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Authors
Hix, Simon
Noury, Abdul
Roland, Gerard

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Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland

Institute of Governmental Studies
University of California, Berkeley

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Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science

Abdul Noury, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Gérard Roland, University of California, Berkeley and CEPR

Abstract

We investigate the dimensionality of political conflict in the European Parliament by applying scaling method techniques to all roll-call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using scaling methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the EU's only elected institution is the classic left-right dimension found in domestic politics. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent, which is explained by conflicts between the parties in 'government' in the EU Council and Commission and the parties in 'opposition' in the Parliament.

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1. Introduction

In less than twenty years the European Parliament has evolved from a consultative body into the most powerful inter-state assembly in history. The European Parliament now has equal legislative power with the governments in many key areas, can amend many lines in the European Union (EU) budget, can veto the governments' nominee for Commission President, and can sack the Commission. Also, further European Parliament powers – such as allowing the parliament to elect the Commission and amend all legislation and budget lines – have been key issues in the debate over the EU Constitution. Nevertheless, outside a small group of experts, the only directly elected European body remains relatively unknown. Understanding politics inside the European Parliament is thus increasingly vital for understanding politics in the EU.

Politics in the EU is different from traditional national politics in democratic countries for several reasons. First, the EU is still more a supranational institution than a federal state. Second, there is considerable heterogeneity between the cultures, histories, economic conditions and national institutions of member states. Therefore, politics in the EU is likely to be more complex and multi-dimensional than national politics. Understanding the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament should thus be an important step forward in understanding both the politics of the EU as well as how politics in other inter-state assemblies may develop.[1]

One of the main ways of understanding politics inside legislative institutions is to investigate the shape of the policy space. The number of policy dimensions and the location of actors on these dimensions determine *inter alia* which actors are pivotal, the size of the winset, and hence the possibility and direction of policy change (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002). Not surprisingly, a

[1] Similar in spirit to what we are doing is the work by Voeten (2000) on the United Nations. Note that the European Parliament has considerably more powers than the UN General Assembly.

fast growing area of political science research in recent years has been the estimation of actors' ideal points. This has taken a variety of forms and methods, such as scaling of roll-call voting data (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997 Heckman and Snyder, 1997; Poole, 2000), hand coding of party manifestos (Budge et al., 2001), surveys of experts' opinions of parties' positions (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Huber and Inglehart, 1995), or computer coding of political statements (Laver, 2001; Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003). The collection and dissemination of these spatial data has transformed several areas of political science and given them a stronger scientific empirical content.

The European Parliament is an especially interesting object of analysis because of its unique features. The European legislators are members of national parties but also of European party groups. Moreover, electoral districts do not transcend national borders, which means that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) also represent their country. A legislature with such characteristics is potentially one with high dimensionality.

A first dimension that comes to mind is the support or opposition to further European integration, a topic that has been the focus of an important part of the literature on the EU (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Marks and Steenbergen, 2002). In this interpretation of EU politics, actors prefer 'more' or 'less' European integration: with states like the Benelux and the supranational institutions (the EU Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice) closer to the 'pro-Europe' end of the dimension, and the United Kingdom and Denmark closer to the 'anti-Europe' end. The European Parliament is generally seen as a unitary actor at the pro-European end of this dimension. However, given that national politicians and national parties are represented in the European Parliament, the EU integration dimension might also play an important role within the European Parliament.

However, in recent research it has been argued that as the EU increasingly makes policies in traditional areas of domestic politics – such as market regulation, social and environmental policies, and justice and interior affairs – we should expect a 'left-right' dimension to emerge in EU politics. There is dispute, however, as to whether this new dimension will remain orthogonal to (Hix, 1999), merge with (Hooghe and Marks, 1999), or replace (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000) the traditional pro-/anti-integration conflict.

The existence of these two underlying dimensions of EU politics has been confirmed at the empirical level, in the positions national parties take on Europe (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2001; Aspinwall, 2002), in the European party federations' election manifestos (Hix, 1999; Gabel and Hix, 2002), and in mass attitudes towards the EU (Gabel and Anderson, 2002). These two dimensions have also been observed in initial research on the policy space inside the European Parliament (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002) and the EU Council (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Mattila, 2004). However, the existing research on the European Parliament has not investigated the full history of voting in the parliament since the first direct elections in 1979. As a result, any change in the number and content of dimensions over time has remained undocumented. Indeed, the European Parliament is an evolving legislative institution. Consequently, one may expect at least some variation in the number and content of dimensions over time. In addition, the existing studies have not used exogenous measures to interpret the substantive content of the dimensions and the relative locations of the actors on these dimensions. Without a clear understanding of conflicts inside the European Parliament, most theoretical models of EU policy-making prefer to treat the European Parliament as a unitary actor (e.g. Tsebelis, 1994; Crombez, 1997),

We consequently describe the policy space inside the European Parliament by applying an established scaling method, Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE algorithm, to all roll-call votes

between 1979 and 2001 – over 12,000 votes by more than 2,000 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This method provides not only a measure of the dimensionality of the policy space, but also ideal point estimates on each policy dimension for every MEP since 1979. One weakness of this and similar inductive scaling methods is that the identification of the substantive meaning of the dimensions requires *post hoc* subjective expert interpretation. This is usually done by mapping vote divisions to find issues with cutting lines that are orthogonal to the dimension of interest. Unfortunately, one cannot rely on existing statistical techniques to confirm these heuristic interpretations. In this paper we seek to overcome this weakness of inductive scaling methods by explaining the substantive content of the observed dimensions through exogenous measures of actors' policy positions. Our regression analysis enables us to understand what the dimensions of politics actually represent, and what changes in the content of the dimensions have occurred over time. This use of exogenous measures of actors' positions is novel and clearly more reliable.

We find one main dimension of politics in the European Parliament. This dimension is the classic left-right dimension of domestic party politics in Europe. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent. This dimension can be interpreted as the pro- and anti-integration dimension. But, closer analysis reveals that the second dimension also captures inter-institutional conflicts between the party groups and national parties in the parliament and the parties in 'government' in the EU Council and Commission. In other words, government-opposition conflicts at the European level are reflected in the European Parliament.[2] Our analysis is robust to the use of other scaling methods. We use another scaling method, Poole's Optimal

[2] This type of behaviour is already documented by Rosenthal and Voeten (2003), who found that the French 4th Republic had two dimensions: the left-right dimension and a dimension essentially representing the government-opposition conflict.

Classification to check how sensitive our results are to using NOMINATE. We find very strong correlation between the ideal point estimates produced by both methods. Moreover, our regression results come out even stronger when using the Optimal Classification method.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides some background information on the European Parliament. Section three presents the results of the NOMINATE algorithm for the five elected parliaments since 1979. Section four presents the substantive interpretation of the dimensions revealed by NOMINATE, using regression analysis. Section five concludes.

2. Parties and Politics in the European Parliament

Existing research on the European Parliament suggests that national parties are the primary principals of the Members of the European Parliament (e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997; Raunio, 1997; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Kreppel, 2001; Hix, 2002). National parties control the selection of candidates in European Parliament elections. European elections are fought mainly as separate national, rather than European-wide, electoral contests. Once inside the European Parliament, national parties decide which European Parliamentary party group 'their' MEPs will belong to, which key committee positions and parliamentary offices their MEPs will seek, and which of their MEPs will get these positions.

