

Beyond the Issues:
A Linguistic and Conceptual Study of American Public Discourse

by

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
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
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Abstract

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Cultural cognitive models (CCMs) are learned and shared by members of cultural communities and serve as shortcuts to the presentation and understanding of communicative events, including public discourse. They are made up of "frames," here defined as prototypical representations of recurrent cultural experiences or historical references that contain culturally-agreed-upon sets of participants, event scenarios, and evaluations. The frames in turn evoke full models, complete with presuppositions, entailments, and other patterns of reasoning and cognition.

These prototypical CCMs have both linguistic and non-linguistic components, which by means of conventionalized contextualization cues (Gumperz) evoke the CCMs for those with cultural competence. We can fruitfully study CCMs using linguistic methodologies: cognitive linguistics (including metaphor theory), frame semantics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, and attention to context.

Once a CCM has been evoked, it is used as the basis for further reasoning. CCMs can thus become subject to manipulation, since, like any other less-than-complete schematized representation of events and experiences, they necessarily selectively hide and highlight aspects of the experience.

The first case study presented here is an examination of the major CCMs used for political self-presentation by Newt Gingrich in his January, 1995, "inaugural" speech as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. The second looks at metaphorical CCMs and linked behavior, specifically with respect to the domain of "business" as understood in the 1980s and early 1990s by two prominent American business schools, Harvard and Wharton (University of Pennsylvania). The third case study briefly examines, for comparison, some CCMs found in public diplomacy and newspaper reporting related to the Northern Ireland peace process.

The next chapter looks at our CCM for manipulating CCMs, namely, that of "propaganda." Rosch's prototype theory helps explain the simultaneous accuracy and inaccuracy of the propaganda analysts' repeated assertion that there are no important differences between political propaganda and product advertisements.

The work begins and ends with a comparison to previous single-issue-focused analyses of public discourse, showing how a CCM-based analysis can both systematically explain earlier observations and extend them into a wider view of sociocultural cognition and behavior.


Eric E. Swartz


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Chapter 1

Introduction: Cultural Cognitive Models and Language

"Many times a day I realize how much my own inner and outer life is
built on the labors of other[s] . . ."

--Albert Einstein

1.0. Introduction.

It is time for the evening news. The network anchor begins with a lead story. Perhaps it is the story of a killer tornado in the American Midwest. Perhaps it is a story of American diplomacy in the Middle East. Perhaps it is a story of armed conflict.

As many media and communication analysts have noted (e.g., among many, A. Bell 1991, Iyengar 1991, 1996; Ryan 1991; Roe 1994; Schön and Rein 1994; Chaffee and Jamieson 1994; Jamieson 1996b), even a few words can set a "frame" around a story, giving it a particular slant, a particular point of view from which it will be interpreted and understood. The tornado is presented as a force of nature, but with at least something of volitionality: we speak of "killer" human beings (lexically simply "killers," with the unmarkedness showing the source domain of the term), "killer tigers" and other dangerous animals (wild or not), and "killer" forces of nature such as tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and ice storms. But we do not speak of "killer cars" or "killer buildings," even if in some way these also cause loss of life, if, say, the brakes fail or there is a construction error and the apartment house collapses. Nor is there much alternative framing of

the tornado as anything other than a mindless natural "force" or, more dramatically, an analogously semi-volitional entity with evil intent.

When actual human beings are involved, however, the possibilities for alternative "framings" increase. Sometimes this leads to charges of presentational, even intentional, bias. U.S.-led peace talks in the Middle East, for example, may be presented as nobly humanitarian in intent, wanting to bring peace to a "war-torn" part of the world, or as cynically manipulative, concerned only with power balances and access to oil. The way the story is written--the words that are used and the mental models they invoke--determines much of the way in which the events are understood by the hearers.

Previous discussions of media "frames" or "framing" have in fact recognized this much, and some analysts have also remarked upon the significant fact that such "frames" bring more than words with them; they bring preconceptions and assumptions and ways of reasoning as well. However, previous analysts have not systematically examined the details of the mechanisms by which the language carries with it more than the dictionary definitions of words, nor have they used the theoretical tools of linguistics to situate the language of specific cases fully within the wider framework of American cultural models and cognitive systems.

Using the methods and insights brought to our use of language by linguistic approaches such as those of pragmatics, cognitive linguistics (including metaphor theory and prototype theory), and frame semantics, as well as some of the context-related aspects of linguistic anthropology, the present work analyzes examples of the language of American national politics, American business schools, political and

product advertising on American television (set in a wider discussion of propaganda), and, for comparative extension, an issue of "public diplomacy" made not by but to Americans (by Gerry Adams of Ireland's Sinn Féin). All of this is done to further our understanding of just how this recognized effect of "framing" occurs linguistically, and what some of the implications are.

1.1. Previous analysis of "framing."

Let us begin with a specific instance. In her 1991 book *Prime time activism: Media strategies for grassroots organizing*, Charlotte Ryan gives case-study analyses of three sets of news stories with alternative framings or, as she terms them, "frames": a hypothetical "child bitten by rats" story, a 1980s labor dispute in Boston, and the Nicaraguan revolution in the 1980s. Although much of her book offers practical advice for interacting with the media in trying to effect a change of framing, she also presents detailed analyses of these three case studies. Therefore, since her approach is one of the most detailed, let us look at her definitions and assumptions in some detail.

First, Ryan characterizes conflicting "frames" for each of the case studies, commenting that

- (1) To say each version of the story represents a different frame means that each has a distinct definition of the issue, of who is responsible, and of how the issue might be resolved. This core argument sets the story line, it is bolstered by appealing to broader political principles and/or cultural themes, and by predicting certain

consequences should the proposed policies be pursued.

(Ryan 1991:56)

She also rightly points out that

- (2) One seldom encounters a news account that explicitly presents the core argument of the frame. More commonly, an image or set of images--metaphors, catch-phrases, and/or anecdotes--carry the frame. (Ryan 1991:56)

Furthermore, she states:

- (3) You don't have to spend more time watching TV to learn that symbols like the American flag or a mother who puts her children through school by scrubbing floors, and themes like freedom and "democracy" are the cultural capital of politicians. . . . [and] [t]he media . . . Contrary to popular belief, facts do not speak for themselves. . . . Cultural resonances are used to shape generally recognized plots (rags to riches, power corrupts). They offer easily recognized social/cultural stereotypes of characters/evil villains, honorable victims, noble heroes and heroines), and they reinforce general social goals, i.e., the underlying or implicit values that shape the way the mainstream media [and others] organize their impressions of society. . . The more a frame draws from the rich web of cultural resonances, the more likely it will be accepted as the obvious, natural way to interpret reality. (Ryan 1991:79-80)

I have quoted from Ryan at some length because it is important to recognize the essential insights underlying her analysis, and because--although I did not come to it until near the end of my own work--her work and that of Gamson and other similar analysts can be used as a somewhat familiar starting point for my own analysis. We may take this as the point from which to ask further questions. What exactly are the mechanisms that produce these effects? That is, precisely how do "mere words" carry these "frames," which are broader than simple dictionary definitions? Furthermore, where and when do we find such framings? Who uses them? Is it only politicians and the news media? And, finally, perhaps the most important question of all: why? Not only, in cultural terms, why do the frames work (that is, what are their details, and how do these details operate?)--but why should we care? Can we, and should we, go "beyond the issues"?

All of us have as part of our thoughts and our actions cognitive models of what we intend when we speak or act, and we use these same mental pictures to understand what others say to us. The intention of a speaker or writer--the originator of a text, oral or written--is precisely to produce an understanding in the hearer or reader, and not all of this understanding is accompanied by fully explicit linguistic expression. Often, a mere suggestion, a linguistic or paralinguistic or nonverbal cue, is enough to evoke shared meaning, via a shared mental image, that is, via a shared "cognitive model."

Some cognitive models are based on our physical interactions with the world; others are structured on the basis of sociocultural

situations, activities, entities, and events. It is the latter sort that is the focus of this dissertation.

Although the linguistic markers and reflexes of these sociocultural cognitive models have not been directly investigated within a linguistic framework, a number of previous scholars have contributed ideas which are important as presuppositions for the analysis of these "cultural cognitive models," or CCMs--specifically, frames and frame semantics, contextualization cues and communicative competence, "framing," and context (all of which will be discussed in this chapter). In this discussion of CCMs, it will be useful to be familiar with these other, underlying concepts--it will keep us from reinventing the wheel, so to speak.¹

After discussing precisely what is meant by a "cultural cognitive model," the remainder of this chapter will present these foundational presuppositions, prior to an analysis of the function of CCMs in several kinds of public texts: political speeches, business discourse, political and product television advertisements and their relationship to propaganda. Linguists who are interested in analyzing actually produced linguistic data have been more interested in conversations than in persuasive language, although some work has been done on the language of advertising, of politics, and of the media.² However, we do not

¹A recent article by David A. Lee (Lee 1997) has also noticed the usefulness of a cognitive linguistics approach to discourse analysis; his approach parallels and complements my investigations.

²On the language of product advertisements, see, e.g., Leech 1966, Geis 1982, Pauwels 1984, Vestergaard and Schröder 1985, Cook 1992, Fairclough 1995b.

On political language, see, e.g., D. Bell 1975; Osgood 1978; Atkinson 1984; Seidel 1985; Chilton 1985, 1987, 1996; Chilton and Ilyin 1993; Geis 1987; Maitland and Wilson 1987; Norris and Whitehouse 1988; Nanov-Schwehr 1988; Wodak 1989; R. Lakoff 1990; Wilson 1990; G. Lakoff 1996. See also political scientists such as Connolly 1974/1993; Edelman 1971, 1978, 1993; Corcoran 1979; Hart 1984; D. Green 1987; Gamson 1992; and others, including communication studies scholars and conversational analysts, e.g., Hudson 1978; Erickson 1985; Heritage and Greatbatch 1986; LaRue 1988; Jamieson 1988; Wolard 1989; Swanson and Nimmo 1990; Campbell and Jamieson 1990; Combs

really speak a different language when we speak publicly or "persuasively." CCMs are another type of linguistic unit.

2.0. What is a "cognitive model"?

What are the foundations of the shared information found in cognitive models? Some of it is grounded in our shared biology: all of us as individual human organisms have certain common features involving the nature of our bodies, such as their general form and our modes of physical interaction with the world and its aspects. For these reasons, we understand--well enough, at least usually--another's report of a beautiful sunset or the buffeting of a windstorm or the experience of slipping and falling. Unless we have a relevant biological impairment, we have ourselves seen sunsets, felt wind, and lost our balance and been subject to gravity.

We have "idealized cognitive models" of this kind of grounded knowledge, and we make use of these models in cognition, including our production and interpretation of language. Such a model is a mental representation of something in our experience or other knowledge: such "[c]ognitive models structure thought and are used in forming categories and in reasoning" (Lakoff 1987:13). They are what Minsky (1975, etc.) called "frames" in computer science/artificial intelligence:

and Nimmo 1993; Dolan and Dumm 1993; Chaffee and Jamieson 1994; Kendall 1995; Jamieson 1996b.

On political advertising in general, see Kaid, Nimmo, and Sanders 1986; Biocca 1991; Diamond and Bates 1992; Jamieson 1996a; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1997. On negative political advertising, Pfau and Kenski 1990; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991; West 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Kamber 1997.

On the related topic of the language of the news media, see, e.g., Dyer 1982; Verschueren 1985; Jucker 1986; A. Bell 1991; Myers 1994; also ("critical linguists" and related approaches) Fowler et al. 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979; van Dijk 1985; Kress 1986; Chilton 1988; Fowler 1991.

On propaganda, Swanson and Nimmo 1990; Pratkanis and Aronson 1991; Sproule 1994; and the other references in chapter 5 below.

- (4) a data structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of the information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these expectations are not confirmed. (quoted in Shanon 1981:36)

There are also "values" that fill the 'slots' in these frames, including defaults that fill the roles if no specific instantiation is observed in that particular instance.

Cognitive models are how we make sense of what we experience. They are the patterns by which we think about things and people and events.

3.0. What is a "cultural cognitive model"?

Varying but often related kinds of cognitive models of events or situations have been called "schemas" (e.g., Rumelhart 1975), "scripts" (Schank and Abelson 1977), and "frames," both in work on artificial intelligence (e.g., Minsky 1974) and lexical semantics (the frame semantics of Fillmore 1975, 1976, 1982, 1985; Fillmore and Atkins 1992, 1994; etc.). Although some of this work (e.g., Bailey 1997, Narayanan 1997) is related to "physically" experienced cognitive models, one of the most well known of these scenarios is a culturally-based cognitive model, namely the "restaurant script" of Schank and Abelson (see below, section 4.2).

Some of the similarities and differences in these approaches are discussed by Tannen (1993:14-21). As she points out, the important

thing about these cognitive models is that they form the background for future understanding: "on the basis of one's experience of the world in a given culture (or combination of cultures), one organizes knowledge about the world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and relationships regarding new information, events, and experiences" (1993:16). One's experiences of the world may be gained by direct means (e.g., visiting a department store or playing in the snow) or by indirect means (such as through observations of others' direct experiences or by transmission through linguistic or other channels). Furthermore, the predictions referred to by Tannen themselves constitute part of the world of the future information, events, and experiences, and people in turn act on them.

Event and situation models are often learned by direct experience; the importance of such experience is revealed by the importance given to dress rehearsals of formulaic events such as weddings, and by the uncertainty that many feel when they face such an event or situation with nothing more than verbal coaching or written instructions. Genres, whether written or oral, such as presidential inaugural speeches, television product commercials, or novels, are a kind of situation model applied to linguistic events.

Cultural cognitive models are learned by us as members of a particular cultural community. We are, of course, each of us, members of many different cultural communities, of many different "sizes" and organizing principles, just as we are members of many different speech communities. The present work is not the place to explore the difficulties of defining such entities as "culture" and "speech community" in great detail. For the purposes of this study, there is

one aspect of culture that is of special significance: that culture is something that is taught to us, explicitly or implicitly, by those with whom we associate. It is not innate or acquired as part of our biological development, and language is a part of it:

- (5) On the one hand, . . . there is no use of language which is not embedded in the culture; on the other hand, there are no large-scale relationships between language and society which are not realized, at least partly, through verbal interaction. In Goodenough's (1964) famous formulation: ' . . . [sic] a society's culture consists of whatever one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for themselves.' Culture is 'what everyone knows', and part of this knowledge is conversational competence. (Stubbs 1983:8).

This characteristic recurs in the various definitions of "culture." Duranti (1997) offers a range of definitions: culture viewed merely as "distinct from nature" (24); as "the body of knowledge necessary for competent participation in a community" (28); as "a representation of the world, a way of making sense of reality by objectifying it in stories, myths, descriptions, theories, proverbs, artistic products and performances" (33); as tools that mediate between people and their environment (40); as "a system of practices" (43); or as "a system of participation . . . in interactions with a world" that it helps to construct (46). In all of these definitions, it remains

true that culture is acquired by interaction with other members of the given community.

"Culture" thus includes information as general as knowledge about the U.S. Congress, American business practices, how to sell a product on American television, and what the stages are in a U.S. presidential election. Some types of cultural knowledge are more widely diffused than other types; just as language practices, such as particular slang, may be found only within a certain occupational, recreational, or other socially constructed (doctors, skaters, a group of friends) or geographically based speech community.

That is, just as our common "physical" or "bodily" knowledge is of different sorts ('grasping' versus 'seeing,' for example), so too is our cultural knowledge. The size of the group, or "cultural community," may be important. In this examination of certain types of American cultural knowledge and their expression in language and occasionally behavior, the focus will be on knowledge--on "cultural cognitive models"--which is, or at least which the speaker expects to be, shared by a large part of the general "American" cultural community.³

³The term "American" itself signals a category with fuzzy boundaries, and which is more than ever contested today. In a sense the definition is circular: an American is one who believes/knows certain information that an American knows. Although this definition is logically unsound, it is true in practice, since much of the knowledge of the type discussed in the following chapters becomes a sort of shibboleth for many people. When students in the "American Languages" class at Berkeley debate the political issue of "Official English," many of them argue against such legislation on the grounds that what constitutes an "American" is not the sharing of any symbolic common language such as English, but rather the sharing of certain beliefs, such as "freedom" and "democracy." Such a definition of an "American" is itself one of the foundational models of American culture, and adherence to it one of the criterial tenets of "Americanism." Many of the culturally based images used in politics are of this sort. (In addition, inhabitants of North, Central, and South America who do not live in the United States sometimes protest the equation of "American" with "U.S. citizen.")

4.0. Methodological approaches to the analysis of CCMs.

In what follows, I will discuss several conventionalized divisions of linguistic analysis under parallel subheads, as if they were in fact parallel in nature. However, this is emphatically not the case. Cognitive linguistics is a linguistic approach that crosses all subfield boundaries; here I use some of the methods, including the metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson, for the analysis of some aspects semantics, pragmatics, and discourse. In that sense, I am doing discourse analysis, but my specific interests are not necessarily those of many, perhaps even most, previous discourse analysts.

The same comment can be made about pragmatics, for example: although it is frequently considered a separate subfield of linguistics, this is an unfortunately artificial division, and many of the ordinary-language questions that have been the province of pragmatics, including Grice's conversational logic, can also profitably be approached with the tools of cognitive linguistics, discourse analysis, and frame semantics.

In short, the parallelism in form of the sections that follow is not to be considered parallelism in an organizational sense. I have adopted these divisions only to be able to anchor my work in what is already familiar to many readers. There are many important aspects of overlap as well as significant areas of difference between my work and that of my predecessors, but in the end what matters is that many approaches have much to contribute to an understanding of language use.

4.1. Cognitive linguistics.

The present analysis shares with cognitive linguistics the central tenet that language is not an entirely separate function from the rest

of our cognition, and that both language and action may reflect thought patterns shared by both. In this way, a particular linguistic pattern and a particular behavioral pattern may be correlated, not related by cause and effect (as in the language about business discussed in chapter 3).

From this approach to linguistic analysis, particularly the theory of conceptual metaphor that was first discussed by Lakoff and Johnson in *Metaphors we live by* (1980) and later developed and extended by them and by others at Berkeley and elsewhere (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1991, 1993, 1996; Lakoff and Turner 1989, Johnson 1987, 1993; Turner 1991, Sweetser 1990, Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990, 1995; Taub 1997; Grady 1997; and others; and discussed in detail in chapter 3 below), I have taken not only my approach to the analysis of the metaphors in chapter 3, but also the notion of systematicity, the idea of mappings, the importance of entailments when considering cognitive models, and the attention that should be paid to what is hidden or highlighted by specific linguistic choices, especially in particular contexts.

4.2. Pragmatics.

An area of linguistic analysis that has often been considered to be a separate subfield, but which in fact lies on the boundary between cognition and culture, is that of pragmatics, which (among other things) studies how we understand what is not explicitly said to us. As we all know, there is more to talk than merely the dictionary definitions of the words we use. For example, seemingly small words such as an introductory "well" regularly affect in conventionalized ways our cognitive or affective interpretation of what is said to us. Among

other things, "well" may indicate, for example, that the speaker does not fully agree with what was just said. (For an extensive discussion of discourse markers of this sort, see Schiffrin 1987.) What is conventionally called "pragmatics" is one way of investigating how language is used and understood in particular situations in daily life.

People rarely produce utterances that can be entirely understood by reference to their "dictionary" meanings. How do we know, for example, that my friend's comment "It's cold in here" was really intended as a request for me to close the window? What seems to be a purely information declarative statement may be properly interpreted by me as a request to perform an action in the world, even though nothing about "closing" or "the window" was actually said. The work done by many scholars on the Gricean conversational maxims (Be as informative as necessary; tell the truth; be relevant [see also the work of Sperber and Wilson and others developing their Relevance Theory]; be brief and unambiguous and orderly) has shed much light on this topic of conversational implicature. (Mental Spaces theory--a relatively new and significant development in cognitive linguistics--also inherits these traditions and has been applied to discourse analysis, but I will do no more than mention this approach in the analyses that follow. For Mental Spaces theory, see the Fauconnier and Turner/Turner and Fauconnier references in the bibliography, as well as the papers collected in Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996.)

Other interesting topics in pragmatics include the often-shifting correlation between pronoun use and reference (deixis and indexicality); how an unstated background assumption (presupposition) can influence or constrain a listener's understanding of or response to an utterance (for

example, formalizing the basis for the hearer's dilemma when told to "answer yes or no" to the question "Have you stopped beating your spouse?"); the nature of "speech acts" (including what constitutes an indirect offer or threat or promise?); and other such issues of language understanding beyond the literal.

Language and cognitive models are also used to present self-images, reflecting and in turn constructing certain aspects of our social roles and relationships. That is, language is at the same time both constitutive and reflective of society and culture, as conversational analysts remind us. For example, the language of a Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives reflects how he perceives that role (based on his own stereotypes) and how he wishes the audience/audiences to perceive it, and also determines how the audience/audiences do in fact perceive it, or at least his instantiation of it. (See chapter 2.) This, in turn, has political effects in terms of his role and status and power, in the transaction of present and future political business.

4.3. Discourse analysis.

Discourse analysts analyze the linguistic units that structure discourse (for example, the function of words such as "anyway" in signaling a return to a temporarily suspended topic; for such "discourse markers," see Schifffrin 1987 and, e.g., Holmes 1986) and determine the "rules" and interactional structures that underlie and form particular genres of talk (remembering that implicit messages can be delivered or received by the degree of conformity to genre expectations). That is,

they study symbolic and cultural systems expressed in connected linguistic utterances.

As one might expect, the study of discourse has crossed disciplinary lines, including linguistics (sociolinguistics, including narrative, variation theory, and interactional sociolinguistics; e.g., the work of Labov); psycholinguistics (language comprehension, child language acquisition; e.g., the work of Ervin-Tripp and Ochs Keenan), philosophical linguistics (reference, truth values; speech acts; e.g., Austin, Searle; also Grice); semiotics (through pragmatics); computational linguistics (and artificial intelligence, especially models of discourse processing; e.g., Winograd, Schank and Abelson, Minsky); anthropology (e.g., Gumperz, Hymes; especially the ethnography of communication, e.g., Hymes, Saville-Troike); and sociology (Goffman; especially ethnomethodology, e.g., Garfinkel, Turner, and the related subfield of conversation analysis, e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, Heritage, Zimmerman, Boden); mental spaces theory (e.g., van Hoek, Rubba, Sanders and Redeker in Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996); rhetoric and literary stylistics, cultural studies, and communication studies, as well as scholars who identify themselves primarily as "discourse analysts" of different schools such as "text linguistics" or "Rhetorical Structure Theory" (e.g., van Dijk, Thompson, Tannen, Halliday and Hasan, Chafe, Mann, R. Lakoff) or "critical linguistics" (e.g., Fowler, Kress, Hodge, Trew, Wodak, also Chilton). Each of these disciplines approaches the analysis of discourse with different assumptions and different methodologies; each has interesting and important insights to contribute to our understanding of real language use. (For a detailed comparison of the approaches to discourse analysis of six methodologies--speech act

theory, interactional sociolinguistics, the ethnography of communication, pragmatics, conversation analysis, and variation analysis--see Schiffrin 1994.)

However, to date discourse analysts have not focused on the cognitive models that also structure discourse, and especially not on the cultural cognitive models, although there is occasional mention that such cultural models must be understood in order to make sense of discourse, e.g.:

- (6) Speakers and hearers in the course of production and comprehension of discourse make strategic uses of their models. . . . In interpreting discourse, participants also draw upon their knowledge of context models (i.e. social and cultural properties, shared assumptions, addresser-addressee roles and relations etc.). (Georgakopoulou and Goutsos 1997:31).

5.0. Presuppositional grounding of the present analysis.

In addition to the above-mentioned scholars, methodologies, and analyses, the foundations of the present study are greatly indebted to the work of several other prominent scholars in linguistics and other social sciences, especially sociologist Erving Goffman, linguist Charles Fillmore, linguistic anthropologist John Gumperz, and sociolinguist and anthropologist Dell Hymes.

5.1. Erving Goffman and frames.

The work of sociologist Erving Goffman also sees meaning as dependent upon both context and cognitive models. Goffman calls these models "frames" and sees them as ways of structuring the world:

- (7) The hypothesis is that any utterance can be understood in numerous ways, and that people make decisions about how to interpret a given utterance based on their definition of what is happening at the time of interaction. In other words, they define the interaction in terms of a frame or schema which is identifiable and familiar. (Goffman 1974:27)
- (8) Taken all together, the primary frameworks of a particular social group constitute a central element of its culture, especially insofar as understandings emerge concerning principal classes of schemata, the relations of these classes to one another, and the sum total of forces and agents that these interpretive designs acknowledge to be loose in the world. . . . It seems that we can hardly glance at anything without applying a primary framework, thereby forming conjectures as to what occurred before and expectations of what is likely to happen now. (Goffman 1974:38)

As with other aspects of "communicative competence" (see below), much of what a speaker knows and uses "easily and fully" is not present at any conscious level and cannot be described completely even if the speaker is explicitly asked (Goffman 1974:21).

It is important to mention here that in this study the term "frame" refers to a particular situation-participant structure and/or scenario that is associated with what I am calling full cognitive models. These models are complete with presuppositions and inferential

structure (entailments, or additional "knowledge" derived from inferential reasoning) as well as frames. Although he formed one of my starting points, Goffman does not use these definitions and distinctions.

The "physically"- or "bodily"-based perceptual frames that are used to label physically based environmental interactions, spatial relationships, and motor routines such as walking or grasping, have already been mentioned. Goffman (1974:21-22) calls these "natural frames":

- (9) In daily life in our society a tolerably clear distinction is sensed, if not made, between two broad classes of primary frameworks: natural and social. Natural frameworks identify occurrences seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, "purely physical." . . . [S]ome premises, such as the notion of the conservation of energy or that of a single, irreversible time, will be shared by all. Elegant versions of these natural frameworks are found, of course, in the physical and biological sciences.

Such "natural" frames can be useful in artificial intelligence research (see for example the work of Terry Regier, Srini Narayanan, David Bailey, and other present and former members of the L-Zero research group at the International Computer Science Institute at the University of California, Berkeley), but they will not form a large part of the analyses in the present work; my interest is chiefly in Goffman's "social" frameworks.

5.2. Charles Fillmore and frame semantics.

The tradition of frame semantics, begun by linguist Charles Fillmore was also important for the development of the present analysis of CCMs. Frames and the models that are associated with them are essential for the understanding of word meanings. Fillmore has analyzed many of these, and has made the point that dictionaries do not pay enough attention to this aspect of lexical semantics (see also Fillmore and Atkins 1992, Atkins 1994):

- (10) The methods and assumptions behind "frame semantics" are different in a number of respects from those associated with familiar theories of semantic fields. Semantic analyses within field theories posit systems of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships connecting members of selected sets of lexical items. . . . Semantic theories founded on the notion of *cognitive frames* or *knowledge schemata*, by contrast, approach the description of lexical meaning in a quite different way. In such theories, a word's meaning can be understood only with reference to a structured background of experience, beliefs, or practices. (Fillmore and Atkins 1992:76)

One of his most cited studies involves what he has called the "Commercial Transaction" frame (most recently reviewed in Fillmore and Atkins 1992:78-79; see also chapter 5 below). He asserts that there are many sets of words that derive their meanings not from some objective one-to-one relationship between lexical item and referent, but rather by being parts of a relatively abstract or schematized situational frame.

'Buy(er)', 'sell(er)', 'money', and so on are members of such a grouping. We cannot define any of them independent of the "Commercial Transaction" frame of which they are a part. How can we explain what a 'buyer' is without any reference to a 'seller', or either without the concept of 'money'? ('Barter' is not part of the basic experiential Commercial Transaction frame in our society.) Furthermore, as Fillmore points out (1975:124), a schematic situational frame of this sort depends on a shared knowledge of prototypes.

These frames may refer to either natural or social frameworks, but compared to biologically based "scripts" or "frames" for 'above' (Regier) or 'walk' (Narayanan) or (slightly more complex) 'climb' (Fillmore), the Commercial Transaction frame is both complex and socially based. However, there are kinds of frames and models that are even more socially constructed.

Roger Schank and Robert Abelson's "restaurant script" (1977), already mentioned, is the most well known of this class. Because we are culturally familiar with restaurants, we know what to expect when the word 'restaurant' is used to describe a situation, and therefore we can use the definite determiner 'the' even the first time we refer to any other of the commonly expected elements in the restaurant frame: "Then the waitress brought the menu." The use of 'the' is restricted to previously mentioned, or otherwise 'old' or 'given' information (Schank and Abelson 1975:4); by virtue of the familiar expectations inherent in the script the common participants in the scene are treated as old information. (More recent work, including that of Ellen Prince, John du Bois, and Gilles Fauconnier, prefers to think of this as "already-accessible" information. There is a rich literature on information flow

in discourse, but I will not be addressing that topic in the present study.)

Cultural cognitive models like the "restaurant script" rely on various kinds of prototypes, including ideals, typical examples, stereotypes, paragons (positive and negative), and salient (often historical as well as resulting from literature, popular culture, and so on). Ideals are based on how we think things should be; typical examples are based on how we think things usually are; stereotypes are based on social expectations, especially with respect to types of people; paragons are individual examples of particular categories that are used as either a perfect positive example (an ideal) or a perfect negative example (an "anti-ideal") of an entire class; and salient examples are individual instances that have been "familiar, memorable, or otherwise salient" in people's own lives and are also used to represent an entire class (Lakoff 1987:chapter 5). Furthermore, when these prototypes are applied to real situations, they can be applied literally (what I will be calling "instantiation") or metaphorically.

In American culture, for example, we have stereotypical Cowboys--strong, silent, brave, and shy--and stereotypical College Professors--in one submodel absent-minded, stoop-shouldered, impractical, perhaps naive, and certainly more aware of and conversant with books than with people; ideal Teachers--caring, concerned, tactful, painstaking, and enthusiastic (notice that "Professors" are not always or even predominantly considered "Teachers" in the American pantheon of CCMs--and ideal Doctors--also caring, with a good bedside manner and enough experience to speak authoritatively but with concern for the individual patient. On the other hand, there are stereotypical doctors, who may be

somewhat distant and unconcerned, as well as stereotypical Working People--with a high school education and a somewhat unpolished appearance, but with practical common sense and a sense of loyalty and hard work. American culture is also full of historical and folkloristic paragons and salient examples: George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Amelia Earhart, and so on. A good place to see many of these prototypical CCMs in practice is in television dramas and situation comedies--some of whose characters in turn become prototypes of some sort, at least temporarily--as well as in commercials and niche marketing.

In the present analyses, the emphasis is on schematized prototypes (stereotypes, ideal examples, typical examples) rather than on referent-based prototypes (salient examples, paragons, anti-paragons; i.e., those that are based on individual, specific examples).

Some of these sociocultural models, such as the romantic artist or the democratic revolutionary, are shared with Great Britain or with Western Europe as a whole. Others belong to the United States alone. These are "models" in the sense of containing a set of prototypical entities, relationships, events, and/or behaviors, as well as presuppositions and entailments: we know that a "Painter" is "likely" to live in a "garret," or at least in a cheap apartment, for example, assuming that s/he has little money. We also make assumptions about the character traits of an Artist: that s/he will be spontaneous and unconventional, for example. Other cultural cognitive models, such as "war," for example, center on describing actions rather than people (see chapter 3 below).

5.3. John Gumperz and communicative competence.

Of course, frames and models are not very useful if they cannot be recognized. In the view of linguistic anthropologist John Gumperz, language is used both to reflect and create interactional and cultural meaning, at the level of the individual speaker and at the level of the society as a whole. This is done by means of what he calls "contextualization cues":

- (11) Roughly speaking, a contextualization cue is any feature of linguistic form that contributes to the signalling of contextual presuppositions. Such cues may have a number of such linguistic realizations depending on the historically given linguistic repertoire of the participants. . . .

Unlike words that can be discussed out of context, the meanings of contextualization cues are implicit. . . .

Their signalling value depends on the participants' tacit awareness of their meaningfulness. When all participants understand and notice the relevant cues, interpretive processes are then taken for granted and tend to go unnoticed. (Gumperz 1982a:131-132)

- (12) [C]onversationalists rely on their knowledge and their stereotypes about variant ways of speaking to categorize events, infer intent and derive expectations about what is likely to ensue. All this information is crucial to the maintenance of conversational involvement and to the success of persuasive strategies. (Gumperz 1982a:130)

One major type of contextualization cue is the hitherto largely unanalyzed cultural cognitive model.

Furthermore, if people are able to satisfy their personal goals without violating any of their society's and/or subgroup's expectations and norms, they can be called communicatively competent:

- (13) Within the social matrix in which it acquires a system of grammar a child [or second language learner] acquires also a system of its use, regarding persons, places, purposes, other modes of communication, etc.--all the components of communication events, together with attitudes and beliefs regarding them. (Hymes 1974:75; cf. also, e.g., Gumperz 1972:205).

Whether (in Edward Hall's sense) a culture is "high" or "low" context, members of that cultural community who are communicatively competent demonstrate the capability of using language--in all its cognitive, sociocultural, and interactional aspects--"properly" within the relevant norms, and this includes the ability to recognize, understand, and use cultural cognitive models.

5.4. "Framing."

One of the notions involved in the use and understanding of sociocultural models is that of "tone" or "key" (see, e.g., Hymes 1974 and below). Another consists of the kinds of "frame" or "framing" discussed by political scientists and media analysts (e.g., Iyengar 1991, 1996; Ryan 1991; Roe 1994S; Schön and Rein 1994; Chaffee and Jamieson 1994; Jamieson 1996b). The first refers to the intention of

humor or irony or seriousness that is intended by the speaker, and presumably--for the communication to be successful--understood by the hearers. Some of the most devastating kinds of miscommunication occur when the key is misunderstood.

The second uses the metaphor of a picture frame to describe a preset approach to interpretation that is superimposed upon a situation. In one of the most simplistic examples, a group of armed persons who take a group of people hostage for political reasons can be described as either "freedom fighters" or "terrorists." As a handbook for "grassroots" organizers puts it;

- (14) Every frame defines the issue, explains who is responsible, and suggests potential solutions. All of these are conveyed by images, stereotypes, or anecdotes. (Ryan 1991:59)

Some of the important cognitive aspects of CCMs have thus been recognized, most often in discussions of how the media present "news" (e.g., the work of Iyengar ["episodic news frames" versus "thematic news frames," i.e., placed in context or not], Gamson, and many others), either in terms of what "story" or "narrative" is being followed (e.g., Ryan, Roe) or in terms of "ideology" (e.g., Gamson and others); other social analysts of American culture (e.g., Reich, Polanyi) have also pointed to the "stories" that are dear to the collective heart of those who claim the name "American." Experimental evidence for the effects on the recipients' interpretation of the content presented in such meta-frames can be found in the work of Kahneman and Tversky, for example (e.g., 1982, 1984, 1987, and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). However, the "frames" recognized by these analysts--and by the "spin

doctors" of the 1990s--are meta-frames: by encompassing the entire text, they predetermine the hearers' interpretation of the larger social context in which they understand the text.

However, this is not all that CCMs do. Not all CCMs are text-wide or meta-textual in scope. Every utterance, public or private, written or oral, makes use of cognitive frames and models, both physical and social. Some have more of one than the other, because of their content, but they are always present, since cognitive models are how we structure for our own understanding a highly multi-structured world.

Furthermore, they appear linguistically, in specific linguistic choices--of word, construction and syntax, register,⁴ following or violating of Gricean maxims and the Cooperative Principle, intonational or other paralinguistic patterns, and so on. It is here that the tools of linguistics can help us understand the structure and operation of cognitive models.

For example, the prototypes and stereotypes that form part of every CCM are not value- or affect-free. We have assessments and evaluations connected with them: as noted before, the ideal Doctor is good, for example. Because of this appraisive aspect, CCMs can be exploitative and manipulative, as Goffman also recognizes:

- (15) Social frameworks, on the other hand, provide background understanding forevents that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being. Such an agency is anything

⁴By "register" I mean "degree of formality": casual (e.g., a conversation with a very close friend) to informal (e.g., a conversation with acquaintances) to deliberative (e.g., a semi-formal occasion, such as a news broadcast or a classroom lecture) to formal (e.g., a toast at a formal banquet). Occupational codes are referred to in this study as "jargon."

but implacable; it can be coaxed, flattered, affronted, and threatened. What it does can be described as 'guided doings.' These doings subject the doer to 'standards,' to social appraisal of his action based on its honesty, efficiency, economy, safety, elegance, tactfulness, good taste, and so forth. . . . Motive and intent are involved, and their imputation helps select which of the various social frameworks of understanding is to be applied.

(Goffman 1974:22)

One such important American model is the positively valued "Just Plain Folks" model (see Chapter 2), which is associated--among other markers and contextualization cues--with low register, colloquial syntax and lexicon, and special casual voice characteristics (for example, simplification of final consonant clusters, as in 'walking/walkin'', and vowel reduction, as in 'fella' for 'fellow').

Finally, following Goffman (1974) and Hanks (1987) we can consider a 'genre' as a kind of model when the discourse type is viewed externally, in terms of how its use is assessed, for example:

- (16) In this view, genres consist of orienting frameworks, interpretive procedures, and sets of expectations that are not part of discourse structure, but of the ways actors relate to and use language' (1987:670). . . . In Hanks's framework, genres occupy a dual relationship to historically situated action. (Briggs and Bauman 1992:143).

Genres in this sense are thus a kind of model that characterizes expectations of the conventions of different utterance types.

Why can we call all of these conceptual constructs "frames" and/or "models"? Because models are ways of structuring our experiences and providing expectations, whether they are concerned with word meaning or historical analogy or present evaluation or meta-narrative. As Tannen put it in her useful review of some previous terminological uses of "frame":

- (17) At the same time that expectations make it possible to perceive and interpret objects and events in the world, they shape those perceptions to the model of the world provided by them. . . . [O]ne forms a general impression (we might say, one labels something as part of a certain scene, frame, or script [or attitude]) and furnishes the details which one builds from prior knowledge (that is, from the script). Thus, structures of expectation make interpretation possible, but in the process they also reflect back on perception of the world to justify that interpretation.
- (Tannen 1993a:21)

(See also Lee 1997; Hein 1981.)

It is by means of language that frames and the full models (with presuppositions and entailments) that result from them are commonly represented in our social and cultural world:

- (18) I assume that when individuals attend to any current situation, they face the question: 'What is it that's going

on here?' Whether asked explicitly, as in times of confusion and doubt, or tacitly, during occasions of usual certitude, the question is put and the answer to it is presumed by the way the individuals then proceed to get on with the affairs at hand. (Goffman 1974:8)

These questions, and the answers to them, are often structured and reasoned about in terms of CCMs.

5.5. Dell Hymes and context.

The work of sociolinguist and anthropologist Dell Hymes also views language as both reflective and constitutive in a given culture. In particular, his work provides a useful reminder of the varied aspects that make up the context of an utterance, arranged mnemonically in the term "SPEAKING":

- (19) •S = situation, i.e., setting and scene (time, place, cultural circumstances)
- P = participants (often fulfilling specified "social roles," in the sociological sense, which are "recognized and sustained" via "social interaction" mediated especially by language, Stubbs 1983:8), including "passive" participants ("listeners" or "audience")
- E = ends (personal and societal purposes or goals, intended or unintended, as well as "conventionally recognized and expected outcomes," Hymes 1974:56)

- A = act sequence (the literal message, including word choice, syntax, pragmatics, and so on; this area has been the most examined to date by linguists)
- K = key ("time, manner, or spirit" of a message [Hymes 1974:57], such as ironic, playful, serious, and so on; may be expressed as much or more by nonverbal or paralinguistic cues such as "tone of voice" [intonation] or "body language" [posture, kinesics, proxemics, etc.])
- I = instrumentalities ("channel"--oral, written, e-mail, etc.; code--language, dialect, register, etc.; and within the channels the "modes of use" [Hymes 1974:58] such as speaking or chanting)
- N = norms of interaction and interpretation (socially expected behavior in situations defined by different combinations of the other factors; includes appropriate loudness, available topics, "politeness" or "rudeness" of gap and overlap behavior, and so on; may also include nonverbal or paralinguistic elements)
- G = genre (culturally defined "types" of discourses, such as a joke, a lecture, a commercial, an editorial, a State of the Union address, and so on; based on the identification of "formal characteristics traditionally recognized" in a particular culture as defining a specific genre)

In the analysis of a particular speech event, such as a political speech, these eight elements interact with and influence each other. The appropriate norms of a particular genre, for example, depend upon the situation, the participants, their desired ends or purposes, and so on; all of these in turn contribute to the actual ends or outcomes.

Many ethnographic studies of "other" cultures have focused on the "norms" factor.⁵ As Hymes (1974:61) further comments:

- (20) Norms of interpretation [and interaction] implicate the belief system [and the social organization] of a community.

The analysis of CCMs is a way to look at these community belief and social systems. (Parenthetically, humor often results from the deliberately constructed violation of any of these expectations and norms--often from the violation of Gricean maxims, which seem at least in part to be culture-based norms rather than completely universal, but that is another topic. Little work has been done directly on the linguistic analysis of humor, except as related to second language learning, but see, e.g., Chiaro 1992.)

⁵The classic precedent in the ethnographic analysis of a language is Malinowski's (1935) treatment of Trobriand magical formulas and ritual under the heading of *dogmatic context*. (Malinowski's other rubrics are roughly related to these presented here in the following way: His *sociological context* and *ritual context* subsume information as to setting, participants, ends in view and outcome, norms of interaction, and higher level aspects of genre; *structure* reports salient patterning of the verbal form of the act or event; *mode of recitation* reports salient characteristics of the vocal aspect of channel use and message form.

There have been other approaches to dividing the components of speech acts and speech events (made up of one or more speech acts) for purposes of analysis. These include Jakobson's (1960) description of six factors and six corresponding features of language (addresser/emotive, addressee/conative, context/ referential, message/poetic [not limited to the genre of "poetry"], contact/phatic [from Malinowski], and code/metalingual) and Halliday's (1973) seven language functions (instrumental, regulatory, interactional, personal, heuristic, imaginative, and representational; also simplified, e.g., Halliday 1970 into ideational and interpersonal.) (Much of the work of British and Australian discourse and text analysts has been based on Halliday's schema; see, for example, Brown and Yule 1983 and others.) (Hymes 1974:61)

Both Hymes's "SPEAKING" framework and the lists of relevant sociocultural aspects presented in Tables 1-1a and 1-1b serve as useful conceptual reminders of many of the parameters of social context that must be considered in order for a full understanding and explanation of language in actual use. These frameworks can then be extended both by seeking cognitive and pragmatic explanations for the functioning of some of the components and by requiring in addition a large amount of explicit real-world ("encyclopedic") knowledge about the historical and cultural context of the speech event.

In political speeches, for example, the audience is one of the participants, passive in the immediate sense but active in an indirect way, since the political language is intended ultimately to move this "passive" audience to some kind of real action in the world based. No action occurs in a vacuum; equally, no action-intentional language occurs in a vacuum, and our understanding and analyses of that language will therefore be incomplete without including historical and sociocultural background, including shared cultural models and the aspects of real-world knowledge and presuppositions that form an important part of these models.

6.0. Conclusion.

- (21) [L]anguage is used by its speakers for a tremendous amount of social work. Not only is language used for a referential function (to transmit information about the world), but it is used for a social function (to establish, maintain, and adjust relationships with others), and an expressive function (to display various selves and their attendant

Context of situation:

who is speaking to whom, when, where and for what purpose;
 the physical setting,
 the social scene in which the discourse occurs;
 the roles and status of the participants involved.

Context of culture:

the speech community;
 what is possible for, or normally done by, members of the
 community;
 the speech events participated in,
 the speech acts performed,
 the topics talked about.

Context as co-text:

the prior and upcoming text; what has just been said, what was
 earlier said, what comes next.

Cognitive context:

knowledge as a set of recognisable conventions, rules, norms
 and shared assumptions;
 the process of inferencing tied to current activity and general
 expectations.

TABLE 1-1a
 Types of Context
 (Table 1.2 in Georgakopoulou and Goutson 1996:18)

Context: the situation giving rise to the discourse, and within which the discourse is embedded

- I. Linguistic context--the language that surrounds or accompanies the piece of discourse under analysis [•also paralinguistic features--intonation, pitch, speech, volume, gestures, eye contact, etc.]
- II. Non-linguistic or experiential context within which the discourse takes place, including:
 - the type [genre] of communicative event (for example, joke, story, lecture, greeting, conversation)
 - the topic
 - the purpose of the event
 - the setting, including location, time of day, season of year and physical aspects of the situation (for example, size of room, arrangement of furniture)
 - the participants [including social class, ethnicity, gender, age, and so on] and the relationships among them [including physical--posture, etc.--and social role]
 - and the background knowledge [of the participants] and assumptions underlying the communicative event [•also ideologies of the participants and/or relevant institutions, as emphasized by "critical linguistics"]
 - [•also channel, i.e., oral, written, etc.]

TABLE 1-1b
Linguistic and Non-Linguistic Contexts
(adapted from Nunan 1993:8)

feelings, orientations and statuses). . . . And just as this tremendous amount of social work is both locally oriented and organized within an interaction, it is also more globally oriented and organized within cultural world views and sets of moral assumptions about being and acting. . . . And finally, because actions are directed by one person toward another, they become the basis for further action from their recipient; the actions accomplished by

language are treated by recipients as a basis upon which to build interaction. (Schiffrin 1987:12)

This quotation from Schiffrin can be applied to CCMs as well. They are cognitive, social, and interactive. They result, as does discourse in general, from "specific linguistic choices and their organisation into meaningful combinations" (Georgakopoulou and Goutsos 1997:3). The intention of a speaker is to produce an understanding in the hearer/reader. This effect often occurs without explicit expression--instead, the hearer frequently has to make interpretations, based partly on shared knowledge of CCMs.

Discourse analysis, broadly defined, is all about understanding how these interpretations occur, about finding "general principles of interpretation by which people normally make sense of what they hear and read" (Brown and Yule 1983) or about explaining the "force that creeps in between the words and between the lines, sparking ideas, images and emotions that are not contained in any of the words one at a time--the force that makes words into discourse" (Tannen 1988:xi). Again, part of this "force" is contained in CCMs, which are based on the systematized social and cultural knowledge that we acquire from our speech/cultural communities.

Furthermore, linguistics allows us to approach CCMs empirically, descriptively, and even predictively with respect to how CCMs are likely to be interpreted in given social and interpersonal contexts, and what kind of behavior they are likely to trigger in the hearers. Linguistics allows us to describe CCMs--their structure and their use--in systematic

terms, highlighting regularities in linguistic form and associated conceptual aspects such as prototypes, presuppositions, and entailments.

We live our lives surrounded by models. These multi-element cognitive structures, complete with rich traditional linguistic and cultural components and associations, including presuppositions and entailments, are how we interpret much of the world. Cultural cognitive models are how a society views, understands, structures, and conducts itself and its activities.

Models free the attention for other matters. When we can classify a situation according to a pre-existing framework, we believe that we know what to expect and how to interact with it. We are able to put aside questions and uncertainties. To do this may not always be desirable--but it is extremely useful. It is, in fact, a necessity.

7.0. The plan of the book

After the introductory material of the present chapter, Chapter 2 focuses on how sociocultural frames/CCMs are used in texts, using a speech given by Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. This chapter is a discourse analysis-based extension of the cognitive concept of CCMs to the historically and culturally constructed social repertoires involved in the American political tradition and to their use in self-presentation.

Chapter 3 presents a different kind of complex CCM--one created by metaphor--by examining metaphors for business at the Harvard Business School and at the Wharton School of Finance and Economy (University of Pennsylvania) in the 1980s and early 1990s. It investigates the

importance of metaphor, metaphorical "families," and their presuppositions and entailments for pragmatic linguistic choice and social-historical behavior.

Chapter 4 suggests the applicability of CCMs to other, not purely "American," situations and texts by looking briefly at a speech given by Irish Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams to an American audience and at some newspaper accounts of the Northern Irish peace process at two particularly crucial points.

Chapter 5 then moves to a "meta-level," looking at categorization-based models, including the definition of "propaganda" (with respect to lexical and frame semantics) and the culturally framed definitions of "advertising" and "political advertising". Based on definitions that focus only on similarities of intent and technique, previous discussions of propaganda have not essentially differentiated between product advertising, political advertising, the "Belgian atrocity" stories told against the Germans during World War I, the war-based output of the Nazis' Propaganda Department (directed by Goebbels) during World War II, Radio Hanoi during the Vietnam War, and so on. To view propaganda in this way, however, misses some crucial model-based cultural distinctions that are made by the recipients of these linguistic activities. The chapter ends with an analysis of some product and political television advertisements.

Finally, in Chapter 6, there is a more detailed comparison of the standard "media framing" and the present "CCM-based" approaches for the understanding of American public discourse and the conceptually systematic role of CCMs in going beyond single issues of sociocultural beliefs and behavior.

Part I: Case Studies: CCMs in Public Discourse

"In a Symbol there is concealment and yet revelation."

--Thomas Carlyle

The next three chapters provide us with several case studies of CCMs in public action. The domains of public discourse and the type of CCM vary in these chapters from politics to business and from prototype-based literal CCMs to metaphorical ones.

Chapter 2 examines several traditional, conventionalized prototype-based (stereotype) CCMs used by an American politician to present himself and his political agenda to a wider audience than merely his own partisans.

Chapter 3 involves a wide range of American public discourse about business, making use of conventionalized metaphorical CCMs and looking at how inferential and other cognitive structure found in CCMs can license particular behaviors.

Chapter 4 extends the study of CCMs, both literal and metaphorical, to a partially non-American context, examining the manipulation of these models for public diplomacy and relating changes in metaphorical CCMs to changes in external circumstances.

Chapter 2

Self-Presentation and Sociocultural Cognitive Models: A Political Speech (Newt Gingrich, 1995)

" . . . the most conventional work speaks to all on first sight."

--Wolf Kahn

1.0. Introduction.

To be effective, politicians must persuade their audiences to accept what they say and, they hope, later to act on it. They must, therefore, speak in a way that is appropriate to their setting, their role, and the norms and expectations of the kind of speech they are giving, or they will appear incompetent. They must speak in a way that is suitable to their audience, being perceived as neither pompous nor patronizing, or they will insult their hearers. Above all, they must be persuasive, or they will not achieve their goals.

One of the most effective ways to be persuasive is to sway both the intellect and the emotions at the same time. Politicians depend on being communicatively competent, and upon the presence of communicative competence in their hearers, often relying on traditional social and political frames and models that have had a long and proven appeal in America. These CCMs are rooted in history, in folklore and legend, and especially in beloved national mythologies about who people think they are.¹

¹Language and gender issues are also relevant, but I am not examining them here.

1.1. Inaugural speeches.

The 'inaugural' speech made by a newly elected Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, like other inaugural speeches, presents the representative to his (not yet 'her') colleagues in his new role as their leader. It may also set the tone for his and his party's political agenda. (For a discussion of the related genre of presidential inaugural addresses, see, e.g., Campbell and Jamieson 1990.) The speech here analyzed was given in the chamber of the House on January 4, 1995, when Gingrich was sworn in for his first term as Speaker. The physical setting reinforces the institutional nature of the speech and the sense of tradition, itself a part of a cultural cognitive model that suggests formality as the appropriate register ("key" and perhaps "norms" in Hymes's terms). For the text, see Appendix 2-1.

The Republican Party had just taken control of the House (as well as the Senate) after a decades-long period of a Democratic Party majority. They did this by means of the mid-term elections of President Clinton's first term, after a campaign based largely on their ten-part political agenda, referred to as the "Contract with America" (see Appendix 2-2). Representatives of both parties were present in the House chamber and formed the immediate audience of Gingrich's speech, in a public but still somewhat face-to-face speech event. They were a directly passive audience, however, since they could not respond verbally to any of his remarks. (They could and did respond with applause, but an examination of this aspect of the speech event is beyond the confines of this paper. For a discussion of the role of applause in political speeches, see Atkinson 1984.)

Even more important was the national audience to whom Gingrich was also speaking. The Speaker's inaugural speech does not usually receive much attention, but in Gingrich's case it was carried live on public radio and cable television. It was considered more than usually newsworthy because Gingrich had established himself in the public and media perception as the leader of the "Republican Revolution," as the Republican Party and much of the media had named the Republican agenda and majority in the 1994 congressional elections. This national audience was necessarily passive at the time, but Gingrich of course hoped that his speech would serve to influence future behavior.

1.2. Gingrich: Cultural cognitive models of self-presentation.

Throughout the speech, Gingrich makes use of at least eight CCMs for self-presentation. It is useful here to extend some of the ideas of Erving Goffman (e.g., Goffman 1959, 1967) from a focus on face-to-face interactional talk (although Goffman himself does not theoretically make such a restriction) to more formal public discourse:

- (i) [all occasions of talk] require[s] each participant to show serious concern with the way in which he handles himself and the others present. (Goffman 1967:33)
- (ii) [T]he performed self was seen as some kind of image, usually creditable, which the individual on stage and in character effectively attempts to induce others to hold in regard to him. . . . A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but his imputation--this self--is a *product* of a scene that comes

off, and is not a cause of it. (Goffman 1959:252; *italics original*)

Like other CCMs, self-presentation models are culturally pre-formed pieces used to construct 'face', in the sense of the self-image that speakers try to project to their hearers. The self-presentation models used by politicians are necessarily widely shared in the general culture, in order to serve the social role and political functions of appealing to present and potential supporters, both as a 'good' prototypical American Politician and as a 'good' individual example.² Gingrich's political agenda is both explicitly presented and contained in or usefully supported by several of his models of self-presentation.

Since the CCMs are not used to organize the speech--each model appears throughout--there is likewise no thematic or structural significance to the order of the CCMs as discussed here. Table 2-1 presents a list of Gingrich's eight models of self-presentation in this speech. I have given labels to the models based on common linguistic expressions that reflect them and thereby help provide conventionalized linguistic evidence for their existence:

Model 1:	The Professor
Model 2:	Just Plain Folks
Model 3:	The Spokesman for Traditional American Values
Model 4:	The Leader
Model 5:	The Authoritarian
Model 6:	The Fighter
Model 7:	The Cooperator
Model 8:	The Visionary

TABLE 2-1
Gingrich's Self-Presentation CCMs

²Self-presentation frames may of course also be psychologically based, but I am not here examining that aspect.

These models are clearly intricately linked to each other, with considerable overlap in some cases. Some, such as Models 1 and 2 or 6 and 7, may seem contradictory, but people have always been able to reconcile cognitive contradictions.

