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1966-03-01


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JOHN W. DYCKMAN



**Social Planning, Social Planners
and Planned Societies**

Institute of Urban & Regional Development
University of California, Berkeley

Reprint No. 12

 JOURNAL
OF
THE
AMERICAN
INSTITUTE
OF
PLANNERS

MARCH 1966

VOLUME XXII NUMBER 1

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SOCIAL PLANNING, SOCIAL PLANNERS, AND PLANNED SOCIETIES

John W. Dyckman

The name "social planning" has been bestowed on the remedial patch-up of unplanned social consequences of public and private programs, to the neglect of other aspects of social planning. An analysis of social planning must distinguish societal planning, programming for selected social goals, and the deliberate introduction of social values into economic or political processes. The relation of the planner to his client spotlights the conflict between social goals and program requirements, and leads to various formulations of social planning. These versions cannot avoid the choice of social ideology, which guides social plans and relates them to societal plans.

Social planning is a belated and tentative response of American planners to functional lag. Physical planning, particularly of cities, has been accepted as a legitimate activity at the governmental level for more than half a century. Economic planning, though partial and inconstant, has been an established part of the governmental scene since the 1930's. Social planning, on the other hand, has been openly recognized only more recently, and then it has proceeded under a cover of confusion which has prevented public debate on its scope and its intentions.

For the most part, social planning in the USA is defensive, and arises from the crises which are spun off as by-products of action programs of government. Public intervention in urban development and renewal, for example, has cast up problems of relocation which are so intertwined in the fabric of social life of the affected communities that "social" planners are called upon for relief.

At the same time, the residual issues of the affluent society are so clearly social issues that earlier concerns of physical and economic planning have in some cases given way to priorities for direct planning of social outcomes. The Poverty Program, for example, recognizes that the problem of poverty is not merely a problem of economics, but is also a problem of the culture of poverty which can be addressed only by direct social action. Juvenile delinquency, mental health, and a range of other social ills are, in the view of the behavioral scientists who examine them, more than economic problems. Indeed, there are many who argue that a planned economy cannot eliminate these problems. The presence of social pathology alongside planning then becomes an argument against an excessively "materialistic" view of society. Paradoxically, opponents of the excessive economic determinism often attributed to Marxism are cast in the role of advocates of increasing planning in the social sphere.

Other types of social planning have been made necessary by rejection of the "planned society" of socialist economists. The whole complex of welfare services which have grown up in the United States were traditionally, and still remain, devices to compensate for the wastage and breakage in a competitive, individual-serving, industrial society. They have existed to cushion the blow of this competitive struggle for those so disadvantaged as to be unable to compete effectively. The traditional social services, both privately and publicly provided, are ad hoc solutions for specific problems. They have not, until recently, drawn upon a common context or comprehensive planning outlook.

The notion of coordinated social services, of planned cooperation between agencies, is relatively recent in the field of social welfare and social work. But even where such coordinating councils exist in cities or metropolitan areas, their planning is roughly advisory (except for determinations which enter into the division of the Community Chest) and lacks measures of progress which would

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guide the allocative decisions. Even more important, the social goals which planning would presumably help to advance are vague and are often stated so as to obscure rather than to adjudicate differences between the goals of the independent agencies.

As a result, there is a great deal of remedial social action, and some social planning in the United States, but this goes on in the absence of even a schematic societal plan which will guide the individual plans of the operating agencies. Societal planning in the United States is principally hortatory, as in the National Goals Reports issued during the Eisenhower Administration.

Some of the most thoughtful work on the meaning of social planning in the American context was instituted several years ago under the direction of Everett Reimer for the Puerto Rican Planning Board. Reimer, assisted by Janet Reiner, commissioned thoughtful papers by Herbert Gans, Abraham Kaplan, and other consultants, and produced many useful internal memoranda. In one of these papers Gans clearly distinguished "societal planning" from "social programs." The former is much more difficult to treat, since it entails some specification of the goals of the society, while the latter are farther along in the "means" end of the means-ends continuum. Gans developed a paradigm for locating programs and actions in this framework which is an excellent statement for orientation to the problem of social planning in the context of the remedial actions of social agencies traditional in the United States.¹

Let us extend this line of reasoning, and take *social planning* to mean the effort to plan for the fate of a whole society. This view emphasizes the interdependence of activities and the shared consequences of program actions. It recognizes that there may be unplanned consequences of planned actions, and that these may deserve attention equal to that given the programs themselves. Much of the concern with social planning among city planners in the United States stems from the unplanned social dislocations and stresses that follow upon public programs such as redevelopment. In a comparable vein, the interest in social planning in developing economies arises from similar stresses that follow upon planned economic development. Indeed, the former draws heavily on the literature developed in the latter, and both have made liberal use of studies developed in crisis situations such as bombings, floods, and deportations. The problems of disrupted working class urban neighborhoods described by Gans and others are in one perspective a pale copy of the disruptions and strains on social goals of political realization, social justice, and cultural self-expression which have accompanied pursuit of the goal of economic development in preindustrial societies.

