Title
Sticky Socialism: A Quantitative Study of Citizens' Adaptation to Economic and Political Regime Change

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Sticky Socialism:
A Quantitative Study of Citizens’ Adaptation to
Economic and Political Regime Change

A dissertation submitted in partial
satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Diana Vladimirova Ichpekova

2014
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Sticky Socialism:
A Quantitative Study of Citizens’ Adaptation to
Economic and Political Regime Change

by

Diana Vladimirova Ichpekova

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2014
Professor David O. Sears, Chair

The collapse of communism two decades ago – and the subsequent political and economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe – has raised new questions about the ability of citizens to adapt to changing institutional orders. This dissertation project starts with a large and fundamental puzzle: over the past twenty years, post-communist nations have shown improved convergence toward Western standards of economic and political performance, yet public opinion has grown increasingly disapproving of the changes that have taken place. Why?

While rational-choice theories expect individuals to engage in simple cost-benefit analyses of altering realities, psychological accounts suggest impediments to such practicable
adjustments; theories of socialization and attitude “persistence,” in particular, emphasize the perseverance and continuing influence of values acquired earlier in life. This dissertation seeks to integrate these various insights and provide a more comprehensive understanding of transition at the individual-level. Utilizing a unique mix of (a) cross-sectional, repeated survey data (European Values Study/World Values Study, 1990-2005), (b) longitudinal survey data (German Socioeconomic Panel, 1999-2010), and (c) macro indicators of economic and political outputs, it investigates the relative importance of early (“primacy”) experiences, (re-)learning procedures, and contemporary societal factors for the development of post-communist beliefs. Incorporating a range of statistical techniques, it also probes related mechanisms of change, including within-person attitude stability, alterations in cohort composition over time, migration, and the intergenerational transmission of values, so as to better address the prospects for convergence.

The findings reveal numerous challenges to the task of attitudinal adaptation. Although post-communists are found to partially respond to changing circumstances – and to move some way toward the norms espoused by their Western counterparts – these shifts are shown to be neither linear over time, nor symmetrical for all involved. Rather, even decades after regime change, significant (leftist) biases remain, particularly for members of older cohorts. Supplementary analyses unearth additional evidence of resistance, illustrating how these stable, socialist distinctions might linger further into the long-term, defying physical relocation and potentially even population replacement. Such an inquiry is hoped to illuminate transitions beyond Europe (e.g., China, Middle East), where citizen adaptation to post-authoritarian climates will be critical for democratic consolidation.
The dissertation of Diana Vladimirova Ichpekova is approved.

Daniel Treisman
James DeNardo
John A. Agnew
David O. Sears, Chair

University of California, Los Angeles
2014
For my Family and Loved Ones,

My Friends and Colleagues,

My Professors and my Chair.
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DIANA V. ICHPEKOVA

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MAIN RESEARCH PAPERS

• “Old Kids on the Bloc: The Dynamics of Post-Communist Attitudinal Adjustment.”
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ACADEMIC WORK EXPERIENCE

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• Academic Exhibition (Merit-Based Scholarship), City of London School for Girls, 1997-2004.

OTHER SKILLS AND INTERESTS

• **Bilingual:** English, Bulgarian (both native).
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of communism two decades ago, epitomized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, is said to have launched the “great transformation” (Kornai 2006) of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The macro-level transition embarked upon by the post-communist states at that time – from both a system of central planning to a market economy and from an authoritarian political regime to a multi-party democratic system – certainly represented a change of remarkable scale, requiring a major upheaval of the pre-existing institutional order. Starting around 1990, the countries of the former socialist bloc began dismantling the establishments of the Soviet system, replacing them with more capitalist and competitive ones, in an effort to both economically and politically liberalize. The ensuing strategies, which included such policies as large-scale privatization, increasing openness to foreign trade, price liberalization, a shrinking of the social safety net, the development of contemporary commercial banking, the adoption of modern legal institutions, the introduction of competitive elections, the re-writing of national constitutions, and the birth of multifarious political parties (Welsh 1994, Boone et al. 1998, Svejnar 2002, Bunce 2003, Rose et al. 2006), amounted not only to a profound metamorphosis of society, but to a fundamental overhaul of citizens’ everyday lives. These changes, it was hoped, would lead to overall economic prosperity and to an improvement in individuals’ quality of life.

As political economists have disagreed about the usefulness of the Washington consensus (Rodrik 2006), the relative merits of a “big bang” vs. “gradualist” strategy (Murphy et al. 1992, Boycko et al. 1995, Dewatripont and Roland 1992, 1995, Wei 1997, Castanheira and Roland 1999, Lau et al. 2000, Roland 2002), the importance of foreign aid\(^3\) (Burnside and Dollar 2000, Easterly 2003), and the significance of initial conditions (Sachs and Woo 1994, DeMelo et al. 2001, Campos and Coricelli 2002), comparativists

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\(^1\) Various explanations have been proposed for the immediate, widespread depression, focusing on such factors as labor market frictions (Atkeson & Kehoe 1996), the arising credit crunch (Calvo and Coricelli 1993), tight macroeconomic policy and falls in aggregate demand (Rosati 1994), and continued monopoly behavior by enterprises (Li 1999).

\(^2\) There are also ongoing debates about the effects of corruption. For studies claiming adverse consequences, see Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Rose-Ackerman (1999); for potentially positive effects, see Leff (1964). For cross-national work on the roots of corruption in the post-communist region, see Treisman (2000).

\(^3\) A related matter of contention has been the necessity of international trade for development (see Sachs and Warner 1995, Rodrik 2001).

Notwithstanding the challenges highlighted by this research, however, what has become equally apparent – and increasingly documented in recent years – has been the generally improved performance of the post-communist area as a whole (Havrylshyn 2001, Falcetti et al. 2006, Shleifer 2009). That is, while there has certainly been much cross-country variation in the timing, scope and effects of liberalization efforts pursued since the collapse, the general consensus after two decades is that the former socialist countries are now largely in the process of advancing toward Western European standards (EBRD 2008, Freedom House 2008).

Economically, for instance, setting aside the hardships generated by the most recent global financial crisis, indicators show that the post-communist markets have become significantly more open and privatized (Bueno 2010: 49), with average GDP

---

⁴ A notable contrast has been the differing paths of transition (in terms of policy choices and outputs) between Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Havrylshyn 2001, Campos and Coricelli 2002).
growth accelerating across most of the region, especially over the past decade (averaging 5.9 percent from 2000-7, up from 1.1 percent in 1995-9 (EBRD 2007, Easterlin 2009, Rovelli & Zaiceva 2009). Standards of living have also notably improved – as captured, for example, by rising levels of real income, household consumption-, residential housing-, cars-, personal computers-, and telephone lines-per capita (see World Bank Indicators, Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009).

In the political realm, eleven of the former socialist states have now become firmly anchored within the European Union (Doyle and Fidrmuc 2006) and three more have secured EU candidacy. What is more, post-communist citizens – who now, for the most part, enjoy greater civil liberties and political rights (Treisman 2010, Freedom House 2008) – are able to choose from a plethora of political parties on election day (Lewis 2000, Grzymala-Busse 2002) and have frequently opted to democratically replace the incumbent governing coalition at the voting booth (Miller et al. 2000, Pop-Eleches 2001, 2010, Roland 2002: 37, Innes 2002, Tavits 2005, Kornai 2006: 216, Roberts 2008, Bunche and Wolchik 2009).

On the whole, thus, in terms of both macro-level performance and institutional or policy design, it would appear that the restructuring efforts undertaken by the transition states since 1990 have propelled these nations to more closely resemble their non-transition neighbors. To the extent that citizens of post-communist states have also borne

---

5 In Russia and the former Soviet Union states, GDP has been growing at 7 percent per year since 1999; in Central and Eastern Europe, growth has averaged an annual rate of 4 percent during this time (see World Bank Indicators).

6 As of April 2004, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are members; Montenegro, Serbia and FYR Macedonia are candidates. See http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm.

7 So much so that some scholars have even started to question whether the “transition” phase has, in fact, come to an end (Gelb 1999, Svejnar 2002: 25).
witness to this “great transformation” (Kornai 2006), a question that naturally arises is how they themselves have changed their ways during this time. Specifically, have post-communist individuals also managed to replace the principles upheld by their previous regimes to instead embrace the ideals and beliefs espoused by their new systems? In terms of their stated attitudes and preferences – particularly those pertaining to different economic and political arrangements – have citizens too converged toward their Western European counterparts?

The purpose of this dissertation is to address precisely this question – one that remains unresolved by both preliminary evidence from the post-communist region (discussed later) and by existing theories of public opinion, which posit somewhat differing conjectures about the likelihood and nature of such attitudinal adjustment. On the one hand, for instance, there are the traditional rational-choice theories of political behavior, which would expect post-communist citizens to predictably modify their beliefs and actions in response to altering circumstances (Fiorina 1978, 1981, Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, Kramer 1971, Hibbs 1982, Kiewet 1983, Miller and Wattenberg 1985, Abramowitz 1988, Erikson 1989, Page and Shapiro 1992, Powell and Whitten 1993, Lewis-Beck and Stegmeier 2000, Chong 2000, Anderson 2008). Specifically, according to these accounts, these citizens (like all individuals) are believed to be incessantly reactive and flexible creatures, basing their economic and political preferences at any one time on simple cost-benefit or winner-loser considerations. Regardless of whether they are theorized to focus on retrospective vs. prospective performance (Lewis-Beck 1988, Clarke and Stewart 1994, MacKuen et al. 1992, 1996, Chappell and Keech 1985, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001, Norpoth 1996, Lockerbie 1992), sociotropic vs. pocketbook

In the context of transition, thus, this would simply imply that post-communists who have personally and/or nationally performed well since regime change should favor more reformist (i.e., capitalist and/or democratic) positions; whereas transition “losers” should exhibit tendencies more in line with the pre-transition era (e.g., Brainerd 1998, Orazem and Vodopivec 1995, Boeri and Terrell, 2002, Terrell 1999, Tucker et al. 2002, Rovelli and Zaiceva 2009, Landier et al. 2008). Under this premise then, individual- and/or country-level indicators of outcomes (e.g., income, unemployment, education, growth, civil liberties, etc.) should be key in explaining variations in preferences, both within and between countries. In terms of attitudinal convergence, such theories would thereby also predict prompt, systematic post-communist adaptation, with little scope for residual “communist” influences once differences in performance are accounted for.

Social-psychological accounts of attitude formation, on the other hand, would suggest a number of impediments to such immediate adjustment. Theories of political socialization and “primacy” effects, for instance, underline the persistence of values acquired during childhood or young adulthood, predicting them to exert an influence on opinions and behaviors throughout later life, thereby reducing sensitivity to surrounding

Notions of “attitude resistance” further reinforce such mechanisms, suggesting that certain beliefs and preferences, once formed, tend to crystallize and strengthen over time, effectively hampering subsequent reversal (Sears and Funk 1999, Alwin 1993, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Jennings and Stoker 1999, Alwin and Krosnick 1991, Marwell et al. 1987, Converse and Markus 1979, Alwin et al 1991, Green and Palmquist 1994). Studies of generational or cohort effects, from both the U.S. and elsewhere, provide further evidence of such phenomena, illustrating how specific experiences or events can distinguish members of certain subpopulations from those who lack similar exposure and/or were raised in different times (Mannheim [1928] 1952, Schuman et al. 2004, Corning 2010, Jennings 1987, Schuman and Scott 1989, Schuman and Corning 2006, Sigel and Haskin 1977, Jennings and Niemi 1981).

Within the realm of transition, social-psychological approaches would therefore question the ability of post-communists to rapidly abandon their socialist histories, at least with regard to their fundamental, regime-specific values. Instead, such theories may anticipate previous experiences with communism to continue to shape predispositions today – independent of present-day circumstances (Howard 2003, Pop-Eleches 2007, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). More specifically, whether due to Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, state command of the media, simply growing accustomed to an

---

8 Some have argued that this over-time strengthening may, in part, be due to biases in information processing (e.g., Redlawsk, Tverdova 2012, Kahneman et al. 1982, Kahneman 2003, Bartels 2002).
authoritarian system, or at least coming of (political) age under one (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007: 1507), a social-psychological perspective would expect post-communists to systematically maintain relatively more leftist preferences compared to their non-post-communist equivalents. Even if some re-learning or responsiveness does occur over time (Mishler and Rose 2007, Duch 2001), according to such a framework, variables such as age and regime socialization (or “primacy” experience) should be vital for understanding post-communist attitudes. In fact, to the extent that civic and regime-related values are among those most typically believed to be assembled at an early age and strengthened over one’s lifetime (Sears and Brown 2013, Sears and Levy 2003), the effect of “years spent under” (or length of exposure to) a contrary political arrangement should be particularly telling for political and economic preferences.

While the long-standing, rational-choice approach has long enjoyed much prominence in the political science and economics literature (see Chapter II), a number of empirical reports from the post-communist region would, nonetheless, question its ability to fully explain attitudinal trends over the last twenty years. For one, as the aforementioned macro-level developments have progressed and regional performance has improved, citizens across the entire transition region have repeatedly been shown to express dissatisfaction with the economic and political changes that have taken place (Krastev 2002, White and McAllister 2004, Hayo 2004, Kornai 2006, Grosfeld and Senik 2010). Juxtaposing the developments captured by objective macro-level indicators, for instance, Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 compare survey results from the 1991 and 2009 “Pulse of Europe Survey” (conducted as part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project). Rather than illustrating an all-round growth in citizens’ approval of the new governing order, these
### TABLE 1.1: PUBLIC APPROVAL OF CHANGE TO CAPITALISM ACROSS CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Approve of change to...</th>
<th>1991 (%)</th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market Economy</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pulse of Europe Surveys, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009

### TABLE 1.2: PUBLIC APPROVAL OF CHANGE TO DEMOCRACY ACROSS CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Approve of change to...</th>
<th>1991 (%)</th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>-20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>+4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pulse of Europe Surveys, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009
tables instead show a general decline in average levels of support, both for the move toward capitalism and, to a lesser extent, for the change to democratic government.  

Figure 1.1 supplements this evidence, demonstrating that in none of the post-communist countries surveyed in 2009 did a majority of the population believe that the economic situation has improved since collapse of the communist empire.  

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9 The 2009 survey presented here represents one of the most recent large-scale public opinion polls conducted in post-communist Europe. The 2009 round of this questionnaire was conducted from Aug. 27 to Sept. 24, 2009 among 14,760 respondents in Britain, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine and the United States. In each country, interviews were conducted in local languages with representative samples of the adult population. The survey re-examined many key questions included in the first “Pulse of Europe” survey, conducted April 15 to May 31, 1991, by the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press (the forerunner of Pew Research Center for the People & the Press). For that survey, interviews were conducted in local languages with 12,569 people in Britain, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Spain, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine. All samples were nationally representative, with the exception of Russia, which did not include respondents living east of the Ural Mountains. More details can be found at: (http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/267.pdf).

10 Original data and tables/figures can be found at: (http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1396/). Last accessed on 4/25/2014.
A separate large-scale (World Bank/EBRD) survey of 28,000 individuals in 28 transition countries carried out even prior to the 2008-9 recession paints a similarly bleak picture, with 49 percent of respondents disagreeing (and only 35 percent agreeing) that the economic situation in their country is better today than it was in 1989. Similarly, 44 percent disagreed (and 35 percent agreed) that the political situation in their country is better today than before transition had started (EBRD 2007; see also Public Opinion Research Center (1999) for even earlier evidence).

These post-communist grievances have not been limited to general assessments about the current economic and political circumstance either. Rather, over the past two decades, citizens across the transition region have proven to be generally unsupportive of

Neither does the demise of the Soviet regime appear to have boosted the subjective wellbeing of these individuals. Instead, during the first ten years of transition, a significant “happiness” and “life satisfaction” gap emerged within the region, with citizens of the former socialist countries reporting lower levels of well-being than (i) their Western European counterparts, and (ii) comparable citizens living in Latin America (e.g., Veenhoven 2001, Saris 2001, Lelkes 2006, Sanfey and Teksoz 2007, Inglehart et al. 2008, Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009). Although “life satisfaction” and “happiness” scores have now returned to – and in some cases surpassed – their 1990 levels, they not only remain below the size expected given the economic progress made throughout the past decade, but some evidence suggests that they are, in fact, still beneath the levels enjoyed during earlier socialist times (Easterlin 2009: 138).11

To some extent, thus, it appears as though the citizens of the former socialist bloc have been unable to fully adapt to – or embrace – the transformations that have swept their nations over the past 20 years. Aside from the economic and political

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11 These assessments are based on responses to surveys conducted during the early-mid 1980s in Hungary, Belarus and the nationally representative region of Tambov, Russia (see Easterlin 2009: 140).
reorganizations that have taken place then – and despite the recent advances captured by international indicators – it is not clear that an individual-level *attitudinal* transition has successfully occurred. Rather, post-communist public opinion has (at least in aggregate) proven to be somewhat puzzling and capricious over the years, varying both within and across states, and not necessarily moving in sync with economic and political developments (EBRD 2007, Rovelli and Zaiceva 2009).

Yet, despite the great scholarly interest in the challenges of transition, far more attention has traditionally been paid to the nationwide, grand changes that have occurred in the region than to this micro-level, psychological element of the process. As shall be discussed further in Chapter II, although a number of researchers have (in isolated studies) looked at distinct aspects of public opinion and political behavior within these countries, previous analyses of post-communist public opinion have been limited in their ability to more thoroughly probe the issue of attitudinal adaptation. To begin with, those studies that have looked at the development of preferences over time have often utilized data from *within* the post-communist region only, or else from a small selection of case studies (see Tucker 2002 for an overview). Such work, while allowing for an exploration of longer-term dynamics, is restricted both in generalizability and in its capacity to contrast post-communist predispositions to some general (e.g., Western) reference point, so as to talk about convergence.

Examinations that have instead relied upon larger, cross-sectional or multi-regional datasets (which permit such broad comparisons) have, however, tended to cover only single or brief periods of time, thereby precluding a rigorous understanding of over-time shifts and trajectories. Moreover, much of the existing research has been confined to
an analysis of a single attitude or behavior, without looking for more general patterns across different types of beliefs. Most have also been conducted at only one level of analysis – either the aggregate, as favored by most political economists, or at the individual level, as usually emphasized by behaviorists – despite the fact that, in reality, both kinds of factors are likely to matter.

Perhaps most critically, however, although many scholars have uncovered evidence of both rational responsiveness among post-communist citizens and of remaining leftist idiosyncrasies, few have sought to actively study the dynamics of these two phenomena together. Instead, researchers have tended to keep within a single theoretical underpinning, without fully considering insights from related disciplines. Consequently, they have failed to provide an all-inclusive, unified account of how these individuals have responded to (or at least kept up with) the large-scale institutional alterations that have occurred. As a result, we also continue to lack a fundamental understanding of both the degree to which – and the processes by which – individuals across the former socialist region have attitudinally adapted to their new Western regimes.

The purpose of this dissertation, thus, is to overcome the shortcomings of earlier work and provide just that. More specifically, by incorporating the main theories of public opinion and attitude formation from both social psychology and political behavior/economy, this dissertation aims to provide a more comprehensive, systematic analysis of both the comparative trajectory of post-communist attitudes over the past 20 years, as well as the relative importance of contemporary societal factors versus early (“primacy”) regime experiences for their development. Now that two decades have
passed since the demise of the Soviet empire, a rich selection of both subjective and objective data has been gathered – and a sufficient span of time has gone by – to enable such an extensive investigation; utilizing an array of available statistics and employing a range of methodological techniques, the research presented here intends to thereby supply one. In doing so, thus, the project can be expected to both fill an important gap in the existing transition literature and to make an original contribution to our knowledge of attitude formation and political learning in a comparative context. It should, moreover, also help make sense of the puzzling trends in post-communist public opinion, allowing us to more fully comprehend their nature, their meaning, and their wider implications.

How – if at all – have individuals in post-communist Central & Eastern Europe adjusted to the “great transformation” (Kornai 2006) that has swept their nations? Have these citizens rationally responded to their changing realities, or have they struggled to replace the principles upheld by their previous regimes? In terms of their stated attitudes and preferences, have post-communist individuals similarly converged toward the norms and standards espoused by their Western European counterparts? These are the kinds of questions that remain unanswered in the transition literature and which this dissertation seeks to address. Such an inquiry is of fundamental scholarly and policy importance, not only for ongoing evaluations of transition in Europe,12 but also in anticipation of future possible regime changes, such as in China or the Middle East, where citizen adaptation to a post-authoritarian climate will be critical for democratic consolidation.13 While there

12 Some scholars have even argued and empirically demonstrated that the macro-level transition process (i.e., the successful implementation of reforms over time) is, in fact, an endogenous process, highly dependent on the support of the mass public (e.g., Wyplosz 1993, Kim and Pirtilla 2006).

13 Numerous scholars have already compared the processes of economic reform between China and Eastern Europe (e.g., Sachs and Woo 1994), and a few recent contributions have briefly noted similarities in the development of public
can be no doubt that the process of institutional change is important in the study of transition, the beliefs, behaviors and assessments of ordinary citizens matter too. In fact, it would be senseless (and perhaps hypocritical) to evaluate the success of transition – the triumph of democratic consolidation or the prosperity of the free market – without considering the judgments and demands of the mass citizenship. In this dissertation, thus, the topic of post-communist adaptation at the individual-level will be given the scrutiny it deserves.

ORGANIZATION AND PREVIEW

The dissertation proceeds as follows. After outlining the existing literature on post-communist attitudes and proposing the dissertation’s meta-theoretical, analytical framework (Chapter II), Chapter III’s “Old Kids on the Bloc” begins the empirical analyses, with a look at the over-time development of individual preferences across 40 European countries. Specifically, in this study, repeated, cross-sectional survey data from four waves of the European Values Survey and World Values Survey (1990-2005) are combined with a variety of corresponding country-level political and economic indicators. Multilevel models are then employed to analyze this data and examine the importance of previous communist experiences for current (i.e., post-communist) attitudes, as well as the relative roles played by present-day circumstances, at both the individual- and national-level.

opinion in response to these reforms; for instance, Easterlin (2009: 136) finds that while “the reported growth of China’s real GDP has been truly stunning…life satisfaction has declined.”
Given that the collapse of communism triggered a fundamental change in both the economic and political systems governing the transition states, Chapter III primarily focuses on the trajectory of two basic economic and political attitudes – a preference for more individual economic responsibility and for a democratic political system, respectively. Nonetheless, in later subsections, additional findings from Extensions that include eight other categories of beliefs (64 total survey items) are also reported.

The empirical analysis here proceeds in three stages: first, a general “post-communist” influence is explored to see whether, all else equal, citizens of transition states tend to consistently hold distinct views (compared to their Western European counterparts), as well as if any such dissimilarities fade over time (i.e., evidence of convergence). Second, the regional effect of age is considered, in order to more carefully probe whether length of exposure to a (disparate) governing system has led to a contrasting age distribution of preferences in the two areas. Finally, birth cohort analyses are undertaken to provide a more nuanced investigation into the evolution of attitudes across different subgroups within the population.

Chapter IV’s “(Re-)Unifying Beliefs, Regaining Control” then takes the investigation one step further, supplementing the preceding cross-country investigations with a longitudinal case study of Germans’ attitudes. More specifically, drawing on survey data from three waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (1999-2010), it takes advantage of the unique German experience of system-based separation and reunification – which offers quasi-experimental conditions – to contrast and analyze the beliefs of former GDR and FRG citizens since the fall of the Berlin Wall. As before, it does so with the aim of exploring the relative impact of early (“primacy”) regime
conditions and contemporary contextual factors for the development of attitudes in (institutionally) reunited Germany. Recognizing the exceptionally repressive nature of the GDR and its Stasi apparatus, it focuses on attitudes pertaining to efficacy or “locus of control” – i.e., perceptions about the extent to which social or external forces command the opportunities and outcomes in one’s own life.

The investigation here begins with the same three-stage analysis undertaken in Chapter III, looking first for (a) general post-communist influences (pooled and over-time), before (b) examining the relationship of age and efficacy in the two regions, and finally (c) carrying out additional birth cohort analyses. In order to more thoroughly probe some related mechanisms of attitudinal adaptation and to make full use of the panel design of the GSOEP data, however, the study then embarks on a more extensive series of supplementary examinations. In addition to more directly probing (d) the degree of within-person attitude stability, as well as (e) the decomposition of attitude change over time (i.e., population turnover vs. opinion updating), the chapter also considers (f) the role of East-to-West migration following reunification, and (g) the intergenerational transmission of values in the two regions.

Overall, the results of both Chapters III and IV are remarkable for the ways in which they provide corroborative evidence in support of social-psychological perspectives. To be sure, while post-communists are found to partially and rationally respond to their changing realities over the course of transition – converging some way toward the norms and attitudes espoused by their Western counterparts – these attitudinal shifts are revealed to be neither linear over time, nor uniform for all involved. Rather, both regional and cohort-specific differences in beliefs are found to linger: citizens that
grew up (and spent longer) under a socialist system are, in fact, shown to remain
distinguishably (and increasingly) leftist in their tendencies – even decades after the
collapse, and regardless of where they live today.

Looking at the deeper processes of adaptation reveals even further impediments to
change; for not only are the values of post-communists shown to be relatively more stable
and resistant to updating from year-to-year, but children of these post-communists are
also demonstrated to be just as susceptible to inheriting their parents’ (distinct)
predilections. While generational turnover may thereby offer some, gradual remedy for
the challenge of post-communist convergence, adjustment even by this means is likely to
be slow and non-automatic.

Altogether then, the course of transition at the *individual*-level is revealed, in this
dissertation, to be a far more complicated process than the institutional transformation of
a regime. The values instilled by half a century of communist rule appear to not be so
easily overturned; the predispositions of former-socialists, in turn, are not as speedily un-
stuck.

Chapter V then draws the dissertation to a close, offering final remarks about the
implications of the study, as well as its generalizability to other realms.
CHAPTER II

POST-COMMUNIST ATTITUDES: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Over the course of the last two decades, scholarly interest in the transition region has grown considerably, with political scientists, economists and sociologists all expressing some interest in post-communist public opinion. However, owing in part to initial data limitations, scholars from these various disciplines have proceeded largely in isolation of one another, often addressing only narrow, subfield-specific questions, and taking an inevitably bottom-up approach as new information has become available. Consequently, the existing literature on post-communist attitudes has come to represent a disjointed, multidisciplinary effort, comprised of numerous small-scale (often non-generalizable) studies, usually relating to only a few nations and over varying periods of time\(^1\) (Tucker 2002). Instead of providing a clear, dynamic and consistent picture of how citizens have overall adjusted to the end of communism, previous empirical studies have thereby uncovered only a collection of empirical facts, which have (perhaps inadvertently) tended to center around two familiar and distinguishable foci.

Before outlining the dissertation, thus – and putting forward an overarching framework for the study of post-communist attitudinal adaptation – this section surveys these two main strands of earlier research to present what has already become clear.

\(^1\) In a 2002 review of the literature on post-communist elections and voting, for instance, Tucker (2002) reveals that published work on the topic had (at that time) been largely dominated by single-country studies, particularly of Russia (which comprised over half of the articles published) and Poland (which had been the subject of four times as many studies than any other country, except Russia, see also Evans 2006: 251). Of the 101 articles written on the topic, only thirteen had chosen to compare countries, and all but one had analyzed only between two and six nations at a time.
The Rationalist Approach

First of these two main strands of investigation, loosely referred to here as the “rationalist” approach, has proven popular among both political scientists and economists alike, with the main point of departure being whether it is variables at the individual- or aggregate-level that have been emphasized. Similar to the long-standing work on “economic voting” (Fiorina 1978, 1981, Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, Kramer 1971, Hibbs 1982, Kiewet 1983, Miller and Wattenberg 1985, Abramowitz 1988, Erikson 1989, Page and Shapiro 1992, Powell and Whitten 1993, Anderson 2007, 2008) and “self-interest” motivations (Chong 2000, Chong et al. 2001, but Sears et al. 1980, Sears and Funk 1991), as undertaken in established democracies (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000 for an overview), this strand of the research has assumed that post-communist individuals are responsive, performance-driven actors, who should predictably base their attitudes and behaviors on current or recent circumstances (Duch 2001, Tverdova 2012, Roberts 2008, Tucker 2006).

Emphasizing that the political and economic reforms associated with liberalization have had divergent monetary consequences for different groups and countries within the region, proponents of this approach have effectively looked for attitudinal cleavages between the “winners” and “losers” of transition (Eble and Koeva 2002, Landier et al. 2008, Denisova et al. 2007, Rovelli and Zaiceva 2009, Tucker et al. 2001). At the individual level, the champions of reform have usually been depicted as those best placed to take advantage of the new market-based opportunities, such as young, well-educated males; whereas the disadvantaged have been regarded as those with
outdated human-capital characteristics, including rural or blue-collar workers with little education (e.g., Doyle and Fidrmuc 2003, 2006, Brainerd 1998, Orazem and Vodopivec 1995, Boeri and Terrell, 2002, Terrell 1999, Tucker et al. 2002). At the country level, contrasting trajectories have instead been captured using numerous economic and political indicators, such as growth, unemployment, inequality, inflation, EBRD liberalization scores and ratings of freedoms and individual rights (Svejnar 2002, Bunce 2003).

Notwithstanding some theoretical deviations regarding the relative importance of retrospective vs. prospective and/or sociotropic vs. pocketbook performance (Tucker 2002), studies from this rationalist approach have been allied in their focus on how post-communist experiences and contemporary transition outcomes have driven citizens’ beliefs across the region. Expecting individuals to promptly adapt to life under their new regimes – with “winners” predicted to exhibit relatively more support for capitalist and/or democratic positions than “losers,” who should instead favor pre-transition (i.e., leftist) perspectives – a plethora of papers have explored the relationships between micro- or macro-level performance and individuals’ attitudes, vote choices, ideologies and beliefs. The results, however, have been far from consistent.

Within the branch of political economy, for instance, where public support for market-based reforms has been the main topic of study, although objective conditions have repeatedly been associated with individual preferences, economists’ preoccupation with uncovering which economic factor is key has led to mixed, conflicting findings and a poor understanding of the overall scope of such a rational-based account to begin with.
Take, for example, developing debates about the importance of macroeconomic outcomes for transition support. Utilizing county-level data from the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland, Fidrmuc (2000) argues that votes for pro-reform parties tend to be negatively correlated with the unemployment rate in a region (see also Pacek 1994). Valev (2004), on the other hand, finds that Bulgarian voters perceive unemployment as a necessary cost of reform, and so high unemployment has only a minimal effect on Bulgarians’ voting behavior (in the 2001 elections, at least). Looking at a longer span of opinion data in the Czech Republic (1990-2 and 1993-8), Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003) claim instead that unemployment – at both the regional and individual level – does play a role on vote choice, but only in the later stage of transition, when the “winners” and “losers” are better known. In similar fashion, however, Grosfeld and Senik (2010) use data from 84 (CBOS) nationally representative surveys to demonstrate that, after 1996, it is actually income inequality that begins to have an adverse relationship with Poles’ economic evaluations. Yet, using data from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (1990-6), Hayo (2004) argues instead that inflation is the variable that has a robust, negative effect on reform support across the region (a finding which is subsequently called into question by Kim and Pirtilla (2006), who extend his data to counterclaim that a combination of macroeconomic factors are, in fact, key).

Similarly ambiguous patterns emerge when considering how individuals’ prospective net gains have influenced the popularity of reforms. For instance, while Kim and Pirtilla (2006) show that “ex ante political constraints” (i.e., a person’s expected
prospects during future reforms) are important for reform support, using a combination of cross-country survey data (from the 2002 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer) and regional-level results from multiple EU accession referenda (conducted across various post-communist nations in 2003), Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006: 341) find that “surprisingly, those who should in principle benefit from redistribution in the EU – the elderly, blue-collar workers, less educated, those with repeated history of unemployment, those living in rural areas and also those living in underdeveloped or agricultural regions – tend to be against accession and/or do not vote.” In other words, economic, self-interest motivations should not be taken for granted (Landier et al. 2008).

Realizing that objective economic outcomes cannot fully account for the observed variations in the popularity of post-communist reforms, a number of recent studies in the political economy literature have begun alluding to other political and/or non-monetary factors that may also play a role. For instance, utilizing both micro data (New Barometer Surveys) and macro-level measures of national performance, Rovelli and Zaiceva (2009) study the determinants of support for both economic and political transition between 1991 and 2004 in 14 transition countries (measured as individual differences in the ranking of past and present economic and political systems). The trends uncovered by these authors warrant highlighting: between 1991 and 2004, support for the communist economic system remained consistently high across these countries, with ratings of the previous regime dominating those of the current economic regime throughout these years. Moreover, while support for the past political system was initially lower than that for the

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2 In fact, the authors extend Hayo’s (2004) dataset to show that reform popularity is related to a combination of past macroeconomic performance (including inflation and income inequality) and ex-ante political constraints. In addition, they reveal that support for reforms is, in turn, positively related to the implementation of further reforms, thereby implying an endogenous transition process.
current system (and was even negative at the beginning of the 1990s), by 1995 the communist political regime was positively evaluated by the mass public and was rated higher than that of the current system.\textsuperscript{3}

Regarding the determinants of support, although Rovelli and Zaiceva (2009) find, as expected, that transition “losers” (i.e., unemployed, less educated, older individuals, living in rural areas, and those with the lowest household income) tend to oppose changes to the governing regime, the authors also demonstrate that political factors (such as preferences for redistribution, ‘ideology’ - measured as approval of dictatorship and the suspension of parliament, and ex-Communist Party membership) have their own, independent effects.\textsuperscript{4} What is more, these scholars also encounter evidence of a separate generational effect, with individuals aged 18 years or younger in 1990 exhibiting higher support for transition, suggesting that those growing up after the fall of the Soviet empire are significantly more favorable toward the new regimes (see Eble and Koeva 2002 for similar findings using the 1998 wave of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey).