2.0. The "orphanage passage" (ll. 391-399).

Before looking at the models in detail, let us consider a passage that appears late in the speech. Most of Gingrich's CCMs found in this speech are present in this passage, namely, Models 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and perhaps by implicit extension 8. Although it is a conventional feature of speeches whose audiences involve both political parties, Model 7 (The Cooperator) has often been far from important to Gingrich, so its absence here is not more than ordinarily significant.

The specific political context of this passage is important. As part of his severe criticism against the welfare spending that he attributed to the Democrats, Gingrich had previously said publicly that poor children would be better off if they were taken away from their "welfare mothers" and placed in orphanages. In turn, he was immediately and equally severely criticized as everything from unfeeling to racist (given that many of the poorest families on welfare are inner-city African-Americans). In this passage, then, Gingrich is defending himself as well as implicitly reasserting a part of his political agenda.

(1) [A]nd we got into what I think frankly has been a pretty distorted and cheap debate over orphanages (392-394)

(2) Let me say, first of all, my father, who is here today, was a foster child. He was adopted as a teenager. I am

adopted. We have relatives who are adopted. We are not talking out of some vague impersonal Dickens "Bleak House" middle-class intellectual model. We have lived the alternatives. (395-399)

"Frankly" in the preceding paragraph (example [1]) has set the framing or key: one of plain speaking (Model 2) and the hard truths of the 'realist' (a Traditional American Value, cf. Model 3).

Gingrich begins with "Let me say." By this phrase a speaker ostensibly asks indirectly for permission to speak, or at least for ratification of his or her turntaking and implicitly of the content of the utterance, but of course in actual usage this construction is not really any sort of indirect request. No one ever pauses afterward to wait for a reply. Instead, what the phrase really signals is a coming statement that is often less than fully acceptable in some way but that carries some degree of emphasis. It signals the speaker's expectation of opposition on the part of the hearer(s), which the speaker is, (courageously) disregarding in stating the 'necessary truth'. Here Gingrich is setting up an important part of his argument: he knows about adoption and orphanages, but his critics do not.

"[F]irst of all," Gingrich says, his father was a foster child and was adopted. Secondly, Gingrich himself was adopted. Thirdly, he has "relatives who were adopted." That is, he is trying to make his argument stronger by an appeal to weight of numbers--"More Is Better" (also see below, section 3.6).

Technically Newt Gingrich was in fact adopted by his stepfather. However, he is misapplying the technicality. The outcry over his

comments about orphanages had to do with removing children from "welfare mothers," but Gingrich's situation was very different. It was non-stereotypical for the terms of the political argument: he was adopted by the man who married his birth mother.

Furthermore, orphanages and adoption are not exactly the same thing in any case. It is true that both situations prototypically involve children who are not living with and being raised by their biological parents--but the resemblance ends there. Because of this degree of similarity, however, the hearer(s) may accept Gingrich's metonymic version of Relevance: the idea that as long as something in the two general scenarios is alike, the entire scenarios can be regarded as completely equivalent, and therefore when one is relevant, the other is also.

The phrase "some vague impersonal Dickens [not the more prescriptively 'correct' Model 1 adjective "Dickensian"] 'Bleak House' middle-class intellectual model" is emotionally evocative and was delivered with intonational force. The constructions "we are not talking about" and "some vague" usually indicate irritation on the part of the speaker and will probably therefore arouse either indignant agreement or corresponding irritation on the part of the hearer(s), especially if accompanied, as here, by an appropriately nuanced intonation. Gingrich's statements are at first short and punchy, followed by an accumulating series of pejoratively-intended adjectives. "Vague," i.e., not forceful, is pejorative in Models 4 and 5 (The Leader, The Authoritarian) and also evokes 'ivory-tower intellectuals' and 'absent-minded professors,' Model 1 stereotypes that are laughable to the Just Plain Folks of Model 2. (The laughter may be either

affectionate or malicious.) "Impersonal" is pejorative in Model 3 (The Spokesman for Traditional American Values). "Middle-class" is often pejorative in Model 1 (The Professor), although this evaluation clashes with its 'typical' and desirable valuation in Models 2 and 3. "Intellectual" is pejorative in Model 2 (Just Plain Folks).

The "Dickens frame" includes all of Dickens's novels and may have triggered the "middle-class intellectual" collocation, since a stereotypical view of Dickens might include both adjectives. By subject matter and sympathies, the Dickens frame evokes the Just Plain Folks model; by virtue of the status of Dickens' novels as classics, it evokes the Professor model.

It is by metonymy within the Dickens frame--whether consciously or not--that Gingrich refers to the adoption in *Bleak House* rather than the orphanage in *Oliver Twist*. Although the latter would perhaps be a more literally appropriate reference given the wider context of the political argument, it would not serve as a very good argument for his support of orphanages. In one sense, then, this metonymic displacement might somewhat undercut his self-presentation as a Professor, but it makes much more sense given his political agenda. In addition, if because of metonymy the model itself is more important than the precise mapping of its elements, there is in fact no problem. "Bleak" is, after all, certainly the proper adjective to describe the stereotypical image of an orphanage which he is trying to refute via his adoption argument--rather more than "Oliver" or "Twist," both of which may also sound amusing to Americans.

Note that except for "bleak" the adjectives in this list are not necessarily pejorative. They receive that interpretation from the

construction and the intonation, as well as from certain background ideologies, including current well-publicized Republican associations of 'liberals' with 'elites', especially in the media and at universities, and therefore transitively with "intellectuals," reinforced by the already mentioned American tradition of anti-intellectualism.

There is, however, no recognition by Gingrich that this pejorative use of "intellectual" might seem odd when spoken by a person who employs Model 1 for self-presentation. Similarly, given Model 2 (Just Plain Folks), the pejorative use of "middle-class" also seems odd, since the middle class has traditionally been viewed as the stable foundation of American society and the prototypical repository of the essential American values (Model 3). Furthermore, the collocation of "middle-class" and "intellectual" applied to the same NP is also odd, since usually (at least outside of a Dickens frame) the two are stereotypically incompatible.

In addition, the effect of all these pejorative words is a sense of belligerence, which signals Model 6 (The Fighter).

Looked at one way, this is a self-presentation CCM clash; looked at another way, it is an inspired way to appeal to two audiences by means of a single non-self-presentational CCM.

Gingrich then concludes this paragraph with another generality (399)--not that this is unusual in political speeches. Just what are these "alternatives"? Although the word "alternatives" may hint at Model 8 (The Visionary), the question is left unanswered.

3.0. Gingrich: The cultural cognitive models.

Let us now consider Gingrich's sociocultural cognitive models in this speech in more detail. Because of space limitations, only a few examples of each will be given, but readers should have no difficulty in finding other examples in the text of the speech. For each model, relevant linguistic markers are identified, including CCM-evoking words and phrases, CCM-evoking references and allusions, register markers (especially with respect to lexical choice and syntax), discursive style, regular CCM-related following and violating of Gricean maxims, and so on. In many cases, speaker use and hearer recognition of these markers and their effects are dependent on extra-linguistic cultural knowledge.

3.1. Model 1: "The Professor."

First, there is the "Professor" model (see Table 2-2). Prior to this speech, this CCM had already been one of Gingrich's favorite models of self-presentation. In interviews and speeches, Gingrich has often called himself a professor of American history, or an historian. However, The topic of his Ph.D. dissertation in history from Tulane University was educational policy in the Belgian Congo, and he did not publish academic articles or books. In the early 1970s, he taught for a few years in the history department of West Georgia College in Carrollton, Georgia, with an emphasis on futurism, and then transferred to the geography department. He later taught a course on the American character and future, first at Kennesaw State College in Georgia and then at Reinhardt College, a private business college in Waleska, Georgia, after the Georgia Board of Regents' ruling that "a public

Name of CCM: The Professor

Submodel 1: The Expert

Submodel 2: The Absent-Minded Professor

Kind of CCM

prototype-based (stereotype)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "intellectual"; "vague")
- lexical choice: •other CCM-evoking words
(e.g., latinate words)
- lexical and syntactic complexity
(e.g., multisyllabic words, involved subordination in clausal structure)
- register: •deliberative
(e.g., syntax, lexical choice)
- presentational style: •unemotional
(i.e., "dry," "boring"), often •didactic
- extensive detail of content or citation
 - May be interpreted by non-specialists as violating the Maxim of Quantity
(i.e., as "boring," and/or as "showing off" or "boasting," especially if not supported by institutional authority based on one's job)
 - Includes •references to classic books or authors and/or to academic analytic studies
- speech acts: •instructions (i.e., for edification)

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all must be mapped)

- professor
- students
- information
- institution
- site of instruction

Speech Events

- classroom lecture (= Instruction)

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

Submodel 1

- professor is an expert or authority; therefore worth listening to
- evaluation = positive, including admiration¹

¹As more professors are used by the media (especially television) as expert commentators on current events (e.g., the O. J. Simpson trial, the Unabomber case, foreign affairs), submodel 1 is gaining in cultural strength.

(Table 2-2, continued)

Submodel 2

- professor is vague, absent-minded
- professor is removed from reality ("in an ivory tower;" cf. saying "Those who can, do; those who can't, teach"), irrelevant
- professor is "prosy" (i.e., too much detail, style dry and unemphatic)
- register is often formal rather than colloquial (perhaps overly so)
- evaluation = negative, ranging from amusedly tolerant to laughable

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- professor knows more than students (i.e., assertives by self-authority)
- professor's purpose is to impart knowledge to students
- students' purpose is to be instructed
- professor is part of college faculty (= felicity condition on assertions, i.e., assertives by institutional authority; otherwise assertives may be taken as Boasting and be very negatively evaluated)
- professors do not take physical action; they prefer to talk (even to excess)
- professors are better with books than with people

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- People who do not agree with the speaker are in need of instruction

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Since the prototypical purpose of Instruction (for the "Pragmaticism" value of Model 3) is to give people information they can use, the knowledge that the professor has is relevant for students' actions.
- Therefore (especially from submodel 2), people listen to professors.
- Therefore, they will act on that information in the future,
- In a way consistent with the evaluations implicit in the information (i.e., if an expert tells you, his/her information may be worth more than the information of a non-expert) (but see "CCM Interactions" below)

(Table 2-2, continued)

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation²
- In the view of his opponents: (inappropriate) metaphor

Relevant Mappings

<i>Source Domain</i>	<i>Target Domain</i>
professor	Gingrich
students	audiences (all of them)
classroom	the House chamber
lecture	Speaker's inaugural speech

Hearer Interpretation

- If one accepts the CCM presuppositions and entailments, one will accept Gingrich's self-presentation as an authority and will see the mapping as accurate and the speech as Instruction.
- If one does not accept the presuppositions and/or entailments, or rejects the mapping, the speech may be evaluated as a Boast.
- The interpretation often depends greatly on hearer's own pre-existing set of political beliefs.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Clashes with Model 2 (Just Plain Folks) in many of the linguistic characteristics and presuppositions.
- May clash with Models 2 and 3 in another way: because of the traditional interpretation of democracy, the Plain Folks' opinions may be worth as much as an expert's (especially if the expert is prototypically removed from reality).
- Presupposition 5 contradicts Model 6 (The Fighter)
- Some of the characteristics of stereotype 1, as well as some presuppositions (e.g., 5) may reinforce Model 8 (The Visionary)

TABLE 2-2
Gingrich's Model 1: "The Professor"

²The kind of mapping identified depends on the importance of one aspect of the definition: it is necessary (i.e., presupposed) that any kind of teaching at a college of any type and for any length of time makes one a "professor." It also hinges on the real-world presupposition that is commonly applied to politicians and military officers as well as to professors: that one retains for life the highest title that one has held in government or military service, or can continue to be addressed as "Professor."

office holder could not teach at a public university such as Kennesaw" (Warner and Berley 1995:208) and after considerable criticism that the course was primarily ideologically political in intent, and questions about the appropriateness of the funding sources. The course on "Renewing American Civilization" has been videotaped and broadcast on cable television. All in all, his scholarly qualifications in the area of American history are not strong according to the standards of the general academic community.

Gingrich evokes this model directly by a lecturing style, as at lines 146-147):

- (3) It is a meaning the world would do well to study in this room.

Although the use of CCM-evoking multisyllabic or latinate words is a frequent feature of Model 1 talk, which is often intended to impress others or to establish authority as well as to convey information and instruct, Gingrich does not use such words in this speech. It is much more important for the leader of a self-labeled 'populist' political movement to emphasize Model 2, Just Plain Folks. However, because he is also claiming authority, and because his frequent use in interviews and statements of the self-label of 'professor' have indicated that it is important to him, he evokes Model 1 in ways that are less likely to provoke the immediate criticism that he is 'talking over people's heads'.

Invoking the Professor CCM carries a certain amount of ambivalence in the American context due to the presence of the two submodels: professors are respected as Experts (at present especially because they

are often briefly interviewed on television as *ad hoc* commentators on news events) and therefore have high prestige, but there is also historically a strong 'anti-intellectual' strand in American popular and political tradition (see, e.g., Hofstadter 1963), and professors have often stereotypically been either ridiculed as "absent-minded" or vilified as removed from reality ('in an ivory tower').

In this speech, Gingrich not only refers to both submodels (evoking the Absent-Minded Professor submodel by his pejorative use of "intellectual" in the "orphanage passage," for example), he also mixes them within a single utterance. For instance, the phrase "You see" in example (4) imparts both a Model 1 lecturing tone (especially given the intonation as delivered) and a Model 2 'Just Plain Folks' colloquialism:

- (4) This is what de Tocqueville wrote: "Often there is not a distinguished man in the whole number. Its members are almost all obscure individuals whose names bring no associations to mind. They are mostly village lawyers, men in trade, or even persons belonging to the lower classes of society." . . . But the word 'vulgar' in de Tocqueville's time had a very particular meaning. (139-146)

In this example, Gingrich has not remained literally accurate. That is, the word "vulgar" does not itself appear in what he has just quoted from "de Tocqueville" (and not the much more common though less 'correct' 'Tocqueville'), although by the Maxim of Relevance he implies that it does; there would otherwise seem to be no need to connect it to the quotation with a "but" or to introduce an archaic meaning of the word at all. The words that do appear in the quotation—"obscure" and

"not . . . distinguished"--are close in meaning to "vulgar" via its meaning as 'common' or 'populist', but do not offer the same opportunity for reinforcing the Professor CCM by explicating the older meaning of a word that is today exclusively used in non-specialist discourse in another, here inappropriate, meaning in American English (i.e., indecent).

More than once, Gingrich cites a specific modern author or book, as in the following example:

- (5) I have been reading Remini's biography of Henry Clay (134-135)

Such references are admittedly a common academic feature, but in context there is a further effect, related to Grice's Maxim of Quantity. Here Gingrich is giving the audience of this non-academic speech more information than is strictly necessary at an informational level: it is not usual to cite one's references in a political speech. Since this additional information does not contribute to the hearers' needs, it must be intended to serve the needs of the speaker. It is relevant to the hearers--and it is part of the tradition of this genre--to mention the nineteenth-century Henry Clay as a model Speaker, but it is not informationally necessary for either prototypical relevance or tradition to know that Gingrich was just reading a (very long) biography of Clay, and who the author was. Instead, the passage serves to reinforce the Professor CCM in both its 'learned' and its 'authority' aspects.

In examples (4), (5), and (6), the Professor model is also marked by a classroom lecturing style:

- (6) I do not know if you have ever thought about this, but for 208 years, we bring [sic] together the most diverse country in the history of the world. (124-126)

Gingrich also seems to make it easy for hearers to recover or impose a presupposition of ignorance as applied to them, if they choose to do so for political reasons. Hearers who make such an implicature--and not all would--could then see this passage as contributing to their negative perception of the Speaker. His use of "but" is also open to such a difference of opinion. If a hearer so chooses, therefore, s/he can be insulted by what can be interpreted as another violation of the Maxim of Quantity: i.e., I do not know if you have ever thought about this, but even if you have I am going to say it anyway because I am lecturing you, presumably because I know more than you. On the other hand, hearers who are not inclined to such a negative interpretation may feel edified by 'Professor' Gingrich's instruction or even flattered by the weaker but perhaps still possible opposite implication that Gingrich thinks that they might have thought about this important topic. In any case, they are immediately made a part of the thought by his use of "we."

By means of this appeal to American history, he is able to connect this CCM not only to Model 4 (The Leader) both generally and specifically (professors are conventionally seen as people with authority to speak, especially on issues connected with their specialties) but also strongly to Model 3 (The Spokesman for Traditional American Values) and by extension Models 6 (The Fighter), 7 (The

Cooperator), 8 (The Visionary), and even 2 (Just Plain Folks), all of which represent specific American values.

3.2. Model 2: "Just Plain Folks."

This CCM (see Table 2-3) is foundational in the American self-image. It is seen as part of a larger model rooted in "mythic" perceptions of the American Revolution. As we saw in example (4), from the beginning Americans have been seen by themselves and others as a land of the common person, a populist democracy and anti-aristocratic form of government. This CCM is also related to Model 3 (Spokesman for Traditional American Values), since the qualities of Just Plain Folks are Traditional American Values.

For these reasons, this CCM is among the most frequently invoked by politicians. For example, Gingrich's characterization of the anti-aristocratic and diverse nature of the House and of America itself (139-165) is found also in the "inaugural" speeches of other Speakers (e.g., Foley 1989:101 *Congresional Record* 1989:10802:col. 2).

This CCM is most directly evoked by words such as "commoners" (163, cf. 139-143), but in American political discourse, especially recently, it is far more common to evoke it by register. In delivering the speech, Gingrich frequently pronounced "let me" as "lemme," for example. Contractions are also frequent. At one point (455) the written version has the contracted form "isn't," but as delivered it was even more colloquial: "that ain't enough." He also makes extensive use of colloquialisms, especially but not restricted to the American colloquial impersonal "you," and other lexical and syntactic markers of informal register (*italics* have been added throughout, unless noted):

Name of CCM: Just Plain Folks

Kind of CCM
 prototype-based (stereotype)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •colloquialisms
 (e.g., "pretty distorted" = "very distorted"), regionalisms
- lexical choice: •direct reference
 (e.g., "commoners," "frankly")
- register: •informal
 - American colloquial "you" as equivalent in reference to the impersonal "one"
 - informal syntax
 (e.g., "worth every American reading" instead of "American's reading")
 - phonetic reduction
 (e.g., "gimme")
 - lexical choice
 (e.g., "guys," "folks," "okay")
- references to popular culture
 (e.g., "I carry the T.V. Guide version of the Contract with me at all times")
- "real people" anecdotes
 - storytelling style and structure

Scenario/Frame**Elements**

(not all must be mapped)

- large number of working people,
 (many middle class or lower middle class)
- set in opposition to a small number of people who "put on airs" because of more money, more education, etc.
- a particular set of values
 (see Model 3, Spokesman for Traditional American Values)

Speech Events

- conversation (informal)
- storytelling (including anecdotes)
- jokes

(Table 2-3, continued)

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- works with hands, prototypically as a farmer or small craftsman, but factory worker also possible
- practical, honest, frank, plain-speaking, realistic, "to the point" (adheres to Gricean Maxims), independent
- "salt of the earth," "down to earth"
- a lot of "common sense," often in opposition to "book learning" ("folk wisdom," "cracker-barrel wisdom")
- does not wear fancy clothes, engage in sophisticated behavior, talk in an educated or sophisticated fashion
- evaluation = positive

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- There are the Just Plain Folks and then there is a contrast group.
- America is a land "of the people, by the people, and for the people."
- This means populism (i.e., Just Plain Folks should be "in charge of" the U.S., if they are not already).
- Formal education is less valuable than practical experience.

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- Members of the opposite political party (here, the Democrats) are not honest, frank, etc.
- The CCM of the Politician [not discussed here] contains the stereotypical qualities of dishonesty, lack of frankness, and so on, but that of course does not apply to "us," here the Republicans.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Just Plain Folks prefer family events to public ones
- Since Just Plain Folks exemplify Traditional American Virtues, any of them can be a Spokesperson for those virtues (interaction with Model 3)

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation
- In the view of his opponents: (inappropriate) metaphor

(Table 2-3, continued)

Relevant Mappings	
<i>Source Domain</i>	<i>Target Domain</i>
Just Plain Folks	Gingrich and his supporters (specifically, Republicans)
the despised elite	Democrats and their supporters

Hearer Interpretation

- If one accepts the CCM presuppositions and entailments, one will value what Gingrich says.
- If one does not accept the presuppositions and/or entailments, or rejects the mapping, the register may be evaluated as inappropriate (to the significance of the occasion).
- The interpretation often depends greatly on hearer's own pre-existing set of political beliefs, although the Just Plain Folks model is important for mythic American history. Most of the presuppositions are very widely held by Americans, regardless of their political affiliations; what varies is the mappings.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Intersects with Spokesman for Traditional American Values (see above)
- May intersect with "The Fighter" ("act first and ask questions later")
- Clashes with Model 1 (The Professor)

TABLE 2-3
Gingrich's Model 2: "Just Plain Folks"

- (7) I am sorry, guys, it just did not quite work out. (10-11)
- (8) The folks who come here . . . your ethnic background
 . . . or your ideology (148-150 ff.) (9) It is a
 little strange if you are from a dictatorship to explain you
 are called the whip but you do not really have a whip (178-
 180)
- (10) You get that sense of emotion when you see something so
 totally different than you had expected (198-199)
- (11) So, leave on the first bell, not the second bell. Okay?
 (233-234; overlaps with Model 5, The Authoritarian)
- (12) Fourth, legislation protecting our kids (269-270)
- (13) I mean, that personalized it. (389)

Gingrich's story about the Russian and Lithuanian visitors (171-195), from which example (9) is taken, reflects an important feature of American political speeches in general that serves to reinforce this Model 2 emphasis on the populist nature of America's view of itself, namely, the use of anecdotes tied in some way to 'real people'. President Clinton's State of the Union addresses, for example, have used identifiable individuals for this purpose, naming them, bringing them to the chamber, and having them stand up when they are mentioned. It is common, however, for politicians to tell 'personal' stories with no specific names or faces attached. President Reagan used these anonymous, generic anecdotes very effectively. (For a discussion of the

non-factual nature of Reagan's anecdotes, see Johnson 1991:59-60 and Erickson 1985.) Gingrich's story of the visitors from Russia and Lithuania in many ways more closely resembles in style the Just Plain Folks stories of Reagan than the Just Plain Folks stories of Clinton.

The provenance of Gingrich's second, very large gavel (49-55) is the subject of a brief referent-based Model 2 'real person' anecdote--this one with a name attached. Following the traditional Just Plain Folks principles of self-sufficiency and the dignity of skilled manual labor, the Georgian who gave Gingrich the gavel made it from his own walnut tree. In this way, the story implicitly evokes an iconic 'historical' (but factually untrue) story that is relevant to both Model 2 and Model 3: that of George Washington's chopping down of the famous cherry tree and then his honest admission that he had done it, because he could not tell a lie.³

The simplified, linearized syntax and register of example (9) may also carry either (a) a humorous intention or (b) some sense of The Professor model (i.e., he is explaining something to the ignorant) which could again be interpreted as either a desire to be helpful or as a negatively evaluated speaker presupposition of ignorance and/or lack of intelligence on the part of the hearers. A great deal depends on the hearers' political inclinations.

Another important part of the Just Plain Folks CCM is "plain speaking." Gingrich signals this--which, interpreted as "honesty," can also be considered part of Model 3 (The Spokesman for Traditional American Virtues)--by his frequent use of "genuinely" and even more so

³This story was apparently invented by Mason Locke Weems, called "Parson Weems"; it first appears in 1806 in the fifth edition of his book *The life and memorable actions of George Washington*.

by his extremely frequent use of "frankly," as in examples (14) and (15):

(14) You could have a Republican who frankly may not know a thing about your district agree to come for a long weekend with you (338-340; cf. also the Just Plain Folks "you"/"your")

(15) [A]nd we got into what I think frankly has been a pretty distorted and cheap debate over orphanages (392-394)

Besides serving as a marker or contextualization cue for the Just Plain Folks populist, anti-intellectual (versus vagueness and "highfalutin'" language), and anti-politician (versus "double talk" and deception) stances, in this speech "frankly" often serves directly as part of Gingrich's self-presentation. That is, Gingrich is presenting himself as objective, and therefore his hearers should accept his assertions as statements of fact without any speaker bias. Even when the truth is unpleasant, he can face it, although he warns his hearers that something unpleasant is coming; therefore he is also not unfeeling. In example (14), the unpleasantness is not related to the hearers' reception of the utterance, but rather to the situation: Republicans need to go on these visits, but it is not a good thing that they do not already know about your district. Example (14) may also evoke the Professor model: let me instruct you as to the situation.

"Frankly" may also serve as a plea for or assertion of belief or authority, whether as a disarming apology, a brave determination to speak the truth, an attempt to bolster a weak case (deflection), a swindle ("look how honest I am"--when I'm lying to you), or an

aggressive challenge. "Frankly" in example (15), coupled with "I think" and the intonation stresses of the delivery, has the effect of an aggressive challenge: This is my opinion, and it is the truth, whether or not you hearers like it.

3.3. Model 3: "The Spokesman for Traditional American Values."

This traditional American political CCM (see Table 2-4) is very closely related to the previous Just Plain Folks CCM. In a sense, it is a blend of Just Plain Folks and Model 4, The Leader: the speaker is not only a practitioner of the Traditional American Values (i.e., is one of the Just Plain Folks), but s/he is also a spokesperson for them. In fact, this CCM forms the center of a kind of radial category; that is, many of the Traditional American Virtues are indirectly the nuclei of different, more elaborated CCMs (see Figure 2-1). This is not surprising, since from the time of Tocqueville Americans have seen themselves as a nation based on ideals, i.e., on values.

Although it is not uncommon for any American politician to appeal to "our children" as "our future," in line with the current Republican appeal to "family values" (which we know by our real-world knowledge is related to the anti-Democratic Model 6), Gingrich makes many references to children (e.g., 102-123, 212-223, 317-318, 371-389, 400-410, 460-466, 524-525), or to the corresponding Model 2 lexical item, "kids," as well as to the love of one's family:

(16) He talked about caring about our spouses and our children
and our families. (212-213 ff.)

Name of CCM:
The Spokesman for Traditional American Values

Kind of CCM
 prototype-based (ideal)

- Linguistic Characteristics**
- lexical choice: •direct reference
 (to values, e.g., "families,"
 "children/kids," etc.)
 - register:
 - casual, informal (intersects with Model 2)
 - deliberative (intersects with Model 4)
 - direct and indirect reference to iconic figures
 and events of American history

- Scenario/Frame**
Elements
(not all must be mapped)
- spokesman (intersects with Model 4)
 - audience by implicature
 - oppositional group by implicature
 - a particular set of values

- Speech Events**
- speeches (orations)

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- Blend of two models: Spokesperson/Leader who
 practices Traditional American Values.
- Some of the Traditional Values: love of
 family, love of country, honesty, hard work,
 religious/moral, mistrust of people who do not
 share these values, populism.
- evaluation = positive

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- These qualities are good things (virtues).
- It is possible to practice them (by choice).
- There are those that do not practice them.
- Those who do not practice them are Bad People.
- Most people in the U.S. practice them.
- Since most people practice these values, and
 since U.S. leaders should be "of the people,"
 U.S. leaders should practice them (and U.S.
 leaders should be those who practice them,
 since those who do not practice them are Bad
 People).

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
 Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- The Democrats do not hold these values.
- The Republicans do.
- Part of the U.S.'s purpose as a nation is to
 promote these values ('beacon of light,'
 'leader of the free world,' etc.).

(Table 2-4, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Since these values are presupposed to be good, they must be good for all people.
- People who do not hold these values should be persuaded to change.
- Since these values are good, and the Republicans hold them, the Republicans are good.
- Since the Democrats do not hold these values, and people who do not hold them are bad, the Democrats are bad.
- The spokesperson for the Republican Party can speak for Traditional American Virtues, and since most Americans hold these values, s/he can therefore speak for all Americans.

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation

Relevant Mappings

Source Domain	Target Domain
spokesman	Gingrich
holders of Values	Republicans in Congress
or	people in U.S. at large
non-holders of Values	Democrats

Hearer Interpretation

- If one accepts the mapping, one will view the self-presentation model as truthful.
- If one does not accept the mapping, the self-presentation will be viewed as a lie.
- The determination of which political party is good and which is bad will be reversed, depending on the hearer's pre-existing set of political beliefs.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Congruent with Models 2 (Just Plain Folks), 4 (Leader), 6 (Fighter), 7 (Cooperator), and 8 (Visionary) (see text)
- Clashes with Model 5 (Authoritarian), since being dictatorial is not a Traditional American Virtue
- Traditionally clashes with Model 1 (Professor), at least when Model 1 is negatively evaluated

TABLE 2-4

Gingrich's Model 3: Spokesman for Traditional American Values




FIGURE 2-1
Models Connected to the Spokesman Model
(slashes indicate non-linked CCMs)

Gingrich also refers to Traditional American Values such as hard work:

(17) We were hired to do a job . . . (279)

(18) character is the key to leadership (209)

Furthermore, the apparently unremarkable sentiment of example (18) is in fact strongly linked to The Fighter of Model 6, via our real-world knowledge that the Republicans have often attacked the Democratic President Clinton on "character" grounds.

Morality and/or religion are also common Traditional American Values, and are often appealed to by American politicians. Until the end of his speech, however, Gingrich makes very little use of either:

(19) The balanced budget is the right thing to do. But it does not in my mind have the moral urgency of coming to grips with what is happening to the poorest Americans. (362-364)

(20) you cannot believe in the Good Samaritan and explain that as long as business is making money we can walk by a fellow American who is hurt and not do something. (428-431; biblical reference: cf. Luke 10:30-37)

(21) "Today we had a bipartisan prayer service" followed by "He preached a little bit. I do not think he thought he was preaching, but he was." (205-211; here "preaching" seems to be a good thing)

At the end of the speech, religion becomes prominent. There he quotes from the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" ("The key phrase is, 'As he died to make men holy, let us live to make men free.' " [479-480]), which is also a reference point for the abolition of slavery and therefore for black Americans, a potential constituency. He also speaks about a prayer-and-fasting day supposedly held by the Constitutional Convention (501-517; for the historical inauthenticity of the Constitutional Convention story, see Wills 1995:7); and ends with the common formulaic closing of many American political speeches, ". . . God bless you" (526).

A somewhat less universally accepted but still quite common American Value recalls the historical populist position that opposes politicians to the rest of us. In the following example, "we" are at first not "politicians" (although this position is immediately negated when "we" as 'non-politicians' shifts to "our" as 'Congress's'):

- (22) We should not be happy just with the language of politicians and the language of legislation. We should insist that our [the Congress's] success for America is felt in the neighborhoods, in the communities, is felt by real people living real lives. . . (469-472)

Presented as a fundamental American value, this tradition (part of Model 2, Just Plain Folks, as well) helped the Republicans replace "career politicians" with a large number of first-time office holders in the 1994 Congressional elections and helped give Gingrich his visible political power as Speaker.

Another obvious element of the Spokesman for Traditional Values CCM consists of the invocation of important iconic figures of American history such as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the nineteenth-century Speaker Henry Clay, as well as paeans to American history in general:

- (23) Yet there is something so wonderful about the process by which a free people decides things. (7-8)
- (24) the America we are now going to try to lead grew from that tradition and is part of that great heritage . . . (21-22)

Notice also in example (23) the colloquial register of "so": an early but subtle introduction of Model 2 ("Just Plain Folks"). The quotation from the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" and the story of the Constitutional Convention are also iconic references. This feature is also strongly linked to Gingrich's American History Professor self-presentational model (Model 1).

Appropriately for a leader of a political movement that rhetorically emphasized a "return to the people" by de-emphasizing the role of the national, federal government, and also rhetorically emphasized a return to "family values," the Just Plain Folks and Spokesman models are the most common CCMS in Gingrich's speech.

3.4. Model 4: "The Leader."

Table 2-5 presents some of the important linguistic markers of Model 4, The Leader:

Clearly, one role of the Speaker of the House is to lead, so it is not surprising that Gingrich also explicitly presents himself as a leader of his fellow Representatives:

- (25) Our challenge should not be anything that is just
 legislative. We are supposed to, each one of us, be
 leaders. I think my challenge has to be to set as our goal,
 . . . (456-459)

However, he does not seem to notice the odd implicature introduced by the denigrating "just" at the beginning of example (25) and supported by the anti-politician populism of Model 2: that enacting legislation that charts the course of the country is somehow not "being a leader."

Name of CCM: The Leader

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (ideal)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: direct reference
(e.g., "leaders," "rule")
- syntax: •direct
 •not highly subordinated
- register: •casual (interaction with Model 2)
 •deliberative
- maxims: followed as closely as possible:
 - Quantity: say only what is needed: do not waste followers' time (especially if the followers are Just Plain Folks who have plenty of honest work to do)
 - Quality: tell the truth (because who can trust a leader who lies?)
 - Relevance: be relevant (again, do not waste followers' time)
 - Manner: be brief and unambiguous (a good leader's instructions should be easily understandable)
- CCM-evoking speech acts: •directives, commands/injunctions; •instructions; •exhortations

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all must be mapped)

- leader
- group of followers
- task or goal
- perhaps opposition to group's achieving the goal

Speech Events

- orations
- summaries
- suggestions
- perhaps commands (if followers agree to being commanded)

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- leader is strong, respected by followers, has talents appropriate for the task(s) at hand (probably superior to others in the group)
- at the same time, the leader is Just Plain Folks (populism; "first among equals")
- evaluation = positive

(Table 2-5, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- The leader of one's own group (or allies) will be good, the leader of one's opponents bad.
- There is a task or set of tasks for which a person to speak for the group, or for which coordination, is needed.
- The "best person for the job" will "rise to the top" (i.e., choice of a leader is based on merit and abilities).
- This person will be accepted by the group without internal dispute (because of clear ability).
- The leader shares the values of the group.
- There may be opposition from others, or other kinds of difficulties.

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- The task (= governing the country) has external opposition, embodied in the Democratic Party.
- The Republican Party embodies the good virtues.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Since the Republican Party is the good party, all Americans should listen to them. (This entailment has less to do with Gingrich's self-presentation as leader than it does with the mapping.)
- Since Gingrich is the leader of the Republican Party, Gingrich should be the leader of all Americans.

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation

Relevant Mappings

Source Domain	Target Domain
leader	Gingrich
followers	Republican Party
	or Congress as a whole
	or Americans as a whole
(the various mappings of the "followers" are reflected in the varying referents of "we"/"us"/"our")	
task	directing U.S. policy
opposition to task	Democratic Party

Hearer Interpretation

- If one accepts the CCM presuppositions, entailments, and mapping, one will accept Gingrich's extended self-presentation as the Leader of the American people, and the speech may be viewed as an exhortation.

(Table 2-5, continued)

- If one does not accept the presuppositions and/or entailments, or rejects the mapping, and the speech will be rejected as exhortation.
- The interpretation often depends greatly on hearer's own pre-existing set of political beliefs.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Congruent with Model 3 (Speaker for Traditional American Values) and Model 2 (Just Plain Folks; with the traditional Leader as *primus inter pares* in a democracy).
- If real-world opposition is presupposed, congruent with Model 6 (The Fighter).
- No inherent clashes, but there may be clashes based on real-world presuppositions and especially on the mapping (whether "followers" = Republican Party).

TABLE 2-5
Gingrich's Model 4: The Leader

3.5. Model 5: "The Authoritarian."

It can be argued that Gingrich's view of leadership is authoritarian. From the beginning of the speech, where he describes governance as "rule" (a word from the frames of kings and dictators [cf. 148, 200-203] and applied specifically to the last forty years of Democratic majority, but applicable also to his own approach to leadership) to the end, he more than once offers in close proximity both the Cooperator (Model 7) stance that is a strongly traditional element of the 'Speaker's inaugural speech' genre and the Authoritarian position that seems to be his addition. Like so much else in the speech, this Authoritarian position can be viewed either positively--as the Traditional American Value of strong leadership--or negatively--as dictatorship. (See Table 2-6.) We have already seen how Gingrich simultaneously appeals to and asserts the Authority of a Professor by violating the Maxim of Quantity. He also asserts Authority by subtle lexical choices ("allowed" rather than, say, 'invited' in example [26] below), by imperatives (e.g., example [27]), and by the assumption of the right to speak (example [28]):

(26) I allowed him to come up here and sit and be Speaker (186-187)

(27) Remember, this is the very beginning of perestroika and glasnost. (188)

(28) But let me say about everything else (325; cf. 305-306, 395, 411, etc.)

Name of CCM: The Authoritarian

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (stereotype)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "I allowed")
- evocation of other frames of authority
(e.g., psychotherapist)
- register: •deliberative
- pronoun reference: •first person
- speech acts: •CCM-evoking imperatives
(commands); •instructions; •exhortations

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all must be mapped)

- leader
- followers (coherent group)
- task or goal
- perhaps opponents and/or other
types of difficulties that block
achievement of the task

Speech Events

- speeches (orations)
- reports
- orders

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- matters are black or white; no compromise, no
opposition allowed
- if seen as harshness: evaluation = negative
- if seen as strength: evaluation = positive

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- There is a task or set of tasks for which a
person to speak for the group, or for which
coordination, is needed.
- A "strong hand at the helm" is needed, because
of internal or external opposition, or
because of the difficulty of the task.
- Someone who is able to enforce his/her will on
the group will become leader.
- Authoritarian leaders can compel even unwilling
followers to act in certain ways.

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- The task has external opposition, embodied in
the Democratic Party.
- The Republican Party embodies the good virtues.
- Stern times demand sternness.

(Table 2-6, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Since the Republican Party is the good party, all Americans should listen to them. (This entailment has less to do with Gingrich's self-presentation as leader than it does with the mapping.)
- Since Gingrich is the leader of the Republican Party, Gingrich should be the leader of all Americans.
- Authoritarian leadership is more extreme than "regular" leadership; therefore, an Authoritarian leader is better or worse (depending on one's point of view) than other leaders.

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation

Relevant Mappings

Source Domain	Target Domain
leader	Gingrich
followers	Republican Party
	or Congress as a whole
	or Americans as a whole
(the various mappings of the "followers" are reflected in the varying referents of "we"/"us"/"our")	
task	directing U.S. policy
opposition to task	Democratic Party

Hearer Interpretation

- If one accepts the CCM presuppositions, entailments, and mapping, one will accept Gingrich's extended self-presentation as the Leader of the American people; his Authoritarianism will be seen as strength; and the speech may be viewed as an exhortation.
- If one does not accept the presuppositions and/or entailments, or rejects the mapping, the speech will be rejected as exhortation, and Gingrich will be seen as a would-be dictator.
- The interpretation often depends greatly on hearer's own pre-existing set of political beliefs.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Congruent with Model 3 (Speaker for Traditional American Values) and Model 2 (Just Plain Folks; in that a traditional Leader is *primus inter pares* in a democracy), but clashes with Just Plain Folks in that the Just Plain Folks value of independence does not accept authoritarian dictates
- If real-world opposition is presupposed, congruent with Model 6 (The Fighter)

(Table 2-6, continued)

- May be clashes based on real-world presuppositions and especially mapping (whether "followers" = Republican Party).

TABLE 2-6
Gingrich's Model 5: The Authoritarian

The already mentioned example of the Russian and Lithuanian visitors to Congress from which examples (26) and (27) (and [9]) are taken is also connected with Model 1, giving a history lesson as a context for the anecdote with Gingrich is the expert who must remind his listeners of the facts. Again, this could be seen interpreted either as a friendly reminder of an important aspect of the context that they know but perhaps have forgotten, or as a lecture that the audience needs because he thinks they are ignorant. Furthermore, its somewhat informal style overlaps with Model 2 (Just Plain Folks).

In lines 233 ff., Gingrich uses explicit Authority (the imperative "leave") and ends with the following implicit Authority:

(29) This may seem particularly inappropriate to say on the first day (234-235)

That is, it may be inappropriate--but I have the authority to say it anyway.

Gingrich presents himself as another type of Authority figure in the passage given as example (30):

(30) I will listen to each of you. I will try to work with each of you. I will put in long hours, and I will guarantee that I will listen to you first. I will let you get it all out before I give you my version (492-495)

Note the register differences between the highly colloquial Model 2 "get it all out," which also perhaps most commonly suggests a frame in which someone is emotionally distressed, and the more standard though still relatively informal "giv[ing] you my version," which evokes a CCM that

is much more reasonable and rational (Model 5, Authoritarian, and Model 1, Professorial).

Listening and then "giv[ing] my version" may further suggest to some--especially those predisposed to a negative assessment of Gingrich--an Authoritarian disregard of 'your version'. To his partisans, however, it could be read as a form of dialogue, though not a prototypical conversation with ongoing turntaking.

In addition, the language in example (30) may suggest therapeutic dialogue, which involves yet another kind of Authority. Although psychiatric care and psychotherapy are no longer as highly stigmatized in American society as they previously were,⁴ and although in the 1990s it is not uncommon to be or have been under the care of a therapist or at least to have read a therapeutic self-help book or listened to a radio call-in psychologist, these are still not entirely positive cognitive models for all Americans, especially for the stereotypical and symbolically significant Just Plain Folks with their Traditional American Value of self-reliance. Nevertheless, here Gingrich is taking the role of the therapist and not that of the patient, so he is not risking much of any stigma that remains. Perhaps more importantly, appeals to psychotherapeutic explanations of and remedies for social as well as personal ills have for some time been generally acceptable and for many even preferred. For these reasons, a mental health care professional is indeed now often framed as a figure of Authority, trust, and even compassion.⁵

⁴In 1972, for example, Thomas Eagleton was forced to leave the campaign as (Democrat) George McGovern's vice-presidential running mate when it was revealed that as a young man he had undergone treatment for depression.

⁵As a self-proclaimed political and social 'conservative', however, Gingrich cannot strongly emphasize psychotherapy, since one of the stereotypical fundamental tenets of 'conservatism' is self-reliance (an element of Models 2 and 3). (For a discussion of

This CCM is also related to Model 1, since the prototypical Professor by virtue of great knowledge also has authority to speak on a subject.

It might be argued that Gingrich in fact undermines Model 5 by constructions that weaken his assertions, such as hypotheticals and negatives ("If we could build that attitude . . . , we would be an amazingly different place," 436-437; "Our challenge shouldn't be just to balance the budget or to pass the Contract. Our challenge should not be anything that is just legislative," 455-457), and especially by his extensive use of the "I + verb" construction to preface a propositional statement that would have been complete without it:

(31) *Beyond the Contract I think there are two giant challenges.*

(289)

(32) *I have said that I think Social Security ought to be off limits (322-323)*

These features are especially noticeable when his inaugural speech is compared with that of Martin in 1947, in which the last previous Republican Speaker laid out an agenda that is strongly reminiscent of the current Contract, but presented very firmly and assertively with many examples of "must": "we must keep the torch of freedom and progress alight in America" (80 Congressional Record 1947:35, col. 3); "The Government's control over the private affairs of the citizens must be ended, and the people's control over their Government must be fully restored"; and so on (pp. 35-36). According to Martin's presentation,

the generalized stereotypical cognitive systems of American 'liberals' and 'conservatives', see G. Lakoff 1996.)

the Republicans "intend to reduce" Government costs and tax rates, balance the budget, and pay off the national debt (37: col.1): "We have given that promise to the American people, and we intend that it shall be fulfilled" (35: col.1).

Gingrich's version of the Republican agenda is less explicitly assertive. In a time of less American self-certainty and a lack of domestic consensus about the proper role of the federal government, this is perhaps understandable. Instead of "must," he uses other, less powerful auxiliaries: "I hope we can have" (293; cf. 337), "is going to be" (450), "we are supposed to . . . be" (457-458; notice also the informal style of this passage), "I think our challenge has to be" (458), "This ought to be" (460), "We should insist" (470), "We should not be happy just with the language of politicians" (469).

Gingrich's extensive use of the first person singular pronouns ("my" and especially "I") is also very noticeable in comparison with the inaugural speeches of the other Speakers, and gives the speech a strong sense of 'ego'-centricity (i.e., a speaker's focus on him/herself). As already mentioned, Gingrich does not limit his use of "I" to unavoidable contexts--e.g., "I agree with everything Congressman Gephardt said" (481-482). Rather, he also uses it in utterances where it adds nothing to the propositional structure and therefore where its effect can be to introduce himself 'unnecessarily' into the discourse (as in examples [30] and [31]). Thus, this construction can serve to foreground Gingrich's ideas and participation by another apparent violation of Quantity.

Conversely, this construction can also serve as equivocation, to hedge his assertions, especially since intonationally they are almost

throwaway. He may also be trying to be The Cooperator of Model 7, making suggestions instead of giving commands. Either self-assertiveness or humility would be coherent with at least some of the other models (humility with Model 2, Just Plain Folks, and assertiveness with Models 1, The Professor, and 6, The Fighter), and the hearers' interpretations will most likely be made on ideological grounds.

Whatever the reason, Gingrich's frequent use of "I think" and other verbs in explicit agenda passages is also more in line with current rhetorical preferences, which have become increasingly more 'personal' and less 'oratorical'.⁶

This sense of "ego"-centeredness can be viewed as supplemented by Gingrich's extensive use of superlatives in describing the events in which he is participating, although, again, one might argue that the superlatives are dictated by the nature of the events themselves, not by his participation in them.

3.6. The genre of the speech, and "more is better."

In line with his several CCM-related violations of the Maxim of Quantity (already discussed), Gingrich seems to hold to the old saw "If one [instance] is good, more than one is better." For example, his speech is much longer than the others in the comparison group.⁷ It requires nearly twelve columns in the *Congressional record*, as opposed

⁶As previously mentioned, I have not discussed linguistic gender stereotypes in this analysis, but some of Gingrich's adjectives and speech act hedges are often considered typical 'women's language' (in the sense of, e.g., R. Lakoff 1970). This is in line with the 'privatizing' of American public discourse style (see, e.g., Jamieson 1988, R. Lakoff 1990). (For the pragmatic effects of speech act qualification, see R. Lakoff 1980.)

⁷Gingrich's speech was compared to eight previous 'Speaker's inaugural' speeches: two by the last Republican Speaker before Gingrich, Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (1947, 1953) and at least one by the most important Democratic Speakers since Martin, namely, Sam Rayburn (1961), Carl Albert (1971), Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, Jr. (1977), Jim Wright (1987), and Tom Foley (1989, 1993).

to 5.5 columns (Foley 1989), 5+ columns (Martin 1947), 4.75 columns (Wright [1987]), 2.75 columns (Martin 1953), 2 columns (O'Neill [1977], Albert [1971], Foley 1993), and slightly more than 1 column (Rayburn [1961]). In like fashion, previous Speakers present only one or two American quotations or references in their inaugural speeches (except for Albert, who had four); Gingrich has six.

One of the traditional sections of the 'Speaker's inaugural speech' genre is the introduction, which involves the expression of gratitude to one's predecessors in office and one's colleagues and the acknowledgment of the presence of one's family. In 1947, Joseph Martin began his speech by expressing gratitude to his colleagues for his election and acknowledging his predecessor. Martin in 1953, Rayburn in 1961, Albert in 1971, and O'Neill in 1977 began very similarly, often using the words "gratitude" and/or "humility," and often mentioning previous Speakers by name.

In 1987 Jim Wright broke the pattern by not actually beginning with the usual expression of this familiar theme, although he thanks the previous Speaker (O'Neill) shortly thereafter. He thanked his colleagues, his predecessors, his wife, and their four children; then in 1989, in a style reminiscent of contemporary televised entertainment awards such as the Oscars or Emmys, the next Speaker, Tom Foley, thanked his constituents, mentors, and predecessors as Speaker, his staff, teachers, and friends, and his wife, mother, sister, and father. Foley's 1989 speech could have been Gingrich's direct model--there are major similarities--or both could derive from the entertainment-awards prototype of the "acceptance speech" genre.

This part of Gingrich's speech is somewhat digressively organized (as is the whole text), but its content is very traditional, thanking his predecessor (Foley), the House officers, and long-serving Republican Congressmen. He extends the related, also traditional, section, which mentions the members of the Speaker's family and friends who are present in the House chamber: in Gingrich's case his mother, his father, his daughters, their husbands, his wife, his three nieces, and his three nephews (86-111). These sections are extended both in length and in level of detail--a feature of "more is better" that is seen consistently throughout Gingrich's speech.

In the next section (112-204), the movement of Gingrich's speech from those he thanks and his family to the "common" (anti-aristocratic) and diverse nature of the House and of America itself is also paralleled in Foley's first speech:

(33) Foley: We are proud to call this the People's House, the fundamental institution of American democracy. Although it is not the oldest parliament in the world, it has existed longer as an independent, popularly elected legislature than any other in the history of mankind.

. . .

This body reflects most closely the Nation at large. It is not, as many have suggested, a fixed, unchangeable body. We have even been called the House of Lords. The fact of the matter is that there is constantly a refreshment from every part of the country as new Members come from all quarters,

from every background, of every race and creed and color and
commitment to serve here. (p. 10802: col. 2)

However, this section of Gingrich's 1995 speech is, again, much longer than the corresponding sections of the previous speeches in the comparison group.

Adjectives are repeated many times. Foley used "bipartisan" once or twice in his speech; Gingrich uses the word three times within just one passage. Certain evaluative adjectives (especially superlatives in form or sense, such as "great," 18, 22, or "extraordinary"/ "extraordinarily," 24, 32) are repeated by Gingrich many times. "Overwhelmed"/"overwhelming" appears seven times in one passage (39-48; the early repetitions are in clauses which balance each other rhetorically). Taken singly, these adjectives can be seen as modest: in the light of so much history and tradition, who could help but feel overwhelmed? Conversely, especially when taken in connection with the multiple uses of "I" already discussed, they can be seen as reinforcing an impression of 'ego'-centricity. Once again, the hearers' preferred interpretations will owe as much to the personal views that are brought to the speech as to anything contributed decisively by the language.

One more-is-better-related detail of Gingrich's speech that might as first seem completely idiosyncratic in fact is not. This is his reference to his gavels: he has two, not just one, and one of them is not only new but larger than usual:

(34) I have two gavels. . . . This was a Georgia gavel I just got this morning, done by Dorsey Newman of Tallapoosa. He decided that the gavels he saw on TV weren't big enough or

strong enough, so he cut down a walnut tree in his backyard, made a gavel, put a commemorative item on it, and sent it up here. So this is a genuine Georgia gavel. . . . (49-55; cf. 60-63)

Speaker Wright also mentioned an oversized gavel given to him by someone from his home state who saw television coverage and noticed the smaller gavel:

(35) Let it be observed that the outsize gavel I am presently using is a gift from the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Gib Lewis, who said he had been watching television coverage of the House on C-SPAN and could not understand why we in Congress were using what he called such wimpy, little gavels. (4: 1: first paragraph of speech)

This episode (related also to Models 2 and 4) provided a 'sound bite' for some of the media coverage, and the irony of the situation is worth noting. In the late 1980s Gingrich was highly instrumental in removing Wright from the Speakership (see, e.g., Barry 1989), primarily on the grounds of ethics violations involving publication of a book in a situation that many of Gingrich's critics have publicly considered to be similar to a publication arrangement made by Gingrich himself.

3.7. Some further comments on speech acts.

In the agenda part of his speech, Gingrich uses many performatives, mostly implicit or explicit (but restricted) promises. In the "Contract with America" section (237-288), for example, what does Gingrich promise?

(36) We then say that within the first 100 days . . . we shall bring to the House floor the following bills (262-263)

To 'say that we shall do' something is understood as a prediction or a promise. However, the phrase does not actually promise--explicitly or otherwise--that the bills will be passed--as in fact most were not.

Similarly, in another passage at the end of the speech Gingrich says:

(37) [I] pledge to you that, if each of us will reach out prayerfully and try to genuinely understand each other, if we will recognize that in this building we symbolize America, and that we have an obligation to talk with each other, then I think a year from now we can look on the 104th Congress as a truly amazing institution without regard to party, without regard to ideology.⁸ (518-523)

Once more he invokes powerful American cultural cognitive models, including especially The Spokesman for Traditional American Values (Model 3) and the rare-for-this-speech Cooperator (Model 7), but he does not actually promise that anything substantive will result, although one of the most likely interpretations is to understand it that way. 'If-then' constructions can often be interpreted as wishes. However, they can also merely be declaratives as to future cause and effect relationships, even those which the speaker has no intention of desiring or bringing to pass. The closest thing to an explicit promise here is his comment "that we have an obligation to talk with each other" (*italics*

⁸"Amazing" is an adjective perhaps more associated with 'simple country boys in the big city', i.e., Just Plain Folks, Model 2, than it is with long-term national politicians.

added); furthermore, the use of "recognize" presupposes that the speaker believes that such an obligation does in fact exist. Although obligations are not always met and no conditions for such talk are given, this passage will in fact probably be interpreted most often as a promise to be nonpartisan, reinforced perhaps by his use of "will" rather than a simple present or the more prescriptively correct but rarely heard subjunctive ('were to') in the "if"-clause. Bipartisanship is a traditional theme for the 'Speaker's inaugural' speech, addressing as it does members from both parties; it has not in fact been carried out.

At the end of the speech, Gingrich breaks his pattern and uses the explicit verb "promise" (491) and the "will" constructions seen earlier in example (30) (492-497). However, here as before Gingrich continues to exhibit the caginess for which politicians are often criticized. That is, he does not promise to act on what he is told, or even to discuss it after "you get it all out" and he "give[s]" you "his version."

Furthermore, despite any good will, if all that Democrats and Republicans can do is "try" to understand each other, and if the only way they can talk to "each other" is to decide that they have an "obligation" to do so, then any agreement will surely be grudging and hard to achieve, despite what Americans think they are hearing.⁹

⁹Before leaving the subject of speech acts, there is one more interesting passage. Near the beginning of the speech (155-162), Gingrich issues what sounds in hindsight very much like an implicit warning:

- (i) It is the most marvelous act of a complex giant country trying to argue and talk. And, as Dick Gephardt said, to have a great debate, to reach great decisions, not through a civil war, not by bombing one of our regional capitals, not by killing a half million people, and not by having snipers. Let me say unequivocally, I condemn all acts of violence against the law by all people for all reasons. This is a society of law and a society of civil behavior.

3.8. Model 6: "The Fighter."

In general American culture, a willingness to 'stand up for one's beliefs' is one of the Traditional Values of Model 3. However, this readiness establishes a separate, more specific 'combative' frame in experiential domains that are conventionally viewed as competitive, such as politics. See Table 2-7 for some of the contextualization cues of this Fighter CCM.

