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
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


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
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
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
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# EMPIRES AND DIVERSITY:

ON THE CROSSROADS OF ARCHAEOLOGY,  
ANTHROPOLOGY, AND HISTORY

EDITED BY GREGORY E. ARESHIAN

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COTSEN INSTITUTE OF ARCHAEOLOGY PRESS  
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February 25, 2013

Los Angeles, California



# INTRODUCTION

## VARIABILITY AND COMPLEXITY IN MULTIDISCIPLINARY AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF EMPIRES

GREGORY E. ARESHIAN

SOCIAL THEORISTS HAVE STUDIED EMPIRES FOR MANY CENTURIES and a casual inquisitive observer may therefore be surprised by the fact that perspectives on this subject, critically important for the understanding of the human past and the prognostication of its future, have been greatly distorted. This is primarily due to the tremendous ideological pressures emanating from the sociopolitical environments in which the explorers of this subject have been working. The initial source of distortion lies in the naturally antagonistic perspectives developed by the conquerors and the conquered. This kind of antagonism has existed at least since the emergence and expansion of the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia during the last quarter of the third millennium BCE. The second source of distortion emanates from an understandable yet ultimately unjustifiable bias toward modernity, which overemphasizes a single model of empires and imperialism: the modern colonial version of imperialism of Western European nation-states. The origins of this bias may be sought in the sociopolitical thought of the American Revolution, but it culminated during the twentieth century both in the writings of those who glorified modern Western European imperialism (such as Cecil Rhodes) and in those of its liberal-democratic, socialist, communist, and nationalist critics (such as Karl Kautsky, Vladimir Lenin, John Hobson, their followers, and many others). It is regrettable that many of the critics of the European colonial



model of imperialism, regardless whether they have worked in Europe, the Americas, Africa, or Asia, adopted and promoted this Western-centric, modernizing kind of political and academic criticism. The adoption of such a point of view very often has been a matter of liberal emotionality or, worse, a reflection of ideological and political expediency on the part of intellectuals from the nations that went through the struggle for liberation from the European colonial yoke (such as India) or the “nations” that have been artificially forming as a result of the deliberate withdrawal of European superpowers. The same goes for the Muslim countries of the Middle East, where many intellectuals consciously refuse to view Islamic imperialism as operating on the same plane as European colonial imperialism, despite many typological similarities between them. Today we are witnessing the rise of a new kind of Muslim imperialist ideology and policy—jihadism—which strives to achieve the fantastic goal of establishing a world order dominated by Shari‘a law (in its pan-Islamist Salafi version) by means of violence (Kepel 2006).

It is obvious that complete liberation of studies of empires and imperialism from ideological biases is an unattainable goal, but the path toward a very substantial reduction of these biases is also clear. First, the current concentration of analytical efforts on modern imperialism, which does not pay sufficient attention to drawing distinctions between its very different models, locks its students in a politically and ideologically supercharged environment. To improve this situation, a quite opposite research orientation must be adopted: the study of empires must shift its perspective toward the Braudelian *longue durée* (i.e., toward analysis of long-term societal processes and related structures; Braudel 1958; Braudel and Coll 1987), balancing more equally the study of various imperial formations from the late third millennium BCE to the present, not only chronologically but also geographically. Second, applying the broadest possible array of methodologies derived from various social sciences and the humanities will facilitate the creation of more objective and balanced critical accounts concerning empires and imperialism. Such an expansion of perspective is already happening. For example, Walter Scheidel (2009) audaciously seeks the origins of imperialism in the natural driving forces of human biology. Third, the rise, expansion, and decline of empires, as well as processes of imperial domination, resistance, sociocultural adaptation and transformation have occurred on different scales, involved a broad variety of political, ideological, and economic structures and their agents, and transformed people’s lifeways to different extents, from pan-imperial to local levels. Therefore, the necessity to conduct multifaceted studies of empires and imperialism

at different macro-, meso-, and micro-levels (Goldstone and Haldon 2009: 19–20) must always be recognized in this domain of social research.

The generally accepted repudiation of Western European colonial imperialism did not occur because the abstract concept of empire was odious, or because of the atrocities that necessarily coincided with the military creation and expansion of empires, but rather because the imperial subjects of the modern Western European powers were denied (even in theory) equal access to the benefits provided by an imperial sociopolitical organization, because they were exploited by an unequal distribution of wealth created in the imperial colonies and because the imperial subjects from various parts of an imperial world were not integrated into the imperial whole. The example of American Revolution directed against taxation without representation represents a typologically characteristic case of resistance against domination by Western European imperialist powers.

This certainly was not the case in other models of imperial sociopolitical organization, represented by such typologically diverse cases as the Holy Roman Empire, the nomadic imperial confederacies of the Eurasian steppes, the Iranian Parthian, the Roman, or the Russian Empires. It is impossible to imagine that George Washington could ever have been appointed commander of the British troops at the battle of Waterloo instead of Lord Wellington, or that the Maharaja of Jaipur could have become the prime minister of Victorian Britain instead of Benjamin Disraeli or William Gladstone. But that was exactly what happened in the Russian Empire, where General Prince Pyotr Bagration, an ethnic Georgian, led the Russian troops against Napoleon, and Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov, born into a family of Armenian merchants in the Caucasus, assumed the leadership of the Imperial Russian government in 1880 under Alexander II. This trend was strengthened in the Soviet Empire, a totalitarian sociopolitical system that was governed for most of its history by representatives of ethnic minorities: Trotsky was of Jewish origin, Stalin was a Georgian, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were Ukrainians, and only Malenkov and Gorbachev were from the Russian ethnic majority.

Discussing the political concept of “happiness through empire,” J.-P. Charnay (1982a: 13–14) contrasted the “somber face of power, domination, and technocratic rationalism” characteristic of the Crusaders, the anti-Crusaders, and the modern Western European colonial powers with “the luminous face” of the empire of Alexander the Great, whose failed ideal was “universal peace and coexistence of heterogeneous entities, nations, and groups” (ibid.: 16). Yet, an important point is absent from the essays published by J.-P. Charnay (1982b): the fact that the whole idea of the universal empire of

happiness and justice for all was adopted and adapted from Achaemenid Persia. Moreover, an uncritical fascination with Alexander does not allow us properly to interpret the charismatic ingenuity of that greatest of empire builders in world history. Judging from his actions and from indirect evidence recorded in written sources, one can conclude that Alexander's political acumen at least matched, if not surpassed, his military skills. In order to begin his imperial conquest, he first mobilized Greek military resources and boosted the morale of his troops by exploiting a powerful anti-Persian sentiment and instilling in them two powerful emotions: revenge for the ravaging of Greece by Xerxes, and greed for the legendary riches of Achaemenid Persia. But, at the same time, from the first year of his campaign, he simultaneously managed the conquered countries by creating alliances with local elites, presenting himself as a liberator from the Persian yoke and paying respect to local religions and cultural traditions.

From the perspective of *longue durée*, the historical scope of Western European colonial imperialism is overestimated. There is virtually no evidence that the nomadic imperial confederations that dominated Eurasia from southeastern Europe to the Pacific have played a lesser role in the societal transformation of the world than has modern Western European colonial imperialism, which has acquired a dominant paradigmatic status among its critics.

The de-Westernization and de-modernization of studies and critiques of imperialism may become a plausible development in the twenty-first century since the model of Western European colonial imperialism will be viewed from a more remote temporal distance; the political, socioeconomic, and ethnic emotions around this subject will abate; and the philosophical ontology of scientific realism may become preponderant in these studies and in social sciences in general.

Certainly an interdisciplinary perspective would be conducive to the creation of a more broad and balanced discourse concerning empires and imperialism. Archaeologists have already recognized the importance of the time-depth that their discipline provides to the study of empires, as evidenced by several publications of major significance that have appeared within the last two decades (e.g. Sinopoli 1994; Alcock et al. 2001; D'Altroy and Hastorf 2001; Lanfranchi et al. 2003). The broadening of the theoretical, methodological, disciplinary, and chronological panorama will bring out of oblivion a number of important studies that remained either almost forgotten or marginalized in scholarly research concerning empires during the second half of the twentieth century (e.g. Ferguson 1913; Grousset 1939; Garnsey

and Whittaker 1978; Larsen 1979, to name only a few), because at the time these works were published their focus was outside the mainstream critique of imperialism.

Issues of typology, models, and trajectories of development of empires are central to a new direction of research, one that is deeply embedded in previous studies, but which has not yet achieved paradigmatic status. Among historians, the importance of such an approach was partially recognized in a general account by R. Niebuhr (1959), although his primary interest was limited to the cyclical nature of sociohistorical processes. The older perspective in the classification of empires, which subdivided them into Western versus all others (e.g. Duverger 1980; Tulard 1997) is based on a Western perception of general differences between civilizations of the West and those of the East; it adds little epistemological value because it fails to contribute to a better understanding of specific trajectories in the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural lives of empires. Nor does a classification based on a single yet very important feature, such as the political organization of imperial governance (theocratic, monarchic, democratic, or authoritarian empires, for instance), seem to be very productive. Much more promising, from a perspective of complex causal interpretation, is the development of analytical models that represent either specific groups of empires unified by a number of similar traits or by more comprehensive, system-forming features, such as empires founded on the basis of a city-state (Athens,<sup>1</sup> Carthage, Rome, etc.); imperial unions (Achaemenid Persia, the Iranian Parthian Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Empire of the Great Saljuqs, etc.); nomadic imperial confederacies (from the Scythians to the Junghars); church empires (the Papacy and the Caliphate); nation-state-based colonial empires, etc. Not surprisingly, some models may be represented by a single case while others would include several similar objects of study, indicating the probability of repetitive causal factors and processes.

An important question that has not been sufficiently addressed is whether empires differ from super-regional states only quantitatively—in size of controlled territory, scale of political control and economic exploitation—or also qualitatively, for example in the mechanics of formation, sociopolitical structures, and ideologies. S. N. Eisenstadt's (1963) still often quoted work *The Political Systems of Empires* disregards this question and, consequently, only similarities between empires and other large polities have become objects of his inquiry. Michael Doyle suggests that the nature of empire is found in "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society." Empires are distinguished

“from the rest of world politics by the actual foreign control of who rules and what rules a subordinate polity” (Doyle 1986: 45).

It seems that, following the period of successful military expansion that is necessary for establishing an empire, there could be five possible outcomes of the subsequent historical trajectories in imperial transformation: (1) an empire successfully assimilates the conquered (this was to a large degree, but not entirely, achieved by the Roman and succeeding Byzantine empires); (2) the conquerors are assimilated by the sociopolitical tradition, culture, and ethnicity of the conquered (the sequence of Chinese empires and empires centered on Iran from the Saljuqs to the Pahlavi); (3) empires rely heavily on oppressive military domination of conquered polities and face fierce overt and covert resistance on the part of the dominated people (Assyria, Western European colonial empires); (4) empires strive to control conquered polities without dismantling them, by incorporating the local elites into imperial institutions of domination and creating unified systems of internal control (Achaemenid Persia, Iranian Parthian and Sasanian Empires, the Soviet Union); or (5) imperial states function as alliances of polities dominated by a state-metropolis (the Greater Athenian State, the United States). These analytical models obviously stress only the most salient characteristics of imperial sociopolitical trajectories and may help in understanding those trajectories. In the actual past, they have been intertwined: such is the case of the Soviet Union, which combined an incorporation of elites of coercively integrated polities with the establishment of dependent allied regimes in different polities across the planet. In any model of empire, conquest, coercion, resistance, negotiation, adaptation, acculturation, and transculturation are present to some degree. And, as is the case with any model, these may be construed as theoretical abstracts and used as methodological tools for further investigation.

Continuing along these lines of analysis, an answer to another fundamental question becomes imperative. Many times students of empires and imperialism have convincingly argued that the necessity and desire to expand control over resources, both natural and social, is the primary force that drives imperial policies. Yet, after the creation of an empire and during subsequent stages of its expansion and sustenance, management of sociopolitical, religious, ethnic, cultural, and economic diversity becomes the central imperial concern, one that has dominated imperial agendas throughout history (Sinopoli 1994: 163–68). As Lu Jia, a member of the Confucian literati, pointed out to Liu Bang (Gaozu, ruled 202–195 BCE), the founder of the Han imperial dynasty in China, “one can conquer the world on horseback but not rule on it” (Sima Qian 1993: ch. 97). It is this strategic super-goal of managing diversity that,

more than any other feature, differentiates empires from smaller-scale states. J. Burbank and F. Cooper characterize empires as a specific type of state by stressing that “empires are large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people” (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 8). However, A. Pagden notes, “But if they have generally tolerated diversity, empires have also inevitably transformed the peoples whom they have brought together. ‘Empire,’ said Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Napoleon’s foreign minister, . . . is ‘the art of putting men in their place’” (Pagden 2001: 10–11). What Talleyrand didn’t mention was that those vertical and horizontal social relocations were driven by specific imperial visions and policies and were intended to strengthen an empire, not to undermine it.

Specifically imperial ideologies have been essential means of diversity management, quite different from super-regional, national, and other state ideologies. Imperial ideologies of world domination inherently combined sociopolitical and religious components. We possess sufficient evidence pointing to a fascinating simultaneous emergence of the concept of world domination just as the first imperial polities were appearing in the historical arena. The first general formulation of the concept of world domination recorded in extant written sources is reflected in the Akkadian titles of Sargon as *šar kiššatim* (“King of the Universe”) and of his grandson Naram-Sin as *šar kibr tim arba'im* (“King of the Four Corners of the Universe”) in the last quarter of the third millennium BCE. The initial concepts from which these universalistic terms derived were localized within Mesopotamian geography (Maeda 1981; Glassner 1984; Hommel 1906: 662; Buccellati 1990: 92–93), which clearly indicates that an imperial ideology was in the making in Mesopotamia as early as the twenty-third–twenty-second centuries BCE.

Michalowski observes, “‘King of the Universe’ was a grandiose claim, but under Naram-Sin a fuller view of dominion was invoked as ‘King of the Four Quarters’ carried a more complex kaleidoscope of meanings. Here history and dominion achieved cosmological heights.” (Michalowski 1993: 89). It is probable that the son and successor of Naram-Sin adopted the titular name *Šar-Kali-Šarri* (“King of all Kings,” which appears in texts as a personal name) upon his ascendance to the imperial throne of his father. A stunning parallel to this imperial formula can be seen in the name of the Inka Empire: “*Tawantin Suyu*, ‘the parts that in their fourness make up a whole,’ with the Inka capital, Cuzco, at its center” (Mannheim 1991: 18).

Yet the most conspicuous example of a lengthy development and gradual transformation of a universalistic imperial ideology is presented by ancient

China. The concept of *sifang*—"the four quarters" or "four cardinal realms" (of the universe) centered around the lineage of the Shang royal clans (ca. 1700–1045 BCE)—was developed into an integral sociopolitical, religious, and, especially, ritual doctrine justifying and, at the same time, materializing the axial position of the Shang kingship in the cosmological world order (Wang 2000: 1–56). With the ascendance to power of the Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE), the doctrine legitimizing a dynastic transfer of the Mandate of Heaven was elaborated (*ibid.*: 58–60, 71). What the example of Bronze-Age China suggests is that expanding early polities had created imperial cosmological ideologies of world domination *before the actual formation* of empires. Further transformation of the cosmological concept of empire dominating the universe and unifying "All under Heaven" beneath the omnipotent universal monarch was elaborated in the process of empire formation in China during the Zhanguo or Warring States period (453–221 BCE) (Pines 2009). What truly differentiates the sequence of empires in China from other imperial polities known to world history is that the success, strength, and continuity of her imperial tradition was due, to a very substantial degree, to the selfless effort exerted by the social stratum of the *shi*: predecessors of modern political scientists, who toiled over the theory of universal monarchy during the centuries of sociopolitical turmoil preceding the emergence of the Qin Empire. Their concept of the cosmic world order of universal monarchy was developed in opposition to and aimed at overcoming the chaos of the Warring States period and the success of the Qin imperial project resulted in the transformation of the *shi* into the imperial literati, which formed the ideological core of the imperial bureaucracy for centuries to come. "The intellectuals' political commitment proved to be one of the most important legacies of the Warring States to the unified empire" (*ibid.*: 3).

The ideal of world domination by a supreme ruler deriving his power from heaven is clearly expressed in the Turkic Orkhon-Yenisei inscriptions discovered in southern Siberia and Mongolia, which date to 732–735 CE (Tekin 1968: 261–81; Turan 1955) and represent the official ideology of a Turkic-nomadic imperial confederacy (Second Turkic Kaganate). Regardless of whether the Turkic imperial ideology was borrowed from China, the independent appearance of very similar imperial cosmological concepts of world domination in Mesopotamia, China, and South America is a clear indication that the emergence of this, essentially new, ideology was inseparably linked with the rise of first empires, and was at least to some extent a precondition thereof. It has constituted the conceptual basis of imperialism ever since, and

has been developed into sometimes very sophisticated political arguments in favor of a singular unified world order.

Within imperial ideologies, the cosmologic concept was developed into ruling doctrines that present an amalgamation of religious and sociopolitical ideas. Imperial ideologies containing pronounced secularist principles were formulated in Han China:

The early Han emperors and empress dowagers, as well as prime ministers Chen Ping and Cao Can, were admirers and practitioners of the Huang-Lao school. . . . They believed that the imperial rule must be a mixture of Daoist Legalism and Confucianism, punishment must be supplemented by reward, coercion mitigated by persuasion, and, as long as the subjects were submissive, additional governance was unnecessary. (Fu 1993: 49)

From the earliest days of many empires, religion has been a major, if not dominant, part of imperial ideologies. In some cases, the founders of empires creatively constructed imperial religions, shaping them along the lines of imperial structures and policies, as was done by Ishpuini and his son Minua at the end of the ninth century BCE during the establishment of the Urartian Empire. The fact that imperial experimentation with religion during what Karl Jaspers called the Axial Age (600 BCE–600 CE; Jaspers 1953) ended in the spread and domination of what are often today called “world religions” may be easily illustrated by a number of examples. The competition between the cult of Caesar, Mithraism, Herculeanism, and Christianity in the Roman Empire ended after the empire sided with Christianity and transformed it into the pillar of imperial ideology. The struggle between Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism in the Iranian Sasanian Empire during the third century CE ended in the victory of the latter when it became the imperial church.

A broad survey of empires from antiquity to the modern era reveals five major features peculiar to most of them: (1) an ideology of world domination without frontiers and with the declared goal of establishing a perpetual peace and world order; “the concept of Empire presents itself not as a historical regime originating in conquest, but rather as an order that effectively suspends history and thereby fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity” (Hardt and Negri 2000: xiv);<sup>2</sup> (2) an imperial elite that develops and strives to implement that ideology in order to achieve its sociopolitical and economic goals and manages the empire by political, ideological, military, and economic means; (3) a military organization and activities that are directed toward the establishment of domination by those elites; (4) the belief (followed by practical actions) that if a uniform universal world order cannot be achieved, the internal sociopolitical disorder must be expelled into the



external barbarian chaos beyond the borders of empire;<sup>3</sup> and (5) a compulsory and/or stimulated transfer of subjugated population from one region of an empire to another.

Yet, in addition to the five aforementioned common features, empires and imperialism have displayed a great variety of specific manifestations. Especially variable were the socioeconomic impulses of imperial expansions. An understanding of that variability is absolutely central for an adequate analysis and interpretation of empires from a global perspective.

From a broad theoretical perspective, empires may be conceptualized as the largest sociopolitical macrocosms ever created by humankind, emerging from the “chaos” of interactions between smaller sociopolitical systems. Such an approach implies the epistemological possibility of a global historical-sociological narrative that follows an agenda of relational-probabilistic neo-determinism and complex causality, which has been developing within the framework of complexity theorizing. From such a perspective, empire has been the ultimate system of spatial sociopolitical self-organization of humankind, an ultimate order (another question is: what kind of an order?) opposing the forces of social entropy. And certainly the binary opposition between empire and republic is only an ideological propagandist construct created by the sociopolitical thought of the Enlightenment, later reinforced in the popular imagination by a variety of means, including George Lucas’s *Star Wars*. Since Classical Antiquity, republics have functioned and restructured themselves as empires, and vice versa: monarchic empires may become republics but preserve most of the systemic sociopolitical parameters characteristic of an imperial organization.

Empires are quasi-spatial sociopolitical structures envisioned to function beyond the foreseeable limits of time; as such they are intended to represent a class of near-equilibrium systems that, in reality, at some point are predestined to collapse, due to the theoretical (as well as practical) impossibility of an indefinite increase of sociopolitical, military, economic, and ideological energy directed to counter an increasing internal entropy and an interaction with external factors-attractors that often trigger the collapse. They are replaced by other, far from equilibrium systems (i.e., “deterministic chaos”) in which evolutionary changes happen (oftentimes through revolutionary mutations possibly triggered by “butterfly attractors”). For these reasons, studies of empires and imperialism must generate increasing interest among the investigators of social complexity.<sup>4</sup>

An understanding of nonlinear mechanisms and processes of social action is pivotal for research in this area.<sup>5</sup> The concept of nonlinearity may be

instrumental to the interpretation of the collapse of empires (e.g. the proverbial “straw that broke camel’s back,” such as the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, which led to Boris Yeltsin declaration of Russia’s independence from the Soviet Union) and to an understanding of repeated failures (despite tremendous expenditure of effort and energy) of ancient and modern imperialists to preserve an existing world order (as, for example, France’s futile war in Algeria).

Another central theoretical and methodological issue—the question of structure and agency, which is “widely acknowledged to lie at the heart of [current] sociological theorizing” (Archer 2000: 1; see also Carter and New 2004: 3–7)—has not yet been sufficiently explored in studies devoted to empires. The development of a new systemic approach from the perspective of interactions between social structures and individual and collective agents representing and transforming those structures is long overdue: empires emerged and collapsed as a result of multidimensional, nonlinear interplay between these forces in specific historical contexts. Since neither empires as entities of the objective world nor our developing knowledge concerning those entities are reducible to the sum of their parts, holism and interdisciplinary approaches become an epistemological imperative.

These and other related themes are explicitly and implicitly at the core of discussion and in the papers presented at the Symposium entitled *Domination and Resistance: Archaeological and Historical Studies of Imperial Action and Indigenous Reaction*, organized by Bradley Parker of the University of Utah at the 69th Annual Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology held in Montreal, Canada. As usually happens, only five out of eleven initial participants (including the editor) submitted their papers for publication in the present volume; therefore, new authors have been invited, which expanded the scope of the presented material and introduced new approaches and interpretations. But the central theme that was sounded at the symposium became deeper and more forceful: that the growth of empires and indigenous reactions to their expansionist policies cannot be treated as linear processes; that they demonstrate major variability in models and trajectories, which were probabilistically determined by local and regional sociopolitical, ideological, and cultural contexts; and that they usually coexisted with or triggered new collateral sociopolitical and cultural processes of varying significance and magnitude. The papers in this volume demonstrate that a multidisciplinary integration of archaeological, historical, ethnographic, and other data reveals patterns and describes processes that are either completely absent from or are

presented quite differently in historical narratives concerning empires and imperialism. C. L. Lyons and J. K. Papadopoulos (2002: 11) write:

The fact remains, that history is written by the winners. Archaeology, we recognize, provides the only means to study cultures and peoples who did not inscribe their own narratives in writing. More than this, archaeology gives voice to people marginally represented or excluded even in literate cultures.

The present book differs from other archaeologically and multidisciplinary oriented researches on this subject in its focus on local and regional trajectories of imperial policies, traditions, impacts, and indigenous reactions, the study of which, at the same time, has implications at a broader scale.

In the first chapter, C. Glatz examines the variability in imperial policies and indigenous response in the Ancient Near East during the crucial period of the Late Bronze Age (1500–1200 BCE), when multi-area competition between different empires (Egyptian, Hittite, and Mittanian) began for the first time in world history. First interimperial interactions had roughly determined the emergence of such a model of imperial borderlands, which comprised on the one hand buffer polities along the lines of contacts with other empires, and on the other hand the zones of interaction with the “barbaric” world. This model, which is represented for the first time by the Egyptian and Hittite cases, had reemerged in the Hellenistic, Roman, and Iranian Late Antiquity. The comparison between the characters of interaction and Hittite imperial domination in the economically, culturally, and militarily buffer-state of Ugarit and those in the tribal lands of the “barbaric” Kaska on the Black Sea coast of north-central Anatolia allows Glatz to demonstrate the differences in the models and degrees of flexibility of indigenous response to Hittite imperialism. The interactive character of relations between the Hittite imperial superstructure and the sociopolitical structure of the state of Ugarit had allowed for a much broader impact of human agency on the mutual adjustment of those two structures than the rigid and constantly repetitive structure of the Hittite–Kaska relations, the character of which was essentially dictated by the Kaska tribal society rather than, as one could have assumed, by the dominant Hittite imperial civilization. Only an integration of the archaeological evidence with historical sources and linguistic data allows for an adequate reconstruction of Ugarit’s negotiated subordination to the imperial powers of that time. Had we only the written texts, we could imagine that this polity was within the sphere of an overwhelming Hittite presence; but the archaeological material clearly indicates that the Egyptian culture, not the Hittite, was regarded with reverence by the Ugaritians, who craved Egyptian imports and Egyptianized artifacts.

In the next chapter, L. Swartz Dodd addresses a topic that remains almost entirely unexplored in Ancient Near Eastern archaeology and history: the ideologization and ethnocultural and political appropriation of a landscape by a local ruling elite and its whole ethnic group through monumental art and epigraphy in the face of foreign imperial aggression. The royal dynasty of a small Neo-Hittite polity of Gurgum, located to the west of the Upper Euphrates, in the tenth–eighth centuries BCE built up an ethnopolitical identity and the allegiance of their subjects which was reflected both in the content of their inscriptions and in the style and iconography of the Neo-Hittite art found in that region. Facing the expansion of the Assyrian imperial domination, they became the agents of negotiated resistance: accepting the Assyrian political overlordship, they superficially acted in foreign relations as imperial agents, yet at home they implemented policies directed toward the preservation of a local ethnopolitical structure and identity: a model of imperial structure–agency relationship that continuously reappeared in world history throughout this past century, as exemplified by the nations coerced to incorporate into the Soviet Empire. The Gurgum dynasty was so successful in its endeavor to instill the Gurgumean ethnopolitical identity into the minds, behavior, and traditions of its subjects that the latter continued to create the traditionally accepted religious art even under direct Assyrian rule, without accepting the ideological and artistic concepts of their imperial conquerors.

As in the Gurgum case, ethnic solidarity as one of the basic forms of resistance to imperial domination is attested many times throughout world history, as is specifically demonstrated by S. T. Smith in the next chapter. The Kushites, though they failed to mount a successful military resistance to the Egyptian domination during the New Kingdom Empire (1550–1050 BCE), sustained their traditional culture, as exemplified archaeologically by burials and pottery assemblages of Nubia, indicating the continuation of local, ethnically meaningful ways of food processing and religious beliefs. The Egyptian religion was reinterpreted in Nubia during the Third Intermediate Period (1050–728 BCE) in such a manner that it resonated with local Kushite cults, beliefs, and rituals. This culture, with a syncretistic tint, became the ideological foundation for the “re-Egyptianization” of Egypt after its conquest by the Kushites, who founded the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty (728–657 BCE). Those who previously had been conquered now became masters of Egypt, promulgating a revival of the great pharaonic traditions of the past.

The next two chapters are devoted to the study of imperial policies and local responses to those policies in the Achaemenid-Parthian-Sasanian

imperial continuum of Ancient Iran. Considered together, they present a diachronic view from Armenia, a country that occupied one of the most prominent positions among the satrapies in the empire founded by Cyrus the Great, and later became one of the largest buffer states of Late Antiquity. To a very substantial degree, the success of the Roman Empire in the East and of the Iranian imperial policies in the West, and sometimes the very existence of the Iranian imperial dynasties, depended upon that buffer state. L. Khatchadourian develops the concept of cooperative hegemony that characterizes extremely well the Achaemenid and subsequent Iranian empires. The archaeological evidence, which has become quite abundant in recent years, unambiguously demonstrates that the Achaemenids had incorporated the conquered peoples into the imperial whole mostly by exercising their authority through the traditional centers of local power. I think that in the Ararat Plain in Armenia such a center of the Achaemenid satrapal power was located at Armavir, where a few cuneiform tablets written in Elamite may represent the remnants of an Achaemenid archive. The key point about the Achaemenid remains at Armavir is that they indicate a reuse of the monumental architecture built by the Urartian Empire in the citadel of that city, which in Urartian times was called Argishtikhinili and served as the principal center of Urartian imperial power in the northwestern half of the Ararat Plain. Khatchadourian's chapter demonstrates that, outside those few centers of the Achaemenid satrapal presence that had conveyed the perception of historical legitimacy through a topological affiliation with the preceding authority and social practices shared between the imperial and local elites, rural communities of Armenia enjoyed relative peace and prosperity, undisturbed by the superficial imperial domination. Thus, some generic characteristics of empires, suggested by scholars who explore the possibility of future emergence of global empires, may be seen already in the imperial sociopolitical continuum that began with the Achaemenid imperial traditions and sustained itself, with some transformations, in the Iranian Parthian and Sasanian Empires. Hardt and Negri (2000: 201) write:

"Divide and conquer" is thus not really the correct formulation of imperial strategy. More often than not, the Empire does not create division but rather recognizes existing or potential differences, celebrates them, and manages them within a general economy of command. The triple imperative of the Empire is incorporate, differentiate, manage.

Although this characterization may be essentially adequate to the features peculiar to the sequence of Iranian empires as well as to those empires in which the empire-building elites were absorbed by the sociopolitical and

cultural traditions of the conquered, it cannot, most certainly, be uniformly applied to many cases representing different models, such as Assyria, Urartu, Byzantium, Han China, the Western European colonial empires, and, finally, the Third Reich and others.

My chapter discusses the ideological foundations of the Iranian Sasanian imperialist policies and focuses on a vain attempt to reverse the trajectory of sociopolitical development in third-century CE Iran by the junior branch of the Iranian Parthian Arsacid dynasty, which established its sovereignty in Armenia in opposition to the Sasanian “usurpers.” As repeatedly happened in world history, the disintegration, fragmentation, and permanent or temporary segmentation of an imperial whole resulted in the emergence of new sociopolitical identities, oftentimes nurtured by the elites of specific ethnic groups: in this case, the Armenians. The emergence of the Armenian national identity is a classic case for researchers of complexity. The linguistic, sociopolitical, and cultural prerequisites for the emergence of that new socioideological quality had developed and interacted with one another for about fifteen hundred years, before the crucial external trigger—the Sasanian revolution of 224 CE—caused the trajectory to bend toward one specific possibility. This new analysis, which is supported by interdisciplinary cross-verification between the archaeological evidence and historical sources, differs fundamentally from the traditional nationalistic account of Armenian history. It also contributes to the scholarly literature, rapidly growing during the last two decades, that argues in favor of specific cases of formation of nations and nation-states in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Arnason 2006, Gorski 2006, Kumar 2006: 12–16; Smith 2006, and many others), which naturally were different from modern nations in some aspects, but nevertheless have met all the basic criteria applied by scholars in defining such nations.

From the mountains, fertile valleys, and deserts of Iran and Caucasia, the chapter by G. Indrisano and K. Linduff takes us to the northern frontier of ancient China. Based on the results of most recent and very detailed archaeological surveys conducted in central Inner Mongolia, it analyzes several hypotheses concerning the inclusion of these territories into the Zhao state (475–262 BCE), and subsequently into the Han Empire (after 206 BCE), focusing at the same time on the correlation and interdependence between social processes at macro- and micro-levels, which is a central problem in the general theorizing on complexity. The authors demonstrate that apparently contradictory patterns emerging from written historical sources on the one hand and from the archaeological survey data on the other, in fact complement one another: they describe the sociohistorical reality at different levels, with

the historical records most often reflecting the macro-level and the archaeological data presenting the micro-level. Micro-level social research should never be underestimated, not only because models adequately representing reality can be constructed only through an integration of the micro- and macro-levels, but also, and especially, because evolutionary changes begin at micro-levels. As with the results obtained by other archaeological projects of the last few decades, the survey presented in this chapter shows that conflicts and other forms of interaction between the world of agricultural China and the nomadic confederacies of Eastern Eurasia in the third quarter of the first millennium BCE developed in much more complex sociocultural landscapes than was thought earlier: a very substantial agro-pastoralist population had inhabited the contact zone by that time. The survey data reveal the indigenous covert resistance to the fiscal and other controlling policies of the Zhao central administration, manifested by a dispersed settlement pattern of individual farmsteads, which would have been much more difficult to control than the agglomerations of village communities that were promoted by the Han imperial administration on most fertile lands in that region and elsewhere.

From archaeological studies of the Chinese imperial borderlands, readers will proceed to imperial heartlands: R. A. Covey's chapter devoted to the distinctive character of the Cusco region within the Inka Empire. Showing the mutual complementarity of archaeological and historical evidence and the necessity of using them in combination, he analyzes the transitional role played by the imperial heartland in connecting the capital of the empire to its provinces. The two-fold function of the heartland—to provide economic support to the capital and to channel imperial control into the provinces—is clearly visible in settlement patterns, in architectural remains related to the organization of agricultural production and transportation, and in ritual practices. Thus, in the social space interceding between the capital and periphery, Inka imperial policies had created dynamically developing sociopolitical, economic, and ethnic systemic relations that functioned as an active collective social agent<sup>6</sup> in the shaping and transformation of their empire. It is noteworthy that the Spaniards used components of the imperial Inka structure in order to acquire historical legitimacy for their colonial rule in a manner that differed little from the Achaemenid, who used the preceding centers of Urartian imperial power to achieve sociopolitical coherence with the dominated indigenous population of Armenia.

The next essay in anthropological history of empires by N. Chann demonstrates several limitations of the Western modern and post-modern approaches to the study and critique of imperialism. Western experience is hardly

applicable to Asia, where a concept of imperial domination substantially different from the modern European ideas has been developed. The paradigmatic pattern of central- and south-Asian medieval empires, with its ostentatious unity of violence and justice, originated partially in the ideology and policies of the Mongol imperialism under Chinggis Khan. And certainly the search for ideological, cultural, and sociopolitical origins of Akbar's Mughal empire of tolerance in sixteenth-century India should not be limited to Islamic law and Indian traditions: in addition to the Inner-Asian Turko-Mongolian roots brought into the spotlight by N. Chann, it seems to me that possible Iranian-Zoroastrian sources of Akbar's world vision also deserve further exploration. For example, the concept of *Farr-i Zadi* (Divine Light) central to Akbar's universal imperial religion can be derived without difficulty from the Middle Persian (i.e., Sasanian) *farrab* (also discussed in Chapter 5) both on phonological and semantic grounds. The chapter also implicitly suggests that the deeply individualistic concepts of free will and rational choice should not be seen as exclusive bases for studies in human agency: even such powerful figures as Chinggis Khan, Timur, and Akbar were restricted by their dependence upon the quite limited number of possible sociopolitical and cultural situations and choices in the development of an imperial societal structure that they had created, represented, and, at the same time, transformed as agents of their own structural creation.

Deconstructing a simplistic linear approach toward the relationship between imperial domination and indigenous resistance and expanding at the same time theoretical perspectives and interdisciplinary approaches, together with spatial breadth and chronological depth in the studies of empires, this book as a whole may raise an important question worthy of further investigation: Can empire, because of the variety of its forms and its ubiquitous presence through time and space, be viewed as a transcendental world order that resists the forces of social entropy? A positive or negative answer to this question will have overwhelming ontological, epistemological, ideological, sociopolitical, economic, and cultural implications on the global scale. Scholars who forecast the advent of a global empire due to the currently accelerating crisis of national sovereignty (e.g. Hardt and Negri 2000) certainly must have an important stake in the exploration of this question. Some ideologues and politicians may subtly welcome its coming, some others would be up in arms calling for resistance to it, while the majority of historical actors will go with the flow, trying to adapt. Yet we, as social scientists, would have to ask ourselves: Can we offer humankind alternatives



to a universal empire? This is especially important because, as Burbank and Cooper (2010: 9) write:

As long as diversity and political ambition exist, empire-building is always a temptation, and because empires perpetuate difference along with incorporation there is always the possibility of their coming apart. . . . The fact is that tribes, peoples, and nations have made empires points to a fundamental political dynamic, one that helps explain why empires cannot be confined to a particular place or era but emerged and reemerged over thousands of years and on all continents.

## NOTES

1. Ian Morris (2009: 99) correctly indicates that the greater Athenian state of 478–404 BC may hardly be called an “empire.” Nevertheless, within the framework of a specific point of view that allows us to consider it as an incipient empire based on a city-state that failed quite early, never developing a long imperial trajectory as did Carthage or Rome, it may be appropriate.

2. See Virgil’s lines in *Eclogue* 4.4–5, “Ultima Cumaevi uenit iam carminis aetas; / magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo” (The final age that the Cumaean [oracle] foretold has arrived; / The great order of the centuries is born again) (Virgil 1969: 10).

3. See, for example, Cecil Rhodes: “My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists” (quoted in Hardt and Negri 2000: 232). The spread of the Uruk civilization from Southern Mesopotamia in the fourth millennium BCE may be viewed, among other possible perspectives, as an expulsion of surplus population through the colonization of the “barbarian” world.

4. In this Introduction, the discussion of social complexity is limited to the ideas developed within the framework of the emerging general theory of complexity and does not explore the concepts of complex societies developed in anthropology and archaeology. The latter, in my opinion, should be discussed and evaluated in relation with the general theorizing of complexity.

5. One of the best introductions to the applications of the emerging general theory of complexity to the social sciences is Byrne 1998, which discusses most of the terminology related to the complexity theory that I am using in this Introduction.

6. The concept of collective social agency is discussed at length in Barnes 2000.

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## CHAPTER 1

## NEGOTIATING EMPIRE

A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION INTO  
THE RESPONSES TO HITTITE IMPERIALISM  
BY THE VASSAL STATE OF UGARIT AND  
THE KASKA OF PONTIC ANATOLIA

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EMPIRES ARE “ORGANIZED BOTH TO ADMINISTER AND EXPLOIT diversity, whether economic, political, religious, or ethnic” (Barfield 2001: 29). The Hittite Empire of Late Bronze Age Anatolia was no exception to this (see Figure 1.1). The many toponyms, names of political units, diverse languages spoken in disparate regions, and the ethnonyms mentioned in Late Bronze Age Anatolian textual sources all constitute the socio-political puzzle of Asia Minor and surrounding regions as the Hittites saw it. Late Bronze Age polities in Anatolia and northern Syria were diverse in size, social organization, cultural orientation, and influence in the international arena. They also showed varying degrees of willingness to accept Hittite imperialism. In the face of this diversity, Hittite strategies of expansion and integration have an air of contingency as well as of inflexibility and standardization.

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**Figure 1.1.** Map showing sites mentioned in the text

Actual or threatened military conquest and the completion of treaties are most commonly attested in textual sources. Resettlement of deportees and viceregal seats of administration in northern Syria were additional measures used to pacify rebellious regions, to overcome labor and settlement shortages, and to gain a firmer grip on regions of particular importance. The inherent fragility of this mode of imperialism is exemplified by the recurring cycles of rebellion, loss of territory, and subsequent retaliation detailed in the royal annals and historical preambles to vassal treaties (Klengel 1999; Beckman 1999). In light of this textual evidence, the Hittite great-kings and leading aristocracy appear by no means solely responsible for the decision-making that determined imperial prosperity or recession. By their own admission, they frequently had to react to local initiatives.

Outright hostile resistance and subtle political negotiation form part of a wide spectrum of behavioral possibilities available to societies entwined in various stages of imperial relationships from conquest and integration to periodic recession and final collapse. I propose here that sociopolitical and economic organization, the will and ability of subordinate groups to cooperate, in addition to imperial modes and intensity of domination, constitute crucial factors in determining the range of resistance strategies available to those incorporated into or otherwise affected by early empires.

The present chapter explores this proposition through an investigation of the strategies employed by the vassal kingdom of Ugarit and the Kaska tribes of northern Anatolia in the negotiation of their positions within the heterogeneous interplay of power-relations of the Hittite empire and beyond. The aim of this discussion is to contribute to our understanding of antagonistic behavioral strategies in imperial relationships in general and of the specific strategies of resistance and negotiation that may have influenced the development of the Hittite imperial system in particular.

The vassal state of Ugarit on the northern Levantine littoral and the Kaska highland tribes of north-central Anatolia occupy opposing ends on the spectrum of sociopolitical complexity that the Hittite empire strove to dominate. Nevertheless, the two regions both feature prominently in Hittite and other documentary sources. While this emphasis in the textual record reflects the heightened concern of the imperial administration, it also leads us to assume an overall greater significance of these two entities in shaping the idiosyncrasies of Hittite imperial development, relative to those not mentioned in texts. A general absence of material culture associated with the Hittite core area in the two regions in question, albeit for different reasons, contrasts with the emphasis in the written accounts.

#### DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND NEGOTIATION: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The textual records of Late Bronze Age central Anatolia, northern Syria, and adjacent regions present a rich source of information on the different types of inter- and intra-polity relations between the central Hittite polity and its various territories and dependencies. A consequence of this perceived richness has been that the Hittite empire, its political history, and its relationships of domination and resistance are essentially textually constructed. Presentations and interpretations of the textual data tend to have strong empirical and particularistic tendencies and, despite copious references to the ideological component in ancient historiography and diplomatic correspondence, often leave little leeway for critical assessments of royal propaganda. Conversely, archaeological evidence, which has the inherent ability to provide a socially more nuanced and balanced picture of imperial-local relationships (see, for example Alcock 1993: 5–6) has thus far featured rarely in the discourse on either Hittite strategies of integration or provincial responses to them. Equally unsurprising and rarer still have been considerations of resistance to Hittite imperialism (but see for example Gorny 1995; Glatz and Matthews 2005; Glatz 2009). In the case of the Hittite empire, but applicable more broadly

to early imperial networks, this is due to the politically one-sided and socially restrictive nature of the available written sources on the one hand and an urban and elite-centric archaeological tradition on the other. As a result, we know very little about the pasts of the conquered and subordinated of Late Bronze Age Anatolia and the wider Near East and their reactions to and attitudes towards imperial power and its representatives. However, behavioral strategies that amount to resistance will most certainly have formed part of the daily routines of subordinated groups. Examining resistance, therefore, is key in understanding imperial relationships and the experience of the conquered and colonized (Given 2004: 8). Instances of resistance, usually overt forms of defiance but also more subtle forms of negotiation, are among those aspects of imperial-local relationships that find resonance—in however general terms—in imperial correspondence and historical narratives and, occasionally, also the archaeological record.

Social power, and resistance to it, have come to be viewed in recent discourse as causally intertwined notions of fundamental importance for the maintenance and transformation of society: “[w]here there is power, there is resistance . . .” (Foucault 1998: 95; see also Miller et al. 1995). From this perspective, power is a capacity or resource rather than a property that may be restricted to those at the top of social hierarchies. It is a component in, and a consequence of, the totality of social interactions; all social actors through their interaction partake in relations of power. A second aspect of power, the notion of *power-over*, generally characterizes hierarchical relationships of domination in addition to the socially omnipresent *power-to* (Miller and Tilley 1984: 5–8). It encompasses the ability to impose one’s will upon others despite resistance (Weber 1964: 152) as well as the capacity to command obedience for a variety of reasons, not all of which are necessarily related to coercion. “. . .[E]very genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an *interest* (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience” (Weber 1978: 212; emphasis in the original).

Relations between early empires and their subordinated societies are, by definition, relations of domination that to a large degree are shaped by the intentions and interests of the imperial elite. The process of imperialism, however, is never entirely one-sided. Domination as a relationship involves a dialectic discourse in which the subordinated also have access to certain resources, material and/or nonmaterial, to counteract oppression (Miller and Tilley 1984: 7). Even if relations of domination involve a certain self-interest or, at least, an interest in self-preservation on the part of the weaker party

(Weber 1978: 212; Galtung 1980: 437), hierarchical power-relations are multifaceted and subordinates are unlikely to be either entirely submissive or entirely insubordinate (Scott 1990: 192). Domination, moreover, is rarely asymmetrical to the degree of total control. In particular, the ability of early states and empires to exert domination was severely curbed by technological factors such as transport and communications as well as by chronic demographic shortages, which influenced the degree of geographical continuity and discontinuity of effective control (Sinopoli 1994: 163; Smith 2003). Therefore, although domination—often in direct coercive form or its implication—underlies the vast majority of imperial relationships, dominance is, at least in theory, contestable; in fact, the expectation would be that it is constantly being contested. Post-colonial studies, moreover, have shown that agency on the part of subordinate individuals or groups, which includes resistance, is by no means only a reaction to the strategies and ideologies of the powerful (Given 2004: 10).

What behavioral forms might we expect this resistance to take? What are the aims and motivations that lie behind resistance? Must it always have the ultimate goal of structural change and take the form of more or less violent rebellion? Or does it include less overt practices of negotiation and subversion such as occasional disobedience and delay in situations where real social transformation seems impossible and may even be undesirable? Foucault has proposed the existence of a whole array of forms of resistance, which occasionally present themselves as radical ruptures but more often take less drastic guises. There may be “resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial” (Foucault 1998: 96). Neither imperial nor subordinate societies are monolithic wholes, acting in perfect unison. Therefore, each imperial relationship will be characterized by more than one form of resistance. The spectrum ranges from unconscious everyday behaviors that ultimately amount to defiance, to conscious but covert acts of insubordination and open rebellion. Based on research among sedentary Malaysian peasant groups, Scott (1990: 17) has argued that, for reasons of security and self-preservation, subordinates in the vast majority of systems of domination resort to covert resistance such as poaching, pilfering, or tax evasion, whose goal is not normally the transformation or overthrow of the social system, though this may be the ultimate result. Actors, particularly those in the past, were perhaps conscious of their circumstances in life but might have known no alternatives with which existing social orders might be replaced. The main



practical reasons for resistance are the desire and necessity to reduce excessive extraction of labor or taxation as well as humiliation. In this model, overt resistance is interlinked with covert forms of antagonistic behavior and is often a development from it, as the constant testing of power-relations may escalate due to particularly severe oppression and the increasing desperation of the population. Scott (1990: 79, 192, 216–17) also proposes a causal connection between the severity of oppression and the likelihood of overt resistance, which is seen as the last resort in circumstances devoid of all other possibilities of dissent. Outright rebellion, from this perspective, is usually the result of a gross overestimation by the subordinates of their power and has historically proven to be, more often than not and in the last instance, an unsuccessful form of resistance.

While the ultimate success of any form of resistance, certainly from the comfortable perspective of the academic observer, may well be the overthrow of the oppressive system or the maintenance of a position beyond its effective control, notions of success or failure ought to be assessed within the historical circumstances of particular relationships of domination and in consideration of the overall situation of the subordinate group. These include the social context of imperial–local interaction; the strategies employed and the overall balances of power in terms of the political, economic, and military capabilities as well as the social coherence of each party through time; the apparent pervasiveness of ideological co-optation; and the interests and benefits for each party to engage or disengage in imperial relations.

Historical circumstances and coincidences represent potentially crucial variables in the developmental trajectories of these complex but inherently fragile sociopolitical entities. Most empires share a common life-cycle of imperial formation through conquest and “diplomatic” expansion via integration, cyclical gain and loss of territory, and final collapse (see Doyle 1986; Sinopoli 1994; Alcock et al. 2001). During these phases, balances of power may shift between imperial center and local power-bases, providing possibilities for successful rebellion at one time and making negotiation and occasional subversion more profitable at others. While open rebellions may be dealt with with relative ease during times of imperial stability, in times of general crisis, small-scale disobedience such as a delay of tribute payments may develop into or contribute to potentially fatal economic difficulties.

The following analysis, thus, takes an inclusive approach to the notion of resistance, recognizing that a variety of antagonistic behaviors will have characterized and constituted Hittite imperial relationships in different regional, social and political contexts as well as through time.

### THE HITTITE EMPIRE: A SHORT HISTORY

The Hittite empire consisted of a series of directly controlled provinces, protectorates, and vassal kingdoms draped around the cultural and political core region of the Land of Hatti and its capital city, Boğazköy-Hattusa, on the north-central Anatolian plateau (see Figure 1.2). At the height of imperial expansion, during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, Hittite control appears to have stretched from what is today's Turkish Aegean coast in the west to the Euphrates in the east, and to the north Syrian coast and parts of Cyprus in the south. Only to the north did effective control not extend much further than perhaps one hundred kilometers beyond the capital city.

Hittite state formation around 1650 BCE was rapidly followed by a first wave of wide-ranging but short-lived expansionism. The campaigns of Hattusili I and his son, Mursili I, during the early part of the Old Hittite Kingdom led the Hittite army into northern Syria on what, at least from the textual sources, appears to have been primarily an adventurous quest for glory and booty (Gurney 1979). Both certainly were gained from the sack of Babylon by Mursili I in 1595 BCE (or 1531 BCE, depending on chronology). These early conquests, however, were left unconsolidated and the murder of Mursili I upon his return to Hattusa initiated a long internal power struggle that lasted for over a century. The consequence of this internal weakness was the severe contraction of Hittite-controlled territory. It is most probably during this phase of the Middle Hittite Kingdom that the Hittites first encountered the Kaska tribes in northern Anatolia, even though nostalgic retrospection places their first appearance much further into the past (Klinger 2002: 446–47; von Schuler 1965: 22–29).

The legendary invasion of the Land of Hatti by rival forces from all cardinal points during the reign of Tudhaliya II/III marks a decisive low point in Hittite historical memory. However, already during the reign of this same king and under the military leadership of his successor, Suppiluliuma I, Hatti's Anatolian territories were gradually reclaimed. The ascent to the throne of Suppiluliuma I is conventionally viewed as the onset of the Hittite imperial phase proper (Gurney 1979). For the first time, organized attempts were made to consolidate military conquests at some distance to the Hittite heartland and their offshoots in the form of “voluntary” submissions. These include the installation of viceregal seats in Aleppo and Karchemish, dynastic marriages, and the conclusions of numerous vassal treaties (Bryce 1998: 175–205). One such treaty (CTH<sup>1</sup> 46, RS 17.340, RS 17.369A: Nougayrol 1956: 48–52; Beckman 1999: 34–36) was concluded between Suppiluliuma I and Niqmaddu II of Ugarit. Suppiluliuma had attempted to woo this small but

Figure 1.2. Synchronisms and events during the second half of the Late Bronze Age

B.C.	Hatti	Ugarit	Egypt	Events
1400	Arnuwanda I	Ammistamru I	Tuthmosis IV	Ugarit – Hatti vassal treaty
1390				
1380				
1370	Tudhaliya II/III		Amenophis III	
1360				
1350	Suppiluliuma I	Niqmaddu II	Akhenaten	
1340			Tutankhamun	
1330			Aye	
1320				
	Arnuwanda II			
1310	Mursili II	Ar-Halba	Horemhab	
1300		Niqmepa		
1290			Ramses I	
	Seti I			
1280				
	Muwatalli II			
1270	Uhri-Tesub (Mursili III)			
1260	Hattusili III	Ammistamru II	Ramses II	
1250				
1240				
1230	Tudhaliya IV	Ibiranu		
1220		Niqmaddu III (?)		
1210	Arnuwanda III	Ammurapi	Merenptah	
1200			Suppiluliuma II	Seti II
			Siptah	
1190			Tewosret	
		Setnakht		
1180				
1170			Ramses III	

wealthy kingdom early during his first Syrian campaign (CTH 45, RS 17.132: Nougayrol 1956: 35–40; Beckman 1999: 125–26) but the previous Ugaritic king, Ammistamru, had affirmed his allegiance to Egypt in an Amarna letter (EA 45: Moran 1992: 117–18) and his successor only submitted to Hittite rule after Ugarit required its protection around 1335 BCE.

