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Part VI
Afterword

Afterword: Living Apart and Together in Germany

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"His [the Bürgermeister's] lady wife, a very cultivated woman, talked about the trinity: the pope in Rome and Luther and Moses."

Silberstein to Isenthal, in Theodore Fontane, *Mathilde Möhring* (1896)

Little Kempen am Niederrhein holds a celebrated place in the history of Western Christianity as the home of Thomas à Kempis (*d.* 1471), author of *The Imitation of Christ*. In the early years of the twentieth century, however, their famous son's message of brotherly love seemed honored more in the breech than in the observance. On Good Friday, when Protestants hurried into church to observe one of the most sacred days of their year, Catholic housewives gave the carpets their annual beating – making a jarring counterpoint to the solemn harmonies of Bach. Their husbands took the opportunity to fertilize their fields, hauling dripping kegs of liquid manure (*Jauche*) through town and thereby releasing a smell noxious enough to penetrate even the thickest church walls. Thus were Kempen's calendars, seasonal and liturgical, Catholic and Protestant, divided. Was the annual offense to Kempener Protestants illegal? Certainly not. Was it intentional? Absolutely![1]

In Bad Oeynhausen, a small town in eastern Westphalia – but not only there – Protestant children were warned by their parents not to shop at the Catholic butcher or baker. Who could trust a man who might cheat you all week, confess and get absolution in time for Sunday mass, and then begin all over again on Monday morning?[2]

How long such customs had been "traditional" among Kempen's Catholics and Bad Oeynhausen's Protestants is anybody's guess. But as the chapters in this volume demonstrate, such markers of confessional difference would have surprised no one in the nineteenth century. Not always mutually hostile, sometimes even cooperative, the members of

Germany's three officially recognized religions were nevertheless acutely aware of each other's presence – and difference. A well-developed internal radar registered confessional inflections not only in the calendar or shopping patterns, but in pronunciation, dress, and of course political choices.[3] Such inflections were embedded in every aspect of life, from the ways people imagined themselves as men or women, as Róisín Healy has suggested, to such scholarly monuments as Germany's dictionary of national biography (the *Neue Deutsche Biographie*), which as late as the 1970s carefully noted "*kath.*" "*evang.*" and "*hebr.*" after each entry. For a century and more, nothing could be said or done in Germany that was not said or done by a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew. The designations testify to contemporaries' belief that these distinctions were real ones, with real consequences, and not simply conventional or customary, the moldy relics of ancient quarrels.

Consciousness of difference, experienced in religious terms, had always been part of the internal radar of Jews, the archetypal European minority. Until the nineteenth century, however, most Christians in Germany had been insulated from such challenges by Reformation settlements that had bought peace at the price of confessional apartheid (*cuius regio, eius religio*). But the political foundations of these settlements were destroyed by Napoleon, and subsequent map-makers at Vienna boldly joined what those at Augsburg and Westphalia had so carefully kept asunder. Thus political and confessional geography no longer coincided, a demographic fact of the first importance as, over the course of the century, democratization brought populations into political decision-making.

If the new political settlements heightened confessional sensitivities, religious developments set off alarms. Among Protestants, the "Awakening," as it was called, provoked resistance among rationalist critics that contributed to a nervous sense of vulnerability on both sides. Among Catholics, recovery from the traumas of Jacobinism and the collapse of the *Reichskirche* was accompanied by an unprecedented centralization of ecclesiastical authority and celebrated with a flamboyance that set others' teeth on edge. Feast days were marked by parading the sacrament through town, resplendent in its gold and silver monstrance and followed by a train of priests in eucharistic vestments and companies of equally gaudy brotherhoods, swinging their ensigns, waving their banners, and piping their horns.

The Church of Rome's conspicuous re-occupation of Germany's public spaces represented, in the eyes of outsiders, the objective correlative of an overweening political ambition that challenged the very sovereignty of the state. Although not everyone went so far as the liberal Swiss jurist,

Johann Caspar Bluntschli, who bluntly declared Catholics "criminals against mankind," Hegel was convinced "that with the Catholic religion, no rational constitution is possible." Even Queen Victoria responded to the news that a Catholic hierarchy was being re-established in England with shock: "Am I Queen of England or am I not?"[4]

Into this mix stepped Germany's third recognized denomination, the Jews, whose own self-conception had been transformed by the eighteenth-century *Haskala* and who began to demand a release from their remaining civil disabilities as well as integration, on the basis of equality, into civic life. Arguments for emancipation made Germany's Jews, although their numbers remained tiny, "present" to their fellow countrymen to a degree unknown in the past.

