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Contentions with Sharing: The Local Structures and Politics of Short-Term Rental Markets in the Platform Economy

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Contentions with Sharing: The Local Structures and Politics of Short-Term Rental Markets in the Platform Economy

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

by

Yotala Oszkay Febres-Cordero

2022

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Contentions with Sharing: The Local Structures and Politics of Short-Term Rental Markets in the Platform Economy

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

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In the last decade, the platform economy has transformed urban life, using crowdsourcing technology to change the way people eat (e.g., Instacart, UberEats, Doordash), move (Lyft, Uber), work (TaskRabbit), and travel (Airbnb). An accompanying, but understudied, change is this economy's dramatic reorganization of urban civic participation, as platforms mobilize their users to fight the market and labor regulations supported by local civic groups and market competitors. My dissertation uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the social bases of short-term rental markets (e.g., Airbnb) and their consequences for urban civic organizing and policymaking. I argue that the very way these markets are socially organized—relying on civic capacities, labor and housing inequalities, and technologies that blend "sharing" with transactional forms of exchange—shape the local politics over their regulation, creating new allegiances between civic groups and the corporation.

The dissertation of Yotala Oszkay Febres-Cordero is approved.

Rebecca J. Emigh

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Paavo Monkkonen

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2022

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, the platform (i.e., "sharing") economy has dramatically transformed urban life, using crowdsourcing technology to change the way people eat (e.g., Instacart, UberEats, Doordash), move (Lyft, Uber), work (TaskRabbit), and travel (Airbnb). Because companies in this economy span a range of services, and because their platforms have become hugely popular, stakeholders and policymakers in a range of institutional fields are now grappling with the implications of these growing markets. Competing corporations, along with labor unions, housing advocates, progressive activists, and residents, who feel the impact of these markets on their economic interests, job stability, working conditions, and neighborhood and housing experiences, would like to see the companies subjected to stringent regulations. As a result of these opponents' activism, platform corporations are increasingly turning to novel political strategies to address policy challenges (Captain 2021; Hussain, Bhuiyan, and Menezes 2020; Walker 2015).

For example, in 2020, in advance of a $3.5 billion IPO, Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky detailed this complex political environment including housing and land use, data transparency, and labor regulations—and the entrenched civic groups and hotel lobby who support them—that could have a "material adverse effect" on short-term rental markets' and the platform's viability (Chesky 2020). In line with other major crowdsourcing technologies in the platform economy (e.g., Uber, Lyft, Instacart, TaskRabbit), Airbnb has devoted significant resources to these political battles, including an "Airbnb Citizen" initiative that mobilizes its local user bases for advocacy. These developments are part of a larger trend in which corporations increasingly rely on employees, community organizers, and academic experts for their policy and electoral goals

(Hertel-Fernandez 2018; Walker 2014). The rising popularity of these services, thus, have not only change the way people "do things," but also how they organize socially and politically.

This dissertation uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the social bases of one form of platform capitalism—contemporary short-term rental markets (e.g., Airbnb)—and its consequences for urban civic organization and policymaking. I ask 1) What are the historical antecedents of short-term rental markets in the platform economy? How do the resources, technologies, participants, and organizational structures of existing markets converge to give rise to platform-facilitated marketplaces around "sharing"? 2) How are short-term rental marketplaces organized? What local resources and social structures do they depend on? 3) How do the ways in which short-term rental markets are structured create contentious politics over their institutionalization? How do they shift civic alliances and create new forms of political advocacy? and 4) What are the outcomes of this shifting social organization at the local level? What consequences do these changing civic alliances have for the institutionalization of contemporary short-term rental markets?

Dominant sociological approaches for understanding markets typically sort into two broad agendas, focusing either on the creation and organization of market structures or market politics and institutionalization. However, even though both these processes have been shown to be pivotal in market formation, the complementary theories that address them are rarely considered together. Furthermore, these approaches often neglect the contingency of place or how local resources, social structures, and politics shape the organization of markets and subsequently, the politics of their institutionalization.

Building on this literature, I argue that the very way short-term rental markets are structured around existing local markets, resources, and forms of social organization shape the local politics over their regulation. That is, short-term rental platforms, in recombining resources and organizing principles from long-term housing and short-term accommodation markets, platform technologies, and the civic sector, create highly popular short-term rental marketplaces that blend "sharing" and more transactional forms of exchange. When these new forms of market organization become contested in the field of policymaking, they also consequently transform traditionally adversarial political relationships (e.g., management vs. labor, homeowners' vs. tenants' rights groups) into "Baptist-Bootlegger" coalitions (Yandle 1983) that combine civic and economic interests. While these coalitions offer advantages—i.e., resources for civic groups and moral cover for corporations—they are not always well-received by policymakers and thus complicate the individual goals of each coalition's members.

The organization of this chapter proceeds as follows: First, I review the distinct literature on market creation and institutionalization. I then propose a synthesis of these literatures, suggesting an approach that explores how the formation of market structures can have consequence for how these markets become institutionalized. Finally, I review my analytic strategy and provide a chapter summary of the rest of the dissertation.

The Creation and Organization of Market Structures

In creating a market, organizations must coordinate the goods, labor, and technology required to circulate new commodities (Emigh 2008). Additionally, the meanings attached to these commodities must have both cognitive legitimacy or fit with the informal categories and understandings of market actors (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Emigh 2008). One approach to markets, thus, emphasizes the material objects, technologies, relationships, and cognitive frameworks that constitute markets as structures (Emigh 2008; Sewell 1992) and facilitate different types of commodity exchange.

For example, resource dependency theory (Davis and Cobb 2010; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) argues that the success of markets depends on how an organization manages its resource flows. In this way, the resource environment can exercise some "external control" on organizations, depending on how critical the resource is, how much discretion the external actors have in allocating the resource, and the availability of the resource (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). To influence these external conditions, managers actively work to "guide and control this process of manipulating the environment" (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 18) through a range of tactics.

More recent organizational approaches enhance this work, illuminating how new and alternative markets emerge from existing structures in an organizational environment. In order to overcome uncertainty and resistance, market actors use bricolage and recombination of existing resources and cultural repertoires to create new innovations, categories, and identities (Baker and Nelson 2005; David, Sine, and Haveman 2013; Galunic and Rodan 1998; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003). Existing organizations and institutions have also been shown to provide the social infrastructure upon which new organizations emerge and become legitimate. For instance civic organizations, social movements, and local businesses have generated new and unconventional markets such as micro-brewing, grass-fed beef, and wind power as well as shielded communities from non-local and extractive forms of investment (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Carroll and Torfason 2011; Goldstein 2018; Rao 2008; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey 2008).

Material-semiotic and performative approaches have shown how markets for commodities are created through the enactment of particular "market devices" such as concrete material objects and economic theories and ideas (Callon 1999; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007). This work is based in actor network theory, which broadly emphasizes the ways in which "actants"—that is, both humans and non-humans—constitute social structures (Latour 2007; Law 1992). In a market context, people often orient their action through these organizing mechanisms (e.g., rankings, double entry-bookkeeping, opportunism) to make sense of the market or enhance profits (Abolafia 2001; Carruthers and Espeland 1991; Espeland and Sauder 2007).

The "relational work" perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes the cognitive dimensions of markets, showing how people ascribe certain meanings to economic relationships that involve sacred goods (Almeling 2007; Rossman 2014; Zelizer 2005, 2011). For example, Zelizer (2005; 2011) describes the "hostile worlds" approach—the notion that intimacy and the economic sphere should never comingle—and the "nothing but" approach—that notion that intimacy is just another form of economic exchange—which emerges when people assign value to intimate relations and goods. To reconcile these hostile worlds, market actors use exchange models like bundling, brokerage, and gift-exchange, each of which work to obfuscate what might otherwise appear as a profane commodity exchange (Rossman 2014; Schilke and Rossman 2018). Like the material-semiotic and performative approaches, relational work perspectives emphasize the cognitive and organizational frameworks that people use to make sense of markets.

This work is complemented by network analyses that emphasize the embeddedness of economic exchanges in social relations and how specific types of relationships—such as those that are personal or "embedded" and those that are simply transactional—serve different purposes in commodity exchange. For example, the trust and knowledge associated with embedded ties can be particularly beneficial in exchanges involving high uncertainty and volatility (Baker 1990; Uzzi 1996, 1997, 1999). Weak, more transactional ties, can be better for novel information-seeking and innovation (Burt 2004; Granovetter 1973). The type of ties, thus, can be both a barrier and benefit to different types of market processes.

Together, this work shows how existing resources, organizations, social networks, ideas, and cognitive categories come to form market structures. Existing material goods, ideas, social relations can serve as vital resources; actors can repurpose and adapt them to create innovative new commodities and facilitate their production (Baker and Nelson 2005; Burt 2004; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Uzzi 1997). Market devices and organizing principles work to situate actors within a market, helping them to assign value to economic goods, rationalize their action, or help them assess whether or not the commodity should be a commodity at all (Abolafia 2001; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Muniesa et al. 2007; Zelizer 2005, 2011).

Indeed, a key tension explored in this work is the segmentation between different types of exchange. That is, in this literature, market organization can be more hierarchical, relying on traditional supply chains, arm-length transactions, and mass production, or more informal, alternative, and network-based, relying on community ties and notions of social intimacy and reciprocity. When an exchange commingles these organizing principles—e.g., a commercial beer producer attempts a craft beer product line (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000), or an intimate or informal practice becomes commodified (Zelizer 2005)—they must be obfuscated through another organizing framework (e.g., brokerage) or risk appearing profane or inauthentic (Carroll and Torfason 2011; Rossman 2014). Such dynamics are at work in the creation and organization of contemporary short-term rental markets.

Market Politics and Institutionalization

While the literature on market creation and organization focuses on market structures and their cognitive legitimacy, the literature on market politics and institutionalization examines how markets achieve socio-political legitimacy, or how they integrate with existing norms, laws and regulations (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). In this literature, the primary unit of analysis is the institutional field, comprising of "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:148). Organizations within a field tend to be isomorphic, as adopting similar structures to other organizations in the field can bring legitimacy. As fields become more institutionalized, experiences and action become more "sedimented" and "congealed" into a taken-for-granted, "objective" reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

However, as field theory argues (Fligstein and McAdam 2012), fields can also be dynamic sites of contention where power and opportunity are in constant flux. Embedded in a "Russian doll" of other proximate fields, an institutional field can be disrupted when the balance of power and resources shifts nearby, providing actors in less advantageous positions political opportunity (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:59). Actors' capacity for preserving the status quo or bringing change to the social order depends on these opportunities and their "social skill," or ability to collectively and politically mobilize others to seize opportunities, forge common identities and interests, and build coalitions with allies both within and outside of the field (Evans and Kay 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). The state often plays a unique role in such contention, as it can certify or discount understandings about what the rules are and who has power within the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).

Publics who feel threatened by change—or, what field theory would describe as incumbents—typically attempt to create a "legitimacy crisis" and expand the scope of conflict to involve other actors such as the state (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Schattschneider 1960;

Schneiberg and Bartley 2001). The firm entrepreneurs seeking change—or challengers—typically emulate the strategies of social movements (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Rao 2008). In the context of regulatory policy, these stakeholders must identify receptive policy contexts and mobilize key resources and allies for favorable regulations (Evans and Kay 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Ingram and Rao 2004; Kluttz 2019; Vasi et al. 2015).

To be sure, this framework deemphasizes "organizations" and "social movements" as distinct theoretical categories, instead defining them in terms of whether they resist or seek change (Walker 2012b). As regular participation in associations declines (Putnam 2001), innovators, consumers, stakeholders, and social movements increasingly channel their civic energies via the marketplace (Cohen 2003; King and Pearce 2010; Rao 2008). Corporations are now a common target of social movements and, as incumbents, field calls from activists to change products, internal policies, capital investments, and production practices (Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000; McDonnell, King, and Soule 2015; Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008). However, companies can also be challengers and activists, utilizing (or co-opting) social movement participation and tactics for their own purposes (Rao 2008; Walker and Oszkay 2020; Walker and Rea 2014). Market politics, thus, can create sometimes strange bedfellows who transcend organizational and social movement categories, and are instead rooted in shared stakes and goals.

In the management and political science literature, the classic model is the Baptist-Bootlegger coalition, in which religious groups with a moral objection and businesses with an economic stake both have an interest in alcohol bans (Yandle 1983). Bootleggers, in a regulatory context, represent market elites who have resources but cannot offer rationales beyond narrow economic interests. Baptists characterize civic groups that seek regulation because they believe it is the right thing to do (Smith and Yandle 2014); by acting in accordance with their system of beliefs, they have “moral authenticity” (Carroll and Wheaton 2009) but lack Bootleggers’ resources (Yandle 1999). While there are high coordination costs in forming these types of alliances—as they require mutual trust and a commitment to staying “on message”—they can be highly beneficial to each party when they combine their strengths to generate policymakers’ support (Murphy, Walker, and Jia 2022).

Indeed, authenticity is, by definition, situated in a context of social audiences who consecrate such claims (Carroll and Wheaton 2009; Walker and Stepick 2020). A hybrid identity, such as one engendered through a Baptist-Bootlegger coalition, can mobilize constituents on a mass scale, providing multiple reasons to join the movement (Heaney and Rojas 2014). Coalitions can also be effective when they leverage their hybridity to divide labor among different organizations in a field, who each perform a niche form of activism (e.g., lobbying, litigation, protest) or have a reputation for covering a particular policy domain (“institutional authenticity”) (Levitsky 2007; Walker and Stepick 2020). Politicians can be quite receptive to such a broad coalition because they can satisfy more than one interest group and justify their decisions under a morally-sound rationale (Murphy et al. 2022; Simmons, Yonk, and Thomas 2011; Smith and Yandle 2014).

In a Baptist-Bootlegger coalition, then, each partner may leverage their unique assets and expertise to advance shared policymaking goals. Business groups (i.e., Bootleggers) have resources to hire lobbying consultants, who do not necessarily buy votes but provide legislative labor and help develop policy agendas with strategically-selected policymakers (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hall and Deardorff 2006). The efficacy of this lobbying is dependent on how well they align with receptive audiences and particular policy domains (Hall and Deardorff 2006;

Walker and Rea 2014). More recently, corporations also hire public affairs consultants to mobilize grassroots activists who can put a favorable "face" on their efforts (Walker 2012a, 2014).

Traditional social movement organizations, activists, and civically-minded stakeholders (i.e., Baptists), then, provide this "face," mobilizing publics toward their cause with compelling storytelling and framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Ferree 2003; Polletta 1998; Vasi et al. 2015). The efficacy of these appeals, when made to policymakers, depends on whether there is a "discursive opportunity structure" or an ideological culture in policymaking institutions that indexes such claims as legitimate and acceptable (Ferree 2003; Graham 2012). Combining their individual strengths, then, hybrid coalitions between Baptist and Bootleggers can be effective in establishing both moral and institutional authenticity with publics and policymaking audiences.

The literature on market politics and institutionalization, thus, illuminates the ways in which market actors either work to preserve or change an existing social order to achieve socio-political legitimacy. At times, organizations within a market seek to comply with the status quo, adopting similar organizational structures, procedures, and rules to signal legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). When there is political opportunity, however, new entrants or organizations with less power may seek change, threatening those incumbents who benefit from the existing order (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). The outcome of this political contention depends on each side's ability to mobilize an effective coalition, and how these coalitions' efforts resonate with the policymaking audiences and publics who can legitimize their action (Ferree 2003; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Walker and Stepick 2020). These dynamics are apparent in the institutionalization processes of platform economy markets.

The Local Foundations of Market Conflict and the Politics of Authenticity in the "Sharing" (Platform) Economy

Integrating the two perspectives on markets, this dissertation explores platform economy market formation as an interlocking process of creating market structures that organize economic exchanges and institutionalizing market structures through organizational and social movement politics. I suggest that platform economy markets emerge from established institutional fields that rely on similar resources and organizational structures and produce similar products and services. The market structures that organize platform economy markets for economic exchange also become consequential for their political organization. As platform economy markets rise in popularity, they create stakeholders in the platform technology such as consumers and suppliers (i.e., "challengers") and threaten actors in nearby institutional fields competing for consumers and relying on similar resources (i.e., "incumbents"). Building on the two literatures, I show how these processes work at the local level, a key consideration for markets that are largely considered "urban phenomena"(Davidson and Infranca 2016) and a dimension of market formation that is not always considered.

Companies associated with the platform economy have in common a business model of 1) sourcing their product from a community of users, 2) renting that product out to their customer/user base, and 3) extracting a profit from the exchange, all through the means of internet technologies. Often, these services are labeled as the "sharing economy" given the decentralized model that relies on crowdsourcing and claims that they encourage egalitarian communities characterized by diversity, hospitality and trust (Powell 2016; Schor et al. 2015; Stabrowski 2022).

In platform economy markets, “prosumers” (producers/providers and consumers) (Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010) are the key resource constituency as they both consume and provide the two commodities circulated via platforms. That is, a crowdsourced network of users both consume the brokerage technology from which the platform extracts a profit and consume and provide the private goods that are advertised through the platform. While this decentralized model reduces production costs and liability for firms in these markets, it does present two major challenges in managing resources: a) accessing enough prosumers of the brokerage technology, so that the companies can extract sufficient profits, and b) overcoming cognitive constraints among prosumers to facilitate the exchange of once-private goods, which—already imbued with a sense of intimacy and attachment—must be re-signified for exchange purposes.

As urban phenomena, platform economy markets' resources are derived from the “scale, proximity, amenities, and specialization that mark city life” (Davidson and Infranca 2016:218). However, while urban living provides an ample potential user base of prosumers to these markets, they are still contingent on a “geography of production” (Storper 2013:7), only able to specialize in particular commodities based on how resources and institutions are spatially configured (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen 2000; Storper 2013). As such, platform economy markets concentrate in urban areas where conducive resources and organizational structures can be easily adapted for production purposes (Fleming et al. 2012; Padgett and Powell 2012; Storper 2013). These marketplaces thus concentrate where local users have private goods with excess capacity and have the cognitive and organizational frameworks to engage in these more direct and intimate, less hierarchical forms of exchange.

Given these resources and structures, the market device (Muniesa et al. 2007) of platform economy markets—that is, the platform technology that brokers economic exchanges among a large community of users—not only efficiently organizes and crowdsource suppliers and consumers but also provides a mechanism for trust. The platform technology allows private individuals, sometimes called microentrepreneurs (Curtis 2014; Frenken and Schor 2017; Zhang, Bufquin, and Lu 2019), to commodify their skills and assets with excess capacity; the income they earn often supplements or replaces the income they earn from conventional labor markets (Schor et al. 2020). The technology also provides a previously untapped customer base to conventional markets already circulating the goods offered on the platforms. Finally, the reputation and feedback systems allowed by the technology comfort users who may be wary of engaging in economic exchanges with "strangers" (Frenken and Schor 2017; Huurne et al. 2017). A conducive local environment and this market device for recruiting users, then, facilitates platform economy market growth.

However, these market structures, if successfully established, also create local contention, threatening established markets in several ways. First, where popular, they threaten the consumer base of competing markets, offering a compelling alternative model of consumption. Second, in local marketplaces where there is a supply of the resources needed for platform economy markets but where such resources are also limited, they threaten the supply chain of markets offering similar goods. Finally, they bring precarity to existing labor markets, both by shifting to a "gig" model of contractual work and by threatening employers in competing markets, who may feel inclined to lay off workers under such uncertainty.

As a result, the market structures of the platform economy create two types of Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions. Platform corporations and established suppliers from existing institutional fields (i.e., Bootleggers) who seek to expand profits unite with small-scale "microentrepreneurs" (i.e., Baptists) seeking livable incomes and social connection under the market device of the platform; they form a challenging coalition that disrupts power and resources for nearby institutional fields. In these nearby institutional fields, corporations (i.e., Bootleggers) who feel platform economy markets threaten their consumer base and supply chain unite with labor movements and other civic activists who want to preserve resources and economic opportunities (i.e., Baptists) to form an incumbent coalition that questions the socio-political legitimacy of the platforms. The outcome of this political struggle is contingent on how the strategies of these two coalitions resonate with the local policymaking context.

In the contemporary context, municipal leaders increasingly view themselves as community partners who serve a wide range of constituents and collective goals (Pacewicz 2016; Pierre 2014). For instance, local policymakers sometimes form partnerships with civic actors or business interests in the context of placemaking, creating land-use projects under a shared understanding of what the city should be (Besek 2020; Hunter, Loughran, and Fine 2018; Pratt 2011). Community-based organizations also serve an increasingly central role in local governance, representing neighborhood interests and providing services and leadership for governments lacking capacity. At times, this role is ceremonial, with their reputation for grassroots "community power" often serving as a guise for policymakers' other political goals (Marwell, Marantz, and Baldassarri 2020; Reckhow, Downey, and Sapotichne 2020). Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions, thus, can leverage their diverse strengths and goals to align with the deficits and goals of these local policymakers.

However, political organizing that spans too many identities and categories also tends to confuse audiences, who not knowing where to cognitively place them, perceive them to be less legitimate. This is particularly true for organizations with categories that are highly dissimilar (Kovács and Hannan 2010; Zuckerman 1999). In policymaking context, hybrid organizational identities can also confuse policymakers who, lacking resources and context, look to such organizations for clear policy goals and expertise (Walker and Stepick 2020).

In Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions, then, combining economic and moral logics can evoke a sense of “hostile worlds,” particularly in the public sphere, which is often understood as a space for moral (not market) claims (Habermas 1989; Zelizer 2005). Mobilizing a coalition that provides moral cover for narrow economic goals is especially vulnerable to accusations of “astroturfing,” or inciting civic participation with economic incentives (Smith and Yandle 2014; Walker 2014; Walker and Stepick 2020). Consequently, politicians who would otherwise be drawn to the broad appeal of these coalitions, may instead see supporting them as a political liability. Bootleggers who obfuscate their economic interests in the moral explanation of Baptists, therefore, risk participating in a counter-productive effort that could either confuse audiences or appear inauthentic.

This may be particularly true for the challenging coalitions of platform economy markets, which combine the action of commercial Bootleggers with the action of microentrepreneurial Baptists. In contrast to incumbent organizations, who have more distinct organizational boundaries and identities (as they likely emerged separately), platform companies and users have a shared organizational identity through the market device of the platform technology. The conflation of interests and expertise within the same organizing framework, exacerbates the sense of “hostile worlds” and generates categorical confusion, ultimately making the achievement of both moral and institutional authenticity difficult for this coalition.

Short-Term Rental Markets in the Platform Economy

This dissertation explores these dynamics by examining one of the most popular forms of platform economy markets, short-term rentals. These exchanges involve owners, tenants, or property managers ("hosts") who rent a housing unit to tourists seeking short-term accommodation. The most popular platform for short-term renting, and among the largest in the broader platform economy, is Airbnb, a company founded in 2008 that sought to scale up home and short-term accommodation and exchange. Airbnb now has over four million hosts worldwide and was valued at $47 billion during its IPO, the highest of that year (Griffith 2020a).

For microentrepreneurs, the income earned on short-term rental platforms like Airbnb, is typically supplemental; it does not often replace traditional forms of work since it is often less labor-intensive than other forms of gig labor (Ravenelle 2019; Schor et al. 2020). However, becoming a successful microentrepreneurial host does involve significant resources, including having extra housing space in a desirable neighborhood to and the know-how to effectively market that space (Ravenelle 2019). Additionally, while reputation systems help build mutual trust with guests, securing a favorable review demands significant emotional labor from providers, who must generate empathy and create memorable experiences for customers with thoughtful "small talk" and personal touches (Huurne et al. 2017; Lutz, Newlands, and Fieseler 2018; Raval and Dourish 2016). The stakes are especially high for microentrepreneurs, who, conducting one-to-one exchanges, offer personalized items and engage frequently with customers. Platforms celebrate the "entrepreneurial ethos" of these hosts in their marketing and advertising, emphasizing the hard-working individuals who struggle to pay their bills and the way that short-term rentals support local economies through such alternative tourism services (Airbnb 2012; Ravenelle 2019).

At the same time, short-term rental platforms devote significant efforts to attracting business travel consumers and thus involve large-scale hosts who operate multiple listings with standardized amenities (Horn and Merante 2017). These hosts may be previous microentrepreneurial hosts who, finding success with short-term renting, are looking to scale up to further expand profits or real estate enterprises from the housing market that, in trying to identify new consumers, convert properties into quasi-hotels (Ravenelle 2019; Samaan 2015a). Additionally, because they are operating at scale, large-scale hosts are also more likely than microentrepreneurial hosts to outsource their labor to agents who manage units and interact with guests. Many large-scale forms of short-term rental exchange, then, offer less personal and local experiences than microentrepreneurial forms.

Both forms, however, implicate housing markets, in their potential to convert housing from long-term to transient use. While some commercial businesses from traditional short-term rental markets (i.e., bed and breakfasts, seasonal rentals, and hotels) now utilize the platforms to advertise their rentals, the innovation of the platform technology is to expand participation through the crowdsourcing model. As such, both residents and commercial landlords can feasibly rent once long-term housing units on the platforms, potentially straining long-term housing stock. This is particularly true for "vacation rentals," which in contrast to the practice of "home-sharing" or renting a spare room, offer up entire units for short-term use. Short-term rental platforms and hosts, thus, are vulnerable to claims that, in their ample and transient use of housing, they contribute to rising housing prices and gentrification (Barron, Kung, and Proserpio 2018; Horn and Merante 2017; Wachsmuth and Weisler 2018).

The similarities and differences between microentrepreneurial and large-scale short-term rentals are accordingly outlined in Table 1. Microentrepreneurial rentals, operated by individual owners or tenants with a spare room or house, are more alternative and personal, promising travelers the experience of "living like a local" (Benner 2016). Large-scale rentals, on the other hand, resemble traditional hotel and short-term rental markets, offering more standardized

Table 1: Idealized Features of Microentrepreneurial and Large-scale Exchanges in Short-term Rental Markets

Type of Rental	Microentrepreneurial	Large-Scale
Exchange Schema		
Host/guest social distance and interaction	One-to-one/Personal	One-to-many/Managed en-masse
Accommodation experience	Local/Idiosyncratic	Translocal/Standardized
Resource Dependencies		
Host Labor	Individual homeowners/tenants	Real estate enterprise
Capital	Low to moderate	High
Housing	One room/unit	Multiple rooms/units

features and less personalized spaces and experiences. Both forms, however, have implications for housing and residential stability, in their potential to make housing use more transient.

The expansion of the contemporary short-term rental market, thus, has consequences for two markets circulating similar commodities: the long-term housing market and the travel accommodation market. Homeowners and renters in marketplaces where short-term rentals are popular feel that they are exacerbating housing shortages, contributing to rising rents, and deteriorating neighborhood character. Hotel companies in highly desirable tourist destinations feel that short-term rentals threaten their competitive advantage. As the practice of short-term rentals grow, these incumbents contest the socio-political legitimacy of these exchanges, prompting local policymakers to consider updating their regulations on short-term rentals or, in cases where they do not exist, creating new ones.

In response to the threat of regulation, Airbnb and other platform technologies have turned to their user base for political campaigns and organizing. In 2015, Airbnb announced their “100 Club” initiative, aimed at organizing short-term rental hosts around the world into “home-

Table 2 Baptist-Bootlegger Coalitions in the Short-Term Rental Debate

	Incumbent Coalition	Challenging Coalition
Baptists	Housing and tenants' rights advocates, neighborhood activists, homeowners, hotel workers	Microentrepreneurial hosts
Bootleggers	Hotel owners	Large-scale hosts, platform technologies

sharing" clubs (Collins 2015; Yates 2021). While the company emphasizes the social aspects of these clubs, and they are often a venue for participants to affirm their identity as "home-sharers," they are also a major vehicle through which Airbnb has advocated for deregulation (Stabrowski 2022; Yates 2021). In this setting, Airbnb "community organizers" help hosts to curate hosts' stories for campaigns aimed at influencing regulatory policy.

The emergence of platform-facilitated short-term rental markets, thus, re-organizes both market and social movement alliances into competing Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions (see Table 2). Tenants' rights groups, housing advocates, homeowners' movements, and labor representing broader community-based and moral interests like economic equity and neighborhood preservation have joined with hotel stakeholders who feel threatened by short-term rentals to form an incumbent coalition. The challenging coalition involves microentrepreneurial hosts, who present short-term rental markets' moral cause of local, small-scale exchange, social connection, shared cultural knowledge, and economic mobility and commercial hosts and platforms, who have clearly defined economic stakes in any market regulation.

