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Orderly Families for the New Economic Order: Belonging and Citizenship in the British Virgin Islands

Bill Maurer

The British Virgin Islands became a tax haven shortly after the U.K. enacted changes to citizenship policy for itself and its colonies. The new citizenship law disaggregated an old citizenship category into several new categories and emphasized legal paternity and descent rather than place of birth. The law encouraged BVI Islanders to position themselves against increasing numbers of immigrants from other Caribbean islands by imagining BVI Islander identity as an attribute of descent, thereby naturalizing it. Citizenship law also enabled BVI Islander legislators to craft tax haven services in the BVI for another new class of foreigners—the British. BVI Islanders and immigrants recreate their families in order to guarantee the “stability” required by this new industry, while BVI Islanders monopolize the few good jobs created and shunt immigrants into menial work.

Key Words: British Virgin Islands, offshore finance, citizenship, Caribbean, identity.

In contrast to many Caribbean countries, the British dependent territory of the British Virgin Islands is a relatively rich place.¹ British Virgin Islanders, whose history does include periods of poverty, hardship, and emigration, today enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the Caribbean. As a reflection of its citizens' level of well being, the British Virgin Islands is no longer a sending country for migrants, but a host country to the thousands who come from the poorer islands of Nevis, St. Kitts, Dominica, and elsewhere to earn U.S. dollars—the official currency—in the growing construction and service sectors of the economy. And unlike the situation in other islands of the Caribbean, where wealthy elites benefit from economic development while the rest of the population lives in desperate poverty, nearly all British Virgin Islander citizens share in the territory's prosperity. In the British Virgin Islands, however, barely fifty percent of the population of eighteen-thousand can claim citizenship rights.² The wealth of British Virgin Islanders is therefore somewhat misleading, for it is not that the British Virgin Islands has no

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poorly paid workers, but that its poorly paid workers tend not to be citizens. Furthermore, immigrants have little chance of seeing their children's economic status exceed their own, since the children of immigrants, even if born on BVI soil, are not citizens under the law.

This paper explores how British Virgin Islanders (or "BVIslanders," as they often call themselves) became relatively rich while people in other Caribbean countries became poor. It investigates how BVIslander immigration and citizenship policies have guaranteed BVIslanders' wealth, and at the same time led to a proliferation of citizenship and other legal statuses that both denied immigrants rights to share fully in the territory's prosperity and furthered the economic interests of the territory in the burgeoning off-shore financial services industry. By U.S. standards, BVIslanders and immigrants to the BVI are "phenotypically similar." To a North American observer, color appears to be unrelated to class, since both prosperous citizens and impoverished immigrants are "black." Yet, I argue, the law has led these phenotypically similar people to see themselves as fundamentally different.

Specifically, I show how citizenship law from the United Kingdom, together with local laws regulating land ownership and labor, led BVIslanders and immigrants to emphasize "paternity" and "legitimacy" in ascribing identities. Once it became linked to paternity and legitimacy, BVIslander identity took on the character of an inherent or natural attribute, passed down blood-lines. New meanings and consequences of paternity and legitimacy exclude many immigrants from sharing in the prosperity brought by the offshore financial services sector. Citizens reap the benefits of this new industry, which does not produce goods but rather provides pathways for transnational capital. Although it creates few, yet lucrative, jobs in banks and trust companies (jobs that citizens have monopolized), the tax haven business contributes significantly to government revenues and has indirectly enabled an expansion of the civil service and the creation of good jobs for citizens.³ Immigrants are shunted into low-wage menial work, building and maintaining the infrastructure to support citizens' new lifestyles.

The presence of immigrants, meanwhile, is seen to pose a threat to "order" in the BVI. Immigrants, by bearing children on BVI soil, are perceived to have the potential to "mix" blood-lines and to weaken "BVIslander" identity. By introducing this element of disorder into a society that defines itself in terms of an imagined heritage of "British law and order"—both to itself and to offshore investors keen to avoid unstable investment environments—immigrants are perceived to have the potential to disrupt the orderly flow of capital into the offshore financial services sector and thus to destroy the economy of the territory. In their trade publications, as I show below, foreign investors make clear that they link "race-mixing" with instability. Citizenship policy that lends an emphasis on lineage to BVIslander discussions of immigrants and that denies citizenship rights to immigrants' BVI-born children helps allay these investors' fears. BVIslanders now see instability in the form of people who are administratively defined as not "belonging" to the territory of the BVI yet who desire access to "BVIslander" resources.

At the same time, immigrants are able to make use of law, especially as they negotiate the unprecedented number of legal citizenship and other statuses created concurrently with the offshore finance business in the Caribbean, in order to advance themselves and gain access to other resources. As a result, they have not protested their position in the BVI or agitated for legal change.

The BVI represents a small but significant case in a larger process characteristic of the current global economic situation. Neoliberal economic policies and free trade doctrine have bolstered efforts of capitalists to facilitate the rapid and easy movement of capital and goods across international borders. Political-economic agreements founded with these interests in mind, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, have tended to foster the harmonization of legal orders to achieve economic integration. Yet, as many scholars have pointed out, economic integration has co-occurred with a rise in nationalist, racist, and ethnic sentiment (see Balibar 1991, Hall 1991, Stolcke 1995) and legal harmonization has not brought about a withering of the state, but quite the contrary, a reinvigoration of the state (see Dezalay 1993). As capital moves with increasing ease, governments attempt to control the migration of peoples across borders in order to protect the gains made by capital movement for a select few in the core capitalist countries. The current period is marked by intensified concerns over immigration and "uprooted" peoples who "stray" from their "proper place" (see Malkki 1992, Gupta and Ferguson 1992, Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992, Rouse 1991, Coutin and Chock, this volume). The BVI case demonstrates how law creates naturalized identities that justify the incarceration of people in space and the punishment accorded to those who "choose" to migrate, and how law at the same time facilitates the movement of capital across borders.

FROM A COLONIAL BACKWATER TO AN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTER

This introductory section briefly surveys the history of the territory's economic development, from a poor colony of emigrants and smugglers to a destination point for Caribbean immigrants and finally, a tax haven where citizens enjoy wealth and privileges denied ever-increasing numbers of immigrants and their children, who despite their birth on BVI soil are nevertheless not guaranteed rights of citizenship. In the following sections, I explore in greater depth the legal underpinnings of the territory's transformation into a tax haven and BVI Islanders' transformation into a category of persons defined as inherently different from immigrants from other Caribbean islands.