In specifically political terms, references to 'bipartisanship', in its usual political-talk reading of 'cooperation', are built into the genre of the 'Speaker's inaugural' speech, just as they are built into the presidential State of the Union address, and for much the same reason: they are delivered by a government official who is supposed to represent the whole of the American people, not just one political party.

In practice, of course, in the American two-party electoral system, this Model 7 Cooperation between political parties that is conventionally represented by the term 'bipartisan' is set within an

In light of the April Oklahoma City bombing—"one of our regional capitals"—this passage takes on a possible interpretation that it did not have for most hearers at the time.

It may have been nothing more than a reference to a situation such as that of Bosnia. Words and phrases such as "civil war," "killing half a million people," and "snipers" seem to support this reading. However, at the time, none of these dangers seemed possible in the United States; nevertheless, this strong condemnation of violence includes explicit deictic references to the U.S. ("our," "this"). The last two sentences especially seem, in retrospect, to be stern warnings, especially as delivered. Now that it is known that politically 'right-wing' extremist militia groups and individuals have for some time been more widespread and more armed than most Americans had realized (most Americans did not even know of their existence), and that the Federal Building in Oklahoma City had long been targeted, it seems at least possible that Gingrich—knowing something that most of the general public did not know—was indeed trying to warn such extremists off. Even if this is the case—and it may not be—I do not mean to imply that Gingrich necessarily had knowledge of the plan that was put into effect in April, 1995—merely that it now appears that there were several plans of this sort in the extreme right-wing community, and therefore it is not unreasonable that rumors might have reached him.

If it is a warning--and it was also delivered intonationally in a manner consistent with a veiled warning--it is not unambiguous, but the timing and phrasing are intriguing.

Name of CCM: The Fighter

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (stereotype)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •words referring to antagonism, including via metaphor (e.g., POLITICS IS WAR)
- lexical choice: •pejorative words being attributed to only one side
- syntax: •explicit syntactic, cognitive, and discourse-iconic equations and oppositions (e.g., 'Republicans' and 'good things' are mentioned first and 'Democrats' and 'bad things' second in parallel lists)
- maxims: •directness in establishing good/evil sides
- speech acts: exhortations; ideological assertions; perhaps commands and boasts

**Scenario/Frame
Elements**

(not all must be mapped)

- two opposed groups: "us" and "them"
- perhaps an unaligned group
- something under dispute

Speech Events

- attacks on the other side
- defense

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- combat of good versus evil; "we" are willing to suffer to defend the good; "they" are bad
- Americans' willingness to fight for a principle (idealism), and/or the underdog
- evaluation = positive

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- There are two sides, the good and the evil.
- The boundaries are clear and unambiguous.
- The issue under dispute is clear.
- Sacrifices may be necessary, but are worth it for the right (i.e., our side) to prevail.
- Even against all odds, struggle for the good side is worth it.
- If disagreement is over principle, cooperation and/or compromise is not acceptable (it would be "giving in to evil").
- If one must stand alone for principle or for the good, so be it.
- Cooperation is not always a bad thing (though compromise usually is bad), but it is lower ranked than standing up for principle.

(Table 2-7, continued)

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- The Democrats and Republicans are in sharp opposition to each other in most if not all issues.
- The boundaries between their positions are sharp.
- Members of the opposite political party (here, the Democrats) are not honest, frank, etc.
- The Republicans characterize the Democrats as the focus of "big [federal] government spending."

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- "We" must oppose "them" at all turns, because they are bad.

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation

Relevant Mappings

<i>Source Domain</i>	<i>Target Domain</i>
"us" (good side)	Gingrich and his supporters (specifically, Republicans)
"them" (bad side)	Democrats and their supporters
(No mapping for House or Congress or America as a whole.)	
(Mapping depends on deictic reference of pronouns.)	

Hearer Interpretation

- Depends on the mapping.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Intersects with Spokesman for Traditional American Values, and with various reference-based CCMs (George Washington, Davy Crockett, John Wayne, etc.)
- The reference-based CCM "The Wild West" (not discussed here) is important.
- Clashes with Model 7 (The Cooperator); perhaps with Model 1 (The Professor), since according to Traditional American Values action is more highly valued than talk.

TABLE 2-7
Gingrich's Model 6: The Fighter

underlyingly adversarial framework. Gingrich's speech is no exception. Although his first lines speak (using conventional political language) of "my good friend, [Democrat] Dick Gephardt" (and cf. 156-157, 345-346, 355, 481-482), Gingrich immediately introduces the Republican/Democratic split in terms of the last forty years in lines 2 and 3 (and *passim*) ("my side," "40 years of Democratic rule," "my side of the aisle," "the losing side"). Furthermore, he clearly thinks that politics is a combat, although cognitively it does not have to be. (The 'construal' relationship of politics to the metaphorical "families" of competition and cooperation is something I have discussed elsewhere [Morgan 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1998; also see below, chapter 3].). For example:

(38) It is the most marvelous act of a complex giant country
trying to argue and talk (155-156)

(39) this and the other body across the way [the Senate] are
where freedom has to be fought out (201-203)

Note the order of the verbs in example (38)--the semantic repartitioning shows that "argue" here has an adversarial sense--and the implicit characterization in example (39) of the House and Senate as a necessary battleground, although without any explicit enemy, in an agentless passive that avoids assigning responsibility. The enemy is therefore presumably the other party, the Democrats.

In the following example, the two 'sides' are the Republicans and the 'leftists':

(40) every Member on both sides . . . I say to those Republicans
. . . I would say to my friends on the left who believe

there has never been a government program that was not worth keeping (427-432)

This is a very partisan equating of all Democrats with "leftist" politics, and is a much more damaging label than the usual Republican collocation of 'liberal Democrat'. "Leftist" is a very negative term for most Americans of both parties, and is not at all outweighed by the politically conventional "my friends."

In general, negative words are explicitly or implicitly associated with the Democrats, primarily through Gingrich's exploitation of his hearers' real-world knowledge that the Democrats have been in control of the House for forty years (as he reminded the hearers in line 3), and that therefore whatever has happened during those forty years ought to be attributed to them ("We can find ways immediately to do things better," 407-408). The only two alternatives presented here are the "humans" or the "bureaucracies" (434-435), and there is a collection of negatively evaluated lexical items that are used to talk about the current situation of children: "killed," "buried," "equal to slavery," "dead," "lost", "end up,"¹⁰ "dumpsters," "doomed," "dangerous," and "jail" (371-386, 400-410).

Furthermore, Gingrich opposes the "welfare state" (of the Democrats) to the "opportunity society" (of the Republicans) in a rather

¹⁰"End up" usually implies a negative evaluation of some part of the situation: a person may be in a good situation undeservedly ("He ended up in the White House despite his negative political advertising"), or the situation may be deserved but not good ("They finally caught her stealing and she ended up in jail"). Compare "Despite his college education, he ended up as a store clerk" (that is, there is implicit disapproval of this outcome and implicit assignation of blame to him) and "Despite his college education, he ended up as a store manager," which sounds somewhat odder. Perhaps this is because it implies that being a store manager should also be viewed disapprovingly as 'beneath' his educational level, a conclusion--unlike the store clerk situation--that is not always generally agreed upon in the United States.

lengthy passage (299-438, not tightly focused), most explicitly in the following examples:

(41) The second ["giant"] challenge ["beyond the Contract with America"] is . . . to truly replace the current welfare state with an opportunity society (299-300; note the informal, Just Plain Folks syntax of the split infinitive; seen also elsewhere occasionally in this speech)

(42) We must replace the welfare state with an opportunity society. (361)

In general usage, the "welfare frame" and its entailments and presuppositions are debatably positive or negative in evaluation, with the judgment being closely linked to political parties, but those of "opportunity" are entirely positive. Exactly which actions and programs constitute "opportunity," however, is of course precisely the point at issue.

In the preceding lines (345-360), Gingrich the Cooperator (Model 7, below) has already identified the "liberal wing of the Democratic Party" and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt with "hope" for a Nation and with integration, two things whose goodness essentially no one (except the most extreme of the extremists) disputes. He has also identified former President Reagan and current Republicans with some kind of plan to deal with the economic challenges, in the discussion of which the reference to the Civil Rights movement is embedded. Discourse iconicity in the order of the collocation of "welfare" and "opportunity" reinforces Gingrich's pre-existing real-world Republican assertion that

the Democrats--mentioned first in the preceding paragraphs--are responsible for the "welfare state", and therefore with the public housing projects and the deaths of children which are mentioned almost immediately following. The 'Republican = good, Democrat = bad' equations are further supported by the general American cultural preference for that which replaces as automatically better than that which is replaced (i.e., 'new and improved').

Similarly, by the discourse iconicity of corresponding second places, the Republicans are associated with the "opportunity society" (see above) and with "find[ing] ways immediately to do things better" (408). In addition, Gingrich explicitly asks:

(43) How can we not decide that this is a moral crisis equal to segregation, equal to slavery? How can we not insist that every day we take steps to do something? (378-381)

Who is the "we"? It could be "any American" (375, and in fact syntactically seems to be), but it is Americans taking the "steps" of the Republicans' "opportunity society" to end this "moral crisis" just as the Democrats previously ended segregation--acting either in flattering imitation of the Democrats or in usurpation of the moral ground, depending once again on one's assessment of Gingrich and the Republicans in general. Furthermore, this is not merely an option; it is something that we "must" do (in one of Gingrich's rare uses of "must," example [42]).

Since Gingrich never mentions specifically what any of the Democrats' "negative" actions have been, there are no details to

challenge his "welfare state" characterization of what the Democratic Party--especially its "liberal wing" (349-350)--established.

3.9. Pronouns.

Before going on to the next CCM, a few last words about Gingrich's use of pronouns--specifically his use of "we"--may be in order. In cases where the referent is clear, the "we" of Gingrich's speech almost always refers to the members of the House of Representatives (or Congress as a whole)--at times explicitly differentiated from the rest of America:

(44) We have to reach out to the American people (439-440; cf. 499)

(45) We should insist that our success for America is felt in the neighborhoods, in the communities, is felt by real people living real lives (470-472)

This populist-based "opposition" of Congress to the American populace is not necessarily untraditional, but it is not common in this genre because it is usually not very relevant: the Speaker's 'inaugural' speech is usually not broadcast to the wider American public. Usually, the audience is in fact just the members of the House.

However, in this speech the referent of "we" is not always clear. In many of these cases the referent seems to be either the members of the House, which is traditional, or else to the Republicans, but often it is not possible to decide which of these is meant. This may reflect Gingrich's own equation: the majority party is the House. In either

case, his use of "we" and "they" is generally part of his adversarial cognitive model of American party politics (Model 6, "The Fighter").

3.10. Model 7: "The Cooperator."

Model 7, The Cooperator, can also be seen as representing one of the Traditional American Values (Model 3). As Benjamin Franklin put it at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, "We must indeed all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately." See Table 2-8 for some contextualization cues and other details of this CCM, including, again, lexical choice.

References to Model 7 in this speech are of two kinds: those dictated by the conventions of the genre ("my good friend, Dick Gephardt," 1-2, and several other positive references to Gephardt, *passim*), and, more often, those that are to a degree inherently negated in this speech by the already discussed adversarial presuppositions of Model 6, The Fighter (e.g., "bipartisan," *passim*). Near the end of the speech, Gingrich explicitly assigns priority to Model 7 in this implicit CCM clash: "I promise each of you that without regard to party my door is going to be open" (491-492).

A statement such as that in example (46) below is essentially a Model 7 appeal to Models 2 and 3 and to American tradition in general, as reinforced by the introduction of the "commoners" theme at the beginning of the utterance. The use of "to some extent" to weaken the mention of partisan politics can be read either as an honest appeal to Cooperation or as a deflection of the issue of partnership in favor of the less demanding appeal to American tradition:

(46) Here we are as commoners together, to some extent

Name of CCM: The Cooperator

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (ideal)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "together," "all")
- lexical choice: •genre conventions
(e.g., "my good friend," "bipartisan support" [but see discussion of "bipartisan" in text])
- lexical choice: •CCM-evoking via metaphor of COOPERATION
(e.g., POLITICS IS A FAMILY)

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all must be mapped)

- "us" versus "them"
(not necessarily a confrontational situation)
- set of decisions/actions

Speech Events

- conversations
- discussions
- summaries

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- amiable, slow to anger
- evaluation = positive (usually)
- evaluation = in a highly polarized confrontational situation can be *negative* (i.e., "a wimp")

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- People have the possibility of disagreement.
- People should work hard to avoid disagreements.
That is, working together is preferable to conflict.
- If there is conflict, it is still possible to seek common ground and work together for common goals.

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- Democrats and Republicans disagree in many things.
- But there is a greater, overriding "good of all." This is the goal toward which everyone should work.

(Table 2-8, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- It is possible for Democrats and Republicans to work together for the good of all Americans.
- It is desirable to do so.

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation
- With respect to his opponents: instantiation

Relevant Mappings

Source Domain	Target Domain
"us"	Gingrich and his supporters (specifically, Republicans)
	or the House or Congress
	or all Americans
"them"	Democrats and their supporters
goal	good of all America
(The mapping depends on the deictic reference of pronouns.)	

Hearer Interpretation

- Depends on the mapping.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Intersects with Spokesman for Traditional American Values (Model 3).
- Clashes with Model 6, The Fighter.

TABLE 2-8
Gingrich's Model 7: The Cooperator

Democrats and Republicans, to some extent liberals and conservatives, but Americans all. (163-165)

The appeal at the end of the speech is conventional, and also makes a similar appeal to Model 3 (The Spokesman for Traditional American Values):

(47) [I] pledge to you that, if each of us will reach out prayerfully and try to genuinely understand each other, if we will recognize that in this building we symbolize America, and that we have an obligation to talk with each other, then I think a year from now we can look on the 104th Congress as a truly amazing institution without regard to party, without regard to ideology. (518-523; = example 37)

A clearer evocation of the spirit of cooperation would have resulted from a more frequent use of the more neutral but certainly less conventional word "nonpartisan," which lacks the reminder of the existence of the Democrats (although it does imply the existence of one or more unspecified party or parties), and therefore does not reinforce the presupposition of an adversarial situation. A person can be without any party affiliation at all and be called "nonpartisan." The use of this word would also have been consistent with the Republicans' emphasis on 'less government'. However, "nonpartisan" is used by Gingrich only once, and that nearly at the end of the speech:

(48) I want us to dedicate ourselves to reach out in a genuinely nonpartisan way to be honest with each other. (489-491)

Within the American political framework, of course, as already discussed, the term "bipartisan" is conventionally understood as emphasizing not its adversarial underpinnings, but rather Cooperation and "working together" (e.g., 445, 448, 451; 218, 224, 226, 286, etc.; cf. 237-238 and 280-281). Gingrich also speaks of creating "a partnership" (439) and having "a real dialog" (293), but it is hard to see clearly who the partners are to be. They might be Democrats and Republicans, or they might be Congress and the rest of America. Since he goes on to use the word "bipartisan" several times, he probably means the two parties, but in both cases both possibilities exist.

Despite the occasional laudatory references (e.g., to the Democrats' ending of segregation and to FDR, especially 345-354), and despite the few explicit Cooperative comments such as "There is much we can share with each other" (359-360; also 280-282, 439), Gingrich has not been known for being a cooperator, and the overall weakness of Model 7 in this speech reflects that ideology.

3.11. Model 8: "The Visionary."

The relative absence of Model 8 (see Table 2-9) in this speech is surprising, considering its inaugural context as a 'beginning' speech and especially given Gingrich's other speeches, statements, and books, which provide evidence for his longstanding interest in 'futurism' from at least the 1970s to the present (also see, e.g., Wills 1995). For example, he wrote the foreword to *Creating a new civilization*, a 1995 book by futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler, many of whose ideas he has long espoused and who have been called his "gurus" by Wills (1995: 4; see also, e.g., Bruck 1995.) (Alvin Toffler wrote the popularly

Name of CCM: The Visionary

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (stereotype)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "hope," "transforming," "future,"
"where we are going," etc.)
- CCM-evoking: •propositions about the future
- register: •not very relevant, though often high
- May violate Maxim of Manner, since it is not
always possible (or expedient) to be very
specific about the details of the future.
- speech acts: •predictions; •exhortations

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all must be mapped)

- visionary
- importance of the future (not of
the past or even the present,
except as it is preparation for
the future)
- predictions
- means of predicting the future
- visionary may be alone or part of a
group, perhaps even its leader

Speech Events

- speeches (orations)
- "sermons"

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- (1) the mythical seer (usually evaluation =
positive)
- (2) the vague dreamer, more concerned with the
visionary or mythical realm than with
practicalities (evaluation = *negative*)
- (3) the inventor (evaluation = *positive* or
negative, depending on the perceived
practicality and therefore value of the
inventions)
- (4) the visionary leader, who gives his/her
followers a sense of direction and purpose
and goals (evaluation = *positive* or
negative, depending on the perceived value
of the goals); there are specific related
reference-based CCMs, such as Martin Luther
King, Jr.)

(Table 2-9, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- It is important to think about the future.
- It is better to be practical when thinking about the future (usually, because of the Traditional American Value of practicality).
- If one has ideas about the future that will benefit people, one should tell them (and perhaps try to persuade others to follow = intersects with Leader CCM)
- There may be opposition.

**Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/
Knowledge held by Gingrich**

- The future will be better than the present or the past--at least in the framework of American Traditional Values--and, importantly, should be.
- It is the role of Congress to set goals and agendas for the U.S.
- The Speaker of the House is a leader of Congress (related to The Leader CCM).
- One political party has better ideas than the other (depending on mapping).
- There is one goal for all Americans.
- Cooperation may help the vision be realized.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- The Speaker of the House is someone whose ideas about the future of American are listened to.
- His/her ideas will be good for all Americans.

Kind of Mapping

- Self-presentation of Gingrich and his supporters: instantiation
- In the view of his opponents: rejected instantiation

Relevant Mappings

Source Domain	Target Domain
visionary	Gingrich
followers	Republican Party
	or/also Congress and all America
(the referent of "we" changes)	
goals	the Republican agenda

Hearer Interpretation

- Depends on the mapping (i.e., who is the participant whose goals are considered good?).

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Interacts with Spokesman for Traditional American Values; perhaps with The Leader; perhaps with The Cooperator; perhaps with The Fighter (partly depends on the mappings)

TABLE 2-9
Gingrich's Model 8: The Visionary

influential books *Future shock* [1970] and *The third wave* [1980].)

Except for the frequent use of the word "hope" (which is also one of the Traditional American Values of Model 3), only a few markers of Model 7 are present:

(49) we can focus on transforming, not just cutting. (312-313)

(50) how we have helped people rise beyond poverty . . . the right sense of where we have to go as Americans (367-370)

(51) and here we are preparing for those children a better future (524-525)

(52) This ought to be the goal that we go home and we tell people we believe in: that there will be a Monday morning when for the entire weekend not a single child was killed anywhere in America; that there will be a Monday morning when every child in the country went to a school that they and their parents thought prepared them as citizens and prepared them to compete in the world market; that there will be a Monday morning where it was easy to find a job or create a job, and your own Government did not punish you if you tried. (460-468)

Example (52) also has links to Model 3 (Traditional American Values of protecting our children, being good citizens, having a job), Model 4 (The Leader: setting the goals), Model 6 (The Fighter, by our real-world knowledge that "your own Government" refers to the Democratically controlled years), and Model 7 (The Cooperator, by

interpreting the referent of "we" as the entire Congress). It is therefore appropriate for the concluding section of the speech.

4.0. Gingrich's model clashes.

Many of the CCMs are coherent with each other--such as The Professor, The Spokesman for Traditional American Values (special case, American history), and The Leader, or Just Plain Folks and The Spokesman for Traditional American Values--but some are not. In the "orphanage passage," for example, we have seen how The Professor model clashes with that of Just Plain Folks: on the one hand, the reference to Dickens helps situate Gingrich as a "professor;" on the other hand, a professor stereotypically isn't a 'regular guy,' so Gingrich also takes a swipe at professors by using "intellectual" pejoratively. Gingrich also causes CCM clashes and a sense of stylistic mismatch by his use of markers of both formal and informal register within the same passage.

Similarly, in the following example, the use of a quotation, the actual citation, the content, and the purpose are Model 1 (Professorial and didactic), but much, although not all, of the extremely colloquial syntax and lexical choice belong to Model 2 (Just Plain Folks):

- (53) He [author Morris Schectman] draws a distinction between caring and caretaking. . . . He said caretaking is when you bother me a little bit, and I do enough. . . . "If you will quit drinking, I will help you get a job." . . . "I feel better. I gave him a buck or 5 bucks." (414-426)

We are reminded here of the passage that begins with Gingrich the Professor quoting from Tocqueville, whose style now sounds formal

(example [4]), but then explains the passage (a Professorial activity) with a Just Plain Folks syntax and pronoun choice ("your," "you"), and follows it with the already mentioned long Russian-and-Lithuanian anecdote, using elements of a conversational story-telling style and an informal evaluation section.

That is, the anecdote of the eight Russians and the Lithuanian (171-195) contains first person pronominalization of the storyteller's involvement, indicating his personal participation and therefore presumably guaranteeing the accuracy of what is being told. There is indefinite deixis to signal that it is a story ("one day") and specific detail to give an additional impression of factuality and involvement ("eight Russians and a Lithuanian," "the Lithuanian was a man in his late sixties"), direct quotes ("They asked me, 'What does a whip do?'), direct address to the hearer(s) ("Remember, this is the very beginning of perestroika and glasnost"), and a plot (I was in my office; these visitors from formerly Communist countries came in; they asked me questions; there was action--we came into the House Chamber, where I answered them in a dramatic way; all the participants were emotionally affected and came away changed in some fashion).

Sometimes the clashes serve the same pragmatic political purpose as the ambiguities, allowing Gingrich to appeal to more than one constituency at one time. Other CCM discrepancies have been resolved culturally in the United States (although not explicitly in this speech) by invoking intersecting submodels in which the discrepancy does not exist. An American can be both a Fighter (Model 6) and a Cooperator (Model 7), for example, by cooperating with others of Us to fight against Them (as well as also a Leader in this fight, Model 4).

Similarly, one can Fight for one's Vision (reconciling Models 6 and 8), or speak for both Traditional American Values and Vision (Models 3 and 8) not only by speaking of hope but by claiming (as Gingrich often does) to be taking traditional American values into the future.

4.1. Metonymy.

Gingrich uses metonymy--here, evoking an entire semantic domain or frame or model by the explicit expression of one element belonging to it--to move within one CCM and from one CCM to another, making use of only the broadest and most general linkages even at the cost of nuanced connections and polished transitions. For example, he moves from "freedom" (Model 3) and "tradition" (Model 3) and "work" (Models 2 and 3) to religion ("a bipartisan prayer service," Model 3) and "moral problems" (Model 3), and so on. The repeated transitions in this passage from secular aspects of Model 3 to religious aspects and vice versa are movements from one subframe to another, with the connections being nothing more than the fact that the broad CCM of Traditional American Values (Model 3) includes them all.

This broad category as that of "Traditional American Values" thus has very emotional evocative power and unity at one level, but looking at the details reveals the variety of subcategories. Although each subcategory has a different experiential frame or model--such as the experiential frame of 'attending a worship service' and that of 'working at a job'--Gingrich ignores them, relying on metonymy within the larger CCM to supply the connections. It does, but not without a certain potentially jarring effect at times, as with the lack of any lexical or rhetorical marker of transition at 203-205:

(54) That is the tradition [of Congress] I hope that we will take with us as we go to work. (203-204)

Today we had a bipartisan prayer service. (205)

This use of metonymy also similarly results at times in a lack of precision. The previous discussion of Gingrich's explication of the Tocqueville passage in example (4) pointed out that he chose one word--"vulgar"--from a semantic field of adjectives meaning roughly "common" or "populist," or by extension "undistinguished," even though the word "vulgar" did not actually appear in the quotation, as if any word in that semantic field could stand for any other. As we have seen, this contradicts the Professor model, since professors are supposed to be precise with respect to their facts; however, at the same time it reinforces Model 2, Just Plain Folks.¹¹

Similarly, at another point in the speech Gingrich moves from "commoners" (163, Model 2) to 'great American figures' such as Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt (166-168 [cf. 327-334], Model 3; intersecting with particularly salient examples of Model 4 Leaders) to "a great country of great people" (169). This last phrase can be seen as belonging to both Model 2 and Model 3, or to either Model 2 or Model 3 alone, depending on which antecedent the audience understands for "great people"--the "commoners" (perhaps slightly preferred) or the important presidents or both. Here, Gingrich can in fact appeal to two CCMs simultaneously by specifying neither.

Thus, in a larger sense, Gingrich's use of metonymy serves to form part of the political balancing act between clashing CCMs that is a

¹¹Also, in the 'Good Old Days' of de Tocqueville, Just Plain Folks were more highly valued, as the pejoration of "vulgar" in recent times shows (E. Sweetser, p.c.).

large part of elected officials' attempts to appeal to as many facets of the American cultural tradition--and therefore as many constituents--as they can, within the beliefs and principles of their own political ideologies.

This kind of imprecise 'CCM metonymy' is found as a feature of Gingrich's style in statements outside this speech as well, including other examples related to American history, such as more than once misrepresenting Thomas Jefferson's words in the Declaration of Independence, and the mis-citation of at least one film title (Wills 1995:6-7).

5.0. Conclusion.

Gingrich's 1995 version of the 'Speaker's inaugural' speech offers little in structure that does not appear in previous speeches of this genre, although most elements are extended beyond those in the 'inaugural' speeches of previous Speakers via a 'more is better' cognitive model or belief that appears in other aspects of Gingrich's speech as well. This speech is also very representative of how he usually chooses to portray himself both to his colleagues in Congress and to a wider audience, and relies on several of his longstanding, favorite themes and slogans (e.g., "The Opportunity Society"). His allusions to American political leaders of the past, for example, are simultaneously traditional elements of the genre and part of his models of self-presentation.

These self-presentation CCMs involve both convention and deliberate choice. The models are of course not his alone; they are deeply rooted in American culture in general and American political

culture in particular, and must be to be useful. Experienced politicians know which CCMs to appeal to for desired effects, and which linguistic cues to use to evoke each. After a long career in politics, much of this surely becomes almost instinctive, but other examples in this speech (such as the allusions to Franklin Roosevelt) are most likely included by design.

All eight of the CCMs in this paper, as well as others found in American culture but not discussed here, are characterized and recognized using the same types of linguistic markers, as Tables 2 through 9 show. Lexical choice is one of the most basic, most obvious, and most effective ways to invoke a CCM, as are other indicators of register (especially important for Models 1 and 2, The Professor and Just Plain Folks) such as more or less informal syntax. Other markers include allusions and CCM-specific fixed phrases.

In this speech, Gingrich presents himself both as a *man of authority and leadership* (Models 1, The Professor; 3, The Spokesman for Traditional American Values; 4, The Leader; 5, The Authoritarian; 8, The Visionary), and as a *man of the people* (Models 2, Just Plain Folks; 3, The Spokesman for Traditional American Values; to some extent also 8, The Visionary, via 3). This double stance is a core part of the American political tradition; Gingrich's use of it offers yet another indication that he is aware that unlike his predecessors as Speaker his audience includes the wider American populace.

There are many overlaps, in varying degrees, of content and therefore of linguistic markers among the models. For example, the overlap between Model 2 (Just Plain Folks) and Model 3 (The Spokesman for Traditional American Values) is considerable; that between 8 (The

Visionary) or 4 (The Visionary) and 3 (The Spokesman for Traditional American Values) is much less. Looked at another way, Models 2, 3, and to a lesser extent 6, 7, and 8, and in a limited fashion 4, are part of a larger "Ideal American" CCM 'cluster'.

CCMs may also clash with one another. For example, the Professor of Model 1 and the Just Plain Folks of Model 2 are often at odds over the value of higher education in the 'ivory tower', especially as compared to 'common sense' in the 'real world'. Perhaps because the Republican party has usually been much less concerned about coalition-building among America's multiple constituencies than are the Democrats, Gingrich does not attempt to reconcile these opposing models directly.¹² Sometimes, instead, he removes the clash by calling up a non-self-presentational CCM that has a place in both, such as the Dickens frame in the "orphanage passage" (example [2]).

In other passages, he simply uses them both in close proximity. Sometimes he merely moves quickly from one model to another, as we have seen.¹³ At other times, he allows one--usually but not always the Just

¹²There are, however, some remarks that are designed to appeal to black Americans in particular, either explicitly (praise of the Civil Rights Movement, 347-350; a breakfast with two members of the Congressional Black Caucus, 382-390; cf. 336-338 ["Members of the Black and Hispanic Caucuses"]); a reference to and a quotation from "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," 475-480, 475-480, 488-489) or implicitly (the tragedy of children killing children in "a public housing project in Chicago," 372-373; cf. 384-387, 400-405, 461-466, and 482-486/487). During and after the 1996 presidential election campaign, the Republicans began to make direct overtures to the African-American community: the black Congressman J. C. Watts of Oklahoma was an important speaker at the GOP nominating convention in 1996 and made the official Republican television response to President Clinton's 1997 State of the Union address; 1996 Republican vice-presidential nominee Jack Kemp campaigned in New York City's Harlem and other inner-city black communities.

¹³Gingrich uses this method in other texts, e.g., *To renew America* (1995:33): "It is stunning [a superlative adjective of the 'more is better' proverbial CCM] to immerse yourself [Model 2] in the visionary [Model 8] world of the American experience [Model 3]--to listen, for example, to Lincoln [Model 3, as well as a reference-based "Abraham Lincoln" CCM] raising cheers from white working-class [Model 2] audiences about Negro [sic] slaves' inherent right to keep the fruits of their own labor [perhaps Model 1 in lexical choice, but Models 2 and 3 in content]--and then to realize how much of this self-confidence and pride in our own accomplishments [Model 3] has been lost. We have gone from being a strong, self-reliant, vigorous society [Model 3] to a pessimistic

Plain Folks model (Model 2) or the closely related Spokesman for Traditional American Values model (Model 3)--to dominate, for reasons of his political agenda. Similarly, he allows referents of pronouns, especially of "we," to shift among CCMs, thus evoking more than one together.

It is not only Gingrich's use of the pronoun "we," however, that is open to almost opposite interpretations, usually depending on the hearers' politics. As we have seen, his frequent "I + verb" constructions, for example, are interpretable as either markers of Authority, even Authoritarianism (Models 1, 4, and 5) or humility (Models 2 and 3), and the antecedent of "great people" in line 169 can be understood as the Model 2 "commoners" or the Models 3 and 4 'great American presidents' or, usefully, both. These ambiguities do not necessarily persuade people to change their minds and support him or his political goals, since those who disagree with him will generally choose the negative interpretations, but they do make it harder for his opponents to find passages that can be unequivocally challenged.

He is also skilled at evoking just enough of a CCM to allow his partisans to infer the rest, without committing himself explicitly to the full CCM. For example, near the end of the speech (492-495, example [29]), he uses language that suggests two submodels: the friend or colleague (who will "listen" and "work with each of you") and the therapist (who also listens and works, although in a marked way). However, neither of these submodels is completely evoked by the language, so that Gingrich fully makes neither the personal commitments of a friend nor the professional commitments of a therapist.

one that celebrates soreheads and losers jealous of others' successes [an opposition that perhaps evokes Model 6]."

Whether for political or personal reasons, Gingrich does not remain long 'in' any one CCM. We have just seen some of the advantages. On the negative side, this constant shifting of models of self-presentation helps lead to a somewhat chaotic speech in terms of thematic organization, since Gingrich does not take advantage of the overlaps and linkages to structure the overall text. Furthermore, the overlaps can easily justify some transitions within models and from one model to another, but in his metonymic fashion Gingrich is often content with links that are appropriate only at the most general level (e.g., within Model 3, as we have seen), resulting at times in transitions that are only loosely connected.

Finally, how useful is this speech to the wider Republican agenda? For an opponent, the speech raises enough semantic and pragmatic questions to confirm a negative opinion of the Speaker and the Republican goals, reinforced by the authoritarian strain that underlies many of the models, and the appeals to cooperation and compassion will be interpreted as little more than a conventional facade full of carefully worded loopholes. A supporter, however, will accept the collection of CCMs, resolving the semantic and pragmatic clashes and ambiguities in Gingrich's favor and seeing the models as together forming the important traditional political model of Traditional American Values, and will from background knowledge fill in the framework of an agenda presented explicitly only in allusions and generalities.

The cultural cognitive models seen in this speech are thus constructed from and construct American political and general culture. They offer the support of a conventionally shared understanding between

speaker and hearer, and a way to direct implicatures without the continual need for explicitness and consequent responsibility. Although an unexpressed or perhaps even consciously unrecognized sense of frequent CCM clashes or ambiguities in a politician's language may contribute to a sense of mistrust on the part of at least some of the electorate, there is in much of this speech also a considerable amount of linguistic room for either a positive or a negative interpretation of Gingrich as he presents himself--and that, of course, is one of the useful abilities of a politician.

CHAPTER 2--APPENDICES

Appendix 2-1

Newt Gingrich

(U.S. House of Representatives, January 4, 1995)

(World Wide Web: <http://dolphin.gulf.net/Gingrich>)
[accessed February 1996]*(apparent errors of syntax, spelling, etc. have not been corrected)*

1 Let me say first of all that I am deeply grateful to my good
2 friend, Dick Gephardt. When my side maybe overreacted to your
3 statement about ending 40 years of Democratic rule, I could not
4 help but look over at Bob Michel, who has often been up here and
5 who knows that everything Dick said was true. This is difficult
6 and painful to lose, and on my side of the aisle, we have for 20
7 elections been on the losing side. Yet there is something so
8 wonderful about the process by which a free people decides things.

9 In my own case, I lost two elections, and with the good help of
10 my friend Vic Fazio came close to losing two others. I am sorry,
11 guys, it just did not quite work out. Yet I can tell you that
12 every time when the polls closed and I waited for the votes to
13 come in, I felt good, because win or lose, we have been part of
14 this process.

15 In a little while, I am going to ask the dean of the House,
16 John Dingell, to swear me in, to insist on the bipartisan nature
17 of the way in which we together work in this House. John's father
18 was one of the great stalwarts of the New Deal, a man who, as an
19 FDR Democrat, created modern America. I think that John and his

20 father represent a tradition that we all have to recognize and
21 respect, and recognize that the America we are now going to try to
22 lead grew from that tradition and is part of that great heritage.

23 I also want to take just a moment to thank Speaker Foley, who
24 was extraordinarily generous, both in his public utterances and in
25 everything that he and Mrs. Foley did to help Marianne and me,
26 and to help our staff make the transition. I think that he worked
27 very hard to reestablish the dignity of the House. We can all be
28 proud of the reputation that he takes and of the spirit with which
29 he led the speakership. Our best wishes go to Speaker and Mrs.
30 Foley.

31 I also want to thank the various House officers, who have been
32 just extraordinary. I want to say for the public record that
33 faced with a result none of them wanted, in a situation I suspect
34 none of them expected, that within 48 hours every officer of this
35 House reacted as a patriot, worked overtime, bent over backwards,
36 and in every way helped us. I am very grateful, and this House I
37 think owes a debt of gratitude to every officer that the Democrats
38 elected 2 years ago.

39 This is a historic moment. I was asked over and over, how did
40 it feel, and the only word that comes close to adequate is
41 overwhelming. I feel overwhelmed in every way, overwhelmed by all
42 the Georgians who came up, overwhelmed by my extended family that
43 is here, overwhelmed by the historic moment. I walked out and
44 stood on the balcony just outside of the Speaker's office, looking
45 down the Mall this morning, very early. I was just overwhelmed by
46 the view, with two men I will introduce and know very, very well.

47 Just the sense of being part of America, being part of this great
48 tradition, is truly overwhelming.

49 I have two gavels. Actually, Dick happened to use one. Maybe
50 this was appropriate. This was a Georgia gavel I just got this
51 morning, done by Dorsey Newman of Tallapoosa. He decided that the
52 gavels he saw on TV weren't big enough or strong enough, so he cut
53 down a walnut tree in his backyard, made a gavel, put a
54 commemorative item on it, and sent it up here.

55 So this is a genuine Georgia gavel, and I am the first Georgia
56 Speaker in over 100 years. The last one, by the way, had a weird
57 accent, too. Speaker Crisp was born in Britain. His parents were
58 actors and they came to the United States--a good word, by the
59 way, for the value we get from immigration.

60 Second, this is the gavel that Speaker Martin used. I am not
61 sure what it says about the inflation of Government, to put them
62 side by side, but this was the gavel used by the last Republican
63 Speaker.

64 I want to comment for a minute on two men who served as my
65 leaders, from whom I learned so much and who are here today. When
66 I arrived as a freshman, the Republican Party, deeply dispirited
67 by Watergate and by the loss of the Presidency, banded together
68 and worked with a leader who helped pave the way for our great
69 party victory of 1980, a man who just did a marvelous job. I
70 cannot speak too highly of what I learned about integrity and
71 leadership and courage from serving with him in my freshman term.
72 He is here with us again today. I hope all of you will recognize
73 Congressman John Rhodes of Arizona.

74 I want to say also that at our request, the second person was
75 not sure he should be here at all, then he thought he was going to
76 hide in the back of the room. I insisted that he come on down
77 front, someone whom I regard as a mentor. I think virtually every
78 Democrat in the House would say he is a man who genuinely cares
79 about, loves the House, and represents the best spirit of the
80 House. He is a man who I studied under and, on whom I hope as
81 Speaker I can always rely for advice. I hope frankly I can
82 emulate his commitment to this institution and his willingness to
83 try to reach beyond his personal interest and partisanship. I
84 hope all of you will join me in thanking for his years of service,
85 Congressman Bob Michel of Illinois.

86 I am very fortunate today. My Mom and my Dad are here, they
87 are right up there in the gallery. Bob and Kit Gingrich. I am so
88 delighted that they were both able to be here. Sometimes when you
89 get to my age, you cannot have everyone near you that you would
90 like to have. I cannot say how much I learned from my Dad and his
91 years of serving in the U.S. Army and how much I learned from my
92 Mother, who is clearly my most enthusiastic cheerleader.

93 My daughters are here up in the gallery, too. They are Kathy
94 Lovewith and her husband Paul, and Jackie and her husband Mark
95 Zylar. Of course, the person who clearly is my closest friend and
96 my best adviser and whom if I listened to about 20 percent more, I
97 would get in less trouble, my wife Marianne, is in the gallery as
98 well.

99 I have a very large extended family between Marianne and me.
100 They are virtually all in town, and we have done our part for the

101 Washington tourist season. But I could not help, when I first
102 came on the floor earlier, I saw a number of the young people who
103 are here. I met a number of the children who are on the floor and
104 the young adults, who are close to 12 years of age. I could not
105 help but think that sitting in the back rail near the center of
106 the House is one of my nephews, Kevin McPherson, who is 5. My
107 nieces Susan Brown, who is 6, and Emily Brown, who is 8, and Laura
108 McPherson, who is 9, are all back there, too. That is probably
109 more than I was allowed to bring on, but they are my nieces and my
110 nephews. I have two other nephews a little older who are sitting
111 in the gallery.

112 I could not help but think as a way I wanted to start the
113 Speakership and to talk to every Member, that in a sense these
114 young people around us are what this institution is really all
115 about. Much more than the negative advertising and the interest
116 groups and all the different things that make politics all too
117 often cynical, nasty, and sometimes frankly just plain miserable,
118 what makes politics worthwhile is the choice, as Dick Gephardt
119 said, between what we see so tragically on the evening news and
120 the way we try to work very hard to make this system of free,
121 representative self-government work. The ultimate reason for
122 doing that is these children, the country they will inherit, and
123 the world they will live in.

124 We are starting the 104th Congress. I do not know if you have
125 every [sic] thought about this, but for 208 years, we bring
126 together the most diverse country in the history of the world. We
127 send all sorts of people here. Each of us could find at least one

128 Member we thought was weird. I will tell you, if you went around
129 the room the person chosen to be weird would be different for
130 virtually every one of us. Because we do allow and insist upon
131 the right of a free people to send an extraordinary diversity of
132 people here.

133 Brian Lamb of C-SPAN read to me Friday a phrase from de
134 Tocqueville that was so central to the House. I have been reading
135 Remini's biography of Henry Clay and Clay, as the first strong
136 Speaker, always preferred the House. He preferred the House to
137 the Senate although he served in both. He said the House is more
138 vital, more active, more dynamic, and more common.

139 This is what de Tocqueville wrote: 'Often there is not a
140 distinguished man in the whole number. Its members are almost all
141 obscure individuals whose names bring no associations to mind.
142 They are mostly village lawyers, men in trade, or even persons
143 belonging to the lower classes of society.'

144 If we include women, I do not know that we would change much.
145 But the word 'vulgar' in de Tocqueville's time had a very
146 particular meaning. It is a meaning the world would do well to
147 study in this room. You see, de Tocqueville was an aristocrat.
148 He lived in a world of kings and princes. The folks who come here
149 do so by the one single act that their citizens freely chose them.
150 I do not care what your ethnic background is, or your ideology. I
151 do not care if you are younger or older. I do not care if you are
152 born in America or if you are a naturalized citizen. Everyone of
153 the 435 people have equal standing because their citizens freely
154 sent them. Their voice should be heard and they should have a

155 right to participate. It is the most marvelous act of a complex
156 giant country trying to argue and talk. And, as Dick Gephardt
157 said, to have a great debate, to reach great decisions, not
158 through a civil war, not by bombing one of our regional capitals,
159 not by killing a half million people, and not by having snipers.
160 Let me say unequivocally, I condemn all acts of violence against
161 the law by all people for all reasons. This is a society of law
162 and a society of civil behavior.

163 Here we are as commoners together, to some extent Democrats and
164 Republicans, to some extent liberals and conservatives, but
165 Americans all. Steve Gunderson today gave me a copy of the
166 'Portable Abraham Lincoln.' He suggested there is much for me to
167 learn about our party, but I would also say that it does not hurt
168 to have a copy of the portable F.D.R.

169 This is a great country of great people. If there is any one
170 factor or acts of my life that strikes me as I stand up here as
171 the first Republican in 40 years to do so. When I first became
172 whip in 1989, Russia was beginning to change, the Soviet Union as
173 it was then. Into my whip's office one day came eight Russians
174 and a Lithuanian, members of the Communist Party, newspaper
175 editors. They asked me, 'What does a whip do?'

176 They said, 'In Russia we have never had a free parliament since
177 1917 and that was only for a few months, so what do you do?'

178 I tried to explain, as Dave Bonior or Tom DeLay might now. It
179 is a little strange if you are from a dictatorship to explain you
180 are called the whip but you do not really have a whip, you are
181 elected by the people you are supposed to pressure--other members.

182 If you pressure them too much they will not reelect you. On the
183 other hand If you do not pressure them enough they will not
184 reelect you. Democracy is hard. It is frustrating.

185 So our group came into the Chamber. The Lithuanian was a man
186 in his late sixties, and I allowed him to come up here and sit and
187 be Speaker, something many of us have done with constituents.
188 Remember, this is the very beginning of perestroika and glasnost.
189 When he came out of the chair, he was physically trembling. He
190 was almost in tears. He said, 'Ever since World War II, I have
191 remembered what the Americans did and I have never believed the
192 propaganda. But I have to tell you, I did not think in my life
193 that I would be able to sit at the center of freedom.'

194 It was one of the most overwhelming, compelling moments of my
195 life. It struck me that something I could not help but think of
196 when we were here with President Mandela. I went over and saw Ron
197 Dellums and thought of the great work Ron had done to extend
198 freedom across the planet. You get that sense of emotion when you
199 see something so totally different than you had expected. Here
200 was a man who reminded me first of all that while presidents are
201 important, they are in effect an elected kingship, that this and
202 the other body across the way are where freedom has to be fought
203 out. That is the tradition I hope that we will take with us as we
204 go to work.

205 Today we had a bipartisan prayer service. Frank Wolf made some
206 very important points. He said, 'We have to recognize that many
207 of our most painful problems as a country are moral problems,
208 problems of dealing with ourselves and with life.'

209 He said character is the key to leadership and we have to deal
210 with that. He preached a little bit. I do not think he thought
211 he was preaching, but he was. It was about a spirit of
212 reconciliation. He talked about caring about our spouses and our
213 children and our families. If we are not prepared to model our
214 own family life beyond just having them here for 1 day, if we are
215 not prepared to care about our children and we are not prepared to
216 care about our families, then by what arrogance do we think we
217 will transcend our behavior to care about others? That is why
218 with Congressman Gephardt's help we have established a bipartisan
219 task force on the family. We have established the principle that
220 we are going to set schedules we stick to so families can count on
221 time to be together, built around school schedules so that
222 families can get to know each other, and not just by seeing us on
223 C-SPAN.

224 I will also say that means one of the strongest recommendations
225 of the bipartisan committee, is that we have 17 minutes to vote.
226 This is the bipartisan committee's recommendations, not just mine.
227 They pointed out that if we take the time we spent in the last
228 Congress where we waited for one more Member, and one more, and
229 one more, that we literally can shorten the business and get
230 people home if we will be strict and firm. At one point this year
231 we had a 45-minute vote. I hope all of my colleagues are paying
232 attention because we are in fact going to work very hard to have
233 17 minute votes and it is over. So, leave on the first bell, not
234 the second bell. Okay? This may seem particularly inappropriate
235 to say on the first day because this will be the busiest day on

236 opening day in congressional history.

237 I want to read just a part of the Contract With America. I
238 don't mean this as a partisan act, but rather to remind all of us
239 what we are about to go through and why. Those of us who ended up
240 in the majority stood on these steps and signed a contract, and
241 here is part of what it says:

242 On the first day of the 104th Congress the new Republican
243 majority will immediately pass the following reforms aimed at
244 restoring the faith and trust of the American people in their
245 government: First, require all laws that apply to the rest of the
246 country also to apply equally to the Congress. Second, select a
247 major, independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit
248 of the Congress for waste, fraud or abuse. Third, cut the number
249 of House committees and cut committee staffs by a third. Fourth,
250 limit the terms of all committee chairs. Fifth, ban the casting
251 of proxy votes in committees. Sixth, require committee meetings
252 to be open to the public. Seven, require a three-fifths majority
253 vote to pass a tax increase. Eight, guarantee an honest
254 accounting of our federal budget by implementing zero baseline
255 budgeting.

256 Now, I told Dick Gephardt last night that if I had to do it
257 over again we would have pledged within 3 days that we will do
258 these things, but that is not what we said. So we have ourselves
259 in a little bit of a box here.

260 Then we go a step further. I carry the T.V. Guide version of
261 the contract with me at all times.

262 We then say that within the first 100 days of the 104th

263 Congress we shall bring to the House floor the following bills,
264 each to be given full and open debate, each to be given a full and
265 clear vote, and each to be immediately available for inspection.
266 We made it available that day. We listed 10 items. A balanced
267 budget amendment and line-item veto, a bill to stop violent
268 criminals, emphasizing among other things an effective and
269 enforceable death penalty. Third was welfare reform. Fourth,
270 legislation protecting our kids. Fifth was to provide tax cuts
271 for families. Sixth was a bill to strengthen our national
272 defense. Seventh was a bill to raise the senior citizens' earning
273 limit. Eighth was legislation rolling back Government
274 regulations. Ninth was a commonsense legal reform bill, and tenth
275 was congressional term limits legislation.

276 Our commitment on our side, and this is an absolute
277 obligation, is first of all to work today until we are done. I
278 know that is going to inconvenience people who have families and
279 supporters. But we were hired to do a job, and we have to start
280 today to prove we will do it. Second, I would say to our friends
281 in the Democratic Party that we are going to work with you, and we
282 are really laying out a schedule working with the minority leader
283 to make sure that we can set dates certain to go home. That does
284 mean that if 2 or 3 weeks out we are running short we will,
285 frankly, have longer sessions on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.
286 We will try to work this out on a bipartisan basis to, in a
287 workmanlike way, get it done. It is going to mean the busiest
288 early months since 1933.

289 Beyond the Contract I think there are two giant challenges. I

290 know I am a partisan figure. But I really hope today that I can
291 speak for a minute to my friends in the Democratic Party as well
292 as my own colleagues, and speak to the country about these two
293 challenges so that I hope we can have a real dialog. One
294 challenge is to achieve a balanced budget by 2002. I think both
295 Democratic and Republican Governors will say we can do that but it
296 is hard. I do not think we can do it in a year or two. I do not
297 think we ought to lie to the American people. This is a huge,
298 complicated job.

299 The second challenge is to find a way to truly replace the
300 current welfare state with an opportunity society.

301 Let me talk very briefly about both challenges. First, on the
302 balanced budget I think we can get it done. I think the baby
303 boomers are now old enough that we can have an honest dialog about
304 priorities, about resources, about what works, and what does not
305 work. Let me say I have already told Vice President Gore that we
306 are going to invite him to address a Republican conference. We
307 would have invited him in December but he had to go to Moscow, I
308 believe there are grounds for us to talk together and to work
309 together, to have hearings together, and to have task forces
310 together. If we set priorities, if we apply the principles of
311 Edwards, Deming and of Peter Drucker we can build on the Vice
312 President's reinventing government effort and we can focus on
313 transforming, not just cutting. The choice becomes not just do
314 you want more or do you want less, but are there ways to do it
315 better? Can we learn from the private sector, can we learn from
316 Ford, IBM, from Microsoft, from what General Motors has had to go

317 through? I think on a bipartisan basis we owe it to our children
318 and grandchildren to get this Government in order and to be able
319 to actually pay our way. I think 2002 is a reasonable time frame.
320 I would hope that together we could open a dialog with the
321 American people.

322 I have said that I think Social Security ought to be off
323 limits, at least for the first 4 to 6 years of the process,
324 because I think it will just destroy us if we try to bring it into
325 the game. But let me say about everything else, whether it is
326 Medicare, or it is agricultural subsidies, or it is defense or
327 anything that I think the greatest Democratic President of the
328 20th century, and in my judgment the greatest President of the
329 20th century, said it right. On March 4, 1933, he stood in braces
330 as a man who had polio at a time when nobody who had that kind
331 of disability could be anything in public life. He was President
332 of the United States, and he stood in front of this Capitol on a
333 rainy March day and he said, 'We have nothing to fear but fear
334 itself.' I want every one of us to reach out in that spirit and
335 pledge to live up to that spirit, and I think frankly on a
336 bipartisan basis. I would say to Members of the Black and
337 Hispanic Caucuses that I would hope we could arrange by late
338 spring to genuinely share districts. You could have a Republican
339 who frankly may not know a thing about your district agree to come
340 for a long weekend with you, and you will agree to go for a long
341 weekend with them. We begin a dialog and an openness that is
342 totally different than people are used to seeing in politics in
343 America. I believe if we do that we can then create a dialog that

344 can lead to a balanced budget.

345 But I think we have a greater challenge. I do want to pick up
346 directly on what Dick Gephardt said, because he said it right. No
347 Republican here should kid themselves about it. The greatest
348 leaders in fighting for an integrated America in the 20th century
349 were in the Democratic Party. The fact is, it was the liberal
350 wing of the Democratic Party that ended segregation. The fact is
351 that it was Franklin Delano Roosevelt who gave hope to a Nation
352 that was in distress and could have slid into dictatorship. Every
353 Republican has much to learn from studying what the Democrats did
354 right.

355 But I would say to my friends in the Democratic Party that
356 there is much to what Ronald Reagan was trying to get done.
357 There's much to what is being done today by Republicans like Bill
358 Weld, and John Engler, and Tommy Thompson, and George Allen, and
359 Christy Whitman, and Pete Wilson. There is much we can share with
360 each other.

361 We must replace the welfare state with an opportunity society.
362 The balanced budget is the right thing to do. But it does not in
363 my mind have the moral urgency of coming to grips with what is
364 happening to the poorest Americans.

365 I commend to all Marvin Olasky's 'The Tragedy of American
366 Compassion.' Olasky goes back for 300 years and looked at what
367 has worked in America, how we have helped people rise beyond
368 poverty, and how we have reached out to save people. He may not
369 have the answers, but he has the right sense of where we have to
370 go as Americans.

371 I do not believe that there is a single American who can see a
372 news report of a 4-year-old thrown off of a public housing project
373 in Chicago by other children and killed and not feel that a part
374 of your heart went, too. I think of my nephew in the back, Kevin,
375 and how all of us feel about our children. How can any American
376 read about an 11-year-old buried with his Teddy bear because he
377 killed a 14-year-old, and then another 14-year-old killed him, and
378 not have some sense of 'My God, where has this country gone?' How
379 can we not decide that this is a moral crisis equal to
380 segregation, equal to slavery? How can we not insist that every
381 day we take steps to do something?

382 I have seldom been more shaken than I was after the election
383 when I had breakfast with two members of the Black Caucus. One of
384 them said to me, 'Can you imagine what it is like to visit a
385 first-grade class and realize that every fourth or fifth young boy
386 in that class may be dead or in jail within 15 years? And they
387 are your constituents and you are helpless to change it?' For
388 some reason, I do not know why, maybe because I visit a lot of
389 schools, that got through. I mean, that personalized it. That
390 made it real, not just statistics, but real people.

391 Then I tried to explain part of my thoughts by talking about
392 the need for alternatives to the bureaucracy, and we got into what
393 I think frankly has been a pretty distorted and cheap debate over
394 orphanages.

395 Let me say, first of all, my father, who is here today, was a
396 foster child. He was adopted as a teenager. I am adopted. We
397 have relatives who were adopted. We are not talking out of some

398 vague impersonal Dickens 'Bleak House' middle-class intellectual
399 model. We have lived the alternatives.

400 I believe when we are told that children are so lost in the
401 city bureaucracies that there are children who end up in
402 dumpsters, when we are told that there are children doomed to go
403 to schools where 70 or 80 percent of them will not graduate, when
404 we are told of public housing projects that are so dangerous that
405 if any private sector ran them they would be put in jail, and the
406 only solution we are given is, 'Well, we will study it, we will
407 get around to it,' my only point is that this is unacceptable. We
408 can find ways immediately to do things better, to reach out, break
409 through the bureaucracy and give every young American child a
410 better chance.

411 Let me suggest to you Morris Schectman's new book. I do not
412 agree with all of it, but it is fascinating. It is entitled
413 'Working Without a Net.' It is an effort to argue that in the
414 21st century we have to create our own safety nets. He draws a
415 distinction between caring and caretaking. It is worth every
416 American reading.