A third feature of the century that sharpened confessional awareness was the progressive extension of civic life itself, with the entry of the "public" into arenas that had previously been reserved to the Crown or attached to corporate bodies. A religious community's relationship to the state (whatever England's queen may have believed) diminished in significance as the importance of its relations to other groups grew. The ability of Germans to express themselves collectively through petitions, the press, and – increasingly – parliaments, provided a megaphone for opinions that would previously have been heard only at the *Stammtisch* or the *Marktplatz*. "Democratization" in its various forms stimulated self-consciousness all around, as each group reflected on its own and others' advantages in a world losing the securities of a segmentary old regime.[5] The confessional self-consciousness of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was thus a thoroughly modern phenomenon, possible because these groups now shared the same spaces – markets, rights, spheres – and, at least potentially, vied for the same power.

Political power in the German Empire was also inflected confessionally: because bureaucratic structures were increasingly important, and still dominated by Protestants (even, for much of the century, in Bavaria); because elections, nationally, rewarded the organized, which meant the Catholics; and because elections, municipally, advantaged those who paid more taxes, which in some places might well mean the Jews.[6]

These processes were much the same in the rest of Western Europe, but Germany's confessional makeup departed significantly from a perceived (Franco-British) norm. France (as the *mot* of a perhaps apocryphal bishop put it) was blessed with 100 different sauces and only one religion – while England, which could boast only one sauce, had 100 religions. The formation of new "denominations," the Anglo-American solution to the problem of conformity versus dissent, was not an attractive option in

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Germany, where three, but only three, religions were recognized by the state. The result was that in Germany religious differences were often expressed, not as binomial conflicts between Self and Other, but in triangular struggles. And in a triangle, the Jews (as Fontane's Silberstein recognized when he reported approvingly on Mathilde Möhring's "trinity" to his friend Isenthal), while always the weakest, need not always be on the bottom.

In fact, Germany's Jews became, willy-nilly, a third party to many of the conflicts within and between the two other confessions. As Protestant piety became increasingly "divided," in Lucien Hölscher's phrase, both traditionalists and rationalists might gain leverage by accusing the other of being, theologically, "like" the Jews.[7] Challenges to Catholicism, such as the Rongean anti-celibacy crusade, might become, once they became matters for political decision, a vehicle for Jewish equality – as Dagmar Herzog has shown for Baden. And the Protestant-led movement against "confessional" (i.e., Catholic) fraternities that burst onto the public stage in 1904 sometimes improved the social status of Jewish students, by integrating their organizations into student councils that excluded Catholics. In Breslau, the entrance of the Jewish "Thuringia" into the student council, a direct consequence of the anti-Catholic *Hochschulstreit*, led to the anti-semitic *Verein deutscher Studenten's* vacating their own seats – a most welcome by-product for Thuringia's members, who had long seen the V.D.St. as "the worst representative of anti-Semitism."[8]

In places where they were both minorities, Catholics and Jews might find their demands directly pitted against each other. "Conspicuous," writes Till van Rahden, describing the controversy over whether the new *Gymnasium* in Breslau was to be interconfessional, "was the active role of Jewish liberals" – conspicuous to the historian and, not surprisingly, to Breslau's Catholic minority as well, which suddenly saw its long-standing hopes for parity in secondary education being finessed by the Protestant-dominated city council's decision for Jewish inclusion. Here as elsewhere, Jews and Catholics pursued, under different rubrics, the (quite legitimate) interests of their own group. No one stood for that "poor bare, forked animal," "the thing itself; unaccommodated man."