The British Virgin Islands is somewhat unique in the Caribbean in that, prior to Emancipation in 1834, significant numbers of persons of African descent were free and owned land. The territory was settled by Quakers, many of whom freed their slaves by 1750 and granted them rights to land in perpetuity (see McGlynn 1980). After abolition, most whites left for other Caribbean islands, the U.S. or England. British Virgin Islanders could obtain legal title by squatting undisturbed for a number of years, but many purchased land as planters liquidated their estates or went bankrupt and had their estates revert to the Crown. In the post-Emancipa-

tion period, British Virgin Islanders were left relatively alone by their colonial masters, growing provision crops on their lands and trading vegetables and cattle for manufactured goods in the nearby Danish colony (and later, U.S. Virgin Island) of St. Thomas (see Harrigan and Varlack 1975, O'Neal 1983).

In the early part of the twentieth century, the BVI was a backwater of the British Empire in the Caribbean. Neglected by metropolitan economic and political concerns, BVI Islanders earned needed cash by migrating to the sugar cane fields of the Dominican Republic and Cuba, to the construction zone in Panama, the oil fields of Trinidad and Aruba, and, especially during World War II, to the U.S. Virgin Island of St. Thomas, the site of a munitions factory. BVI Islanders also took advantage of their geographical position near the U.S. Virgin Islands to exploit profitable smuggling routes for cane rum, especially during Prohibition (Maurer 1994:141–170).

People with boats earned a good living in the early part of the twentieth century, providing passage for laborers and smuggled goods. Many of the families that rose to prominence at mid-century had made their fortunes in such activities during the decades before (see Penn 1990). These families formed an important merchant class who, after World War II, began agitating for local autonomy. In fact, a measure of autonomy was won in 1950, when the BVI was granted its own representative Legislative Council with the power to draft and enact legislation for local needs. The early actions of these legislators, together with the small size of the population and, crucially, the fact that most BVI families owned land, set the foundations for the economic development of the islands and their people.

One of the most important acts of the first legislators was to limit land speculation. As I discuss below, conflicts over land between BVI Islanders and English and American speculators during the 1950s generated legislation that served equally well, in the 1960s and 1970s, to limit immigrants' access to land and the prosperity that went with it. Tourism development took on a decidedly different cast than it did in other Caribbean islands. Rather than opening doors to foreign companies, government incentives encouraged citizens to set up their own businesses to serve tourism and their own construction companies to build hotels; other incentives encouraged citizens to build their own, small, cottage-style tourist accommodations rather than huge hotels or resort complexes. Several very important large resorts were built in the BVI (notably, Laurence Rockefeller's "Rock Resort" on Virgin Gorda), but tight government controls ensured that local businessmen and landowners would benefit from these projects, and labor shortages ensured that immigrants, not BVI Islanders, would take on the more menial jobs that came with tourism.

The labor shortage and subsequent migrations of the 1960s laid the foundation for the current labor pattern. Relatively well-off citizens owned land and businesses and hired poor immigrants from other Caribbean islands. In the 1980s, with the rise of the tax haven business, immigrants continued to occupy menial jobs in construction and other services, while BVI Islanders won jobs in the civil service, management sector, banks, and trust companies. The government revenue generated by the offshore finance sector also allowed for the expansion of the civil service and made loans more easily obtainable by citizens with property.

To show the crucial role of law in demarcating citizens from immigrants and naturalizing the inequalities that obtained between them, I turn next to legislation passed in the BVI and in the UK that called forth new categories of persons while limiting land speculation and employment rights and reformulating citizenship.

MAKING 'BELONGERS': LAND SPECULATION, TOURISM, AND IMMIGRATION, 1950-1980

As noted above, one of the first acts of the Legislative Council was to regulate land speculation. The post-war economic boom in the United States generated a massive tourism industry in the Caribbean and elsewhere. As the BVI's potential for tourism became more and more apparent, American and British businessmen arrived, looking for scenic or beachfront lands to purchase, subdivide, and re-sell to hoteliers and others. Legislators in the BVI recognized the potential gains tourism would bring to this small, poor territory, in the form of employment, trade and especially infrastructure. The Legislative Council passed several pieces of incentive legislation designed to encourage foreign and local businesses to begin hotel development.

But legislators feared that speculators would drive land prices so high that BVI Islanders would be out-priced in the land market and would be reduced to workers for foreign-owned tourism interests. Furthermore, the Crown-appointed Governor retained the power to dispose of public lands to potential developers without the legislature's approval. The echoes of slavery and indenture were not lost on BVI Islanders. As one member of the Legislative Council commented in a passionate speech:

It would not be any exaggeration to say that, if the people should lose control of their lands, they may one day awaken to a situation not altogether dissimilar from the present situation in South Africa. The price of freedom is eternal vigilance and it behooves all concerned to be vigilant (H.R. Penn, in Minutes 21 April 1953).

Some BVI Islanders did sell their land to speculators, however, finding it difficult to resist the (to them) huge sums offered. Before the 1950s, land was worth "the cow who grazed there," as an older resident remembers. During the late 1950s, people remember being offered a thousand dollars an acre. (Today, by comparison, a tenth of an acre house plot sells for at least fifteen thousand dollars.) The Legislative Council was faced with the predicament of desiring to encourage tourism while curtailing land alienation to foreigners.

Throughout the 1950s, the Legislative Council experimented with several "Land Control" laws to limit development and speculation. For the most part, these failed. The major problem legislators faced was finding a legal means of regulating the activities of persons from England who, like themselves, were "British subjects." Citizenship law was not within the purview of the Legislative Council, being defined in the BVI's constitutions as a matter of "external affairs and defense," and, therefore, under direct Crown jurisdiction. And in the 1950s and 1960s, according to acts of Parliament, British Virgin Islanders and whites from

Britain enjoyed the same citizenship status—both were “British subjects,” or “Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies” (see Dummett and Nichol 1990).

In addition, the legislators were new to the game of policy-making and negotiating their colonial relationship with Britain. Many of the laws they drafted could be worked around by currying favor with the Governor or other officials. In 1953, they did successfully limit the powers of the Governor to dispose of public land. But the attractiveness of tourist dollars only grew to local people as the industry brought huge investment into the Caribbean region.