417 He said caretaking is when you bother me a little bit, and I do
418 enough, I feel better because I think I took care of you. That is
419 not any good to you at all. You may be in fact an alcoholic and I
420 just gave you the money to buy the bottle that kills you, but I
421 feel better and go home. He said caring is actually stopping and
422 dealing with the human being, trying to understand enough about
423 them to genuinely make sure you improve their life, even if you
424 have to start with a conversation like, 'If you will quit

425 drinking, I will help you get a job.' This is a lot harder
426 conversation than, 'I feel better. I gave him a buck or 5 bucks.'

427 I want to commend every Member on both sides to look carefully.
428 I say to those Republicans who believe in total privatization, you
429 cannot believe in the Good Samaritan and explain that as long as
430 business is making money we can walk by a fellow American who is
431 hurt and not do something. I would say to my friends on the left
432 who believe there has never been a government program that was not
433 worth keeping, you cannot look at some of the results we now have .
434 and not want to reach out to the humans and forget the
435 bureaucracies.

436 If we could build that attitude on both sides of this aisle, we
437 would be an amazingly different place, and the country would begin
438 to be a different place.

439 We have to create a partnership. We have to reach out to the
440 American people. We are going to do a lot of important things.
441 Thanks to the House Information System and Congressman Vern
442 Ehlers, as of today we are going to be on line for the whole
443 country, every amendment, every conference report. We are working
444 with C-SPAN and others, and Congressman Gephardt has agreed to
445 help on a bipartisan basis to make the building more open to
446 television, more accessible to the American people. We have talk
447 radio hosts here today for the first time. I hope to have a
448 bipartisan effort to make the place accessible for all talk radio
449 hosts of all backgrounds, no matter their ideology. The House
450 Historian's office is going to be more aggressively run on a
451 bipartisan basis to reach out to Close Up, and to other groups to

452 teach what the legislative struggle is about. I think over time
453 we can and will this Spring rethink campaign reform and lobbying
454 reform and review all ethics, including the gift rule.

455 But that isn't enough. Our challenge shouldn't be just to
456 balance the budget or to pass the Contract. Our challenge should
457 not be anything that is just legislative. We are supposed to,
458 each one of us, be leaders. I think our challenge has to be to
459 set as our goal, and maybe we are not going to get there in 2
460 years. This ought to be the goal that we go home and we tell
461 people we believe in: that there will be a Monday morning when
462 for the entire weekend not a single child was killed anywhere in
463 America; that there will be a Monday morning when every child
464 in the country went to a school that they and their parents
465 thought prepared them as citizens and prepared them to compete in
466 the world market; that there will be a Monday morning where it was
467 easy to find a job or create a job, and your own Government did
468 not punish you if you tried.

469 We should not be happy just with the language of politicians
470 and the language of legislation. We should insist that our
471 success for America is felt in the neighborhoods, in the
472 communities, is felt by real people living real lives who can say,
473 'Yes, we are safer, we are healthier, we are better educated,
474 America succeeds.'

475 This morning's closing hymn at the prayer service was
476 the Battle Hymn of the Republic. It is hard to be in this
477 building, look down past Grant to the Lincoln Memorial and
478 not realize how painful and how difficult that battle hymn is.

479 The key phrase is, 'As he died to make men holy, let us live to
480 make men free.'

481 It is not just political freedom, although I agree with
482 everything Congressman Gephardt said earlier. If you cannot
483 afford to leave the public housing project, you are not free. If
484 you do not know how to find a job and do not know how to create a
485 job, you are not free. If you cannot find a place that will
486 educate you, you are not free. If you are afraid to walk to the
487 store because you could get killed, you are not free.

488 So as all of us over the coming months sing that song, 'As he
489 died to make men holy, let us live to make men free,' I want us
490 to dedicate ourselves to reach out in a genuinely nonpartisan way
491 to be honest with each other. I promise each of you that without
492 regard to party my door is going to be open. I will listen to
493 each of you. I will try to work with each of you. I will put in
494 long hours, and I will guarantee that I will listen to you first.
495 I will let you get it all out before I give you my version,
496 because you have been patient with me today, and you have given
497 me a chance to set the stage.

498 But I want to close by reminding all of us of how much bigger
499 this is than us. Because beyond talking with the American people,
500 beyond working together, I think we can only be successful if we
501 start with our limits. I was very struck this morning with
502 something Bill Emerson used, a very famous quote of Benjamin
503 Franklin, at the point where the Constitutional Convention was
504 deadlocked. People were tired, and there was a real possibility
505 that the Convention was going to break up. Franklin, who was

506 quite old and had been relatively quiet for the entire Convention,
507 suddenly stood up and was angry, and he said:

508 I have lived, sir, a long time, and the longer I live the more
509 convincing proofs I see of this truth, that God governs in the
510 affairs of men, and if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without
511 His notice, is it possible that an empire can rise without His
512 aid?

513 At that point the Constitutional Convention stopped. They took
514 a day off for fasting and prayer.


515 Then, having stopped and come together, they went back, and
516 they solved the great question of large and small States. They
517 wrote the Constitution, and the United States was created. All I
518 can do is pledge to you that, if each of us will reach out
519 prayerfully and try to genuinely understand each other, if we will
520 recognize that in this building we symbolize America, and that we
521 have an obligation to talk with each other, then I think a year
522 from now we can look on the 104th Congress as a truly amazing
523 institution without regard to party, without regard to ideology..
524 We can say, 'Here America comes to work, and here we are preparing
525 for those children a better future.'
526 Thank you. Good luck and God bless you.

APPENDIX 2-2

Republican Party: "The Contract with America"

(Advertising insert, TV Guide, issue of October 22-28, 1994)

A campaign
promise
is one thing.
A signed contract
is quite another.



Republican House
candidates have
signed a contract
with America.
If we break
this contract,
throw us out.
We mean it.

That's why Republican House candidates have pledged, in writing, to vote on these 10 common-sense reforms.

Contract with America

We've listened to your concerns, and we hear you loud and clear.

On the first day of Congress, a **Republican House** will:

- Force Congress to live under the same laws as every other American
- Cut one out of every three congressional committee staffers
- Cut the congressional budget

Then, in the first 100 days, we will vote on the following 10 bills:

- 1. Balanced budget amendment and line-item veto:** It's time to force the government to live within its means and to restore accountability to the budget in Washington.
- 2. Stop violent criminals:** Let's get tough with an effective, believable and timely death penalty for violent offenders. Let's also reduce crime by building more prisons, making sentences longer and putting more police on the streets.
- 3. Welfare reform:** The government should encourage people to work, not to have children out of wedlock.
- 4. Protect our kids:** We must strengthen families by giving parents greater control over education, enforcing child support payments and getting tough on child pornography.
- 5. Tax cuts for families:** Let's make it easier to achieve the American Dream, save money, buy a home and send the kids to college.
- 6. Strong national defense:** We need to ensure a strong national defense by restoring the essential parts of our national security funding.
- 7. Raise the senior citizens' earning limit:** We can put an end to government age discrimination that discourages seniors from working if they choose.
- 8. Roll back government regulations:** Let's slash regulations that strangle small businesses, and let's make it easier for people to invest in order to create jobs and increase wages.
- 9. Common-sense legal reform:** We can finally stop excessive legal claims, frivolous lawsuits and overzealous lawyers.
- 10. Congressional term limits:** Let's replace career politicians with citizen legislators. After all, politics shouldn't be a lifetime job.

After these 10 bills, we'll tackle issues such as common-sense health care reform, tax rate reductions and improvements in our children's education.

Call 800-742-2662 to get your copy of the contract.

If we break this contract, throw us out. We mean it.

Chapter 3

"All's Fair in Business and War": Metaphor-Based Models and the Harvard Business School in the 1980s and early 1990s

"You win a few, you lose a few, but you keep on fighting--and if you need a friend, get a dog. It's trench warfare out there."

--"Gordon Gekko," in *Wall Street* (1987 film)

1.0. Introduction.

Such cultural cognitive models, including those evoked by metaphors for an experiential domain as inherently amorphous as "business," play an important role in social and economic events. The last chapter presented examples of the emergence of effective rhetoric from the use of relevant CCMs. The present chapter examines the correlation between metaphorical patterns of thinking, as evidenced through language, and demonstrable behavior in two prominent business schools in the 1980s and early 1990s.

This chapter examines some aspects of the cultural cognitive models used by and about the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (the "Harvard Business School," or "HBS"), generally the 'preeminent' business school in the 1980s in popular opinion, in defining its place and mission. The effects that the presuppositions and entailments of these metaphorical models--particularly that of Business as War with its overwhelming priority of victory at any cost--have had on the way business has been done in America from the 1960s to

the early 1990s, with emphasis on the illegalities of the 1980s, is significant.

The "Business is Competition" root metaphor and the related metaphors that depend on it--not only "Business is War" but also "Business is a [Team] Sport," "Business is a Game," "Business is a Race," and "Business is Predation"--are so dominant today that it may not be obvious at first (1) that all businesses--and business schools--do not always share one way of speaking about business, and (2) that there are clear behavioral correlates to the different beliefs held. That is, there is evidence to trace the belief systems based on different metaphorical cultural cognitive models both through the language of discourse by and about business, and also through the actions of those who hold them.

Sources for this study are articles about Harvard in popular national mass-circulation magazines and newspapers such as *Life*, *Look*, and the *Wall Street Journal*; in national business magazines such as *Forbes*, *Fortune*, and *Business Week*; and in sources directly related to the Business School, such as the catalogue, the *Harvard Business Review*, and books by faculty members. In addition, especially in the 1980s, several books were published about the Business School by former students or including many interviews with former students. The Wharton School of Finance and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, another old and very prominent graduate school of business, is also discussed, for purposes of comparison.

2.0. The Lakoff-Johnson approach to the study of metaphor.

In 1980, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson pioneered a distinctive way of studying metaphor in language and thought in their book *Metaphors we live by*. Briefly, their thesis involves the following points: (1) metaphor is more than just a flourish of language or rhetoric; (2) linguistic metaphors are reflexes of systematic conceptual metaphors; that is, (3) because metaphors are conceptual, metaphorical uses of language are not isolated words or phrases, but instead involve productive and systematic use of wide ranges of semantically related vocabulary items taken from slices of our daily experience (real or culturally virtual), forming experientially based frames; (4) we do in fact use metaphorical models to conceptualize and to reason about abstract situations; and (5) even common and conventional metaphorical frames are used in this way.

A clear example of a metaphor that illustrates these five points is "Love is a Journey." Some common phrases that linguistically illustrate various aspects of this conceptual metaphor are given in Table 3-1. In this cognitive model, the experience of Love is seen in terms of a Journey.

Each of these phrases describes something different about a love relationship (the area of our experience to be described, or Target Domain), and these different meanings are taken from what we know about real-world journeys (the 'source domain,' or the area of our experience from which the descriptive language and cognitive structure is taken). Objects, relationships, and events in the 'target domain' (which is usually more "abstract") are related to those in the source domain

- Look *how far we've come*.
- We're at a *crossroads*.
- We'll just have to go our *separate ways*.
- We can't *turn back now*.
- I don't think this relationship *is going anywhere*.
- It's been a *long, bumpy road*.
- This relationship is a *dead-end street*.
- We're just *spinning our wheels*.
- Our marriage is *on the rocks*.
- We've gotten *off the track*.
- This relationship is *foundering*.

TABLE 3-1
Linguistic Expressions of the Conceptual Metaphor
"Love is a Journey"
(*italics [and ellipses] added throughout, including in quotations,
unless otherwise indicated*)

(which is usually more "concrete") by means of conceptual "mappings" that indicate the correspondences.

"Entailments," which are inferences made in the target domain based on our knowledge of the source domain, and "presuppositions," which are unstated background assumptions that we make about the target domain based on the assumptions we have about the source domain, are also mapped. Not all possible correspondences of entities, relationships, activities or events, presuppositions, or entailments will be mapped, both because of incomplete parallels between domains (what I call "frame incompatibilities") and because metaphorical mappings always highlight certain aspects of the frames and hide others.

In the real world source domain, there are many kinds of trips we can make: by car, by boat, by plane, by train, on horseback, on foot, and so on. All of these different source frames are reflected in the phrases, although in different degrees. For example, when people reach a literal crossroads in a real-world journey, we know the following facts (as well as others that are not conceptually relevant here):

- (i) The path splits into two or more paths; therefore, a decision about which way to go must be made.
- (ii) The paths lead to different destinations.
- (iii) Travelers cannot go down both paths at once, but they can
 - (a) go down the same path together; or (b) not go down the same path (i.e., go down separate paths).
- (iv) Once the paths divide, it is unlikely that they will join again.
- (v) The travelers may encounter obstacles or barriers or other difficulties as they progress along the path.

Similarly, two lovers on their "journey" together:

- (i) Have to make a decision about the future state of their relationship.
- (ii) The options will cause different results in their lives.

- (iii) Each of them cannot go exercise both options at once, but they can (a) continue through life together; or (b) continue through life separately.
- (iv) Once the decisions are made, their lives will not be the same again.
- (v) The lovers may suffer difficulties as they continue in their love relationship.

The obvious similarities of our knowledge about these two scenarios allow us to connect them by means of mappings, giving us the metaphor that "Love is a Journey." Some of the mappings in this metaphorical relationship are given in Table 3-2:

<i>SOURCE DOMAIN</i> (Love)	<i>TARGET DOMAIN</i> (Journey)
•love	•a journey
•lovers	•travelers
•decisions about relationship (e.g., whether to continue)	•decisions about the journey (e.g., whether to continue)
•obstacles to love	•obstacles to travel
•the state of the relationship in the past	•the nature of the journey so far

TABLE 3-2
Some Mappings of the Metaphor "Love is a Journey"

Nor is Love the only possible target domain. We can also understand a Career or a Life as a whole in terms of a journey, and most of the terms in Table 3-1 are commonly used to describe these other target domains as well.

Other evidence that people reason in terms of these sorts of conceptual metaphors has come from psychology experiments (see Gibbs 1994 for discussions of many of these). Dedre Gentner and Donald R. Gentner, for example, examined the way people think about electricity in their 1983 paper, "Flowing waters or teeming crowds: Mental models of electricity". Their question was the following:

- (1) When people discuss electricity (and other complex phenomena) in analogical terms, are they thinking in terms of analogies, or merely borrowing language from one domain as a convenient way of talking about another domain? If analogies are to be taken seriously as part of the apparatus used in . . . reasoning, it must be shown that they have real conceptual effects. (Gentner and Gentner 1983:99)

They compared the reasoning in problems concerning current and resistance in circuits between two groups of people: those who had the "water-flow" metaphor for electricity (i.e., electricity "flows" through the wires of an electrical system just as water flows through the pipes of a water system) with that of people who had a metaphor of electricity as "teeming crowds" of people (or cars, or whatever moving objects one pleases) rushing through passages. As one would expect if cognitive models do in fact affect reasoning processes, they indeed found differences in the answers of the two groups.

One of the most interesting and significant points about these results was that when the answers were wrong, they were wrong in just the "right" ways--that is, people who had the "water-flow" metaphor made errors inconsistent with the actual performance of electricity, but

consistent with the actual performance of water (e.g., splitting one water pipe into two parallel pipes predicts less flow [less current] in each resistor of a parallel-resistor circuit, but this result is incorrect). People who had the "teeming-crowds" metaphor made errors also inconsistent with the actual performance of electricity, but consistent with the actual performance of moving crowds of objects.¹

So we know that people use metaphorical models to reason--that we bring not only concepts, but real-world source domain knowledge and inferences based on that knowledge, to our understanding of the target domain.

3.0. Harvard and Wharton: Some facts and figures.

In the 1980s, the "B-school" at Harvard was generally considered the most prestigious American business school, especially by the public at large. It also had very real power. In the mid-1980s,

- (2) about 20 percent of the top officers of Fortune 500 companies ha[d] degrees from HBS. . . . about one-third of HBS graduates of twenty-five years ago [held] positions equal to chief executive officer, managing director, partner, or owner. . . . [and HBS graduates were] the backbone of the leading-edge fields of investment banking, venture capital and management consulting. (Kelly and Kelly 1986:9)

¹(For a comparison of "logical reasoning" and "reference point reasoning," including reasoning from specific cases, from shared baseline points, and from representativeness, including prototypes, see Rosch 1983.)

Companies which have been headed by HBS graduates include Kodak, Corning, General Mills, Procter and Gamble, Bethlehem Steel, Bache and Company, Litton, IBM, Xerox, RJR Nabisco, Levi Strauss, Remington, Texas Air Corporation, Zenith Electronics, American Express, Cray Research (supercomputers), Ford, and MCI:

- (3) Typically MBAs left Soldiers Field for New York or Chicago to work for Fortune 500 companies, the biggest they could get into, where they would climb the corporate ladder of success for twenty or thirty years. Barring that [or often as their first choice], graduates gravitated toward the financial capitals of the world to become employees of large financial service companies such as Goldman, Sachs and Company; Kidder, Peabody & Company; and Chase Manhattan. Already it had become common knowledge that there were more presidents and chief executives of the Fortune 500, and leading financial firms, with Harvard MBAs than with any other graduate diploma. . . . Few graduates ever left Harvard Business School with the express idea of starting their own company [although some had done it because of job loss or dissatisfaction]. (Mark 1987:108-109)

HBS graduates have also gone into government, including Nicholas Brady (a former Secretary of the Treasury), Governor Charles Roemer III. of Louisiana, and Robert Macnamara, Kennedy's Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War, who was

- (4) often cited as typical of the analytical, tough-minded decision-makers the school turns out (*Business Week*, January 19, 1963:76)

General William Westmoreland was a graduate. Business, finance, and government leaders of other countries have also graduated from Harvard's MBA or executive programs.

The Wharton School of Finance and Economy at the University of Pennsylvania was founded in 1881 by industrialist Joseph Wharton in order to train business leaders who would be broadly educated in the liberal arts as well as in business and finance. Wharton graduates include heads of Reliance Group Holdings, General Electric, American Airlines, First Boston Corporation, *U. S. News and World Report*, Pfizer, and Xerox, as well as Geoffrey Boisi (Goldman, Sachs), Saul Steinberg, John Sculley (Pepsi and Apple Computer), Michael Milken, and Donald Trump. In comparison with Harvard, which has aimed at producing general managers, Wharton traditionally has had a reputation for specialization, although general management has also become strong since the 1960s.

4.0. The "Competition" metaphors.

The idea that business is necessarily competitive is one of the major folk theories about business found in our society, resulting in an important metaphorical cultural cognitive model: "Business As Competition."

4.1. Competition.

Our general understanding of "competition" involves both an abstracted static "schematic" set of participants and relationships

between them, and a dynamic minimal set of expected events involving those participants (see Table 3-3a). The basic elements of the prototypical Competition model are two entities, both of whom want the same desired object, which only one of them can in fact possess. In this most basic form, the Competition model gives us lexical items such as "compete," "win," "lose," "victory," and "defeat." The real-world, experientially based scenario that most closely matches the basic Competition schema of prototypical expectations about a situation is the scenario of "Hand-to-Hand Combat." This model adds very little beyond the basic abstracted model besides filling in the slots or roles with human beings; nevertheless, it is the prototype for the entire Competition "cluster."

Frame-Schema: "competition":
 E -> DO <- E (E = entity, DO = desired object)

Frame-Schema Real-World Prototype: hand-to-hand combat

Frame-Schema Core Metaphors:

WAR / A (TEAM) SPORT / A GAME / A RACE / PREDATION IS
 COMPETITION
 Our army/Our baseball team/The current chess champion/
 The fastest horse/The tiger won.

WAR IS HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT
 The Allies beat the Axis powers in World War II.
 A (TEAM) SPORT IS HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT
Fightin' Phillies

(newspaper headline referring to a baseball team)
 A GAME IS HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT
 They went head to head in the third round.
 (newspaper report on a golf tournament)

A RACE IS HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT
 Citation beat the other horses in the backstretch.

PREDATION IS HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT
 The animals of the jungle engage in a constant *fight*
 for survival.

TABLE 3-3a

The Competition Metaphorical Family: Frame-Schema and Core Metaphors

In inherently "competitive" scenarios, only one winner is possible, but the way that winner is 'selected' differs: by destructive team battles (War), by friendly, rule-governed team 'battles' ([Team Sports]), by individual, rule-governed competitive activities (Games), by an individual, pathwise, someone-reaches-the-goal-first, linear match-up (Race), or by deadly tooth and claw (Predation) (see Table 3-3b). I have called this kind of cluster of metaphors a "metaphorical family" (Morgan 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1998). These five domains are the "core," or inherently competitive, members of the Competition metaphorical family. Other activities can be viewed in terms of Competition, but do not have to be; these are "construal" members. Construal members include Business, Politics, The Law/Argumentation, Love, Marriage, and so on.

The evidence for the existence of this metaphorical family is linguistic as well as conceptual; it is well summed up by a writer on business:

- (5) Foreign trade may well be a zero-sum game. Zero-sum games are where there are only winners and losers. Honda Rimei, the nineteenth-century philosopher of Tokugawa Japan, understood that 150 years ago. Foreign trade is a war in which each party seeks to extract wealth from the other, remember? Football is a zero-sum game. Ask Tom Landry. Baseball is a zero-sum game. Pete Rose knows that. Tennis is a zero-sum game. John McEnroe has known that since he was about nine years old. We seem to understand the concepts of winning and losing in athletic competition much

COMPETITION MF: Core Metaphors:

WAR IS A (TEAM) SPORT	•The troops made an <i>end run</i> around the enemy.
WAR IS A GAME	•The rules of war forbid torture.
WAR IS A RACE	•We're ahead in the arms race.
WAR IS PREDATION	•Richard the <i>Lion-Hearted</i> (i.e., Richard I of England); Cu Chulainn (a traditional Irish hero whose name means "Culann's [guard] Dog") •<i>shark's "faces"</i> painted on fighter planes
A (TEAM) SPORT IS WAR	•the <i>offensive/defensive line</i> (football) •<i>strategy</i> •The Lakers <i>blew the Celtics out of the water</i>. (basketball)
A (TEAM) SPORT IS A GAME	•The Raiders were dealt a <i>bad hand</i> last Sunday. (football)
A (TEAM) SPORT IS A RACE	•The Tigers are ahead in the pennant race. (baseball)
A (TEAM) SPORT IS PREDATION	•the <i>Sharks, the Lions, the Bears, the Wolverines, the Bengals</i> (names of American hockey and football teams)
A GAME IS WAR	•That's good <i>strategy</i> (e.g., chess, bridge). (Cf. chess itself as a literalization of this metaphor.)
A GAME IS A (TEAM) SPORT	•<i>end run</i> (applied to a chess match)
A GAME IS A RACE	•He's not <i>in the running</i>. •They're in a race to accumulate points.
A GAME IS PREDATION	•If you play him, he'll eat you alive. (Also said of an individual sport, such as tennis) •He's a regular pool <i>shark</i>.

(Table 3-3b, continued)		
	A RACE IS WAR	•There's a <i>battle</i> in the backstretch for second place.
	A RACE IS A (TEAM) SPORT	•The U.S. Tour de France team (bicycle racing); the Bridgestone team (auto racing)
	A RACE IS A GAME	•She <i>gambled</i> everything on one last sprint.
	A RACE IS PREDATION	•The leader <i>gobbled up</i> the backstretch. •The racers ate up the miles.
	PREDATION IS WAR	•Let us discuss this species's <i>strategy</i> for survival. •We witnessed a <i>battle</i> between a lion and an elephant.
	PREDATION IS A SPORT	•When I saw the stuffed fox, I knew he was a real <i>sportsman</i> .
	PREDATION IS A GAME	•FRAME INCOMPATIBILITY (see text below)
	PREDATION IS A RACE	•FRAME INCOMPATIBILITY (see text below)

TABLE 3-3b
The Core Metaphors of the Competition Metaphorical Family

better than we understand them in economic competition.

Sumo is also a zero-sum game. . . . [So in trade competition with the Japanese] only one of us will win. . . . For those that lose, the existence of even larger social gains are irrelevant. They are only interested in preventing their losses. (Schlossstein [sic] 1984:238-239)

In actuality, of course, business activities are not always a zero-sum game; in fact, often quite the opposite may be true. That is, the establishment of a second or third clothing store on the same city block as an already existing clothing store often increases the business of all of them, since now people begin to view the area as a clothing center.

When we choose to view another activity in terms of Competition--and that in itself is an important choice to begin with, since, as we have just seen, the situation may in fact not always be in all ways an inherently competitive activity--we must also choose what kind of Competition we mean. Then, by our choice of competition type we create other metaphors relating our new activity to the selected form of Competition: "Business is War," "Business is a [Team] Sport," "Business is Predation," and so on. Importantly, both the basic Competition metaphor and each of these subsidiary choices--whether conscious or conventionalized--carries with it its own scenario, entailments, and other pragmatic effects (see Table 3-4). That is, each is a separate, although related, cultural cognitive model.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Harvard Business School accepted this general model of Business as Competition without reservation. If

COMPETITION IS HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT:

<i>Target Domain</i>	<i>Source Domain</i>
competitor 1	combatant 1
competitor 2	combatant 2
(prototypically: 2 competitors/combatants; more than 2 combatants = "War")	
goal	defeat or death of opposing combatant
manner of competition	physical violence

COMPETITION IS WAR:

<i>Target Domain</i>	<i>Source Domain</i>
competitor 1	1 of 2 enemies
competitor 2	the other of two enemies
goal	defeat or death of enemy
manner of competition	physical violence; + death

COMPETITION IS A (TEAM) SPORT:

<i>Target Domain</i>	<i>Source Domain</i>
competitor 1	team 1
competitor 2	team 2 (prototypically: 2 teams)
goal	higher score (= winning)
manner of competition	physical violence; no death; + rules

COMPETITION IS A RACE:**Submapping 1:**

<i>Target Domain</i>	<i>Source Domain</i>
competitor 1	racer 1
competitor 2	racer 2 (prototypically probably more racers)
than 2	
linear space	order of ranking (hierarchical) ("first place")
goal	reaching the finish line; or higher placement in linear hierarchical order with respect to reaching the finish line ("first place" = most desirable)
manner of competition	no physical violence; no death; + rules

Submapping 2:

competitor 1	racer
competitor 2	the distance still remaining to finish line
goal	completion of the race
manner of competition	no physical violence; no death; + rules

Submapping 3:

competitor 1	racer
competitor 2	the "record" of oneself [= "personal best"] or another) (i.e., metonymically, the time required to cover the distance)
goal	travel distance to finish line in "shorter" time
manner of competition	no physical violence; no death; + rules

(Table 3-4, continued)

COMPETITION IS A GAME

Submapping 1:

Target Domain	Source Domain
competitor 1	player 1
competitor 2	player 2
other competitors	other players (prototypically more than two players)
goal	higher score (number of points)
manner of competition	no physical violence; no death; + rules

Submapping 2 (Special Case: Games of Chance):

Target Domain	Source Domain
competitor 1	player 1
competitor 2	player 2/the "house"
Note: In games of chance such as roulette, the opponent is the "house" (and the odds); in games which involve both chance and player skill, such as poker, the opponent(s) are the other players, although the odds are also in effect sitting in at the table.)	
goal	gaining money (by "beating the odds" and/or by acquiring a marker of superiority, such as the "highest" ranking according to the sets of cards held in poker)
manner of competition	no physical violence (innately); no death; + rules

COMPETITION IS PREDATION:

Target Domain	Source Domain
competitor 1	predator (animal)
competitor 2	prey (animal)
goal	survival
manner of competition	physical violence; death of one entity; no rules

TABLE 3-4

The COMPETITION MF: The Frame Semantics of the Core Members

there is one word used consistently and often in all sources about HBS, it is "competitive." As one student put it:(6) Because at the Business School it was so much more, you know, compete, compete, compete, you've got to win, you've got to succeed. (Cohen 1973:88)

Even the kindest of the books by former students has such a description:

- (7) At HBS students are almost all extremely competitive, ambitious, and highly motivated individuals. Heated discussion, if not outright argument, comes as second nature. (Kelly and Kelly 1986:16)

This attitude was fostered by the official institutional discourse. Titles and descriptions of courses in the 1991-92 HBS catalogue, for example, often include the words "competition" or "competitive." For example, at Harvard there was a course called "Competition and Strategy," described as follows:

- (8) The primary focus of the course is on competitive strategy in particular industries, the primary arena in which competitive advantage is either won or lost. The course also examines how competitive advantage can be enhanced through the corporate strategy of a diversified firm by selecting the right industries in which to participate and coordinating the strategies of related business movements. (Harvard Catalogue 1991:25)

4.2. The Competition metaphors at Harvard: "Business is a (Team) Sport."

One of the core members of the Competition metaphorical family is "(Team) Sports." An essentially competitive place such as HBS instantiates all of the core members, although not in equal degrees. For example, one author (Ewing 1990) uses the "Business is a (Team) Sport" model to explain how the case method makes good MBAs "in the sense the Harvard Business School wants." That is, just as good baseball players learn by playing sandlot ball, not by watching baseball on TV, so too do business students learn

- (9) By playing with and against others who have potential. By trial and error. By succeeding and failing in competition. In short, by participating in what behaviorists call a peer group. (Ewing 1990:67-68)

Outside HBS, the "Business is a (Team) Sport" metaphorical CCM has been even more important to many business leaders than it has been within the school. For example, it is the predominant metaphor (using the various sports source domains of boxing, baseball, and football), overlapping with the "A (Team) Sport is a Game" core metaphor, for Lee Iacocca in his second book, *Talking straight*:

- (10) You have to say "Okay, I don't care how you grew up or what you are--here's the way we're going to run this ball club. And here are the plays. If you don't like them, it's going to show. By that time, you won't have to get off the team--I'll throw you off. . . . [after telling a Super Bowl anecdote] My feeling is that there's nothing like playing.

. . . I like to get my people into the *game*. . . . I divvied up the company [Chrysler] into manageable pieces and told these executives to go play the *game* to the hilt. . . . An aging CEO is like an aging athlete. The good *fighter* knows when to *climb out of the ring*. He's slowed down a little. The aging *baseball player* knows that he can't run to *first base* anymore. . . . To me, business is the same. . . [the CEO must be the one to] lay out the size of the *playing field* (Iacocca 1988:79, 81, 82, 86, 87²).

Furthermore, the mapping of "Football" onto "Business" motivates a fairly frequent second career for many retired football players and coaches: as motivational speakers for business audiences.

With respect to HBS, the metaphorical equation of "Business" and "(Team) Sports" appears mainly in popular illustrated articles on the Business School during this period in the form of a photograph of one of the sports teams such as rugby or crew. In an expression of the core metaphor "A (Team) Sport is Business," team members were sometimes shown wearing their uniform shirts with a dollar sign on the back, and nothing else for school identification (e.g., Kiechel 1987:34). Or, as a 1967 *Look* article put it in a caption:

- (11) MBA athletes take naturally to play that's rather like one side of management. (*Look*, January 10, 1967:65)

²Cf. also Miller 1983:262 for an elaboration of the "team sport" metaphor, again with respect to management practices in general.

4.3. The Competition metaphors at Harvard: "Business is a Game."

This metaphor is not very important in either internal or external descriptions of the B-School's ethos, but it does appear occasionally. As one author points out in an otherwise non-Sports-metaphor book, *What they still don't teach you at Harvard Business School*, money is

(12) the way most businesspeople keep score. (McCormack 1989:1)

Or, according to another author:

(13) It's a game. And all a game is, is strategy [a military term, reflecting the core metaphor "A Game is War;" cf. chess]. (Cohen 1973:89)

The course descriptions in, say, the HBS 1991-92 catalogue (e.g., p. 25) also occasionally use "Business is a Game":

(14) Course: "Management Simulation Exercise": "'The Business Game': 'competing corporations . . . develop and exercise their own strategies in a dynamic case environment.'"

(15) Course: "Games of Strategy": "Many business situations can be thought of as games" or "competitions," with "strategies of conflict as well as cooperation."

However, for Harvard 'A Game' is not just a game: a game is itself War. Here is how one course was described:

(16) If Looking Out for Number One is inevitable in business without some help--OPEC, the government, illegal collusion

among companies--the best strategy would seem to be to cooperate as long as possible, thus preventing needless losses, and then [sic] attack the other guy at the last moment, reaping large rewards. This may not be the most admirable behavior one could mention, but it is how the Harvard Business School students find themselves playing competitive games--in class and on the corporate battlefield. [Solman and Friedman then detail a 'game' in the "Competitive Decision Making" course that specifically warns against friendship.]

In other words, the question is not whether [italics original] you'll turn on your opponent but when [italics original]. Months, years, even decades of gentlemanly competition in an industry can swiftly deteriorate into savage warfare. From each other's behavior, Business School students learn, in effect, that warfare is inevitable, and the company that has "*first-strike capability*" and acts before the competition does will often prevail. (Solman and Friedman 1982:61, 64)

4.4. Frames, presuppositions, and entailments of Sports and Games.

Clearly, the models for the "Business is a (Team) Sport" and "Business is a Game" metaphors retain the idea of Competition, but without the potential for destruction of the opponent (again, see Table 3-4). They also have less possibility of abuse, since by the very nature of things Sports and Games have inescapable rules, violations of which are penalized. Furthermore, and in complementation, the folk

belief for Sports and Games is not "All's fair in love and war;" instead, it is the opposite: "It's not whether you win or lose; it's how you play the game." With the Sports metaphor, therefore, Iacocca can say:

- (17) When all is said and done, management is a code of values and judgments. (Iacocca 1988:89)

Discourse featuring the Sports and Games frames is therefore less "bloodthirsty" in lexical choice, presuppositions, and entailments than are texts with the Hand-to-Hand Combat or War models.

"Business is a (Team) Sport" and "Business is a Game," as well as "Business is a Race," also formed a part of the internal Pepsico corporate structure for John Sculley, although there it alternated with the dominant "Business is War" in a less benign, less rule-bound, more military atmosphere than Iacocca sets up. As Sculley has described his time at Pepsico:

- (18) [W]inning is the key value. Consistent runners-up find their jobs disappear. You must win merely to stay in place. You must devastate the competition to get ahead. (Sculley 1987:2-6)

He quotes the president of the parent corporation (Pepsico), Ardall E. Pearson:

- (19) Once I focus on you [i.e., a single "competitor"], I'm going to make progress. I have a standard and a goal. It makes all the difference because *competition is what the world is*

all about. It fosters innovation because you're trying to beat someone. . . . It works in sports, like the Celtics against the Lakers. They do better because they know who to beat. In the classroom, kids compete against each other. So why wouldn't it work in business? We were fortunate to have a deadly competitor to focus on [i.e., Coca-Cola]. . . A lot of the pressure we put on individuals was to make sure they had a strategy which gave us a competitive edge versus a lot of dreaming. (in Sculley 1987:18-19).

4.5. The Competition metaphors at Harvard: "Business is Predation."

The last member of the Competition metaphorical family--"Business is Predation"--does not often occur in reference to the Harvard Business School, although it is not uncommon in works on business in general (e.g., the bestselling *How to Swim with the Sharks*; "predator . . . or prey [radio advertisement for a mobile phone service, December, 1997]; "it's a jungle out there," or "a dog-eat-dog world"). It does appear briefly in Pileggi (1968):

- (20) Every day, through teaching methods subtly designed to set one student against another, the Harvard B School sharpens the competitive nature of its graduate students, and as a result totally involves them in a predatory pursuit of their studies.

"In the case method," said James Light, a 24-year-old second-year student from North Carolina, "with one hundred

highly competitive, hungry³ guys in a room you just don't want to lose face with your peers. The motive for learning is not necessarily the fear of flunking out, but the general atmosphere of really intense competition."

"They're ready to tear you apart, rebuild your business without you, and leave you for dead [= War] in the boardroom," said a New York-based personnel officer of an electronics company. (Pileggi 1968:92, 93)

It appears in spirit, although not linguistically, in a discussion of class competition:

- (21) The pressure to speak in class . . . has a threefold purpose: first, to teach through participation; second, to keep noses to the grindstone through the threat of low grades and public humiliation if one is unprepared; and third, to temper the individual by driving home the omnipresence of self-interest. When push came to shove, America's future managers would be on their own--against one another. (Solman and Friedman 1982:65)

In this metaphorical model of "Business" as "Predation" there is a synthesis of "Business is War" with the anarchic or "jungle" or "survival of the fittest" spirit of "Business is Predation." Similarly, evolution allows some yuppies to evolve into a "more agile" creature:

³The conventional metaphor "A Desired Object is Food" is congruent with Hunting, a Special Case of Predation.

- (22) chameleons that have mysteriously evolved into some slightly more agile species of lizard (*Time*, May 4, 1981:69, quoted in Shames 1986:191-192)

The most important advantage of agility is that prey can more successfully escape its predators.

4.6. The Competition metaphors at Harvard: "Business is War."

The most common metaphorical CCM for Business in the U.S. is that of War. Many writers on business use the language of war extensively:

- (23) speaking a warriors' language of poison pills and scorched earth tactics and masterminding strategies . . . The intensity of these battles . . . the takeover wars pit free market forces against . . . the government (Johnston 1986:inside back flap of jacket).
- (24) The troops were many. The strategy was in the hands of a few--the privileged handful of insiders who met in the boiler room to devise the game plans that would win or lose the war. (Johnston 1986:165: note the "War is A Game" --> "War is a (Team) Sport" overlap within the same sentence)
- (25) The riveting account of how a covey of corporate raiders and Wall St. mercenaries launched an assault on that bastion of American values, Walt Disney Productions, and of the furious combat that followed" and how the Disney management unsuccessfully tried a "frantic series of maneuvers to beat back the attack;" a "particular and particularly fascinating

corporate fight" (Taylor 1987: inside front flap of jacket; note also "Business is Hand-to-Hand Combat": "attack," "fight").

The most common of the Competition metaphorical models for Business in much of the world during much of the middle-late twentieth century has in fact been "Business is War." Before examining this CCM specifically with respect to the Harvard Business School, where it has also been predominant, let us first review some of our important knowledge about the CCM of War.

4.6.1. The prototypical War model (simplified): Knowledge and entailments.

There are several models in our everyday personal and cultural experience that add rich details of participants, relationships, events, presuppositions, and entailments to the basic Competition model. As we have briefly seen (Table 3-4) all of them involve further prototypes that fill out the slots or roles of Competitors and Goal (i.e., the desired object) and the associated inference structure in culturally conventionalized ways. The prototypical model for War is one of these culturally based cognitive models.

Some of the most important elements in our general understanding of the prototypical War CCM are the following (see also Lakoff and Johnson 1980:78-81):

- (i) There are two opponents, each leading a different group.
- (ii) There is a cause of hostility, based on harmful action by another group and/or a desire for something the other group has.

(For a discussion of the "just war" idea and its relationship to the Fairy Tale scenario, see Lakoff, 1992).

- (iii) War is declared; many people become combatants and are put in danger. The the lives of the non-combatants are also affected. Both combatants and non-combatants expect to be asked to make sacrifices toward the victory. There is danger for both, but much more for the combatants. Any harm to noncombatants is viewed as more heinous than harm to combatants, but often necessary.
- (iv) The fighting occurs on land; hence "armies" are involved. "Navies" and "air forces" are found in special circumstances.
- (v) Each side has a plan for defeating the other side. The details of this plan are created by the expert war leaders of each side and are carried out by the masses of followers. (In one widespread submodel, familiar of course to Americans, there is a hierarchical internal structure involving intermediate levels of commanders, ranked in terms of authority and obedience, to enable the obedience of the general scenario to be regulated efficiently.)
- (vi) The followers are not allowed to discuss, question, or change any aspect of the plan they carry out. Working as a group, one side's followers through superior numbers and/or their leaders' superior planning ability and/or superior technology will succeed in the goal of rendering the enemy unable to continue fighting.
- (vii) Often this success means that the leader or even the entire group will be destroyed as completely as possible, i.e., killed.

Partial success is measured by "advances" such as the capture of territory formerly held by the opponent.

(viii) The successful group rejoices, feeling pride and superiority.

Most of this scenario has been adopted without alteration by the "Business is War" metaphor, and in some cases has contributed directly to the problems faced by Harvard and other business schools.

4.6.2. Simplified prototypical mapping: The "Business is War" metaphorical model.

We can follow the prototypical War CCM in American culture in the mappings of the metaphor-based CCM for "Business is War" in Tables 3-5a and 3-5b, and for the Special Case of the Harvard Business School in Table 3-5c.

Notice that there are also three important Special Cases: (1) two or more companies offer the same product or service; (2) one company tries to take control of another; (3) two or more groups within one company are trying to achieve internal control over each other. In the discussion that follows, distinctions among these three Special Cases are noted when relevant. However, often the War source domain extends across all three, without differences.

Table 3-6 presents linguistic examples of these mappings. However, for a mapping that would logically seem to be at the heart of entire metaphor, there seem to be very few expressions referring to the competitors directly, i.e., "enemy" --> "competitors." Usually, this part of the mapping is entailed by the other parts; e.g., if you're in a Cola War, then you must have an enemy among other cola manufacturers, and so on. Perhaps being explicit in using the generally socially

SOURCE DOMAIN (war)	TARGET DOMAIN (business)
•military tactics	----> business tactics
•military confrontation	----> business competition
Special Case 1: "rival" companies offering the same product or service	
Special Case 2: one company takes over another	
Special Case 3: "rivalries" among internal groups for control within a company	
•military threat	----> deliberate economic competition
•"theater" of war	----> potential market
Special Case 2: theater of war	----> the company 'under attack'
•soldiers	----> workers/businessmen
Special Case 2: executives fighting a hostile takeover	----> white knights
Special Cases 1, 3: practitioners of martial arts	---> successful executives
Special Case 3, within an organization: top military leaders	----> top executives
ordinary soldiers	----> ordinary business employees
•enemy	----> competitors
Special Case 2: executives trying to take over a company	----> corporate raiders
•victory	----> dominance in the marketplace (majority or total)
•death in battle	----> going out of business (as a result of competition)

TABLE 3-5a
Dominant Harvard Business School Cultural Cognitive Model:
"Business is War"

Note: There are almost no references to pre-modern forms of warfare, although we find, e.g., "white knight," "economic legions." A rare example, appearing in a 1967 *Look* magazine article: "As squires were coached toward knighthood, [so] Harvard's select 700 learn the life-style of the decision maker in giant organizations" (*Look*, January 10, 1967:65). Non-Western forms of combat or warfare (such as samurai or ronin) are not used specifically with reference to HBS, although they appear in discussions of business in general (e.g., Rogers 1984).

Name of CCM: War

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (stereotype)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "battleground," "soldier,"
"strategy")
- jargon (military)
- maxims: •violation of Quality allowed (see
Entailments)
•CP violated with respect to the enemy
- speech acts: •commands

**Scenario/Frame
Elements**

(not all have to be mapped)

- "us" vs. "them" (enemy)
- battlefield
- victory vs. defeat (vs. truce)
- capture and/or death
- each group's hierarchy of officers
(general, lieutenant, etc.) and
soldiers
- strategy, tactics

Speech Events

- orders

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- Violence, brutality (especially "them");
hardships; sacrifice for principle/victory;
courage; lack of full support = cowardice
and/or treason
- War may be viewed as inherently noble or evil
or neutral according to one's ideologies
and/or circumstances of a particular
conflict:
 - to defend oneself (or others who are
otherwise defenseless) vs. threat = a
good/just war (evaluation = positive)
 - to try to impose one's desires on others who
are unwilling = a bad war (evaluation =
negative)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

(for details see text)

- Victory is the most important goal.
- Much can and should be sacrificed for victory.
- Hierarchy within the "chain of command" must be
maintained for victory to occur.
- Death before surrender (at least prototypically,
if not realistically).
- "All's fair in love and war."

(Table 3-5b, continued)

**Some Relevant Real-World
Presuppositions/Knowledge**

- "We" are good and "they" are bad.
- "They" are essentially unlike "us" in one or more "significant" ways (What is "significant" depends on "our" definition.)

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Total destruction/death of the enemy may be necessary (and is justified because they are Bad People)
- Total destruction/death of some or all of one's own supporters (combatants or non-combatants) may occur at the sites of battles; this is regrettable but may be necessary
- Almost anything that ensures "our" victory is allowed (subject to a few real-world constraints such as the Geneva Convention for prisoners of war and treaties concerning chemical warfare; but these are not prototypical)

Kind of Mapping

- instantiation

Relevant Mappings

- See other Tables, this chapter.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Part of the "Competition" metaphorical family (see text; see also Morgan 1993, 1994b, 1995)

TABLE 3-5b
The CCM Prototype of War in Anglo-American Culture

<u>SOURCE DOMAIN (war)</u>		<u>TARGET DOMAIN (business)</u>
•military academy (emphasis on training of officers/executives)	---->	Harvard Business School
or •boot camp (emphasis on effort and hardships and unpleasantnesses during training)	---->	Harvard Business School
•officers in training	---->	HBS students
•military chaplain (rare)	---->	professor of ethics
•warfare simulation training method	---->	case method
"Why does the case method make managers good 'fighters' on economic battlefields?" (Ewing 1990:36)		
•combat	---->	in-class competition
"I entered the battle of the case method unarmed" (an HBS student quoted by C. Roland Christensen, 1987, <i>Teaching with cases at the Harvard Business School</i> , itself quoted at the end of Ewing 1990:36).		

TABLE 3-5c
 "Business is War": Special Case: The Harvard Business School

SOURCE DOMAIN (war)	TARGET DOMAIN (business)
•military tactics and instruments ---->	business techniques
first strike/preemptive strike	first to introduce a new product when others are trying with something similar
retaliatory strikes	attempt to retake market share by introducing something similar to a new product introduced by others
outgunned/outmaneuvered	operating according to a less effective set of business techniques
industry targeting	directing most energy toward a specific product/market
industrial espionage	
aggressive marketing tactics/campaign	
guerrilla marketing	cheap, innovative, piggyback and/or not always entirely legal methods of advertising, such as holding up a sign in the audience of major televised sports events or hanging a banner from a freeway overpass
"Where American industry has fallen short is in the strategic determination. . . to make excellence in manufacturing a primary competitive weapon." (Survival strategies for American industry, by the editors of the Harvard Business Review; quoted in Taub 1988 [a book from Harvard Business School Press]:13)	
•military confrontation ---->	business competition
Special Case 1: "rival" companies offering the same product or service	
Nike called a truce in the sneaker wars (cf. price/fare/gas/cola/bidding/etc. wars)	
Special Case 2: one company takes over another	
hostile takeover/hostile tender offers	
"multibillion-dollar struggles [< Hand-to-Hand Combat] for corporate control . . . three dramatic corporate battles were moving through the powerful financial network that runs the takeover wars: Carl Icahn was fighting [< Hand-to-Hand Combat] Texas Air for command of TWA, Fred Hartley was binding the wounds [< Hand-to-Hand Combat] of Unocal after surviving a fierce battle with T. Boone Pickens, . . . This bold new phase of the mergers and acquisitions game [< "Business is a Game"] had swept the oil industry in the early 1980s and was now invading any industry where raiders could find vulnerable targets" (Johnston 1986:inside front jacket)	
Special Case 3: "rivalries" among internal groups for control within a company	
proxy fights	
•military threat ---->	deliberate economic competition
The U.S. defended itself against Japanese trade policies by enacting protectionist legislation.	
•"theater" of war (i.e., place of battles) ---->	potential market and/or geographic area and/or disputed area of potential market territory
target strategic areas/vulnerable targets	(cf. "industry targeting" above)

(Table 3-6, continued)

Special Case 2:		
theater of war	---->	the company 'under attack'
(perhaps metonymic for the markets of the company 'under attack')		
"Perhaps as important were the psychological evaluations of the enemy that went on steadily in the war rooms and hotel rooms that were the boundaries of the team's ["War IS SPORT"] world. . . . [One of the Unocal executives "under attack" from T. Boone Pickens was] Sachs, who had been introduced to strategic thinking by Henry Kissinger as an undergraduate government major at Harvard. . . Facing Pickens's two-pronged attack, the one thing they did not do was search for a white knight." (Johnston 1986:165)		
Special Case 3:		
theater of war	---->	power/authority within the company
corporate battleground" (cf. <i>Life and death on the corporate battlefield: How companies win, lose, survive</i> (Solman and Friedman 1982; the authors are journalists who have studied at HBS and who thank Harvard professors in their acknowledgments)		
•soldiers (ours)	---->	employees/businessmen
corporate soldiers; work force		
Special Case 2:		
executives fighting	---->	white knights
a hostile takeover		[a compound with "White is Good/Black is Bad"]
Special Cases 1, 3:		
practitioners of martial arts	--->	successful executives
See the many book titles that came out in the 1980s likening successful strategies for business to Japanese martial arts: <i>Fighting to Win: Samurai Techniques for Your Work and Your Life</i>⁴; <i>The Way of the Ronin</i>; etc.		
Special Case 3, within an organization:		
top military leaders	---->	top executives
Here's our commander-in-chief.		CEO or president
ordinary soldiers	---->	ordinary business employees
We need to rally the troops.		motivate the salespeople
We need a new rallying cry		
We need to support the guys in the trenches. (i.e., the employees who are face-to-face with the buying public)		

⁴You may not be aware of it, but in both your business and personal life you are engaged constantly in some form of combat. To be successful [i.e., on "achieving your utmost potential"] you must learn how to fight effectively. . . . Your opponent in your daily battle might be a business competitor, a prospective client, a sales goal, a potential employer at a job interview. It could be your own fear or depression, your own productivity, or the productivity of your staff" (Rogers 1984, inside front jacket). This is one of the most far-reaching explicit elaborations of the scope of the "War" metaphor, carrying it beyond business into all other aspects of daily life.

(Table 3-6, continued)

"There's a word in the corporate vocabulary called 'good soldier.'" (Gallese [HBS graduate] 1982:155-156) (i.e., a subordinate who obeys without questioning)

•enemy	----->	competitors
Special Case 2: executives trying to take over a company	----->	corporate raiders
•victory	----->	dominance in the marketplace (majority or total)
capture the market		selling one's product/service exclusively or nearly so in a particular area or market
Coke and Pepsi battle it out for first place ["Business is a Sport"/"A [Team] Sport is War"] in the cola wars.		
•death in battle	----->	going out of business (as a result of competition)
Osborne was one of the early casualties in the computer wars.		

TABLE 3-6
Linguistic Examples: "Business is War"

unacceptable word "enemy" would bring the entire metaphor too sharply into focus and cause the actual social desirability of its entailments to be questioned.

4.6.3. The Harvard Business School and the "Business is War" model.

The construal of business as a form of competition--accurately or not--is found even in early articles and books about HBS. However, the War CCM is rarely specifically mentioned in those sources. Beginning in the mid-late 1960s, however, a strong version of the "Business is War" metaphorical CCM has appeared as the explicit controlling metaphor for the Harvard Business School's view of itself and for outsiders' views of the school, as we see in the following representative passage:

- (26) In the M.B.A. program, students learn not only lessons of logic, analysis, and procedure, but also how to develop a killer instinct. Self-interest dominates the classwork, which features competitive games, and even colors student life, as the bright young initiates prepare--and are prepared--for life on the corporate battlefield. (Solman and Friedman 1982:56)

Once David Sarnoff, a brigadier general and RCA board chairman, had labeled the Harvard Business School as the "West Point of capitalism," militaristic discourse about Harvard became prevalent and rich:

- (27) judging by the militant loyalty of its alumni, the *business-über-alles* approach of its students and the global influence of its faculty, the description is apt. It is, after all,

Harvard's "B" School that graduates the most effective of the nation's persuaders, a drip-dry army that is more a symbol of America today than the bald eagle and the cracked Liberty Bell combined. American businessmen are to the U.S. what the Legions were to Rome. Armed only with attaché cases and credit cards, they can bargain where the U.S. Army cannot go. They are welcomed in countries where U.S. embassies are stoned. And . . . Harvard Business School graduates are already finding themselves on both sides of almost every merger and proxy fight. (Pileggi 1968 [in the chapter titled "The West Point of American Business"]:91; *italics original*).

- (28) Every year the Harvard Business School turns out a new regiment of ambitious, aggressive young captains of industry. Most of them will eventually wield more real power in the world than the average statesman or general. (Pileggi 1968:90)

- (29) The MBA marks a man. To most of his college generation, he is a sellout on the gray-flannel slave market. To the Harvard Business School faculty, he is a potential rogue who might ruthlessly exploit the weapons they've taught him to use. To the older businessman, he is a computer-smart lieutenant fresh out of capitalism's West Point. (*Look*, January 10, 1967:65)

- (30) Harvard Business School is to chief executive officers what West Point is to generals . . . --an excellent place for training, and for getting noticed. (*Business Week*, May 4, 1974:55)
- (31) "They told me this place was a cross between Marine boot camp and Dale Carnegie, and they weren't wrong," muses second-year student Todd Hixon, a former military officer who hopes to move into investment banking. (*Business Week*, May 4, 1974:56)
- (32) In 1802 the country established a military academy at West Point in order to provide a steady supply of trained army officers to meet the threat of military warfare. . . . Today it is not military warfare but economic struggle that we must prepare better for, and a striking parallel can be seen between the two. There is as much folly in trusting to hit-or-miss luck for corporate leadership as for military leadership. . . . Global economic rivalries are, of course, less vivid and spectacular than shooting and bombing, and their effects take longer to become manifest. But in the end their consequences are far-reaching--standard of living, public programs, control over our destiny, pride. Foreign nations can defeat us more convincingly in economic warfare than in military action. As we are learning to our sorrow, the economic casualties inflicted can be severe. (Ewing 1990:275-276)

The phrases "the West Point of Capitalism" and "boot camp" occur repeatedly in articles about Harvard and in comments of HBS alumni (e.g., Henry 1983:80; Shames 1986:188; Solman and Friedman 1982:44; Ewing 1990:52; Pileggi 1968).

The metaphor is extensively extended in what a discussion of what one author sees as a literal, not metaphorical, conception of 'the way business is' and of Harvard's place in it:

- (33) For more than a quarter of a century, the U.S. economy has been slipping in global competition. In industry after industry, American leadership has fallen away, as if our industrial forces were a big, fat, inefficient army that smaller, leaner, hungrier foreign armies could defeat in skirmishes and small battles. Three decades ago our economic legions [i.e., pre-modern War] dominated the world economy. Now some of these legions have been decimated, others have withdrawn, and many are fighting for their lives.

The consequences have been appalling [he then lists job losses, deficits, social problems with high costs]. . . . [No one] . . . meets the number-one need, which is for people who can take charge and win.

In global economic competition, as in warfare, an industry has to have top-notch leaders. This wasn't always the case in the past because other nations didn't know how to compete.

. . .

