In the history of urban design as it is currently taught, the story of the American low-rent public housing program can be neatly encompassed in a pair of images. On the left we would see, rising up, Le Corbusier’s 1925 Plan Voisin for Paris — that great shock image of twentieth-century urbanism, the ultimate urban-renewal project. The Plan Voisin not only called for the demolition of the historic core of Paris and its replacement by highrise towers-in-the-park, but it announced modernism’s ruthless attitude toward the past and its demand for a revolutionary redesign of the city.¹

On the right, we would see, crashing down, one of Minoru Yamasaki’s Pruitt-Igoe highrise public-housing towers in St. Louis, demolished in 1972 after they had become uninhabitable. With brute finality, the Pruitt-Igoe demolition seemed to mark both the bankruptcy of an important program of social transformation through modernist design, and, by implication, the return to traditional patterns of urbanism. Charles Jencks used the precise hour of the first explosion to announce that “modern architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri, on July 15, 1972, at 9:32 p.m. …”²

The contrast between the two images seems overpoweringly convincing — but so too, in their day, did the contrast between the dark, claustrophobic slum and Le Corbusier’s light-filled Radiant City. Any such rhetoric of images can be dangerous, however and one need only consider how the current narrative of public housing’s demise — although, with their superblocks covering the old urban grid, they could be dismissed as milder versions of modernist anti-urbanism.

More disturbing to conventional wisdom is “when bad things happen to good neighborhoods,” i.e., the fate of those core neighborhoods that embodied many of the principles either of Jane Jacobs’s work or the New Urbanism, but which suffered abandonment as devastating as the highrise projects. I think especially of neighborhoods in Camden, New Jersey, where I used to teach. These once boasted a varied housing stock (much of good quality), a

Despite their human scale, these lowrise projects have often suffered as much abandonment as the guilty highrises — although, with their superblocks covering the old urban grid, they could be dismissed as milder versions of modernist anti-urbanism.

Right: Destruction of Pruitt-Igoe Houses, St. Louis. Images from Peter Blake, Form Follows Fiasco. See note 3.
mix of uses, pedestrian scale and local shopping districts, good mass-transit links, gridded streets and alleyways, and even porches! Such neighborhoods could indeed have served as models for New Urbanist developments today — if they had survived. Too often, however, such areas are so devastated that it is difficult to remember a neighborhood once thrived there. Sometimes these abandoned neighborhood sites even merge with partially demolished public housing sites to form a kind of common graveyard of urbanisms.

The Incomes Crisis

In this article, I do not wish to challenge the conventional wisdom that the public-housing towers were bad design, still less to deny that the traditional neighborhoods often embodied a far superior urbanism. But I do wish to challenge the presumed central responsibility of modernist design for the failure of low-rent public housing. Clearly, if the towers and the neighborhoods were suffering a similar fate, there were massive destructive forces at work that overwhelmed what might ordinarily have been significant design differences. To employ a metaphor: ordinarily, it makes a great deal of difference whether a swimmer venturing out into the surf is a novice or an Olympic medalist. But if both are unlucky enough to be caught in a riptide, both will be equally and inevitably carried out to sea.

As I will argue, a tide of destruction ripped through our inner cities, devastating good, bad, and indifferent urban design. However different the rowhouse neighborhood and the highrise tower might have been in design and ownership, they wound up falling victim to essentially similar causes. Indeed, I would argue further that, insofar as design issues mattered, they were not the great issues of modernism versus traditional urbanism, but such factors as the differing maintenance costs for towers versus lowrise, and the availability of units with more than two bedrooms.

What then was this riptide of urban destruction? As usual, the beginning of wisdom on this, and perhaps all urban topics, can be found in Jane Jacobs's *Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) — in particular, her prophetic chapter “Subsidizing Dwellings.” Here she asserts that the “housing crisis” was in reality an “incomes crisis.” Where housing reformers had asserted that the problem was a housing industry so mired in profiteering, inefficient building methods, and obsolete design that it could never produce decent housing for a significant proportion of city dwellers, Jacobs states that “ordinary housing needs can be provided for almost anybody by private enterprise.” What is peculiar about those who lack decent housing is “merely that they cannot pay for it.”