In 1959, the Cuban Revolution and subsequent closing of Cuba to U.S. tourists heightened American investors’ interest in the BVI (see O’Neal 1983). And in 1961, with the legislature’s permission, Laurence Rockefeller purchased land on the island of Virgin Gorda to begin construction of a large-scale luxury tourist facility. A former legislator involved in the transaction pointed out to me that the Rockefeller venture was seen as a “good deal” for the BVI, since Rockefeller was obligated by the terms of sale to construct infrastructure that would benefit the whole island. Indeed, the Rock Resort helped bring paved roads, electricity, water, and sewer pipes to Virgin Gorda. But land prices skyrocketed. In addition, construction on Virgin Gorda brought hundreds of immigrant laborers from the other eastern Caribbean islands to this island, which before Rockefeller had perhaps been one of the sleepiest parts of this sleepy territory. Residents of the BVI feared a white takeover of their country; they also saw Caribbean immigrants as a threat to their livelihoods and worried that “worldly” immigrants from the bigger and (compared to the BVI) more “sophisticated” islands like Antigua and St. Kitts would also get in on the land market and price BVI Islanders out of their homes.

The Legislative Council responded in 1969 by creating a legal status they called “belonger status.” A “belonger” was defined as (1) any person born in the BVI, (2) any person whose mother was born in the BVI or (3) any legitimate child of a man born in the BVI.⁴ Belongers automatically had rights to purchase land and to work without restriction. “Non-belongers” needed to apply for licenses in order to purchase land, stating in the application their development plans and promising to complete their proposed development within three years of purchase. Land purchased with a “Non-belongers Land Holding License” could not, however, be sold or bequeathed to another non-belonger without applying for another license. Non-belongers were also required to obtain work permits from the Department of Labour if they intended to become employed in the BVI.

Although “belonger” resembled a citizenship category in that it conferred rights and was passed on to children, it was not the same as citizenship. It did not, for example, grant voting rights. In addition to placing checks on the activities of BVI Islanders’ “fellow citizens” from across the Atlantic, belonger status provided a means of regulating the Caribbean immigrant population. It enabled BVI Islanders to keep immigrants from buying land and to regulate their employment, keeping them out of management positions created in the tourist sector and shunting them into service jobs and manual work.

Belonger laws worked quite well to quell land speculation. Tourist development proceeded in an orderly fashion compared to other Caribbean islands, with BVI Islanders founding businesses in construction, boat building and provision-

ing, taxi and ferry services, souvenir products, beach bars, and so forth. Quite a few experimented with their own small cottage hotels or beach bungalows.

As more and more immigrants arrived from other Caribbean islands, the Legislative Council drafted new employment restrictions and finally condensed all labor regulations into a comprehensive Labour Code, enacted in 1975.⁵ The new Code required that employers have proof of their prospective employees' *belonger* status before hiring them. It also required employers to show preference to *belongers* over *non-belongers*. Prospective employees now had to mark their *belonger* status on a form next to their name and sex.

Being a *belonger* became a job qualification. People who, before, might not have cared whether they were *belongers* now became aware of their status. So while the terms "*belonger*" and "*non-belonger*" did not catch on immediately after their legal creation, they did come into common discourse by the mid-1970s. Of course, the *belonger* category was particularly meaningful to immigrants, especially those who had come as children with their parents and hence were not born in the BVI. One high school teacher related to me the reaction of these people to the new law. They had lived in the BVI their entire life and only "*discovered*" when they reached working age "*that they didn't belong. They got restless and angry.*" However, this anger never turned into organized protest, for reasons I discuss below.

MAKING 'CITIZENS': THE 1981 BRITISH NATIONALITY ACT

During my fieldwork in 1991 and 1992–1993, both citizens and immigrants used the terms "*belonger*" and "*non-belonger*" regularly in everyday conversations. But they used them to indicate *citizenship* status, and not legal *belonger* status. In fact, it was only near the end of an initial period of fieldwork in the summer of 1991 that I realized, looking over the laws of the BVI, that "*belonger*" was a legal term in its own right. The words "*belonger*" and "*non-belonger*" are used in a variety of expressions to mark persons according to their citizenship status. The most common such expressions are simple declarations or queries of identity, such as "*I am a believer,*" or "*Is she a non-belonger?*" Other expressions change the legal label into a verb, as in "*He does not belong to here,*" or "*He only gets away with that because he *does* belong to here.*"⁶ The 1975 Labour Code brought *belonger* and *non-belonger* into everyday language, but how did the terms come to signify citizenship?

The answer lies in changes to British citizenship policy. From 1914 to 1971, Parliament enacted a number of British Nationality Acts that conferred identical rights to both British persons and British colonial persons, such as BVI Islanders. All were "*British subjects,*" or "*Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies*" (with only a few exceptions). Decolonization erased the citizenship rights of most former colonial subjects, but posed a problem for whites in the colonies who desired rights in England, not the new post-colonial states in which they might have been born. In 1968, in an effort to restrict British citizenship to "*full-blooded Britons*" and exclude some colonial subjects, a new Nationality Act continued to stress place of birth as a determinant of citizenship, as earlier Acts had done, but also es-

established the concept of "patriality." White legitimate children born in the colonies were granted "full" British citizenship if they could prove that one of their male ancestors had been born on U.K. soil (see Dummett and Nichol 1990). The legal invention of patrials, or lines of descent traced through legal fathers, made citizenship appear to be a quality of the "blood," and granted some individuals "national membership on the basis that one of their [male] grandparents had been born in the U.K." (Gilroy 1987:45).

Citizenship law changed dramatically in 1981. The 1981 British Nationality Act abolished the concept of patrials. It also abolished the unrestricted *jus soli*, or "law of the soil" that conferred citizenship rights to all children born within the territorial borders of the United Kingdom and its colonies. The 1981 Nationality Act based a person's citizenship exclusively on that of his/her mother or father, and thus encoded the *jus sanguinis*, or "law of the blood," into the laws of Britain and its colonies (see White and Hampson 1981, 1982; White, Evans and Hampson 1981). Birth within the U.K. and its colonies no longer guaranteed British citizenship.⁷ In addition, "mother" and "father" were defined quite specifically in the Act:

For the purposes of this Act—a) the relationship of a mother and child shall be taken to exist between a woman and any child (legitimate or illegitimate) born to her; but b) ... the relationship of a father and child shall be taken to exist only between a man and any legitimate child born to him; and the expressions 'mother,' 'father,' 'parent,' 'child,' and 'descended' shall be construed accordingly (British Nationality Act 1981, V section 50(9)).

In other words, according to the 1981 Act, a "father" is a "father" only if he is legally married to a mother and begets "legitimate" children or specifically "legitimates" his children born out of wedlock. Paternity was legally defined in terms of legitimacy. Fathers pass on their citizenship only to their "legitimate" children.

