

University of California  
Santa Barbara

# Stochastic Differential Games and Systemic Risk Measures

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Statistics and Applied Probability

by

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December 2022

The Dissertation of Yichen Feng is approved.

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December 2022

Stochastic Differential Games and Systemic Risk Measures

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by

Yichen Feng

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my family.

## Acknowledgements

Foremost, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my advisor Professor Jean-Pierre Fouque for his very helpful guidance in my study and research and all the hours of discussion we had throughout these last four years. Professor Jean-Pierre Fouque is definitely one of the most understanding and caring professors I have met and is one of the reasons why I am here.

I would also like to thank the members of the committee: Professor Tomoyuki Ichiba and Professor Nils-Christian Detering for supporting my research. They were always very helpful in discussing problems or any questions I had while working here and they enriched my ideas.

Many thanks to Professor Ruimeng Hu for being available for endless meetings with me, which brought the success of our projects. Her support and encouragement is important to me during this long journey and her advice on both research as well as on my career have been priceless.

I also owe my gratitude for the many useful discussions with Professor Marco Frittelli, Professor René Carmona, Professor Samuel Drapeau, Professor Stéphane Crépey, Ming Min, Alessandro Doldi, Mekonnen Tadese, Dorinel Bastide and Romain Arribehaute. Thank you all for the great help.

I would like to thank all professors who have taught me in the PSTAT department for their excellent classes on my first two years of program, for allowing me to build strong bases to proceed in my research. I thank all the fellow students and staff in the department for being always available to help me whenever I needed it.

I am very grateful for the great financial support I received from the department, Professor Jean-Pierre Fouque, Professor Ruimeng Hu and UCSB graduate division.

I very much appreciate all the friends I met at UCSB. Thanks to Jiaye Xu for being

a role model encouraging me to be strong and independent. Thanks to Alex, Joshua, Youhong, Aritra and Chang Yuan for showing me that the language and the origin are not barriers to build friendship. I also wish to thank Yi Zheng, Menglin Li, Jiawei Wang, Yue He, Weiyi Li, Xianxuan Fang and Weiyu Wang for the time we enjoyed together. You have made my PhD life colorful.

Last but not least, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my parents, Feng Lei and Li Xinshe, for their unwavering love and support. I am deeply indebted to my Shifu, Ding Dahong and Wang Zhifen, for teaching me Tai-Chi and caring about me over the last ten years. I also feel extremely fortunate to have my boyfriend Ming Min by my side during the pandemic days. It was his accompany and love that helped my overcome everything in my life and study over the years.

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- Y. Feng, J.-P. Fouque, and T. Ichiba, Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games on Random Directed Networks, *Journal of Mathematics and Statistical Science* Vol. 7(3), p. 79-108, 2020. [Journal]
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## Abstract

Stochastic Differential Games and Systemic Risk Measures

by

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In the first part of this thesis, we study linear-quadratic stochastic differential games on directed chains inspired by the directed chain stochastic differential equations introduced by Detering, Fouque and Ichiba [1]. We solve explicitly for Nash equilibria with a finite number of players and we study more general finite-player games with a mixture of both directed chain interaction and mean field interaction. We investigate and compare the corresponding games in the limit when the number of players tends to infinity. The limit is characterized by Catalan functions and the dynamics under equilibrium is an infinite-dimensional Gaussian process described by a Catalan Markov chain, with or without the presence of mean field interaction. We then continue the analysis through developing a random directed chain structure by assuming the interaction between every two neighbors is random. We solve explicitly for an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the system and we find that the dynamics under equilibrium is an infinite-dimensional Gaussian process described by a Catalan Markov chain. The discussion about stochastic differential games is extended to a random two-sided directed chain and a random directed tree structure.

The second part is about systemic risk measures introduced by Biagini, Fouque, Frittelli, and Meyer-Brandis [2]. We first analyze the systemic risk measures for disjoint and overlapping groups (*e.g.*, central clearing counterparties (CCP)) by proposing new models with realistic game features. Specifically, we generalize the systemic risk measure proposed in [2] by allowing individual banks to choose their preferred groups instead



of being assigned to certain groups. We introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium for these new models, and analyze the optimal solution under Gaussian distribution of the risk factor. We also provide an explicit solution for the risk allocation of the individual banks, and study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium both theoretically and numerically. The developed numerical algorithm can simulate scenarios of equilibrium, and we apply it to study the bank-CCP structure with real data and show the validity of the proposed model.

Under the framework in Biagini, Fouque, Frittelli, and Meyer-Brandis [2], systemic risk measures can be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash that secures the aggregated system by allocating capital to the single institutions *before aggregating* the individual risks. This problem has no explicit solution except in very limited situations. We then apply the deep learning method as a tool to compute the optimal strategy of capital allocations for the risk measures. Deep learning is increasingly receiving attention in financial modelings and risk management and we propose our deep learning based algorithms to solve both the primal and dual problems of the risk measures, and thus to learn the *fair* risk allocations. In particular, our method for the dual problem involves the training philosophy inspired by the well-known Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) approach and a newly designed direct estimation of Radon-Nikodym derivative. In the end, we show substantial numerical studies of the subject and provide interpretations of the risk allocations associated with the systemic risk measures. In the particular case of exponential preferences, numerical experiments demonstrate excellent performance of the proposed algorithm, when compared with the optimal explicit solution as a benchmark.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games

The study of stochastic differential games on networks is a broad area. In a stochastic differential game on a network, the state process of each player is associated with a vertex of the network graph and each player minimizes the individual cost function by controlling its state, where the state processes are described by a stochastic differential system. The interactions among the players through the network is encoded in the individual cost functions. Roughly speaking, if player  $i$  (vertex  $i$ ) is connected to player  $j$  (vertex  $j$ ) in the network, then the cost function of player  $i$  depends on the state process of player  $j$ , and the cost function of player  $j$  depends on the state process of player  $i$ . If the graph is directed, and if there is an arrow from  $j$  to  $i$ , then the cost function of player  $i$  depends on the state process of player  $j$ . The goal of study of stochastic differential game problem on networks is to determine and analyze the Nash equilibrium of the game for different types of networks. There are the following two extreme situations of the networks.

On one hand, we can consider a fully connected network (complete graph), described in fig. 1.1 (a), with interaction of mean-field type. When the number  $N$  of players goes to

infinity, i.e.,  $N \rightarrow \infty$ , with appropriate scalings, this kind of game can be approximated by a mean field game. The approximation problem of mean field games has been discussed widely, for instance in Lacker [3]. Stochastic games on infinite random networks have been proposed and studied. Delarue [4] investigated an example of a game with a large number of players in mean-field interaction when the graph connection between them is of Erdős-Rényi type. More recently, Caines and Huang [5] [6] explored stochastic differential games under dense graphs.

On the other hand, we can consider a very sparse, structured network such as a directed, torus chain of  $N$  vertices in fig. 1.1 (b), where there are arrows from  $i + 1$  to  $i$  for  $i = 1, \dots, N - 1$  and an arrow from 1 to  $N$ . There are only  $N$  directed edges in the network in contrast to the fully connected graph, where there are  $\binom{N}{2}$  undirected edges. It is a complete opposite to the mean field games, since, on a directed chain network, each player interacts only with its neighbor in a given direction. The finite directed chain of  $N$  vertices in fig. 1.1 (c) is obtained as a graph with even a fewer number of directed edges, by removing the directed edge from 1 to  $N$  in the directed, torus chain of fig. 1.1 (b). The difference between them is how to deal with the boundary vertices (vertices 1 and  $N$ ).

In chapter 2, we introduce a stochastic differential game aspect of the directed chain structures and identify Nash equilibria. We consider the limit, when the number of players goes to infinity as in fig. 1.1 (d), and generalize the results to the stochastic differential games on a directed tree structure.

Recently, the stochastic processes on one-dimensional, infinite directed chain have been studied in Detering, Fouque and Ichiba [1] without the game aspect. Similarly, Lacker, Ramanan and Wu [7] studied the limit of an interacting diffusive particle system on a large sparse interaction graph with finite average degree. Interestingly, the equilibrium dynamics on the network discussed in this paper turns out to be different from




Figure 1.1: (a) Fully connected graph, (b) Directed torus chain graph, (c) Finite directed chain, (d) Infinite directed chain.

the dynamics suggested in [1]. Particularly, the long time variance behavior is different. The equilibrium dynamics for the infinite-player game is described by a Catalan Markov chain introduced in chapter 2.

## 1.2 Systemic Risk Measures

Financial institutions are increasingly and tightly connected together at an unprecedented scale, and the complex dynamics of the inter-connectedness aggregate their idiosyncratic risks within the financial system. Consequently, failures of individual institutions due to excessive risk-taking may quickly propagate throughout the entire financial network and systemically cause cascading disasters. Such financial crises (*e.g.*, [8, 9, 10]) have dramatically demonstrated the importance of understanding the nature of systemic risk and designing models and methods to capture and analyze it. A large part of the current literature on systemic financial risk is concerned with the modeling structure of financial networks and the analysis of the contagion and the spread of a potential exogenous shock

into the system, *e.g.*, [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. We refer interested readers to the book [16] for an exhaustive review. For a given financial network and a given random shock, one then determines the “cascade” mechanism, which generates many defaults. This mechanism often requires a detailed description of the balance sheet of each institution; assumptions on the interbank network and exposures, on the recovery rate at default, on the liquidation policy; the analysis of direct liabilities, bankruptcy costs, cross-holdings, leverage structures, fire sales, and liquidity freezes. Meanwhile, central clearing counterparties (CCPs) are introduced to the financial markets to mitigate the cascade defaults. They require default funds from their members to absorb the cost of clearing member’s defaults, and several mechanisms of default funds have been designed by Albanese et al. [17].

The study of the contagion can help to reduce the risk of a complete system when breaking down and is valuable from the point of view of a policy maker. However, one may also be interested in measuring the risk embedded in the financial system, which is defined as the capital requirements to regulate the risk assumed by market participants and to allocate existing capital. Our approach is closely related to the classical conceptual framework of univariate monetary risk measures which was first introduced by the seminal paper of Artzner et al. [18]. Over the last few years, the literature on systemic risk has been growing fast taking in account different points of view on the subject. Properties of measures and duality were emphasized in the studies of Föllmer and Schied [19] and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin [20]. Systemic risks characterized by interbank lending has been studied via mean field approach in Fouque and Sun [21], Fouque and Ichiba [22], Carmona et al. [23]. We refer the reader to Armenti and Crépey [24] for deterministic systemic risk allocations and the solutions to the classical optimization problem. For empirical studies on the default fund of Central Counterparty Clearing houses, we refer for example to Feng et al. [25], Armenti et al. [26], and Ben-Tal and Teboulle [27]. See also the volume of Fouque and Langsam [28] for an exhaustive overview on the literature

on systemic risk.

Methodological frameworks based on acceptable allocations have been proposed by several studies. In the previous works [29, 2], the authors introduced a general class of systemic risk measures that allow for random allocations to individual banks before aggregation of their risks. They also proved the dual representation of a particular subclass of such systemic risk measures and the existence and uniqueness of the optimal allocation. They interpreted the systemic risk measures as the minimal amount of cash that secures the aggregated system by allocating capital to the single institutions before aggregating the individual risks, which allows for a possible ranking of the institutions in terms of systemic risk measured by the optimal allocations. While they mainly conduct systematic studies of the properties of the proposed measures in terms of set valued functions, diversification and monotonicity, the explicit solution can be found only in very limited cases. Armenti et al. [26] developed an approach in a similar spirit, covering allocation first followed by aggregation frameworks.

### 1.3 Originality

**Statement** The content of this thesis is either my original work with collaborators, or relevant prior or concurrent work included for reference.

1. The content of chapter 2.1.1 and appendix A is the result of a collaboration with Jean-Pierre Fouque and Tomoyuki Ichiba, and has previously appeared in [30] and [31].
2. The content of section 3.2 and appendix B is the result of a collaboration with Jean-Pierre Fouque, Ruimeng Hu and Tomoyuki Ichiba, and has previously appeared in [25].
3. The content of section 3.3 is the result of a collaboration with Ming Min and Jean-Pierre Fouque, and has previously appeared in [32].



## Chapter 2

# Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games on Directed Networks

The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 2.1, we consider tractable stochastic differential games on directed chain networks and find their Nash equilibria explicitly in a similar spirit of the work by Carmona, Fouque and Sun [23]. We focus on open-loop Nash equilibria, discuss briefly closed loop Nash equilibria and examine how the structure of the network affects this Nash equilibrium. We propose three directed chain networks shown in fig. 1.1 (b)-(d) first. In these considerations, all these graphs are not considered as geometric graphs. In other words, the graph represents interactions among players through the cost functions but not necessarily reflects physical (spatial) distance among players. In section 2.2 we investigate linear-quadratic stochastic differential games on random directed networks and their open-loop Nash equilibria. We propose first a stochastic game on a random directed chain network shown in Figure 2.2. Then, we generalize the result to a stochastic differential game on a random two-sided directed

chain structure as an extension of random directed chain graphs. Section 2.3 is devoted to the analysis of another extension of section 2.1 and section 2.2, which considers a directed tree structure with deterministic or random interactions between players in the neighboring generations. We conclude in section 2.4 and appendix A includes some technical proofs and discussions.

## 2.1 Deterministic Directed Chain Game

The section is organized as follows. In section 2.1.1, we propose a finite-player game model on a directed chain of fig. 1.1 (c), and construct an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We discuss general boundary conditions on the boundary vertex of the network graph as well as two special cases to illustrate that the boundary condition actually affects weakly the Nash equilibrium. We also observe that for this type of games open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria coincide.

Section 2.1.2 is devoted to the analysis of an infinite-player stochastic differential game on a directed chain of fig. 1.1 (d). We find an open-loop Nash equilibrium from a similar Riccati system to that of the finite-player game. The solutions of the infinite-dimensional Riccati system are called Catalan functions. We use them to build a Catalan Markov chain and introduce an infinite-dimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in section 2.1.2.2. We find that its long-time asymptotic variance and covariance are finite.

In section 2.1.3, we shall incorporate the mean-field interactions to the stochastic differential games on the directed chain. We call it a mixed system of directed chain and mean-field interactions. We discuss both finite-player and infinite-player games for the mixed system. By choosing a tuning parameter  $u \in [0, 1]$ , we may adjust the model to be a purely mean field game (studied in [23]), or a purely directed chain game, or a mixture of the two interactions. For it, we repeat the same steps as in section 2.1.1, section 2.1.2,

and section 2.1.2.2 to find the Nash equilibria and we construct a generalized Catalan Markov chain describing the two effects. We find that the long-time asymptotic variance of the process with the purely directed chain interaction is finite, which is different from the case with mean-field interaction as it was shown in Table 1 in [1].

In section 2.1.4, we propose an  $N$  player stochastic differential game under the directed chain torus graph fig. 1.1 (b). It corresponds to the periodic boundary condition. We construct an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We conjecture that as  $N \rightarrow \infty$ , its infinite-player limit is the same as the one found for other boundary condition. This conjecture is supported by numerical results.

## 2.1.1 N-Player Directed Chain Game

### 2.1.1.1 Setup and Assumptions

In fig. 1.1 (c), we consider a stochastic differential game in continuous time, involving  $N$  players indexed from 1 to  $N$ . Each player  $i$  is controlling its own, real-valued private state  $X_t^i$  by taking a real-valued action  $\alpha_t^i$  at time  $t \in [0, T]$ . The dynamics of the states of the  $N$  individual players are given by  $N$  stochastic differential equations of the form:

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N, \quad (2.1)$$

where  $0 \leq t \leq T$  and  $(W_t^i)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, N$  are independent standard Brownian motions on a filtered probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  with filtration  $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$  generated by the noises and augmented with an initial  $\sigma$ -algebra  $\mathcal{F}_0$ , independent of the Brownian motions.

Here and throughout the paper, the argument in the superscript represents index or label but not the power. For simplicity, we assume that the diffusion is one-dimensional

and the diffusion coefficients are constant and identical denoted by  $\sigma > 0$ . The drift coefficients  $\alpha^i$ 's are progressively measurable with respect to the filtration  $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$  and satisfy the square integrability  $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^T |\alpha_t^i|^2 dt] < \infty$  for  $i = 1, \dots, N$ . The system starts at time  $t = 0$  from *i.i.d.* square-integrable,  $\mathcal{F}_0$ -measurable random variables  $X_0^i = \xi_i$  for  $i = 1, \dots, N$ , independent of the Brownian motions. For simplicity, we assume  $\mathbb{E}(\xi_i) = 0$  for  $i = 1, \dots, N$ .

In this model, among the first  $N - 1$  players, each player  $i$  chooses its own strategy  $\alpha^i$ , in order to minimize its objective function given by: for  $1 \leq i \leq N - 1$

$$J^i(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)^2 \right) dt + \frac{c}{2}(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)^2 \right\}, \quad (2.2)$$

for some constants  $\varepsilon > 0$  and  $c \geq 0$ . The running cost and the terminal cost functions are defined by

$$f^i(x, \alpha^i) := \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2, \quad \text{and} \quad g^i(x) := \frac{c}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2, \quad (2.3)$$

respectively for  $x := (x^1, \dots, x^N) \in \mathbb{R}^N$  and  $\alpha^i \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, N$ . This is a *Linear-Quadratic* game on a directed chain network in fig. 1.1 (c), since the state  $X^i$  of each player  $i$  interacts only with  $X^{i+1}$  through the quadratic cost functions for  $i = 1, \dots, N - 1$ . The system is completed by describing the behavior of player  $N$ , which will be done in the following section, when we discuss it as the *boundary condition* of the system.

### 2.1.1.2 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium

In this section, we search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the system of  $N$  players among the admissible strategies  $\{\alpha_t^i, i = 1, \dots, N, t \in [0, T]\}$  by the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle (see the monograph [33] for stochastic controls, and also see [34] for

stochastic maximum principle in the mean-field games) and study the effect of boundary conditions induced by the behavior of player  $N$ .

**Definition 2.1.1** (Open-loop Nash equilibrium). We call  $\{\alpha^i, 1 \leq i \leq N\}$  an open-loop Nash equilibrium if for every player  $i$  and for any other  $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$  adapted and square-integrable control  $\beta$ , we have

$$J^i(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^{i-1}, \beta, \alpha^{i+1}, \dots, \alpha^N) \geq J^i(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^{i-1}, \alpha^i, \alpha^{i+1}, \dots, \alpha^N). \quad (2.4)$$

We discuss a general boundary condition first and then show two particular choices in the next discussion.

**General Boundary Condition** We consider a setup with a general boundary condition for the directed chain where the last player  $N$  does not depend on the other players. The expected cost functional for player  $N$  is defined by:

$$J^N(\alpha^N) := \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^N)^2 + q_2(X_t^N) \right) dt + Q_2(X_T^N) \right\}, \quad (2.5)$$

$$\text{where } q_2(x) := \frac{a_1}{2}(x - m)^2 + a_2, \quad \text{and } Q_2(x) := \frac{c_1}{2}(x - m)^2 + c_2, \quad x \in \mathbb{R} \quad (2.6)$$

are non-degenerate convex quadratic functions in  $x$ , where  $a_1, a_2, m, c_1, c_2$  are some constants with  $a_1 > 0$  and  $c_1 > 0$ . The running cost and terminal cost functions are  $f^N(x, \alpha^N) := \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^N)^2 + q_2(x)$  and  $g^N(x) := Q_2(x)$ , respectively. This can be seen as a control problem for the player  $N$  and we assume its state is attracted to some constant level  $m \in \mathbb{R}$ . We define the Hamiltonian for each player. The Hamiltonian for player  $i \leq N - 1$  is given by:

$$H^i(x^1, \dots, x^N, y^{i,1}, \dots, y^{i,N}, \alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) := \sum_{k=1}^N \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2,$$

while the Hamiltonian for player  $N$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} H^N(x^1, \dots, x^N, y^{i,1}, \dots, y^{i,N}, \alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) \\ := \sum_{k=1}^N \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^N)^2 + \frac{a_1}{2}(x^N - m)^2 + a_2 \end{aligned}$$

for  $x^k, y^{i,k}, \alpha^k \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $i, k = 1, \dots, N$ . For  $i = 1, \dots, N$  the value of  $\alpha^i$  minimizing the Hamiltonian  $H^i(\cdot)$  with respect to  $\alpha^i$ , when all the other variables including  $\alpha^j$  for  $j \neq i$  are fixed, is given by the first order condition

$$\partial_{\alpha^i} H^i = y^{i,i} + \alpha^i = 0 \quad \text{leading to the choice: } \hat{\alpha}^i = -y^{i,i}.$$

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^i = (Y_t^{i,j}; j \leq N)$  and  $Z_t^i = (Z_t^{i,j,k}; j, k \leq N)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, N$  are defined as the solutions of the system of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs): for  $j = 1, \dots, N$

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t^{i,j} &= -\partial_{x^j} H^i(X_t, Y_t^i, \alpha_t) dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k \\ &= -\varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}) dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \\ Y_T^{i,j} &= \partial_{x^j} g_i(X_T) = c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}), \quad i \leq N-1; \\ dY_t^{N,j} &= -a_1(X_t^N - m)\delta_{N,j} dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{N,j,k} dW_t^k, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \\ Y_T^{N,j} &= c_1(X_T^N - m)\delta_{N,j} \end{aligned} \tag{2.7}$$

where  $\delta_{i,j} := 1$ , if  $i = j$ , and 0, otherwise. Particularly, for  $j = i$ ,  $j = i + 1$ , it becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t^{i,i} &= \varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,i,k} dW_t^k, \quad Y_T^{i,i} = -c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i), \\ dY_t^{i,i+1} &= -\varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,i+1,k} dW_t^k, \quad Y_T^{i,i+1} = c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i), \quad (2.8) \\ dY_t^{N,N} &= -a_1(X_t^N - m)dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{N,N,k} dW_t^k, \quad Y_T^{N,N} = c_1(X_T^N - m) \end{aligned}$$

for  $i \leq N - 1$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . Thus, because of  $Y_T^{i,i} = -Y_T^{i,i+1}$  and of the form of dynamics, it is reduced to

$$Y_t^{i,i} = -Y_t^{i,i+1}, \quad Z_t^{i,i,k} = -Z_t^{i,i+1,k} \quad (2.9)$$

for  $i \leq N - 1$ ,  $k \leq N$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . For  $j \neq i, i + 1$ ,  $i \leq N - 1$ , it becomes:  $dY_t^{i,j} = \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k$ ,  $Y_T^{i,j} = 0$ , and hence, the solution is

$$Y_t^{i,j} \equiv 0, \quad Z_t^{i,j,k} \equiv 0, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T. \quad (2.10)$$

Considering the BSDE (2.8) and its terminal condition, we make the ansatz:

$$Y_t^{i,i} = \sum_{j=i}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,i,j} X_t^j + (\phi_t^{N,i,N} X_t^N + \psi_t^{N,i}) = \sum_{j=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,j} X_t^j + \psi_t^{N,i}, \quad (2.11)$$

for some deterministic scalar functions  $\phi_t$  (depending on  $N$ ) satisfying the terminal conditions: for  $1 \leq i \leq N - 1$ ,  $\phi_T^{N,i,i} = c$ ,  $\phi_T^{N,i,i+1} = -c$ ,  $\phi_T^{N,i,j} = 0$  for  $j \geq i + 2$ ,  $\psi_T^{N,i} = 0$ ; and  $\phi_T^{N,N,N} = c_1$ ,  $\psi_T^{N,N} = -c_1 m$ . With this ansatz, the optimal strategy  $\hat{\alpha}$  and the controlled forward equation for  $X$  in (2.1) become, for  $i \leq N$

$$\hat{\alpha}_t^i = -Y_t^{i,i}, \quad dX_t^i = -\left(\sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} X_t^k + \psi_t^{N,i}\right)dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad t \geq 0. \quad (2.12)$$

Differentiating the ansatz (2.11) and substituting (2.12) leads to:  $dY_t^{i,i}$  has drifts

$$\left\{ \sum_{k=i}^N (\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,k} - \sum_{j=i}^k \phi_t^{N,i,j} \phi_t^{N,j,k}) X_t^k + [\dot{\psi}_t^{N,i} - \sum_{j=i}^N \psi_t^{N,j} \phi_t^{N,i,j}] \right\} dt \quad (2.13)$$

and martingale terms  $\sigma \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} dW_t^k$ . Here  $\dot{\phi}_t$  represents the time derivative of  $\phi_t$ . Comparing the martingale terms of two Itô's decompositions (2.8) and (2.13) of  $Y_t^{i,i}$ , we obtain the deterministic (and therefore adapted) processes  $Z_t^{i,i,k}$ :

$$Z_t^{i,i,k} = 0 \quad \text{for } k < i, \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t^{i,i,k} = \sigma \phi_t^{N,i,k} \quad \text{for } k \geq i; \quad (2.14)$$

Moreover, the drift terms show that the functions  $\phi_t^{N,\cdot,\cdot}$  and  $\psi_t^{N,\cdot}$  must satisfy the system of Riccati equations :  $\dot{\phi}_t^{N,N,N} = \phi_t^{N,N,N} \cdot \phi_t^{N,N,N} - a_1$ ,  $\phi_T^{N,N,N} = c_1$  and

$$\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,j} = \sum_{\ell=i}^j \phi_t^{N,i,\ell} \phi_t^{N,\ell,j} + \varepsilon(-\delta_{i,j} + \delta_{i+1,j}), \quad \dot{\psi}_T^{N,i,j} = c(\delta_{i,j} - \delta_{i+1,j}) \quad (2.15)$$

for  $i \leq N-1$ ,  $j \leq N$ , and  $\psi_t^{N,j}$ ,  $j \leq N$  are determined by  $\dot{\psi}_t^{N,N} = \psi_t^{N,N} \phi_t^{N,N,N} + a_1 m$ ,  $\psi_T^{N,N} = -c_1 m$  and for  $i \leq N-1$

$$\dot{\psi}_t^{N,i} = \sum_{j=i}^N \psi_t^{N,j} \phi_t^{N,i,j}, \quad \psi_T^{N,i} = 0, \quad (2.16)$$

From the equations above, the functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,i}$  for all  $i = 1, \dots, N-1$  are identical; the functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,i+1}$  for all  $i = 1, \dots, N-2$  are identical ;  $\dots$ ; and the functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,N-2} = \phi_t^{N,i+1,N-1}$ . The functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,N}$  for all  $i$  depend on  $\phi_t^{N,N,N}$  of the last player which is determined by the boundary condition. However, the functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,i}, \dots, \phi_t^{N,i,N-1}$  are independent of  $\phi_t^{N,i,N}$  and the boundary condition. The functions  $\psi^{N,\cdot}$  depend on the  $\phi$  functions and have no effect on  $\phi^{N,i,j}$  ( $j < N$ ) as well.



In conclusion, these  $\phi^{N,i,j}$  ( $j < N$ ) are solvable, identical and independent of the boundary condition as long as the boundary condition defines the last player as a self-controlled problem. The preceding argument is summarized as the following.

**Proposition 2.1.1.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic stochastic game with cost functionals (2.2)-(2.3) for the first  $N - 1$  players and (2.5)-(2.6) for the  $N$ th player is given by (2.12), where  $\phi^{N,i,j}$  and  $\psi^{N,j}$  are uniquely determined by the system (2.15)-(2.16) of Riccati equations.*

As the number of players goes to infinity, we can get rid of the boundary condition and get a sequence of functions  $\{\phi_t^j, j = 1, 2, \dots\}$ , defined by  $\phi_t^0 = \phi_t^{N,i,i}$ ,  $\phi_t^1 = \phi_t^{N,i,i+1}$ ,  $\dots$ ,  $\phi_t^j = \phi_t^{N,i,i+j}$  for large  $N$  and so on. It indicates that the Nash equilibrium converges to a limit independent of the boundary condition. Therefore, it is natural to study a similar game with infinite players. We conjecture that in general, as the number  $N$  of players goes to infinity, the limit of the Nash equilibrium of the finite-player, linear-quadratic stochastic differential game under the directed chain graphs gives us the Nash equilibrium of the infinite-player game, and moreover,  $\{\phi_t^j, i \in \mathbb{N}\}$  is the solution to the Riccati equation system of the infinite-player game. This will be discussed in section 2.1.2. Next, two particular examples are discussed to better illustrate the effect of the special boundary.

**Boundary Condition 1:  $X^N$  is attracted to 0** Here, we discuss the case when  $X^N$  is attracted to 0 which is also the common mean  $\mathbb{E}[\xi_i] = 0$  of the initial condition. It is equivalent to the general boundary condition (2.5)-(2.6) with  $m = 0$ . Without loss of generality, we can take constants:  $a_1 = \varepsilon$ ,  $c_1 = c$  and  $a_2 = c_2 = 0$ . Then the cost

functional for player  $N$  is given by:

$$J^N(\alpha^N) := \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^N)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(X_t^N)^2 \right) dt + \frac{c}{2}(X_T^N)^2 \right\}.$$

The running cost function is defined by  $f^N(x, \alpha^N) = \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^N)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}x^2$  and the terminal cost function is defined by  $g^N(x) = \frac{c}{2}x^2$ . Then,  $X^N$  is independent of the other players and is the solution of a self-controlled problem. We then make the same ansatz as (2.11) with  $\psi_t^{N,i} = 0$  for all  $i$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . As a result,  $Z_t^{i,i,k}$  and  $\phi_t^{N,i,j}$  are as (2.14) and (2.15), respectively.

Consequently, we have the same conclusion: the functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,i+k} = \phi_t^{N,j,j+k}$  for all  $i, j \geq 1, k \geq 1$  and  $i+k < N, j+k < N$ ; and functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,j}$  ( $j < N$ ) are independent of the boundary condition.

*Remark 2.1.1* (Shift invariance). Notice that in this case  $\phi_t^{N,N,N}$  has the same solution as  $\phi_t^{N,i,i}$  ( $i < N$ ). Thus, in the ansatz (2.11), we can actually assume the solution  $\phi_t^{N,i,j}$  depends only on the difference  $j - i$  for  $j \geq i$ .

**Boundary Condition 2:**  $\alpha^N = 0$  We study the case when there is no control for the last player  $X^N$ , i.e. the dynamics of the state is given by:

$$dX_t^N = \sigma dW_t^N, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T; \quad X_0^N = \xi_N, \quad \mathbb{E}(\xi_N) = 0.$$

Player  $i$  chooses the strategy  $\alpha_t^i$  ( $i < N$ ) to minimize  $J^i$  given in (2.2) and the last player does not control, i.e.,  $\alpha^N \equiv 0$ . We make the same ansatz as in (2.11) with  $\psi_t^{N,i} = 0$  for all  $i$ . Then  $Z_t^{i,i,k}$  are the same as in (2.14) for  $i \leq N, k \leq N, 0 \leq t \leq T$ , and  $\phi_t^{N,i,j}$ ,  $i \leq N-1, j \leq N$  satisfy (2.15), however, for  $i = N$ ,  $\dot{\phi}_t^{N,N,N} = -\varepsilon$  for  $0 \leq t \leq T$  with  $\phi_T^{N,N,N} = c$ .

Thus, it is demonstrated again that the boundary condition does not affect the so-

lutions  $\phi^{N,i,j}$  ( $j < N$ ), however, the functions  $\phi^{N,i,N}$  for all  $i$  are different from those in section 2.1.1.2, which depends on the boundary.

### 2.1.1.3 Closed-loop Nash Equilibrium

In search for closed-loop Nash equilibria, the controls are of the form  $\alpha^k(t, x)$ . When computing  $\partial_{x^j} H^i$  in the derivation of the BSDE for  $Y^{i,j}$ , one needs to pay attention in taking derivatives with respect to  $x^j$  in  $\hat{\alpha}^k$  for  $k \neq i$ , using  $\hat{\alpha}^k = -y^{k,k}$  and the ansatz (2.22). This is a tedious but straightforward computation which leads to the fact that the obtained closed-loop equilibrium coincides with the open-loop equilibrium identified before. We omit the details here as well as repeating this remark in the following sections. The only place where closed-loop and open-loop equilibria will be different is in section 2.1.3 when we will look at a mixture of directed chain and mean field interactions for finite player games, as it is already the case for pure mean field interaction studied in [23]. However, they will coincide again for the infinite-player games in section 2.1.3.2.

## 2.1.2 Infinite-Player Game Model

Motivated by the limit of the finite-player game discussed in section 2.1.1, we define the game with infinite players on a directed chain structure as shown in fig. 1.1. In remark 2.1.2 in section 2.1.2.1, we will see that the Hamiltonian only depends on finite players, which will make it well-defined. We assume that the state dynamics of all players are given by the stochastic differential equations of the form: for  $i \geq 1$ ,

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.17)$$

where  $(W_t^i)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ ,  $i \geq 1$  are one-dimensional, independent Brownian motions on a filtered probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  with filtration  $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ . Similar to the setup for the finite-

player games in section 2.1.1, we assume that the drift coefficients  $\alpha^i$  are adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions and satisfy  $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^T |\alpha_t^i|^2 dt] < \infty$ . We also assume that the diffusion coefficients are constant and identically denoted by  $\sigma > 0$ . The system starts at time  $t = 0$  from *i.i.d.* square-integrable random variables  $X_0^i = \xi_i$  with  $\mathbb{E}(\xi_i) = 0$ , independent of the Brownian motions. In this model, player  $i$  chooses its own strategy  $\alpha^i$  in order to minimize its expected cost function of the form:

$$J^i(\alpha) := \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T f^i(X_s, \alpha_s^i) ds + g^i(X_T) \right], \quad (2.18)$$

where the running and terminal cost functions  $f^i(x, \alpha^i)$ ,  $g^i(x)$  are the same as in (2.3).

### 2.1.2.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium

We search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the infinite system (2.17) among admissible strategies  $\{\alpha_t^i, i = 1, 2, \dots, 0 \leq t \leq T\}$ .

**Definition 2.1.2** (Open-loop Nash equilibrium). We call  $\alpha := \{\alpha^i, i \geq 1\}$  an open-loop Nash equilibrium if for every player  $i$  and for any other  $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$  adapted and square-integrable control  $\beta$ . we have

$$J^i(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^{i-1}, \beta, \alpha^{i+1}, \dots) \geq J^i(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^{i-1}, \alpha^i, \alpha^{i+1}, \dots). \quad (2.19)$$

First, we define the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} H^i(x^1, x^2, \dots, y^{i,1}, \dots, y^{i,n_i}, \alpha^1, \alpha^2, \dots) \\ := \sum_{k=1}^{n_i} \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (x^{i+1} - x^i)^2, \end{aligned} \quad (2.20)$$

assuming it is defined on real numbers  $x^i$ ,  $y^{i,k}$ ,  $\alpha^i$ ,  $i \geq 1$ ,  $k \geq 1$ , where only finitely many

$y^{i,k}$  are non-zero for every given  $i$ . Here,  $n_i$  is a finite number depending on  $i$  with  $n_i > i$ . This assumption is checked in remark 2.1.2 below. Thus, the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  is well defined for  $i \geq 1$ .

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^i = (Y_t^{i,j}; j \leq n_i)$  and  $Z_t^i = (Z_t^{i,j,k}; j \leq n_i, k \geq 1)$  for  $i \geq 1$  are the solutions of the following BSDEs for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ ,  $i \geq 1$ ,  $1 \leq j \leq n_i$ ,

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{i,j} &= -\varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j})dt + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{i,j} &= \partial_{x^j} g_i(X_T) = c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}). \end{cases} \quad (2.21)$$

*Remark 2.1.2.* For every  $j \neq i$  or  $i+1$ ,  $dY_t^{i,j} = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k$  and  $Y_T^{i,j} = 0$  implies  $Z_t^{i,j,k} = 0$  for all  $k$ . This observation is consistent with (2.10) in the finite player game case. Note also that  $Y^{i,i+1} = Y^{i,i}$ . There must be finitely many non-zero  $Y^{i,j}$ 's for every  $i$ . Hence, the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  in (2.20) can be rewritten as

$$H^i(x^1, x^2, \dots, y^{i,i}, y^{i,i+1}, \alpha^1, \alpha^2, \dots) = \alpha^i y^{i,i} + \alpha^{i+1} y^{i,i+1} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2.$$

Since each  $H^i$  is minimized at  $\hat{\alpha}^i = -y^{i,i}$ , inspired by the conclusion from the finite-player game (see also remark 2.1.1), we then make the ansatz of the form:

$$Y_t^{i,i} = \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{j-i} X_t^j, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T \quad (2.22)$$

for some deterministic scalar functions  $\phi_t^i$  satisfying the terminal conditions:  $\phi_T^0 = c$ ,  $\phi_T^1 = -c$ ,  $\phi_T^i = 0$  for  $i \geq 2$ . Substituting the ansatz (2.22), the optimal strategy  $\hat{\alpha}^i$  and the forward equation for  $X^i$  in (2.17) are

$$\hat{\alpha}_t^i = -Y_t^{i,i} = -\sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{j-i} X_t^j, \quad dX_t^i = -\sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{j-i} X_t^j dt + \sigma dW_t^i \quad (2.23)$$

for  $i \geq 1$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . Differentiating the ansatz (2.22), we obtain

$$dY_t^{i,i} = \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \dot{\phi}_t^\ell X_t^{i+\ell} dt - \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \left( \sum_{j=0}^{\ell} \phi_t^j \phi_t^{\ell-j} \right) X_t^{i+\ell} dt + \sigma \sum_{\ell=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{\ell-i} dW_t^\ell. \quad (2.24)$$

Now by comparing the two Itô's decompositions (2.24) and (2.21) of  $Y_t^{i,i}$ , we obtain

$$Z_t^{i,i,k} = 0 \quad \text{for } k < i \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t^{i,i,k} = \sigma \phi_t^{k-i} \quad \text{for } k \geq i$$

and the system of Riccati equations: for  $i \geq 0$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$

$$\dot{\phi}_t^i = \sum_{j=0}^i \phi_t^j \phi_t^{i-j} + \varepsilon(-\delta_{0,i} + \delta_{1,i}), \quad \phi_T^i = c(\delta_{0,i} - \delta_{1,i}). \quad (2.25)$$

The solutions to this Riccati system coincide with the limit of the solutions to the ODE system (2.15) of the N-player directed chain game in section 2.1.1, i.e.,  $\phi^i = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \phi^{N,i,i+j}$  in the supremum norm. The Riccati system (2.25) is solvable.

**Proposition 2.1.2** (Catalan functions). *With  $c > 0$ ,  $\varepsilon > 0$ , the solution to (2.25) satisfies*

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^j = 0, \quad \phi_t^0 = \frac{(-\varepsilon - c\sqrt{\varepsilon})e^{2\sqrt{\varepsilon}(T-t)} + \varepsilon - c\sqrt{\varepsilon}}{(-\sqrt{\varepsilon} - c)e^{2\sqrt{\varepsilon}(T-t)} - \sqrt{\varepsilon} + c} > 0, \quad (2.26)$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . Moreover, the functions  $\phi^k$ 's are obtained by a series expansion of the generating function  $S_t(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \cdot \phi_t^k$ ,  $z \leq 1$  of  $\{\phi^\ell\}$  given by  $S_t(1) \equiv 0$ , and

$$S_t(z) = \frac{(-\varepsilon(1-z) - c\sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)}(1-z))e^{2\sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)}(T-t)} + \varepsilon(1-z) - c\sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)}(1-z)}{(-\sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)} - c(1-z))e^{2\sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)}(T-t)} - \sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)} + c(1-z)} \quad (2.27)$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ ,  $z < 1$ . We call  $\phi^k$ 's Catalan functions.

*Proof:* Given in appendix A.1.1.

*Remark 2.1.3.* It follows from (2.1.2) that the forward dynamics (2.23) can be written as:

$$dX_t^i = - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^j X_t^{i+j} dt + \sigma dW_t^i = \phi_t^0 \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{-\phi_t^j}{\phi_t^0} X_t^{i+j} - X_t^i \right) dt + \sigma dW_t^i \quad (2.28)$$

for  $i \geq 1$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . This is a mean-reverting type process with  $\phi_t^0 > 0$ . We also see that this system is invariant under the shift of indices of individuals, i.e., the law of  $X^i$  is the same as that of  $X^1$  for every  $i$  and also  $X^i$  is independent of  $(W^1, \dots, W^{i-1})$ .

We end with a summary of this section on the infinite player game.

**Proposition 2.1.3.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the infinite-player stochastic game with cost functionals (2.18) with (2.3) is determined by (2.28), where  $\{\phi^j, j \geq 0\}$  are the unique solution to the infinite system (2.25) of Riccati equations.*

### 2.1.2.2 Catalan Markov Chain

In order to simplify our analysis, we look at the stationary solution  $\{\phi^j, j \geq 0\}$  of (2.25) and the corresponding dynamics of (2.28), as  $T \rightarrow \infty$ . For simplicity, we assume  $\varepsilon = 1$ . By taking  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , we obtain the stationary long-time behavior satisfying  $\dot{\phi}^j = 0$  for all  $j$ . Then, (2.25) gives the recurrence relation for the stationary solution  $\{\phi^j, j \geq 0\}$ :

$$\phi^0 = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{j=0}^n \phi^j \phi^{n-j} = \delta_{0,n} - \delta_{1,n}; \quad n \geq 0. \quad (2.29)$$

This is closely related to the recurrence relation of *Catalan* numbers. By using a moment generating function method as in appendix A.1.1, we get the stationary solutions

$$\phi^0 := 1, \quad \phi^1 := -\frac{1}{2}, \quad \phi^j := -\frac{(2j-3)!}{(j-2)! j! 2^{2j-2}} \quad \text{for } j \geq 2. \quad (2.30)$$

We consider the continuous-time Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$  with state space  $\mathbb{N}$  and generator matrix  $\mathbf{Q} = (q_{i,j})$ , where  $(i, j)$  element  $q_{i,j}$  of  $\mathbf{Q}$  is given by  $q_{i,j} := p_{j-i} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\{j \geq i\}}$  with  $p_k := -\phi^k$ ,  $k \geq 0$ ,  $i, j \geq 1$ . Note that the transition probabilities of the continuous-time Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$ , called a Catalan Markov chain, are  $p_{i,j}(t) = \mathbb{P}(M(t) = j | M(0) = i) = (e^{t\mathbf{Q}})_{i,j}$ ,  $i, j \geq 1$ ,  $t \geq 0$ . Then with replacement of  $\phi_t^j$ ,  $t \geq 0$  by the stationary solution  $\phi^j$  in (2.30), the infinite particle system  $(X^i, i \geq 1)$  in (2.28) can be represented formally as a linear stochastic evolution equation:

$$d\mathbf{X}_t = \mathbf{Q} \mathbf{X}_t dt + d\mathbf{W}_t; \quad t \geq 0, \quad (2.31)$$

where  $\mathbf{X}_\cdot = (X^i, i \geq 1)$  with  $\mathbf{X}_0 = \mathbf{x}_0$  and  $\mathbf{W}_\cdot = (W^k, k \geq 1)$ . Its solution is

$$\mathbf{X}_t = e^{t\mathbf{Q}} \mathbf{x}_0 + \int_0^t e^{(t-s)\mathbf{Q}} d\mathbf{W}_s; \quad t \geq 0. \quad (2.32)$$

Without loss of generality, let us assume  $\mathbf{X}_0 = \mathbf{0}$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} X_t^i &= \int_0^t \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} p_{i,j}(t-s) dW_s^j = \int_0^t \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \mathbb{P}(M(t-s) = j | M(0) = i) dW_s^j \\ &= \mathbb{E}^M \left[ \int_0^t \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \mathbf{1}_{(M(t-s)=j)} dW_s^j | M(0) = i \right]; \quad t \geq 0, \end{aligned} \quad (2.33)$$

where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability induced by the Catalan Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$ , independent of the Brownian motions  $(W^j, j \in \mathbb{N}_0)$ . This is a Feynman–Kac representation formula for the infinite particle system  $\mathbf{X}_\cdot$  in (2.33) associated with the continuous-time Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$  with the generator  $\mathbf{Q}$ . Interestingly, we may compute quite explicitly the corresponding transition probability.