Jacobs went on to suggest a radical change in housing policy which I will discuss below. But, however prophetic her policy prescriptions would prove to be, she was in 1961 less aware that, in the 1950s and 1960s, this category of “those who cannot pay” was rising steeply in the urban centers. Poverty, to be sure, was nothing new; what was new was the increasing isolation of the black urban poor from the prosperity that was lifting the rest of society. This latter development was well outlined in an important document less frequently cited in academic circles than Jacobs’s book: the “Moynihan Report” of 1965. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and his colleagues in the Labor Department documented the “incomes crisis” in the inner city, emphasizing the way black male unemployment and underemployment were separating the black experience from the rest of the prospering metropolis. As their report asserted, “the fundamental, overwhelming fact is that Negro unemployment, with the exception of a few years during World War II and the Korean War, has continued at disaster levels for 35 years.” These levels (which sadly have continued to our time), consistently two to three times that of white unemployment, were steadily undermining the black family and leading to family breakup and female-headed households dependent on welfare. The report further observed, “… our study has produced some clear indications that the situation may indeed have begun to feed on itself. It may be noted, for example, that for most of the post-war period male Negro unemployment and the number of new AFDC [welfare] cases rose and fell together as if connected by a chain . . . . In 1962, however, for the first time, unemployment declined, but the number of new AFDC cases rose. In 1963 this happened a second time. In 1964 a third. The possible implications of these and other data are serious . . . .”

“Terms of Trade”

One such “implication” surely involved housing. Economists speak of the shifting “terms of trade” among nations — the relative buying power of, say, a developing country to purchase with its local commodities the manufactured products of the West. By analogy, one might state that the “terms of trade” for purchasing housing shifted decisively against the inner city in the 1950s and 1960s. Ironically, it was the upgrading of even the worst urban housing so that it now included indoor plumbing, hot water, central heating, gas and electric appliances that rendered the situation critical. Families in the inner city had to purchase with their uncertain and diminishing income the increasingly expensive services provided by the skilled workers who were now indispensable to housing
One can easily see how this “incomes crisis” would devastate private rental housing directly dependent on residents’ ability to pay “economic” rents, i.e., rents that at least cover basic costs. (I will return to private rental housing later.) What is not obvious at all is why public housing was equally vulnerable to this crisis. After all, public housing was heavily subsidized, precisely to compensate for the low income of its tenants. Here, one might believe, the failures were due to design rather than economics.

In fact, low-rent public housing had from its inception what I would argue was a fatal flaw. As specified in the 1937 Wagner-Steagall Housing Act and reaffirmed in the landmark 1949 Housing Act, the federal government met all the capital costs of low-rent housing projects, including land acquisition and construction. But the local housing authority, which owned and administered each project, was responsible for meeting all the day-to-day maintenance costs out of the rents paid by the tenants.7

This division of responsibility made good sense in 1937, and even as late as 1949. As Michael Katz has shown, twentieth-century welfare programs tended to preserve the nineteenth-century distinction between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor, and public housing was initially aimed directly at the former.8 The target tenants were working families with steady incomes and few children. The inefficiencies and profiteering of the private sector, it was believed, had deprived many of these families of the opportunity for decent housing; but the nonprofit public sector, utilizing better planning and building techniques, could provide affordable housing that would be a shining example to the private sector. Since these families would earn incomes more or less comparable to the workers who built and maintained public housing, the “terms of trade” would be equitable: there would be no question of a growing gap between expenses and the tenants’ ability to pay a rent that would cover those expenses.

This strategy, unfortunately, proved less and less appropriate during the course of the 1950s and 1960s. Increasingly, public-housing tenants were stranded in the low-wage, intermittent-employment or welfare sectors of the economy, while construction workers and even the lowest-paid employees of a housing authority enjoyed steady work at rising pay. The generous federal subsidies for land acquisition and construction induced a “cost-plus” mentality that both failed to achieve the efficient construction techniques and also paid little heed to long-term maintenance expenses. Although the federal government set cost-per-room limits, in practice these meant exorbitant construction costs that nevertheless...
skimped on room size and finish quality and burdened especially the highrise projects with a multitude of complex maintenance requirements.9

