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A Nation under Joint Custody: How Conflicting Family Models divide US Politics

By

Eva Elisabeth Wehling

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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Committee in charge:

Professor George Lakoff, Co-chair

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Abstract

A Nation under Joint Custody: How Conflicting Family Models divide US Politics

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Across the globe and throughout history, politics are regularly divided into “left-leaning” and “right-leaning” camps. Explaining the sources of this conservative-liberal divide has become a major quest in the cognitive and social sciences. Early attempts have focused on self-interest as a possible explanation. However, as the self-interest hypothesis repeatedly failed, researchers’ belief in its explanatory power dwindled. Recent investigations have thus begun to tap into genetic material, personality traits, psychological needs, and moral concerns as possible explanations.

One early account of the moral underpinnings that guide conservative and liberal politics is Moral Politics Theory (Lakoff, 1996). It proposes that conservatives and liberals endorse different moral worldviews, which conceptually unify their positions on issues as diverse as abortion, education, the economy, or the environment. Those worldviews are grounded in different beliefs about ideal parenting: conservatives endorse a strict-father and liberals a nurturant-parent model. The theory proposes that parenting beliefs are mapped onto national politics via the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, and that language use in synch with the two models can significantly influence people’s perception of political issues.

More specifically, Moral Politics Theory has three principal components: First, it holds that the two parenting models form unified and independent belief systems that are predictive of conservatism and liberalism. Second, it predicts that people engage in a metaphoric mapping process when making political judgments, mapping parenting beliefs onto governance. Third, it predicts that issue framings in terms of the two worldviews result in framing effects, and that only those who endorse a given worldview are susceptible to framings that echo it.

Despite the academic and political world’s fascination with Moral Politics Theory, its three principal components have not been tested to date. The present research is a comprehensive test of Moral Politics Theory’s principal components in a series of six studies. Studies 1 and 2 test the two parenting models’ internal consistency, conceptual independence and predictive power for conservative and liberal political attitudes. Studies 3 and 4 examine the mediating role of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor for political judgments in terms of parenting models. Finally, Studies 5 and 6 investigate framing effects associated with the two worldviews.

To my parents, Uta and Gerd

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Introduction

Political landscapes across the globe and throughout history are commonly divided into two major camps: conservative “right-leaning” groups and liberal “left-leaning” groups. In the United States, this conservative-liberal divide is particularly pronounced – with the Republican Party promoting conservative and the Democratic Party promoting liberal policies and ideology. While it is conceivable that the political fabric of a nation is, in its nitty-gritty detail, made up of more than two all-encompassing belief systems, researchers regularly distinguish between conservatism and liberalism as the two major, opposing worldviews that occur across cultures and throughout history – a distinction that “has proven to be an efficient and useful way to classify political viewpoints” (McAdams, Albaugh, Farber, Daniels, Logan, & Olson, 2008, p. 978).

Past research commonly evolved around the notion that citizens derive their political attitudes from their material self-interests: people would support policies that furthered their self-interests, and they would oppose policies that contradicted it. This self-interest hypothesis for human behavior dominated the past four centuries of Western culture, spanning, for example, from Thomas Hobbes’ notion of an “all against all” world and John Locke’s notion that interest diversity makes majority rule necessary to the Marxists’ call for protecting public over private interest (Sears & Funke, 1991, pp.1-2).

As researchers started to put the self-interest hypothesis to the test, however, it repeatedly failed to explain the political attitudes of citizens. Not only did people endorse positions that did nothing much to further their own material interests, they also commonly supported policies that directly contradicted it.

This left researchers in the cognitive and social sciences with an important question to answer: What drives people’s conservative and liberal attitudes, if not their self-interest?

Over the past decades, a number of alternative explanations emerged. For example, research found that genetic material can account for up to fifty percent of people’s ideology (e.g., McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999). Other research observed the important role of personality traits, cognitive styles and psychological needs for the formation of ideology (see, e.g., Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009 for a review). Finally, one major line of investigation has been concerned with understating the extent to which moral concerns explain conservative and liberal attitudes (e.g., Feldman, 1988; Lakoff, 1996; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). A principal question in this line of work is: Can conservative and liberal attitudes be explained in terms of morality, and if so, what is the nature of conservative and liberal morality?

One early account of the divergent moral concerns that underlie conservatism and liberalism is Lakoff’s Moral Politics Theory (1996). Lakoff’s (1996) account of the moral templates that structure conservative and liberal thought resulted from research that started out with a simple question: Why do conservatives embrace the positions they do – such as opposition to abortion and gun control, support for the death penalty, the call for an unrestricted free market, and minimal public provisions? And why do liberals embrace the positions they do – such as concern for the environment, support for public education and health care, and opposition to capital punishment? Lakoff conducted an in-depth analysis of public political discourse in the US, examining the ways in which conservatives and liberals spoke – and reasoned – about issue areas as diverse as abortion, warfare, health care, the economy, and the environment. The principal data of Lakoff’s (1996) analysis was the public discourse of political elites addressing citizens. This anal-

ysis of elite-to-citizen discourse not only allowed for insights into the conceptual models implemented by conservative and liberal politicians; it furthermore was informative of the modes of reasoning that were, at least to great part, present in the minds of citizens (since politicians normally resort to language that is understood by citizens and helps both the political elite and the citizenry make sense of political issues). Lakoff's (1996) analysis yielded two conceptual models, which structured conservative and liberal discourse and cognition: a conservative model that centered around notions such as self-discipline, competition, reward and punishment, in-group nurturance, hierarchical communication, and obedience to authorities; and a liberal model that centered around notions such as empathy, nurturance, individual and social responsibility, in- and out-group nurturance, open two-way communication, and accountability. These two models, which encompassed moral concerns, seemed to unify the positions that conservatives and liberals held across issue areas. Furthermore, they were predictive of the stances that both camps took on new issues that came up in day-to-day political debate.

But the question remained: Why would conservatives and liberals resort to these two models when reasoning about the "right" and "wrong" kind of governance, and what unified the two models' many subcomponents so that they formed overarching, coherent worldviews?

Research in the cognitive sciences has shown that people commonly use conceptual metaphors when reasoning about rather abstract domains, such as politics. That is, they resort to knowledge from concrete experiential domains in order to make sense of abstract domains of thought. In fact, reasoning about abstract domains is almost impossible without metaphor. Conceptual metaphors are constitutive of the meaning of many abstract ideas, and they are a natural, necessary, and inevitable part of everyday reasoning.

When it comes to reasoning about governing institutions in society, people commonly resort to family life as a metaphoric source domain. Thus, one of the most common metaphors for nationhood and governance is the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, which construes the nation in terms of a family and governance in terms of parenting. Lakoff (1996) found that the two conceptual models for conservative and liberal cognition, which the analysis of elite-to-citizen discourse in the US had yielded, fit with two conflicting views of ideal parenting: the conservative model fit with a strict-father view of parenting, and the liberal one with a nurturant-parent view of parenting. Furthermore, the two models in many ways paralleled parenting styles that had been found to structure actual parent-child interaction in families. Specifically, the strict-father model resonated with an authoritarian and the nurturant-parent model with an authoritative parenting style (Baumrind, 1971).

In sum, then, Moral Politics Theory as of 1996 found that conservative and liberal political attitudes were grounded in two conflicting views of ideal parenting, which were mapped onto governance via the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. While conservatives endorse a strict-father model, liberals endorse a nurturant-parent model. Since 1996, the two models' relevance for conservative and liberal discourse and reasoning, and their predictive power for the positions that conservatives and liberals in the US take on a vast range of day-to-day issues, has been further confirmed (Lakoff, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008).

Moral Politics Theory further holds that while some people endorse one of the two parenting models more or less exclusively, others may endorse both models when reasoning about politics. These "biconceptuals" commonly apply one model to one specific set of issues while applying the other to another specific set of issues (e.g., Lakoff, 2008).

For example, a “moderate” conservative may apply the strict-father model to most issue areas, but endorse the nurturant-parent model whenever he or she reasons about abortion and gay marriage. Likewise, a “moderate” liberal may endorse the nurturant-parent model when reasoning about most issue areas, but resort to the strict-father model when reasoning about, say, budget deficits.

Furthermore, biconceptuals may apply the two models in different domains of social interaction. For example, they may use the strict-father model to reason about politics, but apply the nurturant-parent model in their professional or family life. Moral Politics Theory holds that biconceptualism is made possible through what is known in neuroscience as “mutual inhibition”: when one model is activated in a person’s brain, the other is automatically deactivated; this mutual inhibition mechanism allows for people to use both models at different points in time without noticing the shift (see Lakoff, 2008 for a detailed discussion).

Lakoff’s (1996) notion of biconceptualism allows for a further prediction. Namely, while it is conceivable that biconceptuals’ contestations of political life in terms of either the strict-father or nurturant-parent model are regularly “bound” to specific issue areas, and thus not arbitrary at all, it is feasible that some biconceptuals are open to reasoning about any given issue in terms of either model. That is, they might be open to reasoning about issues such as immigration or crime in terms of *either* strict-father *or* nurturant-parent values. Such “open” biconceptuals should be especially malleable in their political attitudes. Their stances toward one and the same issue might shift depending on what family model is brought to the fore of their reasoning through the language used in public discourse.

Moral Politics Theory holds that the language that is being used in public discourse can exert a strong effect on people’s political reasoning over time: arguments that frame political issues in terms of either the strict-father or the nurturant-parent worldview activate and strengthen that worldview in people’s minds due to Hebbian learning, that is, the strengthening of neural connections in the brain through the repetition of language (see Lakoff, 2008 for a detailed discussion). Recurrent exposure to issue framings in terms of either the strict-father or nurturant-parent model can thus determine which of the two models people in their everyday reasoning about politics endorse. Importantly, the reasoning processes that framing addressees undergo must be by no means conscious. In fact, frames regularly remain entirely undetected by those who use them, while at the same time significantly influencing their attitudes (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Lakoff, 2008; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011).

Based on the notion that language can strongly influence political reasoning, Moral Politics Theory’s predicts that issue framings in terms of the two models not just changes people’s reasoning over time, but may also result in short-term framing effects: strict-father framings may lead people to endorse more conservative attitudes, while nurturant-parent framings may lead them to endorse more liberal positions. However, Moral Politics Theory predicts that such framing effects are restricted to people who regularly endorse the morality in question in their everyday reasoning. This entails that “open” biconceptuals should be especially susceptible to moral framings in terms of the two models. Furthermore, since moral worldviews are taken to unify conservatives’ and liberals’ reasoning across political issues, such framing effects should occur across issues as diverse as, say, crime, immigration, or abortion.

In summary, Moral Politics Theory encompasses three principal components. First, it holds that conservative and liberal political attitudes are guided by two contrasting models of ideal parenting: the strict-father and the nurturant-parent model, respectively. These two models should form unified and independent belief systems, and they should be predictive of conservatism and liberalism.

Second, the theory predicts that people engage in a metaphoric mapping process when making political judgments, mapping their beliefs about ideal parenting onto their beliefs about ideal governance via the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor.

Third, the theory predicts that issue framings in terms of the two worldviews result in framing effects, and that only those who endorse a given worldview are susceptible to framings that echo it. Biconceptuals endorse both parenting models in their political reasoning. While the theory holds that biconceptuals most commonly apply the models in a non-arbitrary manner to specific issues, other biconceptuals may in fact be open to use either model with regard to any given political issue. Such “open” biconceptuals should be susceptible to issue framings in terms of both models, endorsing more conservative attitudes when confronted with a strict-father framing and more liberal attitudes when exposed to a nurturant-parent framing. Finally, since moral worldviews unify people’s positions across issue areas, framing effects for such open biconceptuals should occur across different issues.

Despite the academic and political world’s fascination with Moral Politics Theory (e.g., Bai, 2005; Bar-Lev, 2007; Deason & Gonzales, 2012), and despite the fact that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models constitute empirical models, which were derived from and repeatedly tested against linguistic data from public political discourse, scholars regularly voice doubt about the validity of Moral Politics Theory (e.g., Iyengar, 2005; Layman, McTague, Pearson-Merkowitz, & Spivey, 2007; Musolff, 2004). And although researchers have put certain aspects of the theory to the test by using, e.g., quantitative and experimental methods (e.g., Ahrens, 2011; Barker & Tinnick, 2006; Cha & Schwarz, 2006; Cienki, 2005a, 2005b; Deason & Gonzales, 2012; Greeley & Hour, 2006; McAdams et al., 2008; Swift, 2009), there is to date no comprehensive test of Moral Politics Theory’s three principal components.

More specifically, while the strict-father and nurturant-parent model are based on the analysis of public political discourse and thus empirical in nature, their internal consistency, conceptual independence, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism have to date not been adequately tested via statistical methods. Moreover, Moral Politics Theory’s prediction that cognition in terms of the two models is mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor as well as the prediction that linguistic framings that echo the two models should result in framing effects lack empirical evidence altogether.

The present research is a comprehensive test of Moral Politics Theory’s three principal components in a series of six studies. First, it constitutes a test of the empirical validity of the two parenting models, putting their internal consistency, conceptual independence, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism to the test through statistical analyses (Studies 1 and 2). This test further solidifies the validity of the two empirical models by complementing prior analyses of their relevance for conservative and liberal discourse

and cognition (such as by Lakoff, 1996, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Second, it constitutes the first empirical test of Moral Politics Theory's prediction that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor mediates political reasoning in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model (Studies 3 and 4). Third, it constitutes the first empirical test of Moral Politics Theory's prediction that issue framings in terms of the two models result in framing effects across issue areas and that only those who endorse a given worldview are susceptible to framings that resonate with it. Furthermore, it tests the prediction that open biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, are susceptible to both strict-father and nurturant-parent framings (Studies 5 and 6).

This series of studies confirms the three principal components of Moral Politics Theory. Study 1 and 2 show that the strict-father and nurturant-parent model are internally consistent and independent belief systems that predict conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Studies 3 and 4 confirm that political reasoning in terms of the two parenting models is mediated by a metaphoric mapping process and show that an increased endorsement of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor results in an increased mapping of parenting beliefs onto governance beliefs. Finally, Studies 5 and 6 confirm Moral Politics Theory's predictions with regard to framing effects and show that open biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, are susceptible to framings in terms of both models across issues.

In six chapters, this thesis discusses the abovementioned studies and provides an account of the ways in which Moral Politics Theory's findings about moral worldviews, metaphoric cognition, and framing effects relate to current research in the cognitive and social sciences. Below, a brief preview of the six chapters is provided to allow for an easy navigation through the text.

Chapter 1 sets out to provide a detailed description of Moral Politics Theory and its principle components. This chapter begins by discussing empirical evidence against the self-interest hypothesis for political reasoning. Next, current research in the cognitive and social sciences that highlights the importance of morality for political cognition is reviewed. Then, a detailed account of Moral Politics Theory is provided. Its influence in the political and academic world is considered, and common criticisms of the theory are discussed. Despite the fact that some remain skeptical of the validity of Moral Politics Theory, an increasing amount of research has recently successfully put certain aspects of the theory to the test. While these investigations do not constitute a test of the theory's three principle components, they offer important insights and grant new empirical support for some its aspects. For example, a set of studies confirms Lakoff's (1996, 2004, 2008) observation that in their discourse, conservatives resort more often to strict-father values, while liberals resort to nurturant-parent values to make sense of politics and morality (e.g., Cienki, 2005b; Deason & Gonzales, 2012; McAdams et al., 2008). Furthermore, some studies grant first insights into the occurrence of biconceptualism (Greeley & Hour, 2006; Swift, 2009), and the causal effect that the two models may exert on people's political cognition (Cha & Schwarz, 2006). Finally, some research hints at the power of the two models to predict conservatism and liberalism (Barker & Tinnick, 2006). These investigations are reviewed in detail, and conceivable shortcomings, specifically with regard to investigations that address the two models' predictive power for conservatism and liberalism (Barker & Tinnick, 2006), are discussed. While these investigations grant most

valuable insights into the role that the strict-father and nurturant-parent model play for political discourse and reasoning, they do not provide a comprehensive test of the theory. Chapter 1 concludes with a detailed discussion of Moral Politics Theory's three principle components and briefly previews how they will be put to the test in a series of six studies.

In Chapter 2, Studies 1 and 2 are presented, which put the strict-father and nurturant-parent models' internal consistency, independence, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism to the test by using statistical methods.

Prior to a detailed discussion of these studies, the exact nature of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model is discussed. Specifically, the two models encompass a range of subcomponents (strict-father: 36; nurturant-parent: 30), which are laid out in detail. In addition, the notion that the two parenting models form consistent and independent belief systems is considered, and attention is drawn to the ways in which Moral Politics Theory's account of conservative and liberal ideology in terms of two distinct moral belief systems differs from common approaches to measure ideology in the social sciences.

The results from Studies 1 and 2 support Moral Politics Theory's finding that the two parenting models form consistent and distinct belief systems that predict political identity.

Moral Politics Theory holds that political cognition is commonly mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. This raises two questions: First, does this metaphor in fact play a crucial role in political judgment? And, second, why should we even expect this metaphor to hold a special status when it comes to people's everyday reasoning about politics? The first question is answered in Studies 3 and 4 in Chapter 4. However, before empirically addressing the question of *whether* the metaphor mediates political cognition, the question of *why* this metaphor should hold a special status for reasoning about moral governance is addressed.

Thus, Chapter 3 offers a comprehensive discussion of the special attributes of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor and its exponent role for political reasoning. First, the general mechanisms of metaphoric cognition and the ways in which conceptual metaphors factor into political reasoning are discussed. Then, attention is drawn to ways in which conceptual metaphors may differ from each other. For example, metaphors can differ with regard to the familiarity, semantic specificity, and categorization level of their source domains, and they may offer different degrees of structural parallelism between their source and target domains. In line with observations in cognitive science research, it is argued that such attributes can determine the availability and impact of metaphoric mappings. Finally, the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor is discussed in detail with regard to the above-mentioned source and target domain attributes. Metaphor alternatives for nationhood, such as the NATION AS VEHICLE or NATION AS BODY metaphors, are presented and compared to the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. Chapter 3 concludes that there is much reason to believe that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in fact holds a special status when it comes to political reasoning, and that it outmatches alternative metaphors for nationhood and governance in multiple ways. Furthermore, it concludes that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor's very nature allows for highly diverse moral contestations of politics and for an application of those concerns across social domains.

Next, in Chapter 4, the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor's role for political cognition in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model is put to the test in two studies. Specifically, in Study 3, the metaphor's mediating role for political judgment is tested. In Study 4, possible effects of an increase in metaphor endorsement are examined. The results from both studies support Moral Politics Theory's prediction that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor mediates political reasoning in terms of idealized family values.

Moral Politics Theory holds that issue framings in terms of the strict-father or nurturant-parent model in public discourse should exert a strong effect on people's political reasoning. Language that echoes the two moral worldviews is predicted to result in framing effects across issues. Such effects, however, should occur only when individuals endorse the morality in question. This leads to the prediction that open biconceptuals are especially malleable in their political attitudes, as they are susceptible to framings in terms of both worldviews. All these predictions are put to the test in Studies 5 and 6 in Chapter 6. However, before empirically addressing the question of *whether* framing effects occur as predicted, the question of *why* such effects should be expected to occur is addressed.

Therefore, Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the role that framing effects play for political cognition, and especially for moral political judgment. First, the basics of cognitive frames and framing effects are discussed. Then, different framing types that are known to influence political cognition are observed, such as grammatical, metaphoric, and explicit emphasis framings. Upon this general introduction to the notions of "frames" and "framing effects" in political cognition, research is reviewed that shows links between individuals' values and their openness to adapt frames. However, past framing research has not always carefully distinguished "moral frames", which directly tap into people's morality, from other frame types that relate in one way or the other to individuals' "values". To close this gap, a four-type typology for frames in political communication is proposed, with "moral frames" as one distinct frame type. The unique attributes of "moral frames" are discussed, and hypotheses are formulated with regard to people's *susceptibility* to moral frames as well as the *generalizability* of moral frames across issue areas. These hypotheses are put to the test in Studies 5 and 6.

Finally, in Chapter 6, Studies 5 and 6 are presented, which put framing effects associated with the strict-father and nurturant-parent model to the test. The results from both studies support Moral Politics Theory's prediction that issue framings in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model result in framing effects. It further supports the notion that open biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, are susceptible to such framing effects (confirming the *susceptibility* hypothesis) and that such framing effects occur across issues (confirming the *generalizability* hypothesis).

Chapter 1: An Introduction to Moral Politics Theory

1. The self-interest myth

Morality matters a great deal in politics. Attitudes toward political issues, parties, and candidates are, to a large degree, grounded in people's moral beliefs and values. In fact, people regularly derive their political attitudes from their moral beliefs rather than their personal self-interests. Political morality encompasses beliefs about what is right and wrong, what makes people moral or immoral, and how a society should be run.

However, the significant role of values for politics is far from obvious. If you ask a politician, a pollster, or an economics or political science professor, or the ordinary person on the street, "What drives political attitudes among citizens?", they will often point to the important role of self-interest. The self-interest hypothesis assumes that people support programs that directly benefit their short-term, material interests. For instance, it would assume that racial minorities would support policies such as affirmative action, which put them on equal footing with non-minorities. It would predict that women would support legal abortions, childcare programs, and pay equity. Furthermore, it would predict that people who are economically discontent would support tax breaks that put more money in their pockets. Likewise, it would predict that citizens who receive governmental services should oppose cuts to the very programs that benefit them.

Past research on political attitudes has frequently evolved around the idea that individuals derive their political stances from their self-interests (e.g., Downs, 1975; Kramer, 1971; Lipset, 1960; Meltzer & Vellrath, 1975; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976). However, the self-interest hypothesis does not hold (e.g., Lau & Schlesinger, 2005; Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001; Sears & Funk, 1991); it is often a bad candidate for explaining political attitudes or anticipating what programs the electorate will support. As Sears and Funk (1991) observe, "self-interest ordinarily does not have much effect upon the ordinary citizen's sociopolitical attitudes" (p. 76).

For instance, Lau and Schlesinger (2005) found that people's attitudes toward health care programs were significantly predicted by their values, but not their self-interests (p. 97). Similarly, studies have found that people's attitudes toward issues such as affirmative action, women's rights, taxes, and public programs are practically never significantly predicted by their self-interest; at best, self-interest turns out to be a marginal indicator for people's stances toward those issues (e.g., Jacobson, 1983; Sears & Citrin, 1985; Sears & Huddy, 1990; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). For example, Jacobson (1983) found that while ethnic minorities sometimes supported affirmative action based on moral perspectives, self-interest did not significantly predict the positions they took on the issue. Similarly, there is only little evidence that women are more likely than men to support initiatives that directly concern their self-interest, such as legal abortions, pay equity, and childcare programs (e.g., Sears & Huddy, 1990; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). Likewise, Sears and Citrin (1985) found that economically discontent people were not more likely than economically content ones to support tax cuts that would put more money in their pockets; and citizens who received governmental services were only slightly more

likely than those who did not to oppose cuts in government spending that would affect the very programs they benefitted from.

In fact, people commonly endorse positions that are not just out of line with their self-interests, but are directly opposed to their self-interests. For example, high-income groups often are the strongest supporters of social welfare and aid to the disadvantaged, acting against their interests to secure their own wealth (e.g., Shingles, 1989). Similarly, the economically disadvantaged are frequently more opposed to new taxes than those who are financially well off, acting against their interests to secure public programs (e.g., Beck, Rainey, & Traut, 1990).

One may be tempted to think that people do not derive their positions from self-interest simply because they do not know enough about the potential benefits of given programs. Lacking relevant information about programs might impede them from forming attitudes consistent with their individual interests. However, this is not at all the case. In fact, politically well-informed citizens are commonly *less* likely to endorse positions based on their self-interest than those who are not as well informed (e.g., Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979; see Sears & Funk, 1991, p. 60 for a discussion).

2. Morality and politics

In lieu of the lack of support for the self-interest hypothesis, scholars have recently turned to other explanations for political attitudes. A major concern of such investigations is to explain the divide between conservatism and liberalism, and to understand why conservatives and liberals endorse the political positions they do. Recent research has, for example, linked conservative and liberal attitudes to genetics (e.g., Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; McCourt et al. 1999) and to personality traits, psychological needs and cognitive styles (e.g., R. Altemeyer, 1996; Block & Block, 2006; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Rokeach, 1960; see Jost et al. 2009 for a review).

One principal line of recent research has investigated the role that values and moral concerns play in political cognition, and there is now much evidence that moral concerns exert a strong influence on the political attitudes that individuals endorse (e.g., Feldman, 1988; Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008; 2008; Kinder, 1998; Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008; Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997; McAdams et al., 2008; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Rokeach, 1973; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). As Layman et al. (2007) observe,

“[...] core values and beliefs – abstract views about the desirable qualities of human life, the proper relationship between groups in society, and the role of government in fostering these qualities and relationships – play an important role in shaping individuals’ attitudes on policy issues and ultimately, their political choices” (p. 7).

Thus, morality plays a crucial role for political cognition. This becomes evident in two ways.

First, moral concerns can determine whether people engage in politics, how they relate

to people who oppose their morality, whether they pay attention to political messages, and how they evaluate policies and candidates (e.g., Barker, 2005; Brewer, 2001, 2003; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001b; Feinberg & Willer 2012; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008; Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2010; Nelson & Garst, 2005; Shen & Edwards, 2005; Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & Bauman 2008; Sniderman & Theriault, 1999, 2004; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). For example, Skitka et al. (2005) found that people defend their attitudes toward political issues more vehemently and show more prejudice against opposing attitudes when their own attitudes are rooted in moral convictions (see Wright et al., 2008 for analogous findings). Moreover, Skitka and Bauman (2008) found that moral convictions regulate political engagement: individuals who perceive their political attitudes as grounded in moral concerns are more likely to vote in elections (see Morgan et al., 2010 for analogous findings).

Morality also plays a major role for political communication and persuasion. For example, when faced with competing political arguments, people tend to be persuaded by those that speak to their moral concerns (e.g., Brewer, 2001, 2003; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001b; Feinberg & Willer 2012; Nelson & Garst, 2005; Shen & Edwards, 2005; Sniderman & Theriault, 1999, 2004). Moreover, people's evaluation of political candidates strongly depends on what values they perceive candidates to endorse (Barker, 2005). Finally, people consider messages more carefully and thoroughly when issues are communicated in terms of values they share (Nelson & Garst, 2005). In sum, people respond exceptionally well to arguments in line with their values, and they tend to disregard arguments that contradict them. As Sniderman and Theriault (1999) observe, "when citizens can hear the clash of political argument, the positions they take on specific issues are markedly more likely to be grounded in their underlying principles" (p. 26).

Second, moral concerns can determine whether individuals endorse conservative or liberal attitudes (e.g., Feldman, 1988; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008; McAdams et al., 2008; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Roache, 1973). For example, Haidt and Graham (2007) observed that moral "gut intuitions" predict political attitudes and that conservatives and liberals differ in the extent to which they endorse five different "moral foundations". Specifically, liberals are more inclined than conservatives to be concerned with protection from harm (*harm*) and reciprocal fairness (*fairness*). In contrast, conservatives are more inclined than liberals to be morally concerned with in-group loyalty (*in-group*), respect for authority (*authority*), and protection of purity and sanctity (*purity*). As Haidt and his colleagues showed, these five moral foundations can predict conservative and liberal political attitudes, are evident in cultural and political narratives (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2010), and can motivate morality-based political stereotyping (Graham et al., 2009).

Much of morality research has been concerned with tracing psychological preferences for single *moral traits* as the source of conservatism and liberalism (e.g., R. Altemeyer, 1996; Feldman, 1988; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Pratto et al., 1994; see also Jost et al., 2003, 2009). This research has provided extremely valuable insights into conservatives' and liberals' preferences for certain human qualities and behavior. For example, it has been found that liberals define moral behavior largely in terms of *fairness* and protection from *harm*, while conservatives largely define moral behavior as the preservation of *purity*, loyalty toward one's *in-group*, and respect for *authority*

(e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007). Research like this has helped explain some differences between conservative and liberal contestations of single *moral traits*.

However, some scholars have pointed out that moral reasoning consists of more than just solitary preferences for single *moral traits*, and that political morality may best be understood by turning to individuals' overarching moral worldviews (e.g., Evans, 1997; Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008; McAdams et al., 2008). As McAdams et al. (2008) observe,

“although social scientists have gained invaluable information regarding the dispositional traits, recurrent needs, and general cognitive styles associated with, for example, RWA [Right Wing Authoritarianism], they have learned little to date about how real people who score high (or low) on RWA live their real lives and understand who they are in the midst of their complex social worlds” (p. 988).

Thus, there is good reason to look into the larger, complex worldviews that lie at the heart of people's political reasoning. As a matter of fact, it seems almost impossible to truly understand moral political cognition without a basic understanding of the larger moral worldviews that conservatives and liberals hold.

The reason is simple: People's reasoning about the right kind of politics and the right kind of governance encompasses more than just notions about good and bad human characteristics and behavior (*moral traits*). It also includes notions about how the government should run the nation in order to maintain a moral society (*moral governance*). Furthermore, beliefs about moral traits and moral governance commonly depend on general assumptions about the nature of people (*human nature beliefs*) and about the ways in which the world works (*world beliefs*).

Moral Politics Theory (1996) offers an account of conservative and liberal morality in terms of such overarching, complex moral worldviews.

3. Moral Politics Theory

Moral Politics Theory (Lakoff, 1996) proposes that conservative and liberal political attitudes are derived from two divergent moral worldviews which are grounded in different beliefs about ideal family life: the strict-father and the nurturant-parent model.

The theory states that people commonly and automatically draw on their beliefs about ideal family life when reasoning about politics and governance. This phenomenon is mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor – since people commonly construe the nation in terms of a family, and governance in terms of parenting, they intuitively draw on their beliefs about ideal family life when reasoning about good and bad in the realm of politics.

The strict-father and nurturant-parent models are complex, encompassing beliefs about moral traits, moral governance, human nature, and the world.

When reasoning about actual family life, the models encompass beliefs about good and bad behavior and characteristics in children (*moral traits*) and the ways in which children should be parented in order to become maximally moral (*moral parenting*). Both beliefs relate to assumptions about the nature of children (*child nature beliefs*) and the world (*world beliefs*). Correspondingly, when reasoning about national politics in terms of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, the two models encompass beliefs about good and

bad behavior and characteristics in people (*moral traits*) and the ways in which citizens should be governed in order to become maximally moral (*moral governance*). Both beliefs relate to assumptions about the nature of people (*human nature beliefs*) and the world (*world beliefs*).

In summary, Moral Politics Theory proposes that national governance is commonly construed in terms of parenting, mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, and that reasoning about national politics in terms of worldviews derived from idealized family models “unifies the collections of liberal and conservative political positions” (Lakoff, 1996, p. 12). The theory further states that while conservatives endorse the strict-father model, liberals endorse the nurturant-parent model when making moral political judgments. Moreover, it postulates that some people endorse both parenting models when reasoning about ideal governance (biconceptuals).

Finally, Moral Politics Theory holds that the language that politicians, journalists, and citizens use in public discourse can have a strong effect on political cognition: issue framings in terms of strict-father values can lead people over time to embrace more conservative attitudes; likewise, a framing of issues in terms of nurturant-parent morality can lead people over time to embrace more liberal attitudes.

3.1. Authoritarian and authoritative parenting

The strict-father and nurturant-parent models show many similarities to two parenting styles that have been attested to in childrearing research as authoritarian and authoritative parenting (Baumrind, 1971). While the strict-father model relates to the authoritarian parenting style, the nurturant-parent model relates to the authoritative parenting style.

Authoritarian parenting is characterized by high levels of parental control, strict rule enforcement, punishment of misconduct (often severe, and often corporal), a high demand for obedience and discipline in children, a low level of communication between child and parent, negative affectivity, and hierarchical communication with parents as absolute deciders (Baumrind, 1971). Authoritative parenting, on the other hand, is characterized by positive affectivity, high but flexible levels of control over children, promotion of the child’s autonomy, two-way communication in the family, nurturance, forgiveness in the case of misconduct, and a general empathy toward the child (Baumrind, 1971).

Other parenting styles, such as indulgent, neglectful, abusive, or laissez-faire parenting can constitute extreme versions of the authoritarian and authoritative parenting styles. For example, neglectful or abusive parenting styles can to part be seen as exaggerations of authoritarian parenting. Similarly, indulgent and laissez-faire parenting styles are sometimes exaggerations of authoritative parenting. While the strict-father and nurturant-parent models relate to Baumrind’s (1971) authoritarian or authoritative parenting style, respectively, it is a common phenomenon that those who oppose it construe conservatism in terms of neglectful or abusive parenting. Likewise, liberalism is regularly construed as indulgent or laissez-faire parenting by those who oppose it. While the two parenting models described in Moral Politics Theory fit authoritarian and authoritative parenting styles, it may, of course, be the case that both conservative and liberal parties in fact do sometimes take more extreme views of ideal governance, mirroring in their policies and

debates more extreme views of ideal parenting, such as abusive, neglectful, indulgent, or laissez-faire parenting.

Parenting styles encompass beliefs about the moral traits that should be fostered in children, as well as beliefs about how to best support children's needs and regulate their behavior (e.g., Darling & Steinberg, 1993; Maccoby & Martin, 1983). Divergent parenting styles thus encompass conflicting understandings of moral traits in children and moral parenting. When family life is mapped onto politics, this results in conflicting beliefs about moral traits in citizens and moral governance. For example, the strict-father model emphasizes self-discipline as a moral trait and punishment as a form of moral governance. Within the strict-father model, it is assumed that people become moral (i.e., self-disciplined) only when they are governed right (i.e., punished for immoral behavior). In contrast, the nurturant-parent model emphasizes empathy as a moral trait and responsible empathic nurturance as a form of moral governance. Within this model, it is assumed that people only become moral (i.e., empathic) when they are governed right (i.e., with responsible empathic nurturance).

Again, while the strict-father and nurturant-parent models are in many ways parallel to Baumrind's (1971) authoritarian and authoritative parenting, they furthermore encompass moral beliefs that may relate to, but go well beyond, the two.

At the core of the two models lie divergent understandings of moral traits and moral governance, and they relate to divergent beliefs about human nature and the world. For example, while the strict-father model assumes that people are born bad and must be taught right from wrong, the nurturant-parent model assumes that people are born good and that their natural kindness must be fostered. And while the strict-father model assumes that most things in the world have direct and simple causes, the nurturant-parent model is open to the idea that most things in the world have systemic and complex causes. It is due to this difference in world beliefs, for example, that someone who endorses strict-father morality is likely to place the fault for unemployment with the individual (who did not work hard enough), while someone who endorses nurturant-parent morality is more likely to place the fault for unemployment on social and economic trends (which can result in unemployment, no matter how hard an individual works).

Before leaping into a more detailed description of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models, it should be noted that the two constitute what cognitive linguistics call idealized cognitive models (Lakoff, 1987a). Idealized cognitive models constitute simplified representations of the world that do not always match reality (e.g., Lakoff, 1987a, 1987b). As Croft and Cruse (2004) put it, an idealized model crucially structures everyday thought but simply does not encompass all possible real-world situations (p. 28). Thus, since both the strict-father and nurturant-parent model are idealized modes of reasoning, it need not be the case that they always match reality. For example, while the strict-father model profiles male authority, it is in reality often the case that women act as strict fathers, both in family life and in politics.

3.2. The strict-father model

The strict-father model builds on the belief that the world is a dangerous and competitive place, and that children are best prepared to succeed in it when they learn the values of self-reliance, competition, and self-discipline. Children are taken to be immoral by na-

ture; that is, they want to do what feels good and have a natural tendency toward self-indulgence. It is the parent's moral obligation to teach children self-discipline and self-reliance. This is best accomplished through strict rule-enforcement, harsh punishment of misbehavior, and absolute parental authority over the child.

In order to teach the child right from wrong, communication and decision making within the family should be maximally hierarchical, and children should never question the authority of their parents. Behavioral standards set by the parents are seen as absolute rights and wrongs, and obedience is an important trait for children to learn.

In the strict-father model, competition is seen as inherently moral, as it leads to self-discipline. Giving children things that they have not earned is immoral, because it makes them weak. Children ought to learn that what they get is what they deserve, that all actions result in direct consequences, and that good behavior will be rewarded while bad behavior will be punished.

Loving and nurturing one's children is crucial, and parents should generally nurture children. However, in the case of misbehavior, priority must be given to parental authority. Parental authority and punishment are seen as nurturance. "Tough love" is an expression of love and concern for the child. In fact, parents who unconditionally nurture and love their children are seen as immoral, as they impair their children's ability to learn self-discipline and self-reliance.

Moreover, children must learn to follow their self-interest and should not be overly concerned with the interests of others. This follows from the assumption that if all people look out for themselves, society as a whole will be better off. Guarding one's self-interests is thus seen as a form of pro-social behavior, as it gives other people the freedom to also guard their own interests and encourages them to take care of themselves, not others.

In the strict-father model, the world is seen as a dangerous place, with both evil and good forces. While strict parents are inherently good (they are the unquestionable moral authorities of the family), people who hold ideals different from those of the parents are a threat to the parents' authority and thus evil. One of the strict parents' primary obligations is to protect children against evil, and any means of fighting evil is legitimate.

Moreover, authority is gendered. That is, the father is typically the primary authority in the family, and the mother's job is to uphold his authority. Children must be prepared to fulfill those gender roles as adults.

