

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

One World, One Dream: Infrastructure and the Olympic Games in Tokyo and Beijing

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in

Film and Television

by

Yunyi Li

2024

© Copyright by

Yunyi Li

2024

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

One World, One Dream: Infrastructure and the Olympic Games in Tokyo and Beijing

by

Yunyi Li

Doctor in Philosophy in Film and Television

University of California, Los Angeles, 2024

Professor Jasmine Nadua Trice, Co-Chair

Professor Steven Franklin Anderson, Co-Chair

This dissertation is a historical and speculative study of the media, cultural, and technological infrastructures that anticipated and accompanied the staging of the Olympic Games in Tokyo (1964, 2020) and Beijing (2008, 2022). Combining comparative and synthetic perspectives, the project examines the Olympic Games as a vehicle of “soft power” diplomacy within global and regional Asian geopolitics from the Cold War to the present, using the concept of the “infrastructural event” as a corollary to and reworking of the familiar media studies notion of the “media event.” Building on existing analyses that primarily treat the Olympic Games and other large-scale broadcasting spectacles textually dramaturgically, this reconsideration centers the long- and short-term technical and aesthetic transformations emblematic of the Olympic preparation process. Through an infrastructural approach bringing together objects of study including undersea cables, railways, urban arts districts, and airports, this project argues that

plans to bring the Olympics to Asia are not simply or principally motivated and rationalized by the desire to assert economic and symbolic parity with the west, as scholarship on the subject has often suggested. Rather, through case studies of infrastructural and symbolic linkages between Tokyo and Beijing, this project shows how the inauguration of Asian cities as “Olympic cities” also contributes to broader regional efforts to generate affective ties, mobility, and profitable exchange across Asian borders despite past and intermittent geopolitical antipathies.

The dissertation of Yunyi Li is approved.

Stephanie DeBoer

Sean Aaron Metzger

Jasmine Nadua Trice, Committee Co-Chair

Steven Franklin Anderson, Committee Co-Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
VITA	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: Dramaturgy/Infrastructure	13
Genre, process, public diplomacy.....	21
Olympic infrastructure in global Asia.....	29
1940.....	33
CHAPTER 2: Cables and Railways at the Precipice of the Information Age (1964).....	42
Remapping and relaying postwar Japan	49
Networking transpacific security	56
On the fast track	64
Nuclear China	72
Infrastructural friendship	81
CHAPTER 3: Staging the Creative City (2008).....	85
Zoning creativity.....	93
Beijing/avant-garde.....	99
Regionalizing creativity	106
The floating world of Olympic-era Beijing	114
Massless Beijing, borderless Tokyo	123
CHAPTER 4: Asia In-flight (2020/2022).....	126
The new Olympic agenda	131
Jet age kinesthetics.....	140
Metabolizing Jing-Jin-Ji.....	146
The architecture of traveling light.....	162
Rescaling the Olympics	168
CODA	171
BIBLIOGRAPHY	175

LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure 1: United States lawmakers destroying a Japanese-made Toshiba brand radio in front of the Capitol Building, 1987</i>	6
<i>Figure 2: Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company advertisement, Japan Times, June 19, 1964</i>	65
<i>Figure 3: Installation view from What is Mono-ha? exhibition catalog, Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007</i>	114
<i>Figure 4: Beijing Daxing International Airport, Zaha Hadid Studios</i>	127
<i>Figure 5: Trans World Airlines logo, circa 1965</i>	145
<i>Figure 6: CompuServe logo, circa 1995</i>	145
<i>Figure 7: Narita International Airport Terminal 3, Nikken Sekkei</i>	162
<i>Figure 8: Rendering of Singapore Changi Airport, Safdie Architects</i>	168

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although there were many instances during this process that had felt momentarily impassable, getting the opportunity to pursue graduate study at UCLA—backdropped by the ocean, chaparral, and mountains—has been such a gift. The years I spent researching, musing, and composing the ideas, prose, and arguments in this document could not have been sustained without the support, guidance, and brainpower of many. I am endlessly grateful for the love and patience of my parents, Wei and Yan, and my partner, Matt. I would like to thank my committee members and Film, Television, and Digital Media faculty—Jasmine Trice, Steve Anderson, Sean Metzger, Stephanie DeBoer, Veronica Paredes, Shelleen Greene, Ellen Scott, Vivian Sobchack, Denise Mann, Chon Noriega, and John Caldwell—for their attentive feedback and engagement with my work, and for their understanding of the circuitous ways by which this dissertation has finally come to completion. I also want to thank my classmates and coworkers in the Cinema and Media Studies program, and my cohort in particular—Ariel, Brandon, Brittany, and Krystal—without whom I likely would have quit long ago. To Ariel: your energy, intellect, and wit have been crucial in making this at all possible. And finally, I would like to thank my union, UAW Local 2865, and all my union siblings for teaching me the most invaluable lessons about justice and discipline.

VITA

Education

PhD in Cinema and Media Studies, University of California, Los Angeles (in progress)
Dissertation: “One World, One Dream: Infrastructure and the Olympic Games in Tokyo and Beijing”
Advancement to candidacy: 04/23/2021

MA in Cinema and Media Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 2017

BA in Women’s Studies and Visual and Media Studies (Interdepartmental Major), Duke University, 2014

Teaching Experience

Teaching Fellow, University of California, Los Angeles, 2022 – 2024
“History of African, Asian and Latin American Film”
“Hollywood and a Divided America”
“Introduction to the Art and Business of Producing”
“Hollywood and Cultural Diversity in America”

Teaching Associate, University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 – 2021
“Introduction to the Art and Technique of Filmmaking”
“Film Noir”
“Digital Media Studies”

Teaching Assistant, University of California, Los Angeles, 2017 – 2019
“Introduction to the Art and Technique of Filmmaking”
“History of the American Motion Picture”
“Sex, Race, and Difference in Transnational Cinema”

Research Experience

Graduate Student Researcher, UCLA Labor Center, 2023 – 2024

Graduate Student Researcher, Prof. Jasmine Trice, UCLA Dept. of Film, Television, and Digital Media, 2020

Graduate Student Researcher, Prof. Kathleen McHugh, UCLA Dept. of Film, Television, and Digital Media, 2017

Conference Presentations

“Netflix Everywhere: The Transnational Labor and Technology of Localization,” Society for Cinema and Media Studies (SCMS), April 2020

“‘Make a Life, Not Just a Living’: Digital Labor, Physical Space, and the Politics of WeWork,”
Theorizing the Web, April 2019

Awards and Fellowships

Kovler Family Fellowship, 2020

UCLA University Fellowship, 2016 – 2020

Graduate Summer Research Mentorship Award, 2018

Edna and Yu-Shan Han Endowed Award, 2018

Fred Thorp Fellowship, 2017

UCLA School of Theater, Film, and Television Executive Award, 2017

INTRODUCTION

On October 16, 1964, six days into the Olympic Games in Tokyo, the People's Republic of China conducted its first nuclear test, codenamed Project 596, at the Lop Nur Test Base in Xinjiang, on the edge of a now-dried saline basin. In 1963, my grandparents' work unit, called a danwei, moved to an isolated, unnamed tract of Gobi Desert land only a few kilometers wide in the northwest interior province of Gansu, leaving family members little information other than a mailing address in Lanzhou more than 700 kilometers away. Residents called the secluded settlement "Nuclear City," but it was explained to the outside world as a mining town; my grandparents did not learn why Nuclear City was built or what industrial activities took place there until after their arrival. This was the location of the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex, numbered Plant 404, where they worked in a train power station generating electricity for nuclear research, using a now largely forgotten method of mobile power generation that delivered temporary electrification anywhere railways could reach. Nuclear City never got a name—my mom, born in a Jiuquan hospital, listed Lanzhou instead as her place of birth on official documents—but at one time, tens of thousands of workers, scientists, and technicians lived on the enclosed desert tract for the advancement of China's nuclear program. The Jiuquan complex was a production line for enriched plutonium, one site in an immense sociotechnical network of science and military academies, mines, computing institutes, mobile power stations, and plutonium and uranium facilities (where fissionable material used in Project 596 was manufactured). In 1967, China's first hydrogen weapon was assembled at the Nuclear

Component Manufacturing Plant in Nuclear City,¹ but by then, my grandparents' danwei had left for a different assignment, supplying electricity by train in the mountain ranges of Shanxi.

On July 29, 1984, the second day of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles, pistol shooter Xu Haifeng, a self-taught marksman from the province of Anhui, became the first Chinese athlete to win an Olympic gold medal. During those two weeks of the Olympic Games, my mom, on summer break from her studies at Beijing Teacher's College, hung around Tiananmen Square with her older sister, watching the Olympics on a mammoth public television screen in the company of hundreds of spectators. The Los Angeles Olympic Games were the People's Republic of China's return to Olympic competition after a three-decade absence, having reached an agreement in 1979 for the right of its National Olympic Committee to participate as "China"; The toponym "Chinese Taipei" would thereafter designate Taiwan in international sporting competitions. In total, China finished the 1984 Olympic Games with 15 gold medals, eight silver, and nine bronze and particularly strong performances in shooting, weightlifting, gymnastics, and women's volleyball; with each win, the congregation at Tiananmen exuberantly flung their bags, caps, and other belongings into the air overhead. When I asked my mom if, at that time, she had thought about whether China would put on the Olympic Games sometime in the future, she told me that there hadn't been any reason to consider the question. From her perspective, China did not have the financial resources, political motivation, or proper infrastructure. After the successful staging of the Asian Games in Beijing in 1990, however, things began to look different. The Asian Games, administered by the Olympic Council of Asia under the motto of "unity, friendship, and progress" (a logical regional precursor to 2008's "one world, one

¹ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 204.

dream”), was proof-of-concept not only for the International Olympic Committee (IOC) but also millions of Beijing residents that the Olympic Games could one day be realized at home.

On August 8, 2008, the first day of the Olympic Games in Beijing, my grandmother on my dad’s side suffered a debilitating hemorrhagic stroke that would leave her permanently bedbound; her part-time caregiver had taken the day off to join in on the festive frenzy of the occasion and watch the opening ceremony, horrified to find my grandmother immobilized when she returned. Later that winter, my parents and I flew back to Beijing for my first time since immigrating in 2000 to Riverside and then Bakersfield, California—weeks before the United States presidential election, and just a few months before the IOC would award the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing. We stayed with my paternal grandparents, former medics in the People’s Liberation Army, who lived in Haidian in a concrete housing block home to a work unit of veteran retirees. We made only a few excursions out, to eat my favorite childhood meal (yangrou paomo, a stew of broth, lamb, and broken-up pieces of steamed bread) at a mall, purchase black-market CDs for my high school friends, and take pictures at the Olympic Green in the nearby district of Chaoyang. Family members recounted all the differences they observed before and after the Olympic Games: Beijing Capital International Airport had just opened a new terminal; the municipal subway system ran more efficiently and reached more places in the city; English-language signage was more common and more precise; and upscale hotels lined newly-constructed commercial districts. Transit stops and public toilets were a lot cleaner—and even the physical shape of city trash bins had been redesigned. Traffic worsened, foreigners were everywhere, and narrow hutong alleys lining siheyuan courtyard residences kept vanishing. For better or worse, Beijing was now a modern city.

This dissertation builds on generations of family and cultural memories and the issues of modernity, infrastructure, development, and globalization that attend them. In this dissertation, I examine the media and non-media infrastructures of the Olympic Games in Beijing and Tokyo, along with the physical, social, industrial, and symbolic processes by which these two capital cities have been inducted into the global system of Olympic cities. It is a comparative and synthetic, historical and speculative study of the Olympic Games in Beijing as well as Tokyo—as media and infrastructural events, and in the production of global frictions and connections and Asian regionalisms since the end of the Second World War. I chose these two Olympic cities, because the bilateral relationship between Japan and China, and the legacy of empire that sifts and weighs over it, remains the greatest factor in calibrating the regional political order. Guided by the work of Kuan-Hsing Chen on “Asia as method” as a means of reading and undoing the legacy of Cold War alignments,² I adopt an interreferential and interregional approach to the Olympic Games. Through the lens of regional exchange in the context of transnationally organized and financed infrastructural development, I argue that plans to bring the Olympics to Asia are not simply or principally motivated and rationalized by the desire to assert economic and symbolic parity with the west, as scholarship on the subject has often suggested. Instead, through case studies of infrastructural and symbolic linkages between Beijing and Tokyo, I show how the inauguration of Asian cities as “Olympic cities” also contributes to broader regional efforts to generate affective ties, mobility, and profitable exchange across Asian borders despite past and intermittent geopolitical antipathies, fashioning new and nascent commercial and cultural affinities across borders within Asia. In the spirit of “Asia as method,” my intention was

² Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 118.

to, however crudely and inevitably imperfectly, foreground sites and contexts within Asia as their own points of reference—in the process, incorporating the west as one fragment among many within the east, rather than as a totalizing other against which Asia must always be measured or understood.³

This dissertation draws heavily on the infrastructural turn within the field of media studies, such as the work of Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, and its focus on the material and industrial bases of media distribution systems in relation to the conventional disciplinary emphases of form, content, production, and consumption to expand on scholarly and popular understandings of the Olympic Games as, first and foremost, media events or as spectacle—in other words, as textual or dramaturgical objects to be decoded for their encrypted ideological meaning. Parks and Starosielski define media infrastructures as “situated sociotechnical systems that are designed and configured to support the distribution of audiovisual signal traffic”;⁴ this project in turn adopts an “infrastructural disposition” that examines the material and social interactions of media and non-media networks, “[referring] not only to tubes and pipes but includes ‘soft’ systems of organization and knowledge, ranging from professional societies to classificatory procedures.”⁵ Infrastructures layers physical, social, and discursive phenomena and does not simply determine or govern human and non-human affairs, protocols, and formations; rather, infrastructures are also dynamically informed by these social and cultural properties.⁶ In

³ Chen, 222.

⁴ Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, introduction to *Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures*, eds. Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 4.

⁵ Parks and Starosielski, 9.

⁶ Lisa Parks, “‘Stuff You Can Kick’: Toward a Theory of Media Infrastructures,” in *Between Humanities and the Digital*, eds. Patrik Svensson and David Theo Goldberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 355.

other words, an infrastructural disposition brings together the material dimensions of circulation with the political conditions and social practices that both sustain and rely on these processes.



Figure 1: United States lawmakers destroying a Japanese-made Toshiba brand radio in front of the Capitol Building, 1987

As Parks and Starosielski write, media infrastructures “operate ethereally, transmitting signals at the speed of light, and are grounded in bunker-like facilities heavily secured on earth. Media infrastructures are material forms as well as discursive constructions. They are owned by public entities and private companies and are the products of design schemes, regulatory policies, collective imaginaries, and repeated use.”⁷ Their characterizations provide a framework for translating the Olympic internationalism of global Asia as a form of futurology through

⁷ Parks and Starosielski, 5.

infrastructure, as markers of the future assembled in the present.⁸ On the other hand, infrastructural development seems to unavoidably precipitate ruin and displacement, and infrastructure in Asia in particular, as Jessamyn R. Abel and Leo Coleman observe, is often met with the prevailing cultural suspicion that these “spectacular infrastructures” are “more image than reality, Potemkin structures propping up some state’s legitimating narratives and not ultimately reliable for use in everyday life.”⁹ Cynicism has long shrouded the infrastructural and architectural ambitions of the Olympic Games—the first modern Olympic Games in Athens in 1896 was beleaguered by gossip that stadium and facilities would not be completed in time, setting, David Goldblatt writes, the precedent for “many of the tropes that still structure Olympic coverage a century later.”¹⁰ Questions about the legitimacy of infrastructure in Asia in particular, however, cannot be distanced from the perception of Asia as the world’s factory for cheap consumer exports—a trope that Japan sought to mitigate during the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, the first in which all measuring devices for competitions were manufactured in the host nation, through advertising campaigns extolling the impeccable quality of “made in Japan” electronic goods.¹¹ Containment of Chinese technology, from solar cells to batteries, is now bipartisan common sense in the United States, a situation that finds at least a partial precedent in the U.S. treatment of its trade deficient with Japan in the 1980s, against which President Ronald

⁸ Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta, “Temporarily, Politics, and the Promise of Infrastructure,” introduction to *The Promise of Infrastructure*, eds. Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 27.

⁹ Jessamyn R. Abel and Leo Coleman, “Dreams of Infrastructure in Global Asias,” *Verges: Studies in Global Asias* 6, no. 2 (Fall 2020): vi.

¹⁰ David Goldblatt, *The Games: A Global History of the Olympics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 45.

¹¹ Jessamyn R. Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933-1964* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015), 153.

Reagan imposed 100% tariffs on computers, power tools, semiconductors, television sets, and other imported goods from Japan.¹² These suspicions are consequential, as western protectionism today animates the terms by which the planet transitions away from its reliance on fossil fuels before its carbon budget is irreversibly depleted.

The problem of “spectacular” infrastructure—or, alternatively, infrastructure as ontologically self-effacing—has itself been the subject of recent scholarly debates, exacerbated moreover in the context of an internet epoch Steven Gonzalez Monserrate calls the “nubecene,” in which all human operations are fueled by the engines of cloud computing, and the specious stories of its inexhaustibility.¹³ What Sean Cubitt refers to as the “myth of immaterial media,” the digital realm as weightless and frictionless (essentially unreal), is mobilized at the expense of the fact of the physical: data centers, servers, routers, cables, cooling systems; in Cubitt’s words, “what we imagine, in short, are consumer goods that have no history: no mines, no manufacture, no freighting, and no waste.”¹⁴ These myths of transcendence are reinforced as much by their discursive power as by everyday engagement with the technical parameters of digital media, such as the optics and logics of interface design: limitless scroll, auto-played feeds, never-ending loops.

Media theorist John Durham Peters’s concept of “infrastructuralism” begins with the provocation that “information overload and infrastructural ignorance go together”; with few

¹² Gerald M. Boyd, “President imposes tariff on imports against Japanese,” *New York Times*, April 18, 1987, 1.

¹³ Steven Gonzalez Monserrate, “The Infinite Cloud Is a Fantasy,” *Wired*, November 15, 2022, <https://wired.com/story/cloud-data-storage-climate/>.

¹⁴ Sean Cubitt, *Finite Media: Environmental Implications of Digital Media* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 13.

exceptions, infrastructures—whether highways, protocols, aqueducts, bureaucracies, or time zones—are only such insofar as they are taken for granted, so to speak, as matter of fact, embedded in the unremarkable humdrum of daily routine.¹⁵ Peters describes infrastructuralism as an orientation towards “the basic, the boring, the mundane, and all the mischievous work done behind the scenes,” writing that “it is a doctrine of environments and small differences, of strait gates and the needle’s eye, of the things not understood that stand. Perhaps [Marshall] McLuhan’s title *Understanding Media* was a pun. Infrastructures stand under the world.”¹⁶ On the contrary, Brian Larkin argues that infrastructure derive their political and affect power as much through their aesthetic operations as through their use—that is, not through an aesthetic formalism but a form of relational political aesthetics through which, Larkins writes, one can “understand the promise of infrastructures.”¹⁷

Through its case studies—undersea cables, railways, arts districts, and airports—this dissertation engages with the full range of viewpoints within these debates and the various ways that infrastructure as a category is articulated within this field of study. Methodologically, I adapt from a range of disciplines, from media studies to urban studies, and triangulate multiple evidence registers of textual, metatextual, and paratextual sources and frames—including exhibition catalogs, policy documents, newspapers, budgets, schedules, blueprints, and more—to examine the form and functionality of physical infrastructures and their mediated, quantified,

¹⁵ John Durham Peters, “Infrastructuralism: Media as Traffic between Nature and Culture,” in *Traffic: Media as Infrastructures and Cultural Practices*, eds. Marion Näser-Lather and Christoph Neubert (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 32.

¹⁶ Peters, 42.

¹⁷ Brian Larkin, “Promising Forms: The Political Aesthetics of Infrastructure,” in *The Promise of Infrastructure*, eds. Nikhil Anand, Akhil Gupta, and Hannah Appel (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 175.

abstracted, and narrativized forms. I make use of their representation in official and unofficial Olympic administrative, promotional, and commemorative media and think through their meaning alongside the various practices and ideologies of economic integration that have regulated regional exchange in Asia from the Cold War to the present. Pandemic-related border and travel restrictions have made international research activities far more difficult than originally expected; I have, by necessity, had to maintain a flexible methodology to adapt to the strange and unpredictable geopolitical and epidemiological circumstances of the past few years, but I am grateful to have had the opportunity to visit the Olympic museums, ride the high-speed rail, and witness firsthand the built legacy of the Olympic Games in both cities. After establishing theoretical foundations on the study of large-scale media events in Chapter 1, later chapters will explore these issues through case studies along three imprecisely classified and often intersecting axes: science, art, and travel.

Chapter 1 introduces and adapts key concepts from existing scholarship on large-scale media spectacles. Although the term media event is often used loosely and colloquially—to reference any event that is widely documented or heavily mediated—the chapter explains Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’s taxonomy of media events as a genre of television, using their framework to analyze an Olympic example mentioned in their work in passing, the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, to address the conceptual uses and gaps of their approach focused on issues of form, style, scripting, and dramatic structure. I also look at the unrealized imperial project of the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games as a prehistory of the later Olympic Games in Tokyo (1964, 2020) and Beijing (2008, 2022), in order to frame the subsequent iterations of Asian regionalisms discussed in later chapters and to begin reconciling Dayan and Katz’s classic scholarship on “media events” with an infrastructural disposition.

The 1964 Tokyo Olympics are popularly remembered as a symbol of Japan's peaceful reentry into the postwar international system, demilitarized and democratized under the tutelage of U.S. occupation. Chapter 2 examines the transnational networking of Japan around the time of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games through the TRANSPAC-1 undersea and the completion of the Tokaido Shinkansen, at the time the world's fastest high-speed rail. Although the 1964 Olympic Games and the test detonation of Project 596, China's first atomic bomb, six days into the Olympic Games are often interpreted as a clash of competing Cold War security alliances, I use the two overlapping events to historicize the development of technocratic governance in both nations through media and non-media infrastructures and the official realignment of diplomatic relations less than a decade later.

Chapter 3 focuses on "soft" infrastructure and the use of the Olympic preparation process to refashion Beijing into a "creative city"—amid readjustments in urban policy towards new modes of postindustrial production oriented to the creative and cultural industries. I connect the Cold War legacy of "people-to-people" diplomacy through the visual and performing arts between China and Japan to more recent practices of interregional, cross-border artistic and curatorial exchange, and the spatial fixture of these exchanges in the arts districts of 2000s Beijing. In this chapter, I also identify practices of regional interreferencing within the curatorial projects of Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, the first overseas gallery to establish itself in the 798 Art Zone, between the awarding of the Olympic Games to Beijing in 2001 and their execution in 2008. Through these projects, I show how instances of informal diplomacy through the curation of "Asian art" helped lend regional contemporary artistic production commercial coherence and currency within the global art market.

Lastly, Chapter 4 examines new airport architecture in Tokyo and Beijing prepared around the time of the 2020 Tokyo Summer and 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games. While optimizing air travel is an expected, routine part of the Olympic preparation process, these infrastructure projects in Tokyo and Beijing also coincide with broader state interventions in urban and human organization and a new phase of regional interdependence within East and Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER 1: Dramaturgy/Infrastructure

In their 1992 monograph, *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History*, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz define “media events” as a genre of television: deliberate and monopolistic interruptions of everyday broadcasting rhythms, designed to simulate “a national, sometimes international, ‘sense of occasion.’”¹ During these scarce occasions, disparate broadcasters, demographics, routines, and localities come together for an instance of shared “festive viewing.”² Through such interruption, large-scale media ceremonies as a genre induce the experience of travel and rework symbolic geographies for mass audiences. Through their ability to suspend the cadences of daily routine, their spirit of reverence, and their seeming omniscience, these media events ritualistically transport viewers into new senses of history and place.³

As examples, Dayan and Katz recount Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977 and the inter-Korean family reunion television specials of the early 1980s, produced to mark the 30th anniversary of the armistice agreement. When al-Sadat met with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, rather than primarily relaying or interpreting current affairs, television itself became the vehicle for diplomacy. Following a series of triangulated, parallel interviews between al-Sadat and Begin, organized and mediated by CBS News and anchorman Walter Cronkite, Sadat traveled to Jerusalem one week later, becoming the first leader from an Arab nation to visit Israel and address the Knesset. The event set the stage for subsequent negotiations towards a peace treaty and imparted for Israelis, at least in the moment, the feeling

¹ Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), viii.

² Dayan and Katz, 1.

³ Dayan and Katz, 160 – 165.

that “they were no longer an island, a Western outpost or besieged fortress in the Middle East.”⁴ According to Dayan and Katz, the televisual occasion reshaped both geopolitical perception and social identity through “the mapping of new constituencies (by linking the TV networks of Israel and Egypt for Sadat’s visit, for example)” via CBS.⁵ Dayan and Katz gesture towards the role of infrastructure here and throughout the book, but the subject is left underexplored in favor of a primarily textual or dramaturgical approach to the media event genre of broadcasting.

Others, including Daniel Boorstin, Guy Debord, and Jean Baudrillard, have made their own contributions to the study of mass culture and mediation; from pseudo-event to spectacle to simulacra, there exists an immense body of scholarship that, despite differing political viewpoints and critical frameworks, treat media objects and events that transfix public attention with suspicion, at times even conspiratorially, as fundamentally synthetic, duplicitous, or hollow. Dayan and Katz’s study of media events is less an indictment of the unsteady relationship between truth and representation in contemporary visual culture—often extrapolated as characteristic of society overall⁶—but a much more limited taxonomy of one genre of mediated experience bound to the organization of national broadcasters and the social, communal function of television: events designed to be relayed in real-time, as premeditated exceptions to the patterns of ordinary programming schedules and domestic routines. Dayan and Katz’s preferred examples are events, often occasions of state, that help demarcate inflection points or phases of redress in history that then live on as “electronic monuments” in collective memory⁷—for the

⁴ Dayan and Katz, 166.

⁵ Dayan and Katz, 197.

⁶ Doug Kellner, “Media Culture and the Triumph of the Spectacle,” *Fast Capitalism* 1, no. 1 (2005): 61.

⁷ Dayan and Katz, 211.

most part, they do not address the longitudinal reception of past media events, or how distance from liveness might modulate meaning over time; and while media events as a genre of television are preplanned, not spontaneous as with other varieties of breaking news, the impression of historical movement that can arise from their passage is neither wholly predestined nor forcibly imposed.⁸

Within this taxonomy, large-scale events such as the Olympic Games are recast as genres of *television* as well as modes of *performance* that share a common dramaturgical schema in terms of their scripting, setting, staging, dramatic structure, and audience address. Through a tacit agreement between organizers, broadcasters, and audiences, “the conferral of media-event status on a given occasion consists in pulling it away from the news and translating it in a fictional register,” although “the same public occasion [may be] submitted to different textual treatments, an ordinary treatment (news) and an extraordinary one (media event)” in different national broadcasting environments.⁹ Earlier, John J. MacAloon had identified the Olympic Games as a “single performance system” that uneasily encases spectacle, festival, ritual, and game; although the International Olympic Committee (IOC) officially rejects the designation of “spectacle,” as the governing body of the Olympic Games, associating the description with cheap amusement and shallow show business, MacAloon describes the Olympics as an example of “spectacle par excellence” that is “irreducibly visual,” where “television, even of the highest technical standard, reduces the spectacle to constricted little rectangles of color and form,

⁸ Dayan and Katz, 186.

⁹ Dayan and Katz, 114.

systematically impoverishing the spectacle's gifts to the human eye."¹⁰ Dayan and Katz's analysis establishes a different relationship between mediation and presence, based not on verisimilitude or physical proximity with the site of performance but the conversion of a private and individuated domestic viewing experience into one that is shared, synchronized, and replicated across households, cities, even nations, through the popular consumer medium of television.

Dayan and Katz's monograph has been reevaluated, reframed, and applied to new event scenarios and the "post-television," "post-network" algorithmic world.¹¹ The baseline viewing conditions assumed then—structured through a national sense of time and the flow of linear television scheduling, as formulated by public broadcasters attuned to the tastes and temporal habits of specific national and regional cultures¹²—have given way to what David Morley and Kevin Robins foresaw just a few years later as a "more fragmented social world than that of traditional national broadcast television" in "the interactive and 'rescheduling' potentialities of video and other new communications technologies may well disrupt our assumptions of any 'necessary simultaneity' of social experience."¹³ The two have themselves since revisited the technological and historical assumptions made in their original work. In 2007, Katz co-wrote an update on what he viewed as the decline of the media event genre, as the feeling of shared

¹⁰ John J. MacAloon, "Olympic Games and the Theory of Spectacle in Modern Societies," in *Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance*, ed. John J. MacAloon (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1984), 245.

¹¹ Amanda Lotz, *The Television Will be Revolutionized*, 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 132.

¹² Raymond Williams, *Television: Technology and Cultural Form*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1991), 81.

¹³ David Morley and Kevin Robins, *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 68.

presence among national audiences continues to be undermined by changes in the organization of national broadcasting institutions and the “widespread realization that the miracles of media events are short-lived.”¹⁴ The live broadcasting of ceremonies of rapprochement, he argues, has been upstaged by the live broadcasting of “traumatic events,” that is, unwelcome and unplanned outbreaks of terror, disaster, and war.¹⁵

Dayan also later co-edited a collection of essays on the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, in which he further historicizes the relative sanguinity of their previous work, when read against Baudrillard and others, for the new millennial context:

In 1992, what had particular resonance was the end of conflicts, the waning of feuds, the rise of gestures that seemed to lessen the possibility of war. [...] On the eve of the Beijing Olympics, the themes that resonate globally are significantly more somber than those of the late 1980s and 1990s. [...] Media events stopped being ‘irenic.’ Their semantics is no longer dominated by the theme of a reduction of conflict through mediation and resolution of differences.¹⁶

In their original examples, from al-Sadat’s visit to Israel to Korean family reunions to the 1989 protests on the streets of Prague, each marked what they regarded—indeed, perhaps myopically—as “the onset of a more open ‘postwar’ period.”¹⁷ Dayan and Katz certainly do not uncritically celebrate the media event concept, and, as I show through this chapter and the rest of

¹⁴ Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes, “‘No More Peace!’: How Disaster, Terror, and War Have Upstaged Media Events,” *International Journal of Communication* 1 (2007): 159.

¹⁵ Katz and Liebes, 163.

¹⁶ Daniel Dayan, “Beyond Media Events: Disenchantment, Derailment, Disruption,” in *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, eds. Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan (Ann Arbor: university of Michigan Press, 2008), 395.

¹⁷ Dayan and Katz, 161.

the dissertation, there are many parts of their framework I find applicable to my study and choose to incorporate. However, embedded within their framework was, I believe, the same teleology of liberal progress that characterizes the Olympic value system; in retrospect, the presence of this teleology is unsurprising, given the recent and abrupt end of the Cold War and its bipolar world order at the time of their writing, but it is this chronological sequencing of geographical proximity and difference that predisposes readings of the Olympic Games in Asia as a matter of “catching up” with the west—an assumption that will be reevaluated throughout the course of this dissertation.

Despite commonalities, the Olympic Games have also always been situated strangely in relation to Dayan and Katz’s broader taxonomy. They are included as archetypal and even exemplary of the genre, but their specific characteristics are only periodically remarked upon. It is important to note, for one, that the complexity of the Olympic Games’ pacifist semantics is derived as much from the codified values of the Olympic movement, in addition to what had been identified by Dayan and Katz as a convention of the media event genre, however short-lived it was. Like other media events, the Olympics Games are announced in advance, but their occurrence every four years—two considering both Summer and Winter since their separation in 1992—is regulated by a progression of established steps that is both much more predictable and considerably more protracted. The IOC typically announces the opening of the bidding process for a future year perhaps six or seven years, at times a decade, ahead of time. Aspiring cities then produce and submit candidature files, almost certainly after some amount of political and actual groundwork to generate consensus around the project; the IOC deliberates and makes a selection; new stadiums, highways, airports, railways, and other facilities and infrastructures continue to be

built; with four years of preparation time still to go, the Olympic flag is passed from one host city to the next at the closing ceremony of the preceding Olympic Games.

The Olympic Games are as much about process as they are singular media events. From one perspective, the format of the Olympic Games—perhaps opening and closing ceremonies aside—plainly contradicts the media event genre insofar as overlapping competitions splinter audience attention, and especially as coverage of sports, disciplines, commentary, and ancillary events are distributed across channels, platforms, and devices.¹⁸ Along with a few other kinds of large-scale international gatherings, such as the FIFA World Cup and the world’s fair, they also involve a level of urban stagecraft and leave behind a built legacy on host cities, and sometimes entire host nations, unmatched by other media events. The remainder of this chapter continues to dissect Dayan and Katz’s case studies and their taxonomy, but I also think through ways to revise their original framework, as they and others have done in recent years, by adopting an “infrastructural disposition” to the study of the Olympic Games as media events and beyond.¹⁹ Understanding the Olympic Games as both process and event, inhabiting time scales both drawn-out and cursory, as infrastructural events they encompass the spells of infrastructural engineering by which cities not only prepare the logistics of bidding for and hosting the Olympic Games, but are also physically, technically, and symbolically initiated into this exclusive global system of Olympic cities. By looking at the Olympic Games as “infrastructural events,” I hope to reconcile the study of media events as a genre, category of media experience, and mode of “soft,”

¹⁸ Lotz, 89.

¹⁹ Lisa Parks, “‘Stuff You Can Kick’: Toward a Theory of Media Infrastructures,” in *Between Humanities and the Digital*, eds. Patrik Svensson and David Theo Goldberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 357.

sometimes informal, diplomacy with the recent and evolving material and infrastructural turn in the field of media studies.

The chapter will also examine the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games—mainly to elaborate on an example suggested by Dayan and Katz in passing—and Japan’s aborted project to host the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 1940 as an infrastructural and geopolitical “prehistory” to the Olympic Games in Beijing and Tokyo discussed in later chapters. The intended dramaturgy of the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games is unambiguously outlined in the candidature file by the Tokyo municipal government, that is, to redraw the symbolic geography of the world for the international community amid Japan’s military incursions into Asia and the Pacific: “Japan no more is on the edge of the world. [...] The Pacific Ocean is the center of the world—and Japan is the focal point upon the Pacific—with Tokyo the center of Japan, geographically, culturally, economically and from the point of view of sports.”²⁰ Although IOC documents indicate wide-ranging preparations for international telephone and telegraph communications and plans to install domestic broadcasting equipment,²¹ presumably to relay events throughout the empire, their timing also predates Dayan and Katz’s periodization and the widespread availability of consumer television sets. In the end, the Olympic Games were ultimately forfeited by Japanese organizers and, unlike 1936 Berlin, furnished no textual and audiovisual records through which to view or further dissect and compare their imperial symbols; in spite of this absence, and in spite of changes in media technology since, the unbuilt legacy and archival remains of “missing” 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games provided the conceptual template of east-meets-west hybridity and

²⁰ Tokyo Municipal Office, candidature file, 1933, International Olympic Committee Archives, ii – iii.

²¹ Organizing Committee of the XII Olympiad, *Report of the Organizing Committee on Its Work for the XII Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo Until the Relinquishment*, 1940, International Olympic Committee Archives, 98.

preview the same infrastructural concerns—both physical and cultural: broadcasting networks, railways, arts institutions, air travel—that would be renewed for the Olympic Games in Tokyo and Beijing in the decades to follow.

Genre, process, public diplomacy

In another example, Dayan and Katz argue that the broadcasting of family reunions in South Korea suggested “a continuity between the two Koreas [that ran] much deeper than the official stance of ideological hostility,” indicating a possibility of exchange, if not total reconciliation, that was further “facilitated by the impending occurrence of another, still hopeful media event: the Seoul Olympic Games.”²² The series, produced by the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), documented and assisted in the reunion of over 10,000 families separated by the turmoil of the Korean War. What had been scheduled as the final episode of a series commemorating the war instead became a telethon hundreds of hours long.²³ Framed by the use of split-screen technology, viewers watched in real-time as individuals on camera studied faces and asked one another questions, in hopes of matching recollections and confirming familial ties.²⁴ It was a rare, if metonymic, opportunity for the South Korean public to engage with the prospect of Korean reunification. As in the previous example, Dayan and Katz argue that popular culture—and the medium of television—played an active and instrumental role in the exercise of public diplomacy, writing that such transformative media events model for

²² Dayan and Katz, 166.

²³ Dayan and Katz, 50.

²⁴ Nan Kim, *Memory, Reconciliation, and Reunions in South Korea: Crossing the Divide* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 6.

audiences the viability of a desired but unrealized state of things, or “an acting ‘as if’ the problem addressed by the event had already been solved.”²⁵

Large-scale media events logically necessitate large-scale coordination and are “the end product of political, aesthetic, and financial bargaining” between the competing interests of at least three parties: organizers, broadcasters, and audiences.²⁶ Media events require a high degree of consensus between agents of production and reception, to suspend disbelief and cynicism and enable its trademark “intermission from reality.”²⁷ In his later reworking, Dayan explained that media events involve a style of “loyalty to the event’s self-definition,” in which its “proposed dramaturgy is not questioned but substantially endorsed and relayed” by all parties²⁸; while the initial premise behind the KBS series unexpectedly shifted, all remained loyal to its new popular purpose, which would not only compel producers to suspend regular programming but tens of thousands to gather at the KBS studio in Seoul, for the chance to appear on live television with inscriptions of names of lost kin.