Eugene Meehan, whose careful study of the St. Louis Housing Authority is exemplary in its thoughtfulness and thoroughness, found that between 1948 and 1963 the tenants increased their income by 26 percent (unadjusted for inflation), but salaries for maintenance men rose three times as fast, to twice the average income of the tenants. From 1948 to 1953 rents collected by the authority increased 10 percent, but operating expenses increased 101 percent; from 1954 to 1963 rents rose 50 percent, but operating expenses increased 300 percent.10 As Meehan observed:

Given a housing authority almost totally dependent upon rent from its tenants and a tenant population with very low incomes, too low to pay economic rents, either the housing authority must go bankrupt or the tenants must pay a very large share of their income for rent ...; in St. Louis the worst of both worlds was achieved, for the tenants paid out a very large share of their income for rent and the housing authority went broke anyway.11

Going broke, moreover, meant increasingly poor tenant services: elevators constantly out of service, heat and hot water lacking, windows broken, and trash accumulating in the lobbies and public spaces. Yet maintenance was constantly being cut back. Thus, during 1969 at Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, an 84-person crew was called upon, among other things, to replace 7,000 light bulbs, 16,000 window shades, and 20,000 panes of glass. It did not help that, in that year, an estimated 40 percent of all maintenance labor costs were due to vandalism.12

Although the local housing authorities have received ample criticism for their inefficiency and sometimes outright corruption, we should recognize that they were caught in a vicious circle that negated the efforts of even the most gifted administrators. As with urban mass transit, a captive population was forced to endure ever-higher costs (especially as a percentage of income) for ever-worse service.

The worst abuses of this system came to an end in 1969 with the “Brooke Amendment” that limited rents to 25 percent of the tenants’ income. This theoretically made the federal government responsible for the difference between a housing authority’s rental income and its legitimate maintenance costs. But by 1969 the projects were already being written off as failures. And federal reimbursement contributions of the 1970s and 1980s tended to freeze maintenance allowances at the grossly inadequate level of the previous decades, so that the projects continued to deteriorate. As Camilo Vergara, the Lewis Hines of the contemporary inner city, has documented in his photographs, many highrise towers that were not intentionally destroyed like Pruitt-Igoe were gradually abandoned from the bottom and from the top. The lowest floors were vulnerable to crime and vandalism, whereas the highest suffered most from constant elevator, heat, and water failures.13

The Role of Design

One might argue abstractly about the fundamental deficiencies of the tower-in-the-park as a form urban housing and urban design: the lack of public space and street life; the lack of connection between mothers in the tower and children playing fifteen floors below; the inhuman scale and isolation from the fabric of the city that this design produced. All these are true but, I would maintain, largely irrelevant to the real crisis of public housing. Families might have adapted to these design problems; indeed, they might have discovered ways to make even the highrises work socially. But public-housing tenants could not adapt
to an environment of constant breakdown caused by the inability of the typical housing authority to budget even the most minimal standards of maintenance raised from rents these tenants could afford to pay.14

Sadly, this collapse of public housing was occurring just when poor families desperately needed an alternative to the private market. Even in the worst years for the most poorly run housing authorities, not only were the projects largely occupied, but there were massive waiting lists for apartments. In 1979, for example, the Baltimore Housing Authority, which then managed some 16,000 units of public housing, had a waiting list of over 40,000 applicants.15

As George Sternlieb showed in his classic study of Newark in the 1960s, *The Tenement Landlord*, the same “incomes crisis” that was undermining public housing — the inability of tenants to pay an “economic” rent — was devastating private rental housing in the inner city.16 The era when the “slumlord” could wring profits from even the poorest families by overcrowding had given way to the steady depopulation of the inner city and a drastic decline in property values that remorselessly drained capital from investors and individual homeowners. Nevertheless, the private sector was not without some effective strategies in this period. Efficient property managers could take advantage of lower labor costs than housing authorities operating with civil-service or patronage workers; and they could better screen potential tenants, and in general utilize the flexibility of the older structures versus the projects.