Furthermore, when children are adults, they have become their own moral authorities, and their parents should no longer meddle with their lives. Any meddling with people who successfully learned to act morally in the world, acquired self-discipline and self-reliance, and have thus become their own social authorities, is seen as immoral.

Finally, the strict-father model assumes that things in the world have direct, simple causes. For example, a lack of success is a direct result of a lack of self-discipline.

3.3. The nurturant-parent model

The nurturant-parent model builds on the belief that children are born good, that they should be loved unconditionally, and that their good nature must be fostered. Empathy, nurturance and cooperation are seen as important moral traits in people, and in order to teach children those traits, parents must nurture them and show empathy toward them.

Children must learn to be responsible for themselves and for others. Only children who learn to take care of themselves will be able to also take care of those around them, and thus self-responsibility is an important skill for children to acquire. However, rather than being a moral trait in and of itself, self-responsibility is seen in part as a means to take on social responsibility.

Children are not all alike, and they need different degrees and types of support from their parents in order to be happy and self-fulfilled. Since the ultimate goal of parenting is to nurture children, and to empower them to follow their dreams, children must be given what they need (need-based fairness) and parental support should never depend on notions of what a child “deserves” based on his or her actions.

Furthermore, there should be mutual respect between children and parents. Parents are accountable for the rules they set, and rules should be discussed with children. A child should always feel free to question his or her parents’ decisions, and questioning is seen as moral behavior, as it expresses a desire to learn and understand.

Parental decisions should be discussed with children in an open, respectful, two-way communication. However, while a child’s challenging of parental authority is not seen as inherently immoral, parents ought to always maintain their authority and, ultimately, make the decisions. Children’s obedience to their parents should come out of their love and respect for their parents, not the fear of punishment. The best way for children to learn moral behavior is for parents to model that behavior. Parents should thus guide by example, rather threaten children with punishment, and they should protect children from any type of harm.

Children should be encouraged to develop their own ideas and values. Children’s ideas that are in conflict with parents’ ideas are not seen as an inherent threat to parental authority. While parental authority must be maintained, divergent ideas should be tolerated and discussed. Tolerance is an important trait for children to learn, and tolerance is based on empathy. Teaching children to see the world through other people’s eyes is an important parental task.

While children should be encouraged to always do their personal best, they should be taught that cooperation with others outweighs competition, and that it is important to maintain strong ties with their family and community members. One of the core principles within the nurturant-parent model is to never harm others. Harming others is seen as immoral, and children ought to learn to not inflict harm. A principle way of teaching children to never do harm is to lead by example, and never psychologically or physically harm one’s children.

Moreover, the nurturant-parent model assumes that things in the world often have systemic and complex causes. For example, a child’s failure may not be a direct result of his or her actions; rather, it may be caused by circumstances that lie outside of the child’s control.

In the nurturant-parent model, the principal goal of parenting is for children to become happy, to live self-fulfilled lives, and to grow up to be nurturers in their own families and communities. Nurturance of one’s children and mutual respect between parents and children allows for a life-long, cooperative, and mutually caring relationship between children and parents.

4. Ideal parenting models and family socialization

The strict-father and nurturant-parent models encompass beliefs about ideal family life and parenting. Moral Politics Theory (1996) states that while those beliefs need not necessarily result from one's own upbringing, the parenting style people are exposed to during their childhood can strongly influence them. To be specific, the theory proposes two things with regard to people's family socialization and their construal of ideal family life.

First, the theory argues that people may endorse the strict-father or nurturant-parent models as adults even if they were brought up in a family that never implemented that parenting style. For example, one can be brought up in an authoritarian, strict-father family, come to reject it, and endorse the nurturant-parent model later in life. Or, one can be brought up in an authoritative, nurturant-parent family, come to reject it, and endorse the strict-father model as an adult. Since both models are omnipresent in our culture, and since both models can be learned in social interactions that exceed family interactions, there is no strict unidirectional causal relationship between one's upbringing and moral political outlooks.

Second, Moral Politics Theory postulates that the parenting style people are exposed to during their childhood can exert a strong influence on their construals of ideal parenting in adult life. For example, it would be no surprise if people who are brought up in an authoritarian, strict-father family would endorse strict-father ideals later in life, as they are intimately familiar with them. Likewise, it would not be unsurprising if people who were brought up in an authoritative, nurturant-parent family endorsed nurturant-parent beliefs as adults.

A variety of research supports the notion that family socialization exerts a strong influence on people's moral outlooks in adult life. Specifically, there is substantial evidence that family interactions and parenting style prominently influence people's political views, and that political ideology and partisanship are regularly transmitted between parents and children (e.g., R. Altemeyer, 1996; Glass, Bengston, & Dunham, 1986; Jennings & Niemi, 1968, 1982, 1991; McClosky & Chong, 1985; McDevitt, 2006). For example, Schönpflug (2001) found that parenting style, among other things, significantly influenced the transmission of collectivist and individualist values between parents and children. Furthermore, since people frequently construe social interactions in their adult life in terms of family dynamics (e.g., Conway & Pleydell, 2000), it comes as no surprise that the parenting styles they were exposed to as children can heavily influence their social reasoning.

However, people need not necessarily adopt their parents' moral values or view the parenting style they were exposed to as children as ideal. In fact, people may embrace political views opposite of those that their parents hold (e.g., Jennings & Niemi, 1968).

Since Moral Politics Theory proposes that family socialization can be an important influence in moral political outlook, and since the strict-father and nurturant-parent models are related to Baumrind's (1971) authoritarian and authoritative parenting styles, it would be worthwhile to briefly review research that found correlations between the two parenting styles and conservative or liberal attitudes in adulthood.

For example, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950) postulated that early childhood experiences with parental authority are the main influence for authoritarian outlooks in adults, including political authoritarianism. While there is empirical evi-

dence for this view (Milburn, Conrad, Sala, & Carberry, 1995), other scholars have taken a broader perspective, arguing that authoritarian social attitudes are learned beyond early childhood and commonly consolidate during adolescence (B. Altemeyer, 1998). In line with this view, Hadjar, Baier and Boehnke (2008) found that adolescents who have been exposed to authoritarian and achievement-focused parenting during their childhood strongly endorse dominance values (i.e., hierarchical self-interest attitudes). Similarly, Duriez, Soenens and Vansteenkiste (2007) showed that parental style and goal promotion predict right-wing-authoritarianism (B. Altemeyer, 1981) and social-dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994) in adolescents. Finally, research that relates Baumrind's (1971) parenting styles to religious outlooks shows intimate links between authoritarian parenting and conservative religiosity (Ellison & Sherkat, 1993; Ellison, Bartkowski, & Segal, 1996; Lienesch, 1991).¹ In sum, exposure to authoritarian and authoritative parenting can in fact exert a strong influence on adults' social and political attitudes.

5. Biconceptualism

Moral Politics Theory proposes that while some people endorse the strict-father or nurturant-parent model more or less exclusively in their moral political reasoning, a certain part of the electorate endorses both models to similar degrees. Lakoff (1996) found that moderates and swing-voters are "biconceptual" in this sense, and engage both idealized family models when reasoning about politics.

However, Lakoff (1996, 2008) states that biconceptuals are not necessarily open to applying either model to any given set of political issues. Rather, they commonly apply one model to one specific set of issues, and the other to a second specific set of issues. For example, biconceptuals may endorse the strict-father model every time they reason about abortion, immigration, and the economy, and endorse the nurturant-parent model whenever they reason about education, women's rights, and the environment. Such biconceptuals "switch" between the two parenting models when reasoning about politics. Which worldview is activated in their minds strongly depends on what issue is being debated, for example, during a given election campaign. This notion is supported by research showing that the majority of Americans embrace both conservative and liberal views on different sets of political issues, rather than fully subscribing to either conservatism or liberalism (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2006).

Moral Politics Theory furthermore argues that biconceptualism may lead people to endorse the two worldviews with regard to different areas of social and political life. For example, one may endorse the strict-father model with regard to work life and family life, and the nurturant-parent model with regard to politics and one's religious community. That is, biconceptualism does not only predict that people are open to applying both parenting models to politics, but that they are also open to applying both parenting models to

¹ Moreover, and interestingly, research has found that authoritarian and authoritative parenting can influence value transmission between parents and children. While authoritarian parenting can decrease the likelihood of children to adopt their parents' values (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994), children in authoritative families are generally more likely to adopt their parents' moral values (Pratt et al., 2003) and political ideology (Murray & Mulvaney, 2012). A discussion of these findings and their entailments for Moral Politics Theory is beyond the scope of this investigation.

other domains of social life (a phenomenon that might best be labeled *cross-domain* biconceptualism).

5.1. Bound and open biconceptualism

Biconceptualism is, in its essence, defined as an individuals' endorsement of both idealized parenting models in political reasoning. A biconceptual is someone who commonly reasons about politics in terms of either the strict-father or the nurturant-parent model.

Since the conceptualization of moral governance is mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, biconceptuals should thus be equally open to reasoning about ideal family life in terms of either the strict-father or the nurturant-parent model. Simply put, they should be torn between the two models in their reasoning about politics as well as family life.

Thus, one way to measure biconceptualism would be to measure the degree to which people endorse both models in their reasoning about ideal parenting: people who score high on only one model would be non-biconceptuals; people who score high on both models would be biconceptuals.

Lakoff (1996, 2008) found that a large portion of the electorate is politically biconceptual, applying one model to one specific set of issues, and the other to a second specific set of issues.

But, the notion of biconceptualism opens the door for a set of further predictions. Namely, while Moral Politics Theory states that biconceptuals' strict-father and nurturant-parent contestations of political life are regularly "bound" to specific issue areas, and thus not arbitrary, it is also conceivable that biconceptuals exist who are open to reasoning about any given issue in terms of either model. Some biconceptuals may be open to reasoning about, say, immigration, crime or abortion in terms of *either* strict-father or nurturant-parent values, since they have both value sets readily available in their minds and regularly use them to make sense of politics.

Therefore, it will be helpful to distinguish between "bound" and "open" political biconceptualism: Bound political biconceptuals use the strict-father model for one specific set of issues and the nurturant-parent model for another specific set of issues; open political biconceptuals, on the other hand, are open to endorse either model with regard to one and the same political issue.

The notion that some people are open biconceptuals, and thus morally "torn" with regard to one and the same issues, fits with observations in ideology research. For example, it has been observed that people are commonly torn between conflicting sets of values when making moral political judgments. As Brewer (2002) summarizes,

"Hochschild (1981) and Feldman and Zaller (1992) [...] show that citizens [commonly] base their political views on multiple values rather than relying on just one principle to define the political world. One implication of this research is that a person may hold two values that pull in opposite directions within a particular issue domain (see also Tetlock, 1986; Alvarez & Brehm, 1995)" (p. 304).

Open biconceptuals should be especially malleable in their political attitudes. The question of what worldview they apply to a given issue should to a great extent depend on the way in which an issue is framed in public debate. If an issue is presented in terms of

strict-father values, open biconceptuals should endorse more conservative attitudes on the issue. Conversely, if an issue is presented in terms of nurturant-parent values, open biconceptuals should endorse more liberal attitudes on the issue.

6. Influence and criticism of Moral Politics Theory

Since Lakoff (1996) first offered his account of moral political reasoning in terms of idealized family models, Moral Politics Theory has gained much influence among political elites around the world. Progressive politicians, activists, and media outlets alike have embraced and discussed the theory. For example, Nancy Pelosi once declared that “Lakoff’s ideas ‘forever changed’ the way in which Democratic House members reason about politics” (Bai, 2005). As Iyengar (2005) observed,

“Don’t Think of an Elephant!, an extract from Lakoff’s more expansive earlier work *Moral Politics*, made the New York Times bestseller list and is required reading among the Democratic-liberal intelligentsia. [...] Lakoff is regularly sought out as an advisor by high-ranking Democrats, including Hillary Clinton and Nancy Pelosi, and has appeared in person before the House Democratic Caucus. Prestigious news outlets regularly comment on his ideas. In short, Lakoff is that rarity among academics: a serious scholar taken seriously by political practitioners” (p. 1).

Aside from the attention the theory receives among political actors, many scholars have pointed to its intuitive validity and relevance for understanding political moral cognition (e.g., Bar-Lev, 2007; Deason & Gonzales, 2012; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Bar-Lev (2007) reports, “I have used [Lakoff’s] models in my college course [...]. There is simply no question that these models function very well for this kind of research. [...] not every political discourse uses the metaphors, but most do, in very straightforward ways” (p. 463). Similarly, Deason and Gonzales (2012) observe, “[...] testing Lakoff’s ideas is sure to generate a wealth of interesting findings that can help psychologists and others to better understand the campaigns to come and the role of moral metaphors in political communication and persuasion” (p. 265).

However, despite the political and academic world’s fascination with Moral Politics Theory, researchers have repeatedly lamented a lack of comprehensive empirical support for its many assertions. For example, Iyengar (2005) calls Moral Politics Theory “a tantalizing theory rather than a demonstrated conclusion” (p. 3). Similarly, Swift (2009) observes, “[...] more research needs to be done to further understand the limits and scope of [Lakoff’s] thesis” (p. 6).

While some scholars question the validity of the two parenting models and their predictive power for conservatism and liberalism (e.g., Layman et al., 2007), others have pointed to the lack of experimental support for the theory’s claim that moral political cognition is mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY mapping (e.g., Bar-Lev, 2007; Musolf, 2004). For example, Bar-Lev (2007) observes, “Lakoff contents himself with laying out hypotheses with their empirical implications – usually amounting to isolated examples, many of them unsourced. Surely one never finds, in his work, anything approaching a systematic analysis of some coherently defined body of data [...]” (p. 460).

Others critique that there is no experimental evidence for Moral Politics Theory's claims concerning framing effects. For example, Deason and Gonzales (2012) observe that "to date there have been no experimental studies of the influence of Nurturant Parent versus Strict Father strategies for framing arguments" (p. 265).

As for the validity of Moral Politics Theory's two parenting models, it ought to be noted that Lakoff (1996) derived the strict-father and nurturant-parent model from real-world data, namely, public political debates in the US. Thus, the models do not constitute a priori theories about the worldviews that underlie conservatism and liberalism. Rather, they are modeled after a large amount of empirical data that reflects conservative and liberal discourse and cognition. In short, the strict-father and nurturant-parent model are empirical in nature. However, it is true that the internal consistency and conceptual independence of the two models, as well as their predictive power for conservatism and liberalism, have to date not been tested via statistical methods. Such a test could provide valuable complementary support for the two models' empirical validity.

Moral Politics Theory's other two predictions, namely that political cognition in terms of the two models is mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor and that framings in terms of the two models should significantly influence people's reasoning, in fact lack empirical evidence altogether.

The present research thus sets out to accomplish three things. First, it further tests the empirical validity of the two parenting models, putting their internal consistency, conceptual independence, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism to the test through statistical analyses. Furthermore, it constitutes the first test of Moral Politics Theory's predictions regarding the role of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor for political reasoning and framing effects associated with the two models.

Before leaping into a more detailed description of the present research, other studies that have put certain aspects of Moral Politics Theory to the test shall be discussed.

7. Complementary empirical support for Moral Politics Theory

While some have remained skeptical of Moral Politics Theory's validity, a growing amount of research has recently put certain components of the theory to the test. Investigations tapped into linguistic evidence of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in political discourse (Cienki, 2005a), the models' occurrence in elite-to-citizen discourse (Ahrens, 2011; Cienki, 2005b; Deason & Gonzales, 2012) as well as citizen discourse (McAdams et al., 2008; Swift, 2009), the models' predictive power for political identity (e.g., Barker & Tinnick, 2006), their causal effects on political reasoning (Cha & Schwarz, 2006), and evidence of biconceptualism (Greeley & Hour, 2006; Swift, 2009).

7.1. The NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in political discourse

Cienki (2005a) offers complementary evidence that the NATION AS FAMILY mapping in fact plays a crucial role in the conceptualization of national politics and governance, and that the mapping frequently entails strict-father and nurturant-parent contestations of ideal family life. In an analysis of the 2000 presidential election debates between George W.

Bush and Al Gore, the author found that words from the family-domain were used more frequently in metaphorical expressions than other words, and that they more frequently entailed strict-father and nurturant-parent values than other words in the corpus used at similar frequency.

7.2. Elite-to-citizen and citizen discourse

Discourse analyses have shown that conservatives and liberals use aspects of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models when reasoning about politics and morality.

As Bougher (2012) pointed out, investigations into metaphoric frames in political discourse are commonly restricted to the discourses of political elites, and little is known about the metaphoric frames and entailments that citizens apply to politics (p. 148). Therefore, while elite-to-citizen discourse is a core determinant of public opinion and can shift citizens' perspectives on political issues (e.g., Druckman, 2001), equal attention must be paid to the ways in which citizens construe politics and morality in their own discourse.

A number of studies have found evidence of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models in conservative and liberal discourse, respectively, among the political elite and citizens. In contrast to Cienki (2005a), these analyses did *not* investigate linguistic evidence for of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor; their primary concern was with citizens' usage of moral entailments that follow from the two family models.

7.2.1. Elite-to-citizen discourse

A number of investigations found evidence of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models in elite-to-citizen discourse (Ahrens, 2011; Cienki, 2005b; Deason & Gonzales, 2012; Johansen, 2007; Norocel, 2010; Szilagyi, 2010).

For example, in an empirical analysis of the 2000 US-American presidential election debates, Cienki (2005b) found that George W. Bush used significantly more strict-father entailments than Al Gore did (296: 80), while the Democratic candidate used slightly more nurturant-parent entailments than his Republican opponent (241: 221). Since politicians commonly adopt their opponents' moral frames (Lakoff, 2002), it is not surprising that both candidates resorted to their opponent's language to some extent. However, the high number of nurturant-parent entailments in Bush's discourse is surprising. Although not discussed by the author, this finding may be due to the fact that George W. Bush's campaign was concerned with framing him as a "compassionate conservative". And in fact, other research paints a similar picture of Bush's discourse: Ahrens (2011) found that during his presidency, Bush used significantly more strict-father than nurturant-parent themes in radio addresses, but not in State of the Union Addresses, which may reach larger parts of the electorate. It seems conceivable, then, that Bush was in fact concerned with framing himself as a "compassionate conservative" – and thus borrowed nurturant-parent frames – when addressing larger, nation-wide audiences (Ahrens, 2011; Cienki, 2005b).

Further evidence of the relevance of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models in conservative and liberal elite-to-citizen discourse comes from Ahrens (2011), who analyzed presidential State of the Union and radio addresses between 1980 and 2006. Searching for lexemes that relate to strength-authority or empathy-nurturance, the author

found that two out of four presidents used the strict-father and nurturant-parent models as predicted: Bill Clinton used significantly more nurturant-parent than strict-father lexemes, and Ronald Reagan used significantly more strict-father than nurturant-parent lexemes.

Finally, Deason and Gonzales (2012) coded the 2008 presidential party convention speeches of John McCain, Sarah Palin, Barack Obama, and John Biden for strict-father and nurturant-parent themes. Overall, 36.8% of the Democratic and 31.7% of the Republican candidates' speeches consisted of moral arguments in line with the two models. Furthermore, the Democratic candidates used more nurturant-parent themes (24.1%) than strict-father themes (12.7%), and they used nurturant-parent themes significantly more often (24.1%) than the Republican candidates did (15.8%). While the Republican candidates did use a higher number of strict-father themes than their Democratic opponents, this difference was not statistically significant. However, candidates significantly differed in their usage of the strict-father theme *toughness*: 6.2% of McCain and Palin's speech invoked the value of *toughness*, while it was featured in only 1.2% of Obama and Biden's speech.

Aside from the above quantitative investigations, a number of qualitative analyses offer additional support for the strict-father and nurturant-parent models' relevance in elite-to-citizen discourse. For example, Johansen (2007) found that conservative and liberal elite discourse in Great Britain differs in the implementation of strict-father and nurturant parent values. In an analysis of the 1997 manifestos of the UK's Conservative Party and Labour Party, the author showed that conservatives commonly used strict-father themes while liberals used nurturant-parent themes. Interestingly, the two models' entailments for moral political cognition were especially evident where the manifestos discussed government-citizen interaction. For instance, while the liberal manifesto emphasized cooperation and equal respect between government and citizens, the conservative manifesto warned against governmental "intrusion" or "meddling" (echoing the strict-father value *absolute social authority*) (p. 42), and cautioned against a "cosy dependence" between government and citizens (echoing the strict-father value *immoral unconditional nurturance*) (p. 54). Similarly, Norocel (2010) analyzed Romanian public discourse during the 2004 presidential elections and found that radical right-wing populists recurrently invoked strict-father values, such as a *good-evil dichotomy*, *rule enforcement*, *self-discipline*, *punishment*, and *male authority* (see Szilagyi, 2010 for related findings in Russian and Hungarian conservative discourse).

7.2.2. Citizen discourse

Evidence of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models has also been found in citizen discourse (McAdams et al., 2008; Swift, 2009).

For example, McAdams et al. (2008) found that conservative and liberal adults identified strict-father and nurturant-parent principles as important to their lives. The authors analyzed life-narrative interviews with 128 religious and politically active adults for the strict-father themes "rule reinforcement" and "self-discipline" and the nurturant-parent themes "nurturant caregiving" and "empathy-openness". They found that "[...] conservatives tended to tell stories invoking rules and reinforcements for good behavior, and they featured protagonists who learned the value of self-discipline in life", while "[...] liberals tended to tell personal stories in which protagonists developed empathy and learned to

open themselves up to new people and perspectives”² (p. 984). A closer look at narrative segments provides vivid examples of how conservatives and liberals reasoned about moral lessons in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent values. For example, among the conservatives,

“[one] participant described how his father spanked him for stealing money from his mother’s purse. Another participant spoke in admiring terms about the rules for good behavior he internalized from his father and an admired teacher” (p. 982).

Contrastingly, in the narratives of liberals,

“the protagonist or another character in the story explicitly displayed an ability to sympathize with another person’s emotional state, to take the role of another, or to be accepting or tolerant of people or points of view that are seen to be very different from their own. The emphasis in this theme was on the ability to emotionally identify with, accept, understand, or tolerate the other” (p. 982).

Similarly, Swift (2009) analyzed in-depth interviews with religious US-American adults about the moral values that motivate their political positions. He found that conservatives referred to strict-father and liberals to nurturant-parent values. Specifically, conservatives identified values such as *competition*, *self-discipline*, *self-reliance* and *tough-love nurturance* (p. 141), as well as *absolute parental authority*, *obedience*, *performance-based fairness*, and *immoral meddling with absolute social authorities* (p. 139). Liberals, on the other hand, identified values such as *empathy*, *empathy-based tolerance*, *nurturance*, *two-way communication*, and *need-based fairness* (p. 139).

7.3. Predictive power for conservatism and liberalism

Initial evidence of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models’ predictive power for political identity comes from Barker and Tinnick (2006) (see Mockabee, 2007, and see Hetherington & Weiler, 2005 as cited in Layman, McTague, Pearson-Merkowitz, & Spivey, 2007 and for comparable findings; but see Layman et al., 2007). Using data from the 2000 American National Election Survey (NES), Barker and Tinnick showed that the attitudes that participants held toward moral traits in children significantly predicted their political attitudes and candidate preferences, even when controlling for confounding variables such as authoritarianism, absolutism versus tolerance, and demographic background. Furthermore, people who held the strongest opinions on parenting practices were the most *consistently* liberal or conservative in their political opinions.

The authors used three NES items to assess people’s childrearing preferences. Namely, participants were asked,

“Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. [...] which one you think is more important for a child to have: Inde-

² However, liberals were not more likely than conservatives to depict authority figures as nurturers.

pendence or respect for elders? Curiosity or good manners? Being considerate or well behaved?” (p. 253).

Preferences for respectful, well-mannered and well-behaved children significantly predicted conservative attitudes, while preferences for independent, curious and considerate children significantly predicted liberal attitudes. While the authors proposed that the first set of preferences indicated strict-father, and the second one nurturant-parent ideals³, it seems that the three items do not capture the two parenting models all too adequately.

First, while some items may be interpreted as loosely capturing certain aspects of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality, some do not resemble either of the two moralities. For example, it is far from clear that the *independence-respect* item captures a difference between strict and nurturant parenting. While a certain form of respect (namely unidirectional respect) does capture attributes of strict-father morality, the notion of *independence* is not exclusive to the nurturant-parent model. In fact, *self-reliance*, a conceptual neighbor to *independence*, is a core value in strict-father morality (leading other studies to use *independence* as an indication of strict-father ideals: Cha & Schwarz, 2006).

Moreover, and aside from issues with the conceptual nature of the items, a three-item measure seems insufficient to measure models as complex as strict-father and nurturant-parent morality. For instance, while the three items tap into *moral traits* in children, they do not touch on *moral parenting* (that is, moral need-support and behavior regulation) at all.

7.4. Causal effects

There is initial experimental evidence for Moral Politics Theory’s prediction that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models can influence moral political cognition. Cha and Schwarz (2006) tested the causal impact of the two models in a priming study and found that priming strict-father values resulted in harsher moral judgment of people in need. In particular, participants were presented with moral traits in children that related to either the strict-father model (character strength, independence, respect for parents and authority, hard work, determination and perseverance) or the nurturant-parent model (empathy, helpfulness, enjoyment of life, curiosity and imagination, and tolerance and respect for others). Participants in the strict-father condition judged people in need of welfare significantly harsher than those in the nurturant-parent condition. For example, they considered welfare recipients as less “mature”, “intelligent”, “responsible” and “careful”, and they reported less sympathy toward them, concluding that welfare recipients “deserved what they got”.

7.5. Biconceptualism

Finally, there is complementary evidence for cross-domain biconceptualism (Greeley &

³ A fourth item from the NES survey, targeting the values of self-reliance and obedience, was dropped in the analysis, as the authors concluded that both concepts tapped into strict-father ideals (p. 253, footnote 12; see also Layman et al. 2007).

Hour, 2006) as well as open political biconceptualism (Swift, 2009). Greeley and Hour (2006) explored the religious and political views of African-American Christians. The authors found that participants endorsed the strict-father model in their religious reasoning, while endorsing the nurturant-parent model in their political reasoning. Thus, they applied the two idealized parenting models to different domains of social life. Furthermore, in an analysis of in-depth interviews with conservative and liberal adults, Swift (2009) found that conservative and liberal moderate views on issues such as abortion were commonly characterized by an openness to comprehend a given issue in terms of either strict-father or nurturant-parent values. For example, the author found that a conservative participant's moderate view on abortion was "[...] based on a biconceptual understanding of the issue. That is, he considers the issue through the lens of both the nurturant parent and strict father moral systems and believes that they both come into play on the abortion issue" (p. 142).

8. Open questions and present research

While there is initial support for certain aspects of Moral Politics Theory, its three principle components have either not been tested via statistical and experimental methods at all or have only received tentative empirical support from some of the studies outlined above.

First, there is no statistical test of the validity of the two family models: Do the sub-components that Moral Politics Theory proposes for the strict-father and nurturant-parent models really constitute unified cognitive dimensions? Is it true that the two models constitute two *distinct* worldviews? In addition, are the two models predictive of conservatism and liberalism? A preliminary statistical test of this prediction was undertaken (Barker & Tinnick, 2006) but faced some serious challenges in adequately testing the theory (as discussed above). Other studies attested that strict-father and nurturant-parent values do play a role in elite and citizen discourse and reasoning (Ahrens, 2011; Cienki, 2005b; Deason & Gonzales, 2012; McAdams et al., 2008; Swift, 2009), but did not directly test the models' predictive power for conservatism and liberalism.

Second, there is no empirical test of the theory's proposal that a correlation of parenting ideals and political attitudes is mediated by a metaphoric mapping, namely the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. All we know thus far is that the metaphor prominently features in elite discourse (Cienki, 2005a; Lakoff, 1996, 2008). This observation, however, does not suffice to validate the important role the metaphoric mapping has for moral political cognition in terms of the two family models.

Third, while there is initial experimental support that the two models can exert a causal effect on moral political reasoning (Cha & Schwarz, 2006), there is no test of the notion that linguistic framings of political issues in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent morality results in framing effects (e.g., see Deason & Gonzales, 2012). Moral Politics Theory's major concern is with the long-term effects of such framings on people's political cognition. However, it also implies that such framings should result in short-term framing effects (which can be tested for via experimental studies). Furthermore, while some studies support the notion of biconceptualism (Greeley & Hour, 2006; Swift, 2009), nothing is known about the role that *open* biconceptualism may play with regard to people's sus-

ceptibility to moral framings. One would predict that open biconceptuals are more malleable in their attitudes, and that framings in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality affect their attitudes across different political issues. But this prediction has not been tested.

Finally, while Lakoff (1996, 2008) estimates that roughly a third of the electorate is biconceptual, there is to date no empirical account of the exact number of biconceptuals.

The present research tested all the above predictions. Specifically, it tested the statistical validity and predictive power of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models for conservatism and liberalism (Studies 1 and 2), the role of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor for moral political cognition in terms of idealized parenting models (Studies 3 and 4), and framing effects associated with the two models (Studies 5 and 6).

8.1. Validity and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism

Moral Politics Theory holds that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models' subcomponents form unified cognitive models, and that those models are minimally overlapping, forming two distinct worldviews. These two aspects of the theory were tested in Study 1. The results show that the models' subcomponents form unified cognitive models with minimal overlap between them. Furthermore, a scale was created that reliably measures strict-father and nurturant-parent beliefs. This Moral Politics Family Scale has two subscales, the strict-father subscale (15 items) and the nurturant-parent subscale (14 items).

Finally, Moral Politics Theory predicts that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models are predictive of conservatism and liberalism. This aspect of the theory was tested in Study 2, which implemented the Moral Politics Family Scale from Study 1. The results show that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models reliably predict political conservatism and liberalism.

8.2. The NATION AS FAMILY metaphor

Moral Politics Theory predicts that the mechanism by which people make moral political judgments is metaphoric mapping: ideas are mapped from a source domain (an idealized view of the family) onto a target domain (national governance). To test this aspect of the theory, Studies 3 and 4 were conducted.

In Study 3, the Moral Politics Family Scale was used as a template to create a Moral Politics Nation Scale, which gauged participants' beliefs about ideal governance in terms of the two family models. This new scale's role in mediating the relationship between ideal parenting models and political attitudes was examined. The results show that the Moral Politics Nation Scale mediates the relationship between ideal parenting models, as measured by the Moral Politics Family Scale, and political attitudes. This finding indicates a metaphoric mapping process: people map ideal family beliefs *onto* national governance in order to arrive at moral political judgments.

Study 4 tested whether the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor's impact on moral political cognition could be increased when participants were encouraged to see the metaphor as an adequate way of reasoning about national politics. To test this, participants were encouraged to either engage or disengage the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. Encouragement to engage the mapping led participants to polarize along the political spectrum: they

embraced their conservative and liberal beliefs more strongly when they were brought to think of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor as an adequate means of conceptualizing politics.

8.3. Moral framing and open biconceptualism

Moral Politics Theory holds that linguistic framings of issues in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent values should entail framing effects. While the theory's major concern is with long-term effects of such framings, it also predicts short-term effects.

Furthermore, one can predict that open biconceptuals (see Section 5.1, above) should be especially malleable in their political attitudes: if issues are framed in terms of strict-father values, they should embrace more conservative attitudes; if issues are, on the other hand, framed in terms of nurturant-parent values, they should endorse more liberal attitudes. In short, open biconceptuals should be especially susceptible to moral framings in terms of the two models, while the same should not hold true for non-biconceptuals (a *susceptibility* hypothesis). Moreover, since moral worldviews can govern people's attitudes across a set of seemingly unrelated political issues, accordant framing effects among biconceptuals should span across multiple issues, even if those seem unrelated at first sight (a *generalizability* hypothesis).

The above hypotheses were tested in Studies 5 and 6. In Study 5, participants were exposed to a framing of the issue "immigration" in terms of either strict-father or nurturant-parent values. In Study 6, participants were exposed to a framing of the issue "crime" in terms of either strict-father or nurturant-parent values. The results from both studies show that strict-father and nurturant-parent framings led to framing effects, and that biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, were susceptible to framings in terms of both models. These effects occurred with regard to both the issues of immigration and crime, lending support to the prediction that strict-father and nurturant-parent framings result in framing effects across different and seemingly unrelated issues.

Finally, as for the general occurrence of biconceptualism: Studies 1 through 3 revealed that an average of 24% of the participants (177 out of 744) were classifiable as biconceptual; whether those biconceptuals were open or bound remains unknown, as their attitude malleability was not tested. Studies 5 and 6 found that 32% of the participants (86 out of 270) classified as biconceptual, and that they were open biconceptuals.

This chapter started out by reviewing evidence against the self-interest hypothesis for political reasoning and action, showing that self-interest is at best a marginal indicator for conservative and liberal political attitudes. Then, current lines of research were identified that investigate the impact of other factors on political attitudes, such as genetic material, personality traits, psychological dispositions and needs, and moral beliefs. The prominent role of moral beliefs for political reasoning and behavior for both conservatives and liberals was discussed; moreover, it was shown that moral concerns regularly determine whether individuals endorse conservative or liberal attitudes in the realm of politics.

One early account of the moral concerns that divide conservatives and liberals is Lakoff's (1996) Moral Politics Theory. Lakoff found that conservatives and liberals regularly endorse different idealized parenting models in their reasoning about politics. Above, Moral Politics Theory was described in detail. For example, the models' correla-

tions with real-world parenting styles, the theory's predictions regarding the relationship of family socialization and political outlooks in adult life, and the idealized nature of the models were discussed.

Next, studies that tested some of Moral Politics Theory's core predictions were reviewed, and it was shown that many of its core assertions to date lack complementary support. Specifically, there is no statistical test of the two models' internal consistency, independence, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism. Moreover, there is no validation of the assertion that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor mediates political cognition in terms of parenting beliefs, and no experimental study exists that investigates how an increase or decrease in metaphor endorsement affects political cognition. Finally, there is to date no test of the notion that linguistic framings in terms of the two parenting models result in framing effects, and it remains an open question whether such framing effects are restricted to open biconceptuals.

In the present study, all the above predictions are put to the test. Studies 1 and 2 test the strict-father and nurturant-parent models' internal consistency, independence, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism are tested (Chapter 2). Studies 3 and 4 test whether the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in fact mediates political cognition in terms of parenting beliefs and examine the effects that an increased endorsement of the metaphor has on political cognition (Chapter 4). Finally, Studies 5 and 6 investigate whether issue framings in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model result in framing effects, whether those effects are restricted to open biconceptuals, and whether they occur across different issue areas (Chapter 6).

Chapter 2: Testing the strict-father and nurturant-parent model: Internal consistency, conceptual independence, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism

Introduction

Moral Politics Theory holds that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models form unified and independent belief systems, and that the former predicts conservatism while the latter predicts liberalism. Studies 1 and 2 were conducted to statistically test these claims.

In order to do so, the two models were dissected into their moral subcomponents, using Moral Politics Theory's original description of the models as a template. Items were created that tap into each of the models' subcomponents, and a Moral Politics Family Scale was created, with a strict-father and nurturant-parent subscale. The two subscales' predictive power for conservatism and liberalism was tested and confirmed. The scale development process also served as a means for testing the notion that the two models' diverse subcomponents form unified belief systems, and that those two belief systems are minimally overlapping and each independently influence political attitudes. Both claims were confirmed.

1. Two coherent worldviews

Moral Politics Theory states that conservative and liberal attitudes relate to two idealized cognitive models: the strict-father and the nurturant-parent model. As became evident in Section 3 in the Introduction, both models are highly complex, with many subcomponents. Lakoff (1996) proposes that these subcomponents make part of unified cognitive models, that is, that they semantically hang together to form large, complex worldviews.

While there is linguistic evidence for this (e.g., Lakoff, 1996), no statistical test has to date been undertaken to examine whether the subcomponents of the two models highly correlate with each other in people's minds. For example, is it true that someone who endorses the strict-father value "punishment" regularly *also* endorses other strict-father values, such as "obedience", "rule-enforcement", "direct causation", and "immoral lenience"? Likewise, is someone who endorses the nurturant-parent value "empathy" likely to *also* endorse other nurturant-parent values, such as "moral nurturance", "need-based fairness", "systemic causation", and "harm avoidance"? If the models' subcomponents form unified, cognitive models, this should be the case. One should find that each model's subcomponents are statistically highly correlated, resulting in a high degree of internal consistency within the two models.

1.1. Moral traits, moral parenting, child nature beliefs, and world beliefs

The strict-father and nurturant-parent models encompass four types of beliefs, namely, beliefs about moral traits, moral parenting, the nature of children, and the nature of the world. Although Lakoff (1996, 2008) does not use these exact labels and does not always strictly categorize the models' subcomponents by the belief types they relate to, he re-

peatedly points to the fact that both models imply beliefs about what makes people good or bad, about moral governance, and about the nature of children and the world (e.g., Lakoff, 1996).

Since the strict-father and nurturant-parent model were construed to represent idealized parenting models, it comes as no surprise that three out of the models' four belief types directly parallel aspects that distinguish parenting types in childrearing research. Childrearing research has established that parenting types most commonly differ with regard to beliefs about the nature of children (e.g., Darling & Steinberg, 1993; Maccoby & Martin, 1983), beliefs about ideal parental goal setting, and beliefs about ideal parent-child interaction (e.g., B. Altemeyer, 1998; Darling & Steinberg, 1993; Duriez et al., 2007; Vansteenkiste, Duriez, Soenens, & De Witte, 2006). Child nature beliefs simply encompass divergent notions about the nature of children. Parental goal setting denotes *what* ideals and behaviors parents want their children to learn. Finally, beliefs about ideal parent-child interaction focus on *how* parents should interact with their children, both with regard to the emotional climate within a family (need-support) and ways in which the behavior of children should be regulated (behavior regulation) (e.g., Barber 1997).