Without first-rate leaders, industry can no more hold its own against foreign enterprises than our armed forces could win without officers from West Point, Annapolis, Colorado Springs, and New London. . . . the trained leaders are the core that we bet on ["Business is a Game"]. We bet on HBS and schools like it because we know they can help the nation win. (Ewing 1990:8-9)

Furthermore, there is a similarity of metaphorical model between life at the Harvard Business School and the predominant internal corporate ethos in the recent past that helps to explain why Harvard graduates have tended to enter large corporations. John Sculley describes how it was at Pepsico when he was there as vice president of marketing and as president of Pepsi-Cola:

- (34) Executives wore the "corporate uniform" (a particular kind of suit); the "junior executives" were the "support staff" for the "division officers and vice presidents"; top management formed a "platoon of executives;" and the "tough corporate culture . . . put us on a search-and-destroy mission [= War] against a Goliath [= Hand-to-Hand Combat/War; special referent-based frame]." (Sculley 1987:26; he also uses language from the Competition Source Domains of Races--"racecourse", Games/Sports--"ground rules")

This mapping of the War model onto the corporate lifestyle also appears frequently (e.g., Sculley on Pearson, above; cf. also, e.g.,

Drucker 1946 on General Motors, and the novels by Sloan Wilson, *The man in the gray flannel suit* [1955] and *The man in the gray flannel suit II* [1984], both of which make comparisons throughout between business and the army, e.g., concerning uniforms, or comments such as "I felt alert, like a soldier in combat" (Wilson 1984:198).

Perhaps because the students themselves are in effect embryonic generals of business, and therefore the most important participants in the model, and because people associate the prominence of the B-School with the institution of Harvard more than with the professors, professors rarely fill a role in the mapping. In one rare example in 1986, the primary HBS professor in ethics at the time, John Matthews, was mapped into the model, admittedly into a relatively unimportant role (the fact that his field was ethics was important for the mapping):

- (35) If HBS is a *boot camp* for America's corporate leaders, then Matthews' role there would seem to be that of the anguished *chaplain* who preaches the need for decency even in warfare, knowing in his heart that out there in the *steam and stench of the jungle* his boys will go right on *cutting off dead enemies' ears* [besides the reference to the Vietnam War, note the congruence with bullfighting, i.e., with a blend of Predation and Sport/Game]. That role is an honorable but unenviable one, and all claims and publicity to the contrary aside, it keeps John Matthews and the study of ethics on the fringe of what the Business School is really all about.
- (Shames 1986:188-189)

4.7. Non-Competition metaphorical models: "Business is Religion."

Some authors (e.g., Iacocca 1988:76; Pascale and Athos 1981:22 ff.) point out that both the armed forces and religious institutions such as the Catholic Church are hierarchical, and hence both can be analogues for the internal structure of major corporations, such as the "concepts of leadership, the chain of command, coordination, control, and functional specialization" (Pascale and Athos 1981:22).

However, it is not the internal structure of religious institutions that form a part of the second most common CCM for HBS itself. "Business is Religion" is the second most common model for HBS in these sources, but it lags very, very far behind "Business is War." If, as we shall see, the entailments of the "Business is War" metaphorical model can be used to encourage unethical behavior, it might seem that "Business is Religion" would provide an ethical counterweight. However, the CCM does not take much from the frame of religion and is not really very productive. The mapping (Table 3-7) is very limited:

SOURCE DOMAIN (war)	TARGET DOMAIN (business)
•place of religious authority	----> Harvard Business School
("The Cathedral of Management," the title of the introduction to Ewing [1990], <i>Inside the Harvard Business School</i>)	
•pronouncements of religious authority	----> HBS's teaching/principles of management
(The gospel according to the Harvard Business School, a book by a former student [=Cohen 1973]; "Ad Prac, in fact, was almost a religion"[Shames 1986:24])	

TABLE 3-7
Harvard Business School: "Business is Religion"

The aspect of the traditional Religion frame that appear in this model do not refer to business practices as do the Competition metaphors, but rather to the prestige and presumed authority of the B-School. In the War and Predation models, "ethics" are subordinate to success in competition, and these models are much stronger at HBS, as the linguistic evidence indicates. Thus the "Business is Religion" CCM should not be viewed as an alternative to "Business is War." It is instead a parallel metaphor, one which provides another reason why people should pay attention to the Harvard Business School.

5.0. The social implications at Harvard of the "Business is War" metaphorical CCM.

It is clear that Harvard has not had a monopoly on the metaphor "Business is War." However, the combination of the increased explicit importance of this metaphorical model--the wearing of it since the mid-1960s, in fact, as a badge of pride--and the prominence of the Harvard Business School graduates in the 1980s have had important ramifications for the discourse of business and for the conduct of American business in the last couple of decades, and indirectly, therefore, on social and political issues.

5.1. Some entailments of the "Business is War" metaphorical CCM.

One of the most important social aspects of the entailments of a metaphorical CCM involves what is not mapped, that is, what is hidden as well as what is highlighted or entailed by the mapping. Some of these "overlooked" results of the "Business is War" metaphor with respect to

both external and internal "competition" are easily observed in books about Harvard and in behavior.

Entailments 1a and 1b: With respect to external business, customers are not seen as individuals (it is not the individual customers who make up the enemy). They are only seen collectively as potential territory to be conquered and therefore controlled or dominated. This has the important effect of allowing the needs of individual consumers to be overlooked or deliberately ignored. In fact, the effects may go beyond this: they may encourage the exploitation of individuals if by doing so the company (= the army) will benefit.

Similarly, with respect to internal organization, the employees are collectively "the troops," who must work en masse and without questioning for the greater good of the organization in which they serve, just as fighting troops must sacrifice all for victory. This has the equally important effect of allowing the needs of individual employees to be overlooked or deliberately ignored. There are repercussions, including but not limited to downsizing, family problems, workaholism, alcoholism, health problems, and corporate inattention to such issues as childcare and maternity/paternity leave or leave to care for sick children or aged parents. All of these have social costs which can be considered irrelevant, or at least part of the necessary costs, given the priorities set up by the War model.

Entailment 2: In either Special Case, there can be only one winner or victor, that is, business and war are seen as unquestionably zero-sum activities. HBS student Fran Worden Henry tried to counter this entailment and the next two in a discussion (about selling baby formula in Third World countries) that both accepted the "victory"

aspects of the War model while also trying to present the need for an alternative metaphor (Cooperation-MF-based) of "living harmoniously."

The passage is long, but well worth quoting:

(36) "The issue is not whether 'we women' are trying to make everything unisex. The issue, as far as I've heard it articulated in the women's movement, is that language needs to be broadened to include women.

"For example, in Marketing class we routinely use the terms *penetration* and *thrust*. We want to penetrate the market by cutting price and to sell more product. Or we want to reposition our product with a new marketing thrust. These words are sexual words and they are male. They connote power as though male sex were the only definition of power.

"We need to broaden the definition. We need to use words like *envelop* and *surround* and use them with a sense of strength and resolve. Then we've got a representative situation in which we all can live harmoniously."

Class was over and I heard a rustle and a sputter behind me. It was Stan Hooper. His body was leaning over the desk and his jaw muscles were tensing up. . . . "What you're saying is totally wrong, because there's no power in strategies which surround," Stan said.

I knew that Stan's background was military--he'd graduated from West Point.

"We learned in school that the only strong offense is to go right at the enemy, the target--and that's just what we learn to do when we penetrate the market."

I got out my pencil and yellow pad. "Here's the target, Stan. And here I am. You can't tell me that it's not just as important to surround a target as to attack it. Perhaps if you surrounded it there would be fewer lives lost."

Stan took the pencil and drew his offensive position. By the time we got through with our circles and arrows our diagram looked almost pornographic, with thrusts and openings everywhere. Neither of us budged.

But I blinked and Stan said, "Fran, I've been going to military school since junior high. Now I'm twenty-nine. For all those years I've been told how to sit, how to eat, how to hold my head, how to think. In this school I experience the most freedom I've every had. Now you're telling me that the words I've used all my life are inappropriate. Your philosophy takes what little power and freedom I have away from me."

"Well, maybe that's what it's about, Stan, sharing power. . . ." (Henry 1983:94-95; italics original)

This passage is full of military words. I will not be discussing the major issue of patriarchy and the military, but certainly there are many entailments relating specifically to this aspect of the issue, and this aspect becomes especially important for many of the postmodern paradigm-shifters, especially the feminists.

Other alumni have similarly explicitly rejected the fundamental "Business is Competition" metaphor itself as applied to intra-company matters precisely because of this entailment (although they usually seem to accept it with respect to "rival" companies in the marketplace). Such critics prefer metaphorical models from the Cooperation metaphorical family (see Morgan 1994b, 1998). In the following long but significant example, however, note also the interspersal of truly military terms ("swords [sic] points," "bloody bodies") and terms which have effectively become conventionally ambiguous among the military, sports, and games ("beat out," "hollow game", "victories"):

- (37) Equally offended by the prospect of "company politics" is Gerland I. Isenberg, whose Bachelor's degree from Bowdoin College is in psychology. "Company psychologists tend to dismiss us [students who were members of HBS's Student Small Business Placement Program, or SSBPP]," Isenberg declares, "on the grounds that the reason we prefer small business is that we're afraid of competition. I'm not afraid of competition. I just think it's humanly destructive in every sphere except sports and politics."

"Employees should not be at swords points [sic]," the 23-year-old Isenberg elaborates. "They should be complementary to one another, sharing their experiences, their information and truly working together. If there is competition, it should be with the product, with the company's existing condition or with other companies, but not between co-workers. The more competition there is within the company,

the less real interaction and the more personal isolation there will be. Efforts and energies tend to become directed inward in a competitive intracompany situation, rather than outward toward the market place where they should be."

Robert A. Fox, who is co-chairman of the SSBPP . . . also feels that competition among employees is self-defeating, contrary to the view that prevails within industry, particularly in the marketing sphere. "Isn't it a rather hollow victory," Fox asks rhetorically, "to beat out a colleague in your own company? Company politics is a hollow game and therefore its victories are hollow, too." Isenberg could not resist adding, "Yeah, there you are at the very top, standing on a pile of bloody bodies, all of them supposed to be 'your friends.'" (*Dun's Review and Modern Industry*, January, 1964:62)

(Note also in this last sentence the presence of the common and conventional metaphor "Good is Up," Special Case "Status is Up," seen also in such phrases as "climbing the corporate ladder.")

Entailment 3: Since all of these entailments are in effect, cooperation will gain you nothing, despite those who argue for it:

- (38) The point was that she [Sheila, an HBS student] had been generous to [fellow student] Mary Pat [by helping with an important and competitive paper in a personal crisis] at a time when Mary Pat had all but given up on generosity at a place such as the Business School, at a time when she had

begun to believe that competitiveness all but excluded an emotion as human as generosity. (Gallese 1985:145)

Entailment 4: Instead, the way to do well is by sacrificing, maneuvering, plotting, spying, etc.--whatever it takes to have gains at the expense of your enemy in war.

In particular, by the folk belief that "All's fair in love and war," many kinds of otherwise unethical behavior are tolerated if Business is seen as War. This encourages industrial espionage, for example, such as that asked of at least one Harvard Business School student by a prospective employer:

- (39) [Reported by a third party] The very first thing that he said to her after hello was: "You know, Pat, that we analyze companies to make sure they are worth their stock price and that they can pay interest on their bonds. Can you think of any clever little tricks to help us analyze a company?"
- . . . Pat answered that she'd been a financial analyst for two years at a New York City bank; she imagined she could do very well analyzing the companies they invested in, but she didn't know what he meant when he said clever little tricks. At that point, he started to get up from his seat. He was finished with her and the interview. "Miss Worth, I can think of a number of clever little tricks, like sneaking into the parking lot at night and looking at what's going out on the loading dock; getting hired as an employee in quality control and finding out their weaknesses; or

stealing some of their garbage to see what's going on.

Obviously, you aren't the one for us." (Henry 1983:226-227).

Entailment 5: Putting all these together, we reach the belief that in all circumstances one's individual good or preference must be subsumed in the good of the company, and in obedience to authority. It is by virtue of this entailment, added to Entailment 5, that justification can be made for the behavior which has associated HBS graduates (among others) with particular types of ethical scandals, especially insider trading, which break the existing rules without challenging the underlying structure.

It has been this open, unashamed, even glorified, status of the metaphor "Business is War" and the entailments of its model in the 1960s-1980s that is striking, and deserves special notice, in light of the business scandals of the late 1980s.

5.2. Harvard graduates and the 1980s ethics scandals: "All's fair in love and business."

It is within the frame of the proverb "All's fair in love and war," when added to the "Business is War" metaphor, that we can now examine the spirit of the 1980s, described by Christopher Lasch as

(40) an era of me-first management" in which "not just shareholders . . . but corporations themselves, the economy, and even the public at large [were] let down by a deterioration in ethical behavior in business and on Wall Street." (Christopher Lasch, "The era of 'me-first'

management," *New York Times*, August 19, 1984, quoted in
Shames 1986:188)

The question ought to be raised, of course, as to whether

- (41) "the general ethical level of business today *isn't* higher than in the days of the robber barons or of the great price-fixing scandals?"

It's a bedeviling question [the asker is HBS professor Matthews, a specialist on competition and ethics], this issue of relative ethical norms. . . . By consensus of the Class of '49, however, the ethical tone that pertains in the 1980s has gotten lower rather than higher, in comparison with that of the immediate postwar years. (Shames 1986:178-179; *italics original*)

Lee Iacocca also refers to an increase in unethical behavior, (e.g., Iacocca 1988:99):

- (42) The reasons for this are several. A team that's winning easily doesn't have to cheat, and through the heart of the big time, American businesses were romping; when the going gets tough, on the other hand, the tough get gouging. If the tough have computer expertise, access to money-laundering havens, and other such new or expanding appurtenances of white collar malfeasance at their disposal, so much the better. But the deeper reason for the broadly perceived crisis in business ethics may have less to do with

business *per se* than with the fragmentation of the social context

--including, that is, social effects of belief structures such as the metaphor-based CCM that "Business is War"--

in which business has its being. America may or may not have been a moral place in 1949. It seems to have *felt* more moral, though, because the nation's Postwar Code suggested a certain communality-in-spite-of-itself that provided a strong incentive for doing right... . as '49er Roger Sonnabend recalls, "by the convenient assumption that we all had high ethical standards to begin with, and that of course we'd all apply them automatically to business, and of course the world of business wouldn't have it any other way. The rules didn't need to be made explicit because good behavior was assumed. Which was fine in theory. But the problem was that in practice there was an uncomfortably thin line between making those quite sincere assumptions, and just signing on with this conspiracy of silence, just going along with the gentlemen's agreement that certain things you didn't talk about." (Shames 1986:177-179; italics original)

This description of a change from a highly rule-governed model of business (even if the rules are unstated), which is congruent with "Business is a Sport" or "a Race" or "a Game," to "Business is War," with which it is not very congruent (and to "Predation," with which it

is not at all compatible), points out the essential model-based difference between these source domains:

(43) The pressure was greater. The pace was more frenzied. The old [unwritten] rules were abandoned and with those old rules went some of the ethics and standards that had guided the nation's investment bankers for decades. (Frantz 1987:45)

However, the fact that the "old rules," although abandoned in principle, were not abandoned in form, marks one of the crucial distinctions between the Harvard War and the Wharton Romantic Artist/Romantic Outlaw metaphor-based CCMs, as we shall see.

Thus, the HBS "Business is War" metaphor and the resulting ethos both reflected and helped shape the business environment of the 1980s that led to major insider trading scandals. For example, the 1987 insider trading scandal directly and deeply involved Dennis Levine, who was convicted while in his first year in the MBA program (he had enrolled after being active in passing tips from his Wall Street investment bank) and Ivan Boesky, who was also found guilty and who had associated himself with Harvard University by donating hundreds of thousands of dollars to them, "which helped him secure an appointment to an advisory panel at the [Business] School. The appointment qualified Boesky for membership in the Harvard Club of New York and he often held court there" (Frantz 1987:145). HBS graduates such as Ira Sokolow of Shearson Lehman and lawyer Martin Siegel of Drexel Burnham Lambert were also implicated in the scandals.

Furthermore, we have already seen that, just as the military makes use of espionage to gain useful information in wars (whether hot or Cold), so too does the corporate world make use of industrial and other types of espionage to get ahead in their war. So did Levine in his insider trading:

- (44) He told Willis [a banker and friend of his, whom he was also trying to recruit] he wanted to create a giant ring of insider traders, with sources at every major investment house and the two biggest takeover law firms . . . Levine even picked up the nomenclature of the spy world, referring to the insider trading operation as "the company," and assigning code names to many of the people in his life. . . . In the parlance of their game, the arbitragers with whom Levine was in increasing contact were "field agents." (Frantz 1987:65-66)

It is significant, therefore, that the nature of the insider trading violations was that they broke the rules without challenging the structure, in an ends- (not means-) based enactment of "All's fair in business and war." This description is highlighted by Levine's comments as well as by his behavior: "Everybody does it. It's all over the Street. . . . Insider trading is part of the business" (Frantz 1987:57, 64).

6.0 Wharton: "Business is (Artistic) Creation."

In the 1980s there was no overwhelming "Business is War" metaphor for Wharton as there was for Harvard, although founder Joseph Wharton had in fact begun with that model. He had wanted the school to

- (45) instill a sense of the coming strife [of business life]: of the immense swings upward or downward that await the competent or the incompetent soldier in this modern strife, (Sass 1982:38)

as he wrote in an 1890 address to the Wharton School Association.

Wharton did not advocate cooperation. Quite the reverse: he expressed

- (46) contempt for "the sentimental notion. . . that international trade between competing nations is or may be carried on upon the principles of universal brotherhood" (Sass 1982:38).

However, when the school's 'authorized biography' discussed the Wharton philosophy of change, there were no references to generals in describing

- (47) the school's century-old effort to raise a leadership class for industrial society. . . . [by] amalgamat[ing] all three classic Western leadership types--the professional, the aristocrat, and the businessman--into a new social persona. (Sass 1982:331)

Similarly, articles on Wharton from the 1980s and early 1990s do not have any controlling metaphorical model with the social acceptance

and discourse overtly of Harvard's "West Point of Capitalism." In the first place, there is very little evidence for "Business is War" in connection with Wharton. Although Wharton's alphabetically-named "cohorts" (somewhat analogous to Harvard's "sections") have given themselves nicknames in recent years such as "Killer Bs" and "G-Force" (Wharton 1991:10), in the 1990-91 catalogue, for example, words such as "competition" and "strategy" are almost never found in course titles.

There is, however, a belief that Business can be conceptualized as a kind of (Artistic) Creation. This metaphor and its associated model are not as common in the general business world as is "Business is War" (despite the increasingly conventionalized recent usage of the phrase "growing a business," which alludes to a type of creation, although not an artistic one).

In a 1988 *Fortune* article on management, for example, a special section on Wharton starts off by quoting the then dean, Russell E. Palmer, as arguing the following position:

(48) that genuine leaders have an *intuition*, an ability to *visualize the big picture*, that inspires people to follow them. "We can't make wimps into generals," he says [in the only use of a non-CREATION--and not coincidentally a specifically military--term in the text. The article goes on to speak of courses] on how to *cultivate leadership traits* [and] mid-career programs for *budding leaders*.

(Labich 1988:66)

The text of the 1991-92 Wharton catalogue also supports the "Business is (Artistic) Creation" metaphor. In his 'dean's message,' Dean Thomas P. Gerrity, for example, says the following:

- (49) Through its emphasis on diversity, global perspectives, and leadership, Wharton not only conveys the traditions of the past but also gives students the tools, resources, and vision they need to *shape* a very different world of the future. . . .[It is] an intensely challenging environment, both academically and personally (Wharton Catalogue 1991:3; the goal of vision is characteristic of but of course not limited to Wharton students)

The catalogue text goes on to say, under the "Diversity of Experience" section, that:

- (50) Business leaders require greater flexibility, broader vision, and the ability to operate in environments of increasing diversity. Because creativity depends on readjusting one's viewpoint, creative responses to business change require flexibility and a broad perspective. . . . The array of experiences offered at the Wharton School creates a challenging environment that nurtures *creativity*, experimentation, and innovation (Wharton Catalogue 1991:5).

Nor is this a bad description of today's CCM of The Artist: someone who is engaged in creativity, experimentation, and innovation. Note that in Ardall Pearson's military-minded Pepsico a visionary sense--often

stereotypically associated with artists--was explicitly rejected--using "competitive" words--as of little value:

- (51) A lot of the pressure we put on individuals was to make sure they had a strategy which gave us a competitive edge versus a lot of dreaming. (quoted in Sculley 1987:19)

A Wharton student stated the CCM clearly:

- (52) "I don't like that we get dumped on, kind of, for the 'Wharton mentality'--everything money, money. At parties, when people ask what your major is, it's hard to say, 'Accounting.' All anybody can say is, 'Oh?' or 'Isn't it boring?' People think you're not creative. . . . [But] To me, it's creative." (Quinn 1984:84)

In addition, Russell Ackoff, one of the most important professors at Wharton, has no doubt been significant in the influence of this metaphorical model, just as the important professor Michael Porter with his emphasis on "competition" has been for the War model at Harvard. Ackoff, professor emeritus of management science, is

- (53) known for creative solutions to management problems (Greene 1987:70),

and has written, among other things, Redesigning the future: A systems approach to societal problems (1974).

Just as Harvard's War model appears very briefly at Wharton, so too does an occasional HBS student suggest that the real goal of business is Wharton's creativity:

(54) Rogers: "I have a yen to make a fortune because there are so darn many other people trying to do it."

Morley: "I don't agree. The real measure of success is in meeting the challenge rather than in saying you have so many zeroes after your name. It's in proving to yourself that you can create this thing, whatever it is, academic or administrative. . . ." (*Forbes*, June 15, 1968:48)

A third participant in the discussion, however, noticed one of the most important entailments of Harvard's "military" social order:

(55) Haas: "The Harvard Business School as an institution has a lot of power in influencing businessmen. We talk about the tire or the drug industry not in terms of social responsibility but in terms of how competition makes it difficult for anyone to step out and deviate from the industry pattern" (*Forbes*, June 15, 1968:48)

Such deviation is perceived as difficult at the West Point of Harvard, but fits easily into the Artist's Studio at Wharton.

Wharton's secondary metaphor is perhaps that "Business is a (Diverse) Community" (part of the Cooperation metaphorical family). Their 1991-92 catalogue, for example, speaks on the first page of text of their school's characteristics:

(56) the diversity, flexibility, and international spectives that MBAs will need to succeed in business. It is a community of leaders that offers challenging debate and education inside and outside the classroom. (Wharton Catalogue 1991:1)

One section is explicitly given the title "A Community of Leaders" (Wharton Catalogue 1991:9), and "diversity" is a common word throughout.

Let us sum up the "Business is (Artistic) Creation" metaphorical model with a basic mapping (Table 3-8):

SOURCE DOMAIN		TARGET DOMAIN
(creation)		(business)
•creator	-->	businessman
•created object	-->	the business
•qualities of creator	-->	qualities of businessman
(e.g., imagination	-->	(e.g., innovation)
Special Case: an artist.		

TABLE 3-8
"Business is (Artistic) Creation"

6.1. Some presuppositions and entailments of "Business is (Artistic) Creation."

This rival metaphor, "Business is (Artistic) Creation," also carries with it a frame, presuppositions, and entailments, especially when paired with the current folk theory of a prototypical creator, that is, an artist. We have inherited this conception of the artist from the European Romantic artists of the nineteenth century, and along with it have accepted certain behavioral allowances. Artists, after all, are "free spirits." (See Table 3-9.)

Name of CCM: The Artist

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (stereotype)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "art," "draw")
- register: •can be informal, colloquial
(i.e., careless of conventions)
- maxims: •violations and flouts of all Maxims
allowed
(especially Relevance, Quality, Manner)
(i.e., careless of convention)
•violations and flouts of CP also
allowed
•may be playfully indirect
(i.e., meaning through implicature)
- speech acts: •passionate declarations

**Scenario/Frame
Elements**

(not all have to be mapped)

- artist
- artistic works
- process of creation

Speech Events

- egocentric monologues

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- unconventional/eccentric in dress and manner,
unkempt
- unstable, brooding or manic-depressive
- imaginative, innovative (often extravagantly
so), forward-looking
- willing to break rules (even just for the sake
of breaking them)
- self-indulgent, egocentric, and/or selfish
- emotional (especially paralinguistically:
volume, intonation, etc.)
- unworldly, especially unconcerned with money
- into sex, drugs, and rock-and-roll (presumably
because unconventional)
- evaluation = both positive and negative:
 - overt disapproval of behavior by many
"stable" members of society
 - but often admired as "daring to be
him/herself" and as "creative/original"

(Table 3-9, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions
(for details see text)

- Because of the stereotypical characteristics, The Artist is impoverished.
- Visual art is most prototypical (poetry second).
- Artists must be allowed "artistic freedom."
- "True" artists are often "ahead of their time" both personally and in terms of their work, which will usually come to be properly appreciated only after their death (which usually occurs from poverty and/or an overdose of drugs or alcohol)

Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/Knowledge

- Some of The Artist's characteristics are transferable to the (stereotypical) business environment.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Certain kinds of unconventional behavior can be overlooked/indulged, if they are performed by someone who is artistically talented (and preferably actually produces artistic work).

Kind of Mapping

- instantiation
- for business: metaphorical

Relevant Mappings

- See Table 3-8

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Partially clashes with War CCM, since independence and subordination (following orders) conflict.

TABLE 3-9
The CCM Prototype of The Artist

As John Sculley (Wharton MBA, 1963; Pepsico and Apple) said, intuitively capturing the Harvard and Wharton dominant metaphors:

(57a) Traditional marketers are obsessed with the notion that marketing is a quantitative process where success is won upon awareness, reach, and frequency, three of the profession's sacraments [< the Religion frame]. Successful marketing, however, cannot be merely reduced to a set of quantitative skills or measurements. While such skills may reduce the risks of making a big mistake, they are a poor substitute for true creative vision. . . . Visionaries are constantly fighting conventional wisdom because they see the world ahead in terms of what it can be if someone is willing to look at things in very different ways. By definition, they are more dependent on their own instincts. They invest their lives in a product by becoming totally absorbed by every aspect of it. They are usually demanding, stubborn, uncompromising, and difficult to be around. But when their perseverance and instincts match up, they are really right.

Sculley continues:

(57b) This is a far cry from the more common systematized competitor, skilled at fighting it out in today's market with an arsenal of Harvard Business School marketing tools. Competitors believe every battle counts, especially their most recent one, so they are too focused on the outcome of the month or the quarter. Visionaries are constantly

looking over the horizon to tomorrow. If their vision is on target, it will change the market and they will prosper-- even if it means losing a few battles along the way.

(Sculley 1987:24-25)

Or, as someone without ties to either school saw it:

(58) "I'll tell you the difference between Wharton and Harvard," says raider Saul Steinberg, elbows resting on his immense desk. "Men and women come out of Harvard and they think they should be one of the senior partners or one of the heads of the company within three to five years. They come out of Wharton and they know the only way to run a company in five years is to start your own." . . . Harvard Business School has the reputation for producing corporate presidents. But it is from the ranks of Wharton graduates that come those who strike fear into the hearts of the business establishment. (Greene 1987:69)

Again, Sculley:

(59) Within Pepsi, we were a band of obsessive misfits . . . six very different individuals who would *shape* the company's marketing in the early 1970s and take on our Atlanta nemesis [note: not 'enemy']. (Sculley 1987:23)

What does this remind one of, except the folk belief of the artist--or more accurately, the nineteenth century belief of the artist, which the twentieth century has inherited? As Trump describes the

highly successful entrepreneur, for example, one need only substitute the word "artist":

- (60) One of the keys to thinking big is total focus. I think of it almost as a controlled neurosis, which is a quality I've noticed in many highly successful entrepreneurs. They're obsessive, they're driven, they're single-minded and sometimes they're almost maniacal, but it's all channeled into their work. Where other people are paralyzed by neurosis, the people I'm talking about are actively helped by it. (Trump 1987:34)

There is also a moral dimension to the artist's freedom in our familiar folk theory:

- (61) The artist, neither exhausted by monotonous drudgery, nor restricted by moral conservatism, seemed attractively free of conventional restraints and able to live a delightfully irregular, often nomadic, life. . . . and seemed to inherit the dashing charm traditionally linked with romantic non-conformist heroes such as gypsies, pirates and outlaws (Jeffares 1979:57)

Compare what Sculley says of the premier R&D group at Macintosh under Steve Jobs:

- (62) Nothing consumed Steve's interest more and nothing seemed more central to that dream [Apple's "ability to change the way people work and live"] than the doings of a team of

young, dedicated fanatics who toiled under a pirates' flag in the Macintosh Building. Steve's "pirates" were a handpicked band of the most brilliant mavericks inside and outside Apple. Their mission . . . was to blow people's minds and overturn standards.

. . . *"It's more fun to be a pirate than to join the Navy,"* Steve would say. . . . [T]his was no traditional development team. This group shunned corporate orthodoxy and the conventions of society. (Sculley 1987:157)

Not surprisingly, whereas Harvard Business School students tend to enter corporations or established companies, inline with Wharton's philosophy, Wharton graduates are known for their entrepreneurship. Although after about 1982 Harvard tried to emphasize entrepreneurship, in order "to guide the media into new and more 'productive' areas" following some of the scandals, the attempt was not highly successful,

(63) precisely because it was not something Harvard Business School was associated with. . . . [Harvard] MBAs were, by nature, a risk-averse group who shunned the wild idea of setting up a speculative enterprise (Mark 1987:108-109)

There were only minimal effects:

(64) Interest in entrepreneurship is on the rise at HBS [but nevertheless] . . . We often wish the HBS system encouraged more people to pursue individual career and life goals, rather than reinforcing what in the past few years has almost become the traditional HBS career path into

investment banking and consulting." (Kelly and Kelly 1986:254)

That is, "creating" is what Harvard traditionally does not do, as described by alumni:

(65) In some ways, HBS students are losing out because the school is not encouraging its students to be more creative in formulating their post-graduate aspirations, and we fear that in some ways American business is losing out as well when a high percentage of a generation of business leaders are being tacitly trained to view the world in a consulting or advising role, rather than in the role of doing and making things. (Kelly and Kelly 1986:254)

In the 1980s, Donald Trump was an example of the entrepreneurial tendency taken to extremes. Although he called himself "competitive" and said that he "love[d] to beat" his New York real estate rivals (terms from the basic Competition frame-schema; e.g., Trump 1987:34, 41), in his books he emphasized his business creativity and artistic-like creation:

(66) [On not making an investment in a friend's oil deal in Texas:] Maybe it's that oil is underground, and I can't see it, or maybe it's that there's nothing creative about it. (Trump 1987:21)

(67) I don't do it for the money. I've got enough, much more than I'll ever need. I do it to do it. Deals are my art

form. Other people paint beautifully on canvas or write wonderful poetry. I like making deals, preferably big deals. That's how I get my kicks. (Trump 1987:3)

**7.0. Wharton graduates and the ethics scandals of the 1980s:
The folk theory of The Artist.**

For a Whartonian like John Sculley (who, probably not coincidentally, had originally intended to become an architect), this sort of freedom to be creative is essential. As he describes his mismatch with Pepsico:

(68) I was an important perfectionist. . . . relentless . . . driven, not by simple power or raw ambition, but by an insatiable curiosity and skepticism as to business's accepted notions. I considered myself a *builder*, someone whose success was dependent on building products and markets, on *changing an industry's ground rules*, not merely *competing* (Sculley 1987:4)

So, too, unlike their Harvard-trained counterparts, Wharton graduates who have been involved in scandals, questionable behavior, or definitely illegal activities have also tended to act outside the established order.⁵ What Michael Milken did with "junk bonds," for

⁵Corporate raiders seem to hold the "Business is War" metaphorical frame in combination with the folk theory of the artist/creator/free spirit, thus enabling them to take their tactics and models from commandos and individual warriors such as knights ("white" and "black") and gunslingers. By their acceptance of the War metaphor, they view economic advantage as something to be gained by force, whether or not the other party objects. Such a merger is explicitly not a congenial "marriage" but a "hostile" takeover:

- (i) So we're not going to kidnap anybody into the family. When it comes to courting, we like to do it the old-fashioned way--to knock on the front door with candy and flowers.
These days, though, with all the raiders running loose, everybody is scared to answer the door. Even a simple phone call

example, was entirely new. Before Milken, major corporations were generally the only businesses to issue bonds to raise capital; others borrowed money from commercial banks. At the time of his misdeeds, Milken was an investment banker, who, true to his Wharton background, created a new approach to buying bonds: he bought non-investment-grade bonds, which were cheap because they were of little interest to Wall Street. They were riskier, since their financial ratings were not high, but to offset that their price was low.

Furthermore, many of the terms used for Milken also reflect this Artistic metaphorical model, and recognize that Milken's approach differed from the more widespread "Business is War":

- (69) Michael Milken was the *maestro* of a Ponzi scheme . . . he built a reputation as a guru of low-rated credits . . . [he] began to create a captive network of buyers of extremely low-value bonds . . . he created the illusion of value

can send a company to battle stations. And if you say that you'd like to stop by and talk, the top brass fills the moat and pulls up the drawbridge. (Iacocca 1988:102)

- (ii) Mergers and acquisitions specialists, once regulated to routine business deals, were about to become celebrities, commandos dropped behind enemy lines to pull off hostile takeovers. (Frantz 1987:31)

That is, to function in the one place in the military structure where individualism and creativity are essential for success.

Compare also what a lawyer says about the same situation, remembering that, like pirates or raiders, mercenaries are somewhat individualistic, but, just as lawyers have to work within the corporate and legal structure, so mercenaries are only semi-autonomous within a military structure:

- (iii) Investment bankers, lawyers, and public relations experts compose [i.e., "orchestrate"] the takeover and defensive strategies which determine the outcome of merger wars. They manipulate the . . . laws. . . Or, as Martin Lipton, a leading merger lawyer, put it, "Corporate takeovers are analogous to feudal wars, and the lawyers are the mercenaries." (Time, 1979:44)

(Stein, a lawyer and consultant, in *Barrons*, September 1990, quoted in Schulte 1991:275)

See, too, the comments of one of Milken's fellow investment bankers at Drexel Burnham, Fred Joseph:

(70) There was no magic to it, except that we're a little different because we won't reject an idea. In most companies, new ideas are met with "What's wrong with it?" and put right back in its jug. We've developed a kind of cultural willingness to do something new. (quoted in Johnston 1986:146)

This willingness to experiment is also part of our current folk model of an Artist.

8.0. A metaphorical model shift?

At first glance, the "Business is War" metaphorical model seems firmly entrenched. There have been dozens of titles like *Marketing warfare* (1986) or *The Wall Street jungle* (1970) or *Liar's poker* (1989) for every *Leadership jazz* (1992) or (using the already-mentioned different but somewhat related metaphor) *Growing a business* (1987). The comparative dates of these books are, however, significant.

In the 1980s, then, the combination of Harvard's "Business is War" and "All's fair in love and war" led to an "All's fair in business" mentality and encouraged ethics scandals in which the participants do not challenge the rules but rather break them, while Wharton's "Business is (Artistic) Creation" along with our folk model of the artist tended

to lead to the individualistic creation of new rules (albeit often unacceptable ones). What has happened in the 1990s? Are any new CCMS replacing these older ones?

Some have already struggled towards new and different metaphors through intuitive dissatisfaction with the old, based on personal experience; we have already seen some examples of these. Others are proposing that there be new metaphorical models in line with what they see as necessary and sweeping changes in general worldviews:

- (71) an increasingly clear sign that the organizational models in place today need to be revised. It is not at all unusual to find structural hierarchies, management/ philosophies, and even day-to-day business language (e.g., references to introductory training as 'boot camp') reflecting antiquated models. Although their origins can be traced to military and religious organizations, these models came into their own throughout the Industrial Revolution. (Kissler 1991:52-53)

Whatever the motivation, however, change is very hard, since it must work in tandem with other societal changes. These values, after all, belong to more than Harvard or Wharton, and to more than just business. Other construal members of the Competition metaphorical family that serve as target domains for the source domain of War include politics, argumentation and the law, love, and marriage. The entirety of a cultural community's social relations are therefore affected by the existence of such interactional cognitive models.

8.1. Within a company.

Most of the suggested replacement models have appeared in connection with internal competition (Special Case 3). For example, some Harvard students who were unhappy with the "Business is Competition" model in effect at the school as well tried to describe their dissatisfaction by referring to Cooperation metaphors. For example, sometimes the desirable form of business culture was described as a community or as a family, both of which are core members of the Cooperation metaphorical family. Notice that some of the entailments of Cooperation models are explicitly presented in the description:

- (72) "At Beckridge Bank and Trust, to a great extent, the people there, it's like a big family. Where people do talk to each other. [He has just finished describing the harshness of Harvard.] People go out with each other, you know, laugh and joke. It's . . . [sic] a very friendly atmosphere. And you'll find a lot of occasions when people will come into that bank, not to make a deposit, not to cash a check, but just to find somebody to talk to. And that's something that has to be reconciled, you know. People complain that the service in the bank is slow. . . . the main reason is that the tellers take time to know people, where they live and what they do, their kids--it does slow down things. But that's a trade-off you have to make. Either we slow down--still making progress now, but humane--or we're going to be very hard about the whole thing. This is a business; you

come in and do it this way and that's it. Which way is it going to be?" (an HBS student quoted in Cohen 1973:90)

Similarly, the 1991-92 HBS catalogue quotes a student (MBA 1990) who mentions

(73) the "close friendships formed in my first-year section 'family'" (27).⁶

Real-world, literal families are not necessarily cooperative, however. In *Inside the Harvard Business School*, the "sections" are called "something of an extended family" (Ewing 1990:70), although they are said to enforce conformity by punishment and are also described as competitive and often mean-spirited:

(74) Competition between students often surfaces. Individuals are at times sarcastic in response to their fellow students' comments in class. When small groups within the section take on one another, the competition can get nasty, and when, on occasion, subgroups from the various sections play one another, matters can get almost out of hand. (Solman and Friedman 1982:65-66)

Another Cooperative alternative suggested in some of the discourse about HBS is that of a singing group. A "Musical Group" is another core member [Special Case] of the "Cooperation" metaphorical family, since it is in the interest of all members for every individual member to perform

⁶As already mentioned, every first-year class is subdivided into "sections," large groups which take all their classes together in the same room for that year.

well (despite competition that arises in other aspects of the entertainment domain, such as competition for roles):

(75) "I used to be in a singing group. And it got to the point where--even though it was a business proposition--you could have fun doing it. . . . We knew each other and if somebody was doing something wrong you didn't come down on him with an ax. You said, 'You can do that right.' You offered support in a friendly fashion. . . . if you're working as a group and you feel good about it, you're not going to let the others down. You're going to do the best you possibly can. Entertainment is the perfect example of what people, working together, can do. So why can't that same thing carry over into business? (Cohen 1973:91; this is the same student who spoke about the bank above, in Part I, "The Fight for Survival")

Some recent books and articles on management have tried to import Japanese management and other business practices (themselves based on a blend of certain aspects of Japanese traditional culture and the post-World War II ideas of American Edward Deming, disregarded in the United States), describing them as extremely cooperative. Japanese culture also includes "Business is War," however, with respect to other companies or countries:

Nevertheless, Japanese business emphasizes the Cooperation aspect of the military (a Military Unit is a core Cooperation member) when it comes to internal management, since social 'harmony' is also an extremely important cultural value:

(76) Matsushita executives were puzzled when we asked about "having fights with other divisions." One manager explained it this way: "We disagree like husbands and wives do in a healthy marriage (or the way close business partners might when they have worked together many, many years). [Spouses and Business Partners are further core members of the Cooperation metaphorical family.] We have conflict without conflicting. Our underlying premise is that in life we will make adjustments. And by "adjustment" we presuppose that the parties will fundamentally strive to pull together rather than push apart." [Even] "when two divisions are competing to make the same new product . . . We try to get these facts out on the table and let reason speak for itself. We build 'acceptance time' into these discussions" because "You can't force people to accept your ideas--we try insofar as possible to expose them gradually and win their acceptance" [interviews with Matsushita managers].

Similarly, Chairman Matsushita himself says that "When I meet with my managers it is seldom formal. We communicate knee to knee. A crucial element is their independence, so, however pointed by question and direct the implications, I refrain from giving orders. We must respect the pride of different individuals and honor the traders of their companies." (Pascale and Athos 1981:48-49; italics original)

(For the issue of these Japanese-model-based "quality circles" and "consensus groups" as controlling processes that, despite appearances, do not always act in the workers' best interests, see, e.g., Gonzalez 1996.)

A very influential author who proposed a complete change from Competition with respect to the Special Case of internal corporate organization is Peter Drucker. Well known and very highly regarded since *The concept of the corporation* (1946), in 1988 he published an article in the *Harvard Business Review* titled "The coming of the new organization," in which he declared that the organization of the future will be an "information-based" and cooperative organization of specialists, for which our experiential frames should be a hospital, a symphony orchestra, or the British civil service in India (Drucker 1988).

Compare also Max De Pree's 1992 book, *Leadership jazz*, for the another model:

(77) one way to think about leadership is to consider a jazz band. . . . A jazz band is an expression of servant leadership. The leader of a jazz band has the beautiful opportunity to draw the best out of the other musicians. . . . jazz, like leadership, combines the unpredictability of the future with the gifts of individuals. (De Pree 1992:9)

The symphony orchestra and hospital frames also appear in *America's management challenge: Capitalizing on change* (Miller 1983:4). This book includes a suggestion that managers are like doctors doing

medical diagnostic procedures (Miller 1983:310). Miller does, however, accept competition (Miller 1983:157). He uses the Cooperation internally-focused core members that correspond to externally-focused core members of the Competition metaphorical family, namely, a Sports Team--specifically football--and a Military Unit:

(78) Clearly the future and the people who will successfully manage through it are different from the present in many ways. However, we must be careful not to paint a picture of a world turned completely upside down. Many of the new management approaches and skills must be viewed as additive to conventional management methods. The forward pass revolutionized football, but it complemented rather than replaced the running game. There are some traditional management techniques that are analogous to the running attack. (Miller 1983:304)

(79) You're going to encounter some [resistance] when you start bringing up these new ideas. . . . People [will] actively oppose your efforts. . . . The people [who believe that] [w]hat counts is the "fire in your gut." Other people aren't important, although this person frequently refers to himself or herself as a team player. However, the "team" consists of people that are under his or her thumb, whose lives are directed by this individual. *It's a team like the army is a team--it works only as long as everybody knows their places and takes orders unquestioningly.* (Miller 1983:316; italics added)

8.2. Between companies.

However, much of this analysis has been concerned with external relationships, especially those between "rival" companies that supply the same goods or services (Special Case 1). Even with respect to this domain, some dissatisfaction has become evident. A few authors, for example, have emphasized postmodern priorities, suggesting that business should be anti-patriarchal (and therefore coherent with an anti-militaristic model), anti-egocentric, pro-diverse, anti-nationalistic, pro-small scale, and pro-"win-win" methods and goals instead of zero-sum results, for example:

- (80) "The Cooperative Mentality: The New Age Alternative to the Bureaucratic Mentality" of competition. (chapter subheading in Satin 1979)

Another set of postmodern values appears in books such as *Management in the Third Wave* (Raymond 1986), which frequently uses the words "organic" and "organism," for example, in a chapter subhead:

- (81) "Corporation Members--The Cells of the Organism." (p. 69)

At the same time, however, this author continues to accept Competition and in fact at times uses specifically and overtly military language and diagrams. In line with this, it would not be surprising to see a Predation-based evolution or ecological metaphor of some sort develop, since such a model would keep the competition angle--so basic in American capitalism and American society in general that it will be hard to eradicate--and yet have the "organic/organism/nature" concept that has become increasingly popular since the 1970s.

Harvard itself, in the wake of its various 1980s scandals, tried to make changes. An ethics program was begun and some curriculum changes were instituted. Students at the time foresaw potentially lasting effects, but as Gary Edwards, of the Ethics Research Center in Washington, D.C., said:

- (82) [S]chools are "missing the point" if they think ethics courses alone are going to make a significant difference. . . . As long as you have a business culture that puts people in impossible situations--'Your division has to grow 7 percent in the next year or else we're going to be No. 2 in the field and if we are, you're going to be job-hunting' --you're going to have [ethics violations] . . . in the time-honored tradition: Results, and only results, count [a statement coherent with the Victory that is the Goal of Competition]."
- (Wilkes 1989:24)

Or, to put it another way, as long as the literal goals and the related predominant Competition metaphor-based CCMs do not change, the entailments will not change, either. Nevertheless, some unease has appeared:

- (83) Along with these characteristics goes an abiding faith in the U.S. business techniques that have always worked . . . [On the other hand,] Not all people with drive, determination, etc. will oppose you [in changing internal structures based on firm hierarchical obedience "like the army"; see example 79 above]. Most of them, like most of

the population at large, have an uneasy feeling that something has gone terribly wrong with U.S. business.

(Miller 1983:316)

Something has. In the 1980s, the "Business is War" metaphorical model, with the help of the prestigious Harvard Business School, took even more control of American business discourse and practices, despite a steady increase in alternative and more Cooperative conceptualizations, creating a particular kind of social climate whose entailed effects were still seen in the 1990s.

9.0. Conclusion.

I have argued that the almost exclusive metaphorical CCM for business used at the Harvard Business School between the mid 1960s and the early 1990s--namely, "Business is War"--coupled with our folk model of prototypical war and the proverb "All's fair in love and war" has led to a view of the business world as a zero-sum game and explains with a high degree of success the characteristic ethics violations on the part of HBS graduates.

Similarly, the Wharton School of Business's characteristic metaphor during the same period--"Business is (Artistic) Creation"--in conjunction with the American folk model (based on the nineteenth century European Romantic artist) of The Artist as a "free spirit" resulted in a different and also highly correlated set of associations involving equally characteristic questionable behavior and infractions on the part of graduates of that school. General social acceptance of these metaphor-based CCMs, with their built-in presuppositions and

entailments, both reflects and is shaped by specialist discourse about business in the United States.

This is not to say, of course, that all graduates from either school hold to the respective metaphorical model and nothing else, nor, certainly, that graduates will necessarily break the laws just because they hold certain belief structures or talk about business in a certain way. It is not even to say that one metaphor is automatically "better" than another in all aspects and in all contexts. What I have intended to do is twofold: to show the coherence between belief as perceived through discourse and through behavior, and to suggest how certain institutional tendencies (and related social roles) and sociocultural trends may be motivated and reinforced by correlations and associations of conceptual and cognitive systems of various sorts.

Chapter 4

CCMs in Northern Ireland: Some Brief Comments on Gerry Adams and the Newspapers

"A man who knows how to omit could make an *Iliad* out of the morning paper."

--Robert Louis Stevenson

1.0. Introduction.

Self-presentation models and other types of CCMs, including metaphorical ones, are not, of course, confined to American public discourse. Such models are constantly used because of their ability to evoke emotionally and psychologically powerful reactions in their hearers and thereby help persuade them to belief or action in line with the speaker's desires. The present chapter presents the beginning of an analysis of self-presentation models and metaphorical CCMs in some examples of Northern Irish public discourse concerning the conflict there and the search for a settlement.

Similar cultures often share many of their models. Therefore, a politician who is able to utilize these overlaps when speaking in a foreign country can appeal to constituencies in both societies. Such an approach to public diplomacy--that is, to the conduct of foreign affairs via the press, public appearances, press conferences, and press releases--has many uses, from raising contributions of money or supplies to increasing public pressure on the government of the host country in such a way as to affect its foreign policy.

On October 4, 1994, Gerry Adams, president of the Irish nationalist political party Sinn Féin,¹ delivered a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. The speech was broadcast on National Public Radio and C-SPAN (cable television), and was available on the Internet. This speech was part of a U.S. tour that Adams was making to gain more support among ordinary Americans and the American government. He especially wanted Sinn Féin to play a formal role in the peace talks in Northern Ireland. Although Adams is Irish, his speech can be analyzed in terms of CCMS that appeal not only to his Irish audience at home but also to the American audience. As an event in public diplomacy, messages of various sorts were being sent via the CCMS to Americans, to all the political parties in Ireland and Northern Ireland, and to the British. This speech therefore illustrates the role of cultural cognitive models as a tool of international diplomacy. For the text, see the appendix to this chapter. (For public diplomacy see, e.g., Tuch 1990; Fisher 1972, 1987.)

Another aspect of public diplomacy is the news media. Whether or not they are being used as a conscious channel of dissemination by political figures, the events as reported in the media help shape world opinion about what is happening. (There has been considerable discussion about bias in the media; see, e.g., Bell 1991; van Dijk 1985a; Kress 1985, 1986; Kress and Hodge 1979; Kress and Trew 1978; Fowler 1991; Fowler et al. 1979; Anderson 1988; Fairclough 1995b; and many communication studies scholars' works on the media and the construction of news.) Although the actual geographic area involved in

¹Sinn Féin, which is found in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, is often identified as "the political wing of the ["terrorist"] Irish Republican Army." Since the beginning of the peace process Adams has consistently disavowed any support for IRA violence.

the dispute in Northern Ireland is very small, the geopolitical ramifications are significant. This situation is partly due to Britain's status in the world community, especially as a close ally of the United States, but it is also partly due to the kinship and nostalgic ties that still bind Americans of Irish descent closely to what happens in Ireland. It is also no doubt partly due to the increasing economic importance of the formerly rural Republic of Ireland as a world computer software center and to the new businesses that have recently been induced to invest and build in both parts of Ireland.

1.1. Background: The situation in Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland consists of the six counties lying to the north of the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom, and this is what the dispute is about, at least on its most obvious level. However, despite popular perception, the division is not merely, or even primarily, religious in a theological or confessional sense. Rather, it is cultural, social, economic, and constitutional.

The labels "Protestant" and "Unionist" and "Loyalist," as opposed to "Catholic" and "Nationalist" and "Republican," are perhaps roughly equivalent in the broadest sense and for much of the population, but there are shades of meaning and cross- and counter-groupings that make these easy divisions entirely too simplistic.

Modern political "nationalism" in Ireland has been defined by one historian (Boyce 1991:392) as "the idea that there was an historic people, a community whose national consciousness could be traced down the ages, and whose struggle to survive is the central theme of Irish history." For many this means that all of the island of Ireland should

be joined in one, independent government. One journalist defines it somewhat more narrowly: a nationalist is "A member of the Catholic population who aspires to a reunited Ireland by non-violent means" (Toolis 1995:xiv). Loosely, "republican" has a similar meaning: "A supporter of a United Ireland" (Toolis 1995:xv), but usually in context it refers to supporters of the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Féin. "Unionists" oppose a United Ireland and support continued British control of the region; "loyalists" advocate violence to support this position. The terms "republican" and "loyalist" in context are generally parallel and "refer to members of . . . [the groups] with uncompromising political views and a tendency to use or accept the use of violence in the pursuit of their objectives" (Boyle and Hadden 1994:22).

Organizations which take a "United Ireland" position include the following (given roughly in terms of extremism, starting with the most moderate): the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP, led by John Hume), Sinn Féin (and the [Provisional] Irish Republican Army), and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). There are also socialists, including the Irish Republican Socialist Movement (IRSM, linked to the INLA).

Pro-United Kingdom (anti-United Ireland) groups include the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP, headed by David Trimble), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, an extreme right-wing party led by Ian Paisley), and the "loyalist" groups that advocate violence: the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), the last two having political wings (Ulster Democratic Party, or UDP, and the Progressive Unionist Party, or PUP) after the loyalist

paramilitaries declared a truce in October 1994 to match the IRA's August ceasefire. There is also a middle-of-the-road party, the Alliance Party (headed by John Alderdice), which is small but supports unionism and a form of nationalism: that is, both British rule and close links with Dublin.

The existence of many of these groups is not legal. Some of these illegal groups were founded after the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that ended the Irish War of Independence (also called the Black and Tan War or the Anglo-Irish War) and established the partition of the island into the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Eire, declared in 1948 and enacted in 1949). Others came into existence after the IRA's campaigns in Northern Ireland, especially the "Border Campaign" of 1956-1962 or after the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland that began in 1967-68 and had several important effects: another wave of increased sectarian violence, the resulting introduction of British troops, internment without trial, and the institution of Direct Rule from Westminster.

This divided situation in Northern Ireland did not begin in the twentieth century. It has Ireland-wide roots that reach back through many rebellions against the English and British since their first inroads into Ireland in the twelfth century, and forward from the 1960s through the continuing sectarian violence, the occasional attempts at restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s, and the 1981 hunger strike in Long Kesh (the Maze) prison that resulted in the death of Bobby Sands and others. The current situation may be considered to have begun with the 1992 secret talks of the British government and Sinn Féin, the 1993 Hume-Adams Initiative (an agreement between the two major nationalist

parties), and the 1993 Downing Street Declaration (a joint declaration between the British and Irish governments as a basis for further negotiation without violence).

In August 1994, the IRA declared a ceasefire in their operations in Northern Ireland--operations which the British and many unionists regarded as "terrorism" and the IRA and many nationalists called "fighting for freedom against oppression." The nature of the actions and events is not what is in dispute; rather, this is a fundamental CCM conflict that is familiar throughout the world.² In October, the Combined Loyalist Military Command followed suit, and as a result British troop patrols stopped in (London)derry after twenty-five years. Although these patrols continued in Belfast until 1995, the security gates between the Protestant and Catholic areas of Belfast were opened in November, 1994. See Table 4-1 for a chronology of the conflict from August 1994 through April 1996, the time period that is the focus of this analysis.

As we shall see, one of Adams's self-presentation CCMs relates precisely to the goal of gaining American public support for the peace negotiations and for Sinn Féin's place in them. Adams makes this goal explicit:

²Cf. Tony Parker's discussion of terminology:

"If you are Protestant and British you'll always call the second biggest city in Northern Ireland 'Londonderry'; if you're Catholic and/or Nationalist, you'll only refer to it as 'Derry'. [Parenthetically: the name was, I believe, recently changed officially back to Derry.] Nationalists and Catholics speak of 'the North', 'Ireland' or, intentionally aggressive, 'the Six Counties'. 'Northern Ireland' and 'Ulster' are Protestant terminology: and to speak of 'the Province' in front of a Nationalist is provocative, even if it wasn't intended. . . . Catholics, and particularly Republicans, never talk about 'the Troubles'--they use the blunter 'the war' or 'the struggle.' Even in the *minutiae* of pronunciation there are giveaways . . . [and the IRA's] members are only called 'Provos' by Protestants: to Republicans, Nationalists and Catholics they're 'the Provies'. . . ." (Parker 1993:4-5)

- 1994
- August: IRA declares ceasefire.
 - October: The Combined Loyalist Military Command declares truce; British troop patrols are stopped in (London)derry after 25 years.
 - November: Security gates are opened on Belfast peace line between Protestant Shankill and Catholic Springfield (Belfast); first reduction in British troops since IRA ceasefire.
- 1995
- January: British army stops daytime patrols in Belfast.
 - February: Draft proposals of Framework Document leaked to newspapers.
 - March: Gerry Adams given U.S. visa; British government withdraws more troops and stops routine night patrols in Belfast.
 - May: British lift ban on ministerial talks with Sinn Féin; talks last five weeks (broken off by Sinn Féin).
 - September: Irish Republic postpones talks with Britain, refusing to link all-party peace talks to London's insistence that IRA disarm first.
 - November: British and Irish governments announce "twin track" process: all-party talks to start in February 1996; commission established to study IRA's decommissioning of arms. Clinton visits Northern Ireland.