Unfortunately, however, with no further examination of (i) how these individuals differ in these underlying political beliefs to begin with, particularly compared to their non-transition peers, (ii) the importance of these various factors over time, and (iii) whether the observed inter-generational gap converges as the years go by (and/or if other cohort effects exist), the “exercise remains purely descriptive” (Rovelli and Zaiceva 2009: 20).

\textsuperscript{3} It should be noted that similar trends were found to exist across the various countries, with the Czechs generally exhibiting the greatest support, and the Ukrainians the least support, for both the economic and political changes that have taken place.

\textsuperscript{4} In this analysis, country effects were also found to be strong and robust, as was the negative influence of living in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In fact, Rovelli and Zaiceva (2009) demonstrate that perceptions of corruption, preferences for secure jobs, institutional trust, and the quality of political institutions (as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators) are most important in explaining the lower support for economic transition in the CIS.
Of course, the idea that economic or performance-based considerations are important for both electoral outcomes and public opinion is not unique to the subfield of political economy. Rather, political scientists have, over the course of many decades, provided similar evidence of “economic voting” in long-standing democracies (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, Anderson 2007), asserting that citizens often reflect on “self-interest” calculations (Chong 2000, Chong et al. 2001, but Sears et al. 1980, Sears and Funk 1991) or on past performance when forming political judgments (though it is arguably subjective perceptions rather than objective outcomes that are said to be more influential here; Fiorina 1978, Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, Erikson 1989). Developing in tandem to the economic literature, thus, behavioral political scientists have also considered how current transition circumstances (at both the personal and national level) may have rationally and predictably driven post-communists’ opinions.

Regarding electoral behavior, the pervasiveness of “economic voting” in post-communist Europe has been explored through both single- and multi-election investigations (see Tucker 2002 for a review), relying on both individual-level (e.g., Powers and Cox 1997, Harper 2000) and aggregate-level data (e.g., Pacek 1994, Bell 1997, Tucker 2001). Although the general conclusion of these studies has similarly been that the economy does matter – both for political attitudes (Duch 1993, Evans and Whitefield 1995, Miller et al. 1994, Anderson and Tverdova 2003, Mishler and Rose 2001, 2005, 2007, Rose et al. 2006, Mishler and Willerton 2003) and for vote choice
(Roberts 2008, White et al. 1997) – its influence has again proven ambiguous, particularly in micro-level studies (e.g., Harper 2000, Powers and Cox 1997).5

Rather than searching to find which economic indicator is key, however, political scientists have instead tended to explore the conditional nature of economic thinking.6 While some have, for instance, investigated the relative importance of sociotropic versus egocentric assessments (e.g., Kluegel and Mason 2004, Mishler and Rose 1997), others have argued that economic factors should only be important for the vote shares of incumbents in the governing coalition (Tucker 2001), or in the short vs. long-term (Owen and Tucker 2010, Tucker 2006). Others still have predicted that “transitional economic voting” will gradually become more common as post-communist citizens acquire political knowledge about (and confidence in) the functioning of democratic institutions (Duch 2001). Most recently, analyzing cross-regional electoral results from five countries, Tucker (2006) offers a “Transitional Identity Model” of economic voting, in which political parties identified with the transition and the implementation of markets reforms (i.e., “new regime” parties) are predicted to do worse in regions with relatively poor economic performance, whereas “old regime” (or communist successor) parties are expected to benefit in such areas. Utilizing survey data from the 1997, 2001 and 2005 Polish parliamentary elections, Owen and Tucker (2010) adopt Tucker’s (2006) approach

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5 In these investigations, the role of the economy has been especially questionable when compared to other factors, such as evaluations of democratic progress (Harper 2000), or whether liberal reformers are, in fact, blamed for poor economic outcomes (Powers and Cox 1997).

6 Although it is beyond the scope of this project, it is worth mentioning that a small body of literature has also examined how electoral rules have affected post-communist politics, with similarly mixed results. In a study of Hungary, for instance, Gabel (1995) presents evidence for the consensus view that fewer parties emerge from single-member districts than from proportional representation districts. In a comparative study of six countries, however, Moser (1999) arrives at a contrary conclusion, arguing that the constraining effect of single-member district elections is mitigated by the institutionalization of the party system, and so will not necessarily reduce the number of political parties in parliament.
and offer a more nuanced picture of citizens’ vote decisions. Their evidence suggests that short-term retrospective economic evaluations (based on responses to the question “do you feel the economy has improved in the past 12 months?”) are important for incumbent party vote shares, but that longer-term economic evaluations (measured as “do you feel the economy has improved since the collapse of communism?”) affect the type of parties (i.e., “new regime” or “old regime” parties) that an individual supports.

Outside of the electoral arena, citizens’ evaluations of the transition experience have also figured prominently in investigations of post-communists’ normative commitments to democracy. Employing cross-sectional survey data from eight post-communist nations in 1993-4, for instance, Evans and Whitefield (1995) analyze the determinants of attitudes toward democracy as an ideal form of government. Although they too find that macro-level, objective measures of economic performance do not square with the rank ordering of countries in terms of average levels of democratic support, they argue that so-called “political experiences” (specifically, subjective assessments of the current practice of democracy and beliefs about the perceived pointlessness of voting) and, to a lesser extent, “economic experiences” (in particular, present evaluations of the market, retrospective evaluations of the household situation and prospective evaluations of national performance), are somewhat influential for the adoption of democratic norms. Interestingly, they also reveal that normative commitments to both democracy and the free market (as ideals) were closely linked during this early stage of transition, so that the relationship between “economic
experiences” and support for democratic norms was, in fact, largely driven by normative commitments to the free market rather than performance-based, evaluative ones.\(^7\)

This last point regarding the notable correlation between political and economic attitudes deserves further comment, for it is, in fact, related to a separate sub-category of the transition literature – namely, research by sociologists and political scientists on the importance of social cleavages within post-communist Europe (for a review of the political science literature, see Whitefield 2002; for an overview of sociology writings, see Evans 2006). Specifically, wary that by disaggregating social classes and precluding the expression of alternative viewpoints, communism may have effectively flattened the social and ideological landscape within the transition region, a number of scholars have sought to explore whether post-communist divisions have, in fact, become structured along common group lines.

Theoretically, although some expected post-communist society to resemble a tabula rasa, unlikely to ever witness the emergence of stable political cleavages (Elster et al. 1998, Lawson et al. 1999), others instead predicted that a unidimensional form of political competition would emerge within the region (at least during the initial period). Most notably, Kitschelt (1992) suggested that support for political liberalism and support for the free market were likely to be closely related in post-communist societies, and that a political division would take place along a single liberal-authoritarian axis. Those with favorable resource endowments (i.e., the young, the educated, men, entrepreneurial groups) were likely to be pro-market/libertarian, whereas state-dependent, poorly

\(^7\) In fact, once support for free market ideals is controlled for, it appears that the direct effect of “economic experience” notably declines (see also Miller et al. 1994).
resourced groups (such as pensioners, the working class, the uneducated, peasants) would support anti-market/authoritarian ideologies (for empirical support of this view, see Miller et al. 1994; for opposing evidence see Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992).[^8]

Although subsequent empirical studies have come to show that diverse, multiple lines of social division exist across the region[^9] (Tucker 2002), the stability, nature, and political significance of such cleavages continues to be a matter of contention (Evans 2006), even within single-country studies.[^10] For example, while Evans and Whitefield (2000) have claimed that social characteristics (such as education, class, age, ethnicity and religiosity) predict both economic and political attitudes (e.g., views about the role of the market, minority rights and social liberalism), as well as – to a lesser extent – partisanship in twelve post-communist societies,[^11] Tavits (2005) has found that ethnic cleavages have had no effect on the stability and structure of party support in fifteen transitioning nations, while social divisions (in particular, the urban-rural divide) have only had a negative influence during times of economic downturn (see Whitefield 2002 for numerous other examples).

[^8]: According to Kitschelt (1992), the link between the two dimensions could potentially weaken as transition proceeds, giving way to a greater diversity in the range of feasible political party positions.

[^9]: Cross-country differences in the nature of these cleavages have, in turn, been attributed to such factors as pre-communist cultural legacies, the form of communist power, the mode of transition, elite or party behavior, initial levels of economic development, institutional design, and the historical salience of different identities (Whitefield 2002).

[^10]: Within Russia alone, for instance, Colton (2000: 81) finds important age, urbanization, and region effects, in addition to weaker effects for gender, education, and occupation on vote choice during the 1995 and 1996 Duma and presidential elections. In analyzing a broader range of Russian elections, however, the general conclusion of White et al. (1997) is that social characteristics exercise much less influence on voting than do Russians’ political attitudes and economic assessments (though White et al. (1997) do not investigate how social structure influence attitudes in the first place, see also Evans 2006: 251).

[^11]: It should be noted that – according to these authors - the strength of the relationships and the nature of the dominant cleavage in each country depends on contextual factors. For instance, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity and the pervasiveness of the Catholic Church (as opposed to the Orthodox Church) is said to affect the politicization of ethnicity and values, respectively.
Similarly, in studying Soviet citizens’ attitudes toward political reform (i.e., democracy) and the locus of responsibility for economic well-being (i.e., individual vs. collective responsibility), although Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) argue that social-structural variables (such as ethnicity, education, income, age and urban dwelling) are important in so far as they separate the “winners” and “losers” of reform, Miller et al. (1994) strongly disagree. Instead, in a self-declared “reassessment” of the issue (albeit using different data, a smaller sample of countries and additional variables), Miller et al. (1994) find that social-structural variables yield their own, important influence on economic and political orientations, even after taking into account individuals’ own economic assessments of the transition experience. In fact, “having controlled for the confounding effects of recent economic change, the statistically significant social structural variables [especially age] actually take on increased relevance” (Miller et al. 1994: 405), implying that the supporters of transition are not necessarily those who have experienced the greatest gains. Rather, according to these authors, the observed attitudinal “stability may be attributed to basic, enduring socialization” (Miller et al. 1994: 400) or, in other words, some long-lasting residue of their communist past.

**The Legacies Approach**

With the passage of time and the accumulation of data, thus, scholars of the transition region have come to realize that the attitudes and behaviors of post-communist citizens do not always follow purely economic or performance-based lines. Accordingly, at the same time as these rationalist accounts have accrued in the existing literature, a second body of research – loosely referred to here as the “legacies” approach – has also
gradually gained steam (Pop-Eleches 2007, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). Although analyses from this family have been far more sparse, less theoretically integrated and have, in fact, often inadvertently fallen out of quantitative investigations, they are united in their uncovering of empirical regularities that both challenge strictly performance-based explanations of public opinion and require a reconsideration of pre-transition influences (Howard 2003: 4).

This has been achieved in a number of ways. One subcategory of these studies has done so by revealing consistent peculiarities in the actions and beliefs of post-communist individuals, at least when compared to citizens from other global regions. Post-communists have, for instance, proven to be notably egalitarian in their policy preferences\(^\text{12}\) (e.g., Blanchflower and Freeman 1997, Suhrcke 2001, Redmond et al. 2002), as well as significantly distrustful\(^\text{13}\) and non-participatory\(^\text{14}\) in their predispositions (Howard 2003, Lovell 2001, Rose-Ackerman 2001, Letki 2009). They have also been shown to exhibit remarkably uncooperative behaviors\(^\text{15}\) (e.g., Ockenfels and Weimann

\(^{12}\) Using three waves of the World Values Survey, Murthi and Tiongson (2008) suggest, however, that there are important regional differences within the post-communist region (see also Heien 2000, Wong 2004). In their examination, it is (surprisingly) citizens of Central and Eastern Europe, rather than of the former Soviet Union, who are found to display a significantly stronger preference for equality than those living in advanced economies (even after controlling for such factors as economic growth, income inequality, and individuals’ confidence in government). That said, compared to elsewhere, individuals in all post-communist countries still prefer greater government responsibility for certain aspects of the economy.

\(^{13}\) It should be noted that within the post-communist states, performance-based considerations have been found to partly explain individual-level variations in political trust (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2003, Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001).

\(^{14}\) Not only has it been found that post-communist citizens are notably more suspicious of political institutions than their Western counterparts, but there also exists “a remarkable pattern of low, perhaps even declining, rates of participation in voluntary organizations of civil society [which is] especially surprising given the well-documented increases in the numbers of existing organizations in the region since the collapse of communism” (Howard 2003: 2). In fact, there appears to be far less variation among post-communist countries (i.e., from East Germany to Russia) than there is between them and non-post-communist nations (Howard 2003).

\(^{15}\) In studying the cooperative behavior of post-communist versus non-post-communist citizens, for example, Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) conducted public goods and solidarity experiments with local subjects from both former East and West Germany, revealing that, in both games, Eastern subjects behaved in a significantly more selfish manner than did
1999) and to have contrasting psychological needs or motives associated with their left-right ideological structure\textsuperscript{16} (Thorisdottir et al. 2007, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Todosijevic 2008).

Another strand of research has instead focused on public opinion trends \textit{within} the transition region itself, exposing similarly suggestive patterns. Most common of these findings has been a general propensity for older post-communists to display considerably more leftist tendencies than younger generations, with regards to such matters as support for redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundelm 2007), privatization (Landier et al. 2008), tax morale (Feld and Torgler 2007), and income inequality (Grosfeld and Senik 2010, Saar 2008).

Although the precise mechanisms by which these regional and/or inter-generational predispositions have arisen remain somewhat vague, most scholars have suggested that the unique authoritarian political history of the area may be partly to blame. Specifically, through both explicit (though usually implicit) references to social-psychological theories of socialization, researchers have repeatedly conjectured that these Western players. Not only did Eastern players invest relatively less in public assets, but they also sacrificed less money to compensate group losers. What is more, Eastern players expected to receive smaller gifts from their partners and/or group than did their Western counterparts. Although the findings of the studies ran counter to the authors’ initial expectations, the fact that the two sets of subjects displayed significantly different tendencies (and in two, separate experiments) nonetheless implies that “cooperation and solidarity behavior seem to depend strongly on different culture-specific norms resulting from opposing economic and social histories in the two parts of Germany” (Ockenfels and Weimann 1999: 275).

\textsuperscript{16} Analyzing (2002) European Values Survey data from 19 countries, for example, Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan and Shrout (2007) investigate whether the same psychological needs, values, and motives that are believed to predict right-wing conservatism in the U.S. also explain political orientations across Europe. Although results from their structural equation models show that traditionalism and, to a weaker degree, rule-following are associated with right-wing conservatism in both the Western and post-communist (Eastern) region, they also find that (i) acceptance of inequality is related to right-wing orientation only in the former, (ii) needs for security predict right-wing orientation in Western Europe but left-wing orientation in Eastern Europe, and (iii) openness to new experience predicts left-wing orientation in Western Europe but right-wing orientation in Eastern Europe (despite being associated with egalitarianism in both areas). In other words, the underlying structure of post-communists’ left-right ideological distinction seems to be fundamentally different from that of their Western peers. In particular, the results provided by Thorisdottir et al. (2007) would imply that Eastern Europeans continue to look toward socialist forms of government in order to satisfy their needs for safety and security, even more than a decade after transition.

Such legacy-based interpretations have received additional support from related work documenting a disproportionately high (and growing) degree of disillusionment across the region, which has occurred in spite of notable improvements in living standards and performance over time (Kornai 2006, Ishiyama 2009). Evidence of this malaise has not only taken the form of expressed dissatisfaction with both democracy and capitalism (as depicted in public opinion polls, e.g., Tables 1.1-1.3, Figure 1.1, EBRD 2007, Pew Global Attitudes Report 2009, 2010, Public Opinion Research Center 1999), but has also manifested itself through the channels of representative democracy, both in the form of declining voter turnout17 (Krastev 2002, Kobach 2001), and as a rise in populist and nationalist sentiments (Rupnik 2007, Krastev 2007, Shafir 2001, Pop-Eleches 2010).

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17 Turnout in post-communist elections has fallen drastically over time, from initial levels of over 80% to below 50% in recent years (albeit with notable inter-temporal and cross-country variation, see Bernhagen and Marsh 2007). Interestingly, all else equal, turnout has been consistently lower (and declining at a faster rate) in nations that have made the most progress toward EU accession and among those countries with greater levels of wealth and development (where the latter is captured by the UN’s Human Development Index; see Pacek et al. 2009). While some have blamed this trend on the economic and social hardships of transition (Pacek 1994, Fowler 2004), others have found no such ‘economic’ effect (Wyman and White 1995), while others still have found a positive one (Bahry and Lipsmeyer 2001). A number of scholars have also partially attributed this pattern to falling levels of efficacy within the region, which has arguably been exacerbated by rampant corruption and the consolidation of power by former communist elites (Kostadinova 2003, White and McAllister 2004, Hutcheson 2004, Tucker 2007).
Perhaps most indicative of this post-communist disenchantment, however, has been the emergence of an Eastern European “happiness gap” (as captured by survey measures of life satisfaction and subjective well-being, e.g., Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009, Easterlin 2009, Inglehart et al. 2008, Deaton 2008, Sanfey and Teksoz 2007, Lelkes 2006, Saris 2001, Veenhoven 2001, but Frijters et al. 2004). Although published work on this topic (as applied to the post-communist region, at least) has thus far been sparse, frequently limited in scope, and undertaken largely by economists (Easterlin 2009: 131), the findings have been remarkable for the way in which they have resembled the conclusions of the more mainstream transition literature (Kornai 2006: 232).

Take, for instance, a recent study by Sanfey and Teksoz (2007). Using World Values Survey data on self-reported life satisfaction, these authors find that after controlling for a host of demographic variables (e.g., age, income, education, marital status, gender), subjective well-being remains significantly lower among individuals in transitioning nations than among those in non-transitioning states. Although the scholars uncover a V-shaped pattern through time in most post-communist countries (with life satisfaction...
satisfaction falling during the early years of transition and rebounding thereafter), in all but a few cases, life satisfaction remains close to (and sometimes below) pre-transition levels, despite strong economic performance over the past ten years. With regard to the individual determinants of well-being, the authors also reveal some important differences in the extent to which certain socio-economic characteristics relate to life satisfaction in the transition versus non-transition states, thereby supporting the idea that the post-communists exhibit certain attitudinal peculiarities. In particular, although life satisfaction exhibits the familiar U-shape pattern with age in both regions (holding all else constant), the minimum age of this relationship occurs almost 10 years later in the post-communist nations and is notably slower to recover thereafter, thereby suggesting that those with a longer experience of socialism have found it particularly difficult to enjoy their post-communist lives.

Guriev and Zhuravsakaya (2009) supplement this World Values Survey evidence with data from both the 2006 Life in Transition Survey and the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (1994-2006) to re-confirm the existence of a “happiness gap.” Specifically, after taking into account a variety of country-level variables (e.g., GDP per capita, log relative household income, log absolute household income, inflation, inequality, unemployment, level of democracy, media freedom) and a host of individual-level factors (e.g., age, gender, employment, marital status, education), these authors show that life satisfaction in the transition countries remains 1.4 points below its

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20 At the macro-level, Sanfey and Teksoz (2007) find that citizens are generally happier in countries with (a) lower levels of income inequality, and (b) either good governance (as measured by World Bank Governance Indicators) or else higher GDP per capita (with severe multi-collinearity making it difficult to precisely distinguish these two effects).

21 The authors also find that, in the post-communist region, education only becomes positively associated with life satisfaction at very high levels of schooling.
predicted level (as compared to elsewhere). This gap not only increases with age (potentially providing further hints of socialization effects), but it is also statistically meaningful (note: life satisfaction is measured on a 1-10 scale and a standard deviation across the world is only about 2.5 points\(^{22}\)). Finally, although the authors provide evidence that the cross-regional difference in life satisfaction may be getting smaller over time, their findings nonetheless reveal that in twelve out of the twenty-three transition countries surveyed, subjective well-being has failed to move in sync with economic progress since 2003 (remaining flat in six, and declining in the remainder).\(^{23}\) Quite simply, thus, regardless of the macro-level strides that have been made, “transition from communism to a market-orientated economy has made people unhappy” (Guriev and Zhuravsakaya 2009: 166).\(^{24}\)

Finally, utilizing data from the World Values Survey, Eurobarometer and German Socioeconomic Panel, Easterlin (2009) provides perhaps the most critical analysis of subjective well-being across post-communist Europe. Specifically, although he too uncovers a V-shaped trajectory of life satisfaction over time, he demonstrates that its recovery since the mid-1990s has fallen far short of that of GDP. In fact, drawing on

\(^{22}\) In fact, within the United States, the difference between the 25\(^{th}\) and 75\(^{th}\) percentile has consistently been around 2 points in every WVS wave (Guriev and Zhuravsakaya 2009: 148).

\(^{23}\) According to Guriev and Zhuravsakaya (2009), possible explanations for these patterns include the growing levels of income inequality, deterioration in public goods (measured as infant mortality, child immunizations and pollution), income volatility (measured as the standard deviation of log GDP growth since 1988), and human capital depreciation (i.e., completing education in the years before transition). Interestingly, changing aspiration levels do not appear to be important; the authors find no significant difference in life satisfaction between countries closer and farther from Western Europe, or between those that were more open and closed during communist times.

\(^{24}\) It should be noted that a number of studies have focused on the direct impact of household income on life satisfaction within transition countries. For instance, using GSOEP data, Frijters et al. (2004) show that real income was an important determinant of East Germans’ life satisfaction immediately following reunification (explaining about 30-40% of the variation in the first five years), but that non-pecuniary aggregate variables became relatively more influential thereafter. Senik (2004, 2008) instead looks at the effect of movements in the income of an individual’s reference group, uncovering a “tunnel effect” in Eastern Europe and Russia, whereby increases in reference group’s income increases self-reported wellbeing, arguably by providing information about societal opportunities.
limited survey data collected in the early-to-mid 1980s from Belarus, Hungary, and Tambov (a nationally representative region of Russia), Easterlin (2009: 140) suggests that life satisfaction may actually have been higher during the last few years of communism than at the beginning of transition, such that “by 2005, with GDP averaging about 25 percent above its early-1990s level, life satisfaction was typically back to its earlier level, but was arguably still below pre-transition values” (p. 130). Interestingly, regarding the role of age, Easterlin (2009) corroborates the conclusion of previous work, demonstrating that, across the post-communist region, age goes from exerting a negligible effect on life satisfaction in the early 1990s to a remarkably negative one by the end of the 1990s. Consequently, even after adjusting for such factors as education, in post-communist Europe it is individuals over the age of 30 (and not just those immediately affected by shrinking old-age pensions) that have suffered the largest relative losses in life satisfaction (p. 138). In other words, just as those socialized under the previous socialist system have found it relatively more difficult to embrace their new political order and adopt the political attitudes of their non-transition peers, so too have they found life under their new regimes relatively less satisfying.

POST-COMMUNIST LEARNING AND ATTITUDINAL ADAPTATION

Overall, thus, the existing literature on transition has come to provide a series of empirical facts about the attitudes and behaviors of post-communist citizens. Utilizing an (ever-)expanding reservoir of data – from large-scale surveys and voting outcomes to in-depth interviews and experimental observations – scholars from a variety of disciplines
have (in distinct, often isolated, works) repeatedly shown that post-communist individuals are, at once, both pragmatic and distinguishable in their tendencies. That is, although at any given point in time, it is clear that these citizens rationally respond to changes in their personal and/or national surroundings, it is also evident that attitudinal variations across citizens and/or countries cannot always be sufficiently accounted for by rational-choice or self-interest type explanations. Moreover, over time, there appears to be a growing sense of dissatisfaction across the entire post-communist region, despite the macroeconomic and institutional improvements that have taken place.

The fact that such post-communist distinctions and disenchantments have been particularly widespread among older citizens (who were raised under the previous governing arrangement), even after accounting for compositional differences in transition outcomes, has thereby raised questions about the automaticity and universality of regime adjustment at the individual-level. Simply put, rather than indicating prompt and systematic attitudinal acclimation, these scattered findings have instead suggested that “learning about the comparative virtues of a [new] system is slow, and largely affected by history” (Landier et al. 2008: 469).

Unfortunately, however, few papers in the existing literature have sought to outwardly investigate the notion of learning or adaptation in Central and Eastern Europe. Post-communist learning (or attitudinal adaptation) – defined here as *the process of adjustment to current (i.e., post-communist) circumstances, such that previous regime experience (i.e., the communist past) gradually has a decreasing independent influence*
on individuals’ attitudes\textsuperscript{25} – is a dynamic phenomenon, requiring both longitudinal and comparative analysis. Specifically, in order to probe whether, ceteris paribus, a legacy of socialism systematically distinguishes the preferences of former socialist citizens over time, what is needed is both (a) a repeated, consistent measure of individuals’ beliefs, and (b) some meaningful attitudinal reference group against which to assess the incidence of convergence. To the extent that individuals are believed to base their preferences on rational, cost-benefit analyses of observable outputs, (c) differences in both individual- and aggregate-level performance must additionally be taken into account.

Restricted, in part, by initial data limitations, most previous studies of post-communist public opinion have been unable to undertake such an adaptation-focused investigation. Rather, existing papers have tended to either rely on over-time examinations of beliefs within a small set of post-communist countries (thereby prohibiting a comparison to some non-post-communist benchmark), or else have utilized cross-regional data but during short periods of time (effectively precluding a discussion of dynamics). Fewer still have looked for patterns across multiple attitudes and/or both micro- and macro- predictors at once. The upshot, thus, has been a generally fragmented and confined understanding of the developments in post-communist attitudes over the last twenty years (see Tucker 2002 for an overview).

Even the most committed efforts to exploring political learning in Central and Eastern Europe – that of William Mishler, Richard Rose and colleagues – have been subject to such shortcomings. Specifically, in a series of articles and books, these

\textsuperscript{25} This is, of course, only one of many potential ways of defining learning. Alternative measures could include, for instance, whether individuals become politically more knowledgeable or sophisticated over time, or whether their symbolic attitudes correlate more strongly with vote choices, party preferences or related beliefs (e.g., Converse 1964). These other possibilities, while equally important, are however left for future studies to address.
scholars have sought to analyze such matters as regime support (Mishler and Rose 2001a, 2005, 2007, Rose, Mishler and Munro 2006), presidential popularity (Mishler and Millerton 2003), national pride (Mishler and Rose 2007) and political trust (Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001b) in the former socialist region. Using data from the New Democracy and New Russia Barometers, the common claim throughout these studies has been that variations in attitudes across post-communist citizens are better explained by so-called “institutional” factors relating to economic and political evaluations than by “cultural” influences (interpreted by these authors to mean social-structural variables). Finding that members of all age groups tend to exhibit similar fluctuations in their reported preferences over time, Mishler, Rose and collaborators posit a “lifetime learning model” of opinion formation, asserting that, post-communist citizens are able to “quickly acquire the attitudes and behaviors appropriate to democracy” (Mishler and Rose 2007: 822).

Notwithstanding the significant contribution made by these authors, the conclusions drawn from their analyses do, however, warrant further inquiry. For one, by conducting their investigations solely on survey data from within the transition region, these authors are limited in their ability to determine whether post-communists do, in fact, differ in their attitudes and behaviors from citizens in other areas – in general and/or over time. A study of learning or adaptation would nonetheless seem to necessitate such an inquiry, in addition to testing the abiding influence of socio-demographic characteristics, as they do.

Furthermore, even by their own accounts, it is not clear that any incidence of learning occurs equally and steadily for all post-communist individuals. Consider, for instance, their results regarding Russians’ support for the new political regime (Mishler
and Rose 2007). Although the authors show that, over time, these beliefs oscillate similarly across all cohorts, they do nonetheless uncover significant differences between generations, as well as notable variations in their relative rates of adjustment. In fact, the degree of change varies so widely that the observed generational gaps grow significantly as the years go by: differences in support for the former communist regime between the oldest group of Russians (those born before 1945) and the youngest (those born after 1965), for instance, almost doubles from 18 points in 1992 to 31 points in 2005 (Mishler and Rose 2007: 826), thereby further challenging the notion that democratic norms have been rapidly and widely adopted by the masses.26

Alternative longitudinal studies that have more actively sought to juxtapose the preferences of post-communists against those of some other group have similarly understated the presence of such asymmetries. A notable example is Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln’s (2007) examination of Germans’ preferences for redistribution (using longitudinal data from the German Socioeconomic Panel). In this paper, Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln go to great lengths to validate the presence of a strong, general post-communist effect, showing that East Germans remain between 14.5 and 17 percentage points more in favor of state intervention than West Germans by 1997. They also make note of the significant inter-cohort differences that exist among respondents, with older

26 On the contrary, rather than embracing political liberalism, responses from the New Russia Barometers would suggest a rising preference for non-liberal arrangements among Russian citizens; for instance, the percentage of Russians that give the pre-perestroika regime a positive rating has increased from 51 percent in 1992 to 72 percent in 1998 (where it has remained since), despite the fact that a majority of respondents (72 percent) have unambiguously characterized the system as a dictatorship (Rose et al. 2006: 131). Moreover, when directly asked whether they endorse a number of alternative, non-democratic arrangements (such as a communist system, suspension of parliament, tough dictatorship or army rule), the performance of the contemporaneous system is actually found to be of little importance (Rose et al. 2006: 145). Specifically, in an OLS regression (with socio-economic controls), core political values (i.e., support for the principles of democracy/free market) are found to be key, whereas performance-based evaluations (e.g., degree to which the current regime is perceived to be democratic and/or corrupt) are largely unimportant. For related data on Russians’ attitudes about Stalin, see also Mendelson & Gerber (2005, 2006); for an analysis of Russian “nostalgia,” see Munro (2006); for generational differences in Russian’s attitudes, see Hahn & Logvinenko (2008).
Germans in the East demonstrating greater support for various forms of redistribution than fellows in the West. Yet, while these authors do discuss average attitude convergence over time (estimating that the general post-communist effect should take 20 to 40 years to diminish, assuming linearity), they do not analyze the incidence of such adjustment across these different cohorts. Nor do they consider the trajectory of other related preferences, or of changes beyond the two years included in their investigation (1997 and 2002). In the end, thus, the overall generalizability and scope of their German case-study is somewhat limited.

**A Unified Framework For A More Comprehensive Study of Convergence**

Clearly then, the broader issue of post-communist adaptation remains far from settled in the existing literature. The purpose of this dissertation is to therefore more directly address this question. Specifically, by integrating the two main tenets discussed above, the research presented here seeks to utilize a more comprehensive, overarching framework of study, as well as a richer set of available data, to better examine the trajectory of post-communist attitudes – looking to see whether these beliefs have come to resemble those of comparable individuals elsewhere, as well as how they have managed to adjust to contemporary, post-communist times.

In terms of country selection, it compares the views of post-communist citizens to those of non-post-communists from the European continent. Given the historical, cultural and geographical ties of the transition states to Western Europe, as well as the attempts made by these nations to become economically and politically integrated into the European community, European citizens are believed to be the most appropriate
reference group for a study of convergence (Schimmelfennig 2003, Kornai 2006, Vachudova 2008). Nevertheless, it considers multiple beliefs, espoused by individuals from a diverse set of these nations, so as to maximize generalizability and allow for any lingering effect of communism to potentially manifest itself across the entire transition region.²⁷

Regarding temporal selection, the study looks at the dynamics of attitudes over the course of two decades (1990-2010 in total). This time span, which is the longest possible given available survey data, is sufficient to cover both a wide range of transition conditions (including the early economic lows, later prosperity, and most recent economic crisis; see Svejnar 2002), and to also provide an opportunity for adaptation to gradually occur.

Since the collapse of communism involved a fundamental overhaul of both the economic and political systems governing the associated nations, the main investigation in Chapter III’s “Old Kids on the Bloc” begins with an extensive analysis of two basic, corresponding attitudes – a preference for more individual economic responsibility, and a preference for a democratic political system – albeit with subsequent extensions to eight other categories of beliefs. Likewise, as the transition also inevitably transformed the freedoms and rights granted to post-communist citizens, turning them from oppressed and scrutinized subjects of the state into liberated and autonomous citizens, Chapter IV’s “(Re-)Unifying Beliefs, Regaining Control” then goes on to study attitudes pertaining to efficacy (or perceived “locus of control”).

