

**The Party of Lincoln:  
How Black Republicans Have Adjusted their Campaign Appeals from 1972-2010**

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### **Abstract**

At the end of the Civil War, the Republican Party came to be known as the “Party of Lincoln,” seeking to include blacks in the party and secure the rights of newly freed slaves. However, starting in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century and solidifying in the mid-to-late 1960s, the two major political parties underwent a political realignment. Republicans now draw large support in the once traditionally Democratic “Solid South,” championing smaller government and states’ rights. Democrats, on the other hand, have gained in places such as the Northeast and have become champions of civil rights and government programs to aid the poor. As a result, black Republicans, once common in the Republican Party, have become all but extinct. Through a content analysis of campaign advertisements and newspaper articles, this project aims to trace how black Republicans have adapted to this shift in the Republican Party in comparison to white Republicans in similar campaigns and states spanning the years 1972-2010. This study will analyze whether black Republicans emphasize appeals to voters on economic conservatism, social conservatism, or black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, shedding light on how the campaign tactics of black Republicans have changed over time, and ultimately, what this may mean for Republican efforts to bring more blacks into the party.

## Table of Contents

I. Introduction.....	5
Setting the Scene: A Brief History of Black Republicans.....	5
Types of Appeals.....	7
What this Could Mean.....	9
Thesis Road Map.....	9
Summary of Results.....	11
II. How Blacks Find Themselves in the Republican Party.....	14
The Rise and Fall of Black Conservative Thought.....	14
Economic Appeal of the Republican Party.....	16
Dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party.....	17
Racial Appeals Made by the Republican Party.....	19
Social Conservative Appeal of the Republican Party.....	20
Concluding Remarks.....	23
III. Measuring Shifts in Black Republican Campaign Appeals.....	25
Model and Hypothesis.....	25
Case Selection.....	25
Concept Definition and Coding Structure.....	27
A Note on Reliability.....	28
IV. Evaluating the Frequency of Campaign Appeals.....	30
Introduction.....	30
Case Studies Selection.....	31
Results and Overall Findings.....	32
Trends Over Time.....	33
Regional Differences.....	36
An In Depth Look at the Dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party.....	41
Taking Liberal Policy Positions.....	44
Conclusion.....	48
V. Looking into the Future: Still the Party of Lincoln?.....	50
Recapitulation.....	50
Limitations and Avenues for Further Research.....	52
Ending Remarks.....	55
Works Cited.....	56
Appendix of Campaign Television Advertisements and Newspaper Articles.....	58

## Tables and Figures

### TABLES

1-1: Percentage of Nonwhite/Black Support for Republican Presidential Candidates in the General Election 1952-2008.....	6
3-1: Black Republican Case Studies.....	26
3-2: White Republican Case Studies.....	26
4-1: Example Coding Scheme: Television Advertisements.....	30
4-2: Example Coding Scheme: Newspaper Articles.....	31
4-3: Regional Breakdown of Case Studies.....	36

### FIGURES

4-1: White Republican Total Proportion of Appeals.....	35
4-2: Black Republican Total Proportion of Appeals.....	35
4-3: Southern White Republican Total Proportion of Appeals.....	39
4-4: Northern White Republican Total Proportion of Appeals.....	39
4-5: Southern Black Republican Total Proportion of Appeals.....	40
4-6: Northern Black Republican Total Proportion of Appeals.....	40
4-7: Explicit Mention of Black Capture within the Democratic Party.....	42
4-8: Black Republican Candidate Mention of Race .....	43
4-9: Black Republican Mention of Crossing Party Lines .....	44
4-10: Proportion of Support for Liberal Policies Amongst Black Republican Cases...47	
4-11: Proportion of Support for Liberal Policies Amongst Black Republican Cases...48	

## **I. Introduction**

Following the Civil War, the Republican Party was the party of blacks and civil rights, and commonly referred to as “The Party of Lincoln.” However, beginning in the 1930s and solidifying in the 1960s, the Democratic Party has come to capture black voters nearly unanimously. The Republicans have moved to become the party of small government, social conservatism, and limited taxation, while the Democrats became champions of expansive civil rights legislation, increased taxation, and the creation of a social safety net. Despite these strong trends, there are a small number of black Republicans on the state and national levels. The Republican Party has attempted to make overtures to black voters, through cabinet appointments, Republican National Convention speakers, and the election of a black Republican National Committee chair. However, these appeals have made little headway in bringing black voters into the Republican Party. There are three main arguments that black elites could use to appeal to black voters: free market economics, accentuating dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, and social conservatism. I ask how black Republican candidates for office have appealed to voters since 1964 in comparison to white Republicans in the same states, races, and time periods. I examine if there are any differences between the appeals that black and white Republicans emphasize in their campaigns, and if black Republicans make implicit or explicit appeals to bring black voters into the Republican Party, or if they act similar to white Republicans. As discussed below, I hypothesize that black Republicans will emphasize more their social conservative credentials in their campaign than white Republicans.

### **Setting the Scene: A Brief History of Black Republicans**

In the years following the Civil War, the Republican Party was the home for freed slaves and blacks more generally. Radical Republicans in Congress championed the ratification of the

Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as programs such as the Freedman’s Bureau, which gave social assistance to freed blacks. However, by the 1930s, this image of the Republican Party began to fade, as Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal programs began to offer limited financial and social assistance to blacks. This shift of blacks into the Democratic Party became sealed by the mid-1960s, with the year 1964 marking the most noticeable shift. In 1964, the Republican Party nominated Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona as their presidential nominee to run against Democratic incumbent Lyndon Johnson. Goldwater spoke of granting greater autonomy to states to make policy decisions and voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act while a Senator. As a result, blacks shifted their allegiance to the Democratic Party and have not significantly moved back into the Republican Party. This culminated in Barack Obama garnering the support of 95 percent of the black vote in 2008. Over the past fifteen presidential elections, black support for the Republican Presidential Candidate has dropped from getting nearly a quarter of the black vote to less than five percent.

**1-1: Percentage of Nonwhite/Black Support for Republican Presidential Candidates in the General Election 1952-2008**

1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992*	1996	2000	2004	2008
21%	39	32	6	12	13	15	10	13	18	10	12	8	11	4

Source: Gallup National Exit Polls (1952-2008). Stanley, Harold W. and Richard G. Niemi. *Vital Statistics on American Politics*. 1999-2000; 2011-2012. CQ Press 2000/2011.

\*Note: Between 1952-1988, the Gallup Poll only recorded the percentage of “nonwhite” support and did not break it down by individual races/ethnicities. From 1992-2008, the Gallup Poll recorded the respondents specifically as “black.” I record the percentage “nonwhite” support from 1952-1988 and specifically black support from 1992-2008.

While my question focuses on elites (politicians and elected officials) rather than the general black mass opinion, knowing where black public opinion falls is important to conceptualize the strategic challenges facing of black Republicans running for office in terms of how best to appeal to all voters and black voters.

One area where black public opinion aligns differently from their white Democratic counterpart is on social issues. Blacks have some of the highest church attendance rates and hold more conservative views on issues such as gay marriage, abortion, and school prayer than do other Democrats. This is evidenced by a 2011 Gallup Poll that shows 53 percent of black Americans identifying as “very religious,” compared with 39 percent of white Americans identifying so<sup>1</sup>. Republicans have attempted to capitalize on this fact, yet have not been very successful in actually swaying black voters to vote for the Republican candidate, as evidenced by studies I will lay out in chapter two of my study. The same Gallup Poll also shows that of blacks that identify as “very religious,” 9 percent are Republicans, compared with 62 percent of white Americans who identify as “very religious.” However, based on the importance black voters place on an active government in the economic sector, social conservatism likely offers the best opportunity for Republicans to attract black voters to the GOP. Therefore, I expect to see Republican candidates, especially black Republicans, heavily appealing to this school of thought in an attempt to bring black voters into the Republican electoral column.

### **Types of Appeals**

My research question is how black Republicans position themselves in campaigns since 1964, and if these appeals differ substantially from white Republicans. There are three types of appeals black Republican elites could use to appeal to black voters. The first is an argument that limited government, free market economic policies are beneficial for blacks in that a free-market system allows anyone to prosper from the system due to the lack of barriers to entry. Promoting back capitalism became a cause of politicians such as Jack Kemp. One example of a free-market economic appeal is the candidate claiming that government welfare programs hold blacks down

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<sup>1</sup> Newport, Frank. *Religion and Party ID Strongly Linked Among Whites, Not Blacks*. Gallup Poll. 1 July 2011.

to a subordinate status in society. The second is an argument that the Democratic Party takes black voters for granted, and therefore does not actually propose policies that benefit them. This causes blacks to be dissatisfied with the Democratic Party and defect to the Republican Party. The final type of appeal is based on higher levels of social conservatism and Christian influence on black voters compared to white voters (as evidenced by the 2011 Gallup Poll), black Republicans can appeal to black voters by taking a conservative stance on social issues, such as being pro-life on the issue of abortion and opposing gay marriage. This does assume, however, that black Republicans are trying to bring blacks into the Republican Party. It could just be (and likely is) that black Republicans are trying to appeal to all voters, black and white alike.

The Republican Party has taken such a strong position in support of free markets and low taxes that a black Republican looking to appeal to black voters (who strongly support government spending and welfare programs) offers no avenue for a black Republican to breakthrough and gain black voters. The argument focused on dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party and the feeling of black voters as “trapped” within the party does not seem to be the case in practice, seen by the nearly unanimous support President Obama and other Democrats get from black voters. Even if black voters feel trapped in the Democratic Party, they are not defecting to the Republican Party. Therefore, due to the public opinion of blacks on many social issues and their higher levels of church attendance, black Republicans, in addition to white Republicans, are likely to see this as the most effective way to appeal to black voters. This is largely a consequence of the fact that if Republicans began to appeal to issues blacks support, such as funding for government job training and greater education spending, it would result in the Republicans losing their conservative base and would not be consistent with GOP ideology. Black Republicans have a unique line to walk in this instance.

**What this Could Mean**

My research has potential consequences for campaign politics and describing how blacks Republicans frame and justify their membership within the Republican Party. It has the possibility of shining light on how Republicans might make different appeals based on the audience and voter demographic the candidates want to reach. There may be a regional difference in how black Republicans appeal to voters. For example in the South, where race has been historically more salient, black Republicans may deemphasize their race and align closer to their white counterparts. However in the Northeast, for example, where racial attitudes have historically been more tolerant, black Republican may emphasize their racial identity and see themselves in a more distinct role in the party, leading to different campaign appeals from their white counterparts.

