UNPACKING “TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP”*

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Abstract What “counts” as transnational citizenship? Like the related notions of global or transnational civil society, the term’s appeal to internationalists is greater than its conceptual precision. However, a wide range of empirical trends do raise questions about the nation-state-based approach to the concept of citizenship. In an effort to avoid conceptual stretching, this essay assesses the degree to which the concept of transnational citizenship helps to address issues raised by “globalization from below.” Because many approaches to citizenship focus on the dynamics and texture of participation, this review incorporates recent findings in sociology, anthropology, and geography into the political science discussion. The essay is organized by propositions that bring together analysis of two distinct empirical literatures, on transnational civil society and on migrant civic and political participation. The review concludes by contrasting two cross-cutting sets of definitional choices. The discussion is framed by a recognition that definitions of citizenship vary along two main dimensions: in their emphasis on rights versus membership, and in high versus low intensity. Only a very bounded definition of transnational citizenship holds up under conceptual scrutiny, limited to what is also called dual or multiple citizenship for migrants.

INTRODUCTION

Diverse patterns of “globalization from below” are both claiming rights across borders and constructing transnational political communities. As our analytical frameworks try to catch up with these new empirical trends, the concept of transnational citizenship resonates with those who want to extend rights and principles of political and social equality beyond nation-state boundaries. Yet normative appeal

*This is a substantially revised and expanded version of a paper first presented at the workshop on “The Rights and Responsibilities of Transnational Citizenship,” Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 11–12, 2004. The essay is informed by recent collaborative studies of three different sets of transnational civil society actors: U.S.-Mexico civil society coalitions (Brooks & Fox 2002), campaigns seeking World Bank accountability (Clark et al. 2003, Fox & Brown 1998), and cross-border indigenous Mexican migrant organizations (Fox & Rivera-Salgado 2004).
is no substitute for a precise definition. Is “transnational citizenship” just a rhetorical tool to encourage globalization from below, or can it be defined with sufficient precision to add analytical value?

Applying the concept of transnational citizenship with analytical consistency requires making explicit definitional choices that specify both what kinds of rights and what kinds of membership are involved. Otherwise, transnational citizenship is a “you know it when you see it” term that is difficult to distinguish from other kinds of civic or political relationships and blurs the conceptual edge of citizenship itself. To focus the discussion, “transnational” will be defined here in common sense terms as “cross-border” (and therefore, technically, “trans-state”).2

In response to these dilemmas, this essay spells out some of the conceptual challenges that any definition of transnational citizenship would have to address in order to be analytically useful. In the process, the review addresses a series of more general questions about both citizenship and globalization from below. The discussion begins by framing some definitional choices, followed by propositions that emerge from the literatures on transnational civil society and migrant collective action. The essay concludes that the concept’s usefulness—so far—is limited to those migrant civic and political rights and memberships that could also be described, perhaps more precisely, as “dual” or “multiple” citizenship. The rest of what might look like transnational citizenship turns out to consist primarily of genres of civic and political participation and membership that fall short of the category of citizenship.

This review crosses three sets of intellectual boundaries. First, the discussion explores the still-underdeveloped interface between international relations, comparative politics, and normative political theory. Second, because so many approaches to citizenship are informed by analysis of collective action and the political construction of rights and membership, the essay draws from relevant research in political sociology, anthropology, and geography. Third, the essay weaves together dilemmas and propositions that emerge from the literatures on migration and transnational civil society—two fields of study that rarely intersect.3 Seen from a different angle, cross-border rights and membership can be framed either as the civil society dimension of the broader process of nonstate actor involvements in international relations, on the one hand, or as the transnational extension of the national construction of rights and political inclusion, on the other (see, e.g., Josselin & Wallace 2001 on nonstate actors more generally).

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2The existence of states that include more than one nation raises issues for defining transnational citizenship that will not be addressed here. Some states recognize their multinational character institutionally through various autonomy and power-sharing relationships (e.g., Belgium, Canada, Spain, Russia, and the former Yugoslavia). A consistent definition of the concept of transnational citizenship would need to address this dimension of the distinction between trans- and multinational (Bauböck 2003).

3For exceptions to this generalization, see Brysk (2003), Yashar (2002), and Tarrow (2005).
Empirically, at least four very distinct trends are raising questions about classic nation-state-based models of citizenship. First, in some cases, globalization from above is undermining national and local rights, as in the widely debated case of the tension between “investor rights” and international trade and financial institutions, on the one hand, and citizen-based national efforts to defend social rights and environmental standards, on the other. This is the “mirror image” of the emergence of transnational rights and membership and will not be addressed in this review (see Fox 2003). Second, the widespread entry of transnational migrant communities into the public sphere, long-distance nationalism, and the rise of dual national identities are provoking sustained debate about distinctions between national identities and civil-political rights (e.g., Faist 2000, Jacobson 1996, Soysal 1994). Third, the rise of transnational civil society and an associated public sphere is extending claims to membership in cross-border civic and political communities grounded in rights-based worldviews, such as feminism, environmentalism, indigenous rights, and human rights. Fourth, within multilateral institutions, regional integration in Europe and broader international “soft law” reforms are recognizing individuals’ standing and “proto-rights” vis-à-vis transnational authorities.4

As Bauböck (2003) put it, “the new challenge for political theory is to go beyond a narrow state-centered approach by considering political communities and systems of rights that emerge at levels of governance above or below those of independent states or that cut across international borders” (p. 704). Can these incipient processes of cross-border inclusion be understood in terms of transnational citizenship, at a historical moment that might turn out to be comparable to the early stages of the construction of national citizenship? After all, it took centuries to construct and expand national citizenship (Tilly 1998). Today, something is going on across borders that requires new conceptual categories—the question here is whether (and how) the concept of transnational citizenship might shed light on it.

The rest of this essay is organized into five sections. The first asks what “counts” as transnational citizenship and cautions against “conceptual stretching.” The second section raises questions for the agency-based approach to citizenship by exploring the distinction between claiming rights and actually gaining rights. The third section searches for possible emerging forms of cross-border citizenship relations within the broader trends in transnational civil society. The fourth section turns to migrant civic and political practices, to assess the degree to which forms of cross-border citizenship are developing within what are widely recognized as “transnational communities.” The fifth section briefly proposes a conceptual framework for mapping possible forms of transnational citizenship. This framework

4In one paradigm case, the multilateral development banks have responded to local/global protest by creating a set of ostensibly mandatory minimum social and environmental standards for institutional behavior, reinforced by the right of affected people to appeal directly to semiautonomous investigative bodies (Clark et al. 2003, Fox & Brown 1998).
returns to the distinction between state- and society-based definitions, cross-cut by the distinction between thick and thin genres of citizenship.

WHAT “COUNTS” AS TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP?