Analytical Approach and Chapter Summary

Drawing from work on market formation and the logic of field analysis, I view short-term rental markets in the platform economy as part of an emerging field embedded in other proximate fields that rely on similar resources. As such, this dissertation draws on mixed-method analyses to examine market development over four chapters (see Figure 1): 1) the antecedent market structures that give rise to the short-term rental market structures of the platform economy 2) the formation and organization of local short-term rental marketplaces 3) the coalitions and strategic action that emerge from these market structures to secure or contest short-term rental markets' legitimacy and 4) the local institutionalization and regulation of short-term rental markets that result from these processes.

In the first empirical chapter, **Chapter 2**, I use historical narrative to explore the context under which platform technologies and contemporary short-term rental markets emerged. I examine how earlier versions of short-term accommodation, platform capitalism, and housing financialization converged to create the resources and organizing frameworks needed for contemporary short-term rental markets. I also argue that Airbnb, in both its rhetoric and structure, obscured the distinction between "sharing" and profit accumulation, a central dynamic

Figure 1. Phases of Market Development and Chapter Organization



that helped activate resources and draw in users but also creates authenticity problems for the political coalition of short-term rental hosts and platforms that is formed later.

In **Chapter 3**, drawing on a quantitative analyses of Airbnb listings collected in 2016 and clustered in 277 U.S. metropolitan areas, I examine how microentrepreneurial and large-scale forms of short-term rental exchange differentially depend on local community structures and inequalities. I argue that microentrepreneurial markets—composed of hosts who are homeowners and tenants—are underpinned by civically active communities struggling with economic and housing precarity. Large-scale markets—operated by those renting multiple properties—reflect real estate investors listing their vacancies in expensive housing markets to expand profits. However, both forms are defined by their ample and transient use of housing and are popular in marketplaces with high rent burdens, setting the stage for politics over their regulation as they threaten housing supply and local residential stability.

In **Chapter 4**, I draw on a case study of Los Angeles to describe how short-term rental markets create new interests, alliances, and policy regimes. In the debate over Los Angeles's short-term rental ordinance from 2015 to 2018, a coalition of hotels, neighborhood advocates, and housing groups argued for fair competition, neighborhood preservation, and housing protections. They opposed a coalition of short-term rental platforms, microentrepreneurial hosts, and commercial hosts advocating for private property rights, economic security, and laissez faire policy. I argue that the incumbent alliance of hotel, neighborhood, and housing interests leveraged their political capital and expertise individually (but in coordination) while the challenging alliance of hosts organized by Airbnb lacked a clear division of labor and thus struggled to convey authenticity. The former Baptist-Bootlegger coalition, then, had more influence on short-term regulation, as their more articulate strategy connected their claims to policymakers' longstanding concerns about residential transiency and the housing crisis.

In **Chapter 5**, I generalize the findings from Chapter 4 to understand how closely short-term rental market regulation across the United States tracks with the grievances and strategies articulated by the two coalitions. Among the principal cities of the 277 metropolitan areas in my sample, I identified 81 short-term rental ordinances passed between 2009 and 2020. Using logistic regression and QCA, I examine a subset of this sample to identify correlates with the enactment of short-term rental market regulation and the factors that result in policies that severely restrict short-term rental practices. I find that the most restrictive policies—which limit both the activities of both microentrepreneurial and large-scale hosts, and as such, affect platform's ability to grow short-term rental markets—are found in progressive, housing-cost burdened cities with large short-term rental markets. In assessing the impact of the two coalitions on these policy outcomes, I find that the incumbent coalition has more influence in policymaking processes, suggesting that the problems miring the challenging Baptist-Bootlegger coalition in Chapter 4 may be widespread.

In the conclusion, **Chapter 6**, I suggest that the study expands understanding of markets and corporate power, accounting for the ways market competitors leverage local interests and allies and the policy outcomes of these new alliances. I also illuminate some of the practical consequences of these new coalitions, suggesting that they fracture solidarity among neighbors and workers that could otherwise lead to more equitable housing and economic policies. Finally, I discuss some limitations of the analyses and the potential future areas of research.

CHAPTER 2. CONTEMPORARY SHORT-TERM RENTAL MARKETS: ANTECEDENTS AND MARKET STRUCTURES

Two roommates, an unaffordable San Francisco apartment, a spare air mattress, technological innovation. The origin story for Airbnb (originally, "Air Bed and Breakfast") reads like most good stories of contemporary technological "disruption": gritty underdogs, identifying inefficiencies in the current system, take on the establishment and change the world with their innovative technology (Birkenshaw 2018). In Airbnb's story, those gritty underdogs were CEOs Brian Chesky and Joe Gebbia, who formulated the idea for Airbnb when a design conference came to San Francisco where they were living. Noticing the opportunity to make "a few bucks" in city with sky-high rents, Chesky and Gebbia decided to rent spare air mattresses in their apartment, designing a website and laying the groundwork for the website that would become Airbnb (Aydin 2019). That idea eventually grew into a platform with more than six million listings worldwide and a publicly-traded company that had the largest initial public offering of 2020 (Franklin 2020).

However, as the market formation literature suggests (see Chapter 1), market innovations do not exist in a vacuum but rather in a broader environment that provides opportunities and constraints. As social structures, markets comprise of *resources*, both human (e.g., physical strength, skills, knowledge, etc.) and nonhuman (e.g., material goods, land, etc.), and *organizing frameworks* including market devices, rules, norms, and shared meanings and categories (Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007; Emigh 2008; Muniesa et al. 2007; Sewell 1992; Zelizer 2005, 2011). Market innovations emerge because actors and organizations recombine and transpose existing resources and forms of organization from their environment for new purposes (Baker and Nelson 2005; Padgett and Powell 2012). What the Airbnb story misses, then, is the broader cast of market actors, organizations, and processes that preceded short-term rental market structures.

How, then, did resources, technologies, participants, and organizational structures from these antecedent markets converge to give rise to platform-facilitated short-term rental markets?

In this chapter, I explore the economic, cultural, and technological environment under which Airbnb emerged. Through historical narratives of three antecedent markets and the rise of Airbnb and platform capitalism, I show how contemporary short-term rental markets reflect a convergence of resources and organizing frameworks from earlier markets for short-term accommodation, housing, and internet technology (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). I suggest that, in a context in which travel consumers were seeking alternatives to the inefficiencies and standardization of commercial hotel markets and homeowners and tenants were facing high housing costs and debts, Airbnb marketed itself as a platform that matched financially constrained "microentrepreneurs" renting their homes for supplemental income with consumers wanting more personalized, socially connected, and "shared" forms of travel. This strategy utilized several forms of organization from earlier markets: a platform model and ethos of entrepreneurialism from internet technology markets, the intimate placemaking associated with homeownership and tenancy in housing markets, and alternative travel culture from other short-term accommodation markets. Combining these market devices, shared meanings, and categories, Airbnb activated the resources to capitalize on short-term rental exchanges, transforming travel consumers, homeowners, and tenants into Airbnb platform users and microentrepreneurs and housing units and short-term accommodations into "home-shares."

This combination of resources and organizing principles also has consequence for the local politics over these markets' legitimacy discussed in later chapters. By utilizing the housing resources and consumer base of nearby markets, Airbnb invited both market and political competition from incumbents in these markets. Furthermore, through the platform technology, Airbnb not only innovated a market device for crowdsourcing users for short-term rental transactions, but also an eventual political tool for Airbnb user advocacy. However, this political tool would also have shortcomings; using a common market device and organizational identity, Airbnb mingled the economic interests of the company and large-scale operators with the more civically minded orientations of microentrepreneurs. This organizing framework attracted skepticism and critique in debates over Airbnb's legitimacy and authenticity.

Analytic Approach

In this chapter, I draw from comparative historical approaches that examine how social units and events interact to produce a particular historical conjuncture (Besek 2020; Clemens 2007; Emigh, Riley, and Ahmed 2016; McMichael 1990). In particular, I examine how the organizational infrastructure, cultural categories, and networks that constitute multiple social orders are "linked," "transposed," "fused," or "recombined" to create a new pattern of collective action (Clemens 2007). Accordingly, I examine how the resources and forms of organization in antecedent markets converged to create platform-based short-term rental exchanges.

This approach first involved constructing a historical narrative and description of the Airbnb-facilitated exchanges that started in 2008, and then tracing back in time to see how their processes, resources, and social organization linked back to antecedent markets. Examining primary and secondary accounts, such as interviews with the founders, Airbnb press materials and documents, and news media and book-length accounts about the emergence of the platform, I identified the key events and features that made such exchanges rise in popularity.

I then looked to other proximate markets—including earlier forms of short-term accommodation, internet technology, and housing—to analyze how these key events and features may have emerged from their historical processes, resources, and organizational repertoires. In doing so, I largely drew on secondary sources to construct a narrative demonstrating their connection to contemporary platform-based short-term rental markets. The resulting analyses are described below.

The Antecedents of Airbnb

Airbnb emerged during a critical intersection of several developments: 1) the rise of mass travel consumption and a subsequent trend in alternative travel, 2) the rise of internet technologies, and 3) the financialization of housing in the United States. In the 20th century, as transportation via the automobile and airplanes proliferated, hotels consolidated into chains to serve this new mass market of travel consumers. However, a niche market promoting social values and unmonetized forms of hospitality also served consumers looking for alternative travel experiences. In the 1990s and early 2000s, internet technologies converged with these markets, bringing the promise of new forms of democratic participation and global connection in travel but also expanding opportunities for corporations to capitalize on their reach. The financialization of housing and the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, was the final development in this conjuncture, creating economic precarity that would eventually be channeled into the formation of Airbnb.

Short-Term Accommodation: Early Forms and Alternatives

Modern travel accommodation—characterized by a tension between mass consumption models and more specialized, socially connected forms—is situated within a broader history of American capitalism and nation-building. Prior to the emergence of a fully capitalist American economy, private hospitality was the primary means of accommodation for mobile Americans (Sandoval-Strausz 2008). However, coinciding with independence from Britain, early monetized forms of travel accommodations, such as public houses, taverns, and inns arose as an important means for early revolutionaries and Federalists to travel and build support for the nascent government; such accommodations were preferred over private hospitality, as they signaled impartiality. However, these accommodations were notorious for their crowded, uncleanly conditions and as such, were resented by early political and commercial elites, who at the same time relied heavily on them to conduct their political and economic activities (Sandoval-Strausz 2008).

In the early late 18th century and early 19th century, these elites established the country's first hotels in urban trade centers. This effort was part of a broader project that sought to develop commerce and transportation networks and cater to elite sensibilities. Among these was New York's City Hotel, which hosted society events and political gatherings and was renowned for its 137 rooms and large library. While plain in comparison to the hotels that followed, the City Hotel became the model for "first-class" luxury hotels, which emphasized comfort and convenience for their elite clientele and became symbols conveying the grandeur of American capitalism (Berger 2011; Sandoval-Strausz 2008).

The era of luxury hotels ended with the advent of the automobile. By the mid-20th century, and following the passage of the Federal Highway Act of 1916, roads were more extensive and leisure travel via automobile was available to and common among the masses (Ingram 1996; Sandoval-Strausz 2008). However, these developments did not mark a boon for hotels; on the contrary, dissatisfied with the poor service and outdated conditions and customs at hotels of the period, many tourists instead opted for tents and autocamping sites while traveling via car (Belasco 1979; Ingram 1996; Sandoval-Strausz 2008). Responding to this backlash and following a Fordist model, popular hotel chains serving customers roadside (as opposed to the previous model serving urban centers), such as the Holiday Inn and Howard Johnson, emerged.

Around the same time, international hotel chains such as Hilton and Intercontinental, took advantage of the popularization of air travel (Chathoth 2016; Quek 2012). Through standardizing amenities and branding, these chains overcame the uncertainty in quality that independent hotels posed for the new masses of travel consumers (Chathoth 2016; Ingram 1996).

Following the rise of chain hotels, however, niche markets surfaced to cater to travelers looking for more personalized and alternative experiences. In the early half of the 20th century, a nascent hostel movement originated out of Germany to promote cheap accommodations for German youth to explore the outdoors (Nagy 2018). While an extensive hostel network never fully took hold in the United States, it became a popular form of accommodation in Europe for visiting Americans by the 1960s and 70s and promoted as a way to foster global and environmental awareness (Anon 2021; McCulloch 1992; Park 2010). In the 1980s and 90s, small businesses and homeowners revived the public house and inn models of the past, creating bed and breakfasts and vacation rentals that sought to scale down accommodation services and offer more personalized tourism experiences (Emerick and Emerick 1994; Lanier and Berman 1993; Schutz 1995). Capitalizing on demand for these alternative experiences, hotel chains like Kimpton began adopting the "boutique hotel" model, creating and buying unique hotels that reflected local character (Ting 2017).

Complementing these alternative markets were gift economies focused on hosting. Alongside hostels and the youth travel movement, student and home exchange programs and organizations like Servas International and WWOOFing arose throughout the mid and late-20th century, reviving local interest in private hospitality that served broader social goals. Through travel accommodation services that depended on generalized or direct reciprocity and largely avoided the exchange of money, these organizations hoped to facilitate global solidarity, peace, cultural exchange, and environmental values (Kiiski and Arente 2006; Lyons and Wearing 2008; dos Santos Santiago and Garcia 2013). Like their monetized counterparts, these forms of exchange sought to counter the impersonal, commercialized means of travel made popular by hotel chain dominance. Airbnb would eventually also draw on this alternative ethos, posing itself as a more sustainable, more egalitarian form of travel accommodation than the traditional hotel chain.

Housing: Homeownership, Financialization, and the Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis

In addition to an alternative model of short-term accommodation, Airbnb's emergence is closely linked to notions of homeownership and homemaking and as such, to the politics of housing policy in the United States. An "ideology of homeownership" (Ronald 2008) has long persisted in the United States, with more and more Americans aspiring to own a home as a means to live out the American Dream (Drew 2013; Pattillo 2013; Ronald 2008; Schor 1998; Warren and Tyagi 2003). Homeownership, particularly in the American context, has typically signaled financial independence, economic security, and a sense of place and belonging (Bate 2018). However, federal housing policy and politics (Kohl 2020; Smith 2019), historically, has delineated the populations for whom homeownership is possible.

For example, in the 1930s, when the Great Depression brought the housing industry to the brink of collapse, policymakers created New Deal reforms that allowed middle-class American to build their wealth through homeownership. The establishment of the Home Loan Bank system and Federal Housing Administration (FHA), in particular, helped to reduce down payments and lengthen mortgage payments, while also insuring banks against the risk of default. The establishment of Federal National Mortgage Association (i.e., Fannie Mae), through its purchase of FHA-insured mortgages, expanded funding to banks to issue more loans (Schwartz

2014). These reforms ultimately allowed individuals with less capital to purchase homes earlier in life. However, federal housing policies, and the FHA, also continuously discriminated against African Americans, creating unequal opportunities for homeownership (Allen 2007; Gordon 2005).

Throughout the mid- to late 20th century, housing policy attempted to expand mortgage access to low-income Americans. The establishment of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (i.e., Freddie Mac) in 1970, with the already-established Fannie Mae, expanded the secondary mortgage market to finance more mortgages. In 1992, The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act created new standards and an explicit mission for these enterprises to purchase mortgages made to individuals with low or moderate income and in residentially-deprived areas (Schelkle 2012). However, these policies, while expanding homeownership, also transformed traditional mortgages that once locally extended credit to homeowners into securities to be traded on a global stock market (Aalbers 2008).

As such, homebuying became increasingly seen as an investment opportunity, resulting in booms in nonoccupant housing whereby buyers acquire properties not for their use-value but to flip them into higher-cost housing or generate rental income (Goldstein 2018). This development, along with local policies focused on returning the upper middle class to city centers (e.g., creative city initiatives), incentivized the investment of global capital in urban housing markets (Scott 2006; Smith 2002; Wetzstein 2017). The increased investment in housing from people of all incomes raised property values, making housing especially costly for homebuyers new to the housing market as well as for renters who, through rent, pay the expected returns of fictitious capital (Aalbers 2008; Smet 2016; Stephens 2007; Teresa 2016). In attempts to cater to these professional classes and global investors, developers also produced a glut of luxury housing that few local residents could actually afford (Brash 2011; Linhart 2011; Stein 2018).

The increasingly financialized structure of the housing market also prompted the proliferation of predatory lending practices and sub-prime mortgages. Throughout the 1990s, sub-prime mortgage lending increased by 900% and, as higher-risk loans, subjected low-income borrowers to high interest rates and additional fees; these borrowers were also vulnerable to higher appraisals, inflating the value of their home and consequently their debts (Shlay 2006). As standards for underwriting loans continued to loosen, and borrowers mounted debts that their incomes and refinancing could not cover, the housing market became unsustainable, resulting in the historical crash of 2007, and eventually the Great Recession (Schwartz 2014). Airbnb arrived in the wake of these crises in 2008, in a context in which homeowners and tenants in the housing market were facing foreclosure and high housing debts and rents.

Internet Technology: Entrepreneurial Capitalism and Participatory Possibilities

The internet technology booms of the 1990s and early 2000s brought with them new opportunities to transform both economic and civic participation, with new technologies and organizational frameworks creating a pathway for the emergence of intermediary platforms like Airbnb. While early internet exchanges were used to connect people within government and academic organizations and were restricted for research and education use, by the 1990s, they were recognized as a promising means to transmit information to users across the globe and were increasingly supported by commercial entities, who often provided interconnection services. In 1995, the National Science Foundation officially relinquished its control of financing and managing the internet infrastructure to the private sector, opening up use of the internet for commercial purposes (Frischmann 2003; Leiner et al. 2009). Around the same time, key breakthroughs—including point-and-click technology, the transmission of pictures, text and voice via the World Wide Web, and emergence of web browsers like Netscape—made the internet more accessible for widespread use (Simpson 2004).

The debut of Netscape in 1995, as the first initial public offering of an internet company, marked a new period of financial investment and e-commerce. Companies using web-browser interfaces to sell their products and services soon proliferated. In the travel space, early entrants like Expedia, Vrbo, and Travelocity served as brokers between travel consumers and established markets for airfare, car rentals, vacation rentals, and hotels (Law 2000; Vrbo 2020).

The arrival of such e-commerce companies was accompanied with an ethos of "entrepreneurial capitalism," in which leaders of these start-ups, and the angel investors taking a chance on them, were seen as disruptive innovators who developed technologies and websites promised to be the next multi-billion dollar "unicorn" (Baumol, Litan, and Schramm 2007; Doody, Chen, and Goldstein 2016; Leary 2019). Pundits also hailed the arrival of a new "creative class" of urban professionals, who through their consumption, promoted social values and a new economy based on services and information (Brooks 2001; Florida 2002). While this initial excitement over the web ultimately ended in collective disappointment for both creators and speculators when the market crashed in 2000, many travel booking sites and the use of the internet as a tool for capital persisted.

The continued proliferation of web-based access to travel, publishing, music, film, and banking eventually led to widespread disintermediation of these markets. Through websites that provided products and services directly or aggregated them en masse, consumers were able to independently access these markets without the assistance of traditional intermediaries like travel agents, financial advisors, publishers, record companies, movie theaters, and retail (Cordón-

García et al. 2013; Pareles 2009; Teixeira 2000; Waldfogel and Reimers 2015). While these developments created more options and lower costs for consumers, they also prompted widespread disruption and reorganization of these markets, whereby web-based intermediaries like Expedia, Intuit (i.e., Quicken, TurboTax, and QuickBooks), eBay/PayPal, Amazon, and Netflix had increasing influence.

In the early 2000s, building on these models, developers reimagined internet services as "Web 2.0," initiating a contemporary period in which users and companies increasingly explore and emphasize the internet's participatory possibilities (O'Reilly 2010). For example, Wikipedia, YouTube, Craigslist, drawing on crowdsourcing and generalized exchange, created platforms in which users volunteered their content, services, and goods for the masses (Wikipedia 2021; Willer, Flynn, and Zak 2012). In line with these developments, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter promised to connect users and provide a space for networking, information-sharing, entertainment, and collaboration. In the context of travel, Couchsurfing also incorporated this participatory model, crowdsourcing and connecting hosts who could offer free accommodations (often, a couch) to guests seeking cheap and personalized travel experiences.

While these platforms were initially free to users, and thus seen as a potential tool for democracy and more egalitarian models of governance, pundits, consumers, whistleblowers, and former employees are increasingly wary of the influence of private interests and investors on these technologies (Lewis 2017; Martin 2016; Pickard 2019; Walker and Oszkay 2020). An emblematic issue has been Google and Facebook's commodification of personal data, which has generated a number of concerns about privacy and personal liberty (Fuchs 2011). The emergence of platforms, thus, has generated conflicting orientations about whether such services are a tool for knowledge, sustainability, social connection, and participatory democracy or for the private accumulation of capital (Martin 2016). This tension—between the internet's democratizing promise and capitalistic tendencies—would resurface once again with the rise of Airbnb and the "sharing economy."

Recombining Resources and Forms of Organization: The Emergence of Airbnb, Platform Capitalism, and the "Sharing Economy"

Airbnb arrived at an opportune moment, in which travelers were seeking accommodations alternative to hotel chains and in which financially constrained homeowners and tenants were seeking solutions for their economic woes. The company, as part of larger economy of crowdsourcing platforms, used the alternative experience of "sharing" a home and themes of "microentrepreneurship" to recruit these alternative travel consumers and the hosts who could provide housing units and labor. However, as the platform became increasingly popular, it also invited commercial interests, who drawing on the scale of crowdsourcing, were looking to expand profits.

Organizing Frameworks: Platform Model, "Home-Sharing," and "Microentrepreneurialism"

Airbnb was part of a broader platform "sharing" economy that emerged following the financial crises, that, drawing on the participatory models of the early aughts, sought to disrupt conventional markets for goods and services. Like the brokerage models of early e-commerce, companies in this economy replaced traditional intermediaries, allowing users to access accommodation (e.g., Airbnb, Vrbo/HomeAway), transportation (Uber, Lyft), food (UberEats, Grubhub, Instacart, Doordash), clothing (Rent the Runway, Poshmark), and labor (TaskRabbit) directly through internet and app-based platforms. However, in contrast to using traditional supply chains of earlier aggregators like Expedia and Amazon, these platforms followed participatory models like Wikipedia, YouTube, and Craigslist to crowdsource their products and services from everyday users.

In fact, in its early days, Airbnb relied heavily on the technology and reputation of these predecessors. Many audiences to Airbnb's concept, including investors, were averse to the "ew factor" of sharing intimate spaces (Gallagher 2017b). To recruit guests, Nathan Blecharczyk, a third co-founder who joined the company early and was the primary engineer for the site, built in a "back door" to Craigslist from the Airbnb platform, creating a one-click integration tool that allowed hosts to advertise to Craigslist's massive user base while still booking through Airbnb (Clary 2021; Gallagher 2017b). In an attempt to build up the supply of hosts, the company also experimented with recruiting existing short-term rental hosts to sign up for the site via automated emails to Craigslist users (Gallagher 2017b; Rosoff 2011). In pitching the website and making it legible to audiences, founders and investors also frequently compared it to the online marketplace eBay, calling Airbnb the "eBay of space" (Caulfield 2010; Gallagher 2017b).

However, the company also tried to differentiate itself from predecessors through thoughtful design that emphasized homes and spaces as "anticommodities" (Gallagher 2017b). Gebbia and Chesky, the other two founders who had initially conceived of Airbnb's concept, were alumni of the Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) and applied their background to the company's marketing strategy. An early problem they identified was that hosts were taking "Craigslist-quality pictures;" in response, they began hiring professional photographers who could highlight the attractive and unique features of each accommodation (Gallagher 2017b). A key priority for the founders was also creating "touchpoints" for social connection between users and the company and hosts and guests; through these touchpoints, both the company and hosts could create unique, personalized experiences for guests that would make Airbnb a more attractive option than hotels (Reid 2017).

This organizational strategy combined the "sharing" models in earlier, alternative forms of short-term accommodation, the intimacy and placemaking associated with private homeownership and tenancy in housing markets, and the entrepreneurial and participatory ethos of internet technologies. Prior to Airbnb, organizations like Couchsurfing.com and Servas International facilitated home-sharing exchanges that were not monetized and focused on promoting global solidarity, peace, and cultural exchange (Ikkala and Lampinen 2015; Parigi and State 2014). Airbnb leveraged the practice of "home-sharing," using the intimate experiences and local knowledge of long-term homeowners and tenants from the housing market. However, in contrast to earlier unmonetized versions of hosting, the company also worked to scale up and monetize these practices through the technology of the platform (Reid 2017).

Through the technology's participatory and monetized model, the company was also able to access more hosts and guests than earlier unmonetized home-sharing brokers and websites. While organizations and technologies prior to Airbnb facilitated similarly monetized short-term rental transactions, they largely served as advertising vehicles for an already well-established niche market of vacation rentals and bed and breakfasts. Predecessors like HomeAway/VRBO, Craigslist, and travel booking sites typically listed vacation homes and bed and breakfasts from small business owners who were likely to continue short-term renting with or without the assistance their technology. However, by marketing as a platform designed specifically for people wanting to rent a spare bed or room in their private home, Airbnb expanded the short-term rental community so that nearly everyone was a potential "microentrepreneur" (Curtis 2014; Frenken and Schor 2017; Ravenelle 2019; Zhang et al. 2019).

In several of its advertising campaigns and blog posts, Airbnb targeted these microentrepreneurs and guests by emphasizing entrepreneurialism, shared resources, and local social connection. Perhaps most indicative of these themes is the "Shared City" initiative the company announced in the spring of 2014 (Chesky 2014):

> "Imagine if you could build a city that is shared.
> Where people become micro-entrepreneurs,
> and local mom and pops flourish once again.
> Imagine a city that fosters community,
> where space isn't wasted, but shared with others…
> We are committed to helping make cities stronger socially, economically, and environmentally.
> We are committed to enriching the neighborhoods we serve.
> We celebrate the cultural heritage of cities.
> We are committed to being good neighbors.
> We are committed to supporting local small businesses.
> *We are committed to working with cities to share with those in need.*
> *We are committed to fostering and strengthening community.*
> We believe in bringing back the idea of cities as villages.
> *We are committed to illuminating the diversity, arts, and character of cities.*
> We believe cities thrive best with micro-entrepreneurs.
> *We are committed to the safety of neighborhoods and their homes."*

As indicated in this announcement, Airbnb framed short-term rentals using messaging that called back to the entrepreneurial ethos of platform capitalism, the intimate neighborhood character of local housing communities, and the sharing ethos of alternative accommodation markets.

Resources: Users, Short-term Accommodations, and Venture Capital

Using these organizing frameworks, Airbnb was able to draw in the hosts, guests, housing units, and capital needed to facilitate short-term rental exchanges on the site. On the demand side, the economic, practical, and social benefits of such rentals attracted travel consumers seeking alternative accommodations and fed up with the mass marketization of hotel chains (Gallagher 2017b). A study of tourists using Airbnb accommodations classified them into five broad categories: money savers, home seekers, collaborative consumers, pragmatic novelty seekers, and interactive novelty seekers. Money savers, home seekers, and pragmatic novelty seekers were drawn to the platform because of its economic and practical incentives; these consumers liked the low cost, non-standard amenities, and home-like feel of accommodations advertised on the platform. Collaborative consumers and interactive novelty seekers, on the other hand, were drawn to Airbnb's social values and the social interaction, local authenticity, and unique experiences that could be cultivated through these short-term rental exchanges (Guttentag et al. 2018). Airbnb promotion of multiple offerings and "home-sharing" schema via the platform, thus, effectively signaled to these consumers that these forms of short-term accommodations could be more cost-effective, meaningful experiences than other alternatives. In an indication of Airbnb's success in mobilizing hosts and guests, by 2018, ten years after its founding, Airbnb had amassed 4.5 million listings and conducted approximately 300 million guest check-ins (Airbnb 2018).