Another implication for my project is that it describes the trend over time in how black Republicans have responded to changes in the Republican Party towards a more conservative racially charged direction. From the 1940s-60s, there was a considerably large faction of the Republican Party comprised of liberal northern Republicans. However, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act and nomination of Barry Goldwater by the Republicans for President in 1964, the Republican Party has made explicit appeals to attract dissatisfied white Southern voters who are disillusioned with the Democratic Party's civil rights platform. This has made the party more ideologically coherent with no room for a moderate and liberal faction within the party. Over time, I suspect that black Republican candidates will become more conservative and closer aligned with their white counterparts, no longer claiming to hold a distinct position within the party.

**Thesis Road Map**

My thesis is organized in the following way: model and hypothesis, research design, analysis and assessment, and the conclusion. Each subsequent section will build upon the previous section and ultimately work to evaluate my hypothesis. My dependent variable is the campaign appeals employed by black Republican candidates across time and in comparison to their white counterparts. My independent variable is the era from which I collected my data. The campaign appeal employed by each candidate depends on both the year when the candidate ran, as well as where the candidate ran. This will help me determine the most prevalent appeals and analyze what this may mean.

I will then attempt to evaluate how black Republicans position themselves in their campaigns in comparison to white Republicans in similar races and states. I examine television campaign ads and newspaper articles in the largest newspaper by circulation in the metropolitan area or state to gather my evidence of how each candidate portrays himself or herself to voters. Based on that, I will assess whether black Republicans distinguish themselves in a different way than their white counterparts. My case studies (14 candidates in total: seven black Republicans and seven white Republicans) span over a period of 38 years, from 1972 to 2010. With one exception, all candidates were running for national office, either the United States House of Representatives or Senate, with House candidates compared to other House candidates, or Senate candidates compared to other Senate candidates. Due to the limited number of black Republican candidates, I could not compare candidates running in the same race. Each black Republican is compared to a similar white Republican candidate, with no more than six years between them. This ensures that the candidates are running in similar political environments.

I will evaluate this hypothesis through a content analysis of the campaign advertisements and newspaper articles. Some examples of my coding structure are how a candidate mentions

government welfare programs (free-market economic appeal), whether a candidate emphasizes their family values (social conservative appeal), and how often the candidate mentions race and make appeals to black capture within the Democratic Party (dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party). I then tally up how many times the candidate referred to any specific statement. This allows me to add up how many times the candidates made each type of appeal. In addition, I have added an “imagery” section to my campaign ad-coding sheet. By “imagery” I look at what and who appears in the television advertisements. For example, I count the number of times blacks, women, and money appeared in the ads as a way to buttress and support what the candidate may explicitly say.

My data comes from the Access World News online archive, ProQuest Newspaper online database, and the Boston Globe online archives. The campaign advertisements are from the University of Oklahoma’s Political Communications Center archive. The black Republican candidates have about five ads each, with their white counterparts having about three ads. This is due to limits on the amount of ads from each candidate that one can order. By keeping the number of ads to a similar number, I attempt to gain the same amount of data from each candidate, not to bias my results in one direction or another. I will avoid inconsistencies in my coding by establishing clear guidelines to apply to each case study during my coding.

### **Summary of Results**

After coding 59 television campaign advertisements and 120 newspaper articles, I discovered limited support for my hypothesis. My results showed that economic appeals dominated amongst both black and white Republicans when aggregated among appeals from both newspaper articles and television ads.

Black Republicans and their campaign messages have not been studied heavily, and my findings may shed light on the role that black Republicans play within the party, and how they position themselves differently in their campaigns than their white counterparts. By examining the implications on these three areas because they are the most relevant to the field of political science and campaign politics. This seems to discount my hypothesis that black Republicans emphasize social issues on aggregate. However, there are regional differences between black and white Republicans. Both southern black and white Republicans employ a socially conservative appeal (mainly be emphasizing their family values and Christian faith) at a higher rate than their northern counterparts, although economic free-market appeals still comprise a larger proportion of appeals. My northern case studies follow a similar trend, but slightly a different one. In north, my case studies emphasize economic free-market appeals at a higher percentage overall than their southern counterparts. Overtime, black Republicans, have reduced their amount of appeals based on highlighting black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party (at a high with Ed Brooke in the 1970s) and had a peak in socially conservative appeals in the 1990s (with JC Watts and Gary Franks). However, proportionally economic free-market appeals still dominate across the 40 years of my case studies.

In the realm of party politics, my findings will help illuminate how black Republicans relate to voters in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement and subsequent civil rights legislation. The fact that the Republican Party has become ideologically coherently conservative requires black Republicans to emphasize similar appeals as white Republicans. This can be seen in my results showing that both white and black Republicans emphasizing economic free-market appeals fairly consistently over my timeframe from 1972-2010. Black Republicans provide a platform of policies black voters do not find appealing. While black voters are more socially

conservative in comparison to their white counterparts, the fact that they vote for Democrats so overwhelmingly, coupled with some preexisting literature on this issue, may suggest that black voters do not vote based on social issues, therefore leaving black Republicans without a solid way to attracting black voters.

## **II. How Blacks Find Themselves in the Republican Party**

Initially after the Civil War, the Republican Party was known as the “Party of Lincoln,” with a reputation for protecting the rights of African-Americans against the Democratic Party, which sought to install segregationist policies throughout the South and the rest of America. In the years since the end of Reconstruction, the Republican Party has become the party of small government, limited taxation, and restricted social spending. In the past 20 years, the Republican Party has averaged about 10 percent of the black vote in national elections (Bolce 1992, 64). This statistic makes the notion of a black Republican today rather curious and an anomaly within our current political framework, since the party shift in the mid-twentieth century.

Nonetheless, there are reasons why blacks might become Republicans. The first is based on the traditional economic arguments of black conservative thought; the second is based on black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party; and the third is based on the social conservatism of blacks aligning with the religious-motivated socially conservative agenda pushed by Republicans. Given current conditions, the social conservative alignment between black votes and the Republican Party seems to offer the best prospects for more African-American and minority inclusion within the Republican Party.

### **The Rise and Fall of Black Conservative Thought**

The origins of black Conservatism go back to the turn of the twentieth century and have their roots in economic development. During the post-Reconstruction era, blacks received little help from the federal or state governments, as the Freedman’s Bureau failed to deliver on its promise of giving back land and services to freed slaves and their decedents. In response to the end of Reconstruction in the South and the take-over of Southern governments by Democrats, blacks needed a way to advance their interests in a heavily constrained political system. In his

work *Saviors or Sellouts: The Promise and Peril of Black Conservatism, from Booker T.*

*Washington to Condoleeza Rice*, Christopher Alan Bracey (2008) traces the development of black conservatism. Booker T. Washington formed the movement around a largely economic goal of black progress. He advocated for blacks to be insular from the rest of American society and work within that structure to gain greater wealth and success. Washington “did not see black economic progress coming about through greater social integration in white southern society...Washington saw progress for blacks taking place within southern black institutions which by definition were less reliant upon the favor of whites” (Bracey 18). Washington’s ideas relate to the Republican Party in that the party would later adopt these notions of self-reliance and that individuals’ hard work would allow one to advance further in American society, in addition to gaining more legitimacy, than one where the government helps blacks economically. Perhaps more importantly is the notion that blacks must work within institutions given to prove that blacks are equally capable as whites and do not need special accommodations (Lewis 2005, 5). These beliefs of early black conservatism would seemingly make the Republican Party home to blacks.

This idea made sense in the world of Jim Crow, yet in the second half of the twentieth century, after the New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement, the notion of economic insulation and conservatism did not hold as broad of an appeal (Bracey 84). While the New Deal did not address the racial segregation still in place in the South, Franklin D. Roosevelt provided blacks with at least small benefits in the agricultural, housing, and welfare sectors, and thus showed that the Democratic Party was more generally interested in the status of blacks in American society than were the Republicans. Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs furthered this sentiment and the “liberal legal strategy had...delivered on the promise of civil and social equality

championed almost a century before by progressives during reconstruction” (Bracey 84). Even Richard Nixon opened the Office of Minority Business Enterprise Liberal, which extended government aid to minority-owned firms (Kotlowski 2002). The fact that blacks were historically excluded from many markets until the government stepped in to correct these exclusions makes it difficult for black conservatives preaching economic-free market ideology to gain significant credibility among blacks as working in their interests.

### **Economic Appeal of the Republican Party**

Black conservatives still see free-market economic policies and capitalism as the best way to advance black interests. This idea originated with Booker T. Washington, but was redeveloped in the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan. Black conservative economists, such as Glenn Loury, argued that, “prosperity in a capitalistic market does not depend on one’s personal connections or one’s inherited position, but the individual’s talent” (Lewis 2005, 5). The main point is that blacks can benefit in a free market capitalistic system since all businesses have equal chance at succeeding and anyone can enter a market at any time. Loury argues that the black community needs to address the “pathology culture” and “moral decay” of blacks is something that no government program or agency can solve (Lewis 2005, 7). This may make sense on face value, but there is not the inherent equality that may be seemingly implicit in this argument. Blacks are at a lower socioeconomic status than other demographic groups in the United States, making it difficult for blacks to enter a market. Talent may not be enough after figuring in fixed and variable costs to run a business.

Black economic conservatives do not support Democratic-led welfare policies as they distinguish blacks as unable of achieving economic success on their own without government help (Lewis 2005, 5). This claim does not hold much weight among blacks in America. Blacks

continue to be supportive of redistributive economic policies. This can be seen by an August 2011 Gallup Poll that shows that 59 percent of blacks believe the government should have a major role in improving the economic and social position of blacks and minorities in America<sup>2</sup>. Interestingly, “the policy concerns of high-income blacks are virtually indistinguishable from blacks at the lowest income levels, [mainly social and health spending]” (Bolce 1992, 261). Katherine Tate (2010) explains how blacks still overwhelmingly support welfare programs, even if their positions are becoming slightly more moderate. While this may show some headway of Republicans into the left economic policies of blacks, the fact that they still largely support government programs that help the poor demonstrates how far Republicans have to appeal to make blacks accept the economic free-market argument of their party.

### **Dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party**

Although the economic preferences of black voters pulled them into the Democratic Party, some blacks seem dissatisfied with what the Democratic Party has done for them (Fauntroy 2007, 46). In recent years, some African-Americans have expressed disappointment with Democrats for not adequately addressing their needs and taking their support for granted. In 2001, the Democratic Party passed up Maynard Jackson in favor of Terry McAuliffe to be Democratic National Committee Chair. In response, black Democratic Congressman from Michigan John Conyers, Jr. remarked that the Democrats needed blacks in both election and non-election years. Additionally, white Florida Democrats prevented a black state legislator from becoming Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives (Lewis and Wallace 2007, 78).

These instances were a larger tactic of the Democratic Party, and one of Bill Clinton’s goals, to

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<sup>2</sup> Gallup Poll. 2011 Aug. 4-7. Question: “How much of a role, if any, do you think the government should have in trying to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups in this country -- a major role, a minor role, or no role at all?” <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1687/Race-Relations.aspx>.

attract more suburban white voters. Since their loss in 1994, Democrats and Clinton “had a general avoidance of black issues...in an electoral system dominated by white interests” (Fymer, 1999, 199). Clinton’s Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) “argued that the party leadership had forsaken suburban whites, tax-reduction-oriented policies” (Walters 2002, 1). These moves by the Democratic Party led blacks to question true importance and power within the Democratic coalition.