When one tries to define transnational citizenship with any degree of precision, the most challenging question is, “What counts?” After all, not all migrant political participation involves crossing borders, and not all transnational public interest campaigning leads to the construction of citizenship. Keck & Sikkink’s (1998) now-classic analysis of transnational advocacy networks detailed the “boomerang” approach, through which civil society campaigns outflank authoritarian regimes by reaching out across borders to use international pressure to open up domestic political space.5 Although transnational action can influence the balance of power between civil society actors and states, this process does not necessarily create transnational citizenship. Influence is not the same as rights, and not all rights are citizenship rights. For example, human rights are not equivalent to citizenship rights. In addition, networks may or may not constitute political communities, and not all forms of community involve citizenship.

Any attempt to pin down the concept of transnational citizenship raises all the contested issues that are associated with the term citizenship itself. Some approaches are defined primarily in reference to the state, with citizenship grounded in rights that are strong enough to constitute “enforceable claims on the state” (Tilly 1998, pp. 56–57). In contrast, diverse communitarian conceptions of citizenship are grounded in membership in civic or political communities.7 In other words, approaches to citizenship that depend on institutionally guaranteed rights are quite different from those defined by collective action and shared identities. These two different dimensions of citizenship can be described in shorthand as state-based and society-based. Though conceptually distinct, in practice they are interdependent. A long tradition of comparative historical-sociological analysis, associated most notably with Barrington Moore, shows how waves of collective action made individual rights possible (e.g., Tilly 1998). As Foweraker & Landman

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5Most of the relevant literature about the influence of cross-border campaigning focuses on the global south, but the process is relevant for the global north as well. For a revealing analysis of a native Canadian campaign experience, see Jenson & Papillon (2000).

6Jones & Gaventa (2002) provide a useful overview of the recent literature on citizenship, which focuses on agency-based approaches. From a different tradition of political theory, Schuck & Smith (1985) distinguish between “ascriptive” (based on circumstances such as birthplace) and “consensual” bases of citizenship (based on “free individual choices”).

7Johnston (2001) tries to transcend this dichotomy. His definition, which is applied to politically empowered migrants, regardless of official citizenship status, “include[s] the citizenries of multiple nationalities within a single state, citizenries of single nations that straddle state borders, and citizenries that simultaneously belong to more than one national polity” (p. 256). See also Johnston (2003).
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(1997) put it, “almost paradoxically, the essentially individual rights of citizenship can only be achieved through different forms of collective struggle” (p. 1, italics in original).

In other words, if the core criteria of rights and membership mean that citizenship is a relational concept—between citizens and a state and/or a political community—then what would transnational citizenship relate to? In the context of liberal democratic states, the relationship is vertical, between the individual and the state, mediated by the rule of law and formal political equality. Some analysts deploy a more horizontal approach, focusing on power relations within society. In the case of transnational citizenship, however, the reference point is not as clear—citizen power in relation to what? If one extends the vertical citizen-state relationship transnationally, then the analogous reference point would be multi-lateral public authorities, such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the international financial and trade institutions, as well as new bodies such as the International Criminal Court. If one extends the more society-based approach to citizenship horizontally across borders, then the focus would be on membership in transnational civic or political communities. These conceptual choices between state- versus society-based definitions of citizenship are each path-dependent, ultimately determining what counts as citizenship according to a given set of assumptions. In an actor-based approach, membership in a political community is the key criterion. In a rights-based approach, the establishment of enforceable access to rights marks the threshold that determines citizenship.

If, as the actor-based approach might suggest, the process of claiming rights across borders were to generate transnational citizenship, then the citizenries that are empowering themselves should be clearly identifiable. If citizenship is about membership in a polity, in addition to claims about rights, then how is that polity defined? Bauböck (1994) defines a polity as “an inclusive community or association of equal members that extends basic rights to everybody subject to its collective decisions” (p. viii). The key questions for defining a transnational polity, then, are (a) what are the criteria for membership? and (b) how are the boundaries delineated? Transnational civil society actors are constructing new kinds of membership, but do they involve rights and responsibilities that are sufficiently clear to count as transnational citizenship? Or are the boundaries of both the concept and the actors themselves so difficult to pin down that transnational citizenship is watered down by its very breadth—a case of conceptual stretching (Collier & Mahon 1993, Sartori 1980)?

A narrow approach would limit the definition of transnational citizenship to those migrants who manage to create or sustain dual or multiple national identities (Bauböck 1994). A broad approach would refer to those multi-level processes through which social, civic, and political actors claim rights in the transnational public sphere. For example, in “the age of globalization,” Yuval-Davis (1999) speaks of “citizenship as a multi-layered construct in which one’s citizenship in collectivities—local, ethnic, national, state, cross or trans-state and suprastate—is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positionings
of each layer” (p. 119, emphasis added). Both these approaches evoke an agency-based notion of citizenship, as distinct from a primarily state-focused rights-based approach.

CLAIMING RIGHTS VERSUS GAINING CITIZENSHIP

One of the problems that arises when we look for citizenship in the transnational public sphere is that claiming rights is not the same as gaining citizenship. Most claims are not enforceable, which underscores the big difference between the widely resonant notion of the “right to have rights” and the actual winning of those rights. The first idea is primarily normative, whereas the second is empirically tangible. This distinction suggests that the society-based or agency-driven concept of citizenship is problematic. Though normatively appealing, it is difficult to define with precision. Yes, in practice, rights are constituted by being exercised, but only some attempts actually win respect for rights.

This leads to the following puzzle: Are those who consider themselves to have rights, but are denied them with impunity, citizens of anything? Imagine the case of a frontline grassroots organizer who is treated as a full participant in international civil society or United Nations forums but is abused with impunity once she gets back home (whether by governments, local political bosses, or her husband). How would the concept of transnational citizenship apply? Can one be a “citizen” while abroad but not at home? Here Yuval-Davis’ (1999) concern for disentangling the interaction between levels of “multi-layered citizenship” is relevant. Painter (2002), a geographer focused on the EU experience with multi-layered citizenship, notes that empirical research on actual practices lags behind the conceptual discussion. The right to be heard in international forums does matter, but it falls short of transnational citizenship. Other terms to describe cross-border recognition of human rights and excluded voices are more precise, such as the notion of standing.

