in Europe and raising public concerns over how, and to what extent, foreign-born populations fit into the European fabric. Global inequalities and conflicts compound the pressures of modern immigration, inflating both the number of people forced across international borders and the negative discourse surrounding them. European concerns over growing immigrant populations and dissolving national borders are therefore contingent on the cultural contexts that feed into conceptions of nationhood and socioeconomic generalizations attributed to immigrant groups.

Using European Social Survey data and Eurostat indicators from 2002-2018, this dissertation investigates (1) patterns of regional change, (2) the influence of economic and cultural biases on immigrant sentiments, and (3) the extent to which urban/rural contexts characterize these attitudes across Western and CEE countries. Building on current immigration

research by examining the application of theories of immigration and integration in new contexts of reception, and, ultimately, testing the veracity of a vast sociopolitical divide between Western and CE Europe.

Findings suggest that although immigrant sentiments are diverging across Western and CEE countries, compositional and value-driven factors can explain contexts in which Europeans in either region feel greater tolerance and acceptance toward immigrants. The extent to which data reflect a salient divide depends therefore on how contexts are frame immigrant characteristics and contributions. Findings across economic cleavages in CEE countries also suggest that the cumulative risk of poverty and isolation is slowly but steadily diminishing in this region, and that immigrants are experiencing the fastest rate of improvement in their personal economic security. Using literature and theories in immigration, nationalism, and political science, the broader contribution of expanding research into new contexts of immigrant reception can be translated into policy implications with actionable, data-driven recommendations.

CHAPTER 1

Contemporary immigration to Europe – beyond the West

As the patterns of industry, opportunity, and political contexts change over time, migration networks of sending and receiving states adjust accordingly. Following two decades of conflict and crises in the Middle East, developing countries across the world are seeing an unprecedented number of arriving immigrants, particularly in the number of refugees (Keating 2015). This is particularly true for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Lyman 2015). Until recently, CEE countries were recognized as sending countries, but since their induction into the European Union (EU) they have experienced greater pressure to liberalize their policies, implement protective measures for vulnerable populations, and establish more liberal and inclusive civic integration policies.

Understanding how anti-immigrant sentiments and support for immigration are affected by these important sociopolitical pressures is complicated by the limited scope of current immigration scholarship. The bulk of research and theory developed around immigration and immigrant sentiments focus on traditional receiving countries in North America and Western Europe. While current theories should not be expected to apply to nascent contexts of reception in the same way as they do in traditional receiving countries, examining existing theoretical frameworks in new contexts can inform current immigration scholarship on the values or contextual factors that inform immigrant sentiments or support for immigration in the absence of long-standing legal and cultural experience with absorbing vast numbers of foreign people. The implications for democratic destabilization and right-wing backlash as a consequence of large-scale immigration have been highlighted recently (Strabac and Listhaug 2008, Thorleifsson

2017), and provide added urgency to expanding contemporary perceptions of nationhood, national identity, and their influence on immigrant tolerance and acceptance.

"Real or Imagined": Theories of Anti-Immigrant Bias

Although there is scant immigration research conducted in this region, previous immigration research has identified two ways to frame the context and reason for anti-immigrant sentiments. The first argument is framed around economic threats, whether as individual threats of increased labor market competition (Gerber et al. 2017, Haimueller and Hiscox 2010, Mayda 2006), or as a broader, societal application, such as reduce the native population's access to welfare benefits (Facchini and Mayda 2009, Hanson et al. 2007). As Naumann et al. (2018) point out, however, research on how the fear of increased competition ties to anti-immigrant sentiments can be ambiguous and lead to opposing conclusions (Facchini and Mayda 2009, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Helbling and Kriesi 2014, Malhotra et al 2013). Facchini and Mayda (2009) also find contextual variations that question the explanatory power of labor market competition theory on individual attitudes. Their findings point to the influence of alternative long-term factors, such as the aging population that would benefit from expanding the future labor force through an influx of young immigrants to support the 'pay as you go' social security systems in place.

The second explanatory framework for anti-immigrant sentiments focuses on the symbolic threat of cultural dissonance, or the fear that people of different countries will introduce cultural practices and beliefs that may unseat the dominant values that tie people together through a national identity (Quillian 1995, Scheitle and Adamczyk 2009). Religion plays a large role in these cultural boundaries, whether through historic ties to national values, or

through clear differences in religious practices (Connor and Krogstad 2015, Espinova and Ray 2017, Keating 2015, Zolberg and Woon 1999).

A large proportion of the refugee population that the EU is currently striving to incorporate is both Muslim and foreign[1] (Manevich 2016). Although the presence of large Muslim communities from the Middle East is not a recent phenomenon in Europe, a number of factors over the past two decades have led to a global suspicion and prejudice against the Muslim population (Adida et al. 2016, Osiewicz 2017, Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Halliday (1999) finds that the public perception of non-European Muslims approaches alarmism and generalization in a way that members of other religious groups are not (Blinder 2015). These feelings have led political groups to campaign specifically against immigrants from Muslim countries in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) (Polyakova 2015, Kriesi and Pappas 2015, Pehrson et al. 2009, Wodak and Boukala 2015). Some argue that opposition to Muslim immigrants is due to both rational *and* irrational threats. The "rational" threat framing Muslim immigrants as clashing with native perceptions of gender and social norms (Martinez et al. 2015, Wikan 2002) and bringing increased violence into the country (Kelek 2011). This is compared to "irrational" fears that are simply the rejection of difference due to the fear of a more visible 'other' (Kislev 2018).

Regardless of whether they are real or perceived threats, the narratives and stereotypes perpetuated about Muslim MENA immigrants feed into the perceived threat of Muslims to European values (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Narratives associated with different immigrant groups do not only operate as binary divisions between native and immigrant populations;

[1] The origin of the Muslim immigrants is important since the religion itself is not unfamiliar to the region: CEE has its own Muslims. Despite the absence of research to support this, I still want to be clear that Middle Eastern or North African Muslims are not received in Western European countries the same way as Bosnian or American Muslims would be.

immigrant narratives and stereotypes instead develop relative to each other within a hierarchy of social power, social opportunities, and social distance within a given national context. Research in Western European countries find that native populations in traditional receiving countries distinguish between those who are 'good' and 'bad' Muslims (Maira 2009). Those who are 'bad' (i.e., do not seamlessly blend into the Western social norms) are socially excluded in order for the host population to better identify those of whom is suspicious and mistrusting. Muslim immigrants are consistently identified as 'bad' immigrants in European countries, thus the tangible disadvantages they (and their children) experience due to these targeted social attitudes have been measured across various Western European countries in the form of exclusionary labor practices and diminished social trust and perceived reliability (Foner and Alba 2008).

Attempts to minimize the distance between MENA immigrants through political interventions have been controversial (e.g., for France, see Bertossi 2007, for the backfiring polices in the UK and Denmark, see Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), and overall, research continues to suggest that the social distance between Europeans and MENA immigrants remains consistently vast due to perceived differences in religion, culture, and demographic characteristics (Adida et al 2016, Fossett 2006).

Beyond the West: Why the CEE is Different

As a region of new and potential receiving countries, CEE presents historic and economic differences relative to traditional receiving countries that require a reconsideration of the assumed framework that these theories otherwise overlook by limiting research to West. There are several reasons to expect the theories of social conflict and labor market competition to lead to different findings in the CEE context (Bandelj and Finley 2016, Snellman and Ekehammar

2005). Ethnic tensions in the region continue to cause confrontational rifts between groups (Zubrzycki 2001) because their heritage and culture is an important source of their shared national identity and social cohesion (Kunovich 2009, Kymlicka 2000). Studies that have looked at diversity in CEE EU member states suggest these countries struggle with diversity partly due to their lack of experience incorporating immigrant groups or otherwise challenging their cultural homogeneity (Nedelsky 2003, Pirro 2017, Rovny 2016). Scholars in the field expect these contexts of long-standing ethnic homogeneity to develop less inclusive nationalist environments compared to the civic liberalism observed in Western European countries (Espinova and Ray 2017).

In addition to these sociopolitical differences, capitalism as shaped by post-Soviet society is not the same as what is observed in Western Europe (Bandelj 2016). The theory of labor market competition may not apply to the immigrant experience in CEE as it would under Western capitalism. The average education, wages, and employment rates (i.e., financial security) are lower in CEE countries than in Western Europe (Barysch 2006). For example, due to the lower wages and average education in CEE, labor market complementarity suggests the threat of competition for employment from the immigrant population becomes more relevant than in the West, where the native-born population is not as likely to be in direct competition with the immigrant population (Facchini and Mayda 2009; for effect of education, see Hello et al. 2002, 2004). Even in France and Germany, where the immigrant community is decades- and generations- old, highly educated French and German natives rarely compete against native-born children of immigrants for employment (Kalter 2011).

The extent to which previous research theoretically is applicable to this context, however, is questionable. The threat of labor market competition cannot as easily be treated as less ‘real’

than the threat of social conflict (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, Billiet et al. 2014) when the historic context casts ethnic conflict and economic instability into stark relief compared to the traditional receiving countries. Findings in this dissertation consistently show that cultural threats are more powerful predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments. Furthermore, economic threats are substantially more effective when situated within a social or ethnic context, such that 'a growing number of immigrants' may not present a serious threat, but 'a growing number of poor, Muslim refugees' is enough to make people resist their inclusion. These findings were not limited to CEE countries or nascent receiving countries, however. Western European countries are not exempt from nationalist or populist leanings, and the results from the following chapters provide strong evidence for the need to conduct more nuanced, comparative research in all of Europe's diverse contexts to better understand how the scope and contexts of contemporary immigration and immigrant incorporation are changing across Europe.

The Changing European context

Since the turn of the century, the European context has been characterized by three important shifts: the accession of CEE countries to the EU in 2004, the global economic crisis in 2008, and the migrant crisis in 2015. Regional variation in Europe influenced the extent to which these shifts affected national outcomes. The division between Northern and Southern Europe is has grown increasingly salient over the last decade (Applebaum 2010), separating the 'budget hawks' in the North from 'those who struggle with austerity measures' in the South. The economic crisis of 2008 damaged the economies of the South more severely, and, due to their geographic positioning on the Mediterranean coast, Italy and Greece also experienced a greater influx of refugees during the refugee crisis of 2015. Therefore, as the social, political, and

economic circumstances in Europe changed over the past two decades, regional positioning and associations played an important role in framing how these shifts influenced national contexts.

In addition to the tangible consequences of these shifts, their effect on the subjective changes in mass attitudes is also important to address when considering how Europe has changed over time. As the definition of the EU changed, so did the European identity (Garry and Tilly 2009). Individual and social identities are fluid (Neumann 1998, Onorato and Turner 2004) and, in the case of national European identities, fluid boundaries become salient in opposition to other identities (Neumann 1998). Each of these shifts thus affected how European people view themselves, particularly with respect to foreign groups. The simple question of national identity feeds into important and consequential discourse framing nationhood and its citizens, what citizenship means and to whom it is extended, particularly through institutional membership to government benefits and privileges.

The fluid and relational changes in respective European identities develop with their respective populations and through their regional association within the broader European context. The expansion of the EU to include a large number of CEE countries raised many questions about the European identity and whether CEE countries were compatible with the sociopolitical values associated with Western Europe (Hadler et al. 2012). This concern underscores the different salience attributed to the East-West divide in Europe compared to divisions between the North and the South: ultimately, difference between Northern and Southern European countries do not raise questions over the authenticity of European membership. For example, a Danish person is not considered more or less European than an Italian. In this respect, the division between Eastern and Western Europe is more salient, and as CEE countries are more strongly associated with the established European identity, what it

means to be German, or British, or Italian also changes (Neumann 1998). Understanding how the regional distinctions between Western and CE Europe have changed over the same time period is therefore an important way of framing contemporary perceptions about the self, the other, and the nation.

Social attitudes and their tangible repercussions

In social research, mass attitudes function as a measure of public support for future political change or as beliefs that sustain a present context (Welzel 2007). As an expression of the collective relationships between individuals and their government, mass attitudes help to conceptualize the role of institutions in nurturing membership within broader society. Importantly, mass attitudes offer a different view of a society relative to political leaders or others in positions of power (Lupton et al. 2015). By the nature of their position, political leaders are more actively involved and invested in politics than the average person. Thus, the direction of political change is a product of the negotiation between the elites and the public, and the extent to which laws affect measurable change in society is ultimately mediated by public sentiments and day-to-day actions.

In the context of immigration, mass attitudes are particularly important as an estimation for how political changes about immigration and inclusion of minorities are received by the general public. While the individual characteristics of an immigrant strongly influence how they are broadly perceived (Bansak et al. 2016), how immigrant groups fit into the sociopolitical hierarchy of their host country is more to do with the national or regional context than their individual differences (Thomann and Rapp 2018). This is in part due to the different barriers immigrants face when crossing national borders, and the resources required to reach each

respective country. Immigrants from the Middle Eastern or Northern African (MENA) countries require greater resources and means to reach Denmark compared to Greece, for example. This increases the likelihood that MENA immigrants in Denmark have more resources, such as financial means or valued skills, than their counterparts in Greece, and subsequently enjoy greater social acceptance.

Examining the role that immigration and immigrants play in the evolution of European identities and social, political, and economic circumstances therefore hinges in part on addressing how immigrant sentiments and perceptions are formed and what influences their perpetuation and salience in different contexts. Most research on public opinions about immigrants, or immigrant sentiments, are conducted in traditional immigrant receiving countries in Western Europe and North America, or countries with large, established immigrant communities. As nascent immigrant-receiving countries, however, CE Europe presents an unusual case where immigrant sentiments are both salient and wide-spread, but the presence of immigrants are low – or, in some cases, negligible.

Taken together, understanding how national and regional differences influence immigrant sentiments and public perceptions of different immigrant groups is a crucial step in advancing productive discourse around immigration in Europe. In an effort to understand how sentiments and perceptions depend on variation in receiving countries as well as the origin country of an immigrant group, the research of this dissertation frames attitudes and support for immigration according to the unique identities of different immigrant groups. By moving away from the monolithic conceptualization of immigrant groups, this dissertation contributes to the broader body of scholarship by beginning to untangle the underlying differences in how immigrants are perceived and supported in their new countries of residence.

Through this new frame of analysis, mass attitudes on perceptions and sentiments about different immigrant groups are compared on national and regional scales. Given how mass attitudes reflect either the sustained support for shared social values, or pre-emptively signal how a society is growing in relation to its institutional identity (Welzel 2007), this dissertation leverages mass attitudinal data on immigrant sentiments to illustrate how perceptions can result in vastly different lived experiences for immigrants who have settled in the same country. Furthermore, by examining these differences on multiple scales, this research contributes toward clarifying whether the sentiments and perceptions that influence immigrant experiences are most indicative of regional, national, or local contexts.

In sum, the aim of this dissertation is to explore how immigrants are valued and supported in various European contexts depending on where they come from, and how broad characteristics like their country of origin or ethnic diversity mitigate their access to the privileges of national membership. While these data cannot tell us what factors have caused attitudes to change, or the underlying mechanisms for why some immigrant groups may be perceived differently, they do inform our understanding of where the distinctions between immigrant groups are most salient relative to each other and to the national population. Ultimately, these questions seek to untangle whose differences are minor enough to allow them to thrive in their new home country, and at what point the differences become so great that immigrants cannot be included in the a country's evolving identity.

The three empirical studies in the following chapters investigate different aspects of how immigration and immigrant sentiments in Europe are evolving over time, to what extent Western

Europe and CEE differ, and whether the determinants of (in)tolerance that are relevant to the Western European context also inform findings from CEE countries.

The first of these studies (Chapter 2) compares changing patterns in immigrant attitudes, economic vulnerability, and government preferences in the origin countries of their non-EU immigrant population. The second study (Chapter 3) tests the nuanced differences in how immigrant effects on the country are perceived, and the extent to which Europeans differ in their resistance to immigration when distinguishing between immigrant groups and their associated ethnic and economic biases. The third and final study (Chapter 4) takes a closer look at contextual differences across the rural/urban divide using a comparative case study of the four European countries that are the most and least receptive to immigration. Put another way, Chapters 3 and 4 build on the foundational trends outlined in Chapter 2 by exploring how attitudes are informed by acknowledging the diversity in (1) immigrant identities and (2) local European contexts. The overall intention of this dissertation is to underscore the importance of moving immigration research beyond broad monolithic assumptions as they are applied to immigrants and regional contexts, and to focus instead on how variations between and within countries inform people's position within the overlapping discourse of social, political, and economic outcomes.

These chapters primarily draw on cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey (ESS), a nationally representative survey that is administered in 36 European countries every two years since 2002. In addition to these attitudinal variables, Chapters 2 and 4 also use country-level variables from the Eurostat databank to provide a comparable overview of the demographic, economic, and social changes across Europe. Although these data are consistently reliable and allow for cross-national comparisons over time, they are both limited in their

availability of data. All countries are not surveyed in every wave of the ESS, and variables made available through the Eurostat databank often differ in their reporting years (e.g., unemployment data were available from 2008, while demographic data go back to 2002).

Chapter 2 examines the regional patterns in immigrant attitudes, economic disparities, and government preferences in the controllable (i.e., non-EU) immigrant composition. This analysis uses the largest sample in the dissertation, comparing 23 countries across 16 years to provide the contextual foundation for the subsequent empirical chapters. In addition to the country-level measures of economic vulnerability, this chapter incorporates ESS data to reflect on the lived experienced of immigrants in CEE through subjective measures of personal economic security, or the extent to which one struggles or lives comfortably on one's household income.

Chapter 3 tests nuances in immigrant sentiments by comparing the determinants and effects of biases against different immigrant groups and their perceived effects on the country. These questions aim to untangle the extent to which economic and cultural threats overlap and compete with one another in the context of immigration. In other words, this chapter aims to distinguish whether people are more resistant to immigrants who are from poor backgrounds (economic threat) or to ethnic minority immigrants (cultural threat)? This chapter also includes a question about a third group of immigrants who share the same ethnic background as the national majority to serve as an approximate reference group.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 4, takes a closer look at contextual differences across the rural/urban divide using a comparative case study of the four European countries that are the most and least receptive to immigration. These findings are explored within the framework of national and EU policies, particularly with respect to how these four countries

implement EU policies, who benefits from them, and how policy design may contribute to the perceived inequalities or biases reported in these countries. Expanding on Maxwell's (2019) work on Western European countries, this chapter incorporates an in-depth comparison of national policies related to immigration and socioeconomic inequality to observe how these countries differ in the way they frame national inclusion, citizenship, and who is deserving of support in times of financial hardship.

The final chapter in this dissertation summarizes the findings of the three empirical chapters, identifies their respective limitations, and concludes with a discussion of their combined contributions and consequent implications for future research.

CHAPTER 2

Diverging attitudes and limited diversity amid socioeconomic growth

The patterns of immigration to Europe have changed substantially over the past two decades. From the largest expansion of the European Union (EU) in 2004 to the recent humanitarian crises in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, various push and pull factors led large and diverse groups of people to migrate to safer, wealthier countries in Europe. The changing ethnic composition in these societies pushed immigration to the center of sociopolitical debates (Kriesi et al. 2012) where xenophobic rhetoric tying social issues to immigrant communities have increasingly led to fear-driven polarization that benefit right-wing agendas (Jacobs et al. 2017, Rydgren 2008). Over the last sixteen years, the direct and indirect consequences of immigration affected social, political, and economic changes across both Western and Eastern Europe.

By its nature, immigration is experienced in a multitude of ways, ranging in magnitude from individual to multinational effects. Sociopolitical tensions associated with immigration, however, are predominately experienced on more local levels as different religious, ethnic, and political groups meet and begin to distinguish themselves according to their unique values and social influence (Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore 2017). In the context of European immigration, Muslim immigrants from MENA countries invoke particularly strong negative associations and anti-immigrant sentiments (Blinder 2015, Morey and Yaqin 2011). Brewing European concerns over growing immigrant populations and dissolving national borders are therefore contingent on the cultural contexts that feed into conceptions of nationhood and socioeconomic generalizations attributed to immigrant groups. This is particularly true of CEE

where, despite their considerably smaller domestic immigrant populations (OECD/European Union 2018), impermeable boundaries of ethnoreligious homogeneity fuel populist contention against the recent influx of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Mitchell 2016).

While fervent objections to what are, objectively, small numbers of immigrants might appear counter-intuitive, recent studies find that the size of an immigrant population is not as important to public sentiments as the quality of stereotypes associated with them (Blinder 2015, Hellwig and Sinno 2015, Strabac and Listhaug 2008). In other words, perceptions of immigrants explain anti-immigrant sentiments and support for immigration more consistently than factual information (Bansak et al. 2016, Blinder 2015, Dunaway et al. 2010). To that end there is a growing consensus in immigration literature that these subjective factors are overall better predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments than tangible variables put forward in economic arguments (Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore 2017, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

Whether material, political, or subjective factors explain anti-immigrant sentiments is, however, secondary to the question of whether these theories apply to present-day experiences of immigration in Europe. The vast majority of research on immigration in Europe is conducted in a small number of Western European countries, and the limited research on immigration in CEE makes it difficult to confidently apply these theories to new contexts of immigration. At minimum, several Western European countries have a longer history of integrating large immigrant populations whereas the ethnoreligious divisions and lingering effects of communism in CEE countries can still be expected to drive political and economic group-threat arguments (Bandelj and Finley 2016).

Therefore, while the subsequent chapters investigate the relationships between national and regional contexts and the perceived threat of different types immigrants more closely, the

purpose of this first chapter is to provide an overview of the underlying differences that help to explain how contextual factors may give rise to these distinct social circumstances. This chapter is organized to highlight regional differences in how objective and perceived factors of immigration affect economic and sociopolitical change in Western Europe and CEE. To capture both the temporal and country-level contexts that foster regional differences, the analyses in this chapter are guided by the following research questions:

RQ1. Are Western European and CEE populations growing more or less similar in their attitudes toward immigrants and immigration?

RQ2. Have regional disparities in economic vulnerability become more similar over time, or are certain populations more at risk?

RQ3. Are there regional and/or national patterns in the composition of domestic immigrant populations? To what extent are these patterns salient?

The purpose of this chapter thus is to clarify contextual foundations associated with Western European and CEE countries in new or non-traditional immigrant receiving countries in Europe. Drawing on attitudinal data from the European Social Survey (2002-2018) and country-level data from Eurostat to answer these research questions, this chapter uses t-tests and data visualization to examine social, economic, and political changes in Europe over the last sixteen years. The broader intended contribution of these analyses is to see how new contexts of immigration in Europe compare to traditional receiving countries and, importantly, question the extent to which theories in immigration research reflect the lived experiences of immigrants across Europe today.

A Divided Union: Differences in immigrant communities and inclusion in the East and the West

Understanding European attitudes and support for immigrants has long been the center of academic scholarship in both the fields of immigration and nationalism. Despite evidence of the progressive convergence of regional attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008), the political and economic histories of Western European and CEE countries offer enough contrast to warrant comparison for how these differences emerge. Centuries of wealth and power from war and colonialism have advantaged many Western European countries but also led to large-scale immigration, whereas the fall of the Iron Curtain served as the recent catalyst for socioeconomic and political development in many CEE countries. Ultimately, expanding on immigration literature to include the CEE context acknowledges the broadening scope of modern migration patterns and, by extension, the need to better understand how factual (Wallace 2002) and perceived (Okólski 2000) immigration experiences are shaped by non-Western histories.

Research focusing on the factual consequences of immigration broadly differentiate immigrant communities in Europe by describing those in Western Europe as larger and more diverse, socioeconomically established, and more politically active than those in CEE (Wallace 2002). However, as the bulk of immigration scholarship on European immigration is conducted in Western Europe, it inherently assumes a context in which the country's role in global migration is reliably constant. In contrast to Western European countries that have primarily served as receiving countries for labor migrants (e.g., in Germany and the Netherlands, Fassman and Munz 1992), refugees and asylum seekers (e.g., France and Sweden, UNHCR 2011), and migrants from countries with past colonial ties (e.g., in France and the UK, Fassman and Munz 1992), CEE demonstrate an evolving and less predictable role between receiving and sending states. Many CEE countries have seen an increase in the variety of immigrants who settle in their countries, such as permanent migrants from Western European and non-EU countries, affluent

Western European retirees, and non-permanent immigrants moving through CEE (King and Thomson 2008, Thomson 2006).

The composition of immigrant communities in CEE and how boundaries between the native and immigrant populations are maintained are determined by factors unlike those in Western Europe, in part due to their comparatively recent development (Thomson 2006). The established mechanisms for incorporating immigrant populations in Western Europe ties public sentiments to official government institutions, such that negative perceptions of immigrants are attributed to a failure in government policy (Ireland 1997).

By contrast, CEE sentiments are tied to regional and national histories and their subsequent ethnic divides (Wallace 2002). In Slovenia, for example, fictitious folklore establish a unique national identity that distances the large number of Balkan immigrants, who otherwise share many ethnic ties with the native population (Erjavec 2003). Similarly, a long history of foreign occupation has led Cypriots to predominately hire non-EU migrants rather than EU migrants because it affords them more control over the actions and permanence of the foreign-born population (Lenz 2006, Panayiotopoulos 2005). Connecting CEE contexts with their nascent practices for governing the composition and incorporation of their immigrant population is the first step towards understanding how the changing nature of global migration patterns will affect the standing theories and expectations in current immigration literature.

Acceptance and (un)employment: When is it resistance and when is it exclusion?

The extent to which immigrants affect the labor market through their participation can be viewed as a measure of successful integration and active participation in society (Breidahl and Larsen 2016, Kavli 2015, van Tubergen 2006), or as the potential threat of economic competition

(Kunovich 2004, Mayda 2006). Immigrants experience an imbalance of economic parity in Europe as a result of higher unemployment rates, less representation in high-status positions, fewer opportunities for employment in high-skilled professions, and lower wages as compared to their native-born peers (Algan et al. 2010, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017).

These disadvantages have been tied to individual economic vulnerability among the native European population (Billiet et al. 2014, Mayda 2006), though it is not clear whether the connection between economic vulnerability and immigration stems from perceived competition (Sides and Citrin 2007, Strabac and Listhaug 2008) or from dissatisfaction with national integration policies (Hooghe and De Vroome 2015, Schlueter et al. 2013). In difference to immigration policies that outline the laws for entering a given country, integration policies describe the process and extent to which governments intentionally arbitrate the legal, socioeconomic, and cultural inclusion of immigrants (Penninx and Garcés-Mascarenas 2016).

While perhaps counter-intuitive, countries with more inclusive integration policies have lower levels of out-group threat (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015, Kauff et al 2013, Schlueter et al. 2013) and anti-immigrant sentiments (Hooghe and De Vroome 2015, Weldon 2006). Western European countries that have substantially greater experience and opportunities to develop effective integration policies are therefore more likely than CEE countries to create sociopolitical contexts that inspire positive attitudes and support for immigrants. In the context of this chapter, the different regional and national experiences with integrating diverse immigrant populations further underscores the need for research that investigates new immigrant receiving states where policies may not yet effectively mediate natives' feelings of immigrant economic threat (Callens and Meuleman 2016) and ultimately reimagine immigrant narratives as productive contributors rather than burdens or competition (Nagayoshi and Hjerm 2015).

Targeted variations in the perception of immigrant groups in present-day Europe

Regional differences in the narratives, or subjective perceptions of immigrants and their potential effects on the broader national context, further complicate the tangible threats and costs associated with immigration in Europe. Narratives are more effective in molding the public's perception about immigrants than facts (Blinder 2015, Brader et al. 2008), and they are often intentionally manipulated (Lynn and Lea 2003) to associate immigrants with widely shared concerns about security risks, crime, and economic hardship (Blinder 2015, Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). In Western Europe, for example, immigrants from CEE are associated with increased crime rates compared to immigrants from MENA countries, who are more strongly associated with threats to national security (Erisen and Kentmen-Cin 2016, Hellwig and Sinno 2017). Generalizations can also perpetuate positive perceptions about different immigrant groups (Bansak et al. 2016), such that the same people who associate CEE and MENA immigrants with different kinds of security risks were also found to associate CEE immigrants with positive effects on national culture and MENA immigrants with improved economic contributions.

The importance of perceptions about immigrants is relevant to this chapter because immigrant groups and communities are not often in control of these narratives, and the extent to which they can intervene or challenge these stereotypes differs from group to group. Among the different non-native populations in Europe, refugees and asylum seekers are one of the most vulnerable groups to public perception because of their limited political voice (Lynn and Lea 2003).

In Western European countries, where immigrant communities are more extensive, established, and politically mobile, immigrants have greater agency over their ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic representation, thus limiting the negative stereotypes and risks associated

with their presence or growth in their communities (Lynn and Lea 2003, Wallace 2002). Furthermore, since tolerance and intolerance of immigrants are multifaceted (Erisen and Kentmen-Cin 2016) and closely tied to risks associated with immigration (Verkuyten and Slooter 2007), countries with these historically established and politically mobile immigrant groups are less likely to express intolerance or report risks with respect to immigration. Instead, people in these countries are more likely to express positive attitudes about immigrants and their effects on the country (Kunovich 2004, Schlueter and Scheepers 2010), and ultimately contribute to a more flexible conceptualization of nationhood.

Data: Attitudinal measures from the ESS

This chapter draws on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurostat to provide a broad overview of the demographic, economic, and attitudinal changes across Europe. The ESS is a nationally representative survey that is administered in 36 European countries every two years since 2002. These data are publicly available and reliable in their consistency, meaning that they are well suited to cross-national comparisons across time. However, as these are cross-national and not longitudinal data, comparisons across time examine changes in trends as opposed to direct causal relationships.

To provide the most comprehensive overview of social change across Europe, and to adequately set the stage for the following two chapters of this dissertation, all nine waves of ESS data (2002 through 2018) were combined. These years capture a wide range of data before and after three major events in Europe that are relevant to immigration research and this dissertation:

the largest expansion of the EU to include CEE countries[2] in 2004, the global recession in 2008, and the refugee crisis in 2015.

All 36 countries did not participate in all waves of ESS data collection, so for the purpose of this chapter the sample was narrowed down to the 23 countries that have been surveyed in at least four waves (i.e., provide at least four data points on all variables of interest). Seven of these countries are categorized as Central and Eastern European (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, and Slovakia) and 15 are Western European (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Cyprus, which is included in this dataset because it is an EU member-state and it is represented in four waves of the ESS, is removed from all East-West comparisons to avoid ambiguity. The total sample size for this chapter is 345,962, and the combined total for regional subsample comparisons is 340,772, whereof 96,009 respondents are from CEE countries and 244,763 respondents are from Western European countries. Missing cases, which make up between 3 and 4.2 percent of the full sample, were excluded from the analyses.

The vast majority of all respondents in this sample (91.3%) are native-born residents of their country. Since the purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for changing attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, a high representation of native-born respondents lends more confidence in national comparisons as they are more likely to have been exposed to the national culture and social contexts for the majority of their life. However, immigrants are also an integral part of European society and are therefore not removed from the sample in order to be as representative of the respective populations as possible. On average, the proportion of native-

[2] Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, & Slovenia were officially accepted in 2002.

born respondents is higher in CEE countries (94.9%) than in Western European countries (89.8%)[3]. See Appendix A Table A for a summary of countries represented in each wave of the ESS data.

Dependent variables from the ESS

There are five outcome variables of interest in this dissertation. These variables were selected in order to pursue a more granular approach to the broad question of immigrant sentiments and support for immigration. While the first two measure attitudes toward immigrants with respect to how individuals feel about their potential impact on the country, the final three focus on how the identity of the immigrant influences attitudes of (in)tolerance. For the factor analysis comparing the association between these variables, see Appendix A Tables B-D.

The first outcome variable addresses the economic threat by asking respondents, *Would you say it is generally bad or good for [Country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?* The second outcome variable addresses the cultural threat of immigrants by asking respondents, *Would you say that [Country's] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?* Both of these questions are asked on a scale of 0 (*Bad for the economy / Cultural life undermined*) to 10 (*Good for the economy / Cultural life is enriched*).

In the three remaining outcome variables, respondents are introduced to different immigrant types and asked the extent to which they would welcome each into the country. All questions are framed as, *To what extent do you think [Country] should allow _____ people to*

[3] Estonia is an outlier with respect to CEE countries, but not with respect to the full dataset. If Estonia were removed, the proportion of native-born respondents in the full sample would change +0.4 percent (91.3% to 91.7%) but +2.3 percent (94.8% to 97.1%) in the CEE subsample.

come and live here? Responses are measured on a four-point scale, which have been reverse coded to range from (1) *Allow none* to (4) *Allow many to come and live here*. In the first of these three outcome variables, the immigrant group is described as *same race or ethnic group* [as national majority]. The second question refers to immigrants who are from a *different race or ethnic group* [as national majority], while the third question refers to immigrants from *poor countries outside of Europe*. With the exception of reverse-coding outcome variables 3-5, the original scale of responses for all five outcome variables are used in order to allow for as much differentiation and specificity as possible.

Independent variables from the ESS

The two independent variables used in this chapter were chosen to capture economic vulnerability on the individual level, and broader feelings about the effect of immigrants on the country. The economic variable is a question directly from the ESS survey that asks the respondents, *Describe how you feel about your household's income*. The responses range from (1) *Living comfortably on present income* to (4) *Finding it very difficult on present income*. This scale was reverse coded and modified to reflect how increased financial security affects attitudes toward immigrants instead. Due to the low response rate for (3) *Difficult on present income* and (4) *Finding it very difficult on present income*, these two were combined. The modified scale goes from (1) *Difficult on present income* to (3) *Living comfortably on present income*.

The second independent variable is an index variable of the three dependent variables that measure respondent attitudes about immigrant contributions to the national economy, culture, and quality of life (Chronbach's α=0.8475). In difference to the measure on economic vulnerability, which is also used as an indicator variable in Chapters 2 and 3, this index variable

is only made for the purpose of evaluating whether there are any regional patterns in attitudes toward immigrants. By combining these three variables, the index variable provides a more comprehensive measure of how opinions about immigrant inclusion in a given country have changed over time.

