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Screen-capitalism: Transnational Korean Screen Culture in Postsocialist China

DISSERTATION

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by

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DEDICATION

To

my family

in recognition of their worth

an apology

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Media Theory and East Asian Popular Culture
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Screen-capitalism: Transnational Korean Screen Culture in Postsocialist China

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The proliferation of the cultural phenomenon known as the Korean Wave (*hallyu*) in China over the last two decades marks the first time in the (post)socialist context that a sizable fandom has been forged of transnational spectators with divergent state-sanctioned ideologies. *Hallyu* has flourished both officially and unofficially in Mainland China despite looming political threats and cultural boycotts. Despite the fact that the term *hallyu* was initially coined in the Chinese context and reshaped the landscape of Chinese pop culture, the cultural entanglements between Koreans and Chinese in screen media have received little attention in English-language literature to date. This dissertation explores these cultural entanglements.

In particular, this project explores the shifting patterns and cultural paradigms of the cultural dynamics between Korean and screen media, proffering a new perspective on the Sino-Korean relationship through the lens of the *screen culture*. More specifically, this project investigates the spread of Korean screen culture through the new forms of remakes and co-productions. This dissertation proposes the idea of screen-capitalism, a new cultural paradigm, as a system of visual relations. Through the development of the concept of screen-capitalism, this dissertation argues that the rhizomatic quality of Korean screen culture allows for all of its points

to be connected or plugged into any and all others outside of itself. This makes Korean screen culture efficiently compatible with heterogenous elements—other cultural, political, ideological, and linguistic communities—in diverse modes. Sino-Korean cultural dynamics provide an illuminating window into how Korea, as well as the visual mechanisms through which various ideologies, identities, aesthetics, and negotiations, have been imagined and constructed through the screen culture apparatus. In making this argument, I demonstrate how screen-capitalism, insofar as it is fluidly transplantable, ideologically permeable, and transnationally gendered, spreads, circulates, and marks a shifting cultural paradigm both on and off the screen.

CHAPTER 1 Introduction: Screen-capitalism

In 2011, while I was in Seoul studying film and television productions, I worked as the Chinese "producer/translator" for the Korean team of a Sino-Korean collaborative film production supported by the Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism. It was during this time that China and Korea started to actively promote exchanges and collaborations in the film and media industry. In other words, new possibilities for Sino-Korean cultural engagement and industrial cooperation were becoming available to recreate or innovate a new arena of screen culture. This particular co-production was between the Beijing Film Academy and the Korean National University of Arts, the two most prominent film schools in China and South Korea, respectively. Issues however arose during the production process. One of the primary conflicts centered on whether or not to have a storyboard. The Korean side, which favored adhering to a globalized standard of film production, stressed the need for a storyboard. The Chinese team, on the other hand, favored a more unorthodox production procedure and felt it was unnecessary to have one. Tension started to mount during a meeting of all crew members from both teams. At one point, "Can you ask the Chinese team to get out of this room right now, our Korean team needs to hold a meeting by ourselves [*uri kkiri*] at this moment." The Korean general manager looked to me, the only Chinese person on the Korean team, to translate into Chinese the sentence he had just spoken. His request raised some unexpected challenges:

> *Am I one of the "*uri*"? Who is "*uri*" here?*[1] *How do I translate that sentence, or should I even translate it? How can I find an appropriate standpoint to smooth the tensions?*

These questions have led me to even bigger questions that laid the foundation for this dissertation: what are the new possibilities and challenges emerging in a global context where collaboration in the economy of screen culture flourishes? How do we collaborate and look for common ground despite conflicts within the interplay of (trans)nationalism and the rise of screen culture?

Visual relation

Amid the contemporary sensory-overloaded *world of screens*, the cultural phenomenon known as the Korean Wave (*hallyu*) stands out as an example of how cultural flows bear a rich arc of interplay among aesthetics, gender, language, ideology, and political economy. The openness and convergence of media forms, together with globally sweeping capitalism, has conditioned Korean screen culture's fluidity of visual storytelling. This storytelling has efficiently woven itself

[1] Of course, there is a lot to unpack here, especially regarding how Koreans commonly use the word "uri"(our/we) instead of I, such as in the daily life phrases of "our home," "our mom," and even "our husband." But in this very context, I discuss this "our" in terms of questions concerning nationality, citizenship, authorship, and participatory culture.

into other national screen cultural narrative forms, both within and outside diegesis. On August 24th, 1992, shortly after the end of the Cold War, China established diplomatic relations with South Korea despite the possibility that this move might offend China's socialist ally North Korea. This was also a diplomatic move that led directly to Taiwan's announcement of breaking off diplomatic relations with South Korea. The following year, China began importing Korean television dramas, opening the floodgate of Korean popular culture and kicking off its spread into post-socialist China, laying the groundwork for *hallyu* that began in the late 1990s. It was not until then that Asian countries started to change their defensive stance against each other's cultural influence and intervene more actively in global capitalist collaboration and communication. It was also the time when South Korea was under the U.S. pressure to open its market of film and television.

Opportunities arise within challenges. At the juncture of media liberalization and sweeping capitalism after the Cold War, Korea has enhanced its international competitiveness in media productions and entertainment industries. The term *hallyu* (한류/韓流/韩流) was coined in the Chinese context meaning the cultural wave from South Korea. The screen-based cultural diffusion of *hallyu*, including Korean films, K-dramas, K-pop, TV reality shows, video games, and social media, is a connotation of its affluent culture, value, and lifestyle. Further, the proliferation of *hallyu* in China over the last two decades since the last 1990s marks the first time in the (post)socialist context that a sizable fandom and a transnational community of co-consumption with divergent state-sanctioned ideologies have been forged. *Hallyu*, then, has both officially and unofficially flourished in Mainland China despite looming political threats and cultural boycotts.

Hallyu stands out because it is not merely a cultural flow into China, it is also a new cultural paradigm that (re)charges itself through self-expanding morphosis and visualized communication. As such, it is capable of surviving and reviving over the course of past and present bilateral

tensions. Its significance as a cultural phenomenon is found in the intensified "inter-actions" and collaborations between China and Korea. Korean screen culture continues to incorporate elements of China, or to be incorporated into China, in a variety of forms of collaboration, ranging from copyright export, to overseas casting and co-productions, to technological outsourcing in post-productions. In effect, this interacting traffic does not stop at the borders of the imaginary forms within onscreen visuality; rather it is a projection of and motor for an action-led system of visual relations. Thus, I propose the concept of "inter-action" as a hyphenated construction, which is by definition separate from mere interaction. Inter-action is a production engendered by a new visual communication pattern of actual actions and multidimensional impacts that in turn condition the engagement among border-crossing spectators on and off screen in their everydayness. This spread of Korean screen cultural flow in China reflects the rise of "screen-capitalism" that has been transplanted onto its neighboring (post)socialist soil, deterritorializing a range of aspects that include cultural content, celebrity culture, tourist attractions, beauty and aesthetic standards, gender identity, and social media participation. Such entanglement has been ceaselessly precipitated by the synergy of the rise of screen culture and the ethos of transnationalism wherein the nation-state is not yet obsolete.

One good example for this action-leading system of visual relation and the newly emerging pattern of inter-action would be the intensifying tourist traffic generated by Korean screen culture. This is attested by quantifiable examples of existing research on the fluidity of how this visual relation is capable of traversing screen and reality.[2] Given the Chinese population base of Korean

[2] The relevance between *Hallyu/*Korean screen culture and tourist numbers can be seen in a myriad of tourism studies. For instance, see in SungKyu Lim& Evangelos Giouvris, "Tourist arrival in Korea: Hallyu as a pull factor," *Current Issues in Tourism*, September 2017. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13683500.2017.1372391?af=R. (accessed on November 1, 2017). SungKyun Kim, Philip Long & Mike Robinson. "Small Screen, Big Tourism: the role of popular Korean television Dramas in South Korean Tourism," *Tourism Geographies*, Volume 11, Issue 3, 2009. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616680903053334?src=recsys (accessed on June 16, 2017).

screen culture and the geopolitical proximity between China and South Korea, it may not be surprising that Chinese tourists make up the largest portion of overseas visitors in South Korea; less discussed and perhaps unexpected, however, is the fact that South Koreans are also the largest subsection of overseas visitors to China.[3] Both the tourism and the increasing collaborations strongly suggest that onscreen worlds, which spark spectators' imaginations, can lead to offscreen actions in spectators' quotidian lives. In turn, these imaginings have been shaped and intensified by the participants' engaged practices on and off screen. These inter-actions invite a rethinking of how Korea, and our world of screens in general, has been (re)imagined through the screen culture apparatus, as well as a more sophisticated analysis of the visual mechanism through which various ideologies, identities, aesthetics, and negotiations are constructed sensationally. One of the predominant themes of this system of visual relations is how and whether we can view a neighbor as a collaborator we could live with, rather than as a dehumanized aggressor (which is also a construct presented by screen culture today) we need to fear or ally against. This is closely related to another important theme of the cultural phenomenon of *hallyu*, and of cultural flows in general—the resistance against it. Although less publicly discussed, the anti-Korean backlash, ignited by the noticeable increase in *hallyu*'s popularity in many countries including China,

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Chan-Guk Huh et al., "Do *Hallyu* (Korean Wave) Exports Promote Korea's Consumer Goods Exports?" Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Volume 53, Issue 6, June 2017.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1313161?src=recsys (accessed on July 10, 2017).
Sangkyun Kim et al., "*Hallyu* Revisited: Challenges and Opportunities for the South Korean Tourism," *Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research*. Volume 21, Issue 5, 2016.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10941665.2015.1068189?src=recsys (accessed on July 11, 2017).

[3] Data of Korean international tourists collected from Korean Tourism Organization.
https://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics.kto (accessed on June 25, 2017).
Thanks to Lynn at Hallyu Experience Office, a marketing agency of Seoul Metropolitan Government, who generously provided me suggestions and access to obtain the data regarding tourism during my field research in Seoul in June 2017.
Data of international tourist in China is from China Tourism Academy's *Annual Report of China Inbound Tourism Development 2017*. Also see the report on October 18, 2017 in *People's Daily Overseas Edition* (in Chinese)
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/2017-10-18/doc-ifymviyp2125936.shtml (accessed on November 2017).

paradoxically embodies "resistance" and "affinity" at the same time.[4] This paradox, thus, punctuates a contemporary juxtaposition of nationalism and transnationalism, evoking a serious consideration of cultural dynamics as productive places for mediating traffic at their intersection with aesthetics, gender, and political economy.

Screen-capitalism

This dissertation proposes the idea of "screen-capitalism" in order to analyze and theorize new challenges and possibilities that have been brought about by the economy of the *screen*. I conceptualize screen-capitalism as a system of visual relations where audiences relate to each other through a visual medium, today's *world of screen*. This visualized communication pattern provides access to life experiences that were previously un-depictable or inaccessible, engendering material and non-material impacts by ceaselessly dispersing onscreen visuality, as well as advancing offscreen interactive traffic among viewers. Paradoxically, this contributes to the building of screen cultural communities as well as of national soft power[5] by driving financial transfers, linguistic exchanges, politico-economic dynamics, and affective engagement—all of which are reflected as cultural "inter-actions." These inter-actions invite a rethinking of how Korea, and our world of screens in general, has been imagined through a screen culture apparatus, as well as the visual mechanism through which various ideologies, identities, aesthetics, and negotiations are constructed.

[4] According to the most recent *2018 Overseas Hallyu Status Report* published by Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) on a survey conducted on the negative perception of Korean cultural content, China, Indian, Thailand, France, and the U.S. ordinally top the list. It is reported by *Global Times* on March 16, 2018. http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2018-03/11669631.html (accessed on May 8, 2018). Original source of data is from KOFICE http://chn.kofice.or.kr/ (accessed on May 8, 2018).

[5] The term soft power was coined by Joseph Nye in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. Soft power here refers to using a noncoercive way to further develop one state's national brand and build its global impact through appeal and attraction.

My dissertation explores the spread of Korean screen culture in its new pattern of remakes and collaborations, following the pop culture fads of *hallyu* in China. Instead of descriptively linking surface-level aspects of the phenomenon from a particularistic inside-out perspective, screen-capitalism is proposed as a new cultural paradigm that both unveils the underlying factors of *hallyu* and re-interprets the (dis)union in East Asia within a de-centered framework of transnationalism. Screen-capitalism is identified through an observation of screen-cultural collaborations and inter-actions between China and Korea. At the same time, it initiates a discourse in a larger context where collaboration in the economy of screen culture flourishes within grammars of ethical obligation and aesthetic question, thus, generating resources of hope that enable viewers to look for common ground within the new possibilities and challenges that screen culture offers. In such a saliently thriving economy of screen culture, collaborations and inter-actions bloom that enrich dialogues between Korea and China. However, little attention in the English-language literature to date, has analyzed or explored the relationship between Korea and China through the lens of the *screen*. This dissertation is tasked with analyzing this relationship.

The concept of "screen-capitalism" in this dissertation utilizes Benedict Anderson's influential concept of print-capitalism as one of the essential factors that made possible the cultural "artefacts" of nationalism. Anderson argued that imagined political communities were made possible through the "interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity."[6] I revisit Anderson's well-known concept in the context of print-based communications growing obsolescence in the era of screen-based communications, in which communities can be extended on a transnational scale. Both national and transnational communities have been

[6] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1991), 42-43.

reconfigured in the context of globalization in a digital age where collaboration and real-time synchronicity, without a central agency, have been advanced more than ever before. After the making of nations as "artefacts," new "artefacts" are produced through screen-based communications embedded in a broader context.

Partha Chatterjee offers a postcolonial critique of Anderson's concept by raising the question of "whose imagined community?"[7] In a transnational framework, the parallel question would be, who are the "our" in "our imagined community" when responding to the question I raised in the opening anecdote. Screen cultural industries often engage participatory spectators/producers across national borders, guided by the market-following nature of capital as well as by the affective interaction of feeling togetherness among them. This practice has deconstructed the national assumption of "our" and, instead, indicates a transnational bonding within the "our" referring to (co)authors or (co)producers. This pluralism of the subject is well dissected by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*: "To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied (1987, p.3)." This "our" has inevitably gained a more extensive meaning in the process of forming a co-productive system among different nations, engaging in poly-local and transcultural production, distribution, and circulation. At this point, I venture to survey the moment and look toward the future. This dissertation is an exploration of how screen-capitalism spreads, circulates, and builds a new cultural paradigm on and off the screen.

More precisely, I would like to proffer some general tendencies or traits of screen-capitalism and how its logic is compatible with global capitalism and Chinese postsocialism. The

[7] Partha Chatterjee, "Whose Imagined Community?" *Millennium* 20, no. 3 (1991): 521–25. doi:10.1177/03058298910200030601.

first trait of screen-capitalism that I wish to point out is its transplantability. Korea is not the first region to produce a transnational screen culture. However, Korea's transnational screen culture exceptionally showcases its transplantablity and permeability, qualities that are made possible through its praxis of mimicry and its willingness to be emulated in return. Further, it is particularly conducive to self-partitioning, being inserted and replanted, and proliferating. As a result, Korean screen culture has redefined transnationalism as a de-centered framework against the backdrop of contemporaneous cultural deterritorialization.

Geographical proximity and cultural similarity are conveniently considered to be the greatest contributors to the cultural inter-actions between China and Korea. Indeed, East Asia was the first territory where *hallyu* landed, and, once there, it built upon the larger global context bound with re/deterritorialization.[8] But more compelling dimensions of Sino-Korean cultural dynamics lie in a more probing theoretical treatment of visual modes and the relations established through them. These dynamics speak broadly to global media production while enriching scholarly knowledge about screen culture. Distant from a particularistic perspective that at times is obsessed with national or ethnic intrinsic interpretations of *hallyu*, Chua Beng Huat takes Singapore as the consuming community for reimaging pan-East Asian identity, an approach that sheds light on how cultural flows contribute to a border-crossing community within the context of unsettling cultural re/de-territorialization. Chua challenges the Confucianist explanation for Korean television culture in Asia by noting that Singaporeans, especially younger generations, have read hardly any classic Confucian texts. The internal cultural, religious, and social heterogeneity in East Asia cannot be totalized into a homogeneous "one pseudo-universal," i.e. Confucian pan-Asia. Instead of the Confucianist hypothesis, Chua emphasizes how the similarities between young, urban, and middle-

[8] See periodization research on *hallyu* in Bok-rae Kim's "Past, Present and Future of *Hallyu* (Korean Wave)," *American International Journal of Contemporary Research* 5, no.5 (2015):154-60.

class consumer lifestyles in Korean television culture have given Asian audiences interchangeable bodies on the screen.[9]

This interchangeability leads to the formation of an abstract identification across East Asia wherein its audiences more readily identify themselves with the characters on screen in East Asian popular culture than they do with those in American or European popular culture. This abstract identification is formed through imaginings that resonate with what John Lie calls "Brand Korea," within and outside of Korea. As Lie interprets what the "K" is in K-pop, he suggests that it "is merely a brand, part of Brand Korea that has been the export-oriented South Korean government since the 1960s."[10] Echoing Chua's demystification of the use of Confucianism as the theoretical umbrella for the spread of *hallyu*, Lie argues that it would be to regard the features of Korean Wave as reproducing traditional Confucian Korean culture (Lie, 2012). The success of K-pop is derived precisely from its non-Korean or non-Asian music elements, and its incorporation of European and American music dance styles. Lie also points out that [i]n any case, entertainment and certainly entertainers were devoid of prestige, and not something that would be desirable [in the Confucian worldview] (2012, p. 360)." The framework of Confucianist values is neither capable of fully explaining the popularity of *hallyu* in China, nor in Japan. As Wang Hui points out in *Politics of Imagining Asia*, "[H]historically speaking, the idea of Asia is not Asian but, rather, European… Fukuzawa [Yukichi] and his successors to contrast Japan with Confucian China through the theory of 'shedding Asia' [*datsu-a*]."[11] Needless to say, *hallyu* has become a global cultural phenomenon; it has garnered wide popularity beyond Asia and reached Middle East, Europe, and North America.

[9] Beng Huat Chua, "Conceptualizing an East Asian Popular Culture." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 5.2 (2004): 200-21.
[10] John Lie, "What Is the K in K-pop? South Korean Popular Music, the Culture Industry, and National Identity," *Korea Observer* 43, no.3 (2012): 361.
[11] See Hui Wang, *The Politics of Imagining Asia* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2011).

What I would like to argue at this juncture is that within contemporary export-oriented Korean culture it is precisely this decontextualization of the traditional, of the historical, of the social context, and of "Koreanness" in general that allows recontextualization, reflective of a process I term transplantability. This transplantability in screen culture does not necessarily serve the purpose of what Neil Postman calls "amusing ourselves to death."[12] Rather, it makes available a productive place wherein lies an interplay between a postmodern ahistorical stance that refuses to be sublime or to be translated, and the affective interactions in the individual domain, allowing one culture to be seeded in another. The ahistorical stance is not a refusal of the past, but a hope for the co-existence of the past and the present, while having futures in mind.

I use a series of phytological terms such as plant, transplant, (re)grow, species, and so forth in this dissertation, in order to highlight the resemblance of Korean screen culture to plant cultivation—from the circulation system it runs, and the entertainment industry it fosters, to the idols it produces. I am not, of course, the first theorist to suggest a horticulture metaphor. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of rhizome gives a subtle specificity to this plant metaphor: "the rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubes."[13] The rhizomatic quality of Korean screen culture allows for all of its points to be connected or plugged into any and all others outside of it. It is efficiently compatible with heterogenous elements—other cultural, political, ideological, and linguistic communities—in very diverse modes. This rhizomatic method ceaselessly decenters itself into other dimensions and registers, resulting in extended longevity, expanded scale, and decentered multiplicity.

[12] See Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (USA: Penguin, 1985).
[13] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), tr. Brain Massumi. 7.

Second, screen-capitalism rests on the same logic of capitalism for its expansion and circulation. The rapidly changing and constant renewal of content delivered by screen media in a digital time has, in return, cultivated consumers' voracious desire for a more efficient and synchronized media capable of breaking boundaries. This desire arises from a fear of being left behind. Such an insatiable need has in turn caused the exponential reproduction of screen culture. "Capitalism" in the term screen-capitalism, is not limited to its sweeping power in monetary or material sectors. Rather, it is tied to the same logic of the screen, emphasizing its efficiency in shaping a paradoxical unity of opposites wherein it intentionally satisfies the private and unintentionally fulfills the public. As a system of visual relations, screen-capitalism has advanced (co)productions and exchanges, binding networked "sodalities,"[14] within which individuals spontaneously participate in maintaining and regenerating its circulation. The emergence of screen-based media has broadened the forms of discussion and platforms of participation. It fundamentally capitalizes on all the activities displayed on the screen because of the capital-driven, intrinsic motivation within screen culture-related industries and the personal awareness of being watched by audiences through screens. The very logic of capitalist expansion triggers the practice of screen culture expansion, which not only travels through different forms of visual media, but also between screen and actuality. The popularity of screen culture can translate into the actuality of audience reception and, then, that affective response can lead to new works of screen culture. This point of self-expansion also informs the spread of *hallyu* in various media forms, ranging from television to video games.

[14] Arjun Appadurai and Neil Coe, *Modernity at Large* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Arjun Appadurai explores that the joint effect of electronic media and mass migration in a "work of imagination" not only contributes to the deterritorialization of the world landscape but also causes the formation of "sodalities" within this new landscape.

Although *hallyu*'s spread started from television, television culture based on new media perpetuates its spreadability both by linking screens with audiences and by linking audiences together on a transnational scale in the era of the Internet where "media convergence"[15] is the norm. While several case studies of my dissertation focus on television culture, in recognition of the aforementioned media convergence and Internet popularization in the post-TV era, it is more appropriate to redefine the field as *screen culture* because television itself has lost its media specificity in terms of the physical ways in which we engage with it. In this dissertation, my use of screen culture, in the singular form, considers screen culture as one category in recognition of a digital time wherein these media-converged genres move forward from an old print culture into a broader co-dependent context. This stands in contrast to the term used in the collection of essays entitled *Korean Screen Cultures*, where the two editors, Andrew David Jackson and Colette Balmain use the plural term "screen cultures," which has the implication of recognizing each form of *hallyu* as a different genre.[16] Now, none of these genres, though, can survive alone without relying on the essential media of the screen in its various incarnations.

The intrinsic logic of infinite expansion of screen culture in a variety of media forms accompanied by the current eco-friendly trend of "going paperless," has made screen culture the inheritor of the role once played by print communication technology. To place screen culture into one category is important because its different forms often engender products from other onscreen media forms. One example is the Korean TV program *Running Man*. Because of its national popularity, it was not only adapted into an animated series but also into a comic book in 2013, entitled *SBS Running Man: Seek Idol Was Kidnapped Station Side*, [*SBS rŏnningmaen napch'i*

[15] Lynn Spigel points out that the media convergence is the norm. See *Television after TV: Essays on a Medium in Transition*, ed. Lynn Spigel and Jan Olsson (Durham: Duke UP, 2004).
[16] *Korean Screen Cultures: Interrogating Cinema, TV, Music and Online Games*, ed. Andrew David Jackson and Colette Balmain (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016).

toen aitoltŭl kuhara], geared towards children.[17] In addition, its Chinese remake, *Hurry Up, Brothers*, after becoming a TV hit, was adapted for the big screen movie and made into mobile games, such as *Hurry Up, Brothers—Tag Tearing*, *Hurry Up, Brothers—Town of Running Man*, and *Running—Pouncing Combat*. The assumption that television culture has lost its audience is perhaps based on the deceptive fact that fewer people, especially young people, possess a TV set at home. Nevertheless, TV's incarnation within converging screen culture has crept into all aspects of daily life and indexically multiplied itself, originating from the spectators' ongoing pursuit of affordable and private leisure at any time. This impulse towards access to the screen at all times correlates to a desire for border-crossing: crossing the boundaries of community through the extension of patterns of visual consumption.

Third, screen-capitalism imagines the breaking down of barriers, which it does for the purpose of self-expansion. This is closely tied to the aforementioned aspect of transplantability. It echoes the spectators' demand for deterritorializing the lingual-scape within screen culture, where an *affective* turn takes place as a discursive mechanism to stand against the confinement of linguistic fixation. In the contemporary *world of screens*, content more freely penetrates barriers, negotiating to eliminate the boundaries of nations, ideologies, and even language, the most stubborn and, possibly, the last boundary that remains within human society. Employing screen-based communications characterized by a more affective and sensory co-experience, the linguistic exchanges in this new era of the screen demonstrate an inclination of refusing enslavement by a variety of barriers, even including language barriers. Anderson notes that the "fatality of human linguistic diversity" in print-capitalism has contributed to the "artefacts" of "nation."[18] This

[17] Chel-kwan Kim, "어린이 예능만화로 태어난 '런닝맨'," *Daily Korea,* April, 2, 2013 (in Korean) http://www.dailykorea.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=83 (accessed September 10, 2017).
[18] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1991), 42-43.

"fatality" can be understood as resulting from the inherent gaps that occur when different linguistic vernaculars collide. Within the context of global circulation, (co)production, and (co)consumption of screen culture, the untranslatability of this collision fosters desires for transnational boundary-breaking in the post-print era. Modern consumers of screen culture seek a liberation from the confinements of print-based linguistic and cultural fixation, through the means of the visualized communication facilitated by the development of technologies. Chased by both the capitalist interests and the humanistic impulse to reach outside, but also limited by the incapacity to capture the signified by any signification in one's own linguistic system, screen-capitalism tends to deterritorialize the lingual-scape and further mechanizes the "glossolalia" for entertainment.[19] Such a playful form of the shifting lingual-scape implies a shared recognition of untranslatability that encases the practices of "playing with" the untranslatables that cross ethnolinguistic borders in the rise of screen-capitalism.

To lay a further probing examination, language implies a certain structure or code.[20] To acknowledge untranslatables is therefore a post-structuralist escape from the "violence of representation."[21] Deterritorializing the lingual-scape is a form of affective negotiation wherein true communications are made possible in such a way that the state-sanctioned official language is nullified, and thus, a language hospitality is implied. Print-capitalism gave "a fixity to language" by avoiding oral vernacular flexibility. In opposition to stabilizing language, screen-capitalism advances this flexibility. The lingual-scape is constantly being remapped by the porous media of

[19] Daniel Heller-Roazen, "Glossolalia: From the unity of the word to plurality of tongues," Edited by Barbara Cassin and Steven Rendall, *Dictionary of Untranslatables: a philosophical lexicon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). 594.
[20] See Richard Bauman and Charles L. Briggs, *Voices of Modernity: Language Ideologies and the Politics of Inequality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511486647; Sinfree Makoni and Alastair Pennycook, "Disinventing and Reconstituting Languages." *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies* 2, no.3 (2005):137-156. DOI: 10.1207/s15427595cils0203_1.
[21] Tejaswini Niranjana, *Siting Translation: History, Post-structuralism, and the Colonial Context* (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), 3.

the screen and rapidly updated netspeak. The fluidity of the lingual-scape within the dynamics of transnational cultures contributes to a new linguistic discourse of transplantability, one which is not bound to the structuralist foundations of translatability.

In the spirit of barrier-breaking, screen-capitalism carries a more de-hierarchical form of communication media. "Print-capitalism," as Benedict Anderson proposed, includes women and children in the reading class family as part of the consumers of "print" in the twentieth century.[22] This equally inclusive nature of "print" has progressed to the "screen" through the popularization of television since the mid to late 1970s in South Korea and since the late 1980s in China. Screen culture has exponentially multiplied itself and reached a larger viewer base with diversified cognitive backgrounds, not only in terms of age, but also in terms of aesthetic caste and education. The different state of women's education in Korea, China, and Japan in the nineteenth and early twentieth century used to be a distinguishing factor that impeded our imaginings of in East Asia. As Hyaewol Choi notes in *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea*, during the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910) the number of educated women in Korea, largely from the upper class, was too few to sustain a community outside home or family.[23] In contrast, there had been a sizable class of educated women engaging in publishing literature in China, and Japanese girls and women were educated at local schools during the Tokugawa era.[24] In line with the arrival of missionaries in Korea that brought Korean women access to education, the proliferating print media played an important role in contributing to putting forward the feminist agenda to the public discourse in the

[22] Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* (London: Verso, 1991), 76.
[23] Hyaeweol Choi, *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old* Ways (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 8.
[24] Susan Mann, *Precious Records: Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Martha Tocco, "Made in Japan: Meiji Women's Education," in *Gendering Modern Japanese History,* ed. Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 39-60. Also cited by Hyaeweol Choi in *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old* Ways (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

early twentieth century in Korea. The number of educated women in Korea, however, "remained very small throughout the Japanese colonial era [1910-1945]," which "affected the range and intensity of the discussion of modern womanhood in East Asia."[25]

At this juncture, I want to point out that the booming of print played the dual roles for Korean women's demand for gender equality and nationalist agendas in that it facilitated the formation of imagined communities. Women's subjectivity in the Korean screen culture has its roots in these women's engagement with public discourse through publishing literature in the 1920s and 1930s that conditioned by print media. Arguably, it is hard to confine the studies of screen media within nationhood; and transnational screen culture may provide sources for preventing feminist agendas being hijacked or appropriated by nationalist agendas. In contrast with the role print media played in bringing gender issues to the public discourse yet within a nationalized frame, screen media contributes to a transnational communities where transnational feminist agendas become imaginable. This is not only because screen media requires less literacy to consume, but also due to the wide accessibility it affords, affective communication it engenders, and de-hierarchical boundary breaking it pursues.

This is also evidenced in the ways in which Korean screen culture exemplifies the global tendency of young audiences in the economy of screen culture, among whom Korean screen culture has built its enormous fandom by connecting young people to one another and to their generation as a whole. At the same time, media convergence resonates with Henry Jenkins's idea of "spreadable media" which states that content travels through various media networks, formally and informally.[26] Despite the serious concern of copyright in regards to the circulation of screen

[25] Hyaeweol Choi, *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old* Ways (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 8.
[26] See Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green. *Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture*. (New York: New York University Press, 2013).

culture, piracy allows "poorer countries a chance to gain ground without having to bear the full costs of investment in production (2013, p.269)." Such a "pirate modernity" is compatible with the "promises of capitalism as a mode of incorporation into economy,"[27] and thus conditions the de-hierarchical effects of visual communication. In addition, in a digital media era, participatory culture has abetted the deconstruction of authorship, and mimicry has developed its own identity. Such a process dissolves the preconceived vertical relationship between author and spectator, and between the original and the mimicked. Further, the content of the screen is accessible to all insofar as there is no prerequisite inhibiting one's ability to consume it. This stands in contrast to print culture, which requires a minimum literacy to engage with it. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily suggest that the spectators of screen culture are less educated or of the aesthetic underclass, as we will see in the statistical evidence detailed in Chapter Two. What I am stressing here is the capability this visual communication has to open accessibility among spectators with different aesthetic, educational, and economic backgrounds.

All the aforementioned traits of screen-capitalism are associated with its essential character—*affective symbiosis*—constructing (trans)national communities across space and time, language and ideology. Economic interdependence is no guarantee of peace, but a system of screen-based visual relations opens an illuminating window for ideological, linguistic, and social *symbiosis*. In the *world of screens* we currently inhabit, we often experience simultaneous engagement with screens, through which one can relate to others and form broader communities across fluid national or ethnic boundaries. This gives the larger public a more intuitive method of depicting how others view, think, and live, thus concretizing and reifying the way they imagine others as well as their membership in a community of *symbiosis*. Screen culture and transnational

[27] Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 226.

ethos give rise to each other. Media convergence is both the product and the facilitator of this process and serves as a better solution to what Raymond Williams calls "the contemporary paradox of mobile privatization,"[28] because it blurs the boundaries between screen culture that bounds the public space (i.e. film) and that which bounds the private space (i.e. television, personal computers, and mobile media). Such fluidity across public and private spaces provides new possibilities for Korean and Chinese feminist criticism at the narrative and enunciative levels through the interactive exchanges within the transnational cultural flow of *hallyu*. *Hallyu* started in China from television that has influenced Chinese audiences' life on a daily basis. Television culture itself has been consigned to a secondary, even feminized, role as a discipline and conveniently placed at the periphery of academic studies. Nevertheless, the gender-specific targeting strategy of Korean "screen-capitalism" works as a national and transnational marketing device, and also as an emotional connector to form its female fandom. This gendered screen-capitalism is attributed to both deterritorializing the mediascape and affective symbiosis. As a result, the *screen* has given rise to a gaze on and from women as transnational consuming subjects who transgress the domestic/national space in order to enter into the public/transnational sphere. This crosscurrent has shattered both the confinement of women to the roles of the daughter of home(家) and the daughter of home-country(国家), as well as the long designation/reservation of the public space and politics for men.

[28] Raymond Williams and Ederyn Williams. *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (London: Routledge, 1990), Xxi-xxii. "Broadcasting was a response to the inherent paradox entailed in two contradictories yet highly connected modes of modern social life: geographic mobility (realized through technologies of transportation and communication) and privatization (realized through domestic architecture and community planning). William calls this paradox 'mobile privatization.'… Broadcasting, … served as the resolution to this contradiction insofar as it brought a picture of the outside world into the private home. It gave people the sense of travelling to distant places and having access to information and entertainment in the public sphere, even as they received this in the confines of their own domestic world."

Screen-based media, inherited from cinema and expanded to screen culture, not only in this horizontal sense (space), but also vertically (time), plays a central role in a space of multiplicities mediating collective affects and memories. As Bliss Cua Lim argues in *Translating Time*, fantastic cinema can be viewed as the coexistence of temporal multiplicities, upholding plural times as "the refusal of anachronisms, and the recognition of untranslatability, that is, the avowal of immiscible temporalities."[29] Lim draws from Henri Bergson's understanding of cinema and time, arguing that "for Bergson, the past is alongside the present."[30] This interpretation strains against the modern concept of homogeneous time to which print culture previously subscribed. Since it is used as media to visually bridge the past and the present in the same time-space, screen culture thereby potentially alleviates the feeling of fragmentation and disconnection in both a national and transnational frame, and within the diegesis and outside of it.

Decentralization

Using a transnational framework, I propose an emergent cultural paradigm of screen-capitalism. In order to avoid any misunderstandings of my way of using the concept of transnationalism, and to unravel the cohesiveness and compatibility between this cultural paradigm and the framework within which it is embedded, my use of transnationalism connotes a four-fold emphasis. First, in recognition of the fact that the *screen-flattening* experiences in the diegesis and outside of it have shaped how we feel, think, and act, I conceptualize transnationalism as a decentering process, instead of any ethnically- or nationally-centered discourse. I do so through a humble acknowledgment of the newly-emerging framework of cultural exchanges and transient cultural flows. In this decentering process, cultural flows are like interconnected convex dots on

[29] Bliss Cua Lim, *Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique,* (Durham: Duke UP, 2009), 12.
[30] Ibid. 14.

one woven net composed of the intersection of the political and economic. This woven net of decentered-ness opens itself up to more connections and possibilities for infinite expansion.

I would like to further discuss how transplantability renders transnationalism in the context of my dissertation different from the previously conceptualized concepts of transnationalism. Of course, my assertation that Korean screen culture is transnational is not the first argument of this kind. In *Recentering Globalization*, emphasizing capitalist modernization as the premise, Koichi Iwabuchi argues that the successful dissemination of Japanese popular culture in East and Southeast Asia challenges contemporary western-centered globalization. Iwabuchi recenters globalization in Japan because Japan is both non-western and "in but above" and "similar but superior to" other parts of Asia.[31] His proposal of Japanese transnationalism focuses on the media flows between Japan and the capitalist, "modernized or rapidly modernizing" Asia of Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, mainland China and Korea, being excluded from Iwabuchi's discussion, render this proposal of recentering Japan questionable, especially when one observes the rise of China and the flourishing of Korean popular culture over the last two decades since the late 1990s. Iwabuchi excludes South Korea from his discussion because of its ban on Japanese popular culture, which was lifted in 1998, after more than half a century. In his study, mainland China was considered "premodern" and therefore failed to meet the premise of Iwabuchi's proposal during the most flourishing period of Japanese popular culture in Asia.[32] Nevertheless, it is not only the global tumultuous modernization and post-Cold War ideologies that have conditioned Korean screen culture's entry into China; also crucial here is how its porous structure of traversing modernity and postmodernity contributed to a heuristic vision for writing dialogues through screen

[31] Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002), 17.
[32] Ibid., 197.

culture. At the same time, as is believed by many, the anti-Japanese sentiment resulting from the atrocities committed during the Second World War has drawn China and Korea closer together after the end of the Cold War.

If today's world had not been stretched by the *screen* into such a flat one, then the various geographical areas in Asia would have experienced fairly different transnational cultural flows as Iwabuchi noted above. However, the *world of screens* under the "homogenous time" of the internet's popularized synchronicity has changed the general public's experiences of screen culture into a flat and accessible network, shattering the linear evolutionary schema and the stage-by-stage pyramid structure that previously dominated. The boundary-collapsing and pyramid-shattering *world of screens* loudly echoes the Deleuzian theory that "the world has lost its pivot" and has become chaos. The abovementioned flatness would be what Deleuze and Guattari call "a single plane of consistency" upon which all multiplicities are flattened, and those "flat multiplicities of n dimensions are asignifying and asubjective (1987, p. 9)." The multiple as a system resembles a rhizome different from roots and radicles.

Kuan-Hsing Chen in his *Asia as Method* stresses the acknowledgement of "multiple modernities," a response to the notion of a singular modernity as the result of uneven geopolitical relations dating from colonial times. In this work, Chen reinforces that there is a need to break through the twenty-first century "new imperial" order and its logic. According to Chen, Western scholars such as Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, and Bourdieu use Europe as their system of reference within their theories. Chen's argument for Asia as method is to "multiply frames of reference in our subjectivities and worldviews, so that our anxiety over the West can be diluted, and productive critical work can move forward."[33] In other words, the multiple should be

[33] Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), 223.

"effectively treated as substantive (1987, p. 8)." The spread of Korean screen culture in East Asia, perhaps, helps to overcome this Western anxiety because of its inter-referencing of multiple cultures, spaces, and histories in both Asia and beyond. His observation about "*minjian*" in Taiwan, in comparison with Partha Chatterjee's political society, supports the Western notion of civil society for understanding the gaps of comprehending the working-class. But more importantly, the potential merits of this notion of "*minjian*" are compelling: it opens a space where mutual references in popular culture, more affectively and effectively transmitted by visual media, serve a critical vision through which questions about aesthetics, ideologies, identities, and psychologies in common people's everyday practice are more realistically projected and, thus, can be understood in a more pragmatic manner.

Chen's appeal for multiplicity resonates with Wang Hui's argument for plurality; both scholars stress the importance of acknowledging cultural heterogeneity. In *Politics of Imagining China*, Wang questions the validity of thinking about Asian history from a European conceptual framework and calls for a rethinking of the cultural and political complexity and plurality that characterizes Asia's regional economic, political, and social structures. Of course, within this structure of plurality, "culture" has developed into a term with plural meanings. Consequently, as Wang indicates, the attempts to summarize the characteristics of Asia within one unitary culture (i.e. Confucianism) will eventually fail.[34] More likely, neither a European framework nor Confucianist ideology can fully explain the spread of Korean screen culture, given that this cultural phenomenon reaches beyond Asia, and that Asia itself refuses a monolithic reading of its cultures.

A new model that both mediates conflicts and interprets (dis)unions within a larger global context of cultural co-existence awaits exploration. For Wang, the new model needs to allow

[34] Hui Wang, *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2011).

"different cultures, religions, and peoples to interact on equal terms within and among states."[35] Contextualization, in a larger frame, must be on Wang's mind when he claims that the issue of Asia is not simply about Asia, but is actually an issue of world history. Human societies have been intertwined with each other and tend to be more closely bonded in the digital time of screen culture. In the face of such global cultural homogenization, locally contextualized and de-westernized area studies are admittedly worth pursuing. Yet "re-centering" narratives in Asia, Japan, Korea, or China can have the effect of arbitrarily cutting off the "new center" from the larger framework, hazardously repeating imperial agendas while blindly denying global interplay. A locally contextualized study must therefore utilize not a re-centering but a de-centering approach.

Indeed, Iwabuchi's discussion of Japanese transnationalism furnishes a way of seriously viewing the power of visual media and resisting a Western-centric order of globalization. He acknowledges that the prefix "trans-" admits the mobility and fluidity of cultural relations. Compared to an all-inclusive and de-contextualized globalism or internationalism, transnationalism is a more locally contextualized term. It especially engages in local issues that are cultural, rather than political and economic.[36] What I am proposing in this dissertation is a decentered transnationalism, given the global syncretism of evolving forms of media accompanied by cultural deterritorialization. This rethinking of transnationalism as a decentering concept is essential because it better correlates with the global rise of the screen. The interplay between the transnationalism and the rise of screen culture is further enhanced by the self-deconstruction of one's cultural content through visual media wherein one becomes less associated with one's national allegory, or, if such an association remains, it is only in tortuous ways.

[35] Ibid., 28.
[36] Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002).

Second, what I am arguing for is a transnationalism which does not conform to hierarchical structures. As Deleuzian theory criticizes and warns, "many people have a tree growing in their heads, but the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree (1987, 15)." Hierarchical structures range from linguistic and ethnic superiority, racial and gender dominance, and cultural and historical supremacy, to the ascendancy of studies on different cultural genres, if not, unfortunately, to screen cultural genres. I redefine the term transnationalism in the spread of screen culture for the purpose of felling these trees.

The third aspect is an extension from the first and the second: de-centering cultural dynamics is de-imperialist. In Particular, research often associates Korean screen culture's diffusion into China with cultural imperialism, given that the practice of mimicry tends to be discussed in the (post)colonial context. For instance, Homi K. Bhabha's argument that mimicry is a form of "metonymic presence" focuses on how this practice is "at once resemblance and menace (to its colonizer)" and can destroy the colonizer's narcissistic authority "through the repetitious slippage of difference and desire" (Bhabha, 1984). Indeed, Bhabha's insight is valuable in understanding the Chinese practice of remaking Korean TV shows as a revolt against the popularity of the original. However, rather this rebellion does not take place in a postcolonial context; instead it engages a postmodern statement of engendering multiple, incomplete, and fragmented signifiers to defy a metaphoric one-to-one even exchange. More importantly, Korean screen culture's entry into China does not follow colonial or neocolonial paradigms. In the practice of mimicking Korean screen culture, China has its own agenda of seeking the new while incorporating itself into global capitalism (*jiegui*). This would be what Deleuze and Guattari call, "not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, (and) a veritable becoming (1987, p.10)." The Sino-Korean inter-actions and collaborations furnish a way

in which becomings "interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities," pushing the de/re-territorializing of each even further, resulting in each's survival and growth throughout their boom and bust. Under a de-centered framework of transnationalism, the Sino-Korean cultural inter-actions require a new cultural paradigm that not only interprets the spread of *Hallyu* in China in a wide variety of forms but also (re)locates the Chinese model within the cultural dynamics of China's changing identity and consumption patterns.

Last but not least, in the context of transnational screen culture, a visualized media form addresses sensory experiences, thus giving a rise to the affective inter-actions that foster feelings of togetherness. The government-built tourist attractions of the mushrooming *Hallyu* Experience Centers, from the Incheon International Airport to the metropolitan hub of Seoul, have strived to give *hallyu* spectators experiences of "feeling Korea" by providing them visual, haptic, auditory, and even olfactory immersion. Rather than reducing the experience of human society to economic conditions or interests, this trait of *affect* in today's transnationalism holds, perhaps, the potential for a productive way of thinking beyond nation-state sponsored narratives. The affective inter-action within screen culture economy is driven by more than capital; rather, it is associated with engaging everyday practices wherein both Chinese and Korean audiences simultaneously watch, think, criticize, discuss, and sympathize.

Screen and Capitalism

The word "screen" used in this dissertation refers to the carrier of cultural content represented in a variety of media forms. Its corresponding translation in Chinese is *yingmu* (glimmering curtain), *yinmu* (silver curtain),[37]or *pingmu* (device for projecting texts or images).

[37] Silver curtain is from the long-established English phrase silver screen in the early years of the film/motion picture industry. The term silver curtain comes from the fact that the fabric was made into large curtain, coated with

Importantly, these translations focus on the morphological appearance or functional meaning of the term. The former is usually linked to a public space and the latter is associated with both public and private domains. *Mu* in both of these Chinese translations means "veil" or "curtain," which refers to a quiescent dormancy and frosty inactivity—a striking contrast to the riotous swirl activities and affect projected on the screen and the simmering dynamics embedded within the economy of screen culture. In Korean, screen is translated as *hwamyeon* (surface of the image) or *moniteo* (a loanword of monitor), the former can be understood as a combination of device and content in a static state. The latter specifies an electronic device with an implication of watching, keeping track of, and surveillance, which is relevant to the English usage of "screen" as a verb for judgement or examination. However, the English word "screen" correlates less with the Chinese word's focus on a morphological sense or the Korean word's emphasis on displaying content. Instead, the English word collapses the term screen culture into simply a motion-picture medium and related industry. These differences suggest the current status quo of the industrial progress, market maturity, and the sophistication of experienced audiences to which each of these languages are tied. Nevertheless, these dimensions have been ceaselessly flattened by the circulation of *screen-capitalism* insofar as the consumption of content is shared across borders.

The "power-of-screen," derived from the spread of screen-capitalism, paradoxically serves the dual purposes of building border-crossing communities and bolstering national soft power. In the era of print, print-capitalism created what Anderson calls "languages-of-power" in certain dialects that "inevitably were 'closer' to each print-language and dominated their final forms" in the unconscious processes of the "fixing of print-language."[38] Within this process of fixation, their

silver or similar reflective content to make up highly reflective surface, which was film screen.

[38] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1991), 42-43.

"disadvantaged cousins" who lost their caste were rendered assimilable to the emerging print-language. These processes of differentiation of status between vernaculars and the emergence of "languages-of-power" resulted "from the explosive interactions between capitalism, technology, and human linguistic diversity (1996, p. 45)." Nevertheless, in the networked transnational framework, these processes of rivalry become less about "languages-of-power" in the domestic sphere and more about the new arena of the "power-of-screen," where the standardization of an official common national language is already framed. In this dissertation I will illustrate some general tendencies that have precipitated this process.

Globalization's unconscious request is standardization. As Appadurai points out, globalization "does not necessarily or even frequently imply homogenization or Americanization (1996, p. 17)." However, it does favor standardization as a new social contract amid transnational interactions. In the transnational context, the tension in translation is more apparent between one standardized national language and another, rather than between administrative vernaculars within the domestic sphere. The global waning of vernacular dialects, and the efforts put towards rescuing them, are proof of this change. With a new generation which will never know life without a screen, we are undoubtedly in a new era of experience. Through a visual format of communication, the *power-of-screen* contributes to arousing affective resonance alongside counter-sentiments, while deterritorializing the lingual-scape and working as a (trans)national device for building communities. In the flourishing era of screen culture, *power-of-screen* emerges among those who have established more matured markets, meet higher industrial standards, cultivated larger fandom, and caused more efficient affective inter-actions at the national level and among those who engender sensations at the individual level.

In contrast to "the permanent form" of print, the media form of the screen is spreadable, porous, interactive, and flexible in a way that does not buttress the "permanent." Rather, it has caused the new "aesthetics of ephemerality" to arise within spectators' sporadic attention spans. Appadurai notes "the tension between nostalgia and fantasy, where the present is represented as if it were already past (1996, p. 45)." The past and the future is compressed into an instantaneous present in the form of transient flows, where Korea and China spread their respective medias and extend cultural longevity by being collaborative.

Needless to say, this process is facilitated by technological development. Standardization is also implied in the economy of screen culture; whoever meets the highest standard gets to set the direction of the national branding. South Korea has become one of the prominent leaders and beneficiaries in the new arena of the *power-of-screen*. These claims are made even more evident when one considers that Korean conglomerate companies, such as Samsung and LG, literally own the most cutting-edge technology for producing physical screens. Further, Korean cultural content has been widely transmitted through various new media via screens and continues to build Korea's screen culture fandom. These practices have been actively advocated for and sponsored jointly by the Korean government and its conglomerates, who are dedicated to (re)shaping the global and national imaginings of Korea. In this sense, the power-of-screen has been institutionalized to build one nation's soft power or, simply put, to tell a more alluring story.