In summary, the claiming of rights is necessary but not sufficient to build citizenship. Along the lines of the state- versus society-based dimensions of citizenship described above, one could pose a distinction between a rights-based approach and an empowerment-based approach. Empowerment, in the sense of actors’ capacity to make claims, is distinct from rights, defined as institutionally recognized guarantees and opportunities. They do not necessarily go together. Institutions may nominally recognize rights that actors, because of a lack of capacity to make claims, are not able to exercise in practice. Conversely, actors may be empowered in the sense of having the experience and capacity to demand and exercise rights, while lacking institutionally recognized opportunities to do so. Rights and empowerment can each encourage the other, and indeed they overlap in practice, but they are analytically distinct. In other words, some must act like citizens (claim rights) so that others can actually be citizens (have rights), but acting like a citizen is not the same as being a citizen. If this distinction makes sense, then most of transnational civil society falls far short of transnational citizenship.
LOOKING FOR CITIZENS IN TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The term transnational citizenship is less expansive than its apparent synonyms, world citizenship and global citizenship, and is more clearly cross-border than the term cosmopolitan citizenship. A longstanding normative theoretical tradition calls for “global” or “world” citizenship. In contrast, the term transnational citizenship can refer to cross-border relations that are far from global in scope. This is analogous to the distinction between the concepts of global versus transnational civil society (i.e., Edwards & Gaventa 2001, Florini 2000, Kaldor et al. 2003, Keane 2003, Lipschutz & Mayer 1996, Tarrow 2001, Walzer 1995, Wapner 1996). Critics of the concept of global civil society argue that it implicitly overstates the degree of cross-border cohesion and joint action in civil society (Laxer & Halperin 2003). In the context of this debate, the term transnational citizenship would apply most clearly to membership in the EU—a political community that is clearly cross-border yet certainly not global. Yet Bauböck (2003), one of the leading proponents of the concept of transnational citizenship, suggests that the EU is better understood instead as “supranational,” meaning that individual membership requires citizenship in an EU nation-state. Indeed, it is not at all clear whether the EU’s transnational political experiment is the leading edge of a growing trend or is the exception that proves the rule in terms of the persistent grip of nation-states on political sovereignty. So far, the latter seems more likely. Either way, analysts agree that EU citizenship is still both “thin” and fundamentally grounded in national citizenship.

Transnational citizenship could also refer more narrowly to strictly binational relationships that are limited to specific political communities (not necessarily nation-states) and are therefore considerably less than global in scope. In contrast, the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship, although it refers to freedom from national limitations, does not necessarily have a cross-border dimension in terms of community membership or rights (Hutchings & Dannreuther 1999). The term cosmopolitan citizenship is close to a synonym for multicultural citizenship, which

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8 Comprehensive normative discussions include Delanty (2000), Heater (2002), and Hutchings & Dannreuther (1999), as well as Bowden’s (2003) critique. Bowden observes that “the idea of global citizenship is inextricably linked to the West’s long and torturous history of engaging in overzealous civilising-cum-universalising missions in the non-Western world” (p. 350). From a Chinese perspective, however, He (2004) defends the concept of world citizenship and Henderson & Ikeda (2004) offer a distinctly non-Western (Buddhist-inspired) approach.

9 A serious discussion of changes in rights, membership and sovereignty in the EU would require a separate review (see, e.g., Bauböck 2003, Bellamy & Warleigh 2001, Jacobson 1996, Jacobson & Benarieh Ruffer 2004, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a,b, Painter 2002, Schmitter 2000, Soysal 1994), Bellamy & Warleigh (2001) are not very sanguine: “[T]he scope and character of the equality conferred by EU citizenship is more akin to that of the subjects of a common ruler than of citizens capable of being both rulers and ruled in turn” (p. 3).
recognizes and respects multiple identities (Kymlicka 1995). From the field of Latino Studies, the term cultural citizenship has come to refer to a similar inclusionary respect for difference, but without specific reference to a cross-border dimension (Flores & Benmayor 1997).

Tarrow (2005) shifts the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship from a multicultural stance toward cross-border engagements with his broad definition of “rooted cosmopolitans” as “people and groups who are rooted in their specific national contexts, but who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transnational networks,...” In contrast with the term transnational citizenship, “rooted cosmopolitan” is broader, not limited to civic-political engagements, and the threshold of transnational engagement is lower than the full membership in a community that one associates with citizenship.

Transnational Civil Society is Necessary but not Sufficient for Transnational Citizenship

Within the arenas of transnational civil society that do not involve migrants, non-governmental organizations that are active across borders include both idea-based and interest-based groups (difficult to disentangle as those collective identities may be). Some share normative principles, as in the case of human rights, environmental, and feminist “principled issue networks” (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Others are based on counterpart class locations, as in the case of the multiplicity of cross-border business associations (Sklair 2001), as well as labor union federations and coalitions within shared industries (Levi & Olson 2000, Waterman 1998, Waterman & Wills 2001) and emerging peasant movement networks (Edelman 2003).

Not all cross-border collective action takes the form of processes that claim rights. Where then does one draw the line between transnational citizenship and other kinds of cross-border collective action? Most transnational civil society strategies lead to a presence in the public sphere that often involves voice and sometimes extracts concession but usually falls short of either rights vis-à-vis powerful institutions or membership in a transnational polity. In the words of a key proponent of the notion of global citizenship, “Citizenship is tied to democracy, and global citizenship should in some way be tied to global democracy, at least to a process of democratization that extends some notion of rights, representation and accountability to the operations of international institutions, and gives some opportunity to the peoples whose lives are being regulated to participate in the selection of leaders” (Falk 1994, p. 128). Muetzelfeldt & Smith (2002) also make the case that “to analyze global civil society and global citizenship it is necessary to focus on global governance” (p. 55). This approach refers to the specific subset of transnational civil society that relates to transnational institutions, but even then citizenship will have to wait until they are (somehow) democratized. Note that the widely-used related term “democratization of global governance” has yet to be defined with any precision. It usually refers to reforms of multilateral institutions.
that would provide greater North-South balance between nation-states (see, e.g., Aksu & Camilleri 2002), regardless of their political regimes, an approach that is unrelated to one-person/one-vote definitions to democracy.

As a final caveat here, the growing literature on transnational civil society focuses primarily on those organizations that pursue certain values: gender, ethnic, and racial equality, political freedom, defense of the environment, and public accountability for powerful institutions. Just as in the case of national civil societies, however, much of existing transnational civil society reinforces the status quo or promotes conservative change that could roll back rights. Are these other civil society actors generating transnational citizens as well?

Most Cross-Border Networks and Coalitions do not Constitute Transnational Movements

The construction of a transnational public sphere involves a wide range of face-to-face encounters, information sharing, exchanges of experiences, and expressions of solidarity. Sometimes these exchanges generate networks of ongoing relationships. Sometimes these networks in turn lead to coalitions and generate the shared goals, trust, and understanding needed to collaborate on specific campaigns. Yet most encounters do not generate ongoing networks, and most networks do not produce sustained active coalitions. As Keck put it (personal communication), “coalitions are networks in action mode.” Networks, unlike coalitions, do not necessarily coordinate their actions, nor do they come to agreement on specific joint actions. In addition, neither networks nor coalitions necessarily involve significant horizontal exchange between their respective bases. Indeed, many rely on a handful of interlocutors to manage relationships between broad-based social organizations that have relatively little awareness of the nature and actions of their counterparts. The concept of transnational social movement organizations, in contrast, implies much higher density and much more cohesion than networks or coalitions have. The term transnational movement organizations suggests a collective actor that is present in more than one country. Classic cases include migrant groups that have organized membership in more than one country, or transnational environmental organizations that have organized social bases (not just employees) in multiple countries, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. In short, transnational civil society exchanges can produce networks, which can produce coalitions, which can produce movements—but not necessarily.

