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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

The Political Economy of Race and Global White Supremacy  
the Case of Mozambique

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts  
in African American Studies

by

Natalina Teixeira Monteiro

2023

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2023

## ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Political Economy of Race, Racism, and Global White Supremacy

The Case of Mozambique

by

Natalina Teixeira Monteiro

Master of Arts in African American Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2023

Professor Sobukwe Okpara Odinga, Chair

This thesis delves into the intricate interplay of race, race formation, and white supremacy within the global political economy of Mozambique. Moreover, this undertaking endeavors to scrutinize the international power structure, considering the political ideologies of blackness amidst the backdrop of neoliberalism and the pervasive global structure of white supremacy. To better understand the informal economy of Mozambique, I engaged in ethnographic exchanges with locals, using research approaches that allowed for an insider perspective. This study examines the impact of Mozambique's adoption of neoliberalism following the destabilization war. This led to the liberalization of the country's economy through the introduction of structural adjustment programs. The investigations that ensued served as guiding principles for understanding

the political economy of race, racism, and global white supremacy in Mozambique. This study seeks to answer the following questions: What political circumstances give rise to the informal economy? How has the political economy of war influenced or contributed to the development of the contemporary informal economy, *dumbanenge*? What is the impact of race and racism on the global white supremacist political and economic system? Is racial discrimination a means to sustain undeveloped and exploited countries of the global south, such as Mozambique? Lastly, can the conflicts in Southern Africa be attributed to racial strife?

The thesis of Natalina Teixeira Monteiro is approved.

Ugo F. Edu

Alden Young

Sobukwe Okpara Odinga, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2023

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## **Abbreviations & Translation**

### **Portuguese and *Changana/Ronga* Words**

*Algodão*--cotton

*Assimilados*--Acculturated

*Candonga*--Informal Economy (Central Mozambique)

*Chapa de Trabalho*--Working permit.

*Chibato*--Forced Labor

*Código de trabalho Indígena*--Indigenous Labor Code

*Condenado*--Condemned

*Contratado*--contract "labor"-migrant

*Deslocados* -internally displaced

*Ditadura Nacional*--National Dictatorship

*Dumbanengue*--Informal economy/trading (*Ronga*--Southern Mozambique)

*Estado Novo*--a corporatist Portuguese state installed in 1933.

Gatuno-thief

*Grupos Dinamizadores*--Dynamizing Workgroups

*Indígenas*--Indigenous

*L'Économie du Traite*--The economy of trade

*Lourenço Marques*--the colonial capital of Mozambique now known as Maputo.

*Maconde (Makonde)* --Sometimes the Portuguese referred to the Mozambicans as

*Maconde*, even though the Makonde are an ethnic group in southeast Tanzania,

northern Mozambique, and Kenya. The Makonde developed their culture on the Mueda



Plateau in Mozambique. At present they live throughout Tanzania and Mozambique and have a small presence in Kenya.

*Machambas (hortas)* --Family plot (farm)

MZN or MT--The metical (meticais) is the currency of Mozambique.

Mönhês--People of Indian, Pakistani, or Prussian descent

Mudende--Head Tax

Muleco- poor destitute mostly a Black person

N'Komati Non-Aggression Pact between South Africa and Mozambique

Polana Caniço--Thorny brush huts

Polana Cimento--Concrete City

*Prazeiros*--the Portuguese and Afro-Portuguese landowners who ruled, in a feudal-like manner, vast estates called prazos that were leased to them by the Portuguese Crown.

Preto--Nigger (Negro)

*Retornados* --returnees

Rio Rovuma--Ruvuma River

### **International Financial and Domestic Institutions**

BA--Banco Austral

BCM--Banco Comercial de Moçambique

BPD--Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento

GATT-The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

IMF-International Monetary Fund

IBRD--International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)-World Bank

WTO-The World Trade Organization

The United Nations

**Media and Newspapers**

AIM-Metical--Carlos Cardoso's Newspaper

Díario de Notícias

Correio da Manhã

Savanna

Radio Difusão Portuguesa

Radio Mozambique

Radio e Televisão Portuguêsa

**Political Parties and Liberation Forces**

ANC-African National Congress

FRELIMO--*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Liberation Front of  
Mozambique)

MPLA--Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (The People's Movement for the  
Liberation of Angola).

PAIGC--The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde --*Partido  
Africano Para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde-PAIGC*

RENAMO--*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*--The Mozambican National Resistance

UNITA--*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (The National Union for  
the Total Independence of Angola)

ZANLA--Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZANU--Zimbabwe African National Union

ZIPRA--Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

## **Programs**

PARAP-Plan for Poverty Reduction

*(Plano de Acção para Redução da Pobreza)*

PRE-Programa de Reabilitação Económica  
(Economic Recovery Program)

SAPs--Structural Adjustment Programs

## **Statesman / Stateswoman**

### **Angola**

Agostinho Neto

### **Botswana**

Sir Seretse Khama

### **Cabo Verde and Guinea Bissau**

Amílcar Cabral

### **Cuba**

Fidel Castro

### **Ghana**

Kwame Nkrumah

### **Mozambique**

Eduardo Mondlane,

Samora Machel, and

Joaquim Chissano

Afonso Dhlakama

### **Portugal**

Marcelo de Caetano

General António Ramalho Eanes

António Oliveria Salazar

António Spínola

**Rhodesia**

Ian Smith

**South Africa**

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela

Pieter W. Botha

**Tanzania**

Julius Nyerere

**United Kingdom**

Margaret Thatcher

**United States**

Richard Nixon

Jimmy Carter

Ronald Reagan

**Zambia**

Kenneth Kaunda

## Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to clarify the definition of the informal economy and its place in the political economy literature. Additionally, I will delve into the research methods employed in my study, present a comprehensive review of existing literature on the topic, and provide a brief overview of the informal economy in Mozambique.

The informal economy, known in Mozambique as *dumbanenge*, plays a crucial role in exploring the development of black life, community, and culture. It reflects the reality of Black Mozambicans who depend on the *dumbanenge* to survive, not just during the colonial era or aftermath of the civil war, but even in today's post-liberalized economy. The informal economy in Mozambique, is the only sector of the economy where the poor blacks, unemployed, and an educated Mozambicans can earn a living. By serving as a constant safety-net for those who have been forgotten; the informal economy allows people to find day work or purchase what they need to survive.

The project highlights the pivotal function of the informal economy in reflecting local realities. The informal economy assists in alleviating the unwavering economic and political malfeasance inflicted upon Mozambique by the international political economic structures, i.e., International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Had it not been for the informal economy, a multitude of Mozambicans would have perished from starvation. The destitute and unemployed Black Mozambicans have been precluded from the neoliberal global order. From the colonial era to the implementation of the neoliberal structural adjustment programs, the global economic structures have had far-reaching influence on Mozambique's national identity, culture, economics, and politics.

Historically, Black Mozambicans have faced marginalization based on race since the Portuguese first arrived in the territories now known as Mozambique. The social relationship between the Portuguese and the Black Mozambicans has been characterized as a civilizing mission, quickly transforming into exploitation, subjugation, and oppression. To the Portuguese, Black Mozambicans were thought of as nonhumans, and the colonial economy was a system racial capitalism, which relied on exploitation and oppression, including slavery, and forced labor, to extract natural resources. The Portuguese established racial hierarchies and categories, classifying individuals as either superior or inferior, thus providing a tool for conquest and rationalizing African individuals' commercialization into slavery. The racialization of Africans and the ensuing notion of race became integral to the legacy of colonialism. Throughout history, the Portuguese and other Europeans have promoted a concept of race that placed whites at the top of the social ladder, followed by *mulatos*, people of mixed European and African, and blacks at the bottom. This system was often reinforced by laws and institutions that preserved the status quo. Today, these racial hierarchies continue to influence the way racial identity is classified in Mozambique. This hierarchy maintained the idea of white racial supremacy as a justification for colonialism, imperialism, conquest, and the oppression of Black peoples worldwide.

The purpose of this study is to examine and uncover the intricacies and variability of Mozambique's informal economy, known as *dumbanenge*<sup>1</sup>. It places particular

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<sup>1</sup> The phrase "Dumbanenge or Dumba Nengue" means "you have to trust your feet." In her book "Dumba Nengue: Run for Your Life: Peasant Tales of Tragedy in Mozambique," Lina Magaia explains that this phrase was associated with war destruction and ransacking of homes and marketplaces by RENAMO troops. However, in southern Mozambique, "dumbanenge" was associated with the illegal profits earned under the socialist government. During this time, participating in the informal economy was illegal, and

emphasis on the role of gender and women in this system. Additionally, the research strives to scrutinize the informal economy within Mozambique's race relations, historical, cultural, political, and economic milieu. Furthermore, the work seeks to comprehend and examine the dynamism and mechanics of the informal economy in Mozambique. The significance of studying the workings of the informal economy rests on the fact that two out of three urban inhabitants earn their livelihood from the informal economy, and most of the laborers are women. Omitting people, particularly women, from socioeconomic and political activities only impedes their development and detracts from their capacity as active participants in their countries' economic and political processes. The informal economy epitomizes the primary labor activity in Mozambique and the rest of Africa. This study of the informal economy introduces a new dimension to state–society relations, whereby civil society may be intended and understood in the African context.

### Chapter synopses

Chapter One provides a comprehensive exposition of the informal economy's definition, connotation, relevance, research methodology, and inquiries. To conclude, it proffers a literature review on the informal economy, including its intersection with the incisive factors of race, class, and gender in Mozambique. Chapter two offers a summary of Mozambique's political economy under colonial rule. It provides historical context on Mozambique's trade-based economy, commonly referred to as "l'économie de traite". The chapter describes how unequal conditions, such as forced and contract labor, as well as the compulsory cultivation of cotton, contributed to the country's economic disparities. The text also examines the incorporation of peripheral economies, like Mozambique, into

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vendors had to be wary of the police while selling their illegal goods. To avoid arrest and confiscation of their goods, these vendors had to run as fast as they could.

the global system of economic exploitation under colonialism. Chapter three discusses both racial formation and Portuguese exceptionalism in Lusophone Africa. The text emphasizes the erasure of blackness and the promotion of cultural assimilation. In chapter four, the book covers post-colonial race politics and the regime of white supremacy in South Africa and former Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. This section specifically addresses FRELIMO's challenges with confronting RENAMO, an armed group sponsored by the South African, Rhodesian, United States, and other western governments. These sponsors intended to destabilize the pro-Soviet government of FRELIMO. Finally, chapter five examines the racial and international political economy of southern Africa and the impact of neoliberal programs on Mozambique's economy. This section focuses on the informal economy traders, in relation to the overall impact of neoliberal reforms.



## Chapter 1: The Informal Economy

This inquiry centers around the informal economy as both a subject and a mode of inquiry. Specifically, the focus is on the Black Mozambican, who rely on this form of economy. By exploring the informal economy, we can gain insight into the means and methods of subsistence used by these citizens. As such, this investigation seeks to scrutinize the distribution of economic leverage, gender relations, racial divisions, and socio-economic strata within the urban context of Maputo. Moreover, as a tool of inquiry, the informal economy enables us to enhance our understanding of the socio-economic and political disparities arising from Mozambique's overarching white supremacist and neoliberal policies, thus rendering it an appropriate setting for grasping the adverse outcomes of such policies.

### Defining the Informal Economy in Mozambique

In this thesis, the informal economy is defined as the non-formal trading activities between traders and consumers occurring in the city, including informal activities at the Mozambican borders such as smuggling goods across the international borders of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Eswatini. The informal economy refers to the production and exchange of legal goods and services that violate zoning codes, lack appropriate business permits, and fail to report taxes.

In academic literature, a dichotomous/continuous model of the economy has been developed, wherein the formal and informal economies represent the extreme fringes of the economic spectrum. Academics have made attempts to scrutinize the informal economy since the 1970s. Nonetheless, there persists no unanimous agreement as to its definition. The academic view of the informal economy, or the less formal 'informal sector,'

inadequately comprehends the underlying 'culture,' the informal economy's significance for Mozambique and African city dwellers remains elusive. Additionally, prevailing literature lacks a historical lens that would otherwise provide insights into the sector's roots and origins. Furthermore, it overlooks the merchants and vendors participating in the informal economy, thereby providing an inadequate sampling of these groups.

Introducing a new dimension to state-society relations, this study of the informal economy sheds light on how civil society is intended and understood in the African context. To understand the intricacies of the informal economy in Maputo's urban sprawl, it's important to first comprehend the geography of the city.

Several countries incorporate informal sectors in their economies. Nevertheless, it was not until Keith Hart's mention of the term informal sector in 1973 and ILO's report in 1972 that the concept entered the realm of political economy. However, the meaning and significance of the informal economy remains controversial and vague. For example, certain leaders and prosperous citizens of the global south perceive the informal economy as a signal of underdevelopment.

The informal economy is often described as a "primitive" mode of production in many circles. It is perceived to reflect the values and institutions of indigenous African societies. The informal economy is viewed by modernization theories as a component of traditional society to be replaced by contemporary institutions and practices. Regardless of how one views the informal economy, it is widely acknowledged that most participants are women, particularly in the global south.

The literature since the early nineties has suggested that the informal economy serves as a significant source of job creation for millions of urban dwellers and

unemployed individuals in countries like Mozambique. The informal economy's existence has been linked to economic prosperity, as indicated by research conducted by Tripp (1997), de Vletter (1995 & 1996), World Bank (1989 & 1996), Elson (1992), Mustapha (1992), and Hyden (1987).

In Mozambique, the World Bank financed field studies in 1995 and 1996 as an attempt to integrate the informal economy with the depleted formal economy. However, the informal economy has failed to create permanent jobs for the thousands of unemployed. In other words, the informal economy reflects "jobless growth" that fails to generate employment (Martinussen, 1995:315). The informal economy faces significant challenges from limited economic and financial, political, and infrastructural support, which restricts its operations. Both the Mozambican government and the World Bank are reluctant to invest in this sector, leading to limited growth and opportunities. For example, government policies impacting the revenue generated by the informal economy, particularly after the privatization of Mozambique's customs services, are viewed as unjust, often eliciting resistance among those involved in informal activities. In my research interviews, many expressed similar concerns. One interviewee shared that despite the government's insistence on taxes and the formation of legal businesses, it provides little support to small-scale enterprises.

The government has been encouraging us to operate legally, citing the benefits to our country. However, despite becoming licensed, some of us are still encountering issues. In fact, a few traders have even gone back to operating illegally because it is easier to do so given the pervasive governmental corruption and red tape (Personal communication with Defina, Maputo 1998).

Despite its needs for government intervention in infrastructure and financing, the informal economy cannot be controlled or transformed for the sole purpose of pleasing

international financial institutions at the expense of those who depend on it. Unfortunately, the Mozambican government and many mainstream approaches to studying the informal economy fail to understand this crucial point. According to a study conducted by the Department of National Economy in 1993, 42 percent of urban economic revenues in Mozambique are believed to come from informal economic activities. However, many experts studying Mozambique's informal economy are skeptical of this estimate and believe that more than 60 percent of households in the area are reliant on this sector (Personal communication, Carlos Cardoso, 1998; Macamo, 1997; Machaieie, 1997).

The *dumbanenge* has been an important source of temporary employment since colonial times, providing jobs for internally displaced communities (*deslocados*). Despite its unpopularity with local officials and the middle class, it continues to play a crucial role in absorbing surplus labor. This function has remained vital throughout the years, and it remains an important means of support for the populations it serves. During Mozambique's destabilization war (1977-1992), the informal economy, specifically the *dumbanenge*, replaced the government.

### The Colonial Era and the Informal Economy

During the late 1940s through the 1960s, several factors led to an influx of informal traders in urban areas. Firstly, an increase in the unskilled labor force occurred after the Second World War in urban regions. During this period, the Portuguese government modernized *Lourenço Marques* and created many jobs. However, these jobs were reserved for unskilled white Portuguese workers and not Africans. Secondly, a reduction in colonial employers' salaries increased the number of individuals entering informal trading. Thirdly, there was a rise in single, divorced, and widowed women that became

heads-of-household due to deteriorating conditions in rural areas. This increase in informal activities led to the rise of informal trades. Fourthly, prices for essential commodities increased, and ordinary Mozambican's purchasing power decreased, leading to an increase in participation in the informal economy. Finally, the increased tax burden of the *mudende* (from 1937-1962) also created more participation in the informal economy.

For unskilled urban Mozambicans, their only means of survival was the informal economy (Caetano, 1967). They produced goods by cultivating *machambas* and sold them in the informal market or to other Mozambicans around the city. Although the products obtained from the *machambas* were primarily for subsistence, they also sold the leftover products for cash. However, the colonial state and white settlers did not consider these informal commercial activities valuable for the national economy and deemed those who participated in them as lazy and aimless. The accumulation of wealth in this manner was nonexistent. Despite this, the informal trading activities were critical for Mozambican survival in the colonial economy, according to Rita-Ferreira (1967-68).

The colonial economic system uprooting of peasants from their land and subsistence lifestyle (Birmingham, 1989; Isaacman, 1996; Mondlane, 1969; and Penvenne, 1995)<sup>2</sup>. The Black Mozambicans had to find new ways of earning a living, leading them to specialize in various fields. Men who engaged in informal activities took up specialties such as watch repair, shoe repair, tailoring, and upholstery. Some of them

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<sup>2</sup> Birmingham, D. Martin P., ed. 1989. *History of Central Africa*. Salt Lake City, UT: Published by Longman. See also Isaacman, Allen F. 1996. *Cotton is the mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961*. N.p.: Pearson Education; Mondlane, Eduardo. 1969. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. London, United Kingdom: Penguin; Penvenne, Jeanne. 1995. *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*. N: Pearson Education.

were barbers, carpenters, cabinet makers, and tinsmiths. A few of them sold art products as well. However, only a small group of men dealt in selling sheets, cloths, combs, mirrors, ornaments, cosmetics, and other trinkets that only interested the rural population. Women were more inclined towards selling firewood, charcoal, drinks, fresh or dried edible products, fruits, small animals, and fish. They often sold these items at markets or around urban centers. However, some women had to resort to prostitution to make ends meet and earn livelihood for *mudende*, especially for those who were unable to earn sufficient income to sustain a decent living. (Rita-Ferreira, 1967/1968:171) This was their only source of income for survival.

During the colonial era, it was very difficult for African informal traders to become legalized tradesmen. They faced great challenges in obtaining cash or credit from both the government and private banks. To become a legal business owner, African merchants had to pay taxes and obtain a business license. Additionally, they were only allowed to conduct business in rural or suburban areas and not within the city. According to Rita-Ferreira, African merchants were permitted to operate in the same way as European or Asian merchants as long as they spoke Portuguese, did not practice customary beliefs or behaviors associated with their race, and had sufficient capital and property to support their endeavors (Rita-Ferreira, 1967/1968: 368).

The belief was that adherence to traditional customs, beliefs, and indigenous behavior was responsible for hindering the development and success of black African businesses. Additionally, it was thought that black African traders were disinterested and unable to attain profits or invest in long-term business ventures. Their products lacked appeal to European or Asian consumers and catered to a poor African clientele,

necessitating small quantities of certain products due to limited wealth. This resulted in them being depicted as ignorant about consumerism processes, resistant to sacrificing their way of life, or spending profits and savings on traditional vices or supporting parasitic extended families. (Rita-Ferreira, 1967/68: 372). The blame for poverty was attributed to African culture instead of Portuguese colonialism, while ignoring the fact that European traders benefited from colonial policies that guaranteed their success and hindered black African prosperity through rules, laws, and taxation. Furthermore, the colonial state provided the Europeans with commercial advantages, tax exemptions, credit, loans, and free land.

Mozambique's informal economy is thus not a recent phenomenon. However, I agree with the characterizations by some Mozambican researchers that the war of destabilization and political and economic liberalization programs, environmental disasters, and the impact of COVID-19 have, nevertheless, increased the proportion of people participating in the informal economy and intensified their labor (Barletta et al. 2021, 773; de Vletter, 1995; Abreu, 1994; Andrade, 1992)<sup>3</sup>.

### Research Methodology and Data collection

This study emanates from ethnographic field research conducted in Mozambique for over two years to comprehend the intersectionality of race, class, and gender in Mozambique's political economy. The respondents were diversified from informal economy traders, warehouse distribution owners, journalists, university professors,

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<sup>3</sup> Abreu, S. R. 1994. "A Mulher e o Sector Informal," Paper presented at the seminar. In *Muleide*, 1-40. Working Paper. Maputo, Mozambique: Frederich Ebert Stiftung; Andrade, Ximena. 1992. *Sector Informal na Cidade de Maputo*. 11/12. Maputo, Mozambique: Estudos Moçambicanos CEA/UEM; Vletter, Fion D. 1996. *The Informal Sector in Maputo and Beira*, Published by the Minister of Finance and Planning. Maputo, Maputo: Ministério do Plano e Finanças Unidade de Alívio a Pobreza.

agriculture ministers, border guards, market officials, and other Mozambican entrepreneurs. The research was carried out concurrently in six distinct informal markets located in Maputo (*Bazuca, Fajardo markets, Kihelene, Estrela Vermelha, Malanga, and Bairro Georgi Dimitrov*) as well as one formal market, Mercado Centrale, primarily focusing on the border traders in *Namchala* and *Ressano Garcia*. In the second phase of the research conducted from 2005 to 2007, the project extended to seven multi-site ethnographies of the markets of *Matola* and *Xipamanine* in Maputo, *Gaza-Xai-Xai, Mabalane, Inhambane, Manica, Beira, and Nampula* along the Mozambican border, *Lebombo/Ressano Garcia* with *Komatipoort*, South Africa, and *Lomahasha*, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) and *Namaacha*, Mozambique.

I gathered data through participant observations, interviews, life stories, surveys, archival research, and multiple other sources, such as the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and the archives of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. To further my understanding, I immersed myself in the broader community by participating in various events, including women's monthly community meetings, union gatherings, market clean-up events, rent collectors, festivals, and protests. Additionally, I partook in monthly meetings with different business owners and stakeholders, including NGOs, like CARE International, Faith-Based Organizations, and PVOs. I researched local archives and several Ministries, including the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Women, and Ministry of Industry and Commerce. For a more comprehensive understanding, I scrutinized primary sources such as speeches delivered at the national assembly of deputies and the works of the first president of Mozambique, Samora Machel.



I procured primary data from multiple financial sources, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Development Program report. Furthermore, local newspapers, including *Notícias*, *Domingo*, *Fim de Semana*, *Savana*, *Tempo*, and *Metical* offered me valuable insights into the post-civil war/war of destabilization situation, thus allowing me to comprehend the motivation behind the implementation of structural adjustment and neo-liberalization in Mozambique.

Between October 1997 and April 1998, September 1998 and December 1998, and from 2005 to 2007, I performed fieldwork in the urban informal markets of Mozambique. The Mozambican *Ressano Garcia*, the South African border of *Komatipoort*, and the Mozambican Zimbabwe and Mozambique borders of *Lebombo* and Eswatini *Lomahasha* provided answers to specific questions related to the traders' livelihoods or the smuggling of goods into Mozambique whenever necessary.

As part of the initial fieldwork, I wandered and chatted with various merchants and vendors involved in informal enterprises across Maputo. I explored various ad-hoc markets in the vicinity of the city center, namely *Xipamanine*, *Bazuca*, *Fajardo*, *Estrela Vermelha*, *Mucorama-Xihelene-Compound*, *Malanga*, and *Bairro Georgi Dimitrov*. The purpose of these visits was to comprehend the activities and familiarize myself with various groups, including but not limited to the jobless or underemployed, unregistered merchants, retailers, storage facility proprietors, production facility proprietors, employees, and local entrepreneurs.

To conduct effective qualitative research, I devised a systematic process guided by three fundamental objectives. Firstly, I sought to pinpoint suitable research locations and participants. Secondly, I intended to comprehend Mozambique's socioeconomic and

political structures and the intricate role played by the informal economy. Lastly, by implementing the political-economic approach, I aimed to comprehend the interaction of race, class, and gender and its impact on the production and ownership of the means of production.

I spent a couple of months liaising with government officials and closely examining the interactions that took place amongst a myriad of stakeholders. Informal dialogues with traders, merchants, factory proprietors, warehouse operatives, and directors of the local markets aided me in drawing an initial comprehension of the vital role each of them played and how they interrelated with each other. While the interviewees were willing to speak with me, I had to provide them with an Institutional Review Board (IRB) ascertaining that the research project had no connections with either the government or the police. A student identification card with my name, photo, profession, and university affiliation printed on it was given to me by the Eduardo Mondlane University Library. I consulted the *Arquivo Histórico Nacional* in Maputo and the *Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo* in Lisbon, Portugal, in the summer of 2022.

### Literature Review

In this section, I strive to assimilate the literature pertaining to the informal economy into the discourse of political economy vis-à-vis race, racism, capitalism, and white supremacy. Undoubtedly, all nations showcase diverse manifestations of the informal economy within their economic infrastructure. It was not until the 1970s that the term 'informal sector' was acknowledged in political economy (Hart 1973, 79)<sup>4</sup> Significant

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<sup>4</sup> Hart, Keith. 1973. "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment Planning in Ghana." *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies* 1, no. 11 (March): 61-89. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00008089>.

ambiguity prevails concerning the connotation and import of the informal economy. For example, some of the leaders and more prosperous citizens residing in the Less Developed Countries consider the informal economy as an indication of backwardness. In Mozambique, it is often the case that the middle class and the elites bemoan the existence of the informal economy, which they perceive as an obstacle to the country's development and progress. The poor are frequently scapegoated by these elites for their supposed misfortunes, with some even asserting that the impoverished masses engage in theft and other illicit activities because they lack gainful employment. Young men are often labeled with derogatory terms such as "*mulacos*" or "*gatunos*".

