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Hawthorne, Camilla A

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There Are No Black Italians?
Race and Citizenship in the Black Mediterranean

By

Camilla A Hawthorne

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requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Geography

and the Designated Emphasis

in

Science and Technology Studies

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Jake Kosek, Chair

Professor Michael Watts

Professor Stephen Small

Professor Donald Moore

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Abstract

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by

Camilla A Hawthorne

Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Jake Kosek, Chair

Our current moment is characterized by the largest global mass migrations of people in recent history and the resurgence of explicitly racist, xenophobic nationalisms. In Italy, post-2008 economic stagnation and the southern European refugee emergency have laid bare the endurance of ethno-nationalism and the production of new racial essentialisms in a supposedly “post-racial” state. Italy is home to almost 1 million children of immigrants who were born in Italy but lack legal citizenship, as well as hundreds of thousands of refugees who endure state-sanctioned and extrajudicial forms of everyday violence. Black youth born and raised in Italy, whose struggles to be recognized as Italian are met with endless legal and de facto obstacles, are at the forefront of a new wave of activism against racialized citizenship, the violence of Fortress Europe, and the unspoken whiteness of Italian identity. Their efforts have crystallized around a movement to reform Italian citizenship law toward *jus soli*, or right of birthplace citizenship. But these activists are increasingly faced with the impossibility of de-racializing the Italian nation, as new racisms are reproduced within the presumably colorblind category of “citizen.” I argue that the fraught task of *disentangling race from nation* has generated new forms of anti-Blackness and racial differentiation that do not adhere to a neat inclusion/exclusion binary, and has also inspired Black Mediterranean diasporic political formations that look *beyond* the nation-state.

This project is based on sixteen months of multi-sited fieldwork conducted over five years with Black activists across northern and central Italy, and employs multiple research methods: interviews, policy analysis, participant observation, virtual ethnography, and archival research. My work draws on Black diaspora studies, postcolonial theory, and critical human geography, and represents the first in-depth study of Black youth political mobilizations in Italy. While there exists extensive research on first-generation immigrants and refugees who traveled from Africa to Italy, there is a lacuna in the literature with regard to the experiences of Black youth who were born and raised in Italy. But rather than asking whether Italians of African descent have “integrated” into a supposedly bounded and homogenous Italian nation, I focus on the ways they have become deeply entangled with the ambiguous process of re-defining the legal, racial, cultural, and economic boundaries of Italy.

While some scholars have argued that European nation-states entirely *preclude* the incorporation of Black subjects, I instead show that the boundaries of Italianness are currently being reworked

in relation to attributes such as cosmopolitan hybridity, economic productivity, and local cultural fluency. In particular, the historic precariousness of Italian “whiteness” in relation to northern Europe has created a unique opening for Black activists to expand the definition of Italianness via older ideas of Italo-Mediterranean *mixedness*. Yet these renegotiations have also generated deeply racialized distinctions between “assimilable” Black citizens-in-waiting and “non-assimilable” Black refugees. The precarious inclusion of Italian-born Black youth has thus become predicated on the extent to which they can be differentiated from Black refugees based on their capacity to “revitalize” the Italian nation.

Scholars of the Black diaspora have long argued for understandings of race, citizenship, and belonging that are not confined to national boundaries. My research extends these formulations beyond the Atlantic to consider Black diasporic imaginaries and resistances to nationalist racism in the Mediterranean. The Black Mediterranean, I argue, is a contemporary limit case where colonial legacies, neoliberal migration management, and sedimented anti-Blackness have come together to produce both new forms of exclusion and new practices of transnational solidarity.

For Valeria:

That the world you are growing up in will one day be worthy of you.

and

For my grandparents, Dorothy and Nathaniel:

Whose hard-fought, lifelong commitment to learning opened a path for me.

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Introduction¹

“The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”²

“SALE, SALE, SALE
let us not sell out
in this interregnum
among unhealthy syndromes
irradiated shrouds
anthropogenic changes
anthropological mutations
rebellions
constitutional crumbings
and the collapse of nations.
In the interstices
wanders the voice
flows the note
resetting the compass
like the ark
hoping and waiting in the dark.”³

“Changes will occur that we cannot even begin to imagine, and the next generation will be both utterly familiar and wholly alien to their parents.”⁴

Who is Italian? Contested Borders and Boundaries in the Time of Monsters

On March 25, 2016, I was preparing to fly back to California from Milan for a short break from my dissertation fieldwork. I was on my way to attend a conference in San Francisco and then spend Easter with my parents and my now-husband. Just three days earlier, a series of coordinated suicide bombings had been carried out at the Brussels Airport in Zaventem and the Maalbeek metro station in the Brussels city center. As I walked to the American Airlines check-in counter with my overstuffed suitcase in tow, bleary-eyed and squinting in the harsh fluorescent airport lights, I noticed a larger-than-usual police presence in the terminal. When it was finally my turn to check in for the flight, I slid my burgundy Italian passport across the counter to a perfectly starched and coiffed white Italian⁵ gate agent. She opened the passport, glanced at the photo page, and then looked up at me. She looked back down at the passport and again at me, searching my face, her quizzical expression giving way to a look of stern suspicion.

- Are you a resident of Italy?
- I’m a resident of California, but I am living in Italy for the year.
- Then why do you have an Italian passport?
- Because I am an Italian citizen.

—Well, were you born *here* or *there*?
—I was born in California.
—Well excuse me, then *why* do you have Italian citizenship?
—My mother is Italian, so I am an Italian citizen.
—Ah! So there *is* a reason why you have Italian citizenship.
—Yes, it’s quite simple. My mother is Italian, so I have Italian citizenship.
—Ma’am, that may be true but I can ask you whatever questions I deem necessary for reasons of security.

Still unsatisfied with my responses, the agent proceeded to ask me what I was doing in Italy, and whether I planned to return. I explained, with as much confidence as I could muster despite the humiliation of this interaction, that I was a PhD candidate from UC Berkeley doing research for my dissertation on immigration in Italy, with financial support from the Ford Foundation. When she finally procured my boarding pass, the hot tears that had been gathering at the corners of my eyes began to stream down my cheeks and I shuffled away to a secluded corner of the terminal. I called my parents in disbelief, wracked with sobs of shame. For a moment, I truly thought that I would not be allowed to board my flight, and that I would be detained for further questioning. And yet I also understood that this experience did not compare with the outright violences, disruptions, and violations endured by Black and brown migrants attempting to navigate the borders of Fortress Europe in this increasingly hostile environment.⁶

The motive behind the gate agent’s line of questioning was quite simple, I realized. There are over 1 million Italian-Americans living in the state of California (the third-largest community in the United States after New York and New Jersey),⁷ and I certainly was not the only one in entire the state who held Italian citizenship. And our exchange had been carried out entirely in Italian—after all, Italian was the first language I grew up speaking. But to the woman behind the counter, I did not look sufficiently “Italian”—there was a disconnect between the color of my skin and the color of my passport. And at a moment when panicked reports circulated about terrorists obtaining fraudulent EU passports, this disconnect made me a potential security risk.

This was not the first time my Italian “credentials” had been called into question, however. When swimming at the community pool in Sesto San Giovanni one evening during that same year of fieldwork—a beloved pastime I shared with my white Italian cousin Mara—a coach asked me if I was from New Zealand. He explained that he had seen my swim cap, which bore the words “Oakland Triathlon Festival,” and—mistaking Oakland for *Auckland*—assumed that I must be from New Zealand because I appeared *mulatta* [racially mixed]. And my mother often tells the story of the time she and I went to a *mercato* together in her hometown to buy fruits and vegetables. It was the early 1990s, and I was a toddler. My mother, a white Italian from Trescore, took me to Italy each summer to visit her family; my father, a Black American who grew up in Oakland, could only join us for one week of these annual trips due to his unrelenting work schedule. Walking with me in tow, my mother approached a market stall run by an elderly Italian woman. The woman took one look at my *cappuccino* skin and enormous head of Afro curls and smiled at my mother with grandmotherly benevolence: “*Ma che brava!* You adopted a little girl from Africa!” My hot-tempered mother raised her chin defiantly, announcing proudly to anyone within earshot, “I didn’t adopt her. She is *my* child, and my husband is Black!”

These experiences came to shape my sense of self, as well as my intellectual and political commitments. I continued to return to Italy regularly to visit my family, and as the years progressed I began to see more and more people who looked like me, and families who

resembled mine. Motivated by an abiding interest in the contemporary circumstances of this growing African diaspora in Italy, I conducted research as an undergraduate and master's student on Italy's anti-human trafficking legislation. "Sex trafficking" was the dominant framework through which Italian policymakers and media tended to approach the African presence in Italy (and in particular, Nigerian women) at this time, in the mid-2000s. I argued that while Italy was generally regarded as having some of the most progressive anti-trafficking laws in the world, these "humanitarian" migration management policies that were ostensibly intended to protect vulnerable women actually worked in practice to police the mobility of Black women *and* men.

But as that research drew to a close, I realized that there was also a new and relatively invisible generation of Black youth who were born and raised in Italy. As this generation came of age, they were grappling with pressing questions of identity, place, and borders in a country that perpetually regarded them as outsiders. While the mainstream media at that time was focused almost exclusively on the 2011 Mediterranean refugee crisis—when thousands of sub-Saharan African migrants working in North Africa fled the upheavals of the Arab Spring—I suspected that these Italian-born children of African immigrants would emerge at the forefront of a new set of negotiations and contestations about the borders of Italy, and of Europe itself.

And indeed, these questions about the boundaries of Italianness and Europeanness have become increasingly urgent as we enter Antonio Gramsci's infamous "time of monsters," filled with the morbid symptoms of neoliberal capitalism, economic precarity, and neofascist racism. Since at least 2008, the phrase "Italy is in crisis" has taken on a powerful discursive self-evidence. Economic decline, austerity, and unemployment in the wake of the Eurozone meltdown are marshaled as evidence that Italy is a dying nation locked into an irreversible free-fall, and they threaten Italy's tenuous inclusion within Europe. Alongside this economic crisis, but inextricably intertwined with it, a second crisis is regularly invoked: the influx of refugees from Africa through Italy's southern maritime border, and more broadly a fear of increasing demographic heterogeneity in Italy. And a third crisis of declining Italian birthrates and renewed emigration raises challenging questions about the future of "Italian" social reproduction.

In their groundbreaking study of the so-called "mugging crisis" on British streets in the early 1970s, Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies argued that their intent was not to reveal an underlying truth that had been concealed by discourses of crisis, nor was it to assess the veracity of crisis narratives. Rather, they were interested in how particular themes "condensed" in the form of a *moral panic* to mobilize much deeper concerns about British national identity, race, and social reproduction.⁸ In Italy, discourses of crisis are continuously generating debates about immigration, citizenship, and the place of people of color within the Italian nation. What is vernacularly invoked as a "crisis" relates just as much to anxieties about "making Italians" in the twenty-first century as it does to more traditionally political economic concerns with underconsumption or overaccumulation. In other words, the so-called crisis is also a matter of political, social, and cultural processes.

But while this deeply uncertain moment has undoubtedly generated an alarming far-right resurgence in Italy (and beyond), this trend has also been matched by new forms of political organizing emerging from Italy's margins and interstices. In particular, Black Italians are leading a new wave of activism against racialized, restrictive citizenship laws, the violence of Fortress Europe, and the unspoken whiteness of Italian identity. At an empirical level, then, the goal of this dissertation is to attend to the incredible proliferation of new forms of Black youth politics in Italy, projects that address both the Italian nation-state and the wider Black diaspora. What are the possibilities and limitations of these emergent mobilizations? What new formations are

possible, and what older ones are resuscitated in this attempt to challenge the borders (both material and symbolic) of Italy? And what can these movements teach us about the nation, liberalism, citizenship, and racism at a moment characterized both by a resurgence of racial nationalism and the largest mass migrations of people in recent history? In short, this project seeks to understand the kind of world that is struggling to be born out of the current interregnum.

Rather than approach migrants, refugees, and their children as an undifferentiated and abject mass, however, I seek to address what Heather Merrill describes as the “contradictory racialization of African-Italos and their invisibility and the centrality of their participation”⁹ in Italian life. Black Italians born or raised in Italy are simultaneously incorporated into new nationalist projects and excluded from multiple forms of belonging. Though they are frequently characterized as invisible, tragically and hopelessly caught between two worlds, the children of African immigrants are actively involved in the ambiguous process not only of producing an emergent Black Italy,¹⁰ but also of producing Italy itself. Their articulations of Black diasporic resources with local forms of Italian knowledge are actively challenging and remaking the boundaries that demarcate citizenship, belonging, and national inclusion in Italy.

While many different groups in Italy are currently engaged in struggles for recognition, substantive rights, and economic stability to varying degrees, I argue that Black youth stand at the front lines of these contestations. People of African descent, “who through bodily appearance are associated with landscapes external to Italy and therefore not assumed to be Italian,”¹¹ are systematically marked as Italy’s Others. As such, in comparison with other immigrants and their families, Afro-descendants face a uniquely virulent set of legal, institutional, and everyday obstacles while seeking to live with dignity on Italian territory.¹² But these activists are also increasingly faced with the impossibility of de-racializing the Italian nation, as new racisms are continually reproduced within the presumably neutral and colorblind category of “citizen.” Indeed, the fraught task of *disentangling race from nation* in practice risks generating new forms of anti-Blackness and racial differentiation that do not adhere to a simple binary of inclusion and exclusion. At the same time, however, these challenges have also begun to inspire diasporic political formations that look beyond the Italian nation-state altogether.

Background: The Black Diaspora in Italy Today

Despite systematic denials and obfuscations, Italy was deeply entangled with both trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism in ways that continue to shape current contestations over the boundaries of Italianness and national citizenship.¹³ As Cedric Robinson notes, Italy was a major hub in the networks of commerce, intellectual dialogue, and cultural production linking what would come to be known as the European, African, Arab, and Asian worlds.¹⁴ Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the merchants and financiers of the Italian maritime republics established extensive Mediterranean trade networks. The use of enslaved labor was central to agricultural production in the Italian outposts of the Mediterranean (Cyprus, Crete, Phocaea, Palestine), and ultimately served as a template for the use of enslaved Africans in the Atlantic colonies.¹⁵ The Genoese in particular took advantage of the lucrative trade that was rapidly expanding from the Magreb and the Mediterranean, to the mid-Atlantic, to the trans-Atlantic.¹⁶ Genoese merchant capitalists served as influential creditors and financiers to the Portuguese monarchy and provided capital to the Portuguese bourgeoisie, to such an extent that their involvement ultimately “determined the direction and pace of ‘discovery’”¹⁷ in the Americas.

Italy was also a “strident imperialist”¹⁸ and significant colonial power, even before the rise of fascism in the twentieth century.¹⁹ Between 1869 and 1943, Italy gradually seized colonial

control of Eritrea, Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, and the Dodecanese Islands (in what is now Greece).²⁰ While Italy was forced to formally renounced its empire by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, these territories had already been occupied by other European powers during World War II—Italian East Africa and Libya were lost to the British army in 1941 and 1943, respectively, and Albania and the Dodecanese Islands were lost to the Germany army in 1943. Even after formal decolonization, however, Italian geopolitical and economic ties persisted in many of these territories. Italy was granted a trusteeship of Somalia by the United Nations from 1949 to 1960, and maintained significant economic influence in Libya until Muammar Gaddafi ordered the expulsion of all remaining Italian settlers.²¹ In addition, the kinship ties, social networks, economic relations, and material infrastructure established through Italian colonialism in Africa also laid the groundwork for the first waves of migration from North and sub-Saharan Africa into Italy during the second half of the twentieth century.




Figure 1 Map showing Italian territorial possessions at the maximum extent of the Italian Empire (1941–1943). Red indicates the Kingdom of Italy and its colonies/possessions. Pink indicates occupied territories and protectorates. Note that these territories were not all controlled by the Italian state concurrently.

Source: Wikimedia Commons map modified by Author.

From the time of Italian national unification at the end of the nineteenth century up until the mid-twentieth century, Italy was primarily a country of *emigration*. During this period, millions of Italians abandoned rural poverty in search of economic opportunity abroad—not only in the Americas, northern Europe, and Australia as widely recounted in popular culture, but also in the Italian colonies of Africa. By the mid-1970s, however, Italy finally achieved a net positive immigration balance (i.e., more arrivals than departures). This shift resulted from both the enactment of restrictive entry policies in countries that had previously been receiving Italian immigrants,²² as well as an increase in transnational labor migration into Italy spurred by the decline of Fordism.²³ As Heather Merrill and Donald Carter explain, this first major generation of immigrants in Italy comprised mainly foreign contract workers and university students.²⁴

During the 1970s, the largest groups of non-European immigrants living in Italy were single male migrants from the Middle East and Africa, working in either unskilled manufacturing labor in northern Italy or agricultural labor in southern Italy; and female domestic workers from the Philippines, Cape Verde, and the former Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa who had been recruited by Catholic Charities to meet the demands of working white Italian mothers.²⁵ Toward the end of the 1980s, Italy's immigrant population began to represent a new plurality of national groups, most of which had no apparent connections to Italy or Italian colonialism.²⁶ This fact distinguished immigration to Italy from the patterns that characterized countries such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands. By 1991, Africans emerged as the second-largest immigrant population in Italy, surpassed only by Italian return migrants.²⁷ But while fears of a supposed “African invasion” continue to suffuse political discourse and mainstream media narratives in Italy, today the African immigrant population is actually far surpassed by the number of Romanians and Albanians living in Italy.

Italy does not collect official ethno-racial statistics (with the exception of data on certain historical linguistic minorities)—a legacy of post-fascism reconstruction after World War II.²⁸ This absence of ethno-racial statistics in Italy makes it especially challenging to estimate the number of self-identified Black Italians. Still, it is possible to triangulate the numerical significance of this group from the various official “proxy” numbers that are readily available. The *Istituto nazionale di statistica* (or Istat, the country's national statistics body) estimates that there are over 1 million Africans with non-Italian citizenship living in Italy, and that they make up roughly twenty percent of Italy's immigrant population. About 360,000 hail from sub-Saharan Africa (primarily Senegal, Nigeria, and Ghana).²⁹ In addition, approximately twenty percent of children in Italy today have at least one immigrant parent, a number that demographers predict could grow in the coming years as white Italian birthrates decline.³⁰

In addition, Italy does not have *banlieue*-style peri-urban residential segregation to the same scale as countries such as France. This means that African immigrants and their children are comparatively scattered throughout many different neighborhoods, cities, and regions of Italy.³¹ Historically, however, the Black presence in Italy has been largely concentrated in the wealthier, industrial northern half of the country, particularly around the cities of the Industrial Triangle economic powerhouse (Milan, Turin, and Genoa). As immigration patterns continue to change, however, the demographic balance of Black Italy has gradually begun to shift to the South, leading to rapidly expanding African communities in cities such as Naples and Palermo.




Figure 2 Map showing Italian cities with African populations larger than 10,000 as of 2017. (Note: For the purposes of this map, “African” is defined as a person legally resident in Italy with citizenship from an African country). For Palermo and Naples, the numbers are 8,512 and 7,241, respectively.

Source: Wikimedia Commons map modified by Author with data from Istat.

(Re)Generations: Engaging the So-Called *Seconda Generazione*

While scholars have devoted ample attention to the circumstances of first-generation African migrants and refugees in Italy, the experiences of Black youth born and raised in Italy remain comparatively understudied. This represents a significant lacuna in the existing literature on race, immigration, and national identity in Italy.³² An earlier wave of studies used ethnographic investigation to address the consequences of Italy's transition from a country of emigration to a country of immigration in the 1990s—often but not exclusively focusing on African migrant workers.³³ In Italy, the fields of migration studies and sociology have witnessed a veritable explosion of research on the so-called “second generation” during at least the last five years. With some notable exceptions,³⁴ however, these scholars tend to approach the *seconda generazione* as a monolithic bloc, using the analytical frameworks of “immigration” and “integration.”³⁵ The “immigration/integration” paradigm, as I define it, approaches migrants and refugees as bearers of essentialized cultural difference, who enter into a foreign yet internally homogenous and neatly bounded space into which they may or may not be effectively integrated.

Finally, the growing field of Italian postcolonial studies has made significant interventions into the study of racism and national identity in Italy; however, much of this work is either purely historical or focused primarily on literature and media. As such, it can be disconnected from everyday negotiations of racism and exclusion in Italy. Through this dissertation, I suggest that an investigation of the everyday practices, mobilizations, and cultural initiatives of Black youth in Italy can in fact disclose a great deal about the reproduction and renegotiation of racial categories in relation to struggles over citizenship, borders, and national identity. In recent years, however, many scholars have dismissed the struggles of Black youth born and raised in Italy (which have been primarily oriented on the goals of legal citizenship and national recognition) as insufficiently radical. Instead, these scholars have focused their attention on refugees, who they portray as embodying a form of fugitive “citizenship from the margins” and who can serve as analytical vehicles for unpacking the violence of the state and its borders.

The centrality of the refugee crisis in Italy raises the question of what can be specifically disclosed by studying Italian-born Black youth. I argue that by focusing on the experiences of Black Italian youth, we can begin to tell a different story, one in which Italy (and Europe) is being actively remade through the everyday activities and political mobilizations of those groups who inhabit its physical and symbolic borderspaces. The children of African immigrants born and raised in Italy represent a group to whom the traditional legal categories of migration and mobility (citizen, immigrant, refugee, asylum seeker) do not neatly apply. They are evidence that difference cannot ever be fully bounded as exogenous to the Italian nation, and that the state's practices of bordering, inclusion, and exclusion are never entirely complete. In addition, the mobilizations of Black Italian youth for citizenship, inclusion, and national recognition—and the ways in which they are renegotiating the boundaries of Italianness in these struggles—will in turn shape the terrain of contestation for newly arrived African refugees in Italy as well.

One of the most notable characteristics of this generation of Black Italians is their hesitant transition toward a collective sense of Black identity and away from the category of *immigrant*. Heather Merrill and Donald Carter note that during the early years of migrant settlement in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s, newcomers from across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia banded together in interethnic activist and labor organizations.³⁶ For these groups, *immigrant* as a form of collective identity performed important political and coalitional work. Increasingly, however, Black youth in Italy are rejecting the intergenerational imposition of the category *immigrant* (as seen, for instance, in the ubiquitous label *second-*

generation immigrant). They are also turning away from identification with specific African countries of origin, arguing that these national distinctions mattered more to their parents than to their own everyday lived experiences. Instead, they are moving toward new forms of self-identification that can capture the experience of racialization that stems from being born or raised in Italy. This shared condition is very much akin to what W. E. B. Du Bois called *double consciousness*, or what Fanon alternately described as dealing with “two systems of reference.”

Over the course of my interviews with Black Italians across Italy about their lives and preferred forms of self-identification, I was regularly told some version of the following after a moment of surprise followed by careful reflection: “You know, I didn’t even begin to *think* of the term ‘Afro-Italian’ [or ‘Black Italian’] until three, maybe two years ago.” This is confirmed in a 2002 article by Jacqueline Andall, “Second Generation Attitude? African-Italians in Milan,” one of the earliest studies focusing on the children of African immigrants in Italy.³⁷ Andall observed that the young people she interviewed saw Blackness and Italianness as mutually exclusive categories. Indeed, many of her interlocutors found it easier to identify with a general sense of Europeaness, African identity, or a wider Black diasporic consciousness than with Italianness specifically. Yet she also predicted that the up-and-coming “younger second generation” of African Italians might not necessarily dismiss the possibility of being both Black and Italian as many of the older, “involuntary pioneers” had done previously. Writing over ten years ago, Andall’s hunch was absolutely correct: the children of African immigrants today are increasingly organizing themselves under the collective terms *Afro-Italian* or *Black Italian*.

Many of my friends in Italy have related to me some iteration of a story in which they grew up understanding themselves as Italian, but then experienced an episode around high school that brought into sharp relief the reality that that this recognition did not run in both directions. One of the founders of the popular blog *Afroitalian Souls* told me the following one overcast afternoon in Milan in 2016, as we sipped coffees in the trendy canal neighborhood of Navigli:

For me, I grew up seeing myself only as Italian. I knew that I was African, but I was Italian, period. Because the few Africans I saw outside of my family were not regarded well, so I grew up saying, “I am Italian, you are African; we are not the same.” Then I went to Uganda, I fell in love with my country, and I thought, wow, I didn’t realize that I was always missing something! ... When I came back here, I thought to myself, geez, I am also Italian! Then when I had trouble getting Italian citizenship, I said, “Well who cares about those Italians, I am also African.” And so I decided from that day, I was only African. I went from one extreme to another. Because I thought to myself, I was born and raised here. Why don’t they consider me to be Italian? Why do I have to go through this whole hassle with citizenship? ... Now, however, I’m finding a balance. The fact that Italians don’t accept me doesn’t mean that I have to stop seeing myself as Italian.³⁸

Now, changing demographics certainly play a part in this story: Italy became an important country of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, so the children of the immigrants who arrived during those decades and settled primarily in the industrial cities of northern Italy and around Rome are now well into their twenties and even their thirties. In other words, they have lived through humiliating episodes of discrimination at the hands of their high school teachers; they have struggled, and often failed, to apply for Italian citizenship on their eighteenth birthdays (Italian citizenship is conferred through *jus sanguinis*, so the children of immigrants born on Italian soil are not automatically granted Italian citizenship at birth); they have dealt with racism

when applying for jobs or renting apartments; and they are old enough to vividly remember the racist and misogynistic attacks in 2013 that were directed against Italy's first Black cabinet member, the former Minister of Integration Cécile Kashetu Kyenge.³⁹

But demographic momentum alone cannot explain the growing visibility of political and cultural activism under the banners of *Black* or *Afro-Italianness*. As I noted above, it is also a deeply uncertain and precarious time in Italy, and Black youth are forced to demonstrate their worthiness as citizens-in-waiting as a direct response to the national scapegoating of Blackness as a drain on scarce state resources. While most children of immigrants in Italy experience a lack of recognition to some extent, this is unmistakably more pronounced and traumatic for Black Italians. As Heather Merrill argues, Blackness *specifically* is a symbol of non-belonging in Italy:

African bodies are (re-) marked as iconic signifiers of illegitimate belonging, represented for instance in media images of packed fishing vessels entering the country clandestinely through southern maritime borders, and in tropes of itinerant street peddlers and prostitutes, suggesting that their very being in an Italian place threatens the moral purity of the nation state.⁴⁰

In this context, Black Italians have begun to marshal practices like entrepreneurship and ideas such as the sedentarist logics of birthplace to legitimate their presence in Italy. They are reworking the boundaries of Italianness in relation to attributes such as cosmopolitan hybridity, economic productivity, and local cultural fluency, making strategic use of the historic precariousness of Italian racial identity. But these renegotiations also risk generating racialized distinctions between “assimilable” Black citizens-in-waiting and “non-assimilable” African refugees. Indeed, a key question facing the emerging Black Italian movement is whether the precarious inclusion of Italian-born Black youth will become predicated on the extent to which they can successfully differentiate themselves from newly arrived African refugees based on their supposed capacity to economically and culturally “revitalize” the Italian nation.

Key Debates: Blackening the Geographies of Europe and the Mediterranean

How does one begin to rethink Italy and Europe from the vantage point of Blackness and the intertwined geographies of slavery, colonialism, imperialism, and migration? Taken cumulatively, the corpus of **Black European studies** argues that postcolonial migrations can no longer be characterized as foreign intrusions into bounded European space—rather, “We are here because you were there!”⁴¹ Scholars of Black Europe have emphasized the deep historical presence of Black communities in Europe and the centrality of racism to European modernity; the relationship between postcoloniality, immigration, and globalized labor regimes; and the unique experiences of Black women. They have also engaged the articulations of diaspora and place that produce racial formations and racisms specific to Europe, a response to what is sometimes deemed African American hegemony⁴² or the “Middle Passage epistemology.”⁴³

Black European Studies has been primarily dominated by investigations of Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Germany and the Netherlands. Within this context, Italy—and southern Europe generally—is an emerging site within Black European studies, and also provides a useful limit case for problematizing European ethnic absolutism.⁴⁴ Italy inhabits a doubly liminal position, straddling both East and West and—in an expansion of Said's *Orientalism*—North and South.⁴⁵ While Italy is marginal in relation to northern Europe, Black Italians are doubly marginalized in relation to the wider Black diaspora. At the same time, the

historic precariousness of Italian “whiteness” in relation to the countries of northern Europe has created a unique opening for Black activists to expand the boundaries of Italianness by reworking much older ideas of Italo-Mediterranean mixedness or hybridity.

Black European studies has also focused primarily on Black *citizens*, or has generally embraced the normative claim that Blacks in Europe *should be* recognized as citizens rather than migrants because of the interconnected geographies of colonialism and slavery that linked their fates to that of Europe. Black communities in Europe remain simultaneously invisible and hypervisible, and their systemic marginalization brings to light the embeddedness of racial ideologies within the very foundations of European nation-states and liberalism.⁴⁶ At the same time, however, this focus on Black citizenship can have the unintended effect of obscuring the variegations among differently positioned Black communities in Europe—from those with direct colonial connections, to recently arrived refugees. Problematizing the very category of citizenship, rather than (or in addition to) simply advocating for Black *legal inclusion* within European nation-states, can shed light on the power differentiations that exist within Black European communities. It can also direct our attention to new ways that racisms are reproduced.

This is where the emerging bodies of literature on race and geography—and **Black geographies** in particular—prove particularly generative. Biological understandings of race have fallen out of official favor in Italy; center-left antiracists advocate postracialism and colorblindness,⁴⁷ while right-wing separatists couch their xenophobia in the “acceptable” language of cultural difference. In Italy, *razza* (race) is associated with fascist-era race-thinking; this legacy, along with the influence of French liberal colorblindness,⁴⁸ accounts for the way in which culture and ethnicity have come to perform the work of race in contemporary Italy. Across Europe, it is clear that even when the legal architecture of explicit, biologically based racism has been dismantled, patterns of racialized disadvantage and exclusion persist under new guises.

Building on influential critiques of Europe’s “new racism,” I argue that it is important to engage critically with not only the *cultural* politics of racism, but also with the *geographical* politics of racism.⁴⁹ Instead of jettisoning the category of race entirely (for being unscientific or laden with genocidal baggage) and replacing it with the supposedly “innocent” category of ethnicity, it is necessary to engage with the multiple geographically- and historically-specific *racisms* that (re)produce that the very category of race itself.⁵⁰ As David Theo Goldberg writes:

If race is a virtually vacuous category, as many have insisted, it must act as a cipher rather than as a motor force with determining power of its own. Its modes of determination must derive from that for which it stands as shorthand [...] [T]he force of race assumes its power in and from the thick of contexts of the different if related geopolitical regions in which it is embedded, the specific conditions of which concretize the notion of race representing them.⁵¹

Thus, a *geographical* and historically situated understanding of race and racism is absolutely essential. A geographical understanding of race provides an analytical toolkit for identifying forms of differentiation that do not explicitly invoke blood (for instance, citizenship by descent) but nonetheless employ essentializing logics. Indeed race is not, and never has been, solely contained within the individual body or inscribed upon the surface of the skin.⁵² Rather, “race” is a power-laden, floating signifier that gains meaning through religion, culture, geography, mobility, bodily practices, and social associations to produce what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls “premature death.”⁵³ And this approach begins to elucidate why, for instance, certain

cosmopolitan-inflected articulations of Blackness and *jus soli* citizenship claims can tentatively coexist in Italy alongside the marginalization of newly arrived refugees from sub-Saharan Africa: each charts different relations among space, place, mobility, and economic status. An analysis of the spatial politics of racism has become increasingly urgent as Black migrants are subjected to increasingly extreme violence at the nexus of racism and xenophobia—from Donald Trump’s reference to African countries as “shitholes” and his decision to end Temporary Protective Status for Haitians,⁵⁴ to the threatened deportation of Black Britons of the “Windrush generation.”⁵⁵

At the same time, however, the complex and overlapping geographies of racism and mobility in Black Italy cannot be fully subsumed within the dominant trans-Atlantic geographies of Black diaspora studies. Increasingly, scholars have turned to the concept of the **Black Mediterranean** as a way to capture the unique histories of cultural encounter⁵⁶ and racial violence linking Europe and Africa. This work, with all of its radical insights as well as instances of romantic naiveté, can be read as a response to the increasing violence of Fortress Europe’s Mediterranean border regimes. The Black Mediterranean engages with the interconnections between Italy and Africa, approaching the Mediterranean Sea as a space of interconnection rather than a solid boundary.⁵⁷ Directly recalling the Black Atlantic (which was first used by Robert Farris Thompson⁵⁸ to describe the visual traditions forged in the transatlantic slave trade and subsequently gained wider circulation with the publication of Paul Gilroy’s influential 1993 text⁵⁹), invocations of the Black Mediterranean carry multiple inflections. They reference the syncretic cultural forms produced through Italy’s colonial and postcolonial entanglements with the African continent,⁶⁰ as well as the histories of racial violence and anti-Blackness that set the conditions of possibility for the current refugee crisis.⁶¹ This work suggests that Italian national identity has had to perpetually define itself in relation to Africa and Blackness, and that Black Italian experiences are shaped by complex Mediterranean histories *in addition* to the transatlantic circulation of diasporic resources emphasized in the tradition of Thompson and Gilroy.

Research Methods: Placing Black Italy

An investigation of race, nationalism, citizenship, and Blackness in contemporary Italy poses several methodological challenges. First, the persistence and intensification of regionalism in Italy—a process often glossed as fragmentation—means that one cannot easily generalize from one part of Italy to the entire country. Second, the sites of Black Italian organizing in Italy are geographically dispersed. The centrality of the Internet and social media to the circulation of diasporic resources, creation of alternative media, and enactment of visibility politics among Black youth poses a further challenge to a spatially bounded analysis. The Internet—and Facebook in particular—has become a haven for emerging conversations (and arguments) among a spatially dispersed generation of Black Italians. Through an ever-growing number of Facebook pages, YouTube channels, and blogs, young Black Italians have been able to connect, achieve new levels of visibility, and create relatively autonomous spaces for discussion, political organizing, and cultural production. In many cases, these platforms exist outside the normal channels favored by the increasingly moribund Italian Left (i.e., political parties, national labor unions, social associations, and community centers), which are frequently derided as patronizing and prone to tokenistic engagements with communities of color and other marginalized groups.

For these reasons, the multiplicity of practices by which Black youth are articulating Blackness and Italianness, and attempting to challenge Italian ethnic absolutism, cannot be adequately contained within one community center, neighborhood, or city. This emergent Black Italia does not have a singular geographical referent, but rather emerges from the interstices of

everyday life. It spans photo shoots in Milan's Piazza del Duomo about respecting the bodily integrity of Black women in public spaces; Afrobeat-influenced DJ sets in Rome attended by Black Italian youth and their white Italian schoolmates; movements to reformulate high school curricula in Bologna; international sporting events during which racist outbursts incite conversations about whether Black players can be representatives of Italy; a growing community of writers remapping Italian colonial history in relation to the present; and online spaces in which news from across the African diaspora is shared and remixed. Capturing the density and complexity of these networks therefore requires a different methodological approach.

This dissertation is based on sixteen months of multi-sited qualitative fieldwork conducted between the years of 2013 and 2017 with Black activists, artists, and entrepreneurs across northern and central Italy. I employed multiple research methods, including in-depth interviews and participant observation; virtual ethnography of online communities; media content analysis of reporting on migration and citizenship issues from the 1980s to the present; archival research on the history of race, Italian national unification, and colonialism; and critical public policy analysis of Italian immigration and citizenship laws. I spent five years developing relationships with Black activists, artists, and entrepreneurs, sitting in on activist meetings around Italy, participating in demonstrations, and organizing gatherings and events. As a self-identified Black Italian, I structured my research in a way that was necessarily reflexive, but also attentive to power (for instance, I have Italian citizenship thanks to the same law that disenfranchises many of my interlocutors). And, as the anecdotes at the beginning of this chapter suggest, I also lived my research intimately, on the surface of my skin.

This project represents the first in-depth study of Black youth political mobilizations in Italy. But rather than asking whether Italians of African descent have “integrated” into a supposedly bounded and homogenous nation, I focus instead on the ways they have become entangled with the process of re-defining Italy's legal, racial, cultural, and economic boundaries. Much of the recent critical border and citizenship studies literature has engaged with the “migrant question” in Europe from a very high level of theoretical abstraction. As such, this work has tended to collapse very different sorts of lived experiences into a singular, abstracted refugee story, obscuring the important contestations about race and national belonging that are unfolding *within* Italy's highly variegated Black community. For this reason, ethnographic research oriented on everyday engagement with activists, artists, and entrepreneurs is crucial: it allows us to see the multiple re-arrangements of race, nationalism, and citizenship that are taking place in Italy today. This finely-grained level of analysis can help us begin to understand, for instance, how certain mobilizations of Black Italianness can actually work to produce to new forms of racial differentiation that, in practice, further marginalize African refugees.

A Note on Language and Translation

What are the terms by which one's political claims can become recognizable?⁶² Or, to paraphrase Tina Campt's question in *Other Germans*, what labels should be used to describe a “group of people for whom there existed no positive term of reference as individuals of both Black and [Italian] heritage”?⁶³ For Black youth in Italy, language is a key terrain upon which debates about identity and belonging are currently staged.⁶⁴ Unlike the United States, where there is at least some general consensus around the terms African American or Black, the language of self-identification in Italy is vast, varied, and highly contested—a testament to the relative newness of these conversations. Some of the terms used by my interlocutors included second generation, new generation, new Italian, Italian-plus, Black Italian, Afro-Italian, person of color, or terms

that identify specific countries (such as Italian-Ghanaian or Italian-Eritrean). Each term marks a set of commitments and has certain political implications.

For the purpose of consistency, I use “Black Italian” throughout this dissertation to refer to the children of African or Afro-descendant immigrants who were born or raised in Italy, as well as the children of mixed unions (including those between Black Africans and white Italians, and between Black Americans and white Italians).⁶⁵ While my interlocutors span these various categories, I found that they most frequently used the terms Afro-Italian or Black Italian to refer to themselves and, collectively, to each other (though not necessarily to the exclusion of other labels). Appellations such as as Afro-Italian or Black Italian are intended both by myself and by my interlocutors to designate similarities not in terms of biological descent, but in terms of lived experience—they work to establish a form of kinship based on shared (but not identical) struggles. In the chapters that follow, I will address the ways that contestations over the language of collective identification are also tied to a larger set of political negotiations about Black solidarity, alliance, and diaspora—negotiations that are always imbricated with ideas related to race, nation, gender, color, and class.

Outline of the Dissertation Chapters

Chapter One of the dissertation examines both the racial history of Italian immigration law and contemporary struggles to reform it toward *jus soli*, or right of birthplace. I argue that political obstructionism and the refugee crisis have forced activists to confront the limitations of citizenship as a means for challenging structural anti-Blackness in Italy. Chapter Two situates contemporary debates in Italy around citizenship and difference within a longer history of racial formation and colonialism in Mediterranean Europe. I argue that the perceived “threat” of African contamination produced notions of Italianness that paradoxically privileged mixedness, but not Blackness. Chapter Three in turn uses a moment of extreme racial violence—the murder of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi at the hands of an Italian fascist in 2016—to analyze emerging conversations about Black Italianness. I argue that Black youth are beginning to articulate a diasporic cultural politics capable of responding to the complex catalog of Atlantic *and* Mediterranean racial ideologies that have shaped contemporary “Black Italy.”

Chapter Four focuses on Black women’s entrepreneurship, a key site wherein young Black Italians are making claims for citizenship and national inclusion. I argue that at a time of economic stagnation, Black entrepreneurship has emerged as an important yet politically ambiguous site of struggle that inadvertently pits Italian-born Black youth against newly arrived refugees. Invoking aforementioned notions of Italian hybridity, young Black entrepreneurs claim that they can re-make Italy as a vibrant cultural and economic crossroads. Chapter Five explores the tenuous relationship between citizenship reform struggles and refugee rights mobilizations in Italy, focusing on the work of Italian-Eritrean youth in Milan. I show that the lived realities of the refugee emergency in Italy have generated newer mobilizations that do not regard citizenship as a primary goal. Instead, these projects are articulating new solidarities across generations and immigration statuses based on what activists perceive as the shared ties of diaspora and anticolonial nationalism. Finally, in the Conclusion I advance a set of claims about the racial cauldron that is unique to southern Italy. I invite further research on the experiences of Black Italian youth from Naples to Palermo as they collide with newly arrived immigrants and informal labor markets in an already marginalized and historically racialized region of Italy.

Throughout this dissertation, I seek to capture a sense of possibility amidst chaos—to shine a light on the small fissures that have been wrenched open by young Black Italians at a

moment when the future of Italy, and Europe more broadly, seems profoundly uncertain and some more than others are being rapidly thrust into a post-apocalyptic present. After all, even though political commentators talk a great deal about Europe being on the brink of crisis, the reality is that certain people have been rendered expendable for centuries, as the foundation upon which Europe was built. But Europe is only now taking notice because the empire is striking back⁶⁶—or, as Aimé Césaire suggested in the *Discourse on Colonialism*,⁶⁷ what used to happen “out there” in the colonies is now happening “in here” within the boundaries of the former metropole, revealing the limits of European (and Italian) claims to universalism. These grave circumstances require new acts of creativity, unexpected alliance, and social self-creation. This, I believe, is the only way to understand the attempts of young Black Italians to construct a future for themselves in Italy, a future in which their existence will no longer be confined to the realm of *fantascienza*, of the unthinkable. It is a story of activists, entrepreneurs, and artists caught between generations and categories and legal statuses and diasporas, in a country that is slowly crumbling under the weight of its unresolved colonial and fascist history.

¹ Elements of the Introduction are adapted from my article in *Transition* 123 (2017): 152-174, “In Search of Black Italia: Notes on Race, Belonging, and Activism in the Black Mediterranean.” They are included in accordance with the copyright agreement signed by the Author for *Transition*.

² Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (International Publishers Co, 1971), 275–76.

³ Pina Piccolo, *I canti dell'interregno* (Rome: Lebeg, 2018), 8–9. Translated by Don Stang.

⁴ Walidah Imarisha and adrienne maree brown, *Octavia's Brood: Science Fiction Stories from Social Justice Movements* (Oakland: AK Press, 2015), 3.

⁵ As Alessandro Portelli notes, Italians do not perceive themselves as “white,” but rather as “normal.” Angelica Pesarini summarizes Portelli’s argument: “Such a structural colour-blindness... is problematic because it associates Whiteness with normality and, consequently, with Italianness. Simply put, to be Italian is to be White. Within this discourse, those who do not fit the alleged (White) Italian type are deemed outside the Nation on a number of levels.” For this reason, in this dissertation I have made a point to mark what is typically left unmarked by specifying “white Italian” where appropriate. This choice of nomenclature is intended to challenge the taken-for-granted conflation of Italianness and the Italian nation-state with whiteness and normality in the popular racial imaginary. See Alessandro Portelli, “The Problem of the Color Blind: Notes on the Discourse of Race in Italy,” in *Crossroutes--The Meaning of Race for the 21st Century*, ed. Paola Boi and Sabine Broeck (Hamburg: LIT, 2003), 29–39; Angelica Pesarini, “‘Blood Is Thicker than Water’: The Materialization of the Racial Body in Fascist East Africa,” *Zapruder World: An International Journal for the History of Social Conflict* 4 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.21431/Z33S32>.

⁶ My experience was likely also tempered by my skin color; a Black woman with dark skin would have likely experienced even greater hostility. As I will discuss in Chapter Five, colorism also shapes the experiences of Black folk in Italy and their relations to each other, in ways that also intersect with gender.

⁷ “States with the Highest Population of Italian Americans,” *The National Italian American Foundation* (blog), accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.niaf.org/culture/statistics/states-with-the-highest-population-of-italian-americans/>.

⁸ Stuart Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (1978; repr., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Michael Keith, *Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society* (London: UCL Press, 1993); Barnor Hesse, “White Governmentality: Urbanism, Nationalism, Racism,” in *Imagining Cities: Scripts, Signs, Memories*, ed. Sallie Westwood and John Williams (London: Routledge, 1997), 85–102.

⁹ Heather Merrill, “Postcolonial Borderlands: Black Life Worlds and Relational Place in Turin, Italy,” *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies* 13, no. 2 (2014): 283.

- ¹⁰ Donald Martin Carter, “Blackness Over Europe: Meditations on Cultural Belonging,” in *Africa in Europe: Studies in Transnational Practice in the Long Twentieth Century*, ed. Eve Rosenhaft and Robbie John Macvicar Aitken (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 206.
- ¹¹ Heather Merrill, “In Other Wor(l)Ds: Situated Intersectionality in Italy,” in *Spaces of Danger: Culture and Power in the Everyday*, ed. Heather Merrill and Lisa M. Hoffman (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015), 89.
- ¹² Leonardo De Franceschi, *La Cittadinanza Come Luogo Di Lotta. Le Seconde Generazioni in Italia Fra Cinema e Serialità* (Rome: Arcane Editrice, 2018).
- ¹³ Angelo Del Boca, “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism,” in *A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present*, ed. Patrizia Palumbo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 17–36.
- ¹⁴ Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (1983; repr., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 102.
- ¹⁵ Robinson, 16; Salvatore Bono, *Schiavi: una storia mediterranea (XVI-XIX secolo)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016). Bono, *Schiavi*.
- ¹⁶ Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 104.
- ¹⁷ Robinson, 104.
- ¹⁸ Stephen Small, *20 Questions and Answers on Black Europe* (Amsterdam: Amrit Publishers, 2018).
- ¹⁹ Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.
- ²⁰ Italy also controlled the 46-hectare territorial concession of Tientsin, in China, from 1901 to 1947.
- ²¹ Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo, “Introduction: Paradigms of Postcoloniality in Contemporary Italy,” in *Postcolonial Italy: Challenging National Homogeneity*, ed. Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1.
- ²² Corrado Bonifazi et al., “Italy: The Italian Transition from an Emigration to Immigration Country.” (Brussels: European Commission, 2009).
- ²³ Heather Merrill, *An Alliance Of Women: Immigration And The Politics Of Race* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
- ²⁴ Heather Merrill and Donald Martin Carter, “Inside and Outside Italian Political Culture: Immigrants and Diasporic Politics in Turin,” *GeoJournal* 58, no. 2/3 (2002): 167–75.
- ²⁵ Jacqueline Andall, *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service: The Politics of Black Women in Italy* (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2000); Merrill and Carter, “Inside and Outside Italian Political Culture.”
- ²⁶ Merrill, *An Alliance Of Women*.
- ²⁷ Asale Angel-Ajani, “Italy’s Racial Cauldron: Immigration, Criminalization and the Cultural Politics of Race,” *Cultural Dynamics* 12, no. 3 (2000): 331–52, <https://doi.org/10.1177/092137400001200304>.
- ²⁸ Elena Ambrosetti and Eralba Cela, “Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Italy,” in *The International Handbook of the Demography of Race and Ethnicity*, ed. Rogelio Saenz, Nestor Rodriguez, and David Embrick, International Handbooks of Population 4 (London: Springer, 2015), 457–82.
- ²⁹ Istat, “Cittadini non comunitari: presenza, nuovi ingressi e acquisizioni di cittadinanza,” October 30, 2016, <http://www.istat.it>.
- ³⁰ Giorgia Papavero, “Minori e Seconde Generazioni” (Milan: Fondazione ISMU, 2015).
- ³¹ Umberto Melotti, “Immigration and Security in Europe: A Look at the Italian Case,” in *The Frontiers of Europe: A Transatlantic Problem?*, ed. Federiga M. Bindi and Irina Angelescu (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 107–26; Francesco Grignetti, “‘Immigrazione diffusa’, la risposta italiana alle banlieue,” *La Stampa*, May 2, 2016, <http://www.lastampa.it/2016/05/02/esteri/immigrazione-diffusa-la-risposta-italiana-alle-banlieue-8p5OH0i0xLdTcN0uFaWuPM/pagina.html>.
- ³² As Michael Watts has demonstrated in his work on the Niger Delta, youth movements and generational forces are both reflective of and can in turn transform broader political, economic, and social structures at a given historical conjuncture. See Michael Watts, “The Sinister Political Life of Community: Economies of Violence and Governable Spaces in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” in *The Seductions of Community: Emancipations, Oppressions, Quandries*, ed. Gerald W. Creed (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2006), 101–42.
- ³³ Andall, *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service*; Donald Martin Carter, *States of Grace: Senegalese in Italy and the New European Immigration* (University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Jeffrey Cole, *The New Racism in Europe: A Sicilian Ethnography* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Merrill, *An Alliance Of Women*.
- ³⁴ Annalisa Frisina, *Giovani musulmani d’Italia* (Rome: Carocci, 2007); Mohammed Khalid Rhazzali, *L’Islam in carcere: l’esperienza religiosa dei giovani musulmani nelle prigioni italiane* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2010).

- ³⁵ Philomena Essed and Kwame Nimako, “Designs and (Co)Incidents: Cultures of Scholarship and Public Policy on Immigrants/Minorities in the Netherlands,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 47, no. 3–4 (2006): 281–312, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715206065784>.
- ³⁶ Merrill and Carter, “Inside and Outside Italian Political Culture.”
- ³⁷ Jacqueline Andall, “Second-Generation Attitude? African-Italians in Milan,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, no. 3 (2002): 389–407, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830220146518>.
- ³⁸ All interview excerpts were originally in Italian and were translated by the Author, unless indicated otherwise.
- ³⁹ Susi Meret, Elisabetta Della Corte, and Maria Sangiuliano, “The Racist Attacks against Cécile Kyenge and the Enduring Myth of the ‘Nice’ Italian,” *OpenDemocracy* (blog), August 28, 2013, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/susi-meret-elisabetta-della-corte-maria-sangiuliano/racist-attacks-against-c%C3%A9cile>.
- ⁴⁰ Merrill, “In Other Wor(l)Ds: Situated Intersectionality in Italy,” 78.
- ⁴¹ Small, *20 Questions and Answers on Black Europe*.
- ⁴² Darlene Clark Hine, “Preface,” in *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*, ed. Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), xvii–xix.
- ⁴³ Michelle M. Wright, *Physics of Blackness: Beyond the Middle Passage Epistemology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).
- ⁴⁴ Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
- ⁴⁵ Jane Schneider, *Italy’s “Southern Question”: Orientalism in One Country* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 1998).
- ⁴⁶ Kwame Nimako, “Theorizing Black Europe and African Diaspora: Implications for Citizenship, Nativism, and Xenophobia,” in *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*, ed. Stephen Small, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 223.
- ⁴⁷ Alana Lentin, *Racism And Anti-Racism In Europe* (London: Pluto Press, 2004); Cristina Lombardi-Diop, “Spotless Italy: Hygiene, Domesticity, and the Ubiquity of Whiteness in Fascist and Postwar Consumer Culture,” *California Italian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2011), <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8vt6r0vf>; Caterina Romeo, “Racial Evaporations: Representing Blackness in African Italian Postcolonial Literature,” in *Postcolonial Italy: Challenging National Homogeneity*, ed. Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 221–36.
- ⁴⁸ Trica Danielle Keaton, “The Politics of Race-Blindness: (Anti)Blackness and Category-Blindness in Contemporary France,” *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 7, no. 1 (2010): 103–31, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X10000202>.
- ⁴⁹ Allan Pred, *Even in Sweden: Racisms, Racialized Spaces, and the Popular Geographical Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
- ⁵⁰ Kamala Visweswaran, *Un/Common Cultures: Racism and the Rearticulation of Cultural Difference* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
- ⁵¹ David Theo Goldberg, “Racial Europeanization,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 2 (2006): 332, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870500465611>.
- ⁵² Donald Moore, for instance, explains (via Foucault) that even before the biopoliticization of race, Europe was suffused with discourses of race that were articulated through notions of spatiality. See Donald S. Moore, *Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 13–14.
- ⁵³ Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
- ⁵⁴ James Doubek, “NAACP Sues Trump Administration Over Ending Protected Status For Haitians,” *NPR*, January 25, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/25/580566917/naacp-sues-trump-administration-over-ending-protected-status-for-haitians>.
- ⁵⁵ “‘Windrush Generation’ Deportation Threat,” *BBC News*, April 11, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-43726976>.
- ⁵⁶ My use of the term “encounter” here is indebted to Mary Louise Pratt’s notion of the contact zone: “[S]ocial spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today.” See Mary Louise Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone,” *Profession*, 1991, 34.
- ⁵⁷ Timothy Raeymaekers, “Working the Black Mediterranean,” *Liminal Geographies* (blog), January 21, 2015, <http://www.timothyraeymaekers.net/2015/01/working-the-black-mediterranean/>; Timothy Raeymaekers, “The

Racial Geography of the Black Mediterranean,” *Liminal Geographies* (blog), January 21, 2015, <http://www.timothyraeymaekers.net/2015/01/the-racial-geography-of-the-black-mediterranean/>.

⁵⁸ Robert Farris Thompson, *Flash of the Spirit: African & Afro-American Art & Philosophy* (1984; repr., Random House, 2010).

⁵⁹ Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic*.

⁶⁰ Alessandra Di Maio, “Mediterraneo Nero. Le Rotte Dei Migranti Nel Millennio Globale,” in *La Citta’ Cosmopolita*, ed. Giulia de Spuches and Vincenzo Guarrasi (Palermo: Palumbo Editore, 2012), 142–63; Gabriele Proglia, “Is the Mediterranean a White Italian–European Sea? The Multiplication of Borders in the Production of Historical Subjectivity,” *Interventions*, 2018, 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2017.1421025>.

⁶¹ P. Khalil Saucier and Tryon P. Woods, “Ex Aqua: The Mediterranean Basin, Africans on the Move, and the Politics of Policing,” *Theoria* 61, no. 141 (2014): 55–75, <https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2014.6114104>; Ida Danewid, “White Innocence in the Black Mediterranean: Hospitality and the Erasure of History,” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 7 (2017): 1674–89, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1331123>.

⁶² Cristiana Giordano, “Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy,” *American Ethnologist* 35, no. 4 (2008): 588–606, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2008.00100.x>.

⁶³ Tina Marie Campt, *Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and Memory in the Third Reich* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 9.

⁶⁴ Masturah Alatas and Igiaba Scego, *Italiani per vocazione* (Fiesole: Cadmo, 2005).

⁶⁵ In Chapter Three, I engage in greater depth with contestations around the use of such terms as “Black Italian” or “Afro-Italian.”

⁶⁶ Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism In 70’s Britain* (1982; repr., London: Routledge, 2004).

⁶⁷ Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (1950; repr., New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000).

Acknowledgements

Graduate school generally, and dissertation writing specifically, is a collective progress that gets invisibilized by the individualistic conventions of academia. I would not have been able to complete this project without support from a wide community of family, friends, and mentors.

First, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee at UC Berkeley—Jake Kosek, Michael Watts, Stephen Small, and Donald Moore. Each has left their indelible mark on this dissertation by encouraging my ideas, shaping my intellectual commitments, challenging my taken-for-granted assumptions, and providing invaluable guidance during inevitable moments of “stuckness.” I am also profoundly grateful for Gillian Hart, who served on my qualifying examination committee; thanks to Gill’s intellectual rigor, I began to truly understand how the production of space was also intertwined with the production of difference. Jovan Scott Lewis and Sharad Chari have contributed in immeasurable ways to the ongoing project of making space within UC Berkeley’s geography department for Black geographies; our many conversations and collaborations have also informed this project. Beyond Berkeley, Cristiana Giordano and Heather Merrill were incredibly generous mentors who supported my research and never hesitated to share pearls of wisdom based on their own ethnographic engagements with questions of race and immigration in contemporary Italy.

Beyond faculty, the support of fellow graduate students buoyed me through the most challenging moments in the PhD program—from Diana Negrín, who lent me a copy of Allan Pred’s *The Past is Not Dead* and convinced me that there was a place for my work within geography, to my amazingly supportive cohort. The Gang of Four (Andrea Marston, Meredith Palmer, Erin Torkelson, and myself) was and continues to be a deeply meaningful community of intellectual and personal nourishment—as well as infinitely memorable dance parties. Mollie Van Gordon has been uniquely able to speak across physical and human geography, and through our many conversations I have come to see my work in new ways. Ilaria Giglioli and Alessandro Tiberio (the so-called Calitalians) have also been invaluable collaborators, sounding boards, and peer editors. Brittany Meché, Sherine Ebadi, Kaily Heitz, Kerby Lynch, and Jane Henderson continue to inspire me for the ways in which they are transforming the discipline of geography through their scholarship and activism. And Ashton Wesner and Jen Smith provided oases of care and comradeship during some of the most grueling moments of dissertation writing.

My five years of involvement in the Black Europe Summer School (BESS) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, was also formative. During my first summer of pre-dissertation fieldwork in 2013, I attempted to explain my research interests to a white Italian postdoctoral scholar. When she heard me utter the word *razza*, her face went pale. Then, with careful condescension, she replied: “You know that in Italy, we don’t use the word *razza*; it reminds us of fascism. And really, ethnicity is a more accurate way of describing human groups.” When I arrived to the Black Europe Summer School a few weeks later, I thought that I would have to completely rethink my dissertation project—after all, how could I study race and national identity in Italy if race was an irrelevant category? Through BESS, I learned that my experience with the Italian postdoc was symptomatic of a more pervasive ethos of colorblindness in Europe, and that I had stumbled upon a rich ethnographic anecdote rather than an impediment to my research. While I cannot list every member of my BESS family and the ways in which they have shaped my work (because that would require another dissertation entirely), I am especially

grateful to BESS Director Dr. Kwame Nimako. Kwame has continually nurtured my intellectual growth, taking me seriously as a scholar before I really began to see myself in that same light.

I am also thankful to have such a rich scholarly community in Europe, and particularly in Italy. Annalisa Frisina sponsored me as a visiting graduate student at the University of Padua in 2016, and we collaborated on a number of articles and book chapters. In addition to Annalisa, Gaia Giuliani, Alessandra Di Maio, Gabriele Proglia, Timothy Raeymaekers, and Leonardo de Franceschi have worked tirelessly to carve out a space within Italian academia for critical race studies, and it has been an honor to work with them on various publications and conferences. Pina Piccolo is a beloved co-conspirator who has been consistently unafraid to challenge the race-blindness of the Italian Left—and although this occasionally gets us into trouble, she has inspired me to stand by my political commitments and embody *la lupa*—the she-wolf. Kehinde Andrews worked with me to organize a series of symposia on the Black Mediterranean at Birmingham City University, as part of the UK's first Black studies degree program. And finally, Angelica Pesarini, Mackda Ghebremariam Tesfau', and Sandra Kyeremeh represent a brilliant new generation of Black Italian social scientists; it has been a true honor to call them my sisters.

Of course, this project would not have been possible without the support and guidance of so many friends and interlocutors in Italy: Adama, Aida, Alem, Alice, Ariam, Ark, Assita, Bellamy, Benamina, Evelyne, Fortuna, Francesca, Francis, Fred, Grazia, Igiaba, Johanne, Karima, Kibra, Kwanza, Marilena, Medhin, Milissa, Mussie, Randa, Reina, Theo, Tommy, Stephanie, and Tamara—just to name a few! Not only did they generously share their stories with me, but through our many conversations and collaborations I came to understand my own Black Italianness in new ways. I cannot understate the significance of this gift. And throughout many, many months of fieldwork, my relatives in Italy always looked out for me. My cousin Mara, her husband Massimo, and their boys Gabriele and Davide were the most wonderful neighbors I could have asked for when I lived in that little green house in Sesto San Giovanni.

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Last, but certainly not least, I would have not survived the past six years if not for my beloved circle of family and friends. My parents, in their infinite patience, have read every chapter of this dissertation and have listened to countless practice presentations. They have talked me down from my most frightening moments of anxiety and self-doubt, and through a perfect blend of care and tough love, gave me the strength I needed to finish the PhD. My dear friends Melissa and Sarah were always a text message and a glass of wine away, providing boundless emotional support and laughter. My cat Marlin ensured that I maintained a healthy work-life balance: he always knew when I needed to step away from the computer, and let me know this by flopping his fuzzy body directly onto my keyboard. And my sweet husband, Shawn: he has seen me at my best and at my worst, celebrated my highest highs and comforted me during my lowest lows. I cannot adequately put into words the kind of support I have received from Shawn, so a brief anecdote will have to suffice. On one particularly challenging day of writing, I decided to stop and take a quick nap. I awoke to a strange sense of swaying, and looked out the companionway to see nothing but blue. Shawn, sensing that I needed a *real* break, had taken our sailboat out onto the bay while I was asleep; I awoke surrounded by water and sky.

Thank you, all of you, from the bottom of my heart. And I am truly excited to begin the next chapter of my academic life in the sociology department at UC Santa Cruz this coming fall.