Confessional controversies were complicated by the century's nationalism.[9] More precisely, the effort to define a German nation inevitably projected contemporary communal struggles on to the past. At the same time, it integrated past religious conflicts into narratives that became a central part of what it meant to belong to the new national community. Anthony Steinhoff has read one such narrative in the architecture and liturgy of Strasburg's "new" Protestant Church. Scholarship was also the

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site of competing narratives – and a battleground of competing legit-
imacies. As Wolfgang Altgeld has shown us, professional historians were
not ashamed to join the fray. But just as important as the narratives of
architects and scholars were the stories that people told about themselves,
as Kevin Cramer, with his analysis of the cult of Soldier-King Gustavus
Adolphus, has demonstrated. The prospect of Protestant ownership of all
the important national holidays concentrated Catholic minds wonderfully.
Who can be surprised that they soon discovered their own candidate for
founding martyr, one who pre-dated the Reformation: Saint Boniface, the
Benedictine monk whose conversion of the "Germans" to Christianity in
the eighth century was proposed as the birthday of the German nation?[10]
More than 100,000 pilgrims streamed to his gravesite in Fulda in 1855
during the celebrations marking the 1,100th anniversary of his martyrdom.
The discourse excoriating German division and "disunity," employed
to great effect by Protestant nationalists, could be now be wielded by
Catholics, as they contrasted the "*blos in Stämme sich zerfasernde Germ-
anentum*," which had confronted Boniface, with the "spiritual foundations
of their civic unification" that was his legacy. [11] The irony of a German
national narrative as a competition between a Swedish soldier and an
English missionary was not lost on contemporaries.

Denis Donoghue, the Irish-born critic, has drawn our attention to the
connection between the imaginative power of narrative and the vitality
of religion itself.

> When we say that Ireland is a Catholic country, we mean that most of its
> people have received their sense of the world in narrative terms, the life, death,
> and resurrection of Christ, the lives of the saints, the commemoration of
> Christ's life in the sacraments, as elucidated by the teachings of the Church
> through its doctrines and rituals. In Ireland, Sunday Mass is the clearest form
> of customary knowledge. To the extent to which this knowledge has been
> eroded, the erosion has come about not mainly because of secularism at large,
> but because, for many people, narrative has lost its power. All that remains of
> the mystery is the tale, and now, for those people, not even that.[12]

In nineteenth-century Germany, we see no sign that narrative had lost its
power.[13]

The master narratives of our own age, especially those that seek to
explain the horrors that began after 1933, have tempted historians to
include among their explanations a presumed confessional *Sonderweg*
in the nineteenth century.[14] But we must be careful not to exaggerate
Germany's peculiarity. English Protestantism was *also* riven by competing
orthodox and rationalist strains (as the very Anglican W. E. Gladstone

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noted when he commented dryly that "Mr. [Matthew] Arnold combines a genuine love of Christianity with a capacity so to state its tenets as to be recognizable by neither friend nor foe"). And Gerard Connolly's study of the Midlands suggests that most of the themes familiar to us from German Catholicism found their counterparts in England: the role of the priest ("omnicompetent") and his political and social activism ("as comfortable on Anti-Corn Law League platform as he was in the pulpit"); the transformation of the irenic piety of the eighteenth century, which emphasized personal ethics and good interconfessional relations, into a militant ultramontanism intent on doctrinal truth and waging "a Jihad against all things non-Catholic" in the nineteenth. Even the "milieu," over which so much German scholarly ink has been spilled, had its Victorian counterpart: by erecting its own set of separate educational and social institutions, the Church in England held the faithful in "protective custody."[15]

And for all the notoriety of Friedrich Julius Stahl's theory of Prussia as "a Christian state," the same designation was invoked in England, and less self-consciously.[16] Although the integration of Britain's proportionally much smaller Jewish minority (less than 0.01 per cent of the population) in the first half of the century was not accompanied by the violence and mass protests that we see in Germany in those years, its peaceful course cannot be attributed to a more secular mentality. Even enthusiastic anglophiles in Germany winced at Victorian England's *geschraubte Kirchlichkeit*.[17] And emancipation there was slow: only in 1846 were bequests to Jewish foundations enforced by the courts, did the synagogue become a legal establishment, was Judaism a religion recognized by law.[18]

Nor was Germany alone in coupling emancipation of its minorities with continued disabilities. Only in 1871 could a Jew or Catholic take a degree at Oxford, Cambridge, or Durham – three of the four English universities. The same 1829 Relief Bill that opened parliament to Catholics required of candidates for all other offices a declaration denying transubstantiation – a central article of Catholic belief. The use of streets and squares for their processions, claimed so boldly by German Catholics, was explicitly denied them in England in 1829, a denial that remained in force for nearly 100 years.[19]