**Proposition 2.1.4.** *With  $\mathbf{x}_0 = \mathbf{0}$ , the Gaussian process  $X_t^i$ ,  $i \geq 1$ ,  $t \geq 0$  in (2.33),*



corresponding to the Catalan Markov chain with the generator  $\mathbf{Q}$ , is

$$X_t^i = \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{2(j-i)}}{(j-i)!} \cdot \rho_{j-i}(-(t-s)^2) e^{-(t-s)} \cdot dW_s^j, \quad (2.34)$$

where  $W^j, j \in \mathbb{N}$  are independent standard Brownian motions and  $\rho_i(\cdot)$  is defined by

$$\rho_i(x) := \frac{1}{2^i} \sum_{j=i}^{2i-1} \frac{(i-1)!}{(2j-2i)!!(2i-j-1)!} \cdot (-x)^{-\frac{j}{2}}, \quad (2.35)$$

for  $i \geq 1$ , and  $\rho_0(x) = 1$  for  $x \leq 0$ .

*Proof:* Given in appendix A.1.2.

*Remark 2.1.4.* To evaluate the asymptotic properties, it can be shown that

$$\rho_j(-\nu^2) = \frac{1}{2^j \nu^j} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{2\nu}{\pi}} \cdot e^\nu \cdot K_{j-(1/2)}(\nu); \quad j \geq 1, \quad (2.36)$$

where  $K_n(x)$  is the modified Bessel function of the second kind defined by

$$K_n(x) = \int_0^\infty e^{-x \cosh t} \cosh(nt) dt (> 0); \quad n > -1, x > 0.$$

The asymptotic behaviors of  $X^i$  in (2.34) are derived rather straightforwardly from its explicit expression and are summarized in the following with proofs in appendix A.1.3 - appendix A.1.5.

**Asymptotic Behavior of the Variances as  $t \rightarrow \infty$**  It follows from (2.34) that for  $t \geq 0$ , the variance of the Gaussian process  $X^i$ ,  $i \geq 1$ , in (2.33) is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(X_t^i) &= \text{Var}(X_t^1) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4j}}{(j!)^2} |\rho_j(-(t-s)^2)|^2 e^{-2(t-s)} ds \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{2}{\pi} \frac{\nu^{2k+1}}{(k!)^2 4^k} (K_{k-(1/2)}(\nu))^2 d\nu + \frac{1 - e^{-2t}}{2} \end{aligned} \quad (2.37)$$

**Proposition 2.1.5.** *The asymptotic variance is  $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^1) = 1/\sqrt{2}$ .*

**Asymptotic Independence** The auto-covariance and cross-covariance are given respectively by: for  $s \leq t$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[X_s^1 X_t^1] &= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \int_0^s \frac{((t-s+u)u)^{j+1/2}}{\pi(j!)^2 2^{2j-1}} K_{j-1/2}(t-s+u) K_{j-1/2}(u) du, \\ \mathbb{E}[X_t^1 X_t^{j+1}] &= \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{s^{j+2\ell+1}}{\pi(j+\ell)! \ell! 2^{j+2\ell-1}} K_{j+\ell-1/2}(s) K_{\ell-1/2}(s) ds, \quad t \geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (2.38)$$

The following propositions give two results about these covariances and the details of the proofs are given in Appendix appendix A.1.5.

**Proposition 2.1.6** (Ergodicity). *The auto-covariance  $\mathbb{E}[X_s^1 X_t^1]$  is positive. For every  $s > 0$ , as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ , it converges to 0, i.e., the process is ergodic.*

**Proposition 2.1.7** (Asymptotic behavior of the cross-covariance). *Similarly, for every  $k \geq 0$  and for any  $t > 0$  the cross-covariance  $\mathbb{E}[X_t^1 X_t^{k+1}]$  is positive, and  $0 < \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[X_t^1 X_t^{k+1}] \leq 1/\sqrt{2}$ . The asymptotic cross-covariance is positive and bounded above, which means the states are asymptotically dependent.*

### 2.1.3 Mixture of Directed Chain and Mean Field Interaction

In the spirit of the paper, we shall look at the game on a mixed system, including the directed chain interaction and the mean field interaction for finite players. This section repeats the same steps as before to analyze the mixed system game. The state dynamics of all the payers are of the form:  $dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + \sigma dW_t^i$  for  $i \geq 1$  as in the previous sections.

#### 2.1.3.1 Finite-Player Game

In this  $N$ -player model, player  $i$  chooses its own strategy  $\alpha^i$  in order to minimize its objective function of the mixed form:  $i \leq N$

$$J^i(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) := \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T f^i(X_t, \alpha^i) dt + g^i(X_T) \right\}, \quad (2.39)$$

where the running cost and terminal cost functions are defined by

$$f^i(x, \alpha^i) := \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + u \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 + (1 - u) \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(\bar{x} - x^i)^2, \quad (2.40)$$

$$g^i(x) := u \cdot \frac{c}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 + (1 - u) \cdot \frac{c}{2}(\bar{x} - x^i)^2, \quad (2.41)$$

for some positive constants  $\varepsilon, c$  and a weight  $u \in [0, 1]$ . Here,  $\bar{x}$  is defined by  $\bar{x} = (x_1 + \dots + x_N)/N$  and we use the convention  $x^{N+1} \equiv 0$  for notational simplicity.

Each player optimizes the cost determined by the mixture of two criteria: distance from the neighbor in the directed chain with weight  $u$  and distance from the empirical mean  $\bar{X}$  with weight  $1 - u$ . The system is again completed by describing the behavior of player  $N$ . For simplicity, we consider the boundary condition of the system where  $X^N$  is attracted to 0 (cf. section 2.1.1.2).

If  $u = 1$ , the system becomes the directed chain system discussed before. If  $u = 0$ , it

becomes a mean-field system where each player is attracted towards the mean.

**Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium** As before, we find an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the system among strategies  $\{\alpha_t^i, i = 1, \dots, N\}$  by reiterating the previous procedure and solving the corresponding BSDE system. It is described by

$$dX_t^i = \left[ -u \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} X_t^k + (1-u)(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i)\theta_t \right] dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad (2.42)$$

where  $\bar{X}_t := (X_t^1 + \dots + X_t^N)/N$ ,  $\phi_t^{N,i,j}$  and  $\theta_t$  are determined by the ODE system

$$\begin{aligned} & u\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,\ell} - u^2 \sum_{j=i}^{\ell} \phi_t^{N,i,j} \phi_t^{N,j,\ell} - 2u(1-u)\theta_t \phi_t^{N,i,\ell} \\ & + u\varepsilon(\delta_{i,\ell} - \delta_{i+1,\ell}) + [(1-u)\dot{\theta}_t - (1-u)^2\theta_t^2]\delta_{i,\ell} \\ & + \frac{1}{N}(1-u) \left[ -\dot{\theta}_t + (1-u)\theta_t^2 + u\theta_t \left( \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} \phi_t^{N,j,\ell} + \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} \right) \right] = 0, \\ & u\theta_t \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} - \dot{\theta}_t + (1-u)\theta_t^2 - \varepsilon \left( 1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (2.43)$$

with terminal condition  $\phi_T^{N,i,\ell} = c(-\delta_{i,\ell} + \delta_{i+1,\ell})$ ,  $\theta_T = c(1 - N^{-1})$  for  $\ell \geq i$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$  and for fixed  $u \in (0, 1)$ .

The Hamiltonian is denoted by  $H^i(x^1, \dots, x^N, y^{i,1}, \dots, y^{i,N}, \alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) :=$

$$\sum_{k=1}^N \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + u \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 + (1-u) \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (\bar{x} - x^i)^2,$$

for player  $i \leq N-1$ , and  $H^N(x^1, \dots, x^N, y^{i,1}, \dots, y^{i,N}, \alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) :=$

$$\sum_{k=1}^N \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + u \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (x^N)^2 + (1-u) \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (\bar{x} - x^i)^2$$

for player  $N$ . Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to  $\alpha^i$ ,

$$\partial_{\alpha^i} H^i = y^{i,i} + \alpha^i = 0 \quad \text{leading to the choice: } \hat{\alpha}^i = -y^{i,i}.$$

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^i = (Y_t^{i,j}; j = 1, \dots, N)$  and  $Z_t^i = (Z_t^{i,j,k}; j = 1, \dots, N, k = 1, \dots, N)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, N$  are defined as the solutions of the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs):

$$i < N : \begin{cases} dY_t^{i,j} &= -\partial_{x^j} H^i(X_t, Y_t^i, \alpha_t) dt + \sum_{k=0}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k \\ &= -\left[ u\varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + (1-u)\varepsilon(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i)\left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j}\right) \right] dt + \sum_{k=0}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{i,j} &= \partial_{x^j} g_i(X_T) = uc(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}) \\ &\quad + (1-u)c(\bar{X}_T - X_T^i)\left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j}\right). \end{cases} \quad (2.44)$$

$$i = N : \begin{cases} dY_t^{N,j} &= -\left[ u\varepsilon X_t^N \delta_{N,j} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + (1-u)\varepsilon(\bar{X}_t - X_t^N)\left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{N,j}\right) \right] dt + \sum_{k=0}^N Z_t^{N,j,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{N,j} &= ucX_T^N \delta_{N,j} + (1-u)c(\bar{X}_T - X_T^N)\left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{N,j}\right). \end{cases} \quad (2.45)$$

When  $j = i$ , it becomes:

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{i,i} &= \left[ u\varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i) + (1-u)\varepsilon(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i)\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \right] dt \\ &\quad + \sum_{k=0}^N Z_t^{i,i,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{i,i} &= -uc(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i) - (1-u)c(\bar{X}_T - X_T^i)\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right), \quad i < N \end{cases} \quad (2.46)$$

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{N,N} = \left[ -u\varepsilon X_t^N + (1-u)\varepsilon(\bar{X}_t - X_t^N) \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \right] dt \\ \quad + \sum_{k=0}^N Z_t^{N,N,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{N,N} = ucX_T^N - (1-u)c(\bar{X}_T - X_T^N) \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right). \end{cases} \quad (2.47)$$

Considering the BSDE system and the initial condition, we then make the following ansatz with function parameters depending on  $N$ :

$$Y_t^{i,i} = u \sum_{j=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,j} X_t^j - (1-u)(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) \theta_t^N, \quad (2.48)$$

for some deterministic scalar functions  $\phi_t, \theta_t$  satisfying the terminal condition: when  $i < N$ ,  $\phi_T^{N,i,i} = c$ ,  $\phi_T^{N,i,i+1} = -c$ ,  $\phi_T^{N,i,j} = 0$  for  $N \geq j \geq i+2$ ;  $\phi_T^{N,N,N} = c$  and  $\theta_T^N = c(1 - \frac{1}{N})$ .

For simplicity of notation, we denote  $\theta_t = \theta_t^N$ . Using the ansatz (2.48), the optimal strategy and forward equation become:

$$\begin{cases} \hat{\alpha}^i = -Y_t^{i,i} = -u \sum_{j=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,j} X_t^j + (1-u)(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) \theta_t, \\ dX_t^j = \left[ -u \sum_{k=j}^N \phi_t^{N,j,k} X_t^k + (1-u)(\bar{X}_t - X_t^j) \theta_t \right] dt + \sigma dW_t^j. \end{cases} \quad (2.49)$$

By taking the averages, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} d\bar{X}_t &= -u \cdot \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=j}^N \phi_t^{N,j,k} X_t^k dt + \sigma \cdot \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N dW_t^j \\ &= -u \cdot \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \left( \sum_{j=1}^k \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right) X_t^k dt + \sigma \cdot \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N dW_t^k \end{aligned}$$

and then

$$\begin{aligned}
d(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) &= -u \cdot \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^{i-1} \left( \sum_{j=1}^k \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right) X_t^k dt + u \sum_{k=i+1}^N \left( \phi_t^{N,i,k} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^k \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right) X_t^k dt \\
&\quad + \left( u \phi_t^{N,i,i} - u \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^i \phi_t^{N,j,i} + (1-u)\theta_t \right) X_t^i dt - (1-u)\bar{X}_t \theta_t dt \\
&\quad + \sigma \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N dW_t^k - u dW_t^i \right). \tag{2.50}
\end{aligned}$$

Differentiating the ansatz eq. (2.48) and using eq. (2.50), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
dY_t^{i,i} &= u \cdot \sum_{j=i}^N [X_t^j \dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,j} dt + \phi_t^{N,i,j} dX_t^j] \\
&\quad - (1-u) \cdot \left( \dot{\theta}_t (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) dt + \theta_t d(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) \right) \\
&\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} u \cdot \text{I} - (1-u) \cdot \text{II} \tag{2.51}
\end{aligned}$$

For the first term, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{I} &= \sum_{j=i}^N [X_t^j \dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,j} dt + \phi_t^{N,i,j} dX_t^j] \\
&= \sum_{k=i}^N \left( \dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,k} - u \sum_{j=i}^k \phi_t^{N,i,j} \phi_t^{N,j,k} - (1-u)\theta_t \phi_t^{N,i,k} \right) X_t^k dt \\
&\quad + (1-u)\theta_t \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} \cdot \bar{X}_t dt + \sigma \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} dW_t^k.
\end{aligned}$$

Then, for the second term, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{II} &= \dot{\theta}_t (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) dt + \theta_t d(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) \\
&= -u\theta_t \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^{i-1} \left( \sum_{j=1}^k \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right) X_t^k dt + u\theta_t \sum_{k=i+1}^N \left( \phi_t^{N,i,k} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^k \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right) X_t^k dt \tag{2.52}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& - [\dot{\theta}_t - u\theta_t(\phi_t^{N,i,i} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^i \phi_t^{N,j,i}) - (1-u)\theta_t^2] X_t^i dt \\
& + (\dot{\theta}_t - (1-u)\theta_t^2) \bar{X}_t dt + \sigma \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N dW_t^k - dW_t^i \right).
\end{aligned}$$

Thus  $dY_t^{i,i} = u \cdot \text{I} - (1-u) \cdot \text{II}$  in (2.51) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{k=1}^{i-1} \left( u(1-u)\theta_t \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^k \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right) X_t^k dt \\
& + \sum_{k=i+1}^N \left[ u\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,k} - u^2 \sum_{j=i}^k \phi_t^{N,i,j} \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right. \\
& \left. - u(1-u)\theta_t \phi_t^{N,i,k} - u(1-u)\theta_t \left( \phi_t^{N,i,k} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^k \phi_t^{N,j,k} \right) \right] X_t^k dt \\
& + \left[ u\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,i} - u^2(\phi_t^{N,i,i})^2 - 2u(1-u)\theta_t \phi_t^{N,i,i} \right. \\
& \left. + (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t + u(1-u)\theta_t \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^i \phi_t^{N,j,i} - (1-u)^2\theta_t^2 \right] X_t^i dt \\
& + \left[ u(1-u)\theta_t \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} - (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t + (1-u)^2\theta_t^2 \right] \bar{X}_t dt \\
& + u\sigma \sum_{k=i}^N \phi_t^{N,i,k} dW_t^k - (1-u)\sigma\theta_t \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N dW_t^k - dW_t^i \right).
\end{aligned} \tag{2.53}$$

Now we compare the two Itô's decompositions (2.46) and (2.53). The martingale terms give the processes  $Z_t^{i,j,k}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
Z_t^{i,i,k} &= -(1-u)\sigma\theta_t \frac{1}{N} \quad \text{for } k < i, \\
Z_t^{i,i,i} &= u\sigma\phi_t^{N,i,i} + (1-u)\sigma\theta_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t^{i,i,k} = u\sigma\phi_t^{N,i,k} \quad \text{for } k > i.
\end{aligned}$$

And from the drift terms, we get the following system of ordinary differential equations for  $\phi^{N,i,k}$ :



when  $i < N$ ,  $k = i$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & u\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,i} - u^2(\phi_t^{N,i,i})^2 - 2u(1-u)\theta_t\phi_t^{N,i,i} \\
 & + (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) - (1-u)^2\theta_t^2\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \\
 & + u(1-u)\theta_t\frac{1}{N}\left(\sum_{j=1}^i\phi_t^{N,j,i} + \sum_{\ell=i}^N\phi_t^{N,i,\ell}\right) \\
 & = -u\varepsilon - (1-u)\varepsilon\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right)^2, \quad \phi_T^{N,i,i} = c,
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.54}$$

for  $k = i + 1$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & u\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,i+1} - u^2(\phi_t^{N,i,i}\phi_t^{N,i,i+1} + \phi_t^{N,i,i+1}\phi_t^{N,i+1,i+1}) \\
 & - 2u(1-u)\theta_t\phi_t^{N,i,i+1} - (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t\frac{1}{N} + (1-u)^2\theta_t^2\frac{1}{N} \\
 & + u(1-u)\theta_t\frac{1}{N}\left(\sum_{j=1}^{i+1}\phi_t^{N,j,i+1} + \sum_{\ell=i}^N\phi_t^{N,i,\ell}\right) \\
 & = u\varepsilon + (1-u)\varepsilon\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right)\frac{1}{N}, \quad \phi_T^{N,i,i+1} = -c,
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.55}$$

for  $k \geq i + 2$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & u\dot{\phi}_t^{N,i,k} - u^2\sum_{j=i}^l\phi_t^{N,i,j}\phi_t^{N,j,k} - 2u(1-u)\theta_t\phi_t^{N,i,k} \\
 & - (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t\frac{1}{N} + (1-u)^2\theta_t^2\frac{1}{N} + u(1-u)\theta_t\frac{1}{N}\left(\sum_{j=1}^k\phi_t^{N,j,k} + \sum_{\ell=i}^N\phi_t^{N,i,\ell}\right) \\
 & = (1-u)\varepsilon\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right)\frac{1}{N}, \quad \phi_T^{N,i,k} = 0,
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.56}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 & u(1-u)\theta_t\sum_{k=i}^N\phi_t^{N,i,k} - (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t + (1-u)^2\theta_t^2 = (1-u)\varepsilon\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right), \\
 & \theta_T = c\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right);
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.57}$$

When  $i = k = N$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
& u\dot{\phi}_t^{N,N,N} - u^2(\phi_t^{N,N,N})^2 - 2u(1-u)\theta_t\phi_t^{N,N,N} \\
& + (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) - (1-u)^2\theta_t^2\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \\
& + u(1-u)\theta_t\frac{1}{N}\left(\sum_{j=1}^N \phi_t^{N,j,N} + \phi_t^{N,N,N}\right) \\
& = -u\varepsilon - (1-u)\varepsilon\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right)^2, \quad \phi_T^{N,N,N} = c,
\end{aligned} \tag{2.58}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
& u(1-u)\theta_t\phi_t^{N,N,N} - (1-u)\dot{\theta}_t + (1-u)^2\theta_t^2 \\
& = (1-u)\varepsilon\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right), \quad \theta_T = c\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right).
\end{aligned} \tag{2.59}$$

**Proposition 2.1.8.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the finite-player stochastic game with cost functionals (2.39) with (2.40)-(2.41) is determined by (2.49), where  $\{\phi^{N,i,j}, \theta\}$  are the unique solution to the finite system (2.54)-(2.57) of Riccati equations with (2.58)-(2.59).*

When  $u = 1$ , the systems are exactly what we obtained for finite-player directed chain game in section 2.1.1. We have the similar conclusion that the boundary condition does not affect the functions  $\phi_t^{N,i,j}$  ( $j < N$ ) for all  $i < N$ . We can also compare the system with the system (2.63) we introduce later. Under suitable assumptions, the system may converge, as the number  $N$  of players goes to infinity.

### 2.1.3.2 Infinite-Player Game Model with Mean-Field Interaction

Motivated by section 2.1.3.1 and following section 2.1.2, we can define a game with infinite players on a mixed system, including the directed chain interaction and the mean field interaction. This section searches for an open-loop Nash equilibrium and repeats

the same steps as before to analyse the infinite mixed system game. We have a more general Catalan Markov chain and table 2.1 below shows the asymptotic behaviors of the variances and covariances as  $t \rightarrow \infty$  for the process with different types of interactions. Comparing it with Table 1 in [1], we have similar conclusions except that our asymptotic variance of purely directed chain does not explode.

We assume the same drift and diffusion coefficients and the initial conditions for  $X^i$  as the finite-player game. By choosing  $\alpha_t^i$ , player  $i$  tries to minimize:

$$\begin{aligned}
J^i(\alpha^1, \alpha^2, \dots) := & \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^i)^2 + u \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)^2 \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left. + (1-u) \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(m_t - X_t^i)^2 \right) dt \right. \\
& \left. + u \cdot \frac{c}{2}(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)^2 + (1-u) \cdot \frac{c}{2}(m_T - X_T^i)^2 \right\}, \tag{2.60}
\end{aligned}$$

for some positive constants  $\varepsilon$ ,  $c$  and  $u \in [0, 1]$ . Here, there is an issue in the choice of  $m_t$ . Intuitively, it should come from the finite-player mixed game described in section 2.1.3.1 as the limit of  $\bar{X}$  as  $N \rightarrow \infty$ . Combined with the fact that we had  $\mathbb{E}\{X_t^i\}$  independent of  $i$ , it is natural to set  $m_t = \mathbb{E}\{X_t^i\}$  and check afterwards that this mean value does not depend on  $i$  de facto after solving the fixed point step. Note that the case  $u = 0$  is very particular, and consists in solving the same mean field game problem for every  $i$ . The case  $u = 1$  has already been studied in section 2.1.2, and therefore, in what follows, we concentrate on the case  $u \in (0, 1)$ .

**Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium** We search for a Nash equilibria of the system among strategies  $\{\alpha_t^i, i \geq 1\}$ . For  $i \geq 1$ , minimizing the Hamiltonian

$$\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + u \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 + (1-u) \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(m_t - x^i)^2, \tag{2.61}$$

with respect to  $\alpha^i$ , and following closely to Carmona, Fouque, and Sun [23], we obtain

$$dX_t^i = \left( -u \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{j-i} X_t^j + (1-u)(m_t - X_t^i)\psi_t \right) dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad (2.62)$$

where  $\phi^k$  and  $\psi$  are determined by the following system of Riccati equation:  $k \geq 0$

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\phi}_t^k &= u \sum_{j=0}^k \phi_t^j \phi_t^{k-j} + 2(1-u)\psi_t \phi_t^k + \varepsilon(-\delta_{0,k} + \delta_{1,k}), \\ \phi_T^k &= c(\delta_{0,k} - \delta_{1,k}), \\ \dot{\psi}_t &= u\psi_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^j + (1-u)(\psi_t)^2 - \varepsilon, \quad \psi_T = c. \end{aligned} \quad (2.63)$$

In appendix A.1.6 we show the following result which simplifies it considerably.

**Proposition 2.1.9.**  *$\phi^j$  satisfies  $\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^j = 0$  for  $0 \leq t \leq T$  and thus,  $\psi$  is the unique solution to  $\dot{\psi}_t = (1-u)(\psi_t)^2 - \varepsilon$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ ,  $\psi_T = c$  in eq. (2.63).*

**Proposition 2.1.10.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the infinite-player stochastic game with cost functionals (2.60) is determined by (2.62), where  $\{\phi^{N,i,j}, \psi\}$  are the unique solution to the infinite system (2.63) of Riccati equations.*

Looking at the stationary solution in the limit ( $T \rightarrow \infty$ ), and without loss of generality assuming  $\varepsilon = 1$  again, the recurrence relation can be solved by the method of moment generating function to obtain:

$$\begin{cases} \psi = \sqrt{\frac{1}{1-u}}, & \phi^0 = \frac{1-\sqrt{1-u}}{u}, \\ \phi^1 = -\frac{1}{2}, & \phi^k = -\frac{(2k-3)!}{(k-2)!k!2^{2k-2}} u^{k-1}, \quad \text{for } k \geq 2. \end{cases} \quad (2.64)$$

**Catalan Markov Chain for the Mixed Model** As in section 2.1.2.2, letting  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , with replacement of  $\phi_t^j$  by the stationary solution  $\phi^j$  in (2.64),  $X^i$ ,  $i \geq 1$  defined by

eq. (2.62) can be represented by the form of eq. (2.31) but now with a new matrix  $\mathbf{Q}^{(u)}$ , where its  $(i, j)$  element  $q_{i,j}$  is given by  $q_{i,i} = -1$ ,  $q_{i,j} = -u\phi^{j-i} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\{j>i\}}$  with  $\phi^j$  in (2.64) for  $i, j \geq 1$ . Since  $u^2 \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \phi^i \phi^{k-i} = -2u\phi^k$ , we have  $(\mathbf{Q}^{(u)})^2 = I - uB$  with  $B$  having 1's on the upper second diagonal and 0's elsewhere.

With a smooth function  $F(x) := \exp(-\sqrt{-x})$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{C}$ , the matrix exponential of  $\mathbf{Q}^{(u)}t$  can be written formally  $\exp(\mathbf{Q}^{(u)}t) = F((-I + uB)t^2)$ . With a slight modification of proof of proposition 2.1.4 in appendix A.1.2, we may compute it explicitly.

We can summarize our finding on the limiting process as  $T \rightarrow \infty$ :

**Proposition 2.1.11.** *With  $\mathbf{x}_0 = \mathbf{0}$ , the Gaussian process  $X_t^i$ ,  $i \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $t \geq 0$ , corresponding to the (Catalan) general Markov chain with generator  $\mathbf{Q}^{(u)}$ , is*

$$X_t^i = \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{u^{j-i}(t-s)^{2(j-i)}}{(j-i)!} \cdot \rho_{j-i}(-(t-s)^2) e^{-(t-s)} \cdot dW_s^j, \quad t \geq 0. \quad (2.65)$$

where  $\rho_j(\cdot)$  is defined in eq. (2.35).

**Asymptotic Behavior** Table 2.1 exhibits the asymptotic behaviors of their variances and covariances as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ . The calculation is given in appendix A.1.7. We find that only when  $u = 0$  (i.e., pure mean field game), the asymptotic cross-covariance is zero, which means the states are asymptotically independent. Otherwise, they are dependent and their covariance is finite. Note in the purely nearest neighbor interaction studied in Detering, Fouque, and Ichiba [1], i.e., in the case  $u = 0$ , the variance is not stabilized as in our ‘‘Catalan’’ interaction equilibrium dynamics.

## 2.1.4 Periodic Directed Chain Game

We consider a stochastic game with finite players on a periodic ring structure in fig. 1.1 (b). Assume the dynamics of the states of the individual players are given by  $N$  stochastic

$u$	Interaction Type	Asymptotic Variance	Asymptotic Independence between two players
$u = 0$	Purely mean-field	Stabilized	Independent
$u \in (0, 1)$	Mixed interaction	Stabilized	Dependent
$u = 1$	Purely directed chain	Stabilized	Dependent

 Table 2.1: Asymptotic behaviors as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ 

differential equations of the form:

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.66)$$

where  $(W_t^i)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, N$  are one-dimensional independent standard Brownian motions. The drift coefficient function, the diffusion coefficient and the initial conditions are assumed to be the same as those in section 2.1.1. In this model, player  $i$  chooses its own strategy  $\alpha^i$  in order to minimize its objective function of the form:

$$J^i(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) := \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)^2 \right] dt + \frac{c}{2} (X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)^2 \right\}, \quad (2.67)$$

with some constants  $\varepsilon > 0$ ,  $c \geq 0$ , where we define  $X^{N+1} = X^1$  or more generally,  $X_t^{i+j} = X_t^{(i+j) \bmod N}$ , because of the periodic ring structure, for  $i, j = 1, \dots, N$ .

#### 2.1.4.1 Construction of an Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium

We construct an open-loop Nash equilibria of the system among strategies  $\{\alpha_t^i, 1 \leq i \leq N\}$  by the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle. The Hamiltonian  $H^i$  for player  $i$  is

$$\sum_{k=1}^N \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (x^{i+1} - x^i)^2. \quad (2.68)$$

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^i = (Y_t^{i,j}; j = 1, \dots, N)$  and  $Z_t^i = (Z_t^{i,j,k}; j, k = 1, \dots, N)$  for  $i = 1, \dots, N$  are defined as the solutions of the system of BSDEs:

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{i,j} &= -\varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j})dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{i,j} &= c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}). \end{cases} \quad (2.69)$$

Based on the sufficiency part of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle, we can get an open-loop Nash equilibrium by minimizing the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  with respect to  $\alpha^i$ :  $\partial_{\alpha^i} H^i = y^{i,i} + \alpha^i = 0$  leadings to the choice  $\hat{\alpha}^i = -y^{i,i}$  for each  $i$ .

With this choice for the controls  $\alpha^i$ 's, the forward equation (2.66) becomes coupled with the backward equation (2.69). We make the ansatz: for  $t \geq 0, i \geq 1$ ,

$$Y_t^{i,i} = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,j} X_t^{i+j}, \quad (2.70)$$

for some deterministic scalar functions  $\phi_t^{N,j}$  satisfying the terminal conditions:  $\phi_T^{N,0} = c, \phi_T^{N,1} = -c, \phi_T^{N,k} = 0$  for  $k \geq 2$  and  $X_t^{i+j} := X_t^{(i+j) \bmod N}$ . Using the ansatz, the optimal strategy  $\hat{\alpha}^i$  and the forward equation (2.66) become:

$$\hat{\alpha}^i = -Y_t^{i,i} = -\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,j} X_t^{i+j}, \quad dX_t^i = -\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,j} X_t^{i+j} dt + \sigma dW_t^i. \quad (2.71)$$

Using the equations (2.71), we can differentiate the ansatz (2.70): for  $1 \leq i \leq N, t \leq 0$ ,

$$dY_t^{i,i} = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} X_t^{i+j} \dot{\phi}_t^{N,j} dt - \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,j} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \dot{\phi}_t^{N,k} X_t^{i+j+k} dt + \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \sigma \phi_t^{N,j} dW_t^{i+j} \quad (2.72)$$

Now comparing the two Itô's decompositions (2.72) and (2.69) of  $Y_t^{i,i}$ , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\phi}_t^{N,i} &= \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,j} \phi_t^{N,N+i-j} - \varepsilon(\delta_{0,i} - \delta_{1,i}), \quad \phi^{N,i}(T) = c(\delta_{0,i} - \delta_{1,i}), \\ Z_t^{i,i,k} &= \sigma \phi_t^{N,N+k-i}, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad 1 \leq i \leq N \end{aligned} \quad (2.73)$$

(cf. (2.25)), where we use a convention  $\phi_t^{N,N+i-j} = \phi_t^{N,i-j}$ , if  $i - j \geq 0$ .

It can be written as a matrix Riccati equation:

$$\dot{\Phi}^N(t) = \Phi^N(t)\Phi^N(t) - \mathbf{E}, \quad \Phi^N(T) := \mathbf{C}, \quad (2.74)$$

where we denote by  $\Phi^N(\cdot)$  the  $N \times N$  matrix-valued function with  $(i, j)$  element being  $\phi_t^{N,N+i-j}$  for  $1 \leq i, j \leq N$  by using the convention  $\phi_t^{N,N+i-j} = \phi_t^{N,i-j}$ , if  $i \geq j$ , and by  $\mathbf{C} = (c_{i,j})$  and  $\mathbf{E} = (\varepsilon_{i,j})$ , respectively the  $N \times N$  matrices with  $(i, j)$  element being  $c_{i,j} := c(\delta_{i,j} - \delta_{i,j+1})$  and  $\varepsilon_{i,j} := \varepsilon(\delta_{i,j} - \delta_{i,j+1})$  for  $1 \leq i, j \leq N$ .

**Proposition 2.1.12.** *The solution  $\phi^{N,k}$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, N$  to the system of Riccati equations (2.73) satisfies the relation  $\sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,k} = 0$  for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ .*

*Proof:* Given in appendix A.1.8.

**Proposition 2.1.13.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic stochastic game with cost functionals (2.67) for the  $N$  players with a periodic boundary condition  $X^{N+1} = X^1$  is given by (2.71), where  $\{\phi^{N,k}\}$  are uniquely determined by the system (2.73) of Riccati equations.*

With finite  $N$ , these equations (2.73) are not easy to solve explicitly. If we let  $N \rightarrow \infty$ , we expect that the system converges to the Riccati system of the infinite-player game studied in section 2.1.2.



*Conjecture 2.1.1.* The limit of each element in  $\Phi^N(\cdot)$  in (2.74) exists as  $N \rightarrow \infty$ , i.e.,  $\Phi^N(t) \rightarrow \Phi^\infty(t)$  and the limit  $\Phi^\infty(t)$  is an infinite dimensional, lower triangular, matrix-valued function of  $t \geq 0$  given by  $\Phi^\infty(t) = (\Phi^{\infty,i,j}(t))_{i,j \in \mathbb{N}}$  with  $\Phi^{\infty,i,j}(\cdot) \equiv 0$  if  $i < j$ ;  $\Phi^{\infty,i,j}(\cdot) \equiv \phi^{i-j}$  if  $i \geq j$ , where  $\phi^k$ 's are given in proposition 2.1.2.

*Remark 2.1.5.* Proving this conjecture is equivalent to verify that for every  $j$ ,  $\sum_{k=j+1}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,k} \phi_t^{N,N+j-k} \rightarrow 0$  as  $N \rightarrow \infty$ . As of now, this remains an open problem.

Our conjecture is substantiated by numerical evidences presented below.

### 2.1.4.2 Numerical Results

By the methods given in [35], we get the numerical solution of the matrix Riccati equation (2.74). Taking  $\varepsilon = 2$ ,  $c = 1$ ,  $T = 10$  (large terminal time), fig. 2.1 (a)-(b) shows the behaviors of the  $\phi$  functions defined by the system (2.25) for  $N = 4$  and  $N = 100$ . They converge to the constant solutions of the infinite game given in section 2.1.2.2, except in the tail close to maturity as  $T$  is large but not infinite. This result confirms our conjecture stated in the previous section. fig. 2.1 (c) shows the behavior of the function  $\sum_{k=1}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,k} \phi_t^{N,N-k}$  for different values of  $N = 5, 10, 20, 50, 100$ . As we can see, the sum converges to 0 when  $N$  becomes larger, which supports the statement with  $j = 0$  in remark 2.1.5. Although these numerical results give us strong evidence and confidence that the conjecture is true, a mathematical proof is still needed.

## 2.2 Random Directed Chain Game

In this section, first we study a stochastic game with infinite players on a directed chain structure and construct an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the system. We assume that the interaction between two neighbor is random but frozen in time and *i.i.d.* among all the successive pairs of neighbors. Then as an extension of random one-sided directed




Figure 2.1: The blue line (top) is  $\phi_t^{N,0}$  and the orange line (bottom) is  $\phi_t^{N,1}$  in (a)-(b).  $\sum_{k=1}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,k} \phi_t^{N,N-k}$  for different values of  $N = 5, 10, 20, 50, 100$  from top to bottom in (c).

chain, we consider a game for countably many players with random double-sided interactions and studies the effect of random double-sided interactions on the open-loop Nash equilibrium.

## 2.2.1 Random One-sided Directed Chain Game

### 2.2.1.1 Setup and Assumptions

In section 2.1, we have studied a stochastic game with infinite players on a directed chain structure and found an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the system. In this section, we are still looking at an infinite-player system but assuming the interaction between every two neighbors is random as follows. We introduce a binary random variable  $R_n$  which represents the random interaction between player  $n$  and  $n + 1$ . The  $\{R_n, n \geq 1\}$  are independent and identically distributed random variables taking values in  $\{0, 1\}$  with probabilities  $p_0$  and  $p_1 = 1 - p_0$ . When  $R_n$  is zero, we assume player  $n$  has no interaction with player  $n + 1$ . An example of the chain structure is shown in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2: Example of a Random Directed Chain:  $R_1 = R_2 = R_3 = R_5 = 1$ ;  $R_4 = 0$

We assume the dynamics of the states of all players are given by the stochastic differential equations of the form: for  $i \geq 1$

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.75)$$

where  $(W_t^i)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ ,  $i \geq 1$  are one-dimensional independent standard Brownian motions. Here and throughout the paper, the argument in the superscript represents index or label but not the power. For simplicity, we assume that the diffusion is one-dimensional and the diffusion coefficients are constant and identical denoted by  $\sigma > 0$ . The drift coefficients  $\alpha^i$ 's are adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions and satisfy  $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^T |\alpha_t^i|^2 dt] < \infty$  for  $i \geq 1$ . The system starts at time  $t = 0$  from *i.i.d.* square-integrable random variables  $X_0^i = \xi_i$ , independent of the Brownian motions and, without loss of generality, we assume  $\mathbb{E}(\xi_i) = 0$  for  $i \geq 1$ .

In this model, each player  $i$  chooses its own strategy  $\alpha^i$ , in order to minimize its objective function given by:

$$\begin{aligned} J^i(\boldsymbol{\alpha}) &= \mathbb{E}_{X,R} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(X_t^{i+R_i} - X_t^i)^2 \right) dt + \frac{c}{2}(X_T^{i+R_i} - X_T^i)^2 \right\} \\ &= \mathbb{E}_X \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)^2 \cdot p_1 \right) dt + \frac{c}{2}(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)^2 \cdot p_1 \right\}, \end{aligned}$$

for some constants  $\varepsilon > 0$ ,  $c \geq 0$  and  $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (\alpha^1, \alpha^2, \dots)$  with  $\alpha^i \in \mathbb{R}$ . According to the objective function, if a player is not in interaction with its right neighbor, then we assume she has no incentive to do anything. This is a *Linear-Quadratic* differential game on a directed chain network, since the state  $X^i$  of each player  $i$  interacts only with  $X^{i+1}$  of player  $i + 1$  through the quadratic cost function for  $i \geq 1$ .

*Remark 2.2.1.* When every player is connected with the next one, i.e.  $p_1 = 1$ , we get back to the stochastic game on a directed chain structure, studied in Feng, Fouque &

Ichiba [30].

### 2.2.1.2 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium

In this section, we search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the system among the admissible strategies  $\{\alpha_t^i, i \geq 1, t \in [0, T]\}$ . We construct the equilibrium by using the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle (see [34] for stochastic maximum principle in the context of mean-field games).

The corresponding Hamiltonian for player  $i$  is given by:

$$H^i(x^1, x^2, \dots, y^{i,1}, \dots, y^{i,n_i}, \alpha^1, \alpha^2, \dots) = \sum_{k=1}^{n_i} \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 \cdot p_1, \quad (2.76)$$

assuming it is defined on real numbers  $x^i, y^{i,k}, \alpha^i, i \geq 1, k \geq 1$ , where only finitely many  $y^{i,k}$  are non-zero for every given  $i$ . Here,  $n_i$  is a finite number depending on  $i$  with  $n_i > i$ . This assumption is checked in Remark 2.2.2 below. Thus, the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  is well defined for  $i \geq 1$ .

The value of  $\hat{\alpha}^i$  minimizing the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  with respect to  $\alpha^i$ , when all the other variables including  $\alpha^j$  for  $j \neq i$  are fixed, is given by the first order condition

$$\partial_{\alpha^i} H^i = y^{i,i} + \alpha^i = 0 \quad \text{leading to the choice:} \quad \hat{\alpha}^i = -y^{i,i}.$$

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^i = (Y_t^{i,j}; j = 1, \dots, n_i)$  and  $Z_t^i = (Z_t^{i,j,k}; 1 \leq j \leq n_i, k \geq 1)$  for  $i \geq 1$  are defined as the solutions of the system of backward stochastic differential

equations (BSDEs): for  $i \geq 1$ ,  $1 \leq j \leq n_i$

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{i,j} = -\partial_{x^j} H^i(X_t, Y_t^i, \alpha_t) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k \\ \quad = -p_1 \cdot \varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{i,j} = \partial_{x^j} g_i(X_T) = p_1 \cdot c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)(\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j}); \end{cases} \quad (2.77)$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . Particularly, for  $j = i$  and  $j = i + 1$ , it becomes:

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{i,i} = p_1 \cdot \varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,i,k} dW_t^k, & Y_T^{i,i} = -p_1 \cdot c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i), \\ dY_t^{i,i+1} = -p_1 \cdot \varepsilon(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,i+1,k} dW_t^k, & Y_T^{i,i+1} = p_1 \cdot c(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i). \end{cases} \quad (2.78)$$

*Remark 2.2.2.* When  $j \neq i, i + 1$ ,  $dY_t^{i,j} = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k$  and  $Y_T^{i,j} = 0$ , which gives  $Z_t^{i,j,k} \equiv 0$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$  for all  $k$ . Thus  $Y_t^{i,j} \equiv 0$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$  for all  $j \neq i, i + 1$ . There must be finitely many non-zero  $Y^{i,j}$ 's for every  $i$ . Hence, the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  in (2.76) can be rewritten as

$$H^i(x^1, x^2, \dots, y^{i,i}, y^{i,i+1}, \alpha^1, \alpha^2, \dots) = \alpha^i y^{i,i} + \alpha^{i+1} y^{i,i+1} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 \cdot p_1.$$

We also note that  $Y_t^{i,i+1} = -Y_t^{i,i}$  and  $Z_t^{i,i+1,k} = -Z_t^{i,i,k}$ , so that it's enough to find  $Y_t^{i,i}$ .