While Chapter III employs multilevel models on a combination of repeated, cross-sectional, individual- and country-level data from forty European countries, Chapter IV instead takes advantage of longitudinal data from (the quasi-experimental case) of Germany. In both Chapters III and IV, however, the main empirical objective is the same: utilize an united model for the study of post-communist attitudes (based upon the two principal approaches previously discussed) to more directly analyze the relative importance of (i) early, “primacy” regime experiences (i.e., socialist history), versus (ii) current individual or societal factors (i.e., performance-based influences), for the development of these fundamental, post-communist attitudes.

(i) The Role of Socialization and “Primacy” Regime Experiences

With regard to the former, the dissertation builds from the suggestive findings of the “legacies” literature to more systematically examine if and how growing up under a socialist regime may have – in and of itself – left an enduring imprint on post-communists’ preferences. Drawing from psychological research on political socialization (Sears 1975, Greenstein 1970, Hyman 1959, Sears and Levy 2003, Sapiro 2004 Sears and Valentino 1997, Stoker and Jennings 2006, Schuman and Scott 1989, Easton and Dennis 1969) and attitude resistance (Alwin 1993, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Jennings and Stoker 1999, Alwin and Krosnick 1991, Marwell et al. 1987, Converse and Markus 1979, Alwin et al 1991a, Green and Palmquist 1994), it conjectures that past experience with communism is likely to have predictably, significantly and durably skewed the economic and political preferences of post-communist citizens, thereby curtailing later convergence.
This postulation is largely derived from “persistence” accounts of attitude formation in the socialization literature, according to which “basic attitudes are acquired early and persist throughout life…[such that] adults’ attitudes are anachronistic, indifferent to the realities of the contemporary environment, and an obstacle to ‘rational’ decision making based on the merits of current alternatives” (Sears and Valentino 1997: 45). To the extent that the content of these attitudes are, in the first place, believed to be largely molded by “polities and political societies and systems [which] inculcate appropriate norms and practices in citizens” (Sapiro 2004: 2; see also Almond and Verba 1963, Easton 1965), it is a short step to the assumption that an individual’s preferences may have been lastingly shaped by the socio-political arrangement in operation during his or her early life. In fact, similar reasoning been employed in studies of “generations,” in which members of specific subpopulations are believed to carry distinguishable memories or beliefs due to some shared experiences or events during youth (Mannheim [1928] 1952, Schuman et al. 2004, Corning 2010, Jennings 1987, Schuman and Scott 1989, Schuman and Corning 2006, Sigel and Haskin 1977, Jennings and Niemi 1981).

In the context of post-communist Europe, such an idea would yield the initial expectation that individuals who grew up under a socialist system – and who acquired their basic, regime-specific values under communism – are likely to continue to hold positions more in line with the communist mantra than citizens who grew up in a non-

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28 To be sure, the literature on socialization is vast and offers a variety of accounts, including the “impressionable years” model (in which attitudes are particularly susceptible during late adolescence and early adulthood, but persistent thereafter; Sears 1975, Schuman and Rogers 2004), the “life cycle model” (in which individuals are drawn to certain attitudes at distinctive stages in life; Alwin 1993), and the “lifelong openness view” (which instead holds that attitudes are vulnerable to change, in a manner akin to the rational-choice approach; see Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001a,b, 2005, 2007, Rose et al. 2006, Mishler and Willerton 2003). However, notwithstanding these nuances and divisions, a major premise of this work is that early life experiences are crucial for the development of longer-term political beliefs.
communist country. Given socialism’s ideological focus on state economic intervention and government responsibility for the assured well-being of all citizens, as well as its political emphasis on totalitarian, single-party rule (Kornai 1992), socialist predispositions should therefore take the form of more leftist and/or authoritarian predispositions. In general terms, these might include anti-free market or egalitarian preferences favoring income equality and redistribution, in addition to the acceptance of autocratic practices, such as strong leadership or centralized decision-making. Of course, these tendencies may have also been shaped by the realities of everyday life under a totalitarian and ubiquitous regime, which may have similarly left citizens feeling more oppressed or skeptical, and relatively less in command of both their nation’s future and of their own lives (see Chapter IV for more discussion on “locus of control”).

With regard to the main economic, political and efficacy attitudes analyzed in this study then (as shall be discussed further in the following chapters), this would imply relatively less support for both (a) individual economic responsibility and (b) a democratic political system, as well as (c) relatively lower rates of efficacy (i.e., perceptions of individual or “internal” control) among post-communists – at least when compared to citizens living in the established, capitalist democracies of Western Europe.

To the extent that theories of socialization and attitude persistence would also assert that such basic beliefs, once formed, are only likely to further crystallize and strengthen over the course of one’s life (see Sears and Funk 1999), it seems reasonable to additionally expect any such communist effect to both endure throughout the transition period, and to present itself more strongly among older members of the transition
population, who spent longer living under the previous system. In fact, although the precise age of attitude formation has been subject to much debate, most previous studies have suggested that individuals do not fully assemble their regime-specific values until their first, “fresh” encounter with the political world during adolescence (Mannheim [1928] 1952, Schuman and Scott 1989, Corning 2010, Sears and Valentino 1997, Schuman et al. 2004), with 15 years of age often cited as the lower bound.

Consequently, if it is the case that “primacy” regime experience (i.e., attitude acquisition under communism) fundamentally alters the economic and political preferences of citizens, then this should only be revealed in the beliefs of post-communists above the age of (approximately) 15 at the time of regime change. For those younger, the short-lived experience of communism in pre-adolescence may not have been sufficient for a deep-seated, long-lasting and stable effect. For individuals beyond the age of 15 at that time, on the other hand, additional exposure to communism (in terms of cumulative years spent living under a socialist regime) should only sway preferences further and more firmly away from Western European norms.

In terms of empirical strategy, in order to comprehensively investigate the relative effect of early, “primacy” regime experiences, this dissertation employs a three-stage plan of analysis, which is performed in both Chapters III and IV. First, the possibility of a general, post-communist effect is explored, to see whether citizens from transition countries do, in fact, systematically differ in their self-reported predispositions. This involves a quantitative contrast of the economic, political and efficacy attitudes of post-

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29 The relationship here is, in fact, two-fold, based on the assumption that that prior communist experiences will inevitably increase with age and that such experiences will, in turn, likely impact the strength or stability of communist-style attitudes (even if not in a perfectly linear way). For similar arguments in the U.S. context see Stoker and Jennings (2008), Alwin and Krosnick (1991).
communist and non-post-communist Europeans, both in general and over time. If socialization or primacy theories are correct, we should find that, ceteris paribus, post-communists tend to exhibit relatively less support for both individual economic responsibility and for a democratic political system (see Chapter III), as well as lower rates of efficacy (as studied in Chapter IV). This is Hypothesis 1. These “post-communist effects” should, in addition, be expected to persist throughout the transition period (Hypothesis 2); any reduction in size over time can instead be treated as evidence of attitudinal adjustment.\(^{30}\)

Second, the dissertation considers the relationship of age in the two regions, in order to probe whether length of exposure to a (contrasting) regime does, in fact, predictably shape attitudes. Previous research in the U.S. and Western Europe has found age to be associated with increasingly conservative positions (e.g., Stoker and Jennings 2008, Alwin and Krosnick 1991, Glenn 1974, Alesina, Alberto and La Ferrara 2005) and higher efficacy or internal control\(^{31}\) (Lachman 1986, Schultz & Schultz 2005, Gurin & Brim 1984). However, in the post-communist region, attitude persistence theories would instead predict age to have yielded stronger and more crystalized socialist positions. Consequently, evidence in support of some “primacy” or socialization effect would therefore take the form of a directly opposite relationship of age in the two areas. In post-communist countries, age should be negatively associated with preferences for individual

\(^{30}\) In fact, by socialization understandings, post-communist attitudinal change (at the societal level) is expected to occur primarily through a process of cohort replacement, rather than by the conversion of mature adults to new points of view (Alwin 1993, Sears and Levy 2003: 79).

\(^{31}\) Although some studies have suggested that internality might, in fact, be somewhat curvilinear over the life course (i.e., increasing throughout most of life, then decreasing in old age), the evidence does nonetheless reveal a general rise until (at least) middle age (see Gecas 1989 for an overview).
economic responsibility, a democratic political system, and with self-reported efficacy (or “internal” control), whereas in non-post-communist Europe, this interrelation should be positive (Hypothesis 3).

Finally, as a third step of investigation, this study undertakes birth cohort analysis – both on the pooled dataset and over time. Specifically, it breaks down the sample of survey respondents into five birth cohorts, born fifteen years apart, and examines the relative development of attitudes across them, so as to allow for the possibility of asymmetric attitudinal adaptation. Again, extrapolating from the literature on socialization and attitude formation, it is expected that the youngest group of post-communists (those born after 1975) will exhibit tendencies relatively more in line with their peers from the non-post-communist region (Hypothesis 4). Individuals from this cohort would not have reached 15 years of age at the onset of regime change and should therefore not have been greatly affected by the socialist past, forming their preferences instead during post-communist times. Members of older post-communist cohorts, on the other hand, who may continue to be influenced by their stockpile of communist experiences, are expected to display progressively socialist tendencies, both in general and over time (Hypothesis 5). For these post-communists, attitudinal adaptation or (re-)learning should represent a far more difficult task. Rapid convergence in beliefs to Western standards, thus, may simply not have occurred.

(ii) The Role of Rationality and Post-Communist Experiences

Of course, as previously discussed, although there are numerous reasons to suspect the existence of lingering communist effects, transition citizens have nonetheless also proven
to be rationally responsive to fluctuations in present-day circumstances over the last two decades. As such, it is imperative for a study of attitudinal adjustment to also consider the systematic effect of current, performance-based factors for the development of beliefs. Such an examination is not only necessary for a deeper understanding of public opinion, but is also required to ensure that any observed post-communist distinctions are not, in actuality, driven by compositional differences in individual and societal outcomes. This latter point is particularly pertinent given the significant cross-country variations in economic and political outputs observed both within the transition region, as well as across the post-communist and non-post-communist areas (Svejnar 2002, Roland 2002).

Accordingly, in addition to considering the role of pre-transition influences, this dissertation also includes an investigation into the influence of current, post-communist experiences for individuals’ preferences.

From a theoretical point of view, uncovering evidence of transition-based or “rationalist effects” is relatively straightforward. To begin with, it requires the quantitative incorporation of economic and political indicators believed to be relevant for the attitudes under study. In the view of the previously discussed literature on economic voting and self-interest motivations, factors expected to be important for the preferences analyzed here include various micro- and macro- gauges of relative performance, such as prosperity, employment, education, inequality and democratization. These variables, it is believed, should be the main movers of public opinion, separating the pleased from the dissatisfied, the ideologically left from the right, and – in the context of transition – the winners from the losers of reform.
The implications of a rationalist framework for this study of attitudinal adaptation are relatively straightforward. Firstly, such an approach would expect variations in Europeans’ economic, political and efficacy attitudes to be explained primarily by differences in individual- or aggregate-level outcomes. This not only means that performance-based variables should be the ones most strongly and closely associated with stated opinions (Hypothesis 6), but also that, once discrepancies in outputs are accounted for, there should be little scope for an independent effect of prior communist experience (counter to Hypothesis 1).

In fact, if post-communist preferences are fundamentally driven by rational analyses of current circumstances (rather than by some prior legacy of socialism), there is also no reason to expect any unique, attitudinal variations based around age. That is, after controlling for compositional differences in outcomes, age should neither be associated with opposing preferences in transition in versus non-transition countries (counter to Hypothesis 3), nor should members of older cohorts exhibit progressively more socialist positions when compared to their Western counterparts (counter to Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5). Instead, significant cleavages should only exist between citizens faring relatively better or worse, in personal and/or societal terms.

Lastly, to the extent that notions of learning or updating are generally more compatible with “rationalist” understandings of attitude formation than with “socialization” or “persistence” accounts, such theories might also more directly speak to the idea of convergence. Specifically, even if citizens from former socialist countries do initially exhibit certain socialist tendencies, performance-based understandings would expect the importance of such pre-transition influences to gradually fade. With the
passage of time and the accumulation of new regime experience, responsive transition citizens should base their beliefs and actions primarily on contemporary, post-communist factors. All else equal, then, their preferences should eventually come to resemble those espoused by their Western counterparts (counter to Hypothesis 2). This attitudinal convergence is, moreover, expected to occur across the entire transition region, among all post-communists, both young and old.

Extensions
The initial three-stage analysis described above represents a major part of the empirical investigations undertaken in Chapters III and IV of the dissertation. In both studies, however, once these examinations are complete, steps are taken to further probe the issue of post-communist attitudinal adaptation. Although the specific theories and conjectures pertinent to these supplementary stages will be presented as they arise in Chapters III and IV, respectively, their contributions are briefly outlined here.

In Chapter III, the main extension involves the broadening of this three-stage analysis to consider eight other categories of attitudes, beyond the basic economic and political preferences outlined above. The reasoning for this exercise is simple: if it is the case that post-communists hold distinct predispositions due to dissimilarities between their previous, communist regime (under which they were socialized) and their current, Western systems (under which they now live), similar attitudinal differences should be discovered for any belief categories subject to such incongruence. By probing to see whether – and which – other attitudes have been susceptible to the “primacy” or socialization” effects discussed earlier, thus, it is possible to both address concerns about
the generalizability of the main results, as well as to speculate about the successes and/or failures of communist indoctrination.

In addition to replicating the main results of Chapter III (with different data and yet another attitude), Chapter IV takes advantage of the longitudinal design of the German Socioeconomic Panel survey, so as to push these extensions further and explore additional mechanisms of adaptation. Drawing from social-psychological theories of “attitude resistance,” for instance, it begins by considering the degree of within-person stability in the beliefs of former East and West Germans, looking to see whether GDR citizens have, in fact, been relatively more likely to re-adjust their stated positions from year-to-year.

In order to explore the decomposition of attitude change over time, it then also undertakes supplementary analyses on those Germans who answered in all waves of the GSOEP. In particular, by examining the extent of attitudinal convergence within this subset of respondents, it offers a cursory probe into the question of whether observed adjustments over time are the result of changing beliefs or changing respondents (see also fn. 30).

Recognizing the potential influences of such demographic dynamics, Chapter IV also goes on to consider the control orientations of former East Germans who have migrated to the Western region following reunification – investigating how they have fared relative to both East Germans that have continued to reside in the East, as well as to long-time West Germans (who now represent their neighbors). Although, using the available data, it is not possible to directly speak to the issue of whether individuals self-selectively migrate based on these attitudes (as there are no comparable measures of
efficacy prior to, or at the time of, reunification), the exercise is nonetheless useful in both demonstrating the long-lasting effects of socialization, as well as in highlighting the potential importance of social context and environment.

Finally, having uncovered numerous traces of “primacy” effects, the last section of Chapter IV turns to the question of intergenerational transmission of values. More specifically, by exploiting the household sampling design of the GSOEP data, it investigates whether locus of control orientations tend to be similarly passed down from parents to children in the two regions. In doing so, it enables an initial exploration into an alternative curb on individual-level transition – one that has the potential to significantly slow down convergence in the long-term, even for those whom communism is but a textbook topic from a bygone generation.

***

All in all, thus, despite the growth in scholarly efforts to understand post-communist public opinion over the last twenty years – and, in particular, to unearth how the processes and outcomes of transition have predictably mapped onto citizens’ attitudes – the cumulative results of these efforts have been somewhat fragmented and unclear, leaving unanswered numerous puzzles and questions about post-communist adaptation. The purpose of this dissertation, thus, is to remedy these shortcomings, by first integrating existing theories of attitude formation into a more comprehensive, overarching framework for study, and by subsequently applying this model in a series of
extensive empirical investigations. Now that the general analytical scheme has been unveiled and its implied consequences laid out, it is time to commence the empirical pursuits. The following chapter begins with Part A of the statistical analysis.
CHAPTER III

Empirical Part A: “Old Kids on the Bloc”

As discussed in Chapter II, although the last twenty years have seen a notable rise in scholarly research on post-communist public opinion, the existing literature has sporadically grown into a fragmented body of singular, discipline-specific work, leaving unresolved numerous questions about the broader issue of post-communist attitudinal adaptation. The purpose of this dissertation is to fill this void. Specifically, by integrating social-psychological theories of socialization and attitude resistance with political science and economic theories of rational-choice, it seeks to incorporate the distinct insights from (what have been referred to here as) the “legacies” and “rationalist” schools into a unified framework for study. Applying this analytical scheme to a series of empirical investigations, it aims to provide a more comprehensive and systematic study of transition (or convergence) at the individual-level – examining, at once, the relative importance of (i) early, “primacy” regime experiences (i.e., socialist history), versus (ii) current individual or societal factors (i.e., performance-based influences), for the development of post-communist attitudes.

Having presented the overarching analytical framework and its observable implications in Chapter II, this section initiates the empirical examinations, beginning first with a broad, cross-regional analysis, spanning individuals from forty countries, over fifteen years.
DATA AND METHODS

In order to investigate the development of post-communist attitudes, Chapter III of the dissertation begins the empirical research, utilizing a combination of micro-level survey data (measuring individual preferences and characteristics) and macro-level economic and political indicators (capturing cross-country differences in socio-political context).

The individual-level data come from multiple waves of the European Values Surveys (EVS) and World Values Surveys (WVS), which – for the purpose of this study – have been integrated into a larger, longitudinal dataset, covering the period of 1990-2005. The EVS and WVS, while representing two, distinct survey research programs, include a number of identically-worded questions and employ analogous sampling methodologies, thereby making it possible to merge and compare data from both sources.¹

Given this dissertation’s focus on the convergence of post-communist attitudes toward Western European standards, all available European WVS/EVS data was consolidated and used in the analysis, yielding four survey waves in total. These correspond to a (i) 1990 wave (WVS and EVS), (ii) 1995 wave (WVS only), (iii) 2000 wave (WVS and EVS), and (iv) 2005 wave (WVS only).² The relevant survey respondents, in turn, emerge from 40 countries: 21 post-communist states (Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation,

¹ For more information, see http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSIntegratedEVSWVS.jsp?Idioma=1

² While the WVS has, since 1990, been conducted every five years, the EVS has typically only been conducted once a decade. Unfortunately, an earlier, 1981 wave of both the WVS and EVS could not be used due to insufficient coverage of the former socialist countries.
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, East Germany) and 19 non-post-communist nations (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, West Germany). In terms of both temporal and cross-national representation, thus, the data analyzed in this study constitute an extensive range of economic and political conditions, covering most European sub-regions and traversing the majority of the transition period.

During each of the WVS/EVS waves, respondents from the surveyed nations were asked to state their opinions and positions on a variety of issues. The present research focuses on the development of attitudes pertaining to two distinct dimensions of beliefs: Economic and Political. This is simply because the collapse of communism required, above all, a replacement of Soviet-style economic and political institutions by those favored in the West. Nonetheless, in later sections, the study also considers Extensions to six other categories of beliefs (Satisfaction/Well-being, Efficacy, Confidence in Institutions, Political Involvement, Religiosity, and Morality). All these belief categories were distinguished a priori, and are each comprised of multiple survey items, grouped together based on their shared content and subject matter. In total, 64 EVS/WVS questions were classified into one of these eight categories and analyzed using the three-stage empirical strategy outlined in Chapter II. General response patterns for each class were then documented, but – for the sake of brevity – are exemplified in this paper by an

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3 Surveys are conducted on nationally representative, random samples from the entire population, 18 years and older. Minimum sample size is 1000 per country, per wave, with no upper age limit imposed in most countries. Interviews are usually conducted face-to-face in the home language. Questions are typically pre-tested and both translated- and reverse-translated. Apart from a few exceptions, a country participated either in an EVS or WVS wave, but not in both.

4 Of course, these eight categories (and 64 variables) do not represent the full range of questions or topics asked in the EVS/WVS. Choice of items was based firstly on longitudinal and geographic availability (i.e., questions asked over multiple waves and in a wide selection of European countries), as well as on relevance for the current research project (i.e., questions believed to be somewhat germane to a study of post-communist adjustment).
analysis of a single, typical item, with primary focus on the fundamental Economic and Political dimensions.

**Basic Economic and Political Preferences**

As opposed to the capitalist, free-markets of Western Europe, the economic structures advocated by the former socialist regimes were based around the core principle of central planning and state responsibility for the assured well-being of all citizens (Miller et al. 1994, Kornai 1991). As such, in order to analyze post-communist attitudinal adjustment with regard to basic *economic* preferences, this study looked at responses to the following question:

“How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between: “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for”

1 ‘People should take more responsibility’
2
...
10 ‘The government should take more responsibility’”

Answers to this item were re-scaled to range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the greatest support for individual responsibility (as per free-market principles) and 0 depicting the most traditionally leftist position (i.e., most in favor of governmental responsibility, in consonance with the communist creed).

Basic *political* preferences were examined using responses to a question about whether “a democratic political system” is a “very good”, “fairly good”, “fairly bad” or
“very bad” way of governing a country. Again, responses to this question were rescaled to range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the most pro-democratic position (“very good”) and 0 the most anti-democratic stance (“very bad”). To the extent that the former communist regimes represented fundamentally authoritarian organizations (with single-party rule, the absence of competitive elections and only limited political freedoms), higher support for a democratic system would, in this case, reflect a position more consistent with Western political models. Anti-democratic tendencies would, in contrast, be more congruent with the socialist political systems of the pre-transition era. Unfortunately, items probing preferences for democracy were not asked in the earliest, 1990 surveys, so this analysis is limited to the later three waves of the EVS/WVS dataset (i.e., 1995-2005).

Explanatory Variables

To explore the possibility that prior experience with communism may have fundamentally altered or distinguished the preferences of post-communist citizens, a Post-Communist dummy is included in the analysis. This dummy takes the value of one if the respondent is a citizen of a post-communist country, and zero otherwise. Although this dummy captures the general effect of being a former socialist citizen, it does not, by itself, speak to the issue of convergence. In order to investigate how individual preferences have adjusted over time, this study also incorporates Survey Wave dummies (taking the value of one for the year in which the survey was conducted, with the earliest wave omitted as the reference category), as well as an interaction term between these Wave dummies and the Post-Communist variable. While the former help illustrate
broader attitudinal trends, as well as account for wave-specific (or period) effects, the latter enables an examination of whether any differences in beliefs between post-communist and non-post-communist citizens have changed over time. An investigation of both, therefore, allows for a more direct assessment of post-communist attitudinal convergence toward the West.

As previously discussed, another main explanatory variable of interest in this study is age, which has the potential to exert a distinct effect in the post-communist and non-post-communist regions. Consequently, Age (measured in years) and an interaction term between Age and the Post-Communist dummy are also included in the investigations (the latter only in the second stage).

Similarly, in order to probe the possibility of disparate attitudinal trajectories across different groups, birth cohort dummies are employed in the third stage of analysis. These variables, which are equivalent to those utilized by Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007), are designed to separate respondents into one of five birth cohorts, born fifteen years apart: those Born after 1975 (the youngest, who would have been under 15 years old when communism collapsed), Born 1961-1975, Born 1946-1960, Born 1931-1945 and those Born 1930 or earlier. For the purpose of exploring differences in stated preferences between post-communist and non-post-communist citizens from the same birth cohort, these dummies are also interacted with the Post-Communist dummy. To subsequently observe whether any such cohort differences have changed over time, a three-way interaction is introduced, interacting the Post-Communist, Wave and Birth Cohort dummies at once.
Finally, in order to account for the effects of both socio-demographic characteristics and individual differences in prosperity (or relative performance, as per rationalist accounts), a number of additional controls are included in all the models. These measures: income (0 to 1 scale, measuring the income decile in which respondent’s household income falls, within country), unemployment (dummy, 1 if unemployed), higher education (dummy, 1 if respondent has completed beyond a secondary level of education), gender (dummy, 1 if female), religiosity (0 to 1 scale, where 1 is most religious), political interest (0 to 1 scale, where 1 is highest interest) and the urbanicity of respondent’s town/city (0 to 1 scale, where 0 is a town-size of under 2,000, and 1 is a population of over 50,000).

5 The measure of individual income utilized here is based on responses to a question asking respondents to state the group (decile) containing their household’s income level, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes, before taxes and other deductions. This variable is thus a within-country measure of relative income, rather than a measure capturing an individual’s relative income across the full set of respondents. Although one might intuitively think that a cross-sample comparative measure would be better, numerous scholars have found that individuals, including post-communists, tend to assess their prosperity based precisely on their position relative to some reference group within their own nation (Senik 2004, 2008). Moreover, computing a precise cross-sample measure would be problematic, given the notable cross-country differences in costs of living, wages, and exchange rates.

6 Unfortunately, the EVS/WVS questionnaires do not include a question asking respondents to state the number of total years of education received. Instead, respondents are usually asked to indicate the highest level of education obtained, based on three levels (lower, middle, higher). Because certain questionnaires (e.g., 1990 wave of the EVS) also did not contain this latter item, education responses were stratified on higher education for this analysis. Specifically, when surveys did contain a question asking for the highest level of education obtained, a dummy was created and assigned one for those with higher education; when this question was not included, a dummy was created and assigned one if the respondent was above the age of 18 when s/he completed his/her education. Only around 10% of the responses fell under this second scenario. As a robustness check, the analysis was repeated without these cases and with alternative coding schemes, neither of which meaningfully altered the results.

7 The religiosity measure was created based on the answers to the question: “How important is [religion] in your life? Very important’, ‘Rather important’, ‘Not very important’, ‘Not at all important.’” These responses were rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (0 is least religious, 1 is most religious). Results remain the same when different questions are used to capture religiosity.

8 Political interest was measured using responses to the question: “How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested’, ‘Somewhat interested’ ‘Not very interested’ ‘Not at all interested.’” Answers were rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (0 is least interested, 1 is most). Again, results remain the same when different items are used for political interest or involvement.

9 Unfortunately, a number of potentially germane individual-level variables could not be used in this study due to missing data issues and/or a lack of relevant survey items. Among these were measures of individual satisfaction with personal economic circumstances (which suffered from a significantly large number of missing responses from non-post-communist countries, particularly in the third wave), as well as of citizens’ general satisfaction with their nation’s
Likewise, various national indicators of economic and political performance were also collected and employed. These macro-level variables were chosen both due to their relevance in previous studies, and also because they capture a range of relevant cross-country differences in societal context. These are: Polity Score (combined, measuring the nature and competitiveness of a regime, where 10 is strongly democratic and -10 is strongly autocratic), Labor Force Participation Rate (% of the total population, age 15+ that is economically active), Gini Index (measuring the distribution of income within a country, where 0 is perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality), GDP Per Capita Growth Rate (Annual % Change), Inflation Rate (Annual % Change in Consumer Prices), and the General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (Annual % Change, measuring government expenditure on goods and services that are used for both individual and collective consumption/needs).\textsuperscript{10}

For the empirical analysis, all country-level variables are kept in their original units and are lagged by one year, in order to allow time for the measures to be reported economic or political situation (due to the complete absence of appropriate questions). The investigation was therefore conducted using only \textit{objective} measures of individual prosperity (i.e., income, education, unemployment) and of country-level performance. Although objective rankings do not always perfectly line up with subjective assessments (Tverdova 2012), the two have usually been found to be correlated, and the former are nevertheless theorized to be important predictors of stated preferences (e.g., Valev 2004, Fidrmuc 2000, Doyle and Fidrmuc 2003, Pacek 1994, Grosfeld and Senik 2003, Hayo 2004). As a robustness check, the quantitative analysis was repeated on a restricted dataset including, as additional controls, both self-reported satisfaction with personal economic circumstances and assessments of human rights in the respondent’s country. These supplementary investigations generated qualitatively similar results to those presented here. As a further inspection, individual self-placements on a left-right ideology scale were also added to the models, with the results again remaining unchanged. Although these left-right self-placements are widely available in the EVS/WVS datasets, they were excluded from the main analysis because of concerns about their comparability across different contexts (Linzer 2011, Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, Tavits and Letki 2009, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010), as well as the fact that they may represent a substitute measure for the attitudes under study, rather than being independently associated with them.

\textsuperscript{10} Sources for these indicators are as follows: Polity Scores come from the Polity IV Project; Labor Force Participation Rates, Inflation Rates and GDP per Capita Growth Rates are from the World Bank; General Government Final Consumption Expenditure Rates are from UN Stats; Gini Index scores are from multiple sources, usually Transmonee for the post-communist countries and either the Luxembourg Income Study, UNU-Wider or EU Stats for the non-post-communist countries. All efforts were made to use the same sources/methods of calculation, in order to maximize over-time and cross-national comparability. Although this was not possible with the Gini Index, excluding it from the analysis does not substantively alter the results.
and observed by the mass public (i.e., figures used are from the year prior to the one in which the EVS/WVS survey was administered). As a robustness check, the analysis was repeated using a number of alternative measures (e.g., actual levels of GDP Per Capita and Government Consumption instead of rates; Freedom House Scores instead of Polity Scores; and current figures instead of lagged data), as well as excluding certain macro-level variables. Neither of these procedures substantively altered the results.\footnote{Due to multicollinearity and data availability problems, not all variables could be included in the empirical models at once. The final decision was made based on data quality, reliability, comparability and theoretical or practical relevance, as per previous studies. Unfortunately, certain potentially important variables, e.g., robust measures of corruption (Linde 2009, Miller et al. 2001, Rose-Ackerman 2001, Smyth and Qian 2009), could not be obtained for the full sample and so had to be set aside altogether.}

\textit{A Multilevel Model}

Due to the fact that survey respondents in this investigation are neatly nested within higher contextual units (i.e., countries) – and that variables from both of these levels are included in the analysis – the dataset utilized here exhibits a multilevel or hierarchical structure. In such data, the possibility of both non-constant variance across contextual units and clustering within them becomes an issue (Gelman & Hill 2007, Raudenbush & Bruk 2002, Rahn & Rudolph 2005). For this reason, traditional OLS modeling techniques (which assume independence in sampling) are inappropriate to use and are, in fact, likely to downwardly bias (or underestimate) standard errors (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). Multilevel modeling techniques, on the other hand, can account for the dependence of error terms of lower-level observations on higher-level units to overcome this statistical challenge (Phan 2008: 32, Goldstein 2003). Consequently, this study employs a random-
intercept, restricted maximum-likelihood multilevel model,\(^\text{12}\) in which the constant term is allowed to vary across groups, to simultaneously examine the micro- and macro-level bases of stated preferences.\(^\text{13}\)

Given both survey- and aggregate- data availability, the multilevel analysis is ultimately undertaken on 87,766 observations (individuals), clustered within 40 groups (countries) for the study of basic economic preferences. For the examination of political attitudes, it is 57,781 observations, clustered within 37 groups that are analyzed (with Wave 1 excluded, as the relevant democracy item was only asked since Wave 2).\(^\text{14}\)

**RESULTS**

**(A) General Post-Communist Distinctions**

The first stage of analysis involved an examination of whether post-communist citizens tend to espouse systematically distinct attitudes compared to Western Europeans, as well as how such post-communist distinctions have evolved over time.

\(^{12}\) Unlike Full Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Restricted Maximum Likelihood Estimation takes into account the degrees of freedom from the “fixed effects” and thus produces variance components that are less biased. Both procedures, however, produce identical “fixed effects” estimates (Albright 2007: 9, Snijders & Bosker 1999).

\(^{13}\) More nuanced investigations sometimes use random-slopes models, which allow the effects of the micro-level variables to vary across different groups (in this case, countries). Such random-slopes models are beyond the scope of this study, though they were considered in earlier, exploratory stages, yielding only modest and predictable results. The random intercepts models presented were estimated using Stata 11’s xtmixed model command and replicated in R.

\(^{14}\) Specifically, if there are observations \(i = 1, \ldots, n\) clustered in groups \(j = 1, \ldots, J\), the resulting model can be written as:

\[
y_i = \alpha_{j[i]} + X_i \beta + \epsilon_i
\]

where \(y_i\) is the dependent variable (e.g., basic economic or political preference), \(X\) is a vector of independent variables (but not the constant term), and \(\alpha\) is the constant term. The second level of the model then simply becomes:

\[\alpha_j \sim N(\mu_{\alpha}, \sigma^2_{\alpha})\]
To recall from Chapter II, if socialization or primacy theories are correct, we should find that, ceteris paribus, post-communists tend to exhibit relatively less support for both individual *economic* responsibility and for a democratic *political* system (*Hypothesis 1*). These “post-communist effects” should, in addition, be expected to persist throughout the transition period (*Hypothesis 2*); any reduction in size over time can instead be treated as evidence of attitudinal adjustment.

According to rationalist accounts, on the other hand, variations in Europeans’ economic and political attitudes should be explained primarily by differences in individual- or aggregate-level outcomes (*Hypothesis 6*). Once discrepancies in these performance-based variables are accounted for, thus, there should be little scope for an independent effect of prior communist experience (*counter to Hypothesis 1*). Even if citizens from former socialist countries do initially exhibit certain socialist tendencies, rationalist understandings would expect the importance of such pre-transition influences to gradually fade. That is, as time passes and as these responsive citizens accumulate new regime experience, their preferences should eventually become based primarily on contemporary, *post*-communist factors, thereby finally converging to those of their (comparable) Western counterparts (*counter to Hypothesis 2*).