The strict-father and nurturant-parent models, as modeled in Moral Politics Theory, encompass all three aspects of parenting: beliefs about the nature of children (*child nature beliefs*), the characteristics and behaviors that parents should foster in children (*moral traits*), and the ways in which parents should interact with their children in order to make them maximally moral (*moral parenting*). Furthermore, the two models imply conflicting beliefs about the nature of the world (*world beliefs*).

For example, the strict-father model assumes that children are born bad, lacking self-discipline (*child nature belief*). Self-discipline is an important value for the child to learn (*moral trait*), since the world is a dangerous and competitive place (*world belief*). Therefore, the moral concern with in-group nurturance is omitted whenever there is need for punishment in order to teach the child self-discipline (*moral parenting*). Similarly, the nurturant-parent model assumes that children are born good, and have a natural tendency to empathize and cooperate with others (*child nature*). Empathy and cooperation are important values to be fostered in children (*moral trait*). Therefore, parents treat children with respect and empathy, leading by example (*moral parenting*).

When the two parenting models are mapped onto politics via the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, they accordingly entail different beliefs about moral traits in citizens, moral governance, human nature, and the world.

While the strict-father and nurturant-parent models involve beliefs about human nature and the world, one would predict that when it comes to people's reasoning about moral governance, the two models' divergent beliefs about moral traits and moral parenting take center stage. The reason is simple: at its core, moral political reasoning is driven by divergent assumptions about *what* constitutes moral characteristics and behaviors in people, and what type of government best *fosters* such traits in society. Thus, while the models imply human nature and world beliefs, and while these are expected to form part of the two cognitive models, divergent beliefs about moral traits and ideal parenting should be the main predictors of conservative and liberal attitudes.

After having given a preliminary description of the two models in Section 3 in the Introduction, it is now time to provide a more detailed overview of them.

In order to acquire a better understanding of the models' details, and to be able to put them to a comprehensive test, they were dissected into their moral subcomponents. Using Lakoff's (1996, 2004, 2006a, 2008) original descriptions of the two models as a template, 36 moral subcomponents for the strict-father and 30 moral subcomponents for the nurturant-parent model were distinguished. Those subcomponents adequately reflect the nature of the two parenting models as described by Moral Politics Theory (Lakoff, personal communication, November 11, 2010).

1.2. The strict-father model

The strict-father model counts 36 subcomponents, and they are described in detail below. The model's moral subcomponents are reflected in the four belief types they relate to: moral traits, moral parenting, child nature beliefs, and world beliefs. For each subcomponent that is discussed, an example item is provided that was used (among other items) in Study 1 to assess the degree to which people endorse it in their reasoning about ideal family life.

1.2.1. Moral traits

The strict-father model encompasses the moral traits *self-discipline*, *self-reliance*, *obedience*, *in-group nurturance*, *purity*, *conventionality*, *gender roles*, *immoral self-indulgence*, and *immoral dependence*. Below is a short description of each trait, together with an example item.

Self-discipline: Self-discipline is a sign of morality, and parents must teach their children self-discipline. (Example item: *Children must understand early on in life: "No pain, no gain".*)

Self-reliance: Being maximally self-reliant is moral and a form of pro-social behavior. Society as a whole will be better off if everyone is maximally self-reliant. Children must learn to rely on themselves as early as possible. (Example item: *Children should become financially independent as early as possible, even if their parents have enough money to support them.*)

Obedience: Obedience is moral. Parents must teach children to abide by authorities. (Example item: *Parents should never tolerate children who disobey them.*)

In-group nurturance: It is moral to nurture members of one's in-group, but not members of out-groups. (Example item: *While other people must not be one's concern, within a family, everyone should look after each other.*)

Purity: Physical and moral purity are signs of morality. (Example item: *Children must be taught to resist impure thoughts.*)

Conventionality: Conventionality is moral. Parents must teach children to follow traditional conventions. (Example item: *It's important that parents lead a traditional lifestyle in order to set a good example for their children.*)

Gender roles: Men and women are different by nature and traditionally fulfill different roles in society. Parents should raise children according to gender roles. (Example item:

Children will benefit most if girls help out with household chores and boys help out with manly duties.)

Immoral self-indulgence: Self-indulgence is immoral and gets in the way of self-discipline. (Example item: *Children who are allowed to be self-indulgent will never amount to anything.*)

Immoral dependence: Asking other people for help is immoral. A responsible child is a child that never asks for help from others but takes care of him- or herself. (Example item: *To teach children responsibility doesn't mean you have to teach them absolute self-reliance*; negatively keyed)

1.2.2. Moral parenting

The strict-father model encompasses the moral parenting beliefs *rule-enforcement, interposing parenting, order through rules, hierarchical communication, absolute parental authority, absolute control, consequences, moral strength, reward, punishment, competition, retribution, performance-based fairness, tough-love nurturance, immoral unconditional nurturance, immoral parental indulgence, and immoral lenience*. Below is a short description of each parenting belief with an example item.

Rule-enforcement: Parents are morally obliged to set rules and strictly enforce them. (Example item: *Firm rule-enforcement isn't a crucial part of parenting.*)

Interposing parenting: Parenting means molding children, who are born bad and lack self-discipline, into good people. Parents must regularly intervene with children's ideas and behaviors in order to make them moral. (Example item: *When children start to behave out of the norm, it's a parent's duty to immediately intervene and put the right ideas back in the child's mind.*)

Order through rules: Parents are obliged to maintain order through strict rules. (Example item: *Children must always be on time.*)

Hierarchical communication: Within a family, communication is hierarchical; parental decisions need not be discussed with children. (Example item: *Children should never question decisions their parents make.*)

Absolute parental authority: Parents must at all times maintain absolute authority over their children. (Example item: *Parents must break the will of rebellious children.*)

Absolute control: Parents must execute absolute control over their children's lives, even at the cost of invading their privacy. (Example item: *It's fine for children to have secrets and hide things from their parents*; negatively keyed)

Consequences: Actions result in consequences, and children must learn to face consequences of their actions by themselves, even if it is painful. (Example item: *Children shouldn't be forced to finish everything they put on their plate*; negatively keyed)

Moral strength: Children only grow strong by facing punishments, overcoming challenges, and experiencing pain. (Example item: *When the going gets tough I won't let my child be a crybaby.*)

Reward: Self-discipline must be rewarded. Children are naturally undisciplined, and their only incentive to become self-disciplined is external reward. (Example item: *Children*

should only receive an allowance if they earned it.)

Punishment: Parents are morally obligated to punish children. Misconduct and failure in children must be punished severely in order for children to become moral. (Example item: *Spanking children who misbehave is in their own best interest.*)

Competition: Competition makes children strong, and parents have to teach children to compete with others. (Example item: *My children should always play to win.*)

Retribution: Immoral behavior is made right through retribution, where the severity of punishment equals the severity of misconduct. (Example item: *If children get punched it's appropriate for them to punch back.*)

Performance-based fairness: Fairness means that children should always get what they deserve based on their actions and performance. (Example item: *Giving children what they don't earn would be unfair to their siblings.*)

Tough-love nurturance: The ideal type of nurturance is “tough love”. Parents need to discipline children for their own good, and strictness is an expression of parental love. (Example item: *A firm hand is a sign of parental love.*)

Immoral unconditional nurturance: Giving children what they need but have not earned makes them weak and dependent. Unconditional nurturance by a parent is immoral. (Example item: *Parents shouldn't handicap their children by making their lives too easy.*)

Immoral parental indulgence: Indulging one's children weakens their character and is immoral. (Example item: *A family's menu for children should consist of two choices: take it, or leave it.*)

Immoral lenience: Parents may never fail to punish their children. When in doubt, it is better to err on the side of authority than lenience, even if that means that an innocent child is wronged. (Example item: *It's better to punish bad behavior in children once too often than once too little.*)

1.2.3. Child nature and world beliefs

Within the strict-father model, beliefs about moral traits and moral parenting are intimately linked to beliefs about the nature of children and the world. Children are assumed to be born bad. Views about the world include beliefs in *direct causation*, *good-evil dichotomy*, *moral essence*, *spreading immorality*, *moral order*, *male authority*, *absolute social authority*, *system defense*, and *objective morality*. Below is a short description of each belief, together with an example item.

Children born bad: Children are born bad, naturally lack self-discipline, and want to do what feels good rather than what is right. (Example item: *One should always be suspicious of children's stories; they are good at making up excuses for their behavior.*)

Direct causation: Events in the world have a direct cause. For example, one's failure is a direct result of one's shortcomings. (Example item: *When children succeed it's their own accomplishment, if they fail it's their own fault – it's as simple as that.*)

Good-evil dichotomy: The world is divided into good and evil. (Example item: *Parents must teach their children that the world isn't just divided into good and evil; negatively keyed*)

Moral essence: One's behavior is a direct expression of one's moral essence. People who do good things have a good essence; people who do bad things have an evil essence. A person's moral essence cannot be changed. (Example item: *Even if certain children behave badly all the time that doesn't mean they're bad at heart*; negatively keyed)

Spreading immorality: Immoral behavior is like a disease that spreads from one individual to the next; therefore, immoral people must be kept apart from moral people. (Example item: *Evil is contagious; therefore I will not have my children socialize with bad kids.*)

Moral order: There is a natural moral order in the world; God is above men, men are above nature, men are above women, whites are above blacks, and so on; some people are inherently better than others and rightfully have authority over them. (Example item: *Children need to learn the natural order of things: God above men, men above nature.*)

Male authority: Men naturally have authority over women. Therefore, men should be the primary authorities in families. (Example item: *In a well-run family, the father decides.*)

Absolute social authority: Strict parents are essentially moral. Therefore, their authority is absolute and may not be challenged by authorities outside of the family. (Example item: *It's no ones business what happens within families.*)

System defense: Strict-father morality is unquestionably right. Therefore, it needs to be defended against other moral systems. (Example item: *I wouldn't want my child to be in close contact with grown ups that hold beliefs different from ours.*)

Objective morality: Certain things in the world are objectively right or wrong, and this cannot be contested. Strict-father morality is objectively right. (Example item: *Children cannot develop a moral compass unless people around them use the clear, sharp language of right and wrong.*)

1.3. The nurturant-parent model

The nurturant-parent model counts 30 subcomponents, and they are described in detail below. The moral subcomponents are represented in terms of the belief types they relate to: moral traits, moral parenting, child nature beliefs, and world beliefs. For each subcomponent that is discussed, an example item is provided that was used (among other items) in Study 1 to assess the degree to which people endorse it in their reasoning about ideal family life.

1.3.1. Moral traits

The nurturant-parent model encompasses the moral traits *individual and social responsibility, nurturance, in- and out-group nurturance, empathy, empathy-based tolerance, cooperation, cooperation over competition, self-fulfillment, social bonds, and personal best*. Below is a short description of each trait, together with an example item.

Individual and social responsibility: Taking care of oneself and others is moral. Self-responsibility is the foundation of social responsibility. (Example item: *Children need to learn that "sometimes you have to put other people's needs before yours".*)

Nurturance: Nurturance is moral. Parents must raise their children to be nurturers. (Example item: *It's essential that parents teach their children to be sensitive to the needs of others.*)

In- and out-group nurturance: It is a moral obligation to nurture members of one's in-group as well as people who do not belong to one's immediate in-group. (Example item: *It's important for parents to teach their children to care about all people.*)

Empathy: Empathy is moral. Parents must teach children to be empathic. (Example item: *Good parents teach children to put themselves in other people's shoes.*)

Empathy-based tolerance: Tolerance is moral, and it requires empathy. Children must learn to understand and tolerate the perspectives of others. (Example item: *Children must learn to empathize with others so that they will not be judgmental of them.*)

Cooperation: Cooperation is moral. Parents must teach their children to cooperate, and a family should be run cooperatively. (Example item: *Parents and children should regularly cooperate, for example when preparing common activities.*)

Cooperation over competition: Cooperation is more important than competition. Parents must teach their children to cooperate rather than compete. (Example item: *Children should be encouraged to work with, not against each other.*)

Self-fulfillment: Leading a happy and self-fulfilled life is moral, and parents should help their children lead self-fulfilled lives. (Example item: *Parents should make the happiness and self-fulfillment of their children a priority.*)

Social bonds: The ability to create and nurture social bonds with others is a form of moral, pro-social behavior. (Example item: *The ability to establish and nurture ties with all kinds of people is something I'd like to see in my child.*)

Personal best: Children should be encouraged to do the best they can in life. Competition should be understood as a means to bring out one's personal best, not as a means to hurt others or establish authority over them. (Example item: *Children should learn: Competition is about reaching the personal best, not beating others.*)

1.3.2. Moral parenting

The nurturant-parent model encompasses the moral parenting beliefs *mutual respect, two-way communication, accountability, empathic nurturance, empowerment, exploration, need-based fairness, unconditional love, physical affection, non-punitive behavior regulation, immoral parental harm, restitution, protection against external harm, leading by example, open guidance, non-intrusive parenting, and bonds with adult children*. Below is a short description of each parenting belief, together with an example item.

Mutual respect: Respect between parents and children must be mutual. Parents must respect their children as much as children must respect their parents. (Example item: *There should be mutual respect between parents and children.*)

Two-way communication: Parents and children should communicate on an eye-to-eye level with each other. Children's ideas must be taken seriously, and children are encouraged to question parental decisions, so that they can understand their parents' reasoning and learn from it. (Example item: *It's important for children and their parents to have*

open communication.)

Accountability: Parents are accountable to their children and must explain their decisions. (Example item: *Parents should be transparent about decisions they make for their children.*)

Empathic nurturance: In order to truly nurture children, parents need to empathize with them. (Example item: *In order to truly nurture children, one needs to be empathic.*)

Empowerment: Parents are morally obligated to empower their children so that they can accomplish their goals and succeed in life. (Example item: *Parents should empower children as much as possible so that they may follow their dreams.*)

Exploration: Parents must allow their children to explore different paths in life. (Example item: *Possibilities in life are endless; there is no such thing as one right path for a child to follow.*)

Need-based fairness: Fairness means that every child gets what he or she needs. (Example item: *Siblings should receive parental support in accordance to their individual needs.*)

Unconditional love: Parents must love and nurture their children unconditionally. (Example item: *A child must be sure of a parent's love, no matter what.*)

Physical affection: Parents must be physically affectionate toward their children. (Example item: *It's important to show physical affection to one's children.*)

Non-punitive behavior regulation: Parents should motivate their children to act morally by displaying pride when they do well, and they should teach them to not act immorally (e.g., to avoid harming others) by showing disappointment. Moral behavior should be fostered through the display of pride rather than material rewards; immoral behavior should be fostered through the display of disappointment rather than physical punishment. (Example item: *Earning the pride of their parents truly motivates children to give their personal best.*)

Immoral parental harm: Parents must never harm their children, physically or psychologically. (Example item: *It can sometimes be appropriate to slap or otherwise hurt a child; negatively keyed*)

Protection against external harm: Parents must protect their children from external harm. (Example item: *Parents should protect their children from harmful things, such as certain chemicals in toys.*)

Restitution: Immoral behavior is made right through restitution; when children do wrong, they must do something good to make up for it. (Example item: *If my children steal from others, they should make up for it by doing something nice for the other kids.*)

Leading by example: Parents should lead by example and act in accordance with the values they want their children to learn. (Example item: *It is not important for parents to guide children by example rather than dictate; negatively keyed*)

Open guidance: Parents should guide children when they have to make decisions, but not force decisions on them. (Example item: *"You have to figure out what's best for you" is an encouragement parents should often give their children.*)

Non-intrusive parenting: Parents should not intervene too much with their children's behaviors and choices. (Example item: *One should let kids be who they are.*)

Bonds with adult children: Parents and their adult children should maintain close bonds with each other. (Example item: *Grownups should always feel comfortable about asking their parents for advice and help.*)

1.3.3. Child nature and world beliefs

Within the nurturant-parent model, beliefs about moral traits and moral parenting are intimately linked to beliefs about the nature of children and the world. Children are assumed to be born good. Views about the world include beliefs in *systemic causation*, and *non-gendered authority*. Below is a short description of each belief, together with an example item.

Children born good: Children are born good and want to do what is right. They have a natural inclination to empathize and cooperate with others. (Example item: *Parents should encourage the good behavior children naturally display.*)

Systemic causation: Events in the world often have systemic causes. (Example item: *There are often complex reasons for children's misfortunes in life and it's not necessarily their fault.*)

Non-gendered authority: Men and women are equal and have equal authority. (Example item: *Gender isn't an important reason for dividing up parental duties.*)

Above, the moral subcomponents of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models were described in detail. Moral Politics Theory holds that each model's subcomponents form a unified, cognitive model (e.g., Lakoff, 1996, 2008). Before proceeding to a test of this prediction, another of Moral Politics Theory's predictions must be discussed: the notion that the two models form distinct moral worldviews.

2. Two distinct worldviews

Moral Politics Theory states that the strict-father and nurturant-parent worldview form two distinct cognitive models. This stands in contrast to other strands of ideology research, which commonly "define" liberalism in terms of a lack of conservative values.

For example, the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) (R. Altemeyer, 1996) and the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO) (Pratto et al., 1994) are used to measure the degree to which people endorse values associated with conservatism, such as authoritarian and social dominance attitudes. Conservatives tend to score high on both scales, and liberals tend to score low on them. Thus, the scales measure the degree to which individuals endorse (conservative) moral attitudes. However, while such scales help understand which moral attitudes liberals commonly do *not* endorse, they do not help much with understanding what moral attitudes liberals *do* endorse.

Furthermore, liberalism and conservatism are commonly defined in terms of the same value sets, such as social dominance (SDO), and distinguished by the degree to which a

given value set is endorsed. Liberalism is, thus, often understood as a lack of conservatism, and vice versa. For example, Jost et al. (2003) found that the Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance scales capture fundamental aspects of conservatism: conservatives distrust change and instability, and they have a high degree of tolerance for social inequality. The authors argued that those two traits best describe conservative ideology, and that liberals are defined by being just the opposite. Namely, liberals are open to change and have a low tolerance for social inequality.

These types of classifications are common in ideology research, but they pose a serious problem: If conservatism and liberalism are defined as different degrees of endorsement of *one* moral domain (such as, e.g., social dominance), then they do *not* constitute two distinct, moral worldviews, each with its own set of moral concerns.

Moral Politics Theory proposes a different account of ideology. Namely, it proposes that conservatism and liberalism are governed by two distinct worldviews, each with its own set of cognitively unified moral concerns.

The strict-father model constitutes a conservative worldview, and the nurturant-parent model constitutes a liberal worldview. Both worldviews can be embraced independently from each other. For example, people may endorse both models when reasoning about politics (biconceptuals); or, they may endorse one of the two models exclusively (non-biconceptuals).

This has an important implication. Namely, an individual who does not endorse the strict-father worldview is not automatically a liberal. Likewise, a person who does not reason about politics in terms of the nurturant-parent model is not automatically a conservative. Rather, it is the *active* endorsement of a strict-father or nurturant-parent worldview in political reasoning that makes one a conservative or liberal, respectively.

Since Moral Politics Theory defines conservatism and liberalism in terms of two distinct sets of moral concerns, there should be minimal statistical overlap between the two models.

3. Open questions and present research

Moral Politics Theory found that the strict-father and nurturant-parent model each have multiple subcomponents that relate to conflicting beliefs about moral traits in children and ideal parenting, as well as the nature of children and the world. A dissection of the two models revealed 36 such subcomponents for the strict-father model, and 30 such subcomponents for the nurturant-parent model. An analysis of public discourse (Lakoff, 1996) suggests that each model's subcomponents form larger conceptually unified cognitive models. However, no statistical test has been undertaken to investigate whether the models' subcomponents significantly correlate with each other. So the question remains: When asked to indicate their beliefs about ideal family life, do people commonly group the two models' subcomponents together in the way Moral Politics Theory would predict? Study 1 tested this prediction by investigating whether the models' subcomponents are highly correlated with each other. The results show that this is the case, and that strict-father and nurturant-parent beliefs about moral traits, moral parenting, human nature, and the world in fact form unified cognitive modes of reasoning.

Furthermore, Moral Politics Theory states that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models represent *distinct* worldviews that can be embraced independently of each other. Study 1 tested this prediction and found a minimal statistical overlap between the two models. This confirms that the models form two distinct ways of reasoning about ideal parenting.

Next, Moral Politics Theory found that conservatives commonly endorse the strict-father model, while liberals commonly endorse the nurturant-parent model, both in public discourse and in policymaking. To date, no scales exist that help measure the extent to which people endorse the two moralities. In Study 1, such scales were created. In order for them to be a handy tool for future research, the final scales were kept as short as possible while maintaining maximal predictive power. The final strict-father scale counts 15 and the nurturant-parent scale 14 items. The items in the final scales encompass beliefs about moral traits as well as moral parenting. Study 2 tested whether the two scales predict conservatism and liberalism, and the results show that the strict-father scale reliably predicts conservatism, while the nurturant-parent scale reliably predicts liberalism.

4. Studies 1 and 2: Internal consistency, conceptual independence, scale creation, and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism

In Studies 1 and 2, a scale was developed that measures endorsement of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models. Developing such a scale was not only useful because such a scale can serve as a tool for assessing individual differences in ideal parenting beliefs (used in Studies 3, 5, and 6), but also because the scale development process served as a means for testing two of Moral Politics Theory's claims: The notion that the two models consist of diverse, yet highly interrelated, subcomponents that form a unified belief system, and the notion that those two belief systems are minimally overlapping and each independently influence political attitudes. Since such notions are matters of internal consistency, dimensionality, and predictive validity, the scale development process served as a means for testing them. In Study 1, scale items were developed and the internal consistency and conceptual independence of the two dimensions was tested. In Study 2, the extent to which the two dimensions predict political attitudes was examined.

4.1. Study 1: Internal consistency, conceptual independence, and scale creation

In Study 1, scale items were developed and the internal consistency and conceptual independence of the two dimensions was tested.

Method

Participants: Three hundred and ninety participants (114 male, 275 female, 1 did not indicate), recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, took part in Study 1 in exchange for a modest payment.

Procedure Item creation: A deductive strategy as described in Burisch (1984) was used to develop items about parenting attitudes based on Moral Politics Theory. Specifically,

items were written that tap into the 36 subcomponents of strict-father morality and the 30 subcomponents of nurturant-parent morality.

The items were clear, specific, non-redundant, and written in a way that could be understood by individuals across diverse cultural backgrounds. Questions were phrased so that they gauged general attitudes about ideal parenting, rather than asking about participants' experience as parents, so that the scale would be accessible to all participants (including non-parents).

As a first step, multiple items were written for each of the two models' subcomponents, including positively and negatively keyed items. A pilot study was conducted with 48 participants that were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and took part in the pilot study in exchange for a modest payment. Participants responded to each of the items using a 7-point Likert response scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *somewhat disagree*, 4 = *neither agree nor disagree*, 5 = *somewhat agree*, 6 = *agree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Based on participants' responses, items were removed from this first lengthy draft of scale items. The rationale behind this pilot study was to ensure that items to be used in Study 1 reliably tapped into individual differences (that is, people needed to respond differently to the items) and were conceptually integrated. The pilot data was examined and items with a very low standard deviation were excluded, as they gauged similar responses from all participants. Moreover, items were excluded that had either a very high or very low mean (since the responses varied between 1 and 7, means of 2 or lower and means of 6 or higher were excluded; this removed items with skewed responses in which most people agree or disagree with the item). Next, since the objective was to create scales that were conceptually integrated, items were examined to see how well they correlated with one another. For each of the subscales, the items with the largest inter-item correlations were retained.

In total, a pool of 188 potential items was retained (98 items that measure the strict-father dimension and 90 items that measure the nurturant-parent dimension), which included both positively and negatively keyed (reverse-scored) items (see appendix A for a list of the items).

In Study 1, participants responded to each of the 188 items using a 7-point Likert response scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *somewhat disagree*, 4 = *neither agree nor disagree*, 5 = *somewhat agree*, 6 = *agree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). After completing the full questionnaire, participants provided basic demographic information, and then the study was over.

Results

Item reduction: The scale inter-item correlations were examined separately for the strict-father and nurturant-parent items in order to remove items that did not correlate well with the proposed construct. Positively keyed items with an inter-item correlation above .40 and negatively keyed items with an inter-item correlation above .15 were retained. At this stage, a less stringent standard for negatively keyed items was used as they often have lower inter-item correlations but are needed to prevent acquiescence bias (Nunnally, 2010).

Additionally, any items with a mean greater than 6.0 or a standard deviation of 1.0 or lower were discarded in order to create a scale that reflected a diversity of responses. This

left 95 items for the strict-father domain and 45 for nurturant-parent domain. Then, a principal components factor analysis was conducted on each subscale separately. Positively keyed items with a factor loading equal to or above .50 and negatively keyed items with a factor loading equal to or above .40 were retained. This left 60 items for the strict-father domain and 23 for nurturant-parent domain.⁴ These items were entered into a principal components factor analysis with Varimax rotation, requesting a two-factor solution. In line with Moral Politics Theory, the factor analysis yielded two factors with a large number of items that fit into one factor and not the other (i.e., they loaded at least .30 on their own factor and not more than .15 on the other; Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986). These items were kept while all other items were removed. Overall, 22 items for the strict-father domain, and 17 for the nurturant-parent domain remained. The 22 strict-father items represented 13 subcomponents of the strict-father model, and the 17 nurturant-parent items represented 12 subcomponents of the nurturant-parent model. In other words, some subcomponents were being measured by more than one item. To ensure that the final scale would not be overly long but still broadly represented Moral Politics Theory, in each instance where there was more than one item measuring a subcomponent, only the one positively keyed item from each subcomponent with the highest factor loading was kept. However, if one of the redundancies involved a negatively keyed item, that item was not eliminated in order to prevent acquiescence bias. In the end, 15 items remained for the strict-father subscale (encompassing 13 subcomponents) and 14 items remained for the nurturant-parent subscale (encompassing 12 subcomponents).

Below are the two subscales of the Moral Politics Family Scale. For each item, it is indicated whether the item was positively or negatively keyed, and what moral subcomponent it relates to.

Moral Politics Family Scale

Strict-father subscale

1. While other people must not be one's concern, within a family, everyone should look after each other. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *In-group nurturance*)
2. Obedience must be instilled in children. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Obedience*)
3. When grownups talk children ought to be quiet. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Absolute parental authority*)
4. Parents shouldn't handicap their children by making their lives too easy. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Immoral unconditional nurturance*)
5. Bad behavior in children must be punished sufficiently. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Punishment*)
6. I will not have my child talk back to me. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Hierarchical communication*)
7. Children must always be on time. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Strict rules*)
8. "Tough love" is required to raise a child right. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Tough-love nurturance*)

⁴ The larger number of strict-father items relative to nurturant-parent items seems to reflect the social desirable nature of many of the proposed nurturant-parent items (e.g., "Parents should protect their children from harmful things, such as certain chemicals in toys."; "A child must be sure of a parent's love, no matter what.").

9. Children need to be disciplined in order to build character. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Moral strength*)
10. Children must be taught that people get what they deserve. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Performance-based fairness*)
11. Children must be disciplined through strict rules at home. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Rule-enforcement*)
12. It's fine for children to have secrets and hide things from their parents. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Absolute control*)
13. When in doubt, parents should err on the side of lenience rather than strictness. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Immoral lenience*)
14. At times it's okay for children to disobey their parents. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Obedience*)
15. Sometimes it's okay to let bad behavior in children go unpunished. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Punishment*)

Nurturant-parent subscale

1. Children will grow up to be happy adults if parents encourage them to follow their curiosity. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Self-fulfillment*)
2. Children should learn to understand others' needs and attend to them. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Individual and social responsibility*)
3. Children must learn to see the world through other people's eyes. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathy*)
4. I rather see my child play cooperatively than play competitively. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Cooperation*)
5. In order to truly nurture children one needs to be empathic. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathic nurturance*)
6. Parenting means nurturing the child's true nature. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Non-intrusive parenting*)
7. Siblings should receive parental support in accordance to their individual needs. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Need-based fairness*)
8. Parents should empower children as much as possible so that they may follow their dreams. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empowerment*)
9. Knowing how to care for others is not a central thing for a child to learn. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Nurturance*)
10. Children shouldn't feel obligated to care about the well being of people they do not know. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *In- and out-group nurturance*)
11. Tending to the needs of others is not a sign of responsibility in children. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Individual and social responsibility*)
12. It's not critical for children to learn to take the perspective of others into account. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathy*)
13. Learning to understand others and accepting them for who they are is not important for children to learn. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathy-based tolerance*)
14. It's not important for parents to explain to their children why they set certain rules and limits. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Accountability*)

Internal consistency: Next, the hypothesis was tested that the two subscales would be internally consistent and unified. The mean inter-item correlation for the strict-father subscale items was 0.56 and the mean inter-item correlation for the nurturant-parent subscale items was 0.55, both within the range recommended by Clark and Watson (1995). Moreover, each subscale showed good internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$ for strict-father and $.87$ for nurturant-parent). Furthermore, each of the subscales was subjected to a principal components factor analysis. The eigenvalues of each of the first unrotated factors were large (strict-father: 6.15, representing 41% of the variance; nurturant-parent: 5.59, representing 39.9% of variance), suggesting that each subscale represents a unified concept.

Conceptual independence: Next, the hypothesis was tested that the two subscales form distinct, independent belief systems. A factor analysis with Varimax rotation was run, entering all 29 items. Results confirmed the hypothesized two-factor solution. Eigenvalues of the first (strict-father; 6.65) and second (nurturant-parent; 5.31) factors were large. The first rotated factor explained 22.94% of variance, and the second factor explained 18.30% of the variance. Table 1 lists the 29 items and their factor loadings for the rotated component matrix.

	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent
Strict Father Items		
Children must be disciplined through strict rules at home.	0.78	-0.12
Obedience must be instilled in children.	0.77	0.06
Children need to be disciplined in order to build character.	0.75	0.00
I will not have my child talk back to me.	0.75	0.00
"Tough love" is required to raise a child right.	0.72	-0.16
When grownups talk children ought to be quiet.	0.68	-0.03
Bad behavior in children must be punished sufficiently.	0.68	-0.01
Parents shouldn't handicap their children by making their lives too easy.	0.66	0.08
At times it's okay for children to disobey their parents. (Reverse)	0.62	-0.08
Children must always be on time.	0.60	0.07
Children must be taught that people get what they deserve.	0.57	-0.05
Sometimes it's okay to let bad behavior in children go unpunished. (Reverse)	0.53	0.00
When in doubt, parents should err on the side of lenience rather than strictness. (Reversed)	0.47	-0.17
It's fine for children to have secrets and hide things from their parents. (Reverse)	0.46	-0.10
Nurturant Parent Items		
Children must learn to see the world through other people's eyes.	0.02	0.76
In order to truly nurture children one needs to be empathic.	-0.01	0.75

Knowing how to care for others is not a central thing for a child to learn. (Reverse)	-0.06	0.72
Children should learn to understand other's needs and attend to them.	-0.02	0.68
Children shouldn't feel obligated to care about the well being of people they do not know. (Reverse)	-0.06	0.68
Tending to the needs of others is not a sign of responsibility in children. (Reverse)	-0.01	0.66
Parents should empower children as much as possible so that they may follow their dreams.	-0.05	0.64
Children will grow up to be happy adults if parents encourage them to follow their curiosity.	-0.07	0.64
It's not critical for children to learn to take the perspective of others into account. (Reverse)	0.02	0.60
Parenting means nurturing the child's true nature.	-0.03	0.57
I rather see my child play cooperatively than play competitively.	-0.17	0.57
Learning to understand others and accepting them for who they are is not important for children to learn. (Reverse)	-0.07	0.56
Siblings should receive parental support in accordance to their individual needs.	0.12	0.51
It's not important for parents to explain to their children why they set certain rules and limits. (Reverse)	-0.17	0.48

Table 1. Item factor loadings for rotated component matrix.

Finally, each subscale's items were averaged together to form a strict-father and a nurturant-parent score for each participant. A correlation analysis entering scores on the two subscales revealed that the strict-father and nurturant-parent dimensions were only minimally correlated, $r = -.11$, $p < .05$, further attesting to the independent nature of the two parenting models.

4.2. Study 2: Predictive power for conservatism and liberalism

Extending the findings of Study 1, in Study 2 the Moral Politics Family Scale was administered to a new sample of participants and these participants' political ideology and attitudes were measured. This provided an initial test of Moral Politics Theory's claim that endorsement of the strict-father model predicts conservative political attitudes, whereas endorsement of the nurturant-parent model predicts more liberal political attitudes.

Method

Participants: Two hundred and three participants (81 male, 120 female, 2 did not indicate), recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, took part in Study 2 in exchange for a modest compensation. The questionnaire in this study included an item instructing participants to select "neither agree nor disagree" as the response option. Given the simplicity of this item, it was determined that participants who failed to respond correctly were not paying attention to the task and were likely not reading the items. Four participants failed

this attention check measure. They were removed from all analyses, leaving a final sample of 197 participants.

Procedure: Participants first completed a demographic questionnaire that included four items measuring political ideology. The first asked participants for the extent to which they identified as liberal or conservative on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). The second and third items paralleled the first except they gauged how much participants identified as *socially* liberal-conservative and *economically* liberal-conservative, respectively. Finally, the fourth item asked participants to indicate how much they identified as a Democrat or Republican on a scale ranging from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7 (strong Republican). Then, participants completed the 29-item Moral Politics Family Scale developed in Study 1. As in Study 1, the internal reliability for each subscale was high ($\alpha_{\text{strict-father}} = .86$; $\alpha_{\text{nurturant-parent}} = .81$) and the two subscales were correlated at $r = -.25$, $p < .001$.

Finally, participants completed an 18-item measure of political policy preferences that assessed positions on various political issues (e.g., “Marriage should be restricted to a man and a woman”; “It’s not the government’s moral obligation to ensure that all Americans have health care”; see appendix B for a list of all items). The internal reliability among the items was high ($\alpha = .90$). They were thus composited together with higher scores representing more support for conservative policy preferences.

Results

Table 2 presents the zero-order correlations between the strict-father and nurturant-parent subscales and the measures of political ideology and political policy preferences. In line with Moral Politics Theory, the higher individuals scored on the strict-father subscale, the more conservative they were. Additionally, the higher individuals scored on the nurturant-parent subscale, the more liberal they were. Next, a series of regression analyses was conducted. Scores on both the strict-father and nurturant-parent subscales were entered as simultaneous predictors, and each of the measures of political attitudes were entered as separate dependent variables. As Table 2 reveals, the two subscales independently predict participants’ political attitudes. Furthermore, the two subscales together explained a large portion of the variance in political attitudes, ranging from 14 to 28% of the variance.

		Conservative policy attitudes	General conservatism	Social conservatism	Economic conservatism	Republican
Zero-order correlations	Strict-father	0.40	0.36	0.38	0.31	0.31
	Nurturant-parent	-0.44	-0.37	-0.37	-0.29	-0.33
Standardized regression weights (both parenting models entered simultaneously)	Strict-father	0.31	0.28	0.30	0.25	0.24
	Nurturant-parent	-0.36	-0.30	-0.29	-0.23	-0.27

Table 2. Zero-order correlations and standardized regression weights demonstrating the relationship be

tween the Moral Politics Family subscales and political liberalism-conservatism. All values are significant at $p \leq .001$.

4.3. Discussion

Studies 1 and 2 together provide initial support for many of the contentions of Moral Politics Theory. In Study 1, through a scale development process, it was shown that the two idealized parenting models form separate and unified dimensions that minimally overlap with one another. Then, in Study 2, the theory's claim that the two parenting models predict political attitudes was tested. Results supported this hypothesis, revealing that each parenting model was a robust and independent predictor of political attitudes.

5. Open questions for future research

The objective of the present studies was to test whether the strict-father and nurturant-parent models form unified and independent belief systems that predict conservatism and liberalism. However, this chapter raised a number of questions that lie beyond the scope of the present investigation. These will be discussed below.

5.1. Belief types

The strict-father and nurturant-parent models encompass four different types of beliefs: beliefs about moral traits, moral parenting, human nature, and the world. Study 1 found that many of the models' subcomponents that relate to those belief types are significantly correlated with each other. This is in line with Lakoff's (1996) findings that the two moral worldviews encompass beliefs about not just moral traits and moral government, but furthermore about the nature of children and the world.

However, when it came to the predictive power of each of those belief types, divergent assumptions about moral traits and moral parenting were the most predictive of conservatism and liberalism. None of the two models' beliefs about children's nature or the world made it into the final scales. As discussed above, this might not be surprising: when reasoning about moral governance, people should be expected to be primarily concerned with notions about what makes a good or bad person and how government can make society maximally moral.

Nonetheless, it would be interesting to further investigate the (different) roles that the four belief types play for moral political cognition. For example, future research could create scales that are concerned with maintaining the highest possible degree of belief type diversity. Would scales that encompass all four belief types reliably predict strict-father and nurturant-parent morality? And if so, how would they perform in comparison with the scales that have been created in Study 1?