The administration of the Olympic Games involves an even more complex process and hierarchy of stakeholders, including the IOC and National Olympic Organizing Committees, as well as host cities, national governments, capital sponsors, and, to a varied degree, the public. The challenges and strains of this bargaining process typified the preparation process of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. As Dayan and Katz mention in passing, 1988 Seoul was seen as a potential forum for mending relations between North and South Korea, and I will extend some of

²⁵ Dayan and Katz, 176.

²⁶ Dayan and Katz, 55.

²⁷ Dayan and Katz, 141.

²⁸ Dayan, 394.

their methods to it here. Although their concept does not adequately capture the full complexity of the Olympic project as both a genre of television and as an urban and sociotechnical process, their exploration of the role of large-scale, televised media events in public diplomacy is indispensable for making sense of the way that the Olympic Games in Asia, in general, have been understood in scholarly and popular contexts as at once inevitable and anomalous.

By the time the bidding process for 1988 began, the Olympic movement had been mired by a decade of misfortune. Any semblance of loyalty to the self-definition of the Olympic Games and their official values of pacificism and internationalism, a tricky matter always, seemed especially fickle. Even in 1984, MacAloon was pessimistic about their future, foreshadowing the tonal turn Dayan and Katz would later take: “But these days a strong foreboding remains about the fate of the Games in general and about the likelihood of joyfulness persisting from one day to the next within each Olympics. The immediate causes vary from one Games to the next, but the overall shift is steady and unremitting. The emotional unpredictability of the spectacle has challenged, and perhaps now supersedes, the more reliable affective structure of the festival.”²⁹ The 1972 Olympic Games in Munich—West Germany’s virtuous return to the international system, as 1964 had represented for Tokyo—was harrowed by the killing of eleven members of the Israeli delegation; the strife of two major consecutive Cold War boycotts afterwards, along with the unprecedented and exorbitant financial disaster of Montreal in 1976, further marred the idea of the Olympic Games for potential host cities, leaving only Seoul and Nagoya as others withdrew from the process. South Korea became the second Asian country to host the Olympics, in what would be the last of the Cold War era.

²⁹ MacAloon, 249.

The 1981 IOC vote in favor of Seoul, initially assessed as infrastructurally underdeveloped by the IOC, was contentious.³⁰ Japan was already a trustworthy partner to the Olympic franchise after hosting two Olympic Games, while South Korea was in the heat of popular uprisings and national political transition between a decades-long line of U.S.-supported military regimes after the assassination of Park Chung-hee.³¹ The international popularity of the KBS telethon did create momentum for some conciliatory gestures on the peninsula in the 1980s, including the first-ever official inter-Korea exchange of family members split across the armistice line. However, while the Cold War order would wane over the decade, it complicated the terms of any movement towards rapprochement. Fidel Castro described the looming boycott of Seoul by Cuba and other non-aligned nations, in a correspondence with IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch, as a potentially “irreversible crisis” to the Olympic movement, which could only be averted by hosting the Olympic Games jointly between the two Koreas.³² In this fraught environment, North Korea and South Korea pursued trilateral talks to cohost the Olympic Games through the IOC, but compromise proposals ultimately failed, in part over disagreement as to how many and which sporting events would be held on what side.³³

In June of 1988 (and then again in August, just weeks before the opening ceremony), some 20,000 pro-reunification university students attempted to march from Seoul to the “truce village” of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone, in hopes of discussing cohosting

³⁰ Ron Palenski, “1988 Seoul,” in *Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement*, eds. John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004), 217.

³¹ James F. Larson and Heung-Soo Park, *Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 159.

³² Fidel Castro to Juan Antonio Samaranch, November 29, 1984, International Olympic Committee Archives.

³³ Palenski, 219.

arrangements.³⁴ As they were blockaded by 60,000 police officers, thirteen of their North Korean counterparts, shown in a broadcast monitored by Tokyo, waited in vain after walking to Panmunjom “with garlands around their necks [...] along roads lined with cheering people.”³⁵ Much of the unrest against the military regime, however, had by then quelled for the time being. Under the pressure of mass protests that risked the security of the Olympic Games, the government earlier announced a new program of political reforms and held direct elections for the presidency; Roh Tae-woo, who previously presided over the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, won the election.³⁶ A few student rallies aside, Seoul largely made good on its assurance to the IOC that “Korea is a country with social stability” and that no political meeting or demonstration would take place in the vicinity of Olympic events.³⁷

The Olympic Games have long been sought as a platform for enacting sovereignty where recognition is in other circumstances denied—for performing “as if,” in Dayan and Katz’s phrasing; under the governance of the IOC, the National Olympic Committee of Palestine has, officially, equivalent status with every other National Olympic Committee, as do the U.S. territories of Guam and Puerto Rico. Conversely, many of those who opposed the “half Olympics” in Seoul believed that having the Olympics on just one side of the armistice line would only further permanently entrench the division of the peninsula by outside powers. The dream of sharing the Olympic stage would go unrealized, but the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games

³⁴ Han Sung-Joo, “South Korea in 1988: A Revolution in the Making,” *Asian Survey* 29, no. 1 (January 1989): 33.

³⁵ Susan Chira, “Marches for Reunification Are Halted by South Korea,” June 11, 1988, *New York Times*, 3.

³⁶ Larson and Park, 162.

³⁷ Seoul Metropolitan Government, *Responses to Questionnaires for the Games of the XXIV Olympiad*, 1981, International Olympic Committee Archives, E-4.

nonetheless illustrated Dayan and Katz's observation about the capacity of media events to prefigure an unfulfilled but desired state of things through the affordances of the television medium. Although South Korea had no diplomatic relations with any of the world's communist nations—most of which refused to attend the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles in response to the U.S.-led boycott of Moscow four years earlier—160 nations, including 24 which had no formal diplomatic ties with South Korea, participated in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.³⁸

Watched by an estimated global audience of 650 million,³⁹ over 8,000 athletes, including about 500 from the USSR, marched together in the Parade of Nations. The day before the opening ceremony, in a speech delivered in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called for a reduction of hostilities on the peninsula, along with increased trade with South Korea; and for the duration of the Olympic Games, the enormous *Mikhael Sholokhov* that housed Soviet athletes and officials was permitted to dock at the port of Incheon—where U.S. General Douglas MacArthur's flotilla landed during the Korean War 38 years earlier—while South Korea's national flag carrier was granted permission to fly through Soviet airspace.⁴⁰ A large delegation of Chinese athletes also competed, which, as Xiaobing Li writes, “totally eclipsed North Korea's absence from the games and was the first tangible success for South Korea's persistent pursuit of non-political contacts with China.”⁴¹ Afterwards, South Korea eagerly provided technical, financial, and organizational assistance to China as it prepared to host the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing and sought a bid for the 2000 Summer Olympic

³⁸ Larson and Park, 172.

³⁹ Larson and Park, 8.

⁴⁰ Larson and Park, 174 – 175.

⁴¹ Xiaobing Li, *The Cold War in East Asia* (Routledge: New York, 2018), 176.

Games.⁴² Increased exchange between South Korea and China, like various other inter-Asian linkages discussed throughout this dissertation, was based on the logic of complementarity, both economic and cultural, that “one country, China, possessed energy and resources while the other country, Korea, could provide technology and capital investment.”⁴³ In 1990, South Korea’s bilateral trade with eastern bloc countries and China reached \$5 billion, at an annual growth rate of over 23%.⁴⁴

President Roh Tae-woo’s “northern policy” to expand economic ties with nations friendly to North Korea—with the end goal of reuniting the divided peninsula under conditions favorable to the South—was aggressively reinforced by IOC President Samaranch himself; as sports historian Ron Palenski notes, the IOC’s selection of Seoul for 1988 “set Samaranch on a seven-year course of diplomatic shuttling rivaled in its air miles only by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as he sought to avert yet another boycott or any other event that could disrupt or demean the first of his Games.”⁴⁵ It is important to note that the program of reforms associated with Roh’s presidency did not resolve but only deferred many of South Korea’s central political issues until after the Olympic Games so as to not interfere with them. Dayan and Katz’s taxonomy points out that, across geopolitical contexts, media events are often conciliatory in tone, coupled with the language and aura of metamorphosis—a dynamic evident in both al-Sadat’s visit to Israel and the KBS telethon. Their examples of conciliatory media ceremonies suggest that media events of a transformative character also tend to possess a “restorative

⁴² Larson and Park, 185.

⁴³ Larson and Park, 175.

⁴⁴ Li, 177.

⁴⁵ Palenski, 218.

dimension,” less a total geopolitical shift than the ostensible course correction of a previously disturbed path.⁴⁶

In some cases, however, this course correction paradoxically reconditions or endorses the status quo. It is this feature of the media event genre that perhaps best describes the domestic situation underpinning the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The success of a well-organized Olympics under South Korea’s popularly elected president was at the same time undercut by Roh’s political and military lineage, to which his immediate predecessor Chun Doo-hwan also belonged; both would later be convicted and imprisoned, then pardoned, for embezzlement and mutiny. National assembly hearings on the 1980 state massacre of civilian protestors in Gwangju, under Chun’s military government, were postponed until two months after the Olympic Games. Although the KBS broadcasts of the hearings did not attract a large global audience, they received record domestic viewership numbers, surpassing that of the opening ceremony.⁴⁷ As Katz came to write, the diplomatic miracles suggested by media events were indeed fleeting. Park Geun-hye, daughter of the military dictator assassinated in 1979, assumed the South Korean presidency in 2013—only after her impeachment would some version of the shared Games on the peninsula be realized, as North and South Korean athletes marched together in the Parade of Nations under the Korean Reunification Flag during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in 2018.

⁴⁶ Dayan and Katz, 182.

⁴⁷ Larson and Park, 163.

Olympic infrastructure in global Asia

Like other Olympic Games, the broadcasts of the 1988 Seoul Olympics were framed by a sweeping set of urban infrastructural improvements to the host city, some visible to the television audience, others less so; in addition to the construction of a new Olympic stadium, new transit lines, and a new international airport terminal, preparation projects included beautification efforts along railways, the greenhouse production of western vegetables, and the conversion of traditional toilets to flush toilets.⁴⁸ The opening ceremony, satellite broadcast to a record number of nations with 160 National Olympic Committees in attendance, began outside the stadium with a boat parade cruising along the fabled Han River, which had recently been the target of a costly flood control and environmental cleanup campaign.⁴⁹ In his study of Olympic Games and world's fairs, Maurice Roche notes the “techno-rationalist” undercurrents of such international “mega-events,” large-scale processes of spectacle making and urban refashioning that drive cities and host nations into new phases of modernity⁵⁰—not through a prefigurative acting “as if,” but by conjuring the future through the material transformation of the present. At the same time that these events propel integration with new mass communications technologies for the documentation and publicity of athletic, technological, and artistic aptitude, they also often function as inaugural showcases for some of these same technologies. This includes the premiere of live television to the U.S. and global public at the 1939 World's Fair in New York City, and the completion of the TRANSPAC-1 undersea cable and the launch of the SYNCOM 3 satellite

⁴⁸ Larson and Park, 153 – 155.

⁴⁹ “You Can't Tell the Olympians Without a Satellite Network,” *New York Times*, September 19, 1988, 14.

⁵⁰ Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000), 9.

in 1964, which, as will be discussed in greater detail in another chapter, telecast the Tokyo Olympic Games later that October.

The hosting of large-scale events furthermore reforms mobility to and within cities through major infrastructural improvements to the experience of travel—although these enhancements, of course, do not benefit all users equally⁵¹—in the form of new subway systems and local and regional thoroughfares, not to mention new international airports. In preparation for the 1964 Olympic Games, Tokyo constructed new highways, a new monorail connecting Haneda Airport with the city center, and the first leg of the high-speed Shinkansen bullet train, which expedited the six-hour train ride on the older Tokaido Main Line from Tokyo to Osaka to less than four. Beijing similarly invested heavily in the city’s transit infrastructure ahead of the 2008 Olympic Games, elongating the city’s municipal rapid transit system by hundreds of kilometers and a half dozen new lines and opening a new international terminal at Beijing Capital International Airport. Olympic sprawl expands on top of and throughout existing urban and surrounding landscapes, to accommodate ceremonial green spaces, ever-growing Olympic programs, ancillary activities and exhibitions, and hundreds of thousands of domestic and overseas visitors. As a form of transnational public culture that thus also entails a “local-level urban dimension” to their ritualized visibility, the staging of the Olympic Games are engines of and/or justification for technological and infrastructural transformation, actualized through negotiations between participating nations, partnerships between public and private enterprise, and financial and operational coordination between host cities and their respective nations⁵² (although the political utility of the Olympic Games is often national in scope, the IOC awards

⁵¹ Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” *Daedalus* 109, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 124.

⁵² Roche, 139.

the Olympics to individual cities, not nations). Infrastructure involves a confluence of tangible and intangible phenomena, producing as much an ecology of experiences and affects as it provides a set of functions, where the most striking architectural compositions sometimes stand in for the everyday functioning of the most ordinary or unseen infrastructures, like wastewater treatment systems or networking protocols.

Within this urban stagecraft, the Olympic Games are heavily documented and mediated—by most, they are experienced second- and thirdhand, as narrative, sound, and image. Media infrastructures are distribution channels that undergird communications networks and facilitate the transmission of the media event itself, but the development of media and non-media infrastructures are in many ways inextricable. As Tung-Hui Hu and others have shown, newer media networks are frequently grafted onto and territorialized by the cartographic logic of older infrastructural pathways, such as railways and sewers;⁵³ the imperial logic of submarine cables, for instance, originally laid to connect British colonies, resurges in the new technology of the cloud and the global fiber-optic infrastructure that supports it. In addition to the boom of aesthetically cosmopolitan physical spaces, the expansion of these kinds of new media infrastructures also makes possible the mediation and audiovisual circulation of mega-events and the networked cityscapes and architectural and infrastructural environments that frame them. Such media infrastructures are in and of themselves framing devices in a different sense, by constructing the sensorial experience of Olympic spaces and events through novel and ever-interactive media technologies. Dayan and Katz's periodization links the Olympic Games as a media event with the medium of television in the age of public broadcasting, but throughout the

⁵³ Tung-Hui Hu, *A Prehistory of the Cloud* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 90.

history of the modern Olympic Games, these have ranged from print and public outdoor radio speakers to mobile livestreaming.

Circulations of the “economic miracles” of Asia under the Olympic spotlight contribute to the positioning of the region as the new “sociocultural vanguard of global futures and global geographies.”⁵⁴ As Doreen Massey describes, discourses about modernity are regulated by the subordination of the spatial dimension to the temporal, in which “spatial difference [is] convened into temporal sequence.”⁵⁵ Similarly, Edward Said, using the writings of novelists, travelers, colonial administrators, and other orientalists (a category including “anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient—and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist—either in its specific or general aspects”⁵⁶), describes the production of the orient/occident binary as a set of “radical and ineradicable” distinctions structured around the “pastness” of the orient;⁵⁷ in Said’s words, “Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’).”⁵⁸ Although framed within the rise of “global Asia” or the “Asian century,”⁵⁹ comparisons between the Tokyo, Seoul, and later Beijing Olympic Games nonetheless flatten their historical and cultural specificities—as well as

⁵⁴ Tina Chen and Eric Hayot “Introducing Verge: What Does It Mean to Study Global Asias?” *Verge: Studies in Global Asias* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2015): vi.

⁵⁵ Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage, 2005), 68.

⁵⁶ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguins, 1978), 2.

⁵⁷ Said, 233.

⁵⁸ Said, 43.

⁵⁹ Nicola Spakowski, “Asia as Future: The Claims and Rhetoric of an Asian Century,” in *Asianisms: Regionalist Interactions and Asian Integration*,” eds. Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), 210.

their interconnections—while at the same time ordering nations along a timescale that then suggests their anomaly and belated arrival.

When the IOC awarded the 2008 Summer Olympic Games to Beijing in July 2001, commentators drew comparisons between China and South Korea, suggesting that the hosting of the Olympic Games in Beijing would, like it had for Seoul, instill stability, diplomatic generosity, and democratic progress in the country and the broader region; these maneuvers—flattening and ordering—however dismiss “the fact that Asia has been present in the world-making project of history and human life from the very beginning.”⁶⁰ Undoubtedly, however, there is some legitimate logic to these comparisons beyond an orientalist predisposition on the part of commentators. Despite the universalist logic of the Olympic movement, certain geographical assumptions are ingrained into Olympic ritual and convention: most have taken place in Europe and North America, and very few in the southern hemisphere—after all, any city in the southern hemisphere that hosts the Summer Olympic Games would likely be doing so during its meteorological winter, and vice versa. In response to the IOC’s eurocentric worldview, Olympic organizers in Asia have often deliberately embraced an “east-meets-west” hybridity to position Asia as the teleological destiny of the Olympic movement—a set of discursive strategies first articulated by the Tokyo municipal government in the bid for the 1940 Olympic Games.

1940

Since the reincarnation of the Olympic Games at the turn of the twentieth century, the inclusion of Asia within the modern Olympic movement—as IOC members, participating

⁶⁰ Chen and Hayot, vi.

nations, and host cities—has shaped and been shaped in relation to the “universalist” Olympic ideals of internationalism, pacifism, and the separation of sports and politics. Charles Pierre de Frédy, Baron de Coubertin, French aristocrat and Hellenophile, established the revivalist IOC in 1894, cobbled together from his motley connections to education reformers and administrators, diplomats and civil servants, military officers, sporting associations, universities, and provincial and local athletic competitions across Europe and North America. Despite the western genesis of the IOC and the modern Olympic Games, the presence of Asian athletes and the eventual staging of the Olympic Games in Asia became, for the IOC, of critical importance in realizing the movement’s claims to universalism—a universalism that the IOC held as nonpolitical. At the same time, as sports historian David Goldblatt puts it, despite Coubertin and the IOC’s insistence of the separation of sports and politics, “Olympia was always a place in which political capital could be generated and traded. As Coubertin was to find out, it would be no different in the modern world; indeed, these features of the games would be amplified and magnified many times over.”⁶¹ Whether 1940 or 1964, the ostensibly nonpolitical character of the Olympic Games was an ideal platform for Japan’s political priorities, whether using the mega-event to ease censure of Japan’s expansionist activities in China and promote its vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940, or to debut Japan’s postwar transformation into under the tutelage of U.S. occupation in 1964.⁶² In Jessamyn R. Abel’s words, “essential to the success of

⁶¹ David Goldblatt, *The Games: A Global History of the Olympics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 19.

⁶² Jessamyn R. Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933-1964* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015), 140 – 141.

Olympic diplomacy is the highly promoted fiction that sports are entirely separate from politics. The myth that the Games were apolitical in fact facilitated their political use.”⁶³

Beyond dramaturgy, the political use of infrastructure has been equally vital to the staging of the modern Olympic Games. As Roche argues, “the national and international ‘ecology of great events’—festivals which are simultaneously charismatic spectacles, products of rational calculation, and ‘functional’ social rituals—has helped to structure the (social) space and time of modernity at the national and international levels.”⁶⁴ Leaving long-lasting, if not always predictable unpredictable, material and imagined imprints on their host cities, “mega-events uniquely, if transiently, identify particular urban and national places in the national, international and global spaces of media and tourist markets and the gaze of their consumers.”⁶⁵ The Olympic Games occasion both physical and “soft” infrastructural changes to the cityscape designed to intensify global economic coordination through attracting new commercial partnerships and remittances; in reference to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Christopher J. Finlay identifies a “new Olympic internationalism” that “positions the Games as a vehicle for negotiating the norms, aspirations, and roles of [...] global actors as they interact in an increasingly interdependent world.”⁶⁶ This new Olympic internationalism suggests the dominance of a new diplomacy predicated less on military force than on global economic integration, interdependence, and exchange—consider, for instance, the transformation of Beijing’s Factory

⁶³ Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933-1964*, 109.

⁶⁴ Roche, 7.

⁶⁵ Roche, 7.

⁶⁶ Christopher J. Finlay, “Toward the Future: The New Olympic Internationalism,” in *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, eds. Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 376.

798, a former state-owned weapons components factory, into a haven of international contemporary art promoted as an official tourist destination during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games—but it is not without latent continuities with the more patently militarized affairs of Olympic Games past.

In *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception*, Paul Virilio recounts Third Reich architect Albert Speer's role during the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games in "constructing the 'real' sets for [Hitler's] political superproduction," after which he was appointed "planner-in-chief of the total war."⁶⁷ Speer, who assisted in the restoration of the Olympiastadion for the Berlin Games, is described by Virilio as having "a cinematic function similar to that of the military commander—namely, the capacity to determine in a building *what is permanent and what is impermanent*" (an observation perhaps similarly apt in describing the infrastructural upheaval and displacement that would afflict subsequent Olympic cities).⁶⁸ The formal innovations and wide circulation of Leni Riefenstahl's 1938 film *Olympia* would also shape both future Olympic media and future Olympic rituals, sanctifying the Nazi pageantry of the torch relay as a permanent Olympic practice. The planning of the Olympic relay for the "non-event" of the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games prompted intense disagreement over the most ideal route. Carl Diem, who oversaw the Organizing Committee of the Berlin Olympic Games, drafted for Tokyo a relay route loosely based on the ancient Silk Road, winding from Olympia through Athens, Istanbul, Tehran, Delhi, Hanoi, Guangzhou, and Seoul to Tokyo. Japan's expansionist activities, however, made terrestrial travel through China politically and logistically challenging, leading to several alternate relay proposals, including one in which kamikaze pilots would fly the Olympic flame

⁶⁷ Paul Virilio, *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception*, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 1989), 69.

⁶⁸ Virilio, 70.

from Olympia to Tokyo.⁶⁹ As a later chapter will show, when Tokyo finally organized the Olympic Games in 1964, the relay was instead designed to map Japan's newfound goodwill with some of its formerly occupied territories, nations now on the receiving end of Japanese technical assistance and reparations following the end of the Second World War.

Despite initial domestic opposition to Tokyo's bid for the 1940 Olympics, Tokyo officials quickly won support from government officials and Emperor Hirohito, and the municipal bid campaign was thus transformed into a national and imperial project, a form of "people's diplomacy" to compensate its withdrawal from the League of Nations and other official diplomatic channels.⁷⁰ Although they were critical of the extravagance of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Tokyo Olympic organizers believed that "holding the 1940 Games in Tokyo could have a similar effect on attitudes toward Japanese activities in Asia by creating an impression of Japan as the natural leader of Asia."⁷¹ Wielding Olympic internationalism for imperialist ends, both 1936 and 1940 tested the official separation of sports and politics. During the bidding process, Japan controversially negotiated directly with Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, circumventing the IOC, to withdraw Rome's bid for the same year. German and Italian IOC members strongly advocated for the success of the Tokyo bid, in what Collins argues "became one of the first concrete linkages among the nations of the future Axis coalition";⁷² in the process, what began under the guise of a people's diplomacy recohered into official channels.

⁶⁹ Sandra Collins, *The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 130 - 131.

⁷⁰ Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan's Global Engagement, 1933-1964*, 110 - 111.

⁷¹ Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan's Global Engagement, 1933-1964*, 123.

⁷² Collins, *The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics*, 156.

Infrastructurally, the unbuilt legacies of the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games chart what would or might have been Japan's reintegration into the international system, following its exit from the League of Nations in 1933, over the recommendation from the League that Japanese-occupied Manchuria be restored to Chinese sovereignty. Preparation plans for the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games recorded efforts to leverage the international gathering to advance imperial Japan's diplomatic agenda, for example, in the dispatch of foreign announcers, commentators, and reporters;⁷³ broadcasting, telephone, and telegraph connections to over two dozen nations;⁷⁴ and National Olympic Committee negotiations with steamship companies for fare reductions and subsidies for travelers from all continents.⁷⁵ Abel argues that the departure was not a rejection of internationalism in Japan but instead reconceptualized it in practice, as Japan turned to new channels to avoid diplomatic isolation, at the same time it was militarily consolidating Japanese control in the region within the framework of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁷⁶ The concept, and the lingering legacy of Japan's past imperial ambitions, continues to shape regional interactions and exchange; as Kuang-Hsing Chen writes, "whenever an alliance in the region is proposed, there are objections that it would be a reproduction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a charge that has effectively undermined numerous attempts at promoting regional solidarity."⁷⁷

⁷³ Organizing Committee of the XII Olympiad, 99.

⁷⁴ Organizing Committee of the XII Olympiad, 98.

⁷⁵ Organizing Committee of the XII Olympiad, 92.

⁷⁶ Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan's Global Engagement, 1933-1964*, 26.

⁷⁷ Kuang-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 120.

By aligning the hosting of the 1940 Olympic Games with the 2,600th anniversary of the mythological founding of Japan by the Emperor Jimmu, Sandra Collin writes, “citizens of the expanding Japanese empire were invited to re-enact the imperial founding as being tied to the creation of the new order in Asia.”⁷⁸ As R. John Williams has argued, orientalist conceptions of Asia have sometimes envisioned the region as a more therapeutic and more organic means of living alongside new technologies, a formulation of “Asia-as-technê” (returned to the Greek etymological origins of “technology”) that reconciles technical knowledge with art and craft; in other words, philosophies and iconographies associated with the east become part of “a compelling fantasy that would posit Eastern aesthetics as both the antidote to and the perfection of machine culture.”⁷⁹ In their bid for the 1940 Olympics, organizers positioned Tokyo as the “sports center of the orient,” the most modern and therefore most appropriate city in Asia to realize Olympic movement’s claims to geographical and cultural universalism:

Opened but 60 years to Western civilization, much of the old remains. There are sharp and interesting contrasts. For this reason, if for no other, the world is interested in Japan. To set the Twelfth Olympiad against this background of a civilization thousands of years old, against the national celebration of the Empire’s 2600th anniversary under a single Imperial Dynasty, would be the lend to the competitions and added interest, a complementary attraction. [...] Tokyo is a modern city, a clean city, a metropolis in Western fashion against the panorama of an age-old civilization.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Collins, *The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics*, 181.

⁷⁹ R. John Williams, *The Buddha in the Machine: Art, Technology, and the Meeting of East and West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 1.

⁸⁰ Tokyo Municipal Office, ii – viii.

Leveraging the internationalism of the Olympic movement and its officially apolitical character, the Tokyo municipal government purposefully embraced the logic of Asia-as-technê, constructing the “new order in Asia” through an east-meets-west and ancient-meets-modern hybridity as still fundamentally harmonious with the existing world system.

In July 1938, Japan forfeited the Tokyo Olympic Games—willingly, contrary to the belief often held that its host city status was retracted by the IOC—to redirect the nation’s resources, manpower, and nationalist convictions towards its protracted war with China and to “embark on a brutal imperialist campaign to ostensibly liberate Asia from the West.”⁸¹ In communicating the decision to cancel the Olympic Games to IOC technical advisor Werner Klineberg, Secretary-General of the Organizing Committee Matsuzo Nagai wrote, “I am exceedingly sorry that you have at this time lost an unprecedented rare occasion to sow the seeds of Olympism in the fertile soil of the Orient.”⁸² Even Japan’s forfeiture is framed as a loss to the IOC, Tokyo still foreordained as the city which would substantiate the universalism of the Olympoc project in spite of the forfeiture. After the Second World War, the Japanese pavilion at the 1964 – 1965 New York World’s Fair continued to incorporate a stylized Asia-as-technê as part of Japan’s “tightrope act” to promote homegrown technological developments without eliciting anxieties about its remilitarization or its technological successes vis-à-vis U.S. competitiveness;⁸³ rocket displays, for example, were juxtaposed with exoticized images of

⁸¹ Sandra Collins, “The Fragility of Asian National Identity in the Olympic Games,” in *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, eds. Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan (Ann Arbor: university of Michigan Press, 2008), 189.

⁸² Matsuzo Nagai to Werner Klineberg, August 4, 1938, International Olympic Committee Archives.

⁸³ Jessamyn R. Abel, “Technologies of Cold War Diplomacy: Transforming Postwar Japan,” *Society for the History of Technology* 62, no. 1 (2021): 131.

traditional culture expected by visitors, such as gardens, palaces, restaurant facilities with tatami seating and hostesses dressed in kimonos, and performances of judo and tea ceremonies.⁸⁴ The success of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, similarly showcasing Japan's technological competency through the therapeutic logic of east-meets-west hybridity, set the discursive and aesthetic precedents later reproduced and updated by Seoul and Beijing. The history of empire underwrites the production of the later Olympic Games in Asia, not only configuring their thematic sensibilities, but also in their functions as part of broader processes of regional and international integration.

⁸⁴ Abel, "Technologies of Cold War Diplomacy: Transforming Postwar Japan," 134.

CHAPTER 2: Cables and Railways at the Precipice of the Information Age (1964)

2:00pm in Japan Standard Time is 7:00am in Sarajevo, 1:00am in Montreal, and 11:00pm the evening prior in Salt Lake City. Differences between time zones impeded synchronous viewing and made cinematic documentation of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games as important as ever, despite plans for greater-than-ever real-time coverage. The Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee (TOOC) appointed director Kon Ichikawa for the task. The result was a stylistically eclectic and technologically innovative documentary production, the first official Olympic film to not only be shot in color but to use widescreen CinemaScope lenses and stereophonic sound.¹ The first few minutes of *Tokyo Olympiad* cut from the forceful collision of a wrecking ball against monotonous, dilapidated residential buildings, to images of a new Tokyo: layers of powerlines and tramways; the suspended, curved rooftop slant of Kenzo Tange's Yoyogi National Gymnasium, an early Metabolist example of biomimetic design. These opening moments then rewind in time to Olympia for the ceremonial lighting of the Olympic torch; the documentary narrates forward the history of the modern Olympic Games, placing Tokyo within the elite lineage of Olympic cities, and unfurls from drab hues of gray into vibrant Technicolor—from Hellenic antiquity into the colorful modernity of postwar Japan.

The sequence is bookended by two lingering shots of a hot orange-red sun, suggestive of Japan's national ensign. From there, the torch relay makes its way back across the continent, using a roundabout route that bypasses the People's Republic of China and the Korean peninsula

¹ Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, *The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964: The Official Report of the Organizing Committee*, 1964, International Olympic Committee Archives, 479.

through British Hong Kong and Taipei.² On-location footage of the torch relay alternates with shots of foreign delegations landing at Tokyo International Airport, including one of the United States delegation disembarking an iconic Pan Am jet. Also called Haneda Airport, Tokyo International Airport was newly connected to the city center by the Tokyo Monorail; the elevated, straddle-beam line began operations just in time for the Olympic Games, coinciding also with the end of travel restrictions for outbound Japanese tourists for the first time in over twenty years.³ A little later, relay runners traverse the base of a snow-capped Mount Fuji, cloud of smoke trailing the Olympic flame, in a shot compositionally homologous with now-famous photographs of the Shinkansen bullet train passing the foot of the volcano.⁴ Infrastructural projects raced against the arrival of the Olympic torch. Like the monorail, the Tokaido Shinkansen was completed only weeks before the Olympic Games began, holding its first high-speed test run between Tokyo and Osaka at the same time that the relay passed through Lebanon and Iran.⁵ The line officially opened to the public nine days before the opening ceremony. Cutting between the relay and the National Stadium, Greece, representing the birthplace of the Olympic Games, leads the procession in the Parade of Nations, while the athletes of the host nation appear last. The final convergence of these two arrivals at the National Stadium in Shinjuku City—the Olympic flame in the final leg of the torch relay and the delegations in the

² Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 247.

³ Emerson Chapin, “D-Day for Japanese Tourist,” *New York Times*, February 9, 1964, XX1.

⁴ Christopher Hood, *Shinkansen: From Bullet Train to Symbol of Modern Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 58.

⁵ Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 247.

Parade of Nations—is seamlessly synchronized for the camera, legible only through the use of crosscutting in media reproductions.

After the opening ceremony and the lighting of the Olympic cauldron, *Tokyo Olympiad* returns to the streets of Tokyo only a few times, including the road cycling and racewalking events, before the marathon. During the marathon, traditionally the last event of the athletics competition, viewers are finally guided by the long-distance runners, after they circle and exit the arena, in a frenetic 42-kilometer tour of the reconstructed capital city. Ichikawa’s directorial style is often described in terms of restraint and detail. Accordingly, the documentary is an understated tapestry of Japan’s postwar rehabilitation, urbanization, and technological development—and its burgeoning technocracy. Little of the rebuilt city is shown, in favor of a compilation of formally idiosyncratic and sometimes comedic vignettes of the fifteen days of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. (For instance, during the opening ceremony, doves are released over the National Stadium, a more-or-less obligatory motif of Olympic opening ceremonies that recalls the ancient tradition of the Olympic truce. As flocks take off overhead, the athletes brace themselves uneasily, as if suddenly in the world of Alfred Hitchcock’s avian thriller.) The 10,000 plus feet of film footage captured of the cityscape was edited down to just over 200—that is, under three minutes of running time.⁶ Nonetheless, signifiers of urban change and technical expertise are everywhere in the film, both in substance and in terms of the production process, as the documentary itself was a major technological achievement and financial investment. The National Olympic Committee spent 80.3 million yen (over \$200,000 USD) on film equipment, including 163 camera lenses with focal lengths ranging from 35mm to 2000mm.⁷

⁶ Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 482.

⁷ Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 481.

Sometimes called the “scientific Games” or “science fiction Games,” the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games forecasted shifting associations of the Japanese nation with technology, both at home and abroad—during this time, mainly in the form of consumer electronics but also larger-scale infrastructural developments like the Shinkansen. Over the next few decades, the growth of these light and heavy industries under technocratic governance would recondition the terms and character of Japan’s relationship with its postwar mentors, where protectionist sensibilities and what David Morley and Kevin Robin described as “Japan panic”—the feeling that Japan had beat the west at its own game—would soon arise, a major factor in motivating deeper economic integration within the region.⁸ But for the time being, the Olympic Games encapsulated the economic and technological miracle of a demilitarized and reconstructed Japan. As sports writer David Goldblatt describes in his global history of the modern Olympics, “Tokyo was cast in concrete, but it was mapped and measured, collated and recorded with electronics.”⁹ These new infrastructures and technologies were colossal and minute in scale, sometimes spectacular and other times inconspicuous; many of these achievements—from computerized measuring devices to electronic music, color television to a new municipal sewage system—were memorialized by *Tokyo Olympiad* and other domestic and foreign popular cultural representations of the event. A sequence of the stadium press center in the documentary showcases the global networking of the event through new electronic and telecommunications technologies. Press delegates—whose speedy movements are captured and sequenced as if also in competition—relay scores and updates electronically in Arabic, Hangul, and more; the IBM data center located just below the

⁸ David Morley and Kevin Robins, *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 159.

⁹ David Goldblatt, *The Games: A Global History of the Olympics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 255.

press center powered their low latency reporting, where events and results were managed and recorded through state-of-the-art computer technology.

Many of these postwar transformations, from the Shinkansen to common household electrification, were funded through World Bank loans. According to Jessamyn R. Abel, this signaled “another way in which postwar Japan was deeply embedded in the international system—the very symbol of its modern technology was funded in large part by an international development organization.”¹⁰ The Tokyo Olympic Games were a proxy for the many ways in which Japan reintegrated into the international system, from the bonds of external debt to entry into intergovernmental organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED), and rehabilitated relationships not only with western powers but also some of its former colonies. As I will demonstrate throughout this chapter, however, concurrent with this high-tech national reinvention was a technophobic postwar identity shaped by a collective identification with the logic of nuclear victimhood.

The Tokyo Olympic Games coincided with another major world event. Six days into the Olympic Games, the People’s Republic of China test detonated its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964. At the exact time that Japan became the first Asian nation to host the Olympics, China became the first in Asia to be nuclear-armed. Both accomplishments were projects of national significance spanning just under a decade. After the 50th Session of the IOC in 1955, at which Tokyo came in last place in the bidding process for the 1960 Olympic Games, the Japanese National Olympic Committee regrouped towards a stronger bid for the 1964 event. Meanwhile, China embarked in the same year on a mission to develop its own nuclear arsenal as part of its

¹⁰ Jessamyn R. Abel, *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933-1964* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015), 163.

“Two Bombs, One Satellite” program—to produce a nuclear bomb, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICMB), and an artificial satellite—in a quest for security and greater self-reliance.

In the days after October 16, newspapers across Japan, from the major national *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* publications to the leading English-language *Japan Times*, shifted from page after page of Olympic news to front page coverage of the nuclear test. Headlines during that week piece together what might have felt like an exceptionally dense week of world events, as athletic competitions continued on: the abrupt ouster of Nikita Khrushchev as the leader of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR;¹¹ the Labour Party’s slim victory in the United Kingdom general election over incumbent Conservatives; and China’s nuclear test,¹² codenamed Project 596, which drove immediate concerns that nuclear fallout might impact the Japanese archipelago in the middle of a large-scale international gathering. Fortunately, Japanese newspapers ultimately reported that increased radioactivity levels from the test, which took place in the far-west autonomous region of Xinjiang at the Lop Nur Test Base, detected by Geiger counters fell below the “danger mark.”¹³

In this chapter, I follow two threads of this complex Cold War web of world events to examine the technocratic pursuits of postwar Japan and the People’s Republic of China: the hosting of the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games and the successful detonation of Project 596. Reading the Olympics as primarily a media event—as Olympic scholarship within media studies has most often done—invites an understanding of the two occasions as a spectacle of geopolitical strain, embodying conflicting orientations towards internationalism and conflicting

¹¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 16, 1964, 1.

¹² “中国ついに核実験,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 17, 1964, 1.

