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Pathways to Populism: Economics, Culture, and Ideological Convergence

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Nicholas T. Willis

March 2022

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Indridi H. Indridason, Chairperson
Dr. Shaun Bowler
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The Dissertation of Nicholas T. Willis is approved:

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Pathways to Populism: Economics, Culture, and Ideological Convergence

by

Nicholas T. Willis

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
University of California, Riverside, March 2022
Dr. Indridi H. Indridason, Chairperson

This dissertation proposes a variation in motivations for voting for left and right populist parties, respectively. It argues voting for both types of populist parties is motivate by disaffection with government policies and perceived ideological convergence - the perception that mainstream parties are essentially ideologically interchangeable on issues relevant to them. Where the pathways to populist voting diverge, however, is argued to be based on the issue type for which the voter has become disaffected. It is argued left populist voters are disaffected with the economy, while right populist voters are disaffected by cultural policies (e.g. immigration). The respective populist party types are argued to own these issue spaces, based on the frequency and fervency with which they address them, giving them authority on the matter. The dissertation explores these claims through the use of a mixed-methods design. The first part of the dissertation explores the topic through statistical analysis. The association between ideological convergence, government failure on cultural issues and right populist voting finds positive support. The association between ideological convergence, government failure on economic issues and left populist voting does

not find support. This result was likely due to a lack of data and cases – something which can be remedied with more of both in the future. Case studies of the Front National in France (right populism) and Podemos in Spain (left populism) are then conducted. The French case study tests the mechanisms suggested by the theory of the dissertation to ensure that the positive association of the statistical analysis was due to the hypothesized factors. The Spanish case study test the mechanisms suggested by the theory of the dissertation to offer evidence that the relationship is functioning as hypothesized, despite the null findings of the left populism statistical model. The dissertation concludes by discussing its findings and contributions.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Populists of both the left and right variety have reached the national level of government in many countries in Europe. These seemingly unprecedented successes betray a much larger electoral trend. This trend of greater electoral success across many different Western nations at best challenges academic understandings of democracy, as some have suggested these actors to be a natural and even desirable part of democracy (Canovan 1999, Laclau 2005). At worst, these victories imperil (liberal) democratic systems, as they often empower actors who do not respect democracy, or at least not liberal democracy (Rosanvallon, 2008; Zakaria, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Therefore, understanding the nature of voter behavior underpinning populist success is crucial to understanding not only how these groups are garnering electoral wins, but also what this may mean for democracy.

One key in understanding the recent surge in populist popularity is to investigate whether major factors suggested by the literature affect voting for left and right populist variants equally. Many differences between these two types of populism remain unexplored,

but much can be gained from a more well-defined typology based in empirical work. This is especially the case as left populism in the form of parties and movements such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain only started gaining much political ground in the second-half of the previous decade. Towards this goal, this paper argues that voters base their decision to vote for a left or right populist party on different issues. This dissertation argues that the issue ownership of right populist parties on cultural (e.g. immigration) issues draws in voters disaffected by government failure to deliver desirable policies on these issues when other mainstream parties offer no real policy alternatives. On the left, voters act similarly, though with economic issues in mind.

The key condition here is having "no real policy alternatives" — to be later defined as "ideological convergence." As many political parties in Europe have begun an ideological "move to the middle," strong ideology-based policy differences between parties have started to disappear. When voters wish to change things up (such as when policy increasingly drifts away from their most preferred positions), picking between seemingly identical options can be difficult, not to mention disheartening. However, by voting for populist parties, voters can turn outside of the mainstream to "shake things up" while also criticizing the very ideological convergence they are picking up on in the mainstream. Understanding under which conditions voters will do so is the subject of this dissertation. Exploring the relationship between government failure of differing issues and ideological convergence will serve to not only help further strengthen the populist party typology, but will also give insight into populist voter behavior and the conditions for the success of populist parties.

This dissertation also aims to help demystify, in part, contradictory results in the literature. Early on in the most recent wave of literature on populism, two popular explanations dominated. One explanation (Inglehart & Norris, 2017) argued that populism's rise was due to a 'cultural backlash' — a reaction to continuously advancing post-materialism in the Western world. The other explanation argued that populism was a reaction to economic changes, such as increased reliance on automation or increasingly frequent economic crises. To say that these explanations are in competition, however, would be to create a false dichotomy, and this is borne out in part by conflicting results across studies with many confirmatory and dis-confirmatory findings proliferating for both theories. The distinction made by this paper between right and left populism contributes to the disambiguation of these competing theories by proposing that neither is incorrect, but that each is better suited to explaining a particular type of populism, rather than populism more generally or (as has been most researched) right populism solely.

1.1 Defining Left and Right Populism

The concept of populism may invoke in the reader's mind traits normally associated with the far-right. Anti-immigration, anti-government and anti-progressiveness all readily spring to mind. However, populism, it bears stating, is not inherently tied to the right. Cas Mudde's definition, for example, certainly makes no such distinction, with its cited key elements being (1) a "thin-centered ideology,"[1] (2) an antagonism between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite," and (3) that politics should be an expression of the general

[1] "Thin-centered" here means an ideology that is not quite a complete system. A few policy positions may be thought out, but they do not follow from an underlying logic based on fundamental beliefs like traditional "thick" ideologies, such as liberalism.

will (Mudde, 2004). An association between populism and radical right politics, therefore, is not academic, but more so the product of a loose and often pejorative usage by the media and in common parlance. The recent emergence of electorally successful left populist parties and movements — such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain — challenges this usage further.

Beginning with their commonalities, both left and right populism share a similar emphasis on an antagonism between the people and the elite, as well as their desire for greater devolution of power to the people. The difference between the types lies in the underlying ideology they embody, thin-centered as it may be.

For left populists, egalitarianism, anti-neoliberalism, anti-capitalism, and anti-globalization are commonly-shared traits (March, 2007; Sola & Rendueles, 2018; Zaslove, 2008). This puts left-populists well in line with the non-populist left. For example, Podemos in Spain endorses traditionally left policies such as: "restructuring of foreign debt, tax reform, progressive state intervention in the economy, [and] women's rights" (Sola & Rendueles, 2018, p. 104). In addition, left-based populists are generally anti-neoliberal, anti-capitalist, and anti-globalization (March, 2007, p.66; Zaslove, 2008, p.329). One exception to this shared ideological base, however, is that the populist left tends to "generally have far less concern with doctrinal purity and class-consciousness" (March, 2007, p.66; see also: Zaslove, 2008, p.329). Regardless of this lack of attention to class-consciousness, economic issues tend to define much of the political agenda of left populists (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015).

For right populists, again similar to their 'thick' host ideology, emphasis lies in positions based on neoliberalism, (social and cultural) conservatism, and inegalitarianism (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015; Ivaldi, 2015; March, 2017; Zaslove, 2008). While some right populist parties appear to be economically less liberal in their promotion of state spending on myriad welfare programs, this spending often takes the form of welfare chauvinism. Welfare chauvinism is the creation of social programs designed to target a specific group and therefore exclude one or many outgroups (Ivaldi, 2015). Such programs should not be mistaken for being economically progressive; if anything, they are quite the opposite. Acknowledging this qualified exception, right populists tend to emphasize and prioritize cultural issues much more in their actions and discourse than economic issues.

Ivaldi et al. (2017) have argued that the fundamental difference between these types of populism is the degree of inclusivity/exclusivity present. While true that not every populist party on the left or right matches exactly the traits listed above, to discount categorizing them as either left or right based on such additional traits due to them not being fully universal may be too strict. In other words, to strip down the differentiation between these two types of populism to just the degree of inclusivity because these other general traits are not completely universal, in the opinion of the author, would be a mistake.[2] Luke March's work contends that the degree of exclusivity is fundamental to differentiating left and right populism. However, he argues that another fundamental dimension exists differentiating the two: the degree of attention to economic and social/cultural issues. For March (2017), left populists tend to have a greater focus and emphasis on economic issues,

[2]This is not to suggest that this is what Ivaldi et al. (2017) do explicitly. It is just to suggest that additional traits need not be universal to each case.

Table 1.1: Left and Right Populism Characteristics

	Left Populism	**Right Populism**
Anti-Elitism	Yes	Yes
Desire Rule by General Will	Yes	Yes
Inclusive	Yes	No
Main Focus	Economy	Culture

while right populists tend to pay greater attention to social/cultural issues (see also: Otjes & Louwerse, 2015, p.62; Berning, 2017, p.16).

1.1.1 A Short Typology

Having distinguished certain characteristics of left and right populist parties, it is now possible to place them within a broader ideological spectrum. The most important distinction to make is that between populist parties and radical/ extremist parties. As populism relies upon making the distinction between elites and the people, as well as expressing the general will of the people, there is no incompatibility between populism and radicalism/ extremism. Populist parties may be either more extreme or more moderate in expressing their views, and they may even change to moderate their views once they gain electoral seats (as findings discussed in the literature below show). Thus, an important distinction must be made (and accounted for empirically) between populist parties and radical populist parties.

That being said, the traits listed above for right and left populist parties should be the most prominent characteristics of populist parties, and these traits commonly align with the more radical parties on either side of the political spectrum. Mass inclusion,

economically left-policies, and social-rights vanguardism are characteristics of populist left parties that may or may not be characteristic of radical left parties as well. A party that holds these characteristics but does not couch its understandings in an elite versus people dichotomy is not populist; one that does use such rhetoric but does not hold these positions is not left populist. Similarly, a party that is not inclusive and has xenophobia, opposition to multiculturalism, and opposition to pluralism as its base but does not express these positions and the policies they imply in a populist fashion is not populist; one that does not hold these positions prominently and does use populism is not right populist.

While it is entirely possible for mainstream parties to be populist, the moderation of ideology necessary in most cases to maintain power and seats in government typically discounts mainstream parties from featuring the above left and right populist characteristics, though they may employ populist rhetoric. If populism is still a prominent feature of a mainstream party's platform and rhetoric, but does not feature either the left or right populist traits discussed above, then it would represent a center populism.

In other words, it is possible to see populism arise at any point along the left-right political spectrum, but it is only when the respective traits above meets with extensive use and reliance upon a rhetoric of elites versus the people and a need to express the general will of the people that it becomes either left or right populism. Failure to do both results in party types as we typically think of them (radical right/left, center right/left, center). Failure to be sufficiently populist results in party types as we know them, as well. Only adding populism but failing to have the traits of populist right or left parties as above results in a center populism or some other variant.

1.2 Theory: Issue Ownership, Disaffection, and Ideological Convergence

1.2.1 Issue Ownership and Government Failure

Given the above definitions, left and right populists can be said to be primarily focused on a particular issue space. For right populists, cultural issues, especially those surrounding immigration in the case of Europe (the area of analysis for this paper), are front and center in their platforms. For left populists, economic issues tend to stand more at the forefront. This is perhaps especially evident in the fact that the few left populist parties that have sprung up in Western Europe reside in the countries most deeply affected by the global financial crisis and subsequent Eurozone Crisis — namely Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece. Given these associations, voters who are otherwise predisposed (as explained further below) to vote for populist parties who are disaffected on economic issues are likely to vote for a left populist, while voters disaffected on cultural issues are likely to support a right populist party with their ballot. In other words, right populist parties "own" cultural issues and left populist parties "own" economic issues.

Further, it should be expected that voters who consider themselves to be somewhat ideologically "center", but that are not quite represented by a mainstream consensus, are more likely to switch away from a mainstream party to a populist party, as they likely have fewer party ties. Those on the left and right are expected to be less likely to jump across ideological lines as well, i.e. a disaffected left voter is unlikely to vote for right populist pa-

rty. In other words, sticking within their bloc when voting for populists is expected of voters who consider themselves ideologically left or right.

Voters become disaffected when the incumbent government fails to adequately manage an issue, take a strong position, or enact legislation they desire. Disaffection is even stronger when no other mainstream party is holding an alternative position (see: ideological convergence below).

A reasonable response to arguing that populist parties 'own' these issues might be to point out that the mainstream left and right in a country may also 'own' these respective issues. Why does the mainstream right party not own issues of immigration, for instance? In fact they may. As Meguid (2005) argues, it is entirely possible for the right/left to co-opt the positions of their radical bloc partners. Mainstream parties may do so to 'steal' away/back votes from these populist parties, who have struck a chord with the public in forefronting said issue(s). In such cases, the populists would lose distinctiveness and their electoral viability would decrease - the intended result of such a co-optation. This is where ideological convergence comes into play in the rise of the populists.

1.2.2 Ideological Convergence

What happens when the mainstream parties do not co-opt the issues of populist parties or otherwise allow these parties to occupy a previously empty political space? The populist parties then own these issues and have carved out a political space for themselves. For voters who are disaffected — for whom the issue positions of the populists resonate — their new choice come election time becomes clearer. Under what circumstances might the mainstream choose not to co-opt issue positions?

There are many underlying circumstances that might lead mainstream parties to refuse to adopt/co-opt populist (or other smaller) party positions on certain issues. Such issue stances may interfere with long-held values (e.g. anti-immigration on the right and equality/inclusivity on the left). There may be little scientific evidence supporting a position. It may even be just a miscalculation on the importance of an issue to voters, coupled with an unwillingness to update their position. Whatever the underling reasoning may be, the end result is a state of *ideological convergence*.

Often seen (but little tested) in the populist literature is the claim that there has been an ideological realignment towards the center from both the left and right in many countries' party systems in Europe (Mudde, 2016; Pauwels, 2010; Muis & Immerzeel, 2016, p.4; van Kessel, 2011, p.78-81; Muller-Rommel, 1998, p.198; Spoon & Klüver, 2019, p. 1031-1034; Rydgren, 2005, p.422-423). Cas Mudde (2016) argues that many European societies post-1960s experienced deindustrialization and secularization. The lessened importance of class and religion among voters resulting from these phenomena led to a "gradual realignment in European politics... [that] saw voters throw their support to old parties that had become virtually nonideological or to new parties defined by relatively narrow ideological stances" (Mudde, 2016, p.27). Following this, Mudde contends "a new elite consensus" emerged, evoking "a common agenda that called for integration through the EU, multi-ethnic societies, and neoliberal economic reforms" (Mudde, 2016, p.27). In other words, among mainstream parties, a shift to the center occurred. Finally, this "convergence," argues Mudde (2016), "created a fertile breeding grounds for populism, as many voters be-

gan to see political elites as indistinguishable from one another, regardless of their party affiliations" (Mudde, 2016, p.27).

This inability to distinguish elites stems from both the aforementioned unified agenda, as well as the resulting powerlessness of national politicians as power was being re-centered at the EU level: concentrated more and more in the hands of unelected bureaucrats. In essence, the perception of choice has been lowering among citizens of many European countries, as mainstream parties become more ideologically similar. Ideological convergence, then, is an ideological similarity or interchangeability between the established political parties and politicians in a country.

Empirically, levels of ideological convergence, as seen in Table 1.2, have been fairly high in Europe for at least the last 25 years. This lends support to the ideological convergence theory. Table 1.2 was created using the CSES Integrated Module Dataset (IMD) and provides impressionistic evidence to this trend. Respondents were asked to place political parties running in the current election year on a left-right scale from zero to ten. To get a sense of the degree and change in ideological convergence, the scores for the top seat-getting party in the election on the left as well as of that on the right (including populist parties where applicable) were subtracted from one another, with the absolute value taken of the resulting difference. Table 1.2 reports the percentage of respondents who perceived high ideological convergence (top two parties being within three points of one another on the left-right ideological scale) among the largest left and right parties in their country in a given election year.

Table 1.2: European Ideological Convergence 1996-2016

Country	Year 1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Austria													65.4					77.7			
Bulgaria						22.7													18.1		
Czech Republic	17.1						21.7				19.2				22.6			51.8			
Denmark			49.1			54.3						48.0									
Finland								78.8				87.0				43.8				91.6	
France							55.6					33.5					31.9				
Germany			66.8				56.7			64.2				68.8				76.4			
Great Britain		45.6								69.0										42.4	
Greece														69.1			34.9			25.6	
Hungary			48.9				23.3														
Iceland				36.9				44.8				61.7		48.6				47.1			
Ireland							69.6					76.3				74.6					
Latvia															62.5	69.5			60.1		
Netherlands			63.6				63.5				58.0				36.7						
Norway		42.6				52.7				32.2				29.6				44.8			
Poland		28.8				36.6				62.2		41.0				63.2					
Portugal							66.2			69.9				72.3						44.9	
Romania	61.8								65.7					56.2			66.8		53.0		
Slovakia															32.4						41.4
Slovenia	79.1								67.9				62.6			55.4					
Spain	49.3				57.4				33.7				35.2								
Sweden			28.1				21.3				48.8								33.6		
Switzerland				40.6				27.1				30.5				23.6					

Source: CSES Integrated Module Dataset. Original Table.
Table shows the percent of respondents who perceived high ideological convergence (≥ 7)

Table 1.2 shows many countries fluctuating in their degree of ideological convergence over time, with many-to-most of the elections showing above fifty percent of respondents perceiving their mainstream left and right parties to be very ideologically similar. This trend matches with and supports the commonly-expressed narrative of the "move to the middle" by the political parties of many European countries. Major fluctuations here are an exception, as are the routinely low scores of a country like Sweden. Compared to Sweden, many more of the other countries' citizens have a significantly higher difficulty in distinguishing between the ideological positions of the left and right mainstream parties in their country. This degree of ideological convergence likely has a large effect on perceptions of citizens about their own political efficacy when they go to vote.

Interestingly, the existence and emergence of populists seems to have a divergent effect on these scores under different circumstances. Firstly, the countries whose largest seat-holding parties were populist for all their data points here — Hungary and Switzerland — have scores on the lower side of things for one or more elections. Secondly, the only case here of a populist party becoming the largest seat-holding party in the legislature was Greece in 2015. Syriza was the second largest party after the second (June) 2012 election, which appears to have tempered perceptions of ideological convergence, even more so once Syriza became the majority party in 2015.

Thirdly, however, other instances of populists joining the ranks of the top two parties in the legislature in other countries seem to have produced the opposite effect. The True Finns party won the second-most seats in Finland's 2015 election, a victory that saw an increase in the amount of respondents viewing the top two parties as ideologically

convergent from 43.8 percent to 91.6 percent. The Czech Republic experienced a similar jump when the populist ANO gained office going from 22.6 percent in 2010 to 51.8 percent in 2013.

The difference between these two cases and the Greek case can be potentially explained as follows. It may be the case that getting a populist into office has a tempering effect on perceptions of ideological convergence that is not immediate (as seen in the Greek case), with the ideological convergence perception being highest during the breakthrough election. This is likely, as populists often run on platforms stressing the lack of choice and corruption in the government. During an election that a populist party has run a campaign successful enough to become one of the top two seat-holding parties in the legislature, the perception of ideological convergence is likely high. The Greek 2012 case presented here is likely an exception to this as Greece had two elections in 2012, with the second being the one surveyed by CSES. Having already had time with Syriza in government after the first election of the year, respondents may have decided the government was no longer highly ideologically converged, as 69.1 percent of respondents thought three years prior. This is likely what happened in the Netherlands as well, with Geert Wilder's PVV (Party for Freedom) having won 5.9 percent of seats in 2006 (later obtaining 15.4 percent in 2010). The perception of high ideological convergence following this breakthrough electoral result dropped from 58 percent the year of the election to just 36.7 the following election.

Lastly, Iceland's populist Progressive party received the second-most seats in the 2013 election, but this seems to have had little effect. This may be due to the fact that the

party is old and was part of the mainstream for a long time. Only after the 2008 economic crisis did the party take its mild populist turn.

1.2.3 Putting It All Together: Left and Right Populist Voter Behavior Hypotheses

The above theoretical insights give rise to the following theory of populist voting behavior. Voters become disaffected when the government fails to enact or champion policies they desire. This is especially the case with policies that require reaction, such as responses to crises (e.g. immigration or economic). When the mainstream parties fail to adequately address such issues with their policies, smaller parties — including populist parties — that champion different stances stand to gain voters. Many smaller parties often focus on one or a small group of issues and so their issue ownership tends to be high among voters. Who better to fix what ails them than these parties then?

Furthermore, if the mainstream parties agree on how to handle an issue, there is no real viable alternative. In other words, in the face of government failure, instances of high ideological convergence leave voters little real choice except to vote for smaller parties that hold different issues stances.

In sum, disaffected voters will vote for a party with a viable alternative position in the face of ideological convergence among mainstream political parties and politicians in their country.

What about left and right populists? Voters for left and right populists both share a disaffection with the mainstream government and both lament the lack of real choice among mainstream parties. Where the two types of voters diverge however, is on

the issues they care about most. Recalling the definition of left and right populists given in section 1.1, right populists tend to emphasize exclusivity and strong stances on cultural issues, such as immigration. For left populists, inclusivity and a focus on economic issues dominate party platforms.

All together, the theory laid out here suggests differing pathways to getting votes for left and right populists. For left populists, voters disaffected by government failure to adequately address economic issues, under conditions of ideological convergence, will turn to left populists for alternative policies to fix the economy. For right populists, voters disaffected by government failure to adequately address cultural/immigration issues, under conditions of ideological convergence, will turn to right populists for alternative policies to 'fix' the state of the country's culture.

From the above theory, four hypotheses may be derived. The first two hypotheses focus on voting for right populists and its relationship to government failure, ideological convergence, and the interaction between the two. More formally:

H1: *If a voter feels their government has failed to adequately handle or address an important cultural issue, then they will be more likely to vote for a right populist party.*

H2: *If a voter feels their government has failed to adequately handle or address an important cultural issue and that voting for a different mainstream party would produce similar results due to ideological convergence, then they will be more likely to vote for a right populist party.*

The second pair of hypotheses follows this formulation closely, but replaces cultural issues with economic issues, as well as right populists with left populists. It reads:

H3: *If a voter feels their government has failed to adequately handle or address an important economic issue, then they will be more likely to vote for a left populist party.*
H4: *If a voter feels their government has failed to adequately handle or address an important economic issue and that voting for a different mainstream party would produce similar results due to ideological convergence, then they will be more likely to vote for a left populist party.*

The expectation in these hypotheses is that the effects of hypothesis 2 would be greater than just those of hypothesis 1, with the same being true for hypotheses 4 and 3, respectively.

1.3 Roadmap of the Dissertation

In order to test these hypotheses a mixed-methods design will be employed by this dissertation. Importantly, I concur with Seawright (2016) that integration rather than triangulation is the proper way to conduct multi-method research. Triangulation, Seawright (2016, p.4) argues, asks "the same question of causal inference using two different methods, and checking that the same substantive conclusions are produced by both." This is problematic as the different methods are asking fundamentally different questions, even if they seem to be focused on the same topic (Seawright, 2016, p.7). That utilizing both methods

to try and answer the same question is possible is dubious in the first respect and useless at best. As Seawright (2016) argues, there is little "serious" evidence that "causal inference is more likely to succeed when it is done twice with different tools and non-comparable results within a single book or article" (p.8).