But the private housing market also had a hidden vulnerability that exposed it to the full force of the incomes crisis. This, as Michael Stegman showed in his study of Baltimore in the early 1970s, was vacancies.17 With tenants constantly moving and with neighborhoods emptying out, vacancies were inevitable. And, under the conditions of the inner city, a vacant unit was very quickly a vandalized unit (either stripped for profit or trashed maliciously), and then frequently an abandoned unit. As in the projects, vandalism struck a powerful blow exactly where inner-city housing was most vulnerable — the gap between the high costs of maintenance and repair and what tenants could afford in rents. In Baltimore, for example, the number of abandoned units rose from approximately 7,000 in 1974 to more than 40,000 by 1990.18

In her “Subsidizing Dwellings” chapter in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Jane Jacobs drew some logical and highly influential conclusions from her analysis of American public housing. If, as she recognized, the real housing crisis was an incomes crisis, then the appropriate public policy would be to provide families who could not

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Top: Abandoned row houses, Camden, New Jersey, 1980s. Photo by author.
Bottom: Henry Horner Houses, Chicago, prior to demolition for HOPE VI program. Photo by Camilo Vergara.
afford an economic rent a direct subsidy — a voucher, to use a later term — that made up the difference between what families could afford to pay and prevailing rents in their metropolitan area. With these vouchers they could seek out the best housing they could find — either in the private market, in the projects, or in newly constructed scattered-site housing. Daniel Patrick Moynihan took the concept even further when, as an advisor to President Nixon, he quixotically advocated transforming welfare into a guaranteed income for poor families.

In 1961, however, Jacobs still believed in the vitality of the urban economy, and she could not foresee the scale of intervention that would become necessary to implement her preferred system. Nor could she foresee the conservative turn in American politics that would win electoral victories by the implicit promise to keep the black urban poor in their place. Not surprisingly, her prized examples of “de-slumming” were invariably white ethnic neighborhoods like Boston’s North End, whose male wage-earners tended to be on the positive side of the shifting “terms of trade” for housing.

By the time vouchers were in fact introduced, tentatively as Section 23 of the 1965 Housing Act and definitively as Section 8 of the 1974 Housing Act, the budget provided for them was radically insufficient to either meet the needs of poor families or to reverse the abandonment of the inner cities. For example, it took twenty years after the 1974 act was passed for the number of vouchers available to low-income families in Baltimore to equal the number of units of conventional public housing that were available for occupancy. Ironically, this parity was reached in the mid-1990s only because HUD’s HOPE VI program reduced the number of project units by financing the demolition of the highrise towers that the Housing Authority of Baltimore City had constructed in the 1950s and 1960s.

HOPE VI provided the arresting spectacle of the government spending billions to demolish the very towers it had constructed some forty years earlier: the final proof, it seemed, of Jencks’s “death of modern architecture” and of the “utopian” idea that architectural innovation might serve social progress. But as I’ve tried to indicate here, the lessons of postwar public housing are more subtle, disturbing, and difficult. Both the modernists and their critics have been too quick to assume that design issues were the root cause. I have instead tried to show how all inner-city housing, regardless of design, was subject to the destructive riptide of the black incomes crisis. Moreover, the degree of destruction often depended less on design per se and more on such specific factors as the vulnerability of vacant, privately owned dwellings to vandalism or the way building janitors were paid (or not paid) in the highrise towers.

A New Vision

It would be much truer to assert that the design of affordable housing does matter — and it matters greatly — but only when it forms a consistent and integral part of a larger complex of social strategies and economic opportunities. After a half-century of urban crisis, there is now good evidence that the “riptide of destruction” has begun to recede, and that the economic underpinnings exist to support a well-designed “re-urbanization” of the inner cities that could mobilize and intensify the positive forces that are developing there.

The signs of this incipient recovery can be seen in a number of places: the revival of downtown economies in most regions which have again put inner cities in close proximity to good jobs; the surge of immigration which has reoccupied abandoned areas and revivified inner-city economies; the decline in concentrated poverty in most central cities; and improvements in public safety. Although unemployment (especially black male unemployment) remains shockingly high, those households with a wage-earner now benefit from the Earned Income Tax Credit, which returns $30 billion annually to poor families, who spend a third of that money on improved housing — making this tax credit a more important housing program than any single program administered by HUD. And households with this extra income now have improved access to credit, thanks to the Community Reinvestment Act and new Federal Housing Administration mortgage policies.

Already, once-devastated neighborhoods in the South Bronx, South Central Los Angeles, South Chicago, and Boston’s Roxbury and Dorchester have seen a welcome tide of private rehabilitation and infill, Jane Jacobs’s “de-slumming.” But these private, piecemeal efforts have not yet reached the households or the districts that need them most.