Considering the BSDE system and its terminal condition, we make an ansatz of the form:

$$Y_t^{i,i} = \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,j} X_t^j, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T \quad (2.79)$$

for some deterministic scalar functions  $\phi_t$  satisfying the terminal conditions:  $\phi_T^{i,i} = p_1 c$ ,  $\phi_T^{i,i+1} = -p_1 c$ , and  $\phi_T^{i,j} = 0$  for  $j \geq i + 2$ .

Substituting the ansatz, the optimal strategy  $\hat{\alpha}^i$  and the controlled forward equation for  $X^i$  in (2.75) become

$$\begin{cases} \hat{\alpha}_t^i = -Y_t^{i,i} = -\sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,j} X_t^j, \\ dX_t^j = -\sum_{k=j}^{\infty} \phi_t^{j,k} X_t^k dt + \sigma dW_t^j. \end{cases} \quad (2.80)$$

Differentiating the ansatz (2.79) and substituting (2.80) leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t^{i,i} &= \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} [X_t^j \dot{\phi}_t^{i,j} dt + \phi_t^{i,j} dX_t^j] \\ &= \sum_{k=i}^{\infty} \left( \dot{\phi}_t^{i,k} - \sum_{j=i}^k \phi_t^{i,j} \phi_t^{j,k} \right) X_t^k dt + \sigma \sum_{k=i}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,k} dW_t^k. \end{aligned} \quad (2.81)$$

Here  $\dot{\phi}_t$  represents the time derivative of  $\phi_t$ . Comparing the martingale terms and drift terms of the two Itô's decompositions (2.78) and (2.81) of  $Y_t^{i,i}$ , the martingale terms give the deterministic (and therefore adapted) processes  $Z_t^{i,i,k}$ :

$$Z_t^{i,i,k} = 0 \quad \text{for } k < i, \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t^{i,i,k} = \sigma \phi_t^{i,k} \quad \text{for } k \geq i. \quad (2.82)$$

Moreover, the drift terms show that the functions  $\phi_t$  must satisfy the system of Riccati equations :

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\phi}_t^{i,i} &= \phi_t^{i,i} \cdot \dot{\phi}_t^{i,i} - p_1 \cdot \varepsilon, & \phi_T^{i,i} &= p_1 \cdot c, \\ \dot{\phi}_t^{i,i+1} &= \phi_t^{i,i} \cdot \dot{\phi}_t^{i,i+1} + \phi_t^{i,i+1} \cdot \dot{\phi}_t^{i+1,i+1} + p_1 \cdot \varepsilon, & \phi_T^{i,i+1} &= -p_1 \cdot c, \\ \ell \geq i + 2 : \quad \dot{\phi}_t^{i,\ell} &= \sum_{j=i}^{\ell} \phi_t^{i,j} \dot{\phi}_t^{j,\ell}, & \phi_T^{i,\ell} &= 0, \end{aligned} \quad (2.83)$$

The Riccati system is solvable and the solutions only depend on the “distance”  $\ell - i$ . Thus, if we define  $\phi_t^{j-i} := \phi_t^{i,j}$  for all  $i \geq 1, j \geq i$  and  $p := p_1$ , we can rewrite the system

(2.83)

$$\begin{aligned}
 \dot{\phi}_t^0 &= \phi_t^0 \cdot \phi_t^0 - p\varepsilon, & \phi_T^0 &= pc, \\
 \dot{\phi}_t^1 &= 2\phi_t^0 \cdot \phi_t^1 + p\varepsilon, & \phi_T^{i,i+1} &= -pc, \\
 k \geq 2: & \quad \dot{\phi}_t^k = \sum_{j=0}^k \phi_t^j \phi_t^{k-j}, & \phi_T^k &= 0.
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.84}$$

**Lemma 1.** *With  $c \geq 0$ , and  $\varepsilon > 0$ , the solution to the Riccati system (2.84) satisfies*

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^k = 0; \quad \phi_t^0 = \sqrt{p} \cdot \frac{(-\varepsilon - c\sqrt{p\varepsilon})e^{2\sqrt{p\varepsilon}(T-t)} + \varepsilon - c\sqrt{p\varepsilon}}{(-\sqrt{\varepsilon} - c\sqrt{p})e^{2\sqrt{p\varepsilon}(T-t)} - \sqrt{\varepsilon} + c\sqrt{p}} > 0 \text{ when } p \neq 0, \tag{2.85}$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . Moreover, the functions  $\phi_t^k$ 's are obtained by a series expansion of the generating function  $S_t(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \phi_t^k$ ,  $z \leq 1$  of the sequence  $\{\phi_t^k\}$  given by  $S_t(1) \equiv 0$ , and if  $z < 1$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_t(z) &= \sqrt{p} \cdot \\
 & \frac{(-\varepsilon(1-z) - c(1-z)\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)})e^{2\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}(T-t)} + \varepsilon(1-z) - c(1-z)\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}}{(-\sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)} - \sqrt{pc(1-z)})e^{2\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}(T-t)} - \sqrt{\varepsilon(1-z)} + \sqrt{pc(1-z)}}
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.86}$$

for every  $0 \leq t \leq T$ .

*Proof:* Define the generating function  $S_t(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \phi_t^{(k)}$  where  $0 \leq z < 1$  and  $\phi_t^{(k)} = \phi_t^k$  in (2.84) to avoid confusion with derivation. Then substituting (2.84), we obtain

$$\dot{S}_t(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \dot{\phi}_t^{(k)} = (S_t(z))^2 - p\varepsilon(1-z), \quad 0 \leq t \leq T; \quad S_T(z) = pc(1-z). \tag{2.87}$$

- For  $z = 1$ , we get the ODE:  $\dot{S}_t(1) = (S_t(1))^2$ ,  $S_T(1) = 0$ . The solution is  $S_t(1) \equiv 0$  for

all  $t$ . Because the series defining  $S_t(1)$  may not converge, we take a sequence  $\{z_n\} \rightarrow 1$ . The limit of  $S_t(z_n)$  converges to the ODE above, and we can get the conclusion. Then we deduce:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^{(k)} = 0, \quad i.e., \quad \phi_t^{(0)} = - \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \phi_t^{(k)}.$$

- For  $z \neq 1$ , the solution to the Riccati equation (2.87) satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned} S_t(z) = & \\ & \frac{(-p\varepsilon(1-z) - pc\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}(1-z))e^{2\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}(T-t)} + p\varepsilon(1-z) - pc\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}(1-z)}{(-\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)} - pc(1-z))e^{2\sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}(T-t)} - \sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)} + pc(1-z)} \\ & \xrightarrow{T \rightarrow \infty} \sqrt{p\varepsilon(1-z)}, \end{aligned}$$

which gives (2.86).

*Remark 2.2.3.* It follows from Lemma 1 that the forward dynamics (2.80) can be formally written as:

$$dX_t^i = - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^j X_t^{i+j} dt + \sigma dW_t^i = \phi_t^0 \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{-\phi_t^j}{\phi_t^0} X_t^{i+j} - X_t^i \right) dt + \sigma dW_t^i \quad (2.88)$$

for  $i \geq 1$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . This is a mean-reverting type process, since  $\phi_t^0 > 0$ . We also see that this system is invariant under the shift of indices of individuals. In particular, the law of  $X^i$  is the same as the law of  $X^1$  for every  $i$ .

Here is a summary of this section on the random infinite player game.

**Proposition 2.2.1.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the random infinite-player game with cost functionals  $J^i$  is determined by (2.88), where  $\{\phi_t^j, 0 \leq t \leq T; j \geq 0\}$  are the unique solution to the infinite system (2.84) of Riccati equations.*



### 2.2.1.3 Stationary Solution and Catalan Markov Chain

By taking  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , we look at the stationary solution of the Riccati system (2.84) satisfying  $\dot{\phi}^j = 0$  for all  $j$ . Without loss of generality, we assume  $\varepsilon = 1$ . Otherwise the solution should be multiplied by  $\sqrt{\varepsilon}$  for all  $\{\phi^k, k \geq 1\}$ . Then the system gives the solutions and the recurrence relation:

$$\phi^0 = \sqrt{p}, \quad \phi^1 = -\frac{\sqrt{p}}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{k=0}^n \phi^k \phi^{n-k} = 0.$$

This is closely related to the recurrence relation of *Catalan* numbers. By using a moment generating function method as in Appendix A.2.1, we obtain the stationary solution:

$$\phi^0 = \sqrt{p}, \quad \phi^1 = -\frac{\sqrt{p}}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \phi^k = -\frac{(2k-3)!}{(k-2)!k!2^{2k-2}} \sqrt{p} \quad \text{for} \quad k \geq 2.$$

Let  $q_0 = -\frac{\phi^0}{\sqrt{p}} = -1$ ,  $q_1 = -\frac{\phi^1}{\sqrt{p}} = \frac{1}{2}$ , and  $q_k = -\frac{\phi^k}{\sqrt{p}} = \frac{(2k-3)!}{(k-2)!k!} \frac{1}{2^{2k-2}}$  for  $k \geq 2$ .

By lemma 1, we have the relation:  $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} q_k = 0$ . Then we consider the continuous-time Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$  with state space  $\mathbb{N}$  and Catalan generator matrix

$$\mathbf{Q} = \begin{pmatrix} q_0 & q_1 & q_2 & q_3 & \cdots \\ 0 & q_0 & q_1 & q_2 & \ddots \\ 0 & 0 & q_0 & q_1 & \ddots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}. \quad (2.89)$$

Note that the transition probabilities of the continuous-time Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$ , called a Catalan Markov chain, are  $p_{i,j}(t) = \mathbb{P}(M(t) = j | M(0) = i) = (e^{t\mathbf{Q}})_{i,j}$ ,  $i, j \geq 1$ ,  $t \geq 0$ . With replacement of  $\phi_t^j$ ,  $t \geq 0$  by the stationary solution  $\phi^j$  in (2.75) and assuming  $\sigma = 1$ , the infinite particle system  $(X^i, i \geq 1)$  can be represented formally as a linear stochastic

evolution equation:

$$d\mathbf{X}_t = \sqrt{p} \mathbf{Q} \mathbf{X}_t dt + d\mathbf{W}_t; \quad t \geq 0, \quad (2.90)$$

where  $\mathbf{X}_\cdot = (X^k, k \geq 1)$  with  $\mathbf{X}_0 = \mathbf{x}_0$  and  $\mathbf{W}_\cdot = (W^k, k \geq 1)$ . Its solution is:

$$\mathbf{X}_t = e^{t\sqrt{p}\mathbf{Q}}\mathbf{x}_0 + \int_0^t e^{(t-s)\sqrt{p}\mathbf{Q}}d\mathbf{W}_s; \quad t \geq 0.$$

Without loss of generality, let us assume  $\mathbf{X}_0 = \mathbf{0}$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} X_t^i &= \int_0^t \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} (\exp((t-s)\sqrt{p}\mathbf{Q}))_{i,j} dW_s^j = \int_0^t \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} p_{i,j}(t-s) dW_s^j \\ &= \int_0^t \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \mathbb{P}(M(t-s) = j | M(0) = i) dW_s^j \\ &= \mathbb{E}^M \left[ \int_0^t \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \mathbf{1}_{(M(t-s)=j)} dW_s^j | M(0) = i \right]; \quad t \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability induced by the Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$ , independent of the Brownian motions  $(W^j, j \in \mathbb{N}_0)$ . This is a Feynman–Kac representation formula for the infinite particle system  $\mathbf{X}_\cdot$  in (2.90) associated with the continuous-time Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$ . We can compute explicitly the corresponding transition probability  $(p_{i,j}(\cdot))$ .

**Proposition 2.2.2.** *The Gaussian process  $X_t^i$ ,  $i \geq 1$ ,  $t \geq 0$  in (2.90), corresponding*

to the Catalan Markov chain, is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 X_t^i &= \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \int_0^t (\exp(\sqrt{p}Q(t-s)))_{i,j} dW_s^j = \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{p^{j-i} (t-s)^{2(j-i)}}{(j-i)!} \cdot F^{(j-i)}(-p(t-s)^2) dW_s^j \\
 &= \sum_{j=i}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{p^{j-i} (t-s)^{2(j-i)}}{(j-i)!} \cdot \rho_{j-i}(-p(t-s)^2) e^{-\sqrt{p}(t-s)} \cdot dW_s^j,
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.91}$$

where  $W^j$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{N}$  are independent standard Brownian motions and  $\rho_i(\cdot)$  is defined by

$$\rho_i(x) = \frac{1}{2^i} \sum_{j=i}^{2i-1} \frac{(i-1)!}{(2j-2i)!(2i-j-1)!} \cdot (-x)^{-\frac{j}{2}}, \tag{2.92}$$

for  $i \geq 1$ , and  $\rho_0(x) = 1$  for  $x \leq 0$ . Moreover, when  $p \neq 0$ , the asymptotic variance of  $X_t^i$ ,  $i \geq 1$  is finite, i.e.

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^i) = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^1) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2p}}.$$

*Proof:* Given in **Appendix A.2.2**.

## 2.2.2 Random Two-sided Directed Chain Game

To extend the investigation of random directed chain in Section 2.2.1, we will consider a linear-quadratic stochastic game for countably many players with random double-sided interactions over a finite time horizon  $[0, T]$ . We shall study the effect of random double-sided interactions on the open-loop Nash equilibrium and compare it with the random one-sided (directed) chain interaction in Section 2.2.1. To represent the random interactions of player  $n$  in two directions, we introduce the binary random variables  $R_n$  and  $L_n$ . The  $R_n$ 's for  $n \in \mathbb{Z}$  are independent and identically distributed random variables

taking values in  $\{0, 1\}$  with probabilities  $p_0$  and  $p_1 = 1 - p_0$ . The  $L_n$ 's for  $n \in \mathbb{Z}$  are also independent and identically distributed random variables taking values in  $\{0, 1\}$  with probabilities  $q_0 = 1 - q_1$  and  $q_1$ .  $\{R_n, n \in \mathbb{Z}\}$  is independent of  $\{L_n, n \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ . When  $R_n$  is one, we assume player  $n$  is interacting with player  $n + 1$ . When  $L_n$  is one, we assume player  $n$  is interacting with player  $n - 1$ . The random variable  $R_n$  affects the left arrow on the right of site  $n$  and the random variable  $L_n$  affects the right arrow on the left of site  $n$ . Examples of the chain structure are shown in Figure 2.3.



Figure 2.3: Examples of Two-sided Directed Chain

We assume the dynamics of the states of all players are given by the one-dimensional stochastic differential equations of the form: for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + \sigma dW_t^i, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.93)$$

where  $(W^i)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ ,  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$  are independent, standard Brownian motions, independent of the initial values  $X_0^i := \xi^i$ ,  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ , the initial values  $\xi^i$  are i.i.d. with finite second moments for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ , a positive constant  $\sigma > 0$  is fixed and  $\alpha^i$  is a control of player  $i$  adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions with  $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^T |\alpha_t^i|^2 dt] < \infty$  for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

In order to take into account the two-sided feature of the model, we introduce the parameter  $p \in (0, 1)$ , which will measure the strength of the asymmetry between the right and left interactions. Notice that if  $p = 0$  or  $1$ , the chain is one-sided as already treated in Section 2.2.1. We shall see how this parameter  $p$  and the weighted average  $pp_1 + (1 - p)q_1$  appear in the Nash equilibrium.

In the model, player  $i$  controls its own strategy  $\alpha^i$  in order to minimize the objective

function defined by

$$\begin{aligned}
J^i(\boldsymbol{\alpha}) &= \mathbb{E}_{X,L,R} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}p(X_t^{i+R_i} - X_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(1-p)(X_t^i - X_t^{i-L_i})^2 \right) dt \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \frac{c}{2}p(X_T^{i+R_i} - X_T^i)^2 + \frac{c}{2}(1-p)(X_T^i - X_T^{i-L_i})^2 \right\} \quad (2.94) \\
&= \mathbb{E}_X \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}p \cdot p_1(X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(1-p) \cdot q_1(X_t^i - X_t^{i-1})^2 \right) dt \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \frac{c}{2}p \cdot p_1(X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i)^2 + \frac{c}{2}(1-p) \cdot q_1(X_T^i - X_T^{i-1})^2 \right\}, \\
&:= \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \int_0^T f^i(X_t, \alpha_t^i) dt + g^i(X_T) \right],
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{where } f^i(x, \alpha^i) &:= \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}p \cdot p_1(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(1-p) \cdot q_1(x^i - x^{i-1})^2, \\
g^i(x) &:= \frac{c}{2}p \cdot p_1(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 + \frac{c}{2}(1-p) \cdot q_1(x^i - x^{i-1})^2,
\end{aligned}$$

for some constants  $\varepsilon > 0$ ,  $c \geq 0$ , and  $x = (x^i, i \in \mathbb{Z})$ ,  $\alpha = (\alpha^i : i \in \mathbb{Z})$  with  $\alpha^i \in \mathbb{R}$ . Each player optimizes the cost determined by the mixture of two criteria: distance from the right neighbor in the directed chain with weight  $p$  and distance from the left neighbor with weight  $1 - p$ . Here, the superscript  $i$  indicates the index but not the power. The functions  $f^i$  and  $g^i$  denote the running cost and terminal cost of player  $i$ , respectively. To simplify some notations, let us write  $\mathcal{S} := \mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{Z}}$  and  $\mathcal{S}^2 := \mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}}$ .

### 2.2.2.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium

We search for Nash equilibrium of the system among strategies  $\{\alpha^i, i \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ . We construct an open-loop Nash equilibrium by the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle. The

corresponding Hamiltonian for player  $i$  is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} H^i(x, y, \alpha) &:= \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \alpha^k y^{i,k} + f^i(x, \alpha^i); \\ &= \sum_{k=-n_i}^{n_i} \alpha^k y^{i,k} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}p \cdot p_1(x^{i+1} - x^i)^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(1-p) \cdot q_1(x^i - x^{i-1})^2, \end{aligned} \quad (2.95)$$

for  $x, \alpha \in \mathcal{S}$ ,  $y \in \mathcal{S}^2$ ,  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ , where only finitely many  $y^{i,k}$  are non-zero for every given  $i$ . Here,  $n_i$  is a finite positive number depending on  $i$  with  $n_i > |i|$ . This assumption is checked in Remark 2.2.4 below. Thus, the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  is well defined for every  $i$ .

The value of  $\hat{\alpha}^i$  minimizing the Hamiltonian  $H^i$  with respect to  $\alpha^i$ , when all the other variables including  $\alpha^j$  for  $j \neq i$  are fixed, is given by the first order condition

$$\partial_{\alpha^i} H^i = y^{i,i} + \alpha^i = 0 \quad \text{leading to the choice: } \hat{\alpha}^i = -y^{i,i}.$$

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^i = (Y_t^{i,j}; -n_i \leq j \leq n_i)$  and  $Z_t^i = (Z_t^{i,j,k}; -n_i \leq j \leq n_i, k \in \mathbb{Z})$  for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$  are defined as the solutions of the system of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs): for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $-n_i \leq j \leq n_i$

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned} dY_t^{i,j} &= -\partial_{x^j} H^i(X_t, Y_t^i, \alpha_t) dt + \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k \\ &= -\left( \varepsilon p p_1 (X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i) (\delta_{j,i+1} - \delta_{j,i}) + \varepsilon (1-p) q_1 (X_t^i - X_t^{i-1}) (\delta_{j,i} - \delta_{j,i-1}) \right) dt \\ &\quad + \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{i,j} &= \partial_{x^j} g_i(X_T) \\ &= c p p_1 (X_T^{i+1} - X_T^i) (\delta_{j,i+1} - \delta_{j,i}) + c (1-p) q_1 (X_T^i - X_T^{i-1}) (\delta_{j,i} - \delta_{j,i-1}); \end{aligned} \right. \quad (2.96)$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . Particularly, for  $j = i$ , it becomes:

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{i,i} &= [\varepsilon p p_1 (X_t^{i+1} - X_t^i) - \varepsilon(1-p) q_1 (X_t^i - X_t^{i-1})] dt + \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,i,k} dW_t^k \\ &= [-\varepsilon (p p_1 + (1-p) q_1) X_t^i + \varepsilon p p_1 X_t^{i+1} + \varepsilon(1-p) q_1 X_t^{i-1}] dt + \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} Z_t^{i,i,k} dW_t^k, \\ Y_T^{i,i} &= c (p p_1 + (1-p) q_1) X_T^i - c p p_1 X_T^{i+1} - c(1-p) q_1 X_T^{i-1}, \end{cases} \quad (2.97)$$

*Claim 2.2.1.* In the case of a deterministic two-sided directed chain, i.e.  $p_0 = q_0 = 0$ ,  $p_1 = q_1 = 1$  and  $0 < p < 1$ , we have for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,

$$Y_t^{i,i-1} + Y_t^{i,i} + Y_t^{i,i+1} \equiv 0, \quad Z_t^{i,i-1} + Z_t^{i,i} + Z_t^{i,i+1} \equiv 0. \quad (2.98)$$

This is quite different from the one-sided directed chain case where the effect of player  $i-1$  does not appear.

*Proof:* First, for the relation among player  $i$  and players  $i \pm 1$ , note from (2.95) that for each  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \partial_i H^i &:= \frac{\partial H^i}{\partial x^i}(x, y, \alpha) = -\varepsilon p (x^{i+1} - x^i) + \varepsilon(1-p)(x^i - x^{i-1}), \\ \partial_{i+1} H^i &:= \frac{\partial H^i}{\partial x^{i+1}}(x, y, \alpha) = \varepsilon p (x^{i+1} - x^i), \\ \partial_{i-1} H^i &:= \frac{\partial H^i}{\partial x^{i-1}}(x, y, \alpha) = -\varepsilon(1-p)(x^i - x^{i-1}), \end{aligned}$$

and hence,

$$\partial_i H^i = -(\partial_{i+1} H^i + \partial_{i-1} H^i), \quad \text{and} \quad \partial_i g^i = -(\partial_{i+1} g^i + \partial_{i-1} g^i).$$

Thus, (according to (2.96)), we claim that for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,

$$Y_t^{i,i-1} + Y_t^{i,i} + Y_t^{i,i+1} \equiv 0, \quad Z_t^{i,i-1} + Z_t^{i,i} + Z_t^{i,i+1} \equiv 0,$$

*Remark 2.2.4.* We can also see from (2.96) that  $Y_t^{i,j} \equiv 0$ ,  $Z_t^{i,j,k} \equiv 0$  whenever  $j \neq i-1, i, i+1$ . Thus there must be finitely many non-zero  $Y^{i,j}$ 's for every  $i$ .

For each  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ , we make the *ansatz*

$$Y_t^{i,i} = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,k} X_t^k + \psi_t^i; \quad i \in \mathbb{Z}, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.99)$$

where  $(\phi_t^{i,j}, i, j \in \mathbb{Z})$ ,  $(\psi_t^i, i \in \mathbb{Z})$  are some differentiable deterministic functions satisfying terminal conditions:  $\phi_T^{i,i} = c(pp_1 + (1-p)q_1)$ ,  $\phi_T^{i,i+1} = -c p p_1$ ,  $\phi_T^{i,i-1} = -c(1-p)q_1$ ,  $\phi_T^{i,k} = 0$  otherwise and  $\psi_T^i = 0$  for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ ; and  $\phi_t^{i,k}$  is assumed to be shift invariant, that is, it depends only on the difference  $k-i$  but not on the values  $i, k$  themselves. Substituting the *ansatz*, the optimal strategy  $\hat{\alpha}^i$  and the forward equation for  $X^i$  in (2.93) become

$$\begin{cases} \hat{\alpha}_t^i = -Y_t^{i,i} = -\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,k} X_t^k - \psi_t^i, \\ dX_t^j = \left(-\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,k} X_t^k - \psi_t^i\right) dt + \sigma dW_t^j. \end{cases} \quad (2.100)$$

Using the ‘‘dot’’ notation for derivatives with respect to  $t$  and differentiating the *ansatz* (2.99) and substituting (2.100) leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t^{i,i} &= \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \dot{\phi}_t^{i,k} dX_t^k + (\dot{\psi}_t^i + \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \dot{\phi}_t^{i,j} X_t^j) dt \\ &= \left[ \sum_{\ell=-\infty}^{\infty} \left(-\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \dot{\phi}_t^{i,k} \phi_t^{k,\ell} + \dot{\phi}_t^{i,\ell}\right) X_t^\ell + \dot{\psi}_t^i - \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \dot{\phi}_t^{i,k} \psi_t^k \right] dt + \sigma \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \dot{\phi}_t^{i,k} dW_t^k. \end{aligned} \quad (2.101)$$



Comparing the finite variation and local martingale parts of the semimartingale decompositions ((2.97) and (2.101)), we derive

$$Z_t^{i,i,k} \equiv \sigma \phi_t^{i,k}; \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad i \in \mathbb{Z}; \quad (2.102)$$

and the following system of ordinary differential equations of Riccati type:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\psi}_t^i &= \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,k} \psi_t^k, \\ \dot{\phi}_t^{i,j} &= \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \phi_t^{i,k} \phi_t^{k,j} + \delta_{j,i+1} \cdot \varepsilon p p_1 - \delta_{j,i} \cdot \varepsilon (p p_1 + (1-p)q_1) + \delta_{j,i-1} \cdot \varepsilon (1-p) q_1 \end{aligned} \quad (2.103)$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ ,  $i, j \in \mathbb{Z}$  with the terminal conditions

$$\phi_T^{i,i} = c(p p_1 + (1-p)q_1), \quad \phi_T^{i,i+1} = -c p p_1, \quad \phi_T^{i,i-1} = -c(1-p)q_1, \quad \phi_T^{i,j} \equiv 0, \quad j \neq i-1, i, i+1, \quad (2.104)$$

and  $\psi_T^i \equiv 0$  for  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

### 2.2.2.2 Discussion of the Riccati System (2.103)

Since we make the ansatz (2.99) shift invariant, that is,  $\phi^{i,k}$  depends only on the difference  $k - i$ , we may write  $\phi^{i,k} = \varphi^{k-i}$  for some function  $\varphi^j$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $0 \leq t \leq T$ . Here, note that the superscript  $j$  is the index but not the power. Then we may rewrite (2.103) for  $\phi^{i,k}$  as the following ordinary differential equation for  $\varphi^j$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{Z}$ :

$$\dot{\varphi}_t^j = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^k \cdot \varphi_t^{j-k} + \delta_{j,1} \cdot \varepsilon p p_1 - \delta_{j,0} \cdot \varepsilon (p p_1 + (1-p)q_1) + \delta_{j,-1} \cdot \varepsilon (1-p) q_1; \quad j \in \mathbb{Z}, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.105)$$

i.e.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \dot{\varphi}_t^0 = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^k \cdot \varphi_t^{-k} - \varepsilon (pp_1 + (1-p)q_1), \\ \dot{\varphi}_t^1 = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^k \cdot \varphi_t^{1-k} + \varepsilon p p_1, \\ \dot{\varphi}_t^{-1} = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^k \cdot \varphi_t^{-1-k} + \varepsilon(1-p)q_1, \\ \dot{\varphi}_t^j = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^k \cdot \varphi_t^{j-k} \quad \text{otherwise,} \end{array} \right. \quad (2.106)$$

with  $\varphi_T^0 = c(pp_1 + (1-p)q_1)$ ,  $\varphi_T^{-1} = -c(1-p)q_1$ ,  $\varphi_T^{+1} = -cp p_1$ ,  $\varphi_T^j \equiv 0$ ,  $j \neq -1, 0, 1$ .

*Remark 2.2.5.* According to equation (2.106), the sum  $\sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^j$  satisfies

$$\frac{d}{dt} \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^j = \left( \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^j \right)^2, \quad \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_T^j = 0. \quad (2.107)$$

This ordinary differential equation has a unique solution

$$\sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^j \equiv 0; \quad 0 \leq t \leq T. \quad (2.108)$$

The generating function  $S_t(z) := \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} z^k \varphi_t^k$ ,  $z \in \mathbb{C} \setminus \{0\}$ , if it is well defined (and the superscript  $j$  of  $z^j$  is the power), satisfies the one-dimensional Riccati equation

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{S}_t(z) &= \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} z^j \dot{\varphi}_t^j = \sum_{j,k=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^k \varphi_t^{j-k} z^j + \frac{1}{z} \cdot \varepsilon(1-p)q_1 + z \cdot \varepsilon p p_1 - \varepsilon (pp_1 + (1-p)q_1) \\ &= \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \sum_{\ell=-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi_t^k \varphi_t^\ell z^{k+\ell} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{z}\right) \varepsilon(1-p)q_1 - (1-z) \varepsilon p p_1 \\ &= [S_t(z)]^2 - \left[ \left(1 - \frac{1}{z}\right) \varepsilon(1-p)q_1 + (1-z) \varepsilon p p_1 \right] \\ &= [S_t(z)]^2 - \varepsilon T(z); \quad z \in \mathbb{C}, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T \end{aligned} \quad (2.109)$$

with  $S_T(z) = cT(z)$ , where  $T(z) = (1 - \frac{1}{z})(1-p)q_1 + (1-z)pp_1$ .

• For  $z^\pm = \frac{(pp_1+(1-p)q_1) \pm \sqrt{(pp_1+(1-p)q_1)^2 - 4pp_1(1-p)q_1}}{2pp_1} = 1$  or  $\frac{(1-p)q_1}{pp_1}$ ,  $T(z^\pm) = 0$ . Then we get the ODE:  $\dot{S}_t(z^\pm) = (S_t(z^\pm))^2$ ,  $S_T(z^\pm) = 0$ . The solution is  $S_t(z^\pm) = 0$ . Then we can conclude:

$$\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} (z^\pm)^k \varphi_t^k = 0.$$

• For  $z \in \mathbb{C} \setminus \{0\}$  and  $z \neq 1$  or  $\frac{(1-p)q_1}{pp_1}$ , the solution  $S_t(z)$  is given by

$$S_t(z) = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} z^k \varphi_t^k = \mathbf{b}(z) \cdot \frac{(\mathbf{b}(z) + \mathbf{q}(z)) \cdot e^{\mathbf{b}(z)(T-t)} - (\mathbf{b}(z) - \mathbf{q}(z)) \cdot e^{-\mathbf{b}(z)(T-t)}}{(\mathbf{b}(z) + \mathbf{q}(z)) \cdot e^{\mathbf{b}(z)(T-t)} + (\mathbf{b}(z) - \mathbf{q}(z)) \cdot e^{-\mathbf{b}(z)(T-t)}}$$

$$\xrightarrow{T \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{b}(z);$$

$$\mathbf{b}(z) := \sqrt{\varepsilon T(z)} = \left[ \left(1 - \frac{1}{z}\right) \varepsilon(1-p)q_1 + (1-z) \varepsilon pp_1 \right]^{1/2},$$

$$\mathbf{q}(z) := cT(z) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{z}\right) c(1-p)q_1 + (1-z) c pp_1.$$

(2.110)

### 2.2.2.3 Stationary Solution for Two-sided Directed Chain Game

In this section, we want to see how the values  $p$ ,  $p_1$ ,  $q_1$  affect the game. For our analysis let us consider the limits  $\phi_t^j := \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \varphi_t^j$  of  $\varphi_t^j$  for  $t \geq 0$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{Z}$ , as  $T \rightarrow \infty$  and take them as a stationary solution of (2.106). As  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , we have obtained from (2.110)

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} z^j \varphi_t^j = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} S_t(z) = \mathbf{b}(z) = \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} z^j \phi_t^j, \quad t \geq 0, \quad z \in \{z : \mathbf{b}(z) \in \mathbb{R}, \mathbf{b}(z) > 0\},$$

where  $\mathbf{b}(\cdot)$  does not depend on  $t$ . Hence, the limit  $\phi_t^j$  does not depend on  $t$ , and we write it as constant  $\phi^j$  for every  $j \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Also, substituting this observation into (2.103) with  $\psi_T^i = 0$ , we observe  $\psi_t^i \equiv 0$ , and hence, we obtain a dynamics for the stationary

equilibrium:

$$dX_t^i = - \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \phi^{i-k} X_t^k dt + \sigma dW_t^i; \quad X_0^i = \xi^i; \quad i \in \mathbb{Z}, \quad t \geq 0. \quad (2.111)$$

We shall identify the values  $\phi^j$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{Z}$  and behaviors of  $X^i$ ,  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

The function  $\mathfrak{b}(z)$  can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{b}(z) &= \sqrt{\varepsilon} \left[ \left(1 - \frac{1}{z}\right) (1-p)q_1 + (1-z)pp_1 \right]^{1/2} \\ &= \sqrt{\varepsilon} \cdot \sqrt{pp_1 + (1-p)q_1} \left[ 1 - \left( z \frac{pp_1}{pp_1 + (1-p)q_1} + \frac{1}{z} \frac{(1-p)q_1}{pp_1 + (1-p)q_1} \right) \right]^{1/2} \\ &= \sqrt{\varepsilon (pp_1 + (1-p)q_1)} \left[ 1 - \left( zw + \frac{v}{z} \right) \right]^{1/2} \end{aligned} \quad (2.112)$$

for  $z \in \mathbb{C} \setminus \{0\} \cap \left\{ \frac{1 \pm \sqrt{1-4wv}}{2w} \right\}$  and define  $w = \frac{pp_1}{pp_1 + (1-p)q_1}$ ,  $v = \frac{(1-p)q_1}{pp_1 + (1-p)q_1}$ , where  $0 < p < 1$ ,  $0 \leq p_1 \leq 1$  and  $0 \leq q_1 \leq 1$ . First, by inequalities, we have  $wv = \frac{pp_1(1-p)q_1}{(pp_1 + (1-p)q_1)^2} \in [0, \frac{1}{4}]$ .

- When  $wv = 0$ , i.e.  $p_1 = 0$  or  $q_1 = 0$ , we get back to Section 2.2.1, one direction random chain game. For example, when  $q_1 = 0$ , each player is interacted with her/his neighbor with a probability of  $pp_1$ .

- In the case when  $wv = pp_1(1-p)q_1 \in (0, \frac{1}{4}]$ , i.e.  $0 < p_1 \leq 1$  and  $0 < q_1 \leq 1$ , we expand formally

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{b}(z) &= \sqrt{\varepsilon (pp_1 + (1-p)q_1)} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \binom{1/2}{i} (-1)^i \left( zw + \frac{v}{z} \right)^i \\ &= \sqrt{\varepsilon (pp_1 + (1-p)q_1)} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \binom{1/2}{i} (-1)^i \sum_{k=0}^i \binom{i}{k} w^k v^{i-k} z^{2k-i} = \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} z^j \phi^j, \end{aligned} \quad (2.113)$$

and hence, comparing the coefficients of  $z^j$  and letting  $B = pp_1 + (1-p)q_1$ , we obtain

$$\phi^0 = \sqrt{\varepsilon B} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \binom{1/2}{2\ell} \binom{2\ell}{\ell} (-1)^{2\ell} w^\ell v^\ell = {}_2F_1(-1/4, 1/4, 1, 4wv), \quad (2.114)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \phi^j &= \sqrt{\varepsilon B} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \binom{1/2}{2\ell+j} \binom{2\ell+j}{\ell+j} (-1)^{2\ell+j} w^{\ell+j} v^\ell \\ &= \sqrt{\varepsilon B} (-1)^j w^j \binom{1/2}{j} {}_2F_1\left(-\frac{1}{4} + \frac{j}{2}, \frac{1}{4} + \frac{j}{2}, 1+j, 4wv\right), \\ \phi^{-j} &= \sqrt{\varepsilon B} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \binom{1/2}{2\ell+j} \binom{2\ell+j}{\ell} (-1)^{2\ell+j} w^{\ell+j} v^\ell \\ &= \sqrt{\varepsilon B} (-1)^j w^j v^{\frac{1}{2}-j} \binom{1/2}{j} \cosh\left(\left(j - \frac{1}{2}\right) \tanh^{-1}(\sqrt{wv})\right) \end{aligned} \quad (2.115)$$

for  $j \geq 1$ , where  $\tanh^{-1}(\cdot)$  is the inverse hyperbolic tangent function and  ${}_2F_1(\cdot)$  is the hypergeometric function defined by

$${}_2F_1(a_1, a_2; b_1; z) := \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(a_1)_n \cdot (a_2)_n}{(b_1)_n \cdot n!} \cdot z^n; \quad z \in \mathbb{C}$$

with the rising factorial  $(a)_0 = 1$ ,  $(a)_n = a(a+1)\cdots(a+n-1)$  for  $a \in \mathbb{C}$ ,  $n \geq 1$ .

#### 2.2.2.4 Special Case: Catalan Markov Chain of the Deterministic Two-sided Chain Game

When the chain is deterministic, i.e.,  $p_1 = q_1 = 1$ , the stationary solution is given in (2.114) - (2.115) by taking  $w = \frac{pp_1}{pp_1+(1-p)q_1} = p$ ,  $v = \frac{(1-p)q_1}{pp_1+(1-p)q_1} = 1-p$  and  $B = pp_1 + (1-p)q_1 = 1$ .

*Remark 2.2.6.* When the chain is deterministic and the interaction is symmetric, i.e.  $p_1 = q_1 = 1$  and  $p = \frac{1}{2}$ , solutions (2.114) - (2.115) suggest to take  $w = \frac{pp_1}{pp_1+(1-p)q_1} = 1/2$

and  $v = \frac{(1-p)q_1}{pp_1+(1-p)q_1} = 1/2$ , and we obtain simpler forms:

$$\phi^0 = \frac{2\sqrt{2}\varepsilon}{\pi}, \quad \phi^j = (-1)^j \cdot \sqrt{\frac{2\varepsilon}{\pi}} \binom{1/2}{j} \frac{\Gamma(1+j)}{\Gamma((3+2j)/2)}, \quad (2.116)$$

$$\phi^{-j} = (-1)^j \cdot \frac{\sqrt{\varepsilon}(3j + \sqrt{3})}{2\sqrt{2}3^j} \binom{1/2}{j}; \quad j \geq 1.$$

Coming back to general  $p \in (0, 1)$ , we have by numerical evaluation,

$$\phi^0 > 0, \quad \phi^j < 0, \quad j \in \mathbb{Z},$$

and hence, (2.111) can be seen as a linear evolution equation. Without loss of generality, we assume  $\varepsilon = 1$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . Since we have the relation:  $\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \phi^k = 0$  in Remark 2.2.5, we can consider a continuous-time Markov chain  $M(\cdot)$  in the state space  $\mathbb{Z}$  with generator

$$\text{matrix } \mathbf{Q} = - \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & \dots & \phi^{-1} & \phi^0 & \phi^1 & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & \phi^{-k} & \dots & \phi^{-1} & \phi^0 & \phi^1 & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & \phi^{-(k+1)} & \dots & \dots & \phi^{-1} & \phi^0 & \phi^1 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}. \quad \text{The infinite particle}$$

system (2.111) can be represented as a stochastic evolution equation:

$$d\mathbf{X}_t = \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{X}_t dt + d\mathbf{W}_t, \quad (2.117)$$

where  $\mathbf{X}_\cdot = (X^k, k \in \mathbb{Z})$  with  $\mathbf{X}_0 = \boldsymbol{\xi} := (\xi^i, i \in \mathbb{Z})$ ,  $\mathbf{W}_\cdot := (W^i, i \in \mathbb{Z})$ . The solution is:

$$\mathbf{X}_t = \boldsymbol{\xi} e^{t\mathbf{Q}} + \int_0^t e^{(t-s)\mathbf{Q}} d\mathbf{W}_s; \quad t \geq 0, \quad (2.118)$$

where  $e^{u\mathbf{Q}}$ ,  $u \geq 0$  forms the semigroup induced by the continuous-time Markov chain

with the generator  $\mathbf{Q}$  and the transition probability matrix function  $p_{i,j}(t)$ ,  $i, j \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $t \geq 0$  in the state space  $\mathbb{Z}$ . Without loss of generality, let us assume  $\mathbf{X}_0 = \mathbf{0}$ . With these transition probability matrix function, we may write the solution of (2.111) as

$$X_t^i = \int_0^t \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} p_{i,j}(t-s) dW_s^j; \quad i \in \mathbb{Z}, \quad t \geq 0. \quad (2.119)$$

The variance of  $X_t^i$  is given by

$$\text{Var}(X_t^i) = \int_0^t \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} [p_{i,j}(t-s)]^2 ds < \infty. \quad (2.120)$$

**Proposition 2.2.3.** *The Gaussian process  $X_t^0$ ,  $t \geq 0$  in (2.117), corresponding to the (Catalan) Markov chain, is given by*

$$\begin{aligned} X_t^0 &= \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^t (\exp(Q(t-s)))_{0,j} dW_s^j \\ &= \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \sum_{m=-\ell}^{\ell} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell} F^{(2\ell)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell)!} \binom{2\ell}{\ell+m} p^{\ell+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} dW_s^{2m} \\ &\quad + \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \sum_{m=-(\ell+1)}^{\ell} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell+2} F^{(2\ell+1)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell+1)!} \binom{2\ell+1}{\ell+1+m} p^{\ell+1+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} dW_s^{2m+1}, \end{aligned} \quad (2.121)$$

where  $W^j$ ,  $j \in \mathbb{Z}_+$  are independent standard Brownian motions and  $F^{(k)}(x) = \rho_k(x) e^{-\sqrt{-x}}$ , with

$$\rho_k(x) = \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{j=k}^{2k-1} \frac{(j-1)!}{(2j-2k)!!(2k-j-1)!} (-x)^{-\frac{j}{2}}, \quad \text{for } k \geq 1.$$

and  $\rho_0(x) = 1$  for  $x \leq 0$ .

*Proof:* Given in **Appendix A.2.3**.

## 2.3 Directed Infinite Tree Game

In this section we first extend our results to a deterministic tree structure (fig. 2.4) with fixed finite number of descendants. We then discuss our results on a directed tree structure with random interactions between players in the neighboring generations in Section 2.3.2.