Curriculum Vitae

UC Berkeley, Department of Geography
507 McCone Hall #4740
Berkeley, CA 94720
Tel: 707-372-3467
Email: camilla.hawthorne@berkeley.edu

EDUCATION

- PhD** University of California, Berkeley
Geography / Designated Emphasis: Science and Technology Studies, May 2018
“There Are No Black Italians”? *Race and Citizenship in the Black Mediterranean*
Jake Kosek (chair); Michael Watts; Stephen Small; Donald Moore
Specialties: Race, Migration, Citizenship, Human Geography, STS
- Visiting Student** University of Padua (Italy)
Philosophy, Sociology, Pedagogy, and Applied Psychology, 2016
Slanting Gaze on Social Control, Labour, Racism and Migration Research Group
- MPA** Brown University
Master of Public Affairs, May 2010
Specialty: Comparative Immigration Policy
- AB** Brown University
International Relations (honors) and Africana Studies, May 2009
Magna Cum Laude; Phi Beta Kappa

PUBLICATIONS

Book Manuscripts in Preparation

Different Waters, Same Sea: Contesting Racialized Citizenship in the Black Mediterranean
(monograph).

Fear of a Black Planet: Black Geographies and Insurgent Knowledge, ed. Jovan Scott Lewis and
Camilla Hawthorne (edited volume).

Journal Articles

- 2018 **Camilla Hawthorne** and Kaily Heitz. “Commentary: A Seat at the Table? Reflections on
Black Geographies and the Limits of Dialogue.” *Dialogues in Human Geography* 8, no. 2
(2018): 148-151.

- 2018 Annalisa Frisina and **Camilla Hawthorne**. “Italians with veils and Afros: gender, beauty, and the everyday anti-racism of the daughters of immigrants in Italy.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 5 (2018; online 2017): 718-735.
- 2017 Ilaria Giglioli, **Camilla Hawthorne**, and Alessandro Tiberio. “Introduction to the special issue ‘Rethinking “Europe” through an ethnography of its borderlands, peripheries and margins.’” *Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa* no. 3 (September–December), 2017: 335-338.
- 2017 Camilla Hawthorne. “In Search of Black Italia: Notes on Race, Belonging, and Activism in the Black Mediterranean.” *Transition* 123 (2017): 152–174.

Journal Special Issues Edited

- 2019 Kehinde Andrews and **Camilla Hawthorne**. “The Black Mediterranean.” *Black Studies* (forthcoming, 2019).
- 2018 Ilaria Giglioli, **Camilla Hawthorne**, and Alessandro Tiberio. “The politics of bordering and exclusion in Europe.” *Social and Cultural Geography* (forthcoming, 2018).
- 2017 Ilaria Giglioli, **Camilla Hawthorne**, and Alessandro Tiberio. “Rethinking ‘Europe’ through an ethnography of its borderlands, peripheries and margins.” *Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa* no. 3 (September–December), 2017.

Book Chapters

- 2019 Camilla Hawthorne. “Dangerous Networks: Internet Regulations as Racial Border Control in Italy.” In *digitalSTS: A Fieldguide*, eds. Janet Vertesi and David Ribes (Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2019).

Book Chapters (Italian)

- 2017 Annalisa Frisina and **Camilla Hawthorne**. “Riconoscersi nel successo di Evelyne, lottare nel ricordo di Abba. Un viaggio tra le icone nere dei figli delle migrazioni in Italia.” In *A fior di pelle. Razza e visualità*, eds. Elisa Bordin and Stefano Bosco, 179–195. Verona: Ombre Corte, 2017.
- 2015 Annalisa Frisina and **Camilla Hawthorne**. “Sulle pratiche estetiche antirazziste delle figlie delle migrazioni.” In *Il Colore della nazione*, ed. Gaia Giuliani, 200–214. Milan: Mondadori Education, 2015.

Manuscripts in Submission

Camilla Hawthorne. “Race, reproduction, and the crisis of ‘Made in Italy.’” (Article under revision for *Social & Cultural Geography*)

Web-Based Publications

- 2016 Camilla Hawthorne and Brittany Meché. “Making Space for Black Feminist Praxis in Geography.” *Society and Space*, September 30 (Reprint forthcoming in *Unknowable: Geography and Black Feminisms*, ed. LaToya Eaves).

Other Publications

- 2017 Camilla Hawthorne. “Blaxploitation, Italian Style.” *Africa is a Country*, May 29.
- 2016 Camilla Hawthorne and Pina Piccolo. “‘Meticciano’ o della problematicità di una parola.” *La macchina sognante*, December 31 (English translation published in *Liminal Geographies*).
- 2016 Camilla Hawthorne and Pina Piccolo. “Anti-racism without race in Italy.” *Africa is a Country*, September 16 (Italian translation published in *La macchina sognante*).
- 2016 Pina Piccolo and Camilla Hawthorne. “‘Razza’ e ‘umano’ non sono termini banali.” *Frontiere News*, July 26.
- 2016 Camilla Hawthorne. “Nakeya Brown’s Hair Stories.” *GRIOT*, July 7 (reprinted in the exhibition catalog for Nakeya Brown’s 2017 solo show “More Than a Woman” at the Urban Institute for Contemporary Arts in Grand Rapids, Michigan).
- 2016 Camilla Hawthorne. “Filmmaker Fred Kuwornu on *Blaxploitation* and Representation in Italian Cinema.” *Doppiozero*, June 17.
- 2016 Camilla Hawthorne. “Asmarina: Postcolonial Heritages.” *Doppiozero*, May 13.
- 2015 Camilla Hawthorne. “Italian Writer Igiaba Scego Rewrites the Black Mediterranean.” *Africa is a Country*, October 14.
- 2011 Camilla Hawthorne. “Lampedusa: Adrift in a Murky Sea of Refugee Policies.” *Fair Observer*, July 20.

AWARDS AND HONORS

- 2017 UC Berkeley Graduate Division Conference Travel Grant
- 2016 UC Berkeley Geography Department Conference Grant
- 2015 UC Berkeley Geography Department Conference Grant
- 2014 UC Berkeley Center for Science, Technology, Medicine, and Society Fieldwork Grant
- 2014 Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellowship**
- 2014 American Association of Geographers Political Geography Specialty Group Travel Grant
- 2014 UC Berkeley Graduate Division Conference Travel Grant
- 2014 UC Berkeley Geography Department Conference Grant
- 2013 UC Berkeley Geography Department Travel Grant

- 2013 Associated Students of the University of California Academic Opportunity Fund Grant
2012 Eugene Cota-Robles Graduate Fellowship
2010 Presidential Management Fellowship
2009 Liman Public Interest Law Fellowship

INVITED TALKS

- 2018 “Black Youth Activism in Italy.” University of San Francisco, April 25.
- 2017 “Black Italy.” Summer School on Black Europe (The Netherlands), July 5.
- 2016 “Perspectives on Black Europe: New Media and the Practices of Diaspora.” University of Pauda (Italy), December 12.
- 2016 “Afrodiscendenti e new media.” University of Pauda (Italy), November 2.
- 2016 “In Search of Black Italia: Speculative Afrofutures and the Crisis of ‘Made in Italy.’” University of Bremen (Germany), October 19.
- 2016 “‘*Come parli bene l’italiano!*’ Feminist Fieldwork Praxis and Adventures in (Mis)recognition in the Study of Black Italian Diasporic Politics.” Mobility and Politics Research Collective, July 5.
- 2016 “‘There Are No Black Italians?’ Race, Citizenship, and the Black Diaspora in Italy.” University of the Western Piedmont (Italy), April 28.

CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES

Conferences and Symposia Organized

- 2018 “International Symposium on Black Europe 2017–Inside Black Europe: Racial Configurations in the Post 9/11 Era.” International Institute for Research and Education (The Netherlands), July 2.
- 2017 “Hopeful Encounters, Violent Collisions: Black and Italian Diasporas in the Contact Zone.” UC Berkeley, Berkeley City College, and San Francisco Museum of the African Diaspora, October 5–25.
- 2017 “Black Geographies: Insurgent Knowledge, Spatial Poetics, and the Politics of Blackness.” UC Berkeley, October 11–13.
- 2017 “International Symposium on Black Europe 2017–Inside Black Europe: Racial Configurations in the Post 9/11 Era.” International Institute for Research and Education (The Netherlands), July 3.

- 2017 “The Black Mediterranean in Action.” Birmingham City University (UK), June 9–10.
- 2017 “Immigration to Europe: Inclusion, Exclusion, and Differential Incorporation.” UC Berkeley Institute of European Studies, April 20.
- 2016 “The Black Mediterranean and the Migrant Crisis.” Birmingham City University (UK), November 9.
- 2016 “International Symposium on Black Europe 2016: Inside Black Europe–Racial Configurations in the Post 9/11 Era.” International Institute for Research and Education (The Netherlands), June 27.
- 2015 “International Symposium on Black Europe 2015: Inside Black Europe–Racial Configurations in the Post 9/11 Era.” International Institute for Research and Education (The Netherlands), June 30.
- 2015 “Race, Space, and Violence: Challenging Scholarly Praxis.” Oakland, CA, June 5–7.
- 2015 Blackness in European Folklore–The Dutch Case: Black Pete.” UC Berkeley Institute of European Studies, December 4.
- 2014 “Citizenship, National Identity, and Multiculturalism in Italy.” UC Berkeley, March 14.
- 2014 “International Symposium on Black Europe 2014: Inside Black Europe–Racial Configurations in the Post 9/11 Era.” International Institute for Research and Education (The Netherlands), June 30.

Panels Organized

- 2018 “New Perspectives on Mediterranean Integration.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, April 10–14.
- 2018 “Decolonizing Geography: Constructing a Collaborative Syllabus.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, April 10–14.
- 2017 “The Black Mediterranean: Liminality, Black subjectivity, and post-/liberalism.” 6th AfroEuropeans: Black Cultures and Identities in Europe (Finland), July 6–8.
- 2017 “Rethinking ‘Europe’ through an Ethnography of its Borderlands, Peripheries and Margins.” Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa Conference (Italy), June 9–11.
- 2016 “Rethinking ‘Europe’ through its Borderlands.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, March 29–April 2.

- 2016 “Digital Border Struggles: Pro- and No-Border Activism and the Rise of Technologies for and against Migration Management.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, March 29–April 2.

Papers Presented

- 2017 “Black Liberation and Refugee Rights.” 6th AfroEuropeans: Black Cultures and Identities in Europe (Finland), July 6–8.
- 2016 “‘There Are No Black Italians’? Race and Citizenship in the Black Mediterranean.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, March 29–April 2.
- 2016 “‘La paura del razzismo’: Italian antiracism and the specter of Blackness.” InteRGRace Symposium (Italy), January 21–22, 2016.
- 2015 “Nappy Roots, Tangled Routes: *Nappytalia*, Diaspora, and the Territorialization of Online Community.” 11th International Conference on Technology, Knowledge, and Society, February 23–24.
- 2014 “National Belonging and the *Nuovi italiani*.” 2014 Conference of Ford Fellows, September 25–27.
- 2014 “Technology, Racialization, and Internet Surveillance in Italy.” International Symposium on Black Europe 2014 (The Netherlands), June 30.
- 2014 “Internet Cafes and ‘Dangerous’ Networks: Internet Regulations as Border Control in Italy.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, April 8–12.

Discussant

- 2017 “Locations and Scale.” Technopolitics and Empire: New Directions in Science Studies, November 2.
- 2016 “Imprese culturali afroitaliane si raccontano.” AfroCult.It: Moda e Culture Africane in Italia (Italy), May 6.
- 2016 Public presentation of the edited collection *Il colore della nazione*. Librati: Libreria delle donne di Padova (Italy), January 20.
- 2015 “The Ignorance that Fights Back: Theorizing Race, Gender, and Bullshit.” “Faking It”: Counterfeits, Copies, and Uncertain Truths in Science, Technology, and Medicine, April 10–11.
- 2014 “New Spaces of Internet Activity.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, April 8–12.

Other Public Appearances

- 2017 “Nuove identità e generazioni a confronto.” Festival Giavera: Ritmi e danze dal mondo (Italy), June 17–18.
- 2016 “Sprigionando pensieri: Un dibattito su cultura, identità, e antirazzismo.” Ottobre africano (Italy), October 29.
- 2014 “Incontro pubblico di presentazione della ricerca: Il razzismo e l’anti-razzismo in Italia—una prospettiva comparativa con gli Stati Uniti e con alcuni altri paesi in Europa.” ARI ONLUS (Italy), July 23.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2018 Certificate in Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, UC Berkeley

UC Santa Cruz

The Political Economy of Race (Teaching Fellow: Winter 2018)

*Instructor of record. Designed syllabus, course materials, and assignments/exams.
Lectured, directed class discussion/activities, and graded assignments/exams.*

UC Berkeley

World Regions, Peoples, and States (Graduate Student Instructor: Fall 2017)

Led discussion sections and graded assignments.

Introduction to Development Studies (Graduate Student Instructor: Fall 2014; Fall 2015)

Led discussion sections and graded assignments/exams.

Postcolonial Geographies (Graduate Student Instructor: Fall 2013)

Led discussion sections; wrote and graded assignments/exams.

Brown University

Intensive English Language in the Globalized World (Instructor: Summer 2010)

*Instructor of record. Designed syllabus, course materials, and assignments/exams.
Lectured, directed class discussion/activities, and graded.*

African Environmental History (Teaching Assistant: Fall 2009)

Led discussion activities and graded some assignments with instructor of record.

TEACHING INTERESTS

Critical race theory and postcolonial theory

Diaspora and Black geographies

Black Europe and the African diaspora

Black feminism and intersectionality

Race, space, and inequality
Black immigrant/refugee experiences
Transnational social justice movements
Qualitative and interdisciplinary research methods

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2012–2013 Researcher for Mobile Application Design, Social Apps Lab @ CITRIS
(Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society), UC
Berkeley.

SERVICE TO PROFESSION

Project Manager, Summer School on Black Europe (2013–present).

REPRISE Expert Reviewer, National Committee of Research Guarantors – Italian Ministry of
Education, Universities, and Research (2018–present).

Editorial Advisory Board, *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies* (2017–
2020).

Secretary-Treasurer, Black Geographies Specialty Group, American Association of Geographers
(2017–2019).

Manuscript Review: Palgrave-Macmillan Pivot series; *Environment and Planning D; Antipode;*
Zapruder World; Modern Italy; Darkmatter (2014–present).

UNIVERSITY SERVICE

Graduate Student Working Group Steering Committee, UC Berkeley Center for Science,
Technology, Medicine and Society (2016-2018).

COMMUNITY OUTREACH

Mentorship

2012–present Mentoring high school students of color in the Bay Area and advising on the
college application process.

Translation

2016–present “AFER: Riflessioni Identitarie” Black Italy Translation Project (founding member
and scientific director).

2016 Italian Media Diversity Manifesto (Italian to English).

2016 *Blaxploitalian* documentary subtitles (Italian to English).

MEDIA COVERAGE

- 2018 “Racism and Xenophobia in Itay” (interview with Wuyi Jacobs of WBUI, Pacifica Radio), 29 April.
- 2017 “Camilla Hawthorne: Una vita a cavallo fra tre culture” (profile). *Voci di confine*, November.
- 2017 “Meet the Comedian Who Is Italy’s New Favorite Politician” (interview). *Latterly 1.2*
- 2017 “Race, culture, and colonial history legacy in today’s Italian citizenship struggles” (cited). *Kheiro Magazine*, June 20.
- 2017 “The Racist Roots of Italy’s Anti-Immigration Movement” (interview). *The Arab Weekly*, June 16.
- 2016 “Envisioning Inclusive Geography” (interview). *UC Berkeley Social Sciences Matrix*, December 15.
- 2016 “Que’ s’amaga darrere les grans obres del Segle d’Or neerlandes?” (interview). *Hemisfera.cat*, June 25.
- 2016 “Voyager Profile: Camilla Hawthorne” (profile). *Griots Republic 1* (January).

LANGUAGES

English (native)

Italian (native)

Spanish (conversational)

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

SLAN.G Research Group (2016–present)

Mobility & Politics Emerging Scholars Research Collective (2016–present)

InteRGRace Research Network (2016–present)

American Association of Geographers (2012–present)

Phi Beta Kappa Society (2009–present)

Chapter One

Italian Ethnonationalism and the Limits of Citizenship

“Until the middle of the 1980s, when Italian society was homogenous, defining citizenship was automatic; today, instead, being a society composed of diverse people, languages, religions, cultures, and ethnicities, the system is more complex.”¹

“The difficulty of accessing citizenship according to the current law, combined with a slow and inefficient bureaucracy, means that immigrants and their children remain ‘foreigners’ for a very long time, if not permanently. For the extracomunitario, the condition of being a foreigner becomes like a biological fact from which it is impossible to escape.”²

“The Document is Something Else”: Confronting the Limits of Citizenship

On a bright sunny morning in March of 2016, a group of thirteen activists from across Italy converged outside a stately *palazzo* near the central Termini train station of Rome. We buzzed our way through the formidable wooden doors of the building and proceeded up the stairs into the offices of Save the Children’s Italian headquarters. As we headed through the office to the main conference room, we passed blown-up promotional photos of young children from around the world, and one poster that leapt out due to its familiarity—it was an image of the Italian-Eritrean activist Medhin Paolos, arms folded across her chest and a confident grin on her face, above the bolded words “*L’Italia sono anch’io*” [“I am Italy, too”]. We took our seats in the red chairs surrounding a large, translucent glass conference table. The meeting space was open and airy, lined with bookshelves along the back and flanked by even more promotional photos of photogenic children from previous campaigns. The tinny hum of cars and scooters zooming along the busy Roman street below filtered through the windows.

This meeting had been organized the *Rete G2* [2G Network], a national advocacy organization comprising “second generation” Italians who had been mobilizing for over a decade to reform Italy’s nationality laws and make it easier for the Italian-born children of immigrants to become Italian citizens. The original founders of the *Rete G2* were now in their late 30s and 40s, and many were raising young children. As such, they were eager to reach out to a younger generation of activists to invigorate the movement with new ideas and mobilization strategies. Two months earlier, they had sent out personal invitations to individuals who had been active on the *Rete G2*’s Facebook page but were not formally part of the group’s organizational core—these were people who themselves had large online presences and, in many cases, were also actively engaged in projects around anti-racism, Black Italian representation, youth empowerment, and women’s employment. Since one of the *Rete G2*’s founders worked for Save the Children, and Save the Children was also a formal partner of the *Rete G2*’s citizenship reform campaign, their offices served as a convenient, central gathering point for this intergenerational group of activists from across the Italian peninsula.

The conditions that had prompted this meeting were dire, to say the least. The lower house of the Italian parliament had approved an attenuated version of a citizenship reform

proposal in October of the previous year, but the bill remained stalled in the Italian Senate. Despite months of backroom lobbying meetings with legislators and staffers working in the Chamber of Deputies offices of Montecitorio in Rome, the Rete G2 organizers did not have a clear sense of when, if ever, the proposal would reach the Senate floor for formal consideration.

The broader political climate did not help the situation, either. The effects of the 2015 Mediterranean refugee crisis continued to reverberate across the country, prompting wildly xenophobic predictions that an expansion of citizenship rights to the children of immigrants born and raised in Italy would precipitate an unstoppable “invasion” of foreigners on Italian soil. A terrorist attack in Paris in November of 2015, for which the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility, subsequently reignited fears about the establishment of a radical Islamic “foothold” in Italy.³ And last but not least, the upcoming Italian municipal elections meant that politicians were unwilling to take a decisive stance on citizenship reform—not only to avoid alienating voters, but also because of their uncertainty over how an expanded electorate comprising the children of immigrants could shift the balance of political power.

Back in the conference room, we proceeded to go around the table and take turns introducing ourselves. The “old guard” of the Rete G2 was clustered at one end of the table, while the newer participants had assembled at the other end. The group ranged in age from early twenties to mid-forties, with a wide swath of national backgrounds represented: Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, Ghana, China, Albania, Eritrea, Chile, and Argentina. Some had come to Italy as small children with their parents, while others were born in Italy; some were born with Italian citizenship, others had finally naturalized after battling for years with the Italian immigration bureaucracy, and yet others were still waiting to become citizens of the country they had called “home” for their entire lives. Their individual stories of legal non-recognition revealed the emotional significance of citizenship, which is too often reduced to a matter of bureaucracy and physical papers. A lack of Italian citizenship had cost many of these activists jobs and educational opportunities; beyond these more material concerns, however, it had also set into motion paralyzing identity crises and feelings of inferiority for many.

But despite this deep and abiding sense that citizenship was more than just a bureaucratic formality, the group could not seem to agree on the reasons *why* citizenship actually mattered so much. Indeed, as the conversation unfolded over an eight-hour day, a series of tensions and subtle conflicts began to emerge among the assembled activists about the purpose of citizenship, its limits, and how to organize effectively *and* ethically for the right of citizenship in a profoundly hostile political climate. These questions might, at first glance, seem painfully obvious and self-evident; after all, liberal social theory tends to take for granted the idea that national citizenship should be the ultimate goal for immigrants and their children. But for the activists who had gathered in Rome that day—whose lives had been so intimately shaped by their limited access to Italian citizenship—things were not so clear-cut.

The debates that day hinged on two interrelated questions. First, *who* should have access to citizenship, and *why*? Was there a real difference between *birth* on Italian soil, versus long-term residency in Italy from childhood? Should one’s eligibility for citizenship be determined by the number of years she or he had spent in Italian schools, or by the parents’ possession of a long-term residency permit? And what about the parents themselves? Would advocating for a law that expanded citizenship rights to the *seconda generazione* drive a painful wedge between generations, pitting children against their parents in a battle for legitimacy and recognition?

And second, what form should their ongoing mobilizations for citizenship reform take? Did it make sense to march in the streets, making themselves visible to the Italian public as

“invisible citizens,” or would they only attract public scrutiny and endanger the larger cause? This question was linked to a broader philosophical matter—namely, what citizenship actually *means*. For some, it was urgent to stage mass demonstrations in which the children of immigrants could display themselves as culturally Italian “though and through.” But for others, this question of cultural performance was a red herring—the *real* question was one of rights. If white Italians were not forced to endure tests of cultural authenticity in order to be recognized as full citizens, then why should this be required (informally or otherwise) of the children of immigrants who had grown up in Italy? Indeed, our introductions at the beginning of the day were interrupted by a telling (and somewhat tense) exchange between Evelyne, one of the newcomers, and Almaz,⁴ one of the founding members of the Rete G2:

Evelyne: I was not able to get citizenship when I turned 18. Citizenship is an important component of life, and at first I felt like I needed that paper to prove that I was Italian.

Almaz: You know, as *seconda generazione* we are forced to “carry the flag,” to be extra Italian, but we should also have the right to critique the country. The document is something else.

Evelyne: Before, I felt like I had to be the *most* Italian. But now I want citizenship as a right. I have worked, contributed, gone to school.

Almaz: But citizenship is not given based on merit.

Evelyne: Citizenship is a block of opportunity. When a job requires Italian citizenship, you have to create other opportunities for yourself. It was important for me to realize that other people didn’t have citizenship; I felt like I was alone, like this was a reflection of my character.

This dialogue, and others like it throughout the day, suggested that an important shift was underway. One was, of course, temporal—a generation had aged through the movement, and a younger cohort was beginning to explore diverse tactics and modes of engagement. But there was also a growing sense of ambivalence about citizenship itself. Many of the young people who were invited to the meeting that day had been primarily occupied with questions of racism and Blackness—not necessarily citizenship. And the ongoing refugee crisis meant that many activists found themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to distinguish themselves publicly not only from their parents, but from newly arrived refugees. In other words, this notion of a teleological, intergenerational transformation into “Italian” was leaving people behind.

The meeting that day complicated the celebratory narratives that are often told about immigration and citizenship: one in which migrants or their children slowly progress from being outsiders to insiders—a narrative that also presumes the boundaries of citizenship to be stable social facts. But how did citizenship become the primary means of advocating for inclusion in Italy in the first place, and what work does this conflation do? How have citizenship reform activists become entangled with the process of re-defining Italy’s legal, racial, cultural, and economic boundaries? And what are the consequences of these re-consolidations of Italianness? To be clear, this is not a story of citizenship per se, nor is it a story of what happens when people become citizens. Instead, it is a story of how different groups make sense of citizenship, and how

the *possibility* of becoming a citizen produces subjects in different ways.

Race, Nation, and the Politics of Citizenship

The 2015 Mediterranean refugee crisis and the subsequent fortification of the legal and physical boundaries of Fortress Europe has prompted scholars to critically re-think citizenship not merely as a question of rights, but also as a tool of exclusion and differential incorporation. Yet this literature often relies on an undifferentiated notion of the migrant “Other,” a *straniero* who is typically assumed to be Black (and/or Muslim). It is profoundly limiting to approach Blackness in Europe so monolithically, however. This approach has not only dominated theoretical engagements with the “migrant question” in Europe, but policymaking and activism as well—collapsing very different sorts of lived experiences into a singular, abstracted refugee story.

Moving away from a generalized notion of Blackness, and focusing instead on the everyday large- and small-scale contestations among Italy’s variegated Black community, enables us to see the fractures and differentiations that emerge through the apparatus of national citizenship. For instance, Italian-born Black youth and newly arrived African refugees relate to citizenship in markedly different ways: it is simultaneously a means of obtaining rights and a strategy of racial exclusion. At the same time, newly arrived refugees must contend with the discursive repertoires that have cohered around citizenship reform activism. In other words, the mobilizations of Italian-born Black youth will also shape the terrain of action for refugees. While Black Italians and Black refugees did not come to Italy at the same time, their stories are now intertwined as they are positioned differently in relation to the possibility of Italian citizenship. This is why an ethnographic and archival methodological approach that takes seriously activists’ contemporary struggles and deeper historical contestations can begin to transform the way we think about citizenship advocacy in Italy—and beyond.⁵

This chapter begins with a discussion of current Italian citizenship law, as well as the movement launched in 2005 to reform the country’s citizenship law toward a moderate form of *jus soli*, or right of birthplace. As I alluded above, these mobilizations have more recently opened up a series of contestations among activists about the actual meaning and purpose of citizenship, as well as the relationship between access to citizenship and other political projects such as refugee rights and the inclusion of Black Italians within the symbolic boundaries of Italianness. Most famously, in 2017 the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben publicly announced his opposition to *jus soli* on the grounds that national citizenship is the problem, not the solution, to the violent regimes of exclusion and differential incorporation in the modern world.

Using Agamben’s controversial provocation as an incitement to discourse, this chapter then turns to consider how and why *citizenship* in particular became the primary terrain of advocacy for racial justice and inclusion in Italy. I first consider a series of recent challenges to the liberal sociology of citizenship from the literature on autonomy of migration and critical citizenship studies. While profoundly generative, I argue that that much of this work has neglected to systematically consider the entanglements of race and nation that shape the apparatus of citizenship itself. In Italy, for instance, the 1990s were a key moment when racial nationalism became embedded within the apparatus of citizenship, a process that was also entangled with ideas about the market and productivity. While the standard narrative is that Italian racial nationalism disappeared along with state fascism after World War II, this relationship merely took on a new form as Italy underwent a dramatic transition from a country of *emigration* to a country of *immigration*. And this development has had the effect of establishing nation-state citizenship as the dominant terrain of struggle for racial justice and

inclusion in Italy. But as I will show, this development has also created a troubling double bind for activists, one in which their legal efforts to expand the boundaries of Italianness could also unintentionally help to reproduce citizenship's racialized "outside."

A Fragmented Nation: Contours of Contemporary Italian Citizenship Law

Italy has among the most restrictive nationality laws in Europe.⁶ This is true even considering that after several decades of heated debate about the "integration" of migrants and their children, *jus sanguinis* (right of blood or descent) is still the dominant principle governing the acquisition of citizenship in Europe, and no country has absolute *jus soli* like the United States.⁷ Currently, the children of immigrants in Italy comprise approximately 15 percent of new births in Italy, or 10 percent of the country's total youth population.⁸ Yet, because Italian citizenship is conferred on the basis of *jus sanguinis*, the children of immigrants who were born and raised in Italy are not automatically granted Italian citizenship at birth. In fact, Italy is one of eight countries that never ratified the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, an agreement stipulating that member states should facilitate the acquisition of citizenship for people born in the country.⁹

The nationality law currently in force in Italy, Law No. 91 of 1992,¹⁰ specifies that the children of immigrants automatically inherit the nationality of their parents at birth. Upon reaching the age of majority (eighteen years old), they subsequently have a one-year window during which they can apply for Italian citizenship.¹¹ To make this request, applicants must have documentary proof of continuous, legal residence in Italy from birth and pay an application fee of 200 Euros. As Jacqueline Andall has observed, many children of immigrants who would have been technically eligible for citizenship upon turning eighteen have been unable to trace proof of continuous residence because their parents did not register their births with the local *anagrafe* [civil registry].¹² For instance, Andall writes that the children of Eritrean immigrants who arrived to Italy in the 1970s and took up residence in "occupied" or squatted homes due to housing shortages did not always have their births officially registered. As a result, when they applied for Italian citizenship upon turning eighteen, they found themselves lacking official documentation to prove that they had been resident in the country from birth and were thus ineligible to petition for Italian citizenship.

Even for those who *are* able to meet the requirements, the citizenship application process has no guarantees. Many individuals find themselves languishing in interminable bureaucratic limbo, as the processing time for naturalization requests varies dramatically between the various regions of Italy. For instance, in Modena—which has seen citizenship requests *double* over the course of the last four years—not a single of the 3,000 requests filed through the province's online system in 2015 had been processed as of the beginning of 2016.¹³ Finally, for those whose requests are approved, their citizenship is formally a *concession*, not a right (unlike citizenship via marriage), granted based on "the interests of the State and the national community."¹⁴

Italian census estimates suggest that Law 91/1992 has left over 800,000 children of immigrants without citizenship.¹⁵ The impacts of Italy's restrictive citizenship laws are thus profound and far-reaching. It is common for individuals within a family to have different citizenship statuses—for instance, while the parents might have fulfilled the ten years' residency required for non-EU immigrants to become citizens, their children who were born in Italy before that time would still lack Italian citizenship. Children without Italian citizenship cannot easily go on school-sponsored fieldtrips outside of Italy with their classmates—they must first request a visa to leave the country.¹⁶ Without Italian citizenship, the children of immigrants cannot apply for jobs through the state system of *concorsi pubblici*, which encompasses career fields ranging

from policing and law to medicine and teaching. They cannot vote in local or national elections. Perhaps the greatest source of fear for the children of immigrants who are unable to successfully petition for Italian citizenship is that they must live in Italy on the equivalent of a work permit (which requires a formal contract with an employer) or a long-term residency permit (which requires, among other stipulations, the maintenance of a minimum income level). The loss of a residency permit thus bears with it the possibility of deportation to a parental home country that they might have never visited, and whose language they might not speak comfortably.

It is important to note that *jus sanguinis* citizenship in Italy was not inevitable. Rather, the contours of Italian citizenship law were shaped by the contentious spatial project of nation building at the end of nineteenth century. The Risorgimento, or Italian national unification process, was completed in 1871 when Rome was incorporated as the country's capital. Nonetheless, the Italian nation-state has been characterized since its inception by deep and intractable political, economic, and cultural "fragmentation" between the economically prosperous and industrialized North and the agricultural, impoverished South.¹⁷

The first attempt at a comprehensive Italian nationality law, the 1865 *Codice Civile* [Civil Code], actually allowed citizenship for those born in Italy; this was part of an effort to recognize the contributions of foreigners who fought in the wars of Italian unification.¹⁸ *Jus sanguinis* only became enshrined in Italian law in 1912, with Law No. 55/1912. This new nationality law was enacted in response to the contradictory pressures of nation building, internal differentiation, and diaspora that plagued the new Italian nation-state. Soon after national unification, millions of southern Italians began to leave Italy in search of work abroad, in wealthier countries in northern Europe and the Americas.¹⁹ And even before the project of national unification was complete, Italy had also begun to undertake projects of "demographic colonialism" in the Horn of Africa, moving in step with the rest of Europe's scramble for African colonies.²⁰

Many Italian politicians viewed these emigration flows as a sort of "pressure release valve" for shunting off excess populations, one that would also extend Italian interests through the establishment of formal African colonies and informal overseas emigrant *colonie* elsewhere in the world.²¹ In this context, Cristiana Giordano argues, *jus sanguinis* (conferred via the paternal line of descent) was seen by lawmakers as a way to construct "a notion of nationality as a tenacious bond that could endure emigration and be passed down to descendants in the diaspora."²² It was not until 1983 that the ability to transmit Italian citizenship by birth was deemed to be the constitutional right of *women* in addition to men;²³ in addition, until 1975, women could lose their citizenship if they married men with non-Italian citizenship.²⁴

This very brief overview of Italian nationality law reveals that the legal boundaries of citizenship have never been stable; instead, they have repeatedly expanded and contracted since the Risorgimento. In particular, the apparatus of citizenship via blood descent was never a "natural" outcome of Italian nation building, but was instead the product of a set of historically and geographically specific debates about the impacts of regional fragmentation, mass emigration, and colonialism on the bonds of the national community. While the 1912 nationality law was a response to the challenges posed by an *outward-moving* Italian diaspora, debates about Italian citizenship since the 1980s have focused on the impact of non-Italian diasporas *entering into* Italian national space. In this context, the new boundary figures on which citizenship debates hinge are *migranti* (immigrants, including "Slavs," Albanians, and Africans), *stranieri* (foreigners), *extracomunitari* (non-EU citizens), and *rifugiati* (refugees, assumed to be African).

Today, however, Italian political commentators (including those who are generally supportive of a reform toward *jus soli*) frequently assert that citizenship was a relatively

straightforward matter before Italy became a country of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s. As the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter from Jesuit journalist Francesco Occhetta suggests, this claim relies upon the invention of a mythical Italian past characterized by a bounded and homogenous national body. This stable sense of *italianità*, the story goes, was rudely interrupted by the arrival of large numbers of postcolonial migrants at the end of the twentieth century.

The history of Italian nationality laws reveals that the question of citizenship in Italy is in fact far more complex than these popular commentators would suggest. In fact, Italian citizenship has been more a question of *managing difference and spatial dispersal* than one of maintaining internal homogeneity and national boundedness—from regional differences, to colonial encounters, to the spatially extended ties of large-scale emigration. It is for this reason that in her magisterial history of Italian nationality law from 1861-1950, Sabina Donati argues:

To be Italian, to become Italian and to exercise rights and duties in the peninsula as Italian citizens meant very different things at specific points...Metaphorically, the changing laws and debates concerning citizenship can certainly be useful pencils for researchers when trying to give form to and grasp the historically evolving and changeable meanings of *italianità*.²⁵

As Donati goes on to explain, citizenship and national identity do not move in lockstep. At times, citizenship laws may reflect particular ideas and ideals of nationhood, but “there is no causal link between national identity and nationality laws.”²⁶

Because *jus sanguinis* is not the natural outgrowth of a stable, unitary notion of *italianità*, this means that it is also open to challenges and transformation. Accordingly, in the next section I will trace the ways in which “second generation” youth activists in Italy have mobilized for *jus soli* citizenship. Descent-based citizenship, these activists argue, enshrines a racialized notion of Italianness that is sharply at odds with the country’s increasing demographic diversity. But in advocating for a legal expansion of “who counts” as an Italian, these activists often find themselves in the equivocal position of having to rely upon the very same political framework that approaches the nation as a bounded object unified by a set of shared characteristics. In the case of the citizenship reform movement, those shared characteristics are not blood, parentage, or descent, but rather the influence of birthplace and the bonds of culture or language.²⁷ In other words, citizenship reform activists are still entangled with the process of producing boundaries—albeit new ones—between who *is* (or should be) and who *is not* (or should not be) a citizen.

The implications of these new divisions became especially pronounced as effects of the 2015 Mediterranean refugee crisis began to intensify. Many of the most prominent citizenship reform activists in Italy are youth of African descent, and the majority of the refugees arriving to Italy via the Mediterranean are from sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria and Eritrea. As these “second generation” activists resist their conflation with African refugees on the grounds they are *Italians, not immigrants*,²⁸ their strategies also raise challenging questions about the limits of nation-state citizenship as an approach to inclusion—and specifically, racial inclusion. These sorts of questions have intensified contestations around citizenship in Italy, not only between “second generation” activists and politicians, but also among activists themselves.

“I am Italy, Too!”: The *Jus Soli* Citizenship Reform Movement

Analyses of the Italian citizenship reform movement have cleaved to one of two dominant narratives. On the one hand are the celebratory accounts of “second generation” activists who are

attempting to radically transform and expand the definition of Italianness. On the other hand are the cynical accounts of activists who have naïvely linked their struggles for social justice to nation-state recognition. The story I wish to tell in this section departs from both of these narratives. I am interested instead in the consolidation of the categories of “second generation” or “Italian without citizenship” as the basis for collective political action, and the way that this project in turn implicates activists in the contentious project of redrawing the boundaries of Italian inclusion and exclusion at a moment of perceived, interlocking “crises.”

The number of children with non-Italian citizenship has grown by almost 300 percent since 2002, from a total of 288,950 to 1,087,016 *minori stranieri* in 2014.²⁹ Indeed, as the “problem” of immigration increasingly figured into political and academic debates about the borders of Italy, a quiet generational shift was gradually underway. Immigrants who settled in Italy in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were now raising children on Italian soil—children who, despite having spent their entire lives in Italy, were not legally or socially recognized as citizens.

In 2005, a group of children of immigrants in Italy came together to form the Rete G2. While this was not the first national Italian organization comprising the children of immigrants (*Giovanni Musulmani d'Italia*, or Young Muslims of Italy, was founded in 2001³⁰), it was the first to engage in political action around a shared “general identity as ‘second generation.’”³¹ The Rete G2 was actually an outgrowth of informal social gatherings in Rome, during which a group of friends would meet regularly to discuss their shared experiences. They quickly found that while their parents had immigrated to Italy from many different countries, their own subjectivities converged on the shared condition of not being recognized as Italian. A common lament during these gatherings was that they found themselves being constantly asked the same question by strangers: “*Ma, dove hai imparato a parlare così bene l’italiano?*” [“Where did you learn to speak Italian so well?]. During a conversation over spiced teas at an Eritrean bar in Milan in 2014, Medhin fondly recounted the early days of the Rete G2:

The Rete G2 emerged from very personal needs, in Rome, in 2005—from things that touched our lives every day. The main objective [of citizenship reform] was selected because it’s not useful to have ten items on your agenda and then not get to any of them. But at first, we started by doing mutual aid. It was like therapy. People would come together and chat, talking about the most basic things, like their hair, like having an Afro.

As a formal association, the Rete G2 engages in two other broad sets of activities beyond advocacy for citizenship reform. First, they serve as a social network for the Italian-born and raised children of immigrants scattered across the Italian peninsula.³² In fact, one of their first initiatives was to establish an online forum³³ for youth to connect, share their stories, and ask questions about the naturalization process.³⁴ For instance, a commenter once posted on the Rete G2 forum that he was having difficulty finding documents that would prove he had lived in Italy continually from birth. Another commenter responded, noting that she had success using vaccination records as proof of residency in her own citizenship application. In this way, the Rete G2 actually helped to pave the way for the explosion of social media pages almost a decade later on topics related to Black Italian identity.³⁵

In addition, the organization has also been involved in a series of national media campaigns that are intended to challenge public perceptions of *who* is Italian. Often, these projects (such as a collaboration with children of Italian immigrants in Switzerland) show how Italy’s own history of mass emigration has complicated questions of national belonging. During

an interview at a bookstore in Rome in 2014, Mohamed, an Italian of Libyan descent and one of the founders of the Rete G2, explained this prong of the group's strategy:

Citizenship is the main objective, but we have to also work on the image that Italy has of itself. Italy is only ever represented as white and Catholic. This has not changed in the last 10 years. Changing the law also means putting this model into crisis. Italy is a country that still doesn't accept immigration...

The organization's choice of name is significant as well. While the sociological concept of *second generation* has been subject to thorough critique,³⁶ Rete G2 activists use this term rather differently from most scholars of migration. For them, *seconda generazione* is not intended to be a stable sociological referent. Instead, it refers to the broader sense of demographic and social transformation represented by a new generation of young people who, in some way or another, have "non-Italian" backgrounds. In this way, the Rete G2 has stretched the "second generation" label to include people who arrived to Italy as young children, as well as adoptees and children of mixed backgrounds. As Medhin elaborated:

Back in 2005, people didn't talk about these things as much. In Italy, they have always talked about immigration, but about the children of immigrants? Never. And now there is criticism of the term 2G. I listen to the critiques, but the way I see it, it's a good thing that there is this debate. Because before, people didn't even have this identity, but now they can debate it. It's a privilege! We didn't invent the term; we just used it in the name Rete G2. Sociologists invented the term. We took it and expanded the definition, because people talk about all of the divisions in the second generation. We wanted to be more inclusive. We include people who were born here, who came here when they were very young, even people who were adopted. In the Rete G2, we wanted to bring all of these people together. They are different ages, they come from different cities, they have different accents, but they are all Italian and something else.



Figure 3 Excerpt from a *fotoromanzo* (photo story) published by the Rete G2 in 2008 called “*Apparenze*” [“Appearances”]. Later in the story, Adriano admits that some of his relatives emigrated from Italy to Australia.

[*Adriano, in broken English*] “Hello! I am Adriano. Can I help you? Do you speak English?”

[*Lucia, in perfect English*] “Yes of course, but if you prefer I can speak Italian as well.”

[*Adriano, speaking slowly in Italian*]: “YOU UNDERSTAND ITALIAN?”

[*Lucia, in Italian*]: Yes, in fact I am Italian. My name is Lucia.

Source: Rete G2, *Fotoromanzo G2: Apparenze* (2008).

For members of the Rete G2, the term *seconda generazione* can be more accurately characterized as a political claim about Italian futurity. Rete G2 activists argue that Italy's dramatic transition from a country of emigration to a country of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s has produced an unstoppable demographic transformation that requires the country to come to terms with own history of colonialism and racism, and with the very tenuousness of Italian national identity itself.

In 2011, the Rete G2 launched a campaign called *L'Italia sono anch'io* [I am Italy, too] along with a coalition of non-profit partners and national labor unions. The goal of this campaign was to gather 50,000 signatures (the threshold required to present a proposal by popular initiative to the Italian legislature) in support of a petition for a new citizenship law.³⁷ The campaign was an unprecedented success, ultimately collecting the signatures of 200,000 Italian citizens. The original proposal from the *L'Italia sono anch'io* campaign included automatic citizenship for any child born to an immigrant who had been legally resident in Italy for at least one year, as well as a simplified path to citizenship for those who arrived to Italy as children or who were born in Italy to parents without a residency permit.³⁸ The proposal also called for a reduction in the time required for naturalization for adult immigrants, from ten to five years. A second proposal developed for the *L'Italia sono anch'io* campaign would have also granted foreigners legally resident in Italy for at least five years the right to vote in local and regional elections.³⁹

L'Italia sono anch'io's proposals were delivered to the Italian legislature in 2012. Finally, on October 13, 2015, the *Camera dei deputati* (the Chamber of Deputies, also known as the lower house of the Italian parliament) approved a citizenship reform bill that incorporated elements of the popular initiative proposal, along with parts of twenty other proposals related to citizenship.⁴⁰ This renewed support for citizenship reform had been galvanized in large part by the efforts of Cécile Kyenge, Italy's Minister of Integration and the country's first Black government minister, in 2013. Kyenge established *jus soli* citizenship as a centerpiece of her agenda, publicly declaring several times that "whoever is born in Italy is Italian."⁴¹

The law ultimately approved by the Camera departed in some significant ways from the original proposal developed by the Rete G2 and the *L'Italia sono anch'io* campaign. First, the provision that would have reduced the residency requirement for naturalization was eliminated. Second, whereas the original proposal only required parents to be legally resident in Italy for one year, the new proposal required at least one parent to be in possession of a long-term residency permit. Finally, the Camera's proposal emphasized a form of citizenship acquisition called *jus culturae* [right of culture]. *Jus culturae* links citizenship for people who arrived to Italy as children to their time spent in the Italian school system. In other words, those who arrived to Italy before the age of 12 could become citizens after five years of school, while those who arrived between the ages of 12 and 18 could acquire citizenship after living in Italy for five years, completing a full scholastic cycle, and obtaining an educational qualification (e.g., a high school or vocational school diploma). While the original *L'Italia sono anch'io* proposal did include one path to citizenship linked to school, *jus culturae* was hailed as an innovation of the Camera bill,⁴² which emphasized this route while attenuating other possible paths to citizenship.

The move toward *jus culturae* was controversial among the citizenship reform activists. As one founder of the Rete G2 explained during a public forum in 2016, "We would have preferred a different form for the kids, something tied to the parents' *permesso di soggiorno* instead of school. Because school makes it seem like citizenship is a cultural thing." Yet this moment also paralleled an important shift already underway in the tone of much citizenship reform activism. Earlier efforts often sought to challenge the narrow conception of Italian

national belonging enshrined in Italian citizenship law by pointing to both the historic and contemporary pluralities of Italianness.⁴³ Now, certain contingents of the citizenship reform movement had increasingly begun to reference an Italian “common culture”⁴⁴ that could become the basis of a de-racialized citizenship. *Jus culturae* rests on the assumption that the Italian-born and -raised children of immigrants have been thoroughly infused with the “essential” cultural qualities of Italian national culture. Thus, a generation of new Italians who should have automatically earned the right to Italian citizenship by virtue of the fact that they were born on Italian soil are disadvantaged by policies that enshrine a biologicistic conception of *italianità*.



Figure 4 A poster drawn by children at an elementary school summer camp in Rome, displayed at a citizenship reform protest outside the Pantheon in 2017. The text reads:

I AM ITALIAN BECAUSE:

Monia: Italy is my reality.

Hasanov: Italian is easier.

Christian: There are more opportunities in Italy.

Thomas: I like the landscapes.

Arianna: I love pizza.

Jeremy: I like soccer.

Pierpaolo: Because in Italy there is safety and freedom!

Source: Author.

The 2012 documentary *18 Ius soli* by Italian-Ghanaian filmmaker Fred Kuwornu is emblematic of this more recent approach to citizenship reform. In one memorable promotional clip, an Italian-Nigerian rapper shares his Italian cultural *bona fides* against a bright blue background, the same shade used on the jerseys of Italian national sports teams: “I love pizza, I eat lasagna. . .I mean, I sing Italian songs to my friends! So that makes me an Italian, just like my friends.”⁴⁵ Indeed, Black Italians have been over-represented in the citizenship reform movement because their efforts to be recognized as fully Italian are met with particularly insurmountable legal and de-facto obstacles. This is because Blackness and Black people in Italy are marked as symbols of national non-belonging in Italy.⁴⁶

Global Black hip-hop style and other resources from across the Black diaspora have featured prominently in the citizenship reform movement.⁴⁷ In 2012, for instance, the Rete G2 released a CD entitled “*Straniero a chi?*” [“Foreign according to whom?”], which featured a collection of original tracks by a group of *seconda generazione* musicians, the majority of whom were rappers, hip hop producers, or reggae artists. The prominence of Black cultural products speaks to the power of the “outernational, transcultural”⁴⁸ politics of the Black diaspora.

At the same time, the circulation of images of Black Italians eating pizza and *lasagne* can also obscure the limitations of a more culturalist approach to citizenship. At first glance, the turn to “common culture” suggests the possibility of an Italianness that is no longer predicated on race. The Italian-Ghanaian soccer star Mario Balotelli, for instance, is frequently described by the Italian press as having an unmistakably *bresciano* accent—the assumption being that if one were not able to see the color of his skin, he could conceivably be mistaken for a white Italian.⁴⁹ But the growing embrace of cultural citizenship also mistakenly presumes “race” and “culture” to be diametrically opposed systems of categorization,⁵⁰ as Stuart Hall argues, however, culture and race are really just “racism’s two registers.”⁵¹

Still, while activists admitted that the new reform bill was a watered-down version of their original demands, its approval by the Camera was met with widespread celebration. And in fact, many children of immigrants actually supported the move toward citizenship via *jus culturae* because it gave them another way to legitimate their membership to a racist and xenophobic Italian public—specifically, through the “facts” of shared language and schooling.

This optimism, however, was short-lived. By the time the group of activists had gathered in Rome (the same meeting recounted at the beginning of this chapter), the reform bill had been languishing in the Italian Senate for over five months. The Lega Nord had introduced thousands of nonsense amendments to the bill, simply to slow its progress through the Senate’s legislative committees.⁵² Right-wing opposition to citizenship reform in the Italian parliament at this time conflated refugee arrivals via the Mediterranean, the threat of radical Islamic terrorism, and the supposed dangers of citizenship reform. Under the brash front-page headline “More Immigrants = More Attacks,” the conservative Italian newspaper *Liberio* argued that summer:

Italy has not yet been struck [by terrorists] because Islamists are less numerous. But above all because Italy does not give citizenship to people who are born here, that way we can drive them out if they do bad things. Too bad the left wants to introduce *jus soli*.⁵³

After the meeting in Rome, a group of older citizenship reform activists and younger recruits splintered off from the Rete G2, demanding more direct action and public protests in support of citizenship reform. Expressing frustration with what they perceived as excessive backroom lobbying and legislative advocacy, this new group organized a series of flash mobs in

major cities around Italy to mark the one-year anniversary of the citizenship reform bill's approval in the Camera. Organizing under the banner of *Italiani senza cittadinanza* [Italians without citizenship], groups of activists descended upon Padua, Bologna, Reggio Emilia, Rome, Naples, and Palermo on October 13, 2016, draped in white bed sheets to symbolize their status as forgotten, "invisible citizens." The flash mobs were accompanied by a national media campaign that included the distribution of "citizenship postcards" featuring the images of individual *italiani senza cittadinanza* and their stories of growing up and attending school in Italy.

#ItalianiSenzaCittadinanza



Assita, Palermo

"Questa é una delle mie foto piú belle di quando ero alle elementari. C'è tutta la mia classe. Ero tranquilla e felice con i miei compagni, ignara di essere una straniera nel Paese in cui sono nata e in cui sarei cresciuta. Oggi che sono finalmente cittadina italiana e continuo a studiare e investire sulla mia formazione, correndo da un corso all'altro, mi capita di riflettere ancora sulla mia condizione e su quella di altri giovani. Mi chiedo: vale la pena offrire il mio "sudore" intellettuale e le mie future competenze professionali ad un Paese che ha aspettato 18 anni prima di riconoscermi Cittadina?".

Figure 5 A citizenship postcard featuring the story of Assita, a Black Italian of Ivorian descent, surrounded by her elementary school classmates in Palermo.

Source: *Italiani Senza Cittadinanza* Facebook page (www.facebook.com/italianisenzacittadinanza/photos).



Figure 6 Scenes from the October 13, 2016 flash mob in Rome.

Source: Author.

The flash mobs were successful in bringing wider public attention back to the subject of citizenship reform in Italy. At the same time, some individuals saw these efforts as somewhat misguided. Over drinks at a popular bar in the Eritrean Porta Venezia neighborhood of Milan, a young Italian-Eritrean anthropologist and documentarian shared her reservations with me:

They are conflating identity or belonging with a bureaucratic thing. Citizenship is a bureaucratic matter; it doesn't mean that you feel that you belong. But part of the mobilization is proving that you are Italian in all of these different ways—with food, for instance.

While I was at first taken aback by these comments, her words continued to resonate in my mind. Luca Bussotti argues that since 1912, Italian citizenship law has emphasized the “quality” of citizenship over the quantity of Italian citizens.⁵⁴ In many ways, my anthropologist friend seemed to be arguing, these activists were once again making a set of claims about the “quality” of their potential citizenship: birth and schooling in Italy had produced a generation of unrecognized youth who were more “Italian” than their counterparts across the Italian diaspora!

I was reminded of the words of conservative Italian politician Giorgia Meloni, leader of the *Fratelli d'Italia* [Brothers of Italy] party, who had expressed opposition to citizenship reform on the grounds that “becoming an Italian citizen should not be a bureaucratic matter, but an act of love.”⁵⁵ Why were citizenship reform activists increasingly forced to prove their Italianness as a prerequisite for citizenship, when citizenship *is* a mere bureaucratic matter for white Italians? As the refugee crisis consumed political debate, citizenship reform activists had to not only enumerate all of the ways in which they had been thoroughly produced as culturally Italian, but also to demonstrate that this quality in turn distinguished them from newly arrived refugees. While citizenship reform activism since the early days of the Rete G2 has rightly emphasized that the *seconda generazione* are not foreigners, this message became increasingly urgent as politicians conflated refugees with the Italian-born children of immigrants.⁵⁶

Along these same lines, the *Italiani senza cittadinanza* sought to challenge Italian ethnic absolutism by showing the public that they were “Italian-plus” (i.e., that their identities encapsulated multiple geographical itineraries including and beyond Italy). Still, they found, this rich and transgressive border consciousness⁵⁷ had to be strategically grounded in some kind of recognizable “Italianness” for their citizenship claims to be taken seriously by the media and politicians. In this way, sympathetic Italian journalists and lawmakers began to wrangle the complex narratives of the *seconda generazione* into a singular nationalist narrative that also worked to elevate their standing in relation to newly arrived refugees from sub-Saharan Africa.

The following summer, the *Italiani senza cittadinanza* were facing another emergency: the citizenship reform bill would expire unless the Senate officially scheduled a vote. On that final day—June 15, 2017—opposition to citizenship reform came to a head in a series of racially charged confrontations unlike any seen previously. The neo-fascist Casa Pound and far-right Forza Nuova parties staged a demonstration in front of the Senate building, waving Italian flags and carrying large posters that explicitly linked *jus soli* and radical Islamic terrorism.




Figure 7 A tale of two signs. On the left, Casa Pound protesters carry signs that say “Thank You Jus Soli: Jihadi John, ‘English.’” On the right, a meme created by a member of *Italiani senza cittadinanza* pokes fun at the figure of the Italian-American born in the United States who can become an Italian citizen in a matter of months. The text reads, “Thank You Jus Sanguinis: Michael Rossi, ‘Italian.’”

Sources: Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata – Ansa (*left*); Kwanza Musi Dos Santos (*right*).

The situation was no better on the Senate floor. As the Senate moved to open discussions of the citizenship reform bill, Lega Nord parliamentarians unfolded papers bearing the bolded words “NO JUS SOLI” and “STOP THE INVASION” as a small group of Black Italian activists looked on in horror from the public gallery. A violent shoving match ensued, sending one senator to the emergency room. On the right, political commentators across Italy declared that if it were approved, citizenship reform would bring about “ethnic substitution.”⁵⁸

That these racialized demographic concerns with the state of the Italian population were refracted onto the question of citizenship was not entirely surprising. A year earlier, the Italian Ministry of Health’s failed “Fertility Day” initiative featured a campaign poster contrasting a stock photo of a white, blond family with an image of a racially mixed group of young friends smoking an unidentified cigarette, all above the unmistakably eugenic caption, “Correct lifestyles for the prevention of sterility and infertility.”⁵⁹ And the day after the Senate hearing, the Berlusconi-owned right-wing newspaper *Il Giornale* was emblazoned with the headline, “Easy Citizenship: ITALIAFRICA.” It is important to note that while sub-Saharan Africans fleeing violence and political instability were overrepresented among the refugees arriving to Italy at that time, the majority of immigrants and their children in Italy are not Black.⁶⁰ Yet the supposed threat of a Black African invasion figured so prominently in debates about citizenship reform that the actual national backgrounds of the *seconda generazione* did not really matter.

For opponents of the citizenship reform bill, Blackness and Islam together had come to stand in for everything that was “foreign” to Italy, and for all of the country’s demographic, economic, social, and political woes.⁶¹ Despite the fact that many Afrodescendants in Italy are *also* Muslim (particularly those with roots in countries such as Senegal or Eritrea), however, Blackness and Islam are understood in Italian public discourse to constitute two relatively distinct “racial” threats.⁶² The former threatens the demise of an unmarked Italian whiteness through racial contamination and degradation, while the latter stands in for “the fear of violent death, the paranoia of Europe’s cultural demise[,]”⁶³ and the annihilation of Italy as a Catholic nation.⁶⁴ Indeed, as David Theo Goldberg has argued, the figure of the Muslim (along with the Jew) has historically “bookended” Europe’s anxieties about Blackness.⁶⁵




Figure 8 Race, sex, and the gendering of citizenship. At left, a promotional poster from the Italian Ministry of Health’s 2016 “Fertility Day” campaign. The large text reads, “Correct lifestyles for the prevention of sterility and infertility.” On the upper photo, the caption says, “The good habits to promote”; below, “the bad ‘company’ to avoid.”

At right, an image used by the far-right Forza Nuova political party in 2017 that reads, “”Defend her from the new invaders! She could be your mother, your wife, your sister, your daughter.” This was initially a fascist poster from 1944 intended to warn the Italian public about the sexual threat posed by Black American Allied soldiers in Italy. Forza Nuova only added the text “...from the new invaders” to the original, fascist-era design.

Sources: Italian Ministry of Health and Monica Rubino, “Fertility day, bufera su opuscolo ‘razzista’. Lorenzin lo ritira e apre indagine,” *La Repubblica*, September 21, 2016, http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/09/21/news/fertility_day_mozione_di_sel-sinistra_italiana_cancellare_la_vecchia_campagna_-148217942/ (*left*); Forza Nuova and “Migranti, polemica sul manifesto di Forza Nuova: utilizza la propaganda fascista del Ventennio,” *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, September 2, 2017, <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/09/02/migranti-polemica-sul-manifesto-di-forza-nuova-utilizza-la-propaganda-fascista-del-ventennio/3831751/>.

While the citizenship reform bill survived the ominous June 2017 deadline, it ultimately died an untimely death in the Italian Senate that December—not from an insufficient number of votes in favor, but because not enough senators were present to form a quorum.⁶⁶ Rather than risk adopting what could be interpreted as a politically divisive stance on the question of Italian citizenship, senators from across the political spectrum simply did not appear on the floor to vote. Horrified, disheartened, and betrayed, *Italiani senza cittadinanza* published an open letter to the Italian government on the seventieth anniversary of the Italian constitution:

On a day that is so beautiful and fundamental to our lives and for our democracy, it is our duty to remind you of how we learned to respect [Italian democracy] in school, learning about the fundamental values of liberty, equality, peace, and respect. [...] Dear President, you should agree that on December 23rd the Republic failed to remove these “obstacles,”⁶⁷ maintaining a clear distinction between citizens and non-citizens on the basis of a purely elitist and economic concept of citizenship.

For these activists, the defeat of the citizenship reform bill was perhaps the greatest setback in an exhausting journey that had begun over a decade earlier. But could it also be a new opening?

Two months earlier, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben had penned a controversial editorial in Italian explaining why he did not sign a petition in favor of *ius soli*. But unlike other opponents of the citizenship reform movement, Agamben’s skepticism had nothing to do with fears of “invasion” or cultural dilution. Rather, his opposition was grounded in the same prevailing concern throughout his work with the relation between sovereignty and biopolitics that is instantiated in modern understandings of citizenship.⁶⁸ As Agamben wrote in his letter:

We take for granted [the idea of citizenship], and we do not ever ask about its origins or its significance. It seems obvious to us that every human being from birth should be registered in a state order and in that way find themselves subjected to the laws and the political system of a state that they did not choose and from which they cannot disengage. [...] No matter the procedure used to determine this registration...the result is the same: a human being is subjected to a juridical-political order. [...] I fully recognize that the status of “statelessness” or “migrant” cannot be avoided, but I am not sure that citizenship the best solution.⁶⁹

Many perceived Agamben’s open letter as yet another in a long series of betrayals; at the end of the statement, he notes that he would in theory support a petition urging people to *give up* their citizenship, though in reality he did no such thing. But despite the immediate short sightedness of his stance, Agamben raises a series of questions that are worth considering further. Are there in fact other possibilities outside of this state-centric, juridical-political order? And following Alexander Weheliye’s incisive critique of Agamben’s *homo sacer*, what happens when we center *racism* in an historical analysis of citizenship and the state?⁷⁰ These are questions that, one way or another, will continue to shape citizenship mobilizations long after the crushing defeat of the reform bill in 2017. As discussed above, many activists have come to understand citizenship reform as a means of contesting racialized national exclusion. In addition, *opposition* to citizenship reform has been articulated in explicitly or implicitly racial terms (e.g., the threat of an African invasion). Over the course of the last five years, citizenship has arguably emerged as

the primary means of engaging with questions of institutional racism and racial inclusion in Italy. But why have the terms of inclusion and exclusion in Italy been articulated primarily in terms of national citizenship, as opposed to other frameworks? Is it possible to contest a deeply restrictive Italian nationality law that disproportionality disadvantages youth of color, while also articulating a political alternative that does not inadvertently reify the bounded nation? And what room is there for immigrants, refugees, and other “border crossers” in the citizenship story?