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the main empirical results of the section, for economic and political attitudes, respectively. The first column in each table outlines the results obtained from the baseline specification, in which only the Post-Communist dummy is added to the various individual- and country-level variables described above. In column 2, Wave dummies, and the interaction of these dummies with the Post-Communist variable, are also included in the multilevel models. To recap, the dependent variables
## TABLE 3.1: MULTILEVEL MODELS OF BASIC ECONOMIC ATTITUDES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Preference for Individual Economic Responsibility (0-100)</th>
<th>I. POST-COMMUNIST EFFECT</th>
<th>II. POST-COMMUNIST EFFECT OVER TIME (with Waves and Interactions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist</td>
<td>-11.101***</td>
<td>-17.753***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.016)</td>
<td>(3.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>-8.040***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.692)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 3</td>
<td>-1.292**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 4</td>
<td>-14.372***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist * Wave 2</td>
<td>-4.326***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.950)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist * Wave 3</td>
<td>-2.510**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.939)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist * Wave 4</td>
<td>6.344***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.219)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>-0.0438***</td>
<td>-0.0425***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (0-1 scale, decile, w/in country)</td>
<td>10.990***</td>
<td>10.987***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-3.198***</td>
<td>-3.113***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.401)</td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>3.421***</td>
<td>3.141***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-2.963***</td>
<td>-2.945***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>2.156***</td>
<td>2.171***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity</td>
<td>-0.601*</td>
<td>-0.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES (lagged one year):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Participation Rate (total, age 15+)</td>
<td>0.500***</td>
<td>0.227***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate</td>
<td>-0.0461***</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita, Annual Growth Rate</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.277***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Gov't Final Consumption Expenditure, Annual Growth</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index</td>
<td>-0.921***</td>
<td>0.421***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>0.220***</td>
<td>-0.442***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RANDOM EFFECTS PARAMETERS</strong></td>
<td>Estimate (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Estimate (Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd(_Cons)</td>
<td>9.353</td>
<td>9.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.092)</td>
<td>(1.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd(Residual)</td>
<td>29.762</td>
<td>29.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intraclass Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: *** = p ≤ 0.001; ** = p ≤ 0.01; * = p ≤ 0.05

Multilevel Model: Restricted Maximum Likelihood

In column 2, Wave 1 is the omitted category.
### TABLE 3.2: MULTILEVEL MODELS OF BASIC POLITICAL ATTITUDES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Preference for a Democratic Political System (0-100)</th>
<th>I. POST-COMMUNIST EFFECT</th>
<th>II. POST-COMMUNIST EFFECT OVER TIME (with Waves and Interactions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist</td>
<td>-7.257** (2.482)</td>
<td>-7.725** (2.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.238*** (0.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.301*** (0.668)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist * Wave 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist * Wave 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.688 (0.876)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Communist * Wave 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.494 (1.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-0.937*** (0.191)</td>
<td>-0.937*** (0.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (0-1 scale, decile, w/in country)</td>
<td>3.973*** (0.373)</td>
<td>4.207*** (0.374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.997** (0.344)</td>
<td>-0.977** (0.344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>4.823*** (0.235)</td>
<td>4.604*** (0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.146*** (0.302)</td>
<td>1.144*** (0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>8.098*** (0.329)</td>
<td>8.091*** (0.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity</td>
<td>0.796** (0.267)</td>
<td>0.772** (0.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES (lagged one year):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>-0.076 (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.362*** (0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Participation Rate (total, age 15+)</td>
<td>-0.509*** (0.063)</td>
<td>-0.472*** (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index</td>
<td>-0.413*** (0.080)</td>
<td>-0.624*** (0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita, Annual Growth Rate</td>
<td>-0.633*** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.859*** (0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate</td>
<td>-0.021*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.017*** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Gov't Final Consumption Expenditure, Annual Growth</td>
<td>0.261*** (0.028)</td>
<td>0.250*** (0.029)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RANDOM EFFECTS PARAMETERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country: identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd(Cons)</td>
<td>7.305 (0.912)</td>
<td>7.588 (0.957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd(Residual)</td>
<td>22.220 (0.065)</td>
<td>22.207 (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intraclass Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N = 57781 Countries = 37</th>
<th>N = 57781 Countries = 37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi² (15) = 2037.23 Prob &gt; chi² = 0.0000</td>
<td>Wald chi² (19) = 2109.04 Prob &gt; chi² = 0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: *** = p ≤ 0.001; ** = p ≤ 0.01; * = p ≤ 0.05
Multilevel Model - Restricted Maximum Likelihood

In column 2, Wave 2 is the omitted category
range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the greatest support for either individual economic responsibility and/or a democratic political system. Relatively higher positions on these items therefore correspond to more capitalist/democratic positions, whereas lower scores represent more leftist/authoritarian stances.

Looking first at Table 3.1, the initial point to note is the striking effect of being a post-communist on economic preferences. The negative, large and significant coefficient on the Post-Communist dummy in column 1, for instance, illustrates that citizens from the former socialist countries are, in general, distinctly leftist in their economic attitudes. In fact, they are found to be 11-points less in favor of individual economic responsibility than their Western European counterparts, advocating instead for a greater role of the state. This effect is not only significant, but is among the strongest of those reported in the multilevel analysis, thereby providing initial support of Hypothesis 1.

What is more, it would seem that this post-communist attitudinal distinction has largely persisted over time. As illustrated in column 2, rather than gradually diminishing through some process of (re-)learning or adjustment, it appears that post-communists’ anti-individualistic tendencies actually became more pronounced during the first decade of transition, only showing signs of decline in the most recent EVS/WVS wave. To see this, it is important to note that, in this second column, the Post-Communist dummy itself illustrates the effect of being a post-communist citizen on economic preferences in Wave 1. In 1990, thus, post-communists were found to be 18-points less individualistic than their Western European counterparts. While the Wave dummies then capture general attitudinal changes in each subsequent wave (relative to Wave 1), the interaction terms indicate the difference in these shifts between post-communist and non-post-communist
Consequently, considering first the negative, significant coefficients on the Wave dummies, what is indicated by column 2 is that Europeans have, on the whole, exhibited lower support for individual economic responsibility over each wave (compared to 1990). However, this general trend did not result in a narrowing of the attitudinal gap between post-communist and non-post-communist citizens. Rather, as revealed by the negative, significant coefficients for the first two interaction terms, post-communist individuals actually moved even further in this leftist direction during this time (albeit by only a few percentage points). Between 1990 and 2000, thus, the gulf between post-communist and non-post-communist Europeans not only remained stable, but even widened slightly, with post-communists preferring increasingly more governmental intervention than their Western peers. Only in the 2005 EVS/WVS interviews does this interaction term become positive, suggesting that the initial attitudinal chasm between transition and non-transition citizens might finally have shown signs of convergence.\(^\text{15}\)

In the case of economic preferences, thus, the results suggest that post-communist attitudinal adjustment has neither been automatic, nor has it occurred linearly. Rather, as expected by Hypothesis 2, former socialists remain distinguishably leftist in their basic beliefs, even fifteen years after the fall.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{15}\) As a robustness check, the multilevel models in column 1 were run separately on subsets of data from each survey wave (without the Wave dummies and Post-Communist interactions). Looking at the Post-Communist coefficient in each wave yields a similar pattern of results: while in Wave 1, post-communist citizens were found to be approximately 19.5-points less individualistic, this difference increases to 22-points in Wave 2, before beginning to decrease, reaching 13-points by Wave 4.

\(^{16}\) In fact, based on these results, it would seem that most of the attitudinal convergence that has occurred between East and West Europeans has actually originated from the latter. That is, rather than post-communists gradually coming to adopt individualistic, pro-market positions, it is Western Europeans that have become notably more leftist over time, particularly in the most recent EVS/WVS wave. Although this finding is intriguing – and does, in fact, receive
With regard to age, the other main variable of interest for socialization theories, the initial results in Table 3.1 reveal a weakly negative relationship overall, suggesting that individuals tend to prefer less individual responsibility as they get older. Although this is the relationship that attitude persistence theories would expect for the post-communist region, the models in Table 3.1 do not actively probe the regional impact of age and so cannot directly speak to Hypothesis 3. This topic is instead explored extensively in the following subsection.

Turning to the rationalist explanations, it would seem that the only variable found to rival the effect of being a post-communist citizen is income. Specifically, income is found to have a large, robust and positive relationship with support for individual economic responsibility, implying that the “winners” within a society do tend to advocate relatively more free-market positions (of approximately 11-points) than the “losers.” Although the existence and magnitude of this effect thereby provides partial support for performance-based theories (Hypothesis 6), it is worth noting that the generally leftist tendencies of post-communist citizens remain strong even when differences in income are accounted for. Moreover, notwithstanding the problems inherent in comparing and interpreting coefficients, the fact that a shift from the lowest income quintile within a country to the very top might – despite its remarkable feat – be insufficient to negate the influence of being a post-communist citizen, is also somewhat telling.

Regarding the remaining individual-level variables, all are comparable across columns 1 and 2, and all yield modest results, compatible with the rationalist perspective.

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additional support from later sections of this dissertation – it is beyond the scope of this study and so is left for future work to address.
For instance, while females and the unemployed are predictably found to be around 3-points less supportive of individual economic responsibility (and more in favor of an active state), having a higher level of education or political interest is enough to counterbalance these influences. Only religiosity and urbanicity do not demonstrate strong or significant relationships with economic preferences.

Among the country-level variables, significant results are also obtained, though the findings here are slightly less consistent. Specifically, while in both columns, it is found that nations with higher rates of unemployment and inflation foster relatively greater interventionist sentiments, it is only with the inclusion of the Wave controls and Post-Communist interactions (in column 2) that states with lower government spending and higher economic growth are also shown to significantly do so. Interestingly, the effects of regime characteristics and income inequality are found to change direction with the inclusion of these supplementary variables: under the basic specification, income inequality and political liberality are associated with lower support for individual responsibility (and higher support for an active state). However, once Wave-specific effects and Post-Communist interactions are accounted for, it is more autocratic, economically homogenous nations that are found to adopt relatively more leftist positions.

Table 3.2 presents analogous results for attitudes about political democracy, though only for the 1995 to 2005 time period. As with economic preferences, what is again remarkable in these multilevel models is the strong, enduring authoritarian predispositions of post-communist citizens. As before, individuals from the former socialist countries are found to be, on the whole, 7-points less in favor of a democratic
political system than Western Europeans (as illustrated by the Post-Communist dummy in column 1). Furthermore, this attitudinal gap is again found to remain stable over time. This is illustrated by the non-significant interactions between the Wave and Post-Communist dummies in column 2. Specifically, while the positive, significant Wave dummies suggest that Europeans did, in general, exhibit relatively more support for democracy in 2000 and in 2005 than during 1995, the small and non-significant interaction effects imply that the initial 8-point deficit between post-communists and non-post-communists remained stable during this time. In other words, post-communist convergence in basic political preferences also did not occur, providing further evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.\(^{17}\)

The only variable from the socialization accounts that does not appear to be critical for attitudes about democracy is age (which fails to reach conventional levels of significance). As discussed previously, however, the results in Table 3.2 do not address the nuanced importance of age across the two regions (as per Hypothesis 3). Age is, in fact, found to be notably telling for the development of both economic and political preferences, much as expected by attitude persistence theories. This issue is dealt with separately in the following subsection.

Of course, the existence of a steady post-communist effect is not to say that transition citizens have been completely unresponsive to contemporary circumstances. On the contrary, as before, the remaining individual- and country-level variables in Table 3.2 are found to yield significant effects, consistent with rationalist accounts and

\(^{17}\) Again, when the analysis is split by wave, the results are virtually equivalent. Specifically, the coefficient on the Post-Communist dummy remains stable, taking the values of -6 in Waves 2 and 3, and -5 in Wave 4, thereby verifying that differences between post-communists and non-post-communists did not notably fade during this decade.
Hypothesis 6 (though somewhat more marginal in size). The estimates are, in fact, almost equivalent in columns 1 and 2. In both columns, income is again found to be meaningful for stated preferences, now associated with more pro-democracy positions. This time, however, it is political interest that most closely rivals the effect of being a post-communist citizen, with a shift from the lowest to highest degree of interest translating into an 8-point increase in democratic support. Similarly, while females and the unemployed are again found to advocate slightly more authoritarian beliefs, higher levels of education, religiosity and urbanicity are shown to offset these effects.

Of the country-level variables, the only change in results between columns 1 and 2 concerns the effect of regime characteristics, which simply gains significance with the addition of extra controls, showing that higher degrees of autocracy tend to foster greater preferences for democracy. Otherwise, all macro variables, except state spending, are found to have negative relationships with this attitude. Specifically, while higher rates of government spending are associated with stronger support for a democratic system, increases in unemployment, inequality and growth are found to encourage more authoritarian leanings (the latter of which would is particularly surprising from a rationalist perspective).

In terms of the general importance of country-level factors for both economic and political attitudes, a useful statistic to review is the intra-class correlation coefficient (presented at the bottom of Tables 3.1 and 3.2). This figure effectively describes the within-cluster correlation, which can be used to discern the proportion of variance attributable to group-level characteristics. Regarding the preferences analyzed here, the reported ICCs suggest that only 9-10% of the variation in economic and political beliefs
is driven by some country-specific influence(s) or trait(s). The remaining variation is instead found to be rooted in individual-level factors and, as has been shown here, by previous experiences with communism. Differences in national-level performance then may only play a relatively small part in the formation of economic and political preferences.

Overall, the results from the first stage of empirical analysis provide noteworthy evidence in support of socialization theories, and somewhat weaker confirmation of rationalist accounts. Quite simply, in terms of preferences for both individual economic responsibility and for a democratic political system, being a citizen of a former socialist country is found to exert a powerful, unrelenting influence on stated attitudes. Even after accounting for differences in individual- and national-level performance, post-communists have proven to be systematically distinguishable from their non-post-communist counterparts, exhibiting relatively more leftist, authoritarian predispositions, and unable to fully converge to positions prevalent in the West.

(B) Age in the Two Regions

In order to more carefully probe the influence of growing up under a socialist regime on economic and political preferences, the initial analysis was extended to examine whether length of exposure to communism has predictably shaped individuals’ attitudes. This was done by studying the relationship of age with stated preferences in post-communist vs. non-post-communist countries, with the belief that time spent living under a dissimilar regime may have led to a contrasting age distribution of preferences in the two regions (i.e., Hypothesis 3, as per Chapter II). For this stage of analysis, thus, an interaction term
between Age and the Post-Communist dummy was added to the more comprehensive multilevel models used to generate the second columns of Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The key results are illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, which present the region-specific, marginal association of age with preferences for individual economic responsibility and for a democratic political system, respectively, holding all other variables constant.

The results of this section are again noteworthy in their correspondence with socialization theories. Specifically, in the case of both economic and political attitudes,
the relationship of age is found to be exactly opposite among post-communist vs. non-post-communist individuals; and, for both beliefs, it is shown to be associated with relatively more socialist positions for transition citizens.

Starting with basic economic preferences, the results in Figure 3.1 corroborate previous studies of economic attitudes, showing that, in the West, individuals tend to be more supportive of individual responsibility (and less in favor of state intervention) with age (e.g., Glenn 1974, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, but Alwin 1993). Within the post-communist region, however, what is instead revealed is that older individuals exhibit
increasingly higher support for government responsibility. The coefficient on the region-age interaction term (-0.28***) is, in fact, found to be more than twice the size of the coefficient on age itself (0.11***), implying that older post-communists’ cumulative experience with socialism is more than sufficient to counteract any general conservatizing influence of age (see Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln 2007: 1515 for a similar finding and interpretation).

The pattern of results is virtually identical for attitudes toward a democratic political system (Figure 3.2). Here, although the general relationship of age is weaker than for economic attitudes (0.06***), the coefficient on the post-communist interaction is again opposite in sign and strong enough to compensate for the overall democratizing influence of growing old (-0.11***). While age appears to be associated with slightly more pro-democratic tendencies in Western Europe, thus, it is instead related to noticeably more authoritarian preferences in the Eastern bloc. Consequently, the attitudinal gap between post-communist and non-post-communist citizens is found to be larger and more consequential for older members of society.

The implications of these findings for the issue of post-communist adaptation are therefore manifold. To begin with, the results presented here add an additional layer of support for attitude persistence accounts, which suggest that values acquired early in life (and which should be shaped by the nature of primacy regime experiences), are likely to only strengthen over time (Hypothesis 3). In addition to this, they also raise questions about the feasibility of rational responsiveness. To be sure, although the inclusion of the Post-Communist x Age interaction term does not substantively change the effects of the remaining individual- and country-level performance variables (which are not reported
here for the sake of brevity), the fact that such contrasting, age-related patterns remain, even after controlling for compositional differences in prosperity, is somewhat unexpected from a rationalist perspective.

With regards to convergence, these findings would also suggest that post-communist adjustment toward Western levels may entail a slower, more challenging and asymmetric process than rationalist theories expect. Specifically, being a post-communist seems to be associated with the espousal of distinctly socialist beliefs, and the accrual of communist experience appears to be related to comparatively more leftist and/or authoritarian positions. This not only means that attitudinal convergence may, on the whole, prove difficult, but also that older post-communists may very well find such changes relatively more demanding. Quite simply, for younger post-communists, who hold relatively less extreme and entrenched positions, adaptation to Western standards should not represent such a challenging feat. For the elderly, however, whose deep-seated preferences are increasingly far from their non-post-communist peers, such replacement is likely to prove far more taxing. Even if convergence does eventually occur, thus, it is not clear that it will do so for all members of post-communist society. To explore this issue further, the following subsection investigates adaptation within the pool of Europeans.

(C) Cohort Differences

As a final stage of analysis, respondents from all four waves of the EVS/WVS were split into one of five birth cohorts, partitioned by fifteen years (Born after 1975, Born 1961-1975, Born 1946-1960, Born 1931-1945 and those Born 1930 or earlier), and the
trajectory of attitudes across these groups was examined.

First, to explore general cohort patterns in economic and political preferences, multilevel models including all the individual- and country-level variables reported in the first column of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 were again examined, but this time also incorporating the five Birth Cohort dummies (instead of age) and their interaction with the Post-Communist dummy. The key results are presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, which plot the difference in stated attitudes between a post-communist and a non-post-communist from the same birth cohort (holding all other variables constant). In each of these illustrations, the baseline level corresponds to the Western European position for the attitude in question; the heights of the bars then can be interpreted as the deviations from this Western level owing to the fact the respondent is a post-communist citizen. Negative differences therefore imply that a post-communist of a certain cohort is less in favor of the relevant survey item than a non-post-communist of the same cohort, all else equal (and vice versa for positive differences). 95% confidence intervals are also marked, so as to elucidate the significance of any post-communist distinctions.

Consider first Figure 3.3, which depicts the degree of support for individual *economic* responsibility among a post-communist from a specific birth cohort, compared to a non-post-communist from the same cohort. The first thing to note from these results is that post-communists of all birth cohorts tend to be less individualistic (and more favorable toward an active state) than their Western European counterparts. This is demonstrated by the prevalence of negative difference-bars across the board, thereby illustrating the general post-communist gap in free-market tendencies (as per *Hypothesis 1*).
Figure 3.3: Economic Attitudinal Differences Between Post-Communist and Non-Post-Communist Individuals From the Same Cohort (Pooled Dataset)

Figure indicates the expected difference in attitudes between a Post-Communist and a Non-Post-Communist individual from the same birth cohort (holding all other variables constant). Included as controls are all the individual- and country-level variables from the previous multilevel analyses, except age.
Figure 3.4: Political Attitudinal Differences Between Post-Communist and Non-Post-Communist Individuals From the Same Cohort (Pooled Dataset)

Figure indicates the expected difference in attitudes between a Post-Communist and a Non-Post-Communist individual from the same birth cohort (holding all other variables constant). Included as controls are all the individual- and country-level variables from the previous multilevel analyses, except age.
What is even more apparent, however, is the finding that older post-communists are progressively more leftist in their economic predispositions than the young (see Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007 for similar findings). In fact, of all the birth cohorts analyzed, only members of the youngest cohort (those born after 1975) are statistically indistinguishable from their non-post-communist peers (as captured by the 95% confidence interval around their expected attitudinal difference, which overlaps zero in this case). As discussed in Chapter II, this birth cohort is comprised of individuals that were under the age of 15 when communism collapsed and who, therefore, should have largely formed their values during post-communist times. As expected by Hypothesis 4, thus, it seems as though the previous era of socialism did not leave a notable mark on the preferences of these post-communist youths. However, for those beyond the age of 15 at the time of regime change, additional exposure to communism appears to have only swayed preferences further and more firmly away from Western European norms (as per Hypothesis 5).

The results are almost identical for attitudes toward political democracy, as shown in Figure 3.4. Here, all the difference-bars again fall in the negative direction, implying that post-communists tend to, on the whole, exhibit lower support for a democratic system than their non-post-communist counterparts (in line with Hypothesis 1). As before, such attitudinal differences grow steadily across the cohort groups, such that older post-communists are increasingly authoritarian in their political beliefs compared to younger ones (as per Hypothesis 5). Once again, only the youngest of these cohorts – those born after 1975 – adopt positions matching those of their non-post-communist peers (in accordance with Hypothesis 4). Members of all other birth cohorts, on the other hand,
continue to be differentiated by their communist past. As late as 2005 then, even after multiple instances of competitive elections, post-communist citizens still appear to be lacking in pro-democratic predilections, at least when compared to their counterparts living in the long-established, liberal nations of Western Europe.

Having considered the general patterns across birth cohorts, the next step is to examine attitudinal convergence over time. In order to do so, Figure 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate these cohort differences in beliefs throughout the time period covered. Specifically, for this analysis, two-way interactions between the Birth Cohort and Wave dummies were included in the multilevel models described above, as well as a three-way interaction between these two variables and the Post-Communist dummy. In this way, it is possible to compare cohort-specific distinctions between post-communists and non-post-communists from wave to wave.18

The results in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 begin by confirming the longevity of the attitudinal gaps discussed above. Specifically, these graphs not only show that post-communists have tended to exhibit relatively anti-individualistic and/or anti-democratic preferences throughout the entire period of transition (thereby supporting Hypothesis 2), but also that older post-communists have proven to be progressively more leftist and/or authoritarian than the young (following Hypothesis 5).

What is also made clear from these figures, however, is that there has not been an obvious, linear path of convergence over time. In the case of economic attitudes (Figure 3.5), the findings instead suggest that attitudinal differences between post-communists

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18 As almost no respondents from the youngest cohort (Born after 1975) were interviewed in Wave 1 of the EVS/WVS, members of this group were integrated with the next cohort (Born after 1961-1975) for this part of the analysis. The estimated attitudinal difference graphed for the two cohorts in Wave 1 of Figure 3.5 is therefore identical. Results remain unchanged if the youngest cohort is omitted from the analysis.
Figure 3.5: Economic Attitudinal Differences Between Post-Communist and Non-Post-Communist Individuals From the Same Cohort (Over Time)

Note: In Wave 1, respondents from the youngest two cohorts are combined, due to absence of individuals Born after 1975

Figure indicates the expected difference in attitudes between a Post-Communist and a Non-Post-Communist individual from the same birth cohort (holding all other variables constant). Included as controls are all the individual- and country-level variables from the previous multilevel analyses, except age.

86
Figure 3.6: Political Attitudinal Differences Between Post-Communist and Non-Post-Communist Individuals From the Same Cohort (Over Time)

Figure indicates the expected difference in attitudes between a Post-Communist and a Non-Post-Communist individual from the same birth cohort (holding all other variables constant). Included as controls are all the individual- and country-level variables from the previous multilevel analyses, except age.
and non-post-communists have been subject to up-and-down fluctuations over the years (though the wide 95% confidence intervals make it difficult to make precise statements about such changes). In particular, for all cohorts except the youngest, the evidence hints at an increase in anti-individualistic (or pro-interventionist) distinctions from 1990 to 1995, before the onset of a gradual diminution through 2005. For the youngest cohort, in contrast, the (relatively smaller) anti-capitalist tendencies seem to remain stable for the first decade or so, before also showing a slight increase and subsequent reversal, finally becoming insignificant in 2005.

In terms of convergence toward the West then, complete adaptation in post-communists’ economic preferences seems to have occurred only fifteen years after the collapse, and only for the very youngest birth cohort (Born After 1975). Again, this is shown by the 95% confidence interval around the expected attitudinal difference for this group, which overlaps zero in 2005. Members of older cohorts, on the other hand, are found to have espoused significantly more pro-government tendencies, long into their new regimes.

Of course, the fact that even members of the youngest cohort (Born After 1975) are found to prefer significantly more state intervention in the earlier survey waves is somewhat surprising from a socialization perspective. To reiterate, these individuals should only have spent their childhood or early adolescence under communism and so are not expected to have been lastingly affected by the socialist past (as per Hypothesis 4). Although a full investigation of this matter is beyond the scope of this section and data, there are, in fact, a number of plausible reasons why this may be the case. Such speculations include the arbitrarily defined cut-point of 15-years for attitude formation
(which could in fact occur earlier); the transmission of anti-free market preferences through parental socialization (as explored further in Chapter IV of the dissertation, see Beck and Jennings 1991, Campbell et al. 1960, Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981, Krok and Selb 2009); or even just the influence of being raised in a generally more leftist environment (which the transition region has herein been found to be).

Nevertheless, at least with regard to preferences for a democratic political system (Figure 3.6), this youngest post-communist cohort does, in fact, conform to Hypothesis 4, proving to be statistically indistinguishable from its Western equivalent, throughout the entire transition period. Moreover, as before, this cohort is the only one found to match up to Western standards. Post-communists from all other birth cohorts are instead shown to have displayed distinct, anti-democratic preferences over time. While the middle three cohorts have retained relatively stable attitudinal differences between 1995 and 2005, trends for the oldest group of post-communists have been somewhat more similar to those for economic preferences, hinting at an initial increase in authoritarian leanings (1995 to 2000), with a subsequent shift toward Western levels (in 2000 to 2005).

Overall then, the results of this section corroborate the presence of significant and relatively stable attitudinal gaps between post-communist and non-post-communist citizens. Even fifteen years after regime change, individuals who grew up under a socialist regime seem to have been unable to fully catch up to Western European standards. Instead, these individuals, and particularly older post-communists, have continued to hold on to the leftist and authoritarian values of their past. Although they have demonstrated some rational responsiveness to economic and political outputs (as per Hypothesis 6), it appears that early (“primacy”) experiences and communist socialization
have played a fundamentally important role, fostering the presence of persistent socialist tendencies, even decades on.

With regards to convergence, thus, it seems clear that post-communist attitudinal adjustment has neither been ineluctable, nor symmetrical. In fact, based on the dynamics reported here, it is difficult to predict if and when convergence in basic preferences will occur. If attitudinal re-learning is assumed to continue in a more linear fashion and to gain apace, it may take a few decades. If not, it may very well require the complete replacement of the communist generation.

EXTENSIONS

(D) Other Categories Of Attitudes

In addition to influencing individuals’ basic economic and political predispositions, it is reasonable to presume that growing up under a socialist system may have also shaped other types of societal values or norms. More specifically, if it is the case that post-communists are distinct in their tendencies due to dissimilarities between the previous, communist credo (under which they were socialized) and contemporary, Western tenets, similar attitudinal differences should be discovered for any belief categories subject to such dissonance. As before, these incongruences might stem from indoctrination of other aspects of the communist ideology (e.g., flattening of social cleavages), or even from prior experience with practices embedded for regime maintenance (e.g., suppression of individual freedoms or political rights). In contrast, values not unique to the previous regime (or which were not strongly emphasized under it) should instead be immune to such post-communist distinctions. Exploring which additional attitudes have been
susceptible to the effects discussed in this section is therefore useful, both for
generalizability purposes, and also as a cursory probe into the successes of communist
inculcation.

Fortunately, the EVS/WVS datasets include multiple items tapping into various
dimensions of opinions and beliefs. As previously mentioned, the three-stage analysis
presented in the last section was undertaken on 64 ancillary survey questions. These
alternative dependent variables – while not representing a random or exhaustive list –
were chosen on the basis of being core, continuous items, that have been replicated over
time in a sufficient number of post-communist and non-post-communist countries. Before
the quantitative analysis was undertaken, these 64 variables were classified into one of 8
(self-determined) categories, based on the general topic under question. The first two of
these categories are basic Economic and Political attitudes, as already discussed in this
section. The remaining six are defined as: Satisfaction (personal and/or contextual),
Efficacy, Confidence in Institutions, Subjective Political Involvement, Religiosity, and
Morals (both in terms of (a) Compliance with Rules and (b) Tolerance). Due to space
constraints, it is not possible to report the full multilevel results from the supplemental
investigations. Instead, Table 3.3 provides a summary account of these Extensions, listing
all the attitudinal categories, an example survey question from each, and a brief overview
of the general patterns uncovered for every dimension.

A number of key findings are worth mentioning. To begin with, it is reassuring to
note that the results obtained in the previous section are not only applicable to economic
and political preferences. Rather, analogous patterns are found for several other attitudes,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudinal Category</th>
<th>Exemplar Question</th>
<th>General Post-Communist Effect?</th>
<th>Regional Effect of Age?</th>
<th>Birth Cohort Effects?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Economic</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
<td>See prior analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3. Satisfaction*     | “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” (1-10 scale) | • General: Yes (negative).                                     | • Yes. Same direction (negative) but significantly stronger in PC region. | • General: Increasing dissatisfaction across PC cohort groups. All cohorts distinguishable from NPC counterparts.  
|                      |                                                                                  | • Over time: Yes, increases than stays the same.              |                                                          | • Over time: Differences are stable. No cohorts manage to converge. In fact, gap increases for oldest three cohorts. |
| 4. Efficacy*         | “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” (1-10 scale) | • General: Yes (negative).                                     | • Yes. Same direction (negative) but significantly stronger in PC region. | • General: Increasing lack of efficacy across PC cohorts. All cohorts distinguishable from NPC counterparts.  
|                      |                                                                                  | • Over time: Yes, stable.                                     |                                                          | • Over time: In Wave 1, all cohorts exhibit similar gap in efficacy. Youngest cohort then converges to Western levels (by 2000). Middle cohort differences remain stable. Efficacy deficit of oldest cohort increases over time. Thus, emerging cohort inequalities over time. |
| 5. Confidence in Institutions* | “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?” [Parliament] (1-4 scale) | • General: Yes (negative).                                     | • No. Slight upward trend in both regions. PC simply lower across all ages. | • General: Very slightly decreasing confidence across PC cohort groups. All cohort distinguishable from NPC counterparts.  
|                      |                                                                                  | • Over time: Emerging PC distinctions. Insignificant in 1990, increasing thereafter. |                                                          | • Over time: Emerging confidence gap for all cohorts. First two Waves, differences are insignificant for all groups; second two Waves, differences become significantly negative for all cohorts. |
| 6. Subjective Political Involvement* | “How interested would you say you are in politics? Very, somewhat, not very, or not at all?” (1-4 Scale) | • General: No.                                               | • No. Slight upward trend in both regions and at similar levels across all ages. | • General: No. All cohorts distinguishable from NPC counterparts.  
|                      |                                                                                  | • Over time: No.                                             |                                                          | • Over time: No. Only oldest cohort becomes significantly less interested in Wave 4. |
| 7. Religiosity*      | “How important is [religion] in your life? Very, somewhat, not very, or not at all?” (1-4 Scale) | • General: No.                                               | • Yes. Same direction (positive) in both regions but less steep in PC region. Lines plotting marginal effect of age overlap. | • General: No effects. All cohorts indistinguishable from NPC counterparts.  
|                      |                                                                                  | • Over time: Emerging. Insignificant in 1990, negative and significant thereafter. |                                                          | • Over time: No effects. Youngest two cohorts marginally more religious than NPC counterparts in Wave 1; subsequently converge in full. All other cohorts indistinguishable from NPC peers in all Waves. |
| 8. Morals            |                                                                                  |                                                               |                                                          |                                                          |
| (a) Compliance with Rules | “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between … [Avoiding a fare on public transport]” (1-10 scale) | • General: No.                                               | • Somewhat. Same direction (positive) in both regions but slightly less steep in PC region. | • General: Maybe. Decreasing compliance across PC cohorts, only oldest group is distinguishable from NPC counterparts.  
|                      |                                                                                  | • Over time: Sign of a small, negative PC effect emerging in Waves 1 and 4. |                                                          | • Over time: Emerging differences among oldest PC cohorts. In Wave 1, all cohorts indistinguishable from NPC; in subsequent Waves, older cohorts become increasingly less compliant. |
| (b) Tolerance*       | “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between … [Homosexuality]” (1-10 scale) | • General: Yes (negative).                                    | • Yes. Same direction (positive), but less steep in PC. | • General: Tolerance is decreasingly negative across cohorts. All cohorts distinguishable from NPC counterparts.  
|                      |                                                                                  | • Over time: Yes, stable over time.                           |                                                          | • Over time: Differences remain steady across all cohorts. Some equalization, i.e., emerging cohort equalities over time. |

For some dependent variables, a number of additional, relevant controls were included/excluded, as follows:

* Additional controls include dummies for married, widowed and divorced/separated individuals.