In contrast to this triangulation method is integrative multi-method research. One integrative method Seawright (2016) suggests is to use case studies to test and refine regressions. In this way, qualitative methods can supplement regression analysis and strengthen it, rather than attempt to replicate it for no real benefit. Four ways for case studies to test and refine regressions are suggested: identifying a case's counterfactuals, validating measurement, testing or discovering hypotheses about causal pathways, and searching for confounders. Of relevance here is the third of these suggestions – testing hypotheses about causal pathways.

Proceeding with this design in mind, the dissertation begins with quantitative analysis in Chapter 2. This large-n study employs random-intercept multilevel logistic regression analysis to test the correlation of the relationship between voting for a left/right populist party and disaffection with government policy on economic/cultural issues. This relationship will be further defined by interacting disaffection with ideological convergence to see whether perceptions of higher ideological similarity among mainstream parties increases the likelihood that disaffected voters will vote for a populist party.

Supplementing the large-n analysis will be two case studies. Chapter 3 will follow the case of France and the Front/Rassemblement National as an example of right populism. The Front/Rassemblement National represents a paradigmatic and long-standing case of

European right populism and thus represents an excellent case for this study. The RN is well-known and has achieved decent electoral success in more recent years as its popularity has been growing.

Chapter 4 will follow the case of Spain and Podemos as an example of left populism. Podemos, again, represents a best-fit case for left populism. The only other European left populist case that might be suitable would be Syriza in Greece, but there are extra factors that complicate using Greece. Firstly, Syriza has attained a near-parliamentary majority in the past and was able to form a coalition government. This not only mainstreamed the party to a degree, but forced backpedaling in policy that significantly complicates analysis of voting behavior and attitudes towards Syriza. Much more common for populist parties is to not achieve such success.

These cases are excellent fits further because they compliment one another in several ways. Firstly, the RN and Podemos have both achieved relatively high electoral success for populist parties. Secondly, France and Spain are good fits for a most-similar systems design, allowing for comparison between them. Both countries consolidated democracy about twenty years apart - though France arguably has a more storied history with democracy, and it is a more recent development in Spain. Both countries are European Union members, as well as European Monetary Union members. Both countries are Schengen Area members. Both countries are unitary states[3] with bicameral parliaments. Both countries have experienced similar economic growth rates over the last five decades, even if France has been wealthier overall. Further, both countries have been dominated more or less by similar left and right mainstream parties since their transition/return to democracy. Given these

[3]At least constitutionally. Spain is a more complicated case on this matter, however.

similarities, the fact that left populism became pronounced in Spain and right populism became pronounced in France leaves the question of why this difference mounted ripe for testing.

The goal with these case studies is to qualitatively check that the causal pathways are functioning in the way suggested, verifying the results of a positive large-n correlation finding, or giving further insight or understanding in the case of negative statistical results, as the case may be. The causal mechanisms that are tested are the underlying assumptions of the statistical model and theory. The assumptions are namely that: voters for each party privilege the suggested (economic or cultural) issue type, voters feel the government is responsible for dealing with that issue (and therefore would use voting as a way to seek change), voters perceive mainstream parties as being ideologically convergent (thus removing them from the voting options when change is desired), and populist parties message clearly according to these issues (respective to the alignment of the populist party) and thus become the clear choice for a vote for change on said issue. To test these mechanisms, survey data and expert data from the Manifesto Project, European Election Voter Study, Comparative Agendas Project, as well as an original data set of Front/Rassemblement National press releases are utilized.

The dissertation concludes with a short discussion of the findings of the study, its contributions to the study of left and right populism – as well as populism more generally – and insights for future work.

Chapter 2

Pathways to Populism:

Quantitative Analysis

This chapter tests the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter by using large-n quantitative analysis. The data to be utilized in testing these hypotheses is from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). In particular, the CSES Module 5 Second Advance Release (CSES5-A2) was utilized as it was the most recent module at the time of testing, as well as because it contains the necessary variables across a range of cases (with populist parties) in the region of interest - Europe.[1] The relevant countries and elections in which the CSES5-A2 conducted surveys include: Austria (2017), France (2017), Germany (2017), Greece (2015), Hungary (2018), Ireland (2016), Italy (2018), Montenegro (2016), and Norway (2017).

[1]Earlier CSES Modules (1-4) do not contain questions surrounding attitudes towards immigration, which are critical to building the variable for government cultural failure.

To begin building the relevant measures, expert scores from questions on the degree of populism and the ideological alignment for each party in each country were combined to classify each party as being either left populist, right populist, or neither. The expert CSES collaborator in each country classified each political party's degree of populism on a scale from 0 (not at all populist) to 10 (very populist). Parties that scored a 6 or below were coded as "not populist." Those that scored a 7 or higher were coded in this project as being "populist". The expert CSES collaborator also classified each party's ideology on a scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). Parties that scored between 0 and 3 were coded as "left," between 4 and 6 were "center," and between 7 and 10 were "right."

Combining these measures, parties that scored below a 7 on the populist scale were not considered populist and were coded as a "0." Parties that scored a 7 or above on the populism scale were then coded as left populist if they also received a left-right ideology score of 3 or lower and as right populist if they received a score of 7 or higher. Populist parties that fell in the middle — "center" — were coded as not left or right populist.

The dependent variables were then created from these classifications. The dependent variable for each model is the party vote choice of the respondent for the lower house of the legislature. The sole exception to these two criteria is France. The CSES5-A2 dataset only contained votes for the presidential election. As such, the vote choice for France is based on the first round of the 2017 presidential election. An appendix with results excluding the French case is included at the end of this dissertation.

For the right populism dependent variable, a vote for a party classified as right populist was coded as "1" and all others were coded as "0." For the left populism dependent

Table 2.1: Political Party Populism Classifications 2016-2018

Country	Party Name	Populism Score	Left-Right Score
Austria			
	The Greens - The Green Alternative	2	2
	Peter Pilz List	6	3
	Social Democratic Party of Austria	4	4
	The New Austria and Liberal Forum	3	6
	Liste Sebastian Kurz	6	7
	Freedom Party of Austria	**9**	**9**
France			
	Indomitable France	**8**	**2**
	Socialist Party	3	4
	The Republic Onwards!	6	5
	The Republicans	4	7
	France Arise	**8**	**9**
	Front National/Rassemblement National	**10**	**10**
Germany			
	Left Party	4	2
	Alliance 90/ The Greens	2	4
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	2	4
	Christian Democratic Union of Germany	1	6
	Free Democratic Party	2	6
	Christian Social Union in Bavaria	2	7
	Free Voters	3	7
	Alternative for Germany	**7**	**9**
Greece			
	Communist Party of Greece	**8**	**1**
	Coalition of the Radical Left	**8**	**3**
	Democratic Coalition	3	5
	The River	3	5
	New Democracy	2	7
	Union of Centrists	6	7
	Independent Greeks (ANEL)	**7**	**8**
	Popular Association - Golden Dawn	**8**	**10**
Hungary			
	Hungarian Socialist Party	6	2
	Together	1	3
	Democratic Coalition	3	4
	Politics Can Be Different	4	4
	Momentum Movement	3	5
	Jobbik	**7**	**7**
	Fidesz	**9**	**9**
Ireland			
	Anti-Austerity Alliance	**7**	**2**
	Social Democrats	3	3
	We Ourselves	6	3
	Green Party	2	4
	Labour Party	2	4
	Tribe of the Irish	2	6
	Soldiers of Destiny	3	6
Italy			
	Free and Equal	0	1
	Democratic Party	2	4
	Five Star Movement	**10**	**5**
	Go Italy	4	7
	Brothers of Italy	**7**	**9**
	Northern League	**9**	**9**
Montenegro			
	Social Democratic Party of Montenegro	3	4
	Democratic Montenegro	6	4
	Albanians Decisively	0	5
	Croatian Civic Initiative	0	5
	Key Coalition	6	5
	Social Democrats of Montenegro	2	7
	Bosniak Party	3	7
	Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro	4	7
	Democratic Front	**8**	**7**
Norway			
	Red	4	1
	Socialist Left Party	3	2
	Labor Party	2	3
	The Greens	3	4
	Center Party	5	4
	Christian Democratic Party	2	5
	Liberal Party	2	6
	Conservative Party	2	7
	Progress Party	**7**	**8**

Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Table.
Populist parties in bold.

variable, a vote for a party classified as left populist was coded as "1" and all other were coded as "0."

The first independent variable is Incumbent Failure on the Economy (IFE). This variable is intended to measure whether the survey respondent feels that the government has failed to adequately address an economic issue. The variable is created by combining measures of government performance and evaluations of the state of the economy. While not perfect, it is likely that those who believe the economy had gotten worse and that the government had done a poor job, are evaluating the government at least partially on the basis of the state of the economy. Whether citizens are thinking of their own personal economic situation, or that of the nation at large, it is likely they attribute poor economic outcomes to government (in)action, even if not similarly recognizing good economic times as the product of government policy. As the theory here is primarily concerned with voters who bemoan the state of the economy, combining these measures as follows should group voters fairly accurately into two groups: those who blame the government for the poor economy and those who either think the economy is fine or do not attribute the poor economy to the government.

For the first of these measures, respondents were asked how they thought the government had performed in general over the past number of years since it had been elected. Possible relevant responses were: (1) Very Good Job, (2) Good Job, (3) Bad Job, and (4) Very Bad Job. For the state of the economy, respondents were asked whether over the past 12 months the state of the economy has: (1) Gotten Much Better, (2) Gotten Somewhat Better, (3) Stayed About the Same, (4) Gotten Somewhat Worse, or (5) Gotten

Much Worse. The two measures were combined to create two groupings: (1) People who thought the economy had got worse [a score of 3 or 4] as well as that the government performed poorly [a score of 4 or 5] and (2) everyone else.

The second independent variable is Incumbent Failure on Culture (Immigration) (IFC). Immigration is the largest cultural issue discussed by the right in Europe and is representative here of broader cultural issues, as many related issues in this category often manifest as anti-immigration. Like the incumbent failure on the economy variable, this not a perfect measure. However, those who hold anti-immigration attitudes and believe the government performed poorly in the previous year are at least somewhat likely to be thinking of immigration policy when evaluating the government. This is different from the incumbent failure on the economy variable as well in that it is more of a measure of held attitudes and not the degree to which the economy/immigration is an issue. Given the propensity of people to believe the amount of immigration in their country is much higher than in actuality — the innumeracy phenomenon (Herda, 2010) — and given the likelihood that those who hold anti-immigrant attitudes are likely to experience such overestimation more acutely and deem it a 'crisis' more readily, this measure is likely still combining groups of people who share the view that immigration is a problem and that it is the government's fault.

Despite these conceptual differences, the incumbent failure on culture variable is crafted very similarly to the incumbent failure on the economy variable, in that both combine other measures with government performance. For this variable, government performance is combined with a question aimed at measuring attitudes towards immigrants. This variable

is intended to measure whether the survey respondent feels that the government has failed to adequately address issues of immigration related to culture — a "cultural backlash" (Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

Survey respondents were asked whether they (1) Strongly Agree, (2) Somewhat Agree, (3) Neither Agree Nor Disagree, (4) Disagree, or (5) Strongly Disagree with the statement "[Country]'s culture is generally harmed by immigrants." This question was then inverted so that higher values coincided with more anti-immigrant attitudes. The government performance and immigration culture variables were then combined to create two groups of people: (1) People who thought immigration was harmful to a country's culture [4 or 5] as well as that the government performed poorly [a score of 4 or 5] and (2) everyone else.

Compared to the other available immigration questions, this question specifically asks about the perceived effects of immigrants on the country's culture. The other available questions ask about immigration's perceived effect on the economy and crime. The first of these alternative questions would be less ideal to use as it problematically ties together questions of the economy and immigration, which are posited as having separate effects for this paper. The question on crime as well, might invoke an economic connection in the mind of the respondent, as crime is often linked to illegal trade. While true the question on culture may also invoke economic ties, it is the least likely to do so out of the three and should only do so very indirectly.

The final main independent variable is ideological convergence. This variable was created by taking the absolute value of the difference of the top two seat-getting parties

from either bloc. In other words, ideological convergence is the ideological distance between the party that won the most seats that is ideologically center-right/right and the party that is ideologically on the center/center-left that won the most seats. Respondents were asked to place all relevant parties in the election on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). While respondents may not be the most accurate judges of how left or right a party *actually* is, their perceptions of how close parties are ideologically is more germane to the theory of this paper than correct approximations (should perceptions and reality diverge).

In most cases, the top two seat-getting parties are also from opposing blocs: one left and one right. However, in a few instances, the ideological convergence variable had to be adjusted to make sure one party from each bloc was represented. The cases in the data here that needed to be adjusted were: France, Hungary, and Ireland.

This adjustment is necessary to get an accurate assessment of the amount of perceived ideological convergence across bloc lines. For example, if two right-wing parties each separately earned the most and second-most seats in the legislature, it would be of little surprise that they were ideologically similar. Further, it may be the case that a smaller left party, while still large in it's own right, offered radically different policy alternatives in that same country. In this case, simply looking at the two largest parties would miss the critical comparison — whether or not there is a mainstream alternative position available.

Controls were largely left as coded in the CSES5-A2. Age was included, as well as age squared, as the literature on populist voting has found a parabolic effect, with younger (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p. 428-432; Taggart, 1995, p.44) and older people (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p.428-432) being more likely to vote for populists, while middle-age people

are less likely to vote for them. Women have been found to be less likely to vote for (right) populists than men (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p.428-432; Taggart, 1995, p. 44), and gender is included as a binary variable. Finally education has been found to have an effect on voting for populists as well,[2] with more education equaling a lessened likelihood of voting for populist candidates, with a middle school level education being the most likely to vote for (right) populists (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p.428-432; Bos et al., 2013, p.204). There is little evident reason at this time to believe any of these control variables to be confounders.

2.1 Models

Random-intercept multilevel logistic regression analysis will be utilized to test the hypotheses. Logistic regression was utilized due to the binary nature of the dependent variable(s). A random-intercept multilevel model was utilized as the survey-level data has individuals nested within countries. Using random-intercept multilevel logistic regression helps control for some unobserved differences between countries and allows for a slightly greater ability to infer the results to a greater population of cases.

Four variables will minimally be needed to conduct this test. The dependent variable will be the vote choice of the respondent. Two separate models will be run with the dependent variable being whether the respondent voted for a right populist (1) or not (0), as well as whether the respondent voted for a left populist (1) or not (0). The independent variables will be (1) government failure on the economy (2) government failure on immigration and (3) ideological convergence.

[2]Particularly right populists.

Further, the government failure variables and the ideological convergence variables will be separately interacted. The theoretical expectation is that government failure only leads to a substantial increase in populist votes when alternative choices among mainstream parties and positions are lacking, i.e. under conditions of ideological convergence. The resulting models are:

[Vote Choice: Right Populist] = α + β_{1ij}[Government Fail. Imm.] * β_{2ij}[Ideological Convergence] + β_{3ij}[Government Fail. Econ.] * β_{2ij}[Ideological Convergence] + Controls + u

[Vote Choice: Left Populist] = α + β_{1ij}[Government Fail. Imm.] * β_{2ij}[Ideological Convergence] + β_{3ij}[Government Fail. Econ.] * β_{2ij}[Ideological Convergence] + Controls + u

2.2 Results

Results will be presented for both the full sample and according to respondent ideology — left, center, or right. The sample is split rather than adding another interaction, as this would unnecessarily complicate the interpretation and presentation of findings. It is expected that those most likely to vote for a populist party will be those in the center of the ideological spectrum, as they are less likely to have strong preexisting ties to a particular party compared to those who consider themselves left and right ideologically. Additionally, it is expected that those who consider themselves ideologically left or right will be more pr-

edisposed to vote for a populist party from their same bloc under conditions of ideological convergence.

The reasoning here is that, say, leftists who no longer perceive there to be a "left" choice among mainstream parties are more likely to seek out a left alternative, including populist parties. The same could be expected under similar conditions for right voters and right populist parties. Under conditions of low ideological convergence, it is expected that left voters are most likely to vote for an ideologically distinctive left mainstream party. The same may be said of the right and ideologically distinctive right mainstream parties. In other words, when a perceived ideological choice remains, voters will be more likely to stick with the mainstream parties, than to seek out ideological alternatives on the outsides of the party spectrum.

As explained in section 2.1, results will be presented separately for left and right populists. In an ideal world, many cases would exist that have both left and right populism so that a multinomial choice model might be utilized. This is unfortunately not the case, however. Therefore, running different models for both left and right populists is necessary as not every case — in fact almost no case — in the data set has both a left and right populist party running in an election. Two exceptions to this are Greece and France, which do have both right and left populist parties, albeit not equally large or successful parties. This means the tests of right populism will include data from every country except Ireland, while the tests of left populism will be subset to just France, Greece, and Ireland. However, to distinguish the relevant effects, both interactions (In. Fail. Econ. x Ideo. Conv. and In. Fail. Cult. x Ideo. Conv.) are included in each model. This design is meant to ascertain

whether the proposed divergence between left and right populism is present, rather than a case where both interactions are substantively and statistically significant, or a case where the inverse of the proposed relationship is true. An example of the latter case would be a right populist vote choice being driven by an interaction between economic government failure at higher levels of ideological convergence, instead of a cultural government failure.

Expectations for the results of the analysis are that the interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence will be significant and positively-signed for right populists, but not for left populists, or at least not as substantively significant for left populists. This would indicate that under conditions of ideological convergence, government failure to address cultural issues/immigration leads more voters to vote for right populist parties.

Similarly, the interaction between incumbent failure on the economy and ideological failure is expected to be significant for left populists, but not for right populists, or at least not as substantively significant. This would indicate that under conditions of ideological convergence, government failure to address economic issues leads more voters to vote for left populist parties.

2.2.1 Right Populism Results

The results of the multilevel logistic regressions in Table 2.2 show support for the proposed theory as pertains to right populist voters. For 'All' voters in both models, the interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence is positive, significant, and substantive. Demonstrated in the top-left graph of Figure 2.1, the marginal

Table 2.2: Random-intercept Multilevel Models: Right Populism and Culture

	Basic Model				Full Model			
	All	Left	Center	Right	All	Left	Center	Right
In. Fail. Cult.	-0.601***	-0.00243	-0.342	0.590	-0.655***	-0.0721	-0.388	0.568
	(-3.41)	(-0.00)	(-0.92)	(1.77)	(-3.70)	(-0.12)	(-1.04)	(1.67)
Ideo. Conv.	-0.147***	-0.0126	-0.0691	-0.0496	-0.140***	-0.0178	-0.0649	-0.0404
	(-7.91)	(-0.18)	(-1.78)	(-1.73)	(-7.52)	(-0.26)	(-1.69)	(-1.39)
In. Fail. Cult. × Ideo. Conv.	0.307***	0.296***	0.262***	0.0981*	0.300***	0.286**	0.254***	0.0928
	(11.76)	(3.35)	(5.14)	(2.06)	(11.46)	(3.26)	(4.99)	(1.92)
In. Fail. Econ.	0.115	0.525	0.0123	0.553	0.125	0.559	0.0146	0.542
	(0.57)	(0.92)	(0.03)	(1.55)	(0.62)	(0.97)	(0.04)	(1.49)
In. Fail. Econ. × Ideo. Conv.	0.0385	-0.0483	0.0391	0.00864	0.0307	-0.0592	0.0312	0.00167
	(1.32)	(-0.55)	(0.71)	(0.17)	(1.04)	(-0.68)	(0.56)	(0.03)
Age					0.0348**	0.0264	0.0118	0.0511**
					(3.02)	(0.61)	(0.67)	(2.66)
Age Squared					-0.000447***	-0.000393	-0.000212	-0.000644***
					(-3.91)	(-0.89)	(-1.22)	(-3.44)
Gender (Female)					-0.272***	-0.130	-0.151	-0.285*
					(-4.08)	(-0.51)	(-1.43)	(-2.56)
Education					-0.206***	-0.276**	-0.239***	-0.184***
					(-10.01)	(-3.20)	(-6.88)	(-5.78)
Constant	-1.782**	-4.286***	-2.394***	-1.327	-0.852	-2.845*	-0.973	-0.771
	(-2.64)	(-6.65)	(-3.58)	(-1.48)	(-1.17)	(-2.24)	(-1.22)	(-0.75)
Country (random effect)	3.870	1.650	3.257	6.637	3.699	1.420	3.054	6.496
	(1.74)	(1.50)	(1.74)	(1.80)	(1.74)	(1.46)	(1.73)	(1.80)
Likelihood-Ratio Test (p-value)	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Observations	8300	2111	3915	2274	8300	2111	3915	2274

t statistics in parentheses
Sample split up by Respondent Ideology: All, Left, Center, Right.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

effect of incumbent failure on culture on voting for a right populist party increases by around 30 percentage points as ideological convergence moves from its minimum value (0) to it maximum value (10). Center voters share a similar pattern and significance, seeing the most pronounced effects of all the ideological subgroups. Curiously, left voters follow a similar trend, though the result only becomes more pronounced at higher levels of ideological convergence compared to the more linear effect seen with the center voters. Right voters again follow a similar pattern, with a slightly weaker statistical relationship, larger confidence intervals, and a weaker substantive relationship as well.

Comparing Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the importance of the interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence becomes clear. For both the All and Center groups, the marginal effect of incumbent failure on culture on voting for right populists is negative until about a moderate level of ideological convergence. This is expected, as those who view the largest parties as offering distinctive alternatives should be less likely to seek out a smaller party to fulfill their policy wishes. However, the turning point from being unlikely to vote for a populist party to being more likely happens at around the mid-point of ideological convergence scores. A five-point difference in ideology between the largest right and left parties is still quite a big gap. However, this trend continues and the more ideological convergence that is perceived, the higher the likelihood someone will vote for a right populist. This goes to show that government failure on culture has an effect on its own outside of ideological convergence, but that it is more profound in conjunction with high levels of it. Even what may seem like a relatively large gap — 3 points — makes a large percentage point difference.

Figure 2.1: Full Model - Marginal Effects of Cultural Government Failure on Voting for Right Populists, Conditional on Ideological Convergence



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

Turning to Figure 2.2, high ideological convergence clearly relies on government failure on culture to drive voters to vote for right populist parties. The marginal effect of ideological convergence on voting for right populists either hovers the zero mark or is negative when people do not believe the government has done that bad of a job on immigration. However, once people become critical of the government's in/action on immigration, then ideological convergence has a large effect.

