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Publication Date

2020

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

Wartime Experiences of Civic Leaders: Legacies of Civil War, Rebel Control, and Democratization in Post-Conflict Africa

By

Justine Maisha Davis

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in Charge:

Professor Leonardo Arriola, Chair
Professor Thad Dunning
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Spring 2020

Wartime Experiences of Civic Leaders: Legacies of Civil War, Rebel Control, and
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This dissertation examines how the wartime experiences of civic leaders affect post-conflict democratization. Although international donors funnel millions of dollars in aid to local civil society organizations in conflict-affected countries with the goal of facilitating democracy and development, neither scholars nor policymakers fundamentally understand the leaders of those organizations. Relatively little is known about attitudes and behaviors held by these civic leaders, who are critical actors in post-conflict democratization, towards political empowerment or resource distribution. I show that living under rebel control affects civic leader behavior, shaping who starts organizations, what kinds of work they do, and how they conduct democracy and development projects in the future.

My theoretical framework explains how exposure to wartime uncertainty created by rebel takeover produces egocentric and discriminatory effects among civic leaders. The egocentric effect emerges because the uncertainty around who is in charge experienced under rebel takeover leads civic leaders to become more inclined to keep resources for themselves as a form of insurance. The discriminatory effect emerges because the distrust fomented during rebel takeover exacerbates existing cleavages, inducing civic leaders to become more discriminatory in their relationships with outgroups.

To assess this theory and its implications, I leverage geographic variation in rebel control within Côte d'Ivoire, a country that experienced years of civil war in the 2000s. During the war period, rebels controlled at least half of the national territory, administering these regions with varying governance structures and levels of rule of law. Utilizing data gathered over the course of 10 months of fieldwork through interview, participant observation, and an original survey of hundreds of civil society organizations, I first detail the ecosystem of local civil society across Côte d'Ivoire. I describe who creates and leads these types of organizations, the work they complete, and the challenges they faced during and after the war. I demonstrate that there are significant and consequential subnational differences in the make-up of civil society in post-conflict settings.

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Additionally, I employ a multi-method research strategy to test the theory and its observable implications, using data collected from surveys and lab-in-the-field experiments. Employing pre-treatment matching, I selected most-similar geographic units for comparison. I then invited civic leaders from former rebel-controlled and former government-controlled regions to participate in a series of dictator games in a lab-in-the-field.

Through my lab-in-the-field experiments and surveys of civic leaders, I demonstrate that civic leaders who lived under rebel control are subsequently more egocentric and more discriminatory than their counterparts who lived in areas continuously controlled by government. I further show that the war shaped who starts organizations and the work that civil society is able to conduct in former-rebel controlled zones. These findings have important implications for the prospect of democratization in post-conflict settings: civic leaders who have lived through rebel takeover and under conditions of intense uncertainty may not exhibit attitudes or behaviors conventionally expected to facilitate democratic culture in the near term.

To Orion.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I first owe a debt of gratitude to my dissertation committee members: Leonardo Arriola, Thad Dunning, Susan Hyde, Aila Matanock, and Ann Swidler. It is actually hard to articulate how appreciative I am of **Leo**. He has been unwavering in his support for the past six years, making sure I had the resources I needed to succeed in the program, providing countless opportunities to excel in the discipline, but also believing in my projects, ideas, and potential as a scholar. His dedication to his students' success and emotional well-being have served as a model for the kind of advisor I will strive to be one day. **Thad** saw something in me during my first year of graduate school, even when I did not see it myself. He pushed me to ask "big questions", but to be rigorous and creative in answering them. **Susan's** practical and career-related advice was invaluable in addition to her thoughtful feedback on the substance of the dissertation. **Aila** was always available to talk through the numerous memos I circulated, while also serving as a thoughtful mentor, facilitating interactions with her vast network in the discipline. I am thankful to have had **Ann**, a sociologist, on my committee, as she helped me to expand the scope of the project beyond political science and drew my attention to important, relevant work in her discipline.

To **Danny Choi**, who I am eternally appreciate of for walking me patiently through my seemingly endless questions via WhatsApp, reading my materials and always offering excellent and helpful feedback. I thank **Fiona Shen-Bayh** for also being readily available to think through theory puzzles and aesthetic plot design, as well as for supporting me personally and intellectually. To my office mates, **Allison Grossman** and **Paul Thissen**, thank you for always putting your own work on hold to answer my questions and talk through concerns, and for being great colleagues and friends.

I am grateful to the participants of the working groups at UC Berkeley to which I circulated many versions of the chapters in this dissertation: the Africa Research Workshop, the Center on the Politics of Development, and the IR/CP Working Group. I also thank Berkeley faculty who attended practice job talks and who led class discussions that pushed this dissertation forward. I additionally am thankful to my CPD fellow, **Luca Amato**, for his data collection efforts and for assistance with data cleaning on this project.

Early versions of chapters were improved based on feedback from participants at the Annual Political Science Association conference and the African Studies Association Conference. I especially thank participants at the Working Group for African Political Economy, the Cornell Institute for African Development Symposium, and the University of San Francisco's Development Economics Seminar for inviting me to present my work and for

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INTRODUCTION

Nestled in the rolling hills of Côte d'Ivoire sits a city called Man, the western front of the rebellion and the main regional distribution center for humanitarian aid. Over the course of eight years under rebel control, Man saw 16 battles and hundreds of civilian deaths. Across Côte d'Ivoire, civil society organizations emerged to provide humanitarian aid, democracy promotion, and development assistance to local populations during and after the war. In Man, however, local civic leaders diagnosed the civil society sector as dysfunctional and in a crisis of leadership. During the war, civic leaders would *bouffe* the money from international donors, keeping it for themselves. A youth organization president lamented: "organization leaders see other organizations as the enemy" and are unwilling to work with people from other ethnic groups.[1]

Less than a four-hour drive away, on the Liberian border, is Toulepleu. Although smaller in population than Man, Toulepleu experienced 14 battles during the war, and is similar regarding poverty levels, ethnic makeup, and partisan identity. Yet, civic leaders in Toulepleu, which remained under government control during the war, tell a very different story than those in Man: here, the population was not suspicious of civil society organizations. People trust us, a leader of a social cohesion organization remarked, and allow us to do our work. In contrast to civic leaders living under the rebels, civic leaders in Toulepleu expressed that the civil society sector works in "perfect harmony" and that peace had returned "thanks to civil society".[2]

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[1]Personal interviews with civic leaders in Man, Côte d'Ivoire, 2017-2018. Throughout this dissertation names of leaders and organizations are changed to protect their identity.

[2]Personal interviews, Toulepleu, 21 April 2018

In explaining contemporary disorder and weakness in local civil society, civic leaders in Man kept recalling their own personal experiences of living under rebel control. They described witnessing violence between rebel groups, militias, and the government. "There was no real authority" to sanction civil society organizations' work. Worse, when rebel administration changed over the course of the war, civic leaders did not know whether they would face benevolence or be terrorized for the work they did. Further, civic leaders and the populations they served faced uneven, or outright absence of, distribution of public goods by the state and rebels, including healthcare, education, and security. When civic leaders attempted to provide these goods, they faced distrust from suspicious rebels and potential constituents, while also navigating polarized contexts along ethnic, partisan, and religious identities.

In both Man and Toulepleu, civic leaders described the importance of their work: often their organizations were the only entities helping vulnerable populations in their communities access services, information, and resources. This sentiment echoes the prescription of international donors about the importance of supporting and building local civil society in post-conflict settings to contribute to democracy and peace. Yet, this brief narrative comparing civic leaders in Man to those in Toulepleu illustrates a larger phenomenon across Côte d'Ivoire: the wartime experiences of civic leaders greatly shapes their actions, attitudes, and behaviors in ways that ultimately impact their ability to contribute to democracy and development during and after the war.

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How does civil war affect post-conflict democratization? Our prevailing knowledge of civil war and democratization focuses on how war affects macro-level indicators of post-conflict democratization (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna and Huang 2012; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Toft 2009). However, understanding the local impediments to democratization are important, considering that civil war creates conditions at the local level – such as polarization, distrust, rupture of the social fabric – that make democratization and peacebuilding difficult. At the local level, civil society organizations are seen as crucial to enabling communities to aspire towards social repair, peace, and democracy in the post-conflict period (Belloni 2008; De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006; Fletcher and Weinstein 2002).

This dissertation examines how civil war affects post-conflict democratization and development, by focusing on the attitudes and behaviors of local civic leaders, citizens who opt to start civil society organizations with goals of contributing to social cohesion, peace, and democracy in their communities. Although little is known about these leaders' attitudes

towards political empowerment or resource distribution, these individuals are critical actors in post-conflict democratization and development, managing large aid portfolios and seen as the chief purveyors of democratic norms. I show how the wartime experiences of civic leaders affects their behavior, shaping who starts organizations, what kinds of work they do, and how they conduct democracy and development projects in the future.

A robust civil society is expected to contribute to democratic consolidation through the promotion of democratic norms and values (Diamond 1994; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993) and to prevent the re-emergence of conflict through their work connecting citizens with government and its services (Belloni 2008; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). The chief virtue of civil society organizations is in their capacity to develop social capital, including trust and reciprocity, among participants (Diamond 1994; Howard 2003; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). Particularly in post-conflict contexts, these attitudes are expected, in turn, to decrease citizen use of violence, increase citizen cooperation and appreciation for diversity, and reduce intergroup conflict (Belloni 2008; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006).

But, how does civil war affect the ability of civic leaders and their organizations to contribute to democracy and post-conflict peace? I answer this question by developing a theory that emphasizes the wartime experience of civil society leaders. I begin from the premise that civic leaders who have lived under rebel control experienced higher levels of uncertainty during the war period than those who lived under continuous government control. I explain that such wartime exposure to uncertainty produces egocentric and discriminatory effects inconsistent with broader democratic expectations. The egocentric effect emerges because the uncertainty around who is in charge leads civic leaders to become more inclined to keep resources for themselves as a form of insurance. The discriminatory effect emerges because the distrust fomented during rebel takeover exacerbates existing cleavages, inducing civic leaders to become more discriminatory in their relationships with outgroups. These effects, in turn, condition the long-term prospects for democratization that civil society is expected to foster in post-war settings.

Through a multi-method research strategy in Côte d'Ivoire, I demonstrate that civic leaders who lived under rebel control are subsequently more egocentric and more discriminating than their counterparts who lived in areas continuously controlled by government. I further show that the war shaped who starts organizations and the work that civil society is able to conduct in former-rebel controlled zones.

The ramifications of these findings for democratization after war are large: these local civil society organizations' role is to foster democracy at the citizen-level through civic

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engagement, humanitarian assistance, and efforts to hold the post-war state accountable (Belloni 2008; De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006; Ottaway 2003). Their mandate is to promote pro-social and democratic norms among the population, and they control a large sum of resources to do so. If the leaders themselves do not demonstrate these attitudes, how can we expect civic leaders to cultivate them on the ground? Indeed, these organizations may reinforce existing cleavages and could potentially exacerbate conflicts in the post-war period.

This dissertation contributes to the scholarship on post-conflict democratization (Brancati and Snyder 2011; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Fortna and Huang 2012; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Matanock 2017; Toft 2009). While attention has been paid to how civil society might foster post-war democratization (Belloni 2008; De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006; Ottaway 2003), this literature focuses almost exclusively on the organizations rather than the individuals who run them. In this respect, I provide new insights to explain why donors and scholars cannot expect homogeneous political behavior by civic leaders even when they are ostensibly committed to democracy. Specifically, in extending the scholarship showing that rebel governance varies significantly across space during civil war (Arjona 2009; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2006), I provide micro-level evidence of how wartime traumas may be replicated in post-conflict governance through the non-democratic behavior of civic leaders — a finding that complicates our understanding of war's influence on political behavior (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014; Hartman and Morse 2018; Voors et al. 2012; Young 2019).

WHY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS?

Since the 1990s, international donors have become increasingly interested in investing in "civil society" as a way to promote democracy abroad. Civil society constitutes the part of the public sphere between the state and the family, embodied in voluntary associations (Howard 2003; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993).[3] Today, "a vibrant civil society is often seen as the key ingredient in the success of advanced democracies in the West, as well as a panacea for developing countries elsewhere in the world (Howard 2003)."

For this dissertation, I define a civil society organization as a formally registered, private, not-for-profit organization with public welfare goals (Boulding 2014; Brass 2016;

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[3]The realm of civil society can also include religious institutions and the media. Indeed, studies of the relationship between democracy aid and democratization look specifically at how democracy aid improves freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom of association through civil society strengthening (i.e. Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007).

Clarke 1998). I deliberately focus on organizations created and run by local populations with headquarters in-country, but potentially supported by international donors. Understanding how local organizations operate in-country is important because they are often expected to be closely linked to local populations as opposed to national or international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (Watkins, Swidler and Hannan 2012).[4]

I examine membership-based and locally oriented organizations as well as professionalized, society-oriented organizations. The former are often called "grassroots" and "community-based" organizations and include agricultural cooperatives, village or neighborhood women's associations, youth associations, etc. Membership can be based on ethnicity, religion, origin, gender, age and other ascriptive characteristics. Society-oriented organizations fit more into the traditional NGO box (Brass 2016; Beaulieu 2014; Bratton 1989). I exclude organizations that are founded to explicitly support local or national political leaders.

I focus on both types of organizations for several reasons. First, focusing only on NGOs does not capture the rich associational life that often proliferates outside of regional capitals, especially in rural areas. Second, civil society organizations and associations may work together, and often with international donors, on public good provision and other development or democracy oriented activities; indeed, they play a crucial role as brokers between donors and local populations (Swidler and Watkins 2017). Third, although formalized NGOs are a relatively new phenomena across the continent, research has demonstrated that many African countries have had long histories of rich associational life at the local level (Barr, Fafchamps and Owens 2005; Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Kasfir 2013; Obadare 2004). Excluding them from analysis, therefore, would result in a weak and ill-informed approach to studying how civil war affects leaders who organize to contribute to their communities in the wake of conflict. For the remainder of this dissertation, I will use the term civil society organization exclusively, though it comprises both types of organizations.

Citizens, leaders, and members of these organizations are expected to learn about democracy through participating in the organizations themselves. Gyimah-Boadi (1996) asserted that African associations can facilitate the development of civil and political skills, stating

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[4]There is a complex "aid chain" that defines the different relationships and functions of INGOs and local organizations: donors distribute aid to INGOs, who then select national organizations to implement their policies and programs. These national actors then subcontract to smaller, local organizations who are expected to be more closely linked to local populations (Watkins, Swidler and Hannan 2012). Additionally, although INGOs often have offices that are staffed by locals, they typically are headed by a foreign national in-country and their headquarters are located in donor countries (Bush 2016). Their time horizons are different from those run by local citizens who, arguably, have created these organizations to participate in the fabric of civil society in the long-run.

that "many if not all of them do serve as large free schools for democracy." Indeed, Offe and Preuse (1991) argue that a democratic polity is born through the continual process of micropolitical learning within civil society organizations. Greater trust, tolerance and bargaining skills are beneficial for democracy, Howard (2003) asserts, allowing people to better understand their role in a participatory democratic system. By stimulating political participation, civil society can promote an "appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship (Diamond 1994)."

These effects are increased when the organizations themselves are internally democratic (Diamond 1994), have cross-cutting interests and memberships (Varshney 2001), and when civil society itself is pluralistic and dense (Howard 2003). Boulding (2014, 34) adds that civil society organizations aid democratic participation by providing resources for political action and by facilitating interactions between members of a community. In other words, civil society organizations can lower the costs, create the motivation, and provide the networks necessary for participating in politics in new democracies.

Yet, civil war can have dramatic effects on the make-up and functioning of civil society. Violent conflict can polarize civil society, leaving resentment and distrust in its wake (Belloni 2008). Indeed, conflict can spawn un-civil society organizations that either use violence, or are divisive for society as a whole – like organizations whose membership is determined by criteria that reinforce hostile, existing cleavages (Belloni 2008; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Colletta and Cullen 2000; Kasfir 2013). Furthermore, in describing a "conflict trap", Collier et al. (2003) find that war increases polarization which in turn can foster future violence. In these contexts, civil society organizations may be seen as explicitly "doing politics" (Bell and Keenan 2004; Marchetti and Tocci 2009).

I join a subset of civil society scholars who argue that the institutional environment in which organizations emerge shape their ability to contribute to democracy. Organizations are often embedded in the political process and reproduce the political contexts in which they exist (Ferme 1999; Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Jamal 2009; Manning 2005; Posner 2004). For example, Jamal (2009) finds that Palestinian civil society mirrors the authoritarian tendencies of the state; organizations may reinforce existing political regimes instead of creating the conditions to foster the social capital needed to build democracy after war. In this dissertation I focus on one institutional environment that has thus far been neglected in the literature, despite its widespread prevalence in civil wars across the world: rebel takeover of territory.

Although significant debates exist in Africanist literature regarding the "foreign nature" of civil society and the presumed incompatibility of the term with African society (Hutchful

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1996; Mamdani 1995; Obadare 2004; Osaghae 2006), one common thread emerges: in the study of civil society in Africa, it is important to understand "actual" civil society in these contexts (Obadare 2011; White 1994). Indeed, Bayart (1986, 118) argues that in Africa, "the advance of a civil society which does not necessarily contain the democratic ideal does not in itself ensure the democratization of the political system." In this dissertation, I aim to investigate the constellation of civil society in post-conflict society in Africa, by including a variety of different types of organizations in the study, ranging from formalized NGOs to local women's agricultural coops; by examining both urban and rural associations; and by examining organizations irrespective of their domains of work or funding status. Indeed, I answer the call from Obadare (2011, 428) to make civil society more relevant in the African context by "pay[ing] greater attention to the interior lives of civil society organizations, as well as the life worlds of individual citizens who people them and give them whatever substance they may have."

WHY CIVIC LEADERS?

Leaders of civil society organizations represent a unique and important type of local civic leaders: heralded as the chief purveyors of democracy in their local communities, they create these organizations, in theory, to contribute to the development of a democratic culture with foundations in altruism, social solidarity, and tolerance.[5] These leaders are expected to exhibit high levels of altruism and to benefit, just like members, from the social capital production in the organization. One reason to believe that civic leaders can generate such outcomes is because, in most cases, they are more educated, older, and more likely to be better connected than the populations they serve (Banks, Hulme and Edwards 2015; Barkan 2012; Fafchamps and Owens 2009; Howell and Pearce 2002; Mercer 2002). Further, their work brings them into direct contact with international donors and government officials (Bush 2016; Boulding 2014; Carothers 2011; Ottaway 2003). Examining their behaviors and attitudes thus contributes to our understanding of how local democratization can occur in post-conflict settings.

I define a civic leader as anyone who holds or has held an executive position in a formally registered civil society organization. The process in which they became a leader may vary from organization to organization: often they themselves are the founder and creator of the organization while few organizations have formal democratic elections to choose their

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[5]This is the expectation that international donors operate from, although there are many who argue that civil society organizations can foster anti-democratic values, especially in authoritarian and post-conflict settings (Belloni 2008; Berman 1997; Chambers and Kopstein 2001; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Hearn 2001; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Jamal 2009; Uvin 1998, *inter alia*).

leaders.

Research in civil war contexts have examined the effect of the war on civilians (Bauer et al. 2016; Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014; Whitt and Wilson 2007) and combatants (Blattman 2009; Blattman and Annan 2016), but has yet to produce widespread knowledge of how war affects local leaders. Indeed, very little empirical work examines leaders of civil society organizations, despite their prominence in democracy-promotion, humanitarian assistance efforts, and civic education initiatives. In this way, civic leaders differ from other types of local leaders: they generally have a broader mandate. Through their organizations, they are engaged in lobbying, social activism, and public goods provision (Bush 2016; Boulding 2014). Civic leaders are expected to promote democratic norms as part of their mandate, while chiefs and religious leaders, although some do, are typically not characterized as purveyors of democratic norms (Baldwin 2016).

Rebel takeover

One facet of civil war that has recently produced significant research is the effect of rebel takeover of territory on a variety of outcomes (Arjona 2016; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2006, *inter alia*). While debate exists on the levels of variation in the concepts of rebel, insurgent, or guerrilla governance, two main tenets underly the definition of this phenomenon: 1) governance occurs where the armed actors have some territorial control; 2) these actors establish rules or institutions that regulate civilian populations (Arjona 2015; Mampilly 2011; Huang 2016; Weinstein 2006).