Citizenship(s) between Autonomy and the State

To frame the critique of citizenship that informs the remainder of this chapter, I will first embark on a brief detour through some recent theorizations of citizenship. The liberal sociology of citizenship has focused on citizenship primarily as a legal contract between the state and the individual that produces access to a set of formal rights. Scholars working in this tradition have examined the various paths by which migrants become citizens, as well as the political, cultural, and historical reasons for differences in countries’ citizenship laws. As Bloemraad et al. observe, these analyses often use distinctions between ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship, or assimilationist and multiculturalist approaches to incorporation.⁷¹

Recent scholarship in the field of critical citizenship studies has instead emphasized questions of meaning, belonging, and identity in relation to citizenship.⁷² In addition, scholars have moved beyond an exclusive focus on citizenship as a question of rights to the problems of inclusion, exclusion, and differential incorporation.⁷³ Importantly, these interventions are welded to a political economic critique, in which borders and immigration/citizenship statuses are tools of state power that condition, filter, and differentiate an international labor force.⁷⁴ Finally, critical citizenship studies has also attempted to de-link citizenship from the state by highlighting emergent and insurgent⁷⁵ forms of citizenship from below. This scholarship understands citizenship as active participation, separate from rights—which could be the *object* of struggle.⁷⁶

While the critical citizenship studies emphasis on both *exclusion* and *acts of citizenship* is profoundly generative, this approach has three key limitations. First, as Sandro Mezzadra argues, this “opening up” of citizenship risks neglecting the despotic tendencies in the evolution of citizenship, cleansing citizenship of “the burden of its historical past.”⁷⁷ Second, this work has begun to downplay the importance of formal, nation-state citizenship. This is likely because much of the research that undergirds this body of literature has been conducted with migrants, refugees, and stateless people—groups for which citizenship may be less materially significant than an absence of direct violence and the freedom to move. But as Dorothy Louise Zinn notes:

For many G2s, the problem of Italian citizenship simply looms too large for them to give much credence to theories of the irrelevance of the nation-state or the ascendancy of European supranationality.⁷⁸

The case of *seconda generazione* activists in Italy suggests that nation-state citizenship, as a mechanism of differentiation, remains deeply consequential—even in an age of globalization and transnationalism. And third, while critical citizenship studies analyzes citizenship in relation to exclusion and differentiation, exclusion and differentiation are typically understood as distinct from racism, or as conditions that can become “racialized” through external forces. But even when national citizenship laws do not explicitly invoke racial categories, the apparatus of citizenship itself cannot be understood outside of the intertwined histories of race, state, and nation. David Theo Goldberg, for instance, argues that race has been central to the state since its

conceptual and institutional emergence.⁷⁹ Specifically, the *raison d'être* of the modern state is to enforce internal homogeneity and expulse heterogeneity from its boundaries. In this sense, race and nation are effectively coterminous, as both are used by racial states⁸⁰ to produce a picture of a coherent population in the face of potentially divisive heterogeneity.

The Italian nation-state, for instance, understood itself in racial terms from its inception. Following the Risorgimento, notions of citizenship and national membership were articulated in relation to both southern Italians and Africans.⁸¹ In this way, the experiences of youth of color in Italy today are shaped by these legacies of struggles over Italy's nation-racial identity. The entanglements of race and the modern nation-state thus provide a conceptual basis for understanding why national citizenship often recurs as a target for anti-racist action, but also why citizenship can be a mechanism by which new forms of differentiation are produced.

Re-Planting the Seeds of Italian Racial Nationalism

To understand how citizenship both became the dominant means of advocating for racial inclusion *and* a means of producing new forms of racial differentiation and exclusion in Italy, we must now return to a set of earlier policy debates. Italy did not have any formal immigration policies until the early 1990s. Before this time, migration to Italy was organized primarily through informal recruitment and resettlement by Catholic charities, or through the transnational social networks set into motion by Italian decolonization in the Horn of Africa.⁸² In fact, what made Italy such an attractive destination for immigration in the 1980s was its comparatively relaxed immigration laws in comparison with other European countries.⁸³

In 1989, the racially motivated murder of South African asylum-seeker Jerry Masslo in southern Italy jump-started the enactment of Italy's first formal immigration legislation. Masslo, a thirty-nine year-old anti-apartheid activist, had fled South Africa in hopes of eventually settling in Canada. At the time, however, Italy only recognized political asylum applications from Eastern Europe.⁸⁴ Because of his uncertain legal status, Masslo was forced to find informal work as a tomato picker in Villa Literno. While little is known about the precise circumstances of his murder, it is believed that he was killed while defending his salary from thieves. A flyer bearing the words "Permanent open season on Negroes" was found near the scene of the crime.⁸⁵

Masslo's murder was incredibly shocking when it occurred. Many Italian commentators—as well as many African students in those early days of immigration to Italy—had predicted that Italy would be a relatively accommodating destination because of Italy's own history of mass emigration.⁸⁶ As Jeffrey Cole has observed, the late 1980s in Italy saw the publication of many books with hopeful titles such as *Gli italiani sono razzisti?* [*Are Italians racist?*] and *Oltre il razzismo: Verso la società multirazziale e multiculturale* [*Beyond racism: Toward a multiracial and multicultural society*].⁸⁷ Masslo's widely circulated reflections on Italian racism, drawn from an interview conducted the winter before his murder, were sobering:

I thought in Italy I would find a space to live, a bit of civilization, a welcome that would allow me to live in peace and cultivate the dream of a tomorrow without barriers or prejudice. Instead, I am disappointed. Having Black skin in this country is a limit to civilized coexistence. Racism is here, too: it is made up of bullying, abuses, daily violences against people who are asking for nothing more than solidarity and respect. Those of us in the Third World are contributing to the development of your country, but it seems that this has no weight. Sooner or later one of us will be killed and then we will realize that we exist.⁸⁸

Jerry Masslo's murder was met by massive, nation-wide anti-racism demonstrations. In Rome alone, over 200,000 marchers descended into the streets—including Tommie C. Smith, the gold medal-winning sprinter who famously raised his fist in a Black Power salute at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. In addition, the public outcry surrounding Masslo's death set into motion the enactment of the Legge Martelli (Law 39/1990) in 1990. This was Italy's first formal immigration law, and its purpose was to regularize migrant workers in Italy by codifying a set of bureaucratic categories for migrants entering the country. Under the Legge Martelli, migrants could apply for renewable two-year visas for the purpose of work, study, medical care, or family reunification; those who overstayed their visas were considered irregular migrants and could be expelled from Italy within 15 days. At the time, lawmakers framed the Legge Martelli as an attempt to protect migrant workers from labor abuse by granting them official, legal status.⁸⁹ But this law worked in practice by narrowing the flow of immigration, setting a yearly quota of migrants linked to the job market. It effectively set into motion an economic view of migration, which has become the basis for all subsequent Italian immigration laws.

On the coattails of the Legge Martelli, a restrictive reform of Italian citizenship law was enacted in 1992. Compared to the previous 1912 law, this legislation simultaneously facilitated the acquisition of citizenship for diasporic descendants of white Italians who have never lived in Italy, while making it more difficult for immigrants and their children to naturalize. Descendants of Italian emigrants living abroad (so-called "latent Italians" or *oriundi*) could easily reacquire Italian citizenship, with no time or generational limits on this re-activation. Italian emigrants and their descendants who had lost or renounced their Italian citizenship due to the nationality laws of their receiving countries could also regain citizenship with three years of residence in Italy.⁹⁰ For non-EU migrants, the time of residency required for naturalization was augmented from five years to 10 years (EU citizens are only required to have four years of residency in Italy).⁹¹ In this way, the new Italian nationality law explicitly doubled down on *jus sanguinis* citizenship at a time of increasing demographic heterogeneity in Italy.

The 1990s were thus a key turning point: they saw both the expansion of the bureaucratic categorization of migrants, linking their status to employment and economic contribution, and contracted access to citizenship. It is important to remember that at this moment, Italy was also coming to understand itself as a country of immigration. These new debates about the need for "migration management" were shaped by a broader set of ongoing conversations about Italian racism, the possibility (or impossibility) of a multicultural Italian future, and the basis of national identity. On the one hand, the Left invoked Italy's status as an historically poorer, racially-ambiguous nation of emigrants and unsuccessful colonizers; on the other hand, the resurgent Right (symbolized by new right-wing and separatist parties such as the Lega Nord and Forza Italia⁹²) embraced increasingly insular nationalist and regionalist politics.

These laws, and especially the 1992 citizenship law, can thus be read as policy expressions of modern nationalism. Through these laws, the connection between race and nation was enframed through the legal apparatus of citizenship. It is important to remember that in post-fascist Italy, *race* became an "unspeakable" category of formal politics. Drawing on Goldberg's powerful theorization of "racial evaporations" in Europe, Caterina Romeo writes:

Race—historically a constitutive element in the process of Italian national identity—has "evaporated" from the cultural debate in contemporary Italy as a result of the necessity to obliterate 'embarrassing' historical events... The presence of race, like the presence of

steam, saturates the air, rendering it heavy, unbreathable. Moreover, there is the constant threat that race could change its status back if challenged by new forces, thus becoming visible again.⁹³

In this context, citizenship and nationality law became a way to re-border the Italian nation at a time of increasing heterogeneity, using supposedly colorblind—but, as we have seen, profoundly racialized—categories such as familial descent and economic productivity. For instance, in a famous 2013 editorial written in opposition to *jus soli* citizenship, Italian political scientist Giuseppe Sartori criticized Minister of Integration Cécile Kyenge's assertion that Italy is a “Paese ‘meticcio’” [“a ‘mixed’ country”].⁹⁴ According to Sartori, “Brazil is a very mixed country. But Italy is not. [...] Our alleged immigration expert [Kyenge] assumes that African and Arab youth both in Italy are ‘integrated’ citizens.”⁹⁵ As Tatiana Petrovich Njegosh rightly argues,

The terms [*jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*] are significant...because they make visible that which the law invisibilizes through “neutral” terms like descent and ascent: the relationship between citizenship, racial categories, and the racialization of citizenship.⁹⁶

It is important to clarify that this is different move than the *biologicistic* conflation of race and citizenship seen during Italian colonialism and fascism, when physiognomy was used to mark the boundaries of Italianness. During the fascist period, citizenship was fragmented into discrete and ranked categories: Italian citizenship for white Italians; colonial citizenship for colonized Libyans; and subjecthood for colonized Eritreans and Somalis.⁹⁷ By 1937, colonial cities in *l’Africa Orientale Italiana* [Italian East Africa] were characterized by varying degrees of apartheid. The children of white Italian men and Black Eritrean women in the colonies who were not formally recognized by their fathers could only obtain Italian citizenship if an Italian judge determined that their features were sufficiently “Aryan-Italian.”⁹⁸ In addition, under the 1938 Racial Laws, Jewish Italians were stripped of key civil rights including the ability to run for office and pursue higher education.



Figure 9 The first issue of the fascist magazine *La difesa della razza* [*The Defense of the race*], published on August 5, 1938. The cover image depicts a linear progression from the Black African, to the Jew, to the Aryan/Roman Italian.

Source: Bartelby08 via Wikimedia Commons
(https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Difesa_della_razza.jpg).

The re-embedding of racial nationalism within citizenship in 1990s Italy relied upon racialized notions of descent and economic productivity, rather than the biological or phenotypic understandings of racial difference characteristic of earlier periods. Nonetheless, this shift still helps us to understand why citizenship has emerged as the primary, acceptable means of advocating for rights and racial inclusion in Italy within the last decade. At the same time, it also helps us to understand why citizenship creates a double bind for young activists, one in which solidarity between the *seconda generazione* and refugees is perceived as politically infeasible and the newly arrived fall outside the racialized boundary of citizenship. It is a product of the way a very specific set of political, economic, and social conditions came together during Italy's dramatic transformation into a country of immigration at the end of the twentieth century.

Beyond Citizenship?

This chapter has argued that in the post-World War II period, racial nationalism became structurally embedded within the presumably colorblind framework of citizenship. It did not simply disappear with toppling of state fascism; rather, the relationship between race and nation took on a new form, one that linked citizenship to deeply racialized notions of descent and economic productivity. The racial underpinnings of citizenship have once again become visible, this time in the cauldron of contemporary struggles to reform Italian citizenship and recent mass migrations into southern Europe from sub-Saharan Africa.

The story of *seconda generazione* citizenship reform activists attempting to de-racialize Italianness suggests that citizenship inevitably produces a racialized “outside”—it is, to paraphrase Engin Isin, the inclusion that relentlessly produces exclusion.⁹⁹ The shifting definitions and requirements for citizenship mean that there is also a constant pattern of exclusion and differential incorporation, though the specific terms of that exclusion may shift over time: from economic productivity, to length of residence, to cultural knowledge, and so on. As citizenship reform activists fight to expand the boundaries of Italian citizenship, they are also faced with the possibility of a reform of Italian citizenship law that consolidates Italianness in new ways—for instance, through the idea of a shared Italian “common culture.” Indeed, because “Italianness” is not formally codified and transmitted through state institutions as in explicitly assimilationist countries such as France, it is open to constant negotiation and contestation by a variety of different constituencies.¹⁰⁰

Too often, citizenship is thought of as a unitary, stable social fact—a “one size fits all” policy. But when we approach citizenship from the starting point of race and racism (rather than seeing racism as an unintended side-effect of nationality laws), we can begin to see citizenship not as the highest legal principle, but as a product of different, racialized histories. This is an important lesson to remember as we try to grapple with the frightening resurgence of far-right ethnonationalism around the world. It is quite easy to view these developments as a break from an earlier period of “colorblind liberalism,”¹⁰¹ or the resurgence of cruder, more overtly biological racisms. Instead, this Italian story forces us to grapple with the embeddedness of race within the nation itself: a past that may have been partially buried but was never truly dead.

This does not mean that citizenship is unimportant, or that activism for a reform of Italian citizenship law is misguided—far from it, in fact. I have participated in citizenship reform demonstrations across Italy, and even organized solidarity protests in the United States. I never cease to be awed by the dedication and persistence of the Rete G2 and *Italiani senza cittadinanza*, and have no doubt that the current Italian citizenship law is unjust, exclusionary, and thoroughly racist. But studying and working alongside citizenship reform activists in Italy

for over five years—sitting in on many difficult, sincere conversations about the long-term implications of the *jus soli* movement—has also taught me the importance of considering the “outside” that is produced through advocacy for citizenship. My work with Black citizenship and immigrants’ rights activists in Italy and beyond has also encouraged me to be open to different kinds of political possibilities, even beyond nation-state recognition.

And this is indeed the direction in which young “second generation” activists in Italy are turning. Disillusioned by a series of betrayals by Italian politicians on the Left and Right, these activists have increasingly begun to de-romanticize the goal of citizenship, approaching it instead as a tool that provides access to a discrete set of rights and capabilities and de-linking citizenship from the murkier philosophical and experiential matters of belonging (national or otherwise). They are not denying the power of the state, but are instead finding new ways to work in, with, and against the violent hegemony of the modern nation-state to articulate of what Emilio Giacomo Berrocal has characterized as an “anti-nationalist” approach to citizenship reform.¹⁰²

In Chapters Three and Four, I will explore the ways in which youth of African descent are increasingly organizing around a shared “Black Italianness.” These new projects are not focused exclusively on citizenship, and instead seek to articulate the experiences of Blackness and anti-Black racism in Italy in relation to a *global* Black diaspora. Disaggregating citizenship, nation, and sovereignty is a theme that has also concerned many de- and post-colonial scholars.¹⁰³ In Chapter Five, I will return to these questions by focusing on a group of Italian-Eritrean youth who have sidestepped the goal of nation-state recognition in favor of new political formations oriented on the shared ties of diaspora and anticolonial struggle. Through their initiatives, “second generation” Italian-Eritreans work alongside newly arrived refugees from the Horn of Africa, providing resettlement assistance and explicitly rejecting a division between the “born here” and the “newly arrived.”

While debates surrounding the boundaries of Italianness in contemporary Italy exceed the category of legal citizenship, this chapter has argued that citizenship nonetheless serves as a powerful cipher for encoding debates about race, nationalism, and the perceived incompatibility of Blackness and Italianness. In the following chapter, I will focus specifically on the way that Italy’s liminal geographical position between Europe and Africa has shaped uniquely Italian understandings of racial difference, which do not necessarily privilege whiteness but that are still compatible with various forms of anti-Blackness. The geographical project of producing Italy’s material and symbolic boundaries in relation to the geobodies of Europe and Africa, I will argue, is also productive of categories of racial difference that continue to shape debates about citizenship and the possibility of “Black Italianness.”

¹ Francesco Occhetta, “La Cittadinanza in Italia,” *La Civiltà Cattolica* IV, no. 3919 (October 5, 2013): 15. All Italian texts were translated into English by the Author, unless indicated otherwise.

² Clelia Bartoli, *Razzisti per legge: L’Italia che discrimina* (Rome: Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2012), 64.

³ In the past, Italy has responded to the perceived threat of radical Islamic terrorism swiftly, with harsh security and surveillance measures. After the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 attacks on London’s public transportation system, for instance, the Italian government immediately enacted some of the strictest Internet regulations in Europe. These regulations, which among other provisions targeted Internet cafes for heightened surveillance, led to the disproportionate policing of immigrant and Muslim communities. For more information, see Camilla Hawthorne, “Dangerous Networks: Internet Regulations as Racial Border Control in Italy,” in *DigitalSTS*:

A Handbook and Fieldguide, ed. Janet Vertesi and David Ribes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2019).

⁴ Pseudonym.

⁵ Citizenship reform activists in Italy regularly noted that they were following, learning from, and sometimes in direct communication with, DREAMers in the United States. The DREAMers are a movement of young people who arrived, undocumented, to the United States as children traveling with their parents. They are seeking a legalization of their immigration status. The name DREAMer comes from the legislative proposal entitled “DREAM: Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors.”

⁶ Chiara Marchetti, “Trees without Roots’: The Reform of Citizenship Challenged by the Children of Immigrants in Italy,” *Bulletin of Italian Politics* 2, no. 1 (2010): 51.

⁷ Patrick Weil, “Access to Citizenship : A Comparison of Twenty Five Nationality Laws,” in *Citizenship Today Global Perspectives and Practices*, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 17–35.

⁸ Mohamed Abdalla Tailmoun, Mauro Valeri, and Isaac Tesfaye, *Campioni d’Italia? Le seconde generazioni e lo sport* (Rome: Sinnos, 2014); Papavero, “Minori e Seconde Generazioni.”

⁹ “European Convention on Nationality,” European Treaty Series-No. 166 Council of Europe § (1997), <https://rm.coe.int/168007f2c8>.

¹⁰ “Acquisto Della Cittadinanza,” Pub. L. No. Legge n. 91 del 1992 (1992), https://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/17/DOSSIER/941909/index.html?part=dossier_dossier1-sezione_sezione11-h1_h14.

¹¹ It is important to note that many children of immigrants are not aware of this one-year window. Until an initiative spearheaded by the Rete G2, municipalities made no effort to inform youth of the naturalization process.

¹² Andall, “Second-Generation Attitude?,” 394.

¹³ “Cittadinanza italiana, boom di richieste e tempi di attesa interminabili,” *ModenaToday*, February 18, 2016, <http://www.modenatoday.it/cronaca/numeri-richieste-attese-cittadinanza-italiana-modena.2015.html>.

¹⁴ Because citizenship conferred this way is a concession, this also means that it cannot be passed on to the naturalized person’s children. See “La concessione e l’accertamento della cittadinanza italiana,” Progetto Melting Pot Europa, September 13, 2009, <http://www.meltingpot.org/La-concessione-e-l-accertamento-della-cittadinanza-italiana.html>.

¹⁵ “Immigrati, i numeri della seconda generazione,” *La Repubblica*, October 12, 2016, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/10/12/news/immigrati_i_numeri_della_seconda_generazione-149594031/.

¹⁶ There are over 800,000 children with non-Italian citizenship in Italian schools, 61 percent of whom were born in Italy. They make up 9.4 percent of schoolchildren in Italy. See Cristina Nadotti, “Crescono gli studenti non cittadini italiani: il 61% è nato in Italia,” *La Repubblica*, March 29, 2018, http://www.repubblica.it/scuola/2018/03/29/news/crescono_gli_studenti_non_cittadini_italiani_il_61_e_nato_in_italia-192524586/.

¹⁷ Giordano, “Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy,” 590.

¹⁸ Tailmoun, Valeri, and Tesfaye, *Campioni d’Italia?*

¹⁹ Between 1876 and 1976 alone it is estimated that over 20 million people left Italy. In fact, the Italian diaspora is regarded as one of the largest mass exoduses in modern history.

²⁰ Bonifazi et al., “Italy: The Italian Transition from an Emigration to Immigration Country.”; Giordano, “Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy,” 591; Wendy A Pojmann, *Immigrant Women and Feminism in Italy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

²¹ Mark I. Choate, *Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Teresa Fiore, “The Emigrant Post-‘Colonia’ in Contemporary Immigrant Italy,” in *Postcolonial Italy: Challenging National Homogeneity*, ed. Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 71–82.

²² Giordano, “Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy,” 591.

²³ During this period, under Italian law a family’s citizenship followed that of the *pater familias*, or head of household.

²⁴ The reforms that granted Italian women the right to pass on citizenship to their children via *jus sanguinis* were the product of protracted Italian feminist struggles that were also linked to social issues such as divorce, abortion, and labor force participation.

²⁵ Sabina Donati, *A Political History of National Citizenship and Identity in Italy, 1861–1950* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013), 8.

²⁶ Donati, 14.

²⁷ Candice Whitney, "Race, Culture and Colonial Legacy in Today's Italian Citizenship Struggles," *Kheiro Magazine*, June 20, 2017, <https://kheiromag.com/race-culture-and-colonial-legacy-in-todays-italian-citizenship-struggles-27b6d9f9649f>.

²⁸ A key tenet in much of the literature on Black European studies is that Blacks in Europe are (or should be recognized as) *citizens, not migrants*. This is an intellectual and political project meant to contest the idea that people of African descent are eternally Europe's outsiders—in other words, that they are perpetual migrants, regardless of how long their communities have been established in Europe. This historically myopic perspective denies the deep entanglements of Europe and Africa, ties of colonialism and enslavement that generated the famous chant, "We are *here* because you were *there*!" At the same time, this emphasis on Black European *citizenship* has the potential to obscure other kinds of differences and power relations within Black Europe. As Barnor Hesse writes, "Comprising neither a conventional spatiality nor a familiar representation, [Black Europe] is located at the intersections of *non-Europe/Europe, outside/inside, other/same, immigrant/citizen, coloniality/postcoloniality*." See Barnor Hesse, "Afterword: Europe's Undecidability," in *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*, ed. Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 291–304; Small, *20 Questions and Answers on Black Europe*.

²⁹ Papavero, "Minori e Seconde Generazioni," 3.

³⁰ Enzo Colombo, Luisa Leonini, and Paola Rebughini, "Different But Not Stranger: Everyday Collective Identifications among Adolescent Children of Immigrants in Italy," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35, no. 1 (2009): 37–59, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830802489101>.

³¹ Dorothy Louise Zinn, "'Loud and Clear': The G2 Second Generations Network in Italy," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 16, no. 3 (2011): 374, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2011.565640>.

³² While Italy never adopted formal policies of assimilation or multiculturalism like France or the United Kingdom, the Italian model of immigrant reception has been frequently characterized as one of "diffusion." Immigrants are comparatively dispersed across the major cities of Italy, and for the most part are not concentrated in *banlieu*-like urban peripheries. For more information, see Melotti, "Immigration and Security in Europe: A Look at the Italian Case"; Grignetti, "Immigrazione diffusa, la risposta italiana alle banlieue."

³³ This forum was originally housed on the Rete G2's website, *secondegenerazioni.it*; it has since migrated to Facebook.

³⁴ Dorothy Louise Zinn, "Italy's Second Generations and the Expression of Identity through Electronic Media," *Bulletin of Italian Politics* 2, no. 1 (2010): 91–113; Zinn, "'Loud and Clear.'"

³⁵ I will elaborate on this phenomenon in Chapter Four.

³⁶ Critiques of the term "second generation" fall into four main categories. First, the term is imprecise, and has been rendered even more confusing with the introduction of terms such as 1.25 or 1.75 to refer to children who immigrated as small children or as young adults. Second, the term suggests that "foreignness" is a heritable category that is passed from immigrant parents to their children. Third, it flattens the variegations in experiences and legal statuses *within* the category of "second generation." And finally, it severs the connections between children and their families by suggesting that the second generation is more "advanced" in a teleological progression of assimilation or integration into the host country. See Isabella Clough Marinaro and James Walston, "Italy's 'Second Generations': The Sons and Daughters of Migrants," *Bulletin of Italian Politics* 2, no. 1 (2010): 5–19; Bjørn Thomassen, "'Second Generation Immigrants' or 'Italians with Immigrant Parents'? Italian and European Perspectives on Immigrants and Their Children," *Bulletin of Italian Politics* 2, no. 1 (2010): 21–44.

³⁷ There were many earlier attempts to reform Italian nationality law before 2011, all unsuccessful. For more information, see Marchetti, "Trees without Roots"; De Franceschi, *La Cittadinanza Come Luogo Di Lotta. Le Seconde Generazioni in Italia Fra Cinema e Serialità*.

³⁸ Vladimiro Polchi, "'L'Italia Sono Anch'io': Due Leggi per La Cittadinanza Agli Immigrati," *La Repubblica*, June 22, 2011, http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2011/06/22/news/campagna_cittadinanza-18041906/.

³⁹ "Documenti," *L'Italia Sono Anch'io* (blog), accessed July 25, 2018, <http://www.litaliasonoanchio.it/index.php?id=522>.

⁴⁰ Annalisa Camilli, "Ius soli, ius sanguinis, ius culturae: tutto sulla riforma della cittadinanza," *Internazionale*, October 20, 2017, <https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2017/10/20/riforma-cittadinanza-da-sapere>.

⁴¹ Emanuela Stella, "'E' italiano chi nasce in Italia" La Kyenge a Venezia per "18 ius soli" - Repubblica.it," *La Repubblica*, August 25, 2013, http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2013/08/25/news/italiano_chi_nasce_in_italia_kyenge_presenta_a_venezias_18_ius_soli-65259182/.

- ⁴² Annalisa Camilli, “Cos’è lo ius soli e come funziona la cittadinanza in altri paesi europei,” *Internazionale*, June 21, 2017, <https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2017/06/21/ius-soli-cittadinanza-italia>.
- ⁴³ Zinn, “‘Loud and Clear,’” 379.
- ⁴⁴ Trica Danielle Keaton, *Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics, and Social Exclusion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
- ⁴⁵ Fred Kuwornu, *18 Ius Soli*, documentary, 2012, <http://vimeo.com/37011695>.
- ⁴⁶ Merrill, “In Other Wor(l)Ds: Situated Intersectionality in Italy,” 78.
- ⁴⁷ Clarissa Clò, “Hip Pop Italian Style: The Postcolonial Imagination of Second-Generation Authors in Italy,” in *Postcolonial Italy: Challenging National Homogeneity*, ed. Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 275–92.
- ⁴⁸ Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic*, 17.
- ⁴⁹ In 2012, the Northern League’s EU parliamentary representative Mario Borghezio went so far as to call Balotelli “a *padano* with dark skin.” *Padania* is a term revived by the Northern League in the 1990s to refer to northern Italy. See “Borghezio su Mario: ‘Balotelli? E’ un padano con la pelle scura,’” *Il Giorno*, June 30, 2012, <https://www.ilgiorno.it/brescia/cronaca/2012/06/30/737145-milano-borghezio-balotelli-padano.shtml>.
- ⁵⁰ Pred, *Even in Sweden*, 79.
- ⁵¹ Stuart Hall, “Conclusion: The Multi-Cultural Question,” in *Un/Settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptios*, ed. Barnor Hesse (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 209–41.
- ⁵² “Ius soli al Senato, 7mila emendamenti della Lega,” *Public Policy*, April 28, 2016, <https://www.publicpolicy.it/lega-senato-emendamenti-cittadinanza-58641.html>.
- ⁵³ Andrea Morigi, “Più immigrati uguale più attentati ma se possiamo cacciarli siamo sicuri,” *Libero*, July 25, 2016, <http://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/italia/11932550/piu-immigrati-uguale-piu-attentati-ma-se-possiamo-cacciarli-siamo-sicuri-.html>.
- ⁵⁴ Luca Bussotti, “A History of Italian Citizenship Laws during the Era of the Monarchy (1861-1946),” *Advances in Historical Studies* 05, no. 04 (2016): 145, <https://doi.org/10.4236/ahs.2016.54014>.
- ⁵⁵ “Cittadinanza: sì della Camera allo ius soli. La nuova legge passa al Senato,” *La Repubblica*, October 13, 2015, http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2015/10/13/news/legge_cittadinanza_senato-124967907/.
- ⁵⁶ Massimo Solani, “Pacciotti: ‘L’Italia Non Può Trattare Milioni Di Persone Come Cittadini Di Serie B,’” *Democratica.It* (blog), October 14, 2016, <http://test.democratica.info/interviste/pacciotti-italia-immigrazione-legge-cittadinanza/?amp>.
- ⁵⁷ Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands* (1987; repr., San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1999).
- ⁵⁸ It is important to note that the “fear of replacement” is a commonly-cited concern among white nationalist groups across Europe and the United States, and can be directly linked to French writer Renaud Camus’ notion of “the great replacement.” See Sergio Rame, “Ius soli, è sostituzione etnica: subito 800mila nuovi ‘italiani,’” *Il Giornale*, June 15, 2017, <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/ius-soli-sostituzione-etnica-subito-800mila-nuovi-italiani-1409527.html>; Thomas Chatterton Williams, “The French Origins of ‘You Will Not Replace Us,’” *The New Yorker*, November 27, 2017, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-french-origins-of-you-will-not-replace-us>.
- ⁵⁹ Monica Rubino, “Fertility Day, Renzi: ‘Campagna inguardabile’. Lorenzin: ‘Basta polemiche, contano i fatti,’” *La Repubblica*, September 22, 2016, http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/09/22/news/fertility_day_al_via_proteste_piazza-148297333/.
- ⁶⁰ Istat, “Cittadini non comunitari.”
- ⁶¹ Many scholars of Black Europe have noted that the preoccupation among European states with the supposed threat of radical Islam has overshadowed concerns about people of African descent, with the result that “there are less and less resources for Blacks and less attention to them as they are rendered marginal.” See Stephen Small, “Introduction,” in *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*, ed. Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), xxxii; Essed and Nimako, “Designs and (Co)Incidents.”
- ⁶² Generally speaking, Black people in Italy are interpellated primarily as “racial subjects,” while Arabs and North Africans are interpellated primarily as “Muslims,” thus invisibilizing the presence of Black Muslims in Italy. One notable exception is the Italian-Somali writer Igiaba Scego, who has written extensively about being Muslim. See, for instance, Igiaba Scego, “Non in mio nome,” *Internazionale*, January 7, 2015, <https://www.internazionale.it/opinione/igiaba-scego/2015/01/07/non-in-mio-nome>.
- ⁶³ Goldberg, “Racial Europeanization,” 346.
- ⁶⁴ The Muslim presence in what is now Italy dates back to ninth-century Sicily. Today, Islam is the second-most widely practiced religion in Italy after Christianity (including Catholicism); there are almost 1.5 million Muslims in Italy, and almost one third of Italy’s immigrant population is Muslim. Nonetheless, Islam (unlike Catholicism,

Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and some other Christian sects) is not formally recognized by the Italian state because it is seen by the government to be incompatible with the principles of the Italian constitution. This means that mosques cannot benefit from the *otto per mille* (0.8 percent) of funding for organized religions that is compulsorily drawn from Italians' annual income taxes. While concerns about Blackness and Islam in Italian space are often held separate public discourse in Italy, the use of Catholicism as a "race-neutral" stand-in for whiteness suggests that Islamophobia and anti-Blackness should actually be analyzed in relation to one another.

⁶⁵ Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization," 344.

⁶⁶ "Ius soli, al Senato manca il numero legale. Assenti tutti i M5s e i centristi. Manca 1/3 dei Dem," *La Repubblica*, December 23, 2017,

http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/12/23/news/cittadinanza_al_senato_manca_il_numero_legale_muore_lo_ius_soli-184997182/.

⁶⁷ The Italian constitution reads, "It is the duty of the Republic to remove the economic and social obstacles that limit the equality of citizens and prevent the full development of the person and the effective participation of all workers in the country's political, economic, and social organization." See "Ius soli: 'Italiani senza cittadinanza' scrivono a Mattarella," ANSA, December 26, 2017, http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2017/12/26/ius-soli-italiani-senza-cittadinanza-scrivono-a-mattarella_ba84d2b2-de6c-4b49-8f48-b9c7246cf0e5.html.

⁶⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

⁶⁹ Giorgio Agamben, "Perché non ho firmato l'appello sullo ius soli," *Quodlibet*, October 18, 2017, <https://www.quodlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-perch-on-ho-firmato-l-appello-sullo-ius-soli>.

⁷⁰ Alexander G. Weheliye and Léopold Lambert, "Claiming Humanity: A Black Critique of the Concept of Bare Life," *The Funambulist*, July 28, 2014, <https://thefunambulist.net/podcast/alexander-weheliye-claiming-humanity-a-black-critique-of-the-concept-of-bare-life>; Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).

⁷¹ Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul, "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 34, no. 1 (2008): 153–79, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608>.

⁷² Ruth Lister, "Inclusive Citizenship: Realizing the Potential," *Citizenship Studies* 11, no. 1 (2007): 49–61, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020601099856>.

⁷³ Roberto G. Gonzales and Nando Sigona, "Mapping the Soft Borders of Citizenship: An Introduction," in *Within and Beyond Citizenship: Borders, Membership and Belonging*, ed. Nando Sigona and Roberto G. Gonzales (London: Routledge, 2017), 1–14.

⁷⁴ Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Duke University Press, 2013).

⁷⁵ James Holston, *Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁷⁶ Lister, "Inclusive Citizenship."

⁷⁷ Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*.

⁷⁸ Zinn, "Italy's Second Generations and the Expression of Identity through Electronic Media," 382.

⁷⁹ David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002).

⁸⁰ Goldberg argues that the modern state is "nothing less than a racial state." In this way, he directs attention away from the extreme cases of "racist states" such as Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa toward the broad realm of processes by which states include and exclude in racially ordered terms.

⁸¹ This will be discussed further in Chapter Two.

⁸² Andall, *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service*.

⁸³ Hans Lucht, *Darkness Before Daybreak: African Migrants Living on the Margins in Southern Italy Today* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 22.

⁸⁴ Roberto Saviano, "Mai sentito parlare di Jerry Masslo?," *La Repubblica*, August 24, 2014, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/24/news/saviano_jerry_masslo-94354580/.

⁸⁵ Jennifer Parmelee, "'Italian Dream' Soured by Racism," *Washington Post*, August 31, 1989, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/31/italian-dream-soured-by-racism/37f5c1d6-b8fb-4b8e-86af-e6d1b5a4f2a9/>.

⁸⁶ Alessandra Di Maio, "Black Italia: Contemporary Migrant Writers from Africa," in *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*, ed. Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 119–44; Merrill, *An Alliance Of Women*.

⁸⁷ Cole, *The New Racism in Europe*.

⁸⁸ “Jerry Masslo, l’uomo Che Scopri Il Razzismo in Italia,” *Stranieri in Italia*, August 25, 2011, <http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita/attualita/attualita-sp-754/jerry-masslo-luomo-che-scopri-il-razzismo-in-italia.html>.

⁸⁹ The Legge Martelli also brought Italy in line with the broader European Union immigration policy framework, in preparation for Italy’s ascension to the EU in 1992.

⁹⁰ Giovanna Zincone and Marzia Basili, “Country Report: Italy,” EUDO Citizenship Observatory (Florence: European University Institute, 2013), 3.

⁹¹ Under the 1992 nationality law, refugees could gain Italian citizenship after 5 years of residency, and adopted children could gain Italian citizenship after 7 years of residency. *Jus soli* only exists for children born in Italy to stateless parents (*apolidi*), unknown parents, or parents who cannot transmit their citizenship to their children.

⁹² Donald Martin Carter and Heather Merrill, “Bordering Humanism: Life and Death on the Margins of Europe,” *Geopolitics* 12, no. 2 (2007): 248–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040601168867>.

⁹³ Romeo, “Racial Evaporations: Representing Blackness in African Italian Postcolonial Literature.”

⁹⁴ Giovanni Sartori, “L’Italia Non è Una Nazione Meticcica Ecco Perché Lo Ius Soli Non Funziona,” *Corriere Della Sera*, June 17, 2013, http://www.corriere.it/opinioni/13_giugno_17/sartori-ius-soli-integrazione-catena-equivoci_686dbf54-d728-11e2-a4df-7eff8733b462.shtml.

⁹⁵ Sartori.

⁹⁶ Tatiana Petrovich Njegosh, “La finizione della razza, la linea del colore e il meticcato,” in *Il colore della nazione*, ed. Gaia Giuliani (Milan: Mondadori, 2015), 224.

⁹⁷ Bussotti, “A History of Italian Citizenship Laws during the Era of the Monarchy (1861-1946).”

⁹⁸ Fabrizio De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea,” *Interventions* 8, no. 3 (2006): 401, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698010600955958>.

⁹⁹ Engin F. Isin, “Engaging, Being, Political,” *Political Geography* 24 (2005): 381.

¹⁰⁰ Keaton, *Muslim Girls and the Other France*.

¹⁰¹ Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America* (2003; repr., Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

¹⁰² Emilio Giacomo Berrocal, “Building Italian-Ness through the Logic of the ‘Other in Us’ and the ‘Self in the Other’: An Anti-Nationalist Approach to the Italian Debate on a New Citizenship Law,” *Bulletin of Italian Politics* 2, no. 1 (2010): 69–90.

¹⁰³ Yarimar Bonilla, *Non-Sovereign Futures: French Caribbean Politics in the Wake of Disenchantment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).

Chapter Two

Racial Imaginaries of Italy, the Mediterranean, and Africa

“Finally, we discover that Italy, despite its political association with Europe, is essentially part of the African plate. Italy represents a promontory which indented Europe at the location of the Alps. Because the notions of Africa and Europe are relative, it is not possible to say whether Italy led the African assault on Europe, or if Europe impaled itself on Italy.”¹

“Where are your monuments, your battles, martyrs? Where is your tribal memory? Sirs, in that grey vault. The sea. The sea has locked them up. The sea is History.”²

On a brisk and typically overcast Milanese morning in 2016, I raced out of my apartment and through the bustling *metropolitana* to meet my friend, the Italian-Ghanaian documentary filmmaker and activist Fred Kuwornu. We had just enough time for tea and orange juice at the Porto di Mare train station’s spartan bar before his meeting at nearby Sky TV, where he planned to pitch a new film project about “second generation” athletes in Italy. Surrounded by the dull murmur of commuters and the clinks of cappuccino cups against porcelain saucers, he asked me how my research was proceeding and then updated me on his plans to use the international momentum surrounding #OscarsSoWhite to launch a media diversity campaign in Italy.

As we ruminated on questions of diversity and Italian national identity, our conversation gradually drifted to the history of civilizational mixing in the Mediterranean basin and in Italy specifically (which, he remarked with a wry smile, is not *really* a country). “That’s why I think it’s so problematic to talk about a single ‘Italian’ culture,” I responded, nodding enthusiastically. “Well, there *is* an Italian culture,” he countered, as he leaned toward me with one eyebrow raised. “It’s precisely that mix of influences—so many things we see as native to Italy really came from elsewhere. If you look at history, you’ll see that all of the popes and emperors had diverse origins—they were not ‘Italian.’ But that history is not taught.”

Fred’s argument that Italianness is best represented not by purity of origin but rather by deep histories of mixing and civilizational cross-contamination in the wider Mediterranean basin was one that I encountered again and again over the course of my research in Italy. The concept of mixing—from the mixing of people of diverse backgrounds together within a community, to the mixing of people of different ethnic or racial backgrounds in an intimate relationship, to an individual person of mixed origins—is hailed by many, particularly on the Left, as both the future of Italy and one of its oldest traditions.³ In 2013 (as noted in Chapter One), then–Minister of Integration Cécile Kyenge helped to re-popularize this vision of Italy when she publicly declared that Italy is “*un paese meticcio*” [a mixed country].⁴ Her assertion was echoed in the fall of 2015 by young activists from the groups Cantiere Meticcio and Arte Migrante at a demonstration against the far-right Lega Nord in Bologna, their faces daubed with brown paint as they chanted in unison, “*Bologna è meticcio! Bologna è meticcio!*”⁵

Indeed, the trope of *meticcio* [miscegenation, mestizaje, mixing, or hybridity] as a natural by-product of Italy’s status as a Mediterranean crossroads has re-emerged as something

of a panacea among certain segments of the Italian Left. This has occurred at a historical moment when Italy is increasingly forced to contend with complex and urgent questions about national identity and the incorporation of racial, ethnic, national, or religious difference into the national body.⁶ This trend is reflected even within the traditionally conservative realm of Italianist scholarship, which has in the last decade witnessed a veritable resurgence of interest in Mediterranean interconnections⁷ and, even more recently, in applying concepts such as hybridity, inter/transculturality, and *meticcio* to the critical study of national identity.⁸ As Italianist scholar Vetri Nathan argues, “Italy is a nation at the cultural crossroads of the Mediterranean. It is also a geographical bridge, a long and narrow peninsula that not only spans North and South, but East and West.”⁹

But these assertions are in no way limited to the ivory tower of academia. They also suffuse cultural centers and business development plans, scientific research agendas and political commentary across Italy. Noting the incredible heterogeneity of Italian peoples and cultures, the Nigerian writer, occasional resident of Rome, and Italian media darling Taiye Selassie penned the following entreaty for the *New York Times*: “Who better than the Italian citizen...to understand that a country that has perpetually expanded to include new complexions, inflections, and politics might (lo, must) expand once more?”¹⁰

As these examples suggest, Mediterranean mixedness constitutes one part of a broader racial imaginary that animates leftist fantasies about future racial, ethnic, and cultural conviviality in Italy. But while mixing has only relatively recently come back into fashion, these ideas are in fact deeply rooted in the history and geography of Italian nation building. After all, even the German philosopher Hegel considered the Mediterranean Sea to be “the center of World-History” because it facilitated frictionless communication and exchange between three entire continents.¹¹ Nonetheless, this preoccupation with Italian heterogeneity has taken on new meanings in the context of struggles over Italianness in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Engaging with histories of exchange and mixing across the Mediterranean is an important way to come to terms with the specific historical and geographical configurations of race and Blackness in contemporary Italy.¹² Yet many invocations of Mediterranean mixing in relation to race-thinking in Italy face one of two problems: they either romanticize the history of mixing and neglect questions of power, or they assume a position of national exceptionalism and thus fail to situate Italian ideas about race within the larger historical-geographical contexts of global racisms and anti-Blackness. In this chapter, therefore, I will trace key moments of “race-making” in relation to ideas of Blackness in Italy. I will focus specifically on how notions of Mediterranean contamination, mixedness, interconnection, and hybridity have been problematized by racial (and self-proclaimed “anti-racist”) scientists of various stripes in the contexts of national unification, colonial expansion, fascism, and postcolonial migrations.

I will build toward two, interconnected arguments in this chapter. First, Blackness has been central to Italianness since national unification—as a threat, a foil, an object of study, or a subject of desire—and, for that reason, cannot be considered in any way “external” or “foreign” to Italy. Second, despite their apparent promises of multiracial and multicultural conviviality, discourses of Mediterraneanism and Italian hybridity in practice work to *exclude* Blackness by distancing Italy from sub-Saharan Africa and metaphorically severing the deep pan-African ties that span the entirety of the Mediterranean basin (Italy included). An Italian-Eritrean scholar illustrated the implications of this anti-Black Mediterraneanism at a conference in 2016; while pointing at the skin of her own wrist, she noted ironically that while “all [white] Italians want to be tan, they don’t necessarily want *my* kind of brown.”

This chapter seeks to use a genealogy of Italian racial thinking as a “history of the present”¹³ to understand the stakes and limitations of current invocations of Mediterranean mixing in conversations about race, national identity, and citizenship. Though the meanings and practices associated with mixing and Mediterraneanism have been reconfigured and reassembled at several different moments across Italian history, what has remained constant is that these concepts always function geographically. In other words, they work to map Italy’s relationship to both Europe and Africa, and in doing so redraw the material and symbolic borders of race, Blackness and whiteness, citizenship, and national membership.

Racial Science and Feminist/Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies

While racial science¹⁴ is not the only site of racial boundary drawing and negotiation in Italy, it has undoubtedly been, historically, a privileged site of knowledge production. At the same time, Italian racial science did not flourish in a vacuum. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, over the centuries positivist social science and population genetics have been inextricably entangled with the politics of nation building, public policy debates, colonialism, economic development, and religion. It is important to remember, for instance, before Enlightenment-era understandings of biological race rose to prominence, “race” during the Renaissance was a spatial mapping of religious difference that demarcated Christendom/The West from the Rest.¹⁵ This is especially significant in Italy, where shifting notions of Italian national-racial identity have always had to contend with the status of Catholicism as a marker of Italianness, and of Italy as a (porous) boundary between the Christian and Muslim worlds.¹⁶

Nonetheless, my motive for focusing on *science* as a lens onto broader questions of Mediterraneanism, mixing, and Blackness in Italy is two-fold. First, scientists have long played a significant public role in Italian nation building. For instance, the positivist social scientists active in Italy at the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century were not hermits sealed within obscure laboratories; rather, they were centrally involved in efforts to solve the seemingly intractable problems facing the new Italian nation, from crises of public health to widespread social ills such as crime, prostitution, and illiteracy. The work of researchers such as Cesare Lombroso traversed the boundaries of craniology, psychology, geography, sociology, and public policy, and had a capacious reach in terms of audience. Even when their scholarship was subject to controversy within Italy, the theories Lombroso and his students developed about the existence of two, racially distinct Italies were cited as far afield as the United States, where they were used to justify restrictions on Italian immigration.¹⁷

The fascist period represented a similar meeting of science and society. The 1938 “Manifesto of racial scientists,” written by ten scientists and professors, codified the late fascist regime’s Aryanist racial policies, and prominent scientists of various disciplines contributed regularly to the popular fascist magazine *La Difesa della razza* [*The Defense of the race*].¹⁸ Those scientists favored by the Italian fascist regime (such as Giovanni Marro or Guido Landra) are often dismissed today as mediocre scholars who subsequently “threw themselves into politics” to curry favor and influence.¹⁹ Nonetheless, they should be viewed instead as symptoms of Italian fascism’s tenuous mix of past-facing traditionalism and modernist preoccupations with scientific, technological, and infrastructural advancement, in which the moral authority of science was an important element in the creation of a fascist “New Man.”²⁰

The second reason for focusing on science in this chapter is that because race was disavowed after World War II in Italy (and Europe more broadly) as a valid sociological category due to its association with fascist eugenics and state-sponsored ethnic cleansing

programs, it was left solely to the realm of science. In other words, biological scientists were subsequently regarded as the only experts with the authority and legitimacy to speak the truth about “race.”²¹ As anthropologist Kamala Viswewaran writes, the liberal midcentury American anthropology codified in the 1950 and 1951 UNESCO Statements on Race²² shared a vision of culture that “drew its very identity from *assigning race to biology*”²³ (emphasis added).

The ceding of race to biology had reverberations far beyond American shores in the aftermath of World War II. Indeed, while Italian biologists, physical anthropologists, and population geneticists continue to publish academic and popular tracts about race and its scientific non-existence,²⁴ the social dimensions of race and racism remain contentious and marginalized subjects of inquiry within the Italian academy.²⁵ In fact, a group of physical anthropologists affiliated with the *Istituto italiano di antropologia* [Italian institute of anthropology] are currently engaged in a campaign to expunge the word “race” from the Italian constitution, on the basis that it “inevitably provokes the prejudices and false concepts at the basis of some of the greatest human tragedies.”²⁶ This is all to say that even in contemporary Italy, scientists continue to play a significant role in shaping and contesting what counts as “acceptable” public discourse about race, difference, and national diversity.

My arguments here are rooted in the central claims of feminist postcolonial science and technology studies—specifically, the inextricable relationship between science, technology, colonialism, modernity, and the power-laden (re)production of race and gender.²⁷ In this sense, science (as knowledge-production and ordering practices) and technology (as materials and artifacts that hail individuals) produce raced bodies by rendering complex amalgamations of nature, culture, and history into simplified and essential qualities that link individual variation to generalized “racial” traits. Along these lines, many scholars have grappled with the relationship between the production of racial categories and the production of scientific knowledge—specifically, whether the practices of bracketing, isolation, and simplification that characterize various strands of race-thinking in science are mere aberrations (i.e., “bad science”) or are fundamentally inextricable from science itself.

Donna Haraway, for instance, understands biology as a *cultural* practice that produces historically specific understandings of the human that are embedded in race, nation, and the patriarchal family.²⁸ In other words, science and society are not two bounded and externally related units. There is no stable, singular outside world that can be accessed through scientific reason; biological realism is simply one point of view that is universalized through the God trick of the scientific gaze. On the other hand, scholars such as Nomi Zack and Stephen Jay Gould have attempted to undermine “race” by demonstrating that as a category, it has no useful scientific explanatory power.²⁹ This strategy, however, does not account for the “polyvalent mobility”³⁰ of race as a category over time—a constant renewal facilitated by the search for “better” technologies of racial identification and categorization.

It is for this reason that Evelyn M. Hammonds and Rebecca M. Herzig, as well as Dorothy Roberts,³¹ understand science as a *heterogeneous* array of mutable practices that produce different understandings of human variation at different sites and by different technological means.³² This perspective allows us to analyze how ideas about “race” are continually retrenched and remade in the present, *even* in the sciences, and *even* when it has been common wisdom for at least half a century that there is no biological or genetic basis to race. What I bring to this analytical framework is an emphasis on the centrality of *geography* and *spatiality* (in addition to biology, genetics, or morphology) in the scientific consolidation, reformulation, and contestation racial categories.³³ The history of “race” is entangled not only

with notions of blood and phenotype, but also with questions of geography, environment, and culture.³⁴ An attentiveness to the multiple registers³⁵ in which race has operated historically can help us respond to contemporary discourses of nationalist exclusion in Italy, which do not always rely exclusively upon the language of biological difference.

Linking Mediterraneanism and Mixing

At various points in Italian history, Mediterraneanism (the idea that societies along the Mediterranean basin represent a coherent historical, cultural, or racial unit) was in vogue while practices of *meticciato* were critiqued; at other times, researchers condoned particular forms of mixing but had comparatively little to say about the Mediterranean as a racial or cultural unit. These concepts are not interchangeable, and as I will elaborate below, they have distinct connotations but nevertheless intertwined genealogies. Nonetheless, I argue that is useful to explore the connections between Mediterranean thinking and mixedness precisely because one of the primary ways in which the Mediterranean has been conjured by racial theorists and cultural commentators alike is as a symbol of confluence and exchange—of people, goods, and cultures.³⁶ In other words, the Mediterranean has long been imagined as a *spazio meticcio*—though at various moments, this mixedness has been approached either as a boon or a challenge to Italian racial superiority.

The Italian terms *meticcio* and *meticciato* themselves derive from the Spanish *mestizo/mestizaje*,³⁷ which—as Marisol De La Cadena reminds us—referred to the transgression of religious, class, or cultural boundaries before it signified a person of mixed or “hybrid” racial background.³⁸ In Italy, however, these terms gained popular traction during the fascist period when they were used to describe the socio-political “problem” posed by children of mixed origins in the Italian colonies. By the late twentieth century, the Italian usage of *meticciato* spread to describe not just individuals of mixed origins, but entire populations—it became a metonym for all sorts of religious, cultural, racial, and national mixing, and for multicultural societies in general. Yet even when the terms *meticcio* and *meticciato* are not used explicitly, the writings of Italian racial theorists still reflect a deep and consistent preoccupation with mixing. This preoccupation, I argue, stems directly from Italy’s liminal geographical position in the Mediterranean, straddling the boundary between Europe and Africa.

Jin Haritaworn argues that while multiraciality and multiculturalism are currently hailed as symbols of anti-racism and metropolitan progressiveness in Europe, earlier colonial figurations described the products of mixing as dangerous and degenerate, threatening to the imperial order of things.³⁹ Yet, while this particular story may hold true for northern Europe,⁴⁰ the history of attitudes toward mixing are much more complex and nuanced in southern Europe, and in Italy specifically, precisely due to the specter of the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, following Haritaworn’s account, the “problem” of Mediterranean mixing still led generations of racial theorists to “measure, dissect, and classify”⁴¹ racially-ambiguous Italians in relation to the Mediterranean, Europe, and Africa. Indeed, and contrary to many popular assumptions, the racial ambiguity of the Mediterranean does not mean that Italy has more open or flexible attitudes about racial difference, or that Mediterranean mixing allows for the complete transcendence of race as a category. It is more accurate to suggest that Italy’s racial liminality has led to different, and often contradictory, practices of racial boundary drawing. In other words, notions of Mediterranean racial uncertainty and mixing can actually serve to shore up the hegemonic power of the nation-state rather than destabilize it.

Liberal Italy and Colonial Expansion

To understand the history of debates about race and Blackness in Italy, it is necessary to begin with post-unification Italy and efforts to consolidate the new nation's racial identity. Angelo Matteo Caglioti argues that while scholarly research on race-thinking in Italy has focused predominantly on the anti-Semitism of late fascist racial science, this emphasis actually elides a domestic tradition of racial theorization that dates back to Liberal Italy.⁴² These earlier writings were less obviously concerned with anti-Semitism,⁴³ but were deeply preoccupied with Italy's trans-Mediterranean relationship to the African continent. Italy's demographic heterogeneity, the country's geographical proximity to Africa, and compounding moral panics about the supposed "backwardness" of southern Italians at the time of national unification led to a variety of approaches for apprehending Italy's racial character, decades before the rise of fascism.⁴⁴ These included the theory of two, racially distinct Italies, and the theory of an autochthonous Mediterranean race—both of which I will discuss in greater detail below.

The Risorgimento, Race, and Italy's Southern Question(s)

The unification of Italy, also known as the *Risorgimento*, took place over five decades, culminating in the incorporation of Rome as the capital of the Kingdom of Italy in 1871. Yet this milestone was met with ambivalence in Italy, perhaps best captured by Massimo d'Azeglio's famous (and possibly apocryphal) quote, "We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians." At the time of the Risorgimento, Italy was a patchwork collection of city-states and languages that were not always mutually intelligible—it was little more than Metternich's mere "geographical expression." The most pressing challenge facing the new nation-state, however, was the so-called "Southern Question." The Southern Question, discussed most famously by Marxist intellectual Antonio Gramsci⁴⁵ but predating him by several decades, refers to the significant differences between northern and southern Italy in terms of economic production, industrialization, infrastructure, literacy, public health, and income. This divergence, Jane Schneider argues, was essentialized and racialized by Italian elites and intellectuals at the time of national unification,⁴⁶ and eventually took on a profoundly Orientalist tenor.⁴⁷

It is also important to note that Italy began acquiring colonial possessions in the Horn of Africa before the process of national unification was complete.⁴⁸ Thus, while postcolonial theory has demonstrated that European nation-states were transformed internally in relation to their outward colonial expansion,⁴⁹ this process was especially pronounced in Liberal Italy. It is therefore accurate to suggest that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Italy was actually faced with *two* racially charged Southern Questions—one regarding southern Italy, and the other regarding the "deeper south" of the Horn of Africa. If the racial character and unity of the fledgling Italian nation was an open question, then what could possibly serve as the basis for Italian superiority and authority in the new African colonies? Certain commentators, including some members of the *Società geografica italiana* [Italian Geographical Society, or SGI], contended that the presence of a pre-colonial Christianity in the Horn of Africa actually made Ethiopia and Eritrea ideal "vehicles" for an Italian civilizing mission.⁵⁰ In this way, they suggested that the similarities between Italy and the Horn could actually strengthen—not undermine—Italy's territorial ambitions in Africa.⁵¹

Nonetheless, the Aryanist racial theories that dominated the intellectual circles of northern Europe (and especially Germany and France) at the time of Italian unification emphasized the importance of racial purity and implied that Italians were racially inferior due to their proximity to the African continent. This was a prospect that, understandably, made Italian

elites deeply uncomfortable. In addition, recent archaeological discoveries along the Italian peninsula had provided scientists in Italy with new physical evidence of historical cross-Mediterranean migrations and mixing that converged in Italy—making any claims about racial purity untenable.⁵²

At the same time, however, most European nation-states also traced their cultural and political genealogies to ancient Rome, thus locating the cradle of European civilization within Italy.⁵³ In his *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races*, the French aristocrat Joseph Arthur de Gobineau attempted to resolve this tension by arguing that while much of Rome was Aryan, the collapse of the Roman Empire could be traced to the degeneration and decadence caused by Aryan Romans' mixing with imperial subjects of other races.⁵⁴ In other words, the civilizational inheritance of Europe could be traced to the Germanic influence in ancient Rome, and the degenerated state of modern Latin societies such as Italy was caused by too much Mediterranean racial intermingling with African and Asian populations.

Racial theorists in Italy thus found themselves contending with the following question, summarized by Mary Gibson: “Could race mixing be invigorating rather than enervating and a signal of mongrelization and decline? If so, was race mixing useful only among ‘whites’?”⁵⁵ These were questions that the positivists Cesare Lombroso, Giuseppe Sergi, and Alfredo Niceforo would take on in their scholarship during and after Italian unification.

Cesare Lombroso, Alfredo Niceforo, and the “Two Italies” Thesis

Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909) was an Italian Jewish positivist criminologist best known for his articulation of a theory of the *delinquente nato*, or “born criminal.” According to Lombroso, the criminal “type” could be identified based on the presence of certain atavistic physical traits, which could also be found among so-called “primitive” peoples and in organisms representing earlier evolutionary stages. Lombroso’s understanding of atavism was influenced by the work of both Darwin and Spencer, and also drew on de Gobineau’s notion of degeneration. Considered the father of modern criminology, Lombroso helped to pioneer a practice of criminal anthropology that focused on the collection of bodily (especially craniological) measurements in order to identify an individual or group’s propensity for criminal behavior. While his methodology was certainly haphazard, and was critiqued by contemporaries such as the neuro-anatomist Carlo Giacomini⁵⁶ (his colleague at the University of Turin), it was not terribly out of the ordinary for standard scientific practice at the time of his research.⁵⁷

Lombroso was a prolific scholar and public intellectual, both in Italy and abroad—his museum⁵⁸ and archive in Turin reveal numerous requests for articles, consultations, and collaborations from as far afield as France, Argentina, and the United States.⁵⁹ Indeed, as Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter have demonstrated, over the five editions of his most well known book *L’Uomo delinquente* [*Criminal man*] published between 1876 and 1897, Lombroso expanded his sections on public policy, especially as they related to the reform of the criminal justice system.⁶⁰ A complicated figure with often-ambiguous politics (he also identified as a socialist), Lombroso supported social reforms such as land redistribution to ease the poverty of the southern Italian peasantry, and publicly expressed opposition to colonialism.⁶¹

While Lombroso is most widely known today for his criminological work, he was also a prolific racial theorist. Indeed, his writings on crime and his inquiries into the human “races” cannot be separated, as his understanding of racial difference undergirded his analysis of the atavistic *uomo delinquente*. Prior to the publication of *Criminal man*, in fact, in 1871 Lombroso published a tract entitled *L’uomo bianco e l’uomo di colore* [*The White man and the*

Black/colored man], in which he asserted that humans can be divided into two general races: white and Black, with “intermediate” races being in the process of transformation into white.⁶²

This earlier investigation influenced Lombroso’s later assertion in *Criminal Man* that modern Italy actually comprised two races: an Aryan Italic race in the north, and a Semitic Mediterranean race in the South.⁶³ According to Lombroso, therefore, southern Italians shared certain physical and lifestyle traits (e.g., the abuse of women, resistance to authority, laziness) with Africans.⁶⁴ As Gaia Giuliani observes, Lombroso characterized the Southern temperament as one “defined by transnational raciologies...deterministically attached to the influence of those Arabic (Semitic) or ‘African’ (Hamitic) races that were also composing the racial background of the newly colonized populations.”⁶⁵ The South of Italy was inhabited by a population of racially mixed people because of its long history of being conquered by different populations, and for Lombroso this fact explained southern Italians’ high tendency toward brigandage, crime, and murder. Although he did acknowledge the role of social factors in shaping southern Italy’s criminological landscape (hence his advocacy for policies such as land reform), race remained a central variable in Lombroso’s analysis of Southern delinquency.



Figure 10 Map commissioned by Cesare Lombroso illustrating the geographical distribution of the *tipo bruno*, or dark-haired type. For Lombroso, the Latin *tipo bruno* represented one of the two major racial groups in Europe, the other being the Germanic “blondes.”