As Gilroy has observed, the 1981 Nationality Act solidified the idea of "race" already implicit in patriality and denied British citizenship to the British-born children of immigrants from newly independent nations of the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia. In addition, the new Nationality Act disaggregated the former "British subject" citizenship category, which had been extended to all citizens of the Kingdom and Colonies. As I discuss further below, the Act turned British Virgin Islanders, who formerly had been "British subjects," into "British Dependent Territories Citizens," while it reserved the "British citizen" category for British people in the United Kingdom alone. In these ways, the law encouraged the equation of "Britishness" with "whiteness" (see Gilroy 1987:45; Dummett and Nichol 1990).

However, the new Nationality Act was welcomed in the British Virgin Islands, especially as a new wave of immigrants from the Dominican Republic and Guyana was beginning to arrive. The Nationality Act applied equally to the BVI as to Britain, and thus provided legal justification for denying rights to immigrants *as well as to their BVI-born children*.

Recall that belonger status, granting rights to land and labor, is determined by both descent and place of birth. Citizenship status after 1981, granting rights to vote and hold passports, is determined only by descent, and not by place of birth. This means that persons in the BVI who have belonger status because they were

born there, but whose mothers or fathers were non-citizen immigrants, are not necessarily citizens.

The 1981 British Nationality Act led to confusion among immigrants and citizens over who was entitled to which rights. The new Nationality Act and the BVI's *belonger* laws are still in effect, and so this confusion continues to this day. One of the reasons for it is that people living in the BVI for any length of time (myself included) tend to use the words "*belonger*," "*citizen*," and "*BVI Islander*" interchangeably. Not all *belongers* are citizens, however. Nevertheless, children born in the BVI to non-belonger, non-citizen immigrants often call themselves "*BVI Islanders*," since they are not sure what else to consider themselves. When others challenge them, as often happens in the schoolyard of the BVI High School, they might respond using the expression "*born here*" to affirm their sense of rights, as in "*I born here*" (Maurer 1995a). A "*real*" *BVI Islander*-citizen schoolmate might then respond "*You do not belong to here.*" After I had been in the BVI for several months, my regular informants and I started using expressions like "*BVI Islander-belonger*" and "*born here non-belonger*" to help us sort through the statuses of people around us.

As a direct result of the 1981 British Nationality Act, people living in the BVI recast the popular (but not legal) meanings of the terms "*belonger*" and "*non-belonger*" to mark citizenship status. The terms' racial significance has also shifted. Since the 1969 *belonger* law was intended to restrict white British businessmen, *belonger* status often implied race: non-belongers were white. When immigrants from the Caribbean arrived in the BVI and, like British whites, were defined by the law as non-belongers, the racial meaning of *belonger* status was somewhat diluted.

However, the Nationality Act has led popular definitions of *belonger* status to signify citizenship. And citizenship is now construed in terms of descent. By igniting people's concern with descent, legitimacy, and paternity, the Nationality Act has re-racialized popular notions of *belonger* status and has led *BVI Islanders* to distinguish themselves from immigrants as if they were a group given in nature or a "*race*."⁸ In the same way that nineteenth century *laissez-faire* economic policies required people to come up with "*natural*" skills for sale on the market (see Collier, Maurer and Suarez-Navaz, this volume), the law now compels people to "*demonstrate*" their legal status as if it were an inherent quality. When people now state, "*I am a believer*," they make a claim not just to citizenship but to a line of descent that links them to past and present *BVI Islanders* as if to suggest that that group has always been defined as a community of blood and a correspondence of kinship and nationality (see Williams 1995).

Paternity has become central to new local ideas about racial identity. Before 1981, women could not pass their citizenship rights to their children. After 1981, they could. The new Nationality Act was seen by some as "*affirming*" the "*natural*" bond between mother and child. For men, on the other hand, the Nationality Act shifted emphasis to "*legitimacy*." A father is a father *only* if he begets a child in wedlock or later legitimates a child born out of wedlock. By law, a child born out of wedlock has no paternity. Whereas the Act was thought to affirm mother's role in

defining children's status, in fact it constructed an invigorated notion of "fatherhood" as centrally important to status and rights, especially for immigrants.

THE NATIONALITY ACT AND FLEXIBLE ACCUMULATION

In addition to abolishing the unrestricted *jus soli* and placing emphasis on legal paternity, the 1981 Nationality Act created three kinds of citizenship (each of which descends according to the principles discussed above). Formerly, as previously noted, people with citizenship rights in the U.K. and its colonies were "United Kingdom and Colonies Citizens" or simply "British subjects." The new Act abolished this all-encompassing category. It replaced it with three new categories: "British Citizen" for people in the U.K., "British Overseas Citizen" for certain other groups of people with claims to citizenship rights, and "British Dependent Territories Citizen" for people in the dependent territories like the BVI. The Act created more than these three categories, however. Each British dependent territory gained a *separate* "British Dependent Territories Citizenship." For instance, BVI Islanders are "British Dependent Territories Citizens (British Virgin Islands)" while people from the Turks and Caicos Islands are "British Dependent Territories Citizens (Turks and Caicos Islands)." The Nationality Act thus created as many citizenship categories as there are dependent territories—in the Caribbean today there are six⁹—as well as "British Citizen" and "British Overseas Citizen."¹⁰

Citizenship categories proliferated throughout the Caribbean during the same time period that the 1981 Nationality Act came into effect. In addition to the six new citizenship statuses created directly by the Act, eight new legal categories of personhood came into being between 1973 and 1983 as other Caribbean islands gained independence in a period of rapid decolonization.¹¹ When the Nationality Act hit the Caribbean dependent territories, a prominent BVI Islander barrister remembers thinking "Uh oh, now everybody going to have a nationality of their own!" Indeed, the 1981 Act contributed to the proliferation of citizenship categories in the Caribbean, as new jurisdictions created by decolonization called up new legal categories of persons: not only "British citizen," "British dependent territories citizen" in its different varieties, and "British overseas citizen," but also "Antiguans," "Kittitians," "Grenadians," and so forth.

The 1981 British Nationality Act and the proliferation of citizenships throughout the Caribbean had an unintended effect for the British Virgin Islands. Not only did it allow BVI Islanders to discriminate against Caribbean immigrants by creating new classes of foreigners from people who had previously shared United Kingdom and Colonies citizenship. It also enabled the local Legislative Council to construct a taxation system that could shelter other new groups of foreigners from the tax laws of their home countries. Specifically, having their own citizenship allowed BVI Islanders to provide a jurisdiction where British citizens could protect their money from British tax laws.