Arjona (2016) argues that rebel governance greatly transforms social processes, bringing about new social orders in war zones; this changes the contexts in which civilians make choices during the war and afterwards. However, the emerging field of inquiry into rebel governance and when rebels win wars is primarily interested in explaining when and how rebel governance emerges (Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2006). Some work looks at how rebel victory affects macro-outcomes such as democracy and development (Arjona 2016; Huang 2016; Toft 2009), but does not probe the mechanism of how citizen experiences within a territory condition their democratic potential. In this dissertation, I see war, and rebel takeover, as a transformative social condition that involves changes in institutions; social relations; and social order (Lubkemann 2010; Wood 2008). I extend our understanding of rebel governance by highlighting the impact of rebel takeover on local civic actors and develop a framework to understand how this process takes place.

1.1 A THEORY OF WARTIME EXPERIENCES OF CIVIC LEADERS

I present in this section an analytical framework for understanding how the takeover of territory by rebels affects civic leader behavior with enduring implications for post-conflict democratization. I argue, in short, that rebel governance is more destabilizing for local civic leaders than continued state governance during civil war because living under rebel control creates more uncertainty across a range of potential interactions. When rebels take over a locality, there is not only greater uncertainty around who is in charge; the putative leaders who have taken over will often have little trust in civic leaders themselves. Uncertainty around who is in charge thus induces an egocentric effect in civic leaders through shorter time horizons, while distrust induces a discrimination effect through doubts about loyalty.

UNCERTAINTY UNDER REBEL CONTROL

When rebels succeed in wrestling local power and territory from the state, they can choose to use violence selectively or indiscriminately, establish governance institutions, and/or provide public goods to citizens under their control. Indeed, rebel movements inherently seek to destroy the legitimacy of the state. This makes the experience of living under rebel control unique in contrast to the relative stability in government-controlled areas: rebel takeover represents a breakdown of the old order and an introduction of new or changed institutions (Mampilly 2011, 13).

Thus, I posit that the every day experience of civic leaders living under rebel control is different from their counterparts who lived under sustained government control. Even if citizens may have wanted rebels to take over, the fact that they do still disrupts the institutional environment that existed before the takeover. By contrast, civic leaders living under government control may feel some uncertainty, but they do not have to contend with the added effect of rival regimes or parallel institutions.[6]

I argue that when rebels take over, civic leaders in the affected territories experience high *uncertainty* in a day-to-day basis. I conceptualize uncertainty for civic leaders as a lack of clear expectations over who is in charge (*governance uncertainty*) and over who one can trust (*social uncertainty*). Table 1.1 summarizes how I conceptualize and measure these

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[6]This is not to diminish the fact that government forces, just like rebels, can also be predatory, extractive, and provide varying levels of public goods. Indeed, in some contexts rebel movements may be more legitimate and supported by local populations than the central state.

dimensions of uncertainty.

<p style="text-align:center">Tab. 1.1: Conceptualization of uncertainty under rebel control</p>

Rebel Control	Conceptualization
Governance Uncertainty: who is in charge	high public goods insecurity, high contestation over power
Social Uncertainty: who can be trusted	high victimization, high discrimination

GOVERNANCE UNCERTAINTY

I conceptualize *governance uncertainty* as the uncertainty over who is in charge produced by high levels of contestation over power and high levels of insecurity around the provision of public goods. There are some cases where rebels maintain control over territory without contestation by the state; however, in most cases, the state strives to regain lost territory and civic leaders are subjected to battles and violence (Weinstein 2006). This demonstrates uncertainty for civic leaders because it is unclear who the ultimate victor will be of these skirmishes and how that will affect their futures. Similarly, in contexts where forces are irregular, it may become difficult to know who enemies are; if government and rebel forces are just as likely to use violence, predate, or discriminate, then civic leaders will live in constant fear of all armed actors in a territory. Contestation, thus, results in greater fear of all armed actors and generalized perceptions of insecurity among civic leaders.

Because provision of public goods by rebels is not guaranteed across time and space,[7] even within the same controlled territories, civic leaders may face insecurity about what types of public goods are available to them and whether their mandate requires that they provide complementary goods. Förster (2015*a*) states that if rebels provide public goods, this gives civilians a certain level of predictability of social life; if not, this induces disorder for local populations. Civic leaders may be unable to predict who is providing security or rule of law on a daily basis and they may not know whether access to public goods is determined by affiliation with certain actors. In places where the rebels do not provide public goods, I expect civic leaders to experience more uncertainty because they do not know when or how they will access such basic necessities as health, education, security, or justice.

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[7]There is a rich, fairly recent literature about why and how rebels provide civilians with public goods. Rebels provide public goods if the state had previously been present in the now rebel-held territories, leading to civilian demand for governance (Mampilly 2011); public goods are provided when rebels have successfully mobilized support in areas they take over (Kasfir 2005); and they provide goods when they have long time horizons and a social contract exists between rebels and civilians (Arjona 2016)

Social uncertainty

I conceptualize *social uncertainty*, uncertainty over who is to be trusted, as high levels of victimization and discrimination by armed actors and civilians living under rebel control. In contexts of uncertainty, rebels may be more likely to resort to violence against civilians (Arjona 2016; Kalyvas 2015). Those under rebel control may thus feel insecure about the likelihood they or their family will fall victim to violence perpetrated by these actors. Particularly in contexts where violence is meted out indiscriminately (Kalyvas 2006), civic leaders will be unable to predict who is likely to be victimized. Household vulnerability to violence may make civilians more likely to support armed groups (Justino 2009), but this may also make them susceptible to violence from other groups due to this support.

Civic leader behavior under rebel control

Civic leaders, because their work requires interaction with formalized entities, want certainty around who is in charge. Indeed, in conditions of uncertainty, international humanitarian actors outsource their response to local implementers, ceding some control to local civil society organizations over where and how aid is distributed (Collinson et al. 2013; McGoldrick 2015; Walch 2018). This means that these leaders need to be able to access communities, obtain documentation for their work, and receive funding to conduct their activities. Under conditions of uncertainty, these leaders are now required to navigate polarized contexts, threats of violence, and determine on-the-fly whom can be trusted and coordinated with, in order to fulfill their mandates (Belloni 2008; Ottaway 2003; Posner 2004; Goodhand 2006; Uvin 1998).

Drawing on the logic outlined above, I argue that the uncertainty of civil war fundamentally reshapes how civic leaders approach their mandate to create and run organizations that serve the public good in altruistic and inclusive ways. These two facets of uncertainty interact with each other to produce two specific mechanisms that affect the behavior of civic leaders with long-term implications: 1) shortened time horizons make it costlier to be altruistic; and 2) fear, distrust, and the inability to differentiate potential enemies increase reliance on discriminatory cues.

Dependent variable 1: Egocentric effect

The egocentric effect emerges because governance uncertainty leads civic leaders to become more inclined to keep resources for themselves as a form of insurance. Not knowing

who is in charge makes the future unpredictable for civic leaders. Leaders may discount the value of the benefits that investing in, and contributing to, the development of others might eventually bring them (Posner 2004), particularly if they do not know who will ultimately be in power. Insecurity around public goods provision changes household economic behavior (Arias, Ibáñez and Zambrano 2014; Justino 2009): they are less likely to invest in agriculture or long-term household expenses. Similarly, civic leaders may discount the value of benefits gained from helping others, as the benefits are not reaped in the short term. Finally, fear of violence and victimization may also shorten time horizons for civic leaders. Why invest in others' well-being when protecting oneself and family is paramount in contexts of insecurity?

Dependent variable 2: Discriminatory effect

The discriminatory effect emerges because the distrust fomented during rebel takeover exacerbates existing cleavages, inducing civic leaders to become more discriminatory in their relationships with outgroups. Contestation over power and indiscriminate violence can signal negative qualities of opposing groups (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2013), such as dishonesty and untrustworthiness.

If the civic leader provides goods and services to the population at-large, she risks assisting individuals or communities that align with the enemy and who may eventually threaten the existence of the organization in the future. Further, if civic leaders are unsure who is likely to access limited public goods provision under rebel control, they may fear that their ability to do so is determined by ascriptive characteristics. Although I expect civic leaders who have experienced rebel control to be more egocentric, when they do opt to share their resources, they do so in a discriminatory way.

Not knowing whom can be trusted, and because there are prohibitive costs to finding out who can be trusted, civic leaders have to rely increasingly on cognitive cues; civic leaders become more sensitive to making quick assessments about people and situations, using cues to sort out who is going to be honest and trustworthy. The easiest and most readily identifiable cues are ascriptive, but partisanship may also be identifiable, especially in contexts where partisanship is tied to ethnicity. Thus, as they are averse to the risk of empowering enemies and have informational constraints as to who can be trusted, when civic leaders do opt to help others, it is in their short-term best interest to help those that are most like them.

POST-WAR VS. WARTIME CIVIC LEADERS

The defining characteristics of the war – polarization, uncertainty, weak state capacity, violence – do not immediately disappear at the signing of a peace agreement. Indeed, it is difficult to even assess when a country is truly at permanent peace, since the likelihood of conflict recurrence remains high, particularly if grievances remain unaddressed and if political reform is slow (Collier et al. 2003; Gates, Nygård and Trappeniers 2016; Toft 2009; Walter 2002).

Considering that the underlying drivers of war likely persist into the post-war period, civic leaders should be expected to continue to rely on the strategies adopted during the war. Those leaders who survive the war continue to operate their organizations and transition these organizations into post-war entities. They socialize new leaders, passing down the strategies they employed that proved successful during the war. These leaders find that the strategies they employ during the war are effective for their work: accessing certain communities, getting aid, and fostering relationships with whomever is governing. They in turn continue to implement these strategies, other organizations replicate what organizations that came before them have done, and new leaders emerging from organizations create organizations with a similar culture to that which was developed during the war.

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY

Table 1.2 presents the hypotheses that I derive from the theory of wartime experiences of civic leaders. I posit that because uncertainty produced by rebel control is particularly exacerbated, I expect that civic leaders living under rebel control are more likely to experience uncertainty than civic leaders living continuously under government control (*Hypothesis 1*). *Hypothesis 2* and *Hypothesis 3* are the main testable implications of the theory: I expect civic leaders who have lived through the uncertainty produced by rebel control are more likely to exhibit attitudes at odds with pro-social behavior than their counterparts who lived under government control. Finally, in *Hypothesis 4* I assert that the behaviors and attitudes that civic leaders living under rebel control developed during the war period persist after the war has ended, and they pass these behaviors and attitudes on to new leaders in civil society.

Tab. 1.2: Observable implications of theory

Hypothesis 1	Civic leaders who lived under rebel control experienced *more governance uncertainty and social uncertainty* than those in former government-controlled areas.
Hypothesis 2	Civic leaders who lived under rebel control *are more egocentric* than those in former government-controlled areas.
Hypothesis 3	Civic leaders who lived under rebel control *are more likely to discriminate against the outgroup* than those in former government-controlled areas.
Hypothesis 4	Civic leaders who emerged in the post-war period *demonstrate the same behaviors* as those leaders who started working before or during the war.

I demonstrate that civic leaders from rebel controlled territories are not more egocentric and more discriminatory because they are poorer or less likely to be funded by international donors than civic leaders from government controlled territories. I also show that exposure to violence cannot explain the variation that I find in civic leader behavior. Living under rebel control shortens the time horizons of civic leaders and creates contexts of extreme uncertainty, which induces these leaders to behave in ways that are at odds with norms expected of liberal and representative governance.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRATIZATION

In this dissertation, I conceptualize and measure two outcomes: the egocentric effect and the discriminatory effect that emerge from the uncertainty experienced by civic leaders living under rebel control. Egocentricism and discrimination are the inverse of altruism and tolerance, which are considered to be important foundations for the social capital necessary to support democracy. High levels of altruism have been linked with more participation in democratic politics (Fowler 2006). Importantly for civic leaders, altruism represents an individual's willingness to bear the cost of working cooperatively towards a common goal – democracy, or peace in post-conflict settings (Fukuyama 1995; Torbisco Casals

2015). Further, democracy rests on civil liberties and legitimate opposition, which, Gibson (1998) and Inglehart (2003) have argued, require tolerance of outgroups and towards groups with whom one disagrees.

War can affect pro-social and democratic attitudes through a number of avenues, but the prevailing narrative focuses exclusively on violence. Prominent research in political science and economics asserts that social cohesion and cooperation are expected to be stronger in communities that experienced widespread violence (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014; Voors et al. 2012). Further, civilians may even develop prosocial preferences in the aftermath of war, becoming more altruistic (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Hartman and Morse 2018), more capable of collective action, and participating more in politics (Blattman 2009). Yet, violence is often widespread during civil war; It alone cannot explain why civic leaders behave differently conditional on whether they lived under rebel control.

1.2   SCOPE: CONTEMPORARY CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA

The theory applies to contexts where rebels take over and administer (to a varying degree) territory. Over 70 percent of African civil wars have involved rebels taking over and controlling territory (Huang 2016 and my calculations).[8] International donors have allocated Approximately 25 billion USD of aid to organizations in these countries in the post-war period, with the largest allocation being towards government and civil society programming (15 percent, ODA 2016). The OECD considers this aid to be crucial for governance and peace in post-conflict contexts: it includes projects on elections, democratic participation, human rights, and women's equality (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2014). USAID notes that a crucial tool for sustainable development and lasting peace is supporting civil society, particularly strengthening a democratic culture that "values citizen engagement, tolerance, and respect for human rights."[9]

However, countries that are emerging from civil war have notoriously weak civil society organizations according to a recent USAID (2015) report: post-conflict countries' civil society organizations have lower public approval, are less effective at advocacy efforts, and have lower organizational capacity than countries that did not experience civil war. To illustrate, civil society organization in Sierra Leone are suffering from a credibility crisis as they are seen as protecting the interests of political parties. In Mozambique, citizens are

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[8]Angola, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

[9]usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/supporting-vibrant-civil-society-independent-media

not likely to support civil society organizations as they see them as less trustworthy than other groups in their communities.

Considering the sizable amount of aid that local civic leaders manage in countries emerging from conflict and the Herculean expectation that they will serve as purveyors of democratic norms in their war-torn communities, it is important to understand how war affects their attitudes and behaviors. Yet, there is little systematic empirical work that investigates the impact of war on civic leader behavior, nor how these wartime experiences affect civil society prospects of contributing to democracy in post-conflict settings.

1.3   CÔTE D'IVOIRE AS A CASE

Fig. 1.1: Map of Côte d'Ivoire

Note: Gray departments are rebel-controlled territories (2002-2011), white zones are government-controlled. Yamoussokro and Abidjan are the political and economic capitals, respectively. Black dotted lines represent the *zone de confiance*.

I assess the explanatory power of my theory through data collected in Côte d'Ivoire, a West African country that experienced a civil war from 2002-2011. During the war period, rebels controlled at least half of the national territory, administering these regions with varying degrees of governance structures and rule of law. In October 2002, with the goal of

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decreasing confrontation between rebel forces and government troops, the United Nations (UN) and French military put into place a 12,000 km^2 (7,500 miles^2) *zone de confiance* (ZDC) that was patrolled by UN forces. This buffer zone meant that, at the height of FN control, rebels held a majority of the national territory with limited confrontation by the state; thus, the state had little ability to uphold rule of law or administer public goods in these occupied territories.

The war ended in a negotiated settlement and the rebel-supported candidate won the presidential elections that were part of the peace agreement provisions in 2010. The election, however, renewed violent confrontation between rebels and government forces after both candidates declared themselves the winner.[10] The conflict ultimately ended when French troops intervened to remove the former president from power in April 2011 and he was subsequently sent to the International Criminal Court for charges of crimes against humanity. Since that time, the country has stabilized and experienced remarkable economic growth (at close to nine percent annually), but concerns abound as to whether reconciliation and sustained peace has been achieved; allegations of victor's justice remain strong (Piccolino 2016), inter-ethnic violence continues to flare up across the country, and political alliances are fragile.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

During the civil war and in the post-war period, Côte d'Ivoire witnessed a marked increase in the number of registered local organizations (See Figure 1.2). This increase is primarily attributed to an influx of international aid, representing an opportunity to receive funding for an organization's work. International funders saw these local civil society organizations as service providers in delivering humanitarian aid (Floridi and Verdacchia 2010).

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[10]Because this violence occurred after peace agreements were signed, civil war datasets such as UDCP and COW code it as a second civil war, whereas some argue it is a continuation of the war itself (McGovern 2011; Balcells 2017), while still others argue that the electoral violence was a political crisis distinct from the war (Straus 2011). For this dissertation, I examine both periods of violence.

Fig. 1.2: Growth of the civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire

*Note:*Total number of organizations registered with the Ministry of Interior and political periods in Côte d'Ivoire. Source: Ministry of Interior, 2017

Organizations in Côte d'Ivoire are all regulated by the same law, irrespective of their status as an NGO, service-providing organization, charity, union, or club. Because of this, most organizations that make up the civil society sector are engaged in a multitude of domains and cannot easily be classified into uniquely service providing or advocacy organizations.

According to data from the Ministry of the Interior of nationally registered organizations, 30 percent of organizations state that they work towards social cohesion in their activi-

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ties; this includes organizations whose mission statements specifically discuss pro-social norms such as tolerance, community spirit and unity.[11] Organizations that do so are involved in 5.14 sectors on average. In particular, social cohesion organizations also work on poverty alleviation (41 percent), development (32 percent), and local culture promotion (46 percent).

Organizations that self-report that they work on democracy – including organizations that promote civil society, elections, citizenship, and rights[12] – although only accounting for 12 percent of total organizations, are also more likely to work in a significant number of domains (5.30 on average). Importantly, of democracy-promoting organizations, 30 percent work on social cohesion, demonstrating that organizations that are democracy focused are also attempting to contribute to pro-social norms at the local level.

Civil society organizations in Côte d'Ivoire do not enjoy widespread support in the public (USAID 2016), which USAID attributes to a lack of understanding in the general population of the role of civil society organizations. In Abidjan, a majority of the population perceives these organizations as partisan and views them negatively, particularly opposition supporters (Davis n.d.). Afrobarometer (2017) reports that over 67 percent of respondents in Côte d'Ivoire think that some or most of NGOs are corrupt.

Nevertheless, the civil society sector has received significant international aid to contribute towards democracy and peace-building efforts. Figure 1.3 plots the amount of Overseas Development Assistance to NGOs in Côte d'Ivoire from 2004 to 2015. There has been a decline in the amount of aid allocated to NGOs in the recent period, as international actors now see the country as more stable and the government as a potential partner. Still, local organizations continue to receive substantial support from the international community for their work. The National Endowment for Democracy, a US-based organization whose main goal is to support local civil society organizations, has dedicated over $600,000 between 2006 and 2015 to supporting 65 local civil society organizations in democracy-building activities, with an average grant of $45,000 per organization.[13]

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[11]This includes any organizations that use one or more of the following terms in their mission statements: "cohesion, entraide, solidarite, union, amitie, tolerance, fraternel, reinsertion, unite, xenophobie, fraternite, unir, entente"

[12]This includes any organizations that use one or more of the following terms in their mission statements: "democrat, droit, elect, societe civile, citoyen, gouv, civique, parlement, corruption, civique, institution, politiques sociales, politique de decentralisation, politique de lutte, civism"

[13]Author's calculations from NED.org

Fig. 1.3: Total amount of ODA allocated to NGOs in Côte d'Ivoire, 2004-2015.

Source: OECD, 2016

Although the empirical data for this analysis are drawn from Côte d'Ivoire, the findings have broader implications. First, Côte d'Ivoire represents a case typical of other recent civil wars: it joins the ranks of at least nine prior civil wars in its nature as a center-seeking civil war in which rebels held territory and their preferred political party won political power after the war (Huang 2016; Dresden 2017). Second, despite variation in public support for civil society organizations, the country has recently witnessed an increase in the number of organizations working towards social cohesion and democracy goals. This makes it a particularly compelling case to better understand the complex dynamics that

war introduces at the micro and macro level, including how internationally-supported organizations have been able to conduct their work in post-war periods. The findings of this project can thus be generalized to other country contexts that may have similar post-conflict dynamics as Côte d'Ivoire.