Capitalism, as Anderson asserts, "'assemble[s]' related vernaculars" in a national framework. As a system of production, capitalism has facilitated vernaculars to form communities. While in a transnational framework, capitalist globalization has rendered nothing merely about the local, due to deterritorialization in numerous aspects. In *Korean Screen Cultures*, Andrew David Jackson and Colette Balmain imagine unification of two Koreas through local and transnational

popular culture flows.[39] Cultural flows and capital follow the same logic of infinite expansion, both facing the challenges which arise within it. A linked transnational community does not suggest sheer consensus. Tensions are also engendered precisely during these transnational interactions. Market utopia does not tell the complete story of building a be-coming community. There are also frictions inherent in this simplistic view of the market. Geographical proximity does not necessarily indicate good terms—indeed, it may simultaneously suggest the opposite, not only in East Asia, but also in many countries in the other parts of the world. As Wang Hui explains, "the dual reliance of capitalist markets on both state and inter-state relations results in the tension between nationalism and supra-nationalism."[40] The capitalist unconscious travels transnationally to form communities; yet it is still juxtaposed with nationalism.

Power-of-screen's integration into capitalism has allowed it to construct itself as a mechanism which builds broader communities. Each participant, through co-consumption or co-production, becomes a member of a be-coming community. It is be-coming because it appertains what Derrida calls the "impossible possibility." It is still hasty to claim a transnational pop culture cosmopolitanism in the East Asian context, given that the co-sentiment of community creates and intensifies contradictory national interests in a manner of mutual disparagement. Going beyond nationalized thinking still remains a crucial task. To form a be-coming community implies an emphasis on symbiosis. The concept of symbiosis is important not only to the relations of gender and nationhood, but also to the relations between different ideologies.

It would be a mistake to view the power-of-screen merely as a product of neoliberal interests or global capitalism. We are reminded of Anderson's emphasis on "the *interplay* between

[39] See *Korean Screen Cultures: Interrogating Cinema, TV, Music and Online Games*, Ed. Andrew David Jackson and Colette Balmain, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016).
[40] Wang hui, *The Politics of Imagining Asia* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2011).

fatality, technology, and capitalism" in establishing imagined communities (1991, p. 43). The power-of-screen is not only employed as a complementary mechanism to human linguistic fatality (deterritorializing the lingual-scape) but also functions as a mechanism to take care of the marginalized (in the individual domain). Various groups, including governmental authorities, either within a capitalist or postsocialist context, intend to utilize this complementary mechanism to appeal for a restoration of a community that stresses humanist spirit via the screen. To emphasize the *interplay* between screen and capitalism in the hyphenated construction "screen-capitalism" is crucial. Screen-capitalism does not hold a noncritical optimism toward capitalism, but rather indicates its opposite: the criticism of capitalism within Marxist materialist or economic critiques is not adequate. We are tasked not only with deconstructions but also with reconstructions, seeking impossible possibilities within global capitalism. The idea of "screen-capitalism" conceptualizes the *screen* as a crucial gear within the capitalist and postsocialist machine.

In a context that is as politically oriented as China, the official import and success of Korean screen culture since 1993 is not motivated only by its high-quality production or market strategy, but also by a kairotic if not serendipitous timing. Korean screen culture entered into the Chinese market when China had begun transitioning from a planned economy to a market economy in 1992. The autonomy of consumption was granted, while the post-revolutionary empty spaces of the entertainment industry and the general publics' leisure lives in China still has yet to be filled. As Jason McGrath describes, Chinese culture is still "hesitant and anxious."[41] The rapid growth of the new economy since the 1990s has undermined traditional and revolutionary ideologies, causing a "persistent feeling of disintegration" in people's experiences within this ideological vacuum as a result of the radical transition "from heteronomy to autonomy (McGrath,

[41] Jason McGrath, *Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

2008).” At the moment of transition towards autonomy, the official import of foreign culture in China would be what Geremie R. Barmé calls a strategy for building a “velvet prison” of “soft” technocratic socialism.[42] Within this context, a window needs to be provided, one that satisfies the general public’s demands for fresh air but not one that extends beyond the parameter of governmental authorities’ regulations. It is under such assumptions that China’s import of Korean screen culture is often considered the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s relatively “safe choice” for the general public, as least among the alternatives, while still fending off western cultural domination or American hegemony. To be more specific, *hallyu* starts in China from exporting television series in 1993 and has garnered its K-drama fandom since 1997.[43] The crowd-pleasing broadcast of K-dramas in the Chinese TV drama scene in 1997, such as *What is Love*, *The Star in My Heart*, and *Model*, marks the start of *hallyu* in mainland China. Television, as an important imported daily commodity, became commonplace in 1987 in mainland China. It has also been a major entertainment provider among most of the Chinese general public and functioned as a significant tool for looking inside and outside of China, allowing Chinese social, political, and economic transformations to be witnessed. From heteronomy to autonomy, Chinese audiences’ collective consumption and imagining, based on screen culture has developed into social

[42] Geremie R. Barmé in *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* employs the concept of “totalitarian nostalgia” from 1990s Russia which is “the product of an environment in which culture had to survive a balancing act between the old ideology and mentality, the demands of art, and new commercial imperatives.” (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), 317.

[43] The first K-drama exported to China was *Jealousy* (질투, MBC, 1992, exported to China in 1993). And the first wave of K-drama in China includes *What is Love* (사랑이 뭐길래, MBC 1991, exported to China in 1997), *The Star in My Heart* (별은 내 가슴에, MBC, 1997, exported to China in 1997), *Model* (모델, SBS, 1997) and so forth. When it moves into the twenty-first century, increasing number of K-dramas have been exported to China, including *Men of the Bath House* (목욕탕집 남자들, KBS, broadcasted in Korea in1995 but it was not exported to China until 2001), *Winter Sonata* (겨울 연가, KBS, 2002), *Autumn Fairy Tale* (가을동화, KBS, 2000, exported to China in 2003), *Can't Take My Eyes off You* (보고 또 보고, MBC, 1998, exported to China in 2003), *Miss Mermaid* (인어 아가씨, MBC, 2002, exported to China in 2004), *The Last Empress* (명성황후, KBS, 2001, exported to China in 2004), *Dae Jang Geum* (대장금, also known as *Jewel in the Palace*, MBC, 2003, exported to China in 2005), *Stairway to Heaven* (천국의 계단, SBS, 2003, exported to Taiwan in 2004, to Hong Kong and mainland China in 2007), and so forth.

interactions in today's transitioning China and Chinese culture in this age of globalization. The popularity of *hallyu* in China began its diffusion by providing Chinese audiences with sources of entertainment consumption on TV at the precise moment of the radical transformation of Chinese society in the 1990s. Chinese authorities' amicable response to Korean screen culture reflects Arif Dirlik's and Ian Weber's insights on the CCP's selective revival of Chinese traditional culture.[44] These analyses partially explained the spread of Korean screen culture in a post-socialist China.

Scholars such as Zhang Xudong, understand Chinese postsocialism as having stemmed from the rupture between the 1980s and the 1990s in Chinese society. Dirlik considers postsocialism "a historical situation where socialism…offered an alternative to capitalism—a choice, in other words, between capitalist and socialist methods of development."[45] This betweenness, from Dirlik's point of view, suggests that Chinese socialism had been made to compromise with capitalism from the beginning. As Dirlik asserts, the current socialist state "must look outside socialism in order to salvage or sustain it."[46] This assertion is reflected in both the CCP's decision to transition to a market economy and to embrace a consumerist culture and in the waning of socialist ideology among the general public. McGrath also argues that political ideology in communist culture and commodities in capitalist culture are not very different in the experiences of people's daily lives, since they both refer to "languages of banality." As he indicates, there is "an abandonment of high cultural ideals and an embrace of commercialism and the profit motive" in the post-socialist China.[47] Paul G. Pickowicz also highlightes this abandonment by claiming

[44] See Arif Dirlik, "Modernity as history: post-revolutionary China, globalization and the question of modernity," *Social History* 27(1). (2002): 16–39.
Weber, I., "Localizing the global: successful strategies for selling television programmes to China," *Gazette*, 65(3). 2003. a273–290.
[45] Arif Dirlik, "Postsocialism? Reflections on "socialism with Chinese Characteristics," *Critical Asian Studies* 21.1, (1989). 40.
[46] Ibid. 41.
[47] Jason McGrath, *Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008),13.

that few people in China actually know or care about socialist theory; what they really care about is their real everyday lives, since they do not see any concrete fulfillment of socialist promises.[48] As McGrath maintains, postsocialism in the Chinese context "does not signify a straightforward 'after' in either logical or chronological terms."[49] I argue that both the localization of socialism in China from the beginning and the current state's "looking outside socialism," tell the story that Chinese socialism has been "post-socialist" from its origin. Either within the economic/materialistic or ideological/non-materialistic transitions, Chinese society pragmatically follows the heteronomic guidance of capitalist modes, shielded and surveilled by the CCP. This is a residue of socialism with its incapability of fulfilling promises. This also generates heterotopic experiences in Chinese everyday life. Neither utopian nor dystopian, Chinese postsocialism is a juxtaposed political and apolitical account with a capital-driven motive that is not only the result of neoliberal globalization, but also the fundamental condition justifying the Party's leadership and exertion of the nation-state's power.

As Anderson comments, although printing was invented first in China around five hundred years before its appearance in Europe, it had no major impact precisely due to the "absence of capitalism" there (1991, p. 44, note 21). If we say that the absence of capitalism in China in the print era prevented the interplay between print communications and capitalism, then post-socialism has conditioned China's participation in the new era of screen-based communications, an engaging practice to build communities through productive visual relations, nationally and transnationally. Along with the end of the Cold War, the start of Chinese Open Door Policy, and

[48] See Paul G. Pickowicz's "Huang Jianxin and the Notion of Postsocialism" in *New Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics*, edited by Nick Browne, Paul G. Pickowicz, Vivian Sobchack, and Esther Yau, 57–87. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), doi:10.1017/CBO9781139174121.005.
[49] Jason McGrath, *Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008),13.

its transition to market economy, Chinese screen cultural market has no longer been insulated from but to march in unison with the world (tongbu jiegui). Ranging from the rush to (re)make TV entertainment programs at major television stations, to the mushrooming growth of video streaming websites and live broadcasting industries in private enterprises, China has actively participated in this transnational trend of screen-capitalism, despite its stated socialist identity. Just as socialism became postsocialism when it was first introduced to China due to localization, screen-capitalism interacts with Chinese postsocialism as it is transplanted to this new soil and grows with Chinese characteristics. Both of these localizations repeat the impossibility of repetition. This is because differences emerge in the process of localization that represent China's desire to seek the "Chinese alternative." The long discourse of discussing or seeking this "alternative" in Chinese studies reveals the anxiety concerning its own cultural and national identity.[50]

Within all these crosscurrents full of chemical reactions and negotiations, shared affective experience within the cultural dynamics of China and Korea has presented new possibilities for and challenges to establishing a healthier relationship. In the context of a young generation who has grown up within the prosperity of screen culture, human linguistic diversity excites the development of "de-texted" visual communication technologies instead of perpetuating national boundaries. The sense-addressing manner of communication has been reshaping our experience of "reading" one another. Screen culture has led to an *affective turn* in terms of its emphasis on sense-based experiences and *feeling togetherness*. At this juncture, I propose the concept of "affective thinking" to inquire into both old thoughts on historical, political, and economic facts and present feelings on affective interactions.

[50] Many scholars in Chinese studies either had a discourse about "Chinese alternative" (Arif Dirlik 1989, 2014) or ways of seeking a "Chinese alternative" (Chun Lin 2006, Kang Liu 2004, Haoming Gong 2012).

"Affective thinking," or a thoughtful feeling of togetherness in the economy of affective media of screen, helps to (re)construct a community with the future in mind. To draw attention to the "structures of feeling" does not mean rejecting thoughts based on reason.[51] As Vincent Ryan Ruggiero puts it in *Beyond Feeling*, "feeling and thought are perfectly complementary."[52] This "feeling togetherness" is a spontaneous response to border-crossing cultural engagement, and potentially contributes to "an excellent beginning to the development of conclusions." Meanwhile, the "thinking" helps us "provide a way to identify the best and the most appropriate feelings."[53] To simply stress the affective feelings or to prioritize the thinking could place us in an unnecessary binarism.

Overview

This project is underpinned by a fairly straightforward question: what are the new possibilities and challenges arising in a transnational context where the collaboration in the economy of screen culture flourishes? This question derives from an even larger question that motivates my research: whether and how contemporary popular culture can address reconciliation and movement forward from historical conflicts, traumatic memories, and geopolitical tensions between different nations? The five main chapters will focus on different aspects of screen-capitalism, analyzing and theorizing screen cultural inter-actions between Korea and China embedded in the context of global media production over the last two decades.

The first part, "Transplantable Screen-capitalism," including Chapters Two, Three, and Four, explores the questions: how has screen-capitalism been transplanted into a different cultural,

[51] Structures of feeling here are drawing from Raymond Williams' notion.
[52] Vincent Ryan. Ruggiero. "Introduction," *Beyond Feelings: A Guide to Critical Thinking* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012), xi.
[53] Ibid.

linguistic, and ideological context? What frameworks can explain the transplantability of screen culture, without reducing it to its seeming frivolity? And what are the shifting patterns and cultural paradigms that could help us better understand the ongoing Sino-Korean cultural dynamics? Specifically, Chapter Two takes *Hurry up, Brothers*, the Chinese remake of the Korean reality show *Running Man* as a case study of the new pattern of *hallyu* in China. In a departure from the previous national frenzy about K-drama or K-pop, this new pattern of remakes penetrates into the Chinese market in a more profound, but nevertheless quiet way. In this sense, I would argue that *hallyu* has become an *amnyu* (暗流, undercurrent) in the Chinese context. This chapter explores the question: what are the possible motivations and hidden intentions behind the new pattern of Chinese remaking of Korean TV reality shows? On the one hand, remakes express cultural affinities; on the other hand, they are often met with resistance from Chinese spectators and the state-sanctioned nationalism. Beyond the simplistic understanding of the remake as mere repetition, the practice of Chinese remakes repeats the impossibility of repetition. In other words, the desire to seek the new is embodied in a form of mimicry. As Deleuze and Gattrari point out, "[M]imicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature (1987, p. 11)." The practice of mimicry is more than a unilateral relation from the original to the copy within the flattened world of screens. Cultural flows are not confined within a unilateral nor a bilateral relationship. Rather, the dynamics of cultural flows are multidirectional and multidimensional, both in space and time; they are restlessly changing and moving; they are "liquid modernity."[54] Neither the cultural flows nor the mimicry are subsumed to a dichotomic tracing. Instead, the process is a map. "The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification… A map has multiple entry ways

[54] See Zygmunt Bauman's *Liquid Modernity*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).

(1987, p. 12).” It is precisely because of its openness and multiple entry ways that Korean screen culture can be transplanted and connected to outside fields. At the same time, humanity’s desire for reaching outside of one’s own cultural milieu and entering into the space of others flourishes in the expansion of screen-capitalism. In the context of this paradoxical dynamic of affinity and resistance, I raise the idea of “affective thinking” to inquire into the forming of a be-coming community within the transient ebb and flow of cultural tides.

Chapter Three, entitled “Affective Singing of a Contrapuntal Line: the Chinese Remake of *I Am a Singer*,” focuses on the question of how Chinese screen culture performs and represents the newly emerging aesthetic demands for deterritorializing the “lingual-scape.” I also explore how it interplays with affective negotiation in the practices of translation/transplant. Neither economic interdependence nor globalization guarantees peace, but it is only when changes penetrate into border-crossing daily life, taking root in routinized trivialities, that possibilities might emerge. Screen-capitalism imagines a deterritorialized zone in the general public’s quotidian life in multifaceted aspects. Screen-capitalism’s circulation rests on the logic of negotiating to eliminate the boundaries and freely penetrate a myriad of barriers. It does so through the affective medium of screen, accompanied with its shared logic of capitalism: expansion. Arjun Appadurai’s framework of fluid Ethoscape, Technoscape, Financescape, Mediascape, and Ideoscape sheds light on the understanding of the global cultural flows (Appadurai, 1996). In these processes of deterritorialization, a shifting lingual-scape is absent and needs remapping. In screen culture, the concept of the lingual-scape reveals the increasing demand for clearing the boundaries away and the origin of that demand in the acceleration of border-crossing collaboration and the audiences’ plea for promptness and synchronicity in a digital era. This chapter interrogates how

the lingual-scape performs affective negotiation and rises above the official lingual system, a process in which sincere communication becomes possible in the spread of screen-capitalism.

Chapter Four, entitled "Screen-capitalism with Chinese Characteristics," answers the question: what are the characteristics engendered by the spreadable screen-capitalism after its growth in the Chinese post-socialist soil? Korean television programs were a fashionable icon and crowd-pleasing form of entertainment in post-revolutionary China. Due to geopolitical tension among China, Korea, and the United States, the Chinese government officially prohibited Korean popular culture as a protest against the new U.S. missile system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which has been under construction in Korea since 2016. This prohibition created a cultural and ideological vacuity in the Chinese entertainment industry and, in turn, in the leisure lives of the general public—a vacuum that still needs to be filled. Breaking from previous collaborative efforts and the mimicking of Korean TV shows, the entertainment industry in China now needs to rely on its own productions. The quest for novelty and national pride has led to the birth of original Chinese TV programs with improved production quality. The rich heritage and the inspiring experience of the "power-of-screen" left by Korean screen culture has provoked China's commitment towards self-exploration. Through an investigating of the 2017 documentary television program produced by China Central Television (CCTV), *National Treasure*, Chapter Four examines the ways in which this social vacuum is being filled and new aesthetic norms are being cultivated. This state-sponsored cultivation punctuates the hidden anxiety of identity at both the national and individual levels. This chapter, therefore, questions how this anxiety of identity is reflected and represented in Chinese screen culture, and the role that screen culture plays in mediating this anxiety. This chapter further asks the question: how does this connect to the

scholarly discourse that seeks a "Chinese alternative" in the interaction between Chinese post-socialism and screen-capitalism?

The second part "Gendered Screen-capitalism," includes Chapters Five and Six and shifts the focus to gender. These chapters address the question: what role do women play in the cultural interactions between China and Korea in the economy of screen culture? Screen culture has been perceived as a male-centered pleasure, characterized by the objectification and taming of women, and international amity has been often interpreted as a friendship of brotherhood. Chapter Five, by examining the Sino-US-Korean collaborative film, *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan*, explores the questions "what about sisterhood? where has she gone?" in the interplay between today's transnationalism and the rise of screen culture.[55] This chapter discusses how the transnational female community formed within intertwined historical contexts and echoed feminist agendas. In this chapter, I suggest that viewing women through a transnational perspective helps us better appreciate the entwined cultural, historical, and social settings represented by the economy of *screen* culture.

Continuing from the preceding chapter, Chapter Six further interrogates the issue of gender in screen culture. I ask: what are the shifting politics of women's identity in the rise of screen culture, both within diegesis and outside of it? It is impossible to overstate the centrality of women's issues and female audiences to the cultural phenomenon of *hallyu*. The long-standing neglect of, or reluctance to acknowledge this point in academic research has perpetuated the gulf between humanities studies and reality. Social criticism and cultural reflections are important, and the significant interplay between gender and screen-capitalism inquiries into a new discourse for both interpreting and mediating conflicts. Taking the K-drama, *Descendants of the Sun*, as a case

[55] Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 2006), 96.

study, this chapter provides a contextualized analysis of the historical and social transformation of Korean society, arguing that Korean women's gender identity has undergone a shift from a "to-be-looked-at" object to a "to-be-catered-to" subject in the rise of *hallyu* over the last two decades. This subjectification has informed *hallyu*'s national and transnational female fandom. Polarized standpoints in Korean screen culture either featured a male-centered approach or insist exclusively on the "absence of men" suggest a path toward reconciliation is a theoretical and ideological exigency. Polarized positions or binary partition provides the source for a hostility instead of presence of good will. Therefore, it remains to be seen what sort of politics are needed to seek the resource of hope among women, for a positive transference from "*han*" (a dull lingering sorrow) to empowerment among women. Such a politics might overcome the gender conflicts and achieve at least a certain level of reconciliation—the possibility of a transformation that gendered screen-capitalism may bring in.

This dissertation concludes with ending remarks of Chapter Seven. The last chapter revisits some of the key arguments made in this project in response to the questions initiated in the Introduction. It also reflects upon my understanding, which comes from a practical perspective, that screen-capitalism holds a key to seeking the resource of hope for uniting us together.

Chapter 2 Transplantable Screen-capitalism: Collaborative Transplant of *Running Man*

> *Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature... The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification… A map has multiple entry ways*.
>
> --Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987, p.11-12)

If a Chinese person were asked to name a commercially successful and crowd-pleasing television program in today's China, the answers would point to a remake, most likely a remake of an original Korean TV show. This new wave of remaking Korean TV shows has deepened Sino-Korean collaboration and communication and brought the Sino-Korean TV industry tremendous profits. Yet it also arouses controversy among Chinese audiences and relevant experts. On April 17, 2015 the *Chinese Economic Observer* tweeted a passage quoting the *Beijing Daily* on Weibo regarding the Chinese audience's response to the series of remakes of Korean shows.

> Nearly half of the entertainment shows in China now have Korean DNA. . .. A huge wave of entertainment TV shows pour out to TV screens this week, and each of the shows carries Korean DNA without exceptions—either adapted from original Korean version, or collaboratively produced by Korea and China. Audiences sarcastically comment that the smell of kimchi is increasingly getting stronger.[56]

Nevertheless, those Chinese remakes blur their 'importedness' by putting Chinese celebrities on the screen and transporting them to typical Chinese tourist attractions, preventing many Chinese viewers from noticing the fact that they are watching a remake. The cultural phenomenon of Korean Wave (*Hallyu*) was first recognized in the rise of Korean popular culture in China, and its

[56] Xiazhi Li, "Sina Visitor System" *Economic Observer*, 4 April 2015. Also reported by *Beijing Daily*, 17 April 2015. Cited in Kyung Hyun Kim and Tian Li, "Running Man: Korean Television Variety Program on the Transnational, Affective Run," *Telos* no.184, 2018.

spread in China has experienced ebbs and flows over the last two decades. Unlike the previous national frenzies over K-drama or K-pop, this new pattern of remakes penetrates into the Chinese market in a more profound but nevertheless quiet way.

. Research often associates the spread of Korean screen culture with cultural imperialism (Huang 2009; Molen 2014).[57] This association with cultural imperialism is usually supported by the fact that the practice of mimicry tends to be discussed in the (post)colonial context. However, Korean screen culture's entry into China does not follow colonial or neocolonial paradigms. In its practice of mimicking Korean screen culture, China has its own agenda: to seek the new while incorporating itself into global capitalism (*jiegui*). The newly emerged cultural engagement between Korea and China requires a new cultural paradigm that can both unveil the underlying factors of *Hallyu* and (re)locate the Chinese model within the cultural dynamics of China's changing identities and consumption patterns originating from China's integration into global capitalism. This chapter focuses on the discourse around Chinese remakes of Korean TV shows to demonstrate that there are paradoxical dynamics of affinity and resistance coexistent in today's expansion of "screen-capitalism." I propose the term "screen-capitalism" to describe and theorize new challenges and possibilities that have been brought about by the economy of *screen*. I conceptualize screen-capitalism as a system of visual relations where audiences relate to each other through a visual medium, *today's world of screen*; this visualized communication pattern provides newly depictable and accessible life experiences, engendering material and non-material impacts by ceaselessly dispersing onscreen visuality, as well as advancing offscreen interactive traffic

[57] See, for instance, Sherri L. Ter. Molen, "A Cultural Imperialistic Homecoming: The Korean Wave Reaches the United States." *In* Kuwahara Y. (eds) *The Korean Wave*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2014. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137350282_9; also see Xiaowei Huang, " 'Korean Wave' — The Popular Culture, Comes as Both Cultural and Economic Imperialism in the East Asia." *Asian Social Science* no. 5, 2009. DOI: 10.5539/ass.v5n8p123

among viewers. This contributes to building screen economy and soft power[58] by engaging financial transfers, linguistic exchanges, politico-economic dynamics, and affective engagement that are reflected as cultural "inter-actions." The hyphen within "inter-action" accentuates both the actual actions and bilateral impacts that have been brought through the synergy of the rise of screen culture and today's transnationalism wherein the nation-state is not yet obsolete. Screen-capitalism rests on the logic of negotiating the elimination of boundaries and the penetration of barriers by the affective medium of screen, accompanied by the capitalist logic of infinite expansion.

As screen-capitalism has been transplanted to (post)socialist soil, not only have copyright issues become a concern in the practice of remakes, but so too have the historical conflicts, geopolitical tensions, and cultural/linguistic untranslatability that arise within the divergent ideological context. This has led to numerus challenges for transnational collaboration in the economy of screen. I examine the flourishing practice of "transplantation" and the backlash against it to suggest that the remake is not evidence of simply mimicking the "master," but quite the contrary, proof of a desire to seek the "new" in a form of mimicry; in other words, the Chinese remakes only repeat the impossibility of repetition. This is because differences emerge in the process of localization of the remakes, as the "Chinese alternative" is often emphasized due to anxiety concerning its own cultural and national identity.[59] Both the current increasing practice of "transplanting" Korean post-production to the Chinese screen cultural industry, and the localization of K-pop idols in the Chinese remake, such as *Idol Producer*, provide ample evidence of Korean Wave's transplantability. The very fact of allowing mimicry while creating the new

[58] The term soft power is coined by Joseph S. Nye in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books Press, 1990). Soft power here refers to using a noncoercive way to further develop one state's national brand and build its global impact through appeal and attraction.

[59] As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, many scholars in Chinese studies either had a discourse about "Chinese alternative" (Arif Dirlik, 1989, 2014) or the way to seek a "Chinese alternative" (Chun Lin 2006, Kang Liu 2004, Haoming Gong 2012).

illustrates *Hallyu*'s transplantability in the economy of screen culture. This transplatability is associated with a deliberate decontextualization in the Korean Wave in general and Korean screen culture in particular. As John Lie raises in his article "What Is the K in the K-pop," "it is precisely because there isn't very much 'Korean' in K-pop can it become such an easy 'sell' to consumers abroad… the K in K-pop is merely a brand, part of Brand Korea that has been the export-oriented South Korean government since the 1960s."[60] This "Brand Korea" has been imagined within and outside of its border and continually built through the border-crossing imagination. What I would like to argue is that it is this decontextualization reinforced by screen culture's porosity that has allowed recontextualization when the original Korean screen culture is transplanted into different soil.

This discourse on transplantability is embedded within contemporary transnational cultural inter-actions and reflected by remakes, such as *Hurry Up, Brothers!*, which call for "affective thinking" to inquire into the formation of a becoming community within the transient ebb and flow of screen-cultural tides. Through examining *Hurry Up, Brothers,* the Chinese remake of the Korean reality show *Running Man*, as a case study of the new pattern of the Korean wave in China, this chapter explores how screen culture has been transplanted into a different cultural, linguistic, and ideological context and confronted by the backlash of resistance.

Remakes and Copyright

In 2013, Hunan Television broadcast Chinese versions of two Korean reality shows, *I Am a Singer* (Korean: 나는 가수다, Chinese: 我是歌手) and *Dad! Where Are We Going?* (Korean:

[60] John Lie, "What Is the K in K-pop? South Korean Popular Music, the Culture Industry, and National Identity." *Korea Observer* Vol.43, no.3, (2012), 361.

아빠! 어디가? Chinese:爸爸去哪儿). By inviting the Korean singers from the original Korean version of *I Am a Singer* to give bilingual or trilingual performances, the Chinese remake of the show has deepened Sino-Korean collaboration in the TV program sector and reshaped the lingualscape of Chinese TV shows. In recognition of the absence of the fathers' participation in raising children during their youth in many Korean and Chinese families, the Chinese remake of *Dad! Where Are We Going?* was warmly received by Chinese audiences for its promotion of the idea of constructing the father figure. The popularity of the remake made considerable profits for Chinese TV stations. The page view number has reached 5.4 billion, advertisement income exceeded 5 billion yuan (around US $728 million), and the tourist income and sponsor earnings brought by the show were more than 10 billion yuan (around US $1.5 billion) each, while Hunan TV bought the Korean copyright from Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC TV) for only 11 million yuan (around US $1.6 million).[61] The floodgate of Chinese remakes opened following these profitable ventures. After tasting the sweetness of successful remakes, in 2014, Hunan TV continued to purchase copyrights from Korea and remade them into Chinese versions. Since 2015, based on the original Korean military variety show *Real Man* (Korean: 진짜 사나이) produced by MBC, Hunan TV has remade three seasons, renaming it *Takes A Real Man* (Chinese: 真正男子汉). The variety dating show, *We Are in Love* (Chinese:我们相爱吧), premiered in April on Jiangsu TV and was adapted from the Korean TV program *We Got Married* (Korean:우리결혼했어요). Though the Chinese version carefully changed the setting from "fake marriage" to "fake relationship" in order not to challenge Chinese audiences' traditional perception of marriage, the show garnered impressive ratings for Jiangsu TV. The transnational couple, Korean actor Choi Si-

[61] Jingjing Bai, "Five Seasons, 10 Billion, Behind the IP Carnival of *Dad! Where Are We Going?* Who is the Winner?" *Film and Television Industry Observers*, edited on December 10, 2017 (in Chinese). https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/31896960 (accessed on June 15, 2018).

won and Chinese model Liu Wen, has been viewed as the personalized narrative of China and Korea. The singing contest show, *King of Mask Singer* (Chinese: 蒙面歌王), debuted in July on Jiangsu TV and was also based on the Korean MBC music show *King of Mask Singer* (Korean:복면가왕). Aside from being broadcast on Now TV in Hong Kong and nowJelli in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, this show was also exclusively streamed at Le.com, a streaming website run by the Chinese multinational conglomerate corporation LeEco.

After previously importing the copyright and remaking the tvN travel-reality show *Grandpas Over Flowers* (Korean: 꽃보다 할배), Shanghai Dragon Television and Korean tvN collaborated a second time. The Chinese travel-reality show, *Sisters Over Flowers*（Chinese:花样姐姐), broadcast on SMG: Dragon Television in 2014, was remade from the Korean tvN show *Sisters Over Flowers* (Korean: 꽃보다 누나). In 2017, Hunan TV adapted tvN's Korean reality show *Youn's Kitchen* (Korean: 윤식당) into the Chinese celebrity reality show, *Chinese Restaurant* (Chinese: 中餐厅). In 2015, Korean MBC accused Shanghai Dragon TV of plagiarizing the Korean MBC game variety show *Infinite Challenge* (Korean:무한도전) with its variety show *Go Fighting!* (Chinese: 极限挑战) which first aired in June 2015 on Shanghai Dragon TV. The copyright for *Infinite Challenge* was purchased by China Central Television (CCTV), which aired its remake later in October of the same year.

Television stations are not the only participants in this practice of remaking; streaming websites have also become actively involved. For instance, a Chinese reality show of the production of boy bands, *Idol Producer* (Chinese: 偶像练习生), was produced, aired, and broadcast by iQiyi, one of China's leading online-streaming websites. However, this show was accused of plagiarism by the Korean music television channel Mnet, which produced the original

version *Produce 101* (Korean:프로듀스).[62] After this accusation, Chinese Tencent Video purchased the rights from Mnet and was licensed to produce its Chinese version *Produce 101* (Chinese: 创造 101). The English translation of the Chinese title, *chuangzao* instead of *zhizao*, might more accurately be rendered as *Create 101* instead of using the original term "produce," implying it's eager to create the new rather than offer an assembly-line production of the replica. Besides the variety shows, Korean TV dramas were also remade by Chinese. For instance, the 2008 K-drama, *Temptation of Wife* (Korean: 아내의 유혹), produced by Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) was remade by Chinese Hunan TV as *Temptation of Home* (Chinese: 回家的诱惑).

Even so, this is by no means an exhaustive list. The actual number of the remakes is much higher since many of them are either not yet being broadcast or are produced without purchasing the rights. For instance, the rights to the KBS reality show *2 Days & 1 Night* (Korean: 1 박 2 일) was bought by Chinese Sichuan Radio and Television, but the remake has not yet been finished. Because of the Chinese TV industry's frenzy about purchasing rights to Korean shows, the price of these rights has skyrocketed. For example, the rights to the earliest imported shows, such as *Dad! Where Are We Going?* and *I Am a Singer*, were purchased for something in the range of US $10,000 to US $30,000 per episode. However, the prices of rights to Korean shows are now ten times higher, even higher than the rights to European and American shows. Despite the skyrocketing price of copyrights, the copyrights of tvN's TV shows, such as *The Romantic*, *Three Idiots*, and *The Genius*, are all sold out. In addition, a license is required for purchasing rights from

[62] "When Looking at the Title Song of 'Idol Producer,' the show that has been Scrutinized for Copyright Violations," *Seoul TV*, January 27, 2018 (in Korean). http://stv.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20180127500011&wlog_tag3=naver (accessed on May 03, 2018).

Korea's three major Television stations, SBS, MBC, and KBS. Many times, the rights to Korean programs have even been bought while they are still in the development stage.[63]

Aside from the fact that copyright has been a fairly fuzzy concept in the Chinese screen cultural industry, state authorities' intervention has also ironically contributed to the practice of plagiarism. Unsurprisingly, Korean popular culture has been officially prohibited from occupying any room in Mainland China following the ban introduced by the Chinese government as a protest against the new U.S. missile system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which has been under construction in Korea since 2016. Accordingly, during this period of high tension, all Sino-Korean collaboration has also been banned. However, the practice of "remaking" has not ceased. The Korean rap competition TV show, *Show Me The Money* (Korean: 쇼미더머니), aired on Mnet, was remade into a Chinese version, *The Rap of China* (Chinese:中国有嘻哈), produced by the online video platform IQiyi. Similarly, the Korean show, *Three Meals a Day* (Korean:삼시세끼), was remade into its Chinese version as *Back to Field* (Chinese: 向往的生活). Both of these shows were produced without purchasing the copyright from the Korean original). For instance, the Chinese reality show of the production of boy bands, *Idol Producer*, was accused of plagiarism by the Korean music television channel Mnet, which produced the original version *Produce 101*.[64] And these are only a few examples of the 34 Chinese TV programs that are accused of plagiarism by Korean media.[65]

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[63] Jie Zhang. "Last Year *Dad! Where Are We Going?* Shot to Fame, This Year *Grandpas Over Flowers* Will Rise to Fame Too." March 22, 2014. Accessed October 03, 2017. http://ent.163.com/14/0322/07/9NU4C6R400032DGD.html (in Chinese).

[64] "프듀 표절 논란 '우상연습생' 주제곡 무대 보니"("When Looking at the Title Song of 'Idol Producer,' the show that has been Scrutinized for Copyright Violations") *Seoul TV*, January 27, 2018. http://stv.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20180127500011&wlog_tag3=naver (accessed on May 03, 2018).

[65] See Korean media's accusation of Chinese copyright infringement see, for instance, "'프듀'부터 '미우새'까지...중국이 표절한 국내 예능 34 건,"("From *Producer 101* to *My Little Old Boy*, 34 variety television program that are plagerized by China") *JoongAng Ilbo*, October 7, 2018. https://news.joins.com/article/23027397 (accessed on January 03, 2019).

Since becoming the "world's factory," China's notorious name has become synonymous with counterfeiting, or producing *Jjaktong* (Korean: 짝퉁), which is what Koreans call the imitation of name brands, or more broadly, replica. Ironically, Chinese alternatives have become synonymous with Chinese remakes under the state's "macro-control." As an exceptional country without YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, or Google, China rolls out Chinese versions of each, such as Youku, Weibo, Wechat, and Baidu (Xiaonei used to be a remake of Facebook). As Ronald V. Bettig points out in *Copyrighting Culture*, there was no copyright system in China until 1991. The Chinese government published the country's first copyright law in May 1991.[66] The boundary between the public and the private has also long been fuzzy in Chinese society. Collective ownership has been perpetuated by socialist doctrine and the Chinese family-centered nepotistic system of clans. Due to its socialist ideology of "sharing without paying," Chinese pirates have been accused of lacking respect for private property and protection of copyright. In another ironic twist, this socialist "sharing without paying" has been motivated by capital-driven purposes in the process of merging China into global capitalism. Such active practices of "remaking" in the screen culture sectors of China perhaps suggests a need for drawing a demarcation line between a salutary mimicry and a copyright infringement.

These practices of integration into capitalism have given alternative perspectives about reproducing screen culture and helped to justify "piracy' in the globalized economy. Brian Larkin draws on Ravi Sundaram's notion of "pirate modernity," arguing that it is "a mode of incorporation into the economy that is disorganized, nonideological, and marked by mobility and innovation" through its ambivalence toward the promises of capitalism.[67] Indeed, it was in the form of piracy

[66] Ronald V. Bettig, *Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), vi.
[67] Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 226.

that cultural content from divergent ideological contexts has been allowed to flow into China. The pirated copies circulating in the "grey zone" of Mainland China, similarly to those in North Korea, are illegal reproductions, yet offer access to those banned cultural contents or limited imports that are regulated by the quota system. These copies satisfy audiences' curiosity and their need to consume, but are at odds with producers' economic interests. As Henry Jenkin notes in *Spreadable Media*, piracy, "historically has been a way to close those gaps created by the uneven and unequal circulation of culture." Besides the cultural aspects, piracy also plays the role of mediating uneven economic development, as it allows "poorer countries a chance to gain ground without having to bear the full costs of investment in production."[68] Jenkins's alternative perspective on piracy fulfills his commitment to thinking transnationally, while the intrinsic motor of producing these remakes remains veiled.

Despite the conveniently obtained profits and deeply engaged border-crossing collaborations in the process of remaking, Chinese remakes have been a jarring reminder of the lack of originality in Chinese screen culture and are seen as a threat to national and cultural identity by critics and Chinese government officials. Yet, the very practices of remaking paradoxically stem from the desire for pursing the new. The post-revolutionary empty spaces of the entertainment industry and the general publics' leisure in China need to be filled. However, for a long time, both industry and the audiences had not learned to cultivate their enjoyment of leisure, given that China had just experienced a moment of transition from a planned economy to a market economy starting in 1992. Korean cultural products began to officially be imported the following year. Audiences were suddenly granted the autonomy for consumption, while the social and ideological vacuity left by the unfilled promises of socialism has left Chinese audiences eager to seek the new. The very

[68] Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green, "Thinking Transnationally." *Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture,* (New York: New York University Press, 2018), 269.

desire to seek the new is embodied in a form of mimicry. Rather than simple repetitions, localized Chinese remakes are repeating the impossibility of repetition for the sake of filling the social vacuity and maintaining ideological vitality. The practice of remakes has facilitated the forming of collaborative regional identities, while also demonstrating the clash of national identities.

Affective Mimicry

Hurry Up, Brother (Chinese: 奔跑吧兄弟; pinyin: Bēnpǎo Ba Xiōngdì), aired on Zhejiang Television sine 2014, is one of the most successful remakes of a Korean-originated entertainment program. It is a remake of Korean SBS entertainment program *Running Man*. The popularity of the show has also attracted large amount of advertising dollars. The named fee alone reached half a billion RMB (around $79.2 million USD) for the remake *Hurry up, Brother.*[69] *Hurry Up, Brother* is one of the most successful remakes of Korean-originating entertainment programs. After it became a TV hit, Zhejiang Blue Star International Media Co., Huayi Brothers Media Group Co. and Wanda Media Co. adapted it into a big screen movie starring the same cast, with production taking only six days. This film version made 227 million yuan (US$36.26 million) in only three days, taking the box office crown from the Hollywood blockbuster *The Hobbit: The Battle of Five Armies.*[70] Interestingly, instead of using the English name of its TV version, *Hurry Up, Brother*, the film was titled *Running Man*, the name of the original Korean version. Since the 2017 season, the show has been renamed *Keep Running* due to the ban's limitation on the import of Korean popular culture. In 2015, the film was screened during the Lunar New Year period, the most important traditional festival shared among Chinese and Koreans for reunions with family and

[69] Named fee is one kind of sponsorship fee in which the sponsor's name is displayed at the beginning of the show.
[70] Rui Zhang, China.org.cn. February 3, 2015 (in Chinese). http://english.entgroup.cn/news_detail.aspx?id=2886 (accessed on May 17, 2018).

friends.[71] This strategic selection of screening time serves and takes advantage of the shared notion of family among both Korean and Chinese audiences, facilitating the production and reception of transcultural and transnational collaborative remakes of Korean entertainment TV shows. By maintaining a family broadcast time and family-oriented material, these reality shows found lucrative patterns of production and remain as the last bridge that maintains bonds between family members through media among Chinese and Korean audiences.

Though television had been viewed as a vehicle for family togetherness,[72] in the context of global converging media, television has lost its "media-based specificity."[73] The increasingly privatized way of watching has also abetted to deconstruct the "family togetherness" of television; most audiences, especially young audiences, tend not to watch the TV series on television sets. Nevertheless, the bonds are given a substitution form of friendship in a larger frame. The development of the internet and mobile devices has removed the constraints of time and space for the consumption of TV content and facilitated the forming of border-crossing communities built upon co-consumption. For example, later on, the showing of the film *Running Man* in the North American AMC theater chain made it possible for members of the Chinese diaspora to access the same cultural product. Crossing from TV screen to movie screen, from Korea to China and up to North America, the Chinese version of *Running Man* surpasses traditional ways of consuming television. In the practices of the original-remake interaction between China and Korea, bonds among the family members have been extended to friends within and beyond borders by creating

[71] According to the statistic report made by entgroup, the Chinese biggest big data collecting platform for Chinese screen cultural industry, film *Running Man* had a box office of 446.444 million yuan (around $70 million USD).
[72] Recognizing the fact that nearly two-thirds of all U.S. families bought a television set between 1948 and 1955, Spigel points out that television has become a vehicle of family togetherness. See Lynn Spigel's *Make Room for TV: Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar America.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1992).
[73] Lynn Spigel and Jan Olsson, *Television after TV: Essays on a Medium in Transition*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). This concept of "TV lost its media-based specificity" is drawn from Lynn Spigel's observation that TV shows are no longer merely consumed via screen of TV, rather reinvented itself in various ways.

a game called "tag tearing" originated from *Running Man*; in the game players wear a name tag on their backs and the objective is to tear opponents' tags off without having their own tags torn. Korean and Chinese audiences have begun mimicking the game. The "tag tearing" game has led to a nationwide emulative game fever among the Chinese audiences. The news report, "*Hurry up, Brothers* Initiates a Game Fever, Audience-Created 'Tag Tearing,'" published by Zhejiang television station's official site on November 27, 2014, notes,

> Recently a university at Chongqing held a "tag tearing" competition as a school cultural activity, created a fashionable topic and gaining a big following. Smart businesses did not miss this opportunity. One shopping mall in Shenyang continuously hold a "tag tearing" competition in order to solicit business and received an overflow of applicants who wanted to join the game. Certainly, there are other loyal audiences of *Hurry up, Brothers* who also long to emulate the game and are itching to invite their friends to try it in their own neighborhoods and gardens.[74]

The emulation of playing the game has been commercialized by businesses to attract more shoppers to their malls. Hence, the game playing has generated actual capital by being employed as a tool to solicit business off screen after the broadcast of the show on screen. These collective experiences of mimicking the game playing among audiences potentially contributes to a feeling of community between Korean and Chinese audiences. This contagious practice of mimicry punctuates physical and affective interactions (chasing, pushing, touching, and tearing, and emotionally engaging with tensions between pleasure, joy, frustration, and anger) among the Chinese and Korean audiences. This affective feeling of togetherness involves sensational engagement in terms of haptic, visual, auditory, and olfactory interactions presented on the screen

[74] "Hurry up, Brothers Initiates a Game Fever, Audience-Created 'Tag Tearing.'" *ZJSTV*. November 27, 2014 (in Chinese). http://www.zjstv.com/news/zjnews/201411/321916.html (accessed on January 27, 2015).

and mimicked among the audiences off screen. The collaborative remake, another form of mimicry, has also led the Chinese and Korean audiences to be involved with affective experience during the coproduction and co-consumption of the shows—an apolitical engagement beyond borders. Therefore, the power-of-screen both capitalizes on the practice of mimicry and contributes to an alternative, perhaps more efficient and intense, affective experience by producing visualized and actualized activities.

Affective Thinking

Such a shared affective experience within the cultural dynamics of China and Korea has presented new possibilities and challenges in establishing a healthier relationship. "Affective thinking," or a thoughtful feeling of togetherness, is required to (re)construct a community with the future in mind. Casting attention on the "structures of feeling" does not entail rejecting thoughts based on reason.[75] As Vincent Ryan Ruggiero puts it in *Beyond Feeling*, "feeling and thought are perfectly complementary."[76] This "feeling togetherness" is a more spontaneous response to cultural engagement that crosses borders, and it potentially contributes to "an excellent beginning to the development of conclusions." At the same time, the "thinking" helps us "provide a way to identify the best and the most appropriate feelings."[77] Simply stressing the affective feelings or to prioritizing the thinking could place us in an unnecessary binarism. Therefore, I propose "affective thinking" as a way of inquiring into both thoughts on historical, political, and economic facts and feelings about affective interactions.

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[75] Structures of feeling here are drawing from Raymond Williams' notion in *Marxism and Literature*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[76] Vincent Ryan. Ruggiero, "Introduction," *Beyond Feelings: A Guide to Critical Thinking*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012, xi.
[77] Ibid.

Affect emphasizes emotional interactions in the individual domain rather than in nation-state narratives. For instance, in *Tourist Distractions*, Youngmin Choe proposes a "model of productive distraction" that is not sponsored by nation-state narratives but instead contributes to a shared affective community.[78] Affective thinking is an apolitical step that is taken, at both the individual and national levels, toward an intensely binding friendship within what Giorgio Agamben calls the "two within one spirit." Such affective thinking also acknowledges that consentiment is grounded in "the pure fact of being."[79] The sharing of the very fact of existence has been represented in the intertextual survival of cultural content within China and Korea's inter-contextual land. On the one hand, in such a context, feeling the pure fact of existence requires taking affect into consideration. On the other hand, however, for people to understand each other's inter-context they must consider "conjuncture" as described by Lawrence Grossberg (i.e. various contexts, including historical, social, economic, and political, that are much more complicated than they first appear).[80] Therefore, rather than being sieged within the dichotomy of celebrating rationalism or falling into a pure emotional domain which risks an orientalist stance,[81] affective thinking should be viewed as a part of a spectrum of affect gradations, shaped by both sympathetic feeling and profound thinking. The economy of affective thinking deconstructs both the concept of thinking devoid of feeling *and* the concept of emotion devoid of thinking.

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[78] Youngmin Choe, *Tourist Distractions: Travelling and Feeling Hallyu Cinema.* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

[79] Giorgio Agamben, "The Friend", *What is An Apparatus? and Other Essays*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. 33. Agamben draws on Aristotle's discussion on friendship that indicates the essence of friendship lies in the pure fact of being, thus friends share the same sweetness of existing. I draw upon Agamben's argument to stress that the co-existence and the shared fact of being are central for establishing a friendship-community among Korean and Chinese spectators.

[80] See Lawrence Grossberg, *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense.* (Durham and London: Duke University press, 2010).

[81] Argument of western imperialism that hierarchizes rational individualism over emotion, while purely stressing emotion within the Asian context denies Asian's entry into western rationalism.

While the transplantation of *Running Man* in China was economically successful and crowd pleasing, the Chinese remake was nonetheless accused of frivolity because of its perceived lack of social concerns or historical depth. The "tag tearing" game has been widely played at many Chinese schools and universities,[82] although when they attempted to film at, for instance, Tianjin University, the show was criticized because some thought it was "not nutritious" and would "tarnish campus," as covered by *Tencent News*.[83] Such accusations of "lacking nutritious value," "being vulgar," and "standing aloof from core socialist values" have become a major concern in online discussions about *Hurry up, Brother*.[84] Despite its lack of "nutritious value" or its standing apart from "core socialist values," this show is quite different from previous Chinese television programs and so has become popular in China nonetheless. Some of the reasons for *Running Man*'s success were analyzed by Korean media. One insight that emerged was that the onsite outdoor real variety show filmed without a script was a unique form in Chinese market. In the Chinese context, audiences were accustomed to programs dealt with social concerns.[85] That is to say, in a departure from previous Chinese television programs, *Hurry up, Brother* focused on borrowing a new form and aesthetic standard from its Korean original version, setting aside social concerns or moral

[82] See note 19 regarding the game fever among Chinese colleges.
[83] Yu Yue, " '跑男'到大学录节目遭抵制, 网友: 没营养的东西, 不要玷污大学" (" 'paonan' dao daxue lu jiemu zao dizhi, wangyou: mei yingyang de dongxi, buyao dianwu daxue," "*Hurry up, Brother*'s on campus filming was counteracted, Netizen: non-nutritious stuff, do not tarnish universities") *Tencent News*, 25 May 2018 https://xw.qq.com/cmsid/20180525A1U1U000 (accessed on 1 September 2019).
[84] See harsh online accusations of *Hurry up, Brother* being lacking in "nutritious value" or "core socialist value" in, for instance, audiences' discussion on *Zhihu* "为什么跑男这么低级趣味而又没有营养的节目会有那么多人喜欢" ("weishenme paonan zheme diji quwei eryou meiyou yingyang de jiemu huiyou name duo ren xihuan," "why there are so many people who like *Hurry up, Brother*, such a program of vulgar taste and non-nutritious") *Zhihu*, 23 May 2015. https://www.zhihu.com/question/30599383 (accessed on 1 September 2019); also see the discussion fomented by Zude Song's allegation of *Running man* standing aloof from core socialist values on *Weibo*, 25 May and 6 July 2018. https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404245448025112183&mod=zwenzhang?comment=1 (accesed on 30 August 2019). Song's allegation was also covered by other media, see for instance, at *Wemedia*, 09 July 2018. https://wemedia.ifeng.com/68360842/wemedia.shtml (accessed on 30 August 2019).
[85] See Korean media's analysis "'런닝맨' 열광하는 중국 사람들 '1 박 2 일' 감흥없는 이유는" ("'rŏnningmaen' yŏlgwanghanŭn chungguk saramdŭl '1pak 2il' kamhŭngŏmnŭn iyunŭn," "The reason that Chinese are enthusiastic about *Running Man* but not interested in *1 Night 2 Days*) *Media Today*, 8 February 2016. http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=127899 (accessed on 30 August 2019).

lessons for affective exchanges and playful interactions. The program was thus socially and historically decontextualized.

