

The Impact of Large-Scale Collective Action on Latino Perceptions of Commonality and Competition with African Americans*

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Objectives. To evaluate the impact of protests on Latinos' perceptions of commonality and competition with African Americans. We hypothesize that the reinforcement and politicization of in-group identities leads to greater identification and sense of commonality with other marginalized racial/ethnic groups. *Methods.* This study utilizes geocoded Latino National Survey data combined with an expanded protest event data set to estimate the effect of temporal and spatial proximity to immigrant rights protests on Latinos' perceptions of commonality and competition with African Americans using ordered logistic regression models. *Results.* The findings suggest that respondents' proximity to marches had a positive impact on Latino perceptions of commonality with African Americans. The results also show that proximity to protests did not lead to an increase in feelings of competition with African Americans except in the case of electoral representation. *Conclusions.* Examining temporal and spatial effects of protests improves our understanding of how protests can influence public opinion and how protests can influence identities and group relations.

The changing demographic composition of racial and ethnic groups in the United States, largely driven by immigration, has generated a great deal of speculation about the future of race relations and ethnic coalitions, particularly between the nation's two largest minority groups—African Americans and Latinos. However, scholars examining interactions between these groups have largely drawn on social science literature on intergroup contact, which still relies largely on a black-white paradigm that needs to be broadened to consider how multigroup contexts may reveal distinct patterns and effects of contact across multiple immigrant and native groups (Oliver and Wong, 2003). Broadening the consideration of intergroup relations and perceptions has the potential to both expand our understanding of the complexity of group interactions, and help us address the critical questions of how and when intergroup perceptions can change.

Existing approaches to black/Latino relations either point to evidence of friction between these two groups, resulting from a combination of negative stereotyping and competing interests (Marrow, 2011; McClain et al., 2006; Morin et al., 2011), or argue that Latinos and blacks perceive more commonalities than differences (Stokes, 2003; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Jones-Correa, 2011). In both approaches intergroup perceptions are seen as relatively fixed and immune to change: groups are apparently fated to be either competitors or collaborators. However, other approaches suggest otherwise. The group consciousness

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literature, for instance, argues that feelings of commonality and linked fate within groups are fostered by shared perceptions and experiences of discrimination (Henry and Muñoz, 1991; Jennings, 1997). Dawson's (1994) seminal work argues this is particularly the case among African Americans. This approach implies that perceptions and experiences are mutable and can change over time. Similarly, research on Latinos has found that nativist contexts help solidify common Latino identity and make it more salient among different Latino national origin groups, regardless of how many generations their families have resided in the United States (Telles and Ortiz, 2009; Massey and Sanchez, 2010). Again, the implication here is that contexts are not constant, and that changing contexts can shape identities, perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. We believe that the 2006 immigrant rights protest wave provides an exceptional opportunity for us to explore these possibilities.

In December 2005, the Republican-led House of Representatives passed H.R. 4437, more commonly known as the "Sensenbrenner Bill." The bill proposed to dramatically broaden the criminalization of activities deemed in violation of federal immigration law, including undocumented immigrants' presence in the United States and the actions of individuals giving aid or employment to these migrants. In opposition to this bill, in the spring of 2006, millions of immigrants and their U.S.-born allies participated in mass mobilizations across the country. Although people from a variety of racial and ethnic groups took part in the mass marches (Zepeda-Millán, 2014), because the proposed legislation primarily targeted immigrants of Latin American descent (Chavez, 2008) the demonstrators were overwhelmingly Latino (Voss and Bloemraad, 2011).

The question then is: Can new contexts and experiences affect intergroup perceptions? Can perceptions of commonality across racial/ethnic lines be triggered by shared experiences of discrimination and/or by mobilizing events? We explore these questions in this study, positing that the reinforcement and politicization of in-group identities as a result of anti-immigrant legislation and exposure to political protests reinforces a sense of commonality with other similarly positioned racial/ethnic groups. In the case of blacks and Latinos, we theorize that the reinforcement and politicization of a group identity among Latinos also leads to a greater sense of their identification and perceived commonality with African Americans, not increased competition.¹

We utilize geocoded respondent data from the Latino National Survey (LNS)—a survey instrument that was in the field before, during, and after the 2006 protest wave—combined with a unique protest event data set to estimate the effect of protests on Latinos' views of African Americans. We theorize that perceptions of commonality across racial/ethnic lines can be triggered by political mobilization against discrimination. Specifically, our contention is that the 2006 protests both reinforced an in-group pan-ethnic identity among Latinos and also activated a more inclusive superordinate identity as racial minorities that increased their sense of commonality with African Americans. Our findings suggest that the mass demonstrations reinforced Latinos' sense of commonality with African Americans in all dimensions but one—electoral representation.

