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### Authors

Stuckey, Mary E.

Murphy, John M.

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# By Any Other Name: Rhetorical Colonialism in North America

MARY E. STUCKEY AND JOHN M. MURPHY

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*For countless ages Nature had been preparing America for her new tenant. Stores of metal and beds of coal had been laid down; inland seas had deposited fertile plains; river valleys and mountain chains had fixed highways for settlement; forests had stretched over the land, and waterfalls foretold the rumble of mills. All was ready for sentient life.*

—Fredrick Jackson Turner, “American Colonization”<sup>1</sup>

Much like the legendary historian Frederick Jackson Turner, famed word-smith William Safire understands the power of language in public affairs. His widely admired *Safire’s New Political Dictionary: The Definitive Guide to the New Language of Politics* not only delineates our political vocabulary, but also announces its own presence with authority.<sup>2</sup> No self-respecting Euro-American can resist such a title; new is, after all, better than old and nothing could be better than a *new* dictionary for a *new* language. The name plays upon the quintessential Euro-American desire to begin again, to leave the Old World and make of the New a “shining city upon a hill,” and to disdain that city, in turn, and “light out for the Territory.” Inhabiting Safire’s “new” language, however, are the same peoples that populated Frederick Jackson Turner’s America, John Winthrop’s City, and Huck Finn’s Territory. Safire discusses *sachem*, a term used to connote political power among the nations of the Haudenosaunee (People of the Longhouse—often called the Six Nations Confederacy or the Iroquois League), as follows:

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Mary E. Stuckey is an associate professor of communication and political science at Georgia State University. Her research focuses on American political communication, especially regarding minorities. She is currently working on a book on inclusion and exclusion in American presidential rhetoric.

John M. Murphy is an associate professor of speech communication at the University of Georgia. His research focuses on contemporary political rhetoric. He is currently developing a book manuscript on the Clinton presidency.

"Take me to your leader," a bromide used in dealing with savages, is reflected in the first recorded use of "sachem." . . . The braves and warriors of Tammany named their leader the Grand Sachem, who presided over meetings held at the "wigwam."<sup>3</sup>

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out the casual racism here; these "braves and warriors" were not members of indigenous nations and the Haudenosaunee did not reside in wigwams. Safire reduces the Six Nations Confederacy, one of the oldest exemplars of democracy in the world and a powerful influence on the framers of the United States Constitution,<sup>4</sup> to "savages" in much the same way that Turner, about a century before, would assert that precolonial America awaited "sentient life." Our political language may not be so new, much less improved, after all.

Yet even these racist statements reveal the constitutive trace<sup>5</sup> of indigenous peoples in the construction of America. Turner, while denying "sentient life," simultaneously deploys the revealing metaphor of a "new tenant." If the colonist is the new, then who is the old? To be a tenant is to posit an owner. Who might that owner be? Similarly, Safire's "savages" provide the civilized denizens of the Tammany political machine with a deeply indigenous identity. *Tammany*, Philip J. Deloria notes, derives from the Delaware leader Tamenend.<sup>6</sup> In the 1730s, clubs formed in his name mythologized his life. After the Stamp Act of 1765, they became political. By the Revolution, Deloria says, "Tammany verged on being a pure representation of an American Self, reflecting the colonists' increasing need to define themselves as something new and non-British. Tammany created American patriots out of British traitors."<sup>7</sup> Of course, while the non-Indian patriots were "playing Indian," the Declaration of Independence denounced the actual Natives as "merciless Indian Savages, whose known mode of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions." Longing to become true Americans, the patriots named themselves Tammany. Longing to become Tammany, the patriots named his true children savages.<sup>8</sup> The originary trace of the "savage" at the heart of the American self is effaced and acknowledged. Safire's savage exemplifies anew the paradoxical constitutive power at the core of the colonial enterprise: the power to name.<sup>9</sup>

In its most fundamental sense, naming enacts our desire to "notice, recognize, and label certain elements or qualities in ourselves and our surroundings."<sup>10</sup> Names order our world and direct our attention, but reliability and validity do not mark this effort. In Kenneth Burke's famous phrase, "Even if any given terminology is a *reflection* of reality, by its very nature as a terminology, it must be a *selection* of reality; and to this extent, it must function also as a *deflection* of reality."<sup>11</sup> Burke's perspective reveals the paradox of naming; even as we seek to reflect the world, we cannot help but deflect it. Our names cannot quite define our situations.

Instead, as Charles Kauffman notes, "Names entitle situations."<sup>12</sup> They provide strategic and stylized answers to the questions posed by the world.<sup>13</sup> Given their brevity, names act as "linguistic shortcuts," as "receptacles of personal attitudes and social ratings due to the fact that language is a social prod-

uct and thus builds the tribe's attitudes into its 'entitlements' and into their 'abbreviations' as words for things."<sup>14</sup> Such shortcuts cohere into complex sets of entitlements, sizing up situations, ordering the "tribe's attitudes," and shaping visions of the world.<sup>15</sup>

The orientations that result from entitlements not only size up our situations, but also assert a kind of ownership over them. Burke's ceaseless shuffling between "name," "entitle," and "title" addresses the power of naming. An entitlement names a right. As the *Random House Thesaurus* says, to entitle is to "give the right to, authorize, qualify, make eligible, allow, permit, enable, title, name, designate, call, etc."<sup>16</sup> The power explicit in the entitlement to name is present in many cultural traditions. In Genesis, for example, the Judeo-Christian God gives Adam dominion over the earth, a power enacted through his ability to name.<sup>17</sup> For members of many cultures indigenous to North America, moreover, breath is not only considered sacred, but the very act of speaking has creative power; one shapes the world by naming the world.<sup>18</sup> Names, then, are powerful forces, for they are the loci of negotiations over social authority and cultural identity.<sup>19</sup>

This essay explores the power of naming and the political consequences that follow from this power. We focus on the colonial project of entitling the landscapes, peoples, and cultures of the North American continent. Entitlement, like the colonialism of which it is but one manifestation, remains largely hidden; not so much concealed as buried within a taken-for-granted culture that views any oppressive or potentially oppressive practices as either the exception to the American democratic rule, or as the province of other people, in other places, with other, less humanistically oriented national ethoi.<sup>20</sup>

Through such an exploration, the colonial project itself and its expression through language can be better understood. In a sense, we respond both to the call for a vigorous engagement on the part of rhetorical critics with colonial, neocolonial, and postcolonial discourses<sup>21</sup> and to the challenge posed by a "constitutive approach to rhetorical historiography."<sup>22</sup> These two tasks cannot be separated; to understand the constitution of an American subject at various points in rhetorical history is simultaneously to recognize the ways in which a subject can only emerge as the product of a complex and dialogic interaction with multiple others.<sup>23</sup> To name the lands and peoples of the continent is to name the reflected and deflected American self.

The argument proceeds in three parts. First, we situate the process of naming within colonial and postcolonial endeavors. Second, we turn to the practice of naming by the colonists and their descendants. Specifically, we analyze the various names for the continent and its indigenous peoples. Finally, to illustrate the orientation that results from such entitlements, we briefly explore a canonical American text and its contemporary echoes: Frederick Jackson Turner's 1893 oration "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." As our critique of Turner demonstrates, this essay is not about the distant past. The colonialism on this continent, and that which exists as a part of the American ethos, not only characterizes our national past, but also our national present.<sup>24</sup> The practices analyzed here continue; the names matter because they erode public deliberation<sup>25</sup> and contribute to

practices that threaten the lives, health, and safety of the members of the over 500 Native nations living on this continent.<sup>26</sup> A discussion of these consequences comprises the final part of the essay.

### NATIONS, NAMING, AND COLONIALISM

Nations, as Ernest Gellner notes, are not inevitable. There are a variety of ways for humans to organize themselves and their lives, and doing so around the idea of nationality is but one such way, reflecting one set of historical, political, and economic circumstances.<sup>27</sup> The idea of a nation embodying a people is, as many have argued, a fiction, a creation brought about by a specific sort of historical necessity and specific kinds of rhetorical action.<sup>28</sup>

Once invented, however, nations require certain elements for their sustenance and growth, and a certain sort of language with which to maintain and perpetuate themselves.<sup>29</sup> In the colonial context of North America, this language reflected, reinforced, and received support from the very fact of colonization.<sup>30</sup> The ways in which the colonists understood, spoke, and wrote about the land and its inhabitants justified the colonial project, which in turn set in motion processes that reinforced the colonists' understanding of themselves and the world.<sup>31</sup> In doing so, naming naturalized the process of colonization, reflecting and reinforcing colonial power.