The enactment of the 1981 Act and the establishment of the offshore financial services sector in the BVI corresponded in time with a global historical moment when metropolitan capital was in a period of retrenchment and redirection. The

1981 Nationality Act was a response to, in part, the crisis and retraction of capital in Britain. One of the explicit purposes of the Act was to help "save" jobs for the "real" British, that it was perceived, were being "lost" to people from the former colonies (see Dummett and Nichol 1990: ch.13).¹² From the oil crisis in the 1970s to the early 1980s, the U.K. granted independence to most of its remaining colonial possessions. As noted above, this led to a proliferation of citizenship statuses. It also, rather significantly, created a proliferation of jurisdictions within which new strategies of capital accumulation could occur. The tax haven business experienced a tremendous expansion, as more investors and capitalists sought specialized financial services that would enable the rapid funds-transfers necessary for "just in time" production and niche marketing (see Harvey 1989:141, 156). The tax haven business also benefitted from capitalists who began to move away from production of goods to generate capital and toward the manipulation of currency instruments and credit to generate capital.

Immediately after the passage of the 1981 Nationality Act, the British Virgin Islands legislature began to put into place the foundations for the offshore financial services business. In 1984, it drafted the International Business Companies Ordinance.¹³ This Ordinance, the first of its kind in the region and in the field of financial services, set up the provisions for a new kind of "investment entity"—the International Business Company, or IBC. Under the Ordinance, an investor can set up an IBC in the BVI for an incorporation fee of US\$300 and an annual licensing fee of the same if the IBC has share capital over US\$50,000. IBCs are subject to no other fees or income tax.

Before the invention of the IBC, other jurisdictions marketing themselves as tax havens, such as the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, had charged minimal income tax on investment earnings, or mandated that boards of directors meet once a year on tax haven soil (see Ginsberg 1991). The IBC Ordinance placed neither of these restrictions on offshore investors, and made the BVI an attractive alternative to existing havens. Sixty thousand IBCs have been continuously on the books since 1984. Most IBCs, however, have a short "shelf-life," being set up only for specific funds transfers and then going out of existence, and hence many more than sixty thousand have incorporated and disincorporated in the past decade. In 1992 alone, IBCs contributed US\$21 million directly to government revenue, out of a total revenue of \$54 million—an increase of more than thirty percent over 1991 figures. The offshore finance sector contributed more to the BVI gross domestic product in 1992 than tourism (Meyers 1993; BVI Legislative Council 1992; see also Maurer 1995b).

Despite the volatility of the industry, financial services have directly and indirectly contributed to an increase in the level of well-being of BVI Islanders, mostly by providing good jobs for citizens. Government revenues from this sector have facilitated an expansion of the civil service and more well-paid office jobs for BVI Islanders. Financial services also created private sector employment in the new banks, trust companies, and legal firms. Although, as an informant recently wrote to me, the financial services sector is bringing "another class of immigrants" to the BVI—white accountants and lawyers—it is also providing lucrative and highly desired employment for many BVI Islanders. BVI High School and Community

College students see "working for the banks" as a glamorous and exciting alternative to the civil service (see Maurer 1995b). But labor laws ensure that the best jobs go to citizens, not immigrants and their children.

In addition, the BVI is experiencing another construction boom, rivaling that of the tourism development during the 1960s, as banks, trust companies, and especially lawyers build offices in the capital city of Road Town. Local contractors have been quite successful. And they employ immigrant workers almost exclusively. New buildings need new grounds-keepers and janitors, and newly rich young BVI Islanders need domestic servants. Many BVI Islanders I knew hired maids from the Dominican Republic who would work for rather meager wages. The BVI is witnessing increasing numbers of construction workers from Guyana, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica (whose banana economies are shrinking or collapsing because of trade liberalization policies in Europe and North America).

PATERNITY, LEGITIMACY, AND IDENTITY BEFORE AND AFTER THE NATIONALITY ACT

How did the conjuncture of citizenship law and the inception of the offshore financial services sector impact BVI Islander notions of their identity and culture? British Virgin Islanders have always been proud of an imagined "British heritage" and have often seen that heritage in terms of values of "law and order." During the early decades of the twentieth century, when many BVI Islander men emigrated to the Dominican Republic, BVI Islanders gained a reputation among planters and laborers for being arrogant because of their pride in their "Britishness." A letter dated 1909 written by two BVI Islanders, for example, refers to Dominicans as a "savage tribe" in contrast to Virgin Islanders, "His Majesty's civilise people" (sic.) (VICO 286 of 1909).

Since at least the mid-1800s, paternity has been important to BVI Islanders concerned with stressing their identity as British persons. As elsewhere in the Caribbean, in spite of high rates of illegitimacy, BVI Islanders valued birth within marriage. Weddings conferred the "respectability" linked to notions of Britishness (see Olwig 1993, Lazarus-Black 1994).

My contention is that the tangible material consequences of "paternity" and "legitimacy" are what gave these concepts their meaning, and that they do not have meaning in themselves (see Delaney 1986, Schneider 1984). The consequences and the concepts are called forth by the law. Before 1945, land inheritance laws emphasized legitimacy and favored first-born sons. After 1945, inheritance laws bequeathed property to all persons with "blood" ties to male ancestors. In practice, legitimacy did not need to be established, but paternity, construed in terms of biological relatedness, did. Elsewhere I have discussed at length the consequences of pre- and post-1945 inheritance law for notions of "blood" relatedness and gender (Maurer 1994:64-118).

Paternity was also called forth in people's assessments of others' identity, especially class identity and identities related to physical appearance and "race." Nearly all BVI Islanders are of mixed African and European descent. Yet like other

Caribbean peoples, they often make fine "racial" distinctions among themselves in certain contexts.¹⁴ For the purposes of the argument here, I would like to focus only on the set of distinctions through which BVI Islanders make assumptions about "family resemblances."

BVI Islanders say that they can tell the "name" or "title" of a person by looking at his/her "face." In this context, name or title refers exclusively to the surname of the biological father. BVI Islander families tend to differentiate themselves in terms of social or economic "class," and family names go hand in hand with class identity. Except perhaps for teenagers, most BVI Islanders readily associate different family names with different levels of socioeconomic status, with "country" versus "city" origin, and with personality traits. In spite of the fact that many class differences have been mitigated among BVI Islanders since the development of tourism and tax haven facilities, certain "big money" titles still carry heavy symbolic weight. A popular expression, considered rude because it calls attention to the class differences that are supposed not to exist anymore among BVI Islanders, is "title get you anything."

Because title refers to patronymic, family resemblances are figured through connections to real or presumed male paternal ancestors. One informant from a family known for light skin and "good hair" (wavy, not kinky), explained that his own "bad hair" resulted from "all the women" in his particular family line who had married in and "corrupted" (his word) the family features. Some recent migrants from the Dominican Republic claim to be descended from the BVI Islander men who emigrated to the Dominican Republic in the early part of this century. One BVI Islander, in expressing her low opinion of these people, remarked that they "can't possibly be from our boys because our boys who went over there were dark-dark, and these people saying they're BVI Islanders are light, Spanish-looking." She had assumed that the BVI Islander men who left for the canefields were from the country and were dark. Since the Dominicans coming to the BVI today are light, she deduced that the dark men who left the BVI could not be their fathers and grandfathers; "race" here is thus linked to notions of patrilineage.