Source: Archivio storico del Museo di antropologia criminale Cesare Lombroso (Torino): 3/1861 “Relativa frequenza del tipo bruno.”

Yet contrary to popular contemporary portrayal of Lombroso as a crude biological determinist, the effects of racial mixing were actually an open question in Lombroso's work, tied to additional variables such as geography and climate.⁶⁶ He believed that certain kinds of mixing could actually be beneficial, leaning on Darwinian evolutionary theory to suggest that hybridization could, under certain circumstances, create more dynamic and progressive races. The Jewish people, for instance, had benefitted from the intermingling that occurred when they migrated to Europe,⁶⁷ as did the offspring of indigenous Americans and European colonists; Lombroso also suggested that Sicilians had a greater potential for moral evolution than Neapolitans because Sicilians had interbred with Normans and Saracens.⁶⁸ Miscegenation between whites and Africans, however, yielded no such positive benefits.⁶⁹

Although Lombroso believed that northern and southern Italians represented two distinct races, this assertion did little to quell Italian uncertainties about their authority in the new African colonies. "It remains to be seen," he wrote at the beginning of *L'Uomo bianco*, "if we whites, who stand proudly at the peak of civilization, will have to one day bow our heads before the prognathous muzzle of the negro, or the yellow and ashen face of the mongoloid."⁷⁰ In the same book, he concludes that only the white race had achieved absolute physical and civilizational perfection.⁷¹ If southern Italians shared the same racial characteristics as the colonized populations in the Horn of Africa, however, what did this imply for the stability and legitimacy of Italian colonialism? As Gibson observes, Lombroso seems to have tentatively resolved this ambiguity by leaving open the possibility for malleability through environment or social intervention into the *milieu* for some groups (Jews and certain southern Italians, depending on the extent of their intermixture with Aryans), but not others (i.e., Africans).⁷²

Lombroso's student, the Sicilian positivist Alfredo Niceforo (1876–1960), adhered closely to his mentor's thesis of the two Italies. In *L'Italia Barbara contemporanea* [*Contemporary barbarian Italy*, 1898] and *Italiani del nord e italiani del sud* [*Italians of the North and Italians of the South*, 1901], Niceforo contended that in ancient times, a race from the African continent had invaded the entire Mediterranean basin, including Italy (a claim he borrowed from Giuseppi Sergi, discussed in further detail below); a subsequent invasion from the North brought Aryans—Celts, Germans, and Slavs—into Umbria and Tuscany until they were driven out by a second wave of Etruscan occupation.⁷³ While these various races comingled in central Italy, Niceforo argued that it was still possible to draw a broad racial distinction between the two halves of the country. Like Lombroso, Niceforo believed that the physical differences between these races (such as skull size and shape) translated into differences of character—for instance, patterns of social organization, democratic governability, and criminal behavior. According to Caglioti, Niceforo's main contribution was his systematization of Lombroso's methodology for collecting anthropometric data, allowing Lombrosian arguments about crime and degeneracy to be generalized to entire populations.⁷⁴

It is also important to note that Niceforo was writing in the wake of the humiliating Italian defeat at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, in which the Ethiopian army successfully resisted Italian colonial occupation. The significance of this outcome reverberated around the world as the first African anti-imperialist victory.⁷⁵ Yet for the new Italian nation seeking to assert itself as a major European power, it rendered questions that had previously concerned Lombroso—about Italian racial ambiguity, backwardness, crime, and poverty—even more urgent. Much like Lombroso, for Niceforo the existence of two Italies provided one avenue for sidestepping the question of Italian inferiority, by externalizing the Mediterranean contamination of "Africanness" to southern Italy and the African continent. At the same time, this did not mean

that national unity was an impossible feat; rather, Niceforo held that the heterogeneous character of the Italian nation simply required regionally distinct forms of governance.

A View from the South: Giuseppe Sergi's "Stirpe Mediterranea"

Lombroso and Niceforo's positivist inquiries into the "two Italies" were not without controversy; indeed, after the publication of *L'Italia barbara contemporanea* Niceforo penned a series of anxious letters to Lombroso pleading for defense against his critics, many from southern Italy.⁷⁶ Alongside the notion of an advanced, Aryan northern Italy and a backwards, Mediterranean southern Italy that gained notoriety following Italian unification, a competing theory emerged—that of an autochthonous Mediterranean race with origins in Africa, from which Italy and the rest of Europe had descended.⁷⁷ The most influential proponent of this idea in Italy was the Sicilian positivist physical anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi (1841–1936).

Sergi, who founded the *Società romana di antropologia* (The Anthropological society of Rome, later renamed the *Istituto italiano di antropologia*, or Italian institute of anthropology) in 1893, was a vehement critic of Aryanist racial theories. In *Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea* (1895; published in English as *The Mediterranean Race: A Study of the Origins of European Peoples*), he made a polygenetic argument that Italy was populated by a Mediterranean race with origins in the Ethiopian highlands of the Horn of Africa. This Mediterranean race gradually spread into North Africa, across the Mediterranean, and into Europe and Asia.⁷⁸ Sergi identified three main branches of this Mediterranean race, which he called *homo eurafricus*: African, Mediterranean, and Nordic.⁷⁹ In doing so, Sergi simultaneously cast doubt on the supposed Indo-European origins of Europeans, and on the idea of a pure Germanic/Aryan racial type. In addition, he traced the origins of European civilization to a Mediterranean stock⁸⁰ that was formed through the comingling of many populations along the Mediterranean basin after an initial dispersal from the African continent. Indeed, for Sergi the geography of the Mediterranean created the "most favorable conditions for the development of a civilization more cosmopolitan than those born in the valleys of the great rivers."⁸¹




Figure 11 Giuseppe Sergi's map illustrating the geographical diffusion of the “Mediterranean race/stock” from the Horn of Africa, across the Mediterranean, and into Europe and Asia.

Source: Giuseppe Sergi, *Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea* (Rome: Società Dante Alighieri, 1895).

While Sergi's concept of the Mediterranean race led him to a different set of conclusions than Lombroso and Niceforo, the three scientists considered each other as colleagues and remained in dialogue over the course of their respective careers. Sergi and Niceforo were both in attendance at the First International Eugenics Conference in London in 1912,⁸² and in a letter to Lombroso from 1897, Sergi asserted that they were both vulnerable to harsh critique as renegade thinkers breaking new scientific ground.⁸³ Nonetheless, while Lombroso and Niceforo responded to de Gobineau's charge of Mediterranean degeneration by distancing a "civilized" northern Italy from southern Italy, Africa, and the racial contamination of Blackness, Sergi instead placed "the mysterious goddess Isis who rises from the Black Hamitic land"⁸⁴ at the heart of Western civilization, thus turning de Gobineau's infamous race struggle on its head.⁸⁵

This section has demonstrated that positivist scientists in Liberal Italy attempted to resolve the tensions stemming from racial mixing in the Mediterranean basin in different ways. While the genealogy explored in this section is by no means exhaustive, I selected indicative figures as windows into key shifts in the conceptualization of Italian racial identity during the Liberal period. Despite the differences between Lombroso and Niceforo on the one hand, and Sergi on the other, they converged on the ideas that, first, the Mediterranean represented the central "problematic" through which the racial character of the new Italian nation could be derived; and second, that regardless of whether "equivocal"⁸⁶ Italians were Aryan or Mediterranean, white or Black, European or African, this racial character could be used to support arguments about civilizational capacity, governability, and the limits of citizenship.⁸⁷ Gramsci noted these similarities when he described the "'Southernist' literature of the clique of writers who made up the so-called positive school: the Ferris, Sergis, Niceforos, Oranos, and their lesser followers," who used science to "crush the wretched and exploited."⁸⁸

In addition, the Italian racial scientists of Liberal Italy were part of what would eventually become, in the words of Stefan Kühl, an "international of racists" [*die international der Rassisten*]⁸⁹—a broad, transnational network of racial scientists and eugenicists. Rather than being shielded from race-thinking by virtue of their location in a more fluid or "hybrid" Mediterranean space, Italian scientists were actually part of a historical conjuncture during which new forms of positivist inquiry came together with race thinking in Europe, and specific bodily measurements were collected and essentialized in order to generate deterministic claims about the innate capacities of human groups. One example of this circulation can be seen in the presence of illustrations of Sarah Baartman (the so-called "Hottentot Venus")⁹⁰ in the archives of Cesare Lombroso.⁹¹ Although Baartman herself never traveled to Italy, images and scientific descriptions of her body were disseminated widely throughout Europe as the "material evidence" to support biocentric claims about Black female inferiority. My arguments here are in line with a growing body of race-critical scholarship in Italy,⁹² which suggests that racism in Italy was neither a foreign imposition by Nazi Germany during World War II, or an automatic response to the arrival of Black migrants in the 1980s and 1990s—instead, it was inseparable from the consolidation of the Italian nation-state itself.

Finally, for that group of scientists Gramsci derisively labeled as "Southernists," the Mediterranean was frequently deployed to distance Italy (or at least those northern Italians who quite literally "embodied" the characteristics of Italian citizenship) from Africa and the contamination of Blackness. In other words, the Mediterranean served as a buffer zone to allow for the digestion and metabolization⁹³ of unruly difference and mixing. While this is more obvious in the cases of Lombroso and Niceforo, one can extend the same claim to Sergi. After all, while Sergi traced the deep historical origins of European civilizations to the Horn of Africa,

he nonetheless concluded that *in the present*, the Afro-descendant peoples of the Mediterranean were simply less suited to civilization and social order.⁹⁴

Fascist Italy and the New Roman Empire

If the theory of the two Italies cast doubt on Italian national unity, then idea of a Mediterranean race was troublesome in a different way, as it did not provide Italians with a substantial racial basis on which their colonial authority could be asserted. Scientific research and debates during the fascist period attempted to resolve these intractable questions; however, despite what earlier accounts of this period have suggested,⁹⁵ fascist racial science did not represent a “clean break” from scientific inquiry in the Liberal period.

Ultimately, Rosetta Giuliani Caponetto argues, during the fascist period these racial uncertainties were increasingly directed *outside* the geographical-territorial boundaries of the Italian nation-state onto the African colonies.⁹⁶ In other words, while Blackness and Mediterranean contamination were located *within* Italy during the Liberal period, the fascist imperial project allowed for the displacement of this Otherness onto the African continent.⁹⁷ As Caponetto argues, Africa has always played an important role in the formation of Italian national identity—first as a way to explain the differences between the North and the South, and later as the constitutive “outside” against which a unified Italian identity could be celebrated.⁹⁸ Nonetheless, the eventual embrace of Aryanism by the Italian fascist regime was not teleological; rather, it was a process contested among different scientific communities in Italy.

Aryan Mediterraneanism in Early Fascist Italy

The rise of fascism in Italy saw an attempt to neutralize internal difference within Italy, as the white/Black binary initially used to distinguish northern Italy from the South was displaced onto Italians and their colonial subjects.⁹⁹ This change could be witnessed in shifting official approaches to emigration:¹⁰⁰ overseas emigration was now a threat to fascist policies of pronatalism, and southern Italians in the colonies were increasingly viewed as key players in the consolidation of Italian empire. An implicitly *white* Mediterraneanism was officially embraced during this period in order to naturalize colonial expansion, and came to be symbolized by a nationalized image of “Italian Mediterranean” female beauty.¹⁰¹

Benito Mussolini initially promoted a notion of what Fabrizio De Donno called *la razza ario-mediterranea*¹⁰²—a theory of Mediterranean Aryanism that stood in contradistinction to the Nordicist raciology of Italy’s allies in Nazi Germany. In 1921, Mussolini claimed that Italian fascism had emerged to meet the needs of an Aryan and Mediterranean Italian race;¹⁰³ in a 1932 interview, he rejected the idea of pure races and instead asserted that “it is often precisely from happy mixtures that a nation derives strength and beauty.”¹⁰⁴ As Giuliani argues, these beliefs fixed Italian Mediterraneanness as different from the Mediterraneanness of colonized Africans, appealed to revanchist politico-territorial visions of a new Roman Empire, and managed to incorporate internal Italian racial differences into a single national identity.¹⁰⁵ Mussolini’s embrace of Mediterranean unity was also partly rooted in a notion of a Catholic Roman universalism, in which Italy and the Mediterranean could be a bridge to the Muslim world.¹⁰⁶

As Mia Fuller has demonstrated, this particular inflection of colonial Mediterraneanism saw *northern Africa* as more closely linked to the Roman Empire and by extension modern Italy, while sub-Saharan Africa (i.e., Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia) was understood as pre-historic, lacking the necessary archaeological footprint necessary to connect it to the great Mediterranean civilizations of antiquity.¹⁰⁷ In the popular Italian imagination, the Horn of Africa was regarded

as “a mythical kingdom”¹⁰⁸ inhabited by a more “noble”¹⁰⁹ (and, at least in the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, Christian) sub-Saharan African population—an idea tied to Sergi’s aforementioned Euro-Mediterranean race originating in the highlands of the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, the supposed civilizational divide between North and sub-Saharan Africa translated into different colonial management and architectural practices applied by Italian administrators to the two regions. In other words, Aryan Mediterraneanism was used both to justify Italian imperialism by invoking the connections forged through the ancient Roman Empire, and to separate Italy from the more “backwards” populations of sub-Saharan Africa.

Italy’s Late Aryanism and the Rejection of Mediterraneanism

While Mediterranean Aryanism held sway for at least the first decade of fascist rule in Italy, thanks to the legacy of Sergi and its more contemporary promoters such as the physician Nicola Pende,¹¹⁰ it was not without critics. Mediterraneanism had the benefit of establishing a link between Italy and its colonies, undergirding the imaginary of a benevolent colonialism in which Italy—as an advanced, modern nation—could help to rekindle the stagnant civilizations along the Mediterranean basin. But debates about the benefits and drawbacks of the Mediterranean idea began to unfold as the complicated realities of colonial miscegenation in the Horn of Africa became increasingly apparent to policymakers, jurists, and scientists in Italy—indeed, this is the moment when *meticciato* first began to enter the popular lexicon in Italy.¹¹¹ How, if at all, should colonial administrators regulate intimate contact between Italian citizens and colonized subjects? And, given the ambiguities of Italian racial identity, to which category should the resulting *meticci* [mixed] children be assigned? Mediterraneanists supported interracial contact as yet another means to reinforce connections with the colonized populations, while Aryanists feared that miscegenation would only undermine colonial hierarchies.¹¹²



Figure 12 Google N-Gram graph showing the frequency of Italian texts containing the word “meticciano” published between 1800 and 2000.

Source: <https://books.google.com/ngrams> (retrieved March 13, 2017).

By 1936—during Italy’s re-invasion and occupation of Ethiopia—fascist Italy turned toward an increasingly Aryanist understanding of racial identity. Interracial mixing in the colonies was officially banned in 1937, both to manage the threat posed by the practice of *madamismo*¹¹³ and the “mixed-race”¹¹⁴ children resulting from these unions, and to protect the prestige of the Italian Empire against the embarrassments caused by working-class Italian settlers.¹¹⁵ In place of earlier, popular portrayals of Italian empire as masculine sexual conquest,¹¹⁶ Italian women were charged with supervising the sexual morality of Italian men and safeguarding the reproduction of the Italian race. By extension, African domestic workers and wet-nurses were increasingly displaced from colonial Italian households.

During this period, Mediterraneanist racial theories increasingly fell out of favor in fascist Italy. Giuseppe Sergi, too old and sick to be of much public influence by this time, found his work increasingly subject to virulent attacks and began to split ideologically from his students such as the fascist anthropologist Guido Landra. The movement toward a more enthusiastic embrace of Aryanism in fascist Italy can be glimpsed through the research of doctor and anthropologist Giovanni Marro (1875–1952).¹¹⁷ While Marro is lesser-known than many of his contemporaries¹¹⁸ such as Lidio Cipriani, Giulias Evola, and Guido Landra, like them he was a prolific public intellectual who published in both academic journals and in popular magazines such as the fascist magazine *La difesa della razza*. A student of Lombroso in Turin, Marro broke from his mentor and eventually went on to found the *Museo di antropologia ed etnografia* [Museum of anthropology and ethnography] in the University of Turin’s biology department.

In a 1941 article, Marro outlines the fascist government’s efforts to articulate a coherent racial program, but warns that many Italian intellectuals continue to turn to racial theorists whose work has had degrading implications for Italians.¹¹⁹ It is necessary, he argues, to fight those theorists who were “proclaimers of our inferiority and our fatal decline into the sunset, especially the famous triad of C. Lombroso, G. Sergi, and G. Ferrero.”¹²⁰ Marro went on to reiterate this argument¹²¹ in a 1942 contribution to *La difesa della razza*, in which he claimed that Sergi’s theory of a Mediterranean race with African origins was influenced by “Jewish internationalism.”¹²² Most notably, in 1938 Marro was appointed to construct the *Sala della razza* [The Hall of the race] in Turin, a monumental exhibition illustrating the origins and history of the Piemontese people who hail from the region directly south of Italy’s Western Alps. While Marro (himself a native of Piemonte) admitted that the Hall was designed with a particularly regional focus, it is clear from his “temporal convening of space”¹²³ (and from many of his other writings) that he sought to shift the center of gravity of the Italian race from the Mediterranean, northward to Italy’s mountainous Alpine regions.¹²⁴



Figure 13 Benito Mussolini at the inauguration of Marro's *Sala della razza* in 1938.

Source: Giovanni Marro, *La Sala Della Razza Nella Rassegna "Torino e l'autarchia"* (Turin: Tipografia Silvestrelli e Cappelletto, 1939), 8.

This gradual shift toward Aryanism was reflected in the “*Manifesto degli scienziati razzisti*” [“Manifesto of racial scientists”], published in the *Giornale d’Italia* on July 14, 1938.¹²⁵ The Manifesto, written in the Ministry of Popular Culture by ten scientists (including two anthropologists, Lidio Cipriani and Guido Landra) and signed by an additional 180 (including Giovanni Marro), was intended by Mussolini to prepare the Italian people for the enactment of the 1938 anti-Semitic racial laws. The ten points of the Manifesto, summarized below with my explanatory comments in brackets, asserted that Italians were part of an Aryan race:¹²⁶

1. There exist human races;
2. There exist large and small races;
3. The concept of race is purely biological [*national differences are, at their core, matters of biological race*];
4. The majority of the current Italian population is of Aryan origin and its civilization is Aryan [*there remain few traces of pre-Aryan civilizations in Italy*];
5. The idea of an influx of large masses of men in historical times is a legend [*unlike other European nations, the racial composition of Italy is the same today as it was thousands of years ago*];
6. There already exists a pure “Italian race” [*this is a biological, not historico-linguistic matter*];
7. It is time for Italians to declare themselves to be racist¹²⁷ [*Italy is Aryan-Nordic but this does not mean introducing German racial theories wholesale into Italy*];
8. It is important to draw a distinction between the Mediterraneans of Europe (the Westerners) on the one hand, and the Orientals and Africans on the other hand [*other, Sergian, theories of a common Mediterranean race with origins in Africa are dangerous*];
9. Jews do not belong to the Italian race;
10. The purely European physical and psychological characteristics of the Italians must not be altered in any way.

While the Manifesto expunges any connection to Africa in the historical “making” of modern Italians (and establishes the Jewish people as the new *internal* threat to Italian homogeneity), there is still significant slippage—Italians are Aryans, but there is also a pure Italian race; there exist Mediterranean Europeans (not to be confused with Oriental or African Mediterraneans), but Italians also have purely European characteristics. This inconsistency stands as a remnant of the debates among the scientists who helped to write the Manifesto under Mussolini’s instructions—as Aaron Gillette points out, in earlier drafts the Italians were actually identified as a Mediterranean race.¹²⁸

Still, despite previous assertions that the Manifesto represented a sharp break from the Mediterraneanist theories that were popular in Liberal and early fascist Italy, I argue that this distinction is not so neat. Giuliani (via Sòrgoni) has argued that Italian claims about a superior Mediterraneanness—which at once elevated Italians to mythical status *and* distanced them from Africans—formed the “symbolic skeleton” of early fascist raciology but were more or less abandoned by the time of the Manifesto.¹²⁹ This is true in one sense, and the Manifesto certainly reveals the creeping influence of German racial theories. Nonetheless, the continued debates among Italy’s racial scientists into the late 1930s, the uncertainties about the wholesale importation of Nazi raciology into Italy, and the extant inconsistencies in the Manifesto show

that, just as in earlier periods, the Mediterranean was still used (albeit in a different way) to distinguish Italy from troublesome associations with Africa and population mixing.

Postwar Italy's Racial Evaporations

Two seemingly paradoxical processes took place in post–World War II Italy. The first was the foreclosure of any discussion of “race” as a marker of human difference, in the sciences and beyond.¹³⁰ The second was the consolidation of an “unmarked” Italian whiteness through popular media, advertising, and consumer culture. Ironically, as Italian society began to reckon with the social consequences of the heterogeneity brought by colonialism and fascism (specifically, in the form of children of mixed origins) in the domains of public policy and media, references to Italy as a mixed or Mediterranean nation remained relatively rare.

David Theo Goldberg defines “racial evaporation” as a “delinking of past from present,” with “racist implications always lingering and diffuse, silenced but assumed, always already returning and haunting, buried but alive.”¹³¹ Caterina Romeo has extended this concept to Italy, arguing that while race was a constitutive element in the process of Italian national identity, it has “‘evaporated’ from the cultural debate in contemporary Italy as a result of the need to obliterate ‘embarrassing’ historical events” such as colonialism, Fascist racial policies, and racism enacted against Italian emigrants abroad.¹³² Yet, as Goldberg and Romeo both acknowledge, racial evaporation is also a characteristic of processes of “racial Europeanization” more broadly, which were set into motion in the aftermath of World War II.

Kamala Viswewaran suggests that the evasion of “race” (in favor of “culture”) in postwar Europe is linked to the global influence of mid-twentieth century liberal American anthropology in the tradition of Franz Boas, who believed that race had to be made a scientific, biological, and value-neutral fact.¹³³ Boas’ student Ruth Benedict argued that the fact of race had to be distinguished from the mystifying values attached to it; in contrast to her colleague Ashley Montagu, she held that *racism*, not race itself, was the great “modern superstition.”¹³⁴ Yet both Benedict and Montagu did agree that “race” implied negative valuation, and that therefore, it was not a meaningful explanation for human social difference. This approach to race was ultimately enshrined in the 1950 and 1951 UNESCO statements on race.¹³⁵ Boasian anthropology was so successful in establishing race as a purely neutral, biological question that after World War II, “race” completely dropped off the agenda of cultural anthropology. This conceptual shift ushered in what Omi and Winant call the “ethnicity-based paradigm of race relations.”¹³⁶

The international circulation of the UNESCO statements went hand-in-hand with what Miguel Mellino (drawing on Emilio Gentile) has called the “de-fascitization of fascism,” and of postwar culture more broadly, in Italy.¹³⁷ This process, he argues, was advanced by both political and cultural elites in Italy and by U.S. geostrategic pressures, and took many forms—including the publication of revisionist histories of Italian fascism. The writings of historian Renzo de Felice, for instance, sought to minimize the existence of racism and colonialism under fascism, attributing Italian racial laws to the influence of Nazi Germany and characterizing racism as a sharp deviation from the mentality and history of the Italian nation.¹³⁸ Many of the institutions that had supported the work of racial scientists began to distance themselves from this research, characterizing those scientists as poor scholars, as not representative of Italian scientific culture, or as dedicated scientists whose research was unfortunately misinterpreted and politicized. The leading figures of the fascist regime were executed, and, as Cristina Lombardi-Diop notes, the legacy of the Italian anti-fascist resistance provided a form of moral absolution for the crimes of

fascist imperialism.¹³⁹ Together, these developments helped bolster the myth of *italiani, brava gente* [Italians, good people]¹⁴⁰—that Italy had no autochthonous tradition of racism.

Alongside the denial of Italian racism and the foreclosure of “race” in the Italian public and academic spheres was the consolidation of an unspoken, “white” Italian racial identity with few references to Mediterraneanism and mixing as characteristics of Italianness. The work of Kristin Ross (whose analysis in turn influenced Lombardi-Diop’s claims about postwar Italy) provides one way to understand this seemingly contradictory process. Writing about France in the aftermath of the war for Algerian independence, Ross claims that in the national French imaginary, colonialism came to be associated with a messy demographic heterogeneity that required containment. This heterogeneity, Ross argues, necessitated practices of “redemptive hygiene” that were achieved through a new French consumer culture that was focused on maintaining the cleanliness of the domestic household.¹⁴¹ In the case of Italy, colonial demographic heterogeneity, fascism, and the “stain of racist persecution and apartheid”¹⁴² all necessitated the reinforcement of the symbolic borders of Italianness so that colonialism and the taint of “race” could be sequestered outside the bounded space-time of the nation.

The stain of racial difference, Silvana Patriarca argues, came to be represented in the postwar period by the visible presence of children of mixed origins across Italy, including the *meticci* (children of Black African women and white Italian fathers) and the *mulattini* (children of Black American soldiers who participated in the liberation of Italy and white Italian women).¹⁴³ At the same time, advertisements—accessible to increasingly large numbers of everyday Italians thanks to new radio and television programs—aggressively promoted the value of personal and domestic hygiene, linking soaps and other cleaning products with images of purity and whiteness.¹⁴⁴ Following Foucault’s notion of the repressive hypothesis, the silence surrounding “race” in postwar Italy was enormously generative,¹⁴⁵ and only reinforced the notion that Italy was a white (or at best, racially unmarked), benevolent, and territorially bounded nation with no links—colonial or otherwise—to the Mediterranean basin and Africa. At the same time, the “unspeakability” of race in Italy meant that Catholicism came to function as a convenient proxy for whiteness in the national discourse.¹⁴⁶ In sum, the process of distancing postwar Italian culture from the horrors of fascist racism entailed bounding the “location” of racism and race as outside of Italy, thereby consolidating Italy as a white, Catholic nation.

Italy as a Country of Immigration

The previous sections in this chapter have demonstrated the uncertain fascist foreclosure of Mediterranean interconnections linking Italy to the African continent; they have also shown the continuity of this foreclosure in postwar Italy as “difference” and the idea of “race” itself came to be seen as markers of an embarrassing or tragic past for Italy to move beyond. This section goes on to explore what happened to ideas of Mediterraneanness, mixture, and Italian racial identity as Italy subsequently became a country of immigration in the late 1980s and 1990s.

As Laura Harris argues, the ideas about racial difference within Italy that developed in the late nineteenth century were “recycled” in the late twentieth century as large numbers of migrants began to arrive to Italy from the African continent.¹⁴⁷ But because of the racial evaporations set into motion both institutionally and through Italian popular and commercial cultures after World War II, these continuities were effectively delinked. In other words, the “problem” of race was displaced onto the body of the foreign (specifically, African) Other entering bounded Italian space. This was not just a problem of right-wing xenophobia; indeed, these discursive practices pervaded the leftist practices of anti-racism and migrant solidarity as

well. Italy's transformation into a country of immigration generated a flourishing industry of knowledge production about migration, ethnicity, and cultural difference—but without the analytical tools to engage with the historically sedimented racial imaginaries animating newer conversations about immigration to Italy. After all, it was the work of scientists to engage with (and deny) race; *culture* was the appropriate realm of anthropologists and social workers.

Antiracism without Race and the Displacement of Difference

One result of the postwar reconstruction in Italy was that because race and racism were “expunged” as exogenous to the nation, difference also came to be seen as external to Italy, embodied by the figure of the geographically mobile or displaced subject. This is not surprising when one considers the theoretical underpinnings of postwar approaches to “race” in Italy and Europe generally. Boas and his students, described earlier, went to great lengths to describe racism as a form of “modern superstition.”¹⁴⁸ The implication was that difference is inherently problematic, generative of a pathology that we have come to know as racism—itsself an unscientific belief system.¹⁴⁹ This framing was echoed in the UNESCO statements on race, part of a broader effort to reject fascist racism and eugenics without completely jettisoning the ethos of modern science.¹⁵⁰ The specter of Nazism in particular is repeatedly called forth as an exemplar of racial “chauvinism”¹⁵¹ taken to its “fanatical extreme”¹⁵² despite the fact that, as Aimé Césaire wrote in the *Discourse on Colonialism*, fascism merely applied to Europe procedures that had previously been reserved for its colonies.¹⁵³ By asserting the scientific, neutral “facts” of race and subsequently framing racism as a form of pathology, liberal anti-racists have been unable to grasp racism as a technology of power that itself *generates* race. This framing (i.e., that difference creates racism, rather than racism constructing difference) has remained the dominant paradigm of anti-racist activism Italy. As a result, the widespread narrative that “racism is a new phenomenon, and it is the result of an increase in immigration to Italy” displaces the cause of racism onto the experience of encounter with an Other—in this case, the so-called foreigner.

Cultural Returns of Mediterranean Mixing

At the same time, ideas of Mediterraneanism and mixing also returned during Italy's transition into a country of immigration—though this time, through a culturalist, rather than explicitly *racial* framework. This period witnessed the rise of *interculturalism* as a leftist institutional framework to “manage the intersection of bodies within a single territory.”¹⁵⁴ The Council of Europe took up the concept of interculturalism from the immigrants' education debates in United States¹⁵⁵ as early as the 1970s and 1980s¹⁵⁶ in response to critiques of multiculturalism. In Italy, intercultural centers and intercultural mediators have proliferated since the 2000s, also emerging as important sources of employment for immigrants and their children. Interculturalism has provided a way for Italians working on migration issues to talk not only about difference via immigration, but also about *internal* differentiation within Italy. Unlike the far-right xenophobic responses to changing labor and economic conditions in Italy, interculturalism approaches diversity as a potential solution to national stagnation. Yet, I will argue below, the political possibilities of interculturalism are limited¹⁵⁷ because, without a robust analysis of racism, it flattens power relations into a depoliticized, romantic cosmopolitanism in which Italians as a “mixed” people have no racial identity and hence no capacity for perpetrating racism.

One element of the resurgence of “mixing” in Italy has been the return of the concept of *meticcio*.¹⁵⁸ In late twentieth and early twenty-first century Italy, however, *meticcio* is no

longer approached solely as a matter of biological-racial miscegenation (because as we have seen, “race,” as a biological category, does not exist). Rather, *meticciano* has come to stand in for multiculturalism, “colorful” urban environments, and mixed societies writ large. Its return to the popular lexicon is not about problematizing individual children of mixed backgrounds, but rather about celebrating these young people as examples of a cultural pluralism that will eventually become Italy’s future. *Meticciano* is no longer a warning sign of degeneration; instead, it symbolizes a particular kind of cosmopolitan society characterized by *meticciano culturale*.



Figure 14 Images from a *National Geographic Italia* photo spread entitled “*Il volto dell’Italia che cambia*” [“The face of a changing Italy”]. The article uses images of these so-called “mulatti” (who have one white Italian parent and one “foreign” parent) to make optimistic predictions about the future demographic and visual profile of Italy.

Source: Barbara Schiavulli, “Il volto dell’Italia che cambia,” *National Geographic Italia* (October 2013). Photos by Guido Fuà.

How did *meticciano* make such a bold return in the supposedly post-racial Italy of the 1990s and 2000s? The influence of the discursive turn in cultural studies, epitomized by scholars such as Homi Bhabha and concepts such as hybridity and in-betweenness, provided Italian intellectuals with a novel framework for thinking through the cultural transformations facing Italy at the end of the twentieth century.¹⁵⁹ In Italy, however, such claims about mixing took on a particularly local or even nationalist inflection—in other words, cultural *meticciano* is not a new phenomenon, but rather is the historical product of Italy's privileged status as a Mediterranean crossroads. Thus, it is not uncommon to hear claims like the one articulated in 2002 by Italian political scientist Pierfranco Malizia in a book about interculturalism:

The Mediterranean created a unique situation, that of a crossroads that developed everything we consider today to be the diverse possibilities of interaction, or assimilation, integration, the melting pot, the salad bowl...¹⁶⁰

In other words, Malizia suggests, the Mediterranean represents an intercultural space *par excellence* that provides a blueprint of how effective “immigrant integration” can take place.

Even scientists have been enrolled in the production of this de-racialized, “rainbow” vision of Italianness.¹⁶¹ One such study, conducted by a team of geneticists partially funded by the *Istituto italiano di antropologia* (the institute founded by Giuseppe Sergi in 1893), was reported in the popular Italian press with great fanfare for proving that Italy had the most genetic “richness” of any country in Europe.¹⁶² In 2008, a group of scientists convened by Marxist geneticist/agronomist Marcello Buiatti in Pisa signed the “*Manifesto degli scienziati antirazzisti*” [“Manifesto of antiracist scientists”], 70 years after the publication of the 1938 “Manifesto of racial scientists.”¹⁶³ Designed as a point-by-point refutation of the fascist-era manifesto, the 2008 document asserted that “race” does not exist, and claimed that “the phenomena of social and cultural *meticciamiento* that have characterized the entire history of the peninsula, and in which not just local populations have participated but also the Greeks, Phoenicians, Jews, Africans, Spaniards, in addition to the so-called barbarians, have produced the hybrid that we call Italian culture.”¹⁶⁴ Yet, while the 2008 manifesto rejects the fascist imaginary of the Mediterranean as a space demarcating the boundary between Italy and the “threat” of Africa, there is no mention of Italian colonialism, nor of Africans themselves, as integral to the construction of Italianness in the *present*.¹⁶⁵ Indeed, by attempting to directly refute each point of the Manifesto of racial scientists, the authors of the “Manifesto of antiracist scientists” find themselves trapped by its same logics. While the 2008 manifesto suggests that Africa played a role in the making of Italy in the deep past, this African presence is vanished from the present—a phenomenon that echoes the earlier work of Giuseppe Sergi, and which postcolonial theorist Edward Said would understand as an element of Orientalist discourse.¹⁶⁶

Thus, as Italy became a country of immigration at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries, intellectuals, policymakers, and social workers began to return to older concepts such as Mediterraneanism, mixing, and *meticciano* as ways to manage difference and imagine a convivial future for social life in Italy. This imaginary relied on the invocation of deeper histories of mixing, civilizational exchange, and population movement across the Mediterranean basin and the through Italian peninsula. While this move conveniently allowed Italians to proclaim their immunity from histories of racial violence,¹⁶⁷ it also severed ties between older forms of race-making in Italy and contemporary practices of managing difference.

As I have demonstrated above, one result of the “cultural return of Mediterranean

mixing” has been the displacement of difference onto the body of the African immigrant whose presence itself catalyzes the recourse to claims about mixing. Because of the insoluble stain of fascist racial science, “race” in postwar Italy was relegated to the realm of biology to be critiqued; it was no longer regarded as an appropriately sociological concept.¹⁶⁸ But without a sociological or anthropological critique of “race,” Blackness once again came to be seen as something external and invasive, which could only be incorporated into the Italian nation through what have been re-territorialized as distinctively *Italian* histories of mixing, Mediterranean conviviality, and *accoglienza* [hospitality].

Re-Articulating the Mediterranean

This chapter has shown that imaginaries of Africa and Blackness have long played a central role in the consolidation of Italian national-racial identity and that therefore, Blackness as such can never be considered as something “external” to Italianness. Indeed, as Stephen Small argues, Black Europe includes not just the tangible presence of Afro-descendants in European nation-states, but also forms of “race-thinking and racist thinking” and the intangible Black cultural presence (often used by Europeans to reinforce negative stereotypes of African savagery and inferiority).¹⁶⁹ I have also sought to illustrate how notions of Mediterranean mixing in relation to the perceived contamination of Blackness have, at various points in Italian history, been conceptualized as either problems or solutions in the process of nation-building.

The last fifteen years have witnessed a growing interest in Mediterraneanist historiography, as the increasingly violent fortification of Europe’s southern borders prompted scholars to construct counterhistories of the Mediterranean as a space of convivial exchange. If the Italian nation-state as a perpetually “open-ended question” or “work-in-progress” has been brought into sharp relief by a set of interlocking economic, demographic, and geopolitical crises, then the Mediterranean has once again emerged as a mode of imagining a possible Italian future. In its most anemic formulations, this has meant embracing a liberal multiculturalism as essential to the “nature” of Italianness, smoothing the historically violent contestations over Italy’s racial and national identity into an idealized vision of Italy as a rich civilizational crossroads.

But it is important to remember that these claims to Mediterraneanism and mixedness have an ambiguous and often sordid history. After all, how else could we begin understand the processes by which the ancient Roman *Mare Nostrum* became the expansionary nationalist and fascist vision of *Mare Nostrum*, and in the twenty-first century was the name given to the now-defunct Italian naval search-and-rescue operation for migrants crossing the Mediterranean? Rather than Hegel’s vision of the Mediterranean as the center of World History (a vision which simultaneously negated the historicity of Africa), we would be advised to heed Césaire’s warning about the unevenness of the oft-romanticized civilizational encounter:

...it is an excellent thing to blend different worlds; that whatever its own particular genius may be, a civilization that withdraws into itself atrophies; that for civilizations, exchange is oxygen; that the great good fortune of Europe is to have been a crossroads. But then I ask the following question: has colonization really *placed civilizations in contact*? Or, if you prefer, of all the ways of *establishing contact*, was it the best? I answer no.¹⁷⁰

Mediterraneanness and mixedness has, in the present moment, been approached by liberal anti-racists in Italy as a solution to the problem of incorporating difference. As the genealogy in this

chapter has demonstrated, however, in practice claims about Mediterranean mixing have worked to preclude or differentially incorporate Blackness in Italy. This is not terribly surprising if one considers that Mediterraneanism itself was a vision linking Italy to the classical civilizations of Egypt, Greece, and Rome while implying a deeper racial-civilizational divide from sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁷¹ Or, as Gaia Giuliani writes, “The ‘unspoken nature’ of Italian whiteness refers to the Italians’ peripheral racial self-assignment in terms of a whiteness that is mostly unmarked and/or associated to the term ‘Mediterraneanness.’”¹⁷²

There is a second, related problem with uncritical invocations of Mediterraneanness and mixing. Specifically, when mixing or *meticciato* are seen as merely the fulfillment of Italy’s world-historical destiny as “the melting pot, the salad bowl,” this elides the collective labor required to actually dismantle historically sedimented structures of anti-Black racism in Italy. Indeed, as anthropologist Jeffrey Cole describes, the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s in Italy were characterized by naïve predictions that Italy would be a less hostile destination for African migrants because of its ambiguous position between Europe and Africa and history of population mixing.¹⁷³ This perspective could be seen in Sante Matteo’s introduction to the 2001 volume *ItaliAfrica*, in which he recounts the long history of contact between Africans and Italians due to their geographical proximity. “Racism based on skin color has not been an entrenched, institutionalized aspect of Italian culture,” he writes; therefore, “diversity and equality may be easier to achieve under conditions that are not tainted by a previous history of master/servant relationships.”¹⁷⁴ In other words, it is not a matter of combatting racism in the present, but one of giving into the powerful momentum of a long-standing historical legacy.

Towards the Black Mediterranean

The critique I have developed over the course of this chapter does not seek to deny the realities of mixing, intertwined histories, or cultural *métissage* in the Mediterranean and in Italy specifically. But, as poet Derek Walcott reminds us in the epigraph to this chapter, the sea is history—a history that is inextricable from systems of violence, exploitation, and death. I admit that this could appear to be a potentially dangerous argument to make at a time of increasingly visible xenophobia, racism, and neo-fascism in Europe. In February of 2017, for instance, a cluster of palm trees was planted in the middle of Milan’s Piazza Duomo, directly across from the city’s most iconic cathedral. Shortly thereafter, members of the neo-fascist CasaPound political movement set fire to the trees in a late-night raid to protest the so-called “*africanizzazione*” [Africanization] of Milan, and members of the notoriously xenophobic Lega Nord party gathered near the trees and handed out bananas to passers-by.¹⁷⁵ In this context, is it misguided to focus on the re-articulation of racial boundaries along the Mediterranean rather than on traditions of peaceful exchange between Italy and Africa? I want to suggest that in order to combat this creeping tide of ethnonationalism in Italy, it behooves us to think very carefully about which histories and narratives we privilege and which ones we obscure in the context of anti-racist struggles, and what the implications of these elisions may be.

In a 2015 article, Katherine McKittrick warns of the inherent danger in critiques of racial violence that “loop” back on themselves to reinforce the same logics they originally sought to challenge. Focusing specifically on the way that science studies critiques of racial science often remain hopelessly trapped within the framework of human biocentricity, thus undermining the “undisciplined and interdisciplinary workings of black intellectual life,” McKittrick writes:

The analytical and methodological purpose then—to name and dismantle race and racism—

tends to move from the physiological figure outward. Black lives are reduced, too, to analytical data and are cast as figures that are biologically determined to become factual parts of a bigger habitual belief system invested in racial differentiation and violence. This discloses a teleological narrative where the body violated by racial and racist scientific narratives is the anchor to a liberatory trajectory and thus can, in this closed system, only realize itself and keep living by—to paraphrase Frantz Fanon—moving from sub-humanness toward a genre of humanness that despises blackness.¹⁷⁶

Similarly, relying on notions of Mediterraneanness and mixing to critique intolerance and xenophobia in contemporary Italy, without acknowledging the complex histories of anti-Blackness entangled with these concepts, risks reproducing new but equally insidious forms of racism that deny the richness and complexity of Black Mediterranean lifeways.

But this is not to suggest that these ideas must be relegated to the dustbin of history. For instance, the Milan-based multiracial youth activist collective *Il Comitato per non dimenticare Abba e per fermare il razzismo* (formed after the murder of nineteen-year-old Abdul Guibre in 2008) has re-appropriated *meticciano* as a way to jettison the discriminatory categories of *integrazione*, *immigrato*, and *extracomunitario* and in their place build a new language for dismantling the interconnected power structures of racism, militarism, border fortification, and capitalism.¹⁷⁷ Another example of a non-idealized approach to hybridity can be found in the reflections of a young Italian-Afro-Brazilian student activist in Rome, who linked the struggles over Italian national unity with the racism faced by Black migrants in Italy:

There is no such thing as a typical Italian. And this makes things more difficult. Already from Milan to Naples, they see each other as a threat. They hate each other, they discriminate against each other, they insult each other. So if you add a black person...it disrupts the whole order of things. There is a perception of invasion...But Italians don't have their own "space." It doesn't exist. And because they don't have this, when someone even *more* different appears, their reaction is "Oh god, what are we going to do?"

In the following chapter, I will explore the ways in which a new generation of young Black activists in Italy is attempting to craft a geographically-specific understanding of Black Italian subjectivity, one that attends to the specificities of Mediterranean racial histories without sanitizing relations of power and histories of racial-colonial violence.

¹ Larry Mayer, "Italian Earthquakes: A Legacy of the Past and a Preview of the Future," in *ItaliAfrica: Bridging Continents and Cultures*, ed. Sante Matteo (Stony Brook: Forum Italicum, Inc., 2001), 29.

² Derek Walcott, *Selected Poems* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014).

³ Vetri Nathan, "Mimic-Nation, Mimic-Men," in *National Belongings: Hybridity in Italian Colonial and Postcolonial Cultures*, ed. Jacqueline Andall and Derek Duncan (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2010), 41–62.

⁴ "Immigrazione, Kyenge: 'L'Italia è Meticcio, Lo Ius Soli Sarà Figlio Del Paese Nuovo,'" *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, June 10, 2013, <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2013/06/10/immigrazione-kyenge-litalia-e-meticcio-ius-soli-sara-figlio-del-paese-nuovo/621519/>.

⁵ Fanpage.it, *Chi Sono (Davvero) Quelli Scesi in Piazza Con Salvini*, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=snMbCsK3hd8>; "'Bologna è Meticcio', La Contestazione Non Violenta Che Manda in Bestia i Salviner," *Radio Città Del Capo* (blog), November 9, 2015,

<http://www.radiocittadelcapo.it/archives/bologna-e-meticcia-la-contestazione-non-violenta-che-manda-in-bestia-i-salviner-167153/>.

⁶ Camilla Hawthorne and Pina Piccolo, “‘Meticciato’ o Della Problematicità Di Una Parola,” *La Macchina Sognante*, no. 5 (2016), <http://www.lamacchinasognante.com/meticciato-o-della-problematicita-di-una-parola-camilla-hawthorne-e-pina-piccolo/>.

⁷ Lombardi-Diop and Romeo, “Introduction: Paradigms of Postcoloniality in Contemporary Italy.”

⁸ Jacqueline Andall and Derek Duncan, *National Belongings: Hybridity in Italian Colonial and Postcolonial Cultures* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010).

⁹ Nathan, “Mimic-Nation, Mimic-Men.”

¹⁰ Taiye Selasi, “When We Speak of Nationality, What Do We Mean?,” *The New York Times*, December 4, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/taiye-selasi-when-we-speak-of-nationality-what-do-we-mean.html>.

¹¹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (1837; repr., Colonial Press, 1900), 87.

¹² Ian Law, *Mediterranean Racisms: Connections and Complexities in the Racialization of the Mediterranean Region* (New York: Springer, 2014).

¹³ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1975; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 2012); Wendy Brown, *Politics Out of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹⁴ As Michael Banton argues, we must also be careful not to assume the existence of a coherent “racial science” or “scientific concept of race” because of the heterogeneity of both investigative practices and understandings of the word *race* itself across time and space. See Michael Banton, “The Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of the Word Race,” *Ethnicities* 10, no. 1 (2010): 127–40, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796809354529>.

¹⁵ Marisol De La Cadena, “Are Mestizos Hybrids? The Conceptual Politics of Andean Identities,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37, no. 2 (2005): 259–84, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X05009004>; Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” in *The Formations of Modernity*, ed. Bram Gieben and Stuart Hall, vol. 1, *Understanding Modern Societies: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 276–332; Walter D. Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism,” *Public Culture* 12, no. 3 (2000): 721–48; Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The Poetics and Politics of Otherness,” in *Global Transformations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 7–28, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04144-9_2.

¹⁶ Interestingly, the relationship between Catholicism and positivist racial science in Italy remains a largely understudied topic.

¹⁷ Jennifer Guglielmo and Salvatore Salerno, *Are Italians White?: How Race Is Made in America* (London: Routledge, 2012); Peter G. Vellon, *A Great Conspiracy Against Our Race: Italian Immigrant Newspapers and the Construction of Whiteness in the Early 20th Century* (New York: NYU Press, 2016).

¹⁸ Francesco Cassata, *La difesa della razza: politica, ideologia e immagine del razzismo fascista* (Turin: G. Einaudi, 2008).

¹⁹ Aaron Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy* (London: Routledge, 2003).

²⁰ John Champagne, *Aesthetic Modernism and Masculinity in Fascist Italy* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).

²¹ One recent example of this tendency: In 2016, at the opening symposium for the thirty-second cohort of doctoral students in the University of Padua’s Philosophy, Sociology, Pedagogy, and Applied Psychology Department (which is also home to one of Italy’s only race-critical research groups, the InterGRRace network), the speaker invited to present on the subject of “race” was the noted Italian population geneticist Guido Barbujani. See also Visweswaran, *Un/Common Cultures*.

²² UNESCO, “Four Statements on the Race Question” (Paris, 1969).

²³ Visweswaran, *Un/Common Cultures*.

²⁴ Guido Barbujani, *L’invenzione delle razze: Capire la biodiversità umana* (Florence: Giunti, 2010); Guido Barbujani, *Gli africani siamo noi. Alle origini dell’uomo* (Rome: Laterza, 2016); Giovanni Destro Bisol and Marco Capocasa, *Italiani. Come il DNA ci aiuta a capire chi siamo* (Rome: Carocci, 2016).

²⁵ Gaia Giuliani and Cristina Lombardi-Diop, *Bianco e nero. Storia dell’identità razziale degli italiani* (Milan: Mondadori Education, 2013); Miguel Mellino, “De-Provincializing Italy: Notes on Race, Racialization, and Italy’s Coloniality,” ed. Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 83–99.

²⁶ The word “race” appears only once in the Italian constitution, in the first section of Article Three: “All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions.” See Maria Teresa Milcia and Gaia Giuliani, “Giochi Al Buio o Parole per Dirlo? Riflessioni Su Razza, Razzismo e Antirazzismo Intorno a Un Colloquio Con Gaia Giuliani,” *Voci: Annuale Di Scienze Umane* 13 (2016): 171–89.

- ²⁷ Richard H. Grove, *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gyan Prakash, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Richard Harry Drayton, *Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the "Improvement" of the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Kavita Philip, *Civilizing Natures: Race, Resources, and Modernity in Colonial South India* (Rutgers University Press, 2004).
- ²⁸ Donna Jeanne Haraway, *Modest-Witness@Second-Millennium.FemaleMan-Meets-OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience* (London: Routledge, 1997).
- ²⁹ Naomi Zack, *Philosophy of Science and Race* (London: Routledge, 2014); Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (1981; repr., W. W. Norton & Company, 2006).
- ³⁰ Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).
- ³¹ Dorothy Roberts, *Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-Crete Race in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: The New Press, 2011).
- ³² Evelyn M. Hammonds and Rebecca M. Herzog, *The Nature of Difference: Sciences of Race in the United States from Jefferson to Genomics* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009).
- ³³ Donald S. Moore, Anand Pandian, and Jake Kosek, "The Cultural Politics of Race and Nature," in *Race, Nature, and the Politics of Difference*, ed. Donald S. Moore, Jake Kosek, and Anand Pandian (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 1–70; Jake Kosek, *Understories: The Political Life of Forests in Northern New Mexico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
- ³⁴ David N. Livingstone, *The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Discipline* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993).
- ³⁵ Hall, "Conclusion: The Multi-Cultural Question."
- ³⁶ Iain Chambers, *Mediterranean Crossings: The Politics of an Interrupted Modernity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Roberto M. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Karla Mallette, *European Modernity and the Arab Mediterranean: Toward a New Philology and a Counter-Orientalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
- ³⁷ "Meticciato, meticcio," *Treccani, l'Enciclopedia italiana*, accessed July 31, 2018, http://www.treccani.it/magazine/lingua_italiana/articoli/parole/meticcio.html.
- ³⁸ Cadena, "Are Mestizos Hybrids?"
- ³⁹ Jinhana Haritaworn, *The Biopolitics of Mixing: Thai Multiracialities and Haunted Ascendancies* (London: Routledge, 2012).
- ⁴⁰ Haritaworn's study focuses primarily on London and Berlin.
- ⁴¹ Haritaworn, *The Biopolitics of Mixing*, 15.
- ⁴² Angelo Matteo Caglioti, "Race, Statistics and Italian Eugenics: Alfredo Niceforo's Trajectory from Lombroso to Fascism (1876–1960)," *European History Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (2017): 461–89, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691417707164>.
- ⁴³ In fact, Cesare Lombroso wrote a book entitled *Anti-Semitism and Modern Science* (1894), in which he attempts to defend the Jewish people from the claims of scientific anti-Semitism.
- ⁴⁴ Francesco Cassata, "Chapter I. Between Lombroso and Pareto: The Italian Way to Eugenics," in *Building the New Man: Eugenics, Racial Science and Genetics in Twentieth-Century Italy*, Hors Collection (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013), 9–42, <http://books.openedition.org/ceup/723>; Vito Teti, *La razza maledetta: origini del pregiudizio antimeridionale* (Rome: Manifestolibri, 2011).
- ⁴⁵ Antonio Gramsci and Pasquale Verdicchio, *The Southern Question* (Guernica Editions, 2005).
- ⁴⁶ Shelleen Greene, *Equivocal Subjects: Between Italy and Africa -- Constructions of Racial and National Identity in the Italian Cinema* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 18.
- ⁴⁷ Schneider, *Italy's "Southern Question."*
- ⁴⁸ An Italian shipping company acquired the town of Assab (now in Eritrea) on the Red Sea in 1869, which led to over a decade of territorial disputes with Egypt. In 1882, Assab was taken over by the Kingdom of Italy. See Mia Fuller, *Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities and Italian Imperialism* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- ⁴⁹ Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*; Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (London: Routledge, 2013); Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, 2nd ed. (1992; repr., New York: Routledge, 2008).

- ⁵⁰ Ann Hallamore Caesar, *Printed Media in Fin-de-Siecle Italy: Publishers, Writers, and Readers* (London: Routledge, 2017).
- ⁵¹ Caesar.
- ⁵² Mary Gibson, “Biology or Climate? Race and ‘Deviance’ in Italian Criminology, 1880-1920,” in *Italy’s “Southern Question”: Orientalism in One Country*, ed. Jane Schneider (Oxford: Berg, 1998), 100.
- ⁵³ De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea.”
- ⁵⁴ Arthur Comte de Gobineau, *The Inequality of Human Races* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915).
- ⁵⁵ Gibson, “Biology or Climate? Race and ‘Deviance’ in Italian Criminology, 1880-1920,” 100.
- ⁵⁶ Francesco Loreti, *Carlo Giacomini (1840-1898)*, Contributo Alla Storia Dello Studio Anatomico Della Università Di Torino (Turin: Accademia delle scienze, 1963).
- ⁵⁷ Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter, “Editors’ Introduction,” in *Criminal Man* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 1–36.
- ⁵⁸ The Lombroso museum and archive in Turin has been the target of petitions by southern Italians calling for its closure (and the repatriation of southern Italian remains) for many years due to Lombroso’s notorious anti-Southernism. See <https://www.change.org/p/chiudiamo-il-museo-lombroso> and <http://www.nolombroso.org/it/petizione/>.
- ⁵⁹ Many thanks to the Archivio Lombroso at the *Museo di Antropologia criminale Cesare Lombroso* at the University of Turin, especially Cristina Cilli and Giacomo Giacomini.
- ⁶⁰ Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter, “Editors’ Introduction,” 13.
- ⁶¹ Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter, 13–15; *Archivio storico del Museo di antropologia criminale Cesare Lombroso (Torino), Attività giornalistica (1882-1907)*, 446: “L’Italia, Armigera dell’Europa” (1907, *Corrier européen*), “Facciamo noi i birri nel mondo?” (n.d.).
- ⁶² Cesare Lombroso, *L’uomo bianco e l’uomo di colore: Letture sull’ origine e le varietà delle razze umane* (Padua: F. Sacchetto, 1871).
- ⁶³ Cesare Lombroso, *Criminal Man* (1876; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea.”
- ⁶⁴ Rosetta Giuliani Caponetto, *Fascist Hybridities: Representations of Racial Mixing and Diaspora Cultures under Mussolini* (New York: Springer, 2016), 37; Giuliani and Lombardi-Diop, *Bianco e nero. Storia dell’identità razziale degli italiani*, 32; Cristina Lombardi-Diop, “Mothering the Nation : An Italian Woman in Colonial Eritrea,” in *ItaliAfrica: Bridging Continents and Cultures*, ed. Sante Matteo (Stony Brook: Forum Italicum, Inc., 2001), 183.
- ⁶⁵ Gaia Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro,” *Interventions* 16, no. 4 (2014): 575, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2013.851828>.
- ⁶⁶ Lombardi-Diop, “Mothering the Nation : An Italian Woman in Colonial Eritrea,” 182.
- ⁶⁷ Lombroso, *L’uomo bianco e l’uomo di colore*, 110.
- ⁶⁸ Lombroso, *Criminal Man*, 328.
- ⁶⁹ Lombroso, *L’uomo bianco e l’uomo di colore*, 15.
- ⁷⁰ Lombroso, 10.
- ⁷¹ Lombroso, 222.
- ⁷² Gibson, “Biology or Climate? Race and ‘Deviance’ in Italian Criminology, 1880-1920,” 105.
- ⁷³ Alfredo Niceforo, *Italiani del nord e Italiani del sud* (Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1901); Alfredo Niceforo, *L’Italia barbara contemporanea: (studi ed appunti)*. (Milan: Remo Sandron, 1898); David Forgacs, *Italy’s Margins: Social Exclusion and Nation Formation since 1861* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- ⁷⁴ Caglioti, “Race, Statistics and Italian Eugenics: Alfredo Niceforo’s Trajectory from Lombroso to Fascism (1876–1960).”
- ⁷⁵ Raymond Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia, *The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia’s Historic Victory Against European Colonialism* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005).
- ⁷⁶ *Archivio storico del Museo di antropologia criminale Cesare Lombroso (Torino), Corrispondenza di Cesare Lombroso: Niceforo 9/1899; Niceforo 21/1899*.
- ⁷⁷ Silvana Patriarca, *Italianità: La costruzione del carattere nazionale* (Rome: Gius.Laterza & Figli Spa, 2014).
- ⁷⁸ Giuseppe Sergi, *Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea* (Rome: Società editrice Dante Alighieri, 1895).
- ⁷⁹ Giovanni Cerro, “Giuseppe Sergi: The Portrait of a Positivist Scientist,” *Journal of Anthropological Sciences* 95 (2017): 109–36, <https://doi.org/10.4436/jass.95007>.
- ⁸⁰ Here it is important to note that Sergi and his contemporaries used the terms *razza* (race), *ceppo* (stock), and *stirpe* (kinship). Giuliani notes that *stirpe* corresponds to a “composite group of people”; during the early fascist period,

this term was also used in reference to Mediterranean groups whose shared relationships were tied to the Roman Empire. Yet, she and Mary Gibson note, authors rarely distinguished systematically between these terms, and often used them interchangeably. See Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro,” 579; Gibson, “Biology or Climate? Race and ‘Deviance’ in Italian Criminology, 1880-1920.”

⁸¹ According to a letter written to Cesare Lombroso in 1897, Sergi saw Venice as an example *par excellence* of the population mixing that constituted the contemporary Mediterranean stock (*Archivio storico del Museo di antropologia criminale Cesare Lombroso (Torino), Donazione Carrara, CL 248*). See also Sergi, *Origine e diffusione della stirpe mediterranea*, 31.

⁸² Cassata, “Chapter I. Between Lombroso and Pareto.”

⁸³ *Archivio storico del Museo di antropologia criminale Cesare Lombroso (Torino), Donazione Carrara, CL 248*.

⁸⁴ Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy*; Giuseppe Sergi, *Gli Aarii in Europa e in Asia: studio etnografico, con figure e carte* (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1903), vi.

⁸⁵ According to Sergi (and again, unlike De Gobineau), the Dark Ages were actually caused by the arrival of “savage,” uncivilized Aryan invaders.

⁸⁶ Greene, *Equivocal Subjects*. As David Forgacs (2014) has noted, Italian positivists such as Niceforo and Sergi did not view skin color as an important marker of racial difference because it could be transformed as a result of migration. “Hard” physical characteristics such as skull shape and size, on the other hand, were a more accurate indicator of racial origin. Indeed, the similarity in skin color between some Italians and North Africans, as well as people from the Horn of Africa, during the colonial encounter raised questions about how Italian citizens should effectively distinguish themselves from their colonial subjects.

⁸⁷ Giuliani and Lombardi-Diop, *Bianco e nero. Storia dell’identità razziale degli italiani*, 29.

⁸⁸ Gramsci and Verdicchio, *The Southern Question*, 33; Greene, *Equivocal Subjects*, 18.

⁸⁹ S. Kühl, *For the Betterment of the Race: The Rise and Fall of the International Movement for Eugenics and Racial Hygiene* (New York: Springer, 2013).

⁹⁰ N. Gordon-Chipembere, *Representation and Black Womanhood: The Legacy of Sarah Baartman* (New York: Springer, 2011); Britt Rusert, *Fugitive Science: Empiricism and Freedom in Early African American Culture* (New York: NYU Press, 2017); Sadiya Qureshi, *Peoples on Parade: Exhibitions, Empire, and Anthropology in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Rachel Holmes, *The Hottentot Venus: The Life and Death of Saartjie Baartman: Born 1789 - Buried 2002* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016); Clifton C. Crais and Pamela Scully, *Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus: A Ghost Story and a Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Anne Fausto-Sterling, “Gender, Race, and Nation: The Comparative Anatomy of ‘Hottentot’ Women in Europe, 1815-17,” in *Skin Deep, Spirit Strong: The Black Female Body in American Culture*, ed. Kimberly Wallace-Sanders (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 66–98; Katherine McKittrick, “Science Quarrels Sculpture: The Politics of Reading Sarah Baartman,” *Mosaic* 43, no. 2 (2010): 113.

⁹¹ *Museo di anatomia umana Luigi Rolando dell’Università di Torino, “Ethnographic Illustrations” collection; Archivio storico del Museo di antropologia criminale Cesare Lombroso* (unsorted and undated collection of scientific illustrations).

⁹² See Giuliani and Lombardi-Diop for a comprehensive bibliography.

⁹³ I thank my colleague Angelo Matteo Caglioti for suggesting this evocative phrasing.

⁹⁴ Pasquale Verdicchio, *Bound by Distance: Rethinking Nationalism Through the Italian Diaspora* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press, 1997), 29–30; Giuseppe Sergi, *Aarii e italici: attorno all’Italia preistorica, con figure dimostrative* (Turin: Bocca, 1898); Lucia Re, “Italians and the Invention of Race: The Poetics and Politics of Difference in the Struggle over Libya, 1890-1913,” *California Italian Studies* 1, no. 1 (2010), <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/96k3w5kn>; Gibson, “Biology or Climate? Race and ‘Deviance’ in Italian Criminology, 1880-1920,” 111.