From 1975 to 1992, the informal economy-*dumbanenge* was deemed illegal, and FRELIMO declared individual entrepreneurship and capitalist enterprise enemies of the Mozambican State.<sup>5</sup> After the implementation of the neoliberal agenda, particularly the PRE-*Programa de Reabilitação Económica*, or the Structural Adjustment Program, there has been a remarkable proliferation of the *dumbanenge* operated within residential premises, suggesting a dramatic reversal of economic fortunes. Meanwhile, others have classified the informal economy as a 'primitive' means of production which mirrors the traditional African customs and systems. Modernization theories have considered the informal economy an inherent component of conventional society that contemporary

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<sup>5</sup> Carlos Cardoso and Delfina, personal communication, Maputo November 20 1997 to May 1998. I sat down with Carlos Cardoso every Friday for a period of six months, while conducting my research in Maputo in 1997. Carlos Cardoso became my mentor; we discussed politics, economics, corruption, education, HIV/AIDS, and social life from Mozambique, Portugal, Angola, and Cape Verde. Additionally, he arranged for me to meet several informal traders and professional who worked in the field of informal economy. Carlos Alberto Lopes Cardoso was a reputable journalist born in Mozambique of Portuguese descent. He was ruthlessly assassinated in central Maputo on 22nd November 2000, while investigating a fraudulent scam worth \$14 million connected with the privatization of Mozambique's largest financial institution, *Banco Comercial de Moçambique*.

institutions and methodologies ought to supplant. (Bratton 1992).<sup>6</sup> Regardless of the perception of the informal economy, it is a widely recognized fact that women constitute most of the individuals who partake in the informal economy, a ubiquitous feature in many Global South countries. The study of the informal market in Maputo investigates the evolving connotations and magnitude of the informal economy throughout the ages within the context of the feminine perspective, as well as its association with civil society and the state.

Scholarly literature informs us that since the advent of the nineties, the informal economy has served as a critical channel of job creation for countless unemployed individuals and city dwellers in Less Developed Countries. The existence of this economy has been identified as indicative of economic advancement. Since 1995, the World Bank led field investigations in Mozambique to assimilate the 'dynamic informal economy' into the 'impoverished' formal economy. However, within this framework, the informal economy was only evaluated in the context of its relation to the formal economy. To this day, the vibrant aspects of Mozambique's informal economy have not led to or instigated job opportunities for the multitude of those unemployed. In other words, the informal economy is an example of what many researchers have depicted as 'jobless growth'—growth with no accompanying rise in employment (The World Bank 1989/99, 117).<sup>7</sup> In Mozambique, the informal economy is bereft of pivotal economic, financial, governmental, and infrastructural reinforcement measures which impede its informal activities. Despite

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<sup>6</sup> Bratton, Michael. 1992. *Governance and politics in Africa*. Edited by Goran Hyden. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner.

<sup>7</sup> The World Bank. 1989/99. *World Bank. 1998. World Development Report 1998/1999: Knowledge for Development*. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5981> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.

its acknowledged existence in the market, the informal economy remains unviable for use from an economic perspective.

Scholars have postulated that the informal economy could serve as a pathway toward the growth of an 'African civil society.' Intuitions indicate that a 'civil society' may be founded upon the informal economy (Tripp 1997, 67) Government interventions into the revenue generated by the informal economy are deemed unjust, especially after the dissemination of neoliberalism and the privatization of Mozambican customs services. As a result, informal economy participants are vehemently resisting the change. In particular, the import fees burden informal traders enormously due to their financial incapability. This group primarily consists of underprivileged Black women residing in Mozambique. Conversely, the higher tier of warehouses and supermarkets are predominantly owned by white South Africans, Portuguese, Southeast Indians, Pakistanis, and Persians. Consequently, clear distinctions involving race, class, and gender arise, accentuating existing inequality.

## Chapter 2: Portugal and its Civilizing Mission

In 1455 the Portuguese monarchy was granted a papal bull entitled *Romanus Pontifex*. Pope Nicholas V. issued this edict. It sanctioned the Portuguese to engage in the subjugation of all perceived "enemies of Christ" regardless of their whereabouts and, furthermore, to maintain such adversaries in a state of irredeemable bondage. The Portuguese African trade operations trace their genesis to patrolling forays of the African coast, beginning in 1441 (Boxer 1963)<sup>8</sup>.

Portugal established itself as a formidable maritime power throughout the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries, transporting and trading substantial quantities of enslaved Africans to various corners of the globe. Consequently, this practice of slavery profoundly impacted the shaping of racial tensions between Portugal and Africa. During the colonial epoch, the melanin-rich Mozambican population were stigmatized as inferior beings, *creaturas*, or creatures, predicated solely on pigmentation. Subsequently, the colonizers compelled these individuals to provide services to Portuguese landholders (*prazeiros*)<sup>9</sup> and private corporations<sup>10</sup> that granted authority over certain regions of the Portuguese domain. Furthermore, the natives were mandated to pay taxation in the form of 'peasant tax' and 'hut tax' to the colonial administrations or the *régulos* (chiefs). Black

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<sup>8</sup> Boxer, Charles R. 1963. *Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415–1825*.

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford: Clarendon Press.

<sup>9</sup> The *Prazeiros* were the Portuguese and Afro-Portuguese landowners who ruled, in a feudal-like manner, vast estates called *prazos* in the Zambezi Valley were leased to them by first the Portuguese Crown and after by the dictator regime of António Oliveira Salazar.

<sup>10</sup> Examples of the private corporation or companies were the Zambezia Company, *Companhia de Moçambique*, and the Niassa Company, controlled and financed mainly by the British, which established railroad lines to their neighboring colonies (South Africa and Rhodesia) with Mozambican forced labor provided by the Portuguese.

Mozambicans often escaped working in mines in South Africa and Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe) instead of entering *chibalo* or forced labor with the Portuguese colonial administrators. If any individual dared to confront or oppose this inequitable regime, the colonizing force exiled them to work as forced laborers (*chibalo*) on the cocoa estates (*prazos*) of São Tomé. These “maligned individuals,” or o *preto atrevido*, were expected to depart from their families and work for at least six months to pay head taxes (Mondlane, 1969)<sup>11</sup>. These families, principally wives, and children, had to engage in peasant work on the minute family farm (plot), known as the *machambas*, to secure food for themselves and their husbands, who labored away for the Portuguese colonial state without compensation. The survival of the Black Mozambicans was of no concern to the Portuguese. In the colonial administrator's eyes, one dies, there are many other men, as well as women, who were kidnapped and forced into ‘voluntary labor’ with the state or with the *Companhia de Moçambique*. Forced or unfree labor was widespread across colonial Africa, particularly following the abolition of slavery. Forced labor, or *chibalo*, was a heinous practice enforced through police raids that would forcibly seize individuals from their residences, subjecting them to physical and corporal abuse as they toiled within the confines of the workplace. The consequences for individuals attempting escape were severe in retaliation (Guthrie 2018, 6-7)<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Mondlane, Eduardo. 1969. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. London, United Kingdom: Penguin.

<sup>12</sup> Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. “The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict.” In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press.

The traders from Arab and Persian territories who journeyed along the Swahili Coast introduced Mozambique to what Amin (1974) calls “Oriental Mercantilism.”<sup>13</sup> Based on Amin's findings, medieval Arabian documents and well-preserved archaeological evidence illustrate how the Muslim traders had previously established multiple settlements on the Eastern African coast as early as the 8th century CE (Fieldhouse 1912, 21)<sup>14</sup>. However, it was not until the 10th century CE that the first documented record of Muslim traders in Mozambique was produced. In his writings, the Arab author al-Mas'udi offered historical accounts of the renowned town of Sofala, located in the southern realm of current-day Beira, along with the Wak Wak society, skilled craftsmen are known for their proficiency in metalwork, that thrived there (Rodney 2018, 87; Newitt, 1995)<sup>15</sup>.

The mercantile realm, emanating from the Zanzibar shoreline in Somalia and spanning to *Sofala* in Mozambique, was interlocked in a vast merchant web that tied together East Africa with Southwest Asia and India (Rodney 2018, 79; Amin 1976; Clarence-Smith, 1985; Parsons, 1993, 25). Rodney contends that the proliferation of Arab traders as far south as *Sofala* in the Mozambique channel spurred Zimbabwe to mine more gold for export (2018, 79)<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> Amin, Samir. 1974. *Accumulation on a world scale: a critique of the theory of underdevelopment*. New York, New York: New York Monthly Review Press.

<sup>14</sup> Fieldhouse, David K. 1912. *The colonial empires; a comparative survey from the eighteenth century*. New York, New York: Delacorte Press.

<sup>15</sup> Newitt, M. D. D. 2017. *A Short History of Mozambique*. London & New York, New York: Oxford University Press; and Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 79



## The Political Economy of Underdevelopment

Mozambique's uneven exchange and underdevelopment commenced with this province's incorporation into the worldwide economy. Muslim merchants arrived looking for ivory and gold in exchange for trade *missangas* (glass beads) and silk fabrics from India. The extensive transnational trade sparked social and economic connections with tribes that had never been known before. These groups exchanged manufactured articles for the more prestigious raw resources (Rodney 2018, 80; Amin 1976; Parsons, 1993; Capela, 1977)<sup>17</sup>.

This trading approach engendered a lopsided association between Mozambicans, Zimbabwe, and the outsiders. The market values and/or the exchange values of possessions provided by the Africans surpassed those of the goods brought in by Asian dealers, such as *missangas* and textiles (Newitt, 1973; Capela, 1977: 40-50). Consequently, consistent with Amin (1974), the economy of trade was a major contributor to the premature underdevelopment of Mozambique.

The trade economy significantly contributed to the development of Mozambique's societal organization. It gave the King and the ruling elites a unique opportunity to acquire rare luxury commodities such as textiles, drugs, perfumes, dates, and salt in exchange for gold and ivory. Furthermore, it enabled them to consolidate their social and political power by procuring horses, copper, iron, and weapons. Scholars such as Bovill (1958) have argued that the mercantile phase mostly reinforced traditional roles between rulers

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<sup>17</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books; Amin, Samir. 1974. *Accumulation on a world scale: a critique of the theory of underdevelopment*. New York, New York: New York Monthly Review Press; Newitt, M. D. D. 2017. *A Short History of Mozambique*. London & New York, New York: Oxford University Press; Capela, José. 1981. *O Escravismo Colonial em Moçambique*. Afrontamento ed. Porto, Portugal: Porto Edições; & Parsons, Neil. 1993 & 1983. *A new history of southern Africa*. 2nd ed. London, UK: Macmillan.

and their subjects. This dynamic encouraged social differentiation and established states and empires within the kingdom of Monomotapa (Rodney 2018, 77; Capela, 1981; Mondlane, 1969; Bovill, 1995)<sup>18</sup>.

*L'économie du traite* thus created a materialist division between the leaders and their people. Unlike prior times, the subjects had to pay tributary to the King of *Munhumutapa's (Monomotapa)*<sup>19</sup> and the local chiefs by working in the gold mines. The King's subjects were not allowed to trade with the Arabs or the Portuguese, which also encouraged illegal trade. This system created a royal monopoly on trade until the arrival of the Portuguese (Rodney, 2018; Clarence-Smith, 1985; Parsons, 1995 [1983]).<sup>20</sup>

For centuries, the Portuguese restricted their activity to a few trading posts, competing with Arab traders for primacy along the coastline of the Indian Ocean. As the gold and slave trades grew in importance, settlers pushed into the interior, hoping to gain a steadier supply of their chosen commodities and stronger control over the region. The Portuguese attempted to legitimize their trade positions by defying Arab authority along

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<sup>18</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books; Bovill, Robin, Edward W., and Robin Hallett. 1995. *The Golden Trade of the Moors: West African Kingdoms in the Fourteenth Century*. 2nd ed. Princeton: N.J.: M. Weiner Publishers; Capela, José. 1981. *O escravismo colonial em Moçambique*. Afrontamento ed. Porto, Portugal: Porto Edições; & Mondlane, Eduardo. 1969. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. London, United Kingdom: Penguin.

<sup>19</sup> Munhumutapa (also spelt 'Monomotapa') was a new kingdom that came to power on the northeastern Zimbabwean Plateau in the later 15<sup>th</sup> century. Munhumutapa was the praise-name taken by its first ruler and was subsequently adopted as a title by later rulers. The king was treated as a god like the priest-kings in Southern African countries. According to Parsons (1993), in 1575 the king Munhumutapa Nogomo ceded land along Zambezi south bank to the Portuguese king, which was divided into *prazos* (plantations) ruled by settler chiefs known as *prazeiros*. In 1606 Gatsi Rusere ceded more gold and silver mines by treaty. After 1606 the Portuguese no longer regarded the Munhumutapa as an independent ruler, refusing to pay tribute. Finally in 1629 Munhumutapa Mavura (the king) agreed to pay regular tribute to the Portuguese king. From 1629-90 the Munhumutapa continued to rule his own people, but Portuguese settlers were exempt from his laws and traded without paying him tribute.

<sup>20</sup> Clarence-Smith, W. G. 1985. *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism*. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press.

the Swahili Coast. Bolstered by their military power, the Portuguese settlers passed a decree which made it illegal for the Africans to trade with the Arabs.

When the Portuguese took *Sofala* from the Muslims in 1506, it was intended that a royal monopoly should be imposed upon the trade. This proved unworkable, and instead, an unofficial private trade developed, which was then taxed by the royal captains at Mozambique Island. An illegal private trade grew up to avoid this taxation, which was difficult to detect (Birmingham, 1989, 259).

This decree created the first documented informal economic activities in Mozambique (Birmingham, 1989)<sup>21</sup>. As previously mentioned, “Mozambicans” defied Portugal’s royal monopoly on trade by engaging in trans-border trade (Galvão, 1952; Chingono, 1996)<sup>22</sup>. Portugal used the “divide and conquer” method to control the local ethnic groups. They used what (Newitt 2017) and Liesegang (1967) have called “African sub-imperialism,” which consisted of civil wars among different regional tribes to intervene in the chieftains’ affairs (Parsons, 1993).<sup>23</sup> The Portuguese signed treaties with local chieftains and extended their protection to the neighboring peoples. The chieftain support contributed to the disassociation of individual chieftains from one another, like the more powerful Munhumutapa and the Gazaland chiefdoms. These treaties gave Portugal a privileged position in this area vis-à-vis other foreigners.

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<sup>21</sup> Birmingham, D. Martin P., ed. 1989. *History of Central Africa*. Salt Lake City, UT: Published by Longman.

<sup>22</sup> Chingono, Mark. *The State, Violence and Development: The Political Economy of War in Mozambique, 1975-1992*. 1996. Brookfield, IL: Avebury & Galvão, Henrique, and Carlos Selvagem. 1952. *Império ultramarino português; monografia do império*. Vol. 4. Lisboa, Portugal: Empresa Nacional de Publicidade.

<sup>23</sup> Liesegang, Gerhard J. 1967. *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im südlichen Moçambique, 1820-1895*, Dissertation. Cologne, Germany; Newitt, M. D. D. 2017. *A Short History of Mozambique*. London & New York, New York: Oxford University Press; & Parsons, Neil. 1993 & 1983. *A new history of southern Africa*. 2nd ed. London, UK: Macmillan.

Nevertheless, it was not until the late 19th century that other European colonial powers recognized Portugal's dominion over this part of Africa. The Portuguese were effectively disrupting the region's economic integration, just as they had accomplished off the Atlantic coast of Senegambia and the Northwest coast of Mauritania in the early sixteenth century. Walter Rodney asserts that in East Africa, violence was employed by the Portuguese to acquire commercial supremacy over the Arabs and Swahili (Rodney 2018, 127)<sup>24</sup>. According to Rodney, 'the Portuguese sought with some success to replace Arabs as the merchants who tied East Africa to India and the rest of Asia. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Portuguese exported most of the East African ivory, which was traded in India, while Indian textiles and commodities were traded in East and West Africa by the Portuguese and other European nations. Thus, Europe initiated the first steps towards converting multiple regions in Africa and Asia into economic satellites' (Rodney 2018, 86).

Moreover, Rodney argues that the so-called international trade was nothing but the extension overseas of European interests (2018:87). He contends that during the earlier part of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese and Spanish were engaged in the acquisition of cotton fabrics from India, which they traded for slaves in Africa, with the single purpose of exploiting them for gold mining in Central and South America. Africa was enmeshed in the web of international commerce, which conferred upon European countries the sole authority to dictate the role to be played by the African economy. Africa

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<sup>24</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books, p127.

Ibid. 86

Ibid. 87

was thus engendered into the European capitalist market and transformed into its extension (Rodney, 2018, 87). These colonial European nations began to exploit in a parasitic manner the resources and labor of the colonized peoples for their sustenance. The colonized countries were coerced into surrendering their interests and autonomous development to act as economic adjuncts to the imperialistic capitalistic system (Cabral 1973, 39)<sup>25</sup>. Imperialism disrupted the relationship between the history and culture of a given society imposing foreign ethics, values, social relations, and processes of development, which hindered the development of the “toiling masses” Mozambicans were subjected to a life of slavery and forced to join the ranks of the oppressed Black people worldwide (Ford 1929, 8; Cabral 1973, 39)<sup>26</sup>.

#### *L'économie du Traite: Slavery*

By the 18th century, slaves had become an increasingly important part of Mozambique's export trade from the East African Coast. Many chieftains developed slave networks from the *Marave* area around the tip of Lake Nyasa to Kilwa Kisiwani Island (today's United Republic of Tanzania) and Mozambique Island (Capela, 1993; Newitt, 2016 & 1972). In central Mozambique, along the Zambezi River, the Portuguese officials and *Prazos* lords, who held land concessions, were the dominant players in the slave trade. The slave armies of the lords would raid villages located along the Zambezi River. The officials and *Prazos* lords served as the coastal intermediaries for Portuguese

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<sup>25</sup> Cabral, Amílcar. 1973. *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amílcar Cabral*. New York, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Ibid 39

<sup>26</sup> Ford, James. 1929. “The Negro Questions: Report to the 2nd World Congress of the League Against Imperialism.” *The Negro Workers*, (August), 1-8.

merchants from Zumbo, Tete, Manica, and Quelimane (Newitt, 2022; Carrilho, 1990; Capela, 1993; Clarence-Smith, 1985). The *Prazos* lords, in this privileged position, amassed great wealth from the slave trade and acquired even more land (Newitt 2022 & 1972; Clarence-Smith, 1985:50). Throughout the 19th century, Mozambicans were sold into slavery through multiple channels, including the Portuguese and Brazilian South Atlantic trade, the Arab trade to the Arabian Peninsula, the French trade to the sugar-producing islands of the Indian Ocean, and to Madagascar. Conflict ensued between various communities, spurred by the desire to procure captives for eventual sale to European traders in exchange for valuable European commodities. African leaders would readily consign their prisoners of war into the hands of these merchants, having acquired them through acts of warfare and conquest (Rodney, 2018, 91). These same African rulers began looking inside their community to exploit their own subjects and capture them for sale. The European thirst for an enslaved workforce created a hierarchy within the politics of Africa, which ultimately made it effortless for those with intentions to colonize and acquire land to do so, resulting in what Rodney described as a 'paradise for slave traders' (2018:91).

Although the trade of slaves declined as a result of mid-19th century reforms, clandestine trade, particularly from central and northern Mozambique, continued into the 20th century (Rodney 2018, 168; Clarence-Smith, 1985; Kaplan, 1977). The abolition of the Atlantic slave trade by Britain in 1834, followed by most of the European countries, presented Portuguese slave traders with a golden opportunity to become the largest slave traders in the world (Rodney 2018, 168; Newitt, 2022 & 1972; Guthrie, 2016; Clarence-

Smith, 1985; Kaplan, 1977)<sup>27</sup>. Even after Portugal agreed to repress the slave trade, many *prazeiros* continued to expand their wealth by selling human beings under the term “*free émigré*.” The “free migrants” or *liberto* were created to provide a useful transitional stage between slave and free men. Still, this only served to give official sanction to not calling a slave a slave. The so-called free men had to be bound for seven to nine years to their masters and were subjected to several restrictions not dissimilar to those of slavery (Isaacman, 1996; Penvenne, 1995; Oliveira Martins, 1905; Mondlane, 1969).<sup>28</sup> This system of freed slaves gave rise to forced labor that continued until the late 1960s. All natives of the Portuguese overseas provinces were subject to forced labor and forced cultivation in the service of the Portuguese government or individual companies (Penvenne, 1992; Oliveria Martins, 1986; Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983; & Mondlane, 1969). Rodney notes that for most European capitalist states, enslaving Africans served its intended purpose by the mid-19th century. However, for those Africans who dealt with captive individuals, the abrupt termination of this trade at any point resulted in a crisis of great magnitude (Rodney, 2018, 168). These African rulers had engaged in battles on

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<sup>27</sup> Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. “The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict.” In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. Virginia Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qsz.7>;

See also Newitt, M. D. D. 2017. *A Short History of Mozambique*. London & New York, New York: Oxford University Press; Clarence-Smith, W. G. 1985. *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism*. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press; Kaplan, Irving. 1977. *Area Handbook for Mozambique*. Washington, D.C., U.S.: Government Printing Office.

<sup>28</sup> Oliveira Martins, Joaquim P. 1905. *As Racas Humans e a Civilização*. 3rd ed. Vol. 2. Lisboa, Portugal: Liveraria editora; Penvenne, Jeanne M. 1995. *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*: Pearson Education; Isaacman, Allen F. 1996. *Cotton is the mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961*. N.p.: Pearson Education; & Mondlane, Eduardo. 1969. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. London, United Kingdom: Penguin.

behalf of one European nation against another; they were willing to trade in and subjugate their brethren. The Europeans understood that in the name of capitalist accumulation, it was possible to implement a system of exploitation, dispossession, and violent obtrusion of Africans by other Africans. In *Lourenço Marques and Beira* in Mozambique, there were communities of Africans, mulattos, and even Indians who helped 'pacify' large areas for the Portuguese after the Berlin Conference. African political conflicts allowed the Europeans to establish colonial supremacy (Rodney, 2018, pp. 172-73)<sup>29</sup>. An epoch of imperialism and racism converged to dominate African populations in political, economic, and cultural spheres. Europeans utilized other Africans to sustain the enactment of exploitation and oppression. Rodney, for instance, posited that the pre-colonial trade era facilitated the advent of black colonial police and army within Portuguese territories (2018, 99).

### The Crises of the *Prazos*

According to Clarence-Smith (1985), from the 1830s to the 1840s, the *prazos* faced a crisis due to the abolition of feudal tenure in Portugal, which was technically applicable to the *prazos* in Mozambique. In the 1870s, the Portuguese implemented the provisions of the 1854 reforms that eliminated the commercial monopoly previously enjoyed by the *prazeiros* and removed the powers of taxation from lessees' *prazos*. The *prazeiros* lords' power was further diminished in 1875 with the abolition of slavery

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<sup>29</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books, pp 172-173.

Ibid 99



(Clarence-Smith, 1985; Alexandre, 1979; Newitt, 1973; Hafkin, 1976).<sup>30</sup> Thus, from 1880 to 1910, the new mercantilist period represented a shift from an informal to a formal mechanism of control and influence in the colonies by the Portuguese regime (Oliveira Martins, 1986; Clarence-Smith, 1985; Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983; Fieldhouse 1967). Throughout the 1890s, governments in Lisbon struggled with impending bankruptcy while simultaneously trying to save industrialists, landowners, and shipping entrepreneurs from ruin (Clarence-Smith 1985)<sup>31</sup>.

The 1890s represent a significant turn of events for the African Portuguese colonies. With the demise of the *prazos* and a bankrupt economy, the Lisbon government signed treaty obligations with Great Britain to provide communications to the coast of British-colonized central Africa (Rodney, 2018; Oliveira Marques, 1986; Clarence-Smith, 1985; Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983). Foreign capital began to enter Mozambique in large quantities; foreign entrepreneurs-built railways and docks, set up plantations, and opened up mines, and in 1892, the Portuguese government gave the land in significant concessions to British chartered companies. The chartered and plantation companies grew out of the reforms of the *prazos* system (Rodney 2018, 164; Clarence-Smith, 1985; Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983)<sup>32</sup>. One famous chartered company was the Zambezi Company, which took over several *prazos* and linked the port of Beira with Rhodesia,

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<sup>30</sup> Alexandre, Valentim. 1979. *Origens do Colonialismo Português Moderno 1822-1891*. April ed. Vol. 1. 1 vols. Lisboa, Portugal: Livraria Sá da Costa Editora; Hafkin, Nancy J. 1976. "Trade, Society, and Politics in Northern Mozambique, c. 1753-1913 / by Nancy Jane Hafkin". Boston University.

<sup>31</sup> Clarence-Smith, W. G. 1985. *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid 159; Isaacman, Allen, and Barbara Isaacman. 1983. *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*. 1st ed. Milton: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429048593>; & Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books, p 164.

present-day Zimbabwe. The *Sena* Sugar Estates, which eventually became one of the largest foreign companies in the colonies, started as a Portuguese company but in 1914 had become a British company. Other essential companies established in 1890 were the Mozambique Company (*Companhia de Moçambique*) and the Niassa Company (*Companhia de Niassa*). The charter system helped perpetuate quasi-federal relations of production in colonial Mozambique. Their power was based on the *chibalo* system, a forced labor policy that forced the Mozambicans to work on plantations, cotton fields, and public works projects. Additionally, Mozambicans were forced to pay hut taxes that kept them in debt. This form of compulsory labor lasted until 1961 (Penvenne, 1995). Despite their efforts, the chartered companies were financially unsuccessful and made little contribution to capital formation in Portugal (Isaacman, 1996; Clarence-Smith, 1985). According to Rodney, Africa [*Mozambican*] integrated into the capitalist market through trade, colonial domination, and capitalist investment. This led to the appropriation by Europe of the wealth generated by African labor and resources (2018: 31)<sup>33</sup>.