The avoidance of historical and social topics minimizes possible emotional frictions between Chinese and Korean audiences regardless of whether the avoidance arose intentionally or unconsciously. Affective thinking enables us to gain a deeper understanding of this protective decontextualization. The Korean TV reality shows and their Chinese remakes illustrate a screen culture genre that is less associated with modernism than with postmodernism, less involved in political allegories and auteur aesthetics than in ahistorical stances and market-driven practices.

Within such assumptions, one might be tempted to ask whether the spectators of these shows are the less educated or the aesthetic underclass. What exactly are the connotations of this seemingly shallow and frivolous popular cultural content? Even many Koreans intellectuals refuse to acknowledge the contributions and significance of the Korean Wave, despite the fact that it profoundly impacts the way Korean national identity is (re)imagined among audiences within and outside of Korea. According to a CSM Media Research report on the Chinese remake *Hurry Up, Brothers* (season 2),[86] the majority of the audience members are young people between the ages of 15 and 44. Views 25 to 34 years old constitute the largest proportion of audience members.[87] When analyzing Korean television culture, Chua Beng Huat indicates that there is an emphasis on the similarities between young, urban, and middle-class consumer lifestyles, and Asian audiences are given interchangeable bodies on screens.[88] This suggests that the shows' young audience may

[86] CSM Media Research is the leader of China's radio and television audience ratings survey agency. It is a joint venture mainly co-funded by CTR Market Research and Kantar Media Dedicated to TV & radio audience measurement research.

[87] Data source from CSM 50 cities. April 24, 2015 (in Chinese). http://www.tvtv.hk/archives/1320.html (accessed on January 03, 2018).

[88] Chua Beng Huat, "Conceptualizing an East Asian Popular Culture." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 5.2 (2004): 200-21.

not be the aesthetic underclass as previously assumed, but may instead be leading the aesthetic trend.

The educational background of audience member of *Hurry Up, Brothers* (season 2) differs from many assumptions, and the CSM report indicates that a plurality of audience members have a college degree or higher (30.8%).[89] Additionally, the largest group of audience members in terms of occupation are junior civil servants/employees (27.2%).[90] The irony here is that the Chinese government disapproves of the remakes while its employees are the main remake consumers.



Table 2.1 Age distribution of audiences for *Hurry Up, Brothers 2*.

[89] This number is fairly high especially considering that less than 10 percent of the Chinese population has a college degree. The educational level is even higher for audiences of some K-dramas. For example, nearly 60% of the Chinese audience for the hit K-drama *My Love from the Star* has a bachelor's degree or higher, among which 14.53% have a master's degree, and 8.89% have a Ph.D. Data on K-drama audiences in China is from "K-drama Audiences are Less Educated? Survey Shows Nearly Sixty Percent Audience Have Bachelor's Degrees or Higher," March 3, 2014 (in Chinese). http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2014/03-03/5900040.shtml (accessed on January 03, 2018).

[90] Data source from Chinese CSM Media Research (CSM) 50 cities. April 24, 2015 (in Chinese) http://www.tvtv.hk/archives/1320.html (accessed on January 03, 2018).



Table 2.2 Distribution of educational levels of audiences for *Hurry Up, Brothers 2*[91]

Decontextualization in screen culture signals a new cultural paradigm accentuating collaboration and boundary-collapsing that runs beyond its seeming shallowness or frivolousness, because decontextualization aims at the potentiality of recontextualization. Decontextualization marks an open stance of allowing the original to be transplanted to a foreign land and grow with its own characteristics. Recontextualization of the original helps the remake fit new audiences' sensibilities, blurs its imported-ness, and prolongs the original versions' longevity. In today's post-print context, the new model of cultural exchange in the economy of screen culture contributes to the longevity of texts in otherwise transient cultural flows. New possibilities and struggles, amidst changing social realities, are waiting to be sorted through and interpreted. Whether it be the fluidity of the contagious mimicking practice of playing the name tag-tearing game spreading across screens and national borders, or the flexibility of allowing recontextualization in a new ideological and linguistic context in Mainland China, these qualities prove the transplantability of the Korean original *Running Man*. It is precisely because of the fact that the show is first decontextualized that

[91] Ibid.

it can be, and the contemporary export-oriented Korean culture in general is, recontexualized when transplanted into a different context— a process I term transplantablity.

This transplantability has maintained the original text's survival even after Chinese government officials imposed a ban on the import of Korean popular culture to protest against the new U.S. missile system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which has been under construction in Korea since 2016. For instance, *Hurry up, Brother* since the 2017 season has been renamed *Keep Running* in English , to keep a safe distance from its Korean original version. The word "brother" (xiongdi) was also removed from its previous Chinese name "Hurry up, Brother" (bengpao ba, xiongdi), which can be read as a metaphorical departure from the prior international collaboration, or "brotherhood." However, the Chinese remake still survives in the politically tension-ridden environment in different modes. The release conference of the first season of *Keep Running* was filmed in Yan'an-- the birthplace of the Chinese communist revolution— so that the new season is not an end but a rebirth through fitting into different state-sanctioned ideological environs. The fifth episode of this season headed to a "red tour," again in Yan'an, and the Chinese celebrity MCs sang in the widely known "red song" chorus, *Defend the Yellow River*, the seventh movement of The Yellow River Cantata composed in Yan'an in 1939 during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Both the choice of filming location in Yan'an and the red song chorus in the new season of *Keep Running* served a patriotic purposefulness of advocating revolutionary politics. This political propaganda of the remake is rooted in the Chinese context in which screen culture has transformed from a state ideological propaganda tool in the 1950s -1980s into a set of profit-driven and yet still state-censored industries since the 1990s. As Jonathan Noble puts it well, "the commercialization of official discourse and the officialization of commercial practices are informing the culture industry in China today" (2000:170). I would also like to point out that this

transformation is reflected in Chinese screen culture, in the conflicting pursuits of both rebuilding revolutionary values and chasing financial returns in Chinese screen culture, in a transforming China of transitioning identity and consumption patterns. The practice of transplanting here not only offers proof for seeking the "new" but also reflects the deployment of screen-capitalism in the Chinese context that mediates between solemn patriotism and amusing performances, party-centered propaganda and capitalist impetus, official narratives and aesthetic enjoyment. This transplantation, further, mirrors a rhizomatic Korean screen culture.

In his essay "Chinese transnational cinema and the collaborative tilt towards South Korea," Brian Yecies discusses how and where Korean practitioners are making a mark on Chinese cinema despite the environment of state-censorship, through examining China-Korean collaborations in post-production period. This post-production collaboration also exemplifies how transplantable Korean screen culture is and how this transplantability sustains an intertexual survival. As Yecies argues, "China has become a unique stepping stone for the further globalization — and perhaps continued survival — of major sectors of the Korean film industry."[92] At the same time, Korean screen culture's transplantability not only facilitates its penetration into and continued survival in the Chinese market, "a potentially volatile policy environment" (2016, p. 236), but also provides resources for Chinese screen culture industries to be compatible with a capital-driven market economy; yet state-controlled narratives still remain against the backdrop of China's transitioning identity and consumption patterns. Korean screen culture's transplantability is attributed to its Deleuzian rhizomatic nature in the sense that "A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines."[93] The rhizomatic Korean screen

[92] Brian Yecies, "Chinese transnational cinema and the collaborative tilt toward South Korea," Michael Keane, ed. *Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in China* (Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA, 2016), 236-244.
[93] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. tr. Brain Massumi.

culture continue survive and revive, by self-modifying, interconnecting, or self-partitioning, containing both old and new lines of segmentarity and places its registers in a variety of forms on and off the screen. In such a way, the rhizome continues expanding underground in the shadows.

Remaking the Korean shows has become a new pattern for spreading *Hallyu*, which is characterized by transplantability. This transplantability in screen culture does not serve the purpose of what Neil Postman calls "amusing ourselves to death" (Postman, 1985). Rather, it makes available a productive place for an interplay between, on the one hand, a postmodern ahistorical stance that refuses to be sublime or to be translated, and on the other hand, the affective interactions in the individual domain, allows one culture to be seeded in another. Indeed, *Running Man* and *Hurry up*, *Brothers* are less historically and socially contextualized. It is because of this seeming frivolity that the show was paradoxically made more transplantable by avoiding historical and cultural conflicts that cannot be solved, at least in the short term. As popular culture, it is obvious that the more friction-provoking it is, the more untransplantable it is. However, within the East Asian conjuncture, the present cannot be understood while cutting off the past. Ahistorical and apolitical attitudes are paradoxically historically relevant, because behind their seeming irrelevance is the intention of eschewing the old historical conflicts and political divergences to carve out a space for new communities. This ahistorical attitude is not a refusal of the past, but a hope for co-existence with the present and the future in mind.

Historical and political disputes, anti-Korean sentiments among Chinese, racism towards Chinese from Koreans, and ideological divergences have caused clashes of national identities even as a regional collaborative identity has emerged. When Chinese audiences are in the midst of a lively frenzy about the game "tag tearing," the transnational Korean TV shows have paradoxically caused a backlash in Mainland China and led South Koreans to accuse the Chinese remakes of

plagiarism and lacking originality. Such "affective thinking" is a mode of reflection that considers all aspects including emotions and their social interactions as well as historical empathy. Those affective thoughts could be the shaping forces of transnational cultural flow dynamics and can supplement our evaluation of these interactions.

Compared with questioning the (im)possibility of reconciliation, to ask how we can live and stay collaborative in the impossibility of reconciliation might be a more pragmatic question. The "affective thinking" of taking both emotional qualities and material facts into consideration may potentially help redefine what is possible. Cultural similarity and geographical proximity cause both affinity and conflicts in the process of material and non-material interactions, reminding us of the need for "affective thinking." In the economy of screen culture, the circulation of capitalism is not limited to its sweeping power in the monetary or material sectors; rather, it interacts with a more affective media (i.e. *screen*). This latter dimension accounts for its efficiency in shaping a paradoxical unity of opposites: intentionally satisfying the private and unintentionally fulfilling the public because of the mutual need for intertextual survival and shared desire for outward contact. This screen-capitalism unprecedentedly advances (co)production and exchange by binding a "networked sodality," within which the individuals spontaneously participate in maintaining and self-generating its circulation.[94] This can be readily observed in both the current increasing collaborations between Hollywood producers and Chinese film companies, and the Sino-Korean collaborations in the production and post-production sectors in diverse genres of screen media.

[94] Arjun Appadurai and Neil Coe, *Modernity at Large.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Arjun Appadurai explores that the joint effect of electronic media and mass migration in a "work of imagination" not only contributes deterritorialization of the world landscape but also causes the formation of "sodalities" within this new landscape.

Self-regeneration of screen culture in converging media forms has rendered the conventional approach of singling out one media form as object of media studies obsolete. Ranging from TV reality shows to mobile games, screen culture always self-regenerates the production in its different forms. Nothing really convincingly settles the borders of these forms of screen media. For instance, the Korean original *Running Man* is adapted into an animation show. The main characters in the show remain in animal forms. In more detail, Yu Jae-seok will be made into grasshopper, Kim Jong-guk into tiger, I kwang-su into giraffe, Ha Ha into penguin, Seok Jin-eun into impala, and Song Ji-hyo into cat.[95] This self-regeneration is also converging and spreading an umbrella to include the traditional print-based media. Grounded on its national popularity, the Korean *Running Man* series was adapted into a comic book in 2013, entitled *Running Man: How do I Find the Kidnapped Idol*, towards its aimed readers of children.[96] In mimetic procedures, these cultural contents continue to disperse; each of abovementioned one can be read starting anywhere and can be related to any other genre and onscreen content.

This practice of re-generation travels beyond Korea. In recognition of the game frenzy among Chinese audiences in their actual lives, audiences' active participation has been capitalized on in another screen-based experience of leisure—mobile games. The Chinese remake, *Hurry Up, Brothers*, did not stop at the genre of reality show and film, but since 2016 has also been made into mobile games, such as *Hurry Up, Brothers—Tag Tearing*, *Hurry Up, Brothers—Town of Running Man*, and *Running—Pouncing Combat*. Thus, the circulation of screen cultural content has experienced a flow that can travel from screen to actuality, and vice versa. For example, this TV reality show can translate into the actuality of audience reception, and then that affective

[95] "[단독] '런닝맨' 애니 나온다…'메뚜기' 유재석·'기린' 이광수…" *Sports Donga*, June 13, 2017 (in Korean). https://entertain.naver.com/now/read?oid=382&aid=0000571503 (accessed October 10, 2017).
[96] Chel-kwan Kim, "어린이 예능만화로 태어난 '런닝맨'," *Daily Korea,* April, 2, 2013 (in Korean) http://www.dailykorea.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=83 (accessed on September 10, 2017)

response can create another genre of screen culture. Therefore, not only does the power-of-screen trespass across the borderline between public and private, but its integration with capitalism has allowed it to form a larger picture and build up communities across national borders. Without a doubt, the circulation of screen-capitalism can contribute to forming communities. At the same time, it can also lead to collective practices of producing disunions. Affective thinking suggests both emotional and intellectual requirements that help us invest in understanding affinities and forging communities despite hostility produced by the clash of national identities.

Clashes of National Identity

The recent tension caused by THAAD once again proved that state-sanctioned nationalism can readily foment the general public's resistance to the Korean wave. The Chinese general public's sentimentality towards this relatively depoliticized popular culture can also be appropriated for political ends. This is not the first anti-Korean wave, nor will it be the last. While Chinese commentators charge Korea of cultural theft of old Chinese traditions and Confucian values, the Korean side nurses a resentment of Sino-centrism and accuses the Chinese screen culture industry of plagiarism. These criticisms of and worries about the diffusion of the Korean Wave are deeply associated with China's cultural anxiety about its national identity. Thus, instead of a simply expressing resistance by boycotting Korean screen culture, Chinese remakes localize the Korean originals into Chinese versions, employing remakes as a countervailing strategy to the previous nationwide expansion of Korean screen culture, while demonstrating and building China's own soft power. Therefore, instead of full acceptance, these remakes are a form of cultural resistance to the substantive imports of Korean original programs.

China has imported Korean television dramas since 1993, the second year after diplomatic relations were established between China and South Korea. China began importing Korean television dramas, opening the floodgate of Korean popular culture and its spread into post-socialist China and laying the groundwork for the Korean wave (*Hallyu*) which began in the late 1990s. The Korean wave has become a significant cultural phenomenon spreading into China, carrying with it films, pop music, fashion styles, customs, values, food culture, and traditions that have greatly influenced Chinese audiences and cultivated a Chinese fandom who are capable of understanding and enjoying Korean cultural content. However, this national frenzy about Korean popular culture has aroused controversies at the same time. Chinese audiences' eagerness for innovation arisen along with the national fad of consuming remakes, while many Chinese commentators view the practices of mimicry as cultural decadence.

Feng Xiaogang, the renowned Chinese Fifth Generation film director, harshly criticized the popular practice of mimicry. His comments were tweeted widely on Weibo:

> On February 15, 2015, Feng Xiaogang criticizes the Chinese entertainment circle's craze for Korean and Japanese popular culture. Korean and Japanese celebrities' marriages and suicides always occupy enormous space on our news. However, why do the Korean and Japanese media not care about reporting the news on Chinese celebrities? Is it degrading? Chinese actors and singers are copying Koreans, and Koreans copied from Americans, so the songs are third hand or fourth hand by the time they come to China.[97]

[97] Ying Chen, *West China City Newspaper*, also tweeted on *Sina Visitor System*, by Vista Kan Tianxia, Feb. 15, 2015. (accessed on December 12, 2015). http://weibo.com/1323527941/C4z8GyFy9?from=page_1002061323527941_profile&wvr=6&mod=weibotime&type=comment#_rnd1451009088970 (in Chinese). Cited in Kyung Hyun Kim with Tian Li, "Running Man: Korean Television Variety Program on the Transnational, Affective Run." *Telos* 184, (2018), 180.

In the context of globalization, the transcultural process of the cross-national and cross-industrial collaborative remake of *Running Man* and other shows of Korean origins has incited questions around the crisis of national identity in China."[98]

In fact, Korean wave has not only encountered backlash in China, but also in other countries. For instance, in Japan, an anti-Korean backlash followed the broadcast of the hit K-drama *Winter Sonata* in 2004, just after *hallyu* had reached its heyday in Japan. Yamano Sharin published his comic books entitled *Hating the Korean wave* (嫌韓流) in 2005, and *Zainichi Map: Seeking out Korea Towns* in 2006.[99] The anti-Korean wave in Japan originated in a suspicion that Korea was exploiting Japanese to fulfill their economic and political agenda (Han *et al*., 2007). Unlike the criticism associated with political and economic ambition in Japan, the counter-Korean current in China has centered more on national and cultural identity. The explosive rage of anti-Korean sentiment in China in 2005, for instance, was triggered when the Gangneung Danoje festival (Korean:강릉단오제, 江陵端午祭) was listed by the UN as "intangible cultural heritage" that belonged to South Korea. Korean heritage officials, however, have never denied that the origins of Dano are Chinese, even though it has "developed its own traditions in the subsequent one and a half millennia after being introduced to Korea."[100] Besides this misunderstanding, rumors spread in China that Korea had claimed ownership of sources of Chinese national heritage,

[98] Kyung Hyun Kim and Tian Li, "Running Man: Korean Television Variety Program on the Transnational, Affective Run." *Telos* 184, (2018), 181.
[99] See, for instance, Min Hwa Han et al, "Forced Invisibility and Negotiated Visibility: Winter Sonata, Hanryu, and Zainichi Koreans in Japan," *Keio Communications Review*, vol 29 (2007), 155-174; also see Rumi Sakamoto and Matthew Allen, "Hating 'The Korean Wave' Comic Books: A sign of New Nationalism in Japan?" *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 5, no.10, 2007; Hye Seung Chung, "Hating the Korean Wave in Japan: The Exclusivist Inclusion of Zainichi Koreans in Nerima Daikon Brothers," *In* Eds. Sangjoon Lee and Abé Markus Nornes, *Hallyu 2.0: The Korean Wave in the Age of Social Media*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2015, 195-211.
[100] "Duanwu: The Sino-Korean Dragon Boat Races," *China Heritage Quarterly*, China Heritage Project, The Australian National University, September 2007. http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=011_duanwu.inc&issue=011 (accessed on October 19, 2017).

such as the Tang dynasty poet Li Bai, contemporary bestselling writer *Han Han*, and the seismograph.[101] Long cultural and geographical entanglements are never only about proximity but also frictions.

The surprising rise of the first Korean wave not only made Korea considerable economic profits, but also enhanced Korea's influence on international relations through its soft power. After the unexpected success of the first Korean wave, accompanied by conglomerate entrepreneurs' active participation, the Korean government has more aggressively intervened in prominent business. Meanwhile, Asian audiences have become more experienced and able to recognize the nationalistic intentions of the Korean wave. The anti-Korean wave among Asian audiences can also be interpreted as, "a result of its aggressive marketing strategies and nationalistic content."[102] Within these bilateral tensions, the anti-Korean wave paradoxically demonstrates the wide diffusion and significant impacts that the Korean wave has brought into Mainland China over the last two decades. The significance of the continuously popular K-wave not only lies in its successful entry into Mainland China, but also in its survival and revival over the anti-Korean wave.

From Translate to Transplant

In order to cater to each national audience, Korea's version of *Running Man* would select China for some of its locations, while the Chinese remake would return to Korea to film, demonstrating the need for an intertextual survival in otherwise transient flows. The rise of the

[101] China invented the seismograph, and Korea invented the astronomical clock. China accused Korea of intentionally printing the Chinese-invented seismograph on their 10,000 won currency when in fact this misunderstanding comes from Korea unintentionally choosing to print only a part of the astronomical clock, rather than printing the whole Korean invention on the Korean currency.

[102] Ah-young Chung, Japanese Pop Culture Boom: Inspiring South Korean Entertainment Industry," *Japan Spotlight* (2009): 16-18.

Korean wave has become a cultural phenomenon in the last two decades. Its ebb and flow in terms of audiences' sporadic attentions in the sensory overloaded world of screens and the inherent transience of cultural flows within such a short time period has drawn people's inquiries into the validity of the research on it. Korean wave not only tells of a need for intertextual survival in the context of the intractability and inescapability of ephemerality, but also signifies the possibility that similar cultural phenomena continue under different names.

The intertextual survival and the cultural reterritorialization give rise to one another, within which transnational interaction thrives. The translingual interactions during the collaborative practices between China and Korea have opened a discourse on translation, addressing concerns of the (un)translatability within cultural interactions. In the context of globalization, the neoliberal market-driven exchanges of cultural goods favorably and conveniently ignore the untranslatables without paying much attention to alterity and plurality in the process of cultural engagement. When the Korean *Running Man* filmed overseas on Hong Kong, it initiated a nice trial in the form of music for the interactions across linguistic borders. In this episode, the way that Korean MCs completed their game mission of Singing Cantonese and Mandarin songs gave subtle specificity to the practice of transplantation instead of translation. The Korean MCs sang the foreign songs without even attempting to understand the meaning of the lyrics. Rather, they merely mimicked the foreign pronunciations while following the melody that they already knew (figure 2.1).[103] The Beijing episode went a step further, without music at all. Korean celebrity MCs looked for and purchased their "mission food"—traditional Chinese snacks—by communicating with local vendors on the snack street of Shichahai. Here, again, they accomplished their mission without

[103] "Hong Kong Episode 72," in *Running Man*, December 11, 2011.

trying to understand the words they were saying, instead simply emulating the Mandarin pronunciation of the food words (figure 2.2 and figure 2.3).[104]



Figure 2.1 Singing the Mandarin song *Tian Mi Mi* in the Hong Kong episode. Photo from Korean *Running Man*, SBS, episode 72, 11 December 2011.
Figure 2.2 "Random Alien Words" in the Beijing episode. Photo from Korean *Running Man*, SBS, episode 61, 18 September 2011.

This playful mimicking practice also got transplanted to its Chinese remake. In the Seoul episode of the Chinese *Hurry Up, Brother*, the guest MCs from Korea and the Chinese MCs speak different languages but play the same "tag-tearing" game in a shared space. In this instance, subtitling helped Chinese audiences to engage in "seamless" cross-cultural and trans-lingual negotiations. Yet this apparently "seamless" subtitling is not provided with Korean version. It also does not change the fact that the Korean and Chinese celebrity MCs communicate primarily through body language and expressions transmitted by the intuitive visualized screen culture. Both the subtitling and the visuality of their interactions reminds audiences of the fact that the show is translated and exported. Subtitles here become "a form of 'derogatory distortion' [that] can occur in the process of language transfer,"[105] to use Basil Glynn's terms. As Bliss Lim points out, "subtitles are always evidence of the process of being transposed, translated, exported."[106] The

[104] "Beijing Episode 61-62," in *Running Man*, September 18, 2011.
[105] Basil Glynn, "Chapter 2 Approximating Cultural Proximity and Accentuating Cultural Difference: Cross-Border Transformations in Asian Television Drama." *Reading Asian Television Drama: Crossing Borders and Breaking Boundaries.* Edited by Jeongmee Kim, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 60.
[106] Bliss Cua Lim, "The Ghostliness of Genre: Global Hollywood Remakes the 'Asian Horror Film,'" *Translating*

practice of translation itself reminds us that things are ultimately untranslatable, with respect to plurality and alterity. Linguistic and cultural heterogeneity therefore are evident in the practice of transplantation. When this game of searching for local street food in a foreign language was transplanted to the Chinese remake, Chinese celebrity MCs went to Kwangjang Market, a traditional Korean market to look for Korean food. This kind of space maximizes interpersonal interactions. In order to complete a Bingo game, Chinese MCs were given a mission guide board on which the names of 25 different items were written. Those names, however, were transliterated, instead of being translated, into Chinese characters, such that the Chinese characters, in spite of being an ideographical language, did not convey any meaning outside of their onomatopoedic function. (Figure 2.4). This game involves a process of refusing the practice of translation.

Figure 2.3 Locals cannot understand the Korean MCs pronunciation in the Beijing episode. Photo from Korean *Running Man*, SBS, episode 61, 18 September 2011.
Figure 2.4 The names of Korean foods are transliterated in the Seoul episode. Photo from the Chinese remake *Hurry up, Brother*, season 1, episode 3, 24 October 2014.

All the aforementioned games played in the overseas episodes, in both the original Korean version and the Chinese remake, involve a refusal, a playful rebellion against, of the practice of translation. By acknowledging linguistic pluralism, they signal an affective turn that liberates transnational interactions from the reliance on translatability.

Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique. (Durham: Duke UP, 2009), 215.

Emily Apter questions the assumption of translatability in *Against World Literature*, proposing a linguistic pluralism.[107] To demonstrate the existence of linguistic pluralism, in fact, requires a humbler stance of dissociating oneself from the presumption of a singular mode of language and acknowledging that human linguistic diversity is fated to remain. Apter examines the notions of "glossolalia" (speaking in tongues) and Wittgenstein's "nonsense" as other forms of "translation failure." Those Korean celebrity teams in *Running Man* and the Chinese celebrity teams in *Hurry Up, Brothers* communicate with local vendors by mimicking their pronunciation in a form of repetitive nonsense speech. The audiences of the shows paradoxically feel pleasure and frustration at the same time upon hearing such sounds of nonsense. These kinds of sounds are what Daniel Heller-Roazen calls "glossolalia," drawing upon Agamben's quote from *The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics*: "To hear such sounds is to know they mean something without knowing exactly what such a 'something' might be; in other words, it is to discern an intention to signify that cannot be identified with any particular signification."[108] The incapacity to capture the signified by any signification in one's own linguistic system potentially has its merit in allowing audiences to affectively view the culture of the other, outside of the confinement of official languages. The MCs in both *Running Man* and *Hurry up, Brother* were speaking in tongues to communicate, tortuously avoiding the possible collision between different linguistic registers.

Liberation from the reliance on translatability signifies an affective turn that emphasizes communication through body languages, signs, expressions, and gestures within visualized screen culture. Affective thinking reminds us to consider both dimensions of emotion and economy in the terrain of screen culture. On the one hand, this screen-based affective communication has been

[107] Emily Apter, *Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability* (London: Verso, 2013), 27.
[108] Daniel Heller-Roazen, "Glossolalia: From the unity of the word to plurality of tongues," Edited by Barbara Cassin and Steven Rendall, *Dictionary of Untranslatables: a philosophical lexicon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). 594.

greatly steered by the economic motivation, which has enabled it to be promptly be shared among millions of transnational audiences to maximize financial returns. As Lydia H. Liu notes, "we can no longer imagine a pure theory of linguistic exchange uncontaminated by economic models of exchange."[109] Undeniably, the linguistic exchange in screen-based communication has been driven by the capital-following nature of the market economy. Nevertheless, on the other hand, employing the power-of-screen, this newly emerging praxis of refusing enslavement by language barriers, or even of mechanizing "glossolalia" for entertainment, signifies a shared recognition of untranslatability in the rise of screen-capitalism. Untranslatability includes the practice of "playing with" untranslatables derives from the voracious desire for the rapid changing and constant renewal of languages and cultures, imposed by globalization. These intensified changes presented at a constitutive level, have been heavily conducive to an ontological understanding of difference where the vicissitudes of languages and cultures become too fast to be caught and given equivalence of meaning. In the post-print era, the fatigue and reluctance of the general public, especially the young generation who have grown up within the screen culture, to deal with text has promoted the development of "de-texted" visual communication technologies, shattering the assumption of logocentric notion of communication.

In short to sum, both sides, the economic motivation and the acknowledgment of untranslatability, have led screen culture to bypass the impasse of untranslatability and explore the new question of transplantability. During the process of transplanting the Korean original version *Running Man* to China, the original was also put to the test when it reached Chinese audiences. As one the online audience responds to the question "how to evaluate *Hurry up, Brother*" at *Zhihu*, a Chinese Q&A social platform counterpart to the crowdsourcing platform Quora, "*Hurry up,*

[109] Lydia He Liu, *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*. (Durham, NC: Duke Univ Press, 2000), 22.

Brother raises the view number per episode of Korean *Running Man* from 10 billion to 25 billon."[110] The transnational prosperity of the Chinese remakes of the original Korean versions reflects the original products' transplantability that allows both the Korean version and the Chinese remake to be successfully acclimated to Chinese audiences' demands and sensibilities. As Lim writes, "the remake attests to the cultural longevity of texts, their intertextual survival, calling into question the presumed closure of the original and bringing it to new audiences" (2009, p.220). More than this intertextual survival for longevity, the interactions between the original Korean *Running Man* and the Chinese remake *Hurry up, Brothers!* have placed cultural and geographical emphases on an affective "brotherhood." As the name of the program, "hurry up brothers," implies, the promotion of brotherhood helps the program move further across national boundaries. This encouragement of brotherhood was embodied by the segment in which each member of the MC team from the original Korean *Running Man* applauded the broadcasting of the Chinese remake *Hurry up, Brothers!* The MCs refer to their Chinese counterparts as brothers. The affective power-of-screen visualizes and actualizes the practices of co-existence and collaboration, enabling one cultural content to be transplanted to new soil and grow with its own characteristics.

[110] See the top answer published in the online discussion of "如何评价奔跑吧兄弟?" (Ruhe pingjia benpaoba xiongdi?, How to evaluate *Hurry Up, Brothers*?) at the Chinese question and answer social platform, *Zhihu*, 20 December 2014. https://www.zhihu.com/question/25922015 (accessed on 30 August 2019).

CHAPTER 3 *Bang Bang Bang*—Nonsense or an Alternative Language?:

The Lingualscape in the Chinese Remake of *I Am a Singer*[111]

Our criticism of these linguistic models is not that they are too abstract but, on the contrary, that they are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the abstract machine that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of enunciation, to a whole micropolitics of the social field. A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles.

-- Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987, p.8)

Even if music is said to be a universal language, the resistance to a foreign-language lyric could be overcome easier with beauty standards and dance routines of the prevailing global norm. MTV of course had appeared as early as 1981, but it nonetheless remained tethered to the music industry and its networks and practices… Given the strong inflection of English lyric, it is difficult to decipher from listening just briefly whether the song is in Korean or any other language.

--John Lie, What Is the K in K-pop? (2012, p.356)

In the contemporary *world of screens*, content freely penetrates barriers, negotiating the elimination of the boundaries of nations, ideologies, and even language, the most stubborn and, possibly, the last boundary that remains within human society. Employing screen-based communications characterized by a more affective and sensory co-experience, the linguistic exchanges in this new era of the screen demonstrate an inclination toward transcending a variety of barriers, including language barriers. More than 35 years ago, Benedict Anderson noted that the "fatality of human linguistic diversity" in print-capitalism has contributed to the "artefacts" of "nation" (Anderson, 1983). This "fatality" can be understood as resulting from the inherent gaps that occur when different linguistic registers collide. The pop culture fad known as the Korean Wave (*hallyu*) was firstly recognized and widely disseminated in the Sinophone world over the

[111] A shorter version of this chapter is published in the journal *China Perspectives*, no.3, (2019): 23-31.

last two decades. Chinese television and entertainment sectors roll out a myriad of remakes of Korean television programs which have become a new pattern of *hallyu*—transformed from an import culture to a collaborative, incorporative, and interlaced set of projects—in Mainland China within the context of bilateral tensions. Nothing is better positioned to exemplify the quotidian exchanges on daily basis than the influence of Korean musical television programs, a screen media form, on the Chinese audiences' lives across linguistic and ideological boundaries. Scholars have discussed the cultural hybridization thesis in the context of the globalization of K-pop and of Korean popular culture in general (Jin & Ryoo, 2014; Lee, 2017; Ryoo, 2009; Shim, 2006; Yoon, 2018).[112] Scholarship has also foregrounded how K-pop is institutionalized to serve national branding in the interest of building Korea's soft power (Choi, 2015; Lie, 2014).[113] Others have centered their inquiries on the "idols" of K-pop, including the problematics of commercialization and gender, either lambasting the "syndrome of girl idols," referring to the spectacularization and commercialization of girl idols' bodies, or on the versatile manufacture of boy idols' masculinity to be Asianized or globally marketable (Jung, 2011; Kim, 2010; Kim, 2011; Lee, 2009; Shin, 2009).[114]

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[112] See, for example, Doobo Shim. "Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia." *Media, Culture & Society*, vol.28, no.1 (2006): 25-44; Woongjae Ryoo. "Globalization, or the logic of cultural hybridization: the case of the Korean wave." *Asian Journal of Communication*, Issue 2, vol. 19, (2009): 137-151; Dal Yong Jin & Woongjae Ryoo. "Critical interpretation of hybrid K-pop: the global-Local paradigm of English mixing in lyrics." *Popular Music and Society*, Issue 2, vol.37, (2014): 113-131; Hyunji Lee. "A 'real' fantasy: hybridity, Korean drama, and pop cosmopolitans." *Media, Culture & Society* 40, no.3 (2017): 365-380; Kyong Yoon. "Global Imagination of K-pop: pop music fans' lived experiences of cultural hybridity." *Popular Music and Society*, Issue 4, Vol.41, (2018): 373-389.

[113] See John Lie, *K-pop: Popular Music, Cultural Amnesia, and Economic Innovation in South Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); JungBong Choi, "Hallyu versus Hallyu-hwa," in Hallyu 2.0: The Korean Wave in the Age of Social Media, ed. Sangjoon Lee and Markus Nornes (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2015).

[114] See D. Lee, "What is Idol Pop?: a symptomatic reading." *Culture Science* 62, (2009): 210–227; S. Kim, "Spectacularization and consumption of girl images." *Media, gender and culture*, (2010): 79–119; Yeran Kim, "Idol republic: the global emergence of girl industries and the commercialization of girl bodies," *Journal of Gender Studies*, 20 no. 4, (2011): 333-345; Sun Jung, "K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile Masculinity: Making Chogukjeok Boys." *Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 163–170; Hyunjoon Shin, "Have you ever seen the *Rain*?

On the Chinese side, scholarship on the politics of media culture has noted government authorities' strategic management of popular music conducive to "national ideologies," nationalist agendas, or "Chineseness" (Chow, 2010; Fung, 2007; Ho, 2006).[115] Ho and Law (2012) discussed how the state uses traditional Chinese culture to legitimize its authority. Much has also been written about political parodies and entertainment-masked democracy or "democratic entertainment" commodities in China (Jian & Liu, 2009; Wu & Wang, 2008).[116] Despite the fact that the term *hallyu* was coined in the Chinese context, the cultural entanglements between Korean and Chinese popular music has received little attention in the English-language literature to date. This chapter, in particular, examines the politics of language and affect in Korean pop music's spread within the Chinese musical world. More specifically, in centers on the question of how K-Pop phenomena have crossed borders and have been (re)produced, and how these shows reflect and simultaneously are shaped by audiences' new aesthetic sensibilities in the context of their interplay with affective negotiation, in response to increasing demands originating from screen culture's travel across borders.

Through an examination of the Chinese remake of the Korean television reality program, *I Am a Singer*, I will explore questions of how the show performs and represents the newly rising

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And who'll stop the *Rain*?: the globalizing project of Korean pop (K-pop). *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Issue 4, Vol.10, (2009): 507-523.

[115] See, for example, Wai-Chung Ho, "Social change and nationalism in China's popular songs," *Social History*, Issue 4, vol.31, 435-453, 2006; Anthony Y.H. Fung. "The emerging (national) popular music culture in China," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Issue 3, vol 8, (2007): 425-437; also see Wai-Chung Ho & Wing-Wah Law, "The cultural politics of introducing popular music into China's music education," *Popular Music and Society*, Issue 3, vol.35, (2012): 399-425; Yiu Fai Chow, "Blowing in the China wind: engagements with Chineseness in Hong Kong's *Zhongguofeng* music videos, *Visual Anthropology*, Issue 1-2, vol 24, (2010): 59-76.

[116] See, for instance, Weihua Wu and Xiying Wang, "Cultural Performance and the Ethnography of Ku in China," *Positions* 16 no. 2, (2008): 409-433. Wu and Wang argue that that the *haixuan* (village election) and *PK* (player Killing) in the Chinese musical competition show *Super Girls* recaptured a sense of democracy "in response to young people's desire, commodified daily experience and the invisible trajectory of crying that we could own as basic individual rights." 417; Miaoju Jian & Chang-de Liu, "'Democratic entertainment' commodity and unpaid labor of reality TV: a preliminary analysis of China's *Supergirl*," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Issue 4, vol 10, (2009): 524-543.

aesthetic demands of what I term as the "lingualscape:" in particular, how it interplays with affective negotiation in the practices of translation or transplantation within the context of cultural deterritorialization. Arjun Appadurai's framework of fluid ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, mediascape, and ideoscape sheds light on the understanding of the global cultural flows (Appadurai, 1996). In these processes of deterritorialization, though, the concept of a shifting lingualscape is absent. I conceptualize the lingualscape as the shifting landscape of languages intermingled with and liberated from standardized national languages through which people communicate at both affective and enunciative levels. I argue that the shifting lingualscape in this Sino-Korean musical TV program demonstrates nonethnic-centered imaginings across national and state-sanctioned ideological boundaries. The lingualscape performs affective negotiation and rises above the official lingual system, a process through which sincere communication becomes possible in a digital time. Critical examination of the interplay between the shifting lingualscape and affective negotiation outside of state-sanctioned official languages foregrounds not only new perspectives on the relationship between China and Korea, but more broadly, an understanding of connecting audiences free from the cohesive violence of language.

Lingualscape and re-compositions

I Am a Singer is a Chinese musical TV show remade from a Korean program of the same name. It debuted on January 18, 2013, close to the Lunar New Year, and viewers have watched it with friends and family members every Friday night since then. This broadcast time has made the show become one of the new year activities among the Chinese audiences across different generations. The program has been one of the most popular reality TV shows in the Mainland China for the past five years. The provincial satellite station Hunan TV station imported *I Am a*

Singer from the Korean MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation), and its first season was produced as a Sino-Korean collaboration. In addition to being broadcast by Hunan TV, the show is also available in Taiwan from GTV and GTV Variety Show; in Hong Kong from Now Mango, TVB (Television Broadcasts Limited) HG Jade, and J5 (TVB Finance Channel); and in Malaysia from Astro Quanjia HD. *I Am a Singer* departs from previous shows such as *Super Girls* in that, instead of entire Chinese audiences sitting in front of the TV voting on the competition, only the select 500-member audience—consisting of individuals of different ages, genders, and occupations—who are present at the show have the right to vote to eliminate one of the seven singers after each week's competition. The competition rules are from its Korean original version. The new competition mechanism has given the show the tone of an apolitical, transnational, and translingual game. In such a game, audiences' emotional participation, which had previously been interpreted as the realization of individual rights, has shifted into a collective manifestation seeking transnational cultural, lingual, financial, and emotional exchanges.

John Lie once noted about K-pop, "[G]iven the strong inflection of English lyric, it is difficult to decipher from listening just briefly whether the song is in Korean or any other language" (2012, p.356). This blurriness in Korean popular music is a strategic move: it is constructed by the social and aesthetic desire for a fluid linagualscape. The interplay between a shifting lingualscape and affective interactions implies an aspiration for communication outside of the state-sanctioned official languages. This negotiation is embedded within the context of Sino-Korean interactions of musical television programs. These cross-border interactions are structured by the logic of negotiating, penetrating, and eliminating boundaries by the affective medium of the screen, accompanied by the capitalist logic of self-expansion. Screen culture proliferates, expands, and imagines a deterritorialized/reterritorialized zone in the general publics' daily life. In these

processes of deterritorialization, the desire for eliminating language barriers is well reflected in the exchanges of musical television programs, a media form driven by a combination of screen culture's proliferation, capitalist market expansion, television's emphasis on the general publics' everydayness, and musical interactions bound to affective exchanges and reflective of liberation from official languages.

The remake of *I Am a Singer* invited the winner from its Korean original version to perform in the third season (2015), a technique that is commonly used in other Chinese remakes of Korean TV shows. The Korean singer known as "The One" (Korean name:정순원) sang the theme songs of many popular K-dramas, such as *All About Eve*, *Only You*, *Princess Hours*, *That Winter the Wind Blows*, and *Famous Child Princesses*, and garnered warm praise from Chinese and other Asian audiences. It is worth mentioning at this point that the popularity of K-drama outside of South Korea has laid the groundwork for cultivating overseas fandom and developing affective empathy among audiences. Some of the in-studio audience members are drawn from this international fan base. Hunan TV, famous for being an entertainment hub among other TV channels in Mainland China, had also imported *Only You* and *Famous Child Princesses* to China. Hunan TV had already aired these shows, so when The One appeared on *I Am a Singer*, the songs were already popular among viewers. In the third season of *I Am a Singer*, The One's trilingual (Chinese, Korean, and English) performance of *My Destiny,* the theme song of the hit K-drama *My Love from the Star*, drew a standing ovation and enthusiastic cheers from the audience. His bilingual (Chinese and Korean) performance of the song *That Man,* the theme song of another hit K-drama, *Secret Garden*, earned him the position of champion for that week. The performance of the same song in the original Korean show has also drawn Korean audiences' warm applause for its emotional resonance. His emotional stage and rendition of *Secret Garden*'s moving soundtrack in the Chinese

I Am s Singer were covered by *Koreaboo*, a digital media across multiple platforms that shares viral Korean pop culture in English to audience from all around world, drawing Korean audience's attention to this performance in connecting with his Chinese fandom and beyond, "[K]nown by many fans as Girls' Generation's Taeyeon's vocal coach, The One impressed Chinese audiences with his powerful performance of 'That Man.' He sang the first half of the song in Chinese, revealing his language flexibility, before transitioning to the original Korean lyrics."[117] His performance in Chinese remake went viral on various online platforms among Chinese and Korean audience, including on YouTube to which access is not officially granted in China, while an affective and interactive fandom community has forged. Audiences from around the globe, in difference languages, left such comments free of ethnic and linguistic boundaries as, " [I] feel this is very touching although there are words that I don't understand," "why this is a need to differentiate nationality, isn't good enough to just enjoy the song?" "I'm so excited just because of his voice," "My tears run down when sing along with him," and "language doesn't matter, just believe in your ears."[118] What our ears and eyes capture are not merely about language or ethnicity. In these interactive online appraisals, sensorial co-experience is highly stressed while standardized national languages are played down. Prior to performing in the Chinese remake, The One had twice been the champion in the Korean version of *I Am a Singer* and co-performed as a guest with the Chinese singer Huang Qishan in the final show of the first season of the Chinese remake in 2013. The connections between the original show and the remake were underscored by this co-performance, which featured the song "Without You." The lyrics of the song, "I can't live, the

[117] "The One takes first with 'That Man' on China's 'I Am A Singer 3,'" *Koreaboo*, 17 February 2015. https://www.koreaboo.com/video/one-takes-first-man-chinas-singer-3/ (accessed on 18 July 2018).
[118] See, for instance, the great number of views and active communication among audiences, in different languages, across from China, Korea, and beyond, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFLyXDKii7E (accessed on 18 July 2019). Also see Korean audiences' online appraisals of Chinese remake *I Am a Singer*, which are translated in Chinese. *Hujiang Korean*, 29 January 2013. https://kr.hujiang.com/new/p447502/ (accessed on 20 July 2019).

living without you," not only imply the intertextual survival of the cultural flows but also reveal unavoidable deterritorialization. The increasing mobility and fluidity of transnational cultural (co)production and (co)consumption have been (re)shaping the "territory" of each nation from a myriad of dimensions.

Figure 3.1 (left) Korean singer The One and Chinese singer Huang Qishan's co-performance of "Without you" in Chinese *I Am a Singer*[119]
Figure 3.2 (right) The One's performance of "That man" in the Korean original version *I Am a Singer*[120]

In such a context, Appadurai's theory on the deterritorialization of the world landscape offers a closely bounded transnationalism rather than a space defined by national borders. Appadurai constructs a framework for global cultural flows, which he loosely defines with the categories ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, mediascape, and ideoscape. As Appadurai explains, the usage of the suffix "–scape" indicates "the fluid and irregular shapes of these landscapes" (1996, p.28). This framework provides a heuristic device for reading the Sino-Korean relationship at the intersection of media, ideology, ethnicity, economy, and technology. Ethnoscape, defined as "the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live" (1996, p.33), refers to the intensified movement of people across borders. In the Sino-Korean

[119] Photo from Chinese remake *I Am a Singer*, season 1, episode 13, 12 April 2013.
[120] Photo from Korean original version of *I Am a Singer*, season 2, 16 September 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kryJASMU8ds (accessed on 19 July 2019).

interactions, for instance, given the population base and geopolitical proximity, it may be not surprising that Chinese tourists make up the largest portion of overseas visitors in South Korea; less discussed and perhaps unexpected, however, is the fact that South Koreans are also the largest subsection of overseas visitors to China.[121] The tourism and the increasing Sino-Korean co-productions in screen media strongly suggest that onscreen worlds, which spark spectators' imaginations, can lead to offscreen interactions in spectators' quotidian lives. In turn, these imaginings have been shaped and intensified by the participants' engaged practices on and off screen. In such a process, it is not difficult at all to imagine the interplay between ethnoscape and other "scapes," including lingualscape. We would be reductive if we equal ethnoscape to lingualscape, as the visual-aural communication and affective interactions traversing screen and reality are not taken into consideration, let alone ethnic identity does not always suggest one's national identity or usage of certain language (i.e. there are fifty-six ethnic groups in China, including Korean ethnic group, in the case of Sino-Korean interactions). And the emphasis on the semantic statement and micropolitics of lingualscape signals a significant departure from the mediascape. Each deterritorializing "scape" cannot be fully understood without first placing itself in an intersectional framework where each "scape" interacts with other "-scapes."

Combining the strengths of the shifting mediascape and technoscape, Korean TV shows have created a new disjuncture between what Appadurai calls "spatial and virtual neighborhoods" (1996, p.189). These neighbors are given access to each other through the projection of their

[121] Data of Korean international tourists collected from Korean Tourism Organization. https://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics.kto (accessed on 25 June 2017). Thanks to Lynn at Hallyu Experience Office, a marketing agency of Seoul Metropolitan Government, who generously provided me suggestions and access to obtain the data regarding tourism during my field research in Seoul in June 2017. Data of international tourist in China is from China Tourism Academy's *Annual Report of China Inbound Tourism Development 2017*. Also see the report on October 18, 2017 in *People's Daily Overseas Edition*. http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/2017-10-18/doc-ifymviyp2125936.shtml (in Chinese) (accessed on 20 November 2017)

similar imaginations about daily trivialities onto the screen. As individuals and yet collectively, virtual neighbors actively engage in the activity that contributes to the ever changing financescape, technoscape, and mediascape. Such activity, and the changes it shapes, takes place within the dynamics of juxtaposing affinity and resistance between Korea and China. In return, the Chinese mediascape has been reshaped along with the shifting ethnoscape, by placing Korean singers on the stage of the Chinese remake. Collaborating with Korean partners and learning from the Korean production technologies and methodologies of musical programs has reformed the mediascape and technoscape on the Chinese scene.