Suppiluliuma's expansion into northern Syria and the eventual destruction of the rival power of Mitanni underscored Hatti's position as a peer in the "club of great powers," then consisting of Egypt, Babylon, and an emerging Assyria (Liverani 2001; Bryce 2003). His successor, Mursili II, further consolidated the Hittite power base in Anatolia with the defeat and subsequent division of Hatti's main Anatolian rival, Arzawa. Later Hittite kings appear to have been primarily preoccupied with the defense and consolidation of what Suppiluliuma I and Mursili II had established. This effort involved the famous military clash with Egypt at the battle of Qadesh and an increasing number of skirmishes with a growing Assyria toward the close of the Late Bronze Age. A number of Anatolian and internal dynastic struggles, as well as natural disasters, further weakened Hittite grip on its subordinate territories in this final phase (Bryce 1998; Klengel 1999). The reasons behind the precise sequence of events and processes leading up to the final collapse of the Hittite empire and other important polities around the eastern Mediterranean in the early twelfth century BCE are still the subject of intense debate (see, for instance Gorny 1989; Zaccagnini 1990; Drews 1993; Seeher 2001; Matthews 2002; Bachhuber and Roberts 2009). Even though these questions do not form the main focus of this chapter, the nature of Hatti's relationships with subordinated and neighboring societies and the varying degrees of antagonism these involved, certainly played their parts in its ultimate demise.

#### BETWEEN DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE: THE VASSAL KINGDOM OF UGARIT

Access to and control over northern Syria were of vital importance and seemingly one of the motivations behind the expansion of the Hittite empire, whose core region on the central Anatolian plateau was a long way away from the nodes of Late Bronze Age international commerce that guaranteed the supply of metals and luxuries. Strong support for this proposition comes from an observation by Korošek (1960: 72; see also Bryce 1998: 51) that only Syrian vassal treaties, in contrast to those of western Anatolia, contained clauses for the payment of tribute. The most important of the Hittite vassal states along the northern Levantine littoral was the kingdom of Ugarit. Though incorporated into the Hittite empire under comparatively favorable conditions, an

exceptionally high tribute burden was imposed on Ugarit by Suppiluliuma I. The payments included annual deliveries of a principle tribute of altogether ca. 560 shekels (ca. 6.2 kg)<sup>2</sup> of gold in addition to gold bowls, large numbers of garments, and purple-dyed wool for the royal court. In comparison, Ugarit's neighbor Amurru had to pay 300 shekels (ca. 3.6 kg) (Bryce 1998: 51; Nougayrol 1956: 40–44; Beckman 1999: 166–68).

In addition to having favorable maritime connections with Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean, Ugarit was situated along the coastal highway linking Egypt with Anatolia and was able to access interior overland routes to the Euphrates and beyond. Throughout the Late Bronze Age, it also lay at the intersection of the limits of power of several imperial polities. This combination of factors allowed Ugarit to function as the preeminent commercial intermediary regionally and to negotiate its position within and between these empires in the most advantageous way (Lattimore 1979: 38–39; Kohl 1987: 16; Galtung 1980: 474). Only in military terms does Ugarit appear to have been passive and helpless. Military incapacity due to its small geographical dimensions (ca. 2,000 sq km; Yon 1997: 19) was seemingly the reason why the kingdom required the protection of a larger power in the context of Syria's petty kings' struggles for local supremacy.

Ugaritic elites were perhaps left with little choice as to their allegiance to the Hittite throne; but they also benefited from their incorporation into the Hittite empire. In return for their eventual pro-Hittite stance, Ugarit was awarded an increase in territory and Hittite overlordship ensured reasonably peaceful conditions for the undisrupted conduct of trade and exchange (Bryce 1998: 179). The advantage on the Hittite side naturally lay in rich tribute payments and the potential for engagement in commercial ventures through Anatolian merchants from coastal cities such as Ura in Cilicia (Klengel 1979: 78). Apparent harmony of interest of this kind, whatever the "real" benefits and disadvantages, is a defining feature of imperialism according to Galtung's structural theory, whereby dominance bases itself on a "bridgehead which the center of the Center nation establishes in the center of the Periphery nation, for the joint benefit of both" (Galtung 1980: 437–38). The types of resistance or negotiation adopted by Ugarit, however, also resemble those of a polity that is located at the center of a political system with multiple cores, and the multifaceted opportunities such a situation affords (Kohl 1987: 16, 20–21). Yet, strategies of this kind are not expected to effect fundamental changes in dominance relations, but may nonetheless lead to the modification of the structures of interaction (Galtung 1980: 474). The definition of some aspects of Ugarit's behavior as resistance to Hittite imperial rule is thus a matter of

degree, as the observable patterns rank at the lower, less overtly aggressive, end of the spectrum. As will be illustrated here, evasion, insubordination, and negotiation existed throughout Ugarit's relationship with the Hittite empire, and to ignore both textual and material culture evidence for it would be to dismiss an important aspect of vassal-overlord relationships, namely that of the self-perception and ideological representation of the subordinate partner.<sup>3</sup>

### *Textual Sources*

The prohibition of independent foreign relations for Hittite vassal rulers detailed in most vassal treaties (Beckman 1999: 3) is a characteristic trait of imperial strategies of integration: to limit horizontal contact and funnel communication toward the political center in the spirit of *divide et impera* (Galtung 1980: 451; Sinopoli 2001: 198). Well aware of Ugarit's connections to other great powers, the Hittite great king Mursili II sought to curb such activities in his vassal treaty with Niqmepa of Ugarit:

... if [you Niqmepa, . . . , do not seek the prosperity afforded by Hatti] and the protection of Mursili, Great King, [King of Hatti, but rather seek the prosperity afforded by] another land—by Hanigalbat, [or by Egypt]—if [you seek] the protection of [another] Great King, [you will transgress the oath]. (CTH 66: Beckman 1999: 67–68)

As a commercial center, however, Ugarit by definition flourished through its international connections. Evidence for high-level external contact is typically found in the early stages of Hittite rule as well as in the final decades of gradually declining Hittite power. Prior to the incorporation of Ugarit into the Hittite empire, Ugarit's king, Ammistamru, wrote to Amenophis III of Egypt as what appears as a subordinate ally in EA 45 (Moran 1992: 117–18). In EA 48 (Moran 1992: 120), a queen of Ugarit sent a gift to her Egyptian counterpart, in what was surely an attempt to reaffirm the good relations between Egypt and Ugarit. EA 49 (Moran 1992: 120–21) is the request of Niqmaddu of Ugarit to probably Amenophis IV for a physician and two attendants from Kush (Klengel 1969: 344; Lackenbacher 1995: 78).

That Ugarit's loyalty to Hatti was not entirely consolidated, in particular during the early stages of their relationship, is also implied by several measures taken by the Hittite court in response to an uprising of Syrian principalities early during the reign of Mursili II (Klengel 1992: 134). Ugarit, though not actively rebellious, appears to have stayed passive and unresponsive to Hittite orders to engage in a military offensive (RS 17.334; Nougayrol 1956: 54–55; Beckman 1999: 126–27). Likely consequences included the deposing of Niqmaddu's successor, Arhalba; the installation of the latter's brother,

Niqmepa, on the throne; and a reduction of Ugarit's territory by about one-third (RS 17.380 and RS 17.382; Nougayrol 1956: 80–83; Beckman 1999: 173–75). In addition, a new and more severe vassal treaty was imposed (RS 17.338 *et duplicata*; Nougayrol 1956: 85–101; Beckman 1999: 64–69).

Relations between Ammistamru II and his overlords at Hattusa and Karchemish appear to have been comparatively free of conflict (Klengel 1992: 144); at least, this is what the preserved documents seem to imply. The relevant international correspondence concerns mainly internal Syrian matters such as dynastic marriages and divorces, and the old question of the size of Ugarit's territory.

King Ibiranu of Ugarit was the recipient of an Assyrian letter (RS 34.165; Lackenbacher 1991: 90–100), possibly sent *en masse* to Hittite subject kings, informing him of an Assyrian victory over Tudhaliya IV at Nihiriya in Upper Mesopotamia (Klengel 1999: 281). It is quite possible that the letter alludes to a potential alliance with Assyria (Lackenbacher 1991: 100). The last king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, again stood in more or less regular contact with Egypt. RS 88.2158, for instance, represents a reply letter by the chancellor of Pharaoh Merenptah (Lackenbacher 1995: 78–83; idem 2001) concerning a request from Ugarit for an artisan to make a stone sculpture of the pharaoh. The image was to be placed in the temple of Baal opposite the statue of the god, which may have been donated by Egypt in the first place (Lackenbacher 2001: n. 13). Although the pharaoh's sculptors were apparently busy finishing works to the glory of his majesty at home, Merenptah, in a clear gesture of diplomatic good will, sent a number of gifts including cloth and precious raw materials to Ugarit. The fragmented RS 86.2230 (Arnaud 2001: 278–79) preserves the opening passage of a letter from Beya, chief of the pharaonic bodyguards, to Ammurapi of Ugarit. Since 1994, a number of other Egyptian letters, whose details are still largely unpublished, have come to light at Ugarit, which will further illuminate the nature of Ugaritic–Egyptian relations (Lackenbacher 2001: n. 15; idem 2004: 104). Several more letters also detail the relations of Ugarit with Egyptian vassal states such as Sidon and Tyre at the close of the Late Bronze Age (Arnaud 2001).

In addition to breaches of vassal duties, a number of documentary sources appear to indicate that whenever geopolitical circumstances allowed, Ugarit reverted to strategies of political negotiation very similar to those attested in the Amarna correspondence of the fourteenth century BCE (Liverani 1983, 2001; Cohen and Westbrook 2000). Ugarit's correspondence with its Hittite overlord differed from the Amarna letters in that the latter regularly responded and was involved in local commercial, judicial, and dynastic

matters. Nonetheless, Ugarit deployed similar tactics of negotiation, disobedience, and delay to those of Egyptian vassals and international diplomacy more generally. Chronologically, these are documented from the very beginning of Ugarit's relationship with Hatti but are most evident in the last decades of the Late Bronze Age, when Ugarit's kings were "subjects little attentive to a weakening empire" (translation of Lackenbacher 2001: 247). One might even conclude that the last king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, "did not consider himself as a vassal of the Hittite king, but as an ally capable of saying 'no'" (translation of Lebrun 1995: 85; see also Astour 1981: 22–23). In this way, Ugarit's passivity and inaction in military matters and the delay of vital supplies may well have contributed in a significant manner to the events and processes that ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Hittite polity.

An early instance of military inaction, during the Syrian rebellion, has already been mentioned and it is perhaps in this context that Tudhaliya IV may have adapted to Ugarit's general disinclination toward military action and granted Ammistamru II a reprieve from military duties for a campaign against Assyria in exchange for an enormous amount of gold (50 minas, ca. 24 kg!) (RS 17.59; Nougayrol 1956: 150–51). In another instance, the son and successor of Ammistamru II, Ibiranu, was urged by the king of Karchemish to send forth his soldiers and chariots—in a matter of life and death—and was told that he should not wait for the Hittite envoy to ascertain the number of troops and chariots placed under Ugarit's command by the central palace (RS 17.289; Nougayrol 1956: 192). In RS 20.237, Karchemish also urges Ugarit to comply with Hittite demands, as Ibiranu appears to have tried to delay the fulfillment of his overlord's request in a previous correspondence with the question as to *how many* chariots His Majesty would desire exactly:

Thus (speaks) the king [:] to the king of Ugarit he says: Greetings! Concerning the chariots which you have asked me about: "How may [chariot]s?" the Sun (simply) sai[d ?:] "Send [them]!" . . . will you [de]liver [what you had pr]omised? Before the [Su]n come! (translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1968: 102–3)

King Ibiranu is also being reprimanded by a Hittite high official for having failed to comply with other aspects of his vassal duties, in this case, the prescribed annual visit to the imperial capital, gifts to the king and his officials, and the regular exchange of messengers:

Why have you not come before His Majesty since you have assumed the kingship of the land of Ugarit? And why have you not sent your messengers? Now His Majesty is very angry about this matter. Now send your messengers quickly



before His Majesty, and send the king's presents together with my presents. (CTH 110/RS 17.247; Beckman 1999: 127; Nougayrol 1956: 191)

Altogether, the arbitrary behavior of Ibiranu seems to have irritated the Hittite administration enough to send a prince from Karchemish to reside at Ugarit. His arrival is previewed in RS 17.423 (Nougayrol 1956: 193) and Ibiranu is urged to treat him according to his rank.

The last king of Ugarit, Ammurapi, grew even bolder and perhaps also desperate as Hittite power decreased and news began to spread across the eastern Mediterranean of hostile peoples, who lived on boats (RS 34.129; Malbran-Labat 1991: 38–39). At a time of apparent famine in Anatolia, a Hittite court official urges the king of Ugarit to load 2,000 measures of grain from Mukis on one large boat and to send it to the port city of Ura in Cilicia. He also repeatedly points out Ugarit's liberation from some of its duties by the great king and reprimands the vassal state for not fully executing the demands of his overlord:

The King relieved you from “service”, but whe[n he] sealed and gave you (these) letters, was there not one among them: “That which will be asked of him, he will hear (it) and do (it)” Yet, that which is asked of you, why do you not do it? Following that which the King, y[our]]Master s[ays], comply fully! He relieved you, on your part, the King, your Master; that which he requests d[o (it)]. At present: the Uraeans l[ack everything ? and] the Sun they asked for supplies. The Sun assigned them 2,000 (measures of) grain coming from Mukiš. You, on your part, provide them with (only ?) one big ship and crew and they shall take this grain to their country! It will take them one or two journeys, but, you, do not deprive them of a boat . . . (RS 20.212, lines 5–26; translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1968: 105)

The very fragmented letter RS 20.141B has been suggested as a possible reply from Ammurapi (Nougayrol 1968: 107). The hypothesis would be that Ammurapi, without overtly refusing the command of the great king, appears to remind him of the impossibility of loading all the grain on even his biggest ship and that he would more likely need thirty. Another delay tactic of the same king is documented in RS 20.255A (Nougayrol 1968: 100–2; Lebrun 1995: 86), in which a Hittite court official urges the Ugaritic king to supply the goods that had been demanded of him previously.

In what appears to be the most outright gesture of resistance and disrespect, Ammurapi seems to have dislodged his Hittite wife, a daughter of the great king, prior to the settlement of his divorce (RS 17.226, RS 17.355, and RS 20.216; Nougayrol 1956: 208–20; idem 1968: 108–10; Beckman 1999: 180–84). This is not a gesture one would expect from a vassal to his overlord.

Another anecdote, although unfortunately undated, further illustrates the tactics of evasion of the Ugaritic court vis-à-vis its overlord. In RS 17.383, Takuhli(nu), a servant of the king of Ugarit, possibly Ammistamru II (Klengel 1992: 144), urges his master to resolve rapidly the affair of the promised but undelivered lapis lazuli to Hattusa, as the Hittite great king was becoming increasingly displeased (lines 13–20; 28–29):

The heart of the King is severely upset and it is against me that the King turned (in these terms): “Does this man not mock me? He picked up from the ground a kamma stone and he made me wear it (with these words:) Here that I made you wear lapis-lazuli.” . . . But now, find lapis-lazuli no matter where and have it be brought to the King. (translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1956: 221–23)

The second letter (RS 17.422), apparently sent from Hattusa to Ugarit by Takuhli(nu), urges the Ugaritic king even more intensely to bring the requested lapis to the increasingly annoyed Hittite great king. Again, the Ugaritic king had attempted to delay the delivery with the excuse that he had looked for lapis lazuli but had been unable to find any (line 16):

On the subject of the lapis-lazuli about which you wrote to the King: “I searched for lapis-lazuli and I could not find any.” The heart of the king with regard to my Master is very badly disposed. (translated from the French edition of Nougayrol 1956: 223–125)

Despite these examples of disobedience and delay, there can be little doubt about Ugarit’s political domination by the Hittite empire from ca. 1340 BCE until the end of the Late Bronze Age, which brought destruction and abandonment to the trading city and to its overlords. Each individual act of insubordination on the part of Ugarit was neither able to nor likely to have been truly intended to change its position in the pecking order of political power in the Late Bronze Age international system. In the majority of textual sources, whose details would exceed the scope of this chapter, Ugarit maintains the appearance of a mostly compliant and cooperating subordinate. Such public maintenance of the hegemonic ideology of domination by the subordinate party may be expected in the context of covert resistance, where the expression of dissent is mostly reserved for spaces removed from the direct access of the dominant group (Scott 1990; see also Miller 1995: 76). The occasional glimpses of insubordination in the high-level diplomatic correspondence of Ugarit may thus be hinting at a more deeply rooted diversion from the official imperial ideology of obedience and co-optation.

Archaeological evidence represents an obvious alternative and complementary path of investigation when most textual sources may be expected to present and reinforce the dominant or official versions of history (Miller 1995: 76). Local cultural identities and ideologies find expression in and undergo renegotiation as a result of the production of material culture (see, for instance, Ross 2005). An investigation of Ugarit's Late Bronze Age cultural traditions, thus, should allow us to gain insights into how at least Ugarit's elite perceived of and chose to portray itself and its relationship with its imperial overlord.

### *Archaeological Evidence*

Indirect imperial rule, which leaves the local political structure and leadership largely intact, may be expected to leave comparatively few archaeological traces, and indeed, with the exception of the clay tablets cited above containing letters and treaties, material culture evidence for Hittite imperial overlordship is conspicuously rare at Ugarit in terms of both imported artefacts and broader cultural connections.

Among the few possible finds of Anatolian origin at Ugarit are a golden hieroglyphic seal-ring of a free Anatolian woman found on the south acropolis (RS 24.145; Galliano and Calvet 2004: no. 76); a hieroglyphic biconvex seal from the harbor area (RS 2.[035]; Galliano and Calvet 2004: no. 77), as well as a much-debated chlorite seal of great king Mursili II from the royal palace (RS 14.202; Galliano and Calvet 2004: no. 74). Mistakes in the cuneiform, and particularly the hieroglyphic texts, have led to serious doubts about the authenticity of the seal and the possibility of a Hittite chancellery at Ugarit (Neu 1995: 124–25), which had been suggested by Schaeffer (1956: 87–93). If the seal is indeed an ancient counterfeit, one cannot but wonder what sort of documents the Ugaritic king might have used his overlord's seal for.

In addition to large numbers of imported Aegean and Cypriot pottery, and in stark contrast to the scarcity of Anatolian materials, Egyptian objects—including imports, local products and amalgamations of Syrian and Egyptian subject matter and styles—are a prominent feature of the archaeological record of fourteenth- and thirteenth-century BCE Ugarit. From these we can infer a level of direct participation in political relations between the Ugaritic elite and Egypt and a preference on the part of the former for Egyptianizing iconography and the ideological currency conferred by Egyptian symbolism. The finds from Ugarit also point to a socially widespread, long-term engagement and familiarity with Egyptian culture.

Egyptian imports suggestive of direct political contact include several statues with royal cartouches of Middle Kingdom date, which may have

reached Syria during the Hyksos period (Helck 1995: 89). Objects with royal Egyptian inscriptions from the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE include stone vessels from Tuthmosis III, Amenophis IV, Horemhab, and Ramses II, and a wedding scarab from Amenophis III. A stone vessel showing king Niqmaddu of Ugarit and his queen in Egyptian dress and iconographic tradition, with accompanying Egyptian hieroglyphic inscription, as well a stele dedicated to Mami, a high official of Merenptah, and a sword with Merenptah's cartouche were also found at Ugarit (Sparks 2003: 53–56; Helck 1995).

The inscribed stone vases in particular command attention, as Egyptian stone vessels were objects of high value around the eastern Mediterranean and specimens with royal Egyptian inscriptions are exceedingly rare (Sparks 2003: 40). Through their royal cartouches, as Sparks has argued, these vessels stand in direct association with the Egyptian administration. Their concentration on the Levantine littoral—in particular in the elite contexts of Ugarit and, to a lesser degree, of Byblos during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE—may be related, among other possible distributive mechanisms, to deliberate diplomatic gestures on the part of the Egyptian court. Conversely, uninscribed Egyptian vases are found in a range of other social contexts at Ugarit (Sparks 2003: 50–51). The chronological distribution of these objects appears to match the pattern outlined by the textual sources of more intensive Egyptian–Ugaritic relations during the Amarna period and coinciding with the *pax Hethitica* following the battle of Qadesh. However, to dismiss as insignificant (Helck 1995: 92) evidence for interaction between Egypt and Ugarit during a phase of strong Hittite control, such as the vessel inscribed by Horemhab, is to ascribe undue supremacy to the textual sources. It also mutes archaeological evidence where it is most instructive: in uncovering “unofficial” sociopolitical and/or cultural negotiations.

A logical extension of the above inquiries is an investigation of local Ugaritic material culture and the various sources for its stylistic and cultural inspirations. During the fourteenth and thirteenth century BCE, south Levantine elites under Egyptian hegemony preferentially used hybrid Egyptian–Levantine material culture in local discourses of prestige and power (Higginbotham 1996; 2000). By contrast, areas under direct Egyptian military and administrative control saw the wholesale introduction of Egyptian cultural assemblages in contexts directly associated with Egyptian rule.


We would therefore expect to find north-central Anatolian cultural influences in the form of locally produced Anatolian objects or the selective incorporation of Anatolian cultural traits into hybrid styles that might be associated with Hittite political influence, to concentrate—if at all—in palatial

and other elite contexts at Ugarit. An investigation of architecture and material culture from such contexts should allow us to reconstruct the Ugaritic elite's stylistic preferences and its cultural and ideological sources of power during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE.


Even at a superficial level of investigation, the vast majority of Ugaritic elite objects immediately betray their strong affiliation with Egyptian stylistic traditions, albeit in the depiction of local Syrian subject matters and with a series of interwoven local as well as Aegean and Mesopotamian influences. Due to the space constraints of this chapter, the following discussion will focus on a few selected aspects of Ugaritic material culture.

Two ivory plaques (RS 16.056 and RS 28.031; Schaeffer 1954: 52–59; Yon 1997: 146) (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4) from what was very likely an Egyptian-style bed (see, for example, Barnett 1982: 29) were found in the royal palace at Ugarit. These are among the iconographically most diverse and multifaceted objects from Late Bronze Age Ugarit (for a summary of Ugaritic iconography, see Cornelius 1999). The representations on each of the two panels consist of eight individual scenes that revolve around subject matters connected to the life of a high-status personality, probably the king. Framed by two sacred trees and a long panel depicting a hunting scene, the king's official roles are portrayed in RS 16.056, while RS 28.031 seems to be concerned with his private or family life. A strong Egyptian influence is remarkable in elements such as posture and hairstyle, yet the majority of depictions portray Syrian subject matters (see, for example, Ward 1969; Barnett 1982), with occasional incorporations of Mesopotamian, Aegean, and Anatolian attributes (Feldman 2002a). Barnett (1982: 29) identifies the representation of a bowman and a stag as a Hittite motif. Another Anatolian element may be found in the winged female Figure on panel RS 28.031: above her Egyptian hairstyle and Mesopotamian/Levantine divine horns, she carries what has been identified as an Anatolian rosette or sun-disc (Ward 1969: 225). This sign is found, for instance, on Anatolian glyptic and monumental iconography (see, for example, Börker-Klähn 1994: 138–45) as well as stamped on pottery in the form of the so-called *signe royal* (Seidl 1972: 65–70). The symbol, however, is chronologically not confined to the Hittite imperial phase in Anatolia and thus may have made it into the Ugaritic iconographic repertoire prior to the establishment of Hittite control.

The stone stelae found in religious contexts throughout Ugarit's acropolis equally combine influences from around the eastern Mediterranean with local religious motifs. The finds-contexts of many stelae are difficult to reconstruct and different date-ranges have been proposed for them. The overriding



**Figure 1.3.** Ivory plaque (RS 16.056) (after Yon 1997, 146)




**Figure 1.4.** Ivory plaque (RS 28.031) (after Yon 1997, 146)

stylistic influence, however, is again Egyptian. The subject of the so-called Stele of “Anat” (RS 2.[038]), which may be a human rather than divine representation (Börker-Klähn 1982: 240), is portrayed in Egyptian dress, posture, and attributes (Yon 1991: fig. 6, no. 3) (see Figure 1.5). The proposed dates vary widely but Yon (1991: 299) suggested placing the stele in the tradition of the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE based on iconographic comparisons with Egypt. Similarly difficult to date is the representation of the *Baal au Foudre* on stele RS 4.427 (Yon 1991: fig. 6, no. 5) (see Figure 1.6), which has stylistic elements of the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE but could also be of earlier date (Yon 1991: 299). It too has strong Egyptian iconographic links, such as the posture of the victorious, smiting pharaoh (Liebowitz 1978:

29), while the headdress and horns are local Mesopotamian/Syrian (Frankfort 1996: 256), recalling the typical appearance of Resheph (Yon 1991: 297). The dagger on the god's waist has been likened to that of a Hittite deity at the Kings Gate at Boğazköy-Hattusa (Schaeffer, 1949: 124–25; Yon 1991: 296; Frankfort 1996: 256), but depending on the date of the stele, it may in fact pre-date the Anatolian example (Böker-Klähn 1982: 238–39).

Smaller-scale divine depictions in the round dating to the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE such as the seated El (RS 23.393: Yon 1997: 142–43, no. 14) and a bronze counterpart of the *Baal au Foudre* (RS. 23.294; Yon 1997: 142–43, no. 15) also show strong Egyptianizing influences (Yon et al. 1990: 4–5; Seeden 1980: 102–3). Several fragments of an alabaster vase (RS 15.239; Yon 1997: 168–69, no. 49) depicting King Niqmadu of Ugarit, who is identified by an Egyptian hieroglyphic inscription, and a woman in Egyptian dress and iconographic tradition, bear additional witness to Ugarit's desire to appropriate Egyptian symbolism and to align itself with Egyptian power.



**Figure 1.5.** Stele of “Anat” (RS 2.[038]) (after Yon 1991, fig. 6, no. 3)



**Figure 1.6.** “Baal au Foudre” (RS 4.427) (after Yon 1991, fig. 6, no. 5)

Feldman (2002b; 2006) has suggested a conscious ambiguity in the representation of the lady as what appears to be a high-status Egyptian bride, and the desired prestige this might have conferred onto the Ugaritic king among the right audience.

From an architectural point of view, few Anatolian influences may be identified in the monumental structures at Ugarit. They are essentially limited to the design of underground passages or posterns, which are a defining feature of central Anatolian defensive architecture. While Ugarit's fortification wall is pierced by just such an underground passage and its construction postdates those on the Anatolian plateau, it seemingly pre-dates Hittite political domination in the Levant (Naumann 1955: 122–25; Bittel 1976: 16, 59; Schaeffer 1939) (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8). Margueron (2004: 145) has recently attributed the Late Bronze Age modifications and transformations of the royal palace at Ugarit to the dominant role of the Hittite . However, he does not elaborate on these propositions in any reconstructable detail. In contrast, Naumann (1955: 354) views the evolution of palatial architecture in northern Syria as a process independent from that of Anatolia.

Ugaritic glyptic too largely preserves its independent local character, while other Syrian subjects of the Hittite empire such as Amurru, Emar, Karchemish, and Alalah develop a hybrid Syro-Anatolian glyptic style that involves the utilization of Luwian hieroglyphs (Neu 1995: 125; Beyer 2001).



**Figure 1.7.** Postern at Ugarit





**Figure 1.8.** Postern at Boğazköy-Hattusa

From this brief and selective overview, the virtual absence of clear Hittite imperial influences on the material culture of Ugarit corroborates Carla Sinopoli's (1994: 169) observation that the absence of standard "imperial indicators does not demonstrate that specific areas were outside an empire." However, the evident contrast between the strong Egyptian influence and the overall absence of Anatolian elements cannot only be explained by an apparent disinterest on the part of the imperial overlord to strive for cultural uniformity. The choice of incorporating cultural elements of a rival Late Bronze Age power over that of one's own political overlord is here suggested to represent an active process of cultural negotiation, as a deliberate, rather than accidental or subconscious, communication of cultural, ideological, and power-political messages.

Material culture and its polysemic nature permit the co-existence of a whole array of changeable meanings and interpretations for a given object (Miller 1995: 76; see also Feldman 2002a, 2006). While Ugaritic elite art and iconography may convey different messages to different viewers depending on their social status, cultural affiliation, and stylistic/iconographic literacy, there is little doubt that Ugarit clearly communicated its own political ambition, via the use of mostly Egyptian or Egyptianizing symbolism, to whomsoever cared to look. Complementary to Feldman's (2002a; 2006) interpretation of particularly the

ivory bed panels and the alabaster vase with Niqmadu's inscription, as part of an internal discourse to reinforce Ugaritic kingship through the use of symbols of power from strongly centralized foreign political entities, I would suggest that the choice of iconographic source and adaptation carries an additional international dimension and direction. Because of the long-standing cultural connections between Egypt and the Levant, it is important to consider whether the use of Egyptian stylistic elements and symbols of power had become part of the local canon of artistic expression in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, and in this way perhaps remained unconscious or "politically neutral" in terms of the international political arena. The expertise with which Ugarit's artists transferred Egyptian royal symbolism into the Levantine ideological and environmental context, and the knowledge of contemporary Egyptian iconography and meaning this process required (Feldman 2002a: 16), seems to indicate a rather conscious decision *for* Egyptian and—by default—*against* other available and equally strong traditions of royal representation.

A recent redefinition of the otherwise cursory term "international style" (Feldman 2002a) may further help to underline this point. Feldman has identified a number of high-status objects at Ugarit, such as the famous golden bowl (RS 5.032; Yon 1997: 174, no. 56), whose iconography and stylistic canon cannot be linked to any particular cultural tradition in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. These high-value portable objects, she argues, would have circulated as part of the international exchange of goods and correspondence between the elites of the great powers of the Late Bronze Age as a kind of material *lingua franca* that reinforced elite commonality across cultural boundaries. Thus, while Ugarit participated in the exchange of "international style," and in this way perhaps "politically correct," objects, its use of selective foreign symbolism with an especially strong reference to Egypt in many of its high-status luxuries seems to underline an element of deliberate choice. Whether the display of such Egyptianizing objects was in any way disturbing to Hittite officials and ultimately to the imperial overlord is, of course, questionable. Nonetheless, Ugarit's elite clearly and loudly projected its self-perception and aspirations within the international system through its material culture.

## REJECTING EMPIRE: THE KASKA OF NORTHERN ANATOLIA

We now turn to another set of imperial relations that differs from the case of Ugarit in all possible respects. The zone of interaction between the Hittites and the Kaska peoples in northern Anatolia in many ways became the Hittite version of a "barbarian frontier" that commenced almost immediately beyond the northern gates of the capital city. This is at least the perspective provided

by the Hittite texts (Matthews 2000a; Glatz and Matthews 2005; Zimansky 2007). Unlike most imperial frontiers, which are established or encountered in the course of imperial expansion, this particular border appears to have been forced upon the Hittites and actively driven into formerly Hittite territory sometime during the Middle Hittite Period (fifteenth century BCE) by the Kaska (Klinger 2002 *contra* von Schuler 1965; Singer 2007). Important Hittite cult-centers and their temples are reported to have been destroyed and plundered in this process, and generations of successive Hittite kings fought for the return to Hittite control of these sacred towns. The overwhelming religious importance of the inner Black Sea region for the Hittite state cult is reflected in the relentless efforts to regain the lost territory and in the readiness of some Hittite rulers to strike deals with the Kaska in order to continue the appropriate worship of the gods of these towns (von Schuler 1965: 30).

In geographical terms, this contested region encompassed the mountainous zone of northern Anatolia stretching from around the Devrez Çay, and possibly further west, across the whole of the Turkish central Black Sea region and along the Yeşilirmak and Kelkit Çay in the east (von Schuler 1965: 61–62; Forlanini 1977; Yakar 1980, 1992; Yakar and Dinçol 1974; Matthews and Glatz 2009b).

### *Textual Sources*

An unusual variety of textual classes from prayers (CTH 375) and oracles (CTH 137) to instructions for officials such as border guards (CTH 257, 260, and 261; Alp 1991), campaign reports (CTH 40, 61, and 81) and treaties (CTH 89 and 138–40), spanning several centuries, illustrate the great concern the Kaska problem caused the Hittite imperial leadership. From these texts, which represent the only Late Bronze Age documentary sources detailing this interaction, a series of strategies of imperial domination may be deduced (for complete summaries, see von Schuler 1965; Glatz and Matthews 2005). Most notable is the apparently static nature of the relationship. Throughout centuries of contact and antagonism, there appears to have been comparatively little development or transformation in the modes of interaction portrayed by the textual sources, which revolved essentially around the same patterns of attack and counterattack, interrupted by occasional, but ultimately futile, attempts at diplomacy and co-optation. The basic mode of engagement, at least from the point of view of the Hittite state, throughout the Late Bronze Age was military conflict and all other activities were structured around an ever-present undercurrent of violence.

Almost yearly campaigns were led by generations of Hittite great kings or their generals into Kaska territory, usually in retaliation for previous attacks on Hittite settlements and property. The recurring details of these encounters involve the often successful break-up of enemy forces and their escape into difficult mountain terrain, the destruction of frequently abandoned settlements, and the taking of prisoners and booty whenever Kaska did confront the Hittite army. Each king claims ultimate victory, yet the recurrence of these accounts betrays the tentative nature of any Hittite success. The vast majority of Hittite–Kaska interaction detailed in the official sources thus conforms most directly to the concept of overt resistance to domination in its most uncompromising form.

In order to consolidate territorial gains and to pacify contested regions, several Hittite kings reverted to the establishment of fortified settlements and garrison-outposts and their resettlement with Hittite and deportee populations (CTH 40, 61, and 89). A number of attempts at diplomatic regulation through treaties and oaths (CTH 81, 89, 138–40, and 375) were also drawn up by the Hittite administration in hopes of calming the situation in the north. The use of high-level diplomatic tools and “peaceful” modes of imperial domination, which are otherwise well adapted to drawing elites of local petty kingdoms into the realm of Hittite domination, in the Kaska context illustrate the basic inability of the Hittite leadership to devise strategies of defense, conquest, and incorporation for a people whose sociocultural organization lacked a central political force and was thus fundamentally different from that of the Hittite core-region and the vast majority of its other subordinates.

Beyond the sparse and often indirect references to Kaska culture, society, and mode of life in Hittite sources, little to nothing is known about them. From Hittite texts, a loose confederation of twelve tribes may be deduced. With the exception of a leader named Pihhuniya who, contrary to Kaska custom, “ruled in the manner of a king” during the time of Mursili II (Goetze 1933: 88–89; Bryce 1998: 215), the Kaska apparently did not tolerate individual rulership (von Schuler 1965: 70). The dispersed sociopolitical organization of the Kaska posed great problems for the Hittite army as the former engaged mainly in the typical hit-and-run tactics despised as barbarous in the royal ideology of the time (Liverani 2001: 108–15). The apparent rapidity and nonchalance with which the Kaska rebuilt their settlements after Hittite attacks and their ability to move whole towns or their inhabitants out of the way of the Hittite army (see, for example, von Schuler 1965: 75–76) may indicate a rather more mobile lifestyle than that assumed by the majority of Hittite-controlled populations.

However, as with all forms of human interaction, frontiers, when examined in greater detail, are not only demarcations of the limits of imperial ability to dominate. Unofficially, border zones are also areas of intensive cross-cultural and social interaction (Lightfoot and Martinez 1995). Hints of this kind of interaction can be found in Hittite documents seeking to regulate the conduct of interaction between befriended Kaska groups and Hittite individuals and communities. Kaska, even if they owed allegiance to the Hittite king, were not allowed into Hittite cities, and legal matters involving Kaska had to be resolved outside the city gates. Also mentioned are intermarriages between Hittites and Kaska (CTH 89; von Schuler 1965: 146–47). Beyond this apparently peaceful interaction on a local level, Kaska contingents are mentioned in Egyptian sources as Hittite allies in the battle of Qadesh (Liverani 2001: 81; Lichtheim 1976: 61); and Hattusili III appears particularly to have exploited the ambiguity between official Hittite perception and localized relations in his struggle for dynastic supremacy (von Schuler 1965: 56–60).

### *Archaeological Evidence*

The Kaska have managed successfully to escape not only Hittite control but also the archaeologists' trowels and the relationship between these tribes and the Hittite empire can only be indirectly reconstructed from the archaeological record. In the absence of excavated Kaska settlements or identifiable material culture traits (for an attempt, see Glatz and Matthews 2005), archaeological investigations of Hittite–Kaska interaction face a unilateral bias similar to that of the textual accounts.

A hoard of metal objects from the Kastamonu region, which included bull rhyta and a bowl decorated with hunting scenes and a Luwian hieroglyphic inscription of the thirteenth century BCE (Emre and Çınaroğlu 1993; Gates 1997: 258; Gates 1996: 298–99; Bilgen 1999; Greaves and Helwing 2001: 498–99) may indeed have been looted from Hittite temples (Matthews 2000b: 1017) as described in the prayer of king Arnuwanda and queen Asmunikkal:

The temples which you, the gods, possessed in these countries, the Kaška sacked them. They smashed the images of you, the gods. They plundered silver and gold, rhyta and cups of silver and gold, and of copper, your implements of bronze and your garments. (CTH 375; Goetze in Pritchard 1955: 399–400)

Associated archaeological contexts would point toward a workshop area that included metal as well as ceramic manufacture (Bilgen 1999). A continuous occupation sequence from the later third to the first millennium BCE has been proposed for this site, however only late third-millennium and transitional early second-millennium BCE as well as Iron Age materials have

been commented on and illustrated in the preliminary reports (Çınaroğlu and Genç 2005). The lack of published later second-millennium BCE materials, unfortunately, inhibits the potential identification of Late Bronze Age material culture traits associated with Kaska and/or Hittite presence at the site.

A general problem of differentiation affects ceramic evidence on a wider scale as distinctive ethnic labels often do not fit well with the usage of particular material culture traits. “North-central Anatolian” pottery may denote the presence of Hittite populations in a political and/or cultural sense but does not exclude the possibility of Kaska populations also using and producing artefacts of north-central Anatolian-style (see Özşait 2003 for a theory of homogenization). However, at the current state of research a rather crude working hypothesis concerning the relation of pots and Hittites has to be made, albeit in corroboration with other strands of evidence.

Archaeological surveys and excavations attest to Middle Bronze Age settlements on or near the central Turkish Black Sea coast (see, for example, Işın 1998; Dönmez 2002) and to thriving contact with the central Anatolian cultural sphere (Müller-Karpe 2001). Sometime during, or shortly after, the sixteenth to fifteenth centuries BCE, however, recognizable permanent settlement appears to cease across the entire area (Dönmez 2002 *contra* Yakar and Dinçol 1974). Throughout the Late Bronze Age, Hittite textual sources also report the demographic depletion of this northern region. In attempts to stabilize the affected areas, several generations of great kings claim to have established fortified border towns and resettled deserted regions (von Schuler 1965).

Archaeological evidence of heightened Hittite settlement activity to the northwest of the Hittite core region comes from recent survey results. Project Paphlagonia (Matthews 2000a, b; Matthews et al. 1998; Matthews and Glatz 2009a) (see Figures 1.9 and 1.10) covered a sizeable and previously archaeologically largely unexplored region of northern Turkey, which formed part of the Hittite provinces of Pala and Tumanna (see, for example, Forlanini 1977; Matthews and Glatz 2009b). While the precise dating of north-central Anatolian-style pottery is problematic and currently under review even at the Hittite capital (see, for example, Schoop 2003, 2006), an apparent increase in Hittite activity in this area can be observed in the Late Bronze Age (Glatz et al. 2009). The majority of the twenty-one Late Bronze Age settlements in the region occupied sizeable multi-period mounds (see Figure 1.11). Many sites controlled strategic communication routes and had access to good agricultural land (Matthews 2000b: 1017), while the overall settlement pattern appears to indicate several lines of defense against a northern enemy.




Figure 1.9. Paphlagonia survey region



Figure 1.10. Project Paphlagonia survey: Late Bronze Age sites



**Figure 1.11.** View of Salman Höyük West

The almost complete absence of Late Bronze Age north-central Anatolian material culture beyond the line of sites in the Devrez River valley (except for the site of İnceboğaz) is echoed by the results of other surveys along the northern fringe of Anatolia. A general decline of settlements with recognizable Late Bronze Age material culture has been reported from the Kastamonu, Sinop, and Samsun regions and beyond the Kelkit and Yeşilirmak valleys (Marro et al. 1996, 1998; Kuzucuoğlu et al. 1997; Işın 1998; Yakar 1980, 2000; Yakar and Dinçol 1974; Dönmez 2002). Recent intensive survey along the north-west central Black Sea coast has yielded a single site with Late Bronze Age north-central Anatolian-style pottery (Glatz et al. 2011: 282-83). To the northeast, the retreat of settlements with recognizable Late Bronze Age material traits appears to have come to a halt in inner Samsun and Amasya provinces (Dönmez 2002). Settlement patterns and site-size distributions in these regions generally correspond to those found to the south of the main line of defense in Paphlagonia (Glatz 2007).

At present we are not in a position to pin down in material culture terms potential groups of people who may have forced the archaeologically visible retreat of Hittite settlement and the deliberate fortification of the area south of the Black Sea mountains. Mountainous terrain and the seemingly more mobile lifestyle of the Kaska tribes as well as the near absence of excavations



in these areas hampers the recognition of potential contemporary material traits to those we may associate with Hittite activities. Textual and archaeological evidence, however, allows a relatively convincing reconstruction of an enduring Kaska claim over an area that was integral geographically and, most importantly, ideologically of the Hittite core region, as well as the persistent resistance of the Kaska to any attempts to either exterminate or co-opt them into joining the Hittite realm. It is, therefore, highly likely that the Hittite inability to pacify northern Anatolia made the Kaska an important agent in the collapse of the empire at the end of the Late Bronze Age.

### NEGOTIATION AND RESISTANCE TO THE HITTITE EMPIRE: SOME CONCLUSIONS

The local reactions to Hittite imperialism that I have just outlined are observed essentially through the macroscopic lens of the textual sources and only tentatively through the archaeological record. An archaeology of the Hittite empire, which accords primacy to archaeological research questions and aims to reconstruct a bottom-up perspective of the relationships of domination and their local effects, is very much in its infancy. With all attention turned to the military, political, and diplomatic aspects of empire recorded in the textual sources and the excavation of capitals and monumental edifices, few detailed archaeological studies have so far been conducted on the cultural, social, and economic impact of Hittite imperialism on its subject polities, their reactions, and the subsequent transformations of imperial relationships (Glatz 2009).

Nevertheless, important insights can be gained from this macro-scale of inquiry about the scope of local strategies of negotiation and resistance to imperial power. On the one hand, we observe the more or less subtle negotiation of Ugarit, attempting to escape its vassal duties through delay tactics and inaction. The self-confident behavior of Ugarit vis-à-vis the Hittite court may be reflected in the absence of material culture indicative of imperial presence or influence. The textually attested active aggression and subsequent resistance to Hittite attempts at military control or diplomatic pacification on the part of the Kaska tribes represent the other extreme of local reaction.

From these two examples of resistance and negotiation against and within the Hittite empire, it would appear that social and economic organization are crucial factors in determining the strategies available to those affected by early imperialism and the acceptability of the potentially violent consequences developing from them. Ugarit, as one vassal state of many in the empires of the Late Bronze Age Near East, was connected to the Hittite great king through a direct, personal alliance with its own king, the preservation of whose position

and that of his family depended on his ability to assert his power internally as well as on his overall compliance with the requirements of the imperial leadership. Ugarit's position as a trading city and, closely intertwined with its commercial success, the power of its king, depended heavily on the prevalence of peaceful conditions. In addition, military protection was at least theoretically afforded by the Hittite overlord, which was perhaps more than could be realistically expected of Egypt. Ugarit thus had an incentive for official obedience, albeit one defined by self-interest rather than ideological co-optation. Ugarit's self-perception and confident aspirations, hinted at in the textual records, becomes more pronounced in its elite's material culture, which makes a clear statement of affiliation with the Egyptian realm; it communicates an ideology rather different from that of a faithful vassal to Hittite overlordship.

No such elite interest appears to have hampered the near-total rejection of Hittite domination, up to and including repeated and contemptuous challenges to the imperial army, by the Kaska. The absence of ruling elites capable of internally controlling the disparate mountain tribes and an ever-shifting pattern of alliances among different groups as well as the strategic advantages of small-scale, acephalous societies such as high mobility, hindered the imposition of imperial control in all its forms and aspects. The Hittite army appears to have had a rather hard time even getting the Kaska to face them in combat, while the lack of leadership capable of internal domination voided any diplomatic overtures. The necessary coercion or its threat, undercurrent in most early imperial relationships, could not be imposed on a king or supreme chief as in the case of Ugarit. Although some Kaska groups could be pacified by means of military control and presumably incentives of a positive kind, others persistently opted out of such relations.

## ABBREVIATIONS

CTH	<i>Catalogue des Textes Hittites</i> (Laroche 1971)
EA	El-Amarna tablet number
RS	Ras Shamra – Ugarit record number

## NOTES

1. See Abbreviations.
2. Hittite weight ratios differed somewhat from their Mesopotamian and Levantine counterparts. One Hittite *mina* measured 40 rather than the more usual 60 shekels, while the weight of a Hittite shekel appears to have been ca. 12g (or 12.8g) (Van den Hout 1990: 525–27).
3. The following discussion does not represent a comprehensive summary of available historical and archaeological evidence relevant for this chapter. The presented data, furthermore, is not evenly distributed chronologically throughout the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE, thus, resulting in the overrepresentation of some phases over others.

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## CHAPTER 2

## MONUMENTS OF RESISTANCE

## GURGUM AND THE ASSYRIAN CONQUEST


LYNN SWARTZ DODD

THREE THOUSAND YEARS AGO, THE RULERS AND INHABITANTS OF a small Neo-Hittite kingdom called Gurgum (see Figure 2.1) were forced to deal with the dramatic expansion of the formidable Assyrian Empire. In more specific terms, Assyrian officials and merchants began to reassess their prospects for expanding Assyria past its traditional western border. This expansion would give them access to trade routes, raw materials, prestige goods such as ivory, silver, elephant skin, red-purple fabrics, and other products that were available beyond the Euphrates River. Although it is possible that the transfer of goods may have begun through commercial relationships, eventually these relationships were transformed by Assyrian aggression. This in turn created tensions that provoked shifts

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**Figure 2.1.** Top: Map of Assyrian Western Expansion. From Fales 2001.  
Bottom: regional map of southern Turkey and northern Syria

in the regional power politics in what is now northern Syria and southern Turkey, including instances of alliance and competition. There were times when Gurgum felt compelled to join with its neighbors, such as the kingdoms of Tabal, Karkemiš (Karkemish), Quwe, and Kummuh, in alliance against the Assyrians. In the face of imperial expansion, this regional landscape became both a political target and a tool of resistance as traditional social and political structures responded to the pressures of Assyrian expansion and the changing cultural, economic, and political environment. Through archaeological and textual evidence from the kingdom of Gurgum, we are now privy to an early instance of local elites negotiating relationships with an expansionistic imperial power. Further, we can view instances of resistance, both in concrete material terms and in mental or psychological terms, within a complex geographical and political landscape, as a tool used to oppose a superior invading force. While these moves and countermoves by both the weak and the strong took place long ago and far away from the geopolitical realities of our world, in many ways they have a familiar ring. Understanding such strategies has relevance now as it did then (Chesnais 2007; Malley 2008).

The rulers of Gurgum resisted the Assyrian expansion in multiple ways: first and most obviously on the battlefield and by attempting to secure the most strategic points within their landscape, including modes of ingress and egress. Ultimately the rulers of Gurgum did not succeed in this form of direct resistance. The Assyrian army was able to make forays into Gurgum and beyond (Levine 1972). Following the failure of military resistance, the kings of Gurgum accepted the role of tributary vassals and Gurgum appeared in Assyrian lists among those kingdoms/provinces submitting tribute. This strategy was employed repeatedly in this area of westward Assyrian expansion; the landscape here was already controlled through well-established palatial centers, such as those at Tell Tayinat, Karkemiš, and Hamath, where local rulers exploited agricultural lands and profited from long-used trade routes (Harrison and Osborne 2012; Harrison 2010).

The Assyrians allowed the Gurgumean king to remain in place as a tool of continuity and hegemonic exploitation; as a result, a second, more subtle strategy of resistance developed. This strategy focused attention on a special relationship that the rulers of Gurgum claimed to three ideologically significant realms: the gods that were worshipped locally; the heritage of the kingdom's past; and the "homeland" itself. By extension, this special relationship extended to the community that lived there, a population whose loyalty and productive output were valuable commodities to the embattled

local rulers. Kingdoms neighboring Gurgum also tried to resist the Assyrians in various ways but in Gurgum we find an intensive and extended cultural strategy of resistance that was reflected in the use of monumental sculpture installed in the landscape by both royal and nonroyal individuals. Tracking the evidentiary remains of this strategy of resistance will be the particular concern of this chapter. After providing a description of Gurgum's landscape and a very brief frame for Assyria's western expansion, I will address how cultural resistance to imperialistic power is manifest in the actions and monuments in the Gurgumean territory and the ways in which the politics of landscape were articulated in this ancient place and time.

We know about the kingdom of Gurgum from texts on inscribed monuments, both local and Assyrian,<sup>1</sup> and from the modern archaeological survey undertaken in the Kahramanmaraş Valley. The most extensive work was directed by Elizabeth Carter of UCLA (Carter 1996, 1997; Carter et al. 1999; Dodd 2002). Other survey research also developed relevant data (Archi et al. 1971; Brown 1967; Görür and İstanbulluoğlu 2006; Konyar 2008). I will return to the nonlocal inscriptions and survey data later.

A significant body of data resides in the buildings and monuments commissioned and erected in this landscape, especially a lion sculpture: this object will serve as a touchstone for this discussion and we will return to it several times. This sculpture is known as MARAŞ 1 (see Figure 2.2) and it is dated to




**Figure 2.2.** MARAŞ 1, Lion with inscription of Halparuntiyas III

the end of the ninth century BCE. Its lion-shaped body was incised with the inscriptions of Halparuntiyas III (Hawkins 2000).<sup>2</sup> An anthropomorphic figure standing on the back of a now-eroded animal, presumably a lion or bull, was added to the lion's left shoulder subsequent to the original carving.