Identity, Competition, and Commonality

The group threat literature, rooted in experimental psychology, finds that intergroup contact may trigger individuals' anxieties and perceptions of group threat—as the result of

¹Conversely, it is possible that exposure to the protests could make Latinos aware of their status within the racial hierarchy and thus more likely to view themselves as competing with African Americans over resources.

discrimination, for instance—and hardening group boundaries (Tropp, 2003; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). However, experiences of discrimination themselves can solidify feelings of group commonality and mobilize individuals to engage in the public sphere, making demands in the civic or political arena. For instance, there is a substantial literature indicating that for African Americans the experience of discrimination is correlated with higher rates of identification and participation (Henry and Muñoz, 1991; Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey, 1999; though see Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999). Experiences of discrimination may also reinforce individuals' perception that their life outcomes are linked to those of their group, or in the case of African Americans, their race (Dawson, 1994). There is some evidence that this "linked fate" concept translates to other ethnic and racial groups as well (Duncan, 1999). For example, despite intragroup differences, Latinos may also share a sense of linked fate, in part due to increased anti-immigrant sentiment that indiscriminately targets all Latinos, regardless of legal status or country of birth (Stokes, 2003; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace, 2013).

An important avenue of inquiry is whether these feelings of linked fate and experiences of discrimination can generate feelings of commonality not only within a racial group, but also *across* racially marginalized groups, as some literature suggests (Kaufmann, 2003; Sanchez, 2008). This work, particularly Sanchez (2008), points to evidence that Latinos perceive shared interests with African Americans. However, McClain et al.'s (2006) research on black/Latino relations in the South not only finds little in the way of perceptions of shared commonalities between Latinos and African Americans, but instead indicates that Latinos' views of blacks are underlain with racial stereotyping similar to those held by some whites (see also Morin et al., 2011). Thus, it is imperative to assess whether linked fate influences Latino perceptions of competition and commonality with African Americans.

Research in social psychology indicates that feelings of commonality across groups can be generated with the creation of a superordinate group identity, one that bridges other identities (González and Brown, 2003; Tropp, 2003). This suggests that if there were to be a sense of commonality bridging black/Latino group solidarity, it would be facilitated by a superordinate bridging identity, one available to both groups. The current research offers hints that this superordinate identity is likely to be based in common perceptions of discrimination, but there is very little in the research conducted thus far to suggest under what conditions these perceptions of discrimination might translate into greater perceptions of commonality across racial groups. In the case of the 2006 protests, we theorize that the marches not only reinforced an in-group pan-ethnic identity among Latinos, but also activated a more inclusive superordinate identity as racial minorities that increased their sense of commonality with African Americans, findings that likely to apply to similar kinds of mobilizing events.

Time, Space, and the Effects of Protests on Public Opinion

While research on the 2006 protests is still incomplete, recent studies examining the impact of the rallies on Latino public opinion have focused on who participated, why they did so, how they viewed the demonstrations, and the effects of the demonstrations on their perceptions of political efficacy and trust in government (Pedraza et al., 2011; Barreto et al., 2009). Despite their important contributions to our understanding of the 2006 protest wave, this research is limited in that the data they utilize are drawn from a single point in time, either from surveys taken during the demonstrations (Barreto et al., 2009) or after the protests had subsided (Pedraza et al., 2011), and thus fail to capture potentially important

temporal effects of the marches. This is important to note because those studies that have considered time in their analysis have interesting findings. For example, examining Latino public opinion before, during, and after the protest wave, Silber Mohamed (2013)² found that the demonstrations bolstered Latinos' sense of American identity and panethnicity, while Zepeda-Millán and Wallace's (2013) study revealed that Latino perceptions of racial identity increased during and after the protests compared to before they began. Similarly, very little prior work examines the spatial dimensions of the protests and how proximity influenced Latino public opinion (see, however, Wallace, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones Correa, 2014; Carey et al., 2014).

Despite the fact that social movements often seek to influence people's attitudes as well as government legislation, most research on the effects of political activism focuses on its contributions to changes in public policy rather than public opinion (e.g., Soule and Olzak, 2004; Burstein, 1999). One reason the effects of social movements on public attitudes may be understudied is that social scientists cannot predict when mass mobilizations will occur (Lee, 2002:42), thus the timing of protests and the administration of surveys do not usually coincide (Banaszak and Ondercin, 2009:12). As a result, studies that do examine the relationship between contentious politics and public attitudes usually look at how public opinion impacts social movements (see Burstein, 1999; Uba, 2009); social movement scholars rarely study how mass mobilizations shape public opinion (see Guigni, 2004; Banaszak and Ondercin, 2009 for exceptions). As explained in detail below, our study helps fill many of the research gaps mentioned above and overcomes the methodological limitations of previous approaches.

Data and Methods

To analyze the impact of spatial and temporal components of social movements on attitudes toward African Americans, we examine the 2006 immigrant rights protest wave by using the 2006 LNS and our unique "2006 Immigrant Protest-Event Dataset".³ One distinct advantage of this analysis over other work examining social movements and political attitudes is that the survey we rely on for our analysis, the LNS, was in the field before, during, and after the protest cycle.⁴ The LNS instrument contained an exact date of interview as well as the specific address of each respondent. These two measures allow us to create a protest variable that measures respondent proximity to protests in terms of time and space. This variable allows us to assess how the protests impacted Latino attitudes toward African Americans.

