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## **DRAFT: NOT TO BE QUOTED**

### DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND THE MARXISTS<sup>1</sup>

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#### **Introduction**

In British universities in the 1960s and 1970s, the institutionalization of Development Studies as a distinct field of teaching and research coincided with the rapid growth of Marxist ideas in the social sciences. This chapter considers aspects of Development Studies and Marxist work over the last 40 years or so, including some intrinsic tensions that each brings to their encounters. I try to identify conditions and issues of intellectual production and its practical applications that may be useful to constructing and pursuing the project of an historical, and critical, sociology of knowledge of Development Studies, which this collection seeks to stimulate.

This essay employs a restrictive or institutional definition of Development Studies as the kinds of teaching and research done in Development Studies departments, centres, institutes, and so on, in British universities, as sites of an academic specialism of recent provenance. What justifies it as a specialism in its own right is the presumption that it is dedicated *and* equipped to generate *applied* knowledge of practical benefit in the formulation and implementation of development policies and interventions. This is what motivates students to enroll in university Development Studies programmes (typically with the hope of making careers in development work), and government and other development agencies to fund applied research on development by academics. As ‘policy

science' Development Studies is centred on two sets of issues: those of economic growth and how to promote it, and of poverty and how to overcome it, principally in what is now known as the (global) South. Virtually all intellectual production in the name of Development Studies, and the claims made for it, can be assimilated to one or other of these overarching goals, or seeks to link them.

This restrictive sense corresponds roughly to what Cowen and Shenton (1996) identify as the 'intent' to develop - constitutive of development discourses or what they call 'doctrines of development' - by contrast with 'immanent' development. Development Studies in the restrictive or institutional sense, founded on such 'intent', eludes definition by any coherent object of study or intellectual paradigm, a problem highlighted by the porousness of its borders: intellectually with the social science disciplines (and the various approaches they contain), in applied work with governments, aid agencies and other development organizations. There is much crossing of both types of borders and in both directions, with more and less happy experiences and outcomes for those who make such journeys. In mapping some of the contexts, contours and issues of the career of Development Studies I use a broad and schematic periodization that posits a founding moment comprising the conjuncture from the end of the second world war to the institutionalization of Development Studies in British universities in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by that of the gathering neo-liberal ascendancy since the 1980s.

## **Development Studies I. The Founding Moment: Big Issues and Big Ideas**

As a recognized field of teaching and research in British universities, and those in other countries, Development Studies was a product of the decolonization of most of Asia and Africa from the late 1940s to the early 1960s and the reorganizations of foreign policy, both political and economic, it generated in the North. Its institutional origins were thus closely linked to the formation and trajectories of agencies, policies and practices of development aid.<sup>2</sup> The colonial factor may partly explain the relative absence of the rubric 'Development Studies' in American universities; the USA had few colonial possessions but substantial historical experience of policy making and intervention in 'informal empire', notably in Latin America.<sup>3</sup>

The centrality of development to the discourses and practices of governments in the conjuncture of decolonization, both North (in foreign policy) and South (in domestic policy), as well as of the major multilateral bodies established at the end of the Second World War (the United Nations, the World Bank), was shaped by the bipolar post-war world of the two superpowers. Their pursuit of influence (or control) in the newly independent states of Asia and Africa incorporated claims of the superiority of their own socioeconomic systems, and their paths of development, as models to emulate. Irrespective of the rubric of Development Studies, for example, American universities produced some of the definitive texts of explicitly Cold War development theory, of which Rostow's 'non-communist manifesto' (1960) was emblematic.<sup>4</sup> Rostow, like other contemporaries across the political spectrum, had a sharp sense of the historical moment he inhabited, of what was at stake when the victorious war against fascism had enhanced the political and military strength of the USA (as well as its economic dominance in the

capitalist world) and of the USSR (now joined, for the time being, by revolutionary China), thereby contributing to the end of (most of) European colonial empire in Asia and Africa which both superpowers, for different reasons, wanted to see dismantled.

In effect, the founding moment of Development Studies was one of world-historical drama, as appreciated by those who shaped the contemporary intellectual frameworks of the meanings and means of development, and engaged in their contestations. This was a moment, then, of asking big questions and pursuing big ideas, with an expansive intellectual agenda that sought to identify and explain key processes of change in the formation of the modern world and their effects. Among such effects in particular was the striking unevenness of forms and rates of economic growth in different regions and countries at different times, together with social, political and cultural forces associated with them and which may contribute to their explanation. That unevenness, of course, was - as it still is - manifested in the brute facts of massive social inequality within and between regions and countries. Key themes of this expansive notion of the study of development, which it often aspires to connect, include: transformations of agrarian societies, patterns of accumulation, and industrialization; the formation and functioning of international markets and divisions of labour, and other aspects of a world economy (flows of people, capital, commodities, technologies, and ideas, images and practices); the formation and functioning of modern states and of an international state system; the differentiated social agents who, individually and collectively, participate in and struggle over such processes and shape their outcomes.<sup>5</sup>

Much of this expansive agenda - especially concerning the conditions, mechanisms, nature and effects of development as the transformation of individual countries/societies - has a rich and diverse intellectual lineage that includes the great founding figures of social science, hence long predates the notion of any distinctive field of Development Studies.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, for intellectual pioneers like Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber, the transformations of their time(s) were being wrought by the development of *capitalism* and, for Marx, above all *industrial* capitalism. Marx also had a very strong sense of the *global* character and consequences of capitalism, albeit one that was relatively little specified or explored in his work. Certainly by the founding moment of Development Studies, issues of the development of individual poor ('underdeveloped') countries (the first set of themes outlined) were increasingly integrated with consideration of international economic and political conditions of development (the second and third sets of themes), which anti-colonial movements did much to impress on the agenda as did the superpower rivalry of the USA and USSR (providing different examples of the fourth set of themes).<sup>7</sup>

Another vital ingredient in the powerful cocktail of this world-historical moment was the complex and compound legacies of European colonialism, and of 'Orientalism' more generally, for the constitution of 'development' as discourse and object of policy in both North and South. This is too large and important a topic to address here, where I note only that in the case of Britain (as of some other European countries, notably France and the Netherlands), the experience of colonial administration and of the 'developmental' phase of late colonialism contributed ideas and practices, and also personnel, to the

emerging professionalization of development expertise in both national and international organizations (see the chapter by Uma Kothari in this collection).<sup>8</sup>

In the founding moment of Development Studies there was an assumption that the state in newly independent (and other poor) countries had a central role in planning and managing economic and social development. Indeed, this assumption held across a very wide range of the political and ideological spectrum with a particularly marked influence in Britain (as in other countries of Northern Europe) of social democratic ideas, associated with structuralist economics (or political economy) and a kind of international Keynesianism applied to issues of aid and trade.<sup>9</sup> Consequently both champions and critics of the newly established field of Development Studies shared an understanding that its rationale was to find ways of assisting state-led development.