### THE GURGUM LANDSCAPE

In all likelihood this lion was created in Gurgum. The kings named in the lion's inscription were Gurgumean rulers and Gurgum is also the region where the lion was found. We may imagine that both the Iron Age stone carver who executed its design and the artist's patron well understood the environment and landscape ruled by the kings whose names were being inscribed. Presumably, had the craftsman looked up from this labor, a glance across the valley would have encompassed a view in which a town sprawled across the hillside around the several springs that flow from the foothills of the Taurus Mountains, which lie at the north end of the Kahramanmaraş Valley (see Figure 2.3). During the fall or late spring, the plain to the south of the modern city's location would have looked like a green-and-gold checkerboard of fields and fallow lands that rolled up to the shallowly incised riverbank and covered the low slopes of rocky hills that squeezed traffic into narrow passages beside the river (marked on Figure 2.3 as I-II and II-III). From the south, Gurgum's territory was approachable through a narrow valley pass between the hills, where the valley floor was intermittently filled with a marshy seasonal lake (see Figure 2.3 along the corridor where sites 3 and 21 are marked). This pass connected Gurgum to the valleys further south, through which caravans would pass as they moved from Mesopotamia to Anatolia, the Mediterranean, the Levant, and Egypt. If caravan traffic intended to travel north toward the central Anatolian plateau, it could either proceed away from Gurgum by crossing the Amanus Mountains, following the road toward Cilicia along the coast before crossing the plain and the mountains; or it could proceed toward Gurgum along the lowland road that rose gently through Gurgum before climbing into a Taurus Mountain pass that was open only during warm seasons (access runs through the corridor where site 178 is located; see Figure 2.3); or it could turn northward up the Euphrates River valley, which lay east of Gurgum. From late fall to early spring, the jagged edges of snow-capped mountains would be visible on the northern edge of Gurgum, where high, snow-clogged passes sealed the kingdom off from the Anatolian plateau and other points north for several months each year. The modern city of Kahramanmaraş, also a locus of ancient occupation, lies at ca. 700 meters above sea level in a bay of low hills from which rise the high Taurus peaks. The



**Figure 2.3.** Map showing the Kahramanmaraş and Sakçegözü region and the location of significant, strategically located Iron Age sites

modern city, located in these low foothills of the Taurus Mountains, receives very light snowfall. A mere 300–400 meters higher in these hills, at ca. 1,000 meters above sea level, there is considerable winter snowfall and in summer the climate is breezy and much cooler than on the sweltering valley floor. Travelers moving northward through the Kahramanmaraş valley leave the southern Mediterranean climate at the beginning of their trip at the southern foot of the valley and reach the upland Anatolian plateau climate once they pass the city of Maraş at the head of the valley.

The rivers that cross the valley were another issue for travel. The north-eastern part of the valley lies on one side of the Aksu River while the southern portion of the valley lies on the other side. The Ceyhan River crosses the valley just south of the modern city of Kahramanmaraş. In ancient times when the rivers drained the heavy snowmelt rushing out of the surrounding mountains, fording them would have been difficult at best and flooding would have made river crossings impossible at times. An ill-timed storm during the spring melt could leave low-lying sites in the landscape completely inundated. It is clear that floods were not uncommon in the region. Corona satellite photography has shown, for example, that the Aksu River has flowed variously on both sides of a very tall ancient mound, Gecit Höyük (KM 63, see Figure 2.3), no doubt as a result of such flood episodes. The prevention of natural catastrophes was a concern of kings at this time, as is attested in Neo-Assyrian sources. Assyrian scholars used the means at their disposal to identify impending catastrophes, including augury, while rulers might manipulate the landscape, for instance through canalization, and attempt to deflect catastrophic events, such as a flood, through the use of efficacious ritual (Radner 2009: 227; 2000: 241).

While such seasonal obstacles tended to enhance the security of the region against military incursion, a periodically blocked pass or river crossing also exacted a high cost in terms of trade. The most well-traveled regional roads—and thus the lucrative toll revenues they generated—avoided Gurgum because of the region's unreliability and ran instead through adjoining kingdoms, unless situations elsewhere deteriorated as Balkan (1957), for example, has documented in the Old Assyrian period. Nonetheless, Gurgum had a certain wealth of its own: it was a well-watered region dotted with towns, farmsteads, and villages.<sup>3</sup> While other areas might suffer drought, Gurgum's problem was getting water off its swampy land and controlling the floods of the two rivers that snaked through the valley. Textual evidence from the Assyrians tells us that Gurgum's wealth included animals on the hoof, and not only goats and sheep but perhaps also elephants.<sup>4</sup> The Assyrians reported both elephant skins and ivory as products of Gurgum and both would have constituted a

source of prestige and wealth during Gurgum's period of independence. The kingdom's autonomy as a somewhat isolated mountain-ringed valley ruled by local kings lasted from the collapse of the Hittite Empire until Gurgum was absorbed into the western provinces of Assyria under a locally installed Assyrian governor, during the reign of Sargon II in the eighth century BCE (Hawkins 1989: 431–32).

### *Assyrian Expansion toward Gurgum*

For the Neo-Assyrian Empire (ninth–seventh centuries BCE), the process of expansion and conquest is well-known and well-described, due to archaeological research at Assyrian period sites and from the visual and textual displays of conquest and domination created by the Assyrians themselves (for example, see Lamprichs 1995a, 1995b; Lanfranchi 2005; Liverani 1988; Parker 2001; Tadmor 1975, 1994; Winter 1981, 1983; Yamada 2000). During the ninth century, the Assyrian westward expansion gained particular momentum. Ashurnasirpal II (883–859 BCE) invited all the rulers of the region to a classic week-long event of elite feasting and prestige display in the new palace he had built in northern Iraq, at Kalhu/Nimrud. The inscription that describes this event shows that the Assyrians were able to gather a vast array of resources from their landscape, to be consumed both visually (as in wall reliefs on the palace walls) and physically (as food and drink) at this event, to which all the kings in the surrounding territories were invited. The ruler of Gurgum attended, and he may have felt like a fly visiting the spider that was fixing to ensnare him. The inscription made by Ashurnasirpal II in commemoration of this event displays Assyrian knowledge of the constituent polities of Syria and Anatolia and thus of their landscape, including Gurgum, a kingdom that had never appeared in any of this king's previous inscriptions. Assyrian representation of the targeted landscape was an active field for imperial propaganda. During the first millennium BCE, Assyrian politico-economic relations with the western polities increasingly were characterized by tribute-gathering. When battle seemed futile or when resistance failed to stymie the Assyrian advance, the targeted kings in the west might pay off the Assyrians. This rationalization of tribute by rulers in the west was couched in explicitly positive terms by Kilamuwa, who stated in *KAI* 24 that he hired the Assyrians as mercenaries (Donner and Röllig 1973; O'Connor 1977; Lipiński 2000; Yamada 2000: 199; Brown 2008). For vassal rulers, the Assyrian expansion was a bitter pill to swallow and the tribute was a heavy burden, but this arrangement at least left them in place to fight another day. As we know well from Liverani's work on the el-Amarna period communication strategies, internally-directed

reports of foreign relations were often structured with a good deal of what in modern terms we would call “spin”: that is, as a presentation intended to make a less-than-glowing reality more palatable to a home audience. Still, the strategy adopted by Gurgum was a good deal more than just “spin doctoring” by a few kings: rather it is better characterized as both a royal and nonroyal strategy of resistance against Assyria, achieved by marking the landscape in self-consciously non-Assyrian ways. Neighboring kingdoms around Gurgum either were not doing this or at least did not adopt these strategies to the same extent.

In the ninth century BCE, soon after the king of Gurgum attended the great banquet of Ashurnasirpal II, the Assyrians began to implement various strategies to advance their interests in the west. The previously attenuated, low-level Assyrian interest in Gurgum turned aggressive as Assyria’s westward expansion gained momentum. Eventually, the Assyrian king Sargon II deposed the local dynast and replaced the local kings of Gurgum (who had been co-opted into Assyrian vassalage decades before) with a newly-installed governor who resided at Marqas (now Kahramanmaraş) within the kingdom of Gurgum.<sup>5</sup> The establishment of efficient administrative and military structures became a particular focus of Tiglath Pileser III and Sargon II in their efforts to build and then maintain the Assyrian Empire. This required exploitation of the conquered periphery, which was ever more depleted of its human and economic resources due to Assyrian demands for tribute (Liverani 2001: 387). It is in this context that we find a pattern among the texts of the ruling Gurgumians that shows them to be mobilizing both a concrete and a symbolic defense of their kingdom and of their right to exist in an increasingly Assyrianized landscape.

### *The Kinglist*

A clear example of these local defensive efforts mounted by the kings of Gurgum is found in the new emphasis that is placed on the depth of the dynastic ties to the kingdom. This was done through the creation of a new text type during the ninth century: the extended kinglist. I have detailed this process elsewhere (Dodd 2002, 2005) so I will merely note briefly that during the course of the ninth century, the local rulers of Gurgum presented far more elaborate genealogies than they had previously. At the opening of the ninth century, they employed what had been the standard-length presentation during Hittite times, namely what might be termed the father-grandfather formula. By mid-century, following the banquet just mentioned, the kings begin to employ four-generation kinglists, and by the end of the ninth century—on



the monumental lion MARAŞ 1 (see Figure 2.2)—the rulers went so far as to enlist and cite *six* generations of ancestral kings, essentially the whole remembered dynastic line. It is not hard to conclude that this impulse to extend a ruler's pedigree farther into the past was related to a sense of insecurity and strife experienced in the present.

### *Royal Landscape Topos*

A second component of the royal assertion of the legitimacy of local rule was the public display of inscriptions that emphasized dedication to kingdom and territory. Territorial control was essential to preserving existing land rights and to protecting the all-important human capital and other resources, such as income-producing trade. Toward the end of the eleventh century and into the early tenth century BCE, during a period before Assyria became a serious threat to Gurgum, the ruler of Gurgum monumentalized his claims on a statue, MARAŞ 8 (see Figure 2.4). There he says, “I am Laramas,



Figure 2.4. MARAŞ 8

Astu-wara-manzas's grandson, Muwa-talis's son. When from my river-land the houses . . . burned down, I found Gurgum the river land waste. . . . For the city I planted out vineyards, I filled granary on granary . . . I called forth the gods to the river" (Hawkins 2000: 253).

For the purpose of our discussion, three features are noteworthy in this inscription. First, there is a reference to houses. This is an incomplete inscription, only partially preserved, but it is clear that the topic of the first sentence is houses within the kingdom ruled by Laramas. The king therefore was drawing his audience's attention to this fundamental concern of his citizens: their houses, the places where they were sheltered and around which their livelihoods and life activities revolved, and where gathered the social group, whether kin-based or otherwise constituted. The house was the locus within the landscape that structured the communal lives of small social groups on an everyday basis; its mention invokes both a fixed point in people's conception of space and the totality of their lived experience and memory there. The importance of the house as a "controlling metaphor and symbol of political order and authority" has been well-documented cross-culturally in pre-industrial societies globally (Johnson 2007: 157; Joyce and Gillespie 2000). The house (for those who habitually live in houses) remains a fixed point in one's conception of space and the rest of the world tends to be organized in relation to it (Bollnow 1963: 58; Lefebvre 1991). Even more importantly, the house serves as a locus of memory, as a lens through which people's recollections of the lived past are refracted and remembered (Stabile 2004; Humphrey 2005). A related corollary is that people may become attached to the places in which they are currently living, so that when Laramas mentioned people's houses he was calling to mind the people's attachment to the place he ruled as king, as well as to their memories of the place, memories that might have been constructed or structured in relation to a physical place in which their daily social relations had been situated (Altman and Low 1992; Smith 2011: 419). By making reference first to houses, Laramas was able to claim credit for the stated action (what he did in relation to the houses) and was also able to engage the audience's memory of what might be termed the "before-Laramas" situation, as opposed to the improved life they will experience in the "during-and-after-Laramas" situation. So the mention of the house, a small part of the larger landscape, evokes memories of personal connection, of attachment to place, and of a personal investment or benefit from the actions of this king as described on this monument. Hence, the king addressed the core component of the citizens' allegiance, parsing his kingdom up into the minute conceptual

units (houses) relevant for those who resided in it, the people whose loyalty he sought to reinforce.

Next, Laramas shifts to a larger scale engagement with the lived-in environment, to the level of widely perceptible and highly valued vineyards (which might typically cover a portion of a hillside). By laying out vineyards, he was investing in the future, since vineyards develop over years. Through these actions, he claimed credit for an act that improved the prosperity and quality of life in his kingdom, for its citizens (Green 2010). Laramas continued by describing actions, presumably agricultural, which produced surpluses to fill granaries. The spatial scale of action has increased yet again, so that his loyal subjects are encouraged to envision whole sections of the valley covered in a blanket of dry-farmed wheat in a fertile valley.

Finally, Laramas moved to the scale of regional watercourses and even to the cosmic realm of the gods who, by virtue of being called by the king to the river that flowed through the land, would attend to it and ensure that the water flowed steadily but without danger of flood, and that all that should happen in a well-functioning world would come to pass. The implication here is that this king through his effective measures would triumph over this landscape and its potential to be overwhelmed by unruly, uncivilized, and uncontrollable elements; as such, this motif might be considered a version of the *Chaoskampf* (Wyatt 1996: 118–34). Linking these traditional gods to a place was a powerful act of transformation. Such an association might be reified either through a monument or through ritual performance, such as Laramas's invocation of the gods.


The presentation of the landscape as a conceptual topos in Gurgum's royal inscriptions intensifies in the ninth century, the period during which Assyria's aggressive moves in the west become visible to us and, indeed, visible to the local population. In the mid-ninth century, Halparuntiyas II gives an account of his deeds on behalf of his kingdom and territory on a sculpted monument known as MARAŞ 4 (see Figure 2.5). Here we see the ruler inscribed permanently within the three-dimensional body of a god. Halparuntiyas II says that he smote the city of Hirika and that he erected a Storm God in that year. Further, he "captured the city Iluwasi . . . and cut off the feet of the men, made the children eunuchs, and thereby exalted himself." The details of these practices are singular in the corpus of inscriptions from Gurgum. They resonate with a brutality and a level of detail that is more commonly associated with the military strategy and elite propaganda of Assyrian kings, whose terror tactics induced many rulers to submit rather than be subjected to the anticipated harsh treatment (Saggs 1963; Miller 2009). By implication, the inscription



Figure 2.5. MARAŞ 4

implies that this king himself was a formidable enemy, a fact underscored by citing his own actions in and around the borders of his kingdom. He also depicts himself as an agent of one of the most important local deities: he is shown speaking on a monumental statue of the Storm God and his own royal image is merged with that of the god in the sculpture.

By the late ninth century, in the ISKENDERUN inscription (Figure 2.6), the topos of improving the landscape and the fortunes of the people living in that landscape returns in even greater detail. Laramas dedicated a millstone and a granary, which he then filled with 4,400 measures of grain. The local king thus displays his largesse by referring to the stored wealth he had created



**Figure 2.6.** ISKENDERUN

within the boundaries of his kingdom, by building and provisioning this new granary. Such a building would have had a dual purpose: to bolster the king's prestige and also potentially to stockpile grain against the possibility of attack or siege.

At the very end of the ninth century, on the latest preserved royal inscription made by a ruler of Gurgum (see Figure 2.2), a king again refers to the landscape as the beneficiary of his energies. Halparuntiyas III says that "he settled the empty/desolate places and benefited the settlements by Tarhunza's and Ea's authority."<sup>6</sup> The two parts of this inscription deserve separate attention. The first part of the inscription states that the royal task was to settle the empty/desolate places. Clearly, the trope invoked here is that unused land was less productively employed (if it was employed at all) before Halparuntiyas's reign. In other words, the underlying idea is one of positive exploitation of the landscape, for which the king is eager to claim credit. Additional settlements further imply that there was an increase in population and a possible increase in agricultural production.

In the second portion of the statement, Halparuntiyas specifically mentions that these settlements are being given benefits (possibly support in the form of rations or building materials?) as a reflex of the authority of two local

gods. Rather than invoking the king's own agency and authority, he invokes that of the deities Ea and Tarhunza. The emphasis on divine sanction for the support of these particular settlements distinguishes this inscription from other instances in which a Gurgumean king engages in a beneficial act for his subjects. The lack of such statements by other Gurgumean kings may be either an accident of preservation or a multi-generational preference in this dynasty. Perhaps the underlying divine support for acts committed by kings was beyond stating in Gurgum because it was so widely understood that "nothing could happen without divine consent or intervention" (Liverani 2001: 380). Unless this pattern is a mere accident of preservation, then it is worthwhile considering the additional implications of this statement and whether the real topic of the inscription is indeed the good things that the king says he did. The king's clearly stated reliance on the gods' authority raises the specter that there is some aspect of these settlements that was negatively marked to the subjects of this kingdom or for the king himself. If we understand this recourse to divine authority as a means of seeking divine legitimacy for an unpopular royal action, then the inscription has some subtle aspects of an apology, explaining why the king allowed these settlements at all and, moreover, why he provided direct support to benefit them.

To explore this interpretation more fully, we have recourse to contemporary archaeological data, architectural, and historical data for this royal inscription. The creation of new settlements would not be an unexpected event during this period in the Iron Age. People were settling new areas, increasing the number of settlements and enlarging established ones in the Kahramanmaraş Valley and also regionally (for example, see Yener et al. 2000; Schwartz et al. 2000; Blaylock et al. 1990; Killebrew and Lehmann 2008). The archaeological survey undertaken by Elizabeth Carter supports the idea that the population increased from the ninth century BCE onward. My analysis of the ceramic data and settlement patterns identifies nearly 37 percent more sites in the Middle Iron Age than had existed during the Late Bronze Age and 24 percent more hectares occupied (Dodd 2012).

The archaeological survey does not make clear why this increase occurred, but a number of interpretations are possible. This region may have been able to absorb people who were moving from environmentally more marginal areas. This valley is unusually well-supplied with water and supported several significant increases in population in premodern times. But, if this were the case, the apologetic recourse to the authority of the two gods, Ea and Tarhunza, would seem to be superfluous. Another possible interpretation is that people were forcibly being moved and redistributed across the landscape,

as deportees from other areas. The deportation and exiling of populations was a well-documented strategy that the Assyrians employed in order to undermine potential indigenous resistance. As a tool, deportation supported the Assyrian desire to settle more aggressively the landscapes under their control; it helped diffuse rebellion by removing troublemakers to distant lands, cutting them off from their ties to land, to long-cultivated resources, and to networks. Deportees could be moved into areas where, for Assyrian purposes, they could better exploit the agricultural potential of underutilized regions (Gallagher 1994; Oded 1979). The Assyrians boasted of this practice and proudly depicted deportees in royal mural sculptures. The pattern of intensifying settlement densities has been documented to the east of the Euphrates across northern Syria during the Neo Assyrian period. There, most of the interstices between settlements were filled in with new villages and farming communities (Wilkinson and Barbanes 2000; Wilkinson and Tucker 1995; Liverani 1988; Parker 2001). A similar process that included the support of deportees into the 'Agig region in northeastern Syria, a landscape targeted for settlement intensification, occurred during the ninth and eighth centuries BCE (Pfälzner 1993). An eighth-century BCE letter survives from an unnamed administrator in Marqas, who writes Sargon II about provisions for the 160 deportees from the Upper Khabur region who have just arrived; the king had told him "you will settle them in Marqasa."<sup>7</sup> When children and others are factored in with this group of 160 persons, this would be equivalent to the population of a decent-sized agricultural village. If Halparuntiyas's inscription refers obliquely to this kind of situation, in which population resettlement and territorial reapportionment were forced on him by the Assyrians, this would be a stark reality indeed. In that case, this inscription is one in which the king refers to his action in the landscape to show his activity and volition to his constituents in a traditional arena (making new settlements and supporting them), but the underlying motivation for benefiting the settlements might have been forced on him by the Assyrians. Hence, he describes the places as having been empty or desolate rather than stating that he established new settlements with no additional information. The explicit description of the newly settled areas as empty or desolate might imply they were underutilized areas that could beneficially be converted into newly productive agricultural lands. Alternatively, it is possible that the settlements were mentioned as being established in an empty or desolate area because this refers to some manner of wasteland that had not been previously settled for some reason. Such an area might have been difficult to irrigate or to farm, or it might have been prone to occasional flooding. In other words, by specifically using the modifier "desolate/empty",

the king suggests that the quality of this settlement location is at issue. An audience that knew the local environment well might have understood this subtext, while a visiting Assyrian official might not.

The architectural context of this inscription also is significant. The MARAŞ 1 lion probably stood at a citadel or palace gate, a place typically replete with iconographic and architectural elements that are meant to remind viewers that the power of the ruler remains intact and potent. We know that similar lions stood at other gates and citadels in the region, including the two examples shown in Figure 2.7, the first from ‘Ain Dara and the second from Malatya.



**Figure 2.7.** Lion statues found in ‘Ain Dara and Malatya



On the backs of these lions are plinths or attachments that are analogous to the one carved on the MARAŞ 1 lion (see Figure 2.2). In such a context, the elements of the inscription should be considered to have been deliberate and reflective of nuanced ideas that could be communicated on multiple levels to different audiences (Marcus 1995).

Halparuntiyas commissioned this inscription in a world where such monuments certainly could have addressed and been seen by multiple audiences, both local and foreign. He was a local ruler of Gurgum with a home constituency but he also served as a vassal ruler beholden to the Assyrians. An analogous tension has been well-documented in the bilingual Tell Fekeriye inscription in which slightly different wording is used to describe the ruler in the local Aramaean dialect while more deferential language is employed in the Assyrian version (Abou-Assaf et al. 1982). In the case of the MARAŞ 1 inscription, which is inscribed only in Luwian, if an Assyrian were to read or have the inscription read, the message would be that the king had acted in accordance with the direct command of the palace and had settled and supported the newly located people. If a local person were to read or have the inscription read, the impression would be that the king was not acting as a puppet of the Assyrians but rather that he acted with the sanction of the great local gods, doing something appropriate to a powerful and autonomous king rather than a provincial governor under the thumb of a superior imperial power. Until additional data comes to light, it is possible only to point out that it is this king, Halparuntiyas, who felt compelled to pair this deed with the longest kinglist ever seen in Gurgum. This innovation served to draw attention toward his storied family past and away from the present inglorious state of political affairs.

In all these examples, the monuments erected by royalty in Gurgum can be shown to reflect a high degree of intention. The inscriptions refer to specific arenas in which the kings of Gurgum sought to demonstrate their efficacy and their sanction to rule. In addition, the choices made by these kings in their inscriptions reflect their understandable need to remain relevant to their subjects, to continue the use of non-Assyrian languages in inscriptions, to stay in power, and to hold the Assyrians at bay even as tensions and demands increased. The prestige of Assyria was resisted by Gurgumians in highly visible—if somewhat covert—ways, and as noted previously, this was done to an extent not seen among most of Gurgum's neighbors. In particular, stylistic choices indicative of political choices of affiliation and avenues of prestige provide a window onto the evolving nature of resistance to Assyria in its western expansion. A detail of the Incirli stele found by the UCLA survey team is

shown (Figure 2.8, top). This monument has been dated on internal criteria to the mid-eighth-century BCE reign of Tiglath Pileser III (Kaufman 2007). On this monument, a neighbor of the Gurgummeans, Awarikku, shows himself in the manner of an Assyrian. The prestige of Assyria is broadcast in his style of dress and posture, and even in the use of the Neo-Assyrian language in the inscription. This monument is an artifact of submission. In contrast, in the MARAŞ 1 inscription dating as late as ca. 800 BCE (Figure 2.8, bottom), Halparuntiyas III still uses Luwian alone (with no bilingual translation, whether Phoenician, Aramaean, or Assyrian). The image that is inset into the lion's mane may have been carved when the monument was commissioned or it may be a later addition carved into the mane where it would not interrupt the text. The image is an anthropomorphic figure, perhaps either the dead, deified king or a god, standing atop a bull or a roaring lion. This image is rooted in the traditional, local, non-Assyrian representational modes. Here on this lion's mane, the artisan engraved and thereby intended to document for all time an image reflecting solidarity with the past, which was the only stable platform left to these rulers as they looked toward an uncertain future. This monument is the last preserved monumental text authored by a king of Gurgum. In more than one hundred years of archaeological inquiry, we have thus far failed to locate any later monument created by the local rulers of this kingdom: one may



**Figure 2.8.** Top: Detail of In-cirli Inscription, photographed by Bruce Zuckerman, and used by courtesy of West Semitic Research Project. Bottom: Detail of figure on shoulder of MARAŞ 1 lion statue

therefore draw the conclusion that the indigenous rulers ceased to create monuments of their own from that time forward. This does not mean that all resistance collapsed. Instead, it is just at this point that a strategy of resistance centered in the landscape is adapted into the private realm.

### *Nonroyal Resistance in the Landscape*

Even though royal monumental inscriptions cease in Gurgum at the end of the ninth century, ca. 800 BCE, private, nonroyal inscriptions continue to be produced and may even become more common (Figures 2.9–2.11), although confident dating of these inscriptions is problematic (Aro 2003: 294ff). Traditional stylistic and presentation conventions continue in use in the nonroyal realm as they had persisted until the end in the royal domain of monumental commissions. It is clear that nonroyal individuals or families populated the landscape with stone monuments erected to the memory of their gods and also to themselves, asserting their identity and their traditions (see Figure 2.10). Most of these monuments were funerary, although some were simply dedications to gods. Some refer to gods who have answered a supplicant's prayer and in return receive various offerings in thanks such as nine oxen or three yearling sheep or eighty measures of barley. Some nonroyal funerary monuments, such as the KARABURÇLU inscription (see Figure 2.11), depict funerary repasts. Such monuments may have been placed in or around sacred enclosures, or in areas set aside for funerary activity. This had the effect of sacralizing portions of the landscape, setting aside particular places for the giving of offerings and as cemeteries marked with special monuments (Bradley 1998). These monuments allowed people to express not only their personal identities (the identity of the depicted persons along with their patron god) but also other forms of collective identity, such as those organized through political or social structures, perhaps associations at the level of a kingdom or family (Bonatz 2000: 161–67). Such monuments are found five times more often in Gurgum than in other kingdoms.

Assyrian rulers depicted mimetic details of the conquered populations, their fortifications, and their cities, displaying them prominently for their home audiences and for visitors to their palaces. The representation of cultural difference and exotic landscapes and buildings presented an opportunity for the Assyrians visually to depict repeated triumph. A given triumph did not occur on a *tabula rasa* on which a new imperial history would be written (Johnson 2007: 189) but rather demonstrated Assyrian superiority over whatever existing version of civilization awaited the Assyrian juggernaut in the targeted territory. Assyrian interests lay in the conversion of otherness to Assyrian-ness, in



Figure 2.9. MARAŞ 2




Figure 2.10. MARAŞ 9



Figure 2.11. KARABURÇLU

the promotion of all things Assyrian as ways and avenues to prestige. We can see this process underway in Gurgum and neighboring regions as Assyrian modes of dress and presentation on monuments increase through the eighth century (see MARAŞ 1 and Incirli in Figure 2.8). From the perspective of the Assyrians tasked with administering the imperial project, the adoption of Assyrian-ness implied complicity, compliance, and, most importantly for the Assyrians, loyalty. From the perspective of the population living in the targeted region, that conversion might have been equated with an attempt to exorcise their traditions, including connections to their ancestors and the places and moments of human–god interface, which were links to the past that enabled a sustaining future. By being in the landscape themselves as people and by populating the landscape with permanent images on funerary monuments, the residents created nodes of communal practice that resisted the erasure of local, cultural distinctiveness and thus pushed back against Assyrian imperial expansion. The funerary and offering monuments erected by nonroyal residents in and around Gurgum show the population to be persisting in its local traditions, active in the landscape, and resisting assimilation to new Assyrian

cultural norms for a period of time by populating the Assyrian-conquered territory with stone images of themselves and with proof of their gods' actions, for which they willingly gave tribute (Evans 1985). Eventually the production of these private monuments ceased as well, and we are only able to guess why. One possible reason is that the mode of resistance that they represented was no longer essential to the population. Indeed, during the seventh-century BCE, Assyria's grip on this territory began to slip; eventually the Assyrian Empire dissolved as its capital was overrun and its government collapsed.

The rulers of Gurgum had referred to their actions in the landscape in order to display their good stewardship of the kingdom and their continued authority in the face of the Assyrian aggression. By siting their monuments in numerous places across the landscape, the people of Gurgum were emulating and continuing a strategy their rulers had begun. Even though local rulers had been stripped of their legitimacy, other traditional social and religious structures could be maintained in the face of the Assyrian onslaught, at least for a time. Private monuments expressed association with socially important groups through shared ritual action honoring ancestors and gods, which might be undertaken by individuals, by families, or by other groups (Halbwachs 1938 [1955], 1941; Marcel and Mucchielli 1999). In these contexts, people did not adopt Assyrian conventions of representation and language in their monuments. They resisted the total seizure and conversion of their landscape by the Assyrians, showing themselves to be determined in this moment of crisis and transition not to be marginalized and cast aside as the refuse of history (Wolf 1992, 1998; Marcus 2003).

This production of monumental sculpture must have been preceded by a sense of local identity that these people were making an effort to maintain. By erecting these private monuments in the landscape as their rulers before them had done, the people's identity was linked to a meaning engendered by belonging to a local, non-Assyrian group. These material productions were acts of association to land, home, and family, similar to the ideas invoked by King Laramas when he opened the inscription on MARAŞ 4 with an invocation to people's houses. These associations had a past and a future that were not coterminous with the Assyrian view of its imperial destiny or service to the Assyrian supreme god Assur (Crumley 1999: 271). In the Assyrian-targeted landscape of Gurgum, these nonroyal funerary monuments were an assertion of resistance, piety, remembrance, and solidarity that transformed this corner of the Assyrian Empire into a *lieu de mémoire*, a permanent commemoration of Gurgum's former independence (see Nora 1984, 2001; Nora and Kritzman 1996).

## NOTES

1. All translations of Luwian language inscriptions in this chapter are derived from Hawkins 2000, with one exception: see n. 6 below. For Luwian monuments, see bibliography in Hawkins 2000; for Karatepe, see Çambel 1998; for the Incirli inscription, see Kaufman 2007; and for additional preliminary information posted by Elizabeth Carter, Steven Kaufman, and Bruce Zuckerman, see the following websites: “Unveiling the Past: The Incirli Trilingual Inscription,” <http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/arc/incirli/index.htm> (accessed 3 September 2012); “The Incirli Stela: A Preliminary Report on the Incirli Stela by Elizabeth Carter,” <http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/nelc/stelasite/stelainfo.html> (accessed 3 September 2012). For the Cineköy inscription, see Lanfranchi 2005; Lemaire and Tekoğlu 2000.

2. Like most monuments from Gurgum, MARAŞ 1 came into a museum collection without excavated provenience. Though this is unfortunate, even devoid of context it has been accepted as an authentic, ancient product; and its material form, its presumed place of installation, and its inscription are informative. MARAŞ 1 is labeled first in the series though it is neither the oldest one known from Gurgum nor the first one to be discovered. Rather, it was numbered in a scheme developed by W. Orthmann in his study of Neo-Hittite monuments. See Orthmann 1971. Inscribed monuments continue to be found in this region, see note 1 above, and in adjacent areas. For an example in Zincirli’s outer town, see Schloen and Fink 2009.

3. For a general characterization of the settlement patterns, see Dodd 2002, 2005, 2012.

4. Elephant bones were found in the southeastern part of the valley near the Gavur Gölü. These elephant bones are now located in the Ankara Museum. Other bones, possibly elephant or mammoth, are located in the Kahramanmaraş Müzesi. Gurgum, the Iron Age kingdom located in this valley, appears in Assyrian tribute lists as offering ivory and also elephant skins (Lamprichs 1995a). It is likely that various parts of northern Syria provided viable habitat for such animals. They are certainly known to have lived in the Orontes Valley and the Amuq, and bones of elephants have been found at Kinet Höyük (Salima Ikram, pers. comm. 2001 and Ikram 2003). A fragment of an elephant-shaped vessel or figurine was found during excavations at Zincirli in Hilani I (probably destroyed during the early seventh-century BCE reign of Esarhaddon); see Andrae 1943: 68, figs. 80–81, pl. 35a, b; Moorey 1999: 118.

5. Tadmor 1994: Ann. 13\*:12; Ann. 27:5; St. I B:25\*, 38\*; Summ. 7:r.8; Ann. 3:5; St. IIIA:18; Ann. 17:4\*; Ann. 21:9\*; Summ. 7:45; St. I B:42\*; St. II B:14\*; T. I B:41\*. Parpola 1987: 257:12; 124:24, r.18, r.2; 253:6.

6. The translation of (“VACUUS”) *ta-na-ta-* as “empty/desolate” represents a revision of the translation used in Hawkins 2000, where “devastated” appears. I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this alternative translation. It is worth noting that the concept of the translation “devastated” also supports the interpretation offered here. In that case, we might consider what the agent of the devastation in the landscape might have been. Flood or earthquake would be natural agents of devastation. Alternatively, a part of a territory might be devastated by an attack from without, either by a belligerent neighbor or by the Assyrians. If the latter choice, an attack, were the agent of the devastation, then the invocation of divine authority by the king is even more necessary, as a deflection of attention from royal vulnerability to divine initiative. The general topos of movement into a problematic landscape transcends this particular historical instance and was used by contemporary kings, including the Assyrians who similarly inscribed their presence in stone in this region (Harmanşah 2012: 70).

7. KUR.mar-qa-si tu-ša-ās-kan-šu-nu. Translation and transcription from Parpola 1987: 257, ll.12–13.

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CHAPTER 3

# REVENGE OF THE KUSHITES

## ASSIMILATION AND RESISTANCE IN EGYPT'S NEW KINGDOM EMPIRE AND NUBIAN ASCENDANCY OVER EGYPT

STUART TYSON SMITH

UPON THEIR CONQUEST OF EGYPT IN CA. 728 BCE, THE NAPATAN rulers and key elites of the Nubian Kingdom of Kush show a strong emulation of Egypt. In particular, the new Nubian pharaohs adopted all the trappings of pharaonic kingship. As a result, Egyptologists have tended to attribute Napata's rise to power not through local agency but as a process driven by an Egyptian or Egyptianized remnant of the old New Kingdom colony, which lasted from ca. 1502–1070 BCE, or alternatively to a new wave of acculturation driven by renewed contact with Egypt around 800 BCE. This assimilative acculturation model<sup>1</sup> was informed by a combination of analogy with northern (Lower) Nubia, where a heavy imperial intervention promoting widespread acculturation is well documented, and Napatan royal ideology, which portrays the Twenty-fifth Dynasty Nubian rulers as the restorers of Egyptian tradition in decadent times. This view continues in more recent general surveys of Egypt, such as David (1988: 28), who asserts of southern (Upper) Nubia that “like many outposts, this area was more ‘Egyptian’ than Egypt.”

The explanatory capacity of acculturation models such as those used for Nubia has increasingly been found wanting and rejected in favor of a more complex constellation of contact situations with varying degrees of domination, resistance, and adaptation (for example, Bishop 1984; Dietler 1990; Helms 1992; Rogers 1990; Stern 1982; Wells 1992; Jones 1997; Deagan

1998). Similarly, the straightforward cultural assimilation assumed in the idea of Romanization and Hellenization have increasingly come under scrutiny and are being replaced with more nuanced interaction-based models (for example, Alcock 2005; Van Dommelen 2002, 2005). Dietler (2010) in particular notes that alien material culture and practices introduced during colonial encounters like the one discussed here can be accepted, adapted, ignored, or outright rejected through an active process of intercultural consumption rather than a unidirectional passive acceptance of alien traits from a dominant donor. Morkot (1995), Yellin (1995), Török (1998), and the present author (S. Smith 1998) have argued that the development of the Napatan state was driven by internal factors and a deliberate strategy of adaptation that co-opted and modified Egyptian ideology to suit Nubian sensibilities. Instead of seeing the Kingdom of Kush as a straightforward survival of an Egyptianized society established during the New Kingdom Empire or a newly Egyptianized kingdom created by a post-New Kingdom influx of Egyptians, this paper examines the rise of these Nubian pharaohs as part of a process cultural entanglement and native opposition to the Egyptian occupation by assessing assimilation along with three basic means of resistance (Scott 1985): open rebellion, ethnic solidarity, and ultimately a strategy that co-opted the dominant Egyptian ideology to serve their own ends.

## BACKGROUND

Relations between Egypt, Lower Nubia, and Upper Nubia varied over time, shifting between Egyptian and Nubian dominance (Figure 3.1; see Trigger 1976; Adams 1977; Zibelius-Chen 1988, 1989; Williams 1991; Bonnet 1990, 1991; O'Connor 1991, 1993; Säve-Söderbergh 1989; Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991; Morkot 1987, 1995; Török 1995, 1997; Yellin 1995; Smith 1995, 2003a; Welsby 1996; Edwards 2004). As the Egyptians expanded into Lower Nubia around 2000 BCE, the increasingly complex and centralized society of the Kerma culture engaged in a thriving trade with Egypt. Two or perhaps three large polities eventually combined into an extensive state with a large urban center located at the third cataract of the Nile. By around 1680 BCE, they had expanded their control into Egypt's former colony in Lower Nubia, where the local C-Group and Egyptian expatriates alike acknowledged the Ruler of Kush as suzerain. (C-Group refers to the culture that appears in Lower Nubia around 2300 BCE, lasting until a generation or so after the Egyptian reconquest of Lower Nubia around 1550 BCE.)<sup>2</sup> Egyptians put an end to the Kerma state in ca. 1502 BCE, ruling both Lower and Upper Nubia during the New Kingdom. In Lower Nubia, they deliberately adopted



**Figure 3.1.** Map of Egypt and Nubia with sites mentioned in the text.

a policy of assimilative acculturation, co-opting local rulers of the indigenous C-Group and eventually drawing the entire population into the Egyptian cultural sphere. In Upper Nubia, however, evidence suggests that local rulers were allowed to retain a measure of autonomy and maintained elements of their native culture inside a more hegemonic imperial system. The New Kingdom Empire collapsed in ca. 1070 BCE, and about 200 years later a strong ruler emerged at Napata, forming a new Kingdom of Kush. By ca. 728 BCE, the Napatans had conquered Egypt, portraying themselves as the

“saviors” of Egyptian civilization. The Napatan Kings of Kush became major players in Near Eastern politics, vying with the Neo-Assyrian Empire for a hundred years over control of Syro-Palestine. Assyrian king Assurbanipal conquered Egypt in ca. 657 BCE, but did not penetrate into Nubia, which survived as a unified state into the fourth century CE.

**Table 3.1:** Chronology

Egyptian Dynasty	Lower Nubia	Upper Nubia	Date
Middle Kingdom (11th–13th)	Egyptian Colony (C-Group)	Kerma State (Kingdom of Kush)	2050–1650
Second Intermediate Period (14th–17th)	Kerma Colony (C-Group)	Kerma State (Kingdom of Kush)	1650–1550
New Kingdom (18th–20th)	Territorial Egyptian Colony (Acculturation)	Hegemonic Egyptian Empire (Autonomy)	1550–1050
Third Intermediate Period (21st–24th)	Uncertain	Pre-Napata	1050–728
Napatan Dynasty (25th)	Napatan Colony	Napatan Kingdom (Nubian Pharaohs)	728–657

Keeping this historical overview in mind, I will now move on to consider strategies of resistance and dominance that allowed Nubian civilization to survive and eventually to conquer its conquerors: open rebellion and ethnic solidarity during the New Kingdom occupation, followed by a consideration of Egyptianization models versus a Napatan strategy of co-opting Egypt’s dominant ideology in order to turn the tables on their former overlords.

## OVERT REBELLION

In his study of peasant resistance, Scott (1985) points out that large-scale revolt is a risky strategy, since it inevitably provokes a strong military response. If a revolution fails, the result is death for the conspirators and a more repressive regime for those who remain behind. The same considerations apply to overt resistance by Nubians to the Egyptian New Kingdom occupation. The realities of Egyptian coercive power circumscribed Nubian strategies of resistance and adaptation. Egyptian monuments record several attempts by Nubians to overthrow Egypt’s colonial regime, each of which was met with overwhelming military force. Pharaoh Merenptah records a particularly brutal suppression of open rebellion (ca. 1219 BCE; Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 3–6):

The wild lion [Pharaoh] sent the hot blast of his mouth against the land of Wawat [Lower Nubia]. They were destroyed at once. There is no heir to their land, all having been brought to Egypt together. Their chiefs have been set on

fire in the presence of their supporters [or relatives?]. As for the rest, the hands of some were cut off because of their crimes; others, their ears and eyes were removed, taken back to Kush and made into heaps in their settlements. Never again will Kush repeat rebellion.

Overt rebellion was unsuccessful in Nubia because the Egyptians could project military force to the south in a relatively short amount of time due to the ease of travel along the Nile. In modern times, a small boat could travel from the First to Second Cataract in eight days under favorable conditions (H. Smith 1976: 83). Based upon ethnographic observations, Reisner (in Gunn 1929: 10) calculated that the trip from Upper Egypt (Edfu) to Kerma would take a small group only 13 to 16 days traveling partly on land and partly by water. A larger caravan might take from 20 to 30 days. Thus the Egyptians could move a small attack force almost instantly, while a larger army could reach the Nubian heartland within a month. Additionally, Egypt at around three million people could field a much larger army than Nubia's two hundred thousand could support (Trigger 1965: 17, 156–61; Butzer 1976: 81–98; Adams 1977: 45; O'Connor 1993: 15, 32).

### ETHNIC SOLIDARITY


In the absence of open rebellion, Scott (1985) notes that the dominated employ other less overt forms of resistance that do not directly threaten dominant interests. He argues that peasant resistance employs strategies that challenge the state while avoiding direct symbolic confrontation that might bring a brutal response. These activities tend to be decentralized, taking place as minor acts such as work slowdowns, satirical stories, and gossip. In our case, the creation and maintenance of ethnic solidarity would provide another potential strategy for resistance that would not necessarily overtly challenge Egyptian authority in Nubia. As noted above, Egyptologists have generally assumed that Nubians assimilated to Egyptian norms, effectively succumbing to Egyptian cultural dominance. This view is understandable given the strong archaeological evidence for assimilative acculturation in Lower Nubia. Fortunately for the archaeologist, however, Egyptian and Nubian material culture, architecture, and burial practice contrast dramatically. For example, Nubian pottery is entirely handmade during this period, while contemporary Egyptian pottery is almost exclusively wheel-thrown. Nubian burial practice presents another striking contrast. Deceased Nubians were placed under tumuli (round mounds) usually alone in simple ovoid pits in a flexed or fetal position. Egyptians were buried in rectilinear tombs, which

for the elite included small pyramids, often communally in underground chambers in a fully extended, usually supine, position. Egyptians sometimes also included a variety of specialized grave goods, including inscribed coffins, papyri, amulets, and figurines.

Both textual evidence and the large-scale archaeological pattern are clear: Nubian culture disappears in favor of Egyptian during the first decades of the New Kingdom occupation in what is usually seen as a deliberate Egyptian policy of assimilation (see, for example, Kemp 1978, 1997, and S. Smith 1995, 1997, who nevertheless offer contrasting views of the motivation behind this policy). Egyptian Nubian princes such as Hekanefer of Miam (Aniba) and Amenemhet and Djehutyhotep of Tehkhet (Serra) are depicted with all of the typical titles, costumes, and poses of an Egyptian official (Simpson 1963; Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 182–211). The tombs themselves adhere to Egyptian norms, as do the remnants of their grave goods. For example, Hekanefer had at least five ushabtis and specialized amulets, including a pectoral inscribed with the heart scarab text from the Book of the Dead (Simpson 1963: 14–15, pl. VII–IX),<sup>3</sup> and Amenemhet was provided with canopic jars, indicating that he received the most elaborate form of mummification. These Lower Nubian princes also played a central role in the civic life of nearby towns, originally founded as fortresses during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom occupation (ca. 2000–1850 BCE), for example leaving votive offerings in the local Egyptian temples. Were it not for their titles and the genealogies that they conveniently provide, Egyptologists might reasonably have assumed that they were bureaucrats sent from Egypt.

Säve-Söderbergh and Troy (1991) document how this pattern of assimilation extended down the social ladder at the cemetery of Fadrus, located in the Principality of Tehkhet (Figure 3.2). At the beginning of the New Kingdom, a small number of Egyptianized wealthy burials were accompanied by only a small number of lower-status burials that might represent subordinates or individuals otherwise attached to them. As time goes on, however, there is a more normal distribution of wealth among the Egyptianized burials with large proportions of lower-status burials, but a comparable number of wealthy ones. This pattern indicates that assimilation was top-down, starting with the princes and wealthier members of society and spreading from there to the general population (S. Smith 1998). There is a decline in wealth during the final phase of the cemetery, which may represent the concentration of the affluent in the Egyptian colonial centers and/or a general impoverishment of the rural population as Nubian society and economy were brought more into line with those of Egypt (Trigger 1965: 112; Kemp 1978: 39–43; Morkot 1987: 38–39).





**Figure 3.2.** Distribution of wealth and Egyptian style burials over time in the Lower Nubian cemetery at Fadrus.


Säve-Söderbergh and Troy (1991) quite reasonably offer one caveat, arguing that the paucity of specialized Egyptian grave goods may indicate that the imitation of Egyptian burial forms was superficial; this reasoning was taken up by Török 1997, 2009; and Morkot 1995. In reaching this conclusion, they follow conventional Egyptological wisdom, according to which specialized items like the Book of the Dead, ushabti figurines, heart scarabs, and full mummification, including the separate mummification of the internal organs and their placement in special canopic jars, were essential components of an Egyptian burial. I have argued elsewhere, however, that this pattern has more to do with social status than cultural affinity (S. Smith 1992, 2003a, 2010). Most of these items were beyond the means of even middle-class families, and therefore reflect the reified practices of the elite rather than the general populace. These objects were also rare in contemporary Egyptian cemeteries, and the Nubian princes *were* buried with all the trappings of an elite Egyptian burial. Other features found at Fadrus provide affirmation of the population's adherence to Egyptian burial practice, including the presence of coffins, mummification, and communal burial, all of which contrast dramatically with Nubian practice. Something as simple as orientation conveyed potent theological symbolism. With the head to the west, the deceased received the rising sun's rays each dawn, sharing in the magical force of the sun's rebirth and ultimately the power of creation at the sun's first emergence. In contrast, Nubian bodies lay flexed on their side with the head oriented in the opposite direction, toward the east.

This pattern was generally extended into Upper Nubia, but some scholars, including Adams (1977: 239–44), have acknowledged that we lack of information on the New Kingdom colony in this region. He also noted the resilience of Nubian culture in the south, even though he ultimately credits Egyptianized Nubians and émigrés for the emergence of pharaonic traditions at Napata. Recent archaeological surveys have confirmed Trigger's (1965: 117) early impression that there was no widespread Egyptianized imperial culture in Nubia's heartland, the region between the third and fourth cataracts (Grzymski 1987, 1997; Osman and Edwards 2012; Welsby 1996, 2001; and Jacques Reinold, pers. comm. 1998). More significantly, evidence from the Egyptian colonial settlement at Askut and the cemetery at Tombos documents the persistence of different elements of Nubian culture within a colonial setting long past the Egyptian conquest (S. Smith 1995; 2003a).

Askut was commissioned around 1850 BCE by Pharaoh Senwosret III during the Middle Kingdom, probably the last link in a chain of fortresses started 150 years earlier at the beginning of the Twelfth Dynasty (S. Smith 1995). These imperial outposts provided security for both Egypt and the new Lower Nubian colony, assisted and regulated traffic and trade along the river, and perhaps most importantly secured the routes into Lower Nubia's substantial gold fields. In spite of this important role, their number and scale initially puzzled scholars (for example, Adams 1977: 183–88), but the ongoing work of Charles Bonnet at Kerma has shown that this polity represented a real military threat commensurate with the elaborate defenses of these impressive forts (S. Smith 2003a: 75–78; Williams 1999; Bonnet 2004; Bonnet and Valbelle 2007: 14–34). The usual view is that these fortresses were abandoned or destroyed by Kerma aggression after the collapse of the Middle Kingdom, but evidence from Askut and a reassessment of the archaeology of the other forts suggest that their residents switched their allegiance to Kerma, a notion supported by inscriptions left at the large frontier fort at Buhen by Egyptians serving the Ruler of Kush (Kerma) during this period (S. Smith 1995, 2003a). Although some forts, most notably Buhen, do show evidence of destruction associated with the New Kingdom conquest (*not* the Kerma takeover, S. Smith 1995: 113–29), stratigraphic evidence at Askut demonstrates that it was occupied continuously throughout the Second Intermediate Period (1650–1550 BCE), when Kermans controlled Lower Nubia, through the New Kingdom Empire (1550–1070 BCE), and perhaps continued after the loss of Nubia at the end of the New Kingdom through the Third Intermediate Period. Whether or not there was continuity, the site was definitely occupied during the Napatan

period (ca. 728 BCE), when Nubian pharaohs forged an empire that stretched from the Upper Nile into the Levant.

An analysis of the proportions of Egyptian and Nubian ceramics at Askut reveals the persistence of Nubian pottery within an otherwise heavily Egyptian assemblage (S. Smith 2003a). As noted above, Egyptian and Nubian ceramic traditions are dramatically different. Egyptian pottery is wheel-made and utilitarian with the occasional appearance of simple painted and incised motifs. Contemporary Nubian pottery is handmade with elaborate incised and impressed decoration and includes high quality black-topped, red-polished wares (Bourriau 1981). Nubian cookpots appear in distinctive shapes with incised herringbone, triangle, and other motifs that contrast with contemporary Egyptian cooking vessels, which are typically thrown and lack any decoration. During the Second Intermediate Period, when Kerma ruled Lower Nubia, there is not surprisingly a modest increase in Nubian vessels overall, but the proportion drops down to less than 10 percent of the total assemblage. In contrast, Nubian cookpots are drastically overrepresented at Askut, starting at nearly half of the cooking subassemblage, growing to two-thirds in the Second Intermediate Period, and dominating during the New Kingdom (S. Smith 2003a: 113–24, 189–93; Figure 3.3). This pattern




**Figure 3.3.** Proportion of Nubian pottery and cookpots over time at the Egyptian fortress at Askut.

continues into the Napatan period. If we suppose, as Egyptian historical sources indicate, that women did most of the cooking, then Askut reflects the kind of bi-directional cultural entanglements that often characterize the colonial encounter (Dietler 2010), with Nubian women transforming colonial foodways in a way that had lasting impact on the colonial society.