Furthermore, he contends that African economies have become intricately enmeshed within the fundamental framework of developed capitalism but in a manner that is grossly discriminatory towards African nations, effectively ensuring their dependence on the larger capitalist powers, thereby perpetuating a state of developmental lag across the entire African continent (Rodney, 2018,32). The profits engendered by the labor of the African populace were remitted from the colonies to

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<sup>33</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books, p.32.

Portugal. As a severely impoverished country, Portugal did not invest in the colonies. Instead, the colonies served as a source of revenue for the colonial State.

In summary, Portuguese rule between 1880 and the early 1930s was characterized by the exploitation of people and resources by private parties, whether foreign company shareholders or colonial bureaucrats and settlers. Eventually, the colonial government terminated the charters of the significant concession companies because of criticism leveled by ex-governors, planters, and journalists who felt that the Portuguese territory had been delivered into the hands of foreigners (Rodney 2018, 173; Newitt, 2017)<sup>34</sup>. As a peripheral nation, Mozambique was not to benefit from integration into the world system (Rodney 2018, 31). Its role centered mainly on producing and selling raw materials to the metropole or (m) other country in exchange for manufactured goods. The Portuguese colonies, such as Mozambique, were established to mitigate the onus of economic downturns in Portugal, a country in comparative poverty to its contemporaneous European powers. Colonial offered the ultimate solution to its economic quandary and land reform. Underprivileged migrants were presented with employment opportunities and landholdings in the overseas territories. The Portuguese regime, whether it be the Monarchy or the fascist Salazar regime, was content in their appropriation of land and control over labor provisions in their colonies. Portugal displayed no inclination to invest in its colonies, as they conformed to the principles espoused by Burden-Stelly and Horne that imperialism's core is rooted in exploitative, pillaging, dominating, deceiving, and coercive acts which serve to expand and fortify trade

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid 173 & Newitt, M. D. D. 2017. *A Short History of Mozambique*. London & New York, Oxford University Press.

while impinging upon weaker nations. Such tendencies invariably lead to bolstered national revenues within more powerful nations at the cost of weaker ones (Rabaka, 2020, p.71)<sup>35</sup>.

Amílcar Cabral contends that ‘colonialism is primarily an economic hegemony-domination. Colonialism or imperialist ultimate objective lies in the economic subjugation of other nations. To achieve this end, colonialism magnifies its political domination, and perpetuates imperialistic forces in our territory, which it intends to subjugate economically’ (Cabral 2016 & 1973, 91)<sup>36</sup>. Following Cabral’s line of thought, Walter Rodney asserts that ‘European planters and miners enslave Africans for economic reasons so that their labor power could be exploited’ (Rodney 2018, 103)<sup>37</sup>.

Furthermore, the Portuguese colonies were marred by extreme violence. In 1914, the colonial government issued a decree mandating the expropriation of the indigenous population from the most arable lands, assigning them to white Portuguese settlers instead. When the native inhabitants refused to vacate the land, they were accused of transgressing on land that legally belonged to the Portuguese State<sup>38</sup>. November 1914 saw the announcement that Portugal had been granted the land of Angola and

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<sup>35</sup> Burden-Stelly and Gerland Horne. “From Pan-Africanism to Black Internationalism” in Rabaka, Reiland, ed. 2020. *Routledge Handbook of Pan-Africanism*. 1st ed. London, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, p.69-86.

<sup>36</sup> Cabral, Amílcar. 2016. *Resistance and Decolonization*. New York, New York: Rowman & Littlefield International & Cabral, Amílcar. 1973. *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amílcar Cabral*. New York, New York: Monthly Review Press.

<sup>37</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books.

<sup>38</sup> Political, Civil, and Criminal Statute of Indigenous Peoples of May 20, 1954. Decree-Law number 39666, Chapter 2, Subsection 3 on the rights over immovable property.

Mozambique since November 11, 1911, and by August of 1921. In June of 1944, the colonial power issued decree number 33727 to forcibly relocate the indigenous people from the fertile land.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, several other decrees were promulgated--decree #3497 in 1945 and decree #43894 in 1961--finally approving rules governing the use, occupation, and administration of all colonial lands overseas.<sup>40</sup> Thus, the state ensures a ready supply of labor for farms, roads, and other services, through the imposition of contracted, obligatory, and coerced labor. The owners of relatively large landholdings were obligated to cultivate mandatory crops, such as cotton, whose quality, according to official accounts, was deliberately undervalued as compared to that produced by white landowners.<sup>41</sup> If the land proved to be unprofitable, the indigenous population was forcibly dispossessed of their lands (Cruz 2006, pp.93-94)<sup>42</sup>. The inhabitants of the colonies were primarily subjected to economic domination. The Portuguese colonial government utilized legal means to dispossess the Black colonized population of their property and labor, favoring it for the benefit of the white settlers. Was this due to a manifestation of racism or solely motivated by their economic greed? Or was it a combination of both?"

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<sup>39</sup> Article 35 of Decree-Law number 39666 stipulates the forced labor confinement of indigenous communities.

<sup>40</sup> On the fourteenth day of May in the year nineteen hundred and forty-four, a proposed legislative measure bearing identification number 2001 was presented, which sought to convey and transfer ownership of five hundred acres of land to the Portuguese settlers and an additional one hundred acres to foreign-born who had nationalized Portuguese. It is worth noting that this bill made no mention of the indigenous Mozambican or Angolan populations residing therein.

<sup>41</sup> The Colonial State, as per the provisions of Decree 16392 issued on January 10, 1929, has determined the procurement expenses for cotton obtained from the indigenous Mozambicans and Angolans.

<sup>42</sup> Cruz, Elizabeth Ceita V. 2006. *O estatuto do indigenato Angola: a legalização da discriminação na colonização portuguesa*. Guimarães, Portugal: Edições Chá de Caxinde.

Sociologist Oliver Cromwell Cox (1987) argues that racism is an enduring feature of imperialism because 'imperialism invariably carries with it contempt for the exploited group. This social fact constitutes the primary source of modern race prejudice and antagonism' (in Hunter & Abraham 1987, 306)<sup>43</sup>. The European ruling class, who were primarily white, subjugated African workers to forced labor in various fields, such as constructing railways, roadways, and bridges and performing arduous work in mines. From Mozambique, Angola, São Tomé to the United States, Blacks were all impacted by this practice. Most of their Black populations were entrapped in never-ending cycles of forced labor and peonage. As a result, they were also subjected to convict leasing, intolerable working conditions, and routine violence (Ford 1929, 1-8)<sup>44</sup>.

#### Forced Labor (*Chibalo*) as a Civilizing Agent in Mozambique

Resistance is a natural thing. All force that exerts itself on a particular thing gives rise to a resistance, that is, a counterforce. And the counter force to the colonial and imperial force is the movement of national liberation (Cabral 2016, 76).

Europeans had formulated notions of racial and cultural superiority between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries while perpetrating genocide and subjugating Africans. Even Portugal, a destitute and backward European nation, was convinced that it had a providential duty to elevate the indigenous peoples of Africa to a more civilized stage of existence (Rodney 2018, 164)<sup>45</sup>. The Portuguese believed that their obligation in Africa was, and has always been, the spiritual conquest over the forces of ignorance. Therefore,

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<sup>43</sup>Hunter, Herbert M., and Sameer Abraham, eds. 1987. *Race, Class, and the World System: The Sociology of Oliver C. Cox*. New York, U.S.: Monthly Review Press, 306.

<sup>44</sup>Ford, James. 1929. "The Negro Question: Report to the 2nd World Congress of the League against Imperialism." *The Negro World* 2, no. 4 (August): 1-8.

<sup>45</sup>Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books, 164.

forced labor was perceived as a means of civilizing the 'primitive' Africans (*Reports on Portuguese Africa*. 1961, 7-8)<sup>46</sup>.

Walter Rodney contends otherwise, positing that certain Europeans maintained that colonialism, compulsory labor, and slavery were established for the welfare of the 'uncivilized natives.' Furthermore, Rodney posits that 'this represented an extension of the previous justification for slavery on the ground that it carried the heathen Africans to Christian lands.' This discourse constituted an essential component of the colonialism's public relations propaganda, aiming to conceal and repudiate the cruel nature of its operations (2018, 258)<sup>47</sup>.

In 1836, the abolition of slavery was announced throughout the Portuguese realm. Despite this, Marquis Sá da Bandeira, a claimed abolitionist, issued a decree which permitted slave owners to retain authority over slave children until they reached twenty years of age (Vera Cruz 2006, 95)<sup>48</sup>. On February 25, 1869, slavery was formally abolished; however, its implementation was deferred until December 14, 1875. Despite legal provisions, the labor code of 1875 obligated newly released enslaved people to continue their service for an additional two years. In 1899, the Department of Service and Regulation in the colonies and provinces of Portuguese Africa issued a labor decree which imposed forced labor, replacing penal punishment or punitive correctional labor. The policy was reinforced through a decree issued by colonial authorities on February 20,

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<sup>46</sup> *Reports on Portuguese Africa*. Education. 1961. 1st ed. Lisbon, Portugal: Lisbon: Overseas Companies of Portugal-Torre to Tombo.

<sup>47</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books, 258.

<sup>48</sup> Cruz, Elizabeth Ceita V. 2006. *O estatuto do indigenato Angola: a legalização da discriminação na colonização portuguesa*. Guimarães, Portugal: Edições Chá de Caxinde.

1894, which raised the poll tax for Black Africans from 200 réis to 600 réis in the first year, and to 1400 réis in year three, an increase of 600 percent. The authorities mandated that the taxes be paid in either money, cotton, or cattle. In the event of non-payment, the *indigenato* or the indigenous were subject to arrest and rented out to white landholders (*prazeiros*) or exiled to São Tomé e Príncipe under *as contratado* - contracted labor. Compulsory labor was legitimized as a civilizing agent. It manifested shortly after the annulment of slavery to civilize the Black *indígenato* and as a justification for converting them to Christianity. The colonial authorities reclassified enslaved people formerly as vagrants, hence punishable by imprisonment or deportation to Angola or São Tomé e Príncipe (Wheeler 1947)<sup>49</sup>. As W.E. B. Du Bois wrote, ‘the slaves went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward slavery [forced labor] ... New slavery arose (Du Bois 1998, 30)<sup>50</sup>.

As per Enes's report to the colonial authorities, there appeared to be insurmountable obstacles to cultivating intellectual abilities in the Black *indígenatos* 1893, 217)<sup>51</sup>. It was deemed unfounded to aspire towards developing their intellectual potential, rendering labor a necessary tributary to their civilizing process, even if it meant entailing compulsory labor. The latter was perceived as a mechanism for instruction, discipline, conquest, and salvation from Islam. Additionally, labor was envisaged as the entity facilitating their transformation from a sub-human to a human-like state (Enes, 1893, 217).

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<sup>49</sup> Wheeler, Douglas L. 2008. “The Galvão Report on Forced Labor in Historical Context and Perspective: The Trouble-Shooter Who Was ‘Trouble.’” *Portuguese Studies Review* 16 (1): 115–52.

<sup>50</sup> Du Bois, W. E. B. 1998. *Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880*. First Free Press Edition ed. New York, New York: Free Press, 30.

<sup>51</sup> Enes, Antonio. 1893. *Moçambique Relatório apresentado ao Governo*. 3rd ed. Lisboa, Portugal: Agência Geral das Colónias-A Torre do Tombo.



Ironically, compulsory labor was a strategic measure that colonial authorities adopted to furnish white property owners with an inexpensive source of labor, as former enslavers were troubled by the risk of labor depletion. Regarding Angola, Vera Cruz emphasizes that the purported "volunteers" experienced confusion about their official standing attributable to linguistic obstacles. Vera Cruz affirms that a laborer inquired if he was a volunteer worker, and upon his positive response, the employer probed whether he was present through volition or choice. The laborer stated that he was coerced into his role (Vera Cruz, 2005, 106)<sup>52</sup>. Numerous Portuguese Africans were employed under the title of *contratados*, or, in other words, 'contracted' workers. My uncle<sup>53</sup>, who was amongst their ranks, was dispatched to various corners of Angola, Mozambique, Bissau, and São Tomé e Príncipe. It is imperative to notice that the term "contract" was a means to veil the truth behind the coerced labor of these individuals. As per Henrique Galvão, "going on contract" was a euphemism emboldened by the whites to mollify the horrors of the situation, where the hapless Negroes were indentured into excruciating labor. (Galvão 1961, 66)<sup>54</sup>. Civilization through work was, therefore, one of the foundations of colonization. This doctrine emerged in the period between the abolition of slavery when the lords felt threatened by the loss of workforce and consequent force labor guaranteed their *status quo*.

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<sup>52</sup> Cruz, Elizabeth Ceita V. 2006. *O estatuto do indigenato Angola: a legalização da discriminação na colonização portuguesa*. Guimarães, Portugal: Edições Chá de Caxinde.

<sup>53</sup> "One of my maternal uncles, Januário Teixeira, was contracted to serve in the Island of São Tomé e Príncipe. For a considerable period, the entire family was under the impression that he had passed away.

<sup>54</sup> Galvão, Henrique S. & Carlos Mata Galvão. 1961. *My Crusade for Portugal*, Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co.

Antonio Enes, in his work of 1893, censured Portuguese legislation due to its lenient stance towards indigenous labor. Enes points out that the indigenous were reduced from slavery to vagrancy. The impunity of this vagrancy finds its basis in the centralized legislation of the metropolis, whose laws are ill-suited for the African colonies. The Portuguese State and its colonial administrators embraced the notion that labor civilizes. In their eyes, labor is the most virtuous pursuit, the most informative institution, and the most disciplinary authority; labor ensures that conquest is less susceptible to revolts, that the army can occupy far-flung territories and police, and that slavery can be contained. Labor is deemed the religion that thwarts Mohammedanism and the education that transforms brutes into civilized men. Indeed, the savage who took up work surrendered himself captive to civilization (Enes 1893).

On the 6th of December in 1928, the new regime, or *Estado Novo*, led by the fascist dictator António Oliveira Salazar, issued a decree numbered 16:199. This decree was called the "Indigenous Labor Code" or *Código de Trabalho Indígena*<sup>55</sup>. The first chapter of this code, specifically article three, clarified that imposing forced labor or *trabalho compelido* was strictly prohibited if it involved private gain. However, utilizing such work for the greater good and in exceptional circumstances was deemed acceptable. On the other hand, article 300 of the code granted colonial authorities the power to determine which work was in the interest of the public good. Furthermore, the *indigenato* or Black Mozambicans were not at liberty to terminate their contract or abandon their work, as a contractual obligation bound them until the end of their tenure (Ministry, 1955). If the

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<sup>55</sup> Paulino dos Santos Gil; editor, and F. P. da Veiga Nogueira. 1930. A atitude do Govêrno da Colónia de Moçambique, perante a aplicação do novo Código do Trabalho Indígena: alguns actos administrativos: Lourenço Marques, 30 de Novembro de 1929. Tipografia do Noticias.

*indigenato* declined to honor his contractual obligation, he was apprehended by the authorities and subleased to the plantation proprietor for a term of two years (Vera Cruz, 2005)<sup>56</sup>.

In the colonial era of Mozambique, Alexopouylou & Juif (2015)<sup>57</sup> demarcated the region into three distinct economic zones, comprising of the Northern peasant economy, the Southern labor-reserve economy as means of service to the mines of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (modern-day Zimbabwe), wrought with rich sources of tax revenue generated by the labor of blacks migrating from other areas. The central region's economy was regulated and controlled by monopolistic or concessionary companies and subsisted predominantly on forced labor (*chibalo*). The lack of development of an effective fiscal state caused Black laborers in the north to bear the weakest tax capacity, while the southern region, with its rich sources of tax revenue, had by far the strongest. The central region, while possessing limited tax capabilities, relied heavily on forced labor (*chibalo*) to keep wages low and stave off labor deprivation.

One of the primary objectives for early colonial administrations in Africa was to establish a system for collecting taxes which was seen as a prerequisite for legitimizing and solidifying power, as defined by the edicts of the Berlin Conference<sup>58</sup>. Crawford

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<sup>56</sup> Cruz, Elizabeth Ceita V. 2006. *O estatuto do indigenato Angola: a legalização da discriminação na colonização portuguesa*. Guimarães, Portugal: Edições Chá de Caxinde.

<sup>57</sup> Alexopoulou-Giannakitsa, K, and D.T Juif. 2015. "Colonial Origins of the Threefold Reality of Mozambique: Fiscal Capacity and Labour Systems."

<sup>58</sup> The General Acts of the Berlin Conference formalized the Scramble for Africa. According to this act, the principle of "effective occupation" stated that only powers that possessed or had treaties with local leaders flew their flag there, and established an administration, including a police force to keep order, could acquire rights over colonial lands. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, pp. 71–72

Young's analysis of the developmental state of colonial Africa was founded on two important concepts: effective occupation and the "hegemony imperative." These concepts demanded the establishment of institutions with hegemonic power, such as military outposts and administrative centers. Moreover, the colonial state needed to generate revenue from taxes to finance itself without straining the metropole, a notion that was also applicable in the Portuguese empire. The poll taxes (*mussoco*) imposed on the native populace alongside *chibalo* or compulsory work for colonizers were both utilized as means to incentivize labor migration to neighboring colonies (CEA 1983; Newitt 2017; O'Laughlin, 2002 & 2013; Newitt & Tornimbeni 2008)<sup>59</sup>. The process of circular migration became institutionalized as Mozambicans were subjected to centralized recruitment and deferred payments, aiming to minimize settlement in their labor migration destinations. This restrictive migration scheme was compounded by the imposition of pass laws limiting their mobility. The government of Portugal asserted that poll taxes were critical for the overarching growth and advancement of the colony and were chiefly intended to imbue a sense of discipline.

The disciplinary measure was designed to have a coercive impact, motivating the Black populace to create goods for the commercial sector or to seek salaried employment while furthering the process of monetizing the economy (Herbst, 2000). The monetization

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<sup>59</sup> Centro de Estudos Africanos-CEA, ed. 1994. "Projecto Temático para a Pacificação da Mulher Moçambicana: Planificação de Género no Programa Extraordinario para a Pacificação." *CEA*, 3-8; Newitt, M. D. D. 2017. *A Short History of Mozambique*. London & New York, New York: Oxford University Press; Newitt, Malyn, and Corrado Tornimbeni. 2008. "Transnational Networks and Internal Divisions in Central Mozambique An Historical Perspective from the Colonial Period." *Cahiers D'études Africaines* 48 (192): 707–40. <https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesafricaines.15471>; & O'Laughlin, Bridget. 2002. *Proletarianization, Agency and Changing Rural Livelihoods Forced Labor and Resistance in Colonial Mozambique* / Bridget O'Laughlin. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies Vol. 28 Issue 3, pp. 511–530, 2002.

of the economy and the adoption of a tax system left Black Mozambicans with no choice but to resort to informal economic measures to subsist. Women cultivated their own family plots, known as *machambas*, while simultaneously engaging in the marketing of their own goods and services to secure a means of living. Unfortunately, with the monetization of the economy and the subsequent introduction of taxes, crop growing, and livestock rearing provided insufficient subsistence for small-scale Black peasants. Under the authority of the Rhodesian, Portuguese, and South African governments, men eventually abandoned their farms and migrated to South Africa and Rhodesia. This agreement, however, failed to factor in the potential for employment of Black Mozambican women. For example, white Portuguese employers preferred to hire men or young boys as servants and caretakers, considering Black women to be morally corrupt and unsuitable for domestic work (Monteiro, 2006). In another region, household labor transmuted into a manifestation of coerced labor targeting female individuals who were delinquent in their poll tax obligations, thereby necessitating them to provide their services in the households of those of European descent.

In the central region of Mozambique, the implementation of *mussoco* or poll taxes alongside *chibalo* or compulsory work for colonizers was both utilized as means to incentivize labor migration to neighboring colonies. (CEA 1983; Newitt 1995; O'Laughlin 2002; 2013; Newitt and Tornimbeni 2008). The process of circular migration became institutionalized as Mozambicans were subjected to centralized recruitment and deferred payments, aiming to minimize settlement in their labor migration destinations. This restrictive migration scheme was compounded by the imposition of pass laws, limiting their mobility, and forced cotton cultivation.

The Portuguese colonial state additionally depended on forced labor (*chibalo*) to erect its infrastructure whilst economizing on public expenditures allocated towards wages. Van Waijenburg (2017) postulates that mandatory labor was an implicit manifestation of government-imposed tax (Waijenburg, 2017)<sup>60</sup>. The monetary value is rescued on wages as a ratio of total state revenue. Correspondingly, in Portuguese colonies, mandatory labor was regarded as a supplement to direct taxes, particularly in areas that were not monetized, where labor was indispensable for landholders (*prazeiros*), and the state, as well as plantation companies, relied extensively on mandatory labor. Following the cessation of the Second World War, a labor shortage came to fruition, which served as the catalyst for the re-introduction of *chibalo* in Portuguese Africa. Between then and the year of 1962, Mozambique bore witness to an array of enforced labor tactics, spanning from the coercive (*Trabalho compelido*) to the punitive (*trabalho correccional*), *contratado* and most notably, labor in the form of exile to the cocoa-laden *prazeiros* of São Tomé (Alexopouylou and Juif 2015 & Guthrie 2018, 45)<sup>61</sup>.

In Southern Mozambique, the white settlers encountered difficulty in procuring labor as they were required to compete with laborers employed at the South African

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<sup>60</sup> van Waijenburg, Marlous. 2017. "Financing the African Colonial State: Fiscal Capacity Building and Forced Labor". ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

<sup>61</sup> Alexopouylou, Kleomiki, and Dacil Juif. 2015. "Colonial origins of the threefold reality of Mozambique: fiscal capacity and labour systems," Presented at the African Economic History Workshop in Wageningen,. [https://www.wur.nl/upload\\_mm/0/e/1/1043e078-cb8d-4268-b505-5eeb3611fedb\\_Alexopoulou-Juif.pdf](https://www.wur.nl/upload_mm/0/e/1/1043e078-cb8d-4268-b505-5eeb3611fedb_Alexopoulou-Juif.pdf); & Alexopouylou, Kleomiki, and Dacil Juif. 2015. "Colonial origins of the threefold reality of Mozambique: fiscal capacity and labour systems," Presented at the African Economic History Workshop in Wageningen,. [https://www.wur.nl/upload\\_mm/0/e/1/1043e078-cb8d-4268-b505-5eeb3611fedb\\_Alexopoulou-Juif.pdf](https://www.wur.nl/upload_mm/0/e/1/1043e078-cb8d-4268-b505-5eeb3611fedb_Alexopoulou-Juif.pdf).

mines. Given the economic limitations, it proved an arduous task for the settlers to match the wages offered at these mines. Politically as well, the settlers failed to monopolize the labor supply. The conflicting interests arising from divergent forms of capital gave rise to a partial resolution that relied on the usage of chibalo, or coerced labor, to ensure the supply of workers for the farms (Bowen, 2000:265)<sup>62</sup>.

The labor obtained from Southern Mozambique soon proved to be indispensable for the South African gold mines, right from the inception of mining activities during the mid-1880s. With a dearth of employment opportunities, Southern Mozambicans became South Africa's low-cost labor reserve. Consequently, adult male peasants were relegated to a semi-proletarianized status as laborers for the South African mining industry for a period of twelve to eighteen months (Bowen, 1992; Isaacman, 1996; Legassick, 1974). A sound agreement finalized between South Africa and Portugal provided the South African mining industry with control over the recruits, thereby assuring a stable workforce. Portugal then in turn secured access to Mozambican ports and railways and collected an emigration tax from each migrant laborer. One-third of the workers' salaries were paid to the Portuguese government at fixed rand gold prices, post-1928 (Guthrie, 2018; Isaacman, 1996; Penvenne, 1995, Bowen, 1992)<sup>63</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup> Bowen, Merle L. 1992. "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (2): 255–79. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00010715>.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. 269; Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. "The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict." In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. Virginia Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qsz.7>; Isaacman, Allen F. 1996. *Cotton is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961*. N.p.: Pearson Education; & Penvenne, Jeanne M. 1995. *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*. N.p.: Pearson Education.

## The Role of Women in Colonial Society

The Emancipation of women is not an act of charity, the result of a humanitarian or compassionate attitude. Women's liberation is a fundamental necessity for the revolution, a guarantee of its continuity, and a precondition for its victory (Samora Machel).

Capitalism has thus far proven insufficient in remedying the persistent issue of gender inequality. In Mozambique, as with many other former colonies, the patriarchal, racist capitalist, and white supremacist system that was put in place did not bestow favor upon women. While colonial authorities may have presented themselves as supporters of women's education and emancipation, in practice, the status of women deteriorated under colonial rule (Rodney 2018:274). Notably, in Portugal during the 19th and 20th centuries, the literacy rate remained alarmingly low.

Notwithstanding Salazar's purported commitment to expanding higher education, he limited it to a select cohort, affording only the privileged the opportunity to enjoy its benefits rather than extending it to the masses. Over 80 percent of the population was found to be illiterate by the end of the 19th century. In the 1930 census, 68.1 percent of Portugal's population was found to be illiterate. During the First Republic, data suggests that the despotic regime of *Estado Novo* witnessed more substantial advancements in propagating rudimentary education. Despite a minor increase in contrivances to ameliorate literacy, from a mere 26% in 1911 to 33% in 1930<sup>64</sup>.