The LNS was conducted in 17 states between November 2005 and August 2006 with over 165 items.⁵ Interviews were conducted by phone and in Spanish or English. We focus on seven categorical measures of Latino attitudes toward African Americans. The first set of

²Silber Mohamed's study sets a start date of April 10, 2006 for the marches, which is much later than the first protest date of February 14 in both the Wallace et al. (2014) and Bada et al. data sets. By April 10, over 2 million people had already taken part in 100 protests. Thus in her work, the before period and the after period both include periods of marches.

³Perceptions of commonality could also be increased between Latinos and Asian Americans given their shared racialized status and immigrant populations. The models presented in Table 1 were run on two general commonality measures that were asked of respondents in CA, TX, NY, and UL. The results indicate exposure to protests had a significant and positive effect on Latinos' perceptions of commonality with Asian Americans.

⁴The breakdown of respondents between before, during, and after the protests are as follows: 1,835 people were interviewed before the protests began, 1,987 during the protests, and 4,110 after they subsided.

⁵The LNS was conducted in the 10 states with the largest Latino population and seven additional states with the fastest growing Latino populations. See LNS codebook (Fraga et al., 2006).

questions concerns commonality. Our first dependent variable is based on a question that asks respondents to evaluate how much Latinos have in common with African Americans in terms of job opportunities, educational attainment, or income. Second, we utilize a question asking respondents how much Latinos have in common with African Americans in terms of their political situation. In order to measure perceptions of linked fate between the two groups, we use a question asking respondents how much does Latinos doing well depend on African Americans doing well.

Turning toward our measures of competition, the models utilize four different items that ask respondents to indicate how much competition they perceive with African Americans in different arenas. The first survey question concerns competition in attaining employment in the private sector. Second, we utilize a measure that asks about competition in access to education and quality schools. The third item asks whether respondents perceive competition in getting jobs with the city or state government. Finally, the last item measures respondents' attitudes toward competition in having Latino representatives in elected office.⁶ Together the commonality and competition variables allow for an examination of a range of factors that influence feelings of "black-brown" competition and commonality.

Our "2006 Immigrant Protest-Event Dataset" builds on a previous collection of the 2006 protest events (Bada et al., 2006) by substantially expanding the number of protest observations and the information collected regarding each demonstration using data the authors collected both during and after the 2006 protests. To be confident in the validity of our data set, we utilized newspaper archives to find at least one article to substantiate the details of each protest observation (both in the original Bada et al., data set and our additional observations). For each protest event in our expanded data set, we also identified the specific geographical street address, city, zip code, and state information, as well as the number of participants and the date of the event. In all, we verified and collected data on a total of 357 immigrant protest events that took place in 2006 in response to the proposed federal immigration legislation, H.R. 4437.⁷

The first protest in our data set occurred on February 14, 2006 and the final series of demonstrations culminated on May 1, 2006. The protests were widely dispersed across the country, taking place in both urban and rural places. Their locations were not restricted to typical immigrant gateway areas in California, Texas, and New York, but included new immigrant-receiving destinations throughout the South and Midwest as well. The number of participants in these protests varied from 10 people to over 750,000 individuals; however, the majority were under 10,000 participants.⁸

To examine the effects of the protests on Latino attitudes toward African Americans, we merged the LNS and the protest data set to calculate the distance between respondents and the demonstrations. We used the specific address information of each respondent to calculate his or her exact distance to every protest location. We used GIS and distance was calculated as the crow flies.⁹ This level of specificity in the space measures is a significant strength of this project because it allows us to precisely assess the impact of proximity of the protest events on respondents' political attitudes.¹⁰

⁶For a full list of survey items, question wording, and response choices, see the online Appendix.

⁷This data set includes pro-immigrant demonstrations and includes 106 more events than the earlier Bada et al. (2006) table of protest events. Our analysis does not include counter (anti-immigrant) protests that might have taken place at the time.

⁸See online Appendix for map of protests (Figure 1A) and distribution of protests over time (Figure 2A).

⁹See online Appendix for specific discussion of the geocoding procedure and discussion of as the bird flies.

¹⁰While only an approximation of how individuals experience distance, this measure between each respondent's address and the location of each protest provides a substantial level of specificity in geographical proximity.