Together, incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence have a strong effect on voter behavior towards right populist parties. While incumbent failure on culture has an effect of its own at normal (middling) levels of ideological convergence, its effects are greatest when citizens start to view the largest parties as offering them no real alternatives on cultural policies. Ideological convergence on the other hand does not seem to have an effect without government failure. This is to be expected. Why should anyone care if the largest parties are adopting the same policy if the policy works?

On the other side of things, the interaction between incumbent failure on the economy and ideological convergence does not have any statistically significant effect on voting for right populists. This contributes to the theory, as it is necessary that only the proposed factors (in this case incumbent failure on culture) contribute to each type of populism. The lack of significance of the interaction including incumbent failure on the economy then signals that right populist voters care more about cultural issues than economic issues and vote accordingly.

Adding in the controls has not changed the results very much compared to the models without them. One notable difference is the drop in significance among right voters.

Figure 2.2: Full Model - Marginal Effects of Ideological Convergence on Voting for Right Populists, Conditional on Cultural Government Failure



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

The interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence retains the same levels of significance for All and Center voters, with the Left voters going from a one percent probability these results are due to chance to a five percent chance. The beta coefficients are also very similar. Finally, the sign remains positive. The interaction between incumbent failure on the economy and ideological convergence remains insignificant. Again, while not expected explicitly to have no relationship, the fact the the interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence is more important for right populist votes in both models than of that between incumbent failure on the economy and ideological convergence is in line with this paper's theory.

Looking at the controls themselves, age-squared seems to have a statistically significant, but substantively very small, negative effect on voting for right populists. According to these results, a voter who is 80 is about 2.8 percentage points less likely to vote for a right populist than an eighteen-year-old on average. Growing a decade older is about a 0.5 percentage point decrease in likelihood of voting for a right populist on average. While this effect is rather small, being a member of an older age cohort may be an important contributing factor in choosing whether or not to vote for a right populist party.

Women overall and on the right, as expected, are about 27 percentage points less likely to vote for right populists than men. Finally, once again as expected, education has a negative relationship to voting for populists.

In both the basic and full models, the likelihood-ratio test shows the multilevel models to be a better fit than a standard logistic regression model.

2.2.2 Left Populism Results

The results of the test of left populism are less clear than for right populism, which may be expected as there are far fewer countries and observations for these tests comparatively. There are no statistically significant results for the interaction between incumbent failure on the economy and ideological convergence, and half the results are signed contrary to expectations (negatively). The marginal effects graphs in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 highlight weak trends, with small confidence intervals, for each voter group. Again, the likelihood-ratio test shows the multilevel models to be a better fit than a regular logistic regression, with the exception (this time) of the models subset to only include ideologically-right voters.

One likely explanation for this null result is the (necessary) inclusion of Greece. Greece was one of the most economically devastated countries during the Eurozone crisis, and the left populist Syriza (the reason the Greek case is included here) was largely elected on the promise to help fix the Greek economy. Instead of facing down harsh European Union restrictions however, Syriza kowtowed, to the great displeasure of many voters. Given the comparative weakness of the left populists remaining in the sample (in France and Ireland), it is likely that the Greek case is driving these results.

Given Syriza's populist status, the amount of citizens who believe there to be a high amount of ideological convergence in the country is smaller compared to other European countries. This is suggested as well by the scores in Table 1.2, with Greece in 2015 having one of the lowest scores reported for ideological convergence. In the Greek case then, it

Table 2.3: Random-intercept Multilevel Models: Left Populism and Economics

	Basic Model				Full Model			
	All	Left	Center	Right	All	Left	Center	Right
In. Fail. Cult.	-1.680***	0.495	-1.508*	-1.390	-1.779***	0.331	-1.508*	-1.989
	(-3.95)	(0.62)	(-2.18)	(-0.85)	(-4.22)	(0.41)	(-2.21)	(-1.17)
Ideo. Conv.	-0.0607	0.0118	-0.0664	0.227	-0.0803*	-0.0160	-0.0854	0.187
	(-1.71)	(0.22)	(-1.09)	(1.53)	(-2.24)	(-0.29)	(-1.41)	(1.20)
In. Fail. Cult. × Ideo. Conv.	0.105	-0.120	0.153	0.195	0.111	-0.0995	0.150	0.246
	(1.75)	(-1.07)	(1.62)	(0.85)	(1.87)	(-0.87)	(1.61)	(1.06)
In. Fail. Econ.	-1.138**	1.397*	-1.214*	1.691	-1.239***	1.373*	-1.362*	1.478
	(-3.11)	(2.08)	(-2.07)	(1.08)	(-3.37)	(2.02)	(-2.32)	(0.86)
In. Fail. Econ. × Ideo. Conv.	0.0878	-0.179	0.0809	-0.349	0.0923	-0.179	0.0941	-0.371
	(1.63)	(-1.83)	(0.96)	(-1.55)	(1.71)	(-1.81)	(1.12)	(-1.63)
Age					-0.0204	-0.0472	-0.0234	0.0824
					(-1.12)	(-1.52)	(-0.81)	(0.92)
Age Squared					-0.0000400	0.000296	-0.0000682	-0.00113
					(-0.22)	(0.97)	(-0.23)	(-1.22)
Gender (Female)					0.0666	-0.338	0.350*	0.00726
					(0.62)	(-1.83)	(2.12)	(0.01)
Education					-0.124***	-0.0656	-0.144**	-0.232
					(-3.74)	(-1.22)	(-2.74)	(-1.40)
Constant	-0.947	-0.503	-1.323	-4.646***	0.875	2.020	0.363	-4.007
	(-1.02)	(-0.58)	(-1.30)	(-4.83)	(0.79)	(1.61)	(0.28)	(-1.50)
Country (random effect)	0.445	0.335	0.480	-18.97	0.517	0.420	0.560	-0.750
	(1.07)	(0.78)	(1.12)	(-0.00)	(1.25)	(0.99)	(1.32)	(-0.63)
Likelihood-Ratio Test (p-value)	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	1	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	0.299
Observations	2510	606	1257	647	2510	606	1257	647

t statistics in parentheses
Sample split up by Respondent Ideology: All, Left, Center, Right.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2.3: Full Model - Marginal Effects of Economic Government Failure on Voting for Left Populists, Conditional on Ideological Convergence



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

Figure 2.4: Full Model - Marginal Effects of Ideological Convergence on Voting for Left Populists, Conditional on Economic Government Failure



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

appears regardless of whether Syriza's actions caused voters to change their views to think of Syriza as just another centrist mainstream party or not, voters do not want to support a party that could not fix the economy. For those who thought Syriza sold out, the likelihood of voting for them only decreased further. This is suggested at by the Left voter marginal effects graphs in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, but the results are not statistically significant. In light of this explanation, the results here are suggestively in *support* of the theory outlined in this paper, though more testing will need to be done to confirm this is the case. Future releases of the CSES Module 5 will contain data on more left populist parties, and this interpretation will be tested more thoroughly.

As was true of the full model with controls for right populism, not much has changed for the full models for left populism. Statistical significance remains nonexistent. Once again, however, the interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence has no significance to voting for left populism, which is in line with the theory. The controls look somewhat differed, however, with age-squared dropping out of significance for every group. The sign for gender has flipped from right populism for all but the left group, as women (expectedly) are more likely to support the more inclusive left populism than right populism., though perhaps not more so than a mainstream left party. Finally, education drops off in statistical and substantive significance for left and right voters, as compared to the right populist models.

2.3 Discussion and Conclusion

The results presented in this paper show mixed results for the paper's theory. The relationship between right populist votes and the interaction between ideological convergence and incumbent failure on culture is strong. The suggested parallel relationship between left populist votes and the interaction between ideological convergence and incumbent failure on the economy has proven less robust. However, given the large differences in available data, it may be expected a greater influx of observations and cases may change this, especially given the current necessity of including the outlier Greek case.

The first takeaway from the significant right populist results is the importance of center-aligned voters as a group. This group appears to feel policy failures and perceptions of not having a real choice to the largest degree. This makes this groups potentially prime targets for populist parties that are seeking to gain votes. Ironically then, it may be the case that a "move to the center" is alienating center voters. The importance of center voters in affecting both mainstream and populist policies needs further investigation.

A second takeaway is the importance of perceptions of ideological convergence in shaping voting behavior. While voters across the ideological spectrum may be disappointed by the policies (or lack thereof) being put out by the government, this only really leads to punishing mainstream parties by going elsewhere when it looks like that is the only choice remaining to bring about change. Ideological convergence, as operationalized here, stands to act as a powerful proxy for the disaffection towards elites that is fundamental to populism.

Future research should take the claims of populists more seriously when looking at their behavior. In other words, if populists say they think the government is corrupt/collusive or that there is no real choice between picking some elites over others, then this is going to be an important factor affecting their decision of for whom they will vote. Future research should also strive to include more cases of left populism as they become more available. As left populism has become more prominent since the mid-2010s — versus the early 1990s for right populism — this should become easier.

Results were confirmatory for the hypotheses on right populism. Results for left populism did not confirm the hypotheses, though the hypotheses were also not disproved. The value in examining left and right populism still remains and further research is warranted. While it is not clear exactly from the results presented that left and right populist voters vote according to differing policy failures mixed with perceived ideological convergence, it is the case that right populist voters react to cultural failures more than/rather than economic failures and that left populists (at the very least) do not react to cultural failures.

Chapter 3

Right-wing Populism: France and the Rassemblement National

France is perhaps one of the best known cases of right populism in the Western world besides the U.S. case. Marine Le Pen's candidacy in the second-round of the 2017 French presidential election was a strong indicator that right-wing populism was gaining significant ground in France - despite the fact she would later receive only half as many votes as Emmanuel Macron. However, the history of right populism in France extends much further back than Marine Le Pen - with just the Rassmeblment/Front National being founded around four decades prior to tis election.

Given the history and current strength of right-wing populism in France, the case represents an excellent fit for checking the mechanism assumptions underlying the quantitative chapter results for right-wing populism. The regression analysis in the previous chapter verified a positive relationship for the interaction between cultural government fail-

ure and ideological convergence on voting for right-wing populists. Having established this relationship through quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis may now be used to test that the relationship is present for the reasons suggested by the theory. For instance, are people voting for right-wing populists *because* they believe the government failed to produce the cultural policies they desire and because no other mainstream party will offer them said policies? Case study analysis will help verify the causal assumptions underlying the regression analysis. Namely, it will seek to verify the underlying assumptions that:

- (certain) citizens privilege one group of relevant issues (economic v. cultural) more than the other (privileged issues)
- citizens blame the governing and mainstream parties for poor economic/cultural conditions (government responsibility)
- governing and mainstream parties essentially offer similar stances on issues of import (ideological convergence), and
- populist parties target voters according to specific issue messages (messaging)

In other words, case study analysis helps verify the regression assumptions that there is empirical evidence that citizens care about economic/cultural issues more than cultural/economic issues, blame the government for current economic/cultural conditions, perceive mainstream party ideological convergence, and that political parties are creating clear, strategic signals that they represent a viable alternative political party for people who desire specific economic/cultural issue positions.

This chapter will investigate these causal chain assumptions in turn by utilizing evidence from France and the Rassemblement National party.

3.1 Privileged Issues

Knowing whom to blame when something goes wrong is an important step to the electoral logic of many citizens. Or, at the very least, having someone or somebody to blame. But this only applies when there is something for which to assign blame in the first place. While many citizens may be multi-faceted and politically aware, others are single-issue voters. In either case, citizens consciously or subconsciously have issues that they feel are of more importance than others – even others they feel to be rather important.

The theory of this dissertation proposes that for right-wing voters – in this case, voters of the Rassemblement National – the issues most in mind are cultural issues. This is to say, issues of equality (sex, gender, race, religion, and others), nationality, and especially citizenship (e.g. immigration) are going to be in mind when it comes time to assess politicians and vote on whether to retain them or their chosen successors. The expectation then is that voters of right-wing populist parties are going to be more likely to care more about cultural issues than economic issues and to put them higher in their hierarchy of issues than economic issues.

To test this assumption, data from the European Election Voter Study (2009, 2014 and 2019) will be used to assess which issues voters feel are most important (Schmitt et al., 2016; Schmitt et al., 2020; van Egmond et al., 2017). Using the EES data has the added benefit of being able to cross-tabulate the survey respondents' most important issue with

the party for which they voted in the (French) national elections as well as the European elections. Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 report the relevant responses.

For each survey year, responses were categorized as belonging to either economic, cultural, or other issue spaces. The European Election Voter Study usefully categorized the responses for 2009 and 2014 into many different categories, which were then condensed again by the author of this book to fit these three categories. For these two years, the economic category condensed responses that were coded as: economic conditions, inflation, unemployment, and wages and earnings. For 2009, the category of "effects of the financial crisis on the economy" was also included. These categories were chosen to capture a general dissatisfaction with the economy, rather than trying to encompass every related economic category. For example, responses that the most important issue facing France today was capitalism, globalization, or taxes – while related to the economy – were purposefully left out of this coding, as they are critiques of the way the economy is run, rather than the products of how it is run. In other words, these indirect economic responses categories were not seen as relating to the functioning of the economy as a whole, but rather to longer-lasting ideas about the economy.

For the cultural issues category for 2009, the condensed categories are: immigration, culture, multiculturalism, and national way of life. For 2014, the categories are: immigration, labour migration/emigration, multiculturalism, ethnic minorities, and national way of life. An important caveat for the cultural issues category stems from this coding. Other cultural issue categories are not coded. These include things like social justice or gender equality. These categories were not coded as belonging to the cultural category, as

they differ in tone from the other categories that were coded. I.e. for the issues that were coded, these are cultural issues championed by the right, while the un-coded categories are more likely to be mentioned by the left. Social justice is not likely to be high on the issue importance list of someone who is *against* social justice. For the sake of comparing respondents when cross-tabulated according to their votes then, cultural issues has been coded to include only right-wing cultural issues. This is not a problem for the economic category, as people are generally not split on whether unemployment is a bad thing, for instance.

Unlike 2009 and 2014, the responses for the 2019 European Election Voter Study are not yet neatly categorized. For this year, the author of this dissertation coded each (n=1000) response as belonging to either the economy, culture, or neither. The economic category includes responses that focus mainly on: unemployment, inflation, wages and earnings (inflation and purchasing power) and general economic malaise. This fits the earlier categorizations for 2009 and 2014. For the culture category, a more conservative grouping was used that simply coded each instance of immigration or emigration being listed as a respondent's most important issue.

One final note before beginning the analysis. As may be seen in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, the surveys differ in the number of issues about which they asked the respondents. The 2009 survey asked respondents for their three most important issues in succession, while the 2014 survey asked for two (again, in succession), and the 2019 survey only asked for one. While comparison is then possible within 2009 and 2014 to a lesser degree, responses for 2019 will focus on the number one most important issue facing France, according to respondents, only.

Table 3.1: Most Important Issue - Economy v. Culture

	2009			2014		2019
Most Important Issue	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 3	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 1
Economy	592	304	146	560	232	217
Culture	15	30	27	66	87	121
Other	393	666	827	448	755	662

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009, 2014, 2019). Original table.
2009 and 2019: n=1000. 2014: n=1074.

Table 3.1 reports the total amount of respondents who listed an economic, cultural, or other issue as being the first, second, or third most important issue, where applicable. For 2009, respondents were asked: "What is, according to you, the most important problem that France faces today?"[1] The following two questions read the same and replace most with second-most (*le deuxième problème le plus important*) and third-most important (*le troisième problème le plus important*). For the 2014 study, the question largely remains the same, except it asks for the most important *issue* or problem France faces today.[2] For 2019, the question wording returns to the original wording from 2009.

Analyzing the responses for Table 3.1 shows a decreased amount of respondents who cite an economic issue as being the most important issue facing France. During the time period available here, the global financial crisis and ensuing Eurozone crisis were underway, so it should not be surprising to see an economic issue dominance. However, as these crises move more to the past, and in-step with the Front/Rassemblement National's popularity, cultural issues start to become more important. From 2009 to 2014, the second-most important issue showed a decrease in respondents pointing to an economic issue and a

[1]Author's translation. Original question: "*Quel est, selon vous, le problème le plus important que la France doit affronter aujourd'hui?*"

[2]Original question: "*Quel est, selon vous, la première question ou le premier problème le plus important que la France doit affronter aujourd'hui?*"

Table 3.2: Most Important Issue - Economy v. Culture - National Elections

	2009						2014				2019	
	Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 3		Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 1	
	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.
Party												
Communist Party	6	0	6	0	1	0						
Democratic Movement	19	0	5	0	4	0						
Europe Ecology	1	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	9	4	6	2
Extreme Left	6	0	4	0	2	0						
The Greens	17	0	8	0	2	3						
Left Front	1	0	0	1	2	0	25	0	10	2	2	0
National Front	4	2	4	2	3	1	30	9	13	6	25	52
The Republic Onwards!											44	11
The Republicans											21	27
Socialist Party	132	2	77	3	39	3	141	7	62	18	18	3
Unbowed France											23	1
Union for a Popular Movement	163	5	64	12	30	14	87	13	34	25		
Union of Democrats and Independents											2	1
Did not Vote — N/AP	43	0	22	1	10	2	147	25	61	18	38	11
Do not Recall — Don't Know	63	1	38	2	13	1	19	3	6	3	12	6
Not Eligible	20	1	9	2	8	0						
Other (recoded)							27	2	17	2	6	1
Other Party	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	1	2
Refused	100	4	57	6	26	3	47	6	13	6		
Voted Blank	15	0	10	1	4	0	13	1	7	3	19	4

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009, 2014, 2019). Original table.

2009 and 2019: n=1000. 2014: n=1074.

2009: Spoiled votes and voted blank values were combined.

modest increase in those pointing to a cultural issue. By 2019, the amount of respondents citing cultural issues as their first most important issue represents a little more than half the amount of those citing economic issues.

When these data are split up according to the party for which the respondent voted in the most recent national legislative elections – as seen in Table 3.2 – these trend remains much the same. Importantly, the years in which these votes took place do not match the years of the survey for the national elections. The 2009 survey inquires about voting in the 2007 legislative election, the 2014 survey asks about voting for the 2012 legislative election, and the 2019 survey asks about the 2017 legislative election. In 2009, cultural issues take a pretty clear backseat to economic issues. Again, this is not surprising amid a global financial crisis. 2014, however, shows a change in trend. As the National Front is rising in popularity, those who vote for them signal cultural issues as being their most important issue about one-third the amount of those who believe an economic issue to be most pressing. For their second most important issue, this jumps to half as much. For the still large Union for a Popular Movement (on the right) this trend can be seen as well. While there are still a small amount of UMP voters citing a cultural issue as their most important issue compared with economic issues, the second-most important issue shows more competition. In this case, thirty-four respondents listed an economic issue, while twenty-five listed a cultural issue.

Finally, in 2019, these trends flip. While respondents were only asked about their most important issue, this is still the point of interest. While Table 3.1 showed a marked increase (from 2014) in the amount of people who chose to list a cultural issue, it is more clear from Table 3.2 who these people were specifically. For those who voted for the right-

Table 3.3: Most Important Issue - Economy v. Culture - European Elections

	2009						2014				2019	
	Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 3		Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 1	
	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.
Party												
Arise the Republic							4	0	2	2	6	8
Communist Party	3	0	2	0	1	0						
Democratic Movement	15	0	3	1	2	0						
Europe Ecology	34	1	20	3	15	1	24	1	14	5	18	3
Extreme Left	9	0	9	0	5	0						
Generation.s											5	1
The Greens	54	0	33	2	17	4						
Left Front							29	0	12	0	1	0
Libertas	3	0	0	0	0	0						
National Front	3	0	2	1	1	1	29	11	16	11	24	52
New Anticapitalist Party							0	1	0	0		
The Republic Onwards!											40	7
The Republicans											12	12
Socialist Party	41	0	23	0	9	1	65	3	23	9	5	1
Unbowed France											11	1
Union for a Popular Movement	99	3	34	11	16	9	42	6	15	8		
Union of Democrats and Independents							29	0	11	3		
Did not Vote — N/AP	209	7	115	4	48	8	269	29	108	34	71	28
Do not Recall — Don't Know	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	2	1
Other (recoded)							10	2	5	2	9	2
Other Party	7	0	4	1	4	0	5	3	2	2	5	2
Refused	98	3	50	6	24	3	37	4	12	9		
Voted Blank	14	1	9	1	4	0	13	6	11	2	8	3

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009, 2014, 2019). Original table.

2009 and 2019: n=1000. 2014: n=1074.

2009: Spoiled votes and voted blank values were combined.

wing The Republicans, as well as the Rassemblement National, the amount of respondents who listed a cultural issue rather than an economic issue as being most important was higher. In the case of the Rassemblement National, more than twice as many respondents privileged a cultural issue over an economic one. It is worth pointing out as well that this is the case even with the more conservative coding scheme for cultural issues explained above. In essence, Rassemblement National voters privilege dealing with immigration specifically more than economic issues.

Turning to Table 3.3, the trends for the European elections are very similar to those for the French national elections, if a bit more muted. Voters for The Republicans list cultural issues and economic issues as being the most important facing France in equal measure. The National Front/Rally voters have almost the same exact score as at the national level, with one less respondent signaling economic issues as being most important.

3.2 Government Responsibility

When voters get disgruntled about the state of the issues most important to them – whether legislation has been passed that does the opposite of what they wish or nothing is getting done at all – it is natural that they should blame the government for the current state of affairs. However, blame is not always easily assessed. In the context of France, the theory of this dissertation would argue that citizens who are disaffected by a lack of addressing cultural issues or addressing them poorly would blame the French government for the ongoing trouble surrounding them. This should be the case whether someone is concerned with greater gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, or other social-cultural issues.

For these example issues, it is reasonable to suggest that a lack of/unsatisfactory progress would be attributed by disaffected citizens to the national government. These are all issues that are handled at the national level for a particular nation. Gender equality or lack thereof, e.g., is something that the national government can produce policy to establish and then enforce. Immigration differs from other cultural issues, however, as immigration is not as easily attributed to national government. Blame can just as easily be foisted on the neighboring countries from which this immigration occurs. In the case of Europe especially, blame for "excessive" immigration can be attributed in part (or perhaps wholly) to the European Union.

Therefore, establishing that citizens will assess their own national government as primarily to blame for immigration is an important check. This is especially important as the quantitative analysis done in Chapter 2 relied on immigration as a proximate for other cultural issues.