These re-compositions in diverse sectors interconnect with the flowing financescape. In recognition of the success of casting Korean singer The One in the third season, the Chinese remake of *I Am a Singer* cast another Korean singer Hwang Ch'iyŏl (황치열) in its fourth season in 2016. After singing popular theme songs such as "You Are My Everything" from the hit K-drama *Descendants of the Sun,* the Chinese song "Bitter Sea," and "An Oath of One's Own," among others, Hwang's fandom rapidly grew, numbering five million Chinese fans on the most popular Chinese social media platform, Weibo. His name promptly went viral after the previous nine years of relative silence in pop music, both in Korea and China. This rising popularity enabled him to achieve huge success in new album sales; the booking fees for his musical performances skyrocketed. According to the Korean Gaon Record Chart's investigation, the sales of his newly-issued mini album "Be Ordinary" reached more than 220,000, making him the highest-sold soloist in 2017, surpassing the record of all solo artists in last four years. His booking fee soared to 400,000 RMB (around 63,000 USD), which is 100 times his price in South Korea. His success and influence capitalized on his exposure to audiences via the screen and has consequently (re)shaped

the Sino-Korean financescape, standing as one of the most representative examples of scape-morphing embodiment and a border-crossing beneficiary in this new pattern of *hallyu* remakes.

Offscreen inter-actions are derived from spectators' imagination upon watching the onscreen cultural content. The charm of the screen-based *hallyu* has led many Chinese audiences to tour South Korea in order to actually experience what they have watched on the screen. The *screen* is capable of capitalizing on the Korean cultural content and tourists' desire for sensational experience. Take for instance, Chinese tourists in Korea: 70 percent of Chinese tourists went there for shopping, with each spending an average of 2200 U.S dollars, doubling the average amount spent by other overseas tourists.[122] The mobility of Chinese tourists and their consumption followed the pop fad *hallyu* has pushed the financescape, and at the same time, deeply grounded the mediascape that projects possible lives, fantasies, and imaginations, in turn inducing spectators' actions and movement. The prosperity of mutual investment and financial exchanges in the Sino-Korean collaborative works offer an apt example for this linkage. Mutually, deterritorialization of the monetary market greatly affects the fluid movement of ethnic groups, thus (re)shaping the ethnoscape, and vice versa.

The interactions between all these fluid -scapes not only reshape post-national identities but also the relationships between China and Korea. The interconnections create bonds between Korea and China that afford an alternative to Western-centric hegemonic transculturation. The shifts of the lingualscape in the Sino-Korean context are also seen in hybridized forms of national culture. Hybridity has been suggested as an explanation for the success of *hallyu*. Doobo Shim points out that hybridity is a struggle when Korean culture is confronted by global cultural

[122] Qingpei Dong, "Chinese tourists boost South Korea's tourism." Chinese tourists boost South Korea's tourism - China.org.cn (in Chinese). http://china.org.cn/travel/2016-01/05/content_37459258.htm (accessed on February 17, 2017).

domination in the era of globalization (Shim, 2006). This hybridity is a negotiation between a minority culture, which seeks cultural expansion, and mainstream global cultural hegemony. Gerardo Mosquera, also, argues in "The Marco Polo Syndrome" that the experience of the hybridity, appropriation, and re-semanticisation gains power in the increasing interactions among cultures.[123] Grounded within hybridized forms, the merging of and connections between Korean and Chinese television programs have strengthened both sides' competitiveness in the television industries within and beyond their domestic audiences, forming a transnational spectatorship that is not dominated by the West.

Constant deterritorialization has already made "Chineseness" or "Koreanness" hybridized notions, rendering baseless the ethno-centric totalized self-perception of a "national" culture as opposed to the presumptuous conception of another culture. Serious methodological problems arise within the preoccupied assumption of cultural or linguistic fixation while all the shifting -scapes are heavily suggestive of that language and culture is not static. We live in "a great time of hybrids," as the Mexican rock star Rockdrigo sang.[124] This "time of hybrids" offers an unconventional challenge: how do we reinterpret these identities without falling back on the oversimplified stance of rejecting dependence or claiming cultural autonomy. Hybridity indeed empowers the spread of both the Korean original show and its Chinese remake. However, hybridity is merely the starting point for our discussion on transcultural research, rather than the conclusion. As Lawrence Grossberg also reminds us, research cannot be conducted "only at the level of local ethnography otherwise it would just be 'a failure' of the work of globalization theory." Grossberg further explains, "I say failure because hybridity is not a solution but the given condition of all

[123] Gerardo Mosquera, "The Marco Polo Syndrome: Some Problems around Art and Eurocentrism." ed. Zoya Kocur and Simon Leung. *Theory in Contemporary Art Since 1985*, 2nd ed., (Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
[124] As quoted in Gerardo Mosquera's "The Marco Polo syndrome."

human reality, the starting point for theorization rather than the theoretical conclusion to an unsolved equation."[125] The theory of hybridity is not unique to Korean culture, of course, and so a particularistic reading lacks intellectual layers to understand the cultural phenomenon. Still, hybridity is a fundamental context and should be the starting point for our studies of China, of Korea, and of transnationality. Within this context, more important questions emerge: What sorts of hybridity are there? In what aspects are different qualities hybridized or intermingled? How would our everydayness differ under these intermingling? In what modes and how would the intermingling account for the ways we view each other and potentials for collaboration within the context of parallel tensions?

Figure 3.3 (left) Korean singer The One's performance of "That Man" in the Chinese remake *I Am a Singer*[126]
Figure 3.4 (right) Korean singer Hwang Ch'iyŏl's performance of "Bang Bang Bang" in the Chinese remake *I Am a Singer*[127]

[125] Lawrence Grossberg, "Constructing the Conjuncture: Struggling over Modernity." *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense* (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2010), 60-61.
[126] Photo by Hunan TV, from *Koreaboo*'s report "The One takes first with 'That Man' on China's 'I Am A Singer 3,'" 17 February 2015. https://www.koreaboo.com/video/one-takes-first-man-chinas-singer-3/ (accessed on 19 July 2018).
[127] Photo by Hunan TV. Chinese *I Am a Singer*, season 4, episode 4. 5 February 2016.

Affective negotiation

The lingualscape performs an affective negotiation outside of state-sanctioned lingual systems, which facilitates a non-politicized communication among the general public. This adds a layer to the hybridization discussed previously. The boundary-blurring multilingual lyrics featured on *I Am a Singer* are far less about "accurate" communication in a standard language than they are about affective communication. The lyrics acknowledge linguistic pluralism and deterritorialize the lingualscape. Co-consumption and co-production practices in the Sino-Korean musical television program both shape and are shaped by the intermingling; it is not so much a hybridity strategy but a fuzzy blurriness, refusing to be sublime or to be translated and deconstructing any ethnic- or national- centric interpretation. In the Chinese remake of the Korean show *I Am a Singer*, it would be hard to define a performance associated with either Chineseness or Koreanness. Hwang Ch'iyŏl's trilingual (Chinese, Korean, and English) performance of *Bang Bang Bang* in season four, for instance, took that week's crown and received warm applause from the audience and music critics. *Allkpop*, a US-based Korean pop blog, reported this performance in which Hwang "stood on stage, decked out in a white tuxedo, and blew away the audience."[128] *BNTNews*, commented that Hwang's "deep and emotional voice" and "passionate dance" has made him "received enthusiastic reactions from the crowd;" "it is no exaggeration to say that Hwang brought 'Hwang Chi Yeol fever' in China," and Hwang is rising to stardom in China as one of the Hallyu celebrity."[129] Indeed, it was a sensation on Weibo and covered by *China Daily*, in which Hwang's

[128] "Bing Bang's 'Bang Bang Bang' wins Hwang Chi Yeol 1st place on Chinese 'I Am a Singer,'" *allkpop*, 6 February 2016. https://www.allkpop.com/article/2016/02/big-bangs-bang-bang-bang-wins-hwang-chi-yeol-1st-place-on-chinese-i-am-a-singer (accessed on 20 July 2019). Korean names are romanized using the McCune-Reischauer system in this dissertation unless it is quoted from other sources (i.e. Hwang Ch'iyŏl). Hwang Chi Yeol is the romanization of the same name according to the Revised Romanization of Korean.

[129] "Hwang Chi Yeol Took the First Place on Chinese version of 'I Am a Singer 4,'" *BNTNews*, 2 June 2016. https://www.msn.com/en-my/news/other/hwang-chi-yeol-took-the-first-place-on-chinese-version-of-%E2%80%98i-am-a-singer4%E2%80%99/ar-BBpbOPq (accessed on 20 July 2019).

remake was compared to the original version sung by BIGBANG, which was, of course, itself recomposed from Teddy G-Dragon's piece by Shin Seung-Ick.[130] Besides the elements borrowed from Black musical conventions in the original song, Hwang's performance also incorporated a prelude of music and movements from the *James Bond* film franchise's iconic opening, Broadway style orchestration, Korean rap, and Chinese and English lyrics, not to mention the Korean and Chinese dancers, Hong Kong music director, and the live band made up with musicians from the U.S., Hong Kong, Portugal, Mainland China, Korea, Australia, without whom Hwang's performance would perhaps not have been received as it was. While there is a whole article's worth of analysis to be done just on the origins of the instruments, garments, makeup, props, and the mutual influence between them, the point is that each dimension's intermingling increases the difficulty to define the nationality or origin of this performance.

The Deleuzian concept of collective assemblage is helpful here to understand this multiplicity in the musical performances, as well as in our daily life of deterritorialization. As Deleuze and Guattari contend, "there is a collective assemblage of enunciation, a machinic assemblage of desire, one inside the other and both plugged into an immense outside that is a multiplicity in any case" (1987, p.23). This music television program, either the Korean original or the Chinese remake, has been set up to be plugged into an "outside" in which multiplicity is the inevitable norm, reflecting a machinic assemblage of desire for multiplying and connecting outside. The pronunciation of the lyrics was less driven by phonetic accuracy and more mixed in a blurriness in which language barriers do not play any important role in connecting audiences. The most efficient part in terms of communication in the performance, however, is conveyed by the

[130] "How is Hwang Chi-yeul's cover of Bang Bang Bang," *China Daily*, 3 Mar 2016 (in Chinese) http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/interface/toutiaonew/53002523/2016-03-03/cd_23728446.html (accessed on 29 January 2018).

lyrics--*bang bang bang*--that are void of meaning outside of their onomatopoedic function. Nevertheless, the "*bang bang bang*" is meaningful in that it is carried out through visual modes of communication that abet deterritorializing the lingualscape.

Language implies a certain structure or code (Bauman and Briggs, 2003; Makoni and Pennycook, 2005). To acknowledge what Derrida calls the "untranslatable" is a post-structuralist escape from the "violence of representation (Derrida, 2000)." Lie points out that even in music, the so-called "universal language," there still exists a "resistance to a foreign-language lyric (Lie, 2012)." Foreigners are the ones from a different culture speaking different languages. When one culture, in the course of engaging with another culture, requires the foreigner to speak the host language, the host culture performs violence as a host. This so-called hospitality is conditional; as Jacques Derrida suggests, it forces foreigners to be one of "us" and thus "violently erases the heterogeneity of others (Derrida, 2000)." The uttering of the quasi-nonsense *bang bang bang* is both a foreigners' revolt against violent conditional hospitality and the host's open acceptance of the foreigners' utterings. Language is not a transparent medium; rather, it is constructed, if not manipulated, by various intentions within the nation-state apparatus. By both acknowledging human linguistic diversity and staying alert to the agenda of control through language, the uttering of the meaningless yet meaningful *bang bang bang* in Hwang's performance opens a window of connecting audiences free of cohesive violence. Thus, I venture to propose that the deterritorializing lingualscape in the Sino-Korean engagement of musical TV shows is a reconstruction of a world order through nonofficial language—a new world order reimagined through the apparatus of screen, one that is decentered, eliminating barriers for communication and establishing visual relations through which audiences achieve a vernacular relationship to one another. It is an order in which affective qualities mediate the relationships between the audiences.

The live and offscreen audiences are related and communicate with each other, experiencing affective interactions that traverse on- and offscreen environments.

Relative to verbal dialogue, while it can be said that music requires less translational intervention, the problem of translating lyrics remains nonetheless. In the musical program *I Am a Singer,* both The One and Hwang Ch'iyŏl's bilingual or trilingual songs were translated and subtitled for broadcasting. However, the 500 live audience members who actually voted on the contestants were not provided any translation. Nevertheless, they rejoiced in the experience of sensorial immersion. The lack of translation apparently did not dampen their appreciation of the show. Like how his online fandom comments: "why this is a need to differentiate nationality" and "language doesn't matter, just believe in your ears."[131] The Chinese audiences were able to greet the Korean performances with hospitality free of linguistic violence, and it is this hospitality that lies at the center of empathetic feeling-togetherness. Only when hostility is removed can this feeling be cultivated. Although neoliberal economic interdependence in the global capitalist economy has been significantly shaping the cultural interactions between Korea and China, it would still be too presumptuous to reduce the complex relationships between nations and humans to the economy. As Lawrence Grossberg argues, "by assuming it is always and all about the economy (stupid!), it renders invisible other developments that are equally important and equally troubling (2012, p.59)." Economy does not provide answers to all. It is when the border-crossing exchanges occur in the general public's everydayness that exchanges can be penetrative into each other culture's milieu and so might possibilities for wholesome, reciprocal relationships emerge. I believe that the trivialities of everyday life for the general public was also on Sheldon H. Lu's mind when he suggested that "postsocialism is everyday life" and "postsocialism pertains to

[131] See note 116, about online comments made by audiences.

perception and affects (2007, p.209)." This is not about the grand ideologies or state-sanctioned narrative; rather, it is about the *affect* of the interactions and negotiations in the general public's everyday interactions. It is here, in the affect, where true communication is possible. Echoing Grossberg, Appadurai's "community of sentiment" (Appadurai, 1990) is a group that begins "to imagine and feel things together, because of the condition of collective reading, criticism, and pleasure (1996, p.8)." Music has long been a medium for expressing people's hidden longings, pouring out their emotions, and bearing their hopes. Transnational fandom is built on the shared affective experiences generated when watching the show, and reinforced further in intentional communities formed to express and share sorrow, joy, sadness, happiness, fury, and the dissatisfaction of partially understanding the multilingual lyrics. Such moments suggest an acknowledgement of linguistic pluralism and a playful mechanization in the form of entertainment. "Glossolalia" (speaking in tongues)[132] becomes a way to communicate in the individual domain through the co-consumption of collaborative screen culture, wherein standard official languages are absent.

Language shapes thoughts, and thoughts guide actions. While officially sanctioned languages can be distorted by various prohibitions and proscriptions, singing through a hybridized language that is not officially constructed might perhaps create space for a new order within which official-sanctioned ideologies are deconstructed and sincere communication is possible. This is a process of building new order through language use that is mediated by the deterritorializing lingualscape based on visual and intuitive modes of communication. This lingualscape imagines a new ordering of various dimensions of linguistic, culture, and ideology, and it reconstructs the ways that

[132] Scholarship on glossolalia, see, for example, Daniel Heller-Roazen, "Glossolalia: From the unity of the word to plurality of tongues," Barbara Cassin and Steven Rendall ed., *Dictionary of Untranslatables: a philosophical lexicon*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 594.

audiences speak, think, and act. The transnational musical TV program *I Am a Singer* enables both Chinese and Korean audiences to relate to each other and to project their affects, either positive or negative, on screen, thereby arousing their affective thinking of each other off screen. As Bliss Cua Lim raises, "the term market proximity refers to a close familiarity between one national-popular audience and another nation's screen texts (2009, p.227)." Bent Hua Chua also mentions that when the focus is on the urban space, Asian audiences more easily self-identify with Korean screen culture than with American screen culture (Chua, 2004). To the audiences, the bodies of the celebrities become interchangeable bodies on the screens, leading to an immersed experience. Consumers are geographically located in "cultural spaces" within which they bring their own cultural context to bear on the content of the imported product. As Chua contends, an audience member is capable of "transcend(ing) his or her grounded nationality to forge abstract identification (2004, p.227)." It is crucial that this abstract identification constructs communities of sentiment, and that in the process, audiences sing, view, read, feel, and communicate through a system of visual relations that crosses barriers. As Appadurai notes, "neighborhoods are designed to be instances and exemplars of a generalized mode of belonging to a wider territorial imaginary." Therefore, a transnational imagined community is potentially forming; as Appadurai writes, "neighborhood as context produces the context of neighborhoods (1996, p.191)." A community of sentiment has been shaped by the amplified dynamics of unremitting deterritorialization where national culture has developed into a hybridized form.

Border-crossing interactions incite accompanying frictions, especially in the context of geographical proximity and cultural similarity. In the case of co-consuming a musical TV show, community is built upon a shared affective experience, though it is important to note that affect does not necessarily suggest a utilitarian pleasurable experience. This is so not only because

negative emotional qualities (presentation of pain, sorrow, and frustration) are involved in exchanges within the lingualscape, but also because these negative affects result from the fact that the nation-state is not obsolete. Along with the Chinese political and cultural transformation in the postsocialist context, official governmental political amity can always serve as the munificent prerequisite to the market interchange that is represented in television and other visual forms of cultural exchange between China and Korea. The Chinese remake of *I Am a Singer* triumphantly rolled out five seasons from 2013 to 2016. Nevertheless, since the Chinese State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) placed a ban on Korean popular culture and Korean performers due to the U.S. missile systems, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in August 2016, the sixth season of *I Am a Singer* was forced to be renamed *Singer*, in order to suggest more distance from the original Korean version.[133] Korean singers are no longer invited to the show. The state's intervention in Hunan TV through surveillance and censorship also made casting more difficult. At the beginning of the sixth season, the program director Hong Tao burst into tears while giving his opening remarks. He choked with sobs as he said, "I had tried my best. We really did our best to try to invite those singers you anticipated to come. This is all I can say."[134] The exact reason for this difficulty in casting is unknown, although it is clear from this incident that the affects delivered through the musical TV show are not only comprised of positive sentiments and optimistic indulgence. Dissonant affects and thoughtful reflection can be raised as well. The role of nation-state intervention is still a crucial question in transnational cultural exchanges.

[133] The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT, 2013–2018). It was formerly named the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT 1998–2013).
[134] Tao Hong, dir., *Singer*, January 16, 2018.

In his book, *Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture*, Henry Jenkins raises this point:

> The transnational circulation of media may be the most fragile, given the geopolitical and economic complexities of the situations we are discussing. However, we do believe that the informal spread of media content through networked communications may circumnavigate if not circumvent some of the factors (political, legal, economic, cultural) which have allowed U.S. mass media to maintain its dominance throughout much of the twentieth century.[135]

Jenkins observes the fragility of the transnational circulation of media, and yet he still credits a great deal to the spreadability of commercial mass media, arguing that the role spreadable media has played is perhaps "the most powerful force in our collective cultural lives (2013, 259)." Hye-seung Chung and David Scott Diffrient question this optimistic assumption based on media spreadability in *Movie Migrations*.[136] Nevertheless, I would like to proffer at this juncture that it is this very spreadability that allows access to one another across boundaries facilitated by the shifting lingualscape in the general public's everyday lives.

In "a potentially volatile policy environment"[137] such as mainland China, accessibility is the first step towards being knowable and comprehensible. Just as hip-hop has become highly politicized as a dominant music genre in the U.S., Chinese audiences also seek musical affective negotiation to project their longings, pour out their emotions, and merge into a transnational context, all without touching the political red line. While Childish Gambino's *This is America* was

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[135] Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green, *Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture* (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 261.
[136] Hye-seung Chung and David Scott Diffrient, *Movie Migrations: Translational Genre Flows and South Korean Cinema* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2015).
[137] In "Chinese transnational cinema and the collaborative tilt toward South Korea," Brian Yecies calls the Chinese "a potentially volatile policy environment" through an observation of transnational collaboration in the Chinese film industry. Michael Keane, ed. *Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in China* (Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA, 2016), 236.

awarded the Grammy Award for Song of the Year in 2019, it is hard to imagine that something like *This is China* could even survive in the Chinese environment, let alone receive an industry-wide award. In fact, in order to integrate into the global musicscape, many countries rolled out their own version of *This is America,* one of which was indeed *This is China*. Nevertheless, the video only survived for three minutes on Weibo, the Chinese counterpart of Twitter. Within this context, the original Korean musical TV program (with of course some politicized parts) provides a model for Chinese musical programs that is compatible with China's transitioning identity and consumption patterns in contemporary market economy. This practice of selective export, in return, helps the original Korean musical TV show itself be capable of connecting with or "plugging into" others' cultural milieu. This incorporation has facilitated cultural deterritorialization where shared life experiences and emotional qualities can flourish, creating regional musicscapes not dominated by U.S. influence.

In the case of the Chinese remake of *I am a Singer*, which is primarily watched on Chinese streaming websites instead of official television stations, the show provides Chinese audiences an alternative way to enjoy everyday leisure across borders, generating a space within which Chinese audiences can watch and compare the original shows and Chinese remakes. Online discussions of these musical shows on internet blogs have changed TV consumption from a linear practice into a multilingual, multidirectional, and interactive experience. In this process, the shifting lingualscape plays a significant role in facilitating audiences' need for synchronicity and in removing language barriers within exchanges, resulting in the forging of a virtual transnational community of common ordinariness. This everydayness comes to fruition in the combination of musical television programs, where the shifting lingualscape of the lyrics transforms sung music into a universal

language, and into the television, which offers an affordable and private leisure available at any time. Together, they reshape audiences' everyday lives.

The potential for establishing mutual understanding and respect between Korea and China is a subset of a bigger issue, that of East Asian "conjuncture," to use Lawrence Grossberg's term, tempered by the identity conflicts caused by modern Japanese colonialism and contemporary national interests. Grossberg calls for "telling a story about what's going on, and to begin to open new possibilities for imagination and struggle…and in particular for imagining new possibilities for a future that can be reached from the present."[138] New possibilities can only be made through new investments. New investments require a reimagining, including a contextualization of all the multiplicities and alternatives and a turn away from making arbitrary conclusions and (re)producing binary extremes. One of the compelling consequences of *hallyu* is that its global fandom has illuminated a transnational vision, one that opens new possibilities, while also abetting Koreans' national pride and other nations' resistance to nationalism. in an attempt to produce a new ideology under an inherited dichotomy, the result would merely be the reproduction of the old. In contrast, to question the state-sponsored narrative via the screen culture apparatus would be a more productive start. In the age of globalization, one of the predominant themes in the Sino-Korean conjuncture is the tension between nationalism and transnationalism. The Chinese practice of importing or mimicking Korean TV programs and the backlash against the practice are forms of "resistance" and "affinity." Particularly, in a transforming China, the old ideologies and new commercial imperatives are at odds. All-powerful capitalist consumerism and commercialism has challenged the revolutionary mentality and the socialist ideology among the general public in Mainland China. Media productions play a central role in this process.

[138] Lawrence Grossberg, *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense.* (Durham and London: Duke University press, 2010). 67.

The Chinese remake of *I Am a Singer*, featuring Korean singers and their multilingual songs, helps to meet this need to blur linguistic boundaries. Such a practice is motivated by the dual purposes of producing a sensational TV show and diversifying the landscape of a performing stage in the globalized screen cultural arena. The collaborative media productions and co-consumption practices of this music television show among Chinese and Korean audiences suggest that common ground is possible. Traffic mediated by screen culture flows across barriers and boundaries in a fluid form of storytelling, within which the demand for collapsing lyrical barriers is correspondingly rising as a newly constructed aesthetic sensibility. The One and Hwang Chi-yeul's multilingual performances have reshaped the lingualscape of the program, satisfied audiences' craving for crossing borders (as the new aesthetic demands), and reconfigured a new global order arranged around the everyday life experience of the general publics.

Quotidian lives

Aesthetic sensibilities construct and are constructed by the shifting cultural landscape. The recurring process of (co)production and (co)consumption of Korean popular culture has contributed to and simultaneously been affected by the ever-morphing financescape, technoscape, ethnoscape, mediascape, and ideoscape that have been penetrative into the general public's quotidian lives. Images of Korean onscreen idols are changing the cultural landscape in Korea and beyond. In order to facilitate ethnic migration of the *hallyu* tourists, stimulate financial profits, and maximize cultural influence that *screen culture* can bring, as a newly emerging cultural hub, Korea has been dedicated to altering its urban landscape by building various *hallyu* experience centers, such as SM town, MBC World, K-style hub, K-star Road (an imitation of Hollywood's star road), Seoul Global Culture Center, and so forth. At these experience centers, K-wave fans can watch the

360-View Media Wall, take photos with Hallyu stars by using AR (Augmented Reality) technology, and learn about Korean traditional culture by actually making Korean food or trying Korean medicine, and so forth. Various kinds of screens provide tourists with different visual, haptic, auditory, and even olfactory experiences aimed at "feeling Korea'. Tourist boom led by K-dramas, films, and K-pop offers affective sensorium to serve and also shape tourists' imagination of Korea. Tourists become spectators bearing such imagination when they watch Korean screen culture that brought them to Korea. The *screen* has played a significant role in providing sensorial experiences to the tourists who were attracted by the cultural content that was showed on the screen. Herein, the *screen* sustains its significance through regenerating and mutual reliant relations. Those experiences constantly negotiate with various boundaries for intimacy within the traffic across borders. If we look into the accumulative data on tourism to South Korea in August 2016.[139] Until August 2016, the tourists from China have amounted to 48.9%, nearly half of the total number of tourists in South Korea. The statistics are categorized by tourists' purpose of visit and nationality. The purpose of these "tours", simply a desire for an authentic Korean experience, has been the major motivating force. It is fair to imagine the deterritorialized ethnoscape in South Korea has palpably reconfigured its cultural landscape.

Like Korean screen culture, all these deterritorialization merge into new space whenever it is capable of connecting to or plugging into. The urban space in Korea has been filled with ubiquitous faces of popular culture stars on the screens that has mushroomed in all over locales such as bus stations, taxis, airports, television, commercials, portable electronic devices, cosmetic shops, and so forth. This permeating visibility of Korean faces and bodies is remade in Chinese

[139] "Korea, Monthly Statistics of Tourism." Korean Tourism Organization. https://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics/eng/inout/inout.kto. (accessed on June 27, 2017).

everyday life and viewed as a sort of aesthetic standard. The construction of such merging aesthetic sensibility has its embodiment ranging from Chinese merchants widely using Korean faces or bodies for commercial advertisement (for instance, on Alibaba Taobao 'shopping website advertising clothing, cosmetics, jewelries, etc.), to the booming of Korean cosmetic industries among many Chinese especially those who joins "plastic surgery tourist groups."[140] Based on such assumptions, aesthetic sensibilities interplays with the shifting cultural landscape. For a fact, to place Korean singers in the Chinese remake *I Am a Singer* in turn deterritorialized the performing stage and cultural landscape in China and served a transnational sensorial experience to Chinese spectators' sensibilities, visually, auditorily, and linguistically. Seeing these aesthetic modes of representing spectators' cognition of cultural landscape in the moment of spreading screen culture presents an everyday permeating and experientially affective exchanges.

Proximity refers to something more than a geographical one; it also refers to communities of the sentiment. Market proximity and the cultural similarity indeed constructs an inseparable variable to allow a feeling together community to take shape screen-capitalism's spread. On the one hand, China established official diplomatic relations with Korea in 1992 and has imported Korean cultural products since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, after more than half a century's ban on Japanese popular culture, this prohibition was finally lifted in South Korea in 1998. Since the 1990s, there has been increased regional cooperation between formerly antagonistic nations. The practice of remake has pushed previous boundaries in East Asia, advancing deterritorialization of various -scapes. Chinese remakes of Korean TV programs are neither a simple repetition nor a precedent. "Japanese popular cultural products have (also) been

[140] Such utilization and commercialization of faces and bodies should be subject to neoliberal and dehumanized criticism, though Korean screen culture seem to be caught in the dilemma between commending morally accusable practices and being empowered by their significant benefits. Here I focus on the less discussed variables of aesthetic sensibilities, cultural landscape, and shifting lingualscape.

'copied', 'partially integrated', 'plagiarized', 'mixed', 'reproduced' into Korean products". Cultural appropriation has reshaped each nation's cultural terrain. Such practices of both learning and mimicking in East Asia agrees with linguistic implications. Japanese word of "to learn (*manabu*)" is etymologically derived from the word "to mimic (*manebu*)." Similarly, Chinese word of *xue* also connotes dual meaning of to learn and to mimic. One mimics/learns from the other. Learning through mimicry has been a praxis that plays a significant role in border-crossing cultural deterritorialization.

Boundary Breaker

Demand for deterritorializing lingualscape does not stop at "nonsense uttering" to remove the walls built by state-sanctioned standardized languages. This demand is also reflected by the numerous boundary breakers who voluntarily contributes to building the system of visual relations. The familiarity formed through market proximity or geographical proximity cannot fully explain how Korean wave built its global fandom among young audiences; rather the familiarity has been cultivated and expanded in constant motion, reaching to broader audiences. Given the increasing cultural and economic exchanges in an internet-connected environment, demands for synchronicity and breaking the language boundaries have resulted in the birth of border-crossing breakers. One of the representative examples is the non-profit volunteer subtitle groups. in the K-Wave fandom. One of the most active volunteer Korean subtitle translating groups among its Chinese fandon is the "Phoenix Angel K-drama Society." "Bad Written" is the main translator of the group, who used to answer audiences' curiosities regarding their work processes in an interview reported by the Shanghai Morning Post[141],

[141] "Most Chinese Caption Team of *Star* are College Students, Finish One Episode per Three Hours," *China News*. February 24, 2014 (in Chinese). http://www.chinanews.com/yl/2014/02-24/5875271.shtml (accessed on July 20,

> "Generally speaking, group members purchase and download the drama resource within 30 minutes of each episode's broadcasting. Usually we form a four to five-person group and divide the labor. We spend around one hour finishing the translation, and another hour making the timeline, proofreading, and reviewing. After two hours' work, we need to compress the file and send it to the online streaming website within another 30 minutes. Take *My Love from the Star* for instance, we start our preparations before 9pm every Wednesday and Thursday and finish all the work before 1am. All these are done online. Our five translators are living all around the world; the furthest one is in America... Most of our translators are college students. In the Korean translating team, many of them are ethnic Korean college students; some other students are Korean majors or students who studied abroad in Korea… Beside the translation part, there are actually more members in charge of the computer technologies. They are K-drama fans but cannot speak any Korean language. They are college students, white-collar workers, and member of the "jet-lag Party (Chinese students studying in Britain or the U.S.)."

Translating groups have been working for more than ten years without any payment. All of their work was voluntary, motivated by their affection for Korean screen culture. From the broadcasting of the episode till showing the subtitled version posted on the streaming websites in front of the Chinese audiences, the entire process merely takes less than three hours. The translating groups' work is one part of the process of global cooperation. The translators for *hallyu* are dispersed in multiple locations in the world, and the fandom also expands to the Chinese diaspora. It is also presumably that the East Asian diaspora were the ones firstly started to consume Korean popular culture and thus built up the *hallyu* fandom in North America. Language has been the frontier of

2017).

cultural dissemination and emblematic of a culture's fandom establishment. It is in many cases that overseas Korean language classrooms are also filled with international Chinese speakers. These boundary-breakers' contributions to the spread of *hallyu* in China has reflected the spectators' desire for deterritorializing the lingualscape in their everydayness, particularly evident in the rising screen-cultural exchanges.

The demand for lingualscape deterritorialization is closely associated with Korean screen culture's excelling in connecting young people who has grown up in the world of screens. Those young people are the major consumers and participatory contributors of screen culture, as well as presages the futurality of screen culture. As "Bad Written" says, the translating group members are "college students, white collars workers, and members of 'jet-lag Party'", those people are producers as well as major consumers. It is not surprising that the boundary between the authorship and spectatorship has been blurred in a time of global net-like co-working. The convergence punctuates "the emphasis on the similarities of young, urban, and middle-class consumer lifestyles."[142] Taking a closer look at the statistical data classified by the tourists' age, Chinese tourists ranging from 21 to 30 accounted for the largest share, around 1.4 million (1,414,325) of the total 5.6 million (5,608,046). Younger audiences emerge as the major consumers. Young consumers have become the motor producing more rapidly updated and diversely composed cultural content. Younger audiences subsidize and in turn abound in the new aesthetics of ephemerality and diversity.

In his discussion of the future of "nation-state," Appadurai offers an optimistic prediction for the relationship between the local and the global. He claims that the "nation-states, as units in a complex interactive system, are not very likely to be the long-term arbiters of the relationship

[142] Chua Beng Huat. "Conceptualizing an East Asian popular culture," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 2004. 5:2, 200-221, DOI: 10.1080/1464937042000236711

between globality and modernity (1996, p.19).” He refers to the positive dimension of “unsettling possibilities” as the “most exciting dividend of living in modernity at large (1996, p.23).” Those unsettling possibilities are in motion and conditioned by a consensus of plurality. A consensus that there is neither a universal logic of development nor a conviction of linear or evolutionary modernity; rather being open to the multiplicities of modernities and making investment to mutual understanding and respect are precisely the prerequisites of a practical and qualified optimism. Within these assumptions, the co-consumption and co-production of the cultural products disseminated by screen-capitalism bequeath a great hope for making such understanding and respect a reality.

On the one hand, as Appadurai suggests, diverse forms of transnational allegiance and affiliation indicate the newly formed world order in the era of globalization. On the other hand, however, “globalization does not necessarily or even frequently imply homogenization or Americanization. (1996, p.17).” Although it is “unlikely that there will be anything merely about the local,” globalization is not a story all about homogenization either. There is an ongoing construction of locality in the process of globalization. The local and the global are paradoxically growing and strategically develop into new forms. As Appadurai contends, “locality is a historical product and the subject to the dynamics of the global (1996, 15).” These subjects of the dynamics of global will not easily disappear provided that globalization is not a finalized practice. What I want to suggest is the logic of globalizing one local culture does not denote that culture melting into homogenization or negating plurality. Instead, in order to sustain the locality itself, instrumentally employing sharing elements with other culture in fact aims at the worldwide expansion of distinctive heterogeneity—by connecting into other’s cultural milieu. Worldwide expansion of *hallyu* by constantly incorporating other cultures’ features is designed to establish a

new hybridized visual mode and construct an imaginative identity for Korea. Persistent incorporation has facilitated cultural deterritorialization where shared life experience and emotional qualities communicate and grow, rendering a regional identity contends with national ones.

Towards a be-coming community

New aesthetic modes arise and bond transnational consumers as is the case, for example, in musical TV programs. Even so, it would be too hasty to draw a conclusion about cosmopolitan pop. Like the anti-Korean wave fomented by the Chinese state, the invention of the nation-state is deeply linked with cultural interactions, including the deterritorializing lingualscape. In *Tourist Distractions*, Youngmin Choe argues that being distracted from nation-state sponsored narratives could be a "productive distraction (Choe, 2016)." Derrida, in *Of Hospitality*, also questions the validity of "hospitality" towards foreigners as a host (Derrida, 2000). As Appadurai argues, culturalism inherently involves ethnic violence, or "identity politics mobilized at the level of the nation-state (1996, p.15)." The ability to be hospitable lies in the ability to be the host. This identity of host is granted by the government. Thus, in order to maintain being a host, there are responsibilities that need to be fulfilled, such as obeying the governmental surveillance and communication via official languages. Paradoxically, the state's intervention becomes the precondition for being a host, although the responsibility of hosting requires that hospitality be offered, sometimes in violation of the state's requirements. In this sense, a genuine "face to face encounter," to borrow Emmanuel Levinas's term (Levinas, 1985), would make it difficult to maintain a reality where violence is perpetuated.

The invention of the third party, the state, not only in the form of intervention and surveillance, but also in the language system it constructs for the purposes of propaganda under the veil of national identification, has destroyed the primal and purist ethical relationship between the Other and the self. In his article "Friend," Giorgio Agamben's insights shed light on the ontological basis of friendship by drawing on Aristotle's theory that friends "share the same sweetness of existing (2006, p.33)." This affective experience, this feeling together, leads people toward (re)constructing a community with the future in mind. The shared experience of co-sensing the music, sound, lights, and images in the same TV programs on screen foster richer understandings across cultures. All these visual modes help to build a system of visual relations in which spectators are able to relate to each other across borders. The musical show *I Am a Singer* allows local audiences to identify themselves and offers them a comparative perspective that permits audiences to speak to each other, albeit not in standardized official languages. This provides a channel for an empathetic appreciation of the other. The shifting lingualscape is an imagination not of a common language, but of powerful multiplicities. It is a reimagination of the general public speaking in tongues to shake off ideological and structural shackles of the state-sanctioned language system.

Achieving this community is also related to Levinas's "serving to the other," wherein one feels compelled to get to know the "other" culture (Levinas, 1985). In Lawrence Grossberg's words, getting to know the other would be an ethical responsibility that needs to be fulfilled. In *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense*, Grossberg argues that ethical commitment is to the other, to the belonging together with the other. As he puts it, "my own ethical sense is constituted as an obligation to an other… the other is what can only be imagined—as a coming community… it is there that ethics and politics, practice and desire, meet (2010, p.100). The (re)construction of this transnational be-coming of community has been shaped by the dynamics of both division and

integration. Thus, it would be more pragmatic to frame discourse about this be-coming community in a future tense. In East Asia, this be-coming community is relevant to Choe's proposal of Asianization in terms of feeling together in an "affect community." Choe argues for a "self-reflective perspective for viewing the complexities—its anxieties, tensions, and celebratory gestures—of a new East Asian affective economy (2016, p.7)." This affective economy requires us to resituate the co-productions and remakes within East Asia in a more affective sense in terms of feeling together. Choe further points out that the "exchange of products and capital… (is in) a sense of what Giorgio Agamben refers to as the 'con-sent' at the heart of friendship (2016, p.7)." In the East Asian affective being-togetherness, this "con-sent" is not only embodied by increasingly interdependent economic engagement, but it is also embedded in the rising regional cultural identity and co-consumption of popular culture as a shared experience and feeling in the everyday life and trivialities of the general public.

Both Korean and Chinese audiences across borders share affective experiences because of the transnational co-productions and remakes that mediate collective affects. These collective affects portray transnational relations through a relatively de-politicalized form of entertainment. Both the original and the remake seek intertexual survival in the land of each other's "brotherhood," where linguistic pluralism and political tension are perpetuated. As the affective negations are never finalized in the shifting lingualscape, the formation of the community beyond the nation-state is also be-coming. The potentiality of transplantability in Korean screen culture contributes to structuring a be-coming community, even as we insist on our hope of its be-coming.

CHAPTER 4 Growing Screen-capitalism with Chinese Characteristics:

Filling the Vacuity with *National Treasure*

In this new cultural and commercial arena, Korea's global experience and success with its own brand of soft power has been instrumental in developing its collaborative relationship with China.

--Brain Yecies, *Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in China*[143]

While recent U.S. Congressional reports have focused on the rise of China's economic and military power, far less attention has been paid to the rise of China's soft power. Yet in a global information age, soft sources of power such as culture, political values, and diplomacy are part of what makes a great power. Success depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins…Although China is far from America's equal in soft power, it would be foolish to ignore the gains it its making. The declining poll results and Washington's absence from the East Asian summit are warning lights. It is time for the U.S. to pay more attention to the balance of soft power in Asia.

--Joseph S. Nye, "The Rise of China's soft power," *The Wall Street Journal*[144]

A critical history of collecting therefore begins not at the time when objects are collected, but at the very first minute when collectors begin to interpret things' meaning and imbue them with cultural significance as collectible items.

--Vimalin Rujivacharakul, *Collecting China*[145]

Telling story through national treasure

After two years' preparation, *National Treasure*, a large-scale weekly program of cultural exploration debuted in China. This project was driven by two primary motivations: one, the freewheeling capitalism of the screen media industry, and two, the need to fill the void—preferably with patriotic content—of the ideological vacuum created by the restrictions on imported TV shows. *National Treasure* debuted in November 2017, after the ban on Korean popular culture was issued in 2016. The program has exhibited 27 of China's most hallowed treasures housed in nine

[143] Brian Yecies, "Chinese transnational cinema and the collaborative tilt toward South Korea," Michael Keane, ed. *Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in China* (Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA, 2016), 242.
[144] Joseph S. Nye, "The Rise of China's Soft Power," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 29, 2005. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113580867242333272 (accessed June 2018).
[145] Vimalin Rujivacharakul, Ed. *Collecting China: The World, China, and a History of Collecting* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 15.

major museums (National Palace Museum, Shanghai Museum, Nanjing Museum, Hunan Provincial Museum, Henan Museum, Shaanxi History Museum, Hubei Provincial Museum, Zhejiang Provincial Museum, and Liaoning Provincial Museum) in China. Every episode of *National Treasure* features three Chinese cultural relics, and well-known actors or actresses play the role of the *guobao shouhuren* (national treasure guardian) for each item. Such a television program, and its stunning assemblage of the entire panoply of museological pundits, archeological authoritative remarks, poignant performances by the most acclaimed actors/actresses, and technological advancements of screen media, could only be produced by the China Central Television (CCTV), the most financially competent and "politically correct" satellite television station in the Chinese environs.

The program's stated intention to bring national treasures to "life" implies that filling up the ideological vacuum and closing the fracture of disconnected (counter)memories among Chinese audiences is no accident. As a national satellite TV channel, CCTV has been institutionalized as the official media guiding public opinion and instilling patriotic loyalty. However, as audiences become increasingly sophisticated in a digital age, they are savvier about recognizing CCTV's institutionalization, and so ironically it become the least popular media channel even as it is supposed to be the major channel offering popular cultural content to the Chinese general public. CCTV has become emblematic of government surveillance, even sharing an acronym with a literal example of surveillance, closed-circuit television. Noticeably, growing demand for unrestrained and lighthearted ambience (apolitical, unofficial, and entertaining content) that engages everyday life and its corresponding modes of aesthetics, has replaced the socialist-realistic, taut, and sullen aesthetics prescribed by the revolutionary politics imposed on the previous generations.

Faced with this predicament, *National Treasure* marks the first time in the history of CCTV-originated TV programs that serious scholarship and humor have been blended to appeal to Chinese audiences across generations. As Paul Pickowicz points out, only a few people in China actually know or care about socialist theory.[146] Instead, they are more concerned about their everyday lives, since they do not see any concrete fulfillment of the promises of socialist ideologies. This also partially explains why the quotidian K-drama, with its positive and humorous narratives, fits well with the sensibility of contemporary Chinese audiences, even though most official Chinese screen culture, especially leitmotif movies, have stubbornly held onto the aesthetics of ruthless realism or socialist realism. The waning of the socialist revolutionary grand narratives was caused by the bankruptcy of the socialist promise and the ideological vacuum that followed. Experienced spectators in a time of screen media easily dismiss grand empty narratives. The consumerist demand for light and humorous screen culture reflects radical changes both in the domains of political-economic material and of the general public's mental lives.

Facing the global trend of having a young spectatorship in the screen cultural industry, this program also seeks to engage more Chinese young people, who have been attracted to the Korean wave and other foreign cultures for a long time. The aforementioned remarks made by the host connects the young people' happiness to the drifting history of the relic; the relic bears witness to the nation's ups and downs. Initiated from the same purpose of linking young people to the official narratives by inspiring cultural confidence in them, at the beginning of each episode, Zhang proudly and passionately asks the audience, "our program is a young program. How young are we?" The audience replies in chorus, "Five thousand years" (*shang xiawuqiannian*).[147] While

[146] Paul G. Pickowicz, "Huang Jianxin and the Notion of Postsocialism.," in *New Chinese Cinemas: Forms, Identities, Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 61.
[147] In *National Treasure*. CCTV 1 and CCTV3. 2017. The TV program is produced by Lǔ Yitao.TV series producer & actor Zhang Guoli serves as the host. Zhang leads audiences to call this slogan at the beginning of every episode.

allowing the young audience to enjoy the witty dialogue, the aesthetic refinement, and the sumptuous feast, this is also the cultivation of national pride and appreciation of Chinese cultural heritage. As the Chief Director Yu Lei says:

> The show will present the treasures through different artistic methods, and fully interpret the stories and histories behind each cultural relic, so that audiences can not only understand how to appreciate the beauty of the cultural relics, but also know the civilization they carry, and the spiritual core of Chinese culture sustained over the years.[148]

This purpose is intuitively realized through the ultramodern use of "ice screen" and holographic technology. This design looks like a set of linear LED blinds, reducing the structural components on the line-of-sight barrier, and providing the audience a more complete perspective with the screens' permeability, which is up to 85 percent. In every episode, the stage is divided into multiple spaces by nine screens that are hung on the stage so that images appear to the audiences to be floating on the glass. The divided multiple spaces integrate into one image, performing for the audience the struggle of connecting fragments and linking parts. The set, therefore, creates a visual analogy of the struggle to reconnect Chinese audiences with their Chinese cultural heritage. The cultural content carried by these futuristically designed screens offers spectators a sumptuous banquet of visual stimuli, interweaving the young audiences into Chinese history. Much like these layered screens, the feeling of disintegration is layered by the social and political transformations at the national level, its corresponding disconnection with the national and cultural identity, and the anxiety of disintegration into globalization in the individual domain.

[148] Bi Nan, "CCTV launches large cultural program 'National Treasure'," *China* Daily, August 25, 2017, 10:42 a.m. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/2017-08/25/content_31092385.htm (accessed on January 12, 2018).

Whose story wins

It is, of course, difficult to prove that this show is specifically and intentionally meant to counter the influence of Korean television programs, a form of screen media that is widely transmitted on daily basis. It is undeniable, however, that the official ban on Korean popular culture was put in place by the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People's Republic of China (SAPPRFT) due to the placement of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016. Despite the fact that the Chinese diplomatic spokesman, Geng Shuang, denied the ban's existence, the ban has in fact been in effect and includes prohibitions on the performance of Korean celebrities in China, on new investments in Korean companies in cultural industries, on Korean idol groups performing before more than 10,000 Chinese audience members, on the signing of any new contracts of collaborative TV drama or shows, and on the broadcasting of any TV drama casting Korean actors or actresses. The Korean media reports that the ban has been in force since early September 2016.

The transplant of Korean shows to China inevitably involves localizing the original versions by tailoring them to fit Chinese audiences' sensibilities. Although Korean-produced content has been banned from China, Chinese audiences' thirst for novelty and desire to compete with foreign cultures remains, which has led to the birth of original Chinese TV programs with improved production quality. For the Chinese TV programs, the ban offered an opportunity to fend off the "invasive species" of Korean screen culture, preventing Chinese-produced screen culture from being squeezed out in its native land. The rich heritage of Korean screen culture in China, and the inspiring experience of the "power-of-screen" left by Korean screen culture, have provoked China's commitment to self-exploration and reflective production.

By investigating the Chinese TV program *National Treasure*, this chapter examines the ways in which the void left after the ban is being filled, paying particular attention to the ways that new aesthetic norms are being cultivated. This state-sponsored cultivation punctuates the hidden anxiety of identity at both the national and individual levels. Hence, it is not entirely surprising that ancient artefacts are used to substantiate a narrative of nationalist archaeology. To further the discussion by adding a twist, this chapter explores how the nationalist desire for a "Chinese alternative modernity" is represented in a transnational context where Chinese post-socialism interacts with a global media format, screen-capitalism. The representation of materiality in the Chinese TV show is operating in two simultaneous modes: the system of global capitalist market economy (either the circulation of the onscreen show or the diegetic relics in the global market) and the system of visual relations established through such circulations projected on screen.

National Treasure came on the air in the absence of Korean popular culture, which is all the more remarkable because Korean cultural content had been widely disseminate throughout China for the previous two decades. The program's debut was timely, planned for the moment after the metamorphosis of *hallyu* transformed from an import culture to a collaborative, incorporative, and interlaced set of projects, which included Chinese remakes of Korean TV programs as an *amnyu* (undercurrent) in the sector of Chinese screen culture and entertainment industry. These Chinese remakes of Korean television programs were shown not only to the Chinese audiences in mainland China, but also available to Chinese diasporas and Chinese speakers around the world through various streaming websites that are not officially endorsed by the Chinese government, such as YouTube, Dailymotion, Lovetvshow, Olevod, Dnvod, Pangzi, and so forth. On streaming media, Korean or English subtitles are not commonly provided, so it is safe to assume that the majority of the audience for these unsanctioned exports were Chinese speakers. Since this far-

reaching spread of cultural consumption connected Chinese-speaking audiences who share this collective memory of popular culture originated from a foreign one, it is not surprising that the Chinese government moved to safeguard its official memory for state-centered integrity.