⁹⁵ Aaron Gillette, “The Origins of the ‘Manifesto of Racial Scientists,’” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 6, no. 3 (2001): 305–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13545710110084253>.

⁹⁶ Caponetto, *Fascist Hybridities*, 2.

⁹⁷ Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro,” 574.

⁹⁸ Caponetto, *Fascist Hybridities*.

⁹⁹ Giuliani and Lombardi-Diop, *Bianco e nero. Storia dell’identità razziale degli italiani*.

¹⁰⁰ Choate, *Emigrant Nation*.

¹⁰¹ The Italian woman was contrasted by the so-called “Black Venus,” as Giuliani (2014) argues. See Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro”; Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, *Woman-Nation-State* (New York: Springer, 1989).

¹⁰² De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea.”

¹⁰³ Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy*.

¹⁰⁴ Glenda Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), 52.

¹⁰⁵ Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro,” 574.

¹⁰⁶ De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea,” 403–4. The Italian fascist region had a complex relationship with the Catholic Church. The 1929 Lateran Treaty suspended church-state conflict in Italy by recognizing Vatican City as an independent state. In addition, the Catholic Church was supportive of fascist pro-natalist policies in the Italian countryside, and had its own tradition of anti-Semitic racist thought. In the mid-1930s, however, the Catholic Church began to change its stance on Jews and oppose Nazi Germany. See Caglioti, “Race, Statistics and Italian Eugenics: Alfredo Niceforo’s Trajectory from Lombroso to Fascism (1876–1960)”; Gaia Giuliani, “Gender, Race and the Colonial Archive. Sexualized Exoticism and Gendered Racism in Contemporary Italy,” *Italian Studies* 71, no. 4 (2016): 550–67, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00751634.2016.1222767>.

¹⁰⁷ Fuller, *Moderns Abroad*, 41.

¹⁰⁸ Fuller, 41.

¹⁰⁹ Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro,” 581; Barbara Sòrgoni, “Racist Discourses and Practices in the Italian Empire under Fascism,” in *The Politics of Recognizing Difference: Multiculturalism Italian Style*, ed. Ralph Grillo and Jeff Pratt (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 41–57.

¹¹⁰ Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro.”

¹¹¹ References to *meticci* appeared frequently prior to the 1920s due to the circulation of Darwinian evolutionary theory (and associated concepts such as hybridization) in Italy; however, *meticciato* as a generalized social phenomenon was not officially problematized until this period. This also coincides with David Theo Goldberg’s assertion in *The Racial State* (2002, 25) that it took several generations of colonial miscegenation to finally convince racial scientists that neither “hybrids” nor their descendants would be infertile or degenerate, or would eventually die out.

¹¹² De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea,” 399–400.

¹¹³ *Madamismo* (also called *madamoto*) refers to domestic and sexual relations between Italian men and Eritrean women under Italian colonialism (Iyob 2000; Lombardi-Diop 2001; De Donno 2006). Children resulting from these unions could be granted citizenship only if they were recognized by their fathers; if their parentage was unknown then citizenship was decided based on the child’s apparent “racial features” (De Donno 2006, 41).

¹¹⁴ As Stephen Small and Rebecca C. King-O’Riain note in the introduction to *Global Mixed Race*, “‘mixed race’ should be read with assumed scare quotes around it, to signify recognition of its socially bound nature.” See Stephen Small and Rebecca C. King-O’Riain, “Global Mixed Race: An Introduction,” in *Global Mixed Race*, ed. Rebecca Chiyoko King-O’Riain, Stephen Small, and Minelle Mahtani (New York: NYU Press, 2014), vii. For a history of the social production of the “mixed-race body” in Italy, see Pesarini, “‘Blood Is Thicker than Water.’”

¹¹⁵ Lombardi-Diop, “Mothering the Nation : An Italian Woman in Colonial Eritrea”; De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea”; Giulia Barrera, “Mussolini’s Colonial Race Laws and State-Settler Relations in Africa Orientale Italiana (1935-41),” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 8, no. 3 (2003): 425–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09585170320000113770>.

¹¹⁶ Seen, for instance, in the popular Fascist marching anthem “Faccetta Nera” (“Little Black Face”), which described Abyssinians as “slaves of [Italian] love.”

¹¹⁷ Paolo Berruti et al., *L’arte Della Folla Nelle Collezioni Del Museo Di Antropologia Di Torino* (Torino: Le Nuove Muse, 2010).

¹¹⁸ One reason why Marro is less well known is that very few of his notes and records remain today because of his ties to Italian fascism. The biological anthropologist Gianluigi Mangiapane, based at the University of Turin, has played a key role in recuperating the remaining documents tied to Marro that remain in the archives of the University’s Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography. Many thanks to Dr. Mangiapane for allowing me to browse the collection of Marro’s writings at the University of Turin and for sharing his own biographical research on this relatively unknown but nonetheless influential figure in fascist Italy.

¹¹⁹ Giovanni Marro, “Un Allarme per Il Razzismo Italiano,” *La Vita Italiana* Anno XXIX, no. Fasc. CCXXXVI (March 1941): 5.

¹²⁰ Marro, 6.

¹²¹ Even among the Aryanists such as Marro and his contemporaries, there were fierce debates about whether race was a purely biological or spiritual concept. Marro tended to focus on the spiritual character of race as opposed to physical characteristics. This is likely because Marro saw himself as a critic of the Italian positivist school of racial

science (see Gillette 2003). For Marro, physical features did not provide clear evidence of where racial lines began and ended. Returning to the previously discussed ambiguities in the work of Lombroso and the other positivists, Marro's critique likely stems from the fact that because many Italians shared certain physical traits (such as skin color) with their colonized subjects, physiognomy did not provide a sufficient basis on which Italian superiority or authority could be determined—hence, the turn to “spiritual” qualities. Nonetheless, as Cassatta 2008, 97) points out, Marro was also criticized by Landra for his insufficiently “scientific” analysis of race. It is this “biological” camp that ultimately triumphed in the final version of the “Manifesto of racial scientists.”

¹²² Cassata, *La difesa della razza*, 96.

¹²³ Doreen Massey, *For Space* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2005), 69.

¹²⁴ Giovanni Marro, *La Sala Della Razza Nella Rassegna “Torino e l’Lautarchia”* (Turin: Tipografia Silvestrelli e Cappelletto, 1939), 8.

¹²⁵ De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea.”

¹²⁶ “Manifesto Degli Scienziati Razzisti,” *Giornale d’Italia*, July 15, 1938,

<https://www.polyarchy.org/basta/documenti/razza.1938.html>.

¹²⁷ The use of *razzisti* (which directly translates as “racist”) in this context lies somewhere between Kwame Anthony Appiah’s notions of racialism (the idea that inherited characteristics allow us to divide humans into races) and racism (the idea that positive moral characteristics are unevenly distributed across races). See Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Racisms,” in *Anatomy of Racism*, ed. David Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 3–17.

¹²⁸ Gillette, “The Origins of the ‘Manifesto of Racial Scientists,’” 313.

¹²⁹ Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro,” 584.

¹³⁰ Mellino, “De-Provincializing Italy: Notes on Race, Racialization, and Italy’s Coloniality,” 88.

¹³¹ Goldberg, “Racial Europeanization,” 334.

¹³² Romeo, “Racial Evaporations: Representing Blackness in African Italian Postcolonial Literature,” 221.

¹³³ Visweswaran, *Un/Common Cultures*.

¹³⁴ Ruth Benedict, *Race and Racism* (1942; repr., Abingdon: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).

¹³⁵ UNESCO, “Four Statements on the Race Question.”

¹³⁶ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* (1986; repr., London: Routledge, 2014), 21.

¹³⁷ Mellino, “De-Provincializing Italy: Notes on Race, Racialization, and Italy’s Coloniality,” 92.

¹³⁸ Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini il duce* (Turin: Einaudi, 1996); Renzo De Felice, *Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2005).

¹³⁹ Lombardi-Diop, “Spotless Italy.”

¹⁴⁰ Patriarca, *Italianità*.

¹⁴¹ Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996).

¹⁴² Lombardi-Diop, “Spotless Italy.”

¹⁴³ Silvana Patriarca, “‘Gli Italiani Non Sono Razzisti’: Costruzioni Dell’italianità Tra Gli Anni Cinquanta e Il 1986,” in *Il Colore Della Nazione*, ed. Gaia Giuliani (Milan: Mondadori Education, 2015), 32–45.

¹⁴⁴ Lombardi-Diop, “Spotless Italy.”

¹⁴⁵ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (1984; repr., New York: Vintage, 1990).

¹⁴⁶ Portelli, “The Problem of the Color Blind: Notes on the Discourse of Race in Italy”; Caterina Lombardi-Diop, “Postracial/Postcolonial Italy,” in *Postcolonial Italy: Challenging National Homogeneity*, ed. Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 175.

¹⁴⁷ Laura Harris, “L’abbandono: Who’s Meticcio/Whose Meticcio in the Eritrea-Italy Diaspora?,” in *ItaliAfrica: Bridging Continents and Cultures*, ed. Sante Matteo (Stony Brook: Forum Italicum, Inc., 2001), 192–204.

¹⁴⁸ Benedict, *Race and Racism*, 97.

¹⁴⁹ Benedict, 141; Visweswaran, *Un/Common Cultures*, 30.

¹⁵⁰ For context, it is important to consider that Robert K. Merton’s writings on the ethos of modern science (now called “Mertonian norms”) were also published during this period.

¹⁵¹ Benedict, *Race and Racism*, 138.

¹⁵² Visweswaran, *Un/Common Cultures*, 13.

¹⁵³ Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*.

¹⁵⁴ Sandro Mezzadra, “Anti-Racist Research and Practice in Italy,” *Darkmatter*, October 10, 2010, <http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/10/10/anti-racist-research-and-practice-in-italy/>.

¹⁵⁵ Ruth Benedict, discussed earlier in the context of Boasian liberal anti-racism, was a major proponent of intercultural education in the United States. By the time intercultural education was taken up in Europe, it had fallen out of fashion in the United States.

¹⁵⁶ Jamie A. Kowalczyk, “Nationalizing Interculturalism: Reading Intercultural School Policy through Italian Cosmopolitanism,” in *Systems of Reason and the Politics of Schooling: School Reform and Sciences of Education in the Tradition of Thomas S. Popkewitz*, ed. Miguel Pereyra and Barry Franklin (London: Routledge, 2014), 277–98.

¹⁵⁷ Massimiliano Tarozzi, *Dall’interculturale alla giustizia sociale. Per un progetto pedagogico e politico di cittadinanza globale* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2015); Valentina Migliarini, “Subjectivation, Agency and the Schooling of Raced and Dis/Abled Asylum-Seeking Children in the Italian Context,” *Intercultural Education* 28, no. 2 (2017): 182–95.

¹⁵⁸ See Figure 14 for a graphical illustration of *meticcio*’s return at the end of the twentieth century.

¹⁵⁹ Ralph Grillo, *Le politiche del riconoscimento delle differenze. Multiculturalismo all’italiana* (Rimini: Guaraldi, 2006); Giuseppe Mantovani, *Intercultura. È possibile evitare le guerre culturali?* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2004); Enzo Colombo and Giovanni Semi, *Multiculturalismo quotidiano. Le pratiche della differenza* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2007).

¹⁶⁰ Pierfranco Malizia, *Interculturalismo: studio sul vivere “individualmente-insieme-con-gli-altri”* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2005), 22.

¹⁶¹ Giuliani and Lombardi-Diop, *Bianco e nero. Storia dell’identità razziale degli italiani*, 11.

¹⁶² These are the same scientists who, as described above, are campaigning to have the word “race” removed from the Italian constitution. See Bisol and Capocasa, *Italiani. Come il DNA ci aiuta a capire chi siamo*; “Il Paese Arcobaleno: Italia Ricca Di Diversità Genetica,” *Corriere Della Sera*, January 20, 2014, http://www.corriere.it/scienze_e_tecnologie/14_gennaio_19/paese-arcobaleno-italia-ricca-diversita-genetica-bf158fe4-8119-11e3-a1c3-05b99f5e9b32.shtml.

¹⁶³ Law, *Mediterranean Racisms*.

¹⁶⁴ “Manifesto Degli Scienziati Antirazzisti 2008,” July 10, 2008, <http://www.meltingpot.org/Manifesto-degli-scienziati-antirazzisti-2008.html>.

¹⁶⁵ Following the structure of the original manifesto, the 2008 document only notes that “Italian Jews are both Jewish and Italian.” It does not make a similar claim about Black Italians.

¹⁶⁶ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

¹⁶⁷ Gloria Wekker, *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

¹⁶⁸ The irony is that in Liberal and fascist Italy, race was never a simple matter of biology—it always yoked together ideas about history, culture, temperament, civilization, and “spirit.”

¹⁶⁹ Small, *20 Questions and Answers on Black Europe*, 8.

¹⁷⁰ Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*.

¹⁷¹ This is related to the “whitening” of ancient Egypt that took place in the eighteenth century, as archeologists, anthropologists, and racial scientists sought to negate the connection between classical Egyptian civilizations and Black Africa. See Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* (1987; repr., New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008); Scott Trafton, *Egypt Land: Race and Nineteenth-Century American Egyptomania* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Debbie Challis, *The Archaeology of Race: The Eugenic Ideas of Francis Galton and Flinders Petrie* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

¹⁷² Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro,” 573.

¹⁷³ Cole, *The New Racism in Europe*.

¹⁷⁴ Sante Matteo, “Introduction: African Italy, Bridging Continents and Cultures,” in *ItaliAfrica: Bridging Continents and Cultures*, ed. Sante Matteo (Stony Brook: Forum Italicum, Inc., 2001), 5.

¹⁷⁵ “Palme Bruciate a Milano, i Sentinelli Sfidano Lega e CasaPound: ‘In Piazza Con Piante Da Tutto Il Mondo,’” *La Repubblica*, February 22, 2017, http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/02/22/news/palme_bruciate_milano_piazza_duomo_sentinelli-158914666/.

¹⁷⁶ Katherine McKittrick, “Diachronic Loops/Deadweight Tonnage/Bad Made Measure,” *Cultural Geographies* 23, no. 1 (2016): 22, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1474474015612716>.

¹⁷⁷ Hawthorne and Piccolo, “‘Meticcio’ o Della Problematicità Di Una Parola.”

Chapter Three¹

The Lived Geographies of the Black Mediterranean

“All had to acknowledge that try as they may the children had become something many of them would never be, for better or worse, new Italians. An emergent Black Italia. That is, the Italian on the inside has become one of the most remarkable characteristics of a new generation living between two souls.”²

“What am I? Who am I? I am Black and Italian. But I am also Somali and black. So am I Afro-Italian? Italo-African? At the end of the day, I am just my story.”³

I took the high-speed train from Milan to Rome in January of 2016 to attend the launch of Marilena Umuhoza Delli’s autobiography, *Razzismo all’italiana [Racism, Italian Style]*.⁴ Marilena and I had met on Facebook after I stumbled across her delightful blog *AfroItalian4Ever*, and we immediately bonded over the fact that we both had one Black parent (her mother is Rwandan) and one white parent from the northern Italian province of Bergamo. Her book talk was held in a small independent bookstore in the Trastevere neighborhood that specializes in texts about Black history, immigration to Italy, African literature, and multicultural children’s stories. The intimate space was far over capacity, and the audience was squeezed precariously into wooden chairs facing a projector screen displaying a charming slideshow of Marilena’s family. The racially mixed group listened intently as Marilena, dressed in a green top, crisp black dress shorts, stylish heels, and curly hair twisted to one side, read excerpts from her book. “My parents are from different cultures,” she explained. “I grew up in Bergamo in the 1980s and saw very few other Black people. I was the only one in my school. It was not easy, but I survived.” Earlier in the presentation, she joked that the original title of her book was going to be *Vaffanculo razzisti di merda! [Go fuck yourselves, racist shitheads!]*, but her publisher ultimately made her change it. The audience burst out in laughter at the audacity of the rejected title, but also in recognition of its acerbic accuracy.

After Marilena finished her reading, the Italian scholar Caterina Romeo (in attendance as a panelist) remarked that books like Marilena’s are part of a new tradition of Italian postcolonial literature and provide timely reflections on what it means to be Black in Italy. While most members of the audience nodded along in agreement with Caterina’s comments, one woman began whispering agitatedly to her neighbor. Her whispers grew louder, meeting disapproving stares from Marilena and the panelists, until she was finally asked to share her thoughts. The woman, visible from where I sat at the back of the crowded room because of the way a dramatic shock of silver hair stood out against the rest of her black coif, asked how much of what Marilena experienced had to do with the “Southern” influence on Italian culture. “*Meridionali* have a culture of hospitality, of sensuality. I can say this because I am Neapolitan! So what you experienced might not have been hostility—it could have just been coming from this part of our culture. For instance, when people would ask you questions about your hair, they might have just

been curious. At the end of the day, I think that Italians are just naturally open to people from other places—after all, Bill de Blasio in New York is married to an African American woman!”

Caterina sighed in frustration, and Marilena quickly intervened. “My book is a chronicle of everyday racism,” she explained calmly but firmly. “I am often asked if Italy is racist. I usually respond by saying that Italy isn’t racist, but it *is* a country where racism is tolerated.” This explanation did not placate the Neapolitan woman, who by this point seemed ready to throw up her arms in frustration. “We can’t be racist!” she proclaimed. “We’re just not *capable* of it!”⁵

Whitewashing the Black Mediterranean

In Chapter Two, I chronicled the ways in which the racial violences constitutive of Italianness are elided through the commonsense deployment of concepts such as Mediterraneanism and mixing. While the specific meanings and practices attached to Mediterranean mixing have shifted many times since Italian national unification, they have often worked to buffer Italy’s ambiguous geographical-racial-national identity from the perceived threat of Blackness and sub-Saharan African contaminations. Yet, as the anecdote above suggests, ideas of Italian mixedness also allow for a strategic distancing of Italianness from the category of whiteness, a move that enables pernicious claims to Italian innocence and victimhood. This innocence, scholars such as Gloria Wekker, Philomena Essed, and Isabel Hoving have argued (writing in the context of the Netherlands), merges easily with the “disavowal and denial of racism.”⁶ In other words, *Italian-innocence-as-product-of-Mediterranean-racial-liminality* does not acknowledge that anti-Blackness is central to the formation of Italy. Nor does it challenge dominant ideas about which groups fit within the racial imaginary of Italy as a crossroads of great civilizations. In this context, to borrow Sebastian Weier’s Afro-pessimist phrasing, Blackness in the Euro-Mediterranean basin is commonly understood as “a position that defines the form of a social structure in which black humanity is present only as constitutive absence.”⁷

These critiques of a “whitewashed Mediterranean” do not mean that there are not unique histories of racial formation in the Mediterranean. It also does not deny the deep connections traversing sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean, and southern Europe. Indeed, a key question facing Black activists in Italy today is how precisely to contextualize the specificities of their lived experiences of racism within the overlapping histories of Mediterranean interconnection, colonialism, and migration. This is especially urgent as they resist being reduced to “junior partners” within a global Black diaspora due to their distance from the formative geographies of the Middle Passage and the Black Atlantic.

This chapter, therefore, is centered on a productive tension: specifically, the tension Black Italians face as they articulate the specificities of Blackness and anti-Black racism in Italy in relation to 1) the myth of a supposedly “colorblind” Italy on the one hand; and 2) the dominance of North Atlantic geographies and North American understandings of racial hypodescent in global conversations about Blackness on the other. This tension could be seen in the book presentation that I recounted at the beginning of this chapter. Marilena’s bold attempt to discuss the unique characteristics of “racism, *Italian style*” (a theme she develops in a fascinating section of her memoir entitled “My Pilgrimage,” wherein her Black Italianness is reflected back to her in different ways in Los Angeles and Paris because it does not fit neatly within hegemonic understandings of Blackness) is quite literally interrupted by a claim to Italian exceptionalism.

This chapter will draw on the voices, experiences, and activism of a group of self-identified Black or Afro-Italian political activists, artists, and entrepreneurs in the wake of the murder of Nigerian asylum seeker Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi in July of 2016. This horrific event

brought to light the tensions and challenges in the articulation of a collective, coherent Black Italian political project. But while a lively (and often contentious) set of conversations about Black Italy are happening within activist and informal electronic spaces thanks to the increasingly visible activities of young Black Italians, they are also beginning to take place on a very limited scale within academia—particularly around the notion of the Black Mediterranean. In this chapter, therefore, I approach both everyday activist and academic spaces as valid spheres of inquiry, and attempt to move between the two in order to foreground the multiple sites in which knowledge production about “Black Italy” takes place. I believe that while the “Black Mediterranean” as a specific term is not currently central in the emergent cultural politics of Black Italy, it can still serve as a productive analytical framework that foregrounds the complicated histories of racism and race in Italy, and the broader Mediterranean.

As an analytic, the Black Mediterranean is focused on linking sub-Saharan Africa to the wider Mediterranean basin, past and present—from the historical connections between Nubia and Egypt to the “often violent and discriminatory migration control regimes”⁸ that characterize today’s migration control collaborations between North African states and Fortress Europe. This is significant because most (though certainly not all) Afro-descendants in Italy today have arrived via trans-Mediterranean geographies. These journeys might entail the aftermath of Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa, plane flights from Dakar on student visas, or voyages across the Sahara to Libya followed by maritime passage to Lampedusa. In addition, the capacious geographic referents of Black youth in Italy cannot be fully subsumed within Atlantic geographies of Blackness, as they also maintain direct familial, cultural, economic, and often political connections to their parents’ countries of origin on the African continent. The Black Mediterranean therefore allows for both historically- and geographically-situated engagements with the complex material and symbolic networks of Italian Blackness.

In addition, centering the irrepressible connections between sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean can also facilitate a critical rethinking of European modernity itself by challenging the separation (described in Chapter Two) between sub-Saharan African Blackness and the imaginary of the Mediterranean as the cauldron within which a presumably white, European civilization was produced. As Robin D. G. Kelley writes in his 2000 introduction Cedric Robinson’s *Black Marxism*, “The exorcising of the Black Mediterranean is about the fabrication of Europe as a discrete, racially-pure entity solely responsible for modernity, on the one hand, and the fabrication of the Negro, on the other.”⁹ Iain Chambers, drawing on Braudel, notes for instance that the Mediterranean was dependent on sub-Saharan African gold before the “discovery” of New World bullion. As European textiles were shipped south across the Sahara, gold (and eventually enslaved Africans) were brought across the desert and the Mediterranean from West Africa into Europe—forging trade networks that, at their height, were far more lucrative than the maritime Mediterranean traffic of the time.¹⁰ Thus, as decolonial Black European scholars Olivette Otele and Nathaniel Adam Tobias Coleman suggested at a symposium on the Black Mediterranean held at Birmingham City University in the fall of 2016,¹¹ re-centering Black life in the story of Euro-Mediterranean modernity can also work to undermine the dangerous pretensions of European ethnic absolutism.

Historian Gabriele Proglia indirectly takes on Kelley’s provocation in his evocative ethnographic essay, “Is the Mediterranean a White Italian-European Sea?” The Mediterranean, he writes, is not intrinsically anti-Eurocentric; rather, it has been:

the repository of de-territorialization and re-territorialization processes (Deleuze and

Guattari ([1975] 1983) of the colonial and postcolonial elsewhere and of the reinvention of Italianness (Proglia 2016). Indeed, the Mediterranean may be viewed as an archive of Italian/European cultural memories (Assmann 1992) or as the domain of Italianness, first symbolic and then physical, first as mental concept/idea/representation of Mediterraneanness, the mythical realm of Italian progeny and then as an assortment of intersubjective practices linked with feelings of belongingness to the Italian imagined community... Actually, this narrative process that is always conceived in contrast to what is deemed black, non-Italian, non-European has a circular pattern, as argued by Edward Said with regard to the category of Orientalism (Said 1979:127) and Dabashi with reference to the new global conflicts (2008).¹²

Indeed, from Hegel¹³ to Mackinder¹⁴ to Braudel,¹⁵ the Mediterranean has been conceived chiefly as Europe's political, cultural, and economic incubator. Yet, as Proglia argues in his introduction to the 2016 edited collection *Decolonizing the Mediterranean*, "sub-Saharan African migration to Europe has unveiled the existence of a Black Mediterranean"¹⁶ with a long history that is nonetheless systematically neglected in the historiography of both Europe *and* the global Black diaspora. Focusing on these connections does not mean privileging narratives of hybridity as an antidote to the myth of European purity, however—the violence of the ever-shifting Euro-Mediterranean border and the persistence of structural anti-Blackness in Italy suggest otherwise. Thus, the Black Mediterranean makes room for the possibility of Blackness in Italy, but also stresses the urgency of anti-racism by emphasizing the constitutive racial violence and subordination¹⁷ undergirding Italian national formation in relation to the Mediterranean

In the sections that follow I will explore the aftermath of an extreme act of racist violence that, in the summer of 2016, shattered the lingering myth of Italian racial conviviality. This event and the mobilizations that followed revealed the complex ways in which young Black activists struggle to craft a language that can attend to the specific contours of racism and exclusion in Italy. What I will argue through these stories is that it is both possible to take seriously the unique fluidity of racial borders in Italy and the wider Mediterranean, while also acknowledging that this very liminality can itself be generative of particularly virulent forms of racism and nationalism. This is significant because although the dominant vocabulary for discussing racism and race is oriented toward notions of biological or phenotypic difference, the discursive repertoires of far-right, xenophobic, and nationalist movements in Europe today do not necessarily employ the language of blood and biology. As I will demonstrate, grasping the overlapping and often contradictory ideas and practices through which modern forms of nationalist exclusion operate is a central task both for Black activists in Italy today, and for scholars concerned with the increasing visibility of violent far-right movements in Europe more broadly.

In the Wake of Fermo¹⁸

On July 5, 2016, a 36-year-old Nigerian asylum seeker named Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi was beaten to death by Amedeo Mancini, a 39-year-old white Italian soccer *ultra* [hooligan] associated with a local chapter of the neo-fascist CasaPound Italy political movement.¹⁹

Emmanuel and his wife Chinyery had fled the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria after losing their parents and a two-year-old daughter when their village church was set on fire. They undertook the dangerous journey through Libya and across the Mediterranean on a smuggler's boat, during which Chinyery suffered a miscarriage, and finally arrived in Palermo.

The harrowing story of Emmanuel and Chinyery is far from an isolated case. UNHCR estimates that in 2016, over 37,000 Nigerians arrived to Italy via the Mediterranean.²⁰ That year, Nigerians made up approximately twenty-one percent of sea arrivals, followed by Eritreans at eleven percent. The journey across the Sahara and Mediterranean to southern Italy is characterized by extreme sexual and racist violence, extortion, exploitation, and unfree labor;²¹ in fact, most sub-Saharan Africans who begin the trans-Mediterranean journey never make it beyond North Africa.²² Deaths and near-fatalities along the extended borders of Europe, argue activist and political theorist Maurice Stierl, “point to the diffuse but connected registers of death-inducing violence that underpin the contemporary European border regime.”²³

Emmanuel and Chinyery had been living at the bishop’s seminary in the small central Italian seaside town of Fermo since the previous September, and were married in January.²⁴ Six months later on the afternoon of July 5, the couple was going for a stroll when two men began shouting insults at them. At one point, one of the men grabbed Chinyery and called her “*una scimmia africana* [an African monkey].”²⁵ When Emmanuel intervened to defend his wife from this assault, Amedeo Mancini attacked him with a street sign ripped out of the ground nearby. Emmanuel fell into an irreversible coma from the beating, and died the following day.

While Chinyere immediately volunteered to donate her husband’s organs,²⁶ her act of generosity was quickly overshadowed by unsubstantiated claims that she fabricated elements of her testimony to police, and that Emmanuel had attacked Mancini in an unprovoked act of aggression. Chinyere (who herself suffered bruises during the assault in Fermo²⁷) has been subject to harassment and death threats since her husband’s murder, and was eventually moved to an undisclosed town for her safety. To many Italian observers, the murder of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi only confirmed their suspicions of the Black body²⁸ in Italy as out-of-place and always-already dangerous—according to right-wing Lega Nord party leader and notorious populist provocateur Matteo Salvini, for instance, it was clear evidence that “clandestine immigration is out of control; actually, this organized invasion will not bring anything positive.”²⁹ While not going so far as to condone the attacks on Emmanuel and Chinyere, Salvini’s statement nonetheless implied that Black migrants and refugees in Italy will inevitably incite violent backlashes from white Italians because their mere presence implies cultural or racial invasion.

The murder of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi rapidly, albeit fleetingly, brought together two groups in Italy who were normally not in direct dialogue, at least not at the level of formal political activism—that is, newly arrived migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand, and the Italian-born or raised children of African immigrants on the other.³⁰ It also temporarily dissolved some lingering differentiations among Italian Afro-descendants along national lines, bringing Eritreans and Nigerians and Ghanaians and many others together into the *piazze* to express their indignation. As an Italian-Congolese stylist told me on the way to an antiracist demonstration in Milan, with a grim sigh, “We’re all in the same boat now.” This is because the brutal attack made shockingly apparent the precariousness of what Frantz Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks* famously called the “fact of Blackness”³¹ (or “the lived experience of the Black man,” depending on the translation) in Italy. The lived experience of Blackness in Italy in many ways transcends immigration and citizenship status—arguably, the primary ways in which questions of difference are framed institutionally because (as noted in Chapter Two) outright references to “race” have been largely silenced in postwar Italy. Despite the “self-reflexive color-blindness of Italians,”³² however, people of African descent are systematically denied recognition as *de facto* Italians and are thus placed in a Fanonian zone of nonbeing.³³

The outpouring of horror, grief, and anger that was expressed in the wake of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi's murder over private text message exchanges and phone calls, and across public-facing social media postings and calls to action, always condensed into a single, nightmarish point: *This could have been any one of us*. Merely for committing the violation of being Black in public, Nnamdi's name had been added to the ever-growing roll call of Black victims of racist violence in Italy—one that stretches from Jerry Masslo (the South African political asylee murdered near Naples in 1989³⁴), to Abdul “Abba” Guibre (the nineteen-year-old Burkinabe who grew up in Italy and was beaten to death in Milan in 2008³⁵), to Samb Modou and Diop Mor (the two Senegalese migrants murdered in Florence in 2011 by another member of the CasaPound³⁶). This, in the land of *Italiani, brava gente* [good Italian people]: the perpetrators of a supposedly more “gentle” and “mild” form of colonialism in Africa, the underdogs of Europe who, thanks to their own national experience of large-scale emigration and history of being racialized as Mediterranean (see Chapter Two), had less of an innate capacity for racism.

#BlackLivesMatter and Anti-Racist Praxis in Italy

Like most summers in Italy, everyday life began to grind to a halt by July of 2016. By this time of year, Italian families typically begin to prepare for the summer school holidays and plan trips to the beach or mountains where they can escape the heat and heavy humidity. Against this backdrop, the death of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi disrupted the gradual, peaceful wind-down of midsummer and immediately sent shockwaves across the country. Many scholars have critiqued the way in which only instances of extraordinary racist violence become legible to national publics; this process, such studies suggest, both elides the more mundane realities of institutional racism and implies that racism can be understood as an exception to the “normal” state of affairs in modern liberal states.³⁷ Nonetheless, Emmanuel's murder and the subsequent smear campaign against his grieving wife Chinyere was able to capture the Italian public's imagination and (at least temporarily) direct a laser-like focus on the persistence of Italian racism in a way that crude anti-refugee propaganda and the steady stream of Black deaths in the Mediterranean could not. The horrific attack catalyzed important conversations precisely because it demonstrated the interconnections between the intersecting forms of quotidian violence that, while invisible to most white Italians, constantly besiege the bodies and souls of Black folk in Italy.

As anti-racism protests rippled across Italian cities that hot and sticky summer, from Fermo to Milan to Rome, demonstrations under the banner of #BlackLivesMatter were also mushrooming across the United States and in European cities such as London, Paris, Berlin, and Amsterdam in response to the extrajudicial murders of Black men and women at the hands of police officers. Indeed, multiple news outlets subsequently referred to 2016 as the year that #BlackLivesMatter “went global.” Some of these marches were organized in solidarity with Black Americans who took to the street in response to the deaths of Alton Sterling and Philando Castile.³⁸ But other marches also attempted to shed light on anti-Black state violence *within* Europe. In France, the death of twenty-four-year-old Adama Traoré in police custody incited marches in Paris that drew links between anti-Black police violence in the United States and Europe, and also sought to challenge the enduring myth of French colorblindness.³⁹ In the U.K., nationwide #BlackLivesMatter marches were timed to coincide with the fifth-year anniversary of the murder of 29-year-old Mark Duggan, who was shot by police in London while unarmed.⁴⁰

Many young Black Italians earnestly followed these global struggles against anti-Black violence from the international window afforded to them by Facebook, noting to me the ways in which their struggles against everyday and institutional forms of racism in Italy seemed to be so

clearly intertwined with the mobilizations of their sisters and brothers in other countries. The issues that interested activists in Italy may not have precisely mirrored the main violations that were mobilizing protesters in other corners of the Black diaspora. Instead of—or perhaps in addition to—police brutality, there are realities such as restrictive citizenship laws and the “letting die”⁴¹ of Black migrants in the Mediterranean. Still, my friends and interlocutors in Italy all expressed a shared sense of their very Blackness being under siege in the context of both micro-level interactions and large-scale bureaucratic encounters.

In Milan, an anti-racism and anti-fascism protest was organized less than a week after Nnamdi’s death with the help of the youth organization *Il comitato per non dimenticare Abba e per fermare il razzismo* [The Committee to remember Abba and stop racism]. The *Comitato*, housed in the occupied collective space known as *Centro Sociale Cantiere*, was formed by a multiracial collective of young people in 2008 in response to the racially motivated murder of Abdul Guibre. To this day, the group works to maintain Abba’s legacy by organizing language workshops, protests, and public events in Milan about the relationship between racism, xenophobia, militarism, border fortification, and capitalism. The Milan-based DJ Marvely Goma Perseverance expressed the continuities (and disjunctures) stretching from Abdul Guibre to Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi in a wrenching open letter addressed to the deceased Abba, published on July 9, 2016 in the online Black Italian arts and culture magazine *GRIOT*:

A lifetime spent with a finger pointed at us, condemned to excel so that we don’t fall into the category of the “usual immigrants” or the “usual blacks,” as if we had chosen to be born “black,” as though we had chosen that label—which, among other things, I never understood. [...] Goodbye Abba, I miss you so much and here nothing has changed. The other day they beat and killed Emmanuel. I didn’t know him but unlike you, who was born Italian, he had a different story that was similar to that of our parents, a refugee in search of Christian charity and calm where he could nurture his own hopes.⁴²

On the day of the protest organized by the *Comitato* in Milan, I was walking with my friend Evelyne, who was that day clad in her trademark red dashiki and a fresh twist-out, as we headed to make handmade posters in her office near the iconic Piazza Duomo. Evelyne, a plucky twenty-nine-year-old Italian-Ghanaian woman who grew up in nearby Brianza, is widely known in Italy as the creator of the first Italian-language Facebook page and blog addressing the care of natural Afro-textured hair, *Nappytalia*.⁴³ Evelyne has, in the last two-and-a-half years, rocketed to mini stardom in Italy—she has been invited to give TEDx talks and speak at universities, she has won numerous entrepreneurship awards both nationally and internationally, and she is often recognized on the street as “*la ragazza di Nappytalia*” [the girl from *Nappytalia*].

As Evelyne and I commiserated about the social and logistic challenges of organizing political demonstrations in Italy, she proceeded to whip out her smartphone, open up the Facebook application, and proudly swipe through photos of a #BlackLivesMatter march that had taken place not long ago in London. We took refuge from the beating sun in the shade of a portico near an empty café, huddled over her phone near a teetering stack of chairs, while she explained to me that the black-clad activists posing solemnly with raised fists in the photos before us were actually Black Italians living, working, and studying in London. Several had met each other for the first time through their involvement in that demonstration—and others had confessed to me earlier that their first encounters with Black radicalism and concepts such as institutional racism or intersectionality did not occur until they left Italy for the U.K.

Evelyne, like so many other young Black Italians born or raised in Italy, had found some inspiration in the model of autonomous Black political action represented by #BlackLivesMatter. Her words echoed the damning statement released by the European Network against Racism,⁴⁴ which declared that Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi's murder was a "wake-up call" for a European #BlackLivesMatter movement:

It's time to say out loud that Black and migrant lives matter—not only at sea, but also in the streets of our cities and in the hearts and minds of all of us. The murder of Emmanuel is yet another wake up call to Europe to take racism and violence seriously. When will it start listening?⁴⁵

Evelyne personally saw #BlackLivesMatter as an incitement to build similar types of anti-racist movements in Italy, even if the specific contours of anti-Blackness in Italy differed from the primary issues centered by activists in the United States and in the emerging U.K.-based offshoot of the #BlackLivesMatter movement. Even the posters we carried reflected the transnational mixture of political influences we were drawing upon: from the obvious "Black Lives Matter," to "*Nessuna Pace Senza Giustizia*," ("No Justice, No Peace," adopted from a 1967 speech by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.⁴⁶), to "*Siate Umani*," ("Be/Stay Human," a slogan that was once the sign-off of Palestine-based Italian journalist Vittorio Arrigoni,⁴⁷ and which was subsequently adopted by migrants' rights activists in reference to the current Mediterranean refugee crisis).

But for other Black Italians, the connection between these struggles was far less self-evident. And the uncertainty that some activists and bloggers felt about the prospect of subsuming their own struggles within an increasingly global but still largely U.S.-centric movement against anti-Black state violence pointed to the doubly marginal position of Black Italian youth both in Italy and within the wider African diaspora. Along these lines, a prominent Italian-Ugandan-Sudanese blogger based in Milan, who over the last year has gained a substantial online following for her smart social commentary, slickly produced anti-racism videos, and curation of beauty tutorials for Black women, posted an incitement to Facebook in the midst of the Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi protests. Her colorful commentary brought to a head the unspoken tensions within a new generation of politically conscious youth that has only very recently (and very tentatively) begun to collectively refer to itself as *Afro-* or *Black Italian*:

Guys, we are not in America and we are not Americans #chill you're more concerned, shouting, and crying for the injustices suffered by African Americans than for things that are happening in the country where you live, your country of origin, and many other places where injustice and discrimination run rampant... #blacklivesmatter here blacklivesmatter there, you're acting as though in the United States your complaints would be taken seriously by someone. Americans NEVER look beyond their own backyard... And they call their president the "Leader of the Free World."⁴⁸

A heated debate quickly ensued under the blogger's aforementioned, indignant message, one I heard directly referenced in passionate conversation over countless aperitifs and coffees over the subsequent weeks. But on that sleepless summer night, I was affixed to my laptop screen as I tried desperately to piece together news reports of racist violence and Black resistance from Minnesota, Louisiana, London, Amsterdam, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, and Fermo.

And with each new and increasingly irate addition to the discussion about Black Italians and their connection to #BlackLivesMatter, my browser emitted an incongruously cheery two-tone notification alert. *BA-BING!* “I am half American, so I feel the injustices and hypocrisies of both countries,” replied a writer from Reggio Emilia, the daughter of a Black American father and a white Italian mother. *BA-BING!* “Afro-Italians simply need to stop emulating African Americans... Afro-Italians can create something better, which hopefully won’t be based on skin color and the stupid ‘one-drop’ rule,” retorted another commenter. His comment was quickly met with statements of approval that remarked on the heterogeneity of Afro-descendants in Europe, as opposed to Black Americans who supposedly cannot trace their ancestry due to the genealogical rupture of slavery. *BA-BING!* “This is why I don’t agree with the use of the term ‘Afro-Italian,’” responded an Italian-Afro-Brazilian student activist from Rome. “It refers to African Americans, but here in Italy and in Europe... there is no ‘Afro’ in common,” she continued, arguing that it is more typical for Afro-descendants in Italy to identify with their or their parents’ country of origin. *BA-BING!* Another young woman took issue with the blogger’s original post: “#Blacklivesmatter not just for America but for the rest of the world. Maybe in Italy they don’t physically kill us like in America, but they kill us morally every day through discrimination,” she wrote.

An Italian-Ghanaian medical student from Verona with a keen interest in Black diasporic cultural politics attempted to mediate between the various positions that had been expressed earlier: “It is true, yes, that we and Black Americans swim in different waters. Just as it’s true that we are able to take our first steps thanks to them. *They are different waters, but at the end of the day we are all drowning in the same sea.*”⁴⁹

Diaspora, Power, and the Interconnected Seas of Struggle

These debates left me feeling profoundly uncertain about my own positionality as a self-identified Black Italian by a different set of routes and routes than most of my interlocutors in Italy—specifically, as a Black American with ancestry linking her to the transatlantic slave trade who also happens to be an “ethnic” Italian with birthright citizenship. My friends’ emphasis on the importance of tracing family lineage to specific African countries seemed to both invoke a strand of anti-Blackness based on the “taint” of slavery⁵⁰ and re-inscribe the importance of blood kinship—ironically, the very same principle that limited their access to citizenship in Italy. Early on in my fieldwork, I became accustomed to answering the question “But where *exactly* in Africa is your father’s family from?” with a shrug. If pressed, I might continue, “We don’t know for sure. Somewhere in West Africa, probably what is today Ghana or Nigeria.”

While existentially troubling, these questions and debates about the characteristics and possibilities of a shared Black identity in Italy were not surprising. Indeed, I had begun to take note of two broad themes in the nascent Black Italian cultural politics. On the one hand, Black Italian activists often look to the United States for inspiration in the form of what sociologist Stephen Small calls *diasporic resources*⁵¹ or anthropologist Jacqueline Nassy Brown calls *diaspora’s resources*⁵²—this includes literature, like the autobiography of Malcolm X, hip hop and rap, cultural icons, self-care practices, and political strategies. Over the past decade, this transnational circulation has been facilitated by the Internet⁵³ and social networking sites such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter. These platforms have allowed for the rapid sharing and remixing of music, videos, memes, images, hashtags, slogans, and political movements.⁵⁴

On the other hand, activists also assert to me that there is something unique about the Black experience in Italy—from limited access to citizenship, to their own personal and familial

entanglements with immigration politics; from to the immediacy of colonialism to their lived experiences, to a direct sense of attachment to specific African countries. Indeed, I sometimes found my questions about American influences brushed off with the assertion that “We are *not* copying Black Americans, but simply trying to work for the benefit of Afro-Italians!” While such a statement could be easily dismissed as a case of misplaced nationalism, I believe that it is more indicative of the oft-overlooked power relations *within* global diasporic communities.

A friend in Milan, the son of a Black Gambian father and a white Italian mother who grew up nearby in the posh town of Monza, explained it to me this way one afternoon:

I didn't have any cultural reference around me. There was no one else who was having the same feelings. [...] And so, you know, that was when I started to look at Black America, because it was the thing you could relate to more, you could find more, you know? And you could also relate more because it was closer to you, because it was the time of hip-hop; it was the time of b-boys. [...] So yeah, I turned to America, and you know, I started like, reading Malcolm X, and all of those things. [...] And my mom was getting worried. But my father was laughing—he said, “This has nothing to do you with you, it's not your history!” [...] And so, in a way, my identity struggle and journey started there. And there were different episodes, of growing up in the only country that you know, but that country did not recognize you as part of this country.

This conversation was part of a longer discussion Daniel⁵⁵ and I shared over several long lunches in 2016. And it seemed to me that he was uniquely situated to comment on the uncertain crosscurrents of diasporic identification: his father was part of the informal network of Senegalese and Gambian migrants who settled in northern Italy and became politically active in the 1980s (a cohort that also included the writer Pap Khouma and the educator and artist Mohamed Ba); he was educated in Switzerland and travels frequently to New York, Paris, and Johannesburg for his work in an Italian foundation promoting African arts. Daniel spoke a subtly accented English peppered with Black American slang and cultural references; even though our conversations usually began in Italian, we always found ourselves gravitating back to English because, as he put it, “Italian just doesn't have the vocabulary to talk about these things yet.”

Yet despite the affinities he expressed with Black America, in Daniel's view the cultural products that had been so formative in his youth were now part of a broader capitalist power structure. And, he noted, racism simply operates differently in Italy than in the United States. He gave two examples to illustrate his point. He first noted that an Albanian might appear to be whiter than the average white Italian, but would still face discrimination. He then recalled that when he was much younger, he had a North African friend who was called a “n****r” by a southern Italian classmate who (Daniel chuckled) actually had darker skin than him; however, when this friend turned to Black American culture and began hanging out with his Black classmates, his mother demanded to know why he was spending so much time with “*those* n****rs.” In other words, Daniel was implying, the social mechanics by which “race” functions in Italy are shaped by complicated histories in which multiple “Souths”—from southern Italy to sub-Saharan Africa—overlap and collide to produce unexpected lines of alliance and fracture.

This insistence on difference, which in Daniel's anecdote was first articulated by his father but later became something he himself would firmly assert to me, is an important reminder that diasporic unity is not automatically a given, and that Blackness cannot be reduced to a single, universal condition. This is the second chapter of the “coming to consciousness”⁵⁶

narrative that I heard so frequently when speaking with young Black Italians about their histories of self-identification. This story frequently began with seeing oneself as solely Italian and having that mutual recognition denied, looking to the other side of the Atlantic for guidance, and eventually realizing that what used to serve as a mirror no longer offered a perfect reflection. My friend's story is reminiscent of Black studies scholar Michelle Wright's call in *Physics of Blackness*⁵⁷ for a form of Black studies that can attend to the complex catalog of histories by which Black Americans and Black Europeans and other diasporans intersect. This is an important matter for the emerging study of "race" in Italy, which in many cases is still caught between the poles of asserting an Italian exceptionalism with regard to racial tolerance, or an over-reliance on models and concepts transposed directly from the United States or Britain.

My attention to the United States here is not a forced comparison, nor is it an attempt to suggest that there exists a normative teleology by which Black diasporic subjects achieve proper "consciousness."⁵⁸ But the aforementioned debates among Black Italian youth about their relationship to Black American cultural politics suggests that Black America remains a powerful reference point, an inescapable center of gravity in discussions about the contours of global or transnational Blackness. Indeed, within the field of Black European studies the notion of "African American hegemony"⁵⁹ is a major source of contention, pointing to the uneven access to academic resources and recognition across the diaspora, as well as Black Americans' deeply equivocal entanglement with (or rather, conscription into) "the most powerful nation on earth."⁶⁰ It is for this reason that Wright has called into question the anchoring of Blackness in what she calls the "Middle Passage epistemology,"⁶¹ a framework that:

points to the Atlantic slave trade as the crucial moment that separated blacks in the West from their ancestral origins, and then locates all preceding and subsequent events, from the classical world to the modern day, in relation to the Middle Passage.⁶²

This epistemology, she argues, begins to lose some of its relevance in the context of Black Europe. Within Black Europe, many people of African descent did not arrive via Middle Passage geographies and therefore use different timelines and historical markers (such as World War II and the role of colonial soldiers in the Allied armies) to recount their community "origin stories."

These questions point to the limitations of conceptualizing the Black diaspora solely in terms of "roots" and "routes." Instead, the story of Black Italians suggests that diaspora can be more accurately addressed as a relation or process rather than a static state of exile or displacement—what Stuart Hall describes as the play of "difference" within diasporic cultural identity.⁶³ The work of scholars such as Jacqueline Nassy Brown⁶⁴ and Tina Campt⁶⁵ is instructive in this regard. Perhaps because they each seek out diaspora in oft-neglected outposts⁶⁶ (Liverpool and Germany during the Third Reich, respectively), they are obligated to attend to the question of what constitutes unity or connection across diaspora; how the particularities of place shape distinct diasporic relations; and how contradiction and tension manifest in diaspora just as often as (if not more than) harmony and accord. In Liverpool, for instance, Brown shows how even a "Black European" community that understands itself in relation to the legacies of the transatlantic slave trade can still have complicated and not always amiable relationships with Black America. Indeed, as Brown writes, "the association of diaspora with worldwide Black kinship, as it were, can actually render certain kinds of Black subjects, experiences, histories, and identities invisible."⁶⁷ In a thoughtful critique of Paul Gilroy's seminal *The Black Atlantic*,⁶⁸ she argues that Gilroy problematically assumes the universality and translatability of Black

American culture without attending to the power relations that stymie the realization of harmonious diasporic connections. These differences and the way they come to shape social practices are what Brown calls “counter/*part*”⁶⁹ relations.

But this emphasis on difference is also complicated by the fact that claims to “Italian exceptionalism” are frequently invoked by everyday white Italians and politicians to *deny* the existence of racism. In other words, racism and racist violence are regarded simply as things that happen “out there” in the United States, with its burdensome legacy of slavery. While the murder of Jerry Masslo in 1989 shattered some of the dangerously naive assumptions about racism in Italy that proliferated during the immigration debates of the 1980s,⁷⁰ these ideas continue to carry political weight today. The conservative Milanese daily *Il Giornale* (part of the Berlusconi media empire), for instance, ran a front page on July 11, 2016 boldly declaring, “The government invents ‘Racist Italy.’”⁷¹ This announcement was juxtaposed with a subheading about anti-police violence protests in the United States that implicitly externalized racism as a specifically *American* problem: “Black revolt in the USA: 200 arrested in a few hours.”

FUNERALI DI EMMANUEL

Il governo inventa l'Italia razzista

*Passerella di politici alle esequie del profugo ucciso a Fermo
 La sinistra usa anche una tragedia per la campagna elettorale
 Rivolta nera negli Usa: 200 arresti in poche ore*

di **Alessandro Salvati**

Ce la sinistra pretende tutto, ma per questo ci riguarda, non ce la lasciamo a farsi venire invidia, a farsi sentire e responsabilità di quella politica e culturale nei confronti delle quali il Paese Italia e gli italiani non hanno alcuna responsabilità. L'inascoltabile Bobek e l'insopportabile Emma Bonino nel governo fanno passerla ai funerali di Emmanuel, il profugo ucraino morto a Fermo aggredito da un bulgardo violento. Non almeno l'opposizione che in Italia è il governo, socialmente solidaria dove meglio credono, col rispetto al servizio di assistenza nel quale fatto di cronaca non in un lato politico come di consueto. Siamo addolorati per Emmanuel, come lo siamo ogni volta che un uomo ucraino è ucciso in un simile, come ogni volta che una ragazza viene violentata. Ma, dato un grande servizio, che cosa dobbiamo fare di più con la sinistra nei confronti degli immigrati? I nostri cittadini ne soffrono da tempo e non ce la

stanno legando con la società civile e quindi, senza appelli e rimorsi morali, purtroppo quasi impossibile da risolvere. E' una abitudine sempre colpa politica per chi? Fazio, con il governo Berlusconi, è stata l'Unione Paese occidentale ad opporsi ai due mesi che hanno provocato queste immensi e la nascita dell'Ucraina e quella alla Libia di Gheddafi. Sopperiamo, e paghiamo, tutto questo per questo ci dice della sinistra e della sinistra che ha fatto degli immigrati un problema? Ma che lo sanno loro chi sono gli italiani? Sono anni che con il loro politico, con il loro partito, con il loro partito che oggi è quello che abbiamo quotidianamente, in non ci sta a farci il servizio da questo governo. E' una sinistra che è un servizio al bene. Fazio, Papa Francesco, che ieri, dice non a caso, ha detto che «Dio è nel migriante che tagliava carota», «Dio, dice Gesù: Dio è con il migriante, perché non ha



CROCIATA SESSISTA

CAPICORONA IN VISTA

Perché per Renzi la ricreazione è finita

di **Stefano Mazzoni**

Per il governo Renzi la ricreazione è davvero finita. Lo stesso direttore da anni, ma adesso è decretato, con un decreto, è il caso di dire. Il caso è quello che ha fatto con una frase - quella della ricreazione - ebbene...

INSUBBIDIA TARDIVA

Fassino scopre il caos immigrati

di **Giuseppe Marino**

Ancora le elezioni, ancora i servizi, perché il fatto, la realtà è questa: l'Italia c'è un problema immigrazione. A cominciare dall'immigrazione irregolare e visto che il ministro di Torino Piero Fassino che, dopo anni, ha promesso «abbiamo permesso»...

CONTROCORRENTE

CONFORTO DELLE ANIME
 Migliaia di **reliqui** abbandonati sulle coste
 di **Giuseppe Sica**

■ Un'operazione di pulizia ambientale in alcune parti del mare per l'arrivo di una grande quantità di rifiuti...

FRAMILLA DI PROLETARI
 Il club dove si condividono pure i genitori
 di **Nino Martelli**

■ Si chiama oggi sharing ed è lo scambio di cose tra gruppi di amici che vogliono risparmiare...

MARILINA OROSCIA
 «Figlio di papà? Odio i debiti e gli sprechi»
 di **Antonio Fazio**

■ Da otto anni guida l'azienda Modetec, che ha fatto della cura spregiudicata del cliente...

Figure 15 Il Giornale front page from July 11, 2016.

Source: Agenzia di Stampa Nazionale (Dire), <http://www.dire.it/11-07-2016/64225-primipagine-quotidiani-11-luglio-2016/>.

But such pernicious claims to innocence conveniently neglect Europe's own complicity in enslavement—including the fifteenth century Mediterranean slave trade, and the Genoese bourgeoisie whose trade networks paved the way for the triangular transatlantic slave trade.⁷² Still, in the wake of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi's murder, I was confidently told by numerous white Italians in casual dinner conversation that Italy is not a racist country—and really, how could I *dare* to make such a brash claim when the police were gunning down my own people with impunity back home in the United States? Indeed, as Crystal Flemming has observed, the lack of available statistical data related to incidents of racist violence in most European countries has made it comparatively difficult for Black European communities to have their mobilizations against racism taken seriously by state authorities and their white co-nationals.⁷³

Alongside this denial of racism in Italy (which functions by way of bounded geographical comparisons and a methodological nationalism⁷⁴ that presumes nations to be hermetically sealed units) are almost-as-common assertions about Italy's status as a *meticcìa*, or hybrid/mixed nation⁷⁵—particularly among white leftists and self-proclaimed anti-racists. These assertions are by no means geographically delimited to southern Italy, as heard in the “*Bologna è meticcìa*” chants at an anti-Lega Nord demonstration in 2015,⁷⁶ or as seen in a 2016 program sponsored by the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage celebrating the artistic production of “hybrid Italians” in Milan.⁷⁷ In fact, one response to the political prominence of absolutist northern Italian identities over the last two decades (as evidenced most dramatically by the rise of the Lega Nord)⁷⁸ has been to re-appropriate discourses of Italian mixedness and hybridity, vaunting Italy's regional patchwork of dialects, cuisines, and local cultures to suggest that there can be ample room for immigrants and their families within this already-heterogeneous nation. But in practice, the aforementioned “hype of hybridity” has become a subtle form of Italian nationalism and even colonial nostalgia. It is a Mediterraneanism that constructs Italy as a crossroads of civilizations, a Hegelian center of World History that benefits from a more fluid and flexible approach to identity than the United States and its infamously restrictive rules of hypodescent.⁷⁹

For decades, in fact, apologist historians claimed (erroneously) that the frequent violations of fascist racial segregation laws in the colonies of Italian East Africa by Italian settlers could be interpreted as evidence of a widespread lack of racial prejudice on behalf of everyday white Italians.⁸⁰ And since World War II (largely due to the centrality of Italian communists in anti-fascist resistance and Third Worldist solidarity movements⁸¹), many white Italians have come to view themselves as inherently opposed to racism, which is in turn understood as “hostility, violence, or intolerance directed against culturally and physically different populations.”⁸² The concept of institutional or structural racism is still relatively obscure in Italy (if explained, it would likely conjure images of Jim Crow segregation or South African apartheid), though it has gained some traction since Clelia Bartoli's publication of *Razzisti per legge* [*Racists by law*] in 2012.⁸³

It is important to remember, however, that the imaginary of the United States as the foil to a more tolerant or racially fluid Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the Italian fascist regime, for instance, the United States was commonly represented as a place where dangerous forms of racial intermingling took place. A 1941 issue of the popular fascist magazine *La difesa della razza*, for instance, printed an unflattering picture of New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia (the son of a white Italian father and a Jewish mother, though in the caption he is referred to only as “the Jew La Guardia”) eating a hotdog next to a Black woman as a “spectacle” of degeneration and vulgar interracial fraternizing.



Figure 16 Page of the fascist Italian magazine *Difesa della Razza* (1941) showing New York major Fiorello La Guardia eating next to a Black American woman.

Source: University of Turin, Department of Biology; Giuseppe Marro archive: "Marro G. Questione Razziale."

But even today, Italy's regional diversity, the history of internal North/South differentiation, and new state-sponsored research on the country's genetic-ethnic-linguistic diversity (discussed in Chapter Two) are marshaled as evidence that racial categories are simply less calcified in Italy than they are in the United States. The problem of bounding "race" as a concept that is territorialized in specific places (even when this is the unintended result of leftist European solidarity with Black liberation movements in the United States, as Sabine Broeck discusses in the context of 1970s West Germany⁸⁴), however, is that it has helped to stymie the development of critical conversations about racism's existence *within* Europe. It is perhaps for this reason that so many of my interlocutors in Italy, Black or white, would unfailingly ask me to weigh in on the same question: "Which country is more racist, the United States or Italy?"—subtly nudging me to concede that American racism is more crude or violent in comparison with the Italian tendency toward *chiusura*, or close-mindedness.

In Italy, appeals to a sort of universal, colorblind hybridity have as their main consequence the invisibilization of the specificities (and historical sedimentations) of anti-Black violence. Even after the murder of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi, a clear, explicit case of Italian anti-Blackness if ever there was one, I saw signs that read, "We are all evolved apes" (remember that his wife was called an African monkey) and protesters declaring, "We are all Africans!" One widely circulated commentary even claimed that the most disturbing aspect of the murder was not "the death of a human being...but the death of the human inside us all."⁸⁵

From the Black Atlantic to the Black Mediterranean

Given all this, how are young Afro-descendants to articulate their distinct Black Italian political subjectivities⁸⁶ without denying the existence of racism in Italy, neglecting the global scale of anti-Blackness and racial formation, or falling victim to an overly romanticized vision of Mediterraneanism or multicultural mixing? After all, in Italy we have to take seriously the histories of racial boundary drawing that were caught up with the process of national unification, as well as Italy's own colonial history (all of which, significantly, *preceded* the rise of fascism)—and the reverberations of these histories in the present. Indeed, drawing on Stuart Hall's own engagement with Antonio Gramsci, it forces us to acknowledge the existence of multiple, geographically and historically situated—yet deeply interconnected—racisms.⁸⁷ And actually, I would argue that the link across time and space between Gramsci and Hall is one powerful example of how a rich body of scholarship on racism from Britain (and the United States) can be deployed transgressively⁸⁸ to challenge the colorblind logics that dominate continental Europe, while also recognizing the particular racial formations that have "settled" in Italy. Even though Hall claimed that "Gramsci did not write about race, ethnicity or racism in their contemporary meanings or manifestations,"⁸⁹ Pasquale Verdicchio notes that Gramsci was actually quite attuned to these questions precisely because Italy's "Southern Question" had already been cast in terms of an immutable, de-historicized racial and ethnic difference.⁹⁰

As I noted earlier in this chapter, the question of how to engage an Anglophone analytic vocabulary of racism in Europe is a central concern for both Black European studies and for the practice of organizing against anti-Black violence in Europe. Fatima El-Tayeb notes that one tendency among European scholars has been to take as a matter of fact the silence surrounding "race" in Europe and suggest that any invocation of race as a category of social analysis is mere "U.S. cultural imperialism."⁹¹ Instead of such a wholesale rejection, she argues, what is necessary is a "contextualized understanding" of processes of racialization.⁹² For this, she turns to David Theo Goldberg's concept of *racial regionalizations*⁹³ and specifically, *racial*

europeanization. Goldberg argues that racist configurations in Europe show the limitations of an “incessant focus on the logics of unqualifiedly racially repressives case such as the US.”⁹⁴ This is not because “race” as such does not exist in Europe, but rather because the “European experience is a case study in the frustrations, delimitations, and injustices of political racelessness.”⁹⁵

Goldberg argues that these distinct yet interrelated racist configurations derive from “their embeddedness, from the particularities that count for socio-specific determinations”⁹⁶—a claim that echoes Hall’s insistence on the way general features of racism are “modified and transformed by the historical specificity of the contexts and environments in which they become active.”⁹⁷ Here, I want to suggest the importance of thinking not just in terms of racial *europeanization*, but also of the Mediterranean and southern Europe specifically. This is not to endlessly subdivide the world into self-contained analytical categories (a problem with many “polyracism”⁹⁸ arguments), but rather to recognize the contours of racism and its denial in a region that has been either vaunted or denigrated as ethnically mixed or culturally plural.