5.2. Low endorsement of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality

In Study 2, 21% of the participants (41 out of 197) scored low (i.e., below the median) on both of the Moral Politics Family subscales. These people seem to endorse neither the

strict-father nor the nurturant-parent model very much when reasoning about ideal family life. How can this be explained? A few possibilities come to mind.

First, one should at least consider the possibility that these people do not derive their political attitudes from moral concerns at all. Although there is plenty of evidence that people's political attitudes are commonly determined by moral concerns (see Introduction, Section 2), could it be the case that some people are in fact "amoral" when it comes to their reasoning about politics?

Second, it might be the case that the two family models do not suffice to capture *all* the conceptual differences between conservative and liberal moral reasoning. People may endorse other metaphors and/or idealized cognitive models as the basis of their political reasoning. Given the prominent role that people's reasoning about ideal family life seems to play in moral political cognition (see Study 1 and 2, above, and see Studies 3 and 4, below), one very tangible possibility comes to mind: people may endorse more than just two idealized parenting models in their political reasoning. Future research should investigate this possibility. One straightforward way to do so would be to turn to other parenting types that have been observed in childrearing research – such as the abusive, neglectful, laissez-faire, and indulgent parenting styles.

Lakoff's (1996) models, which relate to the authoritarian and authoritative parenting styles, have proven to be potent predictors of conservative and liberal attitudes (Study 2). However, if people's reasoning about ideal parenting in actual family life does not stop at those two parenting styles, why should their reasoning about ideal governance be limited to them? The eminence of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in political reasoning should allow for *any* parenting style to be mapped onto governance.

Chapter 3: Conceptual metaphor, political cognition, and the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor

Introduction

Moral Politics Theory holds that people commonly construe national politics in terms of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, and that this metaphor allows for their beliefs about ideal parenting to translate into beliefs about ideal governance. Studies 3 and 4 were conducted to test this notion, and to further investigate the role of the NATION AS FAMILY for political cognition.

However, before turning to the question of *whether* the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor plays such exponent role in people's political reasoning in Studies 3 and 4, it ought to be addressed *why* we should expect this metaphor to be a crucial mediator for people's reasoning about what constitutes morally "right" or morally "wrong" governance. First of all, why should we even expect people to turn to metaphor when reasoning about governance? And, why should it be the case that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor outmatches other metaphors for nationhood, such as NATION AS VEHICLE or NATION AS BODY, when it comes to the reasoning about moral governance?

This chapter provides answers to those questions. First, the crucial role of conceptual metaphors for everyday thought and decision-making is discussed. Research is reviewed which shows that people commonly (and largely unconsciously) resort to metaphors to make sense of politics. For example, it has been shown that metaphors commonly determine people's attitudes toward political issues, outmatching other factors such as self-interest or "rational" considerations of facts and statistics.

Next, this chapter turns to the question of "what makes for a popular and cognitively highly potent metaphor". That is, attributes are discussed that may contribute to the ease with which people engage certain metaphors and the impact those metaphors have on cognition. For example, metaphors can draw on highly familiar domains of experience, they can relate to people's most basic levels of everyday cognition, they can be semantically highly specified, and they can offer a high degree of structural co-alignment. It has been argued by others that such attributes can contribute to the relevance and potency of metaphors. This chapter will integrate those observations in a discussion about metaphor selection criteria and potency and, building on observations in the cognitive sciences, propose additional criteria.

After this general discussion, the nature of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor is discussed in detail. Metaphor alternatives for governance are introduced, and it is argued that based on its attributes, the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in fact emerges as the prime candidate for people's everyday reasoning about moral governance. In conclusion, the implications of the metaphor for moral political and social reasoning are discussed.

1. Conceptual metaphors in cognition and communication

Conceptual metaphors constitute mental processes in which elements and inferential structures of cognitive frames (e.g., Fillmore, 1975, 1976, 1985) are mapped from a

source domain to a target domain (Gibbs, 1994, 1996; Gibbs, Bogdanovich, Sikes, & Barr, 1997; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Sweetser, 1987, 1992; Turner, 1987). For instance, the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING uses ‘vision’ as a source and ‘knowledge’ as a target domain. Via a cross-domain mapping, people draw on their comprehension of the source domain VISION to reason and speak about the target domain KNOWLEDGE, and they use linguistic expressions such as “I *see* what you mean” (as opposed to the literal “I *understand* what you mean”).

Metaphors are frequent and unavoidable in everyday thought and communication. When we say, “This week *passed by* quickly” – meaning *the time elapsed quickly* – we use the metaphor TIME IS AN OBJECT MOVING TOWARD US (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). When we say, “I *get* what you say” – meaning *I understand what you say* – we use the metaphors IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and COMMUNICATION IS OBJECT EXCHANGE (Grady, 1998; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Reddy, 1978; Sweetser, 1987). There is little metaphor-free language, a finding that extends even to signed languages (Taub, 2001; Wilcox, 2000). Conceptual metaphors are a natural part of everyday reasoning, and are processed just as rapidly as literal language (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005).

Metaphors are a matter of cognition, and as such they structure language (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Sweetser, 1987), gesture (e.g., Cienki, 1998; Cienki & Müller, 2008; Sweetser, 1998; Wehling, 2012b), and everyday reasoning (e.g., Casasanto & Jasmin, 2010; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), including social and political cognition (e.g., Landau, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2009; Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011; Williams & Bargh, 2008, 2010).

For example, the metaphor COMMUNICATION IS OBJECT EXCHANGE, which is evident in linguistic expressions such as *giving* and *getting* ideas, also structures gesture production: interlocutors use their hands as iconic containers to *offer* ideas to each other or to metaphorically *fend* them *off* in space (Bavelas, Chovil, Lavrie, & Wade, 1992; Calbris, 2011; Kendon, 1995; McNeill, 1992; Müller, 2004; Sweetser, 1998; Wehling, 2012b). Similarly, the metaphor TIME IS AN OBJECT MOVING TOWARD US structures both language – as in “This week *passed by* quickly” – and gesture: People in many cultures gesture towards their back to indicate past events, that is, events that have already *passed them by*. The construals FUTURE IS IN FRONT OF EGO and PAST IS BEHIND EGO, however, are not universal, which becomes apparent in cross-linguistic studies of language and gesture. In Aymara, the past is conceptualized as in front of ego and the future as behind ego. The reason lies in the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. Events in the future are unknown, metaphorically *not visible*, and therefore behind us; events in the past are known, metaphorically *visible*, and therefore in front of us. This conceptualization shows up in Aymara language and gesture, where *last year* is linguistically expressed as *front year* and with a forward gesture, while *next year* is linguistically expressed as *back year* and with a backward gesture (Nuñez & Sweetser, 2006). Gesture, then, draws strongly from conceptual metaphors, and linguistic and gestural mappings are commonly parallel in form and meaning.

People’s everyday reasoning is strongly influenced by metaphor. For instance, Casasanto (2008) found that words or objects located close to each other in space are judged to be conceptually more similar, in line with the metaphor SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY. Similarly, Williams and Bargh (2010) showed that the mapping AFFECTION IS CLOSENESS underlies social cognition: priming for spatial proximity leads to height-

ened association with other people (although see Pashler, Harris, & Coburn, 2011). Finally, metaphors can play a crucial role for political cognition. For example, Oppenheimer and Trail (2010) found that the metaphor CONSERVATIVE IS RIGHT inferred strong priming effects among participants: when engaging the *right* side of their bodies, people shift toward more conservative political positions. Metaphor thus plays a central role for cognition and communication with regard to spoken and signed languages as well as gesture.

However, while conceptual metaphors regularly become evident in language, they need not be evident in language in order to structure thought. In fact, some of the most common metaphors implemented in everyday reasoning become evident only in gesture, imagery, or cognition. For example, the metaphor FUTURE IS TO THE RIGHT (Nuñez & Sweetser, 2006) surfaces in gesture, where people locate future events to the right and past events to the left. While the FUTURE IS TO THE RIGHT metaphor is extremely common in gesture production and imagery, it plays no role in language. People simply do not say, “I will call you *to the right*” in order to say that they will call the next day. Similarly, the metaphor MORE IS RIGHT surfaces in imagery, e.g., when demographic illustrations place citizens with less financial resources to the left, and those with more resources to the right. Another case is the metaphor GOOD IS LEFT, which is used by left-handers but not right-handers. While left-handers are not more likely than right-handers to use the metaphor in their speech (for instance, they do not say “This is the *left* thing to do” instead of the conventional “This is the *right* thing to do”), the metaphor influences their cognition and gesture production: left-handers evaluate objects located to the left more favorably than those to the right (Casasanto, 2009), and they are more likely to gesture with their left hand when communicating positive ideas (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2010). Metaphors thus have a strong influence on people’s reasoning, spoken and signed languages, and gesture.

The question of what metaphors people use to reason about the world commonly depends on what metaphors are brought to the fore of their reasoning. Metaphors can be invoked in people’s minds in many different ways, such as, physical movement (e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007), spatial positioning (Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010), bodily sensations such as temperature (IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008), language (Gibbs et al., 1997; Landau et al., 2009; Matlock, 2004; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011), non-linguistic visual input (Boroditsky, 2000; Williams & Bargh, 2010), and gesture perception (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2010).

Finally, there is increasing empirical evidence for the notion that metaphor comprehension is grounded in the neural system (e.g., Feldman, 2006; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Narayanan, 1997). Studies show that brain areas associated with metaphoric source domains are active during metaphoric language comprehension (e.g., Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009; Lacey, Stilla, & Sathian, 2012; although see Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009).

2. Metaphor and political cognition

Given the strong influence that conceptual metaphoric mappings have on all aspects of

everyday reasoning, it comes as no surprise that they play a major role in political cognition. People regularly use metaphors to discuss politics and to make sense of political issues (e.g., Lakoff, 1996; Bougher, 2012 for a review). Conceptual metaphors are a powerful tool for political persuasion (e.g., Charteris-Black, 2005; Sopori & Dillard, 2002), and they can both deepen and bias message processing (Lakoff, 2004; Ottati, Rhoads, & Graesser, 1999; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). Metaphor, thus, is “a unique cognitive mechanism underlying social thought and attitudes” (Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010, p. 1046), and people commonly draw on metaphors when making political decisions and forming political attitudes (e.g., Landau et al., 2009; Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; Schlesinger, 1997; Schlesinger & Lau, 2000). At the same time, people frequently remain unaware of the fact that their political attitudes and decisions are grounded in metaphor usage (e.g., Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011).

2.1. Metaphor in public political discourse

Metaphors are highly common in public political debate. They are used to reason about political processes (e.g., Fausey & Matlock, 2011; Regier & Khalidi, 2009), political issues (e.g., Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008; Musolff, 2004; Schlesinger, 1997; Schlesinger & Lau, 2000), and political morality (Lakoff, 1996, 2008).

For example, Fausey and Matlock (2011) found that public discourse about elections is commonly structured by an ELECTIONS ARE RACES metaphor, where political candidates are engaged in a metaphoric race against each other. Relatedly, Regier and Khalidi (2009) found that US-American media after 9/11 construed public opinion in Arab nations in terms of a PUBLIC OPINION AS ARAB STREET metaphor, a conceptualization that infers volatile and irrational opinion forming in those parts of the world.

Furthermore, metaphors commonly underlie public conceptualizations of political issues, such as taxation, religion, poverty, and the environment (e.g., Lakoff, 1996), social issues (Sontag, 1991), health care (Schlesinger & Lau, 2000), and the European Union (Musolff, 2004, 2006). For example, Sontag (1991) found that public discourse frequently employs illness metaphors to discuss social issues and threats, and Musolff (2004, 2006) found that public European discourse regularly draws from body and family metaphors when construing the European Union. Finally, conservative and liberal moral political attitudes are frequently understood in terms of the metaphors NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING (Lakoff, 1996).

2.2. Metaphor as a predictor of political attitudes and metaphoric framing effects

Metaphors do not just surface in public discourse and structure public conceptualizations of issues, they can directly determine how people perceive political issues. For instance, Schlesinger (1997) found that policy positions toward issues such as substance abuse, long-term care, help for the homeless, and public education among people are predicted by the metaphors they engage when reasoning about those issues. Similarly, Schlesinger and Lau (2000) found that people rely on metaphors to form attitudes about health care.

Moreover, recent investigations into the role of metaphor for political cognition have found that metaphor affects people’s attitudes about political issues, whether metaphor-

ic source domains are invoked via non-linguistic priming (Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010) or linguistic framing (Landau et al., 2009; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011).

In a series of experiments, Oppenheimer and Trail (2010) disclosed the effect of the spatial metaphors CONSERVATIVE IS RIGHT and LIBERAL IS LEFT on people's political judgments.⁵ When primed for *leftness* through movement on the left side of their body, such as grasping with the left hand, or through spatial positioning toward the left or clicking on the left side of a screen, participants were more likely to embrace liberal attitudes. When primed for *rightness* in the same manner, participants showed higher support for conservative policies and ideas. The effects were found for independents, liberals and conservatives alike, indicating that a large part of the electorate is movable in their attitudes through metaphoric priming. (The authors did not evaluate to what extent conservative or liberal moral concerns interfered with the priming effects.)

While the above study found metaphoric priming effects on a most fundamental level of cognition (priming for spatial concepts as a metaphoric source domain), other studies have investigated the effect of linguistic metaphoric framing on people's attitudes toward specific policies. For example, Landau et al. (2009) showed that participants embraced anti-immigration policies more strongly when reminded of viral diseases and simultaneously brought to think about the nation in terms of a metaphoric body. In a similar line of research, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that a linguistic framing of crime statistics in terms of the CRIME AS VIRUS metaphor led people to support preventative crime policies, while framing them in terms of the CRIME AS BEAST metaphor led to increasing support for harsh anti-crime policies. While there is a substantial body of research that shows metaphoric priming effects for most basic everyday cognition processes (e.g., Casasanto, 2008; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009, and many others) as well as social cognition (e.g., Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007; Moeller, Robinson, & Zabelina, 2008; Schubert, 2005; Williams & Bargh, 2008, 2010; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008, and many others), empirical investigations of such effects for political cognition have only just begun (e.g., Landau et al., 2009; Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011).

Political cognition, in sum, relies heavily on conceptual metaphor, and use of metaphoric language in public debate can determine how citizens view political issues. In fact, metaphor can be the deciding factor when it comes to political attitudes, outmatching social group membership, self-interest, political identification, and even statistics and facts. Landau et al. (2009) found that while metaphor usage significantly affected people's attitudes toward immigration, their social group membership – and thus group self-interest – did not predict their attitudes equally well (p. 2, footnote 1). Correspondingly, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) reported that divergent metaphoric framings of crime predicted people's political attitudes significantly better than self-reported political identification did (p. 10). Finally, participants in metaphoric framing studies regularly derive their political attitudes from the metaphors used in texts, and not from the statistics and facts they are presented with (e.g., Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011).

⁵ This study is groundbreaking in more than one way, as it is to date the only account of metaphoric framing effects due to metaphors that are learned solely through linguistic convention, not through experiential correlations.

2.3. Metaphor as implicit political cognition

Although conceptual metaphors strongly influence political attitudes and opinions, they commonly remain undetected by those who use them (e.g., Lakoff, 1996, 2004; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). For example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that while people's attitudes toward crime significantly differed depending on metaphor usage, all participants indicated crime statistics as the basis of their policy attitudes. Not one participant pointed to the employed metaphor or used metaphoric entailments to argue for his or her point. In line with the authors' findings, many lines of research report that conceptual metaphors remain unconscious to a great extent, while most strongly structuring people's cognition (e.g., Casasanto, 2008; Gibbs et al., 1997; Matlock, 2004; Williams & Bargh, 2010; Wilson & Gibbs 2007; see Bougher, 2012 for a review).

Metaphoric priming effects indicate that people do not necessarily derive political positions and attitudes from factual considerations at all. Rather, they commonly – unconsciously – use conceptual metaphors to make sense of political issues. Despite their pervasiveness, then, metaphors often go undetected by those who use them, and people are commonly unaware of the constraining role they can play for political decisions (Bougher, 2012, p.148). Researchers have recently become increasingly concerned with automatic, implicit reasoning processes as the foundation of political cognition, including moral political cognition (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Lakoff, 1996, 2008; Nosek, Graham, & Hawkins, 2010). Investigations into the conceptual metaphors that underlie people's political cognition ought to be a core part of these explorations, as metaphors constitute largely automatic and non-reflected cognition processes that have a strong impact on people's attitudes toward political issues (e.g., Landau et al., 2009; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011; see Landau et al., 2010 for a review). As Bougher (2012) observes,

“Identifying the metaphors that shape the public's understanding of political issues can help further elucidate why citizens hold the preferences they do and indicate which they are likely to hold in the future - even if those preferences or the reasons behind them are outside of citizen awareness” (p. 148).

3. Metaphor selection criteria

Not all conceptual metaphors are alike. They can differ with regard to three factors: characteristics of the target domain, characteristics of the source domain, and structural parallelism between a source and target domain.

First, not all cognitive domains rely on metaphoric mappings in the same way: while reasoning about directly perceivable domains (such as *quantity*) commonly relies on cross-domain mappings (e.g., the MORE IS UP metaphor), reasoning about abstract domains relies on metaphor in a special way. Second, source domains can be remarkably well entrenched in the cognitive and neural system and have a high degree of cultural relevance (basic-level source domains), and they can differ in their degree of semantic specificity (low-level and higher-level source domains), as well as with regard to how familiar people are with them. Third, source and target domains can offer high or low degrees of structural alignment with each other, affecting the number of cross-domain

inferences they allow for.

Thus, characteristics of target and source domains, as well as structural parallelism between them, can determine the relevance and potency of a metaphoric mapping.

3.1. Target domain characteristics and mapping types

Metaphors commonly play a crucial role in the conceptualization of rather abstract domains of thought, such as *time* (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000; Clark, 1973; Gentner, 2001; Nuñez & Sweetser, 2006), *communication* (e.g., Bavelas et al., 1992, Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), *power* (e.g., Moeller et al., 2008; Schubert, 2005), *divinity* (Meier et al., 2007), *morality* (e.g., Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), *affection* (e.g., Williams & Bargh, 2010; Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008), *good* and *bad* (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2010), or *liberal* and *conservative* (Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010). For all such abstract domains, metaphoric reasoning is vital. Abstract cognitive domains are simply very hard to reason about without metaphor. Metaphor allows people to map knowledge from domains they have direct world-experience with onto abstract domains they commonly reason about but cannot directly physically experience. For example, while people often reason about power relationships in society, *social power* cannot be touched, seen, smelled, heard, or physically experienced in any other way. People thus automatically resort to their world-experience with power and control as a metaphoric source domain to reason about social power. One common experience with power relates to *verticality*: as we grow up, we recurrently experience that being on top of other people implies power over them. For example, in a wrestling match between siblings, the sibling that ends up on top of the other is in control. From this experience, people derive the metaphoric mapping POWER IS UP, and they subsequently use *verticality* as a source domain to reason about *social power*. In language, this metaphor surfaces when people say, “I’m *on top* of things” or “He’s *high up* in the hierarchical stepladder”. The metaphor also structures social perception: people process social power relationships with more ease when powerful groups are visually situated to the top, and powerless ones to the bottom of their visual fields (Schubert, 2005). The point is a simple one: abstract domains of reasoning – *power*, *divinity*, *morality*, and so on – commonly rely on the usage of metaphoric source domains that embody physical sensory-motor experiences.

But not all metaphors constitute mappings from concrete to abstract domains. Therefore, it is helpful to distinguish between at least two types of metaphoric mappings: mappings in which a physically perceivable domain is processed in terms of another (*concrete-concrete* mapping), and mappings in which a non-physically-perceivable domain is processed in terms of a directly perceivable one (*concrete-abstract* mapping) (Wehling, 2012a)⁶.

An example of a *concrete-concrete* mapping is the MORE IS UP metaphor, which construes quantity in terms of verticality. Both quantity and verticality are directly accessible domains of experience. However, people commonly think and talk about quan-

⁶ Two more mapping types can be distinguished but are not discussed here as they are not directly relevant to the present investigation – mappings in which a directly perceivable domain is processed in terms of a non-directly-perceivable one (*abstract-concrete* mapping), such as in the PARENTING IS GOVERNANCE metaphor, and mappings in which a non-directly-perceivable domain is processed in terms of another non-directly-perceivable one (*abstract-abstract* mapping), such as in the ARGUMENT IS WARFARE metaphor.

tity in terms of verticality, for instance when using expressions like “The prices are *rising*”. An example of a *concrete-abstract* mapping, on the other hand, is the MORALITY IS PURITY metaphor, which construes morality in terms of physical purity (e.g., Lakoff, 2008). While people throughout their lives accumulate manifold sensory-motor experience with physical cleanliness, they have little direct access to morality per se. *Morality* is, just like *power*, an abstract domain – it cannot be touched, seen, smelled, or directly interacted with in any way. People therefore commonly reason and speak about morality in terms of purity, and, for instance, use expressions such as “*dirty play*” or “*filthy character*”. And physical purification has a direct impact on people’s perception of morality: people who engage in immoral thoughts and subsequently physically clean themselves think of themselves as less immoral than people who do not; in short, physical purification entails perceived moral purification (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).

While *concrete-concrete* mappings are unavoidable in everyday reasoning, they are, in theory, not necessary to comprehend a metaphoric target domain. The same is not true for *concrete-abstract* mappings. The only route to certain abstract realms of cognition is via mappings from more concrete domains of knowledge.

In politics and political discourse, many issues and concerns are abstract. Taxation, for example, is a rather abstract concept. Taxes cannot be touched, seen, smelled, or in any other way directly experienced. It comes as no surprise, then, that people commonly resort to *concrete-abstract* mappings to make sense of taxation. Probably one of the most common metaphors for taxation is TAXES ARE BURDENS (Lakoff, 1996), a metaphor that construes taxes as a physical affliction from which one can be relieved. The metaphor is evident in expressions such as “*tax relief*” or “*tax burden*” and it is omnipresent in both conservative and liberal discourse. *Concrete-abstract* mappings are the most common mechanism by which people make sense of abstract political issues. For instance, immigration is commonly construed in terms of natural disasters (e.g., Ana, Moran, & Sanchez, 1998; Charteris-Black, 2006), indigestible foods (O’Brien, 2003), animals (Ana, 1999), or viral diseases (e.g., O’Brien, 2003).

Thus, while now there is little doubt that conceptual metaphors structure almost all aspects of everyday thought and communication, people simply have no choice but to rely on them when reasoning about abstract ideas, including political concepts.

Conceptual metaphors, hence, are extremely common and productive in political reasoning *because* most political concepts are abstract (e.g., Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010, p. 659; see also Lakoff, 1996; Schön, 1993). In order to make them maximally meaningful, people simply have to rely on *concrete-abstract* mappings. This makes political discourse a metaphor minefield. As Bougher (2012) observes, “The more abstract, complex, or unfamiliar the topic, the more likely metaphorical reasoning will be employed. For these reasons, metaphor is likely to figure prominently in the political cognition of citizens” (p. 148).

3.2. Source domain familiarity, categorization level, and semantic specificity

Metaphoric source domains can differ with regard to three important aspects: familiarity, categorization level, and semantic specificity. They can determine how readily a source domain is resorted to, how big an impact the metaphor has on cognition, and how many cross-domain inferences it offers.

3.2.1. Source domain familiarity

The role of concrete, sensory-motor experience for abstract cognition cannot be underestimated. People's social cognition is strongly embedded in their direct, sensory-motor experiences in the world, and they often unconsciously draw from such embodied experiences when reasoning about rather abstract social concepts and situations (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 2006; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005 for a review). For example, while there is evidence that language can introduce novel metaphors (Boroditsky, 2001; but see Chen, 2001) and that conventional linguistic metaphors influence cognition (Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010), such linguistic conventions can be overridden by world-experience. In testing the *Body-Specificity Hypothesis* (Casasanto, 2009; Willems, Toni, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2009), which claims that people who interact with their environment in systematically different ways acquire different metaphors, Casasanto (2009) found that differences in world-experience between left-handers and right-handers lead to systematically different metaphors. Based on divergent experiences with ease of movement on the left and right side of their bodies, and *despite* shared linguistic conventions, left-handed people rely on the metaphor LEFT IS GOOD in their reasoning and decision making, while right-handers resort to the metaphor RIGHT IS GOOD. Thus, abstract domains of cognition, such as *good* and *bad*, are to a great extent influenced by metaphoric mappings directly resulting from world-experience.

Thus, when construing abstract target domains in terms of concrete source domains people commonly turn to source domains with which they have maximal direct experience and most intimate familiarity (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1996; Schlesinger & Lau, 2000; see also Bougher, 2012, p. 150). As Landau et al. (2009) conclude in their exploration of immigration metaphors, “[...] people often frame potentially controversial social topics metaphorically in terms of a domain with which they are intimately familiar” (p. 6).

3.2.2. Basic-level metaphors

While source domain familiarity serves as an important selection criterion for political metaphors, the potency of a metaphoric mapping, and the question of how readily people resort to it, can furthermore be determined by the source domains' level of categorization.

Metaphoric source domains can be located at different levels of categorization. They can be above basic-level cognition, at basic-level cognition, or below basic-level cognition. To give an example for basic-level categorization, the concept *dog* is a basic-level category, while *animal* is above and *dachshund* below the basic level of cognition.

Political discourse commonly implements metaphors that rely on basic-level source domains as well as metaphors that rely on source domains above the basic level. For instance, while the common mapping NATION AS VEHICLE is above the basic level, the mappings NATION AS BOAT, NATION AS TRAIN, or NATION AS AIRPLANE all draw from basic-level source domains.

Basic-level categories constitute concepts that are the most strongly entrenched in people's neural system (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005, p. 466), and extensive research on basic-level categories illustrates their special status for reasoning (e.g., Berlin & Kay,

1969; Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1974; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Rosch, 1977, 1978; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). The question of whether or not a source domain constitutes a basic-level category matters for a number of reasons.

First, basic-level categories come with clearly constrained mental images. For example, one can easily bring up an image of a ‘dog’ in one’s mind. But it is not possible to come up with one clear mental image that encompasses the prototypical shape of all members of the category ‘animal’. Second, basic-level categories are most intimately tied into people’s motor-programs. People learn prototypical motor-interactions with concepts at the basic level, but not above the basic level. For example, individuals have a repertoire of movements they typically perform when interacting with chairs or armoires (basic-level categories), and those motor-movements are distinct from each other. But they do not store such distinct motor-movements in their minds with regard to more abstract categories such as ‘furniture’. Simply put, “the basic level is the level at which we interact optimally in the world with our bodies” (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005, p. 466). Third, basic-level concepts are perceivable via gestalt perception, processed faster than other categories, learned earliest in life, and easiest to recognize and remember (e.g., Brown, 1958; Mervis & Rosch, 1981). Furthermore, the basic level is the level at which most of our knowledge is organized, basic-level categories serve important social functions (e.g., Stross, 1973), and they have high degrees of cultural significance (e.g., Berlin & Kay, 1969). As Lakoff (1987) observes,

“Perhaps the best way of thinking about basic-level categories is that they are ‘human-sized.’ They depend not on the objects themselves, independent of people, but on the way people interact with objects: the way they perceive them, image them, organize information about them and behave toward them with their bodies” (p. 51).

When it comes to conceptual metaphors, then, basic-level source domains should be maximally meaningful. They provide strong and clearly-defined mental imagery, are intimately tied into our neural motor-programs, are easiest to access and remember, are culturally highly significant, and constitute common means of organizing (metaphoric) knowledge about the world and society.

3.2.3. Semantic specificity

While source domain familiarity and categorization level can influence the accessibility and cognitive impact of metaphoric mappings in political discourse, a third aspect is also important with regard to a source domain’s nature: its level of semantic specificity.

Metaphoric source domains can vary in the degree to which they are semantically specified. Some source domains offer highly specified frame semantics, while others offer more general, semantically underspecified frame semantics. In order to capture this difference, I have in the past distinguished between semantically specified *low-level* and semantically underspecified *higher-level* source domains (Wehling, 2012a). For example, the issue of immigration is commonly construed in terms of metaphor. Politicians may frame the matter in terms of a higher-level IMMIGRATION AS DISEASE mapping or a low-level IMMIGRATION AS VIRUS mapping. The IMMIGRATION AS DISEASE mapping leaves plenty room for semantic contestation, granting no answer to questions such as where the disease originates and how it can be prevented and cured. The IMMIGRATION AS VIRUS

mapping, on the other hand, offers more specified frame semantics: viruses originate outside of the body and persistently try to enter the body, and they can be prevented and cured by a strengthening of the immune system. The low-level mapping, thus, paints a picture of immigration that is semantically very precise, leading to a set of vivid and highly meaningful metaphoric inferences.

It should be noted that basic-level and low-level mappings have much in common with each other and regularly overlap. For instance, basic-level source domains tend to be semantically well specified and thus regularly fall into the category of low-level mappings. However, concepts below the basic level of cognition can be semantically even more specified, and thus also constitute low-level mappings (while not inferring the cognitive impact of basic-level categories). Nevertheless, I am using the notions of basic-level and low-level mappings to make two theoretical points. First, a basic-level source domain is maximally embedded in the neural (sensory-motor) system; it brings up clear mental imagery and motor-programs in the mind, it is learned early on in life, highly memorable, easily accessible, linguistically and culturally highly salient, processed via gestalt perception, and so on.

Second, a low-level source domain is simply characterized by granting highly specified, detailed frame semantics and a low degree of semantic contestability, while a higher-level source domain is semantically underspecified.

3.3. Source and target domain parallelism

Another deciding factor for the accessibility and effectiveness of metaphors is their degree of structural parallelism between source and target domain. The more co-aligned a source and target domain are with regard to their elements and structure, the easier and more productive the metaphoric mapping process (e.g., Bougher, 2012; Gentner, 2003; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Sweetser, 2004; Wehling, 2012a).

Notice that a source domain's level of semantic specificity interacts with its structural parallelism to a target domain in an important way: low-level mappings, due to their high degree of semantic specificity, can maximize parallelism between source and target domain. In fact, politicians seem to commonly implement low-level mappings that grant high degrees of source and target domain alignment.

Take the Italian public debate under former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi as an example (Wehling, 2012a). During Berlusconi's presidency, Italian public discourse saw a major moral divide, with strong opposition to Berlusconi's persona and policies. One of Berlusconi's concerns during office, therefore, was to frame his opposition as a moral threat to the 'right' kind of government (Berlusconi's government) and the 'right' kind of policies (conservative policies). An analysis of Berlusconi's public use of language showed that he commonly resorted to the low-level mapping IMMORALITY AS CANCER to frame his political opposition as a moral threat to the country (e.g., by labeling it "[...] a *cancer* that can no longer be tolerated, that has to be *cut out*", or, "[...] the *metastases* of our democracy"; Wehling, 2012a). Importantly, the low-level mapping IMMORALITY AS CANCER offered not just very detailed frame semantics; it also permitted a high degree of structural parallelism with the target domain. Just as *cancer* is a disease that originates inside the body (source domain), so did the *moral threat* posed by the political opposition originate in the Italian nation (target domain).

This structural cross-domain parallelism made the IMMORALITY AS CANCER metaphor a much better candidate for framing Berlusconi's political opposition as a moral threat than, say, an IMMORALITY AS VIRUS mapping (which would have located the origin of the moral threat outside of the metaphoric 'nation body'), or a higher-level IMMORALITY AS DISEASE mapping (which would have left its origin unspecified).

Structural parallelism between source and target domains, thus, is not just "likely to determine which metaphoric sources are spontaneously applied in political cognition" (Bougher, 2012, p. 150), but it can furthermore increase the conceptual potency of a metaphoric mapping.

4. The NATION AS FAMILY metaphor

The NATION AS FAMILY metaphor is evident in many languages, such as in the English "founding fathers" or "nanny state", the Korean "motherland" (Korean: *mo-kwuk*), and the German "fatherland" (German: *Vaterland*) and "homeland" (German: *Heimatland*). National budgets are regularly referred to as a nation's household budget, as in the German "state household" (German: *Staatshaushalt*), and politicians are commonly conceptualized as fathers or mothers of a nation. For instance, the first President of the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II, Theodor Heuss, was referred to as "Daddy Heuss" (German: *Papa Heuss*), and the current German chancellor Angela Merkel is called "Mommy Merkel" (German: *Mutti Merkel*). In short, nations are commonly construed in terms of a NATION AS FAMILY mapping, and governance is accordingly construed in terms of a GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mapping. Due to the abstract nature of the concepts 'nation' and 'governance', and due to their source and target domain characteristics, the two metaphors are prime candidates for moral political cognition. Furthermore, while all people acquire and regularly apply both mappings, their moral contestation can be strongly influenced by both their family socialization and other forms of socialization. Finally, the frequent usage of the FAMILY source domain across social institutions, and thus beyond the political realm, entails important insights about the nature of human moral reasoning.

4.1. Mapping characteristics and conceptual alternatives

The NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mapping constitute prime candidates for political moral cognition for a number of reasons. First, *nation* and *governance* are abstract concepts and thus rely heavily on metaphoric conceptualization. Second, the FAMILY and PARENTING source domains grant high degrees of familiarity and semantic specificity, and they constitute basic-level categories; they furthermore offer a high degree of structural parallelism with the target domains NATION and GOVERNANCE. Finally, while they constitute basic-level categories, they are still contestable in terms of different family and parenting values, allowing for divergent conceptualizations of moral governance. For all those reasons, the NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mapping outmatch common metaphoric alternatives for nationhood and governance.

4.1.1. Target and source domain characteristics

When people reason about moral politics and governance, they perforce constantly resort to metaphoric mappings. *Nation* is a highly abstract concept that cannot be physically experienced, and thus, like many other abstract concepts, depends on *concrete-abstract* mappings. The question is: which source domain are politicians and citizens most likely to resort to when reasoning about moral governance, and how strong a grasp can we expect the mapping to have on political cognition? Lakoff (1996) proposes that national moral politics and governance are most commonly construed in terms of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor (see also Lakoff, 2006a, 2008). There are several reasons to believe that this mapping is, in fact, the primary basis for reasoning about political morality.

First, people are intimately familiar with the *family* domain and gain manifold direct world-experiences within it (see also Schlesinger & Lau, 2000, p. 613).

Second, *family* is a basic-level category with high degrees of cognitive and cultural salience; it is easily accessible and highly memorable, encompassed by clear mental imagery, acquired early on in life, and so on.

Third, the *family* domain offers a high degree of semantic specificity with clearly defined semantic roles and structures: e.g., it encompasses the roles of parents and children (family members), a straightforward discrimination from other groups (non-family members), hierarchical structures (parents as authorities), and objectives (parenting goals).

Fourth, the source domain FAMILY and target domain NATION have a high degree of structural parallelism. Both imply, for example, clearly defined group membership, a distinction of authorities from non-authorities, and goals of the interaction between authorities and non-authorities. This structural parallelism allows for a large number of cross-domain inferences: citizenship is construed as family membership, and non-citizens as non-family members; political and social authorities are construed as parental authorities, while citizens who are not moral authorities are construed as children. Finally, governance goals are construed in terms of parenting goals.

Fifth, the *family* domain offers frame semantics that are especially relevant for the conceptualization of political morality. Namely, it encompasses notions about moral traits in children (the “right” kind of child) as well as moral parenting (the “right” kind of parent-child interaction). Those two aspects are core to any reasoning about political morality: they enable a mapping of moral traits in children onto moral traits in citizens, as well as a mapping of moral parenting onto moral governance.

Sixth, while *family* is a basic-level category with a high degree of semantic specificity, it still leaves room for semantic contestation; there are different types of families and parenting (in terms of categorization, such specified types would fall beneath the basic level). Importantly, the contestability of the basic-level source domain FAMILY allows for divergent conceptualizations of moral governance. Thus, while conservatives may construe moral governance metaphorically as strict-father parenting, liberals may construe it as nurturant-parent parenting (Lakoff, 1996).

For the above reasons, the NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mappings are prime candidates for the reasoning about politics in general and political morality specifically. But there are, of course, other source domains for *nationhood* and *governance*. A discussion of such metaphoric alternatives in relation to the NATION AS

FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mappings will further show the special status of the FAMILY source domain.

4.1.2. Metaphoric alternatives for nationhood and governance

There are a number of metaphors for nations, such as NATION AS POSSESSION (“*Handing* the nation *over* to a political opponent”), NATION AS CONTAINER (“There is no *room* for more immigrants”), NATION AS MACHINE (“This nation is *running* smoothly”), NATION AS VEHICLE (“The nation is *moving* in the right direction”), NATION AS ORGANISM (“The nation is economically *healthy*”), and NATION AS SOCIAL GROUP (“All citizens are *members* of this nation”).

Commonly, nation metaphors come in sets with one overarching, higher-level metaphor and a number of semantically specified, basic-level cases of that metaphor. All of the above metaphors are higher-level mappings, and they come with such subcases. For example, take the NATION AS VEHICLE metaphor. It is semantically underspecified but comes with a number of semantically specified, basic-level cases, such as NATION AS BOAT (“If we take on more immigrants, this nation will *sink*”), NATION AS CAR (“Our current economic policies will *drive* this nation *against the wall*”), or NATION AS TRAIN (“We must put this nation back *on track*”). The semantically specified, basic-level cases grant rich frame semantics and clear mental imagery. Similarly, the NATION AS SOCIAL GROUP metaphor has a number of low-level subcases, such as NATION AS COMMUNITY, NATION AS VILLAGE, NATION AS CLUB, NATION AS SPORTS TEAM, or NATION AS FAMILY. Overall, then, while there are only few higher-level metaphors for nationhood, these higher-level constructs come with manifold basic-level cases that structure people’s reasoning about nationhood and governance.