New evidence from the cemetery at Tombos reflects similar entanglements as the result of choices made by women to maintain key elements of indigenous culture within an otherwise Egyptian setting. Located at the headwaters of the third cataract of the Nile, Tombos lay upon an important internal boundary marking the transition between zones characterized by territorial (first through third cataract) and hegemonic (third through fifth cataract) imperial strategies (compare Hassig 1988; D'Altroy 1992; Morkot 2001; S. Smith 2003a). This transition was physically marked by a number of stelae carved to commemorate the defeat of Kush by King Thutmose I in 1502 BCE. Thutmose recognized that Tombos occupies a strategic position at a point where river traffic is easily regulated only ten kilometers from Kerma, the former capital of the Kingdom of Kush. The discovery of a large pyramid tomb containing the remains of Siamun, a high-ranking ancient Egyptian colonial administrator who held the title Scribe of the Treasury and Overseer of Foreign Lands, and his mother Weren, the Mistress of the House, reinforces the importance of the site. Although this diplomatic title is frequently used in the Levant, only two other officials in the Nubian bureaucracy held it: the viceroy and the military commander of the colony. Overseers of Foreign Lands managed the empire as officials responsible for frontier zones: areas that were under imperial control but not incorporated into a direct colonial occupation in Nubia, Libya, and the Levant (Higginbotham 2000: 2, 39–44, 136–38). Morkot (1991: 299) suggests that Theban officials bearing this title may have been Upper Nubian princes raised at court. Siamun may thus have been either an Egyptian or an assimilated Nubian posted to the third cataract on a permanent mission to gather tribute for the annual ceremonial presentation to the pharaoh in Thebes, and perhaps to monitor goings-on in the former Kushite capital.

Siamun's tomb lies in an elite zone at Tombos that contained perhaps ten large pyramid tombs of a type popular with high-level bureaucrats during the New Kingdom. In a nearby middle-class cemetery, remains of decorated and inscribed coffins, evidence for mummification, and specialized items like ushabti figurines and amulets reflect an Egyptian belief system (S. Smith 1992, 2003a). During our second season of excavation, however, we found burials of four women in Nubian style, flexed and oriented head to the east,



**Figure 3.4.** Flexed, Kerma style burials of women in a large mud brick chamber tomb at Tombos dating to around the reign of Amenhotep III (c. 1350 BCE).

as opposed to the position of the Egyptian burials that lay above and around them: mummified, extended on their backs with heads to the west (Figure 3.4). Since Egyptian funerals were public events, these individual assertions of ethnic solidarity by Nubian women would have had a strong impact within this colonial community.

### ASSIMILATION

Egyptologists have largely attributed Napata's dramatic rise in complexity into a regional empire not to local agency but to a process of acculturation driven by an Egyptian or Egyptianized remnant of the old New Kingdom colony or by some new direct intervention from Egypt (Morkot 2003). This acculturation model was informed by analogy with Lower Nubia, where a heavy imperial occupation promoting widespread acculturation is well documented, and by Napatan royal ideology, which portrays the Twenty-fifth Dynasty Nubian rulers as the restorers of Egyptian tradition in decadent times. Thus Breasted (1909: 561) attributed Napatan success to acculturated Nubians but especially to Egyptian émigrés. With the Egyptocentric view typical of the period, he concludes that once the Egyptians died out, Nubia "relapsed into a semi-barbaric condition." In a similar vein, Reisner (1919: 246–48) attributed the rise of Napata to Egyptianized Libyan influence, an idea that was eventually discredited (see discussion and references in Dixon 1964). More recently

Fairservis (1962: 187), Arkell (1961: 114–15), and Emery (1965: 206–8), while rejecting the Libyan model, credited Napata's rise to the influence of the descendants of New Kingdom Egyptians and Egyptianized Nubians, especially a continuing cult of Amun at Gebel Barkal (as did Reisner 1920: 53). This view continues in more recent general surveys of Egypt, such as David (1988), quoted above. Kendall (1999) has more recently revived this notion with a new twist. He argues that after their abortive rebellion against Takelot II's installation of Crown Prince Osorkon as High Priest of Amun-Re in ca. 839 BCE, a group of Theban priests of Amun-Re fled to Nubia, where they revived the cult of Amun at Napata and facilitated the Egyptianization of the emerging Nubian rulers. Although ultimately crediting Egyptianized Nubians and émigrés for the emergence of pharaonic traditions at Napata, both Adams (1977: 239–44) and O'Connor (1993: 65) note the lack of information on the New Kingdom colony in Upper Nubia and acknowledge the resilience of Nubian culture in the south. Other scholars have adopted a similar mixed view, arguing for Egyptianization and some lasting influence from the New Kingdom colony, while acknowledging the importance of internal dynamics and native agency (Dixon 1964; Gardiner 1961: 335).

Recent anthropological publications have reevaluated the state of culture-contact studies, challenging the basic assumptions of previous generations of scholars, particularly acculturation models (Curtin 1984; Thomas 1990; Schortman and Urban 1992; Wilson and Rogers 1993; Lightfoot 1995; Cusick 1998). In the past, contact tended to be regarded using "Quincentennial" models emphasizing the unequal relations of Old World dominance over New World cultures. In particular, acculturation models stressed a European donor culture transforming a passive Native American culture into an image of the dominant core (Foster 1960; Spicer 1962). In the same way, Egyptologists have attributed the rise of Napatan complexity to a direct emulation of the Egyptian core. Acculturation models continue to be used today, sometimes in surprising contexts such as the spread of agriculture in Neolithic Europe (for example, the Demic Diffusion model of Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza 1984; Cavalli-Sforza 1996), or the replacement of Neanderthals by modern humans (for example, D'Errico et al. 1998). In contrast, Native American responses to European colonialism are now seen as complex adaptations, transculturation or ethnogenesis, the synthesis of different cultural features to create a new cultural identity (Deagan 1998), rather than acculturation (for example, Charlton and Fournier 1993; Cleland 1993; Rogers 1990, 1993; Farnsworth 1992; Turnbaugh 1993; Waselkov 1993). For example, as Bamforth (1993) has demonstrated, even the adoption of metal tools in California was conditioned

by a complex set of factors, including cultural considerations as well as the effectiveness of the new technology. Indeed, several scholars have pointed out that even in contexts of dramatic power differential, such as slavery, cultural borrowings are not passive, but rather selective and adaptive (see, for example, Davis 1994; Singleton 1998; Armstrong 1998; compare Scott 1985).

The concepts of “Romanization” and “Hellenization” are traditionally framed in similar terms of assimilative acculturation, with a dominant core cultural donor and passive peripheral recipient. Classicists are increasingly critiquing this perspective, arguing instead for a nuanced view more in line with current anthropological approaches to culture contact and interaction (for example, Gardner 2007; Dietler 2005). These ideas are particularly salient for a new understanding of “Egyptianization” in Nubia. For example, in studying the Roman colonization of Greece, Alcock (2005) argues that local inhabitants determine imperial outcomes as much as Roman colonists. She sees the colonies themselves not as monolithic representatives of Roman culture with a single goal, but as multiethnic and stratified, with different segments of society reflecting different interests involved in the colonial encounter. The cultural dynamic that emerged was not polyphonic, but rather a complex creolization of Roman and Greek societies. In a similar way, Van Dommelen (2002, 2005) argues against a simplistic binary opposition between donor and recipient cultures. In line with postcolonial theory, he contends that the meanings that lie behind material culture are not passively received but rather actively constructed by individuals in specific social contexts. In this way, native peoples play an active role in shaping colonial outcomes, even in the context of unequal power relationships and the appearance of cultural assimilation.

Morkot (1995), Yellin (1995), Török (1998), and the present author (S. Smith 1998) have challenged the acculturation model’s relevance to Nubia, arguing for an alternative view that attributes the development of the Napatan state to internal competition between native polities after the collapse of the New Kingdom Empire (ca. 1070 BCE). On the other hand, the UCSB excavations at the Egyptian colonial cemetery of Tombos have established the existence of a substantial Egyptian community at the third cataract itself (S. Smith 2003a). Our recent field seasons demonstrated that this community survived into the Napatan period (S. Smith 2007, Smith and Buzon in press). The cultural entanglements and hybridity that appeared in the aftermath of empire allowed both for a strong Nubian revival and for a continuity of Egyptian colonial society, each of which blended Egyptian and Nubian elements. A somewhat different but similar pattern is also

emerging with recent work in the cemetery at the colonial center of Amara West, where there is also evidence of continuity and mixed cultural practices (Binder 2011). Tombos and potentially other communities like it were tied to the local population through intermarriage and a long history of political and cultural engagement. These mixed communities could have facilitated the rise of the new Kushite dynasty by serving both as advisors to and a model for the emerging Kushite rulers at Napata, showing how Egyptian and Nubian features could be reconfigured into new cultural constellations. At Tombos, Egyptian-style burials continue in the cemetery after the end of the New Kingdom Empire, but with the addition of a separate zone of Nubian-style tumulus graves that begin at around the same time and continue through the Napatan period. All but two burials excavated in this area were extended, head to the west, but placed upon a bed. This reflects a combination of Egyptian and Nubian burial practice, respectively. The two exceptions were a woman oriented with head to the west but flexed and placed upon a bed and a child extended but with head to the east. A Napatan burial within the pyramid cemetery was more Egyptianized but showed a similar combination of Egyptian and Nubian features: extended and confined but laying upon a bed. A group of tall red polished beakers from the tomb were thrown using Egyptian technology, but the shape and decoration represent the continuation of Nubian ceramic traditions, including a black-topped design that echoes a popular decorative motif from the Kerma culture. Several objects in the tomb were decorated with bulls and cows, including three copper-alloy bowls with incised running- and standing-bull motifs and a small box with an elaborate openwork marsh design showing a cow suckling a calf. Although the designs are in Egyptian style, the selection of these objects for the tomb may nevertheless reflect the long-standing Nubian religious emphasis on cattle. The discovery of a Napatan pyramid adds further complexity to the ethnic and social dynamics of this community (Figure 3.5), implying that Tombos continued to be a key administrative center under the Twenty-fifth Dynasty. Additionally, this discovery opens the real possibility that this community—and perhaps others like it—inspired the adoption of steep-sided pyramids as a royal funerary monument by Piye, the first of the Nubian pharaohs to control all of Egypt, and his successors. This new evidence points toward a more complex process of cultural entanglement and ethnogenesis, in which elements of Egyptian and Nubian culture merge during the colonial experience to produce a dynamic multicultural society that most likely contributed to the adoption of pharaonic ideology by the Napatan Kingdom of Kush.





**Figure 3.5.** Twenty-fifth Dynasty chapel and pyramid (foundations only) at Tombos. The soldier's tomb is to the left towards the back of the complex.

### CO-OPTING THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY


Scott mentions another means of resistance available to and used by subordinates: co-opting the elite ideology and reinterpreting it to allow the subaltern group to acquire power vis-à-vis the ruling elite. At first glance, this does not seem to work for Kush. The emulation of Egyptian culture by the emerging Nubian pharaohs and their elite supporters seems so complete that it's no wonder that the model of assimilative acculturation has such resilience. The Nubians themselves reinforce this notion, reviving the old New Kingdom *Ma'at* theology, which portrayed the king as the one who establishes order in an otherwise chaotic world. In his conquest of Egypt, Piankhi not only asserts an Egyptian ethnic identity, but also chides the petty dynasts of the Nile Delta for not knowing the proper rituals of kingship, indeed refusing them an audience until they learned the correct way for an Egyptian to approach a pharaoh (in this case, without eating fish).

Although Nubian culture was transformed by the colonial experience, archaeological evidence suggests that it persisted in spite of Egyptian policies of assimilation. How then did the Napatans so effectively become Egyptian? The traditional picture posits a cultural and political gap immediately after

the collapse of the New Kingdom Empire, characterized by hostility between Nubians and Egyptians. Thus Kendall (1999) argues that Egyptian practices like the execration ceremony of “Breaking the Red Pots” were part of a new infusion of Egyptian contact in the form of renegade priests from Thebes. Egyptian things had become acceptable again a couple of hundred years later. But the evidence for a flourishing multicultural community at Tombos with continuity back into the New Kingdom suggests that peaceful interactions between Egyptians and Nubians continued during the Third Intermediate Period, at least partly through the conduit of surviving colonial communities, who perhaps played a central role in the eventual rise of the Napatan Twenty-fifth Dynasty.

In critiquing Kendall’s thesis, Morkot notes that the ceremony of “Breaking the Red Pots” was no longer in use during the Third Intermediate Period, and so was an unlikely practice for the Theban refugees to introduce. On the other hand, the practice is attested at Tombos during the New Kingdom, and might have survived in the memory of the people there, although there is no direct archaeological documentation of the continuance of this specific practice into the Third Intermediate Period. Egyptian-style burials do, however, continue at Tombos through the two-hundred-year gap between the end of the empire and the first burial at el-Kurru, the royal Napatan cemetery. Thus the surviving colonists, who were still buried Egyptian-style, could have directly introduced practices not attested in contemporary Egypt, like the “Breaking of the Red Pots” and the use of steep-sided pyramids, which begin again at Tombos by at least 700 BCE, if not earlier.

I do not mean to imply, however, that these communities drove the process. Rather I would suggest that the new dynasty tapped into a community with whom they—or at least members of the Nubian elite—had long-standing ties. When the Napatan kings aspired to become pharaohs, they naturally turned to communities like Tombos, who continued to be important players in the region and through their multicultural ties might have served as ideal intermediaries between Nubia and Egypt. A close examination of Napatan ideology shows that the Nubians were selective rather than slavishly imitative (S. Smith 1998). For example, although they worshiped Egyptian deities, they emphasized those that had some connection with Nubia, such as the ram-god Khnum, his consort Satet and daughter Anukis, the patron deities of Aswan, or those who resonated with Nubian religious ideas, such as Amun-Re (Figure 3.6). He was syncretized with a Nubian god, Amani, whose ram-headed imagery probably came from Nubia. Isis, the Egyptian goddess of queenship, was selected for special reverence, probably because of the



**Figure 3.6.** Nubian Pharaoh Taharqa offers Ma'at to Amun-Re, Anukis, and Satet on a shrine that was originally part of the Amun temple complex at Kawa (Ashmolean Museum, Oxford).

importance in Nubia of queens, who played a far more prominent ideological and political role than did queens in Egypt. Later queens like Amanitore (ruled ca. 1–20 CE) were shown in aggressive poses mirroring those of kings. For example, she joins her husband Natakamani in slaughtering foreigners on the façade of the Temple of Apademak at Naga in an otherwise typically Egyptian expression of the royal theology of *Ma'at*.

Although Piankhi portrays himself as the legitimate successor to Egyptian tradition, in fact, he was the first of his line to truly adopt Egyptian burial practice, including the use of pyramids similar to, but more substantial than, those used by Egyptian elites during the New Kingdom in both Egypt and Nubia (Figure 3.7). It is clear that Piankhi was not the descendant of Egyptianized Nubians, but rather deliberately co-opted Egyptian ideology in order to legitimate his expansion into Egypt. Piankhi's ancestors were buried in Nubian-style tumuli at el-Kurru, which remained the standard form of burial for those outside the highest elite, as within the tumulus cemetery at Tombos. Burials in the nearby cemetery of Hillat el-Arab, which runs from the late New Kingdom through the Napatan period, show stronger similarities to New Kingdom burial practice, including communal burial in underground chambers and the use of the supine burial position. Other practices show marked differences, including painted decoration on the walls that resembles



**Figure 3.7.** Post Twenty-fifth Dynasty royal Pyramids at Gebel Barkal in northern Sudan.

traditional rock art rather than Egyptian canons and a lack of consistent orientation, mummification, and coffins (Vincentelli 2006). What we see here is a very limited emulation of selected aspects of Egyptian burial practice, such as the use of the supine burial position within the tumulus cemetery at Tombos, a practice also attested at other Third Intermediate Period sites in Upper Nubia (see, for example, Griffith 1923; Vila 1980; and Geus 1997).

The presence of both New Kingdom and Napatan pyramids at Tombos implies that these monuments were transmitted through a continuation of local traditions rather than directly from Egypt, where pyramids had ceased to be erected as either royal or private funerary monuments. Indeed, we can see the reintroduction of pyramids as a royal burial monument as an innovation as much as imitation, since no Egyptian king had built one in nearly a thousand years when Piankhi began work on his tomb. Darnell's (2006) recent retranslation and dating of the inscription of Queen Katimala at the old fortress of Semna supports this notion. He argues persuasively that Katimala ruled over an Egyptianized polity centered at the second cataract at a time early in the Third Intermediate Period. Her name indicates that she was of Nubian descent, even though she is represented with the typical iconography of an Egyptian queen. He argues that the text of this difficult inscription reflects access to literate scribes and individuals who had maintained the cult

of Amun-Re, which emerges as the preeminent cult in the Nubian dynasty. A dynastic alliance between rulers of this Egyptianized polity and its more Nubian counterpart south of the third cataract may provide a mechanism for the archaeologically rapid transition to Egyptian modes of burial at el-Kurru. The cultural realities of Nubia in the aftermath of colonization were, however, more complex than Darnell acknowledges. The Nubians themselves recognized that they still needed help in order to get it right. Piankhi's son and successor Taharqa effectively admits this conscious borrowing when he boasts of bringing Egyptian artisans and priests to Nubia in order to ensure that everything was made according to the latest Egyptian standards (Edwards 2004: 136; Eide, et al. 1994: 142). This explains the elements of Napatan royal burials that do reflect contemporary Egyptian practice, including funerary texts, coffins, and ushabtis.

### CONCLUSIONS

Egyptologists typically either ignore or deny the possibility that the conquered Nubians might have mounted any effective military, political, or even cultural resistance in the face of Egyptian hegemony (Emery 1965; Adams 1975; Trigger 1976; Frandsen 1979; Kemp 1978). During the sometimes brutal Egyptian occupation of the New Kingdom, Nubians—especially Nubian women—maintained a sense of ethnic solidarity in spite of Egyptian hegemony, and we can see these acts as a daily assertion of their identity. The preservation of elements of Nubian ceramic traditions, foodways, and burial practice would establish the foundations for the survival of Nubian culture despite five hundred years of Egyptian domination. At the same time, we find the emergence of a multicultural milieu at Tombos through long-term entanglements that changed Nubian culture and provided a deep connection to Egypt. Nevertheless, the Egyptianizing features such as royal burials in pyramids were not merely the survivals of an old imperial culture but were consciously adapted from a combination of the lasting legacy of former colonial communities like Tombos and direct contact with contemporary Egypt in a process of ethnogenesis. Legitimized at home in Nubia through the materialization of external cosmological power (S. Smith 1998), the Napatan rule in Egypt, by co-opting pharaonic ideology, also allowed the emergent Kushite dynasty to exact revenge on their former conquerors, and to enter onto the regional geopolitical stage as a counterbalance to Assyrian aggression in Syro-Palestine. The result was a vibrant civilization that lasted a thousand years with its own unique synthesis of Egyptian and Nubian elements.

## NOTES

1. Regarding the distinction between the general concept of acculturation and the model of assimilative acculturation commonly adopted in studies of colonialism, see discussions in several chapters of Cusick 1998.
2. The terminology used to identify the different Lower Nubian cultural phases is based upon an arbitrary sequence devised by George Reisner, who simply used a letter of the alphabet to indicate the different phases (Trigger 1976; Adams 1977; O'Connor 1993; Edwards 2004). The A-Group appeared around 3500 BCE, reaching its peak around 3000 BCE, about the same time that Pharaonic civilization emerged. The culture disappeared as a result of military aggression on the part of Egypt's First-Dynasty Pharaohs. Reisner originally designated a succeeding B-Group, but this is now regarded as simply an impoverished A-Group, so the term has largely fallen out of use. Nevertheless, a remnant of the A-Group culture appears at Egyptian Old Kingdom establishments like Buhen. Shortly after the abandonment of these colonial outposts, the C-Group appears in Lower Nubia. It shows strong affinities to the early Kerma culture, which appears in Upper Nubia at about the same time (ca. 2300 BCE). The X-Group is the only other of Reisner's cultural designations commonly in use. It refers to a much later culture that appears in the aftermath of the Meroitic collapse around 300 CE.
3. The Book of the Dead contained spells designed to ensure that the deceased became immortal in the Afterlife. Ushabti figurines substituted for the deceased in the Afterlife when the gods demanded work. Heart scarabs both protected the heart and ensured that it would not testify against its owner during the final judgment, since Egyptians believed that the heart was the seat of the soul and represented an individual's moral center (Taylor 2001: 112–35, 196–98, 205–6).

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CHAPTER 4

# AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF HEGEMONY


## THE ACHAEMENID EMPIRE AND THE REMAKING OF THE FORTRESS IN THE ARMENIAN HIGHLANDS

LORI KHATCHADOURIAN

IN ONE OF THE MORE EXTRAORDINARY REPRESENTATIONS OF EMPIRE from the ancient world, the Achaemenid Persian kings (ca. 550–330 BCE), by all accounts rulers of the largest polity the world had ever known, created an original visual rendering of a model of imperial order (Figure 4.1).<sup>1</sup> Variants of the scene were sculpted on the jambs of doorways leading into monumental columned halls at the imperial center of Persepolis and on the royal tombs at Naqsh-e Rostam. In these stone reliefs, the human figures personifying the empire’s subject territories are shown in two or three registers with their arms interlocked in an atlas posture, effortlessly holding up a structure that supports the king (Root 1979: 147–61).<sup>2</sup> Margaret Root’s seminal studies of this “throne bearing” scene have long drawn our attention to the fact that, as a representation of principles of kingship and empire—one that was in fact remarkably innovative for its time—the motif depicts a participatory and cooperative imperial venture (Root 1979, 2000; see also Lincoln 2012: 127–44). The personified lands of the empire, one of which is Armenia, are shown actively engaged in glorifying the king and, in so doing, upholding the imperial order. In

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**Figure 4.1.** Drawing of the relief from the east jamb of the eastern doorway at the southern entrance into the Hall of 100 Columns at Persepolis (Curtis and Tallis 2005: fig. 38). The personification of Armenia may be the second figure from the left in the top row

place of an iconography of coercion over the subjugated, the figures are instead shown in dignified poses, in some cases even bearing arms. As an ideological strategy, these scenes emphasize a social order reciprocally constituted between king and subject (Root 2000: 21). Through their “participatory action” (Root 2000: 22) in holding up the king, the subject lands also hold up the empire.

This representation of imperial power as a capacity maintained through reciprocity between dominant and subordinate groups poses a challenge to the thinking on power that commonly informs the archaeology of early empires. In their ideological production, the Achaemenid kings put forward a vision of empire predicated not on domination over subalterns and violence in the face of resistance but on consent forged through mutual exchange and the active role of subjugated peoples in the reproduction of the polity. Through material representation, these kings thus advanced a conception of power and order premised, at least partially, on hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) and on the participatory action of subjects in the maintenance of a political community. Although these scenes are components of an ancient ideological program, they also belong to what Bruce Lincoln (2007: xv) has called the Achaemenid “metaphysic of power”, and in this they resonate with conceptions of the political elaborated in contemporary social theories that emphasize the work of both rulers and ruled in social reproduction. Analytically, then, the sculpted monuments are not easily contained as the idealized doctrine of visionary kings, bearing no relevance to the practical making of empire. Insofar as the atlas pose device advances an aspirational claim upon the proper order of things, and enshrines ever-vulnerable founding political principles, they cannot be read as a statement on how the Achaemenid Empire actually *was* maintained. Nevertheless, these renderings of a political imaginary call upon us to interrogate the lived experience of subjection under empire.

This essay develops an archaeological approach to the study of power and authority within one region of the Achaemenid imperial formation by drawing on the concept of hegemony, the central element of Antonio Gramsci’s political thought, as a productive analytic for interpreting the satrapal condition under empire.<sup>3</sup> The difficult circumstances under which Gramsci wrote *The Prison Notebooks* and other works have left us with an interconnected series of provocative reflections rather than a cohesive and polished political theory (Ransome 1992: 132). One result is that Gramsci’s key concepts have been customized to suit the interpretive concerns of various disciplines: “Gramsci’s writings have therefore made sense to the extent that they have helped to make sense of other things” (Jones 2006: 121). It is in this spirit that very select

elements of Gramsci's thought are harnessed here for the archaeological study of premodern empire.

From Gramsci, attention turns to situating the concept of hegemony in the context of existing perspectives within archaeology on the political relations between dominant and subordinate groups of early empires, in order to show that Gramsci clears a space for a productive new direction in analysis. This entails a brief look at how the archaeology of empire has framed political power and the relations between imperial and provincial authorities. Subsequently, I develop the particular case study of this essay, the Armenian highlands under Achaemenid rule, and focus specifically on the remaking of the fortress as an institution of authority and hegemonic control during centuries of imperial transformation. The analysis centers on the reconfiguration of built space within highland fortresses during a period of imperial formation, decline, and reformation.

## HEGEMONY

The State, according to Gramsci, is "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci 1971: 263). This formulation holds that neither force nor the threat of force is sufficient for constituting a political community. Rather, polities are reproduced primarily through hegemony, "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" (Gramsci 1971: 12).<sup>4</sup> Gramsci's hegemony is thus "the consensual basis of an existing political system within civil society" (Adamson 1980: 170), which partially eclipses (but is nevertheless indivisible from) force in the maintenance of that political system. Maintaining consent, or moral and cultural persuasion, must be an ongoing process if alternative hegemonic projects are to be neutralized. Hegemony thus entails "an incessant repositioning of the relationship between rulers and ruled" (Jones 2006: 3), as dominant alliances struggle to instill their values in the lives of subalterns so as to shape what comes to be common sense. A dominant group garners consent from subalterns not through coercive control but, "as it were 'voluntarily' by persuading them to accept and assimilate the norms and values of its own prevailing world-view" (Ransome 1992: 135). Social power, in other words, is not reducible to an opposition between domination and subordination. The reproduction of a dominant group's political and social power occurs to a considerable degree in the daily lives of subalterns.

The work of hegemony and coercion is done through the intertwined institutional spheres of *political society* and *civil society*. Gramsci at times correlates

the former domain with the coercive apparatus of the State (operationalized through such institutions as the army, police, and penal system), while he assigns the hegemonic apparatus to the institutions of civil society (e.g., the Church, political parties, education system, workplace, media, family) (Gramsci 1971: 12). But elsewhere it is clear that this is an ideal dialectic, and that in practice Gramsci recognizes the relations between political and civil society as complex and overlapping (Ransome 1992: 139–44). Ultimately, as a form of social control, Gramsci's hegemony is inherently political, "not reducible to the notion of cultural influence" (Sassoon 1980: 14). In addition, it is created not by abstract forces but by human agents acting within political and social institutions. Specifically, publics are "hegemonized" through the work of what Gramsci calls *intellectuals*—politically conscious activists who elaborate, disseminate, and reproduce the values of a hegemonic project through the practical activities of daily life.<sup>5</sup> It is important to stress that Gramsci sees hegemony operative in everyday social and cultural practices, whether by actors functioning as intellectuals or living by "common sense." Yet he does not necessarily privilege agency over structure. In some respects, Gramsci's concepts are compatible with practice theories like those of Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1977), but Gramsci contributes an explicitly political emphasis to the workings of agency and structure.

Hegemony is Gramsci's most contested concept, in large measure because across his numerous writings he used the term differently with respect to both historical conditions and theoretical abstractions. An important element of the concept for present purposes emerges from Gramsci's reflections on the Southern Question, the problem of culturally integrating Italy's poor and exploited South with its more industrialized North in order to create what he called a "national-popular" culture. If such a project were to be successful, Gramsci reasoned, the working-class movement of the North would have to incorporate into its own worldview the cultural values that were important to the Italian peasantry of the South. Steve Jones has drawn from this a critical insight about the working of hegemony: in order to garner consent, "a truly hegemonic group or class really must make large parts of its subalterns' worldview its own. In the course of this, the leading group will itself become changed . . ." (Jones 2006: 45). Hegemony thus entails not only instilling a dominant bloc's values in the daily lives of subalterns, but also, in part, constantly reshaping the ideals of the dominant group as room is made for subaltern aspirations.

Gramsci largely reserved his understanding of hegemony for modern industrialized societies, in part, due to an oversimplification of the premodern

past, in which he thought societies “organized themselves into closed estates and reproduced a fixed, static, and ‘mechanical’ separation of dominant and subaltern classes” (Adamson 1980: 173). But the notion that dominant and subordinate groups are ever entirely autonomous, that there can be a sharp distinction between government and society, or that premodern polities utterly lacked cultural institutions that cut across classes and other social alignments, are generalizations difficult to sustain. Gramsci’s politics are grounded in a time of mass participation in politics within democratic Western societies and in his view it is through the institutions of such mass-based politics that hegemony largely operates. Voluntary associations of civil society such as political parties and unions may be unique institutions of advanced capitalism. But from this it does not follow that ancient polities did not also rely on the participation of subjects for their reproduction. On an abstract level, judging by their innovative iconography of empire, the Achaemenid kings appear to have understood this. Rethinking hegemony for a premodern context requires acknowledging that although specific hegemonic institutions are historically contingent, hegemony as consensual control is operative in all complex societies. The challenge is to identify its operation in the premodern past. It is to such premodern empires that I now turn.

#### POWER AND HEGEMONY IN ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY OF EMPIRES

How have archaeologists theorized the nature of power relations between dominant and subordinate groups in the reproduction of early imperial polities?<sup>6</sup> How has archaeological theory traditionally accounted for why early imperial formations persisted over time, particularly in those formations that endured for centuries?<sup>7</sup> Consistent with Gramsci’s understanding of power, it is often noted that dominant groups within early imperial formations did not resort solely to the use or threat of coercive measures against subjugated peoples in order to sustain their prerogative to rule (see, for example, D’Altroy 1992: 9–11; Sinopoli 2001: 456). Nevertheless, many authors maintain that the capacity to exert such measures undergirded the viability of some early empires (see, for example, Brumfiel 1996). Katharina Schreiber, for instance, has placed considerable emphasis on coercion as the source of imperial power, noting that local rulers of subaltern groups agree to collaborate with imperial authorities in order to avoid “the threat of sanctions” (Schreiber 1992: 19; see also 24, 27–28).

At the same time, however, Schreiber and others have recognized that alternatives to coercion are essential in order for an imperial group to maintain



its dominance. These alternatives relate primarily to the dispensation of economic benefits and rewards to the highest echelons of subjugated groups. Referring to such provincial elites, Schreiber (1992: 19) has written that "the empire must be generous with its collaborators, and lavish them with gifts and other prerequisites of imperial office." Regional elites participate in the imperial project and accept their subordination, this rational-choice perspective holds, because "they have access to new status goods through their connection into the imperial system of distribution; the empire offers a variety of . . . trappings of power to reinforce the status of the local ruler, and to ensure his continued cooperation and collaboration" (Schreiber 1992: 27). Michael Smith and Lisa Montiel (2001: 249) echo this perspective: "Empires . . . typically 'buy off' provincial elites with gifts and privileges in order to gain their cooperation in administering the provinces." Within Terrence D'Altroy's (1992) energetic approach, subjugated groups, and particularly the local elites among them, participate in imperial reproduction when the benefits of collaboration outweigh the costs. In D'Altroy's (1992: 11) view of imperial rule, "the source of most political power among subordinate polities shifts from the subject society to the imperial core. In essence, political power becomes delegated from above, not allocated from below." One limitation of perspectives that emphasize economic rewards as an incentive for collaboration is that they fail to account for why the vast majority of imperial subjects who do not enjoy privileged access to such high-status goods (and do not organize resistance) accept their subordination. As Carla Sinopoli (2001: 460) has noted, "few imperial subjects would have been ignorant of the broader political milieu in which they lived," even if their identities were primarily tied to local group affiliations.

While also recognizing the material and economic benefits of cooperation that accrue to provincial elites, Sinopoli (2001: 454, 457) at the same time has acknowledged that there are social and ideological rewards that account for why such subjugated local leaders agree to participate in imperial projects. For instance, "[t]hese elites . . . in exchange for their cooperation maintain rights to some degree of local autonomy" (Sinopoli 2001: 454). Schreiber (1992: 27) makes a similar point, suggesting that one reason why elites of subordinate groups collaborate with imperial authorities and thereby perpetuate their own subordination is that "they get to stay in control." These perspectives derive from models of imperial organization that lean toward indirect forms of rule, which are often marked by cultural tolerance and considerable autonomy in local decision-making on the part of formerly independent local rulers. Yet this explanation for why subjugated communities within empire replicate

the practices that maintain the polity is not entirely persuasive. First, subalterns would obviously enjoy greater autonomy in the absence of the imperial power, thus ensuring that even indirect imperial rule would require substantial commitment to coercive force to ensure that even “loyal” provinces were not undermining their subjection. Second, explanation by indirect rule can account for obeisance to a foreign sovereign, but not the adoption of wider forms of social, cultural, and religious practice. Within the range of explanations for imperial reproduction offered by archaeology, then, we are thus left to return to coercion or an economic reductionism that views subaltern collaboration as motivated by the promise of gifts and luxury goods.


Excluded from many of these accounts are the exercise of consensual control and the social and cultural basis of imperial reproduction (i.e., hegemony in a Gramscian sense). D’Altroy (1992: 11) alludes obliquely to this dimension of imperialism when he founds political power upon “one entity’s ability to dominate the process of *managing* consent” (emphasis added). But he leaves unaddressed the pressing question of how such consent is garnered in the first place. D’Altroy is perhaps partly constrained by the limited role he accords to ideology in the constitution of imperial polities, in response to what he regards as unsatisfactory approaches in Inka studies that privilege the idea of a unified Inka world-view across space and social boundaries. D’Altroy (1992: 14) rightly points out that “individuals participate in ideology differently” and that subject populations do not necessarily accept official ideologies. While Sinopoli (2001: 451) shares this view, she nevertheless allows for the construction of *imperial* identities (one among the many identities that subalterns can mobilize in different contexts) as a means of binding and reproducing empire (Sinopoli 2001: 460). The participation of subalterns in imperial formation and re-formation lies somewhere between the unwitting acceptance of imposed official ideologies and the calculated tolerance of such ideologies as a cost of subjugation that is outweighed by its material benefits.

To bridge between these extremes, it is necessary to consider how the maintenance of dominion and the making of an imperial culture entails “processes of incorporation . . . and also *reformulation*” (Sinopoli 2001: 460; emphasis added), such that the worldviews and norms of dominant groups are themselves inflected by subaltern practice. In part a result of the influence of practice theories on the archaeology of empires, recent attention to domains of daily practice and social relations are introducing new perspectives in the archaeology of empires that are consistent with a Gramsci-inspired approach. Kathleen Deagan (2001: 179), for example, has emphasized that the Spanish Empire in America was maintained in large measure through “the social

integration and willing involvement” of subalterns in the imperial project, and the careful accommodation of imperial ideology and local conditions and practices (but see Voss 2008). In her work on the Vijayanagara Empire, Kathleen Morrison (2001a: 255) has likewise stressed that “[s]ubaltern actions and consciousness are not simply reactive . . . . Instead, processes of power might be understood more fully in light of recent discussions that stress interplay and the mutual constitution(s) of power relations.” Enlarging on these perspectives, the remainder of this essay explores the hegemonic dimensions of Achaemenid rule within one province of the imperial dominion.

### AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF HEGEMONY: THE ARMENIAN HIGHLANDS AND THE ACHAEMENID EMPIRE

From its heartland in modern southwestern Iran, the Achaemenid dynasty maintained ever-shifting degrees of sovereignty over an enormous domain that stretched from the Aegean Sea to the Indus river, from Egypt and Arabia to the Caucasus mountains and Central Asia. Historical sources indicate that imperial agents held sway over the Armenian highlands—the upland plateau that extends from the northern Euphrates eastward to the lesser Caucasus—for over two centuries (Figure 4.2). The circumstances and timing of Armenia’s initial capitulation to Achaemenid rule are uncertain; however, the combined weight of Greek and Babylonian sources (in particular, a new reading of the Nabonidus Chronicle [Oelsner 1999/2000]) offer grounds to suspect that the region was one of the many lands vanquished by Cyrus II in his sweep across parts of southwest Asia in the mid-sixth century BCE.<sup>8</sup> Judging by various Achaemenid royal documents and classical texts, the land (or *dabyu*) of Armenia remained an integral part of the empire until Alexander the Great and his forces defeated the Persian army in 330 BCE. The borders of Armenia and the precise administrative status of the region within the imperial organization are uncertain, but it is possible that this *dabyu* was nested within a larger entity called Media (Jacobs 1994: 176; Khatchadourian 2008b; Lecoq 1997: 197).<sup>9</sup> Oblique references in a range of ancient sources suggest that Armenia was itself partitioned into eastern and western divisions. An exceedingly elaborate genealogical reconstruction, built on an array of written sources disparate in time, medium, and language, have led historians to posit that a dynastic family known as the Orontids, closely aligned with the Achaemenid dynasty by marriage, governed the region by at least the late fifth century BCE (Dörner 1996; Khatchadourian 2008b; Osborne 1973; Tirats’yan 1958; Toumanoff 1959, 1963).



Apart from Armenia's involvement in the unsuccessful revolts that were waged against the empire during a period of severe dynastic and provincial unrest in the 520s BCE, there is as yet a notable absence of historical or archaeological evidence for political violence or resistance in the highlands during the centuries of Achaemenid rule.<sup>10</sup> Resistance and the "hidden transcripts" of subaltern experience are, of course, usually undetectable in the historical and archaeological record, opening the risk of overstating the consensual basis of complex societies (Scott 1990). The instruments and use of violence, however, are often archaeologically pronounced, for instance in the form of weapon assemblages, destruction levels, defensive fortifications, and an iconography of warfare. In conquering the highlands, the Achaemenids incorporated a region with a deep and archaeologically conspicuous tradition of militarism reaching back to the Middle Bronze Age (Kushnareva 1997). The empire that ruled the highland region in the centuries preceding Achaemenid conquest, the kingdom of Urartu, centralized the institutions of coercion, leaving us with historical and archaeological evidence that attests to a robust and frequently mobilized infrastructure for state-organized violence.<sup>11</sup> Urartian inscriptions as well as a number of archaeological sites evince

a persistently militaristic imperial program, and an approach to governance that was predicated in part on forcibly cutting peoples' attachments to place through forced relocations (A. T. Smith 2003: 168).

Archaeological evidence for the deployment of, or defense against, violence virtually falls away in the succeeding centuries of the mid-first millennium, following the collapse of the Urartian regime:<sup>12</sup> the weapons and armor so favored by the Urartians ceased to be manufactured or circulated; settlements that were abandoned during the centuries of Achaemenid dominance indicate no evidence of conflagration; images and accounts of warfare all but disappeared; and in some areas of the highlands, settlement patterns indicate a movement away from fortified dwelling.<sup>13</sup> The evidence currently available suggests a striking transformation in the disposition of highland communities vis-à-vis state-sponsored aggression during the period of Achaemenid rule, leading Adam T. Smith (2003: 172) to speak of a "*pax Persica*." In short, sources of power alternative to those familiar on the highlands appear to have been sustaining Achaemenid control in this region. This by no means implies a complete obeisance to Achaemenid suzerainty. But it does point to the adoption of a new political tradition on the part of the region's communities and provides grounds to doubt that the use or threat of force alone bound regional elites to the Achaemenid empire for over two centuries.

The gaze of this case study remains squarely on privileged locales of social reproduction on the highlands, specifically the region's hilltop fortresses, which had been the primary institutions of political authority in the Armenian highlands for centuries prior to Achaemenid conquest.<sup>14</sup> Through a focus on the fortress, I examine transformations in the materiality of political culture and practice—particularly the forms and arrangement of fortress architecture and the kinds of interactions it forged—from the period before to the period after the Armenian highlands were incorporated into the empire. Of concern here are places where values, beliefs, and political traditions of the dominant and the subjugated could be assimilated, reshaped, and reproduced through material culture practice. To what extent did highland leaders assimilate and materialize Achaemenid traditions of political authority and to what extent did imperial authorities incorporate local political traditions, even reshaping their own views on the constitution of political authority? The analysis begins with a discussion of the role of the fortress in the local political tradition of the highlands prior to the emergence of Achaemenid power. I then develop a case for the radical transformation of this tradition, focusing ultimately on two fortress sites—Erebuni and Altintepe—that appear to have been reconstituted as centers of regional authority during the mid-first millennium BC.

## THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF A FORTRESS TRADITION

Across the Armenian highlands, as the pastoral traditions of the Middle Bronze Age gave way to the earliest complex polities of the Late Bronze Age, fortresses emerged as hosts of a suite of new institutions that reordered social life. The systematic fortification of the region's natural hilltops and mountain peaks is thus associated with the initial rise of complex societies during the middle of the second millennium BCE (Lindsay 2006; A. T. Smith 2003: 170; Smith et al. 2009). This fortress tradition endured well into the Iron Age, reaching what is widely regarded as its apogee under the kings of Urartu, whose ashlar masonry fortresses hosted a multifaceted imperial apparatus.<sup>15</sup> By the heyday of the Urartian Empire, the fortress appeared to be firmly rooted as *the* place for the reproduction of order and authority in many parts of the highlands. While the fortresses of Urartu were often located at lower elevations than their Late Bronze Age counterparts, on large hills of the plains rather than in remote mountains, they restricted access in new ways. Urartian fortresses consisted of often densely built-up interior spaces that were considerably segmented and thus conducive to regulating movement, isolating activities, and restricting access (A. T. Smith 2003: 241–54). These fortresses were used to organize the empire's political, economic, religious, and military affairs. The citadels of the regime mediated relations between people and that most prominent of structural positions, the imperial administration, collecting taxes, organizing labor, and constraining peoples' choices and actions. In other words, under Urartu, the fortress anchored a network of powerful institutions that articulated people with one another as subjects of an authoritative imperial regime.

The Urartian Empire collapsed sometime during the mid-seventh century BCE; opinions differ as to the timing and causes of the empire's decline (Çilingiroğlu 2002; Diakonov and Medvedskaya 1987; Kroll 1984; Piotrovskii 1969; Zimansky 1995b). A period of approximately one century elapsed before the Achaemenid conquest of the region, and this "transitional" phase is poorly understood on both historical and archaeological grounds. What is clear, however, is that during the subsequent centuries of Achaemenid rule, inhabitants of the highlands largely discontinued the active use of the Urartian fortresses around them as centers for political association. This appears to have been the case particularly at the large seventh-century fortresses of the Urartian king Rusa II. For instance, at Ayanis, on the east shore of Lake Van (Figure 4.2) (Çilingiroğlu et al. 2001), no evidence for reoccupation after the demise of Urartu has been identified either on the citadel or in the lower town (P. Zimansky, pers. comm. 2008). Another construction of Rusa II,

Bastam, in northern Iran, also remained uninhabited during the centuries of Achaemenid imperialism (Kleiss 1979, 1980, 1988). Yet a third fortress of Rusa II, Teishebai URU (or Karmir Blur), located on the Ararat plain, had been violently destroyed and then abandoned in the late seventh century BCE. By the following century, Teishebai URU would likely have appeared as a dilapidated heap of melted mud-brick atop stone foundations. This once-impressive Urartian political center was never cleared, repaired, or reoccupied.<sup>16</sup> Similarly at Tushpa, on the southeastern shore of Lake Van, once the capital of the Urartian Empire, there is no evidence for a reoccupation of the site during the mid-first millennium BCE.<sup>17</sup>


At Oshakan, on the northern Ararat plain, the Urartian citadel at the summit of a hill was left vacant during the period in question, despite the presence of a reusable complex of fine ashlar masonry. That said, an unfortified residential structure below the citadel does appear to show some evidence for continued occupation (Esayan and Kalantarian 1988; Ter-Martirosov 2001). Similarly at Horom, while the areas inside the walled citadel remained uninhabited after the collapse of Urartu, researchers discovered a small, post-Urartian domestic complex and animal stable constructed against the external face of one of the fortification walls (Badaljan et al. 1997; Kohl and Kroll 1999). Other Urartian fortress sites that also stood in disuse as political centers during the centuries of Achaemenid rule on the highlands include Aramus and Aragats on the Ararat plain and Çavuştepe and Anzaf in eastern Turkey.<sup>18</sup> Finally, the site of Argishtihinili presents a complicated case, but researchers have yet to identify architecture or a stratigraphic level clearly associated with the sixth through fourth centuries BCE.<sup>19</sup>

From this brief survey of several major and minor fortresses of Urartu, it is safe to conclude that most of the walled spaces of that polity were largely repudiated by the authorities of the highlands as centers of political control following Urartu's decline. For some groups—those who buried their dead in and around the fortresses or established small settlements outside the walls—these sites may have been places of some significance on account of their associations with ancestors long dead. But by and large the summits of the Urartian imperial apparatus appear to have been either citadels to be avoided, or places simply deemed inappropriate in the constitution of a new regime.

#### THE COLUMNED HALLS OF EREBUNI AND ALTINTEPE

Two fortresses, however, present notable exceptions to the pattern documented above. The small fortress of Altintepe, which was excavated by Turkish teams beginning in the 1950s, is located on a steep, conical mound that

risers up at the eastern end of the Erzincan plain, in modern eastern Turkey (Özgüç 1961/1962, 1966). During the Iron Age, Altın-tepe hosted two main periods of occupation. The first is marked by an Urartian temple surrounded by a portico, ancillary storerooms, and tombs, all contained within a buttressed fortification wall (Figure 4.3). During the second period of occupation, a large columned hall was built to the south of the earlier structure. The dating of this columned hall has been the subject of some recent reevaluation



**Figure 4.3.** Plan of Altın-tepe (after Summers 1993, fig. 2)




(Karaosmanoğlu and Korucu 2012), but on present evidence (among which the presence of a post-Urartian ceramic style known as Triangle Ware is particularly salient) an Achaemenid-era dating appears still the most likely (Summers 1993, Summer and Burney 2012). The earlier structures appear to have lain unused, although the fortress wall was rebuilt.


The hypostyle hall was made of thick mud-brick walls stacked on top of a stone socle. The structure's roof was supported by eighteen wooden columns, which bore their weight down upon round, poorly-finished limestone column bases. Access to this large ( $44 \times 25.30$  m) space was afforded through a single entrance in the east, which led through a vestibule to a small room that opened on a series of variously sized annexes. Apart from a hearth in the hall's northeastern quadrant, there were no preserved fixed architectural features; however, fresco fragments were found on the floor and walls of the room (Özgülç 1966: 47–58). Excavations in 2004 revealed an earlier structure beneath the floor of the hall, which measured 14 by 10 meters, considerably smaller than the later structure (Karaosmanoğlu et al. 2005).

The site of Erebuni is set atop a steep hill, which rises up at the eastern end of the fertile Ararat plain, on the outskirts of Yerevan, the modern capital of Armenia. Excavations at Erebuni began in the late nineteenth century, but systematic efforts got underway only in the 1950s, under the joint sponsorship of the State Pushkin Museum in Moscow and the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR (Hovhannisyan 1961). Royal cuneiform inscriptions found at the site securely date the first significant occupation of the hill to the first half of the eighth century BCE, when the Urartian king Argishti I built several densely arranged buildings, within a buttressed fortification wall (Figure 4.4). As at Altuntepe, there is evidence for one or more significant later building phases at the site, marked most notably by the expansion of a preexisting court or portico into a columned hall (apparent by, among other indicators, the mixed masonry of the final structure; Figure 4.5). Some of the original Urartian buildings may have been reused during subsequent centuries, and the fortification wall underwent minor renovation.

In its final iteration, the columned hall at Erebuni measured approximately 29 by 33 meters in its internal dimensions (i.e., slightly smaller than the hall at Altuntepe). The hall, also made of stone foundations with a mud-brick superstructure, contained 5 rows of 6 wooden columns that rested on hidden, sub-surface tufa column bases (26 of these were found *in situ*). From the main hall, there was one doorway leading to an ancillary room in the west (in the wall of the original, eighth-century Urartian construction), but the only point of egress into and out of the complex as a whole, as with the hall at Altuntepe,



**Figure 4.4.** Plan of Erebuni (courtesy of Adam T. Smith). This plan does not reflect recent discoveries in the vicinity of the columned hall, including the closure, during the hall's second phase, of the doorway leading to the temple of Haldi



**Figure 4.5.** Plan of Erebuni. Dark-stippled walls belong to the later building phase. Adapted from A. Farahani (Stronach et al. 2010, fig. 10). In this adaptation, the circles designate the locations of the columns, without assuming their placement on the floor of the room, nor the existence of circular brick-and-mortar “surrounds”

was in the east (a passage in the southwest leading to the earlier Urartian temple of Haldi was shuttered and blocked by a bench [Stronach et al. 2010]). And as with the columned hall at Altuntepe, the Erebuni hall was colorfully ornamented with wall paintings depicting multiple registers of vegetal motifs, animals, griffins, and geometric patterns, judging by extant fresco fragments (Hovhannisyan 1973; Ter-Martirosov 2005a). However, unlike Altuntepe, there were two fixed features inside the Erebuni building, a low, packed-clay bench running along the walls and a three-stepped clay altar built against the southwestern wall (traces of ash and charcoal were found on this feature and on the wall behind it) (Hovhannisyan 1961: figs. 43, 44; Stronach et al. 2010: 119).

It is important to stress that despite early best efforts, methods of excavation and renovation undertaken at Erebuni during the late 1960s did not match the standards of the present, resulting in the loss or misrepresentation of data (Stronach et al. 2010: 125–26), and, as with many sites that boast a long history of research, there are limitations to basing interpretation on the early findings. Recently revived excavations at Erebuni are working to refine our understanding of the site's chronology, and particularly the dating of the columned hall (Deschamps et al. 2011; Stronach et al. 2010; Ter-Martirosov 2005b). Until very recently, the prevailing view, on the basis of the early work at the site, held that the hypostyle hall was built during the period of Achaemenid rule on the highlands, and represented an *apadana*-like structure on the model of the elaborate halls at Persepolis and Susa (though the use of the term *apadana* for the highland structures was always a misnomer, even if the Achaemenid date for the construction of the building were to be accepted [Stronach 1985]) (Hovhannisyan 1961; Khatchadourian 2008; Ter-Martirosov 2001, 2005; Tirats'yan 1960, 1988: 24–27). Interpretations of the findings uncovered since 2008 have cast doubt on this established dating, and instead assign the construction of the columned hall at Erebuni to the closing decades (or even years) of the seventh century BCE (Deschamps et al. 2011; Stronach et al. 2010), during the transitional period between the demise of the Urartian state in around 640 BC and Cyrus's conquest of the region during the 540s.

The chronological details merit brief consideration, as the dating of the hall has significant implications for the ensuing analysis. The redating of the structure is based on three main points. First, investigators have noted the presence of finely dressed andesite blocks in the stone socles of the northern and eastern walls of the hall, which are not otherwise employed in the earlier Urartian constructions at the site. In form and size, these blocks find their closest parallels at the nearby Urartian site of Teishebai URU (as well as

at the early seventh century site of Ayanis), from which, investigators now hypothesize, the blocks were brought to Erebuni for reuse after the mid-seventh century destruction of Teishebai URU (Stronach et al. 2010: 120). Second, great significance is placed upon the presence of the mud-brick benches surrounding the hall, for which the highlighted parallels are the Iron Age columned halls of Hasanlu IV and especially the late seventh/early sixth century Median site of Godin Tepe in central western Iran (Stronach et al. 2010: 123). Third, the investigators have emphasized the placement of column bases beneath the floor surface, an approach also taken at the Median sites in Iran, such as Godin Tepe and Tepe Nush-i Jan. Again on parallel with these sites, it is speculated that additional elements of the sub-floor column support (namely, brick and mortar “surrounds”) also once existed in the hall at Erebuni, but were undetected by the original excavators (Deschamps et al. 2011, 130; Stronach et al. 2010: 125).