### 2.3.1 Deterministic Directed Tree Game




Figure 2.4: Directed Tree Network

We describe a stochastic game on a directed tree structure with  $N \geq 2$  generations first. Starting with one player in the root node denoted by  $(1, 1)$  in the first generation, recursively each parent has a fixed, common number of descendants, denoted by  $d \geq 1$ , and there are  $d^{n-1}$  players in the  $n$ -th generation for  $n \geq 1$ . For



$1 \leq n \leq N, 1 \leq k \leq d^{n-1}$ ,  $X^{n,k}$  represents the state of the  $k$ -th individual of the  $n$ -th generation, and its direct descendants in the  $(n+1)$ st generation are labelled as  $\{X^{n+1,(k-1)d+1}, X^{n+1,(k-1)d+2}, \dots, X^{n+1,kd}\}$ . We consider the stochastic differential game of players in the  $N$  generations and then we generalize to a stochastic differential game in a directed infinite tree by considering its limit as  $N \rightarrow \infty$ . The network is shown in fig. 2.4.

We assume the dynamics of the states of the players are given by the stochastic differential equations of the form:

$$dX_t^{n,k} = \alpha_t^{n,k} dt + \sigma dW_t^{n,k}, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.122)$$

where  $(W_t^{n,k})_{0 \leq t \leq T}, 1 \leq n \leq N, 1 \leq k \leq d^{n-1}$  are one-dimensional independent standard Brownian motions. Similarly, we assume that the diffusion is one-dimensional and the diffusion coefficients are constant and identical denoted by  $\sigma > 0$ . The drift coefficients  $\alpha^{n,k}$ 's are adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions and satisfy  $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^T |\alpha_t^{n,k}|^2 dt] < \infty$ . The system starts at time  $t = 0$  from *i.i.d.* square-integrable random variables  $X_0^{n,k} = \xi_{n,k}$  independent of the Brownian motions and, without loss of generality, we assume  $\mathbb{E}(\xi_{n,k}) = 0$  for every pair of  $(n, k)$ .

In this model, among the first  $N - 1$  generations, each player  $(n, k)$  chooses its own strategy  $\alpha^{n,k}$  in order to minimize its objective function of the form: for  $1 \leq n < N$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & J^{n,k}(\alpha^{m,\ell}; 1 \leq m \leq N, 1 \leq \ell \leq d^m) \\
 & := \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t^{n,k})^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (\bar{X}_t^{n+1,k} - X_t^{n,k})^2 \right) dt + \frac{c}{2} (\bar{X}_T^{n+1,k} - X_T^{n,k})^2 \right\}, \quad (2.123)
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $\bar{X}^{n,k} := \sum_{i=(k-1)d+1}^{kd} X^{n,i} / d$  for some constants  $\varepsilon > 0$  and  $c \geq 0$  and for  $n, k \geq 1$ . The running cost and the terminal cost functions are defined by  $f^{n,k}(x, \alpha^{n,k}) :=$

$\frac{1}{2}(\alpha^{n,k})^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(\bar{x}^{n+1,k} - x^{n,k})^2$  and  $g^{n,k}(x) := \frac{c}{2}(\bar{x}^{n+1,k} - x^{n,k})^2$ , respectively with  $\bar{x}^{n,k} := \sum_{i=(k-1)d+1}^{kd} x^{n,i}/d$ . For simplicity, the behaviours of the  $N$ -th generation are described by the boundary condition where all the players  $\{X^{N,k}, 1 \leq k \leq d^{N-1}\}$  are attracted to 0. The cost functional for player  $(N, k)$  is given by:

$$J^{N,k}(\alpha^{N,k}) := \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_t^{N,k})^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(X_t^{N,k})^2 \right) dt + \frac{c}{2}(X_T^{N,k})^2 \right\} \quad (2.124)$$

for  $k = 1, \dots, d^{N-1}$ . Since players of the last generation do not depend on the other players, the boundary condition defines a self-controlled problem.

Now, inspired by the conclusion in section 2.1.1, as the number  $N$  of generations goes to infinity, i.e.,  $N \rightarrow \infty$ , the effect of the boundary condition should vanish. Thus it is natural and reasonable that we decide to pass the  $N$ -generation finite tree to an infinite tree with infinite number of generations, and study the Nash equilibrium of the infinite-tree game. We still assume each parent has  $d$  direct descendants. The dynamics of the states and the costs are the same as (2.122) and (2.123) with  $n \geq 1$ .

### 2.3.1.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibria

We search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the directed infinite-tree system among strategies  $\{\alpha^{n,k}; n \geq 1, 1 \leq k \leq d^{n-1}\}$ . The Hamiltonian  $H^{n,k}(x^{m,l}, y^{n,k;m,l}, \alpha^{m,l}; m \in \mathbb{N}, 1 \leq l \leq d^{m-1})$  for player  $(n, k)$  is

$$\sum_{m=1}^{M_n} \sum_{l=1}^{d^{m-1}} \alpha^{m,l} y^{n,k;m,l} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^{n,k})^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(\bar{x}^{n+1,k} - x^{n,k})^2,$$

assuming it is defined on  $Y_t^{n,k}$ 's where *only finitely many*  $Y_t^{n,k;m,l}$ 's are non-zero for every given  $(n, k)$ . Here,  $M_n \in \mathbb{N}$  represents a depth of this finite dependence depending on  $n$  with  $M_n > n$  for  $n \geq 1$ . This assumption is checked in remark 2.3.1 below. Thus, the

Hamiltonian  $H^{n,k}$  for player  $(n, k)$  is well defined for  $n, k \geq 1$ .

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^{n,k} = (Y_t^{n,k;m,l}; m \in \mathbb{N}, 1 \leq l \leq d^{m-1})$  and  $Z_t^{n,k} = (Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q}; m, p \in \mathbb{N}, 1 \leq l \leq d^{m-1}, 1 \leq q \leq d^{p-1})$  for  $n \in \mathbb{N}, 1 \leq k \leq d^{n-1}$  are defined as the solutions of BSDEs

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t^{n,k;m,l} &= -\varepsilon(\bar{X}_t^{n+1,k} - X_t^{n,k})(\bar{\delta}_{m,\ell}^{n+1,k} - \delta_{m,\ell}^{n,k})dt + \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q=1}^{d^{p-1}} Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q} dW_t^{p,q}, \\ Y_T^{n,k;m,l} &= \partial_{x^{m,l}} g_{n,k}(X_T) = c(\bar{X}_T^{n+1,k} - X_T^{n,k})(\bar{\delta}_{m,\ell}^{n+1,k} - \delta_{m,\ell}^{n,k}), \end{aligned} \quad (2.125)$$

where  $\delta_{m,\ell}^{n,k} := 1$ , if  $(n, k) = (m, \ell)$ ; 0, otherwise, and  $\bar{\delta}_{m,\ell}^{n,k} := \sum_{i=(k-1)d+1}^{kd} \delta_{m,\ell}^{n,i}/d$ .

*Remark 2.3.1.* For every  $(m, l) \neq (n, k)$  or  $(n+1, i)$  where  $(k-1)d+1 \leq i \leq kd$ ,  $dY_t^{n,k;m,l} = \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q=1}^{d^{p-1}} Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q} dW_t^{p,q}$  and  $Y_T^{n,k;m,l} = 0$  implies  $Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q} = 0$  for all  $(p, q)$ . Thus, there must be finitely many non-zero  $Y^{n,k;m,l}$ 's for every  $(n, k)$ . Hence, the Hamiltonian can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} H^{n,k}(x^{m,l}, y^{n,k;n,k}, y^{n,k;n+1,i}, \alpha^{m,l}; m \in \mathbb{N}, 1 \leq l \leq d^{m-1}, (k-1)d+1 \leq i \leq kd) \\ = \alpha^{n,k} y^{n,k;n,k} + \sum_{i=(k-1)d+1}^{kd} \alpha^{n+1,i} y^{n,k;n+1,i} + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha^{n,k})^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}(\bar{x}^{n+1,k} - x^{n,k})^2. \end{aligned}$$

By minimizing the Hamiltonian  $H^{n,k}$  at  $\hat{\alpha}^{n,k} = -y^{n,k;n,k}$  with respect to  $\alpha^{n,k}$  for all  $(n, k)$ , we can get an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We make the ansatz:

$$Y_t^{n,k;n,k} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \phi_t^i \sum_{j=0}^{d^i-1} X_t^{n+i,d^i k-j} = \sum_{m=n}^{\infty} \phi_t^{m-n} \sum_{j=0}^{d^{m-n}-1} X_t^{m,d^{m-n} k-j}, \quad (2.126)$$

for some deterministic scalar function  $\phi^k$  satisfying the terminal conditions:  $\phi_T^0 = c$ ,  $\phi_T^1 = -\frac{c}{d}$ ,  $\phi_T^k = 0$  for  $k \geq 2$ . Using the ansatz, the optimal strategy  $\hat{\alpha}^{n,k}$  and the forward

equation for  $X^{n,k}$  in (2.122) for an open-loop Nash equilibrium become:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\alpha}_t^{n,k} &= -Y_t^{n,k;n,k} = -\sum_{m=n}^{\infty} \phi_t^{m-n} \sum_{j=0}^{d^{m-n}-1} X_t^{m,d^{m-n}k-j}, \\ dX_t^{n,k} &= -\sum_{m=n}^{\infty} \phi_t^{m-n} \sum_{j=0}^{d^{m-n}-1} X_t^{m,d^{m-n}k-j} dt + \sigma dW_t^{n,k}.\end{aligned}\tag{2.127}$$

Now comparing the two Itô's decompositions of  $dY^{n,k;n,k}$  from (2.125) and (2.126)-(2.127), we obtain from the martingale terms:

$$Z_t^{n,k;n,k;p,q} = \sigma \phi_t^{p-n} \text{ for } p \geq n \text{ and } 1 \leq q \leq d^{p-n}; \quad Z_t^{n,k;n,k;p,q} = 0, \text{ otherwise,}$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$ , and we obtain from the drift terms:  $k \geq 0, 0 \leq t \leq T$

$$\dot{\phi}_t^k = \sum_{j=0}^k \phi_t^j \phi_t^{k-j} - \varepsilon \left( \delta_{0,k} - \frac{1}{d} \cdot \delta_{1,k} \right), \quad \phi_T^k = c \left( \delta_{0,k} - \frac{1}{d} \cdot \delta_{1,k} \right).\tag{2.128}$$

This Riccati system is closely related to the one in (2.25) for the infinite-player directed chain game and we can have a similar result.

**Proposition 2.3.1.** *Let  $\phi^{(k)} := \phi^k$  in (2.128) to avoid confusion from the power. We have  $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} d^k \phi^{(k)} = 0$ , and the functions  $\phi^k$ 's can be obtained by a series expansion.*

*Proof:* Given in appendix A.1.9.

**Proposition 2.3.2.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic stochastic game with cost functionals (2.123) for the infinite players on the directed tree in fig. 2.4 is given by (2.127), where  $\{\phi^i\}$  are uniquely determined by the system (2.128) of Riccati equations.*

Without loss of generality, we assume  $\varepsilon = 1$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . Following section 2.1.2.2, by taking  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , we look at the stationary long-time behavior of the Riccati system

(2.128) satisfying  $\dot{\phi}^k = 0$  for all  $k$ . Then the system gives the recurrence relation:  $\phi^0 = 1$ ,  $\phi^1 = -1/(2d)$  and  $\sum_{j=0}^k \phi^j \phi^{k-j} = 0$  for  $k \geq 0$ .

By using a moment generating function method as in appendix A.1.10, we obtain the stationary solution (cf. (2.30)):

$$\phi^0 = 1, \quad \phi^1 = -\frac{1}{2d}, \quad \text{and} \quad \phi^k = -\frac{(2k-3)!}{(k-2)!k!2^{2k-2}} \cdot \frac{1}{d^k} \quad \text{for} \quad k \geq 2. \quad (2.129)$$

### 2.3.1.2 Catalan Markov Chain for the Directed Tree Model

As  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , the limit of average of the infinite particle system (2.127) can be rewritten as

$$d\bar{\mathbf{X}}_t = \mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{d}\text{-tree}} \bar{\mathbf{X}}_t dt + d\bar{\mathbf{W}}_t, \quad t \geq 0 \quad (2.130)$$

a linear stochastic evolution equation of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type, where  $\bar{\mathbf{X}}_t := (\bar{X}_t^k \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{d^{k-1}} X_t^{k,i}/d^{k-1}, k \in \mathbb{N})$  with  $\bar{\mathbf{X}}_0 = \bar{\mathbf{x}}_0$ , and  $\bar{\mathbf{W}}_t := (\bar{W}_t^k \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{d^{k-1}} W_t^{k,i}/d^{k-1}, k \in \mathbb{N})$  is a vector of averaged Brownian motions with mean 0 and variance  $t/d^k$  in each generation  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , and  $\mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{d}\text{-tree}}$  is exactly the same as  $\mathbf{Q}$  in section 2.1.2.2. Its solution is

$$\bar{\mathbf{X}}_t = e^{t\mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{d}\text{-tree}}} \bar{\mathbf{x}}_0 + \int_0^t e^{(t-s)\mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{d}\text{-tree}}} d\bar{\mathbf{W}}_s; \quad t \geq 0. \quad (2.131)$$

Similarly to proposition 2.1.4 we can find the following formulas for  $X_t^{1,1} \equiv \bar{X}_t^1$  and its asymptotic variance. Proof is in appendix A.1.11.

**Proposition 2.3.3.** *With  $\mathbf{x}_0 = \mathbf{0}$ , the formula for the root node  $X_t^{1,1}$  in (2.130) is:*

$$X_t^{1,1} = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{2(j-1)}}{(j-1)!} \cdot \rho_{j-1}(-(t-s)^2) e^{-(t-s)} \cdot d\bar{W}_s^j, \quad t \geq 0, \quad (2.132)$$

where  $\rho_i(\cdot)$  is in (2.35). Moreover, the asymptotic variance of  $X_t^{1,1}$  is finite, i.e.,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^{1,1}) = \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \cdot \left(1 + \left(\frac{d-1}{d}\right)^{1/2}\right)^{-1/2} \in \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}\right]. \quad (2.133)$$

*Remark 2.3.2* (Connection to the mean-field game). When  $d$  goes to infinity, we are in the regime of the mean field game. The asymptotic variance is  $\frac{1}{2}$  which is consistent with the variance of an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process where the particle is attracted to 0 and the volatility and the mean reversion constant are both 1.

## 2.3.2 Random Directed Tree Game

Motivated by the discussion about the deterministic directed infinite tree game in section 2.3.1, we now look at a random tree structure. The connection and similarity between random and non-random cases is illustrated in remark 2.3.6.

### 2.3.2.1 Setup and Assumptions

We describe a stochastic game on a directed tree where the interaction between every two players in the neighboring generation is random. All players have a fixed number of potential players in the next generation to interact with, denoted by a finite positive integer  $M$ . That is, for  $n, k \geq 1$ , player  $(n, k)$  is the  $k$ -th individual of the  $n$ -th generation and she can interact with the players in the  $(n+1)$ -th generation labelled as  $\{(n+1, M(k-1)+j) : 1 \leq j \leq M\}$ . We introduce the *i.i.d.* binary random variables  $N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j}$ , valued in  $\{0, 1\}$ , which represent the random interaction between player  $(n, k)$  and player  $(n+1, M(k-1)+j)$  for  $1 \leq j \leq M$ , present with probability  $p$ , where  $0 < p < 1$ . When  $N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j}$  is zero, we assume player  $(n, k)$  has no interaction with player  $(n+1, M(k-1)+j)$  for  $1 \leq j \leq M$ . We assume the dynamics of the states of

the players are given by the stochastic differential equations of the form:

$$dX_t^{n,k} = \alpha_t^{n,k} dt + \sigma dW_t^{n,k}, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T, \quad (2.134)$$

where  $(W_t^{n,k})_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ ,  $n, k \geq 1$  are one-dimensional independent standard Brownian motions. We assume that the diffusion is one-dimensional and the diffusion coefficients are constant and identical denoted by  $\sigma > 0$ . The drift coefficients  $\alpha^{n,k}$ 's are adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motions and satisfy  $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^T |\alpha_t^{n,k}|^2 dt] < \infty$ . The system starts at time  $t = 0$  from *i.i.d.* square-integrable random variables  $X_0^{n,k} = \xi_{n,k}$  independent of the Brownian motions and, without loss of generality, we assume  $\mathbb{E}(\xi_{n,k}) = 0$  for every pair of  $(n, k)$ .

In this model, each player  $(n, k)$  chooses its own strategy  $\alpha^{n,k}$  in order to minimize its objective function of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} J^{n,k}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}) = & \mathbb{E}_{N,X} \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t^{n,k})^2 \right. \right. \\ & + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \left( \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j}} \sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} X_t^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} - X_t^{n,k} \right)^2 \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} \neq 0} \Big) dt \\ & \left. + \frac{c}{2} \left( \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j}} \sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} X_T^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} - X_T^{n,k} \right)^2 \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} \neq 0} \right\}. \end{aligned} \quad (2.135)$$

for some constants  $\varepsilon > 0$ ,  $c \geq 0$  and  $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (\alpha^{n,k} : n \geq 1, 1 \leq k \leq M^{n-1})$  with  $\alpha^{n,k} \in \mathbb{R}$ . When the player has no connection with any player in the next generation, her incentive is to choose  $\alpha^{n,k} = 0$ .

Conditioning on  $\sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} = d_{n,k}$  where  $0 \leq d_{n,k} \leq M$ , and denoting  $p_{d_{n,k}} = P(\sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} = d_{n,k}) = \binom{M}{d_{n,k}} p^{d_{n,k}} (1-p)^{M-d_{n,k}}$ , we get

$$\begin{aligned} J^{n,k}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}) = \mathbb{E}_X \left\{ \int_0^T \left( \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t^{n,k})^2 + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} X_t^{n+1,j} - X_t^{n,k} \right)^2 \right) dt \right. \\ \left. + \frac{c}{2} \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} X_T^{n+1,j} - X_T^{n,k} \right)^2 \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (2.136)$$

where  $S_{d_{n,k}} = \{(i_1, \dots, i_{d_{n,k}}) : M(k-1) + 1 \leq i_1 < \dots < i_{d_{n,k}} \leq Mk\}$  denotes the set of all possible combinations of  $d_{n,k}$  elements between  $M(k-1) + 1$  and  $Mk$  with an increasing order.

### 2.3.2.2 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium

We search for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the directed random tree system among strategies  $\{\alpha^{n,k}; n \geq 1, k \geq 1\}$ . The Hamiltonian for player  $(n, k)$  is of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} H^{n,k}(x^{m,l}, y^{n,k;m,l}, \alpha^{m,l}; m \geq 1, 1 \leq l \leq M^{m-1}) = \sum_{m=1}^{N_n} \sum_{l=1}^{M^{m-1}} \alpha^{m,l} y^{n,k;m,l} + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha^{n,k})^2 \\ + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} x^{n+1,j} - x^{n,k} \right)^2, \end{aligned}$$

assuming it is defined on  $Y_t^{n,k}$ 's where *only finitely many*  $Y_t^{n,k;m,l}$ 's are non-zero for every given  $(n, k)$ . Here,  $N_n$  represents a depth of this finite dependence, a finite number depending on  $n$  with  $N_n > n$  for  $n \geq 1$ . This assumption is checked in Remark 2.3.3 below. Thus, the Hamiltonian  $H^{n,k}$  for player  $(n, k)$  is well defined for  $n \geq 1$ .

The adjoint processes  $Y_t^{n,k} = (Y_t^{n,k;m,l}; m \geq 1, 1 \leq l \leq M^{m-1})$  and  $Z_t^{n,k} = (Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q};$



$m, p \geq 1, 1 \leq l \leq M^{m-1}, 1 \leq q \leq M^{p-1}$  for  $n \geq 1, 1 \leq k \leq M^{n-1}$  are defined as the solutions of the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs):

$$\begin{aligned}
dY_t^{n,k;m,l} &= -\partial_{x^{m,l}} H^{n,k}(X_t, Y_t^{n,k}, \alpha_t) dt + \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q=1}^{M^{p-1}} Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q} dW_t^{p,q} \\
&= -\varepsilon \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \\
&\quad \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} X_t^{n+1,j} - X_t^{n,k} \right) \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} \delta_{(m,l),(n+1,j)} - \delta_{(m,l),(n,k)} \right) dt \\
&\quad + \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q=1}^{M^{p-1}} Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q} dW_t^{p,q},
\end{aligned} \tag{2.137}$$

with terminal condition:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_T^{n,k;m,l} &= c \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \\
&\quad \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} X_T^{n+1,j} - X_T^{n,k} \right) \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} \delta_{(m,l),(n+1,j)} - \delta_{(m,l),(n,k)} \right).
\end{aligned}$$

*Remark 2.3.3.* For every  $(m, l) \neq (n, k)$  or  $(n+1, i)$  for  $M(k-1) + 1 \leq i \leq Mk$ ,  $dY_t^{n,k;m,l} = \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q=1}^{M^{p-1}} Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q} dW_t^{p,q}$  and  $Y_T^{n,k;m,l} = 0$  implies  $Z_t^{n,k;m,l;p,q} = 0$  for all  $(p, q)$ . Thus there are finitely many non-zero  $Y^{n,k;m,l}$ 's for every  $(n, k)$  and the Hamiltonian can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned}
& H^{n,k}(x^{m,l}, y^{n,k;n,k}, y^{n,k;n+1,i}, \alpha^{m,l}; m \geq 1, 1 \leq l \leq M^{m-1}, M(k-1) + 1 \leq i \leq Mk) \\
&= \alpha^{n,k} y^{n,k;n,k} + \sum_{i=M(k-1)+1}^{Mk} \alpha^{n+1,i} y^{n,k;n+1,i} + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha^{n,k})^2 \\
&+ \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} x^{n+1,j} - x^{n,k} \right)^2.
\end{aligned} \tag{2.138}$$

*Remark 2.3.4.* For every  $(n, k)$ , we will solve (2.137) when  $(m, l) = (n, k)$  in the following discussion. Other non-zero  $Y^{n,k;m,l}$ 's in (2.137) are solvable with the similar method.

When  $(m, l) = (n, k)$ , (2.137) becomes:

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned}
dY_t^{n,k;n,k} &= \varepsilon \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} X_t^{n+1,j} - X_t^{n,k} \right) dt \\
&+ \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q=1}^{M^{p-1}} Z_t^{n,k;n,k;p,q} dW_t^{p,q}, \\
Y_T^{n,k;n,k} &= -c \sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \left( \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} X_T^{n+1,j} - X_T^{n,k} \right).
\end{aligned} \right. \tag{2.139}$$

To simplify the equation system, we use the result: for all  $d_{n,k} \in [M(k-1) + 1, Mk]$

$$\begin{aligned}
& p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} x^{n+1,j} \\
&= p_{d_{n,k}} \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I=(i_1, \dots, i_{d_{n,k}}) \in S_{d_{n,k}}} (x^{n+1,i_1} + \dots + x^{n+1,i_{d_{n,k}}}) \\
&= p_{d_{n,k}} \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \cdot \binom{M-1}{d_{n,k}-1} (x^{n+1, M(k-1)+1} + \dots + x^{n+1, Mk}) \\
&= p_{d_{n,k}} \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=M(k-1)+1}^{Mk} x^{n+1,j},
\end{aligned}$$

which gives:

$$\sum_{d_{n,k}=1}^M p_{d_{n,k}} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{M}{d_{n,k}}} \sum_{I \in S_{d_{n,k}}} \frac{1}{d_{n,k}} \sum_{j \in I} x^{n+1,j} = (1-p_0) \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=M(k-1)+1}^{Mk} x^{n+1,j}.$$

Then we can rewrite system (2.139) as:

$$\begin{cases} dY_t^{n,k;n,k} = \varepsilon(1-p_0) \left( \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=M(k-1)+1}^{Mk} X_t^{n+1,j} - X_t^{n,k} \right) dt + \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q=1}^{M^{p-1}} Z_t^{n,k;n,k;p,q} dW_t^{p,q}, \\ Y_T^{n,k;n,k} = -c(1-p_0) \left( \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=M(k-1)+1}^{Mk} X_T^{n+1,j} - X_T^{n,k} \right). \end{cases} \quad (2.140)$$

By minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to  $\alpha^{n,k}$ , we can get an open-loop Nash equilibrium:  $\hat{\alpha}^{n,k} = -y^{n,k;n,k}$  for all  $(n, k)$ . Considering the BSDE system, we make the ansatz of the form:

$$Y_t^{n,k;n,k} = \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j=M^{i-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{i-n}k} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} X_t^{i,j}, \quad (2.141)$$

for some deterministic scalar function  $\phi_t$  depending on  $(n, k)$ . According to (2.140), the functions satisfy the terminal conditions:

- $\phi_T^{n,k;n,k} = c(1-p_0)$ ;
- $\phi_T^{n,k;n+1,j} = -c(1-p_0) \frac{1}{M}$ , for  $M(k-1)+1 \leq j \leq Mk$ ;
- $\phi_T^{n,k;n+\ell,j} = 0$ , for  $\ell \geq 2$ ,  $M^\ell(k-1)+1 \leq j \leq M^\ell k$ .

Using the ansatz, the optimal strategy  $\hat{\alpha}^{n,k}$  and the forward equation for  $X^{n,k}$  in

(2.134) become:

$$\begin{cases} \hat{\alpha}_t^{n,k} &= -Y_t^{n,k;n,k} = -\sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j=M^{i-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{i-n}k} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} X_t^{i,j}, \\ dX_t^{n,k} &= -\sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j=M^{i-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{i-n}k} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} X_t^{i,j} dt + \sigma dW_t^{n,k}, \end{cases} \quad (2.142)$$

which gives: for  $0 \leq t \leq T$

$$dX_t^{i,j} = -\sum_{r=i}^{\infty} \sum_{s=M^{r-i}(j-1)+1}^{M^{r-i}j} \phi_t^{i,j;r,s} X_t^{r,s} dt + \sigma dW_t^{i,j}.$$

Define a set  $S^{u,v} = \{i : M^u(v-1) + 1 \leq i \leq M^u v, i \in \mathbb{N}\}$ . Differentiating the ansatz (2.141) and substituting (2.142), we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t^{n,k;n,k} &= \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} (\phi_t^{n,k;i,j} X_t^{i,j} dt + \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} dX_t^{i,j}) \\ &= \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} X_t^{i,j} dt \\ &\quad + \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} \left[ -\sum_{r=i}^{\infty} \sum_{s \in S^{r-i,j}} \phi_t^{i,j;r,s} X_t^{r,s} dt + \sigma dW_t^{i,j} \right] \\ &= \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} X_t^{i,j} dt - \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{r=i}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \sum_{s \in S^{r-i,j}} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} \phi_t^{i,j;r,s} X_t^{r,s} dt \\ &\quad + \sigma \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} dW_t^{i,j} \\ &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{I} - \text{II} + \text{III}. \end{aligned} \quad (2.143)$$

For the first and third terms, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{I} &= \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;i,j} X_t^{i,j} dt = \sum_{r=n}^{\infty} \sum_{s=M^{r-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{r-n}k} \dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;r,s} X_t^{r,s} dt; \\ \text{III} &= \sigma \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} dW_t^{i,j} = \sigma \sum_{r=n}^{\infty} \sum_{s=M^{r-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{r-n}k} \phi_t^{n,k;r,s} dW_t^{r,s}. \end{aligned}$$

Then, for the second term, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{II} &= \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \sum_{r=i}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S^{i-n,k}} \sum_{s \in S^{r-i,j}} \phi_t^{n,k;i,j} \phi_t^{i,j;r,s} X_t^{r,s} dt \\ &= \sum_{r=n}^{\infty} \sum_{s=M^{r-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{r-n}k} \left( \sum_{i=n}^r \phi_t^{n,k;i, \lceil \frac{s}{M^{r-i}} \rceil} \phi_t^{i, \lceil \frac{s}{M^{r-i}} \rceil; r,s} \right) X_t^{r,s} dt, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\lceil x \rceil$  denotes here the smallest integer greater than or equal to  $x$ .

Thus equation (2.143) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t^{n,k;n,k} &= \text{I} - \text{II} + \text{III} \tag{2.144} \\ &= \sum_{r=n}^{\infty} \sum_{s=M^{r-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{r-n}k} \left( \dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;r,s} - \sum_{i=n}^r \phi_t^{n,k;i, \lceil \frac{s}{M^{r-i}} \rceil} \phi_t^{i, \lceil \frac{s}{M^{r-i}} \rceil; r,s} \right) X_t^{r,s} dt \\ &\quad + \sigma \sum_{r=n}^{\infty} \sum_{s=M^{r-n}(k-1)+1}^{M^{r-n}k} \phi_t^{n,k;r,s} dW_t^{r,s}. \end{aligned}$$

Now comparing the two Itô's decompositions (2.140) and (2.144), we obtain first the processes  $Z_t^{n,k;n,k;p,q}$  from the martingale terms :

$$Z_t^{n,k;n,k;p,q} = \sigma \phi_t^{n,k;p,q} \text{ for } p \geq n \text{ and } M^{p-n}(k-1)+1 \leq q \leq M^{p-n}k; \quad Z_t^{n,k;n,k;p,q} = 0, \text{ otherwise.}$$

Then we obtain from the drift terms:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bullet \quad \dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;n,k} &= \phi_t^{n,k;n,k} \phi_t^{n,k;n,k} - \varepsilon(1-p_0), & \phi_T^{n,k;n,k} &= c(1-p_0); \\
 \implies \phi_t^{n,k;n,k} &\equiv \phi_t^{i,j;i,j} \quad \text{for any pairs } (n,k), (i,j);
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.145}$$

- for  $M(k-1) + 1 \leq \ell \leq Mk$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;n+1,\ell} &= \phi_t^{n,k;n,k} \phi_t^{n,k;n+1,\ell} + \phi_t^{n,k;n+1,\ell} \phi_t^{n+1,\ell;n+1,\ell} + \varepsilon(1-p_0) \frac{1}{M} \\
 &\stackrel{(2.145)}{=} 2\phi_t^{n,k;n,k} \phi_t^{n,k;n+1,\ell} + \varepsilon(1-p_0) \frac{1}{M}, & \phi_T^{n,k;n+1,\ell} &= -c(1-p_0) \frac{1}{M};
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.146}$$

- for  $m \geq n+2$ ,  $M^{m-n}(k-1) + 1 \leq \ell \leq M^{m-n}k$ ,

$$\dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;m,\ell} = \sum_{i=n}^m \phi_t^{n,k;i,\lceil \frac{\ell}{M^{m-i}} \rceil} \phi_t^{i,\lceil \frac{\ell}{M^{m-i}} \rceil;m,\ell}, \quad \phi_T^{n,k;m,\ell} = 0. \tag{2.147}$$

### 2.3.2.3 Discussion about the Solution

*Remark 2.3.5.* Since by definition,  $p_0 = (1-p)^M = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{1}_{\sum_{j=1}^M N^{n,k,M(k-1)+j} \neq 0}\right]$  for any  $(n,k)$ , the above equation system (2.145)-(2.147) depends on  $p$  and  $M$ .

**Theorem 2.3.1.** *The solution of the system (2.145)-(2.147) are independent of  $n, k$  and depend on the "depth"  $i$ , i.e.*

$$\phi_t^{n,k;n+i,\ell} = \phi_t^{m,j;m+i,\bar{\ell}}$$

for suitable pairs  $(n,k)$ ,  $(m,j)$  and integer  $i \geq 0$ . Thus the system is closed for  $\{\phi_t^{n,k;m,\ell}, m \geq n, 1 \leq \ell \leq M^{m-n}(k-1) + 1 \leq \ell \leq M^{m-n}k\}$  and the solutions exist.

*Proof:* First, the equation (2.145) is a Riccati equation and independent of  $(n, k)$ . Thus the solution exists for every  $\phi_t^{n,k;n,k}$  and we have  $\phi_t^{n,k;n,k} \equiv \phi_t^{m,j;m,j}$  for any suitable pairs  $(n, k), (m, j)$ .

Since the equation (2.146) only depends on  $p_0$  and  $M$  and functions  $\phi_t^{n,k;n,k}$  are identical, we conclude that the solution of  $\{\phi_t^{n,k;n+1,\ell+M(k-1)}, 1 \leq \ell \leq M\}$  for any pair  $(n, k)$  exists and are also identical, i.e.

$$\phi_t^{n,k;n+1,\ell+M(k-1)} \equiv \phi_t^{m,j;m+1,\tilde{\ell}+M(j-1)} \quad \text{for } 1 \leq \ell, \tilde{\ell} \leq M. \quad (2.148)$$

For  $m = n + 2$  and  $1 \leq \tilde{\ell} \leq M^2$ , the equation (2.147) gives:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;n+2,\tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} &= \sum_{i=n}^{n+2} \phi_t^{n,k;i, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M^{n+2-i}} \rceil + M^{i-n}(k-1)} \phi_t^{i, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M^{n+2-i}} \rceil + M^{i-n}(k-1); n+2, \tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} \\ &= \phi_t^{n,k;n,k} \phi_t^{n,k;n+2,\tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} \\ &\quad + \phi_t^{n,k;n+1, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil + M(k-1)} \phi_t^{n+1, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil + M(k-1); n+2, \tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} \\ &\quad + \phi_t^{n,k;n+2,\tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} \phi_t^{n+2,\tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1); n+2, \tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} \\ &= 2\phi_t^{n,k;n,k} \phi_t^{n,k;n+2,\tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} \\ &\quad + \phi_t^{n,k;n+1, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil + M(k-1)} \phi_t^{n+1, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil + M(k-1); n+2, \tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)}. \end{aligned}$$

Here,

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_t^{n+1, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil + M(k-1); n+2, \tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)} &= \phi_t^{n+1, \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil + M(k-1); n+2, \tilde{\ell}' + M \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil + M(k-1) - 1} \\ &= \phi_t^{n,k;n+1, \tilde{\ell}' + M(k-1)} \quad \text{according to equation (2.148),} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\tilde{\ell}' = \tilde{\ell} + M - M \lceil \frac{\tilde{\ell}}{M} \rceil$  satisfies  $1 \leq \tilde{\ell}' \leq M$ . Then the differential equation of  $\phi_t^{n,k;n+2,\tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)}$  is reduced to a first order linear differential equation depending on

$\phi_t^{n,k;n,k}$  and  $\phi_t^{n,k;n+1,\tilde{\ell}+M(k-1)}$  functions, whose solutions exist and are identical. Thus we conclude the solutions exist for functions  $\{\phi_t^{n,k;n+2,\tilde{\ell}+M^2(k-1)}, 1 \leq \tilde{\ell} \leq M^2\}$  and identical.

When  $m > n + 2$ , we proceed the discussion recursively by using a similar method, we can reduce the differential equation of  $\phi_t^{n,k;m,\tilde{\ell}+M^{m-n}(k-1)}$  to a first order linear differential equation depending on functions  $\{\phi_t^{n,k;i,\tilde{\ell}+M^{i-n}(k-1)}, n \leq i < m, 1 \leq \tilde{\ell} \leq M^{i-n}\}$ . Then we can conclude that the solutions exist for functions  $\{\phi_t^{n,k;m,\tilde{\ell}+M^{m-n}(k-1)}, 1 \leq \tilde{\ell} \leq M^{m-n}\}$  and identical for every given  $m$ .

From above, we can conclude the solutions for  $\phi$  functions exist, only depending on the "depth"  $m - n$ . Thus the system for  $\phi$  functions can be reduced to a closed system for  $\{\phi_t^{n,k;m,\ell}, m \geq n, M^{m-n}(k-1) + 1 \leq \ell \leq M^{m-n}k\}$ .

*Remark 2.3.6.* If we assume that each individual  $(n, k)$  is in interaction with its all potential players in the  $(n + 1)$ -th generation, i.e.  $p = 1, p_0 = 0$ , the model becomes the same as the system of the deterministic tree model in in Feng, Fouque & Ichiba [30].

*Proof:* When  $N_{n,k} \equiv M (> 0)$ , the functions only depend on the depth. Thus equations (2.145)-(2.147) above become

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\Psi}_t^m &:= \dot{\phi}_t^{n,k;n+m,\ell} = \sum_{i=n}^{n+m} \Psi_t^{i-n} \cdot \Psi_t^{n+m-i} - \delta_{m,0}\varepsilon + \delta_{m,1}\varepsilon \frac{1}{M} = \sum_{i=0}^m \Psi_t^i \cdot \Psi_t^{m-i} - \delta_{m,0}\varepsilon + \delta_{m,1}\varepsilon \frac{1}{M}, \\ \Psi_T^m &= \delta_{m,0}c - \delta_{m,1}c \frac{1}{M}. \end{aligned}$$

It is the same as the Riccati systme in Feng, Fouque & Ichiba [30] with  $M = d$ .

**Proposition 2.3.4.** *An open-loop Nash equilibrium for the infinite-player stochastic game on the random tree with cost functionals (2.135) is determined by (2.142), where  $\{\phi^{n,k;i,j}, i \geq n, M^{i-n}(k-1) + 1 \leq j \leq M^{i-n}k\}$  are the unique solution to the infinite system (2.145)-(2.147) of Riccati equations.*



## 2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we first studied a linear-quadratic stochastic differential game on a directed chain network. We were able to identify Nash equilibrium in the case of finite chain with various boundary conditions and in the case of an infinite chain. This last case allows for more explicit computation in terms of Catalan functions and Catalan Markov chain. The Catalan open-loop Nash equilibrium that we obtained is characterized by interactions with all the neighbors in one direction of the chain weighted by Catalan functions, even though the interaction in the objective functions is only with the nearest neighbor. Under equilibrium the variance of a state converges in the infinite time limit as opposed to the diverging behavior observed in the nearest neighbor dynamics studied in Detering, Fouque & Ichiba [1]. Our analysis is extended to mixed games with directed chain and mean field interaction so that our game model includes the two extreme network interactions, fully connected and only one neighbor connection. It is also extended to game on a deterministic tree structure in section 2.3.1.

In the second part, we studied a linear-quadratic stochastic differential game on a random directed chain network by assuming the interaction between every two neighbors exists with a probability  $p$ . We constructed an open-loop Nash equilibrium in the case of infinite chain and computed the stationary solution explicitly, named Catalan functions. The equilibrium is characterized by interactions with all the players in one direction of the chain weighted by Catalan functions and the probability of interaction  $p$ . The asymptotic variance of a player's state converges to a finite limit depending on  $p$  in the infinite time limit, which is different from the behavior of the nearest neighbor dynamics discussed in Detering, Fouque & Ichiba [1]. The random directed game model is extended to games on a random two-sided directed chain structure and a random tree structure.

# Chapter 3

## Systemic Risk Measures and Machine Learning Computation

### 3.1 Systemic Risk Measure Review

A concept of systemic risk measure was proposed by Biagini et al. [29, 2], where the authors considered the following problem of risk allocations of  $N$  individuals labelled as  $\{1, \dots, N\}$ . Given a joint distribution of an  $N$ -dimensional, real-valued random vector  $\mathbf{X} := (X^1, \dots, X^N)$  on a probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ , the risk sensitivity vector  $\alpha := (\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) \in (0, \infty)^N$ , the risk tolerance value  $B < 0$  and the partition set  $\{I_m := \{n_{m-1} + 1, \dots, n_m\}, m = 1, \dots, h\}$  (indexed by a vector  $\mathbf{n} := (n_1, \dots, n_h)$  with  $0 = n_0 < n_1 < \dots < n_h = N$  for some  $h \geq 1$ ) of the  $N$  elements  $\{1, \dots, N\}$ , one defines the aggregate risk

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) := \inf \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N Y^n : \mathbf{Y} = (Y^1, \dots, Y^N) \in \mathcal{C}_0^{(\mathbf{n})}, \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^N u_n(X^n + Y^n) \right] = B \right\} \quad (3.1)$$

where if we take  $u_n = -\frac{1}{\alpha_n}e^{-\alpha_n x}$  as exponential utility functions,  $\alpha_n$  could be interpreted as the risk aversion of individual  $n$ . The random allocation  $\mathcal{C}_0^{(\mathbf{n})}$  of partition index vector  $\mathbf{n}$  and the associated partition  $\{I_m, m = 1, \dots, h\}$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}_0^{(\mathbf{n})} := \{ \mathbf{Y} \in \mathbb{L}^0(\mathbb{R}^N) : \text{there exists a real vector } \mathbf{d} := (d_1, \dots, d_h) \in \mathbb{R}^h \\ \text{such that } \sum_{i \in I_m} Y^i = d_m \text{ for every } m = 1, \dots, h \}. \end{aligned} \quad (3.2)$$

The partition set  $\{I_m, m = 1, \dots, h\}$  represents the grouping among the individuals and determined by the vector  $\mathbf{n}$ . Here  $\mathcal{C}_0^{(\mathbf{n})}$  is a subfamily of random vectors  $\mathbb{L}^0(\mathbb{R}^N)$  associated with  $\mathbf{n}$  such that all the partial sums of elements divided by the partition are deterministic real numbers.