In response to this possible dissatisfaction with the Democrats, the Republican Party has made attempts to appeal to Black voters. In Florida, Governor Charlie Crist developed strong relationships with the African-American community. He was a lifetime member of the NAACP, pushed for the multimillion-dollar compensation for an African-American victim of a wrongful conviction, and appointed Blacks to high positions in the state government. (Ferguson 2008, 223). On Election Night 2007, 16-18 percent of Black voters rejected the Democratic nominee in favor of Crist (Ferguson 2008, 226). His recognition of the potential of Black voters to decide elections is important to note if the Republicans hope to gain any Black support and capitalize on black frustration of being captured within the Democratic Party.<sup>3</sup>

In the 2000 Presidential Election, George W. Bush attempted to change the image of the Republican Party into one of more racial inclusivity. Black speakers received prominent speaking times during the Republican National Convention, some notables including Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell. There were actually “more black speakers...featured on the first night of the 2000 convention than had appeared during all four days of the 1996 convention (Philpot 2007, 55). The number of Black delegates increased substantially from 52 in 1996 to 85 in 2000

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<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to note that when Crist ran for a vacated US Senate in Florida in 2010, he was defeated by conservative Marco Rubio in the primary and eventually ran as an independent, losing the general election to Rubio. His moderate views may have hurt him in this race.

(Philpot 2007, 55). These attempts to capture Black voters by showing interest in their opinions and issues would seem to be the right moves for the Republican Party.

These Republican attempts to exploit dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party and reach out to black voters have not been successful. Blacks still see the Republican Party as racially charged and the Democratic Party as advocating more for Blacks, making it a powerful symbol for Black voters. As Tasha Philpot shows, six months prior to the 2000 Republican National Convention, 79 percent of Blacks and 49.2 percent of Whites believed that the Democratic Party better represented the interests of Blacks (Philpot 2007, 29). After the Convention, Blacks did not see the Republican Convention as much evidence of a change in the Party's mentality. For one, "the Republicans made very few substantive changes to their positions on traditionally racial issues such as affirmative action or social spending but rather preserved their conservative policy platform" (Philpot 2007, 55). Furthermore, Philpot shows how Blacks who watched the Convention and those who did not exhibited negligible difference in perceptions of the Republican Party's image with respect to race (Philpot 2007, 108). The attempts of the Republicans to mend their racially charged image and appeal to disgruntled black Democrats largely failed, seeing Bush only received 8 percent of the black vote (see Table 1-1).

### **Racial Appeals Made by the Republican Party**

This history of conservative racial appeals by the Republican Party largely begins in the year 1964 with the nomination of Barry Goldwater as the Republican Candidate for President. Black Republicans saw Goldwater as running contrary to their interests, as he voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a United States Senator and spoke often of "states rights," which alluded to state-imposed segregation. As historian Leah Wright notes, "for many blacks, supporting Goldwater was tantamount to betraying their race" (Wright 2009, 33). What was

unique about this moment for blacks in the Republican Party was that they worked to change the Party instead of automatically deflecting to the Democrats. Disgruntled Republican National Convention Delegates formed the Negro Republican Organization, where members “[resolved] not to defect to the Democratic Party, but rather stay and enact change from within the organization” (Wright 2009, 36). Despite these attempts, the Republican “Southern Strategy” to absorb racially conservative whites went on as planned and succeeded, seen with Goldwater winning five states in the Deep South. Both Nixon and Reagan built on this strategy of appealing to these conservative Southern Democrats through race-based appeals.

Today, Republican politicians still seem to bring race back into the party and national political dialogue, further pushing Blacks into the Democratic Camp. Former Mississippi Senator and Majority Leader Trent Lott was forced to resign in 2005 after insinuating that America would have been better off voting for Strom Thurmond’s segregationist agenda in 1948<sup>4</sup>. In addition, President Bush’s handling of Hurricane Katrina also reminded blacks that the Republican Party did not make their needs and well being a priority (Harris-Perry 2011, 10). Therefore, the Republican Party has garnered an image of racial hostility.

### **Social Conservative Appeal of the Republican Party**

A potential way for Republicans to appeal to blacks is through social conservatism and support for religious institutions. Katherine Tate demonstrates through public opinion polls that blacks are consistently more conservative on social issues. In the abortion debate, “The antiabortion camp has represented one-quarter of the Black population” (Tate 2010, 101). The issue of embryonic stem cell research also demonstrates this social conservatism, given that “in a

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<sup>4</sup> “Trent Lott on the Ropes.” (2002). *The New York Times*.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/17/opinion/trent-lott-on-the-ropes.html?scp=15&sq=trent+lott&st=nyt>. Accessed on 30 September 2011

Pew/PSRAI poll, 46 percent of Blacks thought stem cell research could lead to new medical cures, while 41 percent opposed destroying human embryos. In contrast, 58 percent of whites/other racial groups saw stem cells as leading to new cures, whereas 29 percent was not in favor due to the use of embryos” (Tate, 2010, 104). On the issue of gay marriage, “five Black House legislators voted for Bush’s antigay marriage constitutional amendment during his administration” (Tate, 2010, 97). In total, the 108<sup>th</sup> Congress (2003-2005) contained 39 black members in the House (Congressional Research Survey, Sept. 2004). This social conservatism is found in the fact that the Church is still very central to Black culture and life. As Tate explains, “While the Black Christian church and Black religious beliefs gave birth to the Black civil rights movement, they have also been identified as barriers to a modern, progressive Black political agenda based on Black political unity across lines of gender and sexual orientation” (Tate, 2010, 96). This can also be seen recent a July 2011 Gallup Poll, where 53 percent of Black Americans responded that they were “Very Religious,” and “making them the most religious of the four race and ethnic groups used in this analysis.” (Newport, Gallup Poll July 2011). During the 2008 General Election, 70 percent of blacks (who turned out massively for Obama) voted in favor of Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in California<sup>5</sup>. With this level of social conservatism and religious commitment, Blacks have given the Republican Party an opening to recruit them into their camp.

Blacks respond the best to religious and social conservative cues because Black conservatives are organic conservatives. In her article, “Black Conservatism in America,” (2005) Angela Lewis defines three types of conservatives: anti-statist, neoconservative, and

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<sup>5</sup> Vick, Karl and Ashley Surdin. “Most of California’s Black Voters Backed Gay Marriage Ban.” *Washington Post*. 7 November 2008. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/06/AR2008110603880.html>.

organic. Anti-statist conservatives are moderate Republicans, whereas neoconservatives are former supporters of the Great Society Programs, but are against government expansion and “set-aside” programs to help minorities. While Black conservatives fall in both camps, Lewis argues that they are largely organic conservatives, who value social, moral and religious issues as most important.

The Republican Party has taken steps to capitalize on this fact. In the 2000 Presidential Election and in his first term in office, George W. Bush implemented his “compassionate conservative” platform by increasing funding and promotion of faith-based initiatives to address the needs of the poor. Bush established the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. Bush’s “emphasizing religion and providing African-American Church Organizations with some economic support...George Bush and the Republican Party [were] well on the path to increasing their potential to win a larger percentage of the African-American vote” (Lewis and Wallace, 2007, 80). Two candidates were able to capitalize on this notion as well. Ann Northrup ran for Congress in Kentucky’s Third district and captured 28 percent of African-American voters, which she garnered largely by supporting inner-city Black churches (Lewis and Wallace, 2007, 86). In addition, Bob Riley defeated Democratic incumbent Alabama Governor Don Sieglmann by playing on the “compassionate conservative” notion and garnering support of Black political group Voter News Network. He likely received between 5 and 10 percent of the Black vote (Lewis and Wallace, 2007, 90). This is still a notable accomplishment for a Southern Republican, as they typically do not garner much Black support.

Despite this social conservatism among Blacks, they still have yet to embrace the Republican Party. In 2004, a Black Democratic incumbent, Robert C. Scott, and a black socially conservative Republican, Winsome Sears, ran for Congress in Virginia’s Third Congressional

District, offering an opportunity to test how much pull a socially conservative agenda had on voters, as all other factors were equal. In their work, “Black Voters, Black Candidates, and Social Issues: Does Party Identification Matter,” Kidd et al (2007) contend that Sears ran on a socially conservative platform and argued that ““When you take the civil rights movement out of the equation, what else do we have in common with the Democratic Party?” (Kidd et. al 168). Yet this strategy did not help out Sears, as she only garnered 30.5 percent of the total vote and 16.1% of the black vote based on the 234 interviews Kidd and his colleagues conducted of black voters. She did not win, and the research of Kidd and his colleagues “suggests that Republicans cannot expect to attract much black support by simply running black candidates who take conservative positions on social issues such as abortion or gay marriage” (Kidd et. al 175). However, as the 2004 Congressional race in Virginia shows that Republicans still face many challenges, even when using socially conservative appeals.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Starting during the New Deal and solidifying in the 1960s, blacks have solidified their support for the Democratic Party and are likely to remain there. However, the economic argument of traditional black conservatism, dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, and the social conservatism of blacks provide the Republican Party with an opportunity to capture Black voters and reestablish its relationships with Black America. Black social conservatism offers the best hope for the Republican Party to capture more Black votes and gain more Black support. This is best seen with Bush’s support for religious charities and the public opinion polls showing that Blacks indeed hold more conservative opinions on social issues.

However, the racially charged images of Trent Lott and the “Southern Strategy” are likely to stick in the heads of blacks for many years to come. One effect of the Republican Party

moving further to the right is that it becomes more difficult to nominate moderate candidates (such as Crist) who would make appeals and support policies directed towards black voters. Until the Republican Party addresses issues that blacks care about (such as welfare spending), and detail how Republican policies can be a viable alternative to Democratic policies in advancing black interests and the black community, the relationship between black voters and Republican elites will remain strained.

### **III. Measuring Shifts in Black Republican Campaign Appeals**

#### **Model and Hypothesis**

My project evaluates how black Republicans have altered their campaign messaging over the period from 1972-2010. I attempt to examine whether or not black Republicans make themselves a distinct faction within the party by distinguishing themselves from their white counterparts or not. Based on the relevant literature, I have determined that there are three main types of appeals that black Republican elites may use to try to pull black voters into the party, while simultaneously distinguishing themselves as a unique faction of the party. These appeals are: economic free-market, social conservatism, and highlighting black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. My two hypotheses state that black Republicans over time have become more similar to their white counterparts and have made more appeals based on social conservatism than white Republicans, who will emphasize more economic conservatism.