This is where, I believe, emerging work on the Black Mediterranean can be instructive. Today, scholars such as Alessandra di Maio⁹⁹ argue, the Black Mediterranean is no longer just a precondition for modern racial capitalism; it is being reproduced everyday at the nexus of anti-Black violence (seen in immigration policy, citizenship law, and everyday racisms) and Black liberation struggles across the Mediterranean basin. New research in comparative literature, Italian studies, sociology, Black studies, and geography is engaging with the production of Blackness and Black subjectivities in the Mediterranean; the erasure of Black histories and dense networks of cultural exchange linking Africa and Europe; the distinct contours of Black life in the Mediterranean; and the practices by which African diasporas in Italy engage with and expand the circuits of global Blackness. Khalil Saucier and Tryon Woods, for instance, mark the histories of racial violence and anti-Blackness in the Mediterranean basin as conditions of possibility for “contemporary forms of policing Europe’s borders.”¹⁰⁰ Timothy Raeymaekers has in turn approached the Black Mediterranean as a fluid landscape of “overlapping and often contradictory histories of mobility and exchange”¹⁰¹ that produce differentiated regimes of labor.

But academia is by no means a privileged site of knowledge production on the Black Mediterranean. Black Italian artists such as writers Igiaba Scego and Gabriella Ghermandi, and documentarians Medhin Paolos (whose work will be discussed in Chapter Five) and Fred Kuwornu (whose work was highlighted in Chapter One) have all articulated sophisticated analyses of Blackness through Mediterranean crosscurrents via the arts. Following the powerful exhortations of Black activists in Italy, these contemporary engagements with the Black Mediterranean provide an emergent framework for foregrounding the interconnections between Italy and Africa without privileging romantic images of unfettered mobility and conviviality. They also serve as powerful examples for how to link Italy to a wider Black diaspora without privileging the Atlantic as uniquely generative of Black diasporic cultures.

The Mediterranean admittedly might seem like an odd geographic referent to employ in light of the fact that most people of African descent still live in the northern half of Italy,¹⁰² and especially when southern Italy is the region traditionally associated with “Mediterranean culture.” I would argue, however, that the Mediterranean (and the Black Mediterranean specifically) is still conceptually relevant for several reasons: because of the way imaginaries and discourses of Mediterranean difference shaped Italian race-thinking in ways that distinguish it from northern Europe; because of the enduring transmediterranean legacies of Italian colonialism; because the large-scale internal labor migration of southern Italians into northern Italian cities after World War II has helped to blur sharp divisions between the two regions;

because the journeys of Africans into Italy are in most cases transmediterranean and postcolonial rather than transatlantic and tied to enslavement; and because tracing these historic and contemporary transmediterranean connections can challenge the ethnic absolutism inherent within dominant narrations of the origins of Italy and Europe.

***Traddutore, Traditore*¹⁰³: Translating Black Italy**

The Black Mediterranean elucidates two urgent questions for the study of an emergent Black Italy: What is unique about the crosscurrents that produce transmediterranean racial formations? And how are they at once distinct from, but also in intimate conversation, with transatlantic diasporic formations? These questions certainly pose interesting intellectual puzzles, but what does it mean to engage them *practically*? The young activists, artists, and entrepreneurs I spoke with in Italy repeatedly asserted that the problem ultimately came down to one of language. As Evelyne told me the very first time we met, “It seems stupid, but vocabulary is really important. In the Italian dictionary, these terms don’t exist. I think that we have to invent, we have to Italianize, we have to find terms—even in dialect.” The lack of an Italian vocabulary that could address the specificities of racism was a lament I that heard frequently, as was a concern that the only terms of collective self-identification available (*Afro-Italian*, *Black Italian*, etc.) were “just copied” from other contexts with different Black histories. Karima 2G, an Italian-Liberian rapper based in Rome who is perhaps best known for an ironic music video (“Orangutan”) parodying the racist taunts against Cécile Kyenge, phrased the challenges facing Black youth this way:

I think that at the historical level, the United States has endured an entire journey, so there have been lots of movements, whereas in Italy there is nothing. So we still need time, at least 50 years. But I am trying to study in order to try and understand which terms have been used in the African American movements, so that I can bring them here to Italy. I think that one term I would start to use is *diaspora*. I think that, yes, we have to build our own language, but we can also take it from other cultures that have already arrived at some solutions, some changes... We need terms here that are stronger, proud, constructive, positive.

I observed a similar conversation between two Italian-Ghanaian friends from Verona about the limited available terms of self-identification in Italy. Esther and Marcus¹⁰⁴ were notably less optimistic about the usefulness or relevance of the Black American experience, however:

Esther: Well, I am afraid that these associations of “new Italians”¹⁰⁵ always focus on the word *Italian* and less on the concept of double identity. That is what is happening: there is an assimilationist model. And so those who were born without citizenship, they say we are Italian, *punto*, to affirm themselves in the society. [Young people] don’t think about “Black Americans,” “Black Italians.” A person born here will say “Italian,” but they will not say “African,” so that they can be accepted. A person born here can’t accept having a double identity... But I say that I am Afro-Italian. It is a passage that still has to happen for the new generations in these movements and associations about citizenship and about identity.

Marcus: I don’t think that you can use the term “Black Italians.” It is not correct. There is the Italian context; it is not the American context. In America, you can say “Black

American.” It makes sense, because the society was born in a particular way. But here, it was born in a different way... We need to use the correct terms; we have to look at reality with different filters. If you look at the Italian reality with American filters, then it is difficult to understand. I have seen that in America, if you’ll allow me, you even have difficulty defining what Blackness is among yourselves! So if you, who are the experts with this term, have problems, then let’s leave it there and *ciao*.

In *The Practice of Diaspora*, cultural historian Brent Hayes Edwards suggests that translating even “a basic grammar of blackness”¹⁰⁶ posed a key obstacle for the development of Black internationalist movements during the interwar period. Thus, while the turn to an expansive sense of shared Black struggle had the potential to challenge restrictive nation-state borders, practical efforts to articulate this sort of tenuous unity often foundered on those very same boundaries. Edwards’ magisterial work suggests that language is not an abstraction, but is instead drawn from concrete experience and in turn shapes a group’s available political horizons. For that reason, the politics of translation provide a privileged vantage point from which to observe the cultures and disjunctures of Black diasporic politics. Even the process of documenting the “fact of Blackness”—and by extension, centering “race” as an important node of insurgent knowledge production—Edwards writes, can be deeply contentious.¹⁰⁷

What, then, can collective Black antiracist organizing in Italy look like when Italian does not have a readily available translation for the word *Blackness* (the closest substitute is *negritudine*,¹⁰⁸ which refers more to the Francophone literary movement initiated by Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor, and Léon Damas); or when use of the word “race” is still generally publicly unacceptable and the term *di colore* [of color] is employed to avoid race rather than to express solidarity among ethnically marginalized groups; or even when self-identification as *Black* or *Afro-Italian* can be a controversial matter? One need only to remember the shock and surprise that reverberated through the national Italian press when Cécile Kyenge publicly declared, “*Sono nera, non di colore, e lo dico con fierezza*” [“I am Black, not ‘of color,’ and I say it with pride”].¹⁰⁹

These were the questions that Evelyne and Imani¹¹⁰ posed to me during the 2016 Black Europe Summer School in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, a two-week program that we all attended together. After meeting Black activists from countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, and reading Black diasporic texts from even further afield, they approached me both heartened and deeply distressed. “We need to translate these texts into Italian,” Evelyne said with great urgency. “This language doesn’t exist in Italian; people who want to talk about these topics use English words, and so we need to construct this groundwork together.”

With these concerns in mind, we collectively hatched a plan: we would translate a selection of chapters from books we found particularly inspiring, post our “guerilla translations” on the Internet, and bring together young Black Italians to share their experiences and reflect upon the readings. Our group quickly expanded from three, to six, to ten, to twenty collaborators, most of whom identified in some way as Afro-descendant Italians—from founders of national advocacy organizations to internationally recognized bloggers; from fashion designers to medical students. Our collective included young people with ties to Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Uganda, as well as individuals of mixed backgrounds like myself. After much deliberation, we settled on three texts: the introduction to *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*,¹¹¹ James Baldwin’s “Stranger in the Village,”¹¹² and some selections from Grada Kilomba’s wrenching *Plantation Memories: Episodes of Everyday Racism*.¹¹³

Beforehand, Marcus sent the group a set of provocative guiding questions: Is the idea of “Afro-Italians” an Afro-Americanization of the circumstances in Italy? How can we focus attention on the experiences of Afro-descendant women in Italy? How can we think about the connection between a “global Blackness” and the specificities of the situation in Italy? He signed off his message with a quote by the Afro-German poet May Ayim (formerly Sylvia Opitz), written in 1995: “It is important that we as Black people create spaces in which we can be among ‘ourselves,’ in order to comprehend our commonalities and differences, to exploit them in our everyday lives and political work. But also...to create some moments of relaxation and release for ourselves.” Marcus’ use of the Ayim quote gestured toward the second, unstated purpose of our gathering: to create a new kind of Black space¹¹⁴ for an “emergent Black Italia”¹¹⁵ that does not have a singular geographical referent, but rather emerges from within the interstices of everyday life. And in many ways, our modest project did in fact draw indirect inspiration from the work of Audre Lorde and Afro-German writers such as May Ayim in the 1980s and 1990s, when they began to “organize as a community and...define their multiple biracial identities.”¹¹⁶

Finally, one chilly evening in December, we gathered at Daniel’s apartment near the Basilica di Sant’Ambrogio in Milan. To our surprise, people had arrived for the meeting from across Italy—from northern cities such as Verona and Padova, from Rome, and even from as far south as Palermo. Daniel cued up a smooth playlist of jazz and R&B as we picked at chocolates, poured ourselves ample glasses of wine, and sprawled across the tiled floor of his painstakingly appointed, lofted apartment. We were mindful of the time because the rapper Tommy Kuti, our beloved Italian-Nigerian “hometown hero” from nearby Brescia, would be stopping by later in the evening to film scenes of the group for his new music video (aptly entitled “#AFROITALIANO”). After Daniel formally welcomed us all to his home, and Marcus recapped our project and the discussion questions, our conversation quickly turned from a more academic reflection on the translated readings to a heated exchange about a different kind of translation—specifically, the possibility of articulating a collective “Black” identity in Italy:

Almaz: It makes sense that in a particular moment, a person or a group of people might choose to organize around a particular term—in that case, it has a use, and that use can change over time—like the term “second generation.” If you want to historicize things, then yes, there have been many migrations of Africans into Italy, but in our times this term serves a purpose. But there can be a forced correlation with some terms, for instance, with the movements of African Americans. If you look on paper, yes, we are Italian, and we are also African. But it’s a generalization. We also belong to specific communities.

Marcus: I don’t often use “Afro-Italian” to define myself.

Almaz: I do, for simplicity’s sake.

Marcus: There’s also the matter of general belonging, and also of pride.

Almaz: That’s true. I grew up in Milan. I remember when you would say “hi” to someone from across the street because they were Afro “something.” But with these new groups like “Black Italians,”¹¹⁷ I feel the need to push harder, to do some more specific research. These general terms aren’t sufficient anymore. Looking at African Americans is okay,

but what about histories of colonialism, in order to understand an Afro-Italian identity? I'm not worried about fragmentation—we've already seen this happen with the Senegalese community.

Daniel: But I'm Italian-Senegalese-Gambian. So I've never had a specific "community" that I am a part of. It's important to find points of commonality...Our generation has a language that is not based on our own experiences, but on borrowings from other places.

Imani: I've never liked the term Afro-Italian...I have a lot of Afro-descendant friends—Senegalese, Nigerians—but they are all very different. I've never seen this sentiment of "Africa United." The only thing they have in common is that they are Italian—but then that valorizes the Italian part and not the Senegalese or Nigerian part. Holding the African American myth on a pedestal takes you away from Italian history. There is an Italian colonial history! We have to study it, to focus on that.

Camilla: Yes, it's important to think about these colonial legacies. And also about histories of racism in Italy, to combat the idea that there is no racism in Italy. But it seems like there is a tension here between our different individual self-identifications, and a shared experience of being "racialized" as Black by a white supremacist society.

Marcus: Some people use "Afro-Italian" to copy Americans, sure. But I don't really see it as trying to emulate them. It's just about finding a common identity. An Ivorian girl and an Angolan girl *do* have something in common; they have similar experiences.

Daniel: There are two inflections to this conversation: self-identification, and the external gaze. I'm comfortable with all of these terms. It's like a hat—I can choose which one I want to put on everyday. I feel profoundly Afro-Italian; I feel profoundly Black Italian; I feel Italian; I feel white European; and so on. All these things can co-exist. The possibility we have is to not accept a basic framework of dichotomy (either/or). We have to find a form of self-identification we can all share, and from there build a sense of community amongst ourselves.

Eventually, tensions cooled as more bottles of full-bodied wine were circulated among the group. Several hours later, the night ended in dancing, singing, and teary-eyed goodbyes. The words of a Black American Fulbright scholar from Bologna who came to participate in the discussion echoed in my mind as I rode the metro home: "When I hear people share their stories, despite the differences, there is *still* something we all have in common." She was referring specifically to Evelyne, and the way in which her highly publicized journey of self-acceptance through natural hair resonated with her own struggles against racialized beauty standards in the United States. So, not only could we begin to think of Black Italy as a distinct cultural formation with its own history, languages, and politics, the young scholar seemed to suggest—it was also beginning to emerge as a rich source of diasporic resources that it could in turn share with Black America, one of the primary cultural beacons of global Blackness.

The task of articulating a shared sense of Blackness in Italy is already underway, despite the profound tensions inherent in this project—tensions that became particularly visible that long evening at Daniel's apartment. One need look no further than to the proliferation of blogs and

books and songs and activist collectives addressing “Afro-” or “Black Italian” identity, or to the way that incidents like the murder of Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi force individuals with disparate lived experiences into an uneasy solidarity with one another and with worldwide Black communities as a matter of survival. It is a project of mapping the lived geographies of the ever-shifting Black Mediterranean—of re-mapping the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in Italy.

Incorporating Blackness, or, the Perils of Representation

As a generation of young Black activists seeks to assert itself, gain national visibility, combat Italian racism, and acquire legitimacy as Italians by birth *who are also Black*, how do their efforts in turn affect the newly arrived in Italy, including those Nigerian and Eritrean refugees who are landing on Italian shores each day? In their attempts to de-racialize or broaden the dominant definitions of Italianness, after all, they must first define *what it means to be Italian* and hence, which forms of Blackness can be effectively incorporated into the nation. As Gaia Giuliani writes, drawing on the work of Fatimah Tobing Rony:

In Italy the white gaze has an anthropophagic posture which turns it into a “scopic regime” that, while producing some subjects as racialized, includes them within the “colour line” that marks the boundaries of the imagined space of whiteness. To be included within the imagined (racialized) community of the Nation, these subjects need to be transformed in appropriable objects.¹¹⁸

In other words, even as young Black Italians push on the boundaries of who “counts” as an Italian by challenging the racism structurally embedded within the Italian nation-state, they may also become complicit in the stabilization of representations and practices of Italianness. This will likely have significant, yet unintentional, consequences for the ongoing Mediterranean refugee crisis. Such is the double bind of national citizenship and recognition, as discussed earlier in Chapter One.

This is the bleak socio-political backdrop that frames the new attempts by Black youth to challenge the inherent racial exclusions of “Italianness.” Black Italians are deploying a complex and multifaceted arsenal of strategies that include practices like entrepreneurship, ideas such as the sedentarist logics of birthplace, and diasporic resources such as Black American lexicons of struggle in order to legitimate their presence in Italy and demonstrate their worthiness as citizens-in-waiting. These various strategies must be situated in the context of an Italy where Blackness is represented by politicians and mainstream media alike as a drain on welfare and state resources. In the chapter that follows, I will discuss the burgeoning world of young Black women’s entrepreneurship in Italy, and the way that ethnically-oriented business activities can be understood, paradoxically, both as claims to Italian citizenship via economic productivity and as attempts to re-orient the power-laden relationship between Italy and Africa.

¹ A earlier version of this chapter appeared as an article in *Transition* 123 (2017): 152-174 as “In Search of Black Italia: Notes on Race, Belonging, and Activism in the Black Mediterranean.” This chapter is included in accordance with the copyright agreement signed by the Author for *Transition*.

² Carter, “Blackness Over Europe: Meditations on Cultural Belonging,” 204.

³ Igiaba Scego, *La mia casa è dove sono* (Turin: Loescher, 2012).

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- ⁴ Marilena Umuhoza Delli, *Razzismo All'italiana* (Milan: Arcane Editrice, 2016).
- ⁵ The woman's reaction echoes an observation recorded by anthropologist Jeffrey Cole in his book *The New Racism in Europe: A Sicilian Ethnography* (1997, 101), when a Sicilian professor declared, "We can't be racist because we've been emigrants for so long!"
- ⁶ Wekker, *White Innocence*, 17; Philomena Essed and Isabel Hoving, *Dutch Racism* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014).
- ⁷ Sebastian Weier, "Consider Afro-Pessimism," *Amerikastudien* 59, no. 3 (2014): 421.
- ⁸ Raeymaekers, "Working the Black Mediterranean."
- ⁹ Robin D. G. Kelley and Cedric J. Robinson, "Foreward," in *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (1983; repr., Chapel Hill: Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005), xiv.
- ¹⁰ Chambers, *Mediterranean Crossings*, 137.
- ¹¹ "The Black Mediterranean and the Migrant Crisis," Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK, November 9, 2016.
- ¹² Proglgio, "Is the Mediterranean a White Italian-European Sea?," 6.
- ¹³ Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*.
- ¹⁴ Sir Halford John Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (New York: H. Holt, 1919).
- ¹⁵ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
- ¹⁶ Gabriele Proglgio, ed., *Decolonizing the Mediterranean* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), ix.
- ¹⁷ Raeymaekers, "The Racial Geography of the Black Mediterranean."
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- ¹⁹ Camilla Hawthorne and Pina Piccolo, "'Razza' e 'Umano' Non Sono Termini Banali," *Frontiere News*, July 26, 2016, <http://frontierenews.it/2016/07/razza-e-umano-non-sono-termini-banali/>.
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- ²³ Maurice Stierl, "Contestations in Death – the Role of Grief in Migration Struggles," *Citizenship Studies* 20, no. 2 (2016): 173, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2015.1132571>.
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- ²⁷ "Nigerian Man Beaten to Death in Racist Attack," *Vatican News*, July 7, 2016, http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2016/07/07/nigerian_man_beaten_to_death_in_racist_attack/1242717.
- ²⁸ I use the phrase "Black body" deliberately in this particular instance to mark the inherent dehumanization of the racializing (or, to borrow Fanonian terminology, epidermalizing) gaze.
- ²⁹ "Fermo, Matteo Salvini: 'Prego per Emmanuel, Non Doveva Morire. L'immigrazione Non Porta Nulla Di Buono,'" *L'Huffington Post*, July 7, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2016/07/07/salvini-emmanuel_n_10854424.html.
- ³⁰ I will explore this division further in Chapter Five.
- ³¹ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952; repr., New York: Grove Press, 2008), 89.
- ³² Portelli, "The Problem of the Color Blind: Notes on the Discourse of Race in Italy," 30.

- ³³ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, xii.
- ³⁴ Merrill, *An Alliance Of Women*, xxi.
- ³⁵ Kate Hepworth and Olivia Hamilton, "'Let Me Stay Home.' Apparetenenza, Luogo e Giovani Di Seconda Generazione in Italia," *Studi Culturali* 11, no. 3 (2014): 493–509.
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- ⁴² Marvely Goma Perseverance, "Lettera Aperta Di Marvely Goma Perseverance per Abba Ed Emmanuel," *GRIOT*, July 9, 2016, <http://griotmag.com/it/lettera-marvely-goma-perseverance-abba-ed-emmanuel/>.
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- ⁴⁸ Facebook post, July 26, 2016 (accessed July 26, 2016).
- ⁴⁹ Emphasis added.
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- ¹⁰¹ Timothy Raeymaekers, "Introduction Europe's Bleeding Border and the Mediterranean as a Relational Space," *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies* 13, no. 2 (2014): 168.
- ¹⁰² This demographic balance is already beginning to shift toward southern Italy with the most recent refugee "emergency" and the insertion of irregular migrants into the informal or "black" economies of southern Italian agriculture and construction. This will be addressed further in the Conclusion.
- ¹⁰³ The title of this section is indebted to Norma Alarcón's 1989 article "Traddutora, Traditora: A Paradigmatic Figure of Chicana Feminism," and to her discussion of linguistic mediation as a potential act of betrayal.
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Chapter Four

Race, Reproduction, and the “Crisis” of Made in Italy

“We...have to define political and social action in different terms, and consider talented, deserving foreigners on the basis of an ethical foundation and a collective need. [...] Our system of production is incapable of taking up the challenges of globalization and transforming the human capital available to it into added value. Are we merely shortsighted, or have we no vision for the future?”¹

“Attention to capitalism as a mediating force in social relations demonstrates how blackness is simultaneously differentiated and celebrated.”²

Spatial Imaginaries of “Afro” Fashion

On July 4, 2016, a group of about thirty fashion designers, stylists, photographers, and journalists gathered in a modern, minimalist event space in southwest Milan. It was a swelteringly hot and humid day, and the slightly pungent odor of a nearby canal lingered in the air, yet the effortless chic of the crowd somehow remained unaffected. Inside the spotless space, bartenders clad in shoulder straps served sparkling waters, statuesque models practiced their catwalks, designers made last-minute adjustments to garments, and photographers lay in wait to snap candid photos. Dressed in a simple black sheath dress and disheveled from the heat and the crowded metro ride that brought me to this remote corner of the city, I was unsuccessful in my half-hearted attempt to blend in with the high-fashion crowd. After retrieving a glass of ice water and calming my nerves, I located an inconspicuous seat toward the back of the room, pulled out my notebook, and waited for the fashion show to start.

This was a preview event organized by the AFRO Fashion Association, founded in 2015 by journalist and activist Michelle Ngomno and obstetrician and fashion designer Ruth McCarthy.³ The following year, Michelle, an Italian-Cameroonian raised in Ferrara, and Ruth, an Italian-Ghanaian raised in Seregno, would use the momentum of this capsule event to launch the first-ever Afro Fashion Week in Milan, the world’s fashion capital. Once the invited guests finished making their way indoors, Ruth took her place at the top of the impromptu catwalk. Despite her petite frame, she dominated the room in her uniform of towering heels, red sheath dress, turban, and oversized black glasses. As the low throb of background techno music died down, she greeted the gathered crowd and explained her philosophy of Afro fashion. The passion and urgency in her voice was palpable:

Our goal is to promote a new culture, something we call “Afro.” We are in a disastrous cultural and political situation right now, with immigration and the plight of the *extracomunitari* [non-European Union immigrants]. This is the right time for this project, because fashion is not just a dress that you wear, a bag you carry, or a shoe you put on. Through fashion, we can show Italy the beauty of a new culture,

“Afro”: a marriage of colors, scents, and patterns that are African, with the style and elegance that are the special touch of Italian culture.

Ruth’s emotional introduction to the fashion show represented one of many concurrent attempts to reframe Italian imaginaries of Africa in direct response to the ongoing southern European refugee crisis. Rather than desperation and abjection, the vision of “Africanness” invoked by the AFRO Fashion Association was characterized by a colorful and happy hybridity that, as a collateral benefit, could also awaken a moribund Italian economy from its slumber. Instead of images of drowning refugees, Ruth conjured a continent full of brightly patterned fabrics and rich creative traditions—a continent whose European-raised children could marshal their spatially extended “Afropolitan”⁴ networks and fluency in multiple languages to revitalize the storied tradition of “Made in Italy.”

Michelle and Ruth’s AFRO Fashion initiative is one example of a broader trend of Black Italian women’s cultural entrepreneurship in Italy. These varied projects, which have gained significant momentum and visibility during the last five years, have allowed for the advancement of alternative images of Blackness, and specifically Black womanhood, in Italy that depart from more ubiquitous tragic or sensationalized media narratives. They have also enabled many women to achieve a relative degree of economic independence, which has in turn afforded them the possibility of engaging in political causes related to the rights of immigrants and their families. Entrepreneurship has therefore provided a limited opening for many Black Italian women to articulate claims to citizenship and belonging in Italy at a time marked by economic stagnation and increasingly virulent xenophobia and racism. Nonetheless, these efforts also risk cooptation when discourses linking economic productivity and citizenship begin to adopt the same language of the Italian racial-capitalist state—specifically, that the precarious inclusion of Black subjects in Italy is predicated on the extent to which they can serve as laboring bodies for the good of an Italian “common culture.”⁵



Figure 17 Models circle the runway during the AFRO Fashion preview event in Milan.

Source: Author.

Engaging Black Italian Women's Entrepreneurship

This chapter focuses on the explosion of projects in northern Italy in the last five years related to Black beauty, style, and (natural) hair care, drawing on ethnographic interviews and participant observation conducted with Black Italian businesswomen and cultural entrepreneurs. Theirs are inherently *spatial* entrepreneurial projects that draw on economic and cultural connections both to specific African countries and to a broader set of circulating Black diasporic cultural, economic, and political resources. These entrepreneurial projects have become strategies both for the fashioning of individual and community livelihoods, and for the advancement of new narratives about Black life and its possible inclusion within the symbolic boundaries of Italy. Indeed, Black women's entrepreneurship represents a significant outgrowth (and is also one of the most widely publicized dimensions) of the emerging "Black Italian" movement that was introduced in Chapter Three.

What I will suggest through this investigation of Black Italian women's entrepreneurship is that the supposed crisis of "Made in Italy" (in other words, the oft-invoked decline of traditional Italian industries and trades) cannot be understood separately from unfolding debates about citizenship, migration, and the symbolic and material boundaries of the Italian nation. Following the work of scholars such as Janet MacGaffey and Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga⁶ and Jovan Scott Lewis,⁷ it is necessary to examine the ways in which the cultural politics of Blackness articulate with conditions of precarity and practices of economic survival—in all of their complexity and political ambiguity. As tensions about *who* can truly "belong" in the Italian nation reach a fever pitch in the context of debates about the expansion of citizenship rights and the resettlement of refugees, Black Italian youth continue to be regarded as illegitimate members of the national community, and African refugees are treated as complete outcasts. This is the sociopolitical context in which Black Italian entrepreneurs are seeking to intervene.

Black Italian women's entrepreneurship represents one example of the ways in which the boundaries of Italy and "Italianness" are being contested and renegotiated across contemporary Italy. As I will demonstrate below, Black Italians are using entrepreneurship in the creative industries to build a new, diasporic sense of Italianness that unites traditional Italian aesthetic sensibilities and practices with cultural influences drawn from the global Black diaspora.⁸ In doing so, they are positioning themselves in relation to the world-famous "Made in Italy" national brand, expanding the definition of *who* and *what* is made in Italy today. It is for this reason that many entrepreneurs see aesthetics and cultural creativity as potent forms of spatial politics tied to struggles for recognition and citizenship in Italy.

Writing about "African American beauty culturalists"⁹ during the civil rights movement in the United States, multiple scholars have pointed to the tensions that arose in the 1960s between Black pride and capitalism. For instance, while many Black women salon owners did not see a contradiction between making money and promoting social causes, other activists contested what they saw as the gradual "commercialization" of natural hair.¹⁰ Similar issues face Black Italian entrepreneurs today as they work against the backdrop of "a racialized geographical discourse of... absolutist identity"¹¹ that has been exacerbated by economic stagnation and a refugee "crisis" in Italy. It is thus urgent to consider what kinds of Black subjects might be included and who might be further marginalized when efforts to advocate for inclusion within the racial-capitalist state are (intentionally or unintentionally) linked to discourses of economic productivity or cosmopolitan ingenuity.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the racial and gendered politics of economic productivity in contemporary post-Fordist Italy, focusing on how discourses of economic

stagnation and precarity have become entangled with debates about immigration and citizenship. I then engage scholarship on neoliberal citizenship and racial capitalism to analyze the layered social and political meanings of “Made in Italy” and Black Italian entrepreneurs’ diasporic re-interpretations of this national Italian symbol. Social and cultural geographies of immigration, ethnic business, and spatial segregation, I will suggest, provide useful insights into the ways that entrepreneurial activities often become part of a repertoire of strategies for surviving and resisting nationalist exclusion. In the subsequent section, I tell the stories of a group of Black Italian “natural hair” entrepreneurs, analyzing both the feminist diasporic politics they ascribe to their initiatives and the (sometimes incongruous) ways their projects have been re-interpreted by Italian media and politicians. I conclude by considering the dangers of a political strategy that inadvertently draws new distinctions between “productive” Black citizens-in-waiting and “unproductive” Black refugees.

Race, Citizenship, and the Politics of Productivity in Italy

Economic activity in general and entrepreneurship in the so-called “creative industries” in particular have emerged as key sites where ideas about Blackness, citizenship, and belonging are currently being articulated and contested by young Afro-descendants who were born or raised in Italy. Indeed, it is significant to note that conversations about who “counts” as an Italian do not always occur within the sphere of more traditional, collective forms of political activism. Indeed, what is often lamented by Italian social commentators as a general de-politicization and individualization of youth tied to rampant consumerism and systematic attacks on trade unions in Italy since the 1970s¹² should also be understood as an expression of profound frustration with the paternalism and many neoliberal compromises of the contemporary Italian Left.

The post-Fordist economy of northern Italy since the 1970s, as described by Heather Merrill, was characterized by strategies of flexible accumulation that included the deployment of new technologies, implementation of modular systems, and contracting to smaller firms.¹³ The increasing flexibilization of labor translated into the hiring of migrant workers from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia to fill increasingly precarious and often informal roles in Italian manufacturing.¹⁴ More recently, however, de-industrialization in Italy has led to the widespread closure of large factories and their gradual repurposing into apartments, concert venues, galleries, university buildings, and high-tech developments.¹⁵ The current conjuncture in Italy is further complicated by economic stagnation and austerity, the on-going Mediterranean refugee “crisis,” and the growing influence of far-right, explicitly xenophobic political parties.

At this same moment (and as described in Chapter One), the Italian-born and -raised children of immigrants are mobilizing for a reform of Italian citizenship law toward *jus soli* citizenship. But resistance in Italy to the legal and de-facto recognition of the children of immigrants is frequently framed in terms of economic drain—in a telling statement, Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori lamented in 2013 that *jus soli* would be “a disaster in a country with high unemployment.”¹⁶ In other words, immigrants, refugees, and their children are seen as diverting state resources such as welfare and taking jobs that should be the sole entitlement of “native” (i.e., *white*) Italians. Examples of this include the mainstream media-fueled national outrage over the supposed 35 Euros per day allotted to refugees and asylum seekers in Italy—in reality, they are disbursed about 2.50 Euros per day of “pocket money,”¹⁷ or the case of the Northern League parliamentarian who donned blackface to protest “hand-outs” supposedly given to Black immigrants.¹⁸ One jaw-droppingly absurd moment illuminated this undifferentiated association of Blackness with national economic drain: In August of 2017, a

photo began to circulate of Black American actor Samuel L. Jackson and Black American basketball player Magic Johnson resting on a bench after a day of shopping at high-end stores in Tuscany. As the photo made the rounds on Facebook and Twitter, countless outraged Italian commentators mistook Jackson and Johnson for refugees who were allegedly spending their 35 Euros on extravagant shopping sprees in Italy.¹⁹



Figure 18 The meme of Samuel L. Jackson (left) and Magic Johnson (right). The text reads “Boldrini’s resources at Forte Dei Marmi / Shopping at Prada with their 35 Euros. Share if you are outraged!” Laura Boldrini, former President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, has faced harsh criticism from the Right for her relatively progressive stance toward immigration policy in Italy. While the creator of this meme (which was seen and shared by thousands of Italians in a span of hours), admits that it was originally intended to be a joke, he later remarked that “40 percent of people understood the provocation, [and] 30 percent were outraged...”

Source: Maya Oppenheim, “Samuel L Jackson and Magic Johnson Mistaken for ‘Lazy Migrants’ by Italians after Shopping in Tuscany,” *Independent*, 21 August 2017, <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/samuel-l-jackson-magic-johnson-lazy-migrants-italy-tuscany-for-te-dei-marmi-louis-vuitton-a7905026.html>.

This phenomenon can be understood as a symptom of what David Theo Goldberg has characterized as “racial neoliberalism.”²⁰ Under racial neoliberalism, Goldberg argues, the welfare state—understood to be no longer serving its “intended” constituency of white citizens at a time when the demographic makeup of Western states is becoming increasingly diverse²¹—is gradually dismantled in favor of color-blind social and economic policies.²² One consequence of this shift is that people of color, regardless of their citizenship status, are regarded as illegitimate recipients of public benefits. Arguably, this phenomenon is exaggerated in the case of the Italian state, where social assistance programs have long lagged far behind their northern European counterparts and the responsibility for care is systematically devolved to the level of the individual family.²³ In the context of Italian welfare state, the stereotype of the non-productive refugee has proven to be a convenient political and economic scapegoat. This situation is especially pronounced for young Black Italians (more so than other children of immigrants) because of the conflation of an undifferentiated *Blackness* with inflammatory stories of a supposed refugee invasion in the popular Italian geographical imagination.

Against this gloomy socio-political backdrop, Black Italian economic activity has taken on multiple layers of meaning. In the 1990s, as immigration became a major point of public concern (as noted in Chapter One, the country’s first comprehensive immigration law was enacted in 1990), migrant women were being stratified into racialized and gendered forms of labor including care work, domestic work, and sex work.²⁴ In this context, interethnic feminist organizations in Italy often sought to create meaningful and dignifying spaces for migrant women through entrepreneurship. As Heather Merrill has noted, while classic Marxist theory might portray the entrepreneur as an emblematic figure of the petit-bourgeoisie, entrepreneurship in Italy is also tied to a genealogy of workerism and work cooperatives in which the radicalization of working classes occurred through cooperatives.²⁵ In some cases, veterans of these worker cooperatives have begun to reach out to aspiring immigrant and “second generation” entrepreneurs through training and professionalization programs like the African Summer School in Verona.²⁶ These partnerships represent an effort to connect the Italian cooperative tradition with other, non-European forms of collective economic practice.

For many Italian born and/or raised children of African immigrants today, entrepreneurial activity is closely tied to the articulation of citizenship claims at a time when Blackness is represented by politicians and mainstream media alike as a drain on scarce state resources. The promotion of Black style and beauty through cultural entrepreneurship has allowed young Black Italians to demonstrate their active contributions to the Italian creative industries and bring visibility to Black Italians as active participants in the increasingly diverse Italian social fabric. These projects show that Black Italians are deeply informed by Italian aesthetic traditions, and that they are also bringing stylistic influences from the broader Black diaspora back into Italy, effectively expanding the boundaries of Italianness in new and creative ways.

As I will argue below, however, Black Italian participation in entrepreneurial ventures should not be dismissed as mere “selling out,” nor can it be fully explained by the logics of what is often called “neoliberal citizenship.” Rather, an analysis of this phenomenon must attend to negotiations and limited openings, while also maintaining a structural political economic critique that does not immediately look to the market (or for that matter, national inclusion writ large) for liberation. This is what Stuart Hall in the inaugural issue of the *New Left Review* called “the imaginative resistances of people who have to live within capitalism.”²⁷ For instance, many young Black Italians pursue entrepreneurship because without Italian citizenship, they are limited in their ability to apply for state jobs through the Italian system of *concorsi pubblici*;²⁸ in

addition, the economic precarity of many immigrant families makes it financially burdensome for young people to pursue higher education.²⁹ The children of African immigrants are thus frequently constrained to finding alternative avenues of employment and basic livelihood.

It is important to note that entrepreneurial activity among immigrants and their Italian-born children is also a geographically specific phenomenon, largely concentrated in the northern and central Italian regions of Lombardy, Lazio, Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, and Piedmont.³⁰ This can be explained by the historically higher levels of economic prosperity and lower rates of unemployment in these regions, the existence of more extensive support networks for entrepreneurship (including “immigrant” entrepreneurship), and the presence of major urban centers and large immigrant populations. In addition, while most immigrant families were devastated by the aftershocks of the 2008 economic crisis, the children of immigrants in northern Italy nonetheless enjoy marginally greater economic stability compared to their counterparts in the South.³¹ This is because their parents in most cases settled in northern Italy in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to pursue university education, work in large factories, or open ethnic shops, grocery stores, and other small businesses.

Racial and Neoliberal Geographies of “Made in Italy”

Since at least the 2008 economic crisis, discussions in Italy surrounding the future of “Made in Italy” have been met with uncertainty. “Made in Italy,” a merchandise mark used since the 1980s to designate the uniqueness of Italian production in the “Four As” of *abbigliamento* [clothing], *agroalimentare* [food], *arredamento* [furniture], and *automobili* [cars and other forms of mechanical engineering] and protected by Italian law since 1999, has been used as a shorthand for the skilled craftsmanship associated with “traditional” Italian industries. More recently, however, policymakers, journalists, and manufacturers’ associations in Italy have begun to express concern that this label (in its various iterations as luxury brands, quality manufacturing, and small-scale artisanship) is at risk. While the decline of “Made in Italy” manufacturing has not been fully supported by available economic data,³² various culprits have been named: the increasing availability of cheaper products from abroad (*cinese*, or “Chinese,” is also a racially-charged colloquialism in Italian that refers derisively to low-quality, mass-produced consumer goods); foreign counterfeiters; the lack of interest among young Italians in traditional industries;³³ the economic crisis; the stagnating effects of that peculiar Italian blend of bureaucracy and organized crime; or the internationalization of product supply chains.³⁴

This question of how to “produce” Italy is also intimately linked with fears about the *social reproduction* of the nation—from declining white Italian birth rates,³⁵ to the comparatively high birthrates of immigrants,³⁶ to the “brain drain”³⁷ of highly educated and skilled young Italians.³⁸ In other words, preoccupations about the state of traditional Italian industries and crafts are closely linked to nationalist fears about the impacts of porous borders, uncontrollable transnational flows, and growing racial/ethnic pluralism. In the context of this uncertainty about the future of Italy—*Who will (re)produce the nation?*—economic activity has emerged as a key cultural and political touchstone.

In this sense, then, I understand “Made in Italy” as more than just a national brand—instead, it signals a set of interrelated questions about *who* and *what* is made in Italy, and by extension *who is making* Italy today and *who will make Italy* in the future. This line of argument is indebted to Marxist feminist critique, and particularly to the work of scholars such as Sylvia Yanagisako³⁹ and Silvia Federici.⁴⁰ This literature has approached the gendered relations of social reproduction as more than the “merely cultural”⁴¹ embellishments atop capitalism’s

material base, and also resists the separation between the political economic and the cultural as two distinct (but not equally important) terrains of struggle.

Italian-Somali writer Igiaba Scego captured the layered social meanings of “Made in Italy” in her award-winning 2003 short story “*Salsicce*” [“Sausages”]. As the story’s Muslim, Roman, Somali protagonist debates whether or not eating pork sausages will make her truly “Italian” in a way that her burgundy-colored Italian passport cannot, she wonders to herself: “Perhaps, by eating a sausage, I might go from neutral fingertips to real ‘Made in Italy’ fingerprints, but is this what I really want?”⁴² As I will discuss in greater detail below, this dilemma is precisely why it is so meaningful for many Black Italian entrepreneurs to be able to affix the “Made in Italy” label to their Black natural hair-care products and African textile–inspired fashion designs. This is also why immigrant-owned businesses are often singled out as the targets of aggressive protests and boycotts by Italian nativists,⁴³ and additionally why the “Made in Italy” slogan is sometimes repurposed in various campaign materials and sound bites for the Italian citizenship reform movement.⁴⁴

In Italy, various scholars⁴⁵ have brought geographical concerns and analytics to bear on the notion of neoliberal citizenship.⁴⁶ This work demonstrates that access to citizenship (and by extension, the Arendtian “right to have rights”) is predicated upon the differential inclusion or exclusion of transnational migrants based on their perceived “value” as potential economic resources. For instance, under the 2002 Bossi Fini Law, Italian visas and residency permits for non-EU migrants are contingent upon possession of a formal work contract (or alternatively, enrollment in higher education). As noted in Chapter One, this means that the Italian-born children of immigrants who are unable to naturalize as Italian citizens risk deportation to their parents’ home country if they are not able to find a formal job or enroll in an Italian university.⁴⁷ This situation became especially urgent in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, when the unemployment rate for immigrants and others without Italian citizenship skyrocketed.⁴⁸ Because the Bossi-Fini law linked residency permits to the possession of a work contract, and the subsequent 2009 “Security Set” deemed undocumented immigration a criminal offense, the termination of a formal contract with an employer could mean having to find work in the informal economy at best, and extended detention and deportation at worst.

These insights, which situate the positioning of non-EU migrants and their children in Italy in relation to an exclusionary regime of neoliberal citizenship, can be deepened with reference to the literatures on racial capitalism. Following Cedric Robinson, the taken-for-granted categories of the economy (class, labor, etc.) cannot be understood outside the history of “race” and nationalism, which developed alongside capitalism⁴⁹ to produce what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls the “capitalist racial state.”⁵⁰ In Italy, these conditions have produced a literal and metaphorical “privatization” of the politics of national inclusion and exclusion, wherein the selective, conditional incorporation of Black migrants and their families within the nation is governed according to supposedly race-neutral (but, following Robinson, profoundly racialized) standards such as profitability or merit.⁵¹

In this context, then, Afro-oriented entrepreneurship can be understood as a politically ambiguous strategy for resisting or surviving within these exclusionary regimes of neoliberal citizenship and racial capitalism. Geographers have long argued that a careful attention to “locations of struggle; communities of resistance; [and] political spaces”—in other words, to the spatial politics and practices of identity—can reveal avenues through which marginalized and subordinate groups challenge dominant discourses of power.⁵² Geographers of migration specifically have studied the practices of national and transnational belonging developed in the

face of restrictive citizenship regimes and ethnic absolutism.⁵³ In particular, business activity among socio-economically precarious and marginalized groups (including immigrants) has historically served as a strategic response both to socio-spatial segregation and the dismantling of the welfare state.⁵⁴ These “ethnic” or “immigrant” businesses are characterized by overlapping spatialities and ambiguous intersections with national borders—from their physical locations within specific immigrant enclaves; to their transnational networks of financing, production, and remittances;⁵⁵ to the spatial practices and imaginaries of the “ethnicity fetish” and “ethnic packaging” in the marketing and consumption of products sold in immigrant businesses.⁵⁶

It is also important to note that across Western Europe and the United States, the figure of the “immigrant entrepreneur” regularly factors into debates about migration and borders. These are debates that also draw upon a much older history of preoccupation with the “undeserving poor” within Europe, including but not limited to Thomas Malthus’ influential writings on the Irish Great Famine of 1845–1852. Contemporary discussions about immigrant entrepreneurship hinge on the question of whether the diasporic, “hybrid” subjectivities of international migrants represent a threat to the integrity of a country’s national culture, or whether they can function as a “smooth supplement to an ideology of free trade and markets.”⁵⁷ For this reason, economic activity in immigrant or otherwise marginalized communities can constitute one part of a repertoire of practices meant to contest national exclusion.⁵⁸ At the same time, however, these practices can also bolster racialized distinctions between “good”/ economically productive neoliberal subjects and “bad”/unproductive ones.

Afro-Business in Italy: From Foreign Contamination to Savvy (Afro)Cosmopolitanisms

Hair care, beauty, and fashion have emerged as key sites of conversation among young Black Italians about the experiences of Black womanhood in contemporary Italy. When I first began my research in Italy, I did not expect entrepreneurship to be such an important hotbed of activity—I instead predicted that I would spend most of my time marching in the streets at political demonstrations. But I quickly learned that there was a rapidly growing world of influential Black women entrepreneurs who were using their regional or national platforms to bring visibility to other Black Italians, serve as role models, advocate for citizenship, and mobilize against racism. I was surprised to learn that many of the most prominent Black activists I met were also highly ambitious and driven businesswomen.

During the last five years in Italy, there has been a veritable proliferation of blogs, Facebook pages, YouTube channels, and traveling workshops encouraging Black women to embrace their natural features and hair textures, and to reject racist and Eurocentric standards of beauty. This phenomenon has, perhaps unsurprisingly, gained significant traction in northern Italy—home to cities such as Milan, the country’s capital of style and industry. The women leading these initiatives grew up in these places, and their projects reflect the deep influence of Italian material culture and bodily aesthetics; however, they also use their businesses as extroverted, Masseyan nodes of interconnection⁵⁹ that infuse Italian sensibilities with new influences and cultural politics.

Afro Hair as Spatial Claims

In January of 2014, Italian-Ghanaian Evelyne Afaawua (who immigrated to Italy from France with her parents shortly after her first birthday) founded the first Facebook page in Italian about the care and valorization of natural, un-chemically-straightened Black hair. Originally called “Afro Italian Nappy Girls” and based in Milan, the community now goes by the name

Nappytalia and includes a robust multi-platform social media presence (including a Facebook fan base of over 15,000 individuals), a blog, an e-commerce site, and offline meet-ups and workshops held around Italy.⁶⁰ This project built implicitly upon the momentum of an internationally resurgent, Internet-mediated “natural hair movement” that, since the mid-2000s, has linked together Black women across the globe.⁶¹ In 2018, Evelyne launched her own “Made in Italy” line of organic hair products and cosmetics, with packaging she designed to convey what she describes as a certain sense of “Italianness” or “Europeanness.” This aesthetic touch, she hopes, will allow her to successfully market her wares to Black consumers beyond Italy, on the African continent and around the global African diaspora.

Evelyne characterizes herself as an “entrepreneur with social ethics.” During our first meeting in Milan during the summer of 2014 (shortly after the founding of *Nappytalia*), she explained why she decided to focus on hair as the basis for a new online community:

Once you’ve developed your ideas, you have to externalize the clarity that is inside. For me, for instance, I tried using skin-lightening creams. This was a period when I wanted to become lighter. There are all of these phases, which make you understand where your place is. And once you understand where your place is, you say, “*Va bene*, to be in that place I have to reflect it, right?” And for a girl, what does she think? Most likely, the first thing is hair. [...] You want the clarity inside to be visible outside. And so *hair*. [...] For me, it could be a question of money, but I have more to demonstrate than just money. Yes, we’re Afro-Italians, and we are showing who we are, but we also want to show it on paper, to show off.

Since *Nappytalia*’s founding, Evelyne has gone on to win Italian and European entrepreneurship awards, acquire local investors for the project, and connect to product manufacturers abroad.⁶² In 2015, she was awarded the MoneyGram Award for foreign entrepreneurship in Italy under the category “*imprenditore giovanile*” [“young entrepreneur”]—the first Afro-descendent entrepreneur to receive this honor. Later that year, she was awarded “Best Blogger” for the *Nappytalia* website at the Divino Foundation’s annual Africa-Italy Excellence Awards. In fact, Evelyne recounted that attending the Africa-Italy Excellence Awards the previous year was an important turning point for her during which, she says, she began to realize the untapped potential of Africans in Italy:

Before the event, I had the idea that Africans were workers, street-sweepers, *vu’ cumprà*.⁶³ After that event, my idea of Africans was doctors, writers, bloggers, directors. Therefore, there was a possibility, an opportunity, to be African but to have the same occupations as many others without being limited by the color of your skin. But the problem is that for us young people, these examples are not as apparent. When I went to this event, I was like, Wow... I started to dream: If there are people who at 45, 60 years old have been able to be doctors, gynecologists, bloggers, directors, then I say, well if the situation in Italy is like this, it’s because these people are not employed at their full capacity.

Evelyne is one of the most visible young Black Italians active in Italy today: she has been the subject of a documentary⁶⁴ and countless magazine features,⁶⁵ and is also invited to speak at universities and conferences on issues related to gender and the Black diaspora in Italy. As such,

she has deliberately used her platform to bring attention to other Black Italians, publicize anti-racism demonstrations, and mobilize support for citizenship reform:

I want to achieve my goals and dreams and become something. To create a position for myself in the society, regardless of whether I am white or Black. I want to be myself, with all of my characteristics, whether you accept them or not. [...] Whereas before I didn't acknowledge my Ghanaian side, now I try to show both. If you accept me, you have to accept me because I am Ghanaian, because I am Italian, *basta*. We have to...let people understand that we exist. I think that what could help would be to make them understand the utility that we have, the utility that we can give to the society. [...] If we talk about an Italian, an Italian can speak Italian well, can speak English, but what would be his approach toward an American, a Latin American, an African? It is probably much easier for an Afro-Italian to work with a foreigner than an Italian. Italians have a closed mentality.

Evelyne had previously attended one of the most prestigious business schools in Italy, but had to indefinitely pause her studies for financial reasons; in addition, she does not have Italian citizenship. But although Nappytalia is a material survival strategy that has allowed Evelyne to supplement her income as a receptionist, the project also allows her to articulate a set of spatial claims—specifically, that people of African descent can belong and be legitimate members of the Italian national community. In this way, Black women's hair has become an embodied remapping of the boundaries of Italianness, one that is nonetheless mediated by market logics that link notions of economic productivity to belonging in the nation. In other words, Evelyne is obligated to demonstrate the contributions of Black Italian women *precisely because* at this moment, Blackness is popularly perceived as a drain on the resources of the Italian state. Nappytalia thus represents a complicated weaving together of themes of Black consciousness, women's empowerment, and neoliberal economic success.

Made-in-Italy “Space Invaders”

The natural hair movement in Italy has evolved significantly since the early days of Nappytalia—no longer just a (virtual or physical) space in which women could come together to discuss their shared experiences, hair related or otherwise, it has increasingly become a source of additional livelihood for many Black Italian women. These aspiring entrepreneurs import hair products and hairstyling accessories from the United States or United Kingdom to sell online to other Black Italians, filling a large gap in the market in Italy for beauty products tailored to the specific needs of Black women.⁶⁶

The natural hair movement in Italy now includes stylists such as “NaturAngi” (Angela Haisha Adamou) and “Afro-On” (Belysa Shabani), product vendors and manufacturers such as AfroRicci and Vanity Case Cosmetics, and beauty bloggers and vloggers such as the women behind the multimedia site *Afroitalian Souls*. It is also important to note that young Black Italian women entrepreneurs have played an important role in the development of e-commerce and social media content production in Italy. The Internet emerged as an important strategy for these women because it allows them to save money on material overhead costs, and also helps to overcome the geographical dispersion that characterizes the Black presence in Italy. The tech savvyness of many young Black Italians is significant considering that Internet penetration rates

in Italy have lagged behind other European countries; in fact, in Italy immigrant communities often surpass “native” Italians in certain digital communication practices.⁶⁷

Countless news features published within the last half-decade have celebrated these Black Italian entrepreneurs for what is characterized as their creative and technologically forward-thinking contributions to the Italian economy.⁶⁸ Indeed, it is important to recognize that for many Black Italian businesswomen, their projects have *two* audiences in mind—an internal audience of other Black Italians who can come together around a particular theme (hair, fashion, beauty) to discuss their shared experiences and struggles, and an external audience of Italians who can learn more about the lives and material contributions of the children of African immigrants in Italy.⁶⁹ These counternarratives are intended to challenge the idea that Black bodies in Italian territory constitute an invasion,⁷⁰ a threat, or a drain on resources—in other words, that they are perpetually “bodies out of place.”⁷¹

In 2011, Italian-Nigerian-Russian entrepreneur and singer Alice Edun opened the first e-shop with products for Black hair in Italy. Several years later, along with her business partner Reina Gomez, her company AfroRicci launched the first “Made in Italy” line of products designed for curly or Afro-textured hair. I first met Reina in Milan in 2014, when she was a boisterous beauty blogger with a passion for Black history (particularly the Haitian Revolution). An Italian-Dominican aspiring hair stylist, she explained to me that she had been galvanized by her experiences of everyday gendered racism⁷² and non-recognition to use *hair* as a platform for connecting Black women in Italy. Alice and Reina now work together out of Alice’s airy home in southwest Milan, candy-colored bottles of hair cream stacked alongside children’s toys and professional-grade recording equipment (in addition to managing AfroRicci and raising two small children, Alice also performs as a soul singer).

Like Evelyne, Alice and Reina’s trajectory to the world of natural hair care involved tangled, multi-sited journeys of self-discovery. Alice was born in Russia to a Black Nigerian father and a white Russian mother, grew up in Nigeria, and came to Italy as a teenager. She met Reina when she was looking for a hairdresser who knew how to trim and style her curls. Reina’s father is a white Venezuelan and her mother is a biracial Black Dominican; she spent her early childhood in Santo Domingo and then came to Italy around elementary school. But while their life stories differ, both women view hair as a way of asserting pride in their African heritage:

Alice: Hair is part of your identity, so when you talk about Afro hair, already the word “Afro” comes from “Africa.” You are describing your hair, which comes from a place, a people. You are identifying with them, even if you were born here, or you were born there, or adopted, or are multiracial. When you describe Afro curls, you are saying that you are part of that category of people. And so identity is part of that, in knowing where you come from, maybe a culture that you don’t know well but that you want to get to know better.

In addition to their hair products, Alice and Reina also organize hair-care workshops around Italy; often, they are catered to young African adoptees and their white Italian parents. But a significant source of pride for both women is claiming the “Made in Italy” label. As Alice and Reina explained one morning over coffee in Alice’s home:

Alice: We are proud to say “Made in Italy.” It is important to show the whole world that even in Italy we are here. We’re here, AfroRicci, and we have our own “Made in Italy” products.

Reina: It’s also a responsibility. “Made in Italy” is known all over the world as a sign of quality. It is a cultural thing, tied to a history of small artisans...

Alice: From Italian shoes, stylists, fashion, to food, the finishing on our houses, furniture... “Made in Italy” is synonymous with quality. So the first cream for Afro hair in Italy has to be that way. It has to be a quality product.

Camilla: It seems important to be able to say “Made in Italy” during this [economic] crisis, too.

Alice: The crisis, of course! I would like it if there were more support from the Italian state for “Made in Italy”... especially for innovative things. [...] Yes, it’s a beauty product, but it’s a niche product, for a particular group of people who are part of the Italian culture. Afro-Italians are part of the Italian culture. There needs to be support for “Made in Italy” products for Afro-Italians, too.

As Alice elaborated in a recent interview, AfroRicci “demonstrates that even I contribute at the social, economic, and cultural levels in *this* country. [...] It is important that Italy recognize the multiethnic woman.”⁷³ Her comments reveal that the meanings attached to entrepreneurship are deeply gendered, as Black Italian businesswomen seek to challenge both their *invisibility* (as non-recognized “citizens in waiting”) and their *hypervisibility* (as sex objects⁷⁴ or docile care workers) in Italian spaces and in the Italian racial imaginary.⁷⁵ Indeed, as geographers of migration have argued, the bodies of those perceived as “foreign”—but especially those of *women*—are systematically instrumentalized to mark the cultural boundaries of citizenship and belonging in European liberal democracies.⁷⁶ The use of “natural” hair has particularly transgressive potential precisely because Afro-textured hair has been historically denigrated as disorderly and uncivilized.⁷⁷ But just as in the case of Evelyne and Nappytalia, this move is only legible through its emplacement within the framework of the market and broader national debates about the precarious fate of “Made in Italy.”

From an Afro Renaissance in Italy in to New Forms of Extraction?

In 2011, then-Italian president Giorgio Napolitano delivered a highly publicized address to a group of newly naturalized Italians who had grown up in Italy as the children of immigrants. In the most widely quoted sentence of the speech, he declared:

It is important to realize that young people of immigrant origins in our schools and in our society are not just an obstacle to be overcome; they are also a fruitful source of stimulation because they come from diverse cultures.⁷⁸

At the gathering, timed to coincide with the 150th anniversary of Italian national unification, Napolitano proceeded to extoll the ways in which the “new Italian citizens” assembled that day would contribute to the collective well-being of Italy by sharing “languages,

constitutional values, civic duties, and laws,” citing as examples young Italian-Chinese entrepreneurs and the Italian-Somali writer Igiaba Scego (mentioned earlier). For many activists,⁷⁹ Napolitano’s speech represented an important, yet limited, moment of institutional recognition in the growing movement to reform Italian citizenship law.

At a time of economic crisis and declining Italian birth-rates, Napolitano’s speech implied, it is simply good business to bring the children of immigrants into the Italian fold: “Without their future contribution to our society and our economy,” he declared, “the burden of national debt would be even more difficult to sustain.” The marking of Italy’s 150th “birthday” was widely derided that year for being lackluster and somber, marred by shameful political scandals and intractable regional divisions.⁸⁰ Ironically, then, Napolitano seemed to be calling upon the children of immigrants at a time of great national pessimism to stand in as symbols for a new, (economically) renewed Italy.

Black Italian women’s entrepreneurship is compelling because while these projects often make use of the “Made in Italy” label, they cannot be fully subsumed within the realm of “traditional” Italian craft. Instead, designers, stylists, and other cultural entrepreneurs often describe their products as “hybrids” of Italian and African influences—for instance, by combining African textiles with Italian sartorial techniques, or traditional African ingredients with the quality standards of Italian cosmetics laboratories. These practices of hybridity and cultural fluency,⁸¹ which position Black Italian women entrepreneurs as “cultural mediators,”⁸² are often cited by outside observers as evidence that “Africa” and “Italy” are not mutually exclusive categories. In other words, the narrative goes, instead of constituting a threat (i.e., of insufficient loyalty to the Italian nation), the global diasporic networks of Black Italians have the potential to revitalize a stagnant Italian nation that has been insular and insufficiently cosmopolitan for much of its recent history.

This strategy also aligns with a particular understanding of Italianness, one that sees the current insularity of Italians as a deviation from a much longer history of Mediterranean mixing and exchange. As discussed in Chapter Two, there have been debates since Italian national unification at the end of the nineteenth century about the extent to which Italians are truly “white” due to centuries of Mediterranean mixing and geographical proximity to Africa. At various moments, this hybridity has been understood not as a problem of racial impurity, but rather as the Italian nation’s unique strength, one that differentiated it from northern, “Aryan” Europe. In this sense, Black Italians are actually making claims to a particular understanding of Italian national identity, arguing that through their connections to a transnational Black diaspora they can restore the country to its true cosmopolitan status.



Figure 19 The Afro Beauty and Fashion Expo in Giavera, Italy.

Source: Author.

At a panel discussion composed of prominent citizenship reform activists at a recent cultural festival in Giavera (just outside the northeastern Italian city of Treviso), a lively conversation erupted among the panelists about just this sort of cosmopolitan outlook among the children of immigrants in Italy. The discussion took place mere steps away from the festival's Afro Beauty and Fashion Expo, which featured booths for nine Black Italian fashion designers, hair product vendors, and stylists. Bruno, the white Italian journalist moderating the panel, opened the discussion by noting that the "new generation of Italians" seated before him (and, it was implied, present at the Expo) represented the resources of the world, something that Italy needed desperately at this moment: "This country is getting older, and is in need of a younger world that has capacities not just in terms of work but also in terms of creativity," he declared. Later in the conversation, an Italian-Moroccan activist noted that these "new generations" could act as a cultural bridge by engaging in international projects that linked Italy to the rest of the world. An Italian-Moroccan educator took the microphone and, nodding in agreement, joked that Italians are typically monolingual. An Italian-Ecuadorian organizer concurred, observing that the ability to speak more than one language (a skill that many children of immigrants in Italy share) is good for business.

A public symposium organized by the Università Cattolica of Milan in 2016 about Black Italian cultural enterprises brought together many of the same entrepreneurs discussed in this chapter or present in Giavera. Like the Giavera festival, this event also addressed the cultural and economic contributions of the children of immigrants to the Italian creative industries. Amid the usual celebrations of cultural exchange, hybridity, mixing, and contamination, however, Italian anthropologist Anna Casella offered forth a sobering word of warning. Is the current vogue for Black Italian entrepreneurship, especially when this phenomenon is valued primarily for what it can contribute to the Italian national economy, simply a continuation of an older, extractive colonial logic?⁸³ Instead of raw materials and labor, Casella implied, the new resources to be mined from Africa today are young Black Italian talent and creativity, along with a generalized sense of transnational Black cultural "richness."

Indeed, the consumption of Black culture is ubiquitous across Europe,⁸⁴ and often occurs in ways that detach cultural products such as wax prints, head wraps, hip hop, or Afrobeat from their original political significance. Black musical genres such as reggae, for instance, enjoy massive popularity among white Europeans, from France to Finland.⁸⁵ This practice takes on a unique valence in Italy,⁸⁶ where (as discussed in Chapter Two) the country's geographical proximity to the African continent via the Mediterranean Sea was historically vaunted by some politicians and intellectuals as a legitimation for colonial expansion,⁸⁷ and more recently has been used to advance economic cooperation between Italy and specific African countries.⁸⁸ But Casella's note of caution, while an important warning, is complicated by the multiple meanings and overlapping spatialities that Black Italians associate with their own cultural enterprises—for instance, the way that such projects may allow them to re-connect with parental homelands that, due to financial limitations and restrictive Italian naturalization requirements, they may not have been able to visit when they were younger. Evelyne of Nappytalia, for instance, aspires to source "ethically-produced" raw ingredients such as shea butter for her line of hair products from organic growers' collectives located in the African home countries of her parents or the parents of her fellow Black Italian business partners.