When societal goals are advanced by unilateral programs of service agencies, unexpected or perverse results may emerge. Thus the goals of economic justice may dictate an emphasis on low-cost meritorious consumer goods such as housing, and the goals of social justice may indicate that the housing should be placed in neighborhoods as favored as those claimed by higher income groups, but the actual programs for achieving these goals may make for outcomes that disturb the harmonious relations between groups, aggravate class tension, and encourage some forms of antisocial actions. Programs of economic development have almost inevitably favored certain classes whose cooperation was vital to the program, to the relative disadvantage of others. More specifically, these programs have been concerned with incentives necessary to realization of the goals, such as high rewards to entrepreneurs, which may have been paid for by relatively disadvantaged groups. One can proliferate examples of this kind, both in economic development and in urban renewal. These examples dramatize the need for a true social planning framework in which to evaluate the social consequences of individual programs.

To clarify these relations, we might distinguish three operational meanings of *social planning*, and three levels of action.

1. At the societal planning level, social planning means the selection of the social goals of the nation or state, and the setting of targets for their achievement. It requires a ranking of these goals, and assessment of the cost (in terms of other objectives) of achieving them, and judgments of the feasibility of such programs.

2. Social planning, in a closely related meaning, involves the application of social values and action criteria to the assessment of programs undertaken in the pursuit of economic or political goals. Thus, it can mean the testing of the consequences—in terms of intergroup or interpersonal relations—of everything from broad economic development programs to specific redevelopment projects.

3. Social planning can mean specifically “social” programming arising from the broad social goals of the community. The traditional welfare activities of public and private agencies have been the principal focus of such planning in the United States. The coordination of programming for and by the multitude of caretaker agencies that have grown up in our free enterprise economy is a popular task for this type of social planning.

Much of the discussion of social planning, and the identification of activities under this label, belongs in the third category. It is my contention that this category has developed in a variety of directions without an adequately specified set of objectives at the first and second levels. This view is independent of considerations of the planned society, though subsequent discussion will make clear that the latter are not irrelevant to it.

Social planning has long been treacherous ground for the city planner because of the ever present danger that the expert determination of need might degenerate into the imposition of class or professional prejudices upon a resistant clientele. Social planning, in the sense of determination of the social needs of a community or a group within the community is torn between the desire to require certain levels of consumption of merit goods on the one hand, and the recognition of the legitimacy of individual choice on the other. Many social planners assert that their interest is in the maximization of opportunity, or freedom of choice. But as a practical matter, no society has found a feasible way of maximizing choice for all groups or individuals at all times. For the exercise of one man's choice is a limitation on the freedom of choice of another.

It is not surprising that social planning has often turned away from goals, in the direction of means. For one thing, it is firmly in the tradition of modern clinical psychology, and the positivism of sociology, to accept individually determined ends as legitimate, and to emphasize means of realizing these ends. But it is a matter of some subtlety, worthy to challenge the professional social actionist, or clinical caretaker, to emphasize the manipulation of behavior, rather than the alteration of goals of behavior. Let us consider some of the problems encountered in these tasks.

FINDING APPROPRIATE
REMEDIES: DIAGNOSIS OF
THE CLIENT

Remedial social planning is necessary in our society because the major forces shaping our lives are unplanned. Social planning has come to the fore because we have been unable to predict, control, or shape the repercussions of technological change or of our planned programs. Because we do not plan our technology, but allow it to follow opportunistic lines, we do not control the repercussions of its development. These repercussions cast up many of the persistent social problems of our times, such as the sharp segregation of the poor, the aged, and the minorities in the cities; the left-behind regions of economic depression; the unemployable cadres of displaced workers; and the great gaps in educational attainment. In many respects, the advanced technological societies need therapeutic social planning as badly as the countries experiencing the stresses of early technological change. For example, urban renewal, which was embraced avidly by liberals and city planners in 1949 at passage of the Housing Act, has proven a specific source of embarrassment and friction to liberal politicians for fifteen years. It is the realization of this fact that has created the call for a Domestic Peace Corps in the United States.