The raw distance measures for each respondent to each protest were used to create a summary protest measure for each respondent that includes both time and space—that is, the timing of the protest event and its distance from each respondent. In studies of public opinion that try to capture temporal effects of events, respondents are often asked about events taking place over the last week, two weeks, or month (Tourangeau et al., 2000). To measure the effects of time, we count the number of protests that occurred in the 30 days prior to the date of the respondent's interview. This allows for meaningful variation in as well as to set a duration of time that will still be recent enough that respondents could plausibly remember, be influenced, or be aware that a protest occurred.¹¹

To capture the effects of geographical proximity to a protest event, the protest measure only counts protests that took place within 100 miles of each respondent's address. In deciding the appropriate range, we selected the maximum feasible social geographical space that we felt most respondents might regularly traverse in the course of their daily lives. We expect 100 miles to represent the equivalent of a two-hour drive,¹² or the maximum likely distance that a respondent would travel regularly in his or her social life to engage in recreational activities with family and friends, and the likely maximum distance most people would be willing to commute every day for work.¹³ Moreover, we expect information about protests to be diffused within the local context via friends, family, individuals, and media news experiences. Thus, our protest variable counts the number of protests that occurred within 30 days of the interview within 100 miles of each respondent's address, which ranges from 0 to 22 relevant protests among respondents.¹⁴

In addition to the protest-specific variable, we also included a variety of covariates that could affect perceptions of commonality, linked fate, and competition toward African Americans. The first set is general demographic control variables. We include age because older respondents may be more likely to be influenced by memories of past social movement experiences such as the civil rights movement or conversely may reflect more conservative attitudes. Education is controlled for because as levels of education increase, respondents may be less likely to perceive competition with other groups (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). We also include gender to examine differences between Latinos and Latinas and party identification to assess if there are differences in attitudes among Democratic and Republican Latinos.

¹¹We examine time in terms of recent exposure to protests for each respondent, but do not emphasize the phases of the protest cycles in the analysis as that has been previously examined by Zepeda-Millán and Wallace (2013). Similarly, this study does not examine the magnitude of protests because we have no strong theoretical reason to expect that size, broadly construed, will play a key role in Latino attitudes toward competition and commonality with African Americans. Magnitude measures are often unreliable given the difficulty in measuring crowds (McPhail and McCarthy, 2004) and the variance in estimates between activists and police (Watson and Yip, 2011).

¹²We approximate the distance of 100 miles as roughly equivalent to two hours. The amount of time to travel this distance could vary depending on traffic, density of the area, and types of roads.

¹³See as a reference, "Journey to Work," Table QT-P23, U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000. See also Brian McKenzie and Melanie Rapino. 2011. *Commuting in the United States 2009*. American Community Survey Reports. U.S. Census Bureau.

¹⁴The construction of the protest variable encapsulates time and space within the measurement of a single variable. Alternative specifications might include expanding the number of miles or the number of days from the date of interview. These changes would only increase the number of protests respondents were exposed to and would not undermine the results. We chose to limit the protest variable numerically to test relatively restrictive parameters while still allowing meaningful variation. Reducing the number of days or distance from a protest event would only result in lower exposure rates to no theoretical effect. Delimiting the boundaries at 30 days and 100 miles allows for meaningful variation while still conforming measuring exposure in terms of space and time in a theoretically sound way. Moreover, the specificity of these measures far exceeds standard measures of time and space and is consistent with prior work in this area (see Wallace et al., 2014).

Second, we include variables related to respondents' immigration history and ancestral roots. Given differences in Latino political attitudes based on national origin groups (Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010; Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003), we include dichotomous measures for whether respondents are of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, or El Salvadoran decent. For example, Cubans are more likely to be the most conservative of the national origin groups, whereas Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are typically the most liberal. We also utilize a variable that measures the percent of a respondent's life that has been spent in the United States. This measure is not restricted to immigrants and is inclusive of the entire population of respondents. We include this measure in case recent immigrants or long-term residents diverge in perceptions of competition and commonality.

Spanish is an important cultural symbol that unifies Latinos as a group since it is a commonly shared trait (Schildkraut, 2003; Huntington, 2004). Usage of Spanish has also been demonstrated to be positively associated with increased Latino pan-ethnic consciousness (Masuoka, 2008). We include a measure of how important respondents think it is for themselves or their family to maintain the ability to speak Spanish because these individuals who feel this way may be more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans. Alternatively, their strong attachment to Latino identity may lead to viewing themselves as having little in common with other groups.

Finally, we also include two measures of discrimination. One measures overall perceptions of discrimination against Latinos as a group in case respondents who perceive discrimination are more likely to think Latinos have more commonality with African Americans. The only group discrimination measure on the LNS instrument asks the degree to which respondents view Latinos can get ahead if they work hard. The LNS also contained four survey items with questions on personal experiences with discrimination in different contexts such as work, school, interactions with police, and restaurants. We created a dichotomous measure that is coded as 1 for all respondents who reported discrimination in any of the four settings. The inclusion of discrimination measures is important because those with experiences of discrimination may be more likely to perceive commonality with African Americans.