Interestingly, Zhang Guoli, the host of *National Treasure*, is a TV series producer who is often regarded as a spokesman against Korea's cultural theft. Zhang was one of the representative gurus in the Chinese screen media industry who caustically criticized the K-drama *Dae Jang-geum*—a hit K-drama that swept across mainland China and many other countries in 2003—as a cultural theft of Chinese traditions. *Dae Jang-geum* portrays Korean traditional medicine in the royal court in the Choson dynasty, however, commentators in China, Zhang being one of the most visible, argued that "Korean traditional medicine" actually originated in China. The criticism of this cultural theft (here "theft" has its both literal and metaphorical meanings) and of other foreigner countries' misconduct in *National Treasure* is expressed through the program's emphasis on the authenticity and originality of the cultural relics, which is meant to solicit a sense of national honor in order to eliminate emotions of disintegration. Instead of blunt rage, the program elicits a combined cosmopolitan aesthetic appreciation of antiques and at the same time promotes affective bonding from consanguinity among the audiences from the same cultural origin. This practice implies that originality is tantamount to the national identity of the relics and to the identity of the descendants with shared cultural origins and bearings. Here the national identity is about connecting audiences by implicitly encouraging them to re-identify as members of a nation with an honored national history and to reimagine national glory by telling the stories of *national treasures*.

In this context, it would be fair to discuss the connection between how Korea's global success in screen culture economy has been instrumental to China and how China tells its own

story by borrowing from the rich experience of Korea's screen-capitalism, even while it is implicitly or explicitly counterattacking the permeation of China with Korean TV shows. Human beings are story-telling animals. Joseph S. Nye has gone so far as to define so-called soft power rivalry as "whose story wins." Screen culture plays a crucial role in the arena of storytelling, and China happens to be notoriously bad at it. In contrast, *hallyu* has been heavily conducive to (re)shaping the imagination of South Korea's national image within and outside of its border by cashing in on transplantable screen-capitalism and telling alluring stories that tug at its spectators' heartstrings. China also aspires to master the techniques of storytelling that would bolster its "soft" power, in addition to its "hard" or "sharp" power. This aspiration has been made explicit in the official national agenda, particularly in the entertainment sector. In recognition of the nationwide frenzy in 2014 over the Korean TV drama *My Lover is from the Star*, members of the National People's Congress had a full morning panel during its annual session to enviously discuss how Korea could be succeeding in winning soft power while China had not yet made its own TV show like *Star*.[149] In the same year, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced that "we should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's messages to the world."[150]

The ban imposed on Korean popular culture in China and the anti-Korean sentiment boosted by the Chinese official media since 2016 has been described by the U.S. media as "Korean Wave run[ning] aground on China's rocky shore."[151] Upon this "running aground," many Chinese remakes of Korean original and Sino-Korean collaborative TV shows either disappeared from

[149] Amy Qin, "China's Love Affair with Irresistible Korean TV," *The New York Times*, July 20, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/arts/television/chinas-love-affair-with-irresistible-korean-tv.html?_ga=2.262976516.909348050.1523745398-1510164726.1520966325 (accessed on February 25, 2018).
[150] David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-power Push," *Foreign Affairs*, June 16, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push (accessed on March 10, 2018).
[151] Duncan Hewitt, "Korean wave runs aground on China's rocky shore," Correspondents, May 18, 2017. https://insidestory.org.au/korean-wave-runs-aground-on-chinas-rocky-shore/ (accessed on May 28, 2017)

Chinese TV screens or cut off relations with South Korea by withdrawing from the collaboration, altering the names of the programs, and relying on their own production.[152] At that moment in time, it was not yet fully understood the extent to which *hallyu* (Korean wave) had already become a *amnyu* (undercurrent) in the Chinese screen media and entertainment industries. It is undeniable that the Korean screen cultural industry and its practitioners had been instrumental in China's journey toward fostering its own screen media and entertainment industry since the 1990s. If the previous two chapters of this dissertation have focused on remakes as collaborative transplantation, then this chapter looks at the chemical reaction between screen-capitalism and postsocialism as a rebirth. The gap of time in between is a period of latency, hibernation, and the resulting severance. The period of latency took place when China was experiencing a flood of foreign screen culture during the process of integrating itself to global capitalism (*jie gui*) and returning to build its own power-of-screen. The delay in China's response to the global capitalism, together with the previously dominating aesthetics of socialist realism prescribed by the revolutionary ideologies, caused its lag in establishing neoliberalist entertainment industries and in building a consumer culture.

South Korea, in contrast, has undergone developments of compressed capitalism for thirty years from the 1960s to the 1990s—ahead of China's emerging market economy, which only began developing in the early 1990s. Capitalist development has been accompanied by a rise of individualism and globally sweeping consumerism following the end of the Cold War. The rise of the pop culture fad known as *hallyu*, or the Korean Wave, in China since the 1990s has both increased exchanges and deepened collaborations between the two nations. In "Chinese transnational cinema and the collaborative tilt toward South Korea," Brian Yecies gave numerous

[152] See a number of examples in Chapter Two about changing titles of the remake TV shows to avoid being flagged as not implementing the ban on Korean popular culture issued by the Chinese official authorities.

examples to show "how a new ecology of expertise involving Korean firms and practitioners working with Chinese colleagues is enabling China to 'catch up' to Hollywood by drawing technological expertise and knowledge through selective collaborative ventures."[153] A handful of Korean technicians working in the Sino-Korean film and television collaborations as well as in post-productions and digital productions had not only smoothed the development of Chinese screen cultural industries, but also shaped the public's viewing habits and aesthetic values by leaving the marks of Korean aesthetics while adapting their technologies and expertise to satisfy Chinese audiences' sensibilities. All these collaborations can be tracked back to the national frenzy of Korean Wave in China since the mid-1990s. Cashing in on the boom of post-Cold War globalization and neo-liberalism, Korean popular culture has grown fashionable in China just as it has in the rest of Asia and beyond.

The impact of the distinctly Korean aesthetics transmitted to China through Korean screen media is both more profound and harder to discern than that of the seeming halt of Sino-Korean screen cultural interactions. When Chinese spectators draw comparisons between Korean and Chinese screen culture, the parallels between the cultural industries and the appreciation of new aesthetic values introduced by Korean screen culture have drawn Chinese officials' attention. The concern about this 'invasive species' became serious; the state worried that Korean screen culture would squeeze out the local. Its more advanced technological development, more matured entertainment industry, and longer history of a market economy characterized by consumer culture elaborates a great deal of Korean screen culture's successful entry into mainland China; equally important, though, is the matter of historical and social timing. The pop culture fad of *hallyu* in mainland China arose within the context of Chinese political, economic, cultural, and social

[153] Brian Yecies, "Chinese transnational cinema and the collaborative tilt toward South Korea," Michael Keane, ed. *Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in China* (Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA, 2016), 239.

transformations. In conjunction with China's developing market economy and consumerist demands, the spread of Korean popular culture has, perhaps without being noticed by Korea itself, filled the ideological and social vacuum that exists in post-revolutionary China. Until the early 1990s, a generation of Chinese had been cultivated by socialist, serious, revolutionary cultural politics. Meanwhile, the long-indoctrinated general public in China were confronted with the fact that socialist promises wreak havoc in reality. Unfulfilled promises and the radical, state-driven, political and cultural transformations have led to an ideological vacuum characterized by uncertainty about what people should believe in and a shortage of ideological resources for national renovation as a whole.

James Lull, in his *China Turned On*, tells a story about a conversation he had with a Chinese student from the People's University after the Tiananmen crackdown, during Lull's field work in China for his research on how television has dramatically influenced the cultural and political consciousness of Chinese.

> In general, however, a pervasive, underlying, depressed feeling covers the college campus and the city of Beijing. One student, for instance, haltingly asked me if I believe in God. When I asked him why he wanted to know, he said: '*We must have something to believe now*.' Another student quietly told of a recent suicide by a classmate who said he could no longer face the future."[154]

Unlike South Korea, the democracy movement in China did not end with the establishment of its civil government. Nevertheless, the Chinese general public yet continues to face the future by steering towards a consumer culture within China's radical transformations. The social and market void in China, left by the previously monopolized revolutionary politics, is waiting to be filled

[154] James Lull, *China Turned On: Television, Reform, and Resistance,* **(**Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2016),

with cultural contents that are engaged less with grandiloquence of empty ideas and more with aesthetics of everydayness. Westernized aesthetics are seeping in, yet the Confucian legacy remains. Korean screen culture is uniquely suited to fill this gap in China, particularly in the leisure and entertainment sectors.

In line with all these forces, the evolving form of converging media, considered under a single global category of "screen culture," has also played a significant role in shaping the border-crossing cultural flows. In conjunction with the global convergence of screen media, China initiated a call to (re)build its national narratives and soft power by capitalizing on the power-of-screen while screen-capitalism is being grown in the postsocialist soil. The ban on Korean popular culture suspended Korea's cultural expansion in China, leaving a vacuum in the entertainment industry, and, in turn, in the leisure lives of the general public, which has yet to be filled. Breaking from previous collaboration efforts and the mimicking of Korean TV shows, the entertainment industry in China now needs to rely on its own productions—to tell its own soft power-engendering stories.

Closing the Fractures of Time and Space

In *Collecting China*, Vimalin Rujivacharakul highlights the problematic connection between material object and its cultural connotation. As he writes, "material evidence can move from one culture to another and… its meaning is often unstable while the ideas embedded inside are always subject to human interpretations." The "national treasures" in the show are brought to "new lives" and given to new interpretations serving the purpose of the show: to fill the gulf of social vacuity and of national disintegration. Rujivacharakul elaborates:

> When material objects are circulated in multicultural contexts, their cultural definitions always change. The challenge is to locate the criteria that alter or maintain those definitions. As such, to ask how and why certain things are called, understood, and marked as "Chinese" is to delve into the subjectivity of things and the ways their cultural significations emerge and Change.[155]

In *National Treasure*, those material objects are 'naturally marked as Chinese' and given lives by telling two stories of each relic. The first story is called the "preceding life" of the treasure; for this story, the treasure's history is acted out theatrically by the most popular performers of the country. The second is called the treasure's "foregoing life," and it is told by researchers who discuss the treasure's discovery, protection, and contemporary significance. The two stories of "preceding life" and "foregoing life" represent the past and the present in the same time-space, connecting historical memory and contemporaneity of the antique to eliciting cultural pride and integral patriotism among its Chinese audiences, who are awash in the feeling of fragmentation and disconnection.

One of the three Chinese cultural treasures showed in the first episode was the Large Vase with Variegated Glazes. Its *shouhuren* (guardian), Actor Wang Kai, played emperor Qianlong (乾隆, r.1735-1796) of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) in the "preceding life" story of the Large Vase with Variegated Glazes. Qianlong's dilettantish fascination with porcelain made him develop an idea to integrate all the greatest glazing techniques into a single vase. He quickly drew a sketch to commission Tang Ying, the supervisor of porcelain production at the kilns in Jingdezhen, to work it out. The vase includes 17 kinds of glaze and 12 paintings, and it had to be re-fired thousands of times because many different glazes need to be used in the production process. According to Zhang

[155] Vimalin Rujivacharakul, "China and china: An Introduction to Materiality And A History of Collecting," in Vimalin Rujivacharakul, Ed. *Collecting China* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 15.

Shen, a guide at the Palace Museum, the likelihood of success in such a complicated process would be no more than 0.23 percent, making the vase a truly remarkable and rare object. In addition to the unfathomable difficulties of its production, to produce such a vase with twelve paintings challenges the previous standards of aesthetics. Prior to this vase, imperial porcelains were considered elegant in their simplicity; in contrast, the Qianlong's would be considered vulgar and exaggerated. Nevertheless, according to the show's interpretation, what the emperor Qianlong desired was precisely the aesthetics of exaggeration, because through this amalgamated coalescence, later generations would know that the Qing dynasty could integrate the finest techniques of all dynasties. Such a project was meant to demonstrate the prosperity of his reign, and is not concerned with other generations' ideas of aesthetics. The performance tells this story scornfully but still highlights the regime's legitimacy and the power of material exhibit.

In this example, the deployment of the power-of-screen adds additional spatial dimensions to the already crowded multiplicities of time and space; the story was told through an imagined conversation in Qianlong's dream in which the past coexists with the present, while "the present" is also the past for contemporary audiences. The presentation of this multiplicity is intended to close the fracture of time and space, eliminating the feeling of disconnection and reconstructing a collective memory of history. In this "preceding life" story, Emperor Qianlong was arguing in a dream with his deceased grandfather, Emperor Yongzheng（雍正）(1678–1735), and two artists, Wang Xizhi（王羲之）(303–361) and Huang Gongwang（黄公望）(1269–1354), in the same time-space. Wang Xizhi, whom Qianlong honors as Mr. Youjun（右军），was a calligrapher from the Jin Dynasty (265–420). Huang Gongwang, whom Emperor Qianlong refers to as Mr. Yifeng（一峰）， hails from the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368). These are the impossible characters who

entered the time-space of emperor Qianlong. This dream sequence appears in the play that is projected on screen, juxtaposing seemingly incompatible time-spaces within a pleasurable hallucinatory fantasy. The co-existing multiple time-spaces then mediate collective affects, and screen-based media plays a crucial role in this process. In *Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique,* Bliss Cua Lim argues that fantastic cinema can be viewed as the coexistence of temporal multiplicities, upholding multiple times as "the refusal of anachronisms, and the recognition of untranslatability, that is, the avowal of immiscible temporalities."[156] Lim draws from Henri Bergson's understanding of cinema and time, arguing that "for Bergson, the past is alongside the present (2009, p.14)." This interpretation strains against the modern concept of homogeneous time, which the power-of-print had previously accentuated. The power-of-screen offers a new way of experiencing time and space, one that bridges the past and the present, and thereby resolves feelings of fragmentation and disconnection.

This imagined dialogue between characters who travel through time on the screen offers a modern explanation for emperor Qianlong's decision to make the Vase. Audiences experience time-travel through this representation of immiscible times. By presenting imperial grandeur and cultural glory, *National Treasure* manipulatively inspires patriotism in Chinese audiences. Nevertheless, the time is "immiscible" because the multiple times are not necessarily dissolved into the code of modern time consciousness. As Lim argues, "I refer to traces of untranslatable temporal otherness in the fantastic as immiscible times—multiple times that never quite dissolve into the code of modern time consciousness, discrete temporalities incapable of attaining homogeneity with or full incorporation into a uniform chronological present (2009, p.12)." The actual reasons that Qianlong made the vase is unknown, and the imagined argument with Wang

[156] Bliss Cua Lim, *Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique.* (Durham: Duke UP, 2009), 12

Xizhi and Huang Gongwang are imagined, yet their reconstruction is both tactile and engaging, made possible by screen media. “We want our audience to feel that the cultural relics are like people who weathered vicissitudes, and that they have their own personalities and lives,” said Yu Lei, the producer and chief director of the program.[157] The show, *National Treasure*, aims to make national treasures come “alive,” which they do by creating a space that allows “co-presenting” the multiplicities of time. The past is not dead, but it paradoxically coexists along with the present, and thereby re-structures the audiences’ memory through correlations across time.

To restructure such a memory the program uses multiplicities not only in the dimension of time, but also in space. In the sixth episode of *National Treasure*, one of the cultural relics shown in the program was the “*min er quan fanglei”* (皿而全方罍, also called 皿方罍 *Min fanglei*). It is a bronze vessel made in the late Shang Dynasty (1600BC–1046BC) and unearthed in 1919 at Maoshanyu, Shuitian village, Taoyuan county, Hunan Province.[158] It is considered to be a representative work of Chinese bronze culture in its heyday. Due to its elegance and the varied carving techniques it features, it has been hailed as the “king of all fangleis.” It is comprised of two parts: the lid and the body, and it is named for the inscriptions on these two parts of the vessel. An eight-word inscription was carved on the lid: 皿而全作父己尊彝 (皿: family name of the owner, 而全: given name of the owner, 己: posthumous name of the owner’s father, 尊彝: wine vessel). On the body, there is a six-word inscription without the given name of the owner: 皿作父己尊彝.[159] It was named “*Min er quan fanglei*” or “*Min fanglei.*” The whole vessel, including the

[157] “TV Show Brings China's "National Treasure" to Life,” *Xinhua English*, December 21, 2017 http://english.sina.com/culture/her/2017-12-21/detail-ifypwzxq4659919.shtml (accessed on January 2, 2018).
[158] The name of the place underwent several changes due to administrative alterations, and since 2011 it has been known as Maoshanyu, Qi Fengshan Village, Jiaqiao County.
[159] Materials from Human Museum Achieves "The ‘Min Er Quan’ Fanglei."

lid and the body, is now preserved in the Hunan Museum. However, the body had been separated from its lid for nearly a century since its excavation in 1919 until 2014, when it was brought from overseas and reunited with the other part. The "preceding life" story, played in *National Treasure*, portrayed this story of reunion, which embodies the desire to connect the fragmented, separated, disconnected culture and history into a united whole. , By doing so, the program reconstructs a collective memory and reestablishes cultural identity and national pride among Chinese audiences, even as they are confronted with contradicting memories brought by foreign cultural waves.

In the "preceding life" story of the *Min fanglei*, the body and the lid were anthropomorphized by its two "treasure guardians," the Chinese actors Huang Bo and Wang Jia. Huang played the body as the elder brother, while Wang played the role of the lid as the younger brother. The program told the story of how, in 1924, a man named Shi Yuzhang from Yiyang city of the Hunan province offered a high price for the body of the vessel and had it carried away, resulting in its long separation from the lid. At that time, Ai Xinzhai, who discovered the *Min fanglei*, proposed that the lid be taken as the tuition fee for the local Xin Min school. The school agreed and took the lid accordingly.

Both the fact that the pieces were separated and the face that one part was exchanged for a tuition fee suggest that the value of the Shang-dynasty bronze was not immediately recognized after its discovery. That cavalier attitude stands in contrast to the way the *Min fanglei* is viewed as a "national treasure" in the show after a long process of transnational circulation and discussion. In her essay "What is Chinese about ancient artifacts?" Shana J. Brown examines a very similar case of the transnational circulation of the Shang-dynasty oracle bones. Brown details a rich history ranging from how these Shang-dynasty oracle bones were described as dragon bones and sold as medicines for curing illness to how they actually constitute the earliest records of Chinese

civilization and proof of the existence of the Shang dynasty (1766-1050BCE). Brown argues that "the debate over the authentic[ity] of the oracle bones and their use as historical materials was merely a first step in a long and complicated discourse over the modern uses of ancient history in transnational contexts."[160] As she describes, in their discussions of the oracle bones pro-China scholars tried to argue a superior position for China within East Asia; while a generation of Japanese archaeologists who have excavated Mongolian and Manchurian relics argued that the bones were evidence of Japanese imperial expansion by justifying the establishment of those regions as sovereign nations. The way that *Min fanglei* was interpreted in *National Treasure* also served to anchoring the Party's legitimacy: the relic has traveled far away from where it was created but was returned to its hometown under the regime of the Party. Equally crucial here is the idea that the relic's homecoming bridges the disconnections and disintegrations among the Chinese audiences through the mediation of the innate transnational screen culture.

Later in the story of *Min fanglei*, staff members of the Xin Min school, where the lid was accepted in lieu of tuition, recognized inscriptions on it that showed it was an antique from the ancient Shang Dynasty. Their discovery was quickly reported to Zhang Shizhao, a minister in the Ministry of Education in Republican China, who commissioned a provincial governor to initiate a thorough investigation into this ancient relic. However, the body could not be found anymore. The lid, too, had been forcibly taken by Zhou Pan for 3000 *yuan* when the inscriptions were recognized, as documented in Taoyuan's history between 1912–1949.[161] After the establishment of the People Republic of China, Zhou was arrested in Kunming, and the lid was seized from him along with a

[160] Shana J. Brown, "What is Chinese about Ancient Artifacts?: Oracle Bones and the Transnational Collectors Hayashi Taisuke and Luo Zhenyu" in *Collecting China: The World, China, and a History of Collecting*. Ed. Vimalin Rujivacharakul. (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 63-73.

[161] "The "Min Er Quan" Fanglei." Human Museum. http://www.hnmuseum.com/en/zuixintuijie/min-er-quan-fanglei-0 (accessed January 8, 2018).

file in 1950. The lid and the file were sent to the Hunan Provincial Cultural Relic Administration Committee in 1952. As the committee and the Hunan Museum merged into one institution, the lid and the file were transferred to the Hunan museum since 1956, where they remain. The missing body, however, had been bought and sold in several rounds of auctions overseas and passed through the hands of several foreign antiques dealers on several continents, including Asia, America, and Europe. A photo of the intact *Min fanglei* was recorded in *A History of Chinese Art,* written by French scholar George Soulie de Morant in 1928 (figure 4.1).



Figure 4.1 The photo of *Min fanglei* in *A History of Chinese Art,* Hunan Museum Archive.

The antique, as noted in the book, had been a part of the collections of A.W. Bahr, C.F. Yau, and C.T. Loo, among others. The book had been published in the English language in America in 1931. Additionally, *A Book About Chinese Bronze Culture* (支那古铜精华彝器部), which was written by Japanese scholar Umehara Sueji (梅原末治) and published in 1933, also showed a photograph of the *Min fanglei* (Figure 4.2). The *Min fanglei* was then collected by Japanese collector Asano Meyoshi (浅野梅吉) during the 1940s and 1950s. His son, Asano Takeshi (浅野剛) carrying on

his unfinished work, published *Old Chinese Art* in 1961, which presented photos and descriptions of the *Min fanglei*. According to the book, the vessel was purchased by Asano Meyoshi in 1930.

The *jiexiaoren* (announcer) of this relic was Lan Tianye, a renowned, prestigious dramatist who was secretly a member of the Communist Party before 1949. In his introduction, he advises young men that they may not understand how precious the establishment of the PRC is, but he and the relic would be satisfied as long as the young generation feels happiness. In the show's trademark anthropomorphic approach, the Chinese young generation's happiness is connected to the long course of "wandering" the relic experienced, promoting patriotic loyalty and collective affect to bind young people together. Given the anxiety over identity at both the national and individual level, the cultural relics displayed in *National Treasure* are presented so that they arouse audiences' national pride for China's ancient cultural glory and unique spiritual civilization. At the same time, those relics are presented so that they evoke the collective memory of how Chinese relics and cultures were stolen by foreigners. These scenarios have established a community centered on a shared object of anger and a history of humiliation. As Barmé points out, state enterprises employ the trope of nostalgia to cast themselves as representatives of both national and consumer interests.



Figure 4.2. The photo of *Min Fanglei* in *A Book About Chinese Bronze Culture*, Hunan Museum Archive

The waning of grand ideas parallels the rise of popular culture, a trend which is reflected especially in the development of television in what Lynn Spigel and Jan Olsson have called the post-TV era.[162] The development of television dramatically influenced the cultural and political consciousness of the people living in a transforming China. The co-consumption of the quotidian, characterized by K-drama, fits the sensibilities of Chinese audiences, and allowed them to construct the hyperreal in their own way. In this way, the Chinese general public is granted agency to access other cultures. The thirst for consumption of material and non-material goods—especially strong after suppressed consumerism—has spread among the Chinese general public in the last two decades. And, this sweeping consumerism is associated with a need to satisfy the desire for identification. Consumers are offered a membership into a certain group through their practice of consumption, thereby giving rise to an emerging cosmopolitanism based on co-consumption.

One of the significant impacts of *hallyu* has been the emergence of new industries based on celebrity culture, within and outside of South Korea. If the spread of *hallyu* has boosted national and cultural anxiety in China, then the impact of this celebrity culture has raised anxiety pertaining to identity among Chinese audiences' everydayness. For instance, the newly emerging "*wanghong* economy" (网红经济, web celeb economy) in China has reflected the impatience of the general public to gain their own fame-capital through the screen-based content dissemination. Although it is not easy for anyone to become a celebrity, individuals might nonetheless think it possible to turn him or herself into a "*wanghong*" (web celeb) by utilizing the power-of-screen. Having struggled with their new desires and identities, those "wannabe" *wanghong* emulate big-time capitalists.

[162] Lynn Spigel and Jan Olsson, *Television after TV: Essays on a Medium in Transition*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). The idea of the post-TV era means the traditional medium television has undergone a transition in the last two decades. This concept is drawn from Lynn Spigel's idea of "television after TV" that television has reinvented itself in numerous ways.

Marx writes, "the economic bourgeoisie are the merchants who demand social status consistent with their economic status." As they capitalize on their personal influence on social media, these "wannabe" *wanghong* utilize the screen as the platform for online advertisement. In such a way, this process not only allows them to generate tremendous profits tied to their economic status, but also becomes the way through which they attempt to acquire social status, in seeking an elevated identification. According to the CBN Data released in the 2016 China E-commerce Internet Celebrity Big Data Report, it is estimated that the output value of the internet celebrity industry in 2016 is close to 58 billion *yuan*, far exceeding Chinese cinema box office revenues of 44 billion in 2015.[163]

China's *wanghong* phenomenon as a celebrity cult has promoted the building of a nascent digital economic system, and consequently an e-commerce industry. On the one hand, audiences of *wanghong* need an outlet for their suppressed consumerism. On the other hand, the rise of "wannabes" has been fueled by increased demand for social status stemming from their anxiety about individual identity. Newly-attained consuming power has kindled the previously suppressed consumerism and hidden desire for the luxury lifestyle of the Western bourgeoisie among the newly-emerging consumer class in Mainland China. The consumer's phantasmagoric fantasy of purchasing membership to certain social classes through the purchase of corresponding products has led to an insatiable desire for consumption and stimulated the consumer market boom. Screen culture in China reflects the juxtaposed national and personal anxieties of the Chinese general public. Simultaneously, screen culture also provides the public with an intuitive medium for consumption, enabling self-identification and self-satisfying imagination. Memory is woven into

[163] "CBNData released 2016 China E-commerce Internet Celebrity Big Data Report," *CBNData*, May 23, 2016. https://cbndata.com/activity/410/detail (accessed on June 16, 2017). China Business News (CBN) is an enterprise data aggregator, since 2015.

one's identity. By (re)constructing an official memory and collective identity, the TV program *National Treasure* transforms the cultural relics from thousands of years ago—bearing symbolic status of being memorial to old cultural glory—into "*wanghong*" that arouse Chinese audiences' self-identification as a part of the "great ancient civilization."

Separation and reunion

In the story of *qianshi chuanqi* (legend of preceding life), the body/elder-brother, played by Huang, was collected by Japanese collector Arata Dongchi （新田棟一）, who bought it for a high price in 1950. He kept the antique until 2001, at which time it was sold through Christie's auction company in New York. During this time period, the lid, played by Wang, which had been kept in the Hunan Museum in China, missed his "elder bother"—the body. Audiences are offered imagined perspectives from the body and the lid of the vessel. The body complained that he was successively traded and was made to wander around overseas, away from his relatives, his fatherland, and country. Hence, he is desperate to reunite with his "younger brother"—the lid. One scene showed an imagined dialogue between the body and the lid across 1930s Paris, 1930s and 1980s Hunan, and 1980s and 1990s Japan (figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 Co-existing time-space in *National Treasure*

Similar to the preceding life story of the Large Vase with Variegated Glazes, here, multiple time-spaces are co-present and connected by the divided stage. The lid and the body become the pivot that links all the different time and space, and so link the audiences. In 1930s Paris, the body, "elder brother," lectures its owner, a Chinese compatriot, affectionately, "as a Chinese you should understand what is *luoyeguigen* (Fallen leaves return to the roots)." And in the Hunan Museum, the lid, "younger brother" furiously whimpers, "why such a big country could not even protect us! I can't understand!" Echoing this line, in his introductory remarks about this relic, the host Zhang suggests, "when the country is week, we could not even protect one object. Only when the nation gets strong, then *youziguijia* (wandering son returns home)." Upon hearing these claims, the Social Darwinian axiom of "those who lag behind are doomed to be battered" is projected across the screen and in the studio to its spectators. The anthropomorphic performance endows the relic with human emotions and cultural traditions, claiming the legitimacy of China's ownership of this relic and lamenting the humiliation that China experienced in its modern history. The "great, glorious, precious" relic could do nothing but revert to its origin. Originality is heavily emphasized as fundamental to the relic's Chineseness. In such a way, transmitted by the intuitive and affective screen media, this show becomes a ground for emanating patriotism and nationalism while being used as a tool for national integral purposefulness reconciled with a consumerist sensual enjoyment of multiplicities.

Immiscible spaces are experienced as normally co-existent and seamlessly connected in order to close the ideological fracture and bridge the historical spaces. In the program, the Japanese collector Arata Dongchi walks in between the spaces of Japan and Hunan, connecting the different time-spaces shown on the divided stage. He is of Chinese descent, born in Taiwan in 1912 when it was part of the Republic of China. His original name was Peng Kaidong（彭楷栋）, and his parents

renamed him in Japanese Arata Dongchi. When Arata Dongchi heard that the lid of the vessel was in China, he immediately went to the Hunan Museum to see it and attempted to trade his other bronze artefacts for the body. The two spaces were co-presented, and the lid asked, "elder brother, are we going to meet each other eventually?" The body in Japan responded, "am I dreaming? After Arata Dongchi visited from China, the curator of the Hunan Museum also came to see me. Are we really going to have a reunion?" Both the body and the lid told Arata Dongchi that they wanted to meet again in China instead of Japan, since it was not only about a reunion, but it was about going back home. The body needed to go back to the place where he was born, the so-called *luoyeguigen*. His existence is the sealing confirmation of his clan. The body claimed that those inscriptions and patterns on the vessel, to the foreigners, are the proof of the excellence of Chinese bronze techniques; however, to him, the story behind every character and line tells him what his ancestors worshipped, believed in, and lived on. This imaginative dialogue between the vessel and Arata Dongchi articulate the spatio-emotional life of the relic and a refusal to being separated by the cultural and historical other.

This refusal is made explicit in the story. When Arata Dongchi tries to use the square bronze lid, which he purchased from the London Christie's auction, to match the body, it does not match either in shape or in color. Although the pieces are the correct ones, they cannot be reunited by a foreigner's hands in a foreign land. The two co-presented separate spaces are not merged into one until the official rescue of the national treasure is launched. As shown in the "legend of preceding life" of this episode, Christie's auction company put the body of *Min fanglei* up for auction in New York in 2001. Once again, the immiscible yet intersecting spaces were co-presented. The elder brother/body was brought to the auction site on the one side of the screen. On the other side, the younger brother/lid was counting the days he would have to wait for his elder brother to come back

after hearing the news that the Shanghai Museum and the Poly Art Museum jointly raised a large sum of money for the Christie's auction. It is at this moment that the two spaces finally start to merge into each other. The elder brother/body and the younger brother/lid walks towards one another. "I'm waiting for you to come back," says the younger brother. Brimming with emotion, the elder brother responds, "Yes, wait for me to come home."[164] The two spaces gradually, intersect as the characters come together. This connecting moment arouses audiences' sympathy for the relic's overseas wandering.

The co-presentation of multiple imagined spaces not only stresses the heterogeneity of the "other" and the self, but also, in Bliss Cua Lim's phrase, implies "a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another."[165] Both the relations of spaces and the relations between cultures within their corresponding spaces, are irreducible to and not superimposable on one another. This emphasis on heterogeneous spaces, China and overseas, rejects connections with foreign lands while re-constructing a connected and unified national identity within the border. The purpose of this reconstruction is to create shared consciousness out of the official narratives presented—none too subtly—told by the story. The power-of-screen here has been utilized as an apparatus to foster collective consciousness, and it is conducive to build China's own soft power from the inside out.

Importantly, though, just as the spectators almost feel they could eventually cheer for the historical reunion, the voice-over informs the audience that the bidding was won by a French buyer at the price of 9.24 million US dollars. The audience follows the ups and downs, the departure and the reunion, the merge and the separation of the spatial-emotional narratives, evoking their

[164] "Hunan Museum." In *National Treasure*. CCTV 1 and CCTV3. 2017. The TV program is produced by Lǔ Yitao. TV series producer& actor Zhang Guoli serves as the host.
[165] Bliss Cua Lim, *Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique* (Durham: Duke UP, 2009), 23.

collective anticipation for its reunion. Spectators are invited to treat these emotional, if not manipulative, narratives as factual history instead of nationalist persuasion. By merging the two separate spaces and shortening the physical distance between the body and the lid, the program juxtaposes the pieces' incompatible emplacements with a desire to bring the antique to its origin, China. This deployment represents the state's eagerness to revive Chinese cultural glory and recover cultural confidence by bridging any cultural and historical fissure. The Hunan Provincial Government was aware that the *Min fanglei* would be auctioned again at Christie's, so they assigned delegates from museums, enterprises, and collection fields to negotiate its purchase in New York City. On March 15, 2014, the Hunan Museum officially addressed the president of the Christie's office in Asia, expressing its strong commitment to return the antique to China. After strenuous efforts, a purchase agreement was eventually reached on March 19, ushering the reunion of the two separated parts of the *Min fanglei* after nearly a century.

National Treasure makes subtle use of cultural terms to boost patriotism among Chinese audiences by stressing China's distinctive cultural and national identity. Although some professional museological curators are invited to comment in *Min fanglei*'s "present life," their remarks are not that much different from the official narratives. They speak highly of the Chinese collectors' wisdom in working toward the relic's *homecoming* and the relic's priceless value in representing the glory of Chinese culture, bearing the longing of all Chinese: yearning for other "wandering relics" to return "home." By replacing nation-state with the notion of home, this statement is affectively imparted to its spectators across screen. Rather than elaborating on the aesthetic refinement, archaeological analysis, forging technologies, or historical significance of the relic *Min fanglei* in its "preceding life story," the show chose to highlight the history of its homecoming to China (1919 Taoyuan→1925 Changsha→Shanghai→Paris→1930 Osaka→1950

Tokyo→New York→2001 France→New York→2014 Changsha).[166] This story constructs and then reifies a contemporary Chinese desire to reclaim cultural relics which were stolen or taken away, and thus should be returned to China. The host, Zhang, is one of the most representative spokesmen in the Chinese screen cultural industry that previously criticized Korean popular culture for its cultural theft from China. In this suggestive context, it is not difficult for audiences to associate the historical theft of the relic with accusations of contemporary cultural theft and to be implicitly provoked to guard their cultural originality. As such, narratives constructed upon ancient artifacts are affectively transmitted by the power-of-screen to substantiate a cultural and national identity. They offer a resistance to the soft power of foreign cultural flows by employing the same media, power-of-screen. The screen, then, has become a covert arena where politics and ideologies vie to occupy the front position in popular culture.

The histories of these relics are inevitably multivalent since they are circulated through multiple cultural contexts, crossing many layers of time and space. Vimalin Rujivacharakul comments that the book *Collecting China* was written based on the belief that "there are no thing naturally or inherently qualified Chinese objects."[167] In the show *National Treasure*, though, those material objects are given a "life," interpreted as a reservoir of Chineseness to support home-state narratives. As the host Zhang declares in the episode about *Min fanglei*, "in other countries, an antique piece is called art, [just] a piece of art. However, in China, the reason it's called a 'cultural relic' (*wen wu* 文物) is because it is engraved in our ancestors' history. It has a soul. It is a faith. It carries the cultural memories of the Chinese…. [A]long with bringing the relics back, *Chinese confidences* are returned."[168] Audiences are invited to treat this differentiation of the notion of relic

[166] "The "Min Er Quan" Fanglei." The "Min Er Quan" Fanglei, Hunan Museum archive. http://www.hnmuseum.com/en/zuixintuijie/min-er-quan-fanglei-0 (accessed on February 04, 2018).
[167] Vimalin Rujivacharakul, Ed. *Collecting China* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011),16.
[168] Yitao Lǔ, prod. *National Treasure*. Episode six, CCTV 1 and CCTV3. January 14, 2018, episode 6.

in Chinese and in foreign contexts as ought-to-know knowledge instead of as a rhetorical tactic. The emphasis on homecoming makes possible the home country an exclusive space for making national identity and cultural confidence, at the cost of concealing the aesthetic value of the relic from transnational perspectives.

Space is emblematic of locality here but also of what has left the local. Space is the carrier of memories. The space of China is represented by the location of the lid, whereas the location of the body represents the cultural artifacts that have been exiled from China. When the show presents the conversation between the body/older brother of the relic in Japan and the lid/younger brother in China, it intersects spaces in a way that constructs a collective memory among Chinese spectators, minimizing the sense of disintegration and fragmentation of Chinese culture, while promoting a state-sponsored spirit of national patriotism. Being immersed in this spirit of patriotism, on the one hand, the general public are connected with Chinese cultural heritage and offered a balm for their feelings of disintegration. This practice can also lead to the peril of state-sponsored ethnocentrism through the promotion of nationalism. As Kang Liu warns, the national spirit (民族魂 *minzu hun*) is an ideological discourse of legitimation, which can promote ethnocentrism of the dominant ethnicity at the expense of multiethnic coexistence and harmony.[169] State-sanctioned nationalism and ethnic purity-based stratification of cultural hierarchies not only ignore cultural mobility, fluidity, and permeability, but they also refuse openness to cultural hybridization, pluralist co-existence, and mutual appreciation. China's current "coexistent, intermingling, and overlapped modes of production" open a space for a type of screen-capitalism that interacts with Chinese post-socialism and reconstructs new socio-ideological frameworks. The multiplying national and global transformations intensify China's "yet-to-be-defined" everyday

[169] Kang Liu, *Globalization and Cultural Trends in China* (Honolulu: U of Hawai'i, 2004), 69.

world, where cultures are open to hybrid formations and anxiety of national and cultural identity arises.

During the time period of the *Min fanglei's* separation and its reunion, in addition to the historical and political turmoil in China, the rapid growth of the new economy also undermined the traditional and revolutionary ideologies, causing a "persistent feeling of disintegration."[170] This feeling of disintegration gets expressed as uncertainty and anxiety about losing China's national identity in confrontation with other cultures. The shifting alliances that the Chinese government exhibits in dealing with foreign cultural flows is derived from this anxiety of national and cultural identity.

China's interaction with Korea in the realm of screen culture is an apt example of this anxiety. The 2014 signing of the landmark China-Korea co-production pact has classified collaborative productions as local films, freeing Sino-Korean collaborations from the Chinese limit on import film and expanding Korea's share of the Chinese box office. The following year, Chinese and South Korea officially signed the China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), after three years of negotiation. These critical agreements signaled that China-Korea collaborations in various industries, including but not limited to screen culture, had reached a heyday. This honeymoon period did not last long, though. Tracking the number of Chinese tourists in South Korea, we can see that the "heyday" is severely hindered by geopolitical tensions; that number has dropped drastically since March 2017. Noticeably, in spite of a steady decline over three months', Chinese tourists are still the largest subgroup (34.7%) of the total number of foreign tourists in South Korea.[171] Border-crossing inter-actions between China and Korea are once again "macro-

[170] Jason McGrath, *Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 21.
[171] See in appendix "monthly statistics of Chinese tourist arrivals from August 2016 to December 2017," The chart is made by Tian Li, according to the Data collected from Korean Tourism Organization.

controlled" by the Chinese state, in this "potentially volatile policy environment." [172] If the shifting alliances resulting from the anxiety only brings temporary alienation, then the further concern would be whether the antagonism perpetuated by the state-sanctioned narratives would remain.

Collecting China, connecting Chinese

In response to the radical transformation of China from the Deng Xiaoping era, and the ideological anxiety surrounding China's integration into globalization, many scholars in Chinese studies, such as Chun Lin, Haoming Gong, and Kang Liu, have proposed seeking a "Chinese alternative" or a "Chinese alternative modernity" as national exigencies. Liu explores the Chinese alternative by examining intellectual debates in China about globalization and contemporary Chinese culture in *Globalization and Cultural Trends in China*. According to Liu, this alternative origin comes from Mao's project of alternative modernity, and there is no systematic alternative visible on the horizon.[173] Contemporary scholars of China generally agree that revolutionary ideology has lost its legitimizing power, leading to a crisis of ideology and legitimacy. Liu further points out that the crisis of legitimacy is not only reflected in the dysfunction of the CCP, but also in its disintegration, which resonates with Lin's description of "parties in the Party."[174] Given the present "absence and disarticulation of an alternative vision," Liu suggests that an alternative can be sought only within the ever-changing and ongoing process of globalization by making a self-reflective and immanent critique.

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https://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics/eng/inout/inout.kto (accessed on June 30, 2017).

[172] Brian Yecies, "Chinese transnational cinema and the collaborative tilt toward South Korea," Michael Keane, ed. *Handbook of Cultural and Creative Industries in China* (Cheltenham, UK: Northampton, MA, 2016), 236.

[173] Kang Liu, *Globalization and Cultural Trends in China* (Honolulu: U of Hawai'i, 2004), 6.

[174] Chun Lin, "The Making and Remaking of the Chinese Model," in *The Transformation of Chinese Socialism* (Durham: Duke UP, 2006), 6.

China, one the one hand, has abandoned its revolutionary legacy within the ambitious neoliberal pursuits; on the other hand, it has tactically rejuvenated its traditional culture to protect its national and cultural unity from the growing influences of foreign cultures. Liu argues that a new cultural formation in China is emerging as the nation further integrates itself into the world-system of capitalism. This new cultural formation "should be understood as postrevolutionary culture that embodies the fundamental tensions and contradictions of globalization (2004, p.4)." Not only should this uncertainty, identified by scholars, such as Jason McGrath and Paul Pickowicz, be considered in this new cultural formation in China, but also the hybridity, as Liu contends. Lin references this hybridity in *The Transformation of Chinese Socialism*, where she adopts a more radical approach and calls for a re-made post-Mao reform to bring about a rebirth of a new kind of Chinese socialism. In order to realize the remaking of Chinese socialism, Lin suggests, China's path must be open to "hybrid" formations, which may involve unprecedented elements (2006, p. 281). Given the sweeping power of capitalist globalization, Liu, who is not as optimistic as Lin, predicts that "China can never remain only 'partially globalized' and must come to terms with all aspects and complexities of the consequences of globalization (2004, p. 11)." As China dedicates itself to integrating into the capitalist world-system and the so-called "socialism with Chinese characteristics," there is the implication that cultural and political reform will wash socialist color off of China through intensifying globalization. In contrast with Liu's "inevitable full integration" with capitalist globalization, Lin suggests that only a "selective globalist" approach may permit China to actively ride on, rather than be swept by, the tide of globalization. And she says, "Socialism, after being made and unmade, could still be remade (2006, p. 283)." Lin indicates that the "post" prefix in the term "post-socialism" is "more descriptive than

prescriptive," while leaving unanswered the question of whether her "selective globalism" might feasibly be a prescriptive approach.

Scholars who are interested in Chinese alternative modernity are motivated by their dissatisfaction with the current domination of Euro-centrist or Western-centrist ideology or with the ongoing ideological crisis in China. Among these scholars, it is the idealists who are the most deeply dissatisfied with the current situation of China. Gong's justification of China's uneven modernity, Lin's remaking of Chinese socialism, and Liu's appeal for a rigorous self-critique for socialist rejuvenation demonstrate that they have never given up on socialism in China. In contrast, those scholars who argue for the ideas of post-socialism or "socialism with Chinese characteristics" admit that penetrative capitalism and its intermingling with socialist system, either from China's transforming era (Zhang Xudong, Jason MaGrath, Paul G. Pickowicz, Sheldon H. Lu) or dating back to socialism's being introduced into China (Arif Dirlik), is an irreversible process. In *Postsocialism and Cultural Politics*, Xudong Zhang describes the term post-socialism as the survival or failure of Chinese socialism, which emerged with the discrepancy between the 1980s and the 1990s in China. Zhang contextualizes this transformation in 1990s Chinese society in a larger frame of the global shift from modernity to postmodernity. Zhang argues that "the social historical rupture of the 1990s, then, can be probed from the perspective of the newfound freedom and subjectivity."[175] Resonating with Zhang's argument of *rupture* and McGrath's assertion of *breaking apart* in the Chinese society, Sheldon H. Lu also points out that the *discontinuities* parallel the continuities in China. Lu suggests that, "as a hyphenated construction, post-socialism

[175] Xudong Zhang, *Postsocialism and Cultural Politics: China in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2008), 8.

is by definition the co-existence of multiple temporalities and modes of production, the symbiosis of capitalism and socialism, and the embodiment of continuities as well as discontinuities."[176]

Deng's *gaige kaifang*, or economic reform based on the Open Door policy, which began in 1978, is viewed as the pivotal point of initializing an era of reform. Liu understands "socialism with Chinese characteristics" to be merely as an invention made up to justify Deng's paradoxical theory as a project of modernity (which is fundamentally at odds with revolutionary hegemony) that is nevertheless "still enmeshed in Mao's hegemonic discourse, which Deng's reform of the last two decades has tried to dismantle." Thus, Deng's project of modernization was "both a partial continuation of Mao's alternative modernity and a partial rejection of it." Liu further argues that Mao's alternative modernity was "a modernity that transcends capitalist modernity and its Eurocentric assumptions of historical teleology and economic determinism." This revolutionary hegemony becomes an "essential feature of Chinese alternative modernity."[177] Liu positions Deng's paradox between the revolution and modernization, and entry point for bringing cultural contradiction and tension into Today's China. As Liu maintains, "if socialism can be rejuvenated in China, it should indeed begin with a rigorous self-critique that interrogates the ideological positions and assertions of the ideological state apparatuses, the economical popular culture, and the intellectual elite (2004, p. 77)."

In contrast with Liu's emphasis on the lack of a sustainable Chinese alternative on the horizon, Lin makes a more urgent and confident gesture to carve out a space outside global capitalism for a socialist modernity. Lin proposes the possibility of remaking socialism by admitting the efficiency of the Communists' leadership in the nation's great rejuvenation, and also

[176] Sheldon H. Lu, "Answering the Question, What is Chinese Postsocialism?" in *Chinese Modernity and Global Biopolitics: Studies in Literature and Visual Culture*. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 210.
[177] Liu, *Globalization*, 49-51.

asserts that "Chinese novelty lay in the phenomenon where the Communist Party enabled private profit seekers to grow from within its own ranks and apparatus."[178] Through the demonstration of this novelty of enabling privatization, which has been promoted by legal, ideological, and policy moves to blur the demarcation between the private and the public, Lin alleges that "China had so far preserved a nationally integral developmental project and retained its party-centered organizational integrity (2006, p.262)." Lin criticizes capitalism as a ruthless and wasteful mode of production, suggesting further that the fact that it "does not have an answer to China's and the world's fundamental problems is what sustains the quest for alternatives." The criticism of capitalism co-exists with the reality of adopting the capitalist market economy in today's China, which answers the lingering question of what can practically and actually "specify an aspiring vision" for a Chinese alternative (2006, p.286). Different economic modes coexist in modern-day China, and they are all, in one way or another, dependent on the state. These fragmented and intermixed economic production modes and ideological modes have together helped to generate feelings of disintegration among the general public. The task of coping with this disintegration is given to the state Party-centered nationally integral development. Nothing is better positioned to fulfill this task than the strategical interpretation of "national culture," particularly "national treasure."

In *Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age*, Jason McGrath suggests that post-socialism in the Chinese context "does not signify a straightforward 'after' in either logical or chronological terms."[179] McGrath's focus on the fragmented worlds of China or the worlds within the fragments helps us to understand Chinese

[178] Chun Lin, "The Making and Remaking of the Chinese Model," in *The Transformation of Chinese Socialism* (Durham: Duke UP, 2006), 260.
[179] Jason McGrath, *Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 13.

audiences' feelings of disintegration. He uses the Chinese words "*beng*" (崩 collapse), "*sui*" (碎 fragments), and "*chai*" (拆 tear down) to implicate the disintegration of culture during modern Chinese economic development; he points out that "cultures are not only transforming, but actually breaking apart, diversifying (2008, p.7-20)." Culture is a process of "*fenhua*" (分化 a differentiation or de-territorialization). As McGrath states, the "postsocialist condition is fraught with experiences of fragmentation and anxiety in addition to the awakening of new desires and identities (2008, p.2)." This strong sense of disintegration inseparably interconnects with the alienation in daily life caused by cohesive suppression and anxiety or uncertainty in both public space and individual domain. The solitude of the postsocialist environment reacts with the rising desire for integration that screen-capitalism has potential to facilitate. It does so by projecting the experiences of fragmentation, the consciousness of anxiety, and the awakening of new desires and identities onto the screen while providing Chinese audiences with an imaginary solution to their immediate life. It provides answers to their concerns, and it manifests their hidden longings in the heterotopic experiences of Chinese everyday life. Screen culture probes into the unconscious of the ordinary people and brings that suppressed unconsciousness onto the screen as consciousness. The collective consumption of screen culture, through which imagination is reconstructed, has developed into social interactions in the context of China's transformation "from heteronomy to autonomy" embedded in the globalized timespace.