Even in a colonial context, these processes proceed neither in isolation nor as the direct and unmediated imposition of one culture upon another. Instead, members of the colonized culture will, to the extent possible, "exercise discretion in accepting and rejecting elements presented to them."<sup>32</sup> They exploit the inability of names to define the world, seek out the aporia present in any given terminology, and deploy in defense the material resources available to them. For instance, the indigenous peoples of the Americas accepted those elements of Christianity that caused the least damage to their resident cultures, while their "conversion" may have helped them to resist the imposition of other elements of the colonial culture.<sup>33</sup> In many ways, the history of indigenous peoples is the history of peoples who managed such resistance and who maintained cultures and communities in the face of extensive efforts of domination.<sup>34</sup>

The fragile ability of resident cultures to resist colonialization does not deny the fact of colonization, nor does it reduce its violence: "Colonization is violence, and there are many ways to carry out that violence."<sup>35</sup> The imposition of a particular linguistic world is one such way. A terminology may allow colonizers to see their new nation as unified, but that pretense is based upon the denial of indigenous identity, a denial that is violent. As Paulo Friere says,

Cultural invasion, which serves the ends of conquest and the preservation of oppression, always involves a parochial view of reality, a static perception of the world, and the imposition of one world view upon another. It implies the "superiority" of the invader and the "inferiority" of those who are invaded, as well as the imposition of values by the former, who possess the latter and are afraid of losing them.<sup>36</sup>

Yet that very fear offers opportunities for resistance. As Carroll Smith-Rosenberg and Philip Deloria argue, Indians play a key role in the constitution of American identity.<sup>37</sup> To lose the Indian is to lose the American and that fear gives the “inferior” leverage. Novelist and literary critic Louis Owens, drawing on indigenous traditions as well as the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, theorizes this process by reclaiming the charged colonialist term *frontier* and juxtaposing it to *territory*. He recognizes that *frontier* bears “the burden of a discourse grounded in genocide, ethnocide, and half a millenium of determined efforts to erase indigenous peoples from the Americas.”<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, he argues that when the term is viewed from “the other direction,” it emerges as a space “wherein discourse is multidirectional and hybridized.” Precisely because the frontier is, literally and metaphorically, a place of “extreme contestation,” always “unstable, multidirectional, hybridized, characterized by heteroglossia, and indeterminate,” it contrasts nicely to *territory*, a space that is “clearly mapped, fully imagined as a place of containment, invented to control and subdue the dangerous potentialities of imagined Indians.”<sup>39</sup> From Owens’ perspective, then, rhetorical colonialism emerges as successive efforts, constantly and inherently incomplete, to transform frontier into territory.

One of the clearest examples of this process is naming. In our analysis, territory functions as an “ultimate term,”<sup>40</sup> often in its own name, more often metaphorically as other terms, such as *America*, substitute for it. Ultimate terms place the “competing voices” of the frontier “in a *hierarchy*, or *sequence*, or *evaluative series*, so that, in some way, we [go] by a fixed and reasoned progression from one of these to another, the members of the entire group being arranged *developmentally* with relation to one another.” For example, the land now known as Oklahoma developed from the frontier to the Indian Territory, a place of control and constraint; only once the land was secured for the white colonists could it be entitled, in a bitter irony, Oklahoma, a “Choctaw name meaning the land of the red people.”<sup>41</sup>

Such constraints, however, cannot be viewed as absolute. The dialectical trope of irony incarnate in *Oklahoma* destabilizes the very linguistic order the colonists sought to impose. It *is* the “land of the red people” and so further entitlements must be asserted to maintain symbolic control over the land; witness the events commemorated in the 1992 film, *Far and Away* in which stars Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman become Americans by stealing Oklahoma land from its Native inhabitants.

Such discourse mandates continued criticism because, as *Far and Away* illustrates, the belief that colonialism can be safely relegated either to distant locations or the distant past is wrong.<sup>42</sup> The entitlements associated with the violent conquest of North America remain in us, for “the practice of colonialism produced ways of thinking, saying and doing that permeated back into the cultures and discourses of the colonial nations.”<sup>43</sup> These ways of “thinking, saying and doing” are embedded in the culture of the contemporary United States. The circle remains unbroken even unto the present day.

This claim complicates contemporary understandings of postcolonial discourses. *Post* implies that colonialism, like modernism or structuralism, is gone. But as Best and Kellner argue of postmodernism, the term is ambiva-

lent. *Post* can be “an active term of negation” but it also reveals the trace of modernism<sup>44</sup> or, as McKerrow puts it, “a dependence on, a continuity with, that which follows.”<sup>45</sup> The consequences of ignoring that trace are significant, particularly in the context of colonialism. Laura Chrisman points out that the “privileging” of postcolonialism “is salutary and important, but it also risks being premature and misleading, if it suggests that the present can be analysed in isolation from the imperialism which formally produced it, and which is only arguably a matter of history. Such imperialism in remaining unanalysed also remains, unwittingly albeit, hegemonic.”<sup>46</sup>

That risk becomes a positive danger when we speak of the indigenous peoples of North America, who remain largely absent from both postcolonial and colonial studies.<sup>47</sup> Neither of the two more popular collections of postcolonial discourse and theory bothers with Native Americans<sup>48</sup> nor do such concerns appear in Shome’s discussion of rhetorical studies and postcolonial theory.<sup>49</sup> Even a critic as astute as Edward Said can sneeringly refer to the writings of indigenous Americans as “that sad panorama produced by genocide and cultural amnesia which is beginning to be known as ‘native American literature.’”<sup>50</sup> The empire, to borrow the title of another book that also ignores Native Americans, does indeed write back.<sup>51</sup> The line from Turner to Safire to Said is a direct one.

## WHAT’S IN A NAME?

### Changing Places

Better than a decade ago, Gerald P. Mohrmann noted, “Recently we have witnessed an almost bewildering outpouring of commentaries on the ways that conceptions of place and space affect us in the living of our lives.”<sup>52</sup> Commentary has, if anything, increased since that time, but his critique of John C. Calhoun’s 1837 address “On the Reception of the Abolition Petitions” remains an acute analysis of the uneasy dialectic between “the strain toward palpability and the subtle indications of local motion”<sup>53</sup> that characterizes space and place in political rhetoric. Calhoun sought to stabilize his place and space in the world, but could not quite make it happen.

Much the same effect results from colonial naming practices. While we recognize that some names may well be pure accident and that others reflect pre-colonial animosity between indigenous nations, even these unintentional labels reinforce the colonial project and reflect Calhoun’s dilemma. On the one hand, place names seek to stabilize the world and turn nameless frontier into entitled territory. As Paul Carter says, names embody “the travelers’ directional and territorial ambitions: his desire to possess where he had been as a preliminary to going on . . . where such viewpoints did not exist, they had to be hypothesized, rhetorically asserted by way of names.”<sup>54</sup> The colonist makes things the signs of words.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, inserting static names into an alien landscape, a fluid history, and a continuous journey destabilizes the process of entitlement. Renaming the land undermines the desired order. If done once, why not again? Linguistic motion makes the names less than palpable.

As a result, they must be asserted continually and powerfully. The entitlement of land, we believe, leaves less room for resistance than either the naming of peoples or the process of public argument. Land means money and the US government has sought to make these labels stick. At least three strategies mark this effort. Colonial place names engage in *classification*, mapping the world such that it makes sense; *imposition*, forcing alien names onto the continent in an effort to recreate home; and, finally, *appropriation*, “borrowing” Native names to make the continent home by taking it from the inhabitants. Each strategy illuminates the other, resulting in a kind of ultimate linguistic order.