Control variables from the ESS

Control variables in this chapter are primarily included because they are important to the subsequent chapters of this dissertation where the analyses are either limited by time (Chapter 3) or by country (Chapter 4). These control variables are gender, age, education, employment, marital status, nativity, children living at home, urbanicity, and religious identity. The first five variables (gender, age, education, employment, marital status) are common control variables in all social research, whereas nativity, urbanicity, children living at home, and religious identity are less common control variables that are relevant to in the field of immigration. They are included in an effort to capture notable individual- and country-level differences between CEE and Western European countries.

Gender is coded as *female* (0=male, 1=female). Age is a continuous variable, as is education, which measures the respondent's *years of full-time education*. Employment is coded as a binary variable, where 1 means *currently employed* and 0 is *currently unemployed*. Marital status has been recoded into a binary variable where 1 is *legally joined* and 0 is *not joined*. Those who are coded as *legally joined* were described in the original survey question as either *legally married* or *legally registered in civil union*. Those who are *not joined* were *legally separated, legally divorced, never married or legally registered in civil union,* or they responded *widowed / civil partner died*. Nativity distinguishes between *native-born respondents* (1) and *foreign-born*

respondents (0). *Urbanicity* identifies whether the respondent lives in a (1) big city or in the suburbs of a big city, (2) in a town or a small city, or (3) a country village or a farm/home in the countryside. Respondents were also asked whether they *Currently have children living at home*, where 1 is yes (where 'children' could refer to biological or adopted children of their own, step-children, foster children, or partner's children) and 0 is no. Finally, religious identity is measured by a series of dummy variables modified variable to reflect the respondent's self-described religious affiliation as either *Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, Other religion*, or *No religion*. The original survey question also included options for *Other Christian denomination, Jewish, Eastern religions, Other non-Christian religions,* but due to the low response rate for these categories they were combined as *Other religion* for these analyses.

Data: Country-level contextual data from Eurostat

In addition to the ESS data, publicly available data from Eurostat are used to help explain the context for the changing demographics and attitudes in the same time period (2002-2018). Rather than acting as a data-collecting organization like the ESS, Eurostat receives representative data from all EU member-states and consolidates the information at the national level to ensure uniformity (Eurostat). Through their oversight, Eurostat data allows for consistent cross-national comparisons over time.

In difference to the ESS, however, Eurostat data are organized by variable (i.e., responses to a specific survey question such as "Total national population as of January 1st of each year") rather than by survey wave or year. These individual variables were gathered and combined in a dataset for the purpose of this chapter. Variables were selected to clarify national variation in immigration and immigration policies and to contextualize national unemployment with respect

to immigrants. Unfortunately, variables curated by Eurostat are not all collected over the same time period. For example, data on national population are available from 2002, but data on the total number of visas granted by a country are only available from 2008. To the extent that was possible, all available data collected in 2002-2018 were included in this dataset.

Contextual variables from Eurostat

The Eurostat data offer insight into three contextual factors: (1) demographic trends measured by the number of native-born and immigrant people per country, per year, (2) economic vulnerability measured by unemployment rates and cumulative risk of poverty per country, per year since 2008, and (3) allocation of legal permits for long-term residence by country. Eurostat (2020) defines these permits as "any authorisation valid for at least 3 months issued by the authorities of a Member State allowing a third country national to stay legally on its territory." The measure specifically chosen for this chapter limits these permits to first-time permits, which includes people ranging from those receiving their first long-term residence permit, to those whose most recent permit expired at least 6 months prior. "Long-term residence" is used in this chapter to distinguish permits longer than short term permits (e.g., tourist visas) up to 3 months, which are different from "long-term resident status" as defined by the European Commission as permits issued based on a legal residence of 5 years or longer.

Using these data, new variables were generated for the purpose of this chapter: a proportional measure of immigrants to total national population, national unemployment rates for native-born, foreign-born, and total populations, and specific measures for the rate and proportional distribution of long-term visa allocation per country. The top three countries prioritized each year for long-term permits were also identified for each country, and another

measure was created manually to identify these prioritized countries as neighboring countries (0=not neighbor, 1=neighbor). Countries that share a border or a small body of water (e.g., Morocco and Spain or Portugal) were identified as neighbors. These data on long-term visa allocation only capture non-EU immigrants, since EU immigrants do not require visas to relocate in EU member states. Therefore, the purpose of these data are not to reflect the totality of domestic immigrants in a given country, but to examine more closely how countries prioritize the cultural, political, and economic backgrounds of the immigrant population whose inclusion they can control.

Analytic approach

T-tests and data visualizations are used to analyze and explain regional and temporal changes in ESS and Eurostat data. Eurostat data are consistent by variable category, such that data on unemployment rates, for example, are consistent for each country. T-tests analyzing Eurostat data therefore are consistent within category, but not necessarily between them. For the ESS, nearly all of the 23 countries in my sample participated in the first and most recent waves of data collection. However, four countries in this sample did not participate in Wave 1 (2002): Estonia and Slovakia, which were first represented in Wave 2 (2004), and Bulgaria and Cyprus, which participated first in Wave 3 (2006). All countries in this sample participated in the most recent wave of ESS data collection in 2018, but due to the Covid-19 pandemic the staggered release of some countries have been delayed. Data for Denmark were not released as of July 2020, and thus the most recent data for their sample is from Wave 7 (2014). To overcome these limitations, t-tests analyzing ESS data compare the first available wave of data for each country to their most

recent wave of data. The different years of available data for all analyses are referenced in text as necessary to clarify the interpretation and reporting of the results.

Descriptive findings: ESS and changing attitudes since 2002

Table 2.1 compares the earliest and most recently collected data on the dependent variables in the full sample and the regional subsamples. Results from t-tests are included in the far-right column. With only a handful of exceptions, the earliest and most recent data in Table 1 were collected in 2002 and 2018, respectively. The past sixteen years of data present a complex and increasingly polarizing image of European attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies.

At first glance, the results from the full sample suggest that opinions about immigrants are improving over time, with more respondents describing immigrants as a benefit to the national economy and overall quality of life in their country. Similarly, there is evidence that support for allowing more immigrants into the country has increased since 2002. Respondents have a different response to immigrant contributions to the national culture, however, and their general wariness of foreign cultures is also reflected in their more modest support for allowing more immigrants of a minority ethnic background into the country compared to those who share the ethnic background of the country's majority.

A closer examination of how these associations differ in the regional subsamples reveals a growing divergence between Western European and CEE attitudes about immigrants[4]. CEE respondents have become significantly less supportive of immigrants and increased immigration.

[4] For graphs comparing change in mean opinion of immigrant contributions to the national cultural and economy over time, see Appendix A Figure A.

Perceptions of immigrant contributions to the national economy, culture, and quality of life are all significantly lower in 2018 compared to 2002. The greatest change in immigrant sentiments was observed in opinions of immigrant contribution to the national culture (-0.94), and compared to 2002 where cultural contributions were more highly valued than immigrant economic contributions, the most recent data reveal that they are nearly equal now.

Opinions about immigrant contributions to the national economy have changed very little (-0.06) since CEE joined the EU, suggesting that people in CEE are relatively satisfied by immigrant inclusion in the labor market. Support for allowing more immigrants into the country have also decreased significantly for all immigrant types, including those who share the ethnic background of the national majority. Ethnic minority immigrants are only marginally more desirable than poor, non-EU immigrants; this was also the case in 2002, though the disadvantage for poor, non-EU immigrants has since grown.

In counterpoint to trends observed in CEE, respondents in Western Europe have grown significantly more positive in all five outcome variables, except in their opinion of immigrant contribution to the national culture, where no significant change was observed. Western European results indicate that immigrants significantly and substantially improve the quality of life in their respective countries and, seeing that the contribution to culture is the most highly valued immigrant contribution, these results suggest that immigrants have improved Western European quality of life by making it more culturally diverse. The increased support for immigrants of the same ethnic background as the national majority (+0.22) is similar to the increased support for ethnic minority immigrants (+0.19), but poor, non-EU immigrants observed a much smaller change in support (+0.06) and the lowest average score (2.63 on a 4-point scale).

Comparing the regional profiles, however, reveals that Western European support for poor, non-EU immigrants is on average still greater than the most welcome immigrants in CEE (ethnic majority immigrants, 2.57 on a 4-point scale). In other words, the moderate and positive results observed in the results of the full sample are a consequence of the larger representation of Western European respondents in this sample, which obscures the diverging trend in immigrant sentiments across the European regions.

Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for ESS outcome variables

	Earliest data				Most recent data				Change in mean
Outcome variables (Ch. 2 and 3)	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	
Immigrant good or bad effect on…	All 23 European countries								
National economy	4.92	2.32	0	10	5.22	2.48	0	10	+.29***
National culture	5.73	2.41	0	10	5.45	2.62	0	10	-.28***
Overall quality of life	4.79	2.16	0	10	5.03	2.37	0	10	+.24***
Allow more immigrants of…									
Same race/ethnic group as national majority	2.77	.81	1	4	2.87	.81	1	4	+.10***
Different race/ethnic group from national majority	2.49	.84	1	4	2.54	.91	1	4	+.04***
Poor origin countries	2.49	.84	1	4	2.43	.91	1	4	-.06***
Immigrant good or bad effect on…	Western European countries								
National economy	5.14	2.25	0	10	5.60	2.38	0	10	+.46***
National culture	5.96	2.35	0	10	5.94	2.54	0	10	-.03
Overall quality of life	4.89	2.13	0	10	5.40	2.31	0	10	+.51***
Allow more immigrants of…									
Same race/ethnic group as national majority	2.78	.78	1	4	3.00	.78	1	4	+.22***
Different race/ethnic group from national majority	2.56	.80	1	4	2.76	.85	1	4	+.19***
Poor origin countries	2.57	.81	1	4	2.63	.85	1	4	+.06***
Immigrant good or bad effect on…	Central and Eastern European Countries								
National economy	4.44	2.38	0	10	4.37	2.53	0	10	-.06
National culture	5.29	2.43	0	10	4.35	2.53	0	10	-.94***
Overall quality of life	4.55	2.20	0	10	4.20	2.31	0	10	-.34***
Allow more immigrants of…									
Same race/ethnic group as national majority	2.75	.87	1	4	2.57	.87	1	4	-.17***
Different race/ethnic group from national majority	2.39	.89	1	4	2.06	.89	1	4	-.34***
Poor origin countries	2.35	.90	1	4	1.99	.89	1	4	-.36***
Total observations (N)	**41,635**				**40,823**				**82,458**

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Table 2.2 presents the t-test results from the independent and control variables. As in Table 1, a regional comparison of the index variable reveals a clear difference in respondent

opinions on the effect of immigrants on their country. The small but significant positive change observed in the full sample is the result of the positive change in Western Europe obscuring the substantively larger, negative change in CEE.

A similar regional comparison of personal income security indicates that despite the substantial and significant decrease in overall appreciation for immigrants in CEE, the immigrant community in CEE countries reports the greatest improvement in financial comfort in the whole sample. In fact, further distinguishing regional differences by comparing respondents by their nativity in each subsample suggests that immigrants in CEE are experiencing significantly better financial security compared to 2002 and compared to their native counterparts. By contrast, immigrants in Western Europe are not only doing worse compared to their native peers, but they are the only group whose financial security has not significantly changed in the last sixteen years.

Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics for contextual variables

	Earliest data				Most recent data				Change in mean
Independent variables	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	
Index of all opinions on immigrant effects									
Respondents from full sample	5.13	1.98	0	10	5.23	2.25	0	10	+.09***
Respondents from CEE countries	4.75	2.05	0	10	4.30	2.21	0	10	-.45***
Respondents from WE countries	5.27	1.94	0	10	5.64	2.15	0	10	+.32***
Individual financial security									
Respondents from full sample	2.06	.73	1	3	2.18	.73	1	3	+.12***
Native nativity, full sample	2.07	.73	1	3	2.19	.72	1	3	+.12***
Foreign nativity, full sample	2.02	.73	1	3	2.14	.75	1	3	-.12***
WE: Native nativity	2.25	.69	1	3	2.35	.71	1	3	+.10***
WE: Immigrant nativity	2.18	.71	1	3	2.20	.74	1	3	+.02
CEE: Native nativity	1.65	.65	1	3	1.88	.70	1	3	+.22***
CEE: Immigrant nativity	1.62	.66	1	3	1.93	.71	1	3	+.31***
Socio-demographic controls									
Female	.53	.50	0	1	.53	.50	0	1	-.00
Native-born respondent	.93	.26	0	1	.90	.30	0	1	-.03***
Foreign-born respondent	.07	.26	0	1	.12	.30	0	1	+.04***
Child of immigrants	.02	.13	0	1	.04	.14	0	1	+.02***
Child with one immigrant parent	.06	.24	0	1	.08	.27	0	1	+.02***
Age	46.68	18.17	15	103	50.62	18.74	15	104	+3.94***
Years of full-time education	11.89	3.91	0	44	13.01	4.13	0	51	+1.12***
Catholic	.33	.47	0	1	.31	.46	0	1	-.02***
Protestant	.33	.75	0	1	.26	.67	0	1	-.07***

Orthodox	.03	.28	0	1	.22	.79	0	1	+.20***
Muslim	.05	.53	0	1	.18	1.03	0	1	+.14***
Other religion(s)	.02	.14	0	1	.02	.15	0	1	+.00
Total observations (N)	**41,635**				**40,823**				**82,458**

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

National differences on attitudes about immigrants and immigrant policies

Figures 2.1-2.6 are heat maps that illustrate changes in respondent attitudes about immigrant contribution and their positions on immigration policies. Figure 2.1 reports how respondents in feel immigrants affect the quality of life in their country. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 reflect respondent opinions about immigrant contributions to the national economy and the national culture, respectively. Figures 2.4-2.6 present the remaining outcome variables on respondent support for increased immigration by immigrant type.

The colors of the heat map and the ranking of countries are determined by different scales: the countries (identified on the left) are ranked by their cumulative averages for all available years, and the color reflects the relative position each data point relative to the minimum and maximum average in the figure. For example, since the most negative average in Figure 2.3 is 3.18 (Cyprus in 2012) and the most positive is 7.32 (Finland in 2002), averages in the 5-point range are neutral and those in the 4-point range are light red. In Figure 2.1, however, the minimum (3.29, Cyprus 2012) and maximum (6.67, Sweden 2014) create a more compressed range that reduces and dilutes the range of neutral values.

In Figure 2.1, respondents in Hungary and Czechia report the most negative opinions. This does not suggest that these opinions are a phenomenon unique to CEE; Italian, Cypriot, and Portuguese respondents report nearly equally negative opinions about how immigrants affect their quality of life, and respondents in Estonia and Slovenia are nearly indistinguishable from Western respondents in Austria. Czechia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia are the only countries in the

sample that are becoming less positive in their attitudes about immigrant effect on their quality of life. For Czechia this is a gradual change and most severe in 2014, but the limited data points on Bulgaria and Slovakia make it difficult to note when attitudes changed. This is less unexpected in Slovakia, where attitudes have been relatively low since its earliest data point in 2004. Bulgarians were more positive than Czechs and Hungarians in their four years of participation (2006-2012), but by 2018 their attitudes were similarly negative.

In this case, survey data may reflect the effect of geographic similarities, as Hungary, Czechia, and Bulgaria are three of the eastern-most countries in the EU and were therefore more likely to experience (or fear) a large influx of refugees from the Middle East in 2015. However, Poland is Czechia's eastern neighbor, so it is difficult to say whether geography alone can explain why Hungary, Czechia, and Bulgaria report the most negative opinions in the sample while Poles are much more positive in their outlook. Surprisingly, Polish attitudes are high relative to the whole sample, third only to Denmark and Sweden.

Figure 2.1. Change in average national opinion about immigrant effect on quality of life

In Figure 2, most CEE countries cluster towards the negative end of the spectrum on their opinion of how immigrants contribute to the national economy. Respondents from Hungary report the most negative average opinion about immigrant contributions to the economy, and Swiss respondents on average report the most positive. For most countries in the sample, there is a pattern of increasing positivity over time. This is observed to a greater extent and more rapidly in Western European countries, but most CEE countries are not far below the average (5 on a 10-point scale) by 2018.

Respondents in CEE countries were, however, more likely than their Western European counterparts to become more negative in their opinions about immigrant contributions to the economy in the 2008 recession. Poland stands out from other CEE countries again in its high opinion of immigrant contributions to the economy. Former colonial powers from Western Europe cluster near CEE countries, and the highest overall opinions about immigrant contributions to the economy are reported by Swiss and Scandinavian respondents. Their high opinions of these contributions are shown to be not only above-average (above 5 on a 10-point scale), but also consistent in the face of economic downturn and the refugee crisis.

Figure 2.2. Change in average national opinion about immigrant contributions to the economy



Regional clustering is less evident in Figure 3 that reports on respondent attitudes about immigrant contributions to the national culture. Cyprus, which was second only to Hungary in its collective opinion of immigrant contributions to the economy, reports the most negative opinion of immigrant contribution to culture, and Finland reports the highest average opinion. Compared to Figure 2.2, the range of color of the heat map of Figure 2.3 suggests that people across Europe on average feel more similarly and more positively about immigrant contributions to the culture than their contribution to the economy.

The small number of values color-coded as neutral indicate that the scale (as determined by the minimum and maximum values) is more compressed than in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The lowest average opinion reported in Figure 2.3 is 3.18 (Cyprus in 2012), which is higher than the lowest opinions reported in Figure 2.2 (3.07, Hungary 2016) and in Figure 2.1 (3.29, Cyprus 2012). Likewise, the highest average opinion in Figure 2.3 is 7.32 (Finland in 2002), which is higher than the averages reported in Figure 2.2 (6.18, Switzerland 2018) and in Figure 2.1 (6.67, Sweden 2014). In sum, a comparison of Figures 2.1-2.3 demonstrates that attitudes across

Europe are more positive about immigrant contributions to the national culture than their contribution to the economy, and more similar in their opinion (i.e., a narrower range of opinions) than with respect to the economy of quality of life.

Figure 2.3. Change in average national opinion about immigrant contributions to the culture



Figures 2.4-2.6 illustrate how attitudes about immigration policies have changed over time, with lower values indicating a desire for greater restriction and the higher values reflecting a more liberal position. These questions are organized by immigrant type such that Figure 2.4 reports opinions about allowing more immigrants who share the ethnic background of the national majority, which is used as a reference group to which opinions of allowing more ethnic minority immigrants (Figure 2.5) and poor, non-EU immigrants (Figure 2.6) are compared.

In Figure 2.4, Hungary reports the most restrictive attitude in the sample while Sweden is the most liberal. Switzerland, Germany, and most of the Scandinavian are overall the most positive. While many countries are becoming more supportive of immigration over time, the few countries that are becoming increasingly restrictive are mostly CEE countries. Czechia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are becoming more restrictive along with Italy. Even the United

Kingdom, which voted to Brexit from the EU in 2016, shows a trend of increasing positivity about welcoming more immigrants (of the same ethnic background to their national majority) since 2012.

Figure 2.4. Changing average support for allowing more ethnic majority immigrants

In Figure 2.5, respondents report less positive opinions about immigration policies when asked specifically about immigrants who are ethnic minorities relative their country. At first glance, the colors of the heatmap in Figure 2.5 indicate more diversity of opinion than in Figure 2.4. The lower and upper limits of the range are again set by Hungary and Sweden, respectively, and overall the average opinions are more negative than those reported in Figure 2.4. In difference to the positive trend over time in Figure 2.4, the attitudes about allowing more ethnic minority immigrants into the country are becoming more restrictive (or more negative) over time.

The regional differences become more obscured here, with Portugal, Austria, Finland, and the United Kingdom moving up on the scale of restrictive countries. Slovenia stands out from its regional neighbors with a remarkably consistent and positive attitude towards ethnic

minority immigrants relative to the full sample. Even Germany leans closer to the median with respect to minority immigrants compared to their averages in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.5. Changing average support for allowing more ethnic minority immigrants

Figure 2.6 reports on attitudes about the final group of immigrants, non-EU immigrants from poorer countries. While the colors of the heatmap suggest that there is greater variation in opinions in Figure 2.6 compared to Figure 2.5, the minimum and maximum values are both higher, meaning that respondents feel more willing to allow poorer immigrants into the country than ethnic minorities. Hungary is on average the most restrictive with respect to poorer immigrants, and Sweden, as in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, is the most liberal. The regional divide is least noticeable in Figure 2.6 compared to Figures 2.1-2.5, with most Western European and CEE countries being equally likely to report restrictive or liberal support for poorer, non-EU immigrants.

Figure 2.6. Changing average support for allowing more immigrants from poor non-EU countries

Descriptive findings: Changing needs and priorities in Eurostat data since 2002

Table 2.3 highlights three aspects of sociodemographic changes observed in European countries: the number and proportion of immigrants in regional populations, unemployment rates of native-born and foreign-born people, and the number of long-term visas granted. The data in Table 2.3 compare 2018 data to the 'Earliest' data available, which is 2002 for employment data, 2008 for data on long-term visa, and 2009 for most demographic data. The extent and statistical significance of these changes are reported in the far-right column. These changes refer to either the full sample (all 23 countries, N=46) or, when indicated on the left, the regional subsamples.

On average, the countries in this sample experienced a total population increase of 1.3 million people since 2002. Roughly half of this increase has taken place since 2009, of which 1.8 percent can be attributed to immigration. The change in immigrants as a proportion of the population was insignificant and lower in CEE countries (1.2%) compared to the significant increase observed in Western Europe (3.6%). Unemployment rates in CEE countries were not

negatively affected by this increased in the proportion of immigrants; in fact, unemployment rates in CEE improved between 2002 and 2018 for both native and immigrant populations, though it was only significant for the natives.

By contrast, the average unemployment rates in Western Europe have increased for both immigrants and natives. The native-born population in in CEE had the lowest unemployment rate in 2018 (4.51%), whereas the unemployment rate for their counterparts in Western Europe (5.62%) was higher than that of immigrants in CEE (5.16%). Immigrants in CEE experienced an unemployment rate as high as 9.39 percent in 2002, but this rate improved by 50 percent (-4.23%) in the last sixteen years. Immigrants in Western Europe, however, had the highest unemployment rate by far in 2018 (10.5%), a disadvantage that has barely changed since 2002 when it was 10.29 percent. Immigrants in Western Europe are therefore not only more likely to be unemployed compared to their native peers, but also compared to immigrants in CEE.

The regional differences in the number of long-term visas granted are interesting but less straightforward. Overall, Western European governments allocate more long-term visas per year than those in CEE. Western European governments reported nearly no difference in the number of long-term visas allocated since 2008 (-4.7%), whereas the number of long-term visas granted by CEE governments grew from 26.4 thousand to 118.6 thousand (or +349.2%).

Furthermore, how (or rather, to whom) these visas were allocated also varies greatly between Western European and CEE countries. The first priority country, or the sending-country to which the largest proportion of long-term visas is allocated by a given government, received on average 30 percent of all long-term visas to CEE countries in 2008. By 2018, not only had the number of long-term visas granted by CEE countries increased by 349.2 percent, but the proportion of these visas granted to the same country doubled to 60 percent. This means that

CEE countries in 2018 were each, on average, allocating around 70.7 thousand visas to immigrants from one country. The largest number of visas granted by any country to its first-priority country was Poland, which granted a total of 585,439 long-term visas to Ukrainian immigrants[5] in 2017. For comparison, the largest number of long-term visas granted to a first-priority country in Western Europe was 221,440 (the number of visas given by Germany to Syrian refugees in 2016).

Table 2.3. Eurostat Descriptive statistics for contextual immigration and employment data

	Earliest data				2018				Change in mean
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max	
Population since 2002	19.9m	23.8m	705.5k	82.4m	21.1m	25.2m	864.2k	82.8m	+1.25m
Demographic variables (since 2009)									
Total population	20.5m	24.5m	796.9k	82.0m	21.1m	25.2m	864.2k	82.8m	+585k
Foreign-born population	2.3m	2.9m	664	13.7m	2.6m	3.6m	664	13.7m	+311k
Immigrant to total population (%)	10.72	4.69	.01	28.67	12.52	6.59	.01	28.67	+1.80
CEE: Immigrant to total pop. (%)	7.51	6.44	1.06	16.49	6.35	5.10	1.06	16.49	-1.17
WE: Immigrant to total pop. (%)	11.28	3.14	.01	28.67	14.83	5.22	.01	28.67	+3.55**
Employment variables (since 2002)									
All active in labor market	8.96k	11.48k	326	43.4k	10.96k	12.58k	326	43.4k	+2.0k
All native in labor market	7.52k	9.67k	92.3	35.5k	8.78k	10.19k	92.3	35.5k	+1.3k
All foreign-born in labor market	1.03k	1.85k	13.8	8.1k	1.63k	2.22k	13.8	8.1k	+603.78
All unemployed (%)	6.21	2.57	2.24	26.09	5.98	2.96	2.24	26.09	-.24
Unemployed native (%)	5.76	2.45	2.19	24.13	5.40	2.75	2.19	24.13	-.36
Unemployed foreign-born (%)	9.70	4.34	2.51	35.73	9.14	4.37	2.51	35.73	-.56
CEE: All unemployed (%)	7.15	2.02	5.61	10.03	4.05	1.25	2.24	5.37	-3.09**
CEE: Unemployed native (%)	6.88	1.64	5.62	9.18	4.51	1.38	2.23	6.53	-2.37**
CEE: Unemployed foreign-born (%)	9.39	3.77	5.08	13.77	5.16	1.99	2.51	7.71	-4.23
WE: All unemployed (%)	6.15	2.71	2.53	11.15	6.46	3.17	3.38	15.25	+.30
WE: Unemployed native (%)	5.62	2.62	2.19	10.94	5.62	3.17	2.80	14.09	+.00
WE: Unemployed foreign-born (%)	10.29	4.40	4.81	19.03	10.50	4.31	4.64	20.68	+.20
Visas (since 2008)									
Total number of visas	112.8k	177.5k	2.5k	732.2k	137.8k	179.7k	2.5k	732.2k	+25.0k
CEE – Total number of visas	26.4k	22.0k	2.5k	683.2k	118.6k	229.1k	2.5k	683.2k	+92.2k
WE – Total number of visas	162.3k	208.3k	18.0k	732.2k	154.6k	163.7k	18.0k	732.2k	-7.6k
Visas given to first priority country	20.7k	31.0k	686	585.4k	40.6k	87.0k	686	585.4k	19.9k
CEE – Visas granted to first priority	8.0k	7.1k	686	585.4k	70.7k	151.4k	686	585.4k	+62.7k
WE – Visas granted to first priority	28.3k	36.8k	2.0k	221.4k	29.0k	37.2k	2.0k	221.4k	+668.34
Total observations (N)	**23**				**23**				**46**

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

[5] Ukraine has been Poland's first-priority sending country since (at least) 2002, but following the internal conflict and territorial disputes, the data do not clarify how many of these visas were given to regular labor migrants vs refugees and asylum seekers.

Regional comparison of risk of poverty

To expand on the individual measures of economic vulnerability, Figure 2.7 compares the cumulative change in the number of people at risk of poverty or social isolation in Europe since 2008. There is a clear regional difference in risk of poverty in Western European and CEE countries, indicating that the risk of poverty or social isolation is growing in many Western European countries since 2008. CEE countries, on the other hand, cluster in the negative values near 0, which means that the risk of poverty or social isolation in most CEE countries has been slowly improving since 2008. Note, however, that these values are not indicative of where the risk of poverty and social isolation is the highest or lowest, but the rate of change they are experiencing since 2008. These data therefore indicate that the risk of poverty or social isolation is increasing most substantively and most quickly in Italy and Spain, whereas Poland is demonstrably improving at the fastest rate compared to all other countries in the sample.

Figure 2.7. Number of people at risk of poverty or social isolation in Europe, cumulative changes since 2008



Patterns of immigrant selection by priorities in visa allocation

Figure 2.8 compares the proportion of visas allocated by Western European and CEE countries to the first, second, and third countries prioritized by their visa allocation each year since 2008[6]. For the past ten years, visas allocated to applicants from first-priority countries by Western European countries are, on average, 20 percent of all long-term visas. CEE countries, however, have allocated between 30 to 50 percent of their visas every year to applicants from one country. The regional difference diminishes slightly in the comparison of the second-priority country; Western countries consistently allocated around 10 percent of all visas to the second-priority country since 2008, while CEE countries typically averaged 15 to 18 percent. By the third priority country, the regional difference disappears, with all countries allocating approximately ten percent of all long-term visas to applicants from their respective third-priority countries.

Figure 2.8. East-West Differences in prioritization of visa-allocation



[6] For table identifying all three top priority countries for all countries in the sample, see Appendix A Table E.

This chapter aimed to provide an overview of the underlying differences between Western European and CEE countries that help to either explain – or dispute – how contextual factors give rise to divergent social circumstances for immigrants. Regional salience and variation were determined through national- and individual-level analyses designed to capture economic, political, and social shifts since 2002. Using ESS survey data and country-level Eurostat data, this chapter investigated (1) whether regional attitudes on immigration and immigrant contributions are diverging or converging, (2) how regional disparities in economic vulnerability are changing, and (3) the extent to which the composition of domestic immigrant populations resulted from regional preferences or prioritization of certain immigrant groups.

The combined findings paint a curious and, at times, counter-intuitive picture. First, there is a clear regional divergence in anti-immigrant sentiments and the support for increased immigration. People in Western Europe are more receptive and positive in their opinions of immigrants, their contributions, and allowing more immigrants into the country than people in CEE. Second, unemployment rates, opinions of personal financial security, and the average number of people at risk of poverty or social isolation indicate that regional disparities in economic vulnerability are shrinking, and that personal financial security in both regions are on average better in 2018 than in 2002. Finally, the allocation of long-term visas illustrates that both Western European and CEE countries have consistent preferences in the types and nationalities of non-EU immigrants that they admit into their country on a long-term basis. On average, CEE countries prioritized their non-EU neighbors, former colonial powers in Western Europe prioritized immigrants from their former colonies, while other Western European countries prioritized immigrants by need instead of origin country. Countries in the last group allocated

visas to a greater variety of countries than the other two groups, which were both more likely to prioritize the same two to three countries every year since 2002.

Divergent immigrant experiences in Europe are perhaps the most meaningful take-aways from this chapter. Unemployment rates identify immigrants in Western Europe as the only population that experienced increased financial hardship since 2008. Despite the increased tolerance and support for immigrants, unemployment rates for immigrants in Western European countries are on average twice that of the native-born population. By contrast, immigrants in CEE countries have lower unemployment rates than their native-born counterparts. Immigrants in CEE countries also reported the most substantive improvement in their personal income security, meaning that the lived experience of people in CEE immigrant communities has improved the most in Europe since 2002. Given the high anti-immigrant sentiments and low support for immigration, the finding that immigrants in CEE reported higher rates of personal income security compared to their native-born peers was surprising.

Taken together, these findings suggest that anti-immigrant sentiments may be tied to relative financial circumstances rather than objective economic variables. This is in line with previous findings that indicate economic variables do not explain anti-immigrant sentiments well unless they are framed by sociocultural concerns (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), though perhaps native attitudes about immigrants are also framed in relation to their experiences. Lyman (2015) quotes a similar sentiment expressed by Lech Walesa, the leader of the country's independence movement, who stated, "Many people here don't believe that they have anything to share with migrants. Especially that they see that migrants are often well-dressed, sometimes better than many Poles" (Lyman 2015: 3). Perhaps native populations that, on average, fare better in the labor market than their non-native counterparts are more positive about immigration,

and natives who feel that immigrants and their children have a higher quality of life compared to them express greater anti-immigrant sentiments. Future research that can leverage more specific data samples to compare immigrants and native groups competing in the same careers in Western Europe can better untangle the relational aspects of native sentiments about immigrants and immigration.

While the analyses in this chapter did not seek to explain these trends, two possible mechanisms identified in previous research may be relevant to the divergent immigrant sentiments in Western European and CEE countries. The first possible explanation ties positive economic outcomes to immigrant identity. Whether this is evidence of social expectations attributed to a large immigrant group in the country that tie them to a specific industry (e.g., Turkish mechanics in Germany, Kalter 2011) or a consequence of less salient out-group boundaries between natives and immigrants from neighboring countries is complicated by the vastly different immigrant populations in each region.

The second possible explanation frames the low rates approval for immigrant cultural contributions as a consequence of the small immigrant population. Larger immigrant populations can mobilize politically to affect sociopolitical change (Lynn and Lea 2003), thus mediating or limiting the freedom with which negative stereotypes or narratives can be perpetuated about them in public discourse and in media. Because the non-native groups in CEE countries are smaller and more recently established, it is not as easy for them to mobilize and present different narratives about their inclusion in their respective host countries. By this argument, regional differences in anti-immigrant sentiments are not simply echoes of staunch preferences for ethnic / cultural homogeneity or economic consequences, but rather a reflection of the variety of voices and messages about non-native and marginalized groups are present in that context.

These findings point to a more complex and nuanced depiction of the regional divide with respect to immigrant inclusion. While there is evidence that people in CEE countries are growing less supportive of sociocultural diversity, these sentiments and government efforts cannot be tied to either economic vulnerability, financial security, or increased immigration. However, this chapter was limited by inconsistency in available ESS and Eurostat data, and the inaccurate scale of refugees and asylum seekers present in Europe. Despite these shortcomings, this chapter offers a broad overview of the trends and regional differences in economic, attitudinal, and demographic change that shaped European development over the past two decades.

CHAPTER 3

Preferences for the real and perceived effects of immigration

Global inequality and conflict compound the pressures of modern immigration, inflating both the number of people forced across international borders and the negative discourse surrounding them. Understanding the perceived threats of immigrants and the factors that fuel their influence has become a focal discussion for immigration scholars. Studies predominately frame attitudes toward immigrants as consequences of cultural threats that may disrupt the social fabric of a nation (e.g., for national identity see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004, for values and beliefs see Fetzer 2000, for social attitudes see Ford 2011), or economic threats that increased competition for limited resources, such as labor market competition (Mayda 2006) and welfare support (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Yet despite the great variety of data and innovative research on the attitudes about immigrants and immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014**),** the majority of these studies conflate contextual nuances by overlooking who these immigrants are. Furthermore, the research used to develop immigration theories are limited to a small number of traditional receiving countries, which may preclude many of the circumstances experienced in newly established receiving countries.