The Entrepreneur and the Refugee in the European “Crisis”

The case of Black Italian women’s entrepreneurship also provides a unique window into the contemporary contestations surrounding the racialized and gendered boundaries of Europe and “Europeanness” in the context of both a migration emergency in the Euro-Mediterranean and an ongoing economic crisis in the European Union and the Eurozone. The renewed European ethnic absolutism catalyzed by these interlocking “crises,” it is important to recognize, affects not just migrants but also their Europe-born children. Regardless of how many generations they are removed from the initial act of migration, these so-called “new generations” are perpetually regarded as Europe’s outsiders according to the racial legacies of colonialism, enslavement, and imperialism.⁸⁹ Accordingly, they are also implicated in wider struggles over the differentiation between “legitimate” European *citizens* suffering in the aftermath of austerity and economic contraction, and “illegitimate” non-European *bodies* who constitute a threat both to national integrity and economic prosperity.

As economic activity increasingly becomes a cipher for the tentative inclusion of young Black Italians into the Italian nation, this raises challenging questions about the ways in which Black women’s bodies and Black women’s labor continue to be conscripted as the raw materials from which European nations can be (re)built or (re)produced. What does it mean when, at a time of widespread national pessimism, young Black Italian entrepreneurs are marshaled by politicians, journalists, and even scholars as a constituency that could potentially “save” or “revitalize” a stagnant Italy? Does this narrative simply reinforce the idea, crystallized in Italian immigration law, that Afro-descendants in Italy are only useful for their bodies or their labor?

Indeed, many Black Italians have begun to vocally criticize the ways in which they are frequently called upon by Italian liberal-left politicians to “wave the [Italian] flag,” as one Italian-Eritrean activist sarcastically described it to me. And this phenomenon of “waving the flag” sometimes occurs quite literally. In 2017, a fifteen-year-old Italian-Senegalese student and aspiring fashion designer named Mbayeb “Mami” Bouss designed an Italian flag–draped gown, which she wore to greet Italian President Sergio Mattarella in Mirandola (a town which had been devastated by an earthquake in 2012).⁹⁰ Images of the meeting were circulated widely, to the celebration of the Italian Left—which elevated the young woman as a symbol of a new, multicultural Italy—and to the horror of the Right—who reported her to the police for “insulting” the Italian flag.

Yet this situation is further complicated by the fact that many young entrepreneurs are also taking advantage of very limited openings in the current political order to infuse their strategies of economic survival with a set of ideas and practices related to Black pride, diasporic connection, women’s empowerment, cooperative economics, opposition to the cultural hegemony of whiteness,⁹¹ the expansion of citizenship rights, the re-definition of Italianness, and radical self-love. These kinds of everyday negotiations reveal how communities live with and contest borders that are both symbolic and material.

And finally, how do the politics of Black Italian women’s entrepreneurship intersect with the ongoing refugee “crisis” in the Mediterranean? Sociologist Tamara Nopper has written about the ways in which immigrants in the United States often articulate moral claims regarding their “character, productivity, and value” to the U.S. economy in contradistinction to Black Americans, who are cast as “lacking a work ethic, militant, xenophobic, and costly to society.”⁹² Nopper’s astute analysis of anti-Blackness in immigrants’ rights organizing is complicated by the contemporary situation in Italy, in which the majority of refugees currently arriving to Italy via the Mediterranean are from sub-Saharan Africa.⁹³ Yet the underlying racial (and gendered)

character of claims for national inclusion via assertions of productivity remains salient. The example of Italy thus reveals how anti-Blackness can be perpetuated even through the production of *new* essentialisms that distinguish between “assimilable” subjects (who are seen as able to marshal their cosmopolitan transnational networks⁹⁴ for the benefit of the Italian economy) and “non-assimilable” refugees (who represent a drain on the economy).

This dynamic became visible during a highly publicized meeting of Milanese city officials in March of 2016. This public event was organized by prominent Italian-Cameroonian businessman Otto Bitjoka, who actively promotes immigrant entrepreneurship in northern Italy based on the understanding that “immigrants are the true young labor force of this country.”⁹⁵ Entitled “*Welfare ambrosiano e cittadini globali*” [“Ambrosian⁹⁶ welfare and global citizens”], the gathering was intended to reframe the question of “immigration” to one of “global citizens” (and “welfare” to “employment”), with an emphasis on valorizing the unrecognized economic contributions of immigrants in Milan specifically and in Italy generally. The speakers that day represented an impressive swath of Milan’s political set, including Giulio Gallera (Assessor of Welfare for the region of Lombardy); Stefano Dambruso (Representative of the Chamber of Deputies for Lombardy); Alessandro Aleotti (entrepreneur, think tank director, and political commentator); and Piero Bassetti (former President of the Region of Lombardy). A second panel even featured a debate among Milan’s mayoral candidates about how best the city should harness the talent of its substantial immigrant population—immigrants comprise over thirteen percent of Milan’s population, and the Lombardy region has the largest immigrant population in Italy.⁹⁷

Otto, dressed that day in an impeccable three-piece suit, introduced the speakers and prepared the audience to “use new words, words that don’t create barriers...to develop a new perspective” on immigration. To his obvious dismay, however, each speaker focused his remarks on the way that the city of Milan had responded to an unprecedented influx of African refugees in 2015 and 2016. Finally, visibly frustrated, Otto intervened, his great booming voice echoing off the vaulted walls of the former cloisters where we were gathered:

You are talking about refugees escaping from war—these are not the people I am talking about. We have to stop reflecting on the people who are arriving on the boats! How do we create a situation where we *empower* the immigrants, transform them into paragons of success? We need a true meritocracy. But if we don’t have a dialogical relationship, we will never get there. Because we have a shared destiny. We must live together in our differences. *That* is the challenge!

The Welfare Ambrosiano event was not explicitly concerned with the children of immigrants; nonetheless, the discussions that day were indicative of a much broader tendency to link the “integration” of immigrants (and their children) in Italy to the value brought by their economic productivity—statements that in turn implicitly cast refugees as poor, passive, or unproductive by way of comparison. For instance, when President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies Laura Boldrini announced the 2016 MoneyGram Award for best immigrant entrepreneur in Italy, she also called upon the Italian parliament to expand citizenship rights to the children of immigrants born and raised in Italy:

The country should be grateful for the entrepreneurial contribution you make to our country. [...] The demographic crisis can be overcome with family policies and new arrivals, by providing the right to Italian citizenship.⁹⁸

The unfolding story of Black Italian women's entrepreneurship in Italy demonstrates the ways in which Black women's efforts to craft community and economic independence under conditions of extreme adversity also risk "appropriation"⁹⁹ by the Italian racial-capitalist state. When media or political narratives turn Black Italian activist-entrepreneurial endeavors into commodities and slot them into the dominant discourses of the nation or the market, there is a risk that the political meanings these women attach to their projects will be overshadowed. Attempts to "domesticate" initiatives in the service of particular national economic or political interests only serve to sever the capacious diasporic spatialities of Black women's everyday resilience and struggle,¹⁰⁰ relations that in practice stretch far beyond the territorial boundaries of the Italian nation-state. In addition, while Black men are also involved in entrepreneurial projects in Italy, Italian media and politicians have tended to disproportionately focus on Black *women* as "the ideal [economic] development subjects" and "new agents of capital."¹⁰¹ This sort of pigeonholing reduces both Black men and women to their economic value, albeit in markedly different ways—Black women as economic resources, and Black men as surplus labor.

In the contemporary moment, the ever-shifting boundaries of Italy are once again being re-mapped; accordingly, the possibility of making space for Black subjects deemed capable of reproducing Italy at a time of economic and demographic "crisis" is a contentious topic of debate among politicians and activists alike. Yet such differential inclusion is always precarious, as it does not challenge the historically sedimented, racist power structures undergirding the Italian nation and embedded within Italian nationality and immigration laws—specifically, the taken-for-granted "whiteness" of Italians.¹⁰² In the context of the ongoing southern European refugee crisis, therefore, this story encourages us to ask what could happen when Black Italians are included (or tentatively lauded) as creative entrepreneurs, but not necessarily as equal *citizens*.

¹ Otto Bitjoka, *Talea: Il Merito Mette Radici* (Segrate: Grafiche Moretti, 2010).

² Jordanna Matlon, "Racial Capitalism and the Crisis of Black Masculinity," *American Sociological Review* 81, no. 5 (2016): 1014–38, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416658294>.

³ Candice Whitney, "Breaking Ground for Emerging Designers: Milan's First Afro Pop Shop Milano," *Women Change Africa* (blog), June 14, 2017, <http://womenchangeafrica.blogspot.com/2017/06/breaking-ground-for-emerging-designers.html>.

⁴ Achille Mbembe, "Afropolitanism," in *Africa Remix: Contemporary Art of a Continent*, ed. Njami Simon (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2007), 26–30; Taiye Selasi, "Bye-Bye Babar | The LIP Magazine," *The LIP*, March 3, 2005, <http://thelip.robertsharp.co.uk/?p=76>.

⁵ Keaton, *Muslim Girls and the Other France*, 90.

⁶ Janet MacGaffey and Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, *Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law* (London: International African Institute, 2000).

⁷ Jovan Scott Lewis, "A So Black People Stay: Bad-Mind, Sufferation, and Discourses of Race and Unity in a Jamaican Craft Market," *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology* 20, no. 2 (2015): 327–42, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jlca.12111>.

⁸ This chapter is deeply indebted to geographer Heather Merrill's research on Black spaces and situated intersectionality in Italy. Her work provides invaluable insight into the multiple ways in which Black Italians have transformed Italy into a diasporic node of interconnection.

⁹ Tiffany M. Gill, "'I Had My Own Business . . . So I Didn't Have to Worry': Beauty Salons, Beauty Culturists and the Politics of African-American Female Entrepreneurship," in *Beauty and Business: Commerce, Gender, and Culture in Modern America*, ed. Philip Scranton (London: Routledge, 2014), 169–94.

¹⁰ Maxine Craig, "The Decline and Fall of the Conk; or, How to Read a Process," *Fashion Theory* 1, no. 4 (1997): 399–419, <https://doi.org/10.2752/136270497779613657>; Tanisha C. Ford, *Liberated Threads: Black Women, Style,*

and the Global Politics of Soul (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Tiffany M. Gill, *Beauty Shop Politics: African American Women's Activism in the Beauty Industry* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2010); Robin D. G. Kelley, "Nap Time: Historicizing the Afro," *Fashion Theory* 1, no. 4 (1997): 339–51, <https://doi.org/10.2752/136270497779613666>; Susannah Walker, "Black Is Profitable: The Commodification of the Afro, 1960—1975," *Enterprise & Society* 1, no. 3 (2000): 536–64.

¹¹ Merrill, "Postcolonial Borderlands," 266.

¹² Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America: The Cold War Between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Nikolaos Papadogiannis, *Militant Around the Clock?: Left-Wing Youth Politics, Leisure, and Sexuality in Post-Dictatorship Greece, 1974-1981* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); Andrea Pimi, "I Giovani Italiani, La 'Non Politica' e Nuovi Cleavages," *Società Mutamento Politica* 3, no. 5 (2012): 157–71.

¹³ Merrill, *An Alliance Of Women*.

¹⁴ Merrill and Carter, "Inside and Outside Italian Political Culture."

¹⁵ Lucy Bullivant, *Masterplanning Futures* (London: Routledge, 2012); Diane Ghirardo, *Italy: Modern Architectures in History* (Islington: Reaktion Books, 2013).

¹⁶ Sartori, "L'Italia Non è Una Nazione Meticcica Ecco Perché Lo Ius Soli Non Funziona."

¹⁷ Vladimiro Polchi, "Migranti, Gli Otto Falsi Miti Da Sfatare," *La Repubblica*, October 13, 2016, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/10/13/news/migranti_falsi_miti_bonino-149688642/.

¹⁸ "Italy MP 'blacks up' for Anti-Migrant Speech," *Al Jazeera English*, January 17, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/01/italy-mp-blacks-up-anti-migrant-speech-20141175475595566.html>.

¹⁹ Maya Oppenheim, "Samuel L Jackson and Magic Johnson Mistaken for 'lazy Migrants' by Italians after Shopping in Tuscany," *The Independent*, August 21, 2017, <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/samuel-l-jackson-magic-johnson-lazy-migrants-italy-tuscany-forte-dei-marmi-louis-vuitton-a7905026.html>.

²⁰ Henry A. Giroux, "Spectacles of Race and Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy Under the Reign of Neoliberalism," *Communication Education* 52, no. 3–4 (2003): 191–211, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0363452032000156190>; Goldberg, *The Threat of Race*; Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*.

²¹ Deborah E. Ward, *The White Welfare State: The Racialization of U.S. Welfare Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

²² Michael G. Lacy, "Black Frankenstein and Racial Neoliberalism in Contemporary American Cinema: Reanimating Racial Monsters in Changing Lanes," in *The Routledge Companion to Global Popular Culture*, ed. Toby Miller (London: Routledge, 2014), 233.

²³ Maurizio Ferrera, "The Uncertain Future of the Italian Welfare State," *West European Politics* 20, no. 1 (1997): 231–49, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389708425183>; Ascoli Ugo and Pavolini Emmanuele, *The Italian Welfare State in a European Perspective: A Comparative Analysis* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016). Ironically, this sparse social assistance and an institutional reliance upon the family to provide care is directly linked to the recruitment of foreign workers into Italy beginning as early as the 1960s. As Jacqueline Andall has argued, female domestic workers from countries including Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Philippines were systematically hired between the 1960s and 1980s to provide childcare for northern Italian families where both parents worked full-time. These migrant workers replaced southern Italian workers, who had previously been migrating to northern Italy to work as live-in domestic laborers until their economic prospects (and the economic development of southern Italy generally) improved. See Andall, *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service*.

²⁴ Andall, *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service*; Rhacel Salazar Parrenas, *The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization* (New York: NYU Press, 2008).

²⁵ I thank Heather Merrill for these important insights regarding the relationship between entrepreneurship and labor organizing in Italy.

²⁶ The African Summer School was founded in 2013 by Italian-Congolese journalist Fortuna Ekustu Mambulu and is held each summer in Verona or Rome. The goal of the program is to train Italians, Italians of foreign backgrounds, and immigrants in Italy to develop social entrepreneurship projects that involve Africa or the African diaspora. As such, the one-week training program includes courses on topics that range from African philosophy and spirituality to social entrepreneurship and microfinance for startups. For more information, see <http://www.africansummerschool.org/>.

²⁷ Stuart Hall, "Introducing NLR," *New Left Review*, I, no. 1 (1960): 1–3.

²⁸ Competitions for state positions based on public exams.

- ²⁹ Andall, “Second-Generation Attitude?,” 398.
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- ³¹ Maurizio Ambrosini and Nazareno Panichella, “Immigrazione, occupazione e crisi economica in Italia,” *Quaderni di Sociologia*, no. 72 (2016): 115–34, <https://doi.org/10.4000/qds.1578>.
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- ³⁴ “Italian Manufacturing: A Washout,” *Economist*, August 10, 2013, <https://www.economist.com/news/business/21583283-years-crisis-have-reinforced-pressure-italys-once-envied-industrial-base-washout>. Yanagisako and Lisa Rofel have explored the ways in which Italian textile and clothing firms attempt to “transfer the prestige and value of ‘Made in Italy’ to ‘Designed in Italy’ as they increasingly turn to joint ventures with Chinese entrepreneurs to export manufacturing to China. See, for instance: Sylvia J. Yanagisako, “Transnational Family Capitalism Producing ‘Made in Italy’ in China,” in *Vital Relations: Modernity and the Persistent Life of Kinship*, ed. Susan McKinnon and Fenella Cannell (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2013), 67.
- ³⁵ Papavero, “Minori e Seconde Generazioni.”
- ³⁶ Carter, “Blackness Over Europe: Meditations on Cultural Belonging”; Merrill, “Postcolonial Borderlands.”
- ³⁷ It is important to note that discussions about the Italian brain drain typically include only white Italians, despite the fact that large numbers of children of immigrants have also left Italy in the wake of the economic crisis for countries such as the United Kingdom. One exception to this trend can be found in the short documentary series “The Expats,” created by Italian-Haitian Johanne Affricot. Each episode of “The Expats” tells the story of a Black Italian creative professional who has moved abroad in search of greater opportunities. More information on the series is available at <http://theexpats.griotmag.com/en/about/>.
- ³⁸ Paolo Balduzzi and Alessandro Rosina, “Giovani talenti che lasciano l’Italia: fonti, dati e politiche di un fenomeno complesso,” *La Rivista delle Politiche Sociali* 3 (2011): 43–59.
- ³⁹ Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, *Producing Culture and Capital: Family Firms in Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
- ⁴⁰ Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch* (New York: Autonomedia, 2004).
- ⁴¹ Judith Butler, “Merely Cultural,” *New Left Review* I, no. 227 (1998): 33–44.
- ⁴² Igiaba Scego, “Sausages,” *Warscapes*, June 1, 2013, <http://www.warscapes.com/retrospectives/food/sausages>.
- ⁴³ Mauro Favale, “‘Boicotta i Negozi Stranieri’. Il Marchio Dei Razzisti Sulle Saracinesche Di Roma,” *Repubblica*, April 15, 2017, http://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/04/15/news/_boicotta_i_negozi_stranieri_il_marchio_dei_razzisti_sulle_saracinesche_di_roma-163019709/; Tom Kington, “Anti-Immigrant Italians Find a New Foe: Food from Abroad,” *The Guardian*, November 15, 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/15/italys-kebab-war-hots-up>.
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- ⁴⁵ Carter and Merrill, “Bordering Humanism”; Andrea Muehlebach, *The Moral Neoliberal: Welfare and Citizenship in Italy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*; Federico Oliveri, “Subverting Neoliberal Citizenship. Migrant Struggles for the Right to Stay in Contemporary Italy,” *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies* 14, no. 2 (2015): 492–503.
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- ⁴⁷ Rising tuition fees at Italian public universities, another example of the neoliberalization of the Italian public sector, renders higher education an inaccessible route to the *permesso di soggiorno* for many adult children of immigrants in Italy. See Mark Olssen and Michael A. Peters, “Neoliberalism, Higher Education and the Knowledge Economy: From the Free Market to Knowledge Capitalism,” *Journal of Education Policy* 20, no. 3 (2005): 313–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02680930500108718>; Luca Scacchi et al., “Neo-Liberalism in the Italian University: Encroachment and Resistance,” *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies* 17, no. 3 (2017): 205–13, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532708616669524>.

- ⁴⁸ Ambrosini and Panichella, “Immigrazione, occupazione e crisi economica in Italia”; Rosanna Cillo and Fabio Perocco, “Migrant Labour in the Underground Economy: Between Processes of Irregularization and Informalization,” EU Sixth Framework Programme (Venice: University of Venice Ca’ Foscari, December 2008).
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- ⁵⁰ Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference: Notes on Racism and Geography,” *The Professional Geographer* 54, no. 1 (2002): 21, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-0124.00310>.
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- ⁶⁹ Annalisa Frisina and Camilla Hawthorne, “Sulle pratiche estetiche antirazziste delle figlie delle migrazioni,” in *Il colore della nazione*, ed. Gaia Giuliani (Milan: Mondadori, 2015), 200–214.
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- ⁸² Gioia Panzarell, “Venditori Di Libri per Strada Come Intermediari Culturali Della Letteratura Della Migrazione,” *El Ghibli* (blog), 2017, <http://www.el-ghibli.org/venditori-di-libri-per-strada-come-intermediari-culturali-della-letteratura-della-migrazione-gioia-panzarella/>.
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<https://doi.org/10.1080/09528829308576402>; Henry Giroux, “Consuming Social Change: The ‘United Colors of Benetton,’” *Cultural Critique* 26, no. Winter, 1993-1994 (1993): 5–32.

⁸⁷ Giuliani, “L’Italiano Negro.”

⁸⁸ The Italian fascist marching anthem “*Facetta nera*” [“Little Black Face”] exemplifies the way in which discourses of intimacy (whether geographical or sexual) were used to legitimate imperial expansion in the Horn of Africa and obscure the violence of colonialism. Representative lyrics include: “*Faccetta nera, bell’abissina/Aspetta e spera che già l’ora si avvicina!/Quando saremo insieme a te/noi ti daremo un’altra legge e un altro Re/La legge nostra è schiavitù d’amore*” (“Little black face, beautiful Abyssinian/Wait and see, for the hour is coming!/When we are with you/we shall give you another law and another king/Our law is slavery of love”). See also Ilaria Giglioli, “Producing Sicily as Europe: Migration, Colonialism and the Making of the Mediterranean Border between Italy and Tunisia,” *Geopolitics* 22, no. 2 (2017): 407–28, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1233529>.

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⁹¹ Gaia Giuliani, “Bella e abbronzata. Visualizzare la razza nella televisione,” in *Il colore della nazione*, ed. Gaia Giuliani (Milan: Mondadori Education, 2015), 46–60.

⁹² Tamara K. Nopper, “The Wages of Non-Blackness: Contemporary Immigrant Rights and Discourses of Character, Productivity, and Value,” *InTensions* Fall/Winter, no. 5 (2011): 1.

⁹³ According to UNHCR, the five main origin countries for refugees arriving to Italy by sea between January and April of 2017 were Nigeria, Bangladesh, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and The Gambia (see UNCHR Bureau for Europe, “Desperate Journeys - January to April 2017,” June 14, 2017, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/57696>). See also the report “Destination Europe?” by the MEDMIG research group (Heaven Crawley et al., “Destination Europe? Understanding the Dynamics and Drivers of Mediterranean Migration in 2015,” 2016, <http://www.medmig.info/research-brief-destination-europe.pdf>).

⁹⁴ Mitchell, “Different Diasporas and the Hype of Hybridity.”

⁹⁵ Antonietta Demurtas, “Italia, Capitale Straniero,” *Lettera43*, October 1, 2011, <http://www.lettera43.it/it/articoli/economia/2011/10/01/italia-capitale-straniero/20484/>.

⁹⁶ Ambrosian, or ambrosiano, refers to the city of Milan (the term derives from the city’s patron saint, Ambrose).

⁹⁷ “Cittadini Stranieri in Italia - 2017” (TuttiItalia.it, 2017), <https://www.tuttitalia.it/statistiche/cittadini-stranieri-2017/>.

⁹⁸ Sergio Rame, “Migranti, Boldrini Al Senato: ‘Approvate Subito Lo Ius Soli,’” *Il Giornale*, accessed August 5, 2017, <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/boldrini-ringrazia-i-migranti-meticciano-forma-cultura-1272560.html>.

⁹⁹ Frisina and Hawthorne, “Italians with Veils and Afros: Gender, Beauty, and the Everyday Anti-Racism of the Daughters of Immigrants in Italy,” 12.

¹⁰⁰ Katherine McKittrick, *Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Katherine McKittrick, “On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place,” *Social & Cultural Geography* 12, no. 8 (2011): 947–63, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2011.624280>.

¹⁰¹ Matlon, “Racial Capitalism and the Crisis of Black Masculinity,” 1016.

¹⁰² Giuliani and Lombardi-Diop, *Bianco e nero. Storia dell’identità razziale degli italiani*.

Chapter 5

Refugees and Citizens-in-Waiting

“[T]he historical origins and political lineage of immigration control, symbolized by the emergence of the passport, lie in its colonial bureaucratic assembling of populations as racially different, its performances of race in the marking of racial demarcations between deserving white European populations, who can move freely without hindrance, and undeserving non-white, non-European populations, who, at different times, in different ways, are regulated more heavily and penalized more frequently.”¹

“These actions might not resemble the nationalist struggles of a previous era. In fact at times they are hard to assess, or even recognize, since they do not involve grand gestures of state overthrow, the rise to power of charismatic leaders, or the development of the large-scale social projects characteristic of modernist statecraft. Yet they still manage to have profound impact, even in their moments of purported failure.”²

Coming Apart at the Seams: Black Solidarity, Liberalism, and the State

It was the summer of 2016, and I was in Amsterdam for a meeting of Black European scholars and activists. That day, in a spacious and sunny conference room, three Black Italian activists and entrepreneurs were sharing their stories with the assembled participants. The group present hailed from a wide swath of European countries with very different histories of Black presences, including Portugal, Switzerland, Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands. The testimonies from the Italian delegation that day centered on their shared experience of being born and raised in Italy, yet being perpetually perceived as foreigners simply because of the color of their skin. This pervasive sense of Blackness as always “out of place” in Italian space, they argued, even suffused debates about the reform of Italian citizenship law.

For instance, they explained, many politicians had argued that citizenship for the children of immigrants should be based on an Italian language proficiency test. But the Black Italian activists argued that this proposal was based on a conflation of all “second-generation” youth with the refugees and asylum seekers who were currently arriving to Italy by boat from the African continent. As they explained, this suggestion was clearly absurd (not to mention deeply offensive): Italian was their first and primary language—the Italian they spoke was so obviously inflected with the accents typical of the places where they were raised in Italy, and they even spoke specific regional Italian dialects. In a country where *national* belonging is frequently articulated in terms of *local* cultural practices, regional accents and dialects are a potent way of asserting that one is not a newcomer. According to the Black Italian activists and entrepreneurs, the largest obstacle to citizenship reform (and more generally, to the recognition of Black youth as legitimate members of the national Italian community) was that the Italian public continued to conflate them with first-generation immigrants and newly arrived refugees from Africa.

A Black activist from Portugal, who organizes Freire-inspired Theater of the Oppressed workshops for African migrants in Lisbon to explore issues such as everyday racism and the

surveillance of immigrant neighborhoods, raised her hand after this explanation. “But what about Pan-Africanism?” she asked, with great urgency and a hint of annoyance. “Doesn’t this split between citizenship and migration just create more divisions in the Black community?” A passionate debate erupted among the activists and scholars gathered in the room:

*Sarah [Italian-Ghanaian]*³: We are stuck with the immigrants, the boats—that is the image that is cast on me. I don’t want that for my children.

Imani [Italian-Brazilian]: The problem is that we don’t exist in Italy. That makes the politics of the government and the institutions and the parliament go in the wrong way. They say, “They have to integrate.” I’ll give you one example. If you say we are like immigrants, that we are all the same, we are all foreigners—some people may have been in Italy for more or less time, but at the end of the day we are all foreigners—then the government will respond by saying, “Then they need to learn the language.” We don’t need that. Immigrants need language courses, but we don’t need that. That is one example of the politics that have been made in Italy for the last 30 years about immigration, but not about citizens.

Anna [German-Turkish]: I understand this distancing from migrants, but at the same time, many people are traveling back and forth, which troubles the distinction.

Imani: When I said that we want to separate from migrants, I mean in terms of the politics regarding us, not because I’m saying “ugh.” Because there are a lot of Italian citizens who have foreign backgrounds. This gap must be filled, not with migration politics, but with the specific politics of *us*. Because there are more than a million of us in Italy...there are more than 5 million immigrants in Italy. But there are no politics for us, for this kind of “migration consequence,” or whatever you want to call us. Of course we are all immigrants, but in a different way, and these differences must be acknowledged, and must have specific politics.

Ines [Afro-Portuguese]: But this is still perpetuating a difference, instead of seeing a connection. The Portuguese constitution, for instance, shows that we are always immigrants—it maintains a distinction between migrants, natives, and stateless people. Look at your own constitutions and see how fundamental these distinctions are. I encourage you to think *beyond* these categories!

The debate that day remained largely unresolved. Yet the divergent viewpoints expressed during that gathering are reflective of a set of similar tensions that have run through each of the previous chapters in this dissertation: tensions between citizenship reform and refugee rights, between national inclusion and transnational Blackness, and between the liberal politics of inclusion and systemic critiques of the racial state. These are not merely abstract intellectual exercises. Rather, they are urgent questions that suffuse Black European life and political organizing. And these dilemmas will only continue to grow in urgency as established Black communities are increasingly confronted with the arrival of more recent migrants and refugees.

Chapter One, for instance, showed that efforts to challenge racist conceptions of citizenship via blood descent can also have the unintended consequence of producing new kinds

of racialized distinctions between “assimilable” and “non-assimilable” Black subjects. Chapter Three explored the challenges that Black youth in Italy face as they attempt to connect with a global Black diaspora and articulate the specificities of their lived experiences, all without reifying Italian exceptionalism or externalizing racism as something that happens “out there” in the United States. Chapter Four focused on one specific segment of these emergent Black Italian politics: Black women entrepreneurs who use their Afro-themed businesses as platforms for addressing sociopolitical issues such as citizenship and everyday gendered racism. I showed that while these women frequently marshal their economic productivity to make claims about their worthiness as citizens-in-waiting during a time of widespread economic stagnation, this move also works to distinguish them from newly arrived African refugees—who are in turn cast by politicians and mainstream media as a drain on scarce Italian state resources.

Each chapter has seemingly led, frustratingly, to a dead-end or an impasse, with no clear political alternatives in sight. On the one hand, Black youth activists have proven that liberal notions of citizenship are not fixed—they are in fact flexible and can be negotiated within the context of claims for the recognition and formal inclusion of historically marginalized racial subjects. At the same time, efforts to stretch the legal boundaries of citizenship to include qualities such as birthplace, cultural knowledge, or economic productivity also inadvertently create new sets of constitutive exclusions. Citizenship seemed at first to open up a new set of possibilities, challenging narrowly defined understandings of the modern nation-state by emphasizing heterogeneity and the porosity of borders. But in the context of an ethnonationalist resurgence in Italy that has linked the arrival of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to a general sense of Italian national malaise, Black activists are increasingly confronting the limitations of citizenship as a strategy for combatting institutionalized, state racism in Italy.

In this way, debates over the reform of Italian citizenship law have created (or at least exacerbated) a double bind in the politics of an emergent Black Italia: a struggle for the recognition of Black Italians that is oriented primarily on the goal of citizenship will also necessarily exclude or marginalize Black migrants and refugees in some way. Writing about the emergence of the category “Liverpool-born Black” in Britain, anthropologist Jacqueline Nassy Brown reflects on the highly ambiguous political work of birthplace in the articulation of Black European subjectivities. Brown focuses specifically on the ways in which the authors of the 1980 report *Racial Disadvantage in Liverpool* linked together Blackness, localness, and “birth here” in ways that distinguish between Blacks born in Liverpool with mixed origins on the one hand, and Africans and Afro-Caribbeans on the other. As she explains:

...the authors do not object to the use of birthplace as a legitimate distinction; their concern, rather, is that some Blacks are not recognized for having been born in Britain. In sum, Black Britons are situating themselves in a counter/*part* relation vis-à-vis the other Blacks who make up the total.⁴

As Brown goes on to explain, these “sedentarist metaphysics,”⁵ which naturalize links between place, culture, and identity, became a powerful way for Black Britons in the city of Liverpool to claim space and recognition. At the same time, this move also differentiated Liverpool-born Blacks politically, socially, and institutionally from recent Black migrants. This strategy itself draws upon a much longer British tradition of coding belonging and expressing the politics of difference through the racialization of place. Brown’s example thus shows how the emergence of Black political collectivities and racial identities operates both with and against hegemonic

national understandings of race, place, and membership. As I have shown in the previous chapters, Black communities in Italy are currently undergoing similar processes of negotiation and contestation as they begin to articulate something called “Black” or “Afro-Italianness” in the context of older Italo-Mediterranean histories of spatial and racial differentiation.

Here I should note that I am not advocating for an uncritical, essentialist notion of universal Black solidarity. After all Brown, writing in the spirit of Stuart Hall,⁶ is arguing precisely that diasporic unity is not necessarily a given, and that differences can (and do) exist within and across the Black diaspora. It is not my objective here to claim that all Black people in Italy share the same interests, political leanings, or lived experiences. Nor do I assert that they *should* constitute a “natural” political collective on the road to a proper diasporic consciousness. I am also not grasping for an ideal-type Black radical politics in Italy to uphold as a model. Rather, I am interested in the ways that the dominance of liberal notions of citizenship and nationalism can in practice preclude certain critiques of the racial state—critiques that see restrictive notions of citizenship, everyday racism against Black Italians, and the marginalization of sub-Saharan African refugees and migrants all as different facets of the same larger phenomenon. What sorts of new possibilities and alliances might be opened up when we begin to look beyond national-scale mobilizations that intentionally or inadvertently draw tenuous distinctions between Black citizens (including citizens-in-waiting) and Black migrants in Italy?

Activists, artists, and entrepreneurs across Italy have been working tirelessly in attempts to untangle these dilemmas. One important strategy has been to distinguish between institutional legitimation and national belonging. In other words, Black Italian activists might approach the struggle for citizenship as an effort to gain access to the rights and protections granted by the Italian state, all while minimizing the *affective* significance of citizenship as an expression of their national belonging, loyalty, or pride. This move, while subtle, has helped to create an opening for the expression of new kinds of capacious, global Black diasporic ties—such as those described in detail in Chapter Three. But although this approach produces powerful new possibilities for re-imagining Black Italy in terms of what Heather Merrill calls “relational place,”⁷ it still cannot fully undermine the hegemony of legally defined categories to produce distinctions among the families and communities that make up Black Italy.

Yet these various struggles also suggest that the dominant liberal frames of nation-state and citizenship are beginning to fray at the seams. Young activists who were deeply invested in making claims through the national community as a means of being legally recognized by the state have increasingly become disillusioned with this political project. After all, if the history of the liberal nation-state is a thoroughly racial formation, as I suggested in Chapter One, then any articulation of citizenship in relation to the nation-state will be by definition fraught and limited. This does not mean that Black activists have abandoned the struggle for the reform of Italian citizenship law—far from it. But at the same time, they are actively developing alternative ways of understanding themselves in relation to space, nations, borders, and diasporas.

Another dilemma remains, however. Nation-state citizenship is by definition exclusionary. But while scholars and activists have attempted to craft alternative forms of non-national citizenship that are more open and flexible (global citizenship, diasporic citizenship, urban citizenship, insurgent citizenship, etc.), the nation-state still holds hegemony over the legal apparatus of citizenship. So what options remain, beyond deploying a strategic form of nationalist essentialism or embracing a non-nationalist sense of transnational belonging with no real legal “teeth”? Are there other ways of imagining community, membership, or citizenship?

In this chapter, I will explore alternative forms of Black political organizing that do not regard citizenship or nation-state recognition as a primary or singular objective. But first, to situate the stakes of these emergent projects, I will briefly trace a series of postcolonial critiques of liberalism.⁸ As these scholars show, the world ordering ruptures of colonialism and slavery created new horizons of possibility while foreclosing other ways of understanding the human, place, and community. Yet other scholars have pointed to alternative formations and imaginations of nation, sovereignty, and citizenship that persist on colonized land and in postcolonial states. These projects, as described in the epigraph from anthropologist Yarimar Bonilla's study of Guadeloupe, may not be legible according to the rubrics of modern statecraft, but they nonetheless represent important political openings and provocations.

Using this work as a guide, I then turn to the work of a group of Italian-born Eritrean youth who began to self-organize as large numbers of Eritrean refugees and asylum-seekers started to arrive in Milan in 2015. Rather than drawing boundaries between themselves and newly arrived refugees on the basis of birthplace or Italian belonging, they have attempted to craft new forms of solidarity based on the shared ties of diaspora and anticolonial struggle. I conclude by considering what new kinds of Black Mediterranean alliances may continue to emerge in Italy, which has recently been rocked by the 2018 electoral victory of far-right and neo-fascist political candidates, as well as a new spate of racist attacks against Black migrants.

Retracing Our Steps: Ordering the World and Imagining Otherwise

Scholars working in the postcolonial tradition have long wrestled with the limits of liberalism, and with the links among liberal understandings of the human, the self-sovereign subject, the citizen, and the state. Gayatri Spivak's provocation in "Can the Subaltern Speak?" for instance, famously asked us to consider what sorts of histories, subjectivities, and possibilities have been foreclosed by colonial systems of power and representation.⁹ While these insights are frequently deployed to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions in colonial or formerly colonized states, however, they can also be flipped to "bring the West and the non-West within a unified field of vision that encompasses the historical terrain of their mutual formation."¹⁰ In the case of contemporary Italy, this means situating Black activists' current dilemmas about citizenship and national recognition in the context of the global geopolitical order that was produced out of the conjoined ruptures of modernity, racial slavery, and colonialism/imperialism.

In "Conscripts of Western Civilization," for instance, Talal Asad argues that Western imperialism ushered in a modern world ordered into discrete nation-states with clearly defined borders.¹¹ The modern state—in its various imperial, colonial, and postcolonial formations—shaped the horizons of possibility for individuals and societies across the world. It created a new set of conditions in which only certain kinds choices could be made—in which the state became the primary mode of organizing public and private life. The dominance of the modern state was not merely about the creation of a narrowly defined political sphere abstracted from the realm of everyday lived experience. Rather, these changes "involve[d] the reformation of subjectivities and the reorganization of social fields in which subjects act and are acted upon."¹²

Specifically, the emergence of the modern nation-state was intertwined with notions of modern subjecthood. This took the form of the liberal self-sovereign subject imbued with natural rights who, from a state of nature, enters into a voluntary agreement out of *his*¹³ own free will to 1) recognize the legitimacy of the state's authority, and 2) give up certain freedoms in exchange for the state's protection. In this formulation, the state serves as a guarantor that uses the apparatus of law to create the necessary conditions under which equal citizens can truly act as

free agents. But as scholars from Uday Mehta¹⁴ to David Theo Goldberg¹⁵ have argued, this supposedly universalist vision of the unencumbered modern liberal subject is in fact built upon a set of constitutive exclusions that have worked, historically, to exclude (or even differentially incorporate) the majority of the world's people.

What Mehta terms “inscrutability” (a parallel, I would argue, to Goldberg’s notion of “racial naturalism”) produces exclusion through the claim that certain groups fall outside the scope of the liberal frame due to their impenetrable racial or cultural alterity. Mehta’s “civilizational infantilism” (similarly parallel to Goldberg’s “racial historicism”), on the other hand, functions through the assertion that certain groups are unprepared for the status of free agent and equal citizen. There is a striking resonance between these claims and the citizenship debates I outlined in Chapter One. Specifically, racial difference (understood as blood descent and lineage) and cultural competency (understood as the temporal process of *becoming* a proper Italian) provided two distinct rationales for determining access to Italian citizenship.¹⁶ In both cases, the state not only creates the conditions under which modern citizens can act as sovereign agents with free will; the state is also a gatekeeper that, through the apparatus of law, determines who falls within the categories of “citizen” and “free agent” in the first place.

Various postcolonial theorists have shown that the dominance of these liberal understandings of individual autonomy in relation to the secular state also displaced other modes of being. Saba Mahmood, for instance, argues that Muslim women’s practices of religious self-cultivation in the context of the Egyptian mosque movement were illegible via liberal feminist understandings of agency.¹⁷ Along similar lines, Samera Esmeir has shown that mystical and religious conceptions of the human were displaced by the institution of juridical and secular articulations of the human under colonialism in Egypt.¹⁸ But what does this mean for our current conjuncture, and for attendant understandings of the state and citizenship? Several postcolonial theorists have characterized our current moment as one of “disenchantment”¹⁹ or “stuckness.”²⁰ The liberal promises of total revolution, national sovereignty, and positive personal freedom have been superseded by new relations of dependence, rampant authoritarianism, and exclusion. I want to argue, however, that this kind of disappointment is not only a characteristic of postcolonial states struggling in the wake of the unfulfilled promises of “political independence and national self-determination.”²¹ Disillusionment and dashed hopes suffuse the politics unfolding at liberalism’s limits around the world—from the southern shores of Europe, where refugees seeking to *gagner l’Europe* are confronted with an onslaught of legal categories that condition their movement, to the cities of Italy’s industrial triangle, where youth of color are facing the continual reproduction of racial exclusions within the category of “citizen.”

But does this mean that we are trapped within an iron cage, with no remaining alternatives? If the state is the primary arbiter of citizenship and rights, and the state itself cannot be understood outside histories of racial differentiation, then what viable political avenues remain? Once again, postcolonial and native studies scholars provide useful insights into the various forms of transgressive politics that have arisen from the margins to challenge the modern nation-state. Gary Wilder, for instance, notes that Aimé Césaire’s vision of Antillean departmentalization with France was a form of “strategic utopianism” that embraced non-national colonial emancipation as a way to address the limits of postcolonial freedom (namely, socioeconomic unfreedoms).²² Audra Simpson provides another generative example, in which the Kahnawà:ke Mohawks of the Iroquois Confederacy actively reject both American and Canadian citizenship and the politics of cultural recognition writ large, instead working to maintain a transnational Haudenosaunee sovereignty that is nested inside two settler colonial

states.²³ And Yarimar Bonilla has shown how the condition of Guadeloupean non-sovereignty has generated nascent political projects that are not exclusively oriented on the goal of national independence or the “membership formulas of the nation-state.”²⁴ These examples suggest that we have not yet exhausted all possibilities, and indeed that the current liberal impasse has (perhaps paradoxically) also generated a new moment characterized by political effervescence and experimentation.

Building on these interventions, and specifically on Yarimar Bonilla’s generative conception of *strategic entanglement*, in the sections that follow I want to consider the political alternatives to citizenship, the nation-state, and national recognition that are beginning to emerge from Black spaces in Italy. Bonilla defines strategic entanglement as “a way of crafting and enacting autonomy within a system from which one is unable to fully disentangle.”²⁵ These practices do not always contain coherent, explicitly articulated political visions, nor do they necessarily rise to the level of directly challenging the hegemony of the modern nation-state. But entanglement, I will argue in the sections that follow, provides a useful analytic for comprehending the ways that Black activists make use of shifting alliances and tactical engagements with the state for purposes that may include, but also extend beyond, the objective of nation-state recognition.²⁶ While the future outcome and implications of these movements remain unclear, they may also wrench open new visions of solidarity and community.

Overlapping Borders: The Eritrean Diaspora in Italy

The story of the Eritrean community in Italy provides a helpful lens through which to view the tensions between citizenship and national membership on the one hand, and diaspora and transnational Blackness on the other. While the narrative that follows is by no means an exhaustive account of the varied diasporas from the Horn of Africa in Italy,²⁷ it links together colonial histories, contemporary migrations, immigration and citizenship law, and the current southern Mediterranean refugee crisis. The multi-generational Eritrean community in contemporary Italy represents a powerful example of the complex and non-linear ways that notions of identity, community, and borders have been increasingly compelled to respond to both legacies of colonialism and contemporary border management practices.

In 1869, an Italian commercial company (with the backing of the Italian government) purchased the town of Assab, located strategically on the Red Sea. In 1882, control of Assab was formally handed over to the Italian state, marking the establishment of the first Italian overseas colony. Subsequently, Italy annexed the Port of Massawa through a secret diplomatic agreement with Britain in 1886. Italy continued to gradually occupy land along the southern part of the Horn of Africa in subsequent decades, forming what would eventually become Italian Somaliland. These territorial ambitions reached a temporary threshold in 1895, when Italy invaded Ethiopia but was soundly defeated by the armies of Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa.

By the 1880s, the Italian government had begun to launch large-scale infrastructural and development projects in the region. Nonetheless, living conditions for Eritreans under Italian rule remained among the poorest on the African continent.²⁸ Around this same time, Italians began to settle in the colonized territories of the Horn of Africa. From a few dozen settlements around the turn of the twentieth century, the white Italian population in Eritrea rapidly expanded to about 4,000 during World War I, and to almost 100,000 at the beginning of World War II.²⁹

Interracial fraternization was a relatively common occurrence in the Italian colonies of the Horn of Africa,³⁰ most notably in the form of the practice of *madamato*, or common law

relationships between Eritrean women and Italian men.³¹ Yet these interactions co-existed with everyday, legal, and spatial systems of separation, hierarchization, and violence deployed to maintain colonial control,³² as well as the widespread circulation of stereotypical (and in the case of women, hypersexualized) images of Blackness across Italy.³³ Italy also conscripted many of its colonial soldiers from Eritrea (the so-called *Ascar*, derived from the Arabic term *ascar*, or soldier).³⁴ These repressive conditions intensified under fascism, when Italy re-invaded Ethiopia and declared the establishment of the Italian Empire (including Italian East Africa) in 1936.³⁵ During the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, for instance, Italian soldiers deployed chemical weapons and violently crushed anticolonial resistance.³⁶ The Fascist period was also marked by spatial apartheid and the enforcement of strict racial laws—including anti-miscegenation policies.³⁷

Following the Italian defeat in World War II and the subsequent dissolution of the Italian empire in 1941, historian Angelo del Boca argues that “the Italian government not only eluded their obligations to clarity [about the realities of Italian colonialism] but actively impeded the emergence of truth.”³⁸ For decades, the only systematic historical account of Italian colonialism was contained in an apologist, 50-volume series published by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs called *L’Italia in Africa*. These “definitive” texts (fifteen of the twenty members of the editorial committee were former colonial officials) reinforced the whitewashed narrative of *italiani, brava gente*, and argued that Italian colonialism was more benevolent than the colonial endeavors of other European countries. While scholars inside and outside Italy have increasingly devoted critical attention to Italian colonialism, however, this subject continues to be neglected in formal school curricula and popular discussion in Italy. Still, the material and symbolic legacies of Italian colonialism endure: from widespread “racial clichés and prejudices,” to the street names and monuments scattered across Italy bearing the names and symbols of formerly colonized territories, to the ongoing border conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia.³⁹

Yet perhaps the most powerful and enduring legacy of Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa has been the establishment of a large and vibrant Eritrean diaspora in Italy. It was not entirely uncommon for Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Somalis to travel to Italy during the colonial period. These voyages were facilitated in part by the presense of the *Aeroporto Civile di Asmara*, first established by the Italian colonial authorities in 1922 as a military airport. The Aeoporto Civile was one of the first airports built in the Horn of Africa, and served as part of an international connection linking Mogadishu, Asmara, Khartoum, and Tripoli to Rome. But Italian decolonization after World War II also set into motion a new wave of migration across the Mediterranean from former colony to metropole. Yet unlike countries such as France, Britain, or the Netherlands, Italy never implemented policies favoring or facilitating immigration from its former colonies, nor did it extend full citizenship to colonized (or formerly colonized) subjects.

The first Eritreans⁴⁰ to settle in Italy were largely women, who came to Italy in the 1960s and 1970s to work as in-home domestic workers—sometimes for the same white Italian families they served in the former colonies after those families were expelled from Ethiopia by Haile Selassie in 1941.⁴¹ The coup d’état of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1974, which established a dictatorship in Ethiopia from 1977-1991, also catalyzed another wave of Eritrean emigration to Italy. This network of Eritreans in Italy assisted subsequent waves of Eritrean settlement in Italy during the war for independence and in the aftermath of the Isaias Afewerki regime. While Eritreans now make up only a small percentage of Italy’s total African population,⁴² in the 1970s they constituted a significant portion of the burgeoning Black community. In addition, many of the Eritreans who settled in Italy during this period were of mixed backgrounds, with a Black

Eritrean mother and a white Italian father who had returned to Italy without his Eritrean family and did not formally recognize his paternity.

The Eritreans who arrived to Italy during the second half of the twentieth century settled primarily in Milan and Rome, and remain largely concentrated in these bustling metropolitan areas today. Indeed, while it is currently popular in Italy to speak about the fate of the so-called “second generation,” or children of immigrants, the Eritrean community is in many cases now in its *third* generation of residence in Italy. Because of this long physical presence, as well as their colonial connections, Eritreans often narrate their ties to Italy in terms of shared language, culture, and sometimes lineage or kinship.⁴³ They constitute something akin to Homi Bhabha’s mimic man: “almost the same, but not quite/white,” a partial presence that both reproduces (post)colonial hierarchies and also threatens to rend them asunder. This is especially significant considering the legacy of one influential strand of Italian colonial racial theory, which posited that populations from the Horn of Africa were not of Black African origin but rather descended from white Semites.⁴⁴

These sorts of ambiguous proximities to Italian colonialism have also produced varying degrees of identification with Blackness among the Eritrean diaspora in Italy, and as a result have sometimes complicated their relationships with other African communities. A young Eritrean man who was born in Asmara but grew up in Milan explained it thusly:

The first generation [of Eritreans in Italy] would call people from Senegal “*negro*” ... we don’t look like people from Senegal; we are Black, but with European features like yours [*he gestures at my face as if to further illustrate his description*], the narrow nose... we’re not big and tall. The second generation gets along with all of the African communities—Senegalese, whatever, without problems. There is a symbiosis. Sports like basketball bring people together. That’s the second generation.

An event held in Milan during the spring of 2016 further illuminated these tensions. At a public forum on Black Italian cultural enterprises, a heated debate erupted between a group of younger Black Italians and an older Eritrean woman. Following a presentation by a group of young Black women entrepreneurs with families from Haiti, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda, the Eritrean audience member stood to tell her story. In her mid 40s or early 50s, dressed in a red dress and a black cardigan, with a red-tinged bob and matching red lipstick, she cut an exceedingly elegant and regal figure. She explained that she had lived in Italy since 1976, but did not experience the sort of discrimination recounted by the young women who had spoken earlier. She told the audience that, while unfortunate to hear, their stories simply did not resonate with her own experiences as an African woman in Italy. In fact, she noted, she had been hired to many high profile positions, including an appointment at the Vatican in Rome.

As she spoke, the young Black Italian women who had presented earlier began to audibly sigh, grumble, and shake their heads in frustration. The forum had already run thirty minutes over schedule, and the room was quickly becoming stuffy as the afternoon sun filtered in through the windows. We were all sweating through our clothes, yet the audience was crackling with energy—this was quickly becoming the liveliest conversation of the day. The moderator struggled to keep up with the ensuing volley of comments, dashing back and forth across the spacious room with a cordless microphone in hand. An Italian-Haitian woman raised her hand and responded that different shades of skin color produce different levels of acceptance or discrimination in Italy—an implicit reference to the Eritrean woman’s lighter complexion. The

Italian-Congolese woman sitting next to her agreed, adding that in her opinion Eritrean women enjoyed greater acceptance in Italy than women from other African countries. Yet these differences aside, Eritreans in Italy also draw heavily upon the cultural and political influences of the global Black diaspora—often in direct response to their experiences of state-sanctioned and everyday racisms.⁴⁵

The density of the co-constitutive ties between the Horn of Africa and Italy also extend beyond the level of everyday experience to encompass postcolonial geopolitics. For instance, the annual Eritrean festivals held in Bologna were key sites in the international struggle for Eritrean independence, bringing together thousands of Eritreans from across Italy, Europe, the United States, and other countries around the world.⁴⁶ Indeed, anthropologist Victoria Bernal notes that at the time of Eritrean independence in 1991, one in three Eritreans (approximately one million people) lived outside of the country—many having taken up residence in Italy.⁴⁷

These transnational connections certainly challenge the racialized notion of bounded national spaces, and of Europe and Africa as discrete and hermetically sealed geobodies. But the bureaucratization of the Italian immigration apparatus in the 1990s (described in Chapter One) began to fragment this multiplicity of overlapping colonial, migratory, labor, and familial relations linking Eritrea to Italy. The institution of Italy's first comprehensive immigration laws, as well as the tightening of Italian citizenship law, helped to calcify distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, and between different legal categories of migrants. Among other new regulations, the Legge Martelli formalized visa requirements for non-citizens seeking to enter Italy for extended periods of stay.⁴⁸ Of course, this is not to idealize a period of (post)colonial cosmopolitanism and mobility between Italy and the Horn of Africa that never actually existed. Rather, I am suggesting that the underlying conditions of Eritreanness and Blackness in Italy shifted in important ways after the 1990s. In particular, the Italian state's interpellation of postcolonial subjects as "migrants" worked to further invisibilize the colonial past, obscuring the ways that Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa had laid the groundwork for a range of northward cross-Mediterranean migrations in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

This sort of spatio-temporal disjuncture was brought to life in *S.I.C.: Stranieri in Casa* [*Strangers at Home*], a short independent film directed by Eritrean activist and nightclub owner Alem Abbai and Marco Luzzi.⁴⁹ *S.I.C.* was filmed in Milan in 1998, and features a cast of amateur actors drawn from the city's tightly knit Eritrean community. In the film, a group of young Eritrean men and women leave a Milanese nightclub after an evening of revelry, only to be stopped by the police as potential suspects in a car robbery. The police officers order them to line up against a wall, and demand that they produce identification documents. When several members of the group reveal their Italian identity cards, one officer responds suspiciously: "You've been here for *how* long? And how is it that you have Italian citizenship?"



Figure 20 Scene from *Stranieri in Casa*: Police officers review the Eritrean group's documents and ask how they have Italian citizenship.

Source: YouTube - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0LFHT8q_98&t=414s (screenshot taken at 6:54).

The direct colonial relationship between Italy and the Horn of Africa, as well as the relatively long history of the Eritrean presence in Italy, distinguishes the Eritrean diaspora from other African communities in Italy. These characteristics are precisely what make the Eritrean diaspora such an important site for engaging with alternative responses to the refugee “crisis” in Italy. How does a Black community that has been firmly established in Italy for multiple generations respond to the arrival of large numbers of refugees who share their national background? How are the possibilities for solidarity conditioned by the imposition of legal, state-sanctioned categories? To what extent does citizenship status produce new divisions, and when can it instead facilitate transgressive acts of solidarity? These questions will be the focus of the following section.

Tales from Porta Venezia and Beyond

The summer and fall of 2015 witnessed the worst refugee crisis in recent memory: nearly 8,000 people daily arrived to Europe, fleeing violence and upheaval in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.⁵⁰ Italy—and specifically the tiny resort island of Lampedusa, located 70 miles away from Tunisia—was a key point of arrival for thousands of refugees and asylum-seekers from Eritrea.⁵¹ That same year, the Mediterranean Sea was designated “the most deadly sea in the world” and “the most deadly border in the world.” By August, the official tally of deaths in the Mediterranean had surpassed 2,000 (for comparison, the total number of recorded fatalities for 2014 was 96). Italy had abandoned its Mare Nostrum maritime search-and-rescue program in 2014 to comply with the EU Triton border securitization operation, with the result that horrifying reports of refugee deaths at sea became a grim fixture in the summer news cycle.⁵²

By the fall, large numbers of Eritreans who had survived the grueling Mediterranean crossing began to appear in Milan, most notably in the Eritrean neighborhood of Porta Venezia. The circumstances of those who had made it as far north as Milan varied widely. Most had arrived to Italy by sea, traveling across the desert to Libya and then traversing the Mediterranean by boat to land in Lampedusa or Sicily. By passing through Libya, a former Italian colony and one of the key transit nodes along the Central Mediterranean migration route, Eritrean asylum-seekers were actually re-tracing a much older Italian colonial route.

A fraction of those Eritreans who arrived to Sicily subsequently registered asylum applications with Italian immigration authorities.⁵³ Those who did not go through these formal channels simply “disappeared” once they arrived to Italy, using informal networks to gradually travel north in search of jobs and in some cases family reunification. But even for those who had filed applications (and whose applications were approved), this did not guarantee easier mobility within Europe. The European Union’s Dublin Regulation states that asylum-seekers must apply for refugee status in the first EU country they enter. This meant that Eritreans who landed in Italy were not allowed to apply for asylum anywhere outside of Italy. Given the weak state of the Italian economy, and the fact that asylum-seekers must wait for six months before they can access the Italian labor market, this effectively trapped Eritrean migrants in legal limbo. Unable to work and unable to leave Italy, the majority went underground, dropping out of the Italian asylum system in an attempt to travel clandestinely to more economically robust countries in northern Europe.⁵⁴ But whether they sought to stay in Italy or travel onward to Germany or Sweden, Milan was a logical stopping point because of Porta Venezia’s Eritrean community.




Figure 21 Map showing central Mediterranean migration routes from Africa to Italy. Brown lines indicate land travel, and white lines indicate sea travel. Thick lines represent heavily traveled routes. Note that one route from Eritrea to Italy passes through Libya, another former Italian colony.

Source: European Political Strategy Centre, “Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean” *Strategic Notes 22* (February 2, 2017), European Commission.

Porta Venezia, located three metro stops northeast of the central Piazza Duomo, draws its name from the enormous stone gates built in the nineteenth century along the former medieval and Roman walls of the city. Lined with stately neoclassical and art nouveau *palazzi* [buildings], Porta Venezia's streets are now home to numerous Eritrean restaurants and cafés as well as nightclubs and underground clubs serving Milan's youthful, stylish set. The neighborhood has also become a major hub for Milan's queer community: it contains some of the city's most popular gay venues, and also hosts Milan's annual Pride Parade. These same qualities have also spurred the rapid gentrification of Porta Venezia over the course of the last decade.⁵⁵

Long-term Eritrean residents of Porta Venezia quickly took notice as refugees began sleeping on the streets and in nearby Montanelli Park, and washing their bodies and clothes in public drinking fountains. Many had not eaten in days, and others bore visible injuries left over from their perilous journeys across the Sahara to Libya, and across the Mediterranean to Sicily. At first, reactions to these newcomers were mixed. Some residents feared that these tattered and weathered new arrivals would damage the reputation of the neighborhood and jeopardize their already precarious standing in Milan. Yet others, who remained supportive of the Afwerki regime despite its track record of human rights abuses, saw these refugees as defectors who had betrayed the embattled cause of Eritrean nationalism. But most residents responded to the influx of refugees from Eritrea by beginning to launch informal networks of support, collecting food and clothing, providing rudimentary first aid, and arranging places for refugees to sleep.




Figure 22 Map of Italy showing the location of Milan. The inset map of Milan indicates the location of Porta Venezia.

Source: Wikimedia Commons maps modified by Author.

The everydayness of these efforts was both striking and inspiring: One evening in early 2016, I happened to be meeting an Eritrean friend from Porta Venezia for an *aperitivo* in the historic center of Milan. As we snacked on finger foods and sipped Aperol spritzes in a trendy bar atop a large department store, his cellphone started to ring. Our conversation paused as he answered the call, speaking quickly and seriously in Tigrinya. When he put down his phone, he explained that a woman had just arrived to Milan from Eritrea six months ago, and was stuck in a precarious housing situation with her brother. Reluctantly, he agreed to take her in because he had a spare couch in his apartment where she could sleep. Noting the look of surprise on my face—he had agreed to house a complete stranger over the course of a rapid-fire, two-minute phone call—he explained that these sorts of phone calls had become extremely common over the last several months. Members of the Eritrean community in Porta Venezia regularly reached out to friends and family to arrange temporary housing for those who had just arrived to Milan.

What is unique about these sorts of interventions in Porta Venezia is two-fold. First, long-time Eritrean residents are resisting the legally produced division between second-generation Black Italians and newly arrived refugees. Second, they are not working with an abstract subject of “human rights” in mind—the dominant framing of the southern European refugee emergency adopted by sympathetic, left-leaning organizations—but rather are engaging with Eritrean refugees through historically and geographically situated understandings of diaspora, urban inequality, postcolonialism, and Black Mediterranean interconnection.

In the section that follows, I will trace the story of one specific group, Cambio Passo. Cambio Passo was formed spontaneously in 2013, when a group of Eritrean youth born and/or raised in Italy began bringing meals to Eritrean migrants and refugees on the streets of Porta Venezia.⁵⁶ The group quickly grew into a “citizens’ committee” that semi-autonomously coordinated service provision for refugees in the neighborhood. In describing the work of Cambio Passo, I will focus on the way that two of the group’s original members narrate their “strategic entanglements” with municipal and national politics, as well as the spatially extended obligations of diaspora. This is not intended to serve as an exhaustive account of the refugee crisis in Milan and of the city’s various resettlement efforts.⁵⁷ Rather, I wish to engage with the ways certain Black refugee rights activists have thought through their own involvement in this “crisis” in relation to broader questions of citizenship, identity, belonging, and diaspora.

“To Porta Venezia They Only Sent the Police”: Swerving Visibility and Representation

In July of 2016, shortly after the gathering in Amsterdam I described at the beginning of this chapter, I met Medhin in Porta Venezia’s sprawling Montanelli Park. Medhin had also been present for that heated exchange between Black European activists about citizenship and refugees, and I was eager to hear her own evaluation of the debate. As an Italian-Eritrean native of Porta Venezia, one of the founders of the Rete G2 (described in Chapter One), a student of Black radicalism, and an advocate for newly arrived Eritrean refugees in Milan, she seemed uniquely situated to think across these different strands of Black Italian youth mobilization.