Theorem 6.2 in Biagini et al. [2] shows that the infimum of (3.1) is attained by

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i &:= -X^i + \frac{S_m + d_m}{\alpha_i \beta_m}, \quad S_m := \sum_{k \in I_m} X^k, \quad \beta_m := \sum_{k \in I_m} \frac{1}{\alpha_k}, \\ d_m &:= \beta_m \log \left( -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right] \right), \quad \beta := \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{1}{\alpha_n} = \sum_{m=1}^h \beta_m, \end{aligned} \quad (3.3)$$

for  $m = 1, \dots, h$  and  $i \in I_m$ ; and

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{n=1}^N Y_{\mathbf{X}}^n = \sum_{m=1}^h d_m. \quad (3.4)$$

Moreover, the systemic risk allocation  $\rho^{i,(\mathbf{n})}(\mathbf{X})$  of individual  $i$  is given by

$$\rho^{i,(\mathbf{n})}(\mathbf{X}) := \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i] = \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right] \right)^{-1} \mathbb{E} \left[ Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i \exp \left( -\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right]; \quad i \in I_m, \quad (3.5)$$

for  $m = 1, \dots, h$ , where  $\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m$  is a tilted probability measure, absolutely continuous with

respect to  $\mathbb{P}$ , determined by the Radon-Nikodym derivative

$$\frac{d\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}{d\mathbb{P}} := \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( - \frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right] \right)^{-1} \exp \left( - \frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right), \quad m = 1, \dots, h. \quad (3.6)$$

By the construction, one has

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{m=1}^h d_m = \sum_{m=1}^h \sum_{i \in I_m} \rho^{i,(\mathbf{n})}(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{n=1}^N \rho^{n,(\mathbf{n})}(\mathbf{X}). \quad (3.7)$$

## 3.2 Systemic Risk Models for Disjoint and Overlapping Groups with Equilibrium Strategies

In this section, we generalize the systemic risk measure under exponential utility functions proposed by Biagini et al. [29, 2] by allowing individual banks to choose their allocations of the risks into different groups instead of being assigned to specific groups. This brings game features into modeling, making it more realistic and providing baselines for a CCP to design its default fund mechanism from rational banks. To solve the new models with game features, we first define the concept of Nash equilibrium based on banks' fair systemic risk allocation, a concept introduced in Biagini et al. [2], and discuss the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies. Then some explicit formulas are derived under the Gaussian distribution of the risk factor. In the overlapping group case, we still focus on the risk measure produced by exponential utility functions and first provide explicit expressions for the systemic risk measure and fair risk allocation of each bank under general risk factor. Sensitivity and monotonicity properties are also established. The concept of Nash equilibrium is then extended to the overlapping group case, whose existence and uniqueness are discussed theoretically and numerically

under Gaussian assumptions and with two groups. In particular, we propose a numerical algorithm based on fictitious play to identify the Nash equilibrium, and use it to study synthetic examples and the bank-CCP structure with real data, showing the validity of the proposed model.

The rest of the section is organized as follows. Based on the disjoint group model review in section 3.1, we first describe the systemic risk models with game features for disjoint groups. We then introduce the concept of group formation and Nash equilibrium, and analyze the optimal solution under Gaussian distribution of the risk factor. In section 3.2.4, we generalize the model and concept of Nash equilibrium to the overlapping group case. We propose numerical methods for computing Nash equilibrium, and give several examples in section 3.2.5. We make conclusive remarks in section 3.2.6.

### 3.2.1 Groups formation and Nash equilibrium

In this section, we generalize the systemic risk measure in section 3.1 to a game setup. For a game with  $N$  individuals, we assume there are  $N$  buckets  $(B_1, \dots, B_N)$  for each individual to choose which one she belongs to. The choice of individual  $n$ ,  $n = 1, \dots, N$ , is denoted by  $a_n$  and  $a_n = j$  means individual  $n$  chooses the bucket  $j$ . We call  $\mathcal{A}$  the set of all strategies. A set of strategies  $\mathbf{a} := (a_1, \dots, a_N) \in \mathcal{A}$  generates  $m$  groups by considering only the non-empty buckets for some  $1 \leq m \leq N$ . Different sets of strategies may generate the same groups denoted by  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})$ . We say two strategies  $\mathbf{a}^{(1)}$  and  $\mathbf{a}^{(2)}$  are equivalent, if the partitions  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}^{(1)})$  and  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}^{(2)})$  are equivalent. With the individual systemic risk allocation in (3.5), the objective function of individual  $n$  under the partition  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})$  is defined by

$$\rho^n(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) = \rho^n(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^n], \quad (3.8)$$

where  $n \in I_m$  for some  $m \in \{1, \dots, h\}$ ,  $Y_{\mathbf{X}}^n$  and  $\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m$  depend on the partition  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})$ .

Let  $\widehat{\mathbf{a}} = (\widehat{a}_1, \dots, \widehat{a}_N) \in \mathcal{A}$  and  $(\widehat{\mathbf{a}}^{-n}, a^n) = (\widehat{a}_1, \dots, \widehat{a}_{n-1}, a^n, \widehat{a}_{n+1}, \dots, \widehat{a}_N) \in \mathcal{A}$ .

**Definition 3.2.1.** With the systemic risk allocation map  $\mathcal{C} \mapsto \rho(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C})$  in (3.5) and the above definitions, the configuration  $\mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}})$  is a Nash Equilibrium if for every  $n = 1, \dots, N$  and  $a^n$ ,

$$\rho^n(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}})) \leq \rho^n(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}}^{-n}, a^n)), \quad (3.9)$$

*i.e.*, the systemic risk allocation of individual  $n$  is minimized under grouping  $\mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}})$ , given other individuals' choices are  $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}^{-n}$ . If there are multiple Nash equilibrium strategies satisfying (3.9) and all the partitions associated with these Nash equilibrium strategies are equivalent, we say the Nash equilibrium strategy is unique up to equivalence relation.

In this paper, we shall consider the following questions:

- Does a Nash equilibrium exist?
- If it exists, is it unique?

We view the equilibrium as a network of risk-sharing. It is easy to show that a single group with all the individuals, called full risk-sharing, is a Nash equilibrium. We call this the trivial Nash equilibrium. This follows from the fact that a configuration with a group having only one individual is never a Nash equilibrium; see Section 6.2 “Monotonicity” in [2]. For simplicity, we take Gaussian distribution for the risk factors and discuss the proposed model in detail with some examples.

### 3.2.2 Extreme examples

Here we discuss some extreme cases. Let  $|I_m|(\geq 1)$  be the number of elements in  $I_m$  for  $m \geq 1$ . Under the exchangeability assumption on the joint distribution of  $\mathbf{X}$  and

the identical exponential utility functions with  $\alpha_1 = \dots = \alpha_N = \alpha > 0$ , the marginal distributions of  $X^i e^{-S_m/\beta_m}$ ,  $i \in I_m$  are identical with the same expectation, that is,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[-X^i e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right] = \frac{-\beta_m}{|I_m|} \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right]; \quad i \in I_m, \quad (3.10)$$

and hence, with  $\beta_m = \alpha^{-1} |I_m|$ ,  $\beta = \alpha^{-1} N$  for  $m = 1, \dots, h$ ,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\left(-X^i + \frac{S_m}{\alpha_k \beta_m} + \frac{d_m}{\alpha_i \beta_m}\right) e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right] = \frac{d_m}{|I_m|} \mathbb{E}[e^{-S_m/\beta_m}].$$

Then substituting it into (3.5) gives the systemic risk allocation of individual  $i$

$$\rho^i(\mathbf{X}; \{I\}) = \frac{d_m}{|I_m|} = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log\left(\frac{-N}{\alpha \cdot (-B)} \mathbb{E}\left[e^{-\alpha S_m/|I_m|}\right]\right); \quad i \in I_m.$$

Under the i.i.d. Gaussian distribution assumptions for  $\mathbf{X}$ , *i.e.*,  $X^i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, N$  are independent, identically distributed Gaussian random variables with mean  $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$  and variance  $\sigma^2 > 0$ ,  $S_m = \sum_{i \in I_m} X^i$  is distributed in normal with mean  $\mu|I_m|$  and variance  $\sigma^2 |I_m|$  for  $m \geq 1$ . Direct calculation yields the systemic risk allocation of individual  $i$

$$\rho^i(\mathbf{X}; \{I\}) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log\left(\frac{N}{\alpha \cdot (-B)}\right) - \mu + \frac{\alpha \sigma^2}{2|I_m|}; \quad i \in I_m, \quad (3.11)$$

is a decreasing function of the size  $|I_m|$  of the group  $I_m$  which individual  $i$  belongs to.

**Example 3.2.1** (I.I.D. Gaussian with the same exponential utility function). The strategy  $\hat{\mathbf{a}} := (1, \dots, 1)$  that everyone chooses the same group is a unique Nash equilibrium. In this case  $\mathcal{C}(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) = \{I_1 = \{1, \dots, N\}\}$  with  $|I_1| = N$ ,  $h = 1$ . Every individual  $k$

belongs to the same group  $I_1$  and by (3.11),

$$\rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}})) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log \left( \frac{N}{\alpha \cdot (-B)} \right) - \mu + \frac{\alpha \sigma^2}{2N} \leq \rho^k(\mathbb{X}; \mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}}^{-k}, a_k)); \quad \mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}.$$

To see its uniqueness, if  $\mathbf{a}^*$  were a Nash equilibrium strategy with  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}^*) = \{I_m^*, m = 1, \dots, h^*\}$  which is not equivalent to  $\mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}})$ , then  $h^* \geq 2$  and all the sets  $I_m^*$ ,  $m = 1, \dots, h^*$  satisfy  $1 \leq |I_m^*| \leq N - 1$ . Take the group number  $\ell_0 := \arg \min_{1 \leq i \leq h} |I_i^*|$ , of its smallest size. For a fixed individual  $k \in I_{\ell_0}^*$ , there exists  $\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}$  with  $a_k = j_0$  such that in the new partition  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}^{*-k}, a_k) = \{I_m\}$  the individual  $k$  belongs to another group  $I_{m_0}$  with  $|I_{m_0}| > |I_{\ell_0}|$ , and hence by (3.11),

$$\rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}^*)) = \rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \{I_m^*, m = 1, \dots, h^*\}) > \rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}^{*-k}, j_0)).$$

This contradicts with the definition of Nash equilibrium. Thus,  $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}$  is a unique Nash equilibrium up to equivalence relation.

**Example 3.2.2** (Non-random, equal outcomes with the same exponential utility function). Instead, if  $\mathbf{X}$  is a deterministic constant vector of  $\mu (\in \mathbb{R})$ 's with  $\sigma^2 \equiv 0$ , that is,  $X^i = \mu$  for every  $i = 1, \dots, N$ , then there is no contribution from  $I_m$  in the systemic risk allocation

$$\rho^i(\mathbf{X}; \{I.\}) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log \left( \frac{N}{\alpha \cdot (-B)} \right) - \mu; \quad i \in I_m, \quad (3.12)$$

and hence, the risk sharing is arbitrary and undetermined.

Next, we shall relax the condition on  $\alpha$ 's. We still assume  $X^i$  are i.i.d. Gaussians with mean  $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$  and variance  $\sigma^2 > 0$ . In this case,  $S_m/\beta_m$  is normally distributed



with mean  $\mu|I_m|/\beta_m$  and variance  $|I_m|\sigma^2/\beta_m^2$ . Then direct calculations produces

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d_m}{\beta_m} &= \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \log\mathbb{E}\left[e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right] = \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \frac{\mu|I_m|}{\beta_m} + \frac{|I_m|\sigma^2}{2\beta_m^2}, \\ \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}\left[\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}\right] &= \left(\mathbb{E}\left[e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right]\right)^{-1}\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right] = \frac{\mu|I_m|}{\beta_m} - \frac{|I_m|\sigma^2}{\beta_m^2},\end{aligned}\quad (3.13)$$

where  $\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m$  is the tilted measure defined by (3.6). Also by (3.10),

$$\mathbb{E}\left[-X^k e^{-S_m/\beta_m} + \frac{S_m}{\alpha_k \beta_m} e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right] = \left(\frac{-\beta_m}{|I_m|} + \frac{1}{\alpha_k}\right)\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} e^{-S_m/\beta_m}\right], \quad (3.14)$$

for  $k \in I_m$ . Hence, substituting (3.13)-(3.14) into (3.5) brings, for  $k \in I_m$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}\rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \{I.\}) &= \left(\frac{-\beta_m}{|I_m|} + \frac{1}{\alpha_k}\right)\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}\left[\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}\right] + \frac{d_m}{\alpha_k \beta_m} \\ &= -\mu + \frac{1}{\alpha_k} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{(-B)}\right) + \frac{\sigma^2}{\beta_m} \left(1 - \frac{|I_m|}{2\alpha_k \beta_m}\right).\end{aligned}\quad (3.15)$$

In order to find a Nash equilibrium, we evaluate the quantity

$$\eta^k(\{I.\}) := \frac{1}{\beta_m} \left(1 - \frac{|I_m|}{2\alpha_k \beta_m}\right) = \alpha_k \frac{\prod_{\{j \in I_m: j \neq k\}} \alpha_j}{\sum_{j \in I_m} \alpha_j} \left(1 - \frac{|I_m| \prod_{\{j \in I_m: j \neq k\}} \alpha_j}{2 \sum_{j \in I_m} \alpha_j}\right); \quad k \in I_m. \quad (3.16)$$

Note that  $\eta^k(\{I.\})$  is an increasing function of  $\alpha_k$ , and thus if  $\arg \max_{k \in I_m} \alpha_k = k_0$ , then

$$\eta^{k_0}(\{I.\}) \geq \eta^k(\{I.\}); \quad \text{for every } k \in I_m. \quad (3.17)$$

However, it is not necessarily true that  $\rho^{k_0}(\mathbf{X}; \{I.\}) \geq \rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \{I.\})$  for every  $k \geq 0$ , because of the term  $(1/\alpha_k) \log(\beta/(-B))$ . Note that  $\eta^k(\{I.\})$  is a decreasing function of  $|I_m|/\beta_m$  and is a decreasing function of  $\beta_m$ .

If  $N = 2$  and  $0 < \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_2$ , then  $\hat{\mathbf{a}} := (1, 1)$  is a unique Nash equilibrium. This is

directly verified by the inequalities

$$\eta^k(\mathcal{C}(\hat{\mathbf{a}})) = \alpha_k \cdot \frac{\alpha_1 \alpha_2}{(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)^2} \leq \frac{\alpha_k}{4} < \frac{\alpha_k}{2} = \eta^k(\{\{1\}, \{2\}\}); \quad k = 1, 2, \quad (3.18)$$

and hence,  $\rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\hat{\mathbf{a}})) < \rho^k(\mathbf{X}; \mathcal{C}(\hat{\mathbf{a}}^{-k}, \mathbf{a}))$  for every  $k = 1, 2$ , and  $\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}$  which is not equivalent to  $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ .

If  $N \geq 2$ , and  $0 < \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_2 \leq \dots \leq \alpha_N$ , then  $\hat{\mathbf{a}} := (1, \dots, 1)$  is a Nash equilibrium for a similar calculation to (3.18),

$$\begin{aligned} \eta^k(\mathcal{C}(\hat{\mathbf{a}})) &= \alpha_k \cdot \frac{\prod_{i \neq k} \alpha_i}{\alpha_1 + \dots + \alpha_k} \left( 1 - \frac{N \prod_{i \neq k} \alpha_i}{2(\alpha_1 + \dots + \alpha_N)} \right) \\ &< \alpha_k \cdot \frac{\prod_{i \neq k} \alpha_i}{\alpha_1 + \dots + \alpha_k} \left( 1 - \frac{\prod_{i \neq k} \alpha_i}{(\alpha_1 + \dots + \alpha_N)} \right) \\ &\leq \frac{\alpha_k}{4} < \frac{\alpha_k}{2} = \eta^k(\{\{k\}, \{1, \dots, N\} \setminus \{k\}\}); \quad k = 1, \dots, N. \end{aligned}$$

There is no reason to move out of the alliance of  $\{1, \dots, N\}$  and to become an outcast. This observation can be generalized: under this setup, there is no reason to move out of the alliance of a group  $I_m$  of size greater than or equal to 2, *i.e.*,  $|I_m| \geq 2$  and to become an outcast.

We conjecture that  $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$  is unique Nash equilibrium under a wide range of configurations of  $\alpha$ 's. For each  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}) = \{I_m, m = 1, \dots, h\}$ , let us consider the group heads  $k_m$ ,  $m = 1, \dots, h$  and the head of the group heads  $k^*$  by

$$k_m := \arg \max_{\ell \in I_m} \alpha_\ell; \quad m = 1, \dots, h, \quad k^* := \arg \max_{k \in \{k_1, \dots, k_m\}} \eta^k(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})). \quad (3.19)$$

Let us denote by  $m^*$  the group name of  $k^*$ , *i.e.*,  $k^* \in I_{m^*}$ . By setting the group heads

and the head of the group heads, we see from the observation made in (3.17) that

$$\eta^{k_m}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) \geq \eta^\ell(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})); \quad \text{for every } \ell \in I_m, \quad m = 1, \dots, h, \quad (3.20)$$

and

$$\eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) \geq \eta^{k_m}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})); \quad \text{for every } m = 1, \dots, h. \quad (3.21)$$

**Lemma 3.2.1.** *If there is a group head  $k_* \in \{k_1, \dots, k_m\} \setminus \{k^*\}$  in a group  $m_*$ , i.e.,  $k_* \in I_{m_*}$  from  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}) = \{I_m, m = 1, \dots, h\}$  such that*

$$\frac{\alpha_{k^*}}{\alpha_{k_*}} \leq 1 + \frac{1}{|I_{m_*}|}, \quad (3.22)$$

then  $\eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) \geq \eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\tilde{\mathbf{a}}))$ , where  $\mathcal{C}(\tilde{\mathbf{a}}) = \{\tilde{I}_m, m = 1, \dots, h\}$  is obtained only by removing  $k^*$  from group  $m^*$  and adding  $k^*$  into group  $m_*$ , that is,

$$\tilde{I}_{m^*} := I_{m^*} \setminus \{k^*\}, \quad \tilde{I}_{m_*} := I_{m_*} \cup \{k^*\}.$$

In addition, either if the inequality in (3.22) is strict or if the strict inequality  $\eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) > \eta^{k_*}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}))$  holds, then  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})$  is not a Nash equilibrium.

*Proof:*

We rewrite  $\eta^k(\{I.\}) = f(1/\beta_m; |I_m|/(2\alpha_k))$  in (3.16) with a quadratic function  $f(x; a) := x(1 - ax)$ ,  $x > 0$ . Note that  $f(0) = 0 = f(1/a)$  and  $f(x; a)$  is increasing in the interval  $(0, 1/(2a))$ . For each group head  $k_1, \dots, k_h$ , we have

$$\frac{|I_m|}{\alpha_{k_m}} \leq \sum_{k \in I_m} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} = \beta_m \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{1}{\beta_m} \leq \frac{\alpha_{k_m}}{|I_m|}; \quad m = 1, \dots, h.$$

Thus, with  $a = |I_m|/(2\alpha_{k_m})$ , we have  $1/\beta_m \leq 1/(2a)$ , and hence,  $x \mapsto f(x; |I_m|/(2\alpha_k))$

is increasing in the interval  $(0, 1/\beta_m)$  for  $m = 1, \dots, h$ .

By the definition of  $k^*$  in (3.19) and (3.21), we have

$$\begin{aligned}\eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) &= \frac{1}{\beta_{m^*}} \left(1 - \frac{|I_{m^*}|}{2\alpha_{k^*}\beta_{m^*}}\right) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{\beta_{m_*}} \left(1 - \frac{|I_{m_*}|}{2\alpha_{k^*}\beta_{m_*}}\right) = f\left(\frac{1}{\beta_{m_*}}; \frac{|I_{m_*}|}{2\alpha_{k^*}}\right) = \eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})).\end{aligned}\tag{3.23}$$

Then by the monotonicity of  $x \mapsto f(x; |I_{m_*}|/(2\alpha_{k^*}))$  in the interval  $(0, 1/\beta_{m_*})$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned}\eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})) &\geq f\left(\frac{1}{\beta_{m_*}}; \frac{|I_{m_*}|}{2\alpha_{k^*}}\right) \geq f\left(\frac{1}{\beta_{m_*} + (1/\alpha_{k^*})}; \frac{|I_{m_*}|}{2\alpha_{k^*}}\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{\beta_{m_*} + (1/\alpha_{k^*})} \left(1 - \frac{|I_{m_*}|}{2\alpha_{k^*}(\beta_{m_*} + (1/\alpha_{k^*}))}\right) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{\beta_{m_*} + (1/\alpha_{k^*})} \left(1 - \frac{|I_{m_*}| + 1}{2\alpha_{k^*}(\beta_{m_*} + (1/\alpha_{k^*}))}\right) = \eta^{k^*}(\mathcal{C}(\tilde{\mathbf{a}})),\end{aligned}\tag{3.24}$$

where we used (3.22) in the last inequality and  $\mathcal{C}(\tilde{\mathbf{a}})$  is obtained only by removing  $k^*$  from the group  $m^*$  and adding  $k^*$  into the group  $m_*$ . Thus, for  $k^*$  it is better to move from  $m^*$  to  $m_*$ , and hence,  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})$  is not a Nash equilibrium.

**Example 3.2.3.** Suppose that we have  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}) = \{I_m\}_{m=1,2,3}$ ,  $I_1 = \{1, 2\}$ ,  $I_2 = \{3, 4, 5\}$ ,  $I_3 = \{6, 7, 8, 9, 10\}$  with

$$\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 2, \quad \alpha_3 = \alpha_4 = \alpha_5 = 3, \quad \alpha_6 = \alpha_7 = \alpha_8 = \alpha_9 = 4, \quad \alpha_{10} = 5.$$

The condition (3.22) holds with a strictly inequality, and  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})$  is not a Nash equilibrium.

**Example 3.2.4.** Suppose that we have  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a}) = \{I_m\}_{m=1,2}$ ,  $I_1 = \{1, 2, 3\}$ ,  $I_2 = \{4, 5, 6\}$  with

$$\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 2, \quad \alpha_3 = 4, \quad \alpha_4 = \alpha_5 = \alpha_6 = 3.$$

The condition (3.22) does not hold, however,  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{a})$  is not a Nash equilibrium.

### 3.2.3 Case discussion: correlated Gaussian distribution

In a system with  $N$  individuals, we assume the joint distribution of  $\mathbf{X} = (X^i, i = 1, \dots, N)^T$  follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution, that is,  $\mathbf{X} \sim N(\mu, \Sigma)$  where  $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^N$  and  $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$  is positive semi-definite. The exponential utility functions for  $N$  individuals have positive parameters  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_N)$ .

For every partition set  $I_m$ ,  $m = 1, \dots, h$ , define a group vector  $A_m \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times N}$  which consists of only 0's and 1's. For all the  $j \in I_m$ , the  $j$ -th element in  $A_m$  is 1, otherwise 0. For example, in a 4-player system, if individuals 1 and 4 in group 1, and individuals 2 and 3 in group 2, the corresponding vectors for the two groups are  $A_1 = (1, 0, 0, 1)$  and  $A_2 = (0, 1, 1, 0)$ . Then, following (3.3), we have

$$S_m = \sum_{i \in I_m} X^i = A_m \mathbf{X} \sim N(A_m \mu, A_m \Sigma A_m^T) \stackrel{def}{=} N(\mu_m^s, (\sigma_m^s)^2). \quad (3.25)$$

The results in Appendix B.1.10 produce that, for  $m = 1, \dots, h$  and for  $k \in I_m$ ,

$$d_m = \beta_m \log \left( -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E}[\exp(-S_m/\beta_m)] \right) = \beta_m \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \right) - \mu_m^s + \frac{(\sigma_m^s)^2}{2\beta_m},$$

and the systemic risk allocation of individual  $k$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^k] &= \mathbb{E} \left[ Y_{\mathbf{X}}^k \cdot \frac{d\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}{d\mathbb{P}} \right] = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ (-X^k + \frac{1}{\alpha_k \beta_m} S_m + \frac{1}{\alpha_k \beta_m} d_m) \cdot e^{-S_m/\beta_m} \right]}{\mathbb{E}(e^{-S_m/\beta_m})} \\ &= -\mu_k + \frac{1}{\alpha_k} \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \right) + \frac{1}{\beta_m} A_m \Sigma_{[:,k]} - \frac{(\sigma_m^s)^2}{2\beta_m^2 \alpha_k}. \end{aligned} \quad (3.26)$$

*Remark 3.2.1* (Effect of Mean). From the above formula of the systemic risk allocation for individual  $k$ , we find that the mean of individual  $k$  has no effect on her risk allocation no matter which group she belongs to. So in the following discussion, without loss of

generality, we take all means to be the constant zero.

*Remark 3.2.2* (Comparison between Trivial Grouping and Multi-Groups). The total risk allocation for multiple groups ( $h \geq 2$ ) is always greater than the total risk allocation for the trivial grouping ( $h = 1$ ). The proof of this statement will be given in Appendix B.1.1, and we refer interested readers to read “Monotonicity” in [2] for general proof free of the distribution of risk factors.

In the following, we present three concrete examples to help better understand on banks’ rational choices under this fair risk allocation.

*Claim 3.2.1.* If  $\mathbf{X} = (X^i, i = 1, \dots, N)^T$  has the same standard deviation  $\sigma > 0$  and correlation coefficient  $\rho \in [-1, 1)$ , and the utility parameters are identical, denoted by  $\alpha (> 0)$ . Then there is only one trivial Nash equilibrium, that is, all individuals being in the same group.

*Claim 3.2.2.* In the case of  $N = 4$ , we assume all the utility parameter  $\alpha_i$ s are the same and equal to 1, and all individuals have the same standard deviation denoted by  $\sigma > 0$ . If the correlation matrix is a block matrix with uniform correlation coefficient, *i.e.*, the

correlation matrix is given by 
$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho & 0 & 0 \\ \rho & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & \rho \\ 0 & 0 & \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix},$$
 we have the following conclusion about

Nash equilibrium.

- If  $\rho \in [-\frac{3}{13}, \frac{3}{8}]$ , there is no nontrivial Nash equilibrium.
- If  $\rho \in [-1, -\frac{3}{13})$ , grouping ”{1,2}-{3,4}”, *i.e.*, the first two and the second two individuals are in two different groups, is a nontrivial Nash equilibrium.
- If  $\rho \in (\frac{3}{8}, 1]$ , grouping ”{1,3}-{2,4}” and ”{1,4}-{2,3}” are both nontrivial Nash equilibriums for the system..

According to the claim, when the correlation is not strong, all individuals tend to be together to form a trivial Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, negatively correlated individuals tend to be in the same group while positively correlated individuals tend to be separate

*Claim 3.2.3.* In the case of  $N = 5$ , we assume the standard deviation are uniform and the

$\alpha_i$ 's are 1. If the covariance matrix is  $\Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma^2 & \rho\sigma^2 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \rho\sigma^2 & \sigma^2 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \sigma^2 & \rho\sigma^2 & \rho\sigma^2 \\ 0 & 0 & \rho\sigma^2 & \sigma^2 & \rho\sigma^2 \\ 0 & 0 & \rho\sigma^2 & \rho\sigma^2 & \sigma^2 \end{pmatrix}$ , which is of

block form with positive standard deviation  $\sigma$  and the correlation coefficient  $\rho \in (-1, 1)$ .

- If  $\rho \in (-1, -2/7]$ , grouping “ $\{1, 2\} - \{3, 4, 5\}$ ” is a Nash equilibrium.
- If  $\rho \in (-2/7, 1)$ , there is no nontrivial Nash equilibrium.
- Grouping “ $\{1, 2, 3\} - \{4, 5\}$ ” can not be a non-trivial Nash for any value of  $\rho$ .

We give derivations of Claims 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 in Appendix B.1.2, B.1.3 and B.1.4, respectively. The result further shows that individuals tend to stay with highly negatively correlated individuals to minimize the systemic risk if they exist. It is impossible for individuals to stay with correlated and uncorrelated individuals at the same time except for the trivial case when all individuals are together.

### 3.2.4 Systemic Risk Measure on Overlapping Groups

To further study the systemic risk measure under exponential utility functions, we generalize the systemic risk allocation for  $N$  individuals on disjoint groups in section section 3.1 to the risk allocation for them on overlapping groups where they can choose multiple groups to allocate their risks. Assuming there are at most  $h$  groups, the weighted

risk factors for the  $n^{\text{th}}$ -individual assigned to multiple groups are labelled as  $w_{n,k}X^n$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, h$  with  $\sum_{k=1}^h w_{n,k} = 1$ . In the weight  $w_{n,k}$ , the index  $k$  refers to the group number the individual  $n$  joins and the weight can be of any value between 0 and 1. If  $w_{n,k} = 0$  for some  $k$ , then we say the individual is not in the  $k$ -th group. Therefore, we can extend the systemic risk measure given by (3.1) to a general measure  $\rho$  defined by

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) := \inf \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^h Y^{n,k} : \mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{C}_0^{\text{new}}, \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^h u_n(w_{n,k}X^n + Y^{n,k}) \right] = B \right\}, \quad (3.27)$$

where we take  $u_n(x) = -\frac{1}{\alpha_n}e^{-\alpha_n x}$  as exponential utility functions;  $h$  is the maximum number of groups individuals can contribute to in total and it is a finite integer; and the random allocations  $\mathcal{C}_0^{\text{new}}$  is given by

$$\mathcal{C}_0^{\text{new}} = \left\{ \mathbf{Y} = (Y^{i,j}, 1 \leq i \leq N, 1 \leq j \leq h) \in L^0(\mathbb{R}^{N \times h}) : \exists d = (d_1, \dots, d_h) \in \mathbb{R}^h, \sum_{i=1}^N Y^{i,j} = d_j, \text{ for } j = 1, \dots, h \right\}. \quad (3.28)$$

*Remark 3.2.3.* Here  $h$  is an integer fixed a priori, to eliminate the situation that an individual wants to split the risk  $X^i$  into infinitely many groups. An alternative way is to impose a minimum value requirement for non-zero weights to avoid too many groups for an individual to participate in, denoted by  $w^{\min}$ . Then, naturally  $h = \lfloor \frac{1}{w^{\min}} \rfloor \cdot N$ .

*Remark 3.2.4.* The generalized system (3.27)-(3.28) still meets the assumptions made in [2]. Because the measure on overlapping groups can be seen as the measure (3.1) on disjoint groups with more individuals with weighted risk factors. Thus the existence and uniqueness of optimal allocation solution  $\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{X}}$  of the primal problem (3.27) is guaranteed, according to the the discussion in Section 4 of [2].



Given the grouping for all individuals, we define the family of sets

$$\{I_j := \{i \in \mathbb{N} : w_{i,j} > 0, i = 1, \dots, N\}, j = 1, \dots, h\}. \quad (3.29)$$

**Theorem 3.2.1.** *The optimal value of  $\rho(\mathbf{X})$  in (3.27) is attained by*

$$d_j = \beta_j \log \left( -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right] \right), \quad (3.30)$$

$$Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j} = \left[ -w_{i,j} X^i + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} (S_j + d_j) \right] \mathbf{1}_{w_{i,j} > 0}, \quad (3.31)$$

where  $S_j = \sum_{i=1}^N w_{i,j} X^i = \sum_{i \in I_j} w_{i,j} X^i$ ,  $\beta_j = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \mathbf{1}_{w_{i,j} > 0} = \sum_{i \in I_j} \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, h$  and  $i = 1, \dots, N$ ,  $\beta = \sum_{j=1}^h \beta_j = \sum_{j=1}^h \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \mathbf{1}_{w_{i,j} > 0}$ , and

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{j=1}^h \sum_{i=1}^N Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j} = \sum_{j=1}^h d_j. \quad (3.32)$$

The systemic risk allocation for individual  $i$  is  $\sum_{j=1}^h \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j}]$  with the density

$$\frac{d\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j}{d\mathbb{P}} := \frac{e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}}}{\mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right]}, \quad j = 1, \dots, h.$$

The proof of Theorem 3.2.1 is left to Appendix B.1.5. According to the theorem, we define

$$\rho^i(\mathbf{X}) := \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}} [Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i] = \sum_{j=1}^h \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j}] = \sum_{j=1}^h \mathbb{E} \left[ Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j} \cdot \frac{d\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j}{d\mathbb{P}} \right], \quad (3.33)$$

as the total fair systemic risk allocation for individual  $i$ .

*Remark 3.2.5.* Compared with the disjoint group case well discussed in Biagini et al.

[2], the model here can be seen as an extended disjoint group case, where we consider that one individual can be divided into several sub-individuals and join different groups. Thus, for the measures  $\{Q_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j}, 1 \leq i \leq N, 1 \leq j \leq h\}$ , we have  $Q_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j} = Q_{\mathbf{X}}^{l,k} := Q_{\mathbf{X}}^m$  if  $j, k \in I_m$  for group  $m = 1, \dots, h$ .

### 3.2.4.1 Sensitivity analysis

Based on the main theorem 3.2.1, we perform a sensitivity analysis by adding a perturbation on the risk factors. Consider the risk factors are given by  $\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}$  where  $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $\mathbf{X} := (X^1, \dots, X^N)$ ,  $\mathbf{Z} := (Z^1, \dots, Z^N)$  on a probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ , we have for  $w_{i,j} > 0$ ,

$$Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^{i,j} = -w_{i,j}(X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^Z) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} d_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}, \quad (3.34)$$

$$d_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}} = \beta_j \log \left( -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-\frac{S_j + \varepsilon S_j^Z}{\beta_j}} \right] \right), \quad (3.35)$$

where  $S_j = \sum_{i \in I_j} w_{i,j} X^i$ ,  $S_j^Z = \sum_{i \in I_j} w_{i,j} Z^i$  and  $S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}} = S_j + \varepsilon S_j^Z$ .

**Proposition 3.2.1.** *Let  $\rho$  be the systemic risk measure in (3.27).*

- *Marginal risk contribution of group  $j$ :*

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} d_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}} \Big|_{\varepsilon=0} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-S_j^Z], \quad j = 1, \dots, h. \quad (3.36)$$

- *Local causal responsibility for individual  $i$  in group  $j$ :*

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}] \Big|_{\varepsilon=0} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i], \quad i \in I_j. \quad (3.37)$$

- *Marginal risk allocation for individual  $i$  in group  $j$ :*

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}] \Big|_{\varepsilon=0} &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i] - \frac{1}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} (Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j}, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i] + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} (X^i, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} (S_j, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}). \end{aligned} \quad (3.38)$$

We leave the proof of Proposition 3.2.1 to Appendix B.1.6. Note that if we replace  $\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j$  with  $\mathbb{P}$ , none of the results above hold. To interpret these formulas, first we look at the first term in (3.38),  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i]$ . This term contains only the increment  $Z^i$  in individual  $i$  and thus is not a systemic contribution. Summing this term over all individuals in group  $j$  gives

$$\sum_{i \in I_j} \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}] \Big|_{\varepsilon=0} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}] = \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} d_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}} \Big|_{\varepsilon=0}. \quad (3.39)$$

This shows the first term contributes to the marginal risk allocation of individual  $i$  without any systemic influence. When  $Z^i$  is positive, which means an increment is added, it results in a risk deduction, regardless of the relation to other individuals. When  $\mathbf{Z}$  is deterministic, we can see, in (3.38), the marginal risk allocation to individual  $i$  in group  $j$  is  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i] = -w_{i,j} Z^i$  and the covariance terms don't exist anymore.

To better study the effect of other terms in (3.38), we take  $\mathbf{Z} = Z^k \mathbf{e}_k$  where  $k \neq i$ . Then from (3.38) we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon Z^k \mathbf{e}_k}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon Z^k \mathbf{e}_k}^{i,j}] \Big|_{\varepsilon=0} = \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} (X^i, Z^k) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} (S_j, Z^k). \quad (3.40)$$

Supposing that  $\frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} (X^i, Z^k) < 0$ , we look at the first term which relates to the covariance between  $(X^i, Z^k)$ . When they have a negative correlation under the systemic risk probability  $\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j$ , the increase in individual  $k$  will result in a decrease of the risk

allocation for individual  $i$ . That means, individual  $i$  takes advantage of the decrease of others. Since the overall marginal risk allocation of group  $j$  doesn't change according to (3.39), some other individuals in the group would pay for this advantage. This is related to the last term.

The last term in (3.38) or (3.40) contains the systemic contribution  $-\frac{1}{\beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j}(S_j, Z^k)$  which only depends on the group  $S_j$ , and the systemic relevance part  $1/\alpha_i$  of individual  $i$ . The systemic component is distributed among the individuals based on  $1/\alpha_i$ . In addition, this term compensates for possible risk decrease in the second term of (3.38), since the overall marginal risk allocation of group  $j$  is fixed.

**Proposition 3.2.2.** (*Sensitivity with respect to weights*). For any  $i, j$  such that  $w_{i,j} > 0$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^{i,j}]}{\partial w_{i,j}} &= -\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [X^i] - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j}(X^i, S_j) + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Var}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j}(X^i); \\ &= -\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [X^i] - \frac{1}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} \left( X^i, \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} S_j - w_{i,j} X^i \right) \end{aligned} \quad (3.41)$$

We give the proof in Appendix B.1.7.

### 3.2.4.2 Monotonicity

In a grouping set sequence  $\{I_1, \dots, I_h\}$ , for some set  $I_m$ , assume there is a non-empty subset  $I_{m'}$  of  $I_m$  and for every  $k \in I_{m'}$ , assume the weight for risk factor  $X^k$  is  $w_{k,m'} \in (0, w_{k,m}]$ . Then define  $I_{m''} = \{k \in I_m : w_{k,m} - w_{k,m'} > 0\}$  and the corresponding weights are  $w_{k,m''} = w_{k,m} - w_{k,m'}$  for all  $k \in I_{m''}$ . Then there will be  $h + 1$  groups and the new grouping set sequence is  $\{I_1, \dots, I_{m'}, I_{m''}, \dots, I_h\}$  while the weights structure are the same as before except those of groups  $I_{m'}$  and  $I_{m''}$ . The optimal risk allocations under the new grouping of the primal problem coincide with  $Y^{k,r}$ ,  $k \in I_r$ , for  $r \neq m$ .

For  $r = m$ ,  $k \in I_{m'}$  or  $I_{m''}$ , we first know  $w_{k,m'} \leq w_{k,m}$ ,  $w_{k,m''} \leq w_{k,m}$  and we have the following.

**Proposition 3.2.3.** *Under the above setup, define  $Y^{k,m}$ ,  $k \in I_m$ , the optimal allocation of group  $m$  to the primal problem given  $h$  groups. Define  $Y^{k,m'}$ ,  $k \in I_{m'}$  and  $Y^{k,m''}$ ,  $k \in I_{m''}$  the optimal allocations of groups  $m'$  and  $m''$  to the primal problem given  $h + 1$  groups, where  $I_{m'} \in I_m$  and  $I_{m''} \in I_m$ . Then*

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m} \left[ \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} Y^{k,m} \right] \leq \eta'_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta'}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{1}{\eta'_m} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right) \right] \right\}, \quad (3.42)$$

where  $\eta'_m = \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} \frac{1}{\alpha_k}$ .

Particularly, if both  $\sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k$  and  $\sum_{k \in I_{m''}} w_{k,m''} X^k$  are nonnegative, it holds that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m} \left[ \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} Y^{k,m} \right] \leq d_{m'}, \quad \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m} \left[ \sum_{k \in I_{m''}} \frac{w_{k,m''}}{w_{k,m}} Y^{k,m} \right] \leq d_{m''},$$

thus

$$\sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} Y^{k,m} + \sum_{k \in I_{m''}} \frac{w_{k,m''}}{w_{k,m}} Y^{k,m} = \sum_{k \in I_m} Y^{k,m} = d_m \leq d_{m'} + d_{m''},$$

where  $d_{m'} = \beta'_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta'}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{1}{\beta'_m} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right) \right] \right\}$  and  $d_{m''}$  are the total risks of groups  $m'$  and  $m''$ . It points out that each individual profits from this decrease (of groups) by avoiding being (group) alone ( $I_m \sim I_{m'} \cup I_{m''}$ ).

Also, when the system allows only disjoint grouping, i.e., each individual joins groups with weight 1, the inequality (3.42) implies the monotonicity result in [2].

The proof is left to the Appendix B.1.8.

### 3.2.4.3 Generalized group formation and Nash equilibrium

For a game with  $N$  individuals and  $h$  groups, similar as before, we assume there are  $h$  buckets for each individual to choose which ones she belongs to and how much she puts. Therefore it induces a corresponding weight matrix for all individuals

$$\mathbf{W} = (w_{i,j}) = \begin{pmatrix} w_1 \\ \vdots \\ w_i \\ \vdots \\ w_N \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times h},$$

defined as their strategies to distribute their risks, in order to minimize the individual total risk allocation. Each vector  $w_i$  contains values of weights showing which groups individual  $i$  belongs to and how much she wants to distribute the risk. So there is a natural constraint:  $\sum_{j=1}^h w_{i,j} = 1$  for every  $i = 1, \dots, N$ . Recall that the weight of individual  $i$  in group  $j$  is denoted by  $w_{i,j} \in [0, 1]$ , and  $w_{i,j} = 0$  means individual  $i$  is not in group  $j$ ,  $w_{i,j} = 1$  means individual  $i$  only joins group  $j$ . The case  $w_{i,j} \in (0, 1)$  means, besides group  $j$ , individual  $i$  joins some other groups at the same time. Different sets of strategies may generate the same groups denoted by  $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{W})$ .

The objective function of individual  $i$  is defined by:

$$\rho^i(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{W})) := \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}} [Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i] = \sum_{j=1}^h \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{i,j}], \quad (3.43)$$

where  $i = 1, \dots, N$  and  $\rho^i$  is the total fair systemic risk allocation for individual  $i$  defined in (3.33).

$$\text{Let } \widehat{\mathbf{W}} = (\widehat{w}_{i,j}) = \begin{pmatrix} \widehat{w}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \widehat{w}_i \\ \vdots \\ \widehat{w}_N \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } (\widehat{\mathbf{W}}^{-i}, w^i) = \begin{pmatrix} \widehat{w}_1 \\ \vdots \\ w^i \\ \vdots \\ \widehat{w}_N \end{pmatrix} \text{ be the weight matrix } \widehat{\mathbf{W}} \text{ with}$$

the weight vector for individual  $i$ , *i.e.*, the  $i$ -th row, is replaced by a new vector  $w^i$  whose elements sum up to 1.

**Definition 3.2.2.** The grouping  $\mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{W}})$  defined by the weight matrix  $\widehat{\mathbf{W}}$  is a Nash equilibrium if for every  $i$  and any  $w^i$ ,

$$\rho^i(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{X}; \widehat{\mathbf{W}})) \leq \rho^i(\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{X}; \widehat{\mathbf{W}}^{-i}, w^i)),$$

*i.e.*, the systemic risk allocation of individual  $i$  is minimized under grouping  $\mathcal{C}(\widehat{\mathbf{W}})$ , given other individuals' strategies are  $\widehat{\mathbf{W}}^{-i}$ .

According the definition of Nash equilibrium, it is to be determined that when the grouping, determined by the matrix  $\mathbf{W}$ , is optimized and how individuals distribute their risks under Nash equilibrium.