Distinguishing between networks, coalitions, and movements helps to avoid blurring political differences and imbalances within so-called transnational movements, which may appear homogeneous from the outside. As Keck & Sikkink

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10 These two paragraphs draw on Fox (2002). For a similar approach, see Khagram et al. (2002).

11 Despite their apparent similarities, these two groups have very different transnational structures. Greenpeace is a single organization with national branches, whereas Friends of the Earth is a coalition of distinct and more autonomous national affiliates.
(1998) point out, transnational networks face the challenge of developing a “common frame of meaning” despite cross-cultural differences (p. 7). In practice, however, such shared meanings are socially constructed through joint action and mutual understanding rather than through shared intentions or professed values and goals. And political differences within transnational networks, despite apparently shared goals, should not be underestimated. Even those transnational networks that appear to share basic political-cultural values, such as environmental, feminist, indigenous, or human rights movements, often consist of actors who have very different, nationally distinct political visions, goals, and styles. At the same time, national borders may not be the most important ones here. For example, ecologists or feminists from different countries who share systemic critiques may have more in common with their cross-border counterparts than with the more moderate wings of their respective national movements in each country (Fox 2002).

These networks and coalitions create a transnational public sphere from which shared ideas of membership, rights, and mutual responsibility can emerge, but only in cases and under conditions that have yet to be specified. In this context, it is useful to distinguish the broad “social field” within which transnational civil society actors operate from the actual relationships between specific actors and their widely varying degrees of cross-border density, cohesion, and balance (Alvarez 2005).12

Shared Targets may not Generate Shared Political Community

Some mobilizations that look transnational are really more international. People in different countries may have common enemies without necessarily experiencing membership in a shared community. For example, wars of aggression can provoke resistance in many countries, but that does not mean that participants identify either with each other or with the target of the aggression. Recall the mobilizations in the 1960s against the U.S. war in Indochina, or in the 1980s against nuclear weapons—protest was very international but not very transnational. Even when there is some degree of coordination among protesters in different countries, that could be purely instrumental, without a shared transnational political community.

Some mobilizations that are widely presented as transnational are in practice more international. For example, campaigns against probusiness trade and investment liberalization, such as those against the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Multilateral Investment Agreement, and the World Trade Organization,
have not necessarily generated a transnational political community that shares
more than instrumental goals (Fox 2002, Laxer 2003). Some would argue similarly regarding a case that seems a paradigm of successful transnational advocacy,
the campaign for an international treaty against land mines (Mekata 2000). Only
the handful of cross-border campaigners who become the “synapses” and “relays”
that stitch together coalitions of primarily locally and nationally grounded move-
ments are plausible candidates for transnational citizenship (Fox & Brown 1998;
Tarrow 1995, 2001). These strategic bridge-builders have been called “rooted cos-
mopolitans” (Tarrow 2005), “citizen pilgrims” (Falk 1994, pp. 138–39, cited in
Heater 2002, p. 13) and “grassroots globalists” (Henderson & Ikeda 2004).

Rethinking Past Internationalisms Sheds Light on
What “Counts” as Transnational Citizenship

If, following an agency-based approach, transnational citizenship refers to cross-
border collective civic or political identities that are rooted in more than one
society, then it could provide a way to rethink historical experiences with classic internationalist social and political movements. Keck & Sikkink (1998) pioneered
the historical contextualization of contemporary transnational activist networks.
Throughout history, individuals have crossed borders and described one society
to another—including “explorers,” traders, and fellow travelers from Marco Polo
to John Reed. They are distinct, however, from the cross-border campaigners
described above, who more strategically strive to construct collective political
identities that are shared across borders. For example, the First International was
the first transnational workers’ political coalition (Nimtz 2002). Other historical
examples of deeply rooted cross-border political identities arise from the spread of
anarcho-sindicalism through Europe and the Americas as part of a massive wave of
migration. Marcus Garvey’s pan-Africanist movement was widely felt in the United
States and throughout the Caribbean (Campbell 1987). The Mexican revolution
incorporated U.S. participants and sent internationalist exiles who joined the U.S.
left, and revolutionary leader Ricardo Flores Magón pioneered “full” political
binationality in both countries (MacLachan 1991). Were the internationalists who
fought to defend Republican Spain transnational citizens? Clearly, transnational
collective political identities have a long history—the question is whether they add
up to a kind of citizenship.

Fast-forward later into the twentieth century and one can ask, where does the tra-
dition of international solidarity with “national liberation movements” fit into the
current discussion of transnational citizenship? Strongly influenced by movements
against colonial and neocolonial legacies, these international solidarity movements
could also be considered fellow travelers of long-distance nationalism—though
their cross-border constituencies and partners included internationalists of diverse
nationalities as well as diasporic nationalists. At least since the 1960s, the national
boundaries of these movements have been quite porous, allowing nationals of one
Latin American country to join movements in other countries. Based on shared
regional transnational collective identities organized around class struggle and anti-imperialism, nationals of one Latin American country could even reach leadership positions across borders. Che Guevara was a paradigm case, an internationalist who became a national icon.

In the 1970s, southern African revolutionaries helped to inspire the U.S. branch of the transnational antiapartheid movement with their call to join the fight from “within the belly of the beast” (e.g., Seidman 2000). U.S. movements in solidarity with Central American revolutionary movements in the 1970s and 1980s followed two parallel tracks, one targeting Central American refugee communities in the United States, the other reaching out to U.S. civil society organizations. These consciously constructed South-North transnational political communities involved U.S. supporters “taking direction” from the South and encouraged an unprecedented degree of people-to-people exchange among religious congregations, trade unions, women’s organizations, and civil rights leaders. By the late 1980s, these networks had gained significant influence in mainstream civil society institutions and the U.S. Congress (e.g., Gosse 1988, 1995). Such international-solidarity activism did involve a kind of cross-border membership, at least for a handful of cultural-political interlocutors, who often had some voice though no vote. They gained a form of internationalist membership by choosing to take on responsibilities, but they rarely gained rights within these political communities.