That order, of course, begins with a name for the entire place. The name of the North American continent reflects classificatory colonial dominance in two ways. First, *America*, as every school child knows, honors Amerigo Vespucci, a mapmaker. Graham Huggan notes that mapping traditionally acts to make sense of a place, to structure a space, and to represent a physical landscape.<sup>56</sup> It is, preeminently, an act of classification. It is, ideologically, no accident that America was named for a mapmaker.<sup>57</sup>

We also “know” that America represents the New World, a place “discovered” by Europeans in search of a new beginning. What few school children know, however, is that the lands now called America have other, older names as well. America, in fact, collapses the heteroglossia of indigenous naming practices into an ideal linguistic order, the second result of classification. Classification in the Euro-American cultural world must result in mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Deviation from this cultural logic is unacceptable; multiple names must be erased and hybridized frontiers transformed into territories.

The most frequently used of the Native names is Turtle Island, which derives from indigenous creation stories in which the land is created by placing mud on the back of a turtle.<sup>58</sup> Other names encompass the land less expansively, revealing the indigenous understanding of their territory as more limited, less potentially global than the entitlements posed by Europeans. Individual places were given names, often in recognition of particular events, but rarely was all of creation given one single name. In the Chikasha (Chickasaw) language, for instance, there is a word for *earth* (*yach-ni*), but not one that names the entire continent.

Like the Chikasha, members of indigenous nations spoke of the earth itself as Mother, or would refer to their ancestral homelands by name, but the view expressed had more to do with home, or territory, than with property, as it is understood in European law.<sup>59</sup> Indigenous peoples maintain a strong connection to specific geographical areas, and will defend them from intrusion, but this title is not transferable to other peoples nor to other places. Their naming indicates “belonging to” rather than “possession of.” The process can make little sense to the European American; Thomas F. Thornton notes, “Mountain ranges, rivers, islands, and bays might remain nameless, although dozens, even hundreds of place names might be applied to portions of these features. For example, Yuroks . . . gave twelve names for places on the slopes of a single mountain, but no name for the mountain as a whole.”<sup>60</sup> Needless



to say, these indigenous practices created problems when the colonists (or the current United States government for that matter) sought (seeks) to buy the mountains and islands.<sup>61</sup>

For example, as frontier turned to territory turned to states, a singular name was needed to mark each property and make it available for settlement and purchase. The singular names that resulted not only classified the land into mutually exclusive and exhaustive pieces, but also instantiated the colonial desire to be at home in the land. Classification intersects with imposition because of the acute need for home in an alien landscape. Owens argues that, having “no history, no ‘place’ within the landscape, the European American can only define it in abstract, broadly aesthetic terms that enable him to subsume it into his own romantic narrative,”<sup>62</sup> an analysis that meshes nicely with Perry Miller’s discussion of the Puritans’ errand into the wilderness.<sup>63</sup> Their “New England” was meant to be only a detour, a stop on the road to a renovated Old World. When the Cromwellian Protectorate in Old England collapsed, the colonists found themselves alone in a howling wilderness, faced with the unenviable task of making the undesirable desirable or, at least, profitable.

The Puritans, as well as the rest of the European Americans, accomplished this task in part through names. With few exceptions, they imposed their linguistic world: Virginia, Maryland, Carolina, Pennsylvania, Georgia, New Hampshire, and New York are but a few of their efforts. As the early republic developed and sought to establish its lineage with past republics colonists invoked the classical: “Troy, Utica, Ithaca, Sparta, Rome, Athens—thus transplanting rhetorically an ancient republican past”<sup>64</sup> onto a new republican wilderness. Other names impose colonialist ideology upon geography through commemoration, such as the “Bering” Strait/Sea/Land Bridge, all named in honor of a man who helped bring Russian imperialism to the North Country, and whose name replaces the Yupik *Imakpik*, which means “Big Container.”<sup>65</sup> Of course, the impositions also serve to justify the theft of the land. Bear Butte, for instance, is better known as “Devil’s Tower,” a name that is so important to the maintenance of order that Representative Barbara Cubin (R-WY) has introduced legislation (H.R. 581) designed to protect it.

Even if the sites remain in indigenous hands, they are often renamed, robbed of their sanctity, and put to other uses, the value of which is determined by the colonizer, not the colonized. Through such devices, the placement of a telescope on *Dzil nchaa si an* (Mount Graham), sacred to the *Nde* (Apache) can be understood as a “reasonable” action, not as blasphemy, and the naming of one of its projects “Columbus” can be seen as neutral rather than insulting.<sup>66</sup> Through such devices, the blasting of stone in the *Paha Sapa* (Black Hills) to commemorate presidents who endorsed the wholesale theft of the land bases of indigenous nations can be understood as “heroic.” And through such devices, the use of “empty” lands, owned and controlled by indigenous nations, can be “put to good use” as dumping grounds for toxic waste.<sup>67</sup>

These linguistic transplants, however, did not fully take in spite of their continued existence and genocidal consequences. As any visitor to Oxford,

Mississippi, Athens, Georgia, or Rome, New York, can testify, they bear little resemblance to their namesakes. The gap between linguistic title and physical place, along with the felt ideological need to make a truly American literature, truly American scholar, or even just a true American,<sup>68</sup> demanded the appropriation of Native place names.

Appropriation is a more ambivalent strategy than the others. Appropriation is theft, but it also implies a dependence upon the previous occupants. Take again the example of states. While we do not posit a strict chronology, the timing is suggestive. Just as a revolutionary American consciousness began to percolate through the colonies, the new settlements “over the mountains” began to assume Native names. Kentucky—“a corruption of the Iroquois *kenta-ke* (meadow land) or Wyandot *kah-ten-tah-teh* (land of tomorrow)”—and Tennessee—“For Tenase, principal village of Cherokees”<sup>69</sup>—entered the geographical and political lexicon.

Such appropriation works in two ways. First, as Deloria suggests, it allows white colonists to play “Indian.”<sup>70</sup> They, and not the Native peoples, are the true inhabitants of the place and thus can feel at home in an otherwise alien landscape. It is their country, their place, their nation and the Native names signify an American identity, separate from European influence, a key tenet, as will be developed later, of Turner’s “Frontier Thesis.” Second, and equally important, such linguistic appropriations clear the way for the literal appropriation of the land. If the name is a “corruption” of the indigenous original, then the land, while resonating with the original, no longer belongs to the original. Linguistic corruption nicely foreshadows political corruption. In a lovely and horribly ironic example of all three strategies, the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota peoples had *Sioux* imposed upon them, had Dakota (“allies”) appropriated for their land, and then saw the land classified as the Dakota Territory and, eventually, the states of North and South Dakota, demonstrating anew that the colonizers were no allies to the colonized.

This sketch is not meant to be exhaustive, any more than the following section of the essay can assay all the complex and varied ways in which the peoples of the continent were named. Nonetheless, the pattern should be clear. The ultimate term, *America*, classifies the land mass as something other than one belonging to the Native inhabitants. Linguistic practices of classification, imposition, and appropriation extend the series, assigning each place available for purchase a particular name, a requirement if the land is to function as capital in a modern economy. Equally important, the heteroglossia evident in Native naming practices and in the notion of the land as frontier yields to the rigid and contained labels of the territory. The colonizer feels at home in the mapped and now-familiar territory.

### Naming Peoples

The European colonizers entitled more than the territory they “discovered.” They also labeled the lands’ inhabitants. The variety of naming practices—classifying, imposing, and appropriating—functions in this case to displace Indians from any meaningful role in political or cultural life in the United

States. Here, our analysis moves less through the types of naming practices and more from the general to the specific, from the ultimate term (*Indian*) to the specific, often derogatory substitutes, each of which is authorized by the other, composing yet another ideal order concomitant with place names. As a result of the totalizing effect of *Indian*, of the derogatory terms developed for specific nations, and of the nastier terms developed as synonyms for Indians, Native peoples find little room at the American table. In this respect, it is interesting that the existing tensions between indigenous nations were reflected in the colonizer's choices of names. This practice probably reflects both the political goals of the Native peoples and as much ignorance and insensitivity on the colonizers' part as animosity and the desire to dominate. However the names were chosen, their seeming inevitability would naturalize for the colonists their colonial project.