These problems have traditionally been easier to identify in the newly developing economies. One might swiftly recognize the particular problems raised for Puerto Rican planning by a host of world and hemispheric developments: the emergence of a new stage in world industrialization; the extension of the urban life style and the obliteration of differences between city and country in the most indus-

trially developed nations; the sharpening of differences between the "educated" and "uneducated"; the development of new technological advances in transportation and communication. Until a Michael Harrington, or some other prophet, calls attention to the lags in our perception, we are likely to miss the similar phenomena which take place in societies starting from a more favored base. It is the merit of urban renewal that it called attention to problems of the city, to implications of public intervention in the city, and to undeveloped perspectives in city planning.

Further, the issue of relocation in urban redevelopment emphasizes the interdependence of the social fabric of communities. It has underlined the reality that one cannot intervene in any important portion of this web without disrupting the structure and entangling himself in the consequences.

But the urban renewal issue is complicated by the complexity of modern government and its ingrown bureaucracy in response to technological pressures operating through the inexorable drive of organizational efficiency. In the course of this transformation of government, many of the more purely "social" concerns, which were adequately handled in the days when political community and social community were identical, have disappeared in the larger governmental apparatus. As a result, the need for social planning is one symptomatic side effect of the organizational conquest of government. This bureaucratization is present at all levels—the distance between the local communities and city government is evident at a public hearing in a major city on the subject of a freeway location or a redevelopment proposal—though it is most intense at the federal level, where the bureaucracies are relatively rationalized and professionalized. Because we have not been conscious of the organizational and technological revolutions in our modern life, we approach the discovery of disparities between local community feeling and bureaucratic objectives with indignation. Truly effective social planning, even in a limited therapeutic sense, would need to deal more self-consciously with the relation between local social objectives and larger organizational requirements.

It is largely this sense of bureaucratic distance, which exists between city planners and citizens, almost equally with practitioners of welfare services and their clients, that has led to the social planning emphasis on *client analysis*. Presumably, by detailed sociological analysis of the client population, akin to the market analysis conducted by firms seeking outlets for their products, social planning can be equipped to overcome this bureaucratic disability. Client analysis has drawn upon, and has developed, substantial insights into the aspirations and motives of the target populations. Presumably, client analysis will also help uncover and recognize the interest of groups who are disenfranchised of power, and whose real aspirations would rarely be reflected in public programs. This more dynamic, or even revolutionary, aspect of client analysis has been widely stressed by social planners operating in minority group areas. It may be likened to a caretaker variant of the civil rights position that the society must do some things to help disadvantaged groups which have not yet been discovered by the disadvantaged groups themselves. In the advertising analogy, client analysis thus leads to taste-making, as well as taste-serving.

In this latter formulation, the client analysis position strikes a responsive note in the ideology of city planners, who have commonly felt that the citizens of the megapolitan world must be saved from themselves. In the social planning context, the inarticulate disadvantaged are saved from a temporary ignorance of their own best interests in order that they can more effectively express those interests over time.

The client analysis position, however, has one great advantage over that of traditional city planning. It explicitly identifies these interests, and neither subsumes them in vague categories of public interest, nor freely ascribes the prejudices of the bureaucracy to the long run best interest of the poor. Client analysis, moreover, begins from the presupposition that many of the bureaucratic standards will be ill-suited to serve the real client population. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the reality that social planning with client analysis merely substitutes market research for the operations of the market. That is, client analysis notwithstanding,

social planning is the antithesis of laissez-faire.

Social planning, in fact, cannot escape the ire of the conservatives by adopting some of the instruments of the market. Indeed, the violence of objections to the rent supplements included in last year's Housing Bill is evidence that indirectness and subtlety in social programs, which place a greater premium on planning than on direct action, may be more deeply resented by opponents of the programs' purposes. One is reminded that the late Senator Bricker belaboured his compatriot Senator from Ohio, Robert Taft, for introducing the "Trojan Horse" of private redevelopment into the publicly subsidized 1949 Housing Act. There is no particular ground for believing that social planning and market mechanisms make public spending any more palatable to enemies of the programs. The very informational requirements of social planning may make the priests of that planning more suspect of hoarding secrets.