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<sup>64</sup> Alfabetização e Escola em Portugal nos Sèculos XIX e XX. Os Censos e as Estatísticas (Lisboa, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2004. Candeias, António; Simoes, Eduarda (1999). "Alfabetização e escola em Portugal no século XX: Censos Nacionais e estudos de caso". *Análise Psicológica* (in Portuguese). 17 (1): 163–194. Archived from the original on 12 May 2014. Retrieved 1 May 2023.



The educational system of the colonial state in the Portuguese territories possessed a dual nature: firstly, to propagate the Portuguese language and culture via educational institutions, and secondly, to actively deter the formation of any non-national organizations, with the sole exception being the Catholic missions which were encouraged to establish mission schools in the pursuit of advancing civilization in the colonies (*Reports on Portuguese Africa; Education* 1960, 7-8). Instruction aimed to acculturate, *assimilados*, the indigenous population to the Portuguese tongue and society. In theory, this protocol was sound, yet its execution was often sketchy and incomplete in practice, particularly for women. The majority of Portuguese colonies were obliged to speak Portuguese as the language of instruction, in commerce and governance.

In rural Mozambique, a small number of men were allowed a rudimentary four-grade education, which served to qualify them for low-level bureaucratic positions; in stark contrast, the female population was systemically excluded from such opportunities (Personal communication, Chimoio, March 15, 2006)<sup>65</sup>.

Faucet and Mosse (2003,11) contend that:

As for the 'civilizing mission' that Portugal boasted of, the harsh reality was that almost no education was available for Blacks. Even in the mid-1970s, the illiteracy rate in Mozambique was around 93 percent (Fauvet and Mosse 2003, 11).

During the colonial period, Walter Rodney (2018, 275) contended that women were deprived of their social, religious, constitutional, and political entitlements. Moreover, economic exploitation was sustained and often intensified due to the disruption of the division of labor according to gender, brought about by the colonial rule, and the

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<sup>65</sup> Personal Communication M. Magaia & D. Isabel (Chimoio October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2006).

introduction of *chibalo* and migrant labor, as was the case in Mozambique. When the men were compelled to migrate or leave their homes and farms to seek employment, the women were left behind, tasked with the burden of every necessary chore required for their own survival (Rodney 2018, 275)<sup>66</sup>.

While migrant labor was historically male dominated, it is imperative to recognize women's role in the migrant labor system. Scholars specializing in the history of southern Africa have long emphasized the structural importance of women's agricultural labor (Walker and Philip 1990: 25-30 & Penvenne 1995)<sup>67</sup>. This was primarily because of its ability to make migrant labor financially feasible, as it indirectly subsidized the meager wages of male migrant workers (Guthrie 2018:66). More broadly, the spatial segregation between the workplace and domestic life, which underpinned migrant labor practices, necessitated which women remained rooted in rural areas whilst their husbands sought work elsewhere (Penvenne 1995, 141)<sup>68</sup>. This objective was aggressively pursued by both colonial officials and elder African males, who had a shared interest in the "preservation" of rural society in the face of the changes wrought by migrant labor (Guthrie

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<sup>66</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books.

<sup>67</sup> Walker, Cheryl, and David Philip. 1990. "Gender and the Development of the Migrant Labor System, C. 1850-1930: An Overview." *Women and Gender in Southern Africa*, 1-32; & Penvenne, Jeanne M. 1995. *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*. N.p141: Pearson Education.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 141

2018, 68-69)<sup>69</sup>. Women cultivated their *machambas* (family plots)<sup>70</sup> as subsistence peasants to supplement their food intake and, at times, sold or traded the surplus in the informal economic market to pay for what emerged during the colonial.

Guthrie (2018, 66)<sup>71</sup> explores how gender and labor mobility intersected in Central Mozambique during the period from 1940 to 1965. He argues that gender roles shaped labor patterns, both in terms of who performed which tasks and in terms of who was able to move for work. For example, men were more likely to head to urban areas for wage work, while women tended to stay behind and engage in subsistence agriculture. However, Guthrie shows that these gendered patterns were not static or unchanging. As colonial rule became more entrenched and as the economy shifted toward cash cropping, new opportunities for women to engage in wage work emerged in the informal economy. This led to social conflict, as traditional gender roles were challenged, and women and men had to navigate new labor exploitation and inequality forms.

Subsequently, the colonial regime co-opted Mozambique's peasant society in its cash crop venture through intensive state coercion to fuel capital accumulation and to achieve better integration with the global economy. Western white Scholars such as

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<sup>69</sup> Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. "The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict." In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. Virginia Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qsz.7>.

<sup>70</sup> *Machambas* were family plots and not family farms. The amount of land that Mozambicans had depended on its location, and all the land belonged to the Portuguese colonial government. Personal communication, Dr. Maria de Lourdes Machieie, Maputo October 30, 2005.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, 66

Bowen (1992), Isaacman (1983 & 1996), Pitcher (1993)<sup>72</sup>, and Guthrie (2018) have well-documented this history. As aforementioned, colonial laws, decrees, and policies further impoverished the peasantry, who were compelled to resort to other means of income to settle the head taxes imposed by the colonial government. Women, in particular, resorted to informal activities such as prostitution, illegal beer brewing, and selling of cooked food (Rita-Ferreira, 1967/1968)<sup>73</sup>. The South African mining industry siphoned male labor through the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, which was merely the beginning of the various predicaments.

During the 1940s to 1960s, the Colonial Cotton Regime commanded compulsory cotton production, which in turn facilitated male migration to the mining industries of South Africa. With the men having departed to the mines, cotton cultivation was taken up by women entirely. As per Isaacman, thousands of men being absent for almost two agricultural seasons resulted in women experiencing a tremendous increase in their workloads. In the past, men were primarily accountable for tasks such as felling trees, cleaning thick brush, burning vegetation, and aiding in preparing soils. However, these duties now fell to women. In a patrilineal region such as the south, female growers often

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<sup>72</sup> Pitcher, M. Anne. 2006. "Forgetting from Above and Memory from Below: Strategies of Legitimation and Struggle in Postsocialist Mozambique." *Africa* (London. 1928) 76 (1): 88–112. See also-Isaacman, Allen F. 1996. *Cotton is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961*. Pearson Education; Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. "The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict." In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. Virginia Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qsz.7>; & Bowen, Merle L. 1992. "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (2): 255-79. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00010715>.

<sup>73</sup> Ferreira, António R. 1967-68. "Os Africanos de Lourenço Marques." *Memórias do Instituto de Investigações Científicas de Moçambique* 9 (C): 95-491.

inhabited places far from their families and were forced to work alone mostly (1996:97) & (see Rodney 2018, 275)<sup>74</sup>.

In many areas of the South, women were assigned men's responsibilities to ensure compliance with the cotton scheme. Women in southern Mozambique were not exempt from *chibalo* (forced labor) like other parts of the country. Colonial officials recruited women "laborers" to maintain roads, clear pathways, and work on European farms and plantations, and additionally, they "had to work in the chief's cotton fields" (Isaacman, 1996, 145)<sup>75</sup>. If they failed to pay taxes, the women were forced to perform labor in the chiefs or European farms as per the law of *chibalo*. Those in power (European farmers) subjected the women to inhumane punishments and sexual threats. Despite facing such atrocities, women in southern Mozambique refused to be victimized. They subverted and manipulated the cotton system by growing peanuts and beans even though overseers attempted to limit the production of these crops when they competed with cotton. Since these food gardens were unsupervised, cultivators were able to practice intercropping and intra-seasonal crop rotation, practices essential for food security and supplementary income (Rodney, 2018: 275; Isaacman, 1996:100).

Bowen (1992)<sup>76</sup> posits that, in certain instances, the augmentation of pecuniary influx from migrant labor served to accentuate the processes of socio-economic delimitation among the rural populace of the region. A segment of the "middling

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<sup>74</sup> Isaacman, Allen F. 1996. *Cotton is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961*. Pearson Education; & Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 145.

<sup>76</sup> Bowen, Merle L. 1992. "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (2): 255-79. <https://doi>

peasantry" who relied upon the bounties of migrant labor embraced agricultural means of production, in conjunction with small-scale craft pursuits, to yield agricultural surpluses for barter and exchange (Bowen, 1992; Isaacman, 1996).

An African laboring class emerged in Lorenzo Marques (LM) due to insufficient funds from their rural cotton harvest to pay hut taxes-*mudende*. In search of earning opportunities, the men migrated towards "urban employment" to escape the harsh conditions of the *chibalo*. Even though most menial jobs in towns created were not open to Black Mozambicans. Despite most low-level jobs in Mozambique being closed off to Mozambicans, they still had to compete with illiterate and sub-skilled Portuguese white settlers who had taken those positions (Rita-Ferreira, 1971). Rita-Ferreira, a Portuguese historian and ethnographer, was the sole historian who studied the African circumstances in Mozambique during colonization, opining that white settlers were better suited for urban jobs than the *indigenatos*. Rita-Ferreira's analysis revealed the white Portuguese's racism agenda during Mozambique's colonial history. In the 1930, the head tax, or *mudende*, was levied on every *indígena* man and woman aged over sixteen. This marked the very first instance where the colonial government mandated African women to make a cash payment. The sum of 100\$00 (in *escudos*, their value equal to 4 British sterling per annum for women) and 150\$00 (in *escudos*, equivalent to 6 British sterling annually for their male counterparts) is the amount demanded.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>77</sup>For more on this topic see "Diário de Serviço," 22 December 1937, ACLM Doc. 92/78, ACLM, AHM; *Brado Africano*, 15 January 1938, 12 March 1938; Ribeiro, Sumário, 245.

During the absence of their spouses or male relatives, women were conscripted into *chibalo* as a substitute. Guthrie (2018, 67)<sup>78</sup> asserts that colonial officials additionally endeavored to involve women in advocating the *contracto* or contract, avowing that it would simplify the process for wives to access a portion of their spouse's remuneration. With thousands of men gone for nearly two agricultural seasons, the onerous burden of cotton cultivation led to a consequential surge in women's workload. As per Guthrie's observation, colonial administrators utilized women to penalize the men who fled, instigating severe retaliations against their wives and mothers to deter the men from challenging their authority (2018, 67)<sup>79</sup>. A few of the women arrived at LM seeking a means of sustenance, as their partners or spouses who had formerly provided them with resources such as access to land, security, and monetary funds did not come back from their contract mining undertaking. As a result, they were left to take care of themselves and their offspring. Moreover, women employed the colonial system to obtain divorces from husbands whose inability to transmit funds implied that they had turned into vagrants (Guthrie 2018, 67)<sup>80</sup>.

Subsequently, in 1937, the colonial government introduced a consequential alteration to the tax system in Lourenço Marques; in lieu of the formerly employed rural hut tax, a head tax was mandated to be implemented. However, as Africans in the urban

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<sup>78</sup> Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. "The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict." In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. Virginia Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qsz.7>.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 67

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 67

periphery already owned or rented wooden and zinc shakes, the execution of the rural hut tax had become problematic (Penvenne 1995:100)<sup>81</sup>. If an African individual in the city-owned the hut they inhabited, they were obligated to pay an extra levy, namely, the *contribuição predial*. Following the new tax regulation, all African inhabitants over the age of sixteen years old - both men and women alike - were required to pay the imposed head tax, or *mudende*. According to Penvenne (1995), the same year that the *mudende* was instigated, the emergency tax on Portuguese civil servants was revoked, and by 1942, the *mudende* was officially extended from *Lourenço Marques* to the whole province (Penvenne, 1995:100). The cash *mudende* was a great burden to women who worked largely outside the cash economy (Penvenne, 1995:143).

The policies about labor by the Portuguese authorities and the political economy of colonial rule had a debilitating effect on women. By the 1930s, women began to flock towards urban centers in a bid to escape the thralldom of mandatory cotton cultivation and the oppressive burden of hut *mudende*. Nonetheless, the Portuguese rulers made it nearly impossible for women to reunite with their spouses stationed at faraway lands since their invaluable unpaid agricultural labor in providing a much-needed supplement to the meager wages paid to migrant laborers barred them from reuniting with their husbands who toiled in South Africa and Rhodesia (Guthrie, 2018:68)<sup>82</sup>.

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<sup>81</sup> Penvenne, Jeanne M. 1995. *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962*. N.p.: Pearson Education.

Ibid, 100

Ibid, 143

<sup>82</sup> Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. "The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict." In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed.



The women who remained outside *Lourenço Marques* spent days in the wilderness procuring firewood to manufacture charcoal with the intention of fulfilling their *mudende* obligations (Penvenne, 1995). Divorced women or heads of single households who relocated to the city in search of work learned that prostitution was their sole source of paid employment. Together with other informal activities, prostitution thrived<sup>83</sup> in the urban centers and became the primary source of income for most women. Those who were employed in the domestic service sector were paid half of what their male counterparts were paid, under the assumption that urban women had accompanied their spouses to the city and enjoyed their support. They erected the sideline economy, as it was designated then, to maintain their households and pay their *mudende* to the colonial government. The underground economy was deemed unlawful by the Portuguese administrators. In an interview conducted in Maputo in 1997, Margarita, also known as "Mamá Gita," stated that,

The Portuguese administrators' policies demanded that we solely engage in cotton cultivation, thereby confiscating any other products. My family is from Sofala, next to Beira, and at the tender age of twelve, my mother and I were persistently harassed by the administrators on our way to the marketplace. There were instances wherein my mother had to venture into the bushes with them; she would tell me to stay here and watch the food and drinks. When she returned, she would cry throughout our journey to the market. The recollection of my thirteenth birthday has been etched in my mind since that day. One of the administrators requested my mother to sell "Little Gita" to him. He promised to make a profit with me. I immediately inquired of my mother, asking if he intended to hire me for house chores. My steadfast mother refused his proposal and declared it unacceptable to discuss further the matter. Consequently,

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Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. Virginia Press, 2018.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qs.7>.

<sup>83</sup> In southern Mozambique, where the custom of lobolo (a bride price) was prevalent, those women who opted to part ways with their wedded partners were frequently coerced into indulging in prostitution, so as to reimburse the lobolo.

my mother decided to cease the sale of goods, making our lives significantly more arduous (G.S., Personal Communication, Maputo, December 18, 1997).

The women interviewed indicated that they experienced persistent persecution at the hands of the colonial authorities. They were unjustly accused of engaging in prostitution, despite their dignified participation in the parallel economy. The two most sold products in informal markets, street stalls, mines, and anywhere locals gathered were alcohol and cooked food. The women who sold these items were very creative in using fruits to make alcohol, including *sclerocarya birrea* (*amarula*), bananas, sorghum, millet, corn, cashew fruit, and watermelon. They fermented these fruits to extract the alcoholic beverage, which they sold along with cooked *xima* (fufu),<sup>84</sup> *matapa* stew<sup>85</sup> with either seafood or meat. Guthrie's (2018) findings reveal that in Central Mozambique, female offenders caught producing illicit spirits such as *nipa* (a distilled sugar cane derivative) were charged, as it was a profitable business. Portuguese officials, as per Guthrie, contended that *nipa* consumption amounted to approximately one million liters annually, yielding profits equivalent to sales revenues generated by cotton and corn combined. Portuguese authorities viewed *nipa* as a catalyst for social issues and a hindrance to male labor, thus rendering it illegal (2018, 71)<sup>86</sup>.

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<sup>84</sup> *Xima* is very similar to fufu--fufu is a pounded meal found in West African cuisine. It is a Twi word that originates from the Akans in Ghana. The word, however, has been expanded to include several variations of the pounded meal found in other African countries including Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Benin, and so on.

<sup>85</sup> *Matapa* is traditionally, made with local cassava leaves, shrimp, peanuts, and coconut milk. In Southern Mozambique due to the Indian influence the Mozambicans call *matapa*, curry. *The matapa* curry is served with *xima* (white corn flour).

<sup>86</sup> Guthrie, Zachary K. 2018. "The Ties That Bind: Gender, Labor Mobility, and Social Conflict." In *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*, 66-85. 1st ed. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. Virginia Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qsz.7>.

The informal economy emerged in Maputo (LM) areas during the later part of the 20th century due to several driving factors. Initially, a surge in unskilled laborers in urban areas followed World War II. During this time, the Portuguese government invested in upgrading Lourenço Marques, which only created job opportunities for unskilled white Portuguese workers. Secondly, decreased payments from colonial employers led to more people participating in the informal economy. Thirdly, the number of unmarried, divorced, or widowed women serving as heads of households increased due to declining conditions for female agriculturalists in rural regions, resulting in a surge in informal activities. Fourthly, elevated prices for key consumables and individuals' decreasing purchasing power led to a larger number of Mozambicans participating in the informal economy. Finally, the larger tax burden on the *mudende* from 1942 to 1962 was a factor in generating an informal economy.

The women cultivated the *machamba* and sold the products in the informal market and around other areas of the city, like Matola. Despite their importance to the survival of Mozambicans in the colonial economy, the colonial state and white settlers did not place a high value on these informal commercial activities. They saw them as lacking contribution to the national economy and accused the informal traders of being idle and vagrant. These colonial ordinances resulted in an overarching progression of the extraneous economic sector in the periphery of *Lourenço Marques*. The African populace, particularly the females, were not granted entrance to the urban fringes without a labor permit or *chapas* (Penvenne, 1995). Additionally, it has been highlighted genders underwent divergent hardships during the colonial era.

We used to wake up before sunrise and work in the '*machamba*' for countless hours. Then we would continue working tirelessly in the cotton fields until late afternoon. My father, who had been deployed to the mines, tragically never returned home. One day, I was brutally thrashed by my overseer, or *patrão*, for dozing off in the cotton fields. The injuries were so severe that I could not work for two weeks. Despite my absence, my mother still had to work additional laborious hours to reach her quota. (This information was gathered from a personal communication Maputo, November 20, 1997).

During the execution of *chibalo*, women left their family *machambas* and children unattended. The female workers reported cultivating the *machambas* from 4 to 6 in the morning, and then tending to the cotton fields during the day under the supervision of the Portuguese officials. 'Even under the light of the moon at night, we women continued to work'<sup>87</sup>. Unfortunately, the lack of assistance from their male partners in food production further exacerbated the difficult conditions for these women (Isaacman, 1996; Penvenne, 1995; Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983). Due to the *chibalo*, women bore the brunt of the forced labor system, including cultivation, construction projects, and domestic and agricultural activities. Notwithstanding all the efforts, the Black Mozambican women were deemed to display fewer or no desirable skills, according to the Portuguese officials. In the Portuguese paternalistic system, women were viewed as inferior to men; therefore, the Portuguese colonists undervalued their labor, and those sectors that hired women workers paid the lowest salaries (Gurthie, 2018, 78; Isaacman and Stephen, 1980, 13)<sup>88</sup>. Furthermore, the imported religious doctrines that were enforced in Mozambique during

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<sup>87</sup> Personal communication with Mamá Julia in December 1997 in Maputo, Polana Caniço & Xhelene market.

<sup>88</sup> Isaacman, Barbara., and June. Stephen. 1980. *Mozambique--Women, the Law, and Agrarian Reform / by Barbara Isaacman, June Stephen*. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

the pre-colonial and colonial epochs intensified women's substandard standing. Islam implanted the concept of dowry in locations previously devoid of it (Cota, 1976)<sup>89</sup>. Moreover, it fortified polygamy and child betrothals, as well as compelling women to cover themselves. Christianity was also replete with patriarchal notions regarding the substandard position of women, and the formal education that African children had access to was controlled entirely by missionary schools. The pupils in the Christian schools were predominantly male, perpetuating the entrenched idea that education was limited to males.

I never attended school due to my mother's inability to finance it. As a young girl, I assisted my mother with household duties and worked in the *machambas*. My younger siblings, boys, attended a missionary school. From the earliest I can recall, I dedicated myself to cultivating cassava, squash, *cacana*, and *imboa*, which we sold at the *dumbanengue*. At present, I am a seasoned sixty-seven-year-old, and this is my life (Personal communication Helen S. March 18, Maputo, 2005).

The legacy of the colonial economy, its political control, and its policy of education, together with traditional beliefs, made it harder for women to enter the labor market. Colonialism also subjected African women to Western forms of sexism, which according to scholars (Rodney, 2018: 274; Guthrie, 2018, 81; Sacks, 1982), was often more oppressive to women than previously existing social relations.

Dona Tina:

Before Mozambique gained independence, there were two types of citizens: indigenous and assimilated. The assimilated citizens, who had access to school, were very few. By the 1960s and 70s, even assimilated women did not attend school. They were told it was not a priority for them and that they should focus on learning skills such as sewing, cleaning, and cooking to be good wives and mothers. My

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<sup>89</sup> Cota, A. F. 1976. "Projecto Definitivo: OMM Archive," Working papers. In *Report presented in the II Conference*. Nampula, Mozambique: 1 (32).

mother sent arranged for a Portuguese lady, Dona Celeste, to teach me how to crochet and sew. My father was happy that I was learning these skills and not asking about attending high school like my brother. It was common for young women to study up to only the fourth grade, and their main purpose was to find a suitable husband. If they did not find one themselves, an arranged marriage was made. Working outside the home as a worker or employee was unthinkable for women during this time. This was also prevalent in Portuguese culture, where women typically attended school only up to fourth or junior high school and married as soon as they finished the equivalent of ninth grade. In the late 1960s and 70s, Portuguese women would marry and move to the colonies with their husbands for a better life (Personal Communication T. Macarias, Maputo November 30, 2005).

Thus, the political, economic, educational, and social policies of the Portuguese created a system in Mozambique that undermined the privileges that were granted to individuals in pre-colonial Mozambique, thereby making them more vulnerable and marginalized. This forced most of these individuals into the informal sector as they struggled to eke a livelihood for themselves and their families in a harsh colonial environment.

During the period of colonialism, African informal traders were faced with significant challenges when it came to transitioning into legalized tradesmen. African traders found it nearly impossible to procure capital, credit, or loans from either the government or private banks. Moreover, African merchants were required to pay taxes and gain business licenses and permits to become recognized business proprietors. Additionally, these businesses could only be operated in rural or suburban areas instead of the city centers (Rita-Ferreira, 1967, 171)<sup>90</sup>. Furthermore, asserts Rita-Ferreira,

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<sup>90</sup> Ferreira, António R. 1967-68. "Os Africanos de Lourenço Marques." *Memórias do Instituto de Investigações Científicas de Moçambique* 9 (C): 95-491.

'Negroes can engage in commerce as effectively as Europeans or Asians. The criteria for eligibility are proficiency in Portuguese, non-adherence to tribal customs and beliefs, and possession of adequate financial resources and property to sustain their commercial operations' (Rita-Ferreira, 1967, 368)<sup>91</sup>.

Racism and prejudice were explicitly manifested in Rita-Ferreira's writing, where he resorted to blaming the customary conduct, indigenous beliefs, and traditional behavior of Black Mozambicans. Such ill-founded beliefs, according to Rita-Ferreira, have stifled the development and prosperity of Black African businesses. Moreover, he was alleged that Black African merchants were apathetic and ineffectual in realizing gains and investing in sustainable commerce, as their merchandise failed to evoke interest from European and Asian markets. African products served a modest African patronage, for whom purchasing power was limited, owing to their modest wealth.

Nevertheless, Africans were often portrayed as "unversed in the tenets of consumerism," naive as to "sacrificing their way of life," or as recklessly spending "their profits and savings on traditional vice or supporting their parasitic extended family" (Rita-Ferreira, 1967, 372)<sup>92</sup>. African culture was evidently held responsible for the state of impoverishment, rather than attributing it to Portuguese colonial and exploitative policies. No consideration was given to the colonial policies that acted as catalysts to the success of European traders by constricting Black African business ventures. The colonial system systematically designed regulations that restricted the prosperity of Black Africans, while

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid, 368

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, 372

simultaneously granting commercial privileges, fiscal immunity, credit, loans, and free land to the European population of the colonial state.

Therefore, the capitalist system of the colonial state resulted in the asymmetric transfer of resources, distorted specialization, and hindered progress as the Portuguese capitalists enjoyed their dominance in Mozambique's markets. The natural resources possessed by the colonial state were traded at substantially reduced prices, whilst the manufacturing goods and technological advancements became increasingly expensive for countries such as Mozambique. The lopsided trade-off, coupled with the implementation of capitalism in Mozambique, fostered a growing society reliant on the global distribution of labor (Rodney 2018, pp 280-284; Amin, 1972)<sup>93</sup>.

Thus, as previously examined, the informal economy during Mozambique's colonial years was a product of prevailing colonial relations of production, modes of production, and underdevelopment policies. It is evident that the social relationships of production during the colonial era were not just ones of economic exploitation but ones of domination and servitude as well. Since the 18th century, alternative economies have emerged to resist colonial exploitation and unequal development in Mozambique. Adriano Moreira, a Portuguese historian, asserts that 'in legal terms, colonization invariably entails a phenomenon of subjugation. Thus, indigenous populations, regardless of the particular legal framework invoked, are inevitably subservient to the political authority of the colonizing state' (1956, 26)<sup>94</sup>. The subsequent chapter will delve into the intricacies of the

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<sup>93</sup> Amin, Samir. 1974. *Accumulation on a world scale: a critique of the theory of underdevelopment*. New York, New York: New York Monthly Review Press; & Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books.

<sup>94</sup> Moreira, Adriano. 1955. *Política Ultramarina*. Lisboa, Portugal: ECPS--Junta de Investigação Ultramarina, Centro de Estudos Politicos e Sociais.



ensemble of the racial formation in colonial Mozambique and the ramifications that it left behind.