¹³ “Radioactive Fallout Under Danger Mark,” *Japan Times*, October 21, 1964, 1.

ideas about what it means to become or to be seen as a world power. Of course, geopolitical hostility is a self-evident historical fact of the Cold War era. Without dismissing the power of spectacle and symbolism, especially in the context of the Olympic Games, however, I supplement such dramaturgical conclusions with an infrastructural angle by looking at Project 596 along with a selection of new technologies associated with the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Games, including the TRANSPAC-1 undersea cable (TPC-1) and the Tokaido Shinkansen; for the purposes of this chapter, I consider the latter as an example of media infrastructure within the emerging “information society” of postwar Japan. In both cases, these national projects that privileged technical expertise and steered in large part by a new emerging class of technical experts. Through a range of textual artifacts—including newspapers, IOC reports, policy and intelligence documents, science journalism, and scientific writing—I use infrastructure as a lens to extract latent technocratic compatibilities between Japan and China to make better sense of the process of diplomatic normalization over the next decade, during and after which the exchange of technical and infrastructural expertise would become a cornerstone of bilateral relations between the two nations.

Technocracy is an often imprecisely defined and used concept—and at times, levied pejoratively—but definitions commonly coalesce around the privileging of technical expertise in the administration of state policy. Miguel Angel Centeno offers a definition for technocratic governance intended to be translatable across disparate political and ideological systems:

[...] *The administrative and political domination of a society by a state elite and allied institutions that seek to impose a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of instrumentally rational techniques.* The definition is an ideal type. Ideal types are logically controlled, precise, and unambiguous conceptions of certain historical

realities, but are often removed from the specifics of empirical cases. [...] It is more productive to view technocracy as a continuum than as a phenomenon that either is or is not present.¹⁴

The infrastructural and technological histories narrated in this chapter, based on Centeno's continuum, outline nascent instances of technocratic policymaking in the midcentury Cold War environment. It is largely outside of the scope of this project to discuss the extent to which "technocrats" in either place have since succeeded in the administration of "a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of instrumentally rational techniques," although it is significant and relevant that, since the 1970s, scientists and engineers have disproportionately made up the ranks of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership and leadership.¹⁵ In any case, the export of technical know-how—from rail technology to airport architecture, which will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter—continues to be integral to the diplomatic agendas of both Japan and China.

Remapping and relaying postwar Japan

The timing of China's nuclear test is occasionally mentioned in passing in historiographical accounts of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, whether scholarly or popular, but seldom discussed in greater detail. Historian Paul Droubie, using a media events methodology in the style of Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, includes a short paragraph referencing Project 596 in

¹⁴ Miguel Angel Centeno, "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy," *Theory and Society* 22, no. 3 (June 1993): 314.

¹⁵ Joel Andreas, *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 242.

his study of the Tokyo Olympics. In it, he interprets the nuclear test as an opportunistic decision to leverage the intensified international attention afforded to Asia during the Olympic Games, something that China alone would not be able to generate:

An even greater threat emerged when the People's Republic of China detonated their first nuclear weapon on October 16, 1964, during the Olympiad itself. Undoubtedly, this was intentional as the PRC's athletes were disbarred from the Olympics and so they had nothing to lose. In addition, in a day and age when few newspapers or TV stations had overseas bureaus, the Tokyo Games represented an unprecedented media event in Asia, especially given that these Olympics were being broadcast live via satellite and in colour, all for the first time. China was guaranteed a global audience and more attention than would have been possible otherwise.¹⁶

The brevity of this analysis sidesteps some necessary context. It is true that Chinese athletes were excluded from the 1964 Olympic Games, due to their participation in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in Jakarta, Indonesia in November 1963. Indonesian President Sukarno planned GANEFO as an alternative to the Olympics, in response to the suspension of the Indonesian Olympic Committee by the IOC after organizers rejected Israeli and Taiwanese athletes from the 1962 Asian Games in Jakarta. Much of the pressure to enforce eligibility rules for the Tokyo Olympic Games, however, came directly from IOC President Avery Brundage himself, because of the perceived threat GANEFO posed to the reputation and the universalism of the Olympic movement, not due to direct ill will between any host and participating nations. Japan had, in fact, also sent competitors to GANEFO—but they were not “Olympic caliber”

¹⁶ Paul Droubie, “Phoenix Arisen: Japan as Peaceful Internationalist at the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 28, no. 16 (November 2011): 2312.

athletes and therefore somewhat less of a problem for Brundage—while Japanese officials attempted, unsuccessfully, to reinstate Indonesia to the IOC.¹⁷ It is also difficult to conclude that the scheduling of Project 596 was a premeditated disruption or cooptation of the Tokyo Olympic Games—progress on the ICBM and winter weather conditions were important considerations¹⁸--but the degree to which the Olympic Games were part of the calculus, if at all, is unclear. Regardless of whether China intended the test detonation as any sort of special threat to the Olympic Games, however, nuclear trauma did shape much of the affective landscape of 1964 Tokyo, as Droubie also describes, and formed a rich ideological environment for postwar Japan to reconceive itself as a peaceful internationalist—and a victim of the Second World War.¹⁹

The 1964 Tokyo Olympics marked Japan's postwar rehabilitation through this reversal, contingent on its embrace of capitalist reforms under the tutelage of US occupation. This instrumentalization of the Olympic platform was in no way unique to Japan. Between 1948 and 1972, every nation that lost the opportunity to host the Olympics due to war was reselected for another cycle of the Olympic Games by the IOC, including each of the three major Axis powers. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the support of German and Italian IOC members for Tokyo's 1940 bid was an early index of the Axis alliance. Postwar, Italy held the 1956 Winter Olympics and 1960 Summer Olympics; Japan the 1964 Summer Olympics and 1972 Winter Olympics; and West Germany the 1972 Summer Olympics—in Munich, given the infeasibility of hosting the Olympics in divided Berlin. As Kay Schiller and Chris Young write, in the aftermath of the

¹⁷ Amanda Shuman, "Elite Competitive Sport in the People's Republic of China 1958 – 1966: The Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEF)," *Journal of Sport History* 40, no. 20 (Summer 2013): 271 – 272.

¹⁸ Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, September 21, 1964, Wilson Center.

¹⁹ Droubie, 2310.

Second World War, the IOC “gradually ushered the defeated nations back to the heart of the international family,” though they note that it was in many ways more challenging for Germany than it was for Italy and Japan to restore its national image, as well as to extricate the 1972 event from the Nazi legacy of the 1936 Berlin Olympics.²⁰

In the case of Japan, the exceptional horror of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the basis for national historical reinvention, dramatized through the torch relay program and the opening ceremony. The domestic leg of the program was split into four different courses—two southbound from Hokkaido and two northbound from Okinawa—covering all four main islands of Japan. *Tokyo Olympiad* carefully documents the relay through Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, a popular “peace tourism” site located in what was prewar Hiroshima’s commercial center.²¹ Aerial shots of Hiroshima were captured by helicopter, courtesy of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The JSDF are a national military in name only, owing to Japan’s postwar constitutional constraints on the sovereign right to wage war,²² but the bird’s-eye perspective of the former city center induces the specter of ruin. Like Yoyogi National Gymnasium, the memorial was designed by the studio of Kenzo Tange, whose Metabolist frameworks involved “a systematic and futuristic approach to urban design that often involved the reorganization of cities on an unprecedented scale.”²³ (Later iterations of Tange’s design

²⁰ Kay Schiller and Chris Young, *The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 56.

²¹ James R. Orr, *The Victim as Hero* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 64.

²² Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 482.

²³ Zhongjie Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 172.

principles regarding the technocratic management of adaptable urban environments would also remake the future skyline of Beijing and surrounding areas in its postmillennial Olympic age.)

Tange's 1960 Plan for Tokyo, for example, reconceptualized urban Tokyo—at the time, a sprawling, unwieldy metropolis whose initial postwar reconstruction was in large part piecemeal and unplanned due to the budgetary constraints of the U.S.-imposed Dodge Line—as a linear, marine megastructure 80 kilometers long across Tokyo Bay. Rather than redressing this unwieldiness by transforming the city into a stable, finished product through the strictures of master planning, the modular, spinal axis of the Tokyo Bay project would form a metabolic cycle that allowed for both outward expansion and internal self-renewal. It was a city for the brink of the information age; as Rem Koolhaas and Hans Ulrich Obrist note in their oral history of the Metabolists, “what Tange's team does not mention is industry: their city is postindustrial, designed for the tertiary sector, a city composed by its flows of communication, information, and road traffic.”²⁴ The 1960 Plan for Tokyo was not realized, but it continues to fascinate as both a blueprint and thought experiment, living on, to name one example, in the ambitious, present-day Saudi plan to build a sustainable, smart city stretching linearly across 170 kilometers of desert to the Red Sea coast.

Nonetheless, Tange was also hardly a techno-optimist, instead intensely concerned about the role of human responsibility in technological advancement, and ambivalent about the generative and destructive power of technocratic governance and design. This ambivalence colors his opening remarks at the 1960 World Design Conference in Tokyo, at which he presented his proposal to create a marine city across Tokyo Bay:

²⁴ Rem Koolhaas and Hans Ulrich Obrist, *Project Japan: Metabolism Talks*, ed. Kayoko Ota and James Westcott (Cologne: Taschen, 2011), 284.

There is no way to predict the future, but I believe we can say this much: the current great exchange is resulting from the development of atomic energy and electronics, and the direction of the change is not toward unregulated expansion of energy, but toward the controlling and planning of its development. Mankind is engaged in a second attempt to gain superiority over scientific techniques.²⁵

After the Second World War, Tange, who had spent part of his adolescence in Hiroshima, won the contest to design and build Peace Memorial Park. The spatial symmetry of Peace Memorial Park is virtually identical to that of his wartime proposal for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Commemorative Building, but the more nationalistic details are replaced with the concrete modernism of Le Corbusier.²⁶ Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park was the project that brought Tange international recognition after its completion in 1954; as Hyunjung Cho writes, “no longer the young architect of unbuilt imperial monuments, he was now the father of postwar Japanese architecture.”²⁷ In this way, Tange was not only the draftsman of a postwar structure of feeling²⁸ to which the logic of nuclear victimhood was fundamental, but was also a beneficiary of this rehabilitation.

This reconciliation, even reversal, of Japan’s national image from defeated imperial aggressor to peaceful internationalist was perhaps best embodied by Yoshinori Sakai, the young

²⁵ Kenzo Tange, “Technology and Humanity,” *Japan Architect* (October 1960): 11 – 12, quoted in Zhongjie Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 173.

²⁶ Hyunjung Cho, “Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the Making of Japanese Postwar Architecture,” *Journal of Architectural Education* 66, no. 1 (October 2012): 77.

²⁷ Hyunjung Cho, “Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the Making of Japanese Postwar Architecture,” *Journal of Architectural Education* 66, no. 1 (October 2012): 77.

²⁸ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 132 – 133.

university student selected to be the final torchbearer in the Olympic relay and to light the Olympic cauldron. Referred to as the “Atomic Boy” in the Japanese and foreign press, Sakai was born just outside of Hiroshima on August 5, 1945, the day the U.S. military detonated the Little Boy atomic bomb over the city. Sakai and the other Japanese relay runners had all been born at the end of or after the Second World War, personifying a national and generational innocence untouched by the burden of wartime responsibility.²⁹ At the same time, the relay route itself maps Japan’s amity with the people and places where it had earlier forced its imperial reach: Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—many of the same nations that the U.S. sought to integrate into its security system, and with whom Japan had begun rebuilding ties either through direct reparations or indirectly through economic cooperation and technical assistance provisions, and in many cases both.³⁰

An NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) World-Japan series, published in the leadup to the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games, recounts the Manila leg of the Olympic torch relay as a milestone in the reconciliation process in the Philippines, a recipient of reparations and Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan. The feature notes that physical damage to the city of Manila was still visible as the torch relay passed through—here a rhetorical testament to the remarkable speed with which the two nations began to rebuild ties—though past conflict between the two is described only vaguely as war, rather than in terms of colonial occupation. The association of a rehabilitated Japan with youth is repeated in a description of Crown Prince Akihito’s diplomatic visit to the country: “And when Japan's Crown Prince Akihito visited the

²⁹ Droubie, 2315.

³⁰ Hiroshi Kan Sato and Akiko Hiratsuka-Sasaki, “Japanese Development Aid and Global Power,” in *Global East Asia: Into the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Frank N. Pieke and Koichi Iwabuchi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021), 53 – 54.

Philippines in 1962, he represented a new kind of Japan—young and vibrant, quite different from the aggressive, militaristic Japan local people knew from the war.”³¹ Trade activity is mentioned as another indicator of healthy bilateral relations and affective goodwill. The article notes that Japanese consumer goods, including cars, had already become a status symbol in the Philippines in the decade since the signing of a reparations treaty in 1956. Japan, during this time, anchored regional economic integration, though it remains up for debate as to whether or not its reparations and “quasi-reparations” economic cooperation programs directly resulted in the increased absorption of Japanese exports throughout former colonies.³² Years later, this same style of bilateral aid from Japan to China would become a crucial resource for the latter’s industrial drive; and eventually, China would mirror this strategy, fashioning itself as a source of technical assistance for others through its own Belt and Road Initiative, a “spatial fix” designed to link “China’s periphery to the broader East Asian economy” through infrastructure partnerships along and beyond the ancient Silk Road trade network.³³

Networking transpacific security

If the torch relay route symbolically mapped the economic and political footprint of Japan and its newfound rapport with formerly occupied territories, the TPC-1 undersea cable materially mapped Japan’s integration across the Pacific Ocean into the Cold War international

³¹ Komata Moshe, “1964 Olympic Legacy: Milestone for Reconciliation in Manila,” *NHK World-Japan*, February 21, 2021, <http://nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/1514/>.

³² Hiroyuki Hoshiro, “Reconsidering Japan’s War Reparations and Economic Re-Entry into Southeast Asia,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 34, no. 4 (2023): 691.

³³ Lindsay Black, “Conflict and Cooperation in Global East Asia,” in *Global East Asia: Into the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Frank N. Pieke and Koichi Iwabuchi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021), 67.

system. In every direction, the infrastructural event of the Olympic Games networked postwar Japan through geographical imaginaries and media infrastructures across a range of topographical and spatial levels. The first coaxial transpacific undersea cable connecting Japan with the United States was completed in June 1964, in a partnership between Japanese telecommunications company Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company (KDD), American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), and Hawaiian Telephone Company. A 1962 AT&T ad in the *Japan Times* couples economic and diplomatic fates through the cable, printing: “We are looking forward to 1964 when Japan and the United States will be linked by underseas telephone cable. [...] The new cable system will be an important international achievement—for it will tie two great industrial nations even closer together.”³⁴ TPC-1, along with the launch of the Synchronous Communications Satellite 3 (Syncom 3) two months later, made possible the international livecasting of the Olympic Games, in a collaboration between the Japanese government and the U.S. State Department. Accounts of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games tend to more often emphasize that it was the first to be satellite televised, but visual and audio signals were in fact bifurcated: while images were transmitted by satellite, sound was relayed by undersea cable.³⁵

Like the 1964 Olympic torch relay, Japan’s rail networks (to be discussed shortly), and most other undersea cable networks, the cartographic logic of TPC-1 developed between the vestiges of older colonial operations and the alignments of a newer Cold War international system. The coaxial cable system connected Japan and, within a few more years, the Philippines with the United States mainland through the North Pacific islands of Guam and Hawaii, its trajectory roughly tracking that of the telegraph line laid by the Commercial Pacific Cable

³⁴ American Telephone and Telegraph, advertisement, *Japan Times*, February 16, 1962, 6.

³⁵ Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 390 – 393.

Company at the turn of the twentieth century. By then, both Guam and Hawaii had already become strategic mid-Pacific colonial outposts as reprovisioning stations for maritime trade, as well as for transpacific telecommunications—as Nicole Starosielski observes, landing points for telegraph cable systems often coincided with those for ships, sharing the same geological and practical exigencies.³⁶ Guam and Hawaii were likewise central to Japan’s imperial objectives in the Pacific during the Second World War. In December 1941, Japan coordinated its offensive on Pearl Harbor with near-simultaneous invasions of other U.S. and British-held territory throughout the Pacific and Southeast Asia; this included the island of Guam, a Spanish colonial possession lost to the United States then subsequently occupied by Japan for over two years. As a staging area for U.S. air and naval operations, the Hawaiian archipelago’s Cold War economy leaned on defense dollars generated by military installations as it transitioned away from plantation agriculture; Guam’s island economy became similarly reliant on U.S. military activity but, unlike Hawaii, remains in a semi-colonial position without official statehood. The cartographic logic of undersea telecommunications infrastructure was and continues to be closely linked to the presence of military infrastructure, following their trail across the Pacific from Hawaii to Midway Atoll to Wake Island to Guam to Japan.

As Christina Klein has described, the Pacific Islands loomed large in the midcentury American middlebrow literary and cinematic consciousness, given their geographical and symbolic importance within the U.S.-led expansionist project to stitch together an ideologically cohesive and economically interdependent “free world,” with Japan central to anticommunist

³⁶ Starosielski, 31.

objectives in Asia.³⁷ In another transference of Japan's frustrated imperial desires into the new Cold War paradigm, Japanese popular culture reciprocated this geographical fascination back across the Pacific towards Hawaii and beyond, in films like Kon Ichikawa's *Alone Across the Pacific* and Yasuki Chiba's *Honolulu, Tokyo, Hong Kong*, both released in 1963, as well as in the popular wakadaisho ("young ace") and kaiju ("strange monster") film series. After restrictions on outbound tourism were eased in 1964, Hawaii quickly became a top destination for Japanese nationals; of the 128,000 Japanese tourists who traveled abroad that year, over a quarter chose to visit Hawaii.³⁸ This mutual enchantment, explored through both actual travel but more often imagined travel, was not exactly organic. U.S. intelligence sought to maintain an ideological foothold on the region by leveraging Japanese popular media as a tool of cultural diplomacy to thwart Chinese influence and the appeal of communism across "free Asia," while promoting Japan's advanced "golden age" studio system as a benchmark for other Asian film industries to emulate—albeit with only partial success at best.³⁹

By no means did this ideological foothold go unquestioned or unchallenged in Japan. Massive populist uprisings over the renewal of the United States-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo), which allowed the United States to maintain a post-occupation military presence on Japanese soil, lasted for fifteen months between March 1959 and June 1960. From Hokkaido to Okinawa, at least 30 million people—about one-third of the total population—are estimated to have taken

³⁷ Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 243 – 245.

³⁸ Yujin Yaguchi and Mari Yoshihara, "Evolutions of 'Paradise': Japanese Tourist Discourse about Hawai'i," *American Studies* 45, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 87.

³⁹ Sangjoon Lee, *Cinema and the Cultural Cold War: US Diplomacy and the Origins of the Asian Cinema Network* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020se), 138.

part in protest activities.⁴⁰ It was in many ways the occupation itself that made possible the sheer scale of the unrest. Japan's postwar constitution, implemented in 1947 under U.S. occupation, enshrined new rights for labor unions—at least until occupation authorities “reversed course” and reoriented stewardship of Japan from the project of demilitarization towards fortifying U.S. security. While the “peace clause” in the constitution renounced the sovereign right to wage war, the Japanese economy benefited from war by fulfilling direct procurement orders in industrial sectors such as auto and steel production, placed to meet the military needs of the Korean War. Inflationary pressures that accompanied the wartime production boom, however, were also eroding real wages.⁴¹ Despite intensification of “reverse course” policies, especially following the Communist victory in China in 1949, the uneven distribution of the Japanese economic miracle, along with the legal groundwork afforded by the new constitution, motivated widespread industrial actions across Japan throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.

It was in this environment of large-scale labor-management conflicts—from Toyota Motor Corporation to Japanese National Railways—that the labor movement trained its confrontational spirit and organizational muscle. The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), backed by the Japan Socialist Party, became the nucleus of the nationwide Anpo struggle, organizing three of the largest one-day general strikes in Japanese history over the course of three weeks in June 1960;⁴² many took part in defiance of “reverse course” policies that barred public employees from striking. Ironically, the Sohyo labor federation had been formed in

⁴⁰ Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 32.

⁴¹ Saburo Okita, “Japan's Economy and the Korean War,” *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 14 (July 1951): 144.

⁴² Kapur, 135.

1950 at the behest of occupation authorities, as an anticommunist alternative to existing unions. While the Anpo struggle forced the resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, it failed to prevent the ratification of the new Security Treaty; to this day, the prefecture of Okinawa—the name given to Ryukyu Kingdom after its annexation by imperial Japan—has one of the densest concentrations of overseas U.S. military bases. The labor movement also suffered a devastating setback in 1960 after a disastrous strike at Miike Coal Mine, as the Sohyo labor federation then splintered from the inside out over the organization’s “red” affiliations.

Nonetheless, the Anpo struggle, overlapping with the April Revolution that deposed U.S. ally Syngman Rhee’s autocratic regime in South Korea, clouded U.S. ambitions to entrench its grip over “free Asia.”⁴³ Socialist and Communist members of the National Diet viewed the revised treaty as an instrument of hegemony that subordinated Japanese sovereignty to U.S. Cold War interests. During a Japan Socialist Party visit to China in March 1959 as opposition to the Security Treaty was fomenting, party leader and Diet member Inejiro Asanuma—who would be assassinated by a teenage right-wing ultranationalist a year and a half later on live television—criticized U.S. imperialism as the shared adversary of both nations.⁴⁴ There was in actuality fairly broad interest in potential rapprochement with China across political and ideological lines, registering alarm among US officials. The CIA reported in May 1964 that “the ties that link Japan to China are so deeply rooted in history that the great majority of Japanese are inclined to view Communist control of the mainland as merely another temporary phase of Chinese political development, not a matter of fundamental importance to Japan’s relationship to China. [...] The

⁴³ Jennifer M. Miller, *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 193.

⁴⁴ Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945 – 1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 135.

Japanese historically have never feared their giant neighbor, and even today there seems to be no concern about a militant China.”⁴⁵ The report goes on to caution that “there has even been a rumor, which has done him no harm, that [Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, Kishi’s successor] wanted to go down in history as the prime minister who ‘normalized’ relations with Communist China, just as Premier Hatoyama had for his settlement with the USSR and Yoshida for the San Francisco Peace Treaty.”⁴⁶ Even Chinese nuclear armament, which understandably triggered uniformly negative responses in Japan, ultimately did not demoralize desires for rapprochement.

Despite these concerns, Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations would remain largely deadlocked for another decade, although trade activity between the two grew over time as it had since the end of the Second World War, including through the Korean War.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the ratification of the Security Treaty brought about—or anyhow coincided with—an era of economic stability, in some ways retroactively justifying its passage. Yoshikuni Igarashi writes,

Kishi’s resignation provided a symbolic resolution to the contradiction between memories of the past and Japan’s present condition under U.S. hegemony. This minor victory, along with the cancellation of Eisenhower’s visit to [Okinawa Prefecture in] Japan, offered the participants and witnesses of the movement against the Security Treaty an alibi for accepting material prosperity, patterned after the lifestyle of the former enemy.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ United States Central Intelligence Agency, “The China Problem in Japanese Politics,” May 1, 1964, 1.

⁴⁶ United States Central Intelligence Agency, “The China Problem in Japanese Politics,” May 1, 1964, 5.

⁴⁷ Akira Iriye, “Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945 – 90,” *The China Quarterly* 124 (1990): 628.

⁴⁸ Igarashi, 142.

The tumultuous events of the Anpo struggle were widely televised to the Japanese public; between 1955 and 1960, the percentage of Japanese households that owned televisions rose from less than 1% to 54%.⁴⁹ The forceful expulsion of an occupation at the National Diet happened “in front of the eyes of a stunned nation watching a live feed on NHK television, [as] the police physically removed each struggling Socialist Diet member from the building, one by one.”⁵⁰ It was in their absence that the Security Treaty passed the Lower House of the legislature: “In a famous and indelible image, the NHK television camera captured the [Liberal Democratic Party] Diet members raising their hands to vote their approval, and then swung dramatically to the right to show that all the seats in the other half of the chamber, where the opposition parties normally sat, were empty.”⁵¹

By the 1970s, television ownership reached 90% of Japanese households, and the “holy trinity of desirable consumer goods” of the Anpo era—the black-and-white television set, washing machine, and refrigerator—had given way to an expanded set of material standards: a color television, air conditioner, and automobile.⁵² Around 65 million people in Japan, out of a total population of about 98 million, watched the 1964 Olympic opening ceremony on NHK.⁵³ Through the newest broadcasting technologies across sea and space, the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games projected the post-Anpo stability and prosperity of a rehabilitated Japan to both domestic

⁴⁹ Shunya Yoshimi, “‘Made in Japan’: the cultural politics of ‘home electrification’ in postwar Japan,” *Media, Culture & Society* 21 (1999): 155.

⁵⁰ Kapur, 23.

⁵¹ Kapur, 23.

⁵² Yoshimi, 155.

⁵³ Sandra Wilson, “Exhibiting a New Japan: the Tokyo Olympics of 1964 and Expo ’70 in Osaka,” *Historical Research* 58, no. 227 (February 2012): 176.

and international audiences. As Igarashi argues, the Olympic Games “served as a powerful antidote to the anti-Security Treaty movement.”⁵⁴ An imperial marine geography incorporated into the logic of Cold War, TPC-1 shadowed a defensive anticommunist perimeter—an island chain safeguarded by a U.S.-Japan alliance that was, however, never historically inevitable or guaranteed. Ahead of the Olympic Games, President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Ikeda commemorated the completion of the undersea cable with a telephone call, relayed across more than 10,000 kilometers of saltwater; their inauguration of the TPC-1 coaxial cable system took place on June 19, 1964, exactly four years to the day after the ratification of the United States-Japan Security Treaty.⁵⁵

On the fast track

Domestically and terrestrially, the debut of the first Shinkansen line by the Japanese National Railways (JNR) rescaled the 500 kilometers between Tokyo and Osaka, where football preliminaries during the Olympic Games were held, and condensed travel time between the two cities from over six hours to under four. The bullet train is a less obvious example of media

⁵⁴ Igarashi, 145.

⁵⁵ KDDI Corporation, “Third IEEE Milestones award for KDDI, the most ever in Japan,” November 12, 2014, <https://news.kddi.com/kddi/corporate/english/newsrelease/2014/11/12/787.html>.




Figure 2: Kokusai Den Shin Denwa Company advertisement, *Japan Times*, June 19, 1964

infrastructure,⁵⁶ but I classify it here as such as and as a means of communication in its capacity to marshal information flows. Compared to the transnationally organized undersea cable or artificial satellite, the diplomatic dimensions of the Shinkansen are likely also less immediately apparent, given that it is a domestic transit network. To explain first the issue of diplomacy: rail technology, and the compression of distance across empire, has been part and parcel to Japan's geopolitical ambitions in Asia. The Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway Zone was a key artery for expansionist objectives in the region, and the false flag bombing of a railroad track was also the pretext for the full-scale invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In the 1930s and 1940s,

⁵⁶ Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, introduction to *Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures*, eds. Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 4.

Japan operated the Asia Express in occupied Manchukuo, the first segment of what was intended as the empire's network of high-speed railways.⁵⁷

However, plans to better connect Tokyo, now situated on the empire's eastern fringe as military expansion continued westward, and the islands of Japan and to economically integrate occupied territories through rail were ultimately abandoned, along with plans to host the 1940 Tokyo Olympics.⁵⁸ Both were then revived after the war. Shinkansen technology was again crucial to Japan's cultural diplomacy and economic cooperation agendas, prominently exhibited at the Japanese Pavilion at the 1964 New York World's Fair and exported to countries including Taiwan and China. The Shinkansen was also a highlight of then-Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's historic state visit to Japan in 1978; it was reportedly this well-documented ride on the Tokaido "super express of dreams" from Tokyo to Kyoto that stirred Deng's "high-speed rail dream" to begin constructing the planet's most extensive high-speed rail network across mainland China.⁵⁹

The bullet train is furthermore fundamental to the overall media infrastructural ecology of Olympic-era Tokyo, complementing the TPC-1 cable through its high-impact visual appeal and its role in transitioning Japan towards an "information society." An earlier part of the dissertation outlined some of the scholarly debates around the pragmatic and aesthetic functions of infrastructure. Many have also pointed out a pervasive "infrastructural ignorance," as John Durham Peters puts it, through which the material basis of everyday technological processes gets obscured. Donna Haraway's groundbreaking essay, "A Cyborg Manifesto," presciently describes the seamless ephemerality often ascribed to emerging cybernetic technologies: "Our best

⁵⁷ Abel, 156 – 158.

⁵⁸ Hood, 21.

⁵⁹ Cui Dianguo, "China's High-Speed Rail Dream," *Leaders Magazine* 38, no. 4 (2015): 54.

machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean because they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of a spectrum. And these machines are eminently portable, mobile—a matter of immense human pain in Detroit and Singapore. People are nowhere near so fluid, being both material and opaque.”⁶⁰ The cybernetics and systems theories referenced by Haraway had earlier shaped the architectural philosophies of the Metabolists, and Tange’s own time at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) overlapped with that of Norbert Wiener, originator of the neologism “cybernetics.” They also lent immediate application to Shinkansen technology in the form of automatic train control (ATC) systems, which use real-time monitoring and feedback to automatically brake,⁶¹ as well as business logistics and “lean” production systems; adopted broadly by Japanese manufacturers including Toyota and Sony Corporation, these technocratic rationalizations helped drive postwar economic productivity.⁶² However, in framing the high human costs associated with these “Sunshine Belt machines [...] as hard to see politically as materially,” Haraway’s abstraction walks the line between making visible infrastructural physicality and reproducing its erasure.⁶³

Haraway might be read, on one hand, as a preemptive counterpoint to the techno-boosterism of the likes of MIT Media Lab and *Wired* founder Nicholas Negroponte, who pines for a sunshine reality made of binary digits rather than physical atoms despite the perils of the

⁶⁰ Donna Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s,” in *The Donna Haraway Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 12.

⁶¹ Hood, 134.

⁶² Yuriko Furuhata, *Climatic Media: Transpacific Experiments in Atmospheric Control* (Durham: University Press, 2022), 125.

⁶³ Haraway, 12.

virtual,⁶⁴ but even she, if inadvertently through irony, divorces technologies of the budding information age from their material foundations. Variations of this infrastructural ignorance are deeply entrenched, in scholarship and as common sense, and perhaps especially apt in the case of undersea cables: the sunken lifeline of global communications systems running kilometers deep along the seabed.⁶⁵ As Starosielski writes, “when communications infrastructures are represented, they are most often wireless: handheld devices, laptop computers, wireless routers, cell phone towers, ‘cloud’ computing, and satellites pervade our field of view, directing our attention above rather than below and reinforcing a long-standing imagination of communication that moves us beyond our worldly limits.”⁶⁶ Starosielski here references the consumer internet age, but the enduring association of the 1964 Olympic Games with satellite technology, rather than undersea cables, attests to her observation. The physicality of cable systems, new and old, is doubly obscured, as a network infrastructure that is often for their own protection geographically provincial as they come onshore. The terminal landing station that links TPC-1 to terrestrial networks on Honshu, Japan’s largest island, is not located in a busy urban center but rather in a more rural and therefore more secure location.⁶⁷ The landing site chosen was Ninomiya in Kanagawa Prefecture on the coast of Sagami Bay about 70 kilometers southwest of Tokyo, a small town serviced by the Tokaido Main Line but bypassed by the faster and newer Shinkansen rail.

⁶⁴ Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 228 – 229.

⁶⁵ John Durham Peters, “Infrastructuralism: Media as Traffic between Nature and Culture,” in *Traffic: Media as Infrastructures and Cultural Practices*, eds. Marion Näser-Lather and Christoph Neubert (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 32.

⁶⁶ Nicole Starosielski, *The Undersea Network* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 5.

⁶⁷ Starosielski, 40.

Although it was an aquatic, extraterritorial, and often provincial technology, TPC-1 was by no means invisible, or without aesthetic value, to the imagination of the urban public—newspaper articles and advertisements with maps and photographs of glittering ocean surfaces drummed up enthusiasm around its newness for years—but the undersea cable lacked the clear-cut, high-tech aesthetic factor that the Shinkansen seemed to effortlessly possess. Infrastructures are neither normatively visible nor self-effacing, and, as Brian Larkin writes, “the distinction between spectacular infrastructures and mundane ones should not be figured as an opposition but as representing different styles of visibility;”⁶⁸ as a style of visibility, the aesthetic function of infrastructure often helps signal national aspirations for the future.⁶⁹ The Shinkansen in turn also had greater direct physical impact on the cityscape of Olympic-era Tokyo. As I mentioned earlier, technocratic approach of Kenzo Tange and other Metabolist architects stretched urban reconstruction in unconventional directions, involving “a host of new concepts, and new territories—on the land, on the sea, in the air—on which to build them.”⁷⁰ Design concepts also included vertically layered transportation systems to offset Tokyo’s unruly centrifugal sprawl. Jessamyn R. Abel notes that “though Tange’s specific vision [for Tokyo] was never implemented, the bullet train propelled the layering of central Tokyo through the construction of elevated tracks and roads above the existing cityscape and underground passageways and

⁶⁸ Brian Larkin, “Promising Forms: The Political Aesthetics of Infrastructure,” in *The Promise of Infrastructure*, eds. Nikhil Anand, Akhil Gupta, and Hannah Appel (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 186.

⁶⁹ Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta, “Temporarily, Politics, and the Promise of Infrastructure,” introduction to *The Promise of Infrastructure*, eds. Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 19.

⁷⁰ Koolhaas and Obrist, 335.

shopping areas below it.”⁷¹ The presence of elevated Shinkansen, monorail, and local rapid system tracks weaving laterally and vertically through the city—along with the many cycles of destruction and reconstruction that it has endured—fabricated the iconic multidimensionality of Tokyo's postwar urban aesthetic.

That is not to say that the Shinkansen and the TPC-1 undersea cable exist as binary oppositions on an infrastructural continuum between form and utility, but, together, they make legible the technocratic values that guided the expansive and experimental projects surrounding the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. The two are moreover part of the “twin revolutions in logistics and information technology,” as Yuriko Furuhashi writes, that thrust Japan’s economic reorientation towards a “postindustrial model of information intensification (to optimize the speed and efficiency of economic productivity by upgrading transportation, telecommunication, and energy infrastructures),” to which “the developments of digital computers, satellites, bullet trains, fax machines, shipping containers and other iconic technological innovations of the [1960s] were central.”⁷² Like Furuhashi, many have noted technical, perceptual, and allegorical connections between media and transit. David Morley observes that the emergence of the information age and its “electronic landscapes” parallels that of actual transportation infrastructure, in terms of issues of speed, mobility, and connectivity;⁷³ and in a more analog context, Lynne Kirby, Tom Gunning, and others have pointed out affinities between the railway and early cinema, while Mitchell Schwarzer has theorized mediated perceptions of the built

⁷¹ Abel, 71.

⁷² Yuriko Furuhashi, *Climatic Media: Transpacific Experiments in Atmospheric Control* (Durham: University Press, 2022), 125.

⁷³ David Morley, “Communications and transport: The mobility of information, people and commodities,” *Media, Culture & Society* 35, no. 5 (2011): 746 – 747.

environment through optical and transportation technologies of speed and motion.⁷⁴ Fittingly, media theorist Marshall McLuhan's *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, published at just about the exact same time as the completion of the Tokaido Shinkansen, uses the analogy of the railway to explain his focal shift from the analysis of texts towards the study of medium forms themselves, writing that the railway's transformation of human sociality "happened whether the railway functioned in a tropical or a northern environment, and is quite independent of the freight or content of the railway medium."⁷⁵

McLuhan's analogy again links the railway with electronic telecommunications and gestures towards an infrastructural disposition—he is, after all, concerned with the way technology determines social and material realities—but the oversimplification in his argument becomes more apparent in the reverse. Contrary to his conclusion that the "railway medium" is freight-agnostic—the same way undersea cables might be described as traffic-agnostic—Abel argues that it was in fact significant that the Shinkansen carried only passengers, rather than commodities. The use of information in ATC systems was mentioned earlier. In addition, in the years before the modern-day data center through which information could be externalized and then re-accessed at scale, the Shinkansen was also often conceptualized, including by JNR officials, as a system for trafficking information in the form of people; if the steel trunk lines of the nineteenth century represented a national arterial network through which "nourishment" in the form of raw materials and goods were distributed, "the shift from arterial to neural metaphors that marked discussions of the bullet train reflects a new conception of rail transportation, from

⁷⁴ Michelle Schwarzer, *Zoomscape: Architecture in Motion and Media* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004), 13.

⁷⁵ Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 8.

the classic industrial model to an information society understanding, in which trains exercise a ‘neural’ control function.”⁷⁶ As Abel writes, while it may seem odd that the Japanese government would invest heavily in an infrastructure many called a “sunset industry” during the “jet age” of the 1950s and 1960s, the Shinkansen, visually and kinesthetically, helped ordinary people make sense of Japan’s transformation into a postindustrial information economy.⁷⁷ The speed and smoothness of riding the bullet train was an experience unmatched by any other form of terrestrial travel, thanks in part to the reduction in the number of stops built into the Shinkansen compared to the older Tokaido Main Line running parallel to it. And so, along with the commercial jetliner, discussed in detail in a later chapter, the bullet train was a sensorial glimpse into a frictionless and endlessly efficient twenty-first century future to be realized on the fast track under technocratic governance, powered by the global circulation of signal traffic through over a million kilometers of undersea cables soon to be laid.