It is the fate of religious minorities to see foreign questions through a different optic than the majority – and thus to face painful questions about their (dual) loyalty. English Jews found themselves stranded during the tidal wave of national indignation in 1876, when the Ottomans, who had a tradition of protecting Jews, were massacring Bulgarian Christians. German Catholics had experienced the same isolation five years earlier,

over the Roman Question.[20] As for that perennial source of conflict, the schools: *The Jewish Chronicle* rejected the Forster Education Act of 1870, one of the great achievements of Gladstone's first ministry.[21] It espoused instead a position analogous to that of Breslau's Catholic press on the interconfessional *Johanneum* (and, *ceteris paribus*, a position opposite to that of Breslau's Jewish community). Educational tangles such as these reveal less about national differences or confessional prejudices than about the inherent difficulty of emancipating individuals without creating conditions that undermine the integrity and vitality of the groups to which they belong.

That religious loyalty might breed communal violence was no secret to the nineteenth century. While the outbursts of vandalism and rioting that occurred in Western Europe were incidental compared to the pogroms that were soon to become regular features of minority–majority relations further East – against Jews, against Armenians, and between neighbors on all sides of the recurrent Balkan wars – hindsight might suggest that they foreshadowed the intractable blood-letting in Northern Ireland, and the worse abominations to come from the very heart of Europe.[22]

Perhaps it was with these terrible futures in mind that the nineteenth century's broils have been seen by Olaf Blaschke as marking the beginning of a "*Second* Confessional Age." The phrase deliberately recalls the first "Confessional Age" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and reminds us of parallels with the past that (we have seen) were never far from contemporary minds. In 1824 a worried Christian Karl von Bunsen predicted to his mentor, the historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr, that "our children will see religious wars."[23]

But while a useful illustration of the over-heated anxiety that sometimes gripped contemporaries, Bunsen's prophesy should alert us against taking these parallels too literally.[24] Graveyards might be vandalized; they were not uprooted. Churches might be shut (more often, forcibly shared), and synagogues even on occasion set on fire: but they were not razed by an arm of the state.[25] Refractory priests were carted off to jail in "culture wagons," nuns and other religious were forced either to dissolve their congregations or to go abroad; but dragoons were not quartered on the population, nor were whole populations expelled from their cities and driven into exile. The one exception, admittedly a significant one, was Prussia's expulsion in 1885–6 from its eastern regions of *c*.30,000 undocumented aliens – Catholic Poles and Eastern Jews: a measure overwhelmingly condemned by the *Reichstag*. But for all the Center Party's attempts to paint the measure as an extension of the *Kulturkampf* (and thus to arouse a silent Vatican), the measure appears to have been a piece of nationality – rather than religious – policy.[26]

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The most important fact about the culture wars of the nineteenth century, even in Germany where they were fiercest, is that they weren't *wars*.[27] For all the anger and suffering they brought to individuals and groups, the religious conflicts of the nineteenth century were not even a dim reflection of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation eras.[28]

The reason for the greater moderation lay not in intensity of belief, which was arguably just as strong, but in the more benign context. Not least important was the fact that the very social and institutional developments that publicized and thus increased confessional tensions – the popular press, the public assemblies, the parliamentary elections – also worked to channel and contain them. "In the nineteenth century," we are told, "religion was politicized as never before"[29] – which is certainly true. But we must remember that politics itself – if by "politics" we mean the exercise of power – was *also* politicized as never before: that is, subjected to processes that were competitive. A confessional age the nineteenth century certainly was; but confessional self-consciousness blossomed in a context that was felt to be "the Age of Improvement."[30]

In these evolving democratic contexts, even confessional conflict could have salutary features. As J. P. Parry has argued, for many people, democratic politics was itself perceived as "an activity of significance mainly because religious issues were so prominent."[31] Parry was referring to England, but his observation is no less true for Germany. An "unintended consequence" of the politicization of religion was to strengthen people's attachments not only to their own group, but also to the institutions – press, public, elections – that made their loyalties effective.[32]