### **Chapter 3 Racial Formation and the Portuguese Exceptionalism: Assimilation and the Erasure of Blackness**

The dilemma of cultural resistance--imperialist colonial domination has tried to create theories that are only gross formulations of racism and which, in practice, are translated into permanent states of the siege of the indigenous populations based on racist dictatorship (or democracy). The so-called theory of progressive assimilation of native populations, which turns out to be only a more or less violent attempt to deny the culture of the people in question. . . the value of culture as a factor of resistance to foreign domination. (Cabral-*Return to the Source: Selected Speeches* 1973, 40).

Race, during colonialism and slavery, was believed to determine not only one's rights but also the quality of life one should have. Interestingly, the literature produced during the heyday of colonialism often contradicts itself when it comes to Portuguese notions of race, racism, and white supremacy policies that were enforced in Lusophone Africa. Assimilation and erasure of blackness or Africanness were central to the Portuguese colonial policy. Unlike other colonizers, Portugal actively promoted racial mixing to create a racial paradise where African identity had no place. The message to those born in the colonies was that they were all Portuguese, with no recognition or respect for any African cultural heritage. Portugal saw itself as an exception to the rule, proud of its racial exceptionalism.

Upon examining the literature from Portuguese historians and anthropologists, it becomes apparent that regardless of legal frameworks, Africans or "native peoples" were considered subservient to the political sovereignty of the colonizer (Moreira 1955, 27). Additionally, "colonization" implies a state of dependency from a legal standpoint; it is important to note that despite any efforts made to assimilate or erase African identity,

those subjected to colonization were not considered Portuguese and could never fully claim such a status.

Oliveira Martins, a Portuguese anthropologist, believes that primitivism is an innate characteristic of Black people. Innate because the state in which they found themselves was reason enough to illustrate it when compared to white people. Oliveira Martins believed that educating Black people was absurd, not only considering history but also due to the mental capacity of these inferior races. A civilized Black person was only possible if they were mixed with the Islamic Negroids of the 'Orient' (Oliveira Martins 1905, pp 255-256)<sup>95</sup>.

Furthermore, he ascertained that imparting education to the negroes would enable them to foster independent thinking, their repudiation of servitude, and their inclination to demand recompense for their labor. Ultimately, he surmised that the African populace was incapable of assimilation into existing societal structures, thereby rendering the theory of colonization unworkable. He advocated for exploring regions without the unwieldy encumbrances that colonization entails. He postulated the question - what reason do we have to believe in the efficacy of the civilizing task of the Negro (*Preto*)? If an African individual, says Oliveira Martins, can transition from that of a pastoral nomad to embracing the life of a farmer, settling upon the land with the capacity to perpetually accumulate wealth similar to that of their European counterparts; if said individual is recognized as a person, a freeman, and he is a Portuguese citizen - all of which entitles him to receive or require compensation for his labor - and with no apparent limitations to

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<sup>95</sup> Oliveira Martins, Joaquim P. 1905. *As Racas Humans e a Civilização*. 3rd ed. Vol. 2. Lisboa, Portugal: Liveraria editora.

one's right to cultivate the land, then it begs the question: why should say individual (o *preto*)<sup>96</sup> subject themselves to serving and enriching a colonist in their efforts when they have the option to autonomously cultivate, harvest, and market their coffee beans (Oliveira Martins 1905, pp. 196-197)<sup>97</sup>. The author compares Black Africans to children, suggesting that they sometimes behave obediently, while at other times, they may behave much like children. As with all European colonizing powers, Africans required a paternalistic overseer to guide and transform them from pagans and infidels to Christians. Portugal, particularly during the fascist regime of António Oliveira Salazar, asserted that the principles of Portuguese colonialization are rooted in the country's traditional Christian faith. De Andrade, writing on behalf of the Fascist government's propaganda, asserted that Catholicism has indelibly shaped the 'laws, customs, and national character.'

Despite occasional compromises to commercial interests, the Portuguese have retained a persistent sense of mission rooted in their Catholic doctrine. Moreover, Andrade maintained that the Portuguese, since the age of Alfonso de Albuquerque, have exemplified in their treatment of their fellow beings overseas the tenets of religious instruction. They have steadfastly upheld the principles of human brotherhood and only resorted to armed conquest in instances of dire necessity (De Andrade 1961, pp.5-6)<sup>98</sup>. Similar to Brazil, Portugal aspired to assert that it had built a racial 'democracy,' but unlike in the United States where laws prohibiting interracial marriage--miscegenation were

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<sup>96</sup> In Portuguese, the word Preto/a is considered a racial slur, similar in meaning to the English word Nigger. When someone uses this word to describe a person, it is meant to suggest that the person is uneducated, unintelligent, inferior, or a lowlife.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, 196-97

<sup>98</sup> De Andrade, António A. 1961. *Many Races -One Nation: Racial Non-Discrimination Always the Cornerstone of Portugal's Overseas Policy*. Lisbon, Portugal: Tip. Silvas LDA.

enforced, African and Latin American societies encouraged miscegenation. De Andrade asserts that Afonso de Albuquerque inaugurated a policy of racial impartiality by encouraging the marriage of Portuguese colonizers with indigenous women. '...and in compliance with Your Highness's orders, I officiated the matrimonial rites,' he wrote to D. Manuel, 'apportioning to each husband his horse, and bovine livestock, house, and lands, as he deemed equitable (De Andrade 1961, pp. 6-7)<sup>99</sup>. Portugal's claim of a racial exceptionalism fascinated Gilberto Freyre's work *Casa-grande e senzala* (1933), which fostered an appreciation that Portugal has been more benign and racially tolerant as a colonizer than had other European powers. According to Freyre, Portuguese colonialism fostered a harmonious mixed-race society, which had incorporated Africans and Indians. Freyre and Germano Correia were captivated by the practice during the rule of D. João III, wherein the Crown dispatched the so-called Kings' Orphans or orphan girls furnished with dowries, to unite in matrimony in India.

According to De Andrade, the fraternal mindset towards natives of far-off territories, even if they are 'savages,' is a unique characteristic that sets the colonizing methods of Portugal apart from those of other civilizations, except specific eras during Spanish history (1961, 7)<sup>100</sup>. De Andrade asserts that 'no discriminatory incidences or measures have ever arisen from racial or religious differences in any of the Portuguese territories. This stands in contrast to the actions of many countries who consider themselves to be champions of people's independence' (De Andrade, 1961, p. 49)<sup>101</sup>. To

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 6

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, 7

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, 49

safeguard the Portuguese racial exceptionalism, De Andrade cites numerous decrees promulgated by the Portuguese government, attesting that the Christians of Portuguese India are completely on par with the Portuguese in all aspects. On May 18th, 1761, the then Secretary of State, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, transcribed duplicates of these enactments to the Governor of Mozambique, accompanied by a royal edict endorsing equivalent rights to the residents of Mozambique.

### Luso-tropicalism Propaganda

As promoted through Luso-tropicalism propaganda, Portuguese racial exceptionalism continued to wield considerable influence in the international community. George Martelli, a journalist for the Daily Telegraph, wrote an article expounding praise for Portugal's racial exceptionalism. He ardently affirmed that there were no territories in Lusophone Africa where 'European only' or 'admittance reserved' segregated areas existed as in Rhodesia and Kenya. He further offered his experiences in Angola as an example of racial harmony. 'I have witnessed family parties along the shores of Luanda on a Sunday afternoon, where men, women, and children of every color gathered to picnic together, and afterward, singing, dancing, and playing in unison.' A spectacle so harmonious and racially integrated, Martelli proclaims, could never have been possible in English colonies (Daily Telegraph 1962, 7)<sup>102</sup>.

Continuing his argument, Martelli posits that the Portuguese populace and administration take immense pride in the fact that their guiding principles of treating

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<sup>102</sup> Martelli, George. "Portugal and the United Nations." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 40, no. 3 (1964): 453–65. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2610828>.

See also Martelli, George. "The Future in Angola." *African Affairs* 61, no. 245 (1962): 300–307. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/719971>.

Africans as equal members of humans are the product of centuries of heritage rather than a new and hastily contrived response to the demands of contemporary detractors. Martelli's argument resembles Salazar's statement in his interview with Der Spiegel, where the Portuguese dictator expressed the following idea.

We have been criticized for persistently adhering to the ideal of a multiracial society developing in the tropics, as if such an ideal were opposed to human nature, to the moral order of the universe or to the interest of people. . . . I think I can say that the distinguishing feature of Portuguese Africa. . . is the primacy which we have always attached to the enhancement of the value and the dignity of man without distinction of color or creed (February 8, 1961, pp.36-44).

J. Murray MacInnes writes for Africa Today and criticizes Martelli's work<sup>103</sup>. MacInnes argues that, unfortunately, Martelli's work is beset by two grievous fallacies. These fallacies color the tone of the article entitled 'Portugal's African Provinces.' Martelli's work was a propaganda tool for the ailing Portuguese fascist regime. Martelli compares Portuguese development and the African countries' tendency towards internal conflict, one-party rule, individual dictatorship, and financial recession. However, according to MacInnes,

Mr. Martelli's depiction of the African states can be applied quite accurately to Portugal itself, for Salazar ascended to power after a civil war and exercised his authority by restricting laws and law enforcement. Even as late as September 1966, decrees 40550 and 47216, which permit "security measures" to be carried out against suspected political dissidents, can lead to their detention without trial, an automatic extension of imprisonment, and/or deportation to penal colonies. In Portugal's Africa, all economic and political deliberative bodies are dominated by government appointees, while all publications are rigidly censored. Except for the National Union, all political parties are forbidden, and the labor force has no legal right to initiate strikes. Considering these details, it is difficult to fathom

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<sup>103</sup> Reporter of December 29, 1966

how Mr. Martelli intimates that Portugal's African provinces signify societal progress and an emergence of democratic principles<sup>104</sup>.

Furthermore, MacInnes avers that Martelli's second primary error lies in the facile conflation of a dislike for the politics of the "white redoubt" of Southern Africa with communism. The propaganda employed by the minority regimes of Southern Africa ostensibly upholds Christianity and civilization; however, says MacInnes, this stance is abhorrent to most people from the East as well as the West. Martelli advances the notion that Portugal's forces were fighting communism<sup>105</sup>. According to the Colonial State's propaganda machine, the argument is that 'In Angola and Mozambique there are no ghettos or compounds, the traditional and hated symbol of inferior social status. There are no "white areas" or "black areas" with rigid lines of demarcation. There are no restrictions on marriage between the races. There is no racial segregation in schools, hospitals, churches, or places of amusement' (1967, pp.8-9). The report also confirms that some individuals have criticized the fact that Africans, particularly those who were lower and middle class, were frequently barred from the finest hotels and restaurants and that racial equality was not a reality in Portuguese Africa. To paraphrase Albert Memmi:

Assimilation will not work for the colonized because 'he [will] never [cease] to be one of them at heart. 'Must he [the native], all his life, be ashamed of what is not real in him, of the only things not borrowed? Must he insist on denying himself, and, moreover, will he always be able to stand it? Must his liberation be accomplished through systematic self-denial (Memmi 1991, pp.123-124)<sup>106</sup>?

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<sup>104</sup> J. Murray MacInnes. "Portugal's Propagandists." *Africa Today* 14, no. 2 (1967): 2-3.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184750>.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, 3

<sup>106</sup> Memmi, Albert. 1991. *The colonizer and the colonized*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.



Salazar, like his predecessors, was dedicated to the theory of incremental assimilation of indigenous peoples. This procedure was meant to eliminate the blackness or Africanness of these communities. Salazar affirmed that Africa does not exist (Cabral 1974, 40)<sup>107</sup>. According to Amílcar Cabral, in their attempts to control African populations, Portugal endeavored to create a minimally educated class whose members were afforded the "privilege" of serving Portugal's interests. These individuals were urged to reject all things African and to instead embrace all things European. Furthermore, Cabral maintains that 'the myth of Portugal's multiracial society came to be exposed for what it was-a tool for little Portugal's domination of vast stretches of Africa.' Despite these powers' claims of 'democracy, liberty, and human dignity, such ideals were systematically denied to colonial subjects' (Cabral 1973, 10)<sup>108</sup>. For those of us who have lived under Portuguese control, the notion of Luso-tropicalism is nothing but a sham. Portugal implemented corporal punishment for individuals who were caught speaking their indigenous languages in public. Cabral argues that the natives lived under a perpetual 'state of siege, imposed by a racist dictatorship'(1973, 40)<sup>109</sup>. Despite their efforts to adopt the cultural norms of the hegemonic class, natives remain subject to scrutiny and derision, for they can never attain the status of a white European. Albert Memmi delves further into the implications of assimilation, positing that...

All that the colonized has done to emulate the colonizer has met with disdain from the colonial masters. They explain to the colonized that these efforts are in vain, that he only acquires thereby an additional

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<sup>107</sup> Cabral, Amílcar. 1973. *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amílcar Cabral*. New York, New York: Monthly Review Press.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid 1973, 39.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, 40

trait, that of being ridiculous. . . . He will say that the colonized is an ape if he is more rude. The shrewder the ape, the better he imitates, and the more the colonizer becomes irritated. With that vigilance and a smell sharpened by malice, he will track down the telltale nuance in clothing or language, the lack of good taste (Memmi 1991, 124)<sup>110</sup>.

The Portuguese colonial government spread propaganda to the global community, insisting that indigenous peoples of the Empire were seen as equal among white Portuguese individuals. However, these individuals were treated as second-class citizens, subjected to slavery, conscripted labor to pay for hut and head taxes, and ultimately dehumanized.

Notwithstanding claims of racial exceptionalism or a utopian society, it is evident that colorism played an instrumental role in establishing a hierarchical system within the colonies. The Africans were at the bottom of the hierarchy and were regarded as less than human. As shown here, the natives were seen as needing guidance and control and were often subjected to forced labor and other forms of exploitation. Above the Africans were the mixed-race people, who were seen as being more civilized than the Africans but less so than the Europeans. Positioned between Africans and Europeans in the hierarchical racialization system were the Southeast Asians, including those of Persian descent and known collectively as *mõnhês*. The European population secured the peak of the hierarchical structure, deemed as the most enlightened and evolved ethnicity.

Racial configuration is a multifaceted process that delineates various groups' perceptions and hierarchical positioning. During the colonial period, this formation played a pivotal role in shaping the Mozambique's society and politics. To comprehend the intricacies of race-crafting, racial capitalism, and white supremacy that were enacted in Mozambique

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<sup>110</sup> Memmi, Albert. 1991. *The colonizer and the colonized*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press

is crucial to integrate the erasure of blackness and the subversion of African cultures, as well as the spurious assertion that Africans lack any historical agency. Familiarizing oneself with these concepts is indispensable for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the nation's history.

The formation of race during the colonial period in Mozambique was a key component of Portuguese rule. The Portuguese used their own ideas about race to create hierarchies that favored themselves and marginalized the Mozambicans. Understanding this process helps us understand the legacy of colonialism in Mozambique, which has left the country with a complex history of race relations that continues to be felt today.

#### Segregation: White and Black Separate and Different.

The colonial world is a compartmentalized world. It is obviously superfluous to recall the existence of 'native' towns and European towns, of schools for 'natives' and schools for Europeans, as it is to recall apartheid in South Africa. . . . The colonized world is a world divided in two (Fanon, 2004, 3)<sup>111</sup>.

Mozambique's urban regions bear the hallmarks of its colonial legacy. The metropolis of Maputo is compartmentalized into five districts but essentially cleaved into the *Polana Cimento* or 'concrete city', and the *Polana Caniço*, replete with thorny-brush huts roofed with corrugated iron. Maputo or *Lourenço Marques* upheld the practice of segregation, where the white Portuguese populace enjoyed residence in *the Polana Cimento*, and Black Mozambicans were restricted to the *Polana Caniço*. Under colonialism, individuals of African descent were exclusively permitted to enter *Lourenço Marques* with a working permit or '*chapa do trabalho*.' Today, the informal markets are

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<sup>111</sup> Fanon, Frantz. 2004. *The wretched of the earth*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York, New York: Grove Press.

still limited to the *Polana Caniço* area. Those who venture into *Polana Cimento* are subjected to harassment, arrested, and having their products confiscated by the police.

Mia Couto, a writer hailing from Mozambique with Portuguese ancestry, disclosed in an interview to filmmaker Tânia Reis Alves that,

I was born in Beira, a city where no one had to explain to me what colonialism was. I knew, and I did not know. I knew because in my city, colonialism was such an evident thing that when in 1972 I came to *Lourenço Marques*, I thought I had arrived in another country. In Beira, there was a clear desire to impose on social relations and space the same social and racial hierarchy. It was necessary to divide the city first by distancing Africa, Africa had to stay away, then to inscribe this colonial order in urban space, where first came the rich whites, then the poorer whites, then the neighborhoods of Indians, Chinese, Mulattos, and then assimilated blacks. And only this racial and social mapping already showed anyone who crossed the city and was attentive that there were several cities within the city (Reis Alves, 2017, 41).<sup>112</sup>

Moreover, Mia Couto states that

I think that to this day, there is an idea in some circles in Portugal that the Portuguese were less racist than other peoples and that Portugal created a very special system [*racial exceptionalism*]. This has some truth to it, but not entirely. Indeed, racism permeated Mozambique, and I myself bore witness to its pernicious presence on the bus and at school. We all knew that the rear seats on the bus were designated for the individuals of Black ethnicity. In high school, there were hundreds of us, but only four or five young black students who were forbidden to speak their languages. In college, I had maybe 200 classmates, and there were only six or seven black students. Among the limited number of African-descent classmates that I had, some expressed their desire to reside nearer the university. However, this was unviable due to racism and housing discrimination that prevailed in the region, as no homeowner would consider renting their space to a black person, despite possessing exemplary linguistic and intellectual proficiencies. To this extent, the segregation in *Lourenço Marques* was the most severe (Reis Alves 2017, pp.41-42)<sup>113</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup> Translations: Natalina Monteiro

<sup>113</sup> Alves, Tânia R. 2017. *A minha pátria é Moçambique*. 1st ed. Cacém, Lisboa: Guerra & Paz.

In 1974, the Portuguese regime collapsed due to the infeasibility of fighting three unwinnable wars simultaneously in three different countries: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. The Carnation Revolution, also known as *Revolução dos Cravos*<sup>114</sup> or *25 Abril*, marked the end of the authoritative Estado Novo regime and over 500-year-old Portuguese colonial empire. Military officers successfully initiated this left-leaning military uprising in Lisbon on April 25, 1974. The Carnation Revolution ushered in a profound consequence: the rapid withdrawal of Portuguese administrative and military personnel from its overseas colonies. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of Portuguese Africans returned to Portugal, including workers, small businesspeople, and farmers, who had deep roots in the former colonies and came to be known as *'retornados.'*

The downfall of the Portuguese empire exposed the white minorities regime of South Africa and Rhodesia. The Johannesburg Star wrote there will undoubtedly be profound changes in Southern Africa, leaving South Africa and Rhodesia increasingly isolated (April 25, 1974). South Africa's white apartheid regime wished that the young Portuguese officers manage to hold on to power (Star, 1974, 2)<sup>115</sup>. However, on July 27, 1974, 'the governor-general and cabinet of Portugal's East African territory of Mozambique resigned. Henrique Soares de Melo resigned Thursday after he was told Portuguese President António de Spínola had decided to name a military junta to rule

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<sup>114</sup> The Carnation Revolution got its name from the fact that almost no shots were fired and from restaurant worker Celeste Caeiro offering carnations to the soldiers when the population took to the streets to celebrate the end of the dictatorship, with other demonstrators following suit and carnations placed in the muzzles of guns and on the soldiers' uniforms. In Portugal, 25 April is a national holiday--*Dia da Liberdade*, Freedom Day that commemorates the revolution.

<sup>115</sup> The Montreal Star. 1974. "Mercenaries Threaten African Freedom Fighters." *The Montreal Star* (Montreal, D1-D18 edition), August 7, 1974, 2.  
<https://www.newspapers.com/image/740549083/?terms=%20Mozambique%20&match=1>.

Mozambique in his place, a government. Unofficial reports said General Carlos Galvão de Melo, a member of the group of young officers that ousted Premier Marcello Caetano in the April 25 military revolt, would be named head of the junta in Mozambique' (Arizona Republic 1974)<sup>116</sup>. Samora Machel unequivocally rejected Spinola's bid to retain power in Mozambique; cognizant of Portugal's weakened bargaining position, Machel categorically refused to entertain the prospect of a referendum and remained steadfast in his commitment to Frelimo's concerted efforts until Portugal acceded to all their demands (Mosse and Fauvet 2003, 22)<sup>117</sup>. On the 9th of September 1974, the Birmingham Evening Mail reported that:

Portugal had instructed its armed forces to reinstate order in the capital of Mozambique, *Lourenço Marques*, as Right-wing dissidents had set up encampments at the country's central radio station. Before this announcement, the Government had released a statement detailing the difficulty troops were having in advancing against the group, as women and children were being detained as hostages. The Right-wing group, known as the Dragons of Death, led by a collective of ex-servicemen, took control of the radio station and placed armed guards at the city's airport and post office within hours of the signing of the Lusaka agreement, which set June 25th of the coming year as the day for Mozambique's independence and established a transitional government led by the Mozambican Liberation Front, Frelimo<sup>118</sup>.

The articles further articulated that in opposition to the agreement, the Conservative faction commenced broadcasting disapproving statements. Responding to this, General Costa Gomes relayed a message over the

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<sup>116</sup> The Arizona Republic. 1974. "Mozambique Chief forced to resign." *Arizona Republic* (Phoenix, Saturday Edition edition), July 27, 1974.

<sup>117</sup> Mosse, Marcelo, and Paul Fauvet. 2003. *Carlos Cardoso: Telling the Truth in Mozambique*. Cape Town, Western Cape: Double Storey.

<sup>118</sup> Birmingham Evening Mail. 1974. "Army is Ordered to Quell Revolt." *Birmingham Evening Mail* (Birmingham, Evening edition edition), September 09, 1974, 8.

Portuguese national broadcast, declaring that the administration and militant forces, *Movimento das Forças Armadas*, will dismiss any endeavors which might bifurcate the community and result in self-destructive behavior. He culminated his statement by indicating that Portugal would abstain from deploying any supplementary troops to this region<sup>126</sup>.

Undoubtedly, the incident laid the groundwork for the protracted 15-year conflict between Frelimo and RENAMO, the latter enjoying backing from former Portuguese military personnel, Rhodesia, and the reprehensible regime of Apartheid South Africa. The independence of Mozambique had a dramatic impact on its powerful next-door neighbor, South Africa, and Rhodesia. It significantly changed the last two white supremacist regimes in Southern Africa.

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<sup>126</sup> Birmingham Evening Mail. 1974. "Army is Ordered to Quell Revolt." *Birmingham Evening Mail* (Birmingham, Evening edition), September 09, 1974, 8.

## Chapter 4: Postcolonial Race Politics: The Same Old Wine in a New Bottle.

The rich man's dog gets more in the way of vaccination, medicine, and medical care than do the workers upon whom the rich man's wealth is built (Samora Moses Machel).

As described in the preceding chapter, Salazar and the Portuguese colonial authorities endeavored to erase blackness and Africanness as part of their racecraft during colonialism. Notwithstanding the assertion that the colonies or territories constituted a single nation, colorism was pivotal in shaping race, fostering racial discrimination, and promoting racial capitalism in the colonies. As the Portuguese fled after independence, a great number of Black Mozambicans laid claim to vacated houses and flats in the segregated Lourenço Marques. The Black Mozambicans could take possession of the *Polana Cimento*, the center of the colonial power. During an interview with Kaita, she articulated that:

When I was seven years old, Milú was nine, our parents moved to *Polana Cimento* after the Portuguese left. Many homes were left vacant, and we were fortunate enough to find one that had not yet been claimed. My father secured the locks and windows to the point where we had essentially claimed it as our own by the time the Frelimo and the *Grupos Dinamizadores de Residência Local* arrived in Maputo (Personal communication Maputo, December 10, 1999, February 5, 2005).

### Frelimo: State Building-Day-by-Day

With the emergence of an independent Mozambique, FRELIMO endeavored to establish a comprehensive infrastructure, sophisticated bureaucracy, and an egalitarian government that catered to the needs of its populace. In stark contrast, the Portuguese, as previously stated, had neglected to foster Mozambique's development. Mozambique



has transitioned from a colonial state to modernity. The FRELIMO party was responsible for establishing judiciaries, enacting laws, devising and implementing public policies, establishing police headquarters, and providing social services, hospitals, and schools within the territory. These endeavors were accomplished despite the formidable challenge of widespread illiteracy among the population.

Furthermore, Machel and FRELIMO were required to cultivate a sense of national solidarity. Machel aimed to grasp the needs and wants of Mozambique's people. On May 24th, 1975, Machel initiated a majestic expedition throughout Mozambique from Ruvuma River--*Rio Rovuma* marking the frontier between Tanzania and Mozambique, progressing to Maputo. Machel traversed nearly 2,000 miles, a duration of roughly one month; as he marched, he disseminated speeches to massive crowds and expounded FRELIMO's policies, elucidating to the Mozambican public what the future would hold for peasants and rural villagers (personal communication, Carlos Cardoso, Maputo, January 20, 1998; see also Reis Alves, 2017, and Iain Christie, 1989)<sup>119</sup>.

The FRELIMO government undertook the task of replacing the capitalist racist and white supremacist colonial regime with Afro-Marxism. The government nationalized and prohibited private enterprises, created collective farms, and adopted centralized planning. Within five years of achieving independence (1975-1980), the FRELIMO Government achieved some level of economic prosperity and political stability.

