throughout the period, like the intentional leak that revealed America's decision to base atomic bombers in Korea. Such moves were undoubtedly the cause of Mao's confidence in sending troops across the Yalu, as the Chinese leader genuinely believed that the American 'paper tiger' (threat of atomic war) was weak when faced with a massive, dispersed enemy position. This fits with the author's proposed theory of doctrinal differentiation. The belief in very different 'theories of victory' saw the deployment of different strategic force methods and, subsequently, deterrence failure, leading to the outbreak of Sino-American engagement on the Korean Peninsula.

In the following sections, Twomey explores different historical instances where doctrinal difference theory applies. Doctrinal differentiation, he argues, catalysed the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East between Israel, Egypt and Syria in the 1950–73 period, with Israeli reliance on armoured and air divisions countering the early infantry-oriented, defence-in-depth focus of Egyptian and Syrian forces, but resulting in overconfidence and underestimation of enemy forces during the 1973 Yom-Kippur War (pp. 207–12). The validity of this thought-provoking model would benefit from its future application not only in areas where realism has failed to predict conflict, but also in the numerous situations where realism has only partially explained patterns of international behaviour.

The doctrinal differentiation model of *The Military Lens* is a useful methodological tool for the examination of inter-state behaviour in conflict spirals. Twomey rounds out his well-planned book by pointing to rising doctrinal inconsistencies in current Sino-American relations. Policymakers and scholars in the field alike would do well to take note of this study, as it is clear that such findings could be used as a blueprint for developing further in-depth analyses of the effects of dissimilar doctrines on political and military deterrence deployments.

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Michael Brecher's *International Political Earthquakes* (*IPE*) distils the core lessons from a lifetime of engagement with the study of international crises. The body of work that resulted from decades of meticulous research presciently avoided methodological warfare by combining large-n and careful qualitative analysis. Revealing a most impressive wealth of knowledge on international conflicts since the end of the First World War, *IPE* provides careful definitions and cautious suggestions for measuring them.

Space constraints preclude a comprehensive listing of this massive volume's findings, which include the fact that there have been slightly more crises within than outside protracted conflicts (persistent violence among the same actors), and both types had roughly the same duration, although protracted conflicts had more violent crisis triggers, higher perceived value threats and more ambiguous crisis outcomes. The proneness of crises to

escalate differed only minimally between protracted conflicts and other crises. No region has been immune to protracted conflicts, which have exhibited higher perceived threats to basic values, but attracted less major power and international organisation involvement than anticipated. For all crises, territory and political regime were the most frequently perceived values at risk; only 30 percent of them entailed violence and only 14 percent entailed war. Europe's crises were the most severe, but their share in international crises declined over time. The Middle East stands first in frequency of full-scale war and, with Africa and Asia, was among the most violence-prone regions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, military regimes were implicated in the higher proportion of crises that escalated into violence.

While recognising that the puzzle of pervasive conflict remains unsolved, Brecher provides a window into its crucial sources and mechanisms. The structure of the international system as provider of system stability receives particular attention. The integrated assessment of the polarity–stability relationship suggests that bipolycentrism (power bipolarity and decisional multipolarity, 1963–89) emerges as most unstable since the First World War. Bipolarity (1945–62) is found most stable, supporting Waltz, followed by multipolarity (1918–45) and unipolycentrism (*IPE*'s term for unipolarity since 1990). Multipolarity ranked most unstable regarding the frequency of wars in crises, and unipolycentrism ranked most unstable regarding the proportion of crises with major power military activity and tension escalation. Brecher's study distils clear policy implications: neither single power hegemony nor multipolarity are optimal as stable structures of world politics. Bipolarity is the best structural conduit to international stability and the obsolescence of war. Although *IPE* foresees that these findings will resolve intense debates on the polarity–stability relationship, they could also induce further contestation, as the history of this research agenda suggests. The rise of China and the nature of US–China relations are bound to be central to this continued debate.

The data collected by this project will allow further refinements. For instance, the findings in this volume combine South, Central and East Asia into a single category. Disaggregating Asia into its subregions could help identify great variability among them, including the potential impact of accelerated economic development among East Asian countries on the reduced level of militarised disputes in the last few decades. The 29 in-depth case studies – an amazing feat for a single-authored volume – are very carefully researched, revealing the kind of familiarity with international politics that few can attain. The cases suggest striking diversity in terms of crisis triggers, duration, number of important decisions, perceived values at risk and attitudinal prisms. Against this diversity, all decision-makers shared escalating stress with the escalation of threat, time pressure and likelihood of military hostilities. In most cases, decision-makers felt a heightened need for information and engaged in a substantial search for, and consideration of, alternatives before taking strategic decisions. Brecher suggests that this is a clear indication of the existence of universal elements in world politics – statehood, stress and human response – that override other variations. At the same time, he finds no support for structural realist postulates that international system structure has a causal impact on state behaviour. The *IPE* dictum here is crystal clear: the realist thesis that system structure determines state behaviour does not conform to the reality of crisis behaviour. The structure of the international system is one source, at most, and not necessarily the most

influential one. This finding affirms others along the same lines in international relations scholarship in the last two decades.

In sum, a wide range of readers – in both the qualitative and quantitative traditions – will find this book of exceptional help. The writing is elegant, precise, engaging and to the point. This Herculean effort to tackle the underlying foundations of international political earthquakes is bound to become the book of reference in the study of international conflict for years to come.

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Oliver Juetersonke, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 212 pp., £69.00 hbk).

Juetersonke's book, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism*, is a knowledgeable and well-researched, though, nevertheless, an ambivalent, study. This ambivalence is expressed in two observations: on the one hand, Juetersonke's assessment of Morgenthau's realism is informed by a profound familiarity with his oeuvre, and, on the other hand, he contextualises his scholarship in the legal, sociological and philosophical debates from the 1920s to the 1940s, a critical period for Morgenthau's intellectual development. Juetersonke highlights the continuity of Morgenthau's key positions as expressed in both his European and American scholarship. To illustrate the trajectory of Morgenthau's thoughts, he elucidates his work ranging from his doctoral dissertation in 1929, his postdoctoral research in Geneva in the early 1930s and his many monographs and articles after his emigration to the US.

Juetersonke provides convincing arguments against the distinction of Morgenthau's oeuvre in a pre- and post-emigration divide as upheld by mainstream International Relations (IR) scholars. Thus, Juetersonke is part of a critical-normative scholarship, which includes colleagues such as Michael Williams, Ned Lebow, Vibeke Tjalve and Sean Molloy, and re-engages 'classical realism' through critical epistemology and ethics, freeing Morgenthau (and other subsumed 'classical realists' such as E.H. Carr, but also historically Thucydides and Hobbes) from the iron grip of monolingual and materialist interpretations, which represent Morgenthau and others as advocates of essentialised national interest and power-politics. This largely mistaken understanding stems from the neo-realist/neo-liberal IR mainstream, but also from many post-structuralist accounts (as most notably from Jim George). Juetersonke's important critique of such narrow readings is complemented by his archival research and wide incorporation of German, French and English sources.

On the other hand, there are statements by Juetersonke which appear self-contradictory at times. We find an example early in the text when Juetersonke writes that '(analysing) Morgenthau's work using the conceptual toolkit of IR theory alone, while at the same