The need for engaging with these currently understudied aspects of modern immigration arises from two standpoints. First, although the theoretical foundation and hypotheses of economic and labor competition studies have greater specificity than the subjective cultural arguments (Kinder and Kam 2009), empirical findings are more supportive of studies on economic threat when they are framed as cultural concerns (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), e.g., respondents are more negative about immigrants who either cannot or will not work

(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2012) or have many dependents that they could not independently support (Iyengar et al. 2013). Distinguishing between different types of immigrants can shed light on how economic and cultural arguments interact. By looking at how respondents feel about immigrants from poor, non-EU countries as opposed immigrants with ethnic minority backgrounds, for example, we can begin to untangle whether economic and cultural arguments operate as mutually exclusive, competing explanatory theories, or if they are more effective in concert with each other.

Second, as global migration patterns diversify and new receiving cities and countries are established (Winders 2018), there is an increasing need to reassess longstanding immigration theories in these new contexts. New receiving countries like the Central and Eastern European (CEE) European Union (EU) member states lack the infrastructure and sociopolitical precedence for absorbing vast numbers of foreign people (Lyman 2015). For example, Sweden has been a net immigration country since 1950, whereas Hungary has only been a net immigration country since 1990. By virtue of greater experience in terms of absolute number of immigrants incorporated, growing second-generation population, and experience with immigration policies, Sweden and other established receiving countries would have an advantage over nascent receiving countries like Hungary.

Additionally, adapting from a net emigration country to a net immigration country in the 21st century and following a sudden influx of refugees is expected to be different from the 1950s, when associations with Nazis, nationalism, and fascism were publicly frowned upon. The different contexts in which Western European and CEE countries came into their roles as immigration countries and the different extents to which they have experience in these roles are

two fundamental reasons why current immigration theories should not be expected to apply the same way in CEE countries as they do in Western European and North American contexts.

Acknowledging this difference by testing the applicability of immigration theories in new contexts is increasingly important given the EU's intention to redistribute the number of refugees and immigrants from the Middle Eastern and Northern African (MENA) countries more fairly across its member states (Lyman 2015). For a number of CEE countries, this will be their first experience receiving and incorporating large numbers of immigrants. The implications of democratic destabilization and right-wing backlash as a result of unsolicited immigration and asylum seekers have already been observed in the region (Thorleifsson 2017), adding to the urgency of expanding the current scope of immigration research to encompass non-Western factors and contexts that influence attitudes on immigrants and support for immigration.

The focus of this chapter is to shed light on how the identity and perceived impact of immigrants affects people's attitudes on immigrants in both Western and Eastern European countries. For this chapter, this question is approached in two ways. The first question addresses how the perceived threats associated with different immigrant groups influence support for increased immigration. Following the findings of previous literature, these perceived threats are defined broadly as economic and cultural, i.e., the extent to which one feels that immigrants are a benefit to the national economy and enrich the national culture. The second question addresses how these same differences in perceived threat affect levels of (in)tolerance for increased immigration. There are three types of immigrants included in this paper, all of which are broadly identified by their backgrounds:

(1) immigrants from countries with the same ethnic background as the national majority,

(2) immigrants from countries with a different ethnic background compared to the national majority, and

(3) immigrants from poor origin countries outside the EU.

The first group is included as a reference point for comparisons intended to untangle prejudices or contexts of unfavorable attitudes with respect to minority (group 2) or poor (group 3) immigrants. Although these are not perfect measures or mutually exclusive categories, the second group of immigrants is included as a measure of outsiders who are pose a cultural threat, whereas the third group is included as a measure of immigrants who pose an economic threat. Given these two objectives, the analyses in this chapter build to answer the following research questions:

RQ1. Do attitudes about immigrants differ with respect to their perceived consequences?

RQ2. Compared to ethnic minority immigrants and poor immigrants, are people more likely to support increased immigration if immigrants shared their country's ethnicity?

These questions are addressed using cross-sectional survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The analyses consist of multiple linear regression models that also control for year, age, gender, education, marital status, religious affiliation, nativity, children living at home, urbanicity, employment, personal financial security, and three index variables measuring attachment to authoritarian values, religiosity, and satisfaction with government institutions.

Measuring the cost of immigration with economic and cultural values

The majority of immigration literature frames concerns over immigrants as either financial concerns such as labor market competition or added financial burdens on the native population,

or as sociotropic threats to cultural norms (Mayda 2006, Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Much like the operationalization of race and ethnic diversity to explain the cultural threats associated with different immigrant groups, individual-level measures of economic threat posed by immigrants try to untangle why hostility toward immigrants (O'Connell 2005) and restrictive immigration policies (Kehrberg 2007, Lapinski et al. 1997) increase during periods of economic vulnerability.

Both economic theories hinge on how and where immigrants enter the work force relative to the native population. Some scholars frame economic interactions between native and immigrant populations by their skill levels, suggesting that low-skilled immigrants are perceived as costly, undesirable burdens on wealthier natives and the national economy (Facchini and Mayda 2009, Hanson et al. 2007), whereas highly-skilled immigrants are seen as both beneficial and desirable (Hanson et al. 2007). By this argument, native low-skilled workers would oppose immigration of low-skilled immigrants for fear of increased competition and lower wages, but they would support high-skilled immigrants because their presence would increase the scarcity of (and need for) the native population of low-skilled laborers (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Since immigrants in Europe are more likely to be modestly educated relative to the European population, the natural conclusion of this argument would be that highly skilled natives in Europe would be more supportive of immigration than low-skilled natives.

Empirical scrutiny of studies that attribute support for immigration to immigrant skill-level contend with the generality of the labor-market competition hypothesis, both with respect to its application and its accuracy. Rather than capturing the effect of economic threat, testing labor market competition in the context of immigration research may instead reveal the effects of native levels of education rather than their skill-level. Higher levels of education are associated with positive intrinsic characteristics, such as lower levels of ethnocentrism, greater support for

cultural diversity, and recognition of the economic contributions of immigrants (Citrin et al. 1997, Chandler and Tsai 2001, Card et al. 2012). Societies with larger proportions of highly skilled natives are overall more likely to support immigration (Mayda 2006, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006).

However, recent research indicates that aggregate data analyses generalize theories of labor market theory too broadly to capture meaningful evidence of its effect simply because most people do not experience direct competition with immigrants (Malhotra et al. 2013). Targeted data sampling and comparisons found that when highly skilled natives are asked about ethnic minority immigrants with comparable skills, highly skilled and highly educated natives also express higher rates of anti-immigrant sentiments (Malhotra et al. 2013). Therefore, while anti-immigrant sentiments are not easily detected in aggregate analyses, strategic comparisons allow scholars to bridge the divide between arguments of sociocultural and economic threat.

Immigration research is now moving in the direction of interactive rather than competitive models of economic and cultural threats (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Malhotra et al. 2013, Malhotra and Newman 2017). This becomes more relevant in comparative immigration research by allowing scholars to test the effects of economic competition when they are framed by cultural threats. Recalling on the above discussion on the effects of complementary skill-level, for example, the prevalence of low-skilled immigrants (i.e., increased likelihood of low-skilled immigrants entering the country) did not negatively influence support for immigration until a cultural identity was applied (Malhotra and Newman 2017).

These studies demonstrate that quantifiable measures of economic threat are not meaningful until a cultural marker is applied to help people decide how they should feel. Thus, subjective indicators of threat, or perceived feelings of economic vulnerability, motivate anti-

immigrant sentiments more reliably than tangible measures, such as individual employment status (Kuntz et al. 2017). Overall, perceived measures of cultural differences (e.g., Burns and Gimpel 2000), economic vulnerability (Citrin et al. 1997), and domestic and incoming immigrant populations (Blinder 2015, Sides and Citrin 2007) are consistently found to be more influential than objective indicators such as individual- or country-level economic conditions and immigrant flow (Ivarsflaten 2005, McLaren and Johnson 2007, Sides and Citrin 2007). Therefore, while studies that focus strictly on economic arguments can use tangible and reliable measures to describe consequences of immigration, the potential effect of immigration on a country's cultural and social norms are found to be two to five times more powerful than fears of lost wages or increased taxes (Card et al. 2012).

Salience of regional differences on immigrant (in)tolerance

Scholarship in the field of immigration focuses on the traditional receiving countries such as the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Changing immigration patterns of present-day globalization and forced migration (Thorleifsson 2017, Winders 2018) challenge researchers to adapt foundational immigration theories to non-Western, non-Christian contexts as it grows into a more inclusive reflection of modern immigration. In the European case, the CEE countries stand out as nascent receiving countries that are expected to receive both immigrants and refugees as part of their EU membership.

For these states, social conflict and labor market competition between native and immigrant populations would not be expected to operate in the same as in Western contexts (Snellman and Ekehammar 2005). While the differences between Western European and CEE countries are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2, there is a relevant and clear distinction

between how countries in these regions feel about their role as receiving states. In a recent Gallup poll (Esipova et al. 2017), CEE countries comprised nine of the ten least receptive countries to immigrants.

While ethnic tensions in the region may borrow from the ethnoreligious identities and shared heritage that nurture high rates of social cohesion (Kunovich 2009, Kymlicka 2000), these social divisions are also the result of strategic political rhetoric employed by elite political actors to achieve specific goals by framing immigrants in ways that serve their purposes (Zubrzycki 2001). Measuring the development of authoritarian values in CEE countries, or how far social attitudes are moving away from authoritarian influence, can therefore provide insight into how the underlying values of their national and political identity are changing over time. After all, when, why, and against whom nationalism is invoked should not simply be dismissed as a consequence of a non-Western context, since neither Western nor CEE identities are as reliably static as the traditional civic-ethnic framework suggests (Bandelj and Finley 2016).

Practical differences between how traditional and nascent receiving countries integrate large immigrant populations also leaves an important mark on how immigration is seen and experienced in a country. Traditional receiving countries in Western Europe demonstrate an active engagement and effort to productively incorporate them into their country clear laws and government agencies, such as requiring immigrants to complete civic education designed to assist their integration into the national society (Goodman and Wright 2015). These practices require both the cultural awareness and structural mechanisms for supporting diversity and facilitating integration, but intuitively, another important component of effectively implementing such policies is practice.

Traditional receiving countries fine-tuned their policies over decades of practice, an advantage that CEE have not yet had since many of them are still net emigration countries. How well countries integrate their immigrant populations and overall manage different segments of their population has a strong effect on how the native population feels about their presence. To date, the few studies that have included CEE countries when investigating diversity in Europe find that even CEE countries in the EU struggle with minority groups, in part due to their lack of experience incorporating immigrants and longstanding (and politically re-purposed) cultural homogeneity (Bandelj and Finley 2016, Nedelsky 2003, Pirro 2017, Rovny 2016).

In addition to social and political differences that encompass the cultural conflict between native and immigrant groups, CEE capitalism as shaped by post-communist society is not the same as what is observed in Western Europe (Bandelj 2016). Economic theories of conflict may therefore also not apply to the immigrant experience in CEE as it would under Western capitalism. This is further complicated by the lower rates of average education, wages, and employment (i.e., financial security) observed in CEE countries relative to Western European countries (Barysch 2006). Due to the lower wages and average education in CEE, labor market complementarity suggests the threat of competition from the immigrant population becomes more relevant than in the West, where the native-born population is not as likely to be in direct competition with the (often low-skilled) immigrant population (Facchini and Mayda 2009; for effect of education, see Hello et al. 2002, 2004).

Holding all other factors equal, the presence of a large ethnic minority in Eastern European countries was also found to increase national income inequality (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010), suggesting that as ethnic minority communities become more visible in CEE countries, their economic disadvantage grows. Compared to traditional receiving countries like France and

Germany, where immigrant communities have been established over multiple generations, the highly educated French and German natives rarely compete for jobs against native-born and educated children of immigrants for employment (Kalter 2011). Thus, the threat of immigrant labor market competition would not be perceived as a meaningful threat in Western Europe to the same extent as it would in CEE countries, where higher rates of economic instability and lower rates of education makes them more susceptible to direct competition with low-skilled immigrants (Billiet et al. 2014, Lucassen and Lubbers 2012).

Preference and Prejudice for immigrant groups

Not all immigrants are created equally, or, more accurately, not all immigrants are perceived to be equally compatible to a given society. Anti-immigrant sentiments are as much about how immigrants are perceived with respect to the host society as they are perceived in relation to other immigrant groups. Cues such as skin color (e.g., Ford 2011) and language (Sniderman et al. 2004) distinguish between the 'good immigrants' willing to integrate and the 'bad immigrants' who resist.

In Europe, the most salient out-group indicator is religion, where Muslim immigrants are perceived as the foreign group least willing to integrate and whose values are seen as incompatible with social norms of the secularized liberal West (Martinez et al. 2015, Wikan 2002). They are described as 'exception populations' (Agamben 2005), socially removed from the bio-social cultural and religious roots in Western countries. In public, their religious clothing and mosques make them stand out (Maussen 2007), while in sociopolitical terms, they stand out compared to other religious immigrant groups because their religious identity remains unusually salient across multiple generations (Jacob and Kalter 2013). Children of Muslim immigrants who

strongly identify with their Muslim identity also report higher levels of dissatisfaction with the national government, more frequent experiences of xenophobic and religious discrimination, and higher rates of residential segregation to maintain tightly-knit coethnic communities (Koopmans 2010).

Although the presence of large Muslim communities from the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) is not a recent phenomenon in Europe, acts of terrorism and humanitarian crises in the region have led to a rise in global suspicion and prejudices against the Muslim population (Adida et al. 2016, Osiewicz 2017, Strabac and Listhaug 2008). In a comparative study across fifteen Western European countries, immigrants from traditionally Muslim MENA countries were perceived as less honest and hardworking than Eastern European immigrants (Pew Research 2018). Refugees and asylum seekers experience a Muslim disadvantage, meaning that including their religion negatively affects native European opinions about whether their application should be approved (Bansak et al. 2016). These perceptions about the unique threat posed by Muslim immigrants are so pervasive and salient that the number of Muslims in a given country have no significant bearing on the native population's proclivity for socially distancing themselves from their Muslim counterparts (Strabac and Listhaug 2008).

In this context, religion is an important variable that brings together economic and cultural threats into a single visible marker. Compared to other religions, Muslim immigrants pose an unusually viable cultural threat due to their association with high levels of resistance to integrating into European society and assimilating to secularizing norms (Martinez et al. 2015, Wikan 2002). Due to higher rates of unemployment and residential segregation from their native peers (Koopmans 2010), Muslim immigrants are also associated with burdens on the European

welfare systems, particularly with respect to refugees and asylum seekers who arrive without the financial means or language / social skills necessary to live without government assistance.

Given these differences, Muslim immigrants (and particularly Muslim refugees and asylum seekers) experience a higher disadvantage relative to other immigrant groups even in traditional receiving countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The refugee crisis of 2015 created the perfect storm of pushing 'bad immigrants' in unexpected numbers into countries that are predominately homogenous, ethnoreligious divisions are salient, and the legal and social framework for incorporating large numbers of immigrants are still absent or unfamiliar. The EU's official plan to re-settle refugees in all EU member-states in the near-future therefore underscores the need for immigration research to expand into new contexts of immigration and test whether, and to what extent, they challenge our current understanding of what factors lead to higher rates of anti-immigrant sentiments.

ESS Survey data: 2006 and 2016

In order to compare the changes in contexts and immigrant sentiment across many European countries and many years, this chapter draws on survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). These nationally representative surveys are conducted every two years. Although there are 36 participating countries, not all countries participate in every wave (European Social Survey, 2018). Data from ESS waves 3 (2006) and 8 (2016) are used in an effort to avoid obscuring results with the effects of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. This time frame limited the number of comparable countries to eighteen, which includes thirteen Western European countries and five Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.

The vast majority of this pooled sample are native to the country in which they were surveyed, which is an advantage for this project, which seeks to understand the determinants of tolerance or intolerance toward immigrants. In other words, these data lend more confidence in national comparisons because the majority of respondents have most likely only been exposed to their own national culture and social contexts. Immigrants are an integral part of European society and are therefore included in the samples to be as representative of the national populations as possible. Their inclusion in the analyses are controlled for in order to distinguish between native-born and foreign-born effects. The total sample size for this project is 69,265, whereof 35,332 are sampled in 2006 and 33,933 are sampled in 2016[7]. The missing cases in this sample varies for each of the fifteen regression models, ranging from 5.8 percent to 9.8 percent.

Dependent variables

There are five outcome variables of interest in this project. The first two outcome variables are geared towards answering the first research question (RQ1), or what respondents perceive the impact of immigrants to be on their country. The purpose of RQ1 is to see the extent to which immigrants are perceived to burden or contribute to a country by distinguishing between the two primary threats identified by literature. Thus the first outcome variable addresses the economic threat by asking respondents, *Would you say it is generally bad or good for [Country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?* The second outcome variable addresses the cultural threat of immigrants by asking respondents, *Would you say that [Country's] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?* Both of

[7] For the full samples and proportion of native-born respondents in each country and each wave, see Appendix B Table A.

these questions are asked on a scale of *0 (Bad for the economy / Cultural life undermined)* to *10 (Good for the economy / Cultural life is enriched)*.

RQ2 focuses on how the identity of the immigrant influences attitudes of (in)tolerance. The three final outcome variables introduce three different immigrant types and ask respondents *To what extent do you think [Country] should allow _____ people to come and live here?* These responses were all measured on a four-point scale, which I have reverse coded to range from *(1) Allow none* to *(4) Allow many to come and live here*. In the first of these three outcome variables, the immigrant group is described as same race or ethnic group [as national majority]. The second dependent variable refers to immigrants who are from a different race or ethnic group [as national majority], while the third dependent variable refers to immigrants from poor countries outside of Europe. Although the scale of the dependent variables addressing RQ2 are more restrictive (scale of 1 to 4), the distinctions between these four responses are still important. The original 4-point scale was used for this measure in an effort to capture more differentiation in the analyses.

By including all three of these dependent variables in these analyses, this project moves away from the monolithic 'immigrant' that lead to a problematic conflation of perceptions and prejudices. The inclusion of immigrants from the same race or ethnic group is expected to be helpful as a reference group for both ethnic minorities and poorer immigrants, and also as a general measurement of a society's distrust of foreigners who are not theoretically associated with either economic and sociocultural threats. For a comparison of means on each outcome variable for the countries in each wave, see Appendix B Table B.

Independent variables: Contextual and Index variables

This chapter uses four indicator variables to help explain what contextual factors influence attitudes toward immigrants. The first variable measures individual financial security, and the remaining three are theoretically motivated index variables designed to capture the contextual differences between regions. The measure on individual financial security is taken directly from the ESS survey that asks the respondents to *Describe how you feel about your household's income*. The responses range from (1) *Living comfortably on present income* to (4) *Finding it very difficult on present income*. Due to the low response rate for (3) *Difficult on present income* and (4) *Finding it very difficult on present income*, these two were combined. This scale was reverse coded and modified so that its application in the regression would reflect how increased financial security affects attitudes toward immigrants instead. The modified scale goes from (1) *Difficult on present income* to (3) *Living comfortably on present income*.

The three original index variables were created as composites of multiple survey questions (see Table 3.1) intended to capture the respondent's attachment to authoritarian values, satisfaction with government institutions, and religiosity. Attachment to authoritarian values are defined as a distance from authoritarian values and therefore hereafter described as *Liberal values*. The six-point scale ranges from (1), which reflects the closest attachment to authoritarian values, to (6), the furthest from authoritarian values.

Respondent satisfaction with government institutions is defined on a scale of 0-10, where 0 is the lowest satisfaction score and 10 is the highest score of satisfaction. Both of these variables were created to capture the different sociopolitical histories of CEE countries relative to the Western European context (Zubrzycki 2001, Kunovich 2009). Since these regional differences were in large part due to ethnoreligious divisions, the final index variable was created

to compare the importance of religious affiliation in each region. *Religiosity* is measured on a scale of 0-10, where 0 is the least religious, or *Not religious at all*, and 10 is the most religious.

Table 3.1. ESS Survey components of contextual index variables

Index variable	Questions used to generate index variable	Chronbach's α
Liberal values	Important to behave properly Important that government is strong and ensures safety Important to follow traditions and customs Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention Important to live in secure and safe surroundings Important to do what is told and follow rules	.7101
Satisfaction with government institutions	How satisfied with present state of economy in country How satisfied with the national government How satisfied with the way democracy works in country State of health services in country nowadays State of education in country nowadays	.8181
Religiosity	Self-reported religiosity How frequently respondent prays How frequently respondent attends religious service	.8064

Control variables

Many demographic factors have been shown to influence attitudes toward immigrants, both with respect to their economic threat (e.g., Mayda 2006) and their cultural impact (e.g., Card et al. 2012). These factors were accounted for in the analyses through the inclusion of the following control variables: year, gender, nativity, age, education, employment, marital status, children living at home, urbanicity, and religious identity. Year is coded to differentiate 2016 data from 2006 (0=2006, 1=2016) to capture the effect of time. Gender is coded as female (0=male, 1=female), and nativity identifies native-born respondents (1) from foreign-born respondents (0).

Age is a continuous variable, but an additional binary variable was included to pull out a group of people referred to as 'young adults', or respondents between the ages of 18 and 40. Empirical research finds that older people are more intolerance of diversity and change due to life cycle or cohort effect, but can also be explained by modernization theory (Strabac et al. 2012), which further posits that younger people will grow increasingly tolerant and inclusive as a result of economic development and technological advancement. However, some studies find that intolerance toward racial minorities is reproduced in well-educated younger generations

despite living in modern, multicultural and highly diverse contexts (Morning 2009). 'Young adults' is therefore included to see how anti-immigrant sentiments among young adults differ from the older generation in the European context.

Education is coded as a continuous variable measuring years of full-time education. Employment is a binary, where 1 means currently employed and 0 is currently unemployed. Marital status has been recoded into a binary variable where 1 is legally joined and 0 is not joined. Those who are coded as legally joined were described in the original survey question as either legally married or legally registered in civil union. Those who are not joined were legally separated, legally divorced, never married or legally registered in civil union, or they responded widowed / civil partner died. Respondents were also asked whether they *Currently have children living at home*, where 1 is yes (i.e., children of their own, step-children, adopted children, foster children, or partner's children) and 0 is no. Urbanicity identifies whether the respondent lives in a *(1) big city or in the suburbs of a big city*, *(2) in a town or a small city*, or *(3) a country village or a farm/home in the countryside*.

Finally, religious identity is a modified variable reflecting the respondent's self-described religious affiliation as either *Catholic*, *Protestant*, *Muslim*, *Other or No religion*, where *Other or No religion* serves as the comparison group. The original survey question also included options for Other Christian denomination, Jewish, Eastern religions, Other non-Christian religions, but these responses were combined with Eastern Orthodox due to the low response rates.

Analytic approach

Six models are run on each of the five dependent variables to help distinguish between the different determinants influencing attitudes toward immigrants. Model 1 (M1) only regresses the

control variables on the outcome variables, Model 2 (M2) includes personal financial security, Models 3-5 (M3-M5) separately test each of the index variables, *Religiosity*, *Liberal values*, and *Government satisfaction*. The sixth model combines them in a full model (M6). In addition to these individual-level variables, all countries in the sample are included as dummy variables to control for national-level differences. Estonia, where average responses to all outcome variables were the closest to the sample mean, was left out as the reference group.

Given the different ways in which the outcome variables are coded, these analyses apply two different approaches to test the different outcome variables. Linear regressions with country fixed-effects are used for the first two outcome variables (DV1 and DV2), and ordered logistic regressions with country fixed-effects are used for the three final outcome variables on respondent support for increased immigration (DV3-5). Tables report odds ratios to enable a clearer representation of the size of effects (Long and Freese 2014). Odds ratios greater than one are positive relationships and odds less than one are negative relationships.

Descriptive findings

In comparing the descriptive statistics of each wave of data from 2006 and 2016, the data reveals an overall improvement in attitudes on immigration. Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis, including the calculated change in means reported in the far right column. Although the difference in scales makes it difficult to compare substantive changes in the five outcome variables, it is clear that they are all changing in a positive direction. Adjusting for these scales, the greatest substantive improvements are observed in response to 'Allow more immigrants from a different race/ethnic group from national majority' and 'Allow more immigrants from poor countries.' The highest general approval across all five outcome variables,

however, is for 'Allowing more immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as the national majority.'

The indices and contextual variable measuring personal income security also reflect a positive shift in public opinions. First, more people are feeling financially secure in their household income in 2016, meaning that fewer people are struggling day to day to make ends meet. Second, people's trust and satisfaction in government institutions have also improved since 2006. Finally, religiosity is the only variable that diminishes over time. The substantive change is overall very minor (-.03), but it is interesting to note that the data shows a negative change in a time where religious and cultural barriers increasingly bolster far-right rhetoric. For table comparing means for all outcome variables across all variables of interest and all countries, see Appendix B Table C.

Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for all variables

	2006				2016				Change in mean
Outcome variables	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	
Immigrant good or bad effect on…									
National economy	4.64	2.55	0	10	4.95	2.53	0	10	+.31***
National culture	5.02	2.71	0	10	5.20	2.70	0	10	+.18
Allow more immigrants of…									
Same race/ethnic group as national majority	2.82	.90	1	4	2.88	.88	1	4	+.06***
Different race/ethnic group from national majority	2.43	.90	1	4	2.57	.91	1	4	+.14***
Poor origin countries	2.36	.93	1	4	2.49	.95	1	4	+.13***
Contextual IVs and Indices									
Personal income security	1.92	.73	1	3	2.03	.74	1	3	+.11***
Religiosity	3.33	2.00	0	10	3.30	2.01	0	10	-.03***
Liberal values	2.66	.83	1	6	2.71	.85	1	6	+.05***
Government satisfaction	4.62	1.85	0	10	4.95	1.84	0	10	+.33***
Religious identity									
Catholic	.27	.44	0	1	.27	.44	0	1	-.01
Protestant	.08	.27	0	1	.10	.30	0	1	+.02
Muslim	.03	.17	0	1	.05	.22	0	1	+.02***

Socio-demographic controls									
Female	.53	.50	0	1	.52	.50	0	1	-.01***
Age	45.82	18.41	16	101	46.92	18.73	16	100	+1.10***
Young adults (18-40)	.38	.48	0	1	.37	.48	0	1	-.01***
Education	12.43	3.90	0	56	12.74	3.69	0	54	+.31***
Native respondent	.91	.28	0	1	.90	.30	0	1	-.01***
Employed	.55	.00	0	1	.54	.00	0	1	-.01**
Married	.57	.49	0	1	.51	.50	0	1	-.06***
Children at home	.26	.44	0	1	.30	.46	0	1	+.04***
Living in big city	.33	.47	0	1	.31	.46	0	1	-.02
Living in town	.35	.48	0	1	.34	.47	0	1	-.01
Living in village	.32	.47	0	1	.35	.48	0	1	+.03
Total observations (N)	**34,992**				**33,756**				**68,748**

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Table 3.3 provides a closer look at the mean changes in attitude from 2006 to 2016 for each country in the dataset, which have been separated to allow an easier comparison of the Western and CEE countries. Among the Western European countries, Austria stands out as the only country where people have grown increasingly negative toward immigrants and their contributions. The Republic of Ireland has also grown less supportive over time, except in their opinion of immigrant contribution to culture. Finland is only less positive about the cultural contribution of immigrants, whereas Spain worries more of their economic contribution, and Switzerland is more concerned over immigrants from poor origin countries.

Two other countries that deserve attention are Portugal and the United Kingdom. Compared to all other countries in the dataset, Portugal reflects one of the greatest substantive positive changes in attitude across all five outcome variables. By contrast, the United Kingdom's public positive changes about immigration is a clear counterpoint to the bon vivants orchestrating the Brexit. The survey data show that the British have experienced the greatest positive growth in their opinion of immigrant contributions, both to the national economy and to

the national culture. Similarly, their support for increased immigration has only improved in this ten-year period.

Compared to the Western countries, opinions in CEE countries are predominantly negative. Poland and Hungary grew increasingly negative across all five outcome variables. The data show that Hungarian people have grown more concerned with the cultural impact of immigrants, though by comparison, they are not as restrictive in their attitudes on immigration as their Polish counterparts. Compared to its CEE neighbors, Estonia is the only country to reflect mostly positive changes in attitudes since 2006. In the same way that Austria stood out in the Western European context, Estonia stands out among the CEE countries, suggesting that while Austria is growing more similar to the CEE mindset, Estonia is growing increasingly similar to its Western neighbors across the sea (see Appendix B Table H for visual representation of these national/regional shifts).

Table 3.3. Mean changes in attitudes between 2006 and 2016

	Immigrant contribution to		**Allow more immigrants from**		
Country	*National economy*	*National culture*	*Majority ethnic group*	*Minority ethnic group/s*	*Poor countries*
Western Europe					
Austria	-.62***	-.31***	-.10***	-.08***	-.18***
Belgium	.32***	.17**	.14***	.21***	.21***
Finland	.07	-.16	.18***	.20***	.21***
France	.14	.11	.25***	.17***	.24***
Germany	1.11***	.36***	.48***	.44***	.44***
Ireland	-.34***	.09	-.15***	-.16***	-.12***
Netherlands	.09	-.08	.30***	.35***	.27***
Norway	.11	.03	.12***	.34***	.28***
Portugal	.78***	.85***	.73***	.61***	.66***
Spain	-.28***	.53***	.43***	.39***	.37***
Sweden	.38***	.03	.09***	.12***	.04***
Switzerland	.11	-.01	.02	.11***	-.21
United Kingdom	1.17***	.95***	.25***	.32***	.30**
Central & Eastern Europe					
Estonia	-.17**	.12	.15***	.10***	.09**
Hungary	-.34***	-1.28***	-.09	-.15***	-.23***
Poland	-.48***	-1.03***	-.41***	-.58***	-.48***
Russia	.04	.18	-.39***	-.03	-.09**
Slovenia	-.30***	-.33***	.15***	-.03	.07**

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Findings from regression analyses

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the results from regressions on all five outcome variables. Table 3.4 looks at two outcome variables measuring opinions on immigrant contribution. Rather than focusing on whether people worry about the economic competition or the sociocultural influence associated with immigrant groups, the results presented in Table 3.4 seek to distinguish who and what circumstances are most likely to lead to positive association with the presence of immigrants. In contrast to Table 3.4, which looks into factors influencing the immigrant sentiments based on the imagined effects of immigrants, Table 3.5 presents the findings on outcome variables that measure support for allowing more immigrants into the country based on different immigrant groups.

Attitudes on immigrant contribution to national economy and culture

Table 3.4 presents the results of a series of linear regressions with country fixed-effects on respondent opinions about immigrant contributions to the country. The most consistently negative predictive factor for how people feel about immigrant contributions to the country is whether they are born in the country or not. The most consistently positive predictor is whether or not an individual identifies as a Muslim, which broadly identified as a non-European identity (Zolberg and Woon 1999).

The three index variables have similarly positive and significant effects on opinions about immigrant contributions, but when accounting for all other variables in the full models, poor personal income security does not negatively impact opinions of immigrant contributions to the national culture the same way it affects opinions about their contribution to the national economy. This suggests that trust in government institutions, identification with liberal values,

and religiosity can account for negative sentiments about immigrant contribution to culture, but not for feelings about their effect on the national economy.

Influence of religious identity on opinions of immigrant contribution

While religiosity, the index variable, has only a slightly significant positive effect, the different religious identities range in their influence on attitudes of immigrant contributions, meaning that the extent to which someone identifies as religious has a unique effect independent of with which religion they identify.

Compared to Muslim and other religious identities that consistently have a significant and positive effect, European religious identities (Catholicism and Protestant Christianity) have minor to no effect. Protestant Christianity has a significant positive effect on how people's opinions of immigrant contributions to the economy, but these effects disappear in the full model; the opposite is true for this religious effect on sentiments about culture, where there is no significant effect until satisfaction with government institutions is accounted for to reveal a negative, significant effect. By contrast, Catholicism has a significant negative effect on both opinions of immigrant contribution, but significant effects on economic contributions only become significant when accounting for index variables.

Influence of financial security

In these models, financial security is measured with two variables. The first control is for whether or not the respondent is employed, and the second is a subjective measure of personal financial security reflects how comfortable the respondent feels living on their current household income. Being employed has a significant adverse effect on both opinions about immigrant contribution, but these effects disappear in the full models.

The subjective measure of financial security, *personal financial security*, has a predictable effect on opinions about immigrant contribution to the national economy, where struggling on one's income has a significant negative effect and those living comfortably has a significant positive effect. With respect to opinions about immigrant contributions to the national culture, however, the adverse effect of struggling on one's income is accounted for by the index variables and the significance of poor personal income security disappears. Living comfortably on one's income continues to have a significant positive effect.

Influence of political values and residential context

Political alignment is assessed by a control variable for nativity, and two index variables that, respectively, measure the respondent's attachment to liberal values and the respondent's satisfaction with government institutions. As stated earlier, nativity is the greatest predictor of negative attitudes across all models. The two index variables, on the other hand, are strong predictors of significant positive attitudes. Their effects are comparable in all models on both outcome variables, but attachment to liberal values has a slightly greater influence than government satisfaction with respect to opinions about culture, while satisfaction with government institutions has a more substantive effect than liberal values on opinions about economic contribution.

Finally, looking at the effect of urbanicity and geographic context, there is another unexpected distinction made between the factors that influence opinions of cultural contribution and economic contribution. Respondents who live in big cities were expected to be the most inclusive (Maxwell 2019), given that they are most likely to experience diversity as part of their daily lives. This effect is only significant with respect to opinions of immigrants' economic

contribution, however, and becomes insignificant when looking at opinions of their cultural contribution. By contrast, living in a village rather than a town has a significantly negative effect on both attitudes of immigrant contribution.