While that understanding was a key route across the border with governments and aid agencies, the expansive framework and agenda of the study of development, embracing a plethora of objects of study, research and reflection, overflows the borders with all the social science disciplines, including History, Law and the relative newcomer of International Relations, hence are not unique to Development Studies, that even newer kid on the block. Indeed, it may be that in practice the latter is today less well placed to investigate, and produce knowledge of, processes of development in the intellectually expansive sense suggested, for reasons considered later. There are programmes of study and research on development in disciplinary social science departments in British universities, for example, in Anthropology, Economics and Politics, hence outside that

particular space in the academic division of labour designated as Development Studies. There is also much research relevant to the study of development by social scientists with particular expertise, including linguistic and other cultural skills, in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They may thus be considered 'Area Studies' specialists in the term used in the American academy, are found mostly in Anthropology and History, followed by Politics and Sociology, among the major social science disciplines, and some of them reject any identification of their work with Development Studies, for various reasons.

## **Development Studies II. The Age of Neo-liberalism: How Less Becomes More, and More Less**

When the gathering ascendancy of neo-liberalism in development policy from the 1980s - the Washington consensus - repudiated any significant interventionist role of states in the South in bringing about economic development, the question therefore arose whether Development Studies retained any purpose.<sup>10</sup> The question made sense. However, Development Studies has not only survived the current period of neo-liberal ascendancy but has prospered in British universities in terms of continued institutional growth.<sup>11</sup> An important, very general, part of the explanation for this is that neo-liberalism can not write the state out of the script of contemporary capitalism, nor does it wish to do so (despite the usual excesses of political rhetoric) and certainly not in the realm of foreign, including aid, policy. In the North, the political course of neo-liberalism as a programme of state reform by various means of squeezing and splitting the state, in the terms used by Mackintosh (1992), combines redefinition of what states should and can do (less welfare,

more 'security', for example) with attempts to re-engineer the ways they do it, rather than any diminution of the overall scope of state activity and the resources it commands. In the South the drive to 'roll back the state' was devised and is pursued by Northern governments through their bilateral aid programmes and collectively through multilateral agencies, above all the World Bank which has established a unique ideological and intellectual hegemony in development policy discourse in the last twenty years or so.

The paradox is that less intervention in theory has meant more intervention in practice. The major shifts of development theory, policy discourse and design, and modalities of intervention in the period of neo-liberal ascendancy, spearheaded by the World Bank, require a great deal of work to replace what preceded them in the period of state-led development.<sup>12</sup> And the intellectual and political labour of deconstruction requires a greater practical labour of reconstruction, from the demands of legitimation by intellectual and technical expertise - including, not least, presenting claims to better results of neo-liberal policies - to the nuts and bolts of reforming particular institutions and practices.

After a brief initial moment of market triumphalism in the early 1980s (get the prices right and all else will follow: growth, prosperity, and stability), it became evident that a few decisive strokes of policy to roll back states and liberate markets was not enough to achieve accelerated economic growth *and* reduce poverty. Matters were not as straightforward as they might have seemed, and here the first paradox meets another whereby apparently less becomes substantially more. Freeing the market to carry out the

tasks of economic growth for which it is deemed uniquely suited rapidly escalated into an extraordinarily ambitious, or grandiose, project of social engineering that amounts to establishing bourgeois civilization on a global scale. Comprehensive market reform confronted similarly comprehensive state reform (rather than simply contraction) as a condition of the former; in turn, the pursuit of ‘good governance’ quickly extended to, and embraced, notions of ‘civil society’ and social institutions more generally. In short, the terrain of development discourse and the range of aid-funded interventions have become ever more inclusive to encompass the reshaping, or transformation, of political and social (and, by implication, cultural) as well as economic institutions and practices.

Bourgeois civilization comes as a complete package<sup>13</sup>, and completing it requires filling many gaps left by displacement of the framework of earlier state-led development, in which public investment and a state economic sector were central to economic growth, and employment generation, strong provision of public goods, and redistributionist measures were central to connecting economic growth and the elimination of poverty (Seers 1969). In conceptual terms, the gap left by public investment in economic infrastructure and enterprise was to be filled by the structures of incentives and competitive pressures to efficiency provided by properly functioning markets and their price signals. In practical terms - and until such time as markets are able to provide - political considerations recommended trying to fill two of the major welfare gaps left by ‘squeezing’ and ‘splitting’ the state, namely losses in ‘formal’ employment and deteriorating provision of such strategic public goods as health care and education. These areas (and especially the latter), along with others bearing on livelihoods and basic needs,

have been increasingly allocated to alternative provision through 'civil society', in practice NGOs (non-government organizations). As amply documented, and widely debated, recent decades have witnessed an explosive proliferation of development NGOs. They constitute an extensive international network - or hierarchy - through which a significant proportion of aid funding is disbursed, most of it in the first place through large international (Northern) NGOs acting as sub-contractors to aid agencies.

Finally, two other aspects of the ever expanding agenda of Development Studies can be noted briefly. The first is the absorption and impact, however uneven and incomplete, of overarching areas of concern of different kinds generated by wider intellectual and political currents, of which issues of gender (from the 1960s) and of the natural environment (from the 1970s) provide the most potent examples (see the chapters by Ruth Pearson and Philip Woodhouse in this collection). The second is that the demise of the USSR opened up a potentially vast new frontier to Development Studies from the early 1990s. Those with credentials in the many areas of applied research embraced by the pursuit of structural adjustment in Asia, Africa and Latin America were now able to stake claims to assist the course of market liberalization, state reform and good governance across the former Soviet bloc from the Baltic to the expanses of Central Asia.

The scope of Development Studies has thus expanded greatly and it has done so, as implied by the above observations, principally by agglomeration. To what may be considered its constant topics - for example, in international economics (trade, investment, and today - above all? - capital markets), macroeconomics (exchange,

interest, inflation and savings rates, employment, productivity), and social policy (health, education) - are added state reform, the (re)design and management of public institutions, democratization, civil society and the sources of social capital, new social movements, small-scale credit, NGO management, (environmentally) sustainable development, women/gender and development, children and development, refugees and development, humanitarian emergencies and interventions, and post-conflict resolution (among other examples). What has been largely abandoned from the earlier agenda of the founding moment of Development Studies is that central attention to issues of economic planning, public investment and accumulation, together with the expansive conceptions of public goods with which they were then associated.<sup>14</sup>

If Development Studies in British universities prospers institutionally, does it also prosper intellectually during this period of the neo-liberal ascendancy when its agenda is set - directly and indirectly - by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, by state and quasi-state bodies, to a greater extent than in the past? An adequate answer to this question would be long and complex, exceeding the limits of space available (and the competence of the author, given the ever expanding terrain of Development Studies and its proliferating specialized sub-divisions). Here, as throughout this essay, I suggest only some elements of an answer, broadly sketched.