(Table 4-1, continued)

- December: "Mitchell Commission" (international commission headed by George Mitchell of U.S.) start work on the decommissioning issue. First "twin-track" talks (Sinn Féin and Britain's Secretary for Northern Ireland).
- 1996 •January: Mitchell Commission proposes all-party talks alongside phased surrender of terrorist weapons. British Prime Minister John Major proposes elections in Ulster to pave the way for all-party talks (angers republicans).
- February: IRA announces end of 17-month ceasefire; bomb in London's Docklands (2 dead, 100 injured); two more IRA bombs in London. June 10 set as date for all-party talks (by Irish Republic and Britain); call on IRA to restore ceasefire to allow Sinn Féin to participate in talks.
- April 8: Sectarian riots over a Loyalist march in Belfast.
- April 17: Another bomb explodes in London; the IRA claims responsibility.
- (1998 •The peace talks are currently [January 1998] underway in London, with all parties invited to participate. Paisley's DUP has refused to sit at the table with Sinn Féin.)

TABLE 4-1
A Chronology of Some Events in the Northern Ireland Peace Process,
1994-1996

- (1) I think it's important to note that what we're asking in some small way is for the U.S.A. to give us back at home in

Ireland what people have here as a matter of every day [sic] rights. (106-109).

In the real world of politics and international diplomacy, not all positions are chiefly presented by means of explicit statements or explicit word meaning. Political positions are also presented implicitly--by word choice, by allusion, by prototypes and stereotypes, by how the discourse is structured, by metaphor, and by other aspects and kinds of CCMs.

Table 4-2 presents a list of self-presentation CCMs in this speech; tables of the individual models will not be as elaborately developed as were those of Newt Gingrich:

•Model 1:	Victim of British Oppression
•Model 2:	Irish Roots
•Model 3:	The (Nationalist) Revolutionary
•Model 4:	The Pluralist

TABLE 4-2
Adams's CCMs of Self-Presentation

All of Adams's CCMs are linked with each other in a complex fashion, and clashes are rare; it is part of the oratorical skill seen in his speeches.

2.0. Gerry Adams's CCMs of Self-Presentation.

2.1. Model 1: "Victim of British Oppression."

Adams's first self-presentation CCM (see Table 4-3), which first appears early in his speech, is not surprisingly that of the Victim of British Oppression. This is historically an effective model for both his Irish and his American audiences, although today Americans

experience it much less emotionally and as weakened by being intermingled with the social prestige of British culture and accent.

- lexical choice
- "code" phrases
- allusions (historical, etc.)
- presuppositions and entailments (see text)
- analogy/implicit here

TABLE 4-3

Adams's Model 1: Victim of British Oppression (Simplified)

There are certain clear and unambiguous lexical contextualization cues of this CCM:

- (2) the repression at home (85-86)
- (3) The last time I came here my voice and the voices of other Sinn Féin representatives *could not be heard* in the British Broadcasting media (133-136)
- (4) the "occupied" "area" or "part" of Ireland (110, 177, 204, 207).

There are in addition some lexical items that link words with negative meanings explicitly to the British, given the history that is so large a part of this CCM. For example, the phrase in example (5),

- (5) because of *famine* (86)

does not seem necessarily to blame anyone. However, the nationalist readings of the mid-nineteenth century "Great Hunger" or "Potato Famine" that resulted in the death or emigration of at least a million (probably

more) Irish--many of them to the U.S.--are that the Famine was deliberate genocide or at the very least deliberate unconcern on the part of the British government. Adams does not assert this interpretation directly: it is debated and highly partisan, and taking that stance overtly would not have been diplomatically wise at that moment. Nor is it compatible with another of his models, that of The Pluralist (Model 4 below). It has, however, a strong appeal to Irish-Americans, many of whom are intensely nationalistic and often would recognize it immediately.

Another indirect way of asserting this oppression is by using words and constructions that presuppose its existence. For example, Adams says that peace talks must be called for by everyone

(6) who has any notion of what is wrong in Ireland (160-161)

--that is, by using the construction "what is wrong in Ireland" he assumes that *something* is wrong in Ireland. Similarly, the phrase in example (7),

(7) who has any notion of what it takes to rectify those
injustices (161-162)

presupposes both that injustices exist (how else could he be singling out some particular injustices--a subset, if you will--by the use of the deictic "those"?), and--importantly for the success of the peace process--that rectification is possible. "What it takes" implies that *something* will be successful. However, it is precisely these ideas that loyalists challenge--but the beauty of presuppositions is that

rhetorically they cannot be directly challenged, precisely because they are unexpressed.

In like manner, Adams makes certain presuppositions when he says that

- (8) Issues of democratic rights need no discussion; either people have democratic rights or we [sic] don't. And if we don't then they should be restored to us as speedily as possible. So there are the three main areas which need a focus. (199-203).

One presupposition is contained in the word "restored": how can something be "restored" unless it previously existed?

A second presupposition is contained in the definite article "the": "the three main areas" presupposes that there are three and only three main areas of discussion. Adams explicitly assumes--by saying that it "need[s] no discussion"--that everyone agrees as to the characteristics of democracy. This may be true in general for the relevant parties in this speech event, namely, the U.S., Britain, and Northern Ireland--perhaps, although even within this small group there are some differences. (It is worth noting, however, that as we move farther away from eighteenth-century-based European definitions, disagreement increases; for "democracy" as a contested concept, see Gallie 1956; and especially Ostiguy 1992, Schaffer 1992 and 1994, and Collier 1994, Collier and Levitsky 1994/1997.) In any event, Adam's utterance here serves as a preemptive strike, furthered by shared models.

Furthermore, one thing that we know from our real-world knowledge about oppressor-oppressed relationships is that oppressors cannot be trusted by the oppressed, no matter what signs of good faith the oppressed are given. In the following example, "stall" is therefore a much more negatively loaded word than its dictionary definition might suggest:

- (9) So here we have a situation where during that period of conflict there were talks, and Mr. Major did the right thing, and here when there is a peace settlement on the horizon, when the IRA has ceased, when Sinn Féin's democratic [note the positive word here, part of another CCM] mandate has been recognized at home by the Dublin government and by governments throughout the world, that the British government appears to stall.

And if one is looking for a reason for that, it's my view that [it is] merely tactical. It's my view that the British--and I think that they're wrong--wish to reduce this opportunity for peace, that they wish to slow the momentum.

(149-159)

That is, even when the oppressed act in good faith to help the cause of peace, the untrustworthy oppressors, the British, act to impede it (although Adams's use several times of the first person in making these statements functions as a speech act hedge, thus creating plausible deniability of speaker intent). It is clear who is being cast as the villain. Perhaps they were villainous--but the point here is

that Adams's portrayal of them is compatible with the history-based CCM of oppressor-oppressed.

Other aspects of this British oppression are also given an explicit listing:

- (10) And let me say as someone who comes from the occupied [notice this explicit lexical item] area, in which Catholics are still discriminated against [a negative phrase], and [in] which there is still a permanent state of emergency [i.e., untrustworthiness and resulting danger], and who has gone through the whole sad [another negative word] litany [evoking a religious frame, with its authority] of imprisonment [negative], and been shot [negative] and ha[d] my family home and my wife and my son subjected [negative] to bomb attacks [negative]. . . let me say that under no circumstances will Irish Nationalists or Irish Republicans ever inflict [negative] upon Protestants what was inflicted by unionists upon Catholics. (176-187)

In other words, the 'occupation' of the British and the extreme loyalist paramilitaries are made equivalent oppressors within this model by placing them together in the text. Furthermore, the many details are unnecessary in strict semantic terms: occupied is occupied. However, there is a communicative reason for this apparent violation of the Maxim of Quantity. That is, the details communicate the strength of the oppression; for emotional purposes, this much detail is required, given the need to establish beyond question the oppressor-oppressed Victim of the British CCM and strengthen American political support. Furthermore,

the details themselves gain in intensity and strength as they move from the general and abstract to the concrete and personal.

It is for this reason, too, that skeptics have challenged the sincerity of Adams's own commitment to peace. Despite his use of personal detail, he explicitly disclaims any special Victim status with one sentence:

(11) and I don't believe that I or those I represent have any monopoly on suffering, and I acknowledge quite freely, and I've done so in Ireland, the suffering that has been inflicted by Republicans (181-184).

His supporters point to statements like this to prove Adams's 'balanced' stature as a peacemaker, but his critics might point out that explicit statements have much less power than implicit ones, that the construction of the "oppression" CCM throughout the speech provide a constant counterweight, and that the very position of the explicit statement in the middle of his list of public and private oppressions makes it seem almost parenthetical. That is, the speech balances explicitness and implicitness in such a way that both supporters and critics will be able to find evidence for their interpretations.

2.2. Model 2: "Irish Roots."

Clearly related to this Oppression CCM is Model 2: that of Adams as the man who has Irish roots and is proud of it; see Table 4-4:

- lexical choice
- analogy
- allusion
- attributed causality (see text)
- presupposition: blood ties (kinship,
ethnicity)

TABLE 4-4
Adams's Model 2: Irish Roots (Simplified)

This is the Irish Roots CCM, and it, too, is rooted in history: from the beginning the rebellions in Ireland appealed for their support to a sense of "Irishness" among the populace. This model is obviously of great importance in the United States, where Irish-Americans have tended to give strong support to the nationalist cause, including the IRA, both with guns and with money, legally or not, on the grounds of ethnicity, and where St. Patrick's Day as a symbol of Ireland is celebrated by everyone in a fashion not formerly seen in Ireland (although things there are changing). Since he is in the U.S., Adams specifically mentions Irishness in connection with Irish immigration to America:

(12) and--perhaps a small historical accident that the first immigrant processed [at Ellis Island] was an Irish woman.

(82-83)

Of course, if it is so "small" and "accident[al]," why mention it at all, since doing so seems to violate the Maxims of Quantity and at first glance Relevance? He does it to establish the Irish Roots model held by much of his American audience, and thus it is Relevant after all, in context. (Adams also calls the trip to Ellis Island "almost a

pilgrimage" [97], which gives the model a strong religious authority, important for many Irish and Irish-Americans.)

For a similar reason he mentions that Ireland has given

(13) 13 presidents to this United States of America (95)

and he thanks

(14) our friends here in Irish America . . . those people here who have kept the faith [evokes both religious and American Civil Rights frames; the nationalists in Northern Ireland have explicitly identified with the American Civil Rights movement; see below], who have not forgotten their roots, who see an opportunity and who have helped to create this opportunity (41-48).

Note also the deictic emphasis of "this"--a reminder of the present after the distancing of "those people" and "their roots" and therefore serves as a vivid link between the audience of Americans and himself as a representative of the Irish.

Adams also makes the Victim of British Oppression model (Model 1) Relevant to his American audience by drawing direct and explicit geographic and historical analogies:

(15) the British Army, which is the largest force and which is in occupation of an area approximately the size of Rhode Island (19-20)

(16) I also, when I was here, went to Arlington Cemetery, . . . Only the magnitude of that place differs from the too many

cemeteries which I have attended back home over the years in Ireland. (101-104).

2.3. Model 3: "The (Nationalist) Revolutionary."

In making a similar historical appeal to the CCM based on the American response to our British oppression, Adams also appeals to one of the foundational American CCMs, one that is often appealed to by American political figures as well: that of The (Nationalist) Revolutionary (or The Just and Glorious Revolution; see Table 4-5). Irish nationalist history has a complementary and complimentary (Nationalist) Revolutionary CCM, which helps Adams appeal to his audience at home at the same time.

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •lexical choice •allusion •causality ("line of descent") •analogy (explicit here) |
|--|

TABLE 4-5
Adams's Model 3: The (Nationalist) Revolutionary (Simplified)

One way to connect CCMs is by thus invoking an analogy. However, in invoking Model 3, The (Nationalist) Revolutionary, Adams goes beyond mere analogy evoked by very positive (within the model) lexical items such as "revolutionary," "independence," and "rights of man." In utilizing knowledge of the American model, he invokes also a claim of causality that links the American Revolutionary CCM to Adams's and Sinn Féin's own political position:

- (17) And the war here [in the U.S.], the Revolutionary War here, the War of Independence, the rights of man, Thomas Payne

[sic], all of that and all that happened in the French Revolution, is where Irish Republicanism comes from, where it springs from. (95-99).

The repetition here ("war . . . War . . . War," "all of that and all that," "Revolutionary . . . Revolution," "comes from . . . springs from") increases the tempo and therefore the emotional pulse of the passage, and functions almost like an incantation.

Although The (Nationalist) Revolutionary CCM might sound especially republican when heard in an Irish context and thus convince the unionists that Sinn Féin has no place in the negotiations, there is another model that offers the unionists hope and reassurance with respect to Adams's view of the future of Northern Ireland. That is the CCM of The Pluralist.

2.4. Model 4: "The Pluralist."

America prides itself on its inclusiveness and diversity; it is part of our national history and part of our national story. Therefore, Adams presents his Pluralist model (Table 4-6) explicitly in terms of America, and links it with the Irish Roots model:

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •lexical choice •allusion •presupposition (see text) •metaphor (•analogy/not explicit here) |
|---|

TABLE 4-6
Adams's Model 4: The Pluralist (Simplified)

The central passage of the speech--the one that appeals to all the CCMs both explicitly and implicitly, and makes clear the public diplomacy goals--is above all a presentation of the Pluralist CCM, and diplomatically this is no accident. The IRA-linked Sinn Féin party has to gather a great deal of support from more than the republicans and nationalists if it is to be important in the continued talks. Parts of this passage have already been separately analyzed; listen for The Victim of British Oppression, Irish Roots, The (Nationalist) Revolutionary, and The Pluralist self-presentation models, and note also the resonance with the analogous foundational American CCMs (79-116):

(18a) And I think also [of] the diversity, the diversity of people who come [sic] through there [Ellis Island] from Europe, from Ireland, of course, Jewish people, all from all over the world, and then to come here and--perhaps a small historical accident that the first immigrant processed was an Irish woman.

So then when I come here to Washington I am reminded that we who could not live in our own country, we who because of the repression at home, because of famine, because of the economic climate, when we came here we were able to join with all of these other races, all of these other nations, and build this union into what it is today.

Never mind that in presenting the history this way Adams is disregarding the very real struggles and discrimination that the Irish faced from

Anglo-Americans in the nineteenth century (see, e.g., Ignatiev 1995, L. P. Curtis 1971).

Here the word "union"--chosen instead of, say, "nation"--serves as a bridge to his message to Northern Ireland and forms another part of the public diplomacy work being done by this speech. Adams's use of the repeated "we" in the later part of the passage also serves The Pluralist and unification function: "we" present-day Irish-Americans, who were "we" Irish first and then became "we" Americans but still remain "we Irish" by blood and self-identification. Adams continues:

(18b) I am also very mindful, and I note--the term Protestants and Catholics has been used . . . I note that the Protestant Irish men and Irish women who joined with the Catholics and the dissenters in a great effort to rid Ireland of British rule, the doctination [sic] here gives 13 presidents to this United States of America. And the war here, the Revolutionary War here, the War of Independence, the rights of man, Thomas Payne [sic], all of that and all that happened in the French Revolution, is where Irish Republicanism comes from, where it springs from.

I also, when I was here, went to Arlington Cemetery, early yesterday morning.

Only the magnitude of that place differs from the too many cemeteries which I have attended back home over the years in Ireland. And I think also when we think of what Ireland has given--no better or no worse than anyone else

--another direct evocation of the Pluralist CCM, in evaluative terms--

(18c) --what Ireland has given to the U.S.A., I think it's important to note that what we're asking in some small way is for the U.S.A. to give us back at home in Ireland what people have here as a matter of every day [sic] rights. What you take for granted here is foreign in the British-occupied part of the six counties.

This is an explicit rejection of a culturally held American presupposition about the 'democratic' nature of British society, law, and politics.

(18d) So the U.S.A., the administration on my visit has taken in not just Irish America, but we have talked to people from the Jewish community, we have talked to people from the Italian community, we will talk to Hispanics and we will talk to the Black Caucus, to people who have come from African roots. *All of that I think sends powerful encouraging signals back home.* (italics added)

To paraphrase: I am speaking also to all you Unionists. You have nothing to fear from the withdrawal of the British. We can all live together.

Later in the speech, he says that "the unionists are my people," using the "A Nation Is a Family" metaphor, one of the powerful political metaphors found in many countries:

(19) the unionists are my people . . . They have as much right to be on the island of Ireland as I have. They have as much right and it is necessary to have their participation in building a new Ireland . . . That needs the full participation of everyone in order to build a lasting and durable and permanent peace. (172-197)

Parenthetically--or perhaps not so parenthetically--the specific mention of Hispanics and African Americans is likely to have a second message to the "folks back home" in Ireland. One of the manifestations of sectarianism in Northern Ireland has been the painting of large murals on buildings and walls, and one of the themes of the republicans has been that of struggles in various parts of the world which are perceived as analogous. The Palestinians in the Middle East, radical organizations such as the South-west African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and Native Americans in the United States have been used as visual analogues. Here Adams evokes the American "Civil Rights Movement" CCM, which in turn is likely to evoke in an indirect and protected fashion these present murals as well as the "peace marches" of Bernadette Devlin and others in the 1960s and later, which were explicitly modeled on the American civil rights marches.

In summary: All of these CCMs work toward Adams's goal of increasing American support for the cause of a United Ireland. The Victim of British Oppression and The (Nationalist) [Irish and American] Revolutionary CCMs appeal by analogy to some fundamental models of American self-presentation, also rooted in history. The Irish Roots CCM appeals to kinship, a fundamental model for any society.

3.0 Some metaphor-based cognitive models.

As we have seen repeatedly throughout the chapters of the present work, not all CCMs are literal. Cultural cognitive models can also be based in metaphor. The hypotheses of metaphor theory state, among other things, that metaphors hide and highlight different aspects of a situation, and that metaphors become especially valuable in times of crisis, helping to provide guidelines for reasoning about difficult and complex situations (G. Lakoff, p.c.; for a brief introduction to the metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson, see chapter 3 above).³ If these hypotheses are true, we would expect to see a change in the metaphors for the peace process to parallel the ups and downs of the real-world process--and we do.

For example, a metaphor based on the experiential cognitive model of a Path was the predominant metaphor used for the peace process in Northern Ireland, both by participants and by reporters, prior to the first 1996 Irish Republican Army (IRA) resumption of bombing in London in April. Here are a few examples:

(20) *to move us all forward* (Adams, October 4, 1994, National Press Club speech [analyzed above]; 243)

(21) *The Joint Framework Agreement is another step in the long, drawn-out process of change in Ireland and in Anglo-Irish*

³All of the cognitive models discussed in the following analysis are physically based cognitive models ("natural" frames, in Goffman's classification). Experiences of paths, of the construction of objects, and of plant growth are obviously not culturally determined. However, the way they are used makes them CCMs in a functional sense--"honorary CCMs," as it were--although technically they remain "physical"- or "bodily"-based cognitive models.

relations. *Many steps lie ahead.* (*The Irish Echo*, February 1995)

(22) We all need to move *speedily toward* [peace] (Gerry Adams, speech, University of California, Berkeley, February 12, 1995)

(23) It was never going to be an easy road but the current *impasse* over the decommissioning of IRA weapons in the Irish peace process is an all-too-weary reminder . . .; the peace process has *founded* before it has seriously begun; . . .
(U.K. Press Association, February 14, 1996)

(24) IRA at *crossroads* (headline, Reuters, March 10, 1996)

When in difficulty, furthermore, talks are "at an impasse" or "stalled" or "derailed" or "not moving forward" or "founded"--all words taken from source domains of various types of travel along marked or virtual paths.

The mappings and entailments of a journey are present:

- (i) Unless otherwise linguistically "marked" with an adjective of some sort, the path already exists; all the travelers have to do is follow it. This entails that the destination also exists. That is, that peace exists; it just has to be reached.
- (ii) Some paths are easy to walk; others are difficult; and the difficulties can be of several sorts. The road may be bumpy, or twisty, or there may be barriers (mountains,

fences, bogs) in the way that prevent forward motion. That is, some proposals for achieving peace are easier than others; there are difficulties, however, that prevent the easy achieving of a peace settlement.

- (iii) If the travelers are in a vehicle, additional things may happen to stop forward progress. The machine may break down (e.g., stall, derail), or the ship may founder, for example. These are specific types (i.e., "special cases") of difficulties, and focus on problems arising internally, from the proposals themselves (in how their "function" is received by the relevant parties), rather than externally by uninvolved people or issues.
- (iv) If the problem is a barrier, it has to be removed, and this will take effort (and perhaps cooperation if many people are traveling together). That is, settlement of the problems will not be easy, and may require the cooperation of all the parties involved.
- (v) If the problem is a malfunctioning or stranded vehicle, expertise is needed to find out what is wrong (one thing will not be working right) and fix it, in accordance with established procedures, before forward motion can be continued. Extended effort, and/or large-scale cooperation, may or may not be needed, depending on the type of problem and its centrality to the motion functioning of the vehicle. That is, internal problems need to be remedied before the talks can resume. There are (diplomatic) procedures to do

this, and the degree of difficulty depends on the nature of the problem.

And so on.

However, after the February 1996 bombings broke the ceasefire the primary metaphor changed. The path metaphor is still occasionally found, as in the following examples:

- (25) The united efforts of Nationalist Ireland towards a lasting peace in their country was met with *roadblock after roadblock*. . . . Britain has been unable to take even one small step . . . (Irish Northern Aid Chairman, February 9, 1996)

- (26) since the peace process was set *on course* , . . Now, John Major will strain every sinew to get that process *back on track* . . . [Major] has travelled farther along the *bumpy, pot-holed road* towards Ulster peace than anyone before him (U.K. Press Association, February 9, 1996).

- (27) We cannot allow our countries to *descend* once more to violence.. . . Clinton's call to all parties to come together in the cause of peace. Our political leaders must work together to *chart a path* which will lead to peace and reconciliation. . . . We must *move rapidly* towards all-party talks; we should not allow ourselves to be driven away from them. (editorial, *Irish News*, February 10, 1996)

However, after the second bomb on February 9, 1996, the peace process very frequently became an object, with various attributes. The object metaphor had been present before the bombings--e.g., "peace can be built" (Adams, above, 11. 33-34), but it was not dominant. It became dominant at that point in February 1996:

- (28) Our efforts to *build* a peace settlement must be redoubled after tonight. . . . Those of us who have taken risks to put together this peace process . . . (Gerry Adams, quoted by Reuters, February 9, 1996)

- (29) the glittering prize of permanent Ulster peace seemed almost within his grasp . . . [but the bomb] left in tatters all that [they] have achieved (U.K. Press Association, February 9, 1996)

- (30) the ever-fragile ceasefire itself (U.K. Press Association, February 9, 1996)

- (31) [the SDLP] has helped *build* the fragile consensus for peace (New York Times editorial, February 11, 1996)

- (32) peace search *crumbles* (Reuters, February 11, 1996)

- (33) Sinn Féin chairman Mitchell McLaughlin said the peace process had now collapsed. (Reuters, February 11, 1996)

This metaphorical model shift is not surprising: the effects of a bomb in the real world are precisely those of shattering and destruction--effects that are prototypically those of our real-world

experience of many objects. However, it may be unfortunate for the peace process; the entailments of the object-creation metaphor are potentially riskier for the success of the process than are those of the path metaphor:

- (i) Our experiences tell us that it is usually easier for people to cooperate on a shared path (arguments about which direction or which path may of course occur, but the destination is usually agreed upon); it is harder for people to cooperate in putting something together (whether they agree on the final vision of what it should look like or not), since more shared decision-making, and presumably more creativity, discussion, and so on, are required. There is also often much less structure in a pile of debris than in a path or route, allowing many more choices and therefore much more opportunity for disagreement.
- (ii) A path metaphor implies that the destination exists; it is just a matter of getting there. The object created by the object-creation metaphor does not already any longer exist.
- (iii) When an object--especially a "fragile" object--is destroyed ("shattered," for example), there is much more likelihood that its destruction is total, that it is beyond mending, than there is for an obstacle on a path to mean a permanent end to all forward progress. On a path, an obstacle can often be removed or bypassed by the combined effort of all parties on the path.

The use of both metaphors in close syntactic proximity in the same sentence, and even two closely-related blends of these two metaphors, have occasionally been used. It is surely no accident that several of these examples come from churchmen, who are likely to see themselves in the social role of mediator. That is, they see themselves as building an object that facilitates movement along a path: namely, a bridge:

- (34) we commit ourselves to the *breakdown of barriers* and the *building* of trust and harmony (Dean of the Church of Ireland's St. Anne's Cathedral in Belfast, quoted by the U. K. Press Association, March 10, 1996)

- (35) Adams lays down new "*blueprint for peace*" (*Irish News*, April 1, 1996)

- (36) Around 200 Christians of all denominations met in the clear spring sunshine in Ormeau Park . . . for an open-air gathering "*to build bridges*" in the area. . . . The Reverend Jim Campbell, the chairman of the Ballynafeigh Fellowship, said that his group had been "*building bridges of hope* between the divides for more than 20 years." . . . [A] Presbyterian minister said that he hoped that the [Easter] service would help people to see the Ormeau bridge as just that--a *bridge and not a barrier* (*Irish News*, April 6, 1996)

In addition to being conventional in English for people fulfilling this social role, the "bridge" metaphor is also partly a further response to specific events--in this case the religious march across the "Lower Ormeau Bridges" that preceded by two days the sectarian march and

riots on April 8. It is therefore not surprising to see the appearance of this metaphorical CCM--a CCM with many more cooperative, and therefore hopeful, entailments.

One additional metaphorical model only rarely found in the statements of people involved in or reporting on the negotiations of Northern Ireland is the "growth" metaphor:

- (37) I think it's worth remembering just within the last few days what the poet, the Irish poet, Seamus Heaney said. He said we have a space in which hope can *grow*. . . . And the delicate *flower*, the delicate *seed* which has been *planted*--hope can *flourish*. Hope can *grow*. . . . (Adams, National Press Club speech, October 4, 1994 [analyzed above], 28-33)

However, Adams immediately reverts to the more "controllable" object-creation metaphor: "and peace can be *built* out of the decades of conflict and violence."

It is not surprising that we find almost nothing of the "growth" metaphorical CCM, because one of its entailments is that the peace process is somehow natural and inevitable. That may sound desirable to us, but for people who have been directly engaged in activities of a particular political stance it is perhaps not surprising that they do not feel, or perhaps do not want to feel, as if they have little actual effect on what happens. Although, as Adams points out, people can step in as cultivators, to make the growth process easier ["I think that is the challenge facing all of us--you as well as me--to widen that space"]--ultimately people are not crucial to the process. A plant in natural conditions will generally grow on its own, without requiring

human care. The creation of an object, on the other hand, is completely under human control, and not only the control of people in general, but the control of particular people.

4.0. CCMs in Northern Ireland: Conclusion.

By making careful use of CCMs that are foundational in both Irish and American national traditions and self-image, Adams is thus able in this speech to make an appeal to both his constituencies: the immediate American audience at the National Press Club and other Americans, including government officials, who were watching or listening, and the audience back home in Ireland. He chooses CCMs (especially Models 2 and 4, Irish Roots and The Pluralist) that are non-threatening to those in Northern Ireland who do not support, or may even fear, Sinn Féin. Many of his lexical items and analogies--and I have not highlighted all the examples of them--also serve as complex internal links among these CCMs.

All in all, then, in this speech Adams proves himself to be a masterful user of political discourse, managing to handle more than one CCM, more than one political group, and more than one different national tradition in a way that satisfies the situation, the multiple potential audiences, and his own political goals.

CHAPTER 4--APPENDIX

APPENDIX 4-1

Gerry Adams, Leader, Sinn Féin

(National Press Club Luncheon Address, Washington, D.C.,

October 4, 1994)

(Transcription, Federal News Service)

(apparent errors of syntax, etc., not corrected)

MODERATOR Gil Klein: . . . I'd like to welcome my fellow club members in the audience today, as well as those of you who are watching us on C-SPAN, or listening to us on National Public Radio or the Global Internet Computer Network.

. . . Our speaker today is Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, the political arm of the outlawed Irish Republican Army. Mr. Adams has been described in a number of ways, depending on which side of the Irish issue one stands. To his supporters he is the man who is trying to take the gun out of Irish politics. To many Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland, and to a considerable number of British, he is, to quote one British journalist, "an apostle of death and destruction in Northern Ireland." Probably the most objective description these days is that Gerry Adams is a man on a tightrope, balancing the desire of Northern Ireland's Catholics to be a free, self-governing part of the Irish Republic, against the historic antagonisms with the Protestant majority in Ulster, as well as British constitutional claims to the north. Mr. Adams himself spent four years in British jails. But he was not without company: his father and uncle and two cousins were there as well.

Joining Mr. Adams on the tightrope this week is the Clinton administration. It must balance its desire for peace in Northern Ireland with the United States's commitment to its chief ally, Great Britain. Everything the administration does will be symbolic. The Washington Post reported this morning that President Clinton lifted the long-standing U.S. ban on official contact with Sinn Fein, and invited Mr. Adams to, quote, "begin a dialogue" with Washington. After a weekend of negotiations, the administration raised the level of U.S. officials that Mr. Adams will meet today at the State Department directly after this luncheon.

But Mr. Adams will not be welcomed at the White House, at least not this time. All this comes about because of what Sinn Fein calls its peace initiative: the IRA's unilateral announcement August 31st of a cease-fire. Mr. Adams is touring the United States saying the IRA wants peace. Now the British government must decide whether to grasp the opportunity. After hundreds of years of conflict in Ireland, is peace at hand? Mr. Adams, we await your assessment. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in a warm Press Club welcome for Mr. Gerry Adams.

(Applause.)

1 MR. ADAMS: (Speaks in Gaelic.) Can I say first of all that I am
 2 very pleased to be here to address the Press Club, and I want to
 3 extend my thanks to the Club and to the president for its
 4 invitation, and I hope that we will have a discussion when I
 5 finish this submission. I also want to thank Mr. Reynolds for the
 6 work he has done in making this happen a lot easier perhaps that
 7 it would otherwise have.

8 I think it's -- and I fear to joke, but the name of the
9 organization which I represent is Sinn Fein. (Laughter,
10 applause.) I would love to be here today to tell you that we have
11 peace in Ireland. But I can't. However, it is my fervent belief
12 that peace is within our grasp, and that God's bearing me that I
13 would be able to come back here, and I hope sooner rather than
14 later, to tell you that we have peace, that we have justice, and
15 we have freedom, and we have prosperity.

16 The IRA announcement, described once again in a White House
17 press release as historic, has of course moved the entire peace
18 process forward. But as I stand here today, other armed groups --
19 the British Army, which is the largest force and which is in 20
20 occupation of an area approximately the size of Rhode Island --
21 that army has so far refused to cease, to complete cease, its
22 military operations. And of course its allies in the loyalist
23 death squad are continuing with theirs. So, since the IRA
24 announcement a number of Catholics have been killed; there have
25 been a series of bomb attacks, including on my offices on the
26 Falls Road and on the family home of at least one Sinn Fein
27 elected counselor. So we still have to move the process forward.

28 However, I think it's worth remembering just within the last
29 few days what the poet, the Irish poet, Seamus Heaney said. He
30 said we have a space in which hope can grow. And I think that is
31 the challenge facing all of us -- you as well as me -- to widen
32 that space. And the delicate flower, the delicate seed which has
33 been planted -- hope can flourish. Hope can grow and peace can be
34 built out of the decades of conflict and violence.

35 I think it's worth noting that a number of individuals
36 played very courageous leadership roles in creating the conditions
37 for recent developments. John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, in a
38 very creative way engaged with me over a very long time to bring
39 about what has been described as a consensus among nationalists in
40 the north of Ireland, and the active engagement of the Dublin
41 government in that, and the piece of the jigsaw provided by our
42 friends here in Irish America, and then the active and proactive
43 engagement by President Clinton -- all helped to create conditions
44 wherein the IRA decision could be announced and become a reality.
45 So when I come here, it is to give an assessment, but it is also
46 to thank those people here who have kept the faith, who have not
47 forgotten their roots, who see an opportunity and who have helped
48 to create this opportunity, and also to commend President Clinton
49 for the manner in which he has made peace in Ireland a foreign
50 policy concern of the White House.

51 Coming here on a very hectic and packed itinerary, where it
52 becomes difficult even to stay in a vertical position for too
53 long, there are a number of personal little moments which I think
54 have penetrated through all of the rest of the hype. One was that
55 I went to Ellis Island, courtesy of the New York Port Police. And
56 I should say on the record that my encounters here with policemen
57 have been much more friendly -- (laughter) -- and in many ways
58 unprecedented.

59 And also I have to say the same for your judges: whatever
60 their faults, I have had a very enjoyable and uncharacteristic
61 series of encounters with judges, in conditions which do not apply

62 precisely or exactly back home.

63 But we went to Ellis Island. And, as I said, it became by way
64 almost of a pilgrimage.

65 And anyone who has been through an institution -- one could get
66 a sense of what it must have been like for people from all over
67 the world to come here and to go through that great hall to be
68 inspected or checked, not knowing whether they would be accepted
69 here or rejected. And I asked the guide because I have not that
70 experience, but anyone who has been through prison is taken
71 through this and checked and inspected and forcibly scrubbed and
72 so on. And I asked the guide if the immigrants, or potential
73 immigrants, could see the mainland from the island, and I was told
74 that they could. And to be so near, to be within sight after
75 presumably a very difficult arduous journey, and to see beyond
76 across the waves what was the land of hope that must be -- sound of
77 sirens from the street outside-- maybe perhaps Mr. Major trying to
78 get through -- (laughter and applause).

And I think also --

MR. KLEIN: Don't worry about that.

79 MR. ADAMS: And I think also [of] the diversity, the diversity of
80 people who come through there from Europe, from Ireland, of
81 course, Jewish people, all from all over the world, and then to
82 come here and -- perhaps a small historical accident that the
83 first immigrant processed was an Irish woman.

84 So then when I come here to Washington I am reminded that we
85 who could not live in our own country, we who because of the
86 repression at home, because of famine, because of the economic

87 climate, when we came here we were able to join with all of these
88 other races, all of these other nations, and build this union into
89 what it is today.

90 I am also very mindful, and I note -- the term Protestants and
91 Catholics has been used, and the struggle in Ireland is not about
92 Catholics or Protestants -- I note that the Protestant Irish men
93 and Irish women who joined with the Catholics and the dissenters
94 in a great effort to rid Ireland of British rule, the doctrination
95 here gives 13 presidents to this United States of America. And
96 the war here, the Revolutionary War here, the War of Independence,
97 the rights of man, Thomas Payne, all of that and all that happened
98 in the French Revolution, is where Irish Republicanism comes from,
99 where it springs from.

100 I also, when I was here went to Arlington Cemetery, early
101 yesterday morning.

102 Only the magnitude of that place differs from the too many
103 cemeteries which I have attended back home over the years in
104 Ireland. And I think also when we think of what Ireland has given
105 -- no better or no worse than anyone else -- what Ireland has given
106 to the U.S.A, I think it's important to note that what we're
107 asking in some small way is for the U.S.A. to give us back at home
108 in Ireland what people have here as a matter of every day [sic]
109 rights. What you take for granted here is foreign in the British
110 occupied part of the six counties.

111 So the U.S.A., the administration on my visit has taken in not
112 just Irish-America, but we have talked to people from the Jewish
113 community, we have talked to people from the Italian community, we

114 will talk to Hispanics and we will talk to the Black Caucus, to
115 people who have come from African roots. All of that I think
116 sends powerful encouraging signals back home.

117 And I have to say that I do not believe that we would have
118 reached this decisive juncture in our history, this grassroots if
119 you like in Anglo-Irish relationships, if it was not for this
120 engagement, if it was not for this concern, if it was not for this
121 interest in moving the situation forward.

122 So I have to ask today why can the British government not
123 follow through also. How come I hear from home that Patrick
124 Mayhew, the British Minister, today reaffirmed that I would be
125 continued to be banned from entering Britain. Today he said that
126 eternal exile from what's allegedly one part of the United Kingdom
127 for someone like myself would continue. And how bizarre that
128 situation is that I can come here to the capital city of the most
129 powerful nation in the world, and leave this luncheon to talk to
130 White House officials and others, and counted out of my own
131 country or in Britain of the same conversation.

132 And that again is I think a timely reminder of almost a
133 subconscious positive element to the U.S. engagement. The last
134 time I came here my voice and the voices of other Sinn Fein
135 representatives could not be heard on the British Broadcasting
136 media, and journalists and broadcasters here were amazed at this
137 element of British democracy. And the British I think were
138 rightly embarrassed, so that when it came to me returning, in
139 order in my opinion to escape further embarrassment they moved to
140 remove that censorship ban.

141 And so it is I would presume and I would hope with the matter
142 of my exclusion from Britain that the ridiculous, bizarre
143 circumstance that discussions which can happen here cannot happen
144 back at home or in Britain will also be removed. The British
145 government refusal to enter into talks is all the more remarkable
146 when one considers that up until November of last year, at a time
147 when the IRA campaign had not ceased, at a time when Mr. Major did
148 not suggest that he had a pay settlement, we in Sinn Fein and his
149 government engaged in lengthy discussions. So here we have a
150 situation where during that period of conflict there were talks,
151 and Mr. Major did the right thing, and here when there is a peace
152 settlement on the horizon, when the IRA has ceased, when Sinn
153 Fein's democratic mandate has been recognized at home by the
154 Dublin government and by governments throughout the world, that
155 the British government appears to stall.

156 And if one is looking for a reason for that, it's my view that
157 it's merely tactical. It's my view that the British -- and I
158 think they're wrong -- wish to reduce this opportunity for peace,
159 that they wish to slow the momentum. I think it's the duty of
160 everyone who has any notion of what democracy means, who has any
161 notion of what is wrong in Ireland, who has any notion of what it
162 takes to rectify those injustices, then they must call for peace
163 talks now.

164 And we have to say if it works in the Middle East, why not in
165 Ireland. And on a day in which Nelson Mandela, the President of
166 South Africa, returns to Washington, we have to say if it works in
167 South Africa, why not in Ireland? Why not? Have the Irish people

168 not got the wit, have we not got the intelligence, do we not have
169 the creativity, is the air in some way strange, is there something
170 in our genes, is the water that we drink in some way polluted,
171 that we need a foreign power to come in and look after us?

172 And the question of the unionists, the unionists are my people.
173 I may not agree with them, but they are my people. They have as
174 much right to be on the island of Ireland as I have. They have as
175 much right and it is necessary to have their participation in
176 building a new Ireland as I have. And let me say as someone who
177 comes from the occupied area, in which Catholics are still
178 discriminated against, and which there is still a permanent state
179 of emergency, and who has gone through the whole sad litany of
180 imprisonment, and been shot and have my family home and my wife
181 and my son subjected to bomb attacks -- and I don't believe that I
182 or those I represent have any monopoly on suffering, and I
183 acknowledge quite freely, and I've done so in Ireland, the
184 suffering which has been inflicted by Republicans -- let me say
185 that under no circumstances will Irish Nationalists or Irish
186 Republicans ever inflict upon Protestants what was inflicted by
187 unionists upon Catholics. That is not the type of Ireland which
188 we want. (Applause.)

189 What we want are peace talks. What is at the core of this
190 peace process is an ability for people to sit down, to discuss, to
191 agree, to be flexible, and to move the situation on.

192 And there are three core areas. There is, of course, the vast
193 question of the constitutional and political future of the people
194 of the island of Ireland. And we concede that that will take time,

195 and that needs agreement. That needs the full participation of
196 everyone in order to build a lasting and durable and permanent
197 peace.

198 The other core issues need less time. Demilitarization needs
199 to commence and to be speeded up immediately. Issues of
200 democratic rights need no discussion, either people have
201 democratic rights or we don't. And if we don't, then they should
202 be restored to us as speedily as possible. So there are the three
203 main areas which need a focus. What you take here for granted, as
204 I've said before, is foreign in the occupied area. I know of no
205 institution like this--none.

206 And I've thought about this. I know of no institutional like
207 this back home in the occupied part of Ireland.

208 Yet in every city here, they have such institutions, perhaps
209 not of this prestige, but certainly it is here as a matter of
210 fact. The right to silence, the right to trial by jury, the right
211 to free assembly, the right to national rights, the right to all
212 of these basic requirements are absent from British democracy in
213 the part of Ireland that I come from. I also think that it's
214 important to note that the people of Britain also want to see an
215 end to this long conflict.

216 So we have a moment, an opportunity, a chance in our history to
217 move from conflict into building our own history. We have an
218 opportunity to put behind all of the baggage and the burden of
219 history. We need only to proceed on the basis of equality; no
220 preconditions, no vetos; a level playing patch of people coming
221 together to work whatever we can work out. I have doubts, as I've

222 said earlier, with the elements which make up political and social
223 and economic life here. I'm asked on many occasions, do I think,
224 do I believe that I will see a united Ireland, and I have to say
225 yes. I do believe it.

226 Had I come here two years ago and outlined how far we would
227 have moved by now, people would have scoffed. Had I come here
228 five years ago and talked about the developments in South Africa
229 or the unity of Germany, or the demise of the Soviet Union, people
230 would have scoffed. So there's no such thing as an intractable
231 problem if there's goodwill and political will to change it.

232 So I think what we want now, and what we need now, and I have
233 had signals of this all over my travels is that goodwill harness
234 into the development of this peace process. A friend of mine,
235 Bobby Sands, died on hunger strike, and in his writings, he wrote
236 in terms of the future of Ireland -- and we should remember that
237 hunger strike is the ultimate pacifistic, non-violent act of
238 protest -- and Bobby and nine other prisoners died in the cell
239 blocks of Long Kesh. And he wrote, "Our victory will be the
240 laughter of our people. Our victory will be the laughter of our
241 people. Our revenge will be the liberation of all." That, I
242 think, is the future that is before us. That is the opportunity
243 which we have. I would ask you to seize it; to move us all forward
244 and to bring peace and freedom and justice to all the people of
245 the island of Ireland. (Untranslated Gaelic phrase.)

MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much.

[Questions followed.]

Part II: Propaganda and the Manipulation of CCMs:

Analysis and Metanalysis

"'Oh, for goodness' sake, my dear boy,' interrupted my uncle, 'don't go
into the theory of it. . . .'"

--Arthur Hugh Clough, Epilogue to *Dipsychus*

Having now taken a look at some different types of CCMs and several domains of public discourse, we can now take a step back and look not only at several more common, traditional American CCMs, but at a CCM about manipulating CCMs.

Politicians and others who make public utterances try to persuade via CCMs, but they have to be careful in order not to invoke a CCM that is very strongly negatively evaluated in Anglo-American cultures, namely, that of "propaganda."

Chapter 5 is therefore both an analysis of texts and related CCMs in advertising (product-related and political), and a metanalysis--in terms of categorization levels, radial categories, and contested concepts--of one CCM of CCM manipulation.

Chapter 5

CCMs, Categorization, and Contested Concepts: Advertising, Political Advertising, and Propaganda

"Hawking's Law of Progress in Science: 'Progress in science consists of replacing a wrong theory with one that is more subtly wrong.'"

--"Murphy's Law" calendar (1982)

1.0. Introduction.

Cultural cognitive models are not always entirely shared across a cultural community. That is, they may be "contested concepts," with debate occurring among members of the community who hold different but well-defined models of the concept. Such concepts are typically of shared importance to the entire community, but are not defined in common by that community. Furthermore, the importance of experiential sociocultural frames for the development of CCMs means that for some CCMs we have to pay attention to the level of experience they are encoding. That is, the details of some CCMs are directly abstracted from our own common experiences, but others are either abstracted from a number of relatively different experiences to form a more generalized schematic type of CCM, while others are filled with details that are relevant to those who are deeply familiar with that area of experience but which are not directly related to everyone's common experiences.

Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues have named these three levels of our conceptual categorization structure the "basic," "superordinate," and "subordinate" levels, respectively. Both contested concepts and categorization levels are important for the study of propaganda,

especially when we step back and look at how scholars who study this subject have approached it.

Although discussions of persuasive language date back at least to Aristotle, the modern study of "propaganda" began in the 1920s, after World War I and the successes of deliberate anti-isolationist messages created and disseminated by the U.S. Committee on Public Information and similar agencies in Great Britain, including false rumors of German atrocities against Belgian nuns, children, and other innocents (e.g., the articles by the American ambassador to Belgium in *Century Magazine* in 1917; cf. also Creel 1920, Bernays 1928, Stuart 1920, Ponsonby 1928; and for general histories, Sproule 1989 and 1994, Combs and Nimmo 1993). Everyone, whether critical or approving, has recognized that the mass media and other social and cultural changes at the turn of the century had changed the nature of "propaganda," a word that dates back to the religious disputes of the seventeenth century.

In the 1920s, 1930s, and the early 1940s, several writers (usually professionals in advertising or public relations) defended the "new propaganda" as necessary in modern mass society, but there was also an increasing concern, often associated with "progressive" political views, that these new, mass-media-based propaganda methods would imperil democracy, and that they could be successfully countered by education into their methods (e.g., Lippmann 1922). Scholars associated with the Institute for Propaganda Analysis prepared case studies and guides to detecting propaganda for use in school curricula (Lee and Lee 1939, 1979; Lee 1952; and cf. the more recent, non-Institute-affiliated Rank [et al.] 1974, 1991). The Institute was founded in 1937 and disbanded in October 1941:

- (1) Most progressives . . . saw nothing but trouble ahead for any organization that tried to analyze competing domestic propagandas during a time of national emergency. (Sproule 1994:35)

From the 1930s through the 1950s, political scientists began to replace the idea of "educating against propaganda" for the sake of democracy with that of examining persuasive communication from quantitative perspectives, and the survey method of marketing research was developed (e.g., the work of Lasswell). Concerns about the manipulation of the public by advertisers became popular after the publication of Vance Packard's *The hidden persuaders* (1957), a book that started an ongoing concern with psychological manipulation on the part of advertisers (e.g., "subliminal seduction" and other keywords from Key 1973, 1977, 1981, 1989/1993; many if not most academic psychologists do not accept these theories.)

Books such as Joe McGinnis's *The selling of the president* 1968 (1969) are often credited with a reawakening of concern about systematic mass manipulation through media techniques, and the ongoing "Public Doublespeak" awards and curriculum guides of the National Council of Teachers of English (e.g., Lutz 1989; Rank 1974, 1991) keep a focus on systematic mass manipulation through language. "Disinformation" has become a standard technique in geopolitics, for all types of governments. "Positive propaganda" has been advocated to promote tolerance and other desired attitudes.

In parallel, scholarly analysts working in propaganda studies in the 1980s and 1990s have once again seen "propaganda" as a threat to democracy. The following comment is representative:

- (2) It is important, especially in a democracy, during an age characterized by ever more sophisticated uses of propaganda techniques that Americans become informed about these devices, the psychological dynamics of what makes them effective, and how to counteract their effectiveness without withdrawing into abject cynicism. (Pratkanis and Aronson 1991:xii)

But what is propaganda? Like art, we all think that we know it when we see it, and perhaps we do, but trying to provide definitions has produced both some clear agreement and some surprising discrepancies. Most important of all, however, the attempts of theorists and critics to define propaganda based on the traditional categorization methods of necessary and sufficient conditions has led to insufficient notice of some important and very real differences among the kinds of things that are labeled "propaganda"--differences based on sociocultural cognitive models.

2.0. Definitions.

Definitions of "propaganda" during the last sixty years have tried to lay out a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to define the category. Here is a rather lengthy, but still only partial, list of representative examples, in order to lay out the problem:

- (3) Modern propaganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group. In our present social organization approval of the public is essential to any large undertaking [positive or negative]. (Bernays 1928:25, 26; Bernays was a public relations practitioner and World War I propagandist)
- (4) Propaganda is promotion which is veiled in one way or another as to (1) its origin or sources, (2) the interests involved, (3) the methods employed, (4) the content spread, and (5) the results accruing to the victims--any one, any two, any three, any four, or all five. (Frederick Lumley, 1933, quoted in Choukas 1965:16)
- (5) We may define propaganda as any organized effort to make people think of something--whether concrete or abstract, simple or complex--otherwise than it would be thought of by a perfectly impartial person aware of all the relevant facts. (Maxwell Garrett, Organizing Secretary of the League of Nations Union, [before 1938], quoted in Choukas 1965:17)
- (6) As generally understood, *propaganda is opinion expressed for the purpose of influencing actions of individuals or groups.* More formally, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis has defined propaganda as "expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with

reference to predetermined ends." (Lee and Lee/Institute for Propaganda Analysis 1939:15; italics original)

- (7) Propaganda can be called the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals toward ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time. (Leonard Doob, 1948, propaganda analyst, quoted in Choukas 1965:13)
- (8) Propaganda is . . . the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist. (T. H. Qualter, 1962, quoted in Choukas 1965:17)
- (9) Propaganda fit the new phenomenon of mass persuasion whereby large groups and institutions seemed newly able to surround the public with symbols conveying synthetic, made-up meaning. . . . most conceptions of propaganda present the term as having inevitably negative connotations. . . . The first [condition] is manipulation through covertness; second is the overpowering of people with a massive and self-serving outpouring of symbols; third is distortion through tricky language; fourth is the pursuit of a special interest as opposed to pursuing objectives of wider public good.

. . . Propaganda represents the work of large organizations or groups to win over the public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both the persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons. (Sproule 1994:3, 8; Sproule is a professor of communication studies and propaganda analyst)

Clearly, no one can decide on exactly one set of criteria.

Propaganda is an inherently "contested concept" (see below).

Equally clearly, there is some degree of consensus. Propaganda is certainly "persuasive"-focused language; in addition, the American CCM for "propaganda" seems to require manipulation of some sort--often actual deception--and often, although not always, either the goal or the means, or both, are viewed negatively.

If definition by necessary and sufficient conditions does not work (and for an extensive discussion of the variety of definitions in the first few decades, see Choukas 1965, chapter 2), are cognitive notions of radial categories any more successful?

3.0. Propaganda as a radial category and a contested concept.

What is a radial category? We may define a category structure as "radial" if it includes a central or uncontested member and also non-central members. There are several ways of constructing the central member. It may be a rich prototypical model whose attributes or characteristics are partly instantiated in a number of non-central members. "Mother" is such a category (G. Lakoff 1987:74ff.). At the center, labeled by the unmodified lexical item "mother" is a complex model with a cluster of correlated features, including giving birth,

contributing genetic material, nurturing the child, being married to the father, and so on. Various non-central members are based on one or more of these attributes, and are given a marked linguistic form (usually by adding an adjective): "birth mother," "foster mother," and so on. Changes in technologies have added some new contrasts: "surrogate mother," for example. Stereotypes are also involved: "nurturing" in traditional American society has included being home with the children; this has led to extensions such as "working mother," which treats a mother who "works" (i.e., is employed for pay outside of the home) as an extended or non-central category member. See Figure 5-1 for a diagram of the current radial category of "mother." (Other examples of radial categories may be extended on the basis of shared attributes, involving perhaps even further extensions that join some of the non-central members with the central member only via intermediate members linked not only literally but also by metaphors, folk theories, metonymies, image schemas, and other cognitive models; see, e.g., the discussion of the Dyirbal classifier system in G. Lakoff 1987:chapter 6.)

An "essentially contested concept" as defined by Gallie (1956) is one that is *inherently* disputable. For such concepts, there will never be complete agreement about definitions and boundaries, by the very nature of the concept. Gallie sets such "essentially contested concepts" apart from other kinds of disputed concepts, which is important because it is clear that any concept or category has the potential of becoming definitionally disputed, or "contested," if there are sufficient social or other reasons.




FIGURE 5-1
The Radial Category of "Mother": The Central and Some Non-Central Members

Gallie identified several characteristics of essentially contested concepts. First, these concepts are "appraisive," that is, the label attaches a positive value which makes it worthwhile to claim or deny membership in the category. (A negative valuation can also be important in the definition of a contested concept, such as "propaganda," if the concept is seen as one to be avoided rather than embraced.) Secondly, these concepts are internally complex; it is not a matter of one simple criterion. Thirdly, this complexity is internally structured, but the hierarchical order assigned to the parts of this structure is not inherently determinable; that is, people may differ as to the relative importance of various criteria for category membership. Fourth, the boundaries and structure can be modified over time with social and other changes, but these modifications are in no way predictable. Fifth, the fact that there is disagreement about the definition is generally recognized, and the grounds on which others' opinions are based are also recognized, although not held, by everyone. Gallie gave "a Christian life" (from the domain of "religion"), "art," and "democracy" as examples of essentially contested concepts.

Contested concepts seem in fact to be structured radially, with the uncontested example(s) at the core and additional examples that share in only some of the central member's attributes. Extensive studies of "feminism" (A. Schwartz 1992; see below), "democracy" (Ostiguy 1992; Collier 1994; Collier and Mahon 1993; Collier and Levitsky 1994), and "science" (Morgan 1992) have shown how cognition and society interact with respect to these contested concepts. (My 1992 study of "science" shows yet another subtype of contested concept, based

on historically established, salient-example prototypes, such as "natural history" and then "physics.")

"Propaganda" is another of these important sociocultural contested concepts.

Before describing the core of the radial category of "propaganda," it is important to note that this discussion is restricted to American English usage. In most English-speaking countries, "propaganda" has a negative connotation that its related terms in other languages do not have. The reason for this is historical. The term originated in the Catholic "Society for the Propagation of the Faith" (Congregatio de propaganda fide), a church organization established in 1622 to disseminate Catholicism in non-Catholic countries. Since England was quite fervently non-Catholic by that time, the term "propaganda" acquired a very negative tone, which it has retained in popular English-language usage.

In the formal definitions proposed by scholars and practitioners, there have been chronologically based alternations between "negative" and "neutral" evaluations. Therefore, whether or not "a negative valuation" is part of the central definition of "propaganda" is dependent upon the language and the theoretical fashion of the time.