"Aggressive social exclusion of those of different faiths" often poisoned the atmosphere in Germany, as in other lands. But contributors to this volume have also shown us signs of cooperation and mutual respect that had themselves become conventionalized, yes, even traditionalized: "social institutions," in Uli Baumann's phrase. The boundaries between confessions were not an "iron curtain."[33] No squadrons of armed *Volkspolizei* patrolled the confessional borders. They were hardly necessary, since confessional boundaries – unlike the involuntary boundaries of the Cold War – were very much self-enforced. Although in the twenty-first century it may seem remarkable that "as late as 1910 scarcely ten percent of those who married dared [*sic*] choose a partner from a different faith," such rates were not unusual. In the American "melting pot," the percentage of endogamous marriages was even higher: in 1950, 97.1 per cent of US Jews married within their own group, as did 93.8 per cent of America's Catholics.[34] We should guard against assuming that low rates of inter-marriage are necessarily evidence of inter-group conflict, or even of

disrespect. Conversely, while high rates of intermarriage are plausibly taken as evidence of a minority's successful integration, they may also be a harbingers of its disappearance.

Integration may indeed be a bigger threat to a group than exclusion. For if any group, including a religious group, is not to disappear, it must have boundaries. It will have to assert its own vision against the surrounding culture. The existence of more than one community in a given social and political space will cause friction. Is this a bad thing? George Santayana once observed that

> any attempt to speak without speaking any particular language is not more hopeless than the attempt to have a religion that shall be no religion in particular. . . . Every living and healthy religion has a marked idiosyncrasy. Its power consists in its special and surprising message and in the bias which that revelation gives to life. The vistas it opens and the mysteries it propounds are another world to live in; and another world to live in – whether we expect ever to pass wholly over into it or no – is what we mean by having a religion.[35]

Our own generation congratulates itself on its commitment to diversity and its embrace of multicultural values. But if "multicultural" is to mean anything at all – that is, if we really do prize difference – then we can hardly desire to erase entirely the "bias" that comes with belonging to a particular religious community and participating in the "special and surprising message [its] revelation gives to life."[36]

Notes

1. Told to me by Frau Prof. Ruth Becker, a Catholic, who grew up in Kempen, learned it from her father, and confirmed it with her sister. The non-observance of Good Friday by Catholics was not universal, and, after the Second World War, Catholic practice increasingly conformed to that of Protestants.
2. Related to me in 1990, by Prof. Reinhard Rürup, a Protestant, with the agreement of his wife and others in the same company – Protestant academics from Franconia and Moravia.
3. Confessional accents: memoirs of the diplomat Rudolf Rahm, quoted in Manfred Vasold, "Konfessionales Afrika," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 October 2000.
4. G. F. W. Hegel ("daß mit der katholischen Religion keine vernünftige Verfassung möglich ist") from *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Theorie-Werkausgabe*, XII. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 531, quoted in Ralf Roth, "Katholisches Bürgertum in

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Frankfurt am Main 1800–1914. Zwischen Emanzipation und Kultur-kampf," *Archiv für mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte* 46 (1994): 207–46; quotation on p. 231. Bluntschli quoted in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, "Brothers or Strangers? Jews and Freemasons in Nineteenth-century Germany," *German History* 18/2 (2000): 143–61; quotation on p. 157; Queen Victoria quoted in Harold J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1917), p. 163.

5. Arguing that the experience of Italy, where as late as 1912 only 7 per cent of the population was enfranchised, suggests that emanc-ipation of minorities was smoothed by the absence of mass politics: Stephan Wendehorst, "Emancipation as Path to National Integration," in *The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews, and Protestants. Minorities and the Nation State in Nineteenth-century Europe*, ed. Rainer Liedtke and Stephan Wendehorst (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 188–206; at p. 200.

6. In Breslau, although Jews constituted in 1905 only 4% of the popul-ation, their wealth gave them 40% and 35% of the votes in the city's first and second voting classes, respectively: Till van Rahden, "Words and Actions: Rethinking the Social History of German Antisemitism, Breslau, 1870–1914," *German History* 18/4 (2000): 415. In Frankfurt city politics, their power was similar and in Berlin, even greater.

7. Men like Ernst Troeltsch and Adolf von Harnack, on Protestantism's theological "left," saw the purification of religion, says Uriel Tal, in "freeing Christianity from . . . Jewish excesses within Christianity . . ., that is, from such phenomena as dogma, doctrinal codifications, sacraments, moral laws": "Debatte um das 'Wesen' des Judentums," quoted in Gangolf Hübinger, *Kulturprotestantismus und Politik* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), p. 274n. 39.