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

MULTI-METHOD RESEARCH STRATEGY

In this dissertation, I take a sub-national approach to the impact of civil war. In doing so, I control for the national legal environment that makes comparing across countries difficult (Snyder 2001). Further, "war may take a different form across local territories, unleashing strikingly different dynamics (Arjona 2009)." As civil society organizations are expected to have local constituents and to engage with local governments Boulding 2014; Brass 2016), understanding the micro-level and localized impacts of conflict will enhance our understanding of variation in local democratization. Further, case studies of specific civil wars can help us better theorize the processes underpinning conflict as well as illuminate mechanisms and variables that are overlooked in large-N analyses of civil war globally (Sambanis 2005).

The analysis in this dissertation employs a multi-method research approach that draws from quantitative analysis of original datasets, survey work, and a lab-in-the-field as well as qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews and participant observation gathered during 10 months of fieldwork in Côte d'Ivoire.[14] It builds on my almost eight years of experience working in and on the country. I also supplement my own collected data with secondary source materials from government ministries, the United Nations, the European Union, international organizations, and local civil society organizations.

The dissertation reflects insights gleaned from over 100 interviews with civic leaders, government employees, and international donors across Côte d'Ivoire. It also draws from participant observation of local civil society organization activities as well as focus groups with civic leaders. I selected informants using existing organization and network rosters, personal contacts, and snowball sampling. These interviews greatly shaped the project: informants' discussion of their war experience served as the catalyst to focus on understanding how rebel takeover affected civic leaders' ability to conduct their work. It was also through interviews with civic leaders that I developed the capacity-building workshop

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[14]This project received IRB approval under protocol 2017-07-10181.

in which I embedded the lab-in-the-field. Indeed, involving the participants in the creation of the workshops not only introduced realism, but also allowed me to "give back" in a tangible way. I describe this process in more detail in Davis 2020.

The quantitative analysis employs two original surveys of civic leaders and analysis of dictator games as part of a lab-in-the-field. The first survey focused exclusively on organizational characteristics: what the organization does, where it works, when it started, and who its funders are. The second survey focused on civic leader experiences: how they perceive their role in the organization and the community and their experiences during the war. The lab-in-the-field engaged the participants in a series of dictator games to assess their willingness to distribute resources to local associations with varying characteristics.

Studying the effect of rebel control on post-war outcomes is difficult, because the variation that explains where the rebellion started or endured may explain why civic leaders behave the way that they do. The research design employed to corroborate the theory of the wartime experiences of civic leaders must therefore account for potential confounders. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the zones that rebels ultimately occupied were poorer, anti-incumbent, and home to geographically concentrated ethnic communities. In the next section, I describe how I selected the cases included in the empirical chapters of this dissertation in order to overcome observable differences in the contextual environment faced by civic leaders in Côte d'Ivoire.

Pre-treatment Matching Case Selection

To select cases from which to draw my civic leader sample, I employ statistical matching (Nielsen 2016; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014) to find "most similar" departments[15] selecting on "pre-treatment" variables that are associated with rebel control. The "treatment" variable is whether or not the department was part of the 10 *comzones* administered by the rebels in 2002.

To create the sample of matched departments, I conditioned on five pre-treatment covariates: distance of the department capital to Abidjan (the economic capital); vote share against the incumbent president in 2001 municipal elections; percent of population that identified as from northern ethnic groups (North Mandé and Voltaïque) from the 1998 census; average night lights for 2000; and average child mortality rates from 2000 (see Table 1.3). The first two demographic variables measure department-level political iden-

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[15]Departments are the third administrative unit in Côte d'Ivoire (N=108: rebel = 41, government = 67). Table A1 in the supplementary appendix shows the matched cases and their Mahalanobis distances.

tity while the last three are proxies for poverty. Further, these variables relate to expressed grievances around why the rebellion was started: discontent with the central government discriminating against northerners and contestation over citizenship laws (Dembele 2003; Marshall-Fratani 2006; McGovern 2011). This yields a matched sample of 21 departments: eight former rebel-controlled and 13 former government-controlled in Côte d'Ivoire (See Figure 1.4).[16] Table 1.3 shows that the matched cases are similar across the conditioning variables, but also other pre-treatment variables, including other ethnic and religious communities, population, geographic variables, and pre-war violence.[17] From these cases, I drew the sample of civic leaders for both surveys. I also conducted interviews in a subset of the selected departments.

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[16]See table A2 in the appendix for the full list of cases.

[17]There is imbalance on distance to Abidjan, due to the geographic nature of the rebel control. Results hold when examining just those departments close to the ZDC (thus correcting for this imbalance). A similar argument can be made about imbalance on cacao production, as cacao production is primarily limited to the southern and western departments: if we drop the non-cacao producing rebel-controlled departments from the sample, the results still hold.

Tab. 1.3: Balance test of matched pairs

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-Value
Distance to Abidjan, km	392.97	325.53	67.44	0.02
Anti-Incumbent, 2001	0.47	0.54	-0.07	0.44
Night Lights, 2000	0.35	0.33	0.02	0.90
Child Mortality, 2000	28.03	24.89	3.14	0.46
Northern Ethnic Groups, 1998	0.32	0.25	0.07	0.49
Other Pre-war variables				
Akan, 1998	0.24	0.36	-0.12	0.15
Krou, 1998	0.13	0.24	-0.11	0.08
South Mandé, 1998	0.30	0.14	0.17	0.13
Muslim,1998	.39	.36	0.03	0.50
1998 population	523516.12	574791.54	-51275.41	0.41
Land inequality, gini coefficient	0.58375	0.73000	-0.14625	0.12
Hospitals per 1000, 2001	1.13	1.21	-0.08	0.68
Average 10-year rainfall, in	104.07	113.89	-9.33	0.41
Cacao production, kg	15469.50	58663.62	-43194.12	0.01
Distance to lootable gold, km	226024.58	192282.12	33742.47	0.31
Pre-war battles, 1992-2001	0.13	0.23	-0.11	0.55

Sources: Ivorian Census, 1998 (RGHP); Goodman, BenYishay and Runfola 2017; Ministère de l'agriculture et des ressources animales: Annuaire 1997 des statistiques agricoles, Edition de novembre 1998; ACLED, 2017; Dabalen et al. 2012; Bouquet 2008; Statistiques des infrastructures publiques de santé par région et par district en 2009, INS and Carte Sanitaire 2008 de la Côte d'Ivoire, Direction de l'information, de la planification et de l'evaluation.

Fig. 1.4: Map of selected cases

Note: Gray departments are rebel-controlled territories (2002-2011), white zones are government-controlled. Black outlines are selected cases. Boxed cities are lab locations. Yamoussoukro and Abidjan are the political and economic capitals, respectively. Black dotted lines represent the *zone de confiance*.

At first glance, the map may provoke a critical question: why are there matched departments so far from the ZDC, such as Tabou, San-Pedro and Sassandra? In fact, this distribution is a direct product of migration policy during the 1960s and 1970s: with an economy based primarily on cocoa and coffee exports, the founding president Houphouet-Boïgny encouraged migration from the north to the farms and plantations in the south, stating

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that whoever toiled the land, owned it (Bah 2010). The primary migrants were from Northern Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, and were mostly Muslims and identified with northern ethnic communities (Akindès 2004; Chauveau and Bobo 2003; Colin, Kouamé and Soro 2007). This explains why certain southern departments are matches for departments with similar ethnic make-ups in the north of the country.

This statistical matching strategy is buttressed by the plausibility that the government-controlled areas in the sample could have fallen under rebel control. In 2002, rebels were headed south, but they were held back by government forces and local militias. The ZDC was established by the UN and French forces to limit violence between the state and rebel forces. The location of the ZDC is not random, per se, but its existence boosts the potential of this matching and counterfactual design: rebels and government forces would have continued advancing had the ZDC not been drawn and enforced by blue helmets and French military. Indeed, my interviews confirmed that prior to the designation of the ZDC, rebels were attempting to capture and advance through cities that later became part of the zone. For example, Daloa and Duékoué are strategically important as cross-roads connecting the North and West to Abidjan and San Pedro, the second-largest port city. Rebels had the explicit goal of capturing these departments and continuing southward before the ZDC was established.

The nature of this design facilitates the ruling out of confounding, but introduces limits on what I can claim about the widespread effect of rebel control on civic leader behavior. In particular, this design only allows for comparison between contested and competitive zones; it does not tell us about differences between rebel strongholds, such as those in the far north and government strongholds, such as those in the far east. It also does not allow for comparison within rebel or within government-held zones.

Despite the shortcomings in this design, it allows me to make stronger claims about the effect the war had on local civic leaders. To bolster my claims, I also include interview data across Côte d'Ivoire, as well as evidence from other scholars regarding rebel governance and primary source materials throughout the dissertation.

1.5   CHAPTER OUTLINE

The dissertation proceeds as follows. **Chapter 2** provides more context about civil society in Côte d'Ivoire. It offers a brief historical overview, before presenting descriptive data from the first survey of organizations in the 21 selected departments. It describes who creates and leads these types of organizations, the work they complete, and the challenges they

faced during and after the war. It demonstrates that there are significant and consequential subnational differences in the make-up of civil society in post-conflict settings.

Chapter 3 presents the Ivorian civil war and describes how rebel control induced uncertainty for civic leaders. It describes the nature of rebel control in the case, how the war advanced, and how uncertainty was felt in rebel-controlled territory. It draws primarily from interview and primary source material to expound on the mechanisms underpinning the theory of wartime experiences of civic leaders in the Ivorian case.

Chapter 4 tests the theory of wartime experiences of civic leaders using a lab-in-the-field design. I draw a sample of 167 civic leaders from the cases selected employing the statistical matching technique described above and invite them to participate in a lab-in-the-field using surveys and dictator games. The chapter begins by describing the sampling methods and research design and is followed by the tests of the main hypotheses. I demonstrate that civic leaders who lived under rebel control are subsequently more egocentric and more discriminating than their counterparts who lived in areas continuously controlled by government.

Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by describing the portability of the theory to other contexts, the implications of the findings and policy prescriptions, and future avenues of research. It suggests examining how variation in the wartime experiences of local populations can shape post-conflict democratization: these experiences shape citizen-civil society relations and civil society-state relations. It develops a future research agenda where variation in the level of rebel governance and level of contestation affects the level of uncertainty for civic leaders and their subsequent behavior. Indeed, this new understanding of rebel takeover's effect on behavior will contribute greatly to our understanding of how civil war affects citizens and elites as well as post-conflict democracy and development outcomes.

2

CIVIL SOCIETY ECOSYSTEM IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

> Civil society is one of the components of the expression of democracy. It contributes to the economic, social and cultural development of the Nation.
>
> ———————————
>
> Article 26, Ivorian Constitution, 2016

For the first time in its 56 years of independence, the Ivorian government explicitly mentioned the importance of the civil society sector in the 2016 constitution. Local organizations saw this official recognition as a step forward in incorporating their work towards democracy and development into the national plan. Indeed, the government considers civil society such a crucial component of democracy that part of the 8th grade (*4ème*) Human Rights and Citizenship Education curriculum is dedicated to promoting a strong civil society for the well-being of local populations: students learn about the role of local organizations in a democratic regime and are encouraged to adopt "democratic behavior" when working with civil society organizations.[1]

The civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire has flourished since the early 2000s. Civic leaders see the role of their organizations as pivotal to the success of democracy and development

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[1]Ministre de l'Education Nationale. 2012. *Programmes Educatifs et Guides d'Execution: Education aux droits de l'homme et à la citoyenneté (EDHC). 4ème.*

goals in the country, despite facing a number of challenges, including funding issues, accusations of partisanship, and weak infrastructure. This chapter serves to provide insight into Ivorian civil society, beginning with a brief history of the growth of the sector. To provide further context, I draw from interviews and survey data of civil society organizations in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as international organization reports and scholarly work on the subject. In section 2.3, I describe findings from an original survey of 163 organizations in 21 departments, elaborating on differences between civil society organizations in former-rebel and former-government controlled Côte d'Ivoire.

2.1   HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

The history of the civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire can be traced through two developments: the politicization of the sector and an increase in international aid. I briefly provide an overview of the history of the sector in this section, before describing in more detail the reality I encountered in my interviews and survey work.

In Côte d'Ivoire, associational life is regulated by the *loi 60-315 du 21 septembre 1960*. It states that an association is defined as "an organization of two or more people who pool together their knowledge or activity for non-profit purposes." This law, therefore, covers civil society organizations, community based organizations, unions, local associations, religious organizations, and organizations that support political parties.

However, in practice throughout the period of one-party rule (1960-1993), organizations independent of the state were banned (Malanhoua 2008). Associations that did exist, called "home-town associations" across West Africa, were created to serve as party sub-committees dependent on the state. Their goals were to promote economic and cultural development in local languages, but also to create a vertical line of communication between the regime and local political authorities (Woods 1994).

Leaders of these local associations saw these organizations as a means to build their clientele base, facilitating their rise in the post-colonial state, providing them with a political monopoly over local affairs. The regime encouraged co-optation of association leaders by extending positions to them within the administration: in exchange for party loyalty, student and teacher associations were extended scholarships and free housing, for example (Woods 1998).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the space for associational life was opened in conjunction with the move towards multi-party elections. For example, the first human rights

organization, *la Ligue Ivorienne de Droits de l'Homme* was officially allowed to register in 1990. At the same time, political organizations, which are also regulated by the same law, were allowed to register; subsequently, these new parties joined forces with unions and were the main agitators for democracy. Civil society organizations were seen as a space for political aspirants to rebrand themselves and use the organization as a "trampoline" into politics (Floridi and Verdacchia 2010; UPND 2004).

Because the law and the state failed to distinguish political parties from local organizations, much of the dynamics that existed during one-party rule persisted into multi-party democracy: Co-optation was rife and associational life was characterized as "top-down paternalism" reliant on vertical-based patronage networks (MacLean 2004). Local associations were thus reliant on urban-based cadres for leadership, accountability, and financing. Similarly, following the 1995 elections, civil society organizations were seen as politicized; according to a 2001 USAID report, these new organizations had "little to build upon except partisanship, given the newness and weakness of links among civil society organizations at all levels (USAID 2001, 17)." The report concluded that "political society is far more powerful force than is civil society, particularly a civil society that has succumbed to partisanship (USAID 2001, 16)".[2]

Contemporary civil society organizations are still seen as politicized and often do not have a good reputation among the public or government (Davis n.d.; USAID 2016). A 2016 USAID report indicates, however, that this opinion might be shifting: rural recipients of civil society services tend to be more supportive of these organizations. Civil society organizations are increasingly consulted by government, including on initiatives to reform the laws regulating the civil society sector, the 2016 constitution referendum, election monitoring, and the Millennium Challenge Account (USAID 2015). Nevertheless, many organizations still face negative perceptions from local communities, who do not understand their role, and still face some impediments by government to fully participate in holding government and the private sector accountable.

2.2   AID DEPENDENCE

The early 2000s saw a proliferation in the number of civil society organizations in Côte d'Ivoire. In fact, in the first year of the civil war (2002-2003) more organizations were created and registered than had been registered in the 50 years prior (Malanhoua 2008;

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[2]Many analysts, including myself in other work, argue that civil society in Côte d'Ivoire is weak due to its perception as politicized. For more on this topic, see: Davis 2012, n.d.; Jones and Djané 2018.

Floridi and Verdacchia 2010). A 2010 European Union report attributes this spike to the need for international donors to find service providers to administer humanitarian aid on their behalf (Floridi and Verdacchia 2010). Similarly, my informants described that, at the war onset, international donors would sometimes create organizations in locales if they could not find partners to work with, in order to deliver humanitarian aid.

The 2010 EU report concludes that civil society organizations in Côte d'Ivoire lack vision and shape their projects around what international donors want, not necessarily by local constituencies (Floridi and Verdacchia 2010). Indeed, this perception of civil society organizations is not unique to Côte d'Ivoire. Critical studies of international support of local civil society organizations emphasize that these organizations may lack local constituencies, may only be accountable to their donors, and may become dependent on international aid to operate (Bano 2008; Belloni 2001; Igoe and Kelsall 2005; Mercer 2002; Ottaway and Carothers 2000). This has been documented in a variety of contexts, but is particularly acute in post-conflict settings. For example, Belloni (2001, 174) found that within organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "decisions about who can participate and be empowered are made through a top-down approach where local communities lie at the receiving end of the process."

In every interview I conducted, civic leaders stated that their biggest challenge was access to funding. Some asserted that with the end of the war came a decrease in the amount of aid they could access, while others argued that the state had replaced them as recipients of aid in the post-war period. They lamented that they were unable to pay employees, maintain headquarters, or conduct the activities they desired to without international funding. Over and over I heard that organizations would work from international project to international project, falling in "standby" mode in between projects as they waited for funding.

Due to the perceived and real uncertainty around funding, organizations are more or less obligated to be part of networks that have almost a monopoly over relationships with donors (Floridi and Verdacchia 2010). In fact, because of this, 98 percent of grassroots organizations and NGOs are part of national networks (Floridi and Verdacchia 2010), such as the Convention for Ivorian Civil Society (CSCI) and the Coalition of Civil Society for Peace and Democratic Development (COSOPCI); these networks or coalitions receive funding for projects, which they then disburse across their various member organizations. Indeed, a 2016 USAID report indicates that funders prefer to fund groups of organizations instead of individual ones (USAID 2016). For example, COSOPCI received the National Democratic Institute (NDI) funding for voter education around the voter registration process in 2015, but deployed agents from its member organizations to carry out the work across the country. Local organizations are aware of this funding set-up, and strategically join multiple

networks to access funding. Thus, many organizations still lack the infrastructure to be financially independent from international donors and lack the resources to fully meet the demands of the local populations for basic services.

Further, civic leaders know that democracy and good governance are buzzwords high on donor agendas (Posner 2004), and thus may create organizations simply to extract from donors without intending to actually contribute to development. Indeed, two terms came up during my interviews to describe these types of organizations: instead of NGO, one leader said that the organizations are NGI, where the I stood for individual; the "organizations" did not exist outside of the founder/leader. Another leader called these types of organizations "NGOs in a bag." Leaders of such organizations know how to lie and divert funds from donors, moving their organization from one donor to the next. Though opportunists are not unique to the civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire, it does appear that the reputation of some organizations as nothing more than just one on paper is deserved.

In the next sections, I provide more fine grained analysis of the civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire, focusing specifically on organizations in former-rebel and former-government controlled parts of the country. I argue that although politicization and aid dependence affect these organizations, these two common explanations for the health of the civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire fail to capture variation in the sector. Instead, I posit that living under rebel control shaped who became a leader and the types of organizations that were established in Côte d'Ivoire. Through analysis of an original survey of 163 organizations and 209 leaders, I show that there are significant and consequential subnational differences in the make-up of civil society in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire.

2.3 CIVIL SOCIETY IN FORMER-GOVERNMENT AND FORMER-REBEL CONTROLLED CÔTE D'IVOIRE

This section serves to provide the reader with an overview of the civil society sector in former-rebel controlled and former-government controlled Côte d'Ivoire. It is based on data collected in 21 departments selected via the pre-treatment statistical matching strategy I described in Chapter 1. I begin with describing the sampling method and survey. I then describe who leads civil society organizations in these departments and the kind of work they do. I conclude with a discussion of how the war shaped the make-up of civil society in Côte d'Ivoire.

2.3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

To build the sample of civil society organizations, I first began with focal points from national networks in the 21 departments, including Regional Civil Society Centers established by the European Union, the West African Network for Peace, the West African Network to End Small Arms Proliferation, and a variety of local networks. Further, I contacted local offices of international donor organizations to determine with whom they had worked previously/currently. From these contacts, I built a snow-ball sample, asking those focal points to kindly share contact information of their peers. This was repeated until the list becomes saturated – no new individuals are named (See Appendix AII for more details on the sample).

One immediate concern about studying civil society organizations today is a possible selection problem: it could be that organizations that exist today or that have survived until today are led by individuals who are systematically different from those who created organizations before or during the war and which no longer exist, other than on paper. To avoid this issue, research assistants asked snowball seeds to provide contact information for those leaders within their personal and professional networks who had previously been active, but no longer were. Of those in the snowball sample, 49 percent came from organizations on the rebel side, versus 51 percent on the government side; in other words, seeds on the rebel side were no more likely to suggest organizations to contact than seeds on the government side.