CARETAKERS AND LONG-RUN CLIENT INTERESTS

Most social planners have at least a modified "caretaker" orientation. In his statement on "Meeting Human Needs" in *Goals for Americans*, the report of the President's Commission in 1960, James P. Dixon, Jr. wrote, "[society] can develop ways by which people can meet their own needs more readily and fruitfully, and it can develop ways by which society as a whole can meet needs that would otherwise be unmet. There are individuals who will not meet their own needs, and others who cannot."² The caretaker responsibility presumably extends to those who will not as well as those who cannot. Few societies take a wholly permissive view towards freedom of choice. In addition to the collective goods which we make available for the use of all citizens, from national defense to national parks, there are public programs encouraging the consumption of certain goods and services, and discouraging others. Economists recognize that societies encourage the consumption of the "merit" goods and discourage the consumption of demerit goods. Thus we exempt certain foods from sales taxes and place punitive taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and other products, and severely restrict the use of narcotics.

Americans have been understandably wary of social planning, since these responsibilities place the planners in the role of caretakers of "safety," "health," and "morals." The technological competence of highly organized government is today so great that there is widespread suspicion and apprehension about government power. We are afraid of the information handling capabilities which modern technology has placed at the disposal of government, for the "disutopians" have warned us of the threat to liberty which may lurk in such power. We all tend to be slightly apprehensive about the governmental capacity for storing information about the individual and recalling it by means of his social security number, zip code, or other identification. These fears may be legitimate even when it is recognized that the information technology is itself morally indifferent, and can be used with equal effect for widely approved and undesirable social purposes. The issue of what is "desirable" is an openly divisive one. Humanists have never been reluctant to prescribe remedies for fellow humans, but a central problem of democratic planning, as Davidoff and Reiner have emphasized, is that of preserving an adequate area of individual choice in the face of expert judgments of the "good."³

This issue is a persistent stumbling block in all social planning programs aimed at overcoming some of the undesirable consequences of our great technical efficiency. The Poverty Program is split, from the very start, on disagreement over the meaning of poverty. The traditional libertarian nineteenth century economists argue that the problem of poverty is one of inadequate income, and the provision of that income will eliminate the poverty. Some of the contemporary liberals argue the contrary, maintaining that there is a culture of poverty independent of income which cannot be redressed by simple money payments. The choice of a measurement of poverty engages this issue. A "market basket" approach as contrasted with an income level approach commits one to a definition of poverty in terms of merit goods, and required consumption, rather than income payment. In short, it takes some of the choice away from the poor, and refers the determination to an objective standard.

In social planning, the caretaker issue directly confronts choice. The case of

planning for mental health, for example, is fraught with instances of value conflict. Even at the margin, where relatively clear-cut issues of community interest can be adduced, there are few clear-cut policy directions. Take the control of discharges from mental hygiene programs. It serves the cause of effective treatment to continue the contact with the patient over a period of time. To maintain this contact normally requires a legal hold on the patient. But it is a matter of great administrative delicacy to decide when the imposition of that hold, usually by court order, is genuinely "protective," and when it is a violation of the patient's civil liberties.

In such cases, the welfare economics rule, crudely paraphrased, would be to restrain the patient only when the marginal social benefit from the continuing contact exceeds the marginal social cost of diminishing individual liberty. In practice, the probability of relapse once removed from contact is the decisive "factual" input. When the social cost of relapse, weighted by the probability of relapse once the patient is removed from contact, exceeds the social cost of deprivation of liberty multiplied by the probability of such deprivation in enforced contact, the restraint is justified. Clearly, administrators may be divided on their relative valuation of the social damage of the behavior of the mentally ill and of freedom to come and go at will. But it is sometimes overlooked that the social sciences, on which such calculus is dependent for its "factual" inputs, are often equally at variance over the behavioral probabilities. As Hans Morgenthau once observed, social sciences are not only uncertain about the nature of causes, given effects, but are also uncertain about the evaluation of the effects, given the causes.

The problem of choice is therefore shifted uncomfortably to the social planner. He finds that he must have a theory of long-run client interests. If he is to engage in this perilous activity, he cannot afford the luxury of positivist detachment. He will not be handed a ready-made packet of goals in the form of a set of well-ordered preference functions, and the task of discerning "latent" goals will take great patience and much free interpretation. The enterprise of social planning has always been facilitated by strong ideology. At the least, it requires determined leadership.