In order to evaluate this hypothesis, I conduct content analysis by coding newspaper articles and television campaign ads over the past forty years. This will allow me to see how black Republicans have adapted to the shift in the Republican Party to be more ideologically cohesive in a conservative direction immediately following the events of 1964 and the use of the “Southern Strategy” by the Republican Party and its affects on black Republicans up through the present era. Based on my findings, I will then evaluate how well my hypothesis held up.

#### **Case Selection**

I will evaluate my hypothesis by selecting a total of fourteen different case studies, half of them black Republicans and half of them white Republicans. My time frame is from 1972-2010, giving me a broad look over the past forty years. All of my case studies were the Republican Party’s general election nominee. In addition, each black Republican candidate will

be compared to a candidate in the same race in similar years. This framework attempts to create uniformity and tries to isolate possible confounders, such as a certain type of appeals being particularly salient in one election year over another. Finally, in order to account for district differences accounting for the types of appeals, I looked for Congressional candidates who were running in districts that had similar partisan leanings. For example, Allen West and Bill Young both ran and represent districts that Obama carried in the 2008 Presidential Elections. My cases are as follows:

### 3-1: Black Republican Case Studies

Candidate	State	Running for	Year
Ed Brooke	Massachusetts	US Senate	1972, 1978
Alan Keyes	Maryland	US Senate	1988
JC Watts	Oklahoma	US House of Representatives	1994
Gary Franks	Connecticut	US House of Representatives	1998
Michael Steele	Maryland	US Senate	2006
Tim Scott	South Carolina	US House of Representatives	2010
Allen West	Florida	US House of Representatives	2010

### 3-2: White Republican Case Studies

Candidate	State	Running for	Year
Francis Sargent	Massachusetts	Governor	1974
Bill Brock	Maryland	US Senate	1992
Steve Largent	Oklahoma	US House of Representatives	1996
Nancy Johnson	Connecticut	US House of Representatives	1998

Eric Wargotz	Maryland	US Senate	2010
Jeff Duncan	South Carolina	US House of Representatives	2010
Bill Young	Florida	US House of Representatives	2010

### Concept Definition and Coding Structure

I will use the relevant literature and black public opinion to gain a basis for how blacks view the Republican Party today in comparison to the pre-1964 era. Before I break down how I identified each types of appeal, it is important to understand where I got my evidence and how I counted each appeal. My data came from a few main sources. The television campaign ads I used in my research mostly came from the University of Oklahoma's Political Communication Center Archive. For each candidate, I ordered between three and five different ads. The University of Oklahoma limits the number of ads that can be ordered to at most five per candidate (some candidates did not even have five ads available). This fact leads to variance in the number of ads per candidate. I also obtained campaign ads for Michael Steele, Tim Scott, Allen West, Eric Wargotz, Jeff Duncan, and Bill Young from their respective YouTube channels.

For the newspaper articles, I used the online databases and archives of Access World News, ProQuest, and the Boston Globe archives. I also narrowed my search for articles within one calendar year. For each candidate, I chose articles from the most circulated newspaper in the metropolitan area. For example, I pulled articles from the *Washington Post* for Alan Keyes and Bill Brock's races, from the *Miami Herald* for the Allen West's race, and from the *Boston Globe* for Ed Brooke and Francis Sargent's races. This will allow me to get a fairly localized and

representative sample of the types of appeals each candidate employed over their respective media markets (and subsequently voters) that they were targeting.

Now that I have established where my data came from, I will explain my coding structure in more depth, and how I executed my coding and context analysis. This will give understanding and background as to how I will end up with my results.

The first appeal is an economic-free market appeal. This appeal sees how many times candidates appeal to the notion of free markets and little government control over the economy. Examples of a free-market economic appeal in my coding is whether the candidate advocating for lower taxes, speaking negatively about government welfare programs, and advocating for urban development. My second type of appeal is a social conservative appeal. Some examples of a candidate making a social conservative appeal in my coding are emphasizing their Christian faith, family values, or pro-life stance. The third type of appeal is that of highlighting black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. On my coding sheet, an example of this is when the candidate mentions their race, highlights blacks being captured in the Democratic Party, and supports school vouchers. Finally, the last category in my coding is that of other personal-based appeals. Examples of these in my coding are if a candidate references their positive judgment, broad support, or previous records as elected officials. When counting how many of each appeals came up, I counted the total amount of a certain appeal came up in total across per paragraph and per frame for the campaign television ads. This gave me a uniform way of measuring the frequency of appeals. In the subsequent section, I will give examples of codes and further explanation into why I put certain codes in their respective larger umbrella category.

### **A Note on Reliability**

The most tenuous measure in terms of the reliability of my study would be the category on dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. Some of the codes in this category are somewhat less defined. An example is a code that could be seen as tenuous is one that measures how often the cases advocated in support for school vouchers. I put this under “dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party” because it is a policy that most blacks support, but Democrats largely do not. Therefore, by advocating for school vouchers could be an instance of a black Republican advocating for how voting for the Republican candidate could better serve the black community’s policy interests. Another problem with reliability is that I completed my coding over a period of six weeks and only coding each campaign ad and newspaper article once. If I had more time and resources to hire a second coder and expand my sample size, I could have reduced some of these problems of the reliability of my study. I have worked my best to reduce confounders in differences that may appear from election cycle-to election cycle and between different types of races by pairing my black and white case studies with a counterpart in a similar race and time period. Had I had the time and resources to expand my sample size and hire a second coder, I could increase the reliability of this measure and my study as a whole.

## IV. Evaluating the Frequency of Campaign Appeals

### Introduction

The literature relevant to my research project highlighted three main avenues that black Republican elites can use to appeal to black voters. These three main appeals are: economic free-market conservatism, highlighting black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, and a social conservative appeal to religion and conservative stances on social issues. My hypothesis is that since 1964, black Republicans have become less distinct and campaign similarly to white Republicans. Black Republicans used to be less conservative on a whole and emphasize how the Republican Party could address the needs of blacks. When it comes to their campaign appeals, I hypothesized that black Republicans make more appeals based on social conservatism than white Republicans, who will emphasize more economic conservatism. In evaluating my hypothesis, I coded television campaign advertisements and newspaper articles to see which appeal mentioned in the relevant literature appeared to be the most prominent. I included an “other” category, for which I coded for personality-based appeals or other types of appeals that did not fall into my three categories. I coded each article based on how frequently certain issues or traits appeared in the ad or newspaper article. When conducting my content analysis, I used nearly identical coding sheets for coding the television ads and newspaper articles. However, for the television ads, I added a section about ad imagery, meant to describe what images each candidate uses. This is important when deciphering if the candidate used a certain type of appeal without making it verbally explicit. Below are some examples of my coding scheme:

#### 4-1: Example Coding Scheme: Television Advertisements

<b>Economic Free-Market</b>	Supports Lower Taxes	Job Creation	Supports Balanced National Budget
<b>Dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party</b>	Supports School Vouchers	Speaks Negatively of Obama	Mentions upbringing

<b>Social Conservatism</b>	Mentions Conservative Values	References Christianity	Pro-Life
<b>Other</b>	Judgment	Record	Tough on crime
<b>Ad Imagery</b>	African-Americans	Women	American Flags

#### 4-2: Example of Coding Scheme: Newspaper Articles

<b>Economic Free-Market</b>	Supports Lower Taxes	Advocates Fiscal Responsibility	Opposes Trade Regulation
<b>Dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party</b>	Mentions Race	Crosses Party Lines	Negatively Mentions Labor Unions
<b>Social Conservatism</b>	Alludes to Conservative Values	Mentions Upbringing	Pro-Life
<b>Other</b>	Outsider	Broad Support	Positive Judgment

### Case Studies Selection

To evaluate my hypothesis, I chose fourteen candidates total, seven black Republicans and seven white Republicans. I chose candidates in Congressional races (with the exception of Francis Sargent who was a Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate) in the same states in similar election years. My logic for choosing Sargent to compare to Ed Brooke was that both were in a statewide election. Each candidate was the Republican Party's nominee in the general election in November. There is at most four years separating the paired case studies. This difference was largely due to the limited number of black Republican candidates who made it to the general election. In order to get an equivalent white Republican in the same state (especially for Senate candidates), a few years gap was occasionally required. Making these pairings and matches between the candidates allows me to track how the appeals have changed throughout the past four and a half decades. My case studies are almost exclusively from the East Coast of the United States, with the exception of Steve Largent and JC Watts from Oklahoma. This allows me to get at least partial sense for the impact of geography on the types of appeals each candidate employs.

## Results and Overall Findings

After coding 59 television campaign advertisements and 120 newspaper articles, my original hypothesis faced some challenges. Over time, blacks Republicans utilized appeals that were increasingly similar to that of white Republicans. However, black Republicans did not necessarily make more socially conservative appeals than their white counterparts. Amongst black Republicans—as with white Republicans—economic conservative free-market appeals seem to be the most commonly used appeal.

When newspaper and TV ad appeals are aggregated and averaged together, about 31 percent of campaign appeals made by black Republicans focused on economic conservatism. This number is higher than the average number of social conservative appeals, which is at about 22 percent. Appeals aimed toward black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party account on average for roughly 22 percent of appeals. Other appeals based more on personal characteristics (i.e. integrity, broad support, outsider, etc.) account on average for 25 percent of all appeals. This figure is similar for white Republicans when aggregating appeals across newspaper and television campaign ads. For white Republicans, they averaged about 42 percent of their appeals towards economic conservatism. Socially conservative appeals, on average, accounted for about 17 percent of all campaign appeals. On average, appeals aimed at dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party accounted for about 7.5 percent of all appeals from white Republicans. Dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party largely looks at how the candidate mentions their race as a factor in their campaign, or if they appeal to how the needs of blacks are not adequately addressed in the Democratic Party. This appeal is the most nuanced of all four appeals, so I will unpack it later in this chapter. Other appeals account for about 31 percent. Based on my data collection and analysis, my original hypothesis that black Republicans employ social

conservative appeals did not seem to be proved to be true. However, there is some evidence that regionally this may hold. It was interesting to see that black and white Republicans were so similar in their campaign appeals.

### **Trends Over Time**

Over time, black Republicans have become more similar to their white counterparts. This can be seen in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2. The proportion of appeals highlighting dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party has decreased over time, with the proportion of the other three types of appeals has increased over time. Ed Brooke, during his 1972 and 1978 Senate campaign, appealed to black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party 45.6 percent of the time. When looking at the other appeals, 5.4 percent were socially conservative, 18.5 percent were economically free-market appeals, and 30.4 percent were other personal/judgment appeals. Francis Sargent's campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 1972 had appeals that were different from Brooke. Out of his campaign appeals, 7.5 percent appealed to black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, 10 percent appealed to social conservatism, and 42.5 percent appealed to economic free-market appeals. Brooke was attempting to moderate his party by deemphasizing the importance of race in his campaign (which Republicans highlighted in their new "Southern Strategy") and taking liberal policy positions.