*Remark 3.2.6.* One can not claim that in this overlapping group case, it is still true that a single group with all the individuals is a (trivial) Nash equilibrium. It follows from the proof in Appendix. B.1.9. When  $B$ , the minimal level of expected utility, is small, it means the system has a high tolerance with respect to risks. Then individuals tend to split into different groups so there is no trivial Nash equilibrium. It can help explain why banks tend to join multiple central clearing counterparties (CCPs) to allocate their risks.

### 3.2.4.4 Case discussion: correlated Gaussian distribution

In this section, we take Gaussian distribution for the risk factors for simplicity and discuss in detail. Similar to section 3.2.3, assume the joint distribution of  $\mathbf{X} = (X^i, i = 1, \dots, N)^T$  follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution, that is,  $\mathbf{X} \sim N(\mu, \Sigma)$  where  $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^N$  and  $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$  is positive semi-definite. And define the column vector of  $\mathbf{W}$  as a group vector given by

$$A_j = \begin{cases} 0, & i \notin I_j \\ w_{i,j}, & i \in I_j, \quad i = 1, \dots, N \end{cases} \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times N}, \quad \text{for } j = 1, \dots, h.$$

Then the group sum follows

$$S_j = \sum_{i \in I_j} w_{i,j} X^i = A_j \mathbf{X} \sim N(A_j \mu, A_j \Sigma A_j^T) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} N(\mu_j^s, (\sigma_j^s)^2),$$

where

$$\mu_j^s = \sum_{k \in I_j} w_{k,j} \mu_k, \quad (\sigma_j^s)^2 = \sum_{m,k \in I_j} w_{m,j} w_{k,j} \sigma_{km}.$$

Using the results in Appendix B.1.10, we have for  $j = 1, \dots, h$  and for  $i \in I_j$ :

$$d_j = \beta_j \log \left( -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E}[\exp(-S_j/\beta_j)] \right) = \beta_j \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \right) - \mu_j^s + \frac{(\sigma_j^s)^2}{2\beta_j},$$



and the systemic risk allocation of individual  $i$  in group  $j$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j}[Y_{\mathbf{x}}^{i,j}] &= \mathbb{E}\left[Y_{\mathbf{x}}^{i,j} \cdot \frac{d\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j}{d\mathbb{P}}\right] = \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[\left(-w_{i,j}X^i + \frac{1}{\alpha_i\beta_j}S_j + \frac{1}{\alpha_i\beta_j}d_j\right) \cdot e^{-S_j/\beta_j}\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left(e^{-S_j/\beta_j}\right)} \\
&= -w_{i,j}\left(\mu_i - \frac{1}{\beta_j}A_j\Sigma_{[i]}\right) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i\beta_j}\left(\mu_j^s - \frac{(\sigma_j^s)^2}{\beta_j}\right) \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{\alpha_i\beta_j}\left(\beta_j \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \mu_j^s + \frac{(\sigma_j^s)^2}{2\beta_j}\right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - w_{i,j}\mu_i + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j}A_j\Sigma_{[i]} - \frac{(\sigma_j^s)^2}{2\beta_j^2\alpha_i}, \tag{3.44}
\end{aligned}$$

where  $A_j\Sigma_{[i]} = \sum_{k \in I_j} w_{k,j}\sigma_{ki}$ .

**Optimal Weights in a General System** Continuing with the Gaussian distribution assumption, we use the formula (3.44) to first find the optimal weight vector  $w^*$  for a given individual assuming the weight structure for other individuals is known. Then we search for Nash equilibrium numerically using an algorithm in section 3.2.5. That is, we minimize the total fair systemic risk allocation of individual  $i$  defined in (3.33) over the weight distributions  $w_i = (w_{i,j}, j = 1, \dots, N)$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
\min_{w_i} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}} [Y^i] &= \min_{w_i} \sum_{j=1}^h \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [Y^{i,j}] \\
&= \min_{w_{i,j}} \sum_{j=1}^h \mathbf{1}_{w_{i,j}>0} \left[ \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - w_{i,j}\mu_i + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j}A_j\Sigma_{[i]} - \frac{(\sigma_j^s)^2}{2\beta_j^2\alpha_i} \right],
\end{aligned}$$

subject to

$$\sum_{j=1}^h w_{i,j} \mathbf{1}_{w_{i,j}>0} = 1.$$

For simplicity, we consider the problem when individual  $i$  joins at most two groups to discuss the optimal weights.

**Risk Allocation under at most Two Groups** When individual  $i$  joins at most 2 groups, there are three cases to discuss about the weights. Without loss of generality, we assume the weights are denoted by  $(w_{i,1}, w_{i,2})$  for individual  $i$ , the weights for others are fixed and there is at least one other individual in group 1 and 2. Given that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}} [Y^i] = & \mathbf{1}_{w_{i,1} > 0} \left[ \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - w_{i,1}\mu_i + \frac{w_{i,1}}{\beta_1} A_1 \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{[i,i]} - \frac{(\sigma_1^s)^2}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right] \\ & + \mathbf{1}_{w_{i,2} > 0} \left[ \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - w_{i,2}\mu_i + \frac{w_{i,2}}{\beta_2} A_2 \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{[i,i]} - \frac{(\sigma_1^s)^2}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right], \end{aligned}$$

where  $\beta_j = \sum_{i \in \{k: w_{k,j} > 0\}} \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$  and  $\beta = \sum_{j=1}^h \beta_j$ , we discuss the following two boundary cases and one non-boundary case.

- Boundary case 1:  $(w_{i,1}, w_{i,2}) = (1, 0)$ , then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}} [Y^i] &= \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \mu_i + \frac{1}{\beta_1} A_1 \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{[i,i]} - \frac{(\sigma_1^s)^2}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \tag{3.45} \\ &= \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \mu_i + \frac{1}{\beta_1} \left( \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,1} \sigma_{ki} + \sigma_{ii} \right) \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \left( \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km} + 2 \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,1} \sigma_{ki} + \sigma_{ii} \right). \end{aligned}$$

- Boundary case 2:  $(w_{i,1}, w_{i,2}) = (0, 1)$ , then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}} [Y^i] &= \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \mu_i + \frac{1}{\beta_2} A_2 \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{[i,i]} - \frac{(\sigma_2^s)^2}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \tag{3.46} \\ &= \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \mu_i + \frac{1}{\beta_2} \left( \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,2} \sigma_{ki} + \sigma_{ii} \right) \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \left( \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km} + 2 \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,2} \sigma_{ki} + \sigma_{ii} \right). \end{aligned}$$

In the above formulas,  $\beta_1 = \sum_{k \neq i, w_{k,1} > 0} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} + \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$ ,  $\beta_2 = \sum_{k \neq i, w_{k,2} > 0} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} + \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$  and

$$\beta = \sum_{k \neq i, w_{k,1} > 0} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} + \sum_{k \neq i, w_{k,2} > 0} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} + \frac{1}{\alpha_i}.$$

- Non-boundary case:  $(w_{i,1}, w_{i,2}) = (w, 1 - w)$ , while  $0 < w < 1$ . Then

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}} [Y^i] = \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta'}{-B} \right) - \mu_i + \frac{w}{\beta_1} A'_1 \Sigma_{[i]} + \frac{1-w}{\beta_2} A'_2 \Sigma_{[i]} - \frac{(\sigma'_1)^2}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{(\sigma'_2)^2}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \quad (3.47)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta'}{-B} \right) - \mu_i \\ &+ \frac{w}{\beta_1} \left( \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,1} \sigma_{ki} + w \sigma_{ii} \right) + \frac{1-w}{\beta_2} \left( \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,2} \sigma_{ki} + (1-w) \sigma_{ii} \right) \\ &- \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \left( \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km} + 2w \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,1} \sigma_{ki} + w^2 \sigma_{ii} \right) \\ &- \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \left( \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km} + 2(1-w) \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,2} \sigma_{ki} + (1-w)^2 \sigma_{ii} \right), \end{aligned}$$

where  $\beta_1, \beta_2$  are the same as before but  $\beta' = \beta_1 + \beta_2 = \beta + \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$ .

### Risk Allocation Comparison between Boundary and Non-boundary Cases

Here we compare the minimal risk allocation of non-boundary case (3.47) with the risks of boundary cases (3.45) and (3.46). First, we investigate the non-boundary case and prove  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}} [Y^i]$  in (3.47) is a quadratic function of  $w$  and the minimal point is  $w^*$  given

by (3.48). Taking partial derivative of (3.47) gives

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_x}[Y^i]}{\partial w} &= \frac{1}{\beta_1} \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,1} \sigma_{ki} + \frac{2w}{\beta_1} \sigma_{ii} - \frac{1}{\beta_2} \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,2} \sigma_{ki} - \frac{2(1-w)}{\beta_2} \sigma_{ii} \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \left( \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,1} \sigma_{ki} + w \sigma_{ii} \right) + \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \left( \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N w_{k,2} \sigma_{ki} + (1-w) \sigma_{ii} \right) \\
&= \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) \sigma_{ki} - \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ki} \\
&\quad + w \left[ \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} + \frac{2}{\beta_2} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} + \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \right] \sigma_{ii} - \left( \frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} = 0,
\end{aligned}$$

and hence,

$$w^* = \frac{\sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ki} - \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) \sigma_{ki} + \left( \frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii}}{\left[ \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} + \frac{2}{\beta_2} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} + \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \right] \sigma_{ii}} \quad (3.48)$$

is a minimizer, since

$$\frac{\partial^2 \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_x}[Y^i]}{\partial w^2} = \left[ \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} + \frac{2}{\beta_2} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} + \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \right] \sigma_{ii} > 0.$$

Here, note that  $\frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} > 0$ ,  $\frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} > 0$ , it is clear that the denominator of (3.48) is positive. If

$$\sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ki} - \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) \sigma_{ki} > - \left( \frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii},$$

we have  $w^* > 0$ ; and if

$$\sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ki} - \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) \sigma_{ki} < \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii},$$

we have  $w^* < 1$ .

In conclusion, let

$$A := \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ki} - \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) \sigma_{ki},$$

$$B_1 := \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii}, \quad B_2 := \left( \frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii}.$$

In non-boundary case, the local optimal weights for individual  $i$  joining two groups are non-zero, *i.e.*,

$$w^* = \frac{A + B_2}{B_1 + B_2} \in (0, 1) \quad \text{and} \quad 1 - w^* \in (0, 1)$$

if and only if  $-B_2 < A < B_1$ , *i.e.*,

$$-\left( \frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} < \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ki} - \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) \sigma_{ki} < \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii}. \quad (3.49)$$

In Appendix B.1.11, we investigate the condition further by reducing it to a simplified sufficient condition.

Then given  $w^*$ , the minimal risk of (3.47) is

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_x} [Y^i] \Big|_{w=w^*} \tag{3.50} \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta'}{-B} \right) - \mu_i + w^* \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left[ \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) - \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \right] \sigma_{ki} \\
&+ \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ki} + \left( \frac{(w^*)^2}{\beta_1} - \frac{(w^*)^2}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} + \left( \frac{(1-w^*)^2}{\beta_2} - \frac{(1-w^*)^2}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} \\
&- \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km} - \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km}.
\end{aligned}$$

- When the condition (3.49) holds, *i.e.*,  $w^* \in (0, 1)$ , we compare the minimal risk of non-boundary case (3.47) with that of boundary cases (3.45) and (3.46) in Appendix B.1.12. We conclude that when it holds that

$$\begin{cases} \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta'}{-B} \right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \right) < \frac{(A - B_1)^2}{2(B_1 + B_2)} + \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km}, \\ \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta'}{-B} \right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \right) < \frac{(A + B_2)^2}{2(B_1 + B_2)} + \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km}, \end{cases} \tag{3.51}$$

the minimal risk for individual  $i$  is achieved at  $(w_{i1}, w_{i2}) = (w^*, 1 - w^*)$  with non-zero weights. This is a necessary and sufficient condition to determine which one is superior when the condition (3.49) is true.

- When the condition (3.49) doesn't hold, if  $w^* \leq 0$  and

$$\frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta'}{-B} \right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \right) \geq \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km},$$

the minimal risk is achieved at the boundary case  $(w_{i1}, w_{i2}) = (0, 1)$ . If  $w^* \geq 1$  and

$$\frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m,k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km},$$

the minimal risk is achieved at  $(w_{i1}, w_{i2}) = (1, 0)$ .

### 3.2.5 Numerical Algorithm for Nash Equilibrium

For a game of (large)  $N$  individuals, it is hard to find the risk allocation of each individual associated with the grouping system. Instead, using the discussion introduced in section 3.1 and section 3.2.4.4, under the assumption of Gaussian distribution for risk factors, we can do numerical analysis of some examples via Python to search for Nash equilibrium for the system, such that no individual could achieve a smaller fair risk allocation by changing grouping or weights under the equilibrium. We conclude that, for the disjoint group case, non-trivial Nash equilibrium does not always exist and, neither does the overlapping group case. If we apply the overlapping group setup to the real world, that is, interpreting  $\sum_{n=1}^N Y^{n,j}$  as the default fund of the CCP  $j$  that is liable for any participating institution/bank, the numerical results indicate that big banks tend to join multiple CCPs while small banks tend to choose one.

#### 3.2.5.1 Numerical algorithm

In this section, we introduce numerical algorithms based on fictitious play. For the disjoint group case discussed in section 3.1:

1. Let  $N$  individuals be in  $N$  different groups, *i.e.*,  $a_n = n$  for  $1 \leq n \leq N$ , as the initial state;
2. At each stage, one individual is randomly picked with equal probability and it

chooses to join the group which gives the minimal risk allocation.

3. Step 2 is repeated until the grouping is stabilized, and no individual has the incentive to move anymore.

For the overlapping group case in section 3.2.4, the algorithm is similar. We take the number of groups  $h$  fixed and the initial weights for every individual in groups are randomly generated. The optimal weights at each stage are determined based on the discussion in section 3.2.4.4.

### 3.2.5.2 Numerical examples

**Example 3.2.5. Nearly-Block correlation matrix with positive, uniform  $\rho$ .**

In the case of  $N = 4$ , assuming the means and standard deviations are the same and  $\alpha_i$ 's are 1, *i.e.*,  $\alpha = [1, 1, 1, 1]$ ,  $\mu = [10, 10, 10, 10]$ ,  $\sigma_i \equiv \sigma$  for all  $i$ . The correlation matrix is

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1. & 0.4 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.4 & 1. & 0.05 & 0 \\ 0 & 0.05 & 1. & 0.4 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.4 & 1. \end{pmatrix}$$
, then for the disjoint group case, there exists one non trivial Nash equilibrium ”{1,3}-{2,4}” .

**Example 3.2.6.**  $N=10$ . When we take  $\rho_{ij} = 0.8$  for all  $i \neq j$ ,  $i, j = 1, \dots, N$  except  $\rho_{19} = -0.3$ . The values for other parameters are listed below:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu &= [1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 6, 6, 6, 7] \\ \sigma &= [4., 2.8, 1.6, 1., 3.8, 2.8, 0.9, 1.1, 4.2, 1.8] \\ \alpha &= [\underline{0.4}, 1.2, 1.8, 2.2, \underline{0.4}, 0.9, 2.8, 2.2, \underline{0.4}, 1.9] \\ B &= -8, \quad \text{The initial weights: } (w_{i,1}, w_{i,2}) = (0.3, 0.7) \quad \text{for all } i. \end{aligned} \tag{3.52}$$

By the algorithm presented in Section 3.2.5.1 we find the optimal weights for each in-




dividual one by one and it turns out there exists a non-trivial Nash equilibrium in the system:

$$\begin{pmatrix} w_{1,1} & w_{1,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ w_{i,1} & w_{i,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ w_{10,1} & w_{10,2} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1. & 0 \\ 0.51 & 0.49 \\ 0.48 & 0.52 \\ 0.44 & 0.56 \\ 0. & 1. \\ 0.49 & 0.51 \\ 0.44 & 0.56 \\ 0.45 & 0.55 \\ 1. & 0. \\ 0.49 & 0.51 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (3.53)$$

We can see for some individuals which seek risks, *i.e.*, with extremely small risk aversion parameters, they prefer being alone instead of separated.

As mentioned at the beginning of the section, the setup of systemic risks in the individual-group structure can be applied to the bank-CCP structure in real-life, where individuals are banks and groups are CCPs. Then an individual with a large utility parameter alpha represents a core bank which is very risk-averse.

**Example 3.2.7.** N=10 (less risk-averse individuals). In this example, the utility parameters are modified to compare with the previous example and we interpret the results using the “bank-CCP” language. Assuming there are two core banks (4,7) and eight peripheral banks, the correlation matrix is given in table 3.1.



	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1										
2	$\rho_{pp} = -.25$			$\rho_{pc} =$	$\rho_{pc'} =$			$\rho_{pp'} = .05$		
3				$-.12$	$-.09$					
4	$\rho_{pc} = -.12$				$\rho_{cc'} = .7$			$\rho_{cp'} = -.09$		
5	$\rho_{pc'} = -.09$			$\rho_{cc'} = .7$				$\rho_{c'p'} = -.12$		
6										
7										
8	$\rho_{pp'} = .05$			$\rho_{cp'} =$	$\rho_{c'p'} =$			$\rho_{p'p'} = -.25$		
9				$-.09$	$-.12$					
10										

Table 3.1: Correlation structure in Example 3.2.7: The left diagram shows partial correlations for 10 banks, where 4 and 5 are core banks and coefficients are labelled for each bank pair. The correlation table on the right shows the correlations matrix where diagonals are all 1 and  $\rho_{..}$  represents the correlation between two distinct banks. Subscripts  $c, c'$  stand for core bank 4 and core bank 5 respectively;  $p$  stands for peripheral banks 1,2,3 and  $p'$  stands for peripheral banks 6,7,8,9,10.

The values for other parameters are listed below:

$$\mu = [1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6, 7]$$

$$\sigma = [4., 2.8, 2.2, 1.7, 1.4, 3.2, 3.8, 1.9, 4.2, 2.5]$$

$$\alpha = [0.4, 1., 1.1, \underline{2.2}, \underline{2.8}, 0.9, 0.8, 1.4, 0.6, 1.3]$$

$$B = -8,$$

and the initial weights are randomly generated based on uniform distribution between 0

and 1 for every  $i$ . There exists a non-trivial Nash equilibrium in the system:

$$\begin{pmatrix} w_{1,1} & w_{1,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ w_{i,1} & w_{i,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ w_{10,1} & w_{10,2} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1. & 0. \\ 1. & 0. \\ 1. & 0. \\ 0.46 & 0.54 \\ 0.32 & 0.68 \\ 0. & 1. \\ 0. & 1. \\ 0. & 1. \\ 0. & 1. \\ 0. & 1. \end{pmatrix}. \quad (3.54)$$

We can see banks tend to stay with negatively correlated banks to mitigate the systemic risks. And risk-averse banks prefer splitting their risks by joining more CCPs.

The analysis of the systemic risk and grouping formation can be applied to the reality, and it turns out our numerical results are consistent with the choices of CCPs for banks and financial institutions. One example is shown below using real data.

**Example 3.2.8. Real-life Example.** We take two CCPs who are clearing the same products but in different region. One is the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. (CME), which operates two separate clearing services, one for commodity and financial futures and options, and one for interest rate swaps and swaptions. The other one is the European Commodity Clearing (ECC), which is a central clearing house in Europe specialising in energy and commodity products. We select 6 clearing members and list them in order: J.P. Morgan(JPM), Goldman Sachs(GS), BNP Paribas(BNP), StoneX Group(SNEX), Banco Santander(SAN) and Interactive Brokers Group(IBKR). Among these firms, JPM,

	JPM	GS	BNP	SNEX	SAN	IBKR
	1.	0.82	0.61	0.87	-0.27	0.86
	0.82	1.	0.86	0.83	0.04	0.79
	0.61	0.86	1.	0.65	0.25	0.60
	0.87	0.83	0.65	1.	-0.35	0.89
	-0.27	0.04	0.25	-0.35	1.	-0.24
	0.86	0.79	0.60	0.89	-0.24	1.
$\sigma$	0.262	0.245	0.235	0.264	0.236	0.233

Table 3.2: Correlation matrix and standard deviation for 6 banks in Example 3.2.8.

GS, SNEX and BNP are members of both CCPs. SAN is only in ECC while IBKR is only in CME.

We estimate the bank correlation matrix and standard deviation  $\sigma$  from banks' stock prices and list them in table 3.2. Without loss of generality, we assume the expected values of their risks are all 0 since they have no effect on Nash equilibria according to the formula (3.44). The values for  $B$  is the same as the previous example. The risk-aversion parameters are chosen according clearing members' "sizes":

$$\alpha = [2., 1.8, 1.7, 1.9, 1.2, 0.85],$$

and we list them in the following order: [ $JPM, GS, BNP, SNEX, SAN, IBKR$ ].

The numerical results show that there exists a non-trivial Nash equilibrium

$$\begin{pmatrix} w_{1,1} & w_{1,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ w_{6,1} & w_{6,2} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0.73 & 0.27 \\ 0.61 & 0.39 \\ 0.56 & 0.44 \\ 0.54 & 0.46 \\ 1. & 0. \\ 0. & 1. \end{pmatrix}. \quad (3.55)$$

This is consistent with the fact that the first four firms JPM, GS, BNP, SNEX are spitted and join in both CCP groups while SAN and IBKR belong to different CCPs. However, the distribution of weights cannot be verified here since related data of banks are not revealed in CCP documents.

### 3.2.6 Conclusion

In this section, we generalize the systemic risk measure proposed in [29, 2] by allowing individual banks to choose their preferred groups instead of being assigned to certain groups. This introduces realistic game features in the proposed models, and allows us to analyze the systemic risk for disjoint and overlapping groups (*e.g.*, central clearing counterparties (CCP)). We introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium for these new models, and analyze the optimal solution under the Gaussian distribution of the risk factor. We also provide an explicit solution for the individual banks' risk allocation and study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium both theoretically and numerically. The developed numerical algorithm can simulate scenarios of equilibrium, and we apply it to study the bank-CCP structure with real data and show the validity of the proposed model. Further research includes obtaining more actual data on bank balances and bank interconnections to conduct more in-depth research and analysis. The participation percentage of financial institutions is left to be validated and explained with more data. It is also valuable to consider CCP clearing fee charge as in [36] and its effect on the equilibrium.

## 3.3 Deep Learning for Systemic Risk Measures

**Deep Learning** Deep learning has been a hot topic in many fields that aims to establish an automatic algorithm to improve performance of tasks. The architectures of deep

learning are conceptually inspired by the structure of the brain and have been applied to fields including computer vision, natural language processing and scientific computing. The financial sector is adopting deep learning techniques and thus entering a new era of rapidly developing. Deep learning shows great power and enables significant opportunities in financial modeling and risk management; see for instance Heaton et al. [37] for financial prediction, Min and Hu [38], Hu [39] and Cao et al. [40] for solving stochastic differential games, Wise et al. [41] for deep hedging, to list a few. A very popular subclass of deep neural networks is generative adversarial network (GAN) [42] that contains two neural networks contesting with each other in a game. We refer the reader to Ni et al. [43] for an alternative GAN method with application of sequential data generation. The optimization of GAN is to solve a min-max problem, which sheds some lights on our algorithm design in this paper.

More precisely, our dual problem 2 is indeed a min-max problem that can be solved by finding two optima, the optimal probability measure  $\mathbf{Q}$  and the optimal random vector  $\mathbf{Z}$ . We hence use the same optimization procedures as GAN. However, our model is not exactly GAN. Classical GAN consists of a discriminator and a generator, where the generator takes random input, e.g. Gaussian random variables, and produces some distributed objects. On the other hand, we take an  $\omega$ -by- $\omega$  approach, and our input to the neural networks are the risk factors  $\mathbf{X}$ .

We design deep learning algorithms to study the systemic risk measures proposed in Biagini et al. [2] and improve it to a more realistic situation of scenario-dependent cash distribution without cross-subsidization. In our algorithms, we first learn the overall risk allocation of the system and the allocations to the individual financial components based on the primal problem. Then using a structure inspired by GAN, we solve an optimization problem over risk measures with a min-max objective function based on the dual representation of such systemic risk measures. One novelty of our paper is that,

given input samples, we output Radon-Nikodym densities of new measure with respect to the original measure as random variables. It serves as a direct method to optimize over measure space and can be of independent interest as a pure data-driven approach for the financial math community. The optimizer in the dual formulation provides a risk allocation which is *fair* from the point of view of the individual financial institutions. In Biagini et al. [2], it turns out only in the case with exponential utilities, explicit solutions of overall risk allocations and *fair* individual allocations of the proposed measures can be provided. However, to this end, our proposed algorithm can handle any utilities and is efficient for more realistic systemic risk measures.

The structure of the section is the following. In section 3.3.1, starting from the multivariate risk measures, developed via multivariate acceptance sets in Biagini et al. [29, 2], we gradually introduce the dual representation of the measures and generalize the measures to be more realistic by adding nonnegativity to risk allocations. In section 3.3.2, we focus on explaining the deep learning algorithms designed for the dual and primal problems. Section 3.3.3 contains numerical examples and interpretations.

### 3.3.1 Problem Setup

To be self-contained, we provide a brief review of risk measures in this section. See section 3.1 and Biagini et al. [29, 2] for detailed definitions and more theoretical foundations.

Let  $\mathcal{L}^0(\mathbb{R}^N) := \mathcal{L}^0(\Omega, \mathcal{F}; \mathbb{R}^N)$  denote the space of  $\mathbb{R}^N$ -valued random variables on the probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ , and let  $\mathbb{E}$  be the expectation under  $\mathbb{P}$ . In what follows, all needed integrability and regularity assumptions are taken for granted. In the case of a system with  $N$  interacting financial institutions, we assume a configuration of risky factors at a future time  $T$  for this system is denoted by  $\mathbf{X} := (X^1, \dots, X^N) \in \mathcal{L}^0(\mathbb{R}^N)$ .

Some systemic risk measures proposed in the literature (for example, [18, 44]) are of the form

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) := \inf\{m \in \mathbb{R} \mid \Lambda(\mathbf{X}) + m \in \mathbb{A}\}, \quad (3.56)$$

where  $\Lambda : \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is an aggregation function applied to the risk factor  $\mathbf{X}$  in order to obtain a univariate random variable  $\Lambda(\mathbf{X})$ , and  $\mathbb{A} \in \mathcal{L}^0(\mathbb{R}^N)$  is an acceptance set. When the univariate random variable  $\Lambda(\mathbf{X})$  is interpreted as some monetary loss, the classical scalar risk measure  $\rho$  quantifies the minimal cash amount, that is needed today, to secure the system *after aggregating individual risks* of the system, i.e.  $\Lambda(\mathbf{X})$ , possibly after a crisis has occurred. There are many choices for the aggregation function  $\Lambda$ . In some literature such as *Systemic Expected Shortfall* by Acharya et al. [45], the risk factors are simply summed up as a way to aggregate multivariate risk, i.e.  $\Lambda(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^N X^i$ . However, the aggregation rule of summing up both profits and losses is not appropriate in a financial system where cross-subsidization between individual institutions is not realistic. Another choice of the aggregation rule that would deal with the situation is to just sum up losses. It is used in Huang et al. [46], for example. We will propose a new systemic risk measure later to take into account the no cross-subsidization scenario and discuss in detail.

In contrast to the form (3.56), to preventing crisis, another systemic risk measure can be defined of the form

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) := \inf \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N m_n \mid \mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_N) \in \mathbb{R}^N, \Lambda(\mathbf{X} + \mathbf{m}) \in \mathbb{A} \right\},$$

where allocations of additional capital  $\mathbf{m}$  are added to  $\mathbf{X}$  *before aggregating risk components*. Furthermore, replacing the deterministic cash  $\mathbf{m}$  with a random vector  $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{C}$  for some given class  $\mathcal{C}$ , choosing the aggregation function  $\Lambda(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{n=1}^N u_n(x_n)$  based on



utility functions  $u_n$ ,  $n = 1, \dots, N$  of all financial institutions and taking the acceptance set  $\mathbb{A} = \{Z \in L^1(\Omega, \mathcal{F}; \mathbb{R}^N), \mathbb{E}[Z] \geq B\}$  for a given constant  $B < 0$ , we define our risk measure as follows.

**Problem 1 (Primal).** The primal formulation of the systemic risk measure is given by

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) := \inf_{\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{C}} \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N Y^n \mid \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^N u_n(X^n + Y^n) \right] \geq B \right\}. \quad (3.57)$$

Here,  $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{R}} \cap M^{\Phi}$ , where

$$\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{R}} := \left\{ \mathbf{Y} \in L^0(\mathbb{R}^N) \mid \sum_{n=1}^N Y^n \in \mathbb{R} \right\}, \quad M^{\Phi} := M^{\phi_1} \times \dots \times M^{\phi_N},$$

and  $M^{\phi_i}$  is the Orlicz heart, see Cheridito and Li [47], corresponding to  $\phi_n(x) := -u_n(-|x|) + u_n(0)$  for all  $n$ .

Note that each  $Y^n$ ,  $n = 1, \dots, N$  is random and depends on the scenario  $\omega$  realized at terminal time  $T$ , but the sum of random allocations is deterministic and known at the beginning, i.e.  $\sum_{n=1}^N Y^n \in \mathbb{R}$ . Thus the *overall systemic risk*  $\rho(\mathbf{X})$  can be interpreted as the minimal total cash amount needed today to secure the system by distributing the cash at the future time  $T$  among the components of the risk vector  $\mathbf{X}$ .

However, it is also important to know how much each financial institution of the system contributes to the overall systemic risk. We denote the *fair* risk allocation of each financial institution by  $\rho^n(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbb{R}$  and it should satisfy the "Full Allocation" property, see Brunnermeier and Cheridito [48] for example, which is  $\sum_{n=1}^N \rho^n(\mathbf{X}) = \rho(\mathbf{X})$ . According to Biagini et al. [2], the solution is given by

$$\rho^n(\mathbf{X}) := \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^n}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^n] \quad \text{for } n = 1, \dots, N, \quad (3.58)$$

where  $\mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{X}} = (Q_{\mathbf{X}}^1, \dots, Q_{\mathbf{X}}^N)$  is the optimizer of the dual problem stated below and the subscript  $\mathbf{X}$  in (3.58) shows the dependence of  $\mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{Y}$  on the risk vector.

**Problem 2 (Dual).** The dual representation of the systemic risk measure in Problem 1 is given by

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) = \max_{\mathbf{Q} \in \mathcal{D}} \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}_{Q^n}[-X^n] - \alpha_B(\mathbf{Q}) \right\}, \quad (3.59)$$

where

$$\alpha_B(\mathbf{Q}) = \sup_{\mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}_{Q^n}[-Z^n] \right\},$$

with  $\mathcal{A} = \left\{ \mathbf{Z} \in M^\Phi \mid \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}[u_n(Z^n)] \geq B \right\}$ .  $\mathcal{D}$  is the domain where the probability measures  $Q^n \ll \mathbb{P}$  for all  $n$  and the densities satisfy:

$$\left\{ \frac{d\mathbf{Q}}{d\mathbb{P}} \mid Q^n(\Omega) = 1, \forall n \text{ and } \sum_{n=1}^N (\mathbb{E}_{Q^n}[Y^n] - Y^n) \leq 0 \right. \\ \left. \text{for all } \mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{R}} \cap M^\Phi \right\}. \quad (3.60)$$

The uniqueness and existence of both the individual optimal risk allocation vector  $\mathbf{Y}$  in the primal Problem 1 and the measure optimizer  $\mathbf{Q}$  in the dual Problem 2 are established in Biagini et al. [2]. Thus the optimal *fair* risk allocation, defined as  $\rho^n(\mathbf{X}) = \mathbb{E}_{Q_{\mathbf{X}}^n}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^n] \in \mathbb{R}$  for all  $n$  in (3.58), also exists and it can be used as reference to collect cash at the beginning from each financial institution. Only in exponential utility case, there are explicit formulas for  $\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Q}$ .

In the primal Problem 1, the choice of set  $\mathcal{C}$  can affect the distributions of cash  $\mathbf{Y}$ . For example, choosing  $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{R}^N$  lead to the result that  $Y^n \in \mathbb{R}$  for all  $n$ , i.e. the allocation to each institution is determined today; for  $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{R}}$ , the distribution can be chosen freely depending on the scenario  $\omega$ . But the latter case may result in negative cash allocations in some situations, which mean withdrawals of cash from certain components, and we call

this phenomenon as *cross-subsidization* between financial institutions. We then propose a more realistic systemic risk measure by requiring the individual risk allocation being nonnegative, based on the primal Problem 1 without cross-subsidization.

**Problem 3** (No Cross-subsidization Systemic Risk Measure). We add nonnegativity on the risk allocation  $\mathbf{Y}$ , and the new measure becomes

$$\rho_+(\mathbf{X}) := \inf_{\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{C}_+} \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N Y^n \mid \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^N u_n(X^n + Y^n) \right] \geq B \right\}, \quad (3.61)$$

where  $\mathcal{C}_+ \subset \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{R}}^+ \cap M^\Phi$  and

$$\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{R}}^+ := \left\{ \mathbf{Y} \in L^0(\mathbb{R}^N) \mid \sum_{n=1}^N Y^n \in \mathbb{R}, Y^n \geq 0 \forall n \right\}.$$

The definition of  $M^\Phi$  is the same as the primal Problem 1 and the dual formulation of the new measure is the same as defined in Problem 2, except that we need to add the condition  $\mathbf{Z} \geq \mathbf{X}$  in the admissible set  $\mathcal{A}$  and restrict the domain of  $\mathbf{Y}$  in (3.60) to be nonnegative, i.e.  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{R}}^+ \cap M^\Phi$ .

The solutions of the no cross-subsidization setup, denoted by  $\mathbf{Y}_+$  and  $\mathbf{Q}_+$ , doesn't have explicit solutions in any cases yet. We will present numerical solutions with interpretations in section 3.3.3 to show the feasibility and superiority of our deep learning algorithm.

### 3.3.2 Algorithms

We state our deep learning algorithms for both primal problem and dual problem in this section. In particular, the dual problem involves optimization over the space of probability measures, we solve this problem by using a neural network to represent the

Radon-Nikodym derivative. This idea may be of independent interest to mathematical finance community since it can be applied to achieve the change of measure from physical measure to risk neutral measure.

### 3.3.2.1 Primal Problem

Denote by  $\varphi : \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^N$  the fully connected neural networks parametrized by weights and biases  $(w, b)$ , that take the risk factor  $\mathbf{X}(\omega) \in \mathbb{R}^N$  as input and generate cash allocation  $\mathbf{Y}(\omega) \in \mathbb{R}^N$  as output for any scenario  $\omega \in \Omega$ . To ease the notation, we will omit  $\omega$  in the rest of the paper when the context is clear. More precisely,

$$\mathbf{Y} := (Y^1, \dots, Y^N) = (\varphi_1(\mathbf{X}), \dots, \varphi_N(\mathbf{X})) =: \varphi(\mathbf{X}).$$

The primal Problem 1 requires the total cash added to the system to be deterministic, we thus add a penalty for the variance of total cash allocation to the loss function. To deal with the acceptance set restriction in the objective, we add a second penalty for the failure cases.

For the primal problem, the objective function for our deep learning task becomes

$$\begin{aligned} J_{\text{primal}}(\varphi) := & \sum_i \varphi_i(\mathbf{X}) + \mu \cdot \text{Var}\left(\sum_i \varphi_i(\mathbf{X})\right) \\ & + \lambda \cdot \left(B - \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{n=1}^N u_n(X^n + Y^n)\right]\right)^+, \end{aligned} \quad (3.62)$$

where  $\mu, \lambda$  are hyperparameters and we write

$$\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{X}) = \inf_{w,b} J_{\text{primal}}(\varphi).$$

In (3.62), the second term is the penalty for the variance and the third term is the

penalty for failure of falling into the acceptance set. With the proper choice of  $\mu$  and  $\lambda$ , the two penalties are very close to 0 at optimum, which renders  $\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{X}) \approx \rho(\mathbf{X})$ . In practice, we will compute the empirical estimation of  $J_{\text{primal}}(\varphi)$  by using Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate the variance and expectation in (3.62). The detailed description is provided in Algorithm 1.

---

**Algorithm 1** Primal problem.

---

**Input:** Data  $\{\mathbf{X}(\omega_i)\}_{i=1}^{\text{batch}}$ , neural net  $\varphi$ , functions  $\{u_n\}_{n=1}^N$  and hyperparameters  $\mu, \lambda, B$ , learning rate  $\gamma$ , Epochs

**for**  $e = 1$  to Epochs **do**

    compute empirical estimation  $\hat{J}$  of  $J_{\text{primal}}(\varphi)$

    compute gradients  $\nabla_w \hat{J}$  and  $\nabla_b \hat{J}$

    update  $\varphi$ :  $w = w - \gamma \nabla_w \hat{J}$  and  $b = b - \gamma \nabla_b \hat{J}$

**end for**

    compute empirical estimation:  $\hat{\rho} = \hat{J}_{\text{primal}}(\varphi)$

**Output:** Updated neural net  $\varphi, \hat{\rho}$

---

### 3.3.2.2 Dual Problem

Without loss of generality, while the reason and discussion on general case will be postponed to Remark 3.3.1, we can just consider the single group case where all measures  $Q^n$ 's are the same by [2], and we will simply write  $Q$  instead of  $Q^n$  for all  $n$  in the following discussion. That is, the restriction in (3.60) can be automatically ignored because we are able to interchange the order of expectation and summation. We estimate the measure  $Q$  by using neural network  $\Theta : \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ , parameterized by  $(w_\theta, b_\theta)$ , to represent its Radon-Nikodym derivative  $\frac{dQ}{dP}$  with respect to the physical measure.  $\Theta$  takes  $\mathbf{X}$  as input and generates nonnegative output with unit mean, which can be realized by using a final **Softplus**<sup>1</sup> layer and dividing the outputs by their average. Since  $\Theta$  has  $\omega$ -by- $\omega$  output, we shall construct another neural network  $\Psi : \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^N$ , parameterized by  $(w_\psi, b_\psi)$ ,

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<sup>1</sup>Softplus( $x$ ) =  $\log(1 + \exp(x))$ .

taking  $\mathbf{X}$  as arguments to generate random variables

$$\mathbf{Z} := (Z^1, \dots, Z^N) = (\Psi_1(\mathbf{X}), \dots, \Psi_N(\mathbf{X})) =: \Psi(\mathbf{X})$$

in evaluating  $\alpha_B(\mathbf{Q})$ . That is

$$\alpha_B(\mathbf{Q}) \equiv \alpha_B(\Psi, \Theta) = \sup_{w_\psi, b_\psi} \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}[-\Psi_n(\mathbf{X})\Theta(\mathbf{X})] \right\}.$$

Similar to the primal case, we have constraint imposed by the acceptance set  $\mathcal{A}$  and thus include penalty when the random variable  $\mathbf{Z}$  falls outside of  $\mathcal{A}$ . Denote by

$$J_\alpha(\Psi, \Theta) = \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}[-\Psi_n(\mathbf{X})\Theta(\mathbf{X})] - \lambda_\alpha \left( B - \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}[u_n(\Psi_n(\mathbf{X}))] \right)^+$$

the objective function to be optimized for  $\alpha_B(\mathbf{Q})$ , and we write

$$\tilde{\alpha}_B(\Psi, \Theta) = \sup_{w_\psi, b_\psi} J_\alpha(\Psi, \Theta).$$

Therefore, the objective function for dual representation is given by

$$J_{\text{dual}}(\Psi, \Theta) := \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}[-X^n \cdot \Theta(\mathbf{X})] - \tilde{\alpha}_B(\Psi, \Theta)$$

and we write

$$\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{X}) = \sup_{w_\theta, b_\theta} J_{\text{dual}}(\Psi, \Theta).$$

At optimal,  $\tilde{\alpha}_B$  and  $\tilde{\rho}$  can approximate real  $\alpha_B$  and  $\rho$  very well in the dual Problem 2 since the penalty terms are almost 0. Note that the first part in  $J_{\text{dual}}$  does not depend on the parameters  $w_\psi, b_\psi$  of neural network  $\Psi$ . Our model is trained in the same fashion

of training GANs and we provide a detailed description<sup>2</sup> in Algorithm 2.

---

**Algorithm 2** Dual problem.

---

**Input:** Data  $\{\mathbf{X}(\omega_i)\}_{i=1}^{\text{batch}}$ , neural nets  $\Psi, \Theta$ , functions  $\{u_n\}_{n=1}^N$  and hyperparameters  $\lambda_\alpha$ ,  $B$ , learning rates  $\gamma_1, \gamma_2$ , Epochs

**for**  $e = 1$  to Epochs **do**

    compute empirical estimations  $\hat{J}_\alpha$  of  $J_\alpha(\Psi, \Theta)$  and  $\hat{J}_{\text{dual}}$  of  $J_{\text{dual}}(\Psi, \Theta)$  by

$$\hat{J}_{\text{dual}} = \sum_{n=1}^N \hat{\mathbb{E}}[-X^n \cdot \Theta(\mathbf{X})] - \hat{J}_\alpha$$

    compute gradients  $\nabla_{w_\psi} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}, \nabla_{b_\psi} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}$  and  $\nabla_{w_\theta} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}, \nabla_{b_\theta} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}$

    update  $\Psi$ :

$$w_\psi = w_\psi - \gamma_1 \nabla_{w_\psi} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}, \quad b_\psi = b_\psi - \gamma_1 \nabla_{b_\psi} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}$$

    update  $\Theta$ :

$$w_\theta = w_\theta + \gamma_2 \nabla_{w_\theta} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}, \quad b_\theta = b_\theta + \gamma_2 \nabla_{b_\theta} \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}$$

**end for**

    compute empirical:  $\hat{\alpha}_B(\mathbf{Q}) = \hat{J}_\alpha(\Psi, \Theta)$  and  $\hat{\rho} = \hat{J}_{\text{dual}}(\Psi, \Theta)$

**Output:** Neural nets  $\Psi, \Theta, \hat{\alpha}_B(\mathbf{Q}), \hat{\rho}$

---

*Remark 3.3.1.* For simplicity of description, we first consider only one group in an  $N$ -institution system and the optimal risk allocation strategy from the primal and dual problem. In this way, we are able to get rid of the restriction described in (3.60) and it is very convenient to construct our algorithm.