SOCIAL PLANNING AND SOCIAL LEADERSHIP

If the democratic ideals of decentralized decision and individual choice are to be pursued concurrently with the officially defined community goals of health and welfare, including increased consumption of meritorious goods and services, extraordinary efforts must be made to bulwark the choosing processes of the disadvantaged with vast amounts of technical information, political leverage, and economic means. In particular, it may be necessary for the poor and disadvantaged to have their own planners. This realization is quickly forced upon those who hold uncompromisingly democratic goals, and who become engaged in the action processes. For example, Paul Davidoff has on various occasions urged that planners take up the role of advocates for the disadvantaged.⁴

The problem is closely analogous to that of foreign aid. In making grants or loans to undeveloped nations, the donors are always faced with the difficult task of insuring efficient use of the funds, without imposing imperialistic controls. The difficulties in such action may account for the predilection in Soviet aid programs for concrete development projects, rather than outright grants. If the projects chosen are popular, some of this difficulty can be avoided. Presumably, if federal programs followed indigenous market choice rather than bureaucratic determination of merit, they would provide freedom schools, key club memberships, and cut-rate Cadillacs rather than public housing, Job Corps camps, and school lunches. It would then be up to local planners, working in the community as advocates, to both extend the impact of the actual choices of the community, and to reshape the choice, by dramatizing the relations between means and ends.

Taken seriously programs like the rent subsidy provisions of the present Housing Act, which are aimed at encouraging the consumption of merit goods, entail a basic reeducation of consumers. Indeed, real incomes measured by consumer satisfaction, may not go up in the short run under such programs even if the objective level of consumption is raised. (In the case of relocation of slum dwellers in housing estates in England, Ireland, and elsewhere, there is even some evidence

that the objective level of living has at times declined slightly with the increased consumption of a particular merit good, housing.)

The closer one gets to the community level, and the closer to the client, the more acute are these problems of individual liberty and choice. The main problem of social planning at the national level is to establish social goals which are attainable, or at least approachable, which can be given some hierarchical ordering, and which can be programmed. National planners should use program guides, standards, and other bureaucratic controls sparingly, lest they make demands on localities which are unreasonable in this sense.

At the local level, where these goals are to be implemented, the democratic ideal would hold out the opportunity for citizens to participate in defining the operational form of their goals. In practice, however, there is a tendency toward organizational efficiency which requires each local agency action to be measured against the operating rules of output which are established by the national bureaucracies. While planning as an activity is independent of the issue of centralization, the same organizational forces that make for planning push for the efficiencies realizable by central control. What is more, the planners are often impatient with the delays, losses, and frictional costs imposed by decentralized administration. The conduct of the Antipoverty Program is an example of such costs, and the uneasiness which these arouse in the planners.

SOCIAL PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY

The Great Society is determined to be The Efficient Society, not content to provide butter with its guns, but bent on having the most Bang for the Buck and the smoothest spreading, high-score product in Dairyland. The success of economic thinking in the Defense Department's planning and the great growth of efficiency analysis techniques supported by government contract effort have encouraged governmental planners to apply performance tests to social welfare programs as well as to military procurement. The city planning profession, which has long vacillated between social utopianism and managerial efficiency aims, now must increasingly accommodate to the imposition of the latter by the administering federal bureaucracies. Local social planning has barely begun to digest the implications of this trend.

The drive for evaluation of the effectiveness of social service programs is eminently reasonable. In the absence of well articulated national social goals, individual program progress is difficult to measure; in a society only recently concerned with defining more subtle measures of social progress than income and employment some confusion of direction is to be expected. The presence of established bureaucracies poised to soak up the new program funds does not reassure the operations analyst. After all, what percentage of applicants to the U.S. Employment Service are placed in jobs by that service? What percentage of referrals to Mental Health clinics are successfully treated? Existing welfare agencies tend to be audited in terms of operations performed, not results achieved. Senator Ribicoff's recent observation that federal agencies may lack the competence to administer the new social programs enacted by Congress is only half the picture; Congress has failed to give clearly the direction of results expected from these programs. Administrative audits may be premature until these purposes are clarified. There is even a danger that too-hasty efficiency measures will impede the development of these goals, for the latter must be defined by the interactions between the clients and the supply agencies.

Since a prime goal of administration is efficiency, and since individuals may be legitimately indifferent to the efficiency of the system or organization, individual behavior is a friction to be overcome in administration. Resistance to the imposition of preference rankings from above is a fundamental democratic tenet, but it is almost inevitably in conflict with programs planned by experts, whether social planners or physical planners. Efficiency-minded physical planners become impatient at the economic and engineering inefficiencies produced by obdurate human behavior, and the social planners, since the origins of the settlement house movement, have marvelled at the capacities of the poor for resisting "self-betterment."