The equation of "face" with "name" allows BVI Islanders to make assumptions about people based on characteristics deemed "racial." When BVI Islanders guess a person's title by looking at her face, they take into consideration features such as skin tone, hair texture, eyes, nose and chin. Certain types of features, people claim, are associated with certain families. Of course, it would be foolish to deny that so-called family resemblances exist in so small a place as the BVI with so few surnames identifiable as longstanding BVI Islander names (between forty and sixty, depending on who does the counting). But there is a lot of guesswork involved, and people often come up with the wrong title of the person they are trying to place. One school teacher explained that if a student "looks like" a BVI Islander, she will often start listing BVI Islander names until she hits upon the correct one, asking "who you for? (i.e. what family do you belong to or, more accurately, who is your father)¹⁵ Rhymer? Dawson? Hodge?" and so forth. An African-American friend who visited me during my fieldwork was often mistaken for "a Penn from East End." Family resemblance is in the eye of the beholder. The beholder in the BVI looks through a lens of "paternity."

With the passage of the 1981 British Nationality Act, however, paternity meant something different. Recall that the Nationality Act linked paternity to legitimacy; one is a father only if one is a *legal* father. If there had been no consequences of legal paternity, BVI Islanders' and immigrants' kinship practices probably would not have responded to this legal technicality. With the Act, however, paternity, constituted as a legal relation, determined *citizenship* and local ideas about "belonging" to the community of BVI Islanders, a community now defined as a community of blood. The child of an immigrant woman and a BVI Islander man would be a citizen only if its parents were legally married. In a rapidly developing territory with a large immigrant population—fifty percent by the early 1990s—legal paternity hence took on great significance. One's ability to share in the spoils of economic development was a function of one's citizenship, and for the children of immigrant women one's citizenship after the Nationality Act was a direct expression of one's legal paternity.

Ideas about the "physical" characteristics supposedly connected to paternity have taken on a new character as paternity comes more and more to mean legal paternity, especially in BVI Islanders' assessments of immigrants and the children of immigrant women. People are still interested in identifying people based on their parentage; school teachers are still trying to discern the family names of students who act rudely in the classroom. But now, determining a person's family name also indicates his or her citizenship status and, crucially, his or her identity as a "BVI Islander" and the ability to claim connections to the imagined "British heritage" of the BVI. If you are identifiable as a "Dawson," "Hodge," "Rhymer" or "Penn," you are now identifiable as a "BVI Islander," and that can make a difference in how you are treated and whether you are employed. BVI Islanders can only connect faces to names when they are searching for BVI Islander names. And so people now claim, as one woman put it, "You can tell a BVI Islander by looking." "BVI Islander" identity is becoming a quasi-racial "natural" characteristic. Citizenship law has contributed to the constitution of "natural" differences between BVI Islanders and immigrants from other Caribbean islands, even if these groups would be considered "phenotypically similar" by U.S. racial standards. It has enabled some to claim a connection to a British heritage—and a continued colonial relationship with Britain—that is associated with law, order, and stability, and has denied that connection to others by virtue of their "natures."

ORDERLY FAMILIES FOR THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER

The new naturalization of BVI Islander identity works quite well to encourage foreign investment in the financial services sector. Trade publications urge investors to avoid jurisdictions with "unstable" governments. According to these sorts of publications, investors can gauge a jurisdiction's stability by looking at its "ethnic" or "racial" composition. "*Racial* considerations are important in many of the havens. Several have widely mixed racial make-ups, a potential factor in the stability of the country" (Kinsman 1978:43, emphasis in original; see also Ginsberg 1991).

BVI Islanders marketing the territory to potential investors make a point of stressing the islands' "British heritage" and the people's unity as a group (see Maurer 1995b). For legislators, the 1981 Nationality Act, which justified the second-class status of half of the territory's population, rather neatly ensured the kind of political stability investors sought. Marketing brochures contain assurances from legislators that the country is stable and the people are unified: as one member of the current Legislative Council boasts in the pages of one such brochure, "we don't have political parties or trade unions" (*Euromoney* 1989:51). Indeed, the consolidation of BVI Islander identity under the *belonger* laws and Nationality Act has rendered party politics and trade unionism a thing of the past (see Maurer 1994: ch.4).

Since the BVI became a tax haven, its leaders (and citizens) have re-emphasized its "Britishness." In the fickle finance industries, a jurisdiction's "reputation" determines in large measure its success as a haven (see Maurer 1995b). BVI Islanders marketing the territory to investors have stressed its "law and order" tradition and its connections to the U.K. The BVI Financial Secretary stated, for an investment brochure, "This is an offshore center that is not for everyone. But it is for those who want to do legitimate business in a stable environment, a British dependency based on Anglo Saxon common laws" (*Euromoney* 1989:49). In the same publication, the Deputy Chief Minister is quoted, "Our people are very strong on law and order" (*Euromoney* 1989:51). Of course, claims to "British" identity may serve to allay investors' fears of banking in what they probably see as a "black" country. Such claims are taken as guarantees of stability and security.

Furthermore, under current definitions of citizenship, it would be difficult if not impossible for a voting block of immigrants or *belongers* without citizenship to form. *Belonger* laws both prevent immigrants from easily becoming landowners and regulate their employment. They also provide a means of policing the population. Fears of deportation for speaking out against the government are common among immigrants. The coming together of citizenship law, *belonger* law, and "stability" of the kind investors look for exemplifies the processes outlined by David Harvey (1989) in *The Condition of Postmodernity*: a proliferation of citizenship categories and naturalized identities has helped foster specialized financial practices, at the same time that such practices have invigorated local class and "national" interests.

Although the BVI is a colony and therefore not a "nation," its people do claim a "national" identity as a distinct "people," and are concerned that immigrants are eroding their sense of nationhood. Many BVI Islanders see the presence of immigrants as a threat to the "law and order" image they like to portray to themselves and investors. For them, new ideas about BVI Islander identity as natural and heritable, coupled with *belonger* and citizenship laws, are seen as means to ensure the promise of stability offered to investors. Legitimacy and paternity have become key components of BVI Islander discourse about the "instability" introduced by immigrants.