One must recognize, to begin, that there is always a tension between scholarship in social science and its appropriations by and for policy. How policy works in practice is shaped much more by political forces and processes than by the intrinsic merits of different

intellectual paradigms and positions and their contestations (a rationalist fallacy to which intellectuals are prone). One of the constant intellectual tensions of Development Studies, then, is between its institutional identity and practical mission on one hand, and the expansive sense of the study of development as one of the definitive themes established by the classic origins of modern social science, on the other hand. And, as noted, important contributions to the latter continue to be made outside the rubric of Development Studies, sometimes in intellectual and/or ideological opposition to the latter *qua* 'policy science'.

Tensions between scholarship, with its exacting disciplines (including the time it takes), and knowledge required, and packaged, for the practical purposes of policy design and implementation, do not amount to an unbridgeable divide between the two endeavours. Such tensions can produce more or less creative effects, depending on broader political and ideological conditions of intellectual production and the specific political complexions and purposes of those who commission or otherwise promote particular kinds of applied knowledge. In an ideal world, the rich intellectual resources for the study of development (in the expansive sense) would be available to the mission of Development Studies (in the restrictive sense), and systematically assimilated and assessed by the latter to inform its work of devising effective development policy and practice. It seems to me that this kind of tension was more creative in the founding moment of Development Studies than it is today when the stretching of the agenda of development discourse to near omniverous proportions is driven by pressure to bridge the

yawning gaps between now conventionalized formulae for market-led economic growth and evidence of growing social inequality and poverty in the South.

For example, one of the constitutive elements of the intellectual agenda of the study of development in its expansive sense is the (variant) relationships between different economic structures and patterns of growth in different places and times in the formation of a modern world economy and the reduction or reproduction of poverty, as an aspect of social inequality intrinsic to *and* produced by capitalist development. This concern was also more evident in the founding moment of Development Studies, characterized by a more diverse and dynamic intellectual and ideological conjuncture, not least due to the influence and impact of Marxist ideas (see below). The key questions of development strategy were framed within serious attempts, from different viewpoints and yielding different interpretations, to understand the massive upheavals that created the contemporary world and continued to shape it.<sup>15</sup> This is now displaced by such notions as ‘pro-poor growth’, which expresses nicely the commitment of contemporary development discourse and doctrine to ‘win-win’ solutions *and* its faith that an inclusive - and globalizing - market economy (or more broadly bourgeois civilization) contains no intrinsic obstacles to a better life for all. There is so much to gain with relatively little pain; the only losers will be rent seekers and others who fail to play by the rules of the game.<sup>16</sup>

The commitment to ‘win-win’ policy solutions to continuing problems of economic growth and poverty imposes one kind of constraint on the intellectual spaces of

Development Studies. It is the credo of what Ferguson (1990) memorably termed an 'anti-politics machine' that 'depoliticizes' development doctrine (see also Harriss, 2001), and marginalizes or displaces investigation and understanding of the sources, dynamics and effects of typically savage social inequality in the South, and of no less savage relations of power and inequality in the international economic and political system. It elides consideration of the often violent social upheavals and struggles that characterize the processes *and* outcomes of the development of capitalism.

Another type of constraint on intellectual work in Development Studies stems from the hegemonism of neo-classical economics which has spiralled during the neo-liberal ascendancy, including the latest manifestations of its ambition to subsume much of sociological and political inquiry within its own paradigm (Fine 1997, 2001). This is as good an example as any of a theoretical model achieving supremacy as a world view, *and* global programme, due to political and ideological conditions rather than intrinsic intellectual superiority. And neo-classical economics provides intellectual support, with more or less plausibility, to the good intentions of the 'win-win' discourse of development policy.

There may be positive aspects of the agglomeration of topics assimilated to the rubric of Development Studies, if not of the loss of some of the classic issues of development strategy of the previous period. What has also been lost to a considerable degree is the wider intellectual, and political, understanding of development as a process of struggle and conflict, and use of the diverse intellectual resources available to advance such

understanding. The expansion of topic range (and policy objects) is not the same as intellectual vitality and depth nor indeed pluralism, all of which, I suggest, have diminished for the reasons indicated. Such observations about the narrowing intellectual horizons, *and* more shallow intellectual base, of Development Studies - how more becomes less - will not meet with general agreement, of course, and require testing by more detailed, and empirical, investigation of its 'output', as well as by the normal course of debate.

The same applies to observations about connections between intellectual practices, and their shifting conditions, and the intellectual skills, experiences, and career paths of those who work in Development Studies – an occupational sociology of the field, as it were. This bears on the key political (and existential) issue of the 'room for manoeuvre', that is, of the positioning and practices, collective and individual, of those critical of the dominant ideological tendencies of development doctrine and of the powerful forces that promote them. This is a matter of the spaces available, or that can be 'captured' or created, *within* the discursive and practical fields of dominant development agencies (and not least their funding practices) to articulate, and implement, alternative ideas and courses of action. In turn, questions of such 'room for manoeuvre' connect with how notions of the tasks of intellectual and applied work are constituted, the capacities they are deemed to require, and of how to combine them.<sup>17</sup>

'Practitioners' have been present in Development Studies from its inception, across a spectrum from the former colonial administrators noted earlier (whose intellectual

contribution was so limited) to architects of national development strategies and plans. However, the demand for practitioners has increased along with the expanded range of Development Studies, and the political and institutional pressures that contribute to this agglomeration. Here are several examples. The first is neo-classical economists who are mathematically well endowed but somewhat challenged in terms of broader intellectual culture, both qualities that commend them for applied work in the 'hard' areas of macro- and micro-economic modelling and policy design. A second example is practitioners of public administration, required to deal with the many nuts and bolts aspects of comprehensive state reform, civil service restructuring and (re)training, decentralization, and other re-engineering of public institutions in the name of 'good governance'. A third is those recruited for, and aimed at, the 'soft' areas of welfare, community-level and other self-help interventions where NGO activity concentrates and the jargon of 'participation', 'empowerment', 'stakeholders' and the like is most pervasive.<sup>18</sup> Of these examples, only the first requires an academic formation of any intellectual presumption and rigour (within its very narrow culture), primarily the acquisition of a well-established analytical 'tool kit'.

The point of these examples is not to (pre-)judge the ethics, intentions or professional competence of such categories of practitioners which, one might reasonably expect, follow a (notionally) normal distribution across Development Studies as any other comparable field of 'policy science'. Rather, it is to pose the question of the effects for the intellectual terrain of Development Studies of the neo-liberal hegemony of development discourse, and of its practical manifestation in the demand of aid agencies

for expert advice across the spectrum of their policy concerns (from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’), and by their willingness to contract some of that expertise from universities.<sup>19</sup> Part of the answer, I suggest - and one which also calls for more systematic empirical research – is that, in the circumstances sketched, efforts to identify and exploit ‘room for manoeuvre’, and the outcomes of such efforts, are more a matter of professional skill than intellectual position or substance, and especially skill in the institutional politics of aid agencies which includes, of course, talking the(ir) talk. ‘Practitioners’ have to be seen, above all, as competent technicians, in the ‘soft’ as well as ‘hard’ areas of development policy and practice. And for this, their training, capacities and interests in development in the intellectually expansive sense proposed above are generally irrelevant and in some (many?) instances are no doubt best concealed in order to pass as competent technicians.