Robert Moses, one of the more impatient of planners, recently gave vent to this

common annoyance, commenting on an engineering feasibility report for a proposed Long Island Sound crossing which he favors. Since the feasibility depends, to some extent, on the ability of the planners to persuade people to use the crossing at times other than summer months and week-ends, Mr. Moses complained that "the usual short season, dependent on the opening and closing of schools, and occasional mid-summer peak loads due to silly, gregarious travel hours, are the despair and curse of those who operate our seashore." The stickiness of this behavior puzzled Mr. Moses, for he continued, "as to hourly schedules, why should motorized lemmings instinctively crawl in huge armies to cast themselves into the sea just at high noon, instead of staggering their arrivals? Why can't they listen to radio and other mechanical instruction? Why must a driver behave like an ant, and if he must, why isn't he an obedient ant?"⁵

The administrative, or management, sciences differ in their approach to planning, depending on the scope and degree of control exercised by the management. More centralized management leans to a "hard" style, with decentralized or democratic management styles featuring a "soft" approach. The mnemonic public administration acronym POSDOORB (plan, organize, staff, direct, coordinate, report, budget) is appropriate to the hard style, while its counterpart DECOCOMO (decide, communicate, coordinate, motivate) is more representative of the soft. The soft style in administrative planning does not ask why man is not an obedient ant, it assumes that strict obedience is not feasible, and that manipulation of the actor's motives will be necessary to achieve the desired performance. But both POSDOORB and DECOCOMO are "top-down" procedures, as the words "direct" and "decide" reveal. The ends, in either case, are given.

The Community Action Committees set up by the Office of Economic Opportunity in its "Poverty Program" wish to have a hand in setting these ends. They wish to exploit the "maximum feasible participation" phrase in the enabling legislation to take a major part in the direction of the program. The Bureau of the Budget, guardian of administrative efficiency and witting or unwitting ally of the established big-city political machinery, has moved to curb the power of the clients in policy-making. Administrative efficiency and mass democracy have often been in conflict; Veblen's Engineers could not leave the conduct of the economy to so anarchic a mechanism as the Price System. Elites and the electorate are constantly in tension, both about the proper ends of the society and the appropriate forms of participation in decision-making.

SOCIAL PLANNING AND RADICAL REFORM

Proponents of social planning in the United States are impeded from developing a coherent plan of action by the ideological strictures of the society in which they operate. Our pragmatic, conservative, democratic ideology holds that *one*, the structure of power cannot be changed from below, and *two*, behavior and taste cannot be changed from above. Under the first, not only are revolutionary *means* excluded, but radical ends are ruled out as well. By the canons of presupposition *two*, democracies must resist the imposition of preferences upon the weak by the strong. Despite welfare economists' demonstration that aggregation of individual values into a community value function is greatly facilitated by acceptance of the preference of authority as the preference of the group (the dictatorship case) this convenience is denied social planners.

Given these limitations, social planning is split, with its left wing rejecting presupposition *one* and accepting *two*; an administrative right accepting *one* but altering *two*; and a political right accepting both *one* and *two* and insisting on confining operations within the alternatives of the status quo. Only the last mentioned has no crisis of legitimation. Radical social planners bent on changing the distribution of power and available actions to maximize individual choice and administrative social planners accepting the power distribution and attempting to secure behavior of the wards to conform to the tastes of their guardians are both pushing for social change. The left wishes substantial redistribution so that its clients will be allowed to transform themselves (along lines of their choosing) while the administrative right wants the clients to transform themselves so that the whole game will work more smoothly, even if the chief beneficiaries of

smoother functioning prove to be the more powerful. Examples of these ideal types are not hard to find in city planning.

The task of the radical social planners is difficult. Society is less tolerant of those who would tamper with the goals than of those who would alter the means, and its organized apparatus is especially uneasy at efforts to incorporate machinery for regularly changing the goals, through radical indulgence of free choice, even when the rhetoric of the social planners uses venerated slogans. The experience of Mobilization For Youth in New York is evidence that revolutionary programs guided by social planners are not likely to be treated by the custodians of civil order with the degree of indulgence sometimes accorded illegal sit-ins. Mobilization For Youth, moreover, was challenging the local governmental administration more directly than it was threatening some vague "power structure." This was true even when it supported tenant movements, for the slum landlords "power" is vested in their relations with local political figures rather than in connections with financial and economic powers.