8. I owe this information to Lisa Fetheringill Swartout, who is complet-ing a dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley, on relations between Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant students in German univers-ities.

9. Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870–1914* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

10. *Missionsvikar* Eduard Müller published his pugnacious *Bonafacius Kalander* in order to assert the presence of a "Church which in 1517 was everywhere bestowing its blessings where those who *currently* confess it are treated as interlopers": "'Dann laß ich 5 Fuß tiefer Graben,'" *Bonafacius Kalander*, 1883, p. 2.

11. For the Boniface cult, pilgrimage figures, and the contemporary quotation, I am indebted to Siegfried Weichlein, who puts them in the context, however, not just of the Gustavus Adolphus, but also of the Hermann (Arminius) cult: Weichlein, "Die Bonifatiustradition und die Rekonfessionalisierung des deutschen Katholizismus zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts," in O. Blaschke (ed*.), Religionskrieg in der Moderne? Renaissance und Rückgang des Konfessionalismus von 1800 bis heute* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).

12. Denis Donaghue, *Warrenpoint* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 171.

13. Rainer Erb and Werner Bergmann's discussion of local memories and memorializing – especially those touching relations between Jews and Christians (*Die Nachtseite der Judenemanzipation. Der Widerstand gegen die Integration der Juden in Deutschland 1780–1860* [Berlin: Metropol, Veitl, 1989], pp. 23–24) – suggests the possibility that replacing local narratives, which were often horrific, by national ones may be, for all the latter's confessional coloration, a means of integration.

14. An explicit link to 1933 can be found in Hölscher, in this volume, and in Olaf Blaschke, "Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter?" in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 26 (Jan.,–Mar. 2000): 38–75; here at p. 67 (basing himself on the argument of M. Rainer Lepsius), and esp. p. 40, which refers to the *verheerenden Konsequenzen* of these lines of conflict *etwa im Blick auf die Nazi-Diktatur*.

15. G. Connolly, "The Transubstantiation of Myth: Towards a New Popular History of Nineteenth-Century Catholicism in England," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 35/1 (Jan. 1984): 78–104; quotations, pp. 94, 96, 97. Gladstone on Arnold was related to me by my first *Doktorvater,* Klaus Epstein, who received his Ph.D. in British history.

16. Valuable on the "Christian state": David Cesarani, "British Jews," in R. Liedtke and S. Wendehorst (eds), *Emancipation*, p. 39. Cesarani's implication, that British Jews had it as bad as continental (and therefore, by implication, German) Jews, cannot be sustained. Stereotypes in fiction and lingering legal inequalities simply do not compare to the insecurity of residence, property, and even life suffered by German Jews in many places before 1850. Cf. Erb and Bergmann, *Nachtseite*, esp. pp. 1–25, 97–108, 217–68. The multiple meanings of the word "emancipation" lead Cesarani to argue, p. 38, that the emancipation of British Jews was "comparatively slow" compared with the emancipation of the slaves (!). His real target is the notion that liberal

England meant a secular England: a straw man that finds little support in either the perceptions of contemporaries or in scholarly literature.

17. Count Barby, in Theodore Fontane, *Der Stechlin* (1898), Goldmann Klassiker Taschenbuchausgabe, Munich, n.d., p. 108.

18. H. S. Q. Henriques, quoted in Cesarani, "British Jews," p. 41.

19. Until 1926. Ian Machen argues that Catholics remain in an inferior position even today. "British Catholics," in Liedtke and Wendehorst, *Emancipation*, pp. 13–14, 31.

20. Liberal impatience with British Jews' preference for Turkey (Cesarani, "British Jews," pp. 50–53) is analogous to German Liberal incomprehension at the Catholic desire for aid on behalf of a dispossessed Holy See.

21. Cesarani, "British Jews," p. 47.

22. Certainly the "robust and rowdy" traditions of a mob-enforced "moral economy," celebrated by E. P. Thompson in *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), pp. 59, 63–7, look less appealing when the wealthy target of broken windows and threatening letter is not a (perhaps dissenting) Englishman but a German Jew. Cf. the "*hergebrachte[n] Vorstellungen einer 'gerechte politischen und wirtschaftlichen Ordnung*,'" in Erb and Bergmann, *Nachtseite*, p. 257. Anti-Catholic riots in Britain: Machin, "British Catholics," pp. 11–32; 26, 27, 28, 32.