Nuclear China

The aquatic dream of fluid, seamless global telecommunications is counterbalanced in the postwar imagination by the threat of the Pacific as a reservoir of nuclear danger. Located in the South Pacific, the Marshall Islands are dozens of atolls, halos of coral reef encircling shallow lagoons. Seized by Japanese imperial forces in 1914, these atolls were then the target of some of the first U.S. air raids on Japanese-held territory in the Second World War; during the Cold War, they were a testing site for the nuclear weapons program of the United States; between 1946 and

⁷⁶ Abel, 107 – 108.

⁷⁷ Abel, 138.

1958, the military conducted 67 tests in and near the Marshall Islands, including underwater, sea-level, reef, and atmospheric tests. Together, the tests discharged a cumulative force of 7,000 times that of the Little Boy atomic bomb that decimated Hiroshima in 1945. In 1954, anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan pitched after the “Castle Bravo” test at Bikini Atoll showered a Japanese fishing vessel and nearby islands with nuclear fallout; the entire crew developed radiation sickness, and the ship’s radio operator passed from radiation-related complications.⁷⁸ Afterwards, a national petition campaign to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs collected about 30 million signatures, organizing one of the major precursors to and coalition groups within the broader Anpo struggle that would engulf the streets of Japan five years later.⁷⁹

The fishing vessel incident also became the basis for the *Godzilla* franchise sensation. In the Toho Studios film series, Godzilla is stirred from his millennia-long hibernation on the Pacific seafloor by the detonation of a nuclear weapon; new behemoths followed, many with nuclear origins, others extraterrestrial: Anguirus, King Kong, Mothra, King Ghidorah, Rodan. Mothra, a telepathic silk moth born out of a giant egg on Infant Island, is among the benevolent kaiju. After a fishing crew is exposed to radiation in the Pacific, a joint Japanese-Rolisican scientific expedition visits Infant Island in the South Pacific. The diegetic geopolitical world of the 1961 film *Mothra* appears to be non-aligned, or at least conspicuously ambivalent—Rolisica is a fictional nation resembling the United States, where “New Kirk City” is the capital city, although the name is a portmanteau of “Russia” and “America.” During the expedition, an unscrupulous Rolisican businessman, played by Japanese-American actor Jerry Ito, abducts a pair of miniature priestesses to Tokyo, where they are caged and forced to perform for night after

⁷⁸ Orr, 48.

⁷⁹ Kapur, 16.

night of sold-out theaters. Mothra, their goddess, glides across the Pacific in a larval stage to free the priestesses, before she metamorphoses into her adult moth form, her transformation powered by the heat of an atomic ray gun set up to obliterate her cocoon wrapped around Tokyo Tower.

Mothra returns to Infant Island safely with the priestesses, but in many other kaiju films, the giant creatures are ultimately defeated by either each other or through non-nuclear technologies, including “mecha” versions of themselves. There is not so much a generalized technophobia in kaiju films, but the aquatic and celestial worlds are depicted, through tokusatsu special effects techniques, as unearthly, sinister sources of nuclear danger. (Relatedly, space age advances in rocket technology, associated with the artificial satellite, is also closely linked with ICBM development.) While the kaiju film might be the postwar genre most often associated with the atomic age, themes of nuclear anxiety can be traced across genres and styles, although overt censure of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was rare.⁸⁰ Akira Kurosawa’s 1955 gendaigeki film, *Record of a Living Being*, is a domestic clash involving an elderly industrialist and family patriarch named Kiichi Nakajima, who is beleaguered by an acute fear of nuclear warfare. In response to his attempts to move his extended family—in-laws, mistresses, and all—to Brazil, his children file for him to be declared mentally incompetent on the basis of fiscal irresponsibility in a Tokyo family court. Nakajima’s behaviors are increasingly erratic. At one point, he confuses a lightning flash at the onset of a sudden thunderstorm for a nuclear attack; but while he is zealous, he is not uncaring, promising to find his former employees a nuclear-safe refuge after he burns down his own foundry. *Record of a Living Being* was not particularly

⁸⁰ Robert Feleppa, “Black Rain: Reflections on Hiroshima and Nuclear War in Japanese Film,” *Crosscurrents* 54, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 106.

commercially successful, but the film's haunting conclusion is memorable, constructing nuclear weapons as a threat to the wellbeing of the postwar nation through visual metaphor. At the end of the film, Nakajima is in a psychiatric hospital, but he is convinced that he has managed to escape to a different planet, with nowhere left on Earth secure from the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. When he looks out the hospital room window at the bright hot sun—the national ensign—he is only able to interpret it as his home planet torched by nuclear warfare.

Considering the deep-seated anxieties reflected both in popular cultural representations and on-the-ground anti-nuclear efforts, the negative reactions in Japan to Chinese nuclear armament, Olympic timing aside, were expected. King Ghidorah, who first appeared in a December 1964 Toho Studios kaiju film soon after the detonation of Project 596, was sometimes interpreted as a stand-in for nuclear China. However, despite widespread criticism across ideological tendencies, including from the Socialist Party, opposition to the test was based not necessarily on the feeling of imminent danger from China specifically but on principles formed by recent experience; despite the dramaturgical collision suggested by the two major events, Chinese nuclear armament did not alter the diplomatic landscape between Japan and China. Officially, Japan separated security from the realm of economics in its interactions with China. Since the end of the Second World War, Japan-China security relations were indirect, triangulated through the alliance systems of the Cold War; the Security Treaty brought Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, so long as Japan did not seek a nuclear arsenal of its own,⁸¹ but the two nations carefully avoided direct military engagement while steadily increasing trade

⁸¹ Shingo Yoshida, "In the shadow of China's bomb: Nuclear consultation, commitment reconfirmation, and missile defence in the US-Japan alliance, 1962 – 1968," in *Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance*, eds. John Baylis and Yoko Iwama (New York: Routledge, 2018), 172.

volume and pursuing “people-to-people” exchanges between students, artists, and writers. Japanese contact with China was heavily scrutinized by the U.S. government, but a meeting between Chinese and Japanese representatives at the Asia-African Conference in Bandung at the invitation of Indonesian President Sukarno in 1955 set the groundwork for a quasi-official “friendship” trade framework. Under the auspices of Zhou Enlai and Hayato Ikeda, the 1962 L-T Agreement (named after Bandung Conference delegates Liao Chengzhi and Tatsunosuke Takasaki, who played major roles in negotiating the memorandum) provided China with machinery, steel, and fertilizers in return for exports of iron ore, tin, coal, soybeans, and more to Japan.⁸² The two countries set up reciprocal liaison offices in Tokyo and Beijing, despite having no formal diplomatic relations; although the political environment constrained a more substantial expansion of bilateral trade activity, after 1963 Japanese businesses began to issue long-term credits to China, indicating the desire for more durable and lasting commercial ties.⁸³

Even Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who was much more concerned about Chinese nuclear armament than predecessor Ikeda,⁸⁴ was relatively moderated in his response to the perceived security risks compared to (and to the ire of) U.S. counterparts; in the first Sato-Johnson Communiqué issued three months after the detonation of Project 596, Johnson condemned China’s “bellicose policies” despite advancing U.S. nuclear testing, while Sato for the most part simply reiterated the principle of separating trade and politics in Japan’s China policy.⁸⁵ The U.S.

⁸² Mayumi Itoh, *Pioneers of Sino-Japanese Relations: Liao and Takasaki* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 117.

⁸³ Iriye, 632 – 633.

⁸⁴ Yoshida, 175.

⁸⁵ John Welfield, *Japan and Nuclear China* (Canberra: Australian National University press, 1970), 5.

Department of State even predicted in 1963 that “a Chinese nuclear capability in itself is unlikely directly to affect Japanese decisions concerning the establishment of official relations with Communist China.”⁸⁶ The success of Project 596, like the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, also forced western observers to reevaluate their previously held assumptions about the scientific and technical capabilities of Asia. The U.S. intelligence and scientific community, however, had closely been monitoring progress through aerial reconnaissance and satellite photography.⁸⁷ After the test, nuclear physicist Philip H. Abelson, a contributor to the Manhattan Project and then editor-in-chief of the distinguished *Science* journal, used the mechanics of the detonation to assess the technical development of the country; he writes that while “a technically incompetent people could not have succeeded [...] without massive help,” “the new accomplishment was not surprising to many U.S. scientists who have had contact with individuals of Chinese extraction and have known of their first-class aptitude for science and technology. [...] Another member has joined the nuclear club. He already has impressive credentials, and his long-term potentialities should not be underestimated.”⁸⁸ Abelson’s racialized comments are backhanded, acknowledging China’s technological milestone but framed within the logic of western expectations as a belated arrival; nonetheless, it signposts the beginning of a shift in the public perception of China as a significant technological, rather than ideological, threat to the security of the capitalist bloc.

⁸⁶ Memorandum from George C. Denney, Jr., United States Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Probable Consequences of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation,” May 6, 1963, iii.

⁸⁷ William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960 – 1964,” *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/2001): 84.

⁸⁸ Philip Abelson, “The Chinese A-Bomb,” *Science* 146, no. 3644 (October 1964): 601.

At the end of the Second World War, the idea of nuclear warfare was, like in many places that had not experienced its horrors firsthand, not immediately legible in China. Newspapers initially reported that it was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, rather than the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that brought Japan to its surrender.⁸⁹ Just as films, trade fairs, exhibitions, and conferences, often with U.S. patronage, normalized the use of nuclear fission for peaceful purposes in postwar Japan,⁹⁰ citizens of the new Chinese nation also had to make sense of the distinctions between good and bad uses of nuclear technology. In the state media, depictions of U.S. leaders delirious over the impending crises of capitalism and the apocalyptic potential of nuclear weapons were contrasted with stories of the USSR, on the brink of harnessing atomic energy to divert Siberian rivers and transforming the deserts of Central Asia into resplendent, fertile gardens.⁹¹ After the United States threatened nuclear warfare against China during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis in a confrontation over two outlying islands, Mao Zedong initiated the “Two Bombs, One Satellite” program in 1955 to develop China’s own nuclear weapons.⁹² His interest in the program was not only strategic but also ideological or even cosmological; for Mao, the fact of nuclear fission was evidence of the basic Marxist law of dialectical materialism.⁹³

⁸⁹ Henrietta Harrison, “Popular Responses to the Atomic Bomb in China, 1945 – 1955,” *Past and Present* 8 (2013): 98.

⁹⁰ Morris Low, *Visualizing Nuclear Power in Japan: A Trip to the Reactor* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 245 – 246.

⁹¹ Harrison, 105.

⁹² Xiaobing Li, *The Cold War in East Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 74.

⁹³ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 39.

China's national budget quickly reflected the state's new priorities in science and technology, and funding for the Chinese Academy of Sciences more than tripled between 1953 and 1957.⁹⁴ Within the Academy, the Institute of Computing Technology sought to develop machines capable of handling the computing tasks associated with advanced weapons deployment, designing, in the process, China's first large-scale, general-use digital computer.⁹⁵ Research and mining facilities aimed at developing a nuclear arsenal, including both atomic and hydrogen or thermonuclear weapon types, were established in isolated locations across the country;⁹⁶ by 1959, construction on the Lop Nur Test Base in China's far-west interior was completed.⁹⁷ The program at first received significant Soviet assistance, and under the New Defense Technical Accord, the USSR was to supply a prototype of a bomb model and relevant technical materials. However, in 1960, the USSR recalled all Soviet technical personnel from China as relations deteriorated, and all scientific cooperation projects, including joint nuclear programs, soon came to a hard stop.⁹⁸ The prototype was never delivered. The codename 596 refers to June 1959, marking a self-sufficient phase of the nuclear program, but even at the height of cooperation between China and the USSR, Chinese leaders believed that "whatever the dimensions of Soviet assistance, any Chinese nuclear program in the long term would have to create an indigenous capability to manage and use the training and material provided by the

⁹⁴ Lewis and Xue, 42.

⁹⁵ Yanqiong Liu, "中国科学院与'两弹一星'工程," *Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences* 35, no. 9 (September 2019): 1006.

⁹⁶ Hui Zhang, "The short march to China's hydrogen bomb," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 11, 2024, <https://thebulletin.org/2024/04/the-short-march-to-chinas-hydrogen-bomb/>.

⁹⁷ Lewis and Xue, 177.

⁹⁸ Li, 148.

Soviet Union.”⁹⁹ After the completion of Project 596 in 1964, China detonated its first hydrogen bomb in 1967.

Between 1957 and 1959, many scientists and engineers across Chinese universities and academies were consumed by anti-rightist, class-leveling campaigns as targets of ideological rectification, when academic credentialing was associated with an reactionary strata of communist society.¹⁰⁰ Those in the nuclear program, although they could not avoid these campaigns entirely, were relatively insulated due to the strategic implications of their work, the atmosphere of intense secrecy around their activities, and their literal physical remoteness.¹⁰¹ As Joel Andreas has shown, the technocratic turn of the Chinese Communist Party developed out of inter-elite contention under the leadership of Mao Zedong, but this longstanding conflict between a new political elite composed of peasant revolutionaries who had fought in China’s civil war and China’s old educated (often foreign-educated) elite ultimately produced the conditions for their convergence into a new technocratic class order.¹⁰² Under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Party was transformed into a party of scientists and engineers; the established “red-over-expert” power structure that oversaw scientific, technical, and industrial activities was not undone until after Mao’s death,¹⁰³ but the nuclear program had earlier built a functional, if fragile, partnership between party cadres, scientists, and technical and military personnel—that

⁹⁹ Lewis and Xue, 42.

¹⁰⁰ Hong Yung Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 59.

¹⁰¹ Lewis and Xue, 46.

¹⁰² Andreas, 130.

¹⁰³ Andreas, 228.

is, between “redness” and “expertise”¹⁰⁴ that was evidence of an incipient technocracy primed to later absorb technology transfers, including in the fields of telecommunications and high-speed rail travel.

Infrastructural friendship

The nuclear bomb and the undersea cable feel and appear kinesthetically opposed: the former characterized by the explosive forces of fission and collision, and the latter a sense of fluid, frictionless connectivity. I imagine it was in part this energetic opposition that played out on the newspaper frontpages and television broadcasts of October 1964, for viewers in the capitalist west: the peaceful internationalism of postwar Japan, set against the aggressive insularity of communist China. Non-metaphorically, after all, the deep-sea abyssal plain made the connective functions of undersea cable networks hardy against the threat of nuclear conflict.¹⁰⁵ But if the Olympic Games rewired Japan into the international system, so did the burdens of nuclear armament for China, out of its quest for security and greater self-reliance; as John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai write in their history of Project 596, “over time, the acquisition of nuclear weapons undermines familiar modes of nationalism and drives nuclear states to a tacit reciprocal tolerance in order to survive.”¹⁰⁶ In both cases, the successful completion of large-scale technical projects of national significance steered things along Miguel Angel Centeno’s continuum of technocracy. Certainly, technocratic governance is by no means limited to these

¹⁰⁴ Lewis and Xue, 235.

¹⁰⁵ Starosielski, 39.

¹⁰⁶ Lewis and Xue, 226.

two examples, and it is also not my intention to reproduce techno-orientalist thinking and essentialize technocracy as something distinctively or inherently Asian. Thousands of years of cultural, linguistic, and economic exchange between Japan and China have undoubtedly contributed to certain historical and contemporary commonalities and feelings of closeness, but the contexts within which each nation envisioned and honed their sociotechnical futures were markedly different.

Infrastructure and technical assistance continued to be at the center of Japan's China policy in the years between diplomatic normalization and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, when disbursement of new ODA loans for Chinese infrastructure projects was earmarked to end.¹⁰⁷ In 1972, Prime Minister Takeo Tanaka traveled to Beijing to sign the historic normalization agreement between Japan and China; China reciprocated the state visit in 1978, when Deng Xiaoping visited Japan to exchange instruments of ratification for the new Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China. When asked in his bullet train carriage what he thought about the Tokaido Shinkansen, shortly before it passed the foot of Mount Fuji, Deng answered, "It's as if it's pushing us to run. Right now, we really have to run."¹⁰⁸ Over the following decades, Japan provided a total of over 3.6 trillion yen of ODA loans and grants to China, in large part for the construction of large-scale public facilities and infrastructures including rapid transit systems, railways, and airports.¹⁰⁹ On August 1, 2008,

¹⁰⁷ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2012," Japan International Cooperation Agency, 124.

¹⁰⁸ "邓副总理离东京抵京都友好访问离东京前，福田首相等到国宾馆送行," *Renmin Ribao*, 1st ed., October 27, 1978.

¹⁰⁹ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "White Paper on Development Cooperation 2018," Japan International Cooperation Agency, 77.

thirty years after Deng's train ride on the Shinkansen to Kyoto, China debuted the first inter-city leg of what would become the world's most expansive high-speed rail network. Like the Shinkansen and the 1964 Olympic Games, the new line began public operations just one week before the opening ceremony. It reduced the trip between Beijing and Tianjin—where football preliminaries were taking place, just like Osaka in 1964—from an hour plus to 30 minutes.

The technological innovations of Tokyo's Olympic era helped birth an image of Japan as a source of infrastructural expertise to model after, as well as a source of technical aid highly desirable for China's own burgeoning technocratic society; beginning with the "lost decade" of economic stagnation in Japan in the 1990s, however, Japanese aid became less and less pertinent to China over the course of the next quarter century. By 2015, China had constructed 20,000 kilometers of high-speed rail of its own, a total distance greater than that of the rest of the planet combined; like Japan, China adopted technical assistance, and rail technology specifically, as a means of making regional friendship.¹¹⁰ Japan is an archipelago nation and does not share direct borders with any other sovereign state, a topographical and geopolitical reality that has greatly influenced its activities on the continent since the Meiji Restoration, including when it comes to acts of technical generosity. Although the Shinkansen was and is an important instrument of cultural diplomacy, it is perhaps obvious that its diplomatic use is inevitably limited insofar as Japan cannot be easily physically linked to any other nation by rail. As China began its divisive mission to terrestrially network its neighbors through high-speed rail—for instance, from Chengdu through Myanmar, for access to the Indian Ocean, and from Kunming to the Gulf of Thailand—in 2015 Japan and China became locked in competition over a transit project on

¹¹⁰ Ezra F. Vogel, *China and Japan: Facing History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2021), 340.

another archipelagic state: a high-speed railway connecting Jakarta and Bandung.¹¹¹ Whether ironically or fatefully, this was the place associated with the “Bandung spirit” of transnational solidarity, where some of the earliest quasi-official ties between Japan and China were set into motion against the grain of the Cold War. However, as Meheroo Jussawalla writes, the thick consortia of undersea cables that now networks Asia are “physical connections [that] link the region more tightly than formal agreements could ever do.”¹¹² The media infrastructures of Asia’s coastlines, the technical standardization required by these networks, and the sharing of technical expertise necessary for standardization map a keen sense of regional interdependence, all despite resurgences of competitive enmity.

¹¹¹ Jonthan E. Hillman, *The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 118.

¹¹² Meheroo Jussawalla, “Telecommunications and Regional Interdependence in Southeast Asia,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 93.

CHAPTER 3: Staging the Creative City (2008)

Tokyo Gallery sits on the seventh floor of a postwar commercial building, accessible by a narrow elevator above coffeeshops, restaurants, and bookstores, amid blocks of Seiko and Citizen showrooms in vibrant, upscale Ginza. Shortly after the conclusion of United States occupation, the district was flattened for a fourth time—this time on screen. First broiled by fire in 1872, Ginza, remade in brick by an Irish expatriate architect under the new Meiji government, was leveled in 1923 by the Great Kanto Earthquake and the subsequent firestorms that swallowed the city.¹ Two decades later, it was destroyed again by incendiary air raids that battered the entirety of the Japanese archipelago, lasting until the surrender of imperial Japan at the end of the Second World War.² In 1954, Godzilla, the titular prehistoric creature of Toho Film Company's science fiction film franchise, tore through the recently rebuilt capital, after being roused from deep-sea sleep by nuclear tests in the Pacific. By then, Ginza had already transformed into a thriving commercial and entertainment center, its reincarnation accented by the iconic Wako clock tower and Morinaga and Company's neon-illuminated globe overlooking boulevards of restaurants, shops, and theaters. After surfacing from the dim waters of Tokyo Bay, Godzilla treads his way through Ginza department stores and the National Diet, recreated through the tokusatsu special effects technique of detailed urban miniatures and figurines. Godzilla leaves intact the nearby Imperial Palace, like the United States had done during its

¹ Bureau of Urban Development, *The Changing Face of Tokyo: From Edo to Today, and into the Future* (Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2019), 26.

² Carola Hein, "Resilient Tokyo: Disaster and Transformation in the Japanese City," in *The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster*, eds. Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 224.

bombing campaign a decade prior, before eventually succumbing to the “oxygen destroyer” and plunging to the ocean floor, only for another to be awoken in a sequel the year after.³

Tokyo Gallery outlived, of course, the celluloid destruction of postwar Ginza, although the space has relocated several times within the neighborhood, moving to its most recent building in 2005.⁴ The gallery, renamed Tokyo Gallery + BTAP (Beijing Tokyo Art Projects) after opening a second location in Beijing, observed its 70th anniversary in 2020 with a two-part exhibition, showcasing its curatorial emphasis on postwar Japanese works in the 1960s and then its pivot towards contemporary Chinese and South Korean artists from the 1970s onwards. The modest, L-shaped space in Ginza is known as the first contemporary gallery in Japan, and its much larger Beijing location the first overseas arts institution to establish itself in the 798 Art Zone, which was zoned by the municipal government as an official “arts district” shortly before the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. Formerly the site of an East German-designed, state-owned weapons components factory, the industrial remnants of 798 Art Zone have metamorphosed into a sprawling thicket of studios, galleries, museums, and events that draws millions of visitors each year. Other than the “art triangle” of museums in the district of Roppongi, Tokyo’s arts infrastructures are comparatively diffused, often embedded ad-hoc within the dense expanse of the metropolis—in contrast to Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Singapore, and other Asian cities where municipal governments have invested substantially in urban cultural development in the form of designated arts districts, either built new or repurposed from older industries.

³ Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945 – 1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 117.

⁴ *Tokyo Gallery + BTAP: 1950 – 2010* (Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2010), 344 – 345.

Tokyo has long been vulnerable to catastrophe environmental, human, and imagined, prone to earthquake, fire, flood, and typhoon. The sense of material impermanence in the postwar period was heightened by the relentless fictional devastation of the capital city at the hands of Ishiro Honda and other kaiju directors, destroyed year after year by giant primates, turtles, moths, crustaceans, sea dragons, pterosaurs, mechanical monsters. (Mike Davis's eschatological account of Los Angeles as the cinematic and literary "disaster capital of the universe" perhaps empirically captures Tokyo better.⁵) Although Kenzo Tange's 1960 Metabolist vision of a modular city over Tokyo Bay flexible to process of growth and decline never came to fruition, cycles of calamity, demolition, and regeneration—paired with the legacy of Dodge Line "reverse course" austerity constraints imposed by U.S. occupation officials, which relegated many reconstruction efforts outside of transit and other infrastructural improvements to the private, sometimes informal, sector—continue to shape Tokyo's mosaic urban morphology.⁶ Architects Yoshiharu Tsukamoto and Ryuji Fujimura describe its current physical organization, however, as a "'Void Metabolism' as opposed to a 'Core Metabolism,'" in which "the voids that exist between freestanding houses continually [are] regenerated grain by grain," "[symbolizing] the urban dynamism not of concentration, but of the scattering of capital and political power in today's urban creation."⁷

⁵ Mike Davis, *Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 276

⁶ Hein, 226 – 227.

⁷ Yoshiharu Tsukamoto and Ryuji Fujimura, "Typo-Morphology of Tokyo," trans. Eric Shiner, *Perspecta* 20 (2008): 35.

Art Space Tokyo, a guidebook to a cross-section of Tokyo's 2000s contemporary art world, prefaces its maps and interviews with a tribute to the city's spatial distribution and elusiveness in the context of its contemporary art world:

The art spaces of Tokyo inhabit all manner of buildings. They are hidden down back alleys in private residences; they are tucked away in east-side blue-collar neighborhoods in dilapidated former warehouses; they occupy the upper floors of bland office complexes; or they may even spontaneously erupt for a single evening down a tiny backstreet in Shinjuku. People walk by them all the time without realizing they are there. Even determined art lovers, driven by word-of-mouth recommendations and armed with a map, can still find themselves standing right in front of their target and yet totally unable to see it.⁸

Non-Japanese visitors are often further impaired by the unfamiliar convention of block numbers used instead of street names in metropolitan addresses. While there are more galleries and museums in neighborhoods such as Ginza, Omotesando, and Roppongi than in others, they are generally compact and discreet given the shortage of large, open spaces in the postwar built environment, often located literally below ground or accessible only through inconspicuous side roads.⁹ Creative production and capital can likewise be found throughout all the textures of Beijing's urban tapestry, but, since the 1990s, its cultural infrastructures have also been consolidated into designated industrial districts, in part as the afterlife of the danwei, or work unit, as a core principle of communist urban and human organization.

⁸ Craig Mod and Ashley Rawlings, preface to *Art Space Tokyo*, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: PRE/POST, 2010), viii.

⁹ Christian Morgner, "Spatial Barriers and the Formation of Global Art Cities: The Case of Tokyo," *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 28 (2019): 192 – 193.

In this chapter, I examine art world exchanges across the creative urban environments of Tokyo and Beijing in the 2000s. More specifically, I focus on the use of the Olympic Games and its ancillary programming to service the transformation of Beijing into a “creative city” and the circulation of Japanese and other transnational capital within its arts and cultural landscapes. I show the ways in which the clustering of Beijing and Tokyo’s art worlds were and continue to be part of an overall intensification in regional exchange, competition, and cooperation in the creative and cultural industries within Asia that, in this case, serves to fortify a more resilient regional art market capable of surmounting local vulnerabilities. The pathways by which Beijing and Tokyo developed their respective contemporary arts and urban cultural infrastructures are shaped by differing world political circumstances and timelines, as well as dissimilar economic conditions and local and national urban and cultural policies; however, agents of the art world both analogized and contrasted the trajectories of the two capitals through historical and cultural linkages and their shared and rarefied status as Asian Olympic cities, both directly and indirectly. Superimposing Beijing’s urban transformation and “soft” infrastructural development on this political economy, I also draw out practices of regional inter-referencing in the artistic and curatorial output of 2000s Beijing, mainly through Tokyo Gallery + BTAP’s exhibition history in Beijing’s 798 Art Zone; through this, I demonstrate how these informal instances of creative diplomacy later helped cultivate a credible sense of contemporary “Asian art”—a category that, while often aesthetically variable, yields geopolitical intelligibility within an ever-cutthroat global art market.

Expanding on the Cold War exchanges budding between Japan and China, discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter refocuses on the interfacing of “hard” and “soft” infrastructural environments amid readjustments in industrial strategy and urban policy towards new modes of

production and exchange oriented to the creative and cultural sectors. The infrastructural process that defined the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games involved not only material transformation but soft forms of human-centered planning and cultural and technological services and amenities that increasingly prescribe the urban and visual identity of what it means to be an Olympic city in the twenty-first century. When it comes to Beijing's 2000s contemporary arts infrastructure, its development can be measured, zoned, and felt through the refurbishment and construction of arts districts and creative industrial parks; upticks in art sales are in turn calibrated according to the speculative assessment of the interregional and transnational creative milieu in which they are produced and exhibited.

The production of aesthetic, economic, and affective bonds between Beijing and Tokyo's art worlds over the last three decades are rationalized, motivated, and propelled by a set of interrelated factors. These factors include a feeling of cultural and geographic proximity and the leveraging of age-old historical and cultural bonds to mediate more recent geopolitical antipathies, legitimizing a renewed Asian regionalism. Increased exchange between the two capital cities is by no means an indication of insularity within the region; instead, each capital city's counterpart is imagined as a potential gateway to the rest of the world, and the desire for reciprocity is driven by shared ambitions to overcome local infrastructural and reputational deficiencies. This regionalization furthermore relies on the promise of mentorship afforded by the prospective flow of experience from a more professionalized art world to one less so, and the presence of Tokyo imports a quality of cosmopolitan knowhow and prestige to Beijing's art world institutions. It was in Japan, after all, that the first generation of China's internationally celebrated contemporary artists found early education and exhibition opportunities in the 1980s and 1990s; these artists include Huang Rui, Xu Bing, Cai Guo-Qiang, Zhang Huan, and Rong

Rong, many of whom were associated with the artist colonies and enclaves that have since been institutionalized into urban arts districts under new municipal planning agendas.

Despite Japan's prominence among other media and popular cultural forms and genres (anime, architecture, design, and fashion), however, observers of the Japanese art world have sometimes used the Galapagos metaphor to describe its status in the global market: "a scene producing an overload of distinctive and often bizarre art, out of step with global art theory and the global art market, largely ignored internationally, and far less successful than contemporary art from other Asian art hotspots, notably China, but also other recently emerged sources such as Korea and India."¹⁰ Compared to China, Japan has generated a lackluster proportion of global sales of contemporary art within a highly stratified market dominated by a few national players, sometimes even considered flyover country by collectors, international curators, and other cultural intermediaries; aside from a limited roster of seasoned, high-profile artists including Yayoi Kusama, Takashi Murakami, and Yoshitomo Nara, relatively few modern and contemporary Japanese artists, particular younger artists, register high on annual auction house reports or capture significant international recognition when it comes to art fairs and major exhibitions abroad. Access to Beijing's creative infrastructure through financial and social investment was therefore also understood as a route to sharpen Japan's competitive edge in the global marketplace of art and culture.

To briefly clarify the periodization of this chapter: in 2011, Chinese art auction sales reached a historic high, becoming the world's largest art auction market, before experiencing

¹⁰ Adrian Favell, "The Art Market in Galapagos: Japan and the Global Art World," in *Cosmopolitan Canvases: The Globalization of Markets for Contemporary Art*, eds. Olav Velthuis and Stefano Baia-Curioni (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 238.

one-and-off contractions throughout the decade since.¹¹ China remains among the top national marketplaces, posting \$4.1 billion USD in annual auction turnover in 2019, second to the United States at \$4.6 billion USD. Together, China and the United States made up nearly two-thirds of the global fine art market that year; Japan came in at seventh at \$111 million USD.¹² The term contemporary art is ambiguous—as art historian Wu Hung writes, “a systematic explanation was yet to be worked out to account for the creation and operation of a ‘local’ or ‘national’ contemporary in today’s world”;¹³ in the context of the art market, however, contemporary art simply refers to works produced by artists born after 1945.¹⁴ The analysis chapter will largely be confined to the period of growth in the market for Chinese contemporary art leading up to 2011.

This period of steep growth in the Chinese market heightened a perennial paradox of the proliferation of new art worlds: the market coherence of contemporary art, defined through its globalized sensibilities, hinges on steady access to new creative resources and locales outside of legacy epicenters such as London and New York where dealers, auction houses, and exhibition spaces have traditionally been concentrated. For example, Iain Robertson, former Head of Art Business Studies at Sotheby's Institute of Art, cautions:

But something fundamental and systemic had changed in 2008. [...] The decided shift in economic and political power towards Asia in particular is today reflected in the high monetary and symbolic value placed on classic works of Chinese art. [...] Popular art

¹¹ Artprice, *The Art Market in 2012: A dialogue between East and West*, 2013, 8.

¹² Artprice, *The Art Market in 2018, 2019*, 7 – 11.

¹³ Wu Hung, “A Case of Being ‘Contemporary’: Conditions, Spheres, and Narratives of Contemporary Chinese Art,” in *Contemporary Art in Asia: A Critical Reader*, eds. Melissa Chiu and Benjamin Genocchio (Cambridge: MIT Press), previously published in *Making History: Wu Hung on Contemporary Art* (Hong Kong: Timezone 8, 2008), 391.

¹⁴ Artprice, *The Art Market in 2023, 2024*, 49.

forms will certainly become more Asian in flavour and, crucially, religious and other ideological principles will restrain conduct and behaviour. Our museums and galleries will show more art inspired by non-Western traditions, and at times this will be difficult for a global art consumer to digest and for a market to process.¹⁵

Like many other critics, curators, and dealers who often describe this perceived shift as an invasion or takeover, the underlying anxiety in Robertson's teleology codes the projected popularity of new Asian art forms as both an imperative and a threat. The fruition of new arts and cultural infrastructures in the 2000s played a key role in driving art markets through iterative expansions of what it means to be contemporary, a process indexed to the continuous rise of new art worlds, from Beijing and elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia to the Gulf States. The ambivalence with which Asia's significance to the global potential of contemporary art is treated mirrors the logic under which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) sought to stage the Games in Asia as early as the 1920s, as a means of validating the universalism of the modern Olympic movement.

Zoning creativity

The modern Olympic Games and the commercializing world of art and design were party to a twinned legacy during the early 20th century, an alliance of sport and art—as well as science and technology—to be further extricated in the context of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics throughout this chapter. Early iterations of the modern Games issued medals for competitive events in music, literature, and the visual arts, and were on some occasions conducted among the

¹⁵ Iain Robertson, *New Art New Markets* (London: Lund Humphries, 2018), 221 – 222.

vast artistic and scientific festivities of the world's fairs.¹⁶ Later Olympic Games organized art festivals as adjuncts to the main sporting competitions and opening and closing ceremonies; this includes the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Arts Festival, a summer performing arts series where Pina Bausch's experimental West German dance company Tanztheater Wuppertal made its American debut.¹⁷ In 1993, each of the six cities vying for the 2000 Summer Olympic bid—Beijing, Berlin, Brasilia, Istanbul, Manchester, and Sydney—contributed objects of aesthetic and historical import to a group exhibition as an ancillary component of the candidature process; art historian José Milicua describes *Art Treasures*, the first show installed at the recently opened Olympic Museum in Lausanne and the first inter-city artistic contest of the sort, as an auspicious expression of the indivisible association of art and sport in the Olympic ideal on the precipice of the new millennium.¹⁸ National Organizing Committees continue to conscript trailblazing architects, artists, choreographers, designers, and filmmakers into the business of Olympic internationalism, bolstered by the growing circuit of freshly inducted Olympic cities.

The preparation process for the 2008 Olympics also corresponded with the imperative of “creative city” urban policy agendas taken up by cities around the world, or what geographer Jamie Peck refers to as the “urban creativity script,” which reorganizes cities as the geographical nerve center of competition against one another in their marshalling of human capital into and

¹⁶ David Goldblatt, *The Games: A Global History of the Olympics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016), 59.

¹⁷ Aljean Harmetz, “Olympic Arts Festival Opens in LA,” *New York Times*, June 2, 1984, 11.

¹⁸ José Milicua, introduction to *Art Treasures: Candidate Cities for the 2000 Olympic Games: Beijing, Berlin, Brasilia, Istanbul, Manchester, Sydney: From 23rd June to 3rd October 1993* (Lausanne: Olympic Museum, 1993), 15.

within the creative and cultural industries.¹⁹ According to Michael Keane, Beijing has accordingly remade its reputation into that of a “creative city” (rather than historical, cultural, or political), citing the goals of Beijing’s Eleventh Five Year Plan, passed in 2006. In addition to establishing an annual fund of 500 renminbi and various credit agreements with major Beijing banking institutions for creative enterprises, as well as easing constraints on foreign investments, the capital city was to also “‘seize the opportunity of the Olympic Games’ and [...] become the ‘national centre’ of art and performance, publishing and copyright trade, radio, TV, film production and trading antique and artworks trading, design, cultural tourism and cultural sports and recreation.”²⁰ In 2011, the Commission’s Twelfth Five Year Plan for post-Olympic Beijing detailed additional objectives for flagship cultural institutions and amenities, including an art trading center and performing arts center. Indeed, this shift in policy towards the cultural economy is evident in the value generated by Beijing’s cultural sector to the city’s gross domestic product, which increased from 4.89% in 2003 to 12.33% in 2010.²¹

Other chapters of this dissertation take a somewhat more “conventional” approach to infrastructure, by looking at the geopolitical dimensions of built, or “hard,” infrastructures like airports, satellites, and undersea cables; this chapter, as mentioned earlier, deals equally with the budding cultural and other “soft” infrastructural developments that helped shore up the city’s status as a rising international and regional hub for contemporary art and related creative and cultural industries in the 2000s. While art and cultural infrastructures are often transient and

¹⁹ Jamie Peck, “Struggling with the Creative Class,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 4 (2005): 765.

²⁰ Michael Keane, *China’s New Creative Clusters: Governance, Human Capital and Investment* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 87.

²¹ Keane, 86.

makeshift, Beijing saw an influx of resources and investment during these years that consolidated and fixed creative production in certain segments of the city, such as the 798 Art Zone, while the execution of smaller-scale events like exhibitions, festivals, and performances also began to fortify more durable regional and global art market connections. Leaving long-lasting material and imagined imprints on their host city, these connections continue to monumentalize the short-lived occasion of the Olympic Games and the cosmopolitan identity that the Olympic city moniker represents. Like with earlier Olympic Games, these cultural developments and experiences are both official and unofficial parts of Olympic programming, sometimes endorsed as official tourist destinations, and in other cases simply one aspect of the multitude of informal and kaleidoscopic satellite experiences that complement the staging of the Olympics.

Beijing's efforts to remake itself and its infrastructures in anticipation of the Olympic Games were concerned not only with physically and visually connoting a modern, cosmopolitan Olympic city identity but also strengthening the city's regional and transnational connectivity. Joshua Neves explains the futurological importance of the Olympic Games in developing the capital city's media urbanism in the context of its "Olympia era," the timeframe spanning "Beijing's victorious Olympic bid in July 2001, to the ninetieth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2011, and into the speculative future of the 2022 Beijing Winter Games."²² Neves argues that "such mega-events not only require the material remaking of the city, they also prepare the city as an image for global circulation, transforming it into a media capital."²³ Digital

²² Joshua Neves, *Underglobalization: Beijing's Media Urbanism and the Chimera of Legitimacy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 3.