In general case with  $h$  non-overlapping groups for  $N$  financial institutions, assuming the index sets are  $I_1, \dots, I_h$ , the set of admissible random allocations should be  $\mathcal{C}^d = \mathcal{C}_0^d \cap M^\Phi$  where

$$\mathcal{C}_0^d = \left\{ \mathbf{Y} \in L^0(\mathbb{R}^N) \mid \exists d_m \in \mathbb{R} : \sum_{i \in I_m} Y^i = d_m, \forall m = 1, \dots, h \right\}.$$

It implies that the sum of components of  $\mathbf{Y}$  in each group must be a deterministic real number. The group sums  $(d_1, \dots, d_h)$  may change but the elements in each group are

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<sup>2</sup>We use  $\hat{\mathbb{E}}$  to represent empirical expectation in this algorithm.

fixed. Thus  $\mathcal{C}^d$  is a linear space containing  $\mathbb{R}^N$  and the dual representation 2 also applies. Biagini et al. [2] concludes that for institutions  $i, j$  in the same group, the measures  $Q^i, Q^j$  of the dual elements are the same. Thus in a multi-group system, we can use  $h$  neural networks  $(\Theta^1, \dots, \Theta^h)$  to represent  $h$  different Radon-Nikodym derivatives. Then the objective function for  $\alpha_B(\mathbf{Q})$  becomes

$$J_\alpha(\Psi, \Theta_1, \dots, \Theta_h) := \sum_{j=1}^h \sum_{i \in I_j} \mathbb{E}[-\Psi_i(\mathbf{X})\Theta^j(\mathbf{X})] - \lambda_\alpha \left( B - \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{E}[u_n(\Psi_n(\mathbf{X}))] \right)^+,$$

and again, the restriction in (3.60) is satisfied automatically. The experiment of the general case is shown in section 3.3.3.2 with  $h = 3$  and flowcharts of the algorithms are illustrated in Figure 3.1.

In this section, we construct algorithms that provide an approximation to risk allocations  $\varphi(\mathbf{X}), \tilde{\rho}$  and Radon-Nikodym derivative  $\Theta(\mathbf{X})$ . Our algorithms are implemented in the context of the numerical examples that are presented in section 3.3.3. We conclude this section by providing the solution to *fair* risk allocations (3.58) of each financial institution which combines Algorithm 1-2,

$$\rho^n(\mathbf{X}) = \mathbb{E}[\varphi_n(\mathbf{X})\Theta(\mathbf{X})], \quad \forall n = 1, \dots, N.$$

### 3.3.3 Experiments

We justify Algorithm 1-2 with two experiments. First, we employ exponential utilities for financial institutions with Gaussian distributed risk factors and compare experiment results with explicit results shown in [2]. Secondly, we apply the same setup to Problem 3 and present numerical results as solutions. We conclude that given a financial system,






Figure 3.1: Illustration of multi-group algorithms. Flowcharts for algorithms to solve primal and dual problems for multi-group case.

we can predict the overall risk allocation and the distribution of risk allocations for all individual banks at terminal time  $T$ , as well as the *fair* risk allocations for institutions at time 0. The algorithms can be used to help decide, in order to secure a system in terms of the systemic risk measures defined in Problem 1 or Problem 3, how much cash from each individual institution  $n$  should be collected, i.e.  $\mathbb{E}_Q[Y^n]$ , and how much to distribute, i.e.  $Y^n(\omega)$  under the scenario  $\omega$ , at the beginning and end of the period, respectively.

Both of our training and testing data consist of 50000 samples. Each sample is a realization of the  $N$  ( $= 10$ ) dimensional vector  $\mathbf{X}(\omega)$ , representing risk factors of 10 pos-

itively correlated financial institutions who are jointly normally distributed. We choose exponential utility functions  $u_n = -\frac{e^{-\alpha_n x}}{\alpha_n}$ ,  $\alpha_n > 0$ ,  $n = 1, \dots, N$ . We vary the utility parameters for all financial institutions and we select  $B < 0$ . We use SGD as our deep learning optimizer for all experiments. For the hyperparameters in both algorithms, we take small values for them at the beginning of training and increase them by multiplying a fixed amount after every a few epochs. We also decrease the learning rate to 1/10 of it every a few epochs to further guarantee the stability and reproducibility of our algorithms. To assess the quality of our algorithm, we consider the following evaluation metrics:

- **Absolute difference.** Absolute value of the difference between estimation and theoretical solution.
- **Overall relative difference (ORD).** Let  $\hat{E}$  be an estimation of  $E$ , we define the ORD by

$$R(\hat{E}, E) = \frac{\|\hat{E} - E\|_1}{\|E\|_1}$$

with  $\|\cdot\|_1$  as the  $l_1$  metric when  $E$  is a deterministic vector, and  $\|\cdot\|_1$  as the  $L_1$  metric when  $E$  is a random variable.

Small values of evaluation metrics imply better performance.

### 3.3.3.1 Single-group Exponential Utility

We focus on the case under section 6 of [2]. Under the same assumptions, the optimal total risk allocation  $\rho(\mathbf{X})$ , the optimal penalty, the optimal allocation  $\mathbf{Y}$  and the optimal measure optimizer  $Q$  of the corresponding dual Problem 2 are explicitly given by, for

each scenario  $\omega$ ,

$$\rho(\mathbf{X}) = \beta \log \left( -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} [\exp(-S/\beta)] \right), \quad (3.63)$$

$$\alpha_B(Q) = \beta \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{dQ}{d\mathbb{P}} \ln \left( \frac{dQ}{d\mathbb{P}} \right) \right] + \beta \ln \left( -\frac{B}{\beta} \right), \quad (3.64)$$

$$Y^n(\omega) = -X^n(\omega) + \frac{1}{\beta \alpha_n} S(\omega) + \frac{1}{\beta \alpha_n} \rho, \quad (3.65)$$

$$\frac{dQ}{d\mathbb{P}}(\omega) = \frac{\exp(-S(\omega)/\beta)}{\mathbb{E} [\exp(-S/\beta)]}, \quad (3.66)$$

where  $\beta = \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{1}{\alpha_n}$ , and  $S(\omega) = \sum_{n=1}^N X^n(\omega)$ . And the optimal *fair* individual risk allocation is given by

$$\rho^n(\mathbf{X}) = \mathbb{E}_Q[Y^n] = \mathbb{E} \left[ Y^n \cdot \frac{dQ}{d\mathbb{P}} \right].$$

We compare with the optimal solutions (3.63)-(3.66) generated by Monte Carlo method to show the accuracy of our proposed Algorithms 1-2.

**Evaluation.** First, to assess the goodness of estimation of Radon-Nikodym derivatives of the optimizer, we use overall relative difference to measure how one derivative function is different from the reference derivative function, i.e.

$$R\left(\frac{\widehat{dQ}}{d\mathbb{P}}, \frac{dQ}{d\mathbb{P}}\right).$$

It turns out the ORD of estimated Radon-Nikodym derivative is **4.55%** and the behavior of the estimated measure derivative  $\widehat{dQ}/\widehat{d\mathbb{P}}$  in terms of the sum of risk factors  $S(\omega)$  for each scenario  $\omega$  is shown in Figure 3.2. The results both show it fits optimal Radon-Nikodym derivative very well.

We show performance of numerical results for the estimated overall risk allocation of  $\rho$  and the estimated penalty of  $\alpha$  in Table 3.3, along with the expected optimal results.




Figure 3.2: Behavior of  $\widehat{\frac{dQ}{dP}}(\omega)$  against  $S(\omega)$ . Scatter plot of estimated measure densities in terms of total sum of risk factors under each scenario.

The absolute differences (Abs. Difference) are quite small which indicates the estimation for the overall risk is successful.

Table 3.4 shows the estimated *fair* risk allocations for all institutions

$$\widehat{\mathbb{E}}_Q[\widehat{Y}] := \left( \widehat{\mathbb{E}}_Q[Y^n] \right)_{n=1,\dots,10} = \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \widehat{Y}^n \cdot \frac{dQ}{dP} \right] \right)_{n=1,\dots,10}$$

and their theoretical optimal values. The overall relative difference (ORD) for them is defined as

$$R(\widehat{\mathbb{E}}_Q[\widehat{Y}], \mathbb{E}_Q[Y]).$$

The ORD is **2.52%** which shows great approximation of our algorithms to the theoretical

Table 3.3: Values of  $\rho$  and  $\alpha$ 

	$\rho$	$\alpha$
Estimated	-3.84	-8.66
Theoretical	-3.97	-8.64
<b>Abs. Difference</b>	0.13	0.02

Table 3.4: Estimated and theoretical optimal values of  $\mathbb{E}_Q[Y^n]$  in one-group.

$n$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>ORD</b>
Estimated	1.11	0.88	0.75	0.22	-0.45	-1.09	-0.12	-0.66	-2.37	-2.11	2.52%
Theoretical	1.12	0.89	0.74	0.18	-0.47	-1.08	-0.16	-0.75	-2.34	-2.11	

optimal *fair* allocation. In conclusion, every optimal value we estimated shows excellent fitness with respect to the theoretical optimal value given by explicit formulas. Thus our algorithms provide reliable and accurate results.

### 3.3.3.2 Multi-group Exponential Utility

We verify our algorithm in the multi-group setup following the procedures described in Remark 3.3.1. Similar to last section, the explicit solutions exist and the formulae are shown in detail in [2].

We consider separating 10 institutions into 3 groups with sizes (3, 4, 3) and we will have one fair risk measure  $Q$  for each group. By solving the dual problem, we get our estimated Radon-Nikodym derivatives for each  $Q$  measure. Evaluating the estimated derivatives  $\frac{dQ}{dP}$ 's on testing data and comparing to the theoretical solutions, we have overall relative differences are (**3.42%**, **6.31%**, **5.12%**) and we show the plots of behaviors of derivatives in terms of sums of group risk factors in Figure 3.3. The Radon-Nikodym derivative of each group is fitted very well and the distance between the estimated and the true functions is quite small. We then solve the primal problem to get estimated individual risk allocations  $\hat{\mathbf{Y}}$ , which renders us the estimate the fair risk allocations  $\widehat{\mathbb{E}_Q[\mathbf{Y}]}$ .

Table 3.5: Estimated and theoretical optimal values of  $\mathbb{E}_Q[Y^n]$  in multi-group.

$n$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	ORD
Estimated	1.19	1.11	0.73	0.18	-0.55	-1.41	0.86	0.09	-2.87	-2.09	3.9%
Theoretical	1.25	1.16	0.77	0.17	-0.56	-1.42	0.77	0.01	-2.91	-2.13	

We compare our estimations with theoretical solutions in Table 3.5. The estimated and optimal values in each pair are close to each other and the ORD is 3.9% which demonstrates success of our algorithm in predicting individual fair systemic risk allocations in the multi-group case. Comparing with Table 3.4, the group sums of multi-group case are  $(3.03, -0.92, -4.87)$  and the systemic risk measure is  $-2.76$ . The relative increase from  $-3.84$  to  $-2.76$  shows that the systemic risk measure increases when the system is separated into smaller subsystems, which is correct both intuitively and mathematically, since it is optimized over a smaller set in multi-group case.




Figure 3.3: Behavior of  $\widehat{\frac{dQ_i}{dP}}(\omega)$  against  $S_i(\omega)$ ,  $i = 1, 2, 3$ . Scatter plot of estimated measure densities in terms of total sum of risk factors under each scenario for each group.

### 3.3.3.3 No Cross-subsidization Measure

Recall that in Problem 3, we proposed a the more realistic risk measure without cross-subsidization. We assume the risk allocations for all institutions are nonnegative which

avoids withdrawing cash from some components. This is called no *cross-subsidization* between financial institutions. However there is no explicit solution under this setup. So we will implement it with our algorithms and interpret the results with knowledge from experiment in section 3.3.3.1.

The estimated overall risk allocation  $\hat{\rho} = 6.26$ ; and the estimated *fair* risk allocations for all institutions are

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[ \widehat{\mathbb{E}_Q[Y^1]}, \dots, \widehat{\mathbb{E}_Q[Y^{10}]} \right] \\ & = [0.69, 0.55, 0.43, 0.01, 0., 0., 2.61, 1.97, 0., 0.]. \end{aligned}$$

Comparing with the values in Table 3.4 of section 3.3.3.1 which allows cross-subsidization, we can see the overall risk allocation for the system gets larger when we add constraints, which implies more cash is needed to secure the system. However the individual *fair* risk allocation moves in no clear direction for every component, since it can be affected by many factors in the system, like individual risk factor distribution and correlations. Based on the fact that the utility parameters are in an increasing order in our experiment, we might reach a possible conclusion that more risk-averse institutions tend to contribute less when the system does not allow cross-subsidization. Future research will consist in studying the relation between risk allocation and factors by allowing control of parameters.

### 3.3.3.4 Scalability

Our algorithm is also scalable. We compare the training time for different size of financial system ( $N$ ) and groups in Table 3.6. The accuracy of all cases is at the same level. In the case with 100 financial institutions and 3 groups, our overall relative differences on the Radon-Nikodym derivative  $\frac{dQ}{dP}$  is (**3.5%**, **4.7%**, **5.3%**). Due to the fact all operations are

realized via GPU in parallel, increasing the size of system only has subtle influence on training time. Increasing group size affects the calculation of our loss functions as well as the gradients of weights in neural networks, but the time increments are still small.

Table 3.6: Training time.

$(N, \text{groups})$	(10, 1)	(10, 3)	(100, 1)	(100, 3)
Time (hours)	0.38	0.43	0.42	0.47

### 3.3.4 Conclusion

In this work, we study systemic risk measures introduced in Problem 1 and 3. Combined with dual problems, these measures can provide both the individual risk allocation  $Y^n$  and the individual *fair* risk allocation  $\mathbb{E}_{Q^n}[Y^n]$  for each institution  $n$ . When applied to a real-life financial system that aims to secure the system from potential systemic risks, the latter can be set as a benchmark for collecting cash from institutions and the former can provide an accurate scenario-dependent estimation of cash distribution at the terminal time. In general there is no explicit solutions to these problems especially for the case where we propose a more realistic measure requiring no-subsidization between financial institutions. We show that the deep learning framework proposed in section 3.3.2, based on the delicately tailored objective functions and newly designed direct estimation of Radon-Nikodym derivative, yields excellent performance on estimating both the overall systemic risk allocation and individual *fair* risk allocations. The algorithm is also efficient in two ways. Firstly in a financial system with a fixed number of institutions, solving the problem with more groups does not take more time than the problem with less groups. Secondly, when the dimension of the system being large ( $N$ ), the processing time with our algorithm to compute optimal risk allocations has subtle difference. Moreover, the neural network based estimation of Radon-Nikodym derivative has broader applications



in financial math, such as robust utility maximization and derivative pricing.

In summary, given the very large amount of institutions in the financial system, such techniques provide the suggestion/possibility of securing the system while keeping efficiency and therefore, mitigate the systemic risk faced by regulators nowadays.

# Appendix A

## Appendix: Stochastic Differential Games

### A.1 Appendix: Deterministic Directed Chain Game

#### A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1.2

Define  $S_t(z) := \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \phi_t^{(k)}$  where  $0 \leq z < 1$  with  $\phi_t^{(k)} = \phi_t^k$  in (2.25) to avoid confusion for  $t \geq 0$ ,  $k \geq 0$ . Then substituting (2.25) into  $S_t(z)$ , we obtain the one-dimensional Riccati equation

$$\dot{S}_t(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \dot{\phi}_t^{(k)} = (S_t(z))^2 - \varepsilon(1 - z), \quad S_T(z) = c(1 - z) \quad (\text{A.1})$$

and its solution is given by (2.27). One needs to be careful when taking  $z = 1$  because the series defining  $S_t(1)$  may not converge a priori. Instead, we take a sequence  $\{z_n\}$  converging to 1, the limit of  $S_t(z_n)$  converges to the ODE  $\dot{S}_t(1) = (S_t(1))^2$ ,  $S_T(1) = 0$ , and hence, solving this limiting ODE, we obtain (2.26).

### A.1.2 Catalan Markov Chain and Proposition 2.1.4

We have the Catalan probabilities  $\{p_k > 0, k \geq 1\}$ :  $\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} p_k = 1$  and  $p_k = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} p_i p_{k-i}$ .

It is easily seen then that  $-\mathbf{Q}^2 = -I + B$  is an infinite Jordan block matrix with diagonal components  $-1$ , where  $B$  having 1's on the upper second diagonal and 0's elsewhere.

Then as a smooth function  $F(x) := \exp(-\sqrt{-x})$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{C}$  of Jordan block matrix, we have

$$\exp(\mathbf{Q}t) = F((-I + B)t^2) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{t^{2k} F^{(k)}(-t^2)}{k!} B^k,$$

where the  $k$ -th derivative  $F^{(k)}$  is given by  $F^{(k)}(x) = \rho_k(x)F(x)$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{C}$  with  $\rho_k$  in (2.35) from direct calculations and mathematical induction. Therefore, substituting them into (2.34), we obtain proposition 2.1.4.

### A.1.3 Proof of Remark 2.1.4

By  $\rho_k$ 's formulae in (2.35), we have for  $\nu \geq 0$ ,  $k \geq 1$ ,

$$\rho_k(-\nu^2) = \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{j=k}^{2k-1} \frac{(j-1)!}{(2j-2k)!!(2k-j-1)!} = \frac{1}{2^k \nu^k} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{2\nu}{\pi}} \cdot e^\nu \cdot K_{k-(1/2)}(\nu),$$

where  $K_n(x)$  is the modified Bessel function of the second kind, i.e.,

$$K_n(x) = \int_0^\infty e^{-x \cosh t} \cosh(nt) dt; \quad n > -1, \quad x > 0.$$

Then, by the change of variables, we obtain

$$\text{Var}(X_t^1) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4k}}{(k!)^2} |\rho_k(-(t-s)^2)|^2 e^{-2(t-s)} ds$$

$$= \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{2}{\pi} \frac{\nu^{2k+1}}{(k!)^2 4^k} (K_{k-(1/2)}(\nu))^2 d\nu + \frac{1 - e^{-2t}}{2}; \quad t \geq 0.$$

### A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.1.5

Using the following identities from the special functions

$$\int_0^{\infty} t^{\alpha-1} (K_{\nu}(t))^2 dt = \frac{\sqrt{\pi}}{4\Gamma((\alpha+1)/2)} \Gamma\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right) \Gamma\left(\frac{\alpha}{2} - \nu\right) \Gamma\left(\frac{\alpha}{2} + \nu\right),$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} x \sqrt{x^2 - \sqrt{x^4 - 16}} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \binom{4k}{2k} \frac{1}{2k+1} \frac{1}{x^{4k}}, \quad \text{for } x \geq 2,$$

based on remark 2.1.4, we obtain the limit of variance of  $X_t^1$ , as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^1) &= \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{2 s^{2k+1}}{\pi (k!)^2 4^k} \cdot [K_{k-(1/2)}(s)]^2 ds \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{2}{\pi (k!)^2 4^k} \cdot \frac{\pi \Gamma(k+1) \Gamma(2k + (1/2))}{8 \Gamma(k + (3/2))} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \binom{4k}{2k} \frac{1}{2k+1} \frac{1}{2^{4k}} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \binom{4k}{2k} \frac{1}{2k+1} \frac{1}{2^{4k}} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} 2\sqrt{2^2 - 0} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}. \end{aligned}$$

### A.1.5 Proofs of Propositions 2.1.6-2.1.7

From the expression (2.34) for  $X_t^1$ , the auto-covariance  $\mathbb{E}[X_s^1 X_t^1]$  and the cross covariance  $\mathbb{E}[X_t^1 X_t^{j+1}]$  are

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[X_s^1 X_t^1] &= \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\pi(i!)^2 2^{2i-1}} \int_0^s (t-v)^{i+1/2} (s-v)^{i+1/2} K_{i-1/2}(t-v) K_{i-1/2}(s-v) dv \\ &= \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\pi(i!)^2 2^{2i-1}} \int_0^s ((t-s+v)v)^{i+1/2} K_{i-1/2}(t-s+v) K_{i-1/2}(v) dv > 0;\end{aligned}\tag{A.2}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[X_t^1 X_t^{j+1}] &= \sum_{i=j}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{1}{\pi i!(i-j)!} \frac{(t-\nu)^{2i-j+1}}{2^{2i-j-1}} K_{i-1/2}(t-\nu) K_{i-j-1/2}(t-\nu) d\nu \\ &= \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\pi(j+i)! j!} \frac{1}{2^{j+2i-1}} \int_0^t s^{j+2i+1} K_{j+i-1/2}(s) K_{i-1/2}(s) ds \\ &\xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\pi(j+i)! j!} \frac{1}{2^{j+2i-1}} \int_0^{\infty} s^{j+2i+1} K_{j+i-1/2}(s) K_{i-1/2}(s) ds > 0.\end{aligned}\tag{A.3}$$

By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ , the asymptotic cross covariance between  $X_t^1$  and  $X_t^{j+1}$  is bounded by

$$\begin{aligned}\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[X_t^1 X_t^{j+1}] &\leq \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} (\mathbb{E}[(X_t^1)^2])^{1/2} \cdot (\mathbb{E}[(X_t^{j+1})^2])^{1/2} \\ &= \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^1) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\end{aligned}\tag{A.4}$$

for  $j \geq 0$ , because  $X^1$  and  $X^{j+1}$  have the same distribution.

To compute the asymptotic auto-covariance, fix  $s > 0$  and let  $t \rightarrow \infty$ . By the asymptotic expansion of the modified Bessel function  $K_\alpha(z)$ ,  $z > 0$ , there exists a positive constant  $c > 0$  such that for every sufficiently large  $t (> s)$

$$\sup_{i \geq 0} \frac{1}{i! t^{i+1}} \int_0^s ((t-s+v)v)^{i+1/2} K_{i-1/2}(t-s+v) K_{i-1/2}(v) dv \leq c \cdot e^{-(t-s)}.$$

Then combining this estimate with (A.2), we obtain

$$\mathbb{E}[X_s^1 X_t^1] \leq \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{4ct^{i+1} e^{-(t-s)}}{\pi i! 4^i} \leq \frac{4ct}{\pi} e^{-(t-s)+(t/4)} \xrightarrow[t \rightarrow \infty]{} 0.$$

### A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 2.1.9

Define  $S_t(z) := \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \phi_t^{(k)}$  for  $0 \leq z < 1$  and  $\phi_t^{(k)} := \phi_t^k$  again to avoid confusion from the power. Then

$$\begin{aligned} u\dot{S}_t(z) &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k u\dot{\phi}_t^{(k)} = u^2(S_t(z))^2 + u(1-u)\psi_t S_t(z) - u(1-z)\varepsilon, \\ uS_T(z) &= u(1-z)c \end{aligned} \tag{A.5}$$

as in appendix A.1.1. For  $z \rightarrow 1$ , we obtain the ODE:  $u\dot{S}_t(1) = u^2(S_t(1))^2 + u(1-u)\psi_t S_t(1)$ ,  $uS_T(1) = 0$ , and hence,  $S_t(1) \equiv 0$  and conclude the proof.

### A.1.7 Some Details on Table 2.1

It follows from Proposition 2.1.11 that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(X_t^1) &= \text{Var}\left(\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{u^k (t-s)^{2k}}{k!} F^{(k)}(-(t-s)^2) dW_k(s)\right) \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{u^{2k} (t-s)^{4k}}{(k!)^2} |\rho_k(-(t-s)^2)|^2 e^{-2(t-s)} ds \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{2u^{2k}}{\pi (k!)^2 4^k} \nu^{2k+1} (K_{k-\frac{1}{2}}(\nu))^2 d\nu + \frac{1-e^{-2t}}{2} \end{aligned} \tag{A.6}$$

for  $t \geq 0$ . As  $t \rightarrow \infty$ , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
& \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^1) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{2u^{2k} s^{2k+1}}{\pi(k!)^2 4^k} \cdot [K_{k-(1/2)}(s)]^2 ds \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} u^{2k} \cdot \frac{\Gamma(2k + (1/2))}{4^{k+1} k! \Gamma(k + (3/2))} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \binom{2k}{k} \frac{u^{2k}}{8^k} \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \left(1 - 4\frac{u^2}{8}\right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} - 1 \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{u^2}{2}\right)^{-\frac{1}{2}} < \infty.
\end{aligned}$$

### A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 2.1.12

Define  $S_t^N(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} z^k \phi_t^{N,k}$ , then, by (2.73),

$$\dot{S}_t^N(z) = (S_t^N(z))^2 + (1 - z^N) \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{N-2} z^j \cdot \sum_{k=j+1}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,k} \phi_t^{N,N+j-k} \right] - (1 - z)\varepsilon, \quad (\text{A.7})$$

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$  with  $S_T^N(z) = (1 - z)c$  for  $0 \leq z < 1$ . As  $z \rightarrow 1$ ,  $\dot{S}_t^N(1) = (S_t^N(1))^2$ ,  $S_T^N(1) = 0$ , and hence,  $S_t^N(1) = \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \phi_t^{N,k} = 0$ .

### A.1.9 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1

Similar to the proof of lemma proposition 2.1.2 in appendix A.1.1, define  $S_t(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \psi_t^{(k)}$  where  $0 \leq z < 1$  and  $\psi_t^{(k)} := d^k \phi_t^{(k)}$  in (2.128). The Riccati system for  $\psi_t^{(k)}$  functions is now the same as (A.1). The conclusion follows directly from the Riccati equation.

### A.1.10 Stationary Solution of (2.128)

Define  $R_t(z) := \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \phi_t^{(k)}$  where  $0 \leq z < 1$  and  $\phi_t^{(k)} := \phi_t^k$  in (2.128) to avoid confusion. Without loss of generality, we assume  $\varepsilon = 1$ . Then  $R_T(z) = c(1 - d^{-1}z)$  and

for  $0 \leq t \leq T$

$$\dot{R}_t(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \dot{\phi}_t^{(k)} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \sum_{j=0}^k \phi_t^{(j)} \phi_t^{(k-j)} - 1 + \frac{z}{d} = (R_t(z))^2 - \left(1 - \frac{z}{d}\right). \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Thus, the stationary solution  $\phi^{(k)}$  of (2.128), as  $T \rightarrow \infty$ , is obtained by the Taylor expansion of  $\sqrt{1 - (z/d)}$ .

### A.1.11 Proof of Proposition 2.3.3

(2.132) follows directly from (2.131) and proposition 2.1.4.

Taking the limit  $t \rightarrow \infty$  in the variance formula

$$\text{Var}(\bar{X}_t^1) = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{2}{\pi} \frac{s^{2k+1}}{(k!)^2 4^k} (K_{k-(1/2)}(s))^2 \cdot \frac{1}{d^k} ds + \frac{1 - e^{-2t}}{2},$$

we obtain (2.133):

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(\bar{X}_t^1) &= \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{2 s^{2k+1}}{\pi (k!)^2 4^k} \cdot [K_{k-(1/2)}(s)]^2 \cdot \frac{1}{d^k} ds \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \binom{4k}{2k} \frac{1}{2k+1} \frac{1}{2^{4k} d^k} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \binom{4k}{2k} \frac{1}{2k+1} \frac{1}{(2d^{1/4})^{4k}} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} 2d^{1/4} \sqrt{4d^{1/2} - \sqrt{16d - 16}} \\ &= \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} d^{1/4} \sqrt{\sqrt{d} - \sqrt{d-1}} = \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \frac{d^{1/4}}{\sqrt{\sqrt{d} + \sqrt{d-1}}} \\ &= \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \left(1 + \sqrt{\frac{d-1}{d}}\right)^{-1/2} \in \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}\right]. \end{aligned}$$

The limit is monotone in  $d$  with maximum of  $1/\sqrt{2}$  at  $d = 1$ .



## A.2 Appendix: Random Directed Chain Game

### A.2.1 Stationary Solution of the Riccati System (2.84)

By taking  $T \rightarrow \infty$  and assuming  $\varepsilon = 1$ , the constant solution of the moment generating function (2.87) satisfying  $\dot{S}_t(z) = 0$  is  $S(z) = \sqrt{p(1-z)}$ . We can then find constant solutions for  $\phi$  functions by taking Taylor expansion and comparing it with  $S(z) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} z^k \phi^{(k)}$ , because

$$S(z) = \sqrt{p(1-z)} = \sqrt{p} \sqrt{1-z} = \sqrt{p} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \binom{\frac{1}{2}}{k} (-z)^k = \sqrt{p} - \frac{\sqrt{p}}{2} z - \sqrt{p} \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} \frac{(2k-3)!!}{2^k k!} z^k.$$

### A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2.2

We have the results:  $q_0 = -1$ ,  $q_1 = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\sum_{j=0}^k q_j q_{k-j} = 0$  for  $k \geq 2$ . Then, it is easily seen that  $(\sqrt{p}\mathbf{Q})^2 = p(I - B)$  with  $B$  having 1's on the upper second diagonal and 0's elsewhere, i.e.,

$$(\sqrt{p}\mathbf{Q})^2 = \begin{pmatrix} p & -p & 0 & \cdots \\ 0 & p & -p & \ddots \\ & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix} = -p J_{\infty}(-1), \quad J_{\infty}(\lambda) := \begin{pmatrix} \lambda & 1 & 0 & \cdots \\ 0 & \lambda & 1 & \ddots \\ & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}.$$

Here,  $J_{\infty}(\lambda)$  is the infinite Jordan block matrix with diagonal components  $\lambda$ .

The matrix exponential of  $\sqrt{p}\mathbf{Q}t$ ,  $t \geq 0$ , is written formally as

$$\exp(\sqrt{p}\mathbf{Q}t) = F(-p\mathbf{Q}^2 t^2) = F(J_{\infty}(-1) \cdot p t^2), \quad t \geq 0, \quad F(x) := \exp(-\sqrt{-x}), \quad x \in \mathbb{C}.$$

Since a smooth function of a Jordan block matrix can be expressed as

$$F(J_\infty(\lambda)) = F(\lambda I + B) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{F^{(k)}(\lambda)}{k!} B^k = \begin{pmatrix} F(\lambda) & F^{(1)}(\lambda) & \frac{F^{(2)}(\lambda)}{2!} & \cdots & \frac{F^{(k)}(\lambda)}{k!} & \cdots \\ & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & & \ddots \\ & & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \\ & & & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix},$$

we get

$$\begin{aligned} \exp(\sqrt{p} \mathbf{Q}t) &= F(J(-\infty) \cdot pt^2) = F((-I + B) \cdot pt^2) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{F^{(k)}(-pt^2)}{k!} (B pt^2)^k \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{p^k t^{2k} F^{(k)}(-pt^2)}{k!} B^k. \end{aligned}$$

The  $(j, k)$ -element of  $\exp(\sqrt{p} \mathbf{Q}t)$  is formally given by

$$(\exp(\sqrt{p} \mathbf{Q}t))_{j,k} = \frac{p^{k-j} t^{2(k-j)} \cdot F^{(k-j)}(-pt^2)}{(k-j)!}, \quad j \leq k,$$

where  $F^{(k)}(x) := \frac{d^k F}{dx^k}(x)$ ,  $x > 0$ ,  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , and  $(\exp(\sqrt{p} \mathbf{Q}t))_{j,k} = 0$ ,  $j > k$  for  $t \geq 0$ .

Here the  $k$ -th derivative  $F^{(k)}(x)$  of  $F(\cdot)$  can be written as  $F^{(k)}(x) = \rho_k(x)e^{-\sqrt{-x}}$ , where  $\rho_k(x)$  satisfies the recursive equation

$$\rho_{k+1}(x) = \rho'_k(x) + \frac{\rho_k(x)}{2\sqrt{-x}}; \quad k \geq 0,$$

with  $\rho_0(x) = 1$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{C}$ . By mathematical induction, we may verify

$$\rho_k(x) = \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{j=k}^{2k-1} \frac{(j-1)!}{(2j-2k)!!(2k-j-1)!} (-x)^{-\frac{j}{2}}, \quad k \geq 1. \quad (\text{A.9})$$

Therefore, substituting them into (2.91), we obtain the formula of Gaussian process.

Next, it follows from (2.91) that for  $t \geq 0$ , the variance of the Gaussian process  $X^i$ ,

$i \geq 1$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(X_t^i) &= \text{Var}(X_t^1) = \text{Var}\left(\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{p^{j-1} (t-s)^{2(j-1)}}{(j-1)!} F^{(j-1)}(-p(t-s)^2) dW_s^j\right) \\ &= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \int_0^t \frac{p^{2j} (t-s)^{4j}}{(j!)^2} |\rho_j(-p(t-s)^2)|^2 e^{-2\sqrt{p}(t-s)} ds. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.10})$$

Since it can be shown that

$$\rho_j(-\nu^2) = \frac{1}{2^j \nu^j} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{2\nu}{\pi}} \cdot e^\nu \cdot K_{j-(1/2)}(\nu); \quad j \geq 1, \quad (\text{A.11})$$

where  $K_n(x)$  is the modified Bessel function of the second kind defined by

$$K_n(x) = \int_0^\infty e^{-x \cosh t} \cosh(nt) dt; \quad n > -1, x > 0.$$

Then substituting (A.11) into (A.10) and using the change of variables, we obtain

$$\text{Var}(X_t^1) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{p}} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^{\sqrt{p}t} \frac{2}{\pi} \frac{\nu^{2k+1}}{(k!)^2 4^k} (K_{k-(1/2)}(\nu))^2 d\nu + \frac{1 - e^{-2\sqrt{p}t}}{2\sqrt{p}}; \quad t \geq 0.$$

Using the following identities from the special functions

$$\int_0^\infty t^{\alpha-1} (K_\nu(t))^2 dt = \frac{\sqrt{\pi}}{4\Gamma((\alpha+1)/2)} \Gamma\left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right) \Gamma\left(\frac{\alpha}{2} - \nu\right) \Gamma\left(\frac{\alpha}{2} + \nu\right),$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} x \sqrt{x^2 - \sqrt{x^4 - 16}} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \binom{4k}{2k} \frac{1}{2k+1} \frac{1}{x^{4k}}, \quad \text{for } x \geq 2,$$

we obtain the limit of variance of  $X_t^1$ , as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned}
\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \text{Var}(X_t^1) &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{p}} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{p}} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{2s^{2k+1}}{\pi(k!)^2 4^k} \cdot [K_{k-(1/2)}(s)]^2 ds \\
&= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{p}} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{p}} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{2}{\pi(k!)^2 4^k} \int_0^{\infty} s^{2k+1} [K_{k-(1/2)}(s)]^2 ds \\
&= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{p}} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{p}} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{2}{\pi(k!)^2 4^k} \cdot \frac{\pi \Gamma(k+1) \Gamma(2k+(1/2))}{8 \Gamma(k+(3/2))} \\
&= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{p}} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \binom{4k}{2k} \frac{1}{2k+1} \frac{1}{2^{4k}} = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{p}} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{2}}{4} 2\sqrt{2^2-0} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2p}}.
\end{aligned}$$

### A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2.3

We assume  $\varepsilon = 1$ ,  $p_k = -\phi^k = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \varphi_t^k$ . According to the equations (2.106), for the fully directed two-sided chain and , we have:  $\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} p_k p_{-k} = 1$ ,  $\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} p_k p_{1-k} = -p$ ,  $\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} p_k p_{-1-k} = -(1-p)$ ,  $\sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} p_k p_{j-k} = 0$  for other  $j$ . Then it is easily seen that  $\mathbf{Q}^2 = I - (pB^* + (1-p)B_*)$  with  $B^*$  having 1's on the upper second diagonal and 0's elsewhere, and  $B_*$  having 1's on the lower second diagonal and 0's elsewhere i.e.,

$$\mathbf{Q}^2 = \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & -(1-p) & 1 & -p & 0 & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & 0 & -(1-p) & 1 & -p & 0 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & 0 & -(1-p) & 1 & -p & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix},$$

$$B^* = \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}, \quad B_* = \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}.$$

If we look at the power of  $pB^* + (1 - p)B_*$ :

$$\begin{aligned} pB^* + (1 - p)B_* &= \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & 0 & 1 - p & 0 & p & 0 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}; \\ (pB^* + (1 - p)B_*)^2 &= \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & (1 - p)^2 & 0 & 2p(1 - p) & 0 & p^2 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}; \\ (pB^* + (1 - p)B_*)^3 &= \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & (1 - p)^3 & 0 & 3p(1 - p)^2 & 0 & 3p^2(1 - p) & 0 & p^3 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}; \\ (pB^* + (1 - p)B_*)^4 &= \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & (1 - p)^4 & 0 & 4p(1 - p)^3 & 0 & 6p^2(1 - p)^2 & 0 & 4p^3(1 - p) & 0 & p^4 & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}; \\ &\dots \end{aligned}$$

We find the diagonal increases following the binomial expansion and we have formulas

to generalize the result:

- $k$  even :  $(pB^* + (1-p)B_*)^k$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots \\ \ddots & \binom{k}{\frac{k}{2}-1} p^{\frac{k}{2}-1} (1-p)^{\frac{k}{2}+1} & 0 & \binom{k}{\frac{k}{2}} p^{\frac{k}{2}} (1-p)^{\frac{k}{2}} & 0 & \binom{k}{\frac{k}{2}+1} p^{\frac{k}{2}+1} (1-p)^{\frac{k}{2}-1} & \ddots & & \ddots \\ \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

- $k$  odd :  $(pB^* + (1-p)B_*)^k$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} \ddots & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & \ddots \\ \ddots & 0 & \binom{k}{\frac{k+1}{2}-1} p^{\frac{k+1}{2}-1} (1-p)^{\frac{k-1}{2}+1} & 0 & \binom{k}{\frac{k+1}{2}} p^{\frac{k+1}{2}} (1-p)^{\frac{k-1}{2}} & 0 & \ddots & & \ddots \\ \ddots & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & & \ddots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

i.e.

- $k$  even :  $((pB^* + (1-p)B_*)^k)_{i,j}$

$$= \begin{cases} \binom{k}{\frac{k}{2}+m} p^{\frac{k}{2}+m} (1-p)^{\frac{k}{2}-m}, & j = i + 2m, -\frac{k}{2} \leq m \leq \frac{k}{2}, m \in \mathbb{Z}; \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- $k$  odd :  $((pB^* + (1-p)B_*)^k)_{i,j}$

$$= \begin{cases} \binom{k}{\frac{k+1}{2}+m} p^{\frac{k+1}{2}+m} (1-p)^{\frac{k-1}{2}-m}, & j = i + 2m + 1, \\ & -\frac{k+1}{2} \leq m \leq \frac{k-1}{2}; \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The matrix exponential of  $\mathbf{Q}t$ ,  $t \geq 0$  is written formally by

$$\exp(\mathbf{Q}t) = F(-\mathbf{Q}^2 t^2), t \geq 0, \quad F(x) := \exp(-\sqrt{-x}), \quad x \in \mathbb{C}.$$

Since a smooth function can be expressed as

$$F(\lambda I + B) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{F^{(k)}(\lambda)}{k!} B^k = \sum_{k \text{ odd}} \frac{F^{(k)}(\lambda)}{k!} B^k + \sum_{k \text{ even}} \frac{F^{(k)}(\lambda)}{k!} B^k.$$

So

$$\begin{aligned} \exp(\mathbf{Q}t) &= F((-I + pB^* + (1-p)B_*)t^2) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{F^{(k)}(-t^2)}{k!} ((pB^* + (1-p)B_*)t^2)^k \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{t^{2k} F^{(k)}(-t^2)}{k!} (pB^* + (1-p)B_*)^k. \end{aligned}$$

The  $(i, j)$ -element of  $\exp(\mathbf{Q}t)$ , is formally given by

$$\begin{aligned} &(\exp(\mathbf{Q}t))_{i,j} \\ &= \begin{cases} \sum_{k \text{ even}} \frac{t^{2k} F^{(k)}(-t^2)}{k!} \binom{k}{\frac{k}{2} + m} p^{\frac{k}{2}+m} (1-p)^{\frac{k}{2}-m} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{-\frac{k}{2} \leq m \leq \frac{k}{2}}, & j = i + 2m, \\ \sum_{k \text{ odd}} \frac{t^{2k} F^{(k)}(-t^2)}{k!} \binom{k}{\frac{k+1}{2} + m} p^{\frac{k+1}{2}+m} (1-p)^{\frac{k-1}{2}-m} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{-\frac{k+1}{2} \leq m \leq \frac{k-1}{2}}, & j = i + 2m + 1, \end{cases} \\ &= \begin{cases} \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \frac{t^{4\ell} F^{(2\ell)}(-t^2)}{(2\ell)!} \binom{2\ell}{\ell + m} p^{\ell+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{-\ell \leq m \leq \ell}, & j = i + 2m, \\ \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \frac{t^{4\ell+2} F^{(2\ell+1)}(-t^2)}{(2\ell+1)!} \binom{2\ell+1}{\ell+1+m} p^{\ell+1+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{-(\ell+1) \leq m \leq \ell}, & j = i + 2m + 1, \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

where  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$  and  $F^{(k)}(x) := \frac{d^k F}{dx^k}(x)$ ;  $x > 0$ ,  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ . Here the  $k$ -th derivative  $F^{(k)}(x)$  of  $F(\cdot)$  can be written as  $F^{(k)}(x) = \rho_k(x)e^{-\sqrt{-x}}$ , where

$$\rho_k(x) = \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{j=k}^{2k-1} \frac{(j-1)!}{(2j-2k)!(2k-j-1)!} (-x)^{-\frac{j}{2}}, \quad \text{for } k \geq 1,$$

and  $\rho_0(x) = 1$  for  $x \leq 0$ .