When it comes to moral reasoning about the nation, politics, and governance, the NATION AS SOCIAL GROUP metaphor outmatches its higher-level relatives, such as NATION AS POSSESSION, NATION AS CONTAINER, NATION AS MACHINE, or NATION AS ORGANISM, for a straightforward reason: the source domain SOCIAL GROUP offers a frame structure that implies a set of individuals, notions of group membership, traits of group members, interactional patterns, hierarchical structures, standards of behavior, and so on. While other higher-level source domains for nationhood, such as CONTAINER, VEHICLE, MACHINE, or ORGANISM, may be extremely powerful as means of construing certain aspects of politics, they do not readily provide a conceptual basis for reasoning about group membership, moral traits in group members, moral interaction with each other, or moral authorities. The NATION AS SOCIAL GROUP metaphor, hence, has a special status among nation metaphors.

As noted above, the NATION AS SOCIAL GROUP metaphor has a number of subcases, such as NATION AS COMMUNITY, NATION AS VILLAGE, NATION AS CLUB, NATION AS SPORTS TEAM, and NATION AS FAMILY. The NATION AS FAMILY mapping outmatches both its higher-level relative NATION AS SOCIAL GROUP and its low-level relatives.

First, the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor is a more potent means of reasoning about moral politics than its higher-level relative NATION AS SOCIAL GROUP. In contrast to the latter, the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor draws on a basic-level source domain and offers a high degree of semantic specificity. Second, the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor outmatches its basic-level siblings for a number of reasons: *family* is our primary, most basic experience with authority (Lakoff, 1996) since all people gain direct experience

within some kind of family in the first years of their lives; but not everyone has direct experience as an active member of other social groups, such as sports teams, clubs, or a local community or village; finally, the NATION AS FAMILY mapping is highly common in political discourse (e.g., Cienki, 2005a) and is thus frequently reinforced in people's minds.

Finally, the source domain PARENTING and target domain GOVERNANCE have a high degree of structural parallelism, as well as many correlations in experience, which give rise to this mapping. Just as parents are concerned with teaching their children right and wrong, and implement a certain parenting style to do so, so is moral governance concerned with making the nation and its citizens maximally moral through moral governance. Thus, while other basic- and low-level source domains for nationhood, such as personhood (the NATION AS BODY metaphor), provide potent means for political reasoning, the NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mappings offer a unique conceptual template for reasoning about moral group interaction, moral traits in group members, and moral governance. Considering all the above, it comes as no surprise, then, that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor is in fact commonly structures political discourse and reasoning (e.g., Cienki, 2005a; Lakoff, 1996; Musolff, 2004, 2006; Schlesinger & Lau, 2000).

4.2. Source domain contestation and range of application

The NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING metaphors commonly structure moral political reasoning, and the source domains FAMILY and PARENTING are cognitively exceptionally potent, for the reasons outlined above. Before proceeding to an empirical test of the mappings' role for moral political cognition in Chapter 4, two issues must be addressed: first, the causal impact of family socialization and other forms of socialization on moral contestations of the metaphoric source domains FAMILY and PARENTING; second, the application of idealized family models beyond the domain of politics.

4.2.1. Source domain acquisition, applicability, and moral contestation

A common question raised with regard to Lakoff's (1996) Moral Politics Theory are whether people's individual upbringing is in fact a core, or even sole, determiner of political morality, and to what extent other social experiences play a role in the formation of political morality (e.g., Barker & Tinnick, 2006, p. 251).

Lakoff (1996) in fact argues that people's individual upbringing might exert a strong influence on whether they adapt strict-father or nurturant-parent ideals. This notion is supported by various empirical evidence that people's early childhood experiences in their families, including experiences with different parenting styles, can determine their moral social and political outlooks as adults (e.g., R. Altemeyer, 1996; Glass et al., 1986; Jennings & Niemi, 1968, 1991; McClosky & Chong, 1985; McDevitt, 2006; Schönplflug, 2001; Ventura, 2001). Furthermore, research on embodied social cognition suggests that direct, sensory-motor experience strongly influences abstract social cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Bergen, 2013; see Niedenthal et al., 2005 for a review). Clearly, experiences within their families are a substantial part of people's direct, sensory-motor experiences in early, formative stages of their lives. It would, therefore,

come as no surprise if such experiences were to form a substantial basis for moral social cognition in adulthood.

However, while scholars commonly interpret Moral Politics Theory to predict a unidirectional causal relationship between people's upbringing and political outlooks, the theory in fact does not predict such an exclusive relationship. Rather, it distinguishes between source domain acquisition and applicability on one hand, and source domain contestation on the other.

As for source domain acquisition and applicability, Moral Politics Theory in fact argues that all people naturally acquire the NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mappings, and that both mappings are highly relevant for political moral cognition. As for source domain contestation, however, it argues that the moral contestation of family life in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent values may be affected by both family socialization and socialization outside of the family. And while Lakoff (1996) acknowledges that childhood experiences with parental authority can have a strong influence on how people construe ideal parenting (and thus ideal governance) later in life, he explicitly argues that experiences outside one's nuclear family – with befriended families, in schools, universities, and sport teams, with cultural institutions and with political discourse – *also* influence how one construes ideal parenting. As Lakoff (2004) puts it, one does not have to be raised in a nurturant-parent family to understand the Oprah Winfrey Show, and one does not have to be raised in a strict-father family to understand an Arnold Schwarzenegger movie.

In line with Lakoff's (1996) assertion, McAdams et al. (2008) observed that conservative and liberal adults who reported important life lessons to be in line with strict-father or nurturant-parent values also reported that such lessons were learned from authority figures across social contexts – encompassing parents, the government, the church and God, teachers, and so on. Hence, while adults acknowledged lessons in strictness or nurturance as relevant to their political outlooks, such lessons were acquired both within and outside of their families. Analogously, Schlesinger and Lau (2000) observe, “[...] the meaning of ‘family’ is a product of one's own family history [...] as well as the images of family constructed by the media and other sources of cultural authority [...]” (p. 613).

In sum, then, while the NATION AS FAMILY mapping is derived from people's primary experiences with governance, the question of *what* they believe to be ideal parenting is not perforce derived from the details of those experiences. Simply put, Moral Politics Theory predicts that if people are asked, “What is the ideal way of governing a nation?”, they will resort to their beliefs about ideal parenting at that moment in time, independently of where those beliefs were acquired.

4.2.2. Range of source domain application

As seen above, metaphoric target domains can be construed in terms of a range of different source domains. For example, nationhood can be conceptualized in terms of personhood, a container, or a family. Likewise, one and the same concept can serve as a metaphoric source domain for a number of different target domains. For instance, verticality serves as a source domain for quantity (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), divinity (e.g., Meier et al., 2007), good and bad (e.g., Crawford, Margolies, Drake, & Murphy,

2006; Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999), and social power (e.g., Moeller et al., 2008; Schubert, 2005).

Likewise, the *family* concept serves as a source domain for more than just one target domain (Lakoff, 2008). People commonly use FAMILY as a source domain to reason about all kinds of governing institutions, i.e., social institutions that imply authorities. Examples of such mappings are: RELIGION AS FAMILY, COMMUNITY AS FAMILY, WORKPLACE AS FAMILY, and UNIVERSITY AS FAMILY. Take the UNIVERSITY AS FAMILY mapping as an example. In Korean culture, one's home university is referred to as one's "mother school" (Korean: *mo-kyo*), and in German, dissertation advisors are referred to as "doctoral fathers" (German: *Doktorväter*), "doctoral mothers" (German: *Doktormütter*), and "doctoral parents" (German: *Doktoreltern*). Analogously, religious communities are commonly construed as families (e.g., Lakoff 1996, 2006a, 2008), a conceptualization that is evident in the German national media's referral to former Pope Benedict XVI as "the strict father"⁷ (German: *Der strenge Vater*), and in terms such as "prayer brother" (German: *Betbruder*), a religious "sister order" (German: *Schwesterorden*), or the "order mother" of a religious order (German: *Oberin Mutter*).

In sum, people use the source domain FAMILY to reason about not just the nation, national authorities and governance, but also to reason about other governing institutions. As Lakoff (1996) points out, the strict-father and nurturant-parent models structure thought and interaction in many realms of social life, including schools, workplaces, religion, and so on.

Recent explorations afford initial support for the view that people apply strict-father and nurturant-parent values across social domains (Jensen, 2009; Swift, 2009). For instance, Jensen (2009) investigated whether conservatives' and liberals' portrayals of God resembled strict-father and nurturant-parent values, respectively. Although both groups portrayed God as nurturant and loving, she found that "[i]n a finding similar to Lakoff's (1996), conservatives conceived of God more in terms of power and judgment than liberals, and they were more likely to see God as male" (p. 142). Other lines of research found links between conservative religiosity and authoritarian parenting (Ellison & Sherkat, 1993; Ellison et al., 1996; Lienesch, 1991), suggesting that an upbringing in conservative religious groups may lead to a conceptualization of authority figures – fathers, teachers, or God – as disciplinarians who teach self-discipline and obedience through strict rule enforcement. Finally, Swift (2009) found that while conservative and liberal Christians pointed to Biblical authorities as a partial determiner of their political views, conservatives were likely to see Christianity in line with strict-father values, while liberals interpreted Christianity as being in line with nurturant-parent values (p. 139).

In sum, then, people use the *family* as a source domain when reasoning about different governing institutions (Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008), such as in RELIGION AS FAMILY, COMMUNITY AS FAMILY, WORKPLACE AS FAMILY, or UNIVERSITY AS FAMILY.

While this observation does not compromise the importance of the NATION AS FAMILY mapping – and its contestations in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent values – for moral political cognition, it points to an important fact: political morality, family morality, religious morality, workplace morality, and so on, may be more intimately

⁷ Spiegel Online, 2/12/2013. *Das Erbe des strengen Vaters*. Online: <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/papst-ruecktritt-bedeutung-fuer-die-katholische-kirche-in-deutschland-a-882719.html> (Last accessed: 3/12/2013).

connected to each other than morality and ideology research commonly assumes (e.g., Barker & Tinnick, 2006; Layman et al., 2007), because all those different social domains are frequently construed in terms of the same metaphoric source domain. Systematic differences in moral contestations of family life may motivate systematic differences in moral attitudes across social domains. Religious, political, and workplace values, for example, need not be strictly distinct. In contrast, their shared metaphoric source domain may make them intimately related and even straightforwardly parallel. For example, when individuals contest ideal families and parenting *exclusively* in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent values, their moral reasoning across social domains should be maximally parallel; they will likely apply accordant family values whenever they reason about governing institutions in terms of the FAMILY source domain, whether those institutions are their church, nation, community, or workplace. If individuals, on the other hand, embrace strict-father and nurturant-parent values to a similar extent when they reason about family life (biconceptuals), they should show cognitive variability with regard to both politics and other governing institutions whenever they (consciously or unconsciously) metaphorically construe those institutions in terms of family life.

In sum, while different kinds of social experience can determine how people construe ideal families and parenting, they regularly use family and parenting as source domains to make (moral) sense of a range of different social institutions. This may bind their moral views across divergent social contexts, leading to *moral alignment* across them, especially if they exclusively subscribe to strict-father or nurturant-parent values. Alternatively, in the case of biconceptualism, source domain parallelism across social target domains may open up all those domains (and not just politics) to a moral contestation in terms of either strict-father or nurturant-parent values (*cross-domain* biconceptualism; see Section 5 in the Introduction).

This chapter set out to examine the crucial role that conceptual metaphors play for people's everyday reasoning and political cognition. The question of "what makes for a popular and cognitively potent metaphor" was discussed. Specifically, attention was drawn to the fact that a source domain's level of familiarity, semantic specificity, and categorization, as well as degrees of structural parallelism between source and target domain, can turn certain metaphors into prime candidates for (political) cognition. The NATION AS FAMILY metaphor was discussed in terms of these attributes. It was shown that there is much reason to believe that this metaphor in fact outmatches other metaphors for nationhood and governance when it comes to people's reasoning about moral governance. Finally, details of how the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor structures cognition were laid out, tapping into matters such as source domain acquisition, applicability, and moral contestation, as well as range of application of the FAMILY source domain.

Chapter 3, thus, answered the question: *Why* should the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor structure people's everyday reasoning about governance, and what are the *implications* of this metaphor for social and political moral judgment?

Next, Chapter 4 turns to the question of how big a role the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor actually plays in political reasoning in terms of Moral Politics Theory's strict-father and nurturant-parent model.

Chapter 4: Testing the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor's role for political cognition

Introduction

Moral Politics Theory holds that people commonly construe national politics in terms of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, and that this metaphor allows for their beliefs about ideal parenting to translate into beliefs about ideal governance. That is, the theory holds that people's political judgment is footed in a metaphoric mapping process, which mediates moral political judgment in terms of family values. Studies 3 and 4 were conducted to test this claim, and to further investigate the role of the NATION AS FAMILY for political cognition. Study 3 tested whether individuals in fact map the idealized parenting models they endorse onto governance. Study 4 examined the effects that an increased endorsement of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor has on political reasoning in terms of the two parenting models. Together, Studies 3 and 4 confirm that moral political cognition in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model is mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor and that increased endorsement of this metaphor increases the usage of the metaphor for political judgment.

1. Open questions and present research

Moral Politics Theory holds that political cognition in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model is mediated by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. However, there is to date no empirical evidence for this claim.

First, while there is evidence that the NATION AS FAMILY mapping, as well as its source domain contestations in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent values, play an important role in political cognition and discourse (e.g., Cienki 2005a; Lakoff, 1996, 2006a), there is to date no empirical evidence that correlations between family and political values are actually the *product of a metaphoric mapping process* (e.g., Bar-Lev, 2007; Musolf, 2004).

Second, scholars commonly voice concern about the applicability of metaphors used by the political elite for the actual reasoning of citizens. For instance, Bougher (2012) cautions that while citizens "can understand and reason with elite metaphors, it does not mean that those are the structures that will actually shape their political understanding in the absence of priming" (p. 149). While Cienki (2005a) showed that elite-to-citizen discourse is commonly structured by the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, no such empirical investigations have been undertaken for citizen discourse. Thus, the question of whether the NATION AS FAMILY mapping structures citizen cognition, just as it seems to structure elite cognition (Cienki, 2005a), so far remains unanswered.

Finally, while many scholars agree that conceptual metaphor should in theory play a crucial role for political cognition, there is to date little empirical evidence for this view (e.g., Bougher, 2012, p. 147-148). As pointed out earlier, while there is a generous amount of work on the impact of conceptual metaphors on everyday cognition (e.g., Casasanto, 2008; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Jostmann et al., 2009, and many oth-

ers) and social cognition (e.g., Meier et al., 2007; Moeller et al., 2008; Schubert, 2005; Williams & Bargh, 2008, 2010; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008, and many others), to date only a handful of studies (Landau et al., 2009; Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; Schlesinger, 1997; Schlesinger & Lau, 2000; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011) have empirically tested the role of conceptual metaphor in political cognition.

Studies 3 and 4 examined the role of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor for moral political cognition in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model. Specifically, Study 3 showed that citizens implement the NATION AS FAMILY mapping in the absence of priming, and that moral political cognition is mediated by this mapping. Study 4 showed that the impact of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor on moral political cognition can be increased when people brought to endorse it as a highly legitimate means of reasoning about politics.

2. Studies 3 and 4: The NATION AS FAMILY metaphor

Although a clear overlap between people's ideal parenting models and political attitudes was found in Study 2, those findings did not explain why such an overlap might exist. Moral Politics Theory proposes that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor enables political cognition in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models. Studies 3 and 4 tested this component of Moral Politics Theory. In Study 3, it was tested whether the relationship between people's idealized parenting models and political attitudes is mediated by their idealized governing models *in terms* of strict-father and nurturant-parent values. In Study 4, people were manipulated so that they either endorsed or did not endorse the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, and the effects of this manipulation on moral political cognition were examined.

2.1. Study 3: Mediating role

In Study 3, a second questionnaire, the Moral Politics Nation Scale, modeled directly after the Moral Politics Family Scale, was utilized. The role of this new scale in mediating the relationship between ideal parenting models and political attitudes was examined. The Moral Politics Nation Scale was directly modeled after the Moral Politics Family Scale in order to capture participants' beliefs about ideal governance while preserving their moral contestations of family life in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality. If the Moral Politics Nation Scale mediates the relationship between ideal parenting models and political attitudes, it would provide initial evidence that individuals map the idealized parenting models they endorse onto governance, which, in turn, translates into political attitudes.

Method

Participants: One hundred and fifty-one participants (71 male, 79 female), recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, took part in Study 3 in exchange for a modest payment. As in Study 2, an attention check item was included that directed participants to select "neither

agree nor disagree” as the appropriate response. Two participants answered this item incorrectly and were removed from all analyses, leaving a total of 149 participants.

Procedure: After completing a basic demographic questionnaire, participants completed the Moral Politics Family Scale ($\alpha_{\text{strict-father}} = .86$; $\alpha_{\text{nurturant-parent}} = .77$). Then, participants were presented with a series of unrelated filler questionnaires that took approximately ten minutes to complete. After these filler measures, participants completed the Moral Politics Nation Scale. This scale included a “governance” version of each item of the Moral Politics Family Scale. Specifically, wherever an item in the Moral Politics Family Scale referred to “parents”, this word was replaced with “the government”, “national authorities”, or conceptually similar words. Likewise, wherever an item in the Moral Politics Family Scale referred to “children” this word was replaced with “citizens”, “the public”, or conceptually similar words. For example, the strict-father item “Obedience must be instilled in children” became “The government must instill obedience in its citizens”, and the nurturant-parent item “Siblings should receive parental support in accordance to their individual needs” became “Americans should receive governmental assistance in accordance to their individual needs”. Below are the two subscales of the Moral Politics Nation Scale. For each item, it is indicated whether the item was positively or negatively keyed, and what moral subcomponent it relates to.

Moral Politics Nation Scale

Strict-father subscale

1. While citizens of other nations must not be one's concern, within the US, everyone should look after each other. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *In-group nurturance*)
2. The government must instill obedience in its citizens. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Obedience*)
3. When the government speaks, Americans ought to listen respectfully. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Absolute governmental authority*)
4. The government shouldn't handicap its citizens by making their lives too easy. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Immoral unconditional nurturance*)
5. Unlawful behavior must be punished sufficiently. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Punishment*)
6. Government authorities should not allow citizens to talk back to them. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Hierarchical communication*)
7. People must always be on time. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Strict rules*)
8. Sometimes the government needs to practice "tough love" to ensure its citizens follow the right path. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Tough-love nurturance*)
9. Citizens need to be disciplined in order to build character. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Moral strength*)
10. People must understand that people get what they deserve. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Performance-based fairness*)
11. Citizens must be disciplined through strict rules and laws. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Rule-enforcement*)
12. It's fine for citizens to have secret dealings and hide things from the government. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Absolute control*)

13. When in doubt, the government should err on the side of lenience rather than strictness. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Immoral lenience*)
14. At times it's okay for citizens to disobey the government's laws. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Obedience*)
15. Sometimes it's okay to let bad behavior in citizens go unpunished. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Punishment*)

Nurturant-parent subscale

1. Citizens will be happy if the government encourages them to follow their curiosity. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Self-fulfillment*)
2. People in America should learn to understand others' needs and attend to them. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Individual and social responsibility*)
3. Citizens must learn to see the world through other people's eyes. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathy*)
4. I'd rather see America work cooperatively with other nations than be in competition with them. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Cooperation*)
5. In order to truly take care of its citizens, the government needs to be empathic. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathic nurturance*)
6. Governing means nurturing the true nature of each citizen. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Non-intrusive governing*)
7. Americans should receive governmental assistance in accordance to their individual needs. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Need-based fairness*)
8. The government should empower its people as much as possible so that they may follow their dreams. (Positively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empowerment*)
9. Caring for others is not a central aspect of being American. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Nurturance*)
10. Americans shouldn't feel obligated to care about the well being of citizens from other nations. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *In- and out-group nurturance*)
11. Tending to the needs of those in other nations is not the responsibility of Americans. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Individual and social responsibility*)
12. It's not critical for people to learn to take the perspective of others into account. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathy*)
13. Learning to understand others and accepting them for who they are is not an important part of being American. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Empathy-based tolerance*)
14. It's not important for the government to explain to its people why it set certain rules and laws. (Negatively keyed; Subcomponent: *Accountability*)

Participants completed the Moral Politics Nation Scale using the same response scale as the Moral Politics Family Scale ($\alpha_{\text{strict-father Nation}} = .82$; $\alpha_{\text{nurturant-parent Nation}} = .81$). Finally, participants completed a 9-item political attitudes measure that gauged participants' stances on "hot-button" political issues (e.g., gay marriage, abortion, and tax policy; see appendix C). Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each political stance on a 7-point scale, ranging from "strongly against" to "strongly in favor" ($\alpha = .84$). All items were scored so that lower scores indicated greater support for liberal stances and higher scores indicated greater support for conservative stances.

Results

Table 3 presents the zero-order correlations among the Moral Politics Family Scale, Moral Politics Nation Scale, and political attitude questionnaire. In line with the results from Study 2, the strict-father and nurturant-parent subscales were only slightly correlated ($r = .10$), further attesting to the independent nature of these two parenting models. Also, as in Study 2, there was a strong positive relationship between endorsement of the strict-father subscale and support for conservative political stances, $r = .37, p < .001$, as well as a negative relationship between endorsement of the nurturant-parent subscale and support for conservative political stances, $r = -.35, p < .001$.

As hypothesized, the two strict-father subscales (Family and Nation) were highly correlated, $r = .67, p < .001$. Likewise, the two nurturant-parent subscales (Family and Nation) were highly correlated, $r = .55, p < .001$. These results demonstrate the cognitive overlap individuals have between their beliefs about ideal parenting and ideal governance. Moreover, scores on the Moral Politics Nation Scale correlated with political policy attitudes: the higher participants scored on the strict-father Nation subscale the more strongly they supported conservative policy stances, $r = .40, p < .001$, and the higher they scored on the nurturant-parent Nation subscale, the less they supported conservative policy stances, $r = -.51, p < .001$.

	Strict-father Family	Nurturant-parent Family	Strict-father Nation	Nurturant-parent Nation	Conservative Policy Preferences
Strict-father Family	--	0.10	0.67***	-0.10	0.37***
Nurturant-parent Family	0.10	--	-0.17*	0.55***	-0.35***
Strict-father Nation	0.67***	-0.17*	--	-0.22**	0.40***
Nurturant-parent Nation	-0.10	0.55**	-0.22**	--	-0.51***
Conservative Policy Preferences	0.37**	-0.35***	0.40***	-0.51***	--

Table 3. Zero-order correlations among Moral Politics Family Scale, Moral Politics Nation Scale, and political attitude questionnaire.

Next, the mediating role of the Moral Politics Nation Scale on the relationship between idealized parenting models and political stances was examined. Scores on both of the strict-father Family and strict-father Nation subscales were entered as simultaneous predictors of political attitudes. Results of this regression analysis revealed that endorsement of the strict-father Nation subscale remained a strong predictor of conservative policy stances, $\beta = .27, p < .01$, whereas now endorsement of the strict-father Family subscale only marginally predicted conservative policy stances, $\beta = .19, p = .06$ (see Figure 1, panel A). A bootstrap analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) revealed that the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include 0 [.02, .52]. In a second regression, scores on both the nurturant-parent Family and nurturant-parent Nation subscales were entered as simultaneous predictors of conservative policy stances. Results of this regres-

sion equation revealed that although endorsement of the nurturant-parent Nation subscale remained a robust predictor of conservative policy attitudes, $\beta = -.45, p < .001$, scores on the nurturant-parent Family subscale no longer significantly predicted conservative policy stances, $\beta = -.10, p = .24$ (see Figure 1, panel B). A second bootstrapping analysis revealed that 0 was not within the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval [-.67, -.27]. These results indicate that participants' beliefs about ideal governance significantly mediate the relationship between the idealized parenting models they endorse and their conservative policy attitudes.⁸




Figure 1. Diagram depicting the mediating role of the strict-father Nation subscale in explaining the relationship between scores on the strict-father Family subscale and conservative policy support (Panel A), and the mediating role of the nurturant-parent Nation subscale in explaining the relationship between scores on the nurturant-parent Family subscale and conservative policy support (Panel B).

Discussion

Study 3 examined a fundamental aspect of Moral Politics Theory, namely the prediction that the relationship between individuals' beliefs about ideal parenting translates into their political attitudes *because* they metaphorically map their moral contestation of the “family” domain onto national politics. The results of Study 3 support this notion. Media-

⁸ Moral Politics Theory asserts that family morality maps onto more general moral ideals and not the reverse. To address this possibility, a reverse mediation analyses was conducted examining if scores on the Moral Politics Family subscales might mediate the relationship between Moral Politics Nation scores and political attitudes. Bootstrap analyses revealed that the confidence interval included 0 for both the strict-father subscales [-.06, .43] and nurturant-parent subscales [-.25, .10].

tion analyses revealed that the relationship between people's endorsement of strict-father ideals within the "family" domain and their political stances were mediated by an endorsement of strict-father ideals within the "nation" domain. Analogously, the relationship between people's endorsement of nurturant-parent ideals within the "family" domain and their political stances were mediated by an endorsement of nurturant-parent ideals within the "nation" domain.

2.2. Study 4: Degree of endorsement

Study 4 further tests the relevance of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor for moral political cognition. After having found a "latent" mapping mechanism that construes ideal governance in terms of ideal parenting in Study 3, Study 4 explores what happens when people are brought to engage or disengage the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor in their reasoning.

Study 4 manipulated the extent to which individuals employ the metaphor by either encouraging or discouraging its endorsement. It was predicted that an increase or decrease in participants' likelihood to employ the metaphor would directly impact the extent to which they relied on the metaphoric mapping for moral political cognition. In other words, by increasing participants' endorsement of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, those espousing strict-father morality should demonstrate greater support for conservative political stances, whereas those espousing nurturant-parent morality should demonstrate greater support for liberal political stances. Conversely, decreasing participants' endorsement of the metaphor should decrease their endorsement of strong political stances in line with strict-father or nurturant-parent ideals. Thus, maximizing the use of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor should lead to political polarization, while decreasing its use should lessen political polarization.

To test this hypothesis, participants' likelihood to endorse the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor was experimentally manipulated. Then, the extent to which they applied the strict-father and nurturant-parent model to their attitudes about governing was measured, using the Moral Politics Nation Scale from Study 3. Additionally, participants' political stances on hot-button issues were measured. If the above hypothesis were correct, the metaphor manipulation should increase the correspondence between parenting models and political attitudes, and scores on the Moral Politics Nation Scale should mediate this relationship.

Method

Participants: One hundred and ninety-five participants (79 male, 116 female), recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, took part in Study 4 in exchange for a modest payment. As in the previous studies, an attention check item was included. No participants failed this check.

Procedure: As part of a background questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate which of the following categories their attitudes about parenting best fit into: (a) *Strictness* – parents should be tough toward their children to help ensure their children grow up to be good people, or (b) *Nurturance* – parents should nurture their children's needs and desires so they can grow up to be whoever they want to be ($n_{\text{strict-father}} = 64$; $n_{\text{nurturant-}}$

parent = 131). Beliefs about ideal parenting were measured in this manner because, as described below, the metaphor manipulation involved asking participants to think about how their parenting beliefs map (or do not map) onto their beliefs about ideal governance. Asking participants to fill out the Moral Politics Family questionnaire prior to being exposed to the manipulation and filling out the Moral Politics Nation questionnaire would imply the risk of creating a demand effect. Thus, in order to avoid a demand effect, preferences for strict or nurturant parenting were measured with a single-item that was embedded within a larger background questionnaire. After participants completed the background questionnaire, they were randomly assigned to either a metaphor-increase or metaphor-decrease condition. Participants in the metaphor-increase condition were given the following instruction:

“There’s a very common metaphor that people use when reasoning and talking about national politics, a metaphor used by conservatives, liberals, and moderates alike. It goes like this: “running a nation is in many ways just like running a family.” In many ways, this metaphor seems to be applicable. For example, one might say that just as parents have authority and lead the family so do government officials have authority and lead the nation. Nations are groups of people and families are groups of people. And so on. We are curious whether you can think of more examples that show how well this metaphor works - please think of some other ways in which the nation is JUST like a family. Simply list 4-5 examples.”

Participants in the metaphor-decrease condition were given the following instruction:

“There’s a rather silly metaphor that people use when reasoning and talking about national politics, a metaphor used by conservatives, liberals, and moderates alike. It goes like this: “running a nation is in many ways just like running a family.” This metaphor is inadequate in many ways. For example, while people in a family are related it isn’t the case that all people in one nation are related. And while you can chose to move to a different nation you cannot chose to move into a different family in the same way. And so on. We are curious whether you can think of more examples that show how inadequate this metaphor is - please think of some other ways in which the nation is NOT like a family. Simply list 4-5 examples.”

After completing this task, participants indicated their agreement with the following statement: “In many ways, governing a nation is like governing a family,” using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This served as a means for measuring the extent to which the manipulation increased or decreased participants’ endorsement of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor.

Participants then completed the Moral Politics Nation questionnaire used in Study 3. As before, reliability on both the strict-father and nurturant-parent Nation subscales was high ($\alpha_{\text{strict-father Nation}} = .82$; $\alpha_{\text{nurturant-parent Nation}} = .84$). Finally, participants completed the 9-item measure of “hot-button” political attitudes that had also been used in Study 3 ($\alpha = .78$) (see appendix B). As before, responses on this questionnaire were coded so that higher scores indicated greater endorsement of conservative political stances. Once participants had completed this questionnaire, the study was over.

Results

Manipulation check: To test whether participants' placement within the metaphor-increase or metaphor-decrease condition influenced endorsement of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor, a t-test was conducted that compared the extent to which participants in each condition agreed with the manipulation check item. This analysis yielded a significant difference, $t(192) = 10.55, p < .001$, such that participants in the metaphor-increase condition reported greater agreement, $M = 4.83$, and participants in the metaphor-decrease condition reported less agreement, $M = 2.58$. This led to the conclusion that the manipulation successfully influenced participants' endorsement of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. Next, the possibility was examined that the manipulation differently influenced participants espousing the strict-father and nurturant-parent model. To test this possibility, a 2(parenting model: strict-father versus nurturant-parent) x 2(metaphor condition: increase versus decrease) ANOVA was conducted, entering agreement with the manipulation check item as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed that there was no significant interaction between the espoused ideal parenting model and the metaphor condition, $F(1, 190) < 1, p < .67$. This suggests that the metaphor manipulation did not affect those espousing the strict-father model and those espousing the nurturant-parent model in different ways.

Moral Politics Nation attitudes: First, scores on the strict-father Nation subscale were subtracted from scores on the nurturant-parent Nation subscale to create a single measure of Moral Politics Nation attitudes, so that higher scores indicated greater endorsement of nurturant-parent Nation attitudes relative to strict-father Nation attitudes. Then, a 2(parenting model: strict-father versus nurturant-parent) x 2(metaphor condition: increase versus decrease) ANOVA was conducted, entering scores on this combined measure of Moral Politics Nation attitudes as the dependent variable. This analysis yielded a non-significant effect of the experimental condition, $F(1, 191) < 1, p = .91$. However, it yielded a significant main effect of parenting model endorsement, $F(1, 191) = 22.14, p < .001$, such that those endorsing the strict-father model scored significantly lower, $M = -.49$, than those endorsing the nurturant-parent model, $M = -1.35$. This result parallels the findings in Study 3. Furthermore, the analysis yielded a significant interaction, $F(1, 191) = 5.70, p < .05$. As depicted in Figure 2, an increased endorsement of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor led to greater polarization in Moral Politics Nation attitudes between participants espousing the strict-father model and participants espousing the nurturant-parent model.




Figure 2. Effects of the metaphor-increase and metaphor-decrease conditions on Moral Politics Nation scores.

Political attitudes: The same 2(parenting model: strict-father versus nurturant-parent) x 2(metaphor condition: increase versus decrease) ANOVA was conducted, this time entering scores on the political attitudes questionnaire as the dependent variable. This analysis yielded a non-significant effect of condition, $F(1, 191) < 1$, $p = .89$, and a significant main effect of parenting model endorsement, $F(1, 191) = 10.27$, $p < .01$, such that those espousing the strict-father parenting model demonstrated greater conservative policy support, $M = 3.43$, than those espousing the nurturant-parent model, $M = 2.87$. Moreover, the analysis yielded a marginally significant interaction, $F(1, 191) = 3.41$, $p = .066$. As shown in Figure 3, there tended to be more polarization between advocates of the two parenting models when they were in the metaphor-increase condition than when they were in the metaphor-decrease condition.




Figure 3. Effects of the metaphor-increase and metaphor-decrease conditions on policy attitudes.

Mediating role of Moral Politics Nation attitudes: Next, it was tested whether scores on the Moral Politics Nation Scale mediated the relationship between parenting ideals and political attitudes for participants in the metaphor-increase condition. A mediated moder-

ation analysis following the guidelines set forth by Muller, Judd, & Yzerbt (2005) was conducted. This analysis revealed that entering participants' Moral Politics Nation scores into the regression equation caused the relationship between the parenting models x metaphor condition interaction and political attitudes to no longer be significant, $\beta = -.08, p = .52$. However, participants' scores on the Moral Politics Nation Scale remained a strong predictor of their political attitudes, $\beta = -.51, p < .001$ (*Sobel* $z = 2.11, p < .05$; Figure 4). This result suggests that participants in the metaphor-increase condition utilized their ideal parenting model as a guide for their beliefs about ideal governance, which in turn guided their political attitudes.




Figure 4. Diagram depicting the mediating role of the Moral Politics Nation Scale in the relationship between parenting ideals and political attitudes for participants in the metaphor-increase condition.

Discussion

In Study 4, the extent to which individuals employ the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor was manipulated by either encouraging or discouraging its endorsement.⁹ The results show that participants in the metaphor-increase condition demonstrated a stronger association between parenting ideals and corresponding political attitudes. In other words, emphasizing the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor led to greater polarization between participants who endorse strict-father ideals and participants who endorse nurturant-parent ideals. Moreover, this relationship was mediated by scores on the Moral Politics Nation Scale.

2.3. Discussion

The results of Study 4, coupled with those from Study 3, help explain *why* people's beliefs about ideal family life and parenting predict their political attitudes. Specifically, in line with Moral Politics Theory, people's tendency to employ the NATION AS FAMILY

⁹ It must be noted here that concept negation frequently results in the activation of the very concepts that are negated in people's minds (e.g., Kaup, Lüdke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdke, 2007; Giora, Balaban, Fein, & Alkabets, 2004). Accordingly, both the metaphor-decrease and metaphor-increase condition brought the metaphor to the fore of people's reasoning. The manipulation did not consist of whether or not people endorsed the metaphor, but whether or not they judged it as "legitimate".

metaphor allows them to construe moral governance in terms of moral parenting, and their so-derived beliefs about moral governance in turn steer their political attitudes.

More generally, Studies 3 and 4 also provide further empirical evidence that conceptual metaphor plays a crucial role for political cognition, and that not just politicians (Cienki, 2005a; Lakoff, 1996), but also citizens embrace the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor.

3. Open questions for future research

The objective of the present studies was to test whether the NATION AS FAMILY mapping in fact mediates moral political cognition, and whether its effect on moral political reasoning increases when the metaphor is brought to the fore of reasoning. However, Chapter 3 and 4 also raised a number of questions that lay beyond the scope of the present investigation. These will be discussed below.

3.1. The NATION AS FAMILY mapping in citizen discourse, metaphoric framing effects, and implicit moral cognition

The present investigations showed that the NATION AS FAMILY mapping motivates moral political cognition among citizens. While this metaphor has been shown to play a crucial role in elite-to-citizen discourse (Cienki, 2005a; see also Johansen, 2007), there is to date no empirical account of its frequency in citizen discourse. Given the mapping's crucial role for moral political cognition, it stands to reason that it should be very common in not just elite-to-citizen but also citizen discourse, and that both conservatives and liberals should regularly implement linguistic expressions based on the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor.

Furthermore, we know nothing yet about the *range* of priming effects associated with the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. In Study 4, participants were primed to either engage or disengage in the metaphoric mapping, and a polarization effect for moral political cognition was found. Future investigation could investigate whether a framing of the nation in terms of the source domain FAMILY versus other source domains, such as CONTAINER, VEHICLE, or PERSON, implies unique framing effects for moral political reasoning.

Finally, while Study 3 suggests that the NATION AS FAMILY mapping is "latently" present in people's mind and structures political cognition in the absence of metaphoric priming, the implicit nature of the metaphor could be further investigated. For example, in replicating Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011), one could present people with a framing of national politics either in terms of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor or in literal terms, and, if framing effects occur, ask participants to identify the basis of their political attitudes.

3.2. Source and target domain characteristics and (political) cognition

In Chapter 3 above, a number of theoretical postulations were made with regard to target and source domain characteristics. For example, it was pointed out that a more rig-

orous distinction between *concrete-concrete* and *concrete-abstract* mappings can help better understand the relevance and impact of metaphoric reasoning. Then, the notion of *basic-level* source domains and semantic specificity was introduced (*low-level* and *higher-level* source domains). Finally, it was argued, in line with others (e.g., Bougher, 2012; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Sweetser, 2004), that structural parallelism between source and target domain may bear important consequences for metaphor selection and potency.