However, once a national party's 'delegation' has joined a party group, these MEPs face pressures from another principal: the leadership of the European party group. The European party groups are the key agenda-setters in the European Parliament. They control the allocation of committee positions, finances, speaking time and the space on the legislative agenda. The

leadership of each European party group also controls the allocation of committee positions and resources between the national party delegations within the European party. The European party groups issue voting instructions to their members, and employ 'whips' to ensure that their MEPs and national parties 'toe the European party line'.

Nevertheless, the transnational parties are ultimately a product of national parties, who created and sustain the transnational parties to serve their own policy goals in the European Parliament. Without a government to support, that can threaten to dissolve the parliament and force new elections, the incentives for collective party organization in the European Parliament are weaker than in domestic parliaments in Europe (e.g. Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998). Nevertheless, transnational parties in the European Parliament help national parties and MEPs structure their behavior in much the same way as parties do in the US Congress (cf. Cox and McCubbins, 1993, and Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1997). Each national party is unlikely to obtain its policy objectives by acting alone. National parties could negotiate coalitions vote-by-vote. However, this would be costly in terms of time, and hard to enforce. As a result, national parties who expect to have similar preferences on a range of future policy issues can reduce the transactions costs of coalition-formation by establishing a transnational party organization. This party organization constitutes a division-of-labor contract: where 'backbench' MEPs provide labor and capital (working out the position of the party and gathering information on the issues on which they become specialized), and party group 'leaders' distribute committee and party offices, communicate party positions and enforce the terms of the party organization contract.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Table 1 shows the political parties in the European Parliament and their strengths after each of the five European elections. As the table shows, most MEPs have been members of party groups that are genuinely 'transnational', with members from most of the EU member states. These transnational parties broadly represent the policy positions of one of the classic European 'party families'. However, throughout the history of the Parliament, particular national parties have deliberately chosen to sit separately from these transnational parties, and to form what can be described as 'nationally-dominated' groups: such as the party groups that have been dominated by the French Gaullists, the British Conservatives, or the Italian Communists. The existence of these groups has declined over time. Most of the member parties from these groups have chosen to join one or other of the larger party groups as the main party groups have strategically altered the Parliament's Rules of Procedure to make it more difficult for nationally-based groups to be formed. Nevertheless, the existence of both transnational and national groups suggests some interesting things about politics in the European Parliament.

First, the fact that most national parties have decided to join transnational party groups suggests that these aggregate agents expect that on most issues on the EU agenda their policy preferences will be closer to parties from the same party family from other member states than to parties from a different party family from their own member state. For example, the French and Swedish Socialists expect to be closer on most issues than they will be to the French and Swedish Conservatives, respectively. If the opposite were the case, the French Socialists would have an incentive to form a transnational party organization with the French Conservatives, and likewise for the Swedish Socialists and Conservatives.

In other words, the predominance of party-based rather than national-based groups in the European Parliament suggests that the main observable dimension of conflict in the European Parliament should correlate with the dimension that distinguishes the European party families

from each other in domestic politics: the left-right dimension, in its socio-economic (intervention-free market) as well as socio-political (liberty-authority) versions.

Second, national parties who established their own party groups expect that their policy positions will be sufficiently different from any of the transnational party groups to make it too costly to join any of these organizations. Hence, despite the expected dominance of party-family based divisions, at least some national parties in the European Parliament expect issues to split representatives along national rather than transnational lines.

So, the existence of some non-transnational groups in the history of the European Parliament, and the fact that national political parties remain the primary principals for the MEPs, suggests that we should also observe 'national' conflicts on issues which are salient to particular member states, when some of the parties from these states can be expected to vote together rather than to follow the instructions of their transnational parties.

Existing studies of roll-call voting in the European Parliament find that the transnational party groups are less cohesive than their cousins in domestic parliaments in Europe, but that the MEPs are more likely to vote along transnational party lines than national lines (Attinà, 1990; Brzinski, 1995; Raunio, 1997; and Hix and Lord, 1997). Also, existing applications of scaling methods to voting in the European parliament suggest that the main dimension of conflict is the left-right (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002; Noury and Roland, 2002). However, these results are derived from samples of votes in particular periods and there are no studies of the evolution of the conflicts and the relative location of parties and MEPs over time.

It is also worth mentioning the place of the European Parliament in the EU's legislative process. The European Commission has exclusive rights to initiate legislative proposals. However, given the very high voting hurdle in the Council (unanimity or a qualified-majority), the Commission rarely initiates proposals that are not expected to win approval in the Council

(Tsebelis, 1994, 2002). The role of the European Parliament has usually been more passive than that of the Council. The European Parliament has a lower voting hurdle (mostly simple majority) and its role was mostly consultative in the early years. The European Parliament therefore had no real agenda-setting powers. However, the extension of co-decision powers has given the Parliament increased powers to shape the content of legislation.

3. Establishing the Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament

There are three types of votes in the European Parliament. The first two types are the 'show of hands vote' and the 'electronic vote'. In both these types, how each MEP votes is not recorded. In the third type of votes, 'roll-call votes', how each MEP votes (Yes, No, or Abstain) is published in the Parliament's official minutes. Only certain votes are required to be taken by roll-call, but a 'political group' or at least thirty-two MEPs can request any vote to be taken by roll-call. In practice, roughly a third of votes in the European Parliament are by roll-call. Regardless of the strategic reasons for calling roll-call votes, it is reasonable to assume that roll-call votes are used for the more important decisions. The number of roll-call votes has increased as the powers of the parliament have increased: from 886 in the first directly-elected parliament (1979-1984) to 3,739 votes in the fourth parliament (1994-1999), and 2,124 in the first half of the fifth parliament (July 1999 to December 2001).

We collected and coded all roll-call votes in the European Parliament from the first plenary session after the first direct elections, in July 1979, to the last plenary session in the first half of parliament fifth elected parliament, in December 2001. We then applied a standard method for extracting ideal points estimates from individual vote decisions in roll-calls: the

NOMINATE scaling method. This method starts with the three main assumptions of standard spatial theory: actors have an ideal point in a multi-dimensional policy space; their preferences are single-peaked and symmetric; third, the likelihood of any actor voting for or against a particular proposal is determined by the distance of his/her ideal point from the 'cutting lines' dividing the Yes and No camps.

Building on these assumptions, NOMINATE calculates the position of each legislator as follows (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997: 233-51). Let s denote the number of policy dimensions (k = 1,2, …, s), p denote the number of legislators (i = 1,2, …, p), and q denote the number of roll-call votes (j = 1,2, …, q). Let legislator i's ideal point be x_i, which is a vector of length s. Call z_{jy} the policy outcome of dimension s, where y refers to the policy outcomes associated with a Yes vote. NOMINATE then assumes that legislator i has a utility function over outcome y on vote j of

$$U_{ijy} = u_{ijy} + \varepsilon_{ijy} = \beta \exp[-d_{ijy}^2] + \varepsilon_{ijy}$$

where u_{ijy} is the deterministic portion of the utility function and ε_{ijy} is the stochastic (idiosyncratic or error) portion, and the d_{ijy} term is the Euclidean distance between x_i and z_{jy}. The coefficient β, is a constant, which acts as a signal-to-noise ratio – as β increases, the deterministic element of the function increases relative to the stochastic element, and 'perfect' spatial voting results, and as β decreases, voting becomes more random. The utility of outcome n on vote j is defined simply by substituting n for y where z_{jn} is defined accordingly. The stochastic term ε_{ijy}, is assumed to have an extreme value distribution.[3]

[3] In later versions of the NOMINATE algorithm the errors are assumed to be normally distributed. This, however, had no substantial effect on legislators' ideal point estimates.