Table 3.4. Beta coefficients of linear regression with country fixed effects: Immigrants make a positive contribution to the national …

	ECONOMY						CULTURE					
Personal financial security	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)
Struggling		-.47***				-.24***		-.29***				-.08
		(.05)				(.05)		(.05)				(.05)
Comfortable		.46***				.31***		.36***				.22***
		(.04)				(.04)		(.04)				(.04)
Index variables												
Religiosity			.05***			.04***			.06***			.05***
			(.01)			(.01)			(.01)			(.01)
Liberal values				.27***		.28***				.35***		.37***
				(.02)		(.02)				(.02)		(.02)
Government satisfaction					.35***	.33***					.30***	.29***
					(.01)	(.01)					(.01)	(.01)
Religious identity												
Catholic	.02	-.01	-.09	.10**	-.12***	-.13***	-.18***	-.20***	-.30***	-.09**	-.30***	-.31***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Protestant	.24***	.19***	.14**	.29***	.09	.06	.01	-.03	-.10*	.08	-.12**	-.14**
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Muslim	.77***	.81***	.62***	.87***	.64***	.67***	.99***	1.02***	.82***	1.11***	.87***	.89***
	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)
Socio-demographic controls												
Year	.25***	.20***	.26***	.23***	.14***	.11***	.12***	.09***	.13***	.11***	.03	.01
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Female	-.29***	-.27***	-.32***	-.28***	-.24***	-.24***	.01	.03	-.03	.02	.05	.04
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.00***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Young adult (18-40)	-.16***	-.14***	-.16***	-.12**	-.14***	-.10**	-.21***	-.20***	-.21***	-.16***	-.19***	-.14***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Education	.12***	.11***	.12***	.12***	.12***	.11***	.13***	.12***	.13***	.12***	.13***	.12***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Native respondent	-.83***	-.91***	-.78***	-.87***	-.65***	-.73***	-.73***	-.77***	-.68***	-.79***	-.57***	-.63***
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Employed	-.09**	-.12***	-.08**	-.09**	-.02	-.04	-.11***	-.13***	-.10**	-.11***	-.06	-.06
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Married	-.06	-.10***	-.07*	-.03	-.06	-.06	-.12***	-.14***	-.12***	-.08**	-.11***	-.09**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Children at home	-.04	-.07	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.10**	-.12**	-.09	-.10**	-.09**	-.10**
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Big city, vs. Town/small city	.19***	.19***	.19***	.19***	.19***	.18***	.09**	.08	.08	.08	.08	.07
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Village, vs. Town/small city	-.10**	-.08**	-.10**	-.09**	-.10**	-.08**	-.10**	-.10**	-.11***	-.09**	-.10**	-.09**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Constant	4.27	4.58	4.15	3.47	2.20	1.55	4.53	4.74	4.40	3.48	2.73	1.65
R^2	**1.49**	**.16**	**.14**	**.15**	**.20**	**.21**	**.21**	**.22**	**.21**	**.22**	**.25**	**.26**
Observations	**64,175**	**63,650**	**64,119**	**62,995**	**64,145**	**62,423**	**64,361**	**63,839**	**64,300**	**63,180**	**64,324**	**62,597**

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Friend or foe: Support for immigrant admission based on immigrant backgrounds

Table 3.5 presents the results for M1 and M6 (base and full models, respectively) on the three outcome variables that explore support for immigration for three different immigrant groups: immigrants who share the ethnic background of the national majority, immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds, and immigrants from poor, non-EU countries. For the regression results of all six models on each outcome variable, see Appendix B Tables D-G.

Limited advantages for immigrants of similar backgrounds

The most significant predictor of low support for allowing more immigrants of all backgrounds is being native to a survey country. In addition to nativity, young adults (age 18 - 40) are also slightly less supportive of immigration for all immigrant groups. Gender has no effect on support for increased immigration, regardless of immigrant type. In fact, the only noticeable advantage for immigrants who share the same ethnic background as the national majority is that urbanicity has no significant effects in the models. In other words, respondents are not more or less likely to support increased immigration for ethnic majority immigrants by virtue of how rural or urban their local contexts are. Living in a big city had a significantly positive effect on support for allowing more ethnic minority and poor, non-EU immigrants into the country, but ethnic minority immigrants also experience a significantly negative effect from people who live in countryside villages.

Religious backgrounds, which historically are closely tied to ethnic boundaries in Europe (Agamben 2005, Feischmidt and Hervik 2015), reveal a similar pattern as observed in Table 3.4. Catholicism has a significant negative effect on increased immigration for all immigrant groups, even when accounting for all variables in the full model. Protestant Christianity has no effect in

any base model, but with respect to ethnic minority immigrants and poor, non-EU immigrants, this religious identity has a significant negative effect in the full model. In contrast to the effect of Catholicism, identifying as Muslim has a significant positive effect on support for increased immigration for all immigrant groups, including immigrants who share the same ethnic background as the national majority (i.e., a group that theoretically would further marginalize the Muslim community who are ethnic minorities).

Table 3.5. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression: Allow more immigrants into the country (by type)

	Same ethnicity as majority		**Ethnic minority**		**Poor, non-EU**	
Personal financial security	*Base*	*Full*	*Base*	*Full*	*Base*	*Full*
Struggling		.01		-.08		-.07
		(.16)		(-1.90)		(-1.83)
Comfortable		.26***		.22***		.17***
Index variables		(9.17)		(7.80)		(5.94)
Religiosity		.02***		.03***		.06***
		(2.65)		(3.79)		(6.54)
Liberal values		.15***		.26***		.26***
		(7.42)		(13.40)		(13.55)
Government satisfaction		.10***		.13***		.12***
Religious identity		(10.37)		(14.05)		(13.19)
Catholic	-.12***	-.18***	-.20***	-.27***	-.12***	-.23***
	(.03)	(-5.16)	(-6.27)	(-7.23)	(.03)	(-6.39)
Protestant	.03	-.04	-.03	-.11***	.00	-.10**
	(.04)	(-.89)	(-.90)	(-2.77)	(.04)	(.04-2.40)
Muslim	.33***	.27***	.51***	.46***	.54***	.45***
Socio-demographic controls	(.09)	(2.85)	(5.67)	(4.84)	(.09)	(4.97)
Year	.06**	.03	.30***	.24***	.29***	.24***
	(2.26)	(.89)	(10.88)	(8.82)	(10.50)	(8.64)
Female	-.02	-.02	.01	.02	.03	.03
	(-.73)	(-.83)	(.50)	(.68)	(1.16)	(.95)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.02***	-.01***
	(-6.29)	(-4.15)	(-11.72)	(-8.24)	(-13.23)	(-10.40)
Young adult (18-40)	-.25***	-.20***	-.20***	-.14***	-.18***	-.13***
	(-5.89)	(-4.71)	(-4.95)	(-3.39)	(-4.44)	(-3.17)
Education	.09***	.09***	.10***	.09***	.08***	.07***
	(25.57)	(22.73)	(26.46)	(23.10)	(22.15)	(19.00)
Native respondent	-.47***	-.44***	-.42***	-.40***	-.37***	-.35***
	(-9.44)	(-8.47)	(-8.39)	(-7.85)	(-7.94)	(-7.10)
Employed	-.08**	-.06**	-.08**	-.06**	-.10**	-.07
	(-2.49)	(-1.97)	(-2.65)	(-2.03)	(-3.18)	(.95)
Married	-.03	-.02	-.07**	-.05	-.05	-.03
	(-1.16)	(-.81)	(-2.41)	(-1.61)	(-1.83)	(-1.03)
Children at home	.04	.05	.00	.01	-.00	.01
	(1.06)	(1.19)	(.11)	(.21)	(-.03)	(.40)
Big city	.06	.05	.11***	.11***	.11***	.10***
	(1.59)	(1.34)	(3.30)	(3.12)	(3.30)	(2.84)
Village	-.03	-.04	-.08**	-.07**	-.05	-.05
	(-1.04)	(-1.12)	(-2.42)	(-2.23)	(-1.58)	(-1.53)
Constant cut 1	-2.06	-1.00	-1.12	.41	-.95	.60
Constant cut 2	-.40	.68	.69	2.27	.77	2.36
Constant cut 3	1.60	2.72	2.82	4.46	2.80	4.44
Pseudo R^2	**.03**	**.04**	**.06**	**.07**	**.07**	**.08**
Observations	**65,107**	**63,283**	**64,987**	**63,181**	**64,690**	**62,897**

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

While understanding that the factors and context for anti-immigrant sentiments remain an important debate in the growing immigration literature, it is equally important to understand around whom and what concerns these attitudes form. In an effort to shed light on the complexity of anti-immigrant sentiments, this chapter looked at the effect of social and economic factors on both opinions of immigrant contribution, and support for increased immigration across different types of immigrant groups.

These findings suggest that sentiments toward immigrants are less universally monolithic than presumed in immigration literature, both with respect to regional country-level differences and immigrant backgrounds. Specifically, urbanicity is shown to draw clear distinctions between what immigrant groups are perceived as welcome or unwelcome. In sum, these results further support the argument that immigrants should not be treated as a monolithic group in immigration research, and that this conclusion should also be applied to CEE countries, where identities and attitudes are more nuanced and varied than most immigration research allows. Although there is a regional difference in their present immigrant sentiments and support for immigration, these findings suggest that these feelings are neither incapable of change nor net of contextual factors.

Two guiding questions help to organize the findings of this chapter. First, do anti-immigrant sentiments differ when accounting for the different ways in which immigrants affect the country (i.e., their effect on the national culture vs their effect on the national economy)? These findings suggest that yes, a number of factors influence how people believe immigrants affect their country, but not all factors are important all the time. Above average personal income security (i.e., *living comfortably on household income*) has a positive effect on both outcomes, but poor personal income security does not have a negative effect in the full model. This indicates that after accounting for satisfaction for government institutions, religiosity, and

attachment to liberal values, the stress of poor income security does not significantly affect opinions about immigrant contributions to culture.

Similarly, the significant negative effect of being employed on both outcome variables disappear when accounting for government satisfaction. Given the context of immigration, these findings suggest that the level of trust and approval that people have about their government's ability to incorporate immigrant populations, address potential or real experiences with unemployment, and meet expected levels of social benefits programs strongly influence anti-immigrant sentiments.

The second main question of this chapter addresses support for increased immigration, and how these sentiments may change once respondents are pushed to think about a particular type of immigrant. Contrary to initial expectations, the support for increased immigration is not significantly improved if the immigrant group shares the same ethnic background as the national majority in either CEE or Western Europe.

Respondent urbanicity seems instead to distinguish between which immigrant types are more or less welcome: living in rural areas such as country-sides and villages have significantly adverse effects on support for immigration for those of ethnic minority backgrounds, whereas living in big cities have significantly positive effects on support for increased immigration of both ethnic minorities and poor, non-EU countries. Therefore, these findings suggest that ethnic boundaries are more salient in rural contexts compared to urban cities. These effects will be explored further in Chapter 3, where urbanicity, personal income security, and the contextual index variables will be tested on the most and least welcoming countries in the sample to see how these factors operate in opposite contexts.

Taken together, these findings urge more nuanced research in future immigration scholarship. For example, understanding how income security and different values operate in the different residential contexts would be helpful in understanding why barriers to ethnic diversity in rural contexts are less permeable. Bandelj and Finley (2016) suggest a cognitive and constructive identity approach to comparative research on CEE countries, and these findings suggest that applying such a context in combination with labor market competition when framed by different cultural contexts could reveal interesting similarities and differences across Europe.

Given the evidence that anti-immigrant sentiments results from perceptions of immigrant threat rather than substantively large immigrant groups (Eurostat 2019, Strabac and Listhaug 2008), understanding what aspects of these narratives and stereotypes are most impactful in different contexts (e.g., Hjorth 2016) can help efforts to reduce anti-immigrant sentiments and reducing the social distance between groups. Selecting more carefully on contextual and demographic factors to do comparative work between Western and CEE countries could not only be fruitful for challenging the monolithic assumptions placed on post-communist CEE countries and better understanding how immigrant sentiments develop differently in distinct contexts, but these types of comparative work can also be helpful in understanding the great range of sentiments observed in Western European countries where inclusive, multicultural ideals live can live next door to deeply xenophobic nationalism.

CHAPTER 4

Skewed Europeanization through civic integration

In the last two decades, the social and political landscapes across Europe were reshaped by economic and humanitarian crises. Conflicts in Syria resulted in an unprecedented number of refugees seeking protection in Europe and raising social and political concerns over how, and to what extent, foreign-born populations fit into the European fabric. Studies find that countries differ not only in their interpretations of what inclusion encompasses, but also who is worthy of inclusion (Thomann and Rapp 2018).

Under the umbrella of EU membership, member-states are pressed to adapt in increasingly liberal and inclusive directions, but research shows that rather than nurturing a strong convergence toward pluralism, national-level differences warp the implementation of these supranational policies to suit their agendas (e.g., Helbling and Kalkum 2018, Szelewa and Polakowski 2019). More importantly, expecting European convergence on integration policies deliberately disregards the sociopolitical differences across European countries (Goodman 2012). Countries differ in their response and implementation to EU policies (Szelewa and Polakowski 2019), and sometimes even the definition of 'implemented' are bent in order to check the necessary boxes (e.g., Poland passed EU childcare policy with unfeasible co-funding requirement to drastically limit its implementation, Łapniewska 2017). Thus, while EU policies on social programs and civic integration are negotiated and defined with a supranational scope, the implementation of these policies across member states are driven by national governments and political actors that reflect the sociopolitical interests of their respective countries.

The interaction between public sentiment and political narratives are dynamic and multifaceted. Even among its citizens, a government does not provide equal treatment or equal access to services to all groups (Frederickson 1990, Grohs et al. 2016). By the argument that vulnerable populations have more to lose by the inclusion of immigrants, the extent to which governments meet the needs of their citizens may therefore be an indicator of how supportive the people of a country are of allowing more immigrants.

Additionally, in a study that highlighted these divisions in Western Europe, Maxwell (2019) found that geographic contexts operated as a second-order manifestation of demographic and cultural mechanisms on immigrant sentiments. These mechanisms, he explains, distinguish between the highly skilled who can afford to congregate in big European cities and the less-educated manual workers who live in more affordable small towns and rural areas (Cunningham and Savage 2017, Maxwell 2019), mirroring the socio-demographic divides that identify those who have the most government-provided benefits to lose with the inclusion of immigrants. Geographic contexts, or urbanicity, could therefore be used as a practical extension of the theoretic divides in immigration literature that distinguish those who are most and least positive about immigrants in the native population, or those who theory describe as, respectively, least and most vulnerable to immigrant inclusion.

Many of these theories and current research on immigration has been limited to a small number of Western European and North American countries. Much less work has been done to test their application in new contexts of immigration such as Central/Eastern European countries (CEE), both with respect to cross-national comparisons testing established immigration theories on anti-immigrant sentiments, or geographic variation thereof. In order to evaluate and extend these arguments in new directions, the analysis in this chapter focuses on four exemplars of

European immigration that can highlight the political, demographic, and cultural contextual variations tied to anti-immigrant sentiments and support for immigration. By selecting the four countries that are most welcoming (Germany and Sweden) and least welcoming (Hungary and Poland) of immigrants in Europe, the correlations between urbanicity and sociopolitical values in the context of immigration in other member states should theoretically fall within a spectrum between these cases. This comparative case study therefore expands on the cross-national findings of the first two chapters by first carefully contrasting the sociopolitical contexts of the four countries, then examining attitudinal variations within these frameworks by asking,

RQ1. To what extent do rural/urban divides characterize attitudes on immigrants?

RQ2. Do these relationships operate differently in CEE countries compared to Western European countries, as Maxwell (2019) suggests?

Why policy matters in social analyses of national differences in the EU

The differences demonstrated by these four cases exemplify the variety that exists within the EU despite efforts to liberalize[8] immigration and civic integration policies. As the previous chapters have addressed the socioeconomic histories of these countries, the theoretical framework of this chapter focuses on how policy differences either created, emphasized, or addressed these national differences. Local political contexts matter to the extent and manner in which EU-level policies are implemented (Szelewa and Polakowski 2019), including the way in which these policies are framed to suit local political agendas. For example, policies intended to serve disadvantaged segments of the population or immigrants have been found to be ineffective in

[8] In this context, liberalized describes the process of expanding national policies and protections to include certain non-citizens, or the process of reducing barriers to naturalizing / citizenship.

meeting the needs of their target populations (Bonoli and Liechti 2018), or worse, to stoke further negative biases and public opinions about certain groups (Hernes 2020, Thomann and Rapp 2018) as a consequence of different methods of implementation.

Intervening factors do not need to be directly related with the policies to change their intended effects. As a consequence of living in urban cities (compared to rural villages) in Western Europe, native populations exhibited lower rates of social distancing and anti-immigrant sentiments. Maxwell (2019) attributed these differences to compositional rather than contextual effects, since those who self-select to live in big cities in Western Europe are often more educated than the average resident and are more likely to be joining like-minded people who abide by fewer traditional – and more modern, liberal – values. They are also more likely to have higher incomes relative to the average population, since they can afford to live in the big cities.

Similarly, intervening factors in the uneven implementation of EU policies also often reflect underlying social attitudes and biases. For example, efforts to provide childcare services across Europe to empower women in the workforce and families in disadvantaged circumstances have instead been found to mainly support middle- to upper-class families in most EU countries (Van Lancker 2013). More focused analyses found that the dissimilar implementations of these policies were not due to different opposing social or political opinions about the benefits of childcare or traditional family households, but the broader biases on who deserves access to nationally provided benefits (Pavolini and Van Lancker 2017). Switzerland, which demonstrates exceptionally firm access biases in the European context, was found to have a highly skewed distribution of childcare services that favored privileged segments of the population (Abrassart and Bonoli 2015) while childcare in Sweden was found to be evenly distributed across different social classes (Van Lancker and Ghysels 2012). Although subtle and less easy to connect to the

disparate outcomes, these country-level differences about who is included and who is deserving of national services can greatly influence the efficacy and success of imposed EU policies.

To connect these policy-based differences to social attitudes and public support for immigration, studies have found that details such as how policies are designed (Thomann and Rapp 2018) and the rhetoric used to communicate policies to the public (e.g., Kende et al. 2019) affect the lived experiences and challenges to inclusion that immigrants face. Biases informed by policy designs are not as simple as boundaries between native and immigrant populations as the 'deserving' vs. 'undeserving' groups, but a complex hierarchy appraising non-native and marginalized groups on their worthiness in relation to the native population (Thomann and Rapp 2018).

How a country frames their approach to incorporation or inclusion of non-natives and non-citizens therefore influences how these groups are perceived by natives, but also informs non-natives on how to perceive each other within the hierarchy of social power and worthiness. Understanding the relationship between changes in national policy and public attitudes and support for immigrant inclusion – or the lack thereof – is therefore not a linear relationship but the dynamic and multifaceted movement of information between public sentiments, expressed as individual actions and opinions, and the political entities that represent the interests of the national majority.

Introducing the four cases: Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden

Using findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, two countries were identified to represent the most and least pro-immigrant attitudes in the European context. These four countries were chosen in order to compare the contextual and attitudinal differences that define the extreme ends of

immigrant sentiments in Europe, and, ultimately, to see whether Western European and CEE countries are as dissimilar as immigration scholarship suggests (e.g., Maxwell 2019). The two countries on the most positive end of that spectrum are Sweden and Germany, and they are home to the largest proportion of non-native populations in Europe. The most restrictive, or least welcoming countries in Europe, were found to be Hungary and Poland (also see, Esipova et al. 2017). Compared to the European countries analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3, Hungary consistently reported the lowest rate of approval for immigrants and the lowest rate of support for increased immigration. By contrast, findings on Poland are sometimes mixed, suggesting that despite their high rates of ethnoreligious homogeneity there are some conditions under which they are welcoming of immigrants in their country.

The following section reviews sociopolitical differences that begin to illustrate how these dissimilar national contexts developed in Europe. While the focus of this analysis is on how compositional effects of urban and rural spaces in the respective countries operate, understanding what gives rise to the broader national attitudes and why, then, these urban / rural spaces may attract different segments of the national population will help to contextualize the results within their respective countries as well as the broader European landscape.

Germany and Sweden: Immigrant disadvantage in labor market despite high acceptance

While they are two of the most inclusive countries in the European context, Germany and Sweden have different approaches to the political, social, and economic ways in which they incorporate their respective immigrant populations. In terms of political inclusion, Sweden has some of the highest rates of citizenship acquisition as a result of its inclusive laws and procedures, whereas Germany, which has inclusive procedures but restrictive laws, falls

somewhere near the average of citizenship acquisition in Europe (Huddleston and Falcke 2019). Although Germany removed the ethnic requirement to its citizenship acquisition in 2000, it also developed a more robust permanent residency status as an alternative means of political inclusion to protect the integrity of its citizenship (Goodman 2012). Germany's introduction of an invigorated permanent residency coupled with its limited acceptance of dual citizenship provide their previously disenfranchised native-born non-citizens with a means for sociopolitical inclusion that does not cost them their original citizenship. While both countries offer means, resources, and clear instructions with how to proceed towards naturalization (Huddleston et al. 2015), whom they incorporate and what political status most foreigners acquire informs immigrants of their position in society and whether their new country is willing to change its national identity and status quo vis-à-vis their naturalization (Moynihan and Herd 2010).

Germany's conservative approach to immigrant inclusion also extends to its labor market and economic benefits, but the extent to which this approach benefits immigrants is difficult to tell. Job creation programs, which typically do not target immigrant populations, often benefit native groups disproportionately due to biases against immigrants at the inclusion stage (Bonoli and Liechti 2018). A higher rate of negative access bias was observed in conservative welfare states like Germany, while the Nordic social-democratic welfare states like Sweden were more inclusive.

However, more conservative welfare states like Germany have also been found to reduce the unemployment gap and influence shorter periods of unemployment in the immigrant populations (Diop-Christensen and Pavlopoulos 2016). The expansion of civic inclusion in Germany opened new opportunities for native-born non-citizens, particularly among the women (Gathmann and Keller 2017). Immigrant women in Germany are more likely to achieve higher

degrees and work in more secure, white-collar jobs than immigrant men. While the economic incorporation of immigrants in Germany is still limited, particularly for men, their approach has led to greater employment opportunities for their domestic immigrant population compared to Sweden, where immigrants and children of immigrants consistently face larger unemployment rates relative to their native peers (Diop-Christensen and Pavlopoulos 2016, Westin 2003).

In Sweden, long-term unemployment for immigrants translate into equally long periods of dependence on social assistance, which have negative associations both among natives and among the immigrants (Bergnehr 2016). Long-term unemployment rates in Sweden create segregated and underprivileged ethnic communities in suburbs (also Hårsman 2006), characterized by the continued in-flow of unemployed and welfare-dependent immigrants and out-flow of the few who find well-paying jobs (Andersson and Bråmå 2004). Among natives, negative prejudices and large shares of unemployed immigrants among a neighborhood correlate with high rates of welfare chauvinism, or the unwillingness to include those unlike one's own group in social benefits (Goldschmidt and Rydgren 2015).

Not to be outdone by their native peers, immigrants also report high rates of frustration over unemployment and the imposed stipulations for those receiving welfare assistance (Bergnehr 2016). However, receiving social benefits confer more than financial assistance or unwanted rules for continued benefits. Sweden's social benefit schemes inspired a deeper sense of belonging among immigrants (Bergnehr 2016), where their unchallenged inclusion in social assistance are seen as tangible efforts by the government to make them feel connected and cared for in their new host country. As further evidence of the emotional connections engendered by the Swedish government through social protection programs, Kogan (2007) re-framed the exceptionally high and persistent unemployment gap between native- and foreign-born job

seekers in the Swedish labor market by defining the generous social assistance program as a protection from jobs that are either unsuited, dangerous, or otherwise unwanted by immigrants. In other words, rather than being pushed into unwanted jobs in the secondary labor market, social assistance allows immigrants in Sweden to sustain their job search until they find a good and fulfilling job in the primary labor market (Kogan 2007).

Taken together, it is difficult to determine which approach to inclusion is a more beneficial and productive for immigrants in Europe. The diversity of immigrants in these societies also complicate the picture, as social and spatial distancing is experienced differently by different immigrant groups. In Germany, the social and spatial distance between Turks and their native-born descendants is greater than that between Germans and European immigrants, but not as great as between Germans and asylum seekers (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). By contrast, Turks in Sweden experience one of the highest degrees of social and spatial distance, unlike Iranian immigrants.

These differences are in large part due to the policies by which they entered the respective countries. Turks in Sweden and Germany both arrived as labor immigrants, whose permanent settlement was not anticipated by either country. Iranians arrived as political refugees and therefore, unlike Turkish labor migrants, they enjoyed greater access to resources and protections (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Thus, while immigrants experience serious disadvantages as a result of social distance and residential segregation in both countries, the German government does a better job of providing training and work-opportunities for immigrants that reduce the unemployment gap (e.g., Kalter 2011), and the Swedish government's generous social assistance (Bergnehr 2016, Kogan 2007), resources for integration (Hoehne and Michalowski 2016), and ease of citizenship acquisition (Goodman 2012) leads to

greater rates of sociopolitical integration and engenders a greater sense of national belonging. These contrasting experiences with economic independence and sociopolitical inclusion make it challenging to assess which system, if any, is better equipped to create a more positive and inclusive society for immigrants.

Hungary and Poland: Contexts defined by perceived identities of native self and foreign other

Compared to the EU countries analyzed in the previous two chapters, a number of CEE countries, including Poland, demonstrate attitudes about and support for immigrants that are comparable to many Western European countries. Additionally, the economic integration of immigrants in these countries are substantially better than those experienced by immigrants in Sweden and Germany, for example. Hungary, which has been a net immigration country since 1990 (Eurostat 2019), has one of the highest immigrant employment advantages in the labor market (Aaskoven 2020). Poland, which is still a net emigration country (Eurostat 2019), has one of the smallest gaps between native- and foreign-born employment rates in Europe. Despite these relative similarities to the Western European context, Hungary and Poland's social and political histories help to explain their high rates of anti-immigrant sentiments.

In the aftermath of World War II and, more recently, the fall of communism, Poland anchored its national identity in its Catholic faith and its war-time victimhood (Spohn et al. 2015). The Polish Catholic church, "increasingly seen as the very essence of Polishness [is] the kind of religious nationalism [that] preferred to keep Europe at a distance – to select some elements and criticize others" (Spohn et al. 2015: 49). In the present-day context, this selective resistance to the EU is expressed through semi-passive rejection of EU policies (Szelewa and Polakowski 2019). As EU benefit programs are passed to Poland for implementation, Polish

politicians do not refuse to implement the policies so much as they implement them with national caveats that render the program ineffective (Szelewa and Polakowski 2019). Therefore, the urban/rural divide becomes a powerful determinate of whether one had access to EU protections and benefits by virtue of the higher concentration of high-income people residing in the big cities who could raise the capital to overcome imposed financial barriers to government services (Szelewa and Polakowski 2019). One such example was in the implementation of EU family support services, which were made available in 13.3 percent of urban municipalities but only in 2 percent of rural municipalities.

National institutions and policies in post-communist Poland intentionally emphasize Catholicism as foundational to the Polish identity. Required religious education in polish kindergartens and public schools led to life-long stigmatization, marginalization, and imposed sense of inferiority among non-Catholic minorities in Poland (Zielinska and Zwierzdzynski 2013, Zwierzdzynski 2017). Additionally, the Polish experience is firmly grounded in its post-war identity of victimhood. As summed up by sociologist Szalo (Lyman 2015: 5), "There is a long history of victimization in our region … and now there is somebody trying to grab that status. People find it very difficult to accept that somebody might suffer more than us." Together, these sources of social cohesion create an insulating effect around the Polish identity that amplifies ethnoreligious divisions between native Poles and immigrants and socializes native-born minorities and non-Catholics with a diminished sense of belonging and worth. Thus, like the cosmopolitan effects that reduced social distance between natives and immigrants in urban cities of Western Europe, the ethnoreligious social polarization observed in Poland is compositional rather than contextual (Evans and Need 2002). Net of political or economic

insecurity and threat, social polarization is most salient along the religious divide between Catholic Poles and all other ethnic minorities.

Despite the considerable ethnoreligious division observed in Poland, findings from Chapter 2 identify Hungary as the most exclusionary and nationalist country in the EU. In direct defiance of EU policies and standards of gender equality and female inclusion in the national workforce, the current Hungarian government introduced a policy on "family mainstreaming" (Félix 2015), transforming the EU's childcare policies intended to support disadvantaged families into policies that explicitly advantaged the native Hungarian middle class. (Szikra 2014). This policy goes as far as to indefinitely exempt all families from paying national income tax if the (Hungarian) mother gives birth to four children (Comben 2019). This law was implemented in response to the falling birthrates because, as Orban succinctly explained, "we do not need [immigrant] numbers, we need Hungarian children" (Comben 2019: 2). In practice, then, this law places the burden of resisting immigration to address falling birthrates on Hungarian women and, by extension, positions women who do not perform as expected as traitors to the state.

Hungary's pathway to citizenship is one of the least favorable in the EU and further illustrates their resistance to minority inclusion. Compared to Poland and Germany, which, respectively, have four common barriers to citizenship, Hungary has nine (Huddleston et al. 2015). In this context, the challenging and opaque access to citizenship is relevant because it reflects the government's limited interest in the civic inclusion of foreigners. Their explicit refusal to make this process more accessible to Syrian refugees (European Web Site on Integration 2019) further underscores their particular hostility toward Muslim immigrants in

particular, which is greater than the average reports of anti-immigrant sentiments observed in the country (Kende et al. 2019).

With one of the highest reported rates of xenophobia in Europe (Wike et al. 2016), EU efforts to pressure Hungary to expand their policies on social and political inclusion has also recast the EU into an adversarial force whose goals are in direct opposition to Hungary's (Kende et al. 2019). Given the exceptionally small proportion of non-EU immigrants (2.1%) or refugees (1.1%) in Hungary, these findings also echo Strabac and Listhaug's (2008) observation that the importance of 'real' group conflict indicators (e.g., economic competition, national unemployment rates) are diminishing in favor of the perceived threat of nameless distant groups are leveraged by political actors in nationalist rhetoric.

Expectations of residential contexts and resistance to immigration

These four cases suggest residents of these countries experience quite different contexts of immigrant receptivity despite all belonging to the EU. Moving beyond the pooled, large-scale analyses of Chapters 2 and 3, focusing on patterns in each of these nations allows the interpretation of why and how these differing contexts may matter. The factors that tend to increase or decrease tolerance may matter differently across countries and within countries. In particular, the notion of urban/rural divides within these nations is particularly useful as a guiding framework. Though previous research (Cunningham and Savage 2017, Maxwell 2019) notes that such divides matter for mostly compositional reasons, the above review suggests that urban/rural contexts do not carry the same meaning or composition across nations. On one hand, the low resistance to civic inclusion and the successful implementation of policies that address socioeconomic inequality in social-democratic countries like Sweden may mean that urban/rural

divides are weaker than in the other contexts (Bonoli and Liechti 2018, Goodman 2012). In contrast to Maxwell's (2019) assumption that the cosmopolitan effect would not be relevant to CEE countries, the admittedly scant literature on the Polish context suggests that due to limited social services outside of big cities, high-income residents will seek out big cities where their economic advantages can be translated into government services and programs (Szelewa and Polakowski 2019). On the other hand, extensive nationalist and exclusionary rhetoric and policies may lead to more consistent views about immigration in Poland and Hungary. This would be in line with Maxwell's (2019) expectations that urban/rural divides would be weaker in CEE contexts, or otherwise operate differently than they would in Western European countries. By this argument, the more inclusive and open political frameworks observed in Sweden and Germany would be expected to increase urban/rural differences.

By an extension of these arguments, Sweden is expected to be more resistant to immigrants from poor, non-EU countries, whereas Germany, Hungary, and Poland are expected to be more resistant to ethnic minority immigrants. The expectations for Germany, Hungary, and Poland are based on the extent to which these governments have attempted to limit access to citizenship for ethnic minorities (Goodman 2012, Huddleston et al. 2015). Until recently, verifiable ethnic ties to the nation were a requirement of citizenship for all these states. By contrast, Sweden has an inclusive and easily accessible naturalization process (Goodman 2012, Huddleston et al. 2015), and a more generous welfare policy than the other three countries (Bonoli and Liechti 2018, Szelewa and Polakowski 2019). Therefore the expectation is that Sweden would be more concerned with the economic factors associated with immigration and much less concerned about ethnic factors compared to the other three countries in the sample.

The limited research on immigration in Hungary does not directly address expectations of the urban/rural divide, but contextual similarities to Poland noted in these past studies as well as the similarities in ESS data indicate that expectations for the effects of urbanicity in Hungary should be similar to Poland. Hungary's Euroskepticism and resistance to fair implementation of EU policies, coupled with their adherence to traditional gender values and salient ethnoreligious boundaries, suggest that Hungary would implement policies intended to empower gender and ethnic minorities with the same inhibitive caveats as Poland. As in Poland, Hungarians with higher than average income security would therefore be expected to live in big cities rather than in rural contexts. This expectation is supported by ESS data, which shows that native Hungarians with high income security are consistently more likely to live in big cities (like in the Polish context), and those who experience poor personal income security live in rural contexts. Therefore, whether these contexts lead to a more apparent urban/rural divide or country-level effects that are not affected by residential contexts, the effect of urbanicity in Hungary is expected to be similar to that observed in Poland.

Data: Attitudinal measures from the ESS

In order to investigate the connection between social attitudes and national policies, this chapter draws on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), a nationally representative survey that is administered in 36 European countries every two years since 2002. These data are publicly available and reliable in their consistency, meaning that they lend themselves to cross-national comparisons across time. Since these data are cross-sectional, they do not allow for causal comparisons, but are well suited to comparing changing trends over time.