By subsuming into the one category *Indian*, as well as its cognates, members of over 500 different nations comprising over 300 different language groups and numerous cultural beliefs, the colonists could justify the annihilation of those peoples while at the same time claiming identification with them in forging a uniquely American identity. Again, as every school child knows, the name *Indian* was a historical accident resulting from the fact that Christopher Columbus did not know where he had landed.<sup>71</sup> Yet the name, in a form of synecdoche, serves nicely as a part for the whole of the naming of indigenous peoples. As Joel Martin puts it, "By substituting fantastic Indians for real ones, Anglo-Americans asserted control over 'Indianness,' domesticated 'Indians' for their own use, and rendered real Indians disposable. In short, they colonized 'Indianness' at a symbolic level even as they colonized Indian land and resources."<sup>72</sup>

Nor did this process stop with the collective peoples of the Americas; it played out upon a national and individual level. First, indigenous *nations* were reduced to *tribes*.<sup>73</sup> This move not only signifies a specific and intentional erosion of sovereignty,<sup>74</sup> but *tribe*, as late as 1970, had as a meaning, "A nation of savages; a body of rude people united under one leader or government; as in the tribes of the six nations; the Seneca tribe in America."<sup>75</sup> The *Oxford English Dictionary* is no better: "A group of persons forming a community and claiming descent from a common ancestor. . . . A race of people; now applied esp. to a primary aggregate of people in a primitive or barbarous condition, under a headman or chief. . . . A class of persons . . . now often contemptuous."<sup>76</sup> The political relations thus displayed could not be more clear.

Not only did the European Americans impose their conceptions of political power and leadership upon indigenous nations, but they did so in such a way as to make those nations particularly vulnerable to colonization. Rather than attempting to understand the various indigenous models of leadership and social organization, colonizers assumed that "tribes" were led by "chiefs," and negotiated accordingly. This practice disenfranchised large numbers of individuals, especially women,<sup>77</sup> and created rifts between those who favored traditional political patterns and those who were more ready to adopt the European molds. As Chrisman points out, "imperial and colonial discourses often deploy strategies of exaggerating and playing off differences among

diverse others.”<sup>78</sup> These rifts—and their consequences—continue and contribute to some of the most difficult political divisions among and between indigenous peoples in North America today.<sup>79</sup>

In the same way, “Indian ‘tribes,’” now less than nations, were renamed according to colonialist dictates. Almost no indigenous nations are now known by the names they gave themselves, but are referred to by their English (read colonialist) names. In doing so, colonists exaggerated differences by playing Native nations off one another in a strategy of divide and conquer. The names also effectively demeaned indigenous peoples by embedding what had been localized insults into the authoritative and dominant language. To give but a few of the best known examples, the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota peoples of the Plains, whose names in their own languages mean “allies,” became the Sioux, a name appropriated from an Algonquin word for “snakes,” or “enemies.”<sup>80</sup> Similarly, the Nde, meaning “the People,” are referred to as Apache, a name that derives from the Zuni word for enemy. The same is true of the Navajo, or Dineh people. *Dineh*, means “we the people,” while *Navajo* comes from the Tewa Pueblo (Pueblo itself a Spanish misnomer) and means “thieves,” or “takers from the fields.”<sup>81</sup> It is perhaps reflective of the colonialist strategy of using one indigenous nation or group of nations as allies in military engagements against others that so many tribal names are derived from an enemy’s language.

Other names are less antagonistic, but they still lack respect for or understanding of indigenous peoples. While Papago, Pima for “bean eaters,” is not necessarily derogatory, their name for themselves, Tohono O’Odham, means “desert people,”<sup>82</sup> indicating the importance of place to their cultural understanding of themselves. The Alaskan Inuit, whose name means “the people,” are more often known to non-Natives as the Eskimo, an Algonquin word for “eaters of raw flesh.”<sup>83</sup> Other colonial names indicate the importance of physical characteristics to the colonizers. The Nez Perce, for instance, were given that title by the French for their practice of wearing nose pendants; they call themselves Nimipus, or “we, the people.” A more egregious example comes from the Salish (again, “we, the people”), better known to the British colonists as the Flathead Indians.<sup>84</sup>

Finally, colonizers often rendered original names meaningless. *Chikasha*, for instance, means “the people who walked away,” recalling their split with the Chata, or Choctaw. In English, they are called the Chickasaw, a word devoid of meaning in any language. The same mechanism renders Shawnee out of Sah-wan-wan-kee which also means, “the people.” By replacing culturally meaningful language with nonsense syllables, the people themselves are stripped of their cultural referents.

Many indigenous nations are reclaiming their own names. Reflecting the divisions caused by repeated governmental relocations, for example, those members of the Ho-Chunk (or Hochungra) nation who live in Wisconsin have readopted their own name, which translates (in one version) as “Speakers of the Original Language.” The Ho-Chunk who reside in what is now Nebraska continue to call themselves and be called by the name given them by the French, via the Algonquin-speaking nations: Winnebago, or “People of the dirty water.”<sup>85</sup>

More often, indigenous peoples have accepted the colonial names for their nations, at least while speaking English. In Mississippi, for instance, the sole remaining federally recognized indigenous presence is the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, who keep the name Choctaw, yet name their tribal business ventures Chata Enterprises. In a nation where upwards of two-thirds of the people still speak their original language, this duality has more than a little political significance, for the Chata people can move in both worlds fluently and resist some aspects of colonization even while ostensibly accepting others.

In the face of such resistance, the colonizer often resorts to less flattering synonyms to cement inequitable power relations. These practices have a long history and the terms are embedded in our language. Seemingly innocuous phrases such as “low man on the totem pole” (a misnomer because the “low man” is protected by the icons above), “Indian giver,” and “on the warpath,” connote negative stereotypes,<sup>86</sup> stereotypes that were often based on misunderstanding as much as on perfidy. Whatever the motives for their derivation, such terms and phrases worked ideologically to naturalize and reinforce the colonial project. More pointedly, words like *renegade*, originally meaning “an apostate from the faith” or “a deserter,”<sup>87</sup> were imposed on those who resisted colonization and incarceration. Additionally, *hostile* is listed in the original *Oxford English Dictionary* as meaning, “a hostile person; spec. (U.S.) A North American Indian unfriendly to the Whites.”<sup>88</sup>

In the same vein, Safire defines “off the reservation,” as “remaining nominally within the party, but refusing to support the party’s candidate,”<sup>89</sup> thus connoting implicit political treason. Without any conscious irony, Safire traces the phrase to the following origins: “The phrase refers to American Indian reservations in the days when unscrupulous whites would trade ‘firewater’ for goods, and ‘off the reservation’ was a lonely and dangerous place for a red man to be.”<sup>90</sup> Given his choice of language, it is hard to argue that things have improved significantly for “the red man.”

Other pejorative terms abound. Even without recourse to *savage* or *barbarian*, much less the often-contested *redskin*, *brave*, and *squaw*, or the blatantly offensive *timber* (or *prairie*) *n*—*r*, the point is easily made. The word *half-bred*, for example, according to Webster, connotes “mean, degenerate,” while the *Oxford English Dictionary* records the word as “of mixed breed; born of parents of superior and inferior strain; mongrel . . . imperfectly acquainted with the rules of good behavior.”<sup>91</sup> That same source gives us half-breed, as “one who is sprung from parents or ancestors of different races; esp. in the U.S., applied to the offspring of whites and Negroes or American Indians.”<sup>92</sup> An additional meaning is, “In U.S. politics, a name applied in derision to certain Republicans of New York who in 1881 wavered in their party allegiance.”<sup>93</sup> According to Safire’s political dictionary, it is “an obsolete political term,” meaning “splinter group, anti-regular.”<sup>94</sup> Bloodlines and disloyalty link together; any trace of indigenous ancestry (half-bred equals anti-regular) is tantamount to treachery, and thus a marker of social guilt and liable to punishment.<sup>95</sup> Lineage, hierarchy, and political loyalty are neatly subsumed into one generic category and entire peoples are dismissed.