This allows the probability that a legislator votes Yes or No on a particular issue to be computed using the standard logit arithmetic. The constructed likelihood function is then maximized to obtain the parameters of the model: the dimensions of the political space, the ideal point of each legislator in this space, and the location of the 'cutting line' of each vote.

This method has been applied with great success to the U.S. Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), and has recently begun to be applied to other voting environments with multiple players and multiple decisions, such as the United Nations (Voeten, 2000) and other parliaments (e.g. Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003).

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Table 2 compares the goodness-of-fit of applying NOMINATE to the European Parliament with other assemblies. The first thing to note is that a two-dimensional model fits the European Parliament as well as the other parliaments: with a similar percentage of individual vote decisions predicted correctly in all nine assemblies. As in other parliaments, voting in the European Parliament is predominantly unidimensional, with the first dimension explaining more than 80 percent of vote decisions correctly, and the second dimension explaining an additional two to five percent. The second dimension was more salient in the first and second European Parliaments than in the subsequent three parliaments. However, the second dimension is more salient in all five European Parliaments than in the U.S. Congress, the United Nations or the French National Assembly.

Figures 1a to 1e show the 'maps' produced by NOMINATE, where each dot represents the estimated location of each MEP in a two-dimensional space. Before interpreting these

figures, it is worth bearing in mind that NOMINATE cannot tell us the content of these dimensions – they are simply 'discovered' from the data.

FIGURES 1a-1e ABOUT HERE

Nevertheless, the location of the party groups in the figures suggests that the two dimensions of politics in the European Parliament are the left-right and pro-/anti-Europe. On the first dimension, in all five parliaments the parties are ordered from left to right exactly as one would expect with only a cursory knowledge of party politics in Europe: with the Radical Left (LEFT) and Greens (GRN) on the furthest left, then the Socialists (SOC) on the center-left, the Liberals (LIB) in the center, the European People's Party (EPP) on the center-right, the British Conservatives and allies (CON) and French Gaullists and allies (GAUL) to the right of the EPP, the Extreme Right (Right) on the furthest right, and the Anti-European (ANTI) divided between some MEPs on the extreme left and some on the extreme right. Also, the figures suggest that the second dimension may be related to party positions on European integration, with the main pro-European parties (the Socialists, Liberals and European People's Party) at the top of the figures, and the main anti-European parties (the Radical Left, Greens, Gaullists, Extreme Right and Anti-Europeans) at the bottom.

Interestingly, the British Conservatives, who changed position dramatically on the question of Europe, move from the top of the second dimension in the first and second parliaments to near the bottom in the fifth parliament (as the outlying group of MEPs in the EPP group in the bottom right hand corner of Figure 5e).

These maps also confirm the two main trends in voting behavior in the European Parliament since 1979 revealed using other methods (e.g. Hix et al., 2004). First, all the party

groups have become more cohesive, as illustrated by the declining dispersion of the positions of the MEPs in each party group across the five parliaments. Second, in terms of the structure of the party system, there is a clear difference between the first three parliaments and the fourth and fifth parliaments. In the first three parliaments, the party system was split into two blocs: a left bloc (of Socialists, Radical Left and Greens), against a right bloc (of the European People's Party, Liberals, French Gaullists and allies, and British Conservatives and allies). However, the fourth and fifth parliaments reveal a different party system. In this new system, the Liberals occupy a position between the Socialists and EPP.

Note that these three groups voted as much with each other as with the smaller groups on the left and right. Put another way, from 1994, the three main party groups (Socialists, EPP and Liberals) emerged as the main 'coalition' inside the European Parliament. Against this coalition are two 'opposition' blocs: on the left, the Greens, Radical Left and the left-wing members of the anti-European group; and on the right, the non-EPP Conservatives, the British Conservatives within the EPP group, the right wing anti-Europeans, and the various Radical Right MEPs (in the non-attached group) (see Hix et al., 2004 for an analysis of coalition formation in the European Parliament over time).

These figures consequently reveal the emergence of clearly distinct party families and alliances at the EU level. In the next section we analyze the content of the dimensions in more detail.

4. Explaining the Dimensions of European politics

4.1. Variables

Table 3 shows the correlations between the positions on the two dimensions of the individual MEPs who served in consecutive parliaments. What we observe is that correlations are very high for the first dimension and somewhat lower, although still high, for the second dimension. The stability of these dimensions over time suggests that the dimensions capture some substantive aspects of conflict in the European Parliament. Note that the correlation coefficients are higher than Poole and Rosenthal (1997) report for the US Congress. These correlation coefficients are especially high considering that the European Parliament has a five-year term whereas the US Congress has a two-year term.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

To interpret the substantive content of the dimensions we use a series of statistical models to explain the location of national parties as a function of exogenous national party positions and other factors. We define the dependent variables as the mean positions of each national party's group of MEPs on each dimension. That is, we treat each national party's delegation of MEPs in each parliament as a separate observation. There were 57 national parties in the first directly-elected European parliament (1979-1984), 73 in the second parliament, 85 in the third, 103 in the fourth, and 119 in the fifth. Consequently, we have 437 observations in the pooled analysis. However, in the pooled analysis, we lose a number of observations as a result of missing data on national party policy positions.

We have three types of independent variables. First, as policy variables, we use exogenous measures of national party positions on the left-right axis and on the pro-/anti-Europe axis, testing the expectation that the policy space in the European Parliament combines these two underlying policy dimensions. These measures are fully exogenous and therefore lead us to an independent evaluation which allows us to give a more objective and statistically founded interpretation of the policy dimensions rather than a purely subjective interpretation. We use the measures of left-right and EU policy position produced by the manifestos research group (Budge et al., 2001).[4] This data has been widely used as an independent assessment of party policy positions across time and space. For our purpose, the party manifesto's data has an advantage over expert judgments of party locations because the manifesto's data has more observations over time. We expect exogenous left-right policy positions to explain national party ideal point estimates on the first dimension, and exogenous pro-/anti-EU policy positions to explain national party ideal point estimates on the second dimension.

Second, to capture the effect of government-opposition dynamics and the national and European levels, we use two dummy measures: (1) whether a national party was in government during the relevant parliament (coded 1 if the national party was in government for a majority of the period and 0 otherwise), and (2) whether a national party had a European Commissioner during the relevant parliament (coded 1 if the national party had a Commissioner for the whole period of the parliament, 0.5 if the national party had a Commissioner for approximately half of the period of the parliament, and 0 otherwise). Table 4 shows some summary statistics for these two variables. Following our theory, we expect these variables to be significant on the second dimension but not on the first.

[4] We use the 'integrated' left-right measure from the manifestos research group dataset.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Third, to distinguish whether the effect of these variables is within or between the European party groups and the member states, we include dummies for all European party groups except the European People's Party and all member states except Germany. Descriptive statistics for all the variables are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.

We first assume that there is no change in the content of the dimensions over time and perform a pooled analysis. The advantage of the pooled analysis is that by having a large number of observations the estimates of the relationships are more precise. In the pooled analysis we introduce dummy variables for each parliament (except the first) as control variables. We then perform parliament by parliament analysis. This allows us to investigate whether the content of the dimensions has changed across parliaments.

4.2. Results

Table 5 shows the results from the pooled analysis. Five noteworthy findings regarding the estimates on the first dimension need to be emphasized. First, as observed in the maps of the parliaments, MEP locations on the first dimension are explained by left-right policy positions. In other words, the main observed dimension of conflict in the European Parliament *is* the amalgamated left-right conflict of domestic party competition in Europe.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Second, EU party policies, participation in government and having a Commissioner are only significant without party dummies. This means that once one controls for party positions these variables are not relevant explanatory factors on the first dimension.