23. Quoted by Vasold, "Konfessionelles Afrika."

24. Oddly, Blaschke argues that "Second Confessionalization" is preferable to the term "Re-confessionalization" (advanced by others) because the latter, he says, "remains metaphorical." "Das 19. Jahrhundert," p. 49.

25. As early as 1819 the states sent in soldiers and/or police to protect threatened Jews. Erb and Bergmann, Nachtseite, pp. 223–7, 233n. 51, 234 and 234n. 58, 235, 236, 239n. 72. Königshütte, Upper Silesia was put under military occupation for two months in the summer of 1871, after a mining strike ended in the torching of buildings and looting of (mostly Jewish-owned) shops. *Görlitzer Anzeiger*, from 29 June through to 15 August, 1871: nrs. 149–52, 154, 159, 162f., 168, 171–3, 189. Cf. Neustettin and neighboring areas in 1881: Christhard Hoffmann, "Politische Kultur und Gewalt gegen Minderheiten. Die antisemitischen Ausschreitungen in Pommern und Westpreußen 1881," in *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 3 [1994]: 93–120.

26. Bismarck: "We want to get shot of foreign Poles because we have enough of our own"; and he replied to protests that the government was expelling "the Jews," that it would have looked confessionally

suspicious if the government had said, "we're getting rid of all the Poles – except the Jews or Protestants." Nevertheless, anti-Semitic motives were unmistakable, even as Progressives mourned the loss of *c*.9,000 Jews, whose children "experience teaches us, would have strengthened the German element": Helmut Neubach, *Die Ausweisungen von Polen und Juden aus Preussen 1885/86: Ein Beitrag zu Bismarcks Polenpolitik und zur Geschichte des deutsch–polnischen Verhältnisses* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1967), pp. 108, 109, 111.

27. The Swiss *Sonderbund* War in 1847 pitted Catholic against Protestant cantons, but the issues were not primarily religious, it lasted only 25 days, few lives were lost, and reconciliation was easy.

28. Nor did they match the inter-ethnic conflicts in the United States, where the mere prospect of sharing equality with African-Americans (i.e., genuine emancipation) produced about two lynchings a week from 1890 to 1920. A reminder of just how draconian the "first" confessional age was: Arno Herzig, "Die Rekatholisierung in deutschen Territorien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 26 (2000): 76–104.

29. Blaschke, "Das 19. Jahrhundert," p. 67. A telling analysis of the use of the new democratic measures for illiberal ends is in James F. Harris, *The People Speak! Anti-Semitism and Emancipation in Nineteenth-Century Bavaria* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994).

30. Admittedly, for many German Jews this age would begin only toward the end of the period in British history (1783–1867) examined under that name by Asa Brigg in his famous 1959 synthesis.

31. *Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867–1875* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 5, quoted in Eduardo Posada-Carbó, "Limits of Power: Elections under the Conservative Hegemony in Colombia, 1886–1930," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 77:2 (1997): 271n. 121–2.

32. Most recently: Hermann-Josef Große Kracht, "Religion in der Demokratisierungsfalle? Zum Verhältnis von traditioneller Religion und politischer Moderne am Beispiel des deutschen Katholizismus im Kaiserreich," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 51 (2000): 140–54.

33. "Iron curtain" (pp. 63, 74), "aggressive social exclusion" (p. 67), are the views of Blaschke, "Das 19. Jahrhundert."

34. German figures and quotation: Blaschke, "Das 19. Jahrhundert," p. 65, which also gives the intermarriage figures for Germany in the 1950s as "a round 20%." US figures from August B. Hollingshead,

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"Cultural Factors in the Selection of Marriage Mates," *American Sociological Review* XVI/1 (October, 1950), cited in Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew. An Essay in American Religious Sociology* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 47.

35. *Reason in Religion*, Vol. II of *Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress* (New York, 1962), pp. 10–11, quoted in Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System" in idem, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 87–126; here at p. 87.

36. Anthony Appiah has argued that the American academia can be the world's loudest champions of cultural diversity precisely because they are culturally so homogeneous: "The Multicultural Misunderstanding," *New York Review of Books*, 9 Oct. 1997.