Thus the Gaussian process  $X_t^0$ ,  $t \geq 0$ , corresponding to the Markov chain, is

$$\begin{aligned}
X_t^0 &:= \sum_{j=-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^t (\exp(Q(t-s)))_{0,j} dW_s^j \\
&= \sum_{j \text{ even}} \int_0^t (\exp(Q(t-s)))_{0,j} dW_s^j + \sum_{j \text{ odd}} \int_0^t (\exp(Q(t-s)))_{0,j} dW_s^j \\
&= \sum_{m=-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^t \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell} F^{(2\ell)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell)!} \binom{2\ell}{\ell+m} p^{\ell+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{-\ell \leq m \leq \ell} dW_s^{2m} \\
&\quad + \sum_{m=-\infty}^{\infty} \int_0^t \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell+2} F^{(2\ell+1)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell+1)!} \\
&\quad \quad \cdot \binom{2\ell+1}{\ell+1+m} p^{\ell+1+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{-(\ell+1) \leq m \leq \ell} dW_s^{2m+1} \\
&= \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \sum_{m=-\ell}^{\ell} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell} F^{(2\ell)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell)!} \binom{2\ell}{\ell+m} p^{\ell+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} dW_s^{2m} \\
&\quad + \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \sum_{m=-(\ell+1)}^{\ell} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell+2} F^{(2\ell+1)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell+1)!} \\
&\quad \quad \cdot \binom{2\ell+1}{\ell+1+m} p^{\ell+1+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} dW_s^{2m+1},
\end{aligned} \tag{A.12}$$

where  $W^k(\cdot)$ ,  $k \in \mathbb{Z}$  are independent standard Brownian motions.

Thus, the variance is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Var}(X_t^0) &= \text{Var} \left( \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \sum_{m=-\ell}^{\ell} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell} F^{(2\ell)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell)!} \binom{2\ell}{\ell+m} p^{\ell+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} dW_s^{2m} \right) \\
&\quad + \text{Var} \left( \sum_{\ell=0}^{\infty} \sum_{m=-(\ell+1)}^{\ell} \int_0^t \frac{(t-s)^{4\ell+2} F^{(2\ell+1)}(-(t-s)^2)}{(2\ell+1)!} \right. \\
&\quad \quad \left. \cdot \binom{2\ell+1}{\ell+1+m} p^{\ell+1+m} (1-p)^{\ell-m} dW_s^{2m+1} \right).
\end{aligned} \tag{A.13}$$



# Appendix B

## Appendix: Systemic Risk Measures

### B.1 Appendix: Systemic Risk Measure on Overlapping Groups

#### B.1.1 Comparison between Trivial Grouping and Multi-Groups

We first look at the trivial grouping, i.e.  $m = h = 1$  and all  $k \in I_1 = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ . The group parameter and group vectors are

$$\beta_m = \beta = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\alpha_i}, \quad A_m = (1, 1, \dots, 1).$$

Then following (3.26), the systemic risk allocation of individual  $i$  is:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^1}[Y_{\mathbf{x}}^i] = -\mu_i + \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{\beta} \sum_{j=1}^N \sigma_{ji} - \frac{1}{2\beta^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{k,j=1}^N \sigma_{jk}.$$

The total systemic risk allocation for the system is

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^1}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i] = -\sum_{i=1}^N \mu_i + \beta \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{2\beta} \sum_{i,j=1}^N \sigma_{ji}. \quad (\text{B.1})$$

Then for the multi-group case, assuming  $m = 1, \dots, h$  ( $h \geq 2$ ) and for  $k_m \in I_m \neq \emptyset$ , the systemic risk allocation of individual  $k_m$  is:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{k_m}] = -\mu_{k_m} + \frac{1}{\alpha_{k_m}} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{\beta_m} \sum_{j \in I_m} \sigma_{jk_m} - \frac{1}{2\beta_m^2 \alpha_{k_m}} \sum_{j,l \in I_m} \sigma_{jl}.$$

The total risk allocation is:

$$\sum_{m=1}^h \sum_{k_m \in I_m} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{k_m}] = -\sum_{i=1}^N \mu_i + \beta \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{m=1}^h \frac{1}{\beta_m} \sum_{j,k \in I_m} \sigma_{jk}. \quad (\text{B.2})$$

We need to compare the total risk of trivial grouping (B.1) and the total risk of nontrivial grouping (B.2). For simplicity, we take  $h = 2$  in the nontrivial grouping case and compare.

Assume a  $N$ -individual system is divided into two subgroups with sizes  $N_1 = |I_1|$ ,  $N_2 = |I_2|$ , respectively. Given all risk factors define

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^N X^i, \quad S_1 = \sum_{i \in I_1} X^i, \quad S_2 = \sum_{i \in I_2} X^i.$$

Note that  $S = S_1 + S_2$ . Therefore

$$\text{Var}(S) = \sum_{i,j=1}^N \sigma_{ij}, \quad \text{Var}(S_1) = \sum_{i,j \in I_1} \sigma_{ij}, \quad \text{Var}(S_2) = \sum_{i,j \in I_2} \sigma_{ij}.$$

Then we compare the last term in (B.1), (B.2):

$$(B.1) : \quad \frac{1}{2\beta} \sum_{i,j=1}^N \sigma_{i,j} = \frac{1}{2\beta} \text{Var}(S) \quad (B.3)$$

$$(B.2) : \quad \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1} \sum_{j,k \in I_1} \sigma_{j,k} + \frac{1}{\beta_2} \sum_{j,k \in I_2} \sigma_{j,k} \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1} \text{Var}(S_1) + \frac{1}{\beta_2} \text{Var}(S_2) \right). \quad (B.4)$$

Since

$$\text{Var}(S) = \text{Var}(S_1) + \text{Var}(S_2) + 2\text{Cov}(S_1, S_2),$$

$$\begin{aligned} 2\beta_1\beta_2\beta \cdot (B.4 - B.3) &= \beta_1\beta_2\text{Var}(S_1) + \beta_2^2\text{Var}(S_1) + \beta_1^2\text{Var}(S_2) + \beta_1\beta_2\text{Var}(S_2) \\ &\quad - \beta_1\beta_2(\text{Var}(S_1) + \text{Var}(S_2) + 2\text{Cov}(S_1, S_2)) \\ &= \beta_2^2\text{Var}(S_1) + \beta_1^2\text{Var}(S_2) - 2\beta_1\beta_2\text{Cov}(S_1, S_2) \\ &= \text{Var}(\beta_2S_1 - \beta_1S_2) \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus (B.3)  $\leq$  (B.4), which is equivalent to (B.1)  $\leq$  (B.2). (The equality holds only if  $S_1 = S_2 = S$ , which we can exclude.)

We can conclude the trivial grouping has a smaller total systemic risk allocation for the  $N$ -player system compared with two-group case. It can be extended to general grouping case and show the advantage of trivial grouping or fewer groups in terms of the total risk. And it is consistent with the monotonicity property proved in [2].

### B.1.2 Proof of Claim 3.2.1

Under the assumption,  $\beta_m = |I_m| \frac{1}{\alpha}$ , equation (3.26) becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^2}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^k] &= -\mu_k + \frac{1}{\alpha} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{\alpha}{|I_m|}(\sigma^2 + (|I_m| - 1)\rho\sigma^2) \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{2\alpha} \left(\frac{\alpha}{|I_m|}\right)^2 (|I_m|\sigma^2 + \binom{|I_m|}{2} 2\rho\sigma^2) \\
&= -\mu_k + \frac{1}{\alpha} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{\alpha}{2|I_m|}\sigma^2 + \left(\alpha \frac{|I_m| - 1}{|I_m|} - \alpha \frac{|I_m| - 1}{2|I_m|}\right)\rho\sigma^2 \\
&= -\mu_k + \frac{1}{\alpha} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \alpha \frac{1}{2|I_m|}\sigma^2 + \alpha \frac{|I_m| - 1}{2|I_m|}\rho\sigma^2 \\
&= -\mu_k + \frac{1}{\alpha} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{\alpha}{2} \left( (1 - \rho) \frac{1}{|I_m|} + \rho \right) \sigma^2.
\end{aligned}$$

First, when  $\rho \neq 1$ , the function is monotonically decreasing in  $|I_m|$ . So the risk allocation for every individual/individual is maximized when  $|I_m| = n$ , i.e. all individuals/individuals are in the same group.

If we assume individuals are separated in several groups which makes it a Nash for all. For some individual  $i$  in the second largest group, moving to the largest group makes it achieve a smaller risk allocation which is better. If there are only two equal size groups, i.e. " $n/2 - n/2$ ", one individual  $i$  in group 1 joining the other one gives " $(n/2 - 1) - (n/2 + 1)$ " and  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^1}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i] > \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^2}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^i]$ . So " $(n/2 - 1) - (n/2 + 1)$ " cannot be Nash neither.

In conclusion, nontrivial grouping strategy cannot be Nash and only  $|I_m| = n$  is Nash under the case that all standard deviation and utility parameters are the same, and the correlation coefficient  $\rho \in [-1, 1)$ .

When  $\rho = 1$ , risks for every individual is constant and grouping has no effect.

### B.1.3 Proof of Claim 3.2.2

First we look at the grouping " $\{1, 2\} - \{3, 4\}$ " and find the equivalent condition to make it a Nash equilibrium. We compare risks for individual 1 under two cases, according to (3.26),

$$\begin{aligned} \text{under } \{1, 2\} - \{3, 4\} : \quad \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^1} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^1] &= -\mu_1 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{2}(\sigma^2 + \rho\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{8}(2\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2); \\ \text{under } \{2\} - \{1, 3, 4\} : \quad \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^2} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^1] &= -\mu_1 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{3}\sigma^2 - \frac{1}{18}(3\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2). \end{aligned}$$

For individual 1, to make the risk allocation under " $\{1, 2\} - \{3, 4\}$ "  $\leq$  that under " $\{2\} - \{1, 3, 4\}$ ":

$$\frac{1}{3}\sigma^2 - \frac{1}{18}(3\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2) \geq \frac{1}{2}(\sigma^2 + \rho\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{8}(2\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2) \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \rho \leq -\frac{3}{13}.$$

For individuals 2,3,4, we repeat similar discussion and the condition is the same:  $\rho \leq -\frac{3}{13}$ .

- So in conclusion, if  $\rho \leq -\frac{3}{13}$ , grouping " $\{1, 2\} - \{3, 4\}$ " is a Nash equilibrium.

In the grouping " $\{1, 3\} - \{2, 4\}$ ", we follow the same discussion about comparing risk allocations for all individuals. For example, for individual 1:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{under } \{1, 3\} - \{2, 4\} : \quad \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^1} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^1] &= -\mu_1 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 - \frac{1}{8}2\sigma^2; \\ \text{under } \{3\} - \{1, 2, 4\} : \quad \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^2} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^1] &= -\mu_1 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{3}(\sigma^2 + \rho\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{18}(3\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2). \end{aligned}$$

For individual 1, to make the risk allocation under " $\{1, 3\} - \{2, 4\}$ "  $\leq$  that under " $\{3\} - \{1, 2, 4\}$ ":

$$\frac{1}{3}(\sigma^2 + \rho\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{18}(3\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2) \geq \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 - \frac{1}{8}2\sigma^2 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \rho \geq \frac{3}{8}.$$

For individuals 2,3,4, we repeat similar discussion and the condition is the same:  $\rho \geq \frac{3}{8}$ .

- As a result, grouping ”{1, 3} – {2, 4}” is a Nash equilibrium if  $\rho \geq \frac{3}{8}$ . It is also the equivalent condition for grouping ”{1, 4} – {2, 3}” to be a Nash equilibrium

### B.1.4 Proof of Claim 3.2.3

Similar to the proof of claim 3.2.2, we look at the grouping ”{1, 2} – {3, 4, 5}” and find the equivalent condition to make it a Nash equilibrium. Under the assumptions, we first compare risks for individual 1 under two cases, according to (3.26),

$$\begin{aligned} \text{under ”}{1, 2}\text{ – }{3, 4, 5}\text{” : } \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^1} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^1] &= -\mu_1 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{2}(\sigma^2 + \rho\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{8}(2\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2); \\ \text{under ”}{2}\text{ – }{1, 3, 4, 5}\text{” : } \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^2} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^1] &= -\mu_1 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{4}\sigma^2 - \frac{1}{32}(4\sigma^2 + 6\rho\sigma^2). \end{aligned}$$

For individual 1, to make the risk allocation under ”{1, 2} – {3, 4, 5}”  $\leq$  that under ”{2} – {1, 3, 4, 5}”:

$$\frac{1}{4}\sigma^2 - \frac{1}{32}(4\sigma^2 + 6\rho\sigma^2) \geq \frac{1}{2}(\sigma^2 + \rho\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{8}(2\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2) \Leftrightarrow \rho \leq -\frac{2}{7}.$$

For individual 2, this is the same condition to have a smaller risk allocation. We then compare risks for individual 3 under two cases:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{under ”}{1, 2}\text{ – }{3, 4, 5}\text{” : } \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^2} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^3] &= -\mu_3 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{3}(\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2) - \frac{1}{18}(3\sigma^2 + 6\rho\sigma^2); \\ \text{under ”}{1, 2, 3}\text{ – }{4, 5}\text{” : } \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^1} [Y_{\mathbf{x}}^3] &= -\mu_3 + \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + \frac{1}{3}\sigma^2 - \frac{1}{18}(3\sigma^2 + 2\rho\sigma^2). \end{aligned}$$

To make the risk allocation for individual 3 under ”{1, 2} – {3, 4, 5}”  $\leq$  that under ”{1, 2, 3} – {4, 5}”, we get the equivalent condition  $\rho \leq 0$ . This is true for individuals 4,5 as well.

In conclusion, when  $\rho \leq -2/7$ , " $\{1, 2\} - \{3, 4, 5\}$ " is a Nash equilibrium for all individuals.

In the grouping " $\{1, 3\} - \{2, 4, 5\}$ ", we follow the same discussion about comparing risk allocations for all individuals. Individual 1 will stay with individual 3 instead of joining the other group if  $\rho = 1$ . Individual 2 will stay if  $\rho \geq 0$ . Individual 3 will stay with individual 1 if  $\rho \geq \frac{2}{5}$  and individuals 4,5 won't move for any  $\rho$ . As a result, grouping " $\{1, 3\} - \{2, 4, 5\}$ " is not a Nash equilibrium for any  $\rho \in (-1, 1)$ .

For the grouping " $\{1, 2, 3\} - \{4, 5\}$ ", after discussion about the condition for every individual not moving, we find a contradiction which proves for any value of  $\rho$ , this grouping cannot be a Nash.

### B.1.5 Proof of Theorem 3.2.1

We can rewrite the systemic risk measure  $\rho$  as:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho(\mathbf{X}) = \inf \left\{ \sum_{m=1}^h d_m : d = (d_1, \dots, d_h) \in \mathbb{R}^h, \mathbf{Y} = (Y^{i,j}, i \in I_j, 1 \leq j \leq h) \in L^0(\mathbb{R}^{\sum_{m=1}^h |I_m| * h}), \right. \\ \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{m=1}^h \sum_{k \in I_m} -\frac{1}{\alpha_k} \exp[-\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k + Y^{k,m})] \right] = B, \\ \left. \sum_{i \in I_j} Y^{i,j} = d_j, \text{ for } j = 1, 2, \dots, h \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

where  $(I_1, \dots, I_h)$  are the group index sets given. **For any group  $m$ , we define the smallest element as  $m^0 \in I_m$  and fix another element  $m^* \in I_m$  and  $m^* \neq m^0$ .** (When there is only one element in the group,  $m^* = m^0$  and the discussion will be similar.) In the following proof we assume  $|I_m| \geq 2$  for all  $m = 1, \dots, h$ . We also assume  $Y$  is defined on a finite space:  $Y^{k,m} \in \{y_1^{k,m}, \dots, y_M^{k,m}\}$  for all  $k, m$  and  $y_j^{k,m} \in \mathbb{R}$ . Then we have:  $y_j^{m^*,m} = d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m}$  for  $m = 1, \dots, h$ .

We show the results with the Lagrange's method with the function defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{Y}, \lambda) = & \sum_{m=1}^h d_m + \lambda \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^M p_j \sum_{m=1}^h \left[ \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} \frac{-1}{\alpha_k} \exp \left( -\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m}) \right) \right. \right. \\ & \left. \left. + \frac{-1}{\alpha_{m^*}} \exp \left( -\alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right) \right) \right] - B \right\}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.6})$$

We compute partial derivatives of  $\mathcal{L}$  with respect to all variables and get all equivalent condition in the following.

1. Given  $m$ , for  $j = 1, \dots, M$ ,  $k \in I_m$  and  $k \neq m^*$ :  $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y_j^{k,m}} = 0$

if and only if for every fixed  $j$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} 0 = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y_j^{k,m}} &= \lambda p_j \left[ e^{-\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m})} - e^{-\alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right)} \right] \\ &\iff \exp \left( -\alpha_k \left( w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m} \right) \right) \\ &= \exp \left( -\alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.7})$$

It implies

$$\exp \left( -\alpha_k \left( w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m} \right) \right) = \exp \left( -\alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right) \right).$$

Then for  $k \neq m^*$ ,

$$y_j^{k,m} = \frac{1}{\alpha_k} \left( \alpha_{m^*} w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) - \alpha_k w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + \alpha_{m^*} \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right), \quad (\text{B.8})$$



and by (B.7) and (B.8), we obtain that (details are shown below):

$$\begin{aligned} y_j^{m^0,m} &= \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^0}\beta_m} \left( \sum_{k \in I_m} w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) \right) - w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^0}\beta_m} d_m \\ &= \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^0}\beta_m} S_m(\omega_j) - w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^0}\beta_m} d_m, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.9})$$

where  $\beta_m = \sum_{k \in I_m} \frac{1}{\alpha_k}$ ,  $S_m = \sum_{k \in I_m} w_{k,m} X^k$ .

*Proof:* By (B.8),

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} &= \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} \alpha_{m^0} \left( w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + y_j^{m^0,m} \right) - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) \\ &= \left( \beta_m - \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^*}} \right) \alpha_{m^0} \left( w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + y_j^{m^0,m} \right) - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j), \\ \implies w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \\ &= d_m - \left( \beta_m - \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^*}} \right) \alpha_{m^0} \left( w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + y_j^{m^0,m} \right) + S_m(\omega_j). \end{aligned}$$

Thus using (B.7),

$$\begin{aligned} & - \alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right) \\ &= -\alpha_{m^*} d_m + (\beta_m \alpha_{m^*} - 1) \alpha_{m^0} \left( w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + y_j^{m^0,m} \right) - \alpha_{m^*} S_m(\omega_j) \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{by (B.7)} \quad = -\alpha_{m^0} \left( w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + y_j^{m^0,m} \right)$$

$$\implies \alpha_{m^*} \beta_m \alpha_{m^0} \left( w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + y_j^{m^0,m} \right) = \alpha_{m^*} d_m + \alpha_{m^*} S_m(\omega_j)$$

$$\implies (\text{B.9}).$$

2. For  $m = 1, \dots, h$ , the derivative with respect to  $d_m$ :  $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial d_m} = 0$  if and only if

$$0 = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial d_m} = 1 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^M p_j \exp \left( -\alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right) \right) \quad (\text{B.10})$$

By (B.7),

$$0 = 1 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^M p_j \exp \left( -\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m}) \right) \quad \text{for all } k \in I_m, \text{ and } k \neq m^*,$$

i.e.  $\sum_{j=1}^M p_j \exp \left( -\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m}) \right) = \frac{-1}{\lambda}.$  (B.11)

3. The derivative with respect to  $\lambda$ :  $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = 0$  if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} B &= \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{m=1}^h \sum_{k \in I_m} \frac{-1}{\alpha_k} \exp[-\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k + Y^{k,m})] \right] \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^M p_j \cdot \sum_{m=1}^h \left[ \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} \frac{-1}{\alpha_k} \exp \left( -\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m}) \right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \frac{-1}{\alpha_{m^*}} \exp \left( -\alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right) \right) \right] \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^M \sum_{m=1}^h \left[ \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} \frac{-1}{\alpha_k} \cdot p_j \exp \left( -\alpha_k (w_{k,m} X^k(\omega_j) + y_j^{k,m}) \right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \frac{-1}{\alpha_{m^*}} \cdot p_j \exp \left( -\alpha_{m^*} \left( w_{m^*,m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k,m} \right) \right) \right] \\ \text{by (B.10), (B.11)} &= \sum_{m=1}^h \left[ \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} \frac{-1}{\alpha_k} \frac{-1}{\lambda} + \frac{-1}{-\alpha_{m^*}} \frac{-1}{\lambda} \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_{m=1}^h \sum_{k \in I_m} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} = \frac{1}{\lambda} \beta. \end{aligned}$$

Hence,

$$\lambda = \frac{\beta}{B}. \quad (\text{B.12})$$

- We then compute  $d_m$  by inserting (B.12) and (B.9) in (B.11) for  $k = m^0 \in I_m$ , and  $m^0 \neq m^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned} -\frac{B}{\beta} &= \sum_{j=1}^M p_j \exp\left(-\alpha_{m^0}(w_{m^0,m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + y_j^{m^0,m})\right) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^M p_j \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta_m}(S_m(\omega_j) + d_m)\right) \\ &= e^{-\frac{d_m}{\beta_m}} \sum_{j=1}^M p_j \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta_m} S_m(\omega_j)\right) = e^{-\frac{d_m}{\beta_m}} \mathbb{E}\left(e^{-\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}}\right). \end{aligned}$$

So

$$d_m = \beta_m \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B} \mathbb{E}\left(e^{-\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}}\right)\right). \quad (\text{B.13})$$

Then back to (B.8) and (B.9), for  $k, m^0, m^* \in I_m$  and  $k \neq m^0 \neq m^*$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
y_j^{m^0, m} &= \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^0} \beta_m} S_m(\omega_j) - w_{m^0, m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^0} \beta_m} d_m; \\
y_j^{k, m} &= \frac{\alpha_{m^0}}{\alpha_k} w_{m^0, m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) - w_{k, m} X^k(\omega_j) \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{\alpha_k} \left[ \frac{1}{\beta_m} S_m(\omega_j) - \alpha_{m^0} w_{m^0, m} X^{m^0}(\omega_j) + \frac{1}{\beta_m} d_m \right] \\
&= -w_{k, m} X^k(\omega_j) + \frac{1}{\alpha_k \beta_m} (S_m(\omega_j) + d_m); \\
y_j^{m^*, m} &= d_m - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} y_j^{k, m} \\
&= d_m + \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} w_{k, m} X^k(\omega_j) - \sum_{k \in I_m, k \neq m^*} \frac{1}{\alpha_k \beta_m} (S_m(\omega_j) + d_m) \\
&= d_m + (S_m(\omega_j) - w_{m^*, m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j)) - \left( \beta_m - \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^*}} \right) \frac{1}{\beta_m} (S_m(\omega_j) + d_m) \\
&= -w_{m^*, m} X^{m^*}(\omega_j) + \frac{1}{\alpha_{m^*} \beta_m} (S_m(\omega_j) + d_m).
\end{aligned}$$

So for given  $m$ , for all  $k \in I_m$ , we have:

$$Y^{k, m} = -w_{k, m} X^k + \frac{1}{\alpha_k \beta_m} (S_m + d_m)$$

where  $d_m = \beta_m \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_m}{d_m}} \right) \right)$ .

In addition, the systemic risk measure is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho(\mathbf{X}) &= \sum_{m=1}^h d_m = \sum_{m=1}^h \beta_m \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_m}{d_m}} \right) \right) \\
&= \beta \log \left( \frac{\beta}{-B} \right) + \sum_{m=1}^h \beta_m \log \left( \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_m}{d_m}} \right) \right).
\end{aligned}$$

### B.1.6 Proof of Proposition 3.2.1

First, we prove the marginal risk allocation for individual  $i$  in group  $j$ .

By theorem 3.2.1, for  $i \in I_j$

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}] &= \mathbb{E} \left[ Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^{i,j} \cdot \frac{d\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^j}{d\mathbb{P}} \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( -w_{i,j}(X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} d_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}} \right) \cdot \frac{\exp\left(-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}\right)}{\mathbb{E} \left[ \exp\left(-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}\right) \right]} \right] \\
&= -w_{i,j} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( (X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) \exp\left(-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}\right) \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( \exp\left(-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}\right) \right)} + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) \exp\left(-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}\right) \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( \exp\left(-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}\right) \right)} \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \left( \log(-\beta/B) + \log \left( \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \right) \right) \\
&= I + II + III.
\end{aligned}$$

Since  $S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}} = S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}$ , and assuming everything is well-defined so that we can use Leibniz integral rule, then we have the following results

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) &= \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right); \\
\frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E} \left( (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) &= \mathbb{E} \left[ S_j^{\mathbf{Z}} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} - (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) \frac{S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Compute the derivatives,

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial I}{\partial \varepsilon} &= -w_{i,j} \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( (X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) \exp \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} \right) \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( \exp \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} \right) \right)} \right) \\
&= -w_{i,j} \frac{1}{\left( \mathbb{E} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right)^2} \left[ \mathbb{E} \left( Z^i e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \right. \\
&\quad + \mathbb{E} \left( (X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} \right) e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \\
&\quad \left. - \mathbb{E} \left( (X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \right] \\
&= -w_{i,j} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [Z^i] - \frac{1}{\beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [(X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}] + \frac{1}{\beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [X^i + \varepsilon Z^i] \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}] \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i] + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X} + \varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} (X^i + \varepsilon Z^i, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}});
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial II}{\partial \varepsilon} &= \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) \exp \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} \right) \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( \exp \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} \right) \right)} \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \frac{1}{\left( \mathbb{E} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right)^2} \left[ \left( \mathbb{E} \left( S_j^{\mathbf{Z}} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \mathbb{E} \left( (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} \right) e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \right] \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \\
&\quad - \mathbb{E} \left( (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) \Big] \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}] - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}); \\
\frac{\partial III}{\partial \varepsilon} &= \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \frac{1}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right)} \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}}{\beta_j}} \right) = -\frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}].
\end{aligned}$$

As a result

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}]}{\partial \varepsilon} &= \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} (I + II + III) \\
&= -w_{i,j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [Z^i] + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} (X^i + \varepsilon Z^i, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}] \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i] + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} (X^i + \varepsilon Z^i, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i] - \frac{1}{\beta_j} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^j} (Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon \mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}, S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}).
\end{aligned}$$

Then when  $\varepsilon = 0$ , we have the formula for marginal risk allocation for individual  $i$  in group  $j$  in proposition 3.2.1.

The marginal risk contribution of group  $j$  is trivial and for the conclusion on local

causal responsibility, we have:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} \left[ \left( -w_{i,j}(X^i + \varepsilon Z^i) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} (S_j + \varepsilon S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} d_j^{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}} \right) \right].$$

Then according to the previous proof,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} \left( -w_{i,j} Z^i + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} S_j^{\mathbf{Z}} \right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^j} (S_j^{\mathbf{Z}}),$$

and thus,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y_{\mathbf{X}+\varepsilon\mathbf{Z}}^{i,j}] \Big|_{\varepsilon=0} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [-w_{i,j} Z^i].$$

### B.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3.2.2

By theorem 3.2.1, for  $i \in I_j$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j} [Y^{i,j}] &= \mathbb{E} \left[ Y^{i,j} \cdot \frac{d\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^j}{d\mathbb{P}} \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( -w_{i,j} X^i + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} (S_j + d_j) \right) \cdot \frac{e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}}}{\mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right]} \right] \\ &= -w_{i,j} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( S_j e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} + \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \left( \log(-\beta/B) + \log \left( \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \right) \right) \\ &= I + II + III. \end{aligned}$$

Assuming everything is well-defined so that we can use Leibniz integral rule, then we have the following results

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial w_{i,j}} \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) = \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{X^i}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \quad ; \quad \frac{\partial}{\partial w_{i,j}} \mathbb{E} \left( S_j e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) = \mathbb{E} \left[ X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} - S_j \frac{X^i}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right].$$



Compute the derivatives,

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial I}{\partial w_{i,j}} &= \frac{\partial}{\partial w_{i,j}} \left( -w_{i,j} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} \right) \\
&= -\frac{\mathbb{E} \left( X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} - w_{i,j} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{(X^i)^2}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) - \mathbb{E} \left( X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{X^i}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\left( \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \right)^2} \\
&= -\frac{\mathbb{E} \left( X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( (X^i)^2 e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} - \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} \right)^2 \\
&= -\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_x^j} [X^i] + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Var}_{\mathbb{Q}_x^j} (X^i);
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial II}{\partial w_{i,j}} &= \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \frac{\partial}{\partial w_{i,j}} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( S_j e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \frac{1}{\left( \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \right)^2} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} - S_j \frac{X^i}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right] \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. - \mathbb{E} \left( S_j e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{X^i}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E} \left( X^i e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} - \frac{1}{\beta_j} \mathbb{E} \left( X^i S_j \frac{e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}}}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} \right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \frac{1}{\beta_j} \mathbb{E} \left( X^i \frac{e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}}}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} \right) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( S_j \frac{e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}}}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} \right) \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_x^j} [X^i] - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_x^j} (X^i, S_j);
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial III}{\partial w_{i,j}} &= \frac{\partial}{\partial w_{i,j}} \left( \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log(-\beta/B) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log \left( \mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \right) \right) = \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \frac{1}{\mathbb{E} \left( e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right)} \cdot \mathbb{E} \left( -\frac{X^i}{\beta_j} e^{-\frac{S_j}{\beta_j}} \right) \\ &= -\frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [X^i]. \end{aligned}$$

As a result

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [Y^{i,j}]}{\partial w_{i,j}} &= \frac{\partial}{\partial w_{i,j}} (I + II + III) \\ &= -\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [X^i] + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Var}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} (X^i) + \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [X^i] \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} (X^i, S_j) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [X^i] \\ &= -\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} [X^i] - \frac{1}{\alpha_i \beta_j^2} \text{Cov}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} (X^i, S_j) + \frac{w_{i,j}}{\beta_j} \text{Var}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}^j} (X^i), \quad i \in I_j. \end{aligned}$$

### B.1.8 Proof of Proposition 3.2.3

Define

$$\eta'_m = \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} \frac{1}{\alpha_k}.$$

By theorem 3.2.1, for  $k \in I_m$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} Y^{k,m} &= \frac{S_m + d_m}{\beta_m} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} - \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} w_{k,m} X^k \\ &= \frac{S_m + d_m}{\beta_m} \eta'_m - \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k. \end{aligned}$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m} \left[ \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} \frac{w_{k,m'}}{w_{k,m}} Y^{k,m} \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m} \left( \frac{\eta'_m}{\beta_m} S_m - \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right) + \frac{\eta'_m}{\beta_m} \beta_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right] \right\} \\
&= \eta'_m \log \left\{ \exp \left[ \frac{1}{\eta'_m} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m} \left( \frac{\eta'_m}{\beta_m} S_m - \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right) \right] \right\} + \eta'_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right] \right\} \\
&\leq \eta'_m \log \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^m} \left[ \exp \left( \frac{1}{\beta_m} S_m - \frac{1}{\eta'_m} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right) \right] \right\} + \eta'_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right] \right\} \\
&= \eta'_m \log \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{e^{\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}} e^{-\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{\eta'_m} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right)}{\mathbb{E}[e^{-\frac{S_m}{\beta_m}}]} \right] \right\} + \eta'_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{S_m}{\beta_m} \right) \right] \right\} \\
&= \eta'_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{1}{\eta'_m} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right) \right] \right\} \tag{B.14} \\
&< \beta'_m \log \left\{ -\frac{\beta'}{B} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{1}{\beta'_m} \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \right) \right] \right\}, \quad \text{if } \sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k \text{ is nonnegative,} \\
&:= d_{m'}.
\end{aligned}$$

In conclusion, if both  $\sum_{k \in I_{m'}} w_{k,m'} X^k$  and  $\sum_{k \in I_{m''}} w_{k,m''} X^k$  are nonnegative, the inequality holds for the risk allocations of subgroup  $I_{m'}$ , as well as  $I_{m''}$ . Otherwise, we have the inequality given by (B.14).

### B.1.9 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for $B$ in Remark 3.2.6

Here we show a necessary and sufficient condition for  $B$  to have trivial Nash through an example. We assume all risk factors are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables where  $\sigma_{ij} = 0$ ,

$i \neq j$  and  $\sigma_{ii} = \sigma$  for all  $i, j$ .

When all banks in one group, i.e.  $h = 1$ ,  $\beta = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$ ,

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^1] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^1}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{1,1}] = \frac{1}{\alpha_1} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \mu_1 + \frac{1}{\beta_1} \sigma - \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_1} N \sigma. \quad (\text{B.15})$$

When bank 1 decides to split and put some weights in another group, e.g.  $\exists w_{1,1}, w_{1,2} > 0$  and  $w_{1,1} + w_{1,2} = 1$ , then  $\beta' = \beta + \frac{1}{\alpha_1}$  and  $\beta_1 = \beta$ ,  $\beta_2 = \frac{1}{\alpha_1}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^1] &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^1}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{1,1}] + \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{X}}^2}[Y_{\mathbf{X}}^{1,2}] \\ &= \frac{2}{\alpha_1} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \mu_1 + \frac{w_{1,1}^2}{\beta_1} \sigma + \frac{w_{1,2}^2}{\beta_2} \sigma \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_1} ((N-1)\sigma + w_{1,1}^2 \sigma) - \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_1} w_{1,2}^2 \sigma. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.16})$$

To have trivial Nash, for bank 1, it should hold that (B.16)  $\geq$  (B.15), which gives:

$$\frac{1}{\alpha_1} \log(-B) \leq \frac{1}{\alpha_1} \log\left(\frac{(\beta')^2}{\beta}\right) - \left[\frac{1}{\beta_1} - \left(\frac{w_{1,1}^2}{\beta_1} + \frac{w_{1,2}^2}{\beta_2}\right)\right] \sigma - \frac{1}{2\alpha_1} \left[\left(\frac{w_{1,1}^2}{\beta_1^2} + \frac{w_{1,2}^2}{\beta_2^2}\right) - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2}\right] \sigma. \quad (\text{B.17})$$

Then by extending (B.17) to all banks, we can get the necessary and sufficient condition on  $B$  to have trivial Nash: for all  $i = 1, \dots, N$ ,  $B$  satisfies

$$\frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log(-B) \leq \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{(\beta')^2}{\beta}\right) - \left[\frac{1}{\beta_1} - \left(\frac{w_{i,1}^2}{\beta_1} + \frac{w_{i,2}^2}{\beta_2}\right)\right] \sigma - \frac{1}{2\alpha_i} \left[\left(\frac{w_{i,1}^2}{\beta_1^2} + \frac{w_{i,2}^2}{\beta_2^2}\right) - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2}\right] \sigma, \quad (\text{B.18})$$

where  $\beta_2 = \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$ ,  $\beta_1 = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\alpha_i}$  and  $\beta' = \beta_1 + \beta_2$ .

Recall that  $B$  is negative and stands for the minimal level of expected utility. Intuitively, when  $B$  is small,  $\log(-B)$  is large, then some of inequalities tend to be violated

so that there would be no trivial Nash in the system. On the other hand, when  $B$  is large (close to 0),  $\log(-B)$  will be extremely small so that trivial Nash may exist in the system.

### B.1.10 Remark for Equation (3.25)

*Remark B.1.1.* Some results about  $S_m$ :

- $\mathbb{E}(e^{-S_m/\beta_m}) = \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta_m} \mu_m^s + \frac{1}{2\beta_m^2} (\sigma_m^s)^2\right)$ ;
- For  $i \in I_m$ , (proof see below)

$$\mathbb{E}(X^i e^{-S_m/\beta_m}) = \left(\mu_i - \frac{1}{\beta_m} A_m \Sigma_{[i,i]}\right) \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta_m} \mu_m^s + \frac{1}{2\beta_m^2} (\sigma_m^s)^2\right);$$

- $\mathbb{E}(S_m e^{-S_m/\beta_m}) = \left(\mu_m^s - \frac{1}{\beta_m} (\sigma_m^s)^2\right) \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta_m} \mu_m^s + \frac{1}{2\beta_m^2} (\sigma_m^s)^2\right)$ ;

*Proof:* Define  $\mathbf{t}^T = (t_1, \dots, t_N)$

$$\mathbb{E}(X^i e^{\mathbf{t}^T \mathbf{X}}) = \frac{\partial M_{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{t})}{\partial t_i} = \frac{\partial}{\partial t_i} \exp\left(\boldsymbol{\mu}^T \mathbf{t} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{t}^T \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{t}\right) \quad (\text{B.19})$$

$$= \left(\mu_i + \mathbf{t}^T \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{[i,i]}\right) \exp\left(\boldsymbol{\mu}^T \mathbf{t} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{t}^T \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{t}\right) \quad (\text{B.20})$$

So

$$\mathbb{E}(X^i e^{-S_m/\beta_m}) = \mathbb{E}(X^i e^{-(A_m/\beta_m)\mathbf{X}}) = \left(\mu_i - \frac{1}{\beta_m} A_m \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{[i,i]}\right) \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta_m} \mu_m^s + \frac{1}{2\beta_m^2} (\sigma_m^s)^2\right).$$

### B.1.11 Sufficient Condition for Local Optimal Weights

To investigate the condition (3.49) further, we make some reasonable assumptions on estimates and introduce some situations when they hold.

- assuming: all  $w_{k,1}, w_{k,2} \neq 0$ , for all  $k \neq i$ , then  $\beta_1 = \beta_2 = \sum \frac{1}{\alpha_k}$ .

Then (3.49) is equivalent to

$$-\left(\frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i}\right) \sigma_{ii} < \left(\frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{1}{\beta_1}\right) \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N (w_{k,1} - w_{k,2}) \sigma_{ki} < \left(\frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i}\right) \sigma_{ii}. \quad (\text{B.21})$$

Since

$$\frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{1}{\beta_1} < 0, \quad |(w_{k,1} - w_{k,2}) \sigma_{ki}| \leq |\sigma_{ki}| \quad \text{for all } k, i,$$

we can deduce a **sufficient** condition for  $w_{(i)}^* \in (0, 1)$  for individual  $i$ :

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{\beta_1 \alpha_i}\right) \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N |\sigma_{ki}| < \left(2 - \frac{1}{\beta_1 \alpha_i}\right) \sigma_{ii}. \quad (\text{B.22})$$

*Remark B.1.2.* From above, we can have a rough estimation: if  $\sigma_i \sim \sigma$ ,  $\rho > 0$  and  $\alpha = [1, 1, 1, 1]$  (or say, **no extremely large  $\sigma$  and no extremely small  $\alpha$** ), the inequality is true when  $\rho < 7/9$ , according to

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{4}\right) \cdot (4 - 1) \rho \sigma^2 < \left(2 - \frac{1}{4}\right) \sigma^2.$$

This explains why in numerical experiments, when we apply reasonable values of parameters, the optimal weights are often located between  $(0, 1)$ . And when  $(w_{k,1}, w_{k,2})$  are close for most  $k \neq i$ , the weights for individual  $i$  are around 0.5 because of small  $A \sim 0$  and  $B_1 \sim B_2$  in this case.

If for individual  $i$ ,  $\sigma_i$  is small and  $\sigma_i \ll \sigma_{i^0}$  for some  $i^0$ , then the sufficient condition doesn't hold and by numerical results, we found  $w_{(i)}^*$  is not in  $(0, 1)$  anymore.

- assuming: for some  $k$ (s),  $w_{k,1}, w_{k,2}$  can be 0 or 1. Then  $\beta_1 \neq \beta_2$  but it is still true that  $-1 \leq w_{k,1} - w_{k,2} \leq 1$  for all  $k$ .

(3.49) can be rewritten as

$$-\left(\frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i}\right) \sigma_{ii} < \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left( w_{k,1} \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{1}{\beta_1} \right) - w_{k,2} \left( \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{1}{\beta_2} \right) \right) \sigma_{ki} < \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii}. \quad (\text{B.23})$$

A **sufficient** condition for  $w_{(i)}^* \in (0, 1)$  for individual  $i$ :

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N |\sigma_{ki}| < \left( \frac{2}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii}, \\ \left( \frac{1}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N |\sigma_{ki}| < \left( \frac{2}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii}. \end{array} \right. \quad (\text{B.24})$$

This is a generalization of (B.22).

### B.1.12 Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Optimal Weights

First, we compare the minimal risk over non-zero weights (3.50) with the corner case  $(w_{i1}, w_{i2}) = (0, 1)$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_x} [Y^i] \Big|_{w=w^*} - (3.46) \tag{B.25} \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + w^* \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left[ \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) - \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \right] \sigma_{ki} \\
&+ \left( \frac{(w^*)^2}{\beta_1} - \frac{(w^*)^2}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} + ((1-w^*)^2 - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} \\
&- \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km} \quad (\text{use the notation of } A, B_1, B_2) \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + w^* \cdot (-A) + \frac{(w^*)^2}{2} B_1 + \frac{w^*(w^* - 2)}{2} B_2 \\
&- \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km} \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \underbrace{w^* \cdot \left( A - \frac{w^*}{2} B_1 - \frac{w^* - 2}{2} B_2 \right)}_{=\Delta} \\
&- \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km} \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \frac{(A + B_2)^2}{2(B_1 + B_2)} - \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,1} w_{m,1} \sigma_{km}. \tag{B.26}
\end{aligned}$$

Since  $w^* = \frac{A+B_2}{B_1+B_2}$ , we get  $\Delta = A - \frac{w^*}{2}(B_1 + B_2) + B_2 = \frac{A+B_2}{2}$ .

Then we compare the minimal risk of non-boundary case (3.50) with the boundary



case  $(w_{i1}, w_{i2}) = (1, 0)$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\mathbf{x}}} [Y^i] \Big|_{w=w^*} - (3.45) \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) + (w^* - 1) \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N \left[ \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2} \right) - \left( \frac{w_{k,1}}{\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} - \frac{w_{k,2}}{\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \right] \sigma_{ki} \\
&+ ((w^*)^2 - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\beta_1} - \frac{1}{2\beta_1^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} + (1 - w^*)^2 \left( \frac{1}{\beta_2} - \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \right) \sigma_{ii} \\
&- \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km} \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - (w^* - 1) \left( A - \frac{w^* + 1}{2} B_1 - \frac{w^* - 1}{2} B_2 \right) \\
&- \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km} \\
&= \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta'}{-B}\right) - \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \log\left(\frac{\beta}{-B}\right) - \frac{(A - B_1)^2}{2(B_1 + B_2)} - \frac{1}{2\beta_2^2 \alpha_i} \sum_{m, k=1, \neq i}^N w_{k,2} w_{m,2} \sigma_{km}. \tag{B.27}
\end{aligned}$$

If both (B.27) and (B.26) are less than 0, we get conditions (3.51), which are the necessary and sufficient conditions to conclude non-zero weights  $(w^*, 1 - w^*)$  are the optimal weights to minimize the total risk.

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