As Jason McGrath declares, "the central cultural logic of China at the turn of the 21st century is not essentially postmodern, but rather is largely consistent with the fundamental dynamics of capitalist modernity itself (2008, p.6)." Postsocialist modernity is a cross-cultural condition, embedded in the transformation of global capitalism. Commodity capitalism is increasingly mediated by screens. We live in a world of screens today, where audiences relate to

each other through a visual medium; this screen-based visualization provides newly depictable and accessible life experiences, generating material and non-material power by circulating images, as well as viewers who travel to the sites that have appeared on screen. This circulation participates in building screen economies and soft power by engaging financial transfers, commodity circulation, and affective interactions.[180] The emergence of screen-based media fundamentally capitalizes on all the activities that are displayed on screen due to the capital-driven motivation of screen culture industries; in other words, everything related to screen culture, from the production of the content to the display of products on screen, is capitalized. Because of the all-pervasive nature of screen-capitalism, audiences have grown conscious of being watched, not only as potential consumers, but also as significant participants in the shaping of the content itself. For example, the ways audiences respond to a show will shape the direction of the future episodes. As audiences have become more experienced as participants in screen culture, they have begun to build their own screen economies on social media platforms and capitalize on their influence, and thus join the circulation of capital and images.

In mainland China, the Chinese postsocialist transition and the evolving form of mediascape in which it is embedded have functioned jointly to nurture screen-capitalism. However, the collapse of the utopian doctrine—the one promised by communist ideology—has resulted in a social vacuity. This would be what Arif Dirlik calls "the price to be paid"[181] for the pluralist possibilities in Chinese society. As McGrath points out, with regard to post-socialist China, "old idealism has been smashed and new idealism has yet to be born (2008, p.6-7)." The radical changes

[180] The term soft power is coined by Joseph Nye in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. Soft power here means using a noncoercive way to further develop one state's national brand and build its global impact through appeal and attraction.
[181] Arif Dirlik, "Postsocialism? Reflections on 'socialism with Chinese Characteristics'," in *Critical Asian Studies* 21.1 (1989): 33-44.

in the economy strengthen the sense of vacuity and uncertainty. The immense ideological vacuum has been partially filled with a more secularized ideology—that of commodity and consumer culture. The failure to fulfill socialist promises and the chaos caused by social turmoil has led to the bankruptcy of revolutionary politics and ideological indoctrination in Mainland China. Grand ideas have given way to increasing concern about the actual daily lives of the people. As Sheldon H. Lu wrote, "postsocialism is everyday life, in which ordinary citizens struggle to make a transition from the guarantees and rigidity of socialist welfare to the fluctuations and freedom of a mass consumer society."[182] Postsocialism implies an emphasis of everydayness, in which a culture of mass consumer has become the norm. The growth of individualism and consumerism in Mainland China occurred simultaneously on the level of consumers and on the level of the Communist Party. On the one hand, this growth functions to "satisfy the actual needs of the shoppers," while on the other hand, "the Party also enjoyed a purchase on the realm of hyperreality, its own symbols becoming art of metacultural landscape of the flourishing commodity culture."[183] In his book, *In the Red: Contemporary Chinese Culture*, Geremie R. Barmé employs the concept of "totalitarian nostalgia" from 1990s Russia, which is "the product of an environment in which culture had to survive a balancing act between the old ideology and mentality, the demands of art, and new commercial imperatives (1999, p. 317)."

By nurturing an intense nostalgia, official narratives such as those in *National Treasure*, often attempt to bolster cultural confidence. This lack of cultural confidence is often, paradoxically, expressed in an overly narcissistic obsession with Chineseness, or sinocentrism for its imperial grandeur and cultural authenticity. Importantly, the indulgence of nostalgia does not necessarily

[182] Sheldon H. Lu. "Answering the Question, What is Chinese Postsocialism?" in *Chinese Modernity and Global Biopolitics: Studies in Literature and Visual Culture*. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 209.
[183] Geremie R. Barmé, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), 239.

restore the traditions of China or enable a bridge with Chinese tradition. Wen-hsin Yen problematizes the notion of "Chineseness" through the discussion of Yeh Family Collection and modern collecting practices. Chinese diaspora and their collecting practice has made and remade the Chinese identity with diverse meanings. It is within such transnational collecting practices that generations of individuals' identities were collected and redefined. As Yen says, "[N]o encounter… is ever in itself compete or lasting…Yeh Family Collection comes to life between the struggles of the past against the present, both of which are fleeting as well as everlasting."[184] Materials are brought to new life through transnational encounter and discussion. Chinese identity itself is escaping from yesterday's definition. Only when we acknowledge the de-centered transnationalism that are presented as the relics' "present," can we properly have aesthetic and sensual enjoyment of the relics instead of being steered by the reductive stories told in official narratives. Openly amplified nostalgia and "selective revival" of "Chinese tradition," endorsed by the Communist Party of China (CCP), are also part of this strategy to construct integration under the Party's ideological guidance in a China of changing identity.

In *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*, Byran S. Turner explores the theme of nostalgia as a response to modernization. Nostalgia, the argument goes, develops within the crises of modern society: the loss of traditional values, and the rise of sociology.[185] Arguably, nostalgia can be deployed as a technique to serve the modern metanarrative of nations in forms of reviving traditions. In addition to is deployment, nostalgia also has its Chinese characteristics in the postsocialist context. In the Chinese context, a "balancing act" (in Barmé's words) has taken place given the mixed economy and cultural contradictions that have been produced by political and

[184] Wen-hsin Yeh, "Living with Art: The Yeh Family Collection and the Modern Practices of Chinese Collecting," *Collecting China: The World, China, and a History of Collecting*, Edited by Vimalin Ruiivacharakul. (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 176-183.
[185] See Byran S. Turner, *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity* (Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, 1990).

social transformations. From Barmé's perspective, "nostalgia develops usually in the face of present fears, disquiet about the state of affairs, and uncertainty about the future," and it has been "institutionalized by the communist party and its claims to legitimacy that emphasized its role as the inheritor and protector of a codified body of national traditions that were summed up in terms of China's unique 'spiritual civilization.'"[186]

By nurturing an intense nostalgia, official narratives such as those in *National Treasure*, often attempt to bolster cultural confidence. This lack of cultural confidence is often, paradoxically, expressed in an overly narcissistic obsession with Chineseness, or sinocentrism for its imperial grandeur and cultural authenticity. Importantly, the indulgence of nostalgia does not necessarily restore the traditions of China or enable a bridge with Chinese tradition. Wen-hsin Yen problematizes the notion of "Chineseness" through the discussion of Yeh Family Collection and modern collecting practices. Chinese diaspora and their collecting practice has made and remade the Chinese identity with diverse meanings. It is within such transnational collecting practices that generations of individuals' identities were collected and redefined. As Yen says, "[N]o encounter… is ever in itself compete or lasting…Yeh Family Collection comes to life between the struggles of the past against the present, both of which are fleeting as well as everlasting."[187] Materials are brought to new life through transnational encounter and discussion. Chinese identity itself is escaping from yesterday's definition. Only when we acknowledge the de-centered transnationalism that are presented as the relics' "present," can we properly have aesthetic and sensual enjoyment of the relics instead of being steered by the reductive stories told in official narratives. Openly amplified nostalgia and "selective revival" of "Chinese tradition," endorsed by

[186] Geremie R. Barmé, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999), 317.
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the Communist Party of China (CCP), are also part of this strategy to construct integration under the Party's ideological guidance in a China of changing identity.

Chinese Characteristics

As discussed in Chapter Two regarding the Chinese remakes of Korean TV shows, Chinese remakes have been a jarring reminder of the lack of originality in Chinese screen culture and are seen as a threat to national and cultural identity by critics and Chinese governmental officials. As I also suggested, the practice of remakes paradoxically embodies the desire to seek the new. The practice of mimicry actually repeats the impossibility of repetition, and differences emerge in the process of localization. Faced with the irony that the so-called Chinese alternative has become synonymous with Chinese remakes, the chief director of *National Treasure*, Yu Lei, explains that "in fact, we have an ambition, which is to make *National Treasure* the first case of outputting Chinese copyright. Not just by adding subtitles and sending the show out like we did previously, but we hope to achieve more, to spread the format of the program so that other countries will *remake* it by learning from us."[188] Along with consciously filling a social and ideological vacuum with cultural cultivation, this example of ideologically-permeable screen-capitalism is devoted to setting up an exclusively Chinese aesthetic standard and program pattern that can potentially be remade by others.

That there is disintegration or fragmentation in the Chinese society is a consensus shared among these scholars' understanding of Chinese postsocialism. When China "looks in two directions"[189] within the *symbiosis* of capitalism and socialism, this disintegration or fragmentation

[188] Yongliang Zhou, "CCTV's National Treasure Goes Viral." *Btime* (*北京时间*). December 21, 2017, http://www.brtn.cn/news/43hpdm9c9jm8kdabm56nsfcgvns (accessed on April 12, 2018).
The Chinese title is "央视《国家宝藏》刷屏：口碑爆棚专家认可冠名费超千万".
[189] In "Answering the Question, What is Chinese Postsocialism?" Sheldon H. Lu calls that postsocilism "is an

is reflected in the ordinary Chinese citizen's mental lives and daily practices, and in the nation-state as a whole. The state has urgently strived to bridge this disintegration in the general public's daily life, and screen culture has played an essential role in this effort. Chinese audiences are awash in a relatively free space of consuming screen culture, configuring their subjectivity through the consumption. This postmodernist self-consciousness and subjectivity—both political and apolitical—is largely integrated into the Chinese post-socialist everyday life among the general public. By exploring 1990s cultural production and intellectual discourse, Zhang juxtaposes postmodernism and post-socialism in order to examine the correlation between the two in the Chinese context.

In contrast to Zhang Xudong's understanding of post-socialism, which stems from the rupture between the 1980s and the 1990s in China, Arif Dirlik, in "Postsocialism? Reflections on 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics'," argues that post-socialism refers to "a historical situation where socialism…offered an alternative to capitalism—a choice, in other words, between capitalist and socialist methods of development." [190] Chinese socialism had been made to compromise with capitalism from the beginning. Chinese socialism has always been "post-socialist" from its origin. As Dirlik contends, the current socialist state also "must look outside socialism in order to salvage or to sustain it (1989, p.41)." From a broader historical perspective, Dirlik refers to the localization of socialism, adapted to the Chinese context, as its vernacularization. This localized socialism in China generates an attenuation of faith in a single vision of the future that is not necessarily detrimental, since it may enable pluralistic possibilities

expectant present moment of unprecedented social experimentation that looks in two directions—back to the past and forward to the future." *Chinese Modernity and Global Biopolitics: Studies in Literature and Visual Culture*. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 210.

[190] Arif Dirlik, "Postsocialism? Reflections on "socialism with Chinese Characteristics"," in *Critical Asian Studies* 21, no.1 (1989), 40.

for imagining the future. What I want to point out is, in a visual system of relations, the present condition of inequality and uncertainty about the future are also spawned by these pluralistic possibilities projected on the screen. As described by Dirlik, the Chinese predicament and the pluralistic possibilities are two sides of the same coin—Chinese post-socialism.

The aforementioned shifting alliances caused by the national anxiety is also reflected in the Chinese government's ambiguous stance towards *hallyu*. On the one hand, the state promotes collaboration within commercialist interests and obtains cultural capital that fits well with the selective revival of Confucianism in the domestic regime. Chinese audiences also turn to Korean culture to find shared traditions in order to complete their fragmented jigsaw puzzle of old cultures, and they revel in the new cultures and lifestyles that satisfy their suppressed consumerism and emerging desires. On the other hand, censorship is still applied to the Korean Wave because of its possible threat to China's cultural identity, and, more importantly, in order to exclude the parts that do not fit into the states' temporary "selective globalism." The transplantation of screen-capitalism in China is enabled at the very origin of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" that requires itself to "look outside socialism."[191] Screen-capitalism makes use of the power-of-screen to permeate the everyday lives of Chinese audiences by providing a fluid ideoscape through intuitive sensory experiences with different cultural ideologies. Chinese (post)socialist ideology is not replaced or erased by the screen-capitalism, but it does penetrate and permeate contemporary Chinese society.

The obliviousness of the general public to political ideology has not stopped Chinese officials from articulating politics using cultural terms. Following the successes of the "Chinese Idiom Competition" in 2014 and the "Chinese Riddle Competition" in 2016, during the 2017 Spring Festival holiday, the "Chinese Poetry Competition" became hugely popular, with total

[191] Arif Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 243.

views of its ten episodes exceeding 1.2 billion. “The passion for culture as well as the tradition and workmanship of the Chinese nation has become a trend,” said Zhu Tong, CCTV deputy editor-in-chief. “This has inspired our resolve to better promote our fine culture.”[192] More than that, CCTV actively produced and broadcast several original cultural TV programs, such as *The Reader*, *Letters Alive*, and *National Treasure* in 2017, which is regarded as the first year of CCTV’s original culturally oriented programming.

Dirlik notes that when socialism was first introduced and transplanted onto Chinese soil, it already had the traits of post-socialism, or “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” A similar analysis could be made of the Chinese remake. Both the transplantation of socialism and the Chinese remakes cannot avoid the interpenetration of capitalism, and they cannot avoid looking outside themselves to seek sustainability. Grounded very much in post-socialist soil, the power-of-screen has been turned into quantifiable data with political and capital currency. According to a report from Xinhua net, “The show quickly went viral, scoring 9.3 out of 10 points on Douban, a popular movie rating platform in China, making it one of the most popular programs of its genre in the country. The program also become sensational on social media and online platforms. On Bilibili.com, one of China’s most popular video-sharing platforms among the young audiences, the first three episodes were viewed over 5 million times in total.”[193] These screen media are capital-driven by the financial returns. While the commercial income of *National Treasure* is still not comparable with the incomes of Chinese remakes of Korean entertainment shows (for instance, the named fee alone reached half billion RMB [around $79.2 million USD] for the remake *Hurry up, Brothers*), *National Treasure* nevertheless has drawn long queues in front of every museum

[192] “TV Show Brings China's ‘National Treasure’ to Life,” *Xinhua English*, December 21, 2017. http://english.sina.com/culture/her/2017-12-21/detail-ifypwzxq4659919.shtml (accessed on February 10, 2018).
[193] Ibid.

featured in the show, and has spurred hit sales on Taobao Alibaba of the peripheral products related to the cultural relics shown in the TV program.[194] This show capitalizes on its popularity, and in doing so brings commercial attention to these cultural sites and products through the power-of-screen. This interest in popularizing Chinese ancient history and archeological knowledge also accentuates the *flatness* of screen-capitalism; once history and archaeology were considered the provision of a prestigious few, but now they are offered up for the pleasure of the general public. In return, popularized consuming practices motivate the capital-driven production of the screen culture. As such, screen-capitalism has gradually dissolved politicization even as it is being employed to fill the ideological vacuum.

National Treasure is perhaps one of the most successful cultural products produced by the official Chinese state media. It is also emblematic of contemporary China's deployment of screen-capitalism: it is able to mediate solemn patriotism and amusing performances, party-centered propaganda and capitalist impetus, ancient traditions and contemporary sensibilities, official narratives and aesthetic enjoyment— in order to dissolve internal disintegrations and build soft power outward.

[194] Named fee is one kind of sponsorship fee in which the sponsor's name is displayed at the beginning of the show.

CHAPTER 5 A Sisterly Language and Female Friendship:

Snow Flower and the Secret Fan

What about sisterhood? Where has she gone?

Screen culture has typically been perceived as a male-centered pleasure, characterized by the objectifying and taming of women, and international amity has been often interpreted as a friendship of brotherhood. The lingering questions in the interplay between today's transnationalism and screen culture are "what about sisterhood? Where has she gone?"[195] The Sino-Korean female community is personalized in the story of friendship between a Chinese girl, Nina, and a Korean girl, Sophia, in the Sino-US-Korean collaborative film *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan*. This chapter discusses the formation of female friendship within an intertwined historical context and shared feminist agenda by examining *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan*. In particular, I accentuate the need to contextualize Chinese and Korean women in their complex historical backgrounds and social structures. I would like to suggest a transnational perspective to view women within the entwined cultural, historical, and social settings represented by the economy of *screen* culture.

The film tells two parallel stories of two pairs of *laotong*. One is about Lily and Snow Flower, who live in rural Hunan Province in nineteenth-century imperial China. The other is about their descendants, a Chinese girl, Nina, and a Korean girl, Sophia, who struggle to maintain their friendship amid twenty-first century demands in Shanghai. The famed Chinese actress Li Bingbing plays both Lily and Nina, and the *Hallyu* star Jun Ji-hyun (also known as Gianna Jun) plays Snow Flower and Sophia. The film starts with Nina and Sophia's story in present-day Shanghai and then

[195] This question is drawn from Jacques Derrida who asks "what about sisters, where has she gone" in the discourse of friendship in *Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 2006), 96.

flashes back to Lily and Snow Flower's story in the late Qing dynasty's China. Sophia finds that this past story parallels her present encounter with Nina because their ancestors also took an oath of sisterhood centuries ago while struggling to defend their friendship during familial and social turmoil. The coextending stories of past and present represent a timeless portrait of one of the most mysterious and treasured relationships of all time—female friendship.

Figure 5.1 Two girls practicing *Nüshu* in *Snow Flower and Secret Fan*

Nevertheless, not only is female friendship missing in the Confucianist relations in East Asia, but it also is absent in Western ethical-political-philosophical discourses. If we revisit Aristotle's remarks on the forms of friendship, we cannot find any mention of women. As Aristotle defined it, "the perfect form of friendship is that between good men who are alike in excellence of virtue."[196] This definition reserves friendship for relationship "between men," while women are excluded. Even so, Aristotle's description of friendship could apply equally well to friendship between women. "Time and familiarity" are two of the features that he used to characterize

[196] J. A. K. Thomson Aristotle and Hugh Tredennick, *The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics* (Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 1999), 68.

friendship. In the film *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan,* two pairs of *laotong* are sworn sisters for life. The friendship between Snow Flower and Lily runs through their childhood, marriage, sufferings, and life changes, until death. Over their lifetime, the emotional lives of the two continued to intertwine. Snow Flower and Lily lived through years of separation during the chaos of social turmoil and the typhoid epidemic, but they still could feel the love in each other's words. Physical separation upon marriage did not cause them to separate emotionally. Rather, their intense emotion and familiarity with each other opened a possibility for shared mourning in their suffocated alienation from male-dominated society. They are each other's congenial allies. Their enduring relationship was even passed down to their descendants Sophia and Nina. As Nina narrates at the end of the film, they will be *laotong* for ten thousand years. Not only do *laotong* share timeless bonding and abiding familiarity, the relationship between sworn sisters is also characterized by a one-to-one exclusiveness and loyalty.

As Aristotle described, "to be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many people at the same time. For love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique (1999, p.68)." This uniqueness exactly describes the relationship of *laotong* in the film. *Laotong* is a paired relationship, a one-to-one sisterhood. When Snow Flower repeatedly calls Lily's name while on her deathbed, her daughter runs to Lily to beg her one last meeting to resolve misunderstanding: "No, she (my mother) doesn't have any other *laotong*. She misled you. She had never had another *laotong*…. She has only one sister of the heart." The reason why Snow Flower had lied to Lily was that she did not want Lily's pity; she did not want her misery to become a burden to Lily. In other words, she "tries (trying) to avoid being the cause of a friend's pain (1999, p.68)." This terrible misunderstanding tears them apart. Similarly, in the story in contemporary Shanghai, in order to let Nina go to New York to

pursue a better career, Sophia lies to Lily telling her that she will leave soon with her new Australian boyfriend (played by Hugh Jackman). This is exactly as Aristotle explains: A man "does not let others join in his lamentations" because "he himself is not given to lamenting," for "he cannot bear the pain which [sympathy for him] gives his friends." However, Aristotle points to femininity as a counterpart of this good intention in friendship: "But womenfolk and womanish men enjoy it when others join their mourning, and they feel affection for them as being their friends and sharers of their sorrow." Nevertheless, this distinction between the good intention and shared mourning is not always tenable. *Laotong* carry out both in their lifetime friendship. Snow Flower confessed her difficult life in the secret fan letter that she sent to Lily, though she "could not bear to tell you the truth." *She* lessens the burden on *her* friend by mourning together to form community and her good intentions are to prevent *her* friend's sympathy.

Jacques Derrida notes in his "Politics of Friendship," there is a "double exclusion" of the feminine "that can be seen at work in all of the great ethico-political-philosophical discourses on friendship."[197] This double exclusion means, "on the one hand, the exclusion of friendship between women, and on the other hand, the exclusion of friendship between a man and a woman (1993, p.383)." Such exclusions of the feminine in the ethical, political, and philosophical paradigms of friendship make the existences of female friendships a quarrelsome question and a disputatious experience in the patriarchy. The privileging of the brother over the sister is related to this politicization of the model of friendship. As Derrida notes,

> "Within the familial schema… this exclusion privileges the figure of the brother, the name of the brother or the name of brother, more than that of the father–whence the necessity of connecting the political model, especially that of democracy and of

[197] Jacques Derrida, "Politics of Friendship," *American Imago 50*, no. 3 (1993), 383.

> the Decalogue, with the re-reading of Freud's hypothesis about the alliance of brothers… These exclusions of the feminine would not be unrelated to the movement that has always "politicized" the model of friendship at the very moment one tries to withdraw this model from an integral politicization. The tension here is within the political itself. It would be necessary to analyze all discourses which reserve politics and public space for man, domestic and private space for woman."[198]

The national identity is a masculine one. The exclusion of the feminine in friendship can be politicized as a national-political masculinity. Thus, we can often see that national relationships have been personalized into friendships between men or, masculine figures. For instance, Lun Xun's famous essay, *Mr. Fujino* (藤野先生), tells the story of the relationship between Lu Xun, a Chinese male student in Japan, and his Japanese anatomy teacher, Mr. Fujino. Eileen J. Chen interprets this story as a friendship that "imagines a paradigm of relationality that goes beyond the limits of nationalist and colonial discourse."[199] This interpretation implies that the relationship between Lu Xun and Mr. Fujino is a reflection of the politicized friendship between China and Japan. Thus, the national identities must be represented by male figures, a friendship of brothers. As Derrida contends, "this double exclusion of the feminine in the philosophical paradigm of friendship would thus confer on it the essential and essentially sublime figure of a virile homosexuality."[200] In the Korean film *Joint Security Area*, the intimate friendship between South Korean soldiers and North Korean soldiers at the DMZ (Korean Demilitarized Zone) confirmed this linkage between the exclusion of the feminine and the sublime figure of homosexuality. In his

[198] Ibid., 383-384. Derrida uses the word "schema" in the Kantian sense: between intuitive singularity and the generality of the concept.
[199] Eileen J. Cheng, "In Search of New Voices from Alien Lands: Lu Xun, Cultural Exchange, and the Myth of Sino-Japanese Friendship," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 73, no. 03 (2014): 589-618.
[200] Jacques Derrida, "Politics of Friendship," *American Imago* 50, no. 3 (1993), 383

"Each Man Kills the Things He Loves" (Transgressive Agents, National Security, and Blockbuster Aesthetics in *Shiri* and *Joint Security Area*), Kyung Hyun Kim argues that the interactions between the four male soldiers (two from North Korea, two from South Korea) "all pose allegories of same-sex eroticism." As Kim contends, "the Name of the Father he (Lieutenant Ch'oe) represents anchors the definite linkage between national security and the prohibitive homoerotic codes of *JSA*." The only female figure in the film, Sophie Jean, serves as "an agent [who] transgresses the boundaries of ideology and gender," according to Kim. As he argues, "Sophie's sexuality is framed outside the realm of desire both within the diegesis and outside of it because she has entered a space that is heavily characterized by its homo-social activity."[201] The exclusion of the feminine is always associated with the sublime figure of homosexuality through a politicized discourse.

Nationhood and Brotherhood

This politicization of the friendship paradigm privileges an androcentric friendship somewhere between nationhood and brotherhood. Such a linkage between self-identity as a sovereign nation and the privileging of masculinity can also be expressed as a violent banishment or subordination of the feminine. In "Out of the Shadows," Ji-Yeon Yuh argues that the exclusion of camptown women and military brides in the Korea and Korean-American society is related to the reluctance to admit South Korea's subjugation under the U.S. The dismissal of those women as outside of the realm of Korean society "allows Koreans to negate the realities of their subjugation under the United States and to glorify the United States as the object of desire."[202] The

[201] Kyung Hyun Kim, "Each Man Kills the Things He Loves: Transgressive Agents, National Security, and Blockbuster Aesthetics in *Shiri* and *Joint Security Area,*" *The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 266-267.
[202] Ji-Yeon Yuh, "Out of the Shadows: Camptown Women, Military Brides, and Korean (American) Communities", Jean Yu-wen Shen Wu and Thomas C. Chen, eds., *Asian American Studies Now: A Critical Reader* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 240.

waning of the nation has been accompanied and represented by the decline of the masculinity and patriarchy. The story of Snow Flower and Lily set against the backdrop of the waning nationhood of imperial China in the late Qing Dynasty.

Both Snow Flower and Lily are born on the same day and their feet bound on the same day, yet their families are of different classes. The two girls' destinies were tied together at the moment of their foot binding in Hunan Province in 1829. The matchmaker in the area also performs the job of matching *laotongs*. To arrange Lily a marriage with someone from a wealthy family, she needs to first make her a match to a sister from an educated, privileged family in the much more affluent area, Tongkou (桐口), in Hunan Province. Other than the fact that the two girls have compatible astrological signs (eight characters), Lily was chosen by Snow Flower's family due to her "golden lotuses," the most perfect bound feet that the matchmaker had ever seen.

To have this pair of "golden lotuses," one needs to experience the extremely painful process of foot binding. Foot binding was the tradition of binding a young daughter's feet by wrapping cloth around their feet tightly and forcing them to walk until their bones broke so that they were easier to mold and change, then tightening the bindings as time progressed. The ideal foot, called the Golden Lotus (or Golden Lily), was approximately 3 inches in length. Such torture would "reward" Lily a marriage to the most powerful family in the region. However, Snow Flower, the girl from the wealthy family, attempts to fly over these constrictions. Although she is from a formerly prosperous family, Snow Flower ends up marrying a butcher, considered the lowest of professions in the Confucian culture. As Charlotte Furth comments in "Pre-modern Chinese Women in Historical Fiction" on the original novel from which film was adapted, "to prepare for a desirable match required the bodily discipline of foot binding as proof of genteel rearing and

sexual attractiveness."[203] Men's fetish for bound feet became a decisive condition of women's fate in the patriarchal society. In that place and time, a Chinese woman had to be subservient to the nearest man, whether he was her father, in-law, husband or even son, as was prescribed by the Confucian norms of obedience.

This film allows us a glance at an intense female friendship against the backdrop of late imperial China's decline as well as of the patriarchy's descent. Along with the waning of the late Qing Dynasty, the social turmoil of the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864) led to the death of Snow Flower's son on the way to escape. She was accused of not taking care of the child and beaten by her husband. All of his sadness was expressed through his fists, and he even refuses to tell Snow Flower where her son is buried. It was during that time when Chinese and Korean societies both faced similar predicaments in terms of the ebbing of the nationhood. Because China has been one of major audiences for the Korean Wave today, Chinese society and the screen culture based on it share an echoed value of feminist discourse with Korean women within the context of their intertwined history.

Intertwined history and interdependency

China and the Korean peninsula have a long history of entanglement and interdependency, from the Japanese invasions of Korea (壬辰倭亂, 1592-1598) during the *wanli* period of the Ming dynasty, to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) during the *guangxu* period of the Qing dynasty, to the the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) during the *xuantong* period of the Qing dynasty. In the modern history of Korea and China alone, their interrelated fate is even more salient. When various

[203] Charlotte Furth, "Pre-modern Chinese Women in Historical Fiction: The Novels of Lisa See," *Education about Asia* 14, no. 1 (2009), 20.

Western powers exerted pressure to open Korean ports, Korea ended with entering into a trade treaty and diplomatic relationship with Japan in 1876 and was forced to open its ports to the outside world, marking the start of Korean modern history. Similarly, in China, the Qing government's signing of Nanjing Treaty with Britain required China to open its ports in 1843, which was a direct result of Qing's failure in the first Opium War and marked the beginning of Chinese modern history. Chinese nationalism, which was provoked by frustration over this humiliating defeat, became one of the most important inducements that aroused Koreans' concern for their own country's survival, as the long-practiced symbolic Sino-centrism of the Korean government was challenged by China's predicament. As Yung-hee Kim notes in her article, "Under the Mandate of Nationalism: Development of Feminist Enterprises in Modern Korea, 1860-1910," China's predicament also made "Korea face a formidable task of defining its own new identity and devising strategies to avoid repeating China's political disaster."[204] Their intertwined historical fates can be seen especially clearly in two places: Tonghak (Eastern learning) and Chung'in (middle people).

The former is a mystical amalgam of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Shamanism that resists the aggression of foreign powers based on Western technology and Catholicism. The founder of Tonghak, Ch'oe Che-u (崔济愚), was inspired by the Christian notion of egalitarianism and added other syncretic elements to form his mystical amalgam. This panentheistic religion was utilized to fend off the inflowing western culture and fight against *yangban* aristocrats as a political ideology in the late nineteenth century. Compared to the positive perceptions of Western missionaries in Korea, negative perception of them in China resulted in a series of acrimonious incident, such as the Boxer Rebellion initiated from Shandong province (1900),[205] which was used

[204] Yung-Hee Kim, "Under the Mandate of Nationalism: Development of Feminist Enterprises in Modern Korea, 1860-1910." *Journal of Women's History 7*, no.4 (1995), 121.
[205] James Hevia, "Leaving a Brand on China: Missionary Discourse in the Wake of the Boxer Movement." *Modern China* 18, no.3 (1992):304-32. Cited in Hyaeweol Choi. *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women,*

by the Qing government to expel the foreign powers from China. There were also, massive rebellion in China that opposed against the Qing government with a Christian millenarian agenda, such as the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).[206] As one of the earliest to attempt to bring the ideologies of nationalism and feminism together in Korea, Tonghak expressed its pro-women ideas in its emphasis on the humanitarian treatment of women. It also led to the Tonghak Peasant Movement in 1894. The frightened Chosun government reached out to the Qing dynasty for help. Fatefully, the Qing government's decision to send its soldiers to Korea without informing Japan—as was required by the Convention of Tianjin—gave Japan an excuse to send its troops to Korean peninsula. This led to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) in which the Qing army withdrew from Korea and the war turned to China. As a result, China was defeated by Japan and co-signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which officially ended the tribunal relation between Korea and China. Chinese influence was expulsed from Korea and the war signaled the end of the Western Affairs Movement (also known as the Tongzhi Restoration, 1861-1895) in China itself.

The latter group, the Chung'in, some of whom were interpreters of the Chinese language, had frequent opportunities to travel to China and witness firsthand the alarming development in world affairs, which convinced them that fresh political visions and strategies were needed in order to save their country without repeating China's failure. Later on, during the Chinese Anti-Japanese War (1931-1945), Koreans located their bases in China to resist Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) and joined the Chinese liberation movement. Echoing the May 4th Movement in China in the same year of 1919, Korea's domestic resistance peaked with the March 1st Movement, when Korean leaders were sent to flee to China. After the end of the World War II, China once again was

Old Ways. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

[206] The leading of Taiping Rebellion, Hong Xiuquan, claimed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ, and thus the leader of the Congregation of God Worshippers. Under the guise of Christian agenda, the Taiping Rebellion, however, led to one of the bloodiest wars in the human history.

involved with the exigence of Korean peninsula, this time in the Korean War (1950-1953). No matter the historical changes or different nations involved, China was involved in every crisis in Korean peninsula, and vice versa.

All these entwined histories of Korea and China, and Asia in general, compel us to go beyond a nationalized view the history from a unitary State apparatus, given that the topic itself is transnationally connected and multidimensionally influential. Deleuze's idea on the matter of history offers us an alternative perspective, "[H]istory is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus, at least a possible one, even when the topic is nomads. What is lacking is a Nomadology, the opposite of a history."[207] In addition, such a nomadology should not be confined within masculine state's narratives. The intertwined history engenders a discourse that impacts both public and private domains. Each national crisis has also led Chinese and Korean women to experience similar struggles and play similar roles in the social turmoil. This entwined history compels us to contextualize gender within the historically constituted, multi-layered, and complex hierarchical social space that was produced by its historical roots.

Inchon and Shanghai

Like their metaphorical sisters in China, Korean women were confronted by the complexity of Korea's waning patriarchy along with the national sovereignty and uneven gender-based power structure in which they had long been struggling. For instance, in O Chong-hui's *Chinatown*, this complexity is well-illustrated by the various mingling layers of hierarchy: US soldiers, South Koreans, North Koreans, sex workers, and Chinese immigrants, all of whom are encompassed in

[207] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, tr. Brain Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 23.

the layered space of this Chinatown, with mixed experiences of modernity in the immediate post-war Korea. Jin-kyung Lee argues that "the Chinese community serves as a metaphor for the foreignness of that historical transition for South Koreans" in *Chinatown*,[208] foreignness that derives from the transition from Japanese colonial rule to American neocolonial rule, and from war to post war. I would suggest the "Chinese community" is also an intertextual reference to a layered social and class space; such intertextuality is not only affected by the dynamics of gender but also of race, class, and ethnic struggles.

This Chinatown is located in Inchon, a port city that various Western powers had been pressuring the Choson Dynasty to open since 1866. This city was renamed from Chemulpo to Inchon and forced to open under an agreement with Japan in 1883. Chinese immigrants, mainly from Shandong Province, began to enter this port in 1884 after a Chinese Consulate and concession were established there. Inchon was also the site where the first shots of the Russo-Japanese war were fired. Later, in 1950, it was occupied by North Korean troops during the Korean War until the United States army landed and pushed North Korea to the northern border; soon after, Chinese forces intervened to help the North Korean Army. A cease-fire agreement was finally signed in 1953, immediately after which, in 1954, the story of *Chinatown* occurs.

The story of *Chinatown* is told from a prepubescent girl's point of view. This view is neither completely cultivated by the adults' sophistication, nor is it in the position of the occupying or dominant power in this multi-layered hierarchical and intertwined social space, one that has been even more complicated by the development of neo-imperial capitalism. This little girl is from a North Korean refugee family that eventually settled in the neighborhood of Chinatown. Her

[208] Jin-Kyung Lee, "National History and Domestic Spaces: Secret Lives of Girls and Women in 1950s South Korea in O Chông-hûi's 'The Garden of Childhood' and 'The Chinese Street'" *Journal of Korean Studies* 9, no.1 (2004), 80.

mother is a housewife with seven children, her animal-like continuous biological reproduction a requirement of the declining, yet still extant patriarchal authority. The father is a jobless, disempowered figure who finally gets a job in the city selling kerosene, though that barely earns him a living. The maternal grandfather is betrayed by his concubine, another sign of the declining patriarchy.

The little girl's family lives right next to Chinatown, but the children "were the only ones who were interested in the Chinese. O Chong-hui attempts to rescue the lost narratives of women in 1950s South Korea and reconfigures the national history by giving a glimpse of the exclusion and alienation of the Chinese community."[209] The Korean adults referr to them indifferently as "Chinks." The neighborhood children are curious about what lies deep inside those Chinese immigrants' minds that is seldom expressed, even through years of friendship. Since the story is narrated from the little girl's point of view, with bona fide transparency, we are allowed to catch sight of the touching interaction between the little girl and a Chinese immigrant who faces racial discrimination in the town. When the girl receives from a Chinese man a package stuffed with "some bread dyed in three colors, which the Chinese ate on their holidays, and a thumb-sized lantern decorated with a plastic dragon," we are allowed a glimpse of an unofficial friendship and unsophisticated communication between the little girl and the Chinese man. This is the moment of "good will". Although good will may not qualify as real friendship because "it lacks intensity and desire", as Aristotle says, "good will is the beginning of friendship."[210] The qualities of good will "always accompany affection." Mutual affection is not always implied in good will, but good will is the first step forward that makes friendship possible.

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[209] Ibid.
[210] Aristotle, J. A. K. Thomson, and Hugh Tredennick, *The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics* (Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 1999), 69.

Like the port city of Inchon in *Chinatown*, that Shanghai, as Nina's father explains to the Korean girl, Sophia, "is a sea port, everyone's from somewhere else. People come and go, come and go." The politics of friendship are also associated with another concept, hospitality. Etymologically, hospitality derives from the Latin *hospes*, meaning "host," "guest," or "stranger." Derrida noted that etymologically the act of hospitality connotes providing women, food, lodging, and entertainment to meet their guests' needs. Hospitality is one of the expression of fraternity. However, the rules of this hospitality have been always made by men, and the forms of it manipulated by men. This hospitality lacks women in an active, subjective role. In the film, the Chinese girl Nina's hospitality toward the Korean girl Sophia fills this gap. To respond to the "double exclusion" of the feminine in the friendship, the friendship between the little girl and the Chinese man in the Chinatown offers us a counterpoint to the androcentric friendship.

Such counterexample punctuates a much-needed rethinking of the earlier conceptualizations of the exclusion of the female in the discourse of friendship. Outdated male-driven conceptions of friends are no longer capable of responding to the decline of the patriarchy or its relationship to the waning of national sovereignty in modern Chinese and Korean history. The historical and cultural contextualization of studies of the Korean feminist agenda and its intertwined relationship with Chinese feminism demands that we reconceptualize friendship and further explore the shifting gender gaze that interacts with the politics of class, race, and generational differences in a transforming society.

Entwined feminist agendas

The waning of nationhood provoked nationalism in both China and Korea, which has in turn been associated with the development of feminism in both countries. As Kim argues, the

historical background of Korean feminism across a half century has actually been intertwined with the emergence of nationalism in Korea. For instance, Korean Kŭnuhoe (Friends of the Rose Sharon, 1927-31) was the organization that brought together women from both the Christian right and Socialist left camps in the name of fighting against colonial rule. However, as Kenneth M. Wells analyzes in "The Price of Legitimacy," the logic of female liberation in the Kŭnuhoe movement was masked and "only served as a handmaiden to the moment." Wells criticizes the movement because the female activists surrendered "their original goal of a new gender arrangement in which women enjoyed self-determination in all personal, social, and eventually political relations to core nationalist and socialist priorities."[211] These women believed that because women's issues are related to the "whole," their solutions depended on the "whole."

The interrelated evolution of feminism and nationalism in Korea have also been entwined with the modern history of China. In China, the active advocacy of male subjects helped to bring about a feminism that was subservient to the nation's sovereignty and independence. Facing a national crisis, Chinese women were encouraged to be female heroes in order to save the national sovereignty. However, after the nationalist agenda succeeded, feminist discourse was postponed. This postponement of the feminist agenda had become common around the world. American women, too, were spurred by the slogan of "we can do it" to enter the workforce during World War II. When the war ended, though, they were sent back to the kitchen, that domestic and private space that is reserved for feminine labors. In China's case, not only has patriarchal nationalism subsumed feminist discourse under the premise of the nation, communism has also subordinated women's issues under class issues. These two strands converged and intertwined with one another

[211] Kenneth M. Wells, "The Price of Legitimacy: Women and the Kŭnuhoe Movement, 1927-1931." Edited by Shin, Gi-Wook, and Michael Edson.Robinson, *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U Asia Center, 1999), 219.

in the case of China and North Korea. Furthermore, South Korean anti-imperial nationalism of the 1980s was a derivative of the North Korean version and therefore shows similar traits to those of China and North Korea.

The entwined discourses of nationalism, communism, and feminism in China have developed into a particular "feminism with Chinese characteristics." In *Women Through the Lens*, Cui Shunqun draws on Li Xiaojiang's critique, claiming that "gender politics in China appear to concern women and nation more than the opposition between men and women… the women-nation polarity cannot be oppositional but must be interdependent." Cui problematizes this positioning of women in the discourse of nationalism, arguing that "in the guise of nationalism, women serve as a figure of the oppressed, bearing external invasions and domestic problems, a trope of resistance in the struggle for national independence and a symbol of a component in the building of the new nation–state."[212] In this sense, "feminism with Chinese characteristics" was in a similar predicament to that of Korean feminism.

It diverges, however, from Korean feminist development in its confrontation of Chinese Marxist and revolutionary politics. As Cui notes, "Marxism sees gender in terms of class and women's emancipation as part of the proletarian revolution," which "denies her a subject position and theoretical orientation." Chinese women merely serve as a subordinated class and gendered body to the totalitarian revolutionary cause, and "the ignorance of her economic condition further conceals the problems that women face." After various liberations, those questions remain; Cui notes, "from guojia（nation-home 国家）to jia（home 家）, "from familial daughter to socialist model, she has no name of her own, no subject position." Amid such assumptions, Chinese film has become a locale where feminism attempts to exert its agenda. Male characters appear through

[212] Shuqin Cui, *Women through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century of Chinese Cinema* (Honolulu: U of Hawai'i, 2003), 174-175.

the women's point of view as objects of female despair in the name of realism. In *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan*, Snow Flower's husband treats her as personal property, sexually and violently. When Lily comes all the way to visit her, walking on her "Golden Lotuses," she gingerly asks her husband to allow her more time to accompany her female friend, whom she has not seen in a long time. This request is rejected without any hesitation, for she does not have any discretion as a sexual object serving her husbands' needs. When her son dies from frigidness and hunger in their escape from rioting during the Taiping Rebellion, Snow Flower, the child's mother, becomes the target of her husband's fury and blame-shifting when he beats her violently.

Although Lily married into an affluent family, her relationship to her husband is no better than Snow Flower's. She is isolated by her family, and her arranged marriage only garners her treatment as a property as well. Her husband never cares about her opinions and never says that he loves her. To this point, Sophia's aunt describes a *laotong* match in the film as follows: "Marriages used to be made for men's reasons, to form business alliances, to manage households, to produce sons, and they were obligatory. A *laotong*'s commitment was for women's reasons, by choice. For companionship, understanding, and happiness." That is, a *laotong* relationship made by choice can bring women emotional companionship and eternal fidelity, which the obligatory heterosexual marriage was supposed to bring yet failed to do so. By signing the traditional *laotong* contract—my hand opens to yours, we of good affection shall never sever our bond—two girls are bonded together for eternity as kindred sisters with deep-hearted love for each other. This sisterly relationship links them more tightly to each other than with their lovers.

Fictive kinship

In her essay "'Let us be Sisters Forever': The Sororal Model of Nineteen-Century Female Friendship," Carol Lasser insightfully observes that "the language of sisterhood runs through the writings of American women from the mid-eighteenth through the nineteenth century."[213] Lasser argues that a woman translates her familial ideals into actual practice in order to construct a relation of "fictive kin," which could "sustain them in the public domain." In the film, Nina and Sophia indeed have been supported by this fictive kinship between each other. Sophia, the Korean girl living in Shanghai, has a family that was broken by the bankruptcy of her father and the absence of her mother. The fictive kinship projects her familial ideals and connects her with Nina in a pseudo-family by practicing the sisterhood. For Snow Flower and Lily in imperial China, they never entered the public sphere but operated only underneath it. More than translating their familial ideals, their practices of sisterhood served as a newly carved-out space of community, between the domestic and private spheres, rather than in opposition to the public sphere. The public sphere for Snow Flower and Lily is only reserved by the power-of-screen, as a non-diegetic narrative.

In "The Female World of Love and Ritual," Carroll Smith-Rosenberg indicates that a specifically female world had been built among women in nineteenth-century America due to the rigid sex-role differentiation and gender-role socialization within family and society.[214] Similarly, in nineteenth-century China, gender segregation was also perpetuated by Confucianist ideology. Such rigid segregation indeed brought Snow Flower and Lily closer to each other. Both of them had experienced foot binding, childbirth, and alienation by their husbands and families. The physical and psychological suffering tied them together in a women's world. For Sophia and Nina,

[213] Carol Lasser, "'Let Us Be Sisters Forever:' The Sororal Model of Nineteen-Century Female Friendship," *Signs* 14, no. 1 (1988): 158-181.
[214] Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations between Women in Nineteenth-Century America." *Signs* 1, no. 1 (1975): 1-29. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3172964.

their liberating dance of *La Cha Bol* was viewed as decadent due to the gender-role differentiation in contemporary society, with a nuance of transnationality applicable to both China and Korea. Sophia, the Korean girl, was the one who was required by her stepmother to stop contacting her Mandarin tutor who was also best friend, Nina. Such constraints women kept within the prescribed social norms and behaviors, leaving them with limited options. This transnational constraint imposed on Korean and Chinese women was also confirmed by the Korean actress, Chun Ji-hyun, in an interview regarding her experiences working on this film. She states that the social and cultural restrictions of women in Korean society allowed her to readily understand the film and thus increase her communication with Chinese actress Li Bingbing and understanding of the characters. Indeed, it is this separation of male and female "spheres" that Derrida argues is one of the significant causes of excluding women from the discourse on friendship. Additionally, the separated spheres have constrained women within the domesticity of "proper behaviors" and made a life in the public world in contemporary Shanghai all the more difficult. Nina, like other women all over the world, had to make more effort than her male colleagues to receive a promotion in her company. One scene in the film showed a close-up of her tired feet after she had taken off her high heels—implied as a parallel torment to the foot binding that her ancestors suffered.

In the film, both in nineteenth-century and in contemporary China, ideal womanhood was inaccessible. It is worth noticing that in the diegetic female world of the film, men are only represented through women's perspectives as objects of despair in unhealthy relationships. The tightly bonded, intense friendship between the two women in the film has frequently been eroticized; critics and lay readers alike have read homosexuality between the *laotong*. In Carroll Smith-Rosenberg's analysis of the correspondence and diaries of women and men between the 1760s and the 1880s, she points out that friendships between women were also questioned as to

whether they were based on emotional or physical love. Smith-Rosenberg responds, "the essential question is not whether these women had genital contact and can therefore be defined as heterosexual or homosexual." Smith-Rosenberg criticizes the dichotomized universe of deviance and normality, arguing that this binary thinking could distort the nature of women's emotional interactions. As Smith-Rosenberg argues, for these American women, "emotionally and cognitively, their heterosocial and their homosocial worlds were complementary." In any case, in the film *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan*, there was no suggestion of genital contact between the *laotong*; rather, they are sworn sisters for a life in East Asian context. Emotional binding is far more strongly indicated in their friendship. Additionally, their heterosocial world only places them within an alienated group. Sexual fetishism and domestic violence, physically or psychologically, merely consigns them to being the object of desire and anger. Their husbands' anger stems from the logic of a weakened masculinity. They are so deprived of patriarchal authority and self-respect in light of the waning of the nation's sovereignty that they bring their fury to home. No matter how their husbands treat them, as women, they still feel obligated and dedicated to being better wives. Therefore, instead of building a complementary world, Snow Flower and Lily carved another world underneath the violence of their heterosocial world rather than fighting against it.

In the *Politics of Friendship*, Derrida cites Nietzsche's position in the discourse of this "history" (his-story): "that is why a woman is not yet capable of friendship: she only knows love." Derrida further notes that "it is necessary to insist here on the 'not yet.' For it extends also to man, but first of all once again to the 'brother' of Zarathustra, as the future of a question, of an appeal or a promise, of a plea or a prayer." However, the exclusion of women from the discourse of friendship neither denies the existence of female friendship nor confirms the existence of friendship among brothers. As Derrida argues, "we already name the friendship that we still have

not met. We *already* think that we *do not yet* have access to it." This is exactly the Zarathustra's interpretation of Aristotle's exclamation of "O my friends, there is no friend." Questioning the "not yet" friendship, Derrida quotes from Zarathustra, "woman is not yet capable of friendship. However, tell me, you men, who among you is capable of friendship? There is comradeship: may there be friendship!" In other words, the exclusion of women from friendship questions the validity of friendship among men.

Symbiosis

In the film, love is one of the elements of *laotong*s' friendship. Their intense friendship is fundamentally rooted in the "sharing of the existence."[215] They share the ups and downs in their lives as "one" breathing community. Despite their physical separation, they live in each other's emotional proximity. They are bound together with peace in this small community by a unique and exclusive language. The messages passed through this language construct a set of common memories between them. This language provides for them another spiritual life in which they have found their happiness within the most cruel and hard suffering. They are united in one spirit, a pure communion of spirit, and thus preserve their hope for the future. This sharing of existence is what Agamben calls the center of friendship, drawing upon Aristotle's discourse on friendship, which is "sharing the sweetness of existence." In the film, women share the sweetness despite the bitterness of life. To quote Agamben's words, "Friendship is, in fact, a community… as the sensation of existing (*aisthisis hotitstin*) is desirable for us, so would it also be for our friends… Friendship is the con-division that precedes every division, since what has to be shared is the very

[215] Giorgio Agamben, "The Friend," in *What is an Apparatus?: And Other Essays* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 33.

fact of existence, life itself."[216] This sharing of "life itself" has been embodied in the friendship between Snow Flower and Lily and that between the Chinese girl, Nina, and the Korean girl, Sophia, as well as in the national relations of China and Korea.