Names and blood also matter to members of indigenous nations. First, they often owe their names to the colonizers, who objected to traditional naming practices and assigned European names to those individuals who came under their control at Indian agencies and boarding schools.<sup>96</sup> Second, the federal prerogative of requiring a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood embodies that control over indigenous nations and their citizens. The federal government has final say over who is and is not an official Indian, depending upon a governmental determination that one possesses the right sort of blood. The battles over state and federal recognition of indigenous nations and over the legal/ethnic identities of individuals are among the most divisive in indigenous communities, while these battles are widely considered a product of an alien and imposed system of identification through blood.<sup>97</sup>

However awful this practice seems upon reflection, it makes sense because of the orientation crafted by the names, which naturalizes the colonial ideology.<sup>98</sup> Fifty years after the European Holocaust, the US government classifies Indians by blood at least partly because the name itself provides the “‘guiding idea’ or ‘unitary principle’”<sup>99</sup> informing the practice. The various names delineated here do not “confront one another as somewhat disrelated competitors that can work together only by the ‘mild demoralization’ of sheer compromise; rather, they [are] like successive positions or moments in a single process.”<sup>100</sup> Much like the way in which the term *America* orders the lands, *Indian* organizes the peoples. From *Indian* through *tribe* through *Apache* through *hostile* through *half-breed* a “somewhat formless” wrangle of names is “creatively endowed with design.”<sup>101</sup> Each term embodies the “ultimate perfection (‘finishedness’) of the series.”<sup>102</sup> To put the matter somewhat facetiously, the Indian is a “savage Apache” who goes “off the reservation” because of “mongrel” blood. The essential principle of *Indian* flows through all the terms; the frontier of jangling, discordant voices is reconciled into a harmonious colonial territory. The accidental Indian, in turn, cannot claim ownership of an always already renamed land. As an instrumental force,<sup>103</sup> rhetorical colonialism undermines the political and cultural influence of Native Americans and asserts control over their lands and resources.

In a double gesture, however, those names are inscribed into the landscape and write the so-called Indian into the American. Such a constitutive move suggests the continuing tension between the principles of American democracy and the practices of rhetorical colonialism. We want to live in the land of the “Red people” even as we displace them. Or, at minimum, we seek these people by identifying with the frontiersman of the nineteenth century or the Atlanta Brave of the twentieth century. In the final section, then, we turn to the ways in which the Indian percolates through Frederick Jackson Turner’s depiction of the American self and the contemporary resonance of that picture. Through this brief example, we seek to explore the (re)constitution of the names as “they unfold in textual practice.”<sup>104</sup> In short, we argue that even as these names make an Indian, they also make an American.

### Making Americans

In this brief analysis, we suggest that Turner's speech embodies, exploits, and preserves the tensions between "savagery and civilization"<sup>105</sup> that constitute, in part, the American character. Such tensions inhere in the orientation of American colonialism; the names shape a "trained incapacity," a "state of affairs whereby one's very abilities can function as blindnesses."<sup>106</sup> The ability to entitle the continent blinds us to the consequences and inevitably shapes the American self as simultaneously civilized and savage.

From this view, to be fully civilized is to abjure an American identity. It is to be the European colonizer, an unacceptable state if we are to make a "shining city upon a hill" as an example to the Old World. To be fully savage is also to abjure an American identity. It is to be the Indian colonized, an equally unacceptable state if we are to make a "city" in a New World. Discursive expressions of the American character must manage and use the tensions between civilization and savagery, European and Indian, colonizer and colonized. That constitutive dialogue shapes Turner's text.

Ronald Carpenter has sensitively read Turner's oration and we rely upon his work.<sup>107</sup> He situates the speech nicely.<sup>108</sup> Facing widespread acceptance of the theory that American institutions grew from English ones and that they, in turn, grew from the "germ" of ancient Teutonic practices, Turner "hammered" the idea that American institutions evolved from a uniquely American character: the frontiersman. Yet for the frontiersman to emerge in Turner's text, he must first reflect, select, and deflect the Indian.

That movement begins with the first sentence of the essay; Turner quotes the 1890 Census claim that the frontier is gone. That same year saw the massacre at Wounded Knee in which the Seventh Cavalry slaughtered nearly three hundred unarmed people, two-thirds of whom were women and children.<sup>109</sup> Significantly, the frontier could not close until the "continuous recession" of "free land" had concluded with the perceived disappearance of its inhabitants.

Turner then turns to his thesis. The "Colonization of the Great West" explains "American development."<sup>110</sup> Yet *development* itself is an ambiguous term and so Turner proceeds to put flesh on its bones. Eschewing the Newtonian machine imagery popular among the Founders, Turner relies instead on the Darwinian organic imagery popular in this period.<sup>111</sup> He says: "Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions."<sup>112</sup> Repetition of *behind* serves a dual function. Chronologically and logically, it seems, the growth of institutions trails behind the vital forces. The institutions of American life, "organs" in his biological terminology, must evolve from the vital forces. What are those forces? In a move typical of his stylistic choices,<sup>113</sup> Turner delays our gratification. He first restates his claim by saying that "American institutions" are "compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people," and so we wonder anew, "What are those changes?"<sup>114</sup>

Proceeding inductively and deploying the Darwinian imagery throughout, Turner initially contends that change itself, the growth and spread of the

American people, is the “distinguishing feature of American life.”<sup>115</sup> He then exploits the metaphor of a “germ” theory to its fullest. His claim germinates subsequent claims as the argument evolves into its natural form. It is not just growth; all societies grow. It is the “recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion.” Yet it is not just recurrence of growth; like evolution, it is differential recurrent growth. Each time there is a “return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line,” there is a “*new* development for that area.”<sup>116</sup> “In this advance,” Turner concludes, “the frontier is the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization.”<sup>117</sup> As a good social Darwinist, Turner takes his seed, germinates it fully into differentiated parts, and then traces it back to its root: The key vital force provided by the frontier is the interaction “between savagery and civilization.” That “meeting point” has shaped American development.

Crucial, then, to his claim is his depiction of the meeting.<sup>118</sup> Turner does not *argue* in support of his thesis. Rather, he *shows* us that encounter. Seeing is believing and the audience can believe the claim when it sees the evolution of European and Indian into the higher life form of the American frontiersman. As Turner begins, he emphasizes the oracular: “In the settlement of America we have to *observe* how European life entered the continent, and how America modified and developed that life and reacted on Europe.”<sup>119</sup> After a brief dismissal of “Germanic origins,” Turner turns to the critical meeting.

The “wilderness” initially “masters” the colonist. Relying upon the visual, Turner depicts the poor European “in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought” being taken “from the railroad car” and dropped into “the birch canoe.” The wilderness “strips off the garments of civilization” and “arrays” the European in “the hunting shirt and the moccasin.” Obviously, an inanimate “wilderness” cannot accomplish such wonders. The animate “Indian” is identified with the wilderness, a part of the scene nurturing the process of Americanization, a point emphasized as Turner puts the European “in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois [literally displacing them] and runs an Indian palisade around him.” Before he knows it, he “shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion.” The European becomes the Indian (at first) because “the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails.”<sup>120</sup>

The last phrase, perhaps, rings literally and metaphorically. The European takes advantage of the material and mimetic resources at his disposal. Yet the process cannot stop there; Turner believes that the “environment” was too much for the “man,” thus drawing a distinction between the wilderness (the Indian) and the human. To end the narrative here would be to leave the American a savage and thus inhuman. “Little by little,” Turner opines, the colonizer “transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe. . . . The fact is, that here is a new product that is American.”<sup>121</sup> The European and the “wilderness” engage in a constitutive meeting, a natural, evolutionary process that grows into the American. Turner continues to naturalize the depiction by portraying the recurrent growth as like “successive



glaciations, so [that] each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics."<sup>122</sup> Critically, the last analogy depicts the process as unfinalizable; there exists an ongoing constitutive tension between the civilized tones of the European and the "war cry of the Indian" in the voice of the "true" American. That, Turner concludes, is "the really American part of our history."<sup>123</sup>

The very long middle section of the speech rehearses this continuing constitutive dialogue. The descriptive passages have confounded historians and critics alike. Carpenter quotes Charles Beard as saying, with a touch of asperity, "of its thirty-eight pages fully one-half are narrative and descriptive and bear on the main theme only by way of illustration"<sup>124</sup> and Carpenter himself dryly notes that Turner "dutifully specified fourteen distinct facets of the frontier that could be studied advantageously."<sup>125</sup> From our perspective, however, those rich descriptive passages depict the successive "glaciations." American colonization, and thus the evolution of the American, takes place over and over again, right before our eyes. The rhetorical performance of colonization, in turn, justifies the material act of colonization as the American emerges in the text and the world. We see the American growing, differentiating, and evolving again and yet again as the frontier moves progressively westward. The form of a heroic epic reinforces the argument.<sup>126</sup> Turner recounts, for instance, the exploits of "the great backwoodsmen" Daniel Boone as he "pioneered the way" to be followed by his grandson, "Col. A. J. Boone" and, of course, by Kit Carson, whose "mother was a Boone."<sup>127</sup> Blood flows true from generation to generation, from glaciation to glaciation, as the American evolves.