International Solidarity: Ideological Affinity Versus Counterpart-Based Coalitions

What has long been called international solidarity was firmly grounded in nationalism as the dominant ideological framework for understanding the struggle for self-determination. More recently, the widespread disillusionment with vanguard political-party-led approaches to national liberation, together with internationalist civil society ideologies, has led to a shift away from implicitly statist “long-distance nationalist” approaches to national liberation. The paradigm case is the Zapatista rebellion, which, despite the “national” and “army” in its name, did not pursue a classic statist approach and instead focused on energizing and mobilizing other civil society actors. Its main focus was on the rest of Mexican civil society, although the Zapatistas soon discovered that their message resonated internationally. Their movement became the “shot heard round the world” against top-down globalization. Their claim to authenticity, their performance and communicative strategies, and their very limited use of violence grounded a vision of changing power relations through participation from below, instead of the classic revolutionary attempt to administer power from above. Their rights discourse reached out to disparate social movements around the world that felt excluded by globalization and disil-

13There is a fascinating debate over the relative weight of international factors and actors in the Zapatista rebellion (see, e.g., Cleaver 2000, Hellman 2000, Oleson 2003, Paulson 2001, Stephen 2002). For an analysis that emphasizes their communicative strategies in terms of “marketing,” see Bob (2001).
舅舅的政党和被政党和建设的意识形态基础，后来被称为全球正义运动。然而，尽管这种广义的“我们都彼此排斥”方法可以建立跨境的团结，但它不一定会产生足够的密度和凝聚力，使我们能够称其为跨边界的共享政治社区，更不用说公民身份了。

另一个重要的转变，与主要基于意识形态亲和力的经典跨境团结不同，更少是语言上的，而是更基于当地和国家的公民社会组织在没有全球化之前没有考虑过的问题。这是转向网络和联盟的建设，基于共享的“对等”地位。跨边境的对等概念在社会行动者中间并不意味着相似或同意，而是类似的角色在各自的国家中（Brooks & Fox 2002）。例如，对等的观念可以适用于与同一公司或农药打交道的抗毒活动者，同一行业或部门的工人，生殖自由活动者，或土著权利活动者。不能假设他们分享理念，他们的政治也不一定是国际主义的——但是他们在各自的国家中类似的位置使得分享经验至少有吸引力。如果对等的共享更多相关的挑战，如果他们也共享文化或语言，那么就有可能进入下个阶段，建立一个共享的集体身份。例如，在美墨之间，从两国的工人之间进行的工人对工人交流比必须面对深刻的语言和文化差异的交流更有可能产生一个共享的身份。对于另一个例子，跨国的人权活动者，他们共享跨境运动文化以及原因，有一个更坚实的基础，因为在这个跨国的女性主义社区和由天主教机构构成的跨国机构中，共享一个身份。然而，这些跨国机构的成员权仍然非常依附，当然低于更具体的概念的公民身份。

CROSS-BORDER MIGRANT POLITICS

不仅如此，最明确的公民身份体现为实际的政治赋权，新兴的跨国投票权模式值得审查。

Direct Transnational Political Enfranchisement

直接的跨国投票权模式有四种主要形式：跨国公民的投票权，移民的投票权在他们所在的政治实体，工人和政治实体的对等。

在美墨之间，工人工人之间的交流，比必须面对深刻的语言和文化差异的交流，更有可能产生一个共享的身份。对于另一个例子，跨国的人权活动者，他们共享跨境运动文化以及原因，有一个更坚实的基础，因为在这个跨国的女性主义社区和由天主教机构构成的跨国机构中，共享一个身份。然而，这些跨国机构的成员权仍然非常依附，当然低于更具体的概念的公民身份。

换句话说，如果跨国机构的成员权仍然非常依附，当然低于更具体的概念的公民身份。
they are not citizens, legislative representation of expatriates, and the election of
transnational authorities.

CROSS-BORDER VOTING RIGHTS    The number of countries that allow migrants to
vote from abroad is increasing, but the actual terms of engagement between polities
and migrant citizens vary widely. The devil is often in the details: the conditions for
the exercise of the rights (which migrants can vote, under what administrative re-
quirements); the degree to which the rights are exercised (degree of expatriate voter
turnout); and the relative weights of migrants in the national polity—measured both
by their share of the potential electorate and by their presence in the national imag-
ination (Aleinikoff 2001, Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer 2000, Aleinikoff et al. 2003,
Castles & Davidson 2000).

So far, the political symbolism of migrant voting appears to outweigh its actual
electoral significance. Turnout is driven down by extensive lags in implementation
and administrative obstacles. In the Philippine case, for example, 16 years passed
between legislative approval and implementation, and voting rights were condi-
tional on the voting migrant’s permanent return to the Philippines within three
years (Landigin & Williamson 2004). So far, the Mexican and Turkish experiences
seem likely to follow similar paths.14 Given the conflicting incentives that
domestic political leaders face when deciding whether and how to grant voting
rights to migrants, one could hypothesize that the larger the emigrant share of the
national population, the more likely politicians are to promise them political inclu-
sion while making the actual exercise of political rights as narrow and difficult as
possible.

MIGRANTS VOTING WHERE THEY ARE NOT CITIZENS    The second form of direct
transnational enfranchisement takes the form of migrants voting in polities in which
they are not citizens, as in the case of local elections in several European countries,
New Zealand, and even some U.S. localities.15 For those migrants who become
naturalized citizens where they settle, the question of transnational membership
becomes ambiguous, insofar as some migrants actively retain home country iden-
tities, loyalties, and sometimes rights, whereas others follow the path of “don’t
look back” assimilation. Until recently, at least in the United States, belonging
to two distinct national polities at once was widely seen as difficult or impossi-
ble, with the partial exception of Israel (e.g., Renshon 2000). It turns out, how-
erver, that continued engagement with home country politics does not necessarily

14An added complication is posed by the distinction between nationality and citizenship,
since not all nation-states consider the two to be equivalent. For the case of Mexico, see
Calderon & Martínez Saldaña (2002), Castañeda (2003, 2004), and Martínez-Saldaña &
Ross (2002).

15See Bauböck’s (2003) useful discussion as well as Walderuch’s (2003) detailed review of
migrant voting regulations in 36 countries. On the emerging debate in the United States,
see Swarns (2004).
conflict with incorporation into the U.S. political system. Migrants from countries that recognize dual nationality are more likely to become naturalized U.S. citizens than are those from other countries (Jones Correa 2001a,b). This finding is consistent with the findings of Guarnizo et al. (2003) and Escobar (2004). At the same time, at least for Latinos in the United States, it is likely that U.S. cultural, political, and legal factors are also powerful determinants of the propensity to become naturalized citizens. For example, a longitudinal cross-state comparative study clearly shows how naturalization rates change in response to anti-immigrant political campaigns (Pantoja et al. 2001). Naturalization decisions should also be understood against the contradictory backdrop of a dominant U.S. political culture that tends to treat Latinos and Asian-Americans as permanent foreigners, even after many generations as citizens (Rocco 2004). New comparative research in developing countries also suggests that some undocumented immigrants also manage to gain voting rights without going through the conventional process of naturalization associated with Europe and the United States (Sadiq 2003).

LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION OF EXPATRIATES The third kind of direct cross-border electoral participation involves the right to be voted for, though not necessarily the right to vote. Some nation-states, such as Italy and Colombia, assign legislative seats to represent expatriate constituencies. In other countries, migrants can run for office—examples include mayoral races and party lists for state and federal Congress in Mexico.

ELECTED TRANSNATIONAL AUTHORITIES The paradigm case of an elected transnational authority is the European parliament. As in many political systems, there appears to be a chicken-and-egg relationship between the European parliament’s perceived institutional relevance and levels of voter engagement (Minder 2004).

Indirect Transnational Political Enfranchisement

Transnational electoral enfranchisement can be indirect in at least two ways. First, migrants can participate in home country elections without voting, both by influencing their family and social networks and through campaigns, fund-raising, and media action (Fitzgerald 2004). Second, they can participate electorally in their country of residence without actually voting by encouraging sympathetic citizens to vote, as in the notable case of campaigns by Los Angeles’ mobilized trade unions that actively include noncitizens—“voting without the vote” (Varsanyi 2004). The question of migrant suffrage raises the broader issue of the relationship between citizenship and voting rights. Today voting rights are seen as inherent in (democratic) citizenship, yet in historical terms this convergence is relatively recent. Before World War I, the majority of U.S. citizens could not vote, whereas alien suffrage was widespread for men of European origin (Varsanyi 2004).
Transnational Citizenship Versus “Long-Distance Nationalism”

Organized social, civic, and political participation by migrants, often grounded in transnational communities, provides the strongest set of cases for both conceptually clarifying and empirically documenting processes of transnational citizenship. Transnational communities are groups of migrants whose daily lives, work, and social relationships extend across national borders. The existence of transnational communities is a precondition for, but is not the same as, an emerging migrant civil society, which also involves the construction of public spaces and representative social and civic organizations.16

As Fitzgerald (2004) has pointed out, much of the literature on transnationalism conflates two distinct forms of nationalism: “(1) the trans-state long-distance nationalism of identification with a ’nation’ despite physical absence from the homeland and (2) the dual nationalism of political identification with two distinct ‘nations’ ” (emphasis in original).17 Although some individuals may participate in both forms of nationalism, they are analytically distinct. Long-distance nationalists are not necessarily dual nationalists.18 Another important distinction is that

16For reviews of the flourishing sociological literature on transnational communities, see, among others, Fletcher & Margold (2003), Guarnizo et al. (2003), Levitt (2001a,b), Portes (2001, 2003), Portes et al. (1999), Smith & Guarnizo (1998), and Waldinger & Fitzgerald (2004). Much of this debate is framed in the broader context of “transnationalism.” Some, like Portes, use survey methods in which the individual is the unit of analysis. He and his colleagues find that only a minority of migrant populations participates intensively in collective transnational activities, while a larger group participates intermittently. Compared to romanticized expectations of very broad-based transnational communities, these levels of reported participation appear low. However, if one compares reported participation levels to the degree to which members of most other social groups engage in sustained social or civic collective action, then they do not seem so low.


18Waldinger & Fitzgerald (2004) also make the stronger claim that long-distance nationalism is inherently “particularistic.” For them, transnationalism does not refer to “trans-state” relationships. Instead they define it much more subjectively as “extending beyond loyalties that connect to any specific place of origin or ethnic or national group” (p. 1178, emphasis in original). By definition, this excludes most of what other sociologists consider to be transnational civic or political identities and collective action. For example, on Turkey, see Østergaard-Neilsen (2003a); on Mexico, see Goldring (2002), Smith (2003a), and Orozco (2004); on the Dominican Republic, see Levitt (2001a) and Itzigsohn et al. (1999); on Colombia, see Escobar (2004); on El Salvador, see Landholdt et al. (1999); on Guatemala, see Popkin (1999); and on Haiti, see Francois (2001) and Glick-Schiller & Fouron (1999). Comparative approaches include Itzigsohn (2000) and Østergaard-Neilsen (2003b). On the role of “sending” nation-states in this process, see footnote 19 and Levitt & de la Dehesa (2003).
long-distance nationalism has a much longer history—only relatively recently have changes in political cultures created the space needed for dual nationalisms to be tolerated.

Historically, the dominant national political cultures in both societies obliged migrants to choose one polity or the other. As Jones-Correa (1998) put it, “loyalties to different territorial political communities are often seen as irreconcilable” (p. 5). Nevertheless, in practice, migrant social and civic actors try to escape this dichotomous choice and are increasingly constructing both the practice of and the right to binationality. In the United States, for example, Latino civil rights activists debate whether migrant cross-border organizing will contribute to the fight for empowerment (Fox 2002). Until recently, there was a notable disconnect between U.S. Latino political representatives and migrant membership organizations, such as hometown clubs and their federations. For example, during the 1994 campaign against California’s infamous anti-immigrant ballot initiative, Prop. 187, Mexican migrant and U.S. Latino organizations had little contact, even if their offices were located across the street from one another. More recently, however, Mexican migrant hometown federations have worked closely with U.S. civil rights organizations and trade unions in Los Angeles to campaign and lobby for undocumented migrants’ right to drivers’ licenses (Rivera-Salgado & Escala-Rabadán 2004, Seif 2003, Varsanyi 2004). Meanwhile, at the other end of the ideological spectrum, other Mexican migrants are active in the Republican Party while campaigning for migrant voting rights in Mexico (Najar 2004).

Transnational Versus Translocal Membership

In the context of what are increasingly called transnational migrant communities, sometimes what seem to be transnational collective identities may be more precisely understood as translocal identities. For many migrants, their strongest cross-border social ties link specific communities of origin and settlement, without necessarily relating to national social, civic, or political arenas in either country. Translocal relationships are community-based social, civic, and family ties that cross borders despite being geographically dispersed, or “deterritorialized” as the anthropologists say (see Besserer 2002, 2004 for examples of multi-sited ethnography of dispersed communities).

However, “long-distance localism” is often treated as transnational, and the former does not necessarily imply the latter—depending on how one defines transnational (Fitzgerald 2004). In this view, translocal and transnational are analytically and empirically distinct. The additional claim that localistic cross-border identities inherently inhibit broader identifications is overstated, however (e.g., Waldinger 2004, Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). In practice, translocal and transnational identities often overlap and may well reinforce each other (Castañeda 2003, 2004), as exemplified by the annual Easter festival in the town of Jeréz, Zacatecas. Its combination of regionally specific customs with the intense involvement of returning migrants would appear to be a paradigm case of translocal, not transnational, collective identity. However, both U.S. and Mexican national flags are prominently
displayed, and crowds joyfully burn effigies of both national presidents as part of the mass celebration (Moctezuma 2004, p. 37).