Survey data from the European Election Voter Study (2009) is presented in Table 3.4 (van Egmond et al., 2017). 1000 French respondents were asked "Third, on the subject of immigration, to what degree is the French government responsible for the level of immigration in France?"[3]. Respondents were asked to place the national government's level of responsibility for the degree of immigration their country experiences on a scale from zero to ten, where zero equaled zero responsibility and ten equaled complete responsibility.

The scores in Table 3.4 indicate that most French citizens believe the national government shares at least half or more responsibility for the level of immigration in France. A

[3]Author's translation. Original text: "*Troisièmement, au sujet de l'immigration, dans quelle mesure le gouvernement français est responsable du niveau de l'immigration en France?*"

Table 3.4: Institutional Responsibility for Immigration - France (%) (2009)

	Responsibility for Immigration (None -> Full)												
Institution	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Refuse	DK
National Gov.	2.50	0.40	2.40	3.10	3.30	16.20	8.30	12.10	15.60	6.10	21.00	1.20	7.80
	(25)	(4)	(24)	(31)	(33)	(162)	(83)	(121)	(156)	(61)	(210)	(12)	(78)
European Union	3.50	1.10	3.90	3.80	4.10	17.00	9.40	10.70	15.10	4.70	14.40	0.90	11.40
	(35)	(11)	(39)	(38)	(41)	(170)	(94)	(107)	(151)	(47)	(144)	(9)	(114)

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009). Original table.

n = 1000

Refuse = refused to answer. DK = don't know.

A score of zero indicates no responsibility. A score of ten indicates full responsibility.

Given values are percentages. The frequency of people for each category are included underneath in parentheses.

little over one-fifth of respondents believe the national government is completely responsible. Just over eleven percent of respondents (scores zero to four) believe that the government shares less than half the responsibility for the level of immigration the country faces.

Respondents were then asked to place the European Union along the same scale. Respondents were asked "And regarding the European Union, to what degree is it responsible for the level of immigration in France?" [4] Looking again at Table 3.4, a few differences from the scores at the national level are apparent.

Firstly, the low responsibility scores account for slightly more than sixteen percentage points of the distribution, compared to just over eleven percent for national responsibility. Secondly, less than one-sixth of respondents believe that the European Union is fully responsible for the level of immigration in France, compared with one-fifth at the national level. Finally, nearly one-and-a-half times the amount of respondents selected "don't know" as compared to the national level, signaling a significant unawareness about the E.U.'s purview on immigration. Despite these differences, it is clear French citizens at least partially attribute the level of immigration their country is facing to the European Union.

These numbers have likely trended even more towards the latter half of the scale since the start of the refugee crisis two years after this survey was conducted (2011). However, it is unlikely that blame has shifted entirely to the E.U. Even if the scores have shifted, the end result is likely the same. For those who privilege immigration as one of their top issues, blame will be given in large part to the national government, whether it is for their failure to adequately address immigration or their failure to assert their national sovereignty

[4] Author's translation. Original text: "*Et à propos de l'Union européenne, dans quelle mesure est-elle responsable du niveau de l'immigration en France?*"

against the European Union on the issue. In other words, an unsatisfactory policy will result in electoral punishment for the national government. The only possible difference then is how much responsibility citizens give to the E.U. for the level of immigration.

One smaller caveat to mention about these scores is that there is not a question about a potential third responsible actors: immigrant origin countries. While a more direct question about these countries – whether specific or vague – would be nice to have, it is reasonable to assume that respondents have these actors explicitly in mind when scoring either (and both) of these other questions. It is probable that respondents who scored their own national government on the lower end of the scale for responsibility are thinking of some other combination of actors as being more responsible, whether that be the European Union or other countries. Still, in reviewing the scores for both the national government and the European Union, the amount of people who blame other parties – i.e. choose low responsibility – (whomever they may be) is low.

Given the scores presented, it is reasonable to suggest that all cultural issues and their un/satisfactory state are attributed by most citizens to their national government. If this is the case for more nuanced and complex issues that involve multiple actors like immigration, then other issues should be attributed to the national government more easily. Importantly, Table 3.4 suggests that citizens largely hold their own country responsible - whether for direct failure or indirect failure to manage E.U. policies - for the level of immigration in their country, rather than other countries. If the latter were true, electoral punishment would not necessarily follow from disaffection as it would not matter who was in office – the result would be the same given the external nature of the problem. For

disaffected citizens then, their choice to vote for a party other than the one that is currently in charge, as well as any other mainstream parties who hold similar policies, relies on their perception that the national government is largely responsible for the current unsatisfactory state of their most privileged cultural policy.

3.3 Ideological Convergence

A third key assumption underlying the theory of populist voting put forth by this dissertation is that citizens perceive there to be ideological convergence between mainstream parties in their country. In other words, citizens perceive a distinct lack of choice when choosing to vote according to their favored issue stance and seeing the most visible, largest, and popular parties essentially offering the same fare. If citizens are blaming the government for failure to deliver on their most privileged issue and start to look elsewhere for with whom to place their vote, the perception that other mainstream parties would follow a similar path as the governing party would cause them to look at those parties outside the mainstream. Therefore, establishing that citizens perceive a significant degree of ideological convergence among the mainstream parties in their country is key to understanding why citizens might choose to cast their vote for a non-mainstream, potentially radical, political party.

While 1.2 in Chapter 1 shows strong evidence that citizens in many European countries do perceive there to be a general widespread ideological convergence among mainstream parties in their country, the measurement remains broad. To improve on this more general evidence, more specific evidence can be provided to show that mainstream political parties do converge on economic issues - for left-wing populism - and cultural issues - for

right-wing populism. In the case of France then, it should be expected that not only do citizens feel there is a general ideological convergence between mainstream parties in their countries, but that mainstream political parties can be shown to be converging ideologically on cultural issues. To test this, two data sets will be examined – The Manifesto Project (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Theres, et al., 2021) and the Comparative Agendas Project.[5]

3.3.1 Ideological Convergence: Manifesto Project Evidence

Firstly, the Manifesto Project can be utilized to examine political party manifestos and how much attention they pay to particular issues. This is a useful comparison of parties temporally, with the French data in particular going back as early as 1946 and as recently as 2017. The Manifesto Project Database codes election programs (or functional equivalents) for parties that have successfully gained one or two (country-dependent) seats in their national elections, as well as other parties which were relevant in the past (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). Coding units are quasi-sentences or one message/sentiment. A sentence is at a minimum one quasi-sentence, although multiple quasi-sentences may be contained within one sentence (Werner et al., 2021). Two or more sentences, however, may not form a quasi-sentence (Werner et al., 2021). As such, the analysis of party platforms present in the manifesto is quite granular in this dataset. These quasi-sentences are then coded into particular categories. These categories also list a direction of the message – positive (in favor) or negative (against). However, some categories

[5]The information presented here is taken from the CAP website – https://www.comparativeagendas.net/ – and the French Policy Agendas Codebook, available for download here: https://www.comparativeagendas.net/france.

exist for opposite policies and therefore are both positive in direction (e.g. Welfare State Expansion – Positive and Welfare State Limit – Positive).

The Manifesto Project codes many quasi-sentences into many different cultural variables that are useful here to examine the extent of mainstream political party ideological convergence. Expected results for many of these categories is that the mainstream left and right competitors in their election manifestos both score near zero for issues on which they have converged. As parties are not likely to campaign on issue stances they share with their opponents, it is expected messaging about that particular issues should be low or absent for these parties. However, for relevant issues, perhaps issues that parties feel they must address in their manifestos because of pressures from populist parties, mainstream parties may choose to address an issue, but maintain a mainstream stance. For example, it might be expected that for a current-day French party to not discuss immigration, which is a hot-button issue, would be a poor move, so they may choose to include discussion on immigration, but emphasize positive support for multicultural diversity in regards to naturalizing immigrants who become citizens. This stance could be expected to be shared between the mainstream parties and, therefore, should exhibit similar attention/scores.

In sum, expectations for examining different categories for cultural variables are that mainstream parties either converge around zero, or if they do make mention of the issue that they mention it about the same amount and support a similar position.

One minor difficulty in examining the data in the above outlined manner is determining what parties are mainstream - especially in France, where the largest parties tend to fluctuate - if only in name at times. For the purposes of this examination, the top

Table 3.5: Mainstream Left and Right Parties in French Elections 1946-2017

Year	**Left Mainstream**	**Right Mainstream**
1946	French Communist Party (PCF)	Popular Republican Movement (MRP)
1951	French Section of the Worker's International (SFIO)	Rally of the French People (RPF)
1956	French Communist Party (PCF)	National Center of Independents and Peasants (CNIP)
1958	French Section of the Worker's International (SFIO)	Union for the New Republic (UNR)
1962	French Section of the Worker's International (SFIO)	Union for the New Republic (UNR)
1967	French Section of the Worker's International (SFIO)*	Democratic Union of the Fifth Republic (UD-Ve)
1968	French Section of the Worker's International (SFIO)*	Union for the Defence of the Republic (UDR)
1973	Socialist Party (PS)	Union for the Defence of the Republic (UDR)
1978	Socialist Party (PS)	Rally for the Republic (RPR)
1981	Socialist Party (PS)	Union for a New Majority (UNM)**
1986	Socialist Party (PS)	Union for a New Majority (UNM)**
1988	Socialist Party (PS)	Union for a New Majority (UNM)**
1993	Socialist Party (PS)	Rally for the Republic (RPR)***
1997	Socialist Party (PS)	Rally for the Republic (RPR)***
2002	Socialist Party (PS)	Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)
2007	Socialist Party (PS)	Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)
2012	Socialist Party (PS)	Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)
2017	Socialist Party (PS)	The Republic on the Move! (LREM)

*1967 and 1968: FGDS coalition made up of SFIO, the Radical Party and others. The FGDS is not coded separately in the Manifesto Project database, so the scores for the SFIO for these years will be referenced, as it is the only coalition member scored.
**1981, 1986, and 1988: the RPR was coded as being in coalition with the UDF and PRL in the Manifesto Project data. The scores for entries coded under the party name "Union for a New Majority - Gaullists/Conservatives" rather than "Union for a New Majority - Conservatives/Gaullists" were utilized when scores diverged. For the Comparative Agenda Project data, this coalition is under the abbreviation "RPR-UDF." 1988 is not coded as a coalition year. For 1988 in the CAP tables, the UDF and RPR scores, while separate, will be considered the mainstream right.
***1993 and 1997: Union pour la France: Coalition between the RPR and UDF. Manifesto Project data will consider the RPR the mainstream right for 1993 and 1997. In 1997, the RPR and UDF scores do not differ across and Manifesto Project data presented.

vote-getting left party and the top vote-getting right party for each election cycle will be considered the mainstream parties for that observation year. Table 3.5 shows the pairings for each year.

While the data do go back quite far here, of primary interest is the time-period of the elections just prior to the 1980s to present. This is not only around the time when the Front National came into existence, but it is also the time that ideological convergence is expected to have started beginning, as discussed in Chapter 2.

Turning to the examination of the Manifesto Project data, the first cultural issue to be examined is multiculturalism. The Manifesto Project codes instances of positive references in a party's manifesto to multiculturalism. Positive references to multiculturalism include those that are "favourable... of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies" and may also "include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions." (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). The Manifesto Project also codes negative references to multiculturalism which include calls for "The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration" and "Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). The scores for each coded French party over time are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.

Looking first at the negative mentions of multiculturalism in Table 3.6, the scores for the mainstream right and left parties are relatively close and low for the period from 1973 to 2017. Furthermore, for most of that period, the scores for these parties are zero, with either party feeling no need to make negative mention of multiculturalism in their

Table 3.6: Multiculturalism – Negative

	Year																	
Party Abbrev.	1946	1951	1956	1958	1962	1967	1968	1973	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017
CNIP		0.00	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
FN											**4.03**	**2.02**	**2.02**	**0.00**	**1.92**	**1.31**	**1.68**	**3.35**
LREM																		**0.83**
MRP	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00													
PCF	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	0.00	1.30	0.00	0.00	1.70	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00
PS								**0.00**	**0.40**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.66**	**0.00**	**0.00**
RPF	1.72	**1.72**	0.86															
RPR									**1.40**				**0.00**	**0.00**				
SFIO	0.00	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**											
UD-Ve						**0.00**												
UDR							**2.00**	**0.00**										
UMP															**0.00**	**0.21**	**1.91**	
UNM										**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**						
UNR				**0.00**	**0.00**													
AC																	0.00	
CD						0.00												
CDP								0.00										
EÉLV																	0.00	0.00
FDG																	0.94	
GE														0.00				
Les Verts													0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
MR								0.00										
MoDem																1.03	0.00	0.00
NC																	0.00	
PDM							0.00											
PR																	0.00	
PRG																	0.22	0.00
PRL	0.00																	
RRRS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00											
UDCA			0.00															
UDF									0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			
UDI																		0.78

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.

Table 3.7: Multiculturalism – Positive

	Year																	
Party Abbrev.	1946	1951	1956	1958	1962	1967	1968	1973	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017
CNIP		0.41	**0.83**	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
FN											**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.08**	**0.00**	**0.00**
LREM																		**1.93**
MRP	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	1.30	4.40													
PCF	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	1.10	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.50	5.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00
PS								**3.30**	**3.20**	**1.70**	**1.20**	**1.70**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1.44**	**0.66**	**0.47**	**0.00**
RPF	0.00	**0.00**	0.55															
RPR									**0.00**				**0.00**	**0.00**				
SFIO	0.86	**0.00**	0.81	**0.00**	**0.90**	**0.00**	**0.00**											
UD-Ve						**0.00**												
UDR							**0.00**	**0.00**										
UMP															**0.94**	**0.10**	**0.00**	
UNM										**1.80**	**2.50**	**0.00**						
UNR				**1.10**	**0.00**													
AC																	0.00	
CD						2.40												
CDP								0.00										
EÉLV																	0.09	2.27
FDG																	0.27	
GE														0.00				
Les Verts													0.00	0.00	1.50	1.38		
MR								0.00										
MoDem																0.00	0.48	2.21
NC																	0.00	
PDM							0.00											
PR																	0.00	
PRG																	0.00	0.37
PRL	0.00																	
RRRS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00											
UDCA			0.00															
UDF									0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.86			
UDI																		0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.

respective platforms. In contrast, the Front National paid a bit more negative attention to multiculturalism, but just barely.

For positive mentions of multiculturalism, starting in 1973, the PS started out mentioning it a little, which was then matched by the UDR in the following election. However, between 1988 and 1993, a couple years after the major relevant (1986) launch of the Front National, both the PS and the right (RPR, then UMP) phased out positive mentions of multiculturalism. Looking at Tables 3.6 and 3.7 together shows the mainstream left and right having similar attention to and stances towards multiculturalism, only really changing noticeably in 2012, when the UMP added more negative mentions, likely in reaction to the Front National.

Turning to Tables 3.8 and 3.9, an even clearer divergence appears between the mainstream and the Front National. Beginning with Table 3.8, both the socialist PS and the various right-wing mainstream parties from the period of 2007-2017 have very little negative mention of traditional morality at all. Most years have zero negative mentions. This means that the manifestos for the mainstream parties are, for most years, devoid of mentions of "support for divorce, abortion, etc.; general support for modern family composition; [and] calls for the separation of church and state" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). For the most part, the Front National follows this trend, which should be unsurprising for those familiar with the party. One small exception is the FN 2007 manifesto, which scores high in comparison to the rest of the parties on the table, save for the socialist SFIO in 1968 – a shocking parallel indeed. This appears to be an isolated incident, however.

Table 3.8: Traditional Morality – Negative

	Year																	
Party Abbrev.	1946	1951	1956	1958	1962	1967	1968	1973	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017
CNIP		0.00	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
FN											**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**6.94**	**0.00**	**0.42**
LREM																		**0.28**
MRP	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00													
PCF	**0.00**	0.00	**0.28**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.67		0.00
PS								**0.00**	**0.00**	**2.60**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.66**	**0.47**	**1.32**
RPF	0.00	**0.00**	0.00															
RPR									**0.00**				**0.00**	**0.00**				
SFIO	0.00	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**6.80**											
UD-Ve						**0.00**												
UDR							**0.00**	**0.00**										
UMP															**0.00**	**0.10**	**0.00**	
UNM										**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**						
UNR				**0.00**	**0.00**													
AC																	0.00	
CD						0.00												
CDP								0.00										
EÉLV																	0.62	2.27
FDG																	0.40	
GE														0.00				
Les Verts													0.00	2.08	0.00	1.23		
MR								0.00										
MoDem																1.03	0.00	0.66
NC																	0.00	
PDM							0.00											
PR																	0.00	
PRG																	1.09	4.47
PRL	0.00																	
RRRS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.80											
UDCA			0.00															
UDF									0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			
UDI																		0.78

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.

Table 3.9: Traditional Morality – Positive

	Year																	
Party Abbrev.	1946	1951	1956	1958	1962	1967	1968	1973	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017
CNIP		6.11	**4.54**	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
FN											**8.06**	**11.36**	**11.36**	**14.67**	**8.65**	**7.51**	**3.03**	**2.09**
LREM																		**0.00**
MRP	**5.92**	7.07	8.22	0.00	0.00													
PCF	**3.05**	0.00	**1.70**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00
PS								**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1.44**	**0.66**	**0.00**	**0.00**
RPF	4.31	**4.31**	2.90															
RPR									**2.70**				**1.57**	**1.64**				
SFIO	1.94	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**											
UD-Ve						**0.00**												
UDR							**3.90**	**0.00**										
UMP															**0.94**	**1.05**	**1.06**	
UNM										**0.00**	**1.30**	**2.10**						
UNR				**1.50**	**2.10**													
AC																	0.00	
CD						0.00												
CDP								6.30										
EÉLV																	0.00	0.00
FDG																	0.00	
GE														1.63				
Les Verts													0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
MR								0.00										
MoDem																2.06	0.24	0.00
NC																	0.00	
PDM							6.30											
PR																	0.00	
PRG																	0.00	0.00
PRL	7.67																	
RRRS	0.00	2.00	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00											
UDCA			0.91															
UDF									0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.64	5.48			
UDI																		0.78

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.

The scores in Table 3.9 reflect positive mentions of traditional morality. This includes favorable references to: "prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behavior; maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value; [and] support for the role of religious institutions in state and society" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). While the mainstream left and right once again both maintain low and often similar scores here, the Front National provides a large contrast. The Front National does not drop below a seven percentage point score until the 2012 election – arguably when the party attempted to mainstream some of its stronger stances. As for the mainstream, again, they are rather indistinguishable, especially in comparison to the Front National.

Percentage of positive mentions of equality – "special protections for underprivileged social groups; removal of class barriers; need for fair distribution of resources; [and] the end of discrimination (e.g. racial or sexual discrimination)" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021) – can be seen in Table 3.10. Positive references to equality starts with a large divergence in the mainstream, followed by a convergence around 1968, and a divergence again starting in 2002 (most strongly). Early and late in the data here, the mainstream right paid little positive mention of equality, while the mainstream left has been strong throughout. However, the scores for the mainstream left and right get much closer for the period of 1968-1997, with the slight exception of 1981 and 1986. In contrast, the Front National paid little positive mention of equality in its manifestos until 2017 – a trend matched by the mainstream right starting in 2002. Overall, positive mentions of equ-

Table 3.10: Equality – Positive

	Year																	
Party Abbrev.	1946	1951	1956	1958	1962	1967	1968	1973	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017
CNIP		1.65	**1.65**	2.90	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50									
FN											**0.75**	**0.37**	**0.37**	**0.00**	**0.64**	**1.14**	**1.35**	**5.86**
LREM																		**11.88**
MRP	**1.04**	2.23	3.42	5.70	10.00													
PCF	**4.88**	6.82	**4.25**	0.00	9.40	5.30	8.70	6.60	8.70	10.70	12.60	9.10	6.80	14.29	13.75	8.00		8.33
PS								**6.90**	**6.40**	**5.20**	**12.20**	**12.70**	**6.40**	**11.89**	**12.64**	**6.64**	**6.54**	**9.21**
RPF	0.86	**0.86**	2.68															
RPR									**5.50**				**4.72**	**8.20**				
SFIO	3.88	**4.05**	8.94	**0.00**	**8.00**	**7.50**	**6.80**											
UD-Ve						**10.80**												
UDR							**7.80**	**5.50**										
UMP															**3.29**	**3.89**	**2.75**	
UNM										**6.30**	**2.50**	**6.40**						
UNR				**4.50**	**3.70**													
AC																	1.39	
CD						0.00												
CDP								4.20										
EÉLV																	5.13	6.82
FDG																	9.37	
GE														4.88				
Les Verts													6.15	12.50	11.28	7.96		
MR								9.00										
MoDem																5.82	6.29	7.08
NC																	12.64	
PDM							4.20											
PR																	4.20	
PRG																	7.86	4.84
PRL	1.64																	
RRRS	2.14	3.07	4.00	12.00	0.00	7.50	6.80											
UDCA			1.37															
UDF									0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.20	1.44			
UDI																		7.39

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.

ality saw mainstream convergence from 1968 until the turn of the millennium, about a decade or so after the Front National became more electorally relevant.

Finally – for the Manifesto Project data – positive mentions of law and order are low and/or similar for the data in Table 3.10 until 2002, with the exception of the 1986 UNM score. The Front National, aside from 2007, scores highly for the duration of its electoral relevance. Favorable mentions of law and order include statements suggesting policies such as: "increasing support and resources for the police; tougher attitudes in courts; [and the] importance of internal security." For the mainstream, 2002 represents a sharp jump, which was later attenuated. For most of the period shown here, however, the mainstream right and left give relatively little positive mention of law and order.