These theoretical postulations are supported by observations of real world linguistic data (as laid out in the above discussions), and the predictions about effects associated with basic-level source domains on (political) metaphoric cognition are backed up by findings in cognitive science research (e.g., Berlin & Kay, 1969; Berlin et al., 1974; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1977, 1978; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978).

However, the relevance of those postulations for metaphor selection and potency ought to be empirically tested with regard to (moral) political cognition and beyond.

3.2.1. Concrete-concrete and concrete-abstract mappings

While there is some empirical evidence that *concrete-concrete* mappings lead to metaphoric priming effects (e.g., Williams & Bargh, 2008, 2010), by far the largest number of studies on metaphoric cognition report priming or framing effects for *concrete-abstract* mappings (e.g., Casasanto, 2008; Crawford et al., 2006; Jostmann et al., 2009; Landau et al., 2009; Meier et al., 2007; Moeller et al., 2008; Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; Schubert, 2005; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011, and many more). This imbalance may, of course, be due to the fact that *concrete-abstract* mappings potentially outnumber *concrete-concrete* mappings (a possibility that has to date not been investigated). More crucially, it may be due to the fact that researchers commonly do not distinguish between the two mapping types, and have not been concerned with the question of whether they imply different cognitive bearings. Obvious questions for future research thus include whether *concrete-abstract* mappings lead to stronger priming effects than *concrete-concrete* mappings and whether they pose different neural mechanisms.

3.2.2. Basic-level source domains

The distinction between basic-level source domains and source domains that do not lie at the basic level of cognition leads to a number of predictions. Metaphoric mappings that imply basic-level source domains should be processed faster, and should also be the easiest to recognize and remember (e.g., Brown, 1958; Mervis & Rosch, 1981). Furthermore, they should provide clear mental imagery and be strongly embedded in neural motor-programs (e.g., Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). Moreover, they should represent concepts that are learned earliest in life and thus be intimately familiar to people. Finally, metaphors that imply basic-level source domains should make up the metaphoric inventory that organizes most of our knowledge, and they should bear important social functions and be culturally highly significant (e.g., Stross, 1973 and Berlin & Kay, 1969, respectively).¹⁰

¹⁰ My discussion centers on source domain characteristics. However, in the case of *concrete-concrete* mappings, target domains may also constitute basic-level categories. For example, the metaphor PERSON AS FLOWER implies a basic-level source and target domain. Further interesting questions thus include whether

In short, if “the basic level is the level at which we interact optimally in the world with our bodies” (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005, p. 466), then basic-level source domains should be “optimal” source domains for political as well as other cognition.

To date, we do not know whether any of these predictions hold true. But these predictions are important ones, both for political cognition (and discourse) and other domains of cognition. They infer a number of interesting research questions. For example, in public political discourse, are basic-level source domains used more often than source domains above or below the basic level? Do they bear stronger impacts on cognition, such as stronger metaphoric priming and framing effects? And do we have to pose special neural mechanisms in relation to basic-level source domains that make them distinguishable from other source domains with regard to their neural architecture?

3.2.3. Semantic specificity and structural parallelism

Metaphoric source domains can vary in their degree of semantic specificity: low-level source domains are semantically well specified, and higher-level source domains are semantically underspecified, leaving plenty of room for semantic contestation (Wehling, 2012a). Furthermore, metaphors may differ in their degree of structural parallelism between source and target domain (Wehling, 2012a; see also Bougher, 2012; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Gentner, 2003; Sweetser, 2004). A number of important questions arise with regard to source domain specificity and structural parallelism. For example, are low-level mappings used more frequently in political discourse, and do they produce stronger metaphoric priming and framing effects than higher-level mappings? For instance, is the low-level IMMORALITY AS CANCER mapping a more effective means of framing national political opposition than its higher-level relative IMMORALITY AS DISEASE, as the source domain specifies the physical threat as within the body (and, thus, the moral threat as within the nation)? Analogously, is the low-level IMMORALTY AS VIRUS mapping a more effective means of construing immigrants as a threat than its higher-level relative IMMORALITY AS DISEASE, as the source domain specifies the physical threat as outside the body (and, thus, the moral threat as outside the nation)?

On the other hand, can low-level mappings compromise the potency of metaphoric mappings when they are matched with target domains that bear little structural parallelism, leaving higher-level mappings the better choice, since their semantic underspecification leaves room for contestations in line with the target domain’s structure? In other words, is it better to have a mapping that is underspecified than one that specifies a source domain in terms not (entirely) compatible with target domain structure?

Finally, does a high degree of structural parallelism make political metaphors more potent, leading to stronger priming and framing effects on people’s cognition?

3.3. A moral metaphor advantage for conservatism?

metaphors that imply basic-level categories at both ends of the mapping hold a special status with regard to the predictions laid out in this section.

While this is outside of the scope of the current investigation, it should be noted that some of the predictions about metaphor selection and potency postulated in Chapter 3 might lead to what would best be labeled a “conservative moral metaphor advantage”.

Metaphoric construals of morality generally evolve around the experience of physical and emotional well-being: things that foster well-being are good, thus moral, while things that threaten well-being are bad, thus immoral. Accordingly, moral threats are metaphorically understood as threats to physical well-being (Lakoff, 1996, p. 41). Importantly, then, our most basic inventory of morality metaphors is derived from direct, physical experiences in the world.

Consequently, moral concerns are most effectively construed in terms of physical concerns. When it comes to reasoning about national politics, concerns with physical well-being as a metaphoric source domain for morality are mapped onto the nation via the NATION AS BODY metaphor. This implies that the most potent metaphoric construals of national morality should be those that draw from physical concerns. Surprisingly, while the relevance of directly embodied morality metaphors for political cognition has been noted (Lakoff, 1996, 2008), there are to date no experimental investigations into the role that (divergent) directly embodied morality metaphors play for political attitudes.

As Lakoff (1996) observes, the strict-father and nurturant-parent models profile different morality metaphors. For example, morality metaphors at the core of the nurturant-parent model include MORALITY AS NURTURANCE and MORALITY AS EMPATHY, while morality metaphors at the core of the strict-father model include MORALITY AS UPRIGHTNESS, MORALITY AS A STRAIGHT PATH, MORALITY AS PURITY, and IMMORALITY AS CONTAGIOUS DISEASE. Thus, while both moral worldviews equally make use of the NATION AS FAMILY mapping, they emphasize divergent morality metaphors.

However, some of the morality metaphors at the core of the two models differ from each other with regard to one important aspect. While they all may be derived from direct experience with physical and emotional well-being, many of the metaphors emphasized in the strict-father model are linguistically highly productive and very common; the same does not hold for most of the morality metaphors emphasized in the nurturant-parent model.

For example, the nurturant-parent mappings MORALITY AS NURTURANCE and MORALITY AS EMPATHY may structure moral reasoning, but they do not constitute linguistic metaphors. We simply do not call someone a *nurturant* or *empathic* person to denote morality (although both traits, of course, can lead to judgments about one’s morality). In contrast, the mappings MORALITY AS UPRIGHTNESS, MORALITY AS A STRAIGHT PATH, MORALITY AS PURITY, and IMMORALITY AS CONTAGIOUS DISEASE are well-established linguistic metaphors. For example, an “*upright* person” metaphorically means a moral person (the MORALITY AS UPRIGHTNESS mapping); similarly, “*deviating from one’s path*” signifies moral transgressions (the MORALITY AS A STRAIGHT PATH mapping); furthermore, if we speak of “*dirty* thoughts” or someone’s “*filthy* character”, we linguistically resort to the source domain ‘purity’ to denote immorality (the MORALITY AS PURITY mapping); finally, in saying that someone’s immoral behavior “*infects*” others we linguistically construe immorality as a contagious disease (the IMMORALITY AS CONTAGIOUS DISEASE mapping). In sum, many of the metaphors that Lakoff (1996) proposes to lay at the core of strict-father morality are linguistically highly productive

and common, while most of the morality metaphors at the core of nurturant-parent morality are *not* evident in language.

Their omnipresence in everyday language may make the morality metaphors that are emphasized in the strict-father model more powerful. While metaphors do not have to be linguistically evident in order to structure thought and behavior (e.g., Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto & Jasmin, 2010; Nuñez & Sweetser, 2006), metaphors that are commonly used in language may be easier to access and remember, easier to talk and reason about, and, importantly, easier to implement in public discourse and thus regularly reinforced in people's minds. No research has been conducted yet to test whether those predictions hold true. But it would not be surprising if one were to find that metaphors that structure not just thought but also language exert a stronger influence on cognition than metaphors that are not linguistically expressed.

Two things follow from this: First, some of the morality metaphors at the core of strict-father morality may be cognitively more potent (for the reasons outlined above); second, they should be easier to implement in public political discourse, as politicians and citizens share a linguistic register for those metaphors.

While the cognitive bearings of morality metaphors at the core of the nurturant-parent model have not been experimentally tested, there is evidence that some of the most prominent morality metaphors in the strict-father model exert an extremely strong influence on cognition.

Consider the MORALITY AS PURITY and IMMORALITY AS CONTAGIOUS DISEASE mappings as an example. Morality is commonly construed in terms of purity and health. As Lakoff (1996) puts it, “[b]ecause it is better to be healthy than sick, it is no surprise to see morality conceptualized in terms of health and attendant concepts like cleanliness and purity” (p. 43). Thus, the two metaphoric mappings are not just linguistically well established; they also directly relate to sensory-motor experiences and constitute an important part of embodied social cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Niedenthal et al., 2005 for a review).

An ever-growing body of empirical research shows the two source domains' relevance for moral reasoning (e.g., Cannon, Robert, Schnall, & White, 2011; Eskine, Kaciniak, & Prinz, 2011; Lee & Schwarz, 2010, 2011; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008a; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008b; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). For example, physical cleansing counteracts the feeling of guilt after moral transgressions (Lee & Schwarz, 2011; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), and moral transgressions, conversely, lead to a need for physical cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Similarly, feelings of disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments (Schnall et al., 2008b; but see Schnall et al., 2008a), including moral judgments of morally contested social issues such as abortion and pornography (Zhong et al., 2010). As for embodiment, Eskine et al. (2011) found that physical disgust can increase moral disgust: a bad taste in the mouth leads to significantly harsher judgments of moral transgressions. Relatedly, Lee and Schwarz (2010) found that the effect of the MORALITY AS PURITY metaphor is sensitive to motor-modality. Moral transgressions performed with one's hands (e.g., conveying a malevolent lie via email) lead to a desire for hand sanitizers, while moral transgressions performed with one's mouth (e.g., conveying a malevolent lie via voicemail) lead to a desire for mouthwash. In short, people desire physical purification of their “dirty” body part, that is, the body part involved in moral

transgression. Finally, Cannon et al. (2011) found that judgment of purity violations is accompanied by facial muscle activity relating to disgust, and that the intensity of facial affect predicts moral judgment of purity violations.

In sum, the domains *purity* and *contagion* generally are prime source domains for metaphoric moral reasoning. And they are stressed in strict-father, but not nurturant-parent morality (Lakoff, 1996).

The importance of purity and contagion concerns for conservatism (Lakoff, 1996) is backed up by a growing body of empirical research on psychological traits associated with conservatism. For instance, conservatives are both highly concerned with purity and easily disgusted (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010; see Jost et al., 2009 for a review). Furthermore, invoking concepts of impurity and disease can lead to conservative political attitudes (Heltzer & Pizarro, 2011; Landau et al., 2009), and moral issue framings in terms of purity can affect conservatives, while leaving liberals unaffected (Feinberg & Willer, 2012). Finally, the influence of physical disgust on moral disgust is especially strong among conservatives (Eskine et al., 2011).

Given the omnipresence of the MORALITY AS PURITY and IMMORALITY AS CONTAGIOUS DISEASE mappings in public conservative discourse (Lakoff, 1996), and given what we know about their impact on moral cognition, and especially conservative moral cognition, it is conceivable that the two mappings – as well as other morality metaphors at the core of the strict-father model which are similarly well entrenched in language – in fact put conservatives at a moral metaphor advantage.

Thus, while both conservatives and liberals implement the NATION AS FAMILY mapping in their reasoning and discourse, and while their moral contestations of the family domain are equally easy to cognize about and communicate, conservatives might be at an advantage when it comes to some of the metaphoric details of their moral worldview.

3.4. Moral alignment

As discussed in Chapter 3 above, people apply the FAMILY source domain not just to national politics but also to a range of other social institutions, including, for example, their schools and universities, workplaces, religious communities, and sports teams (Lakoff, 1996). Since the FAMILY source domain is used across social contexts, moral contestations of family life in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent values can determine moral outlooks with regard to not just politics (Lakoff, 1996), but also other governing institutions (see Jensen, 2009 and Swift, 2009 for initial empirical support; see Ellison & Sherkat, 1993, Ellison et al., 1996 and Lienesch, 1991 for related findings).

In short, if a number of different social institutions are reasoned about in terms of one and the same metaphoric source domain – in this case, FAMILY – then the moral contestation of that source domain should govern attitudes across those domains. This prediction is in contrast to prominent assumptions in current ideology and morality research, which commonly treat moral concerns within different social institutions as completely separate matters (e.g., Barker & Tinnick, 2006; Layman et al., 2007).

An important prediction follows from this: While people that are biconceptual in their moral contestation of ideal family life may implement some divergent values across social domains, people that *exclusively* subscribe to strict-father or nurturant-parent values should more or less *exclusively* use those values across social domains, leading to *moral alignment*.

We simply do not know yet whether this prediction holds. But it points to an interesting and important line of future research.

Chapter 5: Framing effects and moral political cognition

Introduction

Moral Politics Theory holds that issue framings in terms of the strict-father or nurturant-parent model in public discourse should exert a strong influence on people's political reasoning. Such framing effects, however, should occur only among those who share the morality in question. This entails that "open" biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, should be especially malleable in their attitudes, responding to both strict-father and nurturant-parent framings across issues. Studies 5 and 6 were conducted to test these predictions.

However, before turning to the question of *whether* such framing effects occur, it ought to be addressed in some detail *why* we should expect them to occur in the first place. For example, why should we expect people to shift in their attitudes solely due to the language they are exposed to? Would they not simply consciously reason through a given issue at hand and make up their minds based on the "rational" consideration of the facts that are involved? And if linguistic framings in fact strongly influence people's attitudes, should we really expect their moral concerns to play a deciding role for whether or not they will be persuaded by an argument? Finally, why should we expect people to shift across different issues, such as immigration and crime, when addressing their deeply held moral concerns?

This chapter provides answers to the above questions. First, the nature of cognitive frames and evidence for "framing effects" is discussed. To exemplify the strong impact that framing can exert on political cognition, studies are reviewed that show the effect of, e.g., grammatical, metaphoric, and explicit emphasis framing on people's political judgment. After this general introduction, the chapter turns to examine ways in which values and moral concerns can determine whether or not people are open to adapt certain frames. In turning to this subject matter, an issue arises. Namely, past research has not always carefully distinguished between different types of "value-based" frames. For example, there is to date no clean distinction between frames that directly tap into people's moral concerns (such as, e.g., the conservative concern with "purity") and frames that tap into values that are not specific to either conservatism or liberalism (such as, e.g., the general value of "free speech"). To overcome this obstacle, a new typology is proposed, in which "moral frames" are distinguished from three other frame types (generic issue, generic value, and morality-specific attitude frames). Then, special attributes of "moral frames" are discussed and a set of predictions is formulated regarding their impact on political cognition. Two of the formulated hypothesis, namely the *susceptibility* and *generalizability* hypothesis, are discussed in more detail (and they are put to the test in Studies 5 and 6). Past research has neither rigorously distinguished "moral frames" from other frames that "resonate with values" nor explicitly formulated what is labeled here a *susceptibility* or *generalizability* hypothesis. However, there is initial evidence for the special status of "moral frames" and the validity of both the *susceptibility* and *generalizability* hypothesis; this research is reviewed and brought into context with the framework proposed in this chapter.

1. Framing effects

As discussed earlier, self-interest is commonly assumed to govern political attitudes. However, there is plenty of evidence against the self-interest hypothesis (see Sears & Funk, 1991 for a review). Among other things, the self-interest hypothesis assumes that political reasoning is rational – people “rationally” weigh factual costs and benefits of their political actions, and then decide to act in a way that best furthers their self-interest. The idea that reasoning is rational in this traditional sense, however, is highly contested.

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that people commonly do not judge situations based on rational considerations at all (see also Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Rather, their decision making is strongly influenced by how facts are framed.

Frames denote cognitive structures that organize our understanding of the world (e.g., Bateson, 1972; Entman, 1993; Fillmore, 1975, 1976, 1985; Goffman, 1974; Iyengar, 1991; Lakoff, 2004; Minsky, 1974), and they can be used to interpret facts in divergent and even contradictory ways. Based on their framing, people can come to different and even contradicting conclusions about the same facts.

For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) found that people were more likely to support a hypothetical health initiative when it was framed as a chance of saving lives, and more likely to oppose it when framed as minimizing the risk of losing lives. Similarly, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that consumers were more likely to purchase insurance packages when they were framed as an *elimination* of certain risks (e.g., fire damage), and less likely to do so if the same packages were framed as an overall risk *minimization*. Furthermore, they found that consumers were more likely to view credit card fees positively when the matter was framed as a *cash discount* (a discount that applied when credit cards were not being used), not a *credit card fee* (a fee that applied when credit cards were being used). In short, when the same facts are presented within different frames, the frames – and not the facts – determine people’s attitudes.

Such findings pose a serious problem to the rationality hypothesis for political reasoning. It simply does not seem to hold true that people evaluate political issues based on program details, facts and numbers, to come to a “rational” decision about what best furthers their individual or shared interests.

While one may be tempted to assume that people who are politically less knowledgeable are especially susceptible to framing effects, and that a high degree of political knowledge acts as an antidote to such effects, this is not true at all. As a matter of fact, studies suggest that people who are more knowledgeable in political matters are *more* vulnerable to framing effects than those less knowledgeable (e.g., Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997a; see Druckman & Nelson, 2003 for analogous analyses and a discussion of incompatible findings).

2. Frames in cognition and communication

Before going into detail about different types of framing effects and their role for political moral cognition, it will be helpful to further clarify the concept of framing.

Frames are, first and foremost, a matter of thought. They denote cognitive structures

that organize world knowledge (e.g., Bateson, 1972; Fillmore, 1975, 1976, 1985; Goffman, 1974), and one and the same fact or situation can regularly be interpreted in terms of divergent cognitive frames. Frames encompass single entities and organizational structures among those entities. For example, the word “child” evokes a frame that also implies entities such as “mother” and “father”, as well as relational structures among them, such as biological, genetic, and social relationships. In short, Cognitive frames lend meaning to concepts. Whenever we process ideas, whether invoked linguistically or otherwise, frames are activated in our minds that give the ideas meaning.

Political cognition strongly relies on cognitive frames (e.g., Iyengar, 1991; Lakoff, 1996, 2004, 2008; Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). For example, Lau and Schlesinger (2005) found that American voters implement different cognitive frames to reason about issues such as health care, programs for the poor, and public education. They also found that those frames significantly influence voters’ stances on each issue, even when controlling for other factors such as demographics and self-interest (p.105). As the authors conclude, “Cognitive frames [...] appear to play a major role in shaping public opinion about different policies” (p. 101).

However, frames that structure cognition ought to be distinguished from frames in language. In drawing a distinction between cognitive and linguistic frames, scholars have in the past resorted to different labels. For example, Kinder and Sanders (1990) draw a line between frames that are “embedded in political discourse” and those that are “internal structures of the mind”; Druckman (2001b) distinguishes “frames in communication” from “frames in thought”; and Borah (2011) differentiates “sociological framing” (i.e., frames in communication) from “psychological framing” (i.e., frames in cognition).

Linguistic frames can express cognitive frames, and thus the study of language can provide valuable insight into reasoning processes, including the conceptualization of political morality (e.g., Cienki, 2005b; Deason & Gonzales, 2012; Haidt et al., 2010; Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008; McAdams, et al. 2008).

Moreover, linguistic frames always evoke cognitive frames, and the use of frames in communication can determine addressees’ perceptions of political issues. For example, Entman (1993) writes that frames “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52). Similarly, Iyengar (1991) states that, “The concept of [linguistic] framing refers to subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment and choice problems” (p. 11).

Linguistic frames in public political debate can lead to enormous differences in how citizens perceive issues. For example, if a politician speaks of a public “*free* education”, he or she evokes an economic-transaction frame in which government and citizens constitute different entities, education is a purchasable good, and citizens that attend public schools receive goods from a service provider – the government – without payment, thus “for free”. If the same politician speaks of a public “*publicly-financed* education”, he or she evokes a frame in which government and citizen do not constitute separate entities, but where citizens collectively organize and finance education for themselves and others through government.

Linguistic frames, whether put forth by citizens, the media, or the political elite, evoke conceptual frames in people’s minds and can determine political cognition (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007 for a discussion), and even the most subtle changes in wording can lead to information processing biases among people (e.g., Fausey & Matlock, 2011;

Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011).

3. Equivalency versus emphasis framing

Druckman (2001b) makes an important point when he distinguishes two types of framing: equivalency and emphasis framing. Equivalency framing has to do with “how the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases [...] causes individuals to alter their preferences” (p. 228). Emphasis framing, on the other hand, shows that “by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker can lead individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (p. 230) (see also Borah, 2011; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001a, 2004).

Equivalency framing, thus, denotes the usage of different but logically identical concepts to communicate facts. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1979) found that consumers favor products framed as 97% fat-free over those framed as containing 3% fat. Similarly, patients are significantly more likely to agree to a surgery when its outcome is framed as a 90% survival chance, and less likely to do so when it is framed as a 10% death risk (see Kahneman, 1991 for a discussion). In both cases, identical facts are framed in logically equivalent ways, while the different framings lend utterly different meanings to the facts.

Emphasis framing, in contrast, introduces larger sets of different considerations that can be relevant to an issue. For example, environmental protection can be framed as a matter of purity concerns or a matter of responsibility concerns (Feinberg & Willer, 2012), and a housing development project may be framed as a matter of environmental protection or economic growth (Nelson & Oxley, 1999). In such cases, divergent framings invite the addressee to consider different perspectives that may be relevant to the issue.

Emphasis framings are highly common in political discourse, and they have been found to significantly influence political cognition with regard to issues such as taxation (Lakoff, 2010), crime (Iyengar, 1991; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011), the environment (Feinberg & Willer, 2012), terrorism (Iyengar, 1991), military spending (Feinberg & Willer, unpublished manuscript), same sex marriage (Feinberg & Willer, unpublished manuscript), health care (Feinberg & Willer, unpublished manuscript), affirmative action and racial inequality (Kinder & Sanders, 1990 and Iyengar, 1991, respectively), housing developments (Nelson & Oxley, 1999), unemployment (Iyengar, 1991), welfare (Rasinski, 1989), and poverty (Iyengar, 1990, 1991; Nelson et al., 1997a).

3.1. Political cognition and types of emphasis framing

The reasoning processes that framing addressees undergo must be by no means conscious. That is, people do not necessarily consciously “ponder” an introduced frame in order to base their political attitudes on it. In fact, frames regularly remain entirely undetected by those who use them, even though frames may be significantly influencing their attitudes (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Lakoff, 2008; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). For example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that framing crime in terms of a viral disease or a beast led to significant

framing effects, even though participants were not at all conscious about the fact that their attitudes depended on the framings they had been presented with.

While framing effects commonly remain unconscious, it may be helpful to distinguish between highly covert and more overt types of linguistic emphasis framing. For example, grammatical and metaphoric emphasis framing are highly covert means of invoking divergent interpretative structures in people's minds, but some forms of linguistic emphasis framing are more explicit, and more accessible to deliberate reflection.

3.1.1. Grammatical emphasis framing

Grammatical emphasis framing can exert a strong influence on political cognition. For example, Fausey and Matlock (2011) found that people's evaluation of political candidates differed based on whether past moral digressions were framed in simple past or past progressive tense. Framing moral digressions in simple past tense, as in "Last year, Mark *had* an affair with his assistant and *took* money from a prominent constituent," led people to view political candidates more favorably. Framing the same digressions in past progressive tense, as in "Last year, Mark *was having* an affair with his assistant and *was taking* money from a prominent constituent," led to harsher moral judgment. The authors concluded that the grammatical simple past tense led participants to infer that the moral digressions lay in the past, while the past progressive tense led them to infer that such digressions might be ongoing. While the grammatical framing exerted a strong influence on participants' reasoning about candidates, it seems safe to argue that they were by no means conscious of the fact that their attitudes were based on grammatical details of the sentences they had read. Similarly, and much in line with Fausey and Matlock's (2011) findings, past research found that syntactic framing, such as word order, also results in framing effects (e.g., Zaller, 1992).

3.1.2. Metaphoric emphasis framing

Metaphoric emphasis framing can also be a strong determiner of political cognition. For example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that divergent metaphoric framings of crime led to different attitudes toward crime policy. While framing crime in terms of the CRIME AS BEAST metaphor resulted in stronger support for harsh crime enforcement, a framing of the issue in terms of the CRIME AS VIRUS metaphor resulted in stronger support for preventive policies.¹¹ Correspondingly, Landau et al. (2009) found that disease reminders increased anti-immigration attitudes among participants when the nation was framed in terms of a NATION AS PERSON metaphor as opposed to literal terms. That is, once the nation was metaphorically framed as a human body, people mapped the notion of viral disease onto immigration, and thus the matter of immigration became a matter of protecting the (nation) body against disease.

Importantly, metaphoric framing of political issues, and a subsequent bias in message processing, can be accomplished by altering no more than a single word (e.g., Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). Furthermore, while subtle changes in metaphoric wording exert a

¹¹ The authors found framing effects across the political spectrum. However, self-identified Republicans were slightly less susceptible to framing effects (49% metaphor congruency) than Independents or Democrats (63% metaphor congruency) (p. 10). The authors attribute this difference to a higher degree of openness among liberals.

strong influence on political attitudes, this effect remains undetected by people. For example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) explicitly tested for metaphor consciousness among participants. They exposed participants to a framing of the issue crime in terms of the CRIME AS BEAST or the CRIME AS VIRUS metaphor and then asked participants who had been susceptible to framing effects to indicate the basis of their policy attitudes. Participants across the two metaphor conditions pointed to the statistics and facts presented in the texts they had read (and those facts were identical across conditions); none of the participants pointed to the CRIME AS BEAST or CRIME AS VIRUS metaphor as having influenced his or her attitude. Moreover, participants did not resort to the two metaphoric mappings in their subsequent discussion of their attitudes (a finding that contrasts with Brewer, 2002 and Brewer & Gross, 2005, who found that certain types of framing *can* result in linguistic adaptation of conceptual frames; see Section 5).

3.1.3. Explicit emphasis framing

While grammatical and metaphoric framings can be extremely subtle, other forms of emphasis framing are somewhat more overt. For example, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997b) showed that support for a Ku Klux Klan rally significantly depended on how the issue was framed. When framed as a matter of free speech, people were more likely to support the Ku Klux Klan's right to rally, and when framed as a matter of public order, they were significantly more likely to oppose it (see Sniderman & Theriault, 2004 for analogous findings). However, in this study, the issue was rather overtly framed as a matter of public safety or free speech – via exposure to different television news or text passages. In an analogous investigation, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) had participants read a text that laid out some facts about a rally planned by the Ku Klux Klan and then fill out an attitude questionnaire. In the introduction to the questionnaire, participants were encouraged to consider either the importance of free speech or the risk of public disorder. The authors found framing effects in line with those reported by Nelson et al. (1997b). The free speech framing led to 85% support, and the risk of public disorder framing led to only 45% support for the hate group's right to rally. Again, the divergent frames were introduced somewhat overtly: participants were explicitly encouraged to consider one of the two concerns as they judged the issue.

Thus, while frames on the whole frequently remain undetected by those who use them (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Lakoff 2008; Levin et al., 1998), some issue framings seem to be more overt than others. Simply put: while it is possible, and sometimes even likely, that individuals recognize it when they reason about, say, of a hate groups' right to rally, as a matter of free speech, it is much less likely for those individuals to recognize it when they base their political judgments on, say, word order, tense, or single metaphoric expressions.

4. Framing and morality

Many scholars have observed that frames in political discourse commonly imply moral evaluations of issues and resonate with larger belief-systems and values (e.g., Entman, 1993; Kuypers, 2009; Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008; Nelson et al., 1997b; Scheufele, 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986).

In public political debate, citizens are commonly exposed to more than one framing of an issue (e.g., Lakoff, 2004; Sniderman & Theriault, 1999). When faced with competing frames, people tend to adapt frames that are in line with their values and moral principles (Brewer, 2001, 2003; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001b; Lakoff, 1996, 2004, 2006a; Nelson & Garst, 2005; Shen & Edwards, 2005; Sniderman & Theriault, 1999, 2004).

For example, in his discussion of the limits of framing effects, Druckman (2001b) notes that individual predispositions such as values can enhance or hinder framing effects, and that frames in line with prior-held values result in stronger framing effects than those which contradict them (see also Brewer, 2001, 2003; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Nelson & Garst, 2005). Accordingly, Shen and Edwards (2005) found that framing welfare in terms of strict work requirements was more persuasive to people with individualistic values than those with humanitarian values; likewise, framing the issue in terms of public assistance was more persuasive to individuals with humanitarian values than individualistic values. Similarly, Barker (2005) found that in the absence of other cues Republican voters evaluated candidates framed in terms of egalitarian values less favorably than candidates who were framed in terms of individualistic values. Finally, Nelson and Garst (2005) found that individualistic and egalitarian values served as a persuasive cue in the absence of message scrutiny.

Moreover, attitude strength can determine whether and to what extent people are susceptible to framing effects. As Chong and Druckman (2007) observe, people who hold strong attitudes are less susceptible to new information and more likely to recognize information consistent with their prior beliefs. Furthermore, they are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning, that is, to process incoming information as in line with their prior-held beliefs. In line with those observations, Judd and Krosnick (1982) found that extreme attitudes are harder to change than less extreme ones.

In sum, people respond exceptionally well to frames in line with their values, and they are less likely to be persuaded by a frame that contradicts those values, especially when their attitudes toward an issue are well established. As Sniderman and Theriault (1999) note, “when citizens can hear the clash of political argument, the positions they take on specific issues are markedly more likely to be grounded in their underlying principles” (p. 26).

Furthermore, value-based frames can affect the scrutiny of message processing and result in the adaptation of values in language. For example, Nelson and Garst (2005) found that people considered messages more carefully and thoroughly when the issues were framed in terms of values they shared, such as egalitarian or individualistic values. And as for language adaptation, Brewer (2002) and Brewer and Gross (2005) found that people adapted values implemented in frames in subsequent issue discussions. For example, Brewer (2002) showed that framings of gay rights as either a matter of equal protection or a threat to traditional morality significantly influenced participants’ subsequent language use. Participants who were exposed to the equality framing explained their positions in terms of equality (regardless of whether they argued for or against gay rights); likewise, participants who were exposed to the traditional morality framing subsequently discussed the issue in terms of traditional morality (again, regardless of whether they supported or opposed gay rights). As Brewer (2002) concludes, “exposure to frames invoking equality and morality led people to explain their views in terms of these values”

(p. 310). Correspondingly, Brewer and Gross (2005) found that arguing for or against school vouchers in terms of an equality frame led participants to adapt that value in their subsequent discussion of the issue, regardless of their position on the issue. Value-based framing may thus bring values to the fore of people's reasoning *and* discourse.

In sum, then, prior-held values can influence whether or not people adapt frames, how carefully they consider messages, and how they talk about political issues. Furthermore, the stronger and more exclusively people endorse certain attitudes, the less likely they are to be persuaded by frames that oppose them.

Although the significance of values for the framing of political issues has been observed, past research has used the notion of "values" very generously.

For example, the general framing literature draws no rigorous distinction between values that are specific to a certain moral belief system (e.g., conservatism or liberalism), and values that are *not* specific to a certain moral belief system, such as "free speech". Furthermore, values that are specific to a moral belief system, and constitute deeply held moral concerns, have not been distinguished from social or political attitudes that are *based* on those concerns. In short, framing research in the past has subsumed a range of distinguishable phenomena under the label "values".

This research proposes a finer-grained view of framing types with regard to political values and morality. Two things are proposed: First, value-based frames should be clearly distinguished from *generic issue frames*, which may resonate with people's values and activate them in their minds but do not directly address them. Second, value-based frames can be divided into three types: *generic value frames*, *morality-specific attitude frames*, and *moral frames*.

To be more specific: First, while frames regularly include values and moral interpretations of issues (e.g., Entman, 1993; Kuypers, 2009; Lakoff, 1996; Nelson et al., 1997b; Scheufele, 2000; Snow et al., 1986), some frames do not directly address values at all (*generic issue frames*). Second, some frames draw on values that are not specific to conservative or liberal morality, such as, say, "free speech" or "public order" (*generic value frames*). Other frames invoke moral attitudes that *follow* from conservative or liberal morality, but do not constitute deeply held moral concerns per se, such as, say, "support for public provisions" or "opposition to immigration" (*morality-specific attitude frames*). Finally, some frames directly tap into moral concerns that are specific to either conservative or liberal morality, such as "purity" and "punishment" or "empathy" and "open communication" (*moral frames*).

4.1. Generic issue frames

The term *generic issue frames* will be used to denote frames that do not directly address specific values. A good example of this might be the framing of the US-American anti-terrorism efforts after 9/11 in terms of warfare – the so-called "War on Terror" (Lakoff, 2004; Zhang, 2007). While the framing *fit* with an overall conservative agenda and catered to conservative values, it did not overtly address any values. Other examples include the framing of a hypothetical housing development as a matter of either environmental protection or economic growth (Nelson & Oxley, 1999); and some of the cases discussed above, such as the framing of crime in terms of the CRIME AS BEAST or CRIME AS VIRUS metaphor (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011) and the framing of the nation in

terms of the NATION AS BODY metaphor (Landau et al., 2009).

Again, generic issue frames may, of course, invoke certain values in people's minds and be partial to certain policies. For example, the "War on Terror" framing of anti-terrorism efforts clearly favored conservative domestic and foreign policies. Importantly, though, generic issue frames do not overtly address specific values.

4.2. Generic value frames

The term *generic value frames* will be used to denote frames that draw on social or political values that are *not* specific to larger moral belief systems, such as conservative or liberal morality. Rather, they draw on values that can be embraced by conservatives and liberals alike. A good example of this type of framing comes from Nelson et al.'s (1997b) investigation of framing effects with regard to hate groups. The authors found that framing a hate group's right to rally in terms of "free speech" or "public safety" led to framing effects, which in part depended on people's prior-held values (see Sniderman & Theriault, 2004 for analogous findings).

While "free speech" and "public safety" constitute general socio-political values that people can embrace to different extents, they do not constitute values that are specific to either conservative or liberal morality. Conservatives and liberals equally value free speech and public safety, although they may contest the two notions very differently, apply them to different issue areas, and hold different views on what policies best protect both. While generic value frames, thus, directly address certain values these values do not represent moral concerns that are specific to conservative or liberal morality.

4.3. Morality-specific attitude frames

The term *morality-specific attitude frames* will be used to denote frames that address social or political attitudes *derived* from a specific morality. Such attitudes can, for example, include racial or religious intolerance, moral attitudes toward government regulation, worker rights, health care, and so on.

Nelson et al. (1997a) found that susceptibility to favorable and non-favorable framings of welfare depended on people's moral attitudes toward the issue. People that held attitudes such as "people on welfare are mostly lazy" or "welfare destroys the motivation to work" were less open to favorable framings of the issue. On the other hand, people that held attitudes such as "welfare is needed because the bad U.S. economy has put many people out of work" or "welfare provides a necessary second chance for many poor people" were more open to favorable framings of the issue (p. 230).

While the two sets of attitudes do not *constitute* deeply held moral beliefs that are specific to conservative or liberal morality, they can be *traced back* to such beliefs. For instance, the attitude that "people on welfare are mostly lazy" fits with the strict-father value *moral self-discipline*, and the attitude that "welfare destroys the motivation to work" fits with *immoral unconditional nurturance*. Likewise, the attitude that "welfare is needed because the bad U.S. economy has put many people out of work" fits with the nurturant-parent value *systemic causation*, and the attitude that "most people on welfare truly need the help because they [...] can't find decent work" fits with *moral empathy*.

Another example of morality-specific attitude frames comes from Shen and Edwards'

(2005) investigation of welfare frames. The authors framed welfare in terms of “strict work requirements” or “public assistance”, and found that people who embraced individualistic moral concerns responded more strongly to the former, while those with humanitarian concerns responded more strongly to the latter framing. While Shen and Edwards (2005) used deeply held moral concerns as a predictor of frame susceptibility, the framings they offered to participants did *not* directly implement such concerns. In other words, while an attitude that favors “strict work requirements” may be traced back to the strict-father value *moral rule enforcement*, and a positive attitude toward “public assistance” may be traced back to the nurturant-parent value *moral nurturance*, the two linguistic frames did not constitute such concerns per se.

In sum, while morality-specific attitude frames address positions that are derived from deeply held moral concerns, they do not directly implement those concerns.

4.4. Moral frames

The term *moral frames* will be used to denote frames that draw on moral concerns that are *specific* to a moral worldview and distinguish that worldview from others. Thus, moral frames can tap directly, and exclusively, into either conservative or liberal morality.