However by 1994, JC Watts looked remarkably similar to his white counterpart, Steve Largent. In total, 27.6 percent of his appeals were economic-free market based, 46.8 percent were socially conservative, 8.5 percent were highlighting dissatisfaction in the Democratic Party, and 17 percent were other character and judgment appeals. For Largent, 33.3 percent of his appeals were based on economic free-market though, 33.3 percent were socially conservative appeals, 14 percent were looking at dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, and 19.3 percent

were based on character and judgment. When compared to the similarities between Brooke and Sargent, these trends seem to be much more in alignment.

Finally, in the 2010 election cycle, Allen West and Bill Young followed similar trends in types of appeals. In terms of West's appeals, 40 percent were economic free-market appeals, 16.4 percent were socially conservative, 23.6 percent were based on dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, and 20 percent were other judgment and character appeals. For Young, 54 percent were economic free-market appeals, 4.2 percent were socially conservative, 0 percent appealed to dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, and 41.6 percent appealed to character and judgment appeals.

The trends in appeals seem to have converged over time among black and white Republicans, much as I hypothesized. Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 show how over time, the proportion of the four different appeals for black Republican candidates has become similar to that of white Republican candidates. Black Republicans have largely deemphasized appeals based on highlighting dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, focusing more on social and economic conservatism, both of which white Republicans focus on as well. In short, black Republicans seem to have lost the moderating role that Ed Brooke appeared to play. Another trend is that black Republican candidates tend to mirror the appeals of the white candidate in their particular region, and the issues that they emphasize.




Figure 4-1: White Republican Total Proportion of Appeals




Figure 4-2: Black Republican Total Proportion of Appeals

## Regional Differences

4-3: Regional Breakdown of Case Studies

<b>Northern Case Studies</b>	<b>Southern Case Studies</b>
Ed Brooke (MA)	JC Watts (OK)
Francis Sargent (MA)	Steven Largent (OK)
Alan Keyes (MD)	Tim Scott (SC)
Bill Brock (MD)	Jeff Duncan (SC)
Gary Franks (CT)	Allen West (FL)
Nancy Johnson (CT)	Bill Young (FL)
Michael Steele (MD)	
Eric Wargotz (MD)	

Above in table 4-3 shows how I broke down my list of case studies (both black and white Republicans) by region. As the Democratic Party lost ground in the once “Solid Democratic South” due to Democratic Party support for civil rights legislation, the Republican Party came in to fill that void in the mid-to-late 1960s. The South became increasingly conservative, both socially and economically, which qualities candidates in the South also share. This partisan realignment is reflected in the campaign appeals employed by southern candidates. While economic appeals still dominate, the proportion of socially conservative appeals was larger among the southern case studies in comparison with the northern ones.

Among the southern case studies, there was greater emphasis on socially conservative campaign appeals. One example of this is the case of JC Watts (a black Republican) and Jeff Duncan (a white Republican), both from Oklahoma. Watts focused 46.8 percent of his campaign on socially conservative appeals compared to Duncan, who devoted 42.8 percent of his campaign appeals to social conservatism. On average, southern black Republicans had 28.2 percent of their appeals based on social conservatism when the newspaper and television ad appeals are aggregated. This compares to economic appeals among southern black Republicans, which

averaged 39.2 percent. In comparison to northern black Republicans, economic free-market appeals averaged 24.6 percent, whereas socially conservative appeals only averaged 17.25 percent. In Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4, the proportions are visibly different between northern and southern black Republicans. Even though economic appeals made up the largest percentage of campaign appeals for both northern and southern black Republicans, the percentage of socially conservative appeals were higher among the southern cases.

By contrast, northern black Republicans had a substantially higher proportion of appeals focused on black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. This measure was composed of a candidate mentioning their race and other blacks, criticize Democratic initiatives, and appeal to how blacks are captured and taken for granted in the Democratic Party. Roughly 28 percent of all northern black Republican appeals aimed at capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. Comparatively, black southern Republicans only appealed to black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party about 15 percent of the time. This could be due to the timing of my southern black case studies, in that by the mid-1990s, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Republican Party had lost the black vote. This fact may be a legacy from the 1870s through the 1950s. This may also due to the fact that southern black Republicans must work to appeal to the Republican base, which consists of white voters. Finally, when it comes to other appeals based largely on character, southern black Republicans average a proportion of about 18 percent of appeals, whereas northern black Republicans have on average a proportion of about 30.4 percent of other appeals. This is likely due to the fact that southern black Republicans tend to be more ideological and adhere closer to the Party's platform in order to attract white voters.

White Republicans have similar trends to the type of appeals used by black Republicans both in terms of over time and regionally. For white Republicans, economic appeals dominate,

but the gap between the proportion of economic free-market and socially conservative appeals is smaller due to a larger amount of socially conservative appeals in the south. Among southern white Republicans, on average, they appeal to economic conservatism in 43.45 percent of their overall appeals. When it comes to socially conservative appeals among southern white Republicans, they proportionally account for roughly 27 percent of all appeals on average. Among northern white Republicans, economically conservative appeals average to 40 percent of all appeals. Socially conservative appeals average to 2.7 percent of all appeals, significantly lower than white southern Republicans. This could largely be due to heavy religious influences in the South that are not present in the North. When it comes to the other two appeals, neither southern nor northern Republicans appeal to black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, on average proportionally counting for only about 4.7 percent and 11.3 percent respectively. Other character-based appeals (i.e. Positive Judgment) do seem to be more present amongst white Republicans, on average accounting for 25 percent of southern white Republican appeals and 40.5 percent of appeals made by northern white Republicans.

Overall, while black Republicans have similar proportions of appeals as white Republicans, there are some slight regional differences along social conservative appeals, appeals based on dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, and “other” appeals based on character and judgment. Economic appeals still tended to be the most emphasized between both northern and southern black Republicans.




Figure 4-3: Southern White Republican Total Proportion of Appeals




Figure 4-4: Northern White Republican Total Proportion of Appeals




Figure 4-5: Southern Black Republican Total Proportion of Appeals




Figure 4-6: Northern Black Republican Total Proportion of Appeals

**Are Black Republicans Becoming More Like White Republicans?**

This data also seems to suggest that black Republicans have become more similar to white Republicans over time, thereby validating part of my hypothesis. However, it still raises questions if even regionally, black Republicans are actually more likely to employ a socially

conservative appeal, or if the regional difference is to blame. While answering this question definitively is a bit beyond my study, it that appears the aggregated totals for both northern and southern black Republicans in comparison to their white counterparts, black Republicans are a bit more likely to emphasize socially conservative appeals.

### **An In Depth Look at the Dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party**

By dissecting appeals based on dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, I attempt to note instances of black Republicans building on the argument that the Democratic Party takes black support for granted. I attempt to measure this variable in my coding scheme by many measures, but there are three main codes that I will focus on in this section: how often the candidates explicitly mention blacks being captured in the Democratic Party, how often race is mentioned by the candidates, and how often candidates are willing to cross party lines. These three measurements help get at how black Republicans may appeal to black voters. Overall, appeals by black Republicans to black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party accounted for 25 percent of all appeals when aggregated across campaign ads and newspaper coverage.

The first measure is of how often black Republicans explicitly mention black capture within the Democratic Party. This appeal seems to only appear in newspaper coverage. No candidate explicitly mentioned in a television ad black capture and dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. Only four black Republicans employed this type of appeal: Alan Keyes, Gary Franks, Michael Steele, and Tim Scott. As shown in Figure 4-7, out of these four candidates that explicitly mentioned black capture within the Democratic Party, 40 percent of such appeals came from Michael Steele. He alluded to Democrats taking blacks for granted. This appeal gets explicitly at black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party and taking blacks for granted in their coalition.




Figure 4-7: Explicit Mention of Black Capture within the Democratic Party

The second prominent measure of dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party is the mention of race is by black Republicans as a way to possibly appeal to black voters and try and counter the image of the Republican Party as racially charged. Campaign ads that show blacks in the ad may attempt to show that the Republican Party is just as diverse as the Democratic Party; therefore, black voters should not rule out the Republican candidate who represents them just as well. Black Republican candidates do still make some appeals based on their race to attract black voters, as Figure 4-8 demonstrates. For example, during his 1998 Connecticut US Senate race, Gary Franks mentioned in two advertisements “Principles” and “Inspiration,” that he had experienced racism growing up and that he is a descendent of slaves. Other candidates, such as Michael Steele in his 2006 Maryland Senate race emphasized his upbringing by a mom who worked at a laundry mat and refused government assistance in one of his campaign advertisements, titled “Hope In Action.” This could also be aimed at appealing to racially liberal whites that do not want to be perceived as having racial biases. Interestingly enough, only four candidates featured blacks in their advertisements (Franks, Steele, Watts, and West). Of racial

appeals, 77 percent were from Franks and Steele. While I expected Brooke to have a substantial amount of appeals based on race, no blacks appeared in his advertisements. This could be due to the fact that Ed Brooke has specifically stated that he was a Republican who happened to be black; therefore, his race would not be something he'd emphasize.




Figure 4-8: Black Republican Candidate Mention of Race

Finally, the last measure of dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party that I will unpack is the mention of crossing party lines. I put this code under this category because black Republicans being willing to cross party lines shows that they are willing to work with Democrats to pass policies that blacks may care about. By doing this, black Republicans are attempting to show that they can represent blacks just as well as a Democrat can. It could also be, as mentioned before, that these candidates are attempting to garner support from all voters, black and white alike. While this is likely the case, it is still a possible way for black Republicans to appeal to black capture within the Democratic Party. Only three candidates mention crossing party lines in their campaign ads and newspapers: Ed Brooke, Michael Steele, and Tim Scott. Michael Steele comprises 54 percent of the appeals to cross party lines. One

example of this type of appeal in practice is from a Michael Steele ad titled “Building Bridges” that features a black woman claiming that she is crossing party lines to vote for Steele. This seems to allude to the fact that she is frustrated with the Democratic Party’s policies and trusts Steele to advocate on behalf of her interests.

Over these three aspects of black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, Michael Steele seems to employ them the most. Figure 4-9 highlights this fact. This is likely due to the fact that he was running in the somewhat liberally state of Maryland, with a significant black population. However, it also could be an example of a modern black Republican working to bring the party back to the center and attract black voters.




Figure 4-9: Black Republican Mention of Crossing Party Lines

### **Taking Liberal Policy Positions**

One last aspect of my data I will analyze is to look at how frequently the candidates take liberal policy positions. By “liberal policies,” I refer to policies that are typically part of the Democratic Party’s platform (i.e. pro-choice, pro-environmental protection, higher taxes) or policies that would not typically be found in the Republican Party platform. I aggregated appeals

across newspaper and TV campaign ads in order to evaluate the frequency that the candidates supported liberal policies. For my black Republican case studies, liberal policy positions accounted for 10 percent of all appeals (aggregated amongst both newspaper articles and television campaign ads). In comparison, my white Republicans took liberal policy positions on 7.27 percent of overall appeals (also aggregated amongst both newspaper articles and television campaign ads). Figures 4-9 and 4-10 show how from 2000 on, neither black nor white Republicans take liberal policy positions, with the exception being Michael Steele. This could be due to the resurgence in polarization between the two parties or a regional difference.