Overall, the mainstream left and right match one another on both negative and positive mentions of major cultural issues for the period of 1946–2017. Most exceptions to this occur past 2000, except in the case of positive mentions of equality, which shows a divergent-convergent-divergent pattern for the mainstream parties. The Front National, in most every case (save negative mentions of traditional morality and, to a lesser extent, positive mentions of multiculturalism) offers scores contrasting those of the mainstream. These data support the assumption that mainstream French parties converged on important cultural issues for a long period of time, if only diverging after the Front National came into electoral relevance. Even in elections after this divergence, the reputation for ideological convergence may still linger, with the Front National having been able to claim issue ownership of the opposing issue stance. This lines up with the evidence from Chapter 1 Table 1.2 that citizens perceive the mainstream parties to be ideologically convergent more

Table 3.11: Law and Order – Positive

	Year																	
Party Abbrev.	1946	1951	1956	1958	1962	1967	1968	1973	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017
CNIP		1.65	**3.31**	0.00	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60									
FN											**4.18**	**8.09**	**8.09**	**12.00**	**9.94**	**0.00**	**13.13**	**12.97**
LREM																		**6.35**
MRP	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00													
PCF	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	1.10	0.00	1.70	0.00	1.20	2.50	5.50	0.68	4.29	2.50	0.33		2.78
PS								**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**2.40**	**0.00**	**0.80**	**3.50**	**6.90**	**3.99**	**4.21**	**11.84**
RPF	2.59	**2.59**	1.29															
RPR									**2.10**				**0.79**	**4.92**				
SFIO	0.00	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**											
UD-Ve						**0.00**												
UDR							**2.00**	**2.40**										
UMP															**18.78**	**4.31**	**8.05**	
UNM										**0.90**	**6.30**	**0.00**						
UNR				**0.00**	**2.40**													
AC																	0.00	
CD						0.00												
CDP								0.00										
EÉLV																	5.04	2.73
FDG																	1.07	
GE														0.81				
Les Verts													0.00	0.00	3.38	0.00		
MR								0.00										
MoDem																1.03	3.39	3.10
NC																	3.75	
PDM							0.00											
PR																	3.15	
PRG																	1.09	4.10
PRL	0.00																	
RRRS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00											
UDCA			0.00															
UDF									0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.92	7.21			
UDI																		8.56

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.

generally, with a noticeable drop-off after 2002. However, even after this drop off, as the table shows, a third of French citizens still believe the mainstream parties in their country to be highly ideologically convergent.

3.3.2 Ideological Convergence: Comparative Agendas Project Evidence

Next, the French party manifestos dataset from the Comparative Agendas Project will be used to explore references to immigration issues. Like the Manifesto Project Data, this dataset codes party manifestos at the quasi-sentence level. The data is then assigned a category/topic. Unlike, the manifesto project, however, whether these quasi-sentences are positive or negative is not indicated.

Table 3.12: Immigration Mentions (Absolute)

	Year						
Party	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007
FN					**6**	**88**	**205**
PC	10	2	0	1	3	0	23
PS	**5**	**0**	**2**	**5**	**11**	**2**	**17**
RPR	1	13	**1**	30			
RPR-UDF	**0**	**20**		**14**	**1**		
UDF			**1**	1		0	5
UMP						**1**	**21**
Verts				1	2	2	49

Source: Comparative Agendas Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.
1988: The UDF and RPR are both considered the mainstream right for this year.
1993 and 1997: Unlike the Manifesto Project, the CAP codes the RPR-UDF coalition – The Union for France (UPF) – that existed from 1992-1997.

The topics of interest here are those under the broader topic of immigration. Quasi-sentences on immigration were assigned a topic code ranging from 900-999, based on

which topic they best fit. Quasi-sentences were coded as referring to:

- 900. Immigration more generally
- 929. Immigrant labor
- 930. The entrance and staying of immigrants
- 931. Refugees and the right to asylum
- 932. Access to citizenship
- 933. Illegal immigration and exportation
- 999. Other

Table 3.12 shows the total mentions per manifesto of the immigration topic - a summation of the frequency that a quasi-sentence was coded as belonging to one of the above listed categories. Table 3.13 shows the total amount of quasi-sentences for each manifesto. Finally, Table 3.14 divides the total mentions of immigration in a manifesto by the total amount of possible observations (quasi-sentences). Table 3.14 therefore reports the percentage of each manifesto that each coded French political party discusses the topic of immigration from 1981-2007.

Looking first at Table 3.14, a familiar pattern emerges. Early in the 1980s, the mainstream left and right were split on the importance of mentioning immigration topics. By the late 1980s, however, these differences started to match, with low relevance for both the PS and RPR-UDF in 1988, and a little more importance the following election in 1993. Aside from 1997, the mainstream left and right have mentioned immigration about the same percent of the time in their manifestos since 1988.

Table 3.13: Total Observations (Absolute)

	Year						
Party	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007
FN					**95**	**1569**	**4173**
PC	504	458	208	331	105	78	776
PS	**227**	**115**	**600**	**152**	**327**	**379**	**760**
RPR	626	304	**240**	428			
RPR-UDF	**90**	**556**		**466**	**112**		
UDF			**107**	62		516	833
UMP						**138**	**1234**
Verts				144	67	179	1549

Source: Comparative Agendas Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.
1988: The UDF and RPR are both considered the mainstream right for this year.
1993 and 1997: Unlike the manifesto project, the CAP codes the RPR-UDF coalition – The Union for France (UPF) – that existed from 1992-1997.

Table 3.14: Immigration Reference Frequency (%)

	Year						
Party	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007
FN					**6.32**	**5.61**	**4.91**
PC	1.98	0.44	0.00	0.30	2.86	0.00	2.96
PS	**2.20**	**0.00**	**0.33**	**3.29**	**3.36**	**0.53**	**2.24**
RPR	0.16	4.28	**0.42**	7.01			
RPR-UDF	**0.00**	**3.60**		**3.00**	**0.89**		
UDF			**0.93**	1.61		0.00	0.60
UMP						**0.72**	**1.70**
Verts				0.69	2.99	1.12	3.16

Source: Comparative Agendas Project. Original table.
Mainstream parties for each year are in bold. The Front National (FN) is also in bold for comparison.
1988: The UDF and RPR are both considered the mainstream right for this year.
1993 and 1997: Unlike the manifesto project, the CAP codes the RPR-UDF coalition – The Union for France (UPF) – that existed from 1992-1997.

Once again providing contrast and showing how close the mainstream parties appear in how much attention they pay to issues concerning immigration, the Front National has scored highly since the data here tracks it. While direction isn't given, The Front National's mention of immigration is most certainly negative, as evidenced by the texts themselves. Some of the quasi-sentences coded by the Comparative Agendas Project from the Front/Rassemblement National's 1997 manifesto read:

- "A Program for Governing... immediate expulsion of all immigrants with an irregular situation, strict control of the political refugee network"
- "Reduction of the time permitted to stay to 1 year and the departure of non-European immigrants at the end of this time"
- "Suppression of the acquisition of French nationality and reform of the nationality code to that of the 'law of blood' "

Still, it may be argued that the Front National numbers are not that high in comparison. For instance 6.32 percent and 3.36 percent is less than a 3 percent gap. Is that really something discernible? In 1997, perhaps. As can be seen in Tables 3.12 and 3.13, the Front National's 1997 manifesto mentioned issues of immigration almost half as much (though most certainly more negatively) than the Socialist Party. However, the Front National's manifesto was much shorter.

A more definitive break would come in 2002, where there is around a 5 percentage point gap between immigration mentions between the Front National and both the mainstream left and right. Five percentage points again may seem low, until it is noticed that

the Front National's 2002 manifesto is just over four times longer than that of the Socialist Party and a little over eleven times longer than that of the UMP. At that length, 5.61 percentage points is a lot of discussion on immigration, with eighty-eight quasi-sentences being coded as pertaining to immigration. This is especially large in comparison to the two and one quasi-sentences in the PS and UMP manifestos, respectively.

The same analysis more-or-less may be applied to the 2007 manifestos. The Front National despite only having 4.91 percentage points of its manifesto devoted to discussing immigration issues (a seeming drop from the previous manifesto's 5.61 percentage points) actually discusses it almost two-and-a-half times more than the previous manifesto. In the raw count, there are 205 immigration-related quasi-sentences in the Front National's 2007 manifesto, which contains a staggering 4173 quasi-sentences total. While the percentage point differences between the mainstream parties and the FN for this year may look like relatively small gaps, it is clear that the mainstream parties are much closer (21 and 17 mentions of immigration) in how much they discuss immigration than to how much it is mentioned by the FN.

Overall, these data are suggestive of the same trends as the Manifesto Project data. The mainstream political parties on the left and right in France for much of the last quarter of the twentieth century through to the present share very similar stances and ideas of which issues and how much said issues need to be addressed. This similarity is further put into perspective by direct comparison with the right-wing populist Front National, which champions a right-wing stance on cultural issues.

3.4 Party Messaging

The final logical step voters go through as inferred by this project's theory is figuring out for whom to vote. The voter's most privileged issue has not been adequately addressed, they have blamed the government and governing party for the failure surrounding said issue, they have looked at the other mainstream parties for solutions and found similar policy positions, and now the voter is at the point of apathy or looking for a party that can provide that alternative policy stance to at least try something new to address their most privileged issue.

While the quantitative analysis showed the link between vote choice and the interaction between government cultural issue failure and ideological convergence, the step whereby voters come to that particular vote choice is not borne out. To help further illuminate the underlying process, this section will explore the messaging of the Rassemblement National party to show how voters could easily come to choose that party as the alternative choice (to mainstream parties) to address cultural issues.

Instead of looking at the messaging of every possible party, the Rassemblement National was chosen based on an inference from the results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Voters - especially for the 2017 election - signaled cultural (immigration) issues as their most important issues for the Rassemblement National. The Republicans also showed a slight favor for cultural issue voting over economic issues, but the Rassemblement National was ultimately chosen for a closer analysis based on its longer-standing reputation.

To explore the party messaging of the Rassemblement National an original dataset was constructed. This dataset collects all the titles, authors, and dates of every Front

National/Rassemblement National press release available on the Rassemblement National's official website[6] from June 19th, 2011 to December 8th, 2021 (n=5852). The titles for these press releases were then hand-coded as belonging to one of 46 categories.[7] The results are presented in 3.15. Press releases were chosen as they represent party positions and statements that are most likely to reach the public - versus something like party manifestos, which the average voter (especially a voter who is not already very partisan) does not likely read.

The titles, rather than the body text themselves were coded as citizens are more likely to at least read the title of a press release as they browse the news. This still leaves a fair amount of press releases coded as "indeterminate" as titles are often salacious and do not hint at the subject of the release – except perhaps for those really "in the know." There is no reason to believe that context-ambiguous titles are chosen in any systematic manner, and the results based on coding titles alone are therefore not expected to experience any kind of systematic bias.

The results of Table 3.15 show strong support for the inference that the Rassemblement National is the premier party for anti-immigration policy. The amount of articles about purely immigration is close to or dwarfs most other raw counts for cultural categories in their respective years. Compared with press releases on the economy, the attention to cultural issues overall begins to become more prominent than overall economic issues. This aligns with the start of the immigration crisis in Europe. However, prior to 2015, the is-

[6]https://rassemblementnational.fr/

[7]Titles were coded according to a translated title, but cross-checked with the original French title. In many, but not all, cases context was derived from the press release body text, but only when it could otherwise have been derived from the title. Else, articles were coded as "indeterminate."

Table 3.15: Rassemblement National - Press Releases 2011-2021

	Year										
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Culture	2	4	5	6	19	7	10	6	9	1	3
Drugs	0	3	4	1	4	2	3	0	0	1	0
Equality	2	10	9	7	5	7	5	4	6	4	3
Immigration	**7**	**14**	**20**	**26**	**82**	**67**	**40**	**59**	**33**	**43**	**48**
Trad. Morality	1	1	5	2	2	2	0	1	0	2	0
Xenophobia	2	19	19	28	35	25	18	33	28	26	14
Total Culture	**14**	**51**	**62**	**70**	**147**	**110**	**76**	**103**	**76**	**77**	**68**
Class	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Currency	5	2	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Economy	6	18	28	20	29	18	15	22	9	16	10
Gov. Spending	3	7	16	11	16	12	6	13	8	2	6
Industry	0	5	14	15	17	16	14	10	18	19	8
Labor	3	20	26	17	16	26	18	19	17	14	7
Taxes	2	7	15	5	10	7	11	10	4	2	5
Trade	0	2	1	5	6	13	9	7	5	2	4
Total Economy	**19**	**63**	**103**	**73**	**96**	**93**	**74**	**82**	**61**	**55**	**40**
Agriculture	1	7	15	12	23	32	19	35	20	26	17
Animals	0	2	0	1	2	11	5	3	3	17	15
Corruption	2	3	4	1	2	3	0	0	2	0	1
Democracy	3	7	8	8	4	8	3	7	2	6	0
Education	2	1	13	16	18	20	9	13	11	4	4
Elections	2	23	29	26	32	5	14	4	11	6	11
Energy	1	0	0	2	5	7	2	10	3	7	0
Environment	0	1	1	10	17	12	1	4	5	7	9
European Politics	8	16	15	28	44	44	30	36	39	44	41
Family	1	3	4	2	4	3	3	4	1	0	0
Foreign Affairs	4	20	13	8	10	14	7	13	7	6	11
Health	1	3	4	9	17	25	11	17	15	36	13
Id. Convergence	0	1	1	3	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
Information	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	3	0
Law and Order	8	33	52	42	37	37	20	47	29	24	18
Liberty	1	2	4	6	9	3	3	6	7	5	10
Media	1	11	9	9	10	4	3	8	3	0	2
Party Affairs	10	46	39	31	30	20	15	14	13	4	3
Pop. Sovereignty	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
Prices	1	5	5	1	3	1	1	2	0	5	4
Religion	0	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	1	0	2
Security	2	15	17	6	12	11	9	9	5	3	3
Sovereignty	1	3	5	5	7	3	8	4	5	11	4
Sports	5	6	12	8	4	2	0	0	1	0	0
Technology	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	1	0	2
Territories	3	1	3	4	3	2	5	5	6	6	7
Terrorism	0	0	0	1	8	8	6	5	11	12	5
Transportation	2	9	8	12	14	20	14	29	7	5	0
Urban-rural	0	3	6	13	9	7	4	10	3	0	0
Generic	16	47	68	58	81	52	42	50	19	13	19
Indeterminate	40	154	177	163	123	102	53	78	70	62	28
Other	2	18	34	21	15	13	7	8	8	5	7
Total	152	559	715	652	793	676	451	610	449	451	344

Source: Original Dataset. https://rassemblementnational.fr/
Dates: June 19th, 2011 - December 8th, 2021
n=5852

sue was not exactly being ignored. It also bears mentioning that these comparisons are internal to the Rassemblement National. Even when the party mentions cultural issues less than economic issues, the raw count is still higher than other parties - as was most clearly presented in Tables 3.12 and 3.14.

Among cultural issues, immigration, in most years, is the largest group. The other categories which come closest, or occasionally drew more attention are Law and Order and European Politics, both of which also often deal with issues of immigration, as well as other cultural issues. For instance, many articles focusing on European Institutions or laws are critiques of stances on immigration and borders. Law and Order deals with crimes and violent attacks within the country, many of which are inferred in the article to have been committed by foreigners and/or immigrants.

Other press release categories also hide cultural xenophobia and anti-immigration attitudes as well. Coding them based on the title does not hint at the underlying purpose, but going on and reading the press release makes the motive clear enough. For example, many articles coded based on their title as pertaining to "Animals" refer in the title to the humane treatment of animals, especially in humane slaughtering of animals. This is a stance many parties share. However, upon further inspection, and considering these types of press releases more holistically, it becomes very clear that a pro-humane slaughter policy stance is actually an anti-Halal policy stance, aimed at making life more difficult for Muslims in France.

Considering the categories of immigration and xenophobia together alone constitutes a large share of press releases made by the Rassemblement National; stances which

contrast heavily with those of the E.U., which has been followed closely by French legislation for at least the years under review in this dataset. Compared with the economic categories, these two categories are still clearly a mainstay of the party, which should be apparent to most anyone reading their press releases. For any citizen disaffected by the (ideologically convergent) cultural issue positions of mainstream parties, they need look no further than the Rassemblement National – and they need not look hard or long either.

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter has sought to check the logical pathway implied by the theory of this project and confirmed via correlation by the relationship tested in the quantitative chapter. By conducting qualitative tests of the assumptions about the logical pathway from disaffection to vote choice, the argument presented here has shown in the case of (prominent) right-wing populism represented by the Rassemblement National in France that voters who privilege cultural issues and disagree with the mainstream solutions being offered or tried are most likely to turn to voting for the Rassemblement National.

Tying things together in the case of the Rassemblement National, the pathway suggested by the results here would look like the following. Firstly, citizens have their most preferred issues. Increasingly over the last few decades, immigration has become a prominent issue, fueled in no small part by the policies of the E.U. and growing anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner sentiments. The mainstream parties on both the left and the right in France have been stocked by elites, who largely agree with and support the immigration policies of the E.U. and embrace (motivations notwithstanding) multiculturalism and neoliberal

economic principles which are congruent with open border policies. This government and mainstream response pushes voters who disagree with these stances to look elsewhere, outside the mainstream, for their vote choice - for some party holding positions with which they agree. Finally, the Rassemblement National is the party with the clearest anti-E.U. anti-mainstream position on this issue and they are not hiding their stances in the least bit.

Overall, the findings of this chapter support the logical pathway inferred by the theory of this project. Voters of the Front National do generally privilege cultural issues like immigration more than voters of other parties. On issues of immigration, citizens believe the national government in more responsible for these policies than the European Union. If dissatisfied with said policies, citizens would turn to voting someone in within their country's government in order to change things. Looking at the mainstream parties, both governing and non-governing, many citizens see similar policies stances across: multiculturalism, traditional morality, equality, and (to a lesser degree) law and order. Citizens also view mainstream parties as ideologically convergent more generally. To get their desired policy results, citizens would have to elect a non-mainstream party - but which one? The answer is obvious. The party that clearly advertises in much of what they say and do the alternative cultural positions that resonate with these voters - the Rassemblement National.

Chapter 4

Left-wing Populism: Spain and Podemos

While right-wing populism has existed in the West for a number of decades now - as evidenced by the (for lack of a better word) "pedigreed" Rassemblement National in the previous chapter - left-wing populism is a more recent development in the region. Perhaps the best known (or second-best known, after Greece's Syriza) is the Spanish Podemos (trans. *We Can*) party. Podemos was born from the 15-M movement which arose in opposition to austerity policies in Spain in 2011 (Rubio-Arostegui & Rius-Ulldemolins, 2022, p.4-5). The origins of the 15-M movement and the consequent formation of Podemos highlight the economic focus of left-wing populist movements. As discovered in the last chapter, right-wing populist parties clearly do not *ignore* economic issues - they remain incredibly important to their voter base. However, the amount of attention right-wing populist parties

and their voters assign to cultural issues is very high - much higher than left-wing populist voters, as will be seen.

This chapter will further explore the relationship between populism and both cultural and economic issues, by following the same voter-centric logic employed in the previous chapter. The same assumptions of the quantitative model from Chapter 2 will be tested using qualitative insights about Podemos and the Spanish voter. One important difference, however, is that Podemos was not one of the cases available in the CSES data the time of analysis. Further (and likely due in part to this absence) the results from the left-wing populist quantitative analysis were not as conclusive as were the results for the right-wing populist analysis.

This gives the mechanism-testing to be done in this chapter both more importance and less weight. The insights gained by exploring the Spanish case can provide evidence of the suggested relationship between economic issue concern and left-wing populist voting that was not provided by the quantitative analysis. However, without a clear quantitative relationship, the results of the mechanism-tracing done in this chapter cannot be reasonably expected to apply to other cases of left-wing populism without further testing.

The chapter will proceed according to the same logic as the previous chapter. As a reminder, this project suggests that voters are more likely to vote for a left populist party if: their most privileged issue is economic well-being, the government is doing a poor job of managing the economy, other mainstream parties are not likely to do a much better job due to ideological similarities (perceived or real), and there exists a left-wing political party that clearly signals that they would implement different economic policies. This logic

then relies on four major assumptions, left-wing populist voters: privilege economic issues, believe the government is handling the economy poorly, believe other mainstream parties are similar in their economic ideology, and that left-wing populist parties hold alternative economic policies that are clearly relayed to citizens. This chapter will focus on confirming the veracity of these four assumptions in order to establish the possibility of this logic being accurate.

4.1 Privileged Issues

It should come as no surprise that a voter of Podemos should care about economic issues. Spain was one of the countries most adversely affected by the Eurozone crisis. The resulting bailouts and austerity policies that followed would place the Spanish economy in a less-than-ideal state. It would be hard for most citizens to not notice the state of their economy. It should be expected, therefore, that Spanish voters during and after the Eurozone crisis should privilege economic issues more than cultural issues, as their economic well-being was under existential threat.

To verify the issue focus of Spanish voters, data from the European Election Voter Study [EEVS] (2009, 2014, 2019) was utilized. Respondents were asked what were(was) the three-most (2009), two most (2014), or most (2019) important issue(s) facing Spain today. As was the case with the EEVS data for France, the respondent replies were already coded for 2009 and 2014. For 2019, the 1000 entries were coded by the author.

For 2009 and 2014, pre-coded categories were combined to make larger "economy" and "culture" variables, which are presented in Tables 4.1 4.2 and 4.3. In order to keep

consistency, the same pre-coded categories that were combined to make the economy and culture variables in the French data coding were used for the Spanish data. For those that were missing, they were dropped. No new categories were added.

For 2009, the economic pre-coded categories were all available and all the same. A response was coded as privileging the economy if it was coded by EEVS coders as being related to economic conditions, inflation, unemployment, wages and earnings, or "effects of financial crisis on economy." Responses were coded as privileging culture if it was coded by EEVS coders as being related to immigration or national way of life. Unlike the French responses, no entries were coded as "culture" or "multiculturalism" and so these categories were dropped. That these categories were dropped may already be telling of the importance of cultural issues in Spain in-and-of-itself, although it may also be the result of different coding strategies. At the least, that these categories go un-utilized tells of the importance of these categories to the EEVS coders for Spain, who likely share an idea of what is important to Spanish citizens.

For 2014, the Spanish economic pre-coded categories again match the French pre-coded categories for the economic category. They are the same as those used for the 2009 economic variable, but they drop "effects of financial crisis on economy." For the culture variable, the pre-coded "immigration" and "national way of life" categories were combined. This drops the pre-coded categories of "multiculturalism," "Labour Migration/Emigration," and "Ethnic minorities," which were all included in the culture variable for the French chapter. Again, the absence of these categories may hint at the importance of these issues or their (lack of a) place in the current Spanish zeitgeist.

For 2019, each response (n=1000) was once again hand-coded to create a variable with three groups: economy, culture, or other. The economic category is largely made up of responses bemoaning the lack of (quality) jobs and general unemployment (*paro*, *desempleo*), although broader statements about the poor state of the economy were included as well. The culture category largely consists of mentions of immigration (*inmigración*) with some instances of more general culture-related responses (e.g. *falta de valores* and *falta de educación social*). While this category is topically focused, it is dwarfed in size by the economic category, however.

Table 4.1: Most Important Issue - Economy v. Culture

	2009			2014		2019
Most Important Issue	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 3	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 1
Economy	856	407	127	742	322	416
Culture	8	67	49	9	26	46
Other	136	526	824	355	758	538

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009, 2014, 2019). Original table.
2009 and 2019: n=1000. 2014: n=1074.