Another foundational resource for the platform were hosts, who supplied the primary commodities being circulated (i.e., accommodations) and the labor to maintain them. The financialization of housing, culminating in 2007 and 2008's crises, created several economic woes for homeowners and tenants, who were burdened with high housing payments and stagnant incomes. While these woes eventually resulted in foreclosure and eviction for the most economically insecure, others turned to the gig labor of the platform economy as a stop gap (Holtz-Eakin, Gitis, and Rinehart 2017; Huang et al. 2020; Ravenelle 2019). Airbnb, through the technological ease of the platform, and its advertised community values and economic benefits, appealed to socially oriented individuals looking to earn extra money (Ikkala and Lampinen 2015; Wang, Asaad, and Filieri 2020). In particular, residents, with high cost burdens—but who lived in neighborhoods desirable to tourists and had the knowhow to market such properties—were able to leverage their extra housing space for supplemental income (Karlsson and Dolnicar

2016; Ravenelle 2019; Sarkar, Koohikamali, and Pick 2019). Many of these small scale hosts eventually scaled up their operations by purchasing or renting additional units for Airbnb use (Ravenelle 2019). Driven by the economic and social opportunities of this form of "microentrepreneurship," then, these hosts helped to transform housing units into "home-sharing" rentals.

The platform's massive crowdsourcing of travel consumers also attracted commercial actors operating more transactional exchanges at scale. In addition to the small-scale hosts who scaled up their operations, Airbnb increasingly involved conventional real estate companies already renting rooms and units on the long-term housing markets, who in Airbnb saw an untapped customer base. These operators did not mobilize personal assets or labor, but rather used the platform to identify new consumers for an already commercialized, but perhaps less capitalized, fleet of housing units. Indeed, as the company has expanded, operators of multiple listings, professional hosts, and hotels are a fast-growing segment of the platform, overtaking transactions and listings conducted by microentrepreneurs (Dolnicar 2021). Airbnb, thus, not only implicated small-scale hosts renting single rooms or homes for supplemental income but also commercial operators of multiple units, who used the technology to expand profits (Adamiak 2019; Yates 2021).

It was Airbnb's association with an entrepreneurial ethos that caught the attention of venture capitalists. In 2009, Airbnb was accepted into Y Combinator, a prestigious accelerator program that provides start-ups with seed money, guidance, and networking with venture capitalists. Paul Graham, a founder of Y Combinator who accepted Airbnb into the program, was impressed with the persistence of Airbnb's founders, who had been funding the platform by selling candidate-themed cereal boxes during the 2008 presidential election and racking up debt on numerous credit cards (Gallagher 2017a; Graham 2020). Graham thought that this scrappy attitude as well as hosts' "need" for Airbnb to pay their rents signaled the platform's promise, speculating that it could scale to being the "market in accommodation the way eBay is in stuff" (Graham 2009, 2020). Eventually, other private investors also bought into the entrepreneurial possibilities of Airbnb, investing $6 billion in the company over the years leading up to its IPO in 2020 (Crunchbase 2020).

Discussion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how Airbnb represented a convergence of resources and organizing frameworks from three antecedent markets: short-term accommodation, housing, and internet technology. Short-term accommodation markets have long been characterized by tension between small, intimate forms of hospitality and large-scale chain operation. Responding to a proliferation of chain hotels in the mid to late 20th century, travel consumers by the 1990s and 2000s were looking for more unique, meaningful, and cost-effective accommodation experiences. Promoting social and environmental values that re-defined short-term rentals as "home-sharing," Airbnb mobilized these travel consumers to use the platform.

In addition to Airbnb's emphasis on home-sharing and social connection, Airbnb also used notions of microentrepreneurship to attract housing market consumers in crisis. Contemporary housing policies, while expanding access to homeownership, also created a financialized housing market that incentivized nonoccupant investment and subprime mortgage lending. Facing high housing cost burdens because of these developments, tenants and homeowners were drawn to Airbnb, which could allow them to earn extra income on their excess rooms and units in the name of small business opportunities, community connection, and environmentalism.

Figure 2. Antecedent Markets of Airbnb and their Contributing Resources and Organizing Frameworks



The platform model, as a market device, further facilitated this user participation as well as the involvement of capital. In line with the marketization and participatory ethos of the internet, platforms like Airbnb crowdsourced goods and services for the purposes of profit-making. These participatory and entrepreneurial possibilities attracted two forms of capital: commercial real estate actors and tech investors. For commercial real estate, the crowdsourced user base gave these actors' access to a new market of consumers, prompting them to transform their long-term housing investments for short-term rental use. Tech investors, on the other hand, were looking to capitalize on the latest innovation and saw promise in the platform's ability to scale up all kinds of short-term transactions.

As Figure 1 demonstrates, then, Airbnb recombined and transposed existing resources and organizing frameworks from its environment to create the structures for these contemporary short-term rental markets (Baker and Nelson 2005; Emigh 2008; Padgett and Powell 2012; Sewell 1992). Drawing on an alternative travel culture from earlier short-term accommodation markets and the homemaking of housing markets, Airbnb re-commodified short-term rentals as "home-sharing," allowing them to source guests who were looking for alternative, more authentic, and more cost-effective forms of travel accommodation. Additionally, as a tech company emerging from the movement toward platform capitalism, Airbnb built on early brokerage models of e-commerce, marketing microentrepreneurial opportunities to economically insecure housing consumers who could provide housing units. Finally, using the crowdsourcing model of these internet technology markets, Airbnb created a market device that scaled up these exchanges and thus attracted interest from capital.

Conclusion

The way Airbnb recombined these resources and forms of organization sets up the political conflict to be discussed in later chapters. By creating a highly popular, unregulated market, Airbnb threatened accommodation and housing market incumbents' resources (i.e., share of travel consumers, housing units) (see Figure 2). That is, the market device of the platform not only attracted users, and eventual political allies, but also, because of its scale, opponents who thought that Airbnb had an unfair advantage over the hotel market, was contributing to housing shortages and rising rents, and was corrupting neighborhood quality through transient tourism.

The organizational frameworks Airbnb used would also make the platform vulnerable to critique. Using the platform technology and notions of home-sharing and entrepreneurship (see Figure 2), Airbnb united users with different motivations (i.e., economic, moral) under a common organizational identity and in doing so, combined "hostile worlds" (Zelizer 2000). Seizing on these housing politics and Airbnb users' seemingly irreconcilable practices of intimate, unmonetized "sharing" and capitalist accumulation and commercialization, opponents would make the case for short-term rental market regulation.

CHAPTER 3. SHARING PLACES: LOCAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND SEGMENTATION IN SHORT-TERM RENTAL MARKETS

Market organization is often differentiated by exchanges that rely on arm's-length transactions and mass production and those that rely on specialization, community connection, or notions of social intimacy and reciprocity (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Uzzi 1997; Willer et al. 2012; Zelizer 2005). Market organization also reflects a "geography of production" (Storper 2013:7), where local contexts with the conducive resources and institutions will specialize in certain commodities and forms of market participation (Molotch et al. 2000; Storper 2013). For example, local communities with civic organizations, social movements, and locally embedded economic practices are ripe for the emergence of specialized and alternative markets such as micro-brewing, grass-fed beef, and wind power and are more resistant to non-local and extractive forms of investment (Carroll and Torfason 2011; Goldstein 2018; Rao 2008; Sine and Lee 2009; Weber et al. 2008). However, such communities do not just encompass institutional and material assets, but also stratified social and economic structures, that can motivate different kinds of market participation. What socio-economic organization and inequalities, then, constitute different forms of local short-term rental exchange?

In the previous chapter, I discussed how Airbnb, drawing on existing resources and organizing frameworks from antecedent markets, created a platform that invited the participation of many kinds housing suppliers to "home-share," including both microentrepreneurs looking to earn additional income and large-scale commercial operators looking to expand their customer base. In this chapter, I further unpack this segmentation, exploring these different forms of short-term rental market exchange thrive in contexts with distinct local socio-economic structures. Drawing on cross-sectional analyses of Airbnb listings in 277 U.S. metropolitan areas, I find that microentrepreneurial markets—involving small-scale exchanges that typically demand more personal investment and social interaction—are embedded in civically active communities struggling with economic and housing precarity. Large-scale markets—involving more socially distant exchanges in which operators rent multiple properties—are prevalent in expensive housing markets, where there are real estate investment opportunities to capitalize on housing vacancies.

Such dynamics illuminate why, in the short-term rental political debates discussed in the following chapters, these two segments become grouped together. While short-term rental markets comprise of two segments with distinct local social bases, both of these segments are defined by their ample and short-term use of housing, are popular in marketplaces with high rent burdens, and are affiliated with each other through the market device of the platform. These resource dependencies and associations invite criticism from incumbents in proximate markets and policymakers, who conflating the interests of these two segments, treat them together as a threat to local residential stability and housing supply.

The Local Socio-Economic Organization and Inequalities of "Sharing"

In Chapter 1, I highlighted some idealized features of short-term rental market exchange (see Table 1), including the varying: 1) exchange structures associated with each type of short-term rental that produce different host/guest interactions and accommodation experiences and 2) resource dependencies, including host labor, capital, and housing. In this chapter, I connect theories on markets to the literature on urban community, labor markets, and housing, showing how short-term rental markets map onto local social stratification and inequality. I propose that microentrepreneurial and large-scale short-term rental markets may thrive in contexts with 1) an institutional ecology that favors alternative "sharing" practices and with 2) labor, income, and housing inequalities that create the economic motivations and excess capacities for different types of short-term rental exchange.

Institutional Structures: Civic Capacity and Locally Embedded Economic Exchange

Sharing economy markets offer an alternative to conventional markets by circulating goods for temporary use. Typically, once a consumer purchases a good, it becomes privately owned, and thus excludable to others. The odd nature of this type of prosumption is that it embodies the conflicted orientations of buying and selling, combining an intrinsic act of "pleasing oneself" with an extrinsic act of "pleasing someone else" (Humphreys and Grayson 2008:12). Such a practice, then, has the potential to evoke a sense of "hostile worlds," or that intimate practices should not be comingled with acts of economic exchange (Zelizer 2005, 2011). Sharing economy markets face an additional constraint in that they depend on temporary exchanges between strangers (Frenken and Schor 2017).

Local civic organizations can help to foster the engagement, community solidarity, and supportive social networks for microentrepreneurial exchanges in particular (Putnam 2001). An urban community with a strong institutional structure provides an opportunity for "blended social action": creating settings for individuals first to congregate and form connections and then mobilize for the collective good (Sampson et al. 2005). A concentration of organizations in an area often matters more for such civic orientations than the size of these organizations' membership (Sampson et al. 2005). As many in the United States retreat from associational life (Putnam 2001), however, these civic capacities often get channeled inward toward mass consumption (Cohen 2003). Markets thus have become a primary locus for civic activity, as both a facilitator and target (King and Pearce 2010; McDonnell et al. 2015; Walker 2014; Walker et al. 2008).

Active communities and social movements often orient their efforts into the creation of alternative markets challenging mass production. The emergence of markets for micro-brewing, grass-fed beef, wind power, and recycling, for example, relied on communities, social movements, and innovators to adapt originally social practices and meanings to economic exchanges (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003; Rao 2008; Weber et al. 2008). Contexts with residential stability, a strong local identity, and civic infrastructure can also be protective, deterring nonoccupant investment and commercial production and retail (Carroll and Torfason 2011; Goldstein 2018; Ingram and Rao 2004; Ingram, Yue, and Rao 2010). Such local social organization has implications for short-term rental markets, as it predisposes communities toward more alternative and socially engaged, rather than more commercial and extractive, market practices.

I anticipate, then, that microentrepreneurial exchanges, which require more personal investment and social interaction than large-scale exchanges, will be associated with socially active communities and locally embedded economic exchanges. In particular, I expect that marketplaces that have a high concentration of local organizations (i.e., the institutional infrastructure for blended social action) and local businesses will have higher rates of microentrepreneurial rentals. These communities will have more opportunities for interfacing and generating the personal connection and solidarity required for microentrepreneurial exchanges and will be more resilient to commercialized, large-scale forms of exchange.

Resources: Labor, Income, and Housing Precarity

The founding of many platforms closely followed the financial and subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, suggesting they correlate with the increased debt and economic insecurity facing many consumers and workers. Since the 1970s, the American economy has been defined by market deregulation, privatized risk, mass consumption practices, and an unprecedented expansion of the financial sector (Centeno and Cohen 2012; Ivanova 2011). These developments are accompanied by wage stagnation, growing inequality, and a retrenchment of worker benefits and union rights (Krippner 2005; Wilmers 2018; Wisman 2013). This is an untenable convergence: consumers are spending and acquiring more while facing mounting debt and more precarious labor arrangements.

As discussed in Chapter 2, this tension has been expressed in urban housing markets, where financialization and an "ideology of homeownership" (Ronald 2008) together contribute to rising housing costs and consumers living beyond their means. With transformation of traditional mortgages into securities traded on a global stock market, creative city initiatives, and the increasing accessibility of mortgages, housing is increasingly understood and desired as an investment opportunity (Aalbers 2008; Goldstein 2018; Schelkle 2012; Smith 2002). These developments have resulted in rising housing costs and gluts in luxury housing, while consumers and workers face wage stagnation, more debt, and a rise in new forms of precarious work.

The shift to a new economy based on technological innovation and services, along with diminishing social protections, has created a new class of workers, who, under flexible work arrangements, lack job stability, regular earnings and hours, and a safety net (Kalleberg 2009; Peck 2005; Scott 2006; Standing 2011). Additionally, with lackluster incomes and rising living costs, households are also increasingly turning to financial services to pay for their housing and living expenses (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015). Such developments correspond with an over-extended, more economically insecure middle class (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2006; Schor 1998; Warren and Tyagi 2003).

The subprime mortgage and financial crises of 2007, then, likely prompted many consumers to turn to microentrepreneurship. The supplemental income offered by short-term rental markets potentially provided an incentive to those facing employment insecurity or stagnant wages but who could still afford extra housing space (Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Kalleberg 2009; Ravenelle 2019; Schor et al. 2020). I expect, then, that microentrepreneurial rentals will thrive in urban marketplaces where there are low unemployment rates but where working hours are insecure, and workers have extra labor capacity. I also expect microentrepreneurial rates to be higher in communities with moderate levels of income—where residents can afford the extra space—but also where the distribution of wealth is unequal and there are high housing costs relative to income (suggesting stagnating wages).

Urban housing trends would also suggest that short-term rental markets are an investment opportunity for real estate developers and global capital. If there is polarization in the short-term rental market between more and less capital intensive and propertied forms of exchange (see Table 1), I expect the more capital intensive, propertied forms, like large-scale rentals, to represent the investment decisions of landed elites who see housing—and the short-term rental of such housing—in expensive cities as a lucrative business opportunity. In such cases, this segment of the short-term rental market would not be underpinned by middle income earners trying to compensate for their high housing costs but rather real estate firms and landed elites who engage in hosting at scale to further accumulate capital on their luxury vacant units (Brash 2011; Wetzstein 2017). I expect, then, for large-scale operation to be more prevalent in contexts where there are large real estate markets and high levels of income. I also expect that large-scale operation will be popular in communities with high rents and high residential vacancies, reflecting the glut of luxury housing units that investors are trying to make profitable.

Microentrepreneurial and large-scale exchange rates may also positively correlate with housing costs, because of their potential effects on housing prices. That is, as opponents of short-term rentals argue, these rentals may deplete long-term housing stock in their conversion of rooms and units for transient use, thereby increasing rents and property values. Several studies (Barron, Kung, and Proserpio 2021; Garcia-López et al. 2020; Todd, Musah, and Cheshire 2022) have examined this question, and while some effect on local housing market supply and pricing has been observed, it is also still feasible that high housing prices also drive short-term rental participation. Under either condition, or both, I would expect both microentrepreneurial and large-scale exchange rates to be higher in contexts with expensive housing.

Analytic Approach

In this study, I use negative binomial estimation with robust standard errors to regress short-term rental listings in a metropolitan area on local indicators of civic capacity, localism, labor market dynamics, income stratification, and housing costs and supply (see Tables 2 and 3). The two sets of estimates for the two dependent variables (microentrepreneurial and large-scale rentals) are presented in Table 5. Column 1 in each set excludes quadratic and interaction terms while Column 2 includes them. Column 3 adds a third interaction term that is theoretically relevant for large-scale rentals. For ease in interpreting the coefficients and interaction terms, I also includes plots of the marginal effects of each variable (Figure S 1 and Figure S 3) and the interaction terms (Figure S 2, Figure S 4, Figure S 5) in the appendix. I also plot the differences in marginal effects across the two types of exchange (Figure S 6, Figure S 7), to compare the effects across different models with the same variables (Mize, Doan, and Long 2019).

Because this study is concerned with short-term rental markets, I use a common unit of analysis used in the study of other markets and meso-level urban phenomena: the metropolitan area. The Census Bureau defines these areas as adjacent communities that have an urban core of at least 10,000 people, at least one community that is more than 50,000 people, and a high degree of economic and social integration with the urban core (U.S. Census Bureau 2018). They most closely approximate marketplaces compared to other geographic delineations (census tracts, county, etc.), and are a well-established measure for local productive systems (Marquis and Battilana 2009).

Regional units of analysis, such as the metropolitan area, are important for understanding the spatial distribution of economic activity, as these geographies encompass dense interlinkages of resources, firms, industries, and labor pools (Fujita and Thisse 2013; Scott and Storper 2015; Storper 2013). The clustering of these institutional and economic structures can lead to regional specialization, which in turn further facilitates or precludes the development of certain industries and market practices in a particular region (Molotch et al. 2000; Storper 2013). As such, metropolitan areas are frequently used in studies of labor markets, tourism trends, housing dynamics, and alternative market forms and segmentation (see Carroll and Torfason 2011; Goldstein 2018; Kadiyali and Kosová 2013; Kemeny and Storper 2012; Rugh and Massey 2010) to understand various geographic patterns of economic development. In line with this work, I use this unit of analysis to understand local patterns of short-term rental market development and segmentation.

Thus, I analyze a sample that includes 277 metropolitan areas with populations over 150,000. Because the Census Bureau's American Community Survey provides the most comprehensive set of measures for the theoretical constructs outlined in this study, I geocoded all other data used in the study to the Federal Information Processing Specification (FIPS) codes for each metropolitan area. The sample, thus, represents mid-sized to large urban marketplaces in the United States.

Dependent Variables

I collected short-term rental listing data from May 2016 to October 2016 on the site Airbnb.com by writing a web-scraping program in Python that searched zip codes for host listings in the metropolitan areas in my sample. I chose the sample period because it reflects a season during which travel accommodation is highly popular, making the choice of whether to participate in hosting, or not, most stark. Furthermore, because this sample year is eight years after the company's founding, I minimize the effect that unfamiliarity with Airbnb might have on participation.

Using these data, I include models that use two different dependent variables: 1) the total number of listings operated by hosts with only one listing (i.e., microentrepreneurs) in a marketplace and 2) the total number of listings operated by hosts with more than one listing (i.e., large-scale operators) in a marketplace. These measures are intended to operationalize the conceptual difference between microentrepreneurial rentals (or one-to-one exchanges that are idealized as more personalized) and large-scale rentals (or exchanges at scale that are idealized as more standardized) outlined in Table 1. In categorizing these exchanges by the number of listings a host operates, I capture the conceptualized differences in magnitude that undergirds microentrepreneurial and large-scale forms of renting. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on these two variables.

Independent Variables

I merged the dependent variables with demographic, economic, and nonprofit data from the 2011-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates, the 2012 Economic Census, the

2011 National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), and a dataset on Walmart store openings (Holmes 2011). These data serve as measures for civic capacity, local economic embeddedness, labor market dynamics, income stratification, and housing costs and supply. Table 3 summarizes the anticipated relationship between each measure and the dependent variables, based on the literature outlined above. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for each measure.

Table 3. Anticipated Relationship between Types of Short-term Rental Markets and Measures

Measure	Microentrepreneurial: Anticipated Relationship	Large-Scale: Anticipated Relationship
Institutional Structures		
Civic Capacity		
Nonprofit organizations per 10k capita	+	
Locally Embedded Exchange		
Walmart stores per 100k capita	-	
% small business retail	+	
Walmart stores per capita x % small business retail	+	
Resource Dependencies		
Labor Market Dynamics		
% working < 35 hrs per week	+	
% unemployed	-	
% working < 35 hrs per week x % unemployed	+	
% real estate firms		+
Income Stratification		
Median family income (ten thousands)	+	+
Median family income (ten thousands), squared	-	
Income inequality gini index	+	
Housing Costs and Supply		
Median rent as a percentage of income	+	
% of nonseasonal vacancies		+
Median contract rent (thousands)	+	+
% of nonseasonal vacancies x median contract rent		+

Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Correlations, 2016 Airbnb.com, 2010-2015 ACS, 2012 Economic Census, 2006 Walmart data (Holmes 2011), and 2011 NCSS

Variable		Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1.	Total listings (thousands)	1.15	3.52	0	42.78	1	.98	.92	.08	-.31	.39	-.07	.08	.28	.27	.25	.14
2.	Microentrepreneurial listing rates (thousands)	.70	2.46	0	32.98	.98	1	.82	.10	-.29	.37	-.08	.06	.23	.28	.25	.10
3.	Large-scale listing rates (thousands)	.45	1.21	0	9.81	.92	.82	1	.03	-.32	.39	-.04	.11	.35	.22	.23	.21
4.	Nonprofit organizations per 10k capita	11.73	4.01	3.50	31.26	.08	.10	.03	1	-.21	.06	-.32	-.33	-.17	.65	.08	-.03
5.	Walmart stores per 100k capita	1.10	.51	0	2.85	-.31	-.29	-.32	-.21	1	-.20	.00	-.24	-.24	-.37	-.01	-.25
6.	% small business retail	41.97	4.51	31.72	60.08	.39	.37	.39	.06	-.20	1	.25	.29	.29	.09	.25	.36
7.	% working < 35 hrs per week	43.70	4.49	30.00	57.10	-.07	-.08	-.04	-.32	.00	.25	1	.49	.14	-.53	.28	.66
8.	% unemployed	5.08	1.22	2.40	9.70	.08	.06	.11	-.33	-.24	.29	.49	1	.13	-.29	.12	.45
9.	% real estate firms	4.76	1.24	2.26	9.03	.28	.23	.35	-.17	-.24	.29	.14	.13	1	.01	.17	.26
10.	Median family income (ten thousands)	6.47	1.16	3.69	10.81	.27	.28	.22	.65	-.37	.09	-.53	-.29	.01	1	-.06	-.15
11.	Income inequality gini index	45.67	2.29	39.65	54.27	.25	.25	.23	.08	-.01	.25	.28	.12	.17	-.06	1	.40
12.	Median rent as a percentage of income	31.06	2.44	24.80	38.60	.14	.10	.21	-.03	-.25	.36	.66	.45	.26	-.15	.40	1
13.	% of nonseasonal vacancies	8.36	2.56	3.30	18.36	-.14	-.16	-.10	-.35	.38	.04	.23	.20	.02	-.50	.23	.06
14.	Median contract rent (thousands)	.72	.19	.44	1.61	.47	.42	.50	.32	-.57	.37	-.09	.07	.44	.67	.05	.31
15.	Total population, ln	3.88	.98	2.76	7.60	.59	.56	.60	.02	-.38	.29	-.23	.15	.30	.35	.25	-.01
16.	% of tourism firms	34.95	7.41	17.00	71.12	.27	.25	.28	.22	-.34	.15	-.03	.08	.19	.24	.20	.23
17.	% of seasonal vacancies, ln	1.18	.74	.18	3.65	.05	.00	.15	.02	.01	.39	.30	.01	.33	-.16	.02	.31
18.	% Non-White, ln	3.36	.56	1.89	4.58	.24	.21	.28	-.39	-.28	.22	.19	.46	.37	-.13	.33	.32
19.	Index of dissimilarity	44.86	12.53	16.99	77.87	.13	.14	.09	.09	.06	.01	-.16	-.01	-.32	.05	.22	-.16
20.	Median age	37.38	4.35	24.50	57.30	.02	.01	.04	.26	.07	.36	.07	.01	-.10	.05	-.09	-.03
21.	Northeast	.14	.34	0	1	.09	.12	.03	.40	-.13	.15	-.14	.00	-.33	.33	-.08	.05
22.	Midwest	.23	.42	0	1	-.12	-.10	-.16	.16	.10	-.35	-.22	-.18	-.36	.09	-.19	-.27
23.	South	.41	.49	0	1	-.06	-.08	-.01	-.36	.34	.11	.02	-.07	.16	-.36	.34	-.02

Table 4 Continued.

Variable		Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
13.	% of nonseasonal vacancies	8.36	2.56	3.30	18.36	1	-.44	-.13	-.01	.09	.16	.25	.11	-.17	-.11	.55
14.	Median contract rent (thousands)	.72	.19	.44	1.61	-.44	1	.39	.33	.19	.33	-.24	.01	.14	-.31	-.24
15.	Total population, ln	3.88	.98	2.76	7.60	-.13	.39	1	.30	-.20	.32	.36	-.01	.06	-.07	-.02
16.	% of tourism firms	34.95	7.41	17.00	71.12	-.01	.33	.30	1	.11	.19	.01	-.04	.15	-.07	-.01
17.	% of seasonal vacancies, ln	1.18	.74	.18	3.65	.09	.19	-.20	.11	1	-.09	-.23	.45	.10	-.32	.12
18.	% Non-White, ln	3.36	.56	1.89	4.58	.16	.33	.32	.19	-.09	1	-.09	-.41	-.26	-.37	.26
19.	Index of dissimilarity	44.86	12.53	16.99	77.87	.25	-.24	.36	.01	-.23	-.09	1	.18	.13	.37	.04
20.	Median age	37.38	4.35	24.50	57.30	.11	.01	-.01	-.04	.45	-.41	.18	1	.28	-.04	-.03
21.	Northeast	.14	.34	0	1	-.17	.14	.06	.15	.10	-.26	.13	.28	1	-.22	-.33
22.	Midwest	.23	.42	0	1	-.11	-.31	-.07	-.07	-.32	-.37	.37	-.04	-.22	1	-.45
23.	South	.41	.49	0	1	.55	-.24	-.02	-.01	.12	.26	.04	-.03	-.33	-.45	1

Measures of Civic Capacity and Locally Embedded Economic Exchange. I anticipate that microentrepreneurial rentals will be more prevalent in communities with high civic capacity and high local investment (see Table 3). In measuring organizations that cultivate "blended social action" and collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 2005), I use the count of nonprofits organizations in each metropolitan area (2011 NCCS) per 10,000 people in the residential population (2011-2015 ACS). In measuring localism, I use the prevalence of small business firms and an inverse measure, nonlocal business investment. Research on nonoccupant housing investments used Walmart data to demonstrate that communities with chain retail like Walmart are more vulnerable to such investment (Goldstein 2018). Using the same data, I calculated the count of Walmart stores in a metropolitan area (in 2006) per 10,000 people in the total residential population. However, I expect that this measure will be moderated by the degree of local business investment as well; that is, metropolitan areas may have a high concentration of Walmarts and still have a strong representation of small, local businesses. I thus also include the percentage of retail firms that have fewer than five employees (from the 2012 Economic Census) and interact the two variables in Models 2 and 3 (see Table 5).

Measures of Labor, Income, and Housing Precarity. I anticipate that the two short-term rental market segments will track differently with local labor market dynamics (see Table 3). That is, I anticipate that microentrepreneurial rentals will be prevalent where there is high employment insecurity but low unemployment, since often, the economic opportunities provided by microentrepreneurial rentals are enough to supplement work that is not full-time, but not enough to substitute other forms of employment entirely. To measure employment insecurity, I use the percentage of the population ages 16 to 64 who typically work less than 35 hours per week from the 2011-2015 ACS; to measure unemployment, I use the percentage of the labor force age 16 and older that is unemployed. I also interact these two variables (see Model 3 in Table 5), anticipating that microentrepreneurial markets will be most popular in metropolitan areas with high percentages of workers who work less than 35 hours per week and low levels of unemployment. I expect that large-scale short-term rental markets will be more popular in large real estate markets, where there is a large investor community. To measure this, I use the percentage of total firms in a metropolitan area that are real estate establishments (from the 2012 Economic Census).

In measuring income inequality dynamics, I use median family income and an inequality index from 2011-2015 ACS. Median family income, in its linear form, is used to test the anticipated positive relationship between wealth and rates of large-scale rentals (see Table 3). I include the quadratic term for median family income in the second model, to test the anticipated relationship that moderate levels of income (not high or low) will have higher rates of microentrepreneurial rentals (see Table 3). I also use the Census's inequality index, which captures the evenness of income across a community, to examine whether microentrepreneurial rates will be higher in places with stagnant wages and rising inequality (see Table 3).