Finally, of course, the names traced throughout our essay parade through Turner's descriptions. From the ultimate term *America*, through the names of states, counties, and even cities, the terminology stabilizes the landscape and offers it up for our observation. As Turner sees the "Indian" as part of the wilderness, "Indian," too, percolates through the speech, from the Iroquois and the Cherokee to the ways in which "civilization entered the wilderness. Every river valley and Indian trail became a fissure in Indian society, and so that society became honeycombed."<sup>128</sup> Again, the terminology naturalizes the destruction of Native peoples. The land itself ("river valley") and Native practices ("Indian trail") create "fissures." Like a river carving a canyon through rock (reinforcing the image of a "river valley"), Indian society "became honeycombed," shot through with natural gaps and holes until it fell apart. It just happened—a process of natural evolution.

As Indian and European evolve out of existence, the frontiersman emerges to close the speech. As Carpenter notes, the depiction of the frontiersman drew the most attention from Turner's contemporaries and, in our view, the natural evolution of his argument can only culminate in the American:<sup>129</sup> "To the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy, that dominant individualism, work-

ing for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom—these are the traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier.”<sup>130</sup>

Carpenter provides a beautiful stylistic reading of this passage and three of his observations bear on our analysis.<sup>131</sup> First, he notes the antitheses balancing the depiction, antitheses which also suggest the balance between savagery and civilization. Second, that balance is precarious. He says, “Turner inverts the normative sequence (*anastrophe*) to place ‘to the frontier’ first in the sentence—a variation suggestive of the disruptive syntactical patterns of an individual in a more impassioned state.”<sup>132</sup> The savage, “restless,” “nervous,” filled with “coarseness,” “strength,” and “freedom,” can barely be held in check. Finally, a variety of devices, particularly repetition and *gradatio*, result in a “spaciousness”<sup>133</sup> “whereby events are endowed with enhanced epic scope or significance.”<sup>134</sup> The “American intellect” fills the auditor’s consciousness just as “he” fills the continent. There is room no more for the European or the Indian as the American evolves and expands. The European, of course, does have another home.

“The Significance of the Frontier in American History” deserves its status as a canonical text in rhetorical studies because it masterfully performs rhetorical colonialism. The American emerges as the natural, evolutionary product of the savage and the civilized. The two forces, held in precarious balance, forever imbricated in each other, mutually constitutive and interdependent, signify our peculiar genius. It is no wonder that such images continue to work their way through American culture, as Carpenter reveals in his powerful critique of the “Frontier Metaphor for War” in American history and as a cursory survey of contemporary life reveals.<sup>135</sup> Apache helicopters, for instance, undoubtedly reinforce the idea of the Nde as savage and warlike. And what are we to make of Cheyenne lamps, Winnebago motor homes, Jeep Cherokees, or logos such the “warrior” of Red Man Tobacco? Whenever notions of freedom, nature, savagery, or warfare are needed for corporate campaigns, they turn happily to the Indian.

Sports mascots are, perhaps, the most hotly contested battlefield, for if the playing fields of Eton led to the victory at Waterloo, surely American identity is played out on the fields of American sports. Sports, in fact, require precisely the sort of precarious balance between civilization (Michael Jordan) and savagery (Dennis Rodman) requisite to the construction of an American. As a result, by our count, there are close to three thousand Indian and Indian-related nicknames for high school, college, and professional sports, not to mention the even more offensive mascots.<sup>136</sup> The Cleveland Indians have assumed perhaps the most prominent public profile of late, not least because of Chief Wahoo. As Jon Saraceno says of him in that bastion of liberal thought, *USA Today*: “Negative images of savagery or goofiness (the harmless, drunken Indian) are reinforced.<sup>137</sup> How else to explain Chief Wahoo, a hall of fame testament to overt racism? The message is painful: red face, toothy grin, dark hair parted in the middle, plus headband and feather equals one dumb Indian.” One savage Indian, as well, if recent pictures of fans happily waving cut-out posters of Chief Wahoo with the appellation, “Scalp N.Y.” are

any indication.<sup>138</sup> Such images can only make sense to those fans from within an orientation that trains them not to notice the more than obvious racism.<sup>139</sup> The savage, if we are to judge from the comments made to protestors at a recent Indians game, remains alive and well in the hearts of Turner's Americans: "We won, why don't you go back to the reservation? This is payback for Custer."<sup>140</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The material effects of the "payback for Custer" can hardly be doubted. The indigenous peoples of the United States are not only the poorest people in the country, but also the most likely to be victims of violent crime,<sup>141</sup> the least educated,<sup>142</sup> and the most likely to die young and of preventable diseases.<sup>143</sup> These statistics are at least partially attributable to the hostile environments in which indigenous peoples now find themselves, and which are created and maintained through language and the policies supported by language.<sup>144</sup> For instance, the literature documenting the destructiveness of those nicknames and mascots for indigenous identities is increasingly voluminous and irrefutable.<sup>145</sup>

It is important to note that these language choices and the policies supported by them do not, generally speaking, represent willful and intentionally malicious actions of imperialistic predators bent on the destruction of indigenous people worldwide. Instead, this language is the result of honest attempts at accurately describing events, portraying peoples, and denoting geography. The examples presented here are not evidence of ill will (with a few obvious exceptions), but of a colonialist ideology. Those who honestly believe that in cheering for teams with Indian mascots they are honoring indigenous peoples, who find places with euphonious Indian names romantic reminders of the noble denizens of a bygone and more pastoral age, and who remember the events that led to the "disappearance" of peoples with regret for the inevitability of evolution, are themselves captured by the language of colonialism, which is constituting a national reality even as it encourages the belief that such language is merely reflecting reality. At the same time, the issue of preserving Native languages is increasingly important, as those languages are themselves under increasing pressure.

In this essay, we have sought to provide a "perspective by incongruity"<sup>146</sup> on such pieties through a planned impiety. Rearranging and recasting the names of the dominant culture, throwing darts at the trained incapacity evident in Turner's "Frontier Thesis" and other discourses, we hope that we have revealed the symbolic charge of rhetorical colonialism. Our attitude shares much with postcolonial criticism and theory and fosters a needed engagement between those investigations and rhetorical studies. In turn, the important constitutive dialogue between savagery and civilization can inform mainstream rhetorical critics and the ongoing effort to comprehend the development of American identities.

Understanding naming and its attendant policy choices matters intellectually and politically.<sup>147</sup> It matters to rhetorical scholars planning linguistic impieties and to academic activists planning an end to the offensive nicknames and

mascots that litter our campuses. It matters not least because the growing debate over naming practices, including the much maligned notion of political correctness, indicates an increasing willingness to share, and to demand a share in, the power of names. Such should be the way of “sentient life.”

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### NOTES

1. Frederick Jackson Turner, “American Colonization,” in *The Eloquence of Frederick Jackson Turner*, ed. Ronald Carpenter (San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 1983), 178.

2. William Safire, *Safire's New Political Dictionary: The Definitive Guide to the New Language of Politics* (New York: Random House, 1993).

3. Safire, *Political Dictionary*, 680.

4. Bruce E. Johansen, *Debating Democracy: Native American Legacy of Freedom* (Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers, 1998).

5. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

6. Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 10–70.

7. Deloria, *Playing Indian*, 22.

8. Ronald Takaki, “*The Tempest* in the Wilderness: The Racialization of Savagery,” *Journal of American History* 79 (1992): 892–912.