Results

The models discussed below are estimated using ordered logistic regression due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variables.¹⁵ All models utilize the same set of covariates to examine in separate models the effects of protests on each of the questions dealing with attitudes toward African Americans. Table 1 contains the results for the models addressing commonality, whereas Table 2 contains the results of the models addressing competition with African Americans.¹⁶

One of the primary variables of interest in this analysis is the protest measure labeled *No. of Protests*, which counts the number of protests that occurred in a 30-day period before the

¹⁵All analyses were performed using Stata 13.

¹⁶We contend that it is appropriate to include respondents who were interviewed before the protests began because their exposure to protests was zero and the protest variable measures how the number of protests one is exposed to in terms of time and space influences attitudes. When the sample is restricted to only those interviewed after the protests began on Feb. 14, 2006 or later, the results for the protest measures are identical to those reported in Tables 1 and 2 with the exception that the strength of the significance of protests on perceptions of political competition is stronger (0.10 vs. 0.05) in the models that exclude respondents from the before period.

TABLE 1
Perceptions of Commonality with African Americans

	(1) Commonality	(2) Political Commonality	(3) Linked Fate
No. of protests	0.0261** (0.00891)	0.0242** (0.00903)	-0.0142*** (0.00843)
Education	0.0410** (0.0128)	0.0458** (0.0129)	-0.0521** (0.0125)
Age	-0.00333* (0.00157)	0.00377* (0.00156)	0.00732** (0.00151)
Male	0.0971* (0.0453)	0.0447 (0.0455)	0.0271 (0.0442)
Republican	-0.162* (0.0709)	-0.109 (0.0709)	-0.231** (0.0686)
Percentage of life in United States	0.0103** (0.000818)	0.00954** (0.000824)	-0.00557** (0.000787)
Mexican	-0.0486 (0.0747)	-0.177* (0.0749)	-0.162* (0.0738)
Puerto Rican	0.214* (0.103)	0.0759 (0.103)	0.0729 (0.101)
Cuban	0.163 (0.127)	0.0687 (0.126)	-0.239*** (0.123)
Dominican	0.288* (0.136)	0.143 (0.135)	0.250*** (0.134)
Salvadoran	0.134 (0.126)	-0.00909 (0.126)	-0.0414 (0.123)
Latino linked fate	0.106** (0.0209)	0.149** (0.0211)	0.530** (0.0211)
Latino discrim.	-0.0702* (0.0357)	0.00962 (0.0359)	0.0361 (0.0350)
Personal discrim.	0.0995* (0.0481)	0.0354 (0.0483)	-0.0701 (0.0470)
Keep Spanish	0.0122 (0.0440)	0.00643 (0.0445)	0.0799*** (0.0422)
Cutpoint no. 1	-0.828** (0.251)	-0.466*** (0.252)	-0.142 (0.240)
Cutpoint no. 2	0.472*** (0.250)	1.096** (0.252)	0.949** (0.240)
Cutpoint no. 3	2.124** (0.252)	2.794** (0.254)	2.212** (0.241)
Observations	6,595	6,559	7,195
Log-likelihood	-8,697.4	-8,561.1	-9,122.7
Chi-square	328.6	304.8	1,049.8
Pseudo <i>R</i> -square	0.0185	0.0175	0.0544

Standard errors in parentheses.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.1$.

interview and within a 100-mile distance of the respondent. In Models 1 and 2 on measures of general commonality and political commonality, *No. of Protests* was significant at the 0.01 level. In essence, exposure to more protests near a respondent resulted in increased feelings of commonality. In Model 3, which assesses Latinos' perceptions of linked fate with African Americans, exposure to protests only had a significant effect at the 0.10 level with

TABLE 2
Perceptions of Competition with African Americans

	(1) Jobs	(2) Education	(3) Government Jobs	(4) Latino Representation
No. of protests	-0.000830 (0.00870)	-0.00222 (0.00855)	-0.00446 (0.00836)	0.0159*** (0.00852)
Education	-0.00232 (0.0129)	-0.0211*** (0.0126)	0.00908 (0.0125)	0.0159 (0.0125)
Age	0.00102 (0.00154)	0.00603** (0.00152)	0.00405** (0.00151)	0.00353* (0.00151)
Male	0.0507 (0.0457)	0.114* (0.0449)	0.0804*** (0.0445)	0.0846*** (0.0443)
Republican	0.102 (0.0704)	0.120*** (0.0695)	0.113 (0.0695)	0.0674 (0.0695)
Percentage of life in United States	0.00603** (0.000823)	0.00441** (0.000807)	0.00246** (0.000797)	0.00144*** (0.000792)
Mexican	-0.387** (0.0746)	-0.225** (0.0737)	-0.344** (0.0735)	-0.137*** (0.0730)
Puerto Rican	-0.0934 (0.102)	-0.117 (0.101)	-0.0279 (0.101)	0.0135 (0.100)
Cuban	-0.405** (0.124)	-0.664** (0.126)	-0.252* (0.123)	-0.307* (0.122)
Dominican	0.197 (0.132)	0.0875 (0.130)	0.146 (0.131)	0.419** (0.133)
Salvadoran	0.0362 (0.125)	0.116 (0.122)	0.0839 (0.123)	0.309* (0.123)
Latino linked fate	0.108** (0.0209)	0.122** (0.0206)	0.129** (0.0204)	0.125** (0.0203)
Latino discrim.	0.00377 (0.0358)	-0.00265 (0.0355)	0.0400 (0.0354)	0.0433 (0.0346)
Personal discrim.	0.0238 (0.0485)	0.142** (0.0477)	0.123** (0.0474)	0.0920*** (0.0472)
Keep Spanish	-0.0167 (0.0437)	0.00913 (0.0431)	0.0308 (0.0433)	0.0618 (0.0429)
Cutpoint no. 1	0.494* (0.248)	0.562* (0.245)	0.386 (0.244)	0.344 (0.241)
Cutpoint no. 2	1.451** (0.248)	1.625** (0.245)	1.496** (0.245)	1.627** (0.242)
Observations	7,195	7,195	7,195	7,195
Log-likelihood	-7,328.6	-7,595.7	-7,749.3	-7,826.7
Chi-square	158.2	148.4	142.1	115.8
Pseudo R-square	0.0107	0.00967	0.00908	0.00734