Ed Brooke, who was largely seen as a moderate, took liberal policy positions in 34.7 percent of all his appeals. This is larger than any other candidate and is largely accounted for by his continued opposition to the Vietnam War, which was prevalent in the newspaper coverage of his campaign. An interesting aside is that he actually criticized Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement for speaking against the war, in that it deviated from the original goal of the movement: to expand political rights to blacks. Also in his newspaper coverage, Brooke expressed the importance of blacks gaining equal rights and justice under the law. Brooke's support for liberal policy made him a moderate within the Senate. . However, it is difficult to discern how much of this liberal policy position-taking is due to Brooke's race or just the state he represents

Francis Sargent, Brooke's comparison, also made a relatively large number of appeals to his support for liberal policy. His appeals emphasized his support for school integration programs, such as school busing. He made appeals based on four liberal policies (positive mention of welfare, equality and justice, and support for school integration). Overall, Sargent took a liberal policy positions in 10 percent of his campaign appeals

When looking at more recent case studies, Michael Steele prominently takes liberal policy positions. In total, Steele appealed to four liberal policies (pro-choice, support for affirmative action, and equality/justice). When aggregating over newspaper articles and campaign advertisements on how often liberal policies were emphasized, out of Steele's total appeals, 9.3 percent were based on liberal policy positions. This is relatively high in comparison to his white comparison, Eric Wargotz. Wargotz praised President Obama once, but did not situate himself liberally on any significant policy.

When looking at white Republicans, one of the most liberal was Nancy Johnson. In her Connecticut House race, she emphasized three liberal policy areas that she supports (pro-choice, pro-environmental protection, and positively mentioning welfare). Throughout her 1998 campaign, 22.7 percent of her appeals took liberal policy positions. This is rather significant, as it accounts for a little over a fifth of her total appeals. In comparison to Gary Franks, her black counterpart, she takes considerably more liberal policy appeals. Franks made two liberal appeals: one in favor of government welfare programs and one where he labeled himself pro-choice.

On a whole, black Republicans seem to emphasize their liberal policy stances on a whole more than their white counterparts. This could be evidence that despite becoming more similar to white Republicans overtime, the role of black Republicans as a moderating faction within the Republican Party still exists.




Figure 4-10: Proportion of Support for Liberal Policies Amongst Black Republican Cases




Figure 4-11: Proportion of Support for Liberal Policies Amongst White Republican Cases

**Conclusion**

As my content analysis has shown, there have been some changes in how black Republicans appeal to voters during their campaigns over the past 40 years. However, my initial hypothesis has been somewhat challenged by my evidence. Overall, economic free-market/conservative appeals dominate both black and white Republican Congressional candidates’ appeals in both television campaign ads and newspaper coverage. However, black Republicans were more likely on average to appeal to social conservatism than were white Republicans. In addition, there was some variation regionally, with southern candidates more likely to be socially conservative than their northern counterparts. Northern black Republicans were also more likely to appeal to black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. However, it is difficult to tell whether these differences were due to regional differences, racial differences, or time period difference. When that appeal was broken down, I showed that the mention and

emphasis of race amongst black Republican candidates seemed to peak in the 1990s and 2000s; none of these appeals seemed to gain traction among black voters. In addition, black and white Republican candidates seemed to be less moderate today than back in the 1970s, as the amount of liberal issues the candidates publically supported and emphasized decreased over time. This does seem to uphold part of my hypothesis that black Republicans have become similar to white Republicans in how they message themselves in their campaigns. Though the Sargent-Brooke comparison may just show that Republicans have become more ideologically conservative over time. Some possible implications of my study are looking at how black Republicans can possibly gain more black support, and how despite the few signs of diversity, the Republican Party has remained largely homogenous ideologically.

## **V. Looking into the Future: Still the Party of Lincoln?**

The Republican Party has changed in the past century both in terms of its ideology and base of support. Starting with the New Deal in the 1930s, and solidifying in the 1960s, the Republican Party went from the “Party of Lincoln,” with a large faction of black support, to the party of the disaffected white voter. This transformation of the party did not happen overnight. As Democrats advocated and passed policies that aided black Americans, the allegiance of black voters shifted into the Democratic camp. The year 1964 perhaps demonstrates this change the best and is seen as a watershed year for blacks in the Republican Party. With the passage of the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Republican presidential nomination of Barry Goldwater (a Senator who voted against the Civil Rights Act), the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the expansion of government social programs under the Great Society, African-Americans saw promise in the Democratic Party. This led white southern Democrats to switch to the Republican Party, but not without much courting. How black Republican candidates altered their campaign strategies since this partisan shift is the main focus of this study.

### **Recapitulation**

Based on the relevant preexisting academic literature, the three prominent ways for black Republican elites to pull blacks into the party are through an economic free-market appeal, a social conservative appeal, and by highlighting the dissatisfaction (or capture) of blacks within the Democratic Party. My original hypothesis states that over the past fifty years, black Republicans have become less of a distinct faction in the party arguing for greater inclusion. The Sargent-Brooke comparison speaks to this fact, seen with their support for government intervention to improve the playing field for blacks in America. Today, black Republicans have adopted many of the same campaign messaging strategies as white Republican candidates. In

addition, I hypothesized that black Republicans would focus more of their campaign television advertisements and newspaper coverage on social appeals. I believed this to be the case because as the Republican Party became more conservative and ideologically unified. Appealing to the benefits of government welfare programs would not be tolerated in today's Republican Party, as it is opposed to a growing federal government. In addition, after the "Southern Strategy" and the perceived success of government programs among black voters, most blacks have become so loyal to the Democratic Party, that appealing to their perceived capture within the party seemed to prove ineffective. Therefore, social conservatism seems to be the only avenue left open for the Republican Party to acquire black voters, who on a whole hold more conservative positions on social issues than their white counterparts. However, it is likely that black Republicans are trying to appeal to the party's base: conservative white voters.

After coding and conducting content analysis on 59 campaign television advertisements and 120 newspaper articles for seven black Republican and seven white Republican candidates from 1972-2010, I found limited support for my hypothesis. It seems that economic free-market based appeals dominate amongst both black and white Republicans. However, over time and across regions, different types of appeals dominate, with southern candidates (both black and white) tending to employ a higher number of socially conservative appeals than their northern counterparts. Yet over all of my case studies in both television ads and newspaper articles, economic free-market appeals dominated.

My research seems to describe trends of how black Republicans have adapted to the partisan realignment between the Democratic and Republican Parties over the past four decades. Black Republicans appear to have become less distinct within the party. The overall dominance of economic appeals demonstrates the fact that black Republican candidates have taken positions

and used appeals nearly identical to their white counterparts. I did observe variations over time and region. When I aggregated and averaged together the campaign and newspaper appeals of my black case studies, I found that economic appeals were most employed, then socially conservative appeals, and finally those highlighting black dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. The category of “other” appeals aimed at emphasizing a candidate’s personal character and judgment accounted for nearly a third of appeals. The same trends were seen among their white counterparts. There does seem to be a spike in socially conservative appeals during the mid-1990s with JC Watts and Gary Franks both emphasizing their “family values” and Christian faith. This leads to another trend I found when analyzing my data, which is a regional difference between my southern and northern case studies. Both black and white southern Republicans (which came from the states of Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Florida) emphasized their social conservative credentials nearly twice as much as their northern counterparts. Both of these findings once again highlight the convergence between black and white Republicans, with blacks ceasing to hold their position as a moderating voice within the party.

### **Limitations and Avenues for Further Research**

When conducting my study, I ran into a few limitations. A first limitation is the small sample of black Republicans available to study. My study included only candidates who were the Republican nominee in the November general election. Had I expanded my case studies to candidates that were running in the Republican primary, I would have been able to expand my observations and perhaps be able to make a broader description of how black Republicans campaign. This fact perhaps limits my findings to this specific group of case studies than a more broadly applicable finding. A second limitation was the number of television advertisements made available to me. The University of Oklahoma limited the number of advertisements I

could check out for each candidate to five. In addition, I wanted to use other comparisons, but they were not available in the database, which added further complications to my study. For example, I originally intended to compare Ed Brooke to Josiah Spaulding during his 1970 US Senate race against Ted Kennedy, but those advertisements were not available. A third limitation was the validity of my coding scheme for dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. If I had the resources and time to work with a second coder, I would be able to bolster the validity of this measure.

My study has some potential implications. First, it gives potential implications for how Republicans relate to black voters. By determining what campaign appeals both white and black Republican candidates for office emphasize, the Republican Party can evaluate the effectiveness of this strategy in drawing in black voters into the party. Second, it gives possible implications on how black Republicans can appeal to the Republican base and the conservative white voter. Finally, a broader implication is determining what the future holds for blacks in the Republican Party. My research shows how overtime, black Republicans have tended to lose their unique place as a moderating force within the party. Now, as black Republicans have become more similar in their white counterparts in how they campaign, it appears that they have lost their impact as a moderating force within the Republican Party.

When it comes to conducting future research, my project provides a springboard for others looking to develop this research on how black Republicans appeal to blacks. One area I wanted to evaluate but could not due to lack of resources was to look at how unelected officials fit into this model. Officials such as Clarence Thomas, Condoleezza Rice, and Colin Powell may offer a different perspective on the relationship between the Republican Party and blacks not seen in a campaign.

Another avenue for future research is to look at other ways that the Republican Party actively attempts to recruit blacks into the party beyond the three campaign appeals I have gleaned from the literature. Perhaps there are different categories of appeals that are equally important, but yet to be discovered and analyzed by the existing literature. One possible way to evaluate this would be to do field research and follow black and white Republican candidates on their campaign trails over a few months to see first-hand the differences between the type of campaign events and audiences that black and white Republicans visit, as well as how voters respond to their campaign messages.

Building on this previous point, it would be fruitful to look at how well financed these black Republican candidates are by the National Republican Party. This could help determine how much of a chance a black Republican candidate has of winning in the eyes of the national party, and how the party views black candidates. Is the emergence of black Republicans evidence that Republicans have succeeded at attracting blacks to the party, or is it just the Republican Party running a black candidate in an attempt to try and run away from their image as propagating racism among their base. Finally, it would have been interesting to look at how black Republicans campaigned before 1964. That would give a better comparison group to how black Republicans positioned themselves when the Republican Party was still seen to be the party of civil rights and the interests of blacks. Perhaps a period from the end of the Civil War to the New Deal would be particularly interesting to see the changes in black Republicans on the campaign trail and within the party. This would be somewhat challenging, as there were no black Republicans in Congress from the end of Reconstruction in the late 1870s until the 1930s. In addition, finding campaign materials from these early candidates would be no easy feat, but absolutely fascinating to find.