The developmental initiatives were structured around FRELIMO's vision of Dynamic Action Groups, referred to as the *Grupos Dinamizadores* (Christie 1989, 132). These groups, comprising of politically minded grassroots committees, were

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<sup>119</sup> See also Tânia Reis Alves, 2017, 17 and Iain Christie, 1989, 90.

democratically elected in various settings such as factories or workgroups (*Grupos Dinamizadores de Local de Trabalho*), and urban settlements (*Grupos Dinamizadores de Local de Residência*). To enhance productivity by reducing absenteeism, helping management with the workforce, preventing theft, and overseeing weekly meetings or *Sessões de Esclarecimento semanais*; these sessions provided a space to discuss issues and newly emerging production problems. 'Dynamizing Workgroups were established in all types of enterprises, including commercial, industrial, service-oriented, and public departments' (K. Machieie, Personal communication, October 25, 2005).

In every neighborhood of cities, Dynamizing Groups in Residences were established to organize locals in various collective tasks. These included street surveillance (before the police were organized), upkeep of cleanliness and hygiene, adult literacy, and the creation of consumption cooperatives. The leaders of these groups were selected by the most active militants and acted as liaisons between the Party Headquarters in each city.

However, in 1978, these Dynamizing Workgroups were replaced by authentic FRELIMO cells, which had already transformed into a Marxist-Leninist political party. At the same time, there were also Vigilance Groups aimed at exposing and censuring (or stopping) attempts at economic sabotage (Edison C., personal communication Maputo, October 14, 1999). FRELIMO Party's mission was to guide, organize, educate, and lead the masses, transforming the popular mass movement into a potent tool for overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism. Consequently, RENAMO and Rhodesia was specifically trained to target symbols of state development such as schools, health posts,

and public civil servants rather than engaging the army. By the mid-1980s, the Mozambique economy was in dire straits.

During this period, the informal economy emerged as a response to the war economy and the state's inability to deliver the promise of people-based development. The government budget was oriented majorly towards military defense due to the war, rendering it unable to fulfill the people's needs. Nevertheless, Machel said.

We refuse to remain eternal suppliers of raw materials. We refuse to allow the old colonial relations to remain. . . . We refuse to participate in the international division of labor in a subordinate position, paying increasingly for finished products and selling our labor power for less and less. (Machel, 1979)<sup>120</sup>.

The state sought self-reliant development and egalitarian socioeconomic policies, with the government involved in all aspects of the political and socioeconomic landscape of the country. The state transformed large estates into state farms and embraced cooperative agriculture, like Nyerere's approach in Tanzania. The FRELIMO government consequently embarked on a major transformation of the national economy. State farms and cooperatives were central to their rural development strategy. The government adopted an Eastern-European model of rapid industrialization to modernize the agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation sectors.

In 1977, FRELIMO's Third Party Congress established a quasi-planned socialist economy intending to address the economic distortions and social inequality that were bequeathed by colonialism. Subsequently, a ten-year plan, named, The Central Planning Phase, *Plano Prospectivo Indicativo--PPI*, was sanctioned in 1980. This strategy sought

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<sup>120</sup> Christie, Iain. 1989. *Samora Machel, a Biography*. New Jersey, New Jersey: Panaf an imprint of Zed press.

to bring about a speedy and premeditated expansion using socialist economic reforms that would promote growth while ensuring equity. FRELIMO discouraged the Mozambicans from partaking in the capitalist mode of production. Carlos Cardoso stated that "informal trading economies were not permitted, as they were deemed to be a venture of capitalism and an adversary of our nation" (C. Cardoso, Personal communication, Maputo, December 15, 1997). FRELIMO's Afro-Marxist government wanted to achieve economic parity and sustainable development.

The postcolonial project in Mozambique was unable to attain full fruition, as Frelimo's espousal of Marxism-Leninism in 1977 this was followed by the eruption of the war of destabilization. Thus, Frelimo was compelled to forsake its aspirations of constructing an idiosyncratic political, financial, and socioeconomic ideology for the recently emancipated country. Following independence, recounted Machado, a university student stated:

the keys to Mozambique's kingdom were bestowed upon us, the Black people. Our land, our homes, and our streets were rightfully ours to claim. One could freely venture into the city without fear of being assaulted or detained for lacking a working permit. We had achieved a level of liberation that enabled me to sit and bask in the park of Jardim Miramar, swaying gloriously on the swings for the very first time in my life (A. Machado Personal communication, Maputo, June 5, 2005).

Machado's recollection of his jubilant emotions and newfound mobility marked a transition in his life. There was a shift from the colonial racial discrimination to postcolonial Africanization (J. Pierre 2013, 38)<sup>121</sup>. Frelimo, similarly, to other African nations upon

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<sup>121</sup> Pierre, Jemima. 2013. *The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race*. Chicago and London, IL: University of Chicago Press.

reaching their independence, was responsible for state 'racecraft' (Pierre, 2013: 39)<sup>122</sup>. Moreover, Pierre astutely posits that 'colonialism assumed two distinct forms: one, a "civil society" grounded in principles of civil and human rights (available only to the European colonial rules); the other, a society based on custom and culture (available only to the nativized subject)' (Pierre 2013, 40)<sup>123</sup>. However, Mozambique was not allowed to establish a postcolonial racial consciousness. Two years after their independence, the administration encountered both internal and external perils. Ultimately, these issues culminated in a 15-year war sponsorship by Rhodesia, South Africa, the United States, Portugal, and other Western associates.

Internationally, Mozambique has endured continued discrimination and oppression in the guise of combatting communism in the Southern African region. With the backing of the United States, the apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia have aggressively sought to perpetuate white supremacist racial power that has been inextricably enmeshed within the colonial state for four centuries.

In an interview conducted with Ishmael

My father, a simple peasant farmer, was always paid less than white farmers for his crops. He found himself in a difficult situation when questioned by the Portuguese administration about the quality of his cotton, which resulted in him being beaten and thrown into jail. As a result, his land was confiscated by the colonial authorities and given to a white farmer. Desperate to find a new home, he fled to Tanzania and joined Frelimo. However, after independence, he and many other FRELIMO sympathizers had to flee their homes due to RENAMO's violent attacks. After the Portuguese left, we believed we were finally liberated. But soon, we realized it was just an illusion. South Africa and Rhodesia still seek to subjugate us, akin to the ways

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 39

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, 40

of the Portuguese (Ishmael P. personal communication, Maputo September 22, 2006).

The Mozambicans' racial consciousness was linked with anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements. Mozambique is but one among the many battlegrounds that was a victim to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. This war was fought for the noble cause of self-determination, state formation, and the Africanization of Mozambique. It was a consequential war, fought to ensure the self-governance of the Black Mozambicans over their own land and to secure their rightful place in the global history.

#### Anti-Blackness and the Regimes of White Supremacy in South Africa and Rhodesia

From 1956 to 1975, Africa witnessed various wars against colonialism. The White Europeans had denied the Black Africans the right to rule themselves for over 500 years through their racist and supremacist global agenda (*The Miami Herald* 1977)<sup>124</sup>. The wars of self-determination in Southern Africa were race conflicts orchestrated by Western countries. The hegemonic narrative created by these countries portrayed these battles for liberty as anti-communist wars while secretly supporting opposition groups against the newly emerging countries. They were determined to exploit natural resources and secure their economic gain. The resulting strife led to brutal civil wars in several newly formed African states. Angola, for instance, suffered a prolonged civil war from 1975 to 2002, beginning with the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) fighting against the rebels, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União*

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<sup>124</sup> Miami News. 1984. "Mozambican refugees bury their Dead on Run." *Miami News* (Miami), May 14, 1984, 13.

*Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* or UNITA). UNITA was sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the white apartheid regime of South Africa, and the military government in Brazil. The conflict between the MPLA and UNITA persisted for a period of 27 years.

The Mozambican Civil War transpired for a duration of fifteen years, between May 30, 1977, and October 4, 1992, in the southern African region of Mozambique; despite being seemingly an internal militia disturbance, it constituted a proxy war with the Soviet Union, an ally in support of the Mozambican government (FRELIMO) and the United States, a contributor of assistance to insurgents, with reinforcement from the South African white Apartheid regime and the white Rhodesian government of Ian Smith. The conflict sparked two years after Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal. FRELIMO, led by President Samora Machel, centralized the government; on the other hand, the Mozambican National Resistance, led by André Matsangaissa, led an opposition party. Race and racism were disregarded and rejected in southern African scholars' pursuit of countering communism during these two wars in former Portuguese colonies. In Portugal, the destabilization war in Mozambique was perceived as a conflict between brethren, and Mozambicans against Mozambicans. The media, Rádio Televisão Portuguesa and the local Portuguese newspaper, engaged in a smear campaign against Frelimo. They claimed that even staunch supporters of the ruling party were at odds with fellow constituents who held divergent opinions and those who grew disillusioned with the country's independence. Moreover, the regional regimes characterized by blatant racism,

from Rhodesia and South Africa, exacerbated the tension and contributed to the conflict (Diário de Notícias, 1977, 3)<sup>125</sup>.

The historical context of the war dates to 1976, when the Rhodesian army invaded Mozambique to conduct operations targeting the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which had established bases in Mozambican territory. André Matsangaissa, an ex-FRELIMO official who had been arrested and confined, was released by the white Rhodesian army, after which he joined RENAMO, which was founded in 1975 to counter FRELIMO<sup>126</sup> (See also St Louis Post-Dispatch, 1986, 9)<sup>127</sup>.

In Europe, the Portuguese propagandists accused Frelimo, the 'non-democratic' government, of obstructing Rhodesia's passage to the Indian Ocean. The news media (*Diário de Notícias* and *Radio Difusão Portuguesa-RDP & RTP*) have commented that Frelimo instigated the war with Rhodesia (Reis Alves 2017, 16). Moreover, Reis Alves reported that Rhodesia had neither invaded nor declared war on Mozambique. She contends that Rhodesia, under the governance of Prime Minister Ian Smith, did not engage in aerial attacks on Mozambique (2017, pp.16-17). It is a well-known fact that the Smith administration offered military backing to RENAMO and Afonso Dhlakama to destabilize and topple the Frelimo administration<sup>128</sup>. Over the course of almost 15 years, RENAMO wrought havoc and destruction upon all manner of infrastructure-from roads,

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<sup>125</sup> <https://www.dn.pt/edicao-do-dia.html>.

<sup>126</sup> By Robin Wright, and Special to The Washington Post. 1976. "Rhodesia Denies Its Troops Invaded Mozambique." The Washington Post (1974-), 1976.

<sup>127</sup> See also The Daily Telegraph 1984, 4 & *The Miami Herald* 1977: 1 & 28A.

<sup>128</sup> Detroit Free Press. 1989. "Crack Troops and Refugees Populate Southern African Lifeline." (Detroit, Monday edition), October 30, 1989, 14.



hospitals, and schools, to railroads. The land, especially the rural areas bordering Rhodesia, namely Manica, Tete, and Chimoio, underwent a dramatic transformation into a vast and desolate wasteland, consumed by raging fires<sup>129</sup>.

Over one million Mozambicans perished in the violent conflict or succumbed to starvation as their food supplies were disrupted. Women endured rape, and tens of thousands of children were rendered orphans; a further five million were displaced throughout the region.

Maputo was besieged, and we were left without sustenance; we were confined and unable to undertake even basic agricultural work on the *machambas*. RENAMO would arrive and seize our provisions, our water, and all other necessities. Many women were subjected to rape; their bodies were then abandoned for the wild dogs to prey upon. We were wholly insignificant in their eyes. As long as I live, I shall never cast my vote in favor of the RENAMO's party. Though they profess to set themselves apart from the rebels, the very name [RENAMO] proclaims the truth to me (T. Rodriguês, personal communication, Maputo, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1998).

In 1980, Rhodesia attained independence and became Zimbabwe; consequently, the support for RENAMO was terminated, and the onus was shifted onto the white supremacist regime in South Africa. FRELIMO relinquished its support for RENAMO and instead extended its assistance to the African National Congress (ANC) in their endeavor to dislodge the last vestiges of the white supremacist government prevailing in Southern Africa (The Philadelphia Inquirer, 1984, 6).<sup>130</sup> Nonetheless, the fortification of the ANC through FRELIMO's backing had the effect of intensifying the turmoil in Mozambique. In

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<sup>129</sup> Robinson, Randall. 1987. "Helms, Dole on Wrong Side of Mozambique Debate." *The Olympian* (Olympia), August 16, 1987, 11.

<sup>130</sup> The Philadelphia Inquirer. 1984. "Despite animosity Mozambique begins talks with South Africa." *The Philadelphia Inquirer* (Philadelphia), January 14, 1984, 6.

the year of 1984, an astounding number of five million people were displaced, signifying the most severe crisis of similar nature ever to be recorded (Miami News, 1984:13)<sup>131</sup>.

The White supremacist right-wing in the United States viewed Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa as kindred spirits in terms of their foreign policy that was hostile towards Black people and communism. The ideology of white supremacy infiltrated the United States' foreign policy. Throughout the Cold War, the United States endeavored to exert its influence over worldwide events. Willoughby-Herard asserts that 'a racial attack on black people sits at the heart of global affairs (2015, 167)<sup>132</sup>. In addition, Willoughby-Herard contends that the strategic interests of the United States in South Africa, framed as a "civilizing mission" that strengthened the Anglo-American partnership, occasioned the establishment of an order both harmonious and stable, which sustained the principle of white supremacy while claiming that they both are concerned with racial equality (Willoughby-Herard 2015, 168).<sup>133</sup> Du Bois contended that a discernible analogy existed between white control in South Africa and the American South. The South proffered a blueprint to South Africa in terms of utilizing terror and violence to safeguard the white supremacy. It is inescapable that in both South Africa and the United States, professed devotion to justice by the white man was merely an empty, vacuous rhetoric<sup>134</sup>.

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<sup>131</sup> Miami News. 1984. "Mozambican refugees bury their Dead on Run." *Miami News* (Miami), May 14, 1984, 13.

<sup>132</sup> Willoughby-Herard, Tiffany. 2015. *Waste of a White Skin: The Carnegie Corporation and the Racial Logic of White Vulnerability*. Oakland, California: University of California Press.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 168

<sup>134</sup> Thomas J. N., Briton, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa, 1879-1914 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1978), 133.

The United States once again put forth a hollow and vapid thesis, that of self-rule. The United States government purports to champion democratic values and self-determination, ostensibly fostering a government that is derived from the people and for the people. However, the notion of autonomy was solely extended to the privileged, chiefly those of white European descent in South Africa, North America, and Europe, while neglecting members of the Black community both in Africa and the diaspora. President Truman asserted,

. . . every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way to life is based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free institutions. . . . The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority (Kinzer 2014, 81)<sup>135</sup>.

Truman's secondary assertion accurately depicts the situation that had been prevalent in Southern Africa for four centuries. Throughout this time, a minority of white individuals forced their will onto the black majority, leading to oppression, slavery, forced labor, and economic exploitation. The US government used terror and supported oppressive regimes that were against anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-neoliberalism. Per the Truman Doctrine (Kinzer 2014, 81)<sup>136</sup>, the United States supported those who resisted external forces or minority groups seeking to subjugate them. However, the war of destabilization in Mozambique challenges this principle, as an extremist minority guerrilla group known as RENAMO--who was responsible for carrying out brutal attacks, killing, raping, dismembering, and kidnapping child soldiers in Manica and Tete. This was done

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid, 81

<sup>136</sup> Kinzer, Stephen. 2014. *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War*. New York, New York: St. Martin's Publishing Group.

with the support of foreign forces such as South Africa, Portugal, Rhodesia, and the right-wing Congress of the United States.

### Peace Talks: Mozambique and South Africa

White ruled South Africa and one of its harshest critics, Marxist Mozambique; yesterday began the first of a series of high-level talks on economic and security issues (The Philadelphia Inquirer 1984, 6).

The United States Department of State improved its diplomatic relations with the government of Mozambique in 1983, following a shift in international policy that had led to Mozambique's accepting peace talks with the white Apartheid South Africa (Detroit Free Press 1983, 11)<sup>137</sup>. In March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the N'Komati Non-Aggression Pact, which validated US policy in southern Africa. By October 1985, US-Mozambican relations had improved considerably. This was evidenced by President Reagan's hosting of Samora Machel later that same month, where they met to strengthen ties between the US and Mozambique<sup>138</sup>.

Machel also appealed for economic assistance to aid his war-torn country and went so far as to address Reagan as "*meu amigo Ronaldo*" or "my friend Ronald." United States aid to Mozambique increased from 1985 to 1990 under Machel's successor-- Joaquim Chissano. The US provided Mozambique with a substantial grant of \$100 million dollars--making Mozambique the largest recipient of US aid in southern Africa at the time (The Los Angeles Times 1985, 20)<sup>139</sup>. However, the State Department's support of

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<sup>137</sup> Detroit Free Press and Remer Tyson. 1989. "Mozambique Peace Action Stalls." *Detroit Free Press* (Detroit), July 23, 1989, 5.

<sup>138</sup> Mannion, Christopher. 1984. "South Africa quick to act after accord with Mozambique." *The Daily Telegraph* (Johannesburg), March 19, 1984, 4.

<sup>139</sup> Los Angeles Times. 1985. "Delivering Food to Mozambican Poor is a risky Business." *Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles), July 19, 1985, 20.

Mozambique proved unpopular with US right-wing organizations, like the Heritage Foundation and some Republicans in Congress, who believed that the State Department was endorsing a regime that at its core, remained Marxist (The Washington Times 1988; Los Angeles Times, 1985, 2).<sup>140</sup>

There was a movement in the United States aimed at discrediting the mounting opposition against the white fascist-apartheid regime of South Africa. Oakland Tribune, assessing the situation in South Africa as increasingly challenging for Americans to judge the situation in South Africa accurately because growing U.S. racism toward the white Afrikaners is bedeviling any reasonable assessment (Rhodie 1986, 23)<sup>141</sup>. It is quite ironic that Rhodie, in his assessment, brands the anti-apartheid campaign as racist, while overlooking the bigotry of white Afrikaners. Moreover, Rhodie writes that former 'President Pieter W. Botha's National Party is being beaten over the head with sanctions, divestiture and threats of international isolation.' Rhodie asserts that the American populace has been deceived regarding the belief that solely white possess the privilege to vote. He affirms that this notion is in fact erroneous, as both Coloreds and Indians are entitled to cast their ballots for the same parliamentary authority. Rhodie inquires why no protest or divestment has been initiated against Liberia, where President Samuel Doe rigged the election during the preceding year. He further ponders, why must the public be misled about South Africa being the solitary state that debars non-whites from citizenship, land ownership, and voting through constitutional decree?

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<sup>140</sup> | *ibid*, 2

<sup>141</sup> Rhodie, Eachel. 1986. "Botha is serious about reforms in South Africa." *Oakland Tribune* (Oakland), July 20, 1986, 23

Rhodie was accompanied by none other than Patrick Buchanan, a political commentator, paleoconservative American, and well-known politician. Buchanan contributed an article to the *Chicago Tribune*, asserting that President Carter lost South Africa due to his support for what Buchanan referred to as "terrorists"--namely, the African National Congress. Additionally, Buchanan opposed President Carter's plan for Namibia and Rhodesia, insisting that it bore a striking resemblance to the Kissinger plan devised for South Vietnam. Most notably, Buchanan was disheartened by the decision of the Carter administration to halt the progression of South African army troops, who invaded Angola and were close to the capital of Angola, Luanda. With the withdrawal of troops, Buchanan contended that 'by pulling out, they also pulled the roasting chestnuts of Agostinho Neto, resident Russian puppet, out of the fire' (*Chicago Tribune*, 1979, 3)<sup>142</sup>.

In 1979, Jeffery Hart, a journalist at the *Lebanon Daily News* in Pennsylvania, completely agreed with Harvard President Derek Bok's decision not to divest from South Africa. Hart argued that were he the president of Harvard, he would double the university's investment in South Africa. Despite recognizing that Apartheid was an unsightly system, he believed its foremost enemies to be prosperity and modernization. According to Hart, when forced to choose between racial prejudices and profitability, the majority of white individuals would opt for the latter. Moreover, according to Hart, South Africa is not viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in contrast to Cuba. If Cubans attempt to enter Rhodesia, they will confront the South African military. Therefore, the military and economic power of South Africa now serves as the representation of Western interests in

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<sup>142</sup> Buchanan, Patrick J. 1979. "Carter losing South Africa." *Chicago Tribune* (Chicago), April 19, 1979, 3.

the region. According to Hart, South Africa was a front-line nation during the Cold War and a key obstacle to Soviet ambitions in Africa. While opinions on apartheid and its American supporters were framed in the context that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' (Hart 1979, 4)<sup>143</sup>.

Mozambique faced a variety of challenges during the period of Machel to Chissano's leadership. Machel's appeal for economic assistance was answered with mixed support, as the US increased aid to Mozambique but encountered opposition from certain American organizations and individuals who considered Mozambique's Marxist core incompatible with American values. This controversy highlights the divisive nature of Cold War politics, which saw countries take sides based on their political ideology. However, it is important to note that this was just one aspect of a larger geopolitical struggle taking place in southern Africa. In particular, the fight against apartheid in South Africa was at the forefront of international attention. Rhodie's assessment, as quoted in the text, was not without its own biases and misconceptions. The anti-apartheid campaign was not racist, but rather sought to address the systemic oppression faced by Black South Africans. Furthermore, Rhodie's portrayal of the National Party as a victim of international pressure ignores the human rights abuses perpetrated by the apartheid regime.

To sum up, although Mozambique received assistance and backing from the US during a challenging time, it was merely a small part of a bigger picture in southern Africa. US aid to Mozambique exemplifies the intricacies of Cold War politics and neoliberal policies. However, it's crucial to consider the racial capitalism, white supremacy and

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<sup>143</sup> Hart, Jeffery. 1979. "South African Dis-Investment." *Lebanon Daily News* (Lebanon), May 15, 1979, 4.

patriarchy, as well as economic exploitation still influence the contemporary world's predicaments.

Chapter five focuses on the relationship between politics, economy, and race in Southern Africa. The text highlights the influence of the Washington Consensus, which promotes free-market principles in line with neoliberal and white supremacist ideologies. Backed by the Frelimo government, this philosophy encouraged people in the region to adopt capitalistic principles instead of African socialism,<sup>144</sup> which aligns more closely with the Western world.

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<sup>144</sup> African socialism or Afro-socialism is a belief in sharing economic resources in a traditional African way, as distinct from classical socialism. Many African politicians of the 1950s and 1960s professed their support for African socialism, although definitions and interpretations of this term varied considerably. These politicians include Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Modibo Keita of Mali, among others.



## Chapter 5: Racial and International Political Economy of Southern Africa

You are proud of your *lumières*, but what use are they to you, and what use would they be to the Hottentot?<sup>145</sup> . . . If, disembarking on his shores, you proposed to lead him towards a more civilized life, to customs that seem to you preferable his, you might be excused. But you have landed in his country to take it from him. You have approached his hut to expel him, to replace him, if you can, by an animal that works under the farmer's lash<sup>146</sup>.

Most of the Western press dubbed the conflict in Mozambique as a fraternal civil war (*Correio da Manhã*, 1979; Reis Alves, 2016)<sup>147</sup>, yet for the Mozambicans it represented a harrowing war of destabilization. During the conflict, which lasted from 1977 to 1992, the country's economy succumbed to implosion, and its productivity dwindled. Mozambique was subjected to one of the most atrocious and gruesome warfare scenarios of modern times, where non-combatants were subjected to the amputation of their limbs, children were coerced into armed conflicts and even compelled to execute their parents and kin, pregnant women were disemboweled and other heinous crimes against humanity. Such warfare brought about colossal poverty, economic downturn, and psychological distress. Such conflict mirrored a racist proxy war that was financed by the United States<sup>148</sup> and the previous colonial powers of Great Britain, Portugal, and the

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<sup>145</sup> Hottentot is a term that was historically used to refer to the Khoekhoe, indigenous nomadic pastoralists of South Africa.

<sup>146</sup> Raynal, Guillaume- T., ed. 1981 [1781]. *Historie philosophique et politique des Deux Indes*. 3rd ed. Paris, France: Yves Benot-Maspero., pp.53-4

<sup>147</sup> Alves, Tânia R. 2017. *A minha pátria é Moçambique*. Lisboa, Portugal: Guerra & Paz.

<sup>148</sup> Robinson, Randall. 1987. "Don't back the Renamo guerrillas." *Oakland Tribune* (Oakland), August 18, 1987, 26.

Federal Republic of Germany. The coalition reinforced a minority white supremacist apartheid regime emanating from South Africa.

The Western powers, under the tutelage of the Nixon and Reagan administrations, along with the majority leader, Jesse Alexander Helms, portrayed the racial conflict in Southern Africa as one against communism<sup>149</sup>. Under the guise of securing freedom, democracy, and a capitalist market economy, the colonizers and global white supremacists engaged in this war. As aptly put by Mills, 'Race is but a shadowy presence.' He further opines that 'race is merely a void' (Mills 1998, 97)<sup>150</sup>.

Growing up in Portugal, I was highly cognizant of the racial jokes and the language utilized by the white Portuguese, the *retornados* (the settler colonialists) hailing from Portugal, Afrikaners, and White Rhodesians. These insensitive jokes referred to Black Mozambicans and Samora Machel - leaders who had been forced to flee Mozambique - using derogatory terms. Despite fighting wars on three fronts, Machel emerged triumphant in the end, vanquishing Ian Smith, the leaders of Rhodesia, the South African Republic, and Portugal, namely Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha, António Oliveira Salazar, Marcelo de Caetano, and General António Spínola, as well as RENAMO insurgents' leader, Afonso Dhlakama, who had been a nemesis to Machel, attended to discredit him.