In comments at the workshop on "Centrally Planned Change" two years ago, John R. Seeley expressed the fear that the federal involvement in traditional local social planning would create a more formidable bureaucratic administrative barrier to the "grass roots" choice school of social planning. Observing that "a number of the executive departments of the federal government have moved into a species of planning and plan-forcing on a scale so massive as to constitute almost a new force in American life, and, incidentally, to render peripheral and probably powerless the previous incumbents of 'the social planning activity,'" he went on to cite Karl Mannheim as labelling "correctly the major danger on which would turn the fate of planning as between the dictatorial and democratic varieties. The former fate would be sealed if planning fell into the hands of the bureaucracies."⁶ But the dilemma for social planning leadership is clearly not "bureaucracy or grass roots," but "what bureaucracy?" In a society in which the "establishment" has vast bureaucratic, rationalizing, technically competent apparatus at its disposal, can a more tolerant, permissive, choice-maximizing movement succeed in redistributing power? And if the radical social planners are allowed to keep presupposition *two* on condition that they give up their opposition to *one*, that is, that they retain democratic choice at the price of foregoing revolutionary redistribution, will they not become the leaders of the lost, the counselors of despair?

This tension in the leadership condition of the radical social planners in the American ghetto slums has been bared by the anarchic outbreaks of Harlem last summer and Los Angeles this year. The democratic social planner resists being made a recruitment officer for the Establishment. He wants the client to be taken on his own terms, to be taken seriously as an arbiter of his own values. He may even attempt to protect indigenous forms and life styles when they are illegal. But he has no revolutionary role or power. In a direct confrontation of authority and the frustrated aspirations of his clients, he has no function, for he cannot relinquish or curb his doctrine of self-determination—that would mean rejection of position *two*—and he cannot speedup the transfer of power.

SOCIAL PLANNING, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIETAL GOALS

At best, our contemporary social planning can achieve some coordination of welfare agency efforts, some limited participation by community groups in welfare planning, and a readiness to be measured against such goals as the discerning savants of our society can muster. Positive social science, which is steadfastly descriptive, and determined to be value-free, can play an important diagnostic role, but without the informing graces of ideology it is remarkably mute on prescription. Social scientists tell us of the plight of the bottom fifth of our society, of the obstacles to social mobility, of the frustrating flight of meaningful work, of intergenerational transmission of dependency, and even of the private grasp of public decision, but they leave program to the reformers and ideologues. Ideologically sustained societal planning, as the socialist experiments show, virtually dispenses with social science.⁷

The ideological socialists are steadfast in their commitment to equity principles, though in practice efficiency considerations of economic development may be

allowed to supersede these as "temporary" expedients. The utilitarian postulates of the economic-efficiency administrative analysts are regarded by social critics as convenient oversimplifications. As a nation we have slipped into a program of broad social reform which involves the organization of our economy, of the space organization of our cities, and even of interpersonal relations, without benefit of societal planning. At the same time our social scientists have compiled some of the best social statistics in the world, and have supported these with unexcelled social analysis and a great deal of partial social theory. At the local community level we are on the verge of comprehensive social accounts.⁸

We are now in an increasingly good position to measure the impact of public programs on their various clients, to establish the benefits and costs of programs, and to measure, in limited terms, the efficiency of public actions, thanks to a host of social studies, social measurements, and social accounts. Our social intelligence system is potentially powerful. Some, like Seeley, fear that this power will be manipulated by the planner-bureaucrats. Others feel, somewhat wryly, that the bureaucrats will keep this knowledge from being mobilized for social action. The "broad citizen involvement and participation" sought in community social planning is frustrated by the lack of basic social democracy. Without this involvement, the political legitimacy of social planning is open to challenge, for we have no consensus on a national social program to guide the community effort.

In any event, the social democracy which is a precondition to collective social planning in a political democracy depends on social gains which will be engineered, for the most part, from Washington. The achievement of economic democracy, the securing of equality in civil rights, the abolition of gross regional differences in education, and other major social gains will be forged by federal power, or not at all. But the societal plan which will set the targets against which all the ad hoc programs will be measured does not exist.

If such national social planning were to be instituted in the USA, substantial reorganization and improvement of our social data might be required. It is obvious, for example, that the relation of economic planning to social planning requires a national manpower policy, and that the latter, in turn, requires a national manpower budget with great regional and local detail. The material for such a budget is abundantly available, but the policy—which would require the setting of targets on full employment, local and regional labor force mobility, and similar matters—is not available to organize the data.