Research assistants called each contact and requested their participation in the project. Eighty-two percent of those contacted desired to participate in the survey, of which 50 percent actually participated. Outright refusal rate was at 18 percent. Civic leaders in the former rebel zones were more likely to participate in the survey (36 percent vs. 29 percent). I can only speculate why this is the case, but it could be linked to the fact that civil society organizations in rebel zones were less likely to have current international partners (see Table 2.3 and discussion below); if they thought participation in the survey would facilitate their access to potential donors, they might be more likely to participate than those civil society organizations in the government zones who currently have relationships with international partners.

163 organizations participated in the survey, 67 organizations from the former rebel zone and 96 from the former government zones. In addition to the survey, I also conducted interviews in nine of the 21 selected departments.

2.3.2 CIVIC LEADERS

Civic leaders varied in how they came to enter the sector, but all of my informants said they started their organization because they recognized a need in their community. Madame K, founder of an organization for children in San-Pedro, explained that children were working in the cocoa plantations and were being exploited. She founded her organization to work towards getting these children back into schools, providing them with school supplies and fees. Monsieur I, executive director of a HIV organization in Bouaké, explained that the organization started originally as a network for people living with HIV in the region, and expanded its mandate over time to include educating the general population about the virus and providing medicine and support for HIV patients. Monsieur B, founder of a peace and social cohesion organization in Bondoukou, had a divine revelation: two angels told him to start an organization to help his community after the Peace Corps Volunteers he had worked with were evacuated in 1999. In Duékoué, Madame D started her organization dedicated to women and children's rights in 2011, at the encouragement of Amnesty International and the *ligue ivorienne de droits de l'homme* with whom she had worked before. Her organization helped those who were victims during the electoral crisis. These origin stories provide a snapshot of how these civic leaders emerged in their communities. In Man, Madame P created her federation of women's organizations in Western Côte d'Ivoire in 2015 to help women get back on their feet and return to their homes after the war.

In this section, I describe the individual characteristics of the civic leaders surveyed in the 21 selected departments. In Chapter 1, I defined a civic leader as one with a leadership position in a registered organization. In the sample of civic leaders I describe here, 64 percent were the founder of their organization, while 66 percent were the current president or director of their organization. A third of the leaders in the survey founded their organization before or during the war.

Civic leaders are on average significantly older than the general population: the median age in Côte d'Ivoire is 19.9 years, while the median age of the sample is 40. In former government-controlled departments, Northern ethnic groups are significantly under-represented in the civil society sector compared to their proportion in the general population: only 12 percent of the sample are from Northern ethnic groups, while Northerners make up 28 percent of the population in those same departments. Similarly, Muslims are under-represented in the former-government controlled departments: 36 percent of the population is Muslim, but only 10 percent of civic leaders. The Akan are under-represented in former-rebel controlled departments by seven percent. Civic leaders from former-government controlled departments are also more educated: the median educa-

tion level for those in the government zone is some university, while in rebel zones it is only some high school. Looking at the general population, NGO leaders are more representative of the education level than those in government zones; the mean education level according to Afrobarometer is 5.05, while the mean for NGO leaders from rebel zones is 5.42.

Tab. 2.1: Demographic balance table for civic leaders

variable	rebel	govt	pvalue
Age	39.69	40.02	0.81
Female	0.34	0.17	0.01
Other NGO experience	0.34	0.51	0.01
Employed permanently by org	0.37	0.60	0.00
Moved during war	0.18	0.28	0.10
Muslim	0.30	0.10	0.00
Northern	0.36	0.12	0.00
Akan	0.15	0.32	0.00
Education level	5.43	6.70	0.00
Support incumbent	0.45	0.45	0.98
Wartime organization founder	0.31	0.34	0.67

Civic leaders from former-rebel controlled departments are less likely to have had experience working in other organizations in the civil society sector: about a third have worked previously for a different organization. This does not necessarily mean they are newer leaders than civic leaders from former-government controlled departments, but that they are more likely to have worked exclusively for their current organization. Further, civic leaders from former-rebel controlled departments are more likely to work outside of their organization: only 37 percent said that they work permanently for their organization compared to 60 percent of civic leaders from the former-government controlled departments. Figure 2.1 plots how civic leaders are employed, with most employed permanently by their organization.

Fig. 2.1: How are civic leaders employed?

Civic leaders expressed concern about the likelihood of civil society organizations succeeding if international funding disappeared, with 56 percent stating that civil society would collapse without international aid. Sixty-five percent of civic leaders feared that their organization would always be dependent on international aid. However, these civic leaders overwhelmingly believed that they could fundraise for their organization: 91 percent agreed that they felt capable raising money for their organization. This was the case for all civic leaders, irrespective of where they lived during the war. Civic leaders did express concerns about profiteers among their peers. Sixty-three percent of the sample agreed that there are a lot of organizations that only exist on paper and do very little for citizens in their department. This is highest among civic leaders from former-government controlled departments.

Regarding the politicization of civil society, I asked civic leaders how often other civil society organizations collaborated with the rebels, government, or military during the war.

The modal answer was "I don't know" or refused to answer. This was also the case when I asked how many organizations were created by rebels or government during or after the war: the modal answer was overwhelmingly "I don't know". Further, fewer than 30 percent of civic leaders agreed that civil society organizations are too close to government. The responses may be marred by social desirability, but they do corroborate what I heard in interviews: there were often suggestions that organizations were started by or supported by government or rebels, but rarely was this confirmed to be accurate.

2.3.3 ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS

Organizations on either side of the ZDC are, as perhaps expected, different: they concentrate their work in different sectors, they differ in current level of international support today, and they differ in their current relationships with the national government today (see Table 2.3). They complete similar numbers of projects and are similar in the type of work they do.

Organizations had different sector priorities conditional on their location during the war. Table 2.2 shows the top five sectors for each group: leaders of civil society organizations in former-rebel zones were less likely to report that their organizations worked in humanitarian aid and human rights than their government counterparts, while education and women's rights were more important sectors for those under rebel control.

Tab. 2.2: Count of top five sectors by rebel vs. government departments

	rebel	govt
1	Social cohesion (37.36)	Humanitarian (56.38)
2	Education (29.62)	Social cohesion (48.70)
3	Development (27.01)	Human rights (47.71)
4	Women (26.18)	Health (46.12)
5	Health (25.87)	Development (44.66)

These differences demonstrate that organizations adapted to their local contexts. Education under rebel control suffered: in 2004, the Ministry of Education estimated that only 50 percent of school-aged children in the north attended school, while only 20 percent of ministry teachers stayed at their posts in the north (Sany 2010). During the war years, the country saw a net increase in the number of gender-based violence incidents, with rebel controlled territories particularly susceptible to women falling victim to rape

(African Development Bank 2012; Human Rights Watch 2007). Thus, organizations in the former-rebel controlled territories prioritized education and women's issues more than their government counterparts.

These civil society organizations worked in a diverse set of sectors. Civil society organizations in the sample worked in six sectors on average; those in former-government zones were involved in more sectors, with an average of 7.13, while those in former-rebel zones were engaged in 5.3 on average. The sample worked primarily in rural areas. Only 12 percent of organizations said they concentrated their work exclusively in urban centers; Eighty-four percent of organizations conducted at least half of their projects in rural areas.

There is a positive, statistically significant relationship between total number of sectors and funding: organizations that are engaged in more sectors are also more likely to receive funding. This is particularly the case in rebel controlled departments, where organizations that receive funding work in four more sectors than those that do not. Anecdotally, civic leaders from the former-rebel controlled departments lamented that their peers "would tell donors what they wanted to hear" when describing the sectors they work in. However, this data does not allow us to differentiate between two competing hypotheses: 1) that donors choose organizations because of their diverse portfolio or 2) that civil society organizations expand their activities as a result of receiving funding.[3]

Organizations in the former-rebel zone that were created after the war are more likely to be in "standby" mode than those created in government zones: 35 percent of organizations created since 2011 in former-rebel zones lack a permanent office and have no current funding. This fits with anecdotal evidence from interviewees who said that since there was an influx of international aid to the former-rebel zones towards the end of the war, organizations were created to reap the benefits in the short-term. These organizations have not been able to obtain funding in the post-war period; these leaders attribute this to too much competition in the civil society organization sector now that the war is over and to changes in the way aid is distributed.

The average number of projects completed (self-reported) was 15. There is no statistically significant difference between projects completed in former-rebel versus former-government zones. The most common type of project is sensitization campaigns: 85 percent of all organizations said that their mission was to disseminate information to constituents. This is compared to fewer than half of the organizations stating that their mission was to provide either public goods (46 percent) or private goods (44 percent).

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[3]Swidler and Watkins (2017) describe this dynamic extensively, where entrepreneurial leaders figure out how to maximize funding from donors in as many domains as possible.)

Tab. 2.3: Balance on organizational characteristics

variable	rebel	govt	pvalue
Created after the war	0.42	0.39	0.67
Local organization	0.86	0.68	0.01
Member of a network	0.71	0.81	0.16
Number of members	89.23	93.02	0.92
Permanent staff	0.40	0.51	0.18
Ever had official headquarters	0.70	0.89	0.00
Number of projects	14.10	12.61	0.71
Public oriented	0.84	0.95	0.02
Mission: Public goods	0.46	0.50	0.55
Mission: Private goods	0.42	0.46	0.67
Mission: Info	0.77	0.91	0.02
Total domains	5.35	7.13	0.03
Never received funding	0.63	0.52	0.14
International partner during war	0.23	0.35	0.10
Local govt partner during war	0.27	0.31	0.61
Ministry partner during war	0.17	0.32	0.03
International partner today	0.17	0.42	0.00
Local govt partner today	0.20	0.30	0.14
Ministry partner today	0.13	0.36	0.00

Over 50 percent of the organizations in the sample have never been funded by international donors. Civil society organizations in former-rebel zones were more likely to fit this category at 63 percent, though this difference is not statistically significant. Those in former-government zones are more likely to have international partners today than those in former-rebel zones, but no more likely during the war period.

The organizations in the sample worked with similar donors during the war. Organizations on both sides of the ZDC worked with the UN mission on projects during the war, as well as with Save the Children, CARE, PEPFAR, the World Food Program and UNICEF. most organizations continued to work with their war donors into the post-war period, although across the former-government controlled departments there was more diversity of partners, including USAID and Amnesty international.

Civil society organizations in former-government zones are twice as likely to have partnerships with government ministries today than those in rebel zones. This is likely because

civil society organizations in the former-government controlled departments are also more likely to have international donors today: Sixty-two percent of organizations with current relationships with international donors have current relationships with ministries, whereas only 19 percent of organizations with current international partners have no ministry partners. The most common ministries that organizations worked with (on both sides of the ZDC) were the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, followed by the Ministry of Women, the Protection of Children, and Solidarity. Relationships with local government are similar across the ZDC.

2.4 CONCLUSION

Taken together, the data in this chapter shows differences between civil society organizations and their leaders, conditional on where the organization is located. Although it is hard to draw a causal interpretation of this data, highlighting the differences that exist in the sector provides a more comprehensive understanding of the landscape of the sector in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire.

This chapter has served to provide an overview of the civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire, with a lens on civic leaders and their organizations in former-rebel controlled and former-government controlled territories. The data from the survey demonstrates that civil society organizations vary subnationally in the work they do. The next chapters provide further evidence of differences between civic leader experiences during the war that shape their attitudes and behaviors today.

3

THE IVORIAN WAR AND EVIDENCE OF UNCERTAINTY UNDER REBEL CONTROL

> When the rebellion arrived, there were no longer any laws. Rebels pillaged the population, there were mass graves. We were afraid to go to the fields.
>
> Civic leader in Vavoua (rebel-controlled), Côte d'Ivoire, 2018

> Every day the fear was there. The young people will always have that [fear] in their bodies.
>
> Civic leader in Sandrou, Facobly (rebel-controlled), Côte d'Ivoire, 2018

As elaborated in Chapter 1, I argue that the takeover of territory by rebels produces considerable uncertainty for civic leaders living in occupied territories. This uncertainty is felt at higher levels for those living under rebel control, because the takeover represents a disruption of the status quo and an introduction of new institutions in ways that are less likely to affect individuals living under continuous government control. I conceptualize two types of uncertainty: uncertainty over who is in charge (governance uncertainty) and over who can be trusted (social uncertainty). Civic leaders living under rebel control thus

face this uncertainty when attempting to conduct their work. This uncertainty, in turn, affects their attitudes and behaviors, namely inducing them to become egocentric and more discriminatory as tools of survival.

The evidence presented in this chapter is derived from over 100 interviews in Côte d'Ivoire, in both former rebel and former government controlled areas, as well as data collected via participant observation of civil society organization activities and focus groups with civic leaders. I conducted the interviews in two waves: the first set of locations were selected based on geographic variation, with one location from the west, southwest, center, and northeast of Côte d'Ivoire (Man, San Pedro, Bouaké, and Bondoukou) in 2017. The second wave (2018) consisted of interviews in nine of the 21 departments selected using the matching case selection strategy described in Chapter 1.

I selected civic leaders to interview in these 11 locations from existing lists of civil society organizations as well as from personal contacts, and some were reached by snowball sampling. Table 3.1 presents descriptive data of the interviews conducted outside of the economic capital, Abidjan; I show the percent of civic leaders interviewed whose organizations worked in the top cited sectors of social cohesion, education, health, human rights, and women's issues. Interviews were conducted in French and either in the offices or homes of the civic leaders. The interviews were semi-structured and covered topics such as the type of work the organization completes, difficulties accessing their constituents, difficulty working with local government today, funding, and their experiences living during the civil war and electoral violence. Respondents were willing to share their war experiences often unprompted. Wood (2003) and others have found that residents' willingness to talk about their personal and community histories of violence is common in ethnographies of civil war; narratives of violence are not only linked to processes of self-identity, but are also meaningful ways to deal with experience after the fact.

Tab. 3.1: Interviews with civic leaders conducted in Côte d'Ivoire, 2017-2018.

rebel	department	count	cohesion	education	health	human rights	women
0	Bondoukou	10	0.12	0.19	0.19	0.12	0.04
1	Bouaké	37	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.17
0	Daloa	8	0.00	0.10	0.20	0.20	0.00
0	Duékoué	6	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.10
1	Facobly	3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25
0	Issia	12	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.10
1	Kouibly	2	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.25
1	Man	18	0.02	0.02	0.20	0.02	0.24
0	San Pedro	11	0.09	0.00	0.14	0.09	0.14
0	Toulepleu	6	0.20	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.10
1	Vavoua	7	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.00
	Total	109	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.15

I also conducted interviews in Abidjan with international organizations; the European Union; national organizations and think tanks; and the national human rights commission. I supplement the interview data with primary sources including Human Rights Watch reports and United Nations documents, and ethnographic studies in former-rebel controlled territories.

In the former rebel controlled territory of Côte d'Ivoire, civic leaders described living under uncertainty during the war. They emphasized that when the rebels took over, this introduced new dynamics of insecurity and fear, which in turn affected their ability to conduct their activities. Civic leaders described the behavioral effects of the war on the civil society sector, asserting that civic leaders were less altruistic and more likely to discriminate against those who were different from themselves.

In contrast, civic leaders in former government-controlled territories rarely evoked descriptions of chaos or brutality when describing their experiences during the war. Instead, they often described the civil society sector as one that was cohesive and cooperative. One leader even proclaimed that the war in 2002 did not "disrupt social cohesion" in his community.[1]

In the next sections I first describe the origins of the Ivorian conflict and the demands and grievances of the rebels. I then present the evidence for the mechanism expounded in

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[1]Personal interview, village on road between Duékoué and Man, April 19, 2018

Chapter 1. The goal of this chapter is to elucidate the two types of uncertainty I argue characterize rebel control – governance and social – in Côte d'Ivoire. It also demonstrates that civic leaders living under rebel control experienced more uncertainty than civic leaders living under continuous government control. I substantiate the connection between rebel control and civic leader behavior in Section 3.6.

3.1 ORIGINS OF THE IVORIAN CIVIL WAR

The origins of the Ivorian war can be traced to economic decline in the country, an increase in ethnic competition, and the destabilization of the political situation in the 1990s. Côte d'Ivoire built its economy around the export of cocoa and coffee and quickly became the wealthiest nation in West Africa in the early years of independence (Chirot 2006). Colonial authorities encouraged migration from Burkina Faso, Mali, as well as central and western Côte d'Ivoire to work the cocoa and coffee regions in the southwest (Chauveau 2000). In the early days of independence, first president Houphouët-Boigny continued to encourage migration to the agriculturally productive zones and deployed "fuzzy" citizenship policies that allowed immigrants to participate in Ivorian politics (Bah 2010). The government even promised that whoever toiled the land, owned it (Chirot 2006). It is estimated that immigrants made up at least a quarter of the Ivorian population during this time period (Chirot 2006).

However, in the mid-1970s Côte d'Ivoire's growth stalled due to price drop in cocoa; the country experienced a 38 percent drop in living standards as a result (Chirot 2006). Like many African nations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire was faced with strict structural adjustment programs imposed by international financial institutions and donors that called for cuts in farmer subsidies and government spending. Poverty rates increased 25 percent in the northern regions in the 1980s (Konan 2002), job opportunities became scarce, and tensions began to develop between southern farmers and northern migrant farm workers.

There are over 60 ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire, grouped into five language groups (Akan, Krou, North Mandé, South Mandé and Voltaïque). Migrants who were encouraged to work the cocoa plantations shared ethnic identity with the majority groups in northern Côte d'Ivoire, primarily from the North Mandé and Voltaïque groups. When the economic stagnation set in, those who had originally inhabited the arable land began to make demands for the return of "their land" from the migrant workers. This led to frequent conflict between "sons of the land" and migrants (Chauveau 2000; Chirot 2006; Toungara 2001).

45

A political vacuum materialized when the first Ivorian president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, died in 1993: conflict over who should be his successor emerged between his once prime minister, Alassane Ouattara, and his co-ethnic and president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié. At the onset of democratization in Côte d'Ivoire, Ouattara was denied participation in the 1995 elections, due to doubts about his Ivorian origins. Bédié instead became president, ushering in a new era of Ivorian politics characterized by polarization. A subset of the ruling party, *le Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), splintered off to create the *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) with goals of increasing northern representation in Ivorian politics, with Ouattara at its helm. Ouattara was seen as representing the interests of the mostly Muslim, Northern ethnic groups (Akindès 2004). The chief opposition party, *le Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), led by Laurent Gbagbo, a teacher from whose ethnic origins were from the West, also contested elections in this period.

In the mid-90s, an ideology called *Ivoirité* emerged as a tool to determine the level of "Ivoirianness" of the population living within the national borders. *Ivoirité* sets forth the criteria of evaluation:"the person who asserts his *Ivoirité* is supposed to have Côte d'Ivoire as his country [and] be born of Ivorian parents belonging to one of the ethnic group's native to Côte d'Ivoire (CURDIPHE, 2000)". In 1996, a manifesto linked to the then president, Bédié, established the parameters of evaluation of *Ivoirité*, as well as communicated the need for such a concept: "the Ivoirian people should affirm their sovereignty...facing the menace of dispossession and subjection that stems from immigration...(CURDIPHE, 2000)". The PDCI used the *Ivoirité* rhetoric to delegitimize the main opposition party leader, Ouattara, asserting that he was not Ivorian, but Burkinabé, thus making him ineligible for elected office.

Ivoirité was legitimized in the constitution, restricting those seeking presidency to those who were born of two Ivoirian parents (Dembele 2003). This new law also challenged non-Ivoirians' rights to property ownership, essentially attacking individuals with Northern ethnic heritages. Further laws affected who could serve in public sector job positions, and anyone requesting an identity document from the Ivorian government had to prove that they were born in an Ivoirian village, thus preventing a number of individuals from obtaining documentation (Bah 2010). These policies isolated immigrants and also were used to discriminate against Northerners who were perceived to not be "real Ivoirians."

This resulted in both economic and political consequences for northerners. The north was poorer than the rest of the country, and individuals from northern ethnic groups reported higher levels of poverty than the ethnic group associated with the PDCI. For example, In the 1998 census, 25 percent of North Mandé and 29 percent of Voltaïque had finished elementary school, compared to 62 percent of Akan, the co-ethnics of Bédié and Houphouët-

Boigny. Thirty-nine percent of Akan had access to a flush toilet, compared to 18 percent of North Mandé and 18 percent of Voltaïque. Under the Bédié regime, both the North Mandé and Voltaïque were underrepresented in government in relation to their share of the national population: making up only 3 percent and 13 percent of the cabinet, respectively, despite being 16.5 percent and 17.6 percent of the national population (Langer 2004).