### **And the Marxists? I. Political Struggle and Intellectual Dynamism**

The history of Marxist ideas is as complex as those of the other great lineages of social theory that contribute to the study and understanding of development in its intellectually expansive sense, and perhaps more so. The reason is that it comprises at least three strands, each stamped with their own tensions and contradictions, as are the various ways in which they intertwine, namely those of Marxist intellectual work (and its specific social and political conditions in different times and places); of political parties and movements that contest the social order of capitalism and imperialism and seek to replace it with a Marxian version of socialism (and eventually communism); and of states that

attempted to construct and pursue a project of socialist construction as a mode of development alternative, and superior, to capitalism - or claimed to do so.

All these strands, and their various effects for each other, were evident with particular dynamism and intensity in the 1960s and 1970s, which saw a massive increase of interest in, and influence of, Marxist ideas in British universities, as elsewhere, as part of the formation of a 'New Left'. In terms of intellectual resources, both reflecting and stimulating this interest were the first English translations of important texts, including some by Marx, especially the first full translation of the *Grundrisse* notable editions of Gramsci's writings; texts by leading protagonists of the Bolshevik debates of the 1920s, for example, Preobrazhensky and Bukharin; and, in addition to the official *Selected Works*, writings of Mao Zedong appeared in new editions of translation and commentary. The efflorescence of Marxist intellectual work and debate added university-based journals like *Antipode*, *Capital and Class*, *Critique of Anthropology*, *History Workshop*, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, *Race and Class*, *Radical Sociology*, *Review of African Political Economy*, and *Review of Radical Political Economy* to existing independent Marxist journals like *Monthly Review* and *Science and Society* in the USA and *New Left Review* in Britain. In the 1960s *New Left Review* soon made explicit its mission to translate and explore contemporary, as well as earlier, Marxist texts and debates – notably from France, Germany and Italy – to provide Marxist intellectual work with theoretical foundations lacking in the inheritance of British (and more generally anglophone) 'empiricism'.

This intellectual ferment was, of course, intimately tied to the political events of its time and the concerns they generated. One preoccupation was the effort to understand better the problems and prospects of economic and social development of poorer countries, only recently independent of colonial rule in most of Asia and Africa, with particular attention to (i) how their processes of accumulation were shaped by their internal social structures and associated forms of state, (ii) their locations in the social divisions of labour of a capitalist world economy - an 'imperialism (now) without colonies' - and (iii) how international and domestic class forces interacted. This expansive intellectual agenda included a commitment to exploring and testing the possible contributions to such understanding of knowledge of pre-capitalist social formations in different parts of the world; of paths of capitalist transition in the now developed countries of the North; and of Latin American, Asian and African experiences of colonialism and their legacies for subsequent processes of development/underdevelopment. All of these became major themes in Marxist (and *Marxisant*) theoretical and historical work, with the first and third also central to the remarkable flowering of Marxist work in Anthropology, and the second and third to an intellectually expansive, and historically minded, political economy of development.

If much of the focus noted was on the development of capitalism and its prospects in the South, this was also intimately linked to the Marxist Left's concerns with anti-imperialism and transitions to *socialism*. Two of the defining global moments of the 1960s and early 1970s were the Vietnamese war of national liberation against US imperialism<sup>20</sup> and the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' (GPCR) and its aftermath

in China. While international progressive support for the former was unanimous, comprehending the baffling course of the latter, and analyzing its effects, generated (or further provoked) a range of sharp and symptomatic disagreements among Marxists about the conditions, strategies and prospects of socialist development in poor countries. Of course, casting its long shadow over those disagreements was the first and fateful experience of social revolution and draft industrialization in a mostly agrarian society, that of Russia/the USSR.

In this context marked by anti-imperialist struggles, by the increasingly evident difficulties of capitalist development in poor countries, and by scepticism about the USSR and communist parties across the world that were aligned with it (a distinguishing feature of the New Left)<sup>21</sup>, it was probably above all the claims of Maoism - as political philosophy *and* model of development alternative to both capitalism and Soviet state socialism - that influenced Marxist intellectuals by both acclaim and rejection. Whether those claims amounted to filling gaps in 'classic' Marxism or to its fundamental (and fatal) revision - in the direction of 'Third Worldism', the absorption of anti-imperialism by nationalism, peasants (and lumpen-proletarians) rather than the organized working class as the revolutionary force of the current epoch, and so on<sup>22</sup> - demanded attention and response across a wide terrain of analytical, empirical and political issues.<sup>23</sup> The moment of Maoism, as that of 'Third Worldism' more generally, certainly had the merit of forcing attention on two of the most problematic ideological currents that had long haunted Marxism in the real worlds of politics it has grappled with, not least by

infiltrating the programmes and practices of Marxist parties and movements, namely nationalism and populism.

Two texts from the large corpus of (British) Marxist writing of this conjuncture illustrate its extreme diversity of approaches to and arguments about development. The better known is Bill Warren's highly contentious *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism* (1980), published posthumously from drafts edited by Warren's former student John Sender. This may be regarded as a restatement of a classic Marxist view that the (full) development of capitalism across the globe is a necessary precondition of any project of socialist construction. By this token capitalism is a progressive force, the seeds of which were first planted in the South by colonial imperialism. While Warren's empirical argument sought to document the actuality of capitalist development, and its benefits, his book was more notorious for its polemical fire. This was directed against positions (sometimes claiming the heritage of Lenin's *Imperialism*) that denied the possibility of capitalist development (accumulation, industrialization, development of the productive forces) in the South, notably the 'development of underdevelopment' and dependency theories influential at the time, *and* against those nationalist and populist - and self-styled 'socialist' - currents in development policy in the South that blocked the contributions of international capital.

By way of contrast, *Social Construction and Marxist Theory: Bolshevism and its Critique* by Philip Corrigan, Harvey Ramsay and Derek Sayer (1978) presented a serious and sustained intellectual argument for Maoism.<sup>24</sup> Its subtitle indicates its purpose, which was to liberate socialist theory (and practice) from what its authors regarded as that

aspect of classic Marxism which privileged the development of the productive forces above mass politics, and was incorporated in Bolshevism: an index of its incomplete break with bourgeois ideas and of the troubled path of Soviet state socialism. In turn, mass politics and its forms of inclusive and dynamic participation, as theorized by Mao Zedong and epitomized by the GPCR in China, generated forms of development centred on satisfying basic needs through creative collective practices.