Third, the left-right variable remains highly significant after the inclusion of party dummies, meaning that left-right policy positions also explain variations in MEP positions on the first dimension within party groups. This cannot be observed from the spatial maps, but is clearly shown in the data. Nevertheless, the massive increase in the size of the R-squared between the first and second models reveals that most variation on this dimension is explained by left-right conflicts between rather than within the party groups.

Fourth, the magnitude of the coefficients on the party group variables on the first dimension confirms the intuition from the spatial figures: with the most left-wing parties having the lowest coefficients and the most right-wing parties having the highest coefficients.

Fifth, country dummies are generally not significant on the first dimension, regardless of the specification. This confirms the view that voting in the European Parliament is not driven by national interest.

Turning to the estimates on the second dimension, EU policy positions are significant without party dummies but not significant at any level with party dummies. This means that variation between party groups on the second dimension is explained by their policies towards EU integration.

Second, the party groups have significant coefficients on the second dimension. The magnitude of these coefficients explains their location on the second dimension: with the most pro-EU party groups having the most positive coefficients, and the most anti-EU party groups having the most negative coefficients. The British Conservatives are the exception, because they

were relatively pro-European in the first and second parliaments, when they were a separate party group.

Third, government participation is highly significant on the second dimension in all specifications. This means that competition between national parties on this dimension in the European Parliament is also driven by government-opposition dynamics, from the domestic arena and also from representation of governing parties in the EU Council.

Fourth, having an EU Commissioner is significant on the second dimension once party dummies are excluded from the specification. In other words, the second dimension also captures a government-opposition dynamic between party groups at the European level, where party groups with a number of Commissioners are more likely to be at the pro-EU end of the dimension.

Fifth, member state variables are generally not significant on the second dimension. In other words, member states' MEPs do not have stable positions over time on this dimension, which suggests that the meaning of this dimension as far as member states are concerned may change over time.

The main findings are still valid when we analyze our data parliament by parliament (see Tables A2a-A2e in the Appendix). One exception is that the left-right variable is not significant in the models of the first dimension that include the party dummies for the third and fourth parliaments. In these parliaments the left-right variable cannot explain the within party group positions, mainly because there is more discipline within the EP, driving out the role of domestic policy positions.[5]

[5] The small sample size cannot be blamed here for this result since the the first and second parliaments have fewer number of observations than the third and fourth parliaments.

Also, in accordance with the goodness-of-fit statistics reported above, the parliament by parliament results reveal some change in the content of the second dimension between the first two parliaments and the last three parliaments. In the first two parliaments, it is not clear that the second dimension is mainly related to EU policy positions. In the last three parliaments, this is much clearer. There is also a strong correlation to government participation. However, this variable is less significant than in the pooled analysis partly due to the small number of observations in the parliament by parliament analysis.

4.3 Robustness Checks

A possible concern with our analysis is our reliance on NOMINATE to scale legislators positions. Although NOMINATE is widely used and applied to various contexts, other scaling methods might deliver different results. Rosenthal and Voten (2004), for example, show that Poole's non-parametric Optimal Classification method does a better job at scaling legislators in the French fourth Republic. To make sure that our results are not driven only by our use of NOMINATE, we also use Poole's Optimal Classification scaling method to derive ideal point estimates for the MEPs. The results obtained with this method are highly correlated with the results obtained using NOMINATE, as table A3 in the appendix shows.

We also replicate our regression analysis on the results obtained via Optimal Classification. The findings, reported in see tables A4a-A4c, are qualitatively identical to our previous results. The coefficients in the regressions are also remarkably similar to those obtained with NOMINATE. The results on the second dimension come out even somewhat stronger with Optimal Classification. This is clearly the case for the government participation variable in the first four parliaments. It is not our purpose here to discuss which of the two methods is the most appropriate for the European Parliament. Our intention is rather to demonstrate that the analysis

of the two main dimensions of politics in the European Parliament is virtually unchanged, whichever of these two scaling methods are used.

5. Conclusion

The European Parliament is surprisingly like all other democratic parliaments. The main dimension of conflict both within and between political parties in the European Parliament is the classic 'left-right' dimension of domestic parliaments throughout the world. Left-right politics explains an overwhelming amount of voting in the European Parliament. In contrast, national interests, independent of party policy positions, have very little systematic influence on voting in the European Parliament.

There is a second, but considerably less salient, dimension of politics in the European Parliament. It reflects the pro-and anti-integration dimension but also government-opposition dynamics at the European level with parties represented in the Council voting one way and parties not represented voting the other way. The main political families – the European People's Party, the Socialists, and the Liberals – are all strongly pro-European and also dominate the seats in the Council and the Commission. As a result, on this dimension, conflict *between* the party groups is explained by both party policies towards EU integration and party representation in the other EU institutions. Nevertheless, conflict *within* the party groups on this dimension is explained by government-opposition dynamics, and not by party attitudes towards the EU.

The latter point highlights some important aspects of agenda-setting in the European Parliament. The Commission initiates legislation but does it in close contact with the Council, where the governing parties of EU members are represented. In particular, a lot of work goes

into ensuring that legislative proposals reach a consensus in the Council. This in turn means that the parties represented in the Council put pressure on their representatives in the European Parliament to approve legislative proposals. This is obviously not the case for parties that are not represented in European governments.

Overall, our analysis shows that the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament is remarkably low given the heterogeneity of interests represented and the limited instruments of discipline available to the leaders of European party group.

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Figure 1a. MEP Ideal Points in the First European Parliament (1979-1984)



Tokens used in Figures 1a-1e.

Party group	Token
Anti-Europeans	A
British Conservatives and allies	C
Christian Democrats-Conservatives	E
Italian Conservatives	F
French Gaullists and allies	G
Liberals	L
Radical Left	M
Non-attached	N
Italian Communists and Allies	O
Regionalists	R
Socialists	S
Greens	V
Radical Right	X

Figure 1b. MEP Ideal Points in the Second European Parliament (1984-1989)



Figure 1c. MEP Ideal Points in the Third European Parliament (1989-1994)



Figure 1d. MEP Ideal Points in the Fourth European Parliament (1994-1999)



Figure 1e. MEP Ideal Points in the Fifth European Parliament (1999-2001)



Table 1. Political Parties in the European Parliament, 1979-1999

Party Description	Abbr.	First Parliament (June 1979)		Second Parliament (June 1984)		Third Parliament (June 1989)		Fourth Parliament (June 1994)		Fifth Parliament (June 1999)	
		Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
Transnational Party Groups											
Socialists	SOC	113	27.6	130	30.0	180	34.7	198	34.9	180	28.8
Christian Democrats & Conservatives	EPP	107	26.1	110	25.3	121	23.4	157	27.7	233	37.2
Liberals	LIB	40	9.8	31	7.1	49	9.5	43	7.6	51	8.1
Radical Left	LEFT	44	10.7	43	9.9	14	2.7	28	4.9	42	6.7
Regionalists	REG	11	2.7	19	4.4	13	2.5	19	3.4		
Greens	GRN					30	5.8	23	4.1	48	7.7
Extreme Right	RIGHT			16	3.7	17	3.3				
Non-attached members	NA	9	2.2	6	1.4	12	2.3	27	4.8	26	4.2
National Party-Based Groups											
French Gaullists and allies	GAUL	22	5.4	29	6.7	20	3.9	26	4.6	30	4.8
British Conservatives and allies	CON	64	15.6	50	11.5	34	6.6				
Italian Communists and allies	LSOC					28	5.4				
Italian Conservatives	--							27	4.8		
Anti-Europeans (mainly French)	ANTI							19	3.4	16	2.6
Total MEPs		410		434		518		567		626	
No. of Roll-Call Votes		886		2135		2715		3740		2124	