Finally, I anticipate high housing costs to be associated with high rates of each form of short-term renting, consistent with other literature demonstrating short-term rental markets' effects on housing prices (Barron et al. 2021; Garcia-López et al. 2020; Todd et al. 2022) or other possible alternative mechanisms theorized in this chapter (see Table 3). One alternative possibility discussed is that microentrepreneurial rentals will be more prevalent in marketplaces with high rent burdens, as hosts may be compensating for wages that are too low in relation to the high cost of housing. To explore this anticipated relationship, I use median gross rent as a percentage of income from the 2011-2015 ACS, which measures how much income people within a metropolitan area are dedicating to rent relative to other expenses. Another alternative possibility discussed is that large-scale rentals will be popular in marketplaces with high housing costs and high residential vacancies since real estate investors may be trying convert their investments in long-term luxury units into profitable rentals on the short-term rental market. To explore this anticipated pattern, I use median contract rent and the percentage of nonseasonal vacant housing units from the 2011-2015 ACS and interact the two in the third model; places with high rents and high vacancies might suggest gluts in luxury housing.

Controls. The analyses also include controls from 2011-2015 ACS and 2012 Economic Census data. I include total population (2011-2015 ACS) with the expectation that metropolitan areas with higher populations will have a higher number of potential Airbnb listings and will be more popular tourist destinations; I use the natural logarithm of this variable to correct for skewness. Using the 2012 Economic Census's industry categories, I combine the percentage of total firms in Accommodation and Food industries with the percentage of total firms in Arts and Recreation industries to create a broader tourism measure. I also include the logged percentage of seasonally vacant housing, as a measure for existing vacation rental markets.

The models also include non-White and median age, using demographic variables from the 2011-2015 ACS. Additionally, I constructed an index of dissimilarity, computing the percentage of Black residents that would have to exchange tracts with non-Black residents to achieve an even residential distribution. This has been noted as a reliable measure for segregation, representing the unevenness of a metropolitan area (Massey, White, and Phua 1996; Rugh and Massey 2010). These variables are more appropriate as controls, as without micro-level data, theorizing potential mechanisms might contribute to reifying racial categories (see the section on limitations that follows). Finally, I control for potential variation in tourism, labor markets, and other regional specialization using 2011-2015 ACS's regional categories.

Multicollinearity Diagnostics. Multicollinearity among independent variables can pose a problem for regression analysis as it can inflate standard errors and make coefficients less precise. One way to diagnose collinearity among variables is by examining their correlation; in examining the independent variables, no pairwise correlation exceeds 0.70 (see Table 4), or the more common cutoff of 0.80 (Berry and Feldman 1985). Additionally, I examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) on a linear regression model that excluded the interaction and quadratic terms; with this model, no VIF exceeded 5, with a mean VIF score calculated at 2.87; these scores suggest a low degree of multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 2005). While inclusion of the interaction and quadratic terms inflated these scores, this is inevitable given their mathematical construction, and should not affect interpretation of the results if they are significant (Belsley et al. 2005; O'Brien 2007). The results of these diagnostics, then, suggest I can proceed with the assumption that multicollinearity does not pose a problem for the analyses.

Limitations of the data and analyses

While this original dataset offers insight into understanding short-term rentals in the platform economy, it does have several limitations because of the collection methods of "scraping," the joining of disparate sources of data, the examination of markets where privacy issues are a concern, and the level of analysis. First, given the timing of the project and inability to scrape retroactive listings on the Airbnb website, the dataset cannot capture the process of short-term rental market *emergence*, beginning with Airbnb's launch in 2008, that may be possible with time-series data. I also had difficulty accessing retroactive data on markets that may have been predecessors to contemporary short-term rental platforms, such as Couchsurfing and earlier forms of vacation rentals. The dataset, consisting of independent variables that span the years 2006 through 2015 and Airbnb listing counts from 2016, are thus treated cross-sectionally and cannot support any attempts at causal inference. Rather, I use the analyses to identify patterns between different types of short-term rental exchange and urban socio-economic organization, as well as to contemplate possible mechanisms for these patterns (see those described under "The Socio-Economic Organization of 'Sharing'").

Second, given the restrictive interface of Airbnb and apparent privacy concerns, the data do not capture actual short-term rental exchanges (i.e., "bookings"), the profitability of the firm, or the number of consumers who only use the site to book accommodation (i.e., guests). Airbnb has been very reluctant to share data, stating concerns about the privacy of users, and in special cases when it does, it does so in censored ways or when legally compelled (Martineau 2019a). The dataset, then, offers only one measure market growth: short-term rental supply.

A final limitation of the study is the level of analysis (metropolitan areas), which raises the issue of "ecological fallacy," or the argument that individual-level conclusions cannot be drawn from group-level data (van Poppel and Day 1996; Robinson 1950). For example, given the significant role racial categorization plays in social trust, economic stratification, residential segregation, and discriminatory housing practices (e.g., Abascal and Baldassarri 2015; Abrahao et al. 2017; Kennedy et al. 2021), it is also likely significant for short-term rental market formation. However, I do not have data on the racial identification of particular market participants, the more micro-level neighborhood environment in which they are directly embedded, and their subsequent decision-making and therefore cannot test hypotheses about relationships between race and short-term rental market participation with this study. If listing rates are significantly associated with marketplaces with particular racial compositions, it would be difficult to identify whether this is because of dynamics of social trust, discrimination, or several possible mechanisms that, without careful investigation, could potentially reify racial categories. Generally, I cannot assume that individual hosts within a metropolitan area who adopt the practice of short-term renting have the aggregated and generalized characteristics of the metropolitan area.

However, given that this study is largely concerned with the growth and segmentation of *markets*—organizational-level phenomena—rather than the reasons for individual host practices and interactions, I proceed cautiously, focusing on meso- and macro-level dynamics and forms of explanation. That is, in contemplating explanations for these market patterns, I describe mechanisms that explain collective processes, emphasizing meso-level socio-economic organization, labor dynamics, and housing markets (not individual persons or racial categories) with tendencies well established by theory. I also include percent non-White, a segregation measure, and median age as controls, with the caveat that the explanation for such relationships must be pursued further with survey, experimental, and qualitative research. Other research more carefully approaches the role of racial biases in host and guest decision-making (Abrahao et al. 2017; Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky 2017). This chapter instead focuses on the urban institutional structures and inequalities that are associated with platform economy market growth, with the acknowledgment that other micro-level factors are also important to these processes.

Results

Before exploring the main results, I present some findings on the descriptive features of short-term rental markets. Overall, there are 319,639 listings among the sample's 277 metropolitan areas. Microentrepreneurial rentals form a majority of these rentals, 61% (194,725), whereas commercial rentals encompass a minority, 39% (124,914). Both types largely depend on entire units of housing (i.e., "vacation rentals") as opposed to partial units (i.e., "homeshares"); in both segments of the market, rentals of entire units constitute 65% of all rentals listed.

The mean number of listings in a marketplace is 703 for microentrepreneurial rentals (SD=2,458) and 451 for commercial rentals (SD=1,206). Both the New York-Newark-Jersey City and Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim metropolitan areas are among the marketplaces with highest numbers of both microentrepreneurial (NY: 32,978; LA: 13,732) and commercial (NY: 9,806; LA: 8,863) listings as well as with the highest number of listings overall. Unsurprisingly, these metropolitan areas have the highest residential populations, but they also rank highly on indicators for localism and economic and housing precarity. Both are more than one standard deviation lower than the mean number of Walmarts per 100,000 residents (1.1), one standard deviation higher than the mean percentage of small business retail (41.97), and two standard deviations higher than the mean inequality index (0.46). Both also have median contract rents above $1,000. Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim also has unaffordable housing relative to income, with a median percentage of income toward rent more than one standard deviation above the mean (31.06%).

The San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward area, where Airbnb is headquartered, has the third largest market for microentrepreneurial listings (12,025); its market for commercial listings is much smaller (4,069). San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward ranks highly for measures of civic capacity and local embeddedness; its density of local nonprofit organizations is nearly two standard deviations above the mean with 18.3 organizations per 10,000 residents, it has a high percentage of small business retail (46.98%), and its density of Walmart stores is more than one standard deviation below the mean with 0.2 stores per 100,000 residents. Conversely, the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach ranks highly in listings for commercial rentals (8,867) and has a much smaller market for microentrepreneurial rentals (7,109). Like Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, it ranks high on inequality and housing costs, with a Gini index of 0.50 and the median percentage of income toward rent at 34.9%.

Institutional Structures: Civic Capacity and Locally Embedded Economic Exchange

I anticipate that civic capacity and localism are associated with growth in platform economy markets, particularly microentrepreneurial markets. The results presented in Table 5 provide support for this anticipated relationship. Across all three models for microentrepreneurial listings, the measure for civic capacity (number of nonprofit organizations per 10,000 capita) has

Table 5. Incident rate ratios for negative binomial regression of short-term rental listings on metropolitan characteristics (N=277)

	Microentrepreneurial			Large-Scale		
Independent Variables	1	2	3	1	2	3
Civic Capacity and Locally Embedded Economic Exchange						
Nonprofit organizations per 10k capita	1.03*	1.03*	1.03*	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Walmart stores per 100k capita	0.91	0.22*	0.18*	0.18	0.18†	1.01
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.13)
% small business retail	1.02*	0.98	0.98	1.04*	0.99	1.03*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Walmart stores per capita x % small business retail	---	1.04*	1.04*	---	1.04†	---
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	
Labor Market, Income, and Housing Dynamics						
% working < 35 hrs per week	1.02	1.09**	1.09**	0.99	1.01	1.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
% unemployed	0.85***	1.54†	1.55†	0.81***	1.00	0.81***
	(0.04)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.04)	(0.32)	(0.04)
% working < 35 hrs per week x % unemployed	---	0.99**	0.99**	---	1.00	---
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.01)	
% real estate firms	1.14**	1.12*	1.10†	1.23**	1.20**	1.18**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Median family income (ten thousands)	1.34***	2.63**	2.43**	1.30***	1.97†	1.12
	(0.08)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.09)	(0.72)	(0.11)
Median family income (ten thousands), squared	---	0.95*	0.96*	---	0.97	---
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	
Income inequality gini index	1.04	1.05*	1.06*	1.00	1.02	1.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Median rent as a percentage of income	1.08**	1.07**	1.06*	1.11***	1.11***	1.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% of nonseasonal vacancies	1.03	1.02	0.97	1.08**	1.08**	0.87†
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Median contract rent (thousands)	---	---	1.20	---	---	0.64
			(0.96)			(0.52)
% of nonseasonal vacancies x median contract rent	---	---	1.08	---	---	1.37**
			(0.11)			(0.16)

a significant ($p<0.05$) positive association with the expected count of microentrepreneurial listings. For each one-unit increase in the variable, the predicted number of listings increases by three percent, controlling for all other indicators. This coefficient is more significant in the microentrepreneurial model than in the large-scale model. In marketplaces with extremely high nonprofit densities (around 20 to 30 organizations per 10,000 residents), the predicted number of

Table 5 Continued.

Independent Variables	Microentrepreneurial 1	2	3	Large-scale 1	2	3
Controls						
Total population, ln	3.61***	3.56***	3.55***	3.60***	3.62***	3.57***
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
% of tourism firms	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% of seasonal vacancies, ln	1.96***	1.98***	1.91***	2.75***	2.84***	2.47***
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)
% Non-White, ln	0.73**	0.79*	0.74*	0.87	0.92	0.74†
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Index of dissimilarity	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98**	0.98**	0.98**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Median age	1.14†	1.12†	1.13†	1.43**	1.42***	1.44***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Median age, squared	1.00†	1.00†	1.00*	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Northeast	0.62*	0.59**	0.62*	0.52*	0.50**	0.58†
	(0.13)	(0.59)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.16)
Midwest	0.80	0.77	0.82	0.64†	0.63*	0.75
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.18)
South	0.73†	0.70*	0.73*	0.60*	0.57**	0.68†
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Constant	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
alpha	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.46	0.46	0.45
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
AIC	3,238.77	3,229.34	3,231.49	3,052.39	3,053.09	3,044.72
BIC	3,318.50	3,319.94	3,329.33	3,132.12	3,143.69	3,131.69

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test)

listings is between 100 to 300 times greater for microentrepreneurial listings than large-scale listings; this difference is within the 95% confidence intervals (see Figure S 6 a. in the supplement).

The measures for localism—Walmarts per 100,000 people and percent small business retail—also have a significant association with microentrepreneurial rates, though less consistently. In the first model for microentrepreneurial rentals in Table 5, the Walmart measure does not have a significant association, but the percentage of small retail firms does (p<0.05). In this model, each one unit increase in the percentage of small business retail is associated with a two percent increase in the rate of microentrepreneurial rentals. However, when the interaction term between the two variables is included (Models 3 and 4), the small business coefficient is insignificant and the coefficient for Walmarts per 100,000 capita has a significant negative relationship ($p<0.05$) with microentrepreneurial rates. The interaction of Walmarts per 100,000 capita with percent small business has a significant positive relationship ($p<0.05$) with the rate of microentrepreneurial rentals. In these models, each additional Walmart per 100,000 people reduces the predicted microentrepreneurial rate by anywhere between 78 and 82 percent. However, the interaction results suggest that this association can be moderated by the presence of small business retail firms; that is, marketplaces where there are high densities of Walmarts can also have high rates of microentrepreneurial rentals, if there is also a high percentage of retail firms that are small business (see Figure S 2 in the appendix).

These findings are not as apparent in the large-scale models, where the interaction term between Walmart density and percent small business retail is not very significant ($p<0.10$). The relationship between percentage of small retail firms and large-scale exchange rates, however, does appear to be significant; for each one percent increase in the percentage of small retail firms the predicted rate of large-scale rentals increases by three or four percent. These findings suggest that the large-scale segment does track, to some degree, with locally embedded economic exchange, perhaps as a more "local" alternative than national hotel chains, but still as a more standardized and mainstream segment than microentrepreneurial markets.

Labor Market, Income, and Housing Dynamics

I anticipated that inequalities in labor markets, income, and housing are associated with growth in microentrepreneurial and large-scale short-term rental markets. The results presented in Table 5 generally provide support for these expectations. First, I expected that microentrepreneurial and large-scale rentals would be associated with different labor market dynamics, with microentrepreneurial rentals more prevalent in areas with low unemployment but high employment insecurity and large-scale rentals more prevalent in communities with large real estate markets. In Model 1 of the microentrepreneurial models, the unemployment rate has a highly significant negative relationship with the rate of microentrepreneurial rentals ($p<0.001$) while the measure for employment insecurity, the percentage of those working less than 35 hours per week, has an insignificant association. However, this association changes in the second and third models, when the interaction between unemployment and percent less than full-time is included.[1]

When the interaction term is included, the main coefficient for percentage of those working less than full-time is highly significant ($p<0.01$); for each one percent increase, the rate of microentrepreneurial rentals increases by nine percent, controlling for all other factors. The main coefficient for unemployment, on the other hand, reverses to a positive association, though this is not very significant ($p<0.10$). The interaction term suggests that unemployment moderates the relationship between employment insecurity and microentrepreneurial listings, with the predicted number of listings being highest in places with low unemployment but high levels of part-time workers. Based on Model 2, in places with the highest percentages of those working less than full-time and an unemployment rate one standard deviation below the mean (3.9%), the predicted number of microentrepreneurial listings is around 1,700; this predicted rate decreases by about 1,000 listings when the unemployment rate is one standard deviation above the mean (6.3%) (see Figure S 4 in the appendix).

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[1] Model 2 also adds the quadratic term for income and Model 3 also adds median contract rent and its interaction with the rate of nonseasonal vacancies.

For the large-scale models, the negative association between the unemployment rate and listing rates is more consistent. In the preferred models for large-scale rental markets,[2] controlling for other factors, each one percentage increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 19 percent reduction in the rate of large-scale listings, a result that is highly significant ($p<0.001$). The results for large-scale models also provide support for the expectation that large-scale markets will correlate with real estate industry patterns; in the large-scale models, each one percent increase in the percentage of total firms that are real estate firms is associated with an 18 to 23 percent increase in the predicted number of large-scale listings, a result that is highly significant ($p<0.01$). This relationship is also significant ($p<0.05$) for microentrepreneurial markets; however, the size of the effect is greater for large-scale markets. In marketplaces with a percentage of real estate firms below the mean (approximately five percent), large-scale markets have significantly fewer predicted listings than microentrepreneurial markets (see Figure S 7 c. in the supplement).

The results in Table 5 also support the expectation that microentrepreneurial rentals would be more prevalent in communities with moderate levels of income and high-income inequality. In Model 1 for microentrepreneurial listings, the linear term for median family income is highly significant ($p<0.001$), suggesting that higher rates of microentrepreneurial listings occur in contexts where there are higher incomes, controlling for all other variables in the model. However, in Models 2 and 3, the significant quadratic term for median family income

[2] The interaction term for percent working less than full-time and percent unemployed and the quadratic term for income is not significant in Model 2 for large-scale rentals and the AIC/BIC scores are lower for Models 1 and 3 (see Table 5), suggesting that these two models are preferred over Model 2.

(p<0.05) and comparative AIC/BIC scores[3] suggest that this relationship may be more curvilinear. Microentrepreneurial rates appear to peak at around $100,000 in median family income, at which point they begin to drop (see Figure S 3 g. in the appendix). Furthermore, the income inequality index also has a significant positive association with microentrepreneurial rates (p<0.05); for each percentage increase in the inequality index, the anticipated rate of microentrepreneurial rentals increases by five to six percent.

The results on income for the large-scale model are more mixed. I anticipated that large-scale rentals would be prevalent in communities with high incomes, an expectation that seems to be supported by the first model, where the linear term for median family income is highly significant (p<0.001). However, the third model, which includes median contract rent, diminishes this association and the term becomes insignificant. Median family income and median contract rent are correlated (0.67), so this finding suggests that rental housing dynamics may better capture the spatial patterns of the large-scale market.

I also suggested that both microentrepreneurial and large-scale markets will be prevalent in communities with high housing costs. For microentrepreneurial markets, this expectation is supported by the findings on median rent as a percentage of income in Table 5. Across all models, the positive association between rent burdens and listing rates remains significant (p<0.05), controlling for all other variables; for each percentage increase in the rent burden, the anticipated rate of microentrepreneurial rentals increases by between six and eight percent. High rent burdens are also significantly (p<0.05) and positively associated with large-scale rental listings. Large-scale rental listings are also highest in contexts where there are high contract rents

[3] Model 2 of Table 5, for microentrepreneurial rentals, has a lower AIC score than and nearly equal BIC score to Model 1 of Table 5, for microentrepreneurial rentals, suggesting that Model 2 is a better fit.

and high nonseasonal vacancies (see Model 3 in Table 5 and Figure S 5 in the appendix), controlling for all other factors. The same interaction term between median contract rent and nonseasonal vacancies is insignificant in the microentrepreneurial model (see Model 3 in Table 5).

Discussion

I have suggested that the local popularity of short-term rental markets is a process of adapting existing institutional structures and resources (Emigh 2008; Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Padgett and Powell 2012; Sewell 1992; Storper 2013) to the needs of each type of exchange. As outlined in Table 1, microentrepreneurial and large-scale segments of the platform economy involve different exchange structures, labor, capital, and housing. These analyses indicate that short-term rental markets grow where there are institutional structures and resources for these different types of economic exchange.

As part of a broader market offering a “local” alternative to traditional travel accommodation experiences, both microentrepreneurial and large-scale markets are situated in contexts where economic exchanges are locally embedded. Based on the findings, both segments are associated with the prevalence of small business retail. However, microentrepreneurial rentals, as the “purer” alternative that relies on direct and intimate interaction, are also associated with civically oriented communities. In a metropolitan area, as the density of nonprofit organizations increases, the rates of microentrepreneurial listings are predicted to be significantly higher than the predicted number of large-scale listings. These findings are consistent with the literature on alternative markets (Carroll and Torfason 2011; Goldstein 2018; Rao 2008; Sine and Lee 2009; Weber et al. 2008), suggesting that institutions for community solidarity and “blended social action” (Sampson et al. 2005) can cultivate the social connection needed for alternative exchanges that rely on the more localized, intimate practice of short-term renting.

However, the unequal socio-economic structures of local urban contexts can also be conducive to certain forms of market exchange. As the analyses demonstrate, both microentrepreneurial and large-scale markets appear to thrive in places with different forms of economic stratification. Based on the findings, microentrepreneurial rentals appear to be prevalent in marketplaces where there is low unemployment, high levels of labor precarity, moderate levels of income, and high income inequality. Large-scale rentals, on the other hand, are more popular in marketplaces with high levels of income, or high rents and nonseasonal vacancies.

These findings reflect the increasing inequality between consumers of housing—who largely buy or rent it for its use value—and investors in housing, who seek increasing returns on their investments (Goldstein 2018). In the former case, housing consumers who are financially overextended and are facing less stable employment prospects (Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Kalleberg 2009; Schor 1998), may have turned to microentrepreneurial forms of short-term renting to repurpose the excess capacities of their homes for supplemental income. In the latter case, wealthy or investor communities may be looking to expand profits on vacant housing through large-scale forms of short-term rentals (Teresa 2016; Wetzstein 2017). Of course, given that both markets are popular in marketplaces with high housing costs, the practice of short-term renting may also be a contributor to rising housing prices, as other research has indicated (Barron et al. 2021; Garcia-López et al. 2020; Todd et al. 2022).

Conclusion

The findings from this chapter foreshadow the ways local civic energies are channeled into these new forms of market participation, as discussed in the following chapters. The microentrepreneurial segment of short-term rental markets, as demonstrated here, relies on communities with organizations that create the civic orientations for "sharing." However, as the next chapters will demonstrate, in addition to absorbing participation from civically oriented communities, short-term rental platforms and markets also become their own sites for "blended social action" (Sampson et al. 2005), transforming community members into market participants and then advocates. Short-term rental platforms also join together, through the platform, microentrepreneurial hosts and large-scale operators, who though having shared stakes and participation in the technology, may otherwise have distinct interests and policy goals.

Indeed, the findings illuminate each segment's complicated relationship with housing politics. As I have suggested, the relationship between short-term rental markets and housing costs could be circular, with microentrepreneurial and large-scale rentals not just causing rising housing prices and high living costs—as previous research has suggested—but also emerging as symptoms of these problems. That is, the microentrepreneurial segment may reflect communities struggling economically whereas the large-scale segment may reflect increased capitalization of already-expensive housing. However, given that both types of markets are popular in urban areas with high housing costs and these segments are grouped together through the platform technology, policymakers and public audiences in these contexts come to view them both critically, as a cause of housing cost problems. The policy consequences of this shifting social and political organization, thus, will be explored in the next chapters.

CHAPTER 4. SHARING HOMES AND BEDS: BAPTIST-BOOTLEGGER COALITIONS AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHENTICITY IN THE REGULATION OF LOS ANGELES'S SHORT-TERM RENTAL MARKETS

Theories of urban politics highlight different kinds of collaboration between policymakers, capital, and civic actors. Urban politics can be an ongoing process of capitalist opportunism, where businesspeople with otherwise disparate interests form coalitions to convince local officials to support land-use projects in the name of urban renewal, "creative city" initiatives, and more broadly, economic growth (Besek 2020; Farmer and Poulos 2019; Molotch 1976; Peck 2005; Pratt 2011). Local policymaking can also be more pluralistic; municipal policymakers rely on certain groups of constituents to provide resources, forming governance models and policy regimes that serve their interests (e.g., development regimes, "slow-growth" regimes, community-based regimes) (Clarke 1995; DeLeon 1992; Imbroscio 1998; Reese and Rosenfeld 2001; Stone 1989, 1993; Whittemore 2012). In the contemporary context, municipal leaders increasingly avoid patronage politics, viewing themselves as community partners who serve a wide range of constituents and collective goals (Pacewicz 2016; Pierre 2014). Ungirding any of these coalitions is the politics of place-making: local policymakers form partnerships with civic actors or business interests under a shared understanding of what the city should be (Besek 2020; Hunter et al. 2018; Pratt 2011).

In this chapter, I examine how short-term rental markets in the platform economy give rise to new forms of political organization and, as a result, re-organize the urban policymaking landscape. In the previous chapters, I described how Airbnb, through the platform technology, groups together two distinct short-term rental markets segments, microentrepreneurial and large-scale. Even though they are characterized by different local resources and institutional frameworks, they, through the market device and scale of the platform, become understood as a mutual threat to incumbents in housing and accommodation markets. As a result, they transform what in the urban studies literature are often characterized as traditionally adversarial relationships (e.g., business elites versus civic actors, management versus labor, homeowners' versus tenants' rights groups) into strategic Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions.

Through a case study of urban politics and policymaking in Los Angeles, I argue that one Baptist-Bootlegger coalition, the subtly coordinated partnership of housing groups, neighborhood activists, and hotel market incumbents, leveraged their individual authenticity, expertise, and resources to articulate a shared vision with policymakers. Conversely, the opposing coalition of short-term rental platforms and hosts more blatantly combined their efforts under an organizational framework that conflated economic and moral claims. This hybrid organizational identity—in explicitly combining Baptist and Bootlegger interests and forms of expertise—was perceived as less authentic by policymaking audiences and precluded potentially more strategic partnerships.

This chapter thus illuminates how the social organization of short-term rental markets described in earlier chapters has consequences for civic organizing and policymaking. While Airbnb's use of the platform technology and meaning-making around "sharing" proved to be useful for mobilizing market participants and eventually organizing them for political advocacy, these strategies also created an entangled organizational identity that made their action illegible and largely ineffective with other audiences. These dynamics are consistent with the varied local policy outcomes across the United States that will be discussed in the last chapter, where in places with high housing costs and a favorable policy context, incumbents were more successful, leveraging their distinct organizational identities to push for more restrictive short-term rental market regulations.

Case Selection

To test the propositions outlined above, I analyze a case of short-term rental politics in Los Angeles, California. Case studies, through historical narrative and contextual specificity, identify causal patterns and mechanisms that can elaborate on theories of change (Büthe 2002; Emigh 1997; Steinmetz 2004). Los Angeles, with an extensive history of political organizing around land-use policies, is a good "testing ground" (Milkman 2006:5) for short-term rental politics.

Throughout the 20th century, a partnership of business interests and bureaucrats created an urban policy regime focused on revitalizing downtown and building apartments in wealthy neighborhoods to accommodate the city's growing immigrant population. However, these development projects cultivated resentment from local white residents about traffic, pollution, and quality of life, leading to the emergence of new policy regime that placated these residents (Deener, Kogan, and Stuart 2013).

By the 1980s, homeowners partnered with small businesses and environmentalists to form anti-growth coalitions that worked to challenge the political influence of commercial developers. When San Fernando Valley residents threatened to secede from the city, the council reformed the city charter and created Los Angeles's neighborhood council system (Deener et al. 2013; Purcell 1997). These neighborhood councils were hotbeds for political conflicts over land use, providing homeowners a new institutional channel to challenge major development projects and pursue quality-of-life goals. However, the neighborhood councils were also sites for contentious debates over who represents a community (Deener et al. 2013).

For example, in the coastal Venice neighborhood, city officials, developers, middle-class homeowners, and progressive activists each worked to shape the neighborhood's trajectory. In the 1970s and 80s, progressive interests representing minorities, renters, and homeless populations partnered with homeowners to challenge city officials and speculators wanting to create luxury development along the coast. However, in 2002, debates within the Venice Neighborhood Council fractured this partnership, with middleclass homeowners blaming progressive activists for local criminal activity and homelessness and progressive activists accusing homeowners of an elite and racist quality-of-life agenda (Deener et al. 2013). These neighborhood politics reflect a broader tension in Los Angeles between “haves” (i.e., homeowners and developers) and “have-nots” (i.e., low-income workers and minority populations) (Whittemore 2012).