The Portuguese media painted Machel as a Soviet puppet and a slave to Fidel Castro, attempting to portray him as an illiterate "monkey" with an African accent who begged for the communist block's support. Notably, Machel, a trained nurse, was a

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<sup>149</sup> Robinson, Randall. 1987. "Helms, Dole on Wrong Side of Mozambique Debate." *The Olympian* (Olympia), August 16, 1987, 11.

<sup>150</sup> Mills, Charles W. 1998. *Blackness visible: essays on philosophy and race*. N.p.: Cornell University Press.

mastermind of military strategy. When his plane was shot down in October 1986, certain white *retornados* (returned) rejoiced and feted that event by extolling the day Agostinho Neto died in September 1979, claiming that there is a God after all, and the devil (Agostinho Neto) is on his way back to hell. However, the colonialist settlers were accused of taking everything away from them in Angola and Mozambique. It begs the question: what did they lose? What did they not deprive of the Africans initially? The racist settlers colonized a land and stole natural resources from the rightful inhabitants. Mondlane (1969)<sup>151</sup> explains how the fascist, white supremacist Portuguese government sought to lure its impoverished, unskilled, uneducated, and often illiterate citizens to seek a better life and unique perks (e.g., tax exemptions and free land) in the colonies, which resulted in great harm to Black Africans (Mondlane 1969, 25)<sup>152</sup>.

The war that ensued for the independence of the Portuguese colonies was brutal, and Portugal is yet to fully atone for the atrocities it committed during its colonialist period, specifically during the reign of the fascist, racist António Oliveira Salazar. The racist administration contravened all the liberal doctrines that Western societies dutifully uphold. Since achieving independence in 1975 via the FRELIMO, the government has replaced the white supremacist capitalist model with Afro-Marxism. The colonizers vacated in apprehension that the African 'savages' would kill them in their sleep. However, it was ironically these so-called "civilized" Europeans who demolished their own abodes and restrooms and filled pipes with cement to ensure that the 'savages' could not live a comfortable life in their homes.

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<sup>151</sup> Mondlane, Eduardo. 1969. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. London, United Kingdom: Penguin.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, 25

## A Racial War: White Supremacy from Washington, D.C., to Pretoria

Liberalism, an ideology rooted in global white supremacy, endeavors to reestablish the economic order worldwide after decolonization. Although liberalism's principles were initially extended to white individuals, it failed to confer equal merits to African people, resulting in the politicization of race. This system, in which Black individuals and those inhabiting Third World countries or former colonies were alienated as though they were living on a separate planet, is paradoxical with our world interconnectedness'<sup>153</sup>. Furthermore, Slobodian posits that,

Neoliberal thinkers, like *Machlup*, believe that democracy might have to be restricted for certain peoples to preserve stability and prosperity. Restricting political freedom, as commonly understood, was necessary under some circumstances to preserve economic freedom. Prominent neoliberals, including Milton Friedman, John Davenport, and Shenfield followed the logic by opposing universal suffrage in Southern Africa (Slobodian 2018, 150)<sup>154</sup>.

Mills contends that race as a political system is a particular mode of domination. This is what happened in the late 1970s and 1980s in southern Africa. Portugal refused to relinquish their colonies in Africa, even when the people from Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe demanded independence. The White apartheid regime of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia refused to relinquish power to the majority. The British economist William H. Hutt advocated for a colorblind market, albeit with a ballot system that emphasized black and white distinctions, then unequally distributed voting rights based on socioeconomic status. Hutt's limitations on

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<sup>153</sup> Slobodian, Quinn. 2018. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. London, U.K.: Harvard University Press.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, 151.

democracy reduced the possibility of economic protectionism and re-distribution<sup>155</sup>. Like Hutt, the German economist Wilhelm Röpke, espouses that 'to provide full political equality to the Black population would be to commit 'national suicide'<sup>156</sup>.

Lest it is forgotten, Röpke avidly espoused the perpetuation of white dominance in South Africa. President Machel's valiant quest for Black empowerment subsequently evolved into a global endeavor to eliminate white supremacy throughout southern Africa. It was on the 1st of July 1975 that President Machel declared *Luta Continua* (the struggle continues). In the fervor of Pan-Africanism, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Agostinho Neto of Angola, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Samora M. Machel of Mozambique and Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana rejected Prime Minister Ian Smith's terms of surrender of power to Rhodesia's Black majority<sup>157</sup>.

The Black leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the guerrilla struggle against the white minority regime in Rhodesia. The battle for liberation in Zimbabwe was a unifying cause. Machel exhibited a fervent determination to reshape Southern Africa by profoundly contributing to Zimbabwe's liberation from the oppressive regime of white supremacy in Rhodesia. Machel's declaration caused a great upheaval within the governments of Rhodesia, apartheid in South Africa, and even the Republican administration residing in Washington D.C. By allowing Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) freedom fighters to operate from its territory, Mozambique furthered its alliance

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid, 152

<sup>156</sup> Ibid, 154-155

<sup>157</sup> The Miami Herald. 1976. "Rhodesian Terms Rejected." *The Miami Herald* (Miami, A edition), September 27, 1976, A1 & A12.

with Machel. The Rhodesian and South African regimes labeled ZANLA and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), whom they considered "terrorist" and "communist" camps, and orchestrated combined operations to strike these groups within Mozambique and Zambia. These operations aimed to persuade FRELIMO to abandon its support of ZANLA. However, these strategies were ultimately ineffective, and as a result, the racist political system encompassing *de facto* and *de jure* white privilege and European domination in Southern Africa continued to persist.

Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa, in Pretoria, issued a statement confirming that the Rhodesian government executed the agreement they reached during their talks with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger the previous week. The Lusaka statement is hard to comprehend, therefore it is crucial for both the United States and British governments to clarify the confusion if a peaceful solution is to be accomplished<sup>158</sup>. Ian Smith had requested for an interim administration that would be evenly distributed amongst members of both the black and white populace, with the white population still able to retain a significant measure of influence and authority (The Miami Herald 1976, 1A)<sup>159</sup>.

In their relentless pursuit to control Southern Africa, Ian Smith and Rhodesian intelligence created RENAMO which aimed to destabilize Mozambique and eliminate FRELIMO and its potential threat to white supremacy and the existing white supremacist economic, political, social, and cultural systems. In 1980, Zimbabwe achieved its

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<sup>158</sup> The Miami Herald. 1976. "Rhodesian Terms Rejected." *The Miami Herald* (Miami, A edition), September 27, 1976, A1 & A12.

<sup>159</sup> The Miami Herald. 1976. "Rhodesian Terms Rejected." *The Miami Herald* (Miami, A edition), September 27, 1976, A1 & A12.

sovereignty, following which the white supremacist apartheid administration in Pretoria transferred guerrilla forces from Rhodesia to the South African Republic for training. Since the early 1980s, RENAMO emerged as a savage force that caused severe instability in the Afro-Marxist governance. Notably, the RENAMO insurgents were a mere tool of white supremacist regimes present in the United States and South Africa.

In 1980, the Mozambican State confronted with a tripartite challenge that intended to destabilize it- (a) a racial conflict, (b) unequal regional development, and (c) an economic downturn. FRELIMO's initial promise of development remained unrealized owing to several intrusions in Mozambican national affairs by countries like the United States, Germany, Portugal, Britain, and a Brazilian right-wing military regime, including South Africa (Austin 1994, 473-474)<sup>160</sup>.

Mozambique was embroiled in a Cold War and apartheid conflict that transformed it into a veritable battlefield. The struggle was mainly a racial contest. Ronald Reagan, a white supremacist, triumphed in the 1980 presidential elections in the United States. Both Thatcher and Reagan accused Mandela and the African National Congress (A.N.C.) of promoting communism and terror during the 1980s. Reagan's government placed Mandela and the A.N.C. on the list of notorious terrorists. The United States and British leaders viewed South Africa's apartheid as an ally while perceiving the opposing A.N.C. as an adversary with designs on propagating communism. In 1986, Reagan remarked that 'The South African government is under no obligation to negotiate the country's future

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<sup>160</sup> Austin, Kathi. 1994. "Invisible Crimes: U.S. Private Intervention in the War in Mozambique." *The Review of African Political Economy* 21, no. 61 (September): 473-474.

with any organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist tactics and violence to achieve it (Little, 2018)<sup>161</sup>.

Thatcher and Reagan's white supremacist regime injected millions of taxpayer dollars into apartheid South Africa to combat "communism" throughout southern Africa. South Africa emerged as a citadel against Afro-socialist governments, particularly in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola. The white supremacist regime enabled the FRELIMO government to retain a state of inequality and perpetuated white control in southern Africa. The ultimate objective was to dismantle the socialist ideal and demonstrate that socialism was only feasible in developed nations. (Saul 1986, 17)<sup>162</sup>. Furthermore, the regime of white supremacists in southern Africa was resolute in perpetuating the exploitation and subjugation of the African peoples. Consequently, race and racism were neglected and disparaged in the fight against communism. Influential figures such as Reagan, Thatcher, and Kissinger propagated the notion that the conflict was a battle between opposing ideologies; communism versus capitalism/neoliberalism, and that race was not a factor.

The Salisbury government, now known as Harare, claimed that the Soviet Union may proclaim victory due to their decisions to continue with the armed struggle. The Russians criticized Kissinger's mission, seeing it as an attempt to reinforce white minority regimes in Southern Africa. During his 10-day diplomatic shuttle in Africa, Kissinger frequently met with Kaunda and Nyerere, as well as Prime Minister Ian Smith and South

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<sup>161</sup>Little, Becky. 2020. "Why Nelson Mandela Was Viewed as a 'Terrorist' by the U.S. Until 2008." Biography. <https://www.biography.com/activists/nelson-mandela-terrorist-reagan-thatcher>.

<sup>162</sup> Saul, John. 1986. *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*. New York, New York: Monthly Review Press.



African Prime Minister Voster, but he excluded Mozambique and Angola since they were supported by the Soviet Union (*The Miami Herald* 1977, A1 & A 12)<sup>163</sup>.

In addition, mainstream scholars tend to hypothesize about balance-of-power politics, advocating for classical international law that upholds state sovereignty and enforces strict non-intervention policies. Yet, they make no attempt to censure the U.S. and British invasion of Third World countries in the name of democracy and women's liberation ironically enough, the U.S. Army is acknowledged as a champion of feminism. These scholars argue that the global economy is the foremost determinant of the character of global politics and that nothing else can rival it. However, the truth remains that key players in the global economic structures, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, have been engineered to uphold systems of global white supremacy (Pierre 2013)<sup>164</sup>.

The global political economy, it can be contended, is ensconced in a structure of both power and white supremacist hegemony. This arrangement raises two pivotal questions: firstly, who or what constitutes the wielders of power? Secondly, what are the politico-economic and socio-cultural consequences of the aforementioned state of affairs for Non-White populations hailing from regions of the Global South? The contentious issue of race, truth be told, is of prime consequence to international relations and the global political economy. It is an issue that has been repeatedly addressed as a

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<sup>163</sup> *The Miami Herald*. 1977. "Rhodesia Offers Voting to Shift rule to Blacks." November 25, 1977. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/627759410/?terms=Mozambique%27s%20war&match=1>.

<sup>164</sup> Pierre, Jemima. 2013. *The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race*. Chicago and London, IL: University of Chicago Press.

mainstream discourse since the emergence of the field of study following the World War I.

W.E.B Du Bois disseminated a famous article in the prestigious Foreign Affairs journal titled 'Worlds of Color' where he reiterated a prognosis that he had initially made more than two decades prior: 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line—the relation of the darker to lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America, and Islands of the sea' (Du Bois 1925, 423-44)<sup>165</sup>. However, several scholars now argue that imperial administration was one of the foremost concerns of early twentieth-century intellectuals studying global politics (Smith 2017, pp. 286-300)<sup>166</sup>. Nicola Phillips posits that the global political economy of globalization is arbitrated by two fundamental debates: (1) Which parties emerge victorious, and (2) which parties are at the receiving end of loss and disadvantage because of said structures (Smith 2017, 253-268)<sup>167</sup>. The writer remains silent on race. The ascendant dominion previously set forth by Europeans, which has since been appropriated by the white supremacist United States, has bequeathed onto us the existing distributions of heightened economic, political, and socio-cultural supremacy, now thoroughly besmirched with the taint of racial differentiation<sup>168</sup>.

Global white supremacy or race as a political system continues to frown against it.

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<sup>165</sup> Du Bois, W.E. B. 1925. "The New Negro--World of Color." *Foreign Affairs* 3 (3): 423-44.

<sup>166</sup> Smith, Steve. 2017. "Race in World Politics." In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, edited by John Baylis and Patricia Owens, 286-300. 7th ed. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid, pp.253-268

<sup>168</sup> Mills, Charles W. 1998. *Blackness visible: essays on philosophy and race*. p,98: Cornell University Press.

The academic mainstream often overlooks the significance of race, racism, and the process of racialization in the global economic system. Anthropology, International Political Economy, Global Studies, and Political Science fail to include race as a means of analysis while examining global economic structures. Consequently, Pierre and Beliso-De-Jesús aptly opine that this approach becomes an insurmountable obstacle to maintaining a continuous focus on the issue of racism<sup>169</sup>. Furthermore, Pierre and Beliso-De Jesús posit that 'conventional anthropology persists in sidestepping the scrutiny of race and the intricacies of racialization'<sup>170</sup>.

### Global white Supremacy and the International Political Economy

In the international political economy, race and racism are commonly treated as epiphenomenal, with no place in the economic, international relations, and political world system. The prevalent assumption is that Neoliberalism, capitalism, and the market economy are and should be entirely color-blind, and policies are established for the supposed "betterment" of all. However, I suggest implementing Charles W. Mills's (1998)<sup>171</sup> political system theory regarding race, as well as its action as a constituent of global white supremacy domination in the postcolonial and post-Civil War political economy. According to Mills, mainstream First World political philosophy barely recognizes the existence of race<sup>172</sup>. Additionally, Mills challenges the ideation of the

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<sup>169</sup> Pierre, Jemima. 2013. *The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race*. Chicago and London, IL: University of Chicago Press, 65-66.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid, 66

<sup>171</sup> Mills, Charles W. 1998. *Blackness visible: Essays on Philosophy and race*. N.p.: Cornell University Press

<sup>172</sup> Mills, Charles W. 1998. *Blackness visible: Essays on Philosophy and race*. pp.97-98. Cornell University Press.

marginalization of races and the underdeveloped nations, as though individuals who lack white pigmentation, inhabit an extraterrestrial sphere, rather than being an integral component of a singular planetary community which is inextricably bound and fundamentally influenced by the geographical region analyzed through the auspices of First World theory<sup>173</sup>.

In Mills' view, political philosophy - and I contend that it extends to the international political economy - has fostered an environment of 'intellectual segregation.'<sup>174</sup> Race is often disregarded as a sentimental idea and non-scientific support to rationalize Africa's economic malpractices. Theorists, such as globalists and neoliberalists, interrogate the occurrence of underdevelopment and penury. These theorists perceive the problem of poverty and imbalanced progress as effortlessly resolvable, contingent solely on the assent of the people from Global South. One must inquire as to which will is involved here. Is it the desire of the Global North, or the preference of the Global South? The onus falls upon the 'will' of the Global South. The underlying assumption is that neoliberalism is an economic doctrine grounded on life, autonomy, and possessions, and that racism contravenes the principles of liberal individualist ideology. Nevertheless, race remains an afterthought in such implementations. Let us examine the realm of international relations and international political economy. Here, we come across the purveyors of Realism, who are preoccupied with the perpetual quest for power among nations, a law that pervades the expanse of both space and time. The tenets of Race, much like those of discipline,

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid, 103

<sup>174</sup> Ibid, 110

decry a global political system devoid of cogitation and insignificant in nature. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the erudite scholars of international relations and international political economy exhibit no discernible inclination towards an analysis of imperialism<sup>175</sup>.

Mills contends that we must regard race as a political structure. We would approach this structure as a distinct means of subjugation, characterized by its exceptional norms dictating the dispensation of privileges and obligations, freedoms and responsibilities, its distinctive system of beliefs, and an internal, semi-autonomous reasoning which indelibly shapes law, culture, and awareness<sup>176</sup>. The Southern African conflicts were waged to uphold the 'European hegemony of the globe, a legacy that has bequeathed us with the racialized disposition of economic, political, and cultural might which presently prevails (Pierre and De Jesús 2020, 66).<sup>177</sup>

A world where global white supremacy controls most of the natural resources and continues to perpetuate a neoliberal economic system exploitatively. Austerity programs, and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), imposed via the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are tools of neocolonialism. These austerity programs have had dire consequences for the economy in Africa. These neoliberalism austerity programs are mechanisms that maintain neocolonialism in Africa. Neocolonialism continues to operate because race and critical work by African scholars is ignored in the global academic system.

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<sup>175</sup> Murphy, C. A. 1993. "International Institutions, Decolonization, and Development." *International Political Science Review* 14 (1): 71-80.

<sup>176</sup> *bid*, 85.

<sup>177</sup> Beliso-De Jesus, Aisha M., and Jemima Pierre. 2020. "Special Section: Anthropology of White Supremacy INTRODUCTION." *American Anthropologist* 122 (1): 65–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13351>.

Furthermore, colonial capitalism survives in the guise of white global supremacy as a political arrangement, and mainstream economic doctrines have failed to scrutinize it. As Mills expounds, 'not only in the conventional Marxist and liberal analyses of imperialism, but in a broader economism that neglects the role of race, where race appears dispensable to the liberal individual's ontology or to the class identification of laborers and capitalists<sup>178</sup>. Furthermore, Mills underscores that imperialism spawns a ubiquitous "White Power" that demonstrates an international complexion and matured into global dominance by the advent of World War I. Mills leverages Walter Rodney's proposition to reveal that, across the globe, individuals of white color possessed control over all facets of governance, finance, armed forces, and even cultural domains. The crux of White Power derives from the exercise of control in nonwhite domains, irrespective of their demographic composition or initial proprietors <sup>179</sup>.

Race, racial prejudice, and the ideology of white supremacy constitute key components in comprehending postcolonial Mozambique amidst the intertwined realities of prejudice, capitalism, global capitalism, structural adjustments, austerity programs, and global white supremacy. The indigenous peoples of Africa cannot be allowed to single-handedly dominate access to the continent's wealth of natural resources. Those nations that refrained from adopting Westernized approaches to modernization have experienced destabilization via acts of warfare, coups d'état, and political assassinations that are a direct result of the influence of racist and white supremacist Western traditions. Mills debriefs liberalism and racism as being 'concurrent and transformative forces which give

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid, 147

<sup>179</sup> Ibid, 148

rise to a racial kind of liberalism.' He posits that 'such an outlook gives birth to a universe of white entitlements- a white moral and legal equality which is mutually connected to a non-white inequality.'<sup>180</sup>

The ruling race in Mozambique considered their superiority to the Black Mozambicans as a self-evident fact, enforcing the notion that the Mozambicans should submit to their authority. The Mozambicans were deemed intrinsically dissimilar, and hence regarded as strangers. Whites held the belief that they constituted the superior race, a ruling force that was providentially predestined by God. Mills (1998) maintains that:

In effect, whites are the ruling race.<sup>45</sup> Race and white supremacy are therefore seen primarily as a system of advantage and disadvantage and only secondarily as a set of ideas and values. The atomic-individualist ontology is necessarily displaced by a social ontology in which races are significant sociopolitical actors. The ontology here is not "deep" in the traditional metaphysical sense of being necessary and transhistorical<sup>181</sup>.

Moreover, Mills points out that 'race becomes the qualification for citizenship, entitled to settle, to expropriate, to be free, or as someone destined to be removed, to be expropriated, to be enslaved. . . as a white colonizer of settler you are a citizen; as nonwhite (Black Mozambicans) were 'subjects.' Finally, Mills concludes that 'the racial contract between whites is in effect an agreement to divide among themselves (as common white property) the proceeds of nonwhite subordination'<sup>182</sup>. Alas, the plight of the

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<sup>180</sup> Mills, Charles W. 1998. *Blackness visible: essays on philosophy and race*. N.p.: Cornell University Press.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid, 99

<sup>182</sup> Ibid, 135.

Mozambican people persists, despite the rise of a ruling class of Black Mozambicans who have reaped substantial benefits from the implementation of neoliberal policies. Tragically, the specter of exploitation looms large, as the whites South Africa, Portugal, and various European nations exploit Mozambique's neoliberal framework to amass untold wealth under the guise of foreign aid-- a phenomenon aptly coined by Du Bois as 'the wages of whiteness, or the determination of the white to keep the black world poor and themselves [*white*] rich (Du Bois 1998, 706)<sup>183</sup>.

The pervasive culture of white superiority has, once again, infiltrated Africa in the form of development savants and financial wizards who claim to have the ability to revitalize the economy. However, this revitalization is often a façade, benefitting not the whole of Mozambique, but rather the purveyors of the prevailing white supremacist agenda and their elite cohorts. This capitulation to neoliberal and capitalist doctrine by the ruling class of Mozambique has rendered the fight against colonialism futile.

The prevailing echelon, much like Fanon, posits the ruling elites ' . . . discovers its historical mission; that of an intermediary. From now on, it will insist that all the big foreign companies should pass through its hands, whether these companies wish to keep on their connection with the country, or to open it up' (Fanon 2004, 152)<sup>184</sup>. In addition, Fanon penned, ' . . . the struggle against colonialism doesn't evolve in a straightforward manner as nationalist movements often do. The indigenous people initially devoted their energies to dissolving specific abuses, including forced labor, corporal punishment, wage

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<sup>183</sup> Du Bois, W. E. B. 1998. *Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880*. First Free Press Edition ed. New York, New York: Free Press, 706.

<sup>184</sup> Fanon, Frantz. 2004. *The wretched of the earth*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York, New York: Grove Press.



inequality, and limitations on political rights. This battle toward democracy against the oppression of humanity gradually abandons the muddled notions of neoliberal universality to ultimately, albeit uncertainly, emerge as a demand for national sovereignty<sup>185</sup>.

From the 1950s onwards, the colonial powers exhibited mixed feelings towards the 'winds of change.' Kwame Nkrumah expounded on the manifestation of neocolonialism, '...which is enforced by monetary or economic means' and implemented 'through a coalition of monetary interests'<sup>186</sup>. Throughout the colonial era, the colonial administration enabled the siphoning of resources from African nations towards the metropolis. In the contemporary age, the instrumentality that perpetuates the subjugation of the Global South is the ideology of neoliberalism. With its unchanging exchange rates, untrammelled mobility of capital, and perpetuation of the white supremacist dogma (viz. liberal democracy and capitalism), the transfer of proceeds towards the metropolis/global north endures. Robert Vitalis avers similarly 'intellectuals, institutions, and arguments that constituted international relations were shaped by and often directly concerned with advancing strategies to preserve and extend that hegemony against those struggling to end their subjection (Vitalis 2015, 2)'<sup>187</sup>.

The Mozambican government accepted the Western ideas of entrepreneurship and neoliberalism, but what the government and the ruling elites have failed to understand is that The Mozambican government has embraced the principles of entrepreneurship and

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid, 152

<sup>186</sup> Ibid, 153

<sup>187</sup> Vitalis, Robert. 2015. *White World Order, Black Power Politics: the Birth of American International Relations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2.

neoliberalism championed by the Western world. Though, it has failed to grasp the fact that the country's economy is still reliant on the international trade of primary commodities, with the key industries put in place after neoliberal reforms, being under foreign ownership. The country continues to export raw materials, electricity and agricultural products to countries such as South Africa and India, for processing. The post-structural adjustment government's objective is to act as a mediator of sorts, between the nation's resources and foreign capital, that is masked as a form of neo-colonialism and a capitalist system that fortifies white supremacy, camouflaged. . . on the mask of neo-colonialism and white supremacy capitalist system. One of the sources I interviewed declared, 'We have the right to be wealthy like the people in North America. Therefore, capitalism is good; we must embrace it and make it work' (Personal communication, P. Mauricio, August, 7 *Nampula, 2005*).

Although 30 years of implementing neoliberalism and capitalism, the international community, especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank claim that neoliberalism has produced economic growth, job opportunities, poverty reduction, and eradication of diseases, these systems have also fueled widespread exploitation. At every turn, inhabitants of Mozambique continue to struggle with dire poverty. The country persists in retaining its label as one of the most destitute nations globally. A variety of interdependent predicaments beset the people of Mozambique. As of 2023, a staggering sixty percent of the populace lack electricity access, while the Human Development Index has plummeted ever lower (HDI, 2022). This is exemplified by Walter Rodney's affirmation:

Capitalism has proved incapable of transcending the fundamental weaknesses such as underutilization of productive capacity, the persistence of a permanent sector of unemployment, and periodic economic crises. . . . Capitalism has created its irrationalities such as

vicious while racism, the tremendous waste associated with advertising, and the irrationality of incredible poverty amid wealth and wastage even inside the biggest capitalist economies, such as the United States of America (Rodney 2018, 10)<sup>188</sup>.

Slobodian contends that race has been disregarded as an illustration of the neoliberal association with the Southern African region.<sup>189</sup> South Africa, Rhodesia, as well as the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, are known to have restricted the global reorganization following the Second World War. Furthermore, it will reconcile the studies of Jamima Pierre and Beliso-De Jesús, particularly their exposition on how the apartheid regime in Southern Africa endures in enabling white South Africans, as well as other Western countries, and currently China as well, to exert their 'economic, political, cultural, and social dominion of the majority Black populace' in Mozambique. Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre point out that to speak of 'global white supremacy is to point to the racial dimensions of an international power system that includes an ideology of white (broadly defined) racial superiority'<sup>190</sup>.