Unquestionably at the center, however, is recognition that propaganda is a form of persuasive language; it is not purely informational. That is, it causes people to believe and thereby act in a certain way. Whether this persuasion is intentional or unintentional has been contested (see, e.g., Doob 1948, quoted in Choukas 1965:13), and therefore intentionality should be considered one of the important possible extensions of the central member.

Everyone also seems to agree that propaganda influences large numbers of people; it is a form of *mass communication*. There seem to be no other central attributes. Nothing else appears in every definition, both expert and non-expert. We might want to say that all "propaganda" is potentially and probably actually biased, that it will do whatever it needs to do to succeed in its end of persuasion. This circles back around into the question of intent, and also raises questions about what to call something that presents nothing but very compelling statements of the speaker or writer's honest beliefs about the state of affairs. Is this propaganda? Or merely persuasive language? For some theorists, this is one of the key points that in their view differentiate "propaganda" (which is a Bad Thing) from "persuasion" (which can be a Good Thing):

- (10) Not all persuasion is propaganda. The classical rhetoric theories of the early Greeks and Romans . . . prized discourse that could illuminate the issue at hand. Such persuasion could take the form of an argument, a debate, a discussion, or just a well-argued speech presenting the case for or against a given proposition. (Pratkanis and Aronson 1991:9)

However, to complicate an already complicated situation, such issues introduce an element of fuzziness into the category. That is, at exactly what point does "persuasion" become "propaganda"?

At the core, therefore, we have *persuasive intent and effect* that is probably intentional and usually in opposition to "informational effect." The effect is directed at large numbers of people at once (via

a *mass communication channel*). Extensions from this core that fill out our folk models of "propaganda" include *being hidden* (i.e., not being explicitly labeled as "propaganda") and *being deceptive* (especially in the use of language). The deceptive nature of "propaganda" has been a central focus of most education against propaganda, such as the seven-point framework developed by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (see its publications and the works of affiliated scholars Alfred and Elizabeth Lee). A communication labeled as "propaganda" is usually, but not for all definitions, *biased*; that is, it presents *opinion* as if it were fact, or presents facts in a distorted fashion; bias is of course related to *deceptiveness*. Finally, "propaganda" is often seen as *serving special interests* instead of the general good of society--however "the general good of society" is to be defined.

Other definitions of "propaganda" include "*the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual*" (Pratkanis and Aronson 1991:9), including symbolic and other CCMs. In the targets' minds, however, acceptance of the advocated position will ostensibly be *voluntary*:

- (11) Propaganda is the communication of a point of view with the ultimate goal of having the recipient of the appeal come to 'voluntarily' accept this position as if it were his or her own. (Pratkanis and Aronson 1991:9)

Culturally, of course, "free choice" is highly valued in the U.S., especially tied as it is to the important "Individualist" CCM (not discussed here, but part of the "Ideal American" CCM cluster; see chapter 2 above).

When we move from the technical definitions of the theorists to common cultural usage in American English, we also need to add that it is important that it involves *political issues*, especially significant ones and those that are pro-Communist or otherwise pro-totalitarian and/or "anti-democratic," and that, as has already been mentioned, in the unmarked case "propaganda" is directed toward a *negatively evaluated end*. (When "big business" is perceived as valueless or as valuing only the accumulation of more profit at the expense of all else, as controlling, and as therefore in some ways "totalitarian," product advertisements can easily be viewed as propaganda.) It is therefore usually considered *intentionally deceptive*: unstated bias prototypically entails deceit, which entails a negative evaluation, in line with the "honesty" aspect of the "Ideal American" CCM. See Table 5-1 for the CCM of "propaganda" in common American usage, and Figure 5-2 (a and b) for diagrams of "propaganda" as a radial category.

The presuppositions built into our cultural models for both product-oriented and electoral-oriented messages assume that some degree of self-interest is attached to the goal of any given message in most contexts. Prototypical exceptions include public service advertisements, presidential State of the Union addresses (where the president is supposedly above partisanship), and perhaps most of all the response of the president and other leaders to a disaster such as a flood or earthquake or a Oklahoma City-bombing-style civil crisis.

Intentional bias or deception, a political content, and a negative appraisal join persuasion and mass communication as effectively additional core attributes--for the American lay definition, although not for that of the expert.

Name of CCM: Propaganda

Kind of CCM

prototype-based (ideal; radial category;
superordinate/basic/subordinate categorization)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •biased words
- lexical items: CCM-evoking words:
 - evoking symbolic CCMs
- much is implicit (understood via
- goal: •persuasion
- may use jargon (or any other group markers) to
make social connection with intended
audience
- channel: •mass (oral or written)
- maxims:
 - may or may not observe Quality
 - Quantity, Relevance may be biased
 - Manner may not be observed
- speech acts: •assertives; not often
 - imperatives (because should be/appear
"voluntary")

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all must be mapped)

- adversarial situation ("us" versus "them")
- intended audience: large number of "their"
general public
- issues that can be made symbolic
- facts used accurately or not to serve persuasive
function (which is labeled "manipulation" if
viewed negatively)
- disseminated through mass communication channel

Speech Events

- can include •speeches (orations); •broadcasts;
etc.

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- "we" = good/truth; "they" = bad/falsehood
(contested concept in instantiations)
- evaluation = negative (according to the
American lay model)
- evaluation = neutral or negative (according to
expert analysts; depends on ideology)
- evaluation = positive (according to expert
practitioners)

(Table 5-1, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

(see also text)

- underspecified core: to be effective, text must reach large numbers of people (i.e., uses mass communication channels)
- underspecified core: propaganda is persuasive
- persuading the audience to change their beliefs will have beneficial effects for "us" in the overall adversarial situation
- American lay model: additional core: propaganda is intentionally biased
- American lay model: additional core: propaganda is (intentionally) deceptive
- American lay model: additional core: propaganda has political content
- American lay model: additional core: propaganda is negatively appraised

**Some Relevant Real-World
Presuppositions/Knowledge**

- In adversarial situation, "we" are good and "they" are bad.
- People's beliefs can be changed by persuasive techniques.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- persuasive success of utterance is not especially dependent upon truth/falsehood, but rather upon symbolic/emotional/etc. appeal
- propaganda is intentionally biased (especially American lay model)
- propaganda is (intentionally) deceptive (especially American lay model)
- propaganda has political content (especially American lay model)
- propaganda is negatively appraised (if viewed as intentionally deceptive) (especially American lay model)
- propaganda uses hidden techniques (all models)
- propaganda uses symbolic and psychological manipulation (especially of emotions) (all models)
- acceptance/compliance of audience is (ostensibly) voluntary (all models)
- propaganda serves special interests (all models)

(Table 5-1, continued)

Kind of Mapping	
•instantiation	
Relevant Mappings	
Source Domain	Target Domain
"right"/"good" side	creators of text
"wrong"/"bad" side	audience of text
truth	"our" texts
falsehood/lies	"their" texts
success	effectiveness in changing audience's beliefs
failure	inability to change audience's beliefs
Some Relevant CCM Interactions	
•Coherent with Television (Product) Commercial, (Political) Television Commercial CCMs	

TABLE 5-1
The "Propaganda" CCM




FIGURE 5-2a: "Propaganda" CCM: Underspecified Core Model
(and consensus model for expert definitions)
(showing some of the elaborate links)




FIGURE 5-2b: "Propaganda" CCM: American Folk Model

FIGURE 5-2
"Propaganda" as a Radial Category/Contested Concept

A communication can be labeled as "propaganda" with only the central attributes, or with any number or combination of the central attributes plus extensions.¹

So far, it might appear that "propaganda" is a contested concept of the "feminism" variety. Alan Schwartz (1992) suggested that at the center of "feminism" is an "underspecified" model--that is, only a few skeletal tenets are held by everyone. All the other rich details of people's definitions of "feminism" are supplied by their other belief systems: liberalism, socialism, Buddhism, or whatever. Since these belief systems are often in conflict, so are the definitions of what constitutes "[true] feminism."²

In the sense that there seem to be only two attributes that appear in everyone's definitions of "propaganda," we seem to be dealing with another underspecified model.

However, the picture is not quite so simple. There are certain instances that are generally agreed to be clear examples of "propaganda": Nazi war films of World War II, for example, or a Soviet radio broadcast during the Cold War that extolled the virtues of the collectivist production system and denounced capitalism. It is not incidental that both of these are examples were produced by groups labeled at the time as America's "enemies." Since deceit is usually saliently part of the American concept of "propaganda," and therefore

¹Although beyond the scope of this analysis, I hope to do extensive corpus work involving these aspects of definition in popular usage in the future. A small pilot examination in a random subset of the "Cobuild" corpus generously made available as part of a UC Berkeley class supports these extensions, but a more rigid examination is obviously needed.

²The addition of the appraisive modifier "true" complicates things in a way that takes us away from our central issues, so I will not discuss it here. I include it as a possible part of the phrase to indicate that there is agreement on at least some principles of "feminism," namely, the underspecified core, as long as no philosophical principles or evaluative aspects are attached.

since in American usage propaganda is negatively evaluated, it is always easier to see others' propaganda--from groups that one views with disapproval--than one's own.

As we have seen, some propaganda theorists and practitioners have recognized this; others have defined propaganda as neutral; still others whose definition included "dubious ends" have had difficulties in establishing a universal definition of propaganda according to a list of necessary and specific conditions, since it is difficult to determine, in the absence of context, what is "dubious" or "unnecessary" in a theoretical sense. (See, e.g., Choukas 1965:13-14.)

In this respect, the contested concept structure of "propaganda" resembles that of "art." In unpublished material extending some comments of Gallie 1956, George Lakoff has discussed the details of "art" as a contested concept: there are central examples that everyone agrees are unquestionably "art," such as the "Mona Lisa." We can make a list of the attributes that make this "art," including expressiveness, the intent of the maker, esthetic qualities, the skillful use of materials and techniques, and so on. The category is extended by instances that incorporate only some of these central attributes. Some include all but a few, some include only a few, and they may include other attributes besides, but what makes them "art" is their partial resemblance to the prototype central member(s).

"Propaganda" also has something of this structure. Consider Nazi war films, for example. They are unquestionably "propaganda" by anyone's definition; they are the most generally accepted "best examples" of propaganda; and so on. In terms of the above criteria, they are *biased, distorting facts and including opinion and fiction as*

factual, especially by means of linguistic utterances. The intent was not to inform in a neutral sense, but rather to persuade people to reach conclusions desired by their makers, and to act on those conclusions; that is, they were intended to deceive. This intent was not explicitly labeled as such. They were designed to advance the agenda of one particular segment of German society; that is, they were designed to serve special interests. This agenda was "not good" according to most standards; that is, the desired conclusions were negatively evaluated by a wide range of people outside the special interest group that created the films. They certainly manipulated symbols in a psychological manner. People came to believe, supposedly voluntarily, in the causes that the films presented, as they came to feel pride in the symbols. And, importantly for our culturally prototypical sense of "propaganda," which excludes many communications such as "docudramas" that satisfy many of the above criteria, they involved political ends.

So what happens with the extensions? The Voice of America (VOA) is propaganda according to some, but not according to others. How does it fit into this structure? It says that it is unbiased; whether it in fact is or not has been the most important factual dispute affecting the use of the label "propaganda." It uses language. It claims to be both directly informative and indirectly persuasive; that is, the expressed philosophy is that if people know what America is really like, they will approve of and accept American positions in the world.

Thus, the expressed goal is *more directly to inform* than to persuade. If one accepts that the information presented is unbiased, then there can be *no intention to deceive*. The broadcasts are *not explicitly labeled as propaganda*. The expressed intent has *nothing to*

do with special interests, although radical and progressive critics of American foreign policy (e.g., Michael Parenti, Noam Chomsky) have charged explicitly or implicitly that this also is not in fact the case, that on the contrary all American governmental policy is designed to advance the interests of a small group that holds political and economic power.

If one accepts that the broadcasts are not biased and are informative only and that the goals are not those of special interests, then the VOA will be positively evaluated. Perhaps the broadcasts of the VOA do not rely heavily on overt symbol manipulation, but they certainly intend their conclusions to be adopted "voluntarily." Finally, at least part of the time they involve political issues; however, critics and some practitioners have asserted that even the overtly non-political issues are chosen to further political ends (presenting a piece on arts funding to indicate the pluralism of American culture and the lack of direct government censorship, for example). That is, one's political and economic beliefs greatly influence whether one considers the Voice of America to be a member of the category of "propaganda" or not.³

How can we reconcile the apparent membership of "propaganda" in both of these kinds of contested concepts? Many of the attributes of the central prototype in the second kind are derivative, falling out from the claim of bias and from the intention to persuade. The secondary attributes can be differentiated from the primary, leaving an underspecified core. This core is then conventionally filled out with

³I am told that the VOA's coverage of "non-flattering" aspects of American life has been cited by some non-Americans as part of the attraction for them of immigration to the U.S.

certain mainstream culturally acceptable external belief structures concerning politics, economics, and so on, so that in actual usage the prototypical example of "propaganda" seems rich, like "art." (Again, see Table 5-1 and Figures 5-2a and 5-2b for the CCM of "Propaganda.")

4.0. Levels of experiential CCMs, categorization, and definitions of "propaganda."

4.1. The "Commercial Transaction" and "U.S. Election" CCMs.

Regardless of how a particular analyst may define the boundaries of the category of "propaganda," in general the English-language definition has treated the category as homogeneous. That is, not only do analysts present a varied collection of entities and objects--the Barbie doll, pro- and anti-smoking ads, presidential campaign spots, Nazi war films--as propaganda, they also base further theoretical claims on the idea that there are no significant differences between these examples:

- (12) Every time we turn on the radio or television, every time we open a book, magazine, or newspaper, someone is trying to educate us, to convince us to buy a product, to persuade us to vote for a candidate or to subscribe to some version of what is right, true, or beautiful. (Pratkanis and Aronson 1991:2)

That is, for expert analysts "propaganda" (in distinction to lay English speakers on the one hand, and recent creators/practitioners of the dolls, anti-smoking ads, or whatever) is being defined more by intent and shared techniques than by actual content.

There is certainly a considerable amount of value in this approach. From the first days of modern propaganda at the time of World War I, advertising and public relations practitioners have easily moved back and forth between their product clients and their government and political ones (see, e.g., Diamond and Bates 1992, Jamieson 1996b). The story of the U.S. government's World War I Committee of Public Information was told by its first director, George Creel, in a book with the title *How we advertised America* (1920); public relations founder and World War I propagandist Edward Bernays wrote a book called *Propaganda*. The public and media concern with presidential television advertisements in the 1980s and 1990s is only the latest twist in an ongoing relationship.

Furthermore, we have an important cultural metaphor that links ideas and commercial transactions, namely, "The Marketplace of Ideas." In this metaphor, different salable goods are mapped onto different ideas, commercial transactions are mapped onto the presentation and interaction of different viewpoints, consumer choice is mapped onto the acceptance or rejection of ideas, a store (or, better, a supermarket, with its wide choice of items) is mapped onto the United States (more specifically, the realm of public discourse in the United States), and so on. Because of the significance of this metaphor in legal rulings involving the First Amendment, the kinds of ideas involved are especially those involving political ideologies:

- (13) [Chief Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes argued [in 1919] that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the

thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." This passage has provided the critical metaphor for the twentieth century ICM [Idealized Cognitive Model] of the first amendment: the *marketplace of ideas*. (Winter 1989:1188-1189)

However, there are also problems with a view that treats "marketing" as undifferentiated across such experientially different domains. In fact, aspirins or soap and presidents or mayors have little *direct connection or interaction with each other in our everyday experience*, and this is precisely the problem with previous approaches to propaganda analysis: they have ignored our CCMs.

We do not have the same goals or expectations for our interactions with aspirin and with presidents. Our interactional frames and models are very different. Our "product consumption" CCM for aspirin is based on Fillmore's "Commercial Transaction" model (see Table 5-2 and chapter 1). It is essentially economic. Aspirin, or soap or Barbie dolls, fills the "Goods" slot. (We have additional frames for aspirin, of course, involving health and headaches, but these are not relevant here.) Our "consumption" model for presidents, on the other hand, has traditionally not been economically based. Instead, it is political in nature. Historically we have not "Bought" with respect to presidents; we have "Voted" for them, and "going to the store" is experientially a very different activity from "going to the polls" (see Tables 5-2 and 5-3).

Name of CCM: Commercial Transaction
(see also the work of Charles Fillmore)

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (typical; experiential)

- Linguistic Characteristics**
- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "buy," "sell")
 - prototype assumes •Cooperative Principle and
•Maxim of Quality in verbal exchanges
related to Commercial Transactions
 - speech acts: •assertions; •questions and
•answers (submodel- and culture-dependent
and often formulaic); •offers and
•acceptances

Scenario/Frame Elements
(not all have to be mapped)

- buyer
- seller
- goods (i.e., something available
for sale)
- 'money' (i.e., medium of exchange)

Script

- exchange of goods for 'money' (in
relatively prescribed order)
- details vary by submodel (e.g., Store,
Farmer's Market) and by culture
(may include 'haggling')
(Barter is a separate but closely
related CCM)

Speech Events

- politeness concerns (submodel- and culture-
dependent and often formulaic)

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- prototypically, 'goods' = an object
- usual evaluation = neutral to positive

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- Buyer and seller are honest (i.e., there are no
misrepresentations of self, goods, or money).
- Seller has legitimate/legal control/ownership of
goods.
- Buyer has legitimate/legal control of 'money'.
- Value of 'money' is equivalent to value of goods.

(Table 5-2, continued)

**Some Relevant Real-World
Presuppositions/Knowledge**

- The medium of exchange ('money') is state-issued "money" (otherwise/non-prototypical = barter or locally-issued script).
- People buy what they need and not what they do not need.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- There will be no complaints, lawsuits, etc. about the transaction after it has occurred.
- Transfer of ownership/control will be legally recognized.
- People will be happy and satisfied with their exchange of goods and 'money'.

Kind of Mapping

- instantiation

Relevant Mappings

Text 1:

<i>Source Domain</i>	<i>Target Domain</i>
potential buyers	audience (especially women)
seller	Easy Spirit
'money'	(U.S.) currency (implied)
goods	Spa shoes

Text 2:

<i>Source Domain</i>	<i>Target Domain</i>
potential buyers	audience (especially men?)
seller	makers of Bayer (unnamed)
'money'	(U.S.) currency (implied)
goods	Bayer aspirin

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Coherent with traditional U.S. "Marketplace of Ideas" metaphorical CCM

TABLE 5-2
The "Commercial Transaction" CCM

Name of CCM: U.S. Election

Kind of CCM
 prototype-based (typical; experiential)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
 (e.g., "election," "vote")
- lexical choice: •CCM-evoking words via the
 metaphorical family of "Competition"
 ("Politics" is a construal member)
 (Source domains: hand-to-hand combat,
 war, predation, [team] sport, race, game)
- lexical and syntactic complexity increasingly
 •simpler (Just Plain Folks CCM; see
 chapter 2)
- register: increasingly •casual, •colloquial
 (replacing more formal oratorical style)
- presentational style: increasingly •personal
- increasingly, people doubt whether politicians are
 following the Maxim of Quality
- speech acts: •assertions; some •imperatives;
 •promises

**Scenario/Frame
 Elements**

(not all have to be mapped)

- voters
- primary election
- general election
- run-off if necessary
- ballot, ballot box, vote count, majority of votes
- campaign issues, campaign promises, campaign
 appearances, campaign speeches, media coverage
 (not yet prototypical, but becoming increasingly
 standard: spin doctors, political consultants;
 the model is changing to accommodate these)

also either

- Democratic and Republican political parties
- candidates (at least two; prototypically one
 from each political party)
- or
- referendum issue (non-partisan, but two sides =
 special interests)

Script

- The campaign and election events occur in a
 particular, specified order; each forms a
 submodel.

(Table 5-3, continued)

Speech Events

- speeches (orations, including special genres: e.g., acceptance or concession speech)
- interviews
- face-to-face formulaic speech events
- praising/blaming

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- Politicians (a CCM) are power-hungry, dishonest, liars (except for the president of the U.S., who is supposed to be above that sort of thing). (evaluation = negative)
- Career politicians are especially wicked; it is good every now and then to elect a non-politician to office ("Mr. Smith Goes to Washington").
- Democracy is the noblest and best form of government. (evaluation = positive)
- Voters show common sense--usually (if they are hoodwinked, it is because the politician is an excellent con artist). (Just Plain Folks are honest).
- Elections will be "fair," that is, ballots will be cast and counted without fraud, buying of votes, intimidation, etc.

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- The candidates will offer a clear choice on the issues (presumably according to party).
- Many people do not vote.
- Voters often vote on one, special interest, issue.
- Campaigns have rules, and those who do not obey them should be punished.
- It is part of a citizen's duty to vote.

Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/Knowledge

- Knowledge of relatively recent political scandals (Watergate, Iran-Contra, funding).
- "Celebrity" recognition confers increased "authority" (i.e., celebrity endorsements).

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Negative advertising should pose a paradox: because politicians are liars, people will believe negative advertising is true (i.e., that the opposing candidate is wicked); but if politicians are liars, why should people believe when s/he says that his/her opponent is wicked?
- If politicians are dishonest, then their campaign promises should not be believed.
- Those who do not vote lose the right to complain (a disappearing presupposition).

(Table 5-3, continued)

Kind of Mapping	
•instantiation	
Relevant Mappings (for the texts being analyzed)	
Source Domain	Target Domain
candidates	Riggs, Alioto (text 1)
voters	relevant congressional district (text 1)
issues	Californians (text 2) (text 1) especially law and order (text 2) capping lawyer's fees
general election	November 1996
Some Relevant CCM Interactions	
•Interacts with Freedom of Speech CCM (a Traditional American Value; see chapter 2)	
•Coherent with Marketplace of Ideas metaphorical CCM (via Freedom of Speech CCM)	

TABLE 5-3
The "U.S. Election" CCM

4.2. The "Television Commercial" CCMs.

Buying and Voting do, however, share the element of available choice, perhaps with the addition of perceived self-interest as the basis for that choice. It is this intersection that allows the crossover, both in theory and increasingly in practice, between the "Television (Product) Commercial" and "(Political) Television Commercial" CCMs. The use of similar production techniques results in highlighting (or "profiling," in Langacker's terms; e.g., Langacker 1987) the one similar element of choice between the "Commercial Transaction" and "U.S. Election" CCMs, to the effective exclusion of the far greater number of differences.

Because our interactional experiential frames exert such a strong influence on our cognitive models, we have as a society so far been somewhat uneasy about the increasing influence of advertising in the process of selecting a president. We have not been comfortable with the imbalance in profiling. Propaganda theorists have ignored the differences, thereby obscuring significant details of our CCMs. From this point of view they have, in effect, oversimplified.

The "Political Commercial" CCM is a composite or blend, taking its genre and techniques from the Television (Product) Commercial CCM and its topic from the U.S. Election CCM (with links to the Freedom of Speech CCM, not discussed here). (For "blended spaces," see the work of Fauconnier and Turner, given in the references under both "Fauconnier and Turner" and "Turner and Fauconnier.") That is, in brief: the linguistic features and presuppositions are taken from both of the CCMs. Some of the entailments are shared (e.g., that "ads cause people to make particular choices") but like the CCM as a whole others are themselves a

blended space (i.e., "the product will do what it says it will do" + "candidate" = "the candidate will do what s/he says s/he will do"). That is, inferences and reasoning result not only from the input CCMs, but also from the nature of the new, blended CCM as well. See Figure 5-3.




FIGURE 5-3
The Composite/Blended "(Political) Television Commercial" CCM

This CCM--Political Commercial--is a blended space that was created by professionals and experts; it did not arise completely naturally from social trends (for the history of political advertising, see especially Diamond and Bates 1992; Jamieson 1996b; Kaid, Nimmo, and Sanders 1986; and chapter 1, footnote 4) That is, it is not a traditional CCM, arrived at via unattributable consensus over years or longer.

There is also linguistic evidence for its new, somewhat ambiguous status, in the slightly differing syntax of the collocations used to describe the two types of television commercial. A "television product advertisement/commercial" (not "product television advertisement/

commercial" indicates that the basic category is "product advertisement," subtype by channel "television" (as opposed to "print" or "radio" or "billboard," and so on). However, the usual collocation to describe the political counterpart is not "television political advertisement" but rather "political television advertisement": the basic category is seen as "television commercial," subtype by content "political." That is, this kind of communication is not seen primarily as an offshoot of former methods of promoting political candidates to the voters (speeches and so on).

By now, the two CCMs involved in the genesis of the political-candidate television commercial have the status of folk models, even though one (Television [Product] Commercial) is relatively quite young. Nevertheless, it has so permeated our daily existence that we accept it without question. The fact that the Political Commercial CCM has not yet been around long enough to reach that status is both a cause and an effect of the ready criticism that many people express. However, certain genre characteristics have already emerged, and familiarity has increased to the point that its status as a folk model will no doubt not be much longer in coming.

However, lack of attentiveness to these fundamental differences in the experiential models underlying the Television (Product) Commercial and (Political) Television Commercial--namely, the Commercial Transaction and U.S. Elections CCMs, respectively--have led propaganda analysts to emphasize the considerable degree of overlap and blending in the two Television Commercial models, and to label them both "propaganda" without any essential distinctions.

4.3. Categorization levels (Rosch).

From this point of view such an approach captures significant similarities. By focusing on similarities, propaganda analysts have profiled the underspecified version of the core of the radial category. However, they have recognized only one level of the three levels of categorization studied by Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues. Their approach to the category of "propaganda" is not "wrong"--but it misses significant contrasts among the levels.

The interaction between experiential frames, models, and categorization levels has not been theoretically specified, but it is significant. It is implicitly recognized in Rosch's second basic principle of categorization:

- (14) the perceived world comes as structured information rather than as arbitrary or unpredictable attributes (Rosch 1986:28).

There are two additional aspects of Rosch's theory of categorization that are also relevant to the category of "propaganda." First:

- (15) many experiments have shown that categories appear to be coded in the mind neither by means of lists of each individual member of the category nor by means of a list of formal criteria necessary and sufficient for category membership but, rather, in terms of a prototype of a typical category member. The most cognitively economical code for a

category is, in fact, a concrete image of an average category member. (Rosch 1977:41)

Secondly, there are at least three levels of categorization for objects or concepts: superordinate, basic, and subordinate.

Definitions according to classical methods of categorization have led propaganda analysts to ignore these differences in levels as they try to define "propaganda" as if everything in the entire category was on one single level. This is, however, not the case. An analysis based instead on CCMs takes account of these differences in categorization levels.

In several papers, Rosch and her colleagues summarized the characteristics of basic level categories (see also Table 5-4). That is:

Experiential frames and the models they generate are crucial in our categorization structures, and "propaganda" is no exception.

What the propaganda theorists have recognized is the existence of a *superordinate* level, which being abstract and schematized is a level of more generality than the basic level; what they have ignored are the *basic* level and a *subordinate* level, which is a level of more specificity than the basic level.

Rosch characterized the three levels as reflecting different "levels of abstraction" (Rosch 1986:32); see Table 5-5:

[T]he basic level is:

- The highest level at which category members have similarly perceived overall shapes.
- The highest level at which a single mental image can reflect the entire category. [For categories that represent non-visual concepts rather than visualizable objects, the basic level is probably represented by a prototypical salient example--e.g., Nazi war films or Soviet Cold War radio broadcasts.]
- The highest level at which a person uses similar motor actions for interacting with category members.
- The level at which subjects are fastest at identifying category members.
- The level with the most commonly used labels for category members.
- The first level named and understood by children.
- The first level to enter the lexicon of a language.
- The level with the shortest primary lexemes.
- The level at which terms are used in neutral contexts. For example, *There's a dog on the porch* can be used in a neutral context, whereas special contexts are needed for *There's a mammal on the porch* or *There's a wire-haired terrier on the porch*.
- The level at which most of our knowledge is organized.

TABLE 5-4

Defining Characteristics of Rosch's Basic-Level Categories
(from G. Lakoff 1987:46)
(cf. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem 1976:382 [abstract])

<u>Superordinate Level</u>	<u>Basic Level</u>	<u>Subordinate Level</u>
Furniture	Chair	Kitchen chair
		Living-room chair
	Table	Kitchen table
		Dining-room table
	Lamp	Floor lamp
		Desk lamp

TABLE 5-5

Categorization and Levels of Abstraction
(Adapted from Rosch 1986:32:Table 2.1: "Examples of
Taxonomies Used in Basic Object Research.")

Another visually useful way to present these three levels is in the form of a "family tree"; see Figure 5-4 for some examples.

Superordinate categories are schematic, not experiential. Both basic and subordinate level categories are experientially based, but subordinate categories have more detail than the basic level of which they are a part. Kitchen chairs and Morris-design easy chairs are rich in distinguishing details of appearance and interaction (both social and physical), just as are CCMS of U.S. elections and laundry-soap television ads.

In treating product advertisements, political advertisements, and Nazi war films as equivalent examples of "propaganda," analysts have given the superordinate level primary importance. All of these examples are in fact equally good instances of a superordinate grouping of PROPAGANDA, whose members share only a few generalized or schematic attributes. At the basic level, however, the groups are characterized by very rich, very different experientially based frames and CCMS, each with some kind of prototype.

Even according to Rosch's framework, however, matters are not always entirely straightforward. For example, often entities or situations can be conceptualized as part of more than one taxonomy. Dogs can be part of either the superordinate category of ANIMALS (i.e., living creatures) or that of PETS. This may seem trivial, since we think of PETS as living creatures, i.e., ANIMALS--but it matters in non-prototypical situations. A fish is as "good" an example of a living creature/ANIMAL as is a dog, but much less of a "good" example of a PET--and it is precisely the reason that the idea of a "pet rock" is funny.




FIGURE 5-4
Alternative Display of Rosch's Categorization Levels

There can also be more than one way to establish subordinate taxonomies involving the same entities/situations. For example, an expert described different kinds of dachshunds in a radio segment on animals (KCBS-AM, San Francisco, March 2, 1997), using terms that are categorized in Table 5-6:

<u>Basic Level</u>	<u>Subordinate Level</u>	<u>Additional Subord. Level</u>
Dog	Dachshund	By color: red cream dapple, etc.
		By coat type: smooth-haired long-haired wire-haired
		By size: standard miniature

TABLE 5-6
Expert Taxonomies of Categorization

The categories are cross-cutting; dachshunds are described as "red long-haired standard," "cream smooth-haired miniature," and so on. The relative importance of the subordinate taxonomies is socially determined, and may vary over time: sometimes miniature dachshunds may be more highly valued in economic terms, for example, or people may find cream-colored dachshunds more desirable.

Experts can of course categorize to much finer detail in their area of expertise than can non-experts. Like the basic level, these additional categories are distinguished by additional, albeit specialist, experiential CCMs based on appearance, interactional routines (e.g., brushing tools and techniques), and so on.

This richness of differences between basic-level categories extends to the CCMs of propaganda, such as what we do as consumers when we Buy aspirin versus what we do as citizens when we Vote for a president, and also between various types of subordinate categories: a television advertisement versus a radio advertisement versus a newspaper advertisement (subordinate taxonomy by channel), an aspirin commercial versus a car commercial versus a candidate campaign commercial versus a referendum/proposition campaign commercial (subordinate taxonomy by content), a negative advertisement versus a positive advertisement (subordinate taxonomy by affect), an informational commercial versus a dramatized commercial (subordinate taxonomy by style), and so on. Experts have many of these different subordinate categories, and each of them is a full cultural cognitive model, complete with a frame, a prototype of some sort, genre specifications, entailments, and so on. Furthermore, like those of dachshunds, these additional subordinate categories interact with each other: there are negative informational television candidate campaign ads and positive dramatized radio aspirin ads, for example.

Experts may be able to categorize all of these additional subordinate categories according to multiple taxonomies and their intersections, but all non-experts in the same cultural community recognize them because of frequent sociocultural and physical experiences with them in all their diversity and detail.

4.4. The expert point of view.

As members of the large-scale U.S. sociocultural community, then, we know the conventions for a large number of "propaganda"-related CCMs

at all three categorization levels: superordinate, basic, and subordinate. We are culturally competent with respect to them. We may even agree that in some way they resemble each other sufficiently to be considered part of a superordinate PROPAGANDA category. On the other hand, we may choose, for various communicative or other reasons, to highlight and profile the differences more than the similarities. In any case, most of us have a "recipient" point of view rather than a "producer" point of view, and therefore are likely to highlight and profile aspects of these models that are most likely not always the same ones that are of interest to either kind of expert, the professional creators or the propaganda analysts.

We must also try to explain why experts so often focus on the superordinate categorization level.

Part of the answer with respect to expert analysts may lie in our CCM of "The Expert." That is, the socialization and authorization of experts in our society tends to rely, at least formally, on certification of knowledge organized according to necessary and sufficient conditions. With respect to expert practitioners, part of the answer seems to involve a functional point of view. That is, since one of the two core superordinate attributes involves knowledge of effective techniques of mass persuasion using mass media channels, it is to the expert practitioner's advantage to highlight those characteristics. This focus has led them, at least, to see no problems in creating essentially the same kinds of advertisements to promote candidates for political office and brands of beer. They do not have a need to fill out this underspecified model by experiential frames, parallel to the belief systems that fill out the underspecified core of

feminism in Schwartz's analysis. For them, as experts, the common "Mass Persuasive Techniques" CCM has replaced the "Co-Experienced" model as the most important.

Unfortunately, as was already pointed out, members of the public as a whole are not involved in the expert-analyst/expert-producer "Mass Persuasive Techniques" CCM, and therefore have encountered few similarities in their interactions between the Voting and Buying CCMs. Consequently, they have not generally shared the experts' opinion. Non-experts interact with products and politics very differently than do either expert analysts or expert producers. An ideal aspirin--or a typical one--has a different set of uses and expectations and interactional routines from an ideal or typical or stereotypical president.

5.0. Some texts.

In this brief comparative study, the following texts will be considered. They all aired on San Francisco television stations just before the general election in November, 1996. The texts are given in the appendix to this chapter:

- Text 1: A television product commercial for Bayer aspirin.
- Text 2: A television product commercial for Spa (women's) shoes.
- Text 3: A television candidate advertisement supporting the re-election of Frank Riggs to the House and opposing the challenger, Michela Alioto.
- Text 4: A television referendum advertisement opposing California's Proposition 211.

The texts that appear in the appendix are not "transcripts" in the linguistic sense. They do not include any notation beyond the words of the text and a brief description of the accompanying visuals.

5.1. The "Television (Product) Commercial" CCM.

Text 1 (Appendix 5-1) describes a Bayer aspirin commercial that aired in the San Francisco area in late October, 1996. It is fairly standard in form and content, its only divergence being in the relative lack of spoken commentary and perhaps the use of onscreen written text instead. However, it is not uncommon for medical-product ads to have written text, probably because writing still lends an air of extreme authoritativeness.

The Bayer commercial begins as if it is going to be a narrative, a genre that is not uncommon in product commercials. We see a man in a real-world setting, obviously suffering in some fashion. Where is he? What is his problem? What will the commercial tell us is the best solution (i.e., what should we buy to fix similar problems in our own lives)? We soon realize that "the noise of the basketball game gave him a headache," since a Bayer aspirin container is brought to our attention by a momentous sound and a quick motion, and thereafter almost fills the screen. There is not going to be any narrative after all.

What there has been is an immediate move into the prototypical participant/scenario of the Television (Product) Commercial CCM. That is, the prototypical roles--the product (filled here by the aspirin), the audience (whose attention has been attracted by incipient narrative, noise, and motion), and the problem/need--are all immediately established. The advantages of the product follow--it relieves pain, it

can help against heart attack--as do the justifications for those claims: it is "Genuine" (Bayer) aspirin; it has been tested (with the heart trace implying that the tests were scientific and medically valid); its usefulness will be vouched for by "your doctor" (and this endorsement will be given freely and readily; all you have to do is "just ask"). It is better than all other similar products (shown visually by the containers of the four competing brands). Since by genre this is a health/medical-product ad, these justifications by authority are the most effective: we all want to believe that The Doctor Knows Best (another CCM).

The linguistic features of the advertisement are similarly characteristic of an authority-based commercial. Although there are no direct-reference lexical items, the Competition CCM of Business (see chapter 2 above) in the U.S. appears in the image of the other familiar brands of pain reliever. This is a mild form of negative comparative product advertising. The utterances are straightforward in syntax: with contextualization cues for the Just Plain Folks CCM such as "Just see your doctor" (see chapter 2 above; italics added) and following the Maxim of Quantity. As befits a medical-product advertisement, the presentational style is also authoritative, both in construction (e.g., the imperative of "just ask") and in intonation (a deep, male voice; part of a CCM that equates Men with Authority). (This "Authority is Male" CCM also overlaps with the still largely unchanged gender default of the Doctor prototype, i.e., male.) Seriousness and authority are also reflected in the deep-toned chord and the slamming sound. (It has been suggested to me that this evokes the sound of a judge's gavel--another cultural sign of Authority.)

The second part of the Television (Product) Commercial CCM (Table 5-7) involves its incorporation of the Commercial Transaction CCM (given already in Table 5-2). The mapping is so routine that it seems unnecessary to mention it: The audience of the commercial are the potential Buyers; the makers of Bayer aspirin (not the usually unmapped and therefore ignored middlemen, such as grocery stores and pharmacies) are the Sellers; the aspirin fills the Goods role, and the Medium of Exchange is implicit but not mentioned; by default it is (U.S.) currency. The significance of our presupposed knowledge of the Commercial Transaction CCM for our understanding of the television advertisement is evident when we realize that not only is the Medium of Exchange not specified, neither is the Place where the Goods are available, despite the fact that it does no good whatsoever to advertise a product for sale unless people know where to go to buy it. (The knowledge of where to buy a specific product in a given culture is not part of the general Commercial Transaction CCM. That is, the Commercial Transaction CCM can be successfully transferred to many other cultures, but a traveler may not always know where to buy aspirin, my thanks to E. Sweetser, p.c., for suggesting the importance of this example for CCMs and cultural categorization systems.)

One of the presuppositions of the Commercial Transaction CCM itself is that the participants are honest and not misrepresenting anything. Often this presupposition is carried over to the Television (Product) Commercial CCM, especially when we add the presupposition from the Television (Product) Commercial CCM that there are consumer protection laws that prevent flagrant lies. Furthermore, we know that it is easy to acquire the aspirin and evaluate it (at least on some

Name of CCM: Television (Product) Commercial

Kind of CCM

prototype-based (typical; genre; experiential)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference (e.g., product and/or manufacturer's name; "buy," "bargain")
- lexical choice: •CCM-evoking words in negative ads via the metaphorical family of "Competition" ("Business" is a construal member) (source domains: hand-to-hand combat, war, predation, [team] sport, race, game)
- lexical and syntactic complexity increasingly simpler (Just Plain Folks CCM; see chapter 2)
- register: increasingly •casual, •colloquial; or •authoritarian (with an authoritative spokesperson)
- presentational style: increasingly •personal; can be more formal if authoritarian, expert-based
- maxims: •increasingly, people doubt whether advertisers are following the Maxim of Quality
 - Quantity enforced by time (money) limitations
 - what counts as Relevant? (see section 5.3)
- speech acts: •exhortation/persuasion/claims and/or •assertions

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all have to be mapped)

- product (for sale)
- manufacturer [creator of ad usually not in CCM]
- audience
- problem and/or need (of potential buyers)
- advantages of buying this product (i.e., there is a particular point of view (the ad is intended to persuade audience toward this belief):
 - that the product is (a) necessary for the consumer's life in some way (health, money, happiness, etc.), with justification for these claims
 - (b) better than all other similar available products), with justification for these claims
- genre expectations (e.g., lecture/by authority; narrative; etc.)

(Table 5-7, continued)

Script

- Uses the Commercial Transaction CCM (see work of Charles Fillmore; chapter 1 above; and Table 5-2): goods; consumer/buyer; seller; (super)market (i.e., where goods are available); act of buying; money may be mapped in the ad, but usually is not

Speech Events

- formulaic exchanges of Commercial Transaction
- praise; blame in a negative ad
- perhaps drama
- exhortation/persuasion/claims and/or assertions

Submodels

- May also include: •narrative; •lecture; •conversation; etc.

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- special interest of manufacturer often leads to evaluation = negative or at least neutral (i.e., not necessarily believed)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- The product offers a clear choice among similar products.
- Consumers often choose based on one, special interest, aspect of the product.
- People should not lie, especially to take other people's money, and those who do should be punished.
- Critics of the current U.S. sociocultural climate often charge that there is a presupposition that it is part of a citizen's duty to buy ("consumerism").
- Consumer protection legislation prevents flagrant lies on the part of the seller.

Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions/Knowledge

- The claims of product ads can be checked out by buying the product.
- Most product commercials are not for very expensive items (except for cars).
- However, there are consumer protection laws and agencies to help keep product manufacturers, distributors, and ads honest.
- Certain kinds of ads/speech events are more persuasive for certain kinds of products than for other (e.g., by authority for medical product).
- Certain CCMs (and associated language and images) are more powerful than others in persuading people.
- "Celebrity" recognition confers increased "authority" (i.e., celebrity endorsements).

(Table 5-7, continued)

- Authority and emotion will both persuade people effectively; humor is riskier.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- If the product is not satisfactory, the error can be corrected by buying another similar product.
- If consumer protection laws do dissuade dishonesty, then the language of the ad can be taken at face value and there will be no surreptitious or implicature-driven attempts to mislead without actual assertions.
- Therefore, the product will do what it says it will do.
- Ads cause people to buy products.

Kind of Mapping

- instantiation

Relevant Mappings (for the texts being analyzed)

Text 1

Source Domain	Target Domain
product	Bayer aspirin
manufacturer	[not given]
audience	consumers
problem	pain (from text); headache (from visuals)
advantages of product	pain relief; perhaps help prevent second heart attacks
genre	lecture

Text 2

Source Domain	Target Domain
product	Spa (women's) shoes
manufacturer	Easy Spirit
audience	consumers
problem	comfort (from text); style (from visuals)
advantages of product	comfort (implicature: elegance, style; therefore, happiness)
genre	conversation (hearer's part implied)

Hearer Interpretation

- If one believes that consumer product legislation works, one will be more ready to trust that the ads are not lying or making false claims.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Coherent with the traditional U.S. "Marketplace of Ideas" metaphorical CCM

TABLE 5-7
The "Television (Product) Commercial" CCM

grounds) for ourselves. If we are not satisfied, we can try one of the other, similar products with relative ease.

However, since we assume that there is protective legislation, there is already an entailment that the product will in fact do what it (explicitly) claims to do. (There are usually further entailments involving the consumer's hopes and desires about what the product will do, but we generally are aware that these are of course not legally protected.) Any dissatisfaction on our part will therefore result from personal preference, not from product inadequacy, at least as far as the prototypical entailments are concerned.

Finally, there is a real-world presupposition in the Television (Product) Commercial CCM that the advertisement will be effective in causing people to buy the advertised product. This is of course self-evident, or advertisers would not spend the money, but it is worth mentioning since it is one of the important points of overlap between the Television (Product) Commercial and Political Television Commercial CCMs.

The advertisement given in Text 2 similarly fulfills many of the Television (Product) Commercial features. There is a product (Spa shoes), a named manufacturer (Easy Spirit), and a presupposed audience. There is a discussion of the product's benefits to the consumer. That is, Spa shoes are asserted to be comfortable, both by lexical implicature--they are "different" from "uncomfortable" shoes--and by direct assertion plus real-world presupposition--they have "cushioning" and "support," both of which are understood to be Good Things. These advantages are produced by "Easy Spirit" ("They have Easy Spirit cushioning and support"), a name which has brand recognition as a

"walking shoe" (and is therefore presumably comfortable) and which is made up of two positively-evaluated lexical items: "easy" and "spirit." "Spirit" evokes the "Free Spirit" CCM, a highly-valued CCM of Adventure that has become increasingly common in advertising in recent years. The Free Spirit CCM is also evoked by the CCM-evoking language of scene 3: "The shoes that let you move," quickly, freely, in a lively fashion, yet elegantly, as the woman in the visuals demonstrates by walking down the stairs and then away (perhaps out a door by a large plate-glass window, through which she appears to be seen?) at the end of the commercial.

Furthermore, from the visuals, although not from the language, we are "informed" that women who wear these shoes are attractive, friendly --constantly smiling, and reinforced by the female narrator's chuckles-- young, thin, and elegant--notice the woman's clothing and hairstyle and the style of the stairway, as well as the type of music and the CCM of "Mannequins" that portray elongated female figures (i.e., that they are features of expensive, tony dress shops). The visuals may thus suggest glamor and even a little flirtatiousness. By the common cognitive presupposition that we are what we look like, as well as the causal entailment relied upon by advertisers that making ourselves look a certain way will make us in fact be that way, we are led to make the inference that if we buy these shoes, we too--or, if male, the women in our life--will look like the woman in the commercial, and our happiness will be increased.

The language reinforces this indirectly, aided by the juxtaposition of real woman and female mannequin: "uncomfortable shoes are for dummies"; real women are not dummies; therefore, uncomfortable shoes are not for real women. Therefore, comfortable shoes are.

Therefore, since Spa shoes are not uncomfortable (as we have already learned), Spa shoes are for women. This is a whole series of inferences, based on several types of presuppositions and entailments that are often exploited by advertisers of all kinds of products.

The visual channel (figures, live and not, and setting) and the auditory channel (music type, pitch and intonational qualities of the woman's voice) are elegant in quality, but the spoken words are somewhat colloquial ("are for dummies," "that let you [not "one"] move," and the fragmentary utterances in Scene 4 ("New. From Easy Spirit"; the period break is intonational). This sets up a balancing act between the aspects of the CCM of The Sophisticate and the CCM of Just Plain Folks, a balance that is reinforced by the varied styles of shoes shown in a row in Scene 3.

Furthermore, it is not surprising that the appeal to justify product claims here is not to Authority, given the type of product, since Authority is not a feature of our CCMs involving (non-medical) clothing. Such clothing is supposed rather to represent personal choice and self-expression (hence the "freedom of speech" cases involving, e.g., school uniforms).

Finally, the CCM of a Television (Product) Commercial intersects considerably with that of the Commercial Transaction. Once again, the slots of the Commercial Transaction are easily filled: the potential Buyers are the audience; the Seller is Easy Spirit; the Goods are the Spa shoes; and again the Medium of Exchange and the Place are implied by our knowledge of the cultural script of buying shoes. The presuppositions and entailments involving consumer protection

legislation, honesty, and persuasive effectiveness described above in connection with the Bayer aspirin commercial are also in operation.

5.2. Political Television Commercials: A newly developing, blended CCM.

Although political commercials (television advertisements) were first introduced in the Eisenhower presidential election campaign of 1952, they have become much more prominent and much more controversial in recent elections. Our discomfort with them has much to do with the fact that they are creating a new niche in our society. As already mentioned, they are in fact a composite or blended CCM, made up of the CCM for Buying (i.e., Commercial Transaction) and the CCM for Voting (i.e., U.S. Election; along with the Freedom of Speech CCM) as well as the already established Television (Product) Commercial CCM.

Television commercials such as texts 3 and 4 (Appendices 5-3 and 5-4) belong to a relatively new but easily recognizable subgenre of television commercials, namely, the "political candidate" advertisement (Table 5-8). The genre is visually and aurally identifiable. Such commercials have a minimum of photographs, with whatever photographs they do have often being stills that include a flattering portrait of the candidate as well as an unflattering photograph of the opponent if the advertisement is a "negative" one. There is usually a single voiceover voice, no music, a minimum of text, and strong simple graphic contrasts (white print on a solid dark background, for example). The statements, both voiceover and text, are declarative, and there is often printing on the screen repeating the messages in "headline" form, i.e., using basic nouns and verbs and with minimal additional wording. There is a prescribed order, ending with a displayed "Paid for by"

Name of CCM: (Political) Television Commercial

Kind of CCM

prototype-based (typical; genre; experiential)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "election," "vote")
- lexical choice: •CCM-evoking words in negative ads via the metaphorical family of "Competition"
("Politics" is a construal member)
(Source domains: hand-to-hand combat, war, predation, [team] sport, race, game)
- lexical and syntactic complexity increasingly simpler (Just Plain Folks CCM; see chapter 2)
- register: increasingly •casual, •colloquial; also •authoritarian (if with authoritative spokesperson)
- presentational style: increasingly •personal; can be more •formal if authoritarian/expert-based
- maxims:
 - increasingly, people doubt whether politicians, political consultants, and advertisers are following the Maxim of Quality
 - Quantity enforced by time (money) limitations
 - what counts as Relevant? (see section 5.3)
- speech acts: •assertions; some •imperatives; •promises; •exhortation/persuasion/claims and/or •assertions

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all have to be mapped)

- professor
- voters
- primary election
- general election
- run-off if necessary
- ballot, ballot box, vote count, majority of votes
- campaign issues, campaign promises, campaign appearances, campaign speeches, media coverage (not yet prototypical, but becoming increasingly standard: spin doctors, political consultants; the model is changing to accommodate these)

(Table 5-8, continued)

also either

- Democratic and Republican political parties
- candidates (at least two; prototypically one from each political party)

or

- referendum issue (non-partisan, but two sides = special interests)

Script

- The campaign and election events occur in a particular, specified order; each forms a submodel.
- audience
- advantages of voting for a particular candidate/in a particular way with respect to an issue
- genre expectations (e.g., lecture/by authority; narrative; etc.)
- a particular point of view (the ad is intended to persuade audience to accept this point of view)

Speech Events

- praising; blaming (in negative ad)
- exhortation/persuasion/claims and/or assertions
- perhaps narrative/drama

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- special interest of politician often leads to evaluation = negative (i.e., not necessarily believed)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- The candidate will offer a clear choice among other candidates (in referenda, the sides are definitionally clear: Yes vs. No).
- Politicians are power-hungry, dishonest liars (except for the president of the U.S., who is ideally supposed to be above that sort of thing). (evaluation = negative)
- Career politicians are especially wicked; it is good every now and then to elect a non-politician to office ("Mr. Smith Goes to Washington").
- Democracy is the noblest and best form of government. (evaluation = positive)
- Voters show common sense--usually (if they are hoodwinked, it is because the politician is an excellent con artist). (Just Plain Folks are honest.)
- Voters often choose based on one, special interest, aspect of the candidate/issue.
- Elections will be "fair," that is, ballots will be cast and counted without fraud, buying of votes, intimidation, etc.
- People should not lie, and those who do should be punished.

(Table 5-8, continued)

- Consumer protection legislation prevents flagrant lies on the part of the politician/ad maker.

**Some Relevant Real-World
Presuppositions/Knowledge**

- There are laws and agencies to help keep politicians and ads honest (or as honest as they can be).
- Certain kinds of ads/speech events are more persuasive for certain kinds of products than for other (e.g., by authority for issues).
- Certain CCMs (and associated language and images) are more powerful than others in persuading people.
- Knowledge of relatively recent political scandals (Watergate, Iran-Contra, funding).
- "Celebrity" recognition confers increased "authority" (i.e., celebrity endorsements).
- Authority and emotion will both persuade people effectively; humor is riskier.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- If laws do dissuade dishonesty, then the language of the ad can be taken at face value and there will be no surreptitious or implicature-driven attempts to mislead without actual assertions.
- Therefore, the candidate/proposition will do what it says it will do.
- Ads cause people to make particular choices.

Kind of Mapping

- instantiation

Relevant Mappings

Text 1:

Source Domain	Target Domain
candidates	Riggs, Alioto
audience	voters
voters	relevant congressional district
issues	especially law and order
general election	November 1996
bias	pro-Riggs (Republican); anti-Alioto (Democrat)
advantages of candidate	tough on crime
genre	lecture

Text 2:

Source Domain	Target Domain
issue	Proposition 211: capping lawyers' fees
audience	voters
voters	Californians
general election	November 1996

(Table 5-8, continued)

bias	anti-Proposition (i.e., "No" vote)
advantages of voting No	no prohibition on lawyers' taking financial advantage of their clients
genre	includes narrative

Hearer Interpretation

- If one believes that legislation works, one will be more trusting that the ads are not lying or making false claims.

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Coherent with Marketplace of Ideas metaphorical CCM

TABLE 5-8
The "(Political) Television Commercial" CCM

announcement (as legally required, but often in very small print and displayed for only a short period of time).

Usually these commercials, like many product commercials (including texts 1 and 2) are "informational" in presentational style as well as in content (e.g., text 3), compared to the "narrative" of text 4.

Compare these techniques to these of product advertisements, which rarely display any printed text, and when they do have such text, it is usually restricted to product name and perhaps a slogan (except for written-Authority-supported commercials like the medical subgenre). Product commercials often contain action: they are not predominantly visually static like the Political commercials. This action usually includes not only a lot of physical motion, but also music and quick camera cuts, and the action is typically performed by a number of live (sometimes animated) actors.

Moreover, these performances are often structured as reproduced frames from daily life, however altered. These frames and associated models may be presented either as mini-dramas or as if the audience is eavesdropping on or observing others, who may or may not be aware of "us." Since these models are chosen to put forth, persuasively, the claimed benefits of the product for the consumer, it is in the manipulation of these models--which are often universally or culturally symbolic--that accusations of bias to fit special interests should be most easily made. Nevertheless, since our CCM of Propaganda saliently requires that the content be political, most non-specialists do not label these product commercials as "propaganda."

The genre of candidate advertisements naturally appeals to the hot-button issues of the moment. Often these are "fear"-based, linked, for example, to CCMs that we have about crime. The pro-Riggs/anti-Alioto congressional television advertisement in 1996 given as text 3 (Appendix 5-3) was in fact nothing but the "Anti-Crime Fear" CCM, with Riggs being portrayed as a stereotypical policeman: as "Tough on crime," for example. The label "policeman" itself evokes the "The Policeman Is Your Friend" model, a stereotype-based CCM that is being seriously challenged by some ethnic, socioeconomic, and political groups. However, it is strongly held by many of the people who demographically more often vote.

The "Fear" CCM in text 4 is targeted especially at seniors, a group that tends to vote in high numbers. It appeals to another common fear-based model: that of financial harm, that is, loss of money in some fashion or another: higher taxes, lack of lower taxes, restrictions on lawsuits, and so on. Here it is "seniors'" fears of becoming "victims":

(16) Husband: I thought it was gonna protect seniors. . . . So the lawyers take as much as they can get, and we settle for what's left. . . . So Two-Eleven protects lawyers, not us.