Turning to the results of the new categorizations in Tables 4.1 4.2 and 4.3, the economy clearly stands dominant in the concerns of most Spanish voters. Table 4.1 shows that at the beginning of the Eurozone Crisis, 85 percent of respondents believed the economy was the most important issue, while only 0.08 percent believed it was a cultural issue. For the second and third most important issues in the same year economy still beats out culture for both, although culture does gain a significant increase in importance for the second and third spots. Compared to France in the same year, the economy is the most important issue to approximately 35 percent more respondents in Spain. Interestingly, culture is more important as a second-most and third-most important issue in Spain than in France in 2009.

For 2014, the economy still remains much more important than culture as far as what the most important issue facing Spain is in the minds of citizens. These results closely follow the inception of Podemos, which also came at the height of economic unrest, so this is unsurprising as well. In France at this time, however, cultural issues started to become much more important to French citizens, with 66 and 87 respondents in France listing a cultural issue as the most and second-most important issue facing France respectively, versus just 9 and 26 respondents in Spain.

Finally, for 2019, more respondents signaled something other than the economy as primarily being the most important issue facing Spain. The other category in this case is largely filled by concerns over politics more generally, corruption, and (prominently) regionalism and separatist concerns. That this change in issue importance should follow the controversial Catalan Declaration of Independence and ensuing battles is to be expected. As the economy continued to recover and separatist movements from both Catalonia and the Basque region continued to grow in fervency, the importance of economic voters gave way to concerns of civil unrest. Unlike in France of same year (with a sample the same size), the number of respondents privileging cultural issues was unremarkable - 46 versus French respondents' 121, an almost threefold difference.

2019 also represents the first time the right-wing populist VOX entered the Spanish parliament - which matches with the shift of issue importance seen here. While Spain is not quite as concerned with immigration as France is, the separatist movements it has been facing for a long time now represent culture-adjacent issues that have long been ignored by mainstream parties. Podemos, in contrast, first entered the Spanish Parliament in 2015,

Table 4.2: Most Important Issue - Economy v. Culture - National Elections

	2009						2014				2019	
	Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 3		Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 1	
	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.
Party												
Andalusian Party (APA)	2	0	0	0	0	0						
Animalist Party Against Mistreatment of Animals											12	0
Aragonese Party (PAR)	1	0	0	0	1	0						
Aragonese Union (CHA)	2	0	0	0	0	0						
Aralar	3	0	2	1	0	0						
Basque Country Gather											0	0
Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV)	1	0	1	1	0	0	4	0	1	0	3	0
Canarian Coalition							5	0	3	0	1	0
Citizens - Party of the Citizenry							4	0	1	0	57	14
Commitment Coalition											3	0
Convergence and Union (CiU)	21	0	12	3	4	4	10	0	8	1		
Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG)	7	0	2	0	0	1	4	0	2	0		
Libertas Spain & Citizens - Party of Citizenry	0	0	1	0	1	0						
Navarre Yes (NA-BAI)	0	0	1	0	0	0						
New Canaries	1	0	0	0	0	0						
Popular Party	255	3	128	22	38	21	149	1	66	11	46	3
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)	4	1	3	0	2	0	18	0	12	0	12	0
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	283	3	130	18	34	12	174	2	58	5	137	8
Sum Navarre											3	0
The Confederation of the Greens	2	0	0	0	0	0						
Together for Catalonia											6	0
Unidas Podemos											55	1
Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD)	11	0	6	2	2	1	19	0	6	0		
United Left & Initiative for Catalonia Greens (IU)	38	0	11	2	7	3						
VOX											16	12
Did not Vote — N/AP	76	0	35	6	13	3	165	4	81	2	35	4
Do not Recall — Don't Know	20	0	10	0	3	0	19	0	8	0	11	2
Not Eligible	14	1	9	1	4	0						
Other (recoded)							50	1	23	3		
Other Party	4	0	1	1	0	0	9	1	4	0	10	1
Refused	93	0	48	8	15	3	104	0	47	4		
Voted Blank	18	0	7	2	3	1	8	0	2	0	9	1

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009, 2014, 2019). Original table.
2009 and 2019: n=1000. 2014: n=1074.
2009: Spoiled votes and Voted Blank values were combined as were Did not vote and N/AP.

the first election following the 15-M movement and harsh austerity policies which incited said movement.

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 break down the categories from Table 4.1 by the party for which a respondent voted. Table 4.2 reports the issue privileging of respondents based on for whom they voted in the National elections closest in the past to the year the survey was taken, while Table 4.3 reports the issue privileging of respondents based on for whom they voted in the European elections that took place the same year as the survey.

Table 4.2 shows an overwhelming privileging of economic issues among mainstream Popular Party (PP) and Spanish Socialist Worker's Party voters (PSOE). By the third most-important issue in 2009, the right-wing Popular Party voters start to signal the need to address cultural issues, but PSOE voters remain concerned with economic or other issues. The pattern remains the same for 2014, with more attention shifting to other issues, as compared with 2009.

By 2019, both Podemos and VOX have entered the political scene. Podemos voters overwhelmingly signal the economy as being more important than cultural issues. VOX voters, in comparison, at the same time and the same place as Podemos, give almost equal weight to economic and cultural issues. In other words, under the same economic and cultural issues, the left-wing populist Podemos voters privilege the economy more than cultural issues, while the right-wing populist VOX voters privilege culture at least as much as the economy. This is not quite to the same degree as the Rassemblement National voters in France in 2019 - who privileged cultural over economic issues at a 2:1 ratio - but VOX is a much newer party in comparison.

Table 4.3: Most Important Issue - Economy v. Culture - European Elections

	2009						2014				2019	
	Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 3		Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 1	
Party	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.	Econ.	Cult.
Animalist Party Against Mistreatment of Animals											15	0
Aragonese Union (CHA)	1	0	0	0	0	0						
Citizens - Party of the Citizenry							3	0	6	0	51	10
Coalition for a Solidary Europe											4	0
Coalition for Europe	17	0	12	2	5	2	12	0	8	0		
Commitment to Europe											2	0
Internationalist Initiative & Solidarity among Peoples	4	0	1	0	0	0						
Left for The Right to Decide (Coalaiton ERC + others)							16	0	12	0		
Libertas Spain & Citizens - Party of Citizenry	2	0	2	1	2	0						
Podemos (We Can)							38	1	19	2		
Popular Party	196	1	102	18	26	14	75	0	28	9	52	6
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)	0	0	1	0	1	0						
Republics Now											10	0
Spanish Alternative (AES)	1	1	2	0	0	0						
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	191	2	79	8	31	9	74	1	31	3	122	6
The Confederation of the Greens	1	0	0	0	1	0						
Together for Catalonia											5	0
Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD)	28	0	13	3	6	1	19	0	5	0		
United Left							26	0	11	2		
United Left & Initiative for Catalonia Greens	24	0	7	2	3	0						
United We Can Change Europe											54	3
VOX											12	9
Did not Vote — N/AP	260	3	129	20	28	20	318	6	138	7	63	9
Do not Recall — Don't Know	13	0	6	1	3	0	13	0	4	0	9	1
Other (recoded)							12	0	5	0		
Other Party	9	0	3	2	0	1	19	1	8	0	10	1
Refused	89	1	44	8	16	2	102	0	41	3		
Voted Blank	20	0	6	2	5	0	15	0	6	0	7	1

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009, 2014, 2019). Original table.
2009 and 2019: n=1000. 2014: n=1074.
2009: Spoiled votes and Voted Blank values were combined as were Did not vote and N/AP.

Table 4.3 reports respondents' most privileged issues based on for whom they voted in the 2009, 2014, and 2019 European Elections. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these results almost mirror the results at the national level - if not being slightly lower due to worse voter turnout. The mainstream PSOE and PP party voters remain very similar to one another throughout the sample, with both groups privileging economic issues well over cultural issues. Podemos (here represented as "United We Can Change Europe") voters still overwhelmingly privilege economic issues, while VOX voters once again give almost equal weight to economic and cultural issues. The VOX results, again, are not quite as strong as those of the Rassemblement National voters in the 2019 European Elections. The lingering emphasis on economic issues, however, is very understandable in Spain versus France, given the severity of the Eurozone Crisis and its effects on the economy in Spain versus France.

Overall, Spain's voters privilege economic issues much more than cultural issues. Only when VOX has recently come on the scene has this begun to change slightly. This is in contrast to France, where Front/Rassemblement National voters have always placed a larger (though not always more than the economy) emphasis on cultural issues. The evidence provided here does help confirm the assumption that left-wing populist voters, especially compared to right-wing populist voters - privilege economic issues over cultural issues. In Spain, as can be seen, this economic issue privileging applies across the board, especially among mainstream PP and PSOE voters. So, when the economy takes a decade long (or longer) downturn as it has in much of Spain, who do the Spanish people blame?

4.2 Government Responsibility

From the previous section it should be clear that Spanish voters overall are concerned about the state of their economy, at least for the past decade. While true that the Spanish party system has essentially been a two-party system since becoming a democracy after the death of Franco in 1975, this does not preclude other parties from making significant headway, should citizens seek to place their votes elsewhere. Choosing to vote outside the well established PP-PSOE duopoly, however, presupposes that citizens blame the government for their current economic malaise.

Unlike cultural issues, which tend to be mostly domestically determined, the economy is made up of a more complex set of issues. This makes assigning blame for poor economic conditions more difficult (if one cares to assign blame accurately, at least). In the case of Spain, the government may not be the clearest actor responsible for the poor state of the Spanish economy - the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (post-bailout) and banks all can easily be pinpointed as having contributed to economic problems.

Once again, the European Election Voter Study can help shed light on with whom Spanish voters place the blame for the state of the economy in 2009 and 2014. Table 4.4 reports where respondents place the Spanish national government and the European Union on separate eleven-point scales (0-10) based on each institution's responsibility for economic conditions and for interest rates in 2009. For economic conditions more generally, 72.7 percent of respondents think the government holds more than half (a score of five) the responsibility for economic conditions, with a quarter of respondents selecting that the Spanish national government holds full (a score of ten) responsibility for economic

Table 4.4: Institutional Responsibility for the Economy and Interest Rates - Spain (%) (2009)

		Responsibility (None -> Full)												
Responsible for:	Institution	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Refuse	DK
Economic Conditions	National Gov.	3.10	0.50	1.10	2.40	4.70	14.60	8.10	14.80	17.60	7.10	25.10	0.10	0.80
		(31)	(5)	(11)	(24)	(47)	(146)	(81)	(148)	(176)	(71)	(251)	(1)	(8)
	European Union	3.70	0.40	2.70	3.50	6.20	18.00	13.00	14.80	13.20	4.80	15.10	0.40	4.20
		(37)	(4)	(27)	(35)	(62)	(180)	(130)	(148)	(132)	(48)	(151)	(4)	(42)
Interest Rates	National Gov.	7.30	1.50	2.80	4.40	3.30	10.40	8.40	9.80	12.20	5.10	18.40	1.60	14.80
		(73)	(15)	(28)	(44)	(33)	(104)	(84)	(98)	(122)	(51)	(184)	(16)	(148)
	European Union	2.40	0.70	1.10	2.10	2.70	11.90	7.90	9.80	13.60	8.80	21.50	1.60	15.90
		(24)	(7)	(11)	(21)	(27)	(119)	(79)	(98)	(136)	(88)	(215)	(16)	(159)

Source: European Election Voter Study (2009). Original table.

Refuse = refused to answer. DK = don't know.

n = 1000

Given values are percentages. The frequency of people for each category are included underneath in parentheses.

conditions. For the European Union, 60.9 percent of respondents believe it is more than half responsible for economic conditions in Spain, with fifteen percent believing it is fully responsible. Comparatively, more blame is assigned to the Spanish national government than the E.U. then, although it is clear the E.U. is not blameless in the eyes of respondents.

Table 4.4 also reports how responsible respondents feel the two institutions are for interest rates in Spain. 53.9 percent of respondents believed the Spanish national government was more than half responsible for interest rates in 2009, compared with 61.6 percent of respondents who thought the E.U. was more than half responsible. In the case of interest rates, more responsibility was assigned to the E.U. However, interest rates are only a part of the overall health of the economy. It is worth mentioning that about 15 percent of respondents did not know with which institution to place responsibility for interest rates, compared with less than one percent and 4.20 for the national government and E.U. on general economic conditions, respectively. This may indicate that the question on responsibility for interest rates was treated as a knowledge check by respondents, whereas economic conditions may have been treated more as "who is to blame for this?"

Table 4.5 reports the results of the 2014 EEVS survey question on institutional responsibility for the economy. Unlike 2009, the 2014 survey has two extra actors that may share responsibility for economic conditions - the IMF and Banks. On the question of institutional responsibility for the economy in 2014, 84.9 percent of respondents thought that the national government was more than half responsible, 75.4 percent of respondents thought the E.U. was more than half responsible, 58.4 percent thought the IMF was more than half responsible, and 87.42 percent of respondents thought that banks were more than

Table 4.5: Institutional Responsibility for the Economy - Spain (%) (2014)

	Responsibility for Economy (None -> Full)											
Institution	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
National Gov.	1.54	0.36	1.27	2.35	2.71	6.42	5.52	11.48	17.27	11.03	39.60	0.45
	(17)	(4)	(14)	(26)	(30)	(71)	(61)	(127)	(191)	(122)	(438)	(5)
European Union	0.99	0.45	1.45	1.54	3.44	12.57	11.21	18.17	19.17	6.42	20.43	4.16
	(11)	(5)	(16)	(17)	(38)	(139)	(124)	(201)	(212)	(71)	(226)	(46)
IMF	1.72	0.36	1.54	1.36	2.26	15.64	9.04	10.22	11.75	7.05	20.34	18.72
	(19)	(4)	(17)	(15)	(25)	(173)	(100)	(113)	(130)	(78)	(225)	(207)
Banks	2.80	0.45	1.27	1.18	0.99	4.88	5.15	9.67	16.18	12.75	43.67	0.99
	(31)	(5)	(14)	(13)	(11)	(54)	(57)	(107)	(179)	(141)	(483)	(11)

Source: European Election Voter Study (2014). Original table.

Refuse = refused to answer. DK = don't know.

n = 1106

Given values are percentages. The frequency of people for each category are included underneath in parentheses.

half responsible. About one-fifth of respondents believed that the E.U. and IMF were fully responsible for the economy in 2014. 39.60 percent of people placed the entire blame on the Spanish national government. A whopping 43.67 percent of people, however, placed the blame entirely on banks.

As hinted at by the existence of extra questions about a larger group of actors in the 2014 survey, these responses are likely targeted specifically to assign blame for the economic crisis in Spain brought about as part of the larger Eurozone crisis. While banks clearly (and deservedly) are seen as the most responsible, they remain largely private institutions, regulation of which is the purview of government. Aside from (or alongside with) banks then, the national government is marked as most responsible for the state of the economy, with the E.U. not entirely blameless, and with a sizable portion of respondents still confused about the role of the IMF vis-à-vis the economy.

Moving from 2009 to 2014, a growing portion of Spanish voters were placing more responsibility/blame on the Spanish national government for the state of the economy. The start of the 15-M movement and rise of Podemos during this period, then, was likely no small coincidence. As seen in the previous section, Spanish voters privilege the state of the economy and economic issues over other issues and as the economy worsened, more responsibility/blame was placed on the Spanish national government. Clearly, change was needed, but for whom should the Spanish voters vote?

4.3 Ideological Convergence

During the period analyzed in the last section (2009-2014) both the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP) had been the majority party in the Spanish parliament. These two parties have essentially traded power since Franco as shown in Table 4.6. While the parties traded power in 2011 (with the PP gaining majority over the PSOE) the economic conditions had not gotten much better. If voters did not believe so already, this lack of change would have highlighted that the choice between the PP and the PSOE was not really a choice at all. In the 2015 Spanish general election then, for a voter whose privileged issue is the economy, and given the way to improve the economy was through voting in a party with a different economic plan (because the government is the actor most responsible for the state of the economy) should that voter vote for the PSOE - the non-majority mainstream party - or another party?

The answer to this question depends on whether the voter thinks the PSOE will manage the economy better than the PP. The entrenched nature of the Spanish party system has no doubt fostered perceptions of corruption. This was one of the most common "other" responses coded for the EEVS survey data by the author. But is voting in the PSOE perceived to give the same results as voting in the PP? Would one do anything differently in respect to the economy than the other? In other words, are these parties ideologically convergent on economic issues?

Table 4.6: Mainstream Left and Right Parties in Spanish General Elections 1977-2019

Year	**Left Mainstream**	**Right Mainstream**
1977	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD)
1979	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD)
1982	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Coalition (AP)
1986	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Coalition (AP)
1989	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
1993	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
1996	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
2000	Socialist Group of the Congress (PSOE-PDNI)*	People's Party (PP)
2004	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
2008	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
2011	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
2015	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
2016	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
2019 (April)	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)
2019 (November)	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	People's Party (PP)

*Coalition of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the Democratic Party of the New Left.

4.3.1 Ideological Convergence: Manifesto Project Evidence

Beginning with the Manifesto Project Data, the similarity of the mainstream PP and PSOE parties on economic policy can be derived from the amount of attention each party pays to certain policies in each iteration of their manifestos. Like with the French chapter, the data presented here codes quasi-sentences to arrive at a percentage of mentions given to a topic in a given manifesto. The amount of times a party manifesto mentions a given topic should indicate roughly the importance of the topic to said party and their stances on said topic, as the Manifesto Project data indicates either favoring a particular policy or the direction of the statements. For instance, there are separate categories for Protectionism, signaling the quasi-sentences are either being positive (in favor of) or negative (against) towards protectionism. There are not, however, separate categories for Controlled Economy, but there is a Free Market Economy category as well, which acts as foil to the former.

The ability to compare both frequency and direction of mentions of economic policy stances allows for better comparison of the mainstream PP and PSOE parties, in order to gauge their level of ideological convergence from 1977 to 2019 for those years in which they published a manifesto. Podemos/Unidos Podemos will also be contrasted for the few years available to show whether it has the comparative outsider or alternative economic policy positions as would be expected according to the theory of this project. For the mainstream parties, it is expected that the percent mentions for most economic policy options will be very similar, and most will converge around zero, if the two mainstream parties are indeed ideologically convergent on economic issues. It is expected in most cases that scores for the PP and PSOE will converge around zero as each party will not be able to differentiate itself from the other by emphasizing policies shared by the other party.

The Manifesto Project has many economic categories into which manifesto quasi-sentences may fit. A significant subsection of these categories focus on economic policy stances. These economic policies will be focused on in the analysis here when comparing the mainstream Spanish parties. While the average Spanish citizen is unlikely to have intimate knowledge of these economic policies and their alternatives, it is unnecessary in order for them to assess the similarity of the parties. Citizens can tell by the actions of the parties over time whether or not one will act differently. For the purposes of constructing evidence that the mainstream Spanish parties are ideologically convergent - which is likely something to be picked up by citizens somewhat intuitively - looking at their economic policy stances (under the assumption they stick somewhat to the stances in their manifestos when given the chance to govern) should establish empirically what citizens know implicitly.

The latter could normally be expressed by a measure such as that given in Table 1.2 in Chapter 1, however the data points for Spain in the CSES Integrated Module data-set stop short of the period of interest here (2011-2019). Therefore, the Manifesto Project and (later) the Comparative Agendas Project data will have to establish ideological convergence more generally, with the assumption being that ideological convergence in manifesto policy positions is understood by citizens.

Appendix Table B.1[1] reports the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions having direct government control of the economy.[2] This may include "control over prices [or] introduction of [a] minimum wage" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). Scores for the mainstream parties remain similar and close to zero for the entire period, with Podemos barely mentioning the idea slightly more.[3]

Appendix Table B.2 reports the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions of corporatism. As with mentions of a controlled economy, neither mainstream party nor Podemos give much attention to economic policies favoring corporatism.

Table 4.7 reports the percentage that each party manifesto mentions the "general need to encourage or facilitate greater production [or the] need for the government to aid economic growth" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). The PSOE mentions the need for government to aid growth a decent amount in their manifesto prior to 1989. After this time, both the PSOE and PP converge on fairly low scores until, where

[1]Tables with less relevant information are available in Appendix B. They are referenced here, however.

[2]As there were two elections in 2019, many parties had two manifestos. Where this is the case, the mean of the two manifesto scores are given.

[3]One quick thing to note is that the 2015 and 2016 Podemos manifestos contain completely identical text for the party policy platform portions. As these tables record party position over time, the score for the 2016 document is kept, as it is a signal of no change in policy positions from 2015.

Table 4.7: Economic Growth (Positive)

	Year													
Party Abbrev.	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					2.83	4.72	0.63	1.59	1.45	1.16	2.77	6.69	6.69	1.38
PSOE	0.36	3.78	2.92	6.26	4.53	2.82	1.76	1.17	0.94	2.06	1.93	2.29	2.32	0.46
Podemos												0.92	0.92	0.45
Unidos Podemos													0.58	
AP	0.00	0.00	6.81	4.91										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							3.25	1.58	2.29	1.89	1.94			0.72
C's												1.92	0.12	0.64
CC						2.57	2.42	1.99	4.00	4.14	5.07			
CC-PNC												5.37	4.68	
CCa-PNC-NC														1.68
CDC													2.50	
CDS			6.57	5.17	4.21	0.75								
CHA									0.47	3.30				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.31	0.31	
CiU		6.95	6.95	6.35	6.48	4.07	2.26	1.67	2.74	4.64	1.60			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												1.03		
Compromis-Q											1.43			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													1.02	
DL												2.44		
EA					3.58	3.06	2.17	2.17	0.76	3.87				
EE	2.61	2.61	2.61	2.61	2.61									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.00	0.00
ERC	2.83	4.25	2.79	1.32	0.58	2.83	2.18	2.18	1.53	2.65	0.88	2.00	2.15	0.22
En Marea												0.68	0.67	
FAC											2.37			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.00	1.33	1.44	0.31	0.43	0.29	0.72	0.12			0.06
JxCat														1.24
Más País-Equo														0.09
Més Compromís														0.54
PA	6.59	6.59			6.59	6.59		5.25	3.98					
PAR	5.80	5.80		5.80	5.80	5.80		5.80						
PCE	1.16	0.49	1.67											
PDP			0.00	4.81										
PL				4.81										
PNV/EAJ	1.19	2.19	4.47	3.39	2.89	4.08	5.62	6.73	0.18	4.98	2.58	6.55	6.55	3.89
PRC														6.48
UCD	1.88	4.37	4.60											
UP												0.16		
UPN									17.05	15.48				
UPyD											0.16			
VOX														0.44
¡TE!														5.46

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

scores begin to diverge again. This is likely in response to different strategies to deal with the economic crisis. However, as mentioned last chapter, impressions of party platforms of long-standing platforms are not likely to change in the minds of citizens overnight. Up until 2015, both mainstream parties had about the same amount to say about government promotion of economic growth - i.e. they were ideologically convergent. It is only when Podemos entered the scene that the PP began to favor government promotion of economic growth more, even though on this particular issue Podemos was closer to the scores of the mainstream parties pre-economic crisis.