Standard errors in parentheses.
** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.1$.

a p -value of 0.09. How much time a respondent has spent in the United States (measured by *percentage of life in United States*) played a positive role in increasing perceptions of commonality with African Americans across both the general and political dimensions; however, it had the opposite effect of perceptions of linked fate with African Americans in Model 3. Latino linked fate demonstrated a strong and significant effect across all three

models. Partisan identification was a strong predictor in Model 1 as well as Model 3.¹⁷ Respondents who identified as Republicans were less likely to perceive commonality in either Model 1 or 2, as well as linked fate in Model 3. This relationship was significant at the 0.01 level across all three models. Personal experiences with discrimination was only significant in Model 1, indicating those who reported experiencing discrimination were more likely to perceive commonality. Perceptions of discrimination toward Latinos as a group were also only significant in Model 1.¹⁸ Overall, respondents' exposure to protests did have a positive effect on feelings of commonality with African Americans; however, it did not increase perceptions of linked fate with African Americans.¹⁹

The results of Models 1–4 across the competition-dependent variables indicate that, by and large, exposure to protests does not have an effect on feelings of competition. However, on the last competition item, which asks respondents to evaluate whether they feel Latinos are in competition with African Americans in having Latino representatives as elected officials, exposure to protests has a significant effect at the 0.10 level with a p -value of 0.06. While this is just beyond the traditional 0.05 level of significance, it does provide some evidence that Latinos exposed to more protests may be more likely to perceive competition with African Americans over political representation. When examining the effects of the other covariates, *percentage of life in United States* once again demonstrates a significant effect across all Models 1–3 of competition. In other words, as the percentage of time spent in the United States increases, perceptions of competition also increase. Turning toward national origin groups, the *Cuban* and *Mexican* variables have significant relationships across all of the measures. Cuban and Mexican respondents are less likely to perceive competition with African Americans than other respondents. On the political dimension, Dominicans and Salvadorans are more likely to perceive competition. Similar to the commonality models, Latino linked fate is significant across all of the competition measures and indicates that those with the strongest belief in Latino linked fate are more likely to perceive competition with African Americans. Those who experienced personal discrimination were also more likely to perceive competition with African Americans over education, government, and city jobs, as well as political representation. Overall, the models indicate that the protests did not affect feelings of competition in most areas of respondents' lives with the exception of the political arena, whereas Latino linked fate and experiences with discrimination did heighten feelings of competition.

Given the difficulties in interpreting coefficients in ordered logit models (Long, 1997), Figures 1–3 provide a better sense of the substantive significance of each variable on

¹⁷A significant effect of party is present in the models using a dichotomous measure of party where Republicans were coded as 1 and all other coded as 0. In an alternate measure that is a composite of those identifying as Republicans, those who lean Republicans, and those who are not sure but if they had to pick a party then they would chose Republican, the effects of party are no longer significant in Model 1.

¹⁸A small percentage of respondents affirmed high levels of perceptions of discrimination or experiences with discrimination. Seventy-five percent answered "strongly agree" if Latinos worked hard they could get ahead and another 17 percent indicated "somewhat agree." For robustness, the models were also run with a variable of respondents indicating skin color (choices ranging from very dark to very light) to assess if there were differences on views of commonality or competition depending on respondents skin tone. The skin color variable did not produce a statistically significant relationship in either the competition or commonality models or change the significance of any variables. The skin color measure contains serious measurement error because over half of respondents rated themselves light or very light, which is unlikely to be true given the distribution of national origin groups.

¹⁹For robustness an alternative set of models also included the percent of the black population within the county a respondent lives in, in both the commonality and competition models. There were no statistically significant effects for this variable, nor did it substantially change the other significant effects found in the models.