Following the descriptive overview in Chapter 2 and closer analysis on the effect of time in Chapter 3, this chapter narrows its scope to comparing the two European countries that have been most welcoming to immigrants, Germany and Sweden, and those that have been least welcoming, Hungary and Poland. Data for these countries were collected in all nine waves since 2002, and therefore capture data before and after three global events that are relevant to immigration research: the largest expansion of the EU to include CEE countries[9] in 2004, the global recession in 2008, and the refugee crisis in 2015. The total sample size for this chapter is 72,083, of which Germany accounts for 25,700, Hungary 14,830, Poland 15,624, and Sweden 15,929. Respondents are predominately native to their survey country, ranging from 98.9 percent in Poland, 98.1 percent in Hungary, 90.7 percent in Germany, and 88.2 percent in Sweden. Narrowing the comparison to respondents who were native and raised by native-born parents makes a difference in the Western European countries, but not in CEE countries: the proportion of natives with native-born parents is 98.0 in Poland and 97.6 percent in Hungary, but 88.0 percent in Germany (-2.7%) and 85.8 percent in Sweden (-2.4%). This difference is explained by native-born children of immigrants, or the second generation. In 2002, the proportion of second-generation immigrants in the domestic population was 1.9 percent in Germany, 0.8 percent in Hungary, 1.5 percent in Poland, and 1.8 percent in Sweden. By 2018, these proportions changed to 3.8 percent in Germany (+1.9%), 0.5 percent in Hungary (-0.3%), 0.5 in Poland (-1.0%), and 2.8 percent in Sweden (+1.0%). While these are still relatively small proportions of full sample, immigrants are an integral part of European society, particularly in the case of these Western European countries where the second-generation has doubled since 2002. They are therefore

[9] Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, & Slovenia were officially accepted in 2002.

included in these analyses of national comparison in order to be as representative of how the national context and culture is experienced in each respective population.

Dependent variables from the ESS

There are five outcome variables of interest in this dissertation. While the first two measure attitudes toward immigrants with respect to how individuals feel about their potential impact on the country, the final three focus on how the identity of the immigrant influences attitudes of (in)tolerance. The first outcome variable addresses the economic threat by asking respondents, *Would you say it is generally bad or good for [Country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?* The second outcome variable addresses the cultural threat of immigrants by asking respondents, *Would you say that [Country's] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?* Both of these questions are asked on a scale of 0 (*Bad for the economy / Cultural life undermined*) to 10 (*Good for the economy / Cultural life is enriched*).

In the three remaining outcome variables, respondents are introduced to different immigrant types and asked the extent to which they would welcome each into the country. All questions are framed as, *To what extent do you think [Country] should allow _____ people to come and live here?* Responses are measured on a four-point scale, which have been reverse coded to range from (1) *Allow none* to (4) *Allow many to come and live here*. In the first of these three outcome variables, the immigrant group is described as *same race or ethnic group* [as national majority]. The second question refers to immigrants who are from a *different race or ethnic group* [as national majority], while the third question refers to immigrants from *poor countries outside of Europe*. With the exception of reverse-coding outcome variables 3-5, the

original scale of responses for all five outcome variables are used in order to allow for as much differentiation and specificity as possible.

Independent variables from the ESS

This chapter uses five independent variables to the effects of individual income security, context of residence, and social beliefs on attitudes about immigrants and support for immigration (for detailed description of proportions and means of these independent variables across national subsamples, see Appendix C Table A). The measure on individual financial security is taken directly from an ESS survey question that asks the respondents to *Describe how you feel about your household's income*. The responses range from (1) *Living comfortably on present income* to (4) *Finding it very difficult on present income*. Due to the low response rate for (3) *Difficult on present income* and (4) *Finding it very difficult on present income*, these two were combined. This scale was reverse coded and modified so that its application in the regression would reflect how increased financial security affects attitudes toward immigrants instead. The modified scale goes from (1) *Difficult on present income* to (3) *Living comfortably on present income*.

Context of residence is also a measure taken directly from the ESS survey, using the question *Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?* The original responses included (1) *A big city,* (2) *The suburbs or outskirts of a big city,* (3) *A town or a small city,* (4) *A country village,* and (5) *A farm or home in the countryside*. Due to the low response rate for (5) *A farm or home in the countryside*, this was combined with (4) *A country village*. Responses for (2) *The suburbs or outskirts of a big city* were also low (11.3% of the total sample), but it was not combined with another response category for two reasons. First, while only 4.1 percent of the sample in Hungary and Poland reside in suburbs, these proportions are

more substantial in Germany (13.2%) and Sweden (22.1%). Second, in these Western European subsamples, the suburbs capture unique contexts of residence that can either be important to the analysis, and, by the same logic, should not be combined with another category to avoid confounding the effects of either *Big city* or *Town*. In Germany, the suburbs are preferred by the native-born population with high income security. In Sweden, the suburbs are closely associated with the non-native population (including the second-generation) (Andersson and Bråmå 2004). These data reflect the socioeconomic and ethnic divide in Swedish residential contexts: among the average Swedish subsample, 22.1 percent reside in the suburbs, but among the non-native population this proportion increases to 30.3 percent. For these reasons, *suburbs* was kept as part of the four-point scale. The final modified scale was also reverse coded so that larger values would correspond with more population-dense contexts, or (1) *Village* to (4) *Big city*. For closer look at how income and nativity distinguish between residential contexts in these countries, see Appendix C Table B.

The three original index variables were created as composites of multiple survey questions (see Table 4.1 below) intended to capture the respondent's attachment to authoritarian values, satisfaction with government institutions, and religiosity. Attachment to authoritarian values operates on a scale of 1-6, where 1 reflects the closest attachment to authoritarian values and 6 is the furthest from authoritarian values. Because attachment to authoritarian values effectively measures the distance from authoritarianism, this variable is described as *Liberal values*. Satisfaction with government institutions is on a scale of 0-10, where 0 is the lowest satisfaction score and 10 is the highest score of satisfaction. Both of these variables were created to capture the different sociopolitical histories of CEE countries relative to the Western European context (Zubrzycki 2001, Kunovich 2009). Since these regional differences were in large part

due to ethnoreligious divisions, the final index variable was created to compare the importance of religious affiliation in each region. Religiosity is measured on a scale of 0-10, where 0 is the least religious or not religious at all, and 10 is the most religious.

Table 4.1. Variables used to create contextual index variables

Index variable	Questions used to generate index variable	Chronbach's α
Liberal values	Important to behave properly Important that government is strong and ensures safety Important to follow traditions and customs Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention Important to live in secure and safe surroundings Important to do what is told and follow rules	.7294
Satisfaction with government institutions	How satisfied with present state of economy in country How satisfied with the national government How satisfied with the way democracy works in country State of health services in country nowadays State of education in country nowadays	.8143
Religiosity	Self-reported religiosity How frequently respondent prays How frequently respondent attends religious service	.8567

Control variables from the ESS

The control variables used in this chapter are year, gender, age, marital status, education, and nativity (for a comparison of these variables of interest across the national and residential contexts, see Appendix C Table C). The first five variables (year, gender, age, marital status, education) are common control variables in all social research, whereas nativity is directly relevant to in the field of immigration. This is included in an effort to control for the effect of differences stemming from one's birth country and heritage. Year is coded to differentiate 2016 data from 2006 (0=2006, 1=2016) to capture the effect of time. Gender is coded as *female* (0=male, 1=female). Age is a continuous variable, as is education, which measures the respondent's *years of full-time education*. Marital status has been recoded into a binary variable where 1 is *legally joined* and 0 is *not joined*. Those who are coded as *legally joined* were described in the original survey question as either *legally married* or *legally registered in civil union*. Those who are *not joined* were *legally separated, legally divorced, never married or legally registered in civil union,* or they responded *widowed / civil partner died*.

In difference to the previous two chapters, *Nativity* is used here to distinguish between (1) *native respondents with native-born parents* and (0) *foreign-born respondents* or *native respondent with foreign-born parents*. While this distinction was less important in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, adjusting *Nativity* for this chapter is motivated by the intention to uncover what makes these four countries the most and least receptive to immigrants. The variable is therefore adjusted to better account for the different circumstances experienced by immigrants and their children in these countries, particularly in Western Europe.

Analytic approach

To take advantage of this narrower focus on understanding the exemplary cases on immigration and immigrant sentiments in Europe, the analyses of this chapter will build on the broad overviews provided in Chapters 2 and 3 to address the research questions of this chapter directly. In order to better understand the effects of different residential contexts in each country relative to the other independent variables, this chapter uses four regression models on each outcome variable in each national subsample: the base model (M1) includes control variables and all index variables; Model 2 (M2) tests the interaction of *Residence x Religiosity*, Model 3 (M3) tests the interaction of *Residence x Liberal values*, Model 4 (M4) tests the interaction of *Residence x Government satisfaction*. For regression models that test the unique contributions of urbanicity, personal income security, and the index variables, see Appendix C Tables D-M.

The first set of analyses look at the extent of economic and cultural threat individuals associate with immigrants (DV 1 and DV 2) using linear regression models. The second set of analyses look at where the support for increased immigration is tied to different immigrant types (DV3-5) using ordered logistic regression models in terms of proportional odds ratios. Additional comparisons of survey data include visualized descriptive comparisons to clarify (1)

how sociodemographic variables help to explain different contexts of residence and (2) how attitudes about immigrant effects on the surveyed country differ across contexts of residence.

Descriptive findings

The most recent wave of ESS data from 2018 is reported in Table 4.2 as weighted means and proportions on all variables of interest for each country, and also for the native- and foreign-born respondents in the pooled sample. The means and proportions of the pooled sample from all waves of data (2002-2018) are reported in the far-right column, beside which the change since 2002 are also reported with their respective significance results from t-tests. These data confirm some expected national differences while contradicting others. As expected, Sweden reports the highest opinion of overall immigrant contributions and Hungary reports the lowest. These countries also report the highest and lowest rates of support for increased immigration into their country for all immigrant types.

By contrast, the similarities between Germany and Poland are surprising. On average, attitudes about immigrants and support for increased immigration in Germany and Poland are the same, with Poland reporting slightly more favorable opinions about cultural contributions made by immigrants. Compared to the first wave of ESS data in 2002, opinions about immigrant contributions to the national economy have improved to the same extent as opinions about their effect on the national culture have soured (for more detailed comparison of changing opinions of immigrant contribution over time, see Appendix Figures A-B). In line with the diminished interest in cultural variegation, only support for immigrants with the same ethnic background has significantly increased since 2002. Support for allowing more immigrants from poor, non-EU countries has significantly decreased over the same period, while support for ethnic minority

immigrants remained relatively unchanged. For a visual comparison of how opinions about immigrant contribution has changed over time for each country, see Appendix C Figure A-B.

Perhaps a bigger surprise than the similarities between Germany and Poland is the similarity between native- and foreign-born attitudes. Understandably, immigrants report higher rates of satisfaction with immigrant contributions to the country, but their support for increased immigration is almost equal to the native-born population. Like native-born respondents, immigrants show a preference for ethnic majority immigrants compared to immigrants who are ethnic minorities or from poor, non-EU countries. Overall, immigrants are more similar to the native-born population than they are dissimilar, and the only variable on which they significantly differ is due to their substantially greater satisfaction with their country's government institutions.

A regional difference is only suggested in the averages reported for contextual factors and indices, specifically with respect to average personal income security, liberal values, and satisfaction with government institutions. Religiosity is an exception where, overall, there has been a downward trend in reported ties to religious beliefs and institutions since 2002. As expected, these data suggest that the changes observed in religious affiliation and beliefs is intricately tied to immigration. Significantly fewer people identify with traditionally European religions such as Catholicism and Christianity in 2018 compared to 2002, while the proportion of people in Europe who identify as Muslim have significantly increased. The Muslim population is primarily in Germany and Sweden, where they make up roughly three percent of the total population in 2018. In the whole sample, less than one fifth (18%) of foreign-born people identify as Muslim.

Urbanicity, or whether people live in urban or rural areas, also suggests a regional divide,

although this is not between big city life and villages in the countryside. Compared to Germany and Sweden, the big cities are home to a larger proportion of the Hungarian and Polish populations. Most people in all four countries are found in towns and countryside villages, but the uneven distribution suggests that there are country-specific reasons for why people choose to live in different contexts. Average levels of personal income security in each area of residence suggest that people who live in the countryside in Hungary and Poland experience slightly poorer income security, though this disadvantage is minor overall. Taken together, these data may not explain why people are drawn to different areas of residence in these countries, but the different distributions suggest that the barriers to moving between these spaces are most difficult to overcome in Poland and least challenging in Sweden. For comparison of different contextual variables across residential contexts in each country, see Appendix C Table M.

Table 4.2. Means and Proportions for all variables in analyses (2018)

	National variation				Demographic variation				Means (Δ) 2002-2018	
Outcome variables	**GER**	**SWE**	**HUN**	**POL**	**Native**	**Foreign**	**Min**	**Max**		
Immigrant good or bad effect on…										
National economy	5.2	5.6	3.7	5.1	5.1	5.7	0	10	5.1	.5***
National culture	5.9	7.0	4.9	6.3	6.0	6.4	0	10	6.0	-.6***
Allow more immigrants of…										
Same ethnic background	3.1	3.3	2.6	2.9	3.0	3.2	1	4	3.0	.1***
Different ethnic background	2.7	3.2	1.9	2.7	2.7	2.8	1	4	2.7	-.0
Poor, non-EU origin countries	2.6	3.2	1.8	2.7	2.6	2.7	1	4	2.6	-.1***
Contextual IVs and Indices										
Personal income security	2.2	2.5	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.0	1	3	2.0	.2***
Liberal values	2.8	3.1	2.5	2.3	2.7	2.6	1	6	2.7	.1***
Govt institutional satisfaction	4.9	5.8	3.9	4.2	4.6	5.7	0	10	4.7	.9***
Religiosity index	3.1	2.5	2.9	4.9	3.5	3.8	1	7	3.5	-.2***
Socio-demographic controls										
Female	51.4%	50.3%	53.3%	52.3%	51.7%	51.7%	0	1	51.7%	.7%
Age	48.4	46.7	46.5	44.8	47.0	45.5	15	102	46.9	4.4***
Education	13.0	12.7	11.9	12.0	12.7	12.1	0	34	12.6	1.6***
Married	53.4%	43.9%	49.3%	56.8%	52.7%	61.2%	0	1	53.4%	1.3%
Children living at home	46.7%	52.1%	49.2%	39.2%	45.7%	46.9%	0	1	45.7%	4.2%***
Native cultural heritage	85.8%	84.5%	97.5%	97.9%	97.6%	0%	0	1	89.8%	-2.7***
Foreign cultural heritage	14.2%	15.5%	2.5%	2.1%	2.4%	100%	0	1	10.2%	2.7***
By self-identified denomination…										
Catholic	26.6%	1.3%	34.0%	89.6%	43.7%	25.7%	0	1	42.2%	-3.3%***
Protestant	28.4%	25.8%	12.1%	.4%	19.7%	15.5%	0	1	19.5%	-.2%
Muslim	3.3%	2.6%	.0%	.0%	.7%	18.4%	0	1	2.1%	.9%***
Other religion(s)	3.3%	2.8%	1.3%	1.0%	1.9%	9.5%	0	1	2.5%	.2%

By area of residence…										
Living in big city	16.9%	13.8%	28.0%	21.7%	18.2%	24.6%	0	1	18.7%	-1.6%**
Living in suburbs	13.0%	23.4%	4.2%	3.9%	10.6%	12.6%	0	1	10.7%	1.6%**
Living in town	37.9%	34.2%	34.6%	31.5%	35.1%	42.6%	0	1	35.7%	1.8%**
Living in village	32.1%	28.6%	33.3%	42.9%	36.1%	20.2%	0	1	34.9%	1.8%**
Income security by area of residence…										
Living in big city	2.3	2.6	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.2	1	3	2.03	.23***
Living in suburbs	2.4	2.7	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.2	1	3	2.29	.23***
Living in town	2.3	2.6	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.1	1	3	2.06	.16***
Living in village	2.4	2.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.3	1	3	1.99	.21***

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Regression findings: Attitudes about immigrant contribution

The regression results on the first two outcome variables, attitudes about immigrant contribution to the national economy and national culture, are reported in Tables 4.3-4.6. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the findings for regressions on economic contribution, while Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the findings for regressions on cultural contribution. Each table includes the four models tested in each national subsample, such that Tables 4.3 and 4.5 report results on Germany and Sweden and Tables 4.4 and 4.6 report results on Hungary and Poland.

Unlike the analyses in Chapter 3, which provided broad comparisons of each variable of interest, these four models focus on the theoretically motivated interaction effects between context of residence and the three index variables. Personal income security is not included as an interaction, because (as the descriptive data in Table 4.2 suggest) this interaction had no significant or substantive effects. In all four tables, M1 is the base model, which including all contexts of residence and index variables as individual variables, M2 tests the interaction of *Residence x Religiosity*, M3 tests the interaction of *Residence x Liberal values*, and M4 tests the interaction of *Residence x Government satisfaction*. As the focus of this chapter, these variables will be the main aspect of this analysis; sociodemographic controls are included in the models

and presented in the tables for clarity, but as they are not central to addressing the research questions, their part in the discussion will be limited.

Additionally, the effect of suburbs will be judged differently compared to other contexts of residence. As explained previously, the suburbs are not easily comparable across national due to their contextual and sociodemographic differences. In Germany, suburbs are predominately home to high income native-born people, whereas in Sweden, the suburbs are associated with immigrants, immigrant communities, and socioeconomic disadvantaged groups. In the CEE countries, however, suburbs are not a common place to live; out of the full sample, 4.1 percent of Hungarians and an equal proportion of Poles live in the suburbs compared to 13.2 percent of Germans and 22.1 percent of Swedes. Therefore, the suburbs will be considered carefully in the Swedish and German contexts, and less so in the Hungarian and Polish contexts. For regression models that also test the unique contributions of urbanicity and personal income security, see Appendix C Tables N-X.

The results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate that for all countries except Sweden, there are contexts in which the expected *Big city* effect is evident. For Germany, living in a big city or in the suburbs has a significant positive effect on opinions about immigrant contributions to the national economy, except in model 2 (M2) and the interaction effect of residence with religiosity. This difference is at least in part because its inclusion reveals that religion is less important in suburbs. This interaction (residence x religiosity) has a similar but opposite effect in Hungary, where religiosity is found to be significantly more important in big cities and that the overall effect of big cities on opinions about immigrant contribution to the national economy is significantly negative. This is also observed in model M3, which reports the greater and positive

significance of liberal values in cities, though the overall effect of living in big cities is not strictly significant (p<.52).

By contrast, when accounting for the interaction between residence and government satisfaction (M4) on Hungary, government satisfaction is less important in big cities but the overall effect of living in a big city is significantly positive. For Poland, on the other hand, living in the big city is only significant in the base model (M1), suggesting that the while none of the interaction effects are significant, their inclusion illustrates that the big city effect in the base model is not due to variations in religiosity, liberal values, or government satisfaction. Sweden stands out from the other national contexts because, overall, the context of residence does not have a meaningful effect on opinions of immigrant contributions to the national economy. In the first two models (M1 and M2), all contexts of residence have significantly positive effects on the outcome variable, and in the final models (M3 and M4), no residential context has a significant effect. The respective effects of living in a big city compared to a village in M1 and M2 is substantively bigger than the effects of living in a town or the suburbs, but by virtue of them all being positive and significant these results indicate a country effect rather than a residential effect. In other words, simply living in Sweden has a significantly positive effect on attitudes about immigrant contributions to the economy – where in Sweden one happens to live is therefore of little relevance.

Table 4.3. Beta coefficients of linear regression - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national economy, by country

			GERMANY				SWEDEN	
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	0.05***	0.08***	0.05***	0.05***	0.08***	0.14***	0.08***	0.08***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)
Liberal values	0.34***	0.34***	0.35***	0.34***	0.33***	0.33***	0.32***	0.33***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)
Government satisfaction	0.41***	0.41***	0.41***	0.45***	0.42***	0.42***	0.42***	0.40***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		-0.03				-0.06		
		(.02)				(.03)		
Suburb		-0.06**				-0.05		

		(.03)				(.04)		
Big city		-0.06				-0.18***		
		(.03)				(.04)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			-0.06				-0.01	
			(.05)				(.06)	
Suburb			-0.02				-0.05	
			(.07)				(.07)	
Big city			0.09				0.14	
			(.07)				(.08)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				-0.04				0.04
				(.02)				(.04)
Suburb				-0.11***				0.04
				(.03)				(.04)
Big city				-0.08***				-0.01
				(.03)				(.05)
Context of residence								
Town	0.05	0.22	0.14	0.22	0.15***	0.29***	0.19	-0.06
	(.04)	(.15)	(.09)	(.13)	(.05)	(.10)	(.20)	(.22)
Suburb	0.16***	0.21	0.36***	0.71***	0.25***	0.38***	0.39	0.04
	(.05)	(.21)	(.11)	(.17)	(.05)	(.11)	(.22)	(.25)
Big city	0.38***	0.12	0.56***	0.79***	0.32***	0.74***	-0.13	0.37
	(.05)	(.20)	(.11)	(.17)	(.06)	(.12)	(.26)	(.29)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	-0.26***	-0.26***	-0.27***	-0.26***	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Comfortable on income	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Female	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.18***	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Age	0.01***	0.00***	0.00***	0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	-0.30***	-0.31***	-0.31***	-0.31***	-0.26***	-0.27***	-0.26***	-0.26***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Married	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years of education	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
R^2	.19	.19	.19	.19	.17	.17	.18	.18
Constant	-35.84	-35.58	-35.53	-35.79	-30.89	-31.02	-30.46	-30.61
Observation	22,080	22,080	22,080	22,080	14,120	14,120	14,120	14,120

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Table 4.4. Beta coefficients of linear regression - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national economy, by country

			HUNGARY				**POLAND**	
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	0.07***	0.02	0.07***	0.07***	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.08***	-0.09***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)
Liberal values	0.22***	0.22***	0.12**	0.22***	0.04	0.04	-0.03	0.04
	(.03)	(.03)	(.06)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)
Government satisfaction	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.31***	0.29***	0.29***	0.29***	0.27***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		0.05				0.01		
		(.04)				(.04)		
Suburb		-0.04				0.09		
		(.08)				(.07)		
Big city		0.13***				0.04		
		(.04)				(.04)		
Residence x Liberal values								

Town			0.14				0.13	
			(.08)				(.08)	
Suburb			-0.16				0.07	
			(.15)				(.15)	
Big city			0.18**				0.12	
			(.08)				(.08)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				-0.01				0.03
				(.03)				(.03)
Suburb				0.06				0.05
				(.07)				(.07)
Big city				-0.12***				0.03
				(.04)				(.04)
Context of residence								
Town	0.05	-0.12	-0.30	0.07	0.14***	0.07	-0.16	-0.00
	(.06)	(.13)	(.20)	(.15)	(.05)	(.20)	(.18)	(.15)
Suburb	0.08	0.18	0.51	-0.17	-0.09	-0.51	-0.24	-0.31
	(.12)	(.24)	(.41)	(.33)	(.10)	(.34)	(.36)	(.31)
Big city	0.09	-0.28**	-0.35	0.57***	0.16***	-0.05	-0.11	0.03
	(.07)	(.14)	(.22)	(.16)	(.06)	(.19)	(.19)	(.17)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07	-0.06	-0.31***	-0.31***	-0.30***	-0.30***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Comfortable on income	0.30***	0.30***	0.30***	0.32***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Female	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.25***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	-1.01***	-0.99***	-1.00***	-1.00***	-0.25	-0.25	-0.26	-0.25
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Married	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Years of education	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
R^2	.10	.10	.10	.10	.09	.09	.09	.09
Constant	77.44	77.20	76.73	76.63	10.29	10.53	10.76	10.35
Observation	11,368	11,368	11,368	11,368	12,813	12,813	12,813	12,813

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the regression results on opinions about immigrant contribution to the national culture for the country subsamples. Unlike the regressions on attitudes on immigrant economic contributions, the context of residence is not as striking in these models. For Germany, living almost anywhere outside of countryside villages has a significantly positive effect on opinions about immigrant contribution to culture. The exceptions are apparent in M2 and M4, where the positive effect of living in a town is no longer significant.

While the interaction effects are not significant in these models, the interaction of residence and *Liberal values* indicate that liberal values are less important in German suburbs. In

Hungary, M3 and M4 report the only significant interaction effects. Liberal values are more important in big cities in Hungary (M3) although the overall effect of living in big cities are significantly negative in the same model. Government satisfaction is instead significantly less important in the big city, but accounting for this interaction reveals a significantly positive *Big city* effect. As observed in the models on opinions of immigrant contribution to the national economy, the effects of residence have opposite effects in Sweden and Poland. In Sweden, the contexts of residence do not explain any variation as they are either all significant and positive (M1, M2, M4) or not significant at all (M3). By contrast, the contexts of residence in Poland are positive in the base model (M1) but not significant in all other models[10]. Taken together, these two results suggest that the effects observed in Sweden and Poland are both indicative of national effects rather than residential effects.

Table 4.5. Beta coefficients of linear regression - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national culture, by country

	GERMANY				SWEDEN			
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	0.05***	0.04**	0.05***	0.05***	0.04***	0.09***	0.04***	0.04***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)
Liberal values	0.41***	0.41***	0.47***	0.41***	0.33***	0.33***	0.34***	0.33***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)
Government satisfaction	0.31***	0.31***	0.31***	0.33***	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***	0.39***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		0.02				-0.05		
		(.03)				(.03)		
Suburb		-0.05				-0.06		
		(.03)				(.04)		
Big city		0.03				-0.12***		
		(.03)				(.04)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			-0.10				-0.07	
			(.05)				(.06)	
Suburb			-0.15**				0.00	
			(.07)				(.07)	
Big city			-0.00				0.09	
			(.07)				(.08)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				-0.01				-0.08**
				(.03)				(.04)
Suburb				-0.07				-0.13***
				(.04)				(.04)
Big city				-0.05				-0.13***

[10] As explained earlier in the Data section, suburbs effects in Hungary and Poland will be interpreted more loosely due to the low representation of respondents from suburbs (4%, respectively, compared to 13% in Germany and 22% in Sweden).

				(.03)				(.05)
Context of residence								
Town	0.14***	0.08	0.43***	0.18	0.12**	0.25**	0.32	0.57**
	(.04)	(.09)	(.16)	(.14)	(.05)	(.10)	(.21)	(.22)
Suburb	0.35***	0.50***	0.78***	0.69***	0.15***	0.30***	0.15	0.88***
	(.06)	(.12)	(.22)	(.19)	(.05)	(.11)	(.23)	(.26)
Big city	0.58***	0.48***	0.58***	0.82***	0.33***	0.61***	0.02	1.06***
	(.05)	(.11)	(.20)	(.17)	(.06)	(.12)	(.26)	(.28)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	-0.21***	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.21***	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Comfortable on income	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***	0.13***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Female	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***	0.47***	0.47***	0.47***	0.47***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	-0.40***	-0.40***	-0.40***	-0.41***	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Married	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years of education	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
R^2	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16
Constant	81.49	81.36	81.52	81.40	44.59	44.34	44.65	43.97
Observation	22,309	22,309	22,309	22,309	14,334	14,334	14,334	14,334

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Table 4.6. Beta coefficients of linear regression - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national culture, by country

			HUNGARY					**POLAND**
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	0.06***	0.03	0.06***	0.06***	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)
Liberal values	0.12***	0.12***	-0.00	0.12***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)
Government satisfaction	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.20***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.19***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		0.01				-0.02		
		(.04)				(.04)		
Suburb		-0.02				0.16**		
		(.09)				(.06)		
Big city		0.07				0.03		
		(.04)				(.04)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			0.09				0.11	
			(.09)				(.07)	
Suburb			-0.34				-0.20	
			(.23)				(.15)	
Big city			0.38***				-0.01	
			(.09)				(.08)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				0.00				-0.03
				(.03)				(.03)
Suburb				0.08				0.05
				(.08)				(.07)
Big city				-0.10***				0.00
				(.04)				(.03)
Context of residence								
Town	0.06	0.02	-0.15	0.05	0.15***	0.22	-0.11	0.26
	(.06)	(.13)	(.22)	(.16)	(.05)	(.19)	(.18)	(.15)

Suburb	0.05	0.11	0.94	-0.24	0.18	-0.58	0.66	-0.04
	(.14)	(.30)	(.61)	(.40)	(.09)	(.31)	(.36)	(.30)
Big city	-0.04	-0.24	-0.96***	0.35**	0.28***	0.12	0.31	0.28
	(.07)	(.14)	(.23)	(.17)	(.05)	(.18)	(.19)	(.16)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.15***	-0.16***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Comfortable on income	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.14**	0.14**	0.14**	0.14**
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Female	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	0.08**	0.08**	0.08**	0.08**
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	-0.95***	-0.95***	-0.94***	-0.95***	-0.25	-0.25	-0.26	-0.25
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)
Married	-0.11**	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years of education	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
R^2	.07	.07	.07	.07	.08	.08	.08	.08
Constant	122.40	122.20	120.56	121.96	111.37	111.83	111.43	111.31
Observation	11,248	11,248	11,248	11,248	12,886	12,886	12,886	12,886

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Regression findings: Support for increased immigration of different immigrant groups

Tables 4.7-4.12 report on the regression results on support for increased immigration in each country by the different immigrant types. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 report the results on allowing more immigrants who have the same ethnic background as the national majority (i.e., ethnic majority immigrant), Tables 4.9 and 4.10 report the results on allowing more immigrants from a different ethnic background as the national majority (i.e., ethnic minority immigrant), and Tables 4.11 and 4.12 report the results for allowing more immigrants from poor, non-EU countries. As with previous tables in this chapter, the first in each of these sets of tables report on results for Germany and Sweden (Tables 4.7, 4.9, and 4.11) and the second in each set report the results for Hungary and Poland (Tables 4.8, 4.10, and 4.12).

The same factors are tested in models M1 through M4, such that M1 is the base model, M2 tests the interaction of residence and religiosity, M3 tests the interaction of residence and liberal values, and M4 tests the interaction of residence and government satisfaction. As with the previous models, he residential context of the suburbs will be evaluated differently for each

region; in Germany, suburbs are expected to reflect high-income native attitudes, and in Sweden, they are expected to be more in line with immigrant communities. Tables report odds ratios to enable a clearer representation of the size of effects (Long and Freese 2014). Odds ratios greater than one are positive relationships and odds less than one are negative relationships.

The results in Table 4.7-4.8 press further to untangle the question of which types of immigrants are welcomed in these countries, and from where this support comes. The *Big city* effect is observed in Germany in the base model and in the interaction between residence and religiosity (M1 and M2), suggesting that people who live in big cities are significantly more likely to be supportive of allowing more immigrants into the country who share their national majority's ethnicity. When controlling for the interaction between residence and government satisfaction (M4), only the residential context of the suburbs is significantly more likely to support increased immigration.

The extension of the *Big city* effect into the suburbs is seen to a greater extent in Sweden, where in all but M3 (*Residence x Liberal values*) those who live in the big cities and in the suburbs are significantly more likely to support allowing more ethnic majority immigrants into the country. Given the prevalence of immigrant and second-generation communities in Swedish suburbs and the descriptive findings reported in Table 4.2, the high support among immigrants for increased immigration of ethnic majority immigrants is in line with expectations. While the interactions did not reveal additional information about the different contexts of residence in Germany and Sweden, the results in Table 4.8 suggest that liberal values and government satisfaction in CEE have some influence on the contexts of residence.

In Hungary, religiosity is significantly more likely to be important in the big city (M2) despite the overall negative effect of big cities that suggest that people who live in big cities are

significantly less likely to support increased immigration of ethnic majority immigrants. The interaction in M4 indicates that government satisfaction is less important in the big city, but this does not lead to an overall significant effect of living in the big city. The only context in which support for allowing more ethnic majority immigrants is significantly positive is in Towns when the model accounts for the interaction effect with *Liberal values* (M3). In this model, liberal values are significantly less important in *Towns*, but the overall residential effect is positive.

The models on Poland also underscore the importance of religiosity in the big city, but in contrast to Hungary, the only significant contexts in Poland are those where the results are positive. In the base model (M1), living in the big city and living in towns makes people more likely to support increased immigration of ethnic majority immigrants, and when accounting for the interaction effect with *Government satisfaction* (M4), people who live in Polish towns are more likely to support increased immigration of ethnic majority immigrants. In other words, while people who lived in big cities in Hungary were found to be less likely to support increased immigration (M1 and M2, the latter of which also revealed significant negative effects of *Towns*), the three significant residential contexts in the models on Poland were all indicative of increased likelihood of supporting ethnic majority immigrants.

Considering the other contextual variables included in the models, Hungary is also the only context in which higher personal income security (i.e., living comfortably on one's household income) does not have a significant effect on any of the four models, while poor personal income security consistently has a significant negative effect; in Poland, on the other hand, both levels of personal income security have the expected effect in all models, where poor income security makes one significantly less likely to support increased immigration of ethnic majority immigrants and high income security makes one significantly more likely to do so.

Another notable difference between the CEE countries is that, under specific conditions, *Liberal values* appear to have some significant effects in Hungary (M3), whereas *Liberal values* have no significant effect in any model on Poland. Finally, *Religiosity*, which is significant in all models for both CEE countries, has a consistent and significantly positive effect in Hungary but a consistently and significantly negative effect in Poland.