* Additional controls include age-squared, self-reported state of health, and dummies for married, widowed and divorced/separated individuals. Post-Communist Age-squared interaction was found to be insignificant and was therefore excluded.

* Additional control is measure of interpersonal trust.

* Political interest was removed as a predictor.

* Additional controls include dummies for married, widowed and divorced/separated individuals. Religiosity was removed as a predictor.
including Satisfaction, Efficacy, and (to a lesser degree) Institutional Confidence and Tolerance.

First of these is the uncovering of a strong, significant and stable satisfaction deficit among post-communist citizens. This finding not only corroborates previous studies on subjective wellbeing in the region (e.g., Easterlin 2009, Inglehart et al. 2008, Lelkes 2006, Saris 2001, Veenhoven 2001, Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009, Sanfey and Teksoz 2007), but also fits neatly with the issue of adaptation addressed here. Specifically, a main conclusion of the previous analysis was that post-communist citizens possess deep-seated socialist predispositions, which they have been unable to fully abandon or replace. If this is the case, it is perhaps only to be expected that life under a contrasting (even incompatible) governing arrangement will have proven disappointing for them. In this way, thus, the uncovering of a perennial satisfaction deficit, which is shown to (i) increase with age, (ii) expand across cohorts, (iii) grow over time, and (iv) be directed at both personal and national circumstances, despite improvements in performance, can be interpreted as additional evidence in support of socialization accounts. By the same token, the revelation that, over time, post-communists have also become disproportionately under-confident in new institutions, and increasingly non-compliant with their rules, is similarly within reason.

Regarding the issue of efficacy, the findings presented in Table 3.3 are almost identical to the patterns documented in the previous section (as well as those presented in the following study), illustrating a shortage of perceived freedom and control among

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19 While the delayed onset of this skepticism and its prevalence across all cohorts is somewhat more intriguing, it is supported by numerous studies (e.g., Lovell 2001, Rose-Ackerman 2001, Howard 2003, Markova et al. 2004, Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001).
post-communists. Although a more thorough investigation of post-communist efficacy (or perceived “locus of control”) constitutes Chapter IV of this dissertation, the intuition is very much the same and can be briefly outlined here. Quite simply, the socialist regimes of the pre-transition era were characterized by a combination of single party rule, lack of freedom to make life choices (e.g., travel, consumption), limited political competition and/or influence, and a reliance on the state for fundamental necessities (Kornai 1992). Consequently, just as theories of socialization and attitude persistence were, in the last section, said to predict relatively anti-capitalist and anti-democratic tendencies, so too would they anticipate a shortage of efficacy among post-communists. That older post-communists (who spent longer under the previous forbidding system) are found to perceive progressively less freedom and internal control thereby adds further credence to the previous results.

Interestingly, for a number of belief categories examined, there appear to be no significant or meaningful differences between the stated positions of post-communist and non-post-communist individuals. These include attitudes pertaining to Subjective Political Involvement and Religiosity. Given communism’s efforts to limit political expression and suppress social or religious cleavages, the absence of effects for these attitudes may, at a first glance, seem counterintuitive. In truth, however, there are a number of reasons to anticipate these (non-)findings.

In the case of Subjective Political Involvement, for instance, although socialism restricted the political choices and information available to individuals, citizens were nonetheless frequently obligated to be involved in the political process, at least symbolically. Whether due to mandatory voting schemes and compulsory membership in
Party organizations (DiFrancesco and Gitelman 1996, Bahry and Silver 1990, Letki 2004, Linz and Stepan 1996) – or simply because of the all-encompassing, intrusive nature of the state – individuals were, in many ways, unable to abstain from or ignore the political sphere. Accordingly, it is not clear that post-communists should be any less attentive to political developments than their peers residing in the free, non-invasive democracies of the West. This point is even more compelling in light of the monumental, politicizing experience of a regime change that post-communists have also had to live through.

As for Religiosity, although half a century of communism could, a priori, be expected to have largely eradicated religious practices, most of the countries of the former Eastern bloc do, in fact, have well-established religious roots that far predate the twentieth century (Dvornik 1959, Payton 2001). To the extent that some of these nations were able to maintain their theological beliefs through hundreds of years of Ottoman rule, so too then is it reasonable for them to have withstood several decades of Soviet control. In fact, given the historic, cross-country variations in religious practices across Europe (both before and during communism), a far more plausible expectation would be for fluctuations in religiosity to depend primarily on national, rather than regional, characteristics. Interestingly, this conjecture is found to receive initial support from the multilevel analyses in this paper, which attribute almost 20% of the variation in religiosity to country-level factors (among the highest of all ICCs obtained).

Notwithstanding the case of religion, the findings reported in Table 3.3 do nevertheless suggest that communism’s suppression of social cleavages has, in other ways, manifested itself in citizens’ predispositions. With regard to acceptability of various social groups and behaviors, for instance, post-communists are found to be
significantly less tolerant than their non-post-communist peers. Not only is this lack of tolerance substantial in magnitude (with the difference reaching up to 40-points for some items), but it is also shown to steadily endure throughout transition.

Overall, thus, in the same way that post-communists have remained relatively leftist and authoritarian in terms of their basic economic and political leanings, so too have they proven distinct in their general social beliefs. Although these citizens are now able to enjoy higher levels of civil liberties, life opportunities and standards of living, the evaluations, norms and values they proclaim continue to be distinguished by their socialist upbringing.

**SUMMARY & CONCLUSION**

Over the course of two decades, the countries of the former Eastern bloc have undergone a radical macro-level transformation, gradually exchanging their socialist economic and political institutions of the Soviet era with the Western ideals of democracy and the free market. The aim of the current study was to examine the corresponding process of adjustment at the micro-level. Specifically, in terms of stated attitudes – particularly those concerning contrasting economic and political arrangements – this chapter sought to investigate whether post-communist individuals have similarly managed to relinquish the principles upheld by their previous systems to instead embrace the values of their new regimes.

As expected by socialization and persistence theories of attitude formation, the main results of this study suggest that such a parallel shift in post-communist predispositions has proven far more problematic. Specifically, although transition citizens
are found to partially update their beliefs in response to altering post-communist realities, a number of findings point to a long-standing influence of the communist past, which has impeded the potential for subsequent adjustment. Not only are post-communists found to espouse significantly more socialist positions than their Western peers, but these distinctions are shown to persist for decades into transition, with limited signs of convergence over time.

What is more, age is found to exert a directly opposite influence in the two areas, as would be expected if these predilections are due to the contrasting socialization (or “primacy”) experiences of post-communist and non-post-communist individuals. While growing old is found to be associated with the adoption of more individualistic and democratic attitudes in the West, older post-communists tend to instead become progressively anti-capitalist and authoritarian with age. Increasing exposure to an alternative system, thus, has translated into increasingly dissimilar attitudes between citizens.

Partly because of this asymmetry in attitudinal biases, the post-communist adaptation process appears to be a somewhat non-uniform and unbalanced endeavor. As revealed by birth cohort analyses, assimilation in basic beliefs poses a far greater challenge for older transition citizens than it does for the youth. In fact, whenever congruence between the East and West has been found to occur, it has usually only involved the youngest group of relatively inexperienced post-communists. For citizens that spent longer than their childhood years under the previous regime, on the other hand, the abandonment of socialist habits has been far less automatic.
Overall, thus, the major implication of this study is that basic attitudes persist, even when institutions change and social conditions improve. This is shown to be the case not only for fundamental economic and political preferences, but also for more general social values and cultural norms. In fact, based on the conclusions and dynamics reported here, it is impossible to tell when Western convergence in post-communist attitudes will finally occur, so as to accompany the macro-level changes that have taken place. Though it is clear that improvements in performance and transition experiences may gradually help attenuate these struggles, in the end, such adaptation may only arise by means of generational replacement rather than through attitudinal adjustment.

In terms of the existing literature then, this chapter most closely corroborates and extends the work of the “legacies” approach, which similarly emphasizes the long-term importance of communism for the region. Unlike previous studies, however, it addresses the issue of adaptation more comprehensively, by both utilizing a rich mix of individual- and national-level data (spanning as many years, nations and attitudes as possible), and by comparing the development of post-communist preferences to some meaningful reference group. In doing so, it is able to provide more concrete and diverse evidence in support of socialization and “legacies” accounts, as well to address topics that have hitherto been overlooked, such as the asymmetric process of convergence across cohorts, or the Western resemblance of the post-communist youth.

Similarly, the research contributes to “rationalist” studies of public opinion by not only confirming the importance of certain performance-based variables, but by also revealing that post-communists nevertheless remain distinctly socialist in their preferences, even if their positions do predictably respond to changing personal and/or
national circumstances over time.

That said, the EVS/WVS dataset employed here does not allow for certain analyses, such as a more direct exploration of attitude change for a given respondent over time. Such an investigation would require the examination of panel data, measuring the stated preferences of the same individuals over the course of many years. Recognizing this drawback, the empirical examinations in Chapter IV of this dissertation shift to the use of longitudinal data from the German Socioeconomic Panel Study. In doing so, they not only corroborate the findings presented here, but also allow for an even deeper exploration of attitudinal adaptation, enabling discussion of such matters as within-person attitude stability, migration, and the decomposition of attitude change over time (see next chapter). They also provide an opportunity to probe some more specific mechanisms at work, such as the intergenerational transmission of values, which may thereby help shed light on the intriguing youth-cohort results from this study.

Other potential limitations of the research include, of course, the more common problems inherent in analyzing cross-national survey data, such as the possibility that questions may have alternative meanings in different countries, that survey answers may not reflect what individuals truly believe, or that responses are likely to be influenced by the interplay between cultural norms and the way an item is phrased or who is asking it (Krosnick 1999, Canache et al. 2001). Again, the subsequent investigations in Chapter IV are designed to address at least some of these concerns. More specifically, by focusing on the development of attitudes within reunified Germany, the following study is able to hold fixed national-level factors that might otherwise impede the comparison of self-reported beliefs across different cultures and countries. This not only includes social
norms that might systematically distort survey responses, but also differences in contemporary economic and political institutions that might not be fully captured by the macro-level indicators used in this chapter. What is more (and as shall be discussed further in Chapter IV), by comparing former East and West Germans – two groups who were also largely indistinguishable prior to the sudden imposition of communist forces in the East – the following study is able to make even more cogent claims about the particular effects of “primacy” regime experiences for current attitudes (that is, by eliminating the chance that post-communists were already socialist-leaning before the bloc was formed).

Finally, as with all observational studies, the findings of this research project are nevertheless bound by data availability constraints. In this chapter, this has meant a further, unavoidable limitation – the absence of potentially relevant variables from the multilevel analyses, including consistent measures of corruption and subjective evaluations of contemporary circumstances. While there is little that can be done to tackle these issues with the current data, it is hoped that future work can offer resolutions, or at least replicate the findings presented here.

With this in mind, Part B of the dissertation continues the empirical investigations, utilizing new data, different variables and distinct techniques to further probe the broader issue of post-communist attitudinal adaptation.
CHAPTER IV

Empirical Part B: “(Re-)Unifying Beliefs, Regaining Control”

The empirical investigations in Chapter III’s “Old Kids on the Bloc” provided initial evidence in favor of social-psychological theories of attitude formation, illustrating the long-standing effects of early, “primacy” regime experiences (i.e., communist socialization) for the development of post-communist beliefs. To recapitulate, while the previous chapter certainly illustrated that individuals in transition countries partially respond to current circumstances when assembling their basic economic and political preferences (as expected by rationalist theories), the brunt of the three-stage analysis uncovered repeated indications of the difficulties of attitudinal adaptation. Not only were post-communists found to espouse significantly more socialist positions than their Western peers, ceteris paribus, but these distinctions were shown to persist for decades into transition, with limited signs of convergence over time. Moreover, age was also discovered to be distinctly related to attitudes in the two regions, which – as was later confirmed by birth cohort analyses – has resulted in a somewhat asymmetrical process of convergence across generations.

Credible as the findings of Chapter III are, however, they nevertheless come from a single set of compiled individual- and country-level data. These data, while providing extensive coverage of both time (fifteen years) and space (individuals from forty, diverse countries), are not without their limitations. In order to further validate the preceding results, thus, it is necessary to both replicate the analyses using alternative data sources,
and to also tackle the methodological drawbacks of the previous investigations. The empirical undertakings of the present chapter are designed and intended to do just so.

Specifically, in “(Re-)Unifying Beliefs, Regaining Control,” longitudinal survey data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is utilized to study the development of attitudes among former East and West Germans since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Focusing on beliefs concerning efficacy (or perceived “locus of control,” as shall be discussed in Data & Methods), the examinations begin with the same three-stage analysis presented in Chapter II and executed in Chapter III (see Results Sections A-C). After substantiating the findings of the previous study (using new data, other variables, and a distinct attitude), however, the examinations take a somewhat different course of action. Specifically, just as Chapter III extended beyond the main investigations to also look at the evolution of alternative sets of beliefs (owing to the large selection of relevant items in the WVS/EVS surveys), so too does this study undertake analytical Extensions that make full use of the specific setup and nature of the GSOEP data.

These Extensions begin, for instance, by taking advantage of the panel design of the GSOEP to both study attitude “stability” (Section D) and East-West convergence (Section E) for the same post-communist and non-post-communist individuals over time (analytical steps that could not be taken with the repeated cross-sectional sample used in Chapter III). In doing so, they test to see whether East Germans have, at least, been relatively more prone to altering their stated positions in the face of reforming circumstances, as well as shedding light on the decomposition of attitude change over time (namely, whether any observed convergences have, in fact, been a product of changing beliefs rather than just changing respondents).
Subsequently, in Section F, additional biographical information from the GSOEP database is drawn upon to separately examine the opinions of former East Germans who migrated to West Germany after reunification – comparing them to both fellow East Germans who remained in the East, as well as their (presently) West German neighbors. While it is not possible with the available data to directly speak to the question of whether individuals self-selectively migrate based on their attitudes (as there are no comparable measures of efficacy prior to, or at the time of, reunification, nor any items asking their reasons for moving), the exercise is nonetheless useful in both demonstrating the long-lasting effects of early socialization, as well as in highlighting the potential importance of social context and environment.

Finally, in Section G, the household sampling design of the GSOEP data is exploited to probe yet another potential obstacle to adaptation: the intergenerational transmission of values. More specifically, by examining whether efficacy tends to be similarly passed down from parents to children in the two regions, the closing Extensions highlight an even more durable curb on attitude change – one that could significantly slow down convergence in the long-term, and which may also help account for the intriguing youth-cohort results revealed in Chapter III.

Altogether then, by both reproducing and supplementing the previous analyses, Chapter IV of this dissertation is intended to further enhance the broader study of post-communist adaptation, the central aim of this research project. In order for this to be so, however, it is necessary to first ensure that the German subjects examined in this chapter represent an appropriate group for analysis. Before outlining the empirical results, thus,
the next subsection begins with a discussion of Germany as a case study for the project in hand.

GERMANY AS A CASE

A Brief History

The separation of Germany in 1945 marked the beginning of a period of exponential divergence between East and West. Prior to this time, the regions of Germany had been part of a single body and had showcased notable conformity since the second half of the nineteenth century (Bauernschuster & Rainer 2011). The foundation of the German Empire in 1871 had institutionally sealed this development, which continued on throughout World War I and the period of the Weimar Republic. By 1945, thus, the areas that would later become East and West Germany were largely indistinguishable in terms of various economic, social and political dimensions – including average per capita income; the proportion of the population working in industry, agriculture and commerce; physical destruction during World War II; labor market participation; marriage behavior; fertility rates; political party support and election outcomes (Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007, Bauernschuster & Rainer 2011, Leuermann & Necker 2011, Rainer & Siedler 2009).

At the end of World War II, however, Germany lay divided between occupying forces of different stripes, who each held irreconcilable views about its future. While political leaders in the occupation zones of West Germany sought to establish democracy and the free market, those in the Soviet areas were determined to establish socialist
operations across the region. As a result, in 1945, Germany was arbitrarily split into two, partitioned by borders that were a by-product of elite bargaining and the pragmatic positioning of the Allies, and which had nothing to do with citizens’ attitudes or other pre-war characteristics of specific regions (Redding & Sturm 2007, Rainer & Siedler 2009, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007). In 1949, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were officially founded, formalizing the (de facto) exogenously imposed separation of East and West Germany.

In the forty years that ensued, the two Germanies developed fundamentally contrasting economic and political systems, which exposed their citizens to markedly dissimilar conditions and governing principles. In the East, the installation of communism accelerated quickly, involving the forceful restructuring of society and the economy, and the institution of total state control (Leuermann & Necker 2011). During this time, GDR citizens lived under what is considered one of the most rigid communist regimes. Economically, this meant the implementation of nationalization and collectivism, which led to minimal income inequalities across both sectors and individuals (to levels less than a quarter of those in the West) and high employment, but which granted individuals few occupational, educational or consumption choices (see Krueger & Pischke 1992, Fuchs-Schundeln & Schundeln 2005, Schwarze 1996, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007).

Politically, the one-party GDR regime was perhaps even more severe, engaging in the systematic violation of its citizens’ basic rights and liberties. During the course of many decades, the GDR’s Ministry of State Security’s Secret Service (or “Stasi”) mercilessly oppressed individual freedoms, establishing permanent scrutiny across the
population and fiercely punishing deviant behavior (Fullbrook 1997, Ross 2002). The prevalence of such subjugation was striking: records suggest that the Stasi kept files on approximately six million people, and developed a large network of civilian informants or “unofficial collaborators” (Heineck & Sussmuth 2010, Rainer & Siedler 2009) comprised of anywhere between 174,000 (Koehler 1999) and 600,000 individuals (Citizens’ Committee 2010). Even at the lowest estimates, this represents one of the highest security penetrations of any nation, with a ratio of watchers-to-watched at least 90-times greater than in the Soviet Union during communism (Rainer & Siedler 2009).

The degree of suppression in the GDR grew significantly after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which sought to physically segregate the two regions. The operation made it increasingly unfeasible to escape the East – in the decades following, migration to the West plummeted from 3 million prior to 1961 to only 600,000 thereafter (Redding & Sturm 2008, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010). With that event, restrictions on GDR citizens also grew tougher, socialist indoctrination became ubiquitous, and intrusion into private life turned into a daily routine (Leuermann & Necker 2011).

Meanwhile, in West Germany, a vibrant, market democracy developed. During these same decades, citizens in the FRG boasted a period of economic growth, rising living standards, and the evolution of an individualistic culture (Roesler 1991, Schwarze 1996, Krueger & Pischke 1992, Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, Leuermann & Necker 2011). This began in May of 1949, when the post-war constitutional law, or Grundgesetz, was approved, which included articles that explicitly protected freedom of opinion and prohibited censorship (Currie 1994). Following this, the FRG witnessed the birth of new political parties and a soaring of political activism and deliberation, with citizens
becoming publicly involved in various large-scale protests on matters as diverse as nuclear plants, GMOs and, of course, communist oppression in the East (Heineck & Sussmuth 2010).

By 1989, thus, differences between the regimes of East and West Germany had grown poles apart. Despite their prior resemblance, after 40 years of separation, citizens of the GDR and FRG were living under markedly different institutions and conditions. Recognizing these contrasting developments, GDR citizens started to display increasing dissatisfaction with their regime, prompting internal revolts in 1989. Rapidly thereafter, their discontent materialized into something rather unexpected – the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall and the official reunification of Germany in 1990.

Reunification of Germany occurred abruptly in October 1990, in what is largely said to have been an “unanticipated” event (Bach & Trabold 2000, Frijters et al. 2004, Fuchs-Schundeln & Schundeln 2005, Rainer & Siedler 2009). At its very core, the process involved little more than the complete transferal of the West’s economic and political system to the East (Currie 1994, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010, Bauernschuster & Rainer 2011). During this time, the former GDR procured the institutions, policies, and governing ideology of the former FRG, including its constitution, political parties, electoral system, free-market practices and democratic principles. To be sure, while four decades of socialist planning inevitably meant that initial regional differences in development would surely exist, numerous measures were taken to equalize the two areas (e.g., Schwarze 1996, Rainer & Siedler 2009, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007, Federal Statistical Office 2006), and the fundamental, regime-
specific structures governing the two regions have, nevertheless, since been one and the same.

Germany as a “Quasi-Natural Experiment”

From a methodological point of view then, the German experience of separation and reunification provides a unique opportunity to study the influence of “primacy” regime characteristics on individuals’ preferences and behaviors. Specifically, because the regions of East and West Germany were economically, politically and socially indistinguishable prior to the exogenous imposition of socialism in the East, the arbitrary (and physical) split of Germany is said to represent a natural experiment of sorts, with West Germans constituting a valid control group for East Germans, who, in turn, received a “communist” treatment.¹

For the purposes of studying attitudinal adaptation, thus, a focus on Germany offers major empirical advantages, yielding a necessary and welcomed supplementation to the cross-country analyses of Chapter III. For one, by rebutting the possibility that the two regions of Germany were already different before separation, this setup allows for a more confident determination of the specific role of communism in shaping attitudes (as opposed to, say, dissimilar prior cultures or national histories). What is more, by holding

¹ Of course, this approach rests on the validity of two, key identifying assumptions: that East and West Germans showed similar patterns prior to separation in 1945, and that no self-selection took place based on individuals’ attitudes. As discussed above, there is numerous evidence illustrating the pre-separation similarities in the areas that later became East and West Germany, on various economic, political and social dimensions. While there is no data available to directly test levels of efficacy prior to 1945, the homogeneity in institutions and laws suggests that perceptions of freedom and control are also unlikely to have systematically differed across these regions. It is, however, more difficult to rule out the potential that self-selection occurred based primarily on these beliefs. What is known from previous research is that family reunions and economic prosperity (rather than efficacy concerns) were, by far, the most common reasons for East-West migration during separation (Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007). Moreover, once the Berlin Wall was erected, migration even on these grounds became virtually impossible.
language, traditions and heritage constant, it is also possible to avoid some of the more common problems inherent in analyzing cross-country data, such as the potential that survey questions may have alternative meanings in different countries, or that responses may be systematically influenced by the interplay between social norms and the way an item is phrased or who is asking it (Krosnick 1999, Canache et el. 2001). Finally, by ensuring that citizens of the two Germanies have, since 1990, been governed (once again) by an equivalent economic and political regime, the analysis here is also able to hold fixed national-level, institutional factors that might otherwise not be fully captured by the macro-level indicators commonly used in international research.

Recognizing these methodological benefits, numerous researchers have now sought to exploit the “natural experiment” of Germany, utilizing this identification strategy to study topics as varied as the effect of market access for economic development (Redding & Sturm 2008), precautionary savings and occupational self-selection (Fuchs-Schundeln & Schundeln 2005), tax morale (Feld & Torgler 2007), preferences for redistribution (Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007), life satisfaction (Frijters et al. 2004), social and institutional trust (Rainer & Siedler 2009, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010), cooperativeness and risk (Ockenfels & Weimann 1999, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010), the importance that individuals assign to different activities and outcomes (Leuermann & Necker 2011), sex-role attitudes (Bauernschuster & Rainer 2011), and partisanship (Zuckerman & Kroh 2006, Dassonneville et al. 2012).

In similar vein, this chapter also aims to make use of this unique, quasi-experimental case to further probe the issue of attitudinal adaptation. Given the exceptionally repressive nature of the GDR, it focuses on the evolution of Germans’
efficacy (or perceived “locus of control”) since reunification (see Data & Methods for more details on this variable). To reiterate, for forty years, inhabitants of the former GDR and FRG were exposed to extraordinarily different conditions, separated by both an ideological and physical barrier. While individuals from the East lived under a severely restrictive, one-party system that ruthlessly sought to monitor, command and indoctrinate citizens, those in the West resided in an open, free-market democracy that encouraged and fostered individualistic norms. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, an unexpected scenario of macro-level amalgamation occurred, in which the institutions and policies of the former FRG were abruptly transplanted back into the former GDR. Since 1990, thus, all citizens of Germany – including those from East – have been able to enjoy the same freedoms, opportunities, legal protections, political rights, democratic ideals and civil liberties afforded to their Western peers since 1945.

The purpose of this chapter, thus, is to examine what has happened at the micro-level. More specifically, utilizing the same empirical approach and identification strategy outlined above, this study seeks to investigate whether citizens of the former GDR have also succeeded in leaving behind the practices and principles affirmed by their previous regime to instead embrace those upheld by their new systems. Quire simply, when it comes to their beliefs about efficacy and control, have East Germans similarly managed to respond to reunification and converge toward their Western peers?

With this in mind, the following section turns to the empirical analyses, beginning first with a discussion of the data and models to be employed.
DATA AND METHODS

In order to study the evolution of Germans’ efficacy since the fall of the Berlin Wall, this chapter draws on data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a large and representative annual household panel, first established in West Germany in 1984, and subsequently extended in 1990 to also cover inhabitants from former East Germany (just a few months prior to official reunification).\(^2\) It includes extensive current and background information on individuals’ socio-demographics, objective living conditions, health statuses, and economic circumstances, as well as some more limited, rotating items on their attitudes, preferences and behaviors.\(^3\) As previously discussed, this chapter focuses on beliefs concerning individuals’ efficacy, or perceived “locus of control.”

*Efficacy, or Perceived “Locus of Control”*

The concept of control is one that plays an important role in several psychological theories. It was first developed in Julian B. Rotter’s (1954) social-learning theory of personality, where it was broadly defined as the extent to which a person believes that s/he can control outcomes in his/her life. More specifically, “locus of control” refers to an individual’s *generalized* expectancy about the underlying forces that determine rewards and punishments (Rotter 1966): those with an “internal” locus of control tend to

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\(^2\) In each wave, trained GSOEP interviewers conduct separate, in-person interviews with every member of the household aged 16+ years, in addition to (i) a supplementary household-level survey with the household-head, and (ii) numerous other context-specific questionnaires (e.g., youth, biography, mother and child questionnaires, etc.). A multi-stage stratified sampling procedure is generally used. Every few waves, refreshment samples are introduced in order to ensure representativeness. For more information on the GSOEP data, see [http://www.diw.de/en/soep](http://www.diw.de/en/soep). For further details about sampling, methodology and attrition, see also Wagner et al. 2007, Frick et al. 2007.

\(^3\) Specifically, in this chapter, the 95% (nationally representative) research sample of the “GSOEP 1984-2011” dataset is used.
view events as deriving primarily from their own actions, whereas those with an “external” locus of control believe that these events are a result of environmental factors beyond their command (see also Lefcourt 1976, Zimbardo 1985).

Since its conception, the notion of “locus of control” has grown to underscore numerous related theories on efficacy, including Seligman’s (1975) probability analysis of control, Weiner’s (1985) attributional analysis of motivation and emotion, Bandura’s (1977, 1986) self-efficacy theory, Gurin et al.’s (1978) idea of control ideology, and Abramson et al.’s (1978) theory of attribution or explanatory style (see Buchanan & Seligman 1995 for a review). While each of these extensions has sought to refine the term, usually by tweaking its specificity, applicability or mensuration, the fundamental idea of perceived controllability has remained a firm concept within the literature, leading scholars from multiple disciplines to study both its consequences and determinants.

In terms of the former, a person’s degree of internality-externality is claimed to have far-reaching ramifications for individual functioning and well-being, with higher levels of personal control usually depicted as being more beneficial for such matters as health (e.g., depression, stress, overcoming phobias, battling addictions, recovering from illness), work outcomes, educational attainment, evaluative interpersonal actions, effort exertion to attain goals, legitimation of status inequalities, and political activism (see Wortman & Brehm 1975, Lefcourt 1976, O’Leary 1985, Bandura 1986, Wallston & Wallston 1978, Strickland 1978, Furnham & Steele 1993, Gecas 1989 for overviews; see also Judge et al. 1997, Mamlin et al. 2001, Della Fave 1980, Paige 1971, Gurin & Brim 1984, Marsh 1977, Ennis & Schrener 1987).
With regards to its bases, a similarly diverse body of research has emerged, with scholars seeking to identify the various familial, socio-demographic and environmental origins of control orientations. While some have emphasized the importance of household context and, in particular, parental “modeling” of efficacious behaviors for the early formation of a child’s locus of control (e.g., Whitbeck 1987, Gecas & Schwalbe 1986, Gecas 1989, Easton & Dennis 1967), others have instead focused on how social structures and norms may – by altering an individual’s opportunity to partake in efficacious actions – continue to shape these perceptions throughout life. From this viewpoint, the influences of socioeconomic status and personal characteristics have proven to be particularly important: higher education, occupational prestige, income, employment, age, and being male have all shown to have positive associations with internal control, likely due to the greater resources and life possibilities they provide individuals (e.g., Gurin et al. 1978, Mirowsky & Ross 1983, Kohn 1969, 1976, Lachman 1986, Schultz & Schultz 2005, Gurin & Brim 1984, Duncan & Liker 1983, Downey & Moen 1987, Sennet & Cobb 1972, Block 1983).

For similar reasons, the cultural foundations of efficacy have also, at times, received attention. In particular, recognizing that different cultures and ideologies often emphasize specific values, norms and principles, a smaller body of work has sought to examine variations in locus of control between members of different heritages or sub-regions (though usually only within the U.S., e.g., Ross et al. 1983, Shiraev & Levy 2004, Berry et al. 1992, Weisz et al. 1985). As one researcher puts it:
“There may be an element of cultural relativism in all this. Certainly the theme [of efficacy] is congruent with the Western (especially American) emphasis on self-reliance, individualism, mastery, and personal achievement...[It] may not be as central a concern in other cultures, especially those with more communal and less individualistic ethos...Clearly, more cross-country research [would be] useful.” (Gecas 1989: 311).

In accordance with this line of inquiry, this chapter seeks to juxtapose the attitudes of former East and West Germans, looking to see whether the contrasting socialization (or “primacy” regime) experiences of these individuals has, in fact, distinctly and long-lastingly shaped their beliefs about efficacy and control. As previously discussed, during the 45 years of exogenously-imposed German separation, citizens of the FRG and GDR were exposed to fundamentally contrasting regime structures and conditions. While inhabitants of the West reveled in a thriving, capitalist democracy, which championed the concepts of liberalism and individualism, those in the GDR experienced one of the most repressive and draconian systems of its time. The all-intrusive, authoritarian regime in the East not only sought to wholly indoctrinate its citizens with communist norms and ideals, but it also effectively denied them the ability to freely act on their daily demands, as well as to make basic economic, political, religious, travel and consumption decisions for themselves (Fullbrook 1997, Ross 2002, Rainer & Siedler 2009, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010, Citizens’ Committee 2010).

Given both their relative lack of autonomy and the ideological slant of the GDR, thus, it seems reasonable to expect East German citizens to have learned to accredit “external” or societal forces for the outcomes and events in their lives – or to, at least, have been relatively more likely to have done so than their FRG counterparts, throughout
the time of German separation. For, during these decades, the day-to-day activities of GDR citizens were very much in the hands (and supervision) of the all-pervasive socialist state.

Since 1990, however, individuals from both the East and West regions have been governed by a single Western regime, enjoying the same constitutional protections, civil rights, opportunities and freedoms. From the perspective of post-communist attitudinal adaptation then, this unique German experience raises important questions about the ability of individuals to adjust to altering realities. To recapitulate the main meta-theoretical underpinnings outlined in Chapter II, if it is the case that individuals are able to predictably update their beliefs in response to changing circumstances (as is expected by rationalist theories), the efficacy perceptions of former GDR and FRG citizens should have largely converged in the period since reunification (at least once individual differences in socioeconomic and personal characteristics are controlled for). If, on the other hand, the unique “primacy” regime experiences of former GDR citizens have continued to long-lastingly shape their attitudes and beliefs (as per the socialization theories), any East-West divergences in locus of control may, in fact, have persisted long after the fall of the Berlin Wall.\textsuperscript{4} The purpose of this chapter, thus, is to more thoroughly investigate this issue using the GSOEP data described above.

\textit{Measuring Control Orientations}

In order to measure efficacy (or perceived “locus of control”), the analysis here looks at

\footnote{In fact, preliminary evidence of this was already uncovered in the analytical \textit{Extensions} of Chapter III of this dissertation, which found systematic differences in the degree to which post-communists and non-post-communists feel that they have “freedom of choice and control over the way life turns out.”}
responses to an item included in the 1999, 2005 and 2010 waves of the GSOEP, asking respondents to state the extent to which they agree with the statement “the possibilities/opportunities in my life are determined by the social conditions.” In 1999, the answers are given on a 1–4 scale (where “1” is “Completely Agree” and “4” is “Completely Disagree”), whereas in 2005 and 2010, the scale ranged from 1–7 (where “1” is “Disagree Completely” and “7” means “Agree Completely”). In order to maintain comparability across years, thus, the response categories were collapsed and recoded, such that individuals who show disagreement with the statement above (i.e., those that signify an “internal” locus of control, or high efficacy) are assigned a value of one. Those in support of the statement, on the other hand, are given value zero (to represent an “external” locus of control, or low efficacy).\(^5\) Positive values on this variable, thus, capture more individualistic tendencies, relatively more in line with the Western values of liberalism and self-autonomy; deviations from this, by contrast, can be understood as deficits in efficacy or personal control. As a robustness check, alternative coding schemes were also executed, with no substantive effect on the results.\(^6\)

It should be noted that the GSOEP has, over the years, included a handful of questions relating to control orientations, asking respondents to similarly state how much of a role they believe is played by luck, fate, destiny and other people in their own lives, as well as to rate their own competencies. In the examinations to follow, however, it is

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\(^5\) By this coding scheme, respondents marking “3” or “4” in 1995 and/or “1,” “2” or “3” in 2005/2010 were denoted as one (otherwise, zero).