9. Naming is a process of abstraction, although we argue here that it has concrete consequences. Nonetheless, it is important to note that many indigenous people do not share the understanding of some of the terms discussed here: that different understanding within those communities will yield different sets of concrete consequences. In addition, the issue of names and naming lies far outside the practical political concerns of many indigenous people. We recognize the importance of these issues, but because our focus is on the practices of colonialism rather than on the strategies of resistance, discussion of them lies outside the scope of this article.

10. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *The Rhetorical Act* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1996), 286.

11. Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 45.

12. Charles Kauffman, “Names and Weapons,” *Communication Monographs* 56 (1989): 273.

13. Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941/1973), 1.

14. Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 361.

15. Richard Gregg, "Kenneth Burke's Concept of Rhetorical Negativity," in *Extension of the Burkean System*, ed. James W. Chesebro (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 196.

16. *The Random House Thesaurus* (New York: Random House, 1984), 239.

17. Umberto Eco, *The Search for the Perfect Language*, trans. James Fentress (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

18. N. Scott Momaday, "The Power and Beauty of Language," in *Native Heritage: Personal Accounts by American Indians 1790 to the Present*, ed. A. Hirschfelder (New York: MacMillan, 1998), 73–74.

19. Thomas A. Tweed, "American Colonialization," in Carpenter, *Eloquence*, 2. See also Kathleen Brogan, *Cultural Haunting: Ghosts and Haunting in Recent American Literature* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999).

20. Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).

21. Raka Shome, "Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An 'Other' View," *Communication Theory* 6 (1996): 40–59; Radha S. Hegde, "A View From Elsewhere: Locating Difference and the Politics of Representation from a Transnational Feminist Perspective," *Communication Theory* 8 (1998): 271–297.

22. James Jasinski, "A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)constitution of 'Constitution' in *The Federalist Papers*," in *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 73.

23. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability*, eds. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, ed. Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993); Louis Owens, *Mixedblood Messages* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); C. Smith-Rosenberg, "Discovering the Subject of the 'Great National Discussion,' 1786–1789," *Journal of American History* 79 (1992): 841–873. Again, we recognize the importance of the dialogic constitution of the American national self-understanding and appreciate that such dialogue means that many indigenous peoples do not share in the interpretations offered by the dominant culture, but real discussion of these points merits separate analyses and lies outside the analysis of the colonial project, which specifically seeks to mute such dialogue.

24. Ward Churchill, *Struggle for the Land: Indigenous Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide, and Expropriation in Contemporary North America* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1993); Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997); Alistair Pennycook, *English and the Discourses of Colonialism* (New York: Routledge, 1998); David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994).

25. Edward Schiappa, "The Rhetoric of Nukespeak," *Communication Monographs* 56 (1989): 253–272.

26. For discussions and illustrations of this point, see S. Elizabeth Bird, ed., *Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American Popular Culture* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Ward Churchill, *Fantasies of the Master Race* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1998); John M. Coward, *The Newspaper Indian: Native American Identity in the*

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27. Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 10–11. See also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

28. See also Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Quebecois*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 133–150; Ward Churchill, *Indians Are Us? Culture and Genocide in Native North America* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994), 291–357; Michael McGee, "In Search of 'The People': A Rhetorical Alternative," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 61 (1975): 235–249.

29. Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

30. Churchill, *Struggle for the Land*; Drinnon, *Facing West*; Jonathan Hart, "Translating and Resisting Empire: Cultural Appropriation and Postcolonial Studies," in *Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation*, eds. Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. Rao (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 137–168; M. Annette Jaimes, ed. *The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonialization and Resistance* (Boston: South End Press, 1992).

31. Takaki, "The *Tempest* in the Wilderness"; Owens, *Mixedblood Messages*.

32. George Foster, "Culture and Conquest," in *Crossing Currents: Continuity and Change in Latin America*, eds. Michael B. Whiteford and Scott Whiteford (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 51. See also Randall A. Lake, "The Rhetor as Dialectician in 'The Last Chance for Survival,'" *Communication Monographs* 53 (1986): 201–220.

33. John Kicza, "The Indian in Latin American History," in Whiteford and Whiteford, *Crossing Currents*, 88–97.

34. Duane Champagne, "Introduction: Change, Destruction, and Renewal of Native American Cultural Issues," in *Contemporary Native American Cultural Issues*, ed. Duane Champagne (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999), 7; Stephen Cornell, *The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence* (New York: Oxford, 1988).

35. Phillip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux 1998), 55.

36. Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 159.

37. Smith-Rosenberg, "Discovering the Subject of the 'Great National Discussion,' 1786–1789"; Deloria, *Playing Indian*.

38. Owens, *Mixedblood Messages*, 26.

39. Owens, *Mixedblood Messages*, 26.

40. Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950/1969), 187.

41. Owens, *Mixedblood Messages*, 135.

42. See also, Pennycook, *Discourses of Colonialism*; J. Singh, *Colonial Narratives/Cultural Dialogues: 'Discoveries' of India in the Language of Colonialism* (London: Routledge, 1996).

43. Pennycook, *Discourses of Colonialism*, 2.
44. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), 29.
45. Raymie E. McKerrow, "Critical Rhetoric in a Postmodern World," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 77 (1991): 75.
46. Laura Chrisman, "The Imperial Unconscious? Representations of Imperial Discourse," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory*, eds. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 498.
47. Rhetorical critics have done considerable work on discourse by and about indigenous peoples: Randall A. Lake, "Enacting Red Power: The Consummatory Function in Native American Protest," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 69 (1983): 127-142; Lake, "Rhetor as Dialectician"; Richard Morris, "Educating Savages," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 83 (1997): 152-171; Richard Morris and Mary E. Stuckey, "'More Rain and Less Thunder': Substitute Vocabulary, Richard Nixon, and the Construction of Political Reality," *Communication Monographs* 64 (1997): 140-160; Victoria Sanchez and Mary E. Stuckey, "Coming of Age as a Culture? Audience Interpretations of *The Indian in the Cupboard*," *Western Journal of Communication* 64 (2000): 78-91; Mary E. Stuckey and Richard Morris, "Pocahontas and Beyond: Commodification and Cultural Hegemony," *World Communication* 28 (1999): 45-67; John Sanchez, Mary E. Stuckey, and Richard Morris, "Rhetorical Exclusion: The Government's Case Against Indian Activists, AIM, and Leonard Peltier," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 23 (1999): 27-52. This work, however, neither situates this discourse within the larger frame of colonialism nor explores the constitutive impact of this rhetoric on American identities.
48. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Postcolonial Literature* (London: Routledge, 1995); Williams and Chrisman, *Colonial Discourse*.
49. Shome, "Postcolonial Interventions."
50. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1993), 304; see also Owens, *Mixedblood Messages*, 36.
51. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, eds., *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* (London: Routledge, 1989).
52. Gerald P. Mohrmann (with Michael C. Leff), "Place and Space: Calhoun's Fatal Security," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 51 (1987): 146.
53. Mohrmann, "Place and Space," 148.
54. Paul Carter, "Naming Place," in *Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, 406.
55. Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 359-379.
56. Graham Huggan, "Decolonializing the Map," in Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *Post Colonial Studies Reader*, 408.
57. It has been pointed out to us that the origin of *America* may be found in a corruption of *Maraca*, an American Indian place name, but we were not able to find a source for this possibility. Vespucci was, of course, a navigator of some stature as well as a mapmaker. We intend no disparagement by referring to him as one.
58. Carl Waldman, *Word Dance: The Language of Native American Culture* (New York: Facts on File, 1994), 245.
59. Waldman, *Word Dance*, 124.
60. Thomas F. Thornton, "Anthropological Studies of Native American Place

Naming," *American Indian Quarterly* 21 (1997): 215.

61. There are many contemporary examples of renaming some places in indigenous languages. This, as well as the fact of names in indigenous languages that coexist with colonial names, indicates just how complicated these practices can be.

62. Owens, *Mixedblood Messages*, 8.

63. Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).