Table 2. Dimensionality in the European Parliament and Other Assemblies

	Number of scaleable roll-calls	Number of scaleable legislators	Percent of roll-call vote decisions predicted correctly			Aggregate Proportional Reduction of Error (APRE)		
			dim. 1	dim. 2	dim. 2-dim. 1	dim. 1	dim. 2	dim. 2-dim. 1
European Parliament 1 (1979-84)	787	500	86.0	91.5	5.5	46.9	67.6	20.7
European Parliament 2 (1984-89)	1690	612	88.6	92.4	3.8	52.9	68.6	15.7
European Parliament 3 (1989-94)	2269	586	89.9	91.8	1.9	54.8	63.5	8.7
European Parliament 4 (1994-99)	3360	716	87.8	9.0	2.2	48.5	58.0	9.5
European Parliament 5 (1999-01)	1914	644	87.5	89.9	2.4	51.2	60.5	9.3
US House of Representatives (1997-98)	946	443	88.2	89.2	1.0	64.4	67.4	3.0
US Senate (1997-98)	486	101	88.0	88.5	.5	64.2	66.0	1.8
French National Assembly (1951-56)	341	645	93.3	96.0	2.7	81.8	89.2	7.4
United Nations General Assembly (1991-96)	344	186	91.8	93.0	1.2	62.1	67.7	5.6

Note: US House and Senate data from Poole and Rosenthal (1997), UN General Assembly data from Voeten (2000), French National Assembly data from Rosenthal and Voeten (2004).

Table 3. Correlation Between MEP NOMINATE Scores in Successive Parliaments

Correlation	Dim 1	Dim 2
EP1-EP2	.905	.792
EP2-EP3	.945	.642
EP3-EP4	.948	.813
EP4-EP5	.919	.769

Table 4. National Party and Party Group Involvement in EU Government

	Percent of member parties who are in national government					Percent of member parties who have a Commissioner				
	First Parliament	Second Parliament	Third Parliament	Fourth Parliament	Fifth Parliament	First Parliament	Second Parliament	Third Parliament	Fourth Parliament	Fifth Parliament
SOC	6.0	4.0	56.3	68.4	73.7	4.0	4.0	46.3	47.4	52.6
EPP	38.5	68.8	52.4	5.0	3.3	34.6	31.3	36.2	23.3	18.2
LIB	87.5	7.0	2.0	26.7	29.4	12.5	2.0	1.0	0.0	11.8
LEFT	.0	.0	.0	11.1	15.4	.0	.0	.0	0.0	0.0
GAUL	33.3	33.3	25.0	25.0	2.0	5.0	.0	25.0	50.0	20.0
REG	.0	.0	8.3	.0	-	.0	.0	.0	16.7	-
GRN	-	-	.0	22.2	27.8	-	-	.0	0.0	5.6
CON	33.3	5.0	-	-	-	33.3	5.0	-	-	-
RIGHT	-	.0	.0	-	-	-	.0	.0	-	-
ANTI	-	-	-	.0	.0	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
NA	2.0	.0	.0	14.3	12.5	.0	.0	.0	0.0	0.0

Table 5. Interpreting the Dimensions: Pooled Results

	Dimension 1				Dimension 2			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Left-Right policy position	.012	.003	.014	.003	-.003	-.002	-.003	-.002
	(12.41)***	(4.91)***	(11.60)***	(3.88)***	(2.05)**	(1.82)*	(2.16)**	(1.24)
EU policy position	.017	.000	.013	.001	.016	-.004	.019	-.002
	(2.53)**	(.10)	(1.84)*	(.32)	(2.02)**	(.74)	(2.31)**	(.43)
Government Participation	.088	.034	.105	.002	.258	.086	.273	.094
	(2.04)**	(1.29)	(2.13)**	(.06)	(4.71)***	(2.25)**	(4.70)***	(2.28)**
Commissioner	.114	.038	.104	.058	.286	.012	.220	-.012
	(2.35)**	(1.24)	(1.84)*	(1.84)*	(4.59)***	(.28)	(3.28)***	(.24)
GRN		-1.069		-1.106		-.706		-.678
		(2.55)***		(2.84)***		(9.32)***		(8.62)***
LEFT		-.866		-.853		-.549		-.503
		(16.70)***		(15.30)***		(7.28)***		(6.08)***
REG		-.799		-.836		-.465		-.452
		(13.13)***		(13.63)***		(5.26)***		(4.98)***
LSOC		-.683		-.731		.091		.118
		(3.49)***		(3.70)***		(.32)		(.40)
SOC		-.606		-.619		.318		.335
		(17.31)***		(17.24)***		(6.23)***		(6.29)***
NA		-.355		-.377		-.615		-.605
		(6.71)***		(7.00)***		(7.98)***		(7.57)***
LIB		-.199		-.200		-.340		-.354
		(5.43)***		(5.47)***		(6.39)***		(6.53)***
GAUL		.026		.032		-.772		-.685
		(.40)		(.46)		(8.14)***		(6.65)***
CON		.036		.086		.483		.401
		(.39)		(.89)		(3.56)***		(2.80)***
RIGHT		.348		.309		-.344		-.223
		(2.98)***		(2.58)**		(2.03)**		(1.25)
Austria			-.209	.020			.282	.065
			(1.15)	(.20)			(1.32)	(.45)
Belgium			.119	.086			-.056	-.074
			(1.12)	(1.51)			(.45)	(.88)
Denmark			.061	-.022			.129	.013
			(.49)	(.32)			(.88)	(.13)
Spain			.163	-.101			.040	.014
			(1.43)	(1.63)			(.30)	(.15)
France			.093	.039			-.235	-.209
			(.75)	(.57)			(1.59)	(2.06)**
Finland			.047	-.051			.149	.053
			(.29)	(.59)			(.76)	(.41)
Greece			-.026	-.048			.012	-.108
			(.21)	(.70)			(.08)	(1.06)
Italy			-.077	.034			-.047	-.047
			(.71)	(.57)			(.37)	(.54)
Ireland			.224	-.033			-.132	-.095
			(1.75)*	(.46)			(.87)	(.90)
Luxembourg			.310	.114			.046	-.017
			(2.40)**	(1.65)			(.30)	(.17)
Netherlands			.167	.004			.035	.040
			(1.41)	(.07)			(.25)	(.42)
Portugal			.139	.006			.019	-.070
			(1.06)	(.08)			(.13)	(.67)
Sweden			-.045	-.086			-.010	-.087
			(.33)	(1.21)			(.06)	(.83)
U.Kingdom			.150	-.021			.355	.113
			(1.08)	(.27)			(2.16)**	(1.01)
Constant	.087	.490	.022	.480	-.299	-.016	-.306	.010
	(1.52)	(1.77)***	(.20)	(7.45)***	(3.62)***	(.24)	(2.31)**	(.10)
Observations	288	288	288	288	288	288	288	288
R-squared	.39	.84	.44	.85	.22	.68	.28	.70
Adj-R-squared	.370	.824	.396	.831	.201	.656	.221	.658

Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Dummies for EP2, EP3, EP4 and EP5 are present but not reported.