While, as ever, they bear the hallmarks of their specific moment of production, the contrast between these two works resonates longstanding tensions in the Marxist tradition. One such tension centres on interpretations of the relationship between, and relative emphasis on, the productive forces (the means of producing wealth) and their unique development in capitalism, and the social relations of production or class relations (the basis of politics). Another tension is inherent in Marx's famous observation (1976: 91) that 'The country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future' - if this is taken to mean that the latter are destined to advance to the same kind (or stage) of capitalist economic development through incorporation in a global capitalist economy shaped (and dominated) by the former. This view was embraced by Warren (above) and rejected by many other Marxists, as well as by many nationalists and populists in the South together with their Northern sympathizers. A somewhat different tension, on an existential as well as intellectual plane, concerns the conditions, purposes and effects of Marxist intellectual work in relation to contemporary political dynamics and struggles with all their contradictory impulses and the sheer messiness of what I term real world politics, a matter to which I

return. And, connecting in different ways with all of these is that pervasive tension at the core of any socialist or communist project between realism and utopianism, between the claims of Marxism as a science of social reality and a programme of human emancipation.

While these kinds of tensions (and many others) permeated Marxist intellectual debate on the general terrain of arguments about capitalism and socialism, and imperialism and development, as well as informing widely divergent political positions on contemporary events, how – and how much – did they connect with the concerns of Development Studies in its founding moment, described earlier? Here are several, once more preliminary or provisional, observations. First, the seemingly inexhaustible firepower of Marxist criticism was turned on other theories of, and prescriptions for, development, from the explicit anti-communism of the mostly American modernization school to the paradigms of mainstream social science to such closer ideological neighbours (and competitors?) as the varieties of dependency theory and social democratic (and nationalist) versions of structuralist economics – all this, of course, in addition to the usual internecine intensity of debates between Marxists. However, there was also a great deal of creative analytical *and* empirical Marxist work ranging from, say, the investigation of intricate structures and processes of class formation in villages and rural localities to analysis of the functioning of international divisions of labour. Much of this work was published in the kinds of journals listed above, which were read widely by those on the Left with intellectual interests and political concerns that extended far

beyond Development Studies in its restrictive sense even when they were employed within it.<sup>25</sup>

However, Marxist academics employed in Development Studies were not necessarily detached from its more applied work, even as they engaged in and contributed to wider debates within Marxism and across the social sciences. First, there was considerably more space for the expression of Marxist ideas in Development Studies in its founding moment, with its relatively more expansive horizons and recognition of the intellectual importance and power of Marxism, not least in large regions of the South, by (some) non-Marxists. Second, Marxists and many on the non-Marxist Left, including more progressive social democrats, often shared political sympathies on particular issues, for example, concerning the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions, and a predisposition towards helping more progressive regimes and governments in the South to formulate and implement their development strategies. This is a lineage that can be traced from the 1950s in Nehru's India<sup>26</sup> through Nkrumah's Ghana and Sekou Toure's Guinea, and revolutionary Cuba, to Allende's Chile in the early 1970s and on to liberated Mozambique and Nicaragua of the Sandinistas.<sup>27</sup> Third, in the conjuncture described there were, as indicated, many apparently progressive regimes in the South to work with *and* an ideologically more conducive set of governments and aid agencies to support such work, especially in (social democratic) Northern Europe (and Canada) and in some parts of the UN system.

The question remains: what, if anything, was specifically Marxist about the methods and techniques, as distinct from the commitments and motivations, *applied* by Marxist ‘practitioners’ in their employment by, or cooperation with, the efforts of progressive regimes in the South to promote economic and social development? Or, to put it somewhat differently: what distinguished the practical policy designs of Marxists from the prescriptive framework and planning methodology of structuralist economics more broadly (with which Marxism shares a common lineage of classical political economy)? My hunch is that the answer is probably ‘very little’. On one hand, Marxists, like structuralist economists more generally, developed and debated the case for development strategies based in public investment, planning and coordination, and did so through arguments about methods of resource allocation and their efficiency/effectiveness that drew on elements of other paradigms in economics.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, as W. Brus (1991: 339), one of the principal Eastern European theorists of ‘market socialism’, observed in relation to possible affinities between planning in socialist regimes and under social democratic governments in the capitalist North: ‘any analogy must be very tentative both because of the starting position and because of the profoundly different conditions of struggle for achieving the desired aim’.

It may well be that the questions just posed are not the right ones, and that Brus’s reference to different starting points and conditions of struggle point towards more apposite questions for assessing the distinctive intellectual contributions, actual and potential, of Marxism to understanding - and facilitating - processes of development, to which I return below.

## **And the Marxists? II. Political Defeats and Beyond**

If the founding moment of modern Development Studies seems part of an already distant past, the contrast between the conditions of Marxist intellectual work then (the 1960s and 1970s) and now (since the 1980s) appears as an almost epochal rupture. And, of course, it is a rupture marked not only by the demise (albeit by very different routes) of the ‘actually existing socialisms’ of the Soviet bloc and China but also by the retreat and disarray of social democratic politics, as well as the disappearance or mostly accelerated decline of historic communist parties in the European democracies. In short, the current moment is one of massive defeat of the Left, both Marxist and non-Marxist, throughout the North, if not so comprehensively across the South.<sup>29</sup> This necessarily has a profound effect for the conditions, preoccupations and styles of Marxist intellectual work in universities in both North and South, and the ways in which it links with the wider political environment and its contradictions - or fails to do so.

Many formerly Marxist academics, whose formation was in the 1960s and 1970s, have abandoned Marxism; there is much less Marxism available to today’s university students as part of their general education in the social sciences. The connections between Marxist intellectual work and the programmes and practices of progressive political formations, both parties and regimes, have eroded with the demise or decline of the latter (and however vicarious such connections, or claims for them, sometimes were). To the extent that one or another variant of Marxism exemplified a (fashionably) radical stance in the

social sciences only a few decades back, this has been largely displaced by the various currents of post-structuralism, post-modernism and the like (loosely defined), the ‘radical’ ambitions of which rest on their subversions of the claims of existing forms of knowledge to objectivity and of any political aspirations to a project of universal emancipation. In relation to Development Studies, the effect of the post-modern(ist) ‘turn’ is to deny the validity of any conception of development other than as an imperializing (Northern) discourse imposed on the South. In short, in the conditions of political defeat outlined, the space for Marxist intellectual work – as most intellectually expansive, and scholarly, endeavour? – within Development Studies, has been reduced drastically by the ascendancy of a neo-liberal common sense of the epoch on one hand, and, on the other hand, by the self-regarding ambition of post-modernism to monopolize the modes of critique.<sup>30</sup>

More broadly, Marxist intellectual work today has lost two of its virtually definitive points of reference, and contestation, of most of the twentieth century, namely the existence and influence of regimes claiming the credentials of ‘actually existing socialism’ and a Leninist model of the party as the indispensable organizational vanguard, leader and shaper, of socialist politics. Those who retain a commitment to Marxist ideas confront a massive challenge with the loss of these intellectual-cum-political preoccupations, so long at the centre of intra-Marxist debate. Key questions of that challenge include: what explains the (global) victory of capitalism? What are the prospects and opportunities of (what kinds of) capitalist development in different regions,

and for different classes, in the South? And what remains politically with the demise of any evident socialist (development) alternative?