While a seventh century date for the construction of the hall is entirely possible on the basis of these observations, some of them raise more questions than they answer. For instance, on what grounds can it be asserted that the removal of andesite blocks from Teishebai URU occurred “not too long after” (Deschamps et al. 2011: n. 6) the destruction of the site? For centuries following the demise of Urartu, communities on the highlands engaged in different ways with the derelict remains of this fallen polity (Khatchadourian 2007) and, indeed, even elsewhere at the site of Erebuni there is evidence for Achaemenid-era (and possibly even early Hellenistic) activity (see below) (Stronach et al. 2010: 128). A late seventh-century date for the arrival of the andesite blocks (if they were indeed transferred from elsewhere) seems arbitrary in the absence of evidence of other datable materials moving along with them. We can be no more comfortable with a seventh-century assignation for the hall’s construction on the basis of the mud-brick bench and its parallel at Median Godin Tepe, for as Deschamps et al. (2010: 130) themselves point out, a mud-brick bench existed at the site of Beniamin, on Armenia’s Shirak Plain (where it is enigmatically associated, just as at Erebuni, with collected fragments of red tufa), whose identification as an Achaemenid-era residence is not in dispute. If the presence of a bench is indeed due to “nothing more complicated than . . . undeniable utility” (Stronach et al. 2010: 123), it can hardly serve as a robust cultural or chronological marker, Median, Achaemenid, or otherwise. For such utility was clearly also not lost on the builders of those columned spaces at Pasargadae and Persepolis that likewise contained mud-brick and stone benches.<sup>20</sup> Nor should it be overlooked that the buttresses reinforcing the exterior northeastern and eastern walls of the hall (measuring

2.70m) find close parallel, both in concept and width (even if not overall scale) in the buttresses on the Persepolis Treasury (ranging 2.80–2.97m) (Schmidt 1953: 158), as Gevorg Tirats'yan (1960: 108) observed over half a century ago (cf. Ghafadaryan 2010: 126).<sup>21</sup> By way of other possible Achaemenid architectural features at Erebuni, also deserving mention here is Felix Ter-Martirosov's (2005a: 50) suggestion that the portico at the entrance to the citadel, on the south side, does not correspond to the Urartian architectural canon given its outward-facing position, undefended by the fortification wall, for which parallel may be found in the outward-oriented porticoes of Palace P at Pasargadae (Nylander 1970: 115).

The crux of the problem is that, at present, no claims *can* be made to robust chronological markers for the building and use life of the hall at Erebuni, where the important new excavations must seek out the few unexcavated pockets of the site, re-excavate old trenches, and contend with the loss of stratigraphy (and the ceramics and other artifacts contained therein) from, most devastatingly for present purposes, the hall's interior.<sup>22</sup> Dating the construction of a building on the grounds of architectural style alone, without independent absolute or relative techniques, may provide a sound basis for a hypothesis, but unfortunately not a conclusion.<sup>23</sup> This is especially the case in the fluid cultural time-space of the first millennium Near East, where a common suite of architectural styles circulate and endure for centuries. In this regard it is worth considering the fact that not only did columned halls and benches obviously endure into the Achaemenid period, but Achaemenid-style column bases and capitals were in use well into the Hellenistic era in the Caucasus (see Knauss 2006, n. 24).<sup>24</sup>

Caution is all the more in order given the discovery of artifacts within and around Erebuni that provide just such alternative absolute and relative dates for activity at the site after the seventh century BC. For example, the two silver coins from Miletus dating no later than 478 BC (Sarkisian 1998: 12), found near the long-lived Susi temple (but without clear stratigraphic context), likely index the same far-reaching exchange networks that brought similar Milesian coins to Persepolis (Schmidt 1957: pl. 84, 11; Tirats'yan 1960: 103). A sherd of a distinctive ceramic bowl with a horizontal duck shaped handle, for which there is good stratigraphic information, is most similar to the duck- and swan-headed stone vessels from Persepolis (Karapetyan 2003: 44–45, pl. 2–3; Schmidt 1957: pl. 53; Tirats'yan 1960: 103).<sup>25</sup> And lastly, the three silver rhyta discovered in the course of construction work near the base of the Erebuni outcrop, which recently received their fullest treatment to date (Stronach 2011; see also Arakelyan 1971 and Ter-Martirosov 1996: figs. 188

and 194), provide perhaps the most firm evidence for the social practices of the most privileged at Erebuni in the Achaemenid and perhaps post-Achaemenid period. Comparably compelling artifactual evidence that can support a seventh-century activity at the site remains to be uncovered.

During this challenging and exciting period of flux in our understanding of Erebuni, socio-political analysis, while not to be indefinitely suspended until hoped-for chronological clarity is achieved, must proceed on the basis of multiple possibilities for the life cycle of the columned hall. I reduce these to the two most likely scenarios.<sup>26</sup> Either the builders of Erebuni, just as those at Altuntepe, working sometime after the region's capitulation to Achaemenid rule, used available Urartian masonry (or techniques) to replicate the form-concept of the columned hall because of its associations with the imperial heartland of Iran. In this scenario, we might suppose that they executed the project in a manner akin to the earlier and more modest halls of the preceding centuries (the most proximate of which were in Median lands, from which the Achaemenids themselves may have drawn inspiration) due to technical and resource constraints (e.g., skilled and manual labor, space, stone suitable for carving, etc.).<sup>27</sup> Alternatively, privileged social actors inhabiting the Ararat plain during the restless late-seventh century BCE, in a search for alternative sources of political authority in the aftermath of Urartu's decline, renovated Erebuni using the resources available to them. They did so with a southward eye to an established columned hall tradition of the Iron Age and its possible attendant meanings (see below), which could be accommodated within the principles of subsequent Achaemenid governance in the region, whose purposes the hall suitably served.<sup>28</sup> It remains to consider the implications of these scenarios for an understanding of Achaemenid hegemony on the highlands.


### FORM, SPACE, AND THE PRACTICE OF HEGEMONY

It is not clear why the two commanding hilltop citadels of Altuntepe and Erebuni, among all Urartian fortresses currently known to us, were singled out for reoccupation. But this revitalization transformed these former Urartian citadels into prominent venues for the production of authority on the Armenian highlands during the period of Achaemenid rule.<sup>29</sup> These renovated sites came to host two of the largest structures currently known on the territory of the highlands. The conjoining of hilltop fortress and hypostyle hall at Erebuni and Altuntepe points to a complex assimilation of foreign and local political traditions that renders these sites, at once and indistinguishably, locales for practices that sustained imperial power and upheld distinctly highland political

values. It is precisely this ambiguous mingling and materialization of local and imperial political cultures that opens Erebuni and Altintepe to interpretation as places of hegemonic production.

On the one hand, by building the hypostyle halls within the buttressed walls of Urartian fortresses—iconic symbols and sources of highland authority—these centers were effectively anchored to a familiar and enduring local political landscape. The new users of these sites appear to have vested their privileged social status in part on the potentially diverse affective responses that these reoccupations might have created for those both within and beyond the walls of the fortresses. They were calling up and reproducing a distinctly highland conception of the proper constitution of political authority, as defined through topographic difference, augmented by formidable defensive constructions (rebuilt at both sites) that accentuated the distance between rulers and ruled.

This particular spatialization of authority, staked appreciably on the cloistering of power high above open plains and behind defensive walls, is not consonant with Achaemenid political tradition as it is articulated spatially in the imperial centers of southwestern Iran. The first newly founded Achaemenid capital of Pasargadae, for instance, occupies the flat and fertile Dasht-i Morghab plain of the Fars province. While an elevated stone platform on a high ridge overlooks the valley from a distance of over 2 kilometers, stone staircases accessing the platform suggest that it “was not intended to become part of a fortified, impregnable position” (Stronach 1978: 15). Achaemenid authorities under the reign of Cyrus built the center of Pasargadae, with its main monumental halls, on the broad open plain, entirely undefended, and near to a rectangular garden whose stone watercourses are still preserved in fragments (Figure 4.6) (Benech et al. 2012; Stronach 1978: 107). Walled gardens, called *paradises* (Old Persian *pairi.daida*), were spaces of cosmological significance to the Achaemenids (Lincoln 2007, 2012). The choice to locate a center of authority on an open plain alongside these sanctuaries of cosmic and imperial perfection represents an intricate merging of religious and political aspirations. Much like Achaemenid cosmology more broadly, the gardens were inflected with deeply political resonances as imaginaries of an ideal imperial order (Lincoln 2007: 1, 16; 2012: 19). Although traces of gardens have not been preserved at other major Achaemenid centers, the sense of openness encountered at Pasargadae is not unique to this site. The capital of Susa, which was spread across three broad mounds, was similarly unfortified (Figure 4.7) (Boucharlat 1997: 57). The capital of Persepolis (Figure 4.8) is also situated within an open expanse,




**Figure 4.6.** Plan of Pasargadae  
(after Allen 2005: fig. 1.16)

in this case that of the Marv Dasht plain, and the walls that enclose the terrace on which the main structures stand are less defensive structures than symbols of imperial unity (Lincoln 2007: 83; Root 1990: 120). In short, the imperial centers built by the Achaemenids convey a sense of accessibility and spaciousness when contrasted with the steeply elevated and heavily fortified centers of the Armenian highlands. If, as textual sources attest, the conquered lands of the empire also had their own paradises (Briant 2002: 233), on the highlands such gardens could have been segregated from the spaces of political practice. The relative accessibility of the Achaemenid capitals and their siting on open plains suggest that, in sanctioning the transformation or continued use of Erebuni and Altuntepe into regional centers, imperial authorities were accommodating a contrary political tradition premised on exclusion and isolation.


At the same time, however, the reuse of Erebuni and Altuntepe is not reducible to a mere mimicking of Urartian traditions. Indeed, as we have seen, the vast majority of known Urartian fortress centers were abandoned as political centers under the Achaemenids, suggesting that by the mid-first millennium BCE, the fortress had lost some of its relevance as a key structuring institution of political life. Moreover, the columned hall itself signals a sharp departure from the local highland past. This building form finds no direct counterpart in the architecture of Urartu (cf. Ghafadaryan 2010). Although





**Figure 4.7.** Plan of Susa (after Allen 2005: fig. 3.8)

columned and pillared spaces were a feature of Urartian architecture, they differed considerably from the halls described above. Urartian columned spaces were long rectangular structures, with only one row of pillars, as, for instance, at Bastam, Armavir, and Erebuni. In addition, the Urartian two-rowed porticoes were markedly smaller than the later hypostyle halls at Erebuni and Altıntepe.<sup>30</sup> Hypostyle constructions were not a part of the Urartian architectural repertoire. By and large, as mentioned above, Urartian fortresses were premised on the segmentation of activities and the



**Figure 4.8.** Plan of Persepolis (Allen 2005: fig. 3.16)

regulation of movement (A. T. Smith 2003). The plan of Erebuni provides but one example of this phenomenon, which is also on view at labyrinthine sites like Teishebai URU, Argishtihinili, and Bastam, where we often find densely compacted rooms separated by long, narrow courtyards (Kleiss 1988; Martirosian 1961, 1974). Promoting interaction among sizable numbers of people who enjoyed access to the restricted inner quarters of the fortress was not an element of Urartian political practice.

In the Achaemenid Empire, what then was the hegemonic, practical, and symbolic significance of a single, relentlessly symmetrical covered space that could accommodate large numbers of people? To answer this question, we must momentarily take leave of Erebuni and Altuntepe, returning once again to the form's genealogy and the columned halls of Iron Age Iran, and then turn to its majestic instantiations in the Achaemenid imperial centers. It has long been suggested that the highly elaborated halls of Pasargadae, Susa, and Persepolis find their origins in the architectural form-concept first articulated at sites like Hasanlu, Godin Tepe, and Tepe Nush-i Jan. But if not set in a sociopolitical frame of analysis, this claim runs the risk of inadvertently reducing some of the most sophisticated architecture of the mid-first millennium BCE to the status of mere derivatives. I am thus inclined to view the articulation between the Iron Age halls of Iran (and perhaps Arabia) and those of the imperial centers, in the first instance, as the result of a careful calculation on the part of the Achaemenid kings (and paramount among them, Cyrus, with his innovative building of Palace P at Pasargadae). Entailed in this calculation was the cooptation of a political tradition belonging to pre-existing social solidarities (like the Medes), who came to be incorporated as subjects (albeit privileged ones) in the imperial project.

The basic social contours of this assimilated tradition entailed what might be called "congregational" politics, for the clearest practical affordance of the columned hall, above all else, is the gathering of large groups (Khatchadourian 2008b: 419; see also Gopnik 2010: 203). The ceramic evidence from Godin, Rumeilah, and Muweilah support an interpretation of these sites as venues for commensal consumption among privileged social actors (Gopnik 2010: 199). As I have elsewhere argued (Khatchadourian 2008b: 420), another of the most salient practical features of this architectural form, with its evenly spaced rows of supports, is the lack of clear frontal orientation, which could allow for a kind of "distributed" (i.e., not steeply hierarchical) sociopolitical interaction.<sup>31</sup>

It is these (and possibly other) dimensions of the spatial logic of the columned hall that the Achaemenids appropriated to their own purposes, hegemonically incorporating select values and cultural practices of a subjugated peoples. For while the practical functions of the many columned spaces of the imperial heartland are still debated, the range of possibilities center on congregational acts of ceremony, assembly, banqueting, and garrisoning. And for all the consequential scalar, material, and decorative departures that the designers of the Achaemenid halls took from their Iron Age antecedents—to the point where it is inadmissible to speak of anything less than architectural innovation—they preserved elements of the fluid directionality permitted in

a space with limited axial definition (although in the *apadana* at Susa, a stone foundation for a throne was discovered between two rows of columns on the southern end of the hall, providing some north–south axiality [Stronach 1985: 438]).

Moreover, rather effectively, the Achaemenids brought these appropriated structural forms and attendant practical possibilities into their own system of meaning. That is, I suggest that there exist certain homologies between the built structure of the columned halls and select Achaemenid cosmological principles, and that these homologies are not coincidental. The first concerns the concept of the Achaemenid paradise, discussed briefly above, whose linked metaphysical and political allusions Lincoln (2007, 2012) has so elegantly illuminated. From Lincoln we learn that the Achaemenid kings regarded these contained outdoor environments of vegetative and zoological abundance and perfection “not only as ideal spaces of repose, but also as models of the empire they were more actively laboring to create and prefigurations of what the world would be when their work was fully accomplished” (Lincoln 2007: 1). Lincoln describes what these venerated spaces of practice and fantasy were (or were imagined) to be like: “Plantings were arranged in geometric patterns to create a sense of perfect order and exquisite beauty.”<sup>32</sup> This resolute commitment to symmetry, pattern, and order executed through the planting of trees in the gardens is mirrored by the meticulous arrangement of soaring columns in the columned halls. Moreover, many of the column elements (not only in halls), for instance at Persepolis, were adorned with vegetative and zoomorphic motifs, such as flowers, palms, and double bull, griffin, and lion protomes (Curtis and Tallis 2005: figs. 5.41, 5.42, 5.43, pp. 60, 64). The zoologically animated forests of columns in these spaces rendered the Achaemenid halls into built metaphors for the politico-religious paradises.

The second homology, recognized also by Gopnik (2010: 204–5), relates to the throne-bearing scenes discussed at the opening of this chapter, in which the standing figures are bracketed by two column-like elements that also support the platform on which the king sits (see Figure 4.1).<sup>33</sup> In their arrangement as parallel elements, the column and the human serve the same structural purpose, each potentially acting as a metaphor for the other. In Gopnik’s (2010: 205) words, “the equation of an architectural column with a supporter of the power of the king was a well-accepted trope in the Achaemenid visual vocabulary.” Just as a column supports the edifice under which it stands, so too the subjugated uphold the institutions built through and for their own subjection. The coherence that exists across the material and conceptual

domains conjured by these homologies is an instance of what Ian Hodder (2012: 113–37) has called “fittingness.”

Let us now return to the highland halls, and proceed first on the assumption that Erebuni was built in the seventh century BCE (some scholars would also include Altintepe). By the time Cyrus and Darius elaborated the form at the imperial capitals over half a century later, we might suppose that the privileged actors at Erebuni would have come to regard the columned hall as an established highland institution, one that had tied them for decades to a broader political aesthetic of congregational and distributed sociopolitical interaction. In terms of scale, the highland hypostyle halls had the capacity to concentrate unprecedented numbers of people in a single interior space.<sup>34</sup> In notable departure from the Urartian past, they drew more participants into the confines of the fortress, inviting interaction among large groups rather than separating and isolating people and activities. The halls also evince the lack of frontal directionality, an absence most clearly expressed at Erebuni, where a low bench surrounds all four sides of the hall’s interior, thus supporting the notion of a distributed (relatively nonhierarchical) interactional space. We may find further cause to doubt that the halls were venues for the promulgation of steeply hierarchical social relations in the circulation patterns they permit. Both complexes at Altintepe and Erebuni have only a single entrance (in both cases in the east) (see figs. 4.3–4).<sup>35</sup> Although right of entry into the halls was potentially strictly regulated by the existence of only one point of entry and egress, this same access point served for all participants engaged in the practices that took place within the halls.<sup>36</sup>

The extractive demands that the Achaemenids would have imposed in this (as any other) satrapal region would have been met in some partial manner through the efforts of privileged individuals whose social standing was preserved in part through the activities that took place in these halls. We might suppose that the halls were multifunctional spaces in which group council or assembly periodically took place, perhaps enabled through the social lubricants of commensal consumption, which during the Achaemenid period took standardized “international” forms.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, it is possible that such gatherings were at the same time opportunities for the shared practice of religious ritual. The fire installations in both halls are notable, particularly the tri-stepped “sacrificial altar” at Erebuni.<sup>38</sup> Without delving into one of the most complex and debated aspects of Achaemenid studies, suffice it to note that tri-stepped fire altars are common in Achaemenid iconography and are linked to the worship of the god Ahuramazda (Garrison 1999; Moorey 1979). In sum, while the specific practices elude us, I suggest that the highland halls

inculcated local leaders in ways both familiar and novel, thus binding the communities from which they came to a larger collective and sustaining its rules and conventions. In a setting where administrative practices and their associated paraphernalia appear to have been eschewed (at least, no durable media survive), assembly halls would have facilitated the production of cadres (what we might equate with Gramsci's "intellectuals") versed in the norms of Achaemenid social practice through face-to-face interaction.

Whether such "intellectuals" would have known of the monumental buildings of distant southwestern Iran, and recognized those buildings as modified assimilations of "their own" political traditions can never be ascertained. But imperial agents who sanctioned the continued use of these local institutions could well have conceptually reformulated them (for themselves and others) as effective symbols for the extension of the struggle for cosmic paradise and political order into the conquered territories. The columned halls would have evoked and sustained the principles and aspirations that underlay the Achaemenid worldview, even as they incorporated some of the norms and values of their northern subjects, whose acquiescence within this very duality consummately represents the workings of hegemony.

A rather more coercive interpretation emerges from a post-547 BCE dating of the halls. In such a case imperial agents may be seen to have imposed a new approach to constituting authority on the highlands that was unfamiliar to those regional elites for whom the memory of Urartu still structured conceptions of the proper spatial logics of power. The symbolic replication within subjugated lands of the homologies that link the columned hall to the Achaemenid "metaphysic of power" would have emplaced and inculcated local leaders within venues subtly iconic of their own subordination. Engaging in the routine or periodic practices that the halls afforded would have amounted to a form of consent to the principles of the empire and the institutions of elite congregational politics that helped hold it together. This ought not be viewed energetically, as the calculated collaboration of local agents anxious to maintain the privilege of power. It was likely, at least for some, and at some times during the over two hundred years of Achaemenid rule, an embrace of Achaemenid political culture.

## CONCLUSION

It is, to be sure, less than satisfying to have to contend with parallel archaeological interpretations because the fundamentals of chronology remain unresolved. But less rewarding still is a relentless quest for chronological precision when it is not clear what is at stake in the discovery, whether historically

or anthropologically. The rapid pace of change in our understanding of Erebuni and Altuntepe occasioned by the renewed investigations will hopefully lead toward such much-desired precision. On present evidence, however, this much is clear: the siting of the highland halls within former Urartian fortresses amounted to a deliberate struggle to assimilate into the new political order of the mid-first millennium BCE elements of a deeply ingrained highland political tradition centered on the fortress. By using the columned halls at Erebuni and Altuntepe at times during the sixth through fourth centuries BCE, highland authorities participated to some degree in the reproduction of what had become an institution of Achaemenid political culture, albeit inflected by aspects of their own world view. I contend that it is the mingling of subaltern and dominant political and cosmological values that opens Erebuni and Altuntepe to investigation as locales of hegemonic production.

That the Achaemenid kings were conscious of this effort at assimilation is tantalizingly suggested by an important royal inscription, commissioned by Xerxes in the fifth century BC, and carved on a high outcrop on the eastern shore of Lake Van. This craggy tor hosted the ruins of Tushpa, former capital of Urartu and one of the many fortresses abandoned after that empire's collapse. Xerxes had the text written into a blank niche that was already chiseled into the precipice. He was thus completing a project that his father, King Darius, had left unfinished in these northern reaches of their vast empire. After an elaborate encomium to the god Ahuramazda, "the greatest of gods, who created the sky and who created the earth and who created man," the Tushpa inscription continues:

I am Xerxes, the great king, King of Kings, the king of countries, king of the entirety of all languages, king of the great, broad earth, the son of king Darius, the Achaemenid.

King Xerxes says: King Darius, my father, by the grace of Ahuramazda made much that was good, and *this mountain*, he gave an order to work the face, and he wrote nothing over it; so I ordered that this be written there. (Lecoq 1997: 263–64, emphasis added)<sup>39</sup>

To a modern historical sensibility, the Tushpa inscription may seem peculiar, if not anticlimactic. An impressive preamble of unfettered kingly bombast,<sup>40</sup> it turns out, prefaces a mere recounting of the banal circumstances surrounding the inscription's own making. But this curious father-son project in fact represents a complex and calculated gesture of imperial intervention that harkens to one aspect of hegemony discussed near the beginning of this essay. Hegemony entails the assimilation of a dominant group's values into the

daily experience of subalterns, the constant renegotiation of relations between rulers and ruled, and the accommodation of subaltern aspirations into dominant hegemonic projects.

In indelibly branding “this mountain,” the Achaemenid kings made a claim on the foundations of authority that had long prevailed in the region. Symbolically and with divine sanction, Darius and Xerxes attempted to co-opt the social rules that had long preserved the mountain fortress as the defining locale of sovereign political authority in the Armenian highlands. They insinuated their royal prerogative into that enduring political tradition. In so doing, however, they also effectively acknowledged the primacy of Tushpa and the values of fortress-based rule it represented. In devising the Tushpa inscription as a way to assert their control, the Achaemenid kings ultimately incorporated a highland institution into their own worldview on the appropriate constitution of authority. The Tushpa monument thus represents another instantiation of the phenomenon on view at Erebuni and Altintepe, in which the Achaemenids, in contrast to their own preference for open, unfortified sites of authority, assimilated the fortress into their norms of political order as part of the process of garnering consent.

An inquiry focused on hegemony runs the risk of downplaying the capacities and aspirations for resistance among subalterns within imperial formations. That is not the intention here, even as resistance has not been the particular focus of this study. That the highland halls may at times have been venues for expressing discontent, breaking rules, organizing noncompliance, or, for that matter, simply “playing by the rules” in order to reap economic benefits and avoid sanctions is not in question. The revolts organized by Armenian rebels against the crown, recounted in the Bisitun inscription, indicate that subjugated elites could work through the existing hegemonic institutions that maintained their solidarity to sow the seeds of transformation. There are risks attendant to overemphasis on these possibilities, however, for they fail to account for the effective endurance of particular relations of power over centuries and generations. In addition, they perpetuate an unsatisfactory understanding of human action in the past as either in constant opposition or narrowly motivated by simple economic calculation, allowing little room for transformations in beliefs and meanings spurred by confrontations between sovereigns and subalterns. In attending to the hegemonic production of the Achaemenid Empire in the highlands, it appears that provincial authority in Armenia was not solely a problem of cooptation and imposition but a deeper encounter between traditions—one that ultimately altered both parties.



## NOTES

1. This article was completed and submitted for publication in 2008. After the long delay in publication, significant revisions could only be made to those sections in which new discoveries necessitated them.

2. The “atlas posture” belongs to a long tradition in Near Eastern art, which pre-dates the Achaemenid Empire. In earlier art, the pose is adopted only by gods and mythical beings and has cosmic and celestial associations. Here it is transformed as part of a metaphor of imperial power (Root 1979: 148; 1980: 12).

3. Satrapy is a Greek word coined by Herodotus (*Hist.* 1.192, 3.89) to refer to the lands of the Achaemenid Empire. It is built off of an Old Persian root word, *-xšaça*, meaning dominion or sovereignty, and lacks the administrative connotations of “province” that historians from Herodotus to the present have used to define it. An analysis of this complex word is beyond the scope of this paper. See Lincoln (2007: 45) for an account of some of the complexity.

4. By “spontaneous” consent Gramsci appears to mean consent that is not entirely conscious. This is closely aligned to his understanding of *common sense*, the conceptions that are shared by a society as a whole and provide a guide to life.

5. Gramsci’s concept of intellectuals is quite distinct from the popular meaning of the word today. “All men are intellectuals,” according to Gramsci (1971: 9), because all occupations entail intellectual and creative capacity, but not all individuals play a role as intellectuals in society. Gramsci’s organic intellectuals are primarily involved in the spheres of economic production, however they also participate more broadly in politics and culture (Ransome 1992: 188).

6. This discussion, which focuses on the postconquest phase of imperial formation, is based on a selection of influential works in the archaeology of empires. It is by no means a comprehensive synthesis of this expansive area of archaeological inquiry, and does not take in important developments of recent years (see n. 1).

7. Considerable attention in the archaeological literature on empires has been devoted to detailing models of imperial organization (e.g., core/periphery, metrocentric, pericentric, systemic, hegemonic, territorial, and patrimonial models, “shadow” empires, etc.) and the strategies of rule available to imperial authorities (see, for example, Barfield 2001; D’Altroy 1992: 14–24; Schreiber 1992: 1–39). I am not concerned here to assess how archaeology has theorized such macro-structural phenomena of early empires (i.e., questions of direct versus indirect rule, or varying degrees of integration), nor to review matters of definition.

8. The history of the Armenian highlands during the period of Achaemenid rule is disjointed. Any narrative must cobble together and sometimes interlace a range of disparate sources, including Persian royal inscriptions and Greek and Roman narrative histories. For a full account of the historical sources on Achaemenid Armenia, see Khatchadourian 2008b. For a brief overview of Achaemenid history, see Kuhrt 2001. For comprehensive historical treatments, see Briant 2002 and Kuhrt 2007a; 2007b.

9. Historians have offered several rather different cartographies of Achaemenid Armenia based on differing extrapolations from the passing geographic remarks in various ancient sources; see Hewsén 1983; Jacobs 1994; Sagona 2004a; Tirats’yan 1980, 1981.

10. The revolts referred to are recounted and depicted on one of the empire’s most famous monuments, the inscription and relief at Bisitun. For a discussion of Armenia and Bisitun, see Khatchadourian 2008b. It is important to recognize that the Bisitun monument is, like the throne-bearing scenes discussed at the start of this paper, a highly calculated creation of an Achaemenid king that served a specific purpose within a larger ideological project. It thus can be thought to depict real conditions with no more accuracy than other products of imperial ideology.

11. The Kingdom of Urartu is thought to have arisen around Lake Van in the central Near Eastern highlands during the late second and early first millennium BCE from a conglomeration of smaller polities; see Barnett 1982; Piotrovskii 1969; Zimansky 1985, 1995a, 1998. Between the mid-ninth and late eighth centuries BCE, Urartu rapidly expanded from its heartland east of Lake Van to encompass areas west of the lake, the South Caucasus, and northern Iran despite the pressures imposed by formidable foes, most especially Assyria.

12. It is important to stress that archaeological investigations into this period in highland history have been limited to date (Khatchadourian 2011: 485–89). For an intellectual history of classical archaeology in the South Caucasus, see Khatchadourian 2008a.

13. On changing settlement patterns in the highlands during the first millennium BCE, see Khatchadourian 2008b: 342–94.

14. Elsewhere I have examined the participation of the subjugated in imperial reproduction through a study of material practices in a single remote town of this region; see Khatchadourian 2008b.

15. The literature on Urartian fortresses is considerable. Both new and seminal publications that provide an opening onto this literature include Kroll et al. 2012, A. T. Smith 2003, Zimansky 1985.

16. It is important to emphasize that the evidence for disregard pertains to the functionality of the fortresses as political institutions. The spaces within and around these fortresses were, in some cases, re-appropriated to different purposes (Khatchadourian 2007). For instance, at Teishebai URU, three burials, which Martirosian dated to the sixth through fourth centuries BCE, were dug into the lower town outside the fortress; see Karapetyan 2003: 24; Martirosian 1961: 137–48.

17. Although here, too, some Late-Iron Age burials (defined rather vaguely by the researcher as Median-Achaemenian-Parthian in date) were found either above or within the level of an Urartian complex; see Tarhan 1994: 39–41.

18. The case of Artashat is inconclusive at present, as it remains to determine the nature of the reoccupation at Hill II of this multi-hilled Hellenistic/Roman-era capital, where an Urartian fortress may have once stood (Tonikyan 1992).

19. Of the eastern and western fortified hills that make up the original Urartian complex at Argishtihinili, the western hill remained unoccupied in subsequent centuries. On the eastern hill, called Armavir, the stratigraphic situation is exceedingly complicated due to several phases of reuse. The long-time director of the Armavir excavations, Gevork Tirats'yan (1988: 11), concluded that there was no clear evidence for an Achaemenid-era stratum at Armavir, despite Felix Ter-Martirosov's (1974) attempt to delineate one as part of his dissertation research. Ter-Martirosov (2001: 156) has since argued that a columned hall at the east side of the eastern hill dates to the period of Achaemenid rule but his post-Urartian dating of the structure in question is not widely accepted (cf. Ghafadaryan 2010). Despite doubts, the existence of an Elamite tablet found at Armavir makes it difficult to set aside the possibility of significant activity during the centuries of Achaemenid hegemony. The limited documentary evidence is tantalizing but inconclusive. Scholars have long debated the dating of this inscription. The first publication associated it with the Epic of Gilgamesh; see Diakonov and Jankowska 1990. Another scholar (Koch 1993) dated it to the Achaemenid period and proposed that it originated from Persepolis. Both readings were disputed by Vallat (1995). Vallat (1997) has offered the latest reading, suggesting a date in the second half or the third quarter of the sixth century BCE, and rejects the idea that the inscription came from Persepolis.

20. Such structures include the Hall 41 of the Treasury and the porticoes of the Apadana and the Council Hall (Schmidt 1953: 80, 111, 178, figs. 40D, 45C, 56D).

21. There are no such buttresses at Godin Tepe, but there are at Nush-i Jan, where the buttresses are about 2 m wide (Stronach and Roaf 2007).

22. It is thus regrettably of little surprise or significance that there is “no visible sign of any post-Urartian occupation within the limits of the structure” (Stronach et al. 2010: 128), since the original excavators were thorough in their removal of the assemblages.

23. The ceramics from the new excavations at Erebuni have yet to be published. At present it can only be surmised that these data do not play a significant role in the site's re-dating. The one published radiocarbon date from the new excavations was collected from the bone collagen of an ovi-caprid skull located beneath the level of the floor (or on a lower floor) near the southwest perimeter of the hall, and yielded a radiocarbon age of 2498  $\pm$  26 BP (Stronach et al. 2010: n. 2). The calibrated date range of 775–521 BC (at 2 sigma, OxCal 4.1) falls directly on the unhelpful Hallstatt plateau, but the stratigraphic context and associated ceramic sherd favor an Urartian date for the sample.

24. As to the hidden column bases at Erebuni, it is unnecessary to speculate the existence of “surrounds” on the order of those at Godin Tepe and Nush-i Jan. Several seasons at the roughly seventh–fourth-century settlement of Tsaghkahovit, in central Armenia, have uncovered roughly hewn column bases embedded into clay-packed floors without any evidence of such stone, brick, mortar and plaster “surrounds” (Khatchadourian 2008b: 200, 205).

25. A comparable example was also found at Armavir (Karapetyan 2003: 45). Karapetyan (2003: 44) reports that the Erebuni sherd was found in 1956 in the southern part of the fortress, within the upper levels of excavated room 11, “in the area of the late period constructions.”

26. See Ghafadaryan 2010 for a third.

27. Other columned halls of the pre-Achaemenid period have recently come to light in southeast Arabia, at Muweilah and Rumeilah (Boucharlat and Lombard 2001; Magee 2001), helping us now understand that the Achaemenids rendered iconic and monumental a kind of spatial politics whose antecedents were dispersed beyond Media (see also Gopnik 2010).

28. In the absence of clear evidence for activity within the hall that post-dates the seventh century BCE, Stronach et al. (2010: 128) suppose that the structure was “probably allowed to collapse within the course of the 6th and 5th centuries . . . .” Under ideal archaeological conditions, the absence of such evidence would unequivocally support such a supposition. But such absence from a structure that has been previously excavated, and whose artifactual contents were thus largely removed (and presumably discarded, given no mention of archival work in the storerooms of the Erebuni or Pushkin museums), is less than significant. This is all the more the case given available evidence for post-seventh century activity elsewhere at the site. Under such conditions, it is improbable that the most dominant, spacious structure would be left to decay (but not be dismantled) while the site was still in use. Finally, it must also be frankly acknowledged that the identification of Achaemenid-era pottery on the Armenian highlands is a formidable challenge in light of: a) the absence of a systematic typology for the period, which recent work is only beginning to address (Karapetyan 2003; Khatchadourian 2008b, under review); b) the rarity of diagnostic wares and forms like Triangle Ware that serve elsewhere as important chronological markers; c) the formal similarities of some fine wares, particularly the all-important carinated bowl, to Urartian forms.

29. One factor may be that neither fortress had been sacked in the conflagrations that destroyed many of Rusa II's citadels. Altuntepe and Erebuni remained untouched, still capable of projecting the impression of an enduring imperial power. It may also be the case that the position of the two outcrops on either end of the highlands made them favored locales for highland and/or Achaemenid authorities, especially if we accept the intimations of an eastern and western division of the satrapy provided in the historical record (see Khatchadourian 2008b).

30. The columned hall at Bastam is a quarter of the size of the hall at Altuntepe and a third the size of the hall at Erebuni. The Urartian hall at Armavir is approximately two-thirds the size of the columned hall at Erebuni and just over half the size of the columned hall at Altuntepe.

31. While also recognizing the lack of axial directionality in the halls, Gopnik (2010: 203) prefers to retain a sense of sharp social distinction within the space, by presuming the presence of a raised seat of honor, or throne (of perishable material) at one end of the hall.

32. This impression is drawn from a passage in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (4.18), which contains the following description of a paradise: “Lysander admired the beauty of the trees in it, the accuracy of the spacing, the straightness of the rows, the regularity of the angles and the multitude of sweet things that clung round them as they walked.”

33. The association of columns and figures assuming the atlas pose is also rather explicit on the tombs of the kings as Naqsh-e Rostam, where the throne bearing scenes is set directly atop the façade of a building with its columns depicted in relief.

34. One of the excavators of Erebuni (Hovhannisyan 1961: 79) estimated that the hall could have held two to three thousand people, but this figure seems inflated.

35. In the case of Erebuni, the closure of the doorway that once led to the Haldi temple at the southwestern corner of the hall is a discovery of the recent excavations (Stronach et al. 2010). To my knowledge, the western doorway has not yet been reexamined, so it is not yet clear whether it was indeed open during the second phase of the structure's use, as the original architectural plans suggest. But it is in any event notable that this doorway leads to small chambers (and not substantial residential quarters, as behind the *apadanas* at Susa and Persepolis) that provide no independent point of entry or egress into the complex.

36. In emphasizing the possibilities for assembly in these halls, I aim to set to one side the traditional view the highland halls functioned as “palaces” or residences of highland satraps—a notion that has fed rather fantastical suggestions of specific historical actors known from classical sources seated literally within the halls (Sagona 2004b: 313; Summers 1993: 96; Ter-Martirosov 2001: 160). In this regard, it is worth also noting that Erebuni and Altuntepe do not have a single-columned room adjacent to the main hall as at Godin, Muweilah, and Rumeilah, which Hilary Gopnik (2010: 203) interprets as a kind of inner quarter for a single individual of privilege who would be well positioned to supervise the activities that took place in the halls.

37. There is no way to know whether the silver rhyta from Erebuni, discussed above, were associated with the columned hall itself. But they are iconic paraphernalia of Achaemenid commensal politics, and their proximity to the citadel is not to be discounted in a consideration of elite practice at the site. In addition, a collection of ornate silver vessels of Achaemenid style are also said to have been found “near Erzincan,” which is only twelve miles west of Altuntepe; see Curtis and Tallis 2005: figs. 104, 106–8. These vessels were included in the 1897 Frank bequest to the British Museum, and are regrettably without provenance. Summers (1993: 96) has associated these objects with the Achaemenid-era occupation at Altuntepe.

38. At Altuntepe, the inbuilt hearth is situated toward the northeastern part of the room, in a spot that breaks distinctly with the overall symmetry of the room, while at Erebuni, the “sacrificial altar” is along the southern wall, also not centered.

39. Trilingual rock-carved inscriptions are a recurring element of the Achaemenid dynasty’s public repertoire. The rock carving at Tushpa is known as Achaemenid royal inscription XV. The translation presented here is of the Babylonian version of the text, which also appears in Old Persian and Elamite.

40. On this formulaic refrain in Achaemenid inscriptions, see Lincoln 2007: 13.

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## CHAPTER 5

# SASANIAN IMPERIALISM AND THE SHAPING OF ARMENIAN IDENTITY

## INTERDISCIPLINARY VERIFICATION AND AMBIVALENCE OF EMPIRE–NATION RELATIONSHIP

GREGORY E. ARESHIAN

**A**N ARCHAEOLOGIST PARTICIPATING IN THE EVER-PASSIONATE academic discussion of past and present imperialism must answer (directly and indirectly, generally and particularly) at least two basic epistemological questions: (1) To what extent can archaeology identify in its data and interpret imperial political, military, and other structures, relations, and actions, as well as various local responses to those actions, without resorting to written historical records or direct ethnographic-sociological observations? (2) How helpful can archaeology be in complementing, correcting, reinterpreting, or revising written evidence concerning empires of the past? In other words: Can an interdisciplinary investigation create new transdisciplinary knowledge concerning empires that would be unattainable within the limits of a particular discipline, which is bound by the constraints of the character of its data and the particularity of its methods?

Performing a mental historical experiment, an archaeologist would most likely recognize an imperial structure behind the system of roads and warehouses of the Incas, even absent any written Spanish records or local memories. As a matter of fact, Peru is, so far, the only geographic region where it was possible to reconstruct the pre-Inca prehistoric Wari Empire

with a substantial degree of probability based solely on archaeological evidence (Schreiber 2001). Or, another example: imagining the total disappearance of Classical literature, epigraphy, numismatics, and later historical and folkloric memory, one could still conclude that the monumental architecture and art in Rome—taken in connection with many uniform components in archaeological assemblages spreading from that center along exemplary roads built by a central power all the way to frontier fortifications known as *limes*—would in aggregate suggest the remnants of a powerful empire. In the Ancient Near East, the archaeological pattern of Urartian fortresses and cities, with their elite culture dominating over a variety of cultures of local ethnic groups, clearly implies an imperial presence.

In the case of the Iranian Sasanian Empire, archaeology, complementing the historical record, may shed light on many significant aspects of Sasanian imperialism, particularly clarifying one of its most important regional policies regarding Armenia and the Caucasus. At the same time, it presents a pattern that reflects the character of the local response to imperial action. Moreover, conceptually new interpretation of written sources combined with relevant archaeological data allow us to discern in the Sasanian–Armenian relations a specific model of interaction between empire and nation,<sup>1</sup> which finds several parallels throughout world history.

Two conflicting perspectives of the Sasanian–Armenian relations may be analyzed. The modern Armenian perspective, constituting a cornerstone of the modern Armenian historical thought, presents these relations from the point of view of an oppressed polity whose struggle against the yoke of the Sasanian Empire is identified with modern Armenian national inspirations. This paradigmatic concept has been expounded many times in Armenian, Russian, and Western scholarship of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. It is predicated on the view that social and cultural identity at a national level is a value per se, and that national ruling elites have the right and duty to resist foreign encroachments on their powers to control national societies. Yet, one must not forget that this perspective was created during the two essential periods of formation and growth of the Armenian national identity, the first one dating from the third to the seventh centuries CE when that identity was shaped, and the second, modern period, when the Armenian nation struggled to reestablish its independent statehood. Naturally, the modern Armenian perspective is substantively nationalistic. It failed even to address the history of emergence and transformation of the Armenian national identity from an anthropological perspective, taking such an identity for granted.<sup>2</sup>

On the other side, it can be postulated that the Sasanian perspective of Sasanian–Armenian relations was derived from at least three essential determinants of that imperialistic ideology: (1) the Sasanian self-perception that had stimulated and directed their activities toward foreign polities and people; (2) the self-serving special interests of the imperial ruling elite; (3) the tradition of preceding Iranian–Armenian relations, which had had many centuries of history before the Sasanian dynasty overtook the imperial power in Iran.

An analysis of primary sources strongly suggests that a very refined state of conceptualization of the Iranian Empire existed during the Sasanian rule. The empire as a whole was called *Ērānshahr*, “the Iranian Realm.” This term most certainly did not exist in the Achaemenid period, and one may wonder whether it was a creation of Parthian times—this seems possible, but not highly probable, for the late Parthian period, i.e., the late first–early third centuries CE—or a political, ideological, and administrative elaboration of the first Sasanians. While the administrative organization of the Sasanian Empire has been thoroughly studied by many scholars, no sufficient summary characterization has been given to the Sasanian imperialistic ideology. The latter found its ultimate expression in the Sasanian concept of history reflected in literature and folklore, and, above all, in a number of Zoroastrian religious texts, especially the *yashts*, which tells us that the sources of inspiration for the Sasanian imperial concepts must be sought in Achaemenid and maybe even pre-Achaemenid times (the latter depending on the dates of the *yasht* contents, not on the dates of their literary canonization).

Two basic ideas dominate that concept. The first was the primeval universal monarchy established by Gayōmard, who, according to the *Bundabishn* (a later Zoroastrian scripture), was the first man created by Ahuramazdā during the sixth stage of cosmogony (Christensen 1917: 45). In early texts, he is already referred to as “King of the World” (Yarshater 1983: 420). The identification of the first human being, Gayōmard, with the first king should be dated no later than Parthian times, since it appears first in the *Dēnkard* III, 35, 2. During the Sasanian period, this identification became canonized, as attested by the *Xvadbāināmāg* (Christensen 1917: 66–74). In an earlier legendary version presented by the *yashts*, Hōshang, who is also called *paradhāta* (created first), stands as the first king and hero. He was said to have created the monarchy *dahyupadēh* and also was viewed as the founder of the mythic Pishdadian dynasty, which was the first to rule the world. Yasht 5 is explicit about the aspirations of that first man:

To her sacrificed Hōshyanga Paradhāta one hundred stallions, one thousand bulls, ten thousand sheep on the slope of Mount Harā. And he implored her

saying: “Give me the fortune, o benevolent and very powerful Arədvī Sūrā Anāhitā, that will let me attain supreme rule over all the countries, over the demons and people. . . . (ibid.: 133)

Firdausī (1973: 10) makes of Hōshang a successor to Gayōmard on the throne of the world. The initial unity of the global monarchy was broken by King Frēdōn, who divided it between his three sons. The central region of the world, which included Ērānshahr, was given to Frēdōn’s favorite son Ēraj (Yarshater 1983: 370–72, 420). Thus emerged the belief in the eschatological mission of the Sasanians, which was to restore the unity of the primeval universal empire under their domination. The perception of empire as being “characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries,” as presenting “itself not as a historical regime originating in conquest, but rather as an order that effectively suspends history and thereby fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity” (Hardt and Negri 2000: xiv) transpires in this idea.

The second idea, which was that of Aryan (i.e., Iranian) ethnocentric superiority, had been embodied in the Avestan concept of *Airyanəm Xvarəno* closely associated already in pre-Sasanian times with the concept of *vərəthragnā*—‘victoriousness’ (literally “smiting of resistance” personified in the warrior-god Vərəthragnā, who was perceived as a companion to Mithra), and later with *pērōzīh* (another kind of ‘victoriousness’). Bearing the initial meaning of ‘good thing’, ‘prosperous, shining fortune’ (Bailey 1943: 2–15), the Old Iranian *bvarnah-* (Middle Persian, i.e. Sasanian *farrah*) became ‘shining glory’, “an inevitable concomitant of victory” (ibid. 27). According to Mary Boyce, “*Xvarənah* seems rather to be a divine grace which descended on those favored by the gods, endowing them with exceptional power and prosperity” (Boyce 1975: 66). A direct conceptual link between *Xvarəno* and the primeval universal monarchy is reflected in Yasht 19, recited by Avestan heroes:

We sacrifice to *Xvarəno*, the vigorous, the royal, the very-glorified, . . . superior to all other creatures, who accompanied Hōshyanga Paradhāta [Hōshang] for a long time, which allowed him to reign over the Earth divided into seven climes, over the demons and men, sorcerers and sorceresses, rulers and kings. . . . (Christensen 1917: 134)

More than all other gods, Mithra was endowed with *xvarəno*; he also was its bestower. He was “giver of *xvarəno*, giver of rule (*xshathrō.dā-*)” (Boyce 1975: 67). The *Xvarəno* has become the cosmic force pertaining to the Aryans in the empire-centric and ethnocentric concept of *Airyanəm Xvarəno*: “the Glory which belongs to the Iranian peoples, born and to be born” (Yasht 19.57). It may be contextually interpreted as the deified, good, solar, shining, glorious

force of the Aryans and of the Aryan gods, kings, heroes, and lands, which “was created by Ahura Mazdā to overcome the countries outside the Aryan lands” (Bailey 1943: 23) (literally *anairya*, “non-Aryan” lands—G.A.) and “to aid in bringing prosperity to the mountains and the valleys” (ibid.). Herein one finds a prototype of the three cornerstone doctrines of modern Western colonial imperialism: (1) the doctrine of dominant political and military power, (2) the doctrine of profit, and (3) the doctrine of the civilizing role of empire (see Thornton 1965). The essential belief in *Airyanam Xvarənō* had helped to assert the Sasanian imperial prestige:

In the legendary history of Ardashīr Pāpakān, the first Sasanian ruler, (which perpetuates perhaps the older legend of the Achaemenian Cyrus) the Kingly Khvarənah (Pahl. *khvarrah ī kayān*) in the form of a great ram leaves Ardabān, the last Parthian king, and runs after Ardashīr, springing finally upon his horse behind him, a sign that sovereignty has now passed to him. (Boyce 1975: 68)

More than eighty years ago, Max Weber (2001: 326) noted with acumen that “the sentiment of prestige is able to strengthen the ardent belief in the actual existence of one’s own might, for this belief is important for positive self-assurance in case of conflict. Therefore, all those having vested interests in the political structure tend systematically to cultivate this prestige sentiment.” The concept of *Airyanam Xvarənō* had justified and stimulated the policy of military conquest as the means of restoring the primeval universal monarchy. But, at the same time, it was viewed as a dominating principle of moral good, a positive spiritual force: *Xvarənō* departs from unjust rulers and sinful heroes, who consequently suffer from ill fate. *Airyanam Xvarənō* was a deeply Iranian development and transformation of the ancient Mesopotamian concept of “awe-inspiring luminosity” denoted by “the probably pre-Sumerian term *melammû*” (Oppenheim 1977: 98), which was used to describe the aura of divinities and kings.

One also can observe the process of gradual transformation of the most important ancient Near Eastern imperial title of “King of Kings” that was creating and legitimizing imperial hierarchy within the Iranian imperial ideology. The first Achaemenids (Cook 1985: 210) simply emulated this supreme royal title of Ancient Mesopotamia. Eight centuries later, Sasanian coins present an elaborated version of the imperial title as: “The worshipper of Mazdah, the divine . . . (such and such) . . . , King of Kings of Iran and non-Iran, who is descended from the gods” (Göbl 1983: 330).

In the case of Armenia, these concepts governing the Sasanian imperial self-perception have been laid over a long-term history of political, cultural, economic, and ethnic relations that had preceded the establishment of the

Sasanian rule in Iran around 224 CE. Since the first political contact between the Roman general Lucullus and the Parthian Arsacid King of Kings Phraates III (ca. 70–58/7 BCE), Armenia, together with Northern Mesopotamia and, to a lesser degree, Caucasian Iberia (Eastern Georgia) and Caucasian Albania, became the apple of discord between two empires: Rome in the west and Arsacid Iran in the east. The treaty of Rhandaia (64 CE) between Nero and Vologeses I established Armenia as a buffer kingdom, an important vassal of the Parthian throne, with an Arsacid prince, often heir to the King of Kings of Iran, being crowned by the Roman emperor as its king. D. M. Lang astutely noted that “during the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D. the Armenian throne was regularly reserved for the Parthian Great King’s nearest kin, who was known as “Great King of Armenia”—rather as the heir apparent to the British throne is called the Prince of Wales” (1983: 517). Such a status had created a unique position for Armenia within the realm of the feudal Iranian Empire, first under the Arsacids and subsequently under the Sasanians.

But after 224 CE, the Sasanian-Armenian relations were dictated by a specific situation that emerged due to an interdynastic conflict: while the Sasanian Ardashīr I and his son Shāpūr I succeeded in overthrowing the Parthian Arsacid Dynasty in the Iranian heartland, the Arsacid heirs to the imperial throne of Iran continued ruling in Armenia. In fact, the Arsacid king of Armenia known in different historical sources under the names of Khosrov the Great or Tiridates II perceived himself to be the only legitimate heir to the throne of Iran (Yeremian 1984: 30). He moved with his troops against Ardashīr toward the heartland of Iran, seized the capital of Media Ecbatana (Hamedan), and, after failing to topple the Sasanians in his first attempt, built a new international coalition against Shāpūr I, in which the rulers of the Kushan Empire (also related to the Iranian Arsacid imperial dynasty) on the northeastern and eastern frontier of Iran actively (and self-destructively) participated.