The sharing of "the very fact of existence" is represented in the intertextual survival of cultural content within each other's intercontexual land (in the sense that neighbors produce the context of the neighborhood) between China and Korea. Rather than politicizing the relationship, as is done with men's friendships, I would like to suggest instead a depolitcicized step of "affective thinking" at the national level in terms of an intensely binding friendship between "two women within one spirit." Rather than being caught between celebrating rationalism or falling into an orientalist argument, this "affective thinking" should be viewed as a part of a spectrum of affect gradations, shaped by both sympathized feeling and profound thinking. The economy of affect deconstructs the idea of an economy void of sensations, and thus forces the discourse of the phallocentric politicized friendship to take a turn. This turn to "affective thinking" is capable of potentially redefining what is possible.

A sisterly language

In the timespace of the nineteenth century, women were denied education and the freedom to truly express their feelings. They were isolated as objects of men. In Korea and China specifically, "they were not expected to think, be creative, or have emotions," as was written in a report in the *New York Times* about the original novel from which this film was adapted.[217]

[216] Ibid., 36.
[217] Janet Maslin, "2 Women Cling in a Culture of Bound Feet," *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/15/books/2-women-cling-in-a-culture-of-bound-feet.html (accessed on January 19, 2018),

Nevertheless, in the film, the titular secret fan is embroidered with messages in *Nüshu* (女书, female writing) describing the major events in Lily and Snow Flower's sudsy lives. In this remote county in rural China, women developed *Nüshu* as their own secret language. This unique writing system was significant in the story because it situates these women in a particular historical and social context. This script written in the local dialect was created in the thirteenth century in southern China. Not only is this language used in writings, the local women in Hunan also used it to sing songs and recite prose and poetry. Scenes in the film show that women sing their songs while working in domestic places, when sending the bride out of the maternal home during her wedding, and when running along desperately during the Taiping rebellion chaos. Through their private language, women are able to communicate their ideas, share their joys, bemoan their tragedies, and keep their hopes alive. *Nüshu* is the only female written language to have been found in the world. This relatively unknown, private written language was used exclusively by women of the Yao ethnic minority in Jiangyoung County, Hunan Province. It is a syllabic language derived from Chinese characters, but unlike Chinese, which is logographic, *Nüshu* is phonetic. Rather than stressing moral virtues and exemplary conduct—as do the Chinese characters developed by Confucian males, *Nüshu* had been used as a language among women to share true emotions, express sincere feelings, exchange life stories, write poignant poems, and sing secret songs. This phonetic alternative took an affective turn, emphasizing emotional connections and sentimental companions.

As an alternative to the logographic Sino-Korean *hanja* (Chinese characters), the phonetic writing system, *hangul*, was also used predominantly by women upon its promulgation by King Sejiong, under whom *hangul* was created in 1443. Despite resistance from male Confucian scholars who were educated in Chinese-- those male aristocrats who had the privilege of learning

Chinese characters in the Confucian patriarchal social order in the Chosen dynasty-- *hangul* helped to spread female literacy in feudal Korea. Compared with the standard Chinese, the shape of the language evolved to be very soft and smooth, and almost threadlike lines became a mark of fine penmanship (figure 5.2). This is because *Nüshu* were often hand woven into belts and straps or embroidered onto everyday items and clothing. This language is only taught among women who are prohibited from gaining education. Men, who did not have access to learning this language, treated these messages as common embroidery patterns.



Figure 5.2 (left) *Nüshu*, Jiangyong *Nüshu* Ecological Museum Archive
Figure 5.3 (right) Comparison with Chinese, Jiangyong *Nüshu* Ecological Museum Archive

Time and space travel

The embroidery made and handled by women's hands symbolizes their secret code of linking with each other tightly because it used as both their sex-segregated domestic labor and an exclusive secret channel of exchanging their innermost words and emotions. In the ending scene of the film, Snow Flower and Lily from nineteenth-century China are looking toward Nina, who is standing on the roof of one of the high-rise buildings over Huang Pu River in twenty-first century Shanghai. This coexistence of past and present is presented through a hallucinatory gaze from Nina, who is holding the fan left by Lily more than a century earlier. It is a gaze from and on women in

the absence of men. The multiplicities of overlapped time and space co-presented in the image imply timelessness. It is a timeless search for expression in their own voice within the male-centric patriarchy, as well as a defense of their precious friendship. Nina monologue in this last scene collapses the line between the extradiegetic and autodiegetic narratives, "our destinies are tied forever, we will be *laotong*, sisters, for ten thousand years." This timeless female friendship is so strong that it can last lifetimes.

Figure 5.4 Co-existence of past and present timespace presented through a hallucinatory gaze from Nina[218]

The secret messages between women were delivered through the most important prop, the silk fan, in the nineteenth-century story of Snow Flower and Lily. To the Chinese girl, Nina, and Korean girl, Sophia, the story of the strong and close ancestral connection between them was also hidden in the folds of this antique white silk fan. The messages written on the secret fans that passed between them built and reflected their closeness. One of their secret letters written from Lily to Snow Flower on the silk fan says:

[218] Photo from the film *Snow Flower and Secret Fan*.

> I am to marry a boy I do not know. He is from a distinguished family. My life will change because of my perfect feet. Sister, you must come to my wedding… You taught me how to be a good wife. I must fulfill all my duties. The wife of the eldest son must serve and honor her mother-in-law. My daughter's birth was a disappointment. I must bear a son. We must rely on the wind to carry our words. Those winds are happy and sad. We are forbidden to see each other. But at every moment I miss you.[219]

This letter provides us a glimpse of the closeness that surpasses their relationships with their husbands. The ultimate goal of being a good wife corrals and tames them, leading them to fulfill their duty and bolster the patriarchy. An affective community is formed under the subjugation to this patriarchy as thee women share all of their happiness and sadness communicated by the secret fans. In the context of alienation from their husbands or family and tribulations from the social turmoil, they look inside themselves to search for what stays unchanging: their loyalty, love, and shared memories between each other. They carve out a space for breathing together within their suffocating lives. This very practice of "breathing together" makes a small yet mighty community, supporting them to live on.

A language void of language

In the present Shanghai, the parallel to the fan was the infamous Mandopop singer Faye Wong's album, *Fu Zao* (*Restless*, figure 5.5), on the cover of which they signed a traditional *laotong* contract, an eternal vow. Faye Wong was their favorite singer, and the album's title,

[219] *Snow Flower and The Secret Fan*, dir. Wayne Wang, perf. Jun Ji-hyun (Also Known as Gianna Jun) and Li Bingbing (Fox Searchlight Pictures, 2011), June 3, 2014, (accessed on January 2018).

"Restless," is in sync with the trepidation and impermanence of women's lives. In this album, Faye Wong created a unique and controversial wordless or self-created sounds, if an alternative musical language, that nobody could understand, overturning the Mandopop musical paradigm of that time. One of the three songs in the film was "la cha bor," the title track of the album, which had drawn Sophia and Nina close. Additionally, their liberated dancing to these "degenerate" songs also became one of the causes for Sophia's stepmother's attempt to separate them (figure 5.6). However, Nina secretly sends messages, written using their secret language, through the window, and Sophia "reaches out of her window" to share her dreams, joys, and frustrations with Nina.



Figure 5.5 Faye Wong's CD *Restless* (Fu Zao): A "shared language" that is void of standardized language[220]

Aside from four very short lines in Chinese, the lyrics of this song are only comprised of the three words "la cha bor," which are outside of the linguistic system; thus, nobody could understand them. This song becomes the secret code between these two girls in 1997 Shanghai.

[220] Photo from the cover of Faye Wong's album *Restless* (Fuzao), 1996.

The song only belongs to and speaks to the people who understand it, and it becomes a shared language between these two girls. This "shared language," void of language, implies a refusal to adapt and speak to the phallogocentric linguistic system. It echoes the exclusive use of *Nüshu* between Snow Flower and Lily instead of Chinese characters in nineteenth-century China.

Like the usage of the secret code, *Nüshu*, among women in *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan* and Faye Wong's song "La cha bor," a language without standardized languages that only speaks to the people who understand it, the entire course of the interactions between the little girl and the Chinese man in *Chinatown* are void of language. Language in *Chinatown* is the official means of communication in the world of power. However, the form of unofficial communication between the little Korean girl and the Chinese man from the bottom of society has drawn together more tightly the people who are living in a multi-layered social and historical space. In the meantime, this unofficial wordless communication enables readers to see a sincere relationship after cleaning up the politics of the social hierarchy and political power structure.

Figure 5.6 Nina and Sophia's Liberating Dance to the "Degenerate" Song *La Cha Bol*

In Derrida's argument on Nietzsche's Zarathustra, he indicates that "woman has not acceded to friendship because she remains—and his love—either "slave" or "tyrant."[221] Thus,

[221] Jacques Derrida, "Politics of Friendship," *American Imago* 50, no. 3 (Fall): 384-385.

women's friendship fails to signify the liberty, equity, and fraternity that a friendship requires and continues to signify for Zarathustra. Indeed, the change in social status between Snow Flower and Lily and that between Nina and Sophia once become a handicap in their friendship. Snow Flower was from a formerly wealthy family but encountered strained circumstances due to her father's addiction to opium. Lily's golden lotuses and men's fetishism of them allowed her to marry into an upper-class family. Similarly, in the story of Nina and Sophia, in 1997 Shanghai, Korean Sophia was from a previously more affluent family. The stock market hit a new low in 1997 during the IMF crisis, which led to her father's bankruptcy and the descent of her family. The failing of the father figure was presented within both stories as causing the decline of the family's social class. On the other hand, career success made possible Nina's climb up the social ladder. Nevertheless, Snow Flower, the rich girl, never took their disparity to heart, and Lily was never ashamed of her lower social status. They felt only love and respect for each other as sworn sisters from the very beginning. As it was stated in the secret fan letter Snow Flower wrote to Lily, "Our fates have been reversed. However, our love will always be strong."[222] Both Snow Flower and Lily were enslaved to the male characters in the film. *Laotong* had a relationship of "slave and tyrant" with their respective husbands, instead of between themselves. The male characters are the objects engaging in this "slave/tyrant" relation in the story, whereas the women's friendship is free from it. Unlike the male figures in Smith-Rosenberg's study of nineteenth-century American women's friendship, in which women's "heterosocial and homosocial worlds were complementary,"[223] their shared fears and hopes, feelings and thoughts, written on the silk fan throughout their life from childhood, marriage, childbirth, and old age, were the only emotional sustenance and spiritual solace that they

[222] Ibid.
[223] Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations between Women in Nineteenth-Century America." *Signs*1, no. 1 (1975), 8. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3172964.

could rely on within the violence of the phallocentric social order. Both the liberated dance between Sophia and Nina and the heartfelt interaction between Lily and Snow Flower allowed them to find an opening for equality, liberty, and fraternity within the suffocating patriarchy.

Affective transnational turn

The shared need for Korean and Chinese women's visibility and the projection of their desires in screen culture deeply engages the Chinese female spectatorship's formation in the recent prosperous diffusion of the Korean Wave in China. The co-production and co-consumption of collaborative screen culture requires a gaze on a female self and produces an imagined space for female spectatorship. To turn this gaze on Chinese and Korean women is to limn a larger framework of transnational community. Cui suggests a transnational feminism in the analysis of a transnational cinema in her book. As she contends, "the positioning of feminism in a transnational framework is constructive and necessary."[224] Cui's argument resonates with Kim Eun-Shil's argument that Asia should be taken as a new reference community to respond to the Korean feminist inquiry. As Kim notes, "Asia is a new category for criticizing Western knowledge systems or theoretical frameworks that had been considered universal."[225] Kim further suggests that "more joint projects across state boundaries need to be carried out, and a new transnational comparative methodology needs to be created."[226] When encountering the dichotomy of Korean/nationalist versus Western/internationalist, East Asia can perhaps be (re)constructed as a network of solidarity and a mutual reference in sisterhood. A social gender formation has been forged within this

[224] Shuqin Cui, *Women through the Lens: Gender and Nation in a Century of Chinese Cinema* (Honolulu: U of Hawai'i, 2003), 174-175.
[225] Eun-Shil Kim, "The Politics of Institutionalizing Feminist Knowledge: Discussing 'Asian' Women's Studies in South Korea." *Asian Journal of Women's Studies 16*, no.3 (2010), 7.
[226] Ibid., 8.

transnational intertwining network. In the meantime, East Asian feminist analysis must create a new space for restructuring itself. These entwined historical and cultural crosscurrents are accompanied by convergences in and between today's market, technology, and media. Thus, the interactive engagement within the transnational flow of the Korean wave provides new possibilities for the Korean and Chinese feminist agenda at both narrative and enunciative levels.

This film was adapted from Lisa See's novel, *Snow Flower and the Secret Fan*. The novel tells a story of two Chinese women, Snow Flower and Lily. However, the film adaption took a transnational turn by adding a parallel story about a Chinese girl, Nina, and a Korean girl, Sophia. The film version tells a contemporary story that is made possible by gendered screen-capitalism. On the one hand, the screen brings the outside world from the public sphere into private territory. On the other hand, it has brought the gaze on and from women to transgress the domestic space standing in a public vision. This crosscurrent has shattered both the confinement of women within the domestic space and the reservation of politics and public space for men. This also forms an intertextuality between the domestic life in the story of Snow Flower and Lily on the screen and the female audience who watches it through the screen across borders. In the introduction for Raymond Williams's *Television: Technology and Cultural Form*, Lynn Spigel introduces Williams's idea that broadcasting serves as a solution to the contemporary paradox of "mobile privatization." As Spigel writes,

> Broadcasting was a response to the inherent paradox entailed in two contradictories yet highly connected modes of modern social life: geographic mobility (realized through technologies of transportation and communication) and privatization (realized through domestic architecture and community planning). William calls this paradox 'mobile privatization.'… Broadcasting, … served as the resolution to this contradiction insofar as it

> brought a picture of the outside world into the private home. It gave people the sense of travelling to distant places and having access to information and entertainment in the public sphere, even as they received this in the confines of their own domestic world.[227]

In addition to the idea that broadcasting is a solution for "mobile privatization," which blurs the boundaries between the public space and private space, I would note its "transnational turn" and recognize the current media convergence and internet expansion in the post-TV era. Under today's circumstances of media convergence, both television or film have lost their media-based specificity. Thus, it is more appropriate to include them both under the name of screen culture. We are surrounded by a world of screens through which one can relate to herself or to another person and form broader communities with fluid national or ethnic boundaries. It gives the larger public a more intuitive method of depicting how others view, think, and live, thus concretizing and reifying the way they imagine others as well as their membership in a given community. The emergence of screen-based media has broadened the forms of discussion and platforms of participation. It fundamentally capitalizes on all the activities displayed on the screen because of the intrinsically capital-driven motivation of screen culture-related industries and the personal consciousness of being watched by audiences through the platform of screens. Capitalism, in the term screen-capitalism, is not limited to its sweeping power in the monetary or material sectors; rather, it emphasizes its efficiency in shaping a paradoxical unity of opposites: intentionally satisfying the private and unintentionally fulfilling the public. It unprecedentedly advances the (co)production and exchange by binding a networked sodality that has contributed labor to generate and regenerate the circulation.

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[227] Raymond Williams and Ederyn Williams, *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (London: Routledge, 1990), Xxi-xxii.

Thus, not only does the power of screen trespass the borderline between public and private, its integration with capitalism has allowed it to form a larger picture and build communities. This process has an emphasis on symbiosis. The word symbiosis is from the Greek sumbiōsis, meaning 'living together.' The Greek word sumbiōsis is from sumbioun, 'live together,' which is from sumbios, meaning (one) living together (with another), partner and companion.[228] This emphasis on symbiosis and companionship in screen-capitalism has determined its quality of emotion and fellowship. In addition, it deconstructs the cultural hierarchy. Carrying a more de-hierarchical form of entertainment, the so-called popular culture, screen-capitalism is equipped with the affective medium of screen to reach large viewing audiences with diversified backgrounds among border-crossing communities. The fictive kinship of sisterhood between Chinese and Korean female audiences potentially provides new possibilities for forming community, where the extension of bonds connects women to the same ancestors on the screen as well as to the same descendants off the screen. Then how do they negotiate the changing gender identity between themselves as subject and agent on the one hand and the state and the male on the other hand? How possibly are they capable of forging a transnational sisterhood and solidarity as a mutual referencing system of feminist criticism? How do Korean and Chinese female spectators construct a voice informed by a self-conscious critical positioning through the screen cultural apparatus? These and related questions are the subject of the next chapter.

[228] Online Etymology Dictionary. https://www.etymonline.com/word/symbiosis.

CHAPTER 6 *Descendants of the Sun* Regardless of Gender:

From a "To-be-looked-at" Object to a "To-be-catered-to" Subject

The complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies—which in the transference neuroses we have called 'anticathexes'—from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished.

–Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Work of Sigmund Freud* [229]

The current spread of screen-capitalism in the case of Korean screen culture is a gendered practice. It is impossible to overstate the centrality of the role women play in *hallyu*, the Korean Wave. The gender distribution of spectators alone indicates how central female audiences are to Korean screen culture, both within and outside of the diegesis. The targeting of one gender works as a national and transnational marketing strategy, as well as a basis for the emotional connection that forms the K-dramas' female fandom within and outside of Korea. At the same time, the long-standing reluctance to acknowledge this gender disparity in academic research has perpetuated the denunciation of the gulf between humanities studies and reality. Scholars in related fields have addressed important questions by pointing out the gender issue in *hallyu*. Within media gender studies, scholars such as D. Lee, Yeran Kim, and S. Kim have all explored the "syndrome of girl idols," [230] lambasting the practice of spectacularizing and commercializing girl bodies. [231] Meanwhile, scholars such as Sun Jung have focused on the K-Pop idol boy images, arguing that their masculinity is manipulated and manufactured in order to be Asianized or marketable on a

[229] Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Work of Sigmund Freud* (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1960), 253.
[230] Lee, D., "What is Idol Pop?: A Symptomatic Reading." *Culture Science* 62 (2009): 210–227.
[231] Yeran Kim, "Idol republic: the global emergence of girl industries and the commercialization of girl bodies," *Journal of Gender Studies* 20, no.4 (2011): 333-345.
Kim, S., Spectacularization and consumption of girl images. *Media, gender and culture* 15 (2010): 79–119.

global stage.[232] Though traditional screen studies have critiqued iterating the male-centered objectification of women's bodies in popular cultural industries, in this consideration of Korean screen-capitalism we must emphasize that *both* male and female idols' faces and bodies have been commercialized by *screen* in the world of capitalism. The different genders are not that different in their subjugation to such commercialization in the screen cultural industries. Korean screen idols, both male or female, have capitalized on their own influence through fandom numbers, click rates, and periphery product sales, in addition to their tremendous conventional income. In a way, the interplay between gender and screen-capitalism suggests a way out of the maze of dualism which has continually led to to fission and opposition. This interplay suggests the possibility of a new discourse for both interpreting and mediating conflicts.

Most critiques of the gender issue in *hallyu* have relied on a decontextualized analysis that lacks a discussion of its nested historical aspects and women's introspective identification against the backdrop of changing society and corresponding to its transnational context. Through a contextualized analysis that takes into consideration both historical and societal background, this chapter argues that Korean screen culture has been dedicated to reconstructing women's identity. Specifically, the rise of *hallyu* over the last two decades has been both tracking and promoting a shift from a "to-be-looked-at" object to a "to-be-cater-with" subject. This subjectification has informed *hallyu*'s national and transnational female fandom. At either extreme of Korean screen culture we can find a male-centered approach or an insistence on the "absence of men" suggest there is a need for a space of reconciliation as both theoretical and ideological exigencies. The polarized positions lead to hostility instead of good will. Therefore, it remains to be seen what kind

[232] Sun Jung, "K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile Masculinity: Making Chogukjeok Boys." *Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 163–170.

of politics are needed to seek the resource of hope for a positive transference from "*han*" (a dull lingering sorrow) to empowerment, through which we might achieve at least a certain level of reconciliation—the possibility of a transformation that gendered screen-capitalism may bring in.

Centralizing the Female

Among the audiences of K-drama in China, the females outnumber the males by a significant amount. For instance, females made up nearly seventy percent of the audience of the popular K-drama *The Descents of the Sun*.[233] In 2014, the TV show *My Love from the Star*, a 21-episode mini-series produced by Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), also ignited a nationwide frenzy in China, particularly among female audiences. Following the broadcast of the shows, the leading female character's favorite snack combo on the show, *chimeak* (fried chicken and beer), experienced a significant uptick among Chinese fans. From a production perspective, women in their teens to forties are the major target audiences for this kind of female-targeted K-drama. Women, more than men, seem to be interested in quotidian things, and so they have become major consumers of this media genre about everydayness. These female consumers of everydayness range from the general public to powerful and influential members of the government and upper classes. The national frenzy about *Star*, for example, reached the first lady of China, Peng Liyuan. She was quoted by the state-run *People's Daily*, commenting on the physical resemblance between the lead male actor Kim Soo-hyun, who played an extraterrestrial heartthrob with a mop of jet-black hair in the show, and her husband, President Xi Jinping, in his younger years.[234]

[233] Data of K-drama gender-classified audiences' number are collected from Korean Tourism Organization. https://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics.kto (accessed on June 25, 2017).
[234] Amy Qin, "China's Love Affair with Irresistible Korean TV," *The New York Times*, July 20, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/arts/television/chinas-love-affair-with-irresistible-korean-tv.html?_ga=2.262976516.909348050.1523745398-1510164726.1520966325 (accessed on February 25, 2018).

The gender imbalance of this screen-capitalism also extends off screen. This off-screen impact is most obvious in tourism. The demographics of international tourism, presumably boosted by the recent rise of *hallyu*, provide an apt illustration to this point. According to the data provided by the Korean Tourism Organization on the accumulated statistics of visitor arrivals by August 2016, among the tourists coming from East Asia and Asia-Pacific, there were approximately three million men and five million women.[235] In the case of Chinese tourists in South Korea, there were nearly two million male tourists and nearly three and a half million female Chinese tourists.[236] The tourist traffic between China and Korea, driven in part by screen culture, demonstrate that border-crossing interactions off screen are also gendered. [237] *Screen* once again has converted the cultural content into tourist numbers, consumer expenses, and the audiences' sensory experiences in South Korea.

This mobility of women is not unidirectional. It is, instead, a mutual practice of centralizing the female. Affective communication not only impacts gendered tourist traffic, but also enters diplomatic spaces. Besides economic and cultural aspects, *hallyu* stars have often traded on their diplomatic and political currency. When the State Counsellor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, visited South Korea in 2013, she particularly requested a meeting with the *hallyu* star Ahn Jae Wook for a dinner at a Seoul Hotel despite her tight schedule. This is because, as she explained,

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[235] The selection of the statistics of August 2016 is because this is the time demarcation when the ban on South Korean entertainment started to take effect in tourism by the Chinese government, due to the conflicts caused by the placement of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), a U.S. missile system, in South Korea.

[236] Data of Korean international tourists collected from Korean Tourism Organization. https://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics.kto (accessed on June 27, 2017). Korean Tourism Organization provided specific numbers: among the tourists coming from the East Asia and the pacific, there were 3,486,087 are men and 5,540,807 are women; and among the Chinese tourists, there were 1,927,116 people were male tourist and 3,476,953 were female.

[237] Although Korean screen culture has become popular among the female audiences in many other countries, such as India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Cambodia, and so forth, gendered tourists of large number does not conform the case in China/East Asia. In these countries, according to the same data source, male tourists in South Korea outnumbered the female tourists. Further research needs to be done on it, but reasons such as limited mobility of women, lack of financial means, and less geographical proximity are the possible variables. Here I focus on the case of traffic between Korea and China/East Asia.

Ahn resembles her father Aung San.[238] These resemblances, either between Kim Soo-hyun and Peng Liyuan's husband, or between Ahn Jae Wook and Aung San Suu Kyi's father, may only be subjective and affective connections, but one thing is for sure, the attractiveness of these Korean actors is something far divergent from traditional masculinity. It is almost the opposite, that it is the tenderness and softness of these male figures makes them more appealing to female audiences. When Korean President Moon Jae-in visited China during the very tense time period of THAAD in December 2017, the Korean actress Choo Ja-hyun (Known as Qiu Cixuan to Chinese audiences) and her Chinese husband Yu Xiaoguang, together with Korean actress Song Hye-kyo, were sitting at the diplomatic dinner table of President Moon's meeting with the president of China, Xi. In recognition that confronting the tough with toughness has been replaced with more roundabout collaboration, the power of the female and "feminine" softness has become a powerful diplomatic weapon, replacing demonstrations of masculine national power. The images of these Korean actresses help to establish a more feminine, empathetic, and amicable interaction towards a peaceable friendship. There is a compelling aspect of this emphasis on the softness of actors and empathy of actresses: the redefinition of masculinity and to the corresponding liberation of women from a masculine national structure

The goal of building a transnational community is implicitly and explicitly indicated within the symbolic utilization of these *hallyu* stars as political and diplomatic personalities. During Moon's visit, the ideals of diplomatic amity and political affinity are embodied in the international marriage between Choo and her Chinese husband Yu. In spite of being a Korean actress, Choo has mostly worked in China and garnered large Chinese fandom through her leading role in the

[238] Kim Young-jin, and Jun Ji-hye, "Aung San Suu Kyi to meet 'Hallyu' stars," *The Korea Times*, January 28, 2013. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/01/116_129611.html. (accessed on July 11, 2018).

Chinese TV drama *Temptation to Go Home* (回家的诱惑) in 2011, a Chinese remake of the Korean SBS TV drama *Temptation of Wife* (아내의 유혹) in 2009. Choo's international marriage with Yu and their appearance in the Korean entertainment program *Same Bed, Different Dreams 2*, which features celebrity couples' lives, served Korea's diplomatic goal of "sharing the same bed despite different dreams," and so replaced the conventional interpretation of the old Chinese character proverb of "dreaming differently despite being in the same bed (同床异梦)." On the one hand, the presence of Choo's Chinese husband Yu satisfies the need and the fantasy of the Chinese government for a masculinized national identity. On the other hand, on the show *Same Bed, Different Dream 2*, Yu was presented as a henpecked figure who always prioritizes his Korean wife Choo. Because of this, neither the Korean government nor the Korean audiences would perceive this international marriage as detrimental to Korea's national prestige and masculinity. The different facets of this couple's relationship, shown on screen and politicized off screen, contributed to a balanced plane promoting collaboration.

In "Feminism and Modern Friendship," Marilyn Friedman argues that "conflict and competition are no longer considered to be the basic human relationships; instead they are being replaced by alternative visions of the foundation of human society derived from nurturance, caring attachment, and mutual interestedness."[239] Despite the facts that the conventional definition of Chinese national identity is a masculine one and that the conventional definition of masculinity rests on the politics of competition, approaches like Friedman's to rethinking human relationships can remap our social reality. The changes in how women are portrayed and imagined in Korean

[239] Marilyn Friedman, "Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community", *Ethics* 99, no.2 (1989):275-290. The University of Chicago Press. Friedman writes this while comparing Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust," *Ethics* 96 (1986):231-60; and Owen Flanagan and Kathryn Jackson, "Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited," *Ethics* 97 (1987): 622-37.

screen culture is a matter of subjectification, and of reconstructing women identity and rethinking relationships, onscreen and probably offscreen as well. Song Hye-kyo, a famed Korean actress, was another important ambassador in the crucial diplomatic meeting between Korea and China due to her pan-Asian popularity. In a stark contrast to other Korean melodramas where female characters are passive, innocent, vulnerable, and excessively feminized, Song played a professional, empowering, and caring figure in the K-drama *Descendants of the Sun* that garnered success among Korean and Chinese audiences during its broadcast from February to April 2016, immediately before the Chinese anti-Korean sentiment was provoked by the deployment of THAAD in July 2016.

Out of Polarization

Song Hye-kyo's figure of empowerment both in the diegesis and in mediating conflicts at the diplomatic table inspires this exploration into a female spectatorship-oriented Korean screen culture, illuminating new imaginings and reflections on moving away from polarization. Instead of attracting critiques like "objectifying women" or "devoid of men," the relationship between the male and female protagonists in *Descendants of the* Sun is portrayed as one of equals standing beside each other. This feature made the television series well received among both Chinese and Korean audiences, and so it has become a popular tendency in Sino-Korean screen culture. It is a tendency in K-drama that male figures are often portrayed through female perspectives as objects of *desire*, instead of objects of *despair,* an earlier practice that was abetted by the sentiment of *han* (a dull lingering, repressed sorrow). This onscreen tendency has contributed to an effort "to-cater-to" female subjectivity. To subjectify women and portray them more empathetically, in fact, requires a stronger portrayal of her, because to heal, to empower, or to reconcile is always more

difficult than to aggravate, to destroy, or to ally against. The co-consumption and collaboration of the female-oriented TV series are gendered practices through which a dilution of, if not liberation from, the sentiments of despair, anger, and hatred is reimagined. The present chapter is an investigation of this imagined path away from polarization. To do so, I look into various "texts" of the "context." Taking the hit K-drama *Descendants of the Sun* as an example of a screen text and drawing from relevant texts of Korean female-authored literature, I explore the contextualized understanding of societal and historical changes in Korea within which women have undergone introspective changes in their identities and the ways these changes have been reflected and projected on the screen and in resonance with its Chinese sisters.

K-drama was the first media genre that China started to import and as such it has become the leading edge of *hallyu*, given that the popularity of K-drama has been widely spread outside of Korea, cultivated its fandom on a daily basis, and thus laid foundations for the spread of other media forms of *hallyu*. It would not be an exaggeration to say that K-drama has already become a Korean brand in the global screen cultural industries. It of course has its own distinctions. One of the traits, arguably, is that K-dramas not only center on female protagonists and their worlds, but also explicitly cater to female audiences, which has been saliently demonstrated in both production and reception processes. Chinese female fans have become one of the major consumer groups of Korean screen culture, and so they should be studied as an important example of border-crossing. The shift of the subject in K-drama is deeply rooted within changes of its social and historical context. From the colonial period to the division of the peninsular after Korean War, to the military regime's political oppression, the democracy movement, industrialization and urbanization, until the suburban dream of "kennel lives"[240] where people were homogenized by the all-powerful

[240] The term "kennel lives' here is drawn from Pyun Hye-Young's novel *To the Kennels*, which metaphorically portrays dehumanized lives in pursuits of suburban dream in the capitalist Korean society. Trans. Yoosup Chang and Heinz

consumerism and commercialism in Korea's development of compressed capitalism after the end of the Cold War.

It is in recognition of their consuming power that Korean women gained subjectivity, and in this way they are similar to Chinese women. Exactly which women are the consumers? The answers are a matter of (in)visibility. Women and their desires are often neglected in the pursuit of national needs. Korean and Chinese women's need for visibility, to a great degree, informed the female spectatorship of Korean screen media. Such a shift across the separation of on-screen and off-screen worlds also illuminates a rethinking on the mechanism of visual relations built into our *world of screens*, provoking a reconsideration of the crucial questions of agency and ethics in feminism. The shift from object to subject connects a transnational female fandom who share the need for visibility and the projection of their desires onto screen, which brings their unconsciousness to consciousness.

In order to investigate this female subjectivity, I closely examine the historical context of Korean screen media, within which Korean women have never become subjects in Korean history but instead were dislocated as the objectified and the subordinated. The process of restoring women's voices is deeply embedded within the social transformation in South Korea. Correspondingly, Korea's social transformations also have embodiments within Korean women's self-development and self-exploration. Various texts mirror these transformations, including women's literature. As Jung Suk Yoo notes in her "Characteristics of Feminine Writing in 1990s Korean Women's Novels," "Korean feminist novelists become more able to write their own stories that are centered on the specific interests and experiences of women, which had been concealed

Insu Fenkl. In *Azalea*, Issue 2, (2008): 307-323.

by male authors or male-dominated ideologies."[241] Yoo shows that Korean women's writing tends to uncover the routinized problems related to women's oppression and subordination in a male-centered society. Yoo further draws on Rita Felski's observation, "the end of the Cold War and the era of reason have resulted in the termination or denial of masculine discourses and narratives within modern literary theories and writing practices in the 1990s."[242] Compellingly, this suggests that the end of the Cold War allows global capitalism to exert control over a new world order that no longer loyally repeats modern theories and practices, or repeats nation—a masculine construction. The waning, if not the end, of the era of reason has given rise to affective theories not only within literary but also screen cultural practices. A visual media bears a more intuitive way of communicating affects and creates a space for addressing female discourses.

This shift is well reflected in the K-dramas wherein women who were previously shown as "to-be-looked-at" objects has become "to-be-catered-to" subjects. It can of course be said that the long "tradition" of objectifying and taming women in screen media is not likely to change anytime soon, especially in a society like Korea which has been dominated by Confucian-prescribed gender ideology and in which women have never appeared as subjects in Korean historiography. Still, there have been gradual changes in recent years of Korean screen media and these have resonated among its Chinese female spectators. I argue that a fuller understanding of this shift in the Korean screen media, has its roots going back to the eighteenth century and the emergence of print media in the nineteenth century. Korean women's identity was deeply bound up in the rich interplay between the discourses of Korean nationalism, Christianity, and the bourgeoning print media.

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[241] Suk Yoo Jung, "Characteristics of Feminine Writing in 1990s Korean Women's Novels: Women's Autobiographical and Confessional Writing." *The Review of Korean Studies* 11, no. 2 (2008), 99.
[242] Ibid.

The rising awareness of gender equality parallels the societal changes in Korea since the eighteenth century. The development of material and technological modernity allowed Korean women to be relatively less occupied by their housework and to have time for self-development. Catholicism was introduced to Korea a century earlier than was Protestantism and played a significant role throughout the development of feminism in Korea. With the proliferation of the print media, women's literacy began to spread among both upper-class and lower-class women as they were involved in underground Catholic communes in the early nineteenth century. American protestant missionaries also provided important sources of Western technology and knowledge to Korean society, and to Korean women in the fields of education, medicine, and social work in the nineteenth century. In 1885, American Protestant missionary Mary F. Scranton was the first Woman's Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church representative to Korea; Scranton established the first modern school for girls in Korea, namely, Ewha Girls School (이화학당) which today is Ewha Womans University. Women's access to education made women's literacy possible, accompanied by the proliferating print media through which the issue of gender equality was brought to public discourse. All these changes have cultivated new ground for the emergence of *Sin yŏsŏng* (신여성, New Woman) in the 1920s and 1930s of Korea during the Japanese colonial era.

As Hyaeweol Choi notes, "feminist scholars argue that New Women signified modernity by challenging Confucian patriarchal gender relations and by emphasizing women's own subjectivities."[243] The New Woman phenomenon marks a milestone for the discourse of women's subjectivities and especially connects with the emergence of print media. Although the discourse

[243] Hyaeweol Choi, *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old* Ways, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 2.

on gender quality in the print media had been primarily led by male intellectuals, among the first generation of educated women, there were several *Sin yŏja* (신여자, new woman), such as Kim Wŏn-ju and Na Hye-sŏk, who published their writings in earlier magazines and thus were able to be public figures. These journals included *Kajŏng chapchi* (Home Journal, 1906), *Yŏja chinam* (Guide for Women, 1908-9), *Hak chi kwang* (Light of Learning, 1914-30) and *Yŏjagye* (Women's World, 1927-21), which served as an important platform to convey new gender norms.[244] It is not difficult to see the significant role print media, along with women's access to education, played in contributing to the formation of readership and authorship among women accompanied. As Choi further points out, "[T]he print media played a major role in reexamining the philosophically sanctioned notions of *namnyŏ yubyŏl*（the distinction between men and women）or *namjon yŏbi* (men honored, women despised)."[245] This change followed the decline of the influence of China-- and Chinese civilization-- in Korea. After China was defeated by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War, the signing of the Treaty of Shinomoseki ended the tributary relationship between China and Korea. The national crisis of China became an alarming call to Korea. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the demand for national independence under Japanese colonial rule conditioned the intersection between nationalist and feminist agendas in Korea, wherein nationalism, like in many other countries in the world, has always been privileged and women's subordination to men continued to be perpetuated.

If print media contributed a great deal to bringing the feminist agenda into the public discourse within a nationalized frame, then screen media contributes to a feminist agenda that is

[244] Ibid., 61.
[245] The Sino-Korean words *namnyŏ yubyŏl* and *namjon yŏbi* are the Confucian-prescribed gender ideologies, which in Chinese are 男女有别 and 男尊女卑. The point regarding the role print media plays in challenging these ideologies were made in Hyaeweol Choi's *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old* Ways (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 14.

transnational. As Hyaeweol Choi notes, "[T]the proliferating print media constituted a vita site for women to contest traditional gender norms and engage in debates with male intellectuals."[246] I would like to point out that the print boom not only shaped Korean women's demand for gender equality but also influenced the rising consciousness of national independence in terms of the formation of imagined communities. The feminist agenda is always considered secondary to a nationalist one within a national framework. Indeed, a broader range of readership and authorship among women was established through the spread of print media. As Anderson notes in *Imagined Communities*, "women and children are included in the reading class family as a part of the consumers of 'print.'"[247] Nationalized thinking would render feminist agenda—especially its transnational sodality—unimaginable. Chungmoo Choi, in *Dangerous Women*, also insightfully points out that "[n]ationalism represses ambivalence about and contradictions in women's subjectivity and therefore leaves no room to negotiate."[248] Nationalism—print media has been bound to— confines the development of women's subjectivity. The transition from print to screen media, from national frame to a transnational one, reveals new opportunities for carving out new room for negotiation. The gender inclusive nature of "print" has progressed through television since the 1970s in South Korea and has particular meaning for Asian women living under patriarchal social structures in terms of its major consumers of women and its centralization of women's world.

TV, as an important screen media and shared cultural memory, has been popularized in Korea since the mid to late 1970s. Media liberation in the 1980s triggered the rapid development

[246] Ibid., 20.
[247] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1991), 76.
[248] Chungmoo Choi, "Nationalism and Construction of Gender in Korea," in *Dangerous Women: Gender and Koran Nationalism*. Ed. Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi, (New York and London: Routledge, 1998), 28.

of technology and techniques in Korean media industries in order to compete with the inflow of American screen media. Korean cultural flow, without exception, is also shaped by the evolving forms of media in the global context where converging media and internet has facilitated the wide dissemination of screen culture. The golden age of Korean cinema in the 1980s and the rise of *hallyu* in the 1990s have all woven the narratives of how screen culture links Koreans and links Korea with the capitalist world. These links, initiated from the screen media, have undergone a gendering process in the last two decades. My proposal of "screen-capitalism" is much indebted to Anderson's idea of print-capitalism; however, I attempt to reconceptualize a world of screen where screen culture provides affective interconnection among women on a transnational scale.

Screen culture has been viewed as a space where sexual inequality is perpetuated, because of the masculinization of the spectator's position. As Miriam Hansen indicates, this position is considered a privileged spot of gratifying a spectatorial pleasure within a hierarchical system of sexual difference.[249] To be more specific, this pleasure was articulated from what Laura Mulvey calls "the spectacularism of women's bodies."[250] This male-centered consumption repositions girls in patriarchal family structures (Hansen, 1986). Images of women have been objectified in both spectacles and narratives. Arguably, this criticism of patriarchal objectification in the screen culture is evidenced with the commodification of girl group idols in the Korean screen media industries. These girls are dehumanized as a commodity, as if they were products made from the assembly line works, which we can see in the star-making system and uniformed plastic surgeries in the Korean entertainment industry. Through the power-of-screen, girls' bodies are not only capitalized into monetary value or national brand, but also drive "beauty tourism"— a booming

[249] Miriam Hansen, "Pleasure, Ambivalence, Identification: Valentino and Female Spectatorship." *Cinema Journal* 25, no. 4 (1986): 6-32.
[250] Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema." *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*. Eds. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen. (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 833-44.

tourist industry of attracting Chinese spectators to travel Korea for aesthetic surgeries. It does so through standardized ideas of beauty and aesthetics that are codified and conveyed in Korean screen media, within the climate of standardization being implied by globalization in overt and covert ways.

The *screen* has facilitated this standardization, which has not only commodified girl group idols in Korean screen media. Men also fall prey to it. It is not difficult to find evidence of the commercialization of men within the prosperous production of boy group idols and the spectacularization of men's bodies. In *Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption*, Sun Jung draws on Bae Gook-Nam's argument to show how the emergence of *kkotmina* (flower-like handsome men) demonstrates the desire to break with earlier idealized militaristic masculinities in Korea.[251] Sun Jung also suggests that "the reconstruction of Korean masculinity gives a rise to soft, global, and postmodern masculinities (2011, p.167)." Indeed, the popularity of feminized *kkotmina* demonstrates new aesthetic trends in ideal male figures. However, the militaristic masculinities were not absolutely rendered obsolete; instead they were blended into the traits of gentleness and softness that female audiences desire. This intermixing of militant masculinity and affective softness characterize the male figure in the K-drama *Descendants of the Sun*. Its male figures are objectified in order to satisfy female spectators' imagination of an ideal male figure. More crucial here is that there are signs that indicate the conventional perception of masculinity has been dissolved within the screen media. A more radical example is that the phenomenon of transgender role-playing is favorably perceived by spectators. In observing this phenomenon, Jung points out that boys mimicking girls' bands and girls mimicking boys' bands display various masculine forms. The manufactured masculinity allows these idol boys to become *Chogukjeok* (transnational)

[251] In *Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption*, Sun Jung cites Bae Gook-Nam's "Why idol stars do not hold curious mystique anymore?" 167.

Boys.[252] This practice of manufacturing men's masculinity becomes possible when women acquire the right to express their sexual desires. It is fair to conjecture that the male figures in the K-drama are like the boy band idols whose "masculinity" are intentionally manufactured in order to become transnational, the better to satisfy transnational female spectators who have become the to-be-catered-to subject. What I would like to suggest is that this manufactured, intermixed "masculinity" is associated with a significant trend toward redefining masculinity, and the redefinition of masculinity disrupts a masculinized national structure and so empowers women to structure transnational communities.

Gendered Transnational Community

From being spectacularized as the "to-be-looked-at" object of male desire, female audiences have become significant consumers of K-dramas who need to be catered to. Women's desires to experience the cosmopolitan city life and enter the workplace, once prohibited by Confucian values, have been fulfilled in the imaginary space in the dramas. As the major consumers and therefore the main target audiences of these television shows, women have become the subjects whose desires and ideals are expected to be satisfied. In such a way, the conventional notions of active/male and passive/female are overturned in screen media. By relating and connecting to each other via the internet-facilitated synchronicity in a digital time, female audiences can reflectively rethink the socially established norms of sexual difference upon watching their screens and then request a projection of their introspective demands on screen. Empathic engagements develop from the intuitive, affective, and shared experiences of watching,

[252] Sun Jung, "K-pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile Masculinity: Making Chogukjeok Boys", in Jung's sense, chogujeok boys（超国籍）means the idol boys are manufactured to own the feature of cross- or trans-nationality, 163-170.

reflection, and expressing desires, through which a sizable fandom is forged beyond the domestic sphere. As a result, this gendered community of transnational female audiences has constituted a crucial component of the Korean wave's spectatorship.

Descendants of the Sun adds another layer of industrial practice to this transnationality. This TV series was produced by New Entertainment World (NEW), broadcasted simultaneously in both Korea and China only after its production was fully completed, in order to accommodate the new regulations launched by Chinese SAPPRFT in April 2015.[253] It is worth mentioning that the production process in South Korea is quite different than in China. In China, in order to send the whole TV series for pre-censoring review at SAPPRFT, full completion of the production is always required prior to its broadcast. All foreign television shows also must be reviewed by censors before they can be streamed. In contrast, TV series produced in South Korea do not need to go through this pre-censoring procedure. The production process in South Korea is more similar to the pattern in the United States. The broadcasting of the TV series usually parallels the production of the following episodes, which allows the showrunners to make revisions based on audiences' feedback.

The case of *Descendants of the Sun* is noteworthy given that the transnational collaborative production changed the norm of production process in the Korean TV series industry. Here again we see the rhizomatic nature of Korean screen media that decenters itself into other registers, allows for all its points to be connected or plugged into other cultural milieus, thus resulting in its extended longevity and expanded scale. Amidst the rapidly increasing Sino-Korean collaborations in media and cultural industries, Korean production companies are seeking ways to capitalize on

[253] The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT, 2013–2018, formerly named the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, SARFT, 1998–2013) released a policy stating that the imported TV dramas in China have to complete their whole production and subtitle in Chinese before being sent to SAPPRFT for pre-censoring and broadcasting.

the fast-growing online market in China. "China is a big part of our strategy now," said Bomi Moon, head of the Korean company HB Entertainment, which opened a Beijing office to expand their market in China.[254] The change in the production process and the specific marketing strategy towards China illustrates a transnational trend of collaboration, made possible by the tradition of spectatorship-guided adaptation originated from Korean screen media's rhizomatic quality that requires connection with audiences.

Before the production of *Descendants of the Sun*, Chinese Huace Film & Television invested in NEW and became the second-largest shareholder of NEW with 13.03% dividends in 2014. As a result, the show was streamed on the Chinese website iQiyi and was streamed 2.3 billion times by April 2016. These transnational practices of reconstructing television production systems and sharing the risks and profits have blurred the concept of screen culture's import/export, as well as fashioned a new transnational cooperative pattern that contributes to border-crossing spectatorship. Importantly, this spectatorship has been built through a gendered path. It reflects a demand for collective consumption among Korean and Chinese women, not only in terms of the screen cultural content, but also through the consumption of peripheral products, including fashion, cosmetics, and lifestyles. Thence, the shift of viewing subject, both in the production and reception of screen culture, opens a transnational discourse on formation of female communities through co-consumption practices. As viewing subjects in the screen economy, these consumption practices shape and are shaped by how these women's desires are projected on the screen. This projection returns to *affect* female spectators' imagination of what their lives could be and so establish a border-crossing community off screen.

[254] Amy Qin, "China's Love Affair with Irresistible Korean TV," *The New York Times*, July 20, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/arts/television/chinas-love-affair-with-irresistible-korean-tv.html?_ga=2.262976516.909348050.1523745398-1510164726.1520966325 (accessed on February 25, 2018).

Semi-nudity of male bodies

The sensually portrayed Marion in Alfred Hitchcock's (in)famous shower scene in *Psycho* has been viewed as a typical representation of women's bodies under the "male gaze." Her nudity in the shower, read as her purity and vulnerability, is sexualized to satisfy a voyeuristic visual pleasure from the male's point of view (figure 6.1). In contrast, the ubiquitous usage of male bodies in Korean screen culture, and in particular, their semi-nudity, suggests that we are seeing her a shift to objectifying men under the "female gaze." This gendered practice has empowered the female audiences on and off the screen. In *Descendants of the Sun*, the male protagonist Yoo Si-jin, played by "heartthrob" Song Joong-ki, is the captain of a South Korean Special Forces unit. The military men's masculinized bodies are placed under the gaze of the female nurses and doctors who are dispatched from the Haesung hospital as a voluntary medical service team. Those female nurses and doctors leisurely wait at the military training field in the morning to watch the soldiers run, half-naked and well-built (figure 6.2). Moreover, these female nurses and doctors show no hesitation or coyness about their enjoyment of watching the men's semi-nudity. At the same time, the female audiences offscreen watch those male bodies through the female characters' gazes. When the male protagonist Yoo the female protagonist Kang Mo-yeon for a first date, he is sitting in a location where he can best show his masculinized attractiveness—the gym. Yoo displays his naked upper body when he calls her. Adding one more layer to the visual relations in this scene, Yoo addresses the camera as though speaking to the female audiences who are sitting in front of the screen. This intentional eroticization of the male's body strategically caters to female audiences. In this way, male bodies have been objectified for women's gaze and fantasy.

Figure 6.1 Shower Scene in *Psycho* Under Male Gaze[255]

By displaying the semi-nudity of these soldiers' bodies on screen, a demonstration of militant masculinity, the show re-masculinizes the male figures on the screen. This approach provoked criticism based on the idea that it reflected an agenda to flaunting national military power. The military has been viewed as a desexualized/homosexualized zone that advances masculinized image and power, which is often tied to the country's national identity. In his *The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema*, Kyung Hyun Kim argues for an anxiety about male identity by examining the changes of the representations of masculinity within the sociopolitical transitions in Korea. Kim highlights the ways that masculine/emasculated figures are narcissistically recast in New Korean Cinema and suggests that "the subjectivity reconstituted or denied in the end is the man's alone."[256] In Kim's study, women are largely left out as onscreen subjects except as stereotypical portraits, either the desexualized mother or the *femme fatale* whore. The merits of this exploration of such misogynic violence in the Korean cinema in the 1980s and 1990s is compelling: it not only contributes to a fuller understanding of redefining masculinity, but it also accentuates the need for non-binary imaginings of gender relations, not to mention the need to raise the visibility of women as thematic concerns in the post-traumatic Korean cinema, and in

[255] Source of picture: http://guru.bafta.org/behind-mask-music-psycho (accessed on April 30, 2018).
[256] Kyung Hyun Kim, *The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 20-29.