\(^6\) It is worth mentioning that a few other scholars have similarly looked at this item in their examinations of redistribution preferences (Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007) and trust, risk and fairness (Heineck & Sussmuth 2010). In both cases, however, this item was not the main focus of study and was only briefly alluded to in later, supplementary discussions.
only the single item referring to the significance of social and environmental conditions that is used. The reasons for this decision are manifold.

Theoretically-speaking, the matter of how best to quantify perceptions of control has been the subject of much scholarly debate within the literature (see Gecas 1989, Furnham & Steele 1993 for overviews). Although Rotter’s (1966) conception envisioned “locus of control” as being unidimensional in nature, captured best by a multi-item, forced-choice scale, subsequent writings have rebutted this claim, showing it to instead be a multidimensional construct, in which each domain should be examined separately using distinct items (even if the underlying belief is a generalized expectancy). In order to assess this issue with the current GSOEP data, a number of additional analyses were undertaken on the various control questions, which similarly showed low consistency between these items, thereby cautioning against the construction of a larger scale. This problem was further exacerbated by the fact that many of the alternative efficacy items have also suffered from notable changes in question wording over time.

Perhaps an even more important justification given the focus of the present study, however, stems from the fact that the German case of separation and reunification has impacted precisely the social environment and living conditions experienced by former GDR citizens. Quite simply, the process of transition has primarily overturned the severe restraints and limitations imposed on former East Germans by their previous, dictatorial regime. While it therefore seems reasonable to expect perceptions about the dominance

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7 This included various internal-reliability, principal component and factor analyses (not shown here for the sake of brevity), which all showed that the ten or so related items could not be combined into a smaller set of scales (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha was always, and often notably, lower than 0.65).
or control of society to have been affected by these developments, it is less clear why this would be the case for beliefs pertaining to, say, destiny or fate.

A Brief Note on “Political Efficacy” vs. “Locus of Control”

Before moving on to the empirical analysis, one further point on language warrants mentioning. Throughout this chapter, the terms “locus of control” and “efficacy” are used interchangeably. This is mainly because both terms refer to an individual’s general perceptions of causality and authority (as opposed to, for instance, their motivations to hold such beliefs, and/or their task-specific attitudes, see Gecas 1989). This broader notion of efficacy should, however, be distinguished from the related (though far more specific) concept of “political efficacy” (or “system responsiveness”), common in the political science and sociology literatures (e.g., Gamson 1968, Almond & Verba 1963, Lane 1962, Aberbach 1969, 1977, Barber 1983, Morrell 2005, Clark & Acock 1989, Craig et al. 1990, Craig & Maggiotto 1982, Finkel 1985, Douvan 1958, Niemi et al. 1991).

The idea of “political efficacy” was originally conceived by scholars in the Michigan School, where it was defined as the “feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties” (Campbell et al. 1954: 187). Since then, it has spurred its own line of research, with scholars similarly splitting the concept into an “external” dimension (referring to citizens’ perceptions about whether the political system will respond to their demands) and an “internal” domain (concerning individuals’ feelings of personal competence to understand and participate in politics effectively). As with “locus of
control,” scholars of “political efficacy” have also set out to study its consequences and determinants, citing many of the same socioeconomic, demographic and contextual factors as their counterparts in psychology, as well as highlighting the notable association it has with participation, activism, and partisanship.8

Although it is therefore clear that the notion of “political efficacy” bears some connectivity to the “locus of control” orientation examined in this chapter, it must be emphasized that the item utilized in this section is more directly related to the latter, and does not fully capture individuals’ feelings about political responsiveness and/or competence. Unfortunately, although the GSOEP includes a comparable question that is more closely linked to “political efficacy” (namely, an item asking individuals how much they agree with the statement “*If one is socially or politically active, one can influence the social conditions*”), data limitations and consistency concerns made this question less preferable for the study at hand. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, as a further robustness check, the main empirical analyses in this section were re-run on this “(external) political efficacy” item, as well as on *all* the other efficacy questions available in the GSOEP dataset. The results, which are too lengthy to be reported here, are notable for the extent to which they support the main conclusions of this chapter (and, in

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particular, how consonant the findings are between perceptions of “external” locus of control and beliefs about “external” political efficacy).\(^9\)

**Explanatory Variables**

As previously discussed, the empirical investigations of this study commence with the same three-stage analytical strategy outlined in Chapter II and undertaken in Chapter III. For this reason, many of the explanatory variables used in this section are identical to those described in the previous study.

For one, as before, in order to explore the possibility that prior experience with communism may have fundamentally altered or distinguished the preferences of former GDR citizens, an “East German” dummy is included in the analysis. This dummy takes the value of one if the respondent was a resident of the former GDR prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and zero otherwise.\(^{10}\) In doing so, it captures the general effect of having lived in former East Germany on current attitudes towards “locus of control.”

To more thoroughly investigate the development of efficacy beliefs *over time* and address the issue of adaptation, however, additional steps are needed. These come in the

\(^9\) Specifically, almost identical results are obtained for items measuring the extent to which individuals believe that “if one is socially or politically active, one can influence the social conditions”, “compared to others I haven’t achieved what deserve”, “others determine my life,” and “abilities are more important than effort.” That is, for each of these measures, East Germans are found to not only express significantly less internal locus of control in general, but to also fail to converge toward West German norms over time. For the few other items related to efficacy or control, the results still tended to demonstrate differences between East and West Germans, but only in specific waves; and for all but one of these variables (“[I] doubt my abilities when problems arise”), the findings revealed that East Germans are, in fact, becoming relatively *less* efficacious over time.

\(^{10}\) Numerous efforts were made to correctly identify former East Germans, including a comparison of multiple survey items, residency information and sample background. Individuals born after 1989 are coded as zero on this item, as they have not had direct contact with communism. Foreign-born individuals and immigrants after 1949 were dropped from the sample, as they likely have not had comparable socialization experiences. As a robustness check, the analyses were re-run with alternative schemes (e.g., using parents’ prior location and/or current region of residence for those born after 1989; including foreigners; examining different GSOEP subsamples), none of which substantively altered the results.
form of both Survey Wave dummies (taking the value of one for the year in which the
survey was conducted, with the earliest wave omitted as the reference category), as well
as interactions terms between these Wave dummies and the East German variable. While
the former help illustrate broader attitudinal trends, as well as account for wave-specific
(or period) effects, the latter enable an examination of whether any East-West differences
in attitudes have changed over time. An investigation of both thereby allows for a more
direct assessment of post-communist attitudinal convergence toward the West.

Just as was the case in Chapter III, another main variable of interest in this
analysis is age, which has the potential to play a distinct role in the former East and West
German regions. Accordingly, Age (measured in years) and an interaction term between
Age and the East German dummy are also included in the analysis (the latter only in the
second stage).

Similarly, in order to probe the possibility of disparate attitudinal trajectories
across different groups, the third stage of analysis employs the same birth cohort
dummies used in Chapter III. To reiterate, these variables, which are equivalent to those
utilized by Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007), are designed to separate respondents
into one of five birth cohorts, born fifteen years apart: those Born after 1975 (the
youngest, who would have been under 15 years old when the Berlin Wall fell), Born
1961-1975, Born 1946-1960, Born 1931-1945 and those Born 1930 or earlier. For the
purpose of exploring differences in beliefs between former FRG and GDR citizens from
the same birth cohort, these dummies are also interacted with the East German dummy.
To subsequently observe whether any such cohort differences have changed over time, a
three-way interaction is introduced, interacting the East German, Wave and Birth Cohort
dummies at once.

Finally, in order to account for the effects of the personal, socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics previously found to be important for “locus of control”
orientations, a number of additional controls are included. As previously discussed, these
performance-based variables are expected to predictably and “rationally” influence the
opportunities afforded to individuals. They measure Income (adjusted monthly, net
household income in Euros, logged); Home Ownership (dummy, 1 if respondent owns
home, included as a supplementary measure of wealth); Employment Status (comprised
of two dummies: a “Retired” dummy equal to 1 if respondent is retired, and a “Not
Working” dummy equal to 1 if respondent is currently not in employment, thereby
omitting those who are currently employed); Unemployment History (namely, years of
prior experience with unemployment, included as an additional gauge of cumulative
financial constraints); Higher Education (dummy, 1 if an individual has completed
beyond a secondary or vocational level of education); Gender (dummy, 1 if female),
Marital Status (made up of two dummies: a “Married” and a “Separated or Divorced”
variable, thereby omitting those who are single and/or never married); and Religiosity
(dummy, equal to 1 if the respondent attends church or other religious events at least once

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11 Reasons for “Not Working” include those unemployed, as well as a few on maternity leave, in the military, engaged in community service, etc. The omitted category is, therefore, those individuals who are currently in employment. Alternative specifications and/or categorizations of these variables do not alter the results that follow.

12 Unfortunately, the GSOEP does not include identical measures of religious attitudes, religious membership or religious participation in every wave. Moreover, even when included, response categories for these questions often change over time. The “frequency” of attendance item used here was therefore chosen simply because it represents the most consistent religiosity item available. Excluding the variable from the analysis does not significantly impact the results. It should be noted that because the relevant question was not asked in 2010, responses for each individual for the third wave were taken from the closest available year (i.e., 2009, or else 2011).
a month). Recognizing also the potential associations between efficacy beliefs and an individual’s degree of both political activism and representation, also included in the model are variables gauging Political Participation (dummy, equal to 1 if respondent participates in politics, community events, or local political initiatives at least once a month) and Party Identification (0 to 1 scale, where 1 is denotes strongest party identification).

The Model

Altogether, the variables described above represent the main factors to be considered in the three-stage analysis outlined in Chapter II. Notwithstanding some later deviations from this methodological framework (as shall be discussed in subsequent Extensions), this specification yields a total of approximately 39,000 observations. Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, logit estimation is used for the analysis; to account for any correlations of errors within individuals over time, robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are also employed in all the regressions.

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13 It should be noted that race is another variable that has previously been shown to influence efficacy beliefs, beyond its association with social class (e.g., Gurin et al. 1978, Lachman 1985). However, as only German-born respondents and/or immigrants prior to 1949 are included in the sample here, it is not one that is particularly relevant or insightful for the present study. As such, it is not included in the results presented.

14 Even though it is not “political efficacy” that is being studied here, these political variables were included to account for the fact that the societal and environmental changes that occurred after reunification were largely political in nature. They are also necessary to control for individual differences in these attributes, especially as East German citizens may have predictably expressed lower levels of party allegiance and participation due to their lack of experience with Western political parties and democracy. Excluding these variables from the analysis yields no notable effect on the results. For more info on partisanship and participation in/across Germany, see Neundorf et al. 2011, Zuckerman et al. 2007, Kroh & Selb 2009, Arzheimer 2006, Schmit-Beck et al. 2006, Zuckerman & Kroh 2006, Dassonneville et al. 2012).

15 Again, as with the religiosity item, the GSOEP does not include measures of political participation in every wave. Consequently, the 2010 responses for this item are taken from the closest available year (i.e., 2009, or else 2011). As before, excluding the variable from the analysis does not substantively change the results.

16 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the study of Germans’ efficacy since reunification allows researchers to hold constant various national and macro-level factors that may also influence attitudes. Unlike in Chapter III, thus, the
RESULTS

(A) General Post-Communist Distinctions

Similar to Chapter III, the first stage of the analysis involved an investigation into the trajectory of Germans’ efficacy since the fall of the Berlin Wall, looking to see whether former GDR citizens are, in fact, prone to expressing lower levels of internal locus of control than their counterparts from the former FRG.

To recall the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter II, if socialization or primacy theories are correct, not only should former East Germans tend to systematically exhibit relatively lower levels of efficacy due to their (“primacy”) experience of communism (Hypothesis 1), but any such post-communist distinctions should, in fact, persist long into the period of reunification (Hypothesis 2). If, on the other hand, rationalist understandings hold ground, then variations in Germans’ control orientations should be explained primarily by differences in individual resources and outcomes, which separate the “winners” from the “losers” of society and predictably determine a person’s possibilities and achievements (Hypothesis 6). Once individual differences in these performance-based variables are accounted for, then there should be little scope for an independent effect of prior communist experience (counter to Hypothesis 1). Even if former GDR citizens do, at the outset, exhibit certain socialist propensities, rationalist understandings would expect these distinctions to promptly fade – that is, as time passes and as these responsive citizens accumulate new regime experience, their preferences

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models utilized in this study do not include country-level economic and political indicators. Of course, the individuals examined here may still be systematically subjected to distinct local or regional characteristics (e.g., different levels of economic growth, employment rates, etc.). While a multilevel analysis incorporating such patterns would inevitably be useful, German data privacy restrictions prohibited the availability of necessary micro-level, geographical data outside of the EU. Such an investigation of local effects is also considered to be beyond the scope of the current chapter. Accordingly, it is left for future work to address.
should come to be based chiefly on contemporary, post-communist factors, thereby gradually converging to those expressed by their (comparable) Western counterparts (counter to Hypothesis 2).

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the main empirical results of this section, illustrating both the coefficients (column 1) and odds-ratios (column 2) from the logit estimations described above. To reiterate, throughout these analyses, the efficacy item under examination was collapsed and dichotomized, such that those who express greater levels of “internal” locus of control (or high efficacy) are assigned value one, whereas those who blame social factors for their life opportunities are instead assigned zero. While Table 4.1 outlines the results obtained from the baseline specification, in which only the East German dummy is added to the various individual-level variables described above, Table 4.2 gives the supplementary results when both the Wave dummies and their interaction with the East German variable are also included, so as to more directly probe the issue of adjustment over time. The remaining variables and controls are identical in both models.

Looking first at Table 4.1, the initial point to note is the striking effect of being a former GDR citizen on locus of control orientations. The negative, large and significant coefficient on the East German dummy in column 1, for instance, illustrates that citizens from the former communist region demonstrate a notable lack of efficacy. In fact, the odds of espousing an internal locus of control are, in general, only 68% as big for East German citizens as they are for their West German peers. This effect is not only

\[17\text{ Data analysis was executed using both R and Stata, facilitated by the PanelWhiz package (Haisken-DeNew & Hahn 2010).}\]
### TABLE 4.1: DIFFERENCES IN INTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANS: POOLED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Internal Locus of Control/High Efficacy</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East German</td>
<td>-0.39***</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>-0.00**</td>
<td>1.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (net household income, adjusted, in Euros, logged)</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>1.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>1.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>1.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status: Not Working (unemployed, maternity leave, training, military)</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status: Retired</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>0.90*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Experience With Unemployment (No. of Years)</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>0.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>0.80***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status: Married</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status: Divorced, Departed, or Widowed</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Party Identification</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>1.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Political Participation</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.66***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                                                         | 39369        | 39369       |

Note: Logit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if an individual does not show agreement with the statement "my opportunities in life are determined by social conditions." Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Wave 1 is the omitted category. *= p<0.05; **= p<0.01; ***= p<0.001
TABLE 4.2: DIFFERENCES IN INTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANS: OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Internal Locus of Control/High Efficacy</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East German</td>
<td>-0.53***</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>-0.80***</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 3</td>
<td>-0.76***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German * Wave 2</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>1.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German * Wave 3</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>1.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>39369</td>
<td>39369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Logit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if an individual does not show agreement with the statement "my opportunities in life are determined by social conditions." Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Wave 1 is the omitted category.

*= p<0.05; **= p<0.01; ***= p<0.001

significant, but is among the strongest of those reported in the analysis, thereby providing initial support of Hypothesis 1.

What is more, as shown in Table 4.2, rather than gradually diminishing through some process of (re-)learning or adjustment, it would seem that this East German attitudinal distinction has largely persisted over time. To understand this, it is important to note that, in Table 4.2, the East German dummy itself illustrates the effect of being a GDR veteran on efficacy beliefs in Wave 1. In 1999, thus, the odds of demonstrating
internal control are found to be over 40% lower for East than for West Germans.

While the Wave dummies then capture general efficacy shifts in each subsequent wave (relative to Wave 1), the interaction terms indicate the difference in these changes between former GDR and FRG respondents. Considering first the negative, significant coefficients on the Wave dummies, thus, what is indicated by Table 4.2 is that Germans have, on the whole, exhibited less internal control over each survey wave (compared to 1999). However, as is revealed by the interaction terms, this general trend has not resulted in the complete eradication of the East-West attitudinal gap. Rather, between 1999 and 2005, the relative odds of internal control for GDR veterans are found to have increased by only 17% (captured by the first, positive and significant interaction term). Although this indicates that the chasm between former East and West Germans did somewhat decrease during this time, the change was not enough to compensate for the heftier, initial gap. In 2005, thus, the odds of efficacy were still a sizable 24% lower among citizens from the post-communist GDR.

What is more, there does not appear to have been any notable, further progress made since then. Instead, as shown by the second interaction term in Table 4.2, the relative odds of internal control for East Germans is shown to have been only 16% higher in 2010 than in 1999. Rather than continuing to converge between 2005 and 2010, thus, the gap in efficacy between East and West Germans seems to have stayed strong and stable during this time (as per Hypothesis 2), with GDR veterans continuing to exhibit only three-quarters of the odds of efficacy expressed by their FRG equals.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^\text{18}\) As a robustness check, the models in Table 4.2 were run separately on subsets of data from each survey wave (without the Wave dummies and East German interactions), yielding virtually identical results.
Far from demonstrating prompt adoption of Western values, thus, the evidence in this section would suggest that post-communist attitudinal adaptation has proven to be somewhat slow and stalled. To help see this, Figure 4.1 offers a visual representation of the main results, illustrating the over-time differences in efficacy between former GDR and FRG citizens, all else equal. In this diagram, the baseline level corresponds to the West German position for the locus of control question (namely, the propensity of FRG veterans to express internal control orientations). The heights of the bars, then, can be interpreted as the deviations from this Western level owing to the fact the respondent is a member of the former GDR. Negative differences therefore imply that individuals who grew up in communist East Germany are, ceteris paribus, less likely to believe in their own, personal command, perceiving instead that social forces have mastery over their lives. 95% confidence intervals are also marked, so as to indicate the significance of any East German distinctions.

A quick glance at Figure 4.1 instantly reaffirms the dynamics implied by the results shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The prevalence of significant, negative difference bars in the diagram clearly elucidates the extent to which former GDR citizens have remained—distinguishably external in their basic control orientations (in support of Hypothesis 1). The lack of linear change over time similarly confirms prior doubts about the onset of eventual convergence (as per Hypothesis 2). Quite simply, just as was found in Chapter III, the findings reported here would suggest that post-communists have struggled to respond to their changing realities and abandon the values upheld by their previous regimes. Even twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the acquisition
of a liberal system of governance, these individuals continue to believe in the dominance of external, societal forces in the shaping of their own lives.\textsuperscript{19}

With regard to age, the other main variable of interest for socialization theories, the initial results in Table 4.1 reveal a (virtually non-existent) negative relationship overall, suggesting that individuals tend to espouse less internal control as they get older. Although this is the relationship that attitude persistence theories would expect for the post-communist area of Germany, the models in Tables 4.1 do not actively probe the

\textsuperscript{19} In fact, as was also the case in Chapter III, the results here would suggest that most of the attitudinal convergence that has occurred between East and West has actually originated from the latter. That is, rather than it being the case that East Germans have gradually become more individualistic in their control beliefs, it appears that Western Germans have simply become notably less efficacious over time, thereby explaining much of the over-time dynamics. Again, intriguing as this finding is, it is beyond the scope of this study and so is left for future work to address.
regional impact of age and so cannot directly speak to Hypothesis 3. This topic is instead explored in the following subsection.

Turning to the rationalist explanations, the results in Table 4.1 confirm that most of the performance-based variables yield their own, expected influence on control orientations. Similar to the results in Chapter III of this dissertation, measures of wealth are found to have a large, robust and positive relationship with efficacy, implying that the “winners” within a society do tend to advocate relatively higher internal control than the “losers.” While owning a home is shown to increase the odds of internality by 8%, the coefficient on the (logged) income variable suggests that a roughly doubling in adjusted, monthly net household income will raise this by a more notable 13%. Although the existence and magnitude of these effects thereby provides partial support for performance-based theories (Hypothesis 6), it is worth noting that the tendency of former GDR citizens to blame external factors for their life opportunities remains strong even when differences in wealth are accounted for. In fact, while comparing and interpreting coefficients is admittedly problematic, that a 100% increase in income is insufficient to even halve the influence of a being a former East German citizen is, nevertheless, remarkable.

The remaining individual-level variables produce similarly modest results, also compatible with the rationalist perspective. While both current and previous experiences with unemployment are found to somewhat reduce the odds of internal control, higher education appears to increase these odds by a meaningful 15%, making it one of the more

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20 It should be noted that all of these individual-level variables were also included in the models used to generate Table 4.2, with comparable results. The coefficients are simply not shown for the sake of brevity.
substantively important predictors of efficacy. In fact, the only other variable to rival this relationship is that of being female, which reduces the odds of internality by 20%. The only controls that do not demonstrate strong or significant associations with locus of control are marital status, religiosity and political participation (though the latter two items suffer from unavoidable measurement problems, as described in fns. 12 and 15).

While this might suggest that internality is mainly influenced by capital and gender considerations, the fact that strength of party identification is also found to yield a significant, positive influence suggests that political factors may also play some role. This association should perhaps be unsurprising: generally-speaking, the concept of “political efficacy” is one that theoretically stems from the broader concept of “locus of control” examined here. In the German case of separation and reunification, the two are likely to be particularly intertwined, not least because of the inherently political nature of the major societal changes that have taken place. The effect of partisanship shown in Table 4.1, thus, is likely to represent a number of forces in operation. In addition to accounting for the anticipated lack of party identification among East German individuals (arising from their shortage of prior experience with Western political parties and democracy; see Zuckerman et al. 2007, Zuckerman & Kroh 2006, Dassonneville et al. 2012, Neundorf et al. 2011, Arzheiner 2006, Kroh & Selb 2009, Schmit-Beck et al. 2006), it may also capture differences in beliefs about political representation, which may, in turn, influence convictions about societal control by impacting the extent to which citizens, at least, feel connected to (or liable for) the social conditions around them.

As shown in Table 4.1, this relationship is indeed significant: those with the strongest degree of party identification are, in fact, 12% more likely to express internal
control than those with no party identification at all. Once again, however, although noteworthy, neither this effect, nor that of work, education and gender, is able to vie with that of growing up under the communist regime of East Germany, which continues to dominate the findings even when these personal characteristics are controlled for.

Overall, thus, the results from the first stage of the empirical analysis are striking in the extent to which they corroborate the results from Chapter III of the dissertation, providing further, strong evidence in support of socialization theories, along with somewhat weaker affirmation of rationalist accounts. Just as was the case with basic economic and political preferences, having lived under a communist regime is found to exert a powerful, unrelenting influence on locus of control orientations. Even after accounting for compositional differences in individual-level resources and performance, citizens from the former, repressive GDR have proven to be systematically distinct in their efficacy beliefs, eschewing individualistic or internal control tendencies in favor of external ones. Despite the fact that these individuals now enjoy the exact same constitutional protections, civil rights, and individual freedoms as their peers from the former FRG, they continue to believe in the dominance of societal forces, and have been unable fully converge to positions prevalent in the West. More than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, thus, the attitudes of former East and West German citizens remain largely split and dis-united.

(B) Age in the Two Regions

Having established the abiding influence of communism on Germans’ locus of control orientations, the second stage of the analysis seeks to more carefully examine whether
length of exposure to the repressive GDR regime may also play a role. As in Chapter III of this dissertation, this is achieved by studying the relationship of age and efficacy among East vs. West German veterans.

To recall briefly from Chapter II, while rationalist understandings of attitude formation do not necessarily predict age to be uniquely associated with individuals’ control orientations across Germany (at least not once differences in individual-level resources and performance are controlled for), social-psychological theories of attitude persistence would expect the (distinct) values acquired by former FRG and GDR citizens early in life to only strengthen and become more crystallized with age and time, thereby generating a contrasting age distribution of beliefs in the two regions (i.e., Hypothesis 3).

In order to empirically probe this potential, thus, an interaction term between Age (in years) and the East German dummy was added to the more comprehensive models used to generate Table 4.2. The key results are illustrated in Figure 4.2, which present the region-specific, marginal association of age with the probability of exhibiting internal locus of control (or high efficacy), holding all other variables constant.

Looking at Figure 4.2, what is again immediately apparent is the degree to which the patterns revealed corroborate socialization accounts of attitude formation, as well as the results of Chapter III. Specifically, just as was the case with basic economic and political preferences, age is found to be conversely related with beliefs about locus of control among post-communist vs. non-post-communist citizens (as per Hypothesis 3). While individuals from the former FRG are more likely to express internal locus of control as they become older (in line with previous studies of efficacy, which have been
largely conducted in liberal democracies, see Lachman 1986, Schultz & Schultz 2005, Gurin & Brim 1984), older veterans of the GDR tend to increasingly blame social forces for the opportunities and events in their lives. In fact, as in Chapter III, the coefficient on the region-age interaction term, although small (-0.01***), is found to be more than twice the size of the coefficient on age, implying that older post-communists’ cumulative experience with socialism is more than sufficient to counteract any general internalizing influence of age.

21 It should be noted that while some of these US/Western studies have suggested that internality might, in fact, be somewhat curvilinear over the life course (i.e., increasing throughout most of life, then decreasing in old age), the evidence does nonetheless reveal a general rise until (at least) middle age (see also Gecas 1989 for an overview). Adding an age-squared term in the models does not substantively impact these results.
What this means for the broader issue of attitudinal adaptation is therefore noteworthy. Not only do the findings of this section provide even stronger evidence in favor of socialization and persistence theories of attitude formation, but they also raise further questions about the ability of citizens to automatically, rationally and uniformly respond to changing circumstances. As previously discussed, from a theoretical viewpoint, the repeated uncovering of contrasting, age-related patterns is somewhat perplexing for rationalist accounts, even if their inclusion does not fundamentally alter the effects of other performance-based variables (results not reported here for the sake of brevity). Yet from a practical standpoint, their implications are even more striking. Quite simply, when it comes to attitudinal convergence, the findings reported here would suggest that post-communist adjustment toward Western levels is likely to represent a far more challenging and uneven process than expected by rationalist theories. According to the results, being a citizen of the former GDR is associated with the expression of distinctly external control orientations, which are increasingly skewed the longer an individual spent living under the previous, communist regime. Consequently, overcoming the East-West attitudinal gap is not only likely to prove an onerous task, on the whole, but it may also end up being extraordinarily demanding for older veterans of the GDR, whose views appear to be particularly distorted and entrenched. That is, while younger post-communists might not find adaptation to Western values significantly taxing (owing in part to their relatively less extreme and ingrained positions), more experienced members of the former GDR may find it exceedingly difficult to replace their more deep-seated and distant beliefs. Over-time convergence towards the West then – if it comes at all – may not occur equally among all citizens of reunified Germany. Post-communist
attitudinal adaptation, in other words, may end up being a lengthy and selective phenomenon. This, then, is the focus of the next section.

(C) Cohort Differences

The results from the previous section have raised doubts about the potential symmetry of post-communist adjustment, suggesting that convergence to Western levels of efficacy may prove more difficult for older veterans of the GDR. In order to probe this matter further, the final stage of analysis turns to an investigation of adaptation within the pool of East Germans. As in Chapter III, this was achieved by splitting respondents from all three waves of the GSOEP into one of five birth cohorts, partitioned by fifteen years (i.e., those Born after 1975, Born 1961-1975, Born 1946-1960, Born 1931-1945, and those Born 1930 or earlier), and examining the trajectory of control orientations across these groups.

The first step was to analyze the general patterns of efficacy across these cohorts. In order to do this, the various Birth Cohort dummies (in lieu of Age) and their interactions with the East German dummy were added to the (pooled) models used to generate Table 1. The key results are presented in Figure 4.3, which plots the difference in stated beliefs between a former East and West German from the same birth cohort (holding all other variables constant). Similar to Figure 4.1, in this diagram, the baseline level corresponds to the West German position for the locus of control question (namely, the propensity of a FRG veteran from a specific birth cohort to express internal control orientations). Again, then, the heights of the bars can be interpreted as the deviations from this Western level owing to the fact the respondent is a member of the former GDR;
negative differences therefore imply that post-communists of a certain cohort are, ceteris paribus, less likely to believe in their own, personal command. As before, 95% confidence intervals are also marked, so as to indicate the significance of any East German distinctions.

The first point to note from these results is that former East Germans from all birth cohorts are significantly less likely to express an internal locus of control, relative to their West German counterparts. This is demonstrated by the pervasiveness of negative difference bars across all groups, which also verify the presence of a general, post-communist gap in efficacy (in line with Hypothesis 1).

The second point to consider, however, is perhaps even more noteworthy. Rather than demonstrating uniform deficiencies in efficacy, the results in Figure 4.3 reveal that older citizens from the former GDR are progressively less internal in their control orientations. This finding, which is (once again) virtually identical to that uncovered in Chapter III of this dissertation, provides supplemental evidence in support of socialization theories, suggesting that additional time spent under communism tends to sway individuals’ attitudes further and more firmly away from West German norms. In doing so, thus, it not only further attests to Hypothesis 5, but also helps confirm the presence of potential asymmetries in the process of adaptation, suggesting that older East Germans will, in fact, need to traverse greater attitudinal chasms in order to converge to their Western counterparts.
Figure 4.3: Differences in Odds of Internality Between East and West Germans From the Same Cohort (Pooled Dataset)

Figure indicates the odds that a former East German from a specific cohort expresses internal control, relative to a former West German from the same birth cohort. Results are based on preceding logit analyses, holding all other variables constant.
Nevertheless, although the results in Figure 4.3 offer instructive insights into general patterns of efficacy across birth cohorts, they do not directly speak to the issue of attitudinal convergence over time. As a final step of the analysis, thus, two-way interactions between the Birth Cohort and Wave dummies were added to the models described above, as well as a three-way interaction between these two variables and the East German dummy. With the inclusion of these variables, then, it is possible to also examine the trajectory of cohort-specific distinctions from wave-to-wave. Figure 4.4 presents the main results.

The patterns shown in Figure 4.4 attend to a number of issues. For one, they provide further verification of a significant – and enduring – gap in efficacy between former GDR and FRG citizens, showing that post-communists have tended to exhibit relatively lower odds of efficacy throughout the entire period of transition (as in Hypothesis 2). In similar fashion, they also add further credence to the previous cohort results, demonstrating that older GDR veterans have perpetually espoused increasingly lower chances of internal control than their younger peers (in support of Hypothesis 5).

What is also made clear from these figures, however, is that there has not been an obvious, linear path of convergence over time. Rather, when it comes to beliefs about efficacy, the findings instead suggest that attitudinal differences between former East and West Germans have been subject to some up-and-down fluctuations over the years (though the wide 95% confidence intervals make it difficult to make precise statements about such changes). In the end, thus, instead of moving closer toward their Western peers, the gaps in efficacy across all East German groups have remained largely strong and stable over time.
Figure 4.4: Differences in Odds of Internality Between East and West Germans From the Same Cohort (Over Time)

Figure indicates the odds that an East German from a specific cohort expresses internal control, relative to a West German from the same birth cohort, over time. Results are based on preceding logit analyses, holding all other variables constant.
In terms of adaptation toward the West then, the findings reported in Figure 4.4 paint a bleak picture. As late as 2010, East German citizens have proven headstrong in their perceptions of societal control. In fact, even once the effects of general time trends are accounted for, the only cohort found to be statistically indistinguishable from their counterparts in the West is the very youngest, made up of individuals born after 1975 (as captured by the 95% confidence interval around their expected attitudinal difference, which overlaps zero in their case). As discussed in Chapter II, this is, in actuality, precisely the outcome that socialization theories would have predicted.