After exchanging pleasantries near the park’s graffiti-covered planetarium, we headed over to a patch of grass near a large, wrought iron gazebo. Medhin produced a tie-dyed blanket out of her canvas bag, along with two cups and a plastic bottle of lukewarm but flavorful tea given to her by an Eritrean acquaintance. Medhin, whose long braids were tied back in a light blue scarf, gestured toward the gazebo in front of us while simultaneously swatting away aggressive tiger mosquitos. The gazebo’s dark balustrades were draped with a rainbow of clothes and linens—a zebra-striped towel, a blue shirt, white singlets. Next to the gazebo, an African man in a red t-shirt sat on a park bench, nodding along to the music in his white earbuds. Nearby, we could also glimpse a group of African men and women washing their feet and drinking water from a public fountain. This was a refugee encampment, Medhin explained. Some of the men looked to her to be Eritrean, but not all of them—Medhin was even fairly certain that she recognized some of them from her years of community organizing in the neighborhood.

Medhin explained that she became involved in refugee activism three years ago, most recently helping to found the group *Cambio Passo*. But when I asked Medhin if there were many *seconda generazione* youth like her who were involved in refugee activism, she shook her head. There was one exception, however: Many Syrian youth who had grown up in Italy became involved in advocacy for Syrian refugees escaping civil war through the extensive network of Islamic organizations in Milan, including the *Coordinamento Associazioni Islamiche di Milano* [Coordination of Islamic Association of Milan, or CAIM]. CAIM’s close connections to the municipality also ensured that the city of Milan was attuned to the needs of Syrian refugees.

But Medhin and several of her Eritrean friends soon noticed that the refugees from Eritrea—who lacked the same level of institutional recognition by city officials—had been largely sidelined in terms of service provision. Indeed, some of the city’s only official engagements with Porta Venezia during the refugee influx were conducted under the auspices of neighborhood security: the police regularly surveilled shops and restaurants in the neighborhood, issuing citations for cleanliness concerns and asking workers for their immigration documents without due cause. The assumption of the police, Medhin and others I spoke to concurred, was that Eritrean residents of Porta Venezia were harboring and possibly even exploiting refugees and irregular migrants.⁵⁸ Sordid stories of Eritrean smuggling rings in Milan belied a more mundane reality, one in which long-time Porta Venezia residents were providing food and shelter (and sometimes arranging travel) for undocumented Eritreans. “The city of Milan *loves* to talk about how great it is with refugee resettlement,” Medhin said sardonically, with an exaggerated sigh. “But the reality is that this is thanks to the mobilizations of its citizens.”

Medhin’s comment could at first glance be dismissed as a symptom of what anthropologist Andrea Muehlebach has characterized as “neoliberal morality,” in which post-Fordism and the retreat of the Italian state have generated a voluntary labor regime in northern Italy that dovetails ambiguously with both Catholic and autonomist worker traditions.⁵⁹ The *modello lombardo del welfare* (Lombardian welfare model), Muehlebach argues, produces a

normative citizen-subject who is responsible for producing social cohesion and public good. As Medhin explained, the initial goal of *Cambio Paso* was to first open a space that would provide services to Eritrean refugees, and then eventually hand the “keys” over to the city of Milan—until the volunteers realized how resource- and expertise-strapped the municipality actually was.

But while Muehlebach’s study was conducted a mere ten metro stops away (in my neighborhood of Sesto San Giovanni), the story of neoliberal morality does not square neatly with the picture Medhin conjured of Porta Venezia. For one, neither those giving nor receiving voluntary services fell within the normative scope of citizenship. Even those who, like Medhin, were able to naturalize through Law No. 91/1992, at the level of quotidian interactions Black Italians were still not recognized as legitimate members of Italian society. In addition, the informal efforts of Porta Venezia’s Eritrean residents were not always valued by municipal officials as signs of proper neoliberal morality, and in fact were often criminalized under the rubrics of “smuggling” or “human trafficking.”⁶⁰ Indeed, projects like *Cambio Passo* were not so much about the social reproduction of abstract urban, regional, or national Italian space, but about the obligations of other kinds of affective ties and connections. Medhin explained:

As the children of immigrants (or immigrants who have been in Italy for a long time), they can help more easily, even if they are not formal cultural mediators. It’s not just a question of being able to speak the necessary languages, although that matters. I am not comfortable conversing in Tigrinya, but there is still some common ground. [...] I want to see more *seconda generazione* get involved because these people are their relatives. There are people who are arriving who are my age. If they weren’t Eritreans, I might not have gotten as involved doing this work. When you are in the story, it’s hard *not* to care.

Medhin was quick to note, however, that activism around citizenship reform was still important. At the practical level, she explained, it made sense for activists to focus on a specific, liberal policy intervention so as not to exhaust their limited energy, resources, and political goodwill. But at the “cultural level,” as she put it, it was still possible for second-generation Black Italians to widen the scope of their concerns. But this was a challenging tightrope walk to navigate, Medhin explained with great empathy, eyes narrowing behind her glasses:

As far as the question of Blackness goes, our generation is still figuring it out. We’ve been going on this journey of identity, of trying to get documents, and so on. But there is a new risk—that whoever achieves a certain level of status will become part of the mainstream (even though we will always be Black). They acquire privilege, like expats compared to immigrants. It’s a similar story with immigrants from southern Italy—they eventually achieved a certain status and now they have no more problems. It’s the same narrative for the children of immigrants, except for the legal documents. But at the quotidian level, it’s more or less the same. So the risk is that we will enter into the same mechanics as the other groups... The citizenship discourse is glamorous; there are so many theses and events about the second generation. The risk is leaving out the newly arrived. Can you enlarge your circle of privilege, or will you do what those before you did? [...] A refugee who arrives when he is 15, because many are arriving when they are that young... I see him as a 2G, though with a different journey. This can’t just end with me and my experiences.

Medhin described her commitment to both the citizenship and refugee struggles as one of articulating multiple (and sometimes, seemingly contradictory) entanglements. On the one hand, she explained, “I am trying to say that I am Italian and this [citizenship] law should include me, to widen a community.” But on the other hand, *not* being perceived as Italian could also help her when working with refugees. “So, you’re shape-shifter!” I exclaimed, both of us collapsing onto the tie-dyed blanket in raucous laughter. Medhin agreed: “You stretch your muscles based on what you have to do. It seems opportunistic, but we all do it. For instance, I have to be able to show the administration that I can speak to [the Eritrean refugees] in a way that they can’t.”

In adopting my characterization of herself as a shape-shifter, Medhin was not invoking a romancitized hybridity in which she could don and shed identities completely unencumbered by relations of power. Nor was she drawing on the liberal language of “free choice.” Rather, she was attempting to explain the different political openings and closures that were generated by her strategic entanglements with the liberal and state-centric politics of national citizenship, the transnational politics of Blackness, and the postcolonial politics of the Eritrean diaspora in Italy. These are the same themes that Medhin explored in her successful independent documentary film *Asmarina* (2015),⁶¹ which tells the story of the Eritrean community in Porta Venezia. In fact, the final section of the documentary focuses specifically on the work of Medhin’s generation to assist Eritrean refugees. As she explained to me, she added this section to the end of the film precisely to challenge the tendency (among both white and Black Italians) to separate the concerns of second-generation youth from those of refugees.



Figure 23 A frame from Alan Maglio and Medhin Paolos' documentary *Asmarina* (2015), showing generations of Eritrean history in Milan.

Source: Still from the *Asmarina* press packet.

A couple of months later, I met with Rahel in the same park in Porta Venezia. It was a temperate fall day; the summer humidity had finally broken and although it was sunny out, the air was no longer unbearably hot. We took a seat on a chipped green bench overlooking the park's pavilion, and again watched as groups of Eritrean men strolled through the park, stopping to wash in a public water fountain and hang their clothes to dry on the balustrades of the wrought-iron gazebo. Rahel, also Eritrean, was born in Rome and raised by a white Italian family; she moved to Milan fifteen years ago to study urban planning at the *Politecnico*. She had worked for a time in Asmara as an urban planner, but ultimately returned to Italy when political instability in Eritrea made her work nearly impossible. Rahel was almost forty, but the only thing that betrayed her actual age was the white fly-aways that frizzed up from her cornrows, which were done in a variation of a traditional Eritrean style—following her head midway down the back of her scalp, and then cascading into long braids that she pulled along the right side of her face. Rahel had a disarming habit of unconsciously running her hands over the ends of her braids pensively as she spoke, and of scrunching up her chin when emphasizing a point.

Rahel was one of the founding members of Cambio Passo, along with Medhin. Several years ago, Rahel began working as a community organizer in Porta Venezia, where she brought together merchants from the neighborhood to challenge the criminalization of their informal *accoglienza*⁶² activities by local authorities. Like Medhin, Rahel was also frustrated that these activities were regarded as little more than refugee exploitation: “I told city councilman [Pierfrancesco] Majorino that without the Eritrean community, there wouldn't be any refugee *accoglienza* in Milan.” While there were reception centers in Milan where refugees could find shelter indoors, Eritreans were disproportionately sleeping outside for a variety of reasons: the centers did not have cultural mediators who spoke Tigrinya, the centers controlled their inhabitants' movements and daily activities in ways that were often highly restrictive; and those who had dropped out of the formal asylum system could not—or were afraid to—engage with certain Italian institutions. These concerns eventually laid the groundwork for Cambio Passo:

People, like Medhin, mostly Eritreans and Ethiopians, who were hanging out here saw this problem. We saw groups, first 10 of them, then 20, then 50, then 100 in precarious conditions, skinny, poorly dressed, sick. So we began to activate our networks. The group started to converge daily on Porta Venezia to collect clothes, goods, and organize medical assistance. When the refugees were at *Milano Centrale*,⁶³ the city provided *accoglienza*, but to Porta Venezia they sent the police.

As Rahel explained, these community-based efforts often swerved the politics of representation. Unlike the Muslim community, which was comparatively well represented through formal associations by the centrist *Partito democratico*, the Eritrean community did not have such strong connections to local government.⁶⁴ As a result, a two-tiered system of refugee reception soon emerged in Milan: one for Arabs, and another for everyone else. When Rahel and her fellow members of Cambio Passo confronted municipal officials about this situation, they only demurred. “They were all just alibis,” Rahel explained. “They said these people weren't planning to stay in Italy...one high-ranking official said that maybe Eritreans just prefer sleeping outside!”

Milan had already seen three occupations between 2004 and 2009, during which Somali, Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Sudanese migrants claimed housing by squatting in abandoned buildings. Yet Black migrants and refugees were perpetually regarded as temporary and transient figures, not potential long-term residents and certainly not connected in any way to the longer

history of the Italian nation. And even if these migrants did intend to leave economically stagnant Italy in search of greener pastures (as many certainly did), they were precluded from consideration because of the dominant, sedentarist understandings of belonging. Ironically, they were trapped by the same spatial politics that shaped the citizenship reform debates unfolding simultaneously in Italy: Black youth were *also* regarded as perpetual migrants and outsiders, and sought formal state recognition by asserting the duration of their residency within Italy.

In this way, the Cambio Passo activists from Porta Venezia sought to call out the limits of the state's immigration apparatus, and specifically the way that the EU and Italian asylum systems intersected with municipal service provision to produce a situation of benign neglect at best, and slow violence at worst. Significantly, they were *not* seeking incorporation into the formal bureaucratic apparatus of *accoglienza*. While Cambio Passo's efforts certainly filled in for the state's racialized neglect of Eritrean refugees, the group did so in a way that also subverted the state's very categories and systems of differentiation. Rahel believed (and I am strongly inclined to agree with her) that neither the institutional Left nor the Right was invested in a broader sense of justice, and would never deign to challenge restrictive state policies regarding migration and citizenship. "And as long as you define the problem like that," Rahel said after a long pause, "I won't get involved." For this reason, both Medhin and Rahel insisted that Cambio Passo was not interested in becoming institutionalized—rather, the group sought to engage tactically with the municipal apparatus in order to "legitimize spaces of pre-existing action" (and thus curtail policing). Indeed, the question of whether to establish Cambio Passo as an official *associazione* [voluntary association] was the subject of lengthy debate among the group's thirteen members. While Cambio Passo ultimately decided to formalize its structure, some of the group's members still contend that this choice has left them with less flexibility.

Like Medhin, Rahel worried that the citizenship reform movement would fragment these tenuous connections between the Eritrean youth who had grown up in Italy and recently arrived refugees. I explained that I was interested in speaking to her precisely because so many Black Italians I had spoken to were careful to emphasize their *difference* from refugees when presenting themselves to the Italian public. Rahel furrowed her brow, responding sharply:

But this is a distinction produced by the society. This is the fear I have with the citizenship law—that it will cut the ties between immigrants and their children. This is a racist country, to the roots. There are so many distinctions, and now there are different levels, starting from those who are absolutely "not integratable."

Indeed, Rahel longed for a different understanding of citizenship that could hold together multiple, overlapping and intersecting attachments. "Our ties are stronger than those of *volontarismo*," she said, echoing Medhin's comments from earlier. "Community ties are not so liquid. We can't just help for six months and then move on to something else." It is important to note here that Rahel was not simply replacing one narrow form of nationalism (Italian) for another (Eritrean). Quite the contrary: Rahel, Medhin, and many other organizers had in fact embraced the category *habesha* as a way of uniting Eritreans and Ethiopians in diaspora, and did not distinguish between the two groups when conducting everyday outreach activities. This move represented a subtle way of undercutting the histories of betrayal and conflict stemming from the border disputes that were catalyzed by Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa.

These engagements can be read as yet another way of understanding the contemporary conditions of Black Italianness. Both Medhin and Rahel emphasized the fact that Black Italian

youth who were born and raised in Italy—those who were still not fully considered by society to be Italian citizens—were the ones providing services for “uprooted” refugees who had been cast aside by the state, thus exposing the limits of liberal universalism. The connections they articulated to newly arrived refugees were framed in terms of postcolonial interconnection, diaspora, and spatially extended kinship—not normative liberal European humanitarianism, or neoliberal Italian voluntarism. It is for this reason that Rahel dreams of eventually expanding the scope of *Cambio Passo*, using refugee *accoglienza* as a jumping-off point to engage other Black Italians in critical discussions about identity—for instance, by reading and reflecting on the autobiographies of immigrants. These sorts of gatherings, Rahel explained, could help Black youth come to terms with the multiple relations in which they are entangled, relations that render them neither fully “Italian” nor “immigrant.” Unlike the dominant framing of citizenship reform, this conceptualization of Blackness in Italy is not oriented on birthplace *or* culture, but rather on the intersections of what Rahel evocatively characterized as “spaces of uncertainty.”

Spaces of Uncertainty, From Emmanuel to Idy

While the previous section focused primarily on the narrations of two individuals, the reflections from Medhin and Rahel about *Cambio Passo* suggest that the interactions between second-generation Black youth and newly arrived refugees can begin to produce spaces of rupture that trouble the assumptions and divisions embedded within state-sanctioned categories such as “migrant” and “citizen.” *Cambio Passo* provides a provocative, albeit limited, example of entanglement: Eritrean youth born and raised in Italy are exposing the limits of a liberal politics of recognition, but they are not disavowing engagements with the state altogether.

This does not mean that the Italian-Eritrean activists are merely cynical and steely-eyed practitioners of “strategic cunning” or “pragmatic vision,” however.⁶⁵ Their involvement in both citizenship reform and refugee *accoglienza* suggests that at the level of everyday practice, Black Italian youth are questioning the liberal promises of visibility, recognition, and citizenship—even as they are still compelled to respond to these same frameworks. Their activities may not always read as clearly articulated political philosophies. Nonetheless, they reflect a preoccupation with the enactment of diasporic solidarities, along with a careful attention to the way that different Black subjects are situated in relation to the very categories they are putting into question. This ambivalence was expressed to me by an Italian-Eritrean journalist and citizenship reform activist: “Does it make sense to focus on the ‘second generation’ while [refugees] are dying?”

This kind of self-questioning may seem politically inconsequential because it does not call for a total revolution, one comprising the complete eradication of nation-state borders and state-sanctioned categories. Indeed, there has recently been a vogue of sorts among scholars upholding the abstracted figure of the refugee as a symbol of complete refusal who embodies an immanent radicalism deriving from his (and in these accounts, it is usually *his*) position within the exceptions of liberalism. But beyond the fact that this approach commits narrative violence against the complex and varied stories of *actual* refugees, it also paradoxically upholds the same modernist vision of self-sovereignty and independence that these intellectuals are seeking to subvert through the refugee. The activists profiled in this chapter have not extracted themselves from oppressive legal categories—instead, they are grappling with their entanglements in both the liberal politics of recognition as well as other kinds of transversal relations. In navigating these “spaces of uncertainty,” they have admirably opened new spaces of solidarity and care in the interstices of a moment characterized by widespread political immobility.

But what is happening beyond the old stone gates of Porta Venezia? The Eritrean community of Milan is a unique example because of its long colonial and postcolonial ties to the Italian nation. But are there other spaces in Italy where new understandings of Black Italianness are emerging that look beyond the liberal categories of citizenship? In Chapter Three, I discussed the wave of organizing and debates spurred by the death of Nigerian asylum-seeker Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi. I observed that this horrific event seemed to bring young Black Italians who were born in Italy and seeking recognition as *Italian* into direct conversation with Black migrants and refugees. But this opening proved to be short-lived. At a protest in Rome the week following Nnamdi's murder, the old fault lines seemed to be cracking opening once again.

About one hundred people had gathered under the beating sun in the Nicola Calipari gardens of Piazza Vittorio Emanuele II on July 12, 2016. The crowd was arranged around a raised platform, and demonstrators could add their name to a list to deliver brief, impromptu speeches. While the majority of those present were white Italians, I recognized many familiar faces from among Rome's African associations, as well as the citizenship reform movement and the burgeoning Black Italian movement. One person in particular caught my eye: Karima, the Italian-Liberian rapper, was dressed in a bright yellow top, her voluminous twists wrapped in an elaborate, colorful turban. She turned to me, a look of exasperation on her face. "I'm ready to leave," she said. After listening to almost an hour of improvised speeches, she was certain that there was a deep confusion about the purpose of this protest, and about the workings of racism in Italian society. "They're talking about refugees, but we live it differently as members of the second generation. [African migrants] experience racism when they arrive, but we live it every day, for 20, 30 years here." Earlier that day, on the way to the protest, I had asked an Italian-Haitian journalist and a Cameroonian activist why it seemed that so few people were turning out for these demonstrations—and why so many Black Italians felt disconnected from these efforts. The Cameroonian activist noted, wistfully, that there had been an enormous march in Rome after the murder of Jerry Masslo in 1989. The journalist responded, with a sigh of resignation, "But that was a different time. There wasn't yet this media discourse of 'invasion.'"

Two years later, in 2018, Italy was embroiled yet again in racially charged national election campaigning. Political parties across the right-wing spectrum continued to direct everyday Italians' economic woes toward animosity against the scapegoat figure of the Black African migrant, using the same rhetoric of invasion my journalist friend had lamented in 2016. Against this backdrop, on February 3 a twenty-eight year old white Italian man named Luca Traini (who had previously run for local office on a Lega Nord ticket) carried out a shooting spree against Black migrants in the central Italian town of Macerata.⁶⁶ Traini claimed that he was acting in retaliation for the death of an eighteen-year-old white Italian woman (allegedly) at the hands of a Nigerian gang member; after the rampage, he wrapped himself in the Italian flag, raised his arm in the fascist Roman salute, and shouted "*Viva l'Italia!*"⁶⁷ While miraculously none of Traini's targets were killed, he ultimately injured five men and one woman—migrants from Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, and Mali. One month later, as Italians were waking up to the national election results, a sixty-five year old white Italian man shot and killed a Senegalese street vendor name Idy Diene in Florence. Roberto Pirrone was unemployed and had planned to commit suicide to relieve his family of the financial burden of his care; instead, he decided to go out into the streets of Florence and kill the first person he encountered.⁶⁸ Yet as additional reports of the murder surfaced, it became clear that Pirrone had actually first crossed paths with a white Italian woman and her child, and then decided to kill Diene instead. In a cruel twist of fate,

Diene's widow had also been the partner of Samb Modou, a Senegalese man who was killed in a racially motivated attack in Florence in 2011.

This series of explicitly anti-Black acts of violence prompted a massive outcry and enormous demonstrations across Italy. But one moment in particular from a protest in Florence stood out. A young Italian-Senegalese woman in a blue puffer coat inaugurated the event, standing against a somber grey sky. She began with her recollections of being a small child in 2011 and hearing the news of two Senegalese migrants being shot in the street "like animals." She remembered hoping to herself that this would be a one-time event, something that would never happen again. Her voice cracking, she described her subsequent horror upon hearing the news from Macerata and then Florence: "I am afraid of walking through the streets because my skin is black. Those of us born and raised here, we all need to fight together." Applause erupted from the audience as she attempted to exit the stage. But the next speaker, an older Senegalese woman, summoned her back up. "I want to speak directly to you," said the older woman into the microphone, a supplicating tone of motherly compassion radiating from her voice. "You said you were born here. You said that you were afraid. But you were born here, and you have rights. If all of us are here," she said, gesturing to the hundreds of African men and woman gathered around them, "it means that we, too, are a part of this country. And we should not be afraid."⁶⁹

The aftermath of Macerata and Florence suggests that once again, the intertwined "crises" of economic stagnation, refugee arrivals, and anti-Black violence may yet produce an opening for a new politics of Black solidarity that unites Black Italian youth, migrants, and refugees. Building on the work of David Scott, I am not arguing that Black activism around citizenship or national recognition is a fundamentally misguided project; rather, these efforts represent tentative interventions into the particular, liberal-modern "problem space"⁷⁰ into which Black youth were involuntarily conscripted.⁷¹ But at the same time, events from Porta Venezia to Macerata to Florence suggest that this liberal frame is coming apart, and something yet to be determined is emerging in its place. The activities of Eritrean youth in Cambio Passo and the dialogue between two generations of Senegalese women in Florence are evidence of a multiplicity of efforts to craft new kinds of relations between mobility and membership, between citizenship and diaspora, and between rights and borders—emergent forms of what Sylvia Wynter described as the unorthodox sovereignties that derive from systemic marginalization.⁷²

These moves, I wish to suggest, are immanent expressions of a Black Mediterranean political praxis. They represent the beginnings of an alternative politics oriented *not* on the nexus of citizenship-integration-migration-xenophobia, but rather on the structural embeddedness of racism within postcolonial Italy. Italy after all, along with the rest of Europe, was complicit in the formation of a colonial, socio-spatial racial order that served as the condition of possibility for restrictive demarcations of "Italianness" and for the racial violences of Fortress Europe.⁷³ But this dense and power-laden web of connections across the Mediterranean, traced back and forth through the centuries by Italian colonial invaders and Eritrean housekeepers, by Nigerians crowded aboard barely-seaworthy boats and EU-sanctioned forced removals, is not only an archive of grief, pain, anger, and righteous indignation. These interconnected spaces and histories—the same ones that allowed a Senegalese woman in Florence to resolutely declare that, regardless of immigration status, we are *here and unafraid*—can also be read against the grain to summon wellsprings of hope and care. These are resources that will allow Italy's multi-generational Black community to imagine futures and spaces otherwise.



Figure 24 Dutch-Caribbean artists Quinsy and Jörgen Gario performing “Treaties of Gifts and Shifting Wills” at the *Salone del Mobile* in Milan in 2016. This performance tells the story of the Treaty of Wuchale, which ultimately led to the First Italo-Ethiopian War from 1895–1896. After a solemn reading of the treaty by Quinsy set to Jörgen’s synthesizer music, the brothers gradually added lines of white tape to the grass below their feet and strung twine from the olive trees above their heads. To the assembled viewers, this immediately recalled a proliferation of walls and borders, drawing a connection between Italian colonialism, the ongoing refugee crisis, and the struggle of Black Italians today.⁷⁴

Source: Author.

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- ¹ Rónán Burtenshaw, “Raceocracy: An Interview with Dr. Barnor Hesse – Part 1,” *Irish Left Review* (blog), October 24, 2012, <http://www.irishleftreview.org/2012/10/24/raceocracy/>.
- ² Yarimar Bonilla, “Freedom, Sovereignty, and Other Entanglements,” *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 21, no. 2 (53) (2017): 202, <https://doi.org/10.1215/07990537-4156930>.
- ³ All names in this dialogue are pseudonyms.
- ⁴ Brown, *Dropping Anchor, Setting Sail*, 107.
- ⁵ Liisa Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees,” *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (1992): 24–44.
- ⁶ Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.”
- ⁷ Merrill, “Postcolonial Borderlands,” 267.
- ⁸ Here I am working with Lisa Lowe’s helpful definition of modern liberalism as “the branches of European political philosophy that include the narration of political emancipation through citizenship in the state, the promise of economic freedom in the development of wage labor and exchange markets, and the conferring of civilization to human persons educated in aesthetic and national culture—in each case unifying particularity, difference, or locality through universal concepts of reason and community.” See Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 3–4.
- ⁹ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313.
- ¹⁰ Fernando Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories,” *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (1996): 78.
- ¹¹ Talal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” in *Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Stanley Diamond*, ed. Christine Ward Gailey, vol. 1: Civilization in Crisis—Anthropological Perspectives (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992), 333–51.
- ¹² Asad, 337.
- ¹³ This gendering is deliberate.
- ¹⁴ Uday S. Mehta, “Liberal Strategies of Exclusion,” *Politics & Society* 18, no. 4 (1990): 427–54, <https://doi.org/10.1177/003232929001800402>.
- ¹⁵ Goldberg, *The Racial State*.
- ¹⁶ I am grateful to Andrea Marston for pointing out the connection between racial naturalism and *jus sanguinis* on the one hand, and between racial historicism and *jus culturae* on the other.
- ¹⁷ Saba Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival,” *Cultural Anthropology* 16, no. 2 (2001): 202–36.
- ¹⁸ Samera Esmeir, “At Once Human and Not Human: Law, Gender and Historical Becoming in Colonial Egypt,” *Gender & History* 23, no. 2 (2011): 235–49, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0424.2011.01636.x>.
- ¹⁹ Bonilla, *Non-Sovereign Futures*.
- ²⁰ David Scott, *Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice* (Duke University Press, 2013).
- ²¹ Greg Beckett, “The Politics of Disjuncture, or Freedom from a Caribbean Point of View,” *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 21, no. 2 (53) (2017): 184, <https://doi.org/10.1215/07990537-4156906>.
- ²² Gary Wilder, “Untimely Vision: Aimé Césaire, Decolonization, Utopia,” *Public Culture* 21, no. 1 (2009): 101–40, <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-2008-023>.
- ²³ Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*.
- ²⁴ Bonilla, *Non-Sovereign Futures*, 205.
- ²⁵ Bonilla, 43.
- ²⁶ According to Bonilla (2017, 206), maroon political projects are emblematic of strategic entanglement, as they “undertook political projects that were predicated on various forms of coexistence, interdependence, and noninterference—rather than sovereign control.” This differs from the reading of maroons in Afro-Pessimist theory, which sees these communities as examples of “Black fugitivity.” Afro-Pessimist conceptions of fugitivity tend to emphasize refusal and disengagement as opposed to entanglement. See, for instance, Paul Khalil Saucier and Tryon P. Woods, *On Marronage: Ethical Confrontations with Antiracism* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2015); Damien M. Sojoyner, “Another Life Is Possible: Black Fugitivity and Enclosed Places,” *Cultural Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (2017): 514–36, <https://doi.org/10.14506/ca32.4.04>.
- ²⁷ The complex relationship between Eritreans and Ethiopians in Italy, and particularly the embrace by some of the unifying category *habesha* (a term referring to people from the highlands of Eritrea and Ethiopia, from which the name Abyssinia is derived), is beyond the scope of this chapter.
- ²⁸ Del Boca, “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism.”

- ²⁹ Gian Luca Podestà, “L’emigrazione Italiana in Africa Orientale” (2004), <http://www.ilcornodafrica.it/rds-01emigrazione.pdf>.
- ³⁰ Barrera, “Mussolini’s Colonial Race Laws and State-Settler Relations in Africa Orientale Italiana (1935-41).”
- ³¹ Ruth Iyob, “Madamismo and Beyond: The Construction of Eritrean Women,” *Nineteenth-Century Contexts* 22, no. 2 (2000): 217–38, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08905490008583509>.
- ³² Nicola Labanca, “Colonial Rule, Colonial Repression and War Crimes in the Italian Colonies,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9, no. 3 (2004): 300–313, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571042000254737>.
- ³³ Sandra Ponzanesi, “Beyond the Black Venus: Colonial Sexual Politics and Contemporary Visual Practices,” in *Italian Colonialism. Legacies and Memories*, ed. Jacqueline Andall and Derek Duncan (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2005), 165–89.
- ³⁴ Del Boca, “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism.”
- ³⁵ Fuller, *Moderns Abroad*.
- ³⁶ Labanca, “Colonial Rule, Colonial Repression and War Crimes in the Italian Colonies.”
- ³⁷ De Donno, “La Razza Ario-Mediterranea.”
- ³⁸ Del Boca, “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism,” 18.
- ³⁹ Alessandro Triulzi, “Displacing the Colonial Event,” *Interventions* 8, no. 3 (2006): 434, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698010600956055>; Rino Bianchi and Igiaba Segeo, *Roma negata: percorsi postcoloniali nella città* (Rome: Ediesse, 2014); Del Boca, “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism”; Ruth Iyob, “The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, no. 4 (2000): 659–82; Paola Tabet, *La pelle giusta* (Turin: Einaudi, 1997).
- ⁴⁰ At this time, the Eritreans arriving to Italy were recognized as Ethiopian citizens, as Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia by the United Nations in 1952. From 1941-1952, Eritrea was governed by a British military administration.
- ⁴¹ Andall, *Gender, Migration and Domestic Service*.
- ⁴² “Cittadini Stranieri in Italia - 2017.”
- ⁴³ Angelica Pesarini, “Colour Strategies. Negotiations of Black Mixed Race Women’s Identities in Colonial and Postcolonial Italy.” (University of Leeds, 2015), White Rose eTheses Online, <http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/10103/>; Hannah Giorgis, “Ethiopia and Eritrea’s Long History With Lasagna,” *Taste* (blog), May 4, 2018, <https://www.tastecooking.com/ethiopian-diasporas-long-history-lasagna/>; Pesarini, “Blood Is Thicker than Water.”
- ⁴⁴ Forgacs, *Italy’s Margins*.
- ⁴⁵ Nicole Trujillo-Pagán, “A Tale of Four Cities: The Boundaries of Blackness for Ethiopian Immigrants in Washington, DC, Tel Aviv, Rome, and Melbourne,” *Social Identities*, 2018, 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2017.1418601>.
- ⁴⁶ Camilla Hawthorne, “Asmarina: post colonial heritages,” *Doppiozero*, May 13, 2016, <http://www.doppiozero.com/materiali/why-africa/asmarina-post-colonial-heritages>.
- ⁴⁷ Victoria Bernal, *Nation as Network: Diaspora, Cyberspace, and Citizenship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
- ⁴⁸ Erin Komada, “Turned Away: The Detrimental Effect of Italy’s Public Security Law on Undocumented Children’s Right to Education,” *Boston University Law Journal* 29 (2011): 451–74.
- ⁴⁹ Alem Abbai and Marco Luzzi, *S.I.C.: Stranieri in Casa*, 1998.
- ⁵⁰ “Europe Gets 8,000 Refugees Daily,” *BBC News*, September 25, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34356758>.
- ⁵¹ “Everything You Want to Know about Migration across the Mediterranean,” *Economist*, April 21, 2015, <https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/05/economist-explains-6>.
- ⁵² Maurice Stierl, “A Fleet of Mediterranean Border Humanitarians,” *Antipode* 50, no. 3 (2018): 704–24, <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12320>.
- ⁵³ According to the United Nations, a person who requests protection while overseas and is then given permission to enter a receiving country is a *refugee*; a person who requests protection after entering the receiving country is an *asylum-seeker*.
- ⁵⁴ Yermi Brenner, “Far Away, so Close: For Migrants, Reaching Italy Is Only the Start,” *Al Jazeera English*, August 20, 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/20/far-away-so-close-for-migrants-reaching-italy-is-only-the-start.html>.
- ⁵⁵ Davide Coppo and Vincenzo Latronico, “Eritrea/Ethiopia,” *Cartography*, no. 1, accessed April 24, 2018, <http://bycartography.com/eritreathiopia/>.

- ⁵⁶ Nicolò Barattini, “Cambio Passo, quando i cittadini accolgono i migranti,” *The TWIG Magazine* (blog), April 8, 2016, <http://www.thetwigmagazine.com/2016/04/08/cambio-passo/>.
- ⁵⁷ Mackda Ghebremariam Tesfau’ and Giuseppe Grimaldi have conducted in-depth research on community-led refugee resettlement efforts. See, for instance, Grimaldi’s work on the mobilizations of second-generation Eritrean youth to assist newly arrived refugees in Porta Venezia: Giuseppe Grimaldi, “Becoming Second Generations: The Young Italians of Eritrean and Ethiopian Origins and the Incorporation of the Diasporic Cultural Norms” (June 8, 2016).
- ⁵⁸ According to Security Set 94/2009, which made undocumented immigration a crime, housing an undocumented immigrant in Italy is punishable by up to three years in prison.
- ⁵⁹ Muehlebach, *The Moral Neoliberal*.
- ⁶⁰ Matteo Congregalli, “Those Who Arrive Here Want to Become Ghosts— Milan’s People Smuggling Trade,” *VICE News*, September 23, 2015, <https://news.vice.com/article/those-who-arrive-here-want-to-become-ghosts-milans-people-smuggling-trade>.
- ⁶¹ Alan Maglio and Medhin Paolos, *Asmarina: Voices and Images of a Postcolonial Heritage*, documentary, 2015, <http://asmarinaproject.com/>; Hawthorne, “Asmarina.”
- ⁶² *Accoglienza* refers to refugee reception and resettlement.
- ⁶³ In 2014 and again in 2015, hundreds of refugees descended upon the Milano Centrale train station hoping to leave Italy for northern Europe; a large number of these refugees were from Syria. For more information, see Alessandra Coppola, “Emergenza profughi, altri 260 siriani in Centrale,” *Corriere della Sera*, June 11, 2014, http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/14_giugno_11/emergenza-profughi-altri-260-siriani-centrale-fdfbeb5e-f130-11e3-affc-25db802dc057.shtml; Gianni Rosini, “Milano, centinaia di profughi accampati in stazione centrale. Obiettivo: ‘Trovare un trafficante per lasciare l’Italia,’” *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, May 10, 2015, <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/05/10/milano-centinaia-di-profughi-accampati-in-stazione-centrale-obiettivo-trovare-un-trafficante-per-lasciare-litalia/1670158/>.
- ⁶⁴ At least some of this can be attributed to the much smaller size of the Eritrean community in Milan—in 2017, there were 1,742 Eritreans (with non-Italian citizenship) living in the city, compared to 35,884 from Egypt and 7,861 from Morocco alone. For more additional information on the composition of Milan’s immigrant communities, see <https://www.tuttitalia.it/lombardia/18-milano/statistiche/cittadini-stranieri-2017/>.
- ⁶⁵ Bonilla, *Non-Sovereign Futures*, xiii.
- ⁶⁶ “Italy Shooting: Mein Kampf Found in Home of Suspect,” *The Guardian*, February 4, 2018, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/04/macerata-shooting-mein-kampf-found-in-home-of-suspect-italy-luca-traini>.
- ⁶⁷ Pietro Castelli Gattinara and Francis O’Connor, “An Italian Neo-Fascist Shot 6 Immigrants. So Why Won’t Italy’s Political Parties Condemn Xenophobia?,” *Washington Post*, February 9, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/09/an-italian-neo-fascist-shot-6-migrants-how-does-this-play-into-the-upcoming-elections/>.
- ⁶⁸ Ylenia Gostoli, “Protests and Questions over Killing of Senegal Migrant Idy Diene,” *Al Jazeera English*, March 8, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/protests-questions-killing-senegal-migrant-idy-diene-180308130543754.html>.
- ⁶⁹ A video of the demonstration can be found online: *Manifestazione per Idy a Firenze, Parenti e Tutta La Comunita Di Stranieri*, 2018, <https://www.facebook.com/abrham.fa/videos/1722563141120963/>.
- ⁷⁰ David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2004), 4.
- ⁷¹ Glen Coulthard, for instance, has argued that anti-essentialist critiques of the liberal politics of recognition must first consider the ongoing power of the (settler colonial) state to adjudicate claims for recognition. See Chapter Three of Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
- ⁷² David Scott, “The Re-Enchantment of the Human: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter,” *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 8 (2000): 135.
- ⁷³ Hawthorne, “Asmarina.”
- ⁷⁴ “RESET,” Koninklijke Academie van Beeldende Kunsten, 2016, <https://www.kabk.nl/projecten/reset>; Hawthorne, “Asmarina.”

Conclusion

Looking South

In Naples they call me Zulù;
I arrived on a boat to the middle of Piazza Gesù.
The tattoo on my stomach says *terrone di merda*,
And I wear that blue-blooded name with pride.
[...]

But in Naples they already know this story.
Those elegant gentlemen who passed through here:
They called everyone who wasn't with them a *brigante*,¹
And cleansed with fire anyone who rebelled.²

“It is well known what kind of ideology has been disseminated in myriad ways among the masses in the North, by the propagandists of the bourgeoisie: the South is the ball and chain which prevents the social development of Italy from progressing more rapidly; the Southerners are biologically inferior beings, semibarbarians or total barbarians, by natural destiny; if the South is backward, the fault does not lie with the capitalist system or with any other historical cause, but with Nature, which has made the Southerners lazy, incapable, criminal and barbaric.”³

“The social construction of space becomes one with the social construction of race. The now-segregated becomes the further racialized. Spatial meanings derived from racialization become racially reinscribed, the confirmation of racial difference. The physically Elsewhereized and Isolated become further discursively Othered. [...] Those exiled to enclaves beyond the metropolitan core become further scapegoated. Where you are becomes who you are, becomes how you are [under]classed. Yet another feat of ontological magic. Yet another dirty trick.”⁴

In early March of 2018, Italian voters were still rubbing their eyes in disbelief at the results of the country's recent parliamentary elections. In a frightening parallel to the U.S. presidential elections a year and a half earlier, center- and far-right parties, along with the populist *Movimento Cinque Stelle* (M5S), swept both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.⁵ Luigi Di Maio of M5S and Matteo Salvini of the *Lega*,⁶ two controversial figures previously considered to be political outsiders, had suddenly entered the mainstream. M5S won 32 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections, while the *Lega* claimed another 17.69 (almost 14 percent higher than their results in the previous elections); for comparison, the centrist *Partito democratico* saw a 6.5 percent decline in its share of the vote, to a mere 18.9 percent. And this was no small shift—over 900 parliamentary seats had been at stake in these elections.

The lead-up to the vote had been particularly grueling. Beyond the typical international ridicule that accompanies any mention of Italian politics, the electoral campaigning had taken on an undeniably racist and xenophobic tenor by the early spring of 2018. Politicians explicitly sought to channel the economic frustrations of everyday white Italians into unbridled hostility

toward African migrants and refugees, resulting in the episodes of deadly racist violence described at the end of Chapter Five. Political commentators around the world feigned surprise at the resurgence of far-right parties in Italy, chalking up this political tectonic shift to anti-establishment protest votes.⁷ But the seeds of this fascist resurgence had been planted over a century ago, in the very foundations of the Italian racial state. They were watered in the bloodletting of Italian colonialism. They were fertilized with the “racial evaporations” of post-World War II Italy, and again with the re-entrenchment of racist exclusion in post-1990s immigration and citizenship laws.

For many Black Italians, the elections results were a source of deep pessimism, fear and insecurity. Many of my friends spoke openly of being afraid to walk in public spaces, for fear of their mere presence provoking racist aggression and violence. While many Black Italians and other children of immigrants had already begun emigrating from Italy in search of better employment opportunities since at least the late 2000s, I heard more people than ever speak of leaving in search of safe havens abroad. There was nothing left for them in Italy, they seemed to be saying. A citizenship reform activist in Rome explained to me, with great sadness, that many of her comrades had become deeply depressed—between the double-punch of the citizenship reform bill’s defeat and the recent election results, they were losing hope. She lamented that some of her long-time activist friends were making concrete plans to leave Italy for their parents’ home countries.

But beyond this desire to emigrate, there is another significant geographical shift underway in the emergent Black Italia. The majority of the research for this dissertation was carried out in major northern Italian cities from Milan to Rome. The children of Italian immigrants who have come of age in the last two decades reside primarily in these cities, which were major sites of industrial employment opportunities for migrants who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s. Even today, the majority of Italy’s immigrant population (and their children) resides in the North.⁸ But as new arrivals are increasingly incorporated into the informal economies of southern Italy, there is now a growing (albeit younger) “second generation” of Black Italians in the South. In 2011, Istat found that since the last Italian national census ten years prior, southern Italy had experienced the largest increase in the foreign-born population of all the Italian regions.⁹ (Still, even today the vast majority of immigrants live in northern and central Italy.)

While the explosion of a laboring migrant underclass in southern Italy has received significant attention in recent years—most notably in books such as Yvan Sagnet’s influential *Ghetto Italia*¹⁰—Black youth born in Italy have been largely neglected in these accounts. Indeed, the 2016 citizenship reform flash mobs described in Chapter One represented one of the first times that these types of mobilizations had taken place outside of northern and central Italy. This can be explained in part by the fact that the children of immigrants in southern Italy are significantly younger on average than their counterparts in the North. But beyond that, life is also notably harder for Black youth living in this doubly marginal corner of Europe. The Italian-Ivorian university student who had organized the flash mob in Palermo explained, tearfully:

Palermo is a world apart. There is such a distance. There is some solitude—you feel foreign to the rest of Italy, and to the rest of the [second generation activists’] network. You have to exert triple the effort. Someone even told me, “Who would have thought that an idea that good could have come from someone in Palermo?” [...] It’s stressful when you fall into precarity...I can’t just go out to the clubs, and hang out at all hours. If I want to do something, I always have to find another way. I have to work harder than others.

In addition, these young Black Italians intersect much more directly with newly arrived migrants and refugees, generating a cauldron of racial and labor politics distinct from northern Italy.

But what are the implications of this geographic shift for the various challenges facing Black Italy today? Without naturalizing southern Italy as a hybrid space of unrestricted mixing, in this conclusion I wish to advance some preliminary ideas about how the changing circumstances in the South may open up different sorts of Black political imaginaries and possibilities. First, I will return to the Black Mediterranean by way of the Caribbean to consider how a reorientation toward the South might begin to unsettle both hierarchical geographies and racialized histories. I will then discuss some of the distinct challenges Black youth in southern Italy face in this geographically, economically, and politically marginal part of Italy—and the diverse political tactics and survival strategies they have adopted as a result. Youth of sub-Saharan African descent in southern Italy are multiply “southern” and confront overlapping Southern Questions. And the conditions in southern Italy are also a harbinger of what may be to come in Italy and Europe more broadly. For all these reasons, southern Italy can offer an important vision of alternative political possibilities and diasporic ethics, as well as emergent forms of solidarity. As an Italian-Nigerian activist from Castel Volturno—a town outside Naples known as “the little Africa in Italy,” famous as the place where Miriam Makeba held her final concert in honor of six West African immigrants massacred by the mafia during the *Strage di San Gennaro*¹¹—told me in 2016, “*Questi sono anni difficili ma importanti.*” These are difficult times, but they are important ones as well.

Lessons from the Caribbean

Many of the same questions about race and the intertwined politics of Blackness and Southernness facing Black youth in the *mezzogiorno* have been taken up by intellectuals working in the tradition of radical Black Caribbeanist thought. Indeed, the Mediterranean shares striking parallels with the Caribbean. Both seas are upheld as spaces of interconnection that have been profoundly shaped by processes of mixing, métissage, or creolization. And both are sites of extreme racial-capitalist violence, both historical and ongoing. Just as the school of Caribbeanist thought characterized by C.L.R. James and his contemporaries emerged from a moment of political emancipation across the global African diaspora, current Mediterraneanist politics have been shaped (in part) by emancipatory visions intended to challenge migrant deaths at sea along Europe’s southern shores. So, what transgressive knowledges from the Caribbean can be “made to the measure” of the contemporary Mediterranean, where Black life remains systematically embattled and excluded? Fatima El-Tayeb argues, for instance, that Caribbean discourses on race, nation, gender, and sexuality can provide a framework for grappling with European discourses of race by emphasizing the relationship between “specific circumstances and universal conditions, local applications and global connections...[and] allowing for the intersectional, sometimes contradictory workings of power structures and subject positions.”¹²

For centuries, scholars in Europe have regarded the Mediterranean Sea as the origin point of “European civilization.” Yet, as Joshua Jelly-Schapiro writes, thinkers from Sidney Mintz to Edwidge Danticat have also attempted to reorient world history on the Caribbean islands, “places where phenomena we think of as belonging to our own age—mass migration and mass industry and transcontinental trade—have been facts of life for centuries.”¹³ According to C.L.R. James, for instance, the racial political economy based around the transnational sugar trade thrust enslaved Black folk into “a life that was in its essence a modern life.”¹⁴ Just as Paul Gilroy later crafted a counternarrative of modernity based in the foundational violence of the transatlantic

slave trade, James' location of modernity in the peculiar socioeconomic relations of the seventeenth-century West Indies became central to anti- and post-colonial claims about modernity, and the position of Black life specifically within the West, liberalism, and capitalism.

Closely related to the violent origins of Caribbean modernity is the cultural creolization for which the region is perhaps best known. Caribbean intellectuals reaching from James to Édouard Glissant to Françoise Vergès to Sylvia Wynter have grappled with the “composite reality”¹⁵ of Caribbean societies—with the way in which diverse groups, languages, religions, and cultural practices have come together under conditions of extreme exploitation and dispossession to collectively generate new forms of life. The implication is that we cannot escape the deeper histories of which creolization or mixing is a product.¹⁶ Taken together, these insights from the Caribbean can contribute to a deeper understanding of the contemporary Black Mediterranean—challenging romantic notions of Mediterranean conviviality without flattening the plurality of this complex contact zone. These same lessons guided me during a visit with a Black activist collective in southern Italy in 2016.

The View from the South(s)

In September of 2016, I took the train south from Milan to Naples. Earlier that year, I had encountered a powerful video of an antiracist demonstration organized in Naples in June of 2015. In the video, posted to Facebook, twenty Black Italian activists from the group Culture Connection Castel Volturno marched into the historic center of Naples, and, after a moment of deafening silence, declared in both English and Italian:

In a non-colored man's country, we fight for equal rights.
Silence.
My silence is power; my silence rules.
We are people.
We are humans.
We deserve equal rights.
Tell me who you are and I will tell you who I am.
My mind is, powerful, strong, kind, generous, peaceful, soulful.
We are genius.
We are educated!



Figure 25: Culture Connection C.V. activists in Naples.

Source: *Culture Connection C.V.* Facebook page
(<https://www.facebook.com/cultureconnectioncv/videos/1622609424618433/>).

The aesthetics of the march seemed to have been clearly influenced by the protest styles of #BlackLivesMatter, but I was curious to understand what had motivated this public action. I connected with one of the group's founders, James,¹⁷ an Italian-Nigerian jurisprudence student, actor, and model. After a lengthy discussion over coffee and cigarettes in Naples, he agreed to show me around his hometown and introduce me to some of his friends and fellow activists.

The following day, a Saturday morning, I met James outside of his university, and together we hopped onto the M1 bus connecting Naples to Castel Volturno. The occupants of the bus that morning were primarily African men; as the bus lumbered north along the 50-kilometer road, more and more people boarded until it was standing room only. Behind James, a man in a Rasta cap was dozing quietly, his head repeatedly nodding almost onto the shoulder of the person sitting next to him. As we drove past endless overgrown cornfields and the occasional hotel, more men in the back of bus tried to catch quick catnaps. Every now and then, the bus would pause at an isolated stop for one of the riders to exit. "This bus is very important," James explained. "It links Naples to the province of Caserta, for all of the people who work in Naples." A few stops before Castel Volturno, a young woman with bouncing caramel curls and a blue dashiki boarded the bus; she approached us, and James affectionately introduced her as Susie, his girlfriend. Fifteen minutes later, we finally arrived to Castel Volturno. We stepped off the bus at a nondescript stop, marked only by a colorful bench installed as part of a public arts project. The bench bore mosaic-like images of the African continent and a woman in a head wrap.



Figure 26: A bench at a bus stop in Castel Volturno.

Source: Author.

The three of us made our way down a street lined with African grocery stores and turned left onto a dusty, unpaved road that led through walled housing compounds. James and Susie pointed out one compound at the end of the road—the Centro Miriam Makeba. The Centro Makeba was founded in 2011 by a Ghanaian woman named Mary, three years after the death of Miriam Makeba in Castel Volturno. Makeba had become a cultural and political icon for the city’s large African community because she performed her final concert here in solidarity with West African laborers—there is even a statue of Makeba in town. The center comprises a colorful, two-story building, and an oasis-like courtyard flanked by palm trees. Drapes made from African textiles hung from the open windows and fluttered gracefully in the breeze. The courtyard was filled with folding tables piled high with clothes that had been collected for African migrants. Mary explained that the following day was the anniversary of Strage di San Gennaro, and she was planning a ceremony in honor of the murdered migrants for the city’s African community. At the center, Mary also organizes workshops, community discussions, and concerts. On most days, however, the Centro Makeba serves primarily as a peaceful meeting place for people of African descent to socialize—from recent West African migrants to Black youth who were born in Castel Volturno. In the back of the building, Mary grows peppers, tomatoes, eggplant, fruit trees, sugar cane, and a fledgling baobab tree.

Inside the building, the walls were covered with posters of African leaders, descriptions of various plants and seeds, anti-capitalist and anticolonial messages, motivational memes, and images of Bob Marley and Miriam Makeba. We were soon joined by James’ sister Iris, who was dressed that day like an Afrofuturistic Elvira. We gathered in the kitchen and set about frying plantains and preparing an aromatic, spicy meat and tomato stew for lunch. As we cooked and snacked, James, Susie, and Iris (all of whom are university students in their late teens and early twenties) began to open up about everyday life in southern Italy. “You know why the [Black Italian] movement is stronger in the North?” James had asked me earlier, during our bus ride. “It’s because they are older. Only more recent immigrants are coming to the South. So the second generation here is young. The median age is ten to fifteen years old. I know someone who is twenty-eight, but that’s about it.” There had been a trickle of African migrants coming to work in Castel Volturno as early as the 1970s and 1980s, and who had found jobs in construction. But in recent years, this trickle had expanded as increasing numbers of West African migrants began to flee economic and political instability in their home countries. Today, however, the employment opportunities in Castel Volturno are not as promising as they once were: immigrants are being inserted into exploitative, informal agricultural labor, as well as organized crime-controlled sectors of the illicit economy.

As we talked about the challenges of Black youth political organizing in Castel Volturno, my interlocutors oscillated between fond descriptions of the “sweetness” of southern Italians and Mediterranean culture, and their own everyday experiences of brutal racism and misogyny.¹⁸ Iris explained, “There’s not as much racism here. But this morning, I experienced an episode that is typical of being a young woman in Castel Volturno: someone thought I was a sex worker. A car stopped for me. The man inside the car asked me, ‘Do you want a ride?’” The other women grimaced and nodded at the familiarity of this anecdote. They proceeded to share harrowing stories of women in town they had known, sex workers who were brutally murdered in three unrelated incidents. “This place is forgotten by the world,” Susie said with a sigh.

After we ate, Mary’s daughter Gabriela burst out of the building, white braids piled atop her head and wide eyes lined in electric blue. Gabriela is also a student, and a close friend of James—they first met when she organized an event at the Centro Makeba on the *seconda*

generazione and citizenship. While her friends characterize her as *vivace* [lively], Gabriela's carefree attitude belies an incredibly sharp wit and astonishing political clarity. She began to tell me about her university studies in African postcolonial studies, and a project she recently worked on related to trash collection in Castel Volturno. As I listened to Gabriela, I realized that the Black community in Castel Volturno was faced with multiple, overlapping forms of invisibility and non-recognition. Beyond the children of African immigrants who are unable to obtain citizenship, Gabriela explained that as many as 30,000 people in Castel Volturno are unaccounted for by the municipality, and live in unregistered villas. "And how can you collect trash from a community that doesn't exist?" Gabriela asked rhetorically.

These various scales of economic and social marginalization in southern Italy, and their deep historical antecedents in both Italian national unification and European colonialism, did not dissuade my interlocutors from political engagement. Gabriela, for instance, is one of many Black activists in Italy who are beginning to rethink the possibilities of political resistance emanating from the South. To do this, they are drawing on the overlapping stories of southern Italian dispossession, migrant labor exploitation, and Black youth struggles for inclusion that have converged at places like Naples and Castel Volturno. Rather than deploy the historic marginalization of southern Italians to downplay anti-Black racism in the present, they are instead on drawing these parallels to activate new sorts of alliances: for instance, between Neapolitan university students and their Black Italian counterparts who are struggling to pay tuition in the wake of austerity and are taking on odd jobs to make ends meet; or Black Italian youth and newly arrived African migrants who, in different ways, remain unseen by the state; or migrant laborers and southern Italians fighting back against the stranglehold of organized crime.

Gabriela, in fact, is part of the music collective *Terroni¹⁹ Uniti*, which comprises thirty well-known Neapolitan artists. The members of the group include white Italians, African immigrants, and "second-generation" Black youth,²⁰ and through music they are attempting to craft a new form of political solidarity based on their shared "Southernness." Their single "*Gente do sud*" ["People of the south" in Neapolitan], quoted in the epigraph above, identifies the singers as "people of the sea" with shared—though not equivalent—histories of oppression and resistance. And the proceeds of their compilation are intended to benefit Watch the Med's Alarm Phone, a hotline for migrants and refugees traveling across the the Mediterranean.²¹

Reorienting the Geographies of Black Resistance

In contemporary Europe, it has become quite easy to automatically associate Blackness with death. Activists on the Left invoke ghastly images of boats of Black refugees capsizing in the Mediterranean, while far-right xenophobes claim that an encroaching Blackness heralds the death of a racially pure Europe that has never actually existed. But to accept the facile equation that Blackness signifies only death is to concede to the very same chant that was hurled at Mario Balotelli, perhaps the most internationally famous Black Italian: "*Non ci sono neri italiani!*" ["There are no Black Italians!"]. After all, as Katherine McKittrick powerfully reminds us, "Racial violences shape, *but do not wholly define*, black worlds."²²

Against such invocations of death and ontological non-being, this dissertation has sought to show how an emergent Black Italy has formed and survived—even thrived—at a moment when the logics of Fortress Europe would have us believe that it should not exist at all. The mobilizations of Italian-born and raised Black youth for national recognition, citizenship, and racial justice have entailed complex negotiations of the boundaries of Italianness, Mediterraneanness, Europeaness, and Blackness. In some instances, these activists have been

able to expand the boundaries of who “counts” as an Italian beyond narrowly biological conceptions of race. At other times, they have become complicit in the process of re-bounding Italianness on the basis of birthplace, economic productivity, or cosmopolitan connectivity. These re-boundings have sometimes inadvertently worked to generate racialized distinctions *within* Italy’s Black community, pitting those born in Italy against the newly arrived. And as new forms of exclusion are continually reproduced within the seemingly colorblind category of “citizen,” the meanings of race and Blackness in Italy continue to shift as well. But as Black youth seeking to de-racialize the Italian nation are increasingly confronted with the limits of liberal citizenship at a time of rising ethnonationalism, what alternatives remain? Black Italians are increasingly looking beyond the nation-state, tentatively exploring the new political formations that emerge from their own strategic entanglements not only with the politics of liberalism, but also with more capacious African and Black Mediterranean diasporas.

Southern Europe is now becoming a hothouse for the many, seemingly apocalyptic forces shaping our present: from economic precarity and austerity, to ethnonationalism and fascism, to global mass migrations met by deadly border regimes and walls. And southern Italy in *particular* provides an oft-overlooked window into the overlapping systems of racial nationalism, border fortification, and labor exploitation that have shaped our modern world. Echoing my engagements with Cedric Robinson’s *Black Marxism* in Chapter Three, we can no longer approach the Black Mediterranean as a (now-defunct) precondition for a racial capitalist order centered on the North Atlantic. Instead, it is urgent to study the *ongoing* reproductions of the Black Mediterranean in the present. In doing so, we can begin to re-orient our stories of Black resistance on one of the spaces where liberal assumptions of equality, citizenship, freedom, and postracialism are most obviously beginning to fray.

In the Black Mediterranean, we can clearly see that immigrants’ rights struggles are not separate from the project of Black liberation; that “identity” and political economy do not exist on separate planes; that diversity and multicultural mixing do not automatically beget justice. For these reasons, I believe that the political practices and solidarities emerging from Black youth spaces in southern Italy will soon inform struggles and strategies elsewhere in the world during this critical moment—what Gramsci described as the interregnum or the time of monsters. The entangled, nested, and overlapping geographies of southern Europe—from the Mediterranean, to Italy, to the *mezzogiorno*, to Sicily, to Lampedusa—offer a lesson in both the spatial reproductions of racism and power, as well as the new possibilities of transgressive alliance.

¹ *Brigante* refers to the history of brigandage or banditry (*brigantaggio*) in southern Italy during the latter half of the nineteenth century. *Brigantaggio* has been explained both as a response to massive wealth inequality after the unification of Italy, as well as a form of popular revolt against unification.

² Terroni Uniti, *Gente Do Sud*, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVKGGyoUIRo>.

³ Antonio Gramsci, *The Southern Question* (Guernica Editions, 2005).

⁴ Pred, *Even in Sweden*, 125.

⁵ Jon Henley and Antonio Voce, “Italian Elections 2018 - Full Results,” *The Guardian*, March 5, 2018, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/mar/05/italian-elections-2018-full-results-renzi-berlusconi>.

⁶ In the 2018 elections, the party formerly known as the *Lega Nord* (Northern League) dropped the *Nord* from its name in a bid to court voters from southern Italy.

⁷ “Why the Populists Won,” *The Economist*, March 8, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/03/08/why-the-populists-won>.

⁸ Istat, “Indicatori demografici,” November 30, 2017, <http://www.istat.it>.

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- ⁹ Istat, “I Dati Del Censimento 2011,” May 3, 2018, <https://www.istat.it/it/immigrati/tutti-i-dati/dati-del-censimento>.
- ¹⁰ Yvan Sagnet and Leonardo Palmisano, *Ghetto Italia: i braccianti stranieri tra caporalato e sfruttamento* (Rome: Fandango Libri, 2015).
- ¹¹ Andrea Scotto, “Una riflessione sui recenti fatti avvenuti a Castel Volturno,” *Huffington Post* (blog), July 21, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.it/arturo-scotto/riflessione-fatti-castel-volturno_b_5604142.html.
- ¹² El-Tayeb, *European Others*, vxiii.
- ¹³ Joshua Jelly-Schapiro, *Island People: The Caribbean and the World* (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2016).
- ¹⁴ C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (1938; repr., New York: Penguin Books Limited, 2001), 392.
- ¹⁵ Édouard Glissant, *Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1989), xli.
- ¹⁶ These insights are also a useful rejoinder to a faddish “hype of hybridity,” which uncritically celebrates examples of in-betweenness without considering the conditions of possibility that make hybridity possible (including histories of race-thinking), or the ways in which some forms of hybridity are actually quite compatible with global processes of capital accumulation. Indeed, as Robert Young has suggested, “hybridity” itself can only appear as a problem or conceptual framework when it is already assumed that there are pre-existing and bounded racial or cultural groups (otherwise, “hybridity” as such would not merit a name; it would be merely another relational state of being). The same could be said for the “invention” of the Mediterranean as a scientific object of inquiry by nineteenth century European scholars—precisely because of the ontological challenges it posed to regionally bounded studies of history and environment. See Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 2005).
- ¹⁷ All names in this section, except for Mary, are pseudonyms.
- ¹⁸ Moya Bailey, “New Terms of Resistance: A Response to Zenzele Isoke,” *Souls* 15, no. 4 (2013): 341, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10999949.2014.884451>.
- ¹⁹ *Terroni* is a derogative term used to refer to people from southern Italy—it literally translates as “people of the dirt.”
- ²⁰ “I Terroni Uniti Le Cantano a Salvini: 30 Artisti Contro Il Razzismo in ‘Gente Do Sud,’” *Adnkronos*, March 10, 2017, http://www.adnkronos.com/intrattenimento/spettacolo/2017/03/10/terrone-uniti-cantano-salvini-artisti-contro-razzismo-gente-sud-video_7UMwVCNwfkud5OeNFy7r2J.html?refresh_ce.
- ²¹ “Gente Do Sud,” Antiwar Songs, 2017, <https://www.antiwarsons.org/canzone.php?id=55448&lang=it>.
- ²² McKittrick, “On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place,” 947.

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