On Christmas eve 1999 the former army chief of staff, General Robert Gueï, alongside disgruntled military officials, staged a successful, bloodless coup d'état against the Bédié government. His ascension to power was applauded by the general population, who saw his takeover as an end to single-party rule and a move towards reducing ethnic and xenophobic tensions stoked under the Bédié regime (Kamara 2000). Gueï was extremely critical of *Ivoirité* and saw it as undermining Ivorian society (Toungara 2001). However, only months later, he began to take up the same underlying rhetoric, stigmitizing foreigners, linking Ouattara, his chief political opponent, with ethnic groups that "had a hold on the national economy" (Akindès 2004). He ushered in a new constitution in 2000 that explicitly denied Ouattara's ability to participate in the elections that year. Those elections were generally considered a "sham" (Toungara 2001) and the RDR and PDCI refused to participate. In a shocking victory, FPI head Laurent Gbagbo won, despite Gueï's best attempts to sway the elections in his favor. The RDR refused to acknowlege the election results and demanded new elections (Langer 2004).

Gbagbo also capitalized on *Ivoirité*, purging northerners from the army, police and civil service, replacing them with his own supporters (Chirot 2006). In the lead up to parliamentary elections in 2000, Gbagbo's security forces repeatedly targeted northerners and opposition supporters simply on the basis of ethnicity and religion. Individuals were detained and tortured (Human Rights Watch 2003). Ouattara was again denied participation in the parliamentary elections by the Gbagbo regime. Northern ethnic groups were again vastly underrepresented in government, with only 13 percent of the representatives from North Mandé and 8 percent from Voltaïque: this is compared to 25 percent of the Krou ethnic group, Gbagbo's co-ethnics, and 41 percent Akan (Langer 2004). In combination with the historical marginalization of these communities as well as the declining socio-economic conditions in the north, sentiments of inequality and discontent were aggravated among elites representing the North Mandé and Voltaïque.

On September 19, 2002, an attempted coup took place simultaneously in Abidjan, the economic capital, and the northern cities of Korhogo and Bouaké, by 800 soldiers under the rebel movement initially called *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) (Kessé 2005). Government troops attempted to re-take the northern cities of Bouaké and Korhogo, but were pushed back by rebel forces.

3.2 REBEL ORGANIZATION

The instigators of the coup were primarily military members of Muslim and Northern origin who had either participated in the 1999 coup or had been purged by the Gbagbo regime (Langer 2004). Several were tortured under the two regimes and many fled to Burkina Faso (Human Rights Watch 2003). While there, they recruited Malian and Burkinabe mercenaries, traditional hunters from northern Côte d'Ivoire, and migrants from Mali and Burkina Faso to fight. In November of 2002, three towns in Western Côte d'Ivoire were attacked by two new rebel groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP, *Mouvement pour la justice et la paix*) and the Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO, *Mouvement populaire Ivoirien du grand ouest*). The groups (MPCI, MJP and MPIGO) merged in 2003 under the moniker *Forces Nouvelles* (FN).

The primary goal of the rebel movement was to overthrow Gbagbo but they also sought to redress political access needs, through demanding that the government hold inclusive elections with representation from the north; to revise the constitution in regards to citizenship and land ownership rights; and give citizenship to all inhabitants of Côte d'Ivoire (Kessé 2005). The leaders of the attempted coup also feared a forced demobilization as part of an *Ivoirité* purge against northern soldiers and wanted to be re-integrated into the state military. They were fed-up with the constant domination by southerners of Ivoirian politics and the rampant discrimination they felt. FN leader, Guillaume Soro, a former student leader of northern origin, dissatisfied with the 2000 elections and the policy of *Ivoirité*, professed "we want a united Ivory Coast. We want a country that lives in harmony and includes everyone. We want a Pan-African nation where the Ivory Coast is a melting pot (Gberie and Addo 2004)."

The rebels were largely drawn from the Senoufo ethnic community of the north, and the initial leaders of the rebellion were part of this community. The fact that the rebels shared ethnicity and religion with the majority of the populations in the far north facilitated their entry into those communities (Förster 2010). However, in other parts of the rebel controlled territory, the rebels were not coethnics with the local populations, which caused problems for both groups (see discussion below).

The FN's headquarters was in Bouaké. The area under rebel control was organized into 10 *comzones*, where a commandant in each *comzone* had a high level of autonomy: the commandants could (and did) establish and control economic resources collected in their zones, while also maintaining military control (Speight 2013). Characterized as an authoritarian military administration (Heitz 2009), the *comzones* established radio stations,

taxed local businesses, levied tolls on major transportation routes, and ran local police stations in which civilian disputes could be settled.

Fig. 3.1: Comzones in Côte d'Ivoire

ZONE DE CONFIANCE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS

The first ceasefire was signed on October 17, 2002. The cease-fire allowed for the insurgents and the government to remain in their respectively controlled areas, but called for the return of administrative life and supplies to occupied towns.[2] In November, France

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[2]UN. MINUCI Background. 2003. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuci/background.html

deployed soldiers, part of *Operation Licorne*, along with 2,500 troops that were already stationed in Abidjan under a defense agreement, to monitor the cease-fire line.[3] They also worked with government troops to push back rebels in the west, keeping them from reaching the economic capital (Gberie and Addo 2004; Human Rights Watch 2003).

By mid-2003, French forces and the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire patrolled a 12,000 km^2 (7,500 miles^2) *zone de confiance* (ZDC). Where the zone was ultimately drawn follows geographic barriers, such as rivers and bridges, or as a function of established rebel camps. This buffer zone meant that, at the height of FN control, rebels held a majority of the national territory with limited confrontation by the state; thus, the state had little ability to uphold rule of law or administer public goods in these occupied territories. The ZDC was dismantled in 2008, following provisions in the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement. This agreement also officially ended the fighting between the belligerent parties, although elections were postponed until 2010.

3.3   GOVERNANCE UNCERTAINTY

I argue that rebel control evokes uncertainty for civic leaders and the general population, particularly uncertainty over who is in charge (governance uncertainty). I focus on two aspects of governance uncertainty: contestation over power and public goods insecurity. Regarding contestation over power, I focus on three types of contestation that characterized rebel control in Côte d'Ivoire: battles between rebels and government forces; conflict within the FN; and conflict between militias and mercenaries. I focus on provision of security and healthcare in the section elaborating public goods insecurity.

3.3.1   CONTESTATION

Fighting between the belligerents created uncertainty among the general population as to who would be in charge. Prior to the establishment of the ZDC, rebel-held departments experienced 92 battles, compared to 78 battles in government-held departments (13 of which occurred in Abidjan). In the first year of the war, departments changed hands 34 times. The government was able to recoup some territory in Man three times and Vavoua once, but ultimately lost ground to the rebels. Although the ZDC was constructed to prevent fighting between the government and FN, 20 battles ensued between these forces in the former-rebel controlled zones while the ZDC was in place, primarily in Korhogo,

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[3]It was the largest French force sent to an African nation since 1983.

Man, and Bouaké. The government was unable to win back these territories while the ZDC was in place, but the battles resulted in at least 30 deaths. These data points, derived from ACLED, demonstrate that citizens living under rebel control were more likely to see contestation between belligerents over the course of the war.

In addition to battles between the rebels and government, there was also contestation by other armed groups. In 2005, a militia led by a South Mandé pastor, *Movement pour la liberation de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire* (MILOCI) carried out several attacks against rebels and civilians in and around Man (Human Rights Watch 2005). French forces suspected that this militia was financed and supported by the government as a means to continue attacks in the rebel-held territory despite a ceasefire (Research Directorate and Refugee Board of Canada 2006). Indeed, the FN and government supported militias during the ceasefire: unidentified armed groups also perpetrated attacks against UN and French troops in Korhogo, Man, and Bouaké.

The two rebel groups that emerged in the west, MPIGO and MJP, drew many of their ranks from former Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters. These mercenaries had a reputation of using violence indiscriminately against civilians. When they first arrived, it was not clear whether they were allied with or fighting against the FN. However, within a short period of time, it was evident that the FN supported the two groups, and may even have encouraged their creation (Ero, Marshall and Marchal 2003; Human Rights Watch 2003; Heitz 2009)

Under circumstances of violent confrontations between belligerent forces, civic leaders faced considerable uncertainty around who would ultimately be and remain the victor. Madame C, a woman who runs an organization to help war orphans and widows, witnessed the arrival of the rebels in Man in 2003. I could have fled when they came, but where would I go, she asked. Other leaders chose to flee. Another woman leader, the head of a coalition of women's agricultural cooperatives, said that her children were still traumatized from having lived several weeks in the bush when the rebels arrived in Man. Similarly, leaders in Facobly, which also saw battles between government and rebel forces, said that civilians fled to avoid the violence and some had yet to return to their homes, even 10 years later.[4]

Once the FN consolidated their control over the occupied territories, they still faced internal conflict that had ramifications for the every day experiences of civic leaders and local populations. Ibrahim Coulibaly, an active member of the Gueï coup and who controlled territory in and around Bouaké, came into direct conflict over leadership with FN head,

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[4]Personal interviews in Man and Facobly, 2018

Guillaume Soro. In 2004, his followers clashed with Soro's in Bouaké and Korhogo. In June 2007, he was accused of an assassination attempt on Soro and in December of attempting a coup d'état against the Gbagbo regime (Leboeuf 2017). Violent confrontations was not the only contestation the FN faced within its ranks. A civic leader in Man related how the leader of the FN had to send emissaries to investigate human rights abuses by one leader,[5] while Speight (2013) discusses how rebel leadership had to intervene when rebels were exploiting local populations in Eastern Côte d'Ivoire.

Civic leaders shared that during the war, they were unclear about the power different groups wielded over the course of the war. Madame C affirmed that there were not just rebels from the north present in Man, but also English-speaking soldiers who would kick truck tires and shout expletives in English. When the rebels first arrived, their commander was sympathetic to the plight of the local population. But, subsequent commanders were not nearly as caring: one leader was so brutal and chaotic, he would roam the streets shooting bullets into the ground just to instill fear in the population. Another commander had to be violently removed by the FN administration.[6] These administration changes occurred in a relatively short period of time and without the predictability of elections or some other means of understanding the cause of turnover, civic leaders and their constituencies faced considerable uncertainty as to who would be in power from one day to the next.

3.3.2 PUBLIC GOODS INSECURITY

The provision of public goods by the rebels also varied within the zone, which represented a source of insecurity for civic leaders: in places where rebels provided services (like Korhogo), it was not clear this would always be the case, and in places where rebels did not or provided minimum services, civic leaders faced uncertainty as to whether their mandate covered helping local populations. I focus here on security, health, education, and justice, which civic leaders deemed important and described as the most uncertain elements during rebel control.

Uncertainty around the provision of security was well documented. Förster (2010) depicts security as a commodity to be purchased on the security market, where citizens had to buy protection from actors or self-defense groups. The rebels themselves asked for "contributions to the common cause", that included seizure of goods or requirements of providing food and meals to rebels (Förster 2015*b*). Civic leaders in Vavoua relayed having to pay

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[5]Personal interview, Man, May 10, 2019

[6]Interviews in Man, 2017-2018

multiple times at checkpoints: "just to go to the fields, even if you were on foot or on a bicycle, you had to pay the rebels."[7] Although checkpoints were rife on both sides of the ZDC, civic leaders argued that the government forces were checking for papers, while the rebel forces just wanted money.[8] Although civic leaders knew that they would be required to pay at checkpoints, there was not always consistency whether a checkpoint would be in place or not. They had to constantly ask themselves, did I speak correctly to the rebels, will they let me pass?[9]

Lack of a coherent justice system also characterized rebel control in Côte d'Ivoire. Rebels set-up roadblocks and threatened arbitrary detention if the population failed to pay (Speight 2013). "The rebels imposed brutal law on us" one civic leader bemoaned in Facobly.[10] Heitz (2009) described justice in the west as the "the law of the jungle" and the "law of the strongest". Citizens were routinely extorted, arbitrarily arrested, and trials lacked access to independent justice throughout the rebel zone (Human Rights Watch 2007).

the FN failed to provide most citizens of Man, Vavoua and Facobly in western Côte d'Ivoire with basic infrastructure, healthcare, and education (Martin 2019). While local populations expected the rebels who governed to play a role in regulating disputes, often the rebels did so either in self-interested ways that did not help the local populations, or exacerbated the tensions themselves (Förster 2015*b*).

In rebel-controlled areas, state institutions were targeted and/or destroyed, with personnel fleeing to the south. To illustrate the increase in public goods insecurity under rebel control, I examined data from the Ministry of Health on the number of health centers built during the war period as an indicator of continued provision of health care during the war.[11] As perhaps expected, there were fewer hospitals in rebel controlled areas than government-controlled areas prior to the war, but despite this fact, during the war, more hospitals were constructed in government zones than rebel zones (See table A3). Interviews confirmed that many public servants, including doctors, fled rebel-controlled areas, resulting in a sharp decrease in public service provision in these areas. Indeed, state institutions were targeted and/or destroyed, with personnel fleeing to the south. The FN rarely provided health services in the *comzones* – studies demonstrate that rebels did not provide health services to civilians in two-thirds of rebel-controlled territories (Martin 2019). These two stylized facts in combination demonstrate that civilians and civic leaders

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[7]Personal interview, Vavoua, April 25, 2018

[8]Participants of civic leader focus group, Vavoua, 25 April 2018.

[9]Personal interview, Kouibly April 17, 2018

[10]Personal interview, April 12, 2018

[11]This analysis excludes Abidjan to avoid inflating the number of health centers in government zones.

on the government-side were less likely to experience a disruption in the provision public goods than those who lived under rebel control.

Interviews with local civic leaders in former-rebel controlled zones confirm that these leaders faced uncertainty regarding who was in charge of administering governance. One informant who had worked in both government and rebel-controlled areas during the war asserted that people were tolerant of government forces, as they were well trained. However, while on the rebel side, "there was no way to know who was in authority, but they all had guns".[12] Informants indicated that citizens living on the rebel side faced shakedowns. Terms like "disorder" and "brutal" were frequently cited by interviewees from rebel-controlled zones when describing how the rebels governed. In Facobly, civic leaders depicted life under rebel control as one characterized by "living in the bush for three years" without schooling, with illness and the displacement of much of the population.[13] Even in places that experienced very little violence, like Kouibly, civilians still fled from fear, while civic leaders expressed that "the population did not die necessarily from violence but due to anxiety around the war and other health issues."[14] Lack of justice and administrative services resulted in, according to one informant, arbitrary arrests and thousands of children lacking birth certificates. Indeed, this lack of public goods provision led many civic leaders to start their organizations, as they stepped in to help the populations they saw as under-served by the rebels.

3.4 SOCIAL UNCERTAINTY

I argue that civic leaders faced high levels of social uncertainty – uncertainty over who can be trusted. I operationalize social uncertainty as high levels of 1) discrimination by the rebels based on identity, and 2) victimization. Although discrimination and victimization could occur in the areas under continuous government-control, the rebels had to face opposition and incomplete information about loyalty, and were notorious in their use of violence.

3.4.1 DISCRIMINATION

Because the rebels were drawn primarily from northern ethnic groups, areas that were majority non-co-ethnics with the rebels felt discrimination. For example, in the eastern-

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[12]Personal interview, Duékoué, 19 April 2018.
[13]Personal interview, Facobly, April 12, 2018
[14]Personal interview, Kouibly, April 12, 2018

most controlled departments, the Lobi, a group unaffiliated with the Senoufo, felt that the FN targeted them specifically for payments: "the Lobi did not create the rebellion, but they have the impression that the rebels have come to humiliate them (Speight 2013)." Speight (2013) also found that other migrant groups, such as the Mossi and Peul, had to pay higher sums to the rebels than the groups closest to the rebels. Being able to know who can be trusted based on institutional affiliations became difficult for the general population, Förster (2015*b*) states, as the lines between rebels, local government, and military were unclear. Instead, "trust in personal identities became much stronger than before" (Förster 2010, 209).

In some parts of Western Côte d'Ivoire, the rebels accused the population of being close to Gbagbo; civic leaders documented mass graves and political killings during rebel control due to their perceived political allegiances.[15] One leader in Man fell victim to rebel violence: she was arrested under suspicions of aiding the government during the war and was held for several days in the basement of the judicial building without any trial. The only supposed evidence the rebels had, she said, was that her name sounded like a name from Gbagbo's ethnic group. [16]

Civic leaders in rebel-controlled areas were either harassed by rebels or coopted by them. Heitz (2009) describes meetings during peace talks between local organizations and rebel leaders in the town of Man that she calls an example of "local power-sharing". My interviews in the same town confirm that some organizations were started by rebel leaders during the conflict or coopted to serve their means. Informants reported that only those organizations that were affiliated with the rebels – either as co-ethnics or as actual dependent organizations – were left alone by the rebels.[17]

3.4.2 VICTIMIZATION

Although the war was often referred to as "neither peace, nor war" from 2003-2008 due to a decrease in fighting and battle deaths, citizens living under rebel control continued to express fears of violence. At first, rebels encountered very little opposition by local populations – their stated objective of righting wrongs such as political exclusion of and discrimination against northerners found supportive ears amongst the citizenry (Human Rights Watch 2003). These sentiments quickly turned sour, however, as Human Rights Watch reports that rebels and militias "preyed on civilians through intimidation and force."

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[15]Personal interview, Facobly, April 12, 2018
[16]Personal interview, Man, May 10, 2018
[17]Personal inteviews in Man, 2017-2018.

"We didn't think the rebels would stay...they said they did not plan to stay," one informant told me.[18]

Civilians living under rebel control fell victim to violence at higher rates than civilians living under government control. Violence against civilians was high on both sides of the ZDC (67 percent of rebel-held departments experienced at least one action against civilians versus 60 percent in government-held zones), but rebel-perpetrated violence only occurred in the rebel zone. Forty percent of departments on the rebel side experienced violence against civilians perpetrated by government, almost three-times as high as on the government side (14 percent). These data points, derived from ACLED, demonstrate that citizens living under rebel control were more likely to face violence from either rebels or government during the war.

Tab. 3.2: Victimization, 2002-2008, ACLED 2019

variable	Rebel mean	Govt mean
% of depts experiencing violence against civilians	0.68	0.59
% of depts experiencing govt violence against civilians	0.40	0.14
% of depts experiencing rebel violence against civilians	0.07	0.00

Indeed, one civic leader stated that the population felt "betrayed" by the rebels, because the rebels had said they would protect the local population, but they instead abused them.[19] One informant affirmed that, at first, citizens and civic leaders did ally with the rebels, since the rebels enjoyed some support of the rebellion, but then "extortion began" and "people became afraid".[20] As table 3.2 shows, there was higher victimization of civilians in the rebel-controlled territories, especially when it comes to rebel-perpetrated violence against civilians. Reprisals in the north and west, particularly against ethnic groups perceived to support the government, were swift and often. Civic leaders in Bouaké told me that living under rebel control meant they faced a "incessant threat" where citizens and civic leaders alike did not know who to trust.[21]

Leaders of human rights organizations were threatened by the FN for their reports about human rights abuses, one local leader in Bouaké recounted.[22] A leader of a health organization detailed the difficulties he encountered when traveling to reach the populations

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[18]Personal interview, Man, 10 May 2018.
[19]Personal interview, November 27, 2017
[20]Personal interview, 10 May 2018.
[21]Personal interview, November 27, 2017
[22]Personal interview, November 28, 2017

he worked with, as the rebels would accuse him of being a spy; sometimes he was unable to deliver necessary medicine to HIV patients.[23] Several informants indicated that rebels were wary of humanitarian actions by civil society, seeing them as government spies: "If civic leaders were attacked, it was because of their [organization's] actions", one woman leader articulated.[24] Figure 3.2 shows the level of predation reported by local populations in the rebel-controlled areas. The west was particularly affected by rebel looting and pillaging, and experienced high levels of tensions between local populations and the FN, in contrast to places farther north, like Korhogo.

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[23]Personal interview, November 27, 2017
[24]Personal interview, Duékoué, 19 April 2018.

Fig. 3.2: Predation by rebels

Note: Summary index of whether rebels were reported to have looted or pillaged and whether there were tensions between local populations and the FN. Gray departments have no data. Yamoussokro and Abidjan are the political and economic capitals, respectively; Bouaké was the rebel capital. Black dotted lines represent the *zone de confiance*. Source: Martin 2019.