To reiterate, because members of this cohort would have been under the age of 15 when the Berlin Wall collapsed, socialization theories would have expected their core values and preferences to have been largely formed during post-reunification times (i.e., Hypothesis 4). The fact that these Eastern youths are indeed found to be undifferentiated from their Western equivalents in terms of their tendencies thereby adds even further credence to this account. Simply put, while the previous era of socialism does not seem to have left a notable mark on the most unseasoned of all post-communists, it appears to have had a major impression on those beyond the age of 15 at the time of regime change; for these individuals, not only has a prior experience with communism exerted a generally detrimental effect on internal control, but it seems to have done so progressively, with additional exposure quashing efficacy levels to deeper and even more consequential lows.22

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22 Of course, the fact that members of the youngest cohort (Born After 1975) were found to also express significantly lower odds of efficacy in the previous (pooled) cohort analyses is therefore somewhat surprising from a socialization perspective. To reiterate, these individuals should only have spent their childhood or early adolescence under communism and so are not expected to have been lastingly affected by the socialist past (as per Hypothesis 4). As discussed in Chapter III of this dissertation, although a full investigation of this matter is beyond the scope of this section, there are, in fact, a number of plausible reasons why this may be the case. Perhaps most obviously, this could
Overall, thus, the results of this section corroborate the results from previous chapters, pointing to the presence of significant and relatively stable attitudinal gaps between former GDR and FRG citizens. Even twenty years after reunification, individuals who grew up under the authoritarian regime of the East seem to have been unable to fully catch up to Western standards of individualism and efficacy. Instead, these citizens – and particularly older veterans of the GDR – have continued to believe in the command of external forces, tending to view the opportunities and outcomes in their lives as being dictated by societal factors and environmental conditions. Although personal differences in resources and performance have predictably (and rationally) played a role (as per Hypothesis 6), it appears that early (“primacy”) experiences have been key. Quite simply, socialization under a communist regime seems to have long-lastingly shaped the predilections of East German veterans, distinguishing them from their Western contemporaries, long after the foundation of their reunited regime.

What all this this implies for the prospects of forthcoming East-West convergence is similarly troublesome. Clearly, post-communist attitudinal adaptation should not be taken for granted, for it appears to be neither an automatic, nor equal process for all involved. Beyond this, however, it is difficult to make predictions based on the dynamics reported here. At this point, only the youngest of all post-communists – those who have virtually no memory of the GDR – seem to have managed to embrace the positions of their non-post-communist peers. What will bode for the nation as a whole, then, will very

simply have been due to the omission of period (i.e., wave) effects in the preceding model. Other, more general speculations include the arbitrarily defined cut-point of 15-years for attitude formation (which could in fact occur earlier, see Sears & Valentino 1997, Sears 1975); the intergenerational transmission of values from parents (as explored further in subsequent Extensions; see also Beck and Jennings 1991, Campbell et al. 1960, Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981, Kroh and Selb 2009); or even just the influence of being raised in a generally more authoritarian environment (which the former GDR region has herein been found to be).
much depend on the various mechanisms of attitude change as the country proceeds into
the future. If rapid re-learning occurs in the East, convergence to the West may take only
a few more decades. If, on the other hand, former GDR citizens prove unwilling to alter
their beliefs over time, complete adaptation may only occur once the communist
generation has been completely replaced. Even then, this will be largely contingent on
other forces of change, such as migration between the Germans regions, or the (lack of)
tergenerational transmission of values from post-communist parents to their kin.

While a full treatment of these related processes of change would require an
entirely separate and extensive project, the longitudinal- and household- structure of the
GSOEP data used here provide an opportune occasion to, at least, briefly explore some of
these issues. Having now completed the main, three-stage analysis outlined in Chapter II,
thus, the investigations of this study move on to a number of Extensions, each seeking to
briefly probe other, germane aspects of adaptation, beginning first with an examination of
attitude stability across the two Germanies.

EXTENSIONS

(D) Attitude Stability Among Former East Vs. West Germans

The three-stage analyses undertaken in Chapters III and IV of this dissertation have
provided numerous indications of the difficulties of attitudinal adaptation, suggesting that
individuals who grew up under communism are unable to promptly adopt the values
espoused by their Western counterparts, even when their systems of governance have
been fundamentally transformed. Yet, compelling as this evidence is, the examinations so
far have centered around a comparison of post-communist vs. non-post-communist attitudes over time, without looking directly at changes in a given person’s beliefs from year to year. If, however, socialization theories are correct and post-communists have, in fact, struggled to readjust their attitudes over the course of transition, an assessment of the latter should also be revealing. In particular, any systematic persistence in the beliefs of post-communist citizens over time should have also manifested itself in the form of high, within-individual attitude stability across the region (for more on this concept, see Alwin et al. 1991a,b, Sears & Valentino 1997, Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1969, Converse & Markus 1979, Jennings & Markus 1984, Krosnick 1991, Miller 1991, Alwin & Krosnick 1991, Green & Palmquist 1994, Sears & Funk 1999).

The purpose of this initial Extension, thus, is to build upon the preceding investigations of control orientations, in order to further probe this issue. Specifically, taking advantage of the longitudinal structure of the GSOEP, this section seeks to compare the degree of stability in the efficacy beliefs of former East and West German citizens, looking to see whether GDR veterans are, in fact, any more or less likely to alter their own stated opinions from year-to-year.

Shanks 1996, Key 1966, Downs 1957). Rather than expecting a high (or at least comparable) degree of attitude perseverance among post-communists, thus, rationalist theories would expect the beliefs of these individuals to have exhibited significantly lower degrees of steadiness and durability – at least when compared, for a given attitude, to individuals who have not directly lived through a complete overhaul of their economic and political systems.

Quite simply, from a rational-choice perspective, citizens of the former GDR have been confronted with an abundance of new information during the last two decades, particularly with regards to their individual freedoms, social conditions and opportunities. Accordingly, if it is the case that citizens are able to gradually update their preferences in light of altering realities and novel experiences, it seems only reasonable to expect these post-communists to have been relatively more likely to change their perceptions and minds during this time. Examining whether this has, in fact, been the case then is the goal of this Extension.

The first step to exploring the relative stability of East and West Germans’ efficacy involves the development of a measure of attitude stability. Recognizing that this issue has in and of itself been the subject of much debate within the existing literature (see Converse 1964, Sears 1975, Sears & Valentino 1975, Petty & Krosnick 1995, Sears & Levy 2003), this section considers three separate measures of attitude stability. Two of these are based on binary variables, which were created to represent a “Strict” and “Loose” measure of stability. These either (a) take a value of 1 if the respondent expressed the same locus of control orientation across all three waves of the GSOEP, and 0 otherwise (i.e., “Strict” measure), or (b) take a value of 1 if the individual indicated the
same locus of control belief in at least two consecutive waves, and 0 otherwise (“Loose” measure). As a “Mid-“ measure of stability, a third, continuous variable was also created, taking the value of 1 if the respondent gave the same locus of control response across all three waves, 0.5 if the belief was the same in at least two consecutive waves, and 0 if his or her answer was different in each successive wave.23

As an initial step of the analysis, the prevalence of stable attitudes among former East vs. West Germans was examined, based on all three measures described above. The resulting comparisons are presented in Table 4.3. As can be seen, these findings are remarkable in the way in which they corroborate the results of the preceding sections. Specifically, looking at the estimations from both the proportion tests (for the two binary, “Loose” and “Strict” measures of stability), as well as from the test of means (using the continuous “Mid-“ measure of stability), what is immediately apparent in Table 4.3 is the persistence of post-communists’ attitudes. Regardless of which measure is employed, former East Germans are found to be notably more prone to espousing the same control orientations over time, despite any changes in their circumstances and opportunities. In fact, the revealed differences between former East and West Germans (of about 10%) are not only significant, but are also consistent across all measures of stability.24 Rather than rationally responding to their altering realities, thus, these results would instead suggest

23 Comparisons across waves were made based on the recoded locus of control variable used in the preceding analysis, due to changes in the response categories provided to individuals over time. Alternative coding schemes did not substantively change the results. It should also be noted that while the “Strict” measure of stability only considers respondents who answered the relevant survey item in all three waves, the other two measures include individuals who provided responses in at least two of the years examined. Excluding these individuals does not significantly change the findings of this section.

24 As further robustness checks, various other tests were also performed on the data, including basic correlations, chi-squared tests, phi-coefficient tests, and tetrachoric correlations, which all indicated the same pattern of results – i.e., that a significantly larger volume of East Germans exhibit stable beliefs over the entire period, relative to West Germans.
that GDR veterans have, in relatively greater portions, tended to stick to their pre-existing views about the command of external factors over their lives.

These results are also substantiated by the findings presented in Table 4.4, which demonstrate the effect of being an East German citizen on each measure of attitude stability, controlling for age, gender and education (the other main predictors of stability;
see references above). As before, in each of these regressions, being an East German citizen is found to be positively associated with the conservation of enduring control orientations. Even for the least stringent of all measures, having grown up in the former GDR is shown to raise the odds of stability by over 50%. Much like before then, instead of readjusting their opinions during the course of transition, citizens from the post-communist region seem to have been relatively more inclined to hold on to their deep-seated beliefs, continuing to espouse the same degrees of efficacy long after the transformation of their regime.

In terms of the broader issue of attitudinal adaptation then, the findings of this section provide a number of further insights. First of all, from a theoretical point of view, the fact that former GDR citizens appear to exhibit relatively more stable attitudes than

| TABLE 4.4: DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE STABILITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANS |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | I: Loose Measure of Attitude Stability (Odds Ratios) | II: Strict Measure of Attitude Stability (Odds Ratios) | III: Mid Measure of Attitude Stability (Odds Ratios) |
| East German | 1.56*** | 1.52*** | 0.07*** |
| (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.01) |
| Age (years) | 1.01*** | 1.01*** | 0.00*** |
| | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| Gender (female) | 1.15* | 1.05 | 0.02* |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.01) |
| Higher Education | 0.89 | 1 | 0.01 |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.65*** | 2.45*** | 0.45*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.20) | (0.01) |
| N | 5429 | 8475 | 8475 |

Note: Logit regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if an individual exhibits loose/strict stability in efficacy responses over time; in column 3, it is the continuous measure of stability, ranging from 0-1.

*= p<0.05; **= p<0.01; ***= p<0.001
their counterparts from the FRG raises further doubts about the applicability of a rationalist approach. Simply put, based on the results reported here, there seems to be less readjustment occurring among those who arguably need in most – citizens of the overhauled, transition region. The notion that individuals are able to promptly and rationally respond to changes in their altering realities, thus, once again, receives little support.25

Yet, the findings uncovered here would also appear to be somewhat surprising from a socialization perspective. To be sure, while social-psychological theories of attitude formation would certainly expect citizens’ efficacy beliefs to largely persevere over time, it is not immediately clear why this should be more predominantly the case for East German than for West German citizens. Although a full investigation of this matter is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is possible to speculate about a number of plausible reasons for this finding. Some scholars of Germany have, for instance, alluded to identity explanations to help justify similar results, arguing that that East Germans may either be engaged in “identity-conserving behavior” to hold up the values of the past (Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012), or else have created a strong “oppositional identity” in order to decrease the costs of lacking assimilation (Leuermann & Necker 2011).

Within the existing theoretical literature on attitude stability, alternative clues can also be found. In prior work on the subject, researchers from various fields have, for

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25 Of course, it could also be the case that any updating in the attitudes of former East Germans occurred prior to 1999 (i.e., the first wave of the GSOEP analyzed here). While data limitations prohibit further examinations of this issue, the preceding results of this dissertation have revealed that East Germans remained distinctly external throughout this later period, which would suggest that even after 1999, there was still room for updating. Moreover, during the timeframe under study here, the Eastern area of Germany did nonetheless benefit from numerous policies designed to further economically equalize the two regions (see Schwarze 1996, Rainer & Siedler 2009, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007, Federal Statistical Office 2006). Consequently, it is practicable to expect any gradual or rational responsiveness to have continued throughout these reforms and years.
example, pointed to a number of conditions deemed important for the persistence of beliefs over time, such as the saliency of the attitude in question, its symbolic nature, and/or its relative strength (e.g., Alwin et al. 1991b, Sears & Valentino 1997, Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1969, Converse & Markus 1979, Jennings & Markus 1984, Krosnick 1991, Miller 1991, Alwin & Krosnick 1991, Green & Palmquist 1994, Sears & Funk 1999). According to these views, variations in the durability of individuals’ beliefs (including orientations pertaining to efficacy) may stem from differences in the relevance, importance and/or intensity of these attitudes across individuals.

Unfortunately, while it was possible to account for demographic characteristics in the preceding analysis, the GSOEP surveys do not include items gauging these other, related factors. Based on what is historically known about the nature of the GDR vs. the FRG, however, it seems reasonable to expect the saliency and potency of control orientations to have systematically varied between these regions. The GDR was, after all, considered to be one of the most dictatorial and all-intrusive of all communist regimes, renowned for the severity with which it sought to indoctrinate individuals with the socialist values of centralization and state command. Given its repressive nature, thus, it seems quite plausible that beliefs about the influence of societal forces are likely to have been more pertinent and vehemently thought-about by veterans of the former East. Consequently, the relative stability of these individuals’ control orientations, even decades after regime change, should also be somewhat anticipated from a social-psychological point of view.

In any case, what is clear from the results of this Extension is that former East Germans have found it comparatively difficult to alter their beliefs about efficacy and
control. Instead, throughout the course of transition, these citizens have been relatively more inclined to preserve their earlier opinions, even when they risk becoming obsolete or incongruent with current times. In terms of the prospects for convergence, thus, the findings reported here elicit even further concerns. In addition to providing additional evidence of the many obstacles to individual-level transition, they do, in fact, also query the bounds of our previous conclusions. In particular, they introduce new questions about the extent to which the (limited) signs of convergence uncovered in prior sections (i.e., Results Section A) have been the result of actual changes in the attitudes of post-communists over time, as opposed to other dynamics of turnover and change. Quite simply, if citizens of the former GDR have been less able to relinquish their pre-existing views, it seems unlikely that any observed adaptation toward the West has arisen primarily by these means. The purpose of the next section, thus, is to probe this matter more directly.

(E) Attitude Change Vs. Generational Replacement

The previous section’s finding that former East Germans exhibit relatively more stable locus of control orientations than their Western peers raises further doubts about the nature and prospects of post-communist convergence. In particular, it calls into question whether the observed rise in East Germans’ efficacy over time (as reported in Table 4.2) has been due to changes in the beliefs of GDR veterans, or simply shifts in the cohort composition over time. This suspicion is further exacerbated by the fact that older Eastern citizens have, in previous sections, also been revealed to be increasingly distinct in their beliefs (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4). What the latter implies is that the usual demographic
shifts over time – i.e., the inevitable replacement of older cohorts by younger ones – are likely to themselves greatly influence the process of adaptation to the West.

To investigate the relative importance of attitudinal readjustments for the dynamics previously observed, thus, Table 4.5 presents the results when the baseline models (from Table 4.2) are re-analyzed, including only those individuals who answered the relevant survey questions in all three waves (see Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln 2007 for a similar approach). Once again, to help interpret the findings, Figure 4.5 offers a visual representation of the estimations, illustrating the over-time differences in efficacy between former GDR and FRG citizens, all else equal (as in Figure 4.1).

Looking at these results, what is immediately striking is the way in which they negate prior hopes of attitudinal adaptation. Specifically, when only the same respondents are examined over time, the interaction effects between the East German variable and both Wave dummies largely disappear, thereby signaling a lack of convergence during these years. To be sure, while the coefficients on the Wave variables remain mostly unchanged from Table 4.2 (indicating that Germans did, in general, exhibit lower efficacy over time), the coefficients on both interactions shrink in size and become insignificant. Consequently, for the duration of transition, the odds of espousing an internal locus of control are found to remain only two-thirds as big for (the same) East German citizens as they are for their West German peers. By 2010, thus, members of the former GDR appear to be just as distinct in their preferences as they were more than a decade before.
What this implies for attitudinal adaptation is therefore simple: based on the results of this section, it does not seem as though much (if any) of the previously observed East-West convergence has arisen from actual changes in East Germans’ beliefs. Instead, much as expected by socialization theories, veterans of the former GDR appear to have firmly held on to their pre-existing locus of control orientations, even in the face of changing circumstances. As a result, almost all of the adaptation that has

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Internal Locus of Control/High Efficacy</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East German</td>
<td>-0.48***</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>-0.72***</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 3</td>
<td>-0.78***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German * Wave 2</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German * Wave 3</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>13923</td>
<td>13923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Logit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if an individual does not show agreement with the statement “my opportunities in life are determined by social conditions.” Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Wave 1 is the omitted category.

\* = p<0.05;  ** = p<0.01;  *** = p<0.001
occurred appears to have been the upshot of over-time population shifts – that is, changes in the cohort composition, which are gradually doing away with the most extreme and un-efficacious of all post-communists.26

With regards to the prospects for future acclimation then, these findings are similarly straightforward. Plainly put, when it comes to post-communist attitudes, it would seem that complete convergence may take even longer than anticipated; for, unless

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26 In their analysis of Germans’ preferences for redistribution, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) find similar results. Specifically, in their examinations, these authors conclude that at least one-third of the observed convergence in preferences has been due to changes in the cohort composition, thereby suggesting that economic policy attitudes may well be more susceptible to rational updating than the locus of control orientations examined here.
re-learning gains apace, it is likely to require the complete replacement of the post-communist generation.

(F) The Beliefs of East-West Migrants

The analyses of the foregoing section have drawn attention to the potential importance of ongoing population changes for the study of attitudinal convergence. Yet another type of such dynamic involves the process of migration within Germany. Migration from East to West Germany has long been an influential force within the nation, spurring initial troubles for the consolidation of the GDR and leading to the eventual construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. While relocation between the two regions was largely suppressed after the establishment of this physical barrier, since its collapse, East Germans have again taken to the prospects of moving West. In 1989 and 1990 alone, for instance, East-West German migration flows represented a nontrivial 2.5% of the East German population (Hunt 2006, Rainer & Siedler 2009. See also Redding & Sturm 2008, Uhlig 2006, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007).

Recognizing the unique experiences of this subpopulation of East Germans – who were socialized under the communist regime of the GDR but were then propelled deep into the institutional situation of the West, surrounding themselves with long-running veterans of the FRG – this section now investigates their relative attitudes and beliefs. In order to do this, the East German variable used in the previous analyses was replaced by two separate dummies: an East-Stayer variable (taking the value of 1 if an individual was living in the region of former East Germany prior to the fall of Berlin Wall and in the years since then), and an East-West-Migrant dummy (taking the value of 1 if an
Utilizing these more nuanced categorizations, this section reexamines the main preceding analyses, looking to see whether migrants to the West are indeed also distinguishable in their internality tendencies. The initial results are illustrated in Table 4.6, which presents the estimations obtained from the baseline specification (as in Table 4.1), including these two dummies and all the individual-level control previous described.

Looking at Table 4.6, the key point to note is – once again – the striking effect of being socialized under the GDR on locus of control orientations. The negative, large and significant coefficients on both the East-Stayer and East-West-Migrant dummies in column 1, for instance, illustrate that citizens from the former communist region were living in the region of former East Germany prior to reunification but subsequently moved to the Western region.)
demonstrate a notable lack of efficacy. In fact, compared to their long-time Western counterparts, the odds of espousing an internal locus of control are only 66% and 77% as big for East German all-timers and migrants, respectively.

The magnitude of this difference can be observed in Figure 4.6, which provides a visual interpretation of the results, illustrating the gaps in efficacy among both East stayers and East defectors, relative to West Germans (all else equal). As can be seen from this diagram, although East-West migrants are found to be significantly different from (and more internal than) their non-moving Eastern peers,\textsuperscript{27} they are nonetheless revealed to exhibit distinctly external tendencies when compared to their West German neighbors.

\textsuperscript{27} Test statistics confirmed that these two coefficients are not equal, at the 5% level.
That even this selective subgroup of GDR veterans is shown to express significantly less efficacy owing to their previous experience of communism thereby provides even further support of socialization accounts (and, in particular Hypothesis 1), demonstrating the undeviating applicability of previous findings.28

From the perspective of attitudinal adaptation, thus, the findings reported here are intriguing, particularly as they speak to the long-standing issues of socialization, acclimation and self-selection. Clearly, the fact that both types of East Germans are distinguishable in their efficacy beliefs corroborates previous evidence of the enduring effects of early (“primacy”) regime experiences on present, post-communist attitudes. However, the finding that East-West migrants exhibit control orientations somewhere in between those of their former Eastern peers and their current Western neighbors is, in fact, more evasive and could be interpreted in a number of ways. On the one hand, this pattern may attest to rationalist accounts of attitude change, insofar as it might demonstrate how the experience of living among West Germans may have driven migrants to more promptly update their preferences toward Western norms; on the other hand, this could simply be due to self-selection – i.e., those with higher levels of efficacy to begin with may have selectively chosen to move to the Western region after 1989 (see also Leuermann & Necker 2011, Bauernschuster & Rainer 2011, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010, Rainer & Siedler 2009, Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln 2007).

Unfortunately, lacking comparable measures of efficacy at the time of reunification and/or items gauging individuals’ motives for moving, it is not possible to

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28 For similar analyses of East German migrants, but with regards to other behaviors or preferences, see Heineck & Sussmuth (2010), Bauernschuster & Rainer (2011), Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln (2007), Rainer & Siedler (2009), Leuermann & Necker (2011), Bonin et al. (2009).
fully explore the extent of self-selection using the panel data at hand. What is possible, however, is an investigation into the relative degree of attitude change among these individuals over time, in order to see whether East-West migrants have, at least, been more or less prone to altering their stated beliefs since relocating. As an additional step of analysis, thus, the comparative durability of locus of control orientations across these individuals was also assessed. Table 4.7 presents these results, showing the effects of being an East-Stayer vs. East-West-Migrant on the three measures of attitude stability previously examined (in Results Section D), controlling for age, gender and education.

Rather than providing consistent evidence in favor of rationalist theories, the results in Table 4.7 would appear to – once more – underline the persistence of post-communists’ predispositions. Considering first the degree of attitude stability among East Germans living in the East, for instance, what is indicated by the consistently positive and significant coefficient on the East-Stayer dummy is that these citizens have been notably more likely than West Germans to hold on to their efficacy beliefs over time, regardless of the measure of stability employed.

While the findings for East German migrants are somewhat more equivocal, they nevertheless point to a largely similar tendency. Specifically, although the coefficient on the East-West-Migrant dummy is only significant for the least stringent stability measure, it is nonetheless found to also be positive for all three. Accordingly, even if it is not possible to unambiguously conclude that Eastern deserters have been significantly more likely than West Germans to retain their prior beliefs (as was the case for their non-moving comrades), it is clear that that they have not, at least, been any more emphatic about relinquishing their values from the past. In other words, despite the fact that East-
**TABLE 4.7: ATTITUDE STABILITY OF EAST-STAYERS VS. EAST-WEST MIGRANTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I: Loose Measure of Attitude Stability (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>II: Strict Measure of Attitude Stability (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>III: Mid Measure of Attitude Stability (Coefficients)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East-Stayer</td>
<td>1.58*** (0.10)</td>
<td>1.62*** (0.10)</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-West-Migrant</td>
<td>1.46** (0.18)</td>
<td>1.15 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>1.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>1.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>1.15** (0.06)</td>
<td>1.06 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.02* (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>0.89 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.65*** (0.06)</td>
<td>2.51*** (0.21)</td>
<td>0.45*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5429</td>
<td>8475</td>
<td>8475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Logit regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if an individual exhibits loose/strict stability in efficacy responses over time; in column 3, it is the continuous measure of stability, ranging from 0-1.

*= p<0.05; **= p<0.01; ***= p<0.001

West migrants have, in many ways, been confronted with the greatest change in circumstances – immersing themselves within the long-established, liberal system and citizenry of the West – they have still not found it any more necessary than their new Western neighbors to readjust their views during this time.29

Comparing these individuals to their former Eastern neighbors yields similar implications; for when it comes to the question of whether these movers have, at a minimum, tended to alter their opinions more frequently than their non-migrating peers,

29 If anything, the findings reported here (and the positive coefficients) would indicate quite the opposite: a tendency to persevere.
the findings are irresolute, hinging largely on the measure of attitude stability employed
and thereby providing no solid evidence of rationalist updating.30

Overall, thus, the findings of this section offer both hopes and warnings about the
prospect of post-communist attitudinal adaptation. While the results reported here have
shown that individuals who migrated to West Germany after reunification appear to be
somewhat less inclined to believe in the dominance of societal forces, it is unclear
whether this tendency has been due to a readjustment of beliefs among these individuals,
or simple self-selection in the decision to migrate. What is more, it does not seem to be
the case that the views of these transient citizens have been subject to relatively greater
fluctuations over time. This latter finding not only cast doubts on the scope for rationalist
theories to account for the (middling) orientations of GDR migrants, but also helps
explain why these post-communists do, nevertheless, continue to espouse distinctly non-
Western views about efficacy and control.

Altogether then, the findings presented here would seem to add further credence
to socialization accounts of attitude formation. Even twenty years after the removal of the
physical barrier separating East from West, individuals who grew up under the
communist GDR are revealed to remain distinguishably authoritarian in their locus of
control orientations, regardless of where they live today. In fact, looking again at Table
4.7, what is perhaps most remarkable is the finding that East-West migrants hold control
orientations relatively more in line with their confreres from the bygone era of
communism than from their contemporary Western realities. This result not only verifies

30 Specifically, test statistics reveal that the coefficients on the East-Stayer and East-West-Migrants variables are only
different from one another, at the 5% level, for the “Loose” and “Mid-” measures of stability.
that the differences in efficacy between East and West Germans reported in Table 4.1 have been driven by both East Germans living in the East and those who relocated West, but it also raises concerns about the possibility of eventual convergence as a result of integration with non-post-communists.

Quite simply, even if migration and contact with the West provides some impetus for rational responsiveness, it does not appear to have excessively hastened the process of convergence in Germany over the last two decades. At the very least, it seems to be no match for the long-lasting influence of socialization (or “primacy”) regime experiences, which have, once again, proven themselves here to be pivotal.\(^3\)

**(G) Intergenerational Transmission Of Values**

So far, the *Extensions* of this chapter have highlighted various difficulties in the process of post-communist attitudinal adaptation, revealing how individuals who grew up in former East Germany have struggled to change their own beliefs over the course of transition. Based on this finding, it has been suggested that eventual convergence to Western norms may therefore occur primarily as a result of generational replacement, as opposed to individual re-learning or even relocation. This reasoning has, however, hitherto neglected the potential role of *person-to-person* influences on attitude formation. In particular, it assumes that parents socialized under the GDR are not able to pass on

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31 In addition to the supplementary analyses presented here, the relationship of age among East-West migrants was also considered. Here again, movers to the West were found to lie somewhere in between all-time East and West Germans. Specifically, while age was found to be positively (negatively) associated with internal control in the West (East), its relationship was found to be insignificant among East-West migrants. While this could be due to peculiarities in the age composition of migrants and/or differences in their patterns of attitude change, it is also likely due in part to the problems of reduced sample size and noisiness. For the same reason, breaking down this subpopulation to conduct over-time and cohort analyses was also problematic, yielding no noteworthy results.
their control orientations to their offspring over time. If such parental transmission were, in fact, a possibility, the ramifications for attitudinal adaptation would be even more disconcerting; for such dynamics would not only expand the long-term influence of the communist past on individuals’ attitudes today (i.e., by enabling post-communists to transfer their distinctly authoritarian predispositions to younger Germans, who may not themselves have any memory of socialism), but it might also slow down any prospects of convergence by means of generational turnover. Accordingly, thus, in this section, the household structure of the GSOEP data is finally exploited so as to probe the relative degree of intergenerational transmission across the two Germanies (for related work, see Dohmen et al. 2012, Leuermann & Necker 2011, 2012, Kroh & Selb 2009, Zuckerman et al. 2007, Kroh 2009, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010).

From a theoretical point of view, the extent to which parental influences are likely to hinder post-communist adaptation are, in fact, varied. On the one hand, for example, there are the numerous studies of intergenerational transmission within the sociological, political- and social-psychological fields, which have repeatedly unearthed nontrivial links between the attitudes of parents and their children (albeit largely in the US domain, see Campbell et al. 1960, Easton & Dennis 1967, Jennings & Niemi 1974, 1981, Loehlin et al. 1981, Beck & Jennings 1991, Jennings et al. 2009). Underlining these papers has been the notion that, “foremost among agencies of socialization into politics is the family” (Hyman 1959: 69) and – in particular – parents, who often provide important cues to adolescents otherwise lacking direct experience with the social or political realm. Notwithstanding the variations that have been found to exist in such parent-child associations depending on the type of attitude being examined (e.g., Jennings & Niemi
1968, Jennings et al. 2009, Sears & Brown 2013, Sears & Levy 2003),\(^{32}\) for a given belief (such as the locus of control orientation analyzed here), the implications of this work for the present study are simple: that is, if these accounts apply to the German setting, such that parents from both the former GDR and FRG are able to similarly pass down their (unique) efficacy beliefs to their descendants, then differences in the attitudes of East and West Germans are only likely to persevere even further into the future. The dangers for eventual post-communist convergence are, therefore, portended to be both palpable and grave.

Yet, from a rationalist perspective, these warnings would appear to be somewhat overstated. For, according to these accounts, parents from the former GDR are expected to have relatively fewer incentives to impart their own (distinct) values to their young. The logic behind this stems from economic models of cultural transmission (Bisin & Verdier 2000, 2001, 2005, 2010), in which parents are assumed to be altruistic and to care about the utility of their offspring. Within later versions of these models, mothers and fathers are said to have a choice about how much effort to exert into educating their children with their own values. This decision is, in turn, largely dependent on the economic and social conditions they anticipate for their kids – or, more precisely, the extent to which they expect their own preferences to also be of value or relevance to their heirs (also known as “perfect empathy;” see Leuermann & Necker 2012). Based on this

\(^{32}\) It should be noted that researchers have also pointed to the importance of parental characteristics and the nature of parent-child relationships in determining the extent of such transmission (e.g., Tedin 1974, Beck & Jennings 1991, Westholm 1999, Jennings et al. 2009). While parental characteristics were included in the models and analyses to come, it was decided that a full investigation into parent-child relationships/communications was beyond the scope of the current study, particularly as such factors are not expected to vary systematically across regions. Nonetheless, as discussed in fn. 45, as part of later robustness checks, variables gauging the extent of fighting between parents and children were also included in the analyses, yielding no substantive effect on the results reported here.
rationale then, when parents recognize that their beliefs may not be as useful in their child’s environment as they were in the one that they were raised – and/or when the surroundings have changed – mothers and fathers are predicted to dispense with the instruments of vertical transmission (see also Leuermann & Necker 2011, 2012, Dohmen 2012, Heineck & Sussmuth 2010, Bisin & Verdier 2000, 2001, 2005, 2010, Achen 2002).

In the case of Germany, thus, such rationalist accounts would appear to yield more optimistic forecasts for eventual adaptation. In particular, given that reunification with the West has resulted in the complete transformation of the economic, political and social conditions of the East – granting all citizens substantial freedoms, extensive protections from the state, and unrestricted opportunities – these models would reasonably predict East German parents to, at a minimum, perceive these changes and therefore downplay the future value of their own experiences and control orientations. By extension then, parents from the former East should also be somewhat less inclined to pass down their views about efficacy and self-rule to their successors – or, at least, relatively less so than their counterparts in the West; for, unlike veterans of the GDR, members of the former FRG will likely expect their offspring to grow up in much the same setting as they did and to therefore benefit from their personal insights and values.\(^{33}\)

In other words then, if rationalist perspectives are correct, the link between the efficacy beliefs of parents and their children should be found to differ in the two parts of Germany; and, in particular, to be significantly weaker among former East Germans. Such a finding would thereby not only dampen any potential risks that intergenerational

\(^{33}\) The children of these GDR veterans may, in turn, also be somewhat hesitant to accept their guardians’ preferences, particularly as they anticipate these Mother’s/Father’s signals to be somewhat redundant or, at least, noisy (e.g., Achen 2002).
transmission might pose for general convergence, but should also mean that younger Germans will cease to be haunted by the experiences of their elders’ past. To the extent that reunification (and the subsequent abolition of socialist institutions) has also effectively eliminated the probability that children will acquire authoritarian traits through horizontal or oblique channels of transmission (e.g., from school curricula, media, mass organizations, etc.), these differential effects should, in fact, be especially pronounced and noteworthy.34

The purpose of this Extension then, is to examine whether parental transmission of attitudes is, in fact, in an equally potent force in the two parts of Germany. In order to do so, the preceding analyses of control orientations are herein, once again, revisited, but now with a focus on individuals whose parents also answered the relevant GSOEP survey questions. By comparing the relative influence of parents’ values on children’s ones in the East versus West, the aim is to probe whether efficacy beliefs are conserved across generations and regions.