## **Ending Remarks**

My study on black Republican campaign strategies began a new discussion on the role of blacks in the Republican Party, both in the past and the present. I also have worked to look at how black Republicans, once a strong faction of the party, have adjusted to the partisan realignment revolving largely around civil rights since the 1930s, solidifying in the 1960s and 1970s. Black Republicans seem to have gotten caught in the middle of this shift. Overall, black Republicans are becoming more like their white counterparts in the party, but their future is definitely uncertain and far from predetermined based on previous politics.

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the National Negro Republican Assembly." *Federal History Online*. Pgs. 32-45.

## Appendix of Campaign Television Advertisements and Newspaper Articles

### Television Campaign Ads

#### Black Case Studies

Case	Ad Title	Ad Commissioner	Date
Edward Brooke	Man	Brooke for US Senator Committee	1972
Edward Brooke	Personality	Brooke for US Senator Committee	1972
Edward Brooke	Cities and Towns	The Brooke Committee, Chair: Stanley Gaffin (?)	1978
Edward Brooke	ERA	The Brooke Committee	1978
Edward Brooke	Taxes	The Brooke Committee; Stanley Gaffin	1978
Alan Keyes	Reagan Endorse	Alan Keyes for US Senate	1988
Alan Keyes	Taxes	Alan Keyes for US Senate	1988
Alan Keyes	Real Contrast	Alan Keyes for US Senate	1988
Alan Keyes	Values	NRSC	1988
Alan Keyes	The Answer	NRSC	1988
JC Watts	Conservative Leader Revised	NRCC & Watts for Congress	1994
JC Watts	Back at Ya	NRCC & Watts for Congress	1994
JC Watts	Difference	NRCC & Watts for Congress	1994
JC Watts	In the Tradition Revised	Watts for Congress	1994
JC Watts	This is America	This is America	1996
Gary Franks	Principles	Gary Franks for Senate	1998
Gary Franks	Record	Gary Franks for Senate	1998
Gary Franks	Gary Franks	Gary Franks for Senate and NRCC	1998
Gary Franks	Inspiration/NRCC	Gary Franks for Senate and RNC	1998
Gary Franks	More Taxes	Gary Franks for Senate	1998
Michael Steele	A Different Kind of Senator	Steele for Senate	2006
Michael Steele	Buildig Bridges	Steele for Senate	2006
Michael Steele	Real Ideas for Change	Steele for Senate	2006
Michael Steele	Real Differences	Steele for Senate	2006
Michael Steele	Taking out the Trash	Steele for Senate	2006
Michael Steele	Hope in Action	Steele for Senate	2006
Michael Steele	Supports Stem Cells	Steele for Senate	2006
Tim Scott	Meet Tim Scott	Tim Scott for Congress	2010
Tim Scott	Character	Tim Scott for Congress	2010
Tim Scott	Win Our Country Back	Tim Scott for Congress	2010

Allen West	This is America	West for Congress	2010
Allen West	Together	West for Congress	2010
Allen West	Real Discussion	West for Congress	2010
Allen West	Tripled	West for Congress	2010
Allen West	Behind Closed Doors	West for Congress	2010
Allen West	Desparate	West for Congress	2010
Allen West	Welcome	West for Congress	2010

### White Case Studies

Case	Ad Title	Ad Commissioner	Date
Francis Sargent	Human Services		1974
Francis Sargent	Party Bills	The Sargent Committee	1974
Francis Sargent	We can say it		1974
Bill Brock	Crime	NRSC	1994
Bill Brock	Education	Friends of Bill Brock for US Senate	1994
Bill Brock	Jobs	Friends of Bill Brock for US Senate	1994
Steve Largent	Economy	Steve Largent for Congress	1994
Steve Largent	Healthcare	Largent for Congress Committee	1994
Steve Largent	Mike	Largent for Congress Committee	1994
Nancy Johnson	Economics	Re-elect Nancy Johnson to Congress Committee	1998
Nancy Johnson	Endorse	Re-elect Nancy Johnson to Congress Committee	1998
Nancy Johnson	Health Care/Holiday	Re-elect Nancy Johnson to Congress Committee	1998
Nancy Johnson	Johnson Education	Re-elect Nancy Johnson to Congress Committee	1998
Eric Wargotz	Political Insidersaurus	Eric Wargotz for US Senate	2010
Eric Wargotz	Can't Count on Mikluski	Eric Wargotz for US Senate	2010
Eric Wargotz	The Wall-Mikluski's Agenda	Eric Wargotz for US Senate	2010
Jeff Duncan	TV Spot	Jeff Duncan for Congress	2010
Jeff Duncan	TV Spot 2	Jeff Duncan for Congress	2010
Jeff Duncan	Lessons Learned	Jeff Duncan for Congress	2010
Bill Young	Bone Marrow	Congressman Bill Young Campaign Committee	2010
Bill Young	Fiscal Responsibility	Congressman Bill Young Campaign Committee	2010
Bill Young	Jobs and Economy	Congressman Bill Young Campaign Committee	2010

### Newspaper Articles

### Black Case Studies

Case	Date	Author	Article Title	Source	Page
Ed Brooke	6/15/72	Richard Audet	Brooke Launches Campaign	Boston Globe	14
Ed Brooke	10/21/72	Joe Pilati	Guessing Game of Sen. Brooke	Boston Globe	7
Ed Brooke	9/11/72	Robert Healy	O'Leary tries to offer choice	Boston Globe	17
Ed Brooke	12/3/72	-	132,818 left blanks in Senate Voting	Boston Globe	85
Ed Brooke	12/10/72	Charles Claffey	Brooke: A Biography	Boston Globe	B8
Ed Brooke	11/5/72	Rachelle Patterson	Cronin seeking bipartisan vote, Kerry stressing Party Ties in 5th District Race		17
Ed Brooke	10/24/72	James Ayres	Brooke, Droncy Campaigns - a study in contrasts	Boston Globe	A13
Ed Brooke	10/19/72	-	ADA backs Sen Brooke, 6 in Mass for Congress	Boston Globe	12
Ed Brooke	10/7/72	John Wood	State labor council rejects panel's choice, refuse to back Hicks	Boston Globe	3
Ed Brooke	6/10/72	David Wilson	Gaithbraith's refusal to contest a black shows patronizing attitude towards Sen Brooke	Boston Globe	9
Ed Brooke	5/6/72	AA Michaelson	Brooke Campaigns Hard Despite 75% Poll Backing	Boston Globe	9
Ed Brooke	1/29/72	David B. Wilson	Only overconfidence can hurt Brooke bid	Boston Globe	9
Ed Brooke	6/1/78	Stephen Wermiel	Brooke is off and running despite troubles	Boston Globe	1
Ed Brooke	11/15/78	Jerimiah V. Murphy	12 years and many changes	Boston Globe	27
Ed Brooke	11/13/78	Ian Menzies	Health care: It could have been the extra vote for Tsongas	Boston Globe	17
Ed Brooke	11/12/78	Norman Lockman	Many blacks suspect race was a factor in the defeat of Brooke by Tsongas	Boston Globe	38
Ed Brooke	11/8/78	Norman Lockman	Brooke concedes, praises Tsongas	Boston Globe	1
Ed Brooke	11/5/78	Norman Lockman	Brooke, Tsongas: the differences	Boston Globe	28
Ed Brooke	1/1/78	Norman Lockman	Brooks, Tsongas Joust on TV	Boston Globe	1
Ed Brooke	10/27/78	Norman Lockman	Brooke, Tsongas in kid-gloves match	Boston Globe	1
Alan Keyes	10/23/88	Robert Barnes	New Right Rallies to Md. GOP Candidate Alan Keyes	Washington Post	B1
Alan Keyes	8/17/88	Jo-Ann Armao & Eric Pianin	Md. Senate Hopeful Makes Splash with Conservative Voters	Washington Post	A21
Alan Keyes	9/11/88	Robert Barnes	Alan Keyes: Unknown but not Anonymous	Washington Post	A1
Alan Keyes	6/11/88	Associated Press	Md. GOP Leaders Leaning to Alan Keyes for Senate	Washington Post	B5
Alan Keyes	8/3/88	Robert Novak & Rowland Evans	The Republican Illness	Washington Post	A17
Alan Keyes	10/23/88	Paul Duggan	The Barnesses and the Hortons Debate	Washington Post	D8

Alan Keyes	11/6/88	-	Maryland: the Choices	Washington Post	C6
JC Watts	9/11/94	Mick Hinton	Watts Gains National Help in House Race	The Daily Oklahoman	1
JC Watts	11/9/94	Anne DeFrango, Karen Klinka, Mike Hinton, Dianne Plumberg	Republicans Control 5 of 6 Congress seats	The Daily Oklahoman	1
JC Watts	10/25/94	Patrick B. McGuigan	Beyond Race: A Better Tomorrow	The Daily Oklahoman	10
JC Watts	11/4/94	Capitol Bureau	Tennessee Governor Backs Watts	The Daily Oklahoman	27
JC Watts	10/31/94	Mick Hinton	On the Campaign Trail - Watts, Perryman Stump in 4th District	The Daily Oklahoman	1
JC Watts	11/15/94	-	Does Clinton Get It?	The Daily Oklahoman	4
JC Watts	9/18/94	Patrick B. McGuigan	Starts, Political & Other, Come out	The Daily Oklahoman	16
JC Watts	9/18/94	Mick Hinton	Democrat, GOP Hopefuls in 4th District Face Tight Races	The Daily Oklahoman	11
JC Watts	10/6/94	Patrick B. McGuigan	The Incomplete GOP "Contract"	The Daily Oklahoman	8
Gary Franks	3/1/98	Fred Musante	What Do Voters Think Anyway?	New York Times	CT1
Gary Franks	7/5/98	David Howard	Gary R. Franks Tries the Rebound Trail	New York Times	CT8
Gary Franks	8/13/98	David Barry	Giuliani to Stump for GOP around US	New York Times	B4
Gary Franks	9/8/98	Mike Allen	Connecticut Senate Rivals Start TV Ad Campaigns Tonight, With No Party Mentioned	New York Times	B8
Gary Franks	10/19/98	Christopher Keating; Michael Remez	Franks Will Try for Sequel to 'Success Story'	Hartford Courant	A1
Gary Franks	1/21/98	Christopher Keating; Dan Haar	Franks Enters Race, Says Dodd is Out of Touch	Hartford Courant	A1
Gary Franks	9/10/98	Christopher Keating	Franks, Dodd Take Campaigns for Senate Seat to TV Audience	Hartford Courant	A5
Gary Franks	10/29/98	Christopher Keating	Former Congressman Franks Challenges Dodd for Senate	Hartford Courant	7
Gary Franks	2/27/98	Christopher Keating	Franks Press Conferences Takes A Detour into Disorderliness	Hartford Courant	A7
Gary Franks	7/25/98	Jon Lender; Christopher Keating	GOP Delegates Ignore Polls, Cheer Franks - Senate Challenger Takes Aim at Dodd	Hartford Courant	A10
Michael Steele	11/8/06	Neely Tucker	Red State and Blue, Reflected in Black and White	Washington Post	D4
Michael Steele	8/25/06	Matthew Mosk	Angling for the Hip-Hop Appeal	Washington Post	B1
Michael Steele	9/19/06	Paul Farhi	Where's the Party? Nowhere to be found in Steele Ads; Senate Candidate Leavs GOP and Issues out of the Picture	Washington Post	C1
Michael Steele	9/21/06	Matthew Mosk	Black GOP Groups Woo Mfume, Blast Democrats to Back Steele	Washington Post	B1