Immigrants from the Dominican Republic are a talking-point for BVI Islanders. Some BVI Islanders attempt to delegitimize the claims of Dominican immigrants to BVI ancestry by implying that their fathers or grandfathers frequented brothels while they were in the Dominican Republic. According to these people, the chil-

dren of prostitutes are by definition illegitimate, and so should not be entitled to citizenship rights.

Stories like this, which link immigrants to prostitution, are common among BVI Islanders. To people who think of them as prostitutes, immigrant women pose a threat to the orderly heritability of name, face, race, and class—and especially, BVI Islander identity and its connection to a British heritage. Immigrant women, by bearing illegitimate children of BVI Islander men, have the potential to “mix” family lines and nationalities that ought to be kept separate. And “mixing,” the investors remind us, leads to “instability.”

Immigrant women suffer great hardship as a result. They are targets of sexual harassment and worse. Stories circulate among immigrant women about men posing as immigration officers threatening them with deportation if they refuse the men’s sexual advances. In 1986, male immigration officers were accused of attempting forcibly to remove pregnant immigrant women from the territory. Although their children, if born within the BVI, would not have been citizens anyway, they would have been belongers with rights to work and to own land. This incident prompted outrage among many BVI Islanders, leading one commentator to refer to his compatriots’ alleged actions as a “Pharoah-like hunt for pregnant mothers without rights of abode” (Rhymer 1986:5).

For many BVI Islanders, however, the “threat” posed by immigrant women is clear. Immigrant women’s sexuality and reproduction must be controlled—through legal marriage or other means—in order to prevent the confusion of lineages, “races,” names, and nationalities.

IMMIGRANTS’ RESPONSE: REMAKING FAMILIES

Immigrants find possibilities in citizenship and belonging law, however, and so tend not to contest it. This is not to diminish some immigrants’ experience that it is the threat of deportation, and not the possibilities offered by law, that keeps them silent. Indeed, in such a small territory, “troublemakers” are easy for officials to spot and to deal with.

In a sense, however, flexible accumulation makes for flexible people. In a place like the BVI, where many people from many places are constantly coming and going, people have become increasingly aware of their citizenship, residence, and employment rights in different jurisdictions. Immigrants and BVI Islanders refer to the collections of rights they hold as “status.” Belonger status in the BVI, residency rights in the U.S., a green card, a work permit, a British dependent territories passport, and so forth all are seen as “statuses,” for they grant various sorts of rights. People associate having multiple statuses with having good chances for economic success. One very successful immigrant I met credits his multiple statuses for his prosperity. A Bermudian by birth, he has status in the U.S., the BVI, the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, the U.K., Portugal, and the Azores. After listing his statuses to me, he exclaimed, “With EEC integration, I will be extremely fortunate!” For many immigrants, the possibility of acquiring multiple statuses miti-

gates somewhat their resentment of BVI policies. For many, the BVI is a stepping-stone to the U.S. and the coveted statuses it has to offer.

Law can be used to one's advantage to acquire statuses. Children born out of wedlock who would have citizenship rights in the BVI if their parents had been married often trouble to have their parents marry in order to "legitimate" themselves. In several Caribbean countries, people can arrange to have their parents "married"—sometimes even posthumously!—and re-register their birth as a "legitimate" one with the Registrar of Births. They can then come back to the BVI with their documents proving legitimate birth and thus rights to citizenship.

Some go to greater lengths. An immigrant woman from the Dominican Republic who claims BVI ancestry pointed out that immigration officials often suspect that documents proving legitimate birth are forged. Fearing her documents from the Dominican Republic would be questioned—supposedly most forgeries are written in Spanish to confuse immigration officials—this woman went to extra expense to prove her case. "I didn't come here with just paper, you know—I came here with my father." Her father, a BVIlander who had settled in the Dominican Republic in the 1930s, personally signed the Birth Register, thereby "legitimizing" her.

Although laws governing belonger status and citizenship suggest that rights are passed through mothers, immigrants' practices invariably involve "paternity." Remember that while the children of BVIlander women are always citizens regardless of legal paternity, and so birth to a BVIlander mother is always a sure way to acquire citizenship (if it were possible for one to choose one's mother), the children of immigrant women fathered by BVIlander men are *only* citizens if they are "legitimate" children. Here, legitimacy constitutes paternity and guarantees rights and identity. The relationship between a child and father, according to the Nationality Act, is only held to obtain "between a man and any *legitimate* child born to him." Paternity here is constituted by legal practice. And it has real effects: it creates new citizens.

CONCLUSION

Changes in citizenship law came to the BVI at a time when capitalists were developing new strategies of accumulation in response to the crisis of the 1970s. Some of these strategies came to depend on the financial services offered by places like the BVI. The 1981 British Nationality Act contributed to an on-going proliferation of citizenship and other "statuses" and led BVIlanders and immigrants to new concerns over paternity and legitimacy as they crafted their families and identities. Paternity was re-made, and became central to legal and economic status as well as to identity as a "BVIlander." BVIlanders' new naturalized identity and their "British law and order heritage" contributed to their great success in the offshore finance industry.

For BVIlanders interested in preserving the spoils of the offshore finance sector for themselves, the construction of paternity in citizenship law naturalized differences between immigrants and citizens and hence justified excluding immigrants

from full participation in the islands' prosperity. The law conjured up deep and lasting ties of blood, connected them to an imagined British heritage, and traced them through citizen mothers and legal fathers. As a result, the law encouraged people to demarcate the community of BVI Islanders from Caribbean immigrant others as if such groups of people were given in nature.

The offshore finance sector focuses immigrants' and BVI Islanders' attention on creating and maintaining orderly families to ensure stable identities and prevent "race mixing." Immigrants are compelled to remake their families in order to attempt to gain rights. Yet remaking their families, they reinforce the naturalized understandings of paternity and belonging called forth by law that provided the underpinning for the offshore finance sector and that denied them rights in the first place. Flexible accumulation has gone hand in glove with new notions of identity elicited by changing citizenship law. People's identities and attitudes about belongers and non-belongers thus seem natural and rational at the same time they encourage the happy "coincidence" of the territory's British heritage of law and order with the offshore finance business.

The BVI case illustrates contemporary global process and the response of legal institutions and local practices to globalizing markets and labor movements. The unprecedented integration of markets and large scale migrations that have accompanied it have led to new logics and rhetorics of exclusion (see Stolcke 1995). As Coutin and Chock show in this volume, states have moved from labor and immigration policies that recognized and granted status to immigrant workers, to attempts to force immigrant workers to go "home" again, and, especially in Europe, to exclusionary immigration and citizenship policies that tend to emphasize "blood" and not birthplace (see Stolcke 1995:9-10, Brubaker 1992, Segal 1991, Dummett and Nichol 1990). The BVI may represent a continuation of this trend and a sample of things to come, as state policies begin to stress citizenship by descent and not birth within state boundaries and thereby create a whole stratum of long-term working residents who may have been born in the territory in which they work but nonetheless do not share the rights of citizens.