FIGURE 1

Substantive Effects of Explanatory Variables on Latinos Have a Lot in Common with African Americans





FIGURE 2

Substantive Effects of Explanatory Variables on Latinos Have a Lot in Common with African Americans in Terms of Their Political Situation




attitudes toward African Americans.²⁰ The values report the difference in probability a respondent will answer the highest value on a survey item if the value of a given variable is changed from its minimum to its maximum, while holding all other variables constant.²¹

²⁰Given that the protest variable, the main variable of interest, is only significant in two commonality models, Models 1 and 2, and one competition model, Model 4, we only present substantive effects for those models.

²¹Continuous variables were held fixed at their means, while dichotomous variables are set to their median value.

FIGURE 3

Substantive Effects of Explanatory Variables on Strong Competition with African Americans in Terms of Having Latino Representatives in Elected Office



For continuous variables, the estimate shows the first difference as a result of moving from the minimum to maximum values for each variable. For dichotomous variables, the first difference represents a change from 0 to 1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are indicated by the lines and in brackets.²²

Figure 3 displays the substantive effects of the covariates on Latinos' perceptions of commonality with African Americans in educational attainment, job opportunities, and income. The change in the predicted probability of respondents answering they have a lot in common with African Americans as a result of exposure to more protests resulted in a 10-point increase in their likelihood of answering they had a lot in common with African Americans. Similarly, an increase in the amount of time a respondent is in the United States results in a 15-point increase in the answer choice of a lot of commonality. Latino linked fate results in a five-point increase in perceptions of commonality, while respondents who are less likely to perceive discrimination against Latinos as a group results in a four-point decrease. Older respondents were four points less likely to respond that they had a lot in common with African Americans. Similarly, Republican respondents are two points less likely to believe there is commonality. While the effects of the protests may appear modest at a 10-point increase, it is important to note that the other variables resulted in much smaller effects and were often not significant.

The substantive effects of the explanatory variables on perceptions of political commonality are displayed in Figure 1. Protest exposure results in a nine-point increase in the predicted probability of a respondent viewing a lot of commonality with African Americans in terms of their political situation. Being Republican results in decreases in the probability of answering a lot in common in terms of their political situation with effects of two and seven points. Increases in the percentage of one's life spent in the United States results in a 13-point increase among respondents answering "a lot in common" with African Americans in terms of politics. Latino linked fate results in a six-point increase. The size of

²²All simulations were performed using Clarify software; see King et al. (2000).

the effects of the other covariates is quite small, with exposure to protests and percent of life in United States resulting in the strongest substantive effects.

When examining perceptions of political competition, in terms of having Latino representatives as elected officials, as displayed in Figure 2, the substantive effect of protests is significant, however only at the 0.10 level. Increases in the number of protests near a respondent result in an eight-point increase in the predicted probability of perceiving strong competition over representation. The effect of protests is considerably larger than the other covariates with the exception of the effect of being Dominican or Salvadoran. Dominican and Salvadoran respondents are 10 and seven points more likely, respectively, to perceive competition in political representation with African Americans. Cubans are less likely to perceive competition and results in a six-point decrease in the predicted probability of indicating strong competition with African Americans. Once again Latino linked fate results in an eight-point increase. Percent of life in the United States results in a modest substantive effect with a three-point increase in perceptions of competition.

Thus, the results of our analysis indicate that the number and proximity of protest events to which Latinos were exposed had important attitudinal effects on their feelings of competition and commonality with African Americans. In addition, Latino linked fate and, at times, experiences with discrimination, and perceptions of discrimination also influenced attitudes. We now turn to a more in-depth discussion of the implications.

Discussion

Social science treatments of intergroup relations tend to be relatively static, and even when these are assumed to be dynamic, there are difficulties providing evidence to show that changes in experiences and contexts shape perceptions of one racial group toward another. Working with data spanning the 2006 immigrant rights protest wave, our models indicate that the number of marches occurring nearby Latino respondents positively impacted their attitudes toward African Americans. In essence, the more protests each respondent was exposed to before the interview, the more likely he or she was to perceive commonality with African Americans in terms of educational attainment, income, job opportunities, and politics. This is not to say there are no feelings of competition with African Americans, but rather exposure to protests did not contribute to those feelings but did positively increase perceptions of commonalities. In short, new experiences of mobilization that politicized Latino identity also increased Latinos' positive perceptions of African Americans. Overall, our analysis of the effect of the 2006 immigrant rights protests on Latino attitudes toward African Americans provides strong evidence of the dynamic quality of perceptions of other racial groups, in particular, of the temporal and spatial effects of large-scale collective action on intergroup perceptions.