3.5 UNCERTAINTY UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Although informants in continuous government-controlled territories spoke of the hardships of living through the war, the absence of complaints about uncertainty and expres-

sion of fears was stark. Civic leaders from rebel controlled territories were more likely to bring up the disorder cultivated under rebel control than those who lived under government control. Further, informants from the government controlled zones knew about the difficulties their compatriots faced on the other side of the ZDC: for example, a civic leader who lived and worked under government control compared the two sides, stating that "the population was at ease with the government because they were used to the military; on the other side, it was not the same – people were abused by the rebels and people fled."[25] Indeed, he disclosed that it was easier for organizations to work in the areas that remained under government control. Elsewhere under government control, a leader of a human rights organization conveyed that the "crisis did not affect" his organization, as they were still able to get the work done that they were supposed to complete.[26]

3.6 UNCERTAINTY AND CIVIC LEADER BEHAVIORS

Living under conditions of governance and social uncertainty shortened civic leaders' time horizons and led them to be distrustful of those around them. These leaders faced challenges from the rebels, preventing them from doing their work. Madame C, in Man, recounted that the rebels prevented her from reaching a village during the ceasefire to aid orphans and women affected by war. The rebels asked her if she was going to actually help, or to just count the dead and report it to the UN. They worried she would report that they had violated the ceasefire agreement. Another woman leader, head of a health and sanitation organization, said that the rebels saw civil society organizations as an "annoying creature" that was going to get in the way of whatever the rebels were doing.[27] Faced with distrust and uncertainty over how the rebels would ultimately rule, civic leaders adopted new strategies to cope with their changed environment.

When asked to describe the attitudes and behaviors of their peers, civic leaders in former-rebel controlled zones confirmed that they believed other leaders lacked altruism and that this mentality developed during the war. Leaders lamented that their peers were only out to get money.[28] Civic leaders were said to still be in a "humanitarian" mentality, which revolved around short-term projects versus a "development" mentality in which they think more in the long-term and about sustainability. Civic leaders had grown accustomed to hand-outs during the war, and had not adjusted to the peace period, several civic leaders

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[25]Personal interview, Duékoué, April 19, 2018

[26]Personal interview, Bondoukou, December 2, 2017

[27]Interviews in Man, 2017-2018

[28]Personal interviews with civic leaders in Man, 8-12 November 2017.

voiced.[29]

Leaders were quick to describe their peers as profiteers on the former-rebel side of the ZDC. In discussing other organizations working in the health sector, one leader declared that "seventy-five percent or more of organizations are not doing the work they were funded to."[30] Several leaders told stories of organizations that were expected to distribute food aid to local populations, but which instead kept the food for themselves. One leader said that NGOs "take the money and buy a big car and send their wives to the United States."[31] Another leader attested that NGO leaders sometimes "divert money to pay for their own hunger" instead of serving the populations they purport to work for.[32] Similarly, one leader remarked with frustration that it is "terrible when you see people dying of hunger, and these organizations steal the money."[33]

Similarly, civic leaders discussed how organization leaders from the rebel-controlled territories were more likely to discriminate in their work. One leader from the former rebel-controlled departments complained that there were leaders in his community that "only help out their own ethnic groups and forget about others".[34] Leaders discussed how their peers rarely wanted to collaborate with leaders who were different from themselves, and that they saw other organizations as enemies to compete with. One leader, who was from an ethnic group from the south maintained that he felt that he had no friends in civic leaders due to his ethnicity.[35] When I asked one leader why these attitudes and behaviors still seem to persist even after the war was over, he said "change is slow. Many organizations copied lots of things and they are slow to evolve".[36]

3.7   CONCLUSION

This chapter has served three goals. First, it has elaborated on the uncertainty experienced by civic leaders living under rebel control in Côte d'Ivoire. Second, it has provided evidence that 1) uncertainty was felt at higher rates in former-rebel controlled territories than under continuous government control; and 2) leaders living under rebel control exhibited

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[29]Personal interview, Bouaké, November 27, 2017; Also, Man, May 8-12, 2018
[30]Personal interview with civic leader in Man, 9 May 2018.
[31]Personal interview, Bouaké, November 27, 2017
[32]Personal interview, Bouaké, November 28, 2017
[33]Personal interview with civic leaders in Man, 12 November 2017
[34]Personal interview with civic leader in Man, 11 November 2017
[35]Personal interview, Man, November 12, 2017
[36]Personal interview, Man, April 13, 2018

attitudes and behaviors at odds with democracy. Finally, the chapter has contextualized the civil war and its dynamics for the reader. The next chapter empirically tests the theory developed in Chapter 1 and offers quantitative evidence of the mechanism.

4

A Lab-in-the-Field Test of the Wartime Experiences of Civic Leaders

This chapter provides the empirical test of the theory presented in Chapter 1. To assess this theory and its observable implications, I leverage the geographic variation in rebel control that emerged during Côte d'Ivoire's decade-long civil war. I isolate the effect of rebel takeover on civic leader behavior through a pre-treatment statistical matching case selection strategy. After selecting most-similar geographic units for comparison, I invited 167 civic leaders from former rebel-controlled and former government-controlled regions to participate in a series of lab-in-the-field games to assess whether differences in civic leader behavior could be attributed to prior exposure to rebel takeover.

I find that civic leaders who lived under rebel control during civil war are subsequently more egocentric and more discriminatory than their counterparts who lived under continuous government control. When allocating real funds in dictator games, leaders from former rebel-controlled areas kept 11 percent more for themselves and gave seven percent less to village associations whose members are from different ethnic or political communities, compared to civic leaders who lived continuously under government control. Further, I demonstrate that civic leaders who lived under rebel control experienced more uncertainty during the war than those who lived under government control, corroborating the mechanism underpinning my theoretical framework. Taken together, these findings have important implications for post-war democratization: the prospects for robust democracy are likely to be limited when civic leaders, as the purveyors of democratic norms, fail to exhibit the altruism and inclusivity that liberal and representative governance often entails.

The chapter begins by summarizing the theory and observable implications and describes the research design. I then provides evidence for the tests of the main hypotheses. I demonstrate that civic leaders who lived under rebel control are subsequently more egocentric and more discriminating than their counterparts who lived in areas continuously controlled by government.

4.1   THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY

The theory of wartime experiences of civic leaders predicts that civic leaders who lived under rebel control adopt strategies to interact with constituents, government, and other organizations that differ systematically from those who did not experience rebel takeover of territory. In particular, I argue that when rebels take over, civic leaders in the affected territories experience high *uncertainty*. I argue that the uncertainty of civil war fundamentally reshapes how civic leaders approach their mandate to create organizations that serve the public good in altruistic and inclusive ways. Uncertainty produces two specific effects that affect the behavior of civic leaders with long-term implications: 1) the *egocentric effect* emerges because uncertainty leads civic leaders to become more inclined to keep resources for themselves as a form of insurance; and 2) the *discriminatory effect* emerges because the distrust fomented during rebel takeover exacerbates existing cleavages, inducing civic leaders to become more discriminatory in their relationships with outgroups.

I hypothesize that civic leaders in former rebel-controlled zones will:

1. be more egocentric than those in former government-controlled areas.
2. be more likely to discriminate against non-co-ethnics and non-co-partisans than those in former government-controlled areas.
3. experience more governance uncertainty and social uncertainty than those in former government-controlled areas.

Additionally, I examine whether civic leaders who emerged in the post-war period *demonstrate the same behaviors* as those leaders who started working before or during the war.

4.2   Research design

The lab-in-the-field and games

Participants who completed the first survey described in Chapter 2 were invited to attend a capacity-building workshop in the nearest regional capital (as shown on figure 1.4). After completing the workshop, participants engaged in the lab games described below. Each workshop/lab included at most 24 participants. The total sample of lab participants is 167 (75 percent response rate). Civic leaders in rebel zones were more likely to attend the labs: 85 percent of those invited versus 70 percent.[1]

The lab was embedded in a capacity building workshop, in which I and a team of research assistants presented sessions on volunteer culture and fund-raising strategies to civic leaders.[2] The goal of the capacity building workshop was two-fold: first, to introduce realism to the games, as civic leaders often attend these types of workshops put on by international donors on a regular basis. Second, the leaders themselves asked how my research would help them; they requested that I provide them with information about the non-profit sector in the United States in order to improve their own fundraising prospects.[3] The workshops were held in four locations (see figure 4.1) over the course of 10 days. Respondents were invited to participate in the lab closest to their location.

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[1]As noted in Chapter 2, this difference may be contributed to the fact that leaders believed attending the workshop would increase their exposure to potential funders, as organizations from former rebel-controlled departments were less likely to currently have international funding.

[2]All materials used during the workshop may be accessed via request to the author.

[3]I expand on how it is important to include research participants in experimental work in Africa in Davis 2020.

Fig. 4.1: Lab locations

The lab and workshop lasted for a maximum of four hours. Participants were paid for their transportation and lunch. The lab began with the administration of a survey, followed by two sessions on fundraising and volunteer culture development, and then participants completed the games. All of the games, described below, were played at the end of the session, using the Qualtrics interface on tablets. Respondents played alone on the tablets, had no interactions with the recipients of the funds they were allocating, and the recipients were unknown to the respondent. The participants collected their winnings at the end of the session.

To measure egocentrism and discrimination, I adapted a series of dictator games to the

local context. Dictator games are popular in economics, political science and psychology as a behavioral measure of social preferences, such as generosity, altruism and a sense of fairness (e.g. Voors et al. 2012; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014; McCauley 2014, among others). Their use allows researchers to overcome issues of endogeneity in observational assessments of behavior. Additionally, in this context, it should be noted that the workshop likely primed leaders to be more altruistic or cooperative, due to the content of the presentations on fundraising and volunteerism, making it even more difficult to demonstrate any difference in the level of egocentrism among respondents. Priming the leaders in such a way makes this a harder test of behavior related to egocentrism and discrimination.

In the dictator game, each respondent was presented with two village associations with varying characteristics. These games measure how altruistic or egocentric an individual is and assess how willing an individual is to discriminate in favor of their own communities (games as seen on the Qualtrics platform can be found in Appendix AIII.1). The respondents were told that the money was theirs to keep, to think of it as a per diem of sorts. In exit conversations, there was no indication that the respondents planned to allocate the money they kept to their organization, or to other associations.

Participants were given the choice to either allocate to themselves or:

1. An association from their department/not from their department

2. An association with the majority of members as the same ethnicity/not same ethnicity

3. An association with the majority of members as the same political identity /not same political identity

In the first round, respondents choose to allocate 1000 FCFA ($1.67) in 100 FCFA coins to themselves or to two village associations with each of the characteristics above. In round two, the three games are played again, but the participant may only keep 500 FCFA for themselves; they must allocate the rest to the two associations. Finally, in the third round, they are told they have two 500 FCFA coins, and that no individual (including themselves) can get both coins. They thus have to discriminate when selecting who they allocate the money to; they may also discriminate against themselves.

The respondents completed a total of nine games. For each round, respondents allocated 3000 FCFA. In round 1, the most that an individual could win was 3000 FCFA. In rounds 2

and 3, the most they could win is 1500 FCFA. This resulted in total possible take-home winnings of 6000 FCFA (10 USD, or two times the official daily minimum wage). Respondents could distribute 9000 FCFA to other groups.

The main outcomes for the games are the amount kept and the amount allocated to non-coethnics, non-copartisans, and different department associations (out-group). Respondents were instructed that the money would be allocated to a randomly selected recipient association after all of the workshops were completed.

Summary statistics for the game outcomes and covariates are presented in Table 4.1. Most of the participants were male, had completed some high school, were between the ages of 35 and 44, and Christian. Regarding the games, participants kept more than 50 percent for themselves, which deviates from expected trends in dictator games (Levitt and List 2007). Additionally, all respondents gave at least 100 FCFA to their noncoethnic.

Tab. 4.1: Individual covariates, summary statistics for full sample

variable	mean	Std. Dev.	min	max	observations
Self	3661.71	1190.13	0	5900	165
Coethnic	798.85	387.97	0	1800	165
Noncoethnic	943.35	356.38	100	1700	165
Copartisan	849.71	359.96	0	1900	165
Noncopartisan	797.06	377.23	0	1900	165
Outgroup	2415.29	931.25	100	4900	165
Ingroup	2611.24	883.54	0	5300	165
Female	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00	165
Age cohort	3.07	0.41	0.00	6.00	166
Education	5.78	1.86	0.00	9.00	157
Muslim	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00	158
Income	1.56	0.91	0.00	3.00	156
Northern	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00	162
Support incumbent	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00	138

4.3 LAB-IN-THE-FIELD FINDINGS

The results presented here generally provide strong, consistent support for the theoretical expectations associated with the egocentric and discriminatory effects of wartime uncer-

tainty. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the difference in means for the amount civic leaders allocated to themselves and the sums they allocated to non-copartisan, non-coethnic, and different department ("outgroup"),[4] respectively. Consistent with egocentric expectations, Figure 4.2 shows that leaders from former-rebel zones kept more for themselves than their counterparts in the former-government zones. Civic leaders in former-rebel zones were also more likely to discriminate against the outgroup (Figure 4.3), giving less than those in former-government zones, which corroborates the theory's discriminatory expectation.

Fig. 4.2: Egocentric Effect: higher self allocation in rebel zones

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[4]The Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .79. Results disaggregated by game can be found in Appendix AIII.3.

Fig. 4.3: Discriminatory Effect: lower allocation to outgroup in rebel zones

Tab. 4.2: Regression Analysis: amount allocated to self and outgroup, with clustered standard errors

	Dependent variable:	
	Amount allocated to self	Amount allocated to outgroup
NGO leader from rebel zones	0.109***	−0.078***
	(0.034)	(0.019)
Observations	167	162
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These results indicate substantial effects of living in former rebel controlled territory on altruism. The estimated effects on amount kept in the dictator game translate into about an 11 percentage point increase; those in former-rebel zones kept the equivalent of $1.35 (or two hours worth of pay at the minimum wage) more than their government counterparts kept for themselves. Civic leaders in former rebel zones were significantly more likely to discriminate against those associations who are from outgroups, the difference representing the equivalent of $1, or over one hour's worth of pay at the minimum wage. These results hold across a number of specifications: excluding departments that are far from the ZDC (See Table A13); controlling for organizational level characteristics (See Table A14) and controlling for workshop session effects (See Table A17).

4.4   MECHANISMS

My theory on the effects of rebel takeover argues that civic leaders experienced uncertainty during the war, which affects their behaviors today. I measure leader experience with uncertainty using a battery of questions in the survey. Table 4.3 presents the difference in means for the battery compared across rebel and government zones. Across measures, it is evident that civic leaders from former rebel zones were more likely to express fear of the rebels and the government, living in danger, and living in fear of discrimination, than their former government-controlled counterparts, confirming hypothesis 3. Further, these leaders were more likely to agree with descriptions of the war period as uncertain and lacking rule of law.

Tab. 4.3: Individual experience with uncertainty

	rebel	govt	difference	p-value	min	max
Governance Uncertainty						
I felt in danger, 2002-2008	5.21	3.94	1.26	0.00	0.00	6.00
I felt rule of law persisted, 2002-2008	2.45	3.89	-1.44	0.00	0.00	6.00
I didn't know who ruled, 2002-2008	3.47	2.46	1.01	0.01	0.00	6.00
Social Uncertainty						
I feared the rebels, 2002-2008	5.16	4.36	0.80	0.00	0.00	6.00
I feared the govt, 2002-2008	2.62	1.69	0.93	0.02	0.00	6.00
I feared discrimination, 2002-2008	0.50	0.34	0.16	0.05	0.00	1.00

In order to assess the relationship between rebel control, uncertainty, and the outcomes of interest, I created an index of uncertainty. I first used the mean for six measures of

individual experience with uncertainty (danger, fear of rebels, fear of government, fear discrimination, rule of law persists, and unknown who rules) as the cut-off point and created an additive index with zero representing no uncertainty and six representing high uncertainty.[5]

First, as posited in the theory and hypothesis 3, uncertainty was considerably higher and felt more intensely at the individual level by those living in former rebel zones: on the index, rebel-zone civic leaders scored an average of 3.65 versus 2.18 for those who lived in former government zones. Using a simple difference-in-means, I then compare the outcomes of interest for this study: amount allocated to self and amount allocated to the outgroup for individuals who experienced high levels of uncertainty (scoring higher than a three on the index).[6] The results are presented in Table 4.4. These results demonstrate that, although uncertainty was experienced on both sides of the ZDC, it was felt at higher levels for those living under rebel control, and correlates with the outcomes of interest. Although I do not claim to identify a causal relationship between uncertainty and the outcomes here, this analysis demonstrates that those who lived under rebel control faced considerable uncertainty during the war and were more egocentric and discriminatory than their counterparts living under government control.

Tab. 4.4: Difference in means for individuals experiencing high uncertainty

Outcome	Rebel - uncertain	Govt - uncertain	p-value
Amount allocated to self	0.67	0.51	0.00
Amount allocated to outgroup	0.28	0.36	0.00

4.5 INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING: WARTIME LEADERS

Important to understanding the outcomes presented here is being able to parse out whether these effects can adequately be attributed to the wartime experience of leaders. In the sample of leaders, some started working for their organization in the post-war period, others were too young to have been working in the sector during the war, and still others may have entered the sector in more recent years as the country stabilized. In hypothesis 4 and in the theory, I posit that the behaviors that wartime civic leaders developed carry forward into the post-war period via institutional transmission: leaders pass on the behaviors and

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[5]The cronbach's alpha for this scale is .71.

[6]I look at high uncertainty, instead of disaggregating by governance or social uncertainty due to the fact that the theory argues that these two types of uncertainty interact to produce the effects.

attitudes they learn to new entrants to the sector. Indeed, informants alluded to this fact during my interviews: what was learned was hard to overcome and leaders emulated what they had seen.

If institutional learning is true, then we would expect that post-war leaders behave similarly to wartime leaders. To test this hypothesis, I create a sample to include only those individuals who were leaders during the war (*wartime leaders*). These are two types of leaders: those who are the founder of their organization that started before or during the war, and those who currently work for an organization founded during the war and who have worked there since at least 2009 (before the war ended). This is a very conservative means to assess who constitutes a wartime leader, as it excludes leaders who perhaps started working in the sector prior to working with their current organization.[7] As seen in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, wartime leaders from former rebel-controlled departments are more egocentric and more discriminatory than wartime leaders from former government-controlled departments. Interestingly, leaders who are "postwar" are more egocentric than wartime leaders, but not more discriminatory.

Tab. 4.5: Wartime leader analysis - self

variable	rebel	govt	p-value	n
wartime leader	0.62	0.49	0.01	61
postwar leader	0.71	0.61	0.02	82

Tab. 4.6: Wartime leader analysis - outgroup

variable	rebel	govt	p-value	n
wartime leader	0.28	0.37	0.00	61
postwar leader	0.28	0.37	0.00	82

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[7]This is a result of poor survey design, where I did not ask respondents how long they worked in the civil society sector, instead only asking how long they worked for their *current* organization.

4.6 Heterogeneous treatment effects

Violence

In political science, the prevailing narrative linking civil war and pro-social behavior focuses almost exclusively on exposure to violence: because experienced violence may be a means for communities to band together, social cohesion and cooperation are expected to be stronger in communities that experienced widespread violence (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014; Voors et al. 2012). Further, civilians may even develop prosocial preferences in the aftermath of war, becoming more altruistic (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Hartman and Morse 2018), more capable of collective action, and participating more in politics (Blattman 2009). Alternatively, others have found that intensity of fighting, especially in contexts of political polarization, may be negatively related to generalized trust and reinforced kinship/ethnic identification (Becchetti, Conzo and Romeo 2011; Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt 2013; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2013). Although violence may increase associational participation in some contexts, it typically does so through increased intragroup trust, and rarely through increased intergroup trust; in other words, violence may create bonding social ties that reinforce kinship ties. This seems to be particularly the case in ethnically heterogeneous places.

Yet, these findings do not probe whether violence interacts with other changes during civil war, such as changes in the institutional environment, and how this may affect post-war behavior. This over-emphasis on experience with violence as a driver for civilian behavior overlooks the fact that war is a transformative social condition that involves changes in institutions, social relations, and social order, even for those who did not experience violence (Lubkemann 2010).