²³Neves, 26.

mediation is a requisite component in the rollout of the creative urban strategies in 2000s Beijing, in turn part of a broader policy tendency in the region. As Xin Gu writes, creative city policy agendas in Asia have especially prioritized the embrace of digital technologies, including information and communications technologies (ICT) and smart urban infrastructures, to support cultural production, making culture “part of a mechanism for building a new cybernetic environment for a new Asian modernity” designed to recruit and retain global capital in various postindustrial arenas.²⁴

Prototypical of the urban creativity script that gained ground beginning in the 1990s and 2000s, the “Olympic city” concept has long designated cities as branding material and the geographical unit of inter-state and inter-city competition against one another through the IOC’s candidature process. Indeed, ambitions to sway the IOC and bring the Olympic Games home are in many cases the ideal cover for the adoption of new creative city urban development programs. The Olympic city concept has likewise imposed strong mandates for aspiring host cities to upgrade information and communications infrastructures—undersea cable systems, satellites, 5G cellular networks—capable of documenting and relaying large-scale events to a global public.²⁵ Such sweeping technological and infrastructural undertaking continue to be constitutive of the physical and symbolic identity of the creative city, in evermore high-tech terms. However, the developments assumed necessary for cities eager to recruit a “footloose” global creative class—the furnishing of the city experience with new cultural, leisure, and entertainment amenities,

²⁴ Xin Gu, “Creative Cities, Technological Utopianism, and Cultural Retrofitting,” in *Re-imagining Creative Cities in Twenty-First Century Asia*, eds. Xin Gu, Michael Kho Lim, and Justin O’Connor (Cham: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2020), 51 – 53.

²⁵ Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 147.

upgraded digital infrastructures, state-of-the-art architectural luster, and more—lend themselves to what Gu calls a process of “cultural retrofitting” whereby older cultural forms are transposed by investments in “new infrastructures that are attractive to international firms irrespective of local needs,” often resulting in the disturbance of existing creative milieus.²⁶

Gu argues that the process of cultural retrofitting in Asia—a set of largely deterritorialized template strategies rarely suitably attuned to specific cultural and local circumstances—are suggestive of a motivation to “catch up” with western counterparts that advances techniques of neoliberal governance, by merchandising culture as a sector of the economy. Gu writes,

It offers, on the surface, a hope that investing heavily in globally standardized cultural—and increasingly technological—infrastructure can be a direct route to a successful global city. Nevertheless, such urban technological utopianism requires what is often a crude cultural retrofitting, creating new conditions for cultural imperialism. By not nurturing a local urban cultural politics and policy, the new creative cities in Asia are at risk of re-entering another round of perpetual catching up, where western cultural knowledge, cultural values and ways of life are privileged over local ones.”²⁷

Analogously, much existing research on the Olympic Games—and much existing criticism of the corrosive influence of the Olympic city concept—likewise foregrounds the at-once nationalist and internationalist inflections of the Olympics, following an essentially world-systems outlook in which nations, especially those on the cusp of the world core, leverage the successful hosting and broadcasting of the Olympic Games to one-up and catch up with one another. Indeed, the

²⁶ Gu, 46.

²⁷ Gu, 53.

Olympic Games held in Asia—whether Japan, South Korea or China—are widely interpreted as debuts; through successfully hosting the Olympic Games and undergoing massive building and reconstruction programs, these nations inaugurate a new era in their national history and assert their parity with the west while also maintaining the pacifist spirit of Olympic internationalism. Through these and other large-scale public ceremonies, newly world-class Olympic cities metonymically dramatize their nation’s ascendance in the global economy. The often-contradictory relationship between the nationalist and internationalist values of the Olympic Games is well-studied, but, as I will show throughout this chapter, these criticisms of the Olympic concept also at times elide the regional character of the Olympic preparation process.

Beijing/avant-garde

Although known for its intractable sprawl, the basic spatial arrangement of Beijing is uniquely symmetrical and highly ordered. With the seat of Ming and Qing dynastic rule, the Forbidden City, at its center, Beijing is bisected east-to-west by a centuries-old road and orbited by a series of much newer concentric highways. Like Tokyo, which has kept much of its basic Edo-era urban geography over many phases of disaster and under layers of reconstruction,²⁸ Olympic and post-Olympic Beijing also retains significant continuities with this historic urban framework, despite major infrastructural and architectural changes. It is within and over this physical framework that Beijing has been given new functions and implemented its creative city planning objectives during the early years of the new millennium.

²⁸ Masami Kobayashi, “Urban Transformations from Edo to Tokyo: Process of Fragmented Structure of the City,” in *Tokyo Urbanism: From Hinterland to Kaiwai*, ed. Masami Kobayashi (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2024), 55.

Many major art museums and flagship cultural institutions were renovated or relocated during the Olympic preparation process, including the National Art Museum of China (NAMOC), located in walking distance northeast of the Forbidden City. NAMOC was the site of *China/Avant-Garde* in February 1989, the first large-scale national exhibit of Chinese contemporary art; the rowdy, two-week long exhibit—which was intermittently closed to museumgoers due to a hoax bomb threat and unauthorized performance pieces involving firearms, shrimp, feet washing,²⁹ condoms, and egg hatching³⁰—was Tokyo Gallery co-director Yukihiro Tabata’s first encounter with the cohort of emerging Chinese artists he would soon begin introducing to a Japanese public (to be further discussed later in the chapter).³¹ Cultural retrofitting, and the broader infrastructural process of Olympic preparation, is often an open-ended event: after a facelift in 2005, workers broke new ground for NAMOC in 2014; the unfinished project, designed by French firm Ateliers Jean Nouvel in collaboration with the Beijing Institute of Architectural Design (BIAD), will sometime soon anchor a new cultural district in Beijing Olympic Park, a venue of 130,000 square meters neighboring the Beijing National Stadium.

Between the IOC selection of Beijing as the 2008 Olympic host city in 2001 and the opening ceremony, Beijing industriously updated the architecture of its cultural infrastructural landscape. Beijing Capital Museum was relocated from a 700-year-old Confucius temple into a new, glass-swathed structure, capped by a flat, overhanging plane of a roof intended as an

²⁹ “中国现代艺术展引起争议,” *Renmin Ribao*, 4th ed., February 21, 1989.

³⁰ Li Xianting, “Confessions of a *China/Avant-Garde Curator*” (1989), in *Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary Documents*, ed. Wu Hung (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010), 117.

³¹ Interview with Yukihiro Tabata, “Between Tokyo and Beijing,” in Craig Mod and Ashley Rawlings, *Art Space Tokyo*, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: PRE/POST, 2010), 174.

abstraction of its architectural predecessor. Both the Museum of Contemporary Art Beijing and Songzhuang Art Museum opened in the eastern suburbs of the capital city, formalizing the artist village in Songzhuang as an official creative and cultural cluster ahead of the Olympic Games, along with the better-known and more centrally located 798 Art Zone. The Digital Beijing Building, a data center and technical support hub resembling a circuit board, was completed on the Olympic Green in 2007 and shortly after converted into an exhibition space for digital technology. In Beijing and elsewhere, unobtrusive, utilitarian infrastructure projects—such as new traffic control systems—are frequently complemented and framed by aesthetic developments designed entice global capital through the appearance of design and architectural expertise and cultural sophistication.³²

Avant-garde architectural developments in Beijing lend credence to critiques that the logic of cultural retrofitting often demands a revision of older cultural forms as “pre-modern, or regressive—as opposed to new modernising cultural forms from the developed West.”³³ Despite the dramaturgical weight given to the idea of tradition and national historical continuity in contexts like the opening ceremony—as a media event, effectively a high-tech homage to China’s cultural and scientific heritage—much of the city’s new construction simulates what Gu refers to as a “globally standardized” aesthetic blueprint. As the next chapter will also elaborate, the most extraordinary new airports, art museums, and sports stadiums worldwide are dreamt up by a handful of architectural firms at the top of the star system of the industry, who compete

³² Xuefei Ren, “Olympic Beijing: Reflections on Urban Space and Global Connectivity,” in *The Beijing Olympics: Promoting China*, ed. Kevin Caffrey (New York: Routledge, 2011), 16.

³³ Gu, 44.

against one another in international design competitions for landmark commissions.³⁴ In addition to NAMOC, Ateliers Jean Nouvel was responsible for the design of Museum of Art Pudong in Shanghai and the National Museum of Qatar in Doha. The studio Foster + Partners, which completed the new Terminal 3 at Beijing Capital International Airport just before the 2008 opening ceremony also produced designs for Chek Lap Kok International Airport in Hong Kong, Queen Alia International Airport in Amman, and Kuwait International Airport (a terminal add-on to the Kenzo Tange-designed main structure). The skylines of Beijing and other Chinese cities showcase the experiments of these primarily European “starchitects”—from the National Stadium (Herzog and de Meuron, nicknamed the “bird’s nest”) and China Central Television (CCTV) Headquarters (Rem Koolhaas, “big underpants”) to the Capital Museum (Jean-Marie Duthilleul) and the National Centre for the Performing Arts (Paul Andreu, “giant egg”)—albeit sometimes in partnership with local counterparts, and often with conceptual inflections of local heritage.

This monumentalization of city space was central to Beijing’s global recognition;³⁵ as scholarship on the topic often highlighted, “new infrastructures are promises made in the present about our future.”³⁶ The feeling of unusual possibility is captured by art critic Pi Li in a 2007 lecture:

³⁴ Xuefei Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 33 – 34.

³⁵ Sheldon Lu, *Contemporary Chinese Cinema and Visual Culture: Envisioning the Nation* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021), 158.

³⁶ Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta, “Temporarily, Politics, and the Promise of Infrastructure,” introduction to *The Promise of Infrastructure*, eds. Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 27.

Some of you probably know that Chinese contemporary art has become very popular internationally, and everybody's talking about China and the high prices of the art. There are so many shows about Chinese contemporary art. If you stay in Beijing you'll see how crazy it is in Beijing. No government in Europe or in the States could build the bird's nest stadium, or the CCTV tower, or the opera house, and make decisions over such a short time and make the buildings in such a short time. Most of my colleagues and I believe that Rem Koolhaas could never realize this kind of crazy project anywhere else in the world.³⁷

At the same time, the maintenance of older forms of urban and human organization have also been important for the development of Beijing's artistic ecosystem; beginning in the 1990s, artists moved into and transformed vacant siheyuan (high-walled courtyard) and danwei (work unit) structures around Beijing into villages for creative practice, taking advantage of their spatial enclosure and cellular design and, in some cases, saving them from planned demolition as they were later formalized as designated arts districts under state patronage.³⁸ Under Beijing's towering, eclectic skyline, the new millennium witnessed an influx in foreign investment in these urban arts districts; a surge in the valuation of contemporary works by Chinese artists—in 2008, Beijing-based painter Zeng Fanzhi's *Mask Series No. 6* sold for a record-breaking \$9.6 million USD at Christie's Hong Kong;³⁹ and the repatriation of overseas Chinese artists from Japan,

³⁷ Pi Li, "On Art, Urbanism, and Public Space in China, with Some Specific References to Caochangdi Village," in *Caochangdi, Beijing Inside Out: Farmers, Floaters, Taxi Drivers, Artists, and the International Art Mob Challenge and Remake the City*, Robert Mangurian and Mary-Ann Ray (Hong Kong: Timezone 8, 2009), 411.

³⁸ Christen Cornell, "The temporal pocket: 1990s Beijing artist colonies," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 19, no. 1 (2018): 64.

³⁹ Artprice, *2008 Art Market Trends*, 2009, 23

Europe, and the United States, some of whom were directly enlisted into the Olympic preparation process by the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG).

For both Beijing and Tokyo, the hosting of the Olympic Games and the physical transformations that accompany them were often interpreted as expressions of nationalist ambitions to achieve symbolic and economic parity with the west within a teleology of liberal progress, through their inclusion in the exclusive network of global Olympic cities. In Beijing, they were also vehicles for fashioning and affirming regional commercial and cultural linkages through transnational infrastructural development. In the previous chapter, I discussed the incipient concept of the postindustrial “information society” that was taking shape in postwar Japan; as the adoption of new real-time tracking and feedback mechanisms increased industrial efficiency and productivity, so did Japan’s competitive edge in the midcentury global economy. In 1981, sociologist Yoneji Masuda described the shift from an industrial society to a postindustrial information society as a future in which “‘the knowledge frontier’ *will become* the potential market.”⁴⁰ As Gu’s analysis also suggests, the creative city paradigm is an extension of this belief in the market potential of the intangible—I would argue, a technocratic application of it in the field of urban design—as cities transition away from heavy manufacturing. These industrial centers transition instead towards what Sharon Zukin describes as an “Artistic Mode of Production” that “transfers urban space from the old ‘world’ of industry to the ‘new’ world of finance, or from the realm of productive economic activity to that of nonproductive economic activity.”⁴¹

⁴⁰ Yoneji Masuda, *The Information Society as Post-industrial Society* (Bethesda: World Future Society, 1981), 31.

⁴¹ Sharon Zukin, *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change*, 25th anniversary ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 178.

Originally destined for demolition during the city's real estate boom during the early 2000s, the old factory remains of the 798 Art Zone were preserved and sanctioned as an official arts district, then promoted as one of Beijing's ten official tourist destinations during the 2008 Olympic Games. Julie Ren writes that the preservation of the 798 Art Zone was "a significant departure from the normalized experience of demolition in Beijing";⁴² Ren credits this rare reversal to the district's political leverage and social capital, its ability to draw large investments from abroad and the cosmopolitan background and international renown enjoyed by many of the artists associated with it.⁴³ Through the logic of historical preservation, however, the infrastructures of industrial production are made into cultural artifacts. Their transformation into cultural artifacts, according to Zukin, reinforces the "image that their economic function is dead," and thus the "urban-industrial infrastructure submits to the rules of the 'picturesque.'"⁴⁴ Put another way, the urban creativity script becomes warranted and is made common sense through the physical preservation and adaptive reuse of industrial legacy. For Beijing, the seeming obsolescence of older industries by way of their infrastructural rebirth also suggests the obsolescence of state enterprise and the danwei—the work unit system through which employment, housing, and public benefits were allocated and spatially managed⁴⁵—as the basic units of urban sociality. The logic of the danwei system has not in fact disappeared, however, but instead reconstituted into China's industrial parks and clusters; paradoxically, it was also the

⁴² Julie Ren, *Engaging Comparative Urbanism: Art Spaces in Beijing and Berlin* (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021), 2.

⁴³ Julie Ren, 72 – 73.

⁴⁴ Zukin, 180.

⁴⁵ David Bray, *Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), 192

distinct spatial features of the danwei compound that had pulled artists to places like the 798 Art Zone to begin with.

Regionalizing creativity

At the microcosmic level of inter-city regional diplomacy, rather than simply pitting cities against one another in a culturally vacant contest for capital, the economic and creative bonds encouraged and organized between the art worlds of Beijing and Tokyo are mobilized by a logic of cultural and economic complementarity, geographical proximity, and sense of historical closeness. These bonds are themselves an outgrowth of practices of cultural and artistic exchange dating to the 1950s—a “people-to-people” diplomacy exercised between Japan and China through traveling museum exhibitions, stage performances, and other art forms. In addition to the considerable volume of soybeans, fertilizer, steel, and so on exchanged during the Cold War despite the lack of official diplomatic relations, the arts—and leftist artists with links to Japan’s Communist and Socialist Parties—were another cornerstone of the two countries’ unofficial bilateral policy: when a delegation of Japanese painters traveled to Beijing to show work at the Forbidden City in June 1960, Chinese and Japanese speakers used the occasion to make appeals for friendship in shared opposition to the renewal of the United States-Japan Security Treaty (discussed in the previous chapter).⁴⁶ *The White-Haired Girl* is likely the best-known example of diplomacy based on artistic exchange. In 1958, the Tokyo-based Matsuyama Ballet Company adapted and staged the Chinese land reform opera *The White-Haired Girl* as a ballet. When Matsuyama Ballet Company toured Beijing in March of that year, a celebration for the overseas

⁴⁶ “北京举行日本现代画展览会,” *Renmin Ribao*, 5th ed., June 20, 1960.

performers, described by the Chinese state media as an “exchange of hearts,” was attended by more than 200 guests, where the National Opera announced plans to adapt a Japanese kabuki production, and dancers from the Japanese troupe socialized with Chinese performers who were part of earlier opera and feature film versions of ballet.⁴⁷

After diplomatic normalization, Japan provided trillions of yen in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) grants, soft loans, and technical cooperation projects on preferential terms towards China’s industrial and infrastructural drive. It was in no small part through ODA that Beijing became Olympic ready; the second and third terminals at Beijing Capital International Airport, were funded in part by ODA and other foreign loans.⁴⁸ People-to-people diplomacy after normalization continued through exchanges of artists, writers, and scholars, joint sporting events and film and television programs, and collaborative archaeological programs;⁴⁹ one standout instance were the “amity runs” on a restored South Manchuria Railway (SMR) locomotive organized by Japanese rail enthusiasts and Chinese rail authorities in the 1980s, although plans to recreate the full ten-hour long ride along the Dalian-Shenyang corridor were never actualized (reflective of the discomfort around SMR’s imperial history).⁵⁰ While people-to-people diplomacy cannot be fully separated from commercial interests, diplomacy through the arts has remained a centerpiece of Sino-Japanese friendship through the highs and lows of other diplomatic avenues, through threats of economic boycotts and suspension of ODA

⁴⁷ “中日艺术家心心相联,” *Renmin Ribao*, 4th ed., March 22, 1958.

⁴⁸ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Beijing Capital Airport Terminal Area Expansion Project,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2011, 11.

⁴⁹ Akira Iriye, “Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945 – 90,” *The China Quarterly* 124 (1990): 634 – 635.

⁵⁰ Jessamyn R. Abel, *Dream Super-Express: A Cultural History of the World’s First Bullet Train* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2022), 225 – 226.

disbursements and projects (including, once, in response to China's decision to continue testing nuclear missiles⁵¹) and periodic outbreaks of nationalist enmity among the public; anti-Japanese protests broke out, for example, across Chinese cities in 1985 for the first time after normalization in response to Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates the spirits of the Japanese war dead, including twelve Class A war criminals associated with the Second World War.⁵²

As Stephanie DeBoer has argued, collaborative transnational practices, such as Sino-Japanese film and television coproductions, signal more proximate diplomatic relations between nations. Like Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz's account of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's 1977 visit to Israel, which linked the television networks of Egypt and Israel,⁵³ the 1972 realignment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China was also, as DeBoer describes, "marked by a series of television images and, notably, by the first on-location satellite broadcast of Sino-Japanese encounter"; the broadcast included scenes of the first direct postwar Tokyo-Beijing airlift, made possible by a technical collaboration between CCTV and the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK).⁵⁴ A 1980 CCTV-NHK coproduction, a travelogue series titled *The Silk Road*, was celebrated by NHK as "the most fruitful Sino-Japanese cultural exchange in postwar history," sidestepping the political and fiscal unevenness of the decade-long production

⁵¹ Masayuki Masuda, "Japan's Changing ODA Policy Towards China," *China Perspectives* 47 (May/June 2003): 2.

⁵² Jessica Chen Weiss, *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 92.

⁵³ Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 197.

⁵⁴ Stephanie DeBoer, *Coproducing Asia: Locating Japanese-Chinese Regional Film and Media* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 85.

process;⁵⁵ DeBoer points out, however, that the series’ “conflation of ancient transnational exchange with that of today is a strategy that obscures more difficult and more recent realities, namely, of a recent past of imperial and wartime encounter and Cold War displacement.”⁵⁶

As DeBoer and others have shown, extensions of these practices of people-to-people diplomacy have also taken on a regional rather than bilateral character in Asia.⁵⁷ In her study of Korean wave (hallyu) cinema, Youngmin Choe describes this as a process of “Asianization” in which “the increased regional cooperation of often formerly antagonistic nations, particularly in East Asia, aimed at obtaining a competitive advantage in the global marketplace.”⁵⁸ In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, hallyu became central to South Korea’s cultural liberalization policies as “the banner under which a highly self-conscious, orchestrated plan, designed to disseminate Korean cultural products globally, was executed with governmental support and guidance.”⁵⁹ Transnational by definition—recognized as a phenomenon only in the context of its international appeal—and thus a departure from the values and production contexts by which an earlier South Korean national cinema had come into existence, hallyu, according to Choe, was part of larger interregional efforts to promote mediate difficult historical legacies that encumber profitable activities, by generating a new regional affective economy (in this case, between South Korea and its three closest neighbors: North Korea, China, and Japan).⁶⁰

⁵⁵ DeBoer, 89.

⁵⁶ DeBoer, 97.

⁵⁷ DeBoer, 185.

⁵⁸ Youngmin Choe, *Tourist Distractions: Traveling and Feeling in Transnational Hallyu Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 7.

⁵⁹ Choe, 198.

⁶⁰ Choe, 14.

As DeBoer writes, since these early years of Sino-Japanese coproductions, the terms of regional creative and cultural exchange have become increasingly mediated through China as “a central route of access to a rapidly expanding and progressing Asia.”⁶¹ The same sentiment was often echoed within Asia’s contemporary art world. In 2007, Tokyo-based gallerist and art dealer Sueo Mizuma, in Beijing to finalize the lease of his new gallery in the arts district of Caochangdi, pinpointed the city as a new regional hotspot for contemporary art trade, against which Tokyo already seemed “really provincial”; although mainland Chinese collectors, according to Mizuma, were not yet purchasing large quantities of art, access to foreign buyers from elsewhere in Asia and beyond had incentivized a rush of overseas gallerists to set up shop in the city.⁶² Mizuma, who in 2012 opened a third gallery in Singapore’s Gillman Barracks cluster, a colonial-era British military camp turned arts district,⁶³ reiterated a commonly held shortcoming of Japan’s art market infrastructure and artistic reputation: there is frustratingly tepid interest in Japanese contemporary art, domestically and internationally. Some attribute the lack of a mature market to Japan’s limited pool of domestic collectors; the insularity of the market has its origins in early art expos and the exclusive Tokyo Bijutsu Club, an early 20th century network of art dealers so exclusive that prospective members could only be accepted with the backing of multiple financial dealer-guarantors.⁶⁴ The conventional wisdom among gallerists and dealers was that, not only are there few art collectors in Japan, they also often

⁶¹ DeBoer, 154.

⁶² Edan Corkill, “Not in Beijing for the Chinese,” *Japan Times*, November 15, 2007, 21.

⁶³ Jeremie Molho, “Becoming Asia’s Art Market Hub: Comparing Singapore and Hong Kong,” *Arts* 10, no. 2 (2021): 13.

⁶⁴ Robertson, 39.

prefer western art or Japanese craftwork and antiquities over contemporary works; Tokyo Gallery + BTAP's Yukihiro Tabata mused that "when it comes to buying artwork, the Japanese have spent phenomenal amounts of money on the Impressionists and on contemporary art from the U.S.—12 billion yen on a Renoir or a Van Gogh, and so on. The Japanese like to spend big on Western art, and yet they don't buy Japanese artwork."⁶⁵

As Christian Morgner puts it, "Tokyo's art world remains invisible not only to outsiders but to Tokyo itself."⁶⁶ The lukewarm market is also counterintuitively the consequence of a seasoned creative environment, encompassing a "complex field of art institutions and go-between Japanese curators" puzzling to those outside of it.⁶⁷ This social and spatial environment have contributed to the "Galapagosization"⁶⁸ of Japanese contemporary art and sometimes alienate potential cultural intermediaries, including established international curators competing to uncover new talent, "who would act as discussants, arbiters, and interpreters of the internal (local) scene to the outside world";⁶⁹ instead, "the likes of [Hans Ulrich Obrist] and [Hou Hanru] found it much easier to call the shots elsewhere."⁷⁰ The literal spatial obscurity of the art world is further compounded by what Nobuko Kawashima describes as a history of governmental indifference to the creative and cultural sectors. Public expenditure towards the arts only began to increase in the 1990s when, like in other cities driven by the urban creativity script, culture

⁶⁵ Interview with Tabata, 176.

⁶⁶ Morgner, 183.

⁶⁷ Favell, 259.

⁶⁸ Favell, 238.

⁶⁹ Favell, 255.

⁷⁰ Favell, 259.

became more closely integrated into urban development schemes. However, investment in flagship cultural institutions were motivated largely as new capital construction projects, disconnected from the context of creative production and what might go inside these new spaces.⁷¹

Given these impediments, during the 2000s, some Japanese galleries instead looked abroad to China and other Asian countries, whether participating in international art fairs or establishing more permanent ties. After Tabata set up a satellite location of Tokyo Gallery in the 798 Art Zone in 2002, others trailed him to Beijing. Creative prestige and capital cycle through Beijing through its arts districts and creative cultural clusters. With the arrival of high-profile contemporary arts spaces such as the Danish Faurschou Foundation and the New York-based Pace Gallery, the 798 Art Zone networks Asia into the regional and global contemporary art markets. Still, regional economic asymmetries and the comparative low cost of rent were also part of what attracted foreign gallerists, although they also often found the rental process and rental terms challenging to navigate.⁷² As Yumie Wada of Wada Fine Arts in Tokyo and Y++ in Beijing recounted, a space the size of a small museum in Beijing “can be run at a fraction of the cost of a cramped, nondescript Tokyo space.”⁷³

I would not, however, describe interest in China from Japanese curators, gallerists, and dealers as entirely opportunistic, although many were no doubt driven by commercial motivations. Some signaled a feeling of personal responsibility in using the cultivation of Asian

⁷¹ Nobuko Kawashima, “The Development of Art Projects in Japan: Policy and Economic Perspectives,” *FIELD* 8, (2017), <https://field-journal.com/issue-8/the-development-of-art-projects-in-japan-policy-and-economic-perspectives/>.

⁷² Julie Ren, 119.

⁷³ Olivier Krischer, “Betting on Beijing,” *Japan Times*, August 21, 2008, 19.

talent to negotiate the difficult regional legacies left by the Second World War. In a foreword to the 2007 exhibition catalog for *What is Mono-ha?* held in Beijing, Tabata writes that “[...] in Mono-ha’s form of expression one can discern a perspective on nature that is shared throughout the Asian region. [...] In the recent past, Japan has been the cause of some of Asia’s unhappiness, but I truly hope that Asia will overcome these problems and look towards a future of mutual cooperation.”⁷⁴ Elsewhere, Tabata situated Asia as a potential powerhouse of artistic talent but reasoned that “the only problem is whether or not these countries can improve their relations with each other. If they can, they will share a phenomenal power. [...] When Japanese, Korean and Chinese people actually meet and work together, they realize how much they have in common.”⁷⁵ Others saw themselves as lending order and expertise to an arena that was still lawless or otherwise behind Japan. Yoichiro Kurata, president of one of Japanese’s largest auction houses, reflected that although “the strength of China’s economy is helping to fuel the rise of the Asian region as a whole,” when it comes to the art market, “the Chinese have no rules! [...] I think that artists should concentrate on making their artworks and leave the business side to the galleries that represent them. The market needs high-quality art, and you can’t really get that when artists are only thinking about how to make money.”⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Yukihiro Tabata, foreword to *What is Mono-ha?* (Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007), 14.

⁷⁵ Interview with Tabata, 178.

⁷⁶ Interview with Yoichiro Kurata, “Bidding for a Better Market,” in Craig Mod and Ashley Rawlings, *Art Space Tokyo*, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: PRE/POST, 2010), 214.



Figure 3: Installation view from What is Mono-ha? exhibition catalog, Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007

The floating world of Olympic-era Beijing

In talking about Olympic-era Beijing, Japanese curators and gallerists often analogized the city with Olympic-era Tokyo. The previous chapter discussed the many ways in which Japan was physically and symbolically networked into the international system during and around the time of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. One exhibition organized by the Museum of Contemporary Art, Tokyo in 1996—a couple of years before the Olympics were scheduled to return to Japan for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympic Games—explicitly used 1964 as a framing device for evolutions in postwar Japanese art; 1964 is presented as a major “turning point,” citing

artist Domoto Hisao's success that year at the Venice Biennale, the prestigious international art festival sometimes called the "Olympics of the art world."⁷⁷ In the case of both countries, the hosting of the Olympic Games in their capital cities was sometimes brought up by artists, critics, and curators as a measure or metaphor for artistic development, while the Olympics were also often taken up as a curatorial refrain: artist Yuan Shun's solo show at Tokyo Gallery + BTAP during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games featured a series of 2D and 3D reworkings of the National Stadium.⁷⁸

Tabata and his brother and co-director Hozu Yamamoto, in writings and interviews, also frequently remarked on similarities between 2000s Beijing and 1960s Tokyo. Writing about *What is Mono-ha?*, Yamamoto makes the case that the themes and forms conjured by Mono-ha, which experienced its peak in activity between the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games and the 1970 Osaka Expo, have now become relevant again as the Beijing Olympics near.⁷⁹ *What is Mono-ha?* was the first major survey of the movement in China, comprised of sculptural compositions of naturally-occurring as well as refined industrial materials such as iron, cotton, wood, paper, and stone. The exhibition was divided across two locations: works from established Mono-ha figures, including Lee Ufan (a Korean émigré) and Nobuo Sekine, were staged in the main space in the 798 Art Zone, while pieces by younger Chinese artists influenced by the movement were placed in a separate annex in a nearby neighborhood. The curatorial intention behind the two-part exhibition was to "create coherence between the work of the Chinese artists, and those of the

⁷⁷ Yaguchi Kunio, *1964: A Turning Point in Japanese Art* (Tokyo: Museum of Contemporary Art Tokyo, 1996), 187.

⁷⁸ Yuan Shun's "0" Project (Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2008), 25 – 26.

⁷⁹ Hozu Yamamoto, foreword to *What is Mono-ha?* (Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007), 15.

Mono-ha artists. For these Chinese artists, Japanese Mono-ha is both a forerunner and something to surpass.”⁸⁰ Although comparisons of the two Olympic cities produce an affective and rhetorical bond between them in service of a regional sense of place, I also detect a trace of belatedness in these references to the Chinese context and, in this specific case, in the spatial separation of these two bodies of work; but in turn, comparisons like these help rationalize the export and import of experience and expertise, much like Japanese technical assistance in the infrastructural fields of railways, airports, and so on.

While I think it would be impossible to fully detach the logic of people-to-people diplomacy or cultural diplomacy from the logic of economic exchange, many of the early connections between the art worlds of Beijing and Tokyo came together informally as movement restrictions between the two countries relaxed, in circumstances that were unlikely to be financially rewarding. As mentioned earlier, Yukihiro Tabata’s first encounter with Chinese contemporary art was through *China/Avant-Garde* at NAMOC in 1989, after hearing about it through Chinese art students studying abroad in Japan.⁸¹ The exhibition was enormous, with 293 works by 186 artists, and was the first large-scale show of contemporary works curated by critics and sponsored by non-academic groups.⁸² It was also controversial, even among some of the artists themselves; one complained that his work had become unrecognizable after it was covered in condoms by someone else’s unauthorized performance piece.⁸³ Controversy turned the show

⁸⁰ Huang Du, “Japanese ‘Mono-ha’ in China,” in *What is Mono-ha?* (Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007), 45.

⁸¹ Interview with Tabata, 174.

⁸² “Chronicle 1976 – 2006,” in *Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary Documents*, ed. Wu Hung (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010), 417.

⁸³ Hang Jian and Cao Xiao’ou, “A Brief Account of *China/Avant-Garde*” (1989), in *Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary Documents*, ed. Wu Hung (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010), 123.

into a local sensation—it attracted large crowds after one participating artist, Xiao Lu, opened gunfire on her own work, an installation of two side-by-side, glass telephone booths, on opening day⁸⁴—but news of the exhibition soon made its way through global channels.

Under Takashi Yamamoto’s direction (Tabata’s father and the founder of Tokyo Gallery), Tokyo Gallery had been promoting Korean art since the 1970s,⁸⁵ and after *China/Avant-Garde*, Tabata sought to bring Chinese contemporary art to a Japanese audience. Tabata recalled *China/Avant-Garde* as “still a work in progress,” “a little behind Western and Japanese art, but [with] a lot of power”;⁸⁶ Beijing-based artist Xu Bing had stood out to Tabata in particular. The two lost touch for some months in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident that June, and a proposed solo show at Tokyo Gallery was postponed until 1991. Instead, Tabata acquired works from *China/Avant-Garde* through contacts in Shanghai, organizing one of the first overseas exhibitions of Chinese contemporary art at Tokyo Gallery in the district of Ginza in July 1989.⁸⁷

The introduction to *Contemporary Art in Asia* describes 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympic Games, as one which “may well be remembered in American art history as that in which Asia stormed the citadel of the New York art world,” when two major cultural institutions hosted retrospectives of contemporary Asian artists: Cai Guo-Qiang at the Guggenheim

⁸⁴ Li, 119.

⁸⁵ Tabata, 14.

⁸⁶ Interview with Tabata, 174.

⁸⁷ *Tokyo Gallery + BTAP: 1950 – 2010*, 187.

Museum, and Takashi Murakami at the Brooklyn Museum.⁸⁸ Cai's gunpowder paintings had also just sold for an astronomical \$9.5 million USD at an auction at Christie's Hong Kong the year before.⁸⁹ Cai was another high-profile, Chinese-born artist who spent formative time in Japan during a height of people-to-people diplomacy, living in Tokyo and Iwaki from 1986 to 1995 between studying at Shanghai Theatre Academy and leaving for the United States. After Tokyo Gallery organized *Chinese Contemporary Artists Now* in July 1989, more shows of Chinese contemporary art in Japan quickly followed: *Asian New Wave: China* at Tokyo Gallery and *Exceptional Passage: Chinese Avant-Garde Artists* at Fukuoka City Museum in 1991; and *Toward Tomorrow* at Tokyo Gallery in 1992. Cai, who would soon become a heavyweight in global art circles and receive a commission from the IOC and BOCOG to direct visual and special effects for the 2008 Beijing Olympic opening and closing ceremonies, participated in all three, in addition to a solo show at Tokyo Gallery (and various others across Japanese cities) in 1994.⁹⁰ By then, Cai was beginning to receive international acclaim, particularly for his land art piece, *Project for Extraterrestrials*, a time-based work symbolically and temporarily elongating the Great Wall at its western terminus by discharging kilometers of light and smoke through the use of explosives. In 1999, he was awarded the international prize at the Venice Biennale.

Several of China's leading art stars held key creative roles in putting on the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games: Ai Weiwei worked with Swiss architects Herzog and de Meuron in the design

⁸⁸ Melissa Chu and Benjamin Genocchio, "What is Contemporary Asian Art? Mapping an Evolving Discourse," introduction to *Contemporary Art in Asia: A Critical Reader*, eds. Melissa Chiu and Benjamin Genocchio (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 1.

⁸⁹ Artprice, 2009, 5.

⁹⁰ "94この1年 伝統とモダンの出会い検証 目立ったアジア興隆の流れ," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 14, 1994, 11.

of the National Stadium (although he later distanced himself from the project); iconoclast Fifth Generation filmmaker Zhang Yimou directed the opening and closing ceremonies; and Cai was in charge of the pyrotechnic displays. The Olympic Games were also bookended by two major exhibitions at NAMOC as part of its official Olympic cultural programming: *Synthetic Times: Media Art China 2008* was an international exhibition of new media art and interactive installations, featuring 40 works by artists from over 30 countries; after its closure, Cai's Guggenheim show made its way to NAMOC, opening halfway through the Olympic Games, in his first large-scale show in mainland China since leaving for Japan in 1986. Xu Bing, who had been living in the United States since 1990, was invited back to Beijing by the Central Academy of Fine Arts—by far China's most renowned and selective art school—to take on a vice-presidential role. Many other diasporic and expatriate artists held major exhibitions in China in 2008, enfranchised by newfound institutional support for contemporary art practice and exhibition.⁹¹

Thinking about the opening ceremony in its urban context—and within this broader ecology of sites, events, and activities—better situates the Olympic preparation process as part of Beijing's transformation into a creative city. The high-tech spectacle of the opening ceremony could certainly be read as a sign of China's technological and creative dexterity, interpolating ancient technological innovations into a progressive national historical trajectory. The performance required the manpower of thousands of performers and technicians, opening with the unfurling of an incandescent, touch-responsive LED scroll stretched across the stadium floor. In one sequence, a soloist performs classical choreography on top of a bolt of silk, raised above head by a procession of travelers moving across projections of Silk Road mountain ranges. Later,

⁹¹ Colin Chinnery, "Beijing," *Artforum* (December 2008): 241.

floating astronauts partition the LED screen, and an illuminated globe emerges from beneath the National Stadium; rows of acrobats tumble across its latitudes, as if to propel its orbit. The opening ceremony and its narrative of technological progress—from the invention of paper to space light—brought an orderly thematic closure to China’s historical arc, but it also showcased its breadth of technical and artistic expertise under the international spotlight: framed by the crosshatched steel beams of the National Stadium and Beijing’s glistening skyline, the performance was itself a testament to the city as a resource for the creative and cultural industries. Dramaturgical readings of the opening ceremony often subordinate the transnational dynamics of creative exchange to a simpler teleological narrative about the rise of China vis-à-vis the west, but there is also a much more interesting backstory here about the regional character of artistic production.