The contemporary policy regime arbitrates among these interests in debates about the city’s increasing inequality, particularly around housing (Whittemore 2012). While the influential neighborhood councils are whiter and wealthier than their communities, low-wage immigrant workers are increasingly represented through the local labor movement which, in coalition with other progressive organizations, recently attained significant victories (Milkman 2006; Milkman, Bloom, and Narro 2010; Musso et al. 2007). These changing power dynamics, and a growing recognition that local housing prices are unaffordable have prompted city officials to challenge anti-growth advocates and create new housing opportunities (Whittemore 2012). Through state mandates, ballot initiatives and updates to the city’s general plan, the city has upzoned more than 1,400 acres, encouraged affordable housing development along transit corridors, and streamlined parking requirements and permitting for accessory dwelling units, all in the name of creating more housing (Gabbe 2019).

The rise of platform technologies like Airbnb also dramatically shifted these alliances. The historical tension between once-distinct commercial development, homeowner, and labor interests have become new cross-cutting alliances that pit corporation against corporation, worker against worker, and neighbor against neighbor (see Table 2). Amidst these competing coalitions, policymakers face mounting pressure to address high housing prices and rates of homelessness, yet are still accountable to commercial real estate and homeowners' movements. This makes Los Angeles an interesting case to tease out which relationships and strategies "win" in policymaking over short-term rentals.

Analytic Approach

As I did in Chapter 2, I draw on comparative approaches in this chapter to examine how interests, social action, and bureaucracy interact to form a "totality" or social context (Emigh et al. 2016; McMichael 1990). Instead of functionalist explanations that attribute case outcomes to their variation, these approaches use incorporated comparison, analyzing how a case "emerges via comparative analysis of 'parts' as moments in a self-forming whole" (McMichael 1990:386); the result is an explanation that shows how the interaction between social units produces a historical conjuncture. While typically at the macro-level of nation-states, these approaches can scaled down to the local level (Besek 2020). Thus, I compare how the interests, actions, and bureaucracy of local policymakers and two competing coalitions (i.e., the social units), in the context of one another, together produce a particular conjuncture: Los Angeles's 2018 short-term rental ordinance.

I first focused on the incumbent coalition (see Table 2), which instigated the policymaking process as short-term rentals became increasingly popular in Los Angeles. Using a database of listings in Los Angeles I scraped from Airbnb.com in 2016, I analyzed the extent to which commercial operation and different kinds of short-term renting were impacting the city. I complemented these data with media reports on the short-term rental issue and pending legislation. In the summer of 2015, following the passage of a motion to draft an ordinance, I interviewed Judy Goldman, the founder of Keep Neighborhoods First (KNF), an organization heavily involved in influencing the motion. From Goldman's contacts, news media reports, and analysis of over 200 public comment documents from Los Angeles City Clerk's I identified more interview participants from the incumbent coalition. Additionally, I analyzed these incumbents' lobbying expenditures from 2015 to 2018, using the City of Los Angeles' Ethics Commission data interface.

In analyzing the challenging short-term rental coalition (see Table 2), I applied a similar data collection approach, conducting interviews with key representatives and stakeholders and examining newspaper articles, organizational media, public comments filed with the City Clerk, and lobbying data. Recruiting interviews from representatives from Airbnb, however, was more difficult because of what, in informal discussions with company employees, were insinuated to be non-disclosure agreements between Airbnb and its employees. Airbnb has a history of being protective of company information and there are reports of confidentiality and non-disparagement agreements being requested of prospective employees, journalists, and company visitors (Carville 2020; Griffith 2020b; Lazzaro 2017). I did, however, interview a former employee, as well as key hosts who were involved in Airbnb's organizing efforts and interfaced with employees through the Los Angeles home-sharing club. I also gleaned the company's corporate strategy by analyzing news reports, company documents and public relations campaigns, and by attending the Airbnb Open conference in Los Angeles in 2016. I triangulated these data with media narratives and interviews with opponents and policymakers. With this approach, I compared the challenging short-term rental coalition's organizational and political strategy with the incumbent coalition's.

Finally, I collected and analyzed data on Los Angeles policymaking bureaucracy to understand how the efforts of the incumbent coalition, the challenging coalition, and policymakers converged to create the short-term rental ordinance. These data included the archive of documented actions on the short-term rental ordinance on the City of Los Angeles City Clerk's website, local news media, interviews I conducted with individuals in the planning department, councilmember offices, and neighborhood councils, and notes from my observation of city hearings (online and in person) over a three-year period. Triangulating and comparing the data on the three social units (i.e., the two competing coalitions and policymakers), I traced how they interacted to produce the final outcome: the short-term rental ordinance.

The Incumbent Coalition

Analyses of short-term rental listings, public comments, media reports, and interviews with various incumbent groups, indicate that incumbents overcame their tenuous history in opposition to work toward a shared goal of short-term rental regulation. While the coalition's strategy was somewhat coordinated through Keep Neighborhoods First (KNF), in public, incumbents articulated their grievances and organized their activities quite separately. The Baptists in this coalition (i.e., housing and tenants' rights advocates, neighborhood and homeowners' associations, and labor unions) worked on research, storytelling, and mobilizing publics that supported their moral appeals while Bootleggers (i.e., hotels) used their resources to lobby privately. This division of labor preserved Baptists' moral authenticity, allowing them to separate their work from economic interests and activities. Furthermore, each coalition member leveraged their institutional authenticity, covering a policymaking domain in which they were experts.

Shared Stakes: The Threat of Short-Term Rentals

Prior to the emergence of technology platforms like Airbnb and HomeAway/VRBO, short-term rentals could only be operated in areas of the city zoned for commercial use and were required to apply for a business license. In residential zones, the rental of residential units for less than 30 days, prior to 2018, were explicitly prohibited. However, following the launch of Airbnb in 2008, many residents and businesses began defying these regulations, using the platform to advertise vacation rentals (i.e., rentals of entire units) and home-shares (i.e., room rentals). According to my analysis of Airbnb listings from 2016, neighborhoods that were traditionally known for their residential character and lacking in hotel infrastructure –such as Venice, the Hollywood Hills, and Silver Lake—became centers for these listings, with more than 70 percent of listings representing vacation rentals. A large number of listings in these areas involved commercial operators advertising multiple units with long-term housing potential.

This demand on housing units and commercial growth created grievances among hotel stakeholders, homeowners, housing advocates. While there is not definitive evidence that short-term rentals co-opted hotels' customers (Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers 2014), both hotel corporations and boutique hotels felt that short-term rental platforms had an unfair advantage, as they were not subject to the same taxation and safety standards.[4] The hotel labor force also felt threatened, with worries that a vulnerable hotel industry might lead to layoffs or reduced wages. Their anxieties were shared with housing advocates: as a low-income, mostly Latinx community, hotel workers were already being displaced from high housing costs and felt that short-term rentals would exacerbate both their work and housing problems.[5]

[4] Lynn Mohrfeld, California Hotel & Lodging Association, interview, December 8, 2016.
[5] Rachel Torres, UniteHere! Local 11, interview, December 20, 2016; Lynn Mohrfeld, California Hotel & Lodging Association, interview, December 8, 2016.

Homeowners in largely single-family neighborhoods (e.g., Bel Air and the Hollywood Hills), on the other hand, were concerned with the increased neighborhood transiency caused by short-term rentals. These residents noted the rapid influx of tourists into their neighborhoods and the emergence of "party houses," where tourists renting large mansions in the hills would host extravagant parties (Van Dyke 2015).[6] In their view, the growth of short-term rentals in residential neighborhoods were a threat to neighborhood safety and quality of life.

In 2013, Judy Goldman, a psychologist and longtime homeowner in Venice, brought together the grievances of both housing advocates and homeowners, arguing that short-term rentals threatened neighborhood quality and through, gentrification and transience, exacerbated an already-rampant housing crisis. Writing an impassioned plea to Councilmember Mike Bonin's office, she asked that the city address the increased parking, trash, and noise nuisances and conversion of housing into "illegal hotels" that had been caused by increased short-term rental activity. This initial effort led to the creation of Keep Neighborhoods First (KNF), which, modeled after Bonin's campaign slogan "Neighborhoods First," organized to challenge short-term rentals in Los Angeles,[7]

Political Strategy and Organization

KNF was the touchstone through which incumbents in housing, neighborhoods, and hotels came together. By 2016, KNF was meeting regularly with representatives from the local hotel labor union, well-established housing and progressive organizations, hotel trade associations, and individual homeowners and activists throughout various neighborhoods. Together, the coalition articulated grievances about quality of life, housing, and fair market

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[6] Maureen Levinson, Bel-Air/Beverly Crest Neighborhood Council, interview, March 29, 2018

[7] Judy Goldman, KNF, interview, August 19, 2016.

standards by dividing the political labor based on each organization's particular expertise and skills.

For example, hotel stakeholders provided support with lobbying power and valuable institutional knowledge about city politics. Out of all the incumbents involved in lobbying during deliberations over the ordinance, hotel stakeholders (trade associations and the hotel union) constituted 72 percent of the coalition's total lobbying expenditures reported to the Ethics Commission. Judy Goldman also mentioned in her interview that a hotel representative advised her to hire a lobbyist; she was initially hesitant but followed the advice shortly after. Additionally, she commented on the mutually symbiotic relationship between her organization and the hotel industry advocates, stating "[I was] happy to have us put forward the housing issue for them. And I've been happy to have them because they've got a team of lawyers who can look at things and interpret things that I don't really understand, some of the verbiage."[8] In her view, hotels had valuable legal expertise to help partners navigate the proposed legislation.

Hotel industry professionals were also already deeply embedded in city hall. Rachel Torres of the hotel labor union UniteHere! Conveyed hotels' unique and extensive knowledge of city land-use politics, saying that, because every new hotel development has to undergo environmental and community review, hotels spend "millions of dollars and many years" hiring lawyers and lobbyists to navigate the process.[9] Just prior to the onset of short-term rental politics, the hotel associations had already been lobbying city hall regarding minimum wage ordinance, standing in opposition to hotel workers. These adversaries, however, tabled their differences and

[8] Ibid.
[9] Rachel Torres, UniteHere!, interview, December 20, 2016

used their existing political leverage in the city to collaborate on the short-term rental ordinance issue.[10]

Indeed, the hotel workers' union, UniteHere! Drew on their connections and skills in community organizing to connect different organizations with a mutual interest in regulating short-term rentals. UniteHere! Collaborates with and provides funding to the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), a policy planning organization that works with unions on other labor issues. Recruited by the union and KNF, LAANE wrote reports documenting the prevalence of short-term rentals and its effects on housing in Los Angeles (Samaan 2015b, 2015a). UniteHere! Had also worked with the housing group Strategic Alliance for a Just Economy (SAJE), who joined the coalition. The union also mobilized its membership to speak at public hearings on the ordinance, however, hotel workers' narratives were sometimes met with accusations they were being paid to show up.[11] Torres and several other members of the coalition thus saw Keep Neighborhood First as the central face and leader of the campaign, with other organizations like the union playing to their specific strengths. As she described, LAANE was the research arm, UniteHere! was a coalition-builder, and KNF was "straight up grassroots."[12]

To be sure, KNF and other housing organizations, in advancing the moral causes of preserving neighborhood character and affordable housing, were more often perceived, as Torres put it, as "straight up grassroots." Members of these groups often had compelling narratives about being evicted so that their landlord could rent their unit on Airbnb. KNF also produced a video entitled "Where have all the neighbors gone?," documenting egregious cases of hosts renting out whole apartment buildings online, which they aired at a neighborhood council

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[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.

meeting. They also staged protests at these buildings and kept records of illegal hotels and complaints, which they shared in meetings with the city attorney.[13] With compelling narratives and data, KNF and housing advocates made the argument that short-term rentals had a deleterious effect on neighborhoods and housing.

The Bootleggers in the coalition, the hotels, allowed their Baptist partners moral authenticity by taking a more backstage role. A representative of the hotel trade association acknowledged the futility in having hotels make the case for short-term rental regulation, suggesting that their economic stakes would make any claims not sound "authentic or genuine"; he followed, "frankly we're in Los Angeles: I have the benefit of having advocates from those areas to speak to those issues."[14] Because they represented a broader set of residents who did not stand to directly benefit economically from any outcome, community based organizations' conveyed a more authentic narrative that strict regulations would benefit the community overall.

The incumbent coalition thus leveraged their institutional authenticity by playing to their individual policymaking expertise. Neighborhood, housing, and economic justice groups, as the Baptists in the coalition, made the moral case that short-term rentals were threatening housing stock and neighborhood quality through compelling storytelling and research. While labor unions, as Baptists representing the moral cause of economic equity, also engaged in grassroots organizing, their connections to the hotel industry and other groups made them more effective as coalition-builders. Recognizing the strengths of their civic counterparts, hotel leaders took a background role in political organizing, pouring resources into less-public interfacing activities such as lobbying.

[13] Judy Goldman, Keep Neighborhoods First, interview, August 19, 2016
[14] Lynn Mohrfeld, California Hotel & Lodging Association, interview, December 8, 2016.

The Challenging Coalition

The challenging coalition comprised of short-term rental hosts organized through affiliate groups of the two major short-term rental platforms, Airbnb and HomeAway/VRBO. In my analysis of interviews with hosts and organizers, news media, research reports, and advertising, I found that Airbnb tried to present an image of short-term renting that involved a diverse, middle-class, and grassroots community. The company, at the same time, tried to distance itself from HomeAway/VRBO, which was associated with more professionalized and commercial forms of short-term renting. This organizing framework, which combined Baptist and Bootlegger interests under a hybrid "Airbnb Citizen" identity that attempted to obfuscate economically motivated interests, posed challenges in articulating a clear vision for regulation.

Shared Stakes: The Threat of Regulation

By the time the debate over a Los Angeles ordinance emerged, short-term rental platforms and hosts already recognized the common threat that regulation would pose for operating short-term rentals and were politically organizing together in various U.S. municipalities. In 2014, San Francisco, Airbnb's headquarters, and a city that like Los Angeles has high housing costs, was the first major city to pass an ordinance regulating short-term rental platform exchanges. Recognizing the threat that such regulations would pose for their bottom line, Airbnb, with its competitor HomeAway/VRBO, responded with a lawsuit against the city in 2016 (Conger 2016).

The two companies were also involved in several lawsuits against other municipalities, as part of a political strategy for influencing regulations. When Los Angeles's neighboring city Santa Monica banned vacation rentals in 2015, the platforms filed a lawsuit that eventually reached a federal appeals court (Dolan 2019; Nguyen 2019). The two companies were also involved in contentious lawsuits with Boston, Miami, and New York over providing host data to municipal enforcement agencies (Dolan 2019; Martineau 2019b).

However, as Airbnb began preparing for an IPO and faced increased scrutiny of its public image (Griswold 2016), it shifted toward settling these lawsuits, wanting to convey a narrative of cooperation more consistent with its organizational identity (Alba 2017). In 2015, during ballot proposition campaign that would have further restricted San Francisco short-term rentals, Airbnb came under fire for tone-deaf advertisements (Griswold 2015b). Despite this flack, however, the company mobilized public opinion to defeat the proposition, attributing the victory to a middle-class movement of home-sharing supporters (Griswold 2015a). After this success, Airbnb replicated the home-sharing club model of the San Francisco campaign in other cities, including Los Angeles.

Political Strategy and Organization

While the threat of lawsuit loomed in negotiations, Airbnb's approach in Los Angeles largely involved mobilizing hosts and private lobbying efforts at city hall. In 2015, Airbnb launched its 100 Club plan and Airbnb Citizen website, modeling the successes of the San Francisco ballot campaign (van Doorn 2020). In articulating the vision for the clubs, Chris Lehane, Airbnb's head of global policy, framed the clubs as an entirely grassroots movement, likening them to previous labor movements that achieved power and protections for the American middle class (Lehane 2015). Los Angeles was among the select cities where Airbnb planned policy support for its host communities, including training, advice, and policy experts. However, Lehane asserted that these groups would be "independent and free to make their own decisions" (Lehane 2015).

Airbnb also hired several "community organizers," to mobilize hosts in Los Angeles. In 2016, the company hired John Choi, a former labor organizer with connections to city hall,[15] to lead policy efforts in Southern California. These efforts included notifying hosts of public hearings and helping them frame their narratives to policymakers. Commercial hosts were often excluded in order to present "a more benign narrative"(Yates 2021:5). Kathrina Abrot, a former Airbnb organizer in Los Angeles, described her responsibilities, stating, "I didn't do anything. I didn't explain anything. I just provided some of the ... I helped articulate the messaging."[16] Abrot said her role was to help organize hosts so "they would know exactly what to do" and leverage their narratives to resonate with councilmembers. Like Lehane, she emphasized the grassroots nature of this work, reiterating Airbnb's background role.

This background role also included lobbying efforts at city hall and public relations campaigns. During ordinance deliberations, Airbnb's lobbying expenditures reported to the Los Angeles Ethics Commission were a staggering $2.9 million dollars, nearly three times more than the entire incumbent coalition's and ten times more than HomeAway/VRBO's. Most of these expenditures ($1.7 million) were spent on research and advertising. Advertisements often featured a diverse, middle class community of hosts explaining how home-sharing helped them stay economically afloat (Barragan 2016). In 2014, Airbnb also released a preemptive report arguing that it had generated $312 million in revenue for the city, supported 2,600 jobs, reduced energy use, water use, and emissions, and cultivated meaningful social connections (Airbnb 2014). Through this storytelling and research, Airbnb tried to elevate the positive image of home-sharing to policymakers.

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[15] Many interviewees from the incumbent coalition believed Choi "sold out" by joining Airbnb.
[16] Kathrina Abrot, Airbnb, interview, February 8, 2017

At the same time, other short-term rental platforms were more focused on lobbying on behalf of commercial hosts of vacation rentals. The less popular but more veteran HomeAway/VRBO comprised almost entirely of vacation rentals, and thus, were concerned about regulations that would prohibit rentals of entire units. Together with another platform that largely represented commercial hosts, AJJK Inc. (Wheatley 2018), they spent close to half a million dollars on lobbying. Additionally, HomeAway/VRBO underwrote the efforts of the Los Angeles Short-Term Rental Alliance (LASTRA),[17] a group that eventually dissolved before the passage of the ordinance.

This group also represented hosts, but unlike Airbnb's advocacy, more staunchly emphasized commercial host interests. Robert St. Genis, the Executive Director of LASTRA, leveraged its membership to mobilize hosts and operators to show up at council and write letters. He suggested that the critique of short-term rentals was actually a Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) argument, saying that the same people opposing short-term rentals in the name of housing would, hypocritically, also oppose any large-scale housing development.[18] At the time of our interview, he also hoped to work with Airbnb more closely to create a "common and unified voice." However, he noted that Airbnb was concentrating on community organizing efforts, preventing such a coalition.

While Airbnb was working with vacation rental platforms like HomeAway/VRBO on lawsuits throughout the U.S., there was a tension between the two companies, and their hosts, when it came to public advocacy. As Abrot, an Airbnb community organizer, described:[19]

> Their messaging…has nothing to do with community… It's business-minded… [At hearings,] you would have Airbnb hosts, and then you would have these

[17] Robert St. Genis, LASTRA, interview, August 2, 2016
[18] Ibid.
[19] Kathrina Abrot, Airbnb, interview, February 8, 2017

> companies that are representing commercial properties…their messaging would be completely off…that they were stealing units off the market…[Airbnb] always made sure to separate itself from vacation homes.

Airbnb hosts who were active in the home-sharing clubs also distanced themselves, arguing that as "mom and pop" operators, they had nothing in common with commercial operators. Both Airbnb and its hosts worked hard to preserve an image that their community represented hard-working and middle-class microentrepreneurs, as opposed to the few bad actors operating at scale.

In contrast to the incumbent coalition, however, Baptist and Bootleggers did not fully separate their efforts to articulate distinct moral and economic claims. Airbnb could have worked more closely with other platforms, as Bootleggers, devoting their resources to strictly lobbying and emphasizing the lost tax revenues from the proposed legislation, as they had in previous campaigns. This strategy would have allowed their hosts, as Baptists, to advance their own moral argument, emphasizing economic justice, community solidarity, and the arguably NIMBYist approach of their opponents. However, Airbnb instead played a very visible and active role in organizing hosts. The company's approach would eventually backfire with policymakers, who could not justify their moral cause when so closely linked with narrow economic interests.

The Policymaking Process

The two coalitions' efforts converged during policymaking deliberations in Los Angeles from 2015 to 2018. My analysis of public documents, news media, interviews with city officials and neighborhood councils, and public hearings, suggests that policymakers, under pressure to address the city's housing costs and transiency, found the incumbent coalition's arguments more justifiable. As such, they created a policy framework for short-term rentals that reflected mutual housing and neighborhood preservation goals. While the challenging short-term rental coalition did negotiate some lenient restrictions, particularly on a cap that would have affected microentrepreneurial hosts, policymakers often viewed their arguments with more skepticism.

The Policymaking Bureaucracy

In June 2015, Councilmembers Herb Wesson (CD10) and Mike Bonin (CD3) motioned for the city to begin looking into regulating short-term rentals. City officials involved in this first stage credited KNF and Venice residents in prompting the motion with their early campaign against short-term rentals.[20] This motion initiated an extended process that involved several municipal bodies and took over three years to legislate.

The Department of City Planning, with support from the City Attorney's office, Planning Commission, and Office of Budget and Finance, conducted research and drafted the four versions of the ordinance. They also collaborated with CD10 and CD3 staff. These district offices, along with others from highly affected districts, such as West Los Angeles councilman Paul Koretz's CD5, faced intense pressure from constituents about neighborhood transiency and unaffordable housing and generally supported more restrictive regulations. Throughout the policymaking process, councilmembers from these districts often publicly pressed planning staff and the rest of council to move the legislation forward.

The Planning and Land Use Management (PLUM) committee also compelled the Planning department to hold community hearings.[21] These hearings convened citizens in different neighborhoods to speak on the issue of short-term rentals. While the incumbent coalition was well represented at these hearings, especially at meetings where UniteHere! Union members were present, more often, they comprised overwhelmingly of Airbnb hosts, some who

[20] Matthew Glesne, Department of City Planning, interview, January 24, 2019; Anonymous city official, interview, March 18, 2019

[21] Planning and Land Use Committee Meeting, August 25, 2015

attended multiple meetings. A city official present at the listening sessions described their frustration at seeing the same hosts at each, saying “we actually were trying to have the same meeting in different neighborhoods, so you didn’t have to show up to each one… just come to the most convenient one, don’t come say your story three times.”[22] As such, these meetings often lasted for hours, with an overflow room of speakers waiting for their turn.

Los Angeles’s neighborhood councils also provided input. When legislation is under consideration at city hall, neighborhood councils often submit a Community Impact Statement, which outlines a council’s official position. Even though Airbnb mobilized extensively at neighborhood council meetings and councilmembers disagreed about particular regulatory priorities, most neighborhood councils supported either enforcing the existing residential ban on short-term rentals or imposing strict regulations that would curb commercial short-term rentals, with only two Community Impact Statements explicitly taking a pro-market stance. Neighborhood councils, thus, were largely aligned with the incumbent coalition.

Finally, the city’s PLUM and Housing committees held hearings to deliberate the regulations. Like in other hearings, members of both coalitions presented their cases. Several members, including Marqueece Harris-Dawson (Council District 8), Jose Huizar (CD14), Gilbert Cedillo (CD1), and Curren Price (CD9), overlapped on both committees and therefore had a great deal of input. Huizar and PLUM member Mitch Englander (CD12) were distinctly more pro-market in their stances, rumored to be in Airbnb’s pocket, and also under federal investigation for pay-to-play schemes with corporations, some of which involved Airbnb (Alpert Reyes and Zahniser 2019; Denkmann 2020). Other committee members, such as Harris-Dawson, Cedillo, and PLUM member Bob Blumenfield (CD3) appeared more neutral, trying to balance

[22] Anonymous city official, interview, March 18, 2019; field notes (5/21/16)

the concerns of "mom and pop" hosts with concerns about neighborhood quality and housing stock.

Policymaking Priorities

These governance units agreed that the current city code on short-term rentals was unenforceable given the rampant growth of platform technologies like Airbnb. The code at the time outlined short-term rentals as an illegal residential use but did not specify ways for collecting adequate evidence to prosecute such cases. Committee members and Planning staff discussed how current regulations had "no teeth, or no legal basis, by which to bring [short-term rental operators] into compliance" and that all the city could with a violation was to "make a suggestion that they stop."[23] In particular, the city could not prosecute operators who converted multi-family units for illegal short-term rental use and thus degraded the long-term housing stock. Policymakers wanted to be able to create a "balanced" ordinance with enforcement mechanisms to prosecute commercial short-term rental operation while also allowing residents to host on a limited scale. They generally agreed that the first priority was protecting valuable housing stock, an issue that the Planning department also took an especially "strong" position on.[24]

Matthew Glesne, the primary planner on the project, emphasized that the department was in fact wedded to this priority, as outlined in the general plan for the city. Glesne described how the city's general plan dictated policy priorities such as protecting the long-term housing stock, conserving single-family neighborhoods, and preventing commercial use in residential areas and gave them a "strong policy rationale to be skeptical" of short-term rental use.[25] However,

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[23] Housing Committee Meeting, September 2, 2015
[24] Ibid.
[25] Matthew Glesne, Department of City Planning, interview, January 24, 2019

Planning also believed these priorities still allowed some leniency for hosts wanting to rent a spare room and earn extra money.

With these goals and Council's direction, Planning created a regulatory framework that persisted throughout the policymaking process. Initially, they were tasked to investigate: 1) a primary residence requirement, permitting short-term use only in residences for which the host could prove they lived there at least six months a year, 2) a prohibition on short-term rental use in units under the Rent-Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) and other affordable housing initiatives, and 3) a restriction on converting residential properties into "Transient Occupancy Residential Structures" (TORS) or de facto hotels. Later, Council also asked them to explore a cap on the total number of days, modeled after San Francisco's ordinance.[26] Additionally, the Planning Commission advised Planning to include a requirement that platforms remove illegal listings and share their data with the city, to help the department with enforcement.[27] While policymakers adjusted these measures' particularities under pressure from outside stakeholders, the core of the ordinance remained.[28]

Shared Visions for the City: Coalitions' Influence on the Final Policy

The ordinance's framework closely resembled the measures favored by the incumbent coalition and neighborhood councils. These groups largely opposed commercial operation, and with exception of a few vocal residents and neighborhood councils who wanted bans on all types, were open to home-sharing on a limited scale. Many incumbent groups like KNF would have preferred a 90-day cap on hosting, instead of the 120-day cap that passed, but were generally pleased that planners had aligned the policy with KNF's recommendations on the

[26] Ibid.
[27] David Ambroz, Los Angeles Planning Commission, interview, July 3, 2019
[28] Matthew Glesne, Department of City Planning, interview, January 24, 2019

primary residence requirement, the RSO restriction, and enforcement through platform accountability.[29]

A city official described how KNF influenced the ordinance by raising "some really legitimate issues about what is a neighborhood for, what are we trying to accommodate?." Repeating KNF's campaign video slogan, this official demonstrated policymakers' aligned interest in preserving neighborhood quality, stating "we wanted to really continue that community centric vibe…people talk about 'where have all the neighbors gone,' so that was an issue that sparked concern."[30] Incumbent influence was also indicated in Planning staff's reports, which drew on findings reported by LAANE in making recommendations. Many of the incumbents' policy priorities, then, were reflected in the final ordinance.