The theory developed here takes us beyond the effects of experienced violence during civil war: it is an important distinction because violence can be experienced widely during civil war, but it may not be the only explanatory factor that drives post-war outcomes. Studies from psychology of civilians living under persistent contexts of uncertainty in civil war demonstrate that they suffer more interpersonal resource loss, loss of faith in government, prefer violence over nonviolence, and are not supportive of reconciliation efforts (Herman 2019; Pham, Weinstein and Longman 2004; Vinck et al. 2007). These studies attribute these outcomes to persistent exposure to fear, uncertainty and stress, which can accompany exposure to violence but are not only limited to those who have been direct victims of violence. Further, the fear of violence can demobilize citizens in ways that contradict the

expected effect of experienced violence (Young 2019). My theory suggests that the context in which violence is experienced matters to pro-social attitudes after the war is over, taking our understanding of the impact of civil war beyond just exposure to violence.

Leaders in former-rebel zones were more likely to have experienced violence than their former-government zone counterparts, as can be seen in Table 4.3. We might expect violence to moderate or amplify the effect of living under the rebels. First, violence does not better explain the outcomes we see here (see analysis in Table A15).

However, there is an interesting trend worth noting. Looking only at civic leaders who live in the former rebel zone, those who have experienced violence are less egocentric compared to those who did not experience violence (the former keeping 64 percent for themselves vs. the latter keeping 73 percent for themselves). This would appear to confirm prior studies: exposure to violence increase pro-social attitudes. However, we do not observe any effect of violence on egocentrism and altruism on the government side: if you are a civic leader from the former-government side that has experienced violence, you are not less likely to keep money. This nuances some of the findings in the literature, as violence may have a negative effect on egocentrism, but only for citizens who have *also* experienced living under rebel control. This analysis demonstrates that although violence is a major factor in war that shapes citizen behaviors, understanding other contextual factors that are also products of war may have more explanatory power for why we see variation in post-conflict outcomes related to development, democracy, and peace.

FUNDING

Within the sample, civic leaders from the former government zone are more likely to work for an organization that received international funding than those civic leaders living in the former rebel zone (51 percent vs. 32 percent). This could be problematic for several reasons: first, lack of funding may explain more egocentrism, as civic leaders in the former rebel zone may just have a higher need for the additional income. Second, the results I find may demonstrate that civic leaders on the former government side have learned from international donors that the norm is to be altruistic and not discriminate.

The first concern relates to income and scarcity of resources. The data does not demonstrate that those civic leaders who lived under rebel control have less resources: when asked to report whether the income they receive allows them to get by, civic leaders from the former rebel controlled departments responded similarly to civic leaders from the former government controlled departments (see in Table A5 in the Appendix). Second, civic

leaders from the former rebel zone are more likely to be employed outside of their organization than those living in the former government zone (45 percent vs. 29 percent). Unemployment rates are similar (13 percent on rebel side, 15 percent on government side). There is, therefore, not a lot of reason to believe that individual poverty or organization lack of funding can explain the results we see above.

Finally, when controlling for international funding in the model, the results hold (see Table A16 in the Appendix); this demonstrates that although there are funding differences, civic leaders on the rebel side who were funded are no more likely to act like organizations on the government side who were funded. It does not appear that civic leaders who have received funding are learning to be more altruistic, at least not on the former rebel-controlled side.

4.7 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Why do we see, seven years after the end of the war, persistent effects of rebel control on civic leader behavior? I argue that mentalities, attitudes and behaviors were replicated over time and that the war period locked in these behaviors for these leaders, resulting in the effects I described above. However, three plausible alternative explanations could challenge these inferences: self-selection via migration, victor's patronage politics, and social desirability.

The conflict resulted in 2.3 million displaced Ivorians, with some fleeing to neighboring countries, while those in rebel-controlled areas fled their villages or southward; international agencies estimate that roughly 87 percent have returned to their homes as of 2015. Although there is migration in my sample (see Table A5 in the Appendix), only five individuals moved from one side of the ZDC to the other. The results hold when excluding these individuals; thus, there is no reason to believe that the results are driven by more egocentric people moving to the rebel zone or more altruistic people moving to the government zone.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the rebel-supported candidate won elections at the end of the war. His supporters were dispatched to govern and re-establish institutions across the former-rebel controlled zones. Indeed, even former rebel commanders were given coveted posts in government, and not a single one was sentenced for crimes against civilians during the war. It could be, therefore, that the results we see today are not a product of rebel-control but instead a product of "victor's patronage," where those civic leaders located in zones that were formerly rebel controlled have reaped the benefits of having a rebel-supported

leader in power and former rebel leaders in local government; this has, in-turn, affected their behavior and attitudes.

If this were true, then we would expect civic leaders in former-rebel zones to have more relationships with a) local government and b) with government ministries than civic leaders in former-government zones. In the first survey, I asked respondents to report their partnerships with international organizations, local government, and government ministries (see Table A6 in the Appendix). In fact, civic leaders on the former-government side are more likely to have relationships with government ministries (31 percent of the organizations) than those who lived under rebel control (16 percent).[8] In Chapter 2 I show that there is a strong relationship between international aid and ministry partnerships: since those on the government side are more likely to have international partners, they are also more likely to have ministry partners. There is no difference in the number of ministries with which the organizations have partnerships. Finally, there is no difference in the number of organizations who have relationships with local government on either side of the ZDC. Though this is not a perfect test for the patronage argument, it does demonstrate that it is not very likely that egocentrism or discrimination can be explained by access to patronage or corruption from the new regime on the part of civic leaders who lived under rebel control.

Another valid concern would be Hawthorne effects – that the civic leaders knew they were part of a study – or demand effects – that the leaders knew what answers the researchers expected. Research has indeed shown that in lab games in the Global South, participants whose villages had longer exposure to international aid were more likely to behave differently in the presence of an American (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2015). There are two ways that my presence could affect the results: first, participants may want to appear more generous in front of a Westerner, as found in the above-mentioned study. Second, civic leaders may think the games are a means for testing their "aid suitability", and may act in such a way to demonstrate that they or their organization are in need of aid funding. In an exit survey, respondents were asked "Why do you think the researchers had you do these activities?" Response options were: to give money to civic leaders in a fun way; to test civic leaders, to see which civic leaders are more deserving of aid; to find out more how civic leaders interact with each other.

Twenty-five percent of respondents believed that the games were a means to assess aid

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[8]There could be an argument that those leaders who partner with government ministries on the government side are less discriminatory because they are working across ethnic lines in partnering with the government. However, this is not the case: leaders with ties to the central government on the government side do not give more or less to the outgroup than those leaders who do not have such partnerships.

suitability, while over 70 percent responded that the games were a means to find out more how civic leaders interact with each other. There is no relationship between amount allocated to self or to the outgroup and believing that the games were a means for testing their aid suitability. It does not appear that the respondents were trying to impress the researcher and demonstrate more need for aid through their actions in the games.

Regarding demand effects, it does seem that respondents were cognizant about giving to non-co-ethnics in a way they were not in giving to non-co-partisans; as can be seen in Table 4.1, every respondent allocated at least 100 FCFA to their non-co-ethnics. Indeed, the ethnic nature of the conflict and the continued political polarization along ethnic lines may explain why ethnicity might have been particularly salient in respondents' minds. However, we would expect demand effects to work across treatment assignment; meaning, we would expect those from rebel zones to act the same, on average, as their government counterparts if they were indeed able to figure out the goal of the games. As the results demonstrate, this is not the case: those in rebel-zones are significantly less likely to give to non-coethnics.

4.8   CONCLUSION

This chapter shows that the experience of living under rebel control has substantial effects on civic leader behavior in post-conflict settings. Using lab-in-the-field outcome measures, I isolated individual-level behaviors and attitudes of civic leaders – an important group of decision-makers whose work directly affects democratization and development. I specifically show that civic leaders from former rebel zones are more egocentric and more likely to discriminate against the outgroup than leaders from former government zones.

There are a few limitations to this study. First, sampling civic leaders in contexts where national registries are not comprehensive is a difficult and daunting task that requires a high level of creativity. In contexts where civic leaders are more accessible, this study would have better external validity. Additionally, although dictator games are widely used as a measure of pro-social behavior, this study can only provide qualitative evidence to support claims that the findings from the lab reflect the real world. Further investigation and measures of pro-social attitudes and behavior would complement any project using these methods.

5

CONCLUSION

> Democratic governance and human rights are critical components of sustainable development and lasting peace. Countries that have ineffective government institutions, rampant corruption and weak rule of law have a... higher risk of civil war ...than other developing countries. To help change this narrative, we are integrating democracy programming throughout our core development work, focusing on strengthening and promoting human rights, accountable and transparent governance, and an **independent and politically active civil society** across all our work.
>
> USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and
> Governance Program
> (author's emphasis)

Why is it difficult to get sustained peace and democracy in the aftermath of civil war? In this dissertation, I highlight one avenue through which democratization may be challenged in post-conflict settings: the effect of civil war and rebel takeover on leaders of civil society

organizations. Civil society organizations are seen as crucial to creating democratic culture in local populations, but I show in this dissertation that their democratic potential can be hampered by the experience of civic leaders during the war.

I argue that when rebels take over, civic leaders in the affected territories experience high *uncertainty*, in contrast to civic leaders living continuously under government control. I conceptualize two types of uncertainty. First, governance uncertainty, uncertainty over who is in charge, includes high levels of contestation over power and high insecurity over public goods provision. Second, social uncertainty, uncertainty over who one can trust, I conceptualize as high levels of discrimination and high levels of victimization by belligerent forces.

I then explain how exposure to uncertainty under rebel control produces egocentric and discriminatory effects among civic leaders. The egocentric effect emerges because governance uncertainty under rebel takeover leads civic leaders to become more inclined to keep resources for themselves. The discriminatory effect emerges because social uncertainty induces civic leaders to become more discriminatory in their relationships with outgroups. I argue that these effects persist into the post-war period because the underlying causes of the war are often not resolved immediately, and new leaders learn to replicate these strategies.

5.1 FINDINGS

This dissertation went on to test this argument in Côte d'Ivoire. Chapter 2 provides background into the civil society sector in Côte d'Ivoire, while also presenting descriptive data of how civil society varies in former-rebel and former-government controlled departments. Chapter 3 draws from rich qualitative data and quantitative analyses to bolster the mechanism central to the argument in the Ivorian case. It demonstrates that civic leaders in former-rebel controlled territories experienced more uncertainty than civic leaders in former-government controlled territories. It describes how rebel control induced governance uncertainty – uncertainty over who is in charge – and social uncertainty – uncertainty over who can be trusted. It also provides qualitative evidence of the outcome: that civic leaders who had lived under rebel control were more likely to display egocentric and discriminatory effects than those who had lived continuously under government control.

Chapter 4 tests the argument using data derived from a lab-in-the-field in Côte d'Ivoire. I find that civic leaders who lived under rebel control during civil war are subsequently more egocentric and more discriminatory than their counterparts who lived under con-

tinuous government control. When allocating real funds in dictator games, leaders from former rebel-controlled areas keep 11 percent more for themselves and gave seven percent less to village associations whose members are from different ethnic or political communities, compared to civic leaders who lived continuously under government control. Further, I demonstrate that civic leaders who lived under rebel control experienced more uncertainty during the war than those who lived under government control, corroborating the mechanism underpinning my theoretical framework.

Taken together, these findings have important implications for post-war democratization: the prospects for robust democracy are likely to be limited when civic leaders, as the purveyors of democratic norms, fail to exhibit the altruism and inclusivity that liberal and representative governance often entails. These findings provide greater understanding of the behavioral constraints faced when relying on war-traumatized civic leaders to facilitate the growth of democratic culture.

5.2 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The argument and evidence of this dissertation contribute to a variety of areas of scholarly importance. First, it expands our knowledge of the conditions under which civil society is able to contribute to democracy. Conventional wisdom concerning civil society support emphasizes the positive role these organizations can play in developing democratic culture and holding regimes accountable. However, the findings here have nuanced this expectation: civil war can shape the people who make up civil society, which in turns shapes their attitudes and behaviors, affecting their ability to produce local democracy. Further, scholars of civil society in Africa have called time and time again for analysis of "actual" civil society on the ground in order to understand whether it can be a force for democratic change. This dissertation does just this: through 10 months of field work built on over eight years of experience working in and on Côte d'Ivoire; hundreds of interviews with local civil society organizations outside of the political/economic capital; and original surveys of civic leaders in their work environment facilitates a deeper understanding of local civil society in Côte d'Ivoire.

Second, this dissertation provides insights into a new type of elite: civic leaders. Scholarship abounds about elected officials, bureaucrats, chiefs, religious leaders, and combatants, but leaders of local civil society organizations are ruefully neglected in our understanding of the role elites play in local politics and democracy building in general, and especially in post-war contexts. Yet, these leaders are often the only elites citizens interact with, pro-

viding much needed services and information in local communities. Understanding their roles, attitudes, and behaviors helps us better interrogate whether countries will emerge from war into peace and democracy with the help of these actors. By looking at democratization through the role of civic leaders, I have demonstrated that they represent a particularly important type of decision-maker working towards the arduous goal of post-conflict democracy. This opens a compelling avenue of research, where their attitudes and behaviors may vary across regime types, levels of development, and levels of democracy.

Third, this dissertation contributes to recent scholarship on rebel governance by developing a mechanism which explains divergent trends in post-conflict outcomes. By describing how rebel takeover induces uncertainty for local populations in contrast to continuous government control, I provide an additional explanation for why we may see uneven development and democracy within post-conflict countries.

Fourth, although the macro outcome in this dissertation is focused on post-conflict democracy, the findings also have implications for economic development and peace. Pro-social attitudes and behaviors facilitate economic growth by creating conditions for cooperation and trust. Exclusion, via discrimination, can further exacerbate economic and social inequality in post-conflict settings, which in turn may impact economic growth. If civil society organizations are not able to overcome the drivers that led the country to war in the first place, they might worsen those very cleavages and create an environment ripe for conflict recurrence.

The policy implications of this dissertation's findings are also large. International donors funnel large sums of aid to local civil society organizations annually. Altruism is lauded as a quality important to the success of the non-profit sector; civic leaders that do not display this quality and who may discriminate in their distribution of goods may not be the best partners in working towards collective action in low-development settings characterized by political polarization. Indeed, civic leaders may reinforce cleavages, contribute to polarization, and inhibit the inclusive distribution of resources in the post-war period.

To be clear, the policy implication is not that international donors should stop working with civil society organizations; indeed, they are sometimes the only providers of public goods, information, and resources to populations affected by civil war. The strategies they developed during the war reflect their own survival skills and how they were able to maintain their work through the difficulties brought on by rebel takeover and conflict. However, these findings do show that a "one-size-fits-all" strategy for civil society development may not be a prudent approach when working with local organizations in post-conflict settings. Instead, donors should attempt to understand sub-national dynamics that shape behaviors

and attitudes when working with local actors and attempt to overcome biases if they aim to productively contribute to post-conflict democracy and development.

A final, open-ended question regarding the findings of this dissertation pertain to whether we can expect the effects to be long lasting and what can be done to overcome the divergence in attitudes and behaviors of civil society actors in Côte d'Ivoire. I believe that it is possible to change the attitudes and behaviors of civic leaders in this context: because civic leaders strategically adopted the behaviors, they can also stop employing these behaviors, if it becomes apparent that they will not help them achieve their goals. However, to do so would require two (at least) changes: first, the institutional environment that created the conditions that led to the war initially would need to be reformed. In Côte d'Ivoire, this would include reforming electoral institutions to create inclusive, transparent, and integrated systems to guarantee free and fair processes; guaranteeing equitable justice for victims of violence; alleviating inequalities between ethnic communities in access to employment and land; and minimizing polarization along ethnic and religious lines. Second, in the short-term, civic leaders can work with their donors and partners to reduce biases and discriminatory behaviors, and to develop fundraising strategies that help move them towards financial independence from international aid. Together, these two changes would create an environment conducive to enhancing the democratic potential of civic leaders across the country.

5.3 BEYOND CÔTE D'IVOIRE

The data for this project were gathered across Côte d'Ivoire. In considering the scope of the argument and these findings, one may inquire whether Côte d'Ivoire is unique. However, the civil society sector conditions described in this dissertation exist in other post-conflict settings outside of Côte d'Ivoire. A 2016 USAID report describes how civil war has deteriorated the organizational capacity of local civil society in South Sudan, while civil society organizations in countries like Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone still have to contend with the polarization and violent remnants from their respective civil wars. Further, the report is explicit in stating that in several post-conflict countries (including Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Sudan), the public is not informed about the role of civil society organizations and perceives them as overly politicized (USAID 2016).

To further illustrate how civil society organizations face different constraints in post-conflict settings, I present new data from Afrobarmeter (2018), where, for the first time, the sur-

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vey asked respondents in 34 countries about NGOs: it queried respondents' opinions on how many NGOs are corrupt in their country.[1] I plot the means of the population that says that some, most or all NGOs are corrupt in Figure 5.1. Citizens from countries that have experienced a civil war in the past 20 years according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) [2] are more likely to state that NGOs are corrupt than citizens in countries that have not experienced a civil war.

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[1]Exact wording: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? The question also asked about the President, National Assembly, government officials, local government, police, judiciary, traditional leaders, religious leaders, business leaders.

[2]Reached the violence threshold of 1,000 battle deaths. Includes: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique,Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, and Uganda

Fig. 5.1: Afrobarometer: NGOs are corrupt.

Note: Percentage of population that agrees that NGOs are corrupt. Source: Afrobarometer 2019

A higher percentage of the population in countries that have had a civil war are more likely to agree that NGOs are more corrupt than other community leaders, such as religious authorities and traditional leaders. In Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, citizens view NGOs as more corrupt than chiefs or traditional leaders. In every country that has experienced a civil war in the Afrobarometer sample, NGOs are viewed as more corrupt than religious leaders.

Fig. 5.2: Afrobarometer: NGOs, religious leaders, and chiefs are corrupt

Note: Percentage of population that agrees that entities are corrupt, in war countries. Mozambique did not collect data on "traditional authorities". Source: Afrobarometer 2019

Although this data is descriptive and requires in-depth interrogation to understand these dynamics within each country, it presents preliminary evidence that civil society organizations in countries that have experienced a civil war face constraints unique to their war experiences. Understanding how the dynamics of the civil war, including rebel takeover, affect civil society organizations represents an exciting new avenue of research.

5.4 AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This section details two primary avenues of future research to address potential limitations of the empirical data presented here: investigating whether or not civic leaders are uniquely affected by rebel takeover, and how variation in rebel governance may condition civic leader response.

CITIZEN RESPONSE TO CIVIC LEADERS AND REBEL GOVERNANCE

In order for civil society democratization efforts to be successful, organizations need to engage and encourage participation by the general citizenry. These organizations and their leaders are expected to cultivate democratic norms and values among the general population, first through participation as members and second as recipients of service. Yet, little research examines how civil war affects the relationship between civic leaders and the general population. How do citizens relate and interact with civic leaders in their communities? How have experiences with civil war shaped citizen-civil society relationships?

To conduct a preliminary test of whether citizens living under rebel control differ systematically in their attitudes and behaviors from those citizens that remained under government control, I present analysis of Afrobarometer R7 (2017) data. I use a question about whether the respondent first identifies as Ivorian as a proxy for the egocentric effect and the discriminatory effect. The idea is that citizens may be more amenable to redistribution to their non-co-ethnics or non-co-partisans if they see themselves as having a national identity as opposed to an ethnic identity. Even after controlling for factors which differ between the north and south, citizens under former rebel control are less likely to identify first as Ivorian than those on the former government side (see Table 5.1).

Tab. 5.1: Effect of living under rebel control on feeling Ivorian

	Dependent variable:
	I feel only Ivorian
Citizen from rebel zones	−0.641***
	(0.164)
Observations	1,131
Log Likelihood	−750.409
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,536.818
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controls: Female, fear and exposure to violence, go without food, urban, own a car, have regular access to water, party identification, religion, ethnicity, where get news.

This preliminary analysis of nationally representative data suggests that citizens in former-rebel controlled territories may behave differently than citizens in former-government controlled territories. Above, I previewed some initial findings from the Afrobarometer that shows that citizens view NGOs as corrupt in Côte d'Ivoire as elsewhere. This question, however, is not ideal for testing the theory developed here: in addition to understanding level of corruption, it is important to understand how citizens interact with these organizations. In Côte d'Ivoire, I have shown that those who view NGOs as politicized are also more likely to see these organizations in a negative light: out to only get international money and not sharing Ivorians' best interests (Davis n.d.). To further assess these claims, it would be important to collect data on two interrelated topics in areas that were under rebel-control and under government-control during the war: 1) whether citizens have different or similar responses as civic leaders when they live under rebel control; 2) whether civil society leader behaviors described in this dissertation (egocentrism and discrimination) are witnessed and experienced by local citizens with whom they interact. Such data would allow us to better understand the relationship between civil society and citizens in post-conflict settings.