In 2002, Yukihiro Tabata secured an empty factory space in the 798 Art Zone with the help of Huang Rui, a Chinese artist friend who had recently returned to Beijing after living and working in Osaka.⁹² The site of a former state enterprise, a red banner bearing the slogan “Chairman Mao is the red sun of our hearts” overlooked the refurbished space. Beijing Tokyo Art Projects’ inaugural show was called *Beijing Afloat*, or *Beijing: Ukiyo-e*, named after Edo period woodblock prints of the “floating world”; the curator was Feng Boyi, another Beijing art world figure with professional ties to Japan. The title constructs an obvious textual link to Japan but was also chosen as an art historical allegory for early 2000s Beijing and the “absurdity of postmodern consumer culture”: as Feng explains, the “world of painstaking self-cultivation” depicted in early ukiyo-e works was replaced over time by images of decadence and pleasure-

⁹² “BTAP (Beijing Tokyo Art Projects) Opens,” in *Tokyo Gallery + BTAP: 1950 – 2010* (Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2010), 319.

seeking.⁹³ In contrast to the kind of smooth historical arc suggested by the opening ceremony, many of the works in the exhibition contain some sort of temporal intrusion into the urban landscape. Huang Rui's wall-size black-and-white photographs document a performance by a group of women on a shopping spree on Wangfujing Street, one of Beijing's major commercial districts, dressed in Qing-era Manchu attire.⁹⁴ Described by Feng as a "graveyard of constantly expanding desire,"⁹⁵ Ma Han's work is a familiar city map of Beijing—its basic outline having been intact for centuries—but the streets are collaged together by over 1,000 high-angle miniature photographs of street traffic; the morphology of Beijing's ring roads are still recognizable, only substituted by a dense constellation of flattened images of buses, pedestrians, and sedans.⁹⁶

In a roundtable discussion about the process of organizing *Beijing Afloat*, Wang Gongxin, one of China's first video artists, brought up the challenges of putting on a "serious" art show with little domestic institutional support:

When Feng Boyi first invited me to be in this exhibition, I was a little worried—exhibiting video work can be quite troublesome, there are some very definite requirements concerning space and equipment. After all it had to be on show for three months! It wasn't a short term, casual exhibition. The result was that they bought some

⁹³ Feng Boyi, "Imagining the Floating World, Dreaming of a Floating Life: about the title 'Beijing Afloat' and other things," in *Beijing Tokyo Art Projects Opening Exhibition: Beijing Afloat* (Beijing: Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2002), 18 – 21.

⁹⁴ *Beijing Tokyo Art Projects Opening Exhibition: Beijing Afloat* (Beijing: Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2002), 24 – 25.

⁹⁵ Feng, 20.

⁹⁶ *Beijing Tokyo Art Projects Opening Exhibition: Beijing Afloat* (Beijing: Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2002), 30 – 31.

very high-grade projection equipment in Tokyo; I was moved by this and also really excited.”⁹⁷

Several of the participating artists described *Beijing Afloat* as their first “real” exhibition in Beijing, the norm being hastily put together, short-term “hit-and-run affairs.”⁹⁸ The art worlds of Tokyo and Beijing were not coeval, but the relationship of exchange was based on a logic of complementarity, not parity. Wang’s appraisal echoes that of Yoichiro Kurata and others, remarking that “we should develop normal commercial operations, because we all have to live.” The environment was only functionally lawless; it was in fact highly regulated, and public exhibitions had to closely follow government rules. But by the 1990s, many artists were no longer satisfied putting on private shows in their home city as they received increasing acclaim abroad, in apartment complexes attended only by artist friends and curious foreigners.⁹⁹

Often, these moments before professionalization are later nostalgically cherished as periods of unadulterated artistic activity, as in the case of Kunsthaus Tacheles in East Berlin following German reunification. In China, some saw the establishment of new exhibition channels as a necessary pathway to legitimizing experimental art. The 2000 Shanghai Biennale, headed by a high-profile, international curatorial team (Hou Hanru, a Chinese-born, Paris-based curator, and Toshio Shimizu from Japan), was another effort to reform exhibition regulations.¹⁰⁰

Others opposed cooperation with public art institutions. Ai Weiwei and Feng Boyi’s *Fuck Off*

⁹⁷ Discussing ‘Beijing Afloat,’” in *Beijing Tokyo Art Projects Opening Exhibition: Beijing Afloat* (Beijing: Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2002), 71.

⁹⁸ “Discussing ‘Beijing Afloat,’” 71.

⁹⁹ Wu Hung, “‘Experimental Exhibitions’ of the 1990s,” in *Reinterpretation: A Decade of Experimental Chinese Art*, eds. Wu Hung, Wang Huangsheng, and Feng Boyi (Guangzhou: Guangdong Museum of Art, 2002), 85 – 87.

¹⁰⁰ Wu, “‘Experimental Exhibitions’ of the 1990s,” 94.

(the title translates more literally to “ways of not cooperating”) was conceived as an counter-event to the official Biennale, drawing substantial attention from the international art world after it was shut down by authorities.¹⁰¹ By the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the city possessed a highly developed infrastructural arsenal for the production, exhibition, and sale of contemporary art—a transformation in no small part indebted to decades of regional exchange.

Massless Beijing, borderless Tokyo

Massless Beijing is a very different kind of floating world. In 2022, teamLab, the Tokyo-based media art collective, opened a permanent immersive museum in Chaoyang Joy City, a high-end shopping mall located in the east of the city. Massless Beijing shares the top floor of the mall with another arts institution, U2 by UCCA Center for Contemporary Art, established in the 798 Art Zone by a Belgian art collector duo in 2007. The new museum’s centerpiece is the namesake installation *Massless Clouds Between Sculpture and Life*, a floating white cloud that repairs itself as visitors walk in and out of its vaporous form.¹⁰² All of teamLab’s interactive and immersive works are themed around the transcendence of physicality through digitization; in one interview, teamLab described digital technologies as an evanescent, non-intrusive alternative to physical media: “Digital technologies such as sensing, networks, light, and sound are non-material and have no physical impact on the environment. By using such non-material digital technologies, nature or historical sites can be turned into living art, without harming them.”¹⁰³ In

¹⁰¹ Melissa Chu, “On Ai Weiwei,” *Social Research* 83, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 176.

¹⁰² teamLab, “teamLab’s 10,000-sqm Immersive Museum teamLab Massless to Open in Beijing in 2022,” press release, vol. 1, February 18, 2022.

¹⁰³ Laura Lee, *Worlds Unbound: The Art of teamLab* (Chicago: Intellect, 2022), 337

this light, the self-healing abilities of Massless Beijing’s installation unwittingly rehearses a popular perception of the cloud (as in cloud computing) as a cultural fantasy, one that, in Tung-Hui Hu’s words, “actively erases its own historicity” and inscribes a sense “of computing power as a virtually unlimited resource.”¹⁰⁴

teamLab launched in Tokyo in 2001 with five founding members; the collective now includes an international workforce of over 600 engineers, animators, designers, programmers, mathematicians, architects, and artists.¹⁰⁵ By some accounts, teamLab could be considered among Japan’s most accomplished when it comes to contemporary art, although traditional art sales are a poor gauge of success—how does someone purchase a room-scale puff of illuminated white cloud? teamLab works are immensely popular; although occupancy is typically managed through timed ticketing systems, exhibitions are busy enough that there is often no way to discern whether an installation’s effects are preprogrammed to appear random or generated in real-time to visitor movement. In 2018, teamLab Borderless in Tokyo drew 2.3 million visitors, becoming the most popular “single-artist” museum in the world, attracting more visitors than the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam and double that of all three Salvador Dalí museums in Spain combined.¹⁰⁶ When asked if teamLab’s art can be sold and bought, cofounder Toshiyuki Inoko replied, “Actually, some museums have a teamLab collection. Honestly speaking, we believe giving a meaningful experience is much more important than having expensive artwork.”¹⁰⁷ But

¹⁰⁴ Tung-Hui Hu, *A Prehistory of the Cloud* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 146.

¹⁰⁵ Lee, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Naomi Rea, “teamLab’s Tokyo Museum Has Become the World’s Most Popular Single-Artist Destination, Surpassing the Van Gogh Museum,” *Artnet News*, August 7, 2019, <https://news.artnet.com/art-world/teamlab-museum-attendance-1618834>.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Toshiyuki Inoko, “TeamLab Co-Founder Toshiyuki Inoko on How He Went From High-School Prankster to an Architect of the Art World’s Experience Economy,” by Katie Rothstein,

the viability of teamLab projects depends completely on the experience economy and the commercial use of physical space: one overseas exhibition of teamLab's work in 2017 drew half a million visitors, translating to over \$10 million USD in ticket sales.¹⁰⁸

teamLab's borderless concepts also belie the territorial logic of regional creative exchange: with installations linking Doha, Jeddah, Kuala Lumpur, Riyadh, Seoul, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Singapore, Taipei, and more, teamLab in effect maps an emerging creative city network across Asia's expanse. Currently, the teamLab collective is nearing completion on Phenomena, a 17,000 square meter museum of immersive, multisensory experiences on Saadiyat Island off the coast of Abu Dhabi, where a new Guggenheim Museum, built by workers reportedly under extraordinarily miserable and hazardous conditions, is also set to soon open.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps the Olympic Games is already or will very soon become outdated as the preferred vehicle for signaling a city's "up-and-coming" or creative status, replaced instead by a new prestigious ecosystem of teamLab installations, Guggenheim locations, and biennales and triennales.

Artnet News, March 19, 2021, <https://news.artnet.com/career-stories/career-stories-teamlab-toshiyuki-inoko-1953102>.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Inoko.

¹⁰⁹ Guy Mannes-Abbott, "Laboring One to Seven (Island of Terror)," *e-flux* 65 (May 2015), <https://e-flux.com/journal/65/336378/laboring-one-to-seven-island-of-terror/>.

CHAPTER 4: Asia In-flight (2020/2022)

In one sense, Beijing Daxing International Airport typifies the “non-place” concept identified by anthropologist Marc Augé; writing in 1992 on the anomic spatial experiences produced under supermodernity, Augé characterizes these globalized non-places as transitory and culturally generic, orderly and clinical. They are “the real measure of our time,” quantifiable “by totalling all the air, rail and motorway routes, the mobile cabins called ‘means of transport’ (aircraft, trains and road vehicles), the airports and railway stations, hotel chains, leisure parks, large retail outlets, and finally the complex skein of cable and wireless networks that mobilize extraterrestrial space for the purposes of a communication so peculiar that it often puts the individual in contact only with another image of himself.”¹ Passengers, individuated but deflated of their relational and locational specificity, move fluidly through the instructional protocols of one non-place to another. Beijing Daxing International Airport is the archetypical, mediated non-place of the current century. It seeks seamlessness through a paperless, digital infrastructure, meant to effortlessly guide travelers from the city center to the rapid transit station, through security check and retail options, to one’s assigned gate, aircraft, seat, and destination. This idealized, software-facilitated procedural and spatial seamlessness—described by Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge as a sort of “code/space” in which airport “spatiality is the product of code, and code exists in order to produce spatiality”²—is also reciprocated in its physical design: parts of Beijing Daxing International Airport literally have no functional, visible seams, its cavernous

¹ Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, trans. John Howe (New York: Verso Books), 79.

² Roy Kitchin and Martin Dodge, *Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 96.

central atrium anchored by bright white hyperboloid columns that cascade smoothly upwards into the building's ceilings.




Figure 4: Beijing Daxing International Airport, Zaha Hadid Studios

Rather than exemplifying the generic, globalized non-place, it is the infrastructural outcome of a specific time and place; the execution of a megaproject like Beijing Daxing International Airport, taking just under five years, would be unthinkable elsewhere. Beginning in 1990s and accelerating through the 2000s, China embarked on a colossal building program, the velocity and scale of which are historically unmatched. As Xuefei Ren has documented, China became the largest construction market in the world during this time.³ Urban mosaics of

³ Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 57.

signature, experimental architecture metamorphosed China's skylines, from Beijing to Shanghai's Pudong district to the clustered cities of the Pearl River Delta. Within this economy of transnational design and construction, Ren writes, "elite international architects are sought after by local private developers as a branding strategy to differentiate their properties, by city officials as a way of promoting their political careers, and by the Chinese state to articulate national ambitions."⁴ When it comes to instrumentalizing architecture to articulate national ambitions, airport projects are perhaps especially significant as a nation's physical and figurative gateway, the seamless curves often found in contemporary airport architecture a stylish reflection of ambitions of global seamless connectivity.

Airport projects are also especially onerous. They are frequently troubled by legal hurdles, construction delays, cost overruns, and other exigencies. On the extreme end, Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, a piece of infrastructure intended as a symbol of German reunification, famously missed its opening date seven times. It finally opened in 2020, nine years overdue (flouting tropes about German efficiency). Bungled by mismanagement and indecision—using up six years just to finalize a site for development—the airport took three full decades from conception to operation.⁵ By comparison, Beijing Daxing International Airport, the world's largest single-building airport terminal, broke ground in December 2014 and had begun

⁴ Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 18.

⁵ "Flughafen BER ist eröffnet mit neun Jahren Verspätung" *Deutsche Welle*, October 30, 2020, <https://spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/berlin-flughafen-ber-eroeffnet-mit-neun-jahren-verspaetung-a-f5648c1b-558f-4529-93e4-554ef0de0088>.

operating commercial passenger flights by September 2019, following an international design competition announced in 2011.⁶

The recent phrases of airport construction and expansion in Beijing map readily onto the city's Olympic chronology. In 1999, several months before the city submitted its bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, Beijing Capital International Airport opened a second terminal to handle international flights, just as inbound tourism to China was on the rise after twenty years of economic reform. Although Beijing's overall civic infrastructural development was considered weaker than that of other shortlisted candidates, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was satisfied that the city could fill the infrastructural gaps necessary to stage the Games, based on the strong political support the city and central governments demonstrated throughout the bidding process.⁷ In 2002, the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) released its roadmap for the city's pre-Olympic preparations, which included large-scale plans to upgrade the city's transit infrastructures and expand the existing airport.⁸ In February 2008, with the opening ceremony less than half a year away, Beijing Capital International Airport's Terminal 3 (T3) began operations, another product of an international design competition completed in record time that, along with other Olympic constructions programs, resulted in the displacement and relocation of countless long-time residents.

⁶ Zaha Hadid Architects, Beijing Daxing International Airport, <https://zaha-hadid.com/architecture/beijing-new-airport-terminal-building/>.

⁷ Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 146.

⁸ Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 147.

This chapter focuses on the role of airport architecture as part of the Olympic infrastructural process, as Tokyo and Beijing each prepared to stage the Olympic Games for a second time. Asia's new airports, many rated the best in the world by Skytrax and other industry trades and organizations, are infrastructural evidence of and instruments for deepening interregional and international connectivity. From the "East Asian miracles" of the 1990s to the triple Olympic Games taking place in Asia between 2018 and 2022, Asia as a site of growth and potential domination have stirred forecasts of an "Asian century," particularly as other national and regional economies undergo prolonged stagnation. Within these projections of the Asian century, Asia, in Nicola Spakowski's words, "is not a concrete place but the rough direction capitalism has to take in order to rejuvenate and regain momentum."⁹ Through Tokyo and Beijing's aviation infrastructure, in this chapter, I look at how these infrastructures underwrite the broader developmental trajectory of the region. In terms of the timing, 2008 onwards also marks a more risk-averse orientation on the part of the IOC, adopted in response to economic and geopolitical precarities that have wrinkled the appeal of the Olympic Games for many would-be host cities. Through bid materials from prospective host cities and other IOC artifacts, the first part of the chapter discusses the importance of aviation and transportation infrastructure, among other considerations, to the host city selection process between 2009 and 2013, which precipitated three consecutive Olympic Games in Asia.

After 2008, the IOC sought to disassociate the Olympic Games with the costly and arduous infrastructural transformations once inextricable with a city's initiation into an Olympic city. Olympic officials began indicating a strong preference towards bids from cities already

⁹ Nicola Spakowski, "Asia as Future: The Claims and Rhetoric of an Asian Century," in *Asianisms: Regionalist Interactions and Asian Integration*, eds. Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), 226.

capable of meeting a high threshold of existing infrastructural functionality and capable of incorporating the hosting of the Olympic Games into longer-term urban development plans. I look at the construction of a new low-cost carrier (LCC) terminal at Tokyo's Narita International Airport and the development of Beijing Daxing International Airport as a nucleus of China's new "Jing-Jin-Ji" industrial cluster, the government's flagship megalopolis anchored by the Xiong'an New Area. These projects to grow in- and outbound passenger capacity coincide with the integration of the Asian aviation market and the rapid overall expansion, however uneven, of regional aerial mobility within East and Southeast Asia over the last three decades. Despite the architectural luster of seamless efficiency that lend themselves to Augé's prognostic description of supermodernity's new spatial frontiers, these new infrastructures must also manage the often-piecemeal mobilities experienced by passengers of Asia's new flying public.

The new Olympic agenda

Between 2018 and 2022, Asia wound up the host continent for three consecutive Olympic Games, in Pyeongchang, Tokyo, and Beijing. As discussed earlier in the dissertation, from the initial revival of the modern Olympic Games during the early twentieth century, members of the IOC viewed Asia's involvement—on the IOC, and as participating nations and potential hosts—a necessary expression of the Olympic movement's core internationalist values; in exchange, countries including Japan, South Korea, and China have sought ways to employ the Games to position themselves as part of the frontlines of global progress.

As the IOC deliberated bids for future Olympic Games in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, for major cities in locations worst impaired by the downturn, the exorbitant and formidable task of staging the Olympic Games was both logistically unviable and often intensely

unpopular among the public. Vancouver faced relentless protests from housing advocates, counter-globalization groups, environmentalists, and indigenous organizers in the leadup to and during the 2010 Olympic Games. Rome's municipal government submitted and withdrew a bid for the 2020 Games on the eve of the candidature deadline, after losing the backing of the Prime Minister. For the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, Beijing and underdog candidate Almaty, the former Kazakh capital which had just hosted the 2011 Asian Winter Games, were left the sole candidates in a two-way race after four European cities pulled their applications at different stages of the bidding process. In response to criticisms that state gigantism and sloppy planning often left Olympic venues and infrastructures useless and neglected afterwards, the IOC began to favor bids that stressed the Olympic Games' compatibility with the host city and nation's preexisting long-range urban development plans, irrespective of the Olympics. This new cautiousness on the part of the IOC was later formally codified in 2014 in the *Olympic Agenda 2020*, which urged more sustainable measures through the reuse of existing facilities and longer-term investments in new infrastructure; these new guidelines also allowed for regional bids that span two or more cities or countries in order to minimize the risk and burden of hosting for any individual city.¹⁰

In this context, Asia was chosen as the platform to advance this new Olympic internationalist ethos, no longer necessarily tied to the organizing principle of the Olympic city. At the time the bids for the 2018, 2020, and 2022 Olympic Games were being drafted and evaluated between 2009 and 2013, the IOC assessed Pyeongchang, Tokyo, and Beijing as familiar, economically reliable, and comparatively low risk options rather than transformative ones, in contrast to the earlier Olympic Games that were awarded to Asia. Almaty would have

¹⁰ International Olympic Committee, *Olympic Agenda 2020*, 2014, 3.

been the more trailblazing—not to mention meteorologically favorable—choice with respect to the 2022 Winter Olympic Games. In its application, Almaty underscored its alpine topography and its historical cosmopolitanism as an east-meets-west node on the ancient Silk Road; calling its vision the “Win-Win-Winter Games,” the Almaty 2022 candidature file also described the Olympic Games as “a strategic win for Almaty and the entire nation of Kazakhstan” synchronous with the country’s broader ambitions to improve its global profile and build out its urban infrastructures.¹¹ Nonetheless, the IOC’s *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission* cited “economic factors, including low oil prices and exchange rate issues, [that] could negatively impact Games preparations and the government’s capacity to provide financial and other support” as a challenge to Almaty’s ability to effectively host the Games. In a narrow vote of 44 to 40, the IOC ultimately conferred the 2022 Games to Beijing, making it the first Olympic city to host both the Summer and Winter Games.¹²

Kicking off the trilogy of Olympic Games in Asia, the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang was seen as an overall success, even a productive opportunity for political peace talks on the Korean Peninsula. In what some hailed as a milestone agreement towards reconciliation brokered by the IOC, the South and North Korean athletic delegations marched together in the Parade of Nations under the Korean Reunification Flag and competed as an integrated Korea team for the women’s hockey event.¹³ The 2018 Olympic Games also inspired the short-lived pursuit of a joint Seoul-Pyongyang for the 2032 Olympics, as permitted by new IOC rules on regional and multi-city bids. By 2020, the geopolitical, economic, and

¹¹ Almaty 2022 Bid Committee, candidature file, 2014, International Olympic Committee Archives, 9.

¹² International Olympic Committee, *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission*, 2015, 33.

¹³ International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration,” January 20, 2018, 1 – 3.

epidemiological conditions had obviously dramatically shifted. The eruption of the coronavirus pandemic in December 2019 and into 2020 forced the postponement of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games by a full year, unsettling the rhythm of the Olympic calendar for the first time since the end of the Second World War.

Japan has been an Olympic regular since the establishment of the modern Olympic movement, sending athletic delegations to almost every competition since the 1912 Games in Stockholm. Japan has had consistent representation on the IOC since 1909, when judo founder Kano Jigoro became the first Olympic official from Asia to be appointed to the organization, and, in addition to the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo, has put on two Winter Olympics, 1972 in Sapporo and 1998 in Nagano. Japan. The Japanese Olympic Committee was thus an experienced and dependable partner to the IOC, contrasting the more turbulent economic and political climate of the two other shortlisted cities, Istanbul and Madrid. Following the guidelines set by the *Olympic Agenda 2020*, the Tokyo bid materials reassure that the city's Olympic budget of over \$4 billion USD was already guaranteed upfront by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and that "Tokyo 2020 will benefit from Japan's decades of experience in hosting major sporting events, and from the highly advanced infrastructure of a city that is one of the safest and most efficient in the world." The candidature file concludes that "in Tokyo, everything works."¹⁴

Istanbul is a serial Olympic hopeful, having submitted bids for almost every Summer Olympic Games of the 2000s, even preemptively finishing the construction of the Atatürk Olympic Stadium in 2002 in anticipation of bringing the Olympics home sometime in the near future. During this round of the host city selection process, the IOC saw the civil war in Syria on

¹⁴ Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games Bid Committee, candidature file, vol. 1, 2013, International Olympic Committee Archives.

Turkey's southern border as an intractable security problem for a large-scale international civilian gathering, despite Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's insistence to the IOC that the Olympic Games could in fact induce peace in the region.¹⁵ Spain had prior experience hosting the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona, but the competition is remembered for its massive cost overrun at 266%.¹⁶ This time, IOC members were concerned about high unemployment and austerity policies, although the Madrid 2020 bid team insisted that, although "the current situation is the most adverse in a long time," the Olympic Games would stimulate much needed economic growth."¹⁷ In the final round of voting, the IOC awarded the Olympic Games to Tokyo over Istanbul with a large margin of 60 to 36.

The IOC's prudence in the host city selection process was, to say the least, undermined completely by the coronavirus pandemic. This was not the first time the Olympic Games had been disrupted in Japan, which had previously forfeited the 1940 Olympics to consolidate national resources towards the war against China. If the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games subsequently embodied Japan's postwar rehabilitation and its reentry into the international system, the 2020 Olympic Games would have signaled Japan's recovery from the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster, which then caused severe damage to core reactors at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant after cooling systems lost power, leaking radioactive material into

¹⁵ Julian Linden, "Istanbul says awarding 2020 Games will 'help peace,'" *Reuters*, September 7, 2013, <https://reuters.com/article/sports/istanbul-says-awarding-2020-games-will-help-peace-idUSBRE9860CA/>.

¹⁶ Bent Flyvberg, Alexander Budzier, and Daniel Lunn, "Regression to the tail: Why the Olympics blow up," *Economy and Space* 53, no. 2 (2021): 240.

¹⁷ Duncan Mackay, "Poor economic conditions should be seen as 'opportunity, not problem' says head of Madrid 2020 Olympic bid," *Inside the Games*, September 24, 2011, <https://insidethegames.biz/articles/14357/poor-economic-conditions-should-be-seen-as-qopportunity-not-problemq-says-head-of-madrid-2020-olympic-bid>.

the atmosphere. Tokyo Governor Naoki Inose's 2012 letter to IOC President Jacques Rogge, prefacing Tokyo's candidature file, urges:

The earthquake and tsunami of March 2011 deeply affected the Japanese people, and we are in need of a dream we can share that will strengthen our solidarity. A dream can give us strength, and with strength we can build a future. If Tokyo is granted the honor of hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games, we can demonstrate to the world how far we have come in rebuilding our country, and give courage especially to those who are confronted with a challenge or hardship. I also believe there is no better way to express our gratitude for the friendship and encouragement we received from all over the world.¹⁸

The Olympic spirit of global progress and togetherness is affective, as Inose suggests, as well as infrastructural; accordingly, in addition to the affective gravity of the "Recovery Games," Tokyo's 2020 bid focuses heavily on the Olympic plan's alignment with, and its potential to contribute, to the city and the nation's overall infrastructural vision, while at the same time using the platform of the Olympics to model this vision as an example for the rest of the world.

Along with new "green" measures and the expedited development of the waterfront Tokyo Bay area, Tokyo's candidature file emphasizes transit infrastructure as an essential asset for and a prospective legacy of the 2020 Olympic Games; the effectiveness of existing systems and the practical feasibility of their further improvement are both central to the Olympic proposal:

The Tokyo 2020 Games will be used both as a process and target to help [...] enhance Tokyo's already highly evolved transportation infrastructure to enable the city to further mature as a model for a sustainable metropolis. 3 ring roads, serving as motorways in the

¹⁸ Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games Bid Committee, 11.

Tokyo Greater Metropolitan Area, will reduce the number of vehicles entering central Tokyo and reduce traffic in areas where venues will be located. Also earmarked for improvement are the major urban arterial routes around the Olympic and Paralympic Village, the Olympic Stadium and the Tokyo Bay Zone where the [International Broadcast Centre and Main Press Centre] will be located. Tokyo International Airport (Haneda), 16 km to the Village, will be enhanced. The number of annual flight arrivals and departures at Haneda is expected to reach 447,000 by fiscal year 2013 - 2014.¹⁹

These plans were central to government objectives to transition Japan into a “Tourism Nation.” At the time of the bid, leisure travel to other destinations in Asia, including China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand, all far surpassed that to Japan, which was barely keeping pace with its goal to attract 25 million annual visitors from abroad by 2020.²⁰

The logistics and infrastructures of travel—inter- and intracity as well as international—are key criteria when it comes to the host city selection process. Cities try to streamline the taxing experience of long-distance travel by land and air during this period of increased activity, and to impress visitors through both the efficiency and aesthetics of transit facilities; at the same time, successful bids must now make a meaningful attempt to demonstrate that the optimization of airports, railway systems, highways, and so on is not expressly pursued for the sake of hosting the Olympic Games. The *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission* points out that “Beijing Capital International Airport is the world’s second busiest, handling more than 82 million passengers a year,” categorizing the airport as a major hub that “supports more than 80 airlines

¹⁹ Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games Bid Committee, 18.

²⁰ Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, “White Paper on Tourism in Japan: The Tourism Situation in FY2012,” Japan Tourism Agency, 3.

serving more than 100 destinations worldwide.”²¹ The report also notes that “whilst not necessary to meet Games needs, a new airport scheduled for completion in 2019 should help relieve air traffic congestion at Beijing Capital International Airport,” referring to the then-unnamed Beijing Daxing International Airport, to be built south of the capital.²²

Voting members of the IOC are prohibited from personally visiting potential host cities ahead of briefing meetings towards making a final decision, due to bribery concerns. Instead, a commission of non-voting members reviews the bids and conducts visits to candidate cities, producing technical assessments of the merits of each proposal. Almaty International Airport, located at the periphery of Almaty city limits, is the largest and busiest international airport in Central Asia and a central hub for Kazakhstan’s high-performing flag carrier, Air Astana. The commission’s report, however, dismissively the airport to a secondary tier status, suggesting that its primary virtue is the availability of flights to major hub airports, including Beijing.²³ It also notes that Almaty International Airport only routinely handled a significantly lower 4.3 million annual passengers and, although only 30 minutes away by bus, lacked metro and rail connection to the city center. While the report acknowledges that the bid’s transport plan is well-conceived and cohesive with the city’s broader infrastructural vision, it signals cynicism regarding its implementation, warning that the “success of the Games transport plan is heavily dependent on completion of the city’s transportation development projects.”²⁴ (To be sure, airport expansion plans did not come to fruition during this timeframe. In 2020, as part of a government plan to

²¹ *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission*, 85.

²² *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission*, 85.

²³ *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission*, 38.

²⁴ *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission*, 38 – 39.

privatize the country's airports, the Istanbul-based TAV Airports Holding acquired Almaty International Airport. Company officials welcomed the acquisition as a strategic location along the “modern Silk Road” of China's Belt and Road Initiative, connecting Central Asia to the China's far western border.²⁵) In the end, despite the total impracticability of Beijing's proposal when it came to actually putting on winter sports—Beijing has virtually no natural snowfall, and sporting events that require snow would have to take place in Hebei province's Zhangjiakou 100 kilometers away, connected to the capital by high-speed rail—financial and infrastructural certainty was enough to persuade a majority of IOC voting members to choose Beijing.

The remainder of the chapter continues to draw out issues of aerial mobility and the mediated experience of travel and urban life, by examining the design, construction, refurbishment, and expansion of new airport infrastructure in Tokyo and Beijing around the time of the 2020 and 2022 Olympic Games. What follows discusses how seamlessness became a dominant design principle and then focuses on one of each capital city's two main airports. Beijing Daxing International Airport and Narita International Airport. An earlier chapter examined the urban reorganization of Beijing into a “creative city” in the years leading up to the 2008 Olympic Games, and the role of Japanese curators, critics, and investors in the city's new contemporary arts institutions. These creative city urban planning agendas presumably recruit a “footloose,” highly mobile global creative class working in the arts, culture, entertainment, media, business, and technology sectors. In contrast, this next part of the chapter uses airport architecture as an entry point to discuss the rescaling of the Olympic city concept, and the more piecemeal mobilities that condition the reality of cross-border movement within Asia.

²⁵ TAV Airports, “TAV Airports opens new terminal in Almaty,” press release, June 1, 2024, <https://tavhavalimanlari.com.tr/tav-airports-opens-new-terminal-in-almaty>.

Jet age kinesthetics

Refining the design and efficiency and increasing the capacity of aviation infrastructure—and their networking with other modes of cross-border and inter- and intracity transport—is a routine part of the Olympic preparation process. This is the case for both chosen host cities, as well as aspiring Olympic cities in the pre-selection phase. Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) weathered a xmajor phase of expansion work prior to the 1984 Olympic Games to upgrade its mid-century, jet-age facilities, constructing the airport’s double-decker arrivals and departure roadway and its new international terminal. Currently, LAX, under considerable operational strain as one of the world’s busiest passenger hubs, is again subject to another mammoth modernization and beautification program to its terminals, airfields, landscaping, concessions, and landside access points; the LAX project is accompanied by a “Twenty-eight by ‘28” initiative to complete an additional twenty-eight transportation projects ahead of the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic Games, such as new transit corridors and waterway bike trails.²⁶ In Rio, airport authorities also invested \$600 million USD to revamp Rio Galeão-Tom Jobim International Airport and install new digital and physical infrastructures, recruiting Changi Airport Group (known for their namesake, award-winning flagship venture, Singapore Changi Airport) to administer the overhaul.

Although frequently and increasingly situated on urban peripheries, airports are centerpieces of pre-Olympic urban planning agendas, whether in Los Angeles, Rio, Beijing, or Tokyo. Both Beijing Daxing International Airport and Narita International Airport are the second

²⁶ Eva Noor Kassens, *Los Angeles and the Summer Olympic Games: Planning Legacies* (Cham: Springer, 2020), 36.

major commercial international airports servicing the two capital cities, and they are both technically outside of the capital city proper, an overspill of metropolitan planning. From the vantage point of Olympic preparation, however, the spatial logic of these airports in relation to the city is multifold, reflecting the disparate interactions that residents, visitors, and others have to urban space. These airports, on one hand, expand the geographical range of the city, complemented by new, speedier, and more efficient networks of regional transit, although often with unpredictable environmental consequences; they can cue the growth of satellite cities and other development projects, as in the case of the ambitious Xiong'an New Area under construction in the freshwater swales south of Daxing, envisioned to absorb the “non-capital” functions of congested Beijing. Simultaneously, airports are physical and figurative gateways into Olympic cities, rather than their distal endpoints, as infrastructural hubs that function as architectural shorthand for broader geopolitical ambitions and which organize first impressions. City leadership, working with central governments, National Olympic Committees, and developers, allocate extravagant budgets for their construction, expansion, and refurbishment, with the goal of producing not only architectural elegance but the experience of seamless kinetic ease, often through digital technologies.

The inextricability between urban life and the intervention of ever-expanding media forms into the cityscape begins with the mediated experience of travel, in some cases on the fringes of the city. Beijing Daxing International Airport was designed and constructed as a collaboration between the London-based Zaha Hadid Architects (ZHA) and the French engineering firm ADP Ingénierie (ADPI). In promotional materials, ZHA praises Beijing Daxing International Airport's “new functional layout that is integrated with, and expressed by, the terminal's fluid architectural language and spatial design”; “echoing principles within traditional

architecture that organise interconnected spaces around a central courtyard,” the airport’s radial design “guides all passengers seamlessly through the relevant departure, arrival or transfer zones towards the grand courtyard at its centre—a multi-layered meeting space at the heart of the terminal.”²⁷ The animating language and principles of global capitalism, as translated by Augé and others, are externalized through architecture. This physical configuration—smooth, intuitive, productive—is in turn supported by a series of “magic-like” technological upgrades, including a full-range 5G network deployed by the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei, to enable a “smart” travel experience.²⁸ Ravi Sundaram characterizes this form of media urbanism as structured by “the evaporation of the boundary between technology and urban life”;²⁹ the high-tech media urbanism of contemporary Olympic cities begins to be shaped through the experience of travel to and from these sites, insofar as they establish a level of sensorial and aesthetic consistency from touchdown onwards. These idealized sensations—of frictionless mobility, facilitated by media technologies—circulate unevenly among Asia’s flying public, as they do elsewhere. Their distribution is situational, in contrast to the more generalized experience Augé describes, in which the traveler, in transit, is “subjected to a gentle form of possession” and “tastes for a while—like anyone who is possessed—the passive joys of identity-loss, and the more active pleasure of role-playing.”³⁰ In Augé’s analysis, travel under the sensorial conditions of supermodernity is cinematic, even indistinguishable from cinema.

²⁷ Zaha Hadid Architects.

²⁸ Huawei, “5G千兆网：从‘神仙机场’开启智慧出行,” <https://carrier.huawei.com/cn/success-stories/Industries-5G/airport/beijing-airport>.

²⁹ Ravi Sundaram, *Pirate Modernity: New Delhi’s Media Urbanism* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 7.

³⁰ Augé, 103.

An earlier chapter discussed some of the other ways in which the relationship between travel and media has been theorized, as well as how physical travel might be understood as a media experience, and transit infrastructure as media infrastructure in relation to the Shinkansen bullet train. Many have pointed out affinities along both conceptual and more literal lines, from early travelogue to contemporary practices of film tourism (for instance, in Youngmin Choe’s work on hallyu film tourism³¹). The history of the movement of people and things by air and the development of digital technology—their collocation in the monumental, high-tech infrastructures of Asia’s new airports and the sensorial expectations they generate—also intersect deeply in more unassuming ways. Vanessa R. Schwartz chronicles the “golden age” of air travel enabled by the advent of the commercial jetliner, which resulted in increases in passenger capacity, reductions in the cost of consumer air travel, and an expansion in the size of the global flying public. Along with the Shinkansen, as discussed in an earlier chapter, the jet age of the 1950s and 1960s also shaped cultural expectations about how the future ought to look and feel. Schwartz explains that “without the piston-operated engine, the ride inside the plane was quieter and the plane transmitted little of its characteristic vibration. In short, the ride itself made the trip less of a physical experience, and ‘less’ experience became the value of jet travel.”³² Examining the aesthetic and material culture of the jet age, the technological and sensorial transformations of this period imparted an enduring perception of fluidity as a marker of the arrival of the future in the present, which in turn informed the engineering of other closely and distantly related infrastructures and activities. Airports were a utilitarian infrastructure that measurably expanded

³¹ Youngmin Choe, *Tourist Distractions: Traveling and Feeling in Transnational Hallyu Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 9.

³² Vanessa R. Schwartz, *Jet Age Aesthetic: The Glamour of Media in Motion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 6.

the technology of air travel, but they were also channels for extending the sensorium of flight—or perhaps better put, the conspicuous absence of friction that characterized this sensorium—into the world outside of the jet. Airport designs, like the iconic, Eero Saarinen-designed Trans World Airlines (TWA) terminal at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, “symbolize the jet age, which put a global transport system into place and became idealized as sites where individuals could prepare to inhabit a future whose time had come. For the government authorities charged with designing and building them, airports were enormous public works projects, claiming vast material and symbolic capital.”³³

Schwartz argues that the visual cultures of the jet age, “which dematerialized experience into a system of circulating spaces, people, and images, produced the condition of the digital age if not its actual technologies,” and softened clear-cut boundaries between the physical and the mediated worlds, from the jet to the airport to the city.³⁴ By glamorizing fluid motion in settings ranging from airport architecture to theme park design to photography and cinema, the jet age aesthetic replicated the flows of globalization at the level of subjective sensation.³⁵ As Schwartz writes, perhaps “the internet is the most remarkable media form of sensationless fluid motion. It exemplifies the impact of the jet age and helps us understand why it makes sense to us that we can ‘surf’ the internet and physically go nowhere at all.”³⁶ The connection Schwartz makes seems to be corroborated by the iconographic linkages left by the early internet: the TWA logo, backdropped by two gridded, intersecting globes, prototypes that of CompuServe, an early online

³³ Schwartz, 19.