Feinberg and Willer (2012) found that a framing of environmental concerns in terms of purity (a conservative moral concern: e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Lakoff, 1996) strongly affected conservative participants, while framing the same issue in terms of social responsibility (a liberal moral concern: e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Lakoff, 1996) did not have the same effect. Importantly, purity and social responsibility are deeply held moral concerns that distinguish conservative from liberal morality, and they can motivate a range of morality-specific attitudes. For example, the conservative moral concern with purity can motivate attitudes such as opposition to pre-marital sex, opposition to sex education, or racial intolerance. Other examples of moral frames include the framing of gay rights in terms of equality or traditional morality (Brewer, 2001, 2003), and the framing of issues or candidates in terms of egalitarian or individualistic values (Nelson & Garst, 2005 and Barker, 2005, respectively).

Moral frames, in sum, directly address deeply held moral concerns that are specific to a larger moral belief system, such as conservatism or liberalism.

4.5. Moral frames and framing effects

When it comes to political framing, three important questions arise: First, who is susceptible to a given frame? Second, can a given frame be generalized across a wide range of issues, even if those issues seem unrelated at first sight? And, third, how likely is it that people who are susceptible to a frame detect its content as the source of their political judgment? Below, those three aspects will be discussed with regard to the four framing types.

In doing so, a major concern is to draw attention to the special status of *moral frames*. Specifically, three observations will be made. First, moral frames lead to morality-dependent framing effects, that is, only people who endorse a given morality are susceptible to them. Second, they are highly generalizable and can be implemented across many and seemingly unrelated political issues. And, third, they may be especially hard to detect

by those who are affected by them, due to the highly implicit nature of moral political cognition.

4.5.1. Susceptibility

Neither *generic issue* nor *generic value frames* draw on values that are specific to a given political morality. Conservatives and liberals may thus be equally open to engaging such frames.

The same does not hold true for *morality-specific attitude* and *moral frames*. People's susceptibility to both frame types depends on whether they endorse conservative or liberal morality. Frames that address conservative moral concerns, or attitudes derived from them, should *only* affect those who embrace conservative morality. Likewise, frames that address liberal moral concerns, or attitudes derived from them, should *only* affect those who endorse a liberal moral worldview.

In short, if a given moral argument does not match an addressee's deeply held moral concerns, it will have little effect on his or her reasoning. Conversely, if a morality-based frame matches a person's deeply held moral concerns, he or she will be highly susceptible to the framing.

In support of this prediction, Feinberg and Willer (2012) showed that moral framings of environmental issues resulted in morality-dependent framing effects. The authors offered two moral framings to people; one framed environmental concerns as a matter of social responsibility (a liberal moral concern), the other as a matter of purity (a conservative moral concern). When confronted with the purity framing, conservatives shifted in their environmental attitudes, showing significantly more concern for environmental issues. Framing environmental issues in terms of social responsibility, on the other hand, led to no such effect among conservatives. Moral frames, thus, in fact only affect individuals who ascribe to a certain moral worldview.

Interestingly, Feinberg and Willer (unpublished manuscript) found that moral frames can persuade conservatives and liberals to embrace positions they traditionally oppose. The authors found that conservatives showed more support for same sex marriage when framed as in-group nurturance (a conservative moral concern: Haidt & Graham, 2007; Lakoff, 1996) and more support for the Affordable Care Act when framed in terms of purity (a conservative moral concern: Haidt & Graham, 2007; Lakoff, 1996). Liberals, on the other hand, were more supportive of high levels of military spending when the issue was framed in terms of reciprocal fairness and equality (a liberal moral concern: Haidt & Graham, 2007). Furthermore, conservatives were more likely to support the reelection of Barack Obama when the matter was framed, e.g., in terms of loyalty toward one's in-group or respect for authority (conservative moral concerns: Haidt & Graham, 2007; Lakoff, 1996). This study is groundbreaking as it shows that moral framing effects are not only limited to people who endorse a given morality, but that such effects can be exceptionally strong, leading people to support programs they would traditionally oppose.

In fact, and in line with the authors' explorations, moral framings may not always lead to framing effects among those whose morality a given framing caters to. Namely, if an individual already strongly endorses a certain issue position, say, pro-environment, as well as a moral concern, say, "social responsibility", one may expect a ceiling effect: the given issue position cannot be any more embraced than is already the case. A moral framing of the issue may simply mean to be "preaching to the choir". In such cases, no fram-

ing effects should be expected to occur.

4.5.2. Generalizability

All four framing types are, of course, generalizable across issues. Generalizability here means that one and the same frame can be used to lend meaning to a range of different political issues.

First, *generic issue frames* are generalizable. For example, economic concerns can be highlighted with regard to housing development (Nelson & Oxley, 1999) and many other issues, such as welfare or taxation. Second, *generic value frames* are generalizable. For instance, the protection of free speech can be emphasized with regard to a hate group's right to rally (Nelson et al., 1997b; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) as well as other issues, such as religious freedom or pornography. Third, *morality-specific attitude frames* are generalizable. For example, the need for public assistance can be profiled with regard to welfare (Shen & Edwards, 2005) as well as, say, care for the elder or food for the poor. And, fourth, *moral frames* are generalizable. For example, purity concerns can be highlighted with respect to environmental issues (Feinberg & Willer, 2012) as well as other issues, such as same sex marriage, abortion, immigration, and health care.

While all four framing types are generalizable across issue domains, one important prediction can be made with regard to differences between the generalizability of *morality-specific attitude* and *moral frames*.

Namely, the latter should be generalizable across a larger set of seemingly unrelated issues. The reason is this: while *morality-specific attitude frames* implement rather specific applications of moral concerns, *moral frames* implement very general moral concerns that govern attitudes across a large set of different, and oftentimes seemingly unrelated, issues. As Lakoff (1996) observes, while conservative and liberal attitudes and issue positions may at first glance seem unrelated, they are bound together via a set of deeply held moral concerns that lie at the core of conservative and liberal morality.

For example, while the *morality-specific attitude frame* "public assistance" may be used to frame different public programs, such as Medicare, welfare, and food programs, the *moral frame* "purity" may be used to frame issues as diverse as pre-marital sex, gay rights, crime, health care, the environment, religious freedom, abortion, and immigration.

Initial support for the wide applicability of moral frames comes from Feinberg and Willer (2012, unpublished manuscript). The authors found that a moral framing of both environmental concerns (Feinberg & Willer, 2012) and health care (Feinberg & Willer, unpublished manuscript) in terms of purity resulted in morality-dependent framing effects. Furthermore, they found that a moral framing of support for Barack Obama and the issue of same sex marriage in terms of in-group loyalty resulted in morality-dependent framing effects (Feinberg & Willer, unpublished manuscript).

In sum, the wide-ranging applicability of moral frames allows politicians to frame a set of seemingly unrelated issues in terms of the same underlying moral principles.

4.5.3. Implicitness

As mentioned earlier, frame adaptation is commonly an implicit process. That is, people do not notice that their political opinions are strongly influenced by frames (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Lakoff, 2008; Levin et al., 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). While there is no doubt that framing effects frequently remain uncon-

scious, there may be reason to believe that *moral frames* hold a special status with regard to implicit political cognition.

It has been observed that deeply held moral concerns are highly implicit (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Lakoff, 1996, 2008; Nosek et al., 2010). For example, Haidt (2001) observes that conservative and liberal attitudes are often grounded in implicit moral judgments – or moral “gut reactions” – rather than conscious reflections on issues. Likewise, Lakoff (1996) proposes that moral political judgments usually remain unconscious, and that implicit metaphoric mappings play a crucial role for conservative and liberal moral cognition. That is, while people resort to idealized family models to make political moral judgments, they rarely do so in a conscious manner. Rather, they implement largely unconscious metaphoric mapping processes (e.g., Casasanto, 2008; Gibbs et al., 1997; Matlock, 2004; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011; Williams & Bargh, 2010; Wilson & Gibbs, 2007; see Boucher, 2012 for a review).

In sum, an ever-growing body of research indicates that the moral concerns behind conservative or liberal moral political judgments remain largely implicit.

Moral frames may thus hold a special status when it comes to long-term and short-term framing effects. Namely, while conservatives and liberals are highly susceptible to frames that address their moral concerns (and can be led to endorse positions they traditionally oppose), the adaptation of *moral frames* should be maximally implicit and minimally open to deliberate reflection. If conservatives and liberals normally do not reflect on the deeply held moral concerns that motivate their political attitudes, they should be more or less “blind” to the fact that *moral frames* addressing those concerns govern their political judgment. The same need not hold true for *morality-specific attitude frames*. For example, people may be able to reflect on the fact that they are not tolerant of other cultures, but they may be much less aware of the fact that this intolerance is motivated by general moral concerns with, e.g., purity or in-group nurturance. Likewise, people may be able to reflect on the fact that they support public programs, but they may be much less aware of the fact that this support is motivated by general moral concerns with, e.g., systemic causation and need-based fairness.

In sum, moral frames may be especially hard to detect by those who are affected by them, due to the highly implicit nature of moral political cognition.

5. Moral frame adaptation criteria

Above, the role of framing for political cognition was discussed. Attention was drawn to the distinction of equivalency and emphasis framing, and some examples for emphasis framing effects on political cognition were introduced, such as grammatical, metaphoric, and explicit emphasis framing effects. Then, the role of values for frame adaptation was discussed, and a new typology of political frames was proposed that distinguishes four frame types: generic issue, generic value, morality-specific attitude, and moral frames. Predictions about susceptibility, generalizability, and implicitness for all four frame types were sketched out, with particular attention to moral frames. *Moral frames* were predicted to be maximally implicit, highly generalizable, and their effects should be systematically restricted to people who endorse the moral concerns they address.

In Studies 5 and 6, three things were accomplished. First, the studies show that moral

frames in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent values can generally result in short-term framing effects. Second, the studies tested the susceptibility hypothesis, showing that people's susceptibility to strict-father and nurturant-parent frames is systematically restricted by the idealized parenting models they endorse. In particular, biconceptuals were found to be susceptible to moral frames in terms of both models, while non-biconceptuals remained unaffected. Third, the studies addressed the generalizability hypothesis, showing that strict-father and nurturant-parent frames result in framing effects across issues as diverse as "crime" and "immigration".

Before entering the discussion of Studies 5 and 6 in Chapter 6, it will be helpful to briefly discuss general mechanisms that underlie frame adaptation, and point to some important predictions they entail for moral framing effects among biconceptuals and non-biconceptuals.

One such selection criterion has been formulated above and may best be labeled *moral relevance*: moral frames must tap into individuals' morality in order to be persuasive to them. But what other factors determine what frames people will use to reason about politics? Chong and Druckman (2007) point to three relevant factors: In order for a frame to be used, it must be available, accessible, and applicable (p. 110). Below, all four criteria are briefly discussed, and their entailments for the adaption of moral frames among biconceptuals and non-biconceptuals will be discussed.

Moral relevance: As laid out above, people are susceptible to moral frames only if the moral concerns addressed in those frames link to their morality (*moral relevance*). While non-biconceptuals exclusively endorse strict-father or nurturant-parent morality, biconceptuals embrace both idealized parenting models. Therefore, while non-biconceptuals should *only* be susceptible to moral frames that align with their morality, biconceptuals should be susceptible to moral frames in terms of *both* models. To be more specific, a moral framing of the issue "crime" in terms of strict-father values should have no effect on people that exclusively endorse nurturant-parent morality; likewise, a framing of this issue in terms of nurturant-parent values should have no effect on people that exclusively endorse strict-father morality. Certain biconceptuals, however, namely "open" biconceptuals, should be susceptible to a moral framing of the issue in terms of either strict-father or nurturant-parent morality. Since moral frames are highly generalizable and can span across a wide range of issues, these predictions should hold true for a number of issues. For example, biconceptuals should be swayed toward conservative positions on *both* the issues "crime" and "immigration" when they are framed in terms of strict-father values, and they should move toward more liberal positions on *both* issues when framed in terms of nurturant-parent values.

Availability: Frame availability simply means that in order to activate a frame, that frame must be generally available in a person's mind. Frames must be retrievable from long-term memory, and they must make up part of an individual's set of beliefs and knowledge (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Importantly, this does not imply that a given framing cannot make new beliefs about an issue available (Chong & Druckman, 2007). For example, some people may in general believe that taxes are a burden, and this belief is easily made available through framing. However, it is also possible for those people to draw from other beliefs. For example, they may also believe that within a community, many things

get accomplished together, and that everyone must contribute to build and maintain a system that benefits all. While they may not normally apply that belief to taxation, they are, in theory, able to do so. However, while it is possible to make new beliefs about issues available through framing, people are most likely to adapt frames that are well entrenched in their conceptual system, commonly used in everyday reasoning, and thus easily retrievable from their long-term memory. In addition, the more strongly and exclusively they engage a certain set of beliefs in their everyday reasoning, the more likely they are to recognize information consistent with those beliefs (Chong & Druckman, 2007), and the less likely they are to endorse new beliefs (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007; Judd & Krosnick, 1982). The availability-criterion implies that non-biconceptuals should give priority to frames that match their general worldview. That is, people who exclusively endorse strict-father or nurturant-parent morality will very readily make accordant beliefs available in their minds, while at the same time having a high threshold for making conflicting beliefs available. On the other hand, biconceptuals, who regularly engage both idealized parenting models in their reasoning, should be equally able to retrieve either strict-father or nurturant-parent beliefs.

Accessibility: Frame accessibility means that frames must be made accessible in order to structure thought. As discussed in Section 2, linguistic framing can make certain beliefs or values accessible in people's minds. The accessibility of frames can depend on the regularity with which they appear in public discourse (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Every time a frame is used in public discourse, that frame becomes more accessible in people's minds (e.g., Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Zaller, 1992), an effect that can be attributed to Hebbian learning (see Lakoff, 2008 for a discussion). The accessibility criterion implies something important for biconceptuals. Namely, biconceptuals have *both* strict-father and nurturant-parent beliefs readily available in their minds. Which set of beliefs they activate in a given situation therefore strongly depends on which set of beliefs is made accessible through the linguistic framing of issues.

Applicability: Frame applicability means that a set of beliefs must be relevant to an issue or situation in order to affect individuals' reasoning. Linguistic framings in public discourse can alter frame applicability over time. Namely, framings that correlate certain values with certain issues can lead people to see those values as especially relevant to the given issue, or to politics in general (e.g., Nelson et al., 1997a, 1997b; Nelson & Oxley, 1999). Linguistic framings in public discourse can affect people's beliefs about *what* values are relevant with regard to what issues, and, more generally, what values are relevant with regard to the political world overall. Moral frames in public discourse may thus encourage non-biconceptuals to consider their moral concerns increasingly relevant for political issues and politics in general. Furthermore, they may lead biconceptuals to consider one of the two parenting models they endorse as more applicable and relevant to the political world.

In sum, the four frame adaptation criteria laid out above lead to the following predictions: Non-biconceptuals should ascribe *moral relevance* only to frames that are aligned with their morality, since they only have one belief set readily *available* in their minds. Moral frames that are aligned with their morality make it *accessible*, and regular exposure to

such frames increases the perceived *relevance* of their moral concerns for politics.

Biconceptuals, on the other hand, should ascribe *moral relevance* to frames that tap into either of the two parenting models, as they have both belief sets readily *available* in their minds. Moral frames that address either morality should make it *accessible*, and regular exposure to strict-father or nurturant-parent frames should influence which belief set they see as more *applicable* to the political world.

This chapter set out to examine the ways in which linguistic framings can influence people's everyday cognition, and, importantly, exert a strong influence on their political reasoning. Evidence for the intimate link between individuals' values and their susceptibility to frames that draw on such values was discussed. In order to be able to better distinguish the many ways in which frames can relate to "values", a typology was introduced that distinguishes between generic issue, generic value, morality-specific attitude, and moral frames. Special attributes of moral frames were lined out and hypotheses with regard to their implicitness, generalizability, and susceptibility were introduced.

Next, Chapter 6 turns to the question of whether moral framings in terms of Moral Politics Theory's strict-father and nurturant-parent model result in framing effects, and whether the susceptibility and generalizability hypotheses hold. Specifically, it is tested whether open biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, are susceptible to framings in terms of both worldviews, and whether this effect occurs across political issues, such as immigration and crime.

Chapter 6: Testing the influence of strict-father and nurturant-parent framings on political reasoning

Introduction

Moral Politics Theory holds that issue framings in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model result in framing effects. Since moral worldviews unify people's positions across issue areas, such framing effects should occur across issues (a *generalizability* hypothesis). However, only those who ascribe to a given morality should be susceptible to issue framings that draw on it (a *susceptibility* hypothesis). The notion of biconceptualism (Lakoff, 2008) allows for the prediction that some people, namely open biconceptuals, should be susceptible to framings in terms of both worldviews.

Studies 5 and 6 were conducted to test these predictions. Participants were exposed to strict-father and nurturant-parent framings of the issues immigration (Study 5) and crime (Study 6). The results of both studies confirm Moral Politics Theory's prediction that strict-father and nurturant-parent framings lead to framing effects. They furthermore confirm the susceptibility and generalizability hypotheses: biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, were significantly affected by the moral framings, and this effect occurred across the two issues.

1. Open questions and present research

Moral Politics Theory holds that moral arguments in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality can exert a strong influence on people's reasoning, such that issue framings in terms of strict-father values result in more support for conservative policies, while issue framings in terms of nurturant-parent morality result in more support for liberal policies (e.g., Lakoff, 1996, 2004, 2008). The theory's major concern is with long-term effects that such framings in public discourse bear on the citizenry's political reasoning. However, it also implies that divergent issue framings should result in short-term framing effects.

Furthermore, Moral Politics Theory found that while some people more or less exclusively endorse strict-father or nurturant-parent morality in their political reasoning, others endorse both parenting models (biconceptuals). Lakoff (1996, 2008) states that biconceptuals are not necessarily open to applying either model to any given set of political issues. Rather, they commonly apply one model to one specific set of issues, and the other to a second specific set of issues. However, it is also conceivable that biconceptuals are open to applying either of the models to any given issue. Such biconceptuals may be thought of as "open" biconceptuals (as opposed to "bound" biconceptuals; see Chapter 1, Section 5). Open biconceptuals should be especially malleable in their political attitudes. In contrast to bound biconceptuals and non-biconceptuals, they should be significantly affected by linguistic framings in terms of *either* strict-father *or* nurturant-parent morality. Furthermore, since moral concerns commonly unify positions toward a number of different issues, biconceptuals should be affected by framings in terms of the two moralities across issues.

Thus, two predictions can be made with regard to framing effects and open biconceptualism. First, a *susceptibility* hypothesis: open biconceptuals should be susceptible to framings in terms of either of the two parenting models. Second, a *generalizability* hypothesis: open biconceptuals should be affected by framings in terms of both moralities across different and seemingly unrelated issues.

While researchers acknowledge the importance and intuitive validity of Moral Politics Theory (e.g., Bar-Lev, 2007; Deason & Gonzales, 2012; Skitka & Bauman, 2008), there are to date no experimental tests of the above predictions.

First, there is no experimental evidence yet that moral framings in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent morality result in short-term framing effects. As Deason and Gonzales (2012) observe, “to date there have been no experimental studies of the influence of Nurturant Parent versus Strict Father strategies for framing arguments” (p. 265). Studies 5 and 6 constitute the first direct test of this prediction and show that moral framings in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent values in fact produce framing effects (this investigation is restricted to short-term framing effects; investigation into the long-term effects of such framings lay well beyond the scope of this research).

Second, while there is initial evidence for morality-dependent framing effects (Feinberg & Willer, 2012), there is to date no empirical test of the prediction that biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, are susceptible to moral framing in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent values. Studies 5 and 6 were conducted to test this prediction. The results confirm the susceptibility hypothesis for biconceptuals, and in addition provide further support for morality-dependent framing effects.

Third, while there is initial evidence that moral framing effects span across larger sets of issues (Feinberg & Willer, 2012, unpublished manuscript), there is to date no empirical test of the prediction that strict-father and nurturant-parent framings affect the reasoning of biconceptuals across different and seemingly unrelated issues. Studies 5 and 6 examined this possibility. The results confirm the generalizability hypothesis for strict-father and nurturant-parent framings.

Finally, while there is initial support for the notion of open political biconceptualism (Swift, 2009), it to date remained unknown how many people fall into this category. Study 5 and 6 found that 27% of the participants (86 out of 143) classified as open biconceptuals.

2. Studies 5 and 6: Biconceptualism and moral framing effects

Since the strict-father and nurturant-parent models are independent dimensions, it is possible for individuals to strongly endorse both models in their reasoning about ideal family life. Since the two models conflict with each other and are mutually inhibitory, people may apply them to politics at different points in time, but never at the same time (see Lakoff, 2006a, 2008 for a detailed discussion). According to Moral Politics Theory, these individuals are “biconceptual”: they are open to reasoning about certain political issues in terms of either strict-father or nurturant-parent values, and in turn endorse both models in their reasoning about ideal parenting.

In fact, a look at the data from Studies 1, 2, and 3 reveals that an average of 24% of the participants (177 out of 744) scored above the midpoint on both dimensions. Those indi-

viduals simultaneously endorse both parenting models to a sufficient extent, and are thus classifiable as biconceptuals. Taking into account that ideal parenting models map onto political stances, it is likely that these biconceptuals are torn between taking liberal and conservative stances on political issues (assuming an “open” biconceptualism). These biconceptuals should demonstrate less hardened political attitudes, being open to reason about a given political issue in terms of either strict-father and nurturant-parent values. In other words, open biconceptuals should be particularly susceptible to persuasive political messages from either side of the political spectrum, especially when these arguments cater to either their strict-father family or nurturant-parent ideals.

Studies 5 and 6 tested the unique malleability of biconceptuals with regard to their political attitudes. In Study 5, participants were exposed to either an anti-immigration argument framed in terms of strict-father morality or a pro-immigration argument framed in terms of nurturant-parent morality. Similarly, in Study 6, participants were exposed to either an argument favoring harsh punishment for criminals framed in terms of strict-father morality or an argument favoring rehabilitation of criminals framed in terms of nurturant-parent morality. It was hypothesized that the divergent issue framings in each study should be particularly persuasive to participants who are biconceptual on the two issues. At the same time, divergent framing of the two issues in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent values should yield no effect on the attitudes of non-biconceptuals, since their political stances are more hardened. Since Studies 5 and 6 encompass two divergent, and seemingly unrelated political issues – namely, crime and immigration – they also served as a test of the generalizability hypothesis.

2.1. Study 5: The issue of immigration

In Study 5, participants were exposed to either an anti-immigration argument framed in terms of strict-father morality or a pro-immigration argument framed in terms of nurturant-parent morality. It was hypothesized that biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, would be susceptible to framing effects based on the two moral framings.

Method

Participants: One hundred and thirty-one participants (64 male, 67 female), recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, took part in Study 5 in exchange for a modest payment. As in the previous studies, an attention check item was included. Four participants failed this attention check measure. They were removed from all analyses, leaving a final sample of 127 participants.

Procedure: After completing a demographic questionnaire, participants completed the Moral Politics Family questionnaire used in Studies 1 through 3. Once again, the reliability for each of the dimensions was high ($\alpha_{\text{strict-father}} = .84$; $\alpha_{\text{nurturant-parent}} = .85$), and the correlation between the two dimensions was minimal and non-significant ($r = .07$). Participants were told that they would read a short paragraph and afterward answer some questions. Participants were randomly assigned to either the anti-immigration or pro-immigration argument.

Participants in the strict-father condition read the following text:

“Illegal aliens are lawbreakers who are immoral and do not share our values. They are invading our nation and take jobs and use resources that should go to citizens. They are therefore undermining the stability of our society and are a threat to the well-being of the country. Values that are alien to the United States can spread as illegal immigration increases. Illegal aliens want to benefit from what others in our nation have accomplished while they are not morally pure enough to build a prosperous nation themselves.”

Participants in the nurturant-parent condition read the following text:

“Immigrants have traditionally come to our nation to seek shelter from social and economic hardship, to work hard and become part of the fabric of the United States. Immigrants with or without documents are quite often doing work that in most cases Americans cannot or do not want to do but needs to be done. They contribute to the lifestyles of our citizens and to our businesses. Because of that contribution they should be treated with respect and given the benefits that all contributors to our country have earned.”

Following this manipulation, participants completed the Attitudes Toward Immigration Scale (ATIS; Kain, Rojas, & Hovey, 1995; Hovey, Rojas, Kain, & Magana, 2000) which is a 10-item measure gauging how positively participants view immigrants. Participants responded to each item using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Once participants had completed this questionnaire, the study was over.

Biconceptuals selection: To determine which participants sufficiently endorsed both the strict-father and nurturant-parent model, and therefore could be classified as biconceptuals, participants' scores on the strict-father and nurturant-parent family dimensions of the Moral Politics Family Scale were split at the median ($SF_{\text{median}} = 4.47$; $NP_{\text{median}} = 5.50$). Participants scoring above the median on both subscales were considered to be biconceptuals ($n = 38$); all other participants were classified as “non-biconceptuals” ($n = 89$).

Results

To examine whether the divergent framings of the immigration issue affected biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, in their political attitudes, a 2 (pro-immigration versus anti-immigration) x 2 (biconceptual versus non-biconceptual) ANOVA was conducted, entering scores on the ATIS as the dependent variable. This analysis yielded a non-significant main effect of biconceptualism, $F(1, 123) < 1$, $p = .77$ and a significant main effect of message condition, $F(1, 123) = 4.50$, $p < .05$. An examination of the means revealed that participants presented with the anti-immigration message demonstrated more negative attitudes toward immigration, $M = 2.44$, than participants in the pro-immigration message condition, $M = 2.18$. However, there was a significant interaction, $F(1, 123) = 4.20$, $p < .05$, demonstrating that the messages influenced biconceptuals' attitudes, $M_{\text{pro}} = 2.58$ versus $M_{\text{anti}} = 2.08$, $F(1, 36) = 6.00$, $p < .05$, but not non-biconceptuals' attitudes, $M_{\text{pro}} = 2.29$ versus $M_{\text{anti}} = 2.30$, $F(1, 87) < 1$, $p = .95$ (see Figure 5).




Figure 5. Effects of strict-father and nurturant-parent framings of the immigration issue on biconceptuals and non-biconceptuals.

2.2. Study 6: The issue of crime

The goal of Study 6 was to conceptually replicate the findings of Study 5, testing whether biconceptual participants are susceptible to persuasive political messages regarding a different political issue, namely, crime.

Method

Participants: Two hundred participants (73 male, 116 female), recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, took part in Study 6 in exchange for a modest payment. As in the previous studies, an attention check item was included. Nine participants failed this attention check measure. They were removed from all analyses, leaving a final sample of 191 participants.

Procedure: The study design mirrored the design of Study 5. Participants first completed the Moral Politics Family Scale ($\alpha_{\text{strict-father}} = .86$; $\alpha_{\text{nurturant-parent}} = .81$). Participants were told that they would read a short paragraph and afterward answer some questions. Participants were randomly assigned to either a punishment or rehabilitation argument.

Participants in the strict-father condition read the following text:

“People that break the law are immoral. A crime must always be punished severely and swiftly; it is better to punish once too often than once too little. Painful punishment is just, and it is the only way to balance the moral books: if you can’t do the time, don’t do the crime; it’s an eye for an eye. Lawbreakers are a bad influence on society. They must be separated from the rest of us because their naturally bad character and criminal inclinations may spread. We must keep criminals imprisoned and treat them harshly.”

Participants in the nurturant-parent condition read the following text:

“The reasons why people commit crimes are usually very complex and can often be traced to the fabric of our society: poverty, poor education, and little chance to find a job are all causes that contribute to crime. Many criminals are essentially – or at least potentially – good people who found themselves in unfortunate circumstances. They will ultimately return to society and their experience should make them better, not worse citizens. Community service is a better way to help non-violent lawbreakers to find their way back onto the right path. By contributing to the community they will gain respect and integrate themselves into society. Criminals are citizens and have rights and deserve to be treated with human dignity.”

Following this manipulation, participants completed a crime attitudes scale (Cullen, Clark, Cullen, & Mathers, 1985), which measures attitudes toward both rehabilitation and punishment of criminals. The 9-item rehabilitation subscale measures the extent to which participants view rehabilitation as important and legitimate (e.g., “The only effective and humane cure of the crime problem in America is to make a concerted effort to rehabilitate criminals”; “The rehabilitation of adult criminals just does not work” (reverse scored); $\alpha = .93$). The 6-item punitiveness subscale gauges individuals’ support for punishing offenders (e.g., “Criminals deserve to be punished because they have harmed society”; “Punishing criminals is the only way to stop them from engaging in more crimes in the future”; $\alpha = .83$). Participants responded to items on both subscales using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The rehabilitation subscale was scored so that higher scores represented more positive attitudes toward the rehabilitation of criminals; the punitiveness subscale was scored so that higher scores represented more support for punishment of criminals. Once participants had completed these measures, the study was over.

Biconceptuals selection: Following the selection procedure used in Study 5, participants who scored above the median on both the strict-father and nurturant-parent family subscales were classified as biconceptuals ($SF_{\text{median}} = 4.73$; $NP_{\text{median}} = 5.50$). Overall, the sample consisted of 48 biconceptuals and 143 non-biconceptuals.

Results

To examine whether the divergent framings of the crime issue affected biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, in their political attitudes, a 2(punishment versus rehabilitation message) x 2(biconceptual versus non-biconceptual) ANOVA was conducted. Entering scores on the punitiveness subscale yielded an unpredicted main effect of biconceptualism, $F(1, 187) = 9.61, p < .01$, a non-significant effect of message condition, $F(1, 187) = 2.42, p = .12$, and the predicted significant interaction, $F(1, 87) = 3.83, p = .05$. An examination of the unpredicted main effect of biconceptualism revealed that biconceptual participants scored higher on punitiveness, $M = 3.41$, than non-biconceptuals, $M = 3.02$. Even so, the pattern of results for the interaction was in the hypothesized direction. While there was no significant difference due to message condition for non-biconceptuals, $M_{\text{punishment}} = 3.00$ versus $M_{\text{rehabilitation}} = 3.05, F(1, 186) < 1, p = .69$, there was a significant difference due to condition for biconceptuals, $F(1, 186) = 4.12, p < .05$. Namely, biconcep-

tuals in the punishment condition scored higher on punitiveness support, $M = 3.64$, than their counterparts in the rehabilitation condition, $M = 3.19$ (see Figure 6).

A second factorial ANOVA, entering scores on the rehabilitation scale, likewise yielded an unexpected main effect of biconceptualism, $F(1, 187) = 7.12, p < .01$, a non-significant effect of message condition, $F(1, 187) = 1.66, p = .20$, and a marginally significant interaction, $F(1, 187) = 3.48, p = .06$. A comparison of rehabilitation scale scores for biconceptuals and non-biconceptuals revealed that biconceptual participants scored significantly lower, $M = 3.17$, than non-biconceptuals, $M = 3.52$. However, the interaction yielded the hypothesized pattern of means: the messaging condition did not significantly effect non-biconceptuals' rehabilitation attitudes, $M_{\text{punishment}} = 3.56$ versus $M_{\text{rehabilitation}} = 3.48, F(1, 186) < 1, p = .56$, but there was a marginally significant difference due to messaging condition for biconceptuals, $F(1, 186) = 3.32, p = .07$. This reveals that biconceptuals in the rehabilitation condition tended to support rehabilitation more, $M = 3.38$, than biconceptuals in the punishment condition, $M = 2.96$.




Figure 6. Effects of strict-father and nurturant-parent framings of the crime issue on biconceptuals and non-biconceptuals.

2.3. Discussion

In line with Moral Politics Theory, the results of Studies 5 and 6 establish that strict-father and nurturant-parent framings of political issues can significantly affect people's political attitudes. Moreover, Studies 5 and 6 (as well as Studies 1, 2, and 3) show that a portion of the population is biconceptual, endorsing both the strict-father and nurturant-parent model in its reasoning about ideal parenting. As a result, these biconceptuals are less hardened in their political attitudes and more susceptible to political persuasion. Specifically, since they endorse two divergent models of ideal parenting, and are open to apply both models to the realm of politics, biconceptuals were found to be susceptible to moral frames in terms of either strict-father or nurturant-parent morality (indicating an open biconceptualism). The same does not hold true for non-biconceptuals. Non-biconceptuals, who scored high on *either* strict-father *or* nurturant-parent morality, were found to be immune to moral framings that did not align with their morality. Somewhat surprisingly, non-biconceptuals who were exposed to a framing in alignment with their morality were also not significantly affected. At second glance, this may be explained by

a ceiling effect. That is, participants who already strongly endorsed a given morality *and* a given issue position simply could not endorse them any more. For example, presenting a non-biconceptual who endorses strict-father morality and is against immigration with an anti-immigration argument framed in terms of strict-father values may simply mean to be “preaching to the choir”. The results from Studies 5 and 6 thus support the susceptibility hypothesis for moral framing. Furthermore, Studies 5 and 6 show that biconceptuals are susceptible to framings in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality with regard to multiple and seemingly unrelated issues, such as immigration and crime. This finding supports the generalizability hypothesis for moral framing.¹²

Implications for elite-to-citizen communication: Studies 5 and 6 showed that moral frames in line with strict-father or nurturant-parent values exert a significant influence on the political attitudes of biconceptuals. This finding has important implications for elite-to-citizen communication and political persuasion, which must briefly be discussed.

A major concern of politicians is to persuade the political “middle” – undecided voters, moderates, independents, and swing-voters. Common wisdom amongst political strategists is that in order to persuade the “middle”, politicians must move towards their opponents in terms of their policies and communication. That is, they must engage issues and arguments of their opponents as much as possible in order to reach the people who are situated “to the left” or “to the right” of their own group. This strategy commonly implies an adaptation of the moral argumentation of one’s opponent. However, the results of Studies 5 and 6 render this strategy not just obsolete, but counterproductive. As Lakoff (1996, 2004, 2008) pointed out, engaging the moral arguments of one’s political opponent invokes his or her morality in the minds of biconceptuals. That is, if a liberal politician argues in terms of strict-father values, he or she will evoke strict-father morality in the minds of biconceptuals – and thereby unwillingly move them *to the right*. Likewise, if a conservative politician argues in terms of nurturant-parent values, he or she will evoke nurturant-parent morality in the minds of biconceptuals – and thereby unwillingly move them *to the left*. Studies 5 and 6 support this prediction of Moral Politics Theory. They suggest that politicians are, in fact, best advised to make arguments that align with the moral worldview they endorse. This observation becomes even more relevant when considering findings like those by Nelson and Garst (2005), who observed that the persuasiveness of value-based arguments decreases when a speaker draws on values that do not match his or her moral identity and the audience’s pre-held beliefs about his or her values.

3. Open questions for future research

The objective of the present studies was to test whether moral framings in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality result in framing effects, whether those ef-

¹² However, while Studies 5 and 6 found that 32% of the participants were open biconceptuals when it came to the issues of immigration and crime, it remains an open question whether those biconceptuals are also open to endorse the two parenting models with regard to other issue areas, such as abortion, the economy, education, or public health care.

fects are restricted to biconceptuals, and whether they span across different issues. However, Chapter 5 and 6 raised a number of important theoretical questions that lay beyond the scope of the present investigation. These will be discussed below.

3.1. Persuading partisans

In their studies of partisan persuasion, Feinberg and Willer (2012, unpublished manuscript) showed that moral framing effects are not just morality-dependent, but that moral frames can furthermore persuade partisans to take on positions they traditionally oppose. For example, the authors were able to bring conservatives to embrace pro-environmental policies when the issue was framed in terms of the conservative moral concern with purity (Feinberg & Willer, 2012). The present studies did not encompass such a test of partisan persuasion. It is conceivable, though, that morality-aligned framings in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality can persuade partisans to endorse positions they habitually oppose. This will be an interesting line for future research.

3.2. Moral frames and implicit cognition

In Section 4.5 of Chapter 5, three hypotheses were formulated with regard to moral frames: they should be maximally implicit, they should be highly generalizable, and their effects should be morality-dependent. In Studies 5 and 6, two of these hypotheses were tested, namely the generalizability hypothesis and the susceptibility hypothesis. A test of the implicitness hypothesis lies well outside of the scope of this investigation, but it poses interesting questions for future research. One obvious question is whether framing effects associated with morality-specific attitude frames differ from moral frames with regard to implicitness. Are people more likely to detect content of the first as a basis of their political judgments, and are they less likely to do so when it comes to the latter? Such predictions would tentatively be supported by research on implicit moral cognition (e.g., Haidt, 2011; Nosek et al., 2010) and implicit metaphoric cognition as a basis of moral judgments (e.g., Lakoff, 1996; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011).

3.3. Frame types and cognitive impact

In Section 4 of Chapter 5, four framing types were distinguished: generic issue, generic value, morality-specific attitude, and moral frames. Since framing literature has previously not distinguished these four types, we know little about possible differences in their implications for political cognition. However, some probable implications were laid out in Section 4, and since the present research was concerned with moral frames, those were at the center of that discussion. While this general discussion of framing types sufficed for the purposes of the present studies, some important questions for future research were raised. For example, one might predict that moral frames exert a stronger influence on political judgments than the other three framing types, as they are maximally relevant to people's (implicit) everyday reasoning about right and wrong. In addition, while moral frames should lead to morality-dependent framing effects across a set of highly divergent political issues, morality-specific attitude frames should be more restricted in their applicability (and remain confined to specific issue areas).