Methodologically speaking, although the empirical approach in this section largely resembles that from the main analyses, a number of modifications were

34 It should be noted that earlier economic models of transmission assumed “imperfect empathy” – namely that parents always believe it is optimal for their children to inherit their own values (or, in other words, that parents’ utility is arbitrarily higher if vertical transmission occurs (see the papers of Bisin & Verdier, as well as Tabellini (2008)). Although this somewhat unrealistic assumption has since been relaxed (see Bisin & Verdier 2010), it is worth noting the implications of this alternative scheme for the analyses here. In particular, while under the assumption of “imperfect empathy,” the model would also predict parents in both East and West Germany to be similarly interested in transferring their own beliefs to their offspring, the probability that a child actually inherits this trait would still nonetheless depend on the likelihood of horizontal transmission (i.e., the fraction of the population sharing this attitude, as well as other channels of oblique socialization, such as schools, media, mass organizations, etc.). Given that reunification has de facto lowered the chances of such oblique influences, observing a similar parent-child link in the attitudes of East and West Germans would therefore solely fit these early models if, and only if, East German parents have compensated for these weaker horizontal links by putting significantly more effort into vertically imprinting their children with their own beliefs (see Leuermann & Necker 2011). Such a behavior, while theoretically plausible, would nonetheless appear to be somewhat restrictive and unrealistic; and, in any case, cannot be verified with the current data at hand. As such, it is left as a hypothetical alternative to the present arrangement.
nevertheless required for the intergenerational investigations and are therefore worth noting. Firstly, in order to compare the attitudes of parents and their offspring, it was necessary to match children with their mothers and/or fathers within the dataset, and to only analyze those respondents for which there is available parental information. In the initial analyses described here (and reported in Table 4.8), this included individuals for which there is relevant information for at least one parent. In later investigations, however, this was restricted to encompass only those for which information is available for both mother and father (see Table 4.9). Fortunately, the household structure of the GSOEP provides ample opportunities for locating such relations; in the present analysis, this process yielded a sizeable 7,000 - 8,000 observations, depending on the controls included in the models (see below).

Once these parent-child pairs were identified, the next step was to create a measure of parental control orientations for each respondent in the sample. The purpose of this variable is to gauge variations in the internality of individuals’ parents, which can then be employed as a predictor of individuals’ own efficacy beliefs. In the investigations that follow, thus, parents’ responses to the same locus of control item used the preceding analyses were gathered and merged to their child’s information, thereby generating an analogous measure of Parental Efficacy. Utilizing this variable in the empirical analyses

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35 It should be noted that while the initial analyses of this section (i.e., Table 4.8) examine pairs for which there is relevant information from at least one parent, later investigations consider only those for which there are responses from both parents (i.e., Table 4.9). In the case of the former, consolidated measures of Mother’s/Father’s responses were included in the analysis: if information was available for both parents, their responses were integrated and this combined information was utilized; if, on the other hand only information from one parent is available, then his/her response is simply used. In the case of the latter, however, maternal and paternal responses were both examined and included separately in the analyses.
then, it is possible to investigate the conformity of a respondent’s personal locus of control orientation to that of his or her parents.\textsuperscript{36}

Of course, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, while parental cues are likely to exert some influence on a person’s locus of control orientations, there are nonetheless a number of personal characteristics and resource-related variables that are also likely to play a part (e.g., education, income, employment, etc.). As was the case in the main, preceding analyses, thus, it is important to control too for the effects of these related predictors. Accordingly, in the examinations of this section, the measure of Parental Efficacy described above is added to all of the \textit{individual}-level controls from the baseline models of Table 4.1.\textsuperscript{37}

Nevertheless, while these individual-level controls may have been sufficient in this chapter’s earlier investigations, from the perspective of intergenerational transmission, they may not be enough; for many of these variables gauging social milieu are, in fact, themselves likely to also be similar across generations (e.g., Dalton 1982, Glass et al. 1986, Mulligan 1997, Solon 2002, Bengtson et al. 2002, Charles and Hurst 2003, Bjorklund 2007, Heineck and Riphahn 2009, Jennings et al. 2009). To ensure that congruities in the attitudes of children and their parents are, in fact, due to the transferal of values as opposed to resemblances in their resources and lifestyles, thus, it is necessary to also account for these same factors at the \textit{parental}-level. For this reason, in addition to

\textsuperscript{36} Specifically, for this measure of Mother’s/Father’s Efficacy, a combined measure of parents’ control orientations was created, based on either the responses from the single parent (if only mother or father answered the locus of control item), or else the information from both (if both mother and father provided answers).

\textsuperscript{37} This corresponds to the following controls, as discussed in the preceding analyses: Age, Income, Home Ownership, Current Unemployment, Unemployment History, Higher Education, Gender, Marital Status, Religiosity, Political Participation and Party Identification. The only difference from Table 4.1 then is that the Retired variable is dropped as a predictor, due to its irrelevance in this younger sample. Including this variable does not substantively alter the results.
the various individual-level predictors included in Table 4.1, the models of this section are subsequently expanded to also include parental measures for all of these controls (see also Dohmen et al. 2012, Leuermann & Necker 2012 for a similar approach using the GSOEP data).38

Utilizing these more elaborate models of control orientations, thus, the extent to which Germans are, ceteris paribus, likely to inherit their parents’ locus of control can now be examined. What remains, however, is a discussion of how the prevalence of such intergenerational transmission is to be compared across both East and West German families. In the analyses of this section, this is in fact achieved in a number of ways. First, as a primary probe, the sample of GSOEP respondents is split into two smaller, subsets – each comprised of individuals whose parent(s) come from either the former GDR or FRG – and the influence of Parental Efficacy is assessed separately within each subcategory. Subsequently, in order to more directly contrast the regional effects of such parental influences, an examination on the pooled sample of respondents is also undertaken. Here, a dummy variable – Parent From East – is created, taking the value 1 if the individual’s parent(s) originate from the former GDR, and zero otherwise. Once generated, both this dummy and its interaction with Parental Efficacy are also included in the models. By examining and comparing the effects of both Parental Efficacy and its interaction with

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38 This was, once again, achieved by gathering and merging parents’ information from the corresponding survey items to their children’s responses. As discussed in a previous footnote, in these initial analyses, parent-child pairs for which there is relevant information from at least one parent are included in the sample. For these controls, thus, consolidated measures of Mother’s/Father’s responses were examined – i.e., if information was available for both parents, their responses were merged and this combined information was utilized; if, on the other hand, only information from one parent is available, then his/her response is simply used. The relevant Mother’s/Father’s controls here are, therefore, combined measures of: Mother’s/Father’s Age, Mother’s/Father’s Income, Mother’s/Father’s Home Ownership, Mother’s/Father’s Employment Status, Mother’s/Father’s Unemployment History, Mother’s/Father’s Higher Education, Mother’s/Father’s Religiosity, Mother’s/Father’s Political Participation and Mother’s/Father’s Party Identification. The only differences from Table 4.1 are that (a) the Gender variable is dropped, and (b) the Marital Status variable is recoded to equal 1 if the respondents’ mother and father are still married, and zero otherwise. Excluding this variable does not substantively alter the results.
Parent From East, thus, it is possible to not only explore the general importance of parental transmission for Germans’ locus of control orientations, but to also see whether this relationship is, in fact, significantly different among children of the post-communist generation.

Table 4.8 presents the main results, illustrating the influence of parents’ control orientations on their children’s efficacy across Germany. While columns 1 and 2 show the basic association within the samples of West and East German parents, respectively, columns 3 and 4 do so with the inclusion of individual- and parental-level controls. Column 5 then demonstrates the findings when the Parent From East dummy and its interaction with Parental Efficacy are included in the full model, with the pooled sample of respondents. In order to correct for possible correlations of the error terms across individuals from the same household, robust standard errors, now clustered at the household-level were employed throughout the analyses.

Considering first columns 1–4 of Table 4.8, what is striking from these findings is the strong, significant and robust intergenerational relationship in efficacy beliefs. Even with the inclusion of numerous individual- and parental-level controls, a person’s odds of espousing an internal locus of control are shown to be raised by over 200% when his or her parents also express such values. The magnitude of this effect is not only noteworthy, but is also found to be stable across each specification and region. In fact, its significance and size is hardly changed across all four columns, suggesting that parental transmission is indeed an equally powerful force in the East and West.
### TABLE 4.8: (COMBINED) PARENTAL TRANSMISSION FOR EAST AND WEST GERMAN PARENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Internal Locus of Control/High Efficacy</th>
<th>West German Sample: Neither Parent from GDR (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>East German Sample: Neither Parent from GDR (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>West German Sample: Neither Parent from GDR (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>East German Sample: Neither Parent from GDR (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>With a Regional Interaction Term: Full Sample (Odds Ratios)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental Efficacy</td>
<td>2.20***</td>
<td>2.38***</td>
<td>2.17***</td>
<td>2.20***</td>
<td>2.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent from East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent from East * Parental Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5303</td>
<td>3268</td>
<td>4406</td>
<td>2837</td>
<td>7243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Logit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if an individual does not show agreement with the statement "my opportunities in life are determined by social conditions." Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. *= p<0.05; **= p<0.01; ***= p<0.001
The results of column 5 confirm this regional correspondence. This is indicated by the interaction term between Parental Efficacy and Parent from the East, which is revealed here to be non-significant (and small in size). In doing so, thus, it provides direct validation of the commonness in intergenerational processes, indicating that parental values are not notably less (or more) instrumental for the offspring of GDR veterans.

The other findings of column 5 simply corroborate the earlier conclusions. Here, Parental Efficacy is again shown to be significant and similarly proportioned, thereby reaffirming its influential role: in this column, having internally-inclined parents is found to, in general, (more than) double the odds of high efficacy for children.

The significant coefficient on the Parent From East dummy, on the other hand, speaks to the externalizing effect of having post-communist parents. This impact is, in fact, critical, for being born to parents from the former East is shown to reduce the odds of internality by around 15%.\(^{39}\) In doing so, thus, it provides even further evidence of the abiding influence of the communist past.

So far, the results of this Extension would appear to cast doubts on the more optimistic tones implied by rationalist theories of intergenerational transmission. That is, rather than it being the case that children of East Germans are relatively immune to inheriting their parents’ beliefs, the findings of Table 4.8 would instead suggest that they are similarly at risk. By conforming to their parents’ views about the dominance of social

\(^{39}\) It should be noted that this variable is likely to speak to various forces at play. For individuals born before 1989 and who themselves grew up in the GDR, it may simply capture their own experiences with communism. Otherwise, it might be a relic of other instruments of socialization – both vertical and horizontal. It could even represent the influence of other untapped but systematic differences in human capital or circumstances faced by children of post-communists.
and external agents, these descendants are, in turn, likely to perpetuate the East-West divide in locus of control orientations.

Until now, however, parents have been treated as a homogenous unit within the family. In order to see whether there are, at least, any regional differences in the rates of transmission between mothers and fathers, Table 4.9 presents results when these analyses are repeated using partitioned information from both parents. For these investigations, thus, the combined Parental Efficacy measure employed in Table 4.8 is replaced by separate measures of Mother’s Efficacy and Father’s Efficacy. Similarly, the variable Parent from East is substituted for by a Both Parents From East dummy, which takes the value of 1 if an individual’s mother and father grew up in the GDR, and zero otherwise. This variable is also used to split the sample, such that the East German subset now includes children to a post-communist mother and father. As before, results are presented both with and without a host of controls, which are now included at the individual-level, as well as separately for mothers and fathers.40 Again, robust standard errors, clustered at the household-level are employed throughout the analyses.

Looking at Table 4.9, what is immediately evident is that both mothers and fathers are important sources of efficacy cues for German children. With or without controls, the likelihood of exhibiting high efficacy is shown to increase significantly when either parent also manifests such self-ruling tendencies. This is, in fact, found to be

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40 In these analyses, then, the relevant controls are: Mother’s/Father’s Age, Mother’s/Father’s Employment Status, Mother’s/Father’s Unemployment History, Mother’s/Father’s Higher Education, Mother’s/Father’s Religiosity, Mother’s/Father’s Political Participation and Mother’s/Father’s Party Identification. As both Household Income and Home Ownership were highly correlated between (and often identical for) mothers and fathers, a combined measure of these variables was used. As in Table 4.8, the Gender variable was also dropped for parents, and the Marital Status variable was recoded to equal 1 if the respondent’s mother and father are still married, and zero otherwise. These results are robust to alternative specifications of these controls.
TABLE 4.9: MOTHER VS. FATHER TRANSMISSION AMONG EAST AND WEST GERMAN PARENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West German Sample (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>East German Sample: Both Parents from GDR (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>West German Sample (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>East German Sample: Both Parents from GDR (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>With a Regional Interaction Term: Full Sample (Odds Ratios)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother’s Efficacy</strong></td>
<td>1.95*** (0.16)</td>
<td>1.51*** (0.19)</td>
<td>1.95*** (0.18)</td>
<td>1.38* (0.19)</td>
<td>1.97** (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Father’s Efficacy</strong></td>
<td>1.29** (0.10)</td>
<td>1.82*** (0.22)</td>
<td>1.34** (0.12)</td>
<td>1.81*** (0.24)</td>
<td>1.34** (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Parents from GDR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents from GDR * Mother’s Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.70* (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents from GDR * Father’s Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.33 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child Controls</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother and Father Controls</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>3905</td>
<td>2120</td>
<td>3089</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>4899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Logit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if an individual does not show agreement with the statement "my opportunities in life are determined by social conditions." Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01; **** = p < 0.001
the case across all subsamples and regions, as evidenced by the estimated odds ratios for both Mother’s Efficacy and Father’s Efficacy, which are significant and greater than 1 in all columns.

Perhaps even more intriguing, however, is the finding that mothers and fathers appear to exert somewhat differing influences on their children’s views, even while both being instrumental. What is more, their relative impact is not necessarily revealed to be the same across German regions. Among Western families, for instance, the results in columns 1 and 3 would suggest that mothers are significantly more influential than fathers for their children’s values; while paternal internality is found to raise the odds of individual efficacy two-fold, paternal efficacy is shown to only increase these chances by about a third.\(^{41}\) Amid families from the former GDR, by contrast, the results would point to the opposite relationship (columns 2 and 4). Here, the point estimates instead suggest that children lean toward procuring their father’s degree of internality rather than resembling their mother’s (though these differences are not found to be statistically distinguishable from one another).\(^{42}\)

A glance at column 5 verifies many of these subtle patterns. Here, both Mother’s Efficacy and Father’s Efficacy are again revealed to be significantly related to an individual’s own beliefs. While these effects are not found to be significantly different from one another in general, the significant interaction between Mother’s Efficacy and the Both Parents From East dummy indicates that maternal values are, at least, distinctly

\(^{41}\) Test statistics revealed that the coefficients on Mother’s Efficacy and Father’s Efficacy are statistically different from one another in the West German sample, at the 5% level.

\(^{42}\) In the East German sample, test statistics could not conclude, at the 5% level, that the estimates for Mother’s Efficacy and Father’s Efficacy were distinguishable from one another.
(less) important in the East. Children of GDR veterans, in other words, appear to be relatively under-swayed by matriarchal orientations than their counterparts from the West. Although it cannot be confirmed that paternal cues are correspondingly more influential for these individuals (owing to the insignificant interaction term), the point estimates are, at least, suggestive of such drifts.

When it comes to the effect of being born into a post-communist family, however, the results are nevertheless explicit. As before, this is found to yield an externalizing force; and an even greater one now that both parents are involved. As is shown in column 5, having two parents from the GDR is, in fact, found to reduce the odds of efficacy by almost 30%. This effect, which is twice as remarkable as that in Table 4.8, is thereby further testament to social-psychological theories, demonstrating the enduring effects of the communist past, even for those who may not themselves have been around.

Overall, thus, the implications of these results for the broader problem of attitudinal convergence would appear to be somewhat thorny. On the one hand, the findings reported in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 clearly provide new warnings about the prospects of post-communist adaptation. That is, not only have veterans of the former East been shown to exhibit distinctly non-Western control orientations as a result of their personal experience with the GDR, but it would now seem that their children might be afflicted too. For, as has been revealed in this section, the sons and daughters of these post-communists are still susceptible to inheriting their parents’ beliefs.
Yet, the nuanced findings from Table 4.9 would also point to some more encouraging trends. In particular, while the results of these later analyses do also validate the importance of parental influences, they nonetheless suggest a relatively smaller role for mothers in the East. Given that females have been found to exhibit significantly lower propensities for internal control (both in the preceding analyses of this chapter, and in the existing literature on locus of control), such asymmetric transferal may, thereby, effectively help compensate for the problems posed by such intergenerational dynamics. In other words, although it seems likely that East-West differences in efficacy are likely to be perpetuated by the instruments of parental transmission, the gap may partially be diminished by the propensity of East German children to, at least, stray a little further from their mother’s norms.

That being said, taken as whole, the findings presented in this Extension do not raise high hopes for rationalist accounts of post-communist transition. That is, rather than providing evidence of prompt responsiveness to altering realities, these results have instead called attention to additional obstacles in the process of adjustment. More specifically, by highlighting the prevalence of intergenerational transmission in the two parts of Germany, they have reaffirmed the enduring influence of the communist past, showing how it may hinder adjustment to Western norms, both in the present and in the future. In doing so, thus, they have provided even further evidence of social-psychological theories and corroborated the results of previous sections. In fact, by offering an explanation for the persistence of East-West distinctions among German youths, they may have also have shed light on some of the more intriguing cohorts results from Chapters III and IV of this dissertation – namely, the finding that even the youngest
of all post-communists (i.e., those born after 1975) often tend to exhibit socialist beliefs, despite their limited first-hand experience with the prior regime.\textsuperscript{44}

What all this bodes for the future of reunited Germany is, therefore, equally unsettling. Simply put, once the potential ramifications of intergenerational transmission are considered, it becomes almost impossible to make predictions about the prospects and timing of eventual convergence. Previously, it was thought that such adaptation might require the entire replacement of the post-communist generation. Now, however, even this appears too soon; for even when beholders of the GDR have gone, their children remain in jeopardy of disseminating their predispositions, and further propagating the communist legacies of the East.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{SUMMARY & CONCLUSION}

As the first fragments of the Berlin Wall hit the ground in November of 1989, the citizens of East Germany were thrust into a state of total institutional metamorphosis. For with that momentous event commenced the complete eradication of the GDR – the removal of arguably the most repressive of all communist regimes, which had ruthlessly dictated

\textsuperscript{44} In fact, in supplementary analyses (not reported here), the degree of intergenerational transmission was also separately examined for members of this (youngest) cohort, who arguably have the lowest incentives for acquiring their parents’ outdated values. The results are, however, almost completely identical to those presented here: that is, individuals from this group are just as prone to inheriting their parents’ control orientations as members of other cohorts and/or other German regions, thereby providing further evidence of the pervasiveness of intergenerational transmission.

\textsuperscript{45} It should be noted that, as an additional robustness check, items measuring the extent to which children fought with their mothers and fathers at the age of 15 were also included in the models, yielding no substantive impact on the results. It was decided, however, that an analysis of the role played by familial relations was beyond the scope of this study, particularly as such conditions are not expected to vary systematically across regions. This concern was exacerbated by the fact that these retrospective variables are subject to numerous problems of measurement and recall. Consequently, such topics are left for future work to address.
these individuals since the exogenous split of the country in 1945. Beginning almost immediately thereafter, the region formerly belonging to the East was to embark upon a process of full integration into the West. Steps were taken for the FRG’s models of the free market and democracy to be easterly transferred, and reforms were passed to induce social and living conditions to be similarly conferred.

By 1990, Germany was, once again, united. After four decades of arbitrarily imposed communism, the East had reverted to the West, adopting back its economic and political system of governance, as well as its guiding ideological principles and laws. The road to transition, in other words, had been traced; and for the first time in forty years, the post-communist citizens of the former GDR could enjoy the same macro-foundations, constitutional protections, civil rights, and individual freedoms as their erstwhile peers across the Wall.

In light of the historic experience of German reunification, thus, the purpose of this chapter was to examine the analogous process of adjustment at the micro-level – that is, to investigate if and how East German citizens have fared with the changes that have taken place. More specifically, drawing from both rationalist and socialization theories of belief formation, it sought to analyze the dynamics of attitudinal reunification, looking to see whether members of the former GDR have similarly managed to move forward from the values and expectations upheld by the previous regime, so as to embrace the norms and standards of the West.

Given the fundamental changes experienced by these individuals in terms of their (newly acquired) personal liberties and self-autonomy, it did so with a focus on attitudes pertaining to efficacy or “locus of control” – i.e., perceptions about the extent to which
social or external forces command the opportunities and outcomes in one’s own life. By contrasting the evolution of these beliefs among former East and West Germans over the course of transition, the aim was to take methodological advantage of the German “natural experiment,” in order to supplement the analyses of Chapter III and further contribute to the dissertation’s study of post-communist adaptation.

In this regard, the chapter has achieved what it set out to do. For, overall, the findings here have been remarkable for the ways in which they have substantiated and replicated the project’s earlier examinations (albeit using new data, distinct variables, and different modeling techniques). As was the case in Chapter III then, at the crux of the results has been the corroboration of social-psychological perspectives and the reaffirmation of the numerous obstacles to post-communist adaptation, owing largely to the forces of socialization, “primacy” regime experiences and attitude persistence. To be sure, while GDR veterans are, in this chapter, again found to have exhibited some signs of responsiveness and rationalist thinking over the last twenty years, the brunt of the findings have nonetheless revolved around the ways in which they continue to be influenced by remnants of their socialist past.

Not only are these individuals, for instance, more likely than their Western peers to perpetually believe in the dominance and command of external forces – despite now sharing the exact same freedoms, rights and securities – but their distinct, authoritarian predispositions are shown to persist for decades into reunification, with limited signs of convergence of time. What is more, on account of their contrasting socialization experiences, age is also demonstrated to be dissimilarly related to control orientations across the two regions. Similar to Chapter III, while growing old is found to be associated
with the adoption of more individualistic attitudes in the West, older post-communists—with longer exposure to the oppressive GDR—tend to instead become progressively less internal as they age.

Consequently, and as was confirmed by birth cohort analyses, the task of adaptation is revealed to be a somewhat non-uniform undertaking for post-communists. In particular, due to the uneven distribution of attitudinal biases, the process of Western acculturation is demonstrated to represent a far greater challenge for older East Germans, who are confronted with the burden of bridging notably greater attitudinal chasms than the youth. For this very reason, whenever East-West convergence has, in fact, been found to occur, it has usually involved only those born in the most recent decades and who arguably were not even socialized under the previous regime. For individuals that spent any longer than their childhood years in the GDR, on the other hand, relinquishing the feelings of entrapment and restraint has proven far more problematic.

Given the similarity of these initial, main results to those in Chapter III, thus, it is already clear that the implications of this study largely echo those from prior analyses. To put it simply, the automaticity of individual-level transition should not be taken for granted; for, as has been shown once more, basic attitudes persist, even when institutions change and living conditions improve. Yet, by embarking upon an expansive series of auxiliary Extensions – made possible by the unique longitudinal- and household-structure of the GSOEP – this chapter would appear to have advanced and augmented these forewarnings even further. For, as a result of these supplementary examinations, a number of (longer-term) mechanisms of adaptation could also be probed, revealing even deeper impediments to change.
In analyses of within-person attitude stability, for instance, the relative fluctuations of East and West Germans’ control orientations were assessed, in order to see whether transition citizens have, at least, been more prone to altering their stated beliefs over time. As suspected by the earlier results, however, this was not found to be the case. On the contrary, rather than rationally updating their views, East Germans are shown to be significantly more likely than West Germans to adhere to their pre-existing values, despite the major societal transformations that have taken place.

The scope of this finding was, in turn, further borne out in the following *Extension*, which investigated the composition of attitude change over time. Here, the problems of post-communist transition became even more evident, for it was revealed that all (previously-observed) signs of East-West convergence do, in fact, disappear when only the same respondents are included in the models and studied. What adaptation has occurred, in other words, would appear to have done so by means of over-time changes in the cohort composition, as opposed to actual adjustments in East Germans’ beliefs.

As an additional probe into the prospects of acclimation and the influences of demographic dynamics, the following *Extension* then explored the topic of migration – namely, the attitudes of former GDR citizens who moved West after reunification. Doing so, however, provided even further support of social-psychological perspectives. To be sure, while East-West migrants are found to espouse control orientations somewhere in between those of their former Eastern comrades and their current Western neighbors, whether this has, in fact, been due to modifications in their values or simply self-selection in their migration could not be deduced. Examinations of their relative attitude stability certainly questioned the applicability of the former, as even these citizens fail to register
appreciable belief fluctuations over time, in spite of the unquestionable overhaul in their environments. In other words, even if relocation away from the post-communist region can be surmised to provide some stimulus for attitudinal updating, it is clearly insufficient for the obliteration of socialist distinctions; for, as shown here, even long-time defectors of the GDR have, after decades in the West, foundered to fully relinquish the native tendencies of the East.

Based on these initial Extensions, thus, it was suggested that East-West adaptation might, in actuality, require the complete replacement of the GDR generation; post-communist (re-)learning, by contrast, was proving too unrealistic a feat. Yet, after examining the process of intergenerational transmission in the chapter’s final Extension, even the chances for such turnover came under fire. Since, as was revealed here, parents from the former GDR are still able to transfer their (distinct) socialist values on to their offspring. By perpetuating the East-West divide through the minds and behaviors of their children, these post-communists may, in effect, prolong the influence of the socialist past, extending it far into the long-term. The potential for eventual convergence, in turn, is likely to be even further inhibited; for the authoritarian habits of East German citizens could, in practice, continue to live on through their families for generations to come.

Altogether then, after considering the evidence provided by these supplementary Extensions, it would seem that the implications of this chapter for the current dissertation are even more stark. To put it simply, the process of attitudinal transition appears to represent are far slower and more complicated endeavor than the institutional transformation of a regime. While reforms can be rapidly passed and conditions can
swiftly follow suit, the core predispositions of individuals are far more resistant to change and cannot be so easily be overturned.

With regard to the existing literature, thus, the results of this chapter can, once again, be understood to most closely substantiate the “legacies” approach, which tends to similarly underline the abiding influence of the communist past. Different from previous papers, however, the present study addresses the issue of adaptation more extensively, by both employing a comprehensive analytical strategy, and incorporating relevant theories from social-psychology, political science and economics. In doing so, it offers a number of contributions to this body of work.

On account of the unique mix of panel-, biographical- and household-level data employed, for instance, the study is successful in providing more diverse evidence in support of “legacy” effects, as well as addressing mechanisms of convergence that have hitherto been overlooked. In addition to reaffirming the already novel discoveries from previous chapters (e.g., the asymmetric process of convergence across cohorts, and the Westernization of the post-communist youth), the research is, in fact, able to shed light on the importance of additional, (previously underexplored) dynamics, such as attitude stability, population turnover, migration and intergenerational transmission.

Methodologically, the study’s focus on the German case affords its own unparalleled advantages, making it a valuable complement to both the existing literature and to the repeated, cross-sectional and multinational investigations of Chapter III. To begin with, as previously discussed, the unique German experience of (exogenously-imposed) separation and reunification represents a “natural experiment” of sorts, allowing for better identification of the causal effects of regime characteristics on
citizens’ attitudes. An examination of Germany thereby not only helps validate the dissertation’s conclusions regarding the long-lasting effects of communist socialization, but also ensures that the attitudinal differences between East and West citizens were not already apparent prior to the establishment of socialism. That the GDR was exceptional in its degree of repression and intimidation adds even further credence to the case, ensuring that the German experience is, in fact, an appropriate one for an investigation of control orientations.

An analysis of attitudes within a unified country does, moreover, also take care of the more common problems inherent in international research. In particular, it allows for a number of contemporary country-level factors to be effectively held constant, permitting their own influences to be better accounted for. This not only includes linguistic or cultural factors (which may otherwise distort survey responses and prohibit comparisons across nations), but also laws, reforms, and economic or political institutions (that could themselves sway preferences, but which might not be fully captured by available macro-level indicators).

For much the same reason, a focus on Germany also allows for a more natural assessment of convergence, enabling the beliefs of post-communists to be juxtaposed against a more organic benchmark – namely, those of their non-post-communist domestic fellows. In doing so, thus, this study is also able to provide more sound and concrete pointers of adaptation, so as to further extend the existing “legacies” approach.

Of course, the resounding evidence in favor of social-psychological perspectives presented here is not to say that “rationalist” accounts have not too been implicated. On the contrary, this research similarly contributes to the existing economics literature on
transition – both by verifying the importance of certain performance- or resource-based variables, as well as by demonstrating their limits for an understanding of post-communist attitudes. That is, while post-communists have, unmistakably, been demonstrated here to respond to short-term changes in their personal circumstances, they are nonetheless revealed to (ceteris paribus) remain markedly authoritarian in their predispositions, regardless of whether they are analyzed across forty countries or within just one. The results of this study thereby not only curtail the overall scope of purely economic explanations, but also make it difficult to predict the eventual onset of convergence – or if the beliefs of these current citizens will ever catch up to the macro-level changes that have taken place. Although it is clear that improvements in both living conditions and transition experiences may attenuate such socialist predilections, in the end, post-communist convergence might only arise by means of (multi-)generational replacement rather than through a process of rational, attitudinal adjustment.

It goes without saying that the findings of this chapter are, nevertheless, bound by the limitations of any observational study of public opinion. While the focus on Germany – and the specific use of the GSOEP data – offers many methodological advantages, the inherent problems of survey research and data availability subsist, and there are numerous issues left unanswered by the present investigation. In addition to ratifying the results of this dissertation with evidence from the behavioral or experimental realms, future studies may therefore also need to address these outstanding questions. They will, for instance, need to find ways to better tackle the issue of self-selection in migration, in order to more definitively explore the prevalence of attitude change following physical relocation. Researchers able to acquire such disaggregated information on individuals’
whereabouts may, in turn, also wish to explore if and how local (economic or social) characteristics exert their own influence on preferences and decisions.\textsuperscript{46}

While scholars of intergenerational transmission might, in addition, wish to probe related aspects of household context (such intra-family relationships, assortive mating, or the nuances of networks), writers on political learning might instead look at the horizontal channels of socialization and information (including friends, schools, or the media). Finally, for the sake of generalizability, later extensions of this work might benefit from contemplating even wider applications, expanding the analytical strategy to include yet broader categories of attitudes, or even other regions of the world.

While the possibilities for future work are therefore multifarious, the implications of this study are nevertheless unchanged. Quite simply, when it comes to the issue of post-communist transition, \textit{attitudinal} adaptation should not be presumed. For, as has been repeatedly shown in this dissertation, core predispositions – once instilled – are difficult to adjust. Even twenty years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, citizens of the former GDR continue to be afflicted by remnants of their repressive past. The reunification of state, in other words, does not automatically imply a reunification of minds.

\textsuperscript{46} Unfortunately, data privacy restrictions on the GSOEP data restricted access to such micro-level/regional information outside of the EU, thereby prohibiting such investigations.
CHAPTER V

FINAL REMARKS

Twenty years after the collapse of communism, the democratic, market economies of the former Eastern bloc bear little resemblance to the autocratic, centralized systems of the previous Soviet era. Following a profound macro-level process of economic and political reform, these nations have now largely succeeded in overhauling their pre-existing governing arrangements. Long gone are the socialist institutions and totalitarian apparatus of the past; and promptly welcomed were the liberal models and founding ideologies of the West. So, at least, goes the story of “the great transformation” (Kornai 2006) of Central and Eastern Europe.

As has been revealed in dissertation, however, the process of regime change is not so simple on the ground. While new laws can be promptly passed and ruling establishments may be swiftly exchanged, the habits and values of individuals cannot be so easily replaced. The psychological element of post-communist transition, in other words, should not be taken for granted, nor should its impediments be overlooked. Basic orientations – once acquired – tend to persist, even as institutions change, living conditions improve, and decades go by. Attitudinal adaptation, thus, is likely to be slow and complex, as individuals socialized under one set of principles and expectations struggle to converge to those upheld by their novel, revolutionized surroundings.

Of course, this is not to say that such adjustments are unmanageable or necessarily preset to founder. Rather, the message is one of prudence – the need to be
vigilant and mindful of the various obstacles to acculturation. Clearly, many factors have herein been shown to aid the task of individual-level transition: enhanced standards of living, affluence, resources and institutional performance are all found to favor attitudinal convergence, thereby providing scope for governments to influence the process through policy and improved outcomes. Education is similarly found to be key, suggesting yet another opening for external guidance, perhaps through increased efforts of civic training or public communications. Although the effects of relocation remain empirically undetermined in this project, direct contact with (or exposure to) the “target” group may well provide its own stimulus for belief updating and opinion change too.

In the end, however, the ultimate remedy for convergence may simply be time. Only with the passage of time and the accrual of new information will the environmental transformations be realized and the pre-existing values relinquished. Even as individuals rationally respond to their altering realities, thus, the importance of time should not be underestimated.

In this sense then, the implications of this dissertation extend far beyond the post-communist region of Central and Eastern Europe. Around the globe, the potential for similar transitions can, in fact, already be felt, be it in the Middle East, China, Cuba, or parts of Latin America (e.g., Venezuela). The lessons learned from this dissertation can, therefore, be expected to illuminate these developments too; for, in each of these cases, the consolidation of democracy – and its popular adoption – will also likely require more than the simple rebuilding of constitutions and governing systems.

Outside of the political realm, the message may apply to even more general instances of assimilation or integration, such as in immigration, globalization, and
international business. Here, individual-level adaptation could well represent just as necessary and costly an endeavor. Having a better understanding of the mechanisms entailed and the time required for such adjustments – as well as the incentives necessary to motivate them – will therefore be similarly beneficial.

Quite simply, as has been shown here, becoming accustomed to new practices, norms, and benchmarks is neither a universal, nor automatic process for those involved. The difficulties of adaptation are tangible and the ramifications are real. Core values and attitudes, once instilled, tend to live on; and so, for post-communists, the remnants of socialism continue to stick.
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