Table 4.8 reports the percentage that each party manifesto calls for orthodox economic policies such as "Reduction of budget deficits; Retrenchment in crisis; Thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship; Support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system; Support for strong currency" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). The mainstream Spanish parties converged around these types of economic policies around 2004, with a slight uptick of support in 2011, right at the crux of the Eurozone Crisis and talk of conditional loans for Spain. Support for such economic policies waned quickly afterwards for the PSOE, while the PP took until 2019 to stop positive mentions of these policies almost entirely. In the period leading up to the emergence of Podemos, however, both mainstream parties were converged on the idea (or resigned to the need of such policies). Podemos, however, paid almost no mind to such policies in comparison.

Arguably, rejection of austere economic policies was the most visible aspect of economic policy to citizens of Spain during the period of 2009-2016. As the 15-M movement

Table 4.8: Economic Orthodoxy

	Year													
Party Abbrev.	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					1.11	3.33	2.47	2.94	0.93	1.55	3.66	2.27	2.27	0.38
PSOE	0.36	1.30	2.28	1.43	0.47	0.59	1.42	0.94	0.65	0.59	2.31	0.63	0.67	0.13
Podemos												0.00	0.00	0.15
Unidos Podemos													0.58	
AP	11.21	11.21	2.87	1.98										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.86			0.00
C's												1.05	1.69	0.50
CC						0.06	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.65			
CC-PNC												0.32	0.30	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.40
CDC													1.32	
CDS			3.08	1.25	1.74	0.75								
CHA									0.00	0.23				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.00	0.00	
CiU		6.22	6.22	3.34	3.63	1.63	1.77	1.52	0.79	1.55	0.93			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.00		
Compromis-Q											1.96			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.00	
DL												0.73		
EA					3.37	1.88	1.69	1.69	0.00	0.00				
EE	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.00	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	2.19	4.39	2.70	0.21	0.11	0.11	0.00	0.37	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00
En Marea												0.00	0.00	
FAC											0.59			
GBai											2.38			
IU				0.17	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.25			0.00
JxCat														0.24
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.03
PA	0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00					
PAR	0.78	0.78		0.78	0.78	0.78		0.78						
PCE	0.39	0.00	0.13											
PDP			11.21	2.30										
PL				2.30										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.00	3.42	4.70	2.94	3.99	4.92	1.21	0.00	2.17	6.72	4.51	4.51	3.33
PRC														0.00
UCD	5.63	2.34	2.27											
UP												0.00		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											1.11			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

championed opposition to austerity measures, support of orthodox economic policies from the mainstream party would have stood out. In this important aspect, Podemos represented an important foil to the establishment.

Appendix Table B.3 reports the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions government economic planning, such as "Policy plans, strategies, [or] policy patterns" (Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, et al., 2021). Both mainstream parties and Podemos seem to pay policies of economic planning little mind, with the slight exception of the PSOE early in the history of modern democratic Spain.

Appendix Table B.4 reports the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions free market capitalism (neoliberalism) as an economic model. As with much of the rest of the world, both mainstream parties converged around favorable discussion of free market policies starting in the 1990s, following the Washington Consensus. The need to discuss such policies consequently waned, and Podemos either never discussed the policies favorably, or never felt the need to challenged the mainstream consensus.

Appendix Table B.5 reports the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions supply-side oriented economic policies. Since 1989 – with the exception of 2004 and 2019 – the mainstream PP and PSOE parties have more or less moved in step with one another on this measure. Even throughout the debt crisis Spain faced in the 2010s, the mainstream parties both looked favorably on supply-side economic policies. Podemos, comparatively, made less favorable mention of said policies. However, as seen in Table B.6 none of these parties spends much of their manifestos positively mentioning demand-side economic policies either. While it may be clear in this case that voting for the PSOE over

Table 4.9: Market Regulation

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					2.13	1.56	1.33	2.94	2.26	4.94	3.03	2.40	2.40	3.37
PSOE	0.36	0.52	2.18	0.32	0.34	1.64	1.30	5.15	4.70	8.23	6.89	6.09	5.97	4.19
Podemos												7.21	7.21	13.22
Unidos Podemos													7.56	
AP	3.45	3.45	1.33	0.46										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							1.67	1.68	1.39	0.29	7.11			2.17
C's												5.76	8.79	7.47
CC						1.42	1.43	2.11	2.56	1.32	4.03			
CC-PNC												0.95	0.91	
CCa-PNC-NC														1.49
CDC													6.36	
CDS			7.83	4.70	1.03	10.45								
CHA									0.00	1.94				
CUP														3.57
CatECP												7.67	7.67	
CiU		0.91	0.91	1.92	1.16	5.07	3.52	2.33	2.68	0.62	3.89			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												7.28		
Compromis-Q											4.73			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													7.29	
DL												6.55		
EA					1.12	1.18	2.04	2.04	2.96	0.31				
EE	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.86	5.09
ERC	1.89	2.13	2.16	2.19	1.16	2.95	2.61	2.61	2.26	1.33	6.08	8.32	7.78	9.87
En Marea												9.15	10.00	
FAC											2.00			
GBai											2.83			
IU				1.84	2.95	2.28	2.17	2.62	0.64	3.65	8.41			7.71
JxCat														6.96
Más País-Equo														6.05
Més Compromís														5.50
PA	4.18	4.18			4.18	4.18		3.03	1.80					
PAR	2.77	2.77		2.77	2.77	2.77		2.77						
PCE	1.16	1.15	2.44											
PDP			3.45	0.46										
PL				0.46										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.91	0.38	0.17	0.28	0.89	2.83	3.32	0.00	0.97	4.39	2.26	2.26	4.58
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.47	3.28	1.92											
UP												7.60		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											7.94			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														1.82

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

the PP or vice versa would not produce more demand-side policies, it is equally unclear that Podemos would go this route if it were the majority party.

Table 4.9 reports the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions regulation the free market. Here there is a clear divide between the mainstream parties, with the right-wing PP favoring less (but still some) increases in market regulation and the left-wing PSOE favoring increased market regulation. Podemos more clearly matches the PSOE in this stance, but also devotes a significant amount more to this topic, with it's 2019 manifestos averaging 13.22 percent of topics mentioned.

Appendix Table B.7 reports the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions government ownership (partial or complete) of national industries. There is across the board few mentions of this topic.

Appendix Tables B.8 and B.9 report the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions lowering or increasing market protections, respectively. As with nationalization, neither the mainstream parties or Podemos devote much attention to the topic of trade barriers.

Finally, Tables 4.10 and 4.11 report the percentage that each party manifesto favorably mentions expanding or limiting the Spanish welfare state, respectively. Talk of limiting the welfare state is basically non-existent in the manifestos of the mainstream or manifesto, but expanding it is another story entirely. Both the PP and the PSOE made similarly high favorable mentions of welfare state expansion in the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, lessening their attention mostly equally for the first decade of the new millennium. 2011 represented a year of divergence in this aspect, with the PSOE ramping

Table 4.10: Welfare State Expansion

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					14.00	11.16	4.27	4.47	6.77	7.64	5.07	10.94	10.94	12.44
PSOE	8.54	11.47	10.46	9.71	17.51	11.34	6.29	10.92	7.65	8.28	10.12	14.46	13.89	15.18
Podemos												11.16	11.16	14.92
Unidos Podemos													14.54	
AP	18.10	18.10	5.34	6.43										
Amaiur											3.45			
BNG							6.39	6.42	7.75	6.61	7.76			13.38
C's												8.75	11.57	11.20
CC						5.25	5.34	10.56	8.00	7.28	10.53			
CC-PNC												7.90	7.55	
CCa-PNC-NC														12.52
CDC													13.31	
CDS			12.34	11.00	10.20	11.94								
CHA									7.96	5.81				
CUP														3.57
CatECP												14.18	14.18	
CiU		6.22	6.22	5.68	10.88	10.17	5.17	4.18	6.02	12.38	7.22			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												16.41		
Compromis-Q											8.56			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													16.20	
DL												13.31		
EA					5.62	4.47	6.70	6.70	7.78	9.60				
EE	5.22	5.22	5.22	5.22	5.22									
EH Bildu												2.63	5.17	10.64
ERC	9.43	8.51	6.89	5.26	6.46	6.45	6.42	6.42	6.39	4.46	8.16	9.15	8.58	7.98
En Marea												11.53	11.33	
FAC											7.40			
GBai											11.03			
IU				6.18	12.36	6.68	7.86	7.39	8.69	8.73	9.40			15.48
JxCat														10.84
Más País-Equo														15.16
Més Compromís														14.06
PA	9.01	9.01			9.01	9.01		8.61	8.09					
PAR	6.49	6.49		6.49	6.49	6.49		6.49						
PCE	6.20	7.24	8.75											
PDP			18.10	10.99										
PL				10.99										
PNV/EAJ	8.33	16.42	10.18	6.43	8.66	4.26	6.07	4.44	0.74	9.42	6.98	9.03	9.03	8.82
PRC														8.33
UCD	9.39	9.52	12.84											
UP												20.38		
UPN									11.36	10.71				
UPyD											7.46			
VOX														7.94
¡TE!														3.64

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table 4.11: Welfare State Limitation

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					0.42	0.27	0.04	0.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.46	0.46	0.38
PSOE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Podemos												0.00	0.00	0.00
Unidos Podemos													0.00	
AP	0.00	0.00	0.39	0.46										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00
C's												0.22	0.00	0.00
CC						0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			
CC-PNC												0.32	0.30	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.00
CDC													0.05	
CDS			0.00	0.36	0.11	0.00								
CHA									0.00	0.00				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.00	0.00	
CiU		0.73	0.73	0.42	0.68	0.00	0.37	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.18			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.00		
Compromis-Q											0.00			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.00	
DL												0.05		
EA					0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
EE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.00	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
En Marea												0.00	0.00	
FAC											0.15			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00
JxCat														0.24
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.00
PA	0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00					
PAR	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00						
PCE	0.00	0.00	0.00											
PDP			0.00	0.79										
PL				0.79										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.45	0.56
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.00	0.00	0.34											
UP												0.00		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.32			
VOX														1.53
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

up its mentions and the PP ramping them down slightly. This would get back on track the following election. Meanwhile, Podemos started with a high amount of favorable mentions of welfare state expansion in its manifestos and maintained that position.

In summary, where do the mainstream parties converge and diverge? The mainstream parties converge on most policies except (positive) economic growth post-2011, economic orthodoxy from 1989-2000 and 2015-2019, market regulation and – to a lesser degree – on the free market economy. Of the fourteen economic policy stance explore there then, the mainstream parties diverged on four. Importantly, in two of those four cases, the mainstream parties only diverged *after* Podemos had emerged and after the economic crisis facing Spain had worsened.

Where did Podemos differ from the mainstream parties when they were or had been converged? Podemos diverged on mentions of: (slightly) controlled economy, (positive) economic growth, economic orthodoxy (i.e. austerity), and incentives (i.e. supply-side economics). Again, this represents four out of fourteen policy stances. However, as argued above, the most important way Podemos differed was on its stances on austerity measures. Leading up to and during the 15-M movements, these particular policies were the most pronounced and therefore the policy stances most citizens would use to take the measure of each party. Having similar favorable mentions of these policies in their manifestos, as well as being the leading parties during the imposition of such policies, would create a large impression of similarity for the mainstream parties. For Podemos, despite its similarity to the mainstream on many other economic policies, be so openly against (at least in its ince-

ption and early years) such policies was the clear signal that voting for Podemos would usher in substantive alternative economic policies.

In short, while Podemos does not radically differ from the Spanish mainstream in its economic policy stances most of the time, it does so where it counts most in regards to attracting disaffected voters.

4.3.2 Ideological Convergence: Comparative Agendas Project Evidence

Further evidence of mainstream party economic ideological convergence may be derived from the Comparative Agendas Project data. As explained last chapter, the CAP data similarly codes each manifesto using quasi-sentences, although the different coding scheme/categorizations may provide further insight on top of that of the Manifesto Project data. While Podemos is unfortunately not included here, the degree to which mainstream parties are ideologically convergent on major economic stances should be made clearer. One additional unfortunate aspect of this data is that no year has manifestos for both the PP and PSOE. This makes comparison more limited. Given the time period available (1982-2008), it is expected the PP and PSOE stances should not be radically different from one another.

Table 4.12 shows the percentage each manifesto for the PSOE and PP mentions economic issues, labor, and commerce and banking. Unlike the Manifesto Project data, this coding is not directional. Looking at the absolute mentions (given in parentheses below the percentages) gives a slightly less skewed idea of issue importance, as the total quasi-sentences for each manifesto varies greatly over time.

Table 4.12: Manifesto Economic Issue Importance (Mentions %)

		Year							
		1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008
Topic	Party								
Economic Issues	PP					9.62	6.35		
						(183)	(143)		
	PSOE	12.04	7.32	6.05	5.15			6.66	3.85
		(141)	(110)	(60)	(80)			(218)	(140)
Labor	PP					3.52	7.15		
						(67)	(161)		
	PSOE	14.77	8.79	10.58	8.05			5.72	6.49
		(173)	(132)	(105)	(125)			(187)	(236)
Commerce and Banking	PP					4.94	6.62		
						(94)	(149)		
	PSOE	7.86	6.52	3.83	5.02			9.60	8.99
		(92)	(98)	(38)	(78)			(314)	(327)
Manifesto Total Quasi-sentences:		1171	1502	992	1553	1903	2252	3271	3636

Source: Comparative Agendas Project. Original table.

Percentages given. Absolute category mentions given below in parentheses.

Beginning with economic issues, the PSOE trend downward in paying them much attention in their manifesto from 1982-1989, with less than half as many mentions in 1989 as in 1982. 1993 shows an uptick in mentions, with the PP the following election more than doubling the 80 mentions of the PSOE in 1993. However, by 2004, the PSOE had caught up to the larger number of mentions of the PP settling into similar numbers by 2008, just before the economic crisis would come into full-swing.

Labor shows a very similar trend, with the major difference being the first transition point in data availability (1993-1996). In other words, the trend is similar, except the PP show an early lack of mentions on labor compared to the PSOE.

Finally, commerce and banking show similar amounts of mentions for both the PSOE and PP until 2004, where the PSOE starts paying much more attention to the issue.

Overall, the trends show more ideological convergence than not. The PSOE mentions start high in each case, and then begin to lessen. When the data availability switches to focus on the PP, it starts with lower mentions on labor and commerce and banking, and then trends upwards, where the PSOE meets it with higher mentions at the second transition (2004), despite the comparatively lower mentions in 1993. When the data availability switches the first time and the PP mentions are higher (in 1996) than the PSOE (in 1993), the PP tapers off to meet closer to where the PSOE ends up.

In other words, the data here tells the story that the mainstream parties may differ for a moment, but are never very far from converging once again in most cases. Were the data to extend past the year range available here however – as may be surmised from the Manifesto Project analysis – the story might be different. However, at that point, voters

who are disaffected on the economy and blame the government will likely have already begun looking for a new party for which to cast their vote. But if it is not being cast for one of the long-standing mainstream parties, for whom should it be cast?

4.4 Party Messaging

For the Spanish voter who is disaffected with the state of the economy, blames the government, and needs to find a non-mainstream party to vote for, the choice is still yet unclear. Spain is home to many non-mainstream parties. How can they know for whom to vote to get have a better chance to improve the economy? They can listen to what the other parties talk about and how often they talk about it. This would likely be in the form of televised speeches, press conferences, or press releases. However, a party's manifesto should hint at the frequency a topic comes up in these other types of media for our purposes.[4]

Returning to the Manifesto Project data, Table 4.13 reports the amount of quasi-sentences contained under each coded category. For Podemos (and Unidos Podemos), the Economy has the second-most quasi-sentences mentioning it in the 2015 Podemos and 2016 Unidos Podemos manifestos[5], with a slight edge into first place in the 2019 manifestos. Welfare and Quality of Life win out in 2015 and 2016, however, it is worth taking a look at what comprises the category.

The Welfare and Quality of Life category is made up of several subcategories: Environmental protection, Culture(Positive), Equality (Positive), Welfare State Expansion,

[4]Unfortunately, Podemos does not have as robust a press release history as that of the Rassemblement National, actually having very few at all.

[5]Bearing in mind the 2015 and 2016 manifestos are identical

Table 4.13: Manifesto Issue Importance (Mentions %)

	Year				
Topic	2015	2016	2016 (UP)	2019 (Apr.)	2019 (Nov.)
External Relations	2.54	2.54	1.75	1.91	1.82
	(44)	(44)	(6)	(22)	(24)
Freedom and Democracy	11.66	11.66	12.28	8.70	9.18
	(202)	(202)	(42)	(100)	(121)
Political System	12.93	12.93	9.65	4.61	5.69
	(224)	(224)	(33)	(53)	(75)
Economy	25.81	25.81	31.29	32.55	32.55
	(447)	(447)	(107)	(374)	(429)
Welfare and Quality of Life	39.03	39.03	35.67	32.29	32.32
	(676)	(676)	(122)	(371)	(426)
Fabric of Society	3.29	3.29	0.58	7.92	6.68
	(57)	(57)	(2)	(91)	(88)
Social Groups	4.73	4.73	8.77	12.01	11.76
	(82)	(82)	(30)	(138)	(155)
Manifesto Total Quasi-sentences	1732	1732	342	1149	1318

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Percentages given. Absolute category mentions given below in parentheses.

UP = Unidos Podemos.

Welfare State Limitation, Education Expansion, and Education Limitation. As may be surmised from Table 4.10, the bulk of discussion in this category stems from favorable mentions of welfare state expansion. In fact, the Welfare and Quality of Life category makes up 195 out of 676 Welfare and Quality of Life mentions for 2015/2016, 50 out of 122 for 2016(UP), 178 out of 371 for Apr. 2019, and 189 out of 426 for Nov. 2019.

Certainly welfare state expansion belongs in the welfare category, but government spending on welfare programs has a real and tangible economic impact for most citizens. Considering those observations as being economic in nature pushes the discussion of the economy by Podemos well into their most discussed topic. Coupling this with discourse on corruption among the mainstream parties that found its roots in the 15-M movement and endured through Podemos' own entering into Parliament, and the voting decision for the disaffected voter becomes clear.

4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter gave empirical evidence in support of the assumptions made by the quantitative tests performed in Chapter 2. While the quantitative testing was inconclusive for left populism, the assumptions that underpinned it all found support here. Firstly, many citizens in Spain clearly privilege the economy more than other issues. Secondly, while blame is often unclear, the actor who is believed to be responsible for the economy most is the government. Thirdly, the mainstream Popular Party and Spanish Socialist Worker's parties share much in common on economic policy and citizens are unlikely to believe that one party will usher in radical economic change, should they choose to give th-

em their vote rather than the other. Finally, Podemos spends much of its time messaging on the topic of the economy.

In sum, for a citizen who privileges the economy, who believes a change in the national government is the solution, who believes the mainstream parties are essentially identical, and who has surface knowledge of the party platform of Podemos, the vote choice is much more likely to be Podemos. As time goes on and more data becomes available, it is the hope of the author to further corroborate these qualitative findings with confirmatory statistical findings. For the moment, however, these results should be seen as suggestive of conforming with the theory of the paper – neither confirming nor disconfirming.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Exploring the empirical differences between left and right populism is still a field rife with possibility. This project has attempted to add to the growing body of empirical work on both populism and its variants through exploring the factors that motivate left populist voting versus right populist voting. It is the contention of the theory of this project that both left and right populist voters are voters who are disaffected with the state of economic and cultural policies in their country (respectively), blamed the government, found the mainstream political party choices interchangeable (and therefore not capable of bringing about change by ousting one in favor of the other), and chose to vote for a populist party which clearly signaled the intention to address their privileged issue. The proposed major underlying difference lies in the privileged issue as well as what type of party is consequently seen as attractive for doing something about the undesirable state of policy on that issue. To test this, a mixed methods design was employed which tested the proposed relationship using statistical analysis, followed by qualitative cases studies of right populism

(France and the Rassemblement National) and left populism (Spain and Podemos) testing the underlying assumptions of the statistical models from the quantitative chapter.

Chapter 2 tested this theory through the use of random-intercept multilevel logistic regression analysis and survey data. For right populism, positive findings were found for the relationship between the interaction of incumbent government failure on cultural policy and ideological convergence (the perceived ideological similarity of mainstream parties) and the dependent variable - voting for a populist party. Findings show that perceived government failure on cultural issues leads to a higher likelihood of voting for a right populist party. This likelihood is further amplified if the same individual perceives mainstream parties to be ideologically convergent. Results hold after adding several controls that typically help account for voting behavior.

The results for left populism were less straightforward. Findings were inhibited by a lack of cases and general data availability. Findings were further driven heavily by the Greek case, which is an outlier in many ways, but was necessary to include given the aforementioned data and case limitations. Findings of the left populism quantitative analysis remain inconclusive, but suggestive. The theory suggested relationship between the interaction of incumbent failure on economic policies and ideological convergence on left populist voting behavior bore no statistically significant results. The relationship remains unverified but not disconfirmed. The lack of a relationship of the same interaction on right populist voting gives some preliminary support to this idea. The author hopes that his future work on left populist voting and ideological convergence will produce more definitive results of the proposed relationship.

Chapter 3 was the first qualitative chapter. Chapter 3 followed the case of the Front/Rassemblement National in France and tested the assumptions of the above-mentioned quantitative model on factors leading to right populist voting. All assumptions of the model found support. Firstly, French voters more generally cared about the economy and cultural issues. However, when looking at those who voted for the RN, over time cultural issues have become much more important, which falls in line the with increased electoral success of the RN itself. Secondly, French voters all understand the government as being primarily responsible for cultural policies, even those that are not entirely domestic issues, such as immigration. Thirdly, about a third of French voters, on average, believe there to be high ideological convergence among the mainstream parties in their country. This finding is further corroborated by expert analysis of party manifesto which shows close policy positions of mainstream parties on many cultural issues. Finally, the Rassemblement National stands out as the clear party for those seeking a non-mainstream party for which to vote who will do something different on cultural policy. An original dataset constructed of eleven years worth of Front/Rassemblement National press releases reveals a laser-focus on issues of immigration (negatively) and xenophobia, both of which stand in stark contrast to the positions of the mainstream parties as well as in volume of attention paid to the issues.