Social science can inform policy directly, as well as contribute to social accounting. The findings of social scientists have influenced the highest councils in the land, as the wholesale citation of Myrdal's *American Dilemma* by the Supreme Court in its civil rights decisions showed, and the revival of brain-trusting style in the executive branch is now graced by richer social science material than was available to the New Deal. At times it seems we have fallen back on "objective" social science findings because our political ideology offers so few positive guides to social reconstruction. Thus a program which might be openly embraced in other countries out of commitment to an ideology might be introduced in the USA under the seemingly nonarbitrary cloak of social "science." There is a danger in this process, for it could lead to the tyrannical "scientism" predicted by intellectual opponents of planning.

More likely, however, it would lead to much ad hoc social planning. For the social scientists cannot supplant the goal-making role of ideology, or relieve the political decision makers of their responsibility for setting the public preference scale and the targets to be embodied in a societal plan. The protection of the citizen against administrative abuses, the biases of planners, the condescension of caretakers, and all arbitrariness in social planning depends upon the open articulation of coherent national social goals, and the public acceptance of social planning targets. The Poverty Program, Appalachia Bill, aid to education, and other "Great Society" Acts need a national social accounting against which to be measured. Even more, they need a national social plan which articulates policy, and target dates, for achieving minimum levels of income and consumption, direction and amount of redistribution of population, reduction of intergenerational dependency, equalization of education, and a host of other social goals.

NOTES

¹ Herbert Gans, "Memorandum," an unpublished paper of the Puerto Rican Planning Board.

² James P. Dixon, Jr., "Meeting Human Needs," *Goals for Americans*, The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals (Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 249.

³ P. Davidoff and T. Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXVIII (May, 1962), 103-115.

⁴ Good statements of the Davidoff position may be found in: Paul Davidoff, "The Role of the City Planner in Social Planning," *Proceedings of the American Institute of Planners, 1964 Annual Conference*, pp. 125-131, and, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXX (November, 1964), 331-338.

⁵ Remarks by Robert Moses on the proposed Long Island Sound Crossing, Triborough Bridge Authority, 1965.

⁶ John R. Seeley, "Central Planning: Prologue to a Critique," *Centrally Planned Change: Prospects and Concepts*, ed. Robert Morris (New York: National Association of Social Workers, 1964), p. 58.

⁷ A well-documented case for this conclusion appears in a yet-unpublished paper on Soviet Social Science prepared by Peter R. Senn for the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Berkeley, December, 1965.

⁸ See Harvey Perloff, "New Directions in Social Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* XXXI (November, 1965), 297-303.

Author's Note: Parts of this article are based on "Memorandum on Social Issues in Planning in Puerto Rico," which I prepared while on a consulting team under the leadership of Professor Robert B. Mitchell in San Juan in July of 1963.

GOALS AND GOAL-SETTING

Robert C. Young

Public goals in a democratic society are seldom set through a methodical procedure, but, since they provide the direction and purposes of plans, planners must find a way to determine and establish unequivocal goals. In order to serve as specifications for plans, broad goals must be converted to measurable objectives through the application of appropriate standards. A procedure for setting goals is suggested which will facilitate the handling of multiple goals and help to resolve inherent conflicts.

The responsibility for setting public goals in a democracy is as diffuse as the authority to govern. Perhaps for this reason few goals are consciously arrived at through a methodical procedure. Rather, such goals as have been established are those which are the desire components of "problems" which the policy-making officials are unable to avoid because of the impetus of public opinion and pressure. Although a problem consists of both a goal—or desire—and an impediment to the realization of the goal, it is an unfortunate fact that most of public and technical attention is usually focused on the impediments rather than on the goals. The nature of public problems is such that the constituent goals court little examination once the problems rise to the level of public awareness. While this may pose few problems to the administrator or politician who is attuned to the popularly voiced goals and can operate a safe half step behind public opinion, it does create difficulty for the planner—the planner who is looking to the future and must consider goals in a multitude of areas for which there are no commonly accepted goals or for which the existing goals are inadequate, irrational, ambiguous, or conflicting. The Housing and Home Finance Agency Planning Letter No. 44,¹ formalizes the setting of objectives as one of five critical points in the development of the transportation element of comprehensive plans and puts the planner's quandary in practical focus insofar as he will have to design programs for goal-setting to comply with the edict of the federal benefactors. This directive is a logical outgrowth of President Johnson's search for meaningful values to delimit the Great Society.