One potential explanation of Latinos' increased sense of commonality with African Americans is that the 2006 marches enhanced both an in-group Latino identity (Barreto et al., 2009; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace, 2013), as well as a more inclusive superordinate identity as a racialized minority. For Latinos, this identification with a more superordinate identity may have bridged their sense of differences between and increased their perceptions of a greater sense of commonality with African Americans. If Latinos viewed themselves as threatened by racialized nativist legislation, then it is plausible that during this period they may also have increased the likelihood that they would perceive themselves as having more in common with another historically marginalized racial group, African Americans.

In addition, the results from our study also indicate that Latinos who demonstrated higher levels of linked fate were more likely to perceive both commonality and competition with African Americans. These findings might seem paradoxical since the concepts of commonality and competition may be viewed as opposites. However, some scholars have demonstrated that it is possible for these to go hand in hand and may be a result of shared experiences as well as increased contact (Jones-Correa, 2011).

The one exception to our commonality findings and protest exposure is the result for the item on competition among blacks and Latinos for electoral representation. Here Latinos seem to be interpreting representation as descriptive (i.e., carried out most effectively by representatives who are of their same ethnicity) and as zero-sum, where any gain in electing a representative who is African American by definition entails one less opportunity to elect a Latino representative. This finding is even more evident for Latino national origin groups like Dominicans and Salvadorans who are minorities within larger Hispanic populations, and who often overlap residentially with native-born blacks. As Esses et al., 2001 (see also Meier et al., 2004) argue, it is particularly in situations defined as zero-sum that intergroup competition is most heightened. However, the significance of Latinos' perceptions of competition with African Americans over political representation may be overinterpreted as recent work has demonstrated that black members of Congress can be very active in representing Latino interests, including issues related to immigration, independent of district demographics (Wallace, 2014).

The results of our research also have broader implications for examining the relationship between contentious politics and political attitudes. Methodologically, this article highlights the importance of temporal and spatial dimensions in politics and in understanding the full scope of the impact of protests. Utilizing geocoding of LNS respondents and protests allowed us to build an argument about political attitudes and social movements that would not have been possible otherwise. Because social protests can come about quickly and are difficult to forecast, the nature of major protest waves creates several problems for scholars to field a large survey instrument at the exact timing when, and in the optimal places where, movements coalesce. The fact that the 2006 LNS was in the field before, during, and after the series of demonstrations allowed us to examine the temporal and spatial effects of the mass marches on Latino respondents' attitudes toward African Americans. In addition, we also demonstrated that it is feasible to better understand the connection between exposure to political events and the formation of political attitudes. Typically, scholars have focused on how attitudes influence political participation, not on how protests may influence attitudes. We find that protest cycles do have significant impacts on social and political attitudes, such as intergroup relations. As such, our research makes significant contributions to several literatures, including public opinion, immigration politics, social movements, and race and ethnic politics.

Conclusion

The formation of cross-racial/ethnic coalitions is said to be the primary vehicle for the political incorporation and empowerment of communities of color (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1984; Jones-Correa, 2001). In fact, "one of the most enduring assumptions in the literature on urban politics since the civil rights movement" is that "success in local politics for racial minorities is inextricably linked with their participation" in multiracial coalitions (Park and Park, 2001:91). Yet, according to some scholars, not only do African Americans and Latinos often harbor negative racial stereotypes about each other (McClain

et al., 2006; McClain and Tauber, 2001:129), but also in many places “conflict and competition among racial-minority groups has been increasing” (McClain and Tauber, 2001:112). Consequently, these authors contend that “competition rather than coalition building may well be the dominant factor structuring intergroup relationships” among African Americans and Latinos (McClain and Tauber, 2001:114). Our results complicate these findings and offer a more optimistic picture of the future of black and brown relations and the potential for cross-racial coalitions in certain contexts, at least from the perspective of Latino perceptions toward African Americans.

In particular, our findings demonstrate that perceptions of intergroup commonality can change over time, reflecting changes in experiences and context. In the case we explored here, the wave of immigrants’ rights marches in 2006, indicated that displays of large-scale political activism by Latinos can increase their feelings of commonality—without an accompanying sense of competition—with African Americans. The results presented in our study indicate that the 2006 protest wave may have triggered among Latinos a sense of “knowing their place” in the social and economic hierarchy of American society—being situated alongside historically oppressed African Americans. At the same time, our findings show that while in general, in the context of the politically charged environment of a heated immigration debate Latinos did not perceive competition with blacks, they did feel that descriptive representation was important to them. Nonetheless, our most important finding is that the reinforcement of group identities through events like the 2006 immigrant rallies heightens perceptions of commonality across racialized minority groups rather than increasing a sense of competition or difference between these groups. While these findings do not negate Latinos feeling a sense of competition with African Americans on some issues, and although this study does not address African American attitudes toward Latinos, our results suggest nonetheless that perceptions of intergroup commonality are not fixed and significant events may increase the potential for coalitions across racial and ethnic groups.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Figure 1A. Immigrant Rights Marches by Location & Number of Participants During Spring 2006

Figure 2A. Number and Size of Protests Over the Immigrant Rights Protest Wave