Most fundamentally, in the light of historical experience to date it may prove impossible to rethink notions of any feasible socialism(s), and of socialist development, that can be projected into a foreseeable future. The best that can be said, with no guarantee of success, is that paradoxically - or dialectically - that process of rethinking socialism should, and can, be informed by analyses of a now untrammelled, and ever more globalizing, capitalism, the contradictions that drive it and the social and political struggles it generates. Three aspects of this can be indicated that link with some of the themes already indicated in this essay.

The first is the critique of neo-liberalism in all its aspects from theoretical doctrine to the practices of development (and Northern foreign policy) interventions. There is no lack of such critique today and, as might be expected, it embraces a wide range of ideological currents - including various strands and combinations of nationalist, populist and deconstructionist elements - on various sites of contestation, and with different degrees of intellectual coherence and depth. In an important sense, then, the vitality of critique is assured but this is no ground for intellectual complacency that assumes, in Manichaeic fashion, its virtue and innocence by contrast with neo-liberal vice and guilt. Not only is such critique so diverse and so often confused, but the strength of its fervour can manifest an underlying sense of impotence in the face of an apparently rampant global capitalism. For Marxist intellectuals the *utility* of critique has to be informed and assessed by its

contributions to developing a better understanding of changes in the world(s) they inhabit.

This leads to the second aspect: analytical and empirical work on the ways in which capitalism is changing today and its effects for economic growth and poverty/inequality in the South. In my view, this is the area in which university-based Marxist intellectuals, in the conditions of wider political constraint sketched, can make their most significant contributions. The work of critique, in Marx's sense, is addressed both to existing social relations and realities and to the ideas/ideologies that, in claiming to explain them, justify them. And such critique, as Marx was also clear, can only be carried forward by generating analytically superior results. This then is a research agenda for Marxists concerned with development: to investigate, understand and grasp what is 'changing before our very eyes' in the world of contemporary capitalism (Bernstein 2004), and thereby to subject Marxist analysis to the necessary test of whether it can generate new knowledges and by what distinctive means available to historical materialism, both inherited *and* that can be created within its intellectual framework. This is the test of the reproduction of Marxist ideas in any dynamic, rather than antiquarian, sense.

Whether these new knowledges also disclose possibilities - 'imaginaries' in the jargon of the day - of different social relations and realities, and how plausibly and effectively they do so, in turn links to a third aspect: that of identifying and understanding, and supporting as appropriate, those forces that contest the capitalist social order in ways that, with all their inevitable contradictions, point to alternative more progressive futures. Here the

major challenges to the dynamic reproduction, hence relevance, of Marxist ideas – and the challenges that generate the most intense disagreements between Marxists of different stripes – centre on the analysis and assessment of the political character and potential of such social forces in the South in an historical moment when belief in the paramount role of the Leninist party and its sociological foundation, the ‘organized working class’, is no longer viable. This, then, is one extension, among others, of Brus’s reference to different starting points and different conditions of struggle (cited above). Other examples of its applications include serious engagement with the ideas and practices, in all their diversity, of ‘anti-globalization movements’ (not the same as either sweeping endorsement or dismissal of their analyses and claims); the scope of popular nationalist politics in opposition to both imperialism and domestic reaction (e.g., the powerful essays on South Asia by Aijaz Ahmad, 2000); and debate of redistributive land reform driven by politics ‘from below’, rather than by programmes of (bourgeois) ‘modernization’ and the World Bank (e.g., Bernstein 2004; Moyo and Yeros, in press).

I am aware of the prescriptive tenor of how I have sketched these three aspects of Marxist intellectual work on development, and by extension on contemporary imperialism, in current conditions, and – by the same token? – how this has moved away from some of the specific issues concerning Development Studies proposed earlier. What then of issues of practicality? Of Development Studies as applied knowledge, and its ‘room for manoeuvre’ when the spaces once provided by more progressive regimes in the South (and governments in the North), and by intellectually and ideologically more sympathetic elements in aid agencies, are so reduced? One response presents a different kind of

paradox: the extent to which critical intellectual work of any substance on development – Marxist and other – requires a greater *distance* from the agendas of official development discourse and practice and their ‘knowledge-power regimes’. The paradox is that this is to reinstate a classically ‘liberal’ theme of intellectual work, namely the necessity of its independence from established centres of power, privilege and patronage. That independence in Development Studies in British universities is now subject to the combined pressure of neo-liberal development doctrine and higher education policy for competitive performance in the market for research funding with its conceptions of ostensibly beneficial knowledge ‘output’.

This is not to be judgemental about those, Marxists and others, who undertake applied research and consultancy on behalf of government and other aid agencies, and may do so in the quest for ‘room for manoeuvre’ and/or for other purposes. It is simply to recommend that they do so without illusion; a self-conscious cynicism may be less harmful existentially than delusion of self and others. There is a final point to be made about ‘practicality’ – or, in more grandiose terms, about utopia and reality. The most identifiable criterion of ‘practicality’, and in that sense of professional success as well as ‘realism’, for many academics in Development Studies is the demand for their services as experts by aid agencies. This is far less elusive than any measure or assessment of the effects of such activity in accelerating economic growth and/or reducing poverty, as part of the mission of those agencies. The formulation of that mission – as ‘pro-poor’ (capitalist) development, or (in the terms I have suggested) as a global project of extending bourgeois civilization to those denied its benefits – is, I suggest, no less

utopian, no more 'practical' or 'realistic', than the fantasies of socialism once entertained by many Marxists.<sup>31</sup>

## **Conclusion**

This essay has emerged in more idiosyncratic fashion than envisioned, which perhaps reflects personal experience, with all its attendant tensions (and worse?), of many years of employment as an academic social scientist concerned with issues of development and intellectually committed to Marxism. That element of biography, even without the confessional mode of several contributions to the first part of this book, no doubt manifests itself in ways I failed to anticipate. Nonetheless, it seems right to conclude with some brief observations on the intellectual power and promise of a Marxist approach to processes of development, as distinct from the issues that confront Marxists who may be employed in Development Studies in its restrictive or institutional sense.