³⁴ Schwartz, 14 – 15.

³⁵ Schwartz, 189.

³⁶ Schwartz, 17.

service provider. The logo for Microsoft’s Internet Explorer web browser also analogized the activity of flight: earlier iterations used a miniature planet Earth, first photographed by the suborbital rocket experiments of the jet age, while later versions were more abstracted, encircled by the plume of a jet contrail.



Figure 5: Trans World Airlines logo, circa 1965



Figure 6: CompuServe logo, circa 1995

Whatever the cause-and-effect, the jet age aesthetic and the nascent internet age drew on an overlapping set of metaphors, images, sensations, and aspirations that continue to interface in, even overdetermining, the infrastructures and aesthetics of Asia’s new showcase airports. However, the “genuinely global expansion of travel by air” cited by Schwartz was, at the time, still restricted to some geographical segments of the midcentury global demographic. This unevenness is reflected by the jet age cohort of cities whose airports were either built or redesigned between the late 1950s and the early 1960s—Schwartz’s examples include Algiers, Brussels, Bordeaux, Copenhagen, London, Los Angeles, Montreal, New York City, Paris, Rome, and Vienna.³⁷ As Max Hirsh has documented, although “American and European airports were at

³⁷ Schwartz, 22.

the forefront of developments in airport architecture and technology,” Asia has, since this first golden era, asserted itself as the new vanguard of high-end, high-tech airport design, from the indoor forests of Singapore Changi Airport to the curvilinear glass walls of Hong Kong's Chek Lap Kok International Airport.³⁸ Changi and Chek Lap Kok, along with Doha Hamad, Seoul Incheon, and Tokyo Haneda, regularly dominate annual Skytrax and other consumer ranking reports over western predecessors. Nonetheless, the technical and stylistic conventions formulated by this earlier generation of airports during the jet age continue to inform Asia's infrastructural development in the decades after.

Metabolizing Jing-Jin-Ji

The China's recent infrastructural boom in the aviation sector is born out of a complex of post-reform professional training programs and developmental aid, most significantly Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan. Architectural conventions and innovations aside, the infrastructures of cross-border air mobility, by nature, require a high degree of industrial standardization for seamless operations, or interoperability; to put it simply, different airports in different places still need to land the same kinds of planes. Just as the Shinkansen set many of the global technical standards for high-speed rail technology—such as track gauge (the distance between rails) and automatic train control systems (which help ensure safety at high speeds)³⁹—

³⁸ Max Hirsh, *Airport Urbanism: Infrastructure and Mobility in Asia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 21.

³⁹ Christopher Hood, *Shinkansen: From Bullet Train to Symbol of Modern Japan* (London: Routledge, 2006), 135.

many aviation specifications were first engineered during this jet age generation of airports, built upon later by the information age. Hirsh writes,

In effect, the introduction of these standards is a form of upstream business development for a range of service providers who produce hardware and software used at airports—everything from elevators, escalators, self-check-in terminals, and biometric devices, to aircraft, airbridges, and air navigation systems. Establishing these norms in emerging economies is essential for the economic survival of development nations, whose voting publics grow both weary and wary of major infrastructure investments, and where building new airports from scratch has become rare.⁴⁰

Enterprises like ODA are a symbol of goodwill, but they are also opportunities to determine and export technical and sociotechnical standards for the rest of the world. As China sought to drastically expand its aviation capacity in the 1990s, the central government commissioned the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA, the agency that allocates ODA) to help expand Beijing Capital International Airport and administer the construction of a new airport planned for reclaimed lands along the Pacific coastline east of Shanghai, a proof-of-concept success that established the terms by which Chinese airport authorities continue to work with transnational engineering and design expertise.⁴¹

In the 1990s, large-scale airport construction projects in China often came together at the intersection of two distinct transnational processes: international design competitions and bilateral technical assistance. The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs described ODA as “one of

⁴⁰ Max Hirsh, “Technical Experts and the Production of China’s Airport Infrastructure,” in *Infrastructure and the Remaking of Asia*, eds. Till Mostowlansky and Max Hirsh (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2022), 220 – 221.

⁴¹ Hirsh, “Technical Experts and the Production of China’s Airport Infrastructure,” 227.

the key pillars of Japan-China relations” and a vital instrument of economic prosperity in the region, improving the “investment environment” in China through the development of economic infrastructure and, as a result, “[boosting] the advancement of Japanese companies into China.”⁴² In order to fortify physical connectivity and facilitate resource sharing to temper legacies left by the Second World War and balance uneven regional growth, Japan invested trillions into China and elsewhere in Asia since the 1950s.⁴³ Shanghai Pudong International Airport was another one of many large-scale projects in China made possible by Japan—in this case, Japan issued ODA loans amounting to 40 billion yen, which also “covered the project’s foreign currency costs, thereby overcoming the perennial challenge of moving money between China and the outside world.”⁴⁴

With funding secured through ODA, airport authorities awarded the design of Shanghai Pudong Airport to the French company ADPI, which had prior experience with land reclamation methods through its work on Kansai International Airport, built offshore on an artificial island in Osaka Bay; ADPI would go on to jointly design Beijing Daxing International Airport with ZHA. ADPI is a subsidiary of Groupe ADP, originally formed to transition French airport infrastructure from military to civilian use following the end of the Second World War. Groupe ADP administered the reconstruction of the Orly airfield outside of Paris after its destruction during the war and now holds partial ownership of TAV Airports Holding, the company that

⁴² Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “White Paper on Development Cooperation 2018,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, 77.

⁴³ Hiroshi Kan Sato and Akiko Hiratsuka-Sasaki, “Japanese Development Aid and Global Power,” in *Global East Asia: Into the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Frank N. Pieke and Koichi Iwabuchi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021), 54.

⁴⁴ Hirsh, “Technical Experts and the Production of China’s Airport Infrastructure,” 227.

acquired Almaty International Airport in 2020. As this mapping suggests, the designers of Asia's new airports belong to a relatively small—and, on the engineering side, often relatively obscure—group of specialist firms and financiers who trained their infrastructural knowhow in the postwar jet age. One newer tendency is a much more expressive slant towards monumentalism in architecture, which was more inhibited during the jet age in favor of a more functional approach concerned with maximizing efficiency when it came to the business of seamlessly moving people and things. Schwartz, for example, describes the boxy Paris Orly Airport as possessing an elegant “antimonumental kind of monumentalism,” impressing visitors not through the beauty of its edifice but instead by its immense size and ability to quickly process travelers through its passageways.⁴⁵ Many of Asia's newer airports—or, in some instances, their new terminals additions to older airports—more overtly embrace the doctrine of fluidity in their physical configuration, for example through the use of curvilinear form; form becomes, in turn, an idealized descriptor of the transnational production process.

The evolution of airport design is by no means linear. Design ideas obsolesce, resurface, and adapt. New airport projects in the United States and Europe sometimes exhibit formal elements associated with contemporary architecture in Asia; for example, the roofline of the recently refurbished Tom Bradley International Airport at LAX, meant to model an undulating ocean swell, mutates the biomorphism of Singapore Changi Airport and Beijing's National Stadium with the jet age legacy of the LAX Theme Building. Many jet age innovations are still popular: LAX, notoriously prone to gridlock, is in the middle of constructing an automated people mover, a midcentury technology popularized at Disneyland's jet age-themed Tomorrowland. With the projection of a greater future use-value and that of a more globalized

⁴⁵ Schwartz, 47.

world in mind, jet age planners also strategized plans with potential opportunities for subsequent expansions. This sense of perpetual expansion further powered the feeling that the future was already and actively being assembled in the present.⁴⁶ Asia's airports have retained many of the technical specifications and sensorial expectations set during the jet age, although airports in general have remained impermanent infrastructures meant to be continuously updated; accordingly, ZHA celebrates Beijing Daxing as "setting a new standard in air transport services, serving the region's growing population with a compact and efficient passenger terminal that is adaptable for future growth."⁴⁷

The copper, radial airport would moreover thoroughly recalibrate the spatial arrangement of the capital city. The Forbidden City at the center of Beijing is surrounded by a network of concentric ring roads, like growth rings on a tree trunk. Beijing Capital International Airport is located at what at one time would have been considered the outlying fringes of the city, but, since 2009, it sits within the radius of the 6th Ring Road expressway. The spacious site designated for Beijing's second large-scale airport development project is considerably more provincial. At nearly 50 kilometers away from the city center to the south on the border of Hebei province, the remoteness of Beijing Daxing International Airport permits easier around-the-clock takeoffs and landings and is better suited for forthcoming expansions, with plans for another terminal and additional runways already in the works.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Schwartz, 21.

⁴⁷ Zaha Hadid Architects.

⁴⁸ Meng Hou, et al., "Airport-airline Relationship, Competition and Welfare in a Multi-airport System: The Case of New Beijing Daxing Airport," *Journal of Transport Economics and Policy* 56, no. 2 (2022): 159.

The location of Beijing Daxing International Airport bolsters short- and long-term state planning agendas oriented towards the redistribution of non-capital functions from Beijing outwards and, according to the central government, to heal the “big city diseases” of sprawl, pollution, traffic, and resource strain that have deteriorated the quality of life in the capital.⁴⁹ Located between Beijing and Hebei, it will service not only the capital city but the new “Jing-Jin-Ji” urban agglomeration formed by Beijing, Hebei, and Tianjin. Since 1979, China has designated numerous “new areas” and “special economic zones,” described by Aihwa Ong as “positive kinds of exception” to national trade law that “capitalize on specific locational advantages of economic flows, activities, and linkages” to “create or accommodate islands of distinct governing regimes” within the wider landscape of governance.⁵⁰ These zoning technologies incentivize overseas investment to accelerate local growth in pockets within the national territory—in a manner continuous, in my view, with the extraterritorial logic of international airports—and produce networks of “technoindustrial nodes that can circumvent political obstacles and bridge politically divided entities” towards regional economic integration.⁵¹ The new Jing-Jin-Ji urban agglomeration scales up zoning technologies to restructure disorganized urban growth, and within it, “non-core” functions of the capital city would be transferred to the urban district of Xiong’an New Area. ZHA emphasizes the centrality of the airport to the region’s future fortune, reporting that it “[offers] direct connections to Beijing, the national high-speed network and local train services, providing a catalyst for

⁴⁹ Kong Xiangwu, “京津冀 协同发展展开新局,” *Renmin Ribao*, 1st ed., October 6, 2017.

⁵⁰ Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 101 – 103.

⁵¹ Ong, 118.

economic development in Tianjin and Hebei Province.”⁵² The strategy behind the construction of Beijing Daxing International Airport and the city’s bid for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games triangulate through this new national imperative, to develop the province of Hebei and ultimately redraw the economic and human geography of the region.

The 2022 Winter Olympic Games themselves were a stimulus for the economic and urban integration of the Jing-Jin-Ji region. Some of the venues built for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, including the National Aquatics Center, were converted for indoor events (the “Water Cube” became the “Ice Cube”). However, many other outdoor events took place in the frostier and wetter climate of Zhangjiakou, a city located in the northwest part of Hebei, given Beijing’s lack of natural snowfall. As the 2022 bid commission summarizes,

The Games vision also aims to accelerate the development of the Beijing-Zhangjiakou Sport, Culture and Tourism Belt, offering a new impetus for China’s economic growth and sustainable development in Beijing and Hebei Province, where the snow sports competitions would take place. This vision is fully aligned with national economic growth strategies and priorities.⁵³

Xiong’an New Area would coordinate the development of the newly established Jing-Jin-Ji economic triangle and absorb non-core activities and functions from Beijing, such as universities and research centers, hospitals and health institutions, financial institutions, software and telecommunications firms, and green-tech innovation companies.⁵⁴ Planning for the 2008

⁵² Zaha Hadid Architects.

⁵³ *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission*, 59.

⁵⁴ Chen Yangqiu, Lai Ning, and Zhang Xueting, “China’s City of the Future: Xiong’an New Area.” *Hitachi Review* 70, no. 1 (2021): 39 – 40.

Beijing Games Olympics relied on the same set of conceptual themes and design plots now rehearsed with Xiong'an; slogans for the 2008 Olympic Games framed itself as the “Green Olympics, High-Tech Olympics, People’s Olympics,” producing, in Joshua Neves’s words, the expectation of a “technologized future city that is defined by its media monuments, transportation infrastructure, business and residential towers, urban consumers, green belts, rivers, and pollution-free skies.”⁵⁵ However, the planning rationales underlying Beijing Daxing International Airport ultimately charts a somewhat different trajectory for the nation’s future than the pathways suggested by the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport in the 1990s and 2000s.

The opening of Beijing Capital International Airport’s second terminal, financed through Japanese ODA, increased total annual passenger capacity from 3 million to 35 million; the prospective annual number of passenger was projected to reach 50 million by 2010 (to be covered by T3), which far outpaced original estimates made at the start of the project.⁵⁶ Beijing Daxing International Airport would help fulfill acutely needed capacity as the city prepared to host the Olympic Games again in 2022.⁵⁷ As discussed in the previous chapter, Beijing’s infrastructural overhaul has been constant since the city was awarded its first Olympic bid in July 2001. High-profile constructions built after the 2008 Olympic Games include Ole Scheeren’s Guardian Art Center and Kohn Pedersen Fox’s China Zun, Beijing’s tallest skyscraper at 109

⁵⁵ Joshua Neves, *Underglobalization: Beijing’s Media Urbanism and the Chimera of Legitimacy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 53.

⁵⁶ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Beijing Capital Airport Terminal Area Expansion Project,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2011, 4 – 5.

⁵⁷ Foster + Partners, Beijing Capital International Airport, <https://fosterandpartners.com/projects/beijing-capital-international-airport>.

stories. Beijing Daxing International Airport is one of four Beijing developments by ZHA; in addition to projects in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Shanghai, ZHA completed a triad of office and retail complexes between 2009 and 2019.

Beijing Daxing International Airport, however, was the firm's inaugural airport project. ZHA had been shortlisted but did not win the international design competition for Mexico City's new airport.⁵⁸ That project, originally planned for the dry basin of Lake Texcoco, was then shelved altogether, after a 2018 national referendum opposing its construction; the city instead built a different international airport, also 50 kilometers outside of the city center. Since then, ZHA has also been appointed to design a new international airport for Mumbai with a projected completion date of 2032, following an international competition between the various prestigious "starchitects" of airport design.⁵⁹ While the engineering and management firms and financiers behind airports often play a relatively discreet role, a well-known group of elite, transnational design firms monopolize the world of contemporary architecture, competing with one another in international competitions for the opportunity to produce high-profile experimental designs. For many cities, these airports, art museums, and sports stadiums—rendered from glass and steel, reflective and curvilinear, with high-tech and climate-sensitive components—are a key visual and infrastructural marker of the future in the present.⁶⁰ As Ren has mapped, the geography of contemporary architectural innovation divides cities into two categories: production cities where

⁵⁸ Daniel Brook, "History of the Present: Mexico City," *Places* (February 2017), <https://placesjournal.org/article/history-of-the-present-mexico-city/>.

⁵⁹ Giaime Botti, *Designing Emerging Markets: A Quantitative History of Architectural Globalisation* (Singapore: Springer, 2023), 447.

⁶⁰ Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta, "Temporarily, Politics, and the Promise of Infrastructure," introduction to *The Promise of Infrastructure*, eds. Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 27.

the work of cutting-edge design is conducted; and consumption cities like Beijing where these designs come to life, and “where international design firms set up local offices (often on a project basis) in order to stay close to the market, have access to the local design labor market, and supervise construction.”⁶¹ Through this exchange, consumption cities become laboratories for experimental designs unlikely to be accepted and realized in the cities of their production counterparts.

Beijing’s foreign-designed architecture is sometimes ill-received by local residents and Chinese architects—members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, some of whom saw these commissions as “a new form of cultural colonialism,” protested Paul Andreu’s design of Beijing’s National Centre for the Performing Arts, although some younger architects, trained in the United States, Europe, and Japan, welcomed the foreign influence and competition.⁶² These commissions have more recently been explicitly criticized by the central government for their aesthetic outlandishness; in 2016, Chinese state media relayed directives to eschew development projects that might be considered “excessive, xenocentric, bizarre, and culturally vacant” in favor of projects that are “practical, economical, green, and beautiful,”⁶³ perhaps in an effort to shore up more of China’s own architectural talent—Beijing Daxing International Airport is therefore an architectural outlier. Many imported designs, however, do include often-nebulous abstractions of vernacular heritage. Foster + Partners describes Beijing Capital International Airport’s Terminal 3 as a “symbol of place, its soaring aerodynamic roof and dragon-like form celebrating

⁶¹ Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 169.

⁶² Xuefei Ren, “Olympic Beijing: Reflections on Urban Space and Global Connectivity,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* vol. 26, no. 8 (2009): 27 – 28.

⁶³ “中国新建住宅将推广街区制 原则上不再建封闭住宅小区,” *Xinhua News Agency*, February 22, 2016, http://xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/22/c_128738587.htm.

the thrill and poetry of flight and evoking traditional Chinese colours and symbols.”⁶⁴ From above, Beijing Daxing International Airport is meant to auspiciously approximate a golden phoenix in flight, with six prongs or extremities—wings, head, and tail—radiating from a central atrium loosely resembling a siheyuan courtyard. Five of the spokes are concourses, placed to minimize walking distance between gates. The sixth is an intercity ground transport hub that connects the airport to nodes throughout Jing-Jin-Ji. Free of the logistical constraints experienced by Beijing proper and meant to redirect growth along Beijing’s southern periphery, Beijing Daxing International Airport is expected to accommodate 72 million passengers a year by 2025 and, eventually, upwards of 100 million, doubling Beijing’s overall annual capacity.⁶⁵

Xiong’an New Area also comes out of a similarly transnational planning process, involving working groups of thousands of Chinese and overseas experts and engineers; the master plan for the project was ultimately awarded to the U.S.-based firm Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM). It also retraces the theoretical and aesthetic legacies of regional urban innovation, seeking to put into practice some of the Metabolists’ most impossible design schemes. Although many of the Metabolists’ proposals remained unbuilt, their technocratic approach to urban design inflects a range of infrastructural developments in and beyond Asia. Rem Koolhaas and Hans Ulrich Obrist write that “Metabolism [developed] a deeply ambivalent attitude towards Japan’s ground, which is usually too densely populated, expensive, mountainous, flood-prone, beautiful, or seismically unstable to build on.”⁶⁶ Like Tange and others, governments in Asia turned to the practice of marine land reclamation,

⁶⁴ Foster + Partners.

⁶⁵ Zhou, et al., 114.

⁶⁶ Koolhaas and Obrist, 340.

ubiquitous in Japan, to construct new floating airports and, in some cases, entire districts or cities, although some have now begun to sink: airports built either partially or entirely on artificial land include: Nagasaki Airport, Kansai International Airport, Kobe Airport, Chubu Centrair International Airport, and Kitakyushu Airport in Japan; Incheon International Airport in South Korea; Shanghai Pudong International Airport and Dalian Jinzhouwan International Airport in mainland China; and both Hong Kong International (Chek Lap Kok) Airport and Macau International Airport.

Responding to the trifold urban crisis of unprecedented population growth, unrelenting traffic, and a scarcity of land and housing in postwar Japan,⁶⁷ Metabolist architect Kenzo Tange's 1960 Plan for Tokyo proposed the urban reorganization of the city into a linear megastructure, its spinal axis gradually extending across Tokyo Bay until it, over time, reached past the shores of Chiba.⁶⁸ Tange later proposed networking the Tokaido corridor—the area between Tokyo to Osaka, which had welded into one continuous industrial belt—by connecting not just Tokyo Bay but the entire archipelago through a national rail axis.⁶⁹ The most ambitious Metabolist designs were never realized in their original forms as entire cities, but individual building projects nested within the city homologized the metabolic processes of long- and short-term cycles, or the synthesis of temporary elements with permanent megastructural elements; Kisho Kurokawa's Nakagin Capsule Tower in the Ginza district of Tokyo was one such homology, comprised of prefabricated, modular cubic units mounted along the sides of two central towers. Nested within

⁶⁷ Rem Koolhaas and Hans Ulrich Obrist, *Project Japan: Metabolism Talks*, ed. Kayoko Ota and James Westcott (Cologne: Taschen, 2011), 284 – 285.

⁶⁸ Zhongjie Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 98.

⁶⁹ Lin, 167.

the metabolic system of Jing-Jin-Ji—based on a megalopolis scale of urban design—Xiong’an New Area literalizes the metaphor of the city as an ever-shifting organic cycle: Xiong’an would connect to Beijing by a high-speed rail axis cutting across Jing-Jin-Ji, built around a “15-minute life cycle” in which all goods and services could be physically accessed within a maximum 15-minute trip; and it would be a self-renewing ecological system, a “sponge city” equipped to absorb, store, purify, and recirculate water to secure Xiong’an from its waterlogged surroundings.⁷⁰

At the same time that Xiong’an New Area advances the megastructural design principles of the postwar Japanese Metabolism movement, it is also an indicator of shifting regional dynamics, a reset when it comes to the terms of infrastructural development and urban aesthetics in China. As Till Mostowlansky and Max Hirsh write, “elevated skywalks, high-rise apartment blocks, and railway-oriented, air-conditioned retail environments quickly became essential signifiers of what it meant, in the East Asian context, to be modern. Those ideas subsequently filtered into post-Mao China through the transfer of capital and infrastructural expertise originating in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.”⁷¹ In 2022, the last of Japanese ODA support for Chinese infrastructure projects ended after nearly five decades and trillions of yen. Bilateral ODA continues to finance the development of aviation infrastructure elsewhere in Asia; for example, in 2021, JICA issued loans and grants totaling nearly \$55 million USD to Laos, including for a new international terminal at Wattay International Airport in the capital of

⁷⁰ Chen, Lai, and Zhang, 38 – 41.

⁷¹ Till Mostowlansky and Max Hirsh, introduction to *Infrastructure and the Remaking of Asia*, eds. Till Mostowlansky and Max Hirsh (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2022), 5.

Vientiane.⁷² It is, in theory but more rarely in practice, the intention of technical assistance for recipient nations to grow out of it. Just as postwar Japan had transformed itself from a recipient of technical assistance into a benefactor for others, China is now itself a major player in regional development aid, patterned after Japan in the 1960s and 1970s.⁷³ In 2015, China and Pakistan signed over 50 agreements, including loans for the construction of motorways and airports within the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor of the “new Silk Road” network.⁷⁴ It remains to be seen whether Xiong’an New Area will be remembered as a science fiction of state gigantism—or an earthbound model of orderly urban development exportable beyond China along its Belt and Road Initiative.⁷⁵

Xiong’an New Area, like Shenzhen for Deng Xiaoping and Shanghai’s Pudong district for Jiang Zemin, is President Xi Jinping’s flagship infrastructure project.⁷⁶ All three are interreferenced and zoned doubles of preexisting city space: Shenzhen of Hong Kong, Pudong of Shanghai, and Xiong’an of Beijing. Zoning technologies, in Keller Easterling’s words, “[operate] in a frictionless realm of exemption.”⁷⁷ But if earlier projects like Shenzhen and Pudong

⁷² Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “White Paper on Development Cooperation 2022,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, 128.

⁷³ Sato and Hiratsuka-Sasaki, 61 – 62.

⁷⁴ Majed Akhter, “Geopolitics of the Belt and Road: Space, State, and Capital in China and Pakistan,” in *Logistical Asia*, eds. Brett Neilson, Ned Rossiter, and Ranabir Samaddar (New York: Palgrave, 2018), 232.

⁷⁵ Simon Curtis and Ian Klaus, *The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2024), 45 – 46.

⁷⁶ Carolyn Cartier, “Magic Cities, Future Dreams—Urban Contradictions,” in *The China Story Yearbook 2016: Prosperity*, eds. Jane Golley and Linda Jaivin (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018), 193.

⁷⁷ Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space* (London: Verso Books, 2014), 56.

represented a reduction in friction through China’s openness to working within the global capitalist system, the developmental model behind Jing-Jin-Ji and Xiong’an New Area represents a renewed emphasis on self-sufficiency in industrial policy to regenerate the Chinese economy. This shift is not wholly inconsistent with the overall arc of economic reform in China, however, which has been long guided by the principle of “crossing the river by feeling the stones”; this describes a process of continuous assessment and adjustment that underlaid, for example, China’s spatial zoning experiments, in contrast to the programs of neoliberal shock therapy embraced by nations of the former USSR (to ruinous results).⁷⁸ Since the realignment of diplomatic relations in 1978, the terms of regional exchange between China and Japan have been structured around a logic of economic complementarity. In relation to Japan, this new shift towards self-sufficiency is not a rejection of transnational collaboration but rather a shift in its terms—that is, regional exchange based on the semblance of parity: built into the plan for Jing-Jin-Ji is, among other designated industrial “demonstration zones,” a Sino-Japanese Innovation Cooperation Demonstration Zone for “international coordinated sci-tech innovation and industrial cooperation and development” that would be a “highland for the capital’s reform and opening up.”⁷⁹ But just as the agglomeration of Jing-Jin-Ji began to take shape with the completion of Beijing Daxing International Airport, air traffic abruptly curtailed after three months of operations in early 2020. Airlines everywhere were moving to suspend flights to and from mainland China, as governments ordered travel advisories and restrictions, sealing terrestrial, maritime, and airspace boundaries for “non-essential” passage to slow the spread of

⁷⁸ Isabella M. Weber, *How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate* (New York: Routledge, 2021), 265.

⁷⁹ Beijing Municipal Commerce Bureau, *2020 Beijing Investment Development Report*, 90.

coronavirus. As the pandemic indicated few signs of easing in the following months, all remaining international flights booked to land at Beijing Daxing were routed back to Beijing Capital International Airport by March 2020.

Meanwhile, the 2020 Olympic torch relay recessed one day after its ceremonial lighting in the ancient ruins of Olympia on March 12; the rest of the leg through Greece was cancelled until the scheduled handover of the torch at the Matsushima Air Base in Miyagi later that month. The concept behind the relay echoed that of 1964 torch relay, discussed in an earlier chapter, covering the prefectures most impacted by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster before making its way to Tokyo. On March 24, after weeks of scrutiny and speculation, the IOC and the Tokyo Organizing Committee announced the suspension of the torch relay and the postponement of the Olympic Games until the summer after.⁸⁰ When the torch relay resumed in Fukushima a year later, organizers struggled to frame “recovery” in terms of the world’s containment of the pandemic, but the 2020 Olympic Games ultimately went ahead on July 23, 2021 socially distanced, with virtually no overseas spectators in attendance.

⁸⁰ Ali Iveson, “Olympic Torch Relay cancelled following Tokyo 2020 postponement,” *Inside the Games*, March 24, 2020, <https://insidethegames.biz/articles/1092380/olympic-torch-relay-cancelled>.



Figure 7: Narita International Airport Terminal 3, Nikken Sekkei

The architecture of traveling light

Within the new international division of architectural labor, Tokyo, unlike Beijing, is a production city, where “highly innovative design concepts and ideas are first conceived [...] and then translated into design drawings and used to guide construction in consumption cities.”⁸¹

Consumption cities, in contrast, “have yet to develop the institutional infrastructure—a network of architecture schools, publications, critics, and so forth—required for architectural design

⁸¹ Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 169.

production and innovation.”⁸² In 2007, no mainland Chinese studios were among the top hundred largest architectural firms, based on the number of branch offices worldwide, although Beijing was in the top five cities in which these offices were located.⁸³ Production cities are more often adversarial towards eccentric designs by foreign architects, a dynamic illustrated by the controversies over the design of the New National Stadium in Tokyo in 2015.⁸⁴ ZHA’s winning proposal for the stadium provoked intense backlash from a group of high-profile Japanese architects, who opposed the project—indeed, for its excessiveness, outlandishness, and xenocentrism; Arata Isozaki described it as resembling “a turtle waiting for Japan to sink so that it can swim away.”⁸⁵ Hadid countered that their disapproval of the design was based in a hypocritical reluctance to allow a foreign architect build the National Stadium, despite a redraft that involved the collaboration of Tokyo-based firm Nikken Sekkei.⁸⁶ In the end, the design of the New National Stadium was awarded to Japanese architect Kengo Kuma after ZHA, unable to secure a construction company to work with, withdrew from the process.

Narita International Airport’s new Terminal 3, also designed by Nikken Sekkei, visually references the Olympic Games, with walkways lined by a bright blue and red running track, an expansion in anticipation of thousands of Olympic visitors who ultimately could not fly. Unlike

⁸² Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 38.

⁸³ Ren, *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*, 27.

⁸⁴ Tomoko Tamari, “Star Architects, Urban Spectacles, and Global Brands: Exploring the Case of the Tokyo Olympics 2020,” *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 28, no. 1 (March 2019): 52 – 53.

⁸⁵ David Ebony, “Controversy Rages Over Zaha Hadid’s Olympic Stadium Design for Tokyo,” *Artnet News*, December 10, 2014, <https://news.artnet.com/art-world/controversy-rages-over-zaha-hadids-olympic-stadium-design-for-tokyo-193837>.

⁸⁶ Dan Howarth, “Japan scraps Zaha Hadid’s Tokyo 2020 Olympic Stadium,” *Dezeen*, July 17, 2015, <https://dezeen.com/2015/07/17/japan-scraps-zaha-hadid-tokyo-2020-olympic-stadium/>.

Beijing Daxing International Airport, the project was comparatively understated, the results sometimes described by travelers as spartan.⁸⁷ But like Beijing Daxing International Airport, it is the second international airport servicing the capital metropolitan area; completed in 1978, I would describe it as a “1.5-generation” airport. Tokyo’s first major airport, Tokyo International Airport, known as Haneda Airport, was the aviation center of imperial Japan, networking Tokyo with the empire’s outlying territories by flight. After the Second World War, U.S. occupation authorities, apprehensive about Japanese militarism, upended the country’s aviation infrastructure with a program of industry-debilitating policies: Haneda Airport was repurposed for U.S. military use; stringent restrictions were imposed on private aircraft operations; all Japanese pilots were grounded; and aeronautical research was paused, to prevent the restoration of military aviation capabilities.⁸⁸ After the occupation, Haneda Airport was returned to Japan for civilian use. Japan began to develop its postwar aviation industry, and Japan Airlines, the state-owned flag carrier, was established in 1951. Passenger traffic at Haneda Airport soon exceeded capacity, but the airport's location in Ota City posed significant challenges to expansion due to spatial and regulatory constraints, leading to the decision to build a second airport instead. The construction of Narita International Airport was marred by years of conflict over land use,⁸⁹ prompting cities like Osaka and Nagoya to construct airports on artificial islands offshore;

⁸⁷ Gail Nakada, “Navigating Tokyo's New LCC Terminal 3,” *HuffPost* (blog), July 30, 2015, https://huffpost.com/entry/navigating-tokyos-new-lcc_b_7900584.

⁸⁸ Chihyung Jeon, “‘No Japanese in the Cockpit’: The Airplane and the Role of Race, Culture, and Bodies in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations,” *Pacific Historical Review* 88, no. 4 (Fall 2019): 563 – 564.

⁸⁹ David Ernest Apter and Nagayo Sawa, *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 8.

located in Chiba across Tokyo Bay, it led the decades-long trend—from Beijing to Mexico City—to dispatch aviation infrastructure to far-flung urban and marine edgelands.

The sociotechnical architecture of Narita International Airport’s modest expansion can be usefully gauged as a marker of regional integration in Asia, characterized by often fractious rather than always frictionless experiences of aerial mobility. Led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the integration of national aviation markets was one of many maneuvers towards regional cohesion following the 1997 financial crisis. The push was reinforced by constraints on state intervention in the operational decisions of commercial airlines and through transport agreements that secured the “freedoms of the skies,” enshrining the rights of airlines to fly to, from, and over partner countries. Against this backdrop, the first Japanese low-cost carriers began operations in 2012,⁹⁰ as more agile and accessible alternatives to the full-service flag carriers and airlines that dominated the jet age. Prior to the opening of Terminal 3, Narita International Airport experienced a persistent decline in traffic, with a net reduction of approximately 600,000 international seats during the 2010s. Some traffic shifted to Haneda Airport, but some airlines chose to hub instead in Beijing or Seoul. Following the completion of Terminal 3, Narita International Airport regained traffic, with annual number of arrival and departure slots increasing from 220,000 to 300,000.⁹¹ By 2015, Japan had achieved an upturn in visitor growth of over 50% from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, following the adoption of “open skies” transport agreements, while the markets of China, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan accounted for another two-thirds of Japan’s total visitor arrivals. The easing

⁹⁰ Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, 11.

⁹¹ Tetsuo Shimizu, “Transport Planning and Management in the Tokyo Metropolitan Region: Its History, Current Situation, and Future Perspectives,” in *Tokyo as a Global City: New Geographical Perspectives*, eds. Toshio Kikuchi and Toshihiko Sugai (Springer: Singapore, 2018), 224 - 225

of visitor entry requirements for Chinese travelers for short-term tourism in 2015 promised additional inflows.⁹²

As the *South China Morning Post* reported in 2018, “today, most indicators suggest that the nation is on course to hit that ambitious target, [Prime Minister Shinzo Abe] is looking like a visionary and the tourism industry has grown into a key driver of the economy—which is convenient for the government as it looks to nurture new sources of income away from more traditional industries.”⁹³ By 2017, tourism accounted for 2% of Japan’s total gross domestic product, with 31.2 million international travelers visiting Japan in 2018.⁹⁴ Although tourism still lagged behind pre-pandemic numbers—the number of Chinese visitors plunged from 9.6 million in 2019 to 2.4 million but is on again on the rise—visitor spending reached a record 5.3 trillion yen (\$35.9 billion) in 2023.⁹⁵ In order to further minimize friction, the extraterritorial logic of international airport space is transposed to the urban environment: duty-free shopping is now an omnipresent fixture in cities like Tokyo. The “graduated sovereignty” identified by Aihwa Ong⁹⁶ spatializes even individual retailers, where duty-free checkout—eligible for purchases made above a certain amount—is zoned to specific machines, counters, or floors.

⁹² Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, “Japan relaxes Chinese visas to stimulate visitor & airline growth, following Southeast Asia success,” January 12, 2015.

⁹³ Julian Ryall, “Japan poised to meet Shinzo Abe’s target of 40 million foreign tourists in 2020,” *South China Morning Post*, October 17, 2018, <https://scmp.com/country-reports/country-reports/topics/japan-business-report-october-2018/article/2168058/japan>.

⁹⁴ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Tourism Trends and Policies*, 2020, 211.

⁹⁵ Mia Glass and Yoshiaki Nohara, “Japan’s Economy Gets Boost From 25 Million Visitors in 2023,” *Bloomberg*, January 17, 2024, <https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/japan-s-economy-gets-boost-from-25-million-visitors-in-2023>.

⁹⁶ Ong, 78.

In Japan, the expansion of budget travel options has also become increasingly important as the nation contends with a contracting, aging domestic workforce and seeks to internationalize its population by recruiting workers from Vietnam, China, and elsewhere in Asia. Under a highly stratified foreign worker policy, for many, this is a high-friction experience that takes the form of precariously temporary and sometimes recurring stays.⁹⁷ As Hirsh points out, there is a “perilous disconnect between the valorization of cross-border mobility and regional economic integration [...] and the aesthetic goals of urban planners.”⁹⁸ The demographic of Asia’s new flying public—migrant workers, students, retirees, budget travelers, largely traveling within Asia⁹⁹—is heterogenous, often bearing little resemblance to the jet-set cutouts simulated in 3D architectural renderings of Asia’s avant-garde airports. In their work on Asia’s immigration infrastructure, Biao Xing and Johan Lindquist write that “migration should not be imagined as a line between two places, but rather as a multi-faceted space of mediation occupied by commercial recruitment intermediaries—large and small, formal and informal—bureaucrats, NGOs, migrants, and technologies.”¹⁰⁰ Narita International Airport’s new low-budget terminal is one airport site among many within this network and the base for a patchwork of regional LCCs—Jeju Airlines from Japan, Spring Airlines from China, Aero K from Japan, AirAsia from the Philippines,

⁹⁷ Gracia Liu-Farrer, *Immigrant Japan: Mobility and Belonging in an Ethno-nationalist Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 122.

⁹⁸ Hirsh, *Airport Urbanism: Infrastructure and Mobility in Asia*, 107.

⁹⁹ Hirsh, *Airport Urbanism: Infrastructure and Mobility in Asia*, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Biao Xiang and Johan Lindquist, “Migration Infrastructure,” *International Migration Review* 48, no. 1 (2014): 142.

Jetstar Airways from Australia—facilitating a spartan form of cross-border travel sensorially and kinesthetically at odds with the cinematic, disembodied “gentle possession” described by Augé.