Locally-constructed essentialized differences between immigrants and workers become incredibly significant as global integration and competition force states to redirect their resources and position themselves in terms of the global, not national, marketplace. In the U.S., political leaders have begun to consider limiting state resources and welfare benefits to citizens and denying protections to immigrant workers. The boundaries of the community of belonging are sharply drawn, and those left outside the circle are not entitled to state protection. Expressing the increasingly powerful idea that those not deemed to "belong" are not entitled to state protection, U.S. Senator Clay Shaw recently stated, "the taxpayers do not have a responsibility towards them [immigrants] if they are noncitizens" (Suro 1994:A2).

This resurgent concern with the rights of immigrants touches a contradiction in bourgeois law between the ideal that all people enjoy certain basic human rights and the notion of sovereignty underlying the rights of states to create and enforce these rights. Globalization may appear to call sovereignty into question, thereby diminishing the importance of the state and requiring increased attention to uni-

versal human rights. In fact, however, as the BVI case demonstrates, the reverse seems to be the case. The state is not withering away. It is redrawing its borders and the limits of the community of belonging in essentialist terms, reserving the spoils of capital movement for its citizens.

But the spoils themselves may turn out to be fleeting or even altogether illusory. In the BVI, the "stability" brought by the conjuncture of the offshore finance sector and new citizenship law depends on the labor of a disenfranchised stratum of exploited workers and on an inherently fickle and highly volatile industry. As the U.S. and other countries close their borders or consolidate racist and exclusionary policies within their borders, it may be only a matter of time before noncitizens in the BVI decide to stake a claim in the territory of their birth instead of using their ambiguous or multiple legal statuses as opportunities for mobility to the U.S. or other destinations. And as global free trade agreements like NAFTA, GATT, and the EC work to "harmonize" the laws of sovereign states in order to facilitate the needs of capital, the "islands" standing outside of the emerging transnational network of legal regimes may soon find their access to global capital choked off by the very institutional practices that enabled offshore financial arrangements.

NOTES

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1. The British Virgin Islands is located about thirty-five miles east of Puerto Rico and is composed of over forty islands and cays. The capital city, Road Town, is located on Tortola, the largest of the British Virgin Islands. The other most important inhabited islands include Virgin Gorda, Anegada, and Jost Van Dyke. Historically, Salt Island was the site of a small village, now deserted. Luxury tourist facilities but no true resident population exist on Guana Island, Cooper Island, Peter Island, and Necker Island.
2. The official population count in 1991 was 16,108 persons; 8,076 of these had been born in the BVI. Many BVI Islanders believe (and I tend to agree) that there was considerable undercounting of immigrants during the 1990 census, and some place the total population closer to 20,000. Census data are taken from British Virgin Islands Development Planning Unit (1992).
3. As I discuss below, and in further detail in Maurer 1995b, the offshore finance industry contributes directly to government revenues in the form of licensing and incorporation fees. These fees, while small—between three hundred and a thousand U.S. dollars—add up to significant sums as tens of thousands of dummy corporations incorporate and disincorporate each year.

4. See Immigration and Passport Ordinance 1969 (No.4 of 1969), Non-Belongers (Restrictions as to employment or occupation) Ordinance 1969 (No.5 of 1969). For this ordinance and other acts and ordinances cited in this paper, refer to WILIP 1992.
5. See Labour Code Ordinance (Act) 1975 (No.7 of 1975).
6. This last sentence was said to me by an immigrant immediately after she had been "chatted up" by a prominent BVIlander. I should add here that many BVIlanders I interviewed considered the use of the terms "belonger" and "non-belonger" as markers of identity a bit awkward because they carry such heavy connotations in English. A visiting Barbadian intellectual invited by the Department of Education to give a public lecture began his remarks by joking about BVIlanders' use of the term "belonger" and "non-belonger" to identify people. The joke did not go over well; there were only some nervous laughs. People use these terms in everyday discourse, but many BVIlanders are hesitant to do so in "respectable" discourse.
7. See British Nationality Act 1981 (U.K.), gazetted in the BVI at G.32 of 1988.
8. For discussions of naturalized national or racial identities figured in terms of descent, see Delaney (1995), Stolcke (1993), Williams (1995), Yuval-Davis (1987), and Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1994). For similar accounts of descent-based naturalizations of difference in the nineteenth century Caribbean, see Smith (1992), Martinez-Alier (1974).
9. The British Dependent Territories in the Caribbean are Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and Anguilla.
10. Dummett and Nichol (1990:242-243) state that all Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies "left over" from the British citizen and British Dependent Territories Citizen categories became "British Overseas Citizens, with no right of abode anywhere." These people included British Asians in East Africa, scattered Indian groups in other Commonwealth countries, and some people of Chinese descent originally from the former Crown colonies of Penang and Malacca. There were also a few Syrians in West Africa, Cypriots in South Africa, and Britons in Argentina who gained this status. Two other categories of citizenship were retained from former legislation: "British Protected Person" and a diminished version of "British subject" for some Commonwealth persons. Another category, "British National (Overseas)" came into being in 1987 in Hong Kong. I will not discuss these categories here, but see Dummett and Nichol 1990 for the fullest account of British citizenship available. Note that only the category "British Citizen" carries the right of abode in the United Kingdom.
11. The former colonial possessions that gained independence (and the years in which it was granted) are: the Bahamas (1973), Grenada (1974), Dominica (1978), St. Lucia (1979), St. Vincent (1979), Belize (1980), Antigua and Barbuda (1982), and St. Kitts-Nevis (1983).
12. In fact, the Nationality Act helped spark capital flight from Britain, in part through offshore financial centers like the BVI, and thus, ironically for the British working classes, led to an overall loss of jobs in the U.K. I would like to thank Jane Collier for pointing this out to me.
13. See International Business Companies Ordinance (Act) (No.8 of 1984).
14. There is a vast literature on constructions and contingencies of "race" in the Caribbean. For some recent discussions, several in the spirit of Drummond's (1980) emphasis on ambiguity and intersystemic processes rather than bounded and static models, see Khan (1993), Wade (1993), Dominguez (1986), Williams (1991).
15. In BVI English, women bear children "for" men while men beget children "by" women, as in "He had a child by her," or "She had a child for him." The expression "who you for?" thus connects a child's identity to its "father."

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