The most salient feature that is most directly relevant is the breadth and depth of Marxist analysis of the political economy of capitalism, that is unparalleled in the other great traditions of social science inquiry. This is a form of analysis centred on social relations, their historical formation, contradictions and changing forms, above all but not exclusively relations of class. Indeed, as hinted earlier, analytical class 'purism' remains a major obstacle to the renewal and development of Marxist investigation, and the knowledge it can yield of how (global) capitalism works, with all its Northern and Southern variants *and* with all its manifold contradictions: across social relations of

gender, ethnicity, and generation, of mental and manual labour, countryside and town, and other divisions inscribed in its social divisions of labour - as well as, and intimately connected with, those of class. What makes capitalism dynamic, and the effects of its uneven development for different regions and social groups within its international structure, remain central preoccupations, the exploration of which today requires the labour of innovative empirical research and analysis as much as (more than?) that of theoretical elaboration.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, this requires engagement with other approaches capable of generating questions, and sometimes concepts and methods, that can be assimilated to and reformulated by a Marxist intellectual agenda to its benefit.

The vital question of a viable Marxist political project – the future of socialism – in current and foreseeable conditions remains as problematic as ever, and even more unanswerable. An element of solace in this is that the contributions of academics to the making of revolutionary or transformational politics are, in any case, negligible, and recognition of which may help to avoid the seductions of *amour propre* that professional intellectuals are prone to. Awareness of the limits of one's conditions of social existence can enhance a fitting modesty, and also the nature and quality of intellectual production possible within those limits – better than the hubris of the philosopher-kings of the neo-liberal ascendancy in Development Studies.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> I am grateful, as always, to my co-worker T.J.Byres for discussion of some of the issues touched on in this essay; responsibility for how those issues are presented remains mine alone. As should be evident, this essay is of a preliminary, hence provisional and indeed incomplete, nature.

<sup>2</sup> In France, as one might expect, development research organizations were established by the state, funded from its aid budget and staffed by experts employed as civil servants. The nearest equivalent in Britain was the founding of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex. This was announced in the White Paper of the Labour government elected in 1964 that established the Ministry of Overseas Development, the first time that Britain's foreign aid programme became the responsibility of a full department of state. The first Director of IDS was Dudley Seers, a central figure in its founding.

<sup>3</sup> In the South, Development Studies - where it exists - is one expression, among others, of the commitment to national development that typified the moment of political independence and remains a fixture, if somewhat embattled, of the discourses of official politics. Its establishment and profile as a distinct academic entity in the South may have been patchy for a different reason to its relative absence in the USA, namely that national development, and how best to achieve it, was the principal preoccupation across social science departments and institutes in Asian and African universities, as to a large extent in Latin America. To be an economist, say, in India or Tanzania or Chile was, in effect, to be a development economist.

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<sup>4</sup> The more recent demise of the USSR, as well as the course of decollectivization and liberalization in China and Vietnam and the dire condition of the Cuban economy, means that today there is no extant version of a state socialist model of development, for better or worse, some effects of which are touched on below.

<sup>5</sup> It should be evident that these grand themes also bear on what we now commonly term modernity, with the diverse and fierce debates in the social sciences and cultural studies today that attach to it. It is rare to find all four sets of themes listed synthesized in a single text with much analytical rigour and historical depth. The book by Schwartz (2000) is an unusually impressive attempt to do this; the scale of its ambition and concentration of its arguments make it a demanding read but by the same token a rewarding one.

<sup>6</sup> Two very different books that have done much to stimulate interest in the lineages of ideas about development, and that illuminate their contemporary relevance, are by Kitching (1982) and Cowen and Shenton (1996). The latter is a Marxist account while the former is strongly influenced by its author's longstanding engagement with Marxist ideas. Gavin Kitching (now in Australia) and the late Michael Cowen were notable intellectual figures in Development Studies in Britain during important parts of their careers, and at one time were colleagues at the Centre for Development Studies, Swansea, while Robert Shenton is an American-born historian of Africa based in Canada. Starting from the eighteenth-century Physiocrats, Kitching provides a lucid and accessible

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account of populist ideas, their sources, and how and why they are reproduced in the long history of capitalist development in different places at different times, together with a critique of populism based in an ‘old orthodoxy’ of political economy: the necessity to development of processes of accumulation and industrialization which are inevitably disruptive and painful. Cowen and Shenton’s book is highly ambitious and original, and brilliant in parts; it is also, in contrast to Kitching, very long, very eccentric, and very reader unfriendly in its organization and style. (To my knowledge, it is the first work on the history of development ideas to devote a long chapter to the theology of Cardinal Newman – and probably the last). Their account is grounded in the problem of order disclosed by the disruptions and upheavals of early industrial capitalism and the ‘dangerous classes’ it generated, especially in relation to labour markets, employment and unemployment; how that problem was constituted as an object of social theory and solutions to it theorized and applied in ‘doctrines of development’ that prescribe harmonious development under state trusteeship, hence ‘intentional’ vs ‘immanent’ development in their terms; and the intrinsic contradictions of such doctrines in both theory and practice, from their early manifestations in Britain and its colonies (including mid nineteenth-century Australia and Canada) to today’s universe of development discourses and interventions.

<sup>7</sup> This is explicit in the use of the title International Development by some university departments and centres.

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<sup>8</sup> The importance of the brief ‘developmental’ phase towards the end of British and French colonial rule in Africa in the late 1940s and 1950s, and of its legacies, is well established by recent work in modern African history; Cooper (2002, especially Ch 5) argues that the continuities of a state-led development project were more significant in certain respects than the moment of political change from colonial rule to independence in sub-Saharan Africa. I am sceptical that the redeployment of former colonial administrators in the new development agencies of the North contributed much to the *intellectual* framework of Development Studies. In my own experience the characteristic, and defensive, stance of most such veterans, former District Officers and the like, was an ideology of ‘practicality’ and anti-intellectualism. Interestingly, Robert Chambers (a contributor to this volume), who appears the most obvious exception to this observation, is best known for his reflections on styles of development practice. With a few noteworthy exceptions, a more explicit theoretical focus on development administration came later with the neo-liberal interest in state reform and efficiency (see below), drawing on developments in neo-classical economics,

<sup>9</sup> Its outstanding representative in the formation of Development Studies in Britain, both intellectually and institutionally, was Dudley Seers (see also note 2 above).

<sup>10</sup> A different kind of argument for the ‘end of development’ as a national, state-led, project – and by extension the end of Development Studies as originally conceived and practiced – is generated by theories of the encompassing power of globalization (e.g. McMichael 1996), usually but not necessarily on the Left.

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<sup>11</sup> For example, two of the largest postgraduate programmes in Development Studies in Britain today were, in fact, established only in the early 1990s in the University of London, at SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies) and the LSE (London School of Economics and Political Science). While Development Studies in the institutional sense appears to flourish still, it can be argued that the centrality to it of a distinct field of Development Economics, defined by the kinds of concerns noted and with its strong structuralist emphasis, has been undermined: there is now only one (neo-classical) Economics, that most dismal of ‘sciences’.

<sup>12</sup> What needed replacement included the contributions of the Bank and other donors to the debris of that period, produced *inter alia* by the incoherence of aid policies and practices and the frustrations and tensions generated by their results.