Appendix

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Pooled dimension 1	437	.017	.470	-.899	.863
Pooled dimension 2	437	-.098	.471	-.974	.927
EP1-dimension 1	57	.131	.402	-.752	.814
EP1-dimension 2	57	-.079	.380	-.836	.791
EP2-dimension 1	73	.013	.474	-.876	.863
EP2-dimension 2	73	-.061	.274	-.685	.823
EP3-dimension 1	85	.091	.427	-.713	.827
EP3-dimension 2	85	-.173	.578	-.954	.927
EP4-dimension 1	103	.033	.483	-.798	.724
EP4-dimension 2	103	-.067	.551	-.974	.882
EP5-dimension 1	119	-.158	.481	-.899	.862
EP5-dimension 2	119	-.104	.378	-.922	.865
Left-Right policy position	346	.208	21.721	-4.030	64.710
EU policy position	289	2.384	3.424	-9.722	25.698
Government participation	437	.343	.475	0	1
Commissioner	437	.195	.391	0	1
SOC	437	.192	.394	0	1
EPP	437	.259	.438	0	1
LIB	437	.137	.345	0	1
GRN	437	.078	.268	0	1
LSOC	437	.002	.048	0	1
LEFT	437	.094	.292	0	1
GAUL	437	.043	.204	0	1
CON	437	.016	.126	0	1
NA	437	.071	.257	0	1
REG	437	.073	.261	0	1
RIGHT	437	.011	.106	0	1
ANTI	437	.023	.150	0	1

Table A2a. Interpreting the Dimensions: First and Second Parliaments

	EP1 – Dimension 1			EP1 – Dimension 2			EP2 – Dimension 1			EP2 – Dimension 2		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Left-Right policy position	.009	.002	.010	-.005	-.004	-.007	.012	.004	.015	.000	-.002	-.000
	(3.22)***	(1.87)*	(2.85)**	(1.58)	(1.37)	(2.37)**	(3.95)***	(1.95)*	(4.28)***	(.04)	(1.30)	(.09)
EU policy position	.045	.014	.054	-.048	-.029	-.007	.004	-.005	.009	.007	-.003	.016
	(2.28)**	(1.85)*	(1.91)*	(1.55)	(.93)	(.23)	(.19)	(.36)	(.45)	(.59)	(.21)	(1.03)
Government Participation	.195	.026	.242	-.147	-.023	-.130	.221	.042	.164	.061	.013	.074
	(2.23)**	(.62)	(2.42)**	(1.15)	(.22)	(1.06)	(2.04)**	(.97)	(1.06)	(.71)	(.22)	(.75)
Commissioner	.117	.012	.075	.107	.070	.057	.053	.027	.130	.236	.040	.074
	(1.18)	(.48)	(.68)	(.79)	(.64)	(.40)	(.63)	(.53)	(1.28)	(2.14)**	(.77)	(.63)
LEFT		-.643			.406			-.823			-.139	
		(8.54)***			(1.79)*			(8.12)***			(1.18)	
REG		-.970			.165			-.855			-.190	
		(9.92)***			(.88)			(9.65)***			(2.17)**	
SOC		-.496			.424			-.567			.122	
		(11.59)***			(3.11)***			(6.71)***			(2.32)**	
NA		-.481			.211			-.739			-.180	
		(8.75)***			(1.51)			(3.21)***			(1.35)	
LIB		-.066			.008			-.057			.190	
		(1.65)			(.10)			(1.28)			(4.41)***	
GAUL		-.210			-.648			.128			-.526	
		(5.92)***			(6.95)***			(1.68)			(4.98)***	
CON		.181			.626			.004			.772	
		(1.71)			(2.80)**			(.06)			(7.93)***	
RIGHT								.420			-.122	
								(6.68)***			(1.84)*	
Belgium			-.086			.014			.058			-.085
			(.49)			(.06)			(.48)			(.50)
Denmark			-.083			.196			.141			.154
			(.35)			(.59)			(1.41)			(.68)
Spain									.257			.025
									(1.93)*			(.13)
France			-.222			-.360			.312			-.357
			(1.08)			(1.39)			(1.80)*			(1.84)*
Greece			-.127			-.286			.160			-.113
			(.76)			(1.27)			(.62)			(.78)
Italy			-.157			-.101			.222			-.095
			(.75)			(.42)			(.88)			(.52)
Ireland			.044			-.551			1.214			-.556
			(.26)			(1.63)			(1.85)***			(3.25)***
Luxembourg			.215			-.212			.498			-.050
			(1.23)			(.83)			(3.46)***			(.24)
Netherlands			.192			.005			.357			.058
			(1.14)			(.02)			(2.73)***			(.29)
Portugal									-.239			-.063
									(2.56)**			(.42)
U.Kingdom			.272			.574			.136			.630
			(1.27)			(2.06)*			(1.65)			(3.86)***
Constant	-.050	.415	-.068	.125	-.188	.084	-.124	.320	-.327	-.127	-.073	-.072
	(.47)	(7.54)***	(.33)	(1.42)	(1.18)	(.34)	(1.18)	(5.28)***	(4.00)***	(2.16)**	(1.19)	(.49)
Observations	33	33	33	33	33	33	51	51	51	51	51	51
R-squared	.58	.97	.75	.27	.71	.63	.47	.91	.66	.19	.79	.60
Adj-R-squared	.525	.954	.578	.160	.563	.372	.424	.881	.514	.12	.723	.424

Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A2b. Interpreting the Dimensions: Third and Fourth Parliaments

	EP3 – Dimension 1			EP3 – Dimension 2			EP4 – Dimension 1			EP4 – Dimension 2		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Left-Right policy position	.010	.003	.014	-.010	-.002	-.016	.009	.001	.015	-.001	.000	-.002
	(4.18)***	(1.00)	(5.58)***	(3.61)***	(.79)	(4.91)***	(4.92)***	(.89)	(5.63)***	(.54)	(.04)	(.53)
EU policy position	.012	.007	.005	-.021	-.029	-.032	.044	-.003	.040	.059	.008	.063
	(1.53)	(.94)	(.55)	(2.42)**	(2.31)**	(3.19)***	(3.57)***	(.71)	(2.68)***	(4.28)***	(1.38)	(3.80)***
Government Participation	.055	-.014	.098	.468	.057	.544	.035	-.011	.087	.484	.016	.493
	(.49)	(.22)	(.76)	(3.07)***	(.89)	(3.44)***	(.39)	(.28)	(.84)	(4.57)***	(.30)	(3.91)***
Commissioner	.136	.044	.141	.259	-.043	.035	.104	.016	.082	.435	-.041	.415
	(1.26)	(.97)	(1.12)	(1.29)	(.47)	(.16)	(.88)	(.44)	(.66)	(3.64)***	(.75)	(3.15)***
GRN		-1.084			-.863			-1.247			-1.002	
		(19.11)***			(1.54)***			(17.61)***			(11.77)***	
LEFT		-.710			-.420			-1.091			-1.011	
		(8.25)***			(2.85)***			(1.65)***			(8.54)***	
REG		-.649			-.883			-.889			-.832	
		(7.96)***			(8.09)***			(9.04)***			(1.50)***	
LSOC		-.621			.056			.000			.000	
		(7.77)***			(.69)			(.)			(.)	
SOC		-.451			.598			-.783			.254	
		(7.19)***			(6.84)***			(2.44)***			(4.09)***	
NA		-.410			-.815			-.069			-1.121	
		(1.07)			(6.79)***			(.75)			(1.38)***	
LIB		-.092			-.445			-.401			-.758	
		(1.60)			(5.02)***			(7.28)***			(1.23)***	
GAUL		.035			-.741			.116			-.937	
		(.58)			(5.07)***			(1.74)*			(11.59)***	
RIGHT		.271			-.617							
		(1.54)			(4.37)***							
Austria									-.185			.044
									(.68)			(.15)
Belgium			-.057			-.001			.235			-.203
			(.20)			(.00)			(1.06)			(.83)
Denmark			-.062			.642			.356			.021
			(.22)			(2.06)**			(2.07)**			(.04)
Spain			-.018			.022			.357			-.170
			(.07)			(.06)			(2.29)**			(.63)
France			-.008			.443			.315			-.331
			(.03)			(1.38)			(2.44)**			(1.16)
Finland									.051			-.286
									(.26)			(.93)
Greece			-.125			.398			.157			-.154
			(.52)			(.93)			(.54)			(.56)
Italy			-.418			.304			-.118			-.246
			(1.60)			(.84)			(.67)			(.75)
Ireland			.336			-.220			.220			-.239
			(1.45)			(.45)			(1.02)			(.76)
Luxembourg			.081			.481			.388			.019
			(.30)			(1.55)			(1.42)			(.06)
Netherlands			.002			.055			.095			-.293
			(.01)			(.15)			(.44)			(1.03)
Portugal			.049			.199			.446			-.173
			(.17)			(.41)			(1.76)*			(.58)
Sweden									-.073			-.180
									(.36)			(.66)
U.Kingdom			-.228			1.012			.313			-.151
			(.97)			(2.65)**			(2.11)**			(.48)
Constant	.048	.417	.130	-.255	.219	-.393	-.144	.514	-.298	-.398	.419	-.228
	(.59)	(6.54)***	(.55)	(3.52)***	(2.46)**	(1.18)	(2.09)**	(7.57)***	(2.19)**	(6.30)***	(4.79)***	(.99)
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	57	72	72	72	72	72	72
R-squared	.27	.81	.41	.35	.90	.52	.36	.96	.47	.46	.93	.50
Adj-R-squared	.214	.754	.1980	.300	.874	.338	.325	.951	.294	.431	.922	.323

Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A2c. Interpreting the Dimensions: Fifth Parliament

	EP5 – Dimension 1			EP5 – Dimension 2		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Left-Right policy position	.013	.003	.017	-.000	.000	-.001
	(7.20)***	(2.26)**	(6.51)***	(.10)	(.13)	(.50)
EU policy position	.008	-.012	.004	.028	.008	.037
	(.68)	(1.18)	(.31)	(2.40)**	(1.59)	(3.30)***
Government Participation	.035	.016	.117	.177	-.007	.169
	(.37)	(.37)	(1.11)	(1.99)*	(.16)	(1.79)*
Commissioner	.182	.099	.144	.218	-.012	.229
	(1.65)	(1.92)*	(1.24)	(1.88)*	(.19)	(1.82)*
GRN		-1.118			-.237	
		(14.51)***			(5.50)***	
LEFT		-1.084			-.506	
		(14.22)***			(8.78)***	
SOC		-.674			.518	
		(12.85)***			(9.51)***	
NA		-.395			-.537	
		(7.18)***			(4.45)***	
LIB		-.361			-.041	
		(5.43)***			(.93)	
GAUL		-.377			-.471	
		(7.12)***			(6.27)***	
Austria			-.323			.391
			(1.15)			(1.18)
Belgium			.197			.217
			(.84)			(.85)
Denmark			.336			.102
			(1.44)			(.33)
Spain			.278			.227
			(1.04)			(.81)
France			.131			-.094
			(.51)			(.35)
Finland			.154			.217
			(.63)			(.79)
Greece			-.185			.148
			(.66)			(.51)
Italy			-.131			.194
			(.56)			(.68)
Ireland			.157			.319
			(.65)			(.86)
Luxembourg			.401			.186
			(1.27)			(.66)
Netherlands			.343			.280
			(1.42)			(1.04)
Portugal			.358			.198
			(1.15)			(.67)
Sweden			.157			.149
			(.75)			(.60)
U.Kingdom			.291			.124
			(.89)			(.42)
Constant	-.249	.346	-.398	-.206	.005	-.400
	(4.07)***	(5.31)***	(2.02)**	(3.97)***	(.13)	(1.67)
Observations	75	75	75	75	75	75
R-squared	.38	.91	.50	.28	.88	.36
Adj-R-squared	.346	.891	.341	.240	.862	.154

Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A3. Correlation Coefficients between NOMINATE and Optimal Classification Ideal Point Estimates

	EP1	EP2	EP3	EP4	EP5
First Dimension	.967	.955	.970	.987	.981
Second Dimension	.919	.860	.857	.841	.862

Table A4a. Results Using Optimal Classification: First and Second Parliaments

	EP1 – Dimension 1			EP1 – Dimension 2			EP2 – Dimension 1			EP2 – Dimension 2		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Left-Right policy position	.009	.003	.010	-.004	-.005	-.006	.006	.003	.008	.001	.002	.001
	(3.24)***	(2.39)**	(2.86)**	(1.89)*	(3.03)***	(3.35)***	(4.13)***	(2.33)**	(4.72)***	(.65)	(1.89)*	(.55)
EU policy position	.041	.013	.040	-.044	-.029	-.004	.017	.012	.015	-.018	-.009	-.019
	(2.40)**	(1.74)*	(1.46)	(2.26)**	(1.36)	(.17)	(1.23)	(1.14)	(1.58)	(2.78)***	(1.60)	(2.39)**
Government Participation	.142	-.007	.167	-.157	-.011	-.145	.093	.018	.076	-.107	-.045	-.112
	(1.90)*	(.18)	(1.82)*	(1.96)*	(.18)	(1.85)*	(1.85)*	(.67)	(1.04)	(2.30)**	(1.90)*	(2.03)*
Commissioner	.108	-.001	.092	.063	.018	.061	.037	.029	.064	-.073	.014	.001
	(1.27)	(.04)	(.88)	(.70)	(.23)	(.75)	(.90)	(.99)	(1.36)	(1.44)	(.57)	(.02)
LEFT		-.636			.242			-.338			.138	
		(6.30)***			(.90)			(4.53)***			(1.97)*	
REG		-.886			.239			-.432			.150	
		(9.82)***			(2.27)**			(4.63)***			(3.78)***	
SOC		-.442			.116			-.228			.020	
		(9.53)***			(1.13)			(4.73)***			(.75)	
NA		-.465			-.036			-.276			.136	
		(8.51)***			(.33)			(3.08)***			(1.67)	
LIB		-.107			-.167			-.026			-.083	
		(2.42)**			(2.33)**			(.79)			(3.61)***	
GAUL		-.209			-.463			.107			.344	
		(5.92)***			(6.01)***			(1.17)			(15.68)***	
CON		.109			.443			-.017			-.298	
		(1.41)			(3.19)***			(.46)			(6.79)***	
RIGHT								.257			.328	
								(6.03)***			(11.05)***	
Belgium			-.029			.081			.043			.039
			(.18)			(.51)			(.85)			(.54)
Denmark			-.092			.353			-.065			-.033
			(.42)			(2.25)**			(.87)			(.31)
Spain									.115			-.006
									(1.94)*			(.07)
France			-.095			-.225			.159			.305
			(.56)			(1.48)			(1.79)*			(3.49)***
Greece			-.050			-.145			.131			.064
			(.39)			(1.14)			(1.20)			(.81)
Italy			-.132			-.038			.122			.095
			(.73)			(.24)			(1.01)			(1.05)
Ireland			.070			-.306			.642			.265
			(.45)			(1.76)*			(1.53)***			(3.57)***
Luxembourg			.228			-.131			.257			.023
			(1.55)			(.75)			(4.60)***			(.19)
Netherlands			.170			-.003			.170			.001
			(1.14)			(.02)			(2.99)***			(.02)
Portugal									-.130			.067
									(2.15)**			(1.08)
U.Kingdom			.095			.393			.097			-.189
			(.49)			(1.79)*			(1.02)			(2.71)**
Constant	-.199	.241	-.200	.201	.032	.081	-.129	.055	-.218	.109	.004	.044
	(2.01)*	(4.34)***	(1.09)	(3.23)***	(.30)	(.55)	(2.25)**	(1.06)	(5.30)***	(2.92)***	(.15)	(.71)
Observations	33	33	33	33	33	33	51	51	51	51	51	
R-squared	.59	.96	.72	.39	.72	.77	.51	.86	.74	.29	.82	

Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A4b. Results Using Optimal Classification: Third and Fourth Parliaments

	EP3 – Dimension 1			EP3 – Dimension 2			EP4 – Dimension 1			EP4 – Dimension 2		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Left-Right policy position	-.006	-.002	-.009	-.005	-.000	-.006	.005	.001	.008	-.000	-.000	-.000
	(3.75)***	(1.04)	(5.73)***	(3.43)***	(.23)	(3.79)***	(4.72)***	(1.35)	(5.55)***	(.34)	(.05)	(.24)
EU policy position	-.006	-.003	-.002	.003	-.004	.001	.024	.001	.022	.041	.013	.042
	(1.36)	(.70)	(.33)	(.77)	(2.54)**	(.15)	(3.90)***	(.64)	(2.97)***	(5.08)***	(1.87)*	(4.99)***
Government Participation	-.025	.022	-.033	.188	.006	.198	.015	.002	.043	.180	.042	.155
	(.34)	(.52)	(.41)	(3.45)***	(.39)	(2.98)***	(.31)	(.09)	(.77)	(4.50)***	(1.05)	(3.31)***
Commissioner	-.089	-.039	-.116	.093	.005	.036	.051	.010	.039	.116	.003	.119
	(1.18)	(1.26)	(1.36)	(1.56)	(.28)	(.46)	(.77)	(.52)	(.56)	(2.56)**	(.16)	(2.30)**
GRN		.587			-.442			-.620			-.399	
		(13.76)***			(23.65)***			(16.09)***			(8.26)***	
LEFT		.528			-.176			-.537			-.409	
		(8.11)***			(2.45)**			(1.52)***			(5.54)***	
REG		.450			-.365			-.483			-.224	
		(9.03)***			(9.01)***			(11.11)***			(5.84)***	
LSOC		.445			.039			.000			.000	
		(8.44)***			(1.82)*			(.)			(.)	
SOC		.313			.142			-.438			.023	
		(7.74)***			(6.61)***			(2.34)***			(1.04)	
NA		.325			-.556			-.068			-.590	
		(1.47)			(7.22)***			(1.28)			(3.29)***	
LIB		.064			-.056			-.249			-.041	
		(1.58)			(1.72)*			(8.04)***			(1.31)	
GAUL		-.015			-.284			.054			-.311	
		(.44)			(13.84)***			(1.47)			(5.92)***	
RIGHT		-.004			-.761			.000			.000	
		(.03)			(19.91)***			(.)			(.)	
Austria									-.111			.048
									(.72)			(.37)
Belgium			.050			-.012			.106			-.014
			(.32)			(.09)			(1.01)			(.12)
Denmark			.065			.188			.182			.207
			(.41)			(1.43)			(2.25)**			(1.97)*
Spain			.062			.031			.172			.028
			(.47)			(.22)			(2.35)**			(.31)
France			.100			-.034			.129			-.228
			(.71)			(.22)			(2.23)**			(1.13)
Finland									.006			.043
									(.05)			(.56)
Greece			.158			.135			.090			-.009
			(1.10)			(.92)			(.68)			(.09)
Italy			.342			.100			-.083			.011
			(2.13)**			(.82)			(.88)			(.10)
Ireland			-.180			.006			.095			.031
			(1.39)			(.03)			(.88)			(.23)
Luxembourg			-.022			.133			.182			.097
			(.15)			(1.25)			(1.27)			(1.04)
Netherlands			-.075			.129			.030			.043
			(.58)			(1.10)			(.29)			(.46)
Portugal			.008			.097			.215			.011
			(.05)			(.61)			(1.67)			(.10)
Sweden									-.068			-.042
									(.67)			(.39)
U.Kingdom			.214			.303			.145			.060
			(1.57)			(2.38)**			(2.01)**			(.63)
Constant	.054	-.189	-.037	-.176	.056	-.227	-.113	.230	-.177	-.206	.069	-.212
	(1.11)	(4.20)***	(.29)	(4.10)***	(3.08)***	(1.96)*	(3.39)***	(5.83)***	(2.85)***	(5.25)***	(1.39)	(2.71)***
Observations	56	56	56	56	56	56	72	72	72	72	72	72
R-squared	.25	.80	.47	.35	.93	.44	.37	.96	.48	0.48	0.85	0.56

Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table A4c. Results Using Optimal Classification: Fifth Parliament

	EP5 – Dimension 1			EP5 – Dimension 2		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Left-Right policy position	.004	.001	.005	-.000	.000	-.000
	(7.38)***	(2.00)**	(6.71)***	(.02)	(.14)	(.05)
EU policy position	.002	-.003	.001	-.010	-.002	-.014
	(.78)	(1.05)	(.30)	(2.61)**	(1.37)	(3.11)***
Commissioner	.043	.025	.032	-.022	.020	-.025
	(1.41)	(2.00)*	(.97)	(.78)	(1.15)	(.76)
Government Participation	.006	.004	.031	-.052	-.011	-.054
	(.22)	(.37)	(1.01)	(2.28)**	(1.00)	(1.90)*
GRN		-.311			.069	
		(14.65)***			(4.44)***	
LEFT		-.310			.213	
		(15.14)***			(7.30)***	
SOC		-.212			-.064	
		(14.76)***			(5.02)***	
NA		-.107			.229	
		(6.25)***			(3.29)***	
LIB		-.113			-.029	
		(6.19)***			(2.64)**	
GAUL		-.098			.212	
		(8.40)***			(8.72)***	
Austria			-.093			-.096
			(1.16)			(1.23)
Belgium			.053			-.083
			(.82)			(1.25)
Denmark			.083			-.066
			(1.32)			(.80)
Spain			.082			-.088
			(1.10)			(1.52)
France			.037			.032
			(.54)			(.45)
Finland			.032			-.101
			(.47)			(1.89)*
Greece			-.058			-.027
			(.78)			(.34)
Italy			-.043			-.054
			(.67)			(.78)
Ireland			.042			-.120
			(.64)			(1.23)
Luxembourg			.114			-.100
			(1.24)			(1.75)*
Netherlands			.091			-.122
			(1.34)			(2.41)**
Portugal			.097			-.061
			(1.11)			(.75)
Sweden			.042			-.099
			(.75)			(1.52)
U.Kingdom			.068			-.065
			(.77)			(.94)
Constant	-.057	.113	-.096	.052	-.031	.130
	(3.42)***	(6.37)***	(1.82)*	(2.53)**	(2.51)**	(2.33)**
Observations	75	75	75	75	75	75
R-squared	.37	.91	.49	.22	.82	.34

Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.