The failure of the Armenian branch of Arsacids to overthrow the Sasanians in Iran resulted in a political and military reorientation of the rulers of Armenia toward Rome and in drastic changes in their domestic policies, which thereafter were aimed at separating Armenia from the Iranian political domination as well as from its civilization. From the rule of Tiridates III (ca. 293–330 CE) through that of Artashes Arsacid (ca. 422–428 CE) the Arsacids of Armenia successfully undertook the compulsory Christianization of the populace; directed the development of national historical writing; ordered the creation of the Armenian alphabet by Mesrop Mashtots; and supported the latter’s efforts to establish a national system of monastic schools, thus playing a decisive role in the creation of the Armenian national identity. Even

a substantial linguistic shift is attested for this period: a gigantic stratum of Middle Iranian loan-words dating to the Parthian times in the Armenian language was overlaid by a new influx of borrowings from Greek and Latin related to Christianization and sociopolitical reorientation.

This process of nation-building developed under conditions of continuous military confrontation with the Sasanians, who had gone on the offensive, being determined to eliminate the Arsacids from Armenia. Independently from one another, the Sasanian and Armenian literary sources paint a vivid picture of hostility between the two dynasties. Sasanian attitudes and feelings toward all Arsacids are clearly expressed in the famous *Letter of Tansar*, which may be called the charter of Sasanian imperialism. It assesses the Arsacid rule as follows:

When however men fell upon evil days, under a reign that did not hold fast the welfare of the world, they fixed their desires upon what was not justly theirs . . . . Violence became open and men assailed one another over variance of rank and opinion, till livelihood and faith were lost to all . . . . 400 years had passed in which the world was filled with wild and savage beasts and devils in human form, without religion or decency, learning, or wisdom, or shame. They were a people who brought nothing but desolation and corruption to the world; cities became deserts, and buildings were razed. In the space of fourteen years, through policy and strength and skill, he [Sasanian Ardashīr] brought it about that he made water flow in every desert and established towns and created groups of villages, in a way not achieved in the 4000 years before him. (Boyce 1968: 39, 67)

On the opposite side, the Arsacid epic tradition created in Armenia during the third and fourth centuries CE and recorded a century later glorified the attacks carried out by Armenian Arsacid Arshak II against the Sasanians in Media and Atropatene during the fourth century CE, i.e., outside the traditional boundaries of the Kingdom of Greater Armenia (Ps. P'awstos IV, 21-25). The same epic recounts the meeting between Arshak II and Sasanian Shāpūr II (ruled Iran in 309-379 CE). Treacherously captured and brought before the King of Kings of Iran, Arsacid Arshak addresses the following speech to the Sasanian King of Kings Shāpūr:

Stay away from me, evil-doing servant, you who became lord over your lords, and vengeance on you and your sons for my ancestors and for the death of King Artevan [i.e. Ardawān V, the last Arsacid King of Kings of the Parthian Empire] [which] shall not be forgiven. . . . The place where you are lounging is mine, get up [and come down] from there! Let me lounge there since it was our clan's. (Ps. P'awstos IV, 54)<sup>3</sup>

The consequences of this meeting were obviously disastrous for Arshak: he was imprisoned in the fortress of Anush and held there until he committed suicide.

The rivalry between the Arsacids and Sasanians resulted in a bitter division among Armenian nobility: for two centuries the pro-Arsacid/pro-Roman faction fought the pro-Sasanian faction. In the end, the Sasanians and the Armenian pro-Sasanian faction achieved their goal. First, they removed the last Arsacid king of Armenia from power (428 CE), then they defeated several rebellions against the Sasanian domination, of which the so-called “Armenian War of the Vardanids” (450–451 CE) was the most notorious. A characteristic trait of the Sasanian policy toward Armenia during the post-Arsacid period must be mentioned: the Sasanians perceived Armenia as a natural and very important extension of their empire. Thus, at least according to their official documents such as the aforementioned *Letter of Tansar*, they had the moral obligation to secure the prosperity of the empire, including Armenia. One could perhaps dismiss such political tenets as official propaganda, but even an avowed enemy of the Sasanians, the historian Elishe, who was claimed to be a participant to the “Armenian War,” had to concede that, after the defeat of the rebels in the battle of Avarayr, the new Sasanian governor Atrormizd “entered the Armenian land with love and peace” (Eghishe 1993: 129). Such a policy stands in stark contrast with terrifying, bloody suppressions of overt rebellion that were so typical of imperial domination throughout world history.

Thus, one must conclude that the mental and political attitude of the Sasanians toward Armenia was quite different during different periods. While under the rule of the Armenian branch of the Arsacids, Armenia was treated by the Sasanians as a country occupied by illegitimate kings representing the overthrown Iranian dynasty of emperors; without the Arsacids, Armenia was viewed by the Sasanians as their own valuable property, as an inseparable part of Ērānshahr (Adontz 1970: 167), i.e., of the Iranian Empire. Speaking in general, one should not forget the fact that the Sasanians, following the Parthian political tradition, had their principal capital at Ctesiphon in Mesopotamia—that is, outside the Iranian ethnic territory yet within the Ērānshahr—which also makes Sasanian imperialism significantly different from other imperial cultures. It hints at the historical circumstances under which Sasanian imperialism had displayed a more equitable attitude toward different polities and ethnicities included in the empire than most of the empires of modern times.

The Armenian nationalistic historical writing does not make the extremely important distinction between the Sasanian policies toward Armenia during the period of Arsacid rule in Armenia on the one hand, and that after 428



CE, on the other, when that rule has ended. This is absolutely natural, since early Armenian historical writing was in itself a creation of the Arsacids and its influence was revitalized in modern times and perpetuated through the present. But making such a distinction is crucial both for understanding the nature of Sasanian imperialism and for a correct interpretation of Armenian history and civilization.

Viewing the Armenian Arsacids as their blood kin, as their ethnopolitical leaders of the past, modern Armenian nationalistic historians usually present the political history of Armenia during the third–seventh centuries CE as a continuous resistance to Sasanian imperial domination and struggle for national independence. If correct, such a perception should find support in a hypothetical pattern of periodic devastations of the country with a trend developing toward a long-term decline of the economy and degeneration of civilization as a whole.<sup>4</sup>

At this point in our exploration, the contradiction between the interpretation of written sources presented above and the traditional viewpoint of Armenian national history may and should be tested against the archaeological evidence. Although archaeological studies of sites dated to the third–fourth centuries CE in the royal domain (Arm. *Ostan Hayots*) of the Armenian branch of the Iranian Arsacids have been unfolding only during the last three decades, the comparison of their results with later assemblages outline two distinct and very different cultural patterns; the chronological divide between them may be placed somewhere around the middle of the fifth century, which roughly coincides with the demise of the Arsacid political tradition in Armenia between 414 and 484 CE.<sup>5</sup> Shifts in the functional character and scales of construction activities are indicative of the differences between these patterns.

During the first period, which reflects the Arsacid struggle against the Sasanians, economic and human resources were quite limited. At the new royal Arsacid summer residence founded atop the mound of Dvin, a relatively small and modest Christian basilica (28.9 × 12.5 m) built in the fourth century CE of mud bricks laid over a stone socle represents the only monumental building that thus far may be attributed with high probability to the Arsacid activity at this site (K'alant'arian and Ghafadarian 1990: 143–46).

In 364 CE, the joint Persian and pro-Sasanian Armenian army in a major ritual act broke into the tombs of Arsacid kings of Armenia and carried away the royal bones in order to transport them to Iran. Being subsequently defeated by the Armenian pro-Arsacid troops, they were forced to surrender the bones to the winners, who reburied the royal remains all together in a miniature crypt (a rectangular room 3.81 × 2.66 m with three attached niches

containing crude stone sarcophagi) in “the fortified village called Ałc’k” (Sahinian 1984: 574). The whole work on this new “royal mausoleum” could have been carried out by one stonemason with few apprentices and a handful of unskilled laborers.

A characteristic type of sites during the third–fourth centuries CE is represented by fortified military settlements, which encircled the royal domain of the last Arsacids. They were intended to protect the domain not only from foreign invaders but also from the neighboring Armenian princes, as well as to control essential routes. The architecture of these forts combines ample military knowledge with poor building skill and displays a thrifty attitude toward resources. One may see the best excavated example of this type of settlements in the fort of Zak’ari-Berd (Kirakosyan 1989; Asatryan 2005). The fortification consisted of two rows of massive stone walls of primitive, in many sections cyclopean, masonry with a regular building plan inside the inner wall. Fifty to sixty troops, some if not all of them being cavalymen, would have lived with their nuclear families in modest standard houses. They engaged in farming activities in order to support themselves. It is very likely that agricultural lands in the vicinity of these settlements were given by the Arsacid royal administration in exchange for military service. The dwelling of the fort’s commander was excavated inside the first floor of one of the towers. It was barely larger and only slightly more comfortable than the houses of the rank-and-file soldiers. These forts were either destroyed (e.g. Zak’ari-Berd, between 364 and 369 CE) or abandoned with the downfall of the Arsacid dynasty.

The second period (from the last quarter of the fifth to the second half of the seventh century CE) witnessed an unprecedented explosion in public construction activities, which, together with other sources, testifies in favor of a large-scale economic expansion consequent to the direct negotiated integration of Armenia into the Sasanian Empire: an integration that preserved, despite periodic conflicts, the religious and, in general, cultural autonomy of the country and the political and economic rights of its nobility and which created a specifically Armenian polity within the Iranian Empire of the Sasanian dynasty. Prominent local princes—such as representatives of the Kamsarakan family who were descendants of one of the most powerful aristocratic clans of Iran, the Karens—had built by the end of the fifth century splendid Christian basilica cathedrals at Tekor and Ereruyk’. Following the elimination of the Arsacids, the influence of the Armenian Apostolic Church rose as well. The cathedral of the modern Holy See of the Armenian patriarchs at Ejmiacin was rebuilt and expanded in the decade following 480 CE, while the Holy See itself was transferred around the same time to Dvin, where the grand basilica

(length 52.4 m) of St. Gregory the Illuminator (Ghafadarian 2002) was erected in white limestone (cf. the aforementioned rustic and relatively small Arsacid church on the Citadel Mound at Dvin).

Yet perhaps a most amazing trajectory can be observed in palatial architecture. No palaces built in Armenia by the Arsacids after the ascendance of the Sasanians to power have been uncovered so far, and the probability of such a discovery gets slimmer as archaeological fieldwork continues to progress. In contrast, several palaces were built from the end of the fifth through the seventh centuries (see Harut'yunian 2002) for the patriarchs of the Armenian Church and for the highest-ranking nobility (three palaces at Dvin and palaces at Avan, Zvart'noc', Aruč, and Byurakan).

Finally, another indication of the major historical, sociopolitical, economic, and cultural divide created during the fifth century is the fact that Armenian nobles abandoned the former capital of the Artashesian (Artaxiad) and Arsacid dynasties at Artashat (Artaxata), which had been founded and developed as a major royal Hellenistic city, and moved the center of religious and political power to Dvin, where multiple features of prosperity are attested during the subsequent century and a half of Sasanian imperial domination over the Armenian polity.

Several historical facts unambiguously indicate that the elimination of the Armenian Arsacids was the outcome strongly desired by a substantial part of Armenian princes who thereafter became direct subjects of the great Kings of Kings of Iran. In 571 CE, Vahan, the grand prince of Siwnik' (pronounced *Syunik'*), officially broke away from the former territories of Arsacid Armenia and, expanding his control over the northeastern part of the Armenian Highland and across eastern Caucasia, received from Khusrau I Anūshirwān the status of *shabr* (kingdom) for his domain, therefore becoming a king within the realm of the Iranian Empire. At the same time, he was appointed as overseer and commander of the Sasanian defense system of the passes through the Caucasus Mountains at Darband and Daryal (Iskanian 1984: 257) that protected the Iranian Empire from nomadic incursions emanating from the steppes to the north of the Caucasus.

The influence of Armenian nobility in the Sasanian Empire reached its zenith under Sasanian Khusrau II (591–628 CE), which most likely was conditioned by the events that took place during his ascent to the throne. At the beginning of his reign, Khusrau had to fight an usurper of the royal power, General Bahrām Chobīn, who effectively had established his rule over the most important parts of the empire. The Armenian nobility had a clear choice: either support the usurper, thereby bringing about a dynastic change in Iran, or

demonstrate allegiance to the Sasanian dynasty. They chose the latter course, most likely viewing the Sasanians as their legitimate suzerains with whom they already had long-standing negotiated relations. Joining the Byzantine forces that supported Khusrau, 15,000 Armenian cavalrymen played a decisive role in defeating Bahrām Chobīn and reinstating Khusrau to the Iranian imperial throne. Consequently, Armenian princes were generously rewarded. One of them, Smbat Bagratuni, was appointed governor of Hyrcania and commander-in-chief of the Sasanian imperial armies in the East (Sebēos, 24–29). Other Armenian lords also received multiple honors and gratuities.

The archaeological record provides unequivocal evidence of the economic prosperity of Armenia during the reign of Khusrau II, a florescence that lasted throughout most of the seventh century until the establishment of the Caliphate domination. Once again, this condition is most obviously reflected in religious architecture. The rebuilding of the cathedral of St. Gregory at Dvin by Smbat Bagratuni and the building of the majestic cathedral of St. Hripsime in Ejmiacin by Katolicos (Supreme Patriarch of the Armenian Church) Komitas ushered in the first golden age of Armenian architecture. Behind it, the benevolent figures of Khusrau and his beloved Christian wife Shīrīn loomed large. R. Grousset (1947: 260–61) offered the following explanation of the Armenian loyalty to the Sasanian Empire:

We discern here the reasons for Armenian sympathies toward Sasanid Persia through a contrast with bad Armeno-Byzantine relations. Persia was a feudal monarchy where Armenian *nakhararq* [grand lords—G.A.] found their place, and had their privileges alongside the Iranian grand barons. Since the Sasanids had relinquished the idea of imposing their religion of Mazdeism upon Armenia, the *nakhararq* saw themselves among the grand vassals of the brilliant court of Ctesiphon, where they were favorably accepted most of the time. By contrast, the Byzantine Empire was a rigorously unitarian state, centralized and administrative, in which a strong and accused [of Christian heresy—G.A.] nationality like the Armenians could only have been mistreated by the bureaucracy.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid, one must keep in mind that the Armenian reaction to Sasanian imperial policies was anything but passive acceptance or exaltation. On the contrary, every attempt by the Sasanian court to strengthen its administrative and ideological control over Armenia by reintroducing Zoroastrianism, by encroaching upon the negotiated ancestral rights of the Armenian grand lords, and by increasing taxation had faced stiff resistance. Armenian Monophysite Christianity became an essential component of ethnic identity for a very substantial part of the populace in Armenia during the fourth–mid-fifth century CE. Historical sources from Eghishe (mid-fifth

century) to *The History by Sebēos* (ca. 670 CE) are unanimous that resistance to the reinstatement of Zoroastrianism had garnered broad popular support. Although, being Christian monks, these historians have most certainly carried respective biases, no evidence to the contrary has so far been uncovered. Defense of the Christian Church was the principal declared agenda of all major rebellions against the Sasanian dominion in Armenia (in 450–451, 476–484, 492–501, and 572 CE). At the same time, persecutions of individual representatives of the Armenian nobility by the Sasanian Kings of Kings often resulted in switching of political allegiance by the persecuted. These grand nobles, fearing the wrath of the Kings of Kings of Iran, usually fled to the protection of the Byzantine Empire or even entered into the service of northern nomadic imperial confederacies.

In any case, the historical and archaeological evidence presented above does not allow us to view the Armenian resistance to Sasanian imperialism as a national struggle for liberation from foreign imperial domination. Such a concept is nothing more than an anachronistic modernization of the history of Late Antiquity inspired by the modern political idea of national self-determination. In this regard, the sources speak for themselves. During the aforementioned episode of Armenian involvement in the restoration of the Sasanian dynasty, the usurper who effectively controlled Iran, Bahrām Chobīn wrote the following letter to the Armenian grand lords, according to *The History by Sebēos* (Sebēos 1979: 11):

I thought that you will come and become my supporters while I am fighting your enemy, since I and you united shall eliminate the peril of the universe, the house of Sasan. But you, gathering together, have launched against me war in their support. . . . But you, Armenians, are displaying love for your overlords at the wrong time, wasn't it the house of Sasan that took over your land and the rule? . . . But should you like to leave them and join me and give me a supporting hand, [then] in case of my victory, I swear by the great god Aramazd, and by the Sun [our] lord and by the Moon, by the Fire and the Water, by Mihr [Mithra] and all other gods, that the Armenian kingdom will be given to you by me, so that according to your wish you appoint a king for yourselves.

Responding to the imposter, the commander-in-chief of the Armenian army Mowšeł (Mushegh) Mamikonian rejected the offer outright, saying: "To God belongs kingship, he gives [it] to whom he wishes" (ibid.). Then he castigates Bahrām Chobīn for not being respectful of God (i.e., Jesus Christ within the Armenian Monophysite dogma), as if foreseeing Khusrau's benevolent attitude toward Christianity. Regardless of the likelihood that this story represents a retrospective interpretation by the Christian author of *The*

*History by Sebēos*, there is nothing that could indicate any interest on the part of Armenian ecclesiastical, military, or civil, leadership in the restoration of the Armenian kingdom. Rather, Armenian resistance to Sasanian imperial policies objectively was aimed at the preservation of internal balance between central authority and local rights within the established imperial system.

Armenia does not represent an exceptional case of regional economic and cultural prosperity within the borders of the Sasanian Empire but outside the core ethnic territory of the people who created that empire.<sup>6</sup> Lower Mesopotamia provides us with another explicit example: there, during the Sasanian period,

in the number of occupied sites, in the breadth of settlement and cultivation, in the dispersion of urban construction, and above all in the massiveness of state-initiated irrigation enterprises upon which those other features largely depended, maxima were reached far in excess of anything before or since (Adams 1965: 69; also Adams 2006).

However, Mesopotamia cannot be considered simply as one among many prosperous lands in the empire. Certainly it was a major source of agricultural commodities and a center of highly profitable sophisticated artisanal production and trade outside the Iranian ethnic territory, which generated enormous revenues to sequential Iranian empires. But the sociocultural and, particularly, political power of place created by Babylon, which later passed to Seleucia on the Tigris, was such an attracting force that it stimulated the Parthian and subsequent Sasanian emperors to transfer the main capital of their empires from Iran to Mesopotamia. It bears emphasizing that the establishment of the Iranian imperial capital outside Iran had a major impact on the makeup of policies and ideologies of both the Parthian and the Sasanian empires, especially keeping in mind that the Sasanians continuously underscored and oftentimes imposed the recognition of their Iranian-ness upon others.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that, among other features of Sasanian imperialism, two have been quite salient: (1) general tolerance for religious, sociopolitical, and, in a broader sense, cultural autonomy of the constituent polities; and (2) genuine concern about the economic development of conquered lands. Both policies were not results of Sasanian altruism: they were followed (explicitly or implicitly) in order to achieve imperial goals. Successful management of ethnocultural diversity had created more cohesion between different parts of the empire, while economic progress beyond the borders of the Persian homeland secured the replenishing of the imperial treasury.

In the case of Sasanian imperialism, the concept of universal monarchy justified by a strong nationalistic idea accepted the existence and rights of

ethnicities and polities subjugated by the empire. One may observe some kind of traditional similarity between the imperial policies of the Sasanians and those of their distant predecessors, the Achaemenids, who practiced for much of the duration of their domination

something like a doctrine of minimal interference and “live and let live” [principle—G.A.] . . . . In the Persian way of dealing with the world many of the old imperialist *leitmotifs* recur, for sure, but played in a softer key as it were. There will no doubt have been *some* truth in the not too rare ancient praise of Persian tolerance and justice, virtues not often attributed to the Assyrians, not even by themselves. (Nylander 1979: 346)

Neither may such virtues be attributed to many other imperialists of ancient and modern times.

Yet, I would not like to end this chapter on such a moralizing philosophical note. Instead, it is appropriate to add to the aforementioned a few more conclusions from the perspective of the anthropological history of Armenia, thinking that the following may also be important to a general understanding of processes related to formation of nations and national states. These conclusions can be derived not only from the preceding account, but also from other well-known data from Armenian history:

- (1) The formation of the Armenian national identity in Late Antiquity was preceded by a long period of cultural and linguistic unity of the population that inhabited a specific, more or less continuous territory in the central part of Near Eastern highlands;
- (2) By that time (third–seventh centuries CE), this population had lived for one and a half millennia within sociopolitical frameworks of different states; i.e., the existence of an institutionalized state preceded the formation of national identity;
- (3) Sociopolitical elites of the state developed a nation-building program focused on the formation of national ideology and national identity shaped in opposition to neighboring states and dominating empires;
- (4) Those elites successfully used the created national identity, which was perpetuated and supported by a coherent ideology and propaganda, for their resistance to imperial assimilation and simultaneous negotiation of an advantageous position within the sociopolitical hierarchy of the Sasanian Empire;
- (5) The Armenian national identity and nationalistic ideology formed during the Sasanian period were revitalized in the Armenian ethnic environment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the growing influence of nationalistic ideologies of modern European national states.

## NOTES

1. Besides politicized nationalistic writings, two major, mutually opposing theories of nation and nationalism have been developing since the nineteenth century in Western, including the Anglophone, social thought: (1) “modernism”, and (2) “primordialism” (Eller and Coughlan 1993). In the opinion of the author of this chapter, “primordialism” is a very inadequate term coined by “modernists,” one that is blurring the clear-cut distinction between “primordialist” scholars and nationalistic writers. In reality, conceptual opposition between “modernists” and “primordialists” stems from the fact that the views of the “modernists” are grounded in the concept of nation as civic entity, whereas the perspective of the “primordialists” stems from the argument supporting an ethnic origin of nations. Prevailing during the second half of the twentieth century, the “modernists” insisted that nations and national states are purely modern, Western phenomena that originated in Western Europe during the initial stages of industrialization in the eighteenth century and later propagated across the globe (e.g. Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1992, Breuilly 1994). In recent years, “primordialism” has certainly undergone a major revival. Insisting that national forms of ethnocultural organization are inherently characteristic of human societies, scholars who more or less adhere to the views of “primordialists” stress the existence of some kinds of nations long before the Modern times (e.g. Hastings 1997, Hutchinson 2005, Roshwald 2006, Smith 2008). A detailed philosophical and methodological analysis of different concepts of nation by Michel Seymour (2000) led him to formulate the concept of *sociopolitical nations*, which he defines as “political communities understood as involving a *lingua franca*, a common structure of culture and a common context of choice” (ibid.: 49), the latter involving national identity. Seymour’s definition attempts to overcome the impasse created in political science, philosophy, and sociology by the ethnic/civic dichotomy. “This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today” (Miscevic 2010). During a debate devoted to philosophical and sociological theorizing on nation and nationalism held at Warwick University in 1995 between a leader of “modernists,” Ernest Gellner, and ethnosymbolist Anthony Smith, Gellner conceded that nations may have had antecedents in pre-modern times, which really didn’t matter to him philosophically because, in his opinion, the nationalistic humankind as a whole is a product of eighteenth-century European modernity. In premodern times, “sometimes a culture had political expression, more often it did not” (Gellner 1995). The author of this chapter does not think that the historical evidence and deriving perspective are supportive of the views of either “modernists” or “primordialists.” “Primordialism,” at least to a certain degree, logically implies that a national ethnocultural organization must necessarily emerge at a certain stage of a society’s development. Historically there are multiple cases in which societies did not develop a national identity linked to an ethnocultural organization either with or without a national state. For example, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to identify “nations” in Europe during the sixth or seventh centuries CE, at the dawn of the Middle Ages. It would be impossible to find a nation in Ancient Mesopotamia through an analysis of all the cuneiform evidence. But, at the same time, one must agree that nations and national states have formed, under certain circumstances, in premodern times. As another example, Ancient Egypt may fit most of the current definitions of national state (Kemp 2006: 19–25).

2. Among few notable exceptions, the work by N. Garsoïan and J.-P. Mahé (1997) must be mentioned.

3. All unreferenced translations of primary sources cited in this chapter are mine—G.A.

4. Such a pattern indeed is clearly visible in Armenia after the adoption of Islam by the Ilkhanid Mongol Empire, of which Armenia was a part, at the beginning of the fourteenth century CE, and to a lesser degree after the conquest by the Islamic Caliphate that started with the first foray in 640 CE.

5. The year 414 CE marks the death of the Armenian Arsacid king Vramshapuh the Great, during whose rule an enormous programmatic state effort directed toward the formation of the Armenian national identity was exerted. Central to Vramshapuh’s policy was the creation of Armenian alphabet and of literature in Armenian language, combined with the building of a state-wide system of Christian Armenian schools. The year 484 CE marks the treaty of Nvarsak between the leaders of Armenian nobility and the representative of the King of Kings of Iran, which established direct suzerainty of the King of Kings over Armenian nobles and recognized the autonomy of the Armenian polity within Erānshahr.

6. Within the borders of the *Ērānshahr*, i.e., of the empire, “the lands conquered by the Iranians never became ‘Iran’; they always remained ‘non-Iran.’ In fact the Sasanians after Shāpūr I took the title ‘King of Iran and non-Iran’ (*Ērān ud anērān*), thus indicating the distinction of Iran as a national state. The wish to impress this distinction on others and to inculcate in Iranians a belief in the merits of purely Iranian virtues contributed to the outlook and tenor of the national history and its rhetoric” (Yarshater



1983: 411). For example, Armenia, which was considered one of the most important regions of *Ērānshahr*, was never viewed as “Iran” by the Sasanians.

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## CHAPTER 6

# EXPANSION OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE INTO ITS NORTHERN FRONTIER (CA. 500 BCE–0CE)

A CASE STUDY FROM SOUTH-CENTRAL  
INNER MONGOLIA

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
**N**ORTH ASIA IS A REGION THAT DEVELOPS EMPIRES INDEPENDENTLY of other areas, making it a useful case study for the study of empires generally. Chinese historical documents dating from the pre-imperial period describe the expansion of the dynastic political system from its cradle in the Yellow and Wei River valleys into its northern border regions (including portions of the modern-day provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia) throughout the second half of the first millennium BCE (Table 6.1, Figure 6.1). These documents describe a process whereby the imperial incursion imposed on the native populations a lifestyle that paralleled that of the empire. This imposed lifestyle was described as dramatically different from that of the local system, and a radical shift toward the lifestyle of the imperial core was allegedly mandated immediately upon integration. Traditional interpretations suggest that pre-integration lifeways closely resembled modern Mongolian pastoral, transhumant lifeways and that this lifeway was replaced by sedentary village agriculture, which was dominant in the imperial core. Recently collected field data suggests otherwise. Not only does the local system not show a

**Table 6.1.** Chronology used in this settlement pattern study. The left half of the table lists the traditional historical chronology of the Central Plain and right half of the table lists the archaeological chronology used here.

Traditional Chronology of the Central Plain from the Historical Record		Liangcheng Country Archaeological Chronology	
Period	Dates	Period	Dates
		Yangshao period	4700–2900 BCE
		Laohushan period	2900–2100 BCE
Xia Dynasty	21st to 16th Century BCE	Zhukaigou period	2100–1500 BCE
Shang Dynasty	16th Century BCE to 1050 BCE	Proposed Occupational Hiatus	1500–500 BCE
Western Zhou Dynasty	1050–771 BCE		
Eastern Zhou Dynasty/ Spring and Autumn Period	770–476 BCE		
Eastern Zhou Dynasty/ Warring States Period	475–221 BCE	Warring States period	500–200 BCE
Qin Dynasty	221–207 BCE	Han Dynasty period	200 BCE–0 CE
Western Han Dynasty	206 BCE– 8 CE		

mobile pattern of occupation before integration, as suggested by ancient as well as recent interpretations of the texts, but also integration did not result in the swift adoption of an imperial Chinese–style agricultural economy. What was provoked, however, was a mixed pastoral-agricultural lifeway on the margins of the settlement pattern.

This chapter<sup>1</sup> does not question that the Chinese political apparatus—beginning in the middle of the first millennium BCE under the states of Qin, Wei, Zhao, and Yan and then under the imperial rulers of the Qin and Han—expanded into the areas north of the Central Yellow River basin, or Northern Zone,<sup>2</sup> but it does offer a new understanding of the process of imperial expansion. We test the models used previously to explain the changes brought about by expansion by applying data collected during archaeological surface surveys conducted in the summers of 2002 and 2004 in Liangcheng County, in south-central Inner Mongolia (Figure 6.1). The currently accepted model for this expansion suggests that both the initial expansion into the Northern Zone that occurred during the Warring States period (ca. 475–221 BCE) and the consolidation of this region by the imperial system that took place during the Qin (ca. 221–207 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–8 CE) dynastic



**Figure 6.1.** Map of north China with an inset of the Daihai Lake region. The Northern Zone, including the Ordos Region, is roughly delimited by the Han and Ming Dynasty Great Walls

periods was accomplished through population replacement. The military conquest recorded in the texts was thought to have caused the local populations to abandon these regions; the resulting empty landscapes were then colonized by peoples sent from the center (Di Cosmo 1999, 2002; Lin 2003; Tian 2000; Tian and Shi 1991). This paper will show that testable archaeological correlates of the population replacement model do not explain the changes in the settlement pattern data from Liangcheng. The data supports the idea, rather, that indigenous populations were slowly integrated into a Central Plain-style settlement system during the period from the fifth century BCE to the beginning of the Common Era. This alternative explanation of the expansion process better explains both the changes in the settlement pattern data and what is known about the archaeological record in other parts of the Northern Zone. Similar processes have been documented in other parts of the ancient world, including the New World, as discussed below.

## HISTORICAL SETTING

There is a large corpus of historical literature relating to the period of Chinese history from the tenth century BCE forward, including the late Zhou to Han periods under discussion here (ca. 770 BCE– ca. 8 CE). These texts include the *Zuo zhuan* (Zuo Commentary), the *Shiji* (Records of the Historian), and the *Hanshu* (Documents of the Former Han). The texts provide a record of events across northern China, informing us of the rise of the Zhou over the Shang in about 1050 BCE and the establishment of a system of government called *zongfa*, a lineage-centered system of social organization characterized by the appointment of royal family members to rule over separate states (*guo*) (Hsu 1965). Each state was still subordinate to the House of Zhou.

By the latter half of the first millennium BCE, however, the *zongfa* system was being replaced by a more strictly administrative system based on meritorious service to the state. With the link between royal family ties and power weakened in many states, those ministers seen by the Zhou as able became more powerful and the administrative structure was tightened to place more power in the hands of the families that ruled the various states and their individual bureaucracies (Hsu 1999: 571). Late Warring States–period bureaucratization affected expansion, or acquisition and control of territory, but it also imposed bureaucratic control and thereby the accrual of taxes to fund state activities. This administrative expansion, including regular taxation based on acreage of arable land, was an essential feature of the territorial states that were constructed out of the feudal manor system of the Western Zhou Dynasty (ca. 1050–771 BCE) (Lewis 1999: 603).

The replacement of the *zongfa* system expanded administration away from the capital and sometimes led to shifts in power to wealthy peripheral areas far from the capital (Hsu 1999: 558). The Zhao, in the far north of the Jin state in an area that includes the survey region, was one of these peripheral areas that rose to prominence (Hsu 1999: 573–74), becoming independent when the Jin broke into three separate states as a result of a succession dispute in 475 BCE (Figure 6.2). The civil war that caused the Jin state to splinter is a prime example of a second feature of this period: warfare. Not only was the *zongfa* system being supplanted but the Zhou Royal House was losing the power to regulate relations between states; this resulted in civil war both within and between states. The Zhao state had to fight wars against the other powers to its south in the Central Plain as well as to protect the northern border from the northern “horse-riding” people described in the texts as inhabiting the regions north of the Great Wall.



**Figure 6.2.** China after the Jin State succession dispute (modified from Lewis 1999: Map 9.2)

The Zhao was the last state in the north to challenge the Qin (the eventual victor in the civil war that ended the Zhou) for supremacy at the end of the Warring States period, losing a decisive battle with the Qin in 262 BCE (Hsu 1999; Lewis 1999: 640). Part of the success of the Zhao was rooted in its administrative reform, which was an essential component of its scheme for raising the taxes necessary to protect its borders (Lewis 1999: 599). It is this administrative-military system that, according to the texts, expanded into the Northern Zone, including the Liangcheng region that is the focus of this study.

Historical documents focused on very large geographic areas, well above the scale at which the changes that accompany imperial expansion take place. This does not, however, necessarily bring these different scales of analysis into direct conflict. Hypotheses made at larger scales can often be tested against their archaeological correlates at smaller scales. Many of the events on the national level (wars, administrative changes) had a direct impact on the peoples of the border regions, therefore these hypotheses can be tested at a regional scale by examining the changes in the pattern of habitation remains in a region.

If the expansion of the Warring States, Qin Dynasty, and Han Dynasty political systems into the Northern Zone was the result of the replacement of nonsedentary, pastoral peoples by fully sedentary, agricultural peoples, as opposed to indigenous development and integration, the expectation would be that pre-Warring States-period settlements would be abandoned and that the Warring States-period settlements would be established in areas that were not previously occupied. This interpretation, called population replacement, is supported by historical analysis that presupposes that the different subsistence strategies practiced by the native and intrusive populations would likely require different settlement patterns, an idea we expand on below. Evaluating these hypothesized changes in settlement pattern pre- and post-integration requires knowledge of the indigenous settlement system that was in place before integration into the Central Plain political sphere and of the Warring States and Han settlement systems from the Central Plain. An archaeological surface survey provides the necessary time depth to undertake this sort of analysis (Table 6.1) and was the method used to collect the data presented in this chapter.

#### FIELD SURVEY IN THE LIANGCHENG REGION

The survey region, Liangcheng County in south-central Inner Mongolia, is located approximately 50 kilometers south and east of Hohhot and 70 kilometers east of the southward-flowing Yellow River (Figure 6.1). Liangcheng County presently averages 430 millimeters of rainfall annually and has an average temperature of 4–6°C (Nei Menggu 1987: 5). South-central Inner Mongolia was part of the Northern Zone, long considered a “zone of interaction” where pastoral and mobile lifeways encountered agricultural and sedentary lifeways, and where the political system of the Central Plain is thought to have come into contact with the peoples of the North (Tian and Guo 2001; Yan 2000). Although direct evidence of specific subsistence practices, such as floral and faunal analysis, have not been the focus of archaeological inquiry in this region, passages in the historical texts have been interpreted to mean that these “Northern Peoples,” who occupied this region before integration, had different subsistence and cultural practices from the dynastic peoples of the Central Plain (see, for example, Barfield 1991; Di Cosmo 2002; Jagchid and Symons 1989; Lattimore 1962). Therefore, although the environment of this area of the Northern Zone is cooler and drier than the Central Plain and burial evidence suggests cultural practices similar to pastoral peoples of eastern Siberia, the nature of the interaction between these two regional manifestations has never been clear.



The methodology chosen for this settlement pattern study was a full-coverage, pedestrian surface survey lead by Indrisano in 2002 and 2004 (Daihai 2006). Teams of three or four people systematically walked the landscape with a survey interval not in excess of 25 meters. Whenever a single, not obviously modern, artifact was found by any member of the survey team, the survey stopped and searched for more artifacts in an area that ideally did not exceed one hectare; each such set of artifacts is called a “collection” and is the smallest unit of analysis in the survey. While other surveys of the region completed in the late 1980s and 1990s were opportunistic (or unsystematic) (Nei Menggu and Riben 2001a), the use of this methodology and the high level of preservation and surface visibility in the region ensures that the blank areas of these maps are places where survey teams visited and found no remains of past human activity rather than places that were not visited. This is an important distinction because settlement patterns consist not only of locations where people chose to settle but also of places where they chose *not* to settle. The latter cannot be identified without a systematic full-coverage methodology.


Few sites were known archaeologically before the beginning of the survey, and these sites were smaller than those known from other full-coverage surveys conducted in eastern Inner Mongolia (the Chifeng Basin) (Chifeng 2011; Drennan et al. 2003b; Linduff et al. 2004). There has also been much discussion in the archaeological literature of past habitation by mobile pastoralists in Liangcheng (Di Cosmo 2002; Tian and Guo 1986). Much of this discussion has been based either on historical documentation or on interpretations of artifact styles at the Maoqinggou cemetery, rather than on settlement archaeology or more direct lines of evidence such as bone isotope analysis (e.g. Psarras 1995; Qiao 2004). However, because mobile peoples were thought to have once occupied this region, the survey interval was reduced to approximate the width of two pastoral tents and their surrounding activity areas, using the modern Mongolian Steppe settlement pattern as a guide. This width is approximately 20–25 meters. In addition, since mobile peoples are thought to leave few remains on the landscape, we used a slightly lower threshold for making a collection than that used in other systematic surface surveys conducted in China to date (Daihai 2006; Drennan et al. 2003b: 127; Indrisano 2006; Liu et al. 2004; Underhill et al. 1998). Collections were made even when only one sherd was found.

Rather than constructing sites based on the distribution of individual artifacts (e.g. Dunnell and Dancey 1983; Dunnell 1992), this analysis follows more closely the methodology utilized by the Basin of Mexico survey, which constructed sites based on the distribution of artifacts across fields (Sanders et al. 1979: 20–30). In the present case, rather than using fields, “sites” are

created from the smallest unit of analysis in the survey—the collection unit (Drennan et al. 2003b)—an approach that has also been referred to as equally siteless, (though on a different scale), as explained by Peterson and Drennan (2005: 21–22). When the term “site” is used in this analysis, it refers to a group of collection units with internal gaps of no more than 100 meters.

The 307.8 square kilometers covered by the Liangcheng survey were divided into two survey tracts: the Yongxing Basin survey tract and the Sansumu survey tract (Figure 6.3). The Yongxing Basin survey tract extends from the northern tributary of the Gongbeihe Reservoir, at approximately 1,200 meters above sea-level (masl), north through two upland plateaus to an elevation of 2,150 meters. This survey tract was chosen to include as much topographic variation as possible. Today the basin floors are dominated by agriculture. Modern land use suggests this survey tract can be divided among agricultural and herding zones and a zone where these two dominant economic pursuits can be productively combined (Indrisano 2006: 17–24).

The Sansumu survey tract is a roughly rectangular slope of 12 by 8 kilometers that rises gradually from the shore of Daihai Lake to the peak of the first



**Figure 6.3.** Liangcheng county survey map, showing both survey zones

mountain ridge (including all of the land to the top of this first ridge). The topographic variation is not dramatic in this zone, with most of the survey region consisting of a gradual slope with elevations from ca. 1,215 meters (the lake shore) to 1,450 meters before rising sharply to 2,100 meters. The best agricultural land in the Liangcheng region is in the Sansumu survey tract north of Daihai Lake, which has the most fertile soils, easy access to rainfall runoff from the mountains, and the highest water table.


Initial estimates of past land use and population at this scale of analysis are dependent on the accurate characterization of the density of remains across the entire landscape. Full coverage pedestrian surface survey was the most effective and efficient method of obtaining this data, which until now has not been available for the Liangcheng region. After analysis of the ceramic assemblages provided chronological control, the survey maps, which include the spatial extent and density of remains, were used to calculate a relative demographic index. This index characterized the density of remains (sherds/m<sup>2</sup>) and the length of an archaeological period (centuries). For instance, a relative measure of sherds/m<sup>2</sup>/century yielded lower numbers for large sites with sparse remains deposited over long periods of time and higher numbers for comparatively small sites with high density remains from moderately short periods of time. This relative demographic index was then correlated to absolute population estimates from excavated sites (calculated using the size and number of contemporaneous households and an average household size). The population estimates used throughout this chapter are calculated in this manner, which is modified from the Chifeng Basin relative demographic index given in Drennan et al. 2003a, and fully explained in Indrisano 2006 (56–89).

The predynastic and very early dynastic periods in Liangcheng County can be divided archaeologically into five chronological periods (Table 6.1). The archaeology of the region before this survey was centered on the analysis of archaeological cultures, which strictly speaking is different from the establishment of a chronology. Knowledge of the sequences from past stratigraphic excavations in this and the surrounding regions allows the ceramic collections to be divided into chronological periods (Nei Menggu 2000; Nei Menggu and Beijing 2003; Nei Menggu and Riben 2001b). Further chronological refinements await future excavations, especially at sites that contain materials from more than one period.


## **SURVEY RESULTS: THE LAOHUSHAN AND ZHUKAIGOU PERIODS**

The earliest remains recovered in the Yongxing and Sansumu survey tracts date to the Laohushan Period (2900–2100 BCE). The survey located eight sites between 3 and 7.5 hectares and a much larger number of homestead

sites, most less than 1 hectare in size. Four of these larger sites have walls that are still visible on the landscape and have been the focus of past excavation (Nei Menggu 2000). Sites of all sizes are found on the south-facing slopes of each survey zone and are grouped into distinct clusters that exhibit characteristics of neither a series of individual households living separately across the survey zone nor a small number of closely packed villages with separate intervening spaces. A large proportion of the landscape is completely uninhabited (Figures 6.4–5). This settlement pattern suggests that the overall social and economic forces that pulled people into communities were stronger than the



**Figure 6.4.** Laohushan period collections in the Yongxing Basin survey tract. Sites mentioned in this chapter are: The three sites of the Laohushan Cluster: (1) Xibaiyu, (2) Mianpo, and (3) Laohushan, as well as (4) Bancheng, (5) Site 600, (6) Site 248, (7) Site 128, and (8) Site 138 (50 m contour interval)



**Figure 6.5.** Laohushan period collections from the Sansumu survey tract (50m contour interval). Sites mentioned in this chapter are: (1) Baiposhan, (2) Yuanzigou, (3) Hetongyao, and (4) Damiao. The hatched area delineates Daihai Lake at 3000 BCE


centripetal forces pulling people away, but over all, these centrifugal forces were not strong. Although clusters of people are seen on the landscape, the most populous of these sites (the Laohushan Cluster in the Yongxing Basin survey tract and Damiao Cluster in the Sansumu survey tract) appear to have had either weak economic integration or were affected by social stress (Figures 6.4–5). These communities show internal population distributions

different from those of the other occupations in this period, as these sites do not have single nodes of population but rather consist of multiple nodes of settlement, with intervening walls. In addition, except for the Laohushan Cluster (300–575 people), populations of more than 300 people budded off to form smaller local communities that occupy similar positions along the south-facing slopes of each survey zone.

The overall Laohushan period settlement pattern establishes several important attributes that are seen in later periods. First, populations settle almost exclusively on the south-facing slopes of the survey zones. Second, populations tend to live in dispersed settlements across the slopes themselves. Although there is a single sizeable cluster of sites at Laohushan, this community is made up of several walled sites rather than one compact community. Both of these characteristics continue in the later Zhukaigou period.

The Zhukaigou period (2100–1500 BCE) is the last stage of independent development in the Liangcheng region before it was incorporated into the Zhao polity during the Warring States period. The Zhukaigou settlement pattern continued to show several of the attributes of the Laohushan settlement pattern, which placed dispersed populations on the south-facing slopes and in the mountains (Figure 6.6). During the Zhukaigou period, the total number of sites and the overall population were drastically reduced; all of the Laohushan settlements on the plains were abandoned, as was all of the settlement in the Yongxing Basin survey tract. The most obvious development between the Laohushan and Zhukaigou periods was a demographic collapse and by extension the complete dissolution of the community organization. This is exemplified by the abandonment of the compact walled settlements seen in the preceding Laohushan period.

The accepted Liangcheng chronology includes an occupational hiatus between the Laohushan (2900–2100 BCE) and Zhukaigou (2100–1500 BCE) periods (Daihai 2006; Tian 1991). Before this survey, the only Zhukaigou remains known in the Liangcheng region were from the site of Yangchanggou, which fell between the two survey zones (Nei Menggu and Beijing 1991). Although recognizable Zhukaigou ceramics were recovered from this site, no stratigraphic excavation took place. The notion of an occupational hiatus is based not on excavation or absolute dates from this region but on a stylistic comparison of ceramics from the Yangchanggou and Zhukaigou sites. According to the excavators, the earliest ceramics from the Yangchanggou site date to Periods III and IV at Zhukaigou (Tian 2000: 76). The number of rim sherds recovered in this survey from the collections at the three Zhukaigou period sites was too small to change this interpretation, and no excavations



**Figure 6.6.** Zhukaigou and Laohushan period collections from the Sansumu survey tract (50m contour interval)

have yet taken place at the Zhukaigou period sites found in the survey zone. In addition, the Zhukaigou site is the only Zhukaigou period site to have been excavated, and no sites that have been excavated to date contain both Zhukaigou and Laohushan remains.

Stylistic comparisons between the Zhukaigou site, over 200 kilometers south and west of the Liangcheng region, and remains recovered in

Liangcheng are further complicated by the chronological uncertainties at the Zhukaigou site itself. Han Jianye (2005) compares Longshan and Zhukaigou ceramic assemblages and posits a date of 1850–1250 BCE for the Zhukaigou site, which would lengthen the gap between the Laohushan and Zhukaigou periods and shorten the proposed occupational hiatus between the Zhukaigou and Warring States period. Utilizing comparisons of the bronze assemblage at Zhukaigou and bronze assemblages on the Central Plain and in Siberia, Linduff (1995) suggests a date of 1900–1500 BCE, which would have little effect on the chronology utilized here.

Little is known about sites coeval with the Zhukaigou period across south-central Inner Mongolia, and the Liangcheng region is no exception. The changes in ceramics and bronzes outside the survey region aside, the Zhukaigou period settlement pattern strongly resembled the Laohushan period settlement pattern, but in much diminished form. A comparison of the settlement patterns between the two periods is suggestive of the continuation of the Laohushan pattern, not an occupational hiatus followed by reoccupation. A large proportion of the Zhukaigou collections either share a location with or were directly adjacent to Laohushan period occupations (Figure 6.6). Baiposhan, the largest Zhukaigou site in the region, shows that many of the inhabitants of the Zhukaigou period lived in exactly the same places they had during the Laohushan period (Figure 6.6, inset A). Site 982 (a single collection) has the highest elevation of any of the Zhukaigou collections, in a portion of the Sansumu survey tract that is very sparsely occupied in any period, but this collection directly abuts one that had Laohushan sherds (Figure 6.6, Inset B). The only collections that were neither directly adjacent to nor in collection units that produced Laohushan sherds were the two collections in the southern portion of inset B in Figure 6.6. These are just over 100 meters from the nearest Laohushan collections and represent the only new occupations in the settlement pattern between the two periods. The settlement pattern data for these two periods, where some of the sites of the preceding period continue to be occupied and there was little new occupation, suggest political collapse more than reoccupation.

Polities have a tendency to cycle, and at their nadir we should expect small, scattered populations like we see in the Zhukaigou period in Liangcheng. It is more intuitive for people to have remained in this region through the zenith of the Neolithic social system, the Laohushan period, and into the nadir of that social system, the Zhukaigou period, than for the population to have left at the end of the Laohushan period and then returned in such small numbers to sites abandoned for hundreds of years. Therefore, the accepted chronology (Tian



2000) has been adjusted to lengthen the Laohushan and the Zhukaigou period by 100 years to 2900–2100 BCE and 2100–1500 BCE, respectively. Excavation at Baiposhan and Site 982 would provide data to test this hypothesis.

There is a second occupational hiatus in the accepted chronology of the Liangcheng region between the end of the Zhukaigou period and the beginning of the Warring States period. The cooling and drying of the environment of the late Zhukaigou period is thought to have caused a nomadic interregnum across the Northern Zone (Du 2000; Wang 2005; Wang and Feng 1991). In western Inner Mongolia, at the site of Zhukaigou, the shift in subsistence strategy from sedentary agriculture to mobile pastoralism is thought to have occurred at this time (see Figure 6.1) (Han 2005; Han 2003; Nei Menggu and Ouerdousi 2000; Tian 2000).

The interpretation of the archaeological evidence at Zhukaigou cited in support of this explanation is based on artifact style, not on remains that relate more closely to subsistence. The faunal evidence from the Zhukaigou sites does not show an increasing reliance on herding animals, which would have been necessary to make the shift to a pastoral economy (Huang 2000). Also, houses do not become smaller and more ephemeral through time at Zhukaigou. There appears to be little evidence at the site to connect its abandonment with increasing nomadization.

An alternative suggestion regarding this now-recognized occupational hiatus is that the chronologies themselves need to be adjusted, and that further fieldwork is called for. Chinese archaeology is based on the analysis of archaeological cultures—which leave behind distinctive sets of artifacts—and this theoretical approach affects which sites are selected for excavation. Sites that have mixed assemblages are often passed over for excavation because these mixed remains are thought to be poor places to learn about an archaeological culture in its pure form. This selection bias means that transitional sites, which are likely to include remains between periods, are unlikely to be chosen for excavation. Across a large area, especially where there is a general dearth of absolute dates from sites, this selection bias can affect our view of the past. Although our present understanding of the regional chronology makes it unlikely that we can disprove the occupational hiatus based on any one site alone, the site of Hetongyao has both Warring States and Laohushan materials, making it a promising place to begin the exploration of the chronological relationship between periods in the Liangcheng region. At present, the best archaeological evidence available for these periods in Liangcheng is the present survey, which shows continuity of settlement type and location through time, suggesting that no occupation hiatus occurred in the region.


**ARCHAEOLOGICAL CORRELATES AND ALTERNATIVE  
EXPLANATIONS: POPULATION REPLACEMENT  
VERSUS INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT**

This paper uses archaeological data to test two competing hypotheses about the transition from pre-to post-imperial domination of the Liangcheng region. The population-replacement hypothesis would posit that the preintegration lifeway was replaced wholesale by the village model of the Central Plain, explained below. The second model would entail the slow integration of the population of Liangcheng into a new settlement pattern.

The population distribution prior to the preimperial or Han period is clear. People occupied the south-facing slopes overlooking the river valley and the lake basin and chose not to occupy the valley floors and lake shore, which today are the best agricultural lands in this region. Populations in the Laohushan and Zhukaigou periods had a tendency to spread out across these slopes, occupying small sites that housed small numbers of people, perhaps no more than an extended family group. Even in the Laohushan period, when populations were considerably more congregated than they were in the Zhukaigou period, these inhabitants rarely congregated in communities of more than 300 individuals, a contrast to the contemporaneous Central Plain settlement pattern described below. The population-replacement hypothesis predicts that the indigenous Liangcheng settlement pattern, as seen in the Laohushan and Zhukaigou periods, would be replaced with the Central Plain settlement pattern.

The Zhou Dynasty period (1050–221 BCE) results of the Yiluo River settlement pattern study included two large sites (Luokou Dongbei, 20 ha; and Qingyi Zhendong, 15 ha) in Henan Province (Liu et al. 2004). Only 5 of the 28 known sites had areas of less than one hectare, like the homesteads that predominate settlement patterns in Liangcheng during the Laohushan and Zhukaigou periods (Chen et al. 2003: 181–82). The settlement pattern in the Yiluo study does not show large numbers of very small sites suggestive of individual households living on their own land as the basic unit of settlement. Rather, collections of populations in farming villages and towns formed the basic unit of habitation, much as farming villages are the basic unit of settlement in modern Liangcheng (Figure 6.7). The Yiluo River valley settlement pattern study, in other words, shows the Central Plain settlement pattern in Henan Province, unlike the pattern seen to develop in Liangcheng.