The distinction between transnational and translocal membership becomes clearest when the boundary between community insiders and outsiders is drawn with precision by community members themselves. This self-definition helps to answer the concerns of some anthropologists about the ambiguity inherent in the concept of “local.” Many Mexican indigenous communities explicitly use the term citizenship to refer to community membership, which requires high levels of responsibility to sustain the rights and standing involved in their participatory self-governance structures. Their definition of community membership, highly regulated by customary law, would meet any criteria for high-intensity, thick citizenship. Many of these communities have been experiencing out-migration for decades and as a result have experimented with a wide range of approaches to permit migrants to retain their community membership, depending on their long-distance contributions and/or their return to fulfill rotating service requirements. Some communities have remained firm, in an effort to address the loss of local leadership by requiring migrants to return to perform the obligatory unpaid leadership service required of all local citizens (e.g., Mutersbaugh 2002). Other communities, especially those with a longer tradition of migration, have redefined membership in an effort to reconcile both local leadership and migrant needs (Robles 2004). In this context, indigenous migrants who do not comply with community membership requirements become lapsed local citizens, though without becoming less (nationally) Mexican.

Three Main Forms of Transnational Citizenship

One could argue that full transnational citizenship, if it were defined as participation in more than one national political community, could follow at least three distinct paths. “Parallel” transnational participation refers to individuals who are active in more than one political community but whose organized communities do not themselves come together. The individuals may have multiple national identities, but the different organizations in which they participate do not. “Simultaneous” transnational participation refers to collective actions that in themselves cross borders. For example, indigenous Mexican farmworkers in Oregon engage in parallel transnational organizing: They participate both in a mainly U.S.-focused farmworker union and in a mainly Mexico-focused hometown association with multiple branches throughout the United States. The same people defend their class and migrant interests through one organization while defending their ethnic and translocal identities through another (Stephen 2004). Yet the two kinds of organizations do not come together. In contrast, in the case of the Oaxacan Indigenous Binational Front (FIOB), migrants use the same membership organization to fight for human rights vis-à-vis local, state, and national governments. Thousands of families identify as members, participating through local committees in both countries while reaching out to civil society organizations and policy
Flexible Forms of Transnational Citizenship

Anthropologists use the concept of flexible citizenship to refer to a specific genre of transnational citizenship. Flexible citizenship “refers to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions” (Ong 1999, p. 6). Ong’s influential and revealing study focuses on diasporic Chinese entrepreneurs’ cross-border “repositioning in relation to markets, governments and cultural regimes.” The diasporic foundation for these transnational identities and communities is clear and confers a strong sense of belonging. The subjects are what Ong calls “ethnically marked class groupings,” and their cross-border flexibility depends heavily on their class location (p. 7). However, the specific relevance of the concept of citizenship to this group is not clearly defined; it remains implicit rather than explicit in the study. These diasporic entrepreneurs are clearly members of a sustained social and cultural community—but they do not appear to be members of a shared civic or political community. This raises questions about whether the term citizenship applies at all.

Another kind of flexible membership in national societies involves the ways in which migrants frequently develop more pronounced national or ethnic identities in the diaspora than they experienced before leaving their homelands, in cases...
where local or regional rather than national loyalties had been primary. The migration literature has produced an ongoing debate about what precisely is new about transnational communities, but one point is clear: In at least some cases, national identities emerged from transnational migration. Notably, the idea of being Italian was created partly in the diaspora (Smith 2003b, p. 746) and Polish peasants became Polish in the diaspora (Burowoy 2000).

Frey (2003) offers a dramatically different approach to “flexible citizenship.” His normative perspective, grounded in an economist’s deductive approach, develops the concept of “organizational and marginal” citizenship, in an effort to account for multiple and partial kinds of rights and obligation-based participation in a wide range of formal institutions. In the process, however, the concept of citizenship becomes nearly synonymous with membership more generally. This conceptual exercise would be enriched by more empirical reflection. For example, Tilly (1998) recalls that early French revolutionary citizenship was defined incrementally, separating passive citizens from active citizens (those who paid three or more days’ wages in taxes and could vote) and second-degree active citizens (who paid at least ten days’ wages in taxes and could be elected).

### Power Relationships between Organized Migrants and At-Home Civil Society Actors

On the one hand, migrant civil society appears to be the paradigm case for transnational citizenship, including both the possibility of binational political rights and a common sense of membership in a shared political community. On the other hand, relationships between migrant organizations and civil society in the home country may or may not be balanced. Organized migrant civil society may or may not overlap or engage with organized civil society back home. The concept of counterparts is useful here. To what degree are migrant organizations engaged in balanced partnerships with counterparts in their countries of origin? In the Mexican context, many migrant organizations have won recognition as interlocutors with national and local governments, as they leverage and administer community development matching funds, but relatively few migrant organizations actually constitute the U.S.-based branch of an organized social actor based in both countries. For example, the Zacatecan federations in the United States are the largest and most consolidated Mexican migrant groups there, but their civil society partnerships in their home state are incipient at best (Goldring 2002). Indeed, civil society in some high-out-migration communities can be quite thin—not surprisingly, given the loss of enterprising young people. In contrast, some of the Oaxacan migrant organizations, many of which are based on broader regional and ethnic identities as well as hometowns, have organized branches not only in California and Oaxaca but also in Baja California, in between. This transnational political space constitutes the imagined community of “Oaxacalifornia” (Fox & Rivera-Salgado 2004).

It is also important to recognize that transnational migrant political mobilization may be undemocratic. This point is especially obvious in the case of authoritarian
transnational political projects, whether based on diasporic nationalism, the Third International, or religious fundamentalism, but the problem can also involve competitive electoral politics. Specifically, cross-border electoral mobilization can reproduce clientelistic practices within transnational families and communities that are inconsistent with democratic citizenship. Three main points are relevant here. First, the outreach strategies of home country political parties and states have had a major influence on patterns of migrant political action, and there is a substantial comparative literature on migrant relations with home country governments. First, migrants who support families in their home country by sending remittances may try to use that power to tell family members how they should vote, and trading money for votes is a defining feature of clientelism. Third, claims to voting rights and political representation for migrants in their home country are often based on the legitimacy and membership that are associated with their economic contribution through remittances. If cross-border economic investments were a sufficient basis for claiming citizenship and political rights, however, then transnational corporations could also claim membership, and if they were a necessary condition, then those migrants who could not afford to send remittances would be excluded. The implication of the remittance-based argument for cross-border voting rights is that national citizenship is not sufficient to justify the right to vote from abroad. In short, although basing claims for political rights on remittances has obvious instrumental political advantages, it risks contradicting such basic democratic principles as birthright citizenship and freedom of movement.

MAPPING TRANSNATIONAL RIGHTS AND MEMBERSHIP

Having reviewed some of the key empirical issues that emerge in the search for possible forms of transnational citizenship, let’s return to the question of how to define citizenship more generally. Our definitional choices about this term will inform the final assessment of whether transnational citizenship works conceptually.