The global political, economic, and social systems are structured in accordance with the colonial system that was entrenched in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth centuries. Following the end of World War II, the settler-colonial system underwent a remodeling that enabled the continued exploitation of non-white people, thereby perpetuating a political economy that is based on white supremacy. This was all

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<sup>188</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books.

<sup>189</sup> Slobodian, Quinn. 2018. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. London, U.K.: Harvard University Press, 149.

<sup>190</sup> Pierre, J., and Beliso De Jesús. 2020. "Anthropology of White Supremacy." *American anthropology* 22 (1): 65-75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13351>.

accomplished under the guise of neoliberal economic policies and governance, specifically the liberal democratic system. According to Slobodian, the post-World War II neoliberals perceived the Bretton Woods system, which has been referred to as embedded liberalism by academics, as a means of isolation that served only to promote illusions of national autonomy<sup>191</sup>. Additionally, Slobodian argues that the global economic forces must instruct "postcolonial" nations on how to properly respond to the demands of the market.<sup>192</sup> In essence, it can be argued that the former colonies are constrained in their ability to prioritize their citizenry's welfare and must instead prioritize the establishment of a global framework that upholds the principles of capitalism. Moreover, Slobodian theorizes that the proponents of globalism and neoliberalism sought to restructure the world order following World War II<sup>193</sup>.

Pierre and Beliso-De Jesús (2020, 250) state that 'white supremacy certainly depends on the construction of the idea of race as a hierarchical relationship of power based on presumed biological and cultural difference, as well as related practices of racism, the valorization of whiteness and the denigration of non-whiteness'. Moreover, Pierre and Beliso De Jesús state that 'to examine white supremacy is thus to point to the presumed power and privilege of whiteness, and to analyze how whiteness is structured in and through our institutions, our disciplinary theories and methods, our everyday relations, as well as through global economic and political processes, processes that are

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid, 148

<sup>193</sup> Slobodian, Quinn. 2018. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. London, U.K.: Harvard University Press, 149.

always racial.’ Furthermore, the above authors argue that when identifying whiteness and scrutinizing white supremacy, it is essential to highlight the significant impact that individuals considered white have in creating the visible disparities related to racial subjugation, stratification, and white-centric interpretations. Additionally, we must not overlook the ways in which ‘white-enforced communal standards, scientific and medicinal classifications, geographical, academic, or professional segregation, and the racial portrayals and doctrines disseminated by the media, popular cultural, and political position, and academia’ reinforce the existing advantages and authority of white communities’ (Pierre and De Jesús 2020, 250)<sup>194</sup>.

Pierre and De Jesús posit that white domination does not operate in isolation; the duo cites Hall (1980), who posited that white supremacy constitutes an approach through which multifarious social and political affiliations are consumed. Colonialism, imperialism, racial capitalism, and neoliberalism, for instance, all operate as approaches by which white supremacy has adapted and perpetuated itself for more than four centuries. Similarly, bell hooks (2000, 118)<sup>195</sup> offered the expression “white supremacist, capitalist patriarchy” to highlight the conjoined manners in which racism, patriarchy, and capitalism differentially impact Black people, especially Black women.

‘White supremacist, capitalist patriarchy’ is a term coined by bell hooks to describe the interconnected systems of power that shape our society. According to hooks, these systems are based on the unequal distribution of power and privilege along lines of race,

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<sup>194</sup> Pierre, Jemima, and Aisha M. Beliso-De Jesús. 2021. “White Supremacy.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Law and Society*, edited by Prabha Kotiswaran, Mariana Valverde, Kamari M. Clarke, and Eve Darian Smith, 249-252. New York, New York: Taylor & Francis.

<sup>195</sup> hooks, bell. 2015. *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. New York, U.S.: Routledge

gender, and class. The term "white supremacist" refers to the way in which whiteness is idealized and seen as superior to other races. The term "capitalist" refers to the way in which the pursuit of profit and economic growth is prioritized over the well-being of Black people around the globe. And finally, the term "patriarchy" refers to the way in which men are privileged over women in society, in her book *Feminist theory from Margin to Center* (hooks 2015, 80)<sup>196</sup>, hooks exposes the conjunction between white supremacy, racial capitalism, and patriarchy that was strategically employed following World War II through the agency of the United Nations, and its Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, also known as the World Bank, which unreservedly favored the Western colonial and imperialistic powers. Since 1945, the face of the global economic scene has experienced significant transformations. However, it remains under the control of a white supremacist political and commercial structure of the Global North, mainly dominated by the United States and Great Britain. As early as 1944, the white supremacist regime-initiated plans toward a more permeable international economy. Noteworthy actors in global financial management include central and regional banks, alongside global organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now a part of the World Trade Organization since 1994/95.

In 1945, the United Nations was established by 51 countries following World War II, with the primary objectives of preserving 'international peace and security while fostering friendly relationships among nations, championing social progress, better living

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid, 118

standards, and human rights advancement' (Meisler 2011, pp.12-34)<sup>197</sup>. However, it is undeniable that these ideologies have served as nothing more than mere window dressing. With the introduction of veto power and the security council, the United Nations ensnared itself in a web of supporting colonialism in Africa and the oppressive apartheid regime of the South African Republic. These establishments, as it were, are symbolic of the organized frames of mind that adhere to a philosophy of global white dominance (Pierre and De Jesús 2021, 49)<sup>198</sup>. The decline of the colonial system had a significant relationship with the phenomenon of 'Third World' development. In the interwar era, efforts were made to create a course of action that would permit the reconfiguring of relations between the metropolises and the colonies, alongside the objective of reconstructing the colonial world.

Cooper (1991, pp. 191-210)<sup>199</sup> posited that the Development Act of the 1940s in Britain was the first notable result of the development concept and that it can be traced back to the imperial power's attempts to withstand challenges to its dominance in the 1930s and to reinvent the empire. This trend was especially apparent in the southern African states, where anxiety over labor and food supply issues led to the modernization of select segments of the African populace. However, such modernization efforts came at the cost of marginalizing Afrocentric views of food and community that women

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<sup>197</sup> Meisler, Stanley. 2011. *United Nations: A History*. New York, New York: Grove Press.

<sup>198</sup> Pierre, Jemima, and Aisha M. Beliso-De Jesús. 2021. "White Supremacy." In *The Routledge Handbook of Law and Society*, edited by Prabha Kotiswaran, Mariana Valverde, Kamari M. Clarke, and Eve Darian Smith, 249-252. New York, New York: Taylor & Francis.

<sup>199</sup> Cooper, F. 1991. *Development and the Remaking of the Colonial World*, Working Paper. Berkeley, California: Paper Presented at SSRC' meeting on Social Science and Development.

staunchly advocated. These initial attempts set the stage for communal development schemes that took form during the 1950s (Murphy 1993, pp.71-85)<sup>200</sup>.

The involvement of the United Nations and its precursor, the League of Nations, in the negotiation of decolonization with numerous Asian and African nations was subpar, at best. Following the conclusion of World War II, this impetus toward decolonization was extended and generalized. This increase was abetted by the advent of pioneering global institutions, which were founded under the framework of the Bretton Woods system. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group (also known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) were created with the aim of furthering the economic exploitation of newly independent states.

The white supremacy ideology is Ansley (2010, 592)<sup>201</sup> argues that is a political, economic, and cultural system with whites overwhelmingly controlling power and material resources. This white supremacy global system involves ‘conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement, as well as relationships of white dominance and non-white subordination that occur daily in a wide range of institutions and social settings’ (Ansley, 2010)<sup>202</sup>. This domination began in the 16 century with colonialism, with ‘total control of the globe by Europe’ DuBois (1946) and it continues today with white supremacist ideologies and practices that are transnational and global in nature. It is

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<sup>200</sup> Murphy, C. A. 1993. “International Institutions, Decolonization, and Development.” *International Political Science Review* 14 (1): 71-85. <https://doi.org/10.1177/019251219301400105>.

<sup>201</sup> Frances Lee Ansley. 2010. “White Supremacy (And What We Should Do About It).” In *Critical White Studies*, 592–. Temple University Press.

<sup>202</sup> Pierre, Jemima, and Aisha M. Beliso-De Jesús. 2021. “White Supremacy.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Law and Society*, edited by Prabha Kotiswaran, Mariana Valverde, Kamari M. Clarke, and Eve Darian Smith, 249-252. New York, New York: Taylor & Francis.



noted by Mills (1998:102) that these efforts were not aimed solely at the development of Africa, but rather were devised and deployed for other purposes. Mills states that,

Independent Third World nations are part of a global economy dominated by white capital and white international lending institutions, that the planet as a whole is dominated by the cultural products of the white West, that many First World nations have experienced a resurgence of racism, including biological determinist ideas once thought to have been definitively discredited . . . and that in general the dark-skinned races of the world, particularly blacks and indigenous peoples, continue to be at or near the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder in both metropolitan and Third World politics (Mills 1998, 102)<sup>203</sup>.

In addition, Du Bois (1933) expounds on this issue by stating that 'whiteness represents eternal ownership of the earth, with the African colonies existing as their perpetual possession'. According to Du Bois, this was attributable to the Portuguese belief in their manifest destiny to colonize Africa. Although the Portuguese were responsible for the least amount of European colonialism in Africa, they maintained control over Angola, Guinea, Santo Tomé e Príncipe, Cape Verde, and Mozambique for a period of five centuries, during which time they undertook the so-called 'white man's burden' of civilizing the indigenous population. Rodney (1973) further underscores this point, stating that,

The Portuguese had not managed to train a single African doctor in Mozambique, and the life expectancy in Eastern Angola was less than thirty years. As for Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese themselves provided some insight that Guinea-Bissau was more neglected than Angola and Mozambique (Rodney 2018, 154)<sup>204</sup>.

In the year of nineteen seventy-nine, the then-president, Machel, declared,

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<sup>203</sup> Mills, Charles W. 1998. *Blackness visible: essays on philosophy and race*. N.p.: Cornell University Press.

<sup>204</sup> Rodney, Walter. 2018. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London & New York, New York: Verso Books.

We refuse to remain eternal suppliers of raw materials. We refuse to allow the old colonial relations to remain. We refuse to participate in the international division of labor in a subordinate position, paying increasingly for finished products and selling our labor power for less and less<sup>205</sup>.

Despite the end of the war in 1992, Mozambique's economic status had significantly declined, rendering it as one of the most impoverished nations globally. This dismal condition was evidenced by the drastic plummet in consumer goods production and the limited importation of such goods, expediting the rise of black-market transactions and causing peasants to veer away from official cash flow. The *dumbenenge* or *candongá* (informal market) system took over the country's food supplies, while the official rationing system collapsed. The war effort severely drained the government's financial resources, as recounted by the stunning 62 percent of the national budget allocated to defense expenditures, leaving only a meager 38 percent for non-war-related imports. This conflict destroyed the country's productive capacity, further swelling the scourge of resource scarcity. Sadly, the entrenched principles of white supremacy and capitalism emerged victorious.

On the 24th of September 1984, Mozambique became a part of the global white supremacist, capitalist economic setup, which was represented by eminent organizations including the World Bank and the IMF. Later, the country also became a member of the GATT/WTO. The Mozambican Government, which was represented by FRELIMO, made a conscious decision to gradually liberalize prices and started to reduce the number of public employees, as it attempted to qualify for international loans. In June of 1985, the

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<sup>205</sup> Samora Moisés Machel. 1979. "Os Deputados na Edificação do Socialismo-Interiorizar a necessidade de prestar contas das actividades e responsabilidades: Preseiden Samora Machel na sessão solene de abertura da 4 sessão da Assembleia Popular. In Notícias: Maputo, 19 June 1979, Page 3.

Bank sanctioned its first loan to Mozambique which was in the tune of USD 45 million (World Bank 1995, 37)<sup>206</sup>.

Mozambique commenced an economic rejuvenation plan, referred to as PRE (*Programa de Reabilitação Económica*), which was curated in line with the guidelines set forth by the International Monetary Fund (Ubide 1997, 22)<sup>207</sup>. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the conditionalities imposed by the World Bank were also included. Despite having gone through a circle, Machel denied the presence of any colonial relations. However, former President Chissano reintroduced these relationships of white supremacists to the people of Mozambique. As per the IMF report of 1998, PRE aimed to achieve a sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium through enhanced economic efficiency and reduced internal and external deficits. The salient features of the said program comprised of economic neo-liberalization, devaluation of the monetary unit (meticaís), a concomitant reduction in government outlays, effective pruning of subsidies and credit growth, wage-adjustments premised upon productivity, allocation of deregulated pricing mechanisms, facilitation of the private sector growth, and an increased emphasis on international trade. Various other components of the PRE initiatives spanned across incentives to augment foreign investments, adjusting primary commodity prices in conformity with the prevailing market trends, disestablishing state-

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<sup>206</sup> World Bank. 1995. *Priorities and Strategies for Education A World Bank Review*, Development in Practice. No. II. Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.

<sup>207</sup> Ubide, Angel. 1997. *Determinants of Inflation in Mozambique*. Vol. WP/97/145. Washington, D.C.: The IMF, pp. 20-22.

owned farms (parastatals), effectively exercising control over credit growth, and so forth (IMF, 1997, 30)<sup>208</sup>.

During the 1990s, the prior Economic Neo-liberalism measures, which had amplified poverty and spurred social inequality, were overtaken by the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program (ESRP). ESRP sought to redress the manifest ill-effects of the earlier measures by addressing the poverty conundrum, arresting the falling rate of production, and reinstating a benchmark consumption and income level for the populace at large, more so in rural areas (The IMF 1998, 59)<sup>209</sup>. Following the proclamation of President Chissano, the implementation of neoliberal norms has inaugurated a novel epoch of affluence in Mozambique, where the tangible GDP escalated from \$1,481 million (approximating \$5 per resident in the US) in 1990 to \$2,407 million (equivalent to \$7 per resident in the US) in 2000 (Hanlon 1996, pp.24-36)<sup>210</sup>. Notwithstanding, my empirical study discovered that notwithstanding the economic progress, it has not materialized in terms of job creation or financial benefits for those struggling to thrive in the unregulated sector.

Furthermore, the devastating 1999 floods have brought about new realities for the citizens of Maputo. The masses of refugees from the affected regions have swarmed into the capital city seeking sanctuary. During the war and famine, countless individuals fled to Maputo as refugees because they were not being given any incentives to return to their

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid, 30

<sup>209</sup> The International Monetary Fund. 1998. "Critical Financing for Developing Countries," Chapter 9. In *Strengthening Financial Systems*, 59. Washington, D.C.: The International Monetary Fund Annual Report. September 13, 1998 ISBN/ISSN:9781557757654/2227-891.

<sup>210</sup> Hanlon, Joseph. 1996. *Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique*. Greenwood, Connecticut: Irish Mozambique Solidarity & the International African Institute.

countryside. The war displaced people opine that the city offers them superior openings than going back home. Consequently, the rural parts of Mozambique are experiencing an erosion in terms of population figures while the city of Maputo is grappling with a surging number of people clamoring for better prospects. The policies driven by neoliberalism have only served to worsen the poverty situation among Mozambicans. Castel-Branco (1995a, pp. 29-30)<sup>211</sup> has leveled several scathing criticisms against the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program, better known as PRE. According to Castel-Branco, the program needs to tackle the actual issues that are ailing the economy. Castel-Branco has shown that the programs of neo-liberalization have resulted in increased poverty and accelerated the growth of social and economic inequality. Castel-Branco expounds that an overabundance of bureaucracy, centralism, and excessive interventionism have acted as impediments to the efficient utilization of the meager resources that are available (Castelo-Branco 1996, pp.10A & 30A)<sup>212</sup>.

Inadequate physical infrastructure poses yet another serious restriction that impedes the exchange of goods between the rural and urban areas. Additionally, the technological capacity of productive sectors within Mozambique remains either ineffectual or non-existent. These crucial issues, however, remain unimportant to both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These financial institutions, more concerned about their Northern white supremacist patrons, ignore the predicaments of the Mozambicans. South Africa's mining sector views Mozambique only as a source of

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<sup>211</sup> Castelo-Branco, C. N. 1995a. "Diferenciação Social agudizou-se e a pobreza apesar do PRE." *Notícias* (Maputo), 10 30, 1995a, 29-30.

<sup>212</sup> Castelo-Branco, C. N. 1996. "Opções Económicas de Moçambique, 1975-95: Problemas, lições e ideias alternativas." *Maduza* (Maputo), 1996, 10A & 30A.

natural resources and low-cost labor. The rampant exploitation of this workforce due to declining wages and scarce employment opportunities has made it attractive once again. The World Bank even lent funds to Mozambique to reconstruct the *Nyungwe Kahoura-Bassa* Dam, formerly known as the *Cahora Bassa* Dam, solely to generate electricity for the benefit of the Republic of South Africa's white citizens.

In Mozambique, the process of 'democratization' as well as economic neo-liberalization has proven to be advantageous solely to cohorts of the elite class with intimate affiliations with global capital. The Black Mozambican populace is currently subjected to an economic dictatorship. Regrettably, we are bereft of options and our opinions on economic policies are rendered irrelevant without any influence. Our governing body is subject to the wishes of international financial institutions, rendering their proclamations indisputable and unhindered by our humble presence. (Personal communication, Assembly person, Beira, September 20, 2005).

The ruling elites have failed to grasp the reality that, while they may profit from the current global financial arrangement, they remain hapless puppets under the dominion of a global, white supremacist, the patriarchal, and capitalist system designed solely to benefit the Global North, rather than the Global South.

Egregious levels of economic disparity among a privileged few starkly contrast with poverty which evokes memories of colonialism. Politicians have turned a blind eye to our plight, despite our having elected them to power. These politicians have amassed substantial wealth, neglecting their constituents' needs and showing no concern about retaining their political status (Personal communication, Nampula, August 21, 1998).

Approximately 80 percent of respondents expressed negative sentiments towards the neoliberal economic and political regime. Furthermore, implementing austerity measures and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) at the behest of white supremacist, international capitalist organizations were discovered to negatively impact most

Mozambicans, thereby leading to an increase in unemployment. One interviewee participating in the study under consideration offered the following statement:

My daughter became infected with malaria, and we took her to the Hospital Central for treatment. However, when we arrived, the nurse asked about our finances, and we told her we only had 10,000 Meticaís (less than \$1). Unfortunately, the nurse was unhappy with our response, and she left to attend to other patients who were wealthier. In the past, under the leadership of Samora, every citizen had access to free health clinics and received dignified treatment (Personal communication, Maputo, December 15, 2005).

Another interviewee, Ishmael, an *empregado doméstico* (domestic worker), stated:

Unfortunately, my children are not currently attending school due to the implementation of the PRE (SAPs in Mozambican). Parents are now responsible for school fees, uniforms, books, and examination fees, which unfortunately, I am unable to afford with my current earnings. Under the honorable President Machel, we were able to live off the land without the burden of these fees, but now we are forced to import nearly everything from South Africa and Swaziland, resulting in the depletion of our own resources while supporting other nations. It is disheartening to see this trend continue to the detriment of our own people (Personal communication, Maputo December 17, 2005).

Alfredo, a peddler, enunciated that,

During the era of socialism, remittance was not mandatory and there were opportunities for adult education. Additionally, children were required to attend school. However, there appears to be a lack of concern towards education in modern times. We are unable to afford tuition fees, textbooks, and other related expenses while simultaneously providing for our basic needs. This has led to our children discontinuing their education in order to help at home and in the family business. Although some may view our decision as misguided, it is a necessary one due to our current circumstances (Personal communication, Gaza, January 20, 2006).

It is a fact that the economic ideologies of capitalism, neoliberalism, and globalization have all played significant roles in the perpetuation of Mozambique's cycle of poverty. In the meantime, the global white supremacy's neocolonialism has enabled white settlers

from Portugal, South Africa, Zimbabwe and transnational corporations, such as the French energy company Total to take over the natural resources in the region, including farmland, gas, mining, and water. As a result, Mozambique has become a zone of extractivism,<sup>213</sup> where the neoliberal and white supremacist capitalist forces exploit the land to extract capital, labor, and profit, leaving the impoverished Mozambican society behind. The extraction and appropriation of resources have ensnared Mozambique in the trap of the resource curse.

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<sup>213</sup> Extractivism is the removal of natural resources particularly for export with minimal processing. This economic model is common throughout the Global South. Domínguez, Rafael M. 2021. "El extractivismo y sus despliegues conceptuales" [Extractivism and its conceptual deployments]." *Revista Territorios y Regionalismos* 4 (January): 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.29393/rtr4-11EDRD10011>.

**For more on this topic See also** --Chagnon, Christopher W., Francesco Durante, Barry K. Gills,, Sophia E. Hagolani-Albov, Saana Hokkanen, Sohvi M. Kangasluoma, Heidi Kontinen, et al. 2022. "From extractivism to global extractivism: the evolution of an organizing concept." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. 49 (4): 760-792. 10.1080/03066150.2022.2069015.



## Conclusion

Global policies that favor white supremacy, capitalism, and racism perpetuate structural inequalities, leading to hardships and challenges that disproportionately affect people in the Global South. Kwame Nkrumah wisely noted that neocolonialism is the worst form of imperialism because it gives absolute power to the perpetrators without any accountability and leaves the oppressed with no recourse against exploitation. The goal of neocolonialism, like that of colonialism, is to export social and economic conflicts of capitalist countries. This tactic, while temporarily successful, highlights the glaring discrepancy between nations with robust economies and those that have been left behind.

Imperialism and racial white supremacy have changed their approach; they have adapted to the changing world. It has given up on its flags and unpopular expatriate officials. Instead, it claims to be granting independence and providing aid while promoting development. Despite these benevolent claims, the neoliberalism policies continue to use various methods to achieve its objectives, the same objectives it had during overt colonialism/imperialism (Nkrumah 1965, 1971, 1974, & 2004, 239)<sup>214</sup>.

Amilcar Cabral designated colonialism as a paralysis or a diversion, even as an arrest of the history of one people, all the while propelling forward the historical advancement of other peoples. (Cabral 1970, 80)<sup>215</sup>. Furthermore Cabral fifty years after Cabral's assassination, Africa still bears the weight of neocolonialism, capitalism, and

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<sup>214</sup> Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965, 1971, 1974, & 2004. *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. London, England: Panaf.

<sup>215</sup> Cabral, Amílcar. 1970. *Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts*. Edited by Richard Handyside. New York, U.S.: Monthly Review Press.

global white supremacy. Colonialism transformed into neoliberalism through three primary mechanisms: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, which, in consort with the pursuit of lucrative, continually increasing accumulation of excess value, control foreign investment and monetary capital, and simultaneously advance the dominion of global white supremacist ideology.

The international white supremacist capitalist corporations brought Mozambique into the spotlight of development. Former Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Prize for his efforts to promote good governance in Africa. However, some argue that the award was not for good governance, but for promoting neoliberalism and structural adjustment programs that have resulted in Mozambique's resources being sold off to the highest bidder. Chissano's commitment to peace, democracy, and stability on the continent appears to have greatly benefited himself and his family in terms of wealth accumulation. During the 1990s, journalist Carlos Cardoso had investigated and publicly exposed rumors of corruption surrounding the Chissano family's business interests. Cardoso's inquiries led to a deeper investigation of the fraud within *Banco Commercial de Moçambique* (BCM), before and after its privatization, as well as the bad loans that eventually brought down the privatized *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento* (BPD), later renamed *Banco Austral*. Tragically, on November 22, 2000, Cardoso was assassinated by men wielding AK-47s. Nyimpine Chissano, Joaquim Chissano's eldest son, was called as a witness in the 2002 trial of the murderers of Cardoso and was confirmed by a witness to have arranged payment of US\$ 46,000 to the killers. On May 11, 2006, the Mozambican public prosecutor's office charged Nyimpine Chissano with 'joint moral authorship' of the murder of Carlos Cardoso. Reports

indicated that a Maputo prosecutor, Fernando Canana, had uncovered evidence that Nyimpine acted as a mastermind behind this unfortunate event. Chissano's parents, former president Chissano and his wife, intervened and subsequently suspended Nyimpine Chissano's sentence<sup>216</sup>. Interestingly, during his acceptance speech, Chissano pledged to carry on his work in support of “good governance.” Does good governance prevail in Mozambique? And for whose benefit? The Mozambican economy is plagued by turmoil, climatic cyclones, political conflicts, and economic struggles that continue to beset the country.

The ongoing situation in Mozambique is an absolute travesty, making it increasingly difficult for us to express our dissent on the streets. Azagaia, a revolutionary rapper, channels his passion for hip-hop and rap to galvanize the populace against these injustices' (I. Matos, personal communication, Lisbon, August 14, 2022).

The song *As Mentiras* (The Lies), performed by Mozambican rapper Azagaia, aptly encapsulates the current situation in Mozambique:

It's a lie that you're independent.

That you take your continent forward

You didn't break the chain.

You're nothing but an unconscious slave.

500 years of slavery

And the Europeans took 36 million slaves and only 16 survived.

Now you call the European, the American or God knows who.

To suck your oil and set up their homes here.

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<sup>216</sup> Cramer, Christopher. Review of *Carlos Cardoso and the Rise of Gangster Democracy in Mozambique*, by Paul Fauvet and Marcelo Mosse. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005): 671–73. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25065034>.

But they don't set up factories here, they just buy the barrel.

On the mainland or in the diaspora

Independent Africans who impoverish our Africa.

Despite the government's claims of development and economic growth,

you return home each day to an empty plate,

You are hungry, and there is no food to eat (Azagaia, 2007).<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Azagaia, AKA Edson Amândio Maria Lopes da Luz. 2007. "Mentiras" Apple Music.

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