The Central Plain or village model has ramifications for administration and agricultural production. The farming village, with its compact organization, facilitates administrative control from above in ways that dispersed settlement




**Figure 6.7.** Left: Zhou Dynasty site size histogram from the Yiluo River Valley survey (Source: Chen et al. 2003). Right: Areas of modern villages in the Liangcheng region without Liangcheng itself. (Histogram bar size is one ha in both histograms.)

does not. The villages themselves make for convenient administrative units and also make group accountability arrangements, like the ones seen in the Qin and Han Dynasties, more feasible (Twitchett and Fairbank 1978: 36–37). Villages also allow for more flexible land-tenure arrangements. Inhabitants of the villages walk from their homes to their fields daily, allowing land tenure to change and noncontiguous plots of land to be farmed.


If the expansion of the Central Plain political sphere to include the Liangcheng region was the result of population replacement, then we would expect the dispersed settlement pattern found on the slopes during the Zhukaigou and Laohushan periods to be abandoned and replaced by the circumscribed village format of the Central Plain seen in the Yiluo River study (Chen et al. 2003). Population replacement would couple this shift in habitation form with a shift in location toward the best agricultural lands. The Laohushan and Zhukaigou period settlement patterns, which favored locations on the south-facing slopes rather than the fertile plains, would not be conducive to agricultural production and the dispersed settlement patterns would not facilitate the collection of taxes and the organization of the populace for corvée labor projects. If the inclusion of Liangcheng into the Zhao state apparatus was the result of integrating this region rather than completely replacing the entire population with foreigners from the Central Plain, then we would expect to see a combination of the old dispersed system of settlement and the village-based system of farming villages.

# WARRING STATES–PERIOD SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN THE LIANGCHENG REGION

Demographic estimates from the survey show that the Yongxing Basin survey tract during the Warring States period had a population almost twice that of the Laohushan period (Laohushan population 425–825, Warring States population 975–1450). Settlement was spread over a larger proportion of the survey area than in previous periods (Figures 6.8–9). For the first time, occupations were found on the flat lands where the Nangou River meets the northern



**Figure 6.8.** Warring States period collections in the Yongxing Basin survey tract. The gray lines show the extent of Figure 6.9 (50 m contour interval)




**Figure 6.9.** Detail of the Yongxing Basin Survey Tract with Warring States and Laohushan period collections (50 m contour interval)

tributary of the Gongbeihe Reservoir (below 1,350 masl). This land, in the center of the Yongxing Basin, is the richest agricultural land in the Yongxing Basin survey tract.

The Warring States–period settlement pattern in the Yongxing Basin survey tract had a site hierarchy different from that of the Laohushan period, showing its dispersed nature. Although total population was increasing, sites on average were actually smaller (Figure 6.10). Based on this dispersed settlement pattern, we may conclude that the Zhao state was unable to organize settlement in the Yongxing Basin survey tract to tax efficiently and to manage its populace. This contrasts strongly with the later Han period.


The Warring States–period settlement pattern in the Sansumu survey tract shows an even larger shift toward agricultural production than in the Yongxing Basin survey tract. For the first time, land on the northern shore of Daihai Lake, the most agriculturally productive land in the region, was exploited by large populations, with two compact settlements occupying the northern shore. But populations still occupied the south-facing slopes in this




**Figure 6.10.** Yongxing Basin Survey Tract Site Size Histograms. Left: Laohushan period Right: Warring States period

period as well (Figures 6.11–12). These settlements, both in their dispersed form and in their locations on the south-facing slopes, recall the settlement patterns seen in the preceding periods. The Warring States-period settlement pattern had two basic components that show the limited influence of the Zhao state administrative structure. One portion of the settlement pattern represented farming villages on the best agricultural land in the Sansumu survey tract. These villages include 31 percent of the population of the Sansumu survey tract. The villages did not hew to the settlement pattern elsewhere in the survey region, but they did resemble the Zhou Dynasty pattern in the Yiluo River settlement pattern study. The balance of the survey (the northern portion of the Sansumu survey tract and the Yongxing Basin survey tract) exhibited a dispersed, homestead-based settlement pattern. The dispersed settlement pattern in the Sansumu survey tract had a higher density than the dispersed settlement pattern in the Yongxing Basin, suggesting interdependence between the villages on the lake shore and the homesteads on the slopes in the Sansumu survey tract. But the gap between them also suggests that the two groups, with their different settlement patterns, avoided closer contact and maintained some independence.

The dispersed settlement pattern seen on the south-facing slopes of the Sansumu survey tract and the entirety of the Yongxing Basin survey tract would have created administrative challenges for the Zhao state. The locus of Zhao administrative control was the farming village, which was situated on the best agricultural land in the Sansumu survey tract, and resistance to this pattern of settlement persisted on the northern slopes of the Sansumu survey tract and over much of the Yongxing Basin survey tract. These lakeshore farming



**Figure 6.11.** Warring States period collections in the Sansumu survey tract. The gray box shows the extent of Figure 6.12 (50 m contour interval)



**Figure 6.12.** Detail of the northern slopes of the Sansumu survey tract with Warring States and Laohushan period collections

villages were unlikely to have been able to manage populations throughout the entire region, and no large settlements or any integrated site hierarchy appear in the Yongxing Basin survey tract. It is possible that the lack of administrative control throughout the survey tracts would have hampered Zhao's efforts to win the military struggles that became increasingly common during this period.

The differences in the settlement patterns on the lake shore and elsewhere suggests that the lakeshore sites, which had higher populations and did not share the internal structures of the other communities in the region, were intrusive to the region. These new, intrusive communities were located on the best agricultural land in the survey tract, supporting the idea that these compact communities were loci of Zhao state control and were intended to increase the agricultural production and tax revenue of this region. The inhabitants of these settlements, on the outskirts of the settlement system, on more marginal land,



may have followed a more mixed economy than those occupying villages on the most productive agricultural lands (Indrisano 2006: 192–95).

In the Yongxing Basin survey tract, none of the population centers, if such a term can be used to describe the small Warring States-period occupations here, attracted the populations inhabiting other small sites. The attractions were weak during the Laohushan period as well, but figure 6.9 shows many more small settlements on the outskirts of the Laohushan cluster than around any of the centers in the Warring States period. The lack of satellite occupations around the densest occupations found at the site (just due east of the modern town of Yongxing) and the dispersed settlement pattern highlight the weak political organization that must have been present during the Warring States period in the Yongxing Basin and show the weak economic integration among these redundant units. Although many of the households in the Yongxing Basin were well positioned to create agricultural surpluses, the Zhao state would have had considerable difficulty taxing and managing these populations because of their dispersed nature.

#### HAN PERIOD (200 BCE–200 CE)


After what might have been a short occupational hiatus (but see below), the Han dynastic apparatus reached the Liangcheng region. Population continued to climb rapidly in this period: the number of Han Dynasty sherds was more than double the number of Warring States period sherds and the occupied area increases from 132.7 to 350.4 hectares. Many of the trends seen in the settlement pattern between the Laohushan and the Warring States periods continued to develop in the Han period. Larger compact villages were founded on the shore of Daihai Lake during the Warring States period and these villages grew in number and in size during the Han period. For the first time, the population living on the lake shore outnumbered those living on the slopes of the Sansumu survey tract. Although there continued to be large populations on the slopes east of the (former) location of the Laohushan Cluster, the proportion of the population situated on the best agricultural land in the Yongxing Basin survey tract continued to grow during the Han period.

The accepted chronology includes a short occupational hiatus between the Warring States and Han periods (Tian 2000). The evidence normally cited for this occupational hiatus is historical. The *Hanshu* describes the loss of the Ordos and neighboring regions after the death of the first Qin emperor (d. 210 BCE) and before the establishment of the Han Dynasty by Liu Bang (202 BCE). Han control over this territory was slowly reestablished during the fifty years following the death of Liu Bang (Emperor Han Gaodi) in 195

BCE (Loewe 1986: 128). Han consolidation in the first half of the second century BCE progressed fitfully: in this period, Empress Dowager Lu usurped control of the throne from the royal family, and the king of Nanyue declared himself Martial Emperor of the South. In the north, the Han continued to have difficulties repelling the Xiongnu. Although the overall trend during this period was toward consolidation, imperial control over territories outside of the Imperial District of the capital Chang'an, near the present-day provincial capital of Xi'an, was uneven (see Figure 6.1).

During the Han Dynasty, the Liangcheng region was part of the nominally autonomous "kingdom" (*guo*) of Dai near the border of the Yunzhong Commandery and was rarely mentioned in the historical records (Figure 6.13). Therefore, these records do not inform us whether the area was abandoned during the interregnum of Central Plain control between the fall of the Qin and the reestablishment of Han power, or whether portions of the population remained there during this period. The famous Han military defeat by the Xiongnu at the battle of Pingcheng (200 BCE) occurred 70 kilometers south and east of Liangcheng. The location of the battle, so far south of the Han Great Wall, bespeaks the tenuous nature of early Han control over the northern zone.

The historical texts and recent archaeological investigations suggest that the loss of Central Plain control (either by Zhao or Qin) over Liangcheng would not necessarily have meant that the region was depopulated. William




**Figure 6.13.** North China during the early Han Dynasty period (c. 163 BCE) (Redrawn from Twitchett and Fairbank 1978: Map 5)

Honeychurch's archaeological work in Mongolia and the historical research of Wu En show that the Xiongnu Confederation did rule over sedentary agricultural populations in their territory north of the Han Great Wall (Honeychurch 2004; Wu 1990). But between the Qin and Han periods, when the Xiongnu Confederation captured territories south of the Great Wall, including Liangcheng, did they chase away the inhabitants of these regions? Did the peasants simply pay their taxes to other groups when Central Plain political authority waned? Or did they pay no taxes at all?


The accepted chronology assumes the former, but from the standpoint of the Xiongnu political economy, this seems disadvantageous. Barfield conceives of the Xiongnu as a predatory polity that redistributed wealth from raids as part of the political economy (Barfield 1981, 2001). Jagchid and Symons argue that raiding was a way of extorting greater concessions from the Han, especially in grains that the Xiongnu did not themselves produce (Jagchid and Symons 1989). Raiding was probably important to both the foreign policy and the political economy of the Xiongnu, but did raiding necessarily mean depopulation? "Mobile polities" like the Xiongnu are widely considered to be uninterested in holding territory in the way the Han colonized the north (Lattimore 1962). The extent of Xiongnu mobility is also a matter of debate, but the northern confederacies, which always had lower populations than the Han, could not stand against Han infantry in wars over territory (Barfield 1989: 72). If the early Xiongnu strategy was to win over defectors like King Han Xin (Barfield 1989: 35), to increase tribute paid to the Shanyu for redistribution (Barfield 2001), or to garner foodstuffs that they were unwilling (or unable) to produce themselves (Jagchid and Symons 1989; Ma 1962), then the wholesale removal of the peasant farming population would seem to be counterproductive.

The ancient written histories offer some support for the point of view that the Xiongnu would have become a taxing authority during the Qin/Han interregnum (c.f. Di Cosmo 1994). Chapter 96 of the *Hanshu* mentions that the Rong and the Di peoples, who were the northern enemies of the Zhou Dynasty and like many non-Han peoples are described as living different lifeways, dwelt intermingled with agricultural populations after the fall of the Zhou. The texts also record a Xiongnu office of "the Commandant of Slaves" (*Tung Bu*) that managed the holdings of the Xiongnu in the western regions (Hulsewé and Loewe 1979: 73). Although neither of these passages recorded management policies in Liangcheng specifically, the fact that the Xiongnu accepted management (as opposed to depopulation) as beneficial elsewhere makes it more likely they would have pursued the same policy in Liangcheng.

Although there seems to be ample historical evidence to support the view that the Xiongnu had both the administrative structures for and an economic interest in preserving the settlements rather than forcing the farming population off their land, none of the discussion above disproves the accepted chronology. The only available archaeological data from these two periods in Liangcheng, the survey data, shows that the largest of the Han period settlements grew out of areas where Warring States period sites were located, suggesting continuity of habitation (figs. 6.14–15). The largest Han settlements were not in exactly the same places as the largest of the Warring States-period



**Figure 6.14.** Warring States and Han Dynasty period collections from the Yongxing Basin survey tract (50 m contour interval)




**Figure 6.15.** Warring States and Han Dynasty period collections from the Sansumu survey tract (50 m contour interval)

settlements, but both the large settlements on the shores of Daihai Lake and the smaller string of settlements in the Yongxing Basin near the road from Yongxing east to Liangcheng had Warring States-period collections near their cores (figs. 6.14–15). There are important differences in the settlement patterns of these two periods, but the connection between the two appears to be one of development, not of abandonment followed by resettlement.


# SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN THE HAN PERIOD

Population in the survey area expanded between the Warring States and Han periods, from approximately 3,050–4,500 to 8,800–13,100 people, and in each of the two survey zones the settlement pattern changed. In the Yongxing Basin survey tract, the settlement pattern continued to be more dispersed than in the Sansumu survey tract, but as was seen on the northern slopes of the Warring States–period Sansumu survey tract settlement pattern, these homestead settlements are loosely clustered (Figure 6.16).



**Figure 6.16.** Han Dynasty period collections in the Yongxing Basin survey tract (50 m contour interval)


The principal difference in the settlement patterns between the Warring States and Han periods is seen in the Sansumu survey tract (Figure 6.17). The population there grew from 2,000–3,100 people in the Warring States period to 5,700–8,225 during the Han period. On the shores of Daihai Lake, where the largest contiguous Warring States-period occupations were located, the




**Figure 6.17.** Han Dynasty period collections in the Sansumu survey tract (50 m contour interval)

Han period saw the foundation of even larger settlements. The growth of settlements on the lake shore occurred at the same time that the upper slopes in the northern reaches of the survey area were largely abandoned. Populations congregated on the best agricultural land both on the slopes of the lake and on the Yongxing Basin valley floors in unprecedented numbers.

The increase in population between the Warring States and Han periods occurs contemporaneously with increasing congregation into larger settlements and an increase in site hierarchy. The difference is more dramatic in the Sansumu survey tract, where the largest site (Site 783) grows to over 60 hectares (Figure 6.18). A similar, if not quite as dramatic, change is seen in the Yongxing Basin survey tract, where the largest site grows to over 10 hectares, almost three times as large as the largest settlement in the Yongxing Basin during the Warring States period (Figure 6.19).



**Figure 6.18.** Sansumu survey tract site size histograms. Left: Warring States period  
Right: Han Dynasty period



**Figure 6.19.** Yongxing Basin survey tract site size histograms. Left: Warring States period. Right: Han Dynasty period



The Han period settlement pattern suggests that the Han government had succeeded in controlling the landscape in ways the Zhao government did not. The Han pattern was organized so that more people lived on the best agricultural land (on the shore of Daihai Lake or on the Yongxing Basin valley floor) than in any other period, and lived in hierarchically organized settlements that would have aided in the collection of taxes and increased the participation in *corvée* labor and military service to the state. Although these two periods are often combined in archaeological discussions, it is clear that even in outlying areas like Liangcheng, the Zhao and Han governmental systems were sufficiently different that the people would have been much more affected by the rise of the Han Dynasty than by incorporation into the Zhao state.

These changes in settlement pattern are the physical manifestations of the different levels of control exerted by the Zhao and Han over this region. A comparison of the settlement patterns shows that the Zhao state government had a much smaller effect on the landscape, with large populations occupying the same slopes they had inhabited since the Neolithic age. The Han settlement pattern, by contrast, saw the abandonment of these slopes for the first time in the Sansumu survey tract, with over 90 percent of the population occupying the best agricultural lands near the shore of Daihai Lake. The Yongxing Basin survey tract still showed some resistance to this pattern, suggesting that the Han Dynasty was focusing its efforts on the richest lands in the region (the shores of Daihai Lake) where agricultural surpluses were likely the highest, and allowing the Yongxing Basin survey tract populations to maintain more of their original settlement pattern.

This settlement pattern data suggests that the method of integration, first used by the Zhao state and then more effectively utilized by the Han Dynasty to control the populace, was the farming village. Farming was the “foundation of the empire” according to an edict of King Wen in 176 BCE (Hsu 1980: 149), but not until the systematic study of the Han Dynasty settlement pattern in a marginal location does it seem clear that the farming village was the basic unit of habitation. Absent from the texts is the idea that there was another divergent settlement pattern in the region before the integration of Liangcheng into the political, economic, and social sphere of the Central Plain. The historical period settlement pattern begins in the Warring States period with two different patterns, one dispersed on the slopes and a second, more dense village pattern on the shores of the lake. The Han period pattern shows a further development of the lakeshore pattern, with larger villages that house a larger proportion of the population. It was in these villages that the social reproduction of the agricultural lifeway that in the later periods are


called “Chinese” would have occurred. This pattern does not meet the expectations of the idealized model of population replacement, as the populations continue to occupy locations utilized since the Neolithic, but the changes seen between the Warring States and Han periods—with increasing numbers of people living in compact farming villages through time—does meet the expectations of integration of indigenous populations into a new settlement system.

This interpretation of the settlement pattern evidence does not require a complete reinterpretation of the textual evidence from this period. The texts record that the Han Dynasty moved populations from the south to the north to inhabit villages (Hsu 1980: 27–28). The villages founded on the lake shore were likely an example of this phenomenon. This settlement pattern study adds information about how this process affected the local populations. The increased density of occupations on the south-facing slopes in the Sansumu survey tract in the Warring States period and the growth of the farming villages in the Han period suggest that the inhabitants of the region before integration stayed and were attracted to these centers.

#### EXPANDING EMPIRES AND SOCIAL CHANGE ON THE PERIPHERY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

This chapter presents and interprets the changes in Liangcheng society during integration into the Central Plain political sphere. The expansion of large empires into hinterlands has been researched in other contexts as well. The Inka expansion across the Andes is chosen as a comparative case here because the Inka was a territorially extensive empire with a subsistence system that is also thought to have shared a complementary relationship between pastoral and agricultural subsistence strategies (D’Altroy 1992; Murra 1980; Parsons et al. 2000). In addition, comparable regional studies have been completed within the boundaries of the Inka Empire and some of these studies have been followed by the stratigraphic excavations and geomorphological and bone chemistry studies that would further test the conclusions reached in Liangcheng based on settlement patterns alone. The results of the work in the Andes serve to amplify the results of this survey, to indicate ways in which the results of the Liangcheng survey might be limited, and to suggest additional research questions (Figure 6.20).

It is important to recognize at the outset that the Inka expansion into the Andes is not a perfect analogy for the Han expansion into the Northern Zone, and that some of the differences are environmental. The landscape of the Andes has topographic variation that limits the productive potential of certain locations and increases the potential of complementarities between



**Figure 6.20.** Map of Peru showing principal archaeological sites and approximate locations of regional surveys cited here (Redrawn and modified from Parsons et al. 2001: 2)

ecological zones (Brush 1977; Murra 1980; Mura 1972 cited in Parsons et al. 2000). Although there are complementary relationships among the subsistence strategies in the modern and ancient settlement patterns in Liangcheng, the environmental characteristics of the landscape do not limit subsistence activities in different portions of the survey tracts to the same extent that the vertical environmental zones do in the Andes.

The Tarma Drainage survey area in highland Peru exemplifies this environmental variation and can be divided topographically into four regions (Parsons et al. 2000: 14–15). Except for localized rain shadows, elevation, average temperature, and rainfall co-vary in this region, making elevation the most direct way to divide the landscape into ecological zones. The *cordillera*, or frost desert (4,700–5,700 masl) is fit for neither farming nor herding. The *upper puna* (4,200–4,700 masl) is the main herding zone; the *lower puna* (3,850–4,200

masl) has a climate that allows for the cultivation of hardy cereals and some tubers. Below the *puna* is the *upper kichwa* (3,500–3,800 masl), which can support the production of tubers and quinoa, and the *lower kichwa* (2,700–3,500 masl) permits the cultivation of maize (*zea mays*).

As this brief introduction suggests, the environment of this region and other regions across the Peruvian Andes places severe limitations on the subsistence strategies that can be pursued in any particular ecological zone. Although there are tuber varieties that grow at all but the highest elevations, grains have a more limited range. Because these environmental characteristics place greater restrictions on the use of the landscape, these divisions allow for better archaeological interpretation of past subsistence strategies and, in combination with regional survey data, aid in the testing of theories relating to societal complexity and subsistence change, a facet of the integration of Liangcheng into the Central Plain political sphere that has been ignored to this point.

### *The Upper Mantaro Valley Survey*

The overall political environment in Liangcheng resembles that of the Upper Mantaro Valley (D'Altroy 1987; Earle et al. 1987) because this region also witnessed the rise of two different political powers. The earliest polity included in the survey is the Wanka (or Huanca), which is divided into two chronological stages: Wanka I (1000–1350 CE) and Wanka II (1350–1460 CE). During Wanka I, the settlements were spread across all of the ecological zones, allowing access to the valley floors where grains could be grown and to areas adjacent to the *puna* where tubers would have predominated (nearly 3,900 masl). The settlement pattern from this period, which exhibits little settlement hierarchy and a lack of defensive architecture, combined with the exposed position of the settlements on the landscape, suggests that warfare was uncommon in the region (D'Altroy 1987: 55; 1992). Paleobotanical and bone chemistry analysis suggest that maize was available to all classes in the community (Hastorf 1990).

The Wanka II settlement pattern shows abrupt shifts in the settlement patterns with a developed site hierarchy including competing centers and the construction of extensive defensive architecture at the sites. Sites move off the valley floors and into defensible positions on high ridges (D'Altroy 1992: 58); this limited access to valley floors affects access of residents to grains like maize and to animals that are herded at higher elevations (Hastorf 1990: 268; 1993: 170). Maize becomes rarer during this period and is associated with elite contexts (D'Altroy 1992: 67; Hastorf 1993: 205).

The settlement pattern changes again with the conquest of the Wanka by the Inka (Wanka III period, 1460–1533 CE). D'Altroy suggests, based on historical materials, that when the Inka invaded, the Wanka chose to fight (instead of submitting to the Inka) and were dispersed onto the valley floors (D'Altroy 1987, 1992). The survey results show the smaller dispersed settlements were in vulnerable positions on the valley floors without defensive architecture. The valley floors were places where maize could be grown effectively, and paleobotanical studies suggest that once again all classes of people had more equal access to maize (Hastorf 1990). The large number of storage centers, located near roads, were testament to the surpluses that the Inka produced in this and other regions (D'Altroy 1992; Snead 1992).


The changes seen in the Upper Mantaro Valley are not unlike what was seen in the historical periods in Liangcheng, and the same conclusions can be drawn from them. First, the Wanka II shift toward the hillsides did not occur because of a desire to shift subsistence regimes or in response to apparent environmental change. Subsistence change there was a proximate result of the shift away from the valley floors caused by conflict (Hastorf 1993: 182). Settlement location does affect subsistence strategy in this case, once again raising the issue of the two-part settlement system in the Sansumu survey tract during the Warring States period. Did the residents of the slopes grow different crops that were better adjusted to these locations? The paleobotanical research required to answer such questions in the Upper Mantaro Valley has already been completed, suggesting that in the Wanka II period maize may have been a high-status subsistence good controlled by the elite (Earle et al. 1987: 101; Hastorf 1993: 205). Might a similar trade in millet have developed between those on the shore of Daihai Lake and those inhabiting the slopes during the Warring States period? In the Upper Mantaro Valley, the subsistence profile shifts again when the Inka moved the populace back to the valley floors, with elites losing differential access to maize. However, elites gained increased access to Inka trade goods. Were similar shifts in subsistence and access to trade goods from the Central Plain seen on the slopes during the Warring States to the Han periods? What were the differences in subsistence strategies and access to trade goods in the center of the Han period settlement pattern in the Sansumu survey tract and peripheral settlements in the Yongxing Basin survey tract, if any?

The Upper Mantaro Valley survey also shows how empires exert pressure on their populations to produce agricultural surpluses. In Peru, the surplus funded the Inka state. But such specialization in agriculture had a corollary subsistence specialization in herding on the puna (Murra 1980: 45). Lees and Bates (1974: 192) and Yoffee (2005: 60) suggest that a pastoral subsistence

specialization developed after the institution of intensive agricultural systems in Mesopotamia. These authors envision the process happening concurrently with the development of early cities and states, not at the lower population densities that are seen in the Peruvian and the Liangcheng cases. Might subsistence specialization at one end of the agricultural–pastoral spectrum have also opened opportunities for specialists at the other end of the spectrum? The Inka case suggests that this may have been the case, especially in the Tarma Drainage (Parsons et al. 2000).

### *The Tarma-Chinchayacocha Survey*

The Tarma Drainage survey was designed to research the integration between the different environmental zones (Parsons et al. 2000: 7). It covered more of the highland Peruvian topographic landscape than the Upper Mantaro Valley survey and included the zone where maize cannot be grown and where herding is the predominate economic activity (Figure 6.21). In the Tarma



**Figure 6.21.** Base map from the Tarma Drainage survey (200 m contour interval) (Redrawn from Parsons et al. 2001)

Drainage survey, the Inka period (or Late Horizon) showed a shift out of the zone, immediately surrounding the 4,000-meter elevation level, where both herding and some agriculture could be practiced from the same habitation site. If the distribution of settlements across the topographic zones is compared between the Late Intermediate period (ca. 1000–1500 CE) and the Late Horizon, a shift is seen toward areas where agriculture is practiced (Table 6.2). In the Late Intermediate period, the proportion of sites in the zone where both agriculture and pastoral pursuits might be combined is almost double that from the Late Horizon. Under the domination of the Inka Empire, therefore, populations are shifted toward regions where specialization, not combinations of subsistence strategies, is most advantageous.

**Table 6.2.** Proportions of settlements in different topographic zones in the three periods identified by the Tarma Drainage survey

Early Intermediate Period		
Elevation Range	Number of Sites	Proportion
4800–4200 masl	8	7.2%
4200–3800 masl	52	46.8%
3800–3400 masl	20	18.0%
3400–3000 masl	29	26.1%
3000–1800 masl	2	1.8%

Late Intermediate Period		
Elevation Range	Number of Sites	Proportion
4800–4200 masl	59	25.7%
4200–3800 masl	101	43.9%
3800–3400 masl	34	14.8%
3400–3000 masl	31	13.5%
3000–1800 masl	5	2.2%

Late Horizon		
Elevation Range	Number of Sites	Proportion
4800–4200 masl	3	6.5%
4200–3800 masl	13	28.3%
3800–3400 masl	15	32.6%
3400–3000 masl	12	26.1%
3000–1800 masl	3	6.5%

After integration into the Inka polity, the Tarma Drainage settlement pattern study suggests a shift toward agricultural pursuits similar to that seen in the Upper Mantaro Valley settlement pattern study. The shift in the Tarma Drainage during the Inka period appears to further isolate the herders of the highland plateau as the proportion of settlements in the agricultural-herding border area drops. The Liangcheng settlement pattern shows no such isolation. The Dongshihao plateau, an area that would have provided analogous isolated herding lands, remained virtually uninhabited during the Warring States and Han periods (figs. 6.8 and 6.16). Further research will be necessary to examine the sites at the center and periphery of the Han period village system to better understand what these labels mean in relation to subsistence resources and access to specialized craft goods and imported trade items.

### *The Carahuarazo Valley Survey*

This contrast between the Wanka and Inka settlement systems seen in the Upper Mantaro Valley and the Tarma Drainage surveys is not repeated in the Carahuarazo Valley in highland Peru (Schreiber 1987). Like Liangcheng, this valley is peripheral to the capitals of the Inka and the Wanri polities, which are centered on the archaeological site of Jincamocco south and west of Wari (Figure 6.20). In the settlement pattern study of this area, the most significant changes occur during the integration into the Wari polity (600–800 CE). People move to areas that are best for grain production and energy is invested in the construction of terraces that most likely produced maize (Schreiber 1987: 271). The incorporation of the Carahuarazo Valley into the Inka Empire is much less intrusive than the incorporation of the Wari polity, but large changes are seen in the surrounding valleys (outside the Carahuarazo survey zone) where provincial capitals were located, suggesting that “the process of consolidation (and its archaeologically visible end-products) are the result of the interplay between two sets of factors: the needs of the empire, and the extant social system. Although it may seem that imperial requirements are of primary importance, it is apparent that these are mediated by and adapted to the local circumstances” (Schreiber 1987: 281). The already extant settlement organization in the Carahuarazo Valley was sufficient to meet the needs of the Inka, who controlled the valley via provincial centers in the neighboring valleys and with the aid of the local elites, a pattern suggested by the historical texts (D’Altroy 1992).

Schreiber’s results contrast strongly with the results of the Upper Mantaro Valley study, but the differences between the two valleys remind us that sampling small areas of a large polity can produce contrasting results that increase



our understanding of the polity as a whole. The Inka, as suggested by the historical analysis of D'Altroy (1992: 24), did not seek to directly administer every portion of their vast empire. The Carahuarazo Valley appears to be an area where the Inka built roads and storage centers and incorporated elites into their bureaucracy in return for provisioning storage sites and maintaining the road system (Schreiber 1987: 282). Therefore, little change in the settlement pattern is seen after incorporation.

The three case studies above highlight the importance of further regional studies across the Northern Zone during the period of integration into the Central Plain political sphere. Was the Zhao polity only concentrating its efforts elsewhere at the expense of management in Liangcheng? Or did the wars on its southern borders consume administrative energy and governmental resources to the extent that the north was not a focus of administration? The Liangcheng data suggest the latter, but without further study it cannot be ascertained if an area immediately adjacent to Liangcheng was the locus of administrative control, as was the case in the Carahuarazo Valley study.

Further regional studies would also enhance our knowledge of the extent of the administrative hierarchy seen within Liangcheng County. There was a military outpost, called Shuanggucheng, placed on a defensible hillside in the southern mountainous portion of Liangcheng County (approximately 20 km over rough terrain from the southern border of the Yongxing Basin survey tract) during the Han period (Liangcheng Xian 1992: 115). It is not clear how this administrative unit (called Woyang during the Han Dynasty), including two abutting walled areas totaling approximately 16.2 hectares, would affect the surrounding settlement pattern. Was this an isolated military outpost? An administrative center? Or did it grow from one into the other through time?

## DISCUSSION

The ways in which scholars traditionally view the integration of hinterlands like Liangcheng into territorially expansive polities contrasts with the Peruvian case studies, which predated and informed both the conceptualization of the Liangcheng survey project and the interpretation of the data. The most commonly imagined mechanism of social change when hinterland areas like Liangcheng are absorbed into the large polities of the Central Plain is population replacement (e.g. Di Cosmo 2002; Tian 2000: 76). The Tarma Drainage, the Upper Mantaro Valley, and the Carahuarazo Valley surveys concentrate on the development of polities and what, if any, effects these developments have on local populations. Integration, not population replacement, is considered the mechanism of change. The interpretation offered here for the Liangcheng

case, which traces the integration of already extant Liangcheng populations first into the political sphere of the Zhao state in the Warring States period and then into the Han Dynasty is more parallel to conceptualizations of Inka expansion.

The Peruvian case studies also explore the changing subsistence strategies of their regions without first trying to define ethnicity. No connections are made between “people” or “ethnicity” (*minzu*) and either politics or subsistence strategies in these studies, as is often suggested in Chinese historical writings. Overlaying difficult questions of ethnicity does not aid in the study of subsistence, especially if subsistence can be affected by changes in societal complexity and is therefore fluid rather than static. The Inka likely considered themselves to be different from the Wanka, and the Inka, like the Han, emphasized agriculture. The differences among Inka and Wanka “people” may have had an effect on elite behavior in the survey areas, but none of these archaeological studies suggest that they maintained their separate identities long enough to be viewed archaeologically. Separating ethnicity from political affiliation and envisioning subsistence as an opportunistic strategy that changes through time allows different interpretations that better explain the settlement patterns recovered from the Liangcheng survey.

The population replacement hypothesis would view all settlements in both the Warring States and Han period settlement patterns as new occupations, including the occupations on the northern slopes in the two survey zones that had been inhabited for millennia. This hypothesis does not view the populations on the slopes of the survey tracts as resisting the new imported farming-village mode of settlement organization or suggest that the differences between the Warring States and Han period plots reflect increasing integration. Populations that are already ethnically Han and therefore agricultural would not be expected to establish a settlement pattern with two different community forms (homesteads and villages). According to this hypothesis, all of the populations in the plots from both periods would be new populations from the Central Plain that only inhabited the region after the Zhao government removed the indigenous populations (ca. 350 BCE). The two different settlement patterns in the Warring States period plots are very difficult to explain according to this population-replacement hypothesis. Ideas of increasing population integration present a much more cogent argument that better explains the patterns seen in data. Imperial expansion, therefore, apparently meant drawing the populations already in place into the lifeway patterns (subsistence strategies, settlement patterns) of the imperial centers.

## NOTES

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2. The “Northern Zone” extends from the coast of the East China Sea to the forests of Liaoning Province, south and west along the Ming Dynasty-period Great Wall toward the Great Bend in the Yellow River, and into the Ordos region that this Bend defines (Figure 6.1).

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CHAPTER 7

# BINDING THE IMPERIAL WHOLE

## THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITAL TO PROVINCE IN THE INKA IMPERIAL HEARTLAND

R. ALAN COVEY

SCHOLARS INVESTIGATING ARCHAIC EMPIRES TEND TO INVOKE qualitative scalar distinctions to advance the most meaningful typological definition possible: empires are centralized states whose administrative capacities are sufficiently well-developed that they manage successfully to incorporate and govern other states and multiple ethnic groups. While all ancient empires may have been large by most comparative measures (population, territory), their temporal trajectories were variable, dynamic, and complex. Skirting the shortcomings of the latter part of the imperial definition advanced above—whether empire is enabled by transcending civic institutions or identity boundaries—researchers face a much more difficult measure, that of successful incorporation and governance of distinct political or ethnic entities. The question of imperial success over time is particularly germane when archaeologists are in dialogue with historians, who may detect empire in more ephemerally materialized, nuanced, and ideational forms. As a macroregional (and, usually, text-aided) endeavor, the study of imperial polities is necessarily interdisciplinary, so attempts should be made to measure imperial trajectories at interpretive scales that are relevant to the various fields involved.

Among other measures, imperial success can be evaluated in terms of growth or durability—either how large a population or territory was incorporated before inevitable processes of decline or collapse took hold, or how

long such processes were successfully held at bay. While provincial dynamics are discernible across vast areas in the imperial periphery, the capital region provides a critical context for comparison; it is a relatively compact area with a longer and more intensive imperial development that includes regional restructuring to facilitate large-scale administration of provincial regions. While rarely, if ever, constituting a case of “empire writ small,” the capital region clearly evidences the administrative ties between central government and provinces. Part of the process of binding the imperial capital with provinces is the development of a highly integrated imperial heartland that is qualitatively distinct from other parts of the empire.

In the Andes, first-generation imperialism by the Wari and Tiwanaku states (ca. 600–1000 CE) increasingly appears to have been a modest extrapolation of the political and economic features of civil societies. While there is consensus that Wari and Tiwanaku established colonies at considerable distances from the state capitals, the evidence for direct provincial administration of local populations remains limited (see, for example, Goldstein 2005; Jennings 2010). From about 1400–1532 CE, the Inkas established a much larger and more diverse imperial order in the Andean region, implementing a dynamic range of administrative strategies in its provincial regions (Figure 7.1). In this chapter, I use the archaeological and ethnohistorical records to consider the strategies employed to develop the Inka imperial heartland, using the capital region to measure the Inka success in uniting core and periphery during the century or so before the European invasion. The following discussion builds on previous work on the topic (see, for example, Bauer 2004; Farrington 1992; cf. Covey 2006), with a particular focus on a study region to the north and west of Cusco that has detailed documentary information and systematic regional archaeological data (Figure 7.2).


#### ETHNOHISTORY OF THE HEARTLAND: IMPERIAL IDEAS AND IDENTITIES

The Inka did not use a writing system, although their *quipu* (a counting and recording device made of knotted cords) is known to have recorded decimal information and to have been used by oral history tellers to perform narratives of the past. Viewing *quipu* records through a modern historiographic lens reveals some problems with deploying them to reconstruct the Inka past: information was highly restricted, it was encoded and consulted in varying ways, and the records and their attendant specialists are said to have been purged repeatedly in pre-Hispanic times. A more relevant set of problems lies in the written documents produced in the uncertain century in which the Inka





**Figure 7.1.** Maximum extent of Inka territory, with the distribution of roads and important peripheral sites



**Figure 7.2.** The Cusco region, with important early Colonial communities and the limits of full-coverage survey research conducted by the author, 2000–2006

Empire was destroyed and reassembled on paper by European adventurers, administrators, priests, and native elites eager to retrieve and edit—and, in some cases, fabricate—fragments of the Inka past and to parlay them into advantages in the Spanish colonial present. Early Colonial authors approached the Inka Empire with different ends in mind, as can be seen in recent historiographic scholarship (see, for example, Covey 2006; Julien 2000; Ramírez 2005; Zuidema 1990).

Despite the myriad problems in the documentary record, a review of the published chronicles and unpublished archival materials is useful for identifying some distinctions between the region surrounding Cusco, the imperial capital, and the principal provincial regions. The documentary record indicates that the Inkas transformed the Cusco region into an imperial heartland where social and ethnic identities, political economy, ritual practice, and ideology were distinct from conditions in provincial contexts.

### *Promotion of the Heartland*


Some accounts call the Inka Empire *Tawantinsuyu* (The Whole that Comprises Four Divisions), and the names of the most important provincial regions are known to us: Chinchaysuyu, Qollasuyu, Kuntisuyu, and Antisuyu (see, for example, González Holguín 1989 [1608]). Ideally, these four regions divided the Inka world beyond the temple or plaza space that constituted its center. The ritual circuits of Cusco's municipal shrine (*ceque*) system radiated outward from the Qorikancha temple in the capital in sectorial divisions based on provincial boundaries (see Bauer 1998; cf. Zuidema 1995 [1964]), while the arrival of provincial ritual participants for empire-wide rituals such as the *Situa* (see below) followed the four principal provincial highways and converged on the Awkaypata, the capital's central plaza (Molina 1989 [1575]; Vaca de Castro 1908 [1543]; see Bauer 2004). In the early Colonial period, villages lying in Cusco's rural hinterland were recognized as lying within one of the four major provincial divisions, even though many of those towns were under the municipal administration of Cusco (Espinoza Soriano 1977; Zuidema and Poole 1982).

Despite some provincial associations for Cusco's rural hinterland, the documentary record clearly demonstrates that the Inkas considered the Cusco region to be set apart from the provinces. It was occupied by individuals and groups with social identities not commonly seen in the periphery, and unique regional ceremonies and rituals celebrated the transition from capital city to provinces. Imperial myth and ideology reinforced the concept of an imperial heartland.

*Imperial Elites and Subalterns: Ethnic Manipulation and Retainership*

The region immediately surrounding the Inka imperial capital experienced a radical restructuring of local identity and of the relationships among local Cusco populations, Inka elites, and individuals of provincial ethnic origins. Five main social categories can be identified for the Cusco region, constituting a social order distinct from what would be found in provincial regions:

(1) Inkas. While lineages and individuals identified as Inka were native to the Cusco Basin, imperial administrative consolidation of the Cusco region involved the placement of Inka officials in local communities, as well as the probable resettlement of Inka groups throughout the region (Figure 7.3). The presence of Inka administrators is common for provincial contexts, where they were often referred to as *orejones* owing to their use of ear spools as a status and ethnic marker. In the area considered in this chapter, descendants of Inka administrators were still living in some local communities in the early Colonial period; witnesses interviewed by the Spanish viceroy Francisco de Toledo in the early 1570s mentioned parents and grandparents who were Inka



**Figure 7.3.** Distribution of Inka inhabitants in the study region

□ Inka residents

○ Residents of Royal Descent

■ ● Honorary Inka Designation

administrators in the towns of Cache, Huaroscondo, Pomaguanca, and Maras Ayllu (Levillier 1940).

In addition to imperial officials, some rural areas in the Cusco region may have experienced an influx of Inka population, especially in places where royal families invested labor tribute to develop new irrigated maize lands. Several towns near the capital (for example, Calca, Lamay, Coya, Písaq, Zurite, Ollantaytambo, Accha, Oropesa) had a descent group (*ayllu*) named Cusco Ayllu in the Colonial period, while documents from more distant communities mention an Inka *ayllu* (for example, Capacmarca, Livitaca, Quili) (see, for example, ADC, Libro de Matrículas, Industria, Indígenas y Eclesiásticas: Provincia de Calca [1722]; Villanueva Urteaga 1982). Some communities with a Cusco Ayllu population are known to have had residents who were members of royal Inka lineages during the early Colonial Period, and the development of royal estates may have contributed to Inka emigration from the Cusco Basin into the surrounding region (table 7.1). It is significant that royal Inka groups living outside the Cusco Basin were generally descendants of the last six rulers, whose offspring constituted the upper moiety of noble Inka lineages (Hanan Cusco). Descendants of the first five Inka rulers (the lineages comprising the lower moiety, or Hurin Cusco) typically were found living within the municipal boundaries of the city of Cusco.

(2) Honorary Inkas. An additional measure of Inka status may be found in a list of Inka towns attending a noble christening in Cusco in 1571 (Ocampo 1999 [1610]). Thirty-four Inka towns are listed, representing many of the communities lying within 30–50 kilometers of Cusco in all directions. These

**Table 7.1.** Communities in or near the study region with a known Cusco Ayllu in the Colonial period (\*), or known individuals of royal Inka descent

Community	Descendants of Ruler	Reference
Lamay*	Yawar Waq'aq	Levillier 1940; AGI, Patronato 231 N7 R12 [n.d.]
Caquia Xaquixaguana	Wiraqocha Inka	Levillier 1940
Huaroscondo	Wiraqocha Inka	Levillier 1940
Anta	Wiraqocha Inka	Levillier 1940
Coya*	Pachakutiq Inka Yupanki	Levillier 1940
Písaq*	Pachakutiq Inka Yupanki	Levillier 1940
Chinchero	Thupa Inka Yupanki	
Yucay	Wayna Qhapaq	ADC, Colección Betancur vol.7
Calca*	Uncertain	Levillier 1940
Zurite*	Uncertain	Villanueva Urteaga 1982

communities represent a broader sharing of the Inka identity. At the onset of the imperial period, many, but not all, of the groups living in the Cusco region received honorary Inka status, a secondary position that came with restrictions on dress and personal ornamentation (Bauer 1992; Garcilaso de la Vega 1965 [1609]; Guaman Poma de Ayala 1980 [1615]). The designation of honorary Inka groups was phrased as a privilege, but it may also be viewed as an administrative innovation that promoted provincial consolidation while reducing resistance to Inka policies in the Cusco region. Significant numbers of some honorary Inka groups were sent to provincial regions where Quechua-speaking colonists could support the process of consolidating imperial order (see, for example, Covey 2006).


Honorary Inka groups had a more complex relationship with Cusco than provincial populations. Colonial period witnesses recalled ancient marriage alliances between their forebears and members of the Inka nobility. Whereas members of royal descent groups (*panaqa*) populated the capital and improved lands surrounding elite estates, there were several individuals living in honorary Inka communities who identified themselves as Inkas based on deep kinship with earlier rulers (see, for example, Levillier 1940). Some honorary Inka descent groups shared elements of their origin myths with the Inkas of Cusco, but there is sufficient documentary evidence to conclude that many of these groups maintained their own initiation ceremonies and rituals to consecrate local sacred landscapes and to celebrate local origin stories (see, for example, Albórniz 1989 [1580s]; Bauer and Barrionuevo Orosco 1998).

(3) Labor Colonists. As imperial resettlement programs dispersed the population of many honorary Inka groups into the provinces, a concomitant influx of new provincial settlers augmented the rural populations of the Cusco region. Temporary settlers were known as *mitmaqkuna* (sing. *mitmaq*); they traveled to the imperial heartland to fulfill labor taxes imposed on their provincial ethnic groups by the imperial elite (see Rowe 1982). Temporary settlers retained rights to resources in their natal regions and in principle were allowed to return after some term of service. Such laborers were periodically assigned in large numbers to the extension of hydraulic agriculture works, particularly in the Sacred Valley, and some groups of *mitmaqkuna* may have farmed such lands, although most royal estate lands appear to have been worked by more permanent *yana* groups (see below).

(4) Retainers. Members of the Inka elite were served by retainers called *yanakuna* (sing. *yana*). Unlike the *mitmaqkuna*, members of the *yana* category were permanently removed from provincial settings and brought to Cusco, where they served Inka nobles directly. This new status appears to have been

hereditary, as descendants of *yanakuna* are known to have served the Inka families who brought their ancestors to Cusco. It is sometimes difficult to use the documentary record to discern Inka *yanakuna* from those using the same appellation in the Colonial period, but it appears that servants and retainers lived and worked in rural areas surrounding the Inka capital to support members of the Inka nobility (see, for example, Covey and Amado González 2008).

(5) Production Specialists. Production specialists (*kamayukuna*; sing. *kamayuk*) were concentrated in the imperial capital, but they are known to have been present in rural communities in the Cusco region as well (Figure 7.4). This is not surprising, given that specialists were engaged in construction of hydraulic agriculture works (*chakrakamayuk*), in masonry work, and in constructing highway infrastructure, as well as in specialized high-elevation herding, lowland cultivation of coca leaf, and the maintenance of evaporation-based salt pans (*kachikamayuk*). Specialists produced fancy textiles in several rural communities near the capital, such as Chiuchis and Chacan (Levillier 1940). Some



**Figure 7.4.** Distribution of production specialists and support staff in the study region

specialists were placed in multiethnic communities, while others resided with members of their own ethnic groups in distinct settlements (Levillier 1940; table 7.2). These patterns appear similar to those seen in some Inka provincial regions; for example, records from the Huánuco region reveal that settlements of potters, woodworkers, and herders were placed in and among local communities, with groups of production specialists representing fairly small residential units, generally, fewer than twenty houses (Helmer 1955–56 [1549]).

Certain specialists seem to have resided only in Cusco, especially those involved in metalworking, featherworking, and lapidary or marine-shell craft production (see Covey 2009). Some of these urban artisans, such as a group of Chimú silversmiths living in the parish of Santiago in Cusco, claimed to have been supported by agricultural lands in the rural areas surrounding the capital, and may have engaged in some farming themselves (AGN Tít. Prop. L.23 C.431 [1585]). It is not clear whether craft producers at the capital were settled in distinct wards or scattered throughout the city near the residences of their elite patrons.

**Table 7.2.** Communities in or near the study region with residents of provincial ethnicity. (Note: Identifications made from 1572 documents in the Colección Betancur identify men living in the towns of Yucay, Urubamba, Huayllabamba, and Maras in 1572, but only those who stated an ethnic identity and were born in the valley before the Inka uprising of 1536)

Group Name	Communities	Source
Qana	Lacrama, Yucay	Levillier 1940; ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]
Cañar	Yucay, Urubamba	Levillier 1940; ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]
Chachapoya	Lavanqui, Chinchaypuquio	Levillier 1940
Chupaychu	Chinchaypuquio, Chiuchis	Levillier 1940
Qolla	Pisac, Vicchu, Chinchero, Urubamba, Huayllabamba	Cook 1975 [1570s]; Levillier 1940; ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]; AGN, Tít. Prop. L.2 C.17 [1587]
Collagua	Chinchaypuquio, Yucay	Levillier 1940; ADC Colección Betancur V. 7 [1572]
Wanka	Lamay, Urubamba, Huayllabamba, Chiuchis	Levillier 1940; ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]
Huaylas	Chinchaypuquio, Huayllabamba	Levillier 1940; ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]
Huayocondo	Huayllabamba	ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]
Pasto	Yucay	ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]
Sora	Pomaganca	Levillier 1940
“Yunga”	Yucay	ADC Colección Betancur vol. 7 [1572]

ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY IN THE HEARTLAND:  
THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIATE ELITES

The Cusco region was uniquely positioned with respect to the imperial political economy and ritual life, and the parallel organizational structures governing local populations, Inka elites, and imperial infrastructure required appropriate administration. Administrators are easily identifiable in the documentary record. Witnesses appearing before Francisco de Toledo in 1571 included men who claimed to administer decimal administration units (of 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000, and 10,000 households), descent groups or moieties, one or more towns, and even to govern an Inka province (Levillier 1940; table 7.3). While higher-order administrators lived in the capital, it appears that at least part of the population of the Cuzco region was organized under the same decimal system seen in the more directly administered provincial regions. In addition to local leaders, Toledo’s witnesses include supervisors and inspectors who looked after the work of labor colonists and production specialists.

The interests of the Inka state were advanced by mid- and lower-level administrators in rural Cusco, but appear to have been safeguarded by the settlement of individuals who were military veterans or who had served Inka rulers as servants, guards, or messengers. Men whose fathers or grandfathers had military experience or a record of loyal service to the ruling family were living in several rural communities in the early Colonial period (Levillier 1940). This is especially true for areas with large honorary Inka populations.

From the perspective of social status, the Cusco region had aspects of administrative organization seen in the provinces while also possessing elements of social hierarchy seen at the capital and not common in provincial contexts. Populations of labor colonists who maintained their peripheral connections and identities appear to have been administered in the manner of

**Table 7.3.** Evidence for Decimal Administration in the Inka Heartland. The exact location of some communities is still unknown. Source: Witness information given to Francisco de Toledo in 1571 (Levillier 1940)

Households Administered	Title	Town	Ethnicity
10	Mandón	Chibaco	
50	Cacique	Sulloc	
100	Cacique, <i>kuraka</i>	Pitoguanca, Lanco	
500	<i>Kuraka</i>	Lamay	Wanka
1,000	<i>Kuraka</i>	Cuzco (3)	Cañari, Huamachuco, Inka
10,000	Cacique principal, <i>kuraka</i>	Cuzco, Marco	Wanka, Inka (?)



provinces, while honorary Inka groups were self-administered and retainers and specialists reported to imperial officials or members of the elite.

### *Ceremony and Ideology of the Cusco Region*

Ritual practice and imperial ideology conceptualized the Cusco region as a transitional zone between the capital city and the provinces. The *Situa* ritual provides an excellent example of this. During this ceremony, Inka runners departed from the Awkaypata, following the main provincial roads and bearing weapons that were purified at the confluences of major rivers marking the boundaries of the Cusco region. Significantly, the runners from Inka lineages handed off their weapons to *mitmaqkuna* upon reaching Cusco's municipal boundaries, and subordinate groups ran the remaining distances along the ritual circuit. Following this preliminary ritual to purify the capital and its surrounding region, provincial people entered the region with sacrificial offerings to participate in ceremonies in the Awkaypata (Molina 1989 [1575]). Although it is unclear who the secondary runners in the *Situa* ritual were, the ceremony demarcated a region that lay outside the urban administration of the imperial capital, but one that did not belong to the provinces, either.