Table 4.7. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression - Allow many immigrants of same ethnicity as the national majority, by country

	GERMANY				SWEDEN			
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	1.39***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.35***	1.11***	1.08***	1.08***
	(.06)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)
Liberal values	1.25***	1.39***	1.40***	1.39***	1.22***	1.34***	1.32***	1.34***
	(.02)	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)	(.03)	(.04)	(.07)	(.04)
Government satisfaction	1.09***	1.25***	1.25***	1.24***	1.08***	1.22***	1.22***	1.25***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.01)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		1.00				.99		
		(.02)				(.04)		
Suburb		.98				.97		
		(.02)				(.03)		
Big city		.99				.89		
		(.02)				(.03)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			.99				.96	
			(.03)				(.07)	
Suburb			.95				1.06	
			(.05)				(.06)	
Big city			1.07				1.14	
			(.06)				(.10)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				1.02				1.00
				(.03)				(.04)
Suburb				.97				.92
				(.02)				(.05)
Big city				1.01				.94
				(.04)				(.05)
Context of residence								
Town	.95	.95	.98	.87	1.11**	1.13	1.25	1.12
	(.04)	(.08)	(.08)	(.15)	(.05)	(.09)	(.27)	(.28)
Suburb	1.14	1.21	1.32	1.33**	1.15***	1.24**	.95	1.89**
	(.09)	(.14)	(.25)	(.16)	(.03)	(.09)	(.18)	(.54)
Big city	1.31***	1.34**	1.08	1.24	1.37***	1.83***	.90	1.99**
	(.05)	(.13)	(.20)	(.23)	(.06)	(.16)	(.27)	(.55)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	.77***	.77***	.77***	.77***	.98	.98	.99	.99
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Comfortable on income	1.33***	1.33***	1.33***	1.33***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Female	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.22***	1.22***	1.22***	1.22***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Age	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	.99**	.99***	.99***	.99***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	0.75**	0.75**	0.75**	0.75**	1.17**	1.17**	1.17	1.17
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.10)
Married	1.12***	1.12***	1.12***	1.12***	1.08**	1.08**	1.08**	1.08**

	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years of education	1.12***	1.12***	1.12***	1.12***	1.11***	1.11***	1.11***	1.11***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Constant cut 1	111.64	111.64	111.60	111.56				
Constant cut 2	113.65	113.65	113.61	113.56				
Constant cut 3	116.14	116.14	116.09	116.05				
Pseudo R^2	.08	.08	.08	.08	.06	.06	.06	.06
Observation	22,294	22,294	22,294	22,294	14,253	14,253	14,253	14,253

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Table 4.8. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression - Allow many immigrants of same ethnicity as the national majority, by country

				HUNGARY				**POLAND**
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	1.13***	1.08**	1.13***	1.13***	.94***	.90***	.94***	.94***
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)
Liberal values	1.04	1.04	1.13**	1.04	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)
Government satisfaction	1.05**	1.05**	1.05**	1.11***	1.09**	1.09**	1.09**	1.09**
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		1.05				1.07		
		(.04)				(.04)		
Suburb		1.02				1.10		
		(.05)				(.09)		
Big city		1.10**				1.07**		
		(.04)				(.02)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			.80**				1.00	
			(.06)				(.06)	
Suburb			.80**				.94	
			(.07)				(.08)	
Big city			1.01				.99	
			(.05)				(.07)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				.94				.98
				(.03)				(.02)
Suburb				.95				1.03
				(.06)				(.06)
Big city				.88**				1.02
				(.05)				(.03)
Context of residence								
Town	.89	.77***	1.55**	1.14	1.16**	.84	1.15	1.28**
	(.08)	(.05)	(.31)	(.18)	(.06)	(.20)	(.16)	(.15)
Suburb	.92	.84	1.63	1.12	1.28	.80	1.47	1.16
	(.09)	(.16)	(.41)	(.34)	(.16)	(.34)	(.38)	(.25)
Big city	.75**	.57***	.74	1.23	1.28***	.91	1.33	1.16
	(.09)	(.09)	(.15)	(.20)	(.07)	(.09)	(.29)	(.13)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	.83***	.83***	.83***	.84***	.83***	.83***	.83***	.83***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Comfortable on income	1.13	1.13	1.13	1.04	1.25***	1.25***	1.25***	1.24***
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.04)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	.99	.99	.99	.99	.98	.98	.98	.98
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Female	.85**	.85**	.85**	.85**	1.04	1.05	1.05	1.05
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Age	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)
Nativity	.49***	.49***	.50***	.49***	.80	.79**	.80	.80
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Married	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years of education	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)

Constant cut 1	-18.35	-18.09	-17.81	-17.87	-50.87	-51.22	-50.85	-50.66
Constant cut 2	-16.62	-16.36	-16.08	-16.14	-48.94	-49.29	-48.92	-48.73
Constant cut 3	-15.26	-15.00	-14.72	-14.78	-46.61	-46.97	-46.60	-46.41
Pseudo R^2	.02	.02	.02	.02	.03	.03	.03	.03
Observation	11,623	11,623	11,623	11,623	13,381	13,381	13,381	13,381

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

The results from Tables 4.9 and 4.10 report the findings on support for increased immigration of ethnic minority immigrants, or immigrants who have a different ethnic background relative to the national majority. For Germany the expected *Big city* effect again expands to the suburbs (for all models except M3, where only *Suburbs* have significantly positive effect on the odds of supporting more immigration). In Sweden, people who live in the big cities and in the suburbs are also more likely to support increased immigration, but the contexts of residence have less significance overall across the Swedish models compared to Germany. The only interaction effects that were significant in these Western European countries were *Government satisfaction* in German suburbs and *Religiosity* in Swedish cities, where both interactions had significantly less important in their respective contexts.

An interesting take-away from the interaction effect observed in Swedish big cities is that, compared to the base model (M1), the only models that report a residential effect in the Swedish context are M2, controlling for the interaction of residence and religiosity reveals a significant positive effect for those living in big cities, and M4, where controlling for the interaction with Government satisfaction reveals a positive and significant effect of living in the suburbs. Given the demographics that are more likely to live in these residential contexts, these findings suggest that controlling for the interaction of residence and religiosity underscore the expected *Big city* effect, but that controlling for the interaction effect of residence and government satisfaction is more meaningful to observing effects in residential contexts that are defined by non-native and underprivileged communities.

The findings in Poland and Hungary are less predictable and, arguably, even more interesting: when accounting for the interaction of *Residence x Government satisfaction,* the residential effects of *Towns* and *Big cities* in Hungary are significantly positive, suggesting that living in towns and in big cities in Hungary makes people significantly more likely to support increased immigration of ethnic minority immigrants. More so than in the context of ethnic majority immigrants (Tables 4.7-4.8), these models on the CEE countries also distinguish the Hungarian models through the significance of *Liberal values,* which are significant in all models on allowing more ethnic minority immigrants, but are not significant in any models on the same outcome variable in Poland. Perhaps the absence of significance for *Liberal values* and the consistent and significantly negative influence of religion in Poland can partly explain why no context of residence is significant across the four models.

For Poland, the significant and positive effect of living in the big city observed in the base model is the only residential effect on support for allowing more ethnic minority immigrants. On a final note on these models, the effects of personal income security again distinguish the Hungarian and Polish contexts; in Poland, the effects of income security are in line with expectations (as they also are in Germany), but in Hungary, neither poor or high income security have significant effects on support for increased immigration in the four models. This suggests that for Hungarians, their support for allowing more ethnic minority immigrants into the country has no bearing on their personal income security, whereas those who experience high personal income security are significantly more likely support allowing more ethnic majority immigrants into the country compared to those who are coping or struggling on their current household income.

By contrast, personal income security has consistently had predictable effects on Poland and Germany have (i.e., poor income security significantly lowers the odds of supporting increased immigration and higher income security significantly increases the odds of supporting increased immigration) and no negative effects in Sweden, where those who are higher income security are significantly more likely to support increased immigration, but experiencing poor income security does not significantly affect support for increased immigration.

Table 4.9. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression - Allow many immigrants of minority ethnicity, by country

	GERMANY				SWEDEN			
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	1.07***	1.06***	1.07***	1.07***	1.08***	1.10***	1.08***	1.08***
	(.01)	(.04)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Liberal values	1.55***	1.55***	1.57***	1.55***	1.41***	1.40***	1.37***	1.41***
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.03)	(.03)	(.07)	(.02)
Government satisfaction	1.23***	1.23***	1.23***	1.23***	1.23***	1.23***	1.23***	1.26***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		1.03				1.00		
		(.02)				(.03)		
Suburb		.98				.98		
		(.01)				(.03)		
Big city		1.01				.88**		
		(.03)				(.04)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			.96				.96	
			(.04)				(.07)	
Suburb			.93				1.05	
			(.07)				(.07)	
Big city			1.06				1.21	
			(.09)				(.13)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				1.02				.99
				(.02)				(.04)
Suburb				.96**				.93
				(.01)				(.04)
Big city				.98				.98
				(.04)				(.06)
Context of residence								
Town	1.02	.92	1.14	.91	1.13	1.13	1.27	1.16
	(.03)	(.06)	(.13)	(.11)	(.08)	(.08)	(.31)	(.32)
Suburb	1.22***	1.29***	1.52**	1.47***	1.15***	1.20	.98	1.78**
	(.06)	(.09)	(.32)	(.10)	(.03)	(.12)	(.19)	(.47)
Big city	1.46***	1.41**	1.23	1.63**	1.30***	1.74***	.71	1.43
	(.08)	(.16)	(.28)	(.31)	(.07)	(.19)	(.27)	(.46)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	.78***	.78***	.78***	.78***	1.07	1.06	1.07	1.06
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Comfortable on income	1.17***	1.17***	1.17***	1.17***	1.18***	1.18***	1.18***	1.18***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	1.04**	1.04**	1.04**	1.04**	1.02**	1.02**	1.02**	1.02**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Female	1.09**	1.09**	1.09**	1.09**	1.33***	1.33***	1.33***	1.33***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	.83	.83	.83	.83	1.17**	1.16**	1.16**	1.17**
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.07)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)

Married	1.05**	1.05**	1.05**	1.05**	1.15***	1.15***	1.15***	1.15***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Years of education	1.11***	1.11***	1.11***	1.11***	1.10***	1.10***	1.10***	1.10***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Constant cut 1	88.59	88.67	88.35	88.83	46.09	46.20	45.97	46.15
Constant cut 2	90.69	90.77	90.63	90.93	48.32	48.42	48.20	48.37
Constant cut 3	93.13	93.21	93.07	93.37	51.21	51.32	51.09	51.26
Pseudo R^2	.07	.08	.08	.08	.06	.06	.06	.06
Observation	22,242	22,242	22,242	22,242	14,266	14,266	14,266	14,266

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Table 4.10. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression - Allow many immigrants of minority ethnicity, by country

	HUNGARY				POLAND			
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	1.06**	1.00	1.06**	1.06**	.93***	.91***	.93***	.93***
	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)
Liberal values	1.15***	1.16***	1.19***	1.15***	1.03	1.04	1.02	1.03
	(.05)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)
Government satisfaction	1.14***	1.14***	1.14***	1.19***	1.08**	1.08**	1.08**	1.08**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		1.06				1.03		
		(.03)				(.03)		
Suburb		1.08				1.08		
		(.09)				(.08)		
Big city		1.13***				1.02		
		(.04)				(.02)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			.91				1.04	
			(.06)				(.06)	
Suburb			.72**				1.01	
			(.10)				(.09)	
Big city			1.06				1.00	
			(.07)				(.06)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				.94**				1.00
				(.02)				(.03)
Suburb				.99				1.09
				(.03)				(.08)
Big city				.92				1.01
				(.05)				(.03)
Context of residence								
Town	1.00	.83	1.25	1.24**	1.13	.98	1.03	1.14
	(.03)	(.08)	(.19)	(.10)	(.07)	(.19)	(.14)	(.14)
Suburb	1.19	.95	2.79**	1.23	1.27	.85	1.25	.89
	(.22)	(.35)	(1.12)	(.29)	(.19)	(.31)	(.38)	(.26)
Big city	1.13	.78	.99	1.59**	1.21**	1.07	1.22	1.16
	(.12)	(.11)	(.20)	(.33)	(.10)	(.09)	(.25)	(.20)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	.92	.91	.91	.92	.83***	.83***	.83***	.83***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Comfortable on income	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.13	1.16**	1.16**	1.16**	1.16**
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	.97	.97	.97	.97	.96	.96	.96	.96
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Female	.90	.90	.90	.90	1.13***	1.13***	1.13***	1.12***
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	0.55***	0.55***	0.55***	0.55***	.88	.88	.88	.88
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Married	.92	.92	.92	.92	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Years of education	1.10***	1.10***	1.10***	1.10***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)

Constant cut 1	-55.95	-55.80	-54.79	-55.79	-76.17	-76.48	-76.22	-76.15
Constant cut 2	-53.66	-53.51	-52.50	-53.50	-74.26	-74.57	-74.31	-74.24
Constant cut 3	-52.09	-51.93	-50.92	-51.93	-72.10	-72.41	-72.15	-72.08
Pseudo R^2	.03	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04
Observation	11,621	11,621	11,621	11,621	13,338	13,338	13,338	13,338

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

The results in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 reflect the support for allowing more immigrants from poor, non-EU countries. The residential effects are observed in Germany and in Sweden as with ethnic minorities: in Germany, those who live in the big cities and in suburbs are significantly more likely than those who live in villages to support increased immigration from poor, non-EU countries, while in Sweden, those who live in big cities and suburbs are more likely to support increased immigration in the base model and in the model that controls for interaction effects with *Religiosity*. Religiosity is reported to be less important in German suburbs and in Swedish big cities in their respective models (M2), but the overall effects of these residential contexts are significant and positive on the odds of allowing more immigrants from poor, non-EU countries.

Results from Table 4.12 point to further importance of religiosity in these models, though in the CEE context it underscores the difference in attitudes between ethnic minority immigrants and immigrants from poor, non-EU countries. In difference to the consistently significant and negative effect of religiosity on the odds of supporting increased immigration of ethnic minority immigrants in Poland, religiosity has no significant effect on the odds of allowing more poor, non-EU immigrants. In contrast to Hungary, where the three index variables predominately have significant and positive effects on the odds of allowing more poor, non-EU immigrants into the country, models on Poland report that only *Government satisfaction* has a significant effect.

Residential context has no noticeably significant effect on the odds of allowing more immigrants from poor, non-EU countries into Poland; the only observed residential effect is

reported in the base model, where living in the big city in Poland instead of a countryside village significantly increases the odds of supporting increased immigration for immigrants from poor, non-EU countries. Despite the consistently significant and positive effects of index variables in Hungary, residential effects appear equally unimportant in Hungary as in Poland: the only significant residential effect is reported in M4, where living in the big city instead of in a village significantly increases the odds of supporting increased immigration for immigrants from poor, non-EU countries. Personal income security continues to tell an interesting story in the Hungarian context.

Recalling that poor income security significantly lowered the odds of allowing ethnic majority immigrants but that high income security made no significant difference, and that income security had no effect on the odds of supporting increased immigration of ethnic minority immigrants, it is interesting to see that high income security increases the odds of supporting immigration of poor, non-EU immigrants. First, these results underscore the existing resistance to ethnic diversification in Hungary (Kende et al. 2019, Wike et al. 2016), and second, in the absence of a cultural threat, these results suggest that immigrants may face less social resistance in Hungary. In other words, immigrants who share the Hungarian ethnicity are only significantly resisted by those who experience personal financial insecurity, and immigrants who are defined by their economic disadvantages are generally resisted by all Hungarians, but, in difference to ethnic minorities, the barrier for poor, non-EU immigrants face can be overcome by improving the income security of native Hungarians. This is contrary to the results from the other three countries where the odds of supporting increased immigration were not affected by personal income security: in Sweden, there is no negative effect of poor income security for any

immigrant group, while in Germany and Poland personal income security has the expected effects on the odds of supporting increased immigration for all immigrant groups.

Table 4.11. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression - Allow many immigrants from poor, non-EU countries, by country

	GERMANY				SWEDEN			
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.08***	1.13***	1.08***	1.08***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(1.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)
Liberal values	1.44***	1.44***	1.45***	1.44***	1.35***	1.35***	1.32***	1.13**
	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.03)	(.03)	(.06)	(.04)
Government satisfaction	1.18***	1.18***	1.18***	1.20***	1.20***	1.20***	1.20***	1.23***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.30)	(.05)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		1.03				.94		
		(.03)				(.03)		
Suburb		.97**				.95		
		(.02)				(.03)		
Big city		.98				.87**		
		(.03)				(.04)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			.95				.98	
			(.05)				(.06)	
Suburb			.96				1.03	
			(.09)				(.06)	
Big city			1.08				1.20	
			(.11)				(.11)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				1.00				.98
				(.03)				(.05)
Suburb				.93				.93
				(.03)				(.04)
Big city				.96				.99
				(.04)				(.06)
Context of residence								
Town	.97	.88	1.11	.99	1.05	1.23**	1.11	1.20
	(.04)	(.10)	(.19)	(.16)	(.07)	(.09)	(.22)	(.37)
Suburb	1.14**	1.25***	1.27	1.62***	1.05**	1.19**	.95	1.64
	(.06)	(.09)	(.33)	(.24)	(.02)	(.10)	(.16)	(.42)
Big city	1.32***	1.40**	1.04	1.62**	1.17**	1.61***	.65	1.24
	(.07)	(.17)	(.30)	(.33)	(.06)	(.15)	(.23)	(.40)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	.83**	.83**	.83**	.83**	1.08	1.07	1.08	1.07
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Comfortable on income	1.14***	1.14***	1.14***	1.14***	1.13**	1.13**	1.13**	1.13**
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Female	1.15***	1.14***	1.15***	1.15***	1.42***	1.42***	1.42***	1.42***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	.87	.87	.87	.87	1.23***	1.22***	1.23***	1.23***
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Married	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.11***	1.11***	1.11***	1.11***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years of education	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Constant cut 1	46.09	46.20	45.97	46.15	15.94	16.26	15.65	16.09
Constant cut 2	48.32	48.42	48.20	48.37	18.03	18.35	17.73	18.18
Constant cut 3	51.21	51.32	51.09	51.26	20.73	21.05	20.43	20.88
Pseudo R^2	.06	.06	.06	.06	.05	.05	.05	.05
Observation	22,240	22,240	22,240	22,240	14,236	14,236	14,236	14,236

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Table 4.12. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression - Allow many immigrants from poor, non-EU countries, by country

	HUNGARY				POLAND			
Index variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
Religiosity	1.05**	1.01	1.05**	1.05**	.97	.94	.97	.97
	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.02)
Liberal values	1.15**	1.15**	1.17**	1.15**	1.00	1.00	.96	1.00
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)
Government satisfaction	1.17***	1.17***	1.17***	1.23***	1.07**	1.07**	1.07**	1.07**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Residence x Religiosity								
Town		1.05				1.04		
		(.03)				(.04)		
Suburb		.97				1.08		
		(.06)				(.10)		
Big city		1.08**				1.05		
		(.04)				(.03)		
Residence x Liberal values								
Town			.92				1.08	
			(.07)				(.08)	
Suburb			.84				1.15	
			(.16)				(.15)	
Big city			1.08				1.04	
			(.11)				(.07)	
Residence x Government satisfaction								
Town				.93				.99
				(.04)				(.03)
Suburb				1.00				1.02
				(.06)				(.09)
Big city				.90				1.03
				(.05)				(.03)
Context of residence								
Town	.98	.85	1.21	1.30	1.09	.88	.91	1.14
	(.07)	(.08)	(.17)	(.25)	(.05)	(.20)	(.16)	(.15)
Suburb	1.30	1.38	2.00	1.31	1.06	.72	.77	.97
	(.21)	(.39)	(.87)	(.43)	(.16)	(.32)	(.31)	(.32)
Big city	1.13	.89	.93	1.68**	1.14**	.91	1.05	1.01
	(.10)	(.09)	(.25)	(.38)	(.07)	(.13)	(.22)	(.18)
Personal income security								
Struggling on income	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.02	.86***	.86***	.86***	.86***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Comfortable on income	1.14**	1.14***	1.14***	1.15***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Socio-demographic controls								
Year	.94**	.94**	.94**	.94**	.96	.96	.96	.96
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Female	.98	.98	.98	.98	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Nativity	.57***	.57***	.57***	.57***	.82**	.82**	.82**	.83**
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Married	.95	.95	.95	.95	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Years of education	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Constant cut 1	73.83	73.93	73.67	73.95	-116.21	-116.33	-115.47	-116.02
Constant cut 2	75.80	75.90	75.64	75.92	-113.92	-114.05	-113.19	-113.73
Constant cut 3	78.07	78.17	77.91	78.19	-112.44	-112.56	-111.70	-112.25
Pseudo R^2	.04	.04	.04	.04	.03	.03	.03	.03
Observation	11,492	11,492	11,492	11,492	13,325	13,325	13,325	13,325

Robust standard errors (clustered by year) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

In an effort to better understand the underlying reasons why European contexts differ on matters of immigrant incorporation and inclusion to the extent that these four countries do, this chapter examined the urban-rural divide with a narrower but more diverse sample than in Maxwell's (2019) to re-test its effect in the most and least inclusive European countries. The results of the narrowed sample and the specificity in outcome variables indicate that there is more nuance to the compositional cosmopolitan effect on immigrant attitudes.

Two take-aways stand out from these results and against the context of Maxwell's earlier article. First, cosmopolitan effects are not universal and are still subject to the type of immigrant and the question asked – in this case, asking about opinions of immigrant contribution compared to support for increased immigration. Second, cosmopolitan effects were already determined to be expressions of underlying social and demographic inequality, and these results underscore the importance of the effects of national policies and political alignments on how cosmopolitan effects are manifested. Nordic countries like Sweden, which have been more successful and intentional in designing integration policies and government programs that productively support the disadvantaged (Bonoli and Liechti 2018), for example, foster a national context in which people experience lower rates of economic, educational, and political marginalization than in the other countries. The more selective sample therefore illustrates the importance of accounting for case selection to avoid confounding the results with underlying differences in how a state frames social and civic inclusion through their policies and programs.

Results from Sweden and Poland on feelings about immigrant contributions to the national economy and culture suggest that, there, the compositional effect is not limited to the residential context but to national composition. In other words, residential context has no significant bearing on the extent to which a person in Sweden is positive about immigrant

contributions, and likewise, residential context has no mediating effect on the negative attitudes about immigrant contributions in Poland. In Germany, there was a consistent cosmopolitan effect in the *Big city* and in the *Suburbs*, which in part is explained by the higher proportion of high-income native-born Germans in suburbs.

Personal income history also stood out in interesting ways for each country. In Sweden, low income security did not have any bearing on any of the outcome variables, while in Poland and Germany, personal income security consistently had the expected outcome where those with poor income security were more hesitant in their support for immigrants and immigration, and those with higher income security were more optimistic and supportive.

Results from Hungary stood out on every outcome variable, and overall contributed to the most interesting finding in this chapter. With respect to economic contribution of immigrants, poor income security had no effect but those with higher income security were more optimistic, suggesting that experiencing poor income security did not make one less supportive of immigrants and immigration. With respect to the cultural effects of immigrants, however, income security had no significant effect in either case, meaning that the (negative) opinion of immigrant contributions to the Hungarian culture was mediated by the presence of economic security, or alternatively, it was not influenced by economic threats.

In the context of support for increased immigration, personal income security further underscored the significance of ethnic divisions in Hungary. For immigrants who share the Hungarian majority's ethnic background, no factor – including personal income security – significantly affected the already higher support (relative to other immigrant groups). Similarly, low support for the cultural contributions of immigrants and allowing more ethnic minorities was not affected by either poor or high personal income security, meaning that these results are a

result of living in Hungary rather than individual circumstances. By contrast, immigrants from poor, non-EU countries were significantly more likely to be welcomed by those with higher income security (and they suffered no significant negative effect from those of poor income security). Together these results suggest that the overall low rate of support for immigrants and immigration in Hungary are tied to economic disadvantages, as those who feel more financially secure are more open to immigrants – provided the immigrants are not ethnic minorities. More detailed survey data would be needed to test the extent to which attitudes differ toward specifically Muslim immigrants as opposed to general perceptions of ethnic minorities.

In addition to these findings, Hungary also distinguishes itself from Poland in ways that were unexpected, given Poland's compositional and attitudinal similarities to Germany. First, across all outcome variables except for support for allowing more immigrants of same ethnicity, results on Hungary reported a positive and consistently significant effect of *Liberal values*, a measure of how distant one is from authoritarian values. While *Liberal values* was significant across all models on all outcome variables in the Western European countries, it was not significant on any outcome variable for Poland. Perhaps it is because of their significant attachment to more liberal values compared to Poland that, in some contexts, Hungary was significantly more positive about immigrant contributions and more supportive of increased immigration for immigrants from poor, non-EU countries.

This translates into three important findings for Hungary. First, these results agree with previous findings that the cultural barrier to inclusion is less penetrable in the Hungarian context than perceived economic challenges of poor, non-EU immigrants (Kende et al. 2019, Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Second, the higher support for immigrants and immigration were consistently observed in the context of big cities in models that controlled for the interaction of *Residence x*

Government satisfaction, which at once agrees with Maxwell's (2019) findings, but also demonstrates that the assumption that such effects would not be observed in the CEE context was unfounded.

Thirdly, finally, and perhaps most importantly: understanding that the policies and actions of the government are counter to multicultural and liberalizing ideas advanced by the EU allows for a clearer interpretation of why the cosmopolitan effect was not only evident in models controlling for *Residence x Government satisfaction*, but also why (in difference to Germany, e.g.) the overall significant effects were tied to lower rates of government satisfaction. This illustrates the reverse effect of Kende et al.'s (2019) finding that present-day Hungarian political and national identity is positioned in counterpoint to EU goals and policies. In other words, Hungarian respondents who feel that the work of government institutions is less important to how they feel about immigrant contributions or whether they support increased immigration, are effectively the same Hungarian people who do not agree with the governments xenophobic and Euroskeptic agenda.

In sum, the findings of this chapter suggest that comparisons between Western European and CEE countries are no less reasonable than comparing multiple Western European countries. No evidence here suggests that the difference between the European experience and CEE countries are any greater than the difference between the European experience and the Nordic social-welfare states – and no scholar would think to exclude the Nordic states from the rest of Western Europe on the grounds that they are, politically and socially, too different. Poland is as exceptional here as Sweden, and Hungary perhaps as exclusionary and resistant to immigration as Germany would be with only 35 percent of its national GDP *per capita*[11].

[11] Eurostat data (2019), GDP *per capita* in 2010 Euros: Germany €35,860, Hungary €12,560, or ~35% of Germany's GDP.

The findings of this chapter are in line with Maxwell's (2019) findings of cosmopolitan effects in big Western European cities, but that these effects are more nuanced than binary interpretation of greater support or less support relative to rural areas. More importantly, the work of this chapter uniquely demonstrates that these effects can exist outside of the Western European context. Future research on immigration and new directions in work in immigration theory should therefore make an effort to include CEE countries in their analyses to in an effort to put aside the blinders that limit our concept of Europe to the same handful of countries immigration literature has examined over the past several decades.

CHAPTER 5

Concluding take-aways on the cost of inclusion

The representation of Western European and CEE countries through these findings depict a collective of varied and dynamic sociopolitical landscapes. Together, these chapters reflect on different aspects of the broader story of European modernization as seen through its experience with immigration. The first substantive chapter paints the landscape by comparing measures of socioeconomic change experienced over time and across all countries in the sample. Within this comparative context, Chapter 3 examines attitudinal variations and biases in an effort to untangle the extent to which European people differentiate between immigrants, in what ways these groups are advantaged or disadvantaged by their associated narratives, and for whom – and in what regional context – these biases are most salient. The final substantial chapter examines the contributing effect of local contexts, and the extent to which the compositional factors in European cities, towns, suburbs, and villages influence their resistance or support for immigrants. As a sum greater than its parts, these analyses present a wide-ranging and nuanced examination of how real or perceived consequences of immigration have affected change in European attitudes, conceptions of nationhood, and broader contextual and social values.

From these findings, the biggest take-away is the importance of perception and how perceptions interact with social, economic, and political inclusion. First, perceptions of nationhood underlie social boundaries of inclusion, and thereby determine who can be included, the extent to which they can be included, and how contextual factors help to identify one's position within the broader society. Second, this research supports previous findings that state perceptions about foreigners, which both inform and interact with concepts of nationhood and

inclusion, are not founded in quantifiable measures or data-driven claims. The novel approach of this research to disaggregate the foreign 'other' and their effect on a country can therefore leverage mass attitudinal data to understand what underpins social resistance to immigrants, and how these exclusionary boundaries are framed. Understanding the nature and motivation behind public perceptions toward immigrants and other vulnerable populations is the first step toward enacting meaningful social, political, or economic change. In practical terms, this means that national (or supranational) laws that do not take social boundaries and perceptions into account are liable to fail through the simple, day-to-day actions of average people abiding by the norms and expectations of their shared culture.

Examining these questions in both Western European and CEE countries made it clear that while they are both important to concepts and measures of inclusion in both regions, there seems to be difference in how these boundaries are enforced. Findings from this dissertation identify authoritarianism and the backlash against inclusive, supranational policies as an underlying explanation for the regional differences. Western European countries, which have a longer history incorporating non-native populations and a greater presence of minority communities, are less likely to resist inclusion of immigrants at the national level. Because of this, Western European people are more likely to be supportive of immigration than CEE people, and their governments are more likely to have resources in place to facilitate their political inclusion. As these findings indicate, however, this does not necessarily mean that it is easier for immigrants to find inclusion in Western Europe – the battleground has simply shifted from contesting the physical presence of immigrants to *the way in which* they are incorporated into the national context and identity. To reiterate a previous example of this observed in the German

context, a Turkish immigrant is well received and highly regarded as a mechanic, but not as, for example, a university professor (Kalter 2011).

Perceptions about immigrants and non-native populations thus inform the extent and context of inclusion and remain a barrier for immigrants vis-à-vis their educational and employment opportunities, acceptable residential spaces, and their day to day interactions with native peers. While the limited opportunities and inclusion of immigrants in Western European countries is not a new argument, by distinguishing between different immigrant groups and opinions about their contributions, this research helps to identify what types of barriers are most salient in a given country and in the experience of which immigrant communities. One of the most important contributions this research makes to our understanding immigrant experiences in Western Europe is that positive attitudes and perceptions of immigrants (i.e., social acceptance) and their growing opportunities for political inclusion are not enough to translate into economic inclusion and independence as evidenced by the vast gap between the economic opportunities between the native and immigrant populations.

By contrast, findings from CEE countries indicate that the contention for immigrant inclusion is more literal in that the physical presence of immigrants is still contested. Not only is average support for increased immigration lower in CEE countries compared to countries in Western Europe, their opinion of immigrant contributions is on average also substantially lower. Explaining these attitudes, however, is confounded by the very low (and sometimes diminishing) number of immigrants in these countries and their relative economic inclusion. Immigrants in CEE countries did not only report a greater sense of personal income security in 2018 compared to 2002, but their average reported personal income security has surpassed the averages reported by the native-born population in CEE. Immigrants in these countries also experience the smallest

unemployment gap compared to their native counterparts, which begs the question of why countries with such a limited and economically successful immigrant population would express such negative attitudes about immigrants.

Results from these chapters support two possible explanations. First, the limited experience that CEE countries have with immigration and folding diverse populations into their society in a positive and productive way. These countries simply have not logistically had the need to develop extensive social and institutional resources for immigrant incorporation like Western European countries have. Second, extrapolating from the findings of Chapter 4, these negative perceptions are associated with the authoritarian governments establishing themselves in opposition to the EU agenda. While the number of immigrants and refugees in CEE countries did not increase much as a result of the refugee crisis of 2015, that moment in history highlights a clear shift in the political discourse around immigrants as it presented nationalist political parties with a clear opportunity to re-frame public attitudes.

Importantly, a shared aspect of the populist rhetoric perpetuated by these political figures is that they were explicitly in opposition to the EU efforts to absorb the refugee population. Through this political re-positioning and the ripe opportunity to exploit public fears of overwhelming numbers of immigrants, these political parties not only established themselves as the protective force dedicated to keeping immigrants at bay, but they depict the EU as a hostile political threat intent on changing their way of life. The extent to which each argument uniquely contributes to negative attitudes toward immigrants and what, if any, mediating factors are present is difficult to tell, but based on these findings and the limited research on immigration in CEE, it was the discourse around the refugee crisis rather than the refugees themselves that

allowed political leaders to manufacture perceptions of a hostile world eager to profit at their respective country's expense.

In sum, these findings suggest that immigrants experience the cost of inclusion regardless of where they live in Europe. The extent to which the public perception of immigrants is real or manufactured does not change the effect it has on the lived experiences of immigrants, since perceptions are enough to fuel inequalities in all aspects of immigrant inclusion and the opportunities available to them.

While research on CEE countries remains limited, studies from Western Europe show that the context of residence (Maxwell 2019), disadvantage developing in segregated ethnic neighborhoods in traditional receiving countries (Koopmans 2010), and divergent economic opportunities between immigrants and their native peers are neither recent nor shocking (Diop-Christensen and Pavlopoulos 2016). Efforts by the EU to address these inequalities are passed in broad enough terms to allow national governments to implement policies as they see fit, but this approach has been ineffective (Abrassart and Bonoli 2015, Szelewa and Polakowski 2019, Van Lancker 2013) and even damaging (Hernes 2018, Thomann and Rapp 2018) to the groups they intended to help in part because they do not explicitly address subjective factors such as mass attitudes and public perception.

Limitations on the scope and specificity of these chapters are attributed to the availability and clarity of ESS and Eurostat data. Neither source provided data for all years of the study, nor consistent waves of data for each year of data collection. ESS data does not survey all 36 countries every year. With respect to Chapter 4, a language barrier that severely limited the possibility of confirming the presence, absence, or details of national laws and policies against the MIPEX report (Huddleston et al. 2015) and European Web Site on Integration (2019).

Furthermore, neither ESS nor Eurostat data allowed for more granular analysis of immigrants. Demographic data (e.g., age, marital status, religion, level of education), language skills, and context of reception were not made clear by the ESS. As a consequence of the greater resources and skills necessary to reach these more distant countries, the immigrants who reach Sweden and Norway are not the same immigrants that arrive in Italy and Greece. Access to these types of data is therefore important for two reasons: first, they inform our understanding of what factors are important to facilitating immigrant integration, and second, they also allow us to contextualize the national perceptions with which the native population views immigrants. Immigrant sentiments in countries such as Norway and Ireland would therefore be expected to be more positive than attitudes expressed in border countries and controlling for these factors could offer greater nuance into what aspect of their diversity best accounts for positive or negative native attitudes.

Additionally, the disconnected nature of Eurobank variables made it difficult to identify which were best suited to use in combination or whether comparison groups were available. It was not clear whether long-term visas included granted refugee cases or not, and the total number of submitted visa applications were not available to further clarify each government's selection process (and selectivity) in granting long-term visas. This latter limitation therefore does not allow for a fair estimate of how skewed these national preferences for first, second, and third priority countries are. In theory, it is possible for the United Kingdom to receive the greatest number of long-term visa applications from China, India and the United States every year for the past 16 years. If that were the case, then their consistent preference for their former colonies is less to do with national preferences but a proportional allocation of visas to submitted

visa applications. In the absence of such a comparison measure, however, best judgement was applied in the interpretation of these data.