Figure 8: Rendering of Singapore Changi Airport, Safdie Architects

Rescaling the Olympics

In describing large-scale media ceremonies like the Olympic Games, Dayan and Katz argued that these media events synchronize a national and sometimes international sense of occasion, transporting viewers from the banality of daily routine and broadcasting rhythms. With pandemic-related restrictions during the 2020 Tokyo and 2022 Beijing Olympic Games, the two recent Olympics both proceeded, without precedent, without an international, in-person audience. Even before mass electrification and national broadcasting, the Olympic Games since their modern reincarnation at the turn of the twentieth century have always been captured as media, whether as text, sound, or image, but, perhaps more than ever, the Olympic Games and

their performances, locations, and infrastructures were experienced not in real-time or as physical things and places but first-and-foremost as media reproductions. At the same time, mediation of the Olympic Games has also become multimodal, no longer monopolized by a central, synchronized broadcasting experience with the IOC, solely responsible for awarding coverage rights for the Olympics on radio, television, and internet platforms to national broadcasting networks of their choosing, at the helm. It is now refracted instead through dozens of platforms and possible viewing experiences, including user-generated content and short-form video, quickly transforming the relationship between authorship and spectatorship.

If television no longer monopolizes the viewing experience of the Olympic Games, the city no longer monopolizes their spatial logic, as the financial and social costs of hosting—along with technocratic shifts in the techniques of state-led planning—recalibrate the geography of large-scale sporting events. The 2022 Winter Beijing Olympic Games was, functionally, already a multi-city event, unfolding not within Beijing but across the broader Jing-Jin-Ji urban cluster. The upcoming Milano Cortina Winter Olympic Games will be span across two former Olympic cities located 400 kilometers apart, but this configuration is even circumscribed compared to the plans of the other main contender for 2026, a regional proposal splitting venues between Sweden and Latvia. This phenomenon is not limited to the Olympic Games; the 2026 FIFA World Cup will be held in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, and 2030 across two continents in Spain, Portugal, and Morocco. Although multi-city events are now codified for the first time in official Olympic policy, the earlier Olympic Games in Tokyo and Beijing, in 1964 and 2008, foreshadowed this rescaling—and even their own conurbation into colossal urban corridors—each holding sporting events preliminaries in nearby cities newly connected by high-speed rail.

From multi-city, multi-country, and multi-continent bids to far-out airports and satellite cities, the Olympic city concept will quickly cease to be an arbiter of national ambition.

CODA

On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the bid for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games began half a century earlier, soon after the 1932 Olympics in Los Angeles, which recorded a surplus of over \$1 million in profit in the middle of the Great Depression.¹ Assisted by a corps of entrepreneurs and property developers, International Olympic Committee (IOC) member and real estate magnate William May Garland sought to leverage the Olympic Games as a means of luring tourism, business, and visibility to the city, where the nation's promising film industry had recently resettled from the east coast—defining, in the process, “both California and the Californian lifestyle for future generations of global visitors and consumers.”² Garland's campaign to win the 1932 bid, and his approach to the urban development of Los Angeles, was coterminous with what Mike Davis identifies as the creation myths that “wrote the script for the giant real-estate speculations of the early twentieth century that transformed Los Angeles from small town to metropolis,” in turn “endlessly reproduced by Hollywood, while continuing to be incorporated into the ersatz landscapes of suburban Southern California.”³ The stylized version of Los Angeles rendered by the 1932 Olympic Organizing Committee was one in which Hollywood indeed came to stand in for the city itself, with industry affiliates contributing to the scripting and the staging of the event. Most notably, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer producer Louis B.

¹ Matthew P. Llewellyn, Toby C. Rider, and John Gleaves, “The Golden Games: The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics,” in *LA Sports: Play, Games, and Community in the City of Angels*, eds. Wayne Wilson and David K. Wiggins (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2018), 203 - 204.

² Llewellyn, Rider, and Gleaves, 204.

³ Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*, 2nd ed (New York: Verso Books, 2006), 20.

Mayer served as a Committee member. The 1932 Olympic Games cultivated not only the popular image of Los Angeles but also the physical and ecological landscape of the city iconized in these circulations: over 30,000 of the now-ubiquitous nonnative palm trees dotting southern California were planted prior to the Olympic Games as part of a massive beautification program, costing \$100,000 of the total Olympic budget.

In 1984, Los Angeles set another precedent for the Olympic Games, a new phase of commercialization of the Olympic enterprise marked by the exclusive use of private financing—corporate sponsorships, broadcasting deals, and licensing and merchandising agreements—and became the first Olympic city to turn a profit, since 1932. City planners began strategizing the return of the Olympic Games to Los Angeles almost immediately after the 1932 Olympics ended, bidding for every possible opportunity until finally winning the 1984 bid in 1978. Controversy over the bid, however, led to the passing of a city charter amendment that prohibited the use of tax revenue for the Olympic Games,⁴ after which Mayor Tom Bradley insisted to the IOC that the city of Los Angeles would assume no financial liability for the event. With Bradley’s threats to pull out from and no easy alternatives—and downcast by the recent withdrawal of Denver from the 1976 Winter Olympic Games after Colorado voters rejected hosting in a statewide referendum—the IOC agreed to revise the Olympic Charter, which previously mandated that host cities shoulder the bulk of expenses; instead, the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) would bear sole responsibility for the success of the Olympic Games.⁵ The 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics thus became the first Olympic Games to be privately financed, converging, as Joshua Glick has argued, “with Mayor Tom

⁴ “1984 Olympics to Rely on Private Enterprise,” *New York Times*, December 6, 1981, 31.

⁵ Llewellyn, Rider, and Gleaves, 206 – 207.

Bradley’s aspiration that the Olympics would cement Los Angeles’s status as a ‘world city’” and “the capital of the Pacific Rim.”⁶

In 2028, the Olympic Games will return to my city, Los Angeles, for a third time; plans for 2028 have been met with considerable skepticism as to how the Olympics will be administered, whether or not hosting will accelerate displacement and ramp up policing, who will benefit from its staging, at what cost, and to whom; but despite vocal criticism from some that the Olympic Games should be abolished altogether, a 2022 poll indicated that a majority of Los Angeles residents were in favor of the 2028 Olympic Games,⁷ imperfect sampling practices notwithstanding. The cancellation of the Olympic Games is extraordinarily unlikely without (and even with) popular support, and, all things considered, I look forward to them. If Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz described large-scale media events such as the Olympic Games as the product of bargaining between the competing interests of three involved parties—event organizers, broadcasters, and audiences—the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic Games will have a fourth front: that of organized labor. UNITE Here Local 11 is the storied labor union representing tens of thousands of hospitality and service workers who staff southern California’s airports, event centers, hotels, restaurants, and sports stadiums; their membership includes the workforce of just about every site of the county’s sprawling Olympic infrastructure, from Los Angeles International Airport to SoFi Stadium and the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. Over the course of its current contract campaign, the union is ensuring their upper hand for the long-haul, ratifying dozens of collective bargaining agreements for service workers with expiration dates

⁶ Joshua Glick, *Los Angeles Documentary and the Production of Public History, 1958 – 1977* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), 201.

⁷ Owen Lloyd, “Poll says 76 per cent of Los Angeles residents in favour of hosting 2028 Olympics,” *Inside the Games*, February 12, 2022, <https://insidethegames.biz/articles/1119171/los-angeles-2028-olympics-survey>.

strategically set to January 2028, six months before the Olympic Games. At that point, their no-strike clauses—included in virtually all union contracts in the United States, to prevent employer lockouts and for access to a grievance and arbitration procedure—will also expire. Under favorable conditions, the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic Games could be a once-in-a-generation moment of leverage for California workers to wrest power from the employer class and earn their just share of the city’s abundance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “1984 Olympics to Rely on Private Enterprise.” *New York Times*. December 6, 1981.
- “94この1年 伝統とモダンの出会い検証 目立ったアジア興隆の流れ.” *Yomiuri Shimbun*. December 14, 1994.
- “BTAP (Beijing Tokyo Art Projects) Opens.” In *Tokyo Gallery + BTAP: 1950 – 2010*. Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2010.
- “Chronicle 1976 – 2006.” In *Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary Documents*, edited by Wu Hung. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010.
- “Discussing ‘Beijing Afloat.’” In *Beijing Tokyo Art Projects Opening Exhibition: Beijing Afloat*. Beijing: Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2002.
- “Flughafen BER ist eröffnet mit neun Jahren Verspätung.” *Deutsche Welle*, October 30, 2020. <https://spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/berlin-flughafen-ber-eroeffnet-mit-neun-jahren-verspaetung-a-f5648c1b-558f-4529-93e4-554ef0de0088>.
- “Radioactive Fallout Under Danger Mark.” *Japan Times*, October 21, 1964.
- “You Can’t Tell the Olympians Without a Satellite Network.” *New York Times*, September 19, 1988.
- “中国ついに核実験.” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 17, 1964.
- “中国新建住宅将推广街区制 原则上不再建封闭住宅小区.” *Xinhua News Agency*, February 22, 2016. http://xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/22/c_128738587.htm.
- “中国现代艺术展引起争议.” *Renmin Ribao*, 4th edition, February 21, 1989.
- “中日艺术家心心相联.” *Renmin Ribao*, 4th edition, March 22, 1958.
- “北京举行日本现代画展览会.” *Renmin Ribao*. 5th edition, June 20, 1960.
- “邓副总理离东京抵京都友好访问离东京前，福田首相等到国宾馆送行.” *Renmin Ribao*, 1st edition, October 27, 1978.
- Abel, Jessamyn R. “Technologies of Cold War Diplomacy: Transforming Postwar Japan.” *Society for the History of Technology* 62, no. 1 (2021): 128 – 155.
- Abel, Jessamyn R. *Dream Super-Express: A Cultural History of the World’s First Bullet Train*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2022.

- Abel, Jessamyn R. *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan's Global Engagement, 1933-1964*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015.
- Abel, Jessamyn R., and Leo Coleman. "Dreams of Infrastructure in Global Asias." *Verges: Studies in Global Asias* 6, no. 2 (Fall 2020): vi – xxix.
- Abelson, Philip. "The Chinese A-Bomb." *Science* 146, no. 3644 (October 1964): 601.
- Akhter, Majed. "Geopolitics of the Belt and Road: Space, State, and Capital in China and Pakistan." In *Logistical Asia*, edited by Brett Neilson, Ned Rossiter, and Ranabir Samaddar. New York: Palgrave, 2018.
- Almaty 2022 Bid Committee. Candidature file, 2014. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- American Telephone and Telegraph. Advertisement. *Japan Times*. February 16, 1962.
- Andreas, Joel. *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Appel, Hannah, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta. "Temporarily, Politics, and the Promise of Infrastructure." Introduction to *The Promise of Infrastructure*, edited by Hannah Appel, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta. Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.
- Apter, David Ernest, and Nagayo Sawa. *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- Artprice, *The Art Market in 2023*, 2024.
- Artprice. *2008 Art Market Trends*, 2009.
- Artprice. *The Art Market in 2012: A dialogue between East and West*, 2013.
- Artprice. *The Art Market in 2018*, 2019.
- Asahi Shimbun*. October 16, 1964.
- Augé, Marc. *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, translated by John Howe. New York: Verso Books.
- Beijing Municipal Commerce Bureau, *2020 Beijing Investment Development Report*.
- Beijing Tokyo Art Projects Opening Exhibition: Beijing Afloat*. Beijing: Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2002.
- Black, Lindsay. "Conflict and Cooperation in Global East Asia." In *Global East Asia: Into the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Frank N. Pieke and Koichi Iwabuchi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021.

- Botti, Giaime. *Designing Emerging Markets: A Quantitative History of Architectural Globalisation*. Singapore: Springer, 2023.
- Boyd, Gerald M. "President imposes tariff on imports against Japanese." *New York Times*, April 18, 1987.
- Bray, David. *Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- Brook, Daniel. "History of the Present: Mexico City." *Places* (February 2017).
<https://placesjournal.org/article/history-of-the-present-mexico-city/>.
- Bureau of Urban Development. *The Changing Face of Tokyo: From Edo to Today, and into the Future*. Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2019.
- Burr, William, and Jeffrey T. Richelson. "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960 – 1964." *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/2001): 54 – 99.
- Cartier, Carolyn. "Magic Cities, Future Dreams—Urban Contradictions." In *The China Story Yearbook 2016: Prosperity*, eds. Jane Golley and Linda Jaivin. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018.
- Castro, Fidel to Juan Antonio Samaranch, November 29, 1984. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- Centeno, Miguel Angel. "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy," *Theory and Society* 22, no. 3 (June 1993): 307 – 335.
- Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation. "Japan relaxes Chinese visas to stimulate visitor & airline growth, following Southeast Asia success." January 12, 2015.
- Chapin, Emerson. "D-Day for Japanese Tourist." *New York Times*, February 9, 1964.
- Chen, Kuang-Hsing. *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
- Chen, Tina, and Eric Hayot. "Introducing Verge: What Does It Mean to Study Global Asias?" *Verge: Studies in Global Asias* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2015): vi – xv.
- Chen, Yangqiu, Lai Ning, and Zhang Xueting, "China's City of the Future: Xiong'an New Area." *Hitachi Review* 70, no. 1 (2021): 36 – 44.
- Chinnery, Colin. "Beijing." *Artforum* (December 2008): 240 – 241.
- Chira, Susan. "Marches for Reunification Are Halted by South Korea." June 11, 1988, *New York Times*.

- Cho, Hyunjung. "Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the Making of Japanese Postwar Architecture." *Journal of Architectural Education* 66, no. 1 (October 2012): 72 – 83.
- Choe, Youngmin. *Tourist Distractions: Traveling and Feeling in Transnational Hallyu Cinema*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
- Chu, Melissa, and Benjamin Genocchio. "What is Contemporary Asian Art? Mapping an Evolving Discourse." Introduction to *Contemporary Art in Asia: A Critical Reader*, edited by Melissa Chiu and Benjamin Genocchio. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008.
- Chu, Melissa. "On Ai Weiwei." *Social Research* 83, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 175 – 177.
- Collins, Sandra. "The Fragility of Asian National Identity in the Olympic Games." In *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, edited by Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.
- Collins, Sandra. *The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Corkill, Edan. "Not in Beijing for the Chinese." *Japan Times*, November 15, 2007.
- Cornell, Christen. "The temporal pocket: 1990s Beijing artist colonies." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 19, no. 1 (2018): 56 – 71.
- Cubitt, Sean. *Finite Media: Environmental Implications of Digital Media*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
- Cui, Dianguo. "China's High-Speed Rail Dream." *Leaders Magazine* 38, no. 4 (2015): 54 – 55.
- Curtis, Simon, and Ian Klaus. *The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2024.
- Davis, Mike. *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*, 2nd edition. New York: Verso Books, 2006.
- Davis, Mike. *Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster*. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.
- Dayan, Daniel, and Elihu Katz. *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Dayan, Daniel. "Beyond Media Events: Disenchantment, Derailment, Disruption." In *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, edited by Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.
- DeBoer Stephanie, *Coproducing Asia: Locating Japanese-Chinese Regional Film and Media*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.

- Droubie, Paul. “Phoenix Arisen: Japan as Peaceful Internationalist at the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics.” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 28, no. 16 (November 2011): 2309 – 2322.
- Du, Huang. “Japanese ‘Mono-ha’ in China.” In *What is Mono-ha?* Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007.
- Easterling, Keller. *Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space*. London: Verso Books, 2014.
- Ebony, David Ebony. “Controversy Rages Over Zaha Hadid’s Olympic Stadium Design for Tokyo.” *Artnet News*, December 10, 2014. <https://news.artnet.com/art-world/controversy-rages-over-zaha-hadids-olympic-stadium-design-for-tokyo-193837>.
- Enlai, Zhou to Mao Zedong. September 21, 1964. Wilson Center.
- Favell, Adrian Favel. “The Art Market in Galapagos: Japan and the Global Art World.” In *Cosmopolitan Canvases: The Globalization of Markets for Contemporary Art*, edited by Olav Velthuis and Stefano Baia-Curioni. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Feleppa, Robert. “Black Rain: Reflections on Hiroshima and Nuclear War in Japanese Film.” *Crosscurrents* 54, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 106 – 119.
- Feng, Boyi. “Imagining the Floating World, Dreaming of a Floating Life: about the title ‘Beijing Afloat’ and other things.” In *Beijing Tokyo Art Projects Opening Exhibition: Beijing Afloat*. Beijing: Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2002.
- Finlay, Christopher J. “Toward the Future: The New Olympic Internationalism.” In *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*, edited by Monroe E. Price and Daniel Dayan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.
- Flyvberg, Bent, Alexander Budzier, and Daniel Lunn. “Regression to the tail: Why the Olympics blow up.” *Economy and Space* 53, no. 2 (2021): 233 – 260.
- Foster + Partners. Beijing Capital International Airport. <https://fosterandpartners.com/projects/beijing-capital-international-airport>.
- Furuhata, Yuriko. *Climatic Media: Transpacific Experiments in Atmospheric Control*. Durham: University Press, 2022.
- Glass, Mia, and Yoshiaki Nohara. “Japan’s Economy Gets Boost From 25 Million Visitors in 2023.” *Bloomberg*, January 17, 2024. <https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-17/japan-s-economy-gets-boost-from-25-million-visitors-in-2023>.
- Glick, Joshua. *Los Angeles Documentary and the Production of Public History, 1958 – 1977*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018.

- Goldblatt, David. *The Games: A Global History of the Olympics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016.
- Gu, Xin, “Creative Cities, Technological Utopianism, and Cultural Retrofitting.” In *Re-imagining Creative Cities in Twenty-First Century Asia*, edited by Xin Gu, Michael Kho Lim, and Justin O’Connor. Cham: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2020.
- Han, Sung-Joo. “South Korea in 1988: A Revolution in the Making.” *Asian Survey* 29, no. 1 (January 1989): 29 – 38.
- Hang, Jian, and Cao Xiao’ou, “A Brief Account of *China/Avant-Garde*” (1989). In *Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary Documents*, ed. Wu Hung. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010.
- Haraway, Donna. “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s.” In *The Donna Haraway Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Harmetz, Aljean. “Olympic Arts Festival Opens in LA.” *New York Times*. June 2, 1984.
- Harrison, Henrietta. “Popular Responses to the Atomic Bomb in China, 1945 – 1955.” *Past and Present* 8 (2013): 98 – 116.
- Hein, Carola. “Resilient Tokyo: Disaster and Transformation in the Japanese City.” In *The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster*, edited by Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Hillman, Jonthan E.. *The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.
- Hirsh, Max. “Technical Experts and the Production of China’s Airport Infrastructure.” In *Infrastructure and the Remaking of Asia*, edited by Till Mostowlansky and Max Hirsh and. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2022.
- Hirsh, Max. *Airport Urbanism: Infrastructure and Mobility in Asia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
- Hood, Christopher. *Shinkansen: From Bullet Train to Symbol of Modern Japan*. New York: Routledge, 2006..
- Hoshiro, Hiroyuki Hoshiro. “Reconsidering Japan’s War Reparations and Economic Re-Entry into Southeast Asia.” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 34, no. 4 (2023): 673 – 702.
- Hou, Meng, et al. “Airport-airline Relationship, Competition and Welfare in a Multi-airport System: The Case of New Beijing Daxing Airport.” *Journal of Transport Economics and Policy* 56, no. 2 (2022): 156 – 189.

- Howarth, Dan. "Japan scraps Zaha Hadid's Tokyo 2020 Olympic Stadium." *Dezeen*, July 17, 2015. <https://dezeen.com/2015/07/17/japan-scraps-zaha-hadid-tokyo-2020-olympic-stadium/>.
- Hu, Tung-Hui. *A Prehistory of the Cloud*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015.
- Huawei. "5G千兆网：从‘神仙机场’开启智慧出行." <https://carrier.huawei.com/cn/success-stories/Industries-5G/airport/beijing-airport>.
- Igarashi, Yoshikuni. *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945 – 1970*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- International Olympic Committee. "Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration," January 20, 2018.
- International Olympic Committee. *Olympic Agenda 2020*, 2014.
- International Olympic Committee. *Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission*, 2015.
- Interview with Toshiyuki Inoko. "TeamLab Co-Founder Toshiyuki Inoko on How He Went From High-School Prankster to an Architect of the Art World's Experience Economy," by Katie Rothstein. *Artnet News*, March 19, 2021. <https://news.artnet.com/career-stories/career-stories-teamlab-toshiyuki-inoko-1953102>.
- Interview with Yoichiro Kurata. "Bidding for a Better Market." In Craig Mod and Ashley Rawlings, *Art Space Tokyo*, 2nd edition. Tokyo: PRE/POST, 2010.
- Interview with Yukihiro Tabata. "Between Tokyo and Beijing." In Craig Mod and Ashley Rawlings, *Art Space Tokyo*, 2nd edition. Tokyo: PRE/POST, 2010.
- Iriye, Akira. "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945 – 90," *The China Quarterly* 124 (1990): 624 – 638.¹
- Itoh, Mayumi. *Pioneers of Sino-Japanese Relations: Liao and Takasaki*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Iveson, Ali. "Olympic Torch Relay cancelled following Tokyo 2020 postponement." *Inside the Games*. March 24, 2020. <https://insidethegames.biz/articles/1092380/olympic-torch-relay-cancelled>.
- Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "White Paper on Development Cooperation 2018," Japan International Cooperation Agency.
- Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Beijing Capital Airport Terminal Area Expansion Project." Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2011.
- Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2012." Japan International Cooperation Agency.

- Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “White Paper on Development Cooperation 2022.” Japan International Cooperation Agency.
- Jeon, Chihyung. “‘No Japanese in the Cockpit’: The Airplane and the Role of Race, Culture, and Bodies in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations.” *Pacific Historical Review* 88, no. 4 (Fall 2019): 554 – 589.
- Jussawalla, Meheroo. “Telecommunications and Regional Interdependence in Southeast Asia.” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 85 – 96.
- Kapur, Nick. *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Kassens, Eva Noor. *Los Angeles and the Summer Olympic Games: Planning Legacies*. Cham: Springer, 2020.
- Katz, Elihu, and Tamar Liebes. “‘No More Peace!’: How Disaster, Terror, and War Have Upstaged Media Events.” *International Journal of Communication* 1 (2007): 157 – 166.
- Kawashima, Nobuko. “The Development of Art Projects in Japan: Policy and Economic Perspectives.” *FIELD* 8, (2017). <https://field-journal.com/issue-8/the-development-of-art-projects-in-japan-policy-and-economic-perspectives/>.
- KDDI Corporation. “Third IEEE Milestones award for KDDI, the most ever in Japan,” November 12, 2014, <https://news.kddi.com/kddi/corporate/english/newsrelease/2014/11/12/787.html>.
- Keane, Michael. *China’s New Creative Clusters: Governance, Human Capital and Investment*. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Kellner, Doug. “Media Culture and the Triumph of the Spectacle.” *Fast Capitalism* 1, no. 1 (2005): 58 – 71.
- Kim, Nan. *Memory, Reconciliation, and Reunions in South Korea: Crossing the Divide*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.
- Kitchin, Roy, and Martin Dodge. *Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011.
- Klein, Christina. *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Kobayashi, Masami. “Urban Transformations from Edo to Tokyo: Process of Fragmented Structure of the City.” In *Tokyo Urbanism: From Hinterland to Kaiwai*, edited by Masami Kobayashi. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2024.
- Kong, Xiangwu. “京津冀 协同发展 展开新局.” *Renmin Ribao*, 1st edition, October 6, 2017.

- Koolhaas, Rem, and Hans Ulrich Obrist. *Project Japan: Metabolism Talks*, edited by Kayoko Ota and James Westcott. Cologne: Taschen, 2011.
- Krischer, Olivier. "Betting on Beijing." *Japan Times*, August 21, 2008.
- Kunio, Yaguchi. *1964: A Turning Point in Japanese Art*. Tokyo: Museum of Contemporary Art Tokyo, 1996.
- Larkin, Brian. "Promising Forms: The Political Aesthetics of Infrastructure." In *The Promise of Infrastructure*, edited by Nikhil Anand, Akhil Gupta, and Hannah Appel. Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.
- Larson, James F., and Heung-Soo Park. *Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
- Lee, Hong Yung. *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
- Lee, Laura. *Worlds Unbound: The Art of teamLab*. Chicago: Intellect, 2022.
- Lee, Sangjoon. *Cinema and the Cultural Cold War: US Diplomacy and the Origins of the Asian Cinema Network*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Lewis, John Wilson, and Xue Litai. *China Builds the Bomb*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Li, Pi. "On Art, Urbanism, and Public Space in China, with Some Specific References to Caochangdi Village." In *Caochangdi, Beijing Inside Out: Farmers, Floaters, Taxi Drivers, Artists, and the International Art Mob Challenge and Remake the City*, Robert Mangurian and Mary-Ann Ray. Hong Kong: Timezone 8, 2009.
- Li, Xianting. "Confessions of a China/Avant-Garde Curator" (1989). In *Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary Documents*, edited by Wu Hung. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010.
- Li, Xiaobing. *The Cold War in East Asia*. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Lin, Zhongjie. *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Linden, Julian. "Istanbul says awarding 2020 Games will 'help peace.'" *Reuters*, September 7, 2013. <https://reuters.com/article/sports/istanbul-says-awarding-2020-games-will-help-peace-idUSBRE9860CA/>.
- Liu-Farrer, Gracia. *Immigrant Japan: Mobility and Belonging in an Ethno-nationalist Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Liu, Yanqiong. "中国科学院与'两弹一星'工程." *Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences* 35, no. 9 (September 2019): 1003 – 1013.

- Llewellyn, Matthew P., Toby C. Rider, and John Gleaves. "The Golden Games: The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics." In *LA Sports: Play, Games, and Community in the City of Angels*, edited by Wayne Wilson and David K. Wiggins. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2018.
- Lloyd, Owen. "Poll says 76 per cent of Los Angeles residents in favour of hosting 2028 Olympics." *Inside the Games*, February 12, 2022.
<https://insidethegames.biz/articles/1119171/los-angeles-2028-olympics-survey>.
- Lotz, Amanda. *The Television Will be Revolutionized*, 2nd edition. New York: New York University Press, 2014.
- Low, Morris. *Visualizing Nuclear Power in Japan: A Trip to the Reactor*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.
- Lu, Sheldon. *Contemporary Chinese Cinema and Visual Culture: Envisioning the Nation*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021.
- MacAloon, John J. "Olympic Games and the Theory of Spectacle in Modern Societies." In *Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance*, edited by John J. MacAloon. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1984.
- Mackay, Duncan. "Poor economic conditions should be seen as 'opportunity, not problem' says head of Madrid 2020 Olympic bid." *Inside the Games*, September 24, 2011.
<https://insidethegames.biz/articles/14357/poor-economic-conditions-should-be-seen-as-opportunity-not-problem-q-says-head-of-madrid-2020-olympic-bid>.
- Mannes-Abbott, Guy. "Laboring One to Seven (Island of Terror)." *e-flux* 65 (May 2015).
<https://e-flux.com/journal/65/336378/laboring-one-to-seven-island-of-terror/>.
- Massey, Doreen. *For Space*. London: Sage, 2005.
- Masuda, Masayuki. "Japan's Changing ODA Policy Towards China." *China Perspectives* 47 (May/June 2003): 1 – 15.
- Masuda, Yoneji. *The Information Society as Post-industrial Society*. Bethesda: World Future Society, 1981.
- McLuhan, Marshall. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
- Memorandum from George C. Denney, Jr. United States Bureau of Intelligence and Research. "Probable Consequences of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation," May 6, 1963.
- Milicua, José. Introduction to *Art Treasures: Candidate Cities for the 2000 Olympic Games: Beijing, Berlin, Brasilia, Istanbul, Manchester, Sydney: From 23rd June to 3rd October 1993*. Lausanne: Olympic Museum, 1993.
- Miller, Jennifer M. *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019.

- Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. "White Paper on Tourism in Japan: The Tourism Situation in FY2012." Japan Tourism Agency.
- Mod, Craig, and Ashley Rawlings. Preface to *Art Space Tokyo*, 2nd edition. Tokyo: PRE/POST, 2010.
- Molho, Jeremie. "Becoming Asia's Art Market Hub: Comparing Singapore and Hong Kong." *Arts* 10, no. 2 (2021): 1 – 20.
- Monserrate, Steven Gonzalez. "The Infinite Cloud Is a Fantasy." *Wired*, November 15, 2022. <https://wired.com/story/cloud-data-storage-climate/>.
- Morgner, Christian. "Spatial Barriers and the Formation of Global Art Cities: The Case of Tokyo." *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 28 (2019): 183 – 208.
- Morley, David, and Kevin Robins. *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Morley, David. "Communications and transport: The mobility of information, people and commodities." *Media, Culture & Society* 35, no. 5 (2011): 743 – 759.
- Moshe, Komata. "1964 Olympic Legacy: Milestone for Reconciliation in Manila." NHK World-Japan, February 21, 2021. <http://nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/1514/>.
- Mostowlansky, Till, and Max Hirsh. Introduction to *Infrastructure and the Remaking of Asia*, edited by Till Mostowlansky and Max Hirsh. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2022/
- Nagai, Matsuzo to Werner Klineberg, August 4, 1938. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- Nakada, Gail. "Navigating Tokyo's New LCC Terminal 3." *HuffPost* (blog), July 30, 2015. https://huffpost.com/entry/navigating-tokyos-new-lcc_b_7900584.
- Negroponte, Nicholas. *Being Digital*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.
- Neves, Joshua. *Underglobalization: Beijing's Media Urbanism and the Chimera of Legitimacy*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2020.
- Okita, Saburo. "Japan's Economy and the Korean War." *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 14 (July 1951): 144 – 144.
- Ong, Aihwa. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. *OECD Tourism Trends and Policies*, 2020.

- Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad. *The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964: The Official Report of the Organizing Committee*, 1964. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- Organizing Committee of the XII Olympiad. *Report of the Organizing Committee on Its Work for the XII Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo Until the Relinquishment*, 1940. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- Orr, James R. *The Victim as Hero*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011.
- Palenski, Ron. "1988 Seoul." In *Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement*, edited by John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004.
- Parks, Lisa, and Nicole Starosielski. Introduction to *Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures*, edited by Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015.
- Parks, Lisa. "'Stuff You Can Kick': Toward a Theory of Media Infrastructures." In *Between Humanities and the Digital*, edited by Patrik Svensson and David Theo Goldberg. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015.
- Peck, Jamie. "Struggling with the Creative Class." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 4 (2005): 740 – 770.
- Peters, John Durham Peters. "Infrastructuralism: Media as Traffic between Nature and Culture." In *Traffic: Media as Infrastructures and Cultural Practices*, edited by Marion Näser-Lather and Christoph Neubert. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
- Rea, Naomi. "teamLab's Tokyo Museum Has Become the World's Most Popular Single-Artist Destination, Surpassing the Van Gogh Museum." *Artnet News*, August 7, 2019. <https://news.artnet.com/art-world/teamlab-museum-attendance-1618834>.
- Ren, Julie. *Engaging Comparative Urbanism: Art Spaces in Beijing and Berlin*. Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021.
- Ren, Xuefei. "Olympic Beijing: Reflections on Urban Space and Global Connectivity." In *The Beijing Olympics: Promoting China*, edited by Kevin Caffrey. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Ren, Xuefei. *Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Robertson, Iain. *New Art New Markets*. London: Lund Humphries, 2018.
- Roche, Maurice. *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*. London: Routledge, 2000.

- Ryall, Julian. "Japan poised to meet Shinzo Abe's target of 40 million foreign tourists in 2020." *South China Morning Post*, October 17, 2018. <https://scmp.com/country-reports/country-reports/topics/japan-business-report-october-2018/article/2168058/japan>.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. London: Penguins, 1978.
- Sato, Hiroshi Kan, and Akiko Hiratsuka-Sasaki. "Japanese Development Aid and Global Power." In *Global East Asia: Into the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Frank N. Pieke and Koichi Iwabuchi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021.
- Schiller, Kay, and Chris Young. *The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010.
- Schwartz, Vanessa R. *Jet Age Aesthetic: The Glamour of Media in Motion*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.
- Schwarzer, Michelle. *Zoomscape: Architecture in Motion and Media*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004.
- Seoul Metropolitan Government. *Responses to Questionnaires for the Games of the XXIV Olympiad*, 1981. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- Shimizu, Tetsuo. "Transport Planning and Management in the Tokyo Metropolitan Region: Its History, Current Situation, and Future Perspectives." In *Tokyo as a Global City: New Geographical Perspectives*, edited by Toshio Kikuchi and Toshihiko Sugai. Springer: Singapore, 2018.
- Shuman, Amanda. "Elite Competitive Sport in the People's Republic of China 1958 – 1966: The Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFU)." *Journal of Sport History* 40, no. 20 (Summer 2013): 258 – 283.
- Spakowski, Nicola. "Asia as Future: The Claims and Rhetoric of an Asian Century." In *Asianisms: Regionalist Interactions and Asian Integration*, edited by Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski. Singapore: NUS Press, 2016.
- Spakowski, Nicola. "Asia as Future: The Claims and Rhetoric of an Asian Century." In *Asianisms: Regionalist Interactions and Asian Integration*, edited by Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski. Singapore: NUS Press), 210.
- Starosielski, Nicole. *The Undersea Network*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2015.
- Sundaram, Ravi. *Pirate Modernity: New Delhi's Media Urbanism*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Tabata, Yukihito. Foreword to *What is Mono-ha?* Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007.
- Tamari, Tomoko. "Star Architects, Urban Spectacles, and Global Brands: Exploring the Case of the Tokyo Olympics 2020." *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 28, no. 1 (March 2019): 45 – 63.

- Tange, Kenzo. "Technology and Humanity." *Japan Architect* (October 1960): 11 – 12. Quoted in Zhongjie Lin, *Kenzo Tange and the Metabolist Movement: Urban Utopias of Modern Japan*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- TAV Airports. "TAV Airports opens new terminal in Almaty." Press release, June 1, 2024. <https://tavhavalimanlari.com.tr/tav-airports-opens-new-terminal-in-almaty>.
- teamLab. "teamLab's 10,000-sqm Immersive Museum teamLab Massless to Open in Beijing in 2022." Press release, vol. 1, February 18, 2022.
- Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games Bid Committee. Candidature file, vol. 1, 2013. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- Tokyo Gallery + BTAP: 1950 – 2010*. Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + Beijing Tokyo Art Projects, 2010.
- Tokyo Municipal Office. Candidature file, 1933. International Olympic Committee Archives.
- Tsukamoto, Yoshiharu, and Ryuji Fujimura. "Typo-Morphology of Tokyo," translated by Eric Shiner. *Perspecta* 20 (2008): 32 – 41.
- United States Central Intelligence Agency. "The China Problem in Japanese Politics." May 1, 1964.
- Virilio, Paul. *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception*, 2nd edition. New York: Verso, 1989.
- Vogel, Ezra F. *China and Japan: Facing History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2021.
- Weber, Isabella M. *How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate*. New York: Routledge, 2021.
- Weiss, Jessica Chen. *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Welfield, John. *Japan and Nuclear China*. Canberra: Australian National University press, 1970.
- Williams, R. John. *The Buddha in the Machine: Art, Technology, and the Meeting of East and West*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.
- Williams, Raymond. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Williams, Raymond. *Television: Technology and Cultural Form*, 2nd edition. New York: Routledge, 1991.
- Wilson, Sandra. "Exhibiting a New Japan: the Tokyo Olympics of 1964 and Expo '70 in Osaka," *Historical Research* 58, no. 227 (February 2012): 159 – 178.
- Winner, Langdon. "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" *Daedalus* 109, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 121 – 136.

- Wu, Hung. “‘Experimental Exhibitions’ of the 1990s.” In *Reinterpretation: A Decade of Experimental Chinese Art*, edited by Wu Hung, Wang Huangsheng, and Feng Boyi. Guangzhou: Guangdong Museum of Art, 2002.
- Wu, Hung. “A Case of Being ‘Contemporary’: Conditions, Spheres, and Narratives of Contemporary Chinese Art.” In *Contemporary Art in Asia: A Critical Reader*, edited by Melissa Chiu and Benjamin Genocchio, Cambridge: MIT Press. Previously published in *Making History: Wu Hung on Contemporary Art*. Hong Kong: Timezone 8, 2008.
- Xiang, Biao and Johan Lindquist. “Migration Infrastructure.” *International Migration Review* 48, no. 1 (2014): 122 – 148.
- Yaguchi, Yujin, and Mari Yoshihara. “Evolutions of ‘Paradise’: Japanese Tourist Discourse about Hawai’i.” *American Studies* 45, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 81 - 106.
- Yamamoto, Hozu. Foreword to *What is Mono-ha?* Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2007.
- Yoshida, Shingo. “In the shadow of China’s bomb: Nuclear consultation, commitment reconfirmation, and missile defence in the US-Japan alliance, 1962 – 1968.” In *Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance*, edited by John Baylis and Yoko Iwama. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- Yoshimi, Shunya. “‘Made in Japan’: the cultural politics of ‘home electrification’ in postwar Japan.” *Media, Culture & Society* 21 (1999): 149 – 171.
- Yuan Shun’s “0” Project. Tokyo: Tokyo Gallery + BTAP, 2008.
- Zaha Hadid Architects. Beijing Daxing International Airport. <https://zaha-hadid.com/architecture/beijing-new-airport-terminal-building/>.
- Zhang, Hui. “The short march to China’s hydrogen bomb.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 11, 2024. <https://thebulletin.org/2024/04/the-short-march-to-chinas-hydrogen-bomb/>.
- Zukin, Sharon. *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change*, 25th anniversary edition. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014.