Chapter 4 mimics Chapter 3 in form, representing the second qualitative chapter. Chapter 4 followed the case of Podemos in Spain and tested the same assumptions as above, but for left populism. All assumptions of the model found support here as well. Firstly, Spanish voters most definitely cared about the economy compared to cultural issues. Compared with French voters, Spanish voters paid little if no mind to issues of immigration

or other cultural issues. The most prominent issues aside from the economy in Spain included political corruption and the various separatist/rationalist movements in the country. Secondly, Spanish voters primarily blamed their national government for the current state of the economy. Finding the national government to be the key actor responsible for the economy means the solution should be directed towards the national government, which, in a democracy, means changing voting behavior. Other actors were seen as less responsible, including the IMF and the E.U., although banks did seem to be found the most responsible in the context of the Eurozone Crisis. Overall, however, the national government is seen as being the most responsible for the economy. Thirdly, the mainstream Popular Party and Spanish Socialist Workers' Party were found to be highly ideologically convergent on most (ten) of fourteen surveyed economic policy positions. Podemos, for its part, did not diverge entirely from many of the positions, but did so where it counted most - on the need for austerity policies. Where the mainstream parties showed initial, if reserved, support for these policies in the face of a debt crisis, Podemos vehemently condemned them. As the economic policy most visible at the time – following the 15-M movement which denounced these very policies – this rejection would have signaled greater economic stance difference between Podemos and the mainstream parties - possibly even more than there is. Finally, further evidence of Podemos' focus on economic issues – making it a clear and very vocal candidate for voters looking for somewhere else to place their vote in hopes of making a positive change for the economy – is provided by inspecting the issue mentions for various categories of Podemos' manifestos over time. It is found, with some qualification, that Podemos focuses heavily on discussion of the economy in its discourse and it would be a

simple matter for the above described pre-populist voter to mark Podemos as the best-fit candidate for which to cast their vote to achieve their individual political goals.

This project has attempted to further clarify the difference between left and right populism by suggesting and testing the different factors affecting how citizens are drawn to vote for them. This project further contributes to the study of populism by formally conceptualizing and operationalizing the concept of ideological convergence, which attempts to create an empirical basis for what often might otherwise be thought of as general corruption, collusion, or elitism. In this way, ideological convergence acts as a powerful concept for those exploring the conditions for the emergence of populism, or for those who find themselves trying to define populism in new and enlightening ways.

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Appendix A

Appendix - Quantitative Results Excluding France (Chapter 2)

This appendix reproduces the results of the chapter, with the French case subset out. Due to the nature of the CSES5 data, the French data only included results for the presidential election. All the other cases used lower-house legislature electoral results. Due to the differing nature of presidential versus legislative elections, results minus the French election are included for robustness.

On the right, the results do not change very much by excluding the French case. Substantively, excluding the French case increases the coefficients of the interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence for most models. The Right group basic model drops statistical significance from the full sample, while the Left group basic model goes from significance with 1 percent chance of error to the 5 percent mark. The

marginal effects graphs look very similar, as well. Overall, the results for right populism are similar and actually slightly more robust without the French case.

On the left, the only major difference to be found is the newly significant Right groups for both the basic and full model. Substantive effects appear to be lower for the interaction between ideological failure on the economy and ideological convergence than in the full sample despite this. Importantly, the interaction between incumbent failure on culture and ideological convergence remains insignificant across the board. The marginal effects graphs again look very similar to those for the full model that were presented in the main body of the paper.

Overall, it does not appear that including the French presidential election in the absence of legislative election data drove the obtained results.

Table A.1: Multilevel Models: Right Populism and Culture

	Basic Model				Full Model			
	All	Left	Center	Right	All	Left	Center	Right
In. Fail. Cult.	-0.871***	-0.266	-0.886*	0.643	-0.924***	-0.242	-0.889*	0.633
	(-4.63)	(-0.42)	(-2.11)	(1.78)	(-4.88)	(-0.38)	(-2.11)	(1.73)
Ideo. Conv.	-0.149***	0.00113	-0.0918*	-0.0441	-0.142***	-0.00787	-0.0857*	-0.0339
	(-7.82)	(0.02)	(-2.21)	(-1.52)	(-7.40)	(-0.11)	(-2.06)	(-1.15)
In. Fail. Cult. × Ideo. Conv.	0.330***	0.267**	0.334***	0.0907	0.322***	0.248**	0.321***	0.0850
	(11.99)	(2.87)	(5.93)	(1.78)	(11.59)	(2.66)	(5.66)	(1.64)
In. Fail. Econ.	-0.107	0.482	-0.453	0.691	-0.0999	0.606	-0.481	0.704
	(-0.48)	(0.80)	(-0.93)	(1.71)	(-0.44)	(0.99)	(-0.98)	(1.71)
In. Fail. Econ. × Ideo. Conv.	0.0418	-0.0385	0.0797	-0.0413	0.0383	-0.0456	0.0803	-0.0457
	(1.28)	(-0.40)	(1.21)	(-0.73)	(1.16)	(-0.47)	(1.21)	(-0.80)
Age					0.0480***	0.109	0.0203	0.0576**
					(3.62)	(1.74)	(0.99)	(2.66)
Age Squared					-0.000551***	-0.00141*	-0.000272	-0.000635**
					(-4.17)	(-2.10)	(-1.33)	(-3.00)
Gender (Female)					-0.352***	-0.263	-0.206	-0.334**
					(-4.72)	(-0.86)	(-1.70)	(-2.74)
Education					-0.184***	-0.258**	-0.193***	-0.171***
					(-8.14)	(-2.63)	(-4.94)	(-4.95)
Constant	-1.758*	-4.343***	-2.290**	-1.373	-1.198	-4.174**	-1.290	-1.199
	(-2.29)	(-6.16)	(-3.01)	(-1.34)	(-1.44)	(-2.59)	(-1.41)	(-1.03)
Country (random effect)	4.432	1.905	3.793	7.666	4.280	1.564	3.615	7.536
	(1.63)	(1.41)	(1.63)	(1.67)	(1.62)	(1.37)	(1.62)	(1.67)
Likelihood-Ratio Test (p-value)	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Observations	7096	1795	3295	2006	7096	1795	3295	2006

t statistics in parentheses
Sample split up by Respondent Ideology: All, Left, Center, Right.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A.1: Appendix Full Model - Marginal Effects of Cultural Government Failure on Voting for Right Populists, Conditional on Ideological Convergence



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

Figure A.2: Appendix Full Model - Marginal Effects of Ideological Convergence on Voting for Right Populists, Conditional on Cultural Government Failure



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

Table A.2: Multilevel Models: Left Populism and the Economy

	Basic Model				Full Model			
	All	Left	Center	Right	All	Left	Center	Right
In. Fail. Cult.	-1.941**	1.000	-0.880	-2.751	-2.099**	1.072	-1.275	-2.943
	(-2.71)	(0.73)	(-0.79)	(-1.21)	(-2.94)	(0.79)	(-1.15)	(-1.29)
Ideo. Conv.	-0.0594	-0.0928	-0.0470	0.313	-0.0671	-0.107	-0.0321	0.239
	(-1.04)	(-1.03)	(-0.44)	(1.33)	(-1.16)	(-1.12)	(-0.29)	(1.04)
In. Fail. Cult. × Ideo. Conv.	0.142	-0.155	0.0371	0.500	0.150	-0.198	0.0812	0.535
	(1.48)	(-0.88)	(0.25)	(1.68)	(1.56)	(-1.12)	(0.55)	(1.79)
In. Fail. Econ.	-2.386***	-0.0661	-2.700**	3.533	-2.386***	-0.0113	-2.380*	3.731
	(-4.40)	(-0.07)	(-2.93)	(1.69)	(-4.28)	(-0.01)	(-2.50)	(1.79)
In. Fail. Econ. × Ideo. Conv.	0.0888	-0.117	0.117	-0.561*	0.0835	-0.120	0.0778	-0.540*
	(1.11)	(-0.83)	(0.88)	(-2.05)	(1.02)	(-0.83)	(0.57)	(-1.97)
Age					-0.0364	-0.107	-0.0276	-0.0173
					(-1.09)	(-1.70)	(-0.54)	(-0.15)
Age Squared					0.000177	0.000985	0.0000642	-0.0000699
					(0.52)	(1.48)	(0.12)	(-0.06)
Gender (Female)					0.559**	0.347	0.759**	-0.359
					(3.10)	(1.09)	(2.82)	(-0.44)
Education					-0.221***	-0.228*	-0.249**	-0.321
					(-3.61)	(-1.96)	(-2.66)	(-1.47)
Constant	-0.910	0.00483	-1.283	-5.973***	0.909	3.532	0.0608	-2.448
	(-0.57)	(0.00)	(-0.70)	(-3.68)	(0.47)	(1.56)	(0.03)	(-0.65)
Country (random effect)	0.798	0.657	0.874	-18.03	0.888	0.792	0.950	-21.88
	(1.58)	(1.28)	(1.71)	(-0.00)	(1.76)	(1.54)	(1.86)	(-0.00)
Likelihood-Ratio Test (p-value)	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	1	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	1
Observations	1306	290	637	379	1306	290	637	379

t statistics in parentheses
Sample split up by Respondent Ideology: All, Left, Center, Right.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A.3: Appendix Full Model - Marginal Effects of Economic Government Failure on Voting for Left Populists, Conditional on Ideological Convergence



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

Figure A.4: Appendix Full Model - Marginal Effects of Ideological Convergence on Voting for Left Populists, Conditional on Economic Government Failure



Source: CSES Module 5 - Advance 2 Dataset. Original Graph.

Appendix B

Appendix - Spain Ideological Convergence Supplemental Tables (Chapter 4)

This appendix contains some of the Manifesto Project tables that were mentioned in the first ideological convergence section of Chapter 4, but which did not need to be printed in the chapter proper.

Table B.1: Controlled Economy

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP						0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.08	0.08	0.00
PSOE	0.00	3.52	0.35	0.32	0.81	0.26	0.17	0.00	0.92	0.35	0.00	0.20	0.23	0.76
Podemos												1.09	1.09	1.05
Unidos Podemos													0.58	
AP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00										
Amaiur											1.72			
BNG							0.00	0.00	0.11	0.29	0.43			0.90
C's												0.20	0.24	0.00
CC						0.27	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.26			
CC-PNC												0.79	0.76	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.31
CDC													0.29	
CDS			0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00								
CHA									3.50	1.37				
CUP														2.68
CatECP												1.37	1.37	
CiU		0.18	0.18	0.17	0.05	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	3.10	0.06			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.67		
Compromis-Q											0.09			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.66	
DL												0.31		
EA					0.10	1.41	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.00				
EE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.86	4.47
ERC	2.83	0.00	0.22	0.44	0.77	0.25	0.13	0.13	0.00	1.96	0.48	0.33	0.54	0.81
En Marea												1.02	1.00	
FAC											0.07			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.67	0.87	2.07	0.26	1.59	1.43	1.29	0.25			0.63
JxCat														0.65
Más País-Equo														0.60
Més Compromís														0.38
PA	0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00		0.16	0.31					
PAR	0.35	0.35		0.35	0.35	0.35		0.35						
PCE	0.39	0.66	1.80											
PDP			0.00	0.00										
PL				0.00										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.36	0.28	0.26	0.33	0.13	0.00	0.40	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.23	0.23	0.00
PRC														0.00
UCD	1.41	0.16	0.07											
UP												1.58		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.00			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.2: Corporate/Mixed Economy

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					0.00	0.21	0.00	0.41	0.14	0.20	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.09
PSOE	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.83	0.47	1.05	0.00	0.23	0.38	0.94	1.16	0.52	0.50	0.38
Podemos												0.29	0.29	0.45
Unidos Podemos													0.29	
AP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.22			0.00
C's												0.02	0.00	0.00
CC						0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.91			
CC-PNC												1.11	1.06	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.34
CDC													0.59	
CDS			0.00	0.00	0.07	0.75								
CHA									0.00	0.23				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.04	0.04	
CiU		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.23	0.00	0.85	0.25	0.00	0.18			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.46		
Compromis-Q											0.45			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.46	
DL												0.57		
EA					2.25	0.71	1.16	1.16	0.07	0.15				
EE	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.00	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.39	0.51	0.29	0.29	0.07	0.00	0.16	1.50	1.21	0.22
En Marea												0.00	0.00	
FAC											0.30			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.92	0.17	0.63	0.73	0.28	0.25	0.05	0.25			0.08
JxCat														0.29
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.06
PA	1.54	1.54			1.54	1.54		0.80	0.07					
PAR	0.35	0.35		0.35	0.35	0.35		0.35						
PCE	0.78	0.00	0.77											
PDP			0.00	0.00										
PL				0.00										
PNV/EAJ	1.19	0.55	0.19	0.43	1.00	0.40	0.18	0.00	0.00	1.08	0.52	0.45	0.45	0.56
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.00	0.16	0.21											
UP												0.16		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.00			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.3: Economic Planning

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					1.25	0.81	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.00
PSOE	0.00	1.43	3.96	1.89	0.07	1.25	0.14	0.47	0.11	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
Podemos												0.06	0.06	0.13
Unidos Podemos													0.00	
AP	0.00	0.00	1.97	1.56										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.69	0.69	0.22	0.07	0.22			0.00
C's												0.14	0.12	0.00
CC						0.06	0.06	0.25	0.00	0.17	0.65			
CC-PNC												0.16	0.00	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.17
CDC													0.00	
CDS			1.42	2.02	3.95	0.75								
CHA									0.00	0.00				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.18	0.18	
CiU		1.28	1.28	1.25	0.48	0.27	0.24	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.00			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.15		
Compromis-Q											0.98			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.15	
DL												0.00		
EA					0.51	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.00	0.00				
EE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.00	0.00
ERC	1.89	0.00	0.88	1.75	1.06	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.83	0.67	0.11
En Marea												0.34	1.00	
FAC											0.59			
GBai											0.00			
IU				1.09	2.25	2.33	1.32	1.40	0.14	0.14	0.12			0.08
JxCat														0.00
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.14
PA	2.86	2.86			2.86	2.86		1.57	0.27					
PAR	8.39	8.39		8.39	8.39	8.39		8.39						
PCE	2.71	1.48	0.90											
PDP			0.00	0.59										
PL				0.59										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	2.01	0.86	1.56	0.83	0.75	0.00	0.00	3.32	0.00	1.03	0.00	0.00	0.28
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.47	1.56	2.13											
UP												0.11		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.16			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.4: Free Market Economy

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					3.94	2.58	1.69	0.85	0.00	1.03	1.72	0.29	0.29	2.55
PSOE	0.36	0.00	0.05	0.14	0.07	0.59	1.53	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.15	0.00
Podemos												0.00	0.00	0.00
Unidos Podemos													0.00	
AP	3.45	3.45	2.62	7.88										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00
C's												1.03	0.84	0.73
CC						0.11	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.52			
CC-PNC												0.32	0.30	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.11
CDC													0.10	
CDS			0.00	0.77	1.74	0.00								
CHA									0.00	0.00				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.00	0.00	
CiU		2.19	2.19	4.18	3.43	1.53	1.28	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.62			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.00		
Compromis-Q											0.09			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.00	
DL												0.10		
EA					0.71	0.00	0.36	0.36	0.00	0.00				
EE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.00	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	0.66	1.32	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00
En Marea												0.00	0.00	
FAC											1.04			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00
JxCat														0.12
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.00
PA	0.88	0.88			0.88	0.88		0.44	0.00					
PAR	0.95	0.95		0.95	0.95	0.95		0.95						
PCE	0.00	0.00	0.00											
PDP			3.45	3.75										
PL				3.75										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.70	0.61	1.77	0.22	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.14
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.47	1.09	1.99											
UP												0.00		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											1.27			
VOX														2.86
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.5: Incentives (Positive)

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					0.33	2.09	5.05	3.79	4.58	2.02	2.40	2.31	2.31	4.11
PSOE	1.07	0.91	0.59	1.98	0.74	1.25	3.31	2.26	0.96	1.38	1.93	2.94	3.09	1.54
Podemos												0.86	0.86	0.49
Unidos Podemos													1.74	
AP	5.17	5.17	4.62	3.46										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.10	0.10	0.17	0.14	0.43			0.18
C's												3.17	3.25	4.96
CC						3.39	3.19	3.85	4.00	2.65	3.64			
CC-PNC												4.11	3.93	
CCa-PNC-NC														3.93
CDC													2.98	
CDS			1.19	2.26	1.74	5.22								
CHA									1.71	1.02				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.49	0.49	
CiU		5.12	5.12	8.77	4.11	4.34	7.22	5.70	5.04	1.86	6.60			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.98		
Compromis-Q											0.98			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.97	
DL												3.28		
EA					2.04	0.94	2.02	2.02	2.00	2.48				
EE	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78									
EH Bildu												0.00	1.72	0.00
ERC	0.94	0.00	0.88	1.75	0.39	2.15	1.57	1.57	1.00	0.90	2.00	2.66	2.41	1.46
En Marea												1.02	1.00	
FAC											5.85			
GBai											2.23			
IU				0.08	0.00	0.42	0.71	0.46	0.50	0.53	1.78			0.75
JxCat														3.83
Más País-Equo														1.28
Més Compromís														1.99
PA	2.20	2.20			2.20	2.20		1.76	1.67					
PAR	1.56	1.56		1.56	1.56	1.56		1.56						
PCE	0.39	0.82	1.03											
PDP			5.17	2.24										
PL				2.24										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.18	2.19	3.04	3.00	2.93	0.35	0.85	0.00	2.17	0.78	2.94	2.94	2.85
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.47	2.34	3.57											
UP												0.16		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											1.43			
VOX														5.08
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.6: Keynesian Demand Management

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.04	0.04	0.04
PSOE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.10
Podemos												0.29	0.29	0.45
Unidos Podemos													2.91	
AP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.29	0.30	0.50	0.00	0.22			1.63
C's												0.20	0.00	0.07
CC						0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.78			
CC-PNC												0.16	0.15	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.28
CDC													0.20	
CDS			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00								
CHA									0.00	0.00				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												1.02	1.02	
CiU		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	1.74	0.64	0.00	0.00			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.41		
Compromis-Q											0.09			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.41	
DL												0.21		
EA					0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
EE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
EH Bildu												0.00	1.72	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.78
En Marea												0.34	0.33	
FAC											0.37			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.17	0.04	0.10	0.25			1.18
JxCat														0.12
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.17
PA	0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00					
PAR	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00						
PCE	0.00	0.00	0.00											
PDP			0.00	0.00										
PL				0.00										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.94	2.94	0.14
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.00	0.00	0.41											
UP												0.11		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.00			
VOX														1.58
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.7: Nationalization

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PSOE	0.36	0.78	0.30	0.28	0.00	0.98	0.11	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00
Podemos												0.57	0.57	1.30
Unidos Podemos													1.16	
AP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.49	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.08			0.36
C's												0.00	0.00	0.00
CC						0.11	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			
CC-PNC												0.00	0.00	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.00
CDC													0.00	
CDS			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00								
CHA									0.00	0.00				
CUP														1.79
CatECP												0.40	0.40	
CiU		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.21		
Compromis-Q											0.09			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.20	
DL												0.00		
EA					0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
EE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
EH Bildu												0.00	1.72	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	0.66	1.32	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.27
En Marea												0.68	0.67	
FAC											0.00			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.92	1.68	2.62	2.76	3.74	0.04	0.10	1.72			2.00
JxCat														0.00
Más País-Equo														0.34
Més Compromís														0.30
PA	0.66	0.66			0.66	0.66		0.33	0.00					
PAR	0.26	0.26		0.26	0.26	0.26		0.26						
PCE	0.00	0.49	1.80											
PDP			0.00	0.00										
PL				0.00										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.00	0.00	0.07											
UP												0.33		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.00			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.8: Protectionism (Negative)

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					0.00	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.16	0.42	0.42	0.34
PSOE	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.14	0.00	0.20	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Podemos												0.00	0.00	0.00
Unidos Podemos													0.00	
AP	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.15										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00
C's												0.26	0.24	0.00
CC						0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.26			
CC-PNC												0.00	0.00	
CCa-PNC-NC														0.00
CDC													0.54	
CDS			0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00								
CHA									0.00	0.00				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.00	0.00	
CiU		0.18	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.00		
Compromis-Q											0.00			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.00	
DL												0.57		
EA					0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.00				
EE	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26									
EH Bildu												0.00	0.00	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.42	0.21	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00
En Marea												0.00	0.00	
FAC											0.00			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.00	0.00	0.21	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00
JxCat														0.06
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.00
PA	0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00		0.05	0.10					
PAR	0.09	0.09		0.09	0.09	0.09		0.09						
PCE	0.00	0.00	0.00											
PDP			0.00	0.00										
PL				0.00										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.06	0.67	0.04	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.90	0.90	0.42
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.00	0.31	0.14											
UP												0.00		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.16			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.

Table B.9: Protectionism (Positive)

Party Abbrev.	Year													
	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016	2019
PP					0.00	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.17
PSOE	0.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.14	0.13	0.24
Podemos												0.34	0.34	0.64
Unidos Podemos													0.87	
AP	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00										
Amaiur											0.00			
BNG							0.59	0.59	0.00	0.14	0.22			0.36
C's												0.22	0.60	0.00
CC						0.27	0.28	0.62	0.22	0.33	0.78			
CC-PNC												3.79	3.63	
CCa-PNC-NC														1.98
CDC													0.05	
CDS			0.00	0.36	0.22	0.75								
CHA									0.00	0.00				
CUP														0.00
CatECP												0.31	0.31	
CiU		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.17	0.03	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.06			
Compromis-Podemos-És el moment												0.15		
Compromis-Q											0.00			
Compromís–Podemos–EUPV													0.15	
DL												0.05		
EA					0.00	0.00	1.41	1.41	2.82	0.00				
EE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00									
EH Bildu												3.51	0.00	0.00
ERC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.25	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.05
En Marea												0.34	0.33	
FAC											0.67			
GBai											0.00			
IU				0.00	0.00	0.10	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00			0.51
JxCat														0.18
Más País-Equo														0.00
Més Compromís														0.21
PA	0.88	0.88			0.88	0.88		0.46	0.03					
PAR	0.17	0.17		0.17	0.17	0.17		0.17						
PCE	0.00	0.00	0.00											
PDP			0.00	0.00										
PL				0.00										
PNV/EAJ	0.00	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.52	0.00	0.00	0.14
PRC														0.00
UCD	0.47	0.16	0.07											
UP												0.22		
UPN									0.00	0.00				
UPyD											0.00			
VOX														0.00
¡TE!														0.00

Source: Manifesto Project. Original table.