Korean screen culture in general. In this 2016 K-drama, *Descendants of the Sun*, the male masculinity/national identity in the military zone is displayed, not as subject but as object, under the female gaze within the diegesis and outside of it. Masculinity is spectacularized as an objectified viewing pleasure for the female nurses and doctors in the military space. (Re)masculinization is withheld on screen, as it aims to serve female audiences' various desires for fantasized male ideals. The very practice of exaggerating masculinity on screen ends up emasculating male figures off screen as it places male bodies under the female gaze. This gaze implicitly and explicitly centralizes the female subjectivity, since females are the viewing subjects, both on and off screen, whose virtual libido is satisfied and taste for fantasized male ideal is catered to. Through their gaze, the female's identity has been elevated to active subject rather than a passive object in the screen culture. In a word, the performance of militaristic masculinity on screen paradoxically conveys the effeminacy of the male off screen as they serve as objects from women's point of view.

Figure 6.2 Semi-nudity in the morning run under female gaze[257]

The shifting subject of the gaze in the emerging economy of screen culture suggests that female spectators have become a "to-be-catered-to" subject. This shift demonstrates that women

[257] Photo from the Korean TV series, *Descendants of the Sun*, episode 1.

are able to express their desires as the active subject. In her famous essay, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Laura Mulvey states, “Desire, born with language, allows the possibility of transcending the instinctual and the imaginary, but its point of reference continually returns to the traumatic moment of its birth: the castration complex.”[258] According to Mulvey, this castration complex, for male spectators, is turned into assurance rather than threat when displaying women as images of a controllable fetish object to the gaze of man in order to maintain the patriarchal order or law of father in its cinematic form. As Kim argues in his analysis of New Korean Cinema, “[T]he sense of melancholia that sentimentalizes the loss and heals the pain renders a determined purpose to embrace the lack—not in the feminist sense of the ‘abject’—but to offer a masculine lamentation of its castration anxiety.”[259] If, say, this castration anxiety is centered on the male in the 1980s and 1990s post-traumatic New Korean Cinema wherein the projected masculinities shift between sadism and masochism, then a castration complex centered on the female is implied within the emergence of gendered screen-capitalism in the Korean screen culture (primarily originating from dramas) over the last two decades since late 1990s. The representation of women’s desire and anxiety not only function as a means of working through trauma, but also energize screen culture itself by offering transnational female spectators’ pleasure and satisfaction, challenging the law of father or patriarchy in screen media forms.

To-be-catered-to subject

Women should not be considered, and are not, the hostage incarcerated in a form of passivity due to the castration complex, where women see themselves as vulnerable objects and the satisfaction of their desire has been laid aside. In Sigmund Freud’s analysis of melancholia in

[258] Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Screen 16, no.3 (1975): 6-18.
[259] Kyung Hyun Kim, The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 26.

his famous essay entitled "Mourning and Melancholia," he differentiates melancholia from mourning by suggesting that melancholia is "related to an object-loss withdrawn from consciousness" so "one cannot see clearly what it is has been lost" and cannot consciously perceive s/he has lost when a loss of an ideal kind occurs.[260] In her reading of this analysis of melancholia, Judith Butler argues, "mimesis within melancholia performs this activity as the incorporation of the other into the ego."[261] By drawing on Freud's theory on altering the ego through identification, Butler points out that mutual implication and complicity is involved in people being like each other. That is to say, one can incorporate the other into their "ideal ego" through acts of *internalization*. Hence the ego is altered through identification. In other words, by absorbing the other into oneself, the incorporation of the other can motivate girls to mourn for what is already absent within melancholia. This process of internalization not only provides answers to why women bear the castration complex even when they have nothing that can be castrated. This internationalization can also transform into a rebellion among women who incorporate whatever they need as a part of themselves. As Butler notices, because authority's ideality is incorporable, it is no longer tied in any absolute sense to one figure of the law. Breaking the singular law of father, women's melancholia can be read as a form of revolt by active internationalization rather than as passive immersion in sorrow or grief. The practice of revolt rests on the mindset that "what remains unspeakably absent inhabits the psychic voice of the one who remains."[262] Those remaining unspeakable psychic voices will find vents, someday, eventually.

Screen media is in one sense a mechanism for projecting the unconsciousness. The castration complex centered on women is well represented in women's desires to place men as "to-

[260] Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Work of Sigmund Freud* (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1960), 245.
[261] Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997), 189-190.
[262] Ibid., 196.

be-looked-at" objects. If we look into K-dramas, especially those that are transnationally successful, they strategically cater to female spectators who have a traumatic complex that has been doubled by the burden of submission demanded by Confucianist gender ideology. For instance, *My Love from the Star* presents omnipotent male characters who satisfy female audiences' fantasies of a perfect male image. These male characters live only for the heroine, instead of the opposite, where women are presented as desexualized mother or hypersexualized whore to serve the male subjects, and their sacrifice for men is prescribed by the patriarchal ideology.

As Miriam Hansen indicates, "[T]he industry's catering to female audiences also [undermines] a long-standing patriarchal economy of vision that began to assert itself all the more forcefully in the formal organization of the emerging classical paradigm."[263] This undermined patriarchal economy of vision can be seen in the ubiquitous trend of depicting boys' love for each other from the female fandom's perspective in the consumption practice of popular culture in the East Asian context. Young female devotees of "boys love" originated in the groups of Japanese anime female fandom from the late 1990s. They were described as fujoshi (腐女子 rotten girls), the female equivalence of otaku (お宅).[264] The female devotees of "boys love" have formed a particular fandom for the K-drama *Descendants of the Sun*. To consciously project men as "to-be-looked-at" objects on screen arouses the female audiences' erotic instinct, and their emotional

[263] Miriam Hansen, "Male Star, Female Fans" in *Babel and Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991), 248.

[264] This gendered term fojoshi (腐女子 rotten girls) refers to the female consumers of boys' love, which is a word play of fojoshi (婦女子 a woman) by changing the first kanji to a homonym, meaning something rotten. It also has its male counterpart fudanshi (腐男子 rotten boys). Studies on the fojisho phenomenon see, for instance, James Welker's "Beautiful, Borrowed, and Bent: 'Boy's Love' as Grils' Love in Shojo Manga," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 31, no.3 (2006): 841-870; James Welker, "Flower Tribes and Female Desire: Complicating Early Female Consumption of Male Homosexuality in Shojo Manga," *Mechademia* 6 (2011): 211-228; Patrick W. Galbraith, Thiam Huat Kam, and Björn-Ole Kamm, eds. *Debating Otaku in Cotemporary Japan: Historical Perspectives and New Horizons*. (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic). 2015; Mizuko Itō, Daisuke Okabe, and Izumi Tsuji, eds. *Fandom Unbound: Otaku Culture in a Connected World.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

substitution originating from the unconscious, in return, contributes to their cult of consumption. To project the conscious desires of women, who have long been objectified in patriarchal screen media, requires a renewed understanding of the practice of fantasized boys' love. The shifting subjectivity is less about homoeroticism than it is about the concept of sympathy and reconciliation working towards a depolarized community of both men and women as a whole.

In *Descendants of the Sun*, besides the male and female protagonists' debut, the first episode provides audiences an interesting account of three pairs of "bromance," or homosocial relations, that run through the entire series. The first pair—the male protagonist Yoo Shi Jin and the North Korean Senior Lieutenant, An Jung Joon-- debut in the opening scene of the first episode. Yoo is in charge of the Alpha Team of the Special Forces in a peacekeeping mission carried out at the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). The confrontation between Yoo and An in this opening scene is a personalization of the conflict between South and North Korea at the highly tense area of the DMZ. This confrontation looks very familiar as it reminds us of the relationship between the North and South Korean soldiers in the Korean film *Joint Security Area*, directed by Park Chan-wook (*JSA*, 2000). The friendship between Yoo and An reminds us of the struggle for amicability within the national hostility between North and South Korean soldiers in *JSA*. However, unlike the tragic death of both North and South Korean soldiers in the *JSA*, Yoo and An end with an unofficial reconciliation in spite of their government's hostilities. This unofficial reconciliation would be a "productive distraction" from the nation-state sponsored narrative as Youngmin Choe proposes.[265]

In "Each Man Kills the Things He Loves," Kim's analysis of *Joint Security Area*, he states that "the prohibited companionship between the four male soldiers, the breaking of political taboo through games of bodily contact, the exchange of bodily fluid, and the use of actual guns and

[265] Youngmin Choe*, Tourist Distractions: Travelling and Feeling Hallyu Cinema* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

bullets as instruments of pleasure, threat, and eventual killings all post allegories of same-sex eroticism."[266] Compared with the morbid same-sex eroticism in *JSA*, *Descendants of the Sun* portrays a sympathetic bromance that is symbolic of a reconciliation that escapes from the nation-state sponsored narratives. In the opening scene, their battle ends with a fraternal conversation, "I am glad to meet you, Captain Yoo Shi Jin." Yoo replies with "I understand, but don't make this an annual event, Senior Lieutenant An Jung Joon." This amicable and restrained dialogue is followed by a moment of putting down their weapons. Yoo immediately reports to his supervisor on the screen, directly addressing the camera and the audiences who are watching off screen, saying, "Alpha Team has completed the mission." Their mission is not killing, but peacemaking. Later in the story, Yoo even challenges his official orders, breaks the political taboo, and risks his own life in order to save An's life. Off screen, these masculinized moments of bromance between Yoon and An please the female spectators in terms of a border-crossing *affect* of empathy. The onscreen militant masculinity paradoxically contributes by catering to the female spectators as the masculinity itself is deployed as sumptuous feast of visual libido in a de-masculinized way.

[266] Kyung Hyun Kim, "Each Man Kills the Things He Loves: Transgressive Agents, National Security, and Blockbuster Aesthetics in *Shiri* and *Joint Security Area*" in *The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 264.

Figure 6.3 Confrontation between *Yoo* and *An* at DMZ[267]

The second pair is the male protagonist Yoo and his best "comrade," Master Sergeant Seo. Following the completion of their mission in the previous battle scene, we see the two men in a warmly humorous "dating scene" in a café in Seoul. Yoo teases Seon, "your girlfriend is really pretty" while pointing to the bunny doll sitting beside Seo. "I feel like I met the girl of my dreams. You two look good together as well," Seo ridicules Yoo while pointing back towards the monkey doll beside Yoo. Such a conversation reflects their special comradeship developed within their military life devoid of heterosexuality and leaves audiences room to fantasize homosexuality between them. Unlike the strict hierarchy within the military system in South Korea in the real world, Yoo and Seo share a de-hierarchical relation of companionship and fraternity. Two male characters' gazing at their imaginary girlfriends simultaneously leads to a picture of boys' love among its female fandom. Instead of presenting masculine and tough images, this mutually mocking moment saturated with bromance is instead a manifestation of their softness, gentleness, and empathy.

This traits of softness and empathy also characterize the third bromance pairing, Seo and the young gangster Kim Ki Bum. Despite the fact that Kim was a street gangster who was caught stealing a motorcycle by Seo, Seo still decides to send him to the hospital rather than the police, to receive treatment for his injury acquired during the capture. By viewing Seo's compassion and tolerance towards Kim, an opposition to his toughness and masculinity in the battlefield, Yoo comments, "I wonder how a softie like you can be so good in the battlefield." Although he claims not to, Yoo has a deep understanding of Seo's sympathy for Kim, which he knows is because Seo's sees his younger self in this young gangster. This care and empathy for the other is at bottom about

[267] Photo from the Korean TV series, *Descendants of the Sun*, episode 1.

himself, a self-reconciled stance. In other words, by caring for the other, Seo is reconciled with his own past self. After this first meeting, Seo not only pays all Kim's hospital expenses without asking to be paid back, but also constantly helps him and became his guardian and mentor. Seo thinks such a young man and skilled athlete should meet good people to lead him, like the fortunate encounters he himself has had. Instead of tough masculinity, Seo's actions are motivated by care and softness, redefining the determinative masculinity ormetanarrative of nationhood and emphasizing instead his empathetic capability that has often been associated with femininity. Jackie Byars draws on Nancy Chodorow's critique of Freud's analysis, arguing that "females define themselves in terms of relationships rather than in terms of separateness and individuality… they(women) are more empathetic than males."[268] If we accept this view of empathetic nature of women, being empathetic is more associated with the female/feminine than with the male/(conventional notion of) masculinity. Teleologically, the presentations and performances of male empathy intentionally appeal to a female audience by evoking a shared empathy among its female spectatorship.

The crosscurrents between the *onscreen* spetacularization of bromance and *offscreen* female audiences' fantasies embody a de-masculinized tendency engendered by the reversed form of female/subject and male/object. The fantasized boys' love stories by the female audiences based on the male characters in K-dramas further generates a new interactive community within Internet literature and forum discussions among Asian women audiences. The absence of female characters in these scenes puts the male completely in the position of "to-be-looked-at objects" to satisfy the female audiences' fantasy. Additionally, it emphasizes the shift in the gaze of the subject, which is employed as a radical healing of women's castration complex and traumatic memories. Of course,

[268] Jackie Byars, "Gaze/voices/power: Expanding Psychoanalysis for Feminist Film and Television Theory," in *Female Spectators: Looking at Films and Television*. Edited by E. Deidre Pibram. (London:Verso, 1988), 113.

the practice of satisfying women's desire is due at least in part to television's media-based specificity in terms of gender-specific target audiences and the capital-driven nature of the market. Women's subjectivity in the television industry and the growth of women's consuming power (in spite of the unsolved questions of which group of women) has been conducive to the diffusion of Korean screen culture within and beyond borders. The power-of-screen illuminates a newly emerged agency for women's subjectivity, although more progress in the real world is certainly needed.

Powerful equals

Confucianism is a theme that we cannot get around when discussing the cultural and social solidarity among Korean and Chinese women, despite the reforms that were carried out in both countries. In "Feminist Philosophy in Korea: Subjectivity of Korean Women," Heisook Kim points out that the gender segregation prescribed by Confucian doctrines has contributed to a unique culture and solidarity among women in Korea. In China, Confucianist ideologies have been intentionally erased during the revolutionary reforms, yet a residual impact remains, along with the Chinese government's strategically "selective revival" of the traditions in order to bolster the nationalism through reviving the inherited culture, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter Four. Feminists and political activists together participated in uprooting Confucian doctrines in Chinese society. Confucianism has been blamed for the persecution of women and for causing the weakness of the nation both in Chinese and South Korean modern history. Attempts to eradicate the long-standing Confucianism in modern history still must contend with its impact on the cultural context as a whole. In "Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan 'Asian Us': Korean Media Flows and Imaginaries of Asian Modern Femininities," Angel Lin and Avin Tong suggest that the perfect desirable male

figure "rewards" female audiences who make a "selective identification" from their traditional values, and thus keep both old and new qualities. They go on, "traditional femininities are affirmed and rewarded by the qualities of the non-traditional (but desirable) qualities of the male characters in Korean dramas."[269] In spite of the waning of patriarchy in the screen media, certain elements of tradition, such as women's obedience, tenderness, faithfulness to love, and single-mindedness, are still expected to be maintained, even when other traditional values are disregarded. Arguably, this theory of reward is largely perpetuated by patriarchal expectations, or even unconsciously buried in women's minds. There is, however, some potential for a reimagining of a more wholesome gender relationship.

In *Descendants of the Sun*, the female protagonist Kang Mo-yeon is presented as a "comrade" to the male protagonist Yoo. He stresses this in the café scene when he says "this is my comrade" referring to his imaginary girlfriend. This dialogue was repeated between Yoo and his real girlfriend Kang in the later scene. This particular comradeship between the male and female protagonist fashioned a new form of romantic relationship in K-dramas. As Kang says onscreen, it would be too cliché to have a romantic relationship between a girl of economically deprivileged background and a *chaebŏrise* (second-generation inheritor of wealth)—a Cinderella story that has constantly been repeated in previous K-dramas. The Cinderella trope has fixed female figures within the power inequalities caused by economic circumstances and has been sold as a phantasmagoric imaginary within the increasingly fixed social hierarchy in the capitalist system. The projection of this self-mocking (this particular K-drama ridiculing a fixed pattern of romantic fantasy in previous K-drama) brings in not only the issue of gender, but also of class. The critique

[269] Angel Lin and Avin Tong, "Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan 'Asian Us'" in *East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave*, Ed. Beng Huat Chua and Koichi Iwabuchi. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 107. DOI: 10.5790/hongkong/9789622098923.001.0001

of hierarchical exploitation, nepotism, and class issues raised in this show also made it something more than a "daydreaming love story" of single-minded girls; it also reveals the complex social reality where we should locate feminism. For instance, Kang continuously fails her promotion exam for professorship in the hospital, despite the fact that she is completely qualified, if not overqualified. Although everyone knows that a surgeon position can be a matter of life or death for many patients, the promotion was still given to Eun jin, an unskilled doctor whose father is a major shareholder of the Heasung hospital. In spite of unfairness and nepotism in the workplace, Kang works hard to make the "skill become her pulling strings."

The character of Kang in this K-drama signals a shift in the aesthetic codes of viewing female figure in the Korean screen culture, away from the stereotypical female figures in melodramatic K-drama. Kang, besides being a Korean surname, also means "strong" or "powerful," implying the leading female character's independence and potential for empowerment. Instead of the conventionally "feminized" jobs that either limited women to the kitchen, behind the counter, or within domestic chores, Kang is a talented surgeon, an occupation that is typically viewed as masculine, especially when picturing someone working with a sharp scalpel. In Kim's argument about the female figure in Korean film *Joint Security Area*, "Sophia's sexuality is framed outside of the realm of desire" in this space "characterized by homo-social activity."[270] Departing from this desexualized female figure, Kang's sexual appeal as a woman is presented as her powerful control in the operation room. Here, woman's ability to take power, contrary from previous assumptions, binds with her sexuality. The characteristics previously reserved for male figures, such as professional expertise, righteousness facing injustice, resolute decision-making ability, and

[270] Kyung-Hyun Kim, "Each Man Kills the Things He Loves: Transgressive Agents, National Security, and Blockbuster Aesthetics in *Shiri* and *Joint Security Area*", *The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 266-267.

courage for saving others' lives, are all found in this female figure and are appreciated as a woman's charm rather than as a threat to the patriarchy. This shifting aesthetic codes in Korean screen culture neither depict a masculine man paired with a vulnerable woman, nor the opposite, a tough woman with her henpecked man (i.e. *My Sassy Girl*). Yet in *Descendants of the Sun*, the leading male and female protagonists' love for each other grows stronger while they remain powerful equals standing together in mutual support and empowerment.

Screen-capitalism has been employed to reconcile a sensibility of cosmopolitanism motivated by its logic of infinite expansion, and nationalist branding to promulgate national power, whether it be soft or hard power. *Descendants of the Sun* paradoxically represents the co-existence of Korea's nationalism and cosmopolitanism, between which screen-capitalism mediates to combine them into the same narrative. As a talented surgeon, Kang spends over twelve hours per day in the operating room to save people who are about to die. In contrast, Yoo kills people in order to protect lives. As soldiers, defending the reputation and dignity of the nation is an essential part of their duty. Nationalist militarism is represented in the Korean special forces who have been put at a competitive position with other countries' forces. This fundamental divergence between Yoo and Kang leads to their break up at least once, since Kang believes in the dignity of life, and there is no value or ideology that can surpass that. "Human life comes first" is her motto. Nationalist militarism is tactically blended into the story of cosmopolitanism. Their divergent values converge in their mission in Uruk, where both of them save or protect people's lives regardless of gender, age, race, class, and nationality in a cosmopolitan, post-national effort.

Nothing presents a nation's masculinity better than military power. As representatives of their national power, these Korean soldiers are humiliated by their American counterparts. In the second episode, when Yoo and his team carry out a joint cooperation with American soldiers of

the Special Forces, a furious fight between the two ethnic groups is provoked by an insult from an American soldier, "you Korean boy scouts go back home and train with your mamas." This confrontation not only poignantly illustrates the problematic issue of racism in transnational collaborations, but it also highlights an emasculation of the Korean soldiers and the nation they represent. In response to this insult, Yoo's blunt rage and skilled fighting with the American soldier projects an aggravated nationalism and recovers his and his nation's masculinity on the screen. Offscreen, however, female spectators' viewing of this remasculinization, deconstructs the building of masculinity *per se* on screen, given that (re)masculinized male figures are treated as aesthetic objects to sate women's appetite for virtuous libido. Indeed, this libidinal-aesthetic signification of male figures contributed greatly to the drama's popularity. The mechanism of multilayered demasculinization/remasculinization deployed in the Korean screen culture indicates a shifting gender subjectivity and reshapes the gender ideology in the screen cultural paradigm.

To reconcile this conflict, at least within the diegesis, the space where the story takes place is heavily influenced by cosmopolitan sensibility. In the fictional country Uruk the protagonists meet again, and so their love story could resume. This fictional city signifies beyond the nation-state. In Uruk, Kang and Yoo's relationship develops through their experiences of an earthquake and an epidemic. Uruk ideally fits Derrida's proposal for a city "dealing with the related questions of hospitality and refuge, elevat[ing] itself above nation-states or at least free[ing] itself from them."[271] The space of Uruk juxtaposes seemingly incompatible nationalism and cosmopolitanism, evoking a reflection on the politics of embrace and hospitality. Kang and Yoo's love relationship develops in a form of comradeship, poignantly illustrated by a rescue scene in Uruk that connotes a goodwill toward humanitarian peacemaking efforts. In order to save the local girl Fatima from

[271] Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, tr. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 9.

the gang leader David Argus who is holding a group of indigenous girls as sexual slaves and selling them as commodities, Yoo and Kang consider the salvation of the girls as their own obligation. To fulfill this obligation toward the other, they launch a rescue and fight with the gangsters at the risk of their own lives. In the rescue, when Kang is able to escape alone, she bravely chooses to rush back to the gangsters' den to save Yoo and Fatima. In this scene, the male figure is rescued by the female figure who courageously fights along with him as a "comrade" instead of passively hiding or retreating.

The woman standing equal and powerful beside, instead of behind of, the man delineates an evenly matched and mutually embraced relationship between the male and the female, rather than a relationship in which the male is absent, or one gender is privileged over the other. Many narratives motivated by the feminist agenda have featured the absence of men. Nancy Chodorow also points out this absence of a patriarchal figure, the "lack" of male characters, in female-oriented melodramas. Recent K-dramas, though, signal a shift towards the next phase of screen media in terms of gender ideology by incorporating male characters as ideal libido-aesthetic objects. The diegesis itself reconciles the gender conflict and emphasizes community establishment, a narrative that Freudian and Lacanian theories do not fully cover, nor do Chodorow's theories on the conventional female-oriented melodrama. This concept of community is built upon a more empathetic interconnectivity where women do not merely empathize among or for themselves, but also with and for others.

Positive Transference

There are indications that some people are ready to seek a new start in East Asian gender relations, instead of fetishizing their wounds. Sarah Ahmed differentiates between healing and

moving on in her book *The Cultural Politics of Emotions,* where she states that "the scars on your skin both attach you to a past of loss and a future of survival. This is not a healing. But you've moved on."[272] Reconciliation, it seems, will not be achieved (or can only be achieved in a passive sense), since we just move on passively instead of actually being healed. Ahmed draws on Fiona Nicoll's (1998) notion of reconciliation which "has a double meaning: [I]t can suggest coming to terms with, but it can also refer to passivity, in which one seeks to make the other passive (to reconcile her to her fate) (2004, p.35)." However, if we are indeed willing to make new investments in the future instead of being lost in the irreversible past, a glimmer of hope still exists for an active reconciliation. Such a reconciliation requires tremendous courage from the subject.

The emerging generation of Korean female writers offers us a glimpse of an initiative, valiant, strong-hearted, and humorous attitude even in the face of life's cruelty—an attitude that we do not find in the older generations, many of whom held their *han*—a repressed sorrow and lament. For example, *Run, Daddy!* by the Korean female writer Kim Aeran (born in the 1980s) offers a vision for moving forward towards reconciliation. The story starts from a fetus's point of view and ends with a gesture of forgiveness—our protagonist putting sunglasses on her imagined running father whom she has never met, although she still wishes for him to run better. Nothing can be crueler than a father returning merely in a form of an obituary letter. Even the object of complaint, malice, hatred, revenge, and anger is lost. In terms of anger, Ahmed argues that the loss of the object (of anger) is not the failure of feminist activism, but it is indicative of its capacity to move, or to become a movement. It opens up possibilities of action that are not constrained by what we are against in the present. Furthermore, Ahmed suggests that we should stay uncomfortable within feminism instead of staying comfortable. This discomfort can help us always

[272] Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 38.

question our own investments (Ahmed 2004, p.178), so that we will be able to move on. To stay uncomfortable also means to stay open to feminism. The little girl in *Run, Daddy!,* who is emblematic of the futurity of Korean women and Korea in general, bravely turns sorrow into humor, and finds a new start through forgiveness and reconciliation without *han*. In the story, the female bonding (mother-daughter) is much stronger than the male bonding (father-son), and lays the foundation for action. I am arguing here that the little girl's gesture of easing and comforting her runaway father showcases a new method of "self-empowerment through empowering the male." The little girl embraces and empowers the disempowered father, in turn empowering herself for a new start of her own life.

There are two types of "wound fetishism" that we need to be cautious of. The first is the comfortable and passive place of dwelling in sorrow and resentment by not taking any action towards moving forward. The little girl's gesture in *Run, Daddy!* echoes what Ahmed calls the "capacity to move," when we choose to lose the object of anger and resentment, thus helping us to get rid of the "wound fetishism" and open up new possibilities of action. Ahmed demonstrates why transformations are so difficult (we remain invested in what we critique) and how transformation is possible (our investments move as we move).[273] Ahmed draws on Wendy Brown's critique of the politics of pain, arguing that by only entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing the pain, the politics of pain hold out no future—for itself or others. The second form of wound fetishism is paradoxically linked with pain. It does not mean that feminism has nothing to do with pain, otherwise it would be another form of "wound fetishism," which ignores that the wound also makes the place of historical injury.[274] In sum, the "wound" is both where the

[273] Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 172.
[274] Ibid.

historical injury took place and the cave of hiding where we should not settle. Either of them can lead to a devastating end, and so a positive transference is needed.

I believe such a caution about wound fetishism was embedded in the director Guo Ke's mind when he produced the documentary *Twenty Two* about the surviving "comfort women."[275] Guo describes his principle of production as follows: "instead of making them to say something, we choose to let them not to say anything," because "the closer you work with these grannies, the harder it is to allow yourself to expose their scars."[276] When questions about their suffering are raised, we need to ask the purpose such questions serve. The constant investment in emotions of resentment and anger only builds a narrow imagination about those victims' inner world. When Granny Wan Yukai, who is one of the survivors from Hainan Province, was shown a picture of a Japanese soldier, instead of getting angry, expressing hatred, or bursting into tears, her response to it is totally against our expectations. Granny Wang looked at the picture and laughed, by saying "that Japanese has become old too, he even doesn't have mustache!"[277] Another survivor, Chen Liancun from Shanxi Province, expressed her kind wish in the film, "I hope China and Japan can make peace with each other. No more wars. Once the war began, a lot of people would die."[278] Many of these kinds of moments during the filming allowed the director Guo to remind us that the people who cannot walk out of the haziness of pain are not the victims. For Guo, it is more important to show how they live on rather than detailing the history of their sufferings. Like one of the survivors from Guangxi Province, Wei Shaolan, said in the film "the world is so good, sustain your life to be witness to it, even if that means eating only wild vegetables."[279] In order to

[275] "Comfort women" is the Japanese euphemism for the women and girls forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in occupied territories before and during World War II, thus I use it here by adding a quotation mark.
[276] http://news.mtime.com/2017/08/27/1572906-all.html
[277] See in the Chinese documentary on "comfort women" survivors, *Twenty Two*, 2017.
[278] Ibid.
[279] Ibid.

live on, to move forward, we need to reflect on our history but without repeatedly licking the wound.

In her "Feminist Attachments," Ahmed centers on the role that emotions (pain, anger, wonder, hope) have played in the acts of feminists speaking out against forms of violence, power, and injustice. Through holding the stance of "wonder," Ahmed unfolds her new politics of emotions (2004, p.179). Starting from a position of "wonder" means seeing the world that one faces and is faced with "as if" for the first time, responding to the world with joy, care, and surprise (2004, p.179). The orientation of "wonder" opens a collective space, and engages a reorientation of one's relation to the world. Feminism cannot be reduced to that which it is against, it is also "for" something. This "for-ness" implies the inevitable involvement with the politics of embrace. Both Sara Ahmed and Miroslav Volf pay attention to the necessity and difficulty of transforming our emotions, in order to achieve reconciliation. Ahmed demonstrates how we transform the anger and pain to "hope" and "move on." Volf shows how we are capable of overcoming vengeance and moving to forgiveness and embrace from a theological perspective. From a Freudian psychoanalytical perspective, a more pragmatic approach is called "positive transference." The action of "putting the sunglasses" on her imagined father, displays her capability of empowering and reconstructing the male figure through a "positive transference." As it was written at the end of the story:

All those years I was picturing dad in my mind, he was always running, his eyes sore and swollen from the blazing sun. So I decide tonight to put sunglasses on him. I imagined his face. He wore a little smile; he was filled with anticipation but trying hard to conceal it. He closed his

eyes, like a boy waiting for a kiss. With my two big hands I put the sunglasses on him. They suited him really well. He'll run better now, I thought.[280]

Sigmund Freud says, "libidinous occupation with objects must have been abandoned, and object-libido must have been transformed into ego-libido." [281] The sublimated form of "transference" is more frequent in men, in the form of "negative transference" in Freud's study. Apparently, this study assumes that the male is the active and normative. As Jackie Byars argues, in Freudian analysis, male/masculine has been taken as the active and normative, so "there is no way to explain the female/feminine except through this norm." This gender bias notwithstanding, I argue that there is a "positive transference" in the narratives and screen culture of Korean women, which requires a reconceptualization of the related film and TV theories, also illuminating new possibilities for reconciliation. In *Descendants of the Sun,* the female protagonist Kang, as a doctor, empowers herself *through* healing others and saving lives. In *Run, Daddy!,* the little girl, instead of collapsing in suppressed negative emotions, heals and empowers herself through kindness toward her demasculinized father figure (by the gesture of putting the sunglasses on him). As Jackie Byars points out in the essay "Gaze/voices/power: Expanding Psychoanalysis for Feminist Film and Television Theory," "A primary difficulty is the dominance in feminist film theory of Freudian and Lacanian theories of psychoanalysis, which describe personality development from a position which favours the masculine… [and] operate conservatively to extend and naturalize the repression of women."[282] This neglect of women's potential for a positive transference basically consigns women to a secondary status. The newly (re)constructed positive form of

[280] Kim Aeran, "Run, Dad!" *Azalea: Journal of Koran Literature &Culture* 1, (2007), 239. Trans. Kevin O'Rourke.
[281] Sigmund Freud and Joan Riviere, "Part Three: General Theory of the Neuroses XXVII. Transference." *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, (Garden City, NY: Garden City Pub., 1943).
[282] Jackie Byars, "Gaze/voices/power: Expanding Psychoanalysis for Feminist Film and Television Theory," in *Female Spectators: Looking at Films and Television*. Edited by E.Deidre Pibram. (London:Verso, 1988), 111.

transference in women counters previous assumptions; in order to achieve self-healing, women need to transform their suppressed traumatic memory and deal with male trauma consciously, as a subject.

Dealing with trauma as a subject interacts with gendered screen-capitalism where women become subjects of consumption and thus have agency to potentially conducive to "positive transference." A gendered screen-capitalism is accentuated here because the forming of the transnational female fandom has contributed to economic and emotional interactions, punctuating connections and collaborations. For Byars, feminine voice as a minority discourse "has been engaged in a long-standing, active, though not always explicit, *opposition to* the dominant, masculine discourse in popular American film and television."[283] While the recent tendency of changes in both Korean female narratives and screen cultures, female voices are heard across screen, potentially engendering a power derived from the *politics of embrace*, rather than the *stance of opposition*.

The stance of embrace is echoed in the interaction between the long-intertwined discourses of feminism and nationalism. Korean feminism has fought against patriarchal aspects of nationalism while continuing to serve as a handmaid to male-centered nationalist agendas. A spirit of embrace in the Korean feminist discourse has been always required for it to integrate or adapt to the male-dominated social changes, instead of changing abruptly. In *Exclusion and Embrace,* Miroslav Volf's theological exploration on "what it takes to overcome the polarity of 'either us or them' and live as a community" illuminates the discourse of mapping a route for embrace.[284] As Volf raises the question on the ambiguities of liberation, "the categories 'oppression/liberation'

[283] Ibid., 129.
[284] Miroslav Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation.* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 100.

seem ill-suited to bring reconciliation and sustain peace between people and people groups (1996, p.104-105).” In order to transform the project of liberation—“to liberate this project from the tendency to ideologize relations of social actors and perpetuate their antagonism,” Volf contends that this project requires politics of a pure heart, which, to some extent, resonates with Avishai Margalit’s “change of heart” necessary in order to truly forgive. As Margalit argues in *The Ethics of Memory*, “if it occurs through simple forgetfulness, it is not real forgiveness. Forgiveness is a conscious decision to change one’s attitude and to overcome anger and vengefulness (1996, p.193).”

Neither amnesia nor anesthesia hands in a satisfying answer to Margalit’s “a change of heart”;[285] rather, it will require a courageous risk that Levinas suggests may be something close enough to find a new start with the other. It is a gamble because of the asymmetricality that the very movement of embrace initiates from. This asymmetricality may lead to what Levinas calls “risk” when one needs to take one step more toward the neighbor. As Levinas contends, “[T]his relationship is also a resignation (prior to any decision, in passivity) at the risk of misunderstanding (like love, where, unless one does not love with love, one has to resign oneself to not being loved), at the risk of lack of and refusal of communication (2010, p.122).” Because of this asymmetricity and systematic underdetermination (waiting, nothing can guarantee that embrace will take place), there is the risk that embrace may be “misunderstood, despised, even violated,” or that an individual may question, “whether my action will be appreciated, supported, and reciprocated (2010, p.147).” Therefore, embrace is grace, and “grace is gamble, always.” It is a gamble and a leap with hope, requiring tremendous courage.

In Korean screen culture, the female subject formulates a new pattern of self-healing and empowerment through empowering men, not by overturning or destroying but by reconciling with

[285] Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2010),120-122.

men and with themselves yet through their libidinal-emotional, aesthetic co-consumption practices. In *Dangerous Women*, Chungmoo Choi draws on bell hooks's argument, asserting that "women of the colonized nation are doubly oppressed"—by the colonizer and by men of the same race.[286] I would like to further suggests that the traumatized Korean woman in the traumatized nation needs her "double healing"—not only healing from her gender-based trauma but also from the trauma of this nation—that requires her to form solidarity within her imagined community and get along with the male, as well as to cope with the rapidly changing and increasingly layered complexity of the social structure. As Kyung Hyun Kim says of the emasculated male figures in Korea cinema, "[T]he post-traumatic recoveries will only be complete once their emasculations are properly reconciled (2004, p. 7)." A process of "positive transference" allows women as a subject to reconcile with their underlying consciousness of traumatic moment, women's birth—the castration complex. Empowering the male is a complementary and effective healing from women's traumatic moment, not only in the imaginary, but also in their actual lives. This process of empowerment suggests an alternative approach to feminist studies in popular culture—one which considers it within a cultural and social-historical setting rather than from an exclusively individual Freudian psychosexual perspective. The onscreen projection of underlying consciousness facilitates the circulation of gendered screen-capitalism, involving its social and historical origins.

In the context of today's convergence of television and internet, as Lisa Parks points out, "we need to explore how technological convergence overlaps with the politics of gender, race, class and generational differences."[287] Technological development and convergence of media have played a significant role in the shifting politics of gender identity. To understand the shift of

[286] Chungmoo Choi, "Nationalism and Construction of Gender in Korea," in *Dangerous Women: Gender and Koran Nationalism*. Ed. Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi, (New York and London: Routledge, 1998), 14.
[287] Lisa Parks, "Flexible Microcasting: Gender, Generation, and Television-Internet Convergence" in *Television after TV: Essays on a Medium in Transition*. Ed. Lynn Spigel and Jan Olsson, (Durham: Duke UP, 2004),134.

Korean women from a “to-be-looked-at” object to a “to-be-catered-to” subject in the TV and post-TV digital age cannot merely rely on a media-based theoretical analysis. Rather, it must consider the interplay between the media role in mediation and women’s introspective, psychological changes embedded in everchanging and multilayered social structures. In this context, women’s shifting identity deeply engages a process of reconciliation for moving forward while women empower themselves through empowering or embracing the male, as well as the rest of the world.

CHAPTER 7 Conclusion

The opening anecdote of this dissertation, although tension-ridden and conflict-filled, ended with a success. How was the storyboard conflict solved? After the Korean general manager requested a separate meeting, each side conducted its own meeting to discuss solutions. I joined both. The project was able to continue after the Chinese team presented a proposal in which each side compromised: instead of creating a storyboard sketch, the director would take photographs of the vice director's performing the desired staging of scene prior to the official shoots. It was an unorthodox yet tolerably acceptable way to agree to the Korean side's standard procedure of film production. In spite of frictions, the film won the best director award at the 2012 Golden Koala Chinese Film Festival.

It would be too presumptuous and naïve to suggest that screen media could bring peace to East Asia and beyond. Collaboration requires unwearied negotiations and a de-centered method. Compromising and finding common ground is not just idealist but pragmatic: given the initial division of the Korean and Chinese crewmembers, for such a sustained collaboration to take place:

we must all be part of the uri.

In this dissertation, I ventured to offer a theoretical treatment of screen-capitalism, a new cultural paradigm exemplified in the relationship between Korean and Chinese screen culture over the last two decades. This transnational exchange through the *lens* of screen culture holds potential to shed new light on the relationships between Korea and China, and it holds the potential to initiate a discourse on transnational collaboration in general. I proposed screen-capitalism as a visual mechanism that is morphologically transplantable, ideologically penetrable, and transnationally gendered. Through screen-capitalism, spectators relate to each other across borders in a decentered manner. Drawing from the Deleuzian idea of rhizome, I argue that the rhizomatic quality of Korean screen culture allows for all of its points to be connected or plugged into any and all others outside of itself. This makes Korean screen culture efficiently compatible with heterogenous elements of other cultures' political, ideological, and linguistic communities. The five main chapters of this study focused on different aspects of this cultural paradigm that have led to the shifting patterns of its practices, transforming the *hallyu* to an *amnyu* (undercurrent) on mainland China within the context of bilateral tensions.

By examining the Chinese remake of the Korean television program *Running Man* as an instance of Korean screen culture's transplantability, I highlighted how the practice of mimicry is conducive to inserting, connecting, transplanting, and proliferating the original into and onto different social, ideological, and linguistic soils. The case study of the Chinese remake of the Korean program *I Am a Singer* focused on the shifting lingualscapes within the collaborative screen culture, wherein the multilingual practices and glossolalia outside of the standardized linguistic system function as an affective negotiation, or a tortuous revolt, instead of a confrontation, within nation-state official narratives. The localization of these mimicry practices repeats the impossibility of repetition and thus reinstates the agenda of producing the new.

This purposefulness is exemplified in the CCTV's *National Treasure*, produced in China after Korean popular culture was banned in mainland China in 2016. Vying to tell an alluring story and inwardly dissolving disintegrations within the state while outwardly building soft power, screen-capitalism in China was developed to mediate the capitalist-driven desires of the state and its postsocialist conditions, as well as offer aesthetic enjoyment and official narratives. Screen-capitalism's fluid traversing between the public and private spaces, between the imaginary and the actual, and between onscreen projection and offscreen traffic substantiates the rise of gendered practice within this cultural paradigm.

Considering the fact that most consumers of Korean screen culture in China and the majority of Chinese tourists in Korea are women, screen-capitalism evokes a legitimate discourse on feminist criticism in a transnational context. The fictive kinship of sisterhood in *Snow Flower and Secret Fan* illuminates a potential transnational female community against the backdrop of intertwined historical backgrounds and feminist agendas. Sisterhood and solidarity are built either by writing in a sisterly language or by singing in a language void of meaning, both of which are

outside of official linguistic systems—similar to the practice of glossolalia in *Running Man* and *I Am a Singer*. These examples emphasize a feminist speaking in tongues to strike fear in the holders of patriarchal power and reserve spaces for metaphorical sisterhood within transnational narratives. The languages void of standard language is communicated by *affective* means that function as discursive mechanism to liberate communication from the confinement of linguistic fixation and official authoritarianism. *Snow Flower and Secret Fan* juxtaposes a contemporary story of a transnational female friendship and the historical story of their ancestors, delving into the affective, sympathetic, and transnational female communities in the rise of screen culture. For further proof that screen-capitalism is a gendered practice, in chapter six, I then examined the transnational female spectators of the K-drama *Descendants of the Sun*. The shifting pattern of emplacement of women as the "to-be-catered-to" subject in Koreans screen culture is suggestive of a more wholesome stance outside of polarization where screen-capitalism contributes to mediation.

The essential character of screen-capitalism is *affective symbiosis*—constructing (trans)national communities across space and time, language and ideology. Affective symbiosis lies at the heart of this dissertation; I propose that the idea of affective thinking that facilitates a better understanding of transnational inter-actions and cooperation. Affective aspects emphasize emotional interactions in the individual domain instead of nation-state narratives. For instance, in *Tourist Distractions*, Youngmin Choe proposes a "model of productive distraction" that is not sponsored by nation-state narratives but contributes to a shared affective community.[288] Affective thinking is an apolitical step that is taken at both the individual and national levels towards an intensely binding friendship between what Giorgio Agamben calls "two within one spirit." This

[288] Youngmin Choe, *Tourist Distractions: Travelling and Feeling Hallyu Cinema*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

affective thinking indicates that con-sentiment is initiated from "the pure fact of being."[289] The infinite expansion of screen culture facilitates audiences' capacity to relate to each other, contributing to a transnational imagined community where the system of visual relations plays a crucial role. The sharing of the very fact of existence has been represented in the intertextual survival of cultural content within China and Korea's inter-contextual lands. In such a context, feeling the pure fact of existence requires taking affects into consideration, on the one hand. On the other hand, for people to understand each other's inter-context they must consider "conjuncture" in the sense that Lawrence Grossberg describes, i.e. various contexts (historical, social, economic, and political, etc.) that are much more complicated than they first appear.[290] Rather than limiting affective thinking to a space between the dichotomy of celebrating rationalism or falling into a purely emotional domain (which risks an orientalist stance),[291] affective thinking should be viewed as a part of a spectrum of affect gradations, shaped by both sympathetic feeling and apathetic thinking. The economy of affective thinking deconstructs the concept of thinking that is void of sensations *and* the concept of emotion that is void of thinking.

The logic of the infinite capitalist expansion triggers the practice of screen culture's expansion, from preproduction to postproduction, from financial confluence to media convergence, from market growth to lingualscape changes, and from resonant themes on screen and industrial communication in actuality. One of the major traits of screen-capitalism that I discussed in this dissertation, transplantability, is apparently driven by these capital initiatives along with cultural

[289] Giorgio Agamben, "The Friend", *What is An Apparatus?: and Other Essays*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 33. Agamben draws on Aristotle's discussion on friendship that indicates the essence of friendship lies in the pure fact of being, thus friends share the same sweetness of existing. I draw Agamben's argument to stress that the co-existence and the shared fact of being is central to establish a friendship-community among Korean and Chinese spectators.
[290] Lawrence Grossberg, *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense.* (Durham and London: Duke University press, 2010).
[291] Argument of western imperialism that hierarchizes rational individualism over emotion, while purely stressing emotion within the Asian context denies Asian's entry into western rationalism.

expansion. This transplantability is not unilateral, although the level of intensity may vary on each side. As I suggested in my discussion of the Chinese remakes of Korean variety shows, to remake is, paradoxically, to seek the new. Television programs like *National Treasure* has the ambitious goal of exporting Chinese intellectual property (IP) by emphasizing its authenticity and originality and flaunting its abundance in historical references. The transplantability of Chinese screen culture is also implicated in the deployment of screen-capitalism in mainland China. Some Chinese TV dramas available on streaming websites, such as Netflix—instead of secondary Korean television channels (i.e. Chunghwa TV, AsiaN, CHING) where Chinese TV dramas used to be broadcast—have become popular with Korean spectators in the past several years, perhaps not as successful as their Korean counterparts. For instance, *Nirvana in Fire* (2015), *Eternal Love* (2017), *A Love so Beautiful* (2017), and *Story of Yanxi Palace* (2018) have all been well-received by their Korean audiences. Many of these shows are historic drama, similar to the case of TV reality show *National Treasure* which makes good use of historical references. China is confident in its superiority in the mastery of historical drama and has well-developed production values and mature techniques in this genre, the better to export its pop cultural influence and aesthetic standards.[292] All these connections suggest that there is no technological, cultural, and aesthetic exchanges or transplant that is not contaminated by the initiative power of capital.

In the context of affective thinking, fresh perspective on the concept of transplantability should be considered by breaking the circuit of being only defined by the capital, or even dissolving our old understandings of capital that was previously prescribed by the nation-state. Affective exchanges and thoughtful reflections in combination craft a route that leads to

[292] Chinese cultural confidence in its production of historic drama can be seen in many news reports. For instance, see "Chinese TV drama entered Korea, leading a hallyu (汉流)," *People's Daily*, May 17, 2016. Also see at *Xinhua net*, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ent/2016-05/18/c_1118879457.htm (in Chinese).

deterritorialization. I have discussed a couple of boundary-breaking and consequentially reterritorialized terrains in border-crossing cultural engagement in this dissertation, including language, culture, ideology, and nation-state. We think and describe our cultures and ideologies in language. A decentralized process of trespassing the boundaries that the nation-state defends is internalized in the process of decentralizing the standardized national languages. In other words, this decentralizing process of breaking the boundaries of languages reflects a desire for decentralizing what the nation-state maintains, regulates, and surveills, and so for elevating communications and cooperation at a transnational level. This decentralization is where affective negotiations initiate and develop, overtly and covertly communicating a language and culture of hospitality.

There are more aspects that can be further discussed in the context of deterritorializations. For instance, the conventional concept of family and nation as they are constructed by capitalism can also be reconstituted. As Deleuze and Guattari contend in *Anti-Oedipus*, "[E]verything returns or recurs: States, nations, families."[293] The schizophrenic process of capitalism is the defensive and limiting mechanism of nation-state and family in the indefinite deterritorialization.[294] In chapter five, I tackled how the fictive kinship connects Sophia and Nina in a pseudo-family that can carve out a space for community within private and domestic spheres. This fictive kinship leads to questions of gender and community. As I argued in chapter five, the print boom played dual roles in Korean women's demand for gender equality and nationalist agendas: it facilitated the formation of nation and imagined community where people use the same language. Screen

[293] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 34.
[294] As Deleuze and Guattari argue in *Anti-Oedipus*, the schizophrenic process results from capitalism's inherent contradictory tendency of breaking boundaries for self-expansion, flows of capital, on the one hand, and axiomatization of the decoding of flows of capital on the other hand.

media in a digital time pursues border-crossing expansion and affective negotiation for communication, trespassing what the nation-state prescribes and surveils. Screen media punctuates a transnational turn that is potentially conducive to an extended community imagined across borders. In the extended community projected by the affective medium of screen, new possibilities rise in a transnational mutually referencing system of feminist criticism, in reserving public space within and outside of diegetic narratives, and in empowerment of the subjugated voices and images that result from the asymmetry of capital and power. The transnational turn engendered by screen media is not only because of screen media's fluidity, but also attributes to the intuitiveness by which affective and sensual co-experiences are transferred and interconnected onto an expanded map.

This affective aspect of screen-capitalism has the potential to contribute to an escape from capitalist axiomatization in the gap spawn by the schizophrenic process and to craft a space for mutual references and effective communication in the general public's everyday practice, under the shell of screen culture. In actuality, the challenges of gender conflicts, of national/nationalist frictions, of historical tension will continue indefinitely. I do not hold answers to all these counter forces to reconciliation. What we can do is closely observe new patterns and boldly raise new models breaking enslavement, and so seek new possibilities wherein we could anchor our hope in more pragmatic practices.

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