The challenging short-term rental coalition, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to two regulations in the passed ordinance: the primary residence requirement and mechanisms requiring platform involvement in enforcement. While Airbnb representatives appeared disinterested in public hearings and followed the lead of hosts, in private meetings with policymakers, Airbnb and HomeAway/VRBO aggressively argued against these measures.[31] However, for policymakers, these two measures were non-negotiable, and platforms did not provide a justification for removing these measures that resonated. In the Planning department's view, both platforms and hosts were understood to represent "economic interests," and thus their arguments were taken with, as Glesne described, "a grain of salt." He also mentioned how they were skeptical of such arguments because they did not see any "average citizens coming out and

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[29] Judy Goldman, KNF, interview, August 19, 2016; Roy Samaan, LAANE, interview, December 20, 2016; Rachel Torres, UniteHere!, interview, December 20, 2016.
[30] Anonymous city official, interview, March 18, 2019
[31] Department of City Planning Report Back, November 28, 2018

saying, 'you know I don't do Airbnb, but I think it should be widespread and legal for everybody.'"[32]

However, policymakers were flexible with the challenging short-term rental coalition on the number of days one could host. In late discussions on the proposed ordinance, councilmembers appeared to be swayed by hosts arguing that instituting a cap would limit their ability to stay afloat economically. [33] A housing group representative from the incumbent coalition noted the "overwhelming" efficacy of the "mom and pop" with councilmembers and some waning enthusiasm for the ordinance among councilmembers.[34] In a signal of this shift, Bob Blumenfield, David Ryu, and Paul Koretz introduced a motion to consider opportunities that would extend the cap to select hosts.[35] Primary residency was required and the default cap on hosting would be 120 days, however, hosts who underwent an extensive application process could qualify for an "extended home-sharing" permit for 365 days a year. Glesne noted that the Planning staff was not "thrilled" with the motion, insinuating that it was a pattern of council whimsically "doing things" to appease constituents.[36]

The final ordinance passed in December 2018 included this extension option, along with late additions that were favorable to the incumbent coalition. These included a prohibition on renting accessory dwelling units built after 2017, to prevent other potential long-term housing's conversion for short-term rental use, as well as fire and event restrictions to clamp down on "party houses." The final ordinance was passed unanimously.[37] In passing the legislation,

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[32] Matthew Glesne, Department of City Planning, interview, January 24, 2019
[33] Field notes, Los Angeles PLUM, Housing and City Council meetings, February 6, 2018 to May 2, 2018
[34] Becky Denison, Venice Community Housing, interview, February 9, 2018
[35] Field notes, Los Angeles City Council meeting, May 2, 2018
[36] Matthew Glesne, Department of City Planning, interview, January 24, 2019
[37] Analysis of City Council votes from 2015 to 2018 indicates very little council dissent. Less than 1% of council action items (179/20,552) from 2015 to 2018 had at least one "no" vote.

Council agreed that while imperfect, the ordinance worked to reconcile many of the voices involved.[38]

The passed ordinance, then, largely reflected the incumbent coalition's goals. Already receptive to the interests of homeowners, labor, and hotels (Whittemore 2012), policymakers echoed these groups' arguments about the effect of short-term rentals on local housing stock and neighborhoods in creating a short-term rental policy that cracked down on commercial operation. The challenging short-term rental coalition had some influence in the later stages of the policymaking process when they emphasized the struggles of "mom and pops." However, policymakers often responded to the challenging coalition's arguments with skepticism, perceiving hosts and platforms' motives as strictly economic.

Discussion

The case of short-term rental regulation in Los Angeles demonstrates how Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions can have varying levels success based on how they organize vis-à-vis policymakers' goals. The emergence of Airbnb and short-term rental technologies in the 2000s brought about a rapid influx of new short-term rental listings to the area. As a result of these developments, two Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions formed, an incumbent coalition of hotel, housing, and neighborhood advocates and a challenging short-term rental coalition of hosts and platforms. However, both coalitions were not equally successful. I argue that while the incumbent coalition leveraged its moral and institutional authenticity to propose solutions that emphasized shared goals with policymakers, the challenging coalition struggled with problems of hybridity (Hunter et al. 2018; Levitsky 2007; Pierre 2014; Walker and Stepick 2020).

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[38] Field notes, Los Angeles City Council meeting, December 11, 2018

The Baptists in the incumbent coalition, including neighborhood, housing, and labor groups, effectively connected short-term rentals to the city's problems with housing, homelessness, neighborhood transiency. They argued that commercial operations were diminishing the city's valuable housing stock, leading to residential displacement and fractured neighborhood character. Furthermore, they highlighted the disruption and danger of "party houses" and illegal hotels in residential neighborhoods. The coalition's Bootleggers, hotels, recognized the value in having their housing and neighborhood partners make this moral argument, and provided background support with lobbyists and lawyers. Through this arms-length framework, the Baptists in the coalition were disconnected from the narrow economic interests of Bootleggers, allowing them "moral authenticity" (Carroll and Wheaton 2009) with policymakers.

Beyond claims-making, the incumbent coalition's clear division of labor also leveraged each organization's individual strengths. Each coalition member had a distinct role and purpose: mobilizing (e.g., housing and neighborhood groups), lobbying (e.g., hotels), research (e.g., LAANE), or brokerage and coalition-building (e.g., UniteHere!). With the exception of KNF, a new organization specifically organized around the short-term rental issue, these organizations had previous relationships with city policymakers on housing and development issues. This history and division of labor allowed the coalition "institutional authenticity," with policymakers' recognizing each group's policy domain (Levitsky 2007; Walker and Stepick 2020). With this strategy, the incumbent coalition effectively aligned their goals with policymakers' own priorities.

In contrast, the challenging short-term rental coalition's organizational strategy created difficulties. The two competing platforms, HomeAway/VRBO and Airbnb, while previously collaborative in other cities, did not work together in Los Angeles as Bootleggers to put political pressure on policymakers about lost tax revenue. Instead, each company decided to use their platforms' technologies and organizational identities to coordinate mobilization among their hosts (HomeAway through LASTRA and Airbnb through the home-sharing clubs). However, this active role in organizing made it hard for policymaking audiences to dissociate the coalition's moral arguments about middle class mobility and community solidarity from elite economic motives. The hybrid organizational identity, lacking both moral and institutional authenticity, drew confusion and skepticism from policymaking audiences (Kovács and Hannan 2010; Walker and Stepick 2020; Zuckerman 1999), who were looking for input from "average citizens."[39]

The challenging coalition's political strategy, then, on the one hand, fragmented what could have been a powerful coalition of elites, and, on the other hand, conflated interests and expertise in way that made both platforms and hosts less efficacious overall. Neither company posed solutions for the top concern of policymakers: the possible effect of short-term rentals on long-term housing stock. Airbnb sidelined the issue by touting its "grassroots" operation,[40] an approach that often yields the opposite result: appearing inauthentic and calculated (Walker and Stepick 2020). A more cohesive strategy among the platforms that more explicitly acknowledged and separated their economic stakes, such as that adopted by the hotel lobby, could have been more convincing among policymakers who were looking for housing solutions and were skeptical of such populist narratives.

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[39] Matthew Glesne, Department of City Planning, interview, January 24, 2019
[40]Kathrina Abrot, Airbnb Community Organizer, interview, February 8, 2017

Similarly, while the home-sharing clubs were effective in mobilizing hosts and sensitizing them to the political process, policymakers did not consider them as seriously because of their connections with big business (Yates 2021). Host narratives were received with a "grain of salt,"[41] even when many, like their competing counterparts, struggle with the city's high cost of living. As such, these hosts won an extension on the cap but lost on the RSO restriction that would have allowed more "mom and pop"-style rentals.

Thus, even though the challenging coalition devoted significant resources, policymakers ultimately crafted an ordinance reflecting their shared vision with the incumbent coalition (Besek 2020; Hunter et al. 2018). The housing crisis, as well as policies on housing and land use that had already been passed, directed policymakers' agendas to preserve Los Angeles's already precious stock of affordable housing. This context provided an opportunity for groups with already established political power in Los Angeles (Whittemore 2012) to make a case about short-term rentals that was politically popular for councilmembers. While the challenging coalition had small achievements, their less established and coordinated political alliance did not achieve enough moral and institutional authenticity for policymakers to scale back the ordinance's most severe restrictions.

Conclusion

This chapter thus demonstrates how the social organization of short-term rental markets in the platform economy have consequence for urban political organization and policymaking. As described in earlier chapters, both microentrepreneurial and large-scale short-term rentals became highly popular in marketplaces with high housing costs like Los Angeles, with hosts seeking supplemental income or a way to capitalize on vacancies. Crowdsourcing both users and

[41] Matthew Glesne, Department of City Planning, interview, January 24, 2019

homes, platform technologies like Airbnb grouped the distinct motivations and scales of operation (more intimate and social vs. more accumulative and capital intensive) of these two segments and in doing so, came to be seen as threat to local resources (i.e., housing supply, travel consumers) in the housing market and accommodation industry. As this chapter discussed, two Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions emerged as a result of these dynamics: a challenging coalition of hosts and platforms with a stake in the growth of these new short-term rental markets and an incumbent coalition of neighborhood, housing, labor, and hotel stakeholders seeking to preserve their resources and interests.

The comparative analysis illustrates both the benefits and costs of these coalitions (Murphy et al. 2022). Had the challenging coalition engaged in a strategy similar to incumbents—dividing the political advocacy based on their distinct interests and expertise, with microentrepreneurial hosts organizing separately to make the case about their housing and economic struggles—they may have gained more institutional and moral authenticity with policymakers and secured a more favorable policy. However, instead, the challenging coalition lacked clear organizational boundaries and a coordinated strategy and therefore confused policymaking audiences, who could not discern the interests of the Baptists (microentrepreneurial hosts) from the Bootleggers (large-scale hosts and the platforms) and devise policies accordingly. The broader consequences of this strategy, which was replicated across various local municipalities in the U.S., will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5. THE LOCAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CONTEMPORARY SHORT-TERM RENTAL MARKETS: POLICYMAKING CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES

While, as Chapter 4 indicated, Los Angeles was an early hotbed for political activism around contemporary short-term rental markets, it was part of a broader movement among U.S. municipalities to introduce and update legislation regulating short-term rental markets. By 2015, Airbnb, in anticipation of these regulatory challenges, had created the broader Airbnb Citizen initiative to recruit and groom hosts for political advocacy across various municipalities in the U.S. and worldwide (Yates 2021). Similarly, around 2013 and 2014, the American Hotel and Lodging Association began "ramping up" their engagement in policy debates, concentrating their advocacy efforts and partnering with labor, housing, and neighborhood groups in cities where short-term rentals were extremely popular and threatening.[42] The emergence of an incumbent coalition of hotels and civic groups and a challenging coalition were, then, not singular to the Los Angeles case, but rather part of a nationwide political strategy.

In Chapter 4, I suggested that efficacy of these two Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions in achieving their policy goals were dependent on how they organized their efforts in relation to the policy context. That is, both incumbent and challenging coalitions must identify receptive policy contexts and mobilize key resources and allies accordingly (Evans and Kay 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Ingram and Rao 2004; Kluttz 2019; Vasi et al. 2015). In Los Angeles, the incumbent coalition proved to be successful than the challenging coalition in achieving their agenda, as their political strategy had more moral and institutional authenticity with policymakers. This chapter extends this analysis to ask: what were the outcomes of each coalition's political organization and strategy across various policy contexts? What

[42] Troy Flanagan, American Hotel and Lodging Association, interview, November 14, 2019

consequences, if any, did challengers and incumbents have for the local institutionalization of contemporary short-term rental markets?

Using logistic regression and QCA, I examine a subset of principal cities of the 277 metropolitan areas in my sample to identify correlates with the enactment of short-term rental market regulation and the factors that result in policies that severely restrict short-term rental practices. I find that the most restrictive policies were enacted in a conducive policy context—i.e., one that was housing-cost burdened, progressive, and had a large short-term rental market—with the incumbent coalition present. Less restrictive regulations were more common in contexts that were not as progressive, were lacking a large short-term rental market, and did not have some form of incumbent mobilization. The challenging coalition did not appear to be extremely consequential for either outcome, suggesting that the problems miring this Baptist-Bootlegger coalition in the Los Angeles case may have been more widespread.

This chapter, then, together with the previous chapters, demonstrates how the early formation of markets can shape their path to institutionalization. The previous chapters showed how contemporary short-term rental markets relied on housing units in strained housing markets and as they became popular and disruptive, invited contention from neighborhood, housing, labor, and hotel advocates. These markets, in both the development of the platform and political advocacy, also depended on organizational schema that combined "home-sharing" and more transactional exchanges. In this chapter, I show how these forms of market and political organization created policymaking contexts and mobilization strategies that were ultimately more favorable to the policy demands of the incumbent coalition.

Analytic Approach

This analysis draws on the tools of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine regulatory outcomes across various U.S. municipalities. QCA combines the rigors of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, with attention to both the complexity of individual cases and formal techniques that identify "conditions" that may lead to a specified outcome (Ragin 1987). Based on Boolean algebra, these methods create parsimonious formulas that identify key regularities present in all cases with the same outcome (i.e., "necessary conditions") and additional conditions that, when present, also produce the outcome (i.e., "sufficient conditions") (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). A distinctive feature of QCA is its focus on equifinality or the acknowledgment that multiple configurations of conditions can produce the same outcome.

To reduce complexity, this analysis uses crisp-set QCA (cs/QCA), which treats conditions and outcomes as binary values indicating their presence or absence. Calibrating variables into binary values should be done transparently and using substantive and theoretical knowledge to identify cutoffs (Rubinson et al. 2019; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). These calibration techniques result in a raw dataset (see Table S 1in Appendix D), with each case corresponding to a select number of conditions that are present or absent and an outcome.

From this raw dataset, the QCA software (fs/QCA) produces a truth table (see Table S 2 in Appendix D), demonstrating the multiple configurations that lead to the presence or absence of the outcome. Coverage and consistency scores are also generated, indicating the proportion of cases covered by a given configuration or solution (coverage) and the proportion of cases covered by a solution that share the same outcome (consistency) (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Finally, using Boolean minimization procedures (i.e., Quine-McCluskey algorithm), the QCA software produces a parsimonious solution, which is a superset of the more complex solutions displayed in the truth table (Ragin 2017).

In this chapter, I also use logistic regression and qualitative description of the cases to complement the QCA. In contrast to QCA, these techniques are used to further contextualize and characterize the policy outcomes, rather than identify any causal conditions. For example, I use logistic regression to identify the characteristics of municipalities that passed any form of short-term regulation as a setup to the QCA, which compares specific types of regulations among those cities that passed regulations. Furthermore, QCA demands a deep knowledge of each case in interpreting results (Ragin 1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2009); to aid in this interpretive endeavor, I thus draw on exploration of media coverage and historical accounts of local political mobilization and policymaking to describe and highlight particular cases that can speak to certain patterns in the QCA results.

Data Collection and Sampling Strategy

The sampling procedure used for the analyses in this chapter are based on the sample of 277 metropolitan areas from Chapter 3. However, because metropolitan areas do not typically correspond with the jurisdictions of local governments, they are not appropriate as a unit of analysis for a study of short-term rental market regulations. Therefore, I selected the principal (or largest) city of each metropolitan area in this sample, which do indeed correspond to municipal government territories. This sampling strategy allowed me to utilize the Airbnb data web-scraped for Chapter 3 as a dimension to be examined in policy outcomes.

I then conducted a keyword search of the municipal websites for all 277 principal cities in this sample. All 277 cities had websites with searchable municipal code, often hosted by platforms such as Municode or American Legal Publishing, which codify ordinances into a searchable format. Using Google's site search function, I searched each municipal government's URL and the following terms: "short term rentals," "short term rental," "short-term rental," "short-term rentals," "Airbnb," "HomeAway," "Vrbo," "vacation rentals" and "vacation rental." I identified 82 cities that passed ordinances on short-term rentals from 2009 to 2020. I chose 2009 as the start of the observation period, since ordinances passed prior to this year were likely not in response to the emergence of platform-facilitated short-term rental markets (since Airbnb was founded in the fall of 2008).

For QCA, the sample was further reduced when incorporating data on conditions, particularly those related to each coalition's political organization and strategies. These data were extracted from Newsbank's local newspaper database (more details in the Conditions section below), which had archives of the dominant local newspaper for 44 municipalities, and ProQuest's database, which had local coverage for Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington D.C., and New York in the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and New York Times. While most major cities (populations over 500,000) are included in this reduced sample, three major cities – Nashville, TN, Louisville, KY, and Memphis, TN – are missing. The final sample used for QCA, thus, represents cities that passed ordinances on short-term rentals from 2009 to 2020 and that have a local major newspaper archived in Newsbank and ProQuest's databases.

Outcomes: Passage of an Ordinance and Regulations Restricting Short-Term Rental Use (RESTRICTIVE)

Prior to 2009, short-term rental practices (defined here as housing rentals for less than 30 days) were largely illegal for residents in most cities. Zoning requirements prohibited such activities in residential areas or required special business licenses subject to extensive review. However, by 2020 existing municipal ordinances on short-term rentals, without any additional policy mechanisms, were outdated and unenforceable, given that platform technologies marketed and facilitated short-term rentals as a commonplace practice even in cities where they were illegal. Cities that did not institute new regulations in this time period were effectively acknowledging that short-term rentals did not pose an immediate policy problem and were, either implicitly or explicitly, allowing their use. Cities that did enact regulations during this time period were changing laws to legitimize and allow widespread short-term rental use or attempting to create policy mechanisms that restricted the practice. In line with this context, this chapter analyzes two types of policy outcomes: 1) through logistic regression, whether or not the municipal government in the principal city enacted a short-term rental ordinance anytime between 2009 and 2020 and 2) through QCA, for those municipalities that did enact an ordinance, whether or not they passed regulations severely restricting short-term rental use.

To construct these outcomes, I read through each ordinance collected from municipal websites in the sample and designed a coding scheme that captured different dimensions of short-term rental market regulation, such as regulations relating to registration, taxation, short-term rental scale, host requirements, parking restrictions, and platform accountability (see codebook in Appendix E). With the assistance of two graduate students at UCLA, we coded each ordinance in the dataset for these various regulations. I assigned each coder the entire set of ordinances to code and then arbitrated over any differences in the coding results. Then, using my case knowledge of the Los Angeles short-term rental ordinance and examining the entire dataset comparatively, I identified those regulations that appeared to me to be most restrictive for short-term rental hosts and platforms like Airbnb and Vrbo.

Among all regulations accounted for in the dataset, I identified two types of regulations that were restrictive for all stakeholders in the short-term rental coalition (microentrepreneurial hosts, large-scale hosts, and platforms): 1) those regulations that restricted how many listings a host could operate[43] and 2) those regulations that restricted the number of days a listing could be booked per year.[44] The former set of regulations were particularly designed to address large-scale operation of short-term rentals, restricting the number of listings per host to a maximum of one listing. The latter set of regulations, with the former set, were designed to limit short-term rental use overall, including for those more microentrepreneurial hosts. Both sets of regulations are impactful for short-term rental platforms because, if appropriately enforced, they limit the number of bookings, and thus, revenues, a platform can generate from each listing. Among the 48 cities in the dataset, 15 cities passed ordinances that included these two types of regulations.

Within each policy scheme in the dataset, there was further variation that could have been understood as more or less restrictive and potentially warrants future analyses. For example, among the 15 cities with more restrictive regulations, all but five (Boulder, CO, Portland, OR, Charlottesville, VA, Madison, WI, and San Jose, CA) also included regulations whereby platforms were accountable in sharing data or enforcing and tracking policy violations. All but three (San Francisco, CA, Boulder, CA and Baltimore, MD) included provisions about parking, events, guest maximums, etc. that made hosts more accountable to their neighbors. Among the entire sample of ordinances, two—for Raleigh, NC and San Luis Obispo, CA—required the host to be present in the unit, allowing only for true "homestays." However, for the purposes of the research questions and a sizeable sample that could demonstrate some discernable patterns, I focused on regulations that directly limited short-term rental exchanges (i.e., listings and bookings) and thus had the most consequence for hosts and the platforms.

[43] This set is characterized by ordinances that, according to the codebook in Appendix E, were coded "1" for eu_primary_resident, p_primary_resident, eu_no_listings_max, or p_no_listings_max.
[44] This set is characterized by ordinances that, according the codebook in Appendix E, were coded "1" for eu_cap or p_cap.

In running the QCA, there was also one city, New York, that shared similar conditions to other cities but did not have the specific regulations limiting scale and bookings identified above, and thus produced contradictory rows in the truth table. Contradictory rows in QCA should be resolved by changing the case selection, adding conditions, or reconceptualizing the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). In the case of New York, policymakers passed an ordinance in 2018 that would allow regulators to collect Airbnb's data. However, unlike other cities that passed similar ordinances (without the more restrictive short-term regulations defined above), New York City was also trying to enforce a statewide law that prohibited the short-term rental of entire units in multifamily properties entirely (Greenberg 2018). Given these municipal policymakers' staunch and oppositional efforts to limit short-term rental use as a practice—which was projected to remove as many of 50,000 units off the market (Greenberg 2018)—I reconceptualized the outcome to include such cases. However, New York was also the only case identified with a nonrestrictive outcome in which policymakers were so clearly attempting to restrict the number of listings and bookings, so it was the only case with a changed outcome in the raw data table.

Conditions

The QCA approach advises selecting a limited number of conditions—typically between four and seven for intermediate analyses with an *n* of 10 to 40 cases—to reduce contradictions and complexity in the results(Fainshmidt et al. 2020; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). In line with this approach, I test seven conditions in my analyses that, as anticipated by the theory (e.g., Evans and Kay 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Ingram and Rao 2004; Kluttz 2019; Vasi et al. 2015), relate to local policy context and political mobilization within each case. In this section, I describe the procedures used to calibrate the measures for each condition and list an abbreviation (in parenthesis) that is used in the QCA solutions presented in the results.

Policy Context: Housing-Cost Burdened (HOUSING). I anticipate that short-term rental policies will be more restrictive in contexts where residents are facing expensive housing costs. In such contexts, policymakers and publics will view short-term rental markets as an additional strain on housing stock (see Chapters 1 and 4). To measure whether residents in a principal city are housing-cost burdened, I draw on the variable median gross rent as a percentage of household income from the 2011-2015 American Community Survey (ACS). A commonly used benchmark to assess rent burdens is 30 percent of one's income, which has origins in federal housing programs. While this cutoff is not a perfect measure for assessing housing affordability, it is still considered reliable over time and when comparing various housing markets (Herbert, Hermann, and McCue 2018; Pelletiere 2008). Using the median gross rent as a percentage of household income variable, I calibrated those cases with a median percentage of more than 30 as housing-cost burdened.

In constructing the QCA truth table, however, I noticed that this condition produced a contradictory row in which three cases with the same conditions—Washington, DC, Denver, CO, and San Francisco, CA—had different outcomes. A main difference between the two cities with the same outcome (Washington, DC and San Francisco, CA) and Denver, CO, which had a different policy outcome, is that the former two cities are often recognized for their high cost of housing and housing shortages; even though there may be higher incomes in these cities (and thus have a lower income-to-rent burden), local policymakers often still recognize housing as a distinct policy problem (Baranski 2019; Schuetz 2020; Schweitzer 2020). Thus, to resolve this contradiction and account for this difference, I added another cutoff point to the housing-cost burden condition: those cities that have median gross rents (based on the 2011-2015 ACS) that are higher than \$1300. Examining the clustering of median rents across all cities in the sample, this seemed to be an appropriate cutoff point and thus included Washington, DC and San Francisco, CA as housing-cost burdened. Cities that had a median gross rent as a percentage of household income that was greater than 30% or median gross rents over \$1300, then, were also coded as housing-cost burdened (HOUSING=1).

<u>Policy Context: Progressive (PROGRESSIVE)</u>. Another policy context condition that I expect to be consequential for short-term rental market regulation outcomes is each city's ideological tendencies. While I did not find a systematic way to capture this across all cities, I use voting behavior as a proxy. While still fairly neoliberal and subject to capitalist influence, the Democratic Party, in contrast to the Republican Party, in the United States is typically associated with labor movement politics, more progressive social policies, and more restrictive market regulations (Heimlich 2012; Skocpol 1995). I would expect Democratic-leaning policy contexts, then, to favor more restrictive short-term rental policies. To capture this, I used county voting behavior from the MIT Election Data Lab (Anon 2018). Examining the clustering of percentage of votes for Barack Obama (Democrat) in 2008 across all principal cities' counties, I chose over 65% as the threshold that proxied more progressive policy contexts; if a city was located in a county where more than 65% of the 2008 presidential votes were for Obama, it was coded as progressive (PROGRESSIVE=1).

<u>Policy Context: Large Short-Term Rental Market (LISTINGDENSE)</u>. The final policy context condition that I examine is whether or not the city has a large short-term rental market relative to its population. I would anticipate that in cities where there are more listings per capita, the short-term rental market is more disruptive to local neighborhoods and residents, and likely

to generate backlash that is encouraging of regulatory policy. Or a large short-term rental market might create pressure for policymakers to legitimize these practices in order to further allow them to flourish and collect taxes on any revenues. Examining the listings per 10,000 residents across all principal cities, the least listing-dense cities appeared to be clustered below 20 listings per 10,000 residents. I, thus, chose this threshold to measure whether or not a city has a large short-term rental market.

The QCA also aims to test the efficacy of each Baptist-Bootlegger coalition in shaping municipal short-term rental policies. Using Newsbank and ProQuest, I collected articles from the archives of each local newspaper that was available for the principal cities in my sample. I did a keyword search that restricted results to articles that mentioned “Airbnb” and words containing “rule,” regulat,” “restrict,” “ordinance,” “policy,” “bill,” or “council.” This resulted in a dataset of 1,079 articles, which I coded for coalition mobilization activity. Articles that appeared after the passage of a city’s ordinance were removed from the dataset. From this coding, I then generated the following conditions for the QCA:

<u>Challenging Bootlegger Mobilization: Airbnb (CBOOTLEGGER)</u>. To measure whether or not a city had any Bootlegger presence from the challenging short-term rental coalition (i.e., Airbnb), I drew from local newspaper articles that were flagged for describing Airbnb policy efforts in relation to short-term rental regulatory debates. These efforts could include lobbying, lawsuits, ad campaigns, local research reports, and court cases. Any mention of Airbnb’s tax collection agreements with cities did not count as political strategy as this eventually became a widespread practice for the platform. If there was at least one article describing Airbnb’s policy efforts in a city, the city was coded as having Challenging Bootlegger mobilization present (CBOOTLEGGER=1).

Challenging Baptist Mobilization: Airbnb Hosts (CBAPTIST). To measure whether or not a city had any Baptist presence from the challenging short-term rental coalition (i.e., hosts), I used two data sources: local newspaper articles that described Airbnb host mobilization and a report of Airbnb's inaugural hundred clubs produced in 2016 (Airbnb 2016). If a city had at least one local newspaper report of Airbnb hosts organizing in public spaces in relation to short-term rental regulatory debates or if they were in the list of cities in which Airbnb organized an early hundred club, they were coded as having Challenging Baptist mobilization present (CBAPTIST=1).

Incumbent Bootlegger Mobilization: Hotels (IBOOTLEGGER). To capture whether or not a city had any Bootlegger presence from the incumbent coalition (i.e., hotels), I drew from local newspaper reports that mentioned hotels' local policy efforts in relation to short-term rental regulatory debates. These efforts could include lobbying, lawsuits, ad campaigns, local research reports, and court cases. If there was at least one article describing hotels' policy efforts in a city, the city was coded as having Incumbent Bootlegger mobilization present (IBOOTLEGGER=1).

Incumbent Baptist Mobilization: Labor, Housing, or Neighborhood Groups (IBAPTIST). To measure whether or not a city had any Baptist presence from the incumbent coalition, I drew from local newspaper reports that mentioned housing, neighborhood, and labor advocates organizing in public spaces in relation to short-term rental regulatory debates. If there was at least one article describing one of these policy efforts, the city was coded as having Incumbent Baptist mobilization present (IBAPTIST=1).

Limitations of the Dataset and Analyses

These analyses have a number of limitations due to dynamics not captured by the data and the selection of QCA as the primary method. First, while newspaper data is well-established as a source for monitoring and tracking political mobilization and I tried several keyword search formats to maximize results reporting such mobilization, political activity from either coalition could have been censored through either a newspaper's failure to report on this activity or through my collection methods (e.g., the search keywords used) (Earl et al. 2004). This is particularly true for private lobbying tactics and more inconspicuous forms of political mobilization, which are more difficult to universally track across all municipalities. For more public mobilization efforts, I tried to account for these potential oversights by including other data (e.g., the hundred club report for CBAPTIST) but for most coalition members, could not find more systematic data than newspapers.

Additionally, as is typical with more meso- and macro-level cases in QCA and a higher number of selected conditions, the sample produces a number of logical remainders, or possible configurations that are not observed in the data (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Because there are seven identified conditions, that means there are 2^7, or 128, possible combinations of conditions; however, only 30 combinations are represented by the data (see Table S 2 in Appendix D). To account for these logical remainders, I present the parsimonious formulas produced by the QCA in the appendix (see Table S 3 and Table S 5 in Appendix F), which, using logical remainders in minimizing the formula, expresses observed cases as part of a "broader zone" that includes unobserved cases (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). However, I focus on the intermediate solution and present the more complex formulas (see Table S 4and Table S 6 in Appendix F), as the parsimonious formulas, in their calculation, make assumptions that certain unobserved combinations will have particular outcomes and may overlook more robust sufficient solutions in favor of parsimony (Dușa 2019; Rihoux and Ragin 2009).