Multiple language barriers prevented efforts to supplement the limited research in CEE countries on immigration and immigration policy. Limited available research more broadly was another theoretical and methodological limitation of this study. Due to the relatively small number of research articles on immigration published in CEE contexts, citations for CEE contexts and previous research are, at times, outdated. On a secondary note about language barriers, one European language was helpful in identifying a final potential limitation in ESS data. Comparing the Swedish and the English language survey questionnaires reveals a clear difference in how the outcome variables were framed. For example, the survey question which in English asks, *To what extent do you think [country] should allow ____ people to come and live here?* includes the consideration of skin color in the Swedish questionnaire: *To what extent do you think that [Sweden] should allow people of the same skin color or ethnic heritage as the Swedish majority to come and live here?* The same component is included in the ethnic minority question. No changes were observed in the other three outcome variables.

In conclusion, these findings suggest that future studies incorporate factors that allow for a greater extent of variation, nuance, and specificity in research on immigration and national identities in Western European and CEE countries. Economic factors and the context of residence stood out in these analyses but understanding how these variables interact in different countries can better inform our understanding of how national contexts differ. For example, Maxwell's (2019) argument about greater acceptance for immigrants in big cities as a consequence of higher education and income was more applicable to Hungary and Poland than to Germany and Sweden (Szelewa and Polakowski 2019).

Comparing these contexts further through mapping or ethnographic research would also add a third layer of analysis to the urban context by capturing the increasingly important factor of social distance. Such an analysis would better determine the extent of residential segregation in European countries in the context of individual measures of economic vulnerability (e.g., employment opportunities, relative over- or under-qualification for job) or community level measures (e.g., proportion of unemployed people in an ethnic space, changing rate of risk of poverty).

Understanding how these contexts affect the lived experience of immigrants is difficult to ascertain without qualitative data. Exploring the different experiences of immigrants in these contexts through qualitative and mixed methods are key to understanding how economic vulnerability compares in Western European and CEE countries. How do social and residential segregation affect the economic independence of immigrant communities? Do immigrants in CEE experience an economic advantage in their day-to-day lives as these data suggest? Are CEE contexts, where income security for immigrants is improving, conducive to greater satisfaction and optimism among immigrant communities, and how are these different from the satisfaction reported among immigrants in Western Europe? In other words, where in the European context is the cost of inclusion highest?

The analyses and discussions in these empirical chapters relate the story of European modernization through its experience with immigration. While the first substantive chapter provides the foundational descriptive regional contexts that compare socioeconomic change experienced over time and across countries. Within this context, the subsequent chapter examines attitudinal variations and biases across Europe more closely to untangle the extent to which social biases motivate the preferences European people express for different immigrant

groups and different immigrant contributions. The final empirical chapter tests the contributing effect of residential contexts and how compositional factors in these spaces influence resistance or support for immigrants. These chapters offer an expansive and nuanced examination of how real or perceived consequences of immigration affected European attitudes, conceptions of nationhood, and broader contextual and social values. Immigration is found to inspire different sentiments across and within regions, wherein different factors rise to the fore as meaningful explanatory variables depending on the sample, local and national geographic context, and variety accounted for across all aspects of respondent identity and perceptions.

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APPENDIX A. Additional tables and figures for Chapter 2

Appendix A Table A. ESS Data: Sample size of each country for every participating year

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	Total
Western Europe										
Austria	2,257	2,256	2,405				1,795	2,010	2,499	13,222
Belgium	1,899	1,778	1,797	1,760	1,704	1,869	1,769	1,766	1,767	16,109
Denmark	1,506	1,487	1,505	1,610	1,576	1,650	1,502			10,836
Finland	2,000	2,022	1,896	2,195	1,878	2,197	2,087	1,925	1,755	17,955
France	1,503	1,806	1,986	2,073	1,727	1,968	1,917	2,070	2,010	17,060
Germany	2,919	2,870	2,916	2,751	3,031	2,958	3,045	2,852	2,358	25,700
Ireland	2,046	2,286	1,800	1,764	2,576	2,628	2,390	2,757	2,216	20,463
Italy	1,206					960		2,626	2,745	7,537
Netherlands	2,364	1,881	1,889	1,778	1,829	1,845	1,917	1,681	1,673	16,857
Norway	2,036	1,760	1,750	1,549	1,548	1,624	1,436	1,545	1,406	14,654
Portugal	1,511	2,052	2,222	2,367	2,150	2,151	1,265	1,270	1,055	16,043
Spain	1,728	1,663	1,876	2,576	1,885	1,889	1,925	1,958	1,668	17,168
Sweden	1,999	1,948	1,927	1,830	1,497	1,847	1,791	1,551	1,539	15,929
Switzerland	2,039	2,140	1,804	1,819	1,506	1,493	1,532	1,525	1,542	15,400
United Kingdom	2,052	1,897	2,394	2,352	2,422	2,286	2,264	1,959	2,204	19,830
Central and Eastern Europe										
Bulgaria			1,400	2,230	2,434	2,260			2,198	10,522
Estonia		1,989	1,517	1,661	1,793	2,380	2,051	2,019	1,904	15,314
Czechia	1,360	3,025		2,018	2,386	2,009	2,148	2,269	2,398	17,613
Hungary	1,685	1,498	1,518	1,544	1,561	2,014	1,698	1,614	1,698	14,830
Poland	2,110	1,716	1,721	1,619	1,751	1,898	1,615	1,694	1,500	15,624
Slovenia	1,519	1,442	1,476	1,286	1,403	1,257	1,224	1,307	1,318	12,232
Slovakia		1,512	1,766	1,810	1,856	1,847			1,083	9,874
Cyprus			995	1,215	1,083	1,116			781	5,190
Total Sample	**35,739**	**39,028**	**38,560**	**39,807**	**39,596**	**42,146**	**35,371**	**36,398**	**39,317**	**345,962**

Appendix A Table B. Interitem Correlation (Covariance) and Cronbach's Alpha

Item	Observation	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Avg. interim covariance	Alpha
Same ethnicity	335,605	+	0.6630	0.5945	1.8342	0.8257
Diff. ethnicity	335,307	+	0.7448	0.6877	1.7629	0.8154
Poor, non-EU	333,455	+	0.7118	0.6469	1.7782	0.8185
Economy	331,430	+	0.8384	0.6965	1.1611	0.7862
Culture	331,796	+	0.8463	0.7051	1.1290	0.7867
Quality of life	331,073	+	0.8503	0.7279	1.1674	0.7734
Test scale					**1.4714**	**0.8316**

Appendix A Table C. Principle component factor analysis for all outcome variables

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.84994	2.93811	0.6417	0.6417
Factor 2	0.91183	0.52684	0.1520	0.7936
Factor 3	0.38449	0.03066	0.0642	0.8578
Factor 4	0.35433	0.04336	0.0591	0.9168
Factor 5	0.31097	0.12301	0.0518	0.9687
Factor 6	0.18796	.	0.0313	1.0000

Appendix A Table D. Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Same ethnicity	0.7764	0.3972
Diff. ethnicity	0.8582	0.2636
Poor, non-EU	0.8228	0.3230
Economy	0.7762	0.3976
Culture	0.7777	0.3952
Quality of life	0.7915	0.3735

Appendix A Table E. Countries prioritized for visa allocation by each country since 2008

Country	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Western Europe											
Austria	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Serbia	Syria	Syria	Syria	Afghanistan
	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	BiH	Serbia	Serbia	Afghanistan	Syria
	BiH	Russia	Russia	Russia	BiH	BiH	Syria	BiH	BiH	Serbia	Serbia
Belgium	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Syria	Syria	Morocco
	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	India	India	Syria	Morocco	Morocco	Turkey
	India	DRC	DRC	USA	USA	USA	USA	India	Iraq	India	DRC
Denmark	China	Ukraine	India	Ukraine	USA	USA	Syria	Syria	Syria	USA	India
	Ukraine	Philippines	USA	Philippines	India	India	USA	USA	India	India	USA
	USA	USA	Philippines	USA	China	China	India	India	USA	Ukraine	Ukraine
Finland	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Iraq	Iraq	Russia
	China	China	India	India	China	India	India	China	Russia	Russia	Iraq
	India	India	Somalia	China	India	China	China	India	Afghanistan	Syria	India
France	Morocco	Algeria	Algeria	Morocco	Algeria	Algeria	Morocco	Algeria	Algeria	Algeria	Morocco
	Algeria	Morocco	Morocco	Algeria	Morocco	Morocco	Algeria	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Algeria
	China	China	China	China	China	China	China	China	China	Tunisia	Tunisia
Germany	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
	China	China	China	USA	China	China	Turkey	Turkey	Iraq	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
	USA	USA	USA	China	USA	USA	China	India	Turkey	Iraq	Iraq
Ireland	Brazil	USA	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil
	USA	Brazil	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	India	USA	USA	India
	India	India	China	China	India	India	India	USA	India	India	USA
Italy	Morocco	China	Morocco	Morocco	China	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Nigeria	Nigeria	Albania
	Albania	Morocco	China	China	Morocco	China	China	Albania	Morocco	Albania	Morocco
	USA	Albania	Ukraine	Albania	Albania	Albania	Albania	China	Albania	Morocco	Nigeria
Netherlands	China	China	China	China	China	China	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	India
	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	USA	USA	India	India	India	India	India	China
	USA	USA	USA	India	India	USA	China	China	China	China	Syria
Norway	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Eritrea	Syria	Syria	India
	Russia	Russia	Eritrea	Somalia	Somalia	Eritrea	India	Philippines	Eritrea	India	Philippines
	Somalia	Eritrea	Somalia	Eritrea	India	Somalia	Eritrea	India	Philippines	Eritrea	Syria
Portugal	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil
	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	China	China	China	China	Nepal
	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau	China	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde	India
Spain	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco	Morocco
	Colombia	Bolivia	Bolivia	Bolivia	Bolivia	China	China	China	China	Colombia	Colombia
	Ecuador	Colombia	Colombia	Colombia	Colombia	Colombia	Colombia	Colombia	Colombia	China	Venezuela
Sweden	Iraq	Thailand	Thailand	Iraq	Thailand	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
	Thailand	Iraq	Somalia	Thailand	Somalia	Somalia	Eritrea	Eritrea	Eritrea	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
	China	Somalia	China	China	Syria	Thailand	India	Thailand	India	India	India
Switzerland					USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA
					India	India	Kosovo	India	India	India	India
					China	China	China	China	China	China	China

United Kingdom	USA	India	USA	USA	*USA*	India	USA	USA	USA	China	China
	India	USA	India	India	India	USA	China	China	China	USA	India
	China	China	China	China	China	Philippines	India	India	India	India	USA
Central & Eastern Europe											
	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey
Bulgaria	Russia	Russia	Russia	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Russia	Russia	Russia
	Iraq	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine
	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine
Estonia	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia
	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	USA	Belarus	Belarus
	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine
Czechia	Vietnam	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia
	Russia	Vietnam	Vietnam	USA	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam
	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	China	China	China	China	China	Ukraine	Ukraine
Hungary	China	China	USA	China	USA	USA	USA	Ukraine	Ukraine	China	China
	Serbia	USA	China	USA	Ukraine	Brazil	Russia	USA	USA	Serbia	Serbia
	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine
Poland	Russia	Russia	China	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus	Belarus
	Vietnam	Belarus	Belarus	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Moldova	Turkey
	BiH	Kosovo	BiH	BiH	BiH	BiH	BiH	BiH	BiH	BiH	BiH
Slovenia	Serbia	BiH	Serbia	Serbia	Croatia	Serbia	Kosovo	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia
	Macedonia	Serbia	Macedonia	Croatia	Serbia	Kosovo	Serbia	Kosovo	Kosovo	Kosovo	Kosovo
	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine	Ukraine
Slovakia	Vietnam	Serbia	Vietnam	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia	Syria	Syria	Serbia
	Serbia	S Korea	Serbia	S Korea	S Korea	S Korea	Russia	Syria	Russia	Vietnam	Russia
	Philippines	Vietnam	Vietnam	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Russia	India	India	India
Cyprus	Vietnam	Philippines	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Russia	Russia	Russia	Syria	Russia	Russia	Russia
	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Russia	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	Philippines	Syria	Nepal	Syria

Color coding scheme: Conflict in origin country; Neighbor (shares a border); Colonial ties. *In cases of overlap*: Conflict in origin country was prioritized first, then Neighbor over Colonial ties.

Source: Data – Eurostat: Residence permits (migr_res); Areas of conflict identified by reports from Council on Foreign Relations and data from their Global Conflict Tracker; supplemental information from Human Rights Watch in cases where no official conflict is identified but civil unrest is dire (e.g., DRC).

Note: Countries separated by small bodies of water (e.g., Morocco and Spain) identified as neighbors. Increased tension in parts of Russia and Balkans (e.g., Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia) are observed but not identified as critical by above sources. Macedonia here refers to the country of North Macedonia; BiH is short for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Appendix A Figure A. Changing opinions about immigrants and immigration, per country (2002-2018)




in France
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
in France
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Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


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
in Germany
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Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


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
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
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
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Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


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
in Norway
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Same ethnicity
Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


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
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Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


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
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Same ethnicity
Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


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
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Same ethnicity
Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU













Central and Eastern European Countries






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
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Same ethnicity
Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


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
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2015
2020
Year
Same ethnicity
Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


in Hungary
10
5
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Year
Ntl Economy
Ntl Culture


in Hungary
4
3
2
1
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Year
Same ethnicity
Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU


in Poland
10
5
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Year
Ntl Economy
Ntl Culture


in Poland
4
3
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2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Year
Same ethnicity
Ethnic minorities
Poor, non-EU





Not Western or CEE





APPENDIX B. Additional tables and figures for Chapter 3

Appendix B Table A. Sample size and proportion of native-born respondent per country (2006 and 2016)

Country	2006		2016		Pooled	
Western Europe	**Sample (N)**	**Native-born (%)**	**Sample (N)**	**Native-born (%)**	**Sample (N)**	**Native-born (%)**
Austria	2,405	93	2,010	90	4,415	92
Belgium	1,798	92	1,766	85	3,564	88
Finland	1,896	97	1,925	85	3,821	97
France	1,986	90	2,070	96	4,056	90
Germany	2,916	92	2,852	90	5,768	91
Ireland	1,800	87	2,757	84	4,557	85
Netherlands	1,889	91	1,681	92	3,570	91
Norway	1,750	93	1,545	89	3,295	91
Portugal	2,222	94	1,270	92	3,492	93
Spain	1,876	92	1,958	89	3,834	91
Sweden	1,927	89	1,551	88	3,478	89
Switzerland	1,804	81	1,525	72	3,329	77
United Kingdom	2,394	90	1,959	86	4,353	89
Central and Eastern Europe						
Estonia	1,517	79	2,019	85	3,536	83
Hungary	1,518	98	1,614	98	3,132	98
Poland	1,721	99	1,694	99	3,415	99
Russia	2,437	94	2,430	95	4,867	94
Slovenia	1,476	93	1,307	91	2,783	92
Total Sample	**35,332**	**91**	**33,933**	**89**	**69,265**	**90**

Appendix B Table B. National averages across all dependent variables for each country (2006 and 2016)

Country	Immigrants good for				Allow more immigrants from					
	National economy		*National culture*		*Ethnic majority*		*Ethnic minority*		*Poor countries*	
	2006	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**
Western Europe										
Austria	5.25	4.64	4.85	4.53	2.78	2.68	2.37	2.27	2.39	2.21
Belgium	4.67	4.98	5.80	5.97	2.85	3.00	2.52	2.73	2.53	2.74
Finland	5.39	5.46	7.11	6.96	2.71	2.89	2.39	2.58	2.29	2.49
France	4.68	4.82	5.14	5.26	2.68	2.92	2.49	2.67	2.38	2.62
Germany	4.72	5.83	5.62	5.98	2.83	3.31	2.45	2.89	2.36	2.81
Ireland	6.05	5.72	5.91	6.00	2.94	2.79	2.76	2.59	2.72	2.60
Netherlands	5.20	5.29	6.13	6.04	2.63	2.93	2.48	2.82	2.41	2.68
Norway	5.51	5.63	5.89	5.91	3.02	3.14	2.67	3.01	2.68	2.97
Portugal	4.90	5.68	5.30	6.15	2.19	2.91	2.11	2.72	2.11	2.78
Spain	5.67	5.39	5.83	6.37	2.54	2.97	2.47	2.86	2.50	2.87
Sweden	5.37	5.75	6.91	6.93	3.24	3.33	3.15	3.28	3.14	3.18
Switzerland	5.92	6.02	6.09	6.07	3.03	3.05	2.63	2.74	2.62	2.71
United Kingdom	4.50	5.67	4.72	5.66	2.61	2.85	2.41	2.72	2.33	2.63
Central and Eastern Europe										
Estonia	4.69	4.52	4.81	4.94	2.76	2.90	2.20	2.30	2.03	2.12
Hungary	3.42	3.07	4.96	3.67	2.57	2.47	1.18	1.68	1.69	1.45
Poland	5.51	5.03	6.60	5.58	3.05	2.63	2.86	2.28	2.89	2.40
Russia	3.68	3.72	3.40	3.57	3.03	2.64	2.21	2.19	2.03	1.94
Slovenia	4.29	3.99	5.07	4.73	2.73	2.88	2.53	2.49	2.42	2.49

Appendix B Table C. Bivariate comparison of means for all variables in regression models

	Immigrants make good contribution to						Allow more immigrants from			
	National economy		*National culture*		*Ethnic majority*		*Ethnic minority*		*Poor countries*	
	2006	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**	**2006**	**2016**
Independent variables										
Personal financial security										
Struggling	4.25	4.18	4.88	4.68	2.66	2.66	2.26	2.29	2.21	2.23
Coping	4.92	4.97	5.52	5.43	2.75	2.86	2.44	2.52	2.39	2.46
Comfortable	5.54	5.75	6.01	6.21	2.93	3.11	2.66	2.86	2.61	2.78
Index variables										
Religiosity	4.97	5.09	5.53	5.56	2.78	2.91	2.47	2.60	2.42	2.53
Liberal values	4.96	5.11	5.52	5.57	2.78	2.91	2.47	2.60	2.41	2.54
Government satisfaction	4.97	5.09	5.53	5.56	2.79	2.91	2.47	2.60	2.42	2.53
Religious identity										
Catholic	5.02	4.95	5.44	5.32	2.66	2.79	2.40	2.45	2.38	2.45
Protestant	5.18	5.51	6.07	6.00	2.78	3.02	2.50	2.72	2.44	2.63
Muslim	5.96	5.87	6.52	6.47	3.06	3.07	2.83	2.91	2.75	2.86
Socio-demographic controls										
Year	4.97	5.09	5.53	5.56	2.78	2.91	2.47	2.60	2.42	2.53
Female	4.77	4.98	5.49	5.57	2.76	2.90	2.44	2.60	2.40	2.53
Age	4.97	5.09	5.54	5.56	2.78	2.91	2.47	2.60	2.42	2.53
Young adult (18-40)	5.14	5.24	5.81	5.74	2.87	2.97	2.61	2.72	2.56	2.66
Married	4.99	5.17	5.52	5.60	2.78	2.91	2.45	2.59	2.40	2.51
Children living at home	4.74	4.88	5.23	5.28	2.68	2.84	2.31	2.47	2.24	2.39
Years of education	4.97	5.10	5.54	5.56	2.79	2.91	2.47	2.60	2.42	2.53
Neighborhood										
Big city	5.23	5.36	5.74	5.80	2.85	2.99	2.55	2.69	2.47	2.60
Town/small city	4.88	5.11	5.48	5.58	2.79	2.91	2.47	2.60	2.41	2.53
Village	4.82	4.87	5.41	5.36	2.73	2.85	2.41	2.52	2.38	2.48
National differences										
Austria	5.25	4.64	4.84	4.53	2.78	2.68	2.37	2.29	2.39	2.21
Belgium	4.66	4.98	5.80	5.97	2.85	2.99	2.52	2.73	2.53	2.74
Estonia	4.69	4.52	4.81	4.94	2.76	2.90	2.20	2.30	2.03	2.12
Finland	5.39	5.46	7.11	6.97	2.71	2.89	2.38	2.58	2.29	2.49
France	4.68	4.82	5.14	5.26	2.68	2.92	2.49	2.67	2.38	2.62
Germany	4.72	5.83	5.62	5.98	2.83	3.31	2.45	2.89	2.36	2.80
Hungary	3.42	3.07	4.96	3.67	2.57	2.47	1.83	1.68	1.69	1.45
Ireland	6.05	5.72	5.91	6.00	2.94	2.79	2.76	2.59	2.72	2.60
Netherlands	5.20	5.29	6.13	6.04	2.63	2.93	2.48	2.82	2.41	2.68
Norway	5.51	5.63	5.89	5.91	3.02	3.14	2.67	3.01	2.68	2.97
Poland	5.51	5.03	6.59	5.58	3.05	2.63	2.85	2.28	2.89	2.40
Portugal	4.90	5.68	5.30	6.15	2.19	2.91	2.11	2.72	2.11	2.78
Russia	3.68	3.72	3.39	3.57	3.03	2.64	2.21	2.19	2.03	1.94
Slovenia	4.29	3.99	5.07	4.73	2.73	2.88	2.53	2.49	2.42	2.49
Spain	5.67	5.39	5.83	6.36	2.53	2.96	2.47	2.86	2.50	2.87
Sweden	5.37	5.75	6.91	6.93	3.24	3.33	3.15	3.28	3.14	3.18
Switzerland	5.92	6.02	6.09	6.07	3.03	3.05	2.63	2.74	2.62	2.71
United Kingdom	4.50	5.67	4.72	5.66	2.61	2.85	2.40	2.72	2.33	2.63
Total Sample	**33,575**	**32,950**	**33,653**	**33,055**	**34,365**	**33,137**	**34,287**	**33,097**	**34,089**	**32,972**

Appendix B Table D. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression: Allow more immigrants into the country (All models for Same ethnicity immigrants)

	Immigrants with same ethnic background as national majority					
Independent variables	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)
Personal financial security						
Struggling		-.06				.01
		(.04)				(.04)
Comfortable		.31***				.26***
		(.03)				(.03)
Index variables						
Religiosity			.02***			.02***
			(.01)			-.01
Liberal values				.13***		.15***
				(.02)		(.02)
Government satisfaction					.11***	.10***
					(.01)	(.01)
Religious identity						
Catholic	-.12***	-.14***	-.17***	-.09***	-.16***	-.18***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Protestant	.03	.01	-.01	.06	-.02	-.04
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Muslim	.33***	.34***	.26***	.36***	.29***	.27***
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Socio-demographic controls						
Year	.06**	.05	.07**	.06**	.03	.03
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Female	-.02	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.00	-.02
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Young adult (18-40)	-.25***	-.22***	-.25***	-.23***	-.24***	-.20***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.09***	.09***	.09***	.09***	.10***	.09***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Native respondent	-.47***	-.49***	-.45***	-.50***	-.41***	-.44***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Employed	-.08**	-.09***	-.08**	-.08**	-.06	-.06**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Married	-.03	-.04	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.02
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Children at home	.04	.04	.04	.05	.04	.05
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Neighborhood *(reference: Town/small city)*						
Big city	.06	.05	.06	.05	.06	.05
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Village	-.03	-.03	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.04
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Constant cut1	-2.06	-2.13	-2.01	-1.67	-1.39	-1.00
Constant cut2	-.40	-.47	-.36	-.01	.27	.68
Constant cut3	1.60	1.55	1.65	2.00	2.29	2.72
Pseudo R^2	**.03**	**.03**	**.03**	**.03**	**.03**	**.04**
Observations	**65,107**	**64,554**	**65,048**	**63,900**	**65,054**	**63,283**

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Appendix B Table E. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression: Allow more immigrants into the country (All models for Ethnic minority immigrants)

	Immigrants with different ethnic background from national majority					
Independent variables	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)
Personal financial security						
Struggling		-.17***				-.08
		(.04)				(.04)
Comfortable		.28***				.22***
		(.03)				(.03)
Index variables						
Religiosity			.03***			.03***
			(.01)			(.01)
Liberal values				.24***		.26***
				(.02)		(.02)
Government satisfaction					.14***	.13***
					(.01)	(.01)
Religious identity						
Catholic	-.20***	-.22***	-.26***	-.14***	-.25***	-.27***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Protestant	-.03	-.06	-.09**	.01	-.09**	-.11***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Muslim	.51***	.51***	.42***	.59***	.46***	.46***
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Socio-demographic controls						
Year	.30***	.28***	.30***	.29***	.26***	.24***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Female	.01	.02	-.01	.02	.03	.02
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Young adult (18-40)	-.20***	-.18***	-.20***	-.17***	-.19***	-.14***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.10***	.09***	.10***	.09***	.10***	.09***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Native respondent	-.42***	-.45***	-.39***	-.47***	-.35***	-.40***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Employed	-.08***	-.09***	-.08**	-.09***	-.06	-.06**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Married	-.07**	-.08***	-.07**	-.04	-.07**	-.05
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Children at home	.00	-.00	.01	.01	.01	.01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Neighborhood *(reference: Town/small city)*						
Big city	.11***	.11***	.11***	.11***	.11***	.11***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Village	-.08**	-.07**	-.08**	-.07**	-.08**	-.07**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Constant cut1	-1.12	-1.25	-1.06	-.40	-.29	.41
Constant cut2	.69	.58	.76	1.42	1.55	2.27
Constant cut3	2.82	2.73	2.90	3.57	3.70	4.46
Pseudo R^2	**.06**	**.06**	**.06**	**.06**	**.07**	**.07**
Observations	**64,987**	**64,447**	**64,928**	**63,787**	**64,937**	**63,181**

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Appendix B Table F. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression: Allow more immigrants into the country (All models for Immigrants from poor, non-EU countries)

	Immigrants from poor, non-EU countries					
Independent variables	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)
Personal financial security						
Struggling		-.16***				-.07
		(.04)				(.04)
Comfortable		.23***				.17***
		(.03)				(.03)
Index variables						
Religiosity			.05***			.06***
			(.01)			(.01)
Liberal values				.24***		.26***
				(.02)		(.02)
Government satisfaction					.13***	.12***
					(.01)	(.01)
Religious identity						
Catholic	-.12***	-.14***	-.23***	-.07**	-.17***	-.23***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Protestant	.00	-.02	-.09**	.05	-.05	-.10**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Muslim	.54***	.55***	.41***	.63***	.49***	.45***
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Socio-demographic controls						
Year	.29***	.26***	.30***	.28***	.25***	.24***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Female	.03	.04	-.00	.04	.05	.03
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Age	-.02***	-.02***	-.02***	-.01***	-.02***	-.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Young adult (18-40)	-.18***	-.16***	-.18***	-.15***	-.17***	-.13***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	.08***	.07***	.08***	.08***	.08***	.07***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Native respondent	-.37***	-.40***	-.34***	-.42***	-.31***	-.35***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Employed	-.10***	-.10***	-.09***	-.10***	-.08**	-.07**
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Married	-.05	-.06**	-.06**	-.03	-.05	-.03
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Children at home	-.00	-.00	.00	.01	.00	.01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Neighborhood *(reference: Town/small city)*						
Big city	.11***	.11***	.11***	.11***	.11***	.10***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Village	-.05	-.04	-.06*	-.05	-.05*	-.05
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Constant cut1	-.95	-1.05	-.84	-.25	-.17	.60
Constant cut2	.77	.69	.88	1.48	1.57	2.36
Constant cut3	2.80	2.74	2.92	3.53	3.61	4.44
Pseudo R^2	**.07**	**.07**	**.07**	**.07**	**.08**	**.08**
Observations	**64,690**	**64,163**	**64,635**	**63,487**	**64,639**	**62,897**

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Appendix B Table G. Beta coefficients of linear regression with country fixed effects – Immigrants make a positive contribution to the national …

	Economy						Culture					
Independent variables	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)
Personal financial security												
Struggling		-.47***				-.24***		-.29***				-.08
		(-9.69)				(-5.01)		(-5.84)				(-1.64)
Comfortable		.46***				.31***		.36***				.22***
		(12.68)				(8.46)		(9.55)				(5.99)
Index variables												
Religiosity			.05***			.04***			.06***			.05***
			(5.03)			(3.51)			(5.25)			(4.59)
Liberal values				.27***		.28***				.35***		.37***
				(11.30)		(12.28)				(14.35)		(15.47)
Government satisfaction					.35***	.33***					.30***	.29***
					(31.86)	(28.51)					(26.73)	(24.61)
Religious identity												
Catholic	.02	-.01	-.09	.10**	-.12***	-.13***	-.18***	-.20***	-.30***	-.09**	-.30***	-.31***
	(.61)	(-.29)	(-1.91)	(2.36)	(-2.99)	(-2.93)	(-4.26)	(-4.86)	(-6.26)	(-2.04)	(-7.19)	(-6.65)
Protestant	.24***	.19***	.14**	.29***	.09	.06	.01	-.03	-.10	.08	-.12**	-.14**
	(4.62)	(3.76)	(2.48)	(5.64)	(1.76)	(1.18)	(.11)	(-.48)	(-1.77)	(1.40)	(-2.19)	(-2.48)
Muslim	.77***	.81***	.62***	.87***	.64***	.67***	.99***	1.02***	.82***	1.11***	.87***	.89***
	(6.83)	(7.12)	(5.39)	(7.47)	(5.45)	(5.44)	(8.89)	(9.13)	(7.32)	(9.72)	(7.70)	(7.54)
Socio-demographic controls												
Year	.25***	.20***	.26***	.23***	.14***	.11***	.12***	.09***	.13***	.11***	.03	.01
	(7.26)	(5.91)	(7.58)	(6.75)	(4.23)	(3.22)	(3.49)	(2.60)	(3.85)	(3.02)	(.76)	(.23)
Female	-.29***	-.27***	-.32***	-.28***	-.24***	-.24***	.01	.03	-.03	.02	.05	.04
	(-8.51)	(-7.97)	(-9.36)	(-8.17)	(-7.22)	(-7.16)	(.34)	(.80)	(-.73)	(.68)	(1.62)	(1.26)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.00***
	(-5.61)	(-4.60)	(-6.13)	(-3.56)	(-3.52)	(-1.03)	(-7.42)	(-6.83)	(-7.95)	(-4.83)	(-5.74)	(-3.14)
Young adult (18-40)	-.16***	-.14***	-.16***	-.12**	-.14***	-.10**	-.21***	-.20***	-.21***	-.16***	-.19***	-.14***
	(-3.23)	(-2.91)	(-3.28)	(-2.49)	(-2.93)	(-2.04)	(-4.07)	(-3.86)	(-4.12)	(-3.17)	(-3.83)	(-2.85)
Education	.12***	.11***	.12***	.12***	.12***	.11***	.13***	.12***	.13***	.12***	.13***	.12***
	(26.18)	(22.64)	(26.23)	(24.88)	(27.05)	(23.16)	(28.13)	(25.35)	(28.20)	(26.54)	(28.95)	(25.55)
Native respondent	-.83***	-.91***	-.78***	-.87***	-.65***	-.73***	-.73***	-.77***	-.68***	-.79***	-.57***	-.63***
Employed	-.09**	-.12***	-.08**	-.09**	-.02	-.04	-.11***	-.13***	-.10**	-.11***	-.06	-.06
Married	-.06	-.10***	-.07	-.03	-.06	-.06	-.12***	-.14***	-.12***	-.08**	-.11***	-.09**
	(-1.74)	(-2.76)	(-1.86)	(-.96)	(-1.80)	(-1.70)	(-3.16)	(-3.79)	(-3.29)	(-2.12)	(-3.13)	(-2.42)
Children living at home	-.04	-.07	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.10**	-.12**	-.09	-.10**	-.09**	-.10**
	(-.81)	(-1.46)	(-9.36)	(-.80)	(-.62)	(-1.08)	(-2.04)	(-2.43)	(-1.94)	(-2.02)	(-2.02)	(-2.19)

Neighborhood *(reference: Town/small city)*												
Big city	.19***	.19***	.19***	.19***	.19***	.18***	.09**	.08	.08	.08	.08	.07
	(4.59)	(4.42)	(4.47)	(4.37)	(4.55)	(4.25)	(2.01)	(1.75)	(1.89)	(1.87)	(1.89)	(1.58)
Village	-.10**	-.08**	-.10**	-.09**	-.10**	-.08**	-.10**	-.10**	-.11***	-.09**	-.10**	-.09**
	(-2.38)	(-2.07)	(-2.54)	(-2.25)	(-2.45)	(-2.16)	(-2.42)	(-2.39)	(-2.58)	(-2.17)	(-2.37)	(-2.29)
R-squared	.14	.16	.14	.15	.20	.21	.21	.22	.21	.22	.25	.26
Constant	4.27	4.58	4.15	3.47	2.20	1.55	4.53	4.74	4.40	3.48	2.73	1.65
Observations	**64,175**	**63,650**	**64,119**	**62,995**	**64,145**	**62,423**	**64,361**	**63,839**	**64,300**	**63,180**	**64,324**	**62,597**

T-scores in parenthesis. Robust standard errors clustered around by year.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Appendix B Table H. Comparing changes in Austria and Estonia to opposite regional patterns



APPENDIX C. Additional tables and figures for Chapter 4

Appendix C Table A. Changes in pro-immigrant sentiments and support for immigration in full sample, per country

	Germany	Sweden	Hungary	Poland
Immigrant good or bad effect on…				
National economy	1.01***	.33***	-.56***	1.14***
National culture	-.15**	-.18**	-1.32***	-.58***
Allow more immigrants of…				
Majority ethnic group	.46***	.08**	-.13**	-.17***
Minority ethnic group	.34***	.10**	-.19***	-.43***
Poor, non-EU countries	.23***	-.01	-.41***	-.33***
Contextual IVs + Indices				
Personal income security	.23***	.15***	.15***	.31***
Liberal values	.03	-.12***	.30***	.26***
Govt institutional satisfaction	1.50***	.47***	-.11***	1.50***
Religiosity index	.10**	-.18**	-.24***	-.38***

*** p<.01, ** p<.05

Appendix C Table B. Where native- and foreign-born people prefer to live, by personal income security

Country	Comfortable on current income				Struggling on current income			
	Prefer		Avoid		Prefer		Avoid	
	Native	*Foreign*	*Native*	*Foreign*	*Native*	*Foreign*	*Native*	*Foreign*
Hungary	Big city	Big city	Village	Village	Village	Village	Big city	Big city
Poland	Big city	Town	Village	Village	Village	Village	Big city	Town
Germany	Suburbs	Village	Town	Big city	Big city	Big city	Village	Village
Sweden	*Varies*	*Varies*	Suburbs	Suburbs	Suburbs	Suburbs	Village	Town

Notes: "Varies" means the 'comfortable' group in Sweden showed no consistent preference for an area of residence.