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20 As Carlos Villanueva, a leader of a Mexican migrant organization campaigning for the right to vote abroad, put it, “one in four households received remittances. They are our militants.” He is both a convener of the National Convention of Mexican Organizations Abroad and a Bush Republican liaison with the Mexican migrant community (Najar 2004).

21 For a pioneering discussion of “market membership,” see Goldring (1998). The National Convention of Mexican Organizations Abroad recently proposed that migrants’ political representation be “at least proportional to the annual level of remittances” Najar (2004). For analyses of remittances and Mexican migrant organizations more generally, see Goldring (2002) and Orozco (2004), among others.
As illustrated in Table 1, these choices can be mapped along two distinct axes: state- versus society-based definitions of citizenship and degrees of intensity (thick versus thin). The first dimension contrasts different frames of reference, whether defined primarily in terms of *rights* as enforceable claims on public authorities (national or international) or in terms of *membership* in society-based political communities (i.e., those defined by ethno-national identities or transformative...
ideologies, which in turn could be civic or religious). The second dimension distinguishes between different degrees of “thickness,” that is, the varying intensities of rights (how broad and deep the rights are vis-à-vis public authorities) and membership (how active it is within society-based transnational political communities). This thick/thin approach is analogous to the distinction between “narrow and broad transnationality” made by Itzigsohn et al. (1999) but adds the distinction between rights and membership.

The sense of citizenship based on active participation and the struggle for equality could be considered “high-intensity citizenship,” whereas a minimum set of rights linked to membership, without necessarily requiring agency, could be seen as “low-intensity.” The two are related—the more the first kind of citizenship raises the ceiling, the more the standards for the floor can go up. So the actual “height” of the high-intensity approach clearly matters. However, high-intensity citizenship rarely reaches more than a small fraction of a given polity, so the “height of the floor” of low-intensity citizenship is what determines most people’s rights, most of the time. Identifying the causal pathways through which the ceiling for the empowered few can raise the floor for the rest is easier said than done. Rights for some citizens may conflict directly with rights for others (as in the case of racialized voting rights or certain property rights). More generally, many national experiences have shown that the widely studied horizontal expansion of citizenship rights from empowered subgroups to encompass entire societies is usually very slow and highly discontinuous, and can be reversible. This point would apply to transnational civil society as well, since there is no clear secular trend toward ever-broader inclusion.

Examples of varying degrees of thickness of rights include the growing array of less-than-full forms of recognition, such as the growing body of international “soft law” (Abbot & Snidal 2000). This discussion quickly leads to the international relations discussion of norms, which has gone furthest in the case of human rights (e.g., Risse et al. 1999, Hawkins 2003). The arena of soft law consists of the international agreements and institutional reforms that grant some degree of recognition or standing to people without requiring the explicit permission of nation-states. These “thin” transnational rights vis-à-vis public authorities range from international agreements on the rights of indigenous peoples, migrants, and refugees, to international multisectoral-stakeholder standard-setting bodies (such as those that propose standards with which to regulate dams or extractive industries), to the right to use national law to sue torturers or corporate abusers across borders, to the unusual degree of “standing” that the World Bank’s Inspection Panel extends

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22 Translocal Mexican indigenous communities complicate this implicitly dichotomous approach to rights- and membership-based domains, since their participatory approach to community self-governance blurs the boundary between local state and society.

23 "Low-intensity citizenship" has its analogue in “low-intensity democracy” (see, e.g., Gills et al. 1993, O’Donnell 1993).
to affected people who make formal claims (e.g., Fox & Brown 1998, Clark et al.
2003, Khagram 2004, Rajagopal 2003). These soft law provisions begin to institu-
tionalize the “boomerang” pattern of bypassing unresponsive nation-states, but the
rights remain thin because they are not enforceable. Within nation-states, examples
of thin rights include forms of recognition granted by subnational governments to
migrants—for example, through acceptance of home country identification docu-
ments, the right to vote in local elections, the right to “in-state resident” tuition in
state universities, or the right to drivers’ licenses (e.g., Seif 2003, Waslin 2002).
Arguably, these subnational measures are forms of “paralegalization.”

On the society side, thick and thin membership are mainly differentiated by
culturally rooted forms of collective identity, such as national, ethnic, linguistic,
or religious identities. By comparison, the ties that bind ideologically based com-
unities across borders tend to be thin. However, when combined, those different
bases for identity—culture, ideology, and counterpart status—can create an es-
pecially strong sense of shared collective identity. Smith’s work on the political
construction of peoples is relevant here. He defines a “political people” as a form
of imagined community that can impose binding obligations and duties, the scope
of which varies along two dimensions: (a) the range of issues involved, which
may be broad, intermediate, or narrow; and (b) “the potency of peoplehood,” the
intensity of the claims, which may be weak, moderate, or strong (Smith 2003c,
pp. 20–21). Table 1 maps analogous variation in relationships to authorities and
societies across borders, but it does not yet answer the key question: Does any of
this add up to transnational citizenship, conceptually or in practice?

CONCLUSIONS

Whenever a concept varies greatly in the eye of the beholder—as in the case of
citizenship—the risk of conceptual stretching is high. This risk is accentuated when
a contested adjective is applied. As a result, the concept of transnational citizenship
raises expectations that are difficult to meet. Perhaps the actual processes that the
concept tries to capture are still too incipient. In another decade or two, we will
know much more about whether current processes of globalization from below will
intensify, erode, or evolve in an unforeseen direction. In the meantime, however,
most of the transnational civic and political communities discussed here involve
boundaries, rights, and responsibilities that are too amorphous to warrant the term
citizenship, especially when ideas such as membership, standing, or human rights
will do.

This review has addressed both rights-based and membership-centered defini-
tions of the term, focusing on the conceptual challenges posed by the definitional
choices. These choices involve tradeoffs. Given these dilemmas, illustrated in
Table 1, only a high-intensity, rights-based definition of transnational citizenship
holds up well. By this definition the term refers to dual or multiple citizenships that
are grounded both in enforceable rights and in clearly bounded membership(s). For
the sake of precision, therefore, the terms dual or multiple citizenship are preferable
to the more open-ended concept of transnational citizenship. Multi-layered citizenship is evocative and captures meaningful new trends, but there is nothing necessarily cross-border about it.

The most powerful evidence in favor of taking notions of multiple or multi-layered citizenship seriously is in the EU. Europeans’ thin form of transnational individual membership can be dismissed as less than transnational citizenship because it is derived from their national citizenship. Skeptics may ask, what rights do “EU citizens” get—really—beyond what their states already provide? One answer is the right to move and work freely across national borders, a right that most migrants can only dream of. Whether one finds the term transnational citizenship evocative or too fuzzy, it is clear that the increasing significance and complexity of migrant-state-society relations leave the conceptualization of citizenship with some catching up to do.

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