Michael Steele	10/4/06	Matthew Mosk & Ann E. Marimow	Steele, Cardin Debate Draws Sharp Distinctions; Iraq War and PACs Among Topics Discussed	Washington Post	A1
Michael Steele	10/17/06	Ann E. Marimow and Ovetta Wiggins	Race vs. Party; Steele Catches the Eye of Frustrated Black Democrats In Prince George's but Will They Cross Over?	Washington Post	B1
Michael Steele	10/30/06	Matthew Mosk & Ann E. Marimow	Debate Puts Steele on Defensive; Candidate Pressed on Bush, Abortion	Washington Post	A1
Michael Steele	11/5/06	Ann E. Marimow and Eric Rich	Cardin, Steele Differ Widely on Health Care	Washington Post	C4
Tim Scott	10/13/10	SCHUYLER KROPF	Scott moving closer to making history - 1ST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	The State	11
Tim Scott	2/9/10	Associated Press	Scott Enters Race for Congress	The State	11
Tim Scott	11/10/10	Wayne Washington	Media Flock to Scott	The State	1
Tim Scott	6/25/10	David Slade	Scott focuses on conservatism, not on race	The State	11
Tim Scott	12/2/10	Associated Press	Scott will not join Black Caucus-US House	The State	11
Tim Scott	11/20/10	Gina Smith	Clyburn: S.C. has lost clout in D.C. - CONGRESS	The State	11
Tim Scott	8/8/10	Tim Flach	'MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY' - RALLY ATTACKS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION	The State	13
Allen West	9/6/10	Amy Sherman & Patricia Mazzei	CAMPAIGN 2010 - CONGRESS : Rematch of rivals Allen West and Ron Klein likely to be closer - After easily defeating Republican Allen West in 2008, Democratic U.S. Rep. Ron Klein is facing a more powerful West who has amassed a massive war chest and national media attention.	Miami Herald	B1
Allen West	10/11/10	Amy Sherman	CAMPAIGN 2010 - U.S. HOUSE DISTRICT 22: Klein- West debate turns nasty - U.S. Rep. Ron Klein and Republican challenger Allen West argued about 'don't ask, don't tell,' tax cuts and other issues during a testy Sunday debate.	Miami Herald	B1
Allen West	10/10/10	Amy Sherman	POLITICAL CURRENTS: U.S. Rep. Ron Klein and Republican challenger Allen West argued during testy debate	Miami Herald	-
Allen West	11/1/10	Amy Sherman & Lesley Clark	CAMPAIGN 2010 - U.S HOUSE DISTRICT 22: Klein- West race down to wire - An expensive campaign in Broward and Palm Beach counties mirrors the tenor of the nation.	Miami Herald	B1
Allen West	11/3/10	Amy Sherman	West leads comfortably, claims victory over Klein for seat in Congress	Miami Herald	-
Allen West	9/17/10	Lesley Clark	FLORIDA POLITICS: Tax cuts carving a divide in Florida - The national debate over ending or extending Bush-era tax cuts is creeping into Sunshine State election campaigns.	Miami Herald	A1
Allen	10/11/10	Lesley Clark	Obama to raise money in Coral Gables	Miami Herald	3B

West					
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## White Case Studies

Case	Date	Author	Article	Source	Page
Francis Sargent	7/17/74	Robert Healy	Sargent drive shifts to the right	Boston Globe	19
Francis Sargent	6/27/74	Rachelle Patterson	Sargent Proposes \$13m housing expenditure to create jobs	Boston Globe	54
Francis Sargent	11/3/74	Rachelle Patterson	Utility hike halt asked by Sargent	Boston Globe	13
Francis Sargent	10/27/74	-	Sargent, in suburbs, says he's 'closing fast' on Dukakis	Boston Globe	7
Francis Sargent	10/25/74	Kent Hartnett	Two Sargent ads hit snags at TV station	Boston Globe	3
Francis Sargent	10/24/74	William Henry 3rd; Rachelle Patterson	Sargent gets tough, Dukakis low key as Dwight and O'Neil join 3rd debate	Boston Globe	1
Francis Sargent	10/20/74	Rachelle Patterson	Sargent charges Dukakis misleads on tax issue	Boston Globe	49
Francis Sargent	10/5/74	William Henry 3rd	Blacks hear Sargent bid for support	Boston Globe	4
Francis Sargent	10/3/74	William Henry 3rd	Candidates disagree on busing roles	Boston Globe	1
Bill Brock	3/8/94	Charles Babington	Trying for a 20th-Century political first	Washington Post	D1
Bill Brock	9/4/94	Charles Babington	Vote '94 The Region	Washington Post	B1
Bill Brock	9/8/94	Charles Babington	Republicans Hope for a Turn	Washington Post	M1
Bill Brock	9/19/94	Kim Masters	Smile When You Say That	Washington Post	D1
Bill Brock	10/20/94	Charles Babington	Brock, Sarbanes Launch All-Out Attack	Washington Post	C1
Bill Brock	10/30/94	Charles Babington	Brock's Md Campaign Breaks with his Past	Washington Post	B1
Bill Brock	10/27/94	Charles Babington	Few Sparks at First Sarbanes-Brock Debate	Washington Post	C4
Steven Largent	7/24/94	Doug Ferguson, AP	Largent Raises funds with Seattle events; Opponents critical	The Daily Oklahoman	12
Steven Largent	6/11/94	Doug Ferguson, AP	Largent, Twilley Face Tough Race	The Daily Oklahoman	21
Steven Largent	10/16/94	-	For Steve Largent	The Daily Oklahoman	12
Steven Largent	8/7/94	Patrick B. McGuigan	Tulsa GOP Field is Impressive	The Daily Oklahoman	8
Steven Largent	10/9/94	Robert Martindale	Going Deep - Largent Covers Lots of Ground	Tulsa World	N1
Steven Largent	9/28/94	Jim Myers	Largent Joins in Signing Legislative 'Contract'	Tulsa World	N6
Steven Largent	11/2/94	Robin Martindale	Women form Groups, Rally for Largent, Price	Tulsa World	N1

Steven Largent	10/30/94	Robin Martindale	Issues Come Into Focus for Price, Largent	Tulsa World	N25
Steven Largent	11/5/94	Editorial Staff	Price is the Man	Tulsa World	N22
Steven Largent	8/21/94	Rob Martindale	Largent Still in Limelight, but New Field	Tulsa World	O3
Steven Largent	10/19/94	Rob Martindale	Largent, Price Spar over School Prayer	Tulsa World	N15
Nancy Johnson	2/25/98	Michele Jacklin	Nancy Johnson: Environmentalist and Maverick?	Hartford Courant	A17
Nancy Johnson	11/4/98	Matthew Hay Brown	Johnson Beats Koskoff for 9th Term	Hartford Courant	A12
Nancy Johnson	9/18/98	Matthew Hay Brown	National Teacher Group Backs Rep. Johnson	Hartford Courant	B6
Nancy Johnson	7/8/98	Matthew Hay Brown	Environmental Unit Backs Nancy Johnson	Hartford Courant	B1
Nancy Johnson	10/27/98	John A. MacDonald	Johnson Points to Her Record and Clout - A Familiar Faceoff in the 6th	Hartford Courant	A4
Nancy Johnson	10/20/98	George Watson, Matthew Hay Brown	Johnson, Koskoff Spar in Heated Debate	Hartford Courant	A4
Nancy Johnson	9/9/98	Kevin Canfield	Johnson Proposing Tax Relief	Hartford Courant	A5
Nancy Johnson	10/29/98	Matthew Hay Brown	Rivals Tone Down Campaign in Final Week	Hartford Courant	B6
Nancy Johnson	10/21/98	Matthew Hay Brown	Johnson Measure to Bar Sex Offenders - Public Housing Residents Cheer Effort	Hartford Courant	A9
Nancy Johnson	1/16/98	David Lightman	Abortion Rift May Frame GOP Image-Issue Simmers as Party Gathers for National Meeting in California Today	Hartford Courant	A1
Eric Wargotz	10/28/10	-	Claud L. Ashbury (R)	Washington Post	PG19
Eric Wargotz	10/4/10	Ben Pershing and Kyle Dropp	Mikluski Leads Despite Drop in Popularity	Washington Post	B1
Eric Wargotz	7/26/10	Ben Pershing	Mikluski has lots of company in primaries; low Senate-filing fees in Md, anti-incumbent fervor widen primaries	Washington Post	B1
Eric Wargotz	10/18/10	Paul West	GOP'S SENATE NOMINEE IS FIGHTING FOR ATTENTION\ SHORE PATHOLOGIST IN UPHILL BATTLE TO UNSEAT MIKULSKI\ MDVOTES	Baltimore Sun	1A
Eric Wargotz	10/28/10	Laura Vozzella	A HIP-HOP HAIL MARY, FROM THE CANDIDATE'S KIDS	Baltimore Sun	3A
Jeff Duncan	4/4/10	-	Who to Watch?	The State	15
Jeff Duncan	11/3/10	-	Congressional Districts	The State	6
Jeff Duncan	10/30/10	James Rosen	Political Upheaval: is it inevitable in SC?	The State	1
Jeff Duncan	6/6/10	Leroy Chapman Jr	Budget to squeeze new schools chief	The State	16
Jeff Duncan	4/8/10	-	Keep EPA out of greenhouse gas regulation	The State	4

Bill Young	2/21/10	Curtis Krueger	Young to Seek his 21st Term	St. Petersburg Times	1B
Bill Young	11/3/10	David Decamp	INCUMBENT REP. YOUNG CRUISES TO RE-ELECTION	St. Petersburg Times	12A
Bill Young	1/31/10	Adam C. Smith	COY ABOUT PLANS, BOLD ABOUT PORK	St. Petersburg Times	3B
Bill Young	10/3/10	David Decamp	JUSTICE LABORS FOR VOTES	St. Petersburg Times	1B
Bill Young	4/21/10	Stephen Thompson	10th District race narrows to field of 2	Tampa Tribune	6