One of the earliest examples of the new CCM of Political Television Commercial was also one of the most dramatic. This was the famous "daisy" television advertisement of the Johnson presidential campaign against the Republican Goldwater in 1964. It was broadcast only one time, during an evening movie. In this ad, the video showed a little girl picking petals off a daisy, with a cut to an atomic bomb explosion and then another cut to text: "Vote for President Johnson on

November 3." Meanwhile, the voiceover presents a little girl counting (forwards, with some doubling and slips), a man's voice counting (backwards), the explosion, a quote from Johnson, and an announcer repeating the text and adding a tag line: "The stakes are too high for you to stay home" (Diamond and Bates 1992:126-127, with stills and audio quotations; also discussed in most works on political advertising).

Besides the controversy inherent in a newly emerging CCM, a large part of the impact and therefore of the emotion fueling the controversy over the advertisement came from its early CCM-breaking use of a product-commercial technique: a dramatized scenario, with a voiceover that was appropriate to the scenario rather than directly commenting on the candidate or the opponent.

The 1988 "Revolving Door" or "Willie Horton" political commercial, in which presidential candidate Bush was portrayed as hard on crime and candidate Dukakis as soft on crime (see, e.g., Kamber 1997 for a detailed history and partial description), manipulated facts and so was open to charges of blatant Propaganda on one of the two central grounds, that of persuasive purpose (it even fulfills the additional lay criteria of intentional, biased deception):

- (17) The advertisement itself was factually misleading in several respects: it suggested that many of the furloughed convicts committed kidnap and rape (in fact, Horton was the only one who did), it failed to provide any baseline information for evaluating the overall success of the Massachusetts furlough program under Dukakis, and it implied that Governor Dukakis himself was the architect of the Massachusetts furlough

program (which, in fact, he inherited from his Republican predecessor). Last but not least, the advertisement also appealed to voters' racial prejudice and stereotypes by highlighting (both in the visuals and in the text) a black perpetrator and a white victim. (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995:4)

However, it has been generally recognized as very effective in affecting the outcome of the presidential election:

- (18) The Dukakis campaign did not respond with a rebuttal advertisement. Shortly after this advertisement began playing (and recirculating in endless news reports), President Bush surged ahead of Governor Dukakis in the polls; this shift in public opinion was widely attributed to the effectiveness of the Horton advertisement.
- (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995:4)

However, things may be changing, as the emerging blended Political Television Commercial CCM adapts some of the Product Commercial techniques. In the "Harry and Louise" advertisements that were produced to discredit the Clinton health care plan proposal at the start of his first term as president, for example, a couple were seen discussing the proposal, as if we were eavesdropping on a private conversation in their home. These ads were effective partly because of this 'allure' of eavesdropping. The Anti-Proposition 211 advertisement in the 1996 California election (Appendix 5-4) uses many of the same elements.

First, it is a mini-drama, in this case another "private conversation" in someone's home. The couple is stereotypically middle class (i.e., middle-middle to upper-middle class), retired ("seniors" by implication from their concern over Proposition 211) but certainly not elderly in appearance. The wife appears somewhat younger than the husband. They are essentially presented as a couple of Just Plain Folks (perhaps a little on the high end, but notice, for example, the pronunciation of "gonna" in example [18], also "It'll" instead of "It will"; see text, Appendix 5-4), relaxing at home in the morning with their coffee.

They have done well with their "American Dream," as we can tell by the furnishings of their house. This Dream, however, is now being threatened by the lawyers (relevant CCMs, not detailed here, include "Anti-Intellectualism," "Mistrust of Rhetoric," and "All Lawyers Are Crooks") who have manipulated the wording of the proposition in a biased fashion, to advance their special interests, using language in a deliberately deceptive fashion: "they wrote the fine print;" "Two-Eleven is a fraud."

The information and opinions are presented by means of a dialogue, with all the persuasive paralinguistics of ordinary conversation. This adds to its "believability": these people are "Solid Citizens," not "California Flakes."

5.3. What is Relevant?

Much of the effect of advertisements in general, in any channel, involves playing fast and loose with the Maxims of Quality and Relevance--or so critics charge. This is one reason that all

advertisements can be labeled "propaganda," or intentionally deceptive distortions of the "truth." Logically speaking, for example, the presence of a beautiful young woman has little to do directly with the necessary attributes of a car, such as its transportation characteristics or the power or prestige of owning an expensive or trendy automobile. Yet many car ads, especially those for expensive cars, routinely have included such women. They are relevant only with the presupposition of the Advertisements CCMs that ads cause people to buy products, along with the chain of reasoning that beautiful young women are drawn by "attractive" men and that having expensive objects and the presupposed money that allows such objects to be bought make men attractive. Criticisms along these lines have been put forth by feminists and activists against drunk driving and smoking, with respect to the advertising links made between alcoholic drinks or cigarettes and beautiful young women and attractive young men.

Sometimes the directly-non-issue-Relevant link in political commercials is put forth as one of "character." In a November 1996 congressional campaign advertisement run by candidate Ellen Tauscher against incumbent Bill Baker, Baker is blamed for several "bad" acts:

(19)	VIDEO	AUDIO (voiceover)
	A baseball player who spits in an umpire's face. (Printed on screen, black background, with "PAID FOR..." at bottom of screen with small photo)	A baseball player who spits in an umpire's face.

A politician who shuts down
the government to get even.
(as above)

A politician who shuts down
the government to get even.

Congressman Bill Baker
refuses to meet with the
husband of a woman killed by
a mass murderer with an
assault weapon. [101
California, San Francisco]
(printed on screen,
superimposed over large full
face photo of smiling Baker
--like a publicity/studio
shot)

Congressman Bill Baker
refuses to meet with the
husband of a woman killed by
a mass murderer with an
assault weapon. [i.e., the
shooting at 101 California
Street, San Francisco, on
July 1, 1993, and left 9
dead]

He calls a group of visiting
high school students
"abortion survivors."
(same)

He calls a group of visiting
high school students
"abortion survivors."

Video of the event; no
printing.

And then, just weeks ago,
Bill Baker storms from a
stage at a political rally
and shoves a protestor.

Don't we deserve better?

Don't we deserve better?

(printed, black background
again)

Yes. (printed)

(No voiceover)

Paid for by Ellen Tauscher
for Congress.

(No voiceover)

Baker was not charged with any crime, either in the advertisement or in the real world. These assertions do not directly state his position on any of the issues; instead, his position must be inferred from his action. This is not a violation of Relevance, nor is it unusual. What makes it worthy of comment is the additional, also regular, "persuasive" implication that they show a bad character on his part--someone who is insensitive and prone to losing control in situations where he is challenged. There is a further real-world entailment: that he cannot handle stress. And who wants someone who cannot handle stress helping to run the country?

In contrast, Baker's corresponding advertisement was directly focused on political issues. For example:

(20)	VIDEO	AUDIO (voiceover)
	Black and white photograph of Ellen Tauscher; printing: TAUSCHER: (white)/(red) NO TO TAX RELIEF ⁴	Ellen Tauscher says No to tax relief, even for families earning just thirty thousand dollars.
	Baker photograph; printing: BAKER:/SIGNED PLEDGE TO NOT RAISE NEW TAXES	Bill Baker signed a pledge to not raise taxes,
	same; BAKER:/PROVIDE FAMILIES TAX RELIEF NOW	and voted to give working families tax relief now.
	Black and white on screen; TAUSCHER: (white)/(red) REFUSES TO SIGN/NO NEW TAX PLEDGE	Ellen Tauscher won't sign the pledge, and opposes all tax cuts.

Tauscher won the election, although her victory was disputed by Baker. It is hard to say how much influence the two different styles of advertisements had in this result, but clearly they were very different.

The playlet in the Anti-Proposition-211 commercial given as text 4 is filled with problematic appeals to Relevance that rely on quick and effective linguistic and visual evocations of several CCMs.

⁴Slashes indicate line breaks in on-screen text.

First, the simple listing of prominent politicians who oppose Proposition 211 only has significance if there is a presupposition that the opinions of prominent people ought to influence the opinion of other voters. This is the presupposition behind all celebrity endorsements, of course, of products as well as issues. Although it is true that some of the politicians listed (e.g., Clinton) had law degrees, the appeal to their 'authority' was not being made on the grounds that they were experts in the legal issue covered by the proposition.

In the playlet, the boundaries of Relevance are pushed in several ways. The visuals set it up, appealing especially to the CCMs of "Solid Married Couple" (notice the symbolic coffee) and "Middle-Class American" (one aspect of which is The Solid Citizen, and which strongly intersects with Just Plain Folks). These CCMs have a very high positive evaluation for many Americans, especially those who are demographically the most likely to vote: middle-class to upper-middle-class and middle-aged or older.

The language of the playlet is evocative of several CCMs. Language such as "fine print" (three times), "loophole," and "fraud" tap into both the Anti-Lawyer CCM and the "Read the Fine Print" CCM, the primary characteristic of which is a mistrust of documents written in "legalese." This CCM is linked to the Anti-Lawyer CCM since it is presupposed in that CCM both that lawyers are more concerned with "winning" than with "honesty" or "truth" or even "justice," and that they are trained in many ways to manipulate legalese to the disadvantage of the ordinary Just Plain Folks citizen. The appeal is thus to the Just Plain Folks CCM (see chapter 2 above), reinforced by the Just Plain Folks "you" (= 'one') in the injunction to "Check it out for yourself"

(italics added). That is, the advertisement hedges its bets, so to speak, making both an appeal to celebrity and authority in the banner and an appeal to the independent judgment of Just Plain Folks in the playlet.

6.0. Are they propaganda?

Are these four commercials "propaganda"? First, all four of these examples indeed fit the supordinate category of "propaganda," since they are all in accordance with the underspecified core. That is, they are disseminated through a channel of *mass communication* (namely, television), and they are *persuasive* (intending to produce a change in attitude and behavior) rather than purely informational.

Whether or not they satisfactorily instantiate any or all of the characteristics that fill out the American folk CCM of Propaganda (Table 5-1) largely depends on the hearer's other beliefs and sometimes external knowledge (for checking accuracy). As a result of these beliefs, is the recipient predisposed to a state of trust toward the producer of the message or to a positive receptiveness of the message? Perhaps. Does the message manipulate the individual by appeals to symbols or psychology or cultural CCMs? Yes, certainly. Are they deceptive? As we have seen, without investigation the answer to that question may vary according to one's political views.

The same is true of many of the remaining characteristics. Is the message composed of opinion or fact? Is there bias? Is the message composed of opinion or fact? Is any acceptance of the message considered to have been voluntary? Does the message serve special interests instead of the general public? The degree of negative

evaluation of the message depends partly on the extent to which we merely accept the increasingly cynical presupposition of the American cultural model that all commercial and many or even most other messages involve some degree of self-interest,⁵ and whether, based on all the other grounds, we perceive or infer an intentional, and highly stigmatized, deception on the part of the producer.

Until relatively recently, product advertisements on television have not usually been considered propaganda in our folk models even though they meet most of the criteria, including our CCM-based assumptions about motive, intent, and self-interest, as well as obviously satisfy the criterion of manipulation by means of symbols and CCMs. Nevertheless, product advertisements are still not usually considered "good" examples of "propaganda" by most lay definitions, no matter how experts such as practitioners and propaganda analysts have adopted an underspecified core model.

This should not be surprising. Prototype theory (following the work of Rosch and her colleagues) has generally considered real-world entities such as birds and dogs, in which cultural considerations play a role (one's prototype--or especially typical--"chair," for example, will be influenced by the sorts of chairs one commonly encounters), but which are tangible and thus open to relative agreement about "good" examples. Socially based intangible categories like "propaganda," however, are entirely cognitively constructed and often, as here, dependent on other beliefs, and therefore we may expect differences in "good examples" to be more common.

⁵A presupposition that results partly from the acceptance of 1960s attitudes into the mainstream, and partly from a lack of faith in the integrity of American business as a result of 1980s/1990s "downsizing." Future corpus work will help evaluate this apparent change in progress.

These differences are exacerbated when evaluation becomes part of the prototype, as it is in the American lay model of "propaganda." "Propaganda" is negatively valued; therefore, anything that is not negatively valued cannot be "propaganda." The mechanism at work here is similar to that of "resolute" versus "stubborn" versus "pigheaded" ("I am resolute; you are stubborn; he is pigheaded," R. Lakoff, p.c.) or "stingy" versus "thrifty." As Fillmore (1982b, 1984) pointed out, "thrifty" is part of an ICM (i.e., a CCM) in which spending as little money as possible is evaluated positively, while "stingy" belongs to one in which such an action is evaluated negatively. Thus, the same person can be either "thrifty" or "stingy," depending upon the observer-evaluator's point of view.

On the other hand, we might expect that television candidate advertisements would be likely to be labeled "propaganda," at least by the opponents of the subject of the commercial--and they often are. Such commercials have political content, and we certainly assume (increasingly) that politicians are motivated by *special interests* more than by truth. However, we are also culturally predisposed by our CCMs to associate "propaganda" with someone else--especially with communism or totalitarianism. This CCM-based ambivalence has led both to a restricted set of acceptable genres for "political advertising" and general public discomfort with each innovation (e.g., "negative" candidate advertising, or "attack ads"), although experts have tended to be more accepting.

Furthermore, a Political Television Commercial such as the Anti-Proposition 211 advertisement makes subtle use of the definition of propaganda itself. By accusing the authors of the proposition of bias,

serving special interests, and so on, and especially by accusing them of the intent to deceive, the advertisement places the *proposition* itself largely inside the cultural folk model of propaganda. The proposition remains outside the model technically in that it is not "persuasive"; that is, it does not attempt to change people's attitudes or behaviors, it merely legislates them. However, this commercial presents enough of the key elements of the Propaganda CCM, especially the important ones, that it triggers a negative appraisal of the proposition as "Propaganda" nonetheless. That is, not just its form but also its content support the importance of the "core" of the American folk model version of the radial category of "propaganda."

7.0. Conclusion.

The criticism that nowadays we are selling presidents like soap gets at the heart of the matter. Most of us--who are not advertising or political experts focusing on successful mass persuasion *techniques*--do not view politicians and soap as at all the same thing, despite our (especially high register) cultural Marketplace of Ideas metaphorical model.

However, the more experience we have with soap-like political ads, less issue-focused and more image-focused, the more acceptable they will become as we develop a cultural CCM of Political Television Commercial. This composite or blended model incorporates some but not all of the elements of each of its component models--political promotion and product advertising--into a CCM in its own right. Separate but related interactional routines and expectations for this "new" CCM are being developed. We may decide to regulate political advertising, but by that

very activity we recognize it as a separate category and begin to define its structure and characteristics. Once we have thus fit "political advertising" completely into our general cultural categorization framework, it will no longer be a conceptual and experiential hybrid and we will no longer feel so uncomfortable with it. In fact, especially since the 1992 presidential election this seems already to be well under way.

On the other hand, our cultural, experiential-model-based resistance to labeling product advertising as "propaganda" (except on the part of those who mistrust the entire political-social-economic-cultural system of the U.S.) has generally remained strong. If this attitude continues, it will block--as it has in the past--the efforts of well-meaning and even passionate specialist advocates of programs to educate the populace against being deceived by propaganda (see, e.g., the work of Lee; Lee and Lee; Rank; Combs and Nimmo; and Sproule). When expert categorization, including taxonomies and definitions, comes up against experientially-based, basic-level cultural models, there is no contest.

CHAPTER 5--APPENDICES

APPENDICES: TEXTS OF COMMERCIALS

Appendix 5-1

Bayer Aspirin
November, 1996

(15 seconds)

Scene 1:

VIDEO

Middle-aged, tired-looking man
at indoor basketball game.
Crowd is screaming around him.
Zooms in to relative close-up
of man's face and hand, as he
props his head on his hand and
shakes his head slightly as
screaming continues.

AUDIO

Sound of crowd cheering and
screaming.

Scene 2:

We see a flash of fingers
thumping a Bayer aspirin bottle
down; the view of the middle
(label) area of the bottle
fills the screen. The label:
"Genuine Bayer Aspirin/Fast,
Safe Pain Relief".⁶ In very
small print in lower right hand
corner, superimposed over edge
of bottle: "Use only as
directed".

Screaming continues until the
bottle is put down. The thump
(see video) is marked by a deep
chord-like sound.

⁶Slashes indicate line breaks in on-screen text.

Scene 3:

White on black, square, sans- No sound.
 serif letters: "If you
 think/all leading pain
 relievers/are the same"

Scene 4:

First two blips are Three fast, equispaced blips of
 synchronized with movement of heart monitor.
 oscilloscope trace on screen
 (green on black); last blip as
 next scene begins.

Scene 5:

Text: white on black, same Last heart blip, then no sound.
 lettering style as before:
 "Only Genuine Bayer/can reduce
 the risk/of another heart
 attack/by up to 50%". In very
 small print (white on black,
 same lettering style), running
 as a banner across the bottom
 of the screen: "Among leading
 pain relievers studies show
 aspirin, taken regularly
 along/with a regimen of diet
 and exercise, can help prevent
 a second heart attack."

Scene 6:

Text on screen (same style as	Thump-thump (beat) thump-thump
before): "Just ask/your	(beat) (twice); then Voiceover
doctor." The very small print	(deep man's voice): "Bayer".
banner from Scene 5 remains.	

Scene 7:

Row of plastic bottles, labels	No sound.
full front (as if on shelf:	
middle of screen, on black):	
Advil, Excedrin, Tylenol,	
Aleve.	

Scene 8:

Zoom in on center of row; then	Voiceover: " <u>Bayer</u> !" then chord
Bayer bottle is again thumped	again (as in Scene 2), as Bayer
down in front of the center of	bottle is thumped down.
the row (again, about the	
middle third/label area of the	
bottle only).	

Scene 9:

View of full box, showing	Voiceover (as pullback occurs;
label: "Genuine Bayer Aspirin"	see below): "Powerful pain
("tablets"); beat between box	relief. And . . . <u>so</u> . . .
shot and voiceover start, as	much . . . <u>more</u> ."
pullback occurs to smaller view	
of box (middle half of black	

(Scene 9, continued)

screen). On lower fourth of
screen as pullback occurs (same
lettering style as before):
"Powerful pain relief/and so
much more."

Appendix 5-2

"Spa" Shoes Ad
November, 1996

(15 seconds)

Scene 1:

VIDEO

AUDIO

Dummies' feet in very high platform heels and then another uncomfortable shoe under a table (they are not clearly dummies' feet on first glance), then 3/4-to-front head shot of female mannequin in warehouse (?). Toward end of chuckle, shoulder and head shot of real woman (thin, dressed in simple sleeveless black dress, hair up); she is laughing, briefly looks at camera and then down, covering her mouth with her hand.

Music. Then voiceover (young adult woman's voice):
"Uncomfortable shoes are for dummies." Beat; then light chuckles (female voice).

Scene 2:

First sentence: feet walking; then young woman makes a face (shoulders & head shot) next to mannequin's head at right of screen Second sentence: pans down row of three single women's shoes, different styles.

Voiceover: "Spa shoes are different. They have Easy Spirit cushioning and support."

Scene 3:

Legs and feet (below short
black dress) with comfortable-
but dressy-looking shoes,
walking down steps of staircase
(top right toward bottom left),
white dowels and stained
(brown) railing diagonally
across screen at left third of
screen; walking fast.

Scene 4:

At "that let," visual changes
from walking scene to 3/4-
front-view of head, neck, and
shoulders (same woman; same
black dress), smiling.

Voiceover: "The shoes that let
you move."

Scene 5:

In foreground silhouette
against light background: part
of head from back, with arm and
hand raised as in farewell
(apparently a mannequin); woman
(silhouettte) pauses in
background, then turns and
starts walking away. Large

Voiceover: "New. From Easy
Spirit."

(Scene 5, continued)

blue letters "SPA" as if behind
the real person (i.e., small
parts of letters obscured);
"Easy Spirit" with curved line
underneath, in white letters,
as if in front of real person
(i.e., overlap). At voiceover
"Easy Spirit": the two figures
fade away; background fade-
changes to black; letter "SPA"
and "Easy Spirit" + curved line
remain.

Appendix 5-3

Pro-Riggs/Anti-Alioto
 Television Commercial
 November, 1996

Scene 1:

VIDEO

ALIOTO OPPOSES THE
 DEATH/PENALTY FOR ALL FEDERAL
 CRIMES (above black and white
 photograph of a smiling Alioto
 with her name underneath in
 lower case/caps)

AUDIO (Voiceover)

Michela Alioto says she opposes
 the death penalty for all
 federal crimes,

. Scene 2:

ALIOTO OPPOSES THE DEATH
 /PENALTY FOR ALL/FEDERAL CRIMES
 above arrest news picture
 (color) of TIMOTHY/MCVEIGH and
 black and white arrest news
 photo of THEODORE/KACZYNSKI

even for suspects in the
 Oklahoma City bombing and
 Unabomber cases.

Scene 3:

Color photo of Riggs above
 text: CONGRESSMAN/ FRANK
 RIGGS/ FORMER COP
 [At *: text changes to TOUGH
 ON CRIME (larger font, photo
 remains)]

As a former police officer,
 Frank Riggs knows we have to be
 *tough on crime.

Scene 4:

VOTED FOR That's why he voted for tougher
TOUGHER/SENTENCING LAWS sentencing laws

(font stays slightly larger)

Scene 5:

VOTED FOR MORE/MONEY FOR POLICE and more money for police.

Scene 6:

WROTE LAW TO LIMIT/DEATH ROW	Riggs helped write the law to
APPEALS	limit death row appeals.

Scene 7:

The 2 photos again: Riggs in	Frank Riggs--a tough record
color above	against crime--Michela Alioto--
RIGGS/TOUGH/ON/CRIME, Alioto	opposing the death penalty
black and white above	
ALIOTO/OPPOSES/THE	
DEATH/PENALTY	

Scene 8:

FOR MORE INFORMATION/CALL/ For more information call Crime
CRIME VICTIMS UNITED/(916) 448- Victims United. (no digits
3291 pronounced)

At bottom of screen: PAID FOR
BY THE CALIFORNIA REPUBLICAN
PARTY (slightly smaller)

Appendix 5-4

Anti-Proposition 211 (California)
Television Commercial
November, 1996

Throughout:

VIDEO (in letter-box format): Banner along top of screen (changes during ad): San Francisco Chronicle: No on 211; President Bill Clinton: No on 211; Bob Dole: No on 211; Senator Dianne Feinstein: No on 211;

At bottom of screen: NO on 211 (in block square arrangement) (remains during most of ad)

In center of screen: playlet.

Playlet:

VISUAL: Husband and wife, early middle-aged (she's in her forties, husband is somewhat older and has reading glasses). He is at the dining room table. The room is middle class-to-prosperous. She hands him a copy of the California state voters' information brochure (i.e., to read the unbiased information). She sits down with coffee at the table, also.

AUDIO:

WIFE: The fine print in Prop Two-Eleven could really hurt us.

HUSBAND: I thought it was gonna protect seniors.

WIFE: Here, read the fine print. (Hands him the voters' information guide) Prop Two-Eleven prohibits any restrictions on lawyers' fees. [Vocal stress on 'fees']

HUSBAND: So the lawyers take as much as they can get, and we settle for what's left?

WIFE: That's the loophole. It'll make it illegal to put limits on lawyers' fees. [again stress on 'fees']

HUSBAND: So Two-Eleven protects lawyers, not us.

WIFE: We-ll--they wrote the fine print.

Conclusion:

VIDEO: Top banner is blank; long shot on the couple in center.

Superimposed over the couple: digits "211" circled in red and big red diagonal slash bottom left to top right ("NO 211"). The bottom banner: PAID FOR BY TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS [with identification number]

AUDIO: ANNOUNCER (voiceover): Check it out for yourself. Two-Eleven is a fraud. Vote No on Two-Eleven.

Part III: Conclusion

Chapter 6

Conclusion

What have these analyses shown us?

In chapter 1 we saw that previous analyses of news stories by media scholars had gone far toward recognizing the importance of CCMs, but without fully indicating either the details of the linguistic and cognitive mechanisms by which they produce their powerful effects or their role in widespread cultural discourse across many domains besides those of politics and news. To present the differences more fully, let us return to Charlotte Ryan (1991) and consider, for example, her discussion of the U.S. media's coverage of the Nicaraguan conflict in the early 1980s.

1.0. A comparison with a previous analysis (Ryan 1991).

1.1. Type of analysis and dominant CCMs.

As we saw briefly in chapter 1, Ryan (1991) correctly notes that framings (which she also calls "frames") consist of several aspects, including the "issue"; the allocation of responsibility; the suggested solution; the designated audiences; and various types of 'symbols' that 'carry the frame,' including "metaphors," "visual images," "historical examples," "stereotypical portrayals," and "catchphrases." She also notes that these frames have "supporting arguments" that include varying degrees of "causal roots," "consequences," "appeals to basic values or principles," and "cultural resonances." (See Tables 6-1a and 6-1b for her presentations of the "East-West Conflict" and "Human Cost of War" "framings.")

3-3

East-West Conflict***What is the Issue?***

- What will the United States permit the establishment of a Soviet-oriented communist state in Central America?

Who is Responsible?/What is the Solution?

- The United States must protect the free world against Soviet expansionism.

How do Symbols Carry the Frame?

- *Metaphors*: domino theory, global chess game, Soviet beachhead.
- *Visual images*: Ortega with Castro or in Moscow, Arafat in Managua, Nicaraguans with Soviet weapons.
- *Historical examples*: Cuba, Grenada—supposedly democratic revolutions which are later judged as essentially Soviet fronts.
- *Stereotypical portrayals*: The United States protects the best interests of all freedom-loving peoples. Sandinistas are totalitarians who betrayed a democratic revolution, or communists who duped their people in a false united front. Soviets are expansionists gobbling up Central America, or at least disrupting it. U.S. critics of federal policy are also dupes or Soviet sympathizers.
- *Catchphrases*: "Cuban-Soviet proxy," "Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas," the "Sandinista regime," "exporters of revolution." Contras are "patriots," "freedom fighters," and "the democratic resistance."

Supporting Arguments

- *Causal Roots*: One causal analysis or explanation of the problem's origins might suggest that Nicaragua is a genuine revolution betrayed by a Communist takeover. Another might present it more simply as another effort by the Soviets/Cubans to infiltrate Latin America.
- *Consequences* of the Nicaraguan revolution: the domino loss of all Central America and then Mexico to communism and the resulting threat to U.S. national security.
- *Appeals to basic values or principles*: freedom of the press, freedom of religion, etc.
- *Cultural resonances* (i.e., tie-ins with broader U.S. political culture): U.S. anti-communism. George Wills calls it "interventionist anti-communism" and proudly traces its history in Korea, Greece, and Vietnam.

SOURCE: William Hoynes, "Political Symbolism and the Central America Movement," Working Papers Series, Social Economy and Social Justice Program, Boston, College, 1987.

TABLE 6-1a.

Ryan's "East-West Conflict" Issue Framing

(Ryan 1991:62, Table 3-3)

3-4

Human Cost of War***What is the Issue?***

- The human cost of the war in Nicaragua is so high that it discredits its sponsors. The issue is will the United States continue an inhuman war that violates its own basic principles.

Responsibility/Solution:

- The United States must stop the war or it will be discredited in the world community.

Symbols:

- *Visual images:* wounded children, victims of torture.
- World Court Decision against U.S.
- *Historical example:* Vietnam.
- *Depictions or stereotypical portrayals:* intervention violating U.S. democratic traditions.
- Sandinistas as sincerely attempting an incomplete democratic revolution but forced into anti-democratic stances by the horrors of the contra war. Contras as terrorists committing unspeakable deeds.

Supporting Arguments:

- *Roots:* Few. Human-Cost-of-War tends to be an ahistorical frame. It notes the war cost is unbearable without addressing war's origins.
- *Consequences:* the weakening of U.S. national security as the United States is perceived as an aggressor. Secondly, will strengthen Soviet image of helper to third world countries.
- *Appeals to basic values or principles:* pacifist and humanist traditions.

SOURCE: Charlotte Ryan, "Framing a Message: Nicaragua Comes to New Bedford," *The Annual Review of Peace Activism*, 1989.

TABLE 6-1b.

Ryan's "Human Cost of War" Issue Framing

(Ryan 1991:64, Table 3-4)

There is little to quarrel with in these representations. However, using the approach developed in the present study, there is also much to add.

In some instances, her components consist of a single CCM. In such cases, her analysis and mine will be especially similar. However, others--perhaps even most--of her framings and their components are in fact collections of several CCMs. For example, the "issue" as stated in her "East-West Conflict" framing of the Nicaraguan issue (see Table 6-1a) itself contains presuppositions from more than one CCM, including the "U.S. Is a World Power" CCM (linguistic contextualization cues: e.g., "[will] the U.S. permit"), the "Communism" model ("Soviet . . . communist"), and the Competition metaphorical family or MF (i.e., the presupposition that the goals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were necessarily at odds). See Tables 6-2a and 6-2b for my analysis of some of the details of the first two additional underlying CCMs.

Similarly, multiple CCMs underlie the attributes of her presented "allocation of responsibility" and the proposed "solutions"--although both are seen as factual because they are entailed by the CCMs acting separately and in concert. They also underlie each of the metaphors seen here, namely, "Politics is a Game [of dominoes, chess]" and "Politics is War" (for these see chapter 3 above) and their stereotype-based prototypes. The listed visual images and historical examples include both referent-based prototypes (i.e., as opposed to stereotype-based; see chapter 1 and chapter 4 above). Ryan's "catchphrases" also evoke both referent-based CCMs and prototype-based CCMs (such as the Traditional American Values of "Freedom" and "Democracy"; see chapter 2 above). Linguistic examples of the former include "Marxist-Leninist"

Name of CCM: Communism

Kind of CCM
 prototype-based (stereotype);
 referents very important

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
 (e.g., "communism"; "dictatorship";
 "totalitarian"; "godless"; "world
 domination") and •salient examples (e.g.,
 "Soviet Union")
- lexical choice: •CCM-evoking negative words
 are applied to one group only ("them")
- maxims: expectations that Quality will be
 routinely violated by the Communists;
 other maxims will also be violated by them
 if expedient to reach their goal
- speech acts: •speech acts that are negatively
 evaluated by "us"
 (e.g., orders leading to "immoral"
 consequences)

Scenario/Frame

Elements

(not all have to be mapped)

- United States/Americans
- declared Communists
- "Marxist-Leninist" (and/or "Maoist")
 political ideology
- Communist goal of world domination
- lack of morality among Communists
- "immoral" and/or "sneaky" methods of the
 Communists to achieve their goal
 (subversion, force if necessary; secret
 police, informers, etc.; spies,
 deception; propaganda, lies)

Speech Events/Genres

- slogans (to shape behavior based on
 political content/ideology)
- propaganda (public speeches, etc.) [see
 chapter 5 above]
- manipulation of all speech events

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- Embodiment of the opposite of the Traditional
 American Values (i.e., "anti-democratic,"
 "anti-religion," "anti-free speech," etc.)
- evaluation = negative

(Table 6-2a, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- Communism has no redeeming features. (In fact, it can often be perceived as actively "evil," because of the following points.)
- The geopolitical goal of Communism is world domination, by any means necessary.
- Their comparable domestic goal is complete domination/control of people inside their political boundaries.
- There can be no compromise with evil people who desire to control the world (i.e., the Communists).
- An equally important feature of Communist ideology is state control and allocation of material resources, production, and ownership of property (i.e., in contradiction to 'free market capitalism').

Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions

- Global issues result in straightforward geopolitical alignments.
- Correspondingly, geopolitical alignments have simple, straightforward explanations.
- Geopolitics should be based on moral values.

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- No citizen or visitor within a Communist state is safe from the intrusions, deceptions, and control of the Communist government.
- No other country is safe from Communist interference.
- Communists will infiltrate and otherwise support activists, including revolutionaries and terrorists, in order to overthrow non-Communist governments.
- Anyone who can be interpreted as supporting "Communist" ideologies (including varieties of socialism) is considered "an enemy of democracy" and therefore of the U.S.
- Such people should not be allowed free rein to disseminate these "harmful" ideas and activities (subject only to the overriding but instantiation-contested "Traditional Value" of "Free Speech").
- Sometimes they should be stopped with force, if that is what is necessary.
- I.e., a war against Communists or Communist sympathizers is a Just War.

Relevant Mappings

Source Domain	Target Domain
good/right ('us')	U.S.
bad/wrong ('them')	Communists/sympathizers

(Any country or individual that disagrees with the U.S. definition of democracy can and may be labeled "Communist," especially if it/he or she has any

(Table 6-2a, continued)

"socialistic" or other equitable-distribution-of-resources ideologies.)

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Clashes with Traditional American Values (see chapter 2 above) and with most of the other 'Ideal American' CCMs.
- Clashes with The Patriot (not discussed here) and also with The Nationalistic Revolutionary (clashes in terms of 'good'/'bad' mapping, since a CCM presupposition is that Communism is entirely bad).
- Coherent with the negatively-valued Authoritarian (see chapter 2 above)

TABLE 6-2a

"Communism":

**One of the CCMs in Ryan's "East-West Conflict" Issue Framing
(somewhat simplified)**

Name of CCM: U.S. as World Power

Kind of CCM
prototype-based (ideal)

Linguistic Characteristics

- lexical choice: •direct reference
(e.g., "permit"; "leadership";
"influence")
- lexical choice: •avoidance of words that
suggest negative CCMs
(e.g., "dominates")
- speech acts: •persuasion (by authority and
by logic)

**Scenario/Frame
Elements**

(not all have to be mapped)

- United States
- rest of the world
- "leadership of U.S. over rest of
world," including:
 - moral authority
 - military strength
 - economic advantages

Speech Events

- public diplomacy (e.g., speeches,
press conferences, press releases,
radio; also primarily non-linguistic
events, e.g., cultural tours)

Associated Characteristics and Evaluations

- Expression of Traditional American Values
(including Just War)
- evaluation = positive

Some Relevant CCM Presuppositions

- Being a "World Power" is a good thing.
- Geopolitical decisions should be made on
moral/value grounds.
- Traditional American Values (e.g., "democracy,"
as the U.S. defines it, but see also D.
Collier and his associates, including
Schaffer) are morally right and therefore
best.
- The U.S. has the right opinions on global
matters because it holds these Traditional
(American) Values.

Some Relevant Real-World Presuppositions

- Global issues have straightforward solutions.
- Geopolitical alliances are straightforward and
have simple explanations.

(Table 6-2b, continued)

Some Relevant CCM Entailments

- Other countries should listen to the U.S. (because of the superiority of Values).
- Therefore, if other countries just listen, the U.S. will be able to convince them (if they are rational and well-intentioned) to perform actions approved by the U.S.
- If they do not listen, the U.S. has the military power to compel them.
- Such coercion is acceptable and justifiable, because the U.S. professes morally right opinions and morally good values.

Relevant Mappings

<i>Source Domain</i>	<i>Target Domain</i>
good/right	a characteristic associated with the U.S.
potential for wrong	a characteristic associated with any/all other countries in the world (entailment: the more different from "us," the greater the potential for wrong)

Some Relevant CCM Interactions

- Coherent with (even depends on) Traditional American Values and The Leader (see chapter 2 above). (Coherent with most of the other 'Ideal American' CCMs.)
- Coherent with War frame (with mapping of U.S. as 'us') as long as the CCM "U.S. Wars are Just Wars" (also entailed by Ideal American CCM cluster) is also held.
- Clashes with The Authoritarian CCM (which is negatively evaluated in the U.S. anyway). (Note that the U.S. is especially against "dictators," and conversely that those whom the U.S. opposes are often labeled as "dictators.")

TABLE 6-2b
 "U.S. as World Power":
 One of the CCMs in Ryan's "East-West Conflict" Issue Framing
 (somewhat simplified)

and "the resistance" (i.e., from World War II); linguistic examples of the latter include "patriots," "freedom" and "freedom fighters," and "democratic." Her "supporting arguments" contain still more CCMs, including the "World Power is a Game of Dominoes" metaphorical CCM (a Special Case extension of "Politics is a Game"), the "Sneaky Commies" submodel of the "Communist" CCM (i.e., Ryan's infiltration "causal root"), the CCMs of additional basic American Values ("freedom of the press," and so on), and the complex of coherent CCMs invoked in Wills's "'interventionist anti-communism.'" This latter complex includes the "Pinko Communist" submodel and the "America to the Rescue" CCM, the latter related to the Western European Hero or White Knight CCM that is perhaps best known in fairy tales but which is found throughout Western politics (see, e.g., G. Lakoff 1991).

Other CCMs in this complex include the referent-based CCMs (especially those of "Korea" and "Vietnam") that we culturally believe embody the stereotypical CCMs. Historically, the disruptive effect of the protest movements on political and cultural unity at home during the Vietnam war was a result of the direct and explicit challenge to many of these same CCMs--a challenge made by questioning the fundamental meta-presupposition (which is also seen here) that CCMs such as "America to the Rescue" or "Politics is a Game of Dominoes" were in fact relevant to the situation in Vietnam at the time. (For a brief discussion of appropriate and inappropriate factors in applying similar analogies of previous situations to new ones that we encounter geopolitically, see, e.g., Shimko 1994.)

1.2. The alternative framing and its lack of success.

1.2.1. Ryan's explanation.

As Ryan points out, the alternative framing (see Table 6-1b) attributed to the "New Bedford" group (people who went to Nicaragua to evaluate the situation for themselves) challenges the culturally dominant "East-West Conflict" frame, but so far it has done so with results that have been less than highly successful. Ryan explains this lack of effect as due to several factors, primarily the control of access to the mainstream media by the dominant frame, with a resulting lack of familiarity and therefore of naturalness, "credibility," or even adequate representation of the alternative frame.

1.2.2. A CCM-based explanation.

This is only part of the story, however. Also important are the effects of the CCMs that the alternative framing uses, especially in their relationships to the CCMs of the dominant framing(s). The dominant models certainly contain at least some degree of real-world accuracy. The U.S. does have a large influence in world affairs, even a degree of control. The communist U.S.S.R. was authoritarian and anti-democratic in many important ways; and the U.S. and U.S.S.R. often did not agree with respect to their goals and desires in world affairs. On the other hand, many of the New Bedford group's representations also correspond to real-world circumstances. Many people not directly involved in the fighting have been badly injured, for example.

What is most important, however, is not necessarily the "facts." As we can see from Tables 6-2a, 6-2b, and 6-2c, it is not the "facts" that are necessarily, or even usually, the most significant factors in

determining the responses of the hearers. Rather, it is the presuppositions, the entailments, the prototypes: all of the unspoken framework brought along with the words--the CCM-supplied connotations as well as, and even more importantly than, the lexical denotations.

Ryan and others have recognized that alternative framings such as that offered by the New Bedford group do not arise from nothing, that they do in fact build on recognizable, culturally widespread CCMs:

- (1) Although the dominant frame obviously has little difficulty finding cultural themes that support the status quo, every society has cultural undercurrents on which an opposition can build. In framing opposition to U.S. policy in Nicaragua, these might include self-reliance [cf. Gingrich's "Spokesman of Traditional American Values," chapter 2 above], democracy, pluralism [see Adams's "The Pluralist," above, chapter 4], neighborliness, little people against big government (family farmer, small businesses) (Ryan 1991:81).

However, although these CCMs indeed appear in the New Bedford position as presented by Ryan, the CCM that primarily underlies their entire alternative framing is the generally culturally unacceptable "U.S. as an Aggressor" CCM. This CCM is unacceptable on several grounds.

First, it was used repeatedly by the Soviets and their supporters during the Cold War to characterize the U.S. as "imperialist"; it thus has for many people a strong referent-based negative evaluation. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is very much in conflict with the fundamental and foundational "Ideal American" CCM cluster, since it

suggests that justice, a Traditional American Value, is not here being practiced by the U.S. According to the entailments of the Traditional American Values CCMs and the Ideal American cluster (see, e.g., Gingrich's Model 3 in chapter 2 above), such a suggestion places the U.S. in the "bad" slot within the mapping of this model. The "U.S. as an Aggressor" CCM is in fact so 'ungrammatical' in a widespread cultural sense that it will often simply be automatically rejected without any consideration.

Therefore, the clash that appears between Ryan's dominant "East-West Conflict" framing and the New Bedford alternative, namely, the clash between the "U.S. Wars are Just Wars" CCM and the "U.S. Is an Aggressor" CCM will usually be quickly decided in favor of the Just War. (See, e.g., Hallett 1991 for a discussion of the "just war" concept.) Although non-linguistic issues of power and control are important, the problem for the New Bedford framing was not merely a simple and direct question of media access. (The role of earlier media access in determining the dominant CCM is an additional factor, but again not the only one; the Just War CCM, for example, is as old as the American Revolution.)

Nevertheless, the New Bedford group's CCMs and CCM elements, such as the "self-reliance," "pluralism," and "neighborliness" mentioned by Ryan, are far from "cultural undercurrents." On the contrary, they too are American fundamentals. Why, then, do they not give the New Bedford framing more power?

In the first place, it is necessary but not sufficient merely to offer competing CCMs and to seek increased media exposure. If the alternative framings are to be powerful and effective, they must also be

coherent internally and their component CCMs must not clash with each other. These characteristics are related to their presuppositions and entailments. Do the CCMs that are offered together as Ryan's two Nicaraguan "framings" mesh in coherent groupings, or are there internal clashes?

As we have seen above, the CCMs that underlie the "East-West Conflict" framing do not clash with each other. However, and in contrast, the frame offered by the New Bedford delegation in Ryan's example does not present a unified front. It challenges the War CCM (see chapter 3 above) in one way--"The human cost of the war" is too great--but it accepts the War frame in another crucial way, by accepting its presuppositions: for example, that the armed conflict is bad not because war or killing are inherently bad, but because in this case they are "unjust." That is, the CCM that is being challenged is in fact the even more emotionally powerful and symbolically resonant "U.S. Wars are Just Wars," and it is not being challenged with contradictions from its own source domain vulnerabilities. Instead, it is being challenged by arguments that accept the terminology and therefore implicitly the presuppositions, entailments, and values of the Competition metaphorical family while trying to challenge them. (See chapter 3 above for a brief description of metaphorical families.) The question therefore becomes not whether we talk in terms of War or not, but what type of war it is.

There are further complications. For example, the Sandinistas are presented in the New Bedford framing as "sincerely attempting an incomplete democratic revolution." This evokes a "Political Revolution" CCM that usually presupposes armed conflict (related to the "Nationalist Revolutionary" model used so effectively by Gerry Adams; see chapter 2

above), and this acceptance of a War-based CCM also runs counter to the desired "Peace"-based framing.

Another lack of coherency involves other members of the Competition metaphorical family (again, for metaphorical families see chapter 3 above). The "(Human) Cost of War" framing is itself one part of a metaphorical CCM, "War is [a] Business." However, the "Cost of War" CCM contradicts the cultural presuppositions that define the structure of the Competition MF. The problem is that seeing War (a inherently Competitive "core" member) in terms of Business (a non-inherent, "construal" member) is highly irregular in terms of the usual directional (core-to-construal) source-to-target mapping found in MFs. Furthermore, since the "War is [a] Business" metaphorical CCM is not commonly found, it is unlikely to be highly persuasive. This is especially true when the mappings of the participants from the real-world War domain to the CCMs are also variable.

That is, in the "War is (a) Business" mapping reflected in some of the language of the New Bedford group (e.g., "cost"), injured civilians are mapped as 'casualties,' in this frame "the human cost of the war." Counter to the entailments of the stereotypical War prototype (chapter 3 above), one of the necessary entailments of the "War is (a) Business" CCM is that the acceptability of the War is determined only by a quantitative measurement: the lower the "costs" (including fewer casualties), the more acceptable the war.

However, this entailment is not coherent with the desire of the New Bedford group that there be no civilian casualties at all, that even one is too many. That is, "War is Hell," or, as the anti-Vietnam War protestors put it, "War is not healthy for children and other living

things." In the Business CCM, however, acceptability is entirely the result of a cost-benefit analysis.

Furthermore, the phrases "wounded children" and "victims of torture" very emotionally evoke frames other than the rationality-based "War Is (a) Business" CCM, causing an affective clash as well between the two models. Although lack of perfect coherence in all respects among the CCMs of a particular framing is not always a problem--there can be both logical and emotional reasons not to do something, and neither necessarily invalidates the other--the equating here of emotion and rationality by the simultaneous double mapping of civilian casualties is experientially unsound, and does not strengthen the New Bedford argument.

In addition, in the Just War scenario that has already been lexically and conceptually evoked, enemy casualties, including civilians, are by definition not innocent victims, either individually or merely as parts of the enemy's unjust system. This justification is often used by terrorists, who quote the nineteenth-century French anarchist Emile Henry: "There are no innocent" (quoted in Simon 1994:5). This discrepancy results in a second, cognitive clash in mapping these participants--in terms of the activated CCMs, are the "enemy's" casualties people who are on the wrong side in a Just War and therefore guilty at least by association, or are they a loss of resources in a Cost-Benefit Analysis? In such clashes or contradictions between the dominant Just War CCM and the CCM(s) offered as an alternative, the already lesser cultural strength of the challenger is weakened more than is the greater cultural strength of the dominant CCM.

In general, then, much of the language used in the New Bedford framing, as well as the CCMs that the language reflects, undercuts in several ways the strength and effectiveness of the New Bedford position.

Finally, there are no culturally widespread acceptable reference-based CCMs available to support the alternative CCM. Vietnam may some day reach that cultural status, given many current scholarly and popular views, but at this point it has not.

1.3. Summary of the CCM-based analysis.

Despite the excellent insights of Ryan and other similar "framing" analysts, then, the problem of challenging dominant CCMs is not merely one of gaining media access and/or substituting an alternative framing. Cognitively speaking, if the collection of challenging CCMs is not as internally coherent as that of the framing being challenged, it is even less likely that the alternative will be accepted. When analyzed in detail, for example, Ryan's "Human Cost of War" framing is really at least four basic CCMs: "U.S. as Aggressor," "War is Hell," "The Just War," and "War is [a] Business," and there are basic inherent contradictions even among these four models that weaken their use as a group. There are in addition an ideologically-linked meta-CCM, that of "Peace," which asserts that nothing should be held as more important than peace, and the Traditional American Values frames, such as "Democracy," which are always presupposed by and therefore implicit background to American public discourse. The presence of these additional models and frames results in still more contradictions. As well as the mapping clash between "The Just War" and "War Is [a]

"Business" that has already been mentioned, some of the other contradictions include the following:

(i) Mapping (i.e., labeling) the U.S. as an "Aggressor" implies that there are some wars in which the U.S. might not be an aggressor, i.e., that there are Just Wars which ought to be fought, but this entailment potentially conflicts with the "War is Hell" CCM, if no wars are viewed as acceptable because of the suffering they cause.

(ii) It is, in fact, the cost-benefit analysis of the "War Is [a] Business" metaphorical CCM that allows the War Is Hell and Just War CCMs to exist together in one framing; the co-occurrence of these particular three CCMs is not without explanation. That is, although the Hellishness of War is recognized, the Justness of a particular war can outweigh it: some things are so bad that they must be eradicated, 'no matter what the cost.'

(iii) However, this conclusion conflicts with the "Peace" meta-CCM that also ideologically underlies many alternative framings like that of the New Bedford group (including those held by Quakers and conscientious objectors). In this "Peace" model, no suffering is "justified," that is, no war can be considered acceptable by appealing to this kind of teleological cost-benefit analysis.

(iv) If War is a Business, then the mapping of "aggressor" should be determined by the participants' economic shortcomings rather than by moral factors, but this conflicts with important Traditional American Values CCMs, including but not limited to "Justice" (leading to "U.S. Wars are Just Wars") and "Democracy."

Therefore, despite the cultural resonances that are certainly present--and individually stronger than Ryan acknowledges--the lack of

widespread acceptance of the New Bedford framing can be traced in large part to its serious internal contradictions. The "East-West Conflict" framing, on the other hand, possesses great internal coherence and therefore strength, resulting from its use of and dependence on the various related CCMs of the Competition metaphorical family, all of which share their core presuppositions and entailments although they differ in details. The "East-West Conflict" framing is also strengthened by the continuously coherent mapping or role assignment of "us" and "them" across all of its related CCMs.

2.0. Suggestions for more successful approaches to alternative framings.

These comments illustrate that the suggestions put forward by Ryan and similar media and political analysts for introducing alternative framings--namely, the redefinition of some American CCMs and the development of new ones, especially via the support of sympathetic artists ("people whose stock-in-trade are cultural resources," Ryan 1991:92)--are not wrong, but are often somewhat oversimplified. This advice does not pay enough attention to two points. First, the CCMs in any alternative framings that contain more than one CCM must not contradict each other in terms of presuppositions, mappings, or entailments. Secondly, specific weaknesses of dominant CCMs can be very effectively exploited.

It is also important to note that if CCM clashes are not explicit (e.g., if they are in the presuppositions), they are harder to counter. In such cases they are in fact usually not even recognized; rather, the alternative CCM is merely dismissed as unpersuasive.

Advice not to challenge dominant framings on their own terms may not always be the best. Sometimes a good way to counter a CCM is precisely to point out what it does not include in its mappings, presuppositions, or entailments. As we have seen throughout the analyses in this work (chapter 2-5, above), all CCMs are oversimplified by virtue of being prototypical. By their very nature they have to be: no schematization of our daily experiences can ever capture all of the important shared elements involved in similar events, not to mention the richness of individual variation. This leaves CCMs vulnerable to a particular kind of criticism, one that can be effective without taking on the gargantuan task of completely overthrowing a dominant and deeply rooted cognitive cultural model all at once.

It proved to be very difficult, for example, to counter the public appeal of the Republicans' 1994 "Contract with America" (see chapter 2, appendix 2, above). There were several options. First, another, preferably non-Competitive, CCM could have been substituted. Choosing which model to use might well have caused problems of its own, however, since a seemingly innocuous Cooperation-MF-based CCM such as "Politics Is a Family" immediately encounters an issue discussed by G. Lakoff 1996, namely, that there are different "definitions" of the properties of a "family." In addition, that particular metaphorical CCM has both the virtues and the vices of being traditionally Democratic (see, e.g., Mario Cuomo's 1984 Democratic Convention keynote address, which I have analyzed in an unpublished paper). Also, the "Contract" CCM's appeal to economics was well tailored for its time, a period of increased public attention to economic issues such as 'balancing the federal budget'.

Attempts were made by some opponents to make such a frontal attack--trying, for example, to substitute culturally strong CCMs such as "Americans are Compassionate--especially toward Kids"--but these attempts were not highly successful; welfare reform was not blocked, for instance. Dominant CCMs are in a position of strength by definition, and people were able to reject the attempted reframing, for example by denying the meta-applicability of the alternative to this situation.

However, if the root problem from the challengers' point of view--the underlying Business model of Politics on which the Contract relied--had been explicitly noticed, another, more effective assault would have become possible. There is a difference between the sort of implicit acceptance of a CCM and its language that undercuts one's position (as in the New Bedford example) and the active engagement with a CCM that counters it on its own terms. The latter is the most elegant, cognitively efficient, and therefore effective kind of challenge that there is. The "Politics is Business"--related "Contract" CCM has inherent weaknesses that were not exploited.¹ For example, since 'everyone knows' that unpleasant and unwanted conditions can be slipped into contracts if people are not alert, one of the stereotypical phrases associated with the "Contract" CCM is a warning:

¹At the time of writing, a new television advertising campaign for one of the Democratic primary-election candidates for governor of California has just begun to be aired, with the slogan "Gray Davis--Experience Money Can't Buy." This is an effective exploitation of conventionalized phrases ("the best X that money can buy" and "money can't buy happiness," for example) to present the personal wealth of his Democratic opponents as part of a negative CCM and then via contrast to blend that CCM with the positively evaluated CCM "Experience Counts." ("Experience Counts" has traditionally been positively valued, but it has recently often been outweighed in the Business domain because of one kind of "bottom-line" analysis: witness 'downsizing' and the hiring of younger people at least partly because they can be given lower salaries.) Shortly after the ad campaign began, Davis became the Democratic frontrunner in the polls. The television commercials and their effectively focused slogan are probably not the only reason (negative advertising and weak response on the part of the other two Democrats are also surely factors), but their cognitively useful language is no doubt not insignificant.

(2) Always read the fine print.

Had this been suggested as an opposing slogan during the campaign, it would have attacked the Republicans' dominant "Contract" CCM by pointing out exactly the aspects that the challengers wanted to highlight and by providing exactly the mapping of the Republicans that the challengers wanted to present: as unscrupulous connivers taking advantage of honest, good-hearted people by not mentioning all the foreseeable consequences of an agreement. Mistrust of the "fine print" of a contract is an *indisputable* part of the Contract CCM, and therefore the argument could not have been adequately deflected and would have occurred on precisely the desired points: the consequences of the "Contract with America" and the character of those who were proposing it.

3.0. Conclusion.

Cultural cognitive models are persuasive, fundamental, and crucial in social interaction. They underlie not only political speech and news reporting, but business talk, foreign policy addresses, advertising, and everyday conversation--in short, all of our language use. They are shortcuts to cultural, cognitive, and social understanding--as with so many other aspects of our cognitive and social experiences, when we share background elements we are able to save time and explanations, both as speakers and as hearers. They also act as group markers, both giving us group cohesion and marking it. However, both stereotype-based and referent-based CCMs are oversimplifications, and therefore they allow manipulation--deliberately or not--by what they include, what they

do not include, and how their participants and scenarios are mapped onto actual situations.

Because of their ubiquity they constantly interact--sometimes successfully by reinforcing or at the very least not conflicting with each other in their mappings, presuppositions, and entailments, but at other times they clash. They can therefore be effectively or ineffectively used by those who rely on the tool of language, such as politicians or advertisers, and such successes or failures are recognized at some level by all members of the 'cultural community.'

New genres--a kind of CCM defined by form--such as that of the "Political Television Commercial" can be developed, but they cause some degree of sociocultural discomfort until they become established. (Again, both the political, economic, and social power and prestige of their proponents as well as their own inherent worth or consistency with themselves and with other CCMs are the determining factors in whether or not they are able to overcome that discomfort and become established CCMs.)

Cultural cognitive models are foundational in social life and communication, both in their own terms and--importantly--in terms of how they form a part of the larger social patterns of cognition and culture found within a cultural community. They are complex and full of the rich experience of our daily experiences, but at the same time they are abstracted, stereotyped, and simplified. When we understand how they are signaled and how they function, conceptually and linguistically, we open ourselves to a wider understanding that indeed goes beyond literary topoi and individual arguments to the cultural cognition that underlies

and supports much of our speaking, interpreting, reasoning, and discourse genres. In this way we can, then, indeed take a broader view of American public discourse, and in this way we can, indeed, look "beyond the issues."

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




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