Ironically, the most powerful models for broader action have come from the HOPE VI program, which, in addition to demolishing the old projects, has also financed the partial replacement of affordable housing units on the cleared sites. HUD’s initiative and funding has brought together two key elements for successful affordable housing: (1) locally based community development corporations (CDCs), which since the 1970s have been financing and constructing small-scale affordable housing under very difficult circumstances, and thus possess a wealth of
practical experience;\textsuperscript{24} and (2) architects and planners, mostly associated with the Congress for New Urbanism, who appreciate the ways in which older neighborhoods fostered a sense of community, and who have sought to use this knowledge to advance the goals of the CDCs.\textsuperscript{25}

In the resulting HOPE VI projects, the CDCs have promoted several positive new strategies: small-scale development funded from multiple private and public sources; low-maintenance design and construction that has mobilized residents’ sense of pride and responsibility; and, above all, mixed-income projects that include subsidized rentals, market-rate rentals, and condominium ownership.\textsuperscript{26} The architects have embodied these goals in designs that not only unify the different groups of tenants, but connect the development to the neighborhood around it. Wherever possible, the old street grid has been resurrected; new buildings have respected the older neighborhood typologies; and careful attention has been paid to the streetscape and to well-defined public spaces that foster neighborhood connections and the building of social capital.\textsuperscript{27}

These housing initiatives, moreover, have implied a wider transformation of the inner city that is perhaps best shown in Urban Design Associates’ East Baltimore Comprehensive Redevelopment Plan. Where the world-renowned Johns Hopkins Medical Center in East Baltimore was once “Fort Hopkins,” tensely confronting the poverty-stricken district around it, the development plan seeks to make the hospital the catalyst for economic development built around a new biotech center. Mixed-income housing should further encourage vital street life to complement the 24-hour activities of the hospital and the biotech center. And these facilities, in turn, should provide the key jobs to support the new affordable housing, parks and transit in the plan. The East Baltimore Plan points the way to the reurbanization of our most devastated inner-city area.\textsuperscript{28}

“There has never been an architect,” sociologist Robert Gutman wrote in 1965, “who was not, in some sense, a student and a critic of society . . . . Many architects hold to a vision of some future social organization that comes closer to achieving goals of justice, humaneness, and order than the society we live in now.”\textsuperscript{29} The travails of public housing did much to undermine that vision of architecture and social justice. But, as affordable-housing and brownfield studios proliferate in our architectural schools, the prospects for a substantial rebuilding in the inner cities have again raised the issues both of design’s powers and design’s limitations.

“How,” Gutman asked in 1965, “. . . are we to produce a true social architecture and a genuine architectural
sociology?" I would rephrase his question with special reference to the history of public housing. How are we to bring a transformative architectural imagination to affordable housing, while not forgetting to ask the crucial question, “Who pays the janitor?”

Notes
This article is based a paper delivered at the Princeton University School of Architecture to honor Robert Gutman’s forty-year contributions as a teacher. I want to thank the organizers of the conference, Hilary Ballon and Marta Gutman, and especially to thank Robert Gutman himself, whose lifelong commitment to “true social architecture” and “genuine architectural sociology” has been a continuing inspiration.


3. In addition to the work of Jane Jacobs cited below, one must acknowledge the influence here of Peter Blake, Form Follows Fiasco: Why Modern Architecture Hasn’t Worked (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).


6. Ibid., p. 47.


9. Eugene J. Meehan, The Quality of Federal Policy Making: Programmed Failure in Public Housing (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), chap. 3. Meehan found that the costs of the notoriously poorly constructed Pruitt-Igoe development were 60 percent above the national average, and only 15 percent below the most expensive luxury apartments in St. Louis.


11. Ibid., pp. 124-125.

12. Ibid., p. 78.


27. The best sources for these projects are the websites of the most active architectural firms. In addition to Calhorce Associates, they include Torli Gallas and Partners; Duany Plater-Zyberk and Company; and Solomon E.T.C. Michael Pyatok (Pyatok Architects, Inc.), though a critic of HOPE VI, has nevertheless been a major design influence. An important guide to the work that immediately preceded HOPE VI is Sam Davis, The Architecture of Affordable Housing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).


30. Ibid., p. 368.