3.4. Biconceptualism and moral language adaptation

As discussed in Chapter 5, frames that implement values can result in moral language adaptation. As Brewer (2002) and Brewer and Gross (2005) showed, framings of issues such as gay rights or school vouchers in terms of certain values can result in the adaptation of those values in subsequent issue discussions. Moral framing, thus, may bring values to the fore of people's reasoning *and* discourse. This finding raises an interesting question with regard to Moral Politics Theory. Namely, are biconceptuals *more* likely than non-biconceptuals to adapt morality-specific language after exposure to either strict-father or nurturant-parent frames? Furthermore, do non-biconceptuals ever adapt moral language from issue framings that are not aligned with their morality?

3.5. Metaphoric moral framing

In Section 3.1. of Chapter 5, three common types of emphasis framing were discussed, namely grammatical, metaphoric, and explicit emphasis framing. Studies 5 and 6 constituted cases of explicit emphasis framing. Future investigation could test the effects of metaphoric emphasis framings in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent values for moral political cognition. For example, one could introduce subtle changes in metaphoric wording to, say, pro-immigration and anti-immigration arguments, and test for framing effects among biconceptuals.

3.6. Range of effects of issue framings

Since moral frames activate larger moral worldviews in people's minds, the question arises whether moral framings of one specific issue might affect people's reasoning beyond that issue. For example, a framing of the issue "abortion" in terms of strict-father values will activate the strict-father worldview in people's mind. Once this worldview is activated, via the framing of the abortion issue, will people embrace conservative positions not just with regard to abortion, but furthermore with regard to other issues? The present research did not test this possibility, but it points to an interesting line of future investigations.

Conclusion

This research set out to provide a comprehensive empirical test of three principal components of Moral Politics Theory (Lakoff, 1996).

First, it examined the internal consistency, conceptual independence and predictive power for conservatism and liberalism of the strict-father and nurturant-parent models.

Second, it investigated the mediating role that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor plays for the application of the two parenting models to politics. Furthermore, through an experimental study, it provided evidence that an active endorsement of this metaphor may increase the usage of family values in political judgments.

Third, it examined framing effects associated with the strict-father and nurturant-parent model. The hypothesis was formulated that biconceptualism (Lakoff, 1996) may take on the form of open biconceptualism, that open biconceptuals are especially vulnerable to issue framings in terms of strict-father or nurturant-parent values, and that this phenomenon applies across political issues.

Specifically, Studies 1 and 2 tested the internal consistency, conceptual independence, and predictive power of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model for conservatism and liberalism. Since the two models are highly complex, they were dissected into their moral subcomponents. This led to 36 subcomponents for the strict-father model and 30 subcomponents for the nurturant-parent model. Those subcomponents accurately mirror the nature of the two models (Lakoff, personal communication, November 11, 2010). A Moral Politics Family Scale was created, with a strict-father subscale (15 items) and nurturant-parent subscale (14 items). The statistical analyses showed that the two scales have high degrees of inter-item correlations and internal consistency, and represent unified concepts. Furthermore, it revealed that the two models are minimally overlapping, thus constituting independent modes of reasoning. Finally, scores on the Moral Politics Family Scale reliably predicted conservatism and liberalism.

In sum, Studies 1 and 2 support Moral Politics Theory's predictions that the strict-father and nurturant-parent models are unified and independent belief systems (that is, belief systems that are not defined in terms of each other), as well as the prediction that the two models predict conservatism and liberalism, respectively.

Studies 3 and 4 investigated the role of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor for moral political reasoning. In Study 3, the metaphor's mediating role for political judgment was tested; in Study 4, possible effects of an increase in metaphor endorsement were examined. Study 3 tested whether the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor plays a mediating role in political reasoning. A Moral Politics Nation Scale was created, which was modeled directly after the Moral Politics Family Scale. This new scale gauged participants' beliefs about ideal governance *in terms of* the two family models. The Moral Politics Nation Scale was found to mediate the relationship between ideal parenting models, as measured by the Moral Politics Family Scale, and political attitudes, suggesting that people in fact map their beliefs about ideal parenting onto their understanding of ideal national governance, which in turn steers their political attitudes. Study 4 tested whether the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor's impact on moral political reasoning might be increased when people were brought to overtly endorse the metaphor. In an experimental design, participants were encouraged to either engage or disengage the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor. Encourage-

ment to engage the mapping led participants to embrace their conservative and liberal beliefs more strongly.

In sum, Studies 3 and 4 support Moral Politics Theory's predictions that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor mediates political reasoning in terms of idealized family values.

Studies 5 and 6 examined whether linguistic issue framings in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model result in short-term framing effects. Based on Lakoff's (1996, 2008) description of biconceptualism, which denotes endorsement of both parenting models in political reasoning, a new hypothesis was formulated. Namely, it was hypothesized that some biconceptuals may be open to applying either model to one and the same issue. This phenomenon, which was coined "open" biconceptualism, stands in contrast to the biconceptualism observed by Lakoff (1996, 2008), in which people apply one model to one specific set of issues and the other to another specific set of issues (this kind of biconceptualism was, thus, coined "bound" biconceptualism).

It was hypothesized that open biconceptuals are especially malleable in their political attitudes, that is, they should show short-term framing effects: issue framings in terms of strict-father morality should shift them toward conservative stances; issue framings in terms of nurturant-parent morality should shift them toward liberal stances. This prediction was embedded in a larger *susceptibility* hypothesis, which stated that moral issue framings should only affect those individuals whose morality they align with (formulated after general observations from prior framing research, and especially from findings by Feinberg & Willer, 2012 and unpublished manuscript). Furthermore, a *generalizability* hypothesis was formulated, which predicted that accordant short-term framing effects should span across issues, since moral framings address overarching worldviews that unify morally motivated positions on diverse issues.

Studies 5 and 6 tested all those predictions in an experimental design. Participants were exposed to strict-father and nurturant-parent framings of the issues immigration (Study 5) and crime (Study 6). Biconceptualism was measured via endorsement of the two Moral Politics Family subscales: participants who endorsed both models above the mean were classified as biconceptual. Biconceptuals, but not non-biconceptuals, were significantly affected by moral framings in terms of the two moralities, that is, they showed short-term framing effects. This confirmed the general susceptibility hypothesis, and it confirmed the hypothesis of open biconceptualism (32% of the participants were open biconceptuals). Furthermore, these framing effects occurred with regard to both the issues immigration and crime. This confirmed the generalizability hypothesis (with regard to the two different and seemingly unrelated issues immigration and crime).

As for the general occurrence of biconceptualism, Studies 1 through 3 revealed an average of 24% of participants as biconceptual; whether those biconceptuals were "open" or "bound" is unknown, as their attitude malleability was not tested.

In sum, Studies 5 and 6 confirmed Moral Politics Theory's prediction that linguistic framings in terms of strict-father and nurturant-parent morality can exert a causal effect on political reasoning. Specifically, they showed that short-term framing effects occur, that those effects are systematically limited to individuals who endorse a given morality, and that they span across political issues. Moreover, Studies 5 and 6 confirmed the hypothesis of open biconceptualism and showed that a substantial part of the participants, namely 32%, were open biconceptuals (with regard to the hot-button issues of immigra-

tion and crime).

In addition to this comprehensive test of Moral Politics Theory's principle components in a series of six studies, Chapters 3 and 5 provided a detailed account of the cognitive mechanisms that allow for the exponent role that the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor as well as framings in terms of moral worldviews can play for political reasoning.

Chapter 3 started out by discussing the relevance of conceptual metaphors for people's everyday reasoning, language, and decision-making. Then, studies were reviewed that speak to the firm grasp that conceptual metaphors have on people's political judgment. The question was raised what attributes may contribute to the availability and cognitive impact of metaphoric mappings, and four attributes were identified: source domain familiarity, semantic specificity, and categorization level, as well as structural alignment between source and target domain. The NATION AS FAMILY metaphor was examined in terms of these attributes and compared to other common metaphors for nationhood and governance. It was argued that the NATION AS FAMILY and GOVERNANCE AS PARENTING mappings are in fact prime candidates when it comes to people's reasoning about moral governance. In conclusion, details of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor were discussed, such as its acquisition, its moral contestation, its applicability to politics, and its applicability beyond politics across a variety of domains of social interaction.

Chapter 5 began by discussing the strong influence that linguistic framings can exert on people's cognition, including their political cognition. To highlight the impact that language can have on political judgment, studies were reviewed that show how rather explicit framings, but also the most subtle changes in grammar or metaphoric wordings, can result in framing effects. Then, the role of values for the adaptation of issue framings was discussed. First, research that shows an intimate link between people's values and their susceptibility to frames was reviewed. Next, it was observed that past framing research lacked a sufficient distinction between different types of frames that "speak to values". To close this theoretical gap, a typology was introduced that distinguishes *generic issue*, *generic value*, *morality-specific attitude*, and *moral frames*. The nature of moral frames was discussed in detail and predictions were formulated with regard to implicitness, susceptibility, and generalizability.

As described in the discussion sections of Studies 1 through 6, this research raised a number of questions that lay well beyond the scope of the current investigation. Some of these are briefly recapped below before turning to some larger-scale questions for future research.

Studies 1 and 2

The discussion of Studies 1 and 2 drew attention to the fact that while the strict-father and nurturant-parent models encompass four belief types (*moral traits*, *moral parenting*, *child nature beliefs*, and *world beliefs*), and while those formed part of two unified and distinct belief systems, only two of the belief types made it into the final, shortened Moral Politics Family Scale. Those were beliefs about moral traits and moral parenting. As stated

above, such beliefs may arguably be the most central to people's reasoning about ideal parenting and governance, and thus be the strongest predictors of conservative and liberal attitudes. However, it remains an interesting question whether a scale that was concerned with maintaining the highest possible diversity of belief types would also predict conservatism and liberalism. If not, the four belief types may simply differ with regard to their centrality for moral cognition. For example, it may be the case that despite the fact that all four belief types form part of the two moral worldviews, child nature and world beliefs are more peripheral to moral political judgment in terms of family models, while moral traits and moral parenting beliefs take center stage.

Furthermore, Studies 1 and 2 found that 21% of the participants endorsed neither the strict-father nor the nurturant-parent model. This points to two possible explanations: First, it may be the case that some people simply do not rely on moral concerns in their political reasoning. While such an explanation would contradict findings about the strong influence that morality exerts on political attitudes (e.g., Feldman, 1988; Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Graham et al., 2009; Kinder, 1998; Lakoff, 1996, 2006a, 2008; Skitka & Bauman, 2008), it must at least be considered. Second, and maybe more likely, it might be the case that people who endorse neither the strict-father nor the nurturant-parent model nonetheless resort to idealized family models when making political judgments, such as an abusive, neglectful, laissez-faire, or indulgent parenting model.

Studies 3 and 4

The discussion of Studies 3 and 4 pointed to a number of open questions with regard to the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor's implications for political reasoning and discourse. For example, while the metaphor has been observed to frequently surface in elite-to-citizen discourse (Cienki, 2005a; see also Johansen, 2007), there is to date no account of the frequency with which this metaphor occurs in citizen discourse. Furthermore, while Studies 3 and 4 show that the metaphor mediates political cognition in terms of family values, it was not examined whether and to what extent people are conscious of this mechanisms. Research in the cognitive sciences would predict the mapping process to largely lie outside of people's awareness (e.g., Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011), but this prediction to date lacks empirical verification.

Furthermore, Chapter 3 raised a number of important theoretical questions, which were not tested in Studies 3 and 4. These relate to source and target domain attributes, such as the concrete versus abstract nature of target domains, source domain familiarity, semantic specificity, and categorization level, and structural parallelism between source and target domains.

For example, the by far largest number of empirical studies on metaphoric cognition examines metaphors that constitute concrete-abstract mappings (e.g., Casasanto, 2008; Crawford et al., 2006; Jostmann et al., 2009; Landau et al., 2009; Meier et al., 2007; Moeller et al., 2008; Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; Schubert, 2005; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011), and only a few studies examined concrete-concrete mappings (e.g., Williams & Bargh, 2008, 2010). This imbalance may well be due to the fact the two mapping types are usually not distinguished in metaphor research. Future research should investigate the possibility that the different nature of these mapping types may infer different impacts on cognition. Similarly, while basic-level categorization has been extensively studied in the

cognitive sciences (e.g., Berlin & Kay, 1969; Berlin et al., 1974; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1977, 1978; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) the question of whether metaphors that draw on basic-level source domains impact cognition in special ways has never been asked. Could it be the case that basic-level source domains are “optimal” source domains for cognition, including political cognition? For example, could it be the case that basic-level source domains are used with the highest frequency in public discourse? And do they bear stronger impacts on cognition; for example, do they result in stronger metaphoric priming and framing effects? Future research on metaphoric cognition should ask these questions.

Somewhat similar questions arise with regard to the semantic specificity of source domains and the structural parallelism between source and target domains. For example, do low-level mappings, which have a high degree of semantic specificity, result in stronger framing effects than higher-level mappings, which have a lower degree of semantic specificity? Likewise, do mappings that offer a high degree of structural parallelism between source and target domain lead to stronger metaphoric framing effects than mapping with a low degree of such parallelism?

Another important question was raised in the discussion of Studies 3 and 4. Namely, the possibility that the conservative moral worldview, such as described in Moral Politics Theory, may lead to what might best be called a conservative “metaphor advantage”. Specifically, the strict-father and nurturant-parent model profile different metaphors for morality, but while the metaphors highlighted in the nurturant-parent model are not used in everyday language, many of those highlighted in the strict-father model are. Furthermore, some of the metaphors at the core of the strict-father model draw on experiential source domains that have been shown to exert an exceptionally strong influence on people’s moral judgment, such as the MORALITY IS PURITY and IMMORALITY AS CONTAGIOUS DISEASE metaphors (e.g., Cannon, Robert, Schnall, & White, 2011; Eskine, Kaciniak, & Prinz, 2011; Lee & Schwarz, 2010, 2011; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008a; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008b; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). While the morality metaphors in both the strict-father and nurturant-parent model originate in direct, physical experiences with well-being, the strong linguistic entrenchment of those profiled in the strict-father worldview may make them a more potent means of persuasion: they are easily implemented in public discourse and their recurrent linguistic implementation in public discourse may strengthen them in people’s minds.

Finally, Chapter 3 discussed an aspect of the FAMILY source domain that was not tested in Studies 3 and 4. Namely, it brought up the issue of *moral alignment*. People resort to the FAMILY source domain to metaphorically reason about not just nationhood and governance, but also other domains of social interaction that imply authorities – such as education, workplaces, religious communities, and so on (Lakoff, 2008; see Jensen, 2009 and Swift, 2009 for complementary findings; see Ellison & Sherkat, 1993, Ellison et al., 1996 and Lienesch, 1991 for related findings). While biconceptuals may resort to different family models when reasoning about these social domains, those people who exclusively subscribe to only one model in their reasoning about ideal family life would be expected to apply the same set of family values across all those domains of social interaction. In short, their morality should be *aligned* across social domains. This notion stands in contrast to prominent assumptions in current ideology

and morality research, which commonly treat moral concerns within different social institutions as completely separate matters (e.g., Barker & Tinnick, 2006; Layman et al., 2007). Testing the prediction of moral alignment for non-biconceptuals will be an interesting line of future research.

Studies 5 and 6

The discussion of Studies 5 and 6 pointed to a number of important questions with regard to moral framing effects based on the strict-father and nurturant-parent model. For example, prior research on moral framing showed that moral frames can persuade partisans to endorse positions they traditionally oppose (Feinberg & Willer, 2012, unpublished manuscript). Studies 5 and 6 did not test whether the same holds true with regard to moral framings in terms of the strict-father and nurturant-parent model. However, one would predict such effects to occur: moral frames in alignment with strict-father or nurturant-parent values may persuade partisan conservatives and liberals, respectively, to endorse issue positions they traditionally oppose. Investigating this possibility would be an interesting line of future research.

Furthermore, Chapter 5 introduced a new frame typology that distinguishes between *generic issue*, *generic value*, *morality-specific attitude*, and *moral frames*. Since framing literature has previously not distinguished these four types, we know little about possible differences in their implications for political cognition. However, some such differences can be predicted. For example, it would be conceivable that moral frames exerted a stronger influence on political reasoning than the other framing types, as they are maximally relevant to people's everyday reasoning about right and wrong. Moreover, while moral frames should be maximally generalizable across issues, the same should not hold for morality-specific attitude frames, which should be restricted to specific issue areas. Finally, it was argued in Chapter 5 that moral frames ought to be highly implicit, and may conceivably be harder to detect than other frame types, such as, e.g., morality-specific attitude frames. Future research should put this hypothesis, which receives tentative support from research on implicit moral cognition (e.g., Haidt, 2011; Nosek et al., 2010), to the test.

Finally, the discussion of Studies 5 and 6 raised an important question about the range of moral framing effects. Studies 5 and 6 showed that linguistic framings of issues such as immigration and crime in terms of moral worldviews result in short-term framing effects among open biconceptuals. That is, open biconceptuals endorsed more conservative positions on both issues when exposed to a strict-father framing, and more liberal ones when exposed to a nurturant-parent framing. However, it remains an interesting question whether the activation of the two moral worldviews in people's minds would furthermore affect their attitudes toward *other* issues. Since moral frames evoke entire worldviews in people's minds, it is conceivable that exposure to, say, an anti-immigration argument in terms of strict-father values influences not just people's attitudes toward the issue at hand (immigration) but also toward other issues. This possibility points to an interesting line of future research.

Aside from the questions for future research that were briefly recapped above, some additional, larger-scale questions emerge from the present investigation. These will be dis-

cussed in conclusion below.

One important question that arises in relation to the present research is to what degree parenting trends in society may influence political trends over time, and vice versa. For example, a shift toward increasingly strict or nurturant parenting practices in society may result in a shift toward respectively more strict or nurturant ways of governance over time. However, the reverse is also conceivable. Namely, increasingly strict or nurturant political governance may result in increasingly strict or nurturant forms of parenting.

Next, the present research tested Moral Politics Theory's principle components by drawing on a US-American population. The question arises whether the findings can be replicated for other populations. For example, do people in European countries, such as Germany, Denmark, Italy, Spain, or Great Britain, endorse the strict-father and nurturant-parent model in their political reasoning? Do they equally rely on the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor when making political judgments in terms of the two parenting models? And do issue framings in terms of the two models lead to framing effects that are similar to the ones observed for the US population?

To investigate these questions, the Moral Politics Family Scale should be translated into several languages, and it should be tested whether its strict-father and nurturant-parent subscales are reliable predictors of respectively conservatism and liberalism in countries other than the US. Likewise, Studies 3 and 4, as well as Studies 5 and 6, should be conceptually replicated with non-US populations.

In gazing beyond the US, another important question arises. European countries such as Germany, Denmark, or Italy, consist of highly diverse multi-party systems. For instance, major parties in Germany include the Christian Conservatives, the Greens, the Social Democrats, the Libertarians, and the Left Party. An interesting question to ask is to what degree those parties endorse the strict-father and nurturant-parent belief system in their reasoning, and whether differences between these parties can be explained by different patterns of bound biconceptualism.

For example, is it the case that two parties exist that are mostly non-biconceptual, subscribing more or less exclusively to either the strict-father or nurturant-parent model, while other parties are largely biconceptual, applying one worldview to a specific set of issues and the other to another specific set of issues? For example, if one would find that, say, both the German Greens and Libertarians endorse the two family models in their reasoning about ideal family life and governance, then the differences between the two groups should lie in the application of the models to different issue areas. An investigation of the forms that such bound biconceptualism takes in multi-party systems would constitute an important line of future research.

However, another possibility comes to mind in considering the moral concerns of the highly diverse political groups that play a role in European multi-party systems (and beyond). Given the fact that parenting models come in more than two types, it may be the case that belief systems other than the strict-father and nurturant-parent model govern the attitudes of certain parties. Considering the prominent role that beliefs about ideal parenting seem to play for political cognition (see Studies 1 through 4, above), it is conceivable

that people endorse more than two parenting types as the basis of their political attitudes. For example, they may endorse abusive, neglectful, laissez-faire, or indulgent models in their reasoning about ideal parenting and, thus, their reasoning about ideal governance. For instance, it might be the case that a European social democratic party to part draws on an indulgent parenting model. Likewise, a European conservative party may to a certain extent draw on a laissez-faire parenting model. Questions such as these point to important lines of future research, and not just with regard to European politics. After all, Studies 1 and 2 found that 21% of the US-participants endorsed neither the strict-father nor the nurturant-parent model. Those participants were neither biconceptuals nor non-biconceptuals. Rather, they simply did not consider either of the two parenting models to be the “right kind of parenting”. Therefore, the question of how alternative parenting models may relate to political attitudes is a potentially important one, also with regard to the US.

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Appendix

A. Study 1: Strict-father and nurturant-parent items

Strict-father items

Self-discipline

Under no circumstances will I let my child become a quitter. (Positively keyed)

Children must understand early on in life: “No pain, no gain”. (Positively keyed)

Children should follow the exact same routine every day. (Positively keyed)

When children cry for no obvious reason, parents should insist that they stop crying. (Positively keyed)

It’s okay to let children quit activities if they are struggling with them. (Negatively keyed)

Self-reliance

Children should become financially independent as early as possible, even if their parents have enough money to support them. (Positively keyed)

Kids should learn it’s either swim or sink. (Positively keyed)

There’s no need for children to become financially independent as long as their parents have enough money to support them. (Negatively keyed)

Obedience

Children must obey their parents. (Positively keyed)

Parents should never tolerate children who disobey them. (Positively keyed)

Obedience must be instilled in children. (Positively keyed)

At times it’s okay for children to disobey their parents. (Negatively keyed)

In-group nurturance

While other people must not be one’s concern, within a family, everyone should look after each other. (Positively keyed)

Purity

Children shouldn’t be exposed to sex; it’ll corrupt their minds. (Positively keyed)

Children must be taught to resist impure thoughts. (Positively keyed)

Conventionality

A house must always be clean and tidy. (Positively keyed)

It’s important that parents lead a traditional lifestyle in order to set a good example for their children. (Positively keyed)

Gender roles

Children will benefit most if girls help out with household chores and boys help out with manly duties. (Positively keyed)

If my son wished for a doll I'd happily get one for him. (Negatively keyed)

Immoral self-indulgence

Children who are allowed to be self-indulgent will never amount to anything. (Positively keyed)

Life isn't fun, that's something children have to learn. (Positively keyed)

Immoral dependence

To teach children responsibility doesn't mean you have to teach them absolute self-reliance. (Negatively keyed)

Rule-enforcement

Children must be disciplined through strict rules at home. (Positively keyed)

It is important to set strict rules at home. (Positively keyed)

Children need to understand that rules are there to be followed, and that as a parent I will make sure of that. (Positively keyed)

Strict rule-enforcement is a crucial part of a parent's job. (Positively keyed)

Firm rule-enforcement isn't a crucial part of parenting. (Negatively keyed)

Interposing parenting

When children start to behave out of the norm, it's a parent's duty to immediately intervene and put the right ideas back in the child's mind. (Positively keyed)

It takes tough parenting to mold a child into a good member of society. (Positively keyed)

Good parenting is not about molding a child into a good member of society. (Negatively keyed)

Orderly behavior

Children must always be on time. (Positively keyed)

Tardiness in children must be punished severely. (Positively keyed)

It's fine for children to be tardy. (Negatively keyed)

Hierarchical communication

As long as I pay the bills my children will do as I say. (Positively keyed)

I will not have my child talk back to me. (Positively keyed)

Children should never question decisions their parents make. (Positively keyed)

Children should never challenge their parents' authority. (Positively keyed)

Parents don't have to explain themselves to their children. (Positively keyed)

It's okay if children talk back to their parents sometimes. (Negatively keyed)

Absolute parental authority

Children should only speak when they are spoken to. (Positively keyed)

Parents must break the will of rebellious children. (Positively keyed)

My children will often hear me say: "I don't like your tone". (Positively keyed)

When grownups talk children ought to be quiet. (Positively keyed)

Parents must not break the will of rebellious children. (Negatively keyed)

Absolute control

It's fine for children to have secrets and hide things from their parents. (Negatively keyed)

Consequences

If children make a wrong decision they must deal with the consequences by themselves. (Positively keyed)

Children shouldn't be forced to finish everything they put on their plate. (Negatively keyed)

Moral strength

When the going gets tough I won't let my child be a crybaby. (Positively keyed)

Children need to be disciplined in order to build character. (Positively keyed)

Reward

Children should only receive an allowance if they earned it. (Positively keyed)

Punishment

Children should be punished swiftly and severely enough to learn their lesson. (Positively keyed)

Spanking children who misbehave is in their own best interest. (Positively keyed)

If my children get bad grades there will be consequences. (Positively keyed)

Bad behavior in children must be punished sufficiently. (Positively keyed)

If children disobey their parents they should take away their allowance. (Positively keyed)

Children must be punished or they won't learn to behave. (Positively keyed)

Sometimes it's okay to let bad behavior in children go unpunished. (Negatively keyed)

Competition

My children should always play to win. (Positively keyed)

Teaching children competitiveness is not central to parenting. (Negatively keyed)

Retribution

Punishment should be painful enough for the child to not do it again. (Positively keyed)

If children get punched it's appropriate for them to punch back. (Positively keyed)

Punishment of children doesn't need to be painful. (Negatively keyed)

Performance-based fairness

The fairest way to treat children is to give siblings exactly what they deserve based on their behavior. (Positively keyed)

Giving children what they don't earn would be unfair to their siblings. (Positively keyed)

Children must be taught that people get what they deserve. (Positively keyed)

Tough-love nurturance

A firm hand is a sign of parental love. (Positively keyed)

"Tough love" is required to raise a child right. (Positively keyed)

Immoral unconditional nurturance

Parents shouldn't handicap their children by making their lives too easy. (Positively keyed)

Sometimes children have to suffer pain in order to grow, and parents should not interfere by soothing away that pain. (Positively keyed)

Giving children everything they want harms them. (Positively keyed)

Giving children things they don't deserve is bad because you take away their chance to earn them. (Positively keyed)

Giving children everything they want won't harm them. (Negatively keyed)

Immoral parental indulgence

A family's budget should be founded on the principle: A penny saved is a penny earned. (Positively keyed)

A family should never waste money on things children do not need. (Positively keyed)

A family must save as much money as possible. (Positively keyed)

A family's menu for children should consist of two choices: take it, or leave it. (Positively keyed)

Immoral lenience

Parents should never fail to punish. (Positively keyed)

It's better to punish bad behavior in children once too often than once too little. (Positively keyed)

When in doubt, parents should err on the side of lenience rather than strictness. (Negatively keyed)

Child born bad

One should always be suspicious of children's stories; they are good at making up excuses for their behavior. (Positively keyed)

Direct causation

When children succeed it's their own accomplishment, if they fail it's their own fault – it's as simple as that. (Positively keyed)

Good-evil dichotomy

Parents must teach their children that the world isn't just divided into good and evil. (Negatively keyed)

Moral essence

Even if certain children behave badly all the time that doesn't mean they're bad at heart. (Negatively keyed)

Spreading immorality

Evil is contagious; therefore I will not have my children socialize with bad kids. (Positively keyed)

Bad behavior spreads easily among children; that's why sometimes it's necessary to separate out "bad apples" from a group. (Positively keyed)

My children shouldn't play with bad kids or they'll start misbehaving themselves. (Positively keyed)

I don't want my children to be exposed to people with unconventional lifestyles; such things can be contagious. (Positively keyed)

It's okay for my children to be exposed to ideas I don't believe in and hold to be immoral. (Negatively keyed)

Moral order

Children need to learn the natural order of things: God above men, men above nature. (Positively keyed)

I want my children to socialize with kids from social classes above and below our own. (Negatively keyed)

Male authority

A father's word is law. (Positively keyed)

When it comes to family decisions "father knows best". (Positively keyed)

In a well-run family, the father decides. (Positively keyed)

Absolute social authority

It's no one's business what happens within families. (Positively keyed)

Sometimes it's necessary for outsiders to interfere with parental authority. (Negatively keyed)

System defense

I wouldn't want my child to be in close contact with grown ups that hold beliefs different from ours. (Positively keyed)

It's fine for my children to be around grownups who hold values different from mine; I'm not concerned that it will undermine my authority. (Negatively keyed)

Objective morality

Children cannot develop a moral compass unless people around them use the clear, sharp language of right and wrong. (Positively keyed)

Nurturant-parent items

Individual and social responsibility

Children should learn to understand other's needs and attend to them. (Positively keyed)

Children need to learn that "sometimes you have to put other people's needs before yours". (Positively keyed)

Tending to the needs of others is not a sign of responsibility in children. (Negatively keyed)

Nurturance

One must teach children to take care of their siblings; it's an important lesson for them to learn. (Positively keyed)

Siblings should be very caring towards each other as well as to others. (Positively keyed)

It's essential that parents teach their children to be sensitive to the needs of others. (Positively keyed)

Knowing how to care for others is not a central thing for a child to learn. (Negatively keyed)

In- and out-group nurturance

It's important for parents to teach their children to care about all people. (Positively keyed)

I would be proud of my children if they were to share their toys with other children they just met on the playground. (Positively keyed)

To teach children responsibility means to teach them how to care for themselves and others. (Positively keyed)

Children shouldn't feel obligated to care about the well being of people they do not know. (Negatively keyed)

Empathy

Good parents teach children to put themselves in other people's shoes. (Positively keyed)

Parents should foster empathy in their children. (Positively keyed)

Children must learn to see the world through other people's eyes. (Positively keyed)

It's essential that parents teach their children empathy towards others. (Positively keyed)

It's not critical for children to learn to take the perspective of others into account. (Negatively keyed)

Empathy-based tolerance

Children should learn to understand others and accept them for who they are. (Positively keyed)

Children must learn to empathize with others so that they will not be judgmental of them. (Positively keyed)

A child should learn to understand the viewpoints of children from other cultural or religious backgrounds. (Positively keyed)

Learning to understand others and accepting them for who they are is not important for children to learn. (Negatively keyed)

Cooperation

It is good to see children cooperate on projects. (Positively keyed)

Every member of a family should do his or her part in keeping the family running. (Positively keyed)

Parents and children should regularly cooperate, for example when preparing common activities. (Positively keyed)

Children shouldn't be encouraged to cooperate with each other. (Negatively keyed)

Cooperation over competition

Children should be encouraged to work with, not against each other. (Positively keyed)

I rather see my child play cooperatively than play competitively. (Positively keyed)

Children should be encouraged to work with, not against each other. (Positively keyed)

For a child, learning to cooperate isn't more important than learning to compete. (Negatively keyed)

Self-fulfillment

It is great to see children develop interests in things, whatever they may be. (Positively keyed)

Children should be encouraged to do what they enjoy doing. (Positively keyed)

Children will grow up to be happy adults if parents encourage them to follow their curiosity. (Positively keyed)

Parents should make the happiness and self-fulfillment of their children a priority. (Positively keyed)

Social bonds

Siblings should not lose contact with each other even after they left the house. (Positively keyed)

The ability to establish and nurture ties with all kinds of people is something I'd like to see in my child. (Positively keyed)

Personal best

Children should learn: Competition is about reaching their personal best, not beating others. (Positively keyed)

Mutual respect

There should be mutual respect between parents and children. (Positively keyed)

It's important for parents to respect their children. (Positively keyed)

It's not important for parents to respect children. (Negatively keyed)

Two-way communication

Families should have regular family conferences where everyone is involved in deciding common goals and guidelines for behavior. (Positively keyed)

It's important for children and their parents to have open communication. (Positively keyed)

Parents should take the opinions of their children into consideration. (Positively keyed)

Accountability

I want my children to understand the rationale behind decisions I make for them. (Positively keyed)

Parents should be transparent about decisions they make for their children. (Positively keyed)

It is not a bad thing that children should occasionally, and politely, challenge their parents. (Positively keyed)

It's not important for parents to explain to their children why they set certain rules and limits. (Negatively keyed)

Empathic nurturance

Parents must be able to understand the needs of their children by taking on their perspective. (Positively keyed)

In order to truly nurture children one needs to be empathic. (Positively keyed)

Children may think and feel very differently from parents, and it's a parent's job to understand them nonetheless. (Positively keyed)

If my child gained lots of weight I'd try to understand what the cause is rather than signal disapproval. (Positively keyed)

If my child wets the bed after a certain age I'd try to find out what is wrong rather than get angry with him. (Positively keyed)

Good parents need the ability to empathize. (Positively keyed)

It's a parents' job to know their children well. (Positively keyed)

Parents don't need to understand their children in order to take good care of them. (Negatively keyed)

It's not important for parents to be able to see the world as their children see it. (Negatively keyed)

Empowerment

Parents should make sure children's basic needs are met so that children can go out and explore the world without having to worry. (Positively keyed)

Parents should empower children as much as possible so that they may follow their dreams. (Positively keyed)

Exploration

Possibilities in life are endless; there is no such thing as one right path for a child to follow. (Positively keyed)

It's not okay for children to "wander off" and explore different possibilities in life. (Negatively keyed)

Need-based fairness

Siblings should receive parental support in accordance to their individual needs. (Positively keyed)

Parents should be especially attentive to those children who need it the most. (Positively keyed)

Even if some siblings seems to need more help than others parents should not give them more help. (Negatively keyed)

Unconditional love

A child must be sure of a parent's love, no matter what. (Positively keyed)

The love of a parent is unconditional. (Positively keyed)

When children have done something hurtful, instead of punishing them, parents should say: "No harm done, but I wish you would have done this differently". (Positively keyed)

Children should know that their parents might not always love them. (Negatively keyed)

Physical affection

It's important to show physical affection to one's children. (Positively keyed)

It's fine for children to sleep in the bed of their parents. (Positively keyed)

Non-punitive behavior regulation

It's extremely important that parents take pride in children when they do well. (Positively keyed)

Earning the pride of their parents truly motivates children to give their personal best. (Positively keyed)

Children can tell when their parents are disappointed, and it makes them try to do things better next time around. (Positively keyed)

Material rewards are better motivators for children to do well than showing pride. (Negatively keyed)

Immoral parental harm

It can sometimes be appropriate to slap or otherwise hurt a child. (Negatively keyed)

Protection against external harm

Parents should protect their children from harmful things, such as certain chemicals in toys. (Positively keyed)

When buying food, parents should keep an eye out for harmful ingredients. (Positively keyed)

It's not important for parents to keep strong cleaning products with potentially harmful chemicals out of the household. (Negatively keyed)

Restitution

If children hurt their siblings, to make up for it, they should do something nice for those they hurt. (Positively keyed)

If my children steal from other children, my children should make up for it by doing something nice for those they stole from. (Positively keyed)

Leading by example

It is not important for parents to guide children by example rather than dictate. (Negatively keyed)

Open guidance

"You have to figure out what's best for you" is an encouragement parents should often give their children. (Positively keyed)

Non-intrusive parenting

Parenting means nurturing the child's true nature. (Positively keyed)

Children should be allowed to eat without help, even if that means they'll make a big mess. (Positively keyed)

One should let kids be who they are. (Positively keyed)

Children should play any games they want, even if they don't seem to make much sense. (Positively keyed)

Children should not play fantasy games that don't make sense. (Negatively keyed)

Bonds with adult children

Grownups should always feel comfortable about asking their parents for advice and help. (Positively keyed)

Children born good

Parents should encourage the good behavior children naturally display. (Positively keyed)

Not every child is good by nature. (Negatively keyed)

Systemic causation

There are often complex reasons for children's misfortunes in life and it's not necessarily their fault. (Positively keyed)

Non-gendered authority

Parents should make family decisions together. (Positively keyed)

Gender isn't an important reason for dividing up parental duties. (Positively keyed)

B. Study 2: Policy items

1. Methods of birth control should not be available to teenagers between the ages of fourteen and sixteen.
2. Physician-assisted suicide should be legal.
3. People with high incomes shouldn't pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
4. The flood of illegal immigrants is a threat to the American way of life.
5. A pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion.
6. Private industry should be free to use our natural resources.
7. Marriage should be restricted to a man and a woman.
8. The government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private business.
9. The key to economic prosperity is a free and unregulated market.
10. Ways to prevent pregnancy should be available to teenagers between the ages of fourteen and sixteen.
11. If a patient with a painful disease requests his life be ended, then the physician should be allowed to help.
12. Wealthier individuals should contribute more towards the nation's resources than those less fortunate; they benefited most from our way of life and can afford to give a bit more back.
13. Undocumented workers contribute a lot to our society's resources and are the foundation of our economy.
14. When a woman reaches the decision to end her pregnancy, she should be able to do it.
15. The government should do more to protect our environment.
16. People who love each other should be allowed to marry regardless of gender.
17. The government should do more to solve our country's problems; through government, we should do together what we cannot do as well for ourselves.
18. It's not the government's moral obligation to ensure that all Americans have health care.

C. Study 3: Issue items

1. Taxes: Increase income taxes for wealthier Americans (couples making at least \$250,000 together, or individuals making \$200,000).
2. Health care: Overturn the federal legislation mandating that all Americans have health insurance.
3. Environmental policy: Pass federal legislation that taxes corporations for emitting carbon dioxide into the air (a carbon tax).
4. Gay marriage: Pass federal legislation making marriage between same-sex individuals legal.
5. Iran: Use military force (e.g., airstrikes) to force Iran to terminate its nuclear weapons program.
6. Abortion: Make having an abortion illegal (overturning Roe vs. Wade).
7. Immigration: Deport back to their home country all illegal immigrants living within the United States.
8. Welfare: Stop paying welfare to those who do not find a job after 6 months.
9. Military spending: Increase the amount of money spent on the military.