In using QCA, I also had to limit the number of conditions analyzed, precluding other potential conditions that could have contributed to the outcome. For example, to reduce complexity and the number of potential contradictions, I excluded more peripheral challengers and incumbents and unaffiliated actors from the analysis. On the challenging side, I only focused on Airbnb's coalition strategy, excluding the participation of other types of short-term rental actors. On the incumbent side, I combined any presence of neighborhood, labor, or housing mobilization into a broad "incumbent Baptist" coalition. Such decisions were consistent with what I knew about the cases, and my observations in the LA case, however, as a result, some political strategies that carried consequences may have been overlooked.

Similarly, the QCA does not account for more temporal conditions, having to do with policy diffusion and isomorphism (Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). That is, I do not account for the normative, mimetic, or coercive effects that other short-term rental policies—at the city, county, or state level—may have had on the policymaking processes in each case. Generally, temporality can be an oversight of QCA and while there are recently devised techniques for addressing such issues, such research questions are beyond the scope of this study (Caren and Panofsky 2005; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). This analysis instead treats the data cross-sectionally, in an effort to focus on effects political mobilization may have in various policymaking contexts.

Results

I first present results for a preliminary logistic regression regressing the passage of any short-term rental ordinance during the observation period on several municipal variables used to calibrate the conditions in the QCA. The model is presented in Table 6, which includes the variables total population (logged for skewness), Airbnb listings per 10,000 residents (logged for skewness), median rent as a percentage of income, median rent, and percentage of 2008

Table 6. Odds ratios for logistic regression of passage of a short-term rental ordinance on principal city characteristics (N=277)

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio
Total Population, ln	1.74**
	(0.29)
Listings per 10,000 residents, ln	2.08***
	(0.32)
Median rent as a percentage of income	0.93
	(0.04)
Median rent	1.00
	(0.00)
Percentage of 2008 votes for Barack Obama	0.99
	(0.01)
Constant	0.00**
	(0.00)

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†<.10, **p*<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test)

presidential votes for Barack Obama. As can be seen in the table, only two coefficients, that for total population and that for listing density, are significant at the 0.05 level.

Total population has a significant positive relationship ($p<0.01$) with the odds that a municipality passed any kind of short-term rental ordinance between 2009 and 2020. For each one unit increase in the natural log of total population, a municipality's odds of passing an ordinance are 74% more likely. Listing density also has a significant positive relationship ($p<0.001$) with the passage of an ordinance. For each unit increase in the natural log of Airbnb listings per 10,000 residents, a city is more than twice as likely to pass an ordinance. Median rent as a percentage of income, median rent, and percentage of 2008 votes for Barack Obama have no significant relationship with the likelihood of passing an ordinance.

Necessary Conditions

In this section, I discuss the conditions that are necessary for a municipality to adopt or

Table 7. Analysis of Necessary Conditions for Restrictive Regulations on Short-Term Rental Use (RESTRICTIVE)

	Restrictive		~Restrictive	
Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
housing	0.94	0.44	0.59	0.56
~housing	0.06	0.07	0.41	0.93
progressive	0.88	0.82	0.09	0.18
~progressive	0.13	0.06	0.91	0.94
listingdense	0.81	0.62	0.25	0.38
~listingdense	0.19	0.11	0.75	0.89
cbootlegger	0.69	0.50	0.34	0.50
~cbootlegger	0.31	0.19	0.66	0.81
cbaptist	0.75	0.41	0.53	0.59
~cbaptist	0.25	0.21	0.47	0.79
ibootlegger	0.50	0.62	0.16	0.38
~ibootlegger	0.50	0.23	0.84	0.77
ibaptist	0.56	0.47	0.31	0.53
~ibaptist	0.44	0.24	0.69	0.76

Notes: housing=housing-cost burdened; progressive=progressive; listingdense=large short-term rental market; cbootlegger=challenging bootlegger mobilization; cbaptist=challenging baptist mobilization; ibootlegger=incumbent bootlegger mobilization; ibaptist=incumbent baptist mobilization

not adopt regulations severely restricting short-term rental use, according to the QCA. Necessary conditions are indicated by high consistency scores; these scores estimate the proportion of cases that share that condition and a given outcome (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). If that score is high, it suggests that the condition is necessary for the outcome in nearly all cases.

Table 7 presents the consistency scores for the presence and absence (indicated by ~) of each condition, as it relates to the presence and absence (indicated by ~) of the restrictive regulations outcome. In those cases where restrictive regulations are present, nearly all municipalities (0.94) are housing-cost burdened. Progressive and listing-dense cities also have high consistency with restrictive regulations, however, not as high as the housing-cost condition.

The inverse is not true for the absence of restrictive regulations, however, except for the progressive condition. That is, the absence of the housing-cost burden condition (~housing) does not have a high consistency score (0.41) in cases with an absence of restrictive regulations (~restrictive). While the absence of the listing-dense condition (~listingdense) does have a higher score (0.75), it is not as high it is for the inverse condition and outcome (0.81). The absence of a progressive policy context (~progressive) does appear to be a necessary condition for less restrictive regulatory outcomes, with a consistency score of 0.91.

In examining the conditions related to political mobilization, no condition has extremely high consistency scores with either outcome. Among all the conditions in this category, the incumbent bootlegger mobilization condition, however, does have the highest degree of consistency with an outcome; in cases where incumbent bootleggers are absent (~ibootlegger), policymaking outcomes tend to be less restrictive for short-term rental use (consistency score for ~restrictive: 0.84). The absence of incumbent Baptists (~ibaptist) and challenging bootleggers (~cbootlegger) are also somewhat consistent (0.69 and 0.66 respectively) with the less restrictive outcome.

Interestingly, the presence of the challenging coalition (cbootlegger and cbaptist) in a case tends toward more restrictive short-term rental regulations. That is, in cases where challenging bootlegger mobilization is present (cbootlegger), a majority of cases (0.69) have the more restrictive policymaking outcome (restrictive=1). Similarly, in cases where challenging Baptist mobilization is present (cbaptist), an even higher number of cases (0.75) have the more restrictive policymaking outcome (restrictive=1).

According to the consistency score results, then, housing-cost burdens (housing) appear to be a necessary condition for more restrictive short-term rental regulations whereas the absence of a progressive policy context (~progressive) appear to be a necessary condition for less restrictive short-term regulations. Political mobilization conditions do not appear to be necessary, though their consistency scores do indicate that some forms of political mobilization may be more effective than others. In particular, the absence of incumbent bootleggers may be consequential for less restrictive regulations while the presence of members of the challenging coalition (cbootlegger or cbaptist) may have the opposite effect of their objectives: helping to bring about more restrictive regulations or at least, failing to bring about less restrictive ones.

Sufficient Conditions

The analysis of sufficient conditions highlights the different configurations that led to the two outcomes. Table 8 displays the intermediate solution produced by the QCA that includes the configuration of conditions that led to the presence of the outcome (RESTRICTIVE=1) or restrictive regulations on short-term rental use. Table 9 displays the intermediate solution produced by the QCA that includes the configuration of conditions that led to the absence of the outcome (RESTRICTIVE=0) or less restrictive regulations on short-term rental use. In describing these results, I also draw on the raw data, the truth table and more parsimonious and complex formulas presented in the appendix (Table S 1, Table S 2, Table S 3, Table S 4, Table S 5, and Table S 6) to further contextualize the results. The solution formulas presented in all tables have perfect consistency and coverage (1.0).

As the first formula in Table 8 demonstrates, the presence of the challenging coalition (cbootlegger*cbaptist), housing-cost burdens (housing), a large short-term rental market (listingdense), and progressive policy context (progressive) is one dominant path toward more restrictive short-term rental regulations, explaining approximately 56% of cases positive for this outcome. These four conditions, when present together, appear to be sufficient for the outcome, regardless of whether any forms of incumbent political mobilization are present. Indeed, Boston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Washington DC—which, as demonstrated by Table 8, have this configuration—are often cited as cities with high housing costs and popular tourist destinations. Given that they also have progressive policymaking contexts, it is unsurprising that as they also become sites for large short-term rental markets (listingdense), policymakers in these cities might view them as threat to housing supply and design more restrictive regulations. It also appears that because of their large-short term markets, they attracted the mobilization of the challenging coalition (i.e., cbaptist*cbootlegger).

As shown by the overlap in cases with the second formula in Table 8, many of these cities—Boston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Washington, DC—in fact had the two competing coalitions present during their policymaking processes, suggesting that the incumbent coalition may have had an advantage in helping frame the debate in these contexts and been successful in pressing for more restrictive regulations. As my discussion of the Los Angeles case indicated, incumbent bootleggers (i.e., hotels) and Baptists (i.e., neighborhood, housing, and labor advocates) could leverage this policy context to independently frame the issue around unfair market advantage, disruption to neighborhoods, exacerbating housing crises, or threatening to labor prospects. This was apparent in other cities like New Orleans, a very high profile policy debate in which hotels and neighborhood advocates were very effective in presenting short-term rentals as a threat, with the slogan “neighbors, not tourists” commonly found on residential yard signs (Benner 2016; Burdeau 2016; Messenger 2016). As indicated by formula 2 in Table 8, it seems that in cases where incumbent coalition and challenging coalition were facing off (cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger*ibaptist) in a location that was housing-cost burdened and had a large short-term rental market (housing*listingdense), the incumbent coalition was able to advocate for more restrictive regulations.

Other paths to more restrictive regulations involved at least two policy context conditions (housing, listingdense, or progressive) or some form of incumbent mobilization. As formula 3 indicates in Table 8, in a smaller number of cases with restrictive regulations (25%), lacking incumbent mobilization (~ibootlegger*~ibaptist) was sufficient for the outcome so long as the context was also lacking a challenging coalition (~cbootlegger*~cbaptist), was housing-cost burdened (housing) and was progressive. Similarly, all three policy context conditions (housing, listingdense, and progressive) present, and absent challenging bootleggers (~cbootlegger), were sufficient to produce restrictive regulations in 19% of cases with that outcome. Two cities (13% of all cases with restrictive regulations, see formula 5 in Table 8), Boulder and Charlottesville, followed a similar path, except were present for Baptists from the challenging coalition (cbaptist), suggesting that these challengers could not overcome the policy context.

Generally, it is possible that the three policy context conditions (housing*listingdense*progressive), regardless of any forms of political mobilization, may have been sufficient to produce more restrictive regulations, as suggested by the more parsimonious solution included in the appendix (see formula 1 in Table S 3). This baseline formula covers 75% of cases with restrictive regulations. However, as my case study of Los Angeles suggests, while this context creates ample political will among policymakers, having incumbent stakeholders can help to provide political cover or keep pressure on in the face of resistance.

Furthermore, in cities lacking a more progressive policy context (~progressive), incumbent political mobilization appears to have been particularly effective in creating a path to more restrictive regulations. As formulas 6 and 7 in Table 8 or the more parsimonious solution in the appendix (formula 5 in Table S 3) indicate, both Kansas City and San Diego's policy outcomes were more restrictive, partially due to incumbent bootlegger and incumbent Baptist mobilization (ibootlegger*ibaptist). These results suggest that the incumbent coalition maintained some influence, even in less conducive policy contexts.

Table 8. Analysis of Sufficient Conditions for Presence of Restrictive Regulations (RESTRICTIVE=1), Intermediate Solution

Formula	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
1. cbootlegger*cbaptist*housing*progressive*listingdense	0.56	0.19	1	Boston, MA; Boulder, CO; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; Portland, OR; San Francisco, CA; Washington, DC
2. cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger*ibaptist*housing*listingdense	0.38	0.00	1	Boston, MA; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; San Diego, CA; San Francisco, CA; Washington, DC
3. ~cbootlegger*~cbaptist*~ibootlegger*~ibaptist*housing*progressive	0.25	0.13	1	Baltimore, MD; Madison, WI; Philadelphia, PA; San Jose, CA
4. ~cbootlegger*~ibootlegger*~ibaptist*housing*progressive*listing dense	0.19	0.00	1	Charlottesville, VA; Philadelphia, PA; San Jose, CA
5. cbaptist*~ibootlegger*~ibaptist*housing*progressive*listingdense	0.13	0.00	1	Boulder, CO; Charlottesville, VA
6. cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger*ibaptist*~progressive*~listingdense	0.06	0.06	1	Kansas City, MO
7. cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger*ibaptist*housing*~progressive	0.06	0.00	1	San Diego, CA

Notes: housing=housing-cost burdened; progressive=progressive; listingdense=large short-term rental market; cbootlegger=challenging bootlegger mobilization; cbaptist=challenging baptist mobilization; ibootlegger=incumbent bootlegger mobilization; Solution coverage: 1.0; Solution consistency: 1.0; Assumptions: housing (present), progressive (present)

In explaining the negative outcome (RESTRICTIVE=0), on the other hand, mobilization from the challenging coalition does not appear to nearly as decisive for less restrictive regulations. The formulas with the most coverage, formulas 1, 2, and 3 in Table 9, indicate that combinations which lack incumbent mobilization (~ibootlegger or ~ibaptist), a progressive policy context (~progressive), or a small short-term rental market (~listingdense) are pathways to less restrictive regulations. Indeed, the lack of mobilization from incumbent bootleggers (~ibootlegger) or incumbent Baptist (ibaptist) is part of the configuration in every formula in Table 9 except formula 8. Denver, CO, is the only case in the sample where both coalitions—facing off against each other—led to less restrictive regulations. This could be because Denver does not have the same housing cost burdens that other cities in the sample with more restrictive

Table 9. Analysis of Sufficient Conditions for Absence of Restrictive Regulations (RESTRICTIVE=0), Intermediate Solution

Formula	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
1. ~cbootlegger*~ibootlegger* ~progressive*~listingdense	0.47	0.09	1	Amarillo, TX; Anchorage, AK; Bellingham, WA; Bloomington, IL; Chico, CA; Colorado Springs, CO; Columbus, GA; Fresno, CA; Las Vegas, NV; Ogden, UT; Oklahoma City, OK; Roanoke, VA; Spokane, WA; Waco, TX; Wilmington, NC
2. ~ibootlegger*~ibaptist* ~progressive* ~listingdense	0.44	0.06	1	Amarillo, TX; Anchorage, AK; Bloomington, IL; Chico, CA; Columbus, GA; Las Vegas, NV; Lubbock, TX; Minneapolis, MN; Ogden, UT; Oklahoma City, OK; Raleigh, NC; Roanoke, VA; Sacramento, CA; Spokane, WA
3. ~cbootlegger*~ibootlegger* ~ibaptist* ~progressive	0.41	0.09	1	Amarillo, TX; Anchorage, AK; Austin, TX; Bend, OR; Bloomington, IL; Chico, CA; Columbus, GA; Las Vegas, NV; Ogden, UT; Oklahoma City, OK; Orlando, FL; Roanoke, VA; Spokane, WA
4. ~ibaptist*~housing* ~progressive* ~listingdense	0.31	0.09	1	Amarillo, TX; Anchorage, AK; Bloomington, IL; Columbus, OH; Jefferson City, MO; Minneapolis, MN; Oklahoma City, OK; Raleigh, NC; Roanoke, VA; San Antonio, TX
5. cbaptist*~ibootlegger*ibaptist* ~progressive	0.19	0.13	1	Chattanooga, TN; ColoradoSprings, CO; Portland, ME; San Luis Obispo, CA; Savannah, GA; Wilmington, NC
6. ~cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger* ~ibaptist* ~listingdense	0.03	0.03	1	Duluth, MN
7. cbootlegger*cbaptist*~ibootlegger* ~ibaptist*~housing*listingdense	0.03	0.03	1	Seattle, WA
8. cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger* ibaptist*~housing*listingdense	0.03	0.03	1	Denver, CO

Notes: housing=housing-cost burdened; progressive=progressive; listingdense=large short-term rental market; cbootlegger=challenging bootlegger mobilization; cbaptist=challenging baptist mobilization; ibootlegger=incumbent bootlegger mobilization; Solution coverage: 1.0; Solution consistency: 1.0; Assumptions: housing (absent), progressive (absent)

regulations had. Generally, however, the formulas in Table 9 suggest that the absence of incumbents and less progressive, less housing-cost burdened, and smaller short-term rental market policy contexts explain most cases with less restrictive regulations.

Discussion

As the logistic regression of the enactment of short-term rental policy on various policy context factors (see Table 6) shows, a municipality's odds of passing an ordinance institutionalizing or regulation short-term rental markets was more likely in population- and short-term rental listing-dense contexts. Prior to 2008, short-term rental markets were largely illegal in most municipalities, however, following the emergence of Airbnb, such policies were difficult to enforce as short-term rental markets became increasingly popular. Large cities with high numbers of listings, then, either needed to institutionalize regulations during this time period that either legitimized short-term rental use or created policy mechanisms that restricted the practice.

The QCA explored these two outcomes among those municipalities that passed regulations. In analyzing those regulations restricted the number of listings a host could operate and days a listing could be booked per year, I found that a conducive policy context—i.e., one that was housing-cost burdened, progressive, and had a large short-term rental market—combined with some level of incumbent mobilization explained most of the cases that passed more restrictive regulations. This suggests that incumbents were able to replicate the strategy in Los Angeles, leveraging their grievances about short-term rental markets' effects on housing supply, residential transiency, and market competition to advocate for policies in their favor, particularly in contexts with large short-term rental markets.

In analyzing the less restrictive regulations that largely sought to institutionalize, legitimize, and collect taxes on contemporary short-term rental exchanges, on the other hand, I found that these regulations were more common in contexts where short-term rental markets did not pose such a distinctive threat to incumbents. That is, most cities with less restrictive policies were not as progressive, were lacking a large short-term rental market, and did not have some form of incumbent mobilization. In such policy contexts, policymakers—not facing ideological and resource pressures from constituents and incumbents—were more favorable to short-term rental markets.

These analyses also suggest that Airbnb's Hundred Club initiative may have been a failed strategy or at the very least, a waste of the company's political and economic resources. The presence of the challenging coalition—that is, the Bootleggers (i.e., Airbnb) and the Baptists (i.e., Airbnb hosts)—in policy debates did not appear to be extremely consequential for either outcome and, in many cases, appeared to have been counterproductive. That is, in a large portion of cases with less restrictive regulations, policymakers passed these measures without challenging Baptists or Bootleggers present. In contrast, in cases with more restrictive regulations, the challenging coalition was largely present, and yet failed to influence the outcome in their favor. Airbnb's extensive efforts to mobilize hosts, then, did not materialize in any significant gains for the company and in some cases, may have contributed to some political losses.

Conclusion

In Chapters 2 and 3, I suggested that Airbnb drew on the resources and social organization of existing markets to create local marketplaces for short-term rentals. The most popular short-term rental marketplaces—that is, contexts with high numbers of listings—were also severely housing-cost burdened, creating contentious politics as policymakers sought to grapple with how to regulate these markets. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, in many of these contexts, competing Bootleggers (i.e., hotels and Airbnb) partnered with Baptists, or more grassroots organizations and activists with similar interests (e.g., labor, housing advocates, neighborhood, activists, Airbnb hosts) to shape local policy.

This chapter explored the outcomes of this political organization and strategy across various policy contexts, assessing challengers and incumbents' role in the local institutionalization and regulation of contemporary short-term rental markets. The findings suggest that the problems miring the challenging coalition in the Los Angeles case may have been widespread. Those marketplaces that were conducive for short-term rental market growth—such as those with high rents and housing cost burdens, where both microentrepreneurial and large-scale operators were thriving—also were conducive for the most restrictive regulations. These housing problems, combined with progressive policy orientations, likely made policymakers in these contexts more receptive to the grievances of incumbents and more skeptical of challenging coalition's efforts. Incumbents were able to effectively organize these grievances to influence policy, while the challenging coalition failed to play a significant role in most policymaking, even where the policy context was more receptive.

While short-term rental platforms like Airbnb, through these policymaking processes, gained legitimacy for short-term rental practices—as no city in the sample enacted an outright ban on all short-term rentals—it also did not enjoy the same free reign to expand short-term rental markets as it did its early days. Some of the company's largest marketplaces—including New York, Los Angeles, Washington DC, and San Francisco—passed some of the most restrictive regulations, potentially hindering the company's prospects for growth. Microentrepreneurial and large-scale hosts also faced more regulatory hurdles in these marketplaces after these policies; during the policymaking processes, their practices got grouped together, with municipalities enacting limitations on both the number of listings and number of days any host could operate. These policy developments demonstrate that short-term rental markets' reliance on key local resources for incumbents (i.e., housing supply, travel consumers) and a framework that combined disparate Baptist-Bootlegger interests under a shared organizational and political identity complicated their path for growth and institutionalization.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

This dissertation sought to integrate two perspectives on markets, examining how the market structures and local socio-economic organization of short-term rental markets in the platform economy have consequence for their institutionalization. That is, I have argued that the case of these short-term rental markets tracks with two phases of market development described in the sociological literature 1) the formation and organization of market structures, which are contingent on actors recombining and adapting existing resources organizing frameworks from their environment and 2) the market politics and institutionalization processes that emerge from these shifts in resources and social organization. Furthermore, I suggest that these processes of market development are local phenomena, with their outcomes contingent on the spatial variation in resources, socio-economic organization, and policy histories of each marketplace.

The Creation and Organization of Market Structures

The literature on the creation and organization of market structures examines how existing resources, organizations, social networks, ideas, and cognitive categories come constitute new and alternative markets. Market actors can repurpose and adapt existing material goods, ideas, social relations to create innovative new commodities and facilitate their production (Baker and Nelson 2005; Burt 2004; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Uzzi 1997). To orient themselves in these new markets, actors also draw on market devices and organizing frameworks, which allow them to assign value to economic goods, rationalize their action, or distinguish between commodities and non-marketized goods (Abolafia 2001; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Muniesa et al. 2007; Zelizer 2005, 2011).

In Chapter 1, I demonstrated how Airbnb's founders adapted the resources, technologies, participants, and organizational structures of existing markets to create platform-facilitated short-term rental marketplaces. At the time of the Airbnb's founding, consumers were seeking alternatives to massively standardized hotel markets and homeowners and tenants, rattled by the financial and subprime mortgage crises of 2007-2008, were facing economic precarity; Airbnb marketed itself as a platform that matched the financially constrained "microentrepreneurs" who had extra housing space with consumers wanting more personalized forms of travel. In doing so, they drew on the organizing frameworks of earlier markets: a platform model and ethos of entrepreneurialism from internet technology markets, the intimate placemaking associated with homeownership and tenancy in housing markets, and alternative travel culture from other short-term accommodation markets. Combining these market devices, shared meanings, and categories, Airbnb also drew in resources from these markets, converting travel consumers from other accommodation markets into Airbnb guests and housing consumers and units from the housing market into Airbnb hosts and "home-shares."

In Chapter 2, I examined this shifting social and market organization further, exploring how local resources and social structures came to underpin different segments of short-term rental markets facilitated by platforms like Airbnb. Through a quantitative analysis of 2016 Airbnb listings in 277 U.S. metropolitan areas, I found that microentrepreneurial markets, or smaller scale exchanges characterized by more personalized touches and investment, were embedded in civically active communities struggling with economic and housing precarity. Large-scale markets, in which commercial operators more impersonally rent multiple properties, were common in expensive housing markets, where these operators could further capitalize on housing vacancies. This segmentation is reflective of the literature on mass and alternative markets, which often highlights the tension between forms of market organization that are characterized by hierarchy, arms-length exchange, and mass production, and those that are more informal, alternative, and egalitarian (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Carroll and Torfason 2011; Uzzi 1997; Willer et al. 2012; Zelizer 2005).

When markets comingle these organizing principles, they often risk appearing profane or inauthentic (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Rossman 2014; Zelizer 2005, 2011). Furthermore the “geography of production” or spatial configuration of market development can create a competition over resources (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Molotch et al. 2000; Storper 2013). Indeed, policymaking audiences do not always view these markets favorably because Airbnb, through the market device of the platform, combines microentrepreneurial and large-scale exchanges and, as such, the “hostile worlds” (Zelizer 2005, 2011) of intimate sharing and transactional market practices. Additionally, because both these markets also rely on the resources of housing markets that are especially strained (i.e., market contexts with high housing cost burdens and rents), they are seen together as a threat to local residential stability and housing supply. The creation and organization of contemporary short-term rental markets, thus, has implications for their politics and institutionalization.

Market Politics and Institutionalization

The literature on market politics and institutionalization focuses on how markets, when disrupted by a change in power or resources, can be sites for political contention. Incumbents, or those who feel threatened by the change, compete with the challengers who seek to gain advantage, often emulating social movements strategies (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Rao 2008). A common strategy for these market actors (i.e., Bootleggers) is to form a Baptist-Bootlegger coalition, bringing in civic allies (i.e., Baptists) who can serve their economic interests with a policy campaign that leverages Baptist’s moral authenticity. Such coalitions can also capitalize on each member’s unique political expertise (e.g., lobbying, litigation, protest) and connections (“institutional authenticity”) (Levitsky 2007; Walker and Stepick 2020). To be sure, to achieve favorable regulatory policies, these efforts must be sensitized to the policy context and leverage the appropriate resources and allies for favorable regulations (Evans and Kay 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Ingram and Rao 2004; Kluttz 2019; Vasi et al. 2015).

In Chapter 4, I showed how the market structures and organization discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 create contentious local politics and as a result, generated Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions that re-organized local civic alliances. The socio-economic organization of the platform and its effects on local antecedent markets (i.e., hotel accommodation and housing) comes to form two distinct Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions: 1) a challenging coalition of short-term rental platforms and hosts 2) an incumbent coalition of hotel management and labor, housing advocates, and neighborhood groups. In my case study of Los Angeles, I showed that the incumbent coalition subtly coordinated their efforts and leveraged their individual authenticity and resources to articulate a shared vision with policymakers. The challenging coalition, on the other hand, more obviously combined their efforts through political organization that conflated economic and moral claims; this hybrid identity was perceived as less authentic by policymakers and publics in Los Angeles.

In Chapter 5, I extended these analyses to examine the broader policymaking consequences of the shifting economic, social, and political organization brought on by the emergence of contemporary short-term rental markets in the United States. I found that larger cities with high densities of Airbnb listings re-evaluated and revised their policies to respond to the shifting market environment. Among these cities, those that were housing-cost burdened, were progressive, had especially large short-term rental markets, and attracted political mobilization from incumbents passed more restrictive regulations. Conversely, cities that were not as progressive, were lacking a large short-term rental market, and did not have some form of incumbent mobilization passed less restrictive regulations. The presence of the challenging coalition in these policy debates did not appear to be extremely consequential for either outcome.

The findings in these chapters, thus, suggest that socio-economic organization of contemporary short-term rental markets had consequence for their political organization and outcomes. While the resources and organizing frameworks from antecedent housing, internet, and short-term accommodation markets helped to set up these markets, they eventually presented complications as short-term rental markets spread locally. The markets' popularity with travel consumers and reliance on housing units in housing-strained contexts put them into a direct competition for resources with incumbents in hotel and housing markets.

Furthermore, the market device of the Airbnb platform, while helping to crowdsource and facilitate transactions among various kinds of users, also brought together mass (large-scale) and niche (microentrepreneurial) market actors together under a shared organizational identity. When Airbnb leveraged the platform to create the Hundred Club coalitions with hosts to advocate for favorable policy, it hybridized this identity further and as such, created skepticism and confusion among policymaking audiences, who could not separate the hosts' moral claims from economic interests. These chapters, thus, demonstrate that early creation and organization of market structures can have lasting consequences for the socio-political legitimacy and institutionalization of markets.

Implications, Limitations, and Future Research

The findings of this dissertation not only expand on sociological understanding of markets but also have implications for broader understandings of civic participation and corporate power. Synthesizing two literatures—those that focus on the emergence and organization of market structures and those that focus on market institutionalization—I show how these processes are actually two interlocking phases of market development. That is, I argue that the very resources and organizing frameworks that facilitate the rise of these marketplaces—found in existing markets, organizations, and communities—also form the politics over their institutionalization, creating alliances and policy contexts that have consequences for the socio-political legitimacy of a market. I incorporate theories on urban community and politics to emphasize the contingencies of place (i.e., local resources, local schema, local allies, and local politics) often overlooked each of these research areas.