Appendix C Table C. Proportions and Means of sample across variables of interest, per country

	Germany	Sweden	Hungary	Poland
Level of personal income security				
Struggling	15.2%	8.8%	44.6%	32.3%
Coping	52.9%	31.1%	48.8%	59.5%
Comfortable	31.9%	60.1%	6.6%	8.3%
Context of residence				
Village	31.5%	29.6%	35.4%	39.6%
Town	38.2%	34.8%	35.2%	32.1%
Suburb	13.2%	22.1%	4.1%	4.1%
Big city	17.1%	13.5%	25.3%	24.3%
Context of residence: Foreign culture				
Village	19.5%	16.2%	34.9%	32.6%
Town	43.3%	32.9%	30.2%	42.6%
Suburb	12.5%	30.3%	3.9%	4.5%
Big city	24.8%	20.7%	31.0%	20.3%
Context of residence: Years of Education (Native)				
Village	13.2	11.8	11.0	11.2
Town	13.4	12.5	12.1	12.4
Suburb	14.2	13.2	12.8	12.6
Big city	14.5	14.3	13.2	13.2
Context of residence: Years of Education (Foreign)				
Village	12.9	12.9	11.3	9.4
Town	12.6	13.0	13.0	11.1
Suburb	13.5	13.3	13.9	10.8
Big city	13.5	14.5	14.3	12.3
Context of residence: Personal income security				
Village	2.2	2.5	1.5	1.7
Town	2.2	2.5	1.6	1.8
Suburb	2.3	2.5	1.7	1.8
Big city	2.2	2.5	1.8	1.8
Context of residence: High income security				
Village	30.7%	29.2%	21.1%	32.2%
Town	36.8%	34.7%	33.6%	31.2%
Suburb	15.6%	22.3%	5.0%	4.7%
Big city	16.9%	13.8%	40.4%	31.9%
Context of residence: Low income security				
Village	26.6%	24.7%	42.2%	45.3%
Town	41.3%	35.2%	35.1%	29.6%
Suburb	11.1%	24.9%	4.0%	3.8%
Big city	21.0%	15.2%	18.9%	21.3%
Context of residence: Economic contribution				
Village	5.2	5.2	3.5	5.0
Town	5.2	5.5	3.7	5.2
Suburb	5.5	5.8	3.9	5.1
Big city	5.7	6.0	3.9	5.4
Context of residence: Cultural contribution				
Village	5.7	6.7	4.6	5.9
Town	5.8	7.0	4.8	6.3
Suburb	6.2	7.2	5.0	6.4
Big city	6.5	7.5	5.0	6.6
Context of residence: Ethnic majority imm.				
Village	3.1	3.2	2.6	2.8
Town	3.0	3.2	2.6	2.9
Suburb	3.2	3.3	2.7	3.0
Big city	3.2	3.4	2.6	3.0
Context of residence: Ethnic minority imm.				
Village	2.7	3.1	1.8	2.5
Town	2.7	3.2	1.9	2.7
Suburb	2.8	3.2	2.0	2.8
Big city	2.9	3.3	2.0	2.8

Context of residence: Poor, non-EU imm.

Village	2.6	3.1	1.7	2.6
Town	2.6	3.1	1.7	2.7
Suburb	2.7	3.2	1.8	2.7
Big city	2.8	3.2	1.8	2.8
Total	**25,485**	**15,794**	**14,595**	**15,474**

Appendix C Table D. Beta coefficients for linear regression models (1/2) - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national economy, by country

	GERMANY					SWEDEN				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		.03			.05		.21***			.15**
		(.81)			(1.12)		(4.26)			(3.16)
Suburb		.20***			.16**		.30***			.25***
		(3.55)			(2.97)		(5.48)			(4.64)
Big city		.36***			.38***		.42***			.32***
		(6.48)			(7.06)		(6.37)			(5.04)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			-.56***		-.26***			-.16		.08
			(-9.17)		(-4.44)			(-1.95)		(1.01)
Comfortable on income			.46***		.21***			.33***		.15**
			(12.37)		(5.83)			(7.57)		(3.48)
Index variables										
Religiosity				.05***	.05***				.08***	.08***
				(4.46)	(4.68)				(5.44)	(5.90)
Liberal values				.36***	.34***				.33***	.33***
				(14.96)	(14.22)				(12.69)	(12.61)
Government satisfaction				.43***	.41***				.42***	.42***
				(37.06)	(33.73)				(28.80)	(27.78)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	.07***	.07***	.06***	.02***	.02***	.02***	.02***	.02***	.02***	.02***
	(17.36)	(17.80)	(15.54)	(4.01)	(4.44)	(5.75)	(5.76)	(5.14)	(4.04)	(3.94)
Female	-.27***	-.27***	-26***	-.18***	-.19***	-.03	-.03	-.01	.05	.07
	(-7.53)	(-7.63)	(-7.44)	(-5.15)	(-5.40)	(-.78)	(-.67)	(-.22)	(1.68)	(1.85)
Age	.00	.00	.00	.01***	.01***	-.00**	-.00**	-.00**	-.00	-.00
	(.90)	(.49)	(.97)	(5.35)	(4.71)	(-2.44)	(-2.45)	(-2.39)	(-.10)	(-.26)
Nativity	-.55***	-.51***	-.66***	-.29***	-.30***	-.41***	-.36***	-.46***	-.30***	-.26***
	(-9.17)	(-8.41)	(-10.86)	(-4.92)	(-5.04)	(-6.95)	(-6.00)	(-7.67)	(-5.11)	(-4.34)
Married	.03	.06	-.03	.05	.05	.15***	.19***	.09**	.08**	.09**
	(.77)	(1.56)	(-.70)	(1.37)	(1.44)	(3.62)	(4.36)	(2.16)	(1.99)	(2.06)
Years of education	.15***	.15***	.14***	.14***	.13***	.16***	.15***	.15***	.14***	.13***
	(27.05)	(25.77)	(23.84)	(25.59)	(22.78)	(26.01)	(23.99)	(24.99)	(23.67)	(21.52)
R^2	.19	.19	.19	.19	.19	.17	.18	.18	.18	.18
Constant	-132.83	-137.40	-118.43	-32.26	-35.84	-42.51	-42.65	-37.87	-31.49	-30.89

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table E. Beta coefficients for linear regression models (2/2) - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national economy, by country

	HUNGARY					POLAND				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		.05			.05		.16**			.14**
		(.89)			(.77)		(4.37)			(2.60)
Suburb		.07			.08		-.08			-.09
		(.59)			(.67)		(-.72)			(-.85)
Big city		.11			.09		.19**			.16**
		(1.72)			(1.29)		(3.37)			(2.86)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			-.23***		-.07			-.48***		-.31***
			(-4.35)		(-1.27)			(-9.27)		(-5.94)
Comfortable on income			.39***		.30**			.35***		.27***
			(3.70)		(2.72)			(4.54)		(3.54)
Index variables										
Religiosity				.07***	.07***				-.10***	-.09***
				(4.10)	(4.31)				(-6.20)	(-5.33)
Liberal values				.22***	.22***				.05	.04
				(6.28)	(6.21)				(1.42)	(1.26)
Government satisfaction				.28***	.27***				.31***	.29***
				(19.84)	(19.04)				(21.67)	(20.20)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	-.03***	-.03***	-.03***	-.04***	-.04***	.02***	.02***	0.1**	.00	-.00
	(-6.73)	(-6.63)	(-6.65)	(-7.47)	(-7.19)	(4.30)	(4.37)	(2.49)	(.15)	(-.68)
Female	-.10**	-.10**	-.09	-.15**	-.14**	-.32***	-.32***	-.30***	-.26***	-.25***
	(-2.09)	(-2.11)	(-1.84)	(-2.87)	(-2.79)	(-7.47)	(-7.56)	(-6.84)	(-5.97)	(-5.80)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01**	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.00**
	(-4.08)	(-4.18)	(-4.02)	(-3.41)	(-3.57)	(-5.70)	(-6.02)	(-3.94)	(-3.78)	(-3.09)
Nativity	-1.23***	-1.22***	-1.21***	-1.02***	-1.01***	-.38**	-.37**	-.36**	-.27	-.25
	(-7.39)	(-7.34)	(-7.15)	(-6.03)	(-5.83)	(-2.32)	(-2.26)	(-2.22)	(-1.65)	(-1.56)
Married	-.02	-.02	-.04	.01	.01	.00	.02	-.02	.08	.07
	(-.37)	(-.30)	(-.78)	(.23)	(.11)	(.03)	(.36)	(-0.43)	(1.66)	(1.49)
Years of education	.12***	.11***	.10***	.12***	.11***	.11***	.10***	.09***	.11***	.09***
	(16.30)	(15.28)	(13.35)	(15.98)	(13.27)	(16.24)	(14.56)	(13.42)	(16.10)	(12.84)
R^2	.10	.10	.10	.10	.10	.09	.09	.09	.09	.09
Constant	74.02	72.52	73.42	80.32	77.44	-36.57	-37.42	-19.31	2.07	10.29

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table F. Beta coefficients for linear regression models (1/2) - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national culture, by country

	GERMANY					SWEDEN				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		.14**			.14**		.16**			.12**
		(3.22)			(3.43)		(3.30)			(2.42)
Suburb		.39***			.35***		.21***			.15**
		(6.64)			(6.11)		(3.85)			(2.77)
Big city		.59***			.58***		.42***			.33***
		(10.74)			(10.86)		(6.80)			(5.38)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			-.42***		-.21***			-.11		.06
			(-6.92)		(-3.61)			(-1.28)		(.76)
Comfortable on income			.41***		.20***			.29***		.13**
			(10.56)		(5.19)			(6.74)		(3.06)
Index variables										
Religiosity				.04***	.05***				.04**	.04**
				(3.15)	(4.35)				(2.76)	(3.02)
Liberal values				.43***	.41***				.34***	.33***
				(17.02)	(16.25)				(12.90)	(12.68)
Government satisfaction				.33***	.31***				.32***	.32***
				(28.33)	(25.74)				(21.72)	(21.03)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.04***	-.04***	-.02***	-.02***	-.02***	-.02***	-.02***
	(-.51)	(-.41)	(-.41)	(-10.34)	(-9.59)	(-3.99)	(-3.97)	(-4.36)	(-5.48)	(-5.51)
Female	.22***	.21***	.21***	.21***	.28***	.39***	.39***	.40***	.47***	.47***
	(6.09)	(5.96)	(5.96)	(5.96)	(7.82)	(10.18)	(10.33)	(10.54)	(12.10)	(12.23)
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.00	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.00**	-.00**
	(-5.92)	(-6.62)	(-6.62)	(-6.62)	(-1.91)	(-5.11)	(-5.04)	(-5.38)	(-2.80)	(-3.11)
Nativity	-.61***	-.53***	-.53***	-.53***	-.40***	-.09	-.04	-.12**	-.05	-.01
	(-10.38)	(-9.08)	(-9.08)	(-9.08)	(-6.80)	(-1.50)	(-.62)	(-2.04)	(-.85)	(-.22)
Married	-.07	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.00	.19***	.22***	.15***	.14***	.15***
	(-1.78)	(-.44)	(-.44)	(-.44)	(-.07)	(4.82)	(5.52)	(3.59)	(3.58)	(3.64)
Years of education	.17***	.16***	.16***	.16***	.14***	.17***	.16***	.17***	.16***	.15***
	(30.86)	(28.88)	(28.88)	(28.88)	(25.05)	(28.46)	(26.56)	(27.02)	(26.32)	(23.94)
R^2	.15	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.16	.16	.16	.16
Constant	8.48	1.02	21.46	87.14	81.49	36.02	35.64	38.99	44.38	44.59

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table G. Beta coefficients for linear regression models (2/2) - Opinions about immigrant contribution to national culture, by country

	HUNGARY					POLAND				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		.07			.06		.20***			.15**
		(1.13)			(.95)		(4.07)			(2.99)
Suburb		.04			.05		.21**			.18
		(.29)			(.35)		(2.23)			(1.87)
Big city		-.03			-.04		.36***			.28***
		(-.43)			(-.56)		(6.63)			(5.07)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			-.08		-.01			-.27***		-.16**
			(-1.38)		(-.22)			(-5.53)		(-3.23)
Comfortable on income			.21		.14			.22**		.14**
			(1.91)		(1.21)			(3.09)		(2.00)
Index variables										
Religiosity				.06**	.06**				-.15***	-.14***
				(3.37)	(3.29)				(-10.30)	(-9.01)
Liberal values				.12**	.12**				-.01	-.01
				(3.26)	(3.20)				(-.25)	(-.44)
Government satisfaction				.18***	.18***				.19***	.18***
				(12.13)	(11.88)				(13.74)	(13.05)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	-.06***	-.06***	-.06***	-.06***	-.06***	-.04***	-.04***	-.04***	-.05***	-.05***
	(-10.91)	(-11.11)	(-10.75)	(-10.75)	(-10.44)	(-8.34)	(-8.01)	(-9.27)	(-11.34)	(-11.39)
Female	-.07	-.06	.06	.10	-.09	.01	.00	.02	.09**	.08**
	(-1.27)	(-1.21)	(-1.07)	(-1.90)	(-1.66)	(.19)	(.06)	(.46)	(2.26)	(2.01)
Age	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***
	(-1.62)	(-1.53)	(-1.61)	(-1.83)	(-1.78)	(-6.34)	(-7.03)	(-5.18)	(-4.66)	(-4.67)
Nativity	-1.08***	-1.10***	-1.09***	-.93***	-.95***	-.33**	-.32**	-.32**	-.26	-.25
	(-6.87)	(-6.94)	(-6.79)	(-5.68)	(-5.71)	(-2.17)	(-2.13)	(-2.11)	(-1.73)	(-1.67)
Married	-.13**	-.13**	-.14**	-.09	-.11	.02	.05	.01	.09**	.10**
	(-2.45)	(-2.54)	(-2.67)	(-1.78)	(-1.96)	(.51)	(1.06)	(1.27)	(2.04)	(2.19)
Years of education	.13***	.13***	.12***	.13***	.12***	.12***	.12***	.11***	.11***	.12***	.10***
	(16.94)	(16.32)	(15.40)	(16.48)	(15.07)	(19.48)	(16.91)	(17.49)	(18.42)	(15.24)
R^2	.07	.07	.07	.07	.07	.08	.08	.08	.08	.08
Constant	126.72	128.40	125.17	123.18	122.40	81.39	78.55	91.23	109.24	111.37

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table H. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression (1/2) – Allowing many immigrants with the same ethnicity as the national majority, by country

	GERMANY					SWEDEN				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		.96			.96		1.14**			1.11***
		(.03)			(.03)		(2.96)			(2.22)
Suburb		1.16**			1.16**		1.19**			1.15**
		(.06)			(.06)		(3.45)			(2.75)
Big city		1.35***			1.35***		1.42***			1.37***
		(.06)			(.06)		(5.93)			(4.99)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			.73***		.73***			.88		.98
			(.04)		(.04)			(-1.69)		(-.21)
Comfortable on income			1.39***		1.39***			1.31***		1.21***
			(.05)		(.05)			(6.78)		(4.54)
Index variables										
Religiosity				1.09***	1.09***				1.08***	1.08***
				(.01)	(.01)				(5.49)	(5.78)
Liberal values				1.42***	1.42***				1.35***	1.35***
				(.04)	(.04)				(12.27)	(11.95)
Government satisfaction				1.73***	1.73***				1.23***	1.22***
				(.05)	(.05)				(14.73)	(13.99)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	1.08***	1.08***	1.08***	1.06***	1.06***	1.02***	1.02***	1.02***	1.02***	1.01***
	(25.77)	(25.88)	(23.80)	(15.81)	(15.84)	(5.01)	(5.02)	(4.53)	(4.17)	(3.94)
Female	.99	.99	.99	1.02	1.00	1.15***	1.15***	1.17***	1.20***	1.22***
	(-.30)	(-.35)	(-.34)	(.59)	(.29)	(3.93)	(4.09)	(4.47)	(4.97)	(5.21)
Age	1.00**	1.00**	1.00**	1.00	1.00	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***
	(-2.57)	(-2.89)	(-2.84)	(1.45)	(.67)	(-8.69)	(-8.68)	(-8.80)	(-6.98)	(-7.31)
Nativity	.68***	.69***	.62***	.78***	.75***	1.12**	1.16**	1.07	1.16**	1.18**
	(-8.10)	(-7.65)	(-9.67)	(-4.98)	(-5.63)	(2.07)	(2.80)	(1.20)	(2.52)	(2.73)
Married	1.09**	1.11**	1.05**	1.13***	1.12**	1.12**	1.15***	1.07***	1.09**	1.08
	(2.76)	(3.36)	(1.47)	(3.66)	(3.44)	(3.04)	(3.75)	(1.66)	(2.15)	(1.90)
Education	1.14***	1.14***	1.12***	1.13***	1.12***	1.13***	1.12***	1.13***	1.12***	1.11***
	(26.42)	(25.24)	(23.31)	(24.42)	(21.33)	(21.40)	(19.74)	(20.42)	(18.83)	(16.78)
Constant cut1	111.64	111.60	111.56	111.82	111.74	28.53	28.59	28.43	28.41	28.48
Constant cut2	113.65	113.61	113.56	113.83	113.75	30.85	30.91	30.75	30.73	30.81
Constant cut3	116.14	116.09	116.05	116.32	116.24	33.96	34.02	33.86	33.85	33.92
Pseudo R^2	.08	.08	.08	.08	.08	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06
Observations	22,294	22,294	22,294	22,294	22,294	14,253	14,253	14,253	14,253	14,253

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table I. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression (2/2) – Allowing many immigrants with the same ethnicity as the national majority, by country

	HUNGARY					POLAND				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		.87**			.89**		1.19***			1.16***
		(-3.06)			(-2.38)		(4.33)			(3.65)
Suburb		.89			.92		1.30**			1.28**
		(-1.30)			(-.90)		(3.27)			(3.08)
Big city		.73***			.75***		1.33***			1.28***
		(-6.23)			(-5.45)		(6.48)			(5.48)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			.85***		.83***			.79***		.83***
			(-4.11)		(-4.35)			(-5.98)		(-4.51)
Comfortable on income			1.12		1.13			1.29***		1.25***
			(1.50)		(1.54)			(4.22)		(3.65)
Index variables										
Religiosity				1.14***	1.13***				.92***	.94***
				(10.30)	(9.40)				(-6.20)	(-4.82)
Liberal values				1.05	1.04				1.02	1.02
				(1.68)	(1.40)				(.83)	(.58)
Government satisfaction				1.05***	1.05***				1.10***	1.09***
				(4.88)	(4.13)				(8.41)	(7.39)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	.99**	.99**	.99**	1.00	.99**	.99***	.99***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(-2.39)	(-3.05)	(-2.68)	(-1.13)	(-2.03)	(-4.13)	(-3.75)	(-5.33)	(-5.92)	(-6.27)
Female	.90**	.91**	.91**	.83***	.85***	.99	.99	1.01	1.04	1.04
	(-2.79)	(-2.62)	(-2.56)	(-4.66)	(-4.04)	(-.35)	(-.38)	(-.21)	(1.15)	(1.27)
Age	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00***	1.00***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(-1.90)	(-1.50)	(-1.88)	(-4.30)	(-3.77)	(-15.86)	(-16.40)	(-14.39)	(-14.38)	(-13.76)
Nativity	.46***	.46***	.47***	.49***	.49***	.75**	.76**	.76**	.79**	.80
	(-6.00)	(-6.01)	(-5.87)	(-5.35)	(-5.32)	(-2.39)	(-2.36)	(-2.29)	(-2.01)	(-1.92)
Married	1.00	.99	.99	1.03	1.00	.99	1.01	.98	1.03	1.03
	(-.00)	(-.40)	(-.38)	(-.73)	(.06)	(-.32)	(.27)	(.52)	(.70)	(.86)
Years of education	1.09***	1.10***	1.08***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.08***	1.08***	1.09***	1.07***
	(15.73)	(16.68)	(13.57)	(15.57)	(14.17)	(16.24)	(13.88)	(14.24)	(15.35)	(12.02)
Constant cut1	-18.35	-18.09	-17.81	-17.87	-17.87	-50.87	-51.22	-50.85	-50.66	-51.09
Constant cut2	-16.62	-16.36	-16.08	-16.14	-16.14	-48.94	-49.29	-48.92	-48.73	-49.16
Constant cut3	-15.26	-15.00	-14.72	-14.78	-14.78	-46.61	-46.97	-46.60	-46.41	-46.83
Pseudo R^2	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.03	.03	.03	.03	.03
Observations	11,623	11,623	11,623	11,623	11,623	13,381	13,381	13,381	13,381	13,381

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table J. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression (1/2) – Allowing many ethnic minority immigrants, by country

	GERMANY					SWEDEN				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		1.01			1.02		1.16**			1.13**
		(.33)			(.55)		(3.39)			(2.59)
Suburb		1.25***			1.22***		1.20***			1.15**
		(4.73)			(4.18)		(3.69)			(2.70)
Big city		1.42***			1.46***		1.37***			1.30***
		(7.86)			(8.26)		(5.28)			(4.21)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			.67***		.78***			.93		1.07
			(-8.11)		(-5.12)			(-.92)		(.81)
Comfortable on income			1.34***		1.17***			1.30***		1.18***
			(9.32)		(4.95)			(6.76)		(4.05)
Index variables										
Religiosity				1.07***	1.07***				1.07***	1.08***
				(6.51)	(6.89)				(5.08)	(5.28)
Liberal values				1.57***	1.55***				1.41***	1.41***
				(22.10)	(21.44)				(14.02)	(13.77)
Government satisfaction				1.26***	1.23***				1.24***	1.23***
				(23.30)	(21.04)				(15.36)	(14.69)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	1.07***	1.07***	1.06***	1.04***	1.04***	1.03***	1.03***	1.02***	1.02***	1.02***
	(20.85)	(21.38)	(19.56)	(12.18)	(12.68)	(7.31)	(7.34)	(6.89)	(6.41)	(6.23)
Female	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.10**	1.09**	1.25***	1.26***	1.27***	1.32***	1.33***
	(1.70)	(1.60)	(1.82)	(3.06)	(2.82)	(6.48)	(6.63)	(6.93)	(7.47)	(7.68)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	1.00***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***
	(-11.33)	(-11.80)	(-11.24)	(-5.40)	(-6.04)	(-13.21)	(-13.20)	(-13.20)	(-11.21)	(-11.42)
Nativity	.77***	.80***	.71***	.83***	.83***	1.12**	1.16**	1.08	1.14**	1.17**
	(-5.54)	(-4.69)	(-6.94)	(-3.72)	(-3.74)	(2.17)	(2.92)	(1.45)	(2.32)	(2.65)
Married	1.00	1.03	.96	1.04	1.05	1.18***	1.21***	1.13**	1.15***	1.15***
	(-.06)	(.89)	(-1.29)	(1.20)	(1.38)	(4.51)	(5.14)	(3.25)	(3.66)	(3.50)
Years of education	1.14***	1.13***	1.13***	1.13***	1.11***	1.13***	1.12***	1.12***	1.11***	1.10***
	(27.18)	(25.67)	(24.60)	(24.27)	(21.49)	(21.15)	(19.58)	(20.29)	(17.60)	(15.92)
Constant cut1	88.59	88.67	88.53	88.83	88.86	46.09	46.20	45.97	46.15	46.17
Constant cut2	90.69	90.77	90.63	90.93	90.97	48.32	48.42	48.20	48.37	48.39
Constant cut3	93.13	93.21	93.07	93.37	93.40	51.21	51.32	51.09	51.26	51.29
Pseudo R^2	.08	.08	.07	.07	.08	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06
Observations	22,242	22,242	22,242	22,242	22,242	14,266	14,266	14,266	14,266	14,266

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table K. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression (2/2) – Allowing many ethnic minority immigrants, by country

	HUNGARY					POLAND				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		1.01			1.00		1.17***			1.13**
		(.16)			(-.10)		(3.83)			(2.96)
Suburb		1.19			1.19		1.30**			1.27**
		(1.81)			(1.76)		(3.22)			(2.92)
Big city		1.12**			1.13**		1.28***			1.21***
		(2.15)			(2.14)		(5.58)			(4.27)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			.86***		.92**			.79***		.83***
			(-3.59)		(-1.98)			(-6.08)		(-4.62)
Comfortable on income			1.19**		1.12			1.20**		1.16**
			(2.11)		(1.34)			(3.04)		(2.42)
Index variables										
Religiosity				1.06***	1.06***				.92***	.93***
				(4.15)	(4.52)				(-6.66)	(-5.47)
Liberal values				1.16***	1.15***				1.04	1.03
				(4.97)	(4.86)				(1.38)	(1.29)
Government satisfaction				1.14***	1.13***				1.09***	1.08***
				(11.98)	(11.16)				(8.29)	(7.25)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	.97***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.96***
	(-7.39)	(-7.18)	(-7.69)	(-6.80)	(-6.79)	(-7.48)	(-7.82)	(-8.91)	(-9.54)	(-9.88)
Female	.92**	.92**	.93	.90**	.90**	1.06	1.06	1.08**	1.12**	1.13**
	(-2.03)	(-2.13)	(-1.84)	(-2.53)	(-2.55)	(1.68)	(1.76)	(2.21)	(3.41)	(3.45)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(-5.92)	(-6.07)	(-5.84)	(-5.71)	(-5.94)	(-19.10)	(-18.76)	(-17.40)	(-17.10)	(-16.31)
Nativity	.50***	.51***	.52***	.54***	.55***	.84	.85	.85	.88	.88
	(-5.39)	(-5.35)	(-5.17)	(-4.68)	(-4.44)	(-1.46)	(-1.50)	(-1.44)	(-1.16)	(-1.09)
Married	.90**	.91**	.89**	.92	.92	1.00	1.01	.98	1.03	1.03
	(-2.48)	(-2.27)	(-2.88)	(-1.92)	(-1.95)	(.36)	(-.12)	(-.43)	(.94)	(.90)
Years of education	1.11***	1.11***	1.10***	1.11***	1.10***	1.09***	1.08***	1.08***	1.09***	1.07***
	(17.85)	(16.65)	(15.57)	(17.53)	(14.87)	(14.32)	(16.56)	(14.69)	(15.54)	(12.56)
Constant cut1	-55.95	-55.80	-54.79	-55.79	-54.30	-76.17	-76.48	-76.22	-76.15	-76.54
Constant cut2	-53.66	-53.51	-52.50	-53.50	-52.00	-74.26	-74.57	-74.31	-74.24	-74.63
Constant cut3	-52.09	-51.93	-50.92	-51.93	-50.43	-72.10	-72.41	-72.15	-72.08	-72.47
Pseudo R^2	.03	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04
Observations	11,621	11,621	11,621	11,621	11,621	13,338	13,338	13,338	13,338	13,338

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table L. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression (1/2) – Allowing many immigrants from poor, non-EU countries, by country

	GERMANY					SWEDEN				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		.96			.97		1.09			1.05
		(-1.27)			(-.78)		(1.89)			(1.16)
Suburb		1.15**			1.14**		1.08			1.05
		(3.11)			(2.76)		(1.62)			(.89)
Big city		1.29***			1.32***		1.22**			1.17**
		(5.73)			(6.04)		(3.33)			(2.43)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			.74***		.83***			.95		1.08
			(-6.35)		(-3.86)			(-.69)		(.99)
Comfortable on income			1.28***		1.14***			1.22***		1.13**
			(7.89)		(4.15)			(5.21)		(2.43)
Index variables										
Religiosity				1.09***	1.09***				1.07***	1.08***
				(9.46)	(9.63)				(5.15)	(5.31)
Liberal values				1.45***	1.44***				1.36***	1.35***
				(18.53)	(17.89)				(12.78)	(12.51)
Government satisfaction				1.19***	1.18***				1.20***	1.20***
				(17.83)	(16.03)				(13.37)	(12.99)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	1.06***	1.06***	1.05***	1.04***	1.04***	1.01**	1.01**	1.01**	1.01**	1.01**
	(17.61)	(17.88)	(16.29)	(10.54)	(10.63)	(2.67)	(2.72)	(2.48)	(2.29)	(2.27)
Female	1.13***	1.13***	1.13***	1.15***	1.15***	1.35***	1.35***	1.35***	1.42***	1.42***
	(4.25)	(4.20)	(4.37)	(4.74)	(4.59)	(8.65)	(8.75)	(8.85)	(9.53)	(9.53)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(-14.60)	(-14.93)	(-14.56)	(-10.03)	(-10.49)	(-15.79)	(-15.77)	(-15.88)	(-13.91)	(-14.18)
Nativity	.80***	.82***	.75***	.88**	.87**	1.19**	1.22***	1.15**	1.23**	1.23***
	(-4.82)	(-4.26)	(-5.98)	(-2.55)	(-2.73)	(3.40)	(3.79)	(2.70)	(3.76)	(3.75)
Married	.98	1.00	.95	1.00	1.01	1.14***	1.16***	1.10**	1.12**	1.11**
	(-.71)	(.04)	(-1.65)	(.12)	(.13)	(3.61)	(3.99)	(2.58)	(2.86)	(2.65)
Years of education	1.11***	1.11***	1.10***	1.10***	1.10***	1.11***	1.11***	1.11***	1.10***	1.09***
	(23.24)	(21.95)	(20.99)	(20.54)	(18.17)	(19.08)	(17.89)	(18.18)	(16.12)	(14.68)
Constant cut1	73.83	73.93	73.67	73.95	73.91	15.94	16.26	15.65	16.09	16.19
Constant cut2	75.80	75.90	75.64	75.92	75.88	18.03	18.35	17.73	18.18	18.27
Constant cut3	78.07	78.17	77.91	78.19	78.15	20.73	21.05	20.43	20.88	20.98
Pseudo R^2	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06	.05	.05	.05	.05	.05
Observations	22,240	22,240	22,240	22,240	22,240	14,236	14,236	14,236	14,236	14,236

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Table M. Odds ratios for ordered logistic regression (2/2) – Allowing many immigrants from poor, non-EU countries, by country

	HUNGARY					POLAND				
Context of residence	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Town		1.02			.98		1.10**			1.09**
		(.32)			(-.39)		(2.45)			(2.14)
Suburb		1.31**			1.30**		1.06			1.06
		(2.68)			(2.53)		(.72)			(.73)
Big city		1.15**			1.13**		1.17***			1.14**
		(2.51)			(2.07)		(3.51)			(2.84)
Personal income security										
Struggling on income			.93		1.02			.83***		.86***
			(-1.61)		(.35)			(-4.95)		(-3.78)
Comfortable on income			1.23**		1.14			1.22**		1.19**
			(2.44)		(1.50)			(3.30)		(2.89)
Index variables										
Religiosity				1.05**	1.05***				.95**	.97**
				(3.36)	(3.73)				(-3.39)	(-2.61)
Liberal values				1.15***	1.15***				1.01	1.00
				(4.80)	(4.67)				(.39)	(.07)
Government satisfaction				1.17***	1.17***				1.08***	1.07***
				(13.58)	(13.22)				(7.23)	(6.28)
Sociodemographic controls										
Year	.94***	.94***	.94***	.94***	.94***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.97***	.96***
	(-14.79)	(-14.65)	(-14.58)	(-14.09)	(-13.63)	(-8.10)	(-7.92)	(-9.11)	(-9.42)	(-9.87)
Female	1.00	1.00	1.00	.98	.97	1.00	1.00	1.02	1.03	1.04
	(.07)	(.03)	(.05)	(-.40)	(-.65)	(.10)	(.09)	(.51)	(.92)	(1.06)
Age	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***	.98***
	(-9.73)	(-9.91)	(-9.68)	(-9.36)	(-9.66)	(-16.55)	(-16.69)	(-15.37)	(-15.40)	(-14.62)
Nativity	.51***	.51***	.51***	.56***	.56***	.79**	.79**	.79**	.83	.82
	(-5.28)	(-5.19)	(-5.16)	(-4.26)	(-4.07)	(-2.14)	(-2.12)	(-2.15)	(-1.76)	(-1.77)
Married	.92**	.93	.91**	.95	.95	1.02	1.03	1.02**	1.04	1.05
	(-1.97)	(-1.78)	(-2.29)	(-1.24)	(-1.24)	(.53)	(.81)	(.46)	(1.19)	(1.22)
Years of education	1.07***	1.07***	1.06***	1.07***	1.06***	1.07***	1.06***	1.06***	1.07***	1.06***
	(11.15)	(10.18)	(9.67)	(10.74)	(9.23)	(12.96)	(11.48)	(11.36)	(12.49)	(10.16)
Constant cut1	-116.21	-116.33	-115.47	-116.02	-115.18	-75.58	-75.92	-75.72	-75.47	-76.13
Constant cut2	-113.92	-114.05	-113.19	-113.73	-112.89	-73.64	-73.97	-73.78	-73.53	-74.19
Constant cut3	-112.44	-112.56	-111.70	-112.25	-111.40	-71.45	-71.79	-71.59	-71.34	-72.00
Pseudo R^2	.04	.04	.04	.04	.04	.03	.03	.03	.03	.03
Observations	11,492	11,492	11,492	11,492	11,492	13,325	13,325	13,325	13,325	13,325

Note: All models include country-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. Z-scores in parentheses.
***p<.01, **p<.05

Appendix C Figure A. Opinions on immigrant contribution to the national economy over time, per country (%)



Source: ESS 2002-2018

Appendix C Figure B. Opinions on immigrant contribution to the national culture over time, per country (%)



Source: ESS 2002-2018