Variation in rebel governance

Understanding how civic leader behavior varies within rebel-held territory in Côte d'Ivoire would also further enhance the findings of the dissertation. This dissertation shows that rebel takeover of territory affected civic leader behavior, specifically in contested zones. Future research can now examine whether variation in the level of rebel governance and level of contestation affects the level of uncertainty for civic leaders and their subsequent behavior. Understanding how variation in rebel governance and duration of rebel control affect civic leaders could help us understand post-conflict democratization dynamics in countries across the global south.

For the purposes of this study, I use a blunt measure of rebel control: either the department was under rebel control or it was not. However, the reality of rebel governance in Côte d'Ivoire is more complex: each *comzone* was administered independently and the level of governance provided varied, as did the level of predation by rebels on the civilian population (Förster 2015*a*; Heitz 2009; Martin 2019; Speight 2014). To perform a preliminary analysis of whether there are differences in the outcomes of interest and the level of governance, I employ data from Martin (2019). He created a measure of rebel governance in Côte d'Ivoire that indexes the provision of public goods across the rebel zone: whether the FN maintained order, regulated land disputes, provided security from attacks, and provided education, health, infrastructure, or loans to civilians. On average, rebels provided 2.73 public goods (min: 0, max: 6). Unfortunately, he did not collect data for every department, so only six of my eight departments are in his sample.[3]

First, I ask do respondents in high governance-rebel[4] zones act like respondents in government zones? Perhaps the rebels were so good at providing public goods that they were able to mimic the same level of governance on the other side of the ZDC; if this is true, then we might expect the effect of rebel takeover to be dampened for citizens living in those departments. As table 5.2 demonstrates, this does not seem to be the case as the relationship still holds: civic leaders from better governed rebel controlled departments are still more egocentric and more discriminatory than civic leaders from former government controlled territories.

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[3]His analysis does not include Kouibly or Kounahiri.

[4]I code a department as high governance if the number of public goods provided is higher than the median in Martin's full sample.

Tab. 5.2: High Governance vs. Government and outcomes

variables	high governance rebel	govt	diff	p-value
Amount to self	0.66	0.56	0.10	0.01
Amount to outgroup	0.30	0.36	-0.06	0.01

Second, I ask do respondents in high governance-rebel zones act differently from low governance-rebel zones? My theory would support this argument, as the level of uncertainty would be lower for civic leaders living in high governance-rebel zones because public goods provision occurs. Alternatively, those living in low-governance zones have the additional uncertainty of low provision of public goods; this may exacerbate their response and further shorten their time horizons. Table 5.3 presents this analysis. Although there appears to be no difference for egocentrism, civic leaders who lived in low governance rebel zones are significantly more likely to discriminate against the outgroup than civic leaders who lived in high governance rebel zones. Although my design did not allow me to examine high governance vs. low governance areas, this finding should encourage further investigation as variation within rebel zones may provide even better analysis of the effect of rebel control on social outcomes in post-conflict settings.

Tab. 5.3: Rebel Governance and outcomes, within rebel zones

variables	high governance rebel	low governance rebel	diff	p-value
Amount to self	0.66	0.70	-0.04	0.49
Amount to outgroup	0.30	0.23	0.07	0.05

This preliminary evidence supports the main findings of the dissertation: uncertainty over outcomes makes civic leaders more discriminatory, but if they have some certainty regarding the social contract between citizens and rebels, they are less likely to demonstrate these characteristics. Future research would collect additional data across former-rebel controlled territories to better understand the effect this variation may have on civic leader response in zones not contested by the government and where rebel governance provision was high.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The theory of wartime experiences of civic leaders I have developed and tested in this dissertation highlights the critical effect civil war has on local civil society organizations in post-conflict settings. I have shown that in Côte d'Ivoire, organizational characteristics vary conditional on wartime experience and that civic leaders from former rebel zones are more egocentric and more likely to discriminate against the outgroup than leaders from former government zones. This dissertation sheds light on a new type of elite – civic leaders – who are important actors for democracy, peace, and development in the Global South, and how their experiences shape their potential to contribute to post-conflict development in their countries.

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A

APPENDIX

AI   RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION

Note: I used a Mahalanobis distance matching technique as described in Nielsen (2016). This technique identifies most similar units by minimizing the Mahalanobis distance (Euclidean distance adjusted for covariance in the data) between pairs – it finds units that are close to each other in the k-dimensional space defined by a selection of covariates.

Tab. A1: Cases using Mahalanobis distance matching

Pair	Dept	Rebel	Dist. Abid-jan	Night Light 2000	Child Mort. 2000	Northern 1998	Anti-Incumbent 2001	d
1	Issia	0	306.57	0.29	35.26	0.27	0.48	0.29
	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	
2	Nassian	0	348.07	0.11	30.16	0.71	0.73	0.39
	Mankono	1	385.62	0.17	40.61	0.86	0.78	
3	San Pedro	0	311.27	0.47	23.82	0.19	0.78	0.57
	Kounahiri	1	345.91	0.20	27.91	0.19	0.61	
4	Oume	0	201.94	0.48	10.53	0.23	0.44	0.77
	Botro	1	318.69	0.45	12.58	0.43	0.56	
5	Sinfra	0	241.97	0.68	11.35	0.19	0.49	0.81
	Botro	1	318.69	0.45	12.58	0.43	0.56	
6	Daloa	0	317.85	0.89	24.97	0.27	0.72	0.88
	Kounahiri	1	345.91	0.20	27.91	0.19	0.61	
7	Duekoue	0	391.62	0.22	34.82	0.18	0.43	0.92
	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	
8	Tai	0	380.02	0.03	31.41	0.18	0.69	0.97
	Kounahiri	1	345.91	0.20	27.91	0.19	0.61	
9	Toulepleu	0	500.59	0.24	36.39	0.18	0.36	1.02
	Facobly	1	427.87	0.60	30.11	0.12	0.24	
10	Toulepleu	0	500.59	0.24	36.39	0.18	0.36	1.05
	Kouibly	1	418.36	0.18	28.93	0.12	0.22	
11	Tabou	0	367.95	0.07	13.50	0.19	0.52	1.07
	Niakaramandougou	1	410.41	0.24	18.68	0.43	0.63	
12	Zoukougbeu	0	357.59	0.16	33.20	0.27	0.45	1.07
	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	
13	Toulepleu	0	500.59	0.24	36.39	0.18	0.36	1.16
	Man	1	459.89	0.84	35.84	0.12	0.28	
14	Sassandra	0	233.72	0.10	22.28	0.19	0.42	1.20
	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	
15	Bouafle	0	272.70	0.56	15.86	0.19	0.51	1.25
	Niakaramandougou	1	410.41	0.24	18.68	0.43	0.63	

Tab. A2: Full list of cases

Government departments	Rebel departments
Bouafle	Botro
Daloa	Facobly
Duekoue	Kouibly
Issia	Kounahiri
Nassian	Man
Oume	Mankono
San Pedro	Niakaramandougou
Sassandra	Vavoua
Sinfra	
Tabou	
Tai	
Toulepleu	
Zoukougbeu	

Tab. A3: Health center construction during the war

variable	Rebel	Govt	diff	p-value
Average number of new health centers (2002-2008)	0.26	1.31	-1.05	0.00

AII Survey 1 sampling

The original list collected resulted in a list of 587 individuals with functioning telephone numbers, 247 organizations.

```
                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │ Called: 988  │
                          └──────────────┘
            ┌───────────────────┼───────────────────┐
            ▼                    ▼                    ▼
┌────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐
│ Wrong number: 88   │ │ Right number: 587  │ │ No Answer: 313     │
└────────────────────┘ └────────────────────┘ └────────────────────┘
                    ┌──────────┴──────────┐
                    ▼                     ▼
           ┌─────────────────┐   ┌─────────────────┐
           │ Agreed: 482     │   │ Refused: 105    │
           └─────────────────┘   └─────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
           ┌────────────────────┐
           │ Participated: 243  │
           └────────────────────┘
```

Fig. A1: Sample Flow Chart

Note: number is the total count. For "no answer", research assistants attempted to call the individual three times over the course of the week and marked them as no response if they did not speak with anyone on the phone. Right number, thus, includes individuals who actually picked up the phone and confirmed their identity.

One imminent concern about studying civic leaders today is a possible selection problem: it could be that organizations that exist today or who have survived until today are led by individuals who are systematically different from those who created organizations before or during the war and which no longer exist, other than on paper. This would be particularly troublesome for this design if this were not balanced across the ZDC. To avoid this issue, research assistants asked snowball seeds to provide contact information for those leaders within their personal and professional networks who had previously been active, but no longer were. Of those in the snowball sample, 49 percent came from organizations on the rebel side, versus 51 percent on the government side; in other words, seeds on the rebel side were no more likely to suggest organizations to contact than seeds on the government side.

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Tab. A4: Balance on response rates for survey 1 sample

variable	rebel	govt	difference	p-value	min	max
wrong number	0.12	0.11	0.01	0.66	0.00	1.00
right number	0.54	0.54	0.01	0.85	0.00	1.00
Interested	0.44	0.42	0.01	0.70	0.00	1.00
Refused	0.10	0.11	-0.01	0.75	0.00	1.00
Participated	0.36	0.29	0.06	0.07	0.00	1.00
No response	0.28	0.31	-0.03	0.33	0.00	1.00

Eighty-two percent of those contacted desired to participate in the survey, of which 50 percent actually participated. Outright refusal rate was at 18 percent.[1] Civic leaders in the former rebel zones were more likely to participate in the initial survey (36 percent vs. 29 percent). I can only speculate why this is the case, but it could be linked to the fact that organizations in rebel zones were less likely to have current international partners; if they thought participation in the survey would facilitate their access to potential donors, they might be more likely to participate than those civic leaders in the government zones who currently have relationships with international partners.

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[1]The difference between desire to participate and actual participation can likely be attributed to the nature through which data was collected. The survey was emailed to civic leaders who wanted to participate on-line, while those who wanted to do it over the phone could do so immediately. Despite several attempts to reach civic leaders who had expressed desire but did not ultimately take the survey (they were emailed at least three times), these leaders did not take the online survey. This could be due to the fact that many leaders did not frequently use their email (which several respondents indicated), email addresses were incorrect, or multiple individuals shared the same email.

AIII Lab-in-the-field

AIII.1 Game examples

Veuillez repartir les 1000FCFA en pièces de 100 FCFA aux entités ci dessous selon votre préférence.

Vous même	0
Une association dont les membres partagent vos opinions politiques	0
Une association dont les membres ne partagent pas vos opinions politiques	0
Total	0

Veuillez repartir les 1000 FCFA en pièces de 100 FCFA à chaque des entités decrits selon votre préférence, **mais cette fois, vous pouvez garder au maximum 500FCFA pour vous même.**

Vous même	0
Une association de votre département	0
Une association d'un département different du vôtre	0
Total	0

Fig. A2: R1 and R2 example

Note: An example of how participants saw the games in rounds 1 and 2. On the left is an example from round 1 – English: Please allocate 1000 FCFA below in 100 FCFA coins to the entities below according to your preferences (Options are: yourself, an association whose members share your political opinions, an association whose members do not share your political opinions). On the right is an example from round 2 – English: **but this time, you can only keep 500 FCFA for yourself.** (Options are: yourself, an association in your department, an association in a different department).

Veuillez repartir les 1000 FCFA en pièces de 500 FCFA à chaque des entités decrits selon votre préférence, **mais cette fois, personne ne peut garder les deux pieces de 500FCFA.**

	Vous même	Une association dont les membres partagent vos opinions politiques	Une association dont les membres ne partagent pas vos opinions politiques
500	○	○	○
500	○	○	○

Fig. A3: R3 example

Note: An example of how participants saw the games in round 3. English: Please allocate 1000 FCFA but this time, no person can keep both 500 FCFA coins.

AIII.2 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR LITF

Tab. A5: Balance on individual covariates

variable	rebel	govt	difference	p-value	min	max
Female	0.34	0.16	0.18	0.01	0.00	1.00
Age cohort	3.04	3.10	-0.06	0.74	1.00	6.00
Muslim	0.22	0.16	0.06	0.34	0.00	1.00
Northerner	0.35	0.21	0.14	0.06	0.00	1.00
Education level	5.13	6.25	-1.11	0.00	0.00	9.00
Support incumbent	0.55	0.42	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00
Income	1.60	1.56	0.04	0.80	0.00	3.00
Self-reported altruism	0.84	0.58	0.26	0.13	0.00	4.00
Remained in department (2002-2008)	0.45	0.56	-0.12	0.15	0.00	1.00
Remained in department (2010-2011)	0.64	0.68	-0.04	0.62	0.00	1.00
Left department (2002-2008)	0.14	0.03	0.11	0.02	0.00	1.00
Left department (2011-2012)	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.81	0.00	1.00
Arrived in department (2002-2008)	0.12	0.21	-0.10	0.09	0.00	1.00
Arrived in department (2010-2011)	0.13	0.07	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
N	68	99				

Tab. A6: Balance table on NGO level variables, labs sample

variable	rebel	govt	difference	p-value	min	max
Created during war	0.38	0.38	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
Standby	0.32	0.17	0.15	0.08	0.00	1.00
Projects	13.70	13.76	-0.06	0.99	0.00	99.00
Mission: info	0.74	0.94	-0.19	0.01	0.00	1.00
Mission: public goods	0.48	0.45	0.03	0.73	0.00	1.00
Mission: private goods	0.47	0.46	0.01	0.94	0.00	1.00
Total domains	5.59	7.39	-1.80	0.03	0.00	23.00
Domain: social cohesion	0.55	0.53	0.02	0.82	0.00	1.00
Domain: Humanitarian	0.28	0.56	-0.29	0.00	0.00	1.00
Domain: Women	0.38	0.52	-0.14	0.14	0.00	1.00
Never funded	0.66	0.50	0.16	0.09	0.00	1.00
International partners, 2002-2008	0.15	0.22	-0.07	0.33	0.00	1.00
International partners, 2009-2011	0.17	0.29	-0.11	0.18	0.00	1.00
International partners, today	0.18	0.39	-0.21	0.01	0.00	1.00
Local govt partners, 2002-2008	0.26	0.19	0.06	0.44	0.00	1.00
Local govt partners, 2009-2011	0.21	0.23	-0.01	0.85	0.00	1.00
Local govt partners, today	0.26	0.27	-0.01	0.86	0.00	1.00
Ministry partners, 2002-2008	0.13	0.22	-0.09	0.20	0.00	1.00
Ministry partners, 2009-2011	0.11	0.20	-0.09	0.19	0.00	1.00
Ministry partners, today	0.11	0.30	-0.20	0.01	0.00	1.00
NGOs don't work	0.58	0.72	-0.14	0.12	0.00	1.00
NGOs would collapse	0.42	0.61	-0.20	0.04	0.00	1.00
Rural	0.79	0.88	-0.09	0.23	0.00	1.00

AIII.3   GAMES OUTCOMES BY ROUND

Tab. A7: R1 results

variable	rebel	govt	pvalue
R1 Ethnicity - Self	4.88	3.88	0.00
R1 Ethnicity - Co-ethnic	2.74	2.83	0.68
R1 Ethnicity - non-Co-ethnic	2.38	3.29	0.00
R1 Partisan - Self	5.07	4.39	0.04
R1 Partisan - Co-partisan	2.60	2.81	0.31
R1 Partisan - non-Co-partisan	2.32	2.83	0.03
R1 Dept - Self	5.15	4.08	0.00
R1 Dept - Same	2.75	3.26	0.01
R1 Dept - Different	2.10	2.66	0.01

Tab. A8: R2 results

variable	rebel	govt	pvalue
R2 Ethnicity - Self	4.24	4.06	0.43
R2 Ethnicity - Co-ethnic	2.73	2.68	0.76
R2 Ethnicity - non-Co-ethnic	2.60	3.14	0.00
R2 Partisan - Self	4.47	4.07	0.05
R2 Partisan - Co-partisan	2.74	2.85	0.53
R2 Partisan - non-Co-partisan	2.28	2.86	0.00
R2 Dept - Self	5.15	4.08	0.00
R2 Dept - Same	2.75	3.26	0.01
R2 Dept - Different	2.10	2.66	0.01

Tab. A9: R3: Ethnic discrimination

variable	rebel	govt	pvalue
R3: % discriminate against self	0.16	0.34	0.01
R3: % discriminate against coethnic	0.49	0.37	0.16
R3: % discriminate against non-coethnic	0.26	0.15	0.08

Tab. A10: R3: Partisanship discrimination

variable	rebel	govt	pvalue
R3: % discriminate against self	0.16	0.29	0.04
R3: % discriminate against copartisan	0.34	0.30	0.64
R3: % discriminate against non-copartisan	0.41	0.28	0.09

Tab. A11: R3: Department discrimination

variable	rebel	govt	pvalue
R3: % discriminate against self	0.09	0.28	0.00
R3: % discriminate against same dept	0.15	0.17	0.67
R3: % discriminate against different dept	0.65	0.42	0.00

Tab. A12: All results: Individual games amount allocated

	Dependent variable:			
	Coethnic	Noncoethnic	Copartisan	Noncopartisan
Civic leader from rebel zones	−0.004	−0.026***	0.00004	−0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

SEs clustered at the department level.
Controls: Female, age, Northern ethnicity.

AIV OTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

The following analyses use specific subsets of the data to re-run the regression analysis described in section 4.2. For every regression, unless noted, the standard errors are clustered at the department level.

AIV.1 OUTLYING DEPARTMENTS

Tab. A13: Analysis excluding outlying departments

	Amount allocated to self	Amount allocated to outgroup
	Dependent variable:	
	(1)	(2)
Civic leader from rebel zones	0.111***	−0.078***
	(0.039)	(0.023)
Constant	0.572***	0.357***
	(0.025)	(0.015)
Observations	114	111
R^2	0.068	0.093
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.084
Residual Std. Error	0.205 (df = 112)	0.121 (df = 109)
F Statistic	8.113*** (df = 1; 112)	11.142*** (df = 1; 109)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

AIV.2 ORGANIZATION CONTROLS

Tab. A14: Analysis with organization-level controls

	Dependent variable:	
	(1)	(2)
Civic leader from rebel zones	0.116***	−0.085***
	(0.034)	(0.021)
Number of organization members	0.001	−0.011**
	(0.010)	(0.005)
National headquarters	−0.031	0.025
	(0.046)	(0.020)
Social cohesion	−0.038	−0.002
	(0.036)	(0.018)
Constant	0.581***	0.391***
	(0.031)	(0.023)
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*	

AIV.3 Violence and aid analysis

Tab. A15: Analysis including violence

	Dependent variable:	
	Amount allocated to self	Amount allocated to outgroup
	(1)	(2)
Civic leader from rebel zones	0.114***	−0.073***
	(0.031)	(0.019)
violence	−0.031	−0.029
	(0.031)	(0.019)
Constant	0.578***	0.373***
	(0.026)	(0.016)
Observations	167	162
R^2	0.077	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.066	0.099
Residual Std. Error	0.195 (df = 164)	0.116 (df = 159)
F Statistic	6.837*** (df = 2; 164)	9.894*** (df = 2; 159)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

	Dependent variable:	
	Amount allocated to self	Amount allocated to outgroup
	(1)	(2)
Civic leader from rebel zones	0.112***	−0.080***
	(0.034)	(0.021)
International funding	−0.035	0.025
	(0.033)	(0.020)
Constant	0.575***	0.354***
	(0.027)	(0.016)
Observations	143	138
R^2	0.089	0.124
Adjusted R^2	0.076	0.111
Residual Std. Error	0.195 (df = 140)	0.116 (df = 135)
F Statistic	6.821*** (df = 2; 140)	9.543*** (df = 2; 135)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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AIV.4   Session effects

Tab. A17: Results with standard errors clustered at the session level (N=6)

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
	Amount allocated to self	Amount allocated to outgroup
Civic leader from rebel zones	0.109**	−0.078***
	(0.031)	(0.016)
Constant	0.561***	0.357***
	(0.025)	(0.007)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01