In examining the case of short-term rental markets, I have shown how the local conditions that give rise to these markets ultimately affect the politics of their institutionalization. Dependent on different resources and exchange schema (see Table 1), microentrepreneurial short-term rental markets reflected local residents facing housing and economic precarity whereas large-scale short-term rental markets reflected landed elites capitalizing on local housing vacancies to enhance profits. However, through the market device of the platform, their mutual dependence on housing units, and their prevalence in marketplaces with high housing costs, both segments organized together and thus, became seen by local policymaking audiences and incumbents as a threat to neighborhood stability, accommodation market resources, and housing supply.

Indeed, the emergence of platforms like Airbnb also instigated a re-organization of local civic alliances in the field of policymaking. In response to the challenging coalition of short-term rental hosts and platforms, an incumbent coalition of hotels, neighborhood and housing advocates, and labor formed to argue for stringent short-term rental regulation (see Table 2). In contrast to the challenging coalition, the incumbent coalition was able to leverage their institutional and moral authenticity more effectively. That is, their arms-length coordination of distinct Baptist and Bootlegger expertise and interests, as opposed to the challenger strategy of explicitly combining these “hostile worlds” (Zelizer 2005, 2011), proved to be more legitimate in the eyes of policymaking audiences. As a result, incumbents achieved significant policy victories, scaling back short-term rental exchanges in some of Airbnb’s most popular marketplaces.

The dissertation thus illuminates the shifting politics of the corporation and civic participation and the role of the platform economy in such processes. The Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions and grassroots strategies deployed by incumbents and challengers in the short-term rental market are part of larger trend in which corporations increasingly turn to civic actors to achieve policy goals. The advent of crowdsourcing technology facilitates these strategies, providing platform corporations with an ample user base that can be mobilized for policy advocacy.

While, in the case of short-term rental markets, such a strategy did not necessarily allow platforms to achieve more favorable policies, it did preclude potentially more strategic and egalitarian partnerships among civic actors. For example, while short-term rental platforms and microentrepreneurial hosts shared a short-term interest in the regulation of short-term rental markets, microentrepreneurial hosts—as local residents who struggle with housing costs and economic precarity—may share more long-term policy interests with labor and housing advocates who opposed them. On the incumbent side, labor and housing advocates sidelined their longer-term interests in better wages and more housing supply to work with the hotel management and neighborhood groups who typically oppose them on these issues. Short-term rental markets of the platform economy, in re-organizing civic participation, thus at least temporarily fractured solidarity among neighbors and workers that could have led to coalitions that generate more equitable economic and housing policies.

A limitation of this research is that contemporary short-term rental markets are indeed contemporary and continuously evolving, making it difficult to account for the ongoing political learning and shifting strategies of these actors. In the case of Los Angeles, enforcement continues to be an issue around which the incumbent Baptist-Bootlegger coalition mobilizes (Zahniser 2022). However, policymakers have also considered drafting further ordinances that would have some leniency for hosts to rent a second home and for tenants who live in rent-stabilized units (Chandler 2019; City News Service 2019). These developments suggest that the short-term rental coalition, now more established, has more legitimacy with policymakers.

This developing leniency among policymakers may also be attributed to hosts' and platforms' changing political strategies. In its own business model, Airbnb appears to be more explicitly consolidating around Bootlegger interests, incorporating hotel bookings and more standardized, large-scale listings into the platform. The company also seems to have abandoned its Airbnb Citizen and Hundred Club initiative,[45] with microentrepreneurial hosts now engaging in more independent policy efforts. For example, in late 2017, a cadre of hosts in Los Angeles formed their own group, the Homeshare Alliance,[46] departing from the Airbnb Citizen model. Another study comparing these changing strategies and any subsequent policy outcomes to the early politics of the platform could yield further insights about contemporary corporate power, civic participation, and policy influence.

[45] The Airbnbcitizen.com website now re-routes to Airbnb's policy news page and there is no longer a dedicated webpage that connects hosts to home-sharing clubs.
[46] https://twitter.com/homesharela

Furthermore, while this dissertation examines one of the largest set of markets within the platform economy, there are other platform economy markets that, drawing on different resources and organizing frameworks, generated different kinds of political issues and alliances and could yield additional scholarly insights. In the case of regulating ride-sharing applications like Uber and Lyft, drivers, like short-term rental hosts, have sometimes sided with the platforms such as in California's Proposition 22 ballot permitting drivers to remain contractual workers. More recently, however, these drivers, along with employees of grocery delivery applications like Instacart and Amazon warehouse workers, have formed a more traditional labor coalition that challenges the conditions of contractual work. These cases of shifting bedfellows provide promising new directions for expanding scholarly knowledge of markets, politics, and civic engagement.

Finally, this dissertation has largely focused on urban contexts pre-2020, overlooking other geographies and temporalities that could expand understandings of these markets. The Covid-19 pandemic, for example, brought significant changes to Airbnb and short-term rental markets, prompting more tourist demand in rural areas where guests could socially distance (Gao 2020). In Joshua Tree in southern California, such Airbnb demand has prompted backlash from residents who have concerns about increasing housing prices and the environmental impacts of tourism and short-term rental development on the landscape (Murphy 2022). The U.S.-centric focus of the dissertation has, as a result, also overlooked other countries where short-term rental markets have become extremely popular. Cities and countries in Europe, for example, typically with stronger labor movements and more progressive social policies, have in some cases banned short-term rentals entirely; in the context of the pandemic, some of cities have seized on the drop in tourist demand to regulate these markets more and address housing issues. Future analyses that examine these policy contexts could further enrich this dissertation’s findings on the local dimensions of platform economy market development.

APPENDIX

A. Chapter 3: Sampling and Geocoding Metropolitan Areas

My initial sample was derived using 2014 population estimates from the Census file CBSA-EST2014-alldata reporting "Annual Resident Population Estimates and Estimated Components of Resident Population Change for Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas and Their Geographic Components." I sampled the 298 metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas with populations over 150,000. However, this sample of 298 metropolitan areas also included metropolitan divisions. There are 11 metropolitan areas with divisions; these are geographic areas within a metropolitan area containing an urban core of at least 2.5 million. I then merged this sample with a zip code crosswalk from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development website, using CBSA and Division codes. This sample of zip codes was the basis for web-scraping methods outlined in the Appendix B.

In merging these data with other data in the study, I discovered that most spatial files and American Community Survey estimates provide CBSA codes. I thus aggregated all metropolitan divisions to the metropolitan area, which resulted in a sample size of 277. Using this sample of 277 CBSA codes, I then merged the American Community Survey data to the data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) and Airbnb. The NCSS data provide addresses for nonprofits, while the Airbnb data provide geographic coordinates; using shapefiles of metropolitan areas provided by the Census I was able to geocode these locations to metropolitan areas in ArcGIS.

B. Chapter 3: Methods for Web-Scraping Airbnb Data

To collect data from Airbnb.com, I wrote a Python web-scraping program that searched listings for the zip codes for each metropolitan area, along with their corresponding state abbreviation. Upon testing a number of search term methods, I found that this yielded consistently accurate results for the geographic areas of interest in my sample. In 2016, Airbnb.com displayed the total listing results for each search; however, the website would cap browsing at 300 results. I designed my program so that if the number of results exceeded this cap, I would filter by price and collect listings for each dollar amount, from the minimum to maximum price in that zip code area. There were only a handful of zip codes where such filtering produced 300 or more results, and thus, for those, I further filtered by the rental type (only three options: entire home, private room, shared room) to ensure I captured all listings. I then verified that the number of listings collected for that zip code matched the result number reported by Airbnb.

The data collection process started on May 6, 2016. As not to overload the site, I queried at a pace that emulated a human browser and thus completed web-scraping on October 19, 2016. To ensure that the dataset only reflected those listings that were created before my web-scraping process began (and thus eliminate bias regarding the order of zip codes searched), on the first day, before running the program I marked the listing identification code of a listing account I created with the site. Fortunately, Airbnb generates these listing identification codes in chronological and numerical order, so making note of the listing identification code from that day, I removed all listings from my set with listing identification codes greater than the one generated on that day. Additionally, because Airbnb often advertised listings beyond the zip code entered, upon completion of the data collection, I geocoded these listings to the metropolitan areas in my sample using Census shapefiles and Airbnb listing coordinates in ArcGIS. At the time, results pages on Airbnb provided these coordinates, along with the aforementioned listing identification code, a host identification code, and listing information about the property type (e.g., house, cabin, apartment, condo etc.), rental type (entire home, entire room, or shared room), and housing type (e.g., house, multifamily unit, vehicle, etc.). The final set had this type of information for each of the 319,639 listings in the 277 metropolitan areas in my sample.

C. Chapter 3: Supplemental Figures

Figure S 1. Predicted count of listings for microentrepreneurial and large-scale rentals, based on measures of civic capacity (density of nonprofits) and locally embedded economic exchange (Walmart density and percentage of small business retail)

a.



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

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

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

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

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

Notes: Plots are based on Model 3 in Table 5. Dotted lines express 95% confidence intervals.

Figure S 2. Predicted count of microentrepreneurial listings, based on percentage of small business retail, at varying levels of Walmart density



Notes: Plotted using Microentrepreneurial Model 2 in Table 5 (preferred model).

Figure S 3. Predicted count of listings for microentrepreneurial and large-scale rentals, based on measures of labor (percentage working <35 hours per week, percentage unemployed, percentage of real estate firms), income (median family income and inequality Gini), and housing dynamics (median rent as a percentage of income, percentage of nonseasonal vacancies, and median contract rent)

a.



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

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

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

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

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

Figure S 3 (continued).

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Notes: Plots are based on Model 3 in Table 5. Dotted lines express 95% confidence intervals.

Figure S 4. Predicted count of microentrepreneurial listings, based on percentage working <35 hours per week, at varying levels of unemployment



Notes: Plotted using Microentrepreneurial Model 2 in Table 5 (preferred model).

Figure S 5. Predicted count of large-scale listings, based on median contract rent, at varying levels of nonseasonal vacancy



Notes: Plotted using Large-scale Model 3 in Table 5 (preferred model).

Figure S 6. Differences in the predicted counts of listings for microentrepreneurial and large-scale rentals, based on measures of civic capacity (density of nonprofits) and local embedded economic exchange (Walmart density and percentage of small business retail)

a.



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

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

Notes: Differences are calculated by subtracting the predicted count of microentrepreneurial listings from the predicted count of large-scale listings (using the Model 3 in Table 5). Dotted lines express confidence intervals.

Figure S 7. Differences in the predicted counts of listings for microentrepreneurial and large-scale rentals, based on labor (percentage working <35 hours per week, percentage unemployed, percentage of real estate firms), income (median family income and income inequality Gini), and housing (median rent as a percentage of income, percentage of nonseasonal vacancies, and median contract rent) dynamics

a.



b.



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

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

e.



f.



Figure S 7 (continued).

g.



h.



Notes: Differences are calculated by subtracting the predicted count of microentrepreneurial listings from the predicted count of large-scale listings (using the Model 3 in Table 5). Dotted lines express confidence intervals.

D. Chapter 5: Raw Data and Truth Tables for QCA Analysis

Table S 1. Raw Data Table for QCA

	Outcome	Conditions						
Principal City	RESTRICTIVE	HOUSING	PROGRESSIVE	LISTINGDENSE	CBOOTLEGGER	CBAPTIST	IBOOTLEGGER	IBAPTIST
Amarillo, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anchorage, AK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Austin, TX	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Baltimore, MD	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Bellingham, WA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bend, OR	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bloomington, IL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boston, MA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Boulder, CO	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Charlottesville, VA	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
Chattanooga, TN	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
Chicago, IL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Chico, CA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colorado Springs, CO	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
Columbus, GA	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Columbus, OH	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Denver, CO	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Duluth, MN	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Fresno, CA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Jefferson, MO	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Kansas, MO	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Las Vegas, NV	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Los Angeles, CA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Lubbock, TX	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Madison, WI	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Minneapolis, MN	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
New Orleans, LA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
New York, NY	1*	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Ogden, UT	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oklahoma, OK	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Orlando, FL	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Philadelphia, PA	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Portland, ME	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
Portland, OR	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Raleigh, NC	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Roanoke, VA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sacramento, CA	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
San Antonio, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
San Diego, CA	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
San Francisco, CA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
San Jose, CA	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
San Luis Obispo, CA	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Savannah, GA	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
Seattle, WA	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Spokane, WA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Waco, TX	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Washington, DC	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wilmington, NC	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1

Notes: *Changed from 0 to 1 following reconceptualization of outcome (see Outcomes discussion in Chapter 5)

Table S 2. Truth Table from QCA

Outcome	Conditions							
RESTRICTIVE	HOUSING	PROGRESSIVE	LISTINGDENSE	CBOOTLEGGER	CBAPTIST	IBOOTLEGGER	IBAPTIST	N
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	2
0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: Logical remainders excluded due to space constraints

E. Chapter 5: Coding Scheme for Municipal Short-Term Rental Ordinances

Variable Name (EU=Entire Units, P = Partial Units)	Meaning (format=binary, unless noted)
Timestamp	Date that ordinance was coded
City	City, State
Ordinance_passed	Date ordinance was passed (YYMMDD)
Distinction	Ordinance distinguishes between rentals of entire units and rentals of partial units
STR_term	Term used to describe all types of short-term rentals (text)
EU_term	Term used to describe short-term rentals of entire units
P_term	Term used to describe short-term rentals of partial units
event_restrictions_YN	Ordinance includes restrictions on events/activities that can be held in a short-term rental
event_restrictions	Restrictions on events/activities that can be held in a short-term rental (text)
liability	Hosts must have documentation of liability insurance
inspection	Host registration/license is conditional on an inspection
good_neighbor	Host must provide information to guests (via brochure, placard, notice, guidelines, etc.) about trash pickup, noise, parking, and other "neighborly" activities.
violation_conseq_YN	Host can face certain consequences if in violation of the ordinance
violation_conseq	Consequences that a host can face if in violation of the ordinance (text)
violation_conseq_other	Consequences that a host can face if in violation of the ordinance (text)
host_fine	Host will be fined if in violation of ordinance
min_fine	Minimum fine that a host is liable to pay if in violation of the ordinance (dollars)
EU_prohibited	Short-term rental of entire units is explicitly prohibited.
EU_prohibited_strict	Prohibition of entire unit rentals is firm, with no loopholes, grandfathering, or alternative registration process.
EU_primary_resident	The host must be a primary resident
EU_owner_restriction	The host must be an owner (as opposed to a renter)
EU_present	The host must be present on the property throughout the stay.

EU_renter_permission	Hosts that are tenants themselves (renters) must have permission from their landlord in order to host. If this equals 1, EU_owner_restriction=0.
EU_HOA_Restriction	Homeowners in co-operative buildings and condominiums can host provided they are in accordance with the homeowners association (HOA) bylaws or have permission from the HOA
EU_RSO_restriction	Residents cannot host in rent rent-stabilized, rent-controlled units, or similar units zoned as affordable. Includes public housing and below-market rate units.
EU_prohibited_structures_YN	Certain housing structures are prohibited from being rented as short-term rentals
EU_dense_proh	Housing structures that add density are prohibited from being rented as short-term rentals.
EU_prohibited_structures	Housing structures that are prohibited from being rented as short-term rentals (text)
EU_neighbor_notice	Hosts must notify neighbors of their intent to rent short-term
EU_host_license	Hosts are required to obtain a license or register with the city in order to rent short-term
EU_registration_fee_YN	Hosts must pay a fee for a short-term rental license or registration
EU_registration_fee_usd	Amount (in dollars) for a short-term rental license or registration
EU_license_post	Host must include a license/registration number in any advertised listings
EU_TOT	Hosts must pay transient occupancy, hotel, lodging, or similar taxes
EU_TOT_pct	Amount (percentage) that host must pay in transient occupancy, hotel, lodging, or similar taxes
EU_other_tax_YN	Host must pay other taxes
EU_other_tax	Name of other tax
EU_other_tax_pct	Amount (percentage) that host must pay in other taxes
EU_no_listings_max_YN	Host cannot not exceed a maximum stated number of units for rental short-term.
EU_no_listings_max	Maximum number of units a host can have for short-term rentals. Stated maximum number of rentals is okay too. This is 1 if there is a primary residence requirement for entire units.

EU_max_guests_YN	Host cannot exceed a maximum number of guests during a short-term rental
EU_no_guests_max_total	Total maximum number of guests a host can have during a short-term rental
EU_no_guests_max_per_bedroom	Maximum number of guests per bedroom a host can have during a short-term rental
EU_cap	Hosts can only rent short-term for a maximum number of days per year
EU_cap_nodays	Maximum number of days per year that a host can rent short-term
EU_strict_cap	Host cannot apply to increase the number of days per year that the host can rent short-term
EU_density_restriction	Certain zones/neighborhoods in the city or the entire city have/has a maximum quota for the number of licenses/registrations that can be issued for renting short-term
EU_zoning_restriction	Short-term rentals prohibited in certain zones/neighborhoods in the city
EU_parking_restrictions_YN	Ordinance stipulates parking restrictions for short-term rentals
EU_parking_restrictions_noperunit	Number of required parking spaces per unit
EU_parking_plan	Host must submit a parking plan.
EU_parking_restrictions_other_text	Other parking restrictions for short-term rentals (text)
P_primary_resident	The host must be a primary resident
P_owner_restriction	The host must be an owner (as opposed to a renter)
P_present	The host must be present in the unit throughout the stay.
P_renter_permission	Hosts that are tenants themselves (renters) must have permission from their landlord in order to host. If this equals 1, P_owner_restriction=0.
P_HOA_Restriction	Homeowners in co-operative buildings and condominiums can host provided they are in accordance with the homeowners association (HOA) bylaws or have permission from the HOA
P_RSO_restriction	Residents cannot host in rent rent-stabilized, rent-controlled units, or similar units zoned as affordable. Includes public housing and below-market rate units.
P_prohibited_structures_YN	Certain housing structures are prohibited from being rented as short-term rentals
P_dense_proh	Housing structures that add density are prohibited from being rented as short-term rentals.

P_prohibited_structures	Housing structures that are prohibited from being rented as short-term rentals (text)
P_neighbor_notice	Hosts must notify neighbors of their intent to rent short-term
P_host_license	Hosts are required to obtain a license or register with the city in order to rent short-term
P_registration_fee_YN	Hosts must pay a fee for a short-term rental license or registration
P_registration_fee_usd	Amount (in dollars) for a short-term rental license or registration
P_license_post	Host must include a license/registration number in any advertised listings
P_TOT	Hosts must pay transient occupancy, hotel, lodging, or similar taxes
P_TOT_pct	Amount (percentage) that host must pay in transient occupancy, hotel, lodging, or similar taxes
P_other_tax_YN	Host must pay other taxes
P_other_tax	Name of other tax
P_other_tax_pct	Amount (percentage) that host must pay in other taxes
P_no_listings_max_YN	Host cannot not exceed a maximum stated number of rooms for rental short-term.
P_no_listings_max	Maximum number of rooms a host can rent short-term. Okay if they list the the number rooms and not the number of listings. If the definition of a short-term rental includes a maximum number of rooms, can use that number to determine the maximum (e.g., Chicago ordinance)
P_max_guests_YN	Host cannot exceed a maximum number of guests during a short-term rental
P_no_guests_max_total	Total maximum number of guests a host can have during a short-term rental
P_no_guests_max_per_bedroom	Maximum number of guests per bedroom a host can have during a short-term rental
P_cap	Hosts can only rent short-term for a maximum number of days per year
P_cap_nodays	Maximum number of days per year that a host can rent short-term
P_strict_cap	Host cannot apply to increase the number of days per year that the host can rent short-term

P_density_restriction	Certain zones/neighborhoods in the city or the entire city have/has a maximum quota for the number of licenses/registrations that can be issued for renting short-term
P_zoning_restriction	Short-term rentals prohibited in certain zones/neighborhoods in the city
P_parking_restrictions_YN	Ordinance stipulates parking restrictions for short-term rentals
P_parking_restrictions_noperunit	Number of required parking spaces per unit
P_parking_plan	Host must submit a parking plan.
P_parking_restrictions_other_text	Other parking restrictions for short-term rentals (text)
platform_license	Platforms are required to obtain a license or register with the city
platform_fee_YN	Platforms must pay a fee for license or registration
platform_fee_usd	Amount (in dollars) for a platform license or registration
platform_acct_license	Platforms must require a registration number from each host who lists on the platform
platform_tax_collect	Platforms are required to collect taxes on behalf of hosts
platform_violation_report	Platforms are required to report any hosts in violation of the ordinance
platform_host_removal	Platforms are required to remove any hosts in violation of the ordinance
platform_data_YN	Platform is required to share some data with the city
platform_data_sharing	Data that platform is required to share with the city (selected data)
platform_violation_conseq_YN	Platform can face certain consequences if in violation of the ordinance
platform_violation_conseq	Consequences that a platform can face if in violation of the ordinance (text)
platform_min_fine	Minimum fine that a platform is liable to pay if in violation of the ordinance (dollars)
affordablehouse_fund	Ordinance mentions that funds will be relegated for the creation of affordable housing
enforcement_fund	Ordinance mentions that funds will be relegated for enforcement of the ordinance
tourism_fund	Ordinance mentions that funds will be relegated for city tourism and marketing. If city has a tax specified for tourism/marketing that hosts must pay, this is marked as 1.
complaint_hotline	Ordinance mentions establishment of a complaint hotline

bureaucracy	Ordinance mentions establishment of an agency or office for short-term rental management
anti_discrimination	Ordinance explicitly mentions that hosts and platforms cannot discriminate on the bases of race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, or other social categories.
Comments	Comments about coding difficulties and other noteworthy aspects of the ordinance

F. Chapter 5: Parsimonious and Complex Solutions Produced by QCA

Table S 3. Parsimonious Solution for Presence of Restrictive Regulations (RESTRICTIVE=1)

Formula	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
1. housing*listingdense*progressive	0.75	0.00	1	Boston, MA; Boulder, CO; Charlottesville, VA; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; San Francisco, CA; San Jose, CA; Washington, DC
2. ~ibootlegger*housing*progressive	0.50	0.13	1	Baltimore, MD; Boulder, CO; Charlottesville, VA; Madison, WI; New York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; San Jose, CA
3. cbootlegger*ibootlegger*housing	0.44	0.00	1	Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA
4. ibootlegger*housing*listingdense	0.44	0.00	1	Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; San Diego, CA; San Francisco, CA; Washington, DC
5. ibootlegger*ibaptist*~progressive	0.13	0.06	1	Kansas City, MO; San Diego, CA

Notes: housing=housing-cost burdened; progressive=progressive; listingdense=large short-term rental market; cbootlegger=challenging bootlegger mobilization; cbaptist=challenging baptist mobilization; ibootlegger=incumbent bootlegger mobilization; Solution coverage: 1.0; Solution consistency: 1.0

Table S 4. Complex Solution for Presence of Restrictive Regulations (RESTRICTIVE=1)

Formula	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
1. cbootlegger*cbaptist*housing* progressive*listingdense	0.56	0.19	1	Boston, MA; Boulder, CO; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; Portland, OR; San Francisco, CA; Washington, DC
2. ~cbootlegger*~cbaptist* ~ibootlegger*~ibaptist*housing* progressive	0.25	0.13	1	Baltimore, MD; Madison, WI; Philadelphia, PA; San Jose, CA
3. cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger* ibaptist*housing*listingdense	0.38	0.06	1	Boston, MA; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; San Diego, CA; San Francisco, CA; Washington, DC
4. cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger* ibaptist*~housing*~listingdense* ~progressive	0.06	0.06	1	Kansas City, MO
5. ~cbootlegger*~ibootlegger* ~ibaptist*housing*progressive* listingdense	0.19	0.00	1	Charlottesville, VA; Philadelphia, PA; San Jose, CA
6. cbaptist*~ibootlegger*~ibaptist* housing*progressive*listingdense	0.13	0.00	1	Boulder, CO; Charlottesville, VA

Notes: housing=housing-cost burdened; progressive=progressive; listingdense=large short-term rental market; cbootlegger=challenging bootlegger mobilization; cbaptist=challenging baptist mobilization; ibootlegger=incumbent bootlegger mobilization; ibaptist=incumbent baptist mobilization; Solution coverage: 1.0; Solution consistency: 1.0

Table S 5. Parsimonious Solution for Absence of Restrictive Regulations (RESTRICTIVE=0)

Formula	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
1. ~ibootlegger*~progressive	0.81	0.78	1	Amarillo, TX; Anchorage, AK; Austin, TX; Bellingham, WA; Bend, OR; Bloomington, IL; Chattanooga, TN; Chico, CA; Colorado Springs, CO; Columbus, GA; Fresno, CA; Las Vegas, NV; Lubbock, TX; Minneapolis, MN; Ogden, UT; Oklahoma City, OK; Orlando, FL; Portland, ME; Raleigh, NC; Roanoke, VA
2. ibootlegger*~ibaptist*~listingdense	0.13	0.13	1	Columbus, OH; Duluth, MN; Jefferson City, MO; San Antonio, TX
3. ~housing*listingdense	0.09	0.00	1	Austin, TX; Denver, CO; Seattle, WA
4. ~housing*progressive	0.06	0.00	1	Denver, CO; Seattle, WA

Notes: housing=housing-cost burdened; progressive=progressive; listingdense=large short-term rental market; cbootlegger=challenging bootlegger mobilization; cbaptist=challenging baptist mobilization; ibootlegger=incumbent bootlegger mobilization; Solution coverage: 1.0; Solution consistency: 1.0

Table S 6. Complex Solution for Absence of Restrictive Regulations (RESTRICTIVE=0)

Formula	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
1. ~cbootlegger*~ibootlegger* housing*~progressive*~listingdense	0.31	0.09	1	Bellingham, WA; Chico, CA; Colorado Springs, CO; Columbus, GA; Fresno, CA; Las Vegas, NV; Ogden, UT; Spokane, WA; Waco, TX; Wilmington, NC
2. ~ibootlegger*~ibaptist*housing* ~progressive*~listingdense	0.22	0.06	1	Chico, CA; Columbus, GA; Las Vegas, NV; Lubbock, TX; Ogden, UT; Sacramento, CA; Spokane, WA
3. ~cbootlegger*~ibootlegger* ~ibaptist*housing*~progressive	0.22	0.03	1	Bend, OR; Chico, CA; Columbus, GA; Las Vegas, NV; Ogden, UT; Orlando, FL; Spokane, WA
4. cbaptist*~ibootlegger*ibaptist* housing*~progressive	0.19	0.13	1	Chattanooga, TN; Colorado Springs, CO; Portland, ME; San Luis Obispo, CA; Savannah, GA; Wilmington, NC
5. ~cbootlegger*~cbaptist*~ibaptist* ~housing*~progressive*~listingdense	0.16	0.13	1	Amarillo, TX; Anchorage, AK; Bloomington, IL; Roanoke, VA; San Antonio, TX
6. ~cbootlegger*cbaptist* ~ibootlegger*~ibaptist*~progressive	0.13	0.06	1	Austin, TX; Columbus, GA; Oklahoma City, OK; Orlando, FL
7. cbootlegger*cbaptist*~ibaptist* ~housing*~progressive*~listingdense	0.09	0.06	1	Columbus, OH; Minneapolis, MN; Raleigh, NC
8. ~cbaptist*ibootlegger*~ibaptist* ~housing*~progressive*~listingdense	0.06	0.00	1	Jefferson City, MO; San Antonio, TX
9. cbootlegger*ibootlegger* ~ibaptist*~housing*~progressive* ~listingdense	0.06	0.00	1	Columbus, OH; Jefferson City, MO
10. ~cbootlegger*cbaptist* ibootlegger*~ibaptist*housing* progressive* ~listingdense	0.03	0.03	1	Duluth, MN
11. cbootlegger*cbaptist* ~ibootlegger*~ibaptist*~housing* progressive* listingdense	0.03	0.03	1	Seattle, WA
12. cbootlegger*cbaptist*ibootlegger* ibaptist*~housing*progressive* listingdense	0.03	0.03	1	Denver, CO

Notes: housing=housing-cost burdened; progressive=progressive; listingdense=large short-term rental market; cbootlegger=challenging bootlegger mobilization; cbaptist=challenging baptist mobilization; ibootlegger=incumbent bootlegger mobilization; Solution coverage: 1.0; Solution consistency: 1.0

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