<sup>13</sup> Which the mostly American social and political theorists of modernization in the 1950s and 1960s were clear about.

<sup>14</sup> Wuyts (1992) advocates an analytically more expansive conception of public goods, as shaped by the social and political dynamics of ‘public action’, in opposition to the restrictive technical definition of public goods in neo-classical economics – a definition which is currently shrinking its sphere of legitimate application in the interests of privatization and market provision.

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<sup>15</sup> Indeed, it can be argued that notions of development *strategy* of any substantive content are largely absent from the intellectual framework of neo-liberal ‘policy science’.

<sup>16</sup> And those who fail to play by the rules are *criminalized* by the discourse, in effect; rent-seekers, for example, are associated with corruption, while social actors and practices that disturb the social and political *order* of an emergent global bourgeois civilization exemplify criminal violence. A recent addition to the concerns of Development Studies - stimulated, funded and steered by aid donors - is the area of state collapse, crisis states, and so on. The connections between development doctrine and global order/security are explored in a stimulating book by Duffield (2001). There are resonances here of the centrality of order to much of the work on political modernization in the 1960s and 1970s, with the particular stimulus at that time of the Vietnam war. Huntington (1968) was a key figure then, as he continues to be with his thesis of the ‘clash of civilizations’ (2002, first published in 1996). In a recent book review (of Moore, 2003), Robert Wade (2004: 150) reports that ‘The murderous attacks of September 11 were, of course, very helpful in forging the consensus at Doha [in the WTO, World Trade Organization, meeting], two months later. Moore [then Director-General of the WTO], with US Trade Representative Zoellick and EU Trade Commissioner Lamy, toured developing-country capitals to insist that the new free-trade round would be a blow against Al-Qaeda – and that objectors would be considered as renegades in the war against terror’.

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<sup>17</sup> In the case of Britain, this would also entail investigating how changes in the political and institutional framework of universities, including the pressures of government education policy and its funding mechanisms - and how universities handle these changes - affect the character of Development Studies departments.

<sup>18</sup> Along with tendencies to celebrate the ‘local’ and ‘indigenous’: the *Gemeinschaftlichkeit* (‘community-ness’) of the ‘natives’ once more?

<sup>19</sup> If to an insignificant degree compared to commercial consultancy firms, from the big corporates – where the serious money is – to the small independents.

<sup>20</sup> Together with the intensity of continuing national liberation struggles in Africa as well as Asia, and of rural guerilla movements in Latin America.

<sup>21</sup> Including the role of communist parties in relation to working class militancy in the North during the 1960s, with France in 1968 as the near definitive case.

<sup>22</sup> In addition to the impact of Maoism noted, tendencies to ‘Third Worldism’ were also stimulated by the writings of Frantz Fanon among others. In the output of a burgeoning Fanon industry (stoked by ‘post-colonial’ cultural studies), the biography by David Macey (2000) is a deeply sensitive and illuminating account of the experiences that stimulated the formation of Fanon’s ideas, hence is the best antidote to the crudity of so many partisan formulations of ‘Fanonism’ by both its champions and detractors.

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<sup>23</sup> The concerns of classic Marxism were focused on the problematic of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, in both its western European heartlands and the adjacent zones of incomplete transition/‘backwardness’ (what would later be called ‘underdevelopment’) in southern and eastern Europe, and Ireland. Also highly influential, however, were the importance of analyses of imperialism by Lenin and others to subsequent work on development/underdevelopment in the peripheries of imperialism. For example, Rosa Luxemburg’s *The Accumulation of Capital* (1963, first published 1913) was an important influence on the formulation, in the 1960s and 1970s, of the articulation of modes of production to explain specific forms of underdevelopment, and their reproduction, in the conditions of capitalist imperialism. As with so much else at the time, the foremost theorists of the articulation of modes of production were French Marxists, in particular two formidable scholars of Africa: Claude Meillassoux and Pierre-Philippe Rey.

<sup>24</sup> A companion volume by the same three authors was titled simply *For Mao. Essays in Historical Materialism* (1979), a reference to Louis Althusser’s seminal *For Marx* (1970, first published in France 1965).

<sup>25</sup> Also at this time there were fewer dedicated Development Studies journals and other publication media.

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<sup>26</sup> With its intellectually formidable planning apparatus that attracted such European Marxist luminaries as Charles Bettelheim and Maurice Dobb (on whom see further note 28).

<sup>27</sup> In several of these cases there was an influx of expertise from the Soviet bloc as well as a range of Marxists from other countries, some of them communist party members but many without party affiliations. The encounters of experts of such different provenance - with each other, and with the political and administrative structures and cadres of the countries they worked in - would make for a fascinating ethnography of one type of situation of development practice. A more recent example - and perhaps the last for the foreseeable future - of international mobilization of expertise on the Left was *Making Democracy Work. A Framework for Macroeconomic Policy for South Africa*, produced by a team of progressive South African and foreign economists, some of them Marxists, during the transition from apartheid in the early 1990s (MERG 1993) - and that sank with barely a trace under South African governments from 1994.

<sup>28</sup> Writing of Maurice Dobb – ‘undoubtedly one of the outstanding political economists’ of the twentieth century – Amartya Sen (1990: 141, 146) notes Dobb’s contribution as ‘a major bridge-builder between Marxist and non-Marxist economic traditions’.

<sup>29</sup> Although the purchase of ‘political religion’ - in the Arab and wider Muslim world, in India (‘Hindu fascism’) and in Latin America (evangelical Protestantism) - challenges, to varying degrees, the popular bases of socialist, as of secular nationalist, politics.

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<sup>30</sup> Cooper and Packard (1997: 3) suggest that ‘The ultramodernist [by which they mean neo-liberal] and the postmodernist critiques have a lot in common, especially their abstractions from the institutions and structures in which economic action takes place and which shape a power-knowledge regime. The ultramodernists see power only as a removable distortion to an otherwise self-regulating market. The postmodernists locate the power-knowledge regime in a vaguely defined “West” or in the alleged claims of European social science to have found universal categories for understanding and manipulating social life everywhere’.

<sup>31</sup> Donald Sassoon (1997: 767) concludes his remarkable survey with the observation that ‘In Western Europe, the main achievement of socialism [that is, the politics of the Left] in the last hundred years has been the civilizing of capitalism’, rather than its replacement. I remain sceptical that there is anything of a civilizing impulse, or any significant ‘room for manoeuvre’ to stimulate one, in today’s neo-liberal development institutions, discourses and practices applied to the different starting points and conditions of struggle of the South.

<sup>32</sup> This is my opinion, or prejudice, perhaps reflecting on what now seems like the inordinate theoreticism of so much Marxist academic debate of the 1960s and 1970s (in which it was followed by subsequent deconstructionisms: blame the French in both cases?!). Solid empirical research always has a utility, unlike theoretical elaboration for its own sake that remains detached from concrete inquiry.

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