64. Deloria, *Playing Indian*, 50.

65. Jack Forbes, "The Colonialism of Names," *Winds of Change* (Winter 1997): 86.

66. Nativenet, [<http://www.uthscsa.edu/archive/nl/91b/0248.html>], 1991.

67. Peter H. Eichstaedt, *If You Poison Us: Uranium and Native Americans* (Santa Fe, NM: Red Crane Books, 1994); Donald A. Grinde and Bruce E. Johansen, *Ecocide of Native America: Environmental Destruction of Indian Lands and Peoples* (Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishing, 1995).

68. See, for instance, Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays and Lectures*, ed. J. Porte (New York: Library of America, 1837/1983). See also Paul Jay, *Contingency Blues* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 20–41.

69. John W. Wright, ed., *The New York Times 1999 Almanac* (New York: Penguin, 1998), 180, 196.

70. Deloria, *Playing Indian*.

71. See also, Lake, "Rhetor as Dialectician," 208.

72. Joel Martin, "Indians, Contact, and Colonialism in the Deep South: Themes for a Postcolonial History of American Religion," in *Retelling U.S. Religious History*, ed. Thomas A. Tweed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 167. See also Churchill, *Indians Are Us?*; and Deloria, *Playing Indian*.

73. It is again important to note here that many contemporary indigenous peoples do not see the words *Indian* and *tribe* as derogatory, but claim them and give them their own meanings. This is an important strategy of resistance, although it can also be read as internalizing colonialism.

74. While there is no empirical evidence for this point, it is likely that precontact members of indigenous groups did not understand themselves as "nations" in the modern sense of the word, but as "peoples," which implies autonomy as well as social cohesion.

75. Noah Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language*, vols. 1 & 2 (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970), np. While it may be easy for skeptics to dismiss "outdated" dictionary definitions, there is little doubt that the cultural resonance of the terms continues long after editors correct the dictionaries (see Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981], 3–40). It is worth noting, for instance, that recent Republican presidential candidates (the elder George Bush and Bob Dole) are of an age to have grown up with the 1933 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, and that that edition was about a quarter-century old when the current president was born. See also, Churchill, *Indians Are Us?*

76. Philological Society, eds., *The Oxford English Dictionary* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 339.

77. Laura F. Klein and Lillian A. Ackerman, eds., *Women and Power in Native North America* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995).



78. Chrisman, "Imperial Unconscious," 500. Equally important, of course, are the differences that are subsumed by those names—members of bands or families could find themselves suddenly defined as part of a larger collectivity with which they had previously not recognized any particular affiliation.

79. Cornell, *Return of the Native*, Joanne Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

80. Waldman, *Word Dance*, 212.

81. James W. Loewen, "Query: Comment on Tribal Names Entry?" [online post to HAMINDIAN LIST SERV], December 10, 1998.

82. Loewen, "Query."

83. Safire, *Political Dictionary*, 651.

84. Loewen, "Query."

85. Waldman, *Word Dance*, 262.

86. Cornel Pewewardy, "Why Educators Can't Ignore Indian Mascots in American Sports Culture," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Indian Education Association, Nashville, TN, October, 1998.

87. Webster, *American Dictionary*, np.

88. Philological Society, *Oxford English Dictionary*, 409.

89. Safire, *Political Dictionary*, 517.

90. Safire, *Political Dictionary*, 517.

91. Philological Society, *Oxford English Dictionary*, 34.

92. It is certainly unusual to see the term *half-breed* applied to groups other than indigenous Americans; we are referring here not to common usage, but to the dictionary definition.

93. Philological Society, *Oxford English Dictionary*, 34.

94. Safire, *Political Dictionary*, 513.

95. Burke, *Literary Form*, 191–220.

96. Morris, "Educating Savages."

97. Ward Churchill, "The Crucible of American Indian Identity: Native Tradition Versus Colonial Imposition in Postconquest North America," in Champagne, *Cultural Issues*; Jaimes, *State of Native America*; D. A. Mihesuah, "American Indian Identities: Issues of Individual Choices and Development," in Champagne, *Native American Cultural Issues*, 13–38.

98. Pragmatic politics are also important here, for contemporary indigenous nations must have some criteria by which they can determine membership.

99. Burke, *Rhetoric*, 187.

100. Burke, *Rhetoric*, 188.

101. Burke, *Rhetoric*, 188.

102. Burke, *Rhetoric*, 190.

103. Lake, "Enacting Red Power"; Jasinski, "A Constitutive Framework," 72–92.

104. Jasinski, "Constitutive Framework," 73.

105. Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in Carpenter, ed., *Eloquence*, 194.

106. Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954/1984), 7.

107. Ronald Carpenter, "Frederick Jackson Turner and the Rhetorical Impact of the Frontier Thesis," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 63 (1977): 117–129; Carpenter, ed.,

*Eloquence*, Ronald Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).

108. Carpenter, *Eloquence*, 44–45.
109. Owens, *Mixedblood Messages*, 26–27.
110. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 193.
111. See Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 120–122.
112. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 193.
113. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric*, 49–50.
114. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 193.
115. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 193.
116. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 193 (emphasis added).
117. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 194.
118. Michael Osborne, “Rhetorical Depiction,” in *Form, Genre, and the Study of Political Discourse*, eds. Herbert W. Simon and Aram A. Aghazarian (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986), 79–107.
119. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 194 (emphasis added).
120. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 194.
121. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 194–195.
122. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 195.
123. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 195.
124. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric*, 46.
125. Carpenter, “Rhetorical Impact,” 120.
126. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*.
127. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 203.
128. Turner, “Significance of Frontier,” 200.
129. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric*, 47–52.
130. Turner, Significance of Frontier, 214.
131. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric*, 48–50.
132. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric*, 48.
133. Richard Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (South Bend, IN: Regnery Press, 1953), 164–185.
134. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric* 50.
135. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric*, 263–218.
136. A full accounting of these names and schools is available from the authors.
137. Jon Saraceno, “Indian Symbols Have no Place in Athletics,” *USA Today*, 19 May 1999, C3.
138. Tom Withers, “Patient Offense, Solid Defense Have Indians Off and Running,” *Times* (Chattanooga, TN), 25 April 1999.
139. Richard Morris, John Sanchez, and Mary E. Stuckey, “Why Can’t They Just Get Over It?” in *Among US: Essays in Intercultural Communication*, eds. M. Lustig and J. Keoster (New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1999).
140. Saraceno, “Indian Symbols.”
141. The same article notes that 70 percent of violent crimes committed against American Indians are committed by someone of another race, usually Caucasian. That fact stands in stark contrast to the low incidence of interracial violence among Blacks (19 percent) and Caucasians (31 percent). Violence against indigenous peoples con-

tinues to be a popular pastime for many non-American Indians. See Fox Butterfield, "Study Says Indians Are Violent Crime Victims at Twice National Average," [nn-dialogue@bioc02.uthscsa.edu]. See also, "The Red Man's Burden," *The Economist*, 20 February 1999, 27.

142. US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *American Indians and Alaskan Natives in Postsecondary Education, NCES 98-291* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998).

143. Martin C. Mahoney and Arthur M. Michalek, "Cancer Control Research Among American Indians and Alaska Natives: A Paradigm for Research in the Next Millennium," in Champagne, *Native American Cultural Issues*, 263–274.

144. Sue Anne Pressley, "Federal Interest Escalates Flap Over Indian Mascots," *The Commercial Appeal* (Memphis), 21 February 1999, A15.

145. Haig A. Bosmajian, "Defining the American Indian," in *Exploring Language*, ed. Gary Goshgarian (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Churchill, *Indians Are Us?*; Pewewardy, "Educators Can't Ignore Indian Mascots"; C. Richard King and Charles Fruehling Springwood, eds., *Team Spirits: The Native American Mascots Controversy* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2001); Laurie Ann Whitt, "Cultural Imperialism and the Marketing of Native America," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 19 (1995): 1–31.

146. Burke, *Permanence and Change*, 69–163.

147. We do recognize that scholars and activists have a political role; we also recognize that this role is limited and that the real issue of colonialism and postcolonialism is the empowerment of Native peoples. Such empowerment is reflected in the reclamation and renaming of sites of particular importance to Native nations, in the preservation of flora and fauna, in the workings of tribal governments, and in the possibilities of economic development.