Other known ceremonies demonstrate that this ritually defined region was not as closely tied to royal Inka ceremonial life as the Cusco Basin, and that not all Inka rituals occurring in Cusco involved the region to an equal degree. As Bauer (1998: 158) has demonstrated, the *ceque* system radiating from the Qorikancha temple organized ceremonial life within the Cusco Basin, but with few exceptions (namely the shrine designated Ch. 9, An. 4) these ritual circuits were restricted to that locale. Beyond the Cusco Basin, local groups continued to recognize distinct origin places, to practice independent initiation rituals, to venerate snow-capped mountains, and to recount origin stories that were not uniformly integrated into an Inka-dominated system of practices (see, for example, Albóroz 1989 [1580s]; Bauer and Barrionuevo Orosco 1998; Covey 2006).

In addition, imperial rituals were conducted that involved only certain parts of the region. For example, ritual activity venerating the creator deity Wiraqocha took place in the Urcos area, while the royal Inka origin story was memorialized in Pacarictambo, and the victory over Chanka invaders—said to be the event that set the Inka imperial trajectory in motion—was celebrated along the route from the Xaquixaguana Valley to the Apurímac River (Molina 1989 [1575]). Cristóbal de Molina's description of the Intip Raymi(n) (Festival of the Sun) ceremony demonstrates how some important imperial ceremonies

did not necessarily involve the entire heartland region. This annual celebration began with ceremonies at the Qorikancha, followed by the sacrifice of camelids on important mountains located to the south and southeast of Cusco.


### *Myth and History in the Imperial Heartland*

As has been discussed, the sacred landscape of the Inka heartland contained locations that played important roles in the creation stories and origin myths of the royal Inka lineages and their neighbors. Accounts of Inka origins written by Andean authors conceptualize the Cusco region as being culturally Inka and describe this circumstance as resulting from the actions of Manqo Qhapaq, the founding ancestor of the royal dynasty (for example, Garcilaso de la Vega 1965 [1609]; Guaman Poma de Ayala 1980 [1615]). The mythical construction of an imperial heartland that traced back to ancestral times reflects an imperial attempt to invent an antiquity and uniformity of control that archaeologists know was not characteristic of preimperial (or, for that matter, imperial) conditions.

The documentary record provides ample evidence that the Inkas developed the Cusco region as the heartland of their empire, and that it was distinct from the capital's municipal jurisdiction, as well as from the principal provincial regions. While ethnohistory provides some perspectives on Inka identities and spatial conceptualizations, the archaeological record adds some important evidence regarding the economic and social restructuring of the imperial heartland.


### THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HEARTLAND: MATERIALIZATIONS OF EMPIRE

Archaeological perspectives on the Inka imperial heartland derive from excavations (mostly at monumental Inka sites) and regional surveys. Regional settlement patterns attest to substantial variability in the preimperial social organization and political economy of the region (Figure 7.5), and local conditions determined aspects of the imperial development program (see, for example, Bauer and Covey 2002). For this chapter, discussion will focus on survey results from the area to the north and west of Cusco, surveyed by the author and colleagues from 2000 to 2006. The total region, referred to in this chapter as the Hanan Cusco survey region, comprises the territories surveyed by the Sacred Valley Archaeological Project (Covey 2006), the Qoricocha *Puna* Archaeological Survey (Covey and Yager 2005), the Xaquixaguana Plain Archaeological Survey (Covey 2007), and the Calca-Yanahuara Archaeological Survey (Covey et al. 2008).



### *Centralization of Political Economy*

Settlement pattern data indicate substantial shifts in imperial Inka times (Figure 7.6). Atop the regional settlement hierarchy are a small number of towns and other large sites (larger than 10 ha) that are linked directly to the Inka elite or state infrastructure. These include Písaq, Calca, Cheq'oq, Chinchero—towns that are associated with royal estates—as well as Tambo Real, which may be the location of the first way station on the royal highway to the Chinchaysuyu province. Large villages with a local settlement component, demonstrated either by a continuity of earlier occupation or a documentary identification of the identity of a resettled population, are generally smaller than 10 hectares in the imperial period and include Raqchi, Pukara Pantillijlla, Poques, Ankasmaka, Ayarmaka, Ak'awillay, Muqukancha, Rosask'asa, Qhakyaurqu, and possibly Anta, where the Inka component is covered by the contemporary settlement. A few sites in the 5–10 hectare range (Tumipampa, and possibly Maras) may represent settlements of provincial populations in the imperial heartland, but most of the region's population was settled in smaller communities. Overall, there are more than 30 small villages



**Figure 7.6.** Locations of important Inka settlements in the Hanan Cusco study region

and minor shrines or state installations ( $2 \leq \alpha < 5$  hectares) in the Hanan Cusco study region, and more than 300 small sites of less than 2 hectares. Areas of terracing were identified throughout the study region and often contain sporadic scatters of Inka pottery (e.g., Covey 2006; Farrington 1992).

Settlement patterns show a change in the regional political economy as the rulers invested labor tribute in improving agricultural lands and developing palaces and personal estates that their descendants enjoyed. Much of the labor investment went into canalizing rivers, constructing irrigation canals, and transporting stone and soil to develop agricultural terraces (see, for example, Covey 2006; Farrington 1983; Niles 1999; Figure 7.7). These new elite-owned resources do not appear to have alienated large proportions of productive resources of local groups, but instead focused on areas where there was limited preexisting local economic activity (but see Quave 2011). Numerous small communities were established near these new fields, some of them occupied by *mitmaqkuna* and *yanakuna*, others probably settled by local groups seeking to reduce travel time involved with their labor service on these



**Figure 7.7.** Inka valley-bottom terraces at Urquillos, part of the estate of the ruler Thupa Inka Yupanki. Rulers made significant labor investments in landscape modifications, leaving these estates to their descendants

lands. Consistent with their prominence in the rural settlement hierarchy, the royal estates dominated the staple production of the imperial heartland, a resource-management arrangement not widely developed in provincial regions. Along with agriculture, camelid herding also appears to have intensified in the imperial period, with the construction of new corral complexes and the designation of pasturelands occurring as part of the growth of royal estates (see, for example, AGN, Tít. Prop. L.1 C.3 [1557]; Covey and Yager 2005; Quave 2011; Figure 7.8). Herds belonging to the state religion and the lineages of deceased rulers were also kept in the Cusco region (Levillier 1940).

Local groups were affected by Inka incorporation to differing degrees (Covey 2011). Groups said to have resisted Inka authority were targeted for a more intrusive royal presence, and their territories were developed as estates. Two examples of this may be seen with the Ayarmaka and the Kuyu (Covey 2006; Covey et al. 2006). While resistant groups appear to have been moved from their homes to make way for estate construction, groups that remained loyal appear to have been left with a greater degree of autonomy. In many cases, these groups seem to have continued to occupy existing communities that were larger than the new communities established as provincial populations were introduced to the region. More work is needed with the archival



**Figure 7.8.** Inka cut-stone masonry at a corral complex located close to Juchuy Ccoscco, the rural retreat of Wiraqocha Inka, the eighth ruler in the dynasty

documents and settlement pattern data to discuss resource access and to link archaeologically identified sites with settlements mentioned in early Colonial documents.

### *Investment in Infrastructure*

The imperial period saw a well-established system of highways and way stations that probably developed as the Inka state extended its territorial interests throughout the Cusco region. Roads to the Chinchaysuyu and Antisuyu provincial regions pass through the area considered in this chapter, and possible way stations have been identified at a distance of 20–25 kilometers from Cusco. Storage facilities were constructed at the *tampu* (way station) of Xaquixaguana, but they were also present throughout the region, especially in proximity to elite agricultural complexes and estates (Bauer 2004; Covey 2006). Storage in the imperial heartland functioned differently than in the provinces, reflecting differences in economic organization (Covey et al. n.d.). In provincial regions, labor service was invested in cultivating staples and transporting them to imperial centers and way stations along the royal road. These stores were intended for the army and for individuals traveling on state business, as well as for mobilizing periodic feasts and feeding workers.

In the Cusco region, local labor tribute may have been invested in a similar system, but *yana* laborers also worked full-time on estate lands producing food to support the Inka nobility and its support personnel. It is noteworthy that storage facilities in the Inka heartland have architecture that is distinct from provincial storage complexes. Storage facilities at provincial centers tend to consist of repetitive groups of detached single-room structures; this may reflect the functioning of the provincial decimal hierarchy, with structures being tied to specific fields and the administrative units working them. While similar facilities are found in the Cusco region, several storage complexes in the capital region employ elongated rectangular structures with substantially larger capacities (Covey et al. n.d.; Figure 7.9).



**Figure 7.9.** Storage architecture at Machu Qollqa, a complex consisting of rows of elongated rectangular structures. This kind of storage facility is not known in provincial areas and reflects the distinct political economy of the imperial heartland

### *Religious Sites*

Religious sites, shrines, and resources used for the support of the Inka state religion were distributed throughout the Hanan Cusco study region. Pasturelands were reserved for the Sun cult; maize lands were set aside from state intensification projects to sustain female ritual specialists in the *aqllawasi*; and there were special shrines and facilities for elite mummies (for example, AGN, Tít. Prop. L.18 C.359 [1647]; ADC Colección Betancur V.7 [1795]; Burns 1999). The proliferation of carved rock outcrops in the Cusco region suggests a degree of symbolic landscape modification that is only seen sporadically in provincial regions (Guchte 1990), and mortuary facilities for the royal dead were found exclusively in Cusco and its hinterland. Carved rocks are common in the Cusco Basin, as well as close to royal estates and religious sites in the surrounding region (Figure 7.10).

Regional archaeology is beginning to yield important perspectives on how the Inka imperial heartland linked the capital to provincial regions. Settlement discontinuities show the disruption of some local pre-Inka economies and political organizations, with a shift toward intensive maize agriculture and centralized herding through royal estates. Local Inka groups



**Figure 7.10.** A modified rock outcrop in the Ancahuasi area to the west of Cusco. Cut-stone walls were built around the rock, as well as in the interior to define an enclosed space. Colonial eyewitnesses declared that this area was used exclusively by the Inka ruler and the state Sun cult



continued to occupy many of their villages in the imperial period, although over time the continued development of royal estates replaced modest local settlement hierarchies with rural palace complexes surrounded by dispersed hamlets and small villages where labor colonists, retainers, and production specialists resided. The evolving parallel economies of local Inka groups and royal Inka estates dominated the Cusco landscape, with more limited evidence of the kinds of state infrastructure found in directly administered provincial regions. The targeted development of local sacred places and the establishment of administrative nodes along the highway system represent the clearest investments in political continuity between imperial capital and province.

#### BINDING THE WHOLE: THE EFFICACY OF THE INKA IMPERIAL PROJECT

The Inka imperial heartland is identifiable in both the documentary and archaeological records as a transitional zone between the capital and the provinces. This region was set apart from the provinces by innovations in political economy, ritual practice, and social organization. At the same time, the transfer of population from the heartland to provincial regions and concomitant influx of provincial labor colonists, retainers, and production specialists forged a stronger link between the capital and the diverse periphery that it governed.

How effective was the Inka promotion of the Cusco region in binding together the empire? There are several factors that might be considered to assess this question. The first is the post-conquest continuity of retainer settlement in Cusco and its surrounding region. While many labor colonists and retainers returned to their homelands after the Spanish Conquest, a substantial proportion of the *yana* population of Cusco remained. The fact that these populations are still identifiable in administrative documents from the 1570s and later attests to the effectiveness of the *yana* status, although the Spanish patronage of so-called *yana* retainers distorts this measure. Of the forty or more ethnic groups living in the Yucay Valley in the early 1570s, many had attached themselves to Spanish masters after the Conquest or had been expropriated from indigenous labor grants (*encomiendas*), although *yanakuna* from at least a dozen ethnic groups testified to having been born in the valley before the Conquest (Covey and Elson 2007). Despite the problems of the Spanish use of the *yana* service category, it is clear that certain provincial populations

living in the Cusco region felt greater connection to or opportunity in the Inka heartland in the early Colonial period. Groups like the Chachapoyas and Cañaris that were said to have resisted Inka incorporation—and thus to have been radically restructured under the Inka imperial system—remained in the Inka heartland in large numbers. The return of labor colonists to provincial regions suggests that the identity of *mitmaq* was either viewed as temporary or was ineffectively promoted.

The popularity of Inka service terms such as *yana* and *kamayuy* in the early Colonial period demonstrates that the early Spanish occupation of the Cusco region involved the preservation of much of the structure of the political economy of the Inka heartland, with Spaniards mapping themselves onto the positions held by the Inka nobility (see, for example, Covey and Elson 2007; Matienzo 1967 [1567]; Varón Gabai 1997). This indicates that the royal estate system and its associated support staff were seen as an effective means of supporting the city of Cusco and governing its rural hinterland.

The effectiveness of Tawantinsuyu in advancing the concept of a holistic imperial vision can also be assessed in the provinces. On the coast, the empire had limited impact on local polities, and there is less evidence for population transfer between coastal areas and the Cusco region. These areas appear to have preserved fewer vestiges of Inka social order following the Spanish Conquest. By contrast, several highland provincial regions show substantial continuity in Inka settlement patterns, hierarchies, and economic practices. Although some imperial facilities were abandoned following the Spanish Conquest, others were settled as new Spanish towns. Inka storage facilities continued to be maintained for several years after the Conquest in some regions (Espinoza Soriano 1972), and Inka-placed communities of production specialists and colonists from the imperial heartland were still at least partially occupied decades after the last Inka emperor reigned in Cusco (see, for example, Covey 2006; Helmer 1955–56). Local elites in some highland regions still possessed *kipu* records in the 1560s and used them to describe local political and economic organization (Diez de San Miguel 1964 [1567]; Ortiz de Zúñiga 1967 [1562], 1972 [1562]).

The ethnohistoric and archaeological evidence reveals how the development of an imperial heartland promoted imperial stability, and the study of this region facilitates our understanding of the variability of imperial strategies for provincial regions, as well as their relative long-term success. The Inka Empire may have been eclipsed after just over a century, but it managed to forge enduring institutions that facilitated the imposition of the succeeding Spanish colonial system.

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## CHAPTER 8

IN THE SHADOW  
OF THE KHAN

NAINDEEP CHANN

## INTRODUCTION

WITH THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL POLITICAL CLIMATE and discussions of whether America has become an “empire” entering popular discourse, it should hardly seem extraordinary that scholars would renew their interest in addressing questions of empire. Two recent books emphasize the revitalized interest in this political formation. Anthony Pagden’s *Peoples and Empires* (Pagden 2001) is a brief essay that covers a sweep of history from Alexander the Great to the present. While Pagden’s main interests are European history and conceptions of empire, he does give some attention to non-Western imperial formations, including the Ottomans, the Mughals, and the Chinese. However, some of history’s most important nomadic conquerors are given short shrift. Though a “European” conqueror such as Alexander is placed at the center of an entire chapter in this relatively short text, Timur (Tamerlane) and Chinggis Khan only garner a passing mention. Another scholarly book titled *Empires* (Alcock et al. 2001), born out of a conference held in Spain in 1997, brings together a number of scholarly experts on precolonial empires. While much of the collection focuses on sedentary empires, the inclusion of Thomas Barfield’s essay “The Shadow Empires” (Barfield 2001) does use the term “empire” to include other types of polities than those usually assumed. Barfield’s essay opens up new avenues in understanding various “typologies” of empire, helping to move scholarship beyond the

sedentary bias in the study of empires. Barfield's typologies are of necessity "pure" types, but clean categories rarely hold in history.

While a descriptive approach seems to be the most fruitful in approaching the term "empire," as a category of analysis it remains a vague though important political formation. Historians have noted empire's importance and longevity, as well as the existence of various "imitations" where newer empires employ legacies and legitimacies of older empires (Pollock 2006).

With the exception of few authors such as Khazanov (1984), historians usually concentrate on sedentary imperial formations or empires that have reached their supposed "zenith." However, research into earlier expansionist phases, often involving smaller mobile nomadic groups, yields insights into continuities of empire even in the sedentary phase. Undoubtedly, nomadic empires would later be influenced by the sedentary polities and populations that they would conquer, as domination affects both the conqueror and the vanquished, but to view only sedentary empires such as the Persians and Romans as providing "imitative" models, while neglecting nomadic confederacies and polities, leaves a gaping hole in the historiography.

For Chinggis Khan, tales and models of the T'u-chueh, Uigur, Khitans, and Jurchids would have been of far more significance than those emanating from sedentary lands. It would have been their stories that he heard as a child, and their legitimacies and legacies that he would have drawn upon in forming his nomadic confederacy.

Upon his death in 1227 CE, Chinggis Khan would be remembered as the nomadic emperor *par excellence*. For the people of the steppes, his legend would become the standard for future nomadic polities. The great early modern "gunpowder empires"—the Ottomans, the Safavids, and the Mughals—were all founded by Turkic-speaking groups, who had largely been displaced by the Khan's conquests. For historians, it is critical to restore the Khan's place in the historiography (Sergei Brodov's trilogy may serve such a purpose in the public imagination!) and his influence on subsequent nomadic-based polities.

The quest for a universal empire is hardly unique to the Central Asian steppes. Such notions existed in pre-Columbian Amerindian and South Asian cosmologies as well. This paper, though it cannot hope to furnish a history of the Turko-Mongolian evolution of the universal empire or of the various reworking of its conception, seeks to sketch with broad strokes three historical figures and their conceptions of empire and memory in relation to one another: Chinggis Khan (d. 1227), Timur (d. 1405), and Akbar (d. 1605).

These three figures cover a span of three centuries and even geographically cover three different regions. In addition to being highly eccentric and

highly successful, all three were the founders of their respective imperial traditions. Each one had to create innovative imperial ideologies that were at the same time “translations” of previous centers of power and legitimacy, whether real or imagined. All three figures, however, belonged to a similar Turko-Mongolian tradition, and all, either through marriage or lineage, to a common line of descent. Thus, despite the ahistoricity of this paper in terms of both time and space, some broad traits can still be outlined that suggest links between their imperial ideologies of a universal emperor; their conceptions of law and justice; and their visions of self-manifestation, through their respective imperial encampments and artistic representations.

### POLITICAL THEOLOGY

The career of Chinggis Khan, the great Mongol Khan, is remembered not only for his military victories and the sheer magnitude of his thirteenth-century conquests, but also for his success in restructuring Eurasia through innovative uses of nomadic traditions. He and his descendants united Asia, albeit briefly, in a new political formation. While studies regarding his bureaucratic structure or even numismatics could provide a better materialist grounding for the Mongol polity's continuity and stability, the “political theology” of the Khan is important in understanding the imperial myths he wished to construct.

A key source for studying Chinggis Khan is the *Secret History of the Mongols* (Rachewiltz 2004). The date of this document has been the subject of historical debate. Various dates have been proposed—1228, 1240, 1252, and 1264—though I. de Rachewiltz argues that the colophon date of the section related to Chinggis Khan is 1228; an additional section was appended later (ibid.: xiii–xiv). The *Secret History* provides us with important glimpses of the Mongol Khan.

The oft-cited starting point is the Mongol belief in Tengri, the universal victory-granting sky god. While the origins of this deity may require a separate discussion, it is important to note that belief in Tengri seems to have been widespread among various nomadic groups of Inner Asia. Some scholars project an ideological trajectory linking this type of monotheism to a subsequent idea of a single ruler over an entire universal realm (Fletcher 1995). However, this raises questions as to the nature of “monotheisms” and assumes a particular teleology.

The historical narrative relates the story of a Mongol paramount “shaman” named Kokochu or Teb Tenggeri, who bestowed the title “Chinggis Khan” upon Temujin and confirmed his position at the *khuriltai* (assembly of Mongol



tribal chiefs) of 1206. Chinggis Khan had already begun building a supratribal polity. Success in battle was a demonstration of Tengri's mandate and Chinggis Khan had already proved himself as a gifted general. He had already shown great prowess and success by the time Teb Tenggeri proclaimed, "God has spoken with me and has said: 'I have given all the face of the earth to Temujin and his children and named him (Chinggis Khan). Bid him administer justice in such and such a fashion'" (Fletcher 1995: IX.34).

However, Teb Tenggeri's survival was to be short-lived: Chinggis Khan's jealousy would not allow a rival power source. Although the Khan asserted mundane political reasons for Teb Tenggeri's assassination, the language used in the *Secret History*, in which the Khan rails against Teb Tenggeri's father, is revealing. He states, "By not restraining your sons' nature you *and your sons* began thinking that you were equal to me, and you have paid *for this* with Teb Tenggeri's life" (Rachewiltz 2004: 174; emphasis in the original). The emphatic "equal to me" may reveal an insecurity on the part of Chinggis Khan. Much of the *yasa* (the code of law systematized by Chinggis Khan) and the code of the royal camp had to do with the importance of asserting the Khan's superior position. Temujin, however, could not have forgotten that his title, as Khan, had been conferred by another. At least in the paranormal sphere, the Khan may have had a grudging recognition that Teb Tenggeri had an equal if not greater position than his own. Chinggis Khan moved to have Teb Tenggeri killed. While this assassination may have had precedents, what seems innovative was that Teb Tenggeri was not replaced by another shaman; rather, Chinggis Khan asserted that an intermediary between himself and Tengri was no longer needed. He could communicate directly with Tengri, who had bestowed favor upon him and his descendants. So strong was the connection between Tengri and the subsequent legend of the great Khan that in both Mongol and Turkic tribes political legitimacy could only rest with those who traced their lineage to Chinggis Khan.

As the dust had settled in the southwestern part of the Central Asian steppes, following the breakdown of the Chaghadayid Khanate—the Khanate named after Chagadai Khan, Chinggis's second son (d. 1241/2)—a new nomadic conqueror would rise in its place. However, much had changed in the subsequent century. Although Turkic-speaking tribes had been migrating westward from Inner Asia prior to the Mongol conquests, the opportunities provided by joining the armies of the Mongol Khans spurred a greater thrust in their movements. While the elite of the Khan remained Mongol, the majority of the Khan's forces were from Turkic-speaking tribes. Along with the greater dispersion of these tribes, a parallel process of the adoption of

Islam and Islamic traditions had been occurring in the Central Asian steppes, since as early as the eighth century. The process was gradual and most often occurred on a tribal basis, spearheaded by dervishes. Thus in the fourteenth century, two different political legitimizing systems of rule co-existed.

However, Timur belonged to neither the old nor the new aristocracy: that is, he was neither a descendant of the great Khan, nor a member of the Quraysh, the Arab tribe of Mohammad. So powerful was the cult of Chinggis Khan that, having achieved mythical status during his lifetime, only his particular bloodline was considered to have the right to rule, long after his empire had crumbled, not only in Inner Asia, but throughout the greater continent. This indicates that the mandate of Tengri was secondary to the charisma of the Khan's bloodline. Timur in the fourteenth century was therefore obliged to create ties to the lineage of the Khan.

Like other rulers following the breakdown of the Khanates, Timur promoted himself as the protector and restorer of the Ulus Chaghadaï. Throughout his life, Timur assumed only modest titles such as *amir* (Arabic "commander"; from the tenth century CE also understood as "prince") as rule was formally held in the name of a puppet Khan. However, as his list of military conquests grew regionally, he formulated a broader myth: he would restore not only the lands of the Ulus Chaghadaï but in fact all the lands of Chinggis Khan. Although Timur could never claim to be a universal emperor, at times his pretensions became apparent, as when he referred to Henry III of Castile as "my son", while addressing the Castilian ambassador, Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo (Manz 1999: 16).

In the meantime, Timur took steps to secure an ideological legitimacy for his imperial ambitions. He married a number of Chaghadaï princesses and thus took the title of *gurgan* ("son-in-law", derived from Middle Iranian *gurgan*, "son of wolf") in relation to Chinggis Khan. As his conquests grew, he drew not only upon Turko-Mongolian forms of legitimacy but also those of frontier Islam. He sought the blessings of pirs, employed the title of *ghazi* (an honorific title gained fighting in the name Islam) and the politics of religion against non-Muslim populations, while patronizing tariqas, buildings, and the arts (Manz 1999). Though formally he relegated himself to secondary status within the house of the great Khan, he continued to foster a personal myth that would enable his descendants to construct a new form of legitimacy based on his accomplishments, and laying the foundation for a new dynasty.

This personal myth was consciously created through his emulation of previous nomadic conquerors, especially Chinggis Khan. In tales of his childhood, Timur emphasized his aristocratic descent but also his low station with

little power or wealth. His modest beginnings, whether created or real, were emphasized in a pattern that fit the well-known origins of Temujin. Starting from such a modest childhood, Timur's rise seemed nothing short of meteoric, and his extraordinary military successes were thus an indication of God's favor toward him. His use of violence, such as the piling of skulls, although ferocious, was deliberate and selective, intended not only as psychological warfare but to further link him with the legacy of Chinggis Khan. He highlighted himself as a "superhuman figure" (Manz 2002), but within the constraints allowed by the increasingly patronized ulema (community of Muslim learned men, arbiters of Shari'a law). He encouraged the title *Sabib-Qiran*, "lord of the conjunction," highlighting his individual prowess and fortune (Chann 2009). Among his nomadic followers, he apparently made his pretensions known, claiming he had direct supernatural power and had even ascended to heaven on a forty-step ladder that appeared from the sky, a possible reference to the Turko-Mongolian Tengri tradition and association with Chinggis Khan (Manz 1988: 118).

Timur was extremely conscious of how he wished to be projected in the future. He had a talent for grandiosity and theatre. His buildings were big, his kettles and commissioned artwork (Komaroff 1992) were big, and his massacres, although infrequent, were even bigger. All the while, he would assume only the modest titles of *amir* or *gurgan*. His symbolic actions were well understood in this ecumene and he had carefully cultivated his own legacy by the time of his death in 1405. His descendants would no longer have to claim legitimacy through a puppet Khan: standing on his shoulders and his stature was now sufficient to secure their legitimacy, though even they carried the tradition of humble titles. Babur, in his *Baburnama*, wrote after his victories in Afghanistan: "Up to that date people had styled Timur Beg's descendents Mirza, even when they were ruling; now I ordered that people should style me Padshah" (Babur 2002: 344).

A direct descendent of the Timurid dynasty, Jalalluddin Muhammad Akbar was born in Umarkot, Sind, in 1542. Only three years before, his father, Nasiruddin Humayun, had been defeated by the Afghan Sher Shah and forced to flee west toward the Safavid Empire. It was during this exile that Akbar was born. Spending his formative years in tent camps in Afghanistan rather than courts in Delhi gave the young Akbar greater exposure to the culture and customs of the steppe tribes. Surrounded by other Chaghadaï Turks and Iranian noblemen, Akbar would have considered the position of the sovereign as something greater than a mere leader. Descended from lineages of both

Chinggis Khan and Timur, Akbar must have heard about the semi-divine status accorded to his family and lineage.

Akbar was not born a universal emperor, but by the time of his death, he had acquired such pretensions. However, Akbar's imperial ideology, far from being static, had to be innovative to deal with the various situations he faced as a ruler. The first phase, roughly corresponding to the first decade of his reign (1556–66), is noted for his consolidation of Humayun's territories and for the influence of his Shi'a-oriented regent, Bairam Khan. A second phase, during the latter half of the 1560s and 1570s, included a massive territorial expansion and a relatively orthodox Sunni politico-religious outlook that was at times openly hostile to Shi'a practices. A third phase, beginning in the late 1570s and noted for the famous *mazhar* (declaration order) of 1579, signifying his messianic claims, was distinguished by the nature of his inclusive policy of internal political alliances. A fourth and final phase, beginning in the late 1580s, saw a mature imperial ideology, partially formulated and transcribed by Abu'l Fazl (Subrahmanyam 2005). Overlap between some of these phases may provide clues into Akbar's eclectic conceptions of himself as universal emperor.

For Akbar, it was not a mere political act that allowed him to consolidate political and spiritual authority to a level unprecedented in previous Indo-Muslim experience; rather, it was part and parcel of his messianic visions about himself. One manifestation of these messianic notions was his promulgation of the famous *mazhar* in 1579. His claim to be the *Badshah-i Islam* ("Emperor of Islam") seemed to go beyond a mere assertion of supremacy over the ulema. In fact, Abu'l Fazl claims that "there was an assemblage of the enlightened, and the thoughts of the wise unanimously agreed upon this: 'The world's lord is the Imām of the Time, and the Mujtahid of the age'" (Fazl 1977: 392). Akbar was claiming a status higher than that of the ulema. If there was a dispute amongst them, he did not need their intermediary but rather his opinion would be held highest. Some members of the ulema, especially Badaoni, lamented this development and questioned whether the Mughal Empire had ceased to have the complexion of a Muslim state (Ahmad 1970). While Moin has recently argued that this move was possibly to redress earlier Safavid slights to his father and grandfather and a desire to follow the example of Safavid Shah Ismail, who combined the prestige of religion and state in his rise (Moin 2012: 130), Akbar's act of amalgamating the powers of belief and state in an Islamic context may have been drawing from his own Turko-Mongolian heritage, from the precedent set by Chinggis Khan and his elimination of Teb Tenggeri.

As Akbar's territorial conquests expanded, so must have his pretensions. In a letter written in 1586 to the Uzbek leader Abdulla Khan, Abu'l Fazl, in praising his sovereign, writes that Akbar had cleared the four corners of India, which was surrounded on three sides by ocean (Fazl 1998: 33). The passage may possibly also refer of the Great Khan. In the *Akbarnama*, Abu'l Fazl states that the Khan had conquered "all Cathay, Khotan, Northern and Southern China (*Cīn ū Mācīn*), the desert of Qibcāq, Saqsīn, Bulgaria, Ās, Russia, Ālān, etc." (Fazl 1977: 194–95). Thus the imagined Chinggis Khan of Abu'l Fazl and Akbar had far surpassed the historic Khan's actual acquisitions. It was only the Mongols whose victories had been bounded by the oceans and it was only the Khan who was the "one who was so great that an universe abode in the shade of his guardianship" (Fazl 1977: 197). Like the imagined Khan, Akbar construed that his victories, too, had only been limited by the surrounding oceans. Such pretensions may indicate that Akbar was no longer trying to emulate his illustrious ancestor Timur, but possibly that greatest of Asian universal emperors, Chinggis Khan. In fact, Abu'l Fazl spends some time trying to resurrect the image of the Khan, who had been demonized by Muslim writers. Fazl writes:

Though this great man be in the eyes of the vulgar and even to the *élite*, at first glance, a leading exponent of Divine wrath, yet to the far-reading view of the wise, *élite* of the *élite*, he is an emanation of Divine blessings. For in the kingdom of Divine justice of which human government is a ray, there can be no injustice or oppression, and everything which comes into existence in the world of evil is based on certain spiritual principles, the real nature of which the superficial cannot perceive and which cannot be comprehended save by the intellects of the far-seeing and awakened-hearted (Fazl 1977: 201).

The culmination of these messianic tendencies can be seen in Akbar's formation of the *Din-i Ilahi* (Divine Faith). No longer satisfied as the mere *Zill-i Ilahi* (Shadow of God) like his father and other Islamic rulers, Akbar was now the carrier of the *Farr-i Zadi* (Divine Light). Based on this illumination, Abu'l Fazl believed the emperor had been accorded the right to rule over mortals with lesser qualities (Richards 1998: 139). His ancestors carried the divine light, but the illumination would only be revealed with the coming of Akbar (*ibid.*: 147). This formulation may have been linked to Akbar's renewed interest in his heritage. Not only did Akbar commission a lavishly illustrated history of the Timurid dynasty, *Tarikh-i Khanadan-i Timuriyya*, tracing the history of the Timurid line to his own time, but he also commissioned dynastic histories such as the *Chingiznama*. In this work and others, the allusions to his imagined connection to the Great Khan were far more pronounced than those

found in the writings of his father Humayun or even his grandfather Babur. Abu'l Fazl's retelling of the birth horoscope of Akbar in his *Akbarnama* states Humayun "fell a'dancing, and from excess of exultation, revolved with a circular motion" because he realized that the "horoscope of this Light of Fortune [Akbar] was superior, in several respects and by sundry degrees, to that of His Majesty, the Lord of Conjunction (Timur)" (Fazl 1977: 111). Merely following in the footsteps of Timur was not enough for Akbar.

In fact, in the *Akbarnama*, Abu'l Fazl writes at great length of Akbar's connection to the matriarch of Mongol sovereignty, Alanquwa. Abu'l Fazl narrates: "One night this divinely radiant one was reposing on her bed, when suddenly a glorious light cast a ray into the tent and entered the mouth and throat of that fount of spiritual knowledge and glory. The cupola of chastity became pregnant by that light in the same way as did her Majesty (*Ḥazrat*) Miryam (Mary) the daughter of 'Imrān (Amram)" (Fazl 1977: 178). This legend seems to have existed even during the life of the Great Khan, as it was attested already in the thirteenth century in the account of the Armenian historian Kirakos of Gandzak (modern Gyanja): he wrote that "the Mongols believed that the Heavens belonged to God and the earth to (Chinggis Khan), and in proof thereof maintained that (Chinggis) was born not of human parentage but of a heavenly light" (Turan 1955: 82). This light would reach its brightest illumination, according to the pen of Abu'l Fazl, with the birth of Akbar.

This linking of Akbar to Alanquwa by Abu'l Fazl is a deliberate move to connect Akbar with his Turko-Mongol heritage. Abu'l Fazl relates that the children born to Alanquwa from that conception with pure light are thus called "Nair n, *i.e.*, light-produced and are considered to be the noblest class among the Mughuls" (Fazl 1977: 183). J. Richards believes this move by Abu'l Fazl was an attempt to fuse "two well-known doctrines: the ancient origin myth of the Mongols and the illuminationist theosophy of Suhrawardi Maqtul, the Persian mystic and philosopher" (Richards 1998: 147). Abu'l Fazl could have constructed links with tariqas, pirs, or sayyids, but instead returned to a formation made possible by Timur, but not for Timur. The Mongol link, through marriage, and thus a link to the Great Khan in his bloodline was part and parcel of Akbar's imperial ideology.

Akbar seemed to view himself as a channel for the Divine. Akbar publicly worshiped the sun in a prostrating position (Richards 1998: 151), but as Abu'l Fazl cautions, "ignorant men consider this forgetfulness of the Almighty, and fire worship" (Fazl 1975: 50). Akbar did not see himself engaging in some type of "Hindu" or "Zoroastrian" practice of fire worship but rather a "religious

duty and divine praise” possibly linked to his Turko-Mongolian heritage (ibid.: 50). Being himself the Divine Light on earth, Akbar was worthy of worship and thus “men, in the presence of [the Divine Light/Akbar], bend the forehead of praise towards the ground of submission” (ibid.: 3). Initiates of the *Din-i Ilahi* order were given a symbolic presentation of the sun and a tiny portrait of Akbar to wear on their turbans (Richards 1998: 152).

For Akbar, the *Din-i Ilahi* was not an eclectic, hybrid form of religion but a reflection of his original “light-emanating” luminosity. As *Farr-i Zadi*, only he was capable of creating the *sulh-i kul* (peace for all). Akbar’s *sulh-i kul* was more than mere tolerance; it was tied to the notions of paternal love and justice (Fazl 1975: 3). Akbar offered this paternal love and the various constituents of his empire were to love him in return. With the “light of insight and penetration” (ibid.: 8), Akbar is able to see people’s true nature and does not discriminate between sects or between religions. This is his universal imperial ideology: he is the embodiment of the empire and able to bring the various religious and ethnic communities into a single political system, yet he himself transcends the various sects by virtue of his benevolent divine light and thus is able to create a broad ideology that provides *sulh-i kul* for all peoples. While some have surmised that the sun as the focus of worship may have been Akbar’s way of invoking pre-Islamic Iranian traditions associated with Zoroaster, “Hindu” beliefs, or even ahistorical notions of a “Central Asian cult of fire,” it may be more likely that he was rewriting earlier Mongol practices (Roychoudhury 1944: 150–51). In fact, in the illustrated *Chingiznama*, Chinggis Khan is shown worshipping, as the text states, “God in the image of the rising sun” (fig. 8.1). I do not wish to submit that Akbar was invoking the Tengri worship of his Mongol ancestors, only that it may have been recognized as one of the religious possibilities to draw upon. From the evidence of Abu’l Fazl’s usage of Alanquwa, the famous *mazhar* of 1579, and the *Din-i Ilahi*, Akbar’s invocation of his distinctly Mongol heritage, differing from that of his descent from Timur, seems to point toward an available thread of imagined ideas and connections Abu’l Fazl could invoke to link the Mughal emperor and the Great Khan.

#### LAW AND JUSTICE

Just as important as their ideologies and aspirations as universal emperors are their positions on law and justice. The *yasa* of Chinggis Khan is described as “great” for its place as an idealized law canon common to all Mongol tribes, as distinct from the tribal *yasas* that had previously existed (Riasanovsky 1965: 25). Although there seems to be continued debate over the *yasa*’s existence as



**Figure 8.1.** Chinggis Khan prays to the sun in the Kipchak Steppe. The text reads, “In the Kipchak steppe between the Irtysh and Dnieper rivers, he mounted a hill alone, as was his custom, and prayed to god in the image of the rising sun.” Leaf from *Jami al-Tavarikh* of Rashid al-Din, created by Akbar’s atelier. Collection part of the *Kitab-i Chingiz-nama* at the Golestan Palace Library at Tehran (Marek 1963: 17).



a written legal code, perhaps more important for our study is its “idea” and its vaunted place for later generations. The Great Yasa was created to regulate the lives of the various tribal groups that joined the Mongols and comprised parts of the Mongol Empire. Riasanovsky claims that its application was to improve relations among the allied Mongol tribal unions and that it was never intended for application in conquered sedentary communities. The sedentary spaces had existing law systems that continued to be practiced following Mongol conquest (ibid.: 33).

Of important note is Fragment 11 of the Great Yasa and its stress upon religious tolerance. It states: “He ordered that all religions were to be respected and no preference was to be shown to any of them. All this he commanded in order that it might be agreeable to God” (ibid.: 84).

Chinggis Khan was welding a polity with a number of different ethnicities and religious groups. Although he seemed fervent in his belief of the Tengri, orthodoxies and religious forms as practiced in urban areas were of little importance to. Chinggis Khan’s “tolerance” should be understood in this light.

By the time of Akbar’s ascent, the importance of Shari’a law had been well established. Although Shari’a was a stated ideal, a myriad of understandings allowed Akbar and some of his key courtiers a broad range of interpretation. While the introduction of the Shari’a and its importance had changed in the three centuries between Chinggis Khan and Akbar, the yasa still held a vaunted place. Both Akbar’s grandfather Babur in his *Baburnama* and his son Jahangir had commented on the continued importance of the *yasa* during their reigns (Balabanlilar 2007). Abu’l Fazl in his *Akbarnama* lauds some of Akbar’s ancestors for preserving the *yasa* (Fazl 1977: 186). Thus it seems safe to presume the yasa’s continued importance for Akbar as well.

Muzaffar Alam, in discussing Akbar’s much celebrated “tolerance,” relates Akbar’s readings of Shari’a through the interpretations of his courtier Abu’l Fazl. Abu’l Fazl drew heavily from the thirteenth-century Persian philosopher Nasir al-Din Tusi and his *Akblaq* writings. The key message in Tusi’s ideology was the centrality of justice in governing the empire. Allowing for a broad interpretation of Shari’a, Tusi felt that the just ruler’s most important attribute is ensuring the well-being of all religious communities (Alam 2004: 49). In regions with non-Muslim populations or even non-Muslim leaders with other notions of law not derived from Shari’a, this ideology would have had special resonance. In fact, after the conquest of the Iranian lands by the Mongols, Tusi reworked his introduction and conclusion, leaving the bulk of the text unaltered but dedicating it to the conquering Mongol ruler. The contents and its importance were seen as so vital by Abu’l Fazl that he wanted

Tusi's text regularly read out to the supposed illiterate ruler and placed as one of the five most important books of the empire (ibid.: 61).

While Abu'l Fazl may have been offering an ideology derived from various Muslim scholars according to the primacy of justice and toleration, historians have neglected to probe the possible reasons why this should have resonated with Akbar. Akbar's own heritage has been left out of the equation in the modern scholarly literature. By focusing solely on Muslim interpreters of jurisprudence, the injunction of the Great Yasa by Chinggis Khan is obscured. Akbar's belief in the importance of tolerance and justice may have been drawn from the yasa of Chinggis Khan, with Abu'l Fazl providing a juridical construction for ideas held by the sovereign. Just as Akbar's power and area of conquest increased, so did his perception of self and his imagined connection with other great conquerors. Thus, while Akbar's tolerance is often viewed as an anomaly in Mughal India, by linking him with his Turko-Mongolian heritage, we may find great continuity in many of his beliefs and policies.

### THE IMPERIAL CAMP

The imperial camp may reflect another tradition connecting the great rulers of nomadic descent. The imperial camp and its spatial layout were linked to conceptions of sovereignty. The camp was not merely for launching military assaults: for these mobile rulers, it was a highly organized space that depicted in this world the hierarchies of the next. P. Andrews, in his seminal work *Felt Tents and Pavilions: The Nomadic Tradition and Its Interaction with Princely Tentage* (1999), pays particular attention to the continuities between the nomadic traditions of the tent and imperial camp with the later princely grandeur, such as that on display in the encampment of Akbar.

Interestingly, in his discussion of the Chinggis Khan's imperial camp, Andrews notes that the center of the camp consisted of the *ordo*. The *ordo* was more than just the palatial tent-headquarters of the Khan; it also included people, his retinue soldiers as well as dependents. The *ordo* would have been laid out in a defensive circular *gur'ien* formation. Within the *ordo* and the tent complex, the main entrance would have faced south. A palatial tent that served for the Khan's residence would have been present. The *Secret History* relates that after a military victory "(Chinggis Khan) held a great council with his kinsmen in a single tent to decide what to do with Tatar tribesmen" (Rachewiltz 2004: 76). Based on other descriptions from the *Secret History*, this tent seems to have been in the center of the *ordo* with the Khan's own residence, located in the northern side, away from the eyes of the rest of the camp and tenaciously protected by his guardsmen.

The described ostentation of Timur's tents overshadows that of the Great Khan's. Although the Great Khan had incorporated sedentary communities into his territory, during his lifetime his lifestyle was still essentially nomadic. Exploitation of sedentary communities does not seem to have been as intense as that which would follow under Timur. For Manz, the difference lies in that while Chinggis Khan was conquering an "alien" world and thus had to adopt measures accordingly, Timur was campaigning in a "known entity" (Manz 1999: 1). Timur was better able to extract the wealth of those within his domains, as manifested in the opulence of his court and tents. A contrast between Timur and Chinggis Khan must be noted: for Chinggis Khan, the camp was his primary abode, while Timur built gigantic palaces and used the camp as his dwelling place only while on military campaigns and hunts.

While the tents of Timur displayed an unprecedented ostentation, the imperial camp space seemed to echo that of the Great Khan, with some important differences. Ahmed ibn 'Arabshah, formerly secretary to Sultan Ahmed of Baghdad, was captured by Timur and spent many years in the amir's camp against his will. Between invectives, referring to Timur as a "suffocating evil," a "viper," and a "bastard," Ibn 'Arabshah provides descriptive passages about Timur's camp. After Timur's defeat of the Ottomans, Ibn 'Arabshah describes how Timur "ordered that his tents should be made the center of that circle and a point in the ambit of those orbs; and a fence surrounded all his tents and tabernacles, furnished with a wide entrance, which gave admission from a great hall into his inner dwellings" ('Arabshah 1936: 216). Much of the *ordo* remained similar in format and in camp protocol, such as the assignments of the guards, but the fact that Timur placed his personal residence in the camp's central point where the Khan had placed his tent for official business does not seem to be coincidental.

The main source of information for Akbar's tents comes from the writings of Abu'l Fazl. His *Ain I Akbar* provides a description of the various institutions during Akbar's reign. The royal encampment gets special attention and Abu'l Fazl goes into great detail about its features, characteristics, and even layout.

In the camp plan provided by Andrews, instead of a circular *ordo*, we find one that is square in shape and allows for easier access to pathways and the bazaars that supply the great number of troops with provender. At the central point of the *ordo*, we do find not the emperor's residence but rather a structure labeled as the "*bargah*." The *bargah* is described as a "tent of state" and includes a two-storeyed wooden gallery, which "the King of the World uses as his oratory; in the mornings, when he has gone up to the top, they make their obeissance" (Andrews 1999: 1277–78). In describing its size and

extravagance, Abu'l Fazl notes that "the bargah can, in the largest cases, hold ten thousand people or more sitting in its shade. A thousand skilled tent-pitchers erect such a tent in a week with the help of traction machines" (Andrews 1999: 1283). Was Akbar's placement of the *bargah* at the central point of the *ordo* a reverberation of that of the Great Khan? Andrews does not provide enough information to deduce the imperial layout of the camps of Babur and Humayun; however, he does note that the Portuguese Jesuit Antonio Monserrate wrote that Akbar ordered his camp to be made in the traditional Mongol style (Andrews 1999: 896). Akbar's and Chinggis Khan's positioning of state tents as the center of the *ordo* may be due to their feeling of security in their claims of legitimacy as emperor. Timur, by contrast, had to establish his legitimacy during his lifetime in the shadow of the Khan and thus had to foster myths related to his personality. Creating legitimacy through a focus on his personality may have led him to place his personal residence thus at the center of his *ordo*.

Other curious connections between the Great Khan and Akbar can be seen even in tent colors. The tent of Chinggis Khan was said to be pure white, possibly associated with Tengri (Andrews 1999: 389). White was believed by the Mongols to be an auspicious color and the manufacture of pure-white tents would have required the selection of the best wool. In Central Asia, the pure-white tent is still the ideal that is sought after. Pure-white tents are rare, however, due to the high cost of accumulating such high quality wool: most tents tend to be some shade of gray (Andrews 1999: 389).

The Timurid royal tents, contemporary observer González de Clavijo noted, were placed within enclosures and heavily decorated (González de Clavijo 1928: 252). Interiors were lined with sable fur, and the color of royal prestige was no longer the pure white of the nomads but a dyed crimson red (ibid.: 240). Andrews notes that, along with the change in color, felt had been replaced in the lavish decorative tents by richer, though less serviceable materials (Andrews 1999: 670). J. Richards surmises that the choice of crimson red for the royal tents may have been drawn from Persian Sasanian traditions (Richards 1998: 137). Akbar's tents seem to have continued this color-usage tradition, with one exception: Akbar's beloved mother, Hamida Banu Begam, was housed in a white tent. Andrews posits that her use of a white tent may have been due to her tribal origin, as she was descended from Ahmad Jami, or that the white tent was a sign of seniority among Turkic women (Andrews 1999: 925). However, an alternative hypothesis may be advanced if we look at the Mongol connection. Hamida Banu Begam was given the prestigious title *Maryam Makkani*. Abu'l Fazl connects the mother of Akbar with the Mongol


Alanquwa, writing, “That day (*viz.*, of Ālanquwā’s conception) was the beginning of the manifestation of his Majesty, the King of Kings, who after passing through diverse stages was revealed to the world from the holy womb of her Majesty Miryam-makānī for the accomplishment of things visible and invisible” (Fazl 1977: 180). The white tent of Maryam Makkani may have been to connect her with the remembered Mongol royal white tents, and thus with the memory of Mongol Alanquwa, or possibly even with the Great Khan’s powerful well-known mother.

### ARTISTIC REPRESENTATIONS

Akbar’s atelier had a strong interest in Mongol themes. Much time and treasure were expended in illustrating Rashid al-Din’s *Chingiznama*. This text’s importance may have been linked to Akbar’s own interest in his Turko-Mongol heritage as well as to the belief that this text excites warrior spirit.

In one of the illustrations and the associated text, the re-visionism at work in Akbar’s atelier can be seen. Next to a depiction of a prostrating Chinggis Khan leading his retinue in prayer before battle, the text reads, “In the Kipchak steppe between the Irtysh and Dnieper rivers he mounted a hill alone, as was his custom, and *prayed to God in the image of the rising sun*” [emphasis added] (Marek and Knizkova 1963: pl. 17; see fig. 8.1). The worship of “God in the image of the rising sun” seems very similar to Akbar’s *Din-i Ilahi*. The artists’ depiction may have been used to illustrate a precedent for Akbar’s contemporary religious practices.

Another illustration from the *Chingiz-nama* shows the Great Khan’s grandson, Mongke Khan, judging various rebels (fig. 8.2). The illustration portrays him seated in the same position as Akbar in the famous depiction of Akbar receiving a petition in the illustrated *Akbarnama*. Mongke Khan sits under a three-tiered kiosk tent with polygonal apex and contingent awnings. This particular tent form was used in illustrations by Akbar’s atelier, not only for Mongke Khan and Akbar, but also to depict Soloman (Solomon) and Alexander the Great. Andrews asserts that the octagonal pavilion in these depictions may have to do with the dispensing of justice and the assertion of claims to universal empire. Koch has noted that the figure of Soloman seems to have been meant to stand for Akbar himself (Koch 1988: 33). The usage of the same symbols of royalty for the Mongol Mongke Khan, grandson of Chinggis Khan, places him in an esteemed company. Akbar’s atelier thus seems to have given a special place of prominence to the Great Khan and his royal successors.



**Figure 8.2.** Three-tiered kiosk tent with polygonal apex, and contingent awnings. Mongke Khan, judging the rebels, attributed to Tulsi. Leaf from *Jami al-Tavarikh* of Rashid al-Din, created by Akbar's atelier. Listed as "Mangu Khan judges the rebels," Opaque watercolor and gold paper, 1595. 35.2cm × 20.7cm. Edwin Binney 3rd Collection, San Diego Museum of Art, 1990.305.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have not tried to suggest that Akbar imagined himself as some “second-coming” of Chinggis Khan. Akbar’s perceptions were far more original and complex. However, the royal symbolism of the Great Khan was part of the repertoire that could be utilized by the great Mughal emperor. It is not always clear whether Akbar was drawing himself to more closely resemble Chinggis Khan or whether he and his court were re-drawing Chinggis Khan to more closely resemble himself. Certain continuities, albeit with substantial reworkings, can be found in Akbar’s conception of universal emperor, ideas on tolerance and peace, and even in symbols attached to the imperial camp, royal tentage, and creations of his atelier. Although this work is a mere sketch, it does propose some new avenues for future exploration.

This chapter should not be read as a return to discussions of Turkic “shamanism” or criticism of related concepts and policies based on some form of “normative” Islam. Rather, while scholars of Akbar and the Mughals have tended to focus on Islamic roots, linking him with Persian traditions, or on his Central Asian Turkic heritage as a descendant of Timur, another possible influence is the Turko-Mongol heritage linked to Inner Asia and particularly Chinggis Khan. This has been largely overlooked. Spending his early years during a period of exile in nomadic tents, Akbar from early childhood would have heard the tales and legends and absorbed some of the traditions of this Turko-Mongol ancestry. The ideological formulations penned by Abu’l Fazl would not have arisen from his mind alone but would have been deeply influenced by Akbar’s own beliefs and self-image. The life of Chinggis Khan formed its own myth throughout Asia and as the scale of Timur’s and Akbar’s empires grew, the presence of the Great Khan’s shadow may have been felt and emulated. A deeper engagement by scholars of South Asia with those studying Inner Asia may shed